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**The philosophy of Ahmed Sékou Touré and its impact on the
development of the Republic of Guinea: 1958–1971**

Diallo, Geraldine Pemberton, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1990

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF AHMED SÉKOU TOURÉ
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF GUINEA: 1958-1971
by
GERALDYNE PEMBERTON DIALLO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in History in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of
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1990

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For my Abdourahmane

PREFACE

At this time, I must thank my readers and mentors who have given time and effort in encouraging my professional development. Professor Donald Harvey and his late wife, Mrs. Jacqueline Harvey, have been incredibly supportive through what were difficult years. Professor Harvey, as mentor and role-model, has influenced my professional development through his criticisms, suggestions and analyses.

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The colleagues and friends who have read and discussed this study as it evolved were very helpful. I also thank the many men and women from Guinea who shared their memories, and materials, with me, even when it was dangerous to do so. I am grateful to my husband, Abdourahmane, for bringing them into my life.

My family and friends were always there.

The final responsibility for this study and for all translations from documents in French belongs to the author.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Ahmed Sékou Touré had a vision of what he wanted Guinea and Africa to become. This vision, based on his concept of the African Personality, evolved into his philosophy of revolution; of development; of social progress; of international relations, and of life. Sékou Touré was one of Africa's significant philosophers who created a process of national formation that provided an option for his contemporaries. This study examines Touré's philosophy from 1958 to 1971 by illustrating and examining the fundamental aspects of his thought and how they affected Guinean development. It is not meant to be a definitive study of the Republic of Guinea.

Sékou Touré was a major contributor to the intellectual history of the modern world. Even without his role as political leader, his philosophy would still have provided important concepts, theories and practical formulations for consideration by students of ideas. He was one of the men whose philosophy introduced a creative way of looking at the world,

especially the African world. Although Touré's regime exhibited some problems, this study emphasizes the philosophy and not the man.

Part One examines the triple foundation of Touré's philosophy: the concept of the African Personality; the non-capitalist way, and the party state. Touré refined, re-emphasized, enriched, applied, re-stated, updated, and strengthened these fundamental elements from 1958 to 1971, but the foundation remained. Always considering himself a revolutionary, Sékou Touré wrote and spoke of these tenets throughout his life.

Chapter II deals with Touré's concept of the African Personality. At the center of his world view, the African Personality was the embodiment of Touré's postulation that a positive future for Africa depended upon the rehabilitation of Africa after the long years of the slave trade and colonialism.

He was determined to have Africa take her rightful place in world affairs and to control her own destiny. Touré was convinced that the uniqueness and richness of African culture would enable her to develop healthy modern states. Although the communocratic ethos became the epitome of African social, political and economic

organization, Touré interwove other elements of the African Personality into his philosophy.

Chapter III examines the economic policy known as the "non-capitalist way." As a former labor leader, Touré was determined that the Guinean Revolution would follow an African imperative. Neither Western capitalism with its built-in possibility of exploitation nor Soviet Marxism which emerged from European imperatives satisfied Touré as an alternative for Guinea. He chose a form of socialism consistent with the African Personality, and utilized the mechanism of the Socialist Cultural Revolution to develop Guinea's rural areas and the villages which produced most of Guinea's non-mineral wealth.

Chapter IV analyzes Touré's political thought. Although the official inauguration of the party-state occurred in 1972, the basis for that creation is the third fundamental in Touré's philosophy. Touré never saw the party as separate from the state. It was the P. D. G. (Parti Démocratique de Guinée-Democratic Party of Guinea) which included that population and provided for the people through the agency of the state. This development emerged from Touré's philosophy, and when

the abuses came to light in 1971 after the invasion, Touré was forced to deal with the result.

In Part Two, (Chapter V), there is an analysis of the restructuring of Guinean society in accord with Touré's philosophy. Women, youth and the workers had sacrificed immeasurably for Touré's vision of the Guinean revolution, and he was committed to produce some of the promised benefits of the independent course they had chosen. Touré wanted the Guinean society to provide a prototype for other African nations, and he sought to create an equitable and just society based upon his philosophy. Unfortunately, there were many forces working against him, and not all of them were domestic.

Much of Touré's international philosophy was established by 1958. In Part Three his international philosophy is explained. Chapter VI looks at Touré's relationship with nations outside Africa, especially France, the United States and the Soviet Union. Touré maintained that African dignity and the right to independence, unity and an equitable share in the profits from her labor and resources must be respected. The Guinean example was an alternative whose potential

power was not ignored. Touré made Guinea a major small nation power player on the world stage during the Cold War Era. His neutral position, although costly in many ways, gave Guinea influence and visibility during the early years.

The major foreign policy arena for Touré's philosophy was Africa. Chapter VII examines Touré's African policy. His friends and supporters included Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Amilcar Cabral. There would be conflicts with Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny. Yet, the commitment to African liberation, his role in the creation of the O. A. U. (Organization of African Unity), and Guinea's membership in regional organizations were efforts by Touré to facilitate the realization of his philosophy. This study ends, as it began, with Touré's concern for Africa and the African Personality.

Sékou Touré was born in 1922 in Faranah, in Upper Guinea. He always claimed to be a descendent of Samory Touré, the patriot who fought against the French at the end of the Nineteenth Century. His early years are poorly documented, but it is known that he studied the Koran at an early age and that he learned French in primary school. He attended neither university nor military academy, and entered the workforce at an early age.

In 1950, Touré was arrested for his role in a strike in Guinea. The next year, Touré was elected to the French National Assembly as the candidate of the P. D. G. which he had formed in 1947. During those years, Touré's party was only one of many, and his energies were divided between Guinean politics and his trade union activities.

In 1957, two significant developments occurred for Touré. As a result of the French Loi Cadre, Guinea and the other African territories gained greater self-government, and Sékou Touré became vice-president of the Territorial Assembly of Guinea. It was the year that the U. G. T. A. N. (Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire-Union of Workers of Black

Africa) was founded with Touré as its leader. His dual political base made him a major African leader even before Guinea chose independence in 1958.

From 1958 to 1971, the philosophy of Sékou Touré would guide the Guinean people in their revolution. This study seeks to illustrate, explain and analyze the significance of that philosophy.

PART ONE

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF THE AFRICAN PERSONALITY

The essential component of the significant intellectual contribution of Ahmed Sékou Touré was his complex philosophical construct of the concept of the African Personality. From the core concept of the African Personality radiate all the major elements of the political, social, and economic philosophy of Sékou Touré. The foundation of his thought rests upon the theoretical creation of a revolutionary Guinean state which would serve as a viable role-model for an independent and rehabilitated Africa. Following this logic, the realization of the Guinean revolution would then enable Africa to take her rightful place within the world community.

Sékou Touré always stressed the importance of the concept of the African Personality in terms of his basic philosophical principles. This concept has been the most enduring as well as the most provocative of the ideological contributions of the Guinean leader. Since the African Personality remains at the center of

the ideas of Sékou Touré, it has also served as the nucleus in providing for the consistency and continuity of his influence upon the development of the Guinean state.

The Guinean choice of independence in 1958 was firmly grounded in the belief of Sékou Touré that all of Africa must become independent, and that Guinea would lead the way for French-speaking Africa. At that time, he said:

Guinea has chosen, not only the path of African opportunity, the path of a united Africa, but also, more importantly, the path of an honorable Africa. It is, perhaps, neither the easiest road nor the most comfortable job to undertake alone the charge of engaging in combat against the domination of Africa, but it is the only noble path, the only historically correct position, undeniably it is the only opportunity for African liberation.¹

Guinea's decision, as explained by Sékou Touré, was designed to "raise the level of consciousness of the African peoples in order to encourage more and more the affirmation of the African Personality."²

The position taken in the first years of Guinean independence has never been modified. Moreover, the basis of Sékou Touré's justification of the role of

Guinea in African affairs lies in his definition of the concept of the African Personality. Frequently called upon to explain the concept within a framework more easily understood by European writers and journalists seeking clarification of his idea, Sékou Touré offered a comparative definition:

One might say it is the totality of intellectual conceptualizations and of psychological and moral behavior peculiar to the men of Africa. One thinks, for example, of the characteristics of the social behavior of the black man compared to those of the European. ...European man has lost that sense of solidarity which characterized the commonality of life based upon freely consented to reciprocal dependencies. ...European man defines himself through rapport between one man and another; the man of Africa defines himself through his relationship with the social group to which he belongs.³

In the social area, the Chief of State of the Republic of Guinea always stressed the fact that the relationship between the individual African and his group was the result of a cultural pattern which encouraged group consciousness and collective identification. The African Personality created a person who tended to conceive of his identity within

the context of the group to which he belonged; the African, therefore, did not exist within the highly individualistic framework common to European society, and this element of the African Personality had to be considered if Africa was to develop her own future.

The most meaningful expressions of the concept of the African Personality were given by Sékou Touré without either comparative or specific references to European social development:

The African Personality is the whole of the material, moral and intellectual realities which distinguish African people from other people. The characteristics of the African Personality have resulted from the diverse historical and economic conditions which have created in Africa the particular sociological conditions which give to the man of Africa his own personality, whether in its positive or negative aspects. But in the human plan, in the universal plan of the nature of the social relationships tying people together, the African Personality appears as one of quality.⁴

The positive quality of the African Personality as seen by Sékou Touré emerged from a special relationship between Africans that is based upon the development of social relationships stressing group responsibility and

collective progress.

Those characteristics which Sékou Touré identified as particularly African are " a sense of solidarity, the love of justice and a communocratic conception of society."⁵ Although it is true that many people, regardless of where they are, espouse similar values, Touré's African saw little of the collective sense of values of the European under colonialism since that system reinforced different standards of conduct in the Europeans' dealings with the Africans from those which they reserved for themselves. When Sékou Touré first explained his concept to Westerners, he was, in essence, responding to the abuses of French colonialism by stressing his belief that African society was superior to European society in its treatment of human beings.

The "communocratic conception of society" is an important element of the African Personality. The essence of the African Personality which resulted in the identification by the individual of his or her own personal interests with those of the group has been the long-term effect of

African communocratic development toward a well-balanced society. Sékou Touré wrote:

A man's equilibrium, his stability, is necessarily a function of the place he holds within society, according to whether he finds protection there for his liberty, his dignity and his interests. And the social equilibrium can only be acquired through a democracy of a fundamental social nature, which makes room for individual liberty, equality and responsibility, in order to bring to light through individual personalities the homogeneous personality of the social groups; a democracy which directs its actions in all spheres of life toward solutions to the general problems of human existence. 6

The communocratic society, an African evolutionary development, was essentially democratic and underlined Sékou Touré's conviction that Africa had the opportunity to develop a democracy based upon true equality.
7

In the early writings of Sékou Touré, the communocratic African society was described as quintessentially humanistic because the African derived all of his rights from the society to which he owed his primary allegiance. Later, this aspect of the African Personality became the basis for the mobilization of

the Guinean masses into the different auxiliaries of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (Democratic Party of Guinea - P. D. G.) Through the Party, Guinean men, women and children were taken into communocratic structures which reinforced the philosophical commitment of the people to their own revolution by maximizing their participation in determining the development of the Guinean future along democratic lines consistent with the concept of the African Personality.

