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BLACK BROOKLYN:

THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY, CLASS, AND GENDER

by

JOHN LOUIS FLATEAU

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

2005

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,

april 19, 2005
Date

John Mollenkopf
Prof. John Mollenkopf, Chair of Examining Committee

April 22, 2005
Date

Prof. Ruth O'Brien, Executive Officer

Supervisory Committee

Prof. Frances Fox Piven

Prof. Marilyn Gittell

Prof. Joyce Gelb

Prof. Philip Kasinitz

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

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Abstract

BLACK BROOKLYN: THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY, CLASS, AND GENDER

by

John Louis Flateau

Advisor: Professor John Mollenkopf

In the 1960s, Black urban communities moved from protest politics to the electoral arena. They made major strides in electing big city mayors with Black led, bi-racial coalitions including white liberals, Hispanics and other coalition partners. The study of this minority ascendancy to urban power in heavily Black and racially mixed cities is known as minority incorporation theory (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 2003). By the 1990s, research shifted to how these earlier bi-racial coalitions and mayoral regimes were sometimes supplanted by more centrist, business oriented, white led multi-racial coalitions, such as Richard J. Daley Jr. in Chicago; Rudolph Giuliani then Michael Bloomberg in New York; Ed Rendell in Philadelphia; and Richard Riordan then James Hahn in Los Angeles. With massive immigration and urban migration from the 1980s onward, Hispanics and Asians, and in New York City, West Indians as well, emerged as important voting blocs, swing voters, and highly mobile coalition partners.

This dissertation argues that in the 21st century study of urban politics, more attention should be paid to the internal dynamics of ethnicity, class and gender among Blacks, in order to better understand their own political development and their ability to coalesce with others. Black Brooklyn, and its two main ethnic groups of African Americans and West Indians, comprises the case study which explores this proposition.

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This research demonstrates how and why ethnicity, class and gender powerfully circumscribe Black Brooklyn's ability to consummate its own racial solidarity and pose a challenge to the pursuit of multiracial coalitions, a critical precondition for minority incorporation. This study tests the central hypothesis that Central Brooklyn's African Americans and West Indians have distinct patterns of ethnicity, class and gender which significantly drive their political behavior, both within and across their ethnic blocs, neighborhood concentrations and political districts. This study verifies that ethnicity, class and gender do matter, and they are statistically significant predictors of voter turnout and candidate choice in the politics of Black Brooklyn, particularly in municipal elections.

Thus ethnicity, class and gender should be taken into account when assessing racial group solidarity, minority incorporation, and multi-racial coalition building in the pursuit of urban power, more effective policy and decision making, and more responsive, representative and equitable governance.

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Preface

"The Good Shepherd"
PSALM 23

1 The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want.
2 He maketh me to lie down in green pastures:
he leadeth me beside the still waters.
3 He restoreth my soul:
he leadeth me in the paths of righteousness for his name's sake.
4 Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death,
I will fear no evil: for thou art with me;
thy rod and thy staff they comfort me.
5 Thou preparest a table before me
in the presence of mine enemies;
thou anointest my head with oil; my cup runneth over.
6 Surely goodness and mercy shall follow me
all the days of my life:
and I will dwell in the house of the Lord forever.

- *The Holy Bible,* King James Version

"For My People"

...For my people blundering and groping and floundering
in the dark of churches and schools and clubs and societies,
associations and councils and committees and conventions,
distressed and disturbed and deceived and devoured
by money-hungry glory-craving leeches,
preyed on by facile force of state
and fad and novelty,
by false prophet and holy believer;

...Let a new earth rise. Let another world be born.
Let a bloody peace be written in the sky. Let a second generation
full of courage issue forth; let a people loving freedom
come to growth. Let a beauty full of healing
and strength of final clenching be the pulsing in our spirits
and our blood. Let the martial songs be written,
let the dirges disappear.
Let a race of men now rise and take control.

- Margaret Walker
For My People, 1937

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Discourse with Walter Stafford, Wilbur Rich, Marion Orr, and Angelo Falcon; Bill Lynch, Jerry Hudson, Esmeralda Simmons, James Steele, Greg Mayers, William Boone and others inform my thinking. I have been blessed withassociations with elected and appointed officials and their staffs, white, Black, Hispanic and Asian, federal, state and local, business, professional, religious and non-profit. I thank them all for allowing me into their worlds.

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John Louis Flateau
April 2005

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1	- Black Brooklyn: The Politics of Ethnicity, Class, and Gender - Introduction, Literature Review, and Theoretical Framework	- 1
Chapter 2	- Black Brooklyn: A Political History, 1600's to 2005	- 29
Chapter 3	- The Census Demographics and Political Economy of Black Brooklyn: Ethnicity, Class, and Gender	- 102
Chapter 4	- African American and Caribbean Elites - Field Interviews: On Black Brooklyn, Politics, Ethnicity, Class, and Gender	- 183
Chapter 5	- Black Brooklyn: Voter Turnout, Candidate Choice, and the Significance of Ethnicity, Class, and Gender (WLS and Ecological Regression, and Spatial Analysis)	- 263
Chapter 6	- Black Brooklyn and 21st Century Urban Politics: Summary, Conclusions, and Future Prospects Ethnicity, Class, and Gender	- 308
Appendix	- A. Field Interview Questionnaire	- 338
	- B. List of Dependent Variables	- 342
	- C. Demographic Analysis Summary (Tables and Charts)	- 345
Bibliography		- 352
Autobiographical Statement		- 369

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List of Tables

Table 2.01	Brooklyn and Black Populations, 1698 - 2000	30
Table 3.01	US Foreign Born Population, 1970 – 2000	109
Table 3.02	West Indian and African Populations, US, NYS and NYC	109
Table 3.03	Selected West Indian Immigration to the US, 1961 – 1998	111
Table 3.04	Undocumented Immigrants: States & Countries of Origin, 1996	112
Table 3.05	Estimated Unauthorized West Indian Population in the US, 2000	113
Table 3.06	US Cities with 250,000 or more Blacks, 2000	114
Table 3.07	Central Brooklyn PUMAs – Black Ethnic Populations, 2000	115
Table 3.08	African American and West Indian Neighborhoods, 2000	117
Table 3.09	Black Neighborhood Population Changes, 1970-2000	125
Table 3.10a	AA Bed-Stuy & WI E. Flatbush – Demographic Comparison	130
Table 3.10b	AA Bed-Stuy & WI E. Flatbush – Demographic Comparison	132
Table 3.10c	Vital Statistics, 1990-1999, Nine Black Neighborhoods	137
Table 3.11	Black Brooklyn, Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP)	142
Table 3.12	Black Brooklyn Senior citizens CVAP by Sex	143
Table 3.13	African American and West Indian Home Ownership	144
Table 3.14	Ethnic Gaps for Married Couples & Female Headed Households	147
Table 3.15	West Indian & African American Households: with Seniors	148
Table 3.16	West Indian & African American Households: Under 18 yr. olds	149
Table 3.17	West Indian & African American Hosueholds: Grandchildren	149
Table 3.18	West Indian & African American Households: Subfamilies	150
Table 3.19	West Indian & African American Educational Attainment	151
Table 3.20	West Indian & African American Education: The Gender Gap	152
Table 3.21	African Americans & West Indians - Labor Force	156
Table 3.22	African Americans & West Indians - Labor Force by Gender	157
Table 3.23	African Americans & West Indians - Poverty Rates by Gender	158
Table 3.24	African Americans & West Indians - Personal Income	160
Table 3.25	African Americans & West Indians - Median Income by Gender	162
Table 3.26	African Americans & West Indians - Class of Workers	165
Table 3.27	African Americans & West Indians - Industry Sectors	166
Table 3.28	African Americans & West Indians – Occupational Categories	168
Table 3.29	African Americans & West Indians - Workers In Family	172
Table 5.01	SES & Nbhd. Stability Model, NYC Voter Turnout, 1988-1994	264
Table 5.02	Voter Turnout Change in Black Brooklyn Nbhds., 1989-1993	265
Table 5.03	Dinkins Vote Change in Black Brooklyn Nbhds., 1989-1993	265
Table 5.04	Descriptive Variables for Ethnicity, Class & Gender	271
Table 5.05	Impact of Ethnicity, Class & Gender on Voter Turnout	274
Table 5.06	Results, WLS Voter Turnout Model, Ethnicity, Class & Gender	276
Table 5.07	Results, WLS Candidate Choice, Ethnicity, Class & Gender	281
Table 5.08	Adj. R^2 s: WLS Candidate Choice, Ethnicity, Class & Gender	283
Table 5.09	African American & West Indian Citizenship and Voting Age	284
Table 5.10	EZI Estimates, African-Amer. & West Indian Voter Turnout	286
Table 5.11	African American and West Indian Citizenship and Voting	294

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List of Tables continued

Table 5.12	EZI Estimates, African Amer. & West Indian Voter Turnout, City Comptroller Primary	298
Table 5.13	EZI Estimates, African Amer. & West Indian Voter Turnout, Mayoral General Election	299

Appendix C - Tables

Table C-1	African Amer. & West Indian – Popula'n & Family Formation	345
Table C-2	African Amer. & West Indian – Education & Gender	346
Table C-3	African Amer. & West Indian – Labor Force Participation	347
Table C-4	African Amer. & West Indian – Income & Poverty	348
Table C-5	African Amer. & West Indian – Class of Workers	349

List of Figures (Maps)

Figure 3.01	New York Assembly Districts in Brooklyn, 1992-2001	105
Figure 3.02	New York City: Predominant Racial Populations	108
Figure 3.03	Black Population Distribution by Community District	110
Figure 3.04	West Indian Population Distribution (Numbers)	119
Figure 3.05	West Indian Population Distribution (Percents)	121
Figure 3.06	Black Brooklyn Population Change, 1990-2000	123
Figure 3.07	West Indian Median Household Income, 2000	162
Figure 5.01	EZI Estimates, African Amer. Turnout, 2001 Comptr.'s Race	295
Figure 5.02	EZI Estimates, West Indian Turnout, 2001 Comptroller's Race	297
Figure 5.03	EZI Estimates, African American Election Districts	302
Figure 5.04	EZI Estimates, West Indian Election Districts	304
Figure 5.05	EZI Estimates, African Amer. Turnout, 2001 General Election	305
Figure 5.06	EI2 Estimates, Bloomberg Vote, 2001 Mayoral Election	306
Figure 5.07	EZI Estimates, West Indian Turnout, 2001 General Election	307
Figure 6.01	Schematic Model: The Politics of Ethnicity, Class and Gender	312

Appendix C - Figures

Figure C-1	Bar Chart - African-Amer. & West Indian CVAP	350
Figure C-2	Bar Chart - African-Amer. & West Indian - Married Couples	350
Figure C-3	Bar Chart - African-Amer. & West Indian – Employed Adults	350
Figure C-4	Bar Chart - African-Amer. & West Indian – College Degrees	351
Figure C-5	Bar Chart - African-Amer. & West Indian – Household incomes	351
Figure C-6	Bar Chart - African-Amer. & West Indian – Homeowners	351

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Chapter 1

Black Brooklyn: The Politics of Ethnicity, Class, and Gender
Introduction, Literature Review, and Theoretical Framework

Drawing upon the scholarly literature on urban politics, racial and ethnic politics, Black politics, Caribbean immigration, minority incorporation theory and linked fate theory, this dissertation will examine Black political development in Brooklyn, New York. This study will focus empirically on the following questions: a) what are the main dimensions of Black Brooklyn's dramatically changing community demographics; b) what impacts do these growing complexities have on the political behavior of the Black Brooklyn electorate and its key constituent groups, African Americans and West Indians; and c) how are the current generation of Black elected officials managing these political challenges in the quest for minority incorporation?

This project uses a three pronged approach to answer these questions: analyzing census demographics in local communities; undertaking quantitative analysis of election results; and contextualizing that analysis with qualitative field research. This project seeks to determine how evolving patterns of Black ethnicity, an increasingly diverse class structure, and growing gender and family differences have led to the emergence of a more complex Black electorate whose heterogeneous voting patterns have important implications for Black political competition, development and coalition politics.

The central focus of this study is how changing patterns of ethnicity, class and gender are shaping Black political behavior and development. Five reasons underscore why this is important to the study of urban politics, racial and ethnic politics, minority incorporation theory and linked fate theory:

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1. The ethnicity, class and gender framework provides new ways of thinking about race. Race is a social construction and this framework allows us to disaggregate racial groups along key components which have significance for political behavior.

2. The ethnicity, class and gender framework provides powerful insights into intra-racial group cleavages which can pre-empt the broader process of incorporation. It also provides insights into racial group solidarity which can transcend cleavages, and become a crucial prerequisite for minority incorporation and coalition building.

   Concentrating on a monolithic incorporation of a 'minority' (e.g. Blacks) into the dominant white urban regime and power structure, does not place enough emphasis on potentially important demographic differences *within* minority groups which drive their political behavior and crucially shape their political trajectories.

   A racial group's internal differences around ethnicity, class and gender, and how these differences are bridged and politically managed, is a key determinant of minority group solidarity and political leverage. Consequently this group solidarity and leverage, in the form of political mobilization and political representation, is a precondition for minority incorporation into the power regime, governing coalition and broader political systems.

3. The ethnicity, class and gender framework identifies some of the key challenges and dynamics of multi-racial and multi-ethnic electoral and governing coalitions, which are critical formations in today's urban power arenas.

   Because of growing racial and ethnic diversity in American cities, successful electoral coalitions in urban politics increasingly require multi-racial, multi-ethnic and issue-oriented coalitions. Mollenkopf (2003), Sonenshein (2003) and others point to the "anomaly" of minority led, multi-racial coalitions which fail to win elections. Examples include Dinkins' 1993 failure at mayoral re-election (an African American incumbent); and the failure of Ferrer for New York City mayor, and Villaraigosa for Los Angeles mayor in 2001 (Hispanic candidates).

   In order to better understand why multi-racial coalitions succeed and fail, research needs to focus on the racial and ethnic groups themselves as the unit of analysis, beyond examining the fault lines and failures of *inter-group* relations. Studying the internal dynamics of ethnicity, class and gender, and how these drive either a politics of group solidarity or fragmentation, helps explain the success and failure of multi-racial and multi-ethnic coalitions.

4. The ethnicity, class and gender framework points to the challenges of, and the need for, visionary indigenous leadership, inclusive policy agendas, and mediating institutions.

   This dissertation will document that ethnicity, class and gender are powerful forces shaping political behavior in Black Brooklyn, and that the challenge to Black

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leadership is to articulate a shared vision and agenda, to better understand, affirmatively manage, and politically lead their Black ethnic communities and contest the forces which challenge their development.

This research suggests that mediating institutions are part of the solution: a) the Black Church, and interlocking social and civic networks, where membership and leadership are ethnically integrated; b) educational institutions such as Medgar Evers College, in the heart of Black Brooklyn, serving African American, Caribbean American and Continental African constituencies; and c) labor unions such as Local 1199, District Council 37, the Transport Workers Union and others, with racially and ethnically integrated leadership and rank and file members.

To be sure, these mediating institutions have their own inter-group and intra-group tensions, as microcosms of larger diasporan and societal groups, each with their own dynamics and cleavages. But in general, these mediating institutions help maintain peaceful co-existence, inter-group cooperation, and communication. For their own self-interested reasons of regime maintenance and institutional survival, they also promote group solidarity, political consciousness and multi-cultural understanding.

5. This project's ethnicity, class and gender framework critiques the "common racial fate" or "linked fate" theory of Black politics by Dawson (1994), Walton (1994) and others which argues that under certain conditions (e.g. national elections), race trumps ethnicity, class and ideology in directing Black political behavior. This research will turn linked fate theory on its head, and demonstrate that sometimes, Black ethnicity trumps or supercedes race.

   This research will critically examine Black Brooklyn's ethnic competition between African Americans and West Indians in relation to ethnic succession. The pluralists' "ethnic succession model" (Dahl 1962; Glazer and Moynihan 1967; Gerson 1990) focuses on how one group supplants or ascends to another group's place in the political hierarchy, generally ignoring the proposition that race matters in the timing and trajectory of succession. This study examines how Black ethnic sub-electorates behave differently; and how the Black political establishment and political entrepreneurs respond to, manage or exploit challenges and cleavages *within* Black Brooklyn's electorates to gain and maintain political advantage.

   Cohen (1999) points out other weaknesses in linked fate theory. She criticizes it for erroneously assuming a racial homogeneity in Black political behavior. Through her analysis of Black leadership's lack of response on the AIDS issue, Cohen argues that "linked fate" underestimates the power of agenda setting, issues, ethnicity, class, gender, ideology and other factors which influence political behavior in Black New York City, the focus of her study.

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There is a significant personal dimension to this dissertation as well. I am the descendant of Africans, slave and free, with roots going back to the 1700s in Maryland, Virginia, Louisiana and elsewhere (my roots also include Europeans and Native Americans). My parents were part of the post-World War II Black migration to Brooklyn, having arrived on Brooklyn Day in 1946. I was born, raised and have lived in Black Brooklyn for over 50 years. I and my family have been intimately involved in Black Brooklyn's rich civic, religious and political life. And I have personally experienced the dramatic racial and ethnic transformation of Black Brooklyn over time. My African American southern-rooted family, which includes two brothers and four sisters, has evolved to become an African diasporan, Black multi-ethnic family. We are inter-married with West Indian and African families and span four generations. Today we are a microcosm of Black Brooklyn.

Beginning as a 1960s student activist, community builder and advocate; later a political strategist and technician, government executive, educator, and now aspiring political scholar, I have personal knowledge of the community life, leaders and political players of Black Brooklyn. I have a deeply personal, intellectual, political, spiritual and cultural interest in understanding the great puzzle which is Black Brooklyn. And I am on a personal mission to see that its phenomenal story is told.

In a theoretical context, this dissertation will use empirical analysis to inform, revise and extend the theory of "minority political incorporation," of Browning, Marshal and Tabb (2003) and others, which focuses on initial Black political exclusion and subsequent partial incorporation of the first generation of Black elected officials into mainstream urban power establishments. Four decades have transpired since the Civil

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Rights era enabled the first Black mayors to be elected. It began in 1967, with Carl Stokes in Cleveland and Richard Hatcher in Gary, Indiana, then Ken Gibson in Newark, New Jersey and continued with their progeny.

Most urban centers, including Black Brooklyn, are today very different communities than they were 40 years ago, in terms of their demographic composition, internal dynamics, politics and power relations. Thus it is important to extend and update the theory of minority political incorporation as a theoretical and analytical tool, in order to better understand the post-incorporation, post-Civil Rights social forces within Black communities, their current patterns of political behavior, and underlying forces such as ethnicity, class and gender which may be important determinants of voting patterns and political development.

The period 1982 – 2002 constitutes 20 years of major Black political advancement in New York and in Black Brooklyn. We can begin in 1982 with Lieutenant Governor Mario Cuomo's defeat of New York City Mayor Ed Koch in the Democratic Gubernatorial Primary with heavy Black support. Cuomo subsequently defeated wealthy Republican Lewis Lehrman in a very close general election for Governor, with the Black vote and Black political leadership playing a major role in Cuomo's victory (Cuomo 1984). In 1984, New Yorkers for Jesse Jackson State Campaign Chairman Assemblyman Al Vann and his operatives provided major political leadership in producing the nation's largest bloc of voting delegates for Jesse Jackson for President at the Democratic National Convention in San Francisco in 1984. In 1988, David Dinkins chaired the Jackson presidential campaign with powerful support from

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Black Brooklyn, and Jesse Jackson took a plurality of the Democratic presidential primary vote in New York City (Thompson 1990).

Manhattan Borough President and African American, Percy Sutton lost the Democratic Primary for Mayor in 1977. In 1988, while losing statewide in the Democratic presidential primary, Jesse Jackson won a plurality of votes in New York City. This clearly signaled the possibility of a Black candidacy that could win in a New York citywide election. Thus in 1989, veteran Democratic politician and Manhattan Borough President David Dinkins became the standard bearer for Black New York's political aspirations. With a multiracial electoral coalition of Blacks, Latinos and white liberals, Dinkins won the mayoralty over former federal prosecutor, and novice Republican candidate Rudolph Giuliani by barely 50,000 out of 1.8 million votes cast in one of the closest mayoral contests in City history. Subsequently, Dinkins was defeated for re-election by Giuliani in 1993, in again one of New York's closest mayoral elections (Levitt 2001).

The election of Brooklyn's first Black Democratic County Leader, Assemblyman Clarence Norman, Jr. in 1990; the mayoral and US Senate campaigns of Black Brooklyn native son and preacher-activist Rev. Al Sharpton in 1992, 1994 and 1997; the election of New York State's first Black Comptroller, Carl McCall in 1994; and the election of New York City's first Black Comptroller, William Thompson, Jr. of Brooklyn in 2001, were other important Black political milestones.

Many important local races as well took place in this period, which expanded Black and Latino political representation, especially as a result of the 1982, 1992 and 2002 Congressional and State legislative redistricting cycles and voting rights advocacy.

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The 1981, 1991 and 2003 City Council legislative redistricting cycles and voting rights advocacy produced similar expansion of Black and Latino political representation. New York City's new term limits law in 2001 forced the retirement of several senior Black Brooklyn City Council members who happened to be female: Priscilla Wooten of East New York; Mary Pinkett of Fort Greene / Crown Heights; Una Clarke of Flatbush; and Annette Robinson of Bedford Stuyvesant. Term limits thus generated significant political leadership turnover in Black Brooklyn and elsewhere.

For this research project, 14 federal, state and municipal elections in the period 1997 – 2001, which are closest in time frame to Census 2000 demographic data, will be analyzed. This election dataset offers a rich array of important political contests which will serve as a powerful lens through which to examine the influences of ethnicity, class and gender on electoral behavior and political dynamics of Black Brooklyn. This phenomenon is worthy of examination because much of urban political analysis, such as linked fate, minority incorporation, pluralist and regime theory generally deal with Blacks as a homogeneous group. Thus they overlook or underestimate key internal forces and fault lines within this racial group such as ethnicity, class and gender, which drive different political behaviors for African Americans and West Indians.

Like so many Black communities, and other ethnic communities in urban America, the nearly one million residents of Black Brooklyn are not an undifferentiated mass. This dissertation seeks to examine how these fault lines are shaping the politics, impacting Black political leadership, and spurring political mobilization and demobilization of Black voters in Brooklyn. It seeks to enrich the conceptual framework of the minority political incorporation model of Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984,

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1997, 2003) which initially described a bipolar model, with a contest between a 'white political establishment' versus Black led, racial minority outsiders, and has evolved to a multi-racial coalition model.

This project argues that three major interrelated variables seem to be of particular importance in the politics of Black Brooklyn. First, African Americans and West Indians are two distinct Black ethnic groups, although there are convergences beyond the first generation. Second, class differentiates these Black ethnic groups in terms of income, education, home ownership and other socioeconomic characteristics. Also, a new generation, middle class, professional base has emerged to challenge the old guard. Third, this project theorizes that there is a gender variable, based on different Black male versus female demographics for education, income, labor force participation and other factors. A predominantly female electorate has a different issue orientation and voting behavior than Black male voters; and a Black male political elite dominates the local power structure despite Black women's majority status in the population and electorate.

These challenges to the Black political establishment raise important questions which may also apply to other racial, ethnic and immigrant communities. Immigration from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean has had a tremendous impact upon the racial and ethnic make-up of New York City where foreign born adults and their children are 50 percent of the City's population. New York City is now 65 percent non-white, according to Census 2000 and subsequent data releases. Cleavages around ethnicity, class and gender most likely exist among other immigrant groups and communities of color such as Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Mexicans; or Chinese, Koreans and Indians. One key question is: "How has increasing internal diversity of broad racial and

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ethnic categories like "Latino" or "Asian" affected the political mobilization or demobilization of various groups as they contend for space and place, political representation and public policy influence in our central cities?" The answers to this and other questions will tell us much about the present and future politics, policy, governance, livability, and civility of America's cities.

The literature on American urban politics addresses the development, succession, assimilation, incorporation, and exclusion of various racial and ethnic groups as they contend for access and influence within local government institutions (Dahl, 1961; Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1984, 1997, 2003; Mollenkopf, 1993). This literature has focused on how minority groups first mobilize a base of political support, then achieve some degree of political representation, and finally begin to influence decisions made by local government. It has paid less attention to: a) what happens to a minority group after they achieve significant incorporation by the political establishment; and b) the internal dynamics of minority groups which might significantly affect their trajectory of incorporation and political development.

With approximately 350,000 registered Democrats in nine contiguous, predominantly Black, Assembly Districts (See Figure 3.01, "Assembly Districts"), Central Brooklyn has among the largest and most consistent bloc of Democratic voters in New York City, New York State and the nation. Electoral majorities compiled in Black Brooklyn have contributed to the political victories of Governor Mario Cuomo (1982); Mayor David Dinkins (1989); presidential candidate Jesse Jackson (1984 and 1988); NYS Attorney General Elliot Spitzer (1998); City Comptroller William Thompson (2001); and Mayoral Primary candidate Freddie Ferrer (2001). They have been decisive

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in the borough-wide victories of Kings County District Attorneys Elizabeth Holtzman (1981) and Joe Hynes (1993); Kings County Surrogate Judge Michael Feinberg (1996); and Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz (2001). Despite this pivotal importance, the internal politics of Black Brooklyn is nearly a blank page in the research lexicon of urban politics.

Blacks have lived in Brooklyn since it was a Dutch colony in the early 1600s. They constituted small, scattered populations near today's Brooklyn Heights, Fort Greene, Williamsburg, Weekesville, Flatbush, and Bedford-Stuyvesant. During the era of massive European immigration and white population growth in Brooklyn from 1830 to 1950, Blacks were less than 10 percent of the population (See Table 2.01). Only in the mid-20th century did Blacks constitute a concentrated and sizable voting bloc (Connolly, 1977; Wilder, 2000). By 2000, Blacks made up 39 percent, or 939,000 of the borough's 2.5 million residents. Today Central Brooklyn is the nation's largest contiguous Black urban population, followed by Chicago, Detroit and Philadelphia (See Table 3.06). This population would qualify as one of America's ten largest cities, almost the size of Detroit or Houston, larger than New Orleans or San Francisco, and twice the size of Atlanta. This project intends to elevate Black Brooklyn as fertile ground for urban political research. This Chapter 1 will further discuss the literature review and theoretical framework for this project.

Literature Review of Black Urban Politics and Black Brooklyn

Among the earliest research discussing issues of ethnicity, class and gender in Black New York was W.E.B. DuBois' 1901 study, *The Black North: New York City and Philadelphia*; and National Urban League and NAACP co-founder Mary Ovington

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White's *Half A Man* (1911). While they were pioneering sociological studies, these texts were silent on questions of Black politics. The "Chicago School" produced the earliest works specifically on Black urban politics. By 1940, the University of Chicago had produced a number of Black social scientists including St. Clair Drake, Horace Cayton, and E. Franklin Frazier. Beginning with Harold Gosnell's (1935) *Negro Politicians: the Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago*, these scholars and others have produced a large body of literature on Black Chicago and its politics (Gosnell, 1935; Drake and Cayton, 1945; J. Q. Wilson, 1960; Pinderhughes, 1977, 1987; Kleppner, 1985; Alkalimat 1988; and Grimshaw 1992). Most of these studies concluded that politically astute Black politicians were periodically successful in maneuvering for local power and patronage. But on balance, Black politicians such as Congressman Bill Dawson and their loyal sub-machines were subordinated to the white ethnic political machines and never achieved full incorporation, with the exception of Harold Washington and his ascendancy to the Chicago mayoralty in 1987.

A number of scholars have focused on Black Manhattan and Harlem (Johnson, 1930; Reid, 1939; Clark, 1965; Ottley and Weatherby, 1967; Osofky, 1967; Lewinson, 1974; Hamilton 1968, 1979 and 1990; and Walter, 1989). Hamilton, Holder, and Walter argue that Harlem Black politicians achieved a significant degree of autonomy, influence, and patronage within the white Democratic machine, known as Tammany Hall, and managed the ethnic political competition of West Indians and African Americans well. Major exemplars of this model were: J. Raymond Jones, a West Indian who was a long time Harlem District Leader and became Tammany Hall's first Black Democratic County Leader in 1964; and Rev. Adam Clayton Powell Jr., independent pastor of the

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huge Abyssinian Baptist Church, which he parleyed into becoming New York's first Black City Alderman in 1937; and then New York's first Black Congressman in 1944. Katznelson (1973), Grimshaw (1992) and others disagree with this analysis and argue that white political machines regularly block Black political mobility, shunting Blacks into subordinate parallel organizations that exercise only marginal influence.

African American historians have described the socioeconomic and demographic evolution of Black Brooklyn and examined its central institution, the Black Church: Harold X. Connolly (1977) *A Ghetto Grows in Brooklyn*, Clarence Taylor (1994) *The Black Churches of Brooklyn*; and Craig Wilder (2000) *A Covenant with Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn.* (All three were originally doctoral dissertations in history.) Others have focused on: a) the rise of the Caribbean community and its social and political interactions with African Americans (Irish and Riviere, 1990; Kasinitz 1992; Vickerman 2001; Rogers 2001); b) the political struggles over community control of the public schools in Black Brooklyn (Gittell and Berube, 1969, et.al.); and c) Central Brooklyn school desegregation battles led by Rev. Milton Galamison (Taylor, 1997). Green and Wilson's *The Struggle for Black Empowerment in New York City* (1989) focuses more on New York City with occasional references to Caribbeans and Black politics in Brooklyn. But these studies do not cumulate into a clear picture of the forces that shaped the development and trajectory of the politics of Black Brooklyn.

One study did attempt a comprehensive analysis of the first stage of this process. Gerson's (1990) dissertation on Brooklyn Democratic machine politics compared the effort by Jews and Italians to wrest control of the Brooklyn machine from the Irish between 1920 and 1950, to Black efforts to make inroads on Jewish and Italian

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hegemony from 1940 to 1964. Gerson's pluralist analysis is that Blacks gradually ascended to power within the Kings County Democratic party using tactics similar to other white ethnic groups including gradualism, political mobilization, challenges with breakthrough candidates, and the threat of party defection. However, Gerson's analysis underestimates the fact that Blacks experienced political exclusion because of their *race,* and their incorporation and succession was qualitatively different from the political assimilation of white ethnic groups. The Irish, Jews and Italians experienced strong ethnic discrimination from older white groups during their ascendancy in New York. However, their white race, and cultural assimilation through learning English, inter-marriage with older white stock, anglicizing their names, and contested acquisition of political and economic power helped them to "melt into the pot," and overcome much of the initial ethnic discrimination against their groups (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970 et.al.).

Gerson's account stops at 1964 however, just as federal legislation on voting rights, civil rights, immigration, and anti-Poverty initiatives in the mid 1960s was beginning to have major impacts on Black Brooklyn and central cities across America. Subsequent to 1964, Black political development in Brooklyn clearly broke with what Charles Hamilton (1990) calls the "patron-client politics" of Assemblyman Bertram Baker, Brooklyn's dominant Black political figure from the 1940s through the 1960s. Thomas Russell Jones, with his insurgent, interracial Unity Democratic Club (UDC), became Brooklyn's second Black Assemblyman in 1962. Wesley Mc Donald Holder beat Baker and the Democratic machinbe to elect Brooklyn's first Black judge, Lewis Flagg, and steered Assemblywoman Shirley Chisholm (a UDC leader) to victory as Brooklyn's first Black Congresswoman in 1968. Jim Sleeper in *Closest of Strangers*

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(1990) discusses New York's post civil rights Black politics from the perspective of a disenchanted white liberal turned neo-conservative who had become disgusted with what he perceived as the pandering racial politics of Black New York's political leadership.

The northern civil rights and Black power movements, and local community mobilizations heavily influenced Black Brooklyn's politics and encouraged the growth of insurgency and factional politics. This major change in Black Brooklyn politics reflected: the waning influence of the Democratic Party organization and white ethnic political clubs; the rapid out-migration of Brooklyn's whites and the continued in-migration of Blacks; the strategic use of voting rights litigation and political redistricting to expand political representation and promote insurgency; the rise of anti-poverty programs and politics; Black nationalist, Black power and community control movements; community mobilization around police brutality, crime and drugs, quality education, and political empowerment; the development of an independent Black political technocracy, including campaign operatives and election lawyers; a growing class of Black entrepreneurs and professionals who financed Black political campaigns; Black politicians' increased access to federal, state, and city employment, patronage and contracts; the creation of non-profit agencies and anti-poverty programs sponsored by Black politicians; and rising political competition between African American and West Indian communities. Democratic presidential administrations (Johnson, Carter and Clinton); gubernatorial administrations (Carey and Cuomo); and mayoral administrations (Wagner, Lindsay, Beame, Koch and Dinkins) provided Brooklyn's Black politicians with additional access, funding and political support.

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The literature on race and urban politics has seen Black insurgency as a phase in the long historical cycle of reform and machine politics as noted by Lowi (1964) and Shefter (1978). The literature describes a powerful tension between insurgency and assimilation, between political autonomy and alignment with the Democratic Party organization. This political tension occurs both between whites and Blacks and within the Black community, and is rooted in specific class, demographic and social formations. Beginning in the late 1960s, spurred by grassroots organization and protest, a new stratum of Black activists organized insurgencies, often in the form of bi-racial coalitions that challenged entrenched white political organizations to achieve Black mayoralties and other elective offices (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1984, 1997 and 2003).

Brooklyn's racial and ethnic wars of political liberation, minority political incorporation, and Black political empowerment occurred throughout the 20th century. In the latter 20th century, the Voting Rights Act, legislative redistricting, and key grassroots mobilizations occurred, with "warm up" victorious insurgencies against the local Democratic machines. This was followed by seminal mass mobilizations around key contests such as the Cuomo primary and general gubernatorial in 1982, the Jesse Jackson 1984 and 1988 presidential primaries, and the Dinkins 1989 and 1993 mayoral races. These exercises, along with changing demographics, amassed and solidified the huge political terrain which is today Black Brooklyn.

This project argues that in the early 21st century, ethnicity, class and gender are the new battlegrounds confronting Black Brooklyn politics and leadership. Either Black Brooklyn's political leadership fails to comprehend, or they comprehend but are failing to lead, manage, embrace and contest the powerful political, public policy and demographic

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transformations which are impacting Black Brooklyn's neighborhoods. This lack of response from the old guard which is the new machine, is breeding insurgency and discontent among a younger, locked out "talented tenth" generation (DuBois, 1903), as well as broader constituencies.

This research extends and redefines the minority political incorporation model, to provide a more robust framework for examining and analyzing Black urban electorates and elites. The political questions to ask and answer are no longer just "How are Blacks, Latinos, and Asians being incorporated into the white political establishment?" or "How are white, Black, Asian and Latino groups interacting or coalescing with one another to achieve incorporation ?" More discriminating questions must be asked and answered if we are to understand the impact of America's explosive urban immigration and growing racial and ethnic diversity.

Some important new lines of inquiry include: "Are ethnic and national groups even communicating with, let alone coalescing with, one another around political and policy issues? Are African Americans sharing power with West Indians and Continental Africans? Are Puerto Ricans sharing power with Dominicans and Mexicans? Are the Chinese coalescing with Koreans, and Indians around concerns of Asian communities, and what are the common agendas? What are the consequences of the successes and failures of coalition building, communication and power sharing? Are there emerging pan Ethnic identities? If so, who and what shapes those identities, and how is this playing out? Are internal issues of gender inequality and class divisions enhancing or inhibiting group political development, political representation and policy input?" Particularly in gateway and heavy immigrant populated cities like New York City, Los

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Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Houston, Phoenix, Miami and elsewhere, the answers to these questions will shape the future of urban, state, national and even global politics.

Another potential theoretical framework for analyzing the politics of Black Brooklyn is urban regime theory. This theory has focused on what happens to insurgent electoral coalitions once they win office and become part of the governing coalition. It looks at Black mayoral regimes in cities such as Atlanta, New York, and Baltimore (Stone 1989; Reed 1988, 1995; Orr 1998). These authors caution that the larger system of power relations severely constrains the ability or political will of Black mayors to attempt substantive policy responses to the needs of their Black constituents. Applied to the politics of Black Brooklyn, urban regime theory would direct our attention to how the Black Brooklyn political establishment would forge ties with white business, civic and political elites and would have to moderate its initial activist oriented political program and policy agenda, to the extent that one existed. Even though urban regime theory is generally applied to the unit of analysis of whole cities, Reed and his colleagues' critiques of Black urban regimes might also provide a conceptual framework for analyzing the politics of Black Brooklyn and its leadership establishment.

The literature cited thus far provides many valuable points of orientation for studying the successive waves of Black political development in Brooklyn, but perhaps with the exception of urban regime theory, it does not provide a road map and clear analytical constructs for understanding the contemporary politics of Black Brooklyn. Here, an incumbent Black political elite gained power on a platform of insurgency, reform and "community empowerment." Today, however, this elite appears disconnected from growing sectors of the electorate and faces several challenges from

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within its own political domain. This study seeks to examine these developments by analyzing key electoral contests, qualitative field research and demographic indicators.

Chapter 1 gives the introduction and background, discusses the central research questions and relevance of this study to the scholarly field of political science. Literature review, substantive focus and theoretical framework are discussed including the three key hypotheses and research methodologies.

Chapter 2 gives a political history of Black Brooklyn from colonial times to the present. The contemporary discussion describes the rise to power of the first generation of "regular" Black politicians beginning with West Indian ancestry Assemblyman Bertram Baker, and the first waves of political succession across Black Brooklyn. It examines the role of regular machine politics and subsequent challenges to it from insurgent and reform factions. The second generation of Black political leadership growing out of the civil rights era is examined through the works of Gerson (1990), Connolly (1977), and Wilder (2000). It will discuss how Bertram Baker, who operated from 1931 to 1970, and other key figures such as Thomas Russell Jones, Shirley Chisholm, Sam Wright, Wesley MacDonald Holder and others negotiated and asserted their political relationship with the Brooklyn Democratic organization and cultivated their own power bases in Black Brooklyn.

It also discusses a new wave of insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s led by Al Vann, Major Owens and their colleagues in the Coalition for Community Empowerment ("CCE"), and how they rode the momentum of the civil rights and Black power movements and synthesized this into their own "community empowerment" movement to create their own Black political power bases in Brooklyn. It concludes by noting that

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these one time insurgents are now the aging African American political establishment of Central Brooklyn, confronted with a new set of political challenges based on ethnic, class, and gender differences in the Black Brooklyn community and electorate.

Chapter 3 describes how distinct Black subpopulations based around ethnicity, class, and gender are evolving in Black Brooklyn. It will mainly use 1990 and 2000 Census data from SF1, SF2, SF3 and SF4 tables; as well as Census 2000, 5 % Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data to examine several socio-demographic trends at the PUMA (PUMS Area) and local neighborhood, census tract and block levels. This analysis will focus on the nine significantly Black neighborhoods of Brooklyn ranging from the predominantly African American Bedford-Stuyvesant, Fort Greene, Brownsville and East New York neighborhoods to the north, to the predominantly West Indian Crown Heights, Flatbush, East Flatbush and Canarsie neighborhoods to the south.

Ethnic differences in educational attainment, income, family formation, home ownership and other important characteristics will be examined. This chapter will highlight the socio-economic cleavages that differentiate the diverse subgroups within Brooklyn's Black population and the neighborhoods and enclaves where these sub-populations are concentrated. This dissertation argues that these concentrations provide the basis for mounting different forms of political behavior, mobilization and demobilization.

Chapter 4 introduces a qualitative, contextual dimension to the research project. Key field interviews examine how ethnicity, class and gender are shaping the politics of Black Brooklyn. This research utilizes a structured sample of 52 interviewees from Black Brooklyn's political elites from its nine Black neighborhoods. The "snowball"

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interviewing technique of including interviewees based upon referrals by other interviewees is also utilized.

Interviewees include a rich cross section of African Americans and West Indians; first, second and third generation Brooklynites; men and women; young, middle aged and older persons; a broad spectrum of political party affiliations and ideological orientations; incumbent politicians as well as insurgents; various occupations and class backgrounds; and other characteristics. The interviewees give a range of comments on questions of Black ethnic conflict, cooperation and competition between African Americans and West Indians; whether or not there are class, generational and gender divisions within Black Brooklyn politics; and speak to other important issues as well.

Chapter 5 examines 14 federal, state and municipal elections in the period 1997 – 2001 which took place in Black Brooklyn, and reflect many of the ethnic, class, and gender differences within Black Brooklyn's electorate. This research project will use Census 2000 socio-demographic variables on Black ethnicity, class and gender constructed at the election district level. This demographic data is appended to an election dataset of 825 election districts (ED) in Brooklyn's 9 significantly Black assembly districts which contains party enrollment, voter turnout and candidate choice data for the 14 elections. Analysis of this dataset explores the voting behavior of some 400,000 registered voters in Black Brooklyn.

This combined political and demographic dataset will be subjected to two forms of regression analysis to determine the statistical significance of demographic variables for ethnicity, class and gender (independent variables) in explaining the electoral outcomes of voting for particular candidates and voter turnout levels (dependent

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variables). Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression, as well as Gary King's ecological regression models "EZI," (for voter turnout) and "EI2" (for candidate choice) are the two statistical techniques which will be used to analyze voting behavior and variables for ethnicity, class and gender to determine their statistical significance in explaining why Black Brooklyn's electorate votes the way that it does.

Statistically significant variables which have been identified through WLS modeling, will be re-estimated using EZI and EI2 models to generate coefficients for each election district. These coefficients are then mapped to determine if there are any significant voting and geopolitical patterns in relation to election district geography. For example, certain voting patterns (e.g. high voter turnout, or voting for mayoral candidate Bloomberg) may show up more heavily in Caribbean neighborhoods; or in public housing; or where there are higher concentrations of female voters; or in areas with high household income.

Statistical analysis of these electoral contests will provide insights into the following questions: "What factors cause African American and West Indian voters to vote similarly and differently? Do Black women voters vote significantly for women candidates? And if so, under what conditions? Are their differences between African American and West Indian women voters ? And, are there class divisions in Black Brooklyn's electorate?"

Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, will reiterate and weave together the findings of the three complementary research methodologies used in this project: socio-demographic analysis, field interviews and linear and ecological regression and spatial analysis. It will discuss how each methodology addresses the three hypotheses of this

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study and to what extent the research proves or disproves these hypotheses. This chapter discusses the extent to which ethnicity, class and gender have or have not played a role in the voting behavior and politics of Black Brooklyn, and in what ways these factors may continue to impact upon African American and West Indian voting behavior, political leadership and political development in Black Brooklyn. This chapter will also discuss the implications of its findings for the future of Black Brooklyn politics and the larger political arena.

Theoretical Framework, Research Objectives and Hypotheses

This research project theorizes that variables for ethnicity, class and gender are significant predictors of political behavior, specifically candidate choice and voter turnout, among African American and West Indian voters in Black Brooklyn. Following is a discussion of the theoretical literature and empirical research on which this premise is based.

Ethnicity. There is a body of sociological literature which argues that although they are from the same Black racial group, African Americans and West Indians have very different ethnic identities (Bryce-LaPorte, 1972; Waters, 1999; Foner, 2001; Vickerman, 2001; Rogers, 2001; McLaughlin, 1981; and Archer, 2000; also see Chapter 4, "Ethnicity" for a detailed discussion). Backed by some empirical research, scholars argue that these differences in ethnic identity translate into different political orientations and agendas, and sometimes conflictual political behavior involving African Americans and West Indians (Green and Wilson, 1989; Holder, 1990; Kasinitz, 1992; and Rogers,

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2004). This research project will help fill the void of comparative empirical research, by testing the ethnicity, class and gender variables for West Indians and African Americans to see if they are significant predictors of political behavior.

Class In his study of voter turnout in New York City elections, Olson (1997:95-126) gives significant attention to "Socioeconomic Status and Voter Turnout," with specific focus on census variables for education and income. Scholars such as Schlozman and Verba (1979), Teixeira (1992) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) cite education, income, occupation and class as significant variables of voter turnout. In his "SES model," Olson's multivariate regression analysis showed direct correlations for education, income and voter turnout in city elections. Following a rational choice model, higher education and higher income increase political resources and reduces the cost of voting, resulting in greater likelihood of voting (Downs, 1957). This dissertation will test Olson's SES model on Black Brooklyn's electorate, using variables for education and income as proxies for class, to test their significance as predictors of political behavior.

Gender. The political gender gap in Black Brooklyn is not just a "Black thing" but part of a national phenomenon. There is a large body of political science and related literature on the gender gap in American politics (see Seltzer, Newman and Leighton, 1997; Mueller, 1988; Gelb and Palley, 1996; Palley, 2001; Palmer and Simon, 2004, 2003, 2001; Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 1997, 2001; Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Norrander, 2003; Kaufman, 2004; Hutchings et.al., 2004; Box-Steffensmeier, et.al., 2004). The literature identifies several factors which help explain the gender gap. Women and men have different issue orientations: women are more compassionate and men more conservative on social welfare issues (Kaufmann, 2004).

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For married men, "...being in charge in the domestic sphere is politically empowering for husbands" (Burns, et.al., 1997). And "gender differences in workplace experiences" explain a substantial portion of the gender gap in political activity (Schlozman et.al., 1999).

A gender gap "...emerges because men and women react differently to cues about how compassionate candidates are towards vulnerable social groups" (Hutchings, et.al., 2004). Women are more supportive of government programs than men, due to: 1) differences in emotional responses to social programs; 2) gendered differences in awareness of social problems; 3) differences in perceived fairness of social institutions; and 4) differences in perceived efficacy of government programs (Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001). "Gender differences in vote choice, opinion, and party identification have...grown when the political climate moved in a conservative direction, the economy deteriorated, and the percentage of economically vulnerable, single women increased" (Box-Steffensmeier, et.al., 2004).

The research literature indicates that senior citizens, who are predominantly female (Peterson and Somit, 1994); regular church attenders, who are predominantly female (Peterson, 1992; Harris, 1994; Smith, 1998); and the civically engaged, who are predominantly female (Putnam 2001; Hacker, 2003) -- often have higher voter participation levels than men. This research project will test a gender variable to determine to what extent, and under what conditions gender matters as a significant predictor of political behavior in Black Brooklyn's elections.

The central hypothesis is that distinct socio-demographic patterns of ethnicity, class and gender concentrated in different Black Brooklyn neighborhoods, give rise to

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distinct patterns of voting behavior. One explanation for these distinct ethnic patterns is that ethnic groups will be more strongly attracted to their own ethnic candidates. An explanation for the distinct class patterns is that different class structures in distinct ethnic communities lead to different class orientations and political preferences for those candidates who best represent their class interests. An explanation for distinct gender patterns is that women will be more attracted to women candidates who are more empathetic and who more effectively articulate their issues of concern.

This study will examine how different types of candidates and elections evoke different electoral responses from different sectors of the Black Brooklyn electorate. It will identify the sectors of the electorate from which these candidates draw their electoral support, and what patterns of voter mobilization or demobilization along the lines of ethnicity, class and gender have occurred. Three hypotheses will be tested:

Hypothesis # 1 (Inter-Ethnic Gap; Intra-Ethnic Attraction) The literature documents differential experiences in the U.S. and Caribbean, resulting in different ethnic identities and political orientations for African Americans and West Indians which will be reflected in their different political behavior in terms of candidate choice and voter turnout.

Thus for certain elections, we can expect to find significant West Indian and African American voting for their own ethnic candidates and against the other group's ethnic candidates. They will also vote differently for candidates of other races; and they will have voter turnout differences as well.

Hypothesis # 2 (Class Gap) West Indians and African Americans have significantly different socioeconomic characteristics for income and education both within and across their ethnic groups (e.g., West Indian households with more married couples and workers in the family, have higher incomes than African Americans). The literature shows income and education to be significant predictors of voter turnout because in part, these variables reduce the costs of voting. And Olson (1997) shows a correlation between higher income and educational attainment and higher voter turnout in city elections.

Thus for certain elections, we can expect to find education and income variables to be significant predictors of voter turnout and candidate choice for African Americans and West Indians.

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Hypothesis # 3 (Gender Gap; Gender Attraction) There are greater numbers of adult females, and similar to city, state and national trends, there is greater female than male voter registration in Black Brooklyn.

Based on the research literature, one can expect significantly higher female voter turnout based on predominantly female senior citizens, church attenders and civically engaged persons in Black Brooklyn. Also, due to their gendered issue orientation, one can expect men and women to vote significantly for candidates of their own sex in certain elections.

Research Design and Data Collection

Of the 20 New York State Assembly Districts in Brooklyn for the period 1992-2001, 9 were majority Black (50% or more) or significantly Black (25 - 49%): Assembly Districts 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 55, 56, 57 and 58. An election district (ED) level dataset has been constructed containing the election returns for 14 exemplary elections, along with party registration and voter turnout figures, candidate votes and census demographic variables which have been appended to the political data. Both Weighted Least Squares regressions (WLS) and ecological regression analysis of this dataset (EZI and EI2) will be used to measure levels of statistically significant performance for dependent variables of voter turnout and candidate choice, using independent variables for ethnicity, class and gender. WLS is a sophisticated form of Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS), where WLS weights the variables to minimize output distortion due to a few outliers which are likely to exist in a slightly imperfect political dataset.

Gary King, Director of the Harvard-MIT Data Center, developed a statistical software program known as "EZI," to be used in "reconstructing individual behavior from aggregate data" (1997). Levitt (2001) used the EZI program to analyze 1989 and

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1993 mayoral elections in New York City. Olson (1997) also used EZI to analyze voter turnout patterns in the 1993 NYC Mayoral and other elections. Once the statistically significant dependent variables have been identified using WLS, this study will then use EZI to generate estimates of voter turnout levels (EZI) and candidate preferences (EI2) for these statistically significant variables. The coefficients generated will then be mapped at the ED level, to see if these variables have significant patterns which correlate with the political geography of particular neighborhoods. For example, the class variable may show up most distinctly for low income housing projects versus high income areas. This dataset has been constructed with assistance from Prof. John Mollenkopf at the Center for Urban Research and Dr. Joseph Pereira of the CUNY Data Service, CUNY Graduate Center.

The *independent variables* include measures of race, West Indian and African American ancestry, gender, income, educational attainment, and males not in the labor force. These data are from Census 2000 Summary Files 1, 2, 3 and 4 reduced from tract to block level and rebuilt to conform to election district boundaries so that they correlate and are contained in the same geography as the political data. The election dataset will contain a rich array of *dependent or outcome variables*, in the form of voter turnout and candidate choice in the various election contests. Crowder and Tedrow (2001) used census data on West Indian ancestry (1990 SF3A) to identify specific census tracts and neighborhood enclaves in Brooklyn. This dataset was updated using the Census 2000 SF3 data to update and distinguish current West Indian neighborhoods from African American neighborhoods within Black Brooklyn.

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This research project is also based on field interviews with diverse members of African American and West Indian political elites in Black Brooklyn. The field research will solicit Black elites' views on: a) the current state of Black Brooklyn's political development; b) an assessment of Black Brooklyn's current leadership; b) views of the next generation of Black Brooklyn's political leadership and how it will emerge; c) the West Indian - African American dialectic and "controversy"; d) the role of Black women in Brooklyn politics; e) class divisions in the Black community and political implications; f) political priorities of Black Brooklyn; g) Black political relations with whites and other racial and ethnic groups; h) Black Brooklyn political relations with the Democratic Party; and i) Black political relations with the Black church and the community.

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Chapter 2

Black Brooklyn: A Political History, 1600's to 2005

Part I: The Beginnings to 1950s

Brooklyn was an early colonial settlement of the Dutch West India Company which started with "Nieuw Amsterdam" on Manhattan Island in 1621 as the downstate base for their New Netherlands possessions, which stretched from Fort Orange (Albany) in the upper Hudson Valley to Long Island. "Nieuw Amsterdam" was renamed New York for title holder the Duke of York when it came under British rule in1664. In 1636, the Dutch branched out from New Amsterdam, crossed the East River to buy land from the Canarsee Indians and established the town of "Breukelen," which was one of the original colonial towns in Kings County. Brooklyn soon became a major agricultural center and it was a politically and militarily strategic region. During the American Revolution, the historic "Battle of Long Island" was actually fought in Brooklyn. The original six towns of Kings County were: Brooklyn, Flatbush, New Utrecht, Gravesend, Flatlands and Bushwick.

The Dutch began importing African slaves in 1626, a practice that continued well past 1808, the year slavery importation was banned by the U.S. Constitution (J.H. Franklin 2004). African slave labor was crucial to the early agricultural and infrastructure development of the Dutch and British colonial possessions in New York. Thus Blacks have lived in Brooklyn and New York since the early 1600s, and they have a long history of protest politics. The majority of the population was enslaved, and slave insurrections were a frequent threat throughout colonial America. There was a major

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slave insurrection in New York City in 1712; and an aborted uprising in 1741. The successful slave revolution in Haiti and defeat of Napoleon's Army in the 1790s had a profound impact. It forced France to sell its Louisiana Territory to America in 1803 and caused increased repression of American slaves. But slave revolts continued: Gabriel Prosser's in 1800 and Nat Turner's in 1821, were both in South Carolina. Racial tremors were also undoubtedly felt in New York, the largest slaveholding state in the North, and in Brooklyn, Kings County, its largest slaveholding county.

Table No. 2.01
Brooklyn and Black Populations, 1698 – 2000

Year	Brooklyn	Blacks	Black %
1698	2,017	296	14.7%
1790	4,495	1,478	32.9%
1800	5,740	1,811	31.6%
1810	8,303	1,853	22.3%
1820	11,187	1,761	15.7%
1830	20,535	2,007	9.8%
1840	47,613	2,846	6.0%
1850	138,882	4,065	2.9%
1860	279,122	4,999	1.8%
1870	419,921	5,653	1.3%
1880	599,495	9,153	1.5%
1890	838,547	11,307	1.3%
1900	1,166,582	18,367	1.6%
1910	1,634,351	22,708	1.4%
1920	2,018,356	31,912	1.6%
1930	2,560,401	68,921	2.7%
1940	2,698,285	107,263	4.0%
1950	2,738,175	208,478	7.6%
1960	2,627,319	371,405	14.1%
1970	2,602,012	656,194	25.2%
1980	2,230,936	723,748	32.4%
1990	2,300,644	873,620	38.0%
2000	2,465,326	938,527	38.1%

Sources: Table 2.1 p. 23, Table 4.1, p.61 and Table 9.1, p.178, *A Covenant with Color...*, Craig Wilder, 2000; and US Census 2000, SF 1.

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Malone (2002) paints a bleak picture of Black political participation in 19th century New York. In 1821, New York State legally disenfranchised over 95 percent of the Black voting population by imposing a $250 property qualification on Black males while eliminating property requirements for white males. This was orchestrated by Martin Van Buren and his "Regency" political machine at the 1821 State Constitutional Convention in order to neutralize the Black vote which was growing in power in New York City. Blacks generally voted for Federalist and Whig candidates, rather than Van Buren's Democratic Party candidates. New York City's free Black population had become a political problem. In 1821 there were 22,000 free Blacks in New York, enough to affect the outcome in close elections. After the 1821 restriction, there were less than 300 eligible voters out of 12,000 Blacks in New York City. New York's gradual Emancipation Law of 1799 freed African female slaves by 1822 and males by 1827. New York Blacks were effectively disenfranchised until passage of the 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1870.

New York State was only 7 percent Black in 1790, while Brooklyn was 33 percent Black. Between 1750 and 1790, nearly one third of all Kings County residents consisted of enslaved Africans, who were agricultural and domestic workers, and laborers (Wilder 2000:33). Blacks would not achieve that one-third ratio again until 1980, due to Brooklyn's massive influx of Irish, Italian, Jewish, German, Scandinavian and other immigrants between 1850 and 1940, when Brooklyn's population grew from 139,000 to 2.7 million. Throughout this period, white business owners and white immigrant labor collaborated to force Blacks out of their key positions in the Brooklyn economy. In the skilled trades and service sectors, Blacks were reduced to the most menial jobs; and a

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small group operated in the segregated professions as preachers, doctors, teachers, and undertakers; as well as the trades, and service businesses with Black clienteles.

Meserole, Van Nostrand, Lefferts, Suydam, Wyckoff, Remsen, Lott, Van Brunt, Courtelyou, and Schenk are familiar Brooklyn street names today. These are the names of Brooklyn's elite Dutch and English slaveholding families. African slaveholding was not just for the wealthy, however. In the 19th century at one time, more than 60 percent of Brooklyn's white families owned slaves (Malone, 2002; Wilder, 2000). New Yorkers also had close commercial and financial ties to the Southern plantation economy as transporters, financiers, manufacturers, buyers and sellers in the commodities of slaves and southern goods. These economic relationships were the foundation for much of the politics of the 17th through the 19th centuries, in Brooklyn and New York.

Aligning with what they perceived as their own economic and political self-interests, most white commercial elites and white immigrants were pro-slavery, pro-South and pro-Democratic Party. By the time of the Civil War, those whites who opposed slavery, and nearly all Blacks, were Republican. Brooklyn's free Black leadership and white abolitionists worked on burning issues of the day such as: emancipation, Black voter enfranchisement in New York, the Underground Railroad, fugitive slave laws, African colonization activities, support for the Civil War, Constitutional Amendments guaranteeing Black citizenship and voting, and Reconstruction. Black self defense and police protection were also major issues, particularly after the New York City Draft Riots of 1863 where scores of Blacks were lynched, causing many to move from Manhattan to Brooklyn.

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One of America's most renowned abolitionist preachers in the antebellum period was Henry Ward Beecher, brother of Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of anti-slavery novel, *Uncle Tom's Cabin.* Beecher was pastor of the Plymouth Church in Brooklyn Heights, which was also an Underground Railroad station. There were several renowned Brooklyn based Black abolitionist preachers at this time: Rev. James Pennington, Rev. Henry Highland Garnett and others (Wilder 2000, Taylor 1997). Black Brooklyn's most powerful institution was the Black church which emerged beginning in 1818 with the Bridge St. AWME Church, followed by other AME, Black Baptist, Presbyterian and Episcopal congregations throughout Black Brooklyn in the 19th century (Taylor 1997).

Blacks formed many civic and political organizations around slavery emancipation, civil rights, and voting rights and most groups were pro-Republican. Blacks supported Republican candidates, sought party nominations for Black candidates, and in a few cases ran unsuccessfully for local public office and party positions in Brooklyn in the late 19th century. Perhaps the highest political recognition Brooklyn Blacks received was appointment to the Brooklyn Board of Education by the Mayor of Brooklyn. The first, Dr. Philip White, was appointed by Mayor Seth Low in 1882. He was followed by T. McCants Stewart from 1891-94; and Samuel Scottron (grandfather of Lena Horne) from 1894-98. After a consolidated New York City in 1898 merged a municipally independent Brooklyn with Manhattan, Black Brooklyn would not have a seat on the New York City Board of Education again until Rev. John Coleman, pastor of Black Brooklyn's St. Philip's Episcopal Church (in Bed Stuy), in 1939.

Brooklyn evolved from a major agricultural center built with African slave labor in the 17th and 18th centuries to a major commercial and industrial center built with white

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immigrant labor in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, major sectors of Brooklyn's industrial economy were still closely linked to African slave labor because two of Brooklyn's major industries were an integral part of the slave based global cotton and sugar economies. Throughout the 19th century, Brooklyn's docks and warehouses became New York City's dominant storage and distribution depot for Southern shipped, slave cultivated cotton, sugar, molasses, tobacco and other agricultural products which were destined for finishing factories in New York, the U.S. and Europe. At one point in the 1800s, nearly 90 percent of New York City's imported tobacco was stored in Brooklyn warehouses (Wilder 2000).

Brooklyn's Williamsburg industrial factories were a huge center for converting slave cultivated raw sugar cane from the South and the Caribbean. By the 1880s, Williamsburg's sugar and molasses refineries were Brooklyn's largest industry, accounting for one third of Brooklyn's total industrial production, and Williamsburg was the sugar refining capital of America and the world . The Havemeyers began sugar refining in 1807 and were the nation's sugar barons. William Havemeyer became New York's Mayor in 1845. The Havemeyer plants were producing 3 million pounds of refined sugar a day in 1883 at the world's largest sugar refinery. In the 1890s they formed a national sugar cartel known as the American Sugar Refining Company, which was based out of their Williamsburg operations (Wilder 2000, pp.52-58).

Changing Demographics - Towards Black Empowerment

With their small numbers throughout the 19th century, Blacks were not a significant factor in the Brooklyn electorate, except for pockets of voters in a few wards

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in the City of Brooklyn (1834-1898), [1] in today's neighborhoods of Brooklyn Heights and Fort Greene, and the Weekesville Black settlement in today's Crown Heights.

From 1900 to 1930 Brooklyn's Black population grew by over 50,000 to 69,000 and 16 percent were from the Caribbean. The 1920s to the 1940s were marked by much social and political action in Black Brooklyn. In 1920 Franklin Morton, Sr., a Black attorney, ran for Republican District Leader in the 1st Assembly District, in the predominantly white downtown Brooklyn area and he lost by only one vote (Gerson 1990). This close political loss and rejection moved Morton and other Blacks towards the Democratic Party and this political migration would accelerate during the FDR years. In 1922, the Ku Klux Klan had 21 klaverns or chapters and 150,000 members in New York City including several thousand in Brooklyn. In 1929, a Klan delegation attended a Sunday service at St. Matthew's Episcopal Church in then predominantly white Bed-Stuy to support the white pastor Rev. William Blackshear who had evicted Black parishioners from his church. This racial incident gained national attention and much reaction from Black Brooklyn and broader leadership (Wilder 2000, p. 121, 129-133).

That same year, the Brooklyn Catholic Diocese founded its first segregated all Black Catholic parish, St. Peter Claver, after much racial ranting from Father Belford, pastor of Bed-Stuy's then white Irish Nativity R.C. Church, about a "Black invasion," which was actually a very small Black in-migration in the 1920s.

With the 1930s came the Depression and major Black leadership efforts to gain a fair share of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) New Deal relief aid and jobs; to fight

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[1] The City of Brooklyn started as a Village (1646), and Town (1683) within Kings County (1683). It did not grow to encompass all of Kings County until 1896. By a Citywide Referendum on Consolidation, which was won by only a few hundred votes, Brooklyn was merged with the rest of modern day New York City in 1898. Sources: http://bbs.brooklynonline.com, "A Short Brooklyn History;" and Margaret Latimer, *The Brooklyn Almanac.*

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employment discrimination against Brooklyn's economically devastated Blacks; and to advocate for federal anti-lynching laws which FDR refused to endorse in the Congress for fear of alienating his Dixiecrat support. Irish Boss John McCooey used relief programs to build the Brooklyn Democratic machine and began courting Black leadership and voters which the Democrats had earlier ignored until heavily Republican Black Brooklyn voted against Franklin Roosevelt and for Hoover in 1932 (Gerson 1990).

Throughout the 20th century, the increasing mechanization of agriculture, gradually decreased the Southern demand for subjugated Black farm labor. Continuing Southern racial oppression, and growing manpower demands in the industrial North spurred by World War II and later industrial expansion, attracted a major southern Black migration to northern industrial cities such as Chicago, Detroit and Brooklyn. Foreign immigration including Black Caribbeans flowed heavily in late 19th and early 20th century America, but this immigration was shut down by federal laws during the Depression and the two World Wars. However, the Hart-Celler Immigration Reform Act of 1965, jump started the major immigration of Afro-Caribbeans to Brooklyn from the 1960s onward.

While Brooklyn's total population was an all time high 2.74 million in 1950, its Black population doubled from 107,000 to 208,000 from 1940 to 1950 (from 4% to 8%). From 1950 to 1970, Black Brooklyn *tripled* to 656,000 (25%); and topped 938,000 in 2000, nearly 40% of Brooklyn's 2.47 million residents. Brooklyn's dramatic post war white population exodus, incentivized by federal programs for housing (FHA and VA mortgages), transportation (new suburban highways), and education (the GI Bill), produced dramatic racial and ethnic transformation (see Chapter 3, Demographics). The sheer growth in the size of the incoming Black population, laid a new demographic

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foundation for increased Black political representation. Today, Black Brooklyn encompasses several assembly districts, councilmanic districts, state senate districts, and congressional districts, ranging in size from 120,000 to over 600,000 persons.

Party Re-Alignment, Black Sub-Machines and Congressional Succession: Black Brooklyn, Harlem and Chicago

Demographics is not always destiny, and this Black political evolution was neither inevitable nor automatic. Over time it required political resources and visionary leadership with an agenda to challenge Brooklyn's white Democratic machine. This process took place across intersecting planes of regular, reform, insurgent and independent party politics; political negotiation, legislative redistricting, voting rights litigation, and political mobilization in order to achieve the goal of expanded Black political representation. While Black Brooklyn's political dynamics is unique, it shares some similarities and differences with Black Chicago and Black Harlem.

Prior to World War II, Black Brooklyn was a small, dispersed community and not politically important in the larger sphere of a 95% white Brooklyn. Black Brooklyn was predominantly Republican, and did not begin moving heavily towards FDR and the Democratic Party until the 1936 presidential election, attracted by FDR's "New Deal" agenda, and Mayor LaGuardia and the Brooklyn Democratic machine's delivery of federal programs to Brooklyn Blacks, to relieve their devastating socioeconomic conditions during the Depression (Connolly 1977; Wilder 2000).

Black Brooklyn's political empowerment shift accelerated after World War II, with phenomenal population growth, almost totally within the context of Democratic party politics. Harlem and Chicago on the other hand, started out with Black Republican

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elected officials, pre-World War II and shifted to the Democratic Party in the mid 1930s and early 1940s as did most Black urban electorates nationally, migrating from the "Party of Lincoln" to the "New Deal Democrats."