According to Sékou Touré, the African Personality was universal in its uniqueness. Each people has its own culture, and the fact that Africa has her personality serves as the basis for her equality with the rest of the world. Yet. Africa's development was seriously threatened by the colonial experience which introduced the systematic denigration and manipulation of the African Personality by the European conquerors. As a result, Sékou Touré repeatedly stated the fact that the African Personality must be rehabilitated if it is to throw off the negative effects of the years of colonial, or external, domination.

In maintaining that each people has its own

culture, Sékou Touré defined culture as:

...the totality of the material and spiritual values created by humanity in the course of its history. This creation is continuous and necessary. It is the corollary, the reflex, the result of the action of mankind of adapting the environment to the demands of survival and betterment. It is inspired by the instinct of conversation at the primary level, [and] by the knowledge of laws at the emergence of a superior stage. 8

Anywhere man existed, he developed a culture which was intrinsically equal to that of all other people. On a larger scale Sékou Touré said, "The grandeur of a people is defined by the dimensions of its culture."⁹

In the same manner in which each people has its own culture, each people has its own personality. It is this element of the concept of the African Personality which strengthened Sékou Touré's philosophical position that Africa's unique personality was the basis of her universality. He wrote:

Yes, Africa has its culture, as does other continents. And, if other people cannot exist without a culture, it is evident that each people, whoever they are, bring new and original elements to universal civilization. 10

Furthermore, Sékou Touré frequently said that while culture creates the personality of a society, each society develops a culture consistent with its own specific and definitive needs and characteristics.¹¹

The culture of Africa was, in Sékou Touré's philosophy, based upon the concept of the African Personality which was specifically the culture of the black person.

The rehabilitation of African culture, civilization and history grew out of Touré's need to respond to the critical problems facing Africans because of the historical imperatives forcing Europeans to demean Africans as an historical entity in order to enslave them, and , later, to conquer them and colonize them. The decision of the Guineans to refuse to agree, by election, to continue in a subordinate position vis-à- vis France was philosophically tied to the need to rehabilitate and re-affirm the African Personality. In addition, Sékou Touré linked the issue of the Referendum of 1958 to the re-affirmation of the African Personality by urging Guineans to refuse to remain voluntarily within the framework of the somewhat camouflaged colonial relationship offered by de Gaulle¹² as the French Community. For the Guineans. the

issue involved choosing to be colonial subjects which would have been a fundamental denial of their rights as Africans.

Rehabilitation was made necessary by the colonial experience which reduced both the pride and the value of the African continent and its peoples as part of the imperialist process. Sékou Touré recognized that Africans could not progress if the myths and stereotypes were permitted to persist. He continually argued that the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism included cultural rehabilitation because:

...all imperialism always aligns itself to cultural aggression, to the enterprise of acculturation, to the action of cultural alienation, for the purpose of conditional integration, necessary for political and economic enslavement.¹³

Sékou Touré clearly understood that the study of history provided one of the soundest forms of attacking those who sought to create and perpetuate a negative image of Africa.

To that end Sékou Touré often used examples from African history in order to provide positive role-models for the conduct of Guinea's militant men and women. The African Personality conceived by him

represented an organic whole, encompassing all past, present and future Africans:

There is only one road open to the human personality of societies, the road of history. By this road personality grows, develops and progresses. It was this road which once united the Tekrur, the Manding and the Sonrai peoples, which brought about the glorious alliance between Fode Kaba, and Baram Bakie, Ba Bemba, Samory, Behanzin and Bondiougou Diara, who today join our illustrious martyrs, Um Nyobe, Felix Moumie and Patrice Lumumba.¹⁴

The link between the past and the present was a crucial part of Sékou Touré's concept of the African Personality and its emphasis on the rehabilitation of Africa's great men and women.

In Guinean history, there are also heroes and heroines who have been honored by the Guinean people in their long struggle against colonialism. The Almamy Samory Touré, the grandfather of Sékou Touré, has been the primary hero of the Guinean revolution, since his struggle against the French served as an excellent role-model for modern Guineans. Along with Samory, Alpha Yaya Diallo was also venerated for the same reason. Their military acumen, their capacity for organization and administration of states encompassing

large territories, and their refusal to accept French rule earned them the historical position which Sékou Touré chose for himself.¹⁵ Sékou Touré, identified with Samory Touré, and Alpha Yaya Diallo, and through him all Guineans were encouraged to see historical validity in resisting external rule.

Since 1955, the P. D. G. has had its own authentic heroine in M'Balía Camara, a young woman party member who was killed by a chef de canton,¹⁶ David Sylla, while engaging in party activities. Her death on February 9, 1955 began the commemoration of that day as a national holiday dedicated to the women of Guinea in honor of their sacrifice in the struggle for Guinean independence. Immortalized by the late Sikhe Camara in his poem, "C'était à Tondon," M'Balía Camara's importance was confirmed:

In Tondon
Remember comrade
A black woman, a giant,
Has fallen
Whose death has embraced
All the people and
Gave a signal

The day has arrived yesterday
In the month of February '55
Dead yesterday
She is more alive today
She will never die
In Tondon
A legend is born. 17

The redemption and preservation of Guinea's heroes who struggled against the French was part of the mandate of the concept of the African Personality. Along with Soundiata Keita, the founder of the Mali Empire, Samory Touré, Alpha Yaya Diallo and M'Baliala Camara became the multi-ethnic heroes and heroines of the Guinean Revolution. Sékou Touré did not encourage any personal idolatry regarding himself; he preferred to encourage the African Personality through the recognition of the contributions of others.

Not only did history offer heroic individuals but it also served as a means of involving young people in Guinea in their own national development. Sékou Touré usually shared the ideas of the party with the young members of the Jeunesse de la Révolution Démocratique Africaine (Youth of the Democratic African Revolution- J. R. D. A.) since they had been given a large share of the responsibility of restoring the African Personality. He reminded them that:

Africa is not a recent creation. She was born with the world, she has developed with it, she will die with it. It has been said that Africa does not have a material, moral and spiritual force, an ethic, a

civilization, a singular culture of her own....In fact, Africa has a civilization which, for all times, has excelled in her material, moral, cultural and spiritual values. Her development, the fruit of her own intelligence and her own will, is marked essentially by a humanism exclusively without racial distinctions between men and between peoples.¹⁸

The capacity for the development of a society marked by the lack of racialism was only one of the characteristics of the African Personality which was considered to be a positive value by Sékou Touré. The lack of racialism applied not only to differences in skin color but to other ethnic differences as well.

Sékou Touré turned to history because of the failure of many European scholars who could not deal honestly with the African heritage. Part of the problem was based upon the fact that the European experience did not prepare these scholars for the societies which they encountered in Africa. Sékou Touré charged that the European scholars created the docile, superstitious and inferior Africans required by the system of colonialism.¹⁹ Because of their own ignorance, many European students of Africa misunderstood much of what they saw, and ignored what

they could not comprehend if it appeared to contradict
²⁰
 their preconceptions.

Sékou Touré's view on the role played by the non-African student of Africa was expressed by the Guinean delegation to the Pan-African Cultural Festival in Algiers in 1969:

Contemporary Anglo-Saxon anthropology is pre-occupied with justifying the reactionary point of view of colonialism, which has long presented Africa as the refuge of backward peoples who were blessed by the force of the humanizing civilization of the colonizer. ²¹

Sékou Touré hailed the Cultural Festival as an important effort to shatter the negative image of Africa by presenting African culture in a true
²²
 light. Since Guinea had refused to participate in all of the "Negro" arts festivals, her support of the Pan-African festival must be seen as consistent with the African Personality as representative of African people, not simply of "Black" people.

One of his strongest statements on the revolutionary value of culture was a part of the statement sent to Algiers. After committing Africa and her people to the struggle for liberation, unification

and rehabilitation, Sékou Touré went further:

Historic culture, political culture, economic culture, social culture, scientific and technological culture, human culture, spiritual culture, --all these together constitute only one and the same force, that of Africa rising in a vigorous manner to break definitively the chains of imperialism, the yoke of both colonialism and perfidious neo-colonialism, and the ruse of religious mystification, that [force] of power and the sole responsibility to aspire to a life of freedom, unity and prosperity.²³

For Sékou Touré the concept of the African Personality would enable the Guinean Revolution to serve as the vanguard of the larger African revolution.

The rehabilitation of the African Personality remained a major concern of Sékou Touré. During the last visit to Guinea by the Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, both leaders pledged themselves to continue the struggle for Africa begun in 1963 with the founding of the Organization of African Unity. Sékou Touré spoke of the unique role of Ethiopia:

...for the history of the continent, [it has had] the highest level of affirmation of the African Personality, of the affirmation of African capability, and the affirmation consequently, of the African presence.²⁴

The Emperor, in a prophetic moment, said that the leaders of Africa had a great responsibility to work both for African unity and for the strengthening of the O. A. U.²⁵ In late 1971, the time of the visit, Guinea was emerging from her crises while Ethiopia's days of revolution had not yet begun.

The restoration of Africa's dignity has been linked in the philosophy of Sékou Touré to the cultural regeneration of the African continent. The P. D. G. accepted Sékou Touré's urging to:

...sacrifice a part of their time or a part of their wealth in order to assume the completion of the rights of our nation, to assure the safety of all of the benefits of the nation, its liberty, sovereignty and democracy for the benefit of all of our people, in order to make of Guinea, as we have always desired, a decisive element in the qualitative transformation which we want for Africa, to inspire other continents, an Africa rehabilitated in its past, its culture, its civilizations and its personality, not only within the dimensions of the continent, but also in the universal sense.²⁶

Broad goals were established for Guinea in the area of cultural development.

A large part of this role was assigned to the youth of Guinea. Other sectors of the society also

undertook roles in this effort. A major part of the cultural impact of the Republic of Guinea was the development and the international popularization of the National Ballet of Guinea, founded by Fodeba Keita.²⁷

Through the presentation of traditional dances, the music and songs of Guinea's people preserved the authenticity of Guinean culture while permitting the outside world to experience the free expression of a people of their own cultural values.²⁸

Guinea's National Cultural Festivals have concretized the philosophical commitment of Sékou Touré to the redemption of African culture. In the Spring of 1970, Mahjoub Faouai, a journalist with Jeune Afrique, visited Guinea and wrote of the festival that year:

This festival has proven, nevertheless, that Guinea has truly accomplished her intellectual decolonization, and that she has rid herself of all the acquired practices, of artificial behavior, which had choked her original personality. She is today endowed with her own culture, in which the human value is indisputable. In this she is, in Africa, in the vanguard of the emancipation of the spirit. 29

The history of Africa continued to have an important part of the Guinean Revolution. The P. D. G.

built into its re-organization of the educational system in 1964 a strong historical component which was mandated; this curriculum, heavily concentrated in African history, served a large role in the return to the African Personality.³⁰ In 1970, the Guinean government worked with the Polish government to study the origins of the Mali Empire through a careful analysis of the sites of Niani and Sankarani on the border between Guinea and the Republic of Mali.³¹

Oral history projects were supported by the government of Sékou Touré, and one of the most important facets of Guinean history, the story of Soundiata, was explored by D. T. Niani.³² All of these efforts to make the past a part of the present, and to preserve the past were part of the concept of the African Personality. Touré was convinced that once a people become proud of their heritage, they would then be better able to fight for their future.

Sékou Touré's concept of the African Personality offered one way of looking at the people of Africa. The other major view was that exemplified by Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of Senegal, who was one of the formulators of the philosophy of Negritude. Sékou

Touré was strongly opposed to the concept of Negritude, and to its political implications for the African continent. Part of the opposition was clearly based upon his rejection of Senghor's political positions. The major part of Sékou Touré's refusal to accept Negritude as a viable philosophy for Africa was based upon his conviction that the concept of the African Personality offered both historical and political validity for an independent Africa.

The first problem Sékou Touré identified with Negritude was what he considered to be the acceptance of the color of one's skin as a means of measuring an individual. Sékou Touré, in the development of the concept of the African Personality, had emphasized his contention that culture has no color.³³ Although the African Personality was historically the personality of the black person, it was the result of shared experiences rather than skin color.³⁴ The very essence of Negritude was questioned by the challenge to the use of skin color as a means of defining a person.

In an interview in 1970, Sékou Touré responded to an inquiry on Negritude by repeating his principal

belief, and then, expanding its implications:

The color of a man does not define him. The color of a man has nothing to do with his nature or his qualities. The black man and the white man who inhabit a continent are subjected to the same realities. They have consequently, the same rights and the same responsibilities to forge a partnership of their efforts to remedy the insufficiencies of their continent, [and] to work for the betterment of man and society. Negritude is not an historical thesis for us. 35

Sékou Touré considered the African Personality to be applicable in its broadest sense.

Sékou Touré linked the idea of Negritude to other factors which served to impede African liberation. On International Workers' Day in 1971, the slogan was:

Down with negritude.
Down with racism.
Down with hoaxes.
Down with puppets.
Down with servility.
Revolution or death. 36

In the address he presented, the Guinean President reinforced his opposition to Negritude by pledging:

...we affirm in your name that revolution is neither black, nor white, nor yellow, nor does democracy, liberty, sovereignty, or progress depend either upon the color of one's skin or upon one's

religion, but on the people who have
 opted for their realization.³⁷

Negritude was also opposed by Sékou Touré because he deemed it to be an irrational response to the equally irrational racial discrimination of the European.³⁸

Part of the conflict resulted from the fact that Negritude emerged from the colonial experience of black men from Africa and from the Antilles in France, while the African Personality grew out of the African experience during the struggle for self-determination which occurred over twenty years after the idea of Negritude was formulated. Sékou Touré opposed the notion that Negritude was a valid philosophy to use in order to free Africa from the negative effects of the "civilizing mission" of the European colonizers.³⁹ Since Negritude had both a racial and an irrational character, the rehabilitation of the African Personality could not be undertaken by those who subscribed to the philosophy of Negritude.⁴⁰

According to Sékou Touré Negritude offered the least threatening response to the direct outrages of imperialism because, in response to the mistreatment in

France and in French Africa, Negritude's literary bent and its emphasis on the equalization of men of black skins with those who have white skins did not address the more serious issues of power. Touré, therefore, called Negritude the response of the slave crying out to his master for better treatment without understanding the need to destroy the system of slavery.⁴¹ He charged that Negritude implied an admitted inferiority because, instead of asserting the African Personality, Negritude created a black man who existed only in relation to Europeans.⁴²

The official Guinean position was that those who espoused the idea of Negritude had lost the vision of the African Personality as an entity apart from that of any other cultural and historical personality. Guinean writers frequently criticized Senghor as being more French than African in their use of epithets such as "petit-négro-français,"⁴³ and "négro-gaulois."⁴⁴ A Senegalese writer, Pathé Diagne, a staunch critic of Senghor and his philosophy of Negritude, wrote on the implications of Negritude for a Guinean publication:

One must notice that it is not only
the reversal of history and the

conversion of Africanity into Latinity which get in the way of those who hold on to Negritude. The great paradox is in all the deployment of out educational, political and diplomatic apparatus in the service of the slogan of Negritude and of the values of so-called Negro civilization, [which are] an incomplete picture sketched from Frenchness and under the cultural hegemony of France. 45

The denial of the African as an historical factor with his or her own special culture, civilization and personality was vehemently opposed by Sékou Touré. He charged that in the philosophy of Negritude the "African ceases to be an African, he became a fantasy, a concept."⁴⁶ For Touré, the concept of the African Personality liberated the African while:

Negritude is the product of history, the history of colonialism; the theoretical justification of colonialism is the negation of all of the human faculties of the African. Thus the "Negro" is considered to be sub-human. 47

If one accepted Negritude as a philosophy, Sékou Touré reasoned, then one also accepted the faulty reasoning supporting the concept.

Because of the absence of an historical position for Africa and Africans apart from Europe, the idea of

Negritude was seen by Touré as having no conception of African development independent of that continent.

Sékou Touré considered it a serious weakness that:

Negritude cannot define the African let alone Africa. The politics of Negritude are founded upon an error of historical viewpoint, and upon one objective, that of side-tracking those who adopt it from the realities of colonialism to which Black people have been subjected, and still more seriously, from the path of progress. The color of one's skin cannot justify anything. It can be neither the model of the best of society nor the expression of a culture. 48

Another aspect of the deficiencies of the concept of Negritude was its failure to lend itself to the development of either a platform or a set of objectives for an independent Africa.⁴⁹ Because of its essentially reflexive and defensive origins, Touré said that the political application of Negritude could not be successful.⁵⁰

Of all of the shortcomings of Negritude the greatest was that Touré classified it as counter-revolutionary.⁵¹ He charged Senghor with acting against the best interests of Africa whenever those interests conflicted with what the French desired. The conflict between Senghor, the philosopher of

Negritude, and Sékou Touré, the philosopher of the African Personality, emerged during the colonial era and continued throughout the entire period from 1958 to 1971.

The basic components of Touré's philosophy depend heavily upon the ideas inherent in the concept of the African Personality. His opposition to all that Senghor's Negritude implied was consistent with Sékou Touré's primary objective of achieving a successful revolution in Guinea which would serve as a model for the entire African continent.

It was clear that Touré wanted Guinea to enter the Twentieth Century as an equal of other states in the world. The primary difficulty was the contradiction in Touré's objective to bring Guinea into the highly competitive world of the technically advanced modern states while still retaining her own African culture. Modernization without Westernization was a dominant theme of the concept of the African Personality, but there was a serious question as to whether such a goal, however laudable, was feasible.

Sékou Touré had been extremely selective in his

application of his concept of the African Personality. Those elements of traditional society which were deemed helpful in terms of progress, modernization and the supremacy of the Party were maintained and strengthened. On the other hand, those characteristics of traditional African society viewed by Touré as either inhibiting, impeding or threatening the Guinean revolution were eliminated.

Although Sékou Touré was a strong African nationalist, and Pan-Africanist, his first concern was the development of Guinean nationalism and the creation of the Guinean state within the mold of the African Personality. As a result, the most popular undertakings of the government were in those areas in which the application of the concept of the African Personality recognized ethnic differences. With the skillful political organization that formed the basis of Sékou Touré's power, he gained support for the elimination of threats to the state from traditional society.

The demands of modernization necessitated certain careful decisions in regard to the powerful ethnic groups in Guinea. First, tribalism had to be

neutralized before a modern state could emerge. In this area, the P. D. G. had accomplished a great deal even before independence. The multi-ethnic form of the party was an important step in the nationalization process, but independence did not automatically create the unity Touré thought that Guinea should have. As a substitute for tribal allegiances, Guineans were given the party and the nation.

At the same time, Sékou Touré chose to safeguard those elements of tribalism which, consistent with his philosophy, could be shaped within the nationalist modern framework of the Guinean state. The "spirit of self-defense of a social, geographic, economic and cultural community" which existed in the tribal culture would be extended to protect the entire nation.⁵² He wrote:

To defeat tribalism, it is necessary to understand that with the achievement of a nation, the tribal spirit becomes an anachronism, a reactionary manifestation, a backward vision, lagging behind social evolution. At the same time, each and every one has contributed in crossing the family frontiers to give birth to a social entity called the tribe; in that same manner today each and every one has a duty to go

beyond the tribe to the benefit of
the superior social entity called
the nation. 53

The concept of the African Personality went beyond the notion of tribalism because the Guinean Revolution was the primary goal of Sékou Touré.

Secondly, the decision to eliminate the chefferie, the semi-traditional leadership group sanctioned by the French, was made early in Guinea's history as part of the move against tribalism. The chefferie was an institution that the French developed as part of their larger colonial strategy, and Touré considered them to be outside of the African experience despite the strong ties they held to the ethnic groups. The liquidation of the chefferie removed a possible source of opposition to the government, and was explained by Touré in 1958 as the removal of a colonial institution,⁵⁴ not a legitimate African institution.

Third, the most serious internal contradiction was found in the issue involving the national languages. Since Guinea's early education was conducted in French, the commitment to mass education and the African Personality resulted in the decision

to initiate, as part of the reforms of 1964, primary education in the national languages of Guinea, rather than in French. The effect of this decision was the maximizing of interaction between the children learning in the primary schools and the adults learning in the adult education classes.⁵⁵ The "alphabetisation" campaign had the additional effect of neutralizing those who had only received a French education and of allowing others who may have had stronger ties to the party to become part of the educational process as teachers. In addition, Sékou Touré stressed that the alphabetisation campaign was to be seen as a decision "to retain authenticity and African culture rather than as a sign of exaggerated Africanism or chauvinism."⁵⁶

Finally, the P. D. G. 's early action against religious competition resulted in the control of both the Christian influences, which were denounced as foreign, and the traditional African religions in Guinea. The control of the Christian churches in Guinea and the demand for African priests and higher officials in the Roman Catholic Church were seen as

legitimate within the framework of African nationalism, even though the decision placed all parochial schools under the authority of the state.⁵⁷

The campaign launched against the traditional religions in 1962 was called the "Demystification Campaign," and was an attack upon the traditional practices, beliefs and leadership of Guinea's coastal and forest peoples who were not Muslim. The Demystification Campaign, reminiscent of Bismarck's "kulturkampf," was an open attack by the party and the government against any authority which challenged them for the allegiance of the people. Since the party was rapidly entering the areas traditionally held in the society by the religious leadership, that leadership had to be destroyed or made ineffective. The party organization undertook the systematic destruction, also, of the images of the ethnic groups in Guinea, and a great deal of the art and artifacts of African culture were destroyed during the overzealous application of party orders.⁵⁸

It is impossible to reconcile the Demystification Campaign and the concept of the African Personality.

As a result, Sékou Touré rarely mentioned this effort in later years, and the contradictions have never really been addressed in his philosophy. Therefore, the only logical conclusion is that the power of the traditional leaders of Guinea's ethnic groups which had retained their own culture, society and religion despite colonialism were perceived as a major threat to Touré's authority. No other power, African or otherwise, was to be permitted in Touré's Guinea.

Building a new society also required that Sékou Touré work with what he found inside Guinea. Realistic and pragmatic, Touré based his vision on his firm understanding of the need for co-operative action. The early introduction of the notion of investissement humaine was based upon the concept of the African Personality and the communocratic society and involved a massive personal and communal effort on the part of Guinea's citizens to fill the gap between Guinea's meager capital and the actual needs at the time of independence. The first development plan, 1960-1963, depended upon human investment to develop the villages and cities, and to build schools and other public

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 buildings. Although Sékou Touré's requests that Guineans work together to build a modern state with their own labor faced serious obstacles at the beginning, Sékou Touré's commitment to the African Personality and its communocratic society remained so strong that he continued to re-introduce the idea throughout the first thirteen years.⁶⁰ Subsequently, the seven-year plan also re-introduced investissement humaine as part of the communocratic approach to the Cultural Revolution.