In all three communities there were sustained periods of at least 20 years, dominated by a Black Democratic submachine. In Chicago it was headed by Ward Committeeman, Alderman, then Congressman Bill Dawson. In Harlem it was headed by District Leader, then County Leader and first Black Boss of all Tammany Hall, J. Raymond Jones. And in Brooklyn it was headed by District Leader and Assemblyman Bert Baker. Interestingly, Ray Jones, Bert Baker and his sometime political rival, Mac Holder, were West Indian Democrats with considerable, though certainly not all West Indian protégés. In New York, this ethnic minority, exercised skillful political leadership within the larger African American communities of Harlem and Bed-Stuy, and in relation to powerful white Democratic machines and other political spheres.

In Chicago, Black Republican Oscar De Priest was elected the first Black Cook County Commissioner in 1904; first Black Chicago Alderman in 1915; and first Black US Congressman ever elected in the North, in 1928. De Priest was defeated by Democrat Arthur Mitchell in 1934; and Congressman William Dawson, State Committeeman and former Alderman, headed Chicago's powerful Black Democratic submachine and served in Congress from 1943 to 1970.

In Harlem, Republican Edward Johnson was elected New York State's first Black Assemblyman in 1917. But by the 1930s, Harlem began electing Black Democrats. In 1939, independent Democrat Adam Clayton Powell was elected a City Councilman. And in 1944 Powell was elected to Congress, exercising skillful voter mobilization and power

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politics, and often challenged the powerful white Democratic machine and their Black submachines, in an era pre-dating the civil rights and voting rights movement.

Harlem not only had the powerful Black Democratic submachine of Ray Jones and other factions, but also the powerful, church based independent Democratic machine of Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., pastor of the huge Abyssinian Baptist Church. In 1939, Powell was elected Manhattan's and New York City's first Black City Councilman under a proportional representation (PR) voting system. PR was approved by the City electorate as part of a 1936 Charter Reform Referendum to loosen the Democratic machine's stranglehold on the New York City Board of Alderman, subsequently renamed the City Council. In 1943 Powell backed Harvard lawyer and Communist Party leader Benjamin J. Davis of Harlem, as New York's second Black Councilman. Powell was then elected as New York's first Black Congressman in 1944, serving until he was defeated by Ray Jones' protégé, Assemblyman Charlie Rangel in 1970.

Black Brooklyn on the other hand, had a different political trajectory to its congressional ascendancy. West Indian Democratic Assemblywoman Shirley Chisholm, led the "regular" faction of founder Tom Jones' insurgent Unity Democratic Club (UDC) established in 1960. Thomas Russell Jones was an early radical and later political insurgent who defeated machine incumbent, Assemblyman Sam Berman in the increasingly Black Crown Heights district, in 1962. Jones then retired to a judgeship offered by the machine, and vacated his Assembly seat, which was won by Shirley Chisholm in 1964.

With her political mastermind Welsey MacD. Holder, Chisholm achieved Brooklyn's first Black congressional seat in 1968, riding the energy of the women's

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movement, the civil rights movement, and 1960's Black community activism. In the Democratic Primary, Chisholm beat Bed-Stuy machine Democrat, State Senator William C. Thompson, father of City Comptroller Bill Thompson. In the General Election, Chisholm beat National C.O.R.E. Director and civil rights leader James Farmer, who ran on the Republican line. Unlike De Priest and Mitchell in Chicago, and Powell in Harlem, Chisholm's victory was the direct result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and a congressional redistricting, specifically designed to politically empower Black Brooklyn.

Brooklyn's Radical and Reform Politics

Brooklyn as well, had a tradition of radical and independent politics. From 1916-1921, the heavily Jewish Brownsville-Crown Heights 23rd A.D. elected Abraham Isaac Shiplacoff, then Charles Solomon to the N.Y. State Legislature on the Socialist Party line. Solomon ran for Governor, US Senator and other public offices as a Socialist throughout the 1930's [2]. Under the new proportional representation voting system for City Council elections, Brooklyn elected Peter Cacchione on the Communist Party line in 1941, 1943 and 1945 until PR was abolished by another Citywide referendum in 1947. The Democratic and Republican Parties conducted a major propaganda campaign to eliminate third parties from the City Council and city politics, after the Socialist, Communist, American Labor Party (ALP), Fusion and Liberal parties gained nearly 40 % of City Council seats during the short reign of PR. Mayor Fiorello La Guardia, Congressman Vito Marcantonio and other progressive politicians and civic groups supported PR and the ALP.

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[2] Sources: www.political graveyard.com; and *New York Legislative Red Books.*

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La Guardia was elected Mayor, as a Republican-Fusion-ALP candidate, challenging the Democratic machine. His top political operative, Congressional successor, and protégé Vito Marcantonio, was a top leader of the ALP. In the 1946 general election, a Black woman, Ida Jackson, made a strong showing on the ALP line in Bed-Stuy's 17th A.D., against white incumbent machine Democrat, Assemblyman John Walsh., which had major ramifications discussed below. Clearly, Bed Stuy was engaged in third party politics.

Harlem and Brooklyn had radical political traditions of trade unionists, Garveyites, Communists, Socialists and American Labor Party (ALP) members, particularly during the 1930s Depression through the 1940s. The NAACP (a radical organization in DuBois' era), the National Negro Labor Council, A. Philip Randolph and his Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), with world headquarters in Harlem and a thriving Brooklyn Division, were all part of the political scene. A combination of rising post war Anti-Communism, government prosecution and imprisonment of Benjamin Davis and other radicals (the precursor of the 1950s McCarthy era), and a Democrat-Republican Party deal to impose two party hegemony upon the City Council and the electoral process, helped dampen multi-party, radical and independent political activity throughout New York City and nationally.

The First Black Political Succession – Bedford Stuyvesant

Betram Baker was born on the island of Nevis in the British West Indies and emigrated to Brooklyn, New York in 1915 at an early age (Howell 1997). In 1931, Baker established the United Action Democratic Association (UADA) in Bedford Stuyvesant,

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Brooklyn's first and most powerful Black Democratic Club, which reigned for nearly 40 years. From this political base, Baker received a political patronage appointment as the Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue in 1939. He and his UADA organization subsequently organized and brokered his way to become Brooklyn's first Black State Assemblyman from 1948 to 1970; and he was elected Brooklyn's first Black Democratic District leader in 1954.

Black Brooklyn had a similar trajectory to Harlem's political development as noted by West Indian scholar Calvin Holder (1990). In Black Brooklyn, the older African American leadership had a 100 year history with the Republican Party. Recently arrived West Indians had no visceral experience with the pro-slavery Democratic Party as did African Americans, who had been born in the South and escaped to the North with fresh memories of racial oppression. Since African Americans were there first, West Indians had much less access to the Republican hierarchy. Thus West Indians were more prone to negotiate with the Democratic Party. This dynamic did not go unnoticed by the Irish dominated Democratic machine, which reached out to exploit this difference in Black ethnic political orientations.

Thus, Baker's UADA began as a loyal sub-machine of the local white controlled 6th A.D. Regular Democratic Club headed by Irish District Leader Vincent Carney. The Brooklyn Democratic Party recognized two clubs in one district, the white controlled regular club headed by Carney, and the Black controlled Democratic club run by loyal lieutenant Bert Baker. Eventually, due to demographic change from a white to a Black community, and his skillful accommodationist politics, Baker and his UADA took control of the district (Gerson 1990).

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Inter-party competition and redistricting facilitated Baker's career when in the 1946 general election, Black women candidates on both the Republican line, (Maude Richardson) and American Labor Party line, (Ida Jackson) equaled the Democratic machine's white incumbent Assemblyman John Walsh's vote total. This signaled that this Assembly seat was ripe for a Black take over. To hold on to this Assembly seat in Bed-Stuy, which was becoming increasingly Blacker with the post-World War II southern migration, the Brooklyn Democratic Party and their local white leadership gave the party nomination to Bertram Baker in 1948. And in the 1954 State Assembly legislative redistricting, the new 6th A.D. was specially carved for Bertram Baker and his Bed-Stuy base, giving him the party leadership position, and he became Brooklyn's first Black Democratic District Leader, a very powerful party position at the time.

1953 – A Black Reform Breakthrough

A frequent political rival of Bertram Baker, Guyanese born former disciple of Hon. Marcus Garvey, Wesley McDonald Holder, was also a consummate political organizer who formed his own political organization, the Bedford Stuyvesant Political League in 1951. Holder consistently challenged the loyalist, gradualist machine politics of Assemblyman Bert Baker, which Holder and other progressives thought was moving too slowly to achieve Black political empowerment in Black Brooklyn. In 1953, Holder spearheaded a Bed-Stuy Black political insurgency and masterminded the election of Attorney Lewis Flagg as the first Black Civil Court Judge in Brooklyn. Holder and his group defeated a white candidate who was backed by the Irish controlled Brooklyn Democratic machine, and the UADA Black sub-machine headed by Assemblyman Bertram Baker. In 1957, Baker's club elected Brooklyn's first Black City Councilman, J.

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Daniel Diggs. Along with Baker's public and party positions, these marked major Black Brooklyn political milestones in the 1950s.

Social Movements in the 1930's and 1940's: Black Protest, Civil Rights, and Demand for Jobs

The internationally known "Scottsboro Boys" case of 1933 had roots in Black Brooklyn and caused major protest mobilizations in America's Black communities. An Alabama court tried, convicted and sentenced to death, nine young black males falsely accused of raping a white woman in a railroad box car. One of the key Scottsboro defense attorneys was Sam Leibowitz of Brownsville, Brooklyn. And one of the outspoken clergymen for the Scottsboro case was nationally renowned, Black activist preacher, Rev. Thomas Harten, pastor of Trinity Baptist Church in Bedford Stuyvesant and President of the National Afro Protective League (Wilder 2000).

Rev. Harten organized support rallies of thousands of Black citizens and attracted New York City Mayor O'Brien and Brooklyn Democratic Boss Mc Cooey to these rallies to show their political support for an issue critically important to the Black Brooklyn community, which was growing in political significance. Harten was also an outspoken critic of police brutality and racial discrimination. Both white and Black radicals, as well as the more conservative Black civil rights and clergy leaders, were actively involved in the Scottsboro affair. Another sensational case closer to home was the murder trial and execution of a young Black male building porter, Major Green, for the murder of a young white socialite, Mary Case in 1937. Most Black New Yorkers felt that the Black defendant's conviction was a miscarriage of justice, and many Black porters were fired throughout the city in a white retaliatory backlash.

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The election of Republican Fusion candidate and progressive Congressman Fiorello LaGuardia to the New York City mayoralty beginning in 1933, shook up the Irish Democratic dominance of city government and city politics, and caused major inter-ethnic competition among Jews, Italians and the Irish for the stakes and prizes of New York City government. Mayor LaGuardia gave some patronage and employment opportunities to Blacks, and built public housing developments such as Fort Greene Houses in Black Brooklyn. Massive federal financial resources under FDR's New Deal, were allocated to LaGuardia's control, in return for LaGuardia's political support.

Craig Wilder (2000), a scholar on Black Brooklyn history, argues that as Bed-Stuy became blacker during LaGuardia's administration, it put fewer police, housing, education and other municipal services into the area. The rise of Nazism abroad in the 1930s encouraged sympathizers among Irish and German ethnic groups in Brooklyn and New York City, epitomized by Father Charles Coughlin, national leader of the "Christian Front" organization, and his Brooklyn counterpart, Father John Cassidy. Nazi sympathizer "German American Bund" chapters were also formed in Brooklyn. Thus, as Bed Stuy and Central Brooklyn transitioned from an amalgam of white ethnic groups such as Irish, Jews, Germans and Italians, to an eventual massive Black ghetto enclave, sanctioned by government and private sector red-lining, the daily political discourse was charged with ethnic and racial tensions (Wilder 2000; Gerson 1990).

The "A" train, completed in 1938, and running from Harlem to Bed-Stuy and out to East New York and beyond, was a major conveyor for the Black population expansion of Brooklyn. As with a smaller trend around World War I, World War II once again created the impetus for a massive in-migration of southern Blacks seeking to fill wartime

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employment demands in northern urban industrial centers such as Brooklyn. According to the Census, there were 110,000 Blacks in Brooklyn in 1940. By 1950 that figure had doubled to 208,000.

The 1940's and 1950's:
WW II, Job Discrimination, and Jackie Robinson...

The 1940s [3] saw Brooklyn become one of the nation's largest war production centers, with nearly 100,000 jobs at the Brooklyn Navy Yard alone, and thousands more in Bush Terminal and Brooklyn's other industrial centers. The Brooklyn Urban League, and other progressive leadership, fought devastating racial discrimination in employment which locked Blacks out of Brooklyn's defense industries, where less than 3 percent of the labor force was Black, and that miniscule number served in menial levels such as laborers and helpers. There were just a few enlightened employers such as Murray Manufacturing and the Zip a Bag Corp. who lifted the color bar and employed Blacks in significant numbers (Wilder, 2000).

However, the vast majority of Brooklyn defense contractors, in collusion with discriminatory white trade unions, expressly prohibited the hiring of Blacks in order to preserve skilled jobs for whites. These companies were cited for racial discrimination by the federal War Manpower Commission and the Fair Employment Practices Commission, but there was no enforcement. In 1946 a National Urban League study indicated that with billions in federal Depression era and wartime construction dollars pumped into the local economy, there were only 30 Black unionized electricians, plumbers and plasterers

[3] On a personal note, the Flateau family tree was transplanted to Bedford Stuyvesant, along its Southern rooted, African American journey, on Brooklyn Day, 1946, according to the family matriarch, Jeanne Flateau. We have grown in the Black diaspora. Sixty years later in 2005, four generations of Caribbean-American, Continental African, and African American Flateau progeny, reside in Black Brooklyn.

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in all of New York City. Returning Black war veterans fared far worse than their white counterparts in obtaining peacetime employment (Wilder 2000:167-74). Ironically, while the color bar was being rigidly enforced in the job market, it was lifted in professional sports when the Brooklyn Dodgers hired Jackie Robinson away from the Negro Baseball League in 1947 to integrate major league baseball.

Black Ghettoization and School Integration Battles

The 1940s and 1950s saw two major trends impact upon Black Brooklyn's social and political landscape. First, there was the ghettoization of Brooklyn's Black population, where over 60 percent of all Blacks in Brooklyn were red-lined into the single Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood. Ironically, this ghettoization produced the demographic foundation for Brooklyn's first Black Assembly District and subsequent political districts. Secondly, as a direct consequence of this Black ghettoization and the creation of a de facto "apartheid system" in the local public schools, the quality education and school integration struggles were launched by Rev. Milton Galamison, pastor of Siloam Presbyterian Church in Bed-Stuy, the local NAACP and others (Taylor 1997). This social protest movement mirrored the national civil rights movement which was in high gear at the time, challenging the very same "separate but equal" issues crystallized in the *Brown v. Board of Education* US Supreme Court decision.

During and after World War II, war-time manpower demands in the Brooklyn Navy Yard and the borough's factories attracted a steady Black in-migration from the South. First in one and then two state assembly districts covering Bedford-Stuyvesant and Crown Heights, Brooklyn absorbed Black migrants mainly from the South, and also Afro-Caribbean immigrants from the West Indies. A third stream was the relocation of

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Blacks which was also underway, from the crowded Harlem ghetto to Bed Stuy, facilitated by the recently constructed "A" train subway line (Osofsky 1967).

As in other large American cities, these massive Black population migrations were channeled into narrowly defined residential areas by the racist institutional forces of ghettoization and red-lining, orchestrated by real estate and banking interests with the tacit approval and complicity of the government and white civil society (Connolly 1977; Massey and Denton 1993; Osofky 1967; and Wilder 2000). Today, nearly one million Blacks live in adjacent neighborhoods in Central and East Brooklyn, making it the largest contiguous Black community or "ghetto" in the United States, and indeed in North America. Though Harlem claimed that distinction beginning in the early 1900s, Black Brooklyn's population far surpassed Harlem by 1970.

The Home Owner's Loan Corporation (HOLC) was launched as a New Deal initiative in 1933 to forestall homeowner bankruptcies during the Depression, and it included the major mortgage banks, realtors, insurance, utility and other major corporations in its Brooklyn operation. HOLC also worked closely with the Mortgage Conference of New York (MCNY), another powerful corporate umbrella which controlled and directed real estate development and financing. HOLC's and MCNY's main impact on Brooklyn real estate and residential development from the 1930s to the 1950s was to reinforce existing racially restrictive covenants; to instigate disinvestment and red-lining of North and Central Brooklyn, creating a Black ghetto; and to promote investment and residential development in southern Brooklyn and suburban New York. Thus this powerful web of public and private partners constructed the institutional and economic framework beginning in the Depression era 20th century, which created the

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Black ghettoization of Central Brooklyn with all its devastating impacts and socio-economic ramifications, which are still powerfully affecting Black Brooklyn in the 21st century (Wilder 2000:175-217; Connolly 1977).

Part II: The 1960's to the 1980's

Black Brooklyn Churches: A Base of the Northern Civil Rights Movement

Beyond the rich historical protest tradition practiced in Black Brooklyn for centuries, Black church leadership brought the 1950s southern based civil rights movement to Brooklyn. Many prominent Black Brooklyn preachers were transplanted southerners as were their congregations, and they maintained close southern connections. The nationally known Rev. Sandy Ray, pastor of Cornerstone Baptist Church was a personal friend of Atlanta, Georgia based "Daddy King," Martin Luther King's father. Rev. William Jones, a Kentucky native, has been pastor of Bethany Baptist Church for some 40 years, and was head of the Brooklyn chapter of "Operation Breadbasket" in the 1960s. This was the northern arm of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Rev. Gardner C. Taylor, a Louisiana native, pastored Concord Baptist Church in Bed-Stuy for nearly 40 years until his recent retirement. Along with Rev. George Lawrence, pastor of Antioch Baptist Church, also in Bed-Stuy, he was a close ally of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. With a large contingent of progressive pastors, they seceded from the National Baptist Convention (NBC) in the 1960s, after a major internal power struggle with the old line, accommodationist, southern Black pastoral leadership. Taylor, Lawrence and others challenged NBC, for not taking a stronger stand in support

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of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the national civil rights movement. Out of this Black Brooklyn led insurgency, Gardner Taylor, George Lawrence, and others formed the Progressive National Baptist Convention (PNBC) (Taylor 1994).

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Cornerstone pastor Rev. Dr. Sandy Ray was a close political ally of Gov. Nelson Rockefeller; and Concord Baptist pastor, Rev. Dr. Gardner Taylor was a close political ally of Mayor Robert Wagner. In fact, Taylor was so politically close to the Mayor, that Wagner named Taylor as part of a troika to run the Brooklyn Democratic Party after Brooklyn Democratic County Leader William McCooey failed to back Wagner's successful re-election bid in 1957.

The Reverends Milton Galamison, Sandy Ray, Gardner Taylor, Bill Jones and other Black Brooklyn clergy were social movement oriented and politically active in the 1950's and 1960's. Brooklyn's Black preachers, lay leaders and others formed an interlocking network of leadership of the Brooklyn Urban League, the Brooklyn NAACP, Brooklyn CORE, and other groups and protest movements, on the battlegrounds of Brooklyn and beyond. Black Brooklyn leadership led boycotts and picket lines of major white owned Fulton Street and downtown businesses from the 1930's to the 1980's to bring about fair employment practices and to protest police brutality.

Rev. Bill Jones, Black Brooklyn clergy and Operation Breadbasket (Rev. Jesse Jackson was national coordinator) protested the lily white trade union construction of SUNY Downstate Medical Center in 1963; supported demonstrations at the 1964 World's Fair in Flushing, Queens to draw attention to racial discrimination in employment, housing and education; and picketed Fulton St. and Downtown businesses for failing to hire Blacks (Taylor 1997).

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Rev. Milton Galamison, pastor of Siloam Presbyterian Church, led the struggle, along with the Brooklyn NAACP and others, for quality education and school desegregation in Central Brooklyn throughout the 1950s, including a highly successful, citywide school boycott in 1964, where tens of thousands of parents kept their children home from school. This was a precursor to the 1968 Ocean Hill-Brownsville "community control" struggles, pitting local Black parents, educators and community leaders against the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), for control of the local public school system, over how to provide a quality education for Ocean Hill-Brownsville's children. There were also major racial and ethnic dimensions to this struggle because many teachers and administrators were white and Jewish, as epitomized by Albert Shanker and the UFT; most of the parents and children were Black; and some of the key community leaders and educators were considered Black radicals (Al Vann, Sonny Carson, Leslie Campbell a.k.a. Jitu Weusi) and others (Gittell and Berube 1969; Taylor 1997; McAdams 1984).

Another seminal '60's event was the Bedford –Stuyvesant urban uprising shortly after the Harlem uprising in Summer 1964, which was part of a larger pattern of national urban uprisings by inner city Blacks in cities across America throughout the 1960s. Persistent reasons cited by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ("The Kerner Commission Report") and others for these Black urban insurrections included: substandard housing, racial discrimination, lack of employment, poor public education systems, and police brutality in the Black community. From the 1970s to the present, there have been a series of high profile police brutality cases in Black Brooklyn and other communities of New York City, which have spurred the Black Brooklyn protest tradition

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to action. Key actors included: activist preachers Rev. Herbert Daughtry; Rev. Al Sharpton and his National Action Network; Assemblyman Al Vann; Sam Pinn, head of Brooklyn CORE; Black activist and former Brooklyn CORE leader, the late Sonny Carson and Viola Plummer, Job Mashariki and the Black Veterans for Social Justice; the Nation of Islam; and the Orthodox Muslim Black community (Daughtry 1997).

The Second Black Political Succession – Crown Heights

The 1954 State Assembly redistricting which created the predominantly Black 6th A.D. for Bert Baker also created an adjoining significantly Black, 17th A.D. to the south, covering Crown Heights and part of eastern Bed-Stuy. By 1960, Thomas Russell Jones established Black Brooklyn's second powerful Black political club, the Unity Democratic Club (UDC), with an interracial membership. In 1962 they defeated incumbent Assemblyman Sam Berman, with Thomas R. Jones being elected Brooklyn's second Black Assemblyman. Jones and UDC protégés included later Assemblyman and District Leader Thomas Fortune, State Senator and later Judge James Shaw, Assemblywoman, District leader and America's first Black Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, and District leader and later City Councilman Enoch Williams.

There was major speculation that Tom Jones would become Brooklyn's first Black Congressman. But after just two years in the Assembly, he accepted a State Supreme Court nomination, and retired from electoral politics, paving the way for UDC leader Shirley Chisholm, to be elected to the State Assembly, and from there to the U.S. Congress in 1968. Woodrow Lewis, supported by Shirley Chisholm, was elected to the Crown Heights Assembly seat, now the 43rd Assembly District, in 1972. Assemblyman

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Lewis remained until he was defeated by Clarence Norman for that seat in 1980, with Vann and Owens backing. Assemblyman Norman remains in this seat until the present. UDC's Democratic Male District Leader, Thomas Fortune was elected to a Bushwick, and East Bed-Stuy Assembly District in 1968, succeeding Chisholm.

UDC had become a loyal arm of the Democratic machine and Fortune's Assembly District was redistricted and merged with a Brownsville district in 1976, while the Bushwick portion was used to create Brooklyn's first Hispanic Assembly District for Victor Robles, staffer to Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm. Running in a new East Bed-Stuy / Brownsville district, Tom Fortune was defeated by Thomas Boyland, who had the major backing of Owens and Vann, who were acquiring more political building blocks for their insurgent movement.

The Third Black Political Succession – Brownsville

The State Assembly redistricting of 1964 saw two powerful Democratic District Leaders, Meade Esposito (County Leader and "Boss" of Brooklyn from 1968 to 1983) and his Co-Leader Shirley Weiner, follow their Italian and Jewish political base away from Brownsville, to the newly built up areas to the south, Canarsie and Flatlands. This left open a new Brownsville Assembly District with a dramatically growing Black population spurred by the massive evacuation of Jews from Brownsville, and the massive build up of public housing developments. This new district elected long time Democratic machine loyalist, African American attorney Sam Wright, who was also a member of Bed-Stuy's powerhouse Concord Baptist Church.

Sam Wright became Ocean Hill - Brownsville's first Black Democratic District Leader. He controlled major portions of Brownsville's anti-poverty programs and

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became Brownsville's first Black State Assemblyman, and first Black City Councilman. In 1976, City Councilman Sam Wright launched a major challenge to Shirley Chisholm and her mastermind Wesley MacD. Holder for control of Brooklyn's first Black Congressional seat. Wright lost to Chisholm in that seminal Black Brooklyn political contest for political control of Black Brooklyn. Afterwards, Wright was convicted of improprieties involving anti-poverty program funds, and he was removed from the City Council. He was succeeded in the City Council by Enoch Williams, a loyal Democratic regular and UDC leader, who remained in office until he was term limited in 2001 (see "Boylands" below).

Sam Wright's political protégés and successors included Assemblyman Charles Hamilton, and Assemblywoman and later Brooklyn's first Black female Deputy Borough President, Jeannette Gadsen. Sam Wright's local regular Democratic organization also engaged in titanic political clashes with Major Owens and his insurgent Central Brooklyn Mobilization (CBM) political organization for control of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville political turf. Owens and CBM won out. Owens was elected to the State Senate from the area in 1974 and was elected to the newly drawn 2nd Black Brooklyn congressional district in 1982, as the Coalition for Community Empowerment (CCE) candidate, where he remains until the present. Congressman Owens announced that he will retire in 2006 and he is supporting his son, Chris Owens. Running again for Owens' seat is Councilwoman Yvette Clarke, daughter of Hon. Una Clarke; Councilmember Tracy Boyland, daughter of former Assemblyman William Boyland. (Clarke and Boyland ran against Owens in 2004 and lost.) State Senator Carl Andrews, State Assemblyman Nick Perry, and others are considering this race.

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At the local level, CBM supported Thomas Boyland in 1976, successfully knocking off Wright protégé Assemblywoman Gadsen, and Assemblyman Tom Fortune, two incumbents forced to run in the same newly redistricted Assembly seat. Thomas Boyland died suddenly within two years, and his brother William Boyland replaced him in the Assembly until 2002. William Boyland then retired and successfully supported his son William Boyland Jr. to be elected to the State Assembly. When Councilmember Enoch Williams was term limited in 2001, Assemblyman William Boyland supported his daughter Tracy Boyland, who was elected to the City Council from the Ocean Hill – Brownsville community. The Boyland family has maintained the 55th A.D. seat for nearly 30 years, starting out as insurgents and protégés of Owens. The Boylands are now regulars, and they are currently engaged in political warfare with Congressman Owens, perhaps in part driven by the fact that Councilmember Boyland is term limited in 2005.

The Fourth Black Political Succession – East New York

With the advent of the 1972 State Assembly redistricting, a new East New York district was created, the 40th A.D., when Kings County Democratic Leader Meade Esposito decided to move his district further south and east into the Canarise, Mill Basin and Flatlands neighborhoods creating the 39th A.D. This seat captured the newer neighborhoods of his Italian and Jewish American constituents, as the Black and Hispanic populations exploded into East New York. Black Panamanian Assemblyman Edward Griffith, a loyal political ally of Meade Esposito and his Co-District Leader Frances Abbracimiento, represented this area from 1972 until 2000, when he was defeated in a local political coup by now Assemblywoman Diane Gordon, who was backed by Congressman Ed Towns.

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Priscilla Wooten, also a loyal ally of Esposito and Abbraciamiento, and a powerhouse with the local Community School Board and Community Board, was the first Black Female Democratic District Leader and competitor of Male Democratic District Leader, and since 1982, Congressman Ed Towns. Wooten was also the first Black City Council member from East New York. She was forced out by term limits in 2001, and succeeded by insurgent City Council candidate Charles Barron, a protégé of activist preacher Rev. Herbert Daughtry.

Towns, Griffith and Wooten formed the original Black political troika in East New York, along with Male District Leader Da Costa Headley also playing a major role. They worked sometimes as allies, but often as rivals, regularly competing for political control over School Board politics, District Leaderships, judgeships and support for incumbents and political candidates.

Community Mobilization Against Police Brutality

Rev. Herb Daughtry, pastor of the House of the Lord Pentecostal Church, and the National Black United Front which he co-founded, grew out of major community protest demonstrations in Brooklyn, New York City and nationally over a series police brutality incidents throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In one such incident in a Brooklyn housing development in 1976, white Police Officer Robert Torsney was exonerated in the killing of a Black teenager, Randy Evans, with the legal defense that Officer Torsney had a "psychomotor epileptic seizure" which caused him to fire his weapon, killing the unarmed Black youth.

In response, clergy, community leaders and activists marched on Abraham & Strauss, one of downtown Brooklyn's major businesses for several months. This resulted

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in a scholarship fund, after school and summer jobs for youth. Daughtry's leadership allies in this movement were Sam Pinn of Brooklyn C.O.R.E., Jitu Weusi of "The East" organization, and Assemblyman Al Vann of Bed- Stuy. Much of this protest mobilization also carried over into voter registration drives and political campaigns throughout Black Brooklyn, closely mirroring the "Protest Is Not Enough" trajectory described by Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1984, 1997) in other urban minority communities.

Black Brooklyn: Congressional Wars

On the heels of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, in the late 1960s and 1970s came the first wave of voting rights litigation in Black Brooklyn and beyond, pushing for greater Black political representation. One of the early voting rights cases helped create the "Chisholm" district in 1968.

In 1974, Black Brooklyn's congressional districts were drawn north-south, splitting the ascendant Black voting power of Bed-Stuy and Crown Heights in half, and attaching major white voting communities of Brooklyn Heights, Greenpoint and Williamsburg to these Black voting rights congressional districts. Chisholm represented the eastern 12th C.D., and white millionaire Fred Richmond represented the western 14th congressional district. In the 1970s, Black insurgent candidate, Dr. Bernard Gifford, with significant Black community mobilization, twice attempted unsuccessfully, to unseat Congressman Fred Richmond, in an effort to liberate the 14th C.D. In 1976, Sam Wright, with machine backing, decided to go after Shirley Chisholm to become "king of the hill" in Black Brooklyn, but Wright lost as well.

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Vann, Owens and their political organizations, VIDA and CBM supported local insurgencies and would knock off four Black and Jewish Democratic submachine incumbent Assemblymen from 1974 – 1980: Cal Williams, Woodrow Lewis, Tom Fortune, and Harvey Strelzin, in Bed Stuy, Crown Heights, Brownsville and Fort Greene; and replace them with Al Vann, Clarence Norman, Tom (who died in office) then William Boyland, and Roger Green.

In 1981, the CCE, the State Legislative Black and Puerto Rican Caucus (Vann headed both groups), and voting rights allies, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Puerto Rican LDEF, and others, convinced the federal courts to suspend the City Council elections until additional minority seats were drawn (*Andrews v. Koch* and *Herron v. Koch*). With this coalition, the CCE reached a pinnacle in Albany in the 1982 congressional and state legislative redistricting round, with aggressive voting rights litigation (*Flateau v. Anderson*), political negotiation, and voter mobilization. The CCE slate won two newly drawn congressional seats with Major Owens and Ed Towns; a new senate seat with Velmanette Montgomery defeating machine incumbent, Anna Jefferson; and re-elections in their four assembly districts. Thus they politically represented the majority of Black Brooklyn.

In the 1982 congressional redistricting round, Chisholm retired, and Vann, then head of the Albany Black and Puerto Rican Caucus, and head of the CCE, pushed through two east-west drawn congressional districts, which better encompassing the growing Black Brooklyn population, and made it politically feasible to elect two Black congress members. (Many thought that Vann would run for Congress, but the "CCE"

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strategy, correctly or not, was to add more "building blocks" below, and for Vann to then run for Borough President in 1985.) Background these congressional races follows.

Early in his career in the 1960s, Ed Towns was a political insurgent with several failed runs for local Democratic district leader in East New York. He eventually made his peace with Meade Esposito and the Democratic organization, and was elected the first Black Male Democratic District Leader in East New York. He was then appointed Brooklyn's first Black Deputy Borough President by Borough President Howard Golden. With Congresswoman Chisholm's retirement at the time of the 1982 congressional redistricting, Towns became the candidate of the CCE. They would subsequently realize that they had politically miscalculated that Towns would then back Vann for Borough President in 1985.

Ed Towns and Major Owens were elected to newly drawn congressional seats in 1982. Towns won against incumbent, convicted white Congressman and millionaire Fred Richmond in a newly drawn district. And State Senator Major Owens won a seminal battle against Democratic machine maverick, State Senator Vander Beatty, a protégé of Hon. Shirley Chisholm and Mac Holder. This huge new Black political landscape was significantly the result of a voting rights redistricting challenge led by Assemblyman Vann and the state legislative Black and Puerto Rican Caucus. Their lawsuit, *Flateau v. Anderson,* was argued by attorneys Paul Wooten and Esmeralda Simmons, and ruled on by Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall (I served as plaintiff and senior researcher.).

An early voting rights lawsuit, *United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg v. Carey* (1974) was a complaint by the Hasidic Williamsburg community against having its voting power split between two Black assembly districts, the Bed-Stuy 56th A.D. and the

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Fort Greene 57th A.D. after the early 1970s redistricting rounds. These lines were drawn to protect machine backed, white incumbent Harvey Strelzin and Black Assemblyman Cal Williams, by attaching favorable Hasidic voting blocs to counterweight the growing Black reform insurgencies within these assembly districts. Nonetheless, Al Vann and Roger Green won these assembly seats in 1974 and 1980 respectively, after earlier failed but strong insurgencies in 1972 and 1978 respectively. In the early voting rights era, it was acceptable to divide white communities but not "protected class" groups such as Black and Hispanic communities. In the 1990s, this approach was deemed "political apartheid" and was outlawed by the Reagan-Bush appointed U.S. Supreme Court.

Community Education Struggles in Ocean Hill-Brownsville

Rev. Milton Galamison, Pastor of Bed Stuy's Siloam Presbyterian Church, and appointed Board of Education member, led major citywide school boycotts protesting the poor quality of public schools for Black children and he pushed for school integration, borrowing strategies and tactics from the civil rights movement (Taylor 1997). City government failed to respond, and this radicalized community groups further, to demand "community control" of local public schools to improve the quality of teachers and curriculum. The Ford Foundation funded a "decentralization" experiment, devolving some power and input to local parents on local advisory boards in Harlem, the Lower East Side and Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Rev. C. Herbert Oliver, a transplanted southern civil rights activist, was Board Chair, Rhody McCoy was the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district administrator, and educator Al Vann was the educational administrator of IS 271.

The African American Teachers Association (Vann was President) weighed in heavily on this educational experiment, along with parent activists, progressive clergy

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such as Fr. John Powis, pastor of the Brownsville Catholic parish, Our lady of Presentation; community leaders, student activists, Black nationalists such as Sonny Carson, and Leslie Campbell a.k.a. Jitu Weusi. Parents and activists espoused an afro-centric educational program for the predominantly Black school children. Major conflicts ensued with the United Federation of Teachers union head Albert Shanker, over questions of parental and community input, teacher supervision, job security and instructional delivery by a predominantly white teaching staff. There was heated rhetoric, charges of racism and anti-semitism, and this experiment in community governance of local schools was halted (Gittell and Berube 1969). One outcome was the New York State Decentralization Law of 1969, which established community school board elections and school board authority over the K-8th grade public schools, including hiring of superintendents and school principals.

Some politicians in Black Brooklyn seized upon school board control as a patronage mill rather than an educational enterprise; and educational and community activists competed as well, in the school board elections which started in 1971. Learning the importance of politics in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment and school board elections, some community activists then gravitated from school board elections to the electoral arena. This was how the "Vannguard" was born.

From Ocean Hill to School Boards to the Legislature: The Birth of Bed Stuy's "Vannguard"

For 40 years, Bertram Baker reigned politically in Bed-Stuy from 1931 to 1970. His second successor, Assemblyman, now Council member Al Vann, has held office for the past 30 years. For a brief interregnum from 1970-74, William Thompson (now a

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retired judge and father of City Comptroller Bill Thompson), and his Stuyvesant Heights Regular Democratic Club struggled for power with local businessman and Assemblyman Cal Williams. But both factions underestimated the community activism turned electoral power of the "Vanguard" independent Democrats, headed by school administrator Al Vann. He and his young, energetic field troops (Roger Green, Michael Nairne, Roger Fortune, John Flateau, Ella McQueen and many others) were steeled by the "School Decentralization" battles, Black nationalist, and civil rights struggles; and recent victories in the new Community School Board elections in 1971.

Vann ran against Assemblyman Cal Williams in the 1972 Democratic Primary. The political novice Vannguard, was knocked off the ballot in the Primary and had to petition again, to establish a "Vannguard Independent Party" line on the ballot in the 1972 General Election. With serious local organizing, Vann polled nearly 3,000 votes on the independent line "down ballot," while Bed-Stuy simultaneously voted overwhelmingly on the Democratic line in the presidential election.

With Albany leadership backing in the 1974 Assembly redistricting, Assemblyman Cal Williams added Hasidic Jewish Williamsburg election districts to the Bed Stuy district to neutralize the "Vanguard," but to no avail. Veteran civil rights activists Carlos Russell, Tyrone Woods, Hudson Reid, John Flateau and others were key leadership of the Vanguard movement, some of whom were young college grads and students who quickly honed their political skills in these and other political struggles.

Encouraged by the 1972 results, Vann ran again for the Assembly in 1974, temporarily teaming with civic leader Carl Butler as his District Leader candidate. Vann and Butler won despite a Williams engineered redistricting which added several

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Orthodox Jewish Williamsburg election districts to bloc vote for Williams and politically counter Vann's Bed-Stuy base. But after the Vann-Butler victory, Butler joined forces with the Stuyvesant Heights Regular Democratic Club (William Thompson's base) as their Male District Leader. Butler joined forces with powerhouse Evelyn Dixson, the club's Female Leader, key member of Cornerstone Baptist Church, and a key player in a powerful matriarchal leadership network of Black women's civic groups. Vann and the Vannguard separated from Butler and his Club after their short political marriage; and had a major political showdown in 1976, to determine who would politically dominate Bed Stuy. And Vann defeated Butler in an extremely close election.

Vann was knocked off the ballot again in 1980, and was re-elected on the Liberal Party line in a presidential year. He was one of New York's few politicians to accomplish such a feat, and "Vanguard" became a legend and power because of its political resiliency, voter education, and political organizing skills. Vann served in the Assembly until 2001, when he ran for his Co-Leader Annette Robinson's term limited City Council seat in a "political swap" which attracting some community protest. Annette Robinson now represents Bed Stuy in the State Assembly; and Vann is the City Council representative, a run of 30 years in political office, to date.

The Birth of "Central Brooklyn Mobilization:" Major Owens, Sam Wright and the Battle of Brownsville

Major Owens a community leader in Brownsville, followed a trajectory based on his personal experience with social movement politics. Owens, a librarian by profession, came to the Brownsville Public Library from Memphis, Tennessee where he had been active in the civil rights movement. He was elected leader of Brooklyn CORE, and was Mayor Lindsay's Commissioner overseeing the City's anti-poverty programs. They were

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a multi-million, federally funded programmatic "empire" in every major Black and Hispanic neighborhood. Black Brooklyn's share included Central Brooklyn Model Cities (which under Chisholm's reign, had key Caribbean leadership such as Horace Morancie); Bed-Stuy Youth In Action, Brownsville Community Corporation and other programs. Manhattan had HARYOU Act, Mobilization For Youth and other funded programs.

Owens ran and was elected to the State Senate in 1974. As his group moved into anti-poverty and school board politics in Ocean Hill Brownsville, Owens' arch political rival became District Leader, Assemblyman, then Councilman Sam Wright, and his Democratic submachine.

Wright built a power base through a network of anti-poverty programs, the local School Board, and his membership in the powerful Concord Baptist Church. Wright went for "all the marbles" in 1976, and lost his bid to defeat Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm. Then Chisholm and Mac Holder attempted to assert their political hegemony over Black Brooklyn politicians through a short lived political umbrella called the "Leadership Alliance of Minority Politicians" (LAMP), but it did not take hold. Wright's political demise, paved the way for Owens, Boyland and their CBM to become the dominant political force in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. [4]

[4] Investigative reporters Wayne Barrett and Jack Newfield at the *Village Voice,* were anti-machine muckrakers, and wrote extensively about Black Brooklyn politics in this era.

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Part III: The 1980s to the Present

The 5th Black Political Succession – Fort Greene

Following State Assembly redistrictings in 1972 and 1974, there were several Black political insurgencies by Vannguard protégé Roger Green and others, against white incumbent Democratic machine loyalists, Assemblyman Harvey Strelzin and Democratic District Leader Abe Gerges. In 1978, African American Dr. Bernard Gifford, Board of Education Deputy Chancellor, who had returned to his Bed Stuy roots from Rochester, New York unsuccessfully challenged white millionaire Congressman Fred Richmond. However, Gifford's congressional campaign did help create political momentum in the predominantly Black 57th A.D. In an historic election cycle in the 1980 Democratic Assembly Primary, African American Roger Green had to run against incumbent Jewish Assemblyman Harvey Strelzin three times, including two court ordered Primary re-runs, before Green was finally certified as the winner. In early 2004, Green resigned due to fiscal improprieties, but he was re-elected in the general election.

Minority Leadership at the Board of Ed

The early 1980s saw a Black Brooklyn led movement to have Black Deputy Chancellor Thomas Minter appointed the city's first Black Schools Chancellor. Mayor Koch instead appointed the less educationally qualified Robert Wagner, but the groundwork was laid for a succession of several Black and Latino Schools Chancellors (Tony Alvarado, Richard Green, Nathan Quinones, and Rudy Crew) for the first time in the city's history. Whereas, the City's public school population had been predominantly Black and Hispanic since the 1960s.

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The Rise and Fall of the CCE: From Mobilization to Deconstruction

Vann in the Assembly and Owens in the State Senate entered Albany together in 1974, continually challenging the Democratic County machine and their local Black submachines. They seemed to have a mutual support agreement, and co-led the political offensive which formally evolved into the "Coalition for Community Empowerment" (CCE) by 1981. With their elected officials, political strategists, election and voting rights attorneys, master technicians, and political organizers, they knocked off several local incumbents and won open political districts they helped to create through redistricting. CCE attorneys and political researchers carefully monitored and analyzed case law, census, and election data which documented the changing demographic and political trends, and signaled new areas of political opportunity.

Black Brooklyn reformers realized that even after the 1965 Voting Rights Act, redistricting had been used to block, contain and dilute Black Brooklyn's voting power and representation in the 1970s and 1980s to protect white and Black machine incumbents. The CCE countered with an agenda of their own, using voting rights research, litigation and negotiation as a political weapon, with aggressive political leadership to extract a maximum number of political districts, not just for Black Brooklyn, but for communities of color throughout the state; and not just for congressional and state legislative redistricting in Albany, but for New York City Council redistricting as well.

The CCE was tested in another major political battle in 1982, when retiring Congresswoman Chisholm and her political director Mac Holder supported their protégé and machine maverick, State Senator Vander Beatty in the newly drawn 12th CD. Owens

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and the CCE defeated Beatty, who was subsequently convicted and jailed for attempting to rig the election with fraudulent voter records.

Also in 1982, the CCE successfully backed Lieut. Gov. Mario Coumo for Governor. He was seen as a progressive, especially in relation to political rival Mayor Ed Koch and his stringent policies towards minority communities. CCE organizing and Black Brooklyn votes were key to Coumo's primary, and close general election victories. As a result, the CCE gained political, policy and patronage access to Governor Coumo, and some CCE professionals joined his administration at high levels.

In 1984, the CCE made another astute move, providing the statewide leadership for Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign chaired by Assemblyman Al Vann. Meanwhile, most of the City's Black Democrats, particularly Harlem, lined up behind Vice President Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro. The Jackson grassroots campaign registered thousands of voters, and collected more petition signatures to put Jackson and his delegates on the ballot, than the Mondale campaign in New York. And Jackson's New York delegation was the largest in the nation. Nonetheless, the CCE did not manage their internal politics sufficiently well, and factions developed which would soon haunt them. The CCE also did a poor job of incorporating, assisting and co-opting non-CCE incumbents, and Caribbean insurgents seeking to expand their political representation.

Vann and the CCE's political trajectory was rising, and 1985 was a watershed year. Most of the CCE endorsed his candidacy for the Borough Presidency in 1985, reasoning that enough 'building block' elected officials were in place from below, to carry a borough wide race against a split opposition. However, Congressman Towns and others complained of heavy handed treatment by Vann's staff (It was alleged that Towns

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was barred from a meeting with Jesse Jackson; and other incidents). Towns refused to support Vann against Towns' former boss Howard Golden, after Vann had backed Towns for Congress against Democratic machine incumbent millionaire Fred Richmond in 1982. Vann's opponents were Borough President and County Leader Howard Golden, and formidable challenger Sen. Marty Markowitz, who was backed by Meade Esposito's protégé, Canarsie District Leader and powerful Assemblyman Tony Genovesi.

Coming off of the political momentum of the Jackson '84 campaign, Vann led a citywide Black political umbrella known as the "Coalition for a Just New York" (CJNY), whose purpose was to identify a consensus mayoral candidate (preferably Black) to challenge incumbent Mayor Ed Koch. After CJNY's first choice Basil Paterson turned down the group's support, Vann promoted Herman Badillo's candidacy, whom Vann thought could also deliver the Brooklyn Hispanic vote for his Borough President's race.

But Black Harlem and the Puerto Rican Bronx have a long standing political rivalry, including Percy Sutton supporting Abe Beame over Badillo for the mayoralty in 1973 (Sutton assumed that the Party would reciprocate and support his candidacy in 1977, -- but they did not). Badillo and Sutton also ran against each other in the 1977 mayoral primary (Koch won after a runoff with Mario Coumo). It was felt by Brooklynites that Harlem blocked Badillo, and strong armed the CJNY endorsement of Harlem Assemblyman Herman Farrell. Vann, Black Brooklyn, and CJNY's other political problem was that a prominent group of Brooklyn based West Indians led by Dr. Lamuel Stanislaus, had been left out of the political calculus. They formed "Caribbeans for Koch," endorsing the Mayor for re-election, and further cleaving Black Brooklyn's political base (Rogers, 2004). Farrell lost badly to Koch and Carol Bellamy in the

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Democratic Primary. In Brooklyn, Vann came in third behind Golden and Markowitz, and the political fortunes of Vann and the CCE declined significantly at that point.

When Jackson ran for President again in 1988, Harlem seized the initiative. Some thought this was because Harlem perceived that Vann and Brooklyn was becoming too powerful. Manhattan Borough President David Dinkins chaired Jackson's presidential campaign, with Black Brooklyn and the CCE playing a key supportive role. Jackson's first place in New York City in 1988 signaled the possibilities of a Black mayoral candidacy in 1989. Dinkins became the consensus candidate. He beat incumbent Mayor Ed Koch in the primary; and went on to defeat Rudolph Giuliani by barely 50,000 votes out of 1.8 million cast, in one of closest mayoral elections in City history (see Flateau 1998; and Levitt 2001).

The legislative redistricting cycles in the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2002-3 were banner periods for expanding political representation in Black Brooklyn and beyond. Black Brooklyn led the voting rights struggles in the legislatures, the courts, the Justice Department, the Board of Elections, and the ground wars in Black Brooklyn's election districts, with an unprecedented level of grassroots political mobilization. The chief political umbrella for this effort was Black Brooklyn's Coalition for Community Empowerment (CCE), which was founded in 1981 in part to use the redistricting process to increase Black political representation in Central Brooklyn. The CCE's local organizing efforts complemented the political struggles and voting rights litigation around congressional, state legislative and City council redistricting which was waged by the 26 member Black and Puerto Rican Caucus of the State Legislature headed by

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Brooklyn's Assemblyman Al Vann in 1981-82 (I was the Caucus Executive Director and the CCE's chief political technician and organizer during this period.)

In a few short years from 1974 -1982, the CCE and its forbears changed Black Brooklyn's political landscape. Vann, Green, Boyland, Norman, Owens, Towns and Montgomery (4 Assembly members, 2 Congress members, a State Senator, and District Leaders) had each defeated Brooklyn Democratic machine backed incumbents in vigorous contests in local political districts with grassroots campaigns and each others' help. The original CCE leadership spanned several Black neighborhoods and political organizations: Bedford Stuyvesant, with Assemblyman and District Leader Al Vann, District Leader Annette Robinson and the Vanguard Independent Democratic Association, VIDA, 56th AD; Brownsville, with State Senator Major Owens, Assemblyman Thomas Boyland and Central Brooklyn Mobilization, 55th AD; Fort Greene - Clinton Hill with Assemblyman Roger Green, State Senator Velmanette Montgomery and Partners for Progress, 57th AD; and Crown Heights with Assemblyman Clarence Norman and the Thurgood Marshall Club, 43rd AD.

The CCE used voting rights litigation and redistricting as tools for political empowerment; and recruited, screened, endorsed and ran their own slates of political candidates, with home grown technical, legal and financial training and support (almost all early CCE incumbents would later rely on the Democratic Party for this support.).

It should be noted that the CCE's power base included a majority, but not all of Black elected officials in Brooklyn. Despite several efforts in the 1980s, the CCE was not successful in defeating Black incumbent City Council members Mary Pinkett and Enoch Williams representing Fort Greene, Bed-Stuy, Crown Heights and Brownsville.

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Nor was the Towns faction able to defeat City Council member Priscilla Wooten representing East New York. Mary Pinkett, a former local president in DC 37, had strong labor support which sustained her tenure. Priscilla Wooten had strong ties to the Brooklyn machine and Mayors Koch and Giuliani, which sustained her tenure. City council redistricting had deliberately split Bed-Stuy between the Pinkett and machine backed Enoch Williams seats so that Vann and his powerful VIDA organization could not politically dominate one Bed-Stuy council seat.

Jesse Jackson's first place in New York City in the 1988 presidential primary signaled the political possibilities for the mayoral race in 1989 [5] Black Brooklyn provided major campaign leadership and the margin of victory in electing New York City's first African American Mayor, David Dinkins in 1989. Black Brooklyn votes have been major factors in other close elections including: Brooklyn District Attorney Liz Holtzman in 1981 and Joe Hynes in 1985; Mario Cuomo for Governor in 1982; Jesse Jackson winning New York City in 1988; David Dinkins' mayoral victory in 1989; Carl McCall, New York's first Black State Comptroller in 1994; Eliot Spitzer, NYS Attorney General in 1998; and Hilary Clinton, US Senate in 2000.

Racial and Political Protests, and the 1993 Election

Two crucial protest events in Black Brooklyn in the early 1990s proved pivotal to the 1993 re-election bid of Mayor David Dinkins. A vehicle in the motorcade of the Crown Heights Lubavitcher Grand Rebbe accidentally killed Black youth Gavin Cato. However, there were no arrests, sparking massive local protests, led by Sonny Carson and others, during which a rabbinical student was stabbed and later died. An investigation

[5] Labor organizer, Dinkins' Borough President Chief of Staff, and Deputy Mayor Bill Lynch was Dinkins' Campaign Manager. And I was Dinkins' Chief of Staff and Deputy Campaign Manager in 1989 and 1993.

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launched by Governor Cuomo issued findings just before Dinkins' 1993 re-election bid, saying that the Mayor held back police protection for the Jewish community during the protests.

The other Black Brooklyn event involved a Flatbush Korean grocer, who allegedly slapped a Black woman shopper, sparking Black protests. A "Korean store boycott" led by Sonny Carson and others ensued; and the media and leadership charged Dinkins with lacking leadership to resolve the "Korean Boycott" and the "Crown Heights Riots." These two Black Brooklyn events played crucial roles in declining white and other electoral support for Dinkins in his 1993 re-election bid. He was defeated in a very close election by repeat Republican candidate, Rudolph Giuliani.

A political analysis of Black Brooklyn's CCE in the critical 1985-90 period reveals that first, it suffered major political setbacks in 1985, with its failure to deliver a Badillo mayoral candidacy, which was defeated by Harlem and other political interests. Second, it was challenged by the emergence of a Brooklyn West Indian, pro-Koch political faction. Third, Vann had a poor showing in the Brooklyn Borough President's race in part due to a breakdown of CCE political discipline, including the crucial defection of Congressman Towns. Fourth, after Black Brooklyn did major groundwork with Vann as statewide Campaign Chair in the 1984 Jackson Presidential Campaign, Harlem took the reigns, with Dave Dinkins as the statewide Campaign Chair in 1988. And fifth, in 1990, major Black political defections and incorporation into the Brooklyn Democratic Party occurred after the election of Clarence Norman as County Leader. This combination of factors spelled the demise of the CCE, in terms of breaking its political

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momentum, and in terms of its original design and purpose. Though perhaps not yet dead, the CCE is today politically dormant, and on "life support" at this time.

A Vision for a "New CCE"…

In Black Brooklyn's current political vacuum, a "CCE like" umbrella mechanism for political planning, negotiation and mass mobilization is still very much needed, and capable of being reconstructed. However, in 2005 and beyond, the construction of a "new CCE" will require several important ingredients, however: 1) political and policy agendas which resonate with the people, the times, and the power structures; 2) creative, bridge building political alliances and coalitions both within, and far beyond Black Brooklyn; 3) a broad-based, inter-generational, multi-ethnic, and gender neutral, leadership, membership and broad community base; 4) major, sophisticated communications and technology strategies; 5) major financial and political resources; and 6) a major reserve of goodwill, social and political capital, within the Black diaspora of Brooklyn and beyond; and with other multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural constituencies.

Redistricting and Its Consequences, 1991-2 and 2002-3

In 1991, the City Redistricting Commission, [6] with technical expertise including Prof. John Mollenkopf, and a favorable minority political dynamic under Mayor Dinkins' regime, further expanded Black Brooklyn's political representation. The 1981 community splitting councilmanic seats were redrawn in 1991. Vann's Co-Leader, Annette Robinson secured councilmanic election; and incumbents Mary Pinkett, Enoch Williams and Priscilla Wooten retained their seats. Also, two new West Indian ancestry

[6] Lorraine Minnite's (1999) dissertation analyzes the 1991 New York City Council Redistricting in great detail.

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City Council districts were drawn, with the help of two Brooklyn Caribbean advocates appointed by Dinkins to the City Districting Commission, Esmeralda Simmons, Esq. and Dr. Luther Blake. Two new Caribbean Americans were elected from specially drawn council seats designed to empower the explosively growing West Indian immigrant communities of Flatbush and East Flatbush. Jamaican born Una Clarke, a day care official and protégé of Congressman Major Owens, was contested in a close election by African American Carl Andrews, and barely won her seat in the Flatbush district. Belizean, Rev. Lloyd Henry, pastor of St. Augustine's Episcopal Church, with County organization backing, won election in the East Flatbush district.

In the 1992 state legislative redistricting, two West Indian ancestry state legislators, Jamaican born Assemblyman Nick Perry (in 1992) and Guyanese-American State Senator John Sampson (in 1996) were elected to represent the East Flatbush and Canarsie communities. Perry won in a newly created Assembly seat (the 58th). Sampson defeated a long term, Thomas Jefferson Club, machine white incumbent, after a few previously unsuccessful Black insurgencies in the rapidly racially changing Canarsie and East Flatbust district. Perry and Sampson were more regulars, and had no substantive CCE affiliation.

In the 2001-2003 election and redistricting cycles, Black Brooklyn's political base grew even further. When 20 year incumbent State Senator Marty Markowitz, representing a heavily West Indian district, was elected Borough President in 2001, he was replaced by African American Carl Andrews, a veteran political operative with strong backing from ally County Leader Clarence Norman. The 2002 state legislative redistricting created another heavily Caribbean state senate district, just below the

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'Andrews' district, which elected African American, Kevin Parker, bringing Brooklyn's total to four of New York's nine Black State Senators. In the 2001 general election, Bed-Stuy's native son William Thompson, achieved election as the City's first Black City Comptroller, due in significant measure to large voting pluralities in Black Brooklyn. (Thompson's father, William Thompson, is of West Indian ancestry, a former City Councilman, State Senator, and retired Supreme Court Justice. The Comptroller's grandfather was also a politico, and one of the Black Brooklyn's first City Marshals.)

The City Charter's term limits law created the opportunity for Black Brooklyn to elect four new City Councilmembers in 2001: 1) Al Vann of Bed-Stuy (who ran for Council member Annette Robinson's seat; then she ran for his Assembly seat); 2) Yvette Clarke of Flatbush, backed by her mother, Una Clarke; 3) James Davis [7] of Fort Greene, who was backed by Mary Pinkett; and 4) insurgent Charles Barron in East New York, a protégé of Rev. Daughtry. (Barron defeated both Towns and Wooten backed candidates.) Two incumbents were also re-elected: Tracy Boyland of Brownsville (daughter of recently retired Assemblyman William Boyland); and West Indian Kendall Stewart of East Flatbush, who succeeded Lloyd Henry in 1997. The 2003 City Council election cycle following redistricting, did not produce any dramatic new political developments for Black Brooklyn, and served to solidify and entrench Black incumbencies.[8]

Women's Empowerment

Black women have historically been active in the church, community and electoral politics for decades in Black Brooklyn. Shirley Chisholm became Brooklyn's

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[7] Councilmember James Davis was assassinated at City Hall in July 2003, by a deranged political aspirant, a few days after his interview for this research. Davis' 2001 Primary rival, Leticia James, won election to the seat on the Working Families Party (WFP) line, a rare feat.

[8] I was appointed to the City Districting Commission by Speaker Gifford Miller.

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first Black Assemblywoman in 1964 and first Congresswoman in 1968, proving that women were adept political leaders. Chisholm was an articulate spokesperson for women's rights, and when she ran for President in 1972, she became a role model for women in politics nationally, paving the way for countless other women in politics.

Black Brooklyn has had several Black women elected and civic leaders including: State Senators Anna Jefferson, Ada Smith and Velmanette Montgomery; Assembly women Shirley Chisholm, Annette Robinson, Jeannette Gadsden and Diane Gordon; City Council women Mary Pinkett, Priscilla Wooten, Annette Robinson, Una Clarke, Yvette Clarke and Letecia James. In addition, each Black assembly district has a Democratic (and Republican) elected District Leader/State Committeewoman; and some 50% of the Black Brooklyn elected judiciary is female. There have also been several appointed Black women officials, including deputy mayors (Lucille Rose) and commissioners (Carmel Marr, Marcella Maxwell, Audrey Bynoe et. al.); and numerous church, social, civic, non-profit and professional organizations have been, and are led by Black women.

It should be noted that Harlem elected Assemblywoman Bessie Buchanan in 1954, the first Black woman in the State Legislature (her husband, Charles Buchanan, was the owner of Harlem's world famous Savoy Ballroom). While Brooklyn's Assemblywoman Chisholm was elected a decade later, in 1964. And Harlem elected State Senator Constance Motley in 1964, the first Black woman in the State Senate; while Brooklyn's Senator Anna Jefferson was elected in 1982, nearly two decades later. [9]

[9] The CCE backed Velmanette Montgomery, who defeated Anna Jefferson, Senator Vander Beatty's Co-Leader and temporary successor in 1984. Today, Sen. Montgomery is 1 of 4 Blacks, and the only female State Senator from Brooklyn.

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Also, Harlem has had two Black women Borough Presidents, Constance Motley in 1965, and C. Virginia Fields in 2001, while Brooklyn, with several failed attempts, has yet to elect it's first Black Borough President, male or female. Of note, Queens, with a much smaller Black population, elected it's first Black, and first Black woman Borough President, Helen Marshall in 2001 (I was her campaign manager).

The Politics of Gender

There is an important gender dynamic in Black Brooklyn. Females make up a disproportionate share of the Black adult population, Black voter registration and voter turnout. Historically, the Black women dominate the Black church, social and civic organizations in the community. In 2002, voter registration in the 56th Assembly District, covering Bedford Stuyvesant, was 60 percent female which is typical throughout Black Brooklyn and above the citywide rates (Anil 2004). This could be the result of several factors including: the high levels of mortality and incarceration among Black males; and the relative success of Black women's educational attainment and labor force participation. While the many public housing projects concentrate low income female-headed households in older African American neighborhoods, in a bi-modal pattern, Black Brooklyn also contains many economically successful female-headed households (see Chapter 3, Demographics).

More Black women are registered, more vote than Black men, and Black women have played a central role in grass roots activism in the Black community (Cohen, Jones and Tronto 1997; Gittell et.al. 1994; Taylor 1994). The predominance of women in the Black electorate, and in social and political organizations, mirrors larger gender trends (Hacker 2003; Putnam 2000). However, most of the current Black Brooklyn political

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establishment is male. Although gender inequality is a persistent undertone in Black political discourse, an overtly gender-based political challenge to the Black male establishment has not yet surfaced. Two instances where this "gender war" did emerge were the Shirley Chisholm versus William Thompson and James Farmer, 1968 congressional race; and the Una Clarke versus Major Owens 2000 congressional race.

Though they are a majority of Black Brooklyn's electorate in 2005, Black women hold only 1 of 7 Black State Assembly seats; 3 of 6 Black represented City Council seats; 1 of 4 Black represented State Senate seats; and none of the 2 Black Congressional seats. The question of the political inequality of women remains a serious unresolved issue in the politics of Black Brooklyn. While it was expounded upon in great detail by Black women elites in the field research it has not yet risen to the level of public discourse (see Chapter 4, Field Interviews).

Black Women and the Brooklyn Judiciary

While most of this commentary has focused on Black legislative representation, another important arena of political activity is the judiciary. From its first Black elected Civil Court Judge, Lewis Flagg in 1953, Black Brooklyn has elected more than 20 Civil Court and State Supreme Court Judges in the last two decades. The CCE's electoral agenda accelerated this process in the 1980s and 1990s. This process has also been accelerated with the ascension of Assemblyman Clarence Norman, becoming the first Black Leader of the Kings County Democratic Party. An attorney and former Brooklyn Assistant District Attorney, Norman seems to have placed a political priority on the election of Black judges in Kings County, and radical demographic change, and racial and ethnic succession in the borough has also aided the process.

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A significant number of Black women elected officials in Brooklyn; a large number of Black women attorneys; and a predominantly female electorate; have also worked in Black women's favor. Thus Black women attorneys have been significant beneficiaries of the judicial elective process in Black Brooklyn, particularly over the past 10-15 years. Becoming an elected Civil Court Judge is a sought after professional, political and economic prize: non strenuous hours and a $125,000 a year salary for a ten year term. Add to this the usual further elevation on the bench,to N.Y.S. Justice of the Supreme Court (JSC), with an even higher salary. Supreme Court is achieved through a bi-partisan (Democrat and Republican), bi-County, party nominating process (Brooklyn and Staten Island comprise the 2nd Judicial District); followed by a general election. As of this writing, the Brooklyn judiciary is under heavy criticism, with calls for reform due to a number of cases of corruption and impropriety on the Brooklyn bench. County Leader Norman is going to trial in 2005 on charges brought by Brooklyn District Atttorney Joe Hynes.

Unlike legislative redistricting which redraws congressional, state legislative and city council boundaries every ten years based on census population changes, Municipal Court District (MCD) lines in Brooklyn (and New York City) have not been redrawn in over 60 years. For example, areas which have shifted racially from white to Black (areas such as Brownsville, East New York and East Flatbush), now have the electoral base to elect Black judicial candidates from local municipal court districts which were formerly white. This is not an automatic occurrence however. One route to success requires the political will and financial resources of candidates; support of local elected officials and

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their political clubs. The Democratic Party plays a major role as sponsor; and knocks insurgents off the ballot.

Another route to electoral victory requires insurgent candidacies, considerable political resources and expertise, and seeking support by going around the party establishment directly to voters and opinion leaders. Several Black judicial candidates have been elected to district and county wide Civil Court (a direct primary election process); and to State Supreme Court (A judicial delegate bartered, party nomination, general election process.) Black judges have been elected as insurgents, or with factional party support and independent resources (In recent years, Norman and Towns have had several such factional battles over judgeships.). But more often, the sponsorship of the Democratic Party has been decisive. It should be noted that the election of Blacks to the judiciary has major long term implications for literally "changing the face" of leadership in the criminal justice arena.

The Old Guard and Post Civil Rights Insurgency

Today, Black Brooklyn has two Black congressmen, four state senators, eight assembly members, six city council members, a major bloc of district leaders on the Democratic Party Executive Committee, and some 400,000 registered voters. In shear numbers, this is one of the largest concentrations of Black political representation and voters in the nation, approached in magnitude only by Chicago's Black political delegation and electorate. Compared to Black Brooklyn, Harlem, with 272,000 Blacks in 2000 (less than a third of Black Brooklyn), has only one Black congressman, one state senator, two assembly members, and two council members; while Southeast Queens, with

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349,000 Blacks in 2000, also has one Black congressman, two state senators, four assembly members, and three city council members.

But Black political leadership ought to be about quality and not just quantity. Politics is not just about how many players you have, but how you play the game. On this score, Harlem is still way ahead of Black Brooklyn. Harlem and Manhattan has a Black Borough President, C. Virginia Fields, in a long line of predecessors starting with Hulan Jack in 1954, then Edward Dudley, Constance Motley, Percy Sutton and David Dinkins. Meanwhile, Black Brooklyn had three failed bids in 1969, 1985 and 2001. Harlem's son David Dinkins, became Mayor.

Harlem's one Congressman, Charles Rangel is one of this nation's most powerful politicians. He is Chair of the New York Congressional Delegation, Ranking member of the House Ways & Means Committee, and Chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). Arguably, Rangel has more clout than New York's other three Black Congressmen combined (Owens, Towns and Meeks). One of only two Harlem Assemblyman (Black Brooklyn has seven), Herman Farrell is State Democratic Party Chair, County Leader, and Chair of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. Harlem's one State Senator, David Paterson is the Senate Minority Lader (Black Brooklyn has 4 State Senators, including Deputy Minority Leader, Sen. Carl Andrews.)