Sékou Touré chose to create a new society in Guinea. The new Guinea was to have been the result of the legitimization of the African Personality and the success of the Guinean revolution. The redemption, rehabilitation and unification of the African continent awaited the success of Guinea's revolution, according to Touré. As early as 1958 Touré said:

Finally, our human freedom, our national freedom is in solidarity with the freedom of other men and other nations. But we offer that solidarity of free men and nations first to Africa so that it can consolidate African unity, without which the people of Africa can neither pretend to control their destiny, nor modify, in any

fundamental manner, the conditions
which impede their full development. 61

The concept of the African Personality was a basic and recurring theme in Sékou Touré's philosophy. Touré's commitment to the concept of the African Personality was related to his determination that the Guinean revolution set the pace for other African revolutions. As a result, many major decisions for Guinea were made with an obvious attempt to legitimize the activities on the basis of their African origins. Most of Touré's foreign policy during the first thirteen years was based upon the link between Guinea's revolution and the solidarity of the entire African continent. Yet, Touré's problem seemed to have been the lack of acceptance by other African states of the Guinean model since it had not been any more successful than other states in achieving the material and political goals of African peoples throughout the continent. Despite the contradictions and difficulties, the concept of the African Personality remained a cornerstone of the philosophy of Sékou Touré throughout his life. But his most successful efforts would come in the political arena where he would

undertake the creation of a strong one-party modern state consistent both with traditional African values and the needs of a nation state.

Chapter II-The Concept of the African Personality

Footnotes

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60. Investissement humaine is discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III

NON-CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

Sékou Touré's economic philosophy from 1958 to 1971 evolved through two distinct phases. The first, from 1958 to 1964, was designed to provide the basis for nation-building and modernization, including the creation of a national economy. From 1964 to 1971, the second phase emphasized the concentrated move to the highly integrated, and intensely politicized socialist state. Because the success of the Guinean Revolution was critical to the liberation of Africa in his thinking, Touré moved to socialism as the means of achieving the creation of a revolutionary Guinean state which could serve as a prototype for African development after the failures in the economy began to threaten his revolution.

The first economic pattern was based upon Touré's major contributions embodied in the concept of the African Personality: human investment; non-capitalist development; the communocratic society; and the rehabilitation of the African continent. In addition to the primary philosophical concerns, there were also

some concrete considerations as to the best way in which Guinea was to achieve modernization and the creation of a strong economic base.

Sékou Touré was in the unique position of being able to co-ordinate relatively rapid implementation of the economic programs consistent with his philosophy. The development of the mechanisms for the supportive and executive economic institutions of independence was a major priority for Guinea in 1958 as it had been for most nations gaining independence from colonial powers. The formulation of Touré's economic philosophy owed significant debts to his earlier experiences in both the traditional and colonial systems in Faranah, a city in Upper Guinea; to his many years in the trade union movement; to his years in the R. D. A.; to his time spent in the French Chamber of Deputies; and to his analysis of the needs of Guinea after the renunciation of the French Community proposed by de Gaulle.

There are two other major elements in Touré's philosophy that must be noted. First, he proclaimed himself to be a social democrat who firmly accepted the many philosophical and theoretical precepts of earlier socialists, including the inevitability of the class

struggle; the dangers posed by the bourgeois class; the inevitability of the success of socialism; the ultimate perfectibility of mankind, and the need for a system providing for the equitable distribution of wealth. Touré, however, was first an African, and his philosophical commitment to the concept of the African Personality would be the barometer by which any applications of socialism in Guinea would be measured.

There were many elements in African history, and society, too, which impacted upon Sékou Touré's socialist thought. The mystique of the struggles waged by such Guinean heroes as Almamy Samory Touré and Alfa Yaya Diallo became part of the folklore enriching the concept of the African Personality. This would be used to justify the inculcation of socialism into the Guinean Revolution. For the men and women represented by the P. D. G. in 1958, colonialism was real, and the abuses were of recent experience. In addition, the traditional society was also a strong part of the life of the adults in Guinea. By the time of the decision in the late Sixties to move to the declaration of a socialist state, a significant portion of Guinea's population was too young to remember living under

colonialism. For this group, Touré's economic philosophy would link the African traditional past to the creation of a modern state.

It was essential that Guinea's political independence be linked to economic independence since Touré's memories of colonialism, continually restated, emphasized the exploitative nature of the system. Guinea's first shock after independence was the far-reaching barrage of economic reprisals from de Gaulle's¹ government in its attempt to weaken Touré's government.

The Three Year Plan for economic development was formulated in 1958 in response to the serious economic dislocations which resulted from Touré's leadership in Guinea's rejection of the French Community. Planned originally in Kankan, in Upper Guinea, as part of the mammoth effort to begin the task of creating a new nation, the Three Year Plan was based upon a national budget of 28 billion francs which came from loans, with low interest, from Ghana, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and both East and West² Germany.

In 1959, Sékou Touré spoke of the Three Year Plan as an effort to achieve "reconversion, the facilitation of commercial networks and an agricultural revolution."³ The Three Year Plan, initially planned for January 1960⁴, was designed to "normalize economic patterns and improve life"⁵ which had been disrupted both by colonialism and the French economic reprisals.

Sékou Touré decided from the beginning that Guinea was to have a planned economy since her development was to be non-capitalist and the role of the party was to be paramount. In 1959, Touré said:

It is evident that certain Marxist conceptions can be applied to the conditions in Africa, but it is more evident that Africa must find her own revolutionary principles....We are, par excellence, an example of "wretchedness" in the Western sense of the word and it is unthinkable that we would choose the capitalist system to resolve our problems....⁶

Touré's vision of Guinea's path would be based upon a "socialism shaped by our conditions and our own methods, a fundamental socialism designed to meet our concerns and objectives."⁷

Touré's first priority for Guinea would be the agricultural revolution. Enhanced agricultural

production would feed a healthy population, lessen dependence upon imported foodstuffs, decrease the expenditure of scarce hard currency and, finally, bring in needed revenue to aid in the accumulation of capital. For Touré, the "real revolution [was] the substitution of extensive and intensive production for subsistence farming,"⁸ which was the lot of⁹ eighty-five percent of Guinea's population.

Because Touré's economic philosophy was inextricably woven into his concept of the African Personality, the agricultural revolution was to be based on what he perceived to be the essential principles of African life. First, the agricultural revolution would be based upon the "communocracy," the cornerstone of African democracy, in his thinking:

African democracy is by definition the respect for the rights and interests of man within society, that which implies equal respect of the rights and interests of that society...In Africa, man is not more valuable than society, he is in accord with it, that is what we call the "communocratic" spirit. 10

Touré's philosophical commitment to the "communocratic" ethos became government policy in 1959 as the

agricultural revolution was planned on the basis of the creation of co-operatives which would function at the village level.¹¹

While denying at that time that he planned communes for Guinea, Sékou Touré stressed the link between his planned co-operatives and the African Personality:

In Africa, land is not individual property, It is the property of the community, and it is used according to very strict ancestral laws and cannot be sold...We are oriented toward the co-operative,[which] respects the social practices of our people and permits intensive mechanized agricultural development. 12

One of the reasons for the resistance of the Peul in Middle Guinea to Touré's collectivization was the long history of that ethnic group as people who had a strong concept of the ownership of property, cattle or land.

A major part of Sékou Touré's plan for the agricultural revolution and for the Three Year Plan was the concept of "Human Investment," also based upon his view of the African Personality. In the absence of sufficient economic resources, the campaign for "Human Investment" was launched by the P. D. G. in 1958 at the Third National Party Congress.¹³ When asked about

the relationship between his "Human Investment" policy and the old colonial policy of "Forced Labor" imposed by the French in Africa, Touré said:

We will never reinstitute the forced labor of sinister memory...Never confuse "Human Investment," which is decided by voluntary labor, conducted by the people themselves, for their own reasons and as they determine their program, with forced labor. 14

Yet, each village would be required to build roads, clinics, schools, raise taxes by collective farming, and other requirements of the village which could not be built with public funds.¹⁵ The "Human Investment" was essential since Guinea could not afford to pay for the labor involved in developing an infrastructure for the agricultural revolution and the Three Year Plan.

While the agricultural revolution was underway, Touré was also dealing with other financial problems which were addressed in the Three Year Plan. The first was the reform of the "financial regime of the capitalist system imposed by colonialism."¹⁶ In 1960, Guinea left the franc zone in a move that signalled complete independence from France. This move

gave Guinea total control over her internal and external finances.¹⁷ Immediately afterwards, the Bank of France changed its CFA currency which made it impossible for Touré's government to utilize any of its reserve of CFA.¹⁸

The second problem involved foreign investment. Sékou Touré was determined that Guinea's economic development would occur on his terms, and that meant that the political interests would be more important than any other considerations. In 1959, he said:

I want to call your attention to the fact that we will never make our politics subservient to our economic needs...we will determine our economic needs as a function of our political objectives...[we would encourage] investments of an industrial nature, [and] the best exploitation of our riches is one in which the raw materials can be transformed locally into a usable state. 19

It was interesting that the relationship Touré had with Americans, the English and the Canadians in the FRIA bauxite complex would serve as the model for subsequent economic relationships between Guinea and other nations.

As a result of de Gaulle's international

machinations, Guinea's primary source of aid during the early years would be from Ghana and Liberia in Africa, and from the Eastern bloc which provided loans, repaid by Guinea in diamonds, gold and some agricultural produce. Guinea was thereby enabled to begin to develop an infrastructure necessary for the Three Year Plan. Touré gave a list of the industrial goods needed by Guinea in 1959:

Our concrete needs are enormous. The most immediate involve hard mechanical equipment: tractors; trucks; cranes; excavators; bulldozers, and materials for public works such as steel beams, harbor equipment, plows and cold storage installations. 20

The Three Year Plan was an ambitious undertaking.

An important part of Sékou Touré's plan for the industrial revolution was the creation of industrial co-operatives as well as agricultural. In the same way that the agricultural crisis in 1958 was addressed through the creation of UNICOOPAGUI (the National Union of African Planters in Guinea),²¹ there were co-operatives of transport workers, construction workers, butchers, bakers, tailors, and others who were brought into a network with a co-operative which approved their provisioning by both internal and

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external commercial government offices.

The industrial goals of the Three Year Plan were designed according to Sékou Touré's philosophy. First, the role of the party was paramount in the creation of a planned economy. Second, the already existing embryonic industries such as bauxite, electricity, and the railroads were to be maintained.²³ Third, capital was to be raised from industrial and mineral production.²⁴ Fourth, there was to be industrial development in each of Guinea's regions, based upon agricultural and mineral resources in the region.²⁵ Finally, a major effort was to have been made to create iron, bauxite and hydroelectric industries as quickly as possible.²⁶

Industrial development conformed with Sékou Touré's philosophy of non-capitalist development in the same manner that agricultural development was to have been achieved. The Three Year Plan was to have provided an economic base for the young nation through the national incorporation of the key African values into the modernization process. In 1962, there was an official evaluation of the Plan by the government:

This first plan had to be

sufficiently supple to be in complete harmony with the conditions of the moment and to allow modifications that would permit it to be put in motion and to take into account the practical experience acquired during the planning. But it always remained very firm in its aim to accomplish the move from the anarchistic economy of colonial mercantilism to a scientifically organized economy. It was in reality a plan of transition. Certainly one could quickly see that it was not possible during the three year period to surmount the mass of obstacles and especially the handicaps of every type bequeathed by 60 years of colonialism. 27

Although there had been major achievements during the Three Year Plan, such as "...a radio transmitter, printing office, jet airport, Polytechnical Institute, major 25,000 seat stadium, three state-owned hotels, tripled efficiency in water and electricity, ...[the creation of] an air force, maritime company,... and the doubling in the number of bridges and ferries,"²⁸ it was clear from Touré's writings that the goals of the Three Year Plan had fallen far short of his expectations.

Sékou Touré's evaluation of the Three Year Plan also underscored another problem in Guinea's economic

development. He had been concerned about the role of workers in Guinea from the early years, and Touré's handling of the workers in Guinea may have been a major factor in the weakness of the Three Year Plan. In 1963, Touré wrote that "irrespective of the stage of development achieved by a society, its major²⁹ productive forces are essentially the working masses. Yet, by 1963 Touré had, in a systematic program, eliminated any possibility of the working masses in having independent action.

In the years immediately preceding independence, Sékou Touré's role as a trade unionist made it possible for him to exercise a great deal of power, and the labor movement in Guinea was very powerful. After becoming Chief of State, Touré was asked about the role of the unions, which he severely diminished by saying that they were:

...voluntarily constituted as one of the principal instruments of our political struggle...[and that] political unity in Guinea realizes all concerns of the population - peasants, workers, artisans, and merchants. 30

Touré also stated that "the working class is in service³¹ to the nation and to the cause of Africa."

In 1960, the National Congress of Guinean Workers (C. N. T. G.) met in Conakry to endorse the Three Year Plan and to hear what the government of the P.D.G. led by Sékou Touré had in store for them. In response to the appeal by Touré that they support his efforts, the C.N.T.G. passed a resolution which would eventually lead to its incorporation within the party:

The C.N.T.G. renews its confidence, its faithfulness, and its attachment to the P.D.G., to its National Political Bureau and to its government and it assures them of its determination in the realization of the objectives of the Three Year Plan. 32

By 1963, the C.N.T.G. had been incorporated into the party, and most of its members were employed by either
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the state or by national enterprises.

Furthermore, Sékou Touré in 1963 was not a supporter of any independent trade union activity:

Clearly, if trade union action opposed such a regime [as ours], it would also oppose the exercise of power by the people. In an essentially popular progressive regime, trade union action directed against the state turns out to be reactionary, anti-popular action, tending only to weaken and overthrow the regime. 34

Although Touré's idealized worker would be seeking to "preserve and develop...[those]...social values and

human virtues, characteristic of the African Personality,"³⁵ the trade unionists were on notice that their independent actions would be considered as treason.

From 1958 to 1964, Sékou Touré was essentially concerned with the economic independence of Guinea which would be linked to a new way of thinking on the part of the Guinean masses. By creating a national bank, Guinean currency, and complete control over all of the foreign investments and foreign-owned companies in Guinea, Touré attempted to restructure Guinea's economy as one independent of both colonialism and neo-colonialism.³⁶ Sékou Touré had learned of Guinea's fiscal realities while administering the colonial territory, and he knew exactly the nature of Guinea's economic potential.³⁷

An important aspect of Guinea's economic development during the first seven years would be the role and control of foreign investors in the development of the state. At first, Touré attempted to regularize the relationship with France by remaining in diplomatic contact in order to establish friendly and equitable economic relations with France.³⁸ By 1961,

it had become clear that de Gaulle would not establish working relations with an independent Guinea within an economic sphere. Touré then moved to set up structures that would facilitate foreign investment in order to build factories and exploit the nation's resources. The Three Year Plan was accompanied by legislation governing foreign investments, and Guinea pledged that:

all those who are ready to invest in the Republic and are willing to participate in the economic development of the country can count on uninterrupted social stability and enjoy guarantees protecting their capital from arbitrary acts and ensuring equitable interests. 39

Sékou Touré was determined that Guinea not be economically isolated from the United States. On May 9, 1962, Touré signed an agreement with the United States, under which Guinea became a participant in the Mutual Security Act of 1954 which guaranteed American
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investments abroad. At that same time, President Kennedy's interest in Guinea resulted in food, money and teachers from the United States arriving in
41
Guinea. Despite de Gaulle's continuing efforts to isolate Guinea economically, the economic relations between Guinea and the American, British and Canadian bauxite firms remained sound.

All foreign investments in Guinea were under the control of the government, in keeping with the principles of the philosophy of Sékou Touré. Because of their strategic importance, all companies involved with either mining, hydrocarbides or hydro-electricity had⁴² to enter into special agreements with the government. Touré also set forth other criteria for foreign investors in Guinea. They could only invest in major technical and industrial enterprises if they included plans to hire significant numbers of Guinean workers, and to train men and women in industrial and technical fields.⁴³ Foreign nationals were restricted from ownership of those few business enterprises in private⁴⁴ hands which could only be owned by Guineans.

Because the Three Year Plan failed to meet his expectations, Touré began to move the economy under complete party control. Political control was one aspect of this move, but the need for economic progress mandated an appeal in 1963 to the communocratic spirit as an essential part of the Guinean Revolution:

...one essential is to follow a correct political line, and another is to organize the masses so that they awaken consciousness of their plight and engage in action.

But equally indispensable is the resolute commitment of each individual, (and) his awareness of his personal responsibility to the nation. In fact, the quality of the revolutionary movement depends on the quality of the many individual contributions to the enterprise, over and above any personal interests. 45

Linking political and economic actions was consistent with Touré's philosophy.

The Guinean experience with the first multi-year plan was not unique. In general, economic development did not fare well in most of Africa in the years immediately following independence. In a study published in 1966, a United Nations economic survey of 1960-1964 reported that:

...with the best of intentions, no African government could have made up, in a few years, for deficiencies in economic and administrative structures, trained personnel, domestic saving capacities, which have their roots in a long past. Secondly, development plans have made people conscious of the need for setting up targets and putting forth efforts to reach them. Finally, African countries which have completed their first development plans are fully aware of the problems they are faced with, and methods required to solve them satisfactorily. 46

Once the Three Year Plan ended, it became necessary for Touré to re-evaluate his project for economic development in Guinea. The plans for rural organization, industrialization and education had yielded political gains in creating a sense of nationhood, but the hard realities of underdevelopment had not been changed. Guinea's large investment in education necessitated bringing the youth into the economic life of the state in order to utilize their skills, knowledge, training, and labor. More important was the need to encourage a respect for agricultural labor if the villages were to be developed.

On May 1, 1964, the National Council of the Revolution met at Gueckedou, in Forest Guinea, and approved the new Seven Year Plan through which the agricultural and industrial production goals of Guinea were to have been met by 1971.⁴⁷ This plan was initially divided into two parts: 1964-68 during which emphasis would be on the infrastructure, and 1968-71⁴⁸ during which industrialization would be stressed.

Although the Seven Year Plan was to have moved Guinea closer toward the economic independence desired by Touré, problems of major proportions arose before

the end of 1964. Touré responded harshly with the promulgation of the Loi Cadre of November 8, 1964, which began the movement called "8th November," in an attempt to salvage the Seven Year Plan. He wrote:

Among the enemies of our people and of Africa's peoples, we verify that in addition to the presence of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, there are feudal Guineans [who are] opportunistic and corrupt in their behavior... External enemies join those in the interior in order to stifle the Guinean economy, engendering popular discontent with the aim of substituting the rule of money, racism and irresponsibility for democracy. 49

Sékou Touré also placed members of the party on notice that "our party must cease to be the refuge of those who wish to make it a springboard for their ambitions or an instrument for their fortune."⁵⁰

The effort to retrieve the goals set by the Seven Year Plan resulted in a major communications effort using the state's radio, press, newspapers, and party institutions.⁵¹ Sékou Touré decided to identify the Seven Year Plan as a new independence effort, and moved Guinea toward socialism. His long poem, "8 Novembre 1984," signified a unified philosophical position, when

at the end, Touré wrote:

People
 We have been chosen
 We are and always will be.
 The Seven Year Plan
 Will yield prosperity
 In countryside and factory
 Today's suffering
 Will bring an abundant harvest
 From our potential
 "Creativity" is born.
 Where triumphant socialism
 To each merit and need
 Dispenses a fair price.
 Oh, 8th November
 The second 28th September of Africa
 You are the source of vitality
 Yours has been the choice of WORK
 Of justice and solidarity
 Through which the True Revolution
 Will live and triumph. 52

The smugglers, black marketeers and others who were accused of sabotaging the Seven Year Plan were also subjected to legal penalties,⁵³ but Touré was more concerned with the larger goal of creating a new Guinean within a socialist society.

Guinea's economic development would continue to be a major concern of Touré's philosophy. As the Seven Year Plan continued to encounter the harsh facts of limited resources and opposition to change, Touré decided to redefine the nature of the economic arm of the Guinean revolution. In 1966, there was a new thrust

toward a type of socialism which could address the particular problems of Guinean and other African economic development. After the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré said that " non-capitalist development is the only guarantee of justice, unity, and national solidarity especially when it provides the means of controlling one's destiny, consciousness, will to progress,[and] capacity to work."⁵⁴

During the meeting of the National Revolutionary Council at Labe, in Middle Guinea, from July 28 to 31, 1966, it was decided to move toward the creation of a socialist state in keeping with Touré's philosophy. The publication of La Revolution Culturelle established his philosophical approach to the continuation of a revolutionary regime in Guinea which was to serve the economic needs of all of the people through its ownership of those things essential for the good of the population.⁵⁵ In Touré's writings and speeches at that time there was also great enthusiasm for the Seven Year Plan's expected success in the industrial sector.⁵⁶

A major decision at Labe was the creation of new governmental structures to facilitate economic

development at the village level which would harness the energies of both students and graduates. The Collèges d'Enseignement Rurale (Colleges of Rural Education- C. E. R.)⁵⁷ were instituted. Sékou Touré saw the C.E.R. as a transition between the old and the new which would permit the movement of the youth into the Guinean revolution at village level.

The C.E.R. was a significant step because it was designed to accomplish many goals at the same time. The goals in the economic sector were tied to both the political and the educational objectives, but Touré's economic aim for the C.E.R., which had quickly been renamed the Collèges d'Enseignement Révolutionnaire (Schools of Revolutionary Education), was clear:

It is the C.E.R. which will establish the first great modern cooperatives based upon radical democratic and progressive structures in the villages, thanks to the organizations they will form. To achieve that end, the C.E.R. will form educational seminars with technicians, farmers, herdsmen and others, in order to multiply, in the cooperatives, the great agricultural and animal husbandry achievement. This will result in a modern peasantry and a rational and dynamic increase in our agricultural

potential. Our young students who leave the Institutes will enter at either one stage of the C.E.R. or the cooperatives issuing from the C.E.R., and will familiarize themselves with rural problems in order to make a contribution to the development of rural youth. 58

Touré had promised during the early years of independence that the villages would not be forgotten.⁵⁹ The C.E.R. were also a means of instituting the socialist revolution at the village level.⁶⁰ The Guinean Revolution envisioned by Sékou Touré was one in which "each sector of the nation's life, each region, each village, each man and each woman of Guinea has to take a share in the development tasks, within the framework of the plan for economic development."⁶¹

The experience of the Three Year Plan and the problems leading to the Loi Cadre of November 8, 1964 influenced Touré's decision to exert his weight to get mass support for the new effort. In August, 1966, Touré introduced the idea of the C.E.R. to the party cadres in Conakry, stressing the increased⁶² opportunities for the youth. At a meeting in December of the same year, he informed the women of Conakry II

that representatives of the World Bank would be coming to evaluate Guinean urban development, and that the C.E.R. would be used to develop the rural areas.⁶³ Because of the turbulence of African political life in 1966, Touré was determined both to revolutionize the Guinean economic revolution, and to popularize the struggle to modernize and industrialize.