Black Brooklyn elites are quietly questioning whether the number of Black elected officials may have reached the point of diminishing returns. They believe that Black Brooklyn had more political clout in earlier eras when there were fewer elected officials, who were in more powerful positions, with more political vision, fortitude, leverage and access than the current class. The remarkable quantity of Black political

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representation in Black Brooklyn reflects the evolution of a complex set of factors worthy of further scrutiny. Black Brooklyn has a distinct social history, political culture, demographic composition, and trajectory of political development, but no one has yet seriously studied its politics. How and why Black political representation comes about in Brooklyn and elsewhere, what blocks it, what births it, what sustains it, and what internal divisions may challenge it, -- are questions that warrant a significant place on the contemporary urban political research agenda.

Black Brooklyn's insurgent political tradition achieved considerable power through civil rights activism, radical politics, and challenges to machine politics such as Mac Holder's 1953 seminal political campaign to elect Black Brooklyn's first civil court judge over powerful Democratic machine opposition. There was a major insurgency spearheaded by Vann, Owens and CCE political campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s, which achieved considerable victories against local "regular" Democratic political clubs and the party machine operations.

Many of the civil rights era Brooklyn Black elected officials are still in place today, 20-30 years later. They now comprise the long term Black political establishment of which the younger generation is highly critical. This one time insurgent, civil rights generation seized political power by challenging Brooklyn's regular Democratic Party organization under the County Leadership of Meade Esposito, then Howard Golden. Along the way they knocked off machine allied Black and white Democratic incumbents. In 1990, with a base of Black Democratic District leaders, they were able to elect one of their own, Assemblyman Clarence Norman, as County Leader of the Kings County Democratic Party organization, one of the largest in the nation. But in 2005, Black

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Brooklyn is in jeopardy of losing this major political prize, due to several pending indictments against Norman, who is understandably preoccupied and locked in a death grip political and legal battle with D.A. Joe Hynes, whom Norman once supported.

The political rhetoric of today's Black political establishment challenged their Black and white political predecessors for being out of step with the needs of Brooklyn's Black communities. Today's incumbents once characterized themselves as agents of systemic change and community empowerment. These one time insurgents are now long term incumbents, and a major part of the very political establishment which they themselves once fought and toppled. Over time, they have now accumulated their own set of political challenges and insurgencies within their own political districts.

Young, ivy league corporate attorney, Hakim Jeffries, challenged 20 year incumbent Assemblyman Roger Green twice, and lost in 2000 and 2002. Young ivy league corporate attorney Barry Ford, challenged 20 year incumbent Congressman Ed Towns twice in 1998 and 2000, and lost. Young City Council members Tracy Boyland and Yvette Clarke together, challenged 20 year incumbent Congressman Major Owens in 2004, and lost. This post civil rights political insurgency is not just a local phenomenon, and has gained traction in other communities, with somewhat better results. [10]

In Newark, New Jersey in 1994, Stanford graduate, Yale attorney, and Rhodes Scholar, 29 year old Corey Booker, defeated a veteran Black City Councilman in an upset victory. Then in 2001, Councilman Corey Booker seriously challenged, but lost to four term incumbent Mayor Sharpe James, who at the time, had been in public office 30 years, as the Mayor, a State Senator, and former City Councilman.

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[10] Sources: *Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress;* www.njleg.state.nj.us; and www.agoodblackman.com/leaders_booker.shtml

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And in Birmingham, Alabama in 2002, 35 year old Harvard lawyer, civil rights attorney, and former Assistant US Attorney, Artur Davis, pulled a surprise upset over five term incumbent Congressman Earl Hilliard, who had also served in the State Legislature since 1974, before being elected to Congress in 1992.

Much has changed in Black Brooklyn that has given rise to the current state of its politics. This research project argues that there are a few key aspects of this change that are particularly salient. First, there is the emergence of a new Black middle class built upon the educational, economic and professional opportunities gained through the civil rights struggles, opportunities largely denied to previous generations. Many who benefited from these opportunities chose to move out of Black Brooklyn, "escaping" to the suburbs and beyond. However, a significant number did remain in Black Brooklyn neighborhoods, and there is also a growing in-migration, creating a Black and white gentrification in Bedford Stuyvesant, Fort Greene, Crown Heights and Prospect Heights. This is creating new leadership bases, which can once again change the racial, ethnic, class, gender, and ideological make up of Black Brooklyn's political representation.

Caribbean Brooklyn - The Epicenter

Brooklyn is the epicenter of West Indian immigration to the United States, particularly spurred by the Hart Celler Immigration Act of 1965 and subsequent immigration laws. While first generation West Indians comprise only 1.9 million of America's 35 million Blacks in 2000, they make up at least a third of Brooklyn's 938,000 Blacks (See Tables 3.02 and 3.08). If we include their U.S.-born children, the West Indian first and second generation population makes up nearly 40 percent of Brooklyn's Black population. Early West Indian politicians such as Bertram Baker, Thomas Russell

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Jones, Shirley Chisholm, William Thompson Sr., Woodrow Lewis, Waldaba Stewart, Edward Griffith, Wesley MacD. Holder and others publicly downplayed their Caribbean ancestry. They played key roles in the 20th century political development of Black Brooklyn, at a time when they were an ethnic minority. Now having achieved numerical parity with African Americans, West Indians continue to play a powerful role in the political development of Black Brooklyn in the 21st century.

Key scholars such as Calvin Holder (1990) notes that historically, as a conscious political strategy, West Indian politicians down played their ethnic identity in order to advance with minimal friction within the broader, dominant African American environment . But times have changed. Calvin Holder (1990), Mary Waters (1999, 2001), Philip Kasinitz (1992), Nancy Foner (1997, 2001), Reuel Rogers (2001), Carol Archer (2000) and Green and Wilson (1992) have all pointed to the emergence of West Indians as distinct ethnic challengers to the African American political leadership of Brooklyn. Compared to their African American counterparts, first generation West Indians tend to have higher rates of labor force participation, more likely two or more earners in the family, and higher home ownership rates. Over the past few decades, West Indians have been the dominant component of population stabilization and growth in Central Brooklyn's Black neighborhoods of Crown Heights, Flatbush, East Flatbush, and Canarsie. Caribbeans' political power will increase in proportion to their increased citizenship, voter registration, voter turnout and political representation.

Caribbean Transnationalism - Its Impacts

The heavy immigration of West Indians into Black Brooklyn from the 1960s onward has structurally defined the body politic into two major ethnic blocs poised for

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political conflict, competition, and sometimes cooperation. The powerful force of transnationalism and Caribbean Americans' maintenance of the politics of home, has important political consequences and pathways concerning the future of Black Brooklyn. First, transnationalism may slow down Caribbean political understanding and integration into American and African American political cultures, a pathway with which not all Caribbeans agree.

Second, the experience of transnationalism may help to construct an authentic Caribbean American brand of politics, which articulates and advocates a clear political and policy agenda of self interest, centered around Caribbean immigrant rights and needs, and a distinctly Caribbean American vision. However, this ethnic autonomy approach of clarity, might turn off African Americans and other potential allies. Inter-group alliances and coalitions are crucial in this era of heightened American national security concerns, stricter federal policies towards immigrants, and economic and political competition among native born Blacks, Caribbeans and other groups.

Ethnicity, Class and Gender: Then and Now

There are major differences along the axes of ethnicity, class and gender in Black Brooklyn today, as distinct from earlier periods, and it is noteworthy to examine how and why these differences have evolved. In a word, the ethnicity factor is explained by Black demographic expansion, and racial and ethnic transformation. The class factor is in part explained by Blacks' general economic advancement, particularly in specific segments of the City's labor market. Also, immigration is sending to Brooklyn, many of the Caribbean's best, and brightest, and most industrious. The gender gap is in part, the product of women's immigration patterns; women more diligently pursuing educational

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attainment and employment opportunities; and Black men who are under-educated, and face greater structural challenges to labor market market access (Levitan 2003, 2004).

Ethnicity. From the 1800s to the 1950s, Black Brooklyn was a tiny racial minority of mainly southern migrated African Americans, with an even smaller ethnic minority of West Indian immigrants, both barely politically significance in Brooklyn which was 95 % white until 1940. Today, Brooklyn is 40 percent Black, with two distinct Black ethnic groups now grown to over 300,000 each, dominating several distinct neighborhoods and political terrains most of which were white, just a few decades ago. Black Brooklyn's African Americans and West Indians today, have a number of distinctive demographic characteristics and electoral behavior linked to their ethnicity.

Class. Class stratification was almost non-existent in Black Brooklyn, and Black America for most of their history, with a very tiny middle, upper and professional class, and an overwhelmingly working class and poor population. The Black Brooklyn community was very small prior to 1950, and had little class stratification: most Blacks were working class or poor. Since the 1950s however, a Black middle class has been growing nationally and in Black Brooklyn. Today a third of Black Brooklyn is middle income, and a third of West Indians and southern Blacks are home owners. Poverty and low incomes are concentrated among African American female headed households with children; twice as many Black women as men have college degrees; and more Black women than men, particularly West Indian women, earn more than $ 75,000.

There is also a growing, post-civil rights, young professional class in Black Brooklyn as well, who are the beneficiaries of educational and job opportunities generated by the civil rights struggles. Among African Americans there is a large

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government employee sector with lower middle incomes (increasingly though, Caribbean Americans are also securing public sector jobs). By 2000, nearly one third of Black Brooklyn was middle income, and the poverty concentration was heavily African American women on welfare with children, and a high unemployment rate for Black males (Levitan 2005, 2004, 2003). Thus there is significant and growing class stratification in Black Brooklyn today which was non-existent or minimal in the past.

Gender. In previous eras, the vast majority of Black Brooklyn men and women did not earn middle incomes or attain college degrees. In Black Brooklyn today, women exceed men in these categories, and there are 100,000 more adult women than men in Black Brooklyn, which has profound social, economic and political implications. Gender gaps are much larger today than in previous eras, in part driven by adult female West Indian immigration flows to Black Brooklyn; and higher morbidity, mortality, mobility, incarceration, unemployment and military service rates for Black men.

Political Entrepreneurs: Black & White, Inside & Outside

Borrowing from John Kingdon (2003), political entrepreneurs are actors, facilitators, negotiators and brokers in the political and policy making process. Political entrepreneurs have played a significant, and often machiavellian role, in the mobilization and demobilization of Black Brooklyn along planes of potential political divisions of ethnicity, class and gender, very often around the ethnicity question of African American versus Caribbean issues and representation.

Ethnicity. Dr. Lamuel Stanislaus, Grenadian-American Ambassador to the U.N. headed "Caribbeans for Koch" in 1985 at a time when the mainly African American CCE

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was heading the "Coalition for a Just New York" (CJNY) to identify a consensus candidate (preferably Black), to run against Mayor Ed Koch (Rogers 2004).

CJNY had generally ignored the question of West Indian political leadership participation in their deliberations, freeing up the Caribbeans to "do their own thing" politically. Thus Dr. Stanislaus, and other West Indian politicos, through the inaction of African American political leadership, produced an ethnic split, with a Caribbean pro-Koch faction, and an African American anti-Koch faction, in the 1985 mayoral election. This ethnic split in Black Brooklyn may have cost Vann Caribbean political support for his Borough President's race in 1985, though Markowitz already had a strong claim on Caribbean the vote.

Dr. Stanislaus and the Caribbean community made similar overtures to Gov. Coumo, signaling that the Caribbean community desired their own direct political relationship with the Governor. Coumo obliged, and provided funding for a Caribbean community center project. Replicating this style of political entrepreneurialism, Dr. Roy Hastick, President of the Caribbean American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CACCI) has cultivated direct entrée to Gov. George Pataki and signals public political support for the Governor in return for the Pataki's administration's support of CACCI's Trade Center project and other intitiatives. Hastick has also cultivated similar relationships with Mayor Bloomberg and his Commissioners. These examples suggest that Caribbean business and civic leaders are much more facile and maneuverable in dealing with both Republican and Democratic powers than are their African American counterparts.

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Insurgent Caribbean political candidates as political entrepreneurs, often campaign on a platform of Pan Caribbean identity or island nationalism, appealing for Caribbean votes in majority Caribbean neighborhoods, knowing that to do so elsewhere, might politically backfire. Giving a few examples: a) West Indian insurgent Anthony Agard used this strategy in his unsuccessful challenges to unseat Assemblywoman Rhoda Jacobs in Flatbush in the 1970s (Kasinitz 1992); b) Una Clarke used this strategy in her successful bid for a newly created Councilmanic seat in Flatbush in 1991; and in her unsuccessful bid to unseat Congressman Major Owens in 2000; c) Nick Perry used this strategy in his successful bid for a newly created Assembly seat in East Flatbush in 1992; d) John Sampson used this strategy to unseat an aging white incumbent State Senator in the East Flatbush - Canarsie area in 1996; and e) Maurice Gumbs used this strategy in unsuccessful bids to defeat Assemblyman Clarence Norman in the 1980s.

Class. Some political entrepreneurs actively campaign in poor neighborhoods. They use housing projects and their votes as a political base, and articulate tenant, poor, and working class concerns using class appeals. Insurgent James Davis was noted for such appeals in the Fort Greene and Farragut housing projects in his successful bid for Councilwoman Mary Pinkett's term limited seat in 2001. Reginald Bowman, a Housing Authority resident and tenant leader, is noted for organizing in public housing developments in Brownsville, in his unsuccessful bids to unseat the Boyland politicians in the past decade. And Reverends Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson are noted for campaigning in public housing developments to get out the vote in New York City.

Gender. One of the confounding questions in this research project is why there is not more gender based politics being played out in Black Brooklyn today, given women's

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superior numbers in the electorate, their significant representation in elected officialdom, and their expressed discontent with what they perceive as gender based political inequality. Three responses of the field research are that: a) men still have the power and women are reluctant to challenge them; b) older women have been exercising political restraint and still hold out hope that change will come; and c) disenchanted younger women are opting out of the electoral arena, thus conceding the field to the status quo.

However, there have been occasions when women as political entrepreneurs overtly signaled that they are seeking women's support, but generally their political message is more subtle. Examples include Shirley Chisholm's historic 1968 campaign for Congress and throughout her career, where she articulated that women should support qualified women such as her, and that men should share more power with women, and accept women's leadership. Una Clarke in her 2000 congressional bid against Owens used both ethnic and gender based appeals (the gender appeals did not work, but the ethnic appeals did work, according to this research). State Senator Velmanette Montgomery maintains a high profile on women and children's issues which seems to translate into significant political support from women. And Jeanette Gadsden, in her 2001 Borough President's campaign made political appeals to both racial minorities and women. Both appeals worked, according to this research (see Chapter 5).

In many instances, political entrepreneurialism by white politicians is the reciprocal of outreach by Black political entrepreneurs. In New York, most major white politicians and campaigns have racial and ethnic staff liaisons, immigrant liaisons, and women's liaisons. Governors Coumo and Pataki; Mayors Dinkins, Giuliani and Bloomberg; U.S. Senators Schumer and Clinton; City Comptroller Thompson, Attorney

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General Spitzer and others, have special staff liasons whose background often mirrors the constituency they are assigned to serve. Thus for example, Gov. Pataki employs Una Clarke in his economic development agency, but she is also his Caribbean community liaison. Furthermore, Pataki has a specific Haitian community liaison; and his director of legislative affairs is a veteran African American official, Jim Harding, who played a similar role for Mayor Ed Koch, and to a lesser extent, for Mayor Dinkins. Politicians do this kind of racial, ethnic and constituency targeting and cultivation, hire staff, attend ethnic events, cultivate ethnic leaders, and utilize ethnic media. In return, they expect to reap a political payoff in racial, ethnic and constituency bloc votes at election time.

Another brand of political entrepreneurialism by white politicians, which is less symbolic, and more hands on, is exemplified by the current Borough President Marty Markowitz. He is arguably the most popular politician Black or white, in Black Brooklyn. For 23 years he served a predominantly Caribbean Flatbush Midwood district, where he delivered little materially for his constituents in terms of major state budget items, because he was in the legislative minority in the Republican controlled State Senate.

One can define Markowitz' political entrepreneurialism in terms of his omnipresence in the community, adept constituent service, consummate political salesmanship, and tireless campaigning. Markowitz is accepted as an "honorary Caribbean," he publicly refers to himself as Trinidadian, and he has hired a prominent Jamaican American, Yvonne Graham, as his Deputy Borough President. This project's research shows that his Caribbean vote in the 2001 Borough President's race was highly statistically significant, (as was Gadsden's African American and women's votes).

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There appears to be at least five kinds of political entrepreneurialism at work in Black Brooklyn. First, there is a kind where external white (and other) politicians are reaching in as Black ethnic political entrepreneurs are reaching out, to negotiate ethnic political support in return for substantive material benefits.

Second, West Indian political candidates are running targeted campaigns with ethnic appeals and touting their ethnic credentials in local ethnic neighborhoods and ethnic media, in hopes of parlaying this into votes for their candidacy against 'white minority rule' incumbents; "ethnic outsiders" such as African Americans; and against their own ethnic political competition.

Third, some incumbents and insurgents are promoting class and gender appeals in hopes of garnering these constituent votes as part of their winning electoral coalition. There have already been several political challenges to aging incumbents by the professional class, post civil rights generation of Barry Ford, Hakim Jeffries and others. There is also a growing potential for class conflict between the home owners in the 'palaces' and the people in 'the projects.'

Fourth, there is a major demographic and electoral base, and political grievance, both "motive and opportunity," from which to launch a gender-based, women's political insurgency. But thus far, the gender driven political entrepreneurs do not yet seem to be in gear.

And fifth, the few remaining white minority incumbents, as well as white candidates running in Black political districts have, and likely will continue to neutralize or supercede issues of racial and ethnic representation with their own brand of the politics of survival, salesmanship, and representation, as Markowitz so skillfully did.

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The Politics of Ethnicity, Class and Gender - A Brief Comparison: Black Brooklyn and Miami-Dade County

One of the few urban jurisdictions in the United States which is comparable to Brooklyn in size, as well as Black racial and ethnic composition, is Miami-Dade County, Florida. Brooklyn has 2.4 million persons and Miami-Dade has 2.3 million persons. Brooklyn has 938,000, and Miami-Dade has 457,000 Blacks. Brooklyn has over 300,000, and Miami-Dade has close to 200,000 persons of West Indian ancestry (Census 2000, SF 3, Ancestry Tables). Interestingly, only 81,000 Blacks including 25,000 West Indians live within the City of Miami with a total of 363,000 persons. Thus only 16 % of the people in Miami-Dade County actually live in the City of Miami. The vast majority live in other local villages, towns and cities outside of Miami and within the County.

For example, the City of North Miami has a total of 60,000 persons, with 33,000 Blacks including 22,000 West Indians. And North Miami Beach has 41,000 persons, with 16,000 Blacks including 11,000 West Indians. It is significant that Miami-Dade County has a very different local government structure than Brooklyn, New York / Kings County. (Until 1896, Brooklyn had its own villages, cities and towns.) According to the "Miami-Dade County-Black Affairs Advisory Board," [11] there are *40* Black Elected Officials in Miami-Dade County including (party officials excluded):

- 2 U.S. Congressmen (Kendrick Meek, Miami; Alcee Hasting, Ft. Lauderdale)
- 2 State Senators
- 3 State Representatives
- 4 Board of County Commissioners
- 6 City Mayors of Miami Gardens, North Miami, Homestead, Florida City
- 5 Vice Mayors of Miami Gardens, Village of Pinecrest, Florida City, El Portal, and Opa-locka

[11] Source: http:// www.miamidade.gov / baab / elected_officials.asp

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- 4 City Commissioners of Opa-locka
- 2 City Commissioners of Florida City
- 1 City Commissioner of Miami
- 1 City Commissioner of South Miami
- 10 City Council Members of Homestead (1), North Miami Beach (2), North Miami (2), and Miami Gardens (5)

Brooklyn has the following roster of Black Elected Officials (party officials excluded):

- 2 U.S. Congressmembers (Owens and Towns, 2 males)
- 4 State Senators (3 males, 1 female)
- 6 State Assemblymembers (4 males, 2 females)
- 6 City Council Members (3 males, 3 females)
- 1 Deputy Borough President (1 female)

The diverse structure of local government in Miami-Dade County with numerous cities, towns and villages, has created opportunities for Black political representation that do not exist in Brooklyn. Preliminarily, this is a substantial roster of political representation which speaks well of the Black politics of Miami-Dade County, particularly in light of the fact that Blacks are a distinct minority in relation to 1.3 million Hispanics who are 57% of the county population, while Blacks are only 20%. Black Brooklyn and Black Miami-Dade County appear to have comparable numbers in terms of the Black racial political representation of their respective populations.

With regards to the politics of ethnicity, the Miami-Dade roster includes several Black elected officials who are of West Indian and Haitian ancestry including: Mayor Joe Celestin and Council Members Jean Monestime and Jacques Despir of North Miami; Councilman Phillipe Derose of North Miami Beach, who is also the former Mayor of the Village of El Portal; and State Representatives Phillip Brutus (North Miami) and Yolly Roberson (Miami). Noteworthy, Black Brooklyn with 75,000 Haitians, has yet to elect its first Haitian American public official.

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Regarding the politics of gender in Miami-Dade County, until recently, the Congressional representative was the Hon. Carrie Meek, an African American woman whose son Kendrick Meek now represents the district. Both State Senators are Black women; one of the State Representatives (lower house) is a Black woman; and the Mayors of Miami Gardens, Opa-locka and El Portal Village are Black women, as are several Vice Mayors, Council members and City Commissioners. Thus preliminarily, Black women appear to be politically active and empowered in Miami-Dade County.

The qualitative research for this project reveals a major critique from Black Brooklyn's women elites, concerning the political inequality of Black women, a phenomenon generally confirmed by the Black male interviewees as well. It would be interesting to see whether or not similar gender patterns exist in Miami-Dade County. As the subject of a comparative study for another project, research on the local political history, elections, demographics, and field research could be conducted to draw out detailed comparisons and analyses, regarding the politics of ethnicity, class and gender in Black Brooklyn, in Miami-Dade County, and other jurisdictions.

Conclusions: Black Brooklyn Politics - Lessons of History

This chronology of the politics of Black Brooklyn illustrates its long and rich history from its origins in the 1600s to the present time. It chronicles a major strand of protest and social movement politics and insurgency, grounded in Black activism and struggles to achieve civil rights, social and economic justice, and political equality. It chronicles a history of struggle, victories and defeats in the electoral arena in both

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machine and reform modes, where reformers are motivated to impact upon the government, market and civil society to deliver goods, services and a better quality of life for Black Brooklyn communities. As Downs (1957) and Aldrich (1995) argue in their rational choice model, most politicians are motivated by self serving political interests, fiefdom building, political power, patronage and control. Both African American and West Indian political elites, yesterday and today can be found grazing on both sides of the political fence. Throughout Black Brooklyn's past, there were singular impulses for reform. But today, the regulars are dominant and the reformers are recessive.

Black Brooklyn also has a long history of oppositional power struggles such as: Baker versus Mac Holder; Chisholm versus Wright; Owens versus Beatty; Owens versus Wright; Clarke versus Owens; Vann versus Williams; Vann versus Butler; Norman versus Towns and others. Granted, democracy is messy. But incessant factionalism also drains the lifeblood, and dims the attention span of leadership, front line warriors, and the body politic. Many of the seminal battles for local political hegemony have galvanized and mobilized -- but have also marginalized and paralyzed, local leaders, politics and communities. There have been a few power centers, and power shifts, two main trends being the dominant era of Bert Baker and his UADA from the 1930's until 1970; followed by Vann, Owens and the CCE in the 1970 -1990 period. There have also been periodic Black "ethnic wars," such as Andrews versus Clarke for City Council in 1991; and Owens versus Clarke for Congress in 2000.

From the 19th century until World War II, Black Brooklyn was a very small community in relation to the larger Brooklyn, particularly as white European immigration flooded the Borough. Thus Blacks were a neglible electoral factor, though they were

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actively involved political protest and the key issues of the day such as slavery emancipation, reconstruction, and early civil rights. The post-War period brought a massive migration of native born Blacks from the South seeking relief from racial oppression and job opportunities.

Simultaneously, the massive white exodus from Brooklyn to the suburbs occurred, along with the ghettoization of Black Brooklyn. This created the Black population base for West Indian political entrepreneur Bert Baker, to play loyal local operative to the white Brooklyn Democratic machine, and become the first Black elected official in 1948. Mac Holder successfully challenged Baker's accomodationist approach, with an insurgent campaign to elect Lewis Flagg the Borough's first Black judge in 1953. Tom Jones, established an insurgent club, the Unity Democratic Club (UDC), which knocked off a white Assemblyman in 1960 in Crown Heights, and Jones became Brooklyn's second Black Assemblyman. On the whole, West Indian politicos faired very well in predominantly African American Brooklyn. Ethnic differences were down played and Blacks were quickly absorbed into the machine. Jones was given a judgeship and Shirley Chisholm took his Assembly seat.

The civil rights era brought major social protests in the streets over jobs, police brutality, and poor quality schools. And the Voting Rights Act was used to leverage additional Black political districts. One of the first beneficiaries was Shirley Chisholm, elected as Brooklyn's first Black and woman Congress member in 1968. With Chisholm as titular political leader of Black Brooklyn, women in leadership fared well during her tenure, but they have stagnated since. The 1960's sparked a major Caribbean immigration to Brooklyn, continuing to today. Also in the 1960's, local civil rights

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protests, the launching of the anti-poverty programs, and the controversial Ocean Hill-Brownsville educational experiment sparked much community mobilization. With elected school boards, anti-poverty programs and growing political seats, local political competition ensued for the stakes and prizes. Vann and Owens' political careers were launched by the social movements and community protests of the period, as they successfully knocked off several Democratic sub-machines, and collaborated to launch the CCE in the early 1980s.

The CCE used the Voting Rights Act to leverage the critical 1981-2 redistricting cycle, to increase Black and minority political representation. The CCE and Vann's loss in the Borough President's race in 1985, and the election of one of Clarence Norman as Democratic County Leader in 1990, undercut the CCE's power, as most former CCE insurgents joined the County organization. In the 1980's, the CCE also politically fueled Jesse Jackson's two presidential campaigns, and Dinkins' mayoral election.

In the post civil rights era, the momentum of earlier social movements, community protests, and battles against the machine had faded. By the 1990's and another redistricting round, Black Brooklyn grew still larger politically, and more demographically diverse. A new wave of West Indian elected officials emerged, including Una Clarke, Nick Perry, Lloyd Henry, Kendall Stewart and John Sampson.

Tensions with African Americans over the growing Caribbean community's quest for political empowerment; post civil rights insurgency by the younger generation against an aging political establishment; and other challenges have now emerged. These issues are being prodded and manipulated by political entrepreneurs and actors with bases inside

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and outside the community, who are seeking to build their political capital, by exploiting the potential cleavages of ethnicity, class and gender in Black Brooklyn.

In 2005, the diagnosis and prognosis for the politics of Black Brooklyn is that, there is no political center of gravity; no farm team, no political midwives except political dynasties and family legacies to birth the next generation of leadership. There is no articulated common political vision and agenda; little reaching out and in, and no coalition building across race and ethnicity, as did modestly occur in previous periods.

While political dynasties grooming their own children, many in the younger generation feel politically left out and sold out by the older generation whom they see as failing to provide leadership on critical community issues, and in the political arena. This post civil rights generation is poised for insurgency, believing that the older generation refuses to exit gracefully, has no exit options, and has failed to groom new leadership.

Black Brooklyn politics seems to be in a transition period, a holding pattern, with major demographic, political and economic realignments underway both within, and external to the community. These shifting "tectonic plates" are bringing forth new challenges, and calling for new kinds of leadership, agendas, political covenants, alliance and coalitions. The outcomes will either be new trajectories of political development; a period of further incubation or stagnation; or a worst case scenario: further political retrogression before things get better.

Over time, a whole range of movement politics and advocacy has clearly shaped Black Brooklyn's politics. The civil rights and voting rights have clearly contributed to Black Brooklyn's political progress. The Black power and Black nationalist ideologies of Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X and others clearly influences an aggressive style of Black

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political activism (Hamilton and Carmichael 1967). Black women's embrace of women's movement ideas of empowerment in the political arena, is evidenced by the significant number of women office holders and organizational leaders. But women are dissatisfied with what they perceive as a subordinate political role, the result of Black patriarchy and sexism still assigning them second class status within the Black community, particularly in it power circles, such as they are.

Black Brooklyn's grassroots, community empowering struggles for quality public schools, parent input and educational reform, fighting police brutality, and other key issues impart an activist, advocacy, and social movement character to Black Brooklyn's broader community politics, as distinct from its narrower electoral politics. Caribbean transnationalism may both facilitate and complicate political communication and cooperation as a tool of group political advancement and inter-group cooperation. All of these movements and trends have blended together to define the major underpinnings, dynamics, mobilization and demobilization traversing Black Brooklyn's politics.

History enlightens and informs a Black political past, present and future. The philosopher, George Santayana (1905) once said, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." In pursuit of Black Brooklyn's political history, there are no institutional vehicles, repositories, or organizations which preserve and transmit the rich political history of Black Brooklyn. Present and future generations urgently need to embrace, analyze and critique this history, in order that future mistakes are minimized; that successes are built upon; and that political dreams and progress continue to be made. In this process, we must acknowledge and celebrate those who have sacrificed and gone before, to lay the powerful foundations of the vibrant political legacy of Black Brooklyn.

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Chapter 3

The Census Demographics and Political Economy of Black Brooklyn: Ethnicity, Class and Gender

This chapter discusses the census demographics of Black Brooklyn in five parts: 1) a general background, overview and national context for understanding Black Brooklyn; 2) the dramatic demographic transformation of Black Brooklyn's nine neighborhoods from 1970 -2000; 3) a comparison and contrast of Black Brooklyn's two most ethnically distinct neighborhoods, East Flatbush and Bed-Stuy; 4) a PUMS analysis of major trends in ethnicity, class and gender across Black Brooklyn; and 5) conclusions regarding the demographic trends of ethnicity, class and gender in Black Brooklyn, and some of their political implications.

Part I: Background, Overview and National Context

There is a major body of social science literature on the relationships between demographics, urban socialization and political participation, focusing on race, ethnicity, class, gender and other factors. Among the earliest proponents of this research was the University of Chicago, founded in 1890 by John D. Rockefeller. The "Chicago School" led by Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess and their colleagues, focused on questions of urban sociology using Chicago's neighborhoods as their laboratory. These social scientists embraced a pluralist theoretical framework arguing that white immigrants and Black Southern migrants would eventually assimilate into Chicago society.[1]

In 1935, "Chicago School" scholar, Harold F. Gosnell wrote *Negro Politicians; the Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago,* an early work on Black urban politics. In 1945, two "Chicago School" Black sociologists, St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, produced

[1] See William Julius Wilson (1997), *When Work Disappears,* pp. 17-18.

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a path breaking study, *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (Chicago), which rejected the pluralist assimilation framework and argued that racial structural and institutional barriers blocked Black employment and residential advancement.

Verba and Schlossman (1992), Putnam (2002) and other works examined a whole range of demographic and political participation variables. Dawson (1986, 1994), and Cohen and Dawson (1993) examined the impacts of race and class on Black political participation. Seltzer, Newman and Leighton (1997) examined gender as a political variable in their research on women's political participation in the American electorate.

While there is research which examines race and other demographic influences on political behavior of various groups, there is little research exploring demographic differences within groups. Thus this study compares ethnicity, class and gender differences for African Americans and West Indians within the Black population, with the notion that ethnicity, class and gender are important demographic factors which explain and shape the politics of Black Brooklyn.

Demographic Analysis: Use of PUMS and Summary File Data

This chapter uses several sources of census data to describe the socio-demographic dynamics of Black Brooklyn: Census 2000 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) data, Summary File 3 and 4 data, and other data cited. The 5% PUMS data is compiled and analyzed for nine Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) which were selected to closely mirror the Community District and Assembly District in Central Brooklyn for this study. The PUMAs are: PUMA 04004 – Fort Greene, PUMA 04003 – Bedford Stuyvesant, PUMA 04007 – Brownsville, PUMA 04008 – East New York,

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PUMA – 04009 – Canarsie, PUMA 04006 – Crown Heights North, PUMA 04011 – Crown Heights South, PUMA 04010 – East Flatbush, and PUMA 04015 – Flatbush.[2]

The N.Y.C. Department of City Planning aggregated census data to the Community District (CD) level which is analyzed for portions of this study. These CDs closely correspond to the 9 PUMAs cited above. Nine predominantly and significantly Black Community Districts in Brooklyn each have 40,000 or more Black residents: CD 2 – Fort Greene, CD 3 – Bedford Stuyvesant, CD 5 – East New York, CD 8 – Crown Heights North, CD 9 – Crown Heights South, CD 14 – Flatbush, CD 16 – Brownsville, CD 17 – East Flatbush, and CD 18 – Canarsie.[3]

Though they are derived from the same survey, the sample data from long form questionnaires returned in Census 2000, PUMS and SF3 – SF4 files have significant differences. SF3 – SF4 data are available at the census tract level of analysis, a small neighborhood that generally includes up to a dozen city blocks and a few thousand people. The unit of analysis is geography and this data can be aggregated for any larger geographies composed of census tracts. This study's dataset includes information on race, ethnicity, age, income, education and housing tenure and was matched to election district geography so that it can be compared with election results, voter registration, party enrollment, voter turnout and votes for candidates. However, only certain types of pre-determined demographic data are contained in the tables for SF3 – SF 4.[4]

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[2] See Table 3.08 "African American and West Indian Neighborhoods."

[3] These CD boundaries also correlate with the 9 Black Assembly Districts for the period 1992 through 2001, which encompass the electoral data used in this study: 39th AD(North) - Canarsie; 40th AD - East New York; 41st AD (North) - Canarsie; 42nd AD – Flatbush; 43rd AD - Crown Heights; 55th AD – Brownsville; 56th AD - Bedford Stuyvesant; 57th AD – Ft. Greene; 58th AD – E. Flatbush. See Map 1.

[4] The author is grateful to Prof. John Mollenkopf and the Center for Urban Research; and Dr, Joseph Periera and the CUNY Data Service for major assistance in developing the datasets for this study.

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Figure 3.01
Brooklyn: New York State Assembly Districts, 1992 – 2001



Source: NYS Legislative Advisory Task Force on Demographics and Reapportionment, 2002.

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On the other hand, PUMS provides data for individual people and households weighted to represent all those who responded to the 2000 Census. Thus a "5% sample" means that 49,715 persons' questionnaires were weighted to represent the 1.2 million persons living in non-institutional settings in the 9 PUMAs for Black Brooklyn. PUMS contains responses to all the questions on the Census long form, thus allowing the analyst to generate any cross-tabulation they desire; and they are not restricted to using pre-set data in the Summary File tables.

The PUMA or "public use microdata area," is the smallest unit of geography which includes at least 100,000 people (there are also "Super-PUMAs which are aggregations of PUMAs). This is much larger than a census tract, which in New York contains about 3,500 people on average. The PUMAs created for New York City closely resemble the boundaries of the city's Community Districts, therefore permitting much more detailed profiles of the nine neighborhoods of Black Brooklyn. PUMS data cannot be disaggregated or apportioned downward to the census tract, census block, or election district level, as can SF3 – SF4 data, and PUMS data must be analyzed at the level of the PUMA, Super PUMA or higher such as county, city state or national levels.

GIS Mapping of Census Demographics

In this study, illustrations of census demographic data are mapped using a geographic information system (GIS) software application[5] in order to gain visual insights into the spatial relationships between key demographic factors, trends and local neighborhood geography. The following maps are illustrated in this chapter:

[5] Thomas Soehl, CUNY Grad. Center, greatly assisted with Maptitude GIS work.

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Figure 3.01 – Brooklyn New York State Assembly Districts, 1992 – 2001

Figure 3.02 – New York City: Preponderant Racial Populations (by Percent)

Figure 3.03 – Central Brooklyn: Black Population Distribution (Fig. 2 magnified)

Figure 3.04 – Black Brooklyn: West Indian Population Distribution (by Numbers)

Figure 3.05 – Black Brooklyn: West Indian Population Distribution (by Percent)

Figure 3.06 – Central Brooklyn: Black Population Change, 1990 – 2000

Figure 3.07 – Black Brooklyn: West Indian Median Household Income.

National and New York Perspectives on the Black Diaspora

According to Census 2000, the U.S. foreign born population is the highest since 1930 and 57 percent higher than in 1990. The U.S. foreign born population was 10 million in 1970, 14 million in 1980, 20 million in 1990 and 31 million in 2000, going from 5 percent of the U.S. total population in 1970 to 11 percent in 2000. From 1860 to 1920, the era of massive European immigration to America, the US population ranged from 13-15 percent foreign born, and in 1930 it was 12 percent foreign born. In 2000, America's 31 million foreign born were 78 percent non-white Hispanics and Asians: 52 percent Latin American and 26 percent Asian (US Census Bureau Press Release, June 4, 2002).

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Figure 3.02
New York City: Predominant Racial Populations



Source: Census 2000 Summary File 3; Maptitude GIS software.

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Table No. 3.01
US Foreign Born Population, 1970-2000

Year	Foreign Born
1970	10 million
1980	14 million
1990	20 million
2000	31 million

Source: *Statistical Abstract of US, 2000 and 2001.*

The Black Foreign Born in New York and Brooklyn

There are two major foreign born populations within the 35 million U.S. Black population in 2,000: 1.9 million West Indians and 1.8 million Sub Saharan Black Africans. Using ancestry data, nearly 40% of the national West Indian population resides in New York State; 80% of this population resides in New York City; and 52

Table No. 3.02
West Indian and African Ancestry Populations, US, NYS and NYC

	West Indians		Africans	
United States	1,869,104	--	1,781,877	--
New York State	685,874	37%	166,508	9%
New York City	549,664	80%	122,425	74%
Brooklyn	283,749	52%	38,363	31%
Queens	136,628	25%	21,950	18%
Bronx	95,807	17%	36,261	30%
Manhattan	27,187	5%	18,988	16%
Staten Island	6,293	1%	6,863	6%

Source: Census 2000 SF3 "QT-P13 Ancestry," select areas

percent of this population resides in Brooklyn. (Using PUMS data and including U.S. born children of West Indian born parents, the Brooklyn total increases to 375,000. No other locality outside the Caribbean has such a population concentration

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Figure 3.03
Central Brooklyn: Black Population Distribution by Community District
(Magnification of Figure 2)

Source: Census 2000 Summary File 3; Maptitude GIS software. For Color Legend, see Figure 2.

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of this magnitude, thus Brooklyn can rightly be called the national epicenter of the West Indian population. While 40% of the national West Indian population is in New York State, only 10% of the African population is in New York, so that the Black African foreign born population is much more diffused nationally, than the West Indian population. Seventy four percent (74%) of the state's African population is in New York City; and 31% of the City's African population or 38,000 Africans resided in Brooklyn but West Indians outnumber Africans by a 10 : 1 ratio.

West Indian Immigration

Table No. 3.03
Selected West Indian Immigration to the U.S., 1961-1998

Country	1961-70	1971-80	1981-90	1991-98	Total
Jamaica	71,000	142,000	213,800	426,800	853,600
Haiti	37,500	58,700	140,200	236,400	472,800
Guyana	7,100	47,500	95,400	150,00	300,000
Trinidad	24,600	61,800	39,500	125,900	251,800
Panama	18,400	22,700	29,000	70,100	140,200
	158,600	332,700	517,900	1,009,200	2,018,400

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the US, 2001* (TableNo.7) *and 2000* (Table No.8).

According to the INS and the Census Bureau, in four decades from 1961 to 1998, 2 million West Indian immigrants came to the U.S. from primarily five Caribbean countries, and 1 million came to the U.S. from 1991 to 1998.

Undocumented West Indian and Other Immigrants

The immigrant population identified by the INS is not the *total* foreign born population. The INS estimated that in 1992 there were 3.4 million, in 1996 there were 5 million, ands in 2000 there were 7 million undocumented immigrants in the United States. In 1996, Arizona, New Jersey, Illinois and Florida had 115,000 to 350,000 undocumented immigrants; New York and Texas had 540,000 and 700,000

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undocumented residents respectively; and California had 2 million of the nation's 5 million undocumented residents, mostly Mexicans. Four Black Caribbean nations, Haiti,

Table No. 3.04
Undocumented Immigrants: Selected States and Countries of Origin, 1996

Top States	Undocumented	Sending Countries	Undocumented
California	2,000,000	Haiti	105,000
Texas	700,000	Bahamas	70,000
New York	540,000	Jamaica	50,000
Florida	350,000	Trinidad	50,000
Illinois	290,000	Mexico	2,700,000
New Jersey	135,000	El Salvador	335,000
Arizona	115,000	Guatemala	165,000
US Total	5,000,000	Canada	120,000

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the US, 2000,* Table No. 10 "Estimated Undocumented Immigrants, By Selected States and Countries of Origin."

Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad had 275,000 undocumented immigrants in the U.S. and constituted a major portion of New York's 540,000 undocumented immigrants in 1996.

More recently, according to a January 2003 INS Report on the "Unauthorized Immigrant Population," there were an estimated 201,000 unauthorized West Indian immigrants in the United States in 2000. With Brooklyn's approximately 15 percent share of the U.S. West Indian population, this could translate into an additional 30,000 "unauthorized" West Indians in Brooklyn. Undocumented immigrants are an additional component of the Census 2000 undercount of the Black population, estimated at 2-3 percent nationally.

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Table No. 3.05
Estimated Unauthorized West Indian Population in the U.S., 2000

	Estimated Unauthorized Population	Total Authorized Foreign Born Popul'n In the U.S.
Barbados	5,000	52,000
Dominica	4,000	16,000
Haiti	76,000	419,000
Jamaica	41,000	554,000
Trinidad & Tobago	34,000	197,000
Belize	8,000	40,000
Panama	11,000	105,000
Guyana	22,000	211,000
Total	201,000	1,594,000

Source: U.S. Immigr'n & Naturaliz'n Service, Office of Policy & Planning, "Table No. 2, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the U.S., 1990-2000." Report, January 2003.

Black Brooklyn in the National Urban Context

There are 12 U.S. cities with Black populations of 250,000 or more: New York City has 2.1 million Blacks, Chicago has 1 million Blacks, followed by Detroit 776,000, Philadelphia 656,000 and Houston with 495,000 Blacks; down to Atlanta with 256,000 Blacks. Thus Brooklyn's 938,000 Blacks comprise the largest contiguous urban concentration in North America. And nowhere else in the U.S. do West Indians constitute 35-40 percent of the Black urban population as they do in Brooklyn. (See Table No. 3.06.)

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Table No. 3.06
US Cities with 250,000 or more Blacks, 2000

City	Total Population	Black Population	Percent Black
New York City	8,008,278	2,129,762	27%
-- *Brooklyn*	2,465,326	*938,127*	38%
Chicago	2,896,016	1,065,009	37%
Detroit	951,270	775,772	82%
Philadelphia	1,517,550	655,824	43%
Houston	1,953,631	494,496	25%
Baltimore	651,154	418,951	64%
Los Angeles	3,694,820	415,195	11%
Memphis	650,100	399,208	61%
Washington DC	572,059	343,312	60%
New Orleans	484,674	325,947	67%
Dallas	1,188,580	307,957	26%
Atlanta	416,474	255,689	61%

Source: SF1 Census 2000, PHC-T-16, Table No. 5 "places of 100,000 or more Ranked by Black Population."

The Demographics of Ethnicity, Class and Gender

One variable in this dataset, "black3" gives a Black ethnic breakdown based on the place of birth of head of household. This variable allows us to analyze the concept of first and second generation ancestry in a way that the SF3 data does not. The SF3 data does not count as West Indian, the American born children of West Indian born parents living in the same household, but the PUMS analysis does allow us to count these children as West Indian. And when we count Blacks this way, African Americans are no longer the dominant population, but West Indians and African Americans in Central Brooklyn are more nearly equal in population, with West Indians having a slight edge. Based on their parents' place of birth, there are 375,000 West Indians in Central Brooklyn.

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Table No. 3.07
Central Brooklyn PUMAs – Black Ethnic Populations

	Number	Percent
Northern Blacks	234,766	19.14%
Southern Blacks	117,318	9.56%
African Americans*	352,084	28.6%
West Indians	374,598	30.54%
Central Am. & Hisp. Blacks	57,700	4.7%
Other Blacks	41,349	3.37%
Total Blacks	825,731	67.32%
Non Blacks	400,922	32.68%
Total Population	1,226,653	

"African American" = Northern Blacks + Southern Blacks

Source: Census 2000, 5% PUMS Dataset, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center.

Using this same concept of "place of birth" of the head of household, the PUMS analysis also allows us to dissect the rest of the Black population as well. Thus we can identify Blacks whose parents were born in New York or northern states or 235,000 "Northern Blacks." These are second and third generation New Yorkers. For Blacks whose parents were born in the southern states, these are first generation New Yorkers whose parents were part of the post-WW II southern migration to New York, heavily from South Carolina, North Carolina and the southeast. These are 117,000 "Southern Blacks." If you add these two groups together as constituting "African Americans," there are 352,000 in this Black ethnic category in comparison to 375,000 West Indians.

Just as immigrant research indicates major distinctions between British West Indians and Haitians, there are also some significant differences within the African American community between Blacks with southern versus northern roots, and actually some similarities between West Indians and Southern Blacks.

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West Indians are more likely to be bi-racial (3.9%) than Northern (1.7%) and Southern (1.1%) Blacks. Jamaicans, Trinidadians and the Guyanese have large Indo-Caribbean populations with Indo-Black racial intermarriages, whereas American racial taboos have restricted this trend among African Americans for centuries. This West Indian multi-racial character, relative proximity of Indo and Black populations, and acceptance of a white minority back home may also contribute to a political dynamic in Brooklyn where West Indians may be predisposed to be more accepting of white politicians than African Americans.

African American and West Indian Neighborhoods

According to the PUMS data analysis (see Table No. 3.08), there are 5 predominantly African American, and 4 predominantly West Indian neighborhoods as far as Black Brooklyn is concerned: *Bed-Stuy* is 73% African American and 18% West Indian, a 4 : 1 ratio; *Fort Greene* is 67% African American and 13% West Indian, a 5 : 1 ratio; *Crown Heights North* is 52% African American and 37% West Indian, a 3 : 2 ratio; *Brownsville* is 62% African American and 25% West Indian, a 2.5 :1 ratio and *East New York* is 54% African American and 28% West Indian, a 2 : 1 ratio.

In terms of sheer size, the largest Black neighborhood in Brooklyn, historically for the first time in Census 2000, was the predominantly West Indian neighborhood of Central and East Flatbush, with 147,000 persons, including 136,000 Blacks, of whom 96,000 were West Indians. This neighborhood surpasses the older African American neighborhood of Bed Stuy with a population of 121,000, which for roughly a half century had been Brooklyn's largest Black neighborhood. This same predominantly West Indian East Flatbush is also percentage wise, the "Blackest" neighborhood in Brooklyn at 93%.

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Table No. 3.08 Black Brooklyn Neighborhoods: African American and West Indian Composition, 2000

PUMA-ID – Nbhd	Northern Black	%	Southern Black	%	African * American	%	West Indian	%	Other Black	%	Total Black	%	Not Black	%	Total
364003 Bed Stuy	43,114	62%	26,858	38%	69,972	73%	17,191	18%	8,865	9%	96,028	79%	25,029	21%	121,057
364004 Ft Grn Bk Hts	22,937	67%	11,157	33%	34,094	67%	6,734	13%	10,381	20%	51,209	45%	61,859	55%	113,068
364006 Crown Hts N	36,313	69%	16,221	31%	52,534	52%	36,749	37%	10,976	11%	100,259	83%	19,911	17%	120,170
364007 Brownsville	39,224	66%	20,243	34%	59,467	62%	24,309	25%	12,009	13%	95,785	84%	18,477	16%	114,262
364008 East N.York	26,254	64%	15,033	36%	41,287	54%	20,899	28%	13,560	18%	75,746	53%	67,681	47%	143,427
364009 Canarsie MB	17,321	72%	6,747	28%	24,068	33%	68,625	66%	10,939	11%	103,632	54%	86,764	46%	190,396
364010 Flatbush E	19,745	69%	9,070	31%	28,815	21%	95,471	70%	11,560	9%	135,846	93%	10,777	7%	146,623
364011 Crown Hts S	18,920	71%	7,769	29%	26,689	28%	60,383	61%	11,312	11%	98,384	86%	15,628	14%	114,012
364015 Flatbush W	10,938	72%	4,220	28%	15,158	22%	44,237	64%	9,447	14%	68,842	42%	94,796	58%	163,638
Total	234,766	67%	117,318	33%	352,084	43%	374,598	45%	99,049	12%	825,731	67%	400,922	33%	1,226,653
				* AA	=No.Blk	+	So.Blk								

Source: 5% PUMS data, Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

In terms of the four West Indian neighborhoods, East Flatbush is 70% West Indian and 21% African American, a 3.5 : 1 ratio; Canarsie, Mill Basin is 66% West Indian and 33% African American , a 2 : 1 ratio; Flatbush is 64% West Indian and 22% African American, a 3 : 1 ratio; and Crown Heights South is 61% West Indian and 28% African American, a 2 : 1 ratio.

It should be noted that these figures cited are not the total populations in these neighborhoods, as Table No. 3.08 denotes but these are the Black ethnic splits within the total Black populations in these neighborhoods. The large "Other Black" category of 99,000 persons is comprised of: a) 29,000 Central American Blacks from countries like Honduras and Belize; b) 29,000 Hispanic Blacks or "Afro Latinos," who are persons claiming both a Black racial identity and Hispanic origin such as Black Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans and South Americans; and c) Blacks of two or more races and others. The 401,000 "Non-Black" category includes Non Hispanic whites, Hispanics, Non-Hispanic Asians, Native Americans and others. These numbers add up to the 826,000 Blacks and the total 1.2 million persons in the nine Black Brooklyn PUMAs. Of note, nearly 90 percent or 826,000 of 938,000 Brooklyn Blacks live in just 9 of 18 PUMAs or neighborhoods indicating that in the year 2000, there was still a very high degree of Black residential segregation in Brooklyn.

Some of these Black neighborhoods contain other important racial and ethnic enclaves. The 21% non-Black population in Bed-Stuy is mainly Hispanic; the 55% non-Black population in Fort Greene is mainly Hispanic and wealthy whites in adjacent neighborhoods of Boerum Hill, Clinton Hill and Brooklyn Heights; the 47% non-Blacks in East New York are mainly Hispanic; the 46% non-Blacks in Canarsie, are heavily

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Figure 3.04
Black Brooklyn: West Indian Population Distribution (by Numbers)

Source: Census 2000 Summary File 3; Maptitude GIS software.

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Jewish, Italian and Hispanic; and the 58% non-Blacks in Flatbush are heavily Jewish, Asian and Hispanic.

The African American – West Indian "Dividing Line"

Eastern Parkway in Central Brooklyn is an historical but also a demographic landmark. It is America's first urban parkway, designed in the late 19th century by Calvert Vaux who also designed the adjacent Prospect Park, and earlier designed Manhattan's Central Park. For the past few decades, Eastern Parkway has been the annual route of the West Indian Labor Day Parade, with generally a million onlookers, one of the largest ethnic parades in America. Eastern Parkway is also the border between Crown Heights North, Community Board (CB) 8 and Crown Heights South, Community Board 9. This parkway today is the major divider between predominantly African American communities to the north and predominantly West Indian communities to the south, (though there are also a significant number of West Indians in Crown Heights North, CB 8, between Atlantic Ave. and Eastern parkway).

Haitian and African Ancestry

Another way to identify Black ethnicity is to correlate the "language spoken at home" variable with Black neighborhoods. In predominantly Black neighborhoods, speaking French, Patois or Kreyol at home equates with Haitian ancestry. There were 20,000 persons in Canarsie, 22,000 persons in East Flatbush, 19,000 persons in Flatbush, and 12,000 persons in Crown Heights South who indicated that they spoke French, Patois or Kreyol at home. And there were in the range of 1100-1500 persons each in Bed Stuy, East New York, Crown Heights South, Flatbush, East Flatbush and Canarsie who indicated that African languages were spoken at home.

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Figure 3.05
Black Brooklyn: West Indian Population Distribution (by Percentage)

Source: Census 2000 Summary File 3; Maptitude GIS software.

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Language Spoken at Home

The variable "language spoken at home" is a gauge of cultural literacy and political literacy as well. Approximately 90% of African Americans indicated that English is the primary language spoken at home whereas only 68% of West Indians indicated such. The other 32% of West Indians who primarily speak another language at home are mainly Haitians who speak French, Patois and Kreyol. This is in addition to 67,000 Hispanic, Central American and Other Black households where more than 75% indicate that their primary language spoken at home is other than English.

This language barrier constitutes a formidable challenge but also a strength around questions of political communication and mobilization in Black Brooklyn. Communicating with Panamanians in Spanish or Haitians in Kreyol around issues important to them can be a powerful communications and mobilization tool. But the language issue is largely unaddressed by politicians on the one hand, and constitutes a "slippery slope" on the other hand, given the ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity of Black Brooklyn. Also related to the literacy question is the variable, the "ability to speak English well." A surprising 15% of Southern Black households (compared to 8% of Northern Blacks) indicated they did not speak well, reflecting low educational attainment for older Southerners subjected to a segregated, inferior educational system.

Part II: Racial and Ethnic Neighborhood Succession, 1970-2000[6]

This section discusses major demographic changes over the past 30 years in Brooklyn and at the neighborhood level from 1970-2000; followed by a more recent focus on some significant demographic changes in the last decade, 1990-2000.

[6] See Table No. 3.09, " 9 Black Brooklyn Neighborhoods, Racial Population Changes, 1970 – 2000," p. _.

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Figure 3.06
Central Brooklyn: Black Population Change, 1990 – 2000

Source: Census 2000, Summary File 3; Maptitude GIS software.

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According to Census 2000 SF3 data provided by the NYC Dept. of City Planning, 9 of Brooklyn's 18 Community Districts had significant Black populations, mirroring the 9 PUMA neighborhoods. What follows is a neighborhood by neighborhood description of some of the dramatic demographic and other shifts in these neighborhoods over the past 30 years; and a discussion of these overall trends which shaped Black Brooklyn.

East Flatbush (CD 17). From 1970 to 2000 the total population increased by 16,000 from 150,000 to 166,000, an 11 percent increase. East Flatbush is now 88 percent Black and mostly of West Indian ancestry, 2 percent white and 6 percent Hispanic. In the past 20 years, the Black population has increased dramatically from 118,000 in 1980 to 147,000 in 2000, by 29,000 or 25 percent. During this same period, the white population dropped precipitously from 20,000 to 2,600, an 87 percent decrease going from 12 percent white in 1980 to 1.6 percent white in 2000.

Ocean Hill – Brownsville (CD 16). From 1970 to 2000 the total population decreased dramatically from 123,000 to 85,000, a decline of 38,000 or 31 percent. Ocean Hill Brownsville is now 78 percent Black, less than 1 percent white and 18 percent Hispanic. In the past 20 years the Black population has increased by 10 percent from 60,000 in 1980 to 67,000 in 2000. In this same period, the white population declined from 1256 to 589, from 1.5 percent to 0.7 percent. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Brownsville was one of the largest most influential Jewish communities in New York City, but the Jewish population had a huge exodus from Brownsville to the suburbs and elsewhere, beginning after World War II. Jewish and white flight accounted for much of the depopulation, but Brownsville's deteriorated housing stock also caused an out migration of Blacks as well. Major low and moderate income housing new

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Table No. 3.09
Racial and Population Changes 1970 – 2000, Nine Black Brooklyn Community Districts

CD – Nbhd	2000							1980							1970
	Pop	White	%	Black	%	Hispan.	%	Pop	White	%	Black	%	Hispan.	%	Pop
17-E.Flatbush	165,753	2,577	1.6%	146,506	88.4%	9,264	5.6%	154,596	19,733	12.2%	117,887	73.1%	13,796	8.6%	149,496
16-Brwnsvlle	85,343	589	0.7%	66,712	78.2%	15,380	18.0%	73,802	1,256	1.5%	60,354	71.1%	11,340	13.4%	122,589
8-CrwnHgtsN	96,076	6,536	6.8%	74,942	78.0%	10,012	10.4%	88,795	5,151	5.3%	74,028	76.4%	8,342	8.6%	121,821
3-Bed-Stuy	143,867	2,056	1.4%	110,431	76.8%	26,020	18.1%	133,377	1,715	1.2%	112,994	81.5%	17,781	12.8%	203,380
9-CrwnHgtsS	104,014	11,733	11.3%	79,466	76.4%	8,581	8.2%	96,667	9,705	8.8%	75,827	68.5%	9,209	8.3%	101,047
18-Canarsie	194,653	67,303	34.6%	98,714	50.7%	15,886	8.2%	169,093	148,663	91.5%	11,115	6.8%	6,839	4.2%	188,643
5-East NY	173,198	8,785	5.1%	84,838	49.0%	65,312	37.7%	154,932	30,231	18.7%	67,566	41.9%	53,984	33.5%	170,791
2-Ft.Greene	98,620	33,931	34.4%	39,916	40.5%	16,535	16.8%	92,732	30,174	31.9%	44,038	46.6%	15,877	16.8%	110,221
14-Flatbush	168,806	60,268	35.7%	66,211	39.2%	22,242	13.2%	143,859	74,831	46.8%	44,284	27.7%	17,234	10.8%	137,041

Sources: "Community District Profiles (2001)," and "Total Popula'n, NYC Com'ty Districts 1970…2000," Popula'n Div'n, NYC Dept. of City Planning, www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dcp; and US Census Bureau Data.

Construction and rehabilitation eventually drew Blacks and Hispanics into Brownsville. (See Landesman and Pritchett's accounts of this major neighborhood transition.[7])

Crown Heights North (CD 8). From 1970 to 2000 this area's population decreased by 26,000 from 122,000 to 96,000 or 27 percent. Crown Heights North is now 78 percent Black, 7 percent white and 10 percent Hispanic. In the past 20 years, the Black population has remained virtually the same at about 75,000 while in this same period, the mainly Orthodox Jewish Lubavitcher white population has actually increased by 25 percent from 5200 to 6500.

Bedford – Stuyvesant (CD 3). From 1970 to 2000 this area's population declined precipitously by 59,000 from 203,000 to 144,000 or 29 percent. Bed-Stuy is now 77 percent Black, 1 percent white and 18 percent Hispanic. In the past 20 years, the Black population has actually declined slightly from 113,000 to 110,000; while in this same period, the white population has increased slightly from 1700 to 2100 or nearly 25 percent, and the Hispanic population has increased significantly from 18,000 to 26,000 or 44 percent. Major depopulation in Bed-Stuy and elsewhere caused major housing abandonment, major declines in municipal services and small business activity, and those areas with low population and low numbers of voters become politically marginalized.

Crown Heights South (CD 9). From 1970 to 2000 this population increased slightly from 101,000 to 104,000. Crown Heights South is now 76 percent Black, 11 percent white and 8 percent Hispanic. In the past 20 years, the Black population has increased slightly from 76,000 to 80,000; while in this same period, the Orthodox

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[7] See Alter F. Landesman, 1971, *Brownsville: the Birth, Development, and Passing of a Jewish Community in New York;* and Wendell E. Pritchett, 2002, *Brownsville, Brooklyn: Blacks, Jews, and the Changing Face of the Ghetto.*

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Jewish Lubavitcher community and other whites have increased by 21 percent from 9700 to 11,700.

Canarsie, Mill Basin, Flatlands (CD 18). In a powerful example of Black 'suburbanization,' these neighborhoods have among the most dramatic racial population shifts in all of New York City. From 1970 to 2000 this overall population increased slightly by 6,000 from 189,000 to 195,000. Canarsie is now 51 percent Black, 35 percent white and 8 percent Hispanic. However, in the past 20 years the Black population has increased phenomenally from 11,000 in 1980 to 99,000 in 2000, -- by 88,000, or a 700 percent increase. The vast majority of this Black population increase is comprised of persons of West Indian ancestry, significantly seeking home ownership and moving in from Brooklyn's older West Indian neighborhoods to the north and west (Flatbush, East Flatbush et. al.). During this same 20 year period, the white population dropped precipitously from 149,000 to 67,000 a loss of 82,000 or 55 percent. Thus in 20 years, Canarsie went from being 92 percent white to 35 percent white; and from 7 percent Black to 51 percent Black and heavily West Indian.

East New York (CD 5). From 1970 to 2000 this population has increased slightly from 171,000 to 173,000. Today East New York is 49 percent Black, 5 percent white and 38 percent Hispanic. In the past 20 years the Black population has increased by 25% from 68,000 in 1980 to 85,000 in 2000 significantly due to new housing construction. During this same period the white population has dropped precipitously from 30,000 to 9000, a 70 percent decrease.

Fort Greene, Clinton Hill, Brooklyn Heights (CD 2). From 1970 to 2000 this population has decreased by 12,000 from 110,000 to 99,000 or 11 percent. Today this

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community is 41 percent Black, 34 percent white and 17 percent Hispanic. In the past 20 years the Black population has decreased slightly from 44,000 in 1980 to 40,000 in 2000; while in this same period, the white population has increased slightly from 30,000 to 34,000, a 13 percent increase.

Flatbush (CD14). From 1970 to 2000 this overall population has dramatically increased by 32,000 from 137,000 to 169,000 or 23 percent. Today this community is 39 percent Black, 36 percent white and 13 percent Hispanic. In the past 20 years however, the Black population has increased dramatically by 50%, from 44,000 in 1980 to 66,000 in 2000. In this same period the white, heavily Jewish population has decreased from 75,000 to 60,000, a 20 percent decrease.

Part III: African American Bed-Stuy and West Indian East Flatbush: Demographic Contrasts in Black Ethnic Neighborhoods

The foregoing demographic analysis used the entire African American and Caribbean PUMS population data in Brooklyn, along with other racial and ethnic groups for purposes of comparing and contrasting similarities and differences in various indicators for ethnicity, class and gender. This section will analyze many of these same variables, but will compare them at the neighborhood level utilizing the two most predominantly Black and ethnically distinct neighborhoods in Brooklyn: African American Bedford Stuyvesant and Caribbean East Flatbush.

In terms of the nine Black neighborhoods of Brooklyn and their corresponding nine significantly Black PUMAs, the two most contrasting neighborhoods with respect to ethnicity are the Bedford Stuyvesant community, PUMA 4003, which is 80 percent Black

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and approximately 6 to 1 African American versus Caribbean; and the East Flatbush community, PUMA 4010, which is over 90 percent Black and better than 2 to 1 Caribbean versus African American. This section will discuss and analyze several indicators from the constructed PUMA data table, "African American Bed – Stuy and Caribbean East Flatbush: A Demographic Comparison," and will compare and contrast these two distinct Black ethnic neighborhoods.

Ethnicity. Bed Stuy has 121,000 persons, is 80 percent Black, more than three-fourths native born African American, and Afro Caribbeans comprise 1 in 6 persons in this community. East Flatbush, on the other hand, has about 145,000 persons, is 93 percent Black, with 83,000 Afro-Caribbeans (as opposed to Hispanic, white and Indo-Caribbeans) and has 33,000 native born African Americans, a ratio of about 2.5 Caribbeans for every African American.

Citizenship and Voting Age. In Bed – Stuy, 82 percent of persons are native born citizens, 7 percent are foreign born, naturalized citizens, and 11 percent are non-citizens; as contrasted with East Flatbush where only 45 percent are native born citizens, 29 percent are foreign born, naturalized citizens and 26 percent are non-citizens. Thus the non citizen rate in East Flatbush is significantly lower than the 36 percent non-citizen population rate for Afro-Caribbeans Brooklyn wide. East Flatbush has a 73 percent voting age population, as compared with Bed Stuy's 68 percent voting age population. When you combine citizenship rates and voting age factors, the Bed Stuy and East Flatbush citizen voting age populations (CVAP) are nearly equal in size at 70,000 and 72,000, even though East Flatbush has 25,000 more voting age persons than Bed Stuy. CVAP is the critical determinant of who is actually eligible to register and vote.

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Table No. 3.10a

African American Bed-Stuy and Caribbean East Flatbush: A Demographic Comparison
5% PUMS Data Census 2000 (All cases are not in every category)

Demographic Variables	African-American – Bed-Stuy PUMA 4003		Caribbean – East Flatbush PUMA 4010	
Ethnicity				
Total Population	120,953		144,778	
Black Population	96,431	79.7%	134,787	93.1%
African-Americans	70,724	73.3%	32,638	24.2%
West Indians	14,900	15.5%	83,106	61.7%
Citizenship & Voting Age				
Native Born Citizens	98,978	81.8%	65,326	45.1%
Foreign Born Citizens	8,871	7.3%	41,384	28.6%
For. Born Non-Citizen	13,104	10.8%	38,068	26.3%
Voting Age Population	80,851	68.2%	104,488	73.3%
Citizen Voting Age	69,863	57.8%	71,666	49.5%
Tenure				
Home Owner	26,979	22.3%	53,987	37.3%
Renter	93,974	77.7%	90,791	62.7%
Family Structure				
Married Couple Families	36,653	30.3%	63,020	43.5%
Single Parent Families	66,233	54.8%	66,257	45.8%
Under 18 Years	37,734	31.8%	38,017	26.7%
Income & Poverty				
Under $15,000	41,985	34.7%	25,494	17.6%
Poverty Level & Below	45,800	38.2%	27,638	19.2%
Over $75,000	17,027	14.1%	31,777	21.9%
Education				
No High School Diploma	65,531	57.2%	64,667	46.6%
BA Degree or higher	7,442	6.5%	14,502	10.5%

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Home Ownership. East Flatbush at 37 percent has a home ownership rate 50 percent higher than Bed Stuy's 22 percent, and in terms of sheer number East Flatbush has double the number of home owners, 54,000 to 27,000 in Bed-Stuy. Even though Bed-Stuy is the smaller of the two communities, it has a greater number of renters 94,000 and 78 percent compared to East Flabush's 91,000 renters and 63 percent. It should be noted that the type of housing stock in a local community is an important factor in home ownership rates, and the older African American Bed Stuy neighborhood in North Central Brooklyn contains a significant number of low income public housing developments while East Flatbush has almost none.