Part of the popularization effort was the use of government officials abroad to tell the world, especially the African world, about Touré's economic policies. Fofana Karim, Secretary of State of Economic Development restated Touré's objectives for the Seven Year Plan in a speech given in Cairo, in early 1966:

1. to consolidate national monetary resources by limiting imports and stimulating exports;
2. to accumulate national revenue;
3. to increase the national treasury at the expense of self-consumption;
4. to promote formation of a professional class to prepare for the last stages of development.⁶⁴

By the end of 1966, Sékou Touré had moved Guinea toward socialism through the creation of structures, such as the C.E.R. and the P.R.L. which would bring the party and the government to the villages. The task of

these institutions was broad. Touré had concluded that economic changes would take place in Guinea only if the entire structure of the society, including its psychology, was altered:

It is futile to suppose that a radical transformation of economic, administrative and social structures can occur without a transformation of mental structures...That is to say that an ideological formation is the first necessity if a people are going to develop. 65

Sékou Touré returned to the dominant themes of the concept of the African Personality as he sought ways in which Guinea's economic problems could be solved. The C.E.R. served as a means of updating the decision made in 1958 to create co-operatives to facilitate an agricultural revolution by forcing the youth to return to the villages in a re-affirmation of the communocratic ethos in his philosophy. In addition, the concept of Human Investment was continued by having those who were educated at the expense of the state give their skills and their labor to the peasants as a means of repaying the people who financed their educations. Touré was seeking to place his revolution back on track with a return to earlier and often stated

goals "...to preserve and develop...[those]...social values and human virtues characteristic of the African Personality."⁶⁶

In 1967, the Guinean government had begun to claim some successes for the Seven Year Plan. Ports had been improved, new airports had been built,⁶⁷ and the bauxite production had flourished.⁶⁸ Yet, the shift in Touré's philosophy, and Guinea's refusal to participate in the economic surveys conducted by the United Nations underscore the real problems in the economic sphere. Touré's philosophical response was the radicalization of the Guinean Revolution along socialist lines which he claimed were not particularly African in nature:

Socialism has no national character, it is not attached to any nation, to any race, to any color [or] to any continent. As a science it is impersonal and inalienable. But the principles, the practices applied to men who are certainly of common values-their creative genius and desire for social progress-but apparently also to their particular realities and historical differences, [and] different economic realities. The road of economic, social and cultural development differs necessarily from one state to another. Socialism is not an end in itself, the end assigned to socialist actions, but the qualitative change of the society of man. 69

Touré was determined that his socialism not be labelled as "African" although his Guinean revolution would be based upon a type of socialism that could be applicable to all African countries. The reason for the applicability would be the concept of the African Personality, not socialism, as the common base despite the fact that the non-capitalist, or socialist, pattern of economic development was a major facet of Touré's philosophy.

Touré's move to socialism was made party policy when the Eighth Party Congress of the P.D.G. confirmed his philosophical position and, in September 1967, "decided to intensify the struggle for the construction of socialism."⁷⁰ The P.R.L. became the political arm of the C.E.R. at the same time. This massive effort to revolutionize the villages as the basis of Guinea's Revolution was based on a plan to involve "Human Investment"⁷¹ in the creation of a "self-sufficient" economy.⁷² All of these elements were united in a commitment to rural development and an agricultural revolution designated as the "Agricultural Year" of 1968-1969.

After four years of intense negotiation, 1968 saw the creation of a major regional cooperative undertaking, the Organization of Senegal River States. Both a political and an economic necessity, the international organization linked Mali, Mauretania and Senegal in a joint venture with Guinea which was planned to enable the four states to develop economically by exploiting the Senegal River. At the first meeting in Conakry, Touré hailed the organization as a broad revolutionary stroke designed to free African states from external economic domination:

Our contribution is to complete the liberation of Africa, to withdraw Africa from imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and to aid each African state in involving itself resolutely in the path of social and democratic progress, and to end rapidly and to outlaw all reactionary behavior paralyzing Africa and the active creativity of our peoples...⁷³

This organization would last for three years.⁷⁴

The Guinea Revolution as a socialist revolution continued to be a major theme in the writing and speeches of Sékou Touré throughout 1969 and early 1970. On the relationship between the individual effort and the Guinean Revolution, Touré wrote:

The constant of socialism, the

constant of the revolution, is work. If work ceases, there is no longer a revolution, there is no socialism. If the direction of the Revolutionary power group of the revolution ceases, there is neither socialism nor revolution. If social justice ceases, the revolution and socialism end. If responsibility ceases, socialism and revolution end, and if progressive unity ceases, socialism is weakened and the revolution is halted.⁷⁵

In dealing with revolution, Touré also wrote that "if liberty, dignity and progress are permanent human aspirations, then revolution, beyond time and space, is also permanent."⁷⁶

Sékou Touré had begun to chart a new development strategy to revitalize the Guinean Revolution in the economic sphere. He was concerned about the agricultural and industrial sectors and asked for the immediate employment of "the greater part of the physical and intellectual energy of the nation...[in order to develop]...agricultural, . marine⁷⁷ and pastoral production in quantity and in quality."

Touré also urged his fellow citizens to "consider the struggle against corruption and the dilution of means"⁷⁸ as a major responsibility.

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When the Portuguese-led invasion occurred in November of 1970, the negative impact on Guinea's economy was total. At first, Touré accused the invaders of "trying to destroy the success of Guinea's economic development."⁷⁹ Then, as the search for the Fifth Column, or those accused of destroying the Guinean Revolution, progressed, many of the accused were also blamed for Guinea's economic problems since dozens of government officials directly involved with the economy were arrested.⁸⁰ The cataclysmic year of severe political dislocation scarred the economic development severely.

Although his philosophy had enabled his nation, and his government, to survive the chaos from November 1970 to November 1971, Sékou Touré knew that economic recovery required a major new effort. Economic life during the year of crisis had been largely decentralized as local political organizations filled the void created by the elimination of many political figures. Yet, a modern state cannot survive with a feudal economy, and Touré decided in November of 1971 to rekindle the economic aspects of his revolutionary philosophy with a seminar dedicated to Soundiata Keita,

the founding emperor of Thirteenth Century Mali. Urging a return to economic development in harmony with nature, Touré attempted to move his nation back to a path toward his earlier economic objectives.⁸¹

From 1958 to 1971, Sékou Touré's economic philosophy guided the development of Guinea. Modernization, industrialization, and an agricultural revolution were all planned as part of a Guinean Revolution which would influence events throughout Africa. The intellectual underpinning for his economic philosophy was the concept of the African Personality, with its communocratic ethos. and socialism, or the non-capitalist way. Yet, Touré resolutely refused to be called an "African" socialist.

Despite the failures of the multi-year plans, Sékou Touré's philosophy led to the creation of the two institutions, the C.E.R. and the P.R.L., which enabled the Republic of Guinea to survive the economic upheavals caused by the invasion in 1970 and its subsequent internal strife. At the end of the crisis, Touré, convinced that his initial philosophy was sound, returned to the same blueprint. Convinced that both

the African Personality and socialism were the only elements which would create a strong Guinean Revolution, Sékou Touré began anew at the end of 1971 by using an old plan, but the difference would be immediately apparent. Guinea had become a party-state which meant that economic abuses against the government could be treated harshly as Touré moved to ensure the success of the economic aspect of his revolution.

Chapter III- Non-Capitalist Development

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CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF THE PARTY STATE

The major significance of the political philosophy of Sékou Touré lies in the relationship he established between his concept of the African Personality and the conceptualization of the Guinean revolution as the vanguard of the liberation of the African continent. In his projection of a future Africa which would be united, economically integrated and independent, Sékou Touré stressed the role of the Guinean revolution in the achievement of an Africa commanding the respect of the world. In his political philosophy, Touré delineated the ways in which the Guinean people, through the success of their revolution, would pave the way for a creative, progressive and effective African continent in which all the basic needs of all of the people would be met.

As part of his formulation of the concept of the African Personality, Sékou Touré highlighted the importance of the elements of traditional African society in the political development of the new Africa.

In Guinea, however, Touré was determined to eliminate those elements which he analyzed as inimical to the establishment of a modern state. Early critics were particularly interested in Touré's destruction of a traditional institution known as the chefferie. When asked about the move by the P.D.G. against the "traditional Chiefs," he responded that :

The expression "traditional chiefs" is improper. Utilized by and subservient to the colonial system, the chiefs have lost the true authority which our social organization conferred upon the chieftancy. Their influence was not the emanation of our social order, but uniquely the emanation of the will of the colonial order.¹

The political development of Guinea mandated the destruction of all colonial institutions, and the chefferie, although based upon a traditional system of African leadership, was eliminated as was any political competition to the P.D.G.

When the P.D.G. began in 1947, it was one of many

parties in Guinea after the French political post-war reconstruction led to a struggle over the political integration of France's colonial subjects. During the early years the party faced a great deal of opposition as a party of the disaffected, or so it appeared to the better educated and better organized leaders of Guinea's other parties. Yet, Sékou Touré, and the young men and women who formed the nucleus of the party advocated progressive and substantive changes in a colony which had suffered greatly during the Second World War, and the formative years enabled the leadership to apply Touré's trade union experience in the organizing of a mass party which could use all of the traditional trade union tactics in achieving power through the consolidation of a party with a mass base.

The young people who worked for the party during the colonial era faced harassment, and, in some cases, death at the hands of those whose special interests were threatened. One young woman, M'Balia Camara, was killed by a chef de canton, David Sylla, when she organized the workers at his plantation.² The date of her death, November 9, is commemorated each year as

Women's day in Guinea, and she has become a heroine of the Guinean revolution.³

The opportunity for the P.D.G. to assume power without bloodshed came when France's President de Gaulle offered Africa the option of independence through a referendum to become part of the French community. Although the French appear not to have anticipated Guinea's rejection, the decision to reject continued colonial status was reached by an agreement of the many different parties under the leadership of the mayor of Conakry, Sékou Touré, and his party.⁴

France's refusal to accept Guinea's choice of independence would affect Guinea's political development during its first thirteen years of independence. The impact of France on Guinea's foreign policy would also be of major importance while Sékou Touré worked to chart Guinea through a neutralist international policy during the years of the Cold War.

Touré's most important political decision during the first two years, and, indeed, his most critical success was the move toward the abolition of all political parties in Guinea except the P.D.G.⁵ The supremacy of a revolutionary party which had its roots

in the masses, and its philosophy grounded in a commitment to restructure the society in order to create a new revolutionary state meant that Guinea's government would begin as more than a mere superimposition of European political forms upon an essentially agrarian and traditional society. Touré's P.D.G. was going to alter Guinean life by bringing all of the people under the auspices of the party in order to maximize the power of the party and to politicize the masses so that they could act in their own interests within the party.⁶

Once independence was achieved and the P.D.G. became the only party in Guinea, Sékou Touré's philosophy was immediately put to a number of tests by the divergent interest groups within the banner of the party. There were promises which were intended to have been kept, and each group began to demand political redress of its grievances. . Almost from the start, and certainly by 1961, it was apparent that Touré was facing difficult political problems. The solutions which he chose, consistent with his philosophical commitment to the African Personality, would move Guinea's interest groups to a position in

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which they would be under the control of the party which would be serving as the guardian of the communocratic spirit. To criticize the party was the same as challenging the state, and the workers and students who were among the first to balk at the omnipotence of the party were brought under party control, thereby beginning the first wave of exiles from a nation which could ill afford to lose talented young men and women.⁷

Sékou Touré's political philosophy was also based upon the credo that the Guinean revolution would be part of a larger African revolution leading to the redemption of the continent. It was essential that he continue as an advocate of an independent and unified Africa. Convinced that the divisions in Africa were artificial constructs which would disappear with the end of colonialism, Touré established political unions with Ghana, an English-speaking state, and with Mali, a French-speaking state, which he planned as the core of a unified Africa.⁸ Other African leaders of that first generation of independence, notably Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, also sought the creation of a strong Africa which could survive without

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dependence upon Europe.

The primary concern of the political philosophy of Sékou Touré was the progress of Guinean internal development. Touré had always militated against tribalism as a reactionary force hampering national development at the same time that he stressed the value of the African Personality.¹⁰ A major strength of the P.D.G. during the formative years had been its identification with something new, the future Guinea which would be free of ethnic competition and racism. It would be ironic that one of the major criticisms of Touré's regime in the early 1970's would be nepotism because the underlying thesis was based upon revolutionary democracy, not patriarchal cronyism. Those who joined the party in the early years were expected to give their loyalty to the party, and to abandon any other claims to their affections,¹¹ especially those from their ethnic groups.

The five men who were at the center of Guinea's political leadership in the first thirteen years represented many different ethnic groups. Because of Sékou Touré's position from a minority group, he appears to have feared control from any one of the

three major groups in Guinea, and his government was carefully balanced. At the head of the government, Touré, in reality, shared power with no one, and exactly how much real power any of the following men held resulted more from the perception held by the masses than by real decision-making and policy-creating activities. The high visibility of men of different ethnic groups was consistent with the concept of the African Personality leading to the creation of a Guinean revolution serving as the nucleus for a larger African revolution. In addition to Sékou Touré, there was Ismael Touré who was Malinke, (His mother was Peul, but that wasn't politically significant.) Louis Lansana Beavogui, a médecin Africain, from the Toma people in the forest region, Saifoulaye Diallo, a Peul from Middle Guinea, and N'Famara Keita, a Sousou. The women who were major participants in the political life of Guinea also represented different ethnic groups; Loffo Camara, Hadja Mafory Bangoura and Jeanne Martin-Cisse appealed to different segments of Guinea's female population.

The basic political philosophy of Sékou Touré was based upon his concept of the African Personality. In

its most theoretical sense, the Guinean revolution was to serve as the quintessential example for the entire continent.¹¹ Once Africa built the necessary state systems, the next step would be the creation of the unified Africa of an integrated continent. Yet, as the new states emerged, the historical forces of nationalism would work against the creation of a united Africa.

Guinea, then, in Touré's thinking, would have to offer a concrete role-model to enable the African continent to rehabilitate itself.¹² The power of the P.D.G. was justified as the necessary step to¹³ liberation for Guineans and for all Africans.

Scholars who have written the classic studies on single-party systems in Europe shed some light on this modern phenomenon, and some of their observations are particularly important in view of political developments in Guinea. If we follow the analysis of Clement Moore, then the P.D.G. would have been classified as a tutelary party in a one-party state in which the party is the "principal source of legitimacy in three ways rather than one - through shared myths,¹⁴ agreed goals and procedural traditions." Touré

created a party which supplanted other forces in Guinea and instituted rituals which replaced those which, along with the old myths, had been abandoned.

Samuel P. Huntington's study helps explain the stability of the P.D.G., especially during the early years during which African governments were in constant flux. According to Huntington, one party systems could be stable only if they can transform dissidents into participants.¹⁵ Touré's early supporters included large numbers of alienated and disaffected Guineans, including himself, who did not identify with either the colonial system or traditional life, and who saw no future in either.¹⁶ These different groups found expression in the early years of the youthful party, and helped bring about both independence and the primacy of the P.D.G.

In order for the party to consolidate its power, it was mandatory that the divergent interest groups be brought under the control of the party. Although all the interest groups were strong advocates of their own positions, the democratic nature of the early party offered an opportunity for the outsiders to come into the seat of power. The problem was that , once the

interest groups relinquished their own independent organizations, they were effectively neutralized, and found that they were, in effect, locked into policy decisions over which they had little or no control.¹⁷

The political obligations owed by Touré were repaid in a manner consistent with his philosophical belief that the survival of the nation of Guinea was indistinguishable from the tenure of the party. Therefore, the women's organizations would be brought into the party, and women would be given a ministry expressly for their social concerns.¹⁸ The Jeunesse de la Révolution Démocratique Africaine (J.R.D.A.) would be created for the youth in order to make them members of the party while still in elementary school, a revolutionary and necessary step in a nation in which half of the population was under the age of 25.¹⁹ The most difficult group to control proved to be the workers, who were originally Touré's staunchest allies. Forced to enter the Congrès National de Travailleurs Guinéennes (C.N.T.G.), the workers continued to demand the right to strike and to determine policy until Touré, using the full force of this political powers,

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destroyed their independence by placing their
 leadership under the direct control of the party. ²⁰

The latter case illustrated an important element of Touré's political position: nothing was to interfere with the role of the party.

As Touré's former supporters found themselves excluded from opportunities for independent action, the ranks of the disgruntled grew as did the list of émigrés. Yet, the majority of the population was experiencing a high level of political involvement and intense political organization and education. Those who had high expectations may have been disappointed, but those who had only experienced colonial and traditional oppression were the new supporters of the party and the government as the cities and villages were brought into the political life of the nation. The public hearings, the meetings, the calls for self-criticism, and the presence of party officials during the early years were powerful weapons against
²¹ opposition. The sharp dichotomy between the true democracy envisioned by the young men and women of the P.D.G. in the Forties and Fifties and the illusion of democracy in the Guinea of the Sixties was slowly

beginning to alienate Guineans who were growing tired of waiting for the revolution to institute substantive change.

Sékou Touré was also growing tired of waiting for things to change, and he decided to move the revolution along once he had established control by eliminating all competing Guinean authority figures and groups, including religious elements as in the "demystification" campaign.²² Touré began to move toward the realization of the concept of the party-state. The party-state would be the political construct embodying the concept of the African Personality.

The party-state, as envisioned by Sékou Touré, was to have been the national political manifestation of the communocratic society which was one of the essential elements of the African Personality. Touré began, at the time of the Socialist Cultural Revolution's formulation, to move the organizations which were created for the women, workers, youth and other interest groups toward greater integration with the party. The result, once the political apparatus of the Socialist Cultural Revolution was in place in 1968,

was to make the population dependent upon the party. Since the party had become increasingly indistinguishable from the state, Touré began to move toward a formal regularization of one of the basic²³ tenets of his political philosophy.

Sékou Touré considered Guinea as a party-state led by an avant-guard political party:

the P.D.G. is at the same time a popular party and an avant-guard party; it organizes the people and orients them constantly in their actions toward progressive objectives. 24

In his conceptualization of the party-state of Guinea, Touré attempted to avoid the dangers of the abuse of power of a one-party state by building a democratic foundation. As a popular party with a mass base, the P.D.G. was to serve as a progressive party moving the nation toward the fulfillments of the political philosophy of Sékou Touré.

It is necessary to analyze Touré's concept of the avant-guard political party. Shaken by the invasion in 1970, and devastated by the revelation that many party officials had used their power as a means of abusing the population, Touré sought a means to correct the abuses, and decided to radicalize the Guinean

revolution by reorganizing the party and its relationship to the people. In 1971, he stressed that the individual aspirations of the people had to be met within the co-ordination of collective action, and that it would be the role of the party to be obedient to the people from whom it gained its power.²⁵

In the same way that the people have created the party, Touré postulated, they have also created the state. The revolutionary, democratic and popular P.D.G. must fulfill the needs and values of the people through their collective action.²⁶ Returning to the themes of the early years of independence, Sékou Touré was moving to wrest control of the party from the party bureaucracy which had developed as a concomitant of the primacy of the party. As head of the party, Touré chose to consider the party superior to the state, and, indirectly, shifted blame for the excessive failures of the sixties to the state.²⁷ After surviving the crisis of the Portuguese aggression, Touré moved to consolidate power, thereby creating the subsequent problems of his last years.²⁸

Inherent in the philosophical process of making the people responsible for the developments in all

aspects of Guinean life is Sékou Touré's concept of man. Touré was convinced that man was "capable of acquiring, if he wishes and decides, all knowledge, all virtues and all good qualities." ²⁹ According to Touré, it was the role of the state to ensure that man progressed in the development and acquisition of all beneficial attributes.

Consistent with his long-held belief that the Guinean revolution would serve as the vanguard of an African revolution, Touré stressed the possibility of creating a perfect society. In offering a position which embraced both the concept of the African Personality and his political philosophy, Touré wrote:

In the specifically African function of character which is our singular option, narrow chauvinistic nationalism must be rigorously fought. The unity of our people must rest upon a common political defined and conducted by the people, themselves, thanks to a continually re-inforced organization of the masses, giving the population maximum freedom and frequent opportunities to confront ideas and analyze different situations in order to choose those solutions which best conform to their aspirations and interests. ³⁰

The creation of the party-state in Guinea was to

have been the culmination of Touré's political thought. In a speech in 1972 after the death of his friend and ally, Kwame Nkrumah, Touré said:

The party-state, which is a conceptual juxtaposition, is not a unique issue of a theoretical viewpoint. It is a logical objective founded upon historical and concrete realities:
 1) that the nation is created around the central core of the state;
 2) the nation is shaped by the action of the political party;
 3) that it is the party which has created the new state, after annihilating the colonial state structures. The state cannot, in the long run, identify itself with the party unless it recognizes that the primal authority rests with the people. 31

After over a decade as the only party in Guinea, the P.D.G. under the leadership of Sékou Touré had begun to experience significant problems which came to the fore as a result of the Portuguese invasion. Because auto-criticism had been built into the party practices, Touré may have believed that he was aware of the opinions and responses of the population, but, in truth, his sycophants had begun to keep legitimate criticisms from him and to move against the critics of the government's abuse of power. 32 As the party

increased its control over the lives of the people, those who opposed the practices of individual members of the government were treated as if they were enemies of the state, and the political prisoners included many who had merely voiced criticism as Sékou Touré had said they should.³³

In the earlier years, however, the task of nation-building was the primary undertaking of the party, and the difficulties of later years were not anticipated as the P.D.G. moved to become the primary positive force in the lives of the people of Guinea. Despite Guinea's antipathy toward France, the French colonial experience, if we accept the analysis of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, probably simplified Touré's political role somewhat:

Where direct rule has been employed most systematically and effectively, as in the French territories, the new African elite has been more cosmopolitan in outlook, more attracted to a unitarian political system, less obstructed by traditional elites, and better able to organize and sustain comprehensive nationalist parties. 34

Had Touré's only political goal been nation-building

and internal modernization, then the political philosophy he expounded would have met with great success since the policies which resulted in an intensely politically conscious and politicized population were largely effective. However, the internal political revolution of Guinea which involved education, communications, personal appeals, led to the creation of a crisis mentality in the population and continual re-organization of the government because of the weaknesses inherent in Touré's regime.