Family Structure. East Flatbush has 63,000 married couple families or 44 percent of the family formations, while Bed Stuy has 37,000 married couple families or 30 percent, a rate almost 50 percent lower than in East Flatbush. Bed Stuy has 66,000 single parent families, virtually equal in number to the larger East Flatbush community but a much higher rate of 55 percent of Bed Stuy families as compared to 46 percent in East Flatbush. Also, Bed Stuy has a 2 to 1 ratio of single parent families to married couple families while East Flatbush has a 1 to 1 ratio. The vast majority of single parent families are female headed households. Bed Stuy is a younger community where one-third of households contain children under 18 years whereas, East Flatbush families are older and only one-fourth of households contain children under 18 years.

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Table No. 3.10b

African American Bed-Stuy and Caribbean East Flatbush: A Demographic Comparison
5% PUMS Data Census 2000 (All cases are not in every category)

Demographic Variables	African-American – Bed-Stuy PUMA 4003		Caribbean – East Flatbush PUMA 4010	
Employment				
Employed	35,370	41.8%	58,637	53.8%
Unemployed	7,272	8.6%	7,310	6.7%
Not In Labor Force (16 – 64 yrs.)	41,952	49.6%	43,065	39.5%
Class of Workers				
Private Sector	31,497	58.9%	52,798	66.5%
Nonprofit Sector	4,982	9.3%	6,436	8.1%
Government	14,375	26.9%	16,526	20.8%
Self Employed	2,608	4.9%	3,628	4.6%
Top Industry Sectors				
Manufacturing	4,432	8.3%	4,210	5.3%
Wholesale	6,912	12.9%	9,760	12.2%
Finance, Insur., Real Estate	4,634	8.6%	7,012	8.8%
Personal Services	8,163	15.2%	9,788	12.3%
Health	6,266	11.7%	17,070	21.4%
Social Services	9,823	18.3%	12,743	16.0%
Occupations				
Managers	2,512	4.7%	3,497	4.4%
Educ. & Svc. Prof'ls	4,394	8.2%	6,286	7.9%
Health Prof'ls & Wkrs	4,766	8.9%	14,232	17.9%
Service Workers	10,872	20.3%	14,683	18.4%
Salespersons	4,697	8.8%	6,665	8.4%
Clerical Workers	12,072	22.5%	15,177	19.0%
Skilled Trades	5,377	10.0%	7,650	9.6%
Transpn & Prod. Wkrs	6,250	11.7%	6,830	8.6%

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Income and Poverty. In the smaller Bed Stuy community, 42,000 households had incomes under $15,000 in 1999 or 35 percent; whereas in the larger East Flatbush community only 26,000 households had less than $15,000 or 18 percent, half the percentage in Bed Stuy. For persons at or below the poverty level there were 46,000 households in Bed Stuy or 38 percent, compared to 28,000 households in East Flatbush or 19 percent, only half of Bed Stuy's poverty rate. At the high end of the income scale there were 32,000 persons in East Flatbush with incomes of $ 75,000 or 22 percent and 50 percent higher than Bed Stuy with 17,000 households and 14 percent above $75,000.

Education. Smaller Bed Stuy has more persons without high school diplomas, 66,000 and 57 percent, compared to East Flatbush with 65,000 persons and 47 percent of it's adult population. At the higher education end of the spectrum, for persons with bachelor's degrees or higher, East Flatbush has twice as many persons as Bed Stuy, nearly 15,000 and 11 percent compared to Bed Stuy with 7400 and 7 percent.

Employment Rates. East Flatbush has much larger numbers and percentages in the labor force than Bed Stuy, with 59,000 persons and 54 percent in the labor force compared to Bed Stuy's 35,000 and 42 percent in the labor force, a rate 22 percent lower. Bed Stuy's 8.6 percent unemployment rate was 20 percent higher than East Flatbush's 6.7 percent; and Bed Stuy had a 20 percent higher rate of persons not in the labor force, 50 percent compared to East Flatbush's 40 percent.

Employment and Industry Sectors. In East Flatbush 67 percent of workers are employed in the private sector, 8 percent in the non profit sector, 21 percent in government employment and 4.6 percent are self employed. In Bed Stuy 59 percent of their workers are in the private sector, 9 percent are in the non profit sector, a high of 27

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percent are in government employment and 4.9 percent are self employed. The top industry sectors for workers in both neighborhoods are manufacturing, wholesale, FIRE, [8] personal services, health and social services. However Bed Stuy workers have slightly higher employment rates in manufacturing, personal services and social services; while East Flatbush workers have a much higher employment rate in the health sector at 21 percent, nearly double Bed Stuy workers' 12 percent rate.

Occupational Categories African American Bed Stuy workers have greater representation than their Caribbean East Flatbush neighbors in all occupational categories except health professionals and workers, where East Flatbush's rate is double, 18 percent compared to Bed Stuy's 9 percent. The occupational distribution for Bed Stuy workers was: managerial 5 percent, professionals 9 percent, service workers 20 percent, sales persons 9 percent, clerical workers 23 percent, skilled trades 10 percent and transportation workers 12 percent.

Part IV: Black Brooklyn: Major Demographic Trends

There were several processes and trends occurring across neighborhoods which brought about the dramatic racial transformation of Central Brooklyn in the 1980 – 2000 period. A major theme was continuing "white flight," beginning in the post WW II period up through the 1980s, spurred by suburban highway transportation, new housing, FHA and VA mortgages, and job opportunities in white suburbs, and white fear of growing Black ghettoes accompanied by school integration. Another factor was Black and Hispanic in-migration steered by redlining banks and block busting realtors into

[8] "FIRE" means the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sectors.

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neighborhoods being abandoned by whites. Black depopulation occurred in older African American northerly neighborhoods like Bed-Stuy and Brownsville; and it also occurred as upwardly mobile Blacks sought new housing, better schools and less crime plagued neighborhoods in Queens and the suburbs. In southern Central Brooklyn, there was an eastward shift of upwardly mobile West Indian immigrants from their heavily rental based Flatbush neighborhood, moving eastward and southward to home ownership opportunities in East Flatbush and Canarsie, as whites vacated these communities.

Population, Race and Ethnicity [9]. From 1990 to 2000, Brooklyn's population increased from 2.3 million to 2.5 million while the City's population increased from 7.3 million to 8 million. Brooklyn's white population declined from 923,000 to 855,000; the Non-Hispanic Black population increased from 798,000 to 849,000; the Asian population increased from 106,000 to 185,000, including a 75% increase of 53,000 Chinese. The Hispanic population increased slightly from 462,000 to 488,000 but with major internal redistribution of national and ethnic groups: Mexicans increased from 22,000 to 59,000; Dominicans increased from 55,000 to 66,000; while Puerto Ricans dramatically declined from 275,000 to 213,000, a loss of 62,000 persons.

Household Formations. Married couple households increased slightly to 340,000; female headed households increased slightly to 196,000; male headed households increased slightly to 48,000; and non-family households increased from 273,000 to 297,000. Household and family size remained the same over the decade at 2.75 and 3.41 persons respectively.

[9] Sources: 1990 STF1, 3 and 4 data; and Census 2000 SF1 and DP-1 Profiles; Popula'n Div'n, NYC Dept. of City Planning. See Table Numbers X1, X2, and X3.

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Housing Market Trends. There was a 6.5 percent increase in total housing units in Brooklyn from 874,000 to 931,000; occupied units increased from 828,000 to 881,000; and vacant units increased from 46,000 to 50,000. The homeowner vacancy rate declined from 2.3 percent to 1.6 percent, indicating a very tight market for home sales; and the rental vacancy rate also declined from 3.8 percent to 3.1 percent. Owner occupied housing increased from 215,000 to 238,000 units; while renter occupied housing increased from 613,000 to 642,000.

Declining Birth Rates[10]. In the 1990s birth rates declined dramatically in West Indian and African American neighborhoods. From 1990 to 1998, in West Indian East Flatbush the birth rate declined from 23 live births per 1,000 to 17, a 22 percent decrease; in Crown Heights South from 22 to 17 per 1,000; in African American Brownsville the birth rate declined from 26 to 19 per 1,000, a 27 percent decrease; and in Bed - Stuy it dropped from 25 to 17 per 1,000, a 32 percent decrease. Thus, with women having less babies, population increases in 2000 were due in part to in-migration of West Indian immigrants as well as declining death rates and infant mortality rates.

[10] See Table No. 3.10c, " Vital Statistics 1990-1999, Nine Black Brooklyn Community Districts."

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Table No. 3.10c
Vital Statistics, 1990 – 1999, Nine Black Brooklyn Community Districts

CD Nbhd	2000 Popula'n	White Pop	%	Black Pop	%	Hispan Pop	%	Birth Rate 90	Birth Rate 98	Death Rate 90	Death Rate 98	InfanMortal Rate 90	InfanMortal Rate 98	Public Assntc 94	Public Asstnc 99	No. 1 – 2 Fam Homes	CD Nbhd
17-E.Flatbush	165,753	2,577	1.6%	146,506	88.4%	9,264	5.6%	23.0	16.7	5.9	4.7	18.3	10.4	22.2	18.8	11,939	17-E.Flatbsh
16-Brwnsvlle	85,343	589	0.7%	66,712	78.2%	15,380	18.0%	25.9	18.7	9.7	7.7	18.6	10.7	46.5	40.2	3,222	16-Brwnsvlle
8-CrwnHgtsN	96,076	6,536	6.8%	74,942	78.0%	10,012	10.4%	22.7	17.0	9.4	8.4	21.8	15.2	34.5	28.2	2,656	8-CrnHgtsN
3-Bed-Stuy	143,867	2,056	1.4%	110,431	76.8%	26,020	18.1%	25.1	17.1	11.5	8.2	23.0	13.5	44.3	36.1	6,578	3-Bed-Stuy
9-CrwnHgtsS	104,014	11,733	11.3%	79,466	76.4%	8,581	8.2%	22.0	16.5	6.5	5.7	14.8	11.5	25.1	20.3	4,317	9-CrnHgtsS
18-Canarsie	194,653	67,303	34.6%	98,714	50.7%	15,886	8.2%	14.3	15.8	9.5	7.8	11.2	8.6	13.1	13.3	29,632	18-Canarsie
5-East NY	173,198	8,785	5.1%	84,838	49.0%	65,312	37.7%	24.4	17.7	7.9	6.5	14.0	7.0	42.0	35.7	10,580	5-East NY
2-Ft.Greene	98,620	33,931	34.4%	39,916	40.5%	16,535	16.8%	16.4	13.1	10.2	7.9	15.5	8.1	23.6	18.7	2,117	2-Ft.Greene
14-Flatbush	168,806	60,268	35.7%	66,211	39.2%	22,242	13.2%	21.7	19.1	8.3	6.6	12.7	8.2	25.7	23.6	8,022	14-Flatbush

Sources: "Community District Profiles (2001)," and "Total Popula'n, NYC Com'ty Districts 1970…2000," Popula'n Div'n, NYC Dept. of City Planning, www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dcp; and US Census Bureau Data.

Declining Death Rates. Declining death rates are a major index of a healthy community and they declined significantly throughout Black Brooklyn from 1990 to 1998. The death rate in heavily West Indian East Flatbush declined from 5.9 to 4.7 per 1,000; and Crown Heights South declined from 6.5 to 5.7. In the African American neighborhood of Brownsville the death rate dropped from 9.7 to 7.7, a 23 percent decrease; and in Bed – Stuy it dropped from 11.5 to 8.2, a 29 percent decrease. But the African American neighborhoods of Bed Stuy and Crown Heights North had the highest death rates and the West Indian neighborhoods of Crown Heights South and East Flatbush have the lowest death rates in Black Brooklyn.

Declining Infant Mortality. Infant mortality rates are another major index of a healthy community and these rates declined dramatically throughout Black Brooklyn. In West Indian East Flatbush the infant mortality rate declined from18.3 to 10.4 per 1,000, a 43 percent decline; and in Crown Heights South a drop from 14.8 to 11.5. In the African American neighborhood of Brownsville there was a dramatic drop from 18.6 to 10.7, or a 43 percent decrease; in Bed-Stuy it dropped from 23.0 to 13.5, a 41 percent decrease. The African American neighborhoods of Crown Heights North and Bed Stuy still had the highest infant mortality rates in Black Brooklyn, though they made significant headway in reducing high infant mortality rates in their communities.

Declining Welfare Rates – A Black Ethnic Gap [11]. Foreign born undocumented persons and non-citizens are now ineligible for public assistance. Thus as expected, the data show much lower welfare rates in heavily West Indian communities. The period 1994 to 1999 straddles the "before and after" period for the landmark federal welfare reform law of 1996. In the heavily West Indian neighborhood of East Flatbush the

[11] See "Table 3.10c Vital Statistics, 1990-1999, Nine Black Community Districts."

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welfare rate declined from 22 percent to 19 percent of the population receiving some form of public assistance, mainly TANF and SSI; and Crown Heights South declined from 25 to 20 percent. The heavily African American neighborhood of Brownsville declined from 47 percent to 40 percent; and Bed-Stuy dropped from 44 to 36 percent. In general, there are nearly twice as many people on public assistance in African American neighborhoods as in West Indian neighborhoods.

A Gender Gap: More Older Women – Fewer Younger Men [12]

In general, West Indian females are older than African American females and both groups of females are older than their male counterparts, with a few dramatic contrasts in certain African American neighborhoods. In West Indian East Flatbush, Crown Heights South, Canarsie and Flatbush, Black female versus male median ages are: 35 versus 30 years; 36 versus 30 years; 33 versus 27 years; and 33 versus 28 years. In African American Brownsville, Bed-Stuy, and East New York Black female versus male median ages are 31 versus 22 years; 34 versus 29 years; and 32 versus 25 years. But in the extreme case of Brownsville, the median age for Black males is 22 years old, -- 9 years younger than the median age for Black females, at 31 years old.

These age differences between the sexes have major political, social and economic implications. In immigrant communities the explanation may partly lie in different immigration and mobility patterns for males and females: more females than males immigrate and more females find employment and stay in the community, and perhaps women leave their sending country at an older age. On the male side of the equation, other explanations include: higher incarceration and mortality rates for Black

[12] See "Table SF1 P-113A: Black NonHispanic Males and Females by Age, Brooklyn Com'ty Districts," Census 2000 SF1 data, Popula'n Div'n, NYC Dept. of Planning (Feb. 2002).

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males, high male unemployment, mobility and out-migration from these communities. The shortage of adult males has profound community impacts. It inhibits the formation of married couple families; it skews the child socialization process towards adult females; it shortchanges household income potential and asset building; and it creates a structural deficit in the gender composition of the Black electorate. These trends are similar in both the African American and West Indian communities.

First and Second Generation West Indians

Persons born in the U.S. and living in a household with a West Indian born parent are the West Indian second generation. For West Indians, 69% are first generation, born in the West Indies; and 24% are second generation born in the U.S. For African Americans, 97% are third generation or more born in the U.S.

More Voting Age Population (VAP) Black Females

Black Female VAP is consistently about 55-60 percent of the total Black population across Black neighborhoods, which is similar to the citywide ratio for male versus female voting age population and voter registration (Anil, 2004). Thus contrary to some popular assumptions, higher Black female voter registration and turnout may be more due to Black females' demographic dominance in the voting age cohort, and not - necessarily due to their greater electoral motivation and activity than Black males, as some argue.

West Indian versus African American Citizen VAP (CVAP)

Regarding nativity and citizenship, over 98% of Northern and Southern Blacks were native born American citizens compared to only 32% for West Indians, who also have an additional 37% foreign born, naturalized citizens; and 31% or 117,000 non-

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citizens, not counting an additional large population of undocumented immigrants. Thus over two thirds (68%) of West Indians are first generation, foreign born and 24% are second generation. With over 90% first or second generation West Indians, there is a relatively small population which has been in Black Brooklyn long enough to be generationally rooted in American and African American political traditions. Nonetheless, several West Indian politicians have come out of Black Brooklyn including its first Black legislator and Democratic District Leader, Hon. Bertram Baker, its first Black Congress member, Hon. Shirley Chisholm and others (see Chapter 2).

Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) is a critically important political variable which determines the base from which voter registration, and voter participation occurs. Northern Blacks have a CVAP rate of 64%; the older Southern Black population has a 79% CVAP (for a combined 243,000 African Americans). But West Indians have a CVAP of only 44% (165,000 persons). Thus there are huge differences in CVAP between African Americans and West Indians, and this explains that while West Indians may now constitute a slim majority of the general population, African Americans still constitute a significant majority (approximately 60%) of the Black electoral base in Central Brooklyn. Within this electoral base, while Southern Blacks are one third of the African American population, because they are older Southern Blacks are approximately 40% of Central Brooklyn's African American electorate, and perhaps an even higher percentage in certain elections since senior citizens tend to have high voter turnout levels.

Citizenship rates pinpoint the question of eligibility for voter registration and voter participation. A PUMS data analysis by Black ethnicity shows that Black Brooklyn's Citizen VAP (CVAP) is 458,000. Black female CVAP exceeds male CVAP

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by 247,000 to 161,000, a gap of 86,000 or 54% to 46%. And even though there are more West Indians (375,000) than African Americans (352,000), Black Brooklyn's African American CVAP (243,000) is larger than the West Indian CVAP (165,000) by 78,000. Add to this CVAP advantage, voter registration and voter turnout rates, and the African American sub-electorate is still dominant in Black Brooklyn.

Table No. 3.11
Black Brooklyn – Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) by Sex

	Male	Female	Total
Northern Blacks	57,412 38.2%	92,937 61.8%	150,349
Southern Blacks	36,375 39.4%	56,064 60.6%	92,349
West Indians	66,816 40.6%	97,924 59.4%	164,740
Other Blacks	22,622 44.7%	28,010 55.3%	50,632
Total	160,603	246,925	458,160

Source: Census 2000, PUMS data, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center.

Black Brooklyn's voting age population (VAP) is 580,000 or 70 percent of the Black population of 826,000. Black Brooklyn's VAP of 0.58 million is 43 percent of New York City's Black VAP of 1.4 million. Black Brooklyn's VAP is as large as the Bronx (290,000) and Queens (306,000) Black VAPs combined; and three times the size of Manhattan's Black VAP of 180,000. Coupled with citizenship rates, voter registration, voter turnout, and a substantial number of insurgents, organized labor, and Democratic Party organizations, local elected officials with local political operations, and this explains in great measure why the Black Brooklyn electoral base can be a potent force in local races and close citywide, statewide and sometimes national elections.

Significant differences in the age, gender and citizenship rates of West Indians, African Americans and others groups in local neighborhoods have significant political implications. In Flatbush, whites are 35 percent of the general population and 37 percent

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of the voting age population. But because there is a very large West Indian immigrant population of 39 percent which is heavily foreign born, non-citizen, non- registered and non-voting, the white population's voting power is magnified. Thus the white Flatbush electoral base has been a key voting bloc for State Senator Markowitz for more than 20 years; and it has supported Assemblywoman Rhoda Jacobs' re-election for more than 20 years, despite several West Indian and African American political insurgencies.

Similarly in Canarsie, whites are 35 percent of the total population, 38 percent of the voting age population, and their voting power is magnified because of a large West Indian immigrant non-citizen, non-registered, non-voting population in that community. This factor, along with legislative redistricting, the powerful white controlled, legendary Thomas Jefferson Regular Democratic Club, and other factors help explain why this neighborhood is still represented by white Assembly members Helene Weinstein and Frank Seddio; and by a white City Councilmember Lou Fidler, despite recent Black political insurgencies. African American Congressman Ed Towns and West Indian American State Senator John Sampson also represent Canarsie, reflecting the area's gradual racial change in political representation.[13]

Table No. 3.12
Black Brooklyn Senior Citizens CVAP by Sex

	Male	Female	Total
Northern Blacks	3,833 32%	8,161 68%	11,994
Southern Blacks	7,017 32.3%	14,697 67.7%	21,714
West Indians	7,942 38.7%	12,595 61.3%	20,537
Other Blacks	2,392 11.3%	5,195 12.8%	7,587
Total	21,184	40,648	61832

Source: Census 2000, PUMS data, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center.

[13] Towns is a first generation Southerner, born in North Carolina; Sampson is of African American and Guyanese parentage.

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Senior Citizen Voting Populations – A Gender Gap

A direct correlation exists between increased age and voter participation: generally, senior citizens have high voter registration and turnout rates (Peterson and Somit, 1994). For West Indians and African Americans, females outnumber male seniors by a 2 : 1 ratio. With a 62,000 CVAP, higher voter registration and turnout rates, senior citizens are a formidable electoral constituency. Also, West Indian seniors have lower citizenship rates and lower voter registration than do African Americans.

Home Ownership Issues

Table No. 3.13
African American and West Indian Home Ownership (All Age Groups)

	Home Owners	Renters
Northern Blacks	21%	79%
Southern Blacks	33%	67%
West Indians	36%	64%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

Political science research also documents a high correlation between home ownership and voter participation (Olson 1997). PUMS data in the table above give information on African American and West Indian homeownership rates. SF1 and SF3 data indicate that African American Bed-Stuy has 10,000 owner occupied units and Brownsville has 4500 owner occupied units. Heavily West Indian East Flatbush has 16,500 owner occupied units; Crown Heights South has 6,000 owner occupied units; and Canarsie has 36,000 owner occupied units, many of which have changed from white to West Indian in the past decade of dramatic racial transition. [14]

[14] Sources: "Table SF3 HU H-302: Total Occupied...Units...NYC Com'ty Districts;" and "Table SF1 H-101: Total Housing Units by Occupancy Status...NYC Com'ty Districts;" Popula'n Div'n, NYC Dept. of City Planning, Oct. 2001.

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A PUMS analysis shows that West Indians (36%) have the highest home ownership rates among the major Black ethnic groups in Brooklyn. But a major split within the African American community however, shows that Southern Blacks (33%) with their strong land ownership traditions have home owner rates nearly equal to West Indians, and 50% higher than the rates for Northern Blacks (21%). Age may be a factor in that Southern Blacks and West Indians are older than Northern Blacks and this age differential may account for some of these differences in home ownership rates.

Not just personal income, assets and credit worthiness but also the market value and composition of the housing stock in a community are major determinants of home ownership. If the community is largely private rental and public housing, with few 1-4 family homes, then this type of housing market will yield very few new home owners. These characteristics describe significant portions of the older African American neighborhoods in North Central Brooklyn (Bed Stuy, Brownsville, East New York), where there is a home ownership base in 1-4 family brownstones, disproportionately owned by seniors , many of whose properties are in arrears on payment of property taxes. There is also a significant portion of multiple dwellings which constituted Black Brooklyn's population center of gravity 20-30 years ago. Here some of the nation's oldest public housing was built during the Depression, post WW II era, and urban renewal eras of the 1960s and 1970s. Mitchell Lama and other government subsidy programs also built many of the moderate and middle income rentals. More southerly neighborhoods such as Crown Heights and Flatbush have large stocks of privately owned multiple dwellings. Thus the structural character of the housing stock in many older, northern African American neighborhoods is skewed against the option of home

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ownership; and skewed towards home ownership in newer West Indian neighborhoods of Canarsie and East Flatbush with their large stock of 1-4 family homes.

Their higher home ownership rates suggest that eligible West Indian neighborhoods should have high voter participation rates, except that these same heavily West Indian home owning communities also have high non-citizen rates which pre-empts their voter participation. Stricter federal immigration laws in the 1990s encouraged more West Indians to become U.S. citizens, and to register and vote.

The historical redlining of Black Brooklyn by government and the banking industry from WW II to the present has depressed Black home ownership and residential mobility and systematically created Black ghetto neighborhoods (Wilder 2000; Massey and Denton 1993). West Indians have been a home owning group in Black Brooklyn since the 1930's.[15] in order to combat discriminatory banks who refused to loan home mortgages to Black Brooklynites, a group of followers of Hon. Marcus Garvey and his philosophy of economic self-sufficiency, established their own home mortgage lending agency in the 1940's, *Paragon Progressive Credit Union.*[16]

More recently, increased West Indian home ownership may be the beneficiary of timing and opportunity. With Fair Housing Act legislation of the 1960s, discriminatory lending practices have somewhat subsided, and federal, anti-discrimination "Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)" minority lending requirements have been instituted. White flight from Crown Heights South, Flatbush, East Flatbush and Canarsie has facilitated Black access to large inventories of 1-4 family dwellings. And realtors and lenders

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[15] Barbadian Bed-Stuy resident Paule Marshall described this phenomenon in her award winning 1950 novel entitled *Brownstones, Brown Girl.*

[16] See Clyde Attewell, *The Paragon Story;* and Craig Wilder, *A Covenant With Color: Race and Social Power in Brooklyn.*

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(some of whom use predatory tactics)[17] are now lending mortgages to Blacks in neighborhoods which were previously redlined for decades.

High Residential Mobility

Many neighborhoods throughout Black Brooklyn are characterized by high residential mobility. Some factors contributing to this mobility include: poor housing conditions and building services; the search for better housing and neighborhoods; gentrification, rising property values and rents; landlord tenant disputes and evictions; fires and arson. Residential mobility inhibits voter registration and voting. Under New York State Election Law, one must be at an address 30 days before registering and one must re-register every time one moves to a new address (even within the same building!). In 2000 in the African American neighborhoods of Bed-Stuy, Brownsville and East New York, 36 percent lived in a different house in 1995. Comparable figures were 34 percent in East Flatbush, 33 percent in Crown Heights, and 37 percent in Canarsie. Olson's (1997) research identified high residential mobility as an important factor in low voter turnout neighborhoods. These residential mobility figures in Black Brooklyn are higher than in stable white Brooklyn neighborhoods. Thus this indicator helps explain lower voter registration and voter turnout patterns in Black neighborhoods.

Table No. 3.14
Ethnic Gaps: West Indian and African American Households

	Married Couple Families	Female Headed Households
Northern Blacks	19.6%	55.7%
Southern Blacks	32.1%	45.2%
West Indians	47.7%	38.9%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

[17] See Center for Law & Social Justice, NYPIRG, and US Sen. Charles Schumer; Anti-Redlining Reports.

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African American and West Indian Households

Nearly 1 in 2 West Indian family formations are married couple families, while this is true for only 1 in 3 Southern Black households and an even lower 1 in 5 Northern Black households. Conversely, more than half of Northern Black households, nearly half of Southern households and 2 in 5 West Indian households are female headed. A shortage of adult males due to higher morbidity, mortality and incarceration rates; an absence and 'invisibility' of males due to welfare rules; social and economic decisions of men and women not to marry; and West Indian immigrant cultural traditions more supportive of marriage, help explain these ethnic disparities in family formation.

A much larger 56% of Northern Black family formations are single parent households, perhaps reflecting their disconnectedness from their southern roots and traditional family values, and the impacts of Black urban life. In the West Indian community there are more married couples than single parent families. The pattern is reversed in the African American community. Among Southern Blacks there are slightly more single parent families than married couple families; but among Northern Blacks there are three times as many single parent families as married couple families (56% to 20%). These are dramatically different patterns in this crucial social structure within the African American community, with profound implications for income and poverty levels, and socialization of children.

Table No. 3.15
West Indians and African Americans: People in Households with Seniors

	# HHs	% HHs
Northern Blacks	23,000	10%
Southern Blacks	42,000	36%
West Indians	71,000	19%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

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Southern Black households are twice as likely as West Indian households and nearly four times as likely as Northern households to have senior citizens residing there. West Indian households are most likely to have children residing there, followed by Northern Blacks, with the smallest proportion living in Southern Black households, who are first generation internal migrants from the 1940s and 1950s.

Table No. 3.16
West Indians and African Americans: Under 18 year olds in the Household

	# HHs	% HHs
Northern Blacks	132,000	56%
Southern Blacks	51,000	43%
West Indians	408,000	60%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

Reflecting a Black southern tradition of the extended family (Billingsley 1992), Southern Black households in Black Brooklyn are three times more likely than West Indian and Northern Black households to have grandchildren living in the household.

Table No. 3.17
West Indians and African Americans: *Grandchildren* in the Household

	# HHs	% HHs
Northern Blacks	24,000	10%
Southern Blacks	35,000	30%
West Indians	47,000	12%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

And Southern Black households are nearly twice as likely as West Indian households, and three times as likely as Northern households to contain one or more subfamilies.

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Table No. 3.18
West Indians and African Americans: *Subfamilies* in the Household

	# HHs	% HHs
Northern Blacks	15,000	6%
Southern Blacks	22,000	18%
West Indians	41,000	11%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

Andrew Billingsley (1992) and other noted scholars on the Black family[18] speak of strong, family oriented cultural traditions of Southern Black families which are rooted in their African cultural origins. This cultural reservoir for Southern Black households seems to have helped them withstand some of the withering social and economic impacts of urbanization and racial discrimination more so than Northern Black families and West Indian immigrant families. One gauge of their resilience is that Southern Black households are more likely to have extended families including seniors, grandchildren and sub-families in their households than their Northern and West Indian counterparts.

Educational Attainment: Ethnic Parity but Gender Gaps

Voter participation rates are positively correlated with educational attainment levels (Campbell, Converse and Miller 1960; Verba and Schlossman 1995). Contrary to popular myths and assumptions, West Indians and African Americans have similar levels of educational attainment. Southern Blacks have a slightly higher attainment of high school diplomas and slightly lower attainment of college degrees. Numerically, West

[18] See Billingsley. 1992. *Climbing Jacob's Ladder: the Enduring Legacy of African American Families;* and works of Black sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, *The NegroFamily*; et.al.

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Table No. 3.19
West Indians and African Americans: Educational Attainment

	No HS Diploma	High School Diploma	BA or More
Northern Blacks	35,000 25%	42,000 30%	21,000 15%
Southern Blacks	21,000 29%	23,000 32%	8,500 12%
West Indians	65,000 27%	73,000 30%	34,000 14%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

Indians with a slightly larger population, also have slightly more high school diplomas and college degrees than African Americans. This suggests an immigrant brain drain, where many achieved good schooling back home and they aggressively pursue educational opportunities here in America as well.

There are significant gender differences in educational attainment, but as the data show, not in terms of the simplistic popular depiction that Black females are more educated than males. The male percentages of educational attainment are nearly equal to the female percentages in most categories and in one case, superior to female educational attainment. Among Northern Blacks, 34% of males but only 28% of females have high school diplomas. Southern Black males have the highest percentage (33%) *without* high school diplomas of any subgroup. Similarly, more West Indian males (30%) than females (26%) are without high school diplomas.

The data suggest that Black males in Black Brooklyn are percentage wise, at substantial educational parity with Black women in both the African American and West Indian communities. However, the problem of the Black male - female education gap lies not in the percentages, but in the huge disparity in the raw numbers and the 2:1 ratio of Black females to males with college degrees.

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Table No. 3.20
Gender Gaps in West Indian and African American Educational Attainment

	Females No HS Diploma	Males No HS Diploma	*Females* HS Diploma	Males HS Diploma	*Females* Some College	Males Some College	*Females* BA or more	Males BA Or more
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Northern	20,800	14,600	24,000	18,300	27,000	14,700	13,700	6,900
Blacks	24%	27%	28%	34%	32%	27%	16%	13%
Southern	11,300	9,700	13,100	9,500	11,300	7,700	5,800	2,800
Blacks	27%	33%	32%	32%	27%	26%	14%	9%
West	36,100	29,100	42,200	30,300	40,300	26,800	21,300	12,400
Indians	26%	30%	30%	31%	29%	27%	15%	13%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

Among 42,000 Northern Blacks with some college, 12,000 more females (27,000) than males (14,700) have some college education. And among 21,000 Northern Blacks with BA degrees or more, 7,000 more females (13,700) than males (6,900) have BA degrees or more. Among Southern Blacks the gender gaps are 4,000 and 3,000 respectively. The combined gender gaps for African American female versus male educational attainment in Black Brooklyn are: 9,000 more females than males have high school diplomas; 16,000 more females than males have some college education; and 10,000 more females than males have baccalaureate degrees or more.

In the West Indian community, 12,000 more females than males have high school diplomas; 14,000 more females than males have some college education; and 9,000 more females than males have a baccalaureate degree or more. In both ethnic communities, twice as many women as men have baccalaureate degrees or more: 20,000 to 10,000 in the African American community; and 21,000 to 12,000 in the West Indian community. At the neighborhood level, in heavily low income Black neighborhoods like Bed Stuy, Brownsville and East New York the gaps are even higher.

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This Black male – female educational attainment gap has profound social, economic and political implications. This means that there is a major deficit in terms of cultural literacy, political literacy and intellectual capital reflected in the huge numbers of under educated Black males. Lower educational levels lead to low level employment, unemployment, low income and some times participation in criminal activity to make up for income deficits. Conversely, huge numbers of better educated Black women are faced with the choices of marrying beneath their income level and class, marrying outside their race, not marrying at all, or pursuing other forms of social and personal relationships.

There are several explanations as to why Black males lag in educational attainment, including: high school dropout rates, lower grades and lack of college guidance which are prerequisites for college admission; close encounters with the criminal justice system which nullify college admissions and financial aid; a priority of immediate employment for economic survival over pursuit of higher education.[19] As Yvonne Bynoe (2004) in *Stand and Deliver*, and Kitwana in *The Hip Hop Generation* (2002) and other young cultural commentators note, there is a powerful Black youth culture which glorifies athletes, entertainers, and ghetto life, and devalues civic involvement and education pursuits as an option.[20]

The Ethnic Gap: Labor Force Participation

West Indians have higher labor force participation and lower employment disabilities particularly as compared to Southern Blacks due in part to West Indians' age,

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[19] Note from Table No. 3.20 that the educational gender gap is most pronounced among Southern Blacks who grew up in a rigidly segregated educational environment, and where Black male subordination was rigidly enforced.

[20] See Yvonne Bynoe (2004) *Stand and Deliver;* and Bakari Kitwana (2002), *The Hip Hop Generation: Young Blacks and the Crisis in African American Culture.*

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self selecting immigrant's journey bringing to America and Brooklyn, healthier, stronger, fairly well educated, prime working age individuals aggressively seeking educational and employment opportunities. West Indians, as part of America's immigrant phenomenon, have high motivation to achieve their 'immigrant dreams' in their new land of opportunity, especially in relation to their home countries, often troubled with weak economies and limited educational and economic opportunities (Foner 2001). West Indian educational attainment, lack of social safety net programs for non-citizens here as well as lacking in home countries, and immigrant dreams are powering West Indians' strong position in the labor market relative to African Americans.[21]

African Americans and West Indians are still struggling to achieve America's promise, and encounter racism and discrimination in education, employment and other arenas. Millions of Blacks fled oppressive economic and social conditions in the South from the early 20th century onward. They migrated to Northern and Midwestern urban centers seeking work during World War II. These cities began de-industrializing right after World War II, and urban Blacks evolved along two distinct trajectories and socioeconomic realities. One trend reflected increasingly concentrated poverty and lack of opportunity enveloping the Black poor and working class in America's urban ghettoes (Wilson 1997; Massey and Denton 1993; Mollenkopf 1982, 1993). Another trend reflected Black socioeconomic advancement and upward mobility in the post-WW II era, spawning the emergence of today's large Black middle class residing both in well off

[21] See Mary C. Waters. 1999. *Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard Unniv. Press; also Vickerman, Rogers, Waldinger and Kasinitz.

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enclaves within these Black urban ghettoes, as well as beyond, in racially integrated and suburban communities (Frazier, Wilson, Patillo-McCoy).[22]

The Global Economy, Job Suburbanization, Poverty Concentration and Black Unemployment

Underlying these trajectories are a number of powerful policy, institutional and macroeconomic forces at work which dictate the size, nature and location of employment, industries and labor markets. These forces either structure or deny economic opportunity to Black individuals and whole communities in terms of jobs, labor markets, access to capital and community investment. William Julius Wilson (1997) in *When Work Disappears,* describes the nexus of global economic restructuring, job suburbanization, poverty concentration and Black urban unemployment.[23] Wilson's research is on Black Chicago and Black urban America, -- but his analysis has much applicability to New York and Black Brooklyn. On global economic restructuring, manufacturing job loss, and impacts on the Black community, Wilson observes:

> ...The wage and employment gap between skilled and unskilled workers is growing partly because education and training are considered more important than ever in the new global economy. At the same time that changes in technology are producing new jobs they are making others obsolete. The workplace has been revolutionized by technological changes...In the new global economy, highly educated and thoroughly trained men and women are in demand...The shift in demand has been especially devastating for those low skilled workers whose incorporation into the mainstream economy has been marginal or recent.
>
> ...Of the changes in the economy that have aversely affected low-skilled African-American workers, perhaps the most significant have been those in the manufacturing sector...The manufacturing losses in some northern cities have been staggering. In the twenty year period from 1967 to 1987, Philadelphia lost 64 percent of its manufacturing jobs; Chicago lost 60 percent; New York City, 58 percent; Detroit, 51 percent. In

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[22] See Mary Pattillo-McCoy. 1999. *Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril Among the Black Middle Class.* Univ. of Chicago Press; E. Franklin Frazier. 1962. *Black Bourgeoisie: The Rise of a New Middle Class in the United States.* Glenco, Ill.: Free Press; and Ellis Cose. 1995. *The Rage of a Privileged Class.* NY: Harper Perrenial.

[23] See Wilson, 1997, "Chapter 2: Societal Changes and Vulnerable Neighborhoods," pp. 25-50.

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absolute numbers, these percentages represent the loss of 160,000 jobs in Philadelphia, 326,000 in Chicago, 520,000 – over half a million – in New York, and 108,000 in Detroit.

Wilson points out how low educational attainment leads to joblessness:

> ...The structural shifts in the distribution of industrial job opportunities are not the only reason for the increasing joblessness and declining earnings among young black male workers...In certain urban areas the prospects for employment among workers with little education have fallen sharply...(D)uring the 1980s New York City lost 135,000 jobs in industries in which workers averaged less than twelve years of education, and gained almost 300,000 jobs in industries in which workers had thirteen or more years of education...The jobs traditionally held by high school dropouts declined...while those held by college graduates increased...(T)he increase in the "college educated" jobs....reflected the educational status of suburban commuters, while...decrease in the "less than high school" category reflected the job losses of city residents.

And the social services economy has been a crucial safety net for Black employment, notes Wilson:

> ...(M)ost of the new jobs for workers with limited training and education are in the service sector and are disproportionately held by women. This is even more true for those who work in social services, which include the industries of health, education and welfare...(M)any workers stay afloat thanks to jobs in the expanding social service sector, especially black women with less than a high school degree...Without the growth of social services employment, the rates of inner-city joblessness would have risen beyond their already unprecedented high levels...

These trends are borne out in Black Brooklyn's local economy and labor markets, as the data illustrate with unemployment and "not in the labor force" rates double that of New York City:

Table No. 3.21
African American and West Indian Labor Force, Black Brooklyn

	Employed	Unemployed	Not In Labor Force
Northern Blacks	53%	10.1%	37%
Southern Blacks	50%	9.1%	41%
West Indians	64%	8.2%	28%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

Black Brooklyn's African American and West Indian labor force participation, unemployment, poverty, income and educational attainment should be seen within the

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broader context laid out by Wilson. There are key ethnic differences, with West Indians having lower unemployment rates and higher labor force participation rates than African Americans. There is also a split within the African American community where Northern Blacks have higher labor force participation rates than Southern Blacks. When we factor in gender, more dramatic results emerge.

Table No. 3.22
African American & West Indian Labor Force Rates by *Gender* (16 – 64 yrs.)

	Male Employed	*Female* Employed	Male Unemployed	*Female* Unemployed	Male NILF	*Female* NILF
Northern Blacks	50%	47%	10%	9%	40%	44%
Southern Blacks	41%	37%	9%	6%	50%	57%
West Indians	59%	55%	8%	7%	33%	38%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

Ethnic and Gender Differences in labor Force Participation

West Indian *male* (59%) labor force participation is 20% higher than that of African American males and there is a split within the African American community where Northern Black male (50%) labor force participation is 20% higher than that of Southern Black males (41%). West Indian *female* (55%) labor force participation is nearly *50% higher* than that of Southern Black females (37%) and higher than Northern Black females' (47%) labor force participation rate as well. Also of note, West Indian women (55%) have higher labor force participation than African American men (47%). While 33% of West Indian males (38,000) were not in the labor force, almost 50% of African American males (44,000) were not in the labor force; and 38% of West Indian women (63,000), but some 52% of African American women (75,000) were not in the labor force.

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There is a direct correlation between labor force participation and household income. Combined with their higher marriage rates, one can expect West Indians to have higher household incomes than African Americans. Along with educational attainment, employment disabilities factor into the labor force participation as well.

Employment Disabilities

The older population of Southern Blacks, followed by Northern Blacks have the highest physical disabilities in relation to employment, while West Indians have the lowest. Fourteen percent (14%) of Southern Blacks, 9% of Northern Blacks, but only 5% of West Indians had physical disabilities. However, when we take into account all types of disabilities, West Indians and Northern Blacks at 30% had some kind of employment disability, while for Southern Blacks the figure is 36%. So that in sum, West Indian workers are more engaged in the labor market and are healthier than African American workers.

Poverty Rates: Ethnic and Gender Gaps

Table No. 3.23
African American and West Indian *Poverty Rates by Gender*

	Males at/below Poverty	*Females* at/below Poverty	Males over 150% of Poverty	*Females* Over 150% Of Poverty
Northern Blacks	34%	38%	57%	52%
Southern Blacks	26%	29%	66%	62%
West Indians	17%	19%	74%	69%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

West Indians have fewer persons at or below the poverty level than do African Americans, with a few important differences regarding ethnicity and gender. Within

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the African American community, *Southern* Black male and female poverty rates of 26% and 29%, are significantly better than *Northern* Black male and female poverty rates of 34% and 38%. In the African American community there are 34,000 males and 50,000 females at or below the poverty level. In the West Indian community, there are 28,000 males and a poverty rate of 17%; and 41,000 females and a poverty rate of 19%. Thus 1 in 3 African Americans but less than 1 in 5 West Indians are at or below the poverty level. In Black Brooklyn, there is a "feminization of poverty," but not so much in terms of a gender gap in poverty rates, but rather in terms of sheer numbers of females versus males in poverty. In the African American community, 16,000 more females; and in the West Indian community, 13,000 more females are in poverty. The "over 150% of poverty" category contained 75 percent of West Indians, 66 percent of Southern Blacks and 60 percent of Northern Blacks. Thus West Indians were economically, the strongest group in this category.

The Welfare Gap: African American Women

With regard to welfare, African Americans with a smaller labor force have much higher numbers receiving public assistance than West Indians, many of whom are not eligible due to their non-citizen status. Thus employment is their only option for economic survival. There were four times as many African American men (4611 and 6%) compared to West Indian men (1003 and 1%) receiving public assistance; and there were three times as many African American women (19,289 and 15%) compared to West Indian women (6,072 and 4%) receiving public assistance. Within the African American community, 18% of Northern Black women and only 10% of Southern Black women received public assistance income.

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Gender and Ethnic Gaps in *Personal* Income

African Americans have much lower personal and median incomes than West Indians. In the "under $15,000" category there are 82,000 Northern Black adults, 35%; and 33,000 Southern Blacks, 27%, a huge, combined 115,000 African Americans under $15,000. There are 1 in 3 low income African Americans compared to only 1 in 6 West Indians. And in all cases women exceed the men in this low income bracket. The gender gap is 15,000 more African American women than men; and 12,000 more West Indian women than men under $15,000.

Table No. 3.24
African American and West Indian Personal Income

		Under $15,000		$35 – 75,000		Over $75,000	
Northern Blacks	Male	32,800	33%	28,000	28%	15,200	15%
	Female	49,200	37%	33,100	25%	15,625	12%
Southern Blacks	Male	12,200	25%	15,000	31%	10,500	22%
	Female	20,700	30%	19,700	29%	12,800	19%
West Indians	Male	25,000	15%	61,900	38%	38,500	24%
	Female	37,900	18%	74,300	35%	44,000	21%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

In the *middle income* $35-75,000 bracket, West Indians have a larger concentration than African Americans; there are more women but a slightly lesser percentage than men in this bracket; and *West Indian females exceed males* by 12,000 persons and *African American females exceed males* by 10,000 in the middle income bracket. For the *upper income* bracket of $75,000 or more, the male female percentages are very close and *women exceed men especially among West Indians.*

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To illustrate how these income patterns vary considerably by neighborhood, in heavily African American Brownsville, 47% of Northern Black men and 51% of women have incomes below $15,000; and only 7% of these men and 5% of women have incomes above $75,000. But in a complete reversal, in heavily West Indian, home owning Canarsie only 6% of West Indian men and 9% of their women have incomes below $15,000; and 31% of West Indian men and 32% of West Indian women have incomes over $75,000. In other words, in heavily poor and African American Brownsville, only 1 in 20 have incomes above $75,000; but in relatively affluent West Indian Canarsie just 2 miles away, 1 in 3 have incomes above $75,000.

Gender and Ethnic Gaps in *Median* Income

An analysis of median income also reveals several internal cleavages. First, there are significant income and gender cleavages within the African American community. The median income for Northern Blacks is $16,800 and for Southern Blacks $11,600, 31% less. An older Southern Black population with lower labor force participation rates, lower educational attainment and lower retirement income helps explain this deficit. Southern Black women are also less likely to be on welfare, which suggests that they constitute a significant share of the working poor with low wage jobs.

Northern Blacks have the largest gender gap in median income, $11,000 higher for men than for women; followed by Southern Blacks which is $6,900 higher for men than for women; and West Indians which is $7,000 higher for men than for women. There is also a dramatic *ethnic gap in median income*: $16,800 for Northern Blacks, only $11,600 for Southern Blacks, nearly one third lower; and $23,000 for West Indians, *twice as high* as the median income for Southern Blacks.

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Figure 3.07
Black Brooklyn: West Indian Median Household Income

Source: Census 2000 Summary File 3 data; Maptitude GIS software.

Table No. 3.25
African-Amer. & West Indian Median Income by Gender (For Workers)

Black Ethnicity	Gender	Wage/Salary Income '99
Northern Blacks	Male	$24,000
	Female	$13,000
	Total	$16,800
Southern Blacks	Male	$15,900
	Female	$ 9,000
	Total	$11,600
West Indians	Male	$27,000
	Female	$20,000
	Total	$23,000

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center For Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

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There is also a large gender gap for median income within the African American community and a large ethnic gap for median income between African Americans and West Indians in Black Brooklyn. The median income for Northern Black males was $24,000 and for females $13,000, barely half. For Southern Black males the median income was a third lower at $15,900 compared to $9,000 for females, barely half again. The median wage income for West Indians overall was $23,000, for males $27,000 and for females a close $20,000. Overall, African Americans ($15,000) in Black Brooklyn earned only two thirds the median income of West Indians ($23,000). Educational attainment levels, and participation in specific industries and occupational categories with their varying wage structures help explain these income gaps (Note: Median income figures are based on wage and salary income for workers; figures do not include persons on welfare or their income.)

The median income for West Indian women was much higher than for African American women, and twice that of Southern Black women. Thus African American women overall are in a much more economically subordinate position in relation to their men, earning only half their men's median income. West Indian women are in an economically stronger position earning nearly 80% of their men's median income; and there are more Black women than men in the middle and upper income brackets. As we shall see in the field research discussion, despite near economic parity with their men in certain income categories, many Black women express feelings of political subordination by their Black men.

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Gender, Nativity and Citizenship

One of the major premises of this research project is that gender matters in political behavior and that there are a number of gender differences within and between African Americans and Caribbean Black ethnic groups which have significant bearing on their respective political behavior patterns. The male to female population ratios for these two groups are: African Americans, 43 percent to 57 percent; and Caribbeans, 42 percent to 58 percent; as compared to whites which have nearly equal sex ratios of 48 percent to 52 percent. African American and Caribbean communities have the largest gender gap of all the major racial and ethnic groups in Brooklyn.

There is great variation in citizenship rates within and across the various racial and ethnic categories. As expected, African Americans have a 95 percent citizenship rate, while Caribbeans have only a 64 percent rate, compared to whites who have an 84 percent citizenship rate. Most Hispanic and Asian groups have citizenship rates of 40-60 percent. Varying citizenship rates have major implications for voter participation.

Citizenship, Naturalization, Place of Birth

An analysis of citizenship rates shows significant variations for different racial and ethnic groups. Among Continental Africans, 53 percent are native born citizens, 19 percent are foreign born, naturalized citizens, and 28 percent are foreign born, non-citizens. Among Caribbeans, only 22 percent are native born citizens, with a slightly higher percent of males (25%) than females (20%) in this category. Forty two percent of Caribbeans are foreign born, naturalized citizens, and 36 percent are foreign born, non-citizens. Most Hispanic and Asian groups have large foreign born, non-citizen populations as well.

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Private, Government, Non Profit and Self Employment

In 2000, the workforce which resides in Brooklyn was approximately 1.2 million persons with 802,000 or 66 percent in the private sector; 222,000 or 18 percent in the public sector (federal, state and city government); 109,000 or 9 percent in the non profit sector; and 91,000 or 7 percent self employed. There are significant gender and ethnic differences across these various employment sectors. African Americans have the highest participation rates in government employment at 30 percent, and the lowest rates in private sector employment at 57 percent. West Indians have higher private sector and lower government sector employment compared to African Americans.
There are also gender differences: 1 in 4 African American men but 1 in 3 African American women are in government employment.

Table No. 3.26
African American and West Indians – Class of Workers

	Private Sector	Government	Non-Profit	Self-Employed
Northern Blacks	58%	30%	9%	3.7%
Southern Blacks	52%	35%	9%	4.3%
West Indians	66%	20%	9%	5.2%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

For West Indians, 2 of 3 in the private sector and 1 in 5 are in government employment, lower rates than for African Americans. One political implication of these employment patterns is that government and public policy actions which affect public sector employment will have greater impacts upon African Americans, particularly women, than upon West Indians.

Non profit sector employment is equal for African Americans and West Indians at 9 percent . In terms of self employment or entrepreneurship rates, 10.4 percent of whites,

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4.2 percent of African Americans, and or 9800; and 5.2 percent of West Indians, are self employed. As a group, the Asian community has the highest entrepreneurship or self employment rates in Brooklyn: 18.3 percent for Japanese,16.5 percent for Koreans, 12.1 percent for Indians, and 7.5 percent for the Chinese.

Government Employment: African Americans

There are gender differences regarding job sector distribution within the various racial and ethnic groups: 1 out of 4 males, but 1 out of 3 females in the African American community is a public sector employee, the highest for any major group. In the West Indian community a lower 1 out of 5 males and females is a public sector employee.

Industries and Occupations: Ethnic Distribution

Additional important components of socioeconomic class are industry and occupational classifications. These categories will be examined for African Americans and West Indians, as well as exploring gender differences within these various categories. African Americans are distributed across their top seven (7) industry sectors which account for 76 percent of their total employment: Wholesale 13 percent, FIRE 8.9 percent, Personal Services 13.1 percent, Education 8.3 percent, Health 15.6 percent,

Table No. 3.27
African Americans and West Indians – Industry Sectors

Industry Sectors	Wholesale	FIRE	Personal Services	Education	Health	Social Services
Northern Blacks	13%	9%	14%	9%	14%	19%
Southern Blacks	13%	8%	14%	8%	15%	20%
West Indians	11%	9%	13%	6%	24%	15%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

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Social Services 18.9 percent. Examining their top seven list further, 61 percent of total African American employment is in just four industry sectors: Wholesale, Personal Services, Health and Social Services. Caribbeans are distributed across their top seven industry sectors which account for 84 percent of their total employment: Construction and Utilities 5.6 percent, Wholesale 10.9 percent, FIRE 8.5 percent, Personal Services 12.6 percent, Education 6 percent, Health 24 percent, and Social Services 15.3 percent. Examining their top seven categories further, 64 percent of their total employment is concentrated in the same four sectors as African Americans: Health, Social Services, Personal Services and Wholesale.

There are significant gender differences in the two largest industry sectors. In the Health sector, 11 percent of Caribbean men, but 35 percent of Caribbean women are employed, three times the number of men. In the Education sector for most groups women outnumber men by a two to one ratio. For example, 10.2 percent of African American women and 5.6 percent of African American men are in this sector. There are more women than men in the Corporate Services sector in both the African American (3.9% to 3.4%) and Caribbean (3.9% to 3%) communities; whereas the male and female rates are a similar 9.5 percent in the white Brooklyn. In the FIRE sector, which is a major engine of the city economy, white men and women in Brooklyn have similar rates of 11.5 percent; while African Americans have more women than men (9.6 to 7.8 percent); and Caribbeans have nearly equal numbers of men and women in the FIRE sector (8.6 and 8.4 percent respectively).

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Occupational Categories: Ethnic and Gender Differences

It is important to examine not just industry sector distributions but occupational categories as well. Because women and men, Blacks and whites, or African Americans and Caribbeans may have equal percentages of representation in a given industry sector, however men might predominate in the managerial ranks while women might predominate in the clerical positions within that particular industry sector. So it is important to do an occupational analysis as well. This section examines some differences by ethnicity and gender for the major occupational categories of managerial, professional, service worker, clerical worker, and skilled trades persons.

Table No. 3.28
African Americans and West Indians – Occupational Categories

Occup'l Categs.	Manag -erial	Educ'l Prof'ls	Health Prof/Wkr	Service Wkrs	Sales Persons	Clerical Wkrs	Skilled Trades	Transpn Wkrs
Northern Blacks	6%	11%	9%	18%	10%	26%	6%	8%
Southern Blacks	6%	9%	11%	19%	8%	25%	7%	10%
West Indians	4%	7%	21%	18%	8%	19%	11%	8%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

Managers. For whites in Brooklyn, 9 percent of their work force is in the managerial category, a rate nearly twice of 5.1 percent of African Americans and 4.2 percent of Caribbeans. For whites, 61 percent of the managerial category is male and 39 percent is female; for African Americans and Caribbeans the pattern is reversed: 3 out of 5African American managers is female; with a closer 56 percent female and 44 percent male for Caribbeans. This pattern holds similarly for the business professional category.

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Professionals. Thirty six percent (36%) of whites are in the combined business (13.2%), educational (16.2%) and health (6.6%) professional categories. Twenty seven percent (27%) of African Americans are in the combined business (6.1%), educational (9.3%) and health (11.4%) professional categories. And 34 percent of Caribbeans are in the combined business (5.7%), educational (6.8%) and health (21.6%) professional categories. Nearly 20 percent of African Americans are in the health and education arenas; but 22 percent of Caribbean professionals are in the health field alone.

There is a major gender gap in the health professional category, 6:1 female: 3 percent of African American males but 17 percent of females; and 5 percent of Caribbean males but 33 percent of Caribbean females are workers or professionals in the health field. The educational professional category also has a major gender gap, 2:1 female: for African Americans, 29 percent male and 71 percent female; and for Caribbeans, 31 percent male and 69 percent female.

Service Workers. In the service worker category there are only 10 percent of whites in Brooklyn, but double this rate for African Americans at 19 percent, and Caribbeans at 19 percent. There is a gender gap among African Americans with 16 percent of women but 23 percent of men in this service worker category. For clerical workers there are 19 percent whites, 25 percent African Americans, and 17 percent Caribbeans. There is a gender gap in this occupational category: 18 percent of African American males but 30 percent of females; and 13 percent of Caribbean males but 20 percent of females are clerical workers.

The largest gender gap is in the skilled trades: 15.8 percent of white males and 0.9 percent of females; 15.4 percent of African American males and 1.4 percent of females;

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and 23.5 percent of West Indian males but only 1.2 percent of females are in the skilled trades. The top three occupational categories for both African American and West Indian males are: skilled trades, service workers and transportation workers (livery cab industry, van drivers, buses and subways). African American and West Indian women are more concentrated than men in managerial and professional ranks. They are highly concentrated in health and social service industries, and in clerical and service positions. Thus there are potential ethnic, gender and class cleavages around workforce issues.

Occupational Categories and Gender Differences

Approximately 5% of African American men and 4% of West Indian men are in managerial titles; 5-8% of African American and West Indian men are in professional titles with African Americans more in Education and West Indians more in Business; three times as many West Indian as African American men are health and hospitals workers (4100 to 1300); 1 in 4 African American men and 1 in 5 West Indian men are service workers; 1 in 6 African American and West Indian men are in clerical titles; 1 in 4 West Indian men but only 1 in 7 African American men are in the skilled trades; and 1 in 6 African American and West Indian men are transportation workers, mainly working for the livery cab industry and the Transit Authority. The top three occupations for West Indian men are the skilled trades 24%, service workers, 18%, and transportation workers 18%. For African American men it is service workers 23%, transportation workers 17%, and skilled trades 14%.

African American women, with 5600 persons in managerial titles, are ahead of West Indian women (4100) as well as African American men (3500) and West Indian

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men (3400). In the business professional ranks, African American and West Indian women are nearly equal (6100 and 6000), and ahead of West Indian men (5900) and African American men (4900). African American women are strong education professionals (11,400) compared to West Indian women (9200), African American men (5200) and West Indian men (3900).

Nearly 33% of all West Indian women are health professionals and workers (37,000) compared to 15% of African American women (14,000); 15-17% of African American and West Indian women are service workers; and nearly 32% of African American women and 22% of West Indian women are clerical workers. The top three occupational categories for West Indian and African American women are clerical, health workers and service workers. African American and West Indian women show more strongly in managerial and professional ranks than their men, while their men are heavily concentrated in blue collar service, transportation and skilled trades occupations. Thus are planted the seeds for potential major class cleavages along the lines of ethnicity, gender and occupation.

Workers in the Family

For African Americans 30% but for West Indians 52% of families have 2 or more workers. Thus with the highest proportion of multiple bread winners per family and the lowest percentage of non-working families, this significantly explains why West Indians have higher incomes and lower poverty rates than African Americans. More married couple families and multiple bread winners in a family also correlates with income accumulation, credit worthiness and the ability to own a home.

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Table No. 3.29
African Americans and West Indians – 2 or more Workers In Family (WIF)

	Male WIF	Female WIF	Total
Northern Blacks	35%	26%	26%
Southern Blacks	46%	38%	34%
West Indians	60%	53%	52%

Source: PUMS data, Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

Language Ability. The question of language ability has several dimensions: in a political context goes to questions of political and civic literacy and the ability to understand and convey political and civic communications. In an economic context it goes to the question of employability. In terms of language spoken at home, 54 percent of whites, 16 percent of African Americans,[24] 34 percent of Caribbeans and 50 percent of Africans reported speaking a language other than English at home. For Caribbeans, one of those other languages would be Kreyol, French or Patois spoken by the Haitian Afro-Caribbean community. In terms of English ability, 25 percent of whites reported that they did not speak English well, 15 percent of African Americans, 16 percent of Caribbeans, and 10 percent of Africans reported such. For Dominicans 39 percent, Mexicans 51 percent; and and Chinese 48 percent reported that they did not speak English well.

[24] "African American" includes a cohort of foreign born Blacks who speak a foreign language (e.g. Black Panamanians who speak Spanish) and identify themselves as African Americans.

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Part V: Conclusions: The Demographics of Ethnicity, Class and Gender

The foregoing census data have been analyzed to distill several demographic patterns and trends along the dimensions of ethnicity, class and gender and to assess their implications for defining distinct demographic bases for African American and West Indian social, economic and political life. This discussion summarizes these demographic trends and suggests how they might influence the political behavior of African Americans and West Indians in Black Brooklyn.

The foreign born population is a potent factor at the national, state, city and Brooklyn borough levels. There are significant differences in the distribution of the foreign born population across Black Brooklyn neighborhoods, and this has major implications for the social, economic and political life of these communities. Older traditional African American neighborhoods like Bed Stuy, Fort Greene and Brownsville have much smaller proportions of Black foreign born populations, while there are newer predominantly West Indian neighborhoods such as East Flatbush, Flatbush, Canarsie and Crown Heights South with a majority Black population which is also predominantly West Indian foreign born, significantly non-citizen, and most of the West Indian residents have been there less than 20 years.

Foreign born and non-citizen status have major implications for political participation, labor force participation, income and poverty. Non citizens cannot vote and welfare is not an option. The West Indian immigrant communities have higher labor force participation rates, lower unemployment rates, more adults in families who are working, and as a consequence, they have higher household incomes. Also, because of

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when they emigrate, West Indians have a different age structure: they are an older population and have more prime working age adults than African Americans. These trends comprise a distinct set of socio-cultural factors in West Indian versus African American communities.

Mirroring larger trends of racial and ethnic shifts in New York City and Brooklyn over the last 30 years, the Black population is undergoing dramatic internal transformations. The internal ethnic composition of Black Brooklyn is significantly transforming and becoming less native born African American and increasingly more West Indian, Continental African and Afro Latino / Black Hispanic. There will also be a major shift in the political center of gravity of Black Brooklyn with African Americans becoming less dominant, if West Indian citizenship, voter registration and voter turnout rates increase significantly, relative to the African American population.

The increasing in-migration of West Indians into older African American neighborhoods such as Crown Heights and Brownsville; and into "white flight" neighborhoods such as Canarsie and East Flatbush has stabilized their overall populations and dramatically altered their racial, ethnic, cultural, social, economic and political character. In the last 20 years East Flatbush has lost nearly 90 percent of its white population and is now the "Blackest" neighborhood in all of Brooklyn, surpassing Bed Stuy which has been the core Black neighborhood of Brooklyn for the past 60 years. And the political representation of East Flatbush has gone from all white to all Black.

The other dramatic racial and ethnic transition occurred in Canarsie which, in 20 years, has gone from 92 percent white, mainly Italian and Jewish, and 7 percent Black, to 35 percent white and 51 percent Black, which is mostly Caribbean in 2000. In Canarsie,

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legislative redistricting and Black community mobilization has begun producing Black political representation and insurgent challenges to local white incumbents.

Ethnicity

West Indians. Including their first and second generations based on West Indian parentage, there are nearly 400,000 West Indians out of 900,000 Black Brooklynites, most of whom live in a "South Central" corridor in a contiguous sweep of four neighborhoods going from west to east: Crown Heights South, Flatbush, East Flatbush and Canarsie. In this corridor they constitute a majority or a plurality and live along side other racial and ethnic groups, except for East Flatbush which is over 93% Black and 70% West Indian. Theses West Indian neighborhoods portray certain characteristics based on their cultural and ethnic backgrounds.

African Americans. African Americans comprise about 350,000 persons and subdivide into two distinctive groups based on their parents' place of birth: "Southern" Blacks whose parents were born in the South; and "Northern" Blacks whose parents were born in New York or the northern states. Southern Blacks portray certain characteristics reflecting their southern cultural traditions. In a few instances, Southern Blacks were demographically more like West Indians than Northern Blacks, such as home ownership rates. But this factor may be based on their older age structure, akin to West Indians.

Class

African Americans have higher poverty rates and lower median family income than West Indians. West Indians have a larger workforce, higher educational attainment, higher household income, less access to the American welfare state (and a minimal home

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country version), immigration and citizenship concerns, and more private sector employment. Both groups have large sectors of low wage earners and concern about the social safety net, health care and better wages. Thus different political and policy orientations are likely rooted in these different population demographics and related factors, suggesting different political orientations, voter responses and public policy agendas for West Indians as opposed to African Americans.

The employment sectors in which Caribbeans and African Americans work, and the extent of politically active worker organizations in those sectors can be a significant determinant of worker political orientation and behavior. African Americans are heavily employed in the municipal labor force thus a key public employee union like District Council 37, AFSCME can have a major influence on their political orientation.

West Indians are heavily employed in the non-profit and private sector health care industry thus major unions like Local 1199 and Local 144, SEIU Health Care Workers may have a major influence on their political orientation. DC 37 and 1199 are both political powerhouses which can influence electoral outcomes in New York City. Each union has predominantly Black and Latino constituencies and over 100,000 members with a multiplier if union member households are considered. These two unions alone can have thousands of union members in a particular legislative district who are mobilized through phone banks, mailings, rallies, street campaigns, campaign donations and volunteers to exert their political clout on behalf of issues and candidates which the unions endorse. Thus unions and their political operations can affect electoral outcomes in local legislative districts, borough-wide and city-wide.

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Confirming popular notions about the entrepreneurial spirit of immigrant communities, West Indians have a slightly higher self-employment rate of 4.8 percent while African Americans have a self-employment rate of 4.3 percent. Perceptions about the private sector and the free enterprise system can play themselves out in the political arena. The 2001 Mayoral election with billionaire candidate Michael Bloomberg may be one of those instances. Field interviews indicate that the Caribbean community gave Bloomberg political credibility based on their positive assessment of him as a business man and not a politician.

Growing numbers of African American and West Indian women are represented in the managerial and professional ranks and in upper income brackets, relative to their men. This may power women's feelings of economic independence on the one hand, and feelings about gender inequality and political subordination on the other hand, as the field research reveals. Gender based voting and other issues will be examined in the election analysis phase of this research. Greater home ownership rates for West Indians is another factor which may correlate with certain voting patterns. Olsen (1997) found home ownership to be a key predictor of voter turnout in New York City elections.

West Indians. West Indians are better off economically than African Americans. They have higher labor force participation, lower unemployment, higher incomes, lower welfare and poverty rates than African Americans, and they are much more concentrated in middle and upper income brackets. A key explanation is that West Indians have more workers per household than African Americans. They also have higher home ownership rates than Northern Blacks but only slightly more than Southern Blacks. West Indians have gravitated to more home owning neighborhoods, while several generations of

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African Americans are still living in public housing developments and rental housing in the older, northern Black neighborhoods.

West Indian industry and occupational distribution is similar to African Americans except that West Indian women are more concentrated in the health professions and their men are more concentrated in the skilled trades. West Indians are more concentrated in the private sector, where it is easier for non-citizens to get jobs and they are slightly more likely to be self-employed. Structurally, West Indians have a larger prime working age population than African Americans; they have more workers in their households; and more workers in the job market than African Americans. West Indian women have incomes very close to their men and nearly twice as many women as men have college degrees in both communities.

African Americans. Unlike the white community, African American women are more concentrated in managerial and professional ranks than their men; and they have more education than their men (twice as many women have college degrees in both communities). African Americans have lower labor force participation, higher unemployment , lower incomes, and higher poverty and welfare rates than West Indians. On these indices, Southern Blacks tend to be better off economically than Northern Blacks although they have lower median incomes, suggesting large numbers in low wage jobs, probably due to low educational levels.

Southern Blacks are also an older population and have more workers with disabilities. African Americans have fewer workers in their households than West Indians, and lower home ownership rates. However, Southern Black home ownership rates are close to those of West Indians. African American industry and occupation

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distributions are similar to West Indians except that African American women are more concentrated in clerical titles, government employment and social services, and they also exceed their men in managerial and professional ranks as do West Indian women. African American men have significantly higher median incomes than their women as compared to West Indians. This is probably due to many more African American than West Indian women on welfare and in low income female headed households.

The class distribution of both African Americans and West Indians is becoming more bi-modal. A professional and managerial class has emerged especially among the women, and there is a a solid middle income group grounded in government, health and social services employment. West Indians are more likely to work in the private sector and be self-employed. But particularly in the African American community, there is a large group mired in poverty due to a number of self-reinforcing causes: teenage parenthood, lack of education, lack of work, welfare dependence, substance abuse, incarceration, health and mental health problems and the like. Proportionally, more African Americans than West Indians are not in the labor force.

West Indians are more concentrated in the middle and upper income classes, and less at the bottom. African Americans have more people at the low income and poverty levels. Class divisions driven by widening education and income gaps are likely growing in both communities. Welfare reform is moving more poor women into education and training programs and if they are fortunate, marginal unskilled jobs. There seem to be few programs and policy agendas to address the education, training and employment, and child care needs of a large Black, non-working population, especially young Black males with poor education, lack of skills, prison records and other deficits.

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Gender

In terms of gender, there are clear demographic differences between Brooklyn's African American and West Indian communities. West Indian women are older than African American women and both groups are older than their men. In the West Indian community, these age differences are in part explained by immigration patterns of more older females and less younger males emigrating to Brooklyn; higher incarceration and mortality rates for Black males; and high male unemployment, contributing to higher male mobility and out-migration from these communities. There is a gender gap in terms of an excess of female over male population once these populations reach adulthood in both African American and Caribbean neighborhoods.

Both African American and West Indian women have larger voting age populations with the latter having lower citizenship rates. If and when West Indian women maximize their citizenship, voter registration and voter turnout; and if and when they vote along the lines of gender and ethnic solidarity, they could become the single largest voting bloc in Black Brooklyn. Significant ethnic differences in citizenship rates between African Americans and West Indians presents formidable barriers to Caribbean voter registration and political participation. The Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) rates are: 65% for whites, 60% for African Americans and only 48% for West Indians. There is also a gender gap for CVAP rates among African Americans and West Indians. For African Americans, 53 percent of males but 64 percent of females; but for West Indians, only 44 percent of males and 51 percent of females are voting age citizens. This gender gap in CVAP provides the demographic basis for a womanized, or female-dominant electorate in both African American and Caribbean communities. Further

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analysis will determine whether or not this gender gap manifests itself in terms of political behavior.

African Americans and West Indians had high percentages of female headed households, but West Indian households had a higher percent of married couple families, and African American women are more likely on welfare and less likely in the labor force. Along with more adult women than men in both communities, these trends suggest a demographic basis for a women's issues oriented electorate, sensitive to issues such as children and families, jobs, education, child care and health care.

West Indians. West Indian women, like African American women, have less men in their population and and are older than their men. But unlike African Americans, West Indians have more married couple families, more children, and proportionally less female headed households. Economically and educationally, women are doing better than their men. Also, West Indians do not have the concentration of poverty to the extent of African Americans; but like African Americans, they do have low wage private sector service and health care jobs for the women, and maintenance and security jobs for the men.

African Americans. Southern Black women are older than Northern Black women, they have higher labor force participation, less children and more seniors in the households. Southern women also have more married couples than Northern women but less than West Indians; and they have less female headed households than Northern women but more than West Indians. In some respects, Southern Black women are a social and cultural bridge for some of the social and economic extremes between West Indian women and Northern women.

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Southern Blacks also displayed their tradition of extended family networks such as seniors, sub-families and grandchildren in the household to a much greater extent than their West Indian and Northern Black counterparts. Economically and educationally, generally African American women are better off than their men. There is a bi-modal income distribution among African American women: a concentration of poverty and welfare at the low end; and a growing class of government civil servants and well off, educated professional women in the middle and upper income brackets.

Additional Research Methodologies…

This chapter on census demographics is the first leg of three research methodologies used to examine Black Brooklyn in the context of ethnicity, class and gender. Subsequent chapters will use field interviews and quantitative analysis to further examine this phenomenon. Using different and complimentary research methods will hopefully provide additional insights into the politics of Black Brooklyn from the perspectives of ethnicity, class and gender.

Chapter 4 – "African American and West Indian Elites," will explore an in-depth conversation with each of 52 interviewees concerning Black Brooklyn's politics in the context of ethnicity, class and gender. In Chapter 5, will use Weighted Least Squares (WLS), ecological regression techniques and spatial analysis to examine voting behavior along the dimensions of ethnicity, class and gender to determine the significance of these variables in predicting candidate choice and voter turnout in 14 recent elections involving Black Brooklyn's electorate.

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Chapter 4

African American and Caribbean Elites - Field Interviews: On Black Brooklyn, Politics, Ethnicity, Class, and Gender

Background

Two major Black ethnic groups, African Americans and West Indians, reside within Black Central Brooklyn. Leaders of these communities were interviewed on the politics of ethnicity, class and gender to complement and amplify the demographic findings of the previous chapter, and to identify additional cleavages within this Black urban terrain.

Despite their common race, the two main ethnic groups of Black Brooklyn have had different historical experiences with slavery and colonialism in the United States and the Caribbean region. The following three sections discuss the politics of ethnicity, class and gender through the hearts, minds and voices of 52 interviewees who are elites in Black Brooklyn's West Indian and African American communities. [1]

Green and Wilson's (1989) *The Struggle for Black Empowerment in New York City: Beyond the Politics of Pigmentation;* Philip Kasinitz's (1992) *Caribbean New York: Black Immigrants and the Politics of Race;* and Mary Waters' (1999) *Black Identities, West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities* are but a few salient examples of field research being deployed in the context of research on New York City's Black communities.

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[1] See Bibliography, "52 Field Interviews," and Appendix, "Interview Questionnaire."

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Jennifer Mason (2002) in her important work, *Qualitative Researching,* offers some insights into how qualitative research can advance the goals of social science research:

> Qualitative researching...has an unrivalled capacity to constitute compelling arguments about how things work in particular contexts...qualitative research is capable of producing very well founded cross-contextual generalities, rather than aspiring to more flimsy de-contextual versions.
>
> This extraordinary set of strengths is sometimes forgotten in the face of criticism that qualitative research is 'merely' anecdotal or at best illustrative, and that it is practiced in casual and unsystematic ways...the idea that qualitative research has these inherent weaknesses is based on a misunderstanding of the logic of qualitative enquiry. It fails to see the strategic significance of context, and of the particular, in the development of our understandings and explanations of the social world. Qualitative research therefore has massive potential...(p.1) [2]

"Strategic Sampling" [3] is an important aspect of qualitative research. From personal knowledge, research and referrals, I constructed a broad cross-section of interviewees according to ethnicity, class background, gender, political and other professions, and from the various neighborhoods of Central Brooklyn. Using this approach, the 52 interviews for this study include: 20 women and 32 men; 30 African Americans, 21 West Indians including 3 Haitians, and 1 African; at least 10 each, young, middle-aged and older interviewees; 10 elected officials including men and women, African Americans and West Indians; 10 religious, non-profit and civic leaders; and 10 persons with public housing experience as residents and service providers. The snowball technique in combination with structured sampling was utilized to identify these 52 interviewees, each averaging 90 minutes. Detailed field notes were made on all interviews, and 21 representative field interviews were transcribed, yielding 400 pages of transcripts.

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[2] For further discussion, see Mason (2002) pages 3 – 8.

[3] See Mason (2002) "Strategic Sampling."

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Field interviews of West Indian and African American women particularly amplified the central research questions of the politics of gender. Most male interviewees only commented on this subject when asked, while female interviewees spoke on this subject at length and with great detail and insight. Though it was initially posed as the "gender gap hypothesis," this question crystalized more strikingly in the demographic and field research stages. An updated version of the research question might be formulated as follows:

> If African American and West Indian women are a clear majority in Black Brooklyn, are nearly equal to or better off than their men on several socioeconomic indices such as income, education and employment, are the dominant part of the Black electorate, and have solid gender representation in local Black elected officialdom and political participation then, -- why aren't African American and West Indian women more of a dominant force in the politics of Black Brooklyn?

A group of 10 interviews focused on the 2001 Mayoral elections, the 2002 Gubernatorial elections, the political impacts of the Sept. 11, 2001 World Trade Center tragedy, and the impacts of ethnicity, class and gender on Black Brooklyn political behavior. A group of 42 interviews focused on Black Brooklyn politics and elections and the impacts of ethnicity, class and gender. The survey instrument used for these field interviews is included in the appendix. [4] The following sections discuss the findings on the politics of ethnicity, class and gender.

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[4] Portions of the field research were presented in a paper entitled "The Politics of Race...or Ethnicity ? African American and West Indian Voting Behavior in Brooklyn for the 2001 NYC Mayoral Elections." NY: Center for Urban Research, CUNY Graduate Center. This paper was co-authored and co-presented by John Flateau and Arielle Goldberg at the 2002 APSA Annual Meeting in Boston.

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Part I: The Politics of Ethnicity

The previous chapter compared and contrasted these variables describing ethnicity, class and gender for the West Indian and African American populations. This portrait illustrates the complexity of these ethnic groups. Field interviews offer additional depth and breadth to this portrait.

Three themes emerge from the field research on the politics of ethnicity: 1) socio-cultural division, 2) political division, and 3) political unification. First, ethnicity operates within the community to divide African Americans and West Indians along social and cultural lines, characterized by mutual mistrust and ignorance of each others' commonalities and differences driven by often inaccurate perceptions of one's own group and the other group. This 'divider' phenomenon operates out of two frames of reference: a) African American fear and misconceptions about labor market competition from West Indian immigrants and b) xenophobia based on each group's stereotypical perceptions of the culture of the other group.

Second, political entrepreneurs [5] operatives, candidates and incumbents both inside and outside of Black Brooklyn manipulate the politics of ethnicity to advance their careers. These actors are seeking to exploit real and manufactured Black ethnic differences to their political advantage with the political objective of mobilizing or demobilizing African American and West Indian constituencies to secure votes and political support for these entrepreneurs' political clients, patrons and agendas.[6] Many

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[5] See Roger Kingdon (2003), for a discussion of "political entrepreneurs."

[6] For example, Andrew Coumo in the 2002 NYS gubernatorial Democratic primary purportedly had a strategy of demobilizing or not engaging Black voters, assessing that they would vote for Black candidate McCall. NYC Mayor Koch and NYS Gov. Pataki had strategies to mobilize

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interviewees saw these political entrepreneurs as demagogues and 'ethnic arsonists' who inflame inter-group tensions around Black ethnic political competition. The interviewees criticized these political operatives' attempts to induce political and historical amnesia in Black Brooklyn, ignoring the fact that historically, the West Indian minority in Black Brooklyn has often politically represented the African American majority. [7] They also criticized how white politicians disadvantaged both groups when they played them off against one another, without delivering goods, services and patronage [8] to the group that favored them. This set of conditions triggers Black ethnic divisions.

Third, under certain conditions, both communities come together or unify, as when they mobilize around police brutality or the seminal Black empowerment candidacies of Jesse Jackson and David Dinkins. In these cases, the politics of ethnicity was trumped and superceded by the politics of race, driven by the "linked fate" imperative (Dawson, 1994). In these instances African Americans and West Indians politically behave and vote as one solid "Pan African" voting bloc, acting from a common political and policy agenda which transcends Black ethnicity. They jointly direct their action towards a common political goal which they deem to be more important than trumpeting the singular Black ethnicity of being "Caribbean" or "African American." This set of conditions triggers pan ethnic unity.

West Indian, but not African American voters, perceiving that West Indians were more receptive to their political appeals.

[7] Note, West Indian Bertram Baker's break-through election to the State Assembly in 1948; West Indian Shirley Chisolm's historic congressional election in 1968; and other examples in Chapter 2, "...Political History."

[8] This was the complaint of some West Indian and Hispanic leadership (e.g. Dennis Rivera and Local 1199) which heavily supported NYS Gov. Pataki's re-election in 2002.

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West Indians: Transnationalism and the Politics of Home

Most respondents stated that ethnic differences manifest themselves politically. Interviewees pointed to four main factors that might drive ethnic differences in voting behavior: 1) different politicization experiences in home countries versus America; 2) different interests in particular issues such as immigration; 3) weaker ties of Caribbean Americans to the Democratic Party and to issues of race; and 4) the importance of home-country politics and political customs to Caribbean Americans. Some respondents noted that the experience of Caribbean Americans with politics in their home country was a very different pattern and trajectory of political incorporation than that of African Americans and the American political system. One respondent used a business analogy to sum things up. Comparing Caribbean Americans to African Americans who have had historical barriers to entrepreneurship, [9] the West Indian respondent noted:

> You can't compare people from a homogenous society with a people who have always been in a multicultural society that has always put them at the bottom of that society. This extends to politics as well because Caribbean Americans are accustomed to being actively involved in the politics of their home country. They are used to seeing politicians who look like them.

West Indian interviewees noted that Caribbean voters tend to keep informed about the politics of their home country and American politics, particularly around issues of immigration, government program eligibility and citizenship. Many West Indians travel back and forth between their home country and America, maintaining family, political, social and economic ties. They are transnationals. Many Caribbean foreign leaders

[9] This is more myth than reality. A Census 2000 5% PUMS analysis shows 4% and 5% self-employment rates for African Americans and West Indians respectively in Brooklyn. Rates are much higher for Asians and whites. But the second point is true that a Black Caribbean will more likely see Black politicians in their home country than a Black American will find them living in America.

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travel to the U.S. and particularly to Black Brooklyn and Medgar Evers College, to meet with their nationals here, who are valuable political and financial contributors, sending millions in remittances back home and maintaining their political party affiliations and social ties through networks of Caribbean American organizations, media and personal travel.

The research on West Indians in urban America has often centered on questions of ethnic identity and assimilation, but little attention has been paid to the question of whether or not West Indians vote similarly or differently from African Americans and if so, why ? Recent studies focus on sociological and economic differences culminating in differing notions of ethnic identity for West Indians and African Americans. On the question of politics, the literature on West Indians and African American has taken two different approaches. One takes an optimistic position regarding the possibilities of an African American-West Indian political coalition; and the other takes a more pessimistic stance, pointing to divergent trends in these groups' political behavior (Kasinitz, 1992; Rogers, 2004).

Kasinitz (1992) contends that West Indians and Black Americans formed a fairly cohesive voting block until the late 1970s. In discussing West Indian political identification with African Americans he notes:

> Identification with the interests of this broader community has been partly a matter of ideological commitment and partly a pragmatic matter of political demography. For the most part, however, it was a response to the overwhelming fact of racial categorization in the United States. It was race, not ethnicity in the cultural sense, that structured the life chances of West Indian immigrants. Thus it was race that conditioned their political responses, even to the point of their playing down ethnic identity in the interest of racial unity (Kasinitz, 1992:207).

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Kasinitz (1992), Holder (1990) and others claim that West Indians tend to have weaker ties to the Democratic Party; and that beginning in the 1970s, West Indians demonstrated their willingness to vote for other West Indians (Kasinitz, 1992):

> Recently, however, we have seen West Indians put forward demands on a self-consciously ethnic basis. This new political style first came to public attention in 1977. It reached something of a watershed between 1982 and 1985 when it brought about sharp conflicts with other black politicians...How much appeal this ethnic politics holds for the community at large is unclear. It has not thus far delivered electoral victories, although it has shaped some electoral outcomes (208).

Reuel Rogers (2002) takes a similar position, acknowledging that while "Afro-Caribbeans" have resisted being identified as African Americans, "Afro-Caribbean immigrants and African Americans also share demonstrable material interests that could provide the common basis for a radical, race-based political coalition." This coalition is not just based on a common "racial" identity, but may also be class based, a result of similar experiences of job discrimination in the labor market. It may also be based on Black immigrants' negative experiences with the police, as demonstrated by the highly sensationalized Amadou Diallo (African) and Patrick Dorismond (Haitian) police shootings in New York City. [10] African American and Caribbean voting cohesion was evident in the Dinkins 1989 and 1993 elections and the Jesse Jackson 1984 and 1988 elections.

Milton Vickerman (2001) and Mary Waters (2001) contend that first and second generation West Indians tend to identify themselves in opposition to African Americans in an attempt to distance themselves from disadvantageous racial stratification. But this

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[10] In a fatal case of mistaken identity, African immigrant Amadou Diallo was killed in a hail of police bullets in his Bronx apartment vestibule. Haitian immigrant Patrick Dorismond was killed by an undercover cop in another police incident. Both events sparked city wide Black protests in 2002.

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oppositional identity fades with successive generations, as they face the same forms of discrimination as African Americans. Waters takes this analysis a step further noting that the decision among first and second generation West Indians to distance themselves from African Americans has important political costs:

> Indeed, one finds cultural distancing from black Americans among the immigrants we interviewed. They argued that West Indians merited inclusion in American society because of their strong work ethic, the value they placed on education, and their lack of pathological behaviors. By asserting a cultural identity as immigrants and as members of a model minority, West Indians make a case for cultural inclusion in American society based on being different from black Americans.
>
> This is a strategy that many new immigrants adopt. However, when Koreans 'become American' by distancing themselves from the underclass black image, the status of the group itself improves. This is how the process worked for the Irish, the Poles, and even the Mississippi Chinese. In contrast, when West Indians and middle-class black Americans attempt the same distancing, a boomerang effect occurs. Cultural distance may help individual black Americans and West Indians, but it leaves intact and reinforces stereotypes of blacks as inferior, thus harming other group members (Waters, 2001:212).

African Americans and West Indians: Similarities and Differences

Respondents commented that on a majority of issues including support for political candidates, African Americans and West Indians have key commonalities and differences. Some West Indian national groups are more politically cohesive than others, and in certain local races such as for City Council, subgroups may vote along regional or national lines (e.g. Jamaicans for Jamaicans, Haitians for Haitians etc.). Respondents commented that cultural differences and lack of communication often prevent them from working together except in times of crisis, mainly around issues of police brutality. These ethnic groups come together around unifying political candidacies such as Jesse Jackson and David Dinkins, and more recently Bill Clinton.

African American and West Indian interviewees contend that their groups have common ground which transcends ethnic differences, around issues of police-community

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relations, quality public schools, health care and jobs. Yet with the exception of police brutality incidents, these issues often fail to bring the two groups together because of: a) a general decline in civic engagement; b) preoccupations with daily community struggles around jobs, crime and drugs, lack of affordable housing, and strict enforcement of immigration laws; and c) a dearth of mediating institutions to bridge these divides and facilitate unified, inter-group approaches to solving common problems.

African American faith based leaders observed that their churches are more politically involved, while West Indian congregations are more conservative and opposed to 'mixing politics and religion.' One respondent speculated that this apolitical stance is a vestige of West Indian colonialism and that West Indians are more focused on social and economic mobility. Higher non-citizenship rates for West Indians also drive their insular perspective. African American churches on the other hand have a strong historical tradition of political activism (Taylor, 1994; Lincoln and Mamiya, 1990). Some West Indian respondents also noted that they are skeptical of American democracy, based on their regional experience with "yankee imperialism" in the Caribbean and Latin America.

One young West Indian professional with ties in both ethnic communities discusses ethnic tensions among African Americans and West Indians:

> You go right over to East Flatbush where the big Caribbean community is. That's a whole another story, you talk about ethnicity....It's crazy because they have a whole different perception of who they are as opposed to the native Blacks who live here and it's divisive to a certain extent. I think that's why Una Clarke lost because of her whole agenda when she challenged Major Owens. I personally did not vote for her because I thought her campaign was divisive, that her whole thing was about West Indians and Caribbeans.
>
> My thing is you're over here now...As my parents and grandparents used to say, "if it was so wonderful you should have stayed where you were. But now you're here, you need to become part of the process going on here." And to try and stack yourself up against the Black native population is ridiculous. So I couldn't support her (Una Clarke) regardless of what she had done because that was so much a part of her vocal message.

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> It saddened me where I did sit in one meeting, a community meeting, where the West Indian sentiment was very strong, there were very few...African Americans...But the whole West Indian contingent was sitting there and they don't necessarily see themselves in partnership with Black people, with the native population. And until they can get over some of that, nothing is going to happen. You're going to have East Flatbush and Flatbush doing whatever they do and then the rest of us doing whatever.
>
> And that's so old. I used to talk to my grandparents and this has been going on probably since the 1920s and 1930s. It started in Harlem and then when they moved to Brooklyn or wherever, it followed. So this is a long-standing thing...My father says that the most militant Caribbeans are outside of the Caribbean. I mean there's some truth to that. If you have so much fire and vigor, you should have done something in the countries where you came from.

An African American woman leader discusses misperceptions of African Americans and West Indians:

> Yes, there is a tension between African Americans and Caribbeans. I think that it's based on the fact that Caribbeans don't respect the struggle that we went through with slavery and they feel that we should have done more to get out of slavery and to forget slavery. That was our holocaust and part of our history and it permeates so many aspects of our lives continuously, even though slavery is over.
>
> The legacy of slavery, they don't really understand it even though many of them came out of slavery. But they feel it was a different kind of slavery and I've heard many Caribbeans speak about the fact that we were not courageous enough, that we were not ferocious enough about slavery, that we were too accepting and so it has a lot to do with the kinds of attitudes we perceive or that they project as far as our leadership and the way we operate in this country. Of course the South I guess has been more aggressive and produced more leaders as far as African Americans are concerned than many of the Northern states. Basically the Northern states were supposed to be more liberal and forward thinking.

Whites and Caribbeans

African American interviewees stated that they embrace all groups but that Caribbean and Haitian politics is different, and is strongly based on ethnicity. In 2001 there was an opportunity to elect an African American woman who was Deputy Borough President as Brooklyn Borough President. But Caribbeans voted heavily for State Senator Markowitz, who had a large, long time Caribbean constituency (this election will be examined more closely in the following chapter). Some Caribbeans advocate liberating "Caribbean" political seats from incumbent white and African American politicians. One African American respondent noted Markowitz' relationship to Blacks:

> Markowitz understands Blacks better than Blacks and embraces Black culture unlike our Black elected officials. We should represent all groups but don't know each others'

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history and culture; and teenagers reflect their parents' biased views in African American – Caribbean discussions. There is no placed for real dialogue around the cultural question. Caribbeans think they have better education, African Americans are lazy, and don't take advantage of opportunity. African Americans question if things were so great at home, why are West Indians here ?

We must define our culture and core values and how it will empower us. We lack political vision. We have internationally recognized events, the African Street Festival and the West Indian Day Parade; but we are not maximizing our political, economic and cultural power. Why is there a Jewish Children's Museum being built before there is an African American Children's Museum in Central Brooklyn ?

The Mayoral 2001 Elections

A powerful prism for examining the politics of ethnicity is the 2001 municipal elections, which included a rich array of African Americans, West Indians and women candidates: William Thompson, of West Indian ancestry ran for City Comptroller; Betsy Gotbaum, a white female, ran for Public Advocate; Jeannette Gadsen, an African American female ran for Brooklyn Borough President; and Caribbean/Hispanic Fernando Ferrer ran for Mayor.

This author did not anticipate the manner in which Ferrer was perceived by Caribbean American interviewees. The author assumed that Ferrer would be a less attractive candidate to Caribbean Americans than to African Americans because he was part of the Black - Latino coalition in New York, and would be less appealing to Caribbean Americans who are less receptive to coalitions based on race. However, nearly all of the West Indian respondents viewed Ferrer as a "Caribbean" candidate because Puerto Rico is in the Caribbean, and this gave Ferrer appeal with Caribbean American voters.

Most African American and West Indian elites empathized with Ferrer and his campaign for the "Other New York," which many interpreted as code words for the poor

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and minorities disenfranchised by Mayor Giuliani's policies. Other Ferrer issues included economic revitalization (based on Ferrer's record of accomplishments as Bronx Borough President) and more parental involvement in public education. Most interviewees believed that race became a key issue in the mayoral primary. After the Sharpton endorsement of Ferrer, Black public opinion shifted significantly to Ferrer, even though Green was perceived as a progressive candidate. Most respondents felt that the Green campaign and certain white media made blatant attempts to racially slur Ferrer and Sharpton and to scare white voters into voting for Green.

Several respondents felt that Green did a good job as Public Advocate and emphasized bringing business back to the city in the post-9/11 era. He had a progressive history, took stands against economic racism and police brutality, and publicly challenged Giuliani on key issues. However post 9/11, Green and all other candidates, except Ferrer, agreed to extend Giuliani's term, which turned off the Black community.

Some interviewees believed that in the mayoral runoff primary Ferrer appeared to be low on campaign funds and did not have enough resources for major television ads and street operations. By the time of the runoff, Ferrer was running against a negative media image. Ferrer tried to appeal to the Black and Latino vote and projected liberal issues. Green had name recognition and still had somewhat of a positive image despite the Black and Latino coalition effort for Ferrer. Black Brooklyn was not cohesive, with several local clubs splitting their endorsements between Green and Ferrer (e.g. in Bed-Stuy, Vann endorsed Ferrer, and Robinson endorsed Green. In Flatbush, Una Clarke endorsed Green, and Yvette Clarke endorsed Ferrer, et. al.). Several interviewees felt that Green showed racial insensitivity and underestimated the political fallout, in not

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apologizing for the negative Ferrer and Sharpton campaign literature which was attributed to Green campaign operatives. This caused Green to lose minority votes but he also gained white votes as a result.

Bloomberg's unprecedented $ 75 million campaign including massive advertising and direct mail, overshadowed the Ferrer-Green runoff and dominated the general election. Green's moves had produced growing racial divisions in the Democratic Party, and Green, facing an unenthusiastic minority electorate, lost a close election to Bloomberg out of 1.5 million votes cast. Green tried to remake himself from a liberal to a centrist and lost Black votes along the way. Green could not compete with Bloomberg's money or blunt his growing negatives. The Black community punished Green and the Democratic Party by giving Bloomberg 25 percent of the Black vote (significantly higher than for Giuliani in 1997), and had a low voter turnout for recent mayoral elections. Interviewees perceived that Bloomberg ran a good campaign on a platform as the "education reform" Mayor and as a business man and not a politician, who would rebuild New York. He spent massive money on media, literature, and phone banks, and there was no united Democratic front against him.

West Indian Response to Bloomberg

There were mixed responses to the general election and to the campaign of Michael Bloomberg. Some interviewees supported Green, some were neutral and some encouraged their community to vote for Bloomberg as an "anti-Green" measure. Most Black elected officials, as loyal Democrats, gave Green their lukewarm endorsement in the general election. In some quarters, Bloomberg's campaign was met with suspicion. One respondent said they saw him as a "wolf in sheep's clothing; and that he did not

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understand the needs of real poor people." Another said that while they supported Green, they knew Bloomberg was going to win because the community was talking money:

> The community was talking about Bloomberg and his money. That is all you heard about was Bloomberg and how much money the man had. I mean it was a household name. Oh this man got money. Oh did you see when he was a little boy. You see how he started out. That is all they talked about in my community.

One interviewee noted that Bloomberg made a strong impact on many Caribbean Americans because, although he did not directly do outreach in the community, he hired Flatbush residents to work on his campaign. A few interviewees who were West Indian campaign operatives even stopped campaigning for the Democrats and switched to Bloomberg because he was paying so well. Some respondents found that many West Indians liked Bloomberg because "...he was not a politician." They felt they could believe him because a lot of politicians "don't tell the truth."

9/11: Minimizing Ethnic Differences

The ultimate anomaly was the cataclysmic terrorist destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11th, also Primary Day in the 2001 MYC municipal elections. There was near unanimity among African American and West Indian elites in terms of its profound political impacts. Interviewees felt that it caused lower voter turnout and shifted the focus from municipal issues to a debate about who was the best mayoral candidate to run New York City in the post 9/11 era. September 11th caused mayoral politics to be dominated by discussions about terrorism, public safety, major public finance, private development, the rebuilding of lower Manhattan, and who would wield the power and resources to make things happen.

Respondents stated that prior to 9/11, Giuliani's popularity had tremendously decreased, in part due to his very public, messy divorce problems; and the press was

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growing more critical of his tenure. After 9/11, Giuliani received high marks for leading the city through the crisis, his popularity soared to new heights, and he parlayed this political capital into support that was critical for Bloomberg's mayoral candidacy. Before September 11th , Giuliani couldn't leave office fast enough for most New Yorkers. After it, Giuliani was the "savior" of New York and a national hero.

Many respondents felt that there would have been a very different electoral outcome but for 9/11. One respondent observed that the same voters from September 11th voted in the rescheduled election on September 25th. On September 11th only the early voters, heavily senior citizens were cancelled out (the election was cancelled by 11am). Some interviewees believed that the Green election day machine was well oiled and ready to go and would have won on September 11th , but after September 11th voters were no longer enthusiastic about the primary. Also, irretrievable election day resources and momentum were unloaded on September 11th and there was less money for the September 25th gotv ("get out the vote") effort.

Some West Indian respondents voiced concerns about the impact of the September 11th attacks on party politics stating that they felt "it helped to solidify the base of the Republican party, having a president, a governor and a mayor supporting each other's views and actions." It would be difficult to criticize them in a highly sensitive political climate where most "New Yorkers wanted some continuity," which they defined as party continuity as well, notwithstanding Bloomberg's previous affiliation with the Democratic Party and his lack of political experience.

The next chapter will show that in the 2001 elections, African Americans voted for Ferrer over Green in the runoff primary, while West Indians voted more favorably for

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Green over Ferrer. In the general election, African Americans were more likely to vote for Green, while West Indians were more likely to vote for Bloomberg. These voting trends comport with field interview comments that West Indians are more likely swing voters and less loyal to the Democratic Party than their African American counterparts.

In the City Comptroller's Democratic Primary, African Americans were more likely to vote for Thompson, the African American (actually, West Indian ancestry) candidate; and Caribbeans were more likely to vote for the Jewish candidate Herb Berman (it should be noted that Berman was a Councilman representing heavily Caribbean Canarsie for several years.) Thus there were some clear ethnic differences in voting African Americans and West Indian voters in the 2001 election cycle.

The 2002 Gubernatorial Race

The 2002 gubernatorial election pitted New York's first elected statewide African American official, State Comptroller Carl McCall, against Governor George Pataki, a two term Republican incumbent who was cultivating Hispanic and West Indian voters. McCall had impressive professional and governmental credentials and successfully ran statewide in 1994 and 1998. Most respondents believed that McCall would get the majority of African American votes and beat Andrew Cuomo in the primary, but McCall was unlikely to beat Governor Pataki in the general election. Some respondents felt that McCall and Cuomo had no major differences on the issues and both appealed to the same Democratic base: Blacks, Latinos, liberals, moderates and unions.

Gov. George Pataki used discretionary grants, high visibility and key issues to cultivate Black and Latino leaders. He understood that McCall's base was in New York City, and cutting into that base would help him win re-election. Pataki capitalized on

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key issues such as opposition to the U.S. military's use of the Puerto Rican island of Vieques as a bombing range, which appealed to the Latino community. The Governor also backed a major health care initiative, garnering the support of the powerful Dennis Rivera and Local 1199, which has a large, politically active membership of West Indians, African Americans and Latinos. He had the endorsement of some prominent Latino Democrats such as State Sen.Olga Mendez. Pataki had some prominent Black ministers' support such as Rev. Dr. Calvin Butts, pastor of Harlem's historic Abyssinian Baptist Church, indirectly a gubernatorial appointee as President of SUNY Old Westbury College.

Many interviewees stated that McCall's campaign should have paid more attention to Black and Latino voters and get out the vote (gotv) efforts. One African American politician stated:

> As far as Black support for Pataki, it's an error to assume that race, color or ethnicity alone will unify us. Politically, there was a time in our history when it was easier to come together around color due to our overt oppression. This is less true today and there is more diversity within the Black community.
>
> It's not surprising that there's Black support for Pataki. For McCall, the more exposure he gets, the more Black support he will get, despite what Black leaders do. For example, Dennis Rivera and 1199 may be endorsing Pataki, but I don't think he can deliver 1199's rank and file for Pataki.

West Indian interviewees believed that key Caribbean leaders seemed to be going with Pataki, because they perceived that he had an incumbent advantage. Pataki had Bloomberg's endorsement, Pataki had a huge campaign fund, and he had been distributing state funds in their communities. African American interviewees believed that their leadership had a long term political relationship with McCall and felt that he needed to do more to reach out to the West Indian community.

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Several respondents were critical of the McCall and Cuomo candidacies. Some felt that McCall had not been visible enough in the Black community after being Comptroller for eight years, and he was now just returning to the Black community because he wanted to run for governor. McCall also had operatives from Harlem and Queens running his Black Brooklyn campaign, which alienated local leaders.

Some respondents perceived that Cuomo was writing off the African American, West Indian and Latino communities, focusing upstate, and didn't want any contested local races in the Black community which might increase the Black vote for McCall in the primary. [11] An African American respondent indicated that if they were not already working for a Democrat, they would have worked for Pataki because his office had been responsive on constituent service issues and "the Black community must learn to work with both Democrats and Republicans." Most respondents felt that Pataki had political negatives such as his opposition to the Campaign for Fiscal Equity court decision which mandated more equitable state funding for the New York City public schools. However, Pataki also increased his profile in the Black community with Randy Daniels, his Secretary of State and key spokesman; and with prominent Black clergy such as Rev. Dr. Calvin Butts and Rev. Dr. Franklin Richardson. Pataki reached out to the Caribbean community via his newly hired staff person Hon. Una Clarke and Dr. Roy Hastick, President of the Caribbean American Chamber of Commerce to whom the Governor promised support for a Caribbean trade center project. There were differences of opinion as to Una Clarke's value to Governor Pataki's campaign.[12]

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[11] In a bid to hopefully retain minority support for a future run, Cuomo dropped out of the race, leaving McCall in an uncontested Democratic primary.

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Pataki learned a few words of Kreyol and hired a Haitian community liaison which won him support among Haitians because they thought that "if he took the time to learn their language, then they should vote for him." Other respondents said that they were inclined to vote for Pataki because he had reached out to the Black community even though he didn't need Black support to win re-election.

Democratic Party Decline in Black Brooklyn

Both African American and West Indian interviewees echoed the declining party thesis of Shefter (1994, 1992) and others. But where you stood on this question depended on where you sat, politically. Among interviewees, Black elected officials and their political operatives gave themselves good grades; while more independent political elites were critical of the party and its elected officials. Interviewees stated that Black Brooklyn's elected officials were too complacent; the community had politically regressed in the post-Dinkins era; and politicians were not delivering as effectively as they could for the Black community.

Interviewees believed that in the 2001 mayoral primary and runoff, neither Blacks nor the Democratic Party were unified and "many local political organizations are dead and dying." Leadership diffused their political clout with multiple endorsements, campaigns were not well organized, and the unions had minimal impact, as distinct from their earlier campaign efforts for Jesse Jackson and David Dinkins. One veteran West Indian politico observed:

> We are no longer in the days of the old line clubs where you had campaign volunteers. Today, there are no real commitments to candidates. Everybody wants to get paid. In the old days the unions went out in the field together with the local organizations. Now all the club members are paid election inspectors sitting inside polls all day long. The

[12] Una Clarke was a popular Jamaican American and recently term limited Flatbush city council member who challenged African American Congressman Major Owens in 2000 and lost.

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> unions now do independent, non-partisan gotv (get out the vote) and union members get stipends.
>
> In the runoff Green and Ferrer took Central Brooklyn for granted and there was no operation and no poll coverage. In the general election Green used racist tactics with attack literature on Ferrer and Sharpton. This turned people off and many Black Democrats crossed over for the first time to vote for Bloomberg (he was on the Republican and Independence party lines). There was even a small Black Republican movement for Bloomberg in Black Brooklyn. There is a weak Democratic Party organization with no cohesion, and a politically divided Black Brooklyn is compromising the community's interests.

One veteran West Indian political elite noted that there is an increasingly bipartisan political orientation in Black Brooklyn, particularly in the West Indian community:

> God is good...He makes people of all stripes who are intelligent and have integrity. There are always points of cooperation in government and must always be, to let this democracy work. So there are good ideas for me in both parties. I don't think Democrats got the only blessing for good ideas.

Many of the Caribbean American interviewees expressed concern about the Democratic Party and its tendency to take its Black core constituents for granted and they saw a trend toward political realignment. They observed that while Pataki knew how to reach out to Caribbean Americans, national Republicans have not yet demonstrated the ability to do so. Most of the respondents indicated that Caribbean Americans are likely to be swing voters if the political trends continue. When asked about ethnic differences and party loyalty, one respondent said: "I think the Democrats are getting a wake-up call right now from the Caribbean communities and even the African Americans." He noted that Republicans have been reaching out to Haitians since that community helped to elect a Cuban-American Republican Mayor of Miami. As one interviewee stated about Pataki's outreach efforts:

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> The simple gesture that a politician makes can win him thousands of votes. Pataki set the standard by going to Flatbush and that has been trashed by everybody. Are you kidding ? This wins him a lot of votes ! He is giving them respect for god's sake.

Ethnic and Cultural Differences

A few scholars have argued that the cultural differences between Caribbean Americans and African Americans are reflected in different political behaviors of these two groups (Bryce-LaPorte, 1972; McLaughlin, 1981; Holder, 1990; Kasinitz, 1992; Rogers, 2002, 2004). Interviewees confirmed many of these earlier studies and some pointed to internal differences within the Caribbean American community, especially between francophone Haitians and anglophone Caribbeans. A Haitian respondent stated that anglophone West Indians treat Haitians like "the black sheep of the Caribbean community." Other non-Haitian Caribbean Americans said that these differences were based mainly on language barriers and Haitians maintaining their own French or Kreyol-speaking institutions (Pierre-Louis 2001).

A young West Indian leader commented on the practical differences between African Americans and Caribbean Americans based on immigration status:

> The issue of immigration and resettlement is something that an African American will never have to deal with...The rules of the game are very different for both groups. An African American can do whatever they want to do, this is their homeland. They go to jail, they come out and they live. You (a Caribbean American) go to jail, you come out and you are on the next plane out.

There are significant policy and political ramifications to tighter immigration and deportation measures in the post-9/11 era which are profoundly affecting West Indian families and communities. Two West Indian community leaders commented:

> Caribbean Americans are a force in Black Brooklyn's politics. They have been here three generations since the 1920s and have melted into the Black community. They are

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> home owners and registered voters. Especially the new immigrants have a presence in major labor unions such as Roger Toussaint and TWU (Transport Worker's Union), 1199 and DC 37. They must increase their citizenship. Under the radar, perhaps 50 percent of Caribbean adults are not citizens by choice. And 40 percent of Caribbean youth are illegally trapped here as non-citizens who can't vote or go to college.
>
> One positive benefit of the immigration laws is that it forced many Caribbeans to become U.S. citizens and to exercise their voting rights. In light of the Immigration Reform Act there are rising deportations and tightening citizenship requirements. Immigration and deportation for those in trouble with the law, the Patriot Act and the Post 911 era have all had an impact. The Immigration Reform Act of 1996 brought about major deportations, decimated many families, and they began to realize the politics of immigration.

Role Models, Ethnic Pride and Political Communication

The number of Caribbean American political clubs and elected officials is growing, and political message is important to the second generation. A young Caribbean political operative noted:

> Immigrant communities are starting to form their own political clubs, ...they're using party politics as a tool for upward mobility...Look at Sylvia Hinds Radix, an immigrant, went to law school, worked for DC 37, now she's a judge and a role model. I think increasingly Caribbean Americans are a force in the politics of Black Brooklyn. I look at it in two parts. I look at folks who were born here, we're starting to come of age....we're already registered and we're out there...But now you have increasingly more folks who are coming of age and they're registering to vote and folks have to speak to us. You have to speak to Caribbean Americans like me who straddle both cultures and your message has to be tailored to that.
>
> You can't give me the same message that you would give the newer immigrants. You just can't because but I have a different experience because I've been raised here. But certainly you still have to talk about issues that affect that immigrant population. So you can't give me the same message you give the African American community. You go into an African American community, you're not going to talk about immigration because that's really not an issue in that community. But certainly if you talk to someone like me, I want to hear what you're saying about immigration...

Ethnic Common Ground and Battle Grounds

One African American female community leader noted that where they came from in the south, "...if you're Black you're Black." They noted that in New York however, there seems to be a separation between Caribbeans and African Americans. This respondent was shocked when a Caribbean candidate ran against an African

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American incumbent elected official and people came to the community and encouraged their Caribbean neighbors to "vote for the Caribbean candidate against the African American." She noted that it is difficult to make such distinctions, particularly when African Americans and Caribbeans are intermarried. She also noted that her first hand experience with Southern racism caused her to migrate North, and that her instincts for inclusion derived from her experience in the Civil Rights movement, and were very much a part of her views on the need to bridge ethnic differences. Even in an ethnically diverse Black community, she saw common ground around key issues: "...our young people not having jobs and education...and no place for our children to have activities."

Many Caribbean American interviewees felt that African Americans often failed to address their critical issue of immigration. Some West Indian respondents stated that this was a result of competition with African Americans who feared that immigrants would take away their jobs, a claim which they believe was unfounded because immigrants often take the low wage, low skill jobs that African Americans do not want. Thus some West Indians respondents expressed the view that African Americans may simply be insensitive, paranoid and anti-immigrant. However there is common ground over issues like police-community relations as exemplified by the Abner Louima, Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond police incidents and joint protest mobilizations in the Black diasporan communities led by Rev. Al Sharpton and others.

Black Ethnic Competition? Yes and No

Several interviewees articulate a few major themes around inter-ethnic political competition. To paraphrase, one major response was: "There is no real competition. We just have some ethnic demagogues within, and outside manipulators who are trying to

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divide and conquer us." There is an added Pan African ideological argument that "we are all one African people and shouldn't divide ourselves," echoing the philosophy of Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. DuBois, Malcolm X and others.

A very different response from other interviewees was: "Yes we are divided, and the political tensions between African Americans and West Indians are real and palpable." African Americans feel that West Indians are ungrateful and unappreciative of African Americans' path breaking contributions through the civil rights struggles which have provided opportunities for West Indians. West Indian interviewees counter that African Americans are too hegemonic and unwilling to share power with West Indians, particularly in neighborhoods where West Indians are a significant presence.

Some African American politicians advance a related argument that: a) today's West Indians have historical and political amnesia, or are in denial of the fact that much of Black Brooklyn's early political leadership was in fact a West Indian minority representing an overwhelming southern rooted African American majority (Bertram Baker, Shirley Chisholm, Thomas Jones, et.al.); and b) Black ethnic divisions are to be avoided because they reduce the overall economic and political clout of the Black community. One African American politician noted:

> It's not clear to me that there is a political competition. I'm not sure that people really understand it in that sense. It's not that sophisticated, it's just that 'if there is attention being paid to this part of town I want to make sure that I'm being paid attention to because I have a feeling, I may be wrong, but, I can't believe that if you're sophisticated politically about political power, that you would allow yourself to be used to neutralize your own political power.
>
> If you are in a position where there is an opportunity to influence the political process, and that opportunity depended on how well you could present a collective front and you decided that you didn't want to do the collective front then I can't imagine that you're politically sophisticated because you're essentially neutralizing the possibility that you can get anything.

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> So whatever you're gonna get it's going to be so much less...One of my colleagues told me recently, "you know I thought that I was doing something really big. I got $200,000 for one of my groups and I thought 'gee this was amazing.' But then I look at the Hasidim and they got $1.5 million, so I see that what I got was nothing. So when you look at that and the Hasidim are a solid bloc, they understand that principle, so they're not separating out into many different little segments or sections.
>
> Whatever is going on out there, they don't even care or listen to it because they know that they approach the system as one voice. So I don't think this separation is necessarily because we're looking for political power, we're looking for attention. But it's not about political power because...you cannot assume to be politically sophisticated if you do not know how to approach the power arena and you go and separate yourself out. It's definitely divisive and it weakens you. It short changes you. It neutralizes you in a way that you can't begin to think that you're getting anything out of it.

Ethnic Uniters: The Second Generation

Some respondents noted that the seminal election regarding ethnic political competition between African Americans and West Indians was the 1991 City Council race for a newly drawn councilmanic district in heavily West Indian Flatbush, featuring Una Clarke versus Carl Andrews. Carl Andrews, was a young African American politico and Vann protégé who lost in 1982, in a newly redistricted Flatbush state senate seat featuring incumbent State Senator Marty Markowitz and former state senator, Panamanian Waldaba Stewart. Andrews subsequently won election to School Board 17 covering Crown Heights and Flatbush. In the 1991 councilmanic race, Andrews was backed by most of the African American political establishment including Vann and Norman. Jamaican American Una Clarke, a day care executive and political protégé of Congressman Major Owens won in a heated primary contest decided by less than 100 votes.

Staunch pro-Caribbean Council member Una Clarke ten years later mounted a primary challenge to Owens in 2000. Once again, this contest stirred up considerable inter-ethnic tensions. When Council member Una Clarke was term limited in 2001, she

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backed her daughter Yvette to fill her vacated seat. Yvette Clarke is a second generation Jamaican American, with a seasoned professional and political resume (Oberlin graduate, Local 1199 staffer; empowerment zone official for Bronx Borough President Ferrer, etc.). Councilmember Yvette Clarke appears to be effective and facile at political fence mending; and cultivating and managing political and ethnic relations within and among first and second generation West Indians, African Americans, and the Democratic Party leadership. Notes one veteran West Indian political operative:

> That was a time when I helped convince Yvette to endorse Jeanette Gadsen and try to extend the olive branch there. (Author: "Did Clarke's endorsement help Gadsen get votes in Clarke's area?") I think a little bit. But you know Marty Markowitz is overwhelmingly popular because that was his district. So that was an important element of peace in Caribbean versus African American politics. (Author: "Coming on the heels of Yvette's mother's race against Owens.") "Which was a bitter, bitter race. Still has some bad taste to this day...
>
> (Thanks to Yvette) now Una and Carl Andrews have made friends...This is a precedent because much suspicion went on for years and years...But I think that is an area where all this is played out and where you can see that progress has been made.

Second generation bridge builders are a sign of political progress between African Americans and West Indians. But other political trends are also noteworthy. In 2001, State Senator Marty Markowitz won the open seat of term limited Brooklyn Borough President Howard Golden, defeating African American Deputy Borough President Jeannette Gadsen and Councilman Ken Fisher. (This was Markowitz' second run, after he and Vann lost to Golden in 1985.) In a February 2002 special election to fill the heavily Caribbean vacant Markowitz seat, Carl Andrews ran again, drawing political criticism from the Caribbean media and community. Andrews defeated West Indian candidates with backing from County Leader Clarence Norman and others. African American Kevin Parker also ran and defeated West Indian candidates in a newly drawn,

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heavily West Indian open state senate seat in 2002. Currently, 3 out of 4 Black state senators in Brooklyn are African Americans (Velmanette Montgomery is African American; John Sampson is Guyanese-American); and two African Americans (Andrews and Parker) represent heavily Caribbean districts. These developments point to the competitive and complex ethnic politics of Black Brooklyn, and why there is some resentment in the Caribbean community.

West Indians as Swing Voters

Some West Indian respondents indicated that while most Caribbean Americans register in the Democratic Party, they are more willing to switch parties, and they vote more on issues than on race. Stated one West Indian leader: "Caribbean Americans vote on issues and things that are important to them, they don't vote on race and ethnicity." Yet this same leader noted that in the Bill Thompson race for City Comptroller, "He was an attractive young *Black* person and that there was an intent on many parts that at least one of the city-wide elected officials should be a *Black* person because of the large numbers of *Blacks* in our city."

Most Caribbean respondents agreed that the willingness of a political candidate to support Caribbean American issues, especially immigration policies, was a key factor in their vote for a particular candidate. Immigration issues range from policies affecting citizenship, education and healthcare for immigrants, to support for a particular U.S. foreign policy toward the Caribbean.

Conclusions: The Politics of Ethnicity

Both African Americans and West Indians maintain strong negative stereotypes about each other which plays into their inter-group paranoia, suspicions, mistrust and lack

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of communication, cooperation and political collaboration. There are few mediating institutions to create common ground and space for these groups to come together. Exceptions seem to be Black Brooklyn churches (congregations range from ethnically segregated to heavily integrated), Medgar Evers College, and two major Black Brooklyn annual cultural events, the International African Street Festival and the West Indian Day Parade.[13] The two ethnic groups also share: social and political clubs, some local non profit agencies, church congregations and common union memberships such as Local 1199 and DC 37 AFSCME. These mediating institutions are on the front lines of bridging the ethnic divide.

According to several interviewees, African Americans and West Indians have different political world views and practice different politics. African Americans are more concerned with racial and diasporan solidarity, the demise of traditional political clubs, ineffectiveness of their political leadership, and they are pessimistic about the role of the Democratic Party. More recently arrived West Indians seem to be more optimistic about politics; less wedded to Democratic Party allegiances; more likely to be swing voters in exercising their political options, and they are more accepting of white politicians in their communities. West Indian elites are focused on supplanting African American political hegemony in West Indian neighborhoods. There is major political competition between these two groups, and they talk about each other, but rarely seem to talk to each other in broad strategic terms of political and cultural understanding. And

[13] These two cultural events have broad based Black diasporan and multiracial participation, and are sponsored annually by a Black cultural nationalist group, and by the "West Indian American Carnival Day Association (WIACDA). Both events and groups receive government support and corporate sponsorship.

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only in times of crisis or major political events, does the leadership of their communities seem to come together.

There are differences in the ways that African Americans and Caribbean Americans are courted by outside political forces, and differences in the ways that their indigenous political leaders play the political game as evidenced by the politics of the 2001 mayoral and 2002 gubernatorial elections. West Indian elites acknowledge that they have some real internal differences within their communities along Caribbean island national lines. For them, the day of a "Pan Caribbean" identity has not yet arrived if indeed it ever will. [14] One African American leader with West Indian ties discussed the Pan African perspective as an umbrella identity for the two black ethnic groups:

> Caribbean Americans being a major force is a new phenomenon in Central Brooklyn. This didn't matter 30 years ago when Shirley Chisholm was elected (to Congress) as a Black woman, not a Caribbean. This is an issue we keep in the closet but we need to deal with it. We have had divisions. The majority polity has used it to inflame for its own purposes of divide and conquer. We have a more diverse Black Brooklyn with Black elected officials from the Caribbean.
>
> The failure to understand our common ancestry can cause fissures and divisions. One of the biggest problems facing Black Brooklyn is a lack of unity, a sense of purpose, a sense of community, understanding our changing demographics. There are challenges beneath the façade of color - cultural differences. But how do we not allow our cultural differences to undermine our ability to deliver goods and services for our community? We must celebrate our differences and not let them separate us. We all come from a common ancestry. When the police stop us they will not ask are we from Barbados or South Carolina.

At the local level these West Indian national groups may view their own transplanted Caribbean island neighbors more as their political competition than they do African Americans. Pan ethnic solidarity and the local institutions to promote it as a conscious, mass process appears to be non-existent except for occasional political

[14] Carol Archer's (2001) dissertation research found rank and file West Indians more comfortable with the concept of a Pan Caribbean identity than elite leaders. For my study, 20 West Indians from 10 different nations and three language groups (English, British West Indies; Spanish, Panama; and French / Kreyol, Haiti) offer a diversity of opinions on the "Pan Caribbean" identity question.

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commentary in the Caribbean print media; a few outspoken Caribbean politicians; and a few Caribbean political insurgents seeking to make the case for increased Caribbean political representation.

Most local Black political clubs tend to be loyal to the Democratic Party and neighborhood oriented, with little emphasis on ethnic or island nation appeals. One reason is that no one West Indian national group is hegemonic in Black Brooklyn or in "West Indian" Brooklyn. The largest group, Jamaicans with 75,000 persons are barely 25 percent of the total West Indian population in Black Brooklyn, followed by Haitians (72,000), Trinidadians (45,000), Guyanese (35,000) and others. [15]

Thus for a political candidate in Black Brooklyn to "wave the flag" of one's own Caribbean national origin could constitute "political suicide." Many interviewees contended that this was precisely one of then Councilmember Una Clarke's mistakes in her 2000 congressional race against Congressman Major Owens, where she emphasized her Jamaican roots and alienated a substantial number of non-Jamaican West Indians as well as African Americans.

Also, there is still a significant African American minority in most Caribbean neighborhoods. As the previous chapter showed, African Americans have nearly a 100 percent citizenship rate compared to a 67 percent citizenship rate among West Indians. These African Americans also have a higher voter registration and voter participation rate, comprising a powerful voting bloc within Caribbean neighborhoods. Thus it would be

[15] Census 2000 Summary File 3 and 5% PUMS data. Panamanians, Barbadians and Grenadians also have a significant presence and political involvement.

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politically unwise to alienate these African American voters with overt West Indian ethnic appeals.

In speaking to interviewees, second generation West Indians who are African Americanized, seemed less wedded to a West Indian ethnic and nationalist identity than first generation interviewees. Some West Indian elites suggested that given the rich diasporan diversity of the West Indian and larger Black communities, a "Pan African" philosophy resonates as a more appropriate unifying political philosophy for second generation West Indians and African Americans. (This pattern confirms Archer's (2001) research.)

According to some Caribbean interviewees, the main advocates of Black ethnic political warfare are usually insurgent Caribbean political candidates advocating a "West Indian empowerment" platform. Meanwhile, the broader West Indian community appears uncomfortable with the notion of exploiting ethnic differences between West Indians and African Americans on questions of political representation.

According to my interviews, there is a disconnect between West Indian political elites and average West Indian voters on the question of Caribbean political empowerment. Average West Indian voters are quite willing to vote for white politicians (e.g. Markowitz, Jacobs, Berman) and African American politicians (e.g. Norman, Parker, Andrews). As well, African Americans voters have historically voted for white (e.g. Fred Richmond et.al.) and West Indian (Shirley Chisholm, et.al.) politicians representing predominantly African American communities.

A few interviewees noted a practical political reason to reject divisions between African American and West Indian communities: these divisions allow white politicians

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to gain and maintain political ascendancy in the Black community. Prime examples of this phenomenon are former State Senator, now Borough President Marty Markowitz, and Assemblywoman Rhoda Jacobs representing heavily West Indian Flatbush and Crown Heights areas for two decades while successfully fending off several local African American and West Indian insurgent political candidates. A very recent example of this 'attempted white takeover' involved the recent close election and re-election of African American State Senator Kevin Parker.[16]

There is West Indian and African American conflict and cooperation around questions of political reform, and the changing rules of the political game just at a time when these ethnic groups are gaining increased access and control over Brooklyn's party politics. One impetus for reform is the recent scandal over political corruption in the judicial, legislative and political party arenas, in Brooklyn Democratic politics in particular.[17] This reform effort was triggered by pressures from the media, public opinion, legislative, party, criminal prosecutors and judicial leadership. Some interviewees expressed concerns that just as Blacks are beginning to benefit from the rules as have the Irish, Italian and Jewish ethnic groups who preceded them, the rules are

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[16] In the September 2004 Democratic Primary, Orthodox Jewish ex-Councilmember Noach Dear outspent African American one term incumbent Senator Kevin Parker 5 to 1. Dear came within 5 percent of defeating Parker, with the help of a "rabbit" West Indian candidate in the race who polled 10% of the vote. The predominantly Flatbush / East Flatbush State Senate district includes a portion of Borough Park.

[17] In November 2003, 23 year incumbent African American Assemblyman Clarence Norman Jr., Chairman of the Kings County Democratic Party, one of the largest local party organizations in the country, was indicted by former political ally and Kings County District Attorney Joe Hynes on corruption charges; and several Brooklyn judges in 2002 and 2003 were cited or indicted for judicial misconduct and corruption. In December 2003 a judicial reform panel appointed by Hon. Judith Kaye, Chief Judge of the N.Y.S. Court of Appeals, released a set of judicial reform recommendations (New York Times 2003a)

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now being changed as a ploy to maintain white minority rule in the new "majority minority" New York City. One African American leader noted:

> Over the past few decades there has been a major increase in Black elected officials in Central Brooklyn and a major amassing of power, longevity and seniority which equates to ascension to major legislative committee chairmanships and power. For example, (in the State Assembly) Vann was Chair of Corporations, Commissions and Authorities; Green is Chair of Children and Families, Towns is Chair of Small Business, Norman is Deputy Speaker; (in the City Council) Pinkett was Chair of Governmental Operations; Wooten was Chair of Education ...The Kings County Democratic Party has amassed major influence. It's challenges today are due in part to the power structure being concerned that Blacks are playing by the rules of the game and gaining power, and this is a threat to the oligarchy.

As West Indians increase their citizenship and voter participation rates, increased political competition with African Americans and others will inevitably follow, as West Indians seek to increase their political representation and to gain a larger political voice in Brooklyn, New York City and beyond.[18] The success or failure of Brooklyn's Black ethnic politics is based on several factors: personal agency, candidate qualifications, campaign finance, ballot access, political organization and resources, party competition, legislative redistricting, and inter-racial and inter-ethnic alliances. A well crafted political succession plan which mediates the political ambitions of various political aspirants can play an important role in managing and minimizing ethnic political conflict. In previous eras, the Democratic machine, Bertram Baker, Wesley MacHolder, the CCE and others grappled with these challenges. Their 21st century equivalent has yet to emerge.

Across the board, interviewees spoke to the need for a new, collaborative, civic, cultural, intellectual and political discourse to be initiated, along with the political space

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[18] Likely local turf battles include African American Congressman Major Owens' 11th CD; Assemblyman Norman's Crown Heights 43rd Assembly District which is heavily West Indian. There are also two heavily West Indian State Senate Districts (21st and 22nd) represented by African Americans Carl Andrews and Kevin Parker.

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and resources to facilitate this discourse. It must be a space where honest discourse can take place; where diasporan leadership can explore their individual and each others' commonalities, differences, issues and challenges; where they can fashion policy and political consensus; develop strategic plans of action and resources for implementation; and it must be a space where creative planning and coordination of policy, political and community agendas can be discussed, critiqued, formulated and implemented.

Part II: The Politics of Class

The politics of class in Black Brooklyn is discussed by the interviewees in four broad themes which emerge from the field research: a) socio-economic differences between African Americans and West Indians, mainly around education, income, occupation and place or neighborhood; b) major class divisions along lines of gender, with significant income and education differences between men and women; c) class and political differences between homeowners and public housing residents; and d) an emerging new middle class spurred by gentrification and high socioeconomic status (SES) young residents. This last theme is about a class and age based, inter-generational difference between the older Black establishment and a younger Black elite who are the post-civil rights generation, with a different political orientation.

Significant differences in education, income and occupation for African Americans and West Indians exist within and across these two Black ethnic communities. Many Black elites contend that these socio-economic differences shape different class interests which in turn manifest themselves in different political orientations and voting behavior. Some examples of class based voting may include: home owners and public

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housing residents; middle class and low income voters; voters with higher versus lower educational attainment; and employed versus unemployed voters.

One young African American professional woman notes that: a) class divisions exist but they are more educational than economic in Black Brooklyn; b) that gender is inextricably woven into this dynamic; and c) younger Black women are afraid, turned off by, and oblivious to political engagement. This interviewee observes that young women are preoccupied with their careers and marriage prospects. They are also confronted with an identity crisis, as well educated and employed young women return to their middle class and working class neighborhoods, and try to re-engage in their community:

> One of our key issues is how do upwardly mobile Blacks fit into the community...Educated people with degrees, trying to find their place. Because there's a lot of people caught in between the lines, you know. You're still Black but you're looking for a certain level of success. And the question is how do you fit into the community and at the same time be successful maintaining your identity.
>
> As you become more successful the people you work with change and you're not dealing with the regular community but a new set of players and you feel lost. These people don't understand that you went to school, worked, struggled to get your degree. A lot of your college classmates were white upper class who don't understand your experiences. They didn't have to deal with your kind of social and economic challenges.

Class Divisions: Education and Gender

The demographic research in the previous chapter and the field research in this chapter both point to a gender gap in educational attainment: nearly twice as many women as men have bachelor's degrees in both African American and West Indian communities. Comments on this subject are visceral among Black women interviewees. States one African American female professional:

> I think that in general in America the class division is based on money but in our community it's based on education...One group says "I don't need a college degree to do such and such." Then you have wealthy people who don't have higher education. And then there's us, the educated class...Education is creating a class division between men and women and some of the implications are the inability to create a family unit...

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> If the man is the head of the household, how can he feel superior to his wife if he thinks she's smarter than him because she has a master's degree and he doesn't?"... They'll be a bunch of women at that level and just a few men...Politics is a prime example of where there are a lot of women who are involved...and the few men that are successful in politics really *work* those male female relationships to their advantage.

This statement that Black men "work" or manipulate male-female relationships, is an important one which bears elaboration. The young Black female interviewees believe that the relatively few, well educated young Black men in their political circles know all too well that they are prized commodities. And some of these males take advantage of the situation by playing out their sexual and personal politics with access to a wide field of young Black females, for whom corresponding Black males are in great demand.

"When Work Disappears"

As the previous chapter's demographic analysis dramatically showed, low labor force participation rates are epidemic, particularly in some of the older African American neighborhoods such as Bed Stuy, Brownsville and East New York, as compared to the heavily non-citizen West Indian neighborhoods, where unemployment insurance and welfare is not an option for economic survival (Wilson 1997). In many instances more than half of the males are not in the labor force and several African American respondents cited high unemployment as a major community problem. Further substantiating these observations, the Community Service Society of New York issued a 2004 study using census CPS data which documented a 50 percent unemployment rate for Black males in New York City (Levitan 2003, 2004).

As the works of Mollenkopf (1983), W.J. Wilson (1996) and other scholars document, the deindustrialization of America's inner cities with a simultaneous racial transformation from white ethnics to Blacks and other racial minorities, has been

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underway for decades. One African American leader notes some of these devastating impacts in Black Brooklyn:

> I don't know which is the chicken or the egg, but certainly employment is a very major issue especially employment opportunities for teenagers and young adults. That's where we have the absolute highest unemployment rate and lowest skill rates. And, there are practically no unskilled jobs, very, very little that we can direct them to. We used to have factories all over Bed-Stuy, people worked in factories.

The Politics of Place and Class [19]

Perceptions of class divisions are also colored by place and geography: what borough or neighborhood you live in, its image, and how and why you got there. Notes one young West Indian professional:

> There is a class issue and Black people don't like to talk about class...Class has always been with us of course since the days of slavery. At least during the civil rights period and the '50s and '60s people kind of papered over the differences because there was a common goal in mind, they were trying to eradicate, racial discrimination, segregation. Those days are over. So you have today class distinctions, and separations certainly exist and they certainly are there and are more prevalent probably than they have ever been.
>
> You could sit in Cambria Heights, Queens or you could sit right here in Crown Heights and you could have conversations about it because you have families who have...doctors and lawyers. The original people came to Black Brooklyn when this was the place to be and they don't have any interest in talking to people in Brownsville or East New York. Those are realities. They're professionals and they've made it and rightly or wrongly they don't see that they have anything in common...
>
> I think there's a lot of animosity between Black Brooklynites and Black people from Queens because at one point in the 70s and 80s, Black people from Brooklyn ran out to Cambria Heights and Laurelton to escape the decline in Brooklyn. They couldn't afford Long Island so that was the next best thing...And there's this tension between the two groups as if to say 'We've made it, we've advanced because we live in Queens, and we have trees on our streets." And people in Brooklyn are saying "I don't see a difference in how you live'...It's the same class of people, it's the same postal workers, the same lower/middle income people...The difference is their perception of themselves, that they're better off than their Brooklyn brethren.

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[19] For a detailed discussion of the intersection of place and class, see Steven Gregory (1998) *Black Corona: The Politics of Place in an Urban Community.*

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Homeowners, Public Housing, Business Owners

A young West Indian professional discusses class stratification in Black Brooklyn:

> There are as many classes of Black Brooklynites as there are classes of Black Americans...You have a smaller professional class and by that I mean college educated or graduate degrees, some of them old line people who have been in the area a long time. And then you have a larger middle class which you can stratify at several different levels and then you have working class and of course you have the poor.
>
> (Class divisions) affect Black Brooklyn's politics more than any other place because I think that the reality is that there's only a small percentage of people in Black Brooklyn that vote and those are normally people with an economic interest in the elections, so those are normally property owners...(Author: "Are home owners and business owners a force in the politics of Black Brooklyn?") "I assume more so than someone who's not because I'm concerned about somebody who is talking about property taxes...or anything that's going to affect my property value. So if I'm a business owner I want to know about empowerment zones.
>
> It's a small slice of people who I think really control Black Brooklyn politics and it's not the masses of people. I would venture to say that the bulk of the poor people have very little input in what's happening, and the working class. I think that those two tiers are disenfranchised.

A veteran West Indian leader notes that the problem may not so much be class, as civic education and community mobilization:

> You can't have effective leadership until you have effective citizenry, people who are engaged and knowledgeable about the policies and the issues...A citizen is somebody who reads the newspapers, who knows what's going on in their neighborhood,...who's willing every so often to come out to an event, and to educate themselves on the issues...who's willing to be educated about who's on the ballot and vote...at the next level perhaps volunteer some time...and resources to make change happen in their community.
>
> We don't have that in Black Brooklyn. We have a lot of people who are willing to be herded around like cattle and they want to complain about what everybody's not doing, but they have one hundred excuses about why they can't do something...and that's why you can have a couple of white people come into a community and they can change the whole agenda...because their ice is colder.

A young African American professional juxtaposes the class and political interests of middle class brownstoners versus those who live in public housing:

> The needs of home owners are completely different from the needs of renters or someone who needs social benefits. And those things clash when you have them living in the same neighborhood,...you have a clashing of politics... I think there are deep class

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> divisions...If you look at Fort Greene and Bed Stuy you have half million dollar homes and the people who live in the projects.
>
> If somebody invests in the community...they want to get the best out of the community which is usually not congruent with the people who live in social housing and so there is always going to be some kind of conflict...or that conflict will be eliminated because the home owners will leave.
>
> It would be very easy to split the Black vote along class lines...You might see more registered Dems vote Republican...If two candidates are running against each other, one trying to represent social issues and the other trying to represent home owner issues, that could separate the vote. And if one happens to be white and the other happens to be Black...home owners will vote their own interests.

A West Indian political leader offered these observations about the tactics and dynamics of class appeals in local political campaigns:

> In some regard yes, in some places people in public housing can be a political factor...But some districts don't have public housing...Yeah there are class divisions...If you look at Tish James' race against James Davis (City Council, Fort Greene), he was able to get those people in the projects behind him because he was loud and he was rash and that's just my personal perception...He was able to raise the fist and create a lot of emotion and excitement and I think that works well in areas where people are angry about a lot of situations. And that you would find with a lot more of those people in the projects.
>
> Tish James was able to garner more of the middle class and that would be white and Black votes than (James) Davis. But he had more of the lower income people in greater numbers because there's a lot of projects [20] in that district and so that's how he got over.

An African American interviewee discusses class divisions, public housing and political mobilization: [21]

> (Author: "Are there class divisions in Black Brooklyn?") "Yes. If you live in New York City public housing, there are two divisions. One being that if you're on public assistance you have a section 8 voucher which is something that helps maintain your rent. And then there are those that are working and live in New York City public housing that

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[20] Author: Fort Greene and Farragut Houses, and Wyckoff Gardens; a number of NYC Housing Authority developments, with a combined several thousand units.

[21] There was also a minority opinion among the interviewees that extraordinary economic and labor market pressures affecting the Black community have compressed and minimized their class divisions. This hearkens back to the pre-Integration era in Black American society where the small Black middle class had few housing options and lived side by side with the working class and the poor.

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pay the max that they can possibly pay based on their income. So there's a class division there in terms of lower income on public assistance versus lower to middle income.

(Author: "Is there any way that these class divisions play out in terms of the politics in Black Brooklyn?") "I guess politicians speak to different issues. In Brownsville they would speak to different issues than in Bedford Stuyvesant. In Bedford Stuyvesant there are homeowners. Even the rental properties are more than the apartments that you would pay in New York City housing. So therefore the income level is higher so therefore the educational level is higher, therefore the issues are a little different than you would play out if you had a discussion at a Town Hall meeting in Brownsville. So it would be a different message that would be put out.

(Author: "There are a lot of public housing developments in Brownsville. Are they politically active, are they a force in the local politics?") Oh yes...in public housing, they vote. Why? Because they have New York City housing issues, they have quality of life issues just like anybody else, they have unemployment issues, so they're very involved in the process.

(Author: " How are they mobilized? Who mobilizes them?") The tenant association, elected officials, senior centers, they all go to senior centers if they're in some of the older buildings. The local political clubs ...organize and maintain a certain working relationship with the tenants. Do you get 100 percent of the vote 100 percent of the time? No. But you get a large majority.

Creating and Politicizing the Home Ownership Class

Possibly deepening class divisions along the lines of housing tenure, a young African American politico noted that City affordable housing initiatives are creating a new class of thousands of new home owners in Black Brooklyn: [22]

(Author: "You mention thousands of new units...Folks that are moving in to this housing are coming from where?") Well, the initial enclave of people came from within the community. Let's just say they moved out of New York City housing and they now own their own housing. That is the first push to move you from a renter to an owner...Many of them came right out of Brownsville Houses into their own homes. So the majority of the people have moved from Brooklyn to Brooklyn, from Brownsville to Brownsville. So that is the first move.

We also have many people from Bedford Stuyvesant move over into Brownsville ...from Bed Stuy renters to Brownsville homeowners ...based on the fact that the houses were structured well and they were affordable and the big question when you look at it is, if you had to put up rent versus a mortgage payment which one would you want? And that

[22] "Nehemiah Houses," sponsored by Rev. Johnny Youngblood and the East Brooklyn Congregations; and "Saratoga Square," a City sponsored development, are just two of these projects.

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> was all we had to say to convince people to buy into the homes, so it was an easy sell... They built a new public school and that attracts new families as well.

An African American leader describes how new home owners become politicized:

> On the local level we've done massive voter registration based on the fact that we have such a large influx of new homes within our community. We have now mobilized teams together to organize all of the new home owners that have moved into the community. Whether they moved from one area to the next or from other communities into our communities. Just on a regular basis my position is organizing people.
>
> We have an advisory board meeting every month...Every month we go to the local Democratic Club Meeting. There are lots of entities around here and we encourage people to form block associations, tenant associations. We work with local organizations like NHS (Neighborhood Housing Services) that come in and do home improvement seminars. We work with thousands and thousands of people and institutions that we have put in place or they have come to join us, help us maintain our "utopia" that we have here.

Home Owners and the Entrepreneurial Class

Interviewees had a wide range of responses in terms of the political clout of local home owners and business owners. Much depends on how well each group is organized; the extent to which local elected officials are responsive to them; and the extent to which these constituencies are numerically, economically and politically significant. The mix of home ownership, private rental and public housing and the number of commercial strips vary significantly from neighborhood to neighborhood throughout Black Brooklyn. Also, West Indian neighborhoods have proportionally more home owners than African American neighborhoods, therefore homeowner issues will be more salient in their communities. One African American politician commented:

> Homeowners and business people are a force in the politics of Black Brooklyn. There are certain things they want to see as a homeowner, for example. If you're a homeowner you want the schools in you're area to be up to par, you want to send your children to good schools. You want your neighborhood to be safe, quality of life issues, you want the police to have a relationship with your community, with your block, with your elected officials. The business owners want to have a safe environment as well, so they want safe streets and crime prevention, garbage pick-ups, they want to see lighting, they want to see paved roads, they want to see an area conducive to people to come to shop.

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> There's a connection between the elected officials and the power that we hold and the homeowners and the business owners and the quality of life issues that they want addressed. And when we work together it happens.

Homeowner interviewees expressed that the home owning class may be a political explosion waiting to happen. Many home owners feel that their middle class interests are being neglected by their political leadership who spend too much time addressing the needs of the poor. One politically active Caribbean home owner noted:

> I think that the perception of home owners is that the poor people and the people on welfare have greater sway in the politics of Black Brooklyn than the home owners. They feel that the politicians are more responsive to the demands of people on welfare, but they're not responsive to homeowners. I think the current financial crisis in the city underscores the fact that taxes were raised on property and certain services were not cut back that home owners felt should have been cut...Folks are really angry at the politicians... They are not responsive to our needs.

> There are a great deal of class divisions between middle income versus low income...in my neighborhood here, there is this abandoned Section 8 property... There's an awful lot of talk about what to do about this Section 8 [23] if these people come back. Home owners just don't want to see that happen.

> Now a lot of that is going to change you know, because we're getting younger people and we're getting white people moving in...They're going to take a much more active role as the new generation of homeowners...They're going to be much more politically active...This will cause the politicians to act more on their agenda, be more responsive. They're going to have to be. These people are not going to sit there and waste half a million dollars plus homes and not have services and not have their demands met.

Gentrification: Creating Class Pressures

The suburban lifestyle with its long commutes, high property and school taxes, and deteriorating quality of life, is becoming less attractive. Coupled with Manhattan's sky high real estate prices, the Central Brooklyn housing market with a substantial supply of newly renovated buildings, new construction and a large stock of relatively affordable 1 – 4 family homes has become a very attractive market, spurring the forces of

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[23] Section 8 is a City government subsidized housing program, mainly for people on public assistance.

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gentrification. [24] A number of respondents commented on gentrification's negative impacts on Black Brooklyn, with rising rents and increasing building conversions which are forcing out long time renters, and pricing young Black prospective home buyers out of the market. However, A West Indian home owner and community leader comments on their perception of some positive benefits of gentrification:

> One of the things that I know folks are fearful of is the gentrification happening. I don't see gentrification as necessarily bad if it's managed properly because gentrification is going to make us begin to recognize the need for certain types of basic services. You've got young people who are buying in here black or white, - *flying* into Central Brooklyn!
>
> They're going to want to be able to go to the movie theater around the corner and they're going to want be able to get a sandwich or something in a café. They're going to want to go to the nearest Laundromat or the dry cleaners. It will improve the life in the community. Rather than our elected officials saying that 'we don't want the community to become too gentrified,' meaning 'we don't want a lot of whites coming in.' I think they should be working to manage it properly rather than just being opposed to it.

Exodus: An Out Migration

While some folks are "flying into Central Brooklyn," other folks are flying out. Many aging, southern rooted Black Brooklyn civic and political leaders are returning to the South for retirement. And many upwardly mobile young Blacks are disillusioned with the quality of life and leadership in Black Brooklyn and are ready to move on to greener pastures. In fact many never return to Central Brooklyn once they go away to college. A young African American professional notes:

> I was talking to someone who wants to buy a home ...but when he walks down the street he sees some kid throwing a bottle...Why would you want to invest in a home in our community where it's going to be destroyed by people who have a complete lack of respect?
>
> I think they're out there (the next generation of leaders), they may be transplants, they may not be born and bred in Brooklyn but have moved into Black Brooklyn... But at the same time you have a lot of Brooklynites...who are waiting to leave. There's Black Brooklyn right in Atlanta...or they just want to move to suburbia.

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[24] Prices are rising dramatically in Central Brooklyn. A Bed Stuy brownstone that sold for $ 2-300,000 ten years ago would sell for $5-600,000 today.

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Unions, Political Clout and Upward Mobility [25]

The demographic data suggests that many African Americans work in government and belong to District Council 37 AFSCME and other public employee unions. Many Caribbeans work in the health and home care industries unionized by the SEIU (Service Employees International Union) Local 1199 and Local 144. Most African American and Caribbean interviewees feel that unions are a political force in Black Brooklyn. One African American leader notes:

> I would say there are a lot of Black union members in Black Brooklyn, certainly some folks are moving out to...Long Island...Historically for the Black community, city employment has been a way to move up into the middle class...you get a job with the city, you join a union and you're going to get certain benefits...Unions provide information on various benefits and discuss issues that are important to their members in local communities...A big issue for a lot of people in Central Brooklyn is...affordable housing...union members want to purchase a house, a condo or a coop so that they can become home owners...Police community relations also comes up as an issue.

A Caribbean union official noted the impact of unions on local politics:

> Yes, unions are a force in the politics of Black Brooklyn but in a very different way than the churches because it's less visible. Unions make endorsements and send out mailings to their members saying "this is the person we endorse, please make sure you go out and vote. We call into those households and say "make sure you vote," and then get our members to go out there on the streets and on Election Day you see the DC 37 green, you see the 1199 purple, you see the 32B 32J purple (SEIU building service workers). You see everybody out there carrying the literature and doing the work.

An African American politician talked about how union members are an integral part of local neighborhoods, and how unions have a political impact in the community at election time:

> A lot of people within the community are members of, they have jobs within those unions. They work in hospitals, they work in corrections, they work in the UFT, they're teachers, they work in school safety...They live in Central Brooklyn, they buy homes in Central Brooklyn, they shop in Central Brooklyn.

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[25] Unionized workers are not a class monolith: there are class divisions based on income and occupational category. Day care workers, paraprofessionals and home attendants have lower salaries and modest benefits. Civil service workers with seniority, and white collar and uniformed services have moderate to middle incomes and good benefits packages.

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> The Central Labor Council just came by our club this morning just giving us a heads up on some of the issues that concern them, budget issues, contract negotiations coming up....We want to know when there are talks of layoffs within labor that affects our community because some of the people that work in the kitchens, in the schools live in our area.
>
> Some of the people that teach and paraprofessionals live in our area. Some of the people that work in the hospitals as laborers are from Central Brooklyn. So they're a very major force. Also, to be endorsed by the Central Labor Council, and these locals and the unions is a help in terms of elections because they send the work force out to assist you and they support you if your issues pertain to the same interests that they have which is about working people.

The Post Civil Rights Generation

The general definition of the "post civil rights generation" is anyone born after 1960. This group is not simply chronologically distant but is qualitatively different from the older generations. This age cohort has no personal experience with the civil rights movement because they did not become young adults until the 1970s or 1980s. Therefore they are largely self-educated about the civil rights movement. Their break with the civil rights past is historical, psychological, political, educational and technological, and presents one of the key challenges from within, for Black leadership in Black Brooklyn and beyond.

A young West Indian professional speaks to the mindset, issues and characteristics of the post civil rights generation:

> We're part of an organization that brings together different elements of the community to look at serious issues affecting our lives...Looking at how the far right organized, we didn't have anything analogous to that. We're good at protesting, we're good at the ra, ra, but have very little planning. Aside from the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies and the Dubois Bunche Center there are very few places that are community-based and talking about the issues in a way that the average person can relate to.
>
> And more importantly, we were people...who were not relating to the civil rights rhetoric and their whole take on a lot of different issues. So we were coming at policies and issues differently. Perhaps part of it was generational. We just have very different perspectives and to try and fall in line with those viewpoints wasn't particularly helpful.

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> I think that...people of the post-civil rights generation grew up in an integrated society or we grew up at least with the idea that segregation was not part of your everyday affair, whereas people ...who were much older who grew up in segregation, everything that they do and say is very much colored by that perspective. And secondly I think there's a technological aspect to this.

A young African American professional articulates the "post civil rights" perspective, including their views on race:

> Even though my parents were from the south and experienced racism they did not talk about it at home...nor did our grandparents...we were comfortably middle class...no bad memories of dogs... And when you start talking to people in their twenties or thirties today, it's clearly not part of their reality. A lot of them either work with people from other ethnicities or races, they live near them in some cases, they've gone to school with them. And whether you like them or don't like them you realize that they're a part of your world and you need to figure out how to deal with them. And more importantly, everything that somebody says that's negative may not be about race. It may be that they don't like you as a person, whereas that's not even a conversation a lot of times that you get to with the older crowd, immediately it's always about race and it's a disconnect there.

A young African American professional talks about the generation gap, and a digital divide not based on race or ethnicity, but based on age:

> I think similarly, in terms of looking at policies there's a bit of a disconnect too because I think a lot of what the civil rights community still pushes for, what was great thirty or forty years ago, doesn't work in the 21st century. And they're very wedded to those ideas and ideologies and they're not ready to move on. I think only recently maybe in the last year or two do I feel like they're at least hearing something that people have been saying for probably 10 years, that they're beginning to think through some things slightly differently.
>
> And in terms of technology, you have people who are in their fifties or sixties who are not even savvy, can't use e-mail, don't know some of the websites...stuff that is so useful if you're talking about organizing or disseminating information...You're talking about two different levels of engagement that people are having because a lot of young people are not going to go out and they're not used to the old get out the vote things where you go and stuff envelopes and knock on people's doors...At this point they're more used to electronic media and the quickness and instant gratification and there's no real sense of how to bridge their familiarity with a more traditional strategy. A lot of stuff is getting lost in between the cracks.

A New Generation of Leadership

This field research identifies the younger generation as a new political leadership cohort. According to the interviewees, this younger cohort feels stymied, still birthed and

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politically locked out of the current political establishment of Black Brooklyn by the aging political incumbents whom the young group argues is failing to cultivate young people as the next generation of political leaders. Sons and daughters of incumbent politicians seem to have the inside track on the pathway to political succession and there is a diversity of opinion as to the efficacy of this trend. Some Black elites stated that hereditary succession is permissible as long as the progeny of incumbents are qualified, noting that hereditary political succession has been practiced in the white community for generations. Other Black elites said that the political leadership succession process should be more open and democratic. There has been and continues to be political and generational warfare in Black Brooklyn around this question, with the post civil rights younger generation challenging the older Black political establishment.[26]

Brooklyn's Black political elites see the next generation of leadership coming from several possible sources. One controversial source is hereditary leadership, which is passed down from incumbent political parents to their children. Some elites see this as anti-democratic and narrowing the field of opportunity for future generations. But a number of Black elites note a surprisingly good crop of young leaders emerging from their parents, as many white political dynasties have done. There is also concern expressed by all age groups of interviewees that the young, educated class is disconnected from politics and is not being groomed for political leadership. A young African American female professional comments:

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[26] Prime examples include the Barry Ford versus Congressman Towns 2000 and 2002 elections; the Hakim Jeffries versus Assemblyman Roger Green 2000 and 2002 elections; and the 2004 Congressman Major Owens versus Councilmembers Yvette Clarke and Tracy Boyland primary elections. Incumbents won re-election in all cases, but with insurgents polling a significant 40-50% of the vote.

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> (Author: "Where is the next generation of leadership coming from?") "I think the next generation will probably come from fathers and sons...Una Clarke to Yvette Clarke...whoever can create those legacies...But I really don't see who's motivated to run for an elective position within my peer group...their interests lie somewhere else...maybe after there's some success in their career...sort of a second career move...after they've had a career as a lawyer, had their hand in the community, on various boards.....but it's not going to be a pure politician...it's going to be someone who has political liaisons but goes from being a vice president of a corporation, or partner in a law firm, or comes from the professional class..."
>
> (Author: "Any other places from which leadership might emerge?") "Teachers, professors, maybe not professors, educators...the hip hop community can generate a certain level of popularity so if you have civic minded artists, it's probably possible...it would be nice to see the hip hop community or the popular culture become more politically astute...there are a couple of people like Russell Simmons who's highly involved in politics, but I can't say that a number of his peers are..."

The aging Black political establishment is perceived by the younger cohort as being caught in a time warp with no exit strategies, or "lily pads" to move on to, other than political office or semi-retired patronage jobs. This reflects a weak institutional infrastructure in the community, which cannot absorb and support political retirees, unlike white communities with their corporate and voluntary sectors. The old retirement route to a judgeship, only works for a few loyal attorneys. It also reflects a lack of career planning, credentials, political chips or risk taking by older Black incumbents. A major reason for long term incumbencies is personal economics. Legislators' salaries are at least $90,000 plus generous benefits and pensions, and older Black incumbents are holding on to these sinecures for as long as they can.[27] In their interviews, most African American and West Indian politicians young or old, expressed no sense of urgency about political succession. A few incumbents, but *most* middle aged and older community

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[27] Owens, Towns, Vann, Norman, Green and Montgomery all have over 20 years of legislative service. Congressmen Towns and Owens each have 22 years of service in Congress, 1983 to present. Owens served 6 years in the State Senate before that. He has announced his retirement in 2006; and is supporting his son Chris Owens to succeed him in a field which includes: State Sen. Carl Andrews (AA), City Councimbr. Yvette Clarke (WI), and Assemblyman Nick Perry (WI). This race sets up another Black ethnic battle...

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elites empathized with the younger generation's concerns about an imminent crisis in political succession in Black Brooklyn.

Young West Indian and African American interviewees believe that the recent corruption scandals are an integral part of the Black political establishment, and they would like to eliminate the aging, corrupt, insular political rule in Black Brooklyn. With regards to inter-generational conflict and the need for political reform, a young West Indian political operative comments:

> The Kings County organization is a strong force, but they are also corrupt. One of the most important issues in Brooklyn is the judicial corruption scandal and the need to open up the system in Brooklyn...You have this old Black political leadership...They have a mentality that "they" are trying to take my job. There's no system of mentorship. They should embrace the youth. Brooklyn is a morass as far as political involvement...There's a culture clash between the young and old.
>
> Young professionals such as (Barry) Ford and (Hakim) Jeffries were labeled as "inauthentic," the same way Corey Booker was labeled by Sharpe James in Newark...The party scandals can lead to change...our two Congressmen are getting old, the backlog in office is an obstacle to progress. Age, the law and prison can shake things up...I wish local politics would do more to facilitate social change...We may be younger but some of us are just as flawed, though we're good people.

Term Limits, Insurgents and New Political Leadership

Term limits and campaign finance have played a major role in determining political leadership. A young, astute Caribbean female political operative comments on the significance of these major political reforms in birthing a new political class in Black Brooklyn and beyond:

> I think term limits has turned politics upside down, term limits and campaign finance reform. Which is why I'm against the whole non-partisan election thing...We could look at James Davis, he's an example....Davis ran against the party...and I don't think he had any labor support. Most of the unions supported his opponent, Tish James and he still managed to win. Because of term limits Mary Pinkett had to leave and because of the campaign finance law, Davis was able to raise money...and win. James Davis, Hiram Montserrat, Helen Foster, Allen Jennings, they all did that. ..That four to one match is powerful! ...We haven't yet seen a full generation of politicians coming through term limits and campaign finance.

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In 2003 there was a major political debate in New York City around whether to institute non-partisan elections and how they might affect the minority electorate or create a new political class. create a new political class. This ballot measure was defeated in the November 2003 general election. A West Indian political operative comments:

> The Mayor is saying we need non-partisan elections because we need to get rid of the party bosses...But we already did that with these two other reforms (campaign finance and term limits)...If it's really about empowering the voter let's do same day registration, let's do instant runoff.
>
> Same day registration is needed because particularly in communities of color like Central Brooklyn folks are going to work, they're sending their kids to school, they're trying to deal with affordable housing so it's not on their radar that they have to go and register to vote. But the day of the election as with any population, we don't start tuning in until it gets closer...By the time it gets close enough and we're tuning in, it's too late to register and vote.
>
> One problem with non-partisan elections that is huge is that it depresses voter turnout in communities of color...People don't have the labels, and folks aren't going to do the research to see where people stand on the issues. But certainly if a person has a label of Democrat or Republican then voters have a general sense...It's like the cliff notes to a book. You're not going to sit there and read the whole book.

Bridging the Generations: Relationships and Trust

A veteran West Indian politico critiques the younger generation's disconnect from community and from leadership:

> (Author: "Another race, Congressman Towns and Barry Ford, '98 and 2000... why did those primaries turn out the way that they did?") What happened in that race? I think Barry Ford young insurgent, Ed Towns old line in office for a very long time, a long term incumbent, with all the resources of Congress, all the relationships built over a long period of time, all the people who know how to work the streets in his clubs, organizations he funded.
>
> He's been in Brooklyn politics since he was a Deputy Borough President and before that. Years and years of being in the same community. Barry Ford, 'new jack,' different type, a little bit elitist in a district where you have so many solidly black people, Barry Ford, Yale graduate all of that. Not really able to relate that well. Doesn't have all the relationships of long standing. So sometimes I think it's a little disappointing to see that the young people aren't getting anywhere. Even the guy that ran against Roger Green (Author: Hakim Jeffries).

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> (Author: "Young people, why aren't young people getting anywhere in the politics of Black Brooklyn?") It's sad in some ways because for their own part they're not willing to join with any incumbents. I think that's a mistake on their part...I think they don't want to spend the time with the incumbents and you haven't seen any of these guys and any of the incumbents ever working together...They don't trust the incumbents. They don't feel like their could be any commitments that could be made to them or that there's going to be anything for them. So they just feel that they have to come in and grab it for themselves. And then they criticize good solid work that has been done and I don't think the voters like it.

" R.E.S.P.E.C.T.... "

To borrow a song title from Aretha Franklin, the "Queen of Soul's" repertoire, an older interviewee discusses the importance of "political respect" to older voters, who comprise a disproportionate share of Black voter turnout:

> (Author: "So they're over stating their case in terms of the need for change?") They're disrespectful. That's how I think the voters see it as disrespectful...I remember one of Roger Green's opponent's workers standing outside the post office on Fulton Street, I saw somebody giving out palm cards and this one lady, she seem to crystalize the whole thing. She said "Well you're young and you just don't understand. Roger Green is my man." And that's just what she told them, "you don't understand" and that is the feeling of the voters. That you're not respecting what's been built here. Where are you coming from, running against Roger Green? He's not old.
>
> The voters, the people who are voting are not the youngest people. They don't think of Roger Green as a senior. They still think of him as a young man. Now when Roger wanted to run he was young, very young, twenty years ago, same age as these people right? He had some incumbent politicians openly endorsing him, Clarence too.
>
> Now these guys don't want to do any of that, they don't want to work with anything that already exists. They want to come in and because they're educated and because they've worked in these white firms, they think that they know what's best for everybody and people are not standing for it.

Older interviewees articulated that if younger persons work hard and relate to the community, respect their elders and incumbent leadership, and are well educated and prepared, then their elders are prepared to give young people their political blessings.

Class Divisions within the Younger Generation

A West Indian professional comments on the socioeconomic divisions *within* the young, Black upwardly mobile ("buppie") class:

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(Author: It sounds like that's a class thing...a generational gap?) Class and generation, yes I believe so, class and generation...(Author: So what is your niece's generation's take on this thing that you describe...and where is it going?") Now you see, my niece and her friends they loved working for Kevin Parker. (Author: "Why?) They seem to be able to relate to him better. (Author: Because he's young like they are?) Yeah...He's their peer. (Author: But so would be Hakeem and Barry Ford...) Again it's a class thing, a perceived class thing.

They didn't go to Yale or Harvard or any of those places, my daughter and her friends went to CUNY or Howard...It's not those white gloves, high type of things. You don't own a brownstone in the white people's area, like Barry and Hakeem do.

(Author: So the class that wants to lead the community, the next generation is not reflective of the class in the community that they want to lead...?) Some of them. Barry Ford connects with the part of the district that's white and well educated Blacks. The same with Hakeem. And so they are disconnected from Black people, the ones who are working class, less educated.

(Author: Some people have said that the aspiration of the working class is that they want to know that their children have succeeded. So they don't necessarily frown upon young people who are college educated.) They want to know that their children succeeded but they don't want them to be looking down their noses at the community.

Paying Dues

A West Indian leader comments on the younger generation's failure to 'pay their political dues:'

(Author: So there's no traction to the young people's criticism that these incumbents have not delivered enough for their communities?) Oh that's bullshit! I feel like they are disrespecting all that work that has gone on before. Come on! These are people who made it possible for you to go to those colleges. They worked on these issues and so forth. And now you want to say these people haven't delivered? Okay, yeah there's lots of work to do, but to say that these people haven't delivered I think is abominable! I think a lot of it shows their lack of knowledge of the process...If you look at the record you couldn't say these people haven't contributed to anything.

They come back, and don't even join the community board, precinct council or nothing...As far as I know, let's take Hakeem Jeffries. When the first campaign went down and he didn't win, Roger Green said come on join up with me, we could get you started in a district leader position. "No." Hakeem just said 'No, not going to do it.' So you don't want to pay the price, you don't want to pay the dues, do the organizing, the street work. For anybody, that's how you get there most of the time... They don't want to do the work.

(Author: "Now that can be generational too.") "Yeah, so? But you're not getting over with that." (Author: "Fastfood, microwave, MTV generation they want this stuff over night?") Yeah, well. Maybe when internet voting becomes the wave, then they can

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> win... (Author:But until everybody gets hooked up on AOL they better just get back out on the street and do some work ?) Exactly!

Black Preachers' Power - Politicians' Pain

A broad cross section of interviewees, African Americans and West Indians, men and women, young and old, politicians and preachers, -- all agreed that the Black church was a powerful force in the politics of Black Brooklyn, though some believed that its influence has been waning. A veteran African American elected official offers insights into the strained power relations between the two most important players in Black Brooklyn's leadership, politicians and preachers:

> The Black Church...is extremely important because it's the largest institution that is independent of government...It has the roots in the community and the capacity to reach large numbers of people but also to function as a social institution...
>
> The danger that always presents itself is that the church is also a political organization. There is a tendency for outside political forces...to approach very directly the church leadership and to thereby undercut the political influence of the elected officials...They go directly to the church, they do not go through us...It weakens our ability to really leverage the influence that we have on them as political entities...
>
> So then if you can put a program there and buy that church constituency then you don't have to deal with Black politicians or an agenda...By the same token if we don't have strong political organizations, which is very difficult to maintain, then we don't have the answer and the leverage to stop it...All this economic development that has gone on,...the Black community has been largely ignored. If we don't have the leverage to address it politically then it's very difficult to deliver on a larger scale for the people that you represent.

A "Sharpton" Factor: Race, Class or What ?

On the question of Rev. Al Sharpton as a potential political proxy or barometer on the question of socio-economic class, a significant number of interviewees believe that Rev. Al Sharpton appeals more to the poor and working class. They also believe that he is broadening beyond his African American base to attract members of the Caribbean community. A minority feels that Sharpton appeals across class lines, with a "sleeper" Black middle class vote and overlapping younger generation vote, because these groups

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like his outspoken challenges to the political establishment and power elites. A minority also believes that he has roughly equal political attraction in both the African American and Caribbean communities. In other words, Sharpton may have cross class appeal and cross ethnic appeal within the Black community. Some interviewees suggested that his brand of protest politics resonated with some middle class and younger generation voters, suggesting fertile ground for this type of activist political expression and leadership in the future. Several respondents commented on a possible Sharpton factor:

> Sharpton gets more African American votes and less Caribbean votes. He gets much club support and plays an interesting game with incumbents.
>
> Sharpton is for the grassroots...He stands up and speaks out when others turn their heads. He's for the oppressed.
>
> There is a "Sharpton Factor" in politics and it affects all communities not just African Americans and West Indians.
>
> Sharpton appeals more to low income voters. There is a Sharpton factor and he appeals across class lines more than white people think.
>
> Sharpton got over 130,000 votes in one of his races and he has cross class appeal."
>
> There is definitely a Sharpton factor and he's a big factor in public housing developments. Black elected officials are missing out on a big opportunity by not linking up with Sharpton around voter registration efforts.
>
> Sharpton has a 20 percent vote ceiling in any race. Because of his stringency and advocacy the majority is turned off.

Conclusions: The Politics of Class

On the question of class, the majority of respondents see definite class divisions between the poor people who live in "the projects" and get welfare on the one hand, and middle class home owners on the other. Home ownership is growing in Black Brooklyn, particularly in West Indian neighborhoods, and this may be laying the seeds for a more overt politics of class, or class warfare in the near future. These divisions in economic interest translate into different political interests and orientations. For example, low income persons with no educational options are more concerned about the public schools,

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and unemployment, while home owners are more concerned about crime, police enforcement, neighborhood services, and quality of life issues.

There are major class divisions by gender: in general, women in Black Brooklyn, equal or exceed their male counterparts in education and income: more women than men have college degrees, and more women than men are in middle and upper income brackets. Class is bi-modal in Black Brooklyn. A growing middle class, more West Indian but also African American, and in both cases heavily female. And there is also high poverty and unemployment, heavily based in African American neighborhoods, with female headed households in public housing.

There is also an important dynamic involving the post civil rights generation versus the baby boomers and older. The former group is a younger, insurgent prone, disgusted and disconnected cohort. They are challenging the older, incumbent political establishment who built their political bases on machine politics, the civil rights movement, community struggles and anti-poverty programs. These two generations are separated by education, occupation and income, as well as age and political orientation. The younger cohort is in their 20s through early 40s; most are college graduates with professional educations. Some have prep school backgrounds, ivy league degrees, and work in corporate America, in law and finance.

From the younger group is emerging a political insurgency which is on the verge of birthing new political leadership for Black Brooklyn. It will be a more educated, business and professional class, but less community-grounded and people-connected than the current generation, many of whom have 20-30 years in office, and will be exiting the political stage in the near future.

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Homeowners, public housing residents, gentrifiers and small business entrepreneurs are warily occupying the same urban space, but with competing demands upon the political process, the private sector and public services in an era of government scarcity. Whoever enters the political stage and can manage this complex politics of class (along with ethnicity and gender) will become the reigning queen or king of the politics of Black Brooklyn.

Part III: The Politics of Gender

Six themes emerged from respondents' conversations about the "politics of gender: 1) Black women vote first for the best candidate, then based on race, ethnicity or national identity; 2) women sometimes vote based on gender or women's issues; 3) Black women's concerns over personal and power relations with Black men profoundly influence their political behavior and bridle their assertiveness; 4) there is a generation gap among Black women over the question of women's empowerment; 5) most Black male interviewees have a 'blind spot' when it comes to gender inequality and women's empowerment; and 6) in politics, many Black women interviewees view themselves as "second class citizens."

Like other groups, Black women want power and political representation. And they will not expend their political capital on the symbolic support of Black women whom they do not perceive as winners, and as powerful and articulate political players.

For a host of historical, social and psychological reasons, Black Brooklyn's politics of gender seems to transcend ethnicity. Interviewees cite deep dimensions to

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Black male and female relations, embedded in the racism and the African slavery and post-slavery experience in the Americas, which play a powerful role in shaping Black Brooklyn's politics of gender.

According to interviewees, Black women have a generational and class divide on the question of their political empowerment. The older Black female generation is more accepting of, and socialized to, Black male hegemony particularly in the church and political arenas, while younger Black females vigorously reject the notion of Black male hegemony.

This upwardly mobile young Black female generation often has more education, income, and occupational status than their male peers as well as older Black women. They are experiencing a recurring pattern of patriarchal and male chauvinistic behavior being perpetrated on them by their young male counterparts. Young Black women are angry, upset, and disappointed at having to cope with this same curse that was visited upon their mothers' and grandmothers' generations, and they are not optimistic about the prospects for change.

Black male interviewees' sensitivity to gender relations, irrespective of ethnicity seems to fall into two categories: most Black men are ignorant of the complexity and challenges of Black women's political empowerment, but a few are sensitive and supportive and see men as facilitating solutions to the problem. Black men and women are both prisoners of this dilemma because, to quote Frederick Douglass, "power concedes nothing without a demand, it never has and it never will." Thus many Black men are not inclined to give up political power to Black women; and most Black women are reluctant to do battle with their Black men in order to acquire power commensurate

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with their superior numbers in the community. Black women are reluctant to engage this volatile issue for fear that they might be ostracized and marginalized; and because this issue might further polarize and damage the current fragile state of Black male and female relations (Franklin, 2000).

Black men and women interviewees do not suggest that there are significant gender differences in voting patterns. However, some Black women indicated that they are more likely to vote for candidates who address 'women's issues' such as education, child care and health care. (The quantitative analysis of voting data in the next chapter will determine the extent of gender based voting in Black Brooklyn under varying conditions.)

Much of the potential female leadership class of Black Brooklyn is preoccupied with establishing their young careers, meeting financial obligations, and developing male-female relationships. A young African American female professional states:

> I have friends who are not even trying to get involved in politics, not even on a voluntary basis. They just want to do other things, pursue their careers...Nobody's having a conversation about how we build our community and make our neighborhoods better, like how do we take over the community? Everybody's worried about paying their student loans, a decent place to live. They would like to buy a house but everybody's being priced out of the market...

> I know a lot of single women who would like to be home owners, advance their careers, have a family. But it's a touch and go situation...Your bread and butter is your job. So women are putting a lot of time into career and personal development, then they are trying to look for a husband. And even though we're in the big city, opportunities are kind of scarce...

> There are more women than men. We outnumber the other sex. Education wise, we pursue a certain level of education more so than the men. In my college we outnumbered Black males four to one. So it's hard to find your peer education wise. And in the workplace you'll find that there are more Black women than men...If we're talking about entry level, I think a Black woman could get a job faster and keep it longer than a Black male. But as far as moving up the corporate ladder, I think there are probably more opportunities for black males than women.

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Gender can be a major factor in political engagement. Men and women have very different psychological dispositions towards politics, and women role models matter. States a politically active Caribbean female:

> Actually, I think women tend to be more of a force when there's a woman in the race. Women are a force because there are a lot more women voters. Now whether they're a lot more informed women voters, I don't know...When Hilary ran it definitely piqued a lot of interest.
>
> Jeannette Gadsen did bring out a lot of women votes but unfortunately Caribbeans voted more. And I think Marty Markowitz had the Caribbean vote and the female Caribbean vote. Jeannette Gadsen did not appeal to the Caribbean community... I don't think she specifically targeted women...And, did she even have the personality of a politician that could win that kind of election?
>
> As far as a "woman's vote," I think there is an unspoken camaraderie between us and if you are a confident, successful woman who is doing your job without scandal or problems, I think that women will say "she deserves it." ...Women have trouble being egomaniacs because to promote yourself you have to buy into your own hype...and a lot of women are more into serving others than serving themselves. Whereas men don't have a problem being the star.

A young Caribbean professional woman talks about the important symbolism of Black female role models, political message and campaign finance:

> I was the only person of Caribbean descent on my job and I got involved in several campaigns, Borough President, judicial races, council races...A huge portion of my time was devoted to the Gadsen race and I'm very disappointed that she lost...There was great symbolism in that historic moment...She could have been the first Black woman elected to borough office in Brooklyn. That just meant so much to me...
>
> The previous Borough President Howard Golden was a figure so tied to that office so...stepping out of his shadow proved to be difficult and maybe she should have started doing that a lot earlier...(and) strategically plan out the fundraising. Unfortunately campaigns are becoming more expensive...Of the three candidates she had the least money...and money gets your message out. Gender and race still enter into it and it's still very difficult for women to be elected to office...

An African American female leader offers additional insights on the Gadsen race, focusing on important personal characteristics of a political candidate:

> I think that Jeannette Gadsen's gender did play a role in her 2001 race to become Borough President...First of all she was not in a position that she could do a lot of things for people. Historically she had been involved in the community...District Manager...Community District 16, and she had been on the school board. But her

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appearance was not one that everybody could relate to as a leader in the Borough ('60s style afro, heavy set, etc).

Most of the time when she went out Jeannette started out by saying "I represent the Borough President" and many people wondered when was she going to represent herself ? As you know in a political campaign you have to go on a diet, you have to appear fit, you have to get an image consultant to help you with your appearance and I don't think she ever came to realize that. So a lot of women who vote could not relate to her...

And then of course it had a lot to do with her style. It was sort of a forceful, preaching style and I think that you had to consult with a public speaking expert on how do you deliver...I know when I first achieved an important position, I went to a consultant to learn how to handle the media. You have to prepare yourself, you learn how to dress, you learn how to go on a diet and you have to have a certain image if you're running for public office. It's all part of getting elected.

A Caribbean woman leader notes the power of woman role models:

I think the conditions already exist for women to be more empowered politically. You have the District Leaders coming in, you have women who are involved in their clubs, you have more women being elected to office and I think that's the most powerful variable in this whole thing because you have other young girls looking and saying well if she can do it I can do it. I mean like a Sylvia Hines Raddix is powerful and Sylvia's of Caribbean descent (elected a civil court judge in 2003)...

She's a woman role model and she's showing folks like you know, "Here I come from another country, I've come here and this is my adopted country, I went to Law School and look at I was able to accomplish and that's very, very powerful. So I think as you're seeing more of that stuff happening I think it's going to impact. And again the transfer from Una to Yvette I think that's very, very helpful.

And granted Jeanette's race may not have been successful but it was an important race. Just like Shirley Chisholm's going for President may not have been successful but it motivated so many woman regardless of nationality. It motivated so many women to run. You know Geraldine Ferraro being a VP candidate, motivated so many woman and that's just a very powerful thing...

A younger Caribbean woman notes that sexism is still a powerful force challenging women's empowerment, but women are rising to meet the challenge:

Women are increasingly a force in the politics of Black Brooklyn because we vote. If nothing else they need our votes, so they got to talk to us... We're registered at a higher rate than the men are and then we're more likely to come out than the men are. And then when you go into the churches we pretty much dominate the churches too.

(Author: "So why aren't woman dominating politics?") "- Sexism, come on now work with me!...I look at things from like gender, race and class, -- I'm big on that. But I think that things are changing. Certainly Yvette Clarke came right after her mom (ex-

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> Councilmember Una Clarke). So you have a transition of power from woman to woman. I think that's a good thing...
>
> And you had Mary Pinkett play a pivotal role ...in helping get James Davis elected. (Author: "Over a woman - Leticia James?") Over a woman granted, but that's the thing though...You had a woman and she didn't go for the woman because she is a woman, she went for clearly the person that she thought was the best candidate for that seat. And that's what having women in power means: that you don't necessarily go, "Oh yes here's another woman. I'm going to bring you in no matter what I think of you." It's being able to make a critical decision and do the analysis and at the end come up with what you think is the best.

Woman elected officials also feel the sting of stereotypes, double standards, and prejudice. A Black female politician noted:

> Part of it is that we still have this idea when you think about leadership, particularly in politics that it's a man's role...In general there are a subset of skills that a politician should have and people identify men with them more than women. Women have a more difficult time because certain issues come up with them that don't come up with men. If you have children, "what about the children, what are you going to do with the children?"
>
> Well, a man who's running and has children is still responsible for being a father as well, but that's not a question that gets posed to them....And if you are a single woman then sometimes your sexual orientation becomes an issue, and a lot of times your appearance becomes an issue, much more definitely than for men.

Young, educated, attractive Black women in the political arena can have a hard time being taken seriously. Notes one young female leader:

> I don't think I'm Halle Berry but I think that sometimes... my gender became an issue... Sometimes men said things about my appearance and I just kind of ignored it like, "you're a good-looking woman, how come this is what you do?"...You know, just little things like that, or not being taken totally seriously. "You know, you're very attractive, would you like to do lunch some time?" – while I'm trying to reroute them back to what I want to discuss...Politics is still sexist...
>
> There's one particular operative that I'm thinking of and she's a Brooklyn woman. A couple of people would say "she's really cold!" and people ascribe negative connotations to her and I questioned that if she were a man would the "B" word ("bitch") be used ?...
>
> There's a double standard and when you think about some of the big players in Central Brooklyn who are able to work on borough-wide, city-wide and state-wide races I don't see too many women...There are less women because we're not being brought into the fold and given leadership positions...as easily as our male counterparts...At the top of major campaigns they pigeon hole or racially profile you...like your specialty is Central Brooklyn...or the Caribbean community.

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"Politics is War" - A Man's Game

Many Black women and men interviewees view politics as a blood sport, too tough an arena for women. (An extreme example of this was the assassination of NYC Councilman James Davis in the City Council Chamber at City Hall by a disgruntled political insurgent in July 2003). One politically active African American woman noted:

> They don't want to get involved in politics because it's not friendly, there's nothing nice about it, it's not like one big happy family. It's like war, like a cold war and you can get your feelings hurt because everybody is vying for power, the power to influence. And they'll do whatever, say whatever to get it. It's not a nice process, so the average person doesn't want to get involved.
>
> It's not a nice place and I don't know if you could be comfortable in that environment without thinking "what is this person's motive?" You hear about playing both sides of the fence, you never know who you're talking to, or what's happening and so anyone who gets into politics and sees what's happening could get discouraged really quick. ...You literally have to fight to be involved in politics.

Black men politicians sometimes feel threatened by competent women and will use tactics to undermine women's advancement. One Black female politician notes:

> (Author: "How do women get elected to office in Black Brooklyn?") "Is it any different than men? Is it a different experience? I don't think there's much of a different experience, although there might be a tad prejudice towards women and I can say that because I have lived the prejudice. When women have children they assume that, some men's perception is that "you won't be as involved in your work based on the fact that you have children...Men in office and out of office have a stereotypical view of women with children and I have experienced that...
>
> (Author: "Why do you think men have this prejudice, where is that coming from?") "I think we're a threat. Woman are now just as educated if not more than men. Women are vocal, woman have the same mobilization powers as a man, woman are equal if not better,..we're very capable. So I become a threat...to you as a man, in terms of the power struggle that is happening within our society.

Some Black women blame men for not supporting their political aspirations. But they also criticize themselves for lack of financial independence and for not "owning" their politics the way that men do. A Black female politician notes:

> I think women who run for office are supported by men, but the primary source of your energy and your ongoing support in terms of resources comes from women, if you're a woman of color. So since women don't necessarily view politics as owning it, women

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> don't own politics the same as men do, that's one thing. And two, they don't give money the same as men. A man will write a check for $1,000 a woman will write a check for $100 or for $50, but that's about it.
>
> (Author: "Is it because women have less economic resources?") "Well they may have less resources but also, it's not an investment in the same way as for men. Women don't view it as an investment. I go to events where there are over 600 mostly women in the room, and it's a social, civic organization. 600 people! You can go to any political event hosted especially for women and if there's 100 people you are doing very well and most of them are going to be at most $50.00 people.
>
> A union will give me $300 and give $3,000 to some male politicians. Same union, same name, same whatever...It's repeated with all of the women I've talked to, all of the women in politics and it's the same story. So it's not just my view that this is what happens. And it's very difficult because you're in the same arena. So there is an assumption that you're on the same playing field, but that's not the case.

Many Black male politicians have a blind spot when it comes to dealing with political women. A Black female politician noted:

> It's that as women politicians, you have different kind of limitations and ...to a very large extent, perception is important... It's not even a black thing, it's a male female thing...The political arena is still very much male dominated in terms of power, and how that plays out. Women are not supported...
>
> Recently I was standing next to a male colleague...and this elected official said "I want to support someone for this congressional district." And he said to my male colleague, "Would you be interested in running for the seat?" The congressional seat he was talking about was in Brooklyn covering my district, but when he spoke of supporting someone to run for congress, he was speaking to a male colleague who lived in another borough.

A Black female elected official offers insights into gender dynamics in the political arena. Yes, male chauvinism and a double standard persist. But power has also been concentrated in the hands of legislative leadership. Consequently both the average male and female legislators have less power:

> Women are public officials, but still a *co*-public official. In other words women are not on the same playing field as men...(Author: What conditions do you think would bring about more gender equity?") "I don't know... I have a feeling, I have a sense that in New York State in particular ...I have experienced politics as a plantation-oriented process, in that the power has been so centralized at every level and it's in the leadership. So that in some ways all of us have experienced less and less personal capacity in terms of being part of the power structure, the decision making, the deliberations.

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A Black female politician notes that women need a tacit partnership with male elected officials in order to succeed; and women need to be more assertive:

> So unless and until that process changes, begins to be diffused, if men don't feel a sense of empowerment I think it's going to continue to be difficult for them to feel that they can share what little power they have with the women...I just remember when I first met Maxine Waters. Here was a woman who when she spoke, she spoke with authority as if she were a power broker.
>
> And then when I met Willie Brown (California Assembly Speaker, her political mentor) it was the support of Willie Brown that made Maxine's power possible. And he said at one point in time that he specifically empowered her to do that. He wanted her to have that power to represent him and all that it meant. So it seems to me that, that's sort of how this process eventually will be different. (Author's opinion: this interviewee underestimates the personal agency and political power of Maxine Waters.)
>
> I see what happens even to some of the women committee chairs. People who can't make a decision, they'll chair a committee and they'll say "We need to look at this, and we can't do that" because they don't feel empowered to decide on this issue or that...Since I've been in the legislature it has changed. I think when I first came here there was a very different kind of woman legislator...and now it's changed for the worse,...it's not better and it hasn't improved... Nationally, particularly black women at one point were almost disappearing from the legislative bodies across this country.

Men Supporting Women: Major Owens and Una Clarke

On the question of why Black women in Black Brooklyn aren't more politically empowered, a number of Black women respondents noted that one of the important ingredients for success was male leadership support for women. There is a sentiment that women politicos in Black Brooklyn should be more conscientious about building their own power bases. Most Black male and female interviewees thought that Major Owens appropriately supported Una Clarke for City Council and that his gesture was politically pragmatic: his district contains a huge Caribbean constituency and it raised his political stock to help elect a Caribbean American in 1991. One reason that Clarke did not get more of a "woman's vote" in her congressional challenge to Owens in 2000 was that many Black women felt that Una Clarke had betrayed Owens after he had launched her

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political career. Clarke's disloyalty may have undermined the cause of female political advancement. A Black woman politician noted:

> Well, as you know that was a very close race and I think the big thing with that was that the race was so contentious that people were either silently Major supporters or silently Una's supporters and Major's supporters out weighed hers...It was contentious in that a lot of people did not like the idea that Una had been a protégé of Major's...I just think that people did not like, did not appreciate her approach. That it was really very unfair and just ungrateful for her to oppose him after he was the main reason for her being in politics in the first place.
>
> (Una) played the "Caribbean card" but Major was actually one of the people who insisted on a city council district being drawn so that she could run in it as a Caribbean district. It was his advocacy that resulted in her district. So I think people realized that and knew the relationship over the years and how much he had supported her...Even when she ran and Carl Andrews ran against her, Major was the only elected official that really stood there with her...I think people really resented that and took it really personally and rejected her candidacy to a large extent because of that. So it was a very emotional race.

Living Off Of Men's Power

Some African American and West Indian women respondents put a major onus on the women themselves for not being more empowered. A Caribbean female leader noted:

> I'm disappointed in the women. We have a few elected officials and female district leaders but they all acquiesce to the males...They let the males set whatever the political agenda is...It was really actually the males who did the organizing around issues. The women didn't. The women were sort of brought along as co-leaders...The voters were registered by the organization and the folks that were in alliance with the males. The women did not set out to organize them...and they haven't built their own organization.
>
> (Author: "How about Chisholm? Did she try to build her own organizational base?") No. Chisholm was a symbol of women's empowerment, but her real organization was done by men (Author: Wesley MacD. Holder was Chisholm's chief strategist and organizer.) "Chisholm was a princess. She was coronated off of the hard work of men.
>
> (Author: "Are women afraid to take on the men or challenge male political hegemony?") "That's right. Women I think are afraid. Women don't want to get down and dirty in a battle with their men...I think of myself as a straggler , but every time I get too far out, I always remember my grandfather saying to me..."back away...you don't go so far as to challenge your men.

A young African American female leader offers some insights as to ethnic differences in Black female political engagement:

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> I think African Americans are more apathetic than Caribbeans. I think Caribbeans already have embedded in their culture being involved in politics on some level...whereas I think African Americans don't walk around with that same ideology. On the islands they came from, they were politically involved and they bring that here.
>
> All my friends are African Americans and most of them were raised by single mothers and some got involved in politics but most did not. They were working day to day to make things happen for the family, the home, the career, the children... In female headed households, as a child you're raised that way and you follow the same thing when your brought up. If nobody has enough time to get involved in politics except to vote then that's going to be your level of involvement.

A number of younger Caribbean interviewees offered insights on the socialization and Americanization of Caribbean immigrant families. Caribbean immigrant boys and girls are raised differently: girls are raised strictly, to be marriageable; boys are given more latitude and independence "to be a man." One can have the same generation of males and females being raised very differently, based on their parents' own evolving Americanization, based on siblings coming and going between their Brooklyn household and the Caribbean, and according to children's own age, gender and peer influences.

Why are so many Black women reluctant to challenge the power and authority of Black men ? Following is a composite explanation from the comments of several Black females and a few male interviewees. Historically, the institution of American chattel slavery and its slave codes targeted the Black male for control and domination (Franklin, 2004). This deficit of Black male authority deficit in the white world, has led Black women historically to compensate by being self sacrificing, supportive, and deferential to Black men's leadership roles in the domestic, social, religious and political arenas. States one Caribbean female leader:

> (Author: So what is the genesis of this because that sounds like a very powerful imperative, it sounds almost like a genetic coding in women that says at a certain point 'don't push the men too far or challenge their authority or power too much.' Where does that come from?) I think it's probably for most people including my grandfather...the impact and legacy of colonialism and slavery...Yes,...I think the idea is that you try to be supportive of the males because of the whole business of the males being...dehumanized

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> by white persons, so you weren't supposed to be seen in competition with your men folk. You had to be supportive...I know for me that is still sort of like a modifier...
>
> (Author: And this has carried itself over into the arena of politics, even when women are autonomously elected, they will still be deferential to a Black male politician who has the same title and office they have?) That's right and if you look at them, even if a woman knows she's more capable than the man, she will defer because I think it's a subtle cultural thing, something you almost get with mother's milk...I always remember that...and I see it in my younger cousins.

Several interviewees offered solutions to the dilemma of female deference and leadership deficits, including: painful and honest communication, consciousness raising, and behavior modification on the part of sensitive, risk taking Black men and women to free each other from the prison of this dilemma. Since Black men are predominantly in the political power positions and still the psychic captives of societally driven male hierarchy, patriarchy, and chauvinism, the onus is on Black males to make the change. One African American female leader notes:

> I think what has to happen is the men have to recognize this mindset, this emotional and psychological mind set and there has to be a willingness on the part of men to sort of join forces and *allow the women* (Author's emphasis) to really rise. They've got to understand this and I think there's a great deal of misunderstanding because there's not an honest discussion. Men are put off, black male leaders are put off by the black female leaders who are aggressive and tend to swing their weight around, and black females are put off by the men as well.
>
> But there's not a conversation. Until there's an honest conversation of why this behavior has been exhibiting itself and until there's a willingness on the part of the men, you're putting a lot of *pressure* on the men to do a lot of things (Author: "The basic 'pressure' is for men to change their behaviors and attitudes to be more accepting of woman leadership?") -- ...Yeah, that's right.

According to the interviewees and other sources, some Black men are trapped in their own prejudice and chauvinism towards women and believe that a 'woman's place is in the home.' Some Black men don't recognize that there is a real problem, that their women leadership feels unfairly subordinated to the men, and that their women feel that they are being denied equal access to power and resources, and equal opportunity to lead.

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Some Black men feel that they are innately superior and women are inferior in matters of politics and power. Some Black men aggressively hold onto the little power that they have and will not follow women's leadership. This phenomenon is exhibited in some Black churches which do not appoint women as pastors or bishops.[28] An African American female leader notes:

> (Author: When you say *allow the women*, -- just because men step back that doesn't guarantee that women are going to step forward.) They will...Women are ready but they need a signal from men that it's not going to be a battle... because women don't want war with their own men.
>
> (Author: So who's going to send the signals? ...Maybe one percent of men understand what you are saying...So how is this supposed to happen? Do women talk amongst each other about this situation, this dilemma?) Some of them do, but most of them don't. They're not able to articulate in this way...And also there's a sense of "What are you going to do about it, how can we change it?"...It's a generic problem in both the African American and Caribbean communities... Women are probably even more deferential to their men in the Caribbean community.

As the previous chapter on Black demographics shows, there is a significant deficit of eligible Black adult males in the Black community due to high incarceration rates, homicides, high mobility, immigration patterns, low educational attainment and low labor force participation rates. Thus with a scarcity of eligible Black men in the community, many Black women interviewees are unwilling to risk another fissure in already fragile Black male female relations over "politics." Such a battle could negatively impact Black women's marriages, prospects for marriage, and personal relationships with Black men. Thus this explosive issue continues to simmer just below the surface for a significant silent majority of Black women elites.

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[28] Major Black denominations, Baptists and Church Of God In Christ (COGIC) are conservative in this regard, with few female pastors in the former and no female bishops in the latter. The African Methodist Episcopal (AME) church ordains female pastors, elected their first female bishop in 2000 (after 200 years) and elected two more in 2004.

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Race Trumps Gender; Gender Trumps Ethnicity

Marty Markowitz is a political legend in Black Brooklyn. He was first elected to the State Senate in the 1970s. In a state senate seat created in 1982 to elect a minority candidate, he defeated Caribbean former State Senator Waldaba Stewart and African American, now State Senator Carl Andrews (a former CCE and Vann protégé, and political ally of County Leader, Assemblyman Clarence Norman). Markowitz parlayed his political assets so skillfully that despite several black challengers, he was re-elected 11 times from 1982 to 2000 in a district that became 85 percent Black and heavily Caribbean. In the 2001 Borough President's race, with another white Jewish male candidate in the race, Councilman Ken Fisher, Markowitz still defeated African American female Deputy Borough President, Jeannette Gadsen. Markowitz declares himself an honorary "Trinidadian" and appointed a Jamaican American, Yvonne Graham, as his Deputy Borough President. In a word, Markowitz's race and "honorary" ethnicity trumped Gadsen's gender in the 2001 Brooklyn Borough President's election.

Using the converse of this concept - gender trumping ethnicity - African American Kevin Parker's gender assets trumped Caribbean candidates' ethnicity in a 2002 State Senate election for a newly redistricted open state senate seat in a heavily Caribbean district including Flatbush, East Flatbush, and heavily Orthodox Jewish Borough Park. A West Indian female leader describes Parker's win in gendered terms:

> Now Parker, apparently they liked him personality wise...they were talking about Parker. They just loved him. "He's a nice young boy...a gentleman..." He made a good presentation, he's articulate...the Caribbean community is not just going to vote for someone because they're Caribbean...They're going to vote for somebody that they think can represent them and they are extremely conservative.
>
> They think of themselves as proper, intelligent, hard-working. So those are the basic characteristics they're going to look for...'Nice boy' translates into proper manners and that kind of stuff. The Caribbean community is very matriarchal in Central

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> Brooklyn...Lot's of women heads of households, home owners, lot's of women working at jobs making more money than the men, some of them are professionals...
>
> So that a candidate has to understand that these women are very much looking for what they tell their sons they have to be. And that's where these things like 'nice boy,' proper, that kind of stuff comes up. ..You need to appeal to women voters and their perceptions. And if you're able to do that, you can get their support irrespective of ethnicity.

Thus Markowitz with his Jewish ancestry, masterful constituent service and high visibility in Caribbean Brooklyn trumped the gender assets of Jeannette Gadsen, African American female Deputy Borough President, who was running under optimal conditions of two white Jewish male opponents, in a Borough with a 55 percent female and estimated 40 percent Black primary electorate. And, the young, debonair, African American Kevin Parker, with his strong appeal to a predominantly female Caribbean electorate trumped the Caribbean ancestry of his opponents, winning in a heavily Caribbean state senate district.

Black Professional Women: Life Without Men and Marriage

According to a number of female interviewees, Black professional women in Brooklyn find it difficult to meet, have relationships with, and marry their Black male peers, given the shortage of eligible Black men (high male incarceration, homosexuality, AIDS and other factors reduce the supply). For many Black women the options are: stay single; move out of Black Brooklyn to more 'male fertile' communities; or date and marry outside of the race. A young Black woman professional observes:

> The women I know, the vast majority are not married and we're talking in the upward almost getting to forties, they're not married, never have been married, a lot of them have no kids. (Author: "Are they looking to get married?") "Some are, some aren't." (Author: Some of these Black women choose not to marry at all ? Others are "Race Women" staying loyal to the race and still holding out for the right Black man to come along, - or 'settle for less' rather than marry outside of their race?) -- Right !

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God, Sons and Husbands - "We're Black First, Women Second"

A West Indian female professional discusses the powerful roles that religion, psychology, and gender play in community affairs and the politics of Black Brooklyn:

> (Author: "If women are the majority in the community and probably in voting, why don't Black women have a more prominent role in the politics of Black Brooklyn?") "It's a male centered society. *God is a man, he's the father*...It sounds almost ridiculous but that's just how it is...
>
> The church pastor is a man because so many women don't have a man to rely on. The pastor is sort of like a figure for the collective husband...and God too. A lot of women would rather have a male pastor than a female pastor because he is the collective Father, husband, male that they don't have...
>
> I got to do a lot of things in my community because my cousins lived down the block and they were able to take up a lot of slack for me when I was out. So I probably got a little further along than a lot of women who didn't have that resource... A lot of women I knew...those mothers wanted to be active too. But they couldn't be out for so long because they had to go home and make dinner for their husbands, or their husbands expected them to be home by a certain time and so forth...
>
> We can always run social organizations and institutions. But now we're talking about *politics, money and power*. When we're talking about business and politics, it's another arena. I've been in many business situations where I'm the only woman. But when we're talking about social, look at all the affiliations I've had with social organizations...They let us do work that is social.

Some Black women elected officials feel subordinated in male dominated power environments. A West Indian female politico observes:

> And you got an old boy's network even in the Black community. And Black women tend to be Black first and women second and I think that there's been times where the women haven't been supported in the same way as the men. And the men have the power and the women have to work under that and try to get the support of the men. There's just so many ways that there are differences. There are subtle policy decisions being made. The entrenched incumbents are mostly male.

Black women are simmering just below the surface concerning their unequal treatment in the Black Brooklyn political arena. The older female generation is holding their fire only because they don't want to start a gender war. Observes a veteran African American female political leader:

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> Black women haven't been willing to go public with any of this because *we're still Black first and women second* and so we still want to keep our dirty linen in the closet...We don't want any of this to get out to anyone. There will be no discussion in the media. There's not going to be 'the Black man versus Black woman thing'...
>
> (Author: "So why are Black women being so noble about this issue?") "Because these are our sons, our husbands, our fathers. In the broad arena of things, these are people that we've worked with all along. And now I'm speaking as the older generation now. I don't know how the young women are going to deal with this. And I see a lot of young women come and go...I've seen them come into campaigns, see what the "deal" is and then go and do other things.
>
> (Author: "What's the "deal?") "The 'deal' is that women have roles as helpers. They might be able to play some major role in the campaign, but they're not feeling that they're going to get the biggest prize. If there's a man, he's going to get a bigger prize.

One West Indian professional woman noted that one of the solutions to gender inequality is for women to better educate themselves and men concerning women's considerable talents and capabilities; and for men to open up or disband their 'old boys networks' and facilitate more opportunities for women:

> Women have to be more forceful and vocal...We have to promote ourselves more. When I say promote ourselves, I think we have to be more aggressive in pushing what our capabilities are and putting ourselves out there in terms of making sure people start talking about what we can do, and what we have done, and how we can accomplish it so that we're not just an after thought all the time...
>
> I don't know if Black women have thought about it in this way...Sometimes the women say we have to have a meeting and then we don't. Nobody calls the meeting together to strategize. (Author: "Does that say something?") It says that we have so many issues that we're working on. And it says that we're still not there in terms of making it a focus of our time to promote ourselves...
>
> I don't think that black men get up in the morning and say "we're going to prevent women from having opportunities." I don't think it's like that so that's something that sort of keeps the anger down. But I think that they get up in the morning and they think about who they worked with before, who they can count on. And so when that happens, you're just going to keep having the same people. Now I've been brought in by men in many situations in a deputy or assistant capacity and so forth and I'm respected for my work and called on again and again, but I'm the exception.

An African American woman leader comments on the power of Black social networks, Black women supporting each other, and mentoring the younger generation:

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> I belong to several women's organizations and it affords me and my sisters the opportunity to mentor, to act as a role models and to perform networking for young Black women. Because of the positive experiences I've had ...as a product of the New York City public schools,...a product of our colleges,...being supported and mentored in leadership roles throughout my career...I am able to help facilitate socialization among women of all races...
>
> What I do is, I invite them to meetings, ask them to serve on committees or to represent me at various organizations. For example, I'll ask a young female attorney to represent me at an important board meeting...I also sponsor young women in many of our prestigious women's organizations...I involve young women so that they can get the exposure and make the connections that will help them to advance in the professional field and in their social life. I passionately believe that people like me, that have had extraordinary opportunities should give something back to the community.

A Black woman professional notes how a lack of resources affects the political status of women:

> (Author: "Are women a force in the politics of Black Brooklyn?")"To some degree, women are a force in the political and civic life of Central Brooklyn. But it's very difficult for women to become a force because of the money issue. And if they're not supported by the county organizations it's very difficult for them to raise funds and to have a voice and networks. We're still fighting the glass ceiling and so we're making progress very slowly, as long as I've been on the battlefield.
>
> There are still major issues that we're struggling with and I think that as far as the number of women in office, we do not yet have our commensurate representation...Yes, we're a majority of the population, a majority electorate, registered voters, and a majority of the people that come out to vote...But I don't think women have learned yet how to stick together and to vote as a bloc...
>
> It's very, very difficult for women going through the childbearing stage, women trying to get educated and being able to spend the time, energy and the money. The finances is the basis of certain issues that women have.

Women's Issues, Organizations and Mobilization

Black women's organizations and leadership have a long and powerful history. Sojourner Truth was perhaps the ultimate symbol of 19th century Black womanhood and leadership: ex-slave, liberator, abolitionist, suffragist and women's rights advocate. She collaborated with the white woman voting rights leaders Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and others. Mary Church Terrell, Ida B. Wells and many other Black

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women carried Sojourner's legacy into the 20th century. One of the most prominent leaders of the 20th century was Mary McLeod Bethune, who founded Bethune Cookman College in Florida, was a key advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt, and founded the National Council of Negro Women. Bethune's successor Dorothy Height, recently retired from her national leadership post after some 40 years.

Historically and today, several national and international Black women's organizations have local chapters and leadership in Black Brooklyn. Groups include: the Negro Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Key Women of America, the National Association of University Women, The Links, Jack and Jill, Delta Sigma Theta sorority, Lioness International, Daughters of the Eastern Star, National Council of Negro Women, Black college alumni associations, various church organizations, the NAACP and others. These groups are middle class based, and many have national affiliations and civic and social agendas. Meanwhile at home, their social action and political impacts in the Black Brooklyn community seem minimal.[29]

"Women's issues" have been a force for community and political mobilization in Black Brooklyn with a class dimension: issue advocacy appears to be more of a mobilizer among working class women who have more at stake, and less economic and social options than middle class, professional Black women. Several of the African American and West Indian women respondents noted how they had "backed into" politics and community affairs by first being actively involved in struggles for quality public education, day care services for working women and other safety net, health and human

[29] In fairness to Black women, Black *men's* organizations, and Black groups in general, seem to be suffering from a malaise of inaction in the "post civil rights" era, despite many critical community issues to mobilize around such as failing public schools, high male unemployment, the AIDS crisis, et.al.).

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services issues vital to the survival of Black families and local neighborhoods. Notes an African American woman non-profit leader, serving public housing residents:

> I was in child care...I learned early on the importance of understanding the sources of support, the resources and where they came from in order for the program to run effectively. I learned the importance of having a strong, informed and active parent organization because there were any number of issues that were always swirling around the program.
>
> How much funding, what the rules and regulations were, what the federal response was, the impact of any federal regulations on it...I understood that we needed to be involved in the process of protecting the program and I also began to better understand my professional responsibility to provide quality child care to the children, and the political decisions that made it possible or impossible for me to do that. So if I were going to do the professional part, I had to do the political part because one could not happen without the other. So that connection was made for me.

Similarly, a West Indian woman active in politics and community affairs observed:

> I got involved with politics and community affairs as a result of my involvement with my children's education, starting with day care and learning how the board of the day care center was related to the staff and how the board was politically chosen and didn't necessarily have the same interests as the parents...And that situation was my first look at how politics affected the community.
>
> When my kids went to public school, I became active there and became the PTA president, then I was president of the President's Council. It was there that I made a decision to make sure that parents were represented on the School Board and we decided to learn the election process so we could get parents elected to the School Board...
>
> So we put together a slate of nine people who were not formally political, had never run for office or anything. But we did a year's worth of training...We knew about Al Vann's progressive politics and his fight for community school boards and asked him for help. We learned a lot of our skills from his people and got a number of people on our slate elected to the School Board. Then I helped Al Vann and the CCE and got involved with a number of campaigns.

Conclusions: the Politics of Gender

The field discourse on the politics of gender presents the dilemma of a crisis within a crisis: the gender inequality of Black women in the politics of Black Brooklyn, nested within the broader context of persistent Black political inequality in American

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democracy.[30] Thus gender inequality is not just a Black problem or a Black Brooklyn problem. As Myrdal, DuBois and other scholars argue, this "Black" problem is indeed an *American* problem.

Andrew Hacker (2003) in his sociological and demographic study entitled *Mismatch, the Growing Gulf Between Men and Women* discusses several national trends between men and women which mirror many of the findings about men and women in Black Brooklyn. Hacker discusses declining marriage rates and two parent households, increasing homes without fathers, declining male and increasing female educational attainment; and the white American family portrait in 2000, converging towards the Black family portrait painted by Moynihan in 1965, in his seminal work, *The Negro Family: the Case for National Action,* which described a "tangled web of pathology."

The African American and West Indian women interviewees' commentary was incisive, quietly angry, frustrated, simmering and war weary beneath a tranquil mask. Many see themselves as professionally qualified, political savvy laborers in the political vineyards who are over talented, under appreciated and politically under deployed. They are politically overworked and under rewarded by Black men when they need Black women's political labor. But Black women feel abandoned by these same men when they attempt to pursue their own political dreams and aspirations.

The older generation of Black women is much more accommodating to male chauvinism. They are supportive, complicitous enablers of Black male hegemony in the Black church and political arenas and off the record, acknowledge this state of affairs. On the other hand, well educated, economically independent, professional young Black professional women "are not having it." They are much less quiescent, and they are

[30] See Myrdal (1948) *An American Dilemma;* and DuBois (1903) *The Souls of Black Folk.*.

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angry and disillusioned by the chauvinist behaviors of their pampered male counterparts. Young Black women see these young Black men as arrogant, disappointing young replicas of the "old boys' network" of the older male generation with their negative attitudes and lack of support for young Black female political leadership and participation. Young Black women interviewees are aggressive in their critique:

> Women are a force in Black Brooklyn's politics but they are not being supported. I have supported several Black male candidates for office but when it comes time to support us, Black men have no backbone. Some Black women are pitted against each other by the men. The solution to Black women's under representation is money and resources...
>
> As far as women versus men, the women are more educated, we outnumber our men 3 to 1, 4 to 1 in college. Finding our peer is difficult. And as far as having jobs, there are more women in the workforce. Women have to fight their way in, in order to be involved in politics...There is an unspoken camaraderie among women...
>
> Women are the backbone of Black Brooklyn's politics, but not as elected officials. The men are in charge. Not a lot has changed. Marriage is a dominant conversation. There's a gender gap. If you can find a man with a stable income, no jail record, no extramarital children, you've hit the lotto. The men say that you have to dumb yourself down. Black women are mad. Among the new generation of Black men, women are relegated to the back bench. Women have to be low on self promotion or else you're tagged as a "problem bitch."
>
> Yes, women are a force in the politics of Black Brooklyn. We have a few female Black elected officials, but we need more visionary women. We need more female role models. Women are a part of the machine and everybody must wait their turn.

Black male interviewees did not discuss gender inequality in Black Brooklyn's politics as freely as women interviewees. However, they largely agreed that Black women are a force in the politics of Black Brooklyn, and they agreed with the women's problem analysis and proposed solutions. One Black male politician sums up the enlightened males' assessment of the situation:

> Women are an up and coming, rising force. They're not organized enough. There needs to be more women's groups formed to embrace social issues and to focus on politics. Men are not receptive to women's political leadership. Sexism exists, but men could not hold them down if women were organized. There's a lack of change due to insurgents' inability to build with money, the mechanisms and 'know how' to win elections.

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These interviews, combined with the political history chapter and personal knowledge point to a political evolution in Black male female power relations. There was a period from the 1950s to the 1970s in Black Brooklyn, when their was a prominent Black female leadership hierarchy which peaked with Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, Deputy Mayor Lucille Rose and what was known as the "Black matriarchy." This Black women's power circle was politically respected and even feared by Black male leadership. These women had political access to mayors, governors, corporate leaders and had national civic, social and religious leadership networks as well. While significant remnants of these networks still exist today, times and historical conditions have changed, and women's political power and mobilization seems waning and dormant in Black Brooklyn at the present time. Sexism, male chauvinism and patriarchy must still be conquered by enlightened men and women joining together to mute these forces.

With more Black women elected and appointed officials, and a greater share of the electorate than ever before, Black women seem to be wielding less political power. Responding to the key question of why this is so, men and women interviewees suggest that: 1) it is women's own self-effacing, overly deferential, counter-productive psychological dispositions towards men, Black and white in the political arena; 2) it is Black women's lack of political solidarity with other Black women (the 'crabs in the barrel' syndrome); 3) Black women's own lack of organizational focus in the political arena, as opposed to their hyper activism in the social, civic and church arenas; and 4) the older generation's failure to embrace, groom and promote a highly talented, well educated, economically secure younger generation -- that is holding Black women back.

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The preceding chapter was the first prong of this research which pointed to key demographic explanations for the politics of ethnicity, class and gender in Black Brooklyn. This chapter on field research offers a nuanced, qualitative perspective on the politics of ethnicity, class and gender in Black Brooklyn. The following chapter is the final leg of this research project. It will pursue the quantitative analysis of several elections using ecological regression, weighted least squares regression techniques and spatial analysis to determine to what extent there are significant differences and similarities in voting behavior along the lines of ethnicity, class and gender among African American and West Indian voters of Black Brooklyn.

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Chapter 5

Black Brooklyn: Voter Turnout, Candidate Choice, and the Significance of Ethnicity, Class and Gender

(WLS and Ecological Regression; and Spatial Analysis)

Chapter 1 set forth a theoretical framework for looking at the politics of Black Brooklyn based on the need to go beyond approaches that treat Black communities as homogeneous entities. Instead, it argued, we must examine whether ethnicity, class and gender shape modes of local political participation such as voter turnout and candidate choice. Chapter 2 gave a brief historical analysis of the alternating strains of political insurgency and accommodation in Black Brooklyn's political development, while Chapter 3 showed Black Brooklyn was indeed differentiated along the key demographic dimensions of ethnicity, class and gender. Chapter 4 presented field interviews of African American and West Indian elites, that explored how ethnicity, class and gender shape the politics of Black Brooklyn.

This third and final leg of the research will conduct regression analysis to determine the impact of key census demographic variables on election outcomes. Two regression analysis techniques are used: Weighted Least Squares (WLS) Regression and King's (1997) approach to Ecological Inference. WLS is a linear regression technique used in stage one of this analysis to evaluate the statistically significant independent or predictor variables of ethnicity, class and gender and their role in explaining the dependent or outcome variables of voter turnout and candidate choice. The weighting element of WLS regression ensures that EDs with more voters contribute a greater share of the explanatory force in the overall equation. In the next stage of this quantitative analysis, for those elections demonstrating the most powerful WLS regression models,

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King's method of ecological inference will be used to generate coefficients (percentages) which will be mapped to determine what other patterns they may reveal.

Part I: Previous WLS and Ecological Regression Studies

Olson (1997), Levitt (2001) and Hirsch and Mollenkopf (2003) are recent studies using ecological regression analysis to examine patterns of voter turnout and candidate choice in New York City and local neighborhoods. Olsen (1997) used census variables and citywide election data for several elections from 1988 - 1994 (see Table 5.01) and tested an "SES Model" and a "Neighborhood Stability Model" to determine turnout levels. He found that individual level demographic variables such as income and education (SES model) were positively correlated with voter turnout, but he also found some high voter turnout in low SES census tracts in Central Brooklyn and the South Bronx (p.164), because these communities were also stable neighborhoods with low mobility.

Olsen found that voter turnout varied over time, for different types of elections, and by neighborhood. Olsen's place-based neighborhood stability model defined as low mobility (using a 1990 census variable for percent of persons who lived in the same house in 1985), was more powerfully correlated with voter turnout than home ownership rates. Olsen's multivariate regression equations for SES (income $50-100k, college education) and Neighborhood Stability (mobility, home ownership) had the following predictive power (Adj. R^2) in explaining voter turnout.

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Table 5.01
Olsen: Voter Turnout Analysis – NYC Elections, 1988 -1994
SES and Neighborhood Stability Model

	Election	Adj. R^2	Significant Variables
1988	Presidential General Election	26 % (.261)	Ed., Inc., Stability
1989	Mayoral Primary Election	11% (.111)	Ed., Inc., Home., Stability
1989	Mayoral General Election	17% (.165)	Ed., Stability
1990	Gubernatorial General Election	22% (.223)	Ed., Inc., Home., Stability
1992	Presidential General Election	25% (.247)	Ed., Home., Stability
1993	Mayoral Primary	8% (.079)	Ed., Inc., Home., Stability
1993	Mayoral General Election	20% (.199)	Ed., Home., Stability
1994	Gubernatorial Election	24% (.244)	Ed., Inc., Home., Stability

Source: Olsen 1997: 166-170, Tables 6-1 to 6-10.

Thus Olsen's SES and Neighborhood Stability Model explained a range of 8 - 26% of voter turnout for these elections.

Levitt's (2001) [1] initial hypothesis was that compared to his close loss in 1989, middle class white voters decisively increased their voter turnout and candidate choice for Rudolph Giuliani in his 1993 mayoral election victory over Mayor David Dinkins, New York City's first African American Mayor (p.228). Through the use of ecological regression at the election district level, Levitt documents that there was a more complex and nuanced set of factors accounting for Giuliani's electoral victory in 1993:

> Not only did turnout among middle class whites not increase, but the percentage of middle class whites who supported Giuliani decreased...as the overall percentage of whites that supported Giuliani remained stable...(E)stimated turnout among African Americans did drop, as did support for Dinkins...White support for Giuliani remained stable from 1989 to 1993, while Asian and Hispanic support for Giuliani grew. (p.254-5).

[1] Melissa Levitt. 2001. *Circling the Wagons: Middle Class Whites and the Election of Rudolph Giuliani.* Ph.D. Dissertation, Political Science Dept., CUNY Graduate Center.

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Levitt's ecological regression analysis of voter turnout indicates significant patterns of racial and neighborhood variation.

Table 5.02
Levitt: Voter Turnout Change, 1989-1993
Black Brooklyn Neighborhoods

Neighborhood	White	Black	Hispanic	Overall Change
Bed-Stuy	3.2%	-7.3%	-0.7%	0.3%
Canarsie	-.0.08%	-4.1%	-1.8%	-0.3%
Crown Heights	2.7%	-6.3%	-3.7%	0.9%
East New York	2.4%	-4.2%	-1.8%	1.4%
Flatbush	2.0%	-4.7%	-4.0%	1.2%
Fort Greene	1.9%	-5.8%	-0.7%	-1.2%

Source: Levitt 2001:236-7, "Table 7.4."

Levitt also conducted ecological regression analysis of changes in voting for Dinkins by neighborhood. These data tables substantiate Levitt's claim that there was a decline in voter turnout and Dinkins support in Black Brooklyn between the 1989 and 1993 mayoral elections.

Table 5.03
Levitt: Dinkins Vote Change, 1989-1993
Black Brooklyn Neighborhoods

Neighborhood	White	Black	Hispanic	Overall Change
Bed-Stuy	-6.7%	-1.2%	2.2%	2.2%
Canarsie	0.4%	-1.6%	2.7%	-0.3%
Crown Heights	1.7%	-1.2%	1.6%	0.0%
East New York	-1.1%	-0.7%	1.6%	0.4%
Flatbush	-3.1%	-2.7%	1.1%	3.7%
Fort Greene	-0.3%	-0.9%	0.3%	-0.5%

Source: Levitt 2001:242, "Table 7.8."

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These factors were replicated citywide, along with others mentioned, which contributed to Dinkins' defeat at the polls by Giuliani in the 1993 mayoral general election.

Hirsch and Mollenkopf (2003) used WLS regression and ecological regression to identify determinants of voter turnout in New York City public housing developments and other forms of government assisted housing in the presidential 2000 election, and in the mayoral primary and general elections of 2001. They note that "...ecological inference estimates...are the most widely acceptable means for confirming that our aggregate results reflect an underlying, individual-level phenomenon." (p.22). Key demographic and other variables they tested included: foreign born, people below poverty level, persons 65 and over, Hispanic VAP, and units in public housing.

Poverty or low income was found to be a greater determinant of low voter turnout in general elections than in the primary. There was a positive correlation between elderly proportion and mayoral election turnout. There was also a positive correlation between population density, proportion of eligible voters and voter turnout; and a slight negative correlation between amount of public housing and voter turnout. Examining a spatial indicator, there was a finding that the shorter the distance from public housing to the polling place, the greater the voter turnout.

In the Hirsch Mollenkopf study, ecological regression analysis showed close voter turnout rates between public housing EDs and all other EDs for the 2001 mayoral primary (28% to 31%); but a much lower public housing versus general voter turnout rate in the 2001 mayoral general election (26% to 41%) and the 2000 presidential election (51% to 64%). The quantitative approaches and findings from the Olsen, Levitt, and Hirsch and Mollenkopf studies form a backdrop for this project's research.

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How much impact do ethnicity, class and gender have on turnout and candidate choice in Black Brooklyn? WLS regression equations test the statistical significance of ethnicity, class and gender as predictors on candidate choice and voter turnout.

Hypothesis # 1 (Ethnicity) African Americans and West Indians have different colonial experiences, which fosters different concepts of race, ethnicity and identity. These different ethnic orientations are reflected in: a) significant ethnic differences in candidate choice and voter turnout for African Americans versus West Indians; and b) there is significant Black ethnic voting for Black ethnic candidates (and others) in certain elections (the "ethnic attraction" sub-hypothesis).

Hypothesis # 2 (Class) Because of different socioeconomic characteristics of income, education, and labor force participation, West Indians and African Americans have different class orientations within and across their ethnic groups. Income and education will show up as significant predictors of candidate choice and voter turnout for certain kinds of elections.

Hypothesis # 3 (Gender) Because of greater female voter registration in the community, one can expect: a) higher rates of female versus male voter turnout; b) significant female voting for female candidates (the "gender attraction" sub-hypothesis); and c) different candidate choice for male versus female voters in certain elections.

In the WLS regression models for this study, all dependent and independent variables are computed as percents. Demographic variables representing ethnicity, class and gender were subjected to diagnostic procedures to avoid multi-collinearity and other statistical problems. Thus all predictor variables are independent of one another and did not contribute redundant information in the equations. WLS regression models are run for two outcome variables: 1) percent vote for candidate; and 2) percent voter turnout. In other words, the equations tested for the extent to which demographic variables representing ethnicity, class and gender explain candidate choice as well as voter turnout.

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A rich array of 27 male and female, white, Hispanic, African American and West Indian candidates ran in 14 different presidential, gubernatorial, mayoral, borough president, and congressional elections in Black Brooklyn over the five year period 1997 to 2001. Thus, voting behavior and candidate choice is analyzed across time and place for various types of elections and candidates (Olsen 1997). The weight in the WLS equations is the total votes cast in a particular election. The key independent variables for ethnicity, class and gender were selected to assess their significance in answering the question: "What roles do ethnicity, class and gender play in the politics of Black Brooklyn?"

The census demographic data have been aggregated to the election district level for the nine significantly Black State Assembly Districts (ADs) of Brooklyn: the 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 55th, 56th, 57th and 58th Assembly Districts (See Figure 3.01). These ADs comprise a total of 826 election districts, 400,000 registered voters and 1.1 million residents (114,000 persons per AD) in Black Brooklyn. According to Census 2000, the study area is 63 percent Black, 20 percent white, 14 percent Hispanic and less than 3 percent Asian.

The political geography containing this data constitutes the Assembly District boundaries in effect for the state legislative redistricting cycle from 1992 – 2001; and the election district boundaries are those in effect in 2001. (Congressional and state legislative districts and many election district boundaries were subsequently redrawn by New York State as part of the 2002 congressional and state legislative redistricting cycle; and Councilmanic Districts and some election districts were redrawn by New York City for the 2003 City Council redistricting cycle.)

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Independent Variables

Census SF 1 and SF 3 data available at the block and census tract and block level were aggregated to match election district (ED) geography.[2] This analysis is conducted at the ED level (average 1500 persons and 500 registered voters) which is often smaller than a census tract (average 3500 persons), and much smaller than a PUMA (100,000 or more). In choosing the eight variables for the WLS model, a much larger pool was tested for multi-collinearity (when two or more independent variables in a regression contribute redundant information) and heteroscedaticity (WLS weighting mutes this problem). SPSS collinearity diagnostics were run on ethnicity, class and gender variables to determine the appropriate ones for the WLS equation. Census variables below the recommended "Condition Index" score of 30 and the "Variance Inflation Factor" (VIF) score of 10 were selected (Note: several male and female variables produced collinearity problems, but the male NILF ("malnilf") variable met the criteria. Thus those independent variables were identified which statistically best represent the concepts of ethnicity, class and gender. (See: Kleinbaum et.al., (1998: 237-48); Freund et.al. (2003:105-115); and Mendenhall and Sincich (2003:342-379).

All variables were computed as percentages for consistency of interpretation. In effect, using both variables for white and Latino population percents control for Black race since these are the three groups residing in the area. Ethnicity variables for "African American" and "West Indian" were always run separately in the WLS equations (running

[2] These datasets were constructed by Prof. John Mollenkopf, Center for Urban Research and Dr. Joseph Pereira, CUNY Data Service, CUNY Graduate Center, who provided invaluable assistance in using them.

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them together produced multi-collinearity). The Asian population in the study area was less than 3 percent, thus it was excluded from the model.

Ethnicity. The following variables were derived from Census 2000 data, and were used in the WLS regression equations to represent the concept of "Ethnicity:"

Ethnicity / Race	Name
1. White population percent	whitep
2. Latino population percent	latinop
3. African American percent[3]	aframpct
4. West Indian percent[4]	windianp

Class. [5] The research literature suggests that among the most prominent variables operationalizing the concept of class are income and education. The following variables are used in the regression equations as proxies for the concept of class:

Education	Variable Name
1. Percent BA degree or higher (25 years old or older)	pcolplus0
Income (Poverty)	
2. Percent Household income less than $25,000	plowinc0

Gender. Among several gender variables tested (female VAP, Black female headed households, et.al.), the following gender variable avoided collinearity with ethnicity and class variables. Percent Males Not In the Labor Force pmalnilf.

---

[3] A Black person's or parents' Place of Birth (POB) which was the Northern or Southern United States as percent of total population.

[4] SF 3 West Indian ancestry data, with Guyana added. According to the NYC Dept. of City Planning, most Afro-Guyanese are in Brooklyn and most Indo-Guyanese are in Queens.

[5] This selection of Class variables mirrors the research of Olson (1997), "Chapter 4: The Socioeconomic Status (SES) Model of Voter Turnout" pp. 95-121; Verba and Nie, (1972); Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980); and Campbell et.al. (1960).

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The WLS Regression equation is: [6]

$$Y = b_0 + b_1 . X_1 + b_2 . X_2 + b_3 . X_3 + ... + e$$

where Y is the *dependent* variable, percent voter turnout or candidate choice;

X's are the *independent* variables for race, ethnicity, class and gender;

b_0 is the Y intercept; b_1, b_2 etc. are the coefficients; and e is the error term or constant.

Table No. 5.04
Descriptive Variables for Ethnicity, Class and Gender
Dependent Variables: Percent Candidate Vote, Percent Voter Turnout
Total N = 808

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
2000 Pct White	808	0	99	17.64	28.040
2000 Pct Latino	808	0	100	13.35	11.665
2000 Pct Afr-Amer.	796	0	100	63.48	15.093
2000 Pct West Indian	808	0	62	21.86	17.329
2000 Pct BA Plus	808	0	75	17.43	12.360
2000 Pct Low Inc (lt$25k)	807	0	100	41.28	16.733
2000 Pct Male NILF	808	0	79	17.08	4.598
Valid N (listwise)	795				

Dependent Variables [7]

Candidate choice and voter turnout in the following fourteen elections were used as the dependent or outcome variables in the WLS regression analysis:

1. 2001 Mayoral General Election (Bloomberg, Green)
2. 2001 Mayoral Election, Democratic Runoff (Green, Ferrer)

[6] All equations are run twice: first with African American, then with the West Indian Black ethnicity variable in the equation

[7] See Appendix B - "Dependent Variables," for the detailed list of variables.

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3. 2001 Mayoral Democratic Primary (Green, Ferrer)
4. 2001 NYC Comptroller, General Election (Thompson, Berman)
5. 2001 NYC Comptroller Democratic Primary (Thompson, Berman)
6. 2001 NYC Public Advocate, General Election (Gotbaum)
7. 2001 NYC Public Advocate, Democratic Primary (Gotbaum)
8. 2001 Brooklyn Borough President Democratic Primary (Gadsden, Markowitz)
9. 2000 US Presidential General Election (Gore, Bush)
10. 2000 Democratic Primary, 11th Congressional District (Owens, Clarke)
11. 1998 NYS Gubernatorial General Election (Pataki, Vallone)
12. 1998 NYS Comptroller General Election (McCall)
13. 1997 NYC Mayoral General Election (Giuliani, Messinger)
14. 1997 NYC Mayoral Democratic Primary (Messinger, Sharpton)

WLS Regression Analysis: ***Voter Turnout***

Several elections where ethnicity, class and gender significantly explained voter turnout and candidate choice are identified through this WLS model. It should be noted that a key aspect not addressed in this study is non-voting. A large body of literature discusses attitudinal and institutional factors affecting political participation.[8] The following highlights some key elections where ethnicity, class or gender mattered in voter turnout.

[8] See Piven and Cloward. 1988. *Why Americans Don't Vote*; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Teixeira 1992; also Matt Barretto, Mara Marks and Nathan Woods. 2004. *Are All Precincts Created Equal? The Prevalence of Low Quality Precincts In Low-Income and Minority Communities in Los Angeles.* CA: Center for the Study of Los Angeles. Restrictive voter registration laws, complicated ballots, inaccessible polling places, inept election administration, lack of personal motivation are some of the attitudinal and structural factors which can inhibit voter participation.

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Two important factors should be noted regarding the WLS analysis: 1) turnout for any "down ballot" race should be seen in light of the fact that the top race drives the overall turnout; and 2) separate WLS equations were run for the West Indian and African American independent variables. In the 2001 general election, for example, more people vote for mayor, than for City Comptroller or Public Advocate. Thus the Adjusted R^2 for "voter turnout" for the Comptroller and Public Advocate general elections is influenced by the mayoral contest. Secondly, all WLS equations were run twice for each dependent variable, with separate runs for the West Indian and the African American independent variable in the equation (all other independent variables remained the same in the equation).

1. 2001 Comptroller Primary Voter Turnout (Falloff): Ethnicity and Class Mattered

A hotly contested primary for the city's second most powerful position, Comptroller, pitted Jewish long time Canarsie Councilman Herb Berman against African American (actually West Indian ancestry) Board of Education President Bill Thompson. In this contest, the WLS Model accounted for a robust 44 percent of voter turnout (Adj. R^2 = .438). The highly significant predictors were *Race* (partial correlations: white .225 and Latino -.198), *Ethnicity* (African American .109; and West Indian -.190, equations) and *Class* (College Education .261 and Low Income -.159). *Gender* was not significant for turnout. Voter turnout was positively associated with whites, African Americans, and college educated; and negatively associated with Latinos, West Indians and Low Income.

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Table No. 5.05
Impact of Ethnicity, Class and Gender on
Voter Turnout

Candidates	Election	Adj. R^2
1. Bloomberg-Green	2001 Mayoral General Elec'n	65 pct. [9] (.650)
2. Ferrer-Green	2001 Mayoral Dem. Runoff	20 percent (.204)
3. Ferrer-Green...	2001 Mayoral Dem. Primary	24 percent (.243)
4. Thompson-Berman	2001 City Comptroller Dem. Primary	43 percent (.429)
5. Gotbaum-Colon...	2001 Pub Advoc. Dem. Primary	39 percent (.389)
6. Gadsden-Markowitz..	2001 Boro President Dem. Primary	29 percent (.287)
7. Gore-Bush	2000 Presidential Gen. Election	10 percent (.102)
8. Owens- Clarke	2000 11CD Congr'l Dem. Primary	29 percent (.285)
9. Pataki-Vallone	1998 Gubernatorial Gen. Elec'n	02 percent (.020)
10. Giuliani-Messinger	1997 Mayoral General Elec'n	03 percent (.025)
11. Messinger-Sharpton	1997 Mayoral Dem. Primary	01 percent (.012)

2. 2001 Mayoral Democratic Runoff Turnout: Race and Gender Mattered

In the contentious runoff between white liberal Public Advocate Mark Green and Puerto Rican Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer, the WLS model explained 20 percent of voter turnout. Only two predictors, Race (white, beta .412) and Gender (.129) mattered. Ethnicity and Class were not significant predictors of turnout in Black Brooklyn.

3. 2001 Public Advocate Primary Turnout: Race and Education Mattered

This diverse primary included: two Manhattan white women candidates, Betsy Gotbaum and Councilmember Katherine Freed; a Bronx Latino and well known musician, Willie

[9] This means that 65 percent of voter turnout on the Mayoral line in the 2001 General Election is explained by the Ethnicity-Class-Gender WLS equation.

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Colon; a white activist who was close to the Black community around police brutality issues, Norman Siegel; popular white Brooklyn Councilmember Steve DiBrienza and West Side white liberal Assemblyman Scott Stringer. The WLS model explained a robust 39 percent of voter turnout, with Race (white, beta .219 and Latino -.145) and Education (.329) as highly significant predictors. Black Ethnicity and Income did not matter; nor did Gender, even though two women candidates were in the election. (What is being measured here is partly fall-off from the mayoral voting.)

4. 2001 Borough President Primary Turnout [10]: Race and Education Mattered

This contest provided an opportunity for an African American female, Brooklyn Deputy Borough President Jeannette Gadsden to win against two white male candidates: Councilmember Ken Fisher and State Senator Marty Markowitz. The WLS model explained a respectable 29 percent of voter turnout. But only race (Latino -.211) and Education (.311) were significant predictors of voter turnout. (What is being measured here is partly fall-off from the mayoral voting.)

5. 2000 11th Congressional Primary: Race, Ethnicity and Class Mattered

This was a heated contest between West Indian Councilmember Una Clarke and African American Congressman and former mentor Major Owens. It was considered to be the seminal African American – West Indian electoral showdown in Black Brooklyn, a contest perceived to be sharply drawn along Black ethnic and possibly gender lines, in terms of voter turnout and candidate choice. The WLS model explained a respectable 29 percent of voter turnout. West Indian voter turnout was not significant; but African

[10] As noted above, the Borough President's contest is "down ballot" from the Mayoral primary. Thus it is partially measuring fall-off from the Mayoral voter turnout.

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American voters (-.182) significantly did not turnout. Gender was not a significant factor but Latino (-.351) and Low Income (-.275) were significant factors in voter turnout.

Table No. 5.06
Unstandardized WLS Regression Coefficients
For Ethnicity, Class and Gender

Dependent Variable: **Voter Turnout**
(*betas* in parentheses)

	2001 Mayor General	2001 Comptroller Primary	2000 Presid'l General	2000 Congr'l 11CD Primary
ETHNICITY				
Percent White	.159(.528)***	.050 (.225)***	-.028(-.067)	.019(.055)
Percent Latino	-.150(-.151)***	-.129(-.198)***	.236(.198)***	-.300(-.351)***
Pct. African American	-.019(-.033)	.043(.109)**	-.059(-.080)	-.081(-.182)*
Pct. West Indian	.019(.038)	-.064(-.190)***	.082(.132)*	.061(.164)
CLASS				
Percent BA Plus	.045(.063)	.123(.261)***	.086(.094)	-.019(-.040)
Pct. Low Income	-.149(-.255)***	-.062(-.159)**	-.145(-.198)**	-.124(-.275)**
GENDER				
Pct. Male NILF	.003(.042)	.050(.785)	.145(.355)***	.201(.113)
Constant	40.350***	20.124***	-11.859***	34.530***
Adjusted R^2	.650***	.429***	.101***	.285***

* p<.05 * * p< .01 * * * p<.001

6. 2000 Presidential Turnout: Race, Ethnicity, Class and Gender Mattered

Generally, presidential elections set the high water mark for votes cast, compared to gubernatorial or mayoral elections. Reflecting this pattern, in New York City the 1992,

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1996 and 2000 presidential voter totals were 2.1 million, 1.8 million and 2.3 million. While the 1989 and 1993 Guliani – Dinkins contests both had turnouts of 1.9 million; and the 2001 Bloomberg - Green Mayoral Election had a much lower voter turnout of 1.5 million (Hirsch and Mollenkopf 2003). The WLS model explained only 10 percent of Presidential 2000 voter turnout. Confirming the literature (Campbell 1960 et.al.), clearly presidential elections have major predictors other than ethnicity, class and gender which drive voter turnout.[11] In presidential 2000, Latino, West Indian, Income and Gender were significant predictors of voter turnout.

7. 1998 Gubernatorial Voter Turnout: Only Class Mattered

The WLS model explained almost none of the voter turnout, with an extremely low Adj R^2 of .020. Only education and income were significant predictors. That contest pitted incumbent Republican Gov. George Pataki against Democratic nominee, City Council Speaker Peter Vallone. Apparently, two conservative white male politicians on the ballot did not evoke significant turnout along the lines of race, ethnicity or gender.

8. 2001 Mayoral General Voter Turnout: Race and Class Mattered

The WLS model explained a robust 65 percent of voter turnout with highly significant predictors of Race (white .528; Latino -.151) and Class (Low Income -.255).

[11] The research literature identifies age, party affiliation, ideology, political activity, church attendance, union membership, polling place access, and other salient factors of presidential voter turnout. See Ruy Teixeira, Ruy. 1992. *The Disappearing American Voter*. Wash. DC: The Brookings Institution.

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Overall, the WLS voter turnout model of Ethnicity, Class and Gender worked best in a hotly contested, polarized mayoral general election, a heated city comptroller primary, and an ethnically contested congressional primary. The turnout model worked least in presidential and gubernatorial general elections. A partial explanation is that the model tested Black Brooklyn, where Blacks are heavily enrolled in the Democratic Party (nearly 80%). Thus Democratic primary turnouts (e.g. the Comptroller and congressional primaries) will have larger shares of Black voter turnouts than general elections, which have a larger share of white voters.

The WLS Model: Candidate Choice [12]

The Ethnicity, Class and Gender predictors in the WLS model were generally highly significant in explaining candidate choice, in the 14 elections studied.

2001 Mayoral. The model accounted for *90 percent* of voting for Bloomberg and Green in the general election. Coefficients for race, ethnicity, class and gender were all highly significant: white -.962 (against Green and for Bloomberg in the general, but for Green and against Ferrer in the runoff); African American -.051 (slightly against Green in the general, but for Ferrer in the runoff); West Indian .117 (for Green in the general, and against Ferrer / for Green in the runoff); BA plus .248 (educated for Green in the general); low income -.261 (thus higher income voters were for Green in the general); and male NILF -.079 (unemployed males were slightly against Green). In the primary, the model explained 77 and 72 percent of Ferrer and Vallone's vote, and a lesser 32 percent of Green's vote in the primary. The model explained *85 percent* of Green and

[12] See Tables Nos. 5.07 and 5.08 for prototype elections. See Appendix for additional WLS analyses.

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Ferrer's vote in the highly polarized Runoff. Ethnicity, class and gender were significant predictors in these elections.

2001 Public Advocate. The model explained 23 percent of Gotbaum's vote in the Primary and fully 50 percent of her vote in the general election. It explained 59 and 54 percent of the Primary vote for Colon and DiBrienza, respectively in the Primary.

2001 Boro President. The model explained a robust 73 percent, 62 percent and 55 percent of voting for Jeannette Gadsden, Markowitz and Fisher in this contest. Ethnicity, class and gender were all significant predictors of voting for Gadsden and Markowitz. Low income .141 and West Indian .715 voters were for, and African American -.503, college educated -.042, and unemployed males -.144 voted against Markowitz.

2000 Presidential. The model explained a powerful 83 percent, 82 percent and 66 percent of voting for Gore, Bush and Nader. Ethnicity, Class and Gender were significant predictors of voting for Gore and Nader.

2000 Congressional. The model explained 33 percent of voting for Owens and Clarke. Ethnicity, education and gender were significant predictors, with West Indians strongly voting for Una Clarke and African Americans strongly for Owens.

1998 Gubernatorial General Election. While the model explained also none of the turnout, it explained 82 percent of voting for Governor Pataki, with highly significant predictors of race (white .948) and class (low income -.305). There was high income voting, and poorly educated voting for Pataki (BA plus -.348). For Democratic challenger Peter Vallone, the model explained 80 percent of his vote with ethnicity, class and gender as significant predictors. White -.958, Latino -.068 and African American -

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.044 were negative predictors; while low income .258, BA plus .317 and West Indian .066 were positive predictors.

In the fall-off race on the same ballot, the model explained 76 percent of voting for incumbent African American State Comptroller Carl McCall, with ethnicity and class as significant predictors. Suprisingly, African American -.070, along with white -.925 and Latino -.047 were negatively correlated; while West Indian .064, low income .295, unemployed males .033, and BA plus .383 were positively correlated with voting for McCall.

1997 Mayoral. The model explained *87 percent* of voting for Giuliani in the general election: white .976, Latino .080, and West Indian .076 were positively correlated; while low income -.318, BA plus -.313, and African American -.079 were negatively correlated. In the closely contested primary, the model explained 50 percent of Ruth Messinger's vote: white .538, Latino .098, low income .121, BA plus .323, and West Indian .114 were positively correlated; while African American -.162 and unemployed males -.073 were negatively correlated.

The model explained 82 percent of Rev. Al Sharpton's primary vote: white -.939, Latino -.136, and West Indians -.047 were negatively correlated; while low income .085, BA plus .083, unemployed males .075, and African Americans .064 were positively correlated. Thus ethnicity, class and gender were significant predictors for Messinger and Sharpton in the primary; gender was not a significant predictor of voting for Giuliani or Messinger in the general election, but ethnicity and class were significant.

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Table No. 5.07
Unstandardized WLS Regression Coefficients
For Ethnicity, Class and Gender

Dependent Variable: **Candidate Choice**
Ethnicity, Class and Gender
(*betas* in parentheses)

	2001 Green Mayor-Gen.	2001 Ferrer Mayor-Runoff	2001 Thompson Comptr.-Prim.	2001 Markowitz Boro President
ETHNICITY				
Percent White	-.641(-.962)***	-.652(-.984)***	-.837(-1.019)***	.334(.503)***
Percent Latino	-.113(-.053)	.223(.123)***	-.162(-.068)***	-.393(-.212)***
Pct. African American	-.064(-.051)***	.123(.108)***	.141(.096)***	-.571(-.503)***
Pct. West Indian	.130(.117)***	-.063(-.062)*	-.101(-.080)**	.688(.715)***
CLASS				
Percent BA Plus	.382(.248)***	.122(.088)**	.496(.286)***	-.057(-.042)
Pct. Low Income	-.330(-.261)***	-.126(-.113)**	.195(.137)***	.157(.141)**
GENDER				
Pct. Male NILF	-.439(-.079)***	.390(.077)**	-.063(-.010)	-.690(-.144)***
Constant	72.559***	52.844***	58.322***	23.274***
Adjusted R^2	.894***	.854***	.807***	.616***

* p<.05 * * p< .01 * * * p<.001

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Gender Voting: Further Exploration

The gender variable used in the WLS analysis thus far is "males not in the labor force." This variable shows up in several elections as statistically significant. To further probe questions of gender voting such as, "Do women vote for women candidates, or vote differently than men?" I will now modify the original WLS equation for ethnicity, class and gender, using another census variable from the Center for Urban Research dataset: "2001 percent of female registered voters" (femrv01).

Gender and class are powerfully intertwined in a bimodal pattern in Black Brooklyn. As noted in the demographics chapter, a large number of African American women are lower SES, on welfare and have female headed households with children under 18 years of age. At the higher SES spectrum, a large number of West Indian women are middle and upper income and have higher labor force participation rates than their African American counterparts. Running collinearity diagnostics on the 'women registered voter' variable showed collinearity with class variables for education and income (as well as white and Latino). Thus the class and race variables were dropped from the equation for this particular research.

For the dependent variable candidate choice, a select number of contests involving women candidates (Messinger, Gadsden and Clarke; as well as the primary, runoff and general in the 2001 mayoral election) were tested against the independent variables of ethnicity (African American and West Indian variables were run in separate equations) and gender (2001 percent female registered voters). Findings are indicated in Table nos. 5.07 and 5.08 and discussed in the conclusions (Item 4).

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Table No. 5.08

Unstandardized WLS Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable: *Candidate Choice* (*betas* in parentheses)

Election	ETHNICITY		GENDER	
2001 Mayor Gen'l	African Amer. Equa'n	West Indian Equation	**Pct. Female Reg'd Voters** AA Equa'n	WI Equa'n
Bloomberg	.182(.141)***	-.455(-.402)***	-.035(-.353)***	-.027(-.257)***
Green	-.207(-.164)***	.469(.422)***	.035(.353)***	.026(.255)***
Constant B/G	36.212*** / 63.898***	54.499*** / 43.735***	---	---
Adj. R^2 B/G	.159*** / .169***	.288*** / .305***	---	---
2001 Runoff				
Green	-.070(-.061)	-.248(-.247)***	-.032(-332)***	-.024(-.242)***
Ferrer	.070(.061)	.248(.247)***	.032(.332)***	.024(.242)***
Constant G/F	65.136*** / 34.864***	62.578*** / 37.422***	---	---
Adj. R^2 G/F	.104*** / .157***	.157*** / .104***	---	---
2001 Primary				
Green	-.093(-.160)***	.146(.293)***	.006(.138)***	.004(.090)**
Ferrer	-.017(.019)	.145(.186)***	.014(.206)***	.011(.164)***
Constant G/F	40.242*** / 32.870***	31.826*** / 29.385***	---	---
Adj. R^2 G/F	.049*** / .041***	.106*** / .075***		

* p<.05 * * p< .01 * * * p<.001

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Table No. 5.09

Unstandardized WLS Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable: *Candidate Choice* (*betas* in parentheses)

Election	ETHNICITY		GENDER	
2001 Boro Pres.	African Amer. Equa'n	West Indian Equation	**Pct. Female Reg'd Voters** AA Equa'n	WI Equa'n
Gadsden	.511(.404)***	-.251(-.232)***	1.743(.351)***	1.873(.376)***
Markowitz	-.613(-.540)***	.446(.464)***	-.974(-.219)***	-1.201(-.271)***
Constant G/M	AA Eq.: -90.475*** / 136.778***		WI Eq.: -60.421*** / 101.316***	
Adj. R^2 G/M	AA Eq.: .258*** / .315***		WI Eq.: .159*** / .237***	
2000 Congr'l Primary				
Clarke	-.394(-.406)***	.300(.370)***	-.002(-.040)	-.002(-.040)
Owens	.394(.406)***	-.300(-.370)***	.002(.040)	.002(.040)
Constant C/O	AA Eq.: 69.712*** / 30.288***		WI Eq.: 37.699*** / 62.309***	
Adj. R^2 C/O	AA Eq.: .157*** / .157***		WI Eq.: .129*** / .129***	
'97 Mayor General				
Giuliani	-.048(-.029)	-.349(-.240)***	-.048(-.029)	-.039(-.300)***
Messinger	.043(.027)	.350(.049)***	.047(.379)***	.038(.004)***
Constant M/G	AA Eq.: 34.362*** / 59.756***		WI Eq.: 35.684*** / 60.793***	
Adj. R^2 M/G	AA Eq.: .044*** / .075***		WI Eq.: .052*** / .127***	
'97 Mayor Primary				
Messinger	-.065(-.101)**	-.075(-.133)***	-.010(-.209)***	-.008(-.159)***
Sharpton	.068(.049)	.295(.237)***	.031(.283)***	.023(.213)***
Constant M/S	AA Eq.: 34.779*** / 39.286***		WI Eq.: 31.217*** / 40.077***	
Adj. R^2 M/S	AA Eq.: .044*** / .075***		WI Eq.: .052*** / .127***	

* p<.05 * * p< .01 * * * p<.001

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Conclusions

Several findings emerge from this WLS regression models using ethnicity, class and gender to understand the dynamics of voter turnout and candidate choice in Black Brooklyn's electorate.

Finding # 1. The same voter turnout and electorate, voting at the same time, in different contests on the same ballot, can demonstrate different electoral responses along different demographics. For example, West Indian voting may be statistically significant in one contest on the ballot (2001 Comptroller's Primary) while not statistically significant in a parallel contest on the same ballot (2001 Public Advocate's Primary). Ethnicity can matter in voter turnout for one electoral contest; while Race and Education might matter for voter turnout in another contest, on the same ballot within the same overall electorate. This a new, more complex way of thinking about voter turnout (at least for this author)

One explanation is that the voters who show up at the polls on election day are actually really several different sub-electorates rather than one monolithic group. These sub-electorates respond in distinct ways to the varying political motivations and mobilizations. Some care more about the down ballot races than others. This illustrates how different demographic categories of voters make different political choices. Also very important in affecting electoral outcomes is, who does *not* show up at the polls due to demobilization, barriers to participation and other factors.

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Table No. 5.10

WLS Model for Ethnicity, Class and Gender
Candidate Choice Assessment

Candidates	Election	Adj. R^2
Bloomberg-Green	2001 Mayoral General Elec'n	90 pct.[13] (.903)
Ferrer-Green	2001 Mayoral Dem. Runoff	85 percent (.854)
Ferrer	2001 Mayoral Dem. Primary	70 percent (.701)
Green		32 percent (.316)
Hevesi		43 percent (.431)
Vallone		77 percent (.774)
Thompson	2001 City Comptroller General	85 percent (.854)
Thompson	2001 City Comptroller Primary	81 percent (.812)
Gotbaum	2001 Pub. Advoc. Gen. Elec'n	50 percent (.499)
Gotbaum	2001 Pub Advoc. Dem. Primary	23 percent (.232)
Siegel		32 percent (.319)
Colon		59 percent (.588)
DiBrienza		54 percent (.540)
Gadsden	2001 Boro President Primary	73 percent (.727)
Markowitz		62 percent (.616)
Fisher		55 percent (.546)
Gore-Bush	2000 Presidential Election	83 percent (.832)
Nader		66 percent (.661)
Owens-Clarke	2000 11CD Congress'l Primary	33 percent (.329)
Pataki-Vallone	1998 Gubernatorial Gen. Elec'n	83 percent (.827)
McCall	1998 State Comptroller Gen'l	63 percent (.634)
Giuliani-Messinger	1997 Mayoral General Elec'n	87 percent (.874)
Messinger	1997 Mayoral Dem. Primary	50 percent (.496)
Sharpton		83 percent (.828)

[13] This means that 90 percent of voting for Bloomberg and Green is explained by the Ethnicity-Class-Gender WLS regression equation.

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Finding # 2. For voter turnout, race mattered or was more consistently statistically significant (white and Latino voter turnout) more often than ethnicity (African American and West Indian turnout), class (Education and Income) or gender in Black Brooklyn's various electoral contests. This suggests that separately targeted African American and West Indian political mobilization did not produce significantly different voter turnout responses.

Finding # 3. Using "males not in the labor force" (NILF) as the gender variable, gender was generally not a statistically significant predictor of voter turnout, even when women were on the ballot in local electoral contests. Thus while women hold nearly a 60:40 percent edge in voter registration and in sheer numbers vote more than men, women's voter turnout is not any more statistically significant than male voter turnout.

Finding # 4. "Males not in the labor force (malnilf)," is a significant predictor of candidate choice in contests involving women candidates. A second gender variable "percent of female registered voters in 2001 (femrv01)," was tested to more directly address the question of female voting (see Table Nos. 5.08 and 5.09). assessing both gender variables, gender mattered in voting for Betsy Gotbaum in the 2001 Public Advocate Primary; for Jeannette Gadsden in the 2001 Borough President's contest; for Una Clarke in the 2000 Primary against Congressman Major Owens; for Ruth Messinger's mayoral primary and general elections. And gender voting also mattered in the 2001 mayoral general, runoff and primary election cycles.

In Black Brooklyn, female registered voters voted for Mark Green and against Bloomberg in the 2001 mayoral general election; for Ferrer and against Green in the Democratic mayoral runoff; and for both Green and Ferrer in the primary. Female

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registered voters voted for Jeannette Gadsden and against Markowitz in the Boro President primary. Women voters did not significantly vote for Clarke, but unemployed males voted against Una Clarke and for Owens in the congressional primary. Women voters voted for Messinger and against Giuliani in the 1997 mayoral general election; but in Black Brooklyn, women voted for Sharpton over Messinger in the mayoral primary.

Finding # 5. In terms of class, as defined by the two proxy variables of Education and Income, Education showed up more often as a significant predictor of voter turnout than Income. Also, class variables show up more strongly in the presidential and gubernatorial elections than in local elections.

Finding # 6. Presidential and gubernatorial election turnout seems to have a very different dynamic than local elections, where the ethnicity, class and gender model has much more explanatory power. While the model explained barely 10 percent of voter turnout in the presidential and gubernatorial elections; it explaining over 40 percent of voter turnout in certain municipal elections.

Finding #7. There is an important dynamic in terms of the role of ethnicity, class and gender as predictors of candidate choice. In several contests examined, the model explained nearly *90 percent* of voting for a particular candidate, particularly in municipal elections.

Finding #8. There appears to be yet another dimension to voter turnout and candidate choice with regards to the predictors of ethnicity, class and gender. While Black ethnicity, - "West Indian versus African American," may not be a statistically significant predictor of *voter turnout*, -- in some elections, it may be a statistically significant predictor of *which candidate* voters vote for, once they do come out to vote

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(candidate choice). For example, race (white and Latino) and class (Education and Income) were significant, but Black ethnicity (West Indian and African American) was not significant as far as *voter turnout* for the 2001 Mayoral Runoff. But when it came to *who* voters voted for in the Mayoral Runoff, ethnicity was a significant predictor with West Indians voting for Green and African Americans African Americans voting for Ferrer.

Finding #9. The ethnicity, class and gender model is much more robust in predicting voter turnout in municipal, state and local elections, accounting for 24 to 64 percent of voter turnout, depending upon the type of election (general, primary or runoff election for various offices) as well as the race, ethnicity and gender of the candidates in that particular election. Whereas in the presidential and gubernatorial elections, the model was almost nullified as a predictor of voter turnout.

Finding #10

There were several contests where ethnicity mattered and West Indians and African Americans voted differently for candidates: Bloomberg-Green mayoral general, Ferrer-Green mayoral runoff, Gadsden-Markowitz, Owens-Clarke, Sharpton-Messinger, Giuliani, McCall et.al. Ethnicity was the most prominent of the three predictors for candidate choice. White race and Latino were consistently strong components of the model as well, followed by class, with education a factor more often than income. Last in significance was gender. Latino voting was statistically significant for Fernando Ferrer in his Mayoral Primary and Runoff; and as well for Willie Colon in his Public Advocate Primary.

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African Americans were significantly positive and West Indians slightly negative on Sharpton (Mayoral Primary 1997). African Americans significantly voted for Major Owens and West Indians significantly voted for Una Clarke in the 2000 congressional primary. African Americans significantly voted for Jeannette Gadsden and West Indians significantly voted for Markowitz in the 2001 Boro President's race. In 1998, neither Black ethnic group significantly voted for Carl McCall in the Controller's race; while West Indians were significantly for Vallone over Pataki in the Governor's race.

African Americans voted more significantly for Bloomberg than West Indians. Confirming this trend, an Exit Poll [14] showed 27 percent of native born Blacks (African Americans) voting for Bloomberg; while only 20 percent of foreign born Blacks (West Indians) voted for Bloomberg. This finding was suprising, given the field interviews suggesting that West Indians were more inclined to be swing voters and vote Republican; and they appeared more attracted to the "businessman as politician' candidate model.

Part III: Ecological Regression Analysis

King's (1997) method of ecological inference modeling is an important statistical tool for addressing the statistical shortcomings of using standard regression modesl like OLS or WLS. (These models can occasionally generate impossible results, like a prediction that 106% of a group voted for a certain candidate.). Voting Rights Act enforcement by the federal courts and U.S. Justice Department and the related political process of legislative redistricting is one major arena which has relied heavily on ecological inference to analyze behavior of minority and non-minority voters. The U.S.

[14] The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Edison Media research & Mitofsky Int'l, NYC General Election, Nov. 6, 2001. Sample: 2,036 voters. USEMR2001-NYC4.

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Supreme Court in its 1986 *Thornburgh v. Gingles* case and its progeny has certified ecological regression as a valid tool for determining racial bloc voting and other standards in voting rights enforcement and litigation (King 1997; Grofman, Handley and Niemi 1992; Loewen and Grofman 1989).

The "ecological fallacy" comes about when one erroneously applies to individual level behavior, the data characteristics that are only available at an aggregate geographic level. Ecological inference modeling manages this problem and fairly accurately reconstructs individual level behavior and data relationships from aggregate data at certain geographic levels of analysis such as the election district level. An illustration of this ecological inference problem in the political science arena follows.

Assume that election district data on race, voter registration and candidate choice is available; and that in election district 1, the voting age population is 50 percent white and 50 percent Black; the voter registration is 50 percent white and 50 percent Black with 1,000 registered voters who are 50 percent registered Republican and 50 percent registered Democrat. Also assume that there was a 50 percent voter turnout in election district 1 in the 2000 presidential election, where Bush got 50 percent and Gore got 50 percent of the vote. It is an ecological fallacy to assume that 100 percent of Black voters voted for Gore the Democrat and 100 percent of white voters voted for Bush the Republican. For within the 500 voters who voted, there could be a range of Black and white voter turnout and candidate choice adding up to a 50% Bush and 50% Gore vote.

Gary King, a political scientist and statistician at Harvard University has developed an approach to ecological inference, as well as a computer program to implement it and takes advantage of the fact that no more than 100% of a group can

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behave a certain way (for background discussions on ecological inference see Robinson 1950, Goodman 1953, Kramer 1983, and King 1997). King cites seven characteristics of his EZI model which he believes make it a robust statistical tool:

> First, the solution is scientifically validated with real data... Second, the method described... offers realistic assessments of the uncertainty of ecological estimates...Third, the basic model is robust to aggregation bias...Fourth, all components of the proposed model are in large part verifiable in aggregate data...Fifth, the solution offered...corrects for a variety of serious statistical problems, unrelated to aggregation bias, that also affects ecological inferences...Sixth, the method provides accurate estimates not only of the cells of the cross-tabulation at the level of the district-wide or state-wide aggregates but also at the precinct level...
>
> Finally, the solution to the ecological inference problem turns out to be a solution to what geographers' call the "modifiable areal unit problem...But making valid ecological inferences is not usually possible without operator intervention. Valid inferences require that the diagnostic tests described be used to verify that the model fits the data and...the distributional assumptions apply. Because the basic problem is a lack of information, bringing diverse sources of knowledge to bear on ecological inferences can have an especially large payoff. (King 1997:17-22).

Adapting the equation model used in the voting rights arena to determine racial bloc voting, several variables were constructed in a special dataset (all values were computed as four place decimals except N value) to run in the EzI (voter turnout) and EI2 [15] (candidate choice) ecological inference models:

T = Percent ED voter turnout for specific election

$X_{(AA)}$ = Percent African American in ED (ethnicity variables are run separately in the equations)

$X_{(WI)}$ = Percent West Indian in ED

N = Total Population in ED (Voting Age Population and Registered Voters were also tested)

V = Percent Candidate Choice per ED (e.g. percent vote for Bloomberg)

[15] EzI version 2.7, April 14, 2003; and EI2, version 1.9, February 8, 2003 were downloaded from Gary King's website and used for this statistical analysis.

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Z_b = Co-Variate for class ("pcolplu0," strongest class variable identified in WLS regression analysis, percent with BA degrees or higher); and

Z_w = Co-Variate for gender ("malnilf" percent of males not in the labor force) (one or two co-variates can be inputted into the EI2 model).

The ecological inference equation is:

$$T \text{ or } V = B_1 X_{(AA \text{ or } WI)} + B_2 Z_b + B_3 Z_w$$

As illustrated below, T, X, N, V and Z variables are built into a dataset (the ADED column is left out of the dataset for the EZI and EI2 equations or they will not run):

ADED	(T)	($X_{WI, AA}$)	(N)	(V)	($Z_{b,w}$)
39001	0.6690	0.0449	495	0.2734	0.1618
39002	0.2885	0.7152	493	0.3367	0.2136
39003	0.5662	0.1324	488	0.2282	0.3030

For each equation estimated through EZI and EI2, the procedures generate "beta B" coefficients for every ED. For the EZI model, the beta B's are the percent voter turnout for the specific X value in the equation (African American or West Indian); and b) for the EI2 model the beta B's are the percent voting for Bloomberg etc. (candidate choice) in each election district. The EZI and EI2 equations also generate a series of statistics, diagnostics, tomography plots at various confidence levels (80 percent and 95 percent), and scatter plots with regression lines to help interpret the models.

Whereas WLS regression analysis produces only one summary Adjusted R^2 and partial correlations for each independent variable for the entire election dataset, EZI and EI2 ecological inference modeling also produces a coefficient for every election district within the dataset for both voter turnout and candidate choice. For the two most robust WLS ECG models, the 2001 mayoral general election and the 2001 city comptroller

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democratic primary, these EZI and EI2 coefficients have been mapped using MapInfo 5.5 a software package, to conduct a visual interpretation of possible geopolitical patterns in the estimated coefficients, on key questions of voter turnout and candidate choice in Black Brooklyn's elections.[16]

The recommended N value or weighting factor in EZI and EI2 is the total population per election district. Total voting age population as well as total voter registration were also tested in the equations, but population weighting seemed to be the most appropriate N value. Class and gender co-variates were also tested, with no significant impact on the output coefficients; and the model itself recommended dropping these co-variates. Population weighting may introduce a slight aggregation bias in the model in that African Americans (60%) have a higher CVAP rate than West Indians (48%) as the table below indicates. Thus the model may tend to slightly understate West Indian voter turnout and candidate choice.

Table No. 5.11
African American and West Indian Citizenship & Voting Age Popula'n (CVAP) Rates

	Citizenship %	Native Born Citizen %	VAP %	CVAP %
White	84%	68%	80%	65%
Afr.-American	95%	89%	65%	60%
West Indian	64%	22%	79%	48%

Source: Census 2000, PUMS data, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Grad. Center

[16] Olsen's (1997) highest Adjusted R^2 for voter turnout predictability with his Neighborhood Stability Model was 26%. The two WLS ECG Model elections selected for EZI and EI2 analysis have a much more robust 44% (Comptroller's Primary) and 65% (Mayoral General Election) for voter turnout; and 80-90% for candidate choice.

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Figure No. 5.01
EZI Estimates, African American Voter Turnout – 2001 Comptroller Primary
(N weight = VAP; Co-Variates included; GIS map of EZI Coefficients)



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Part IV: Spatial Analysis of Voter Turnout and Candidate Choice

A few key interpretations emerge from the spatial distribution of voter turnout coefficients for African Americans and West Indians in the 2001 City Comptroller's Democratic Primary. 456 of 754 EDs or 61% of EDs with West Indian population had less than 20 percent voter turnout; while 486 of 756 EDs, or 64% of EDs with African American population, had greater than 20% voter turnout. Overall, African Americans seem to have had a higher voter turnout than West Indians for candidate Bill Thompson (he is perceived as African American; but he is actually third generation West Indian.).

But less expected was *where* a significant portion of this higher voter turnout occurred. One would expect high African American voter turnout in traditional African American middle class neighborhoods like Clinton Hill and Stuyvesant Heights which did show up on the map. But there was also a high percentage African American voter turnout (but small numbers of African Americans) in significantly white and Caribbean, heavily middle class and home owner neighborhoods such as southern Flatbush, Canarsie and Mill Basin. These are areas where African Americans are beginning to grow as a share of the population.

This suggests at least two explanations. Perhaps there was a class bias in African American voter turnout with traditional low income, heavily public housing neighborhoods to the north in Bed-Stuy, Brownsville and East New York having lower voter turnout. (The Hirsch and Mollenkopf (2003) study confirmed lower voter turnout in public housing in the 2001 municipal elections). An overlapping explanation is the neighborhood contextual effect. African American voters living among white middle class home owners to the south, had higher voter turnout rates than in their low income

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Figure No. 5.02
EZI Estimates, West Indian Voter Turnout – 2001 Comptroller Primary
(N weight = VAP; Co-Variates included; GIS map of EZI Coefficients)



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Table No. 5.12

EZI Estimates – African American & West Indian Voter Turnout
City Comptroller Democratic Primary, 2001

ED Turnout	Afr.-Amer. Areas	West Indian Areas
40-100% *	11	3
30-40% *	74	10
25-30%	142	44
20-25%	259	241
15-20%	178	399
01-15%	92	57
Total EDs	756	754

Source: EZI Coefficients; and map legends, Figs. 5.01 and 5.02.
* This high voter turnout mainly occurred in white EDs of the 39th and 41st ADs.

neighborhoods to the north. Another possible explanation is that some of these "African Americans" in heavily white and Caribbean neighborhoods are actually West Indians who self identified in the census as African Americans (this would be another interesting phenomenon to research.).

Not surprisingly, West Indians' highest estimated voter turnout EDs were in Crown Heights South, East Flatbush and Canarsie, the more affluent sections of their community. However, an exception to this spatial analysis occurred where West Indians in their own middle class, home owning neighborhoods had lower voter turnout than African Americans. This suggests at least two explanations: a) less voting enthusiasm among West Indian than among African American voters for African American candidate

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William Thompson; and b) a smaller percentage of voters (adult registered citizens) in local neighborhoods, due to low West Indian CVAP rates. And this neighborhood contextual factor may have dampened West Indian voter turnout.

Overall, the EZI and EI2 estimates were comparable and complemented the WLS outputs. Spatial analysis techniques further complemented the process and enriched my analysis of the election and other data. The field interviews and demographic analysis previously noted that West Indians are more active in the labor market (higher labor force participation, more workers per family, higher home ownership etc.). Thus the heavily immigrant West Indian community may be less knowledgeable than African Americans concerning local politics, civic and political culture, and government services. West Indians may also be less inclined towards civic and political participation and voting, and more preoccupied with making a living and other economic pursuits.

Table No. 5.13
EZI Estimates, African American & West Indian Voter Turnout
Mayoral General Election, 2001

ED Turnout	Afr.-Amer. Areas	West Indian Areas
40-100% *	15	1
30-40% *	95	1
20-30%	297	8
10-20%	242	114
0-10%	12	406
Total EDs	661	530

Source: EZI Coefficients; and map legends, Figs. 5.05 and 5.07.
* Note: this high voter turnout mainly occurred in white EDs of the 39th and 41st ADs.

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This final stage of spatial analysis of mapped ecological regression coefficients looks at the 2001 mayoral general election, the exemplary election for the WLS ethnicity, class and gender model. It maps the distinct West Indian and African American ED patterns (Figures 5.03 and 5.04) in Black Brooklyn. It examines two EZI estimated 2001 voter turnouts in the Comptroller's primary and mayoral general election (see Figures 5.05 and 5.07; and Table No. 5.12 above) for African Americans and West Indians. And it examines an EI2 estimated map of voting for Bloomberg (Fig. 5.06) in Black Brooklyn.

Several distinct patterns emerge from the spatial analysis. First, the voter turnout for African Americans is much higher than for West Indians in both the Comptroller Democratic primary and the mayoral general election. Second, examining the Bloomberg voting pattern (Fig. 5.06), West Indian voting for Bloomberg is significantly higher than among African American voters. This confirms the ecological regression data on Black ethnic voting for Bloomberg, which was higher for West Indians and lower for African Americans. Thus in the 2001 Mayoral general election, there were clear Black ethnic differences in terms of candidate choice and voter turnout.

It is important to note that this finding appears to contradict the Exit Poll data cited earlier in this chapter (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Edison Media Research & Mitofsky Int'l, NYC General Election, Nov. 6, 2001.), which indicated that African Americans voted 27 percent for Bloomberg while West Indians voted a lesser 20 percent for Bloomberg. But, this exit poll data is *citywide,* and it is not disaggregated to the borough level, which the EI2 analysis is for Black Brooklyn, which is approximately 35-40 percent of the citywide Black electorate. Thus it is quite possible that Black ethnic groups were voting one way in Black Brooklyn, while they were voting differently in

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other African American and West Indian neighborhoods throughout the rest of New York City, in this highly targeted and polarized contest, with a high degree of demobilization (with 1.5 million votes cast in 2001, 300,000 fewer than in 1993). Further research beyond the scope of this dissertation, can help offer further insights and explanations to this and other interesting questions.

Conclusions

This chapter set out to statistically verify whether and how ethnicity, class and gender matter as predictors of candidate choice and voter turnout in the political behavior of Black Brooklyn. Studying 14 exemplary elections over a five year period 1997 – 2001, this project subjected election and demographic data to both linear regression (WLS) and ecological regression (EZI and EI2) analysis, supplemented with spatial analysis of voting patterns. These exercises clearly document that the census demographic variables for ethnicity, class and gender in a variety of elections and with a diversity of candidates are in fact statistically significant predictors of candidate choice and voter turnout in the political behavior of Black Brooklyn.

From the ecological inference models, approximately 800 ED level coefficients were mapped across the 9 assembly districts of Black Brooklyn. Visual analysis of these estimates confirmed the WLS regression findings and added nuances: 1) African American and West Indian voter turnout is higher in higher income areas and lower in poorer areas, particularly in public housing EDs; 2) African American voter turnout was higher than West Indian turnout in the 2001 Comptroller's primary; 3) African American voter turnout was higher than West Indian turnout in the 2001 Mayoral general election;

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Figure No. 5.03
EZI Estimates, African American Election Districts, 2001

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4) African Americans in white neighborhoods tended to favor Bloomberg more than those in African American areas, possibly the result of a neighborhood contextual effect and higher incomes (higher income areas voted more for Bloomberg according to the visual analysis as well); and 5) a higher proportion of West Indians than African American voted for Bloomberg; and the ecological regression and spatial analysis confirmed field interviews which signaled this stronger West Indian preference for Bloomberg.

Thus the linear and ecological regression and spatial analysis confirmed the earlier demographic findings which identified major differences in Black Brooklyn along the lines of ethnicity, class and gender which could translate into ethnically different political behavior. The final chapter of this dissertation will discuss the implications of these findings for the future political development of Black Brooklyn and other urban landscapes.

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Figure 5.04

EZI Estimates, West Indian Elections Districts, 2001



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Figure No. 5.05

EZI Estimates, African American Voter Turnout
2001 Mayoral General Election



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Figure 5.06

EI2 Estimates - Bloomberg Vote – 2001 Mayoral General Election

(+ 50% Bloomberg EDs are heavily white and mixed African African American and West Indian; Crown Heights Orthodox Jewish Lubavitcher EDs in map's center; and Mill Basin, Gerritsen Beach, Midwood white ethnic EDs to the south.)

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Figure No. 5.07
EZI Estimates, West Indian Voter Turnout
2001 Mayoral General Election



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Chapter 6

Black Brooklyn and 21st Century Urban Politics: Summary, Conclusions, and Future Prospects

Ethnicity, Class, and Gender

At the beginning of this research, I offered five reasons why the ethnicity, class and gender framework might be important for understanding the role of Blacks in urban politics, racial and ethnic politics, and minority incorporation theory:

1. The ethnicity, class and gender framework provides new ways of thinking about race. This framework allows us to disaggregate racial groups along key components which have significance for political behavior.

2. The ethnicity, class and gender framework provides powerful insights into intra-racial group cleavages which can pre-empt the broader process of incorporation. And it provides insights into how racial group solidarity can be developed in the face of cleavages and become a crucial prerequisite for minority incorporation and coalition building.

   Concentrating on how a monolithic 'minority' (e.g. Blacks) can be incorporated into the dominant white urban regime does not place enough emphasis on potentially important demographic differences *within* minority groups which drive their political behavior and crucially shape their political trajectories.

   The depth of a racial group's internal differences around ethnicity, class and gender, and the political management of these differences are key determinants of minority group solidarity, which in turn is a precondition for minority incorporation into the power regime, governing coalition, and broader political systems.

3. The ethnicity, class and gender framework identifies some of the key challenges facing multi-racial and multi-ethnic electoral and governing coalitions.

   Because of growing racial and ethnic diversity in American cities, successful electoral coalitions in urban politics increasingly require multi-racial and multi-ethnic and issue oriented coalitions. Mollenkopf (2003), Sonenshein (2003) and others point to the "anomaly" of minority led, multi-racial coalitions which fail to win elections in majority-minority cities. Examples include Dinkins' 1993 failure at mayoral re-election (an African American incumbent); and the failure of Ferrer for New York City mayor, and Villaraigosa for Los Angeles mayor in 2001 (Hispanic candidates).

   To better understand why multi-racial coalitions succeed or fail, research needs to focus on the racial and ethnic groups themselves as the unit of analysis, beyond

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examining the fault lines and failures of *inter-group* relations. Studying the internal dynamics of ethnicity, class and gender, and how these trends evolve towards either a politics of group solidarity or fragmentation, helps explain the success and failure of multi-racial and multi-ethnic coalitions.

4. The ethnicity, class and gender framework points to the challenges of, and the need for, visionary indigenous leadership, inclusive policy agendas, and mediating institutions.

   This dissertation will document that ethnicity, class and gender are powerful forces shaping political behavior in Black Brooklyn, and that the challenge to Black leadership is to articulate a shared vision and agenda, to better understand, affirmatively manage, and politically lead their Black ethnic communities and contest the forces which challenge their development.

   This research suggests that mediating institutions are part of the solution: a) the Black Church, and interlocking social and civic networks, where membership and leadership are ethnically integrated; b) educational institutions such as Medgar Evers College, in the heart of Black Brooklyn, serving African American, Caribbean American and Continental African constituencies; and c) labor unions such as Local 1199, District Council 37, the Transport Workers Union and others, with racially and ethnically integrated leadership and rank and file members.

   To be sure, these mediating institutions have their own inter-group and intra-group tensions, as microcosms of larger diasporan and societal groups, each with their own dynamics and cleavages. But in general, these mediating institutions help maintain peaceful co-existence, inter-group cooperation, and communication. For their own self-interested reasons of regime maintenance and institutional survival, they also promote group solidarity, political consciousness and multi-cultural understanding.

5. This project's ethnicity, class and gender framework critiques the "common racial fate" or "linked fate" theory of Black politics by Dawson (1994), Walton (1994) and others which argues that under certain conditions (e.g. national elections), race trumps ethnicity, class and ideology in directing Black political behavior. This research will turn linked fate theory on its head, and demonstrate that sometimes, Black ethnicity trumps or supercedes race.

   This research will critically examine Black Brooklyn's ethnic competition between African Americans and West Indians in relation to ethnic succession. The pluralists' "ethnic succession model" (Dahl 1962; Glazer and Moynihan 1967; Gerson 1990) focuses on how one group supplants or ascends to another group's place in the political hierarchy, generally ignoring the proposition that race matters in the timing and trajectory of succession. This study examines how Black ethnic sub-electorates behave differently; and how the Black political establishment and political entrepreneurs respond to, manage or exploit challenges and cleavages *within* Black Brooklyn's electorates to gain and maintain political advantage.

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> Cohen (1999) points out other weaknesses in linked fate theory. She criticizes it for erroneously assuming a racial homogeneity in Black political behavior. Through her analysis of Black leadership's lack of response on the AIDS issue, Cohen argues that "linked fate" underestimates the power of agenda setting, issues, ethnicity, class, gender, ideology and other factors which influence political behavior in Black New York City, the focus of her study.

This dissertation has documented how ethnicity, class and gender shape political behavior in Black Brooklyn. Also well documented is the challenge to Black leadership to articulate a shared vision and agenda, to better understand, affirmatively manage, to politically lead their Black ethnic communities, and to challenge the forces which confront them. This research suggests that mediating institutions that can help with the solution include: a) the Black Church, and interlocking social and civic networks, where membership and leadership are ethnically integrated; b) educational institutions such as Medgar Evers College, in the heart of Black Brooklyn, serving African American, Caribbean American and Continental African constituencies; and c) labor unions such as Local 1199, District Council 37, the Transport Workers Union and others, with racially and ethnically integrated leadership and rank and file members.

To be sure, these mediating institutions have their own inter-group and intra-group tensions, as microcosms of larger diasporan and societal groups, each with their own dynamics and cleavages. But in general, these mediating institutions help maintain peaceful co-existence, inter-group cooperation and communication. And, for their own self interested reasons of regime maintenance and institutional survival, they also promote group solidarity, political consciousness and cultural understanding.

The major hypothesis of this research project is that ethnicity, class and gender are important demographic variables which explain the politics of Black Brooklyn. This

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central hypothesis has been examined with three complementary research methodologies: a) a comprehensive analysis of the community demographics focusing on ethnicity, class and gender; b) qualitative field interviews of African American and West Indian elites to contextualize the issues of ethnicity, class and gender; and c) linear and ecological regression and spatial analysis to identify the statistically significant variables and geopolitical trends which explain voter turnout and candidate choice in the politics of Black Brooklyn. This research concludes that ethnicity, class, and gender are statistically significant factors in explaining Black Brooklyn's voting behavior. The schematic process diagram in Figure 6.01 depicts the ethnicity, class and gender or E-C-G Model.

This project substantiates the hypothesis that ethnicity, class and gender shape Black Brooklyn's politics, with possible application to other urban political settings. Black Brooklyn's political processes are taking shape within the broader context of economic restructuring, cultural and political evolution, and racial and ethnic transformations underway in New York City, America and on the global scene. Globally, we are at a point where cities are fast becoming the dominant human habitat, and the incorporation of the left out and locked out into the urban power structures of democratic societies is a crucial challenge for the governance and future of cities. And gaining greater insights into the powerful dynamics of Black urban and other communities, their structural constraints and facilitators, is an important achievement along the path to creating quality urban futures.

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Figure 6.01 The Politics of Black Brooklyn

ETHNICITY – Different cultural and historical experiences sometimes = different political outlooks, voting, ethnic competition & power relations. Populations are nearly equal but Afr.-Amers are still politically dominant because of incumbency, 1/3 of West Indians are non-citizens, and groups cross vote for each others' candidates.



The E-C-G Regression Model

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explains up to 90 % of Candidate Choice and 65 % of Voter Turnout.

CLASS – Persistent poverty for Afr.-Amers., rising Middle Class for West Indians with less welfare, more workers per family. Jobs are heavily in health, social services and education, low entrepreneurship rates. Educational levels are similar, with a gender gap. Aging black leadership class versus insurgent, disconnected young professionals.

GENDER – Men hold the power, women have more voters, but voting rates are similar. Women maintain families, social capital and community. Women have more college degrees, often better jobs than men, many female headed households. Older women accept male hegemony, younger women are fed up. Women do vote for women.

This narrative will reiterate this dissertation's three key hypotheses regarding ethnicity, class and gender, and discuss the research findings.

Hypothesis # 1 (Ethnicity) African Americans and West Indians have histories of racial oppression which fosters different concepts of race, ethnicity and identity. These different ethnic orientations are reflected in: a) significant differences in candidate choice and voter turnout; and b) significant Black ethnic voting for candidates representing their own ethnicity, in certain elections (the "ethnic attraction" sub-hypothesis).

Ethnicity. Elite interviewees noted that while they have race, color and African ancestry in common, African Americans and West Indians have different historical experiences with slavery, colonialism, and racism. With their different geographies, societies, and cultures, one group evolved as a racial majority and the other group as a racial minority. This has resulted in different social, economic, cultural and political orientations and different contours of power relations across their respective communities, within their respective communities, and in relation to the white political establishment. In Black Brooklyn, these two Black ethnic groups find themselves living and working in close proximity. At times they are politically mobilized and demobilized together, and at other times apart.

Throughout the 20th century, African Americans were numerically dominant in Black Brooklyn and West Indians were politically circumspect of this fact, and navigated their political destiny as an ethnic minority within the larger racial minority of African Americans who were the historical objects of American racism and discrimination. Perhaps the greatest example of this phenomenon was Hon. Shirley Chisholm, of West Indian ancestry who became overwhelmingly African American Black Brooklyn's first Black Congressperson from 1968 – 1982. (She died in January 2005.)

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However, the West Indian population has grown significantly since the 1960s, spurred by the Hart Celler Act of 1965 and subsequent immigration reforms. At the dawn of the 21st century, the West Indian ancestry population is nearly equal to that of African Americans in Black Brooklyn. This numerical equality sometimes plays itself out in the political arena with fierce ethnic competition for representation, patronage, and public goods and services. A few examples of these Black ethnic battles include: Andrews (AA) versus Stewart (WI) for a state senate seat in 1982 (Markowitz won); Andrews (AA) versus Clarke (WI) for a city council seat in 1991 (Clarke won); and Clarke (WI) versus Owens (AA) for Congress in 2000 (Owens won).

Several factors also mitigate this Black ethnic competition. First, mediating institutions such as the Black church, Medgar Evers College, networks of social and civic engagement, inter-marriage, common cultural activities such as the West Indian Day Parade, the Afrikan Street Festival, Kwanzaaa celebrations, and pan-ethnic or racial unity around common problems such as police brutality are among the socio-cultural and political ties that bind these two Black ethnic groups together.

Second, only 48% of West Indians are voting age citizens, while 60% of African Americans are, making the latter group more numerous in the Black Brooklyn electorate. Further, there are significant African American voting enclaves within heavily West Indian neighborhoods. And while there are periodic Black ethnic voting cleavages such as in the Owens-Clarke and Markowitz-Gadsden races studied here, there is also evidence of crossover voting for Black ethnic, white and Latino candidates such as West Indian and African American voting for McCall for State Comptroller; Vallone for Governor; Thompson for City Comptroller; Bloomberg, Ferrer, Green and Sharpton for

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Mayor; and other contests. By and large though, Black ethnic political warfare has been minimal, especially given the large numbers of these two groups; and their major differences. Three factors however, could rapidly undermine this ethnic equilibrium of "*pax africanus*:" 1) a rapid and significant increase in Caribbean citizenship, voter registration, and voter turnout [1]; 2) Caribbeans' continuing perceptions of a lack of political power sharing by African Americans; and 3) political entrepreneurs seeking to exploit potential Black ethnic cleavages.

Hypothesis # 2 (Class) Because of different socioeconomic characteristics of income, education, and labor force participation, different class orientations have emerged within and between the two ethnic groups. Income and education are significant predictors of candidate choice and voter turnout for certain kinds of elections.

Class. There are higher poverty and welfare rates in African American neighborhoods than in West Indian neighborhoods. Partly due to lower citizenship rates, there is less welfare in West Indian neighborhoods, more workers per household and higher labor force participation rates. West Indians hold more private sector jobs while African Americans have more government jobs. African Americans have a larger low income population, smaller middle income ($35-75,000), and smaller upper income households (over $ 75,000) than do West Indians.

West Indians also have higher home ownership rates, but importantly due to their spatial distribution in lower density, high 1-2 family home owner neighborhoods recently vacated by whites. There are also gender dimensions to class. The African American and West Indian communities both have more adult women than men; more women than

[1] The Caribbean electorate is growing. Lorraine Minnite's (2005) "New Americans Exit Poll Project" analyzed New York City immigrant voters in the 2000, 2002 and 2004 elections. Approximately 25% of the City voters were immigrants; and some 25% of the foreign born voters were mainly Black Caribbeans (although this figure also includes a number of Africans).

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men in the middle and upper income groups; more women than men with college degrees; and more women than men in poverty and not in the labor force.

There were occasional cleavages when examining the role of class (college degree and low income). Class variables were highly significant in voting for Bloomberg (negatively associated with low income and college degree); and low income was negatively associated, while college degree was positively associated with voter turnout in the 2001 mayoral election. Regression analysis, field research, and previous studies (Olsen 1997 et.al.) show education to be a dominant class variable, significantly associated with candidate choice and voter turnout in the many elections studied.

One of the overwhelming facts that emerges from the demographic analysis of Black Brooklyn is that West Indians are much better off in terms of household income, poverty, labor force participation, and home ownership rates. There are major cleavages in the class structure of African American and West Indian communities. West Indians have a larger, more solid middle class with more married couple families and more workers per family than African Americans. The surprising fact is that these class cleavages have not played out even more dramatically in the political arena.

One explanation is that politicians have been targeting ethnic and cultural cleavages between the two communities using West Indian ancestry as a proxy for class, rather than targeting an overt political message based on raw class appeal, such as favoring home owners or criticizing the poor. Field research documents that some segments of the Black middle class feel ignored by their Black politicians. And this middle class is growing in its demands for greater political attention and redress regarding quality of life issues, crime, home owner issues, retail services and amenities.

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Though numerically smaller than the West Indian sector, there is still a substantial African American middle class which has historically embraced its West Indian counterparts in its churches, networks of social and civic engagement and in its politics. This inter-ethnic bonding has probably helped mitigate ethnic and class conflict in the political, community and economic arenas.

Another possible explanation for minimal class conflict between African Americans and West Indians is that the "linked fate" theory may be at work in Black Brooklyn, bridging class divisions in much the same way that Dawson (1994) found it to operate in his studies of national black voting behavior in the 1984 and 1988 presidential election cycles. Regression analysis identified some instances where class and ethnicity were significant factors in candidate choice and voter turnout, and where ethnic divisions may perhaps mask class divisions, however.

The two class variables in the regression models were education and income. College education significantly explained voting for Mark Green in the 2001 mayoral general election; voting for Freddie Ferrer in the mayoral runoff; and voting for William Thompson in the City Comptroller's Primary. Low income significantly explained voting for Thompson and Markowitz in their primaries; and it was negatively associated with voting for Green and Ferrer in their contests. In terms of voter turnout predictors, Black ethnicity and gender mattered little, and the key class variable was income: higher income explained greater voter turnout. But concerning candidate choice, ethnicity, class and gender variables were all significant predictors. In other words these variables were less significant at explaining who comes out to vote, but they were better at explaining who they voted for. Field research also offers an assessment that an aging, incumbent

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Black political class is juxtaposed against an educated, young professional class which feels undervalued, disconnected, alienated and is given to political insurgency.

Hypothesis # 3 (Gender) Because of greater female voter registration in the community, one can expect: a) higher rates of female versus male voter turnout; b) significant female voting for female candidates (the "gender attraction" sub-hypothesis); and c) different candidate choice for male versus female voters in certain elections.

Gender. There are 100,000 more adult Black women than men in Black Brooklyn; and more women than men voters, though their turnout rates are statistically similar. Under certain conditions there is a "female vote" with black women voting for women candidates. In the 2001 Borough President's race, women with college degrees were significantly likely to vote for African American candidate Jeannette Gadsden. There was no women's vote for white candidate Betsy Gotbaum in the crowded 2001 Democratic Primary. But in the general election, black female headed households above poverty, and black females in the labor force were significantly associated with the vote for Gotbaum.

WLS regression analysis confirmed the field research that indicated that Black women were turned off by Una Clarke's display of ingratitude by challenging her former political mentor Majors Owens. Black females voted against Clarke and for Major Owens in the hotly contested 2000 congressional primary. Black females voted for Sharpton over Messinger in the hotly contested 1997 Democratic mayoral primary, but voted for Messinger over Giuliani in the general election. Women voted for Ferrer and Green in the primary, Ferrer in the runoff, and Green in the 2001 mayoral general election.

Field research documents older African American and West Indian women's perceptions that male power is hegemonic. Black women say that their deference to this

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arrangement is rooted in historical and psychological conditioning from the time of slavery when Black men were targeted for oppression and Black women needed to support their men. Younger, educated professional Black women interviewees however, reject this formulation. They voice an open challenge to male hegemony, which they feel is perpetuated by their young Black male peers. Overall, Black women's desire for positive gender relations is keeping a lid on potential gender wars.

The field research and the literature document that Black women sustain a rich social capital infrastructure including the Black church, social organizations and networks of civic engagement. But Black women believe that they hold subordinate leadership roles in the political arena. A number of Black women elected officials feel they are treated as second class citizens in the face of Black and white male hegemony. Many Black male elites agreed with these assessments; and both Black men and women felt that Black women were psychologically holding their own selves down.

According to the demographic and field research, women in both Black ethnic communities are dominant in middle and upper income strata as well as in educational attainment. This creates a high demand for the low supply of eligible, educated, income secure Black males. Black women critique this prized pool of Black males for unfairly leveraging their favored status to subordinate Black women in the job market, the political arena, and in their inter-personal relations.

In Black Brooklyn, less than half of West Indian adults are eligible to vote. But nearly two-thirds of African American adults are eligible. They do register and vote, which puts a damper on tendencies towards "West Indian political nationalism." Even the most predominant election district in this research is only 62 percent West Indian and

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fewer than 50 of 822 election districts are 50 percent or more West Indian, with the balance of population generally being African American. More than 200 election districts are 80 percent or more African American. The majority of actual voters in many significantly West Indian election districts, due to high non-citizenship rates for West Indians, are African Americans.

From the 14 elections studied, the regression analysis documents significant instances of ethnic, class and gender based voting. West Indians rallied around the candidacy of their long time, popular State Senator Marty Markowitz, running for Borough President. African American voters were equally as loyal to the African American candidate Jeannette Gadsden. West Indian voters rallied around West Indian City Council member Una Clarke. Women voters significantly voted for Betsy Gotbaum, Ruth Messinger, and Jeannette Gadsden. And they seemed to politically punish Una Clarke for turning on her mentor, Major Owens (though not significantly).

Ethnicity, class and gender were statistically significant and mattered more powerfully as predictors of candidate choice than of voter turnout. Ethnicity, class, and gender were more powerful predictors in the municipal elections than statewide and presidential elections. Given these findings, this project argues that a minority incorporation theory needs to recognize that ethnicity, class, and gender matter. These demographics influence the political trajectory of the minority group as they contend for access, influence, and incorporation; and for ownership of their local politics, governance and power structures, all of which will define the trajectory of their political development.

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On the national level, in November 2004 George Bush was re-elected President. Federal budget deficits are growing and major cuts in federal spending are looming at a time when the shrinking size, low seniority, and minority party status of New York City's congressional delegation gives it the lowest political clout in Washington in decades. New York State, already facing billion dollar state budget deficits, was dealt another blow in November 2004 with a court mandated "Campaign for Fiscal Equity" settlement ordering billions in state funding increases for New York City public schools. New York City is also facing multi-billion budget deficits while looking to spend billions on city economic development projects including a new West Side stadium, the 2012 Olympics, Javits Convention Center expansion, a Brooklyn sports stadium, and Lower Manhattan redevelopment.

New York and the nation are in an era of fiscal austerity, reduced spending for social programs, and tax cuts which reduce government revenues at a time when the Black Brooklyns of America direly need funding for affordable health care and housing, public education, jobs and training. How Black Brooklyn's political leadership manages these challenges will not only determine their own political futures, but will also determine the future trajectory of Black Brooklyn's political, economic and social development for the foreseeable future.

Additional Research...

Additional research should be conducted on several fronts to replicate and verify the findings of this project. Firstly, a more comprehensive set of elections and census demographics can be utilized to confirm this research and to surface additional insights. Secondly, this study should be replicated using other racial and ethnic groups. The

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Hispanic and Asian electorates in New York City are growing and becoming increasingly more diverse. Many of the same questions and more, concerning the voting behavior of African Americans and West Indians, can be asked about Puerto Rican, Dominican, Mexican and Central and South American voters. Chinese, Korean and Indian voters can be studied similarly. Comparative city studies can use the ethnicity, class and gender framework to study how Hispanics vote differently or the same in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and Miami. Key questions might be addressed such as: "Is there such a thing as a "Pan Asian" or "Hispanic" voting bloc, driven by the linked fate imperative which one finds with the Black electorate?"

Brooklyn's racial and ethnic political wars of liberation, minority political incorporation and Black political empowerment transpired over the second half of the 20th century. The major impetus came from accomodationist, factional, insurgent and anti-machine political mobilizations to achieve racial and ethnic succession. Legislative redistricting, the Voting Rights Act, grassroots political mobilization, term limits, and campaign finance reforms were important factors as well.

In the 21st century, new battlegrounds are confronting Black Brooklyn politics and leadership around dimensions of ethnicity, class and gender. The question is no longer just "How are Blacks, Latinos, or Asians being incorporated into the white political establishment ?" New questions must be asked and answered if we are to understand the impacts of America's explosive urban immigration and growing racial and ethnic diversity in gateway cities such as New York.

New lines of inquiry include: "Are ethnic and national groups communicating, let alone coalescing, with one another, if so how and through what mediating institutions?"

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"Is there power sharing taking place among African Americans, West Indians and Continental Africans? – Among Puerto Ricans, Dominicans and Mexicans ?" "What do they have in common and what are their differences in terms of politics, policy, power and public service demands ?" "Are their new emerging racial, pan-ethnic, cultural and political identities ?" "Who and what are these identity shapers, and how is this process playing out ?" "Are internal issues of gender inequality and class divisions inhibiting group political development, representation and policy input?"

In heavily immigrant gateway cities like New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, Chicago, Phoenix, and Miami, the answers to these questions will tell us much about the present and future of city, state, national and even global politics, policymaking, and governance. And the answers will define the prospects for human sustainability and livability in the built urban environment where half the world's population will soon reside.

This research project began with the theoretical framework of "minority incorporation theory" of Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1984, 1997, 2003) and others. In this framework, the politically excluded contest for access to city politics, power and government. They achieve power when they wrest concessions from an unwilling city hall, when they win elective office against determined opposition, and when they succeed in forming a coalition that defeats an incumbent group. A powerful precondition for that process is for minority groups to be able to cross racial and ethnic boundaries in the pursuit of political equality. They can be greatly constrained by the internal dynamics of their communities around ethnicity, class and gender.

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Future Prospects

Two scholars on racial and ethnic politics, Reuel Rogers and Raphael Sonenshein have published recent works offering insights into the future of Black Brooklyn and its politics of ethnicity, class and gender. Sonenshein (2003) in his article on "Post-Incorporation Politics in Los Angeles," describes the highly fluid cross racial coalition politics in the post-Bradley era. He identifies three key elements for the success of electoral and governing coalitions: strong, creative leadership, common interests, and shared ideology. Evolving coalitions no longer replicate the traditional Black centered, bi-racial coalition model of Bradley's 20 year mayoral regime. Today, Blacks, Latinos, Asians and whites are all key potential coalition allies and sometimes adversaries in pursuit of the political stakes and prizes, and the levers of power and policy in the "mix and match coalition politics of the post-Bradley era."

A case in point was the hotly contested, racially charged 2001 mayoral election. Former Assembly Speaker Antonio Villaraigosa finished first in the non-partisan April primary with 30 percent of the vote from Latinos, whites and Jews. While white liberal City Attorney James Hahn got 25 percent of the vote, with overwhelming Black support. In the general election, Hahn defeated Villaraigosa 54 percent to 46 percent with major Black and Republican votes, and a split white vote; while Villaraigrosa got overwhelming Latino votes and substantial Asian and white votes.

It should also be noted that there was a second Latino running for citywide office on the ballot at the same time as Villaraigosa. Rocky Delgadillo won the City Attorney's race with overwhelming Latino votes as well as a majority of Black votes. Key issues in the mayoral campaign included potential secession of alienated white suburban voters in

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the San Fernando Valley; Latino political incorporation, and police reform. Other issues included Black versus immigrant conflicts over Korean domination of the small business economy in the Black community; Black versus Latino job market competition; fear of crime and gang violence; and police brutality and corruption (pp.51-75).

Sonenshein's prognosis for Los Angeles, is applicable in many ways to Black Brooklyn and New York City. On the state of minority incorporation in Los Angeles politics and governance, Sonenshein concludes that:

> ...(M)inority politics in the twenty first century is likely to be played simultaneously in several dimensions, with cross-cutting and shifting alliances. Issues of class and ethnicity are likely to re-emerge centered around the social and economic incorporation of immigrant communities...As city leaders devised new council district boundaries following the 2000 census, these issues came into focus...Thus the politics of race, ethnicity and place emerged as key factors in the new Los Angeles...(There is a) thin line between conflict and coalition...
>
> The political future is up for grabs...(T)emporary voting alliances have formed...Blacks are now both status quo defenders and insurgents. Latinos are Democrats...but ethnically assertive...Jews are Democrats, often liberal, but...worried about crime...(N)ew divisions based on a two headed minority search for power and the weaker attachments between groups have created an atmosphere of shifting alliances and coalitions. With liberal ideology fragmented, it is harder than before to identify and pursue a progressive agenda...(T)he path to coalition and incorporation will likely depend on flexible and movable coalitions. The new Los Angeles confirms the power of minority incorporation...(but) the framework of ideology, interests, and leadership that animated the movement for minority incorporation will be profoundly altered in the years to come. (pp.73-5)

Reuel Rogers (2004) in his article entitled "Race-Based Coalitions Among Minority Groups: Afro-Caribbean Immigrants and African-Americans in New York City," addresses the question of how immigrant groups "alter the coalition dynamics in demographically diverse cities such as New York and Los Angeles, where alliances are a do-or-die fact of political life." He notes that minority group scholars predict that American racism and discrimination will predispose new immigrant minorities to forge race based, rainbow coalitions and alliances with native born African Americans. In

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essence, race trumps ethnicity and class in their "linked racial fate" model (Dawson 1994; Tate 1993). However, Rogers cites New York, Los Angeles and Miami as cities where these coalitions fail to occur, noting that inter-group relations "are marked more...by conflict than cooperation" and the question is "Why?" (p.283-4).

Rogers' examines the case of African Americans and West Indian immigrants in Brooklyn. Based on 15 field interviews of West Indian elites in 1996-7, Rogers concludes that race is a double edged sword (pp.301-313). There are racial commonalities between the two groups and race can be a rallying point for coalition building. But it can also "heighten divisions among racial minority groups by emphasizing some interests over others." Rogers finds that this conflict of interests occurs significantly around "descriptive representation," and that "two key New York City political institutions, -- it's parties and elections – have tended to undermine the intra-racial commonalities" between African Americans and West Indians. [2]

Rogers argues that this happened because the legislative redistricting process has positioned these two Black ethnic groups in fierce competition in place-based political wars to maintain or secure local political representation for their respective communities:

> The question is how the immigrants have come to value ethnic over racial representation...New York's elective institutions may very well dispose them to do so. The City's electoral structure encourages groups to organize and think of themselves primarily as ethnic cohorts, rather than as racial constituents. Electoral jurisdictions...closely follow the outlines of ethnic neighborhoods...(They are) the fundamental unit of the city's political cartography...the institutional logic of the city's electoral districts. Once institutional arrangements are in place, they tend to influence

[2] I differ with Rogers on this point. In 1991, Carl Andrews (African American) and Una Clarke (West Indian) closely contested the North Flatbush Council seat drawn for West Indians (I supported Clarke). But West Indian, Kendall Stewart achieved victory in the adjacent East Flatbush seat from among West Indian candidates at the same time. And in 1992, West Indian, Nick Perry won an Assembly seat drawn to empower West Indians from among a field of West Indian candidates. Historically, at times campaigns and elections have empowered the West Indian minority in a predominantly (until 2000) African American Black Brooklyn (E.g. Baker, Chisholm, Jones, Stewart, Thompson, Lewis, Griffith et.al.)

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> how elites understand their interests, their ties to constituents, and their relations with other groups...fulfilling the logic of the district's original design...It is no wonder, then, that relations between Afro-Caribbeans and African-Americans have been plagued by interethnic tensions over descriptive representation... (pp.301-313)

Another conflict of interests is that African American politicians are opposed to West Indians being catered to separately in terms of political mobilization and negotiation, and see this as undermining the political leverage of the larger Black community. West Indian elites, on the other hand, see this as a self aggrandizing position of African American elites who are politically dominant and refuse to share power, or to empower West Indian leadership:

> As the dominant minority group in the Democratic Party, in fact African Americans have been able to control a significant share of the material rewards. Mobilization by Afro-Caribbean newcomers...could ...threaten their hold on these political prizes. Entrenched African-American elites thus have a rational interest in maintaining the status quo and resisting Afro-Caribbean mobilization...The ascension of an Afro-Caribbean to political office could mean the replacement of an African-American incumbent...Battles over political turf and representation...thus devolve into zero sum struggles... (pp.301-313)

Rogers cites the Black ethnic political dynamics in the 1985 mayoral election, where an African American led "Coalition for a Just New York" sought to unify opposition to incumbent Mayor Ed Koch, who was very unpopular in the minority and progressive communities. Simultaneously, a group of Brooklyn's West Indian leaders organized a "Caribbeans For Koch," Committee, causing a major rift with African American leadership. [3]

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[3] Here are a few more details on the political dynamics. In 1982, Black Brooklyn backed Cuomo for Governor, while Harlem backed Mayor Koch. Brooklyn also elected two Black congress members, Owens and Townsin 1982. In 1984, Black Brooklyn provided the statewide leadership for Jesse Jackson's strong showing in the presidential primary (Vann was State Chairman). In 1985, Vann ran for Brooklyn Boro President. One interpretation was that Harlem moved to undercut Black Brooklyn's political ascendancy, especially with Brooklyn considering support of ex-Bronx Boro Pres. Herman Badillo for Mayor. (Badillo was a political rival of Manhattan Boro Pres. Percy Sutton. They both ran for Mayor and lost in 1977.) Harlem and

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Rogers also cites the 11th Congressional district primary in 2000 between incumbent African American Congressman Major Owens and West Indian Councilmember and former Owens protégé, Una Clarke. Owens' position was that Clarke was dividing the Black community; Clarke's position was that Owens was ineffective and stifled West Indian political empowerment in the heavily Caribbean congressional district.

Rogers observes that there are "limits of racial solidarity," noting that:

> ...(A)ppeals to racial solidarity often implicitly privilege one set of interests over others without any open debate. Even worse, the resulting bias takes cover beneath the rhetorical gloss of "natural" or "collective" racial interests that benefit the population as a whole. Consequently, interests that ought to be debated or evaluated for how they affect different constituents are instead deemed to be settled and beyond question...(T)he group that happens to have more influence...has the advantage of framing the agenda this way. African-American elites in New York thus have often taken the lead in prescribing what is required for a race-based alliance or minority empowerment, even if that agenda is not necessarily conducive to the interests of Afro-Caribbeans or other non-White groups... (pp.301-313)

Rogers also speaks to the need for mediating institutions to bridge the Black ethnic divide:

> If New York's electoral institutions have encouraged or exacerbated the interethnic conflicts between Afro-Caribbean and African-American political leaders, the absence of certain other kinds of institutions have made those differences difficult to bridge...Institutions are equally as important as interests, ideology, personal relations and leadership for cultivating and sustaining coalitions...(C)oalitions require an institutional mechanism for expressing and mobilizing substantive, shared racial interests... (I)nstitutional networks have been critical to successful inter-group coalition building...The absence of such an institutional vehicle for New York's Afro-Caribbean and African-American political leaders largely explains their failure to override interethnic tensions and build an enduring race-based alliance...(P)olitical leaders looking to foster race based alliances must turn to neighborhood and community institutions. (pp.301-13)

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others pushed through the late endorsement of Harlem Assemblyman Herman Farrell. Koch won and Farrell lost badly. In Brooklyn, Vann lost his bid for Boro President, and he and the CCE lost political clout as well. Thus while African American were in the midst of mayoral politics with Harlem, Brooklyn Caribbeans split off and went their separate way.

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Ten Key Challenges of Black Political Leadership

"A Ten Point Program"

From this research on Black Brooklyn, one can distill ten key challenges and goals confronting its political and broader leadership:

1) closing the gender gap: fighting sexism and the political inequality of women; and diffusing gender wars: building better male – female relations;

2) confronting the gender mismatch: the absence of men in college, the community and the labor market; dismantling the prison industrial complex;

3) promoting independent, and multi-party politics; moving beyond the Democratic Party, and exercising more political options;

4) closing the generation gap: promoting youth; leadership development, and succession planning;

5) promoting citizenship, political participation, civic education, and community action among citizens and non-citizens alike;

6) forging inter-ethnic, inter-racial and multi-cultural understanding, alliances and coalitions;

7) an inclusive policy agenda: immigration, education, housing, jobs and training, entrepreneurship, police community relations, health and mental health, day care, drug treatment, quality of life et.al.;

8) research, advocacy and technology in service to planning, managing and agenda setting, campaigns and elections;

9) building a shared vision, values, ideology and political culture; and

10) building the collective will and political resources; and the intellectual, social and political capital, to achieve and sustain the goals cited above.

Sonenshein's and Rogers' assessments of minority incorporation seem to be on target regarding the necessary ingredients for coalition building and political mobilization, the need for inclusive multi-racial and multi-ethnic electoral and governing and electoral

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coalitions, and the need for creative leadership and mediating institutions to make those alliances and coalitions durable. I submit that these features apply to the case of Black Brooklyn and its politics of ethnicity, class and gender.

This dissertation tests and proves that ethnicity, class and gender shape the political behavior of African American and West Indian neighborhoods of Black Brooklyn; and frames their relations with other racial and ethnic groups, interest groups, and stakeholders in the larger power structure. These findings have broader relevance for understanding how and why racial and ethnic groups seek alliances and coalitions, and contend for urban power and incorporation in America's growing racially and ethnically diverse cities.

America is still an imperfect, predominantly white society with a legacy of racial discrimination. Racial and ethnic minorities of color are fast becoming majorities throughout America's major cities, as they are in a continue their long quest for political equality, economic empowerment, and social justice. They must form multi-racial, multi-ethnic coalition politics to achieve these goals. A racial, ethnic and coalition politics of color, which is devoid of substantive issues, interests and policy agendas is "like a tinkling brass, a sounding symbol...signifying nothing." Some Black and other political leadership today, still does not fully comprehend or embrace the paradigm shift in American urban politics, which is driven by changing demographics, changing politics, and serious public policy debates.

Beginning in the 1960s, a powerful Black led, progressive, Black-white, bi-racial, bi-polar model (with Hispanics and Asians as second tier supporters) prevailed in many cities. That remarkable winning streak elected Black mayors Carl Stokes (Cleveland),

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Gary Hatcher (Gary), Kenneth Gibson (Newark), Tom Bradley (Los Angeles), Coleman Young (Detroit), Ernest Morial (New Orleans), Maynard Jackson (Atlanta), Harold Washington (Chicago), Wilson Goode (Philadelphia), Norman Rice (Seattle), Wellington Webb (Denver), David Dinkins (New York City) and Willie Brown (San Francisco).

But beginning in the 1990s and into the 21st century, business oriented, centrist-conservative, multi-racial, multi-polar models have arisen to displace some of these successes. Largely due to immigration and urban migration, Asians and Hispanics, and in New York, Afro-Caribbeans, now powerfully emerge as critical voting blocs in urban electorates. This model is exemplified by the mayoral regimes of Riordan then Hahn in Los Angeles, Giuliani then Bloomberg in New York City, Daley Jr. in Chicago, and Rendell in Philadelphia (now returned to a Black mayor, John Street).

Sonenshein (2003b, p.351-2) goes so far as to announce a political funeral: "We have reached the end of a great wave of American minority politics: the experiment in minority incorporation...Like all waves, it will continue to flow unevenly...We should ask...Where do we go from here? In the answer to this question, the meaning and potential of multiracial coalitions will emerge."

I partially agree with Sonenshein's (2003b, p.354) conclusions that:

> As an organizing principle for new progressive multiracial coalitions, color is an unreliable glue. As a bond for coalitions, using ethnicity rather than addressing the serious economic and social issues of community life will have the paradoxical effect of exacerbating coalition tensions. The evidence is that there must be goals beyond race relations to make coalitions succeed. Coalitions must be able to make a difference, to cut deeper, and to provide leadership.
>
> ...(G)ood will is not enough, but neither is cold self-interest...(C)olorblindness distorts the realty of American life, color alone is an insufficient basis for enduring coalitions...We can neither be color-blind nor color-coded...The struggle for equality...requires leaders who can create – and sustain – enduring systems of belief, manage conflicts of interest, promote interest alliances, and cross society's racial and ethnic barriers, in the interest of a humane vision for the whole society.

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> Minorities must continue...to be part of the leadership coalitions...and to engage in the battle to frame public issues. These struggles inevitably call for communication and coalitions,...and...connecting the aspirations of minorities to such broad symbols of good governance as reform, efficiency, and responsiveness.

I do not concede that Black urban America should now be at the "funeral" stage of a "post-incorporation" era, however. Black New York City, Black Chicago, Black Los Angeles, and elsewhere still have not achieved permanent incorporation into the urban power structure. Instead, they have politically retrogressed in their post-Dinkins, post-Washington, post-Bradley eras. They must fight on -- but now with new visionary leadership, new political strategies and tactics, new (and old) coalition partners. And they must craft and negotiate new, inclusive policy agendas that transcend race, narrow parochial self interests, and the potential fissures of ethnicity, class and gender.

Metropolitics - Place Based Coalitions

Coalition building must not only be race based, but *place* based as well. Peterson in *City Limits* (1981) describes the structural limits of urban capacity imposed by inter-governmental and macroeconomics forces. Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2001) in their work *Place Matters,* promote the need for central cities to strategically link their policy agendas to surrounding suburban jurisdictions as matter of political survival and advancement. Browning, Marshall and Tabb (2003b) describe the 21st century as "the Suburban Century" noting that:

> Not only white population but also its taxable wealth and the investments of corporations are being suburbanized. Migration to the suburbs has decreased the electoral power of central cities and increased the concentration of minority populations in them. At the same time, the minority populations of central cities face severe and intractable problems, and their cities are losing resources to cope with them. (p.377)

There is little placed based coalition building occurring within Black New York to mediate the inter-borough political tensions which are powerfully playing out through the

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borough based political institutions: five Democratic Party County organizations, each franchising its own loyal Black submachine(s), allies and factions. Black Brooklyn, Black Queens, Black Manhattan and the Black Bronx rarely come together around larger political and policy agendas such as: electing Presidents, Governors, Mayors or Speakers; or stadium projects; or city and state minority business laws; or AIDS funding; or the Black male unemployment crisis; or failing public schools.

Precious few, faltering, mediating institutions come close to bridging this gap. They include: the NYS Council Of Black Elected Democrats (COBED); the NYS Black, Puerto Rican, Hispanic and Asian Legislative Caucus; and the NYC Black, Hispanic and Asian Legislative Caucus. All three are organizationally challenged by borough, racial, ethnic and gender factions.

The solutions to these challenges lie in the public, private, and non-profit sectors. Central city economic development, both mega projects and smaller scale, as well as retaining, attracting and expanding the middle class and working class will increase a city's tax and revenue base. Another solution lies in the inter-governmental sector, creating interlocking, mutually beneficial, win-win agendas through masterful negotiations around budget and policy making, taxing and spending. But these transactions can only be conducted by visionary, trusted, highly competent, multi-lateral leadership, operating among and between eclectic, fragile and fleeting, issue based and multiracial coalitions which marry the "strange bed fellows" of inner city policy and programmatic requirements with suburban, state, national, and even global political and economic interests.

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Ending Democratic Party Monopoly: Multi-Party and Independent Politics

Since the election the election of Black Brooklyn's first legislator in 1948, nearly 80 percent of the electorate, and 100 percent of the legislators have been loyal members of the Democratic Party, which has had a lock on the politics of Black Brooklyn for the past 60 years. This was not always so. Black America overwhelmingly supported the Republican Party, the party of the "Great Emancipator," President Abraham Lincoln, from the Civil War era through the 1930s partisan realignment and birth of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" Democratic Party (J.H. Franklin 2004; Carmines and Stimpson 1989). A number of Black New Yorkers have supported the moderate Republicanism of President Eisenhower, Gov. Nelson Rockefeller, Sen. Jacob Javits and Mayor John Lindsay in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's. In the 2001 Mayoral election, an estimated 20-25 % of Blacks voted for Michael Bloomberg, the highest percentage Black vote for a Republican in decades.

Black Brooklynites seem to have historical and political amnesia, some of which is promoted by political entrepreneurs with agendas other than Black political empowerment. It was in part, the American Labor Party and Republican challenges to the Democratic machine in Bed Stuy, that forced the Brooklyn Democratic machine to anoint their submachine operative, Bertram Baker as Black Brooklyn's first elected official in 1948. Al Vann ran on the Vanguard Independent Party line in November 1972, after being knocked out of the Democratic Primary contest. This laid the groundwork for political victory and election to the State Assembly in 1974.

Both Al Vann and Roger Green were knocked off the ballot by the Democratic machine in the 1980s, and were only able to maintain their political survival, by running

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on the Liberal Party line. Black Brooklyn political organizers and the electorate, were key factors in the independent Democratic, history making Jackson 1984, Jackson 1988, and Dinkins 1989 campaigns. And in a 2003 special election, Leticia James was elected to the City Council on the Working Families Party line. Thus Black Brooklyn is no stranger to third party and independent politics.

In recent times, there has been an unhealthy, over concentration of Black politics and power in the Democratic Party. As a consequence, when Democrats are out of power at the city, state or national levels, as is largely the case today, so too is Black Brooklyn, and indeed are all Black Democratic politicians -- unless they "sneak in through the back door." Because of its overwhelmingly Democratic voting and elected officials, too often Black Brooklyn is taken for granted by the Democratic Party, and it is written off by the Republican and other political parties. To address this problem, Black Brooklyn must now think beyond the "Democratic" box, and develop and implement new political strategies and tactics, while achieving its goals of political empowerment.

To address this "structural political deficit," Black Brooklyn must strategically diversify its voting behavior, as well as the political alliances, coalitions and agendas of its leadership, -- while communicating and coordinating among a diversity of Blacks, with a multiplicity of political persuasions, and political and economic bases. Black Brooklyn must become multi-partisan, more politically diverse and independent, more strategic, and less predictable in exercising its political power, if it is to become a more effective and respected political actor in local, state and national politics.

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Gender Matters: the Political Inequality of Women…

Perhaps the most explosive issue for Black Brooklyn, yet one that it could manage, has to do with gender. Black Brooklyn contains a major cohort of "under-developed" men -- too many with criminal records, undereducated, and unemployed; and too many of whom still harbor sexist, male chauvinist dispositions which are acted out at home, in the community, the marketplace, and in the political arena. On the other hand, Black Brooklyn has a major cohort of "over-developed" women, -- for example, more women than men have college degrees and make over $75,000. Few other racial or ethnic communities are similarly situated, and this has profound social, economic, and cultural implications for Black Brooklyn communities, male-female relations, children and families, and political empowerment.

In several soul searing interviews, some of Black Brooklyn's best and brightest women said that they did not want to air their "dirty linen in public" namely, the political inequality of Black women. This means that smart women, financially well off women, are not politically engaged at all, or are under involved in the political process. Politically speaking, Black Brooklyn is therefore operating way under capacity. The majority of the Black Brooklyn electorate is female; and nearly half of Black elected officials are female, raising the question of how this critical mass of Black female political leadership, which is already in place and yet to come, can become more effective and powerful. More power sharing men, more active women in substantive roles, and more women in authentic leadership, will alter the balance of power, increase the potency, and change the direction not only of the politics of Black Brooklyn, but also of the larger political spheres within which it operates.

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The African Diaspora - E Pluribus Unum...?

In his seminal work in 1903, *The Souls of Black Folk,* W.E.B. Du Bois (2003) opens his second essay with the statement, "The problem of the twentieth century, is the problem of the color-line,..." (p.15). And speaking to the challenges of forging a Black racial identity in America, he states in his first essay:

> ...One ever feels his twoness, - an American, a Negro; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
>
> The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife, - this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face. (pp.5-6)

To paraphrase Du Bois, a growing problem of the *21st century* for Black Brooklyn, and Black America is, the problem of the *ethnic line*, -- that invisible but palpable line, between African Americans, Caribbeans and Continental Africans. David Levering Lewis in his introduction, refers to Du Bois' notions of a "dual identity" and "the divided self." Black Brooklyn too, has a dual identity and a divided self: African American and Caribbean. At times, there is ethnic and political tension between these "two warring ideals in one dark body." African Americans should not try to "African Americanize" Caribbeans. And Caribbeans should not try to "Caribbeanize" African Americans. For, they both have a unique message for each other, and the world. Together, they must explore better ways "to merge (their) double self into a better and truer self," -- making it possible to be both African American and Caribbean, in unique celebration, as well as, -- in unity and strength...

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APPENDIX A - Interview Questionnaire

"Politics of Black Brooklyn"
Research Study (IRB #02-07-067, CUNY Graduate Center)
Principal Investigator: John Flateau

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the politics of Black Brooklyn with you. "Black Brooklyn" refers to the Central Brooklyn neighborhoods where nearly 1 million Blacks reside according to Census 2000.

1. Tell me how and why you first got involved in politics or community affairs here in Brooklyn.
   a) Were your family or friends already involved?
   b) Thinking back, who taught you the most about Brooklyn politics? Who were your mentors?
   c) Who are some of the people you work with most closely, in terms of allies, advisors, or supporters?

2. Beginning with your first important involvement, can you tell me about the major things you have been involved with over the years? Let's start with:
   a) Campaigns and elections
   b) Community organizing
   c) Advocacy around specific issues
   d) Jobs and positions you've held
   e) Anything else we've missed

3. What do you see as the major forces in the politics of Black Brooklyn? What do you think about:
   a) The Kings County Democratic Party Organization
   b) Local elected officials (Congresspersons, State Legislators, City Councilmembers, District Leaders)
   c) Reformers and Insurgents?
   d) The Black Church?
   e) Labor Unions
   f) Caribbean - Americans?
   g) African Americans whose origin is the American South
   h) Women?
   i) Home Owners, Business People
   j) People on welfare, people in public housing
   k) Class divisions (middle income versus low income)
   l) OTHER ?

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4. How and when do candidates for city-wide or state office, or state or national party operatives, come to seek political support in Black Brooklyn?
   a) Can you give a few examples of who comes into Black Brooklyn? Who do they hook up with? Why? What do these people do?
   b) Who conducts the most effective Get Out The Vote (GOTV) operations on election day? What do they do, - how do they do it, - and does it work? Do some politicians avoid Black Brooklyn, or make a poor effort to appeal to the community? For example, how about George Pataki in the recent gubernatorial election?

5. What groups or individuals actually get voters to the polls. How do they figure out who they want to pull out ?

6. Why did the 1989 and '93 mayoral races between David Dinkins and Rudy Giuliani turn out the way that they did? Would things have been different if Dinkins had won in 1993 ?

7. Why did the 1997 mayoral primary between Ruth Messinger and Al Sharpton; and the general election between Messinger and Giuliani turn out the way that they did ?
   -- Who did African Americans and West Indians vote for ? And why ?

8. Why did the 1998 and 2000 congressional primaries between Congressman Ed Towns and Barry Ford turn out the way they did ?

9. Why did the 2000 congressional primary between African American Congressman Major Owens and West Indian City Councilmember Una Clarke turn out the way it did ?

10. Why did the 2000 and 2002 Assembly District primaries between Assemblyman Roger Green and Hakim Jeffries turn out the way they did ?

11. Why did the 2001 mayoral primary between Ferrer and Green, and the general election between Green and Bloomberg turn out the way they did?
    -- Who did African Americans and West Indians vote for ? And why ?

12. a) Why did the 2001 Brooklyn Borough President's race involving African American woman and Deputy Boro Pres. Jeannette Gadson and Jewish State Senator Marty Markowitz turn out the way it did ? Who did African Americans, West Indians and women vote for ? And why ?

    b) Why did the 1997 and 2001 City Council races in East New York involving Charles Barron, Priscilla Wooten and others turn out the way they did ?

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13. Why did the 2002 gubernatorial elections between McCall, Cuomo, Golisano and Pataki turn out the way they did ? Who did African Americans and West Indians vote for ? And why ?

14. In 2002 in Brooklyn, two new, heavily West Indian State Senate districts elected two African American candidates, Carl Andrews and Kevin Parker. Why did these elections turn out this way ? Who did African Americans and West Indians vote for? And why ?

15. a) I'd like your thoughts on - when and how you see 'Black racial identity' playing an important role in Central Brooklyn politics – or do people just take it for granted? b) And when do the ethnic differences between blacks from New York and the South versus from the West Indies become important ? And why?

16. Some people say that African Americans and Caribbeans are battling each other for political power. How much truth is there to this? What are the most important examples? What causes this competition? What do you think about it?

17. How would you describe political relations between Blacks and Hispanics in Brooklyn?

18. How would you describe political relations between Blacks and Jews in Brooklyn?

19. How would you describe political relations between Blacks and whites in

20. How would you describe political relations between Blacks and Asians in Brooklyn?

21. In your opinion, what are the most important issues currently being debated within Black Brooklyn politics?

22. In your opinion, what are the biggest problems facing Black Brooklynites right now ?

23. As far as Black Brooklyn is concerned, is there an issue that you think deserves more attention than it is currently getting from federal, state, and city leaders?

24. What is your overall opinion of the elected political leaders from Black Brooklyn today? Do you think they are in touch with what is going on at the grass roots? Do you think they are effective in getting resources for the community? Do you think they are encouraging innovative new approaches to our problems?

25. Who do you see as the next generation of political leaders in Black Brooklyn? What young leaders are coming along? Are there some potential leaders who are falling to the wayside, or being pushed aside ?

26. How would you characterize the role that women play in Black Brooklyn's politics?

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27. Do you think the middle class is separated from the poor in Black Brooklyn? If so, what helps to create separations? How does that affect Black Brooklyn's politics?

28. How does Black Brooklyn connect politically with:
    a) other Blacks in New York City (e.g. Queens, Harlem, the Bronx)?
    b) the rest of Black America (e.g. Blacks in the South, and other cities)?
    c) Africa and the Caribbean?

29. Please sum up in your own words what you think is the current state of politics in Black Brooklyn? Where do you think it is headed?

30. In closing, I'm going to ask you a few more questions. Please describe your...

    i. Race
    ii. Ethnicity
    iii. Birthplace
    iv. Nationality
    v. Citizenship
    vi. Parents' Birthplace
    vii. Parents' job or profession
    viii. The neighborhood where you currently reside (how long)
    ix. Where you lived before that
    x. Year when you began to live in Brooklyn ___ Work in Brooklyn ____
    xi. Gender
    xii. Age >21, -- 21- 34, -- 35-44, -- 45- 59, -- +60
    xiii. Household Income > $25K, -$25-49K, - $50-74K, - $75-99K, - +$100K
    xiv. Education (highest degree completed)
    xv. Current employment
    xvi. Previous employment
    xvii. Work Locations
    xviii. Political Affiliations
    xix. Voter Registration/Party Affiliation
    xx. Civic, Community, Religious, Professional Affiliations

31. Any final comments ? --
    Thank you !

32. Do you have any other persons you might recommend that I talk to regarding this research?

-- Thank you for your giving so generously of your time on this important research project !

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APPENDIX – B Dependent Variables

The following fourteen (14) elections, percent candidate votes and voter turnouts were used as the dependent or outcome variables in the WLS regression analysis:

Election		Dependent Variable
1. 2001 Mayoral General Election		
a) Percent Bloomberg	-	bloomp
b) Percent Green	-	greenp
c) Percent Turnout	-	pturng01
d) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tmay01
2. 2001 Mayoral Election, Democratic Runoff		
a) Percent Green	-	rgreenp
b) Percent Ferrer	-	rferrerp
c) Percent Turnout	-	pmrunof1
d) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tdmr01
3. 2001 Mayoral Democratic Primary		
a) Percent Ferrer	-	pferrerp
b) Percent Green	-	pgreenp
c) Percent Vallone	-	pvallp
d) Percent Hevesi	-	phevesip
e) Percent Turnout	-	dmptrn01
f) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tdmp01
4. 2001 NYC Comptroller, General Election		
a) Percent Thompson	-	thomp
b) Percent Turnout	-	pturng01
c) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tdmp01
5. 2001 NYC Comptroller Democratic Primary		
a) Percent Thompson	-	pthomp
b) Percent Turnout	-	ptdcp01
c) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tdcp01
6. 2001 NYC Public Advocate, General Election		
a) Percent Gotbaum	-	pagottp
b) Percent Turnout	-	pturng01
c) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tdmp01

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(WLS Dependent Variables continued)

Election		Dependent Variable
7. 2001 NYC Public Advocate, Democratic Primary		
a) Percent Gotbaum	-	pgotbam
b) Percent Siegel	-	psiegel
c) Percent Colon	-	pcolon
d) Percent DiBrienza	-	pdibrien
e) Percent Turnout	-	pubad01p
f) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tdpp01
8. 2001 Brooklyn Borough President Democratic Primary		
a) Percent Markowitz	-	pctmarko
b) Percent Gadsen	-	pctgadsn
c) Percent Fisher	-	pctfishr
d) Percent Turnout	-	pctvotbp
e) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	bpvotes
9. 2000 US Presidential General Election		
a) Percent Gore	-	pgore00
b) Percent Bush	-	pbush00
c) Percent Nader	-	pnader00
d) Percent Turnout	-	ptout00g
e) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tpvote00
10. 2000 Democratic Primary, 11th Congressional District		
a) Percent Owens	-	pctowens
b) Percent Clarke	-	pctclark
c) Percent Turnout	-	pctvot11
d) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	vote11cd
11. 1998 NYS Gubernatorial General Election		
a) Percent Pataki	-	gp98p
b) Percent Vallone	-	pv98p
c) Percent Turnout	-	ptout98g
d) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tgen98
12. 1998 NYS Comptroller General Election		
a) Percent McCall	-	pmccall98
b) Percent Turnout	-	ptout98g
c) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	contr98

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(WLS Dependent Variables continued)

Election		Dependent Variable
13. 1997 NYC Mayoral General Election		
a) Percent Giuliani	-	rwg97p
b) Percent Messinger	-	rwmp
c) Percent Turnout	-	pmpgen97
d) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	tgen97
14. 1997 NYC Mayoral Democratic Primary		
a) Percent Messinger	-	rwm97dpp
b) Percent Sharpton	-	as97dpp
c) Percent Turnout	-	pmdpri97
d) Turnout/WLS Weight	-	dmp97tot

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APPENDIX C - Demographic Summary

Table No. C - 1
Comparative Census 2000 Demographics:
POPULATION and FAMILY FORMATION
African Americans and West Indians in Black Brooklyn

Variable	African–American	West Indian	Comparison
Total Population	352,000	375,000	Nearly equal [1] popula'ns/depends on count method.
Citizen VAP)	243,000 60 %	165,000 48 %	80,000 more Afr.-Amers.; less than ½ of WI adults
Citizenship Rate	95 %	64 %	Nearly all Afr.-Amers.; less than 2 /3 of West Indians
Foreign Born	5 %	78 %	4 out of 5 West Indians; 1 in 20 Afr.-Amers.
Married Couples	25 %	48 %	½ of WI families; only ¼ of Afr.-Amer. Families
Female Head. HHs	53 %	39 %	Half of Afr.-Amer. hshlds; 2/5ths W.I. hshlds.

Source: "Chapter 3: Black Brooklyn: Cleavages of Ethnicity, Class and Gender;" PUMS 5 % Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Graduate Center.

[1] This research project uses the broadest possible definition of "West Indian:" from PUMS 5 % data: a person whose place of birth (POB) for one or both parents was the West Indies. This definition includes a person with one African American and one West Indian parent, which could be counted either way.

Table No. C - 2

Comparative Demographics, Census 2000:
EDUCATION and the GENDER GAP
African Americans and West Indians in Black Brooklyn

Census Variable	African – American	West Indian	Comparison
Less Than High School	28 %	27 %	Similar.
High School Diploma	31 %	30 %	Similar.
BA degree Plus (%)	14 %	14 %	Similar.
BA degree Plus (#)	29,200	33,700	4500 more West Indians
Females w/ BA Plus	19,500	21,300	TWICE as many females as males w/BA plus
Males w/ BA Plus	9,700	12,400	2700 more West Indians

Source: "Chapter 3: Black Brooklyn: Cleavages of Ethnicity, Class and Gender;" PUMS 5 % Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Graduate Center.

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Table No. C - 3

Comparative Demographics, Census 2000:
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
African Americans and West Indians in Black Brooklyn

Census Variable	African – American	West Indian	Comparison
Males Employed	48 %	59 %	West Indian men have 25 % hi-er Emplt. Rate
Females Employed	44 %	55 %	West Indian women have 25% hi-er Emplt. Rate
Males Not In Labor Force (NILF)	42 %	33 %	Nearly 1/3 more AA Males are NILF
Females NILF	48 %	38 %	25% more AA Females are NILF
Males Unemployed	10 %	8 %	AA Males have a 25% hi-er Unemplt. Rate
Females Unemployed	8 %	7 %	Similar

Source: "Chapter 3: Black Brooklyn: Cleavages of Ethnicity, Class and Gender;" PUMS 5 % Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Graduate Center.

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Table No. C - 4

Comparative Demographics, Census 2000:
INCOME and POVERTY
African Americans and West Indians in Black Brooklyn

Census Variable	African – American	West Indian	Comparison
Persons Below Poverty	84,000	69,000	AA's have hi-er poverty rates and 15,000 more prsns
Females Below Poverty	50,000	41,000	10,000 more AA than WI females in poverty
Males Below Poverty	34,000	28,000	6,000 more AA than WI males in poverty
Middle Income Households $ 35- $ 75,000	96,000	136,000	40,000 more WI than AA Mid. Inc. households
Upper Income Households + $ 75,000	54,000	83,000	29,000 more WI than AA Upper Inc. households
Household Median Income	$ 15,000	$ 23,000	Median Hsld. Inc. is 50% hi-er for West Indians
Home Ownership Rates	25 %	36 %	Home Ownership Is 50% hi-er for West Indians

Source: "Chapter 3: Black Brooklyn: Cleavages of Ethnicity, Class and Gender;" PUMS 5 % Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Graduate Center.

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Table C - 5

Comparative Demographics, Census 2000:
CLASS OF WORKERS
African Americans and West Indians in Black Brooklyn

Census Variable	African – American	West Indian	Comparison
Private Sector	55 %	66 %	WI Emplt. is 20% hi-er in Private Sector
Government Sector	32 %	20 %	1/3 of AAs but 1/5 of WIs are in Government Emplt.
Non-Profit Sector	9 %	9 %	Similar.
Self Employment	4 %	5 %	WIs have a slightly hi-er Entrepr. rate than AAs [2]
2 or more Workers In Family (WIF)	29 %	52 %	West Indians have nearly double the rate of AAs

Source: "Chapter 3: Black Brooklyn: Cleavages of Ethnicity, Class and Gender;" PUMS 5 % Census 2000, Center for Urban Research, CUNY Graduate Center.

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

Figure C - 1

African Americans and West Indians:
Population and Citizen VAP

	CVAP	Popula'n
West Ind.	165,000	375,000
Afr.-Amer	243,000	352,000



Figure C -2

African Americans and West Indians:
Married Couple Families and
Female Headed Households

	Married Couples	Fem Head Hslds
West Ind.	53%	39%
Afr.-Amer.	25%	48%



Figure C - 3

African Americans and West Indians:
Employed Males and Females

	Males-Employed	Females-Employed
West Ind.	59%	55%
Afr.-Amer.	48%	44%

group political development, political representation and policy input ?"

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

Figure C - 4

African Americans and West Indians:
Males & Females - College Degrees

	Males-BA+	Females-BA+
West Ind.	12,400	21,300
Afr.-Amer.	9,700	19,500



Figure C - 5

African American and West Indian
Household Income (# of HHs):

	Upper Income + $75 k	Middle Income $35-75k	Below Poverty
West Ind.	83,000	136,000	69,000
Afr-Amer.	54,000	96,000	84,000



Figure C - 6

African American and West Indian
Home Ownership Rates and 2 or More Workers in the Family

	Home Ownership	2+ Wkrs In Family
West Ind.	36%	52%
Afr.-Amer.	25%	29%

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Lake, Andre. Director, Youth Programs, Medgar Evers College. July 8, 2003.

Lewis, Bertha Mae. Exec.Dir., NYS Working Families Party. July 17, 2003.

Lewis, Nathaniel. President, Ron Brown Political Club, East New York. July 12, 2003.

Mason, Dr. Marco. Executive Director, Caribbean Women's Health Assoc. August 17, 2002.

Maxwell, Dr. Marcella. Executive, Miracle Makers, Inc. July 23, 2003.

Mayers, Esq., Gregorio. College Professor, Medgar Evers College; politically active. July 16, 2003.

Montgomery, Velmanette. State Senator, Fort Greene, Clinton Hill, Bed-Stuy. July 16, 2003.

Morris, Celeste. Dir., MWBE, NYC Dept. of Small Business Svs; politically active. July 8, 2003.

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Norman, Jr., Esq., Clarence. Assemblyman, 43rd AD, Crown Heights.; County Leader, Brooklyn Democratic Party. July 18, 2003.

Okotieuro, Gbubemi. Dir. of Govt. Affairs, Medgar Evers College; former chief of staff, Councilmember. Mary Pinkett. July 8, 2003.

Owens, Major. US Congressman, 11th CD, Crown Heights, Brownsville, Flatbush, Park Slope. July 29, 2003.

Parker, Kevin. NY State Senator, 19th SD, Flatbush, E. Flatbush, July 15, 2003.

Perry, Nick. NYS Assemblyman, 58th AD, East Flatbush. July 17, 2003.

Perry, Sharonnie. Former Chairperson, Community Board 3 (Bed-Stuy); staff to Congressman Ed Towns. August 19, 2002.

Reid, Asquith. Chief of Staff, Councilmember Kendall Stewart, 45th CO, Flatbush. July 11, 2003.

Roberts, Michael. Senior Correspondent, *Carib News*. August 17, 2002.

Robinson, Annette. NYS Assemblywoman, 56th AD, Bed-Stuy; Democratic Female Leader; former City Councilmember. July 6, 2003.

Sampson, Esq., John. NY State Senator, East Flatbush, Canarsie. July 21, 2003.

Scott, Willie. Former District Manager, Community Board 17, East Flatbush.
July 24, 2003.

Simmons, Esq., Esmeralda. Exec. Dir., Center for law & Social Justice, Medgar Evers College; politically active. August 17, 2002.

Steele, Jr., James. Aide, US Congressman Meeks, politically active. July 9, 2003.

Taylor, Dr. Mark V.C. Pastor, Church of the Open Door (Fort Greene & Farragut Houses). August 2, 2003.

Towns, Edolphus. US Congressman, 10th CD, Fort Greene, Bed-Stuy, East New York, Canarsie.
July 28, 2003.

Vann, Albert. NY City Council Member; Democratic District Leader; former Assembly Member, 56th AD. August 16, 2002.

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Williams, Peter. Deputy NYC Public Advocate; former Nat'l Urban League executive. June 17, 2003.

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Autobiographical Statement – Dr. John Louis Flateau

John Louis Flateau holds a Ph.D. in Political Science in American Politics and Public Policy from the Graduate Center, City University of New York. His doctoral dissertation is entitled, *Black Brooklyn: The Politics of Ethnicity, Class, and Gender.* He holds M.Phil. and M.A. degrees from the Graduate Center; an M.P.A. from Baruch College, CUNY; and a B.A. in English Literature from New York University. He has numerous academic honors, and graduated from Bishop Ford High School, and St. Peter Claver Elementary School in Brooklyn, New York City.

His research and professional interests include: American and urban politics, campaigns and elections, public policy, intergovernmental relations, national institutions, racial and ethnic studies, demography, immigration, voting rights, minority business, economic development, survey research, spatial mapping, media and communications, criminal justice, youth development, leadership, and strategic planning. He is a media commentator, lectures at universities, and presents at conferences. He has authored books and articles, and was a plaintiff and researcher in the US Supreme Court voting rights case, *Flateau v. Anderson.*

Dr. John Flateau is Dean of the School of Business at Medgar Evers College, CUNY, where Dr. Edison O. Jackson is the President. He leads the Business School, nationally accredited by the ACBSP, with 8 degree programs, 4 academic departments, 90 faculty, 1300 students, 2 honor societies, 5 student clubs, 3,000 alumni, 3 research and program centers, and $2 million in grants. His other positions include(d): President's Cabinet, Professor in Public Administration, Dean of Institutional Advancement, Exec. Dir., MEC Educational Foundation, Exec. Dir., DuBois Bunche Center For Public Policy, Dir., Census Information Center, and Dir., Center for Entrepreneurship & Economic Development.

Additionally, he has been a Research Associate at the Center for Urban Research; and the Howard Samuel Center for State Policy Management at the CUNY Graduate Center.

Previous positions include: Chief of Staff, Mayor David Dinkins; Senior Vice President, NYS Urban Development Corporation; Exec. Dir., NYS Black and Puerto Rican Legislative Caucus; Chief of Staff, Hon. Al Vann; and Teacher, Education Dept., DC 37, AFSCME. He consults with business, government, political, civic, educational and professional clients.

Contact: School of Business, Medgar Evers College, CUNY, 1650 Bedford Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11225, Tel. 718-270-5110. Email: jflat@mec.cuny.edu.

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