The struggle for literacy was essential to the success of Sékou Touré's political philosophy. Becoming a modern state was possible only if the people were capable of learning modern skills and technology. The acquisition and application of knowledge was a major goal, and during the early years, Guinea sent students to the United States and the Soviet Union in search of nation-building skills. In addition, Guinea spent hard currency on teachers who would educate the youth inside Guinea. Educational reforms were undertaken in 1964 when Guinea's educational accomplishments began to lag behind the government plans because of the failure of overseas

students to return and the increased disaffection of students inside the country. A transition was then made to increase the political education of the masses³⁵ at the expense of education for modernization.

The party also controlled and owned all of the media. The sources of information were all government operated: Horoya, the daily newspaper; Horoya hebdomadaire, the weekly magazine; Fonike, the youth magazine, and the radio station, Voix de la Révolution, formerly Radiodiffusion de Guinée. The Patrice Lumumba Press had the capacity to publish all of the books, journal and magazines needed, but it was never fully operational because it could not publish or print any private material. Fearing competition from any source, Touré established a rigid code of censorship which ultimately silenced more than the opposition since it left no room for writers, playwrights, historians, and scholars who had interests and opinions in which the government was not interested. Debate and discussion could only take place within forums endorsed by the party, and the ultimate reports of any such undertakings could only be reported by the party.

The political philosophy of Sékou Touré did

sanction looking backward to the old cultures and traditions once there were no longer any political concomitants involved. The oral traditions, the poetry, music and dance were brought within the scope of the party as part of the annual cultural festivals. Efforts were advanced to preserve and advance the national languages in what became the "alphabetisation campaign."³⁶ By publishing articles in Guinea's traditional languages, the media appeared to be attempting to serve the people more effectively. The truth, however, was that the educational system in Guinea had deteriorated so badly that, by the end of the 1960's, Guinea's top officials had begun to send their children to schools outside of the country because there were not enough teachers who could³⁷ educate the youth in French.

The political philosophy of Sékou Touré had failed to produce more than the creation of a national identity by the mid 1960's. Economic failures, international setbacks, the preponderance of new military governments in the other African states, the weakening of the O.A.U., and the increasing emigration

resulted in a situation that could not be ameliorated by Touré's personal magnetism alone.

Touré's charisma was a significant part of his appeal. He was everywhere as he took his case to the people. His personal political style was one of personal involvement. Touré had an open door policy, and every Thursday, without fail, citizens could come to whatever residence he was in to discuss their problems or to ask for favors. He travelled throughout the country, visiting villages and cities, and was an attentive listener when presented with local concerns. He brought his message directly to the interest groups at seminars and other meetings, and all of it was dutifully reported in the media. Finally, as in the case of the Three Year Plan, Sékou Touré was willing to subject himself to auto-criticism and admit that something had not been successful.

Gaining support for new policies was one of Touré's most important skills, and he was able to move Guineans into many difficult new directions because he appealed to their national pride and their intelligence. The currency reforms of 1961, the Loi Cadre of November 8, 1964, and the Cultural Socialist

Revolution launched in 1967 took Guinea into new political situations because they were consistent with Touré's political philosophy of maintaining strong control over every aspect of Guinean life.

While advocating an African postal service, telephone service and news service for the continent, Touré challenged the control of Africa's communications³⁹ by the outside world. His rigid censorship in Guinea weakened his position somewhat. Guineans had access to outside information through the Voice of America, which played Latin American music, and Radio Moscow; by comparing and contrasting these broadcasts, therefore, Guineans found out a great deal about the outside world.

Sékou Touré's political program for Guinea was nurtured by a state of perpetual crisis, real and manufactured. By presenting Guinea as a nation under siege, he was able to consolidate power by overwhelming the opposition with charges of treason regardless of what the critics were advocating. Since there had been significant threats to Guinea during the early years, the crisis mentality was built into the political

philosophy, and the early machinations by de Gaulle only served to strengthen a national consciousness based upon struggle. Initially, the struggle was for national liberation against imperialism, but , as time went on, the battle turned inward in search of enemies of the revolution who could be blamed for the failures of Touré's regime. As a result of the formative years which involved great struggles, the P.D.G. was imbued with the concept of continual struggle, and the rhetoric and programmatical response remained as a legacy of the early history of the party.

An important tenet of Sékou Touré's political philosophy was that there were no purely internal enemies; nevertheless, those inside Guinea who are identified as having worked against the party were placed in Camp Boiro, the political prison, often without trial, and tortured to force confessions of their "foreign" involvement.⁴⁰

Critics of Sékou Touré have usually underplayed the real threats to his regime, and have preferred to make him appear as if he were paranoid. The record shows that there was a real base upon which Guineans could accept the concept of being a nation under siege.

From 1958 to 1970, there were five major attempted coups d'état in Guinea which were not the imaginings of Sékou Touré but carefully organized, though⁴¹ unsuccessful, efforts to overthrow his government. They failed because of an inadequate understanding of the strength of the political superstructure created by Touré and the P.D.G.

Chapter IV-The Concept of the Party State

Footnotes

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25. Ahmed Sékou Touré, La Révolution et l'Unité Populaire, 1964, p. 49.
26. Pour la Victoire des Peuples, pp. 5-7.
27. Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea, p. 33.
28. R. D. A. Bulletin, no. 13, January 1967, p. 32.
29. This idea is restated in many of the writings. See: Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea, p. 439; Apprendre...Savoir...Pouvoir, p. 100; and L'Afrique et la Révolution, p. 183.

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31. Ahmed Sékou Touré, Promotion Kwame Nkrumah, 1972, p. 256.
32. The International Human Rights League, Communication to the United Nations on a Consistent Pattern of Violations of Human Rights in the Republic of Guinea, 1977.
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PART TWO

CHAPTER V

RESTRUCTURING THE GUINEAN SOCIETY

Once the philosophical base of the Guinean revolution was established by Sékou Touré, it was necessary to apply the precepts to the restructuring of Guinean society. Even before achieving independence, Sékou Touré addressed himself to the difficulties of societal rehabilitation as part of the process of developing the backbone of the support of the P. D. G.

Sékou Touré recognized that all of the essential elements of his philosophy in re-ordering the cultural, economic and political realities of the Guinean state would have to become a part of the everyday life of the people if the Guinean revolution was to succeed. In formulating the social philosophy for Guinea, Sékou Touré undertook the task of social restructuring as well as the creative construction of a cultural amalgam newly emerging from the experience of colonialism. He knew that the success of the Guinean experiment depended upon the support which it received from the

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Guinean people. The improvement of Guinean society would also determine the capacity for the fulfillment of Sékou Touré's objectives outside of Guinea. First of all, however, he faced the awesome task of building a society faithful to his philosophy and responsive to the needs of the Guinean people.

The new Guinean society was to be based upon the highest values inherent in Sékou Touré's social philosophy. He was convinced that the building of a new society to fulfill the highest of human aspirations would favor the enhancement of the best interests of the society by stressing the values of the whole society over those of the individual.¹ This he considered necessary, since a new society would be a step toward the creation of a new Guinea in a new world free of the problem of man exploiting man,² among other benefits.

Part of the essence of the formation of a new society was the creation of the new men and women who make up that society. These new Guineans would be:

...resolutely engaged in the struggle against colonialism, for social equality, progress, love and goodwill for their people, for the total liberation of

the African peoples, for the friendship and solidarity of the peoples of the world. 3

The Guinean revolution was to serve as a role-model for the rest of Africa in the social area as well as in the economic and political sectors.

In keeping with the moulding of the new Guineans within a new state was the idea that both were part of an inexorable historical process which had created a new mentality based upon the new imperatives:

...this implies a selective choice of principles and methods for regulating human activities, the reflexive behavior which assures complete harmony between progressive aspirations of the society and the basic attitudes of each social element. 4

As far as Sékou Touré was concerned, the social restructuring of the society was less the recreation of institutions than the essential re-shaping of the philosophical base of an entire people.

As Guineans continued to build their own progressive society, Sékou Touré over and again committed the Guinean state to the task of protecting the societal restructuring as he had already committed the apparatus of the P. D. G. The role of the state

as he saw it was to provide "Health, Education,
Justice, Security, Police and Information."⁵ The
combination of the development of a new Guinean man and
woman with the positive involvement of the Guinean
government would result in the creation of a society
vastly different from the one inherited from the past.
Sékou Touré was certain that the identification of the
problems of the Guinean state of 1958 would result in a
determined effort to follow his lead in the building of
a new Guinean state.

Sékou Touré expressed the desire to create a
democratic society in Guinea. In developing this
thesis during an interview in 1958, Touré said:

African democracy is by definition the
respect of rights and interests of man
in the society, which implies an equal
respect of the rights and of the
interests of that society. 6

He went further to say that:

In Africa, man is not more important
than the society, it is a solidarity
which we call the "communocratic" spirit
of the African society. In Africa, man
does not live alone, he participates fully
in the existence of his social milieu in
which each man, and each woman fulfills
his or her own tasks in the community.⁷

The foundations of Touré's social philosophy grew

out of the concept of the African Personality in that he wished to co-ordinate the new society needed in Guinea with the traditional positive values in African life. At the same time, however, the pressure of the needs of the modern state would challenge Touré to construct a new vision of the people of Guinea.

Since in the early days of the Republic of Guinea the country was essentially rural and comprised of villages rather than cities, Sékou Touré also found it necessary to show how his social program would differ from that experienced by Guineans in the past. He said that:

Africa is a continent of old democratic forms established at the smallest social level, that of the village, which is why the political leadership which imposed itself upon the masses, or those whom they imposed, never remained. The truth is that it is the natural tendency springing from our traditional and social practice for each man to be an involved man, a responsible man. 8

The concept of the African Personality continually affected Touré's social philosophy, and he made constant efforts to re-shape Guinean thought in terms of the relationship of the individual to his or her society. He acknowledged that he was basically re-

introducing the pre-colonial values of the communocratic society upon which he also based his economic policies. In the social areas, Touré moved further to encourage the commitment of the people to bettering their own lives through their renewed consciousness of themselves as a people.

Sékou Touré emphasized that the role of the people⁹ as the "motivating force of history" was crucial. He urged Guineans on by reminding them of their historic role:

It is essentially the people who are the creative force of a nation and they by their intellectual abilities and creative capacities raise their voices and make their imprint on history through the phenomena of transformations useful in satisfying their aspirations. 10

The responsibility of the Guinean people for the success of their revolution was an idea that Sékou Touré ceaselessly stressed.

Throughout the first thirteen years Sékou Touré reminded Guineans that the nation was more important¹¹ than the tribe. Yet, national life, he insisted, was also more important than the individual:

Man is incorporated into a group, but in

order to earn a place in society, he must try to distinguish himself by his capacities and concrete support. In reality, man always brings less to society than he receives. 12

The process of reshaping patterns of loyalty occupied Touré as a means of facilitating social progress.

Launching appeals to Guinean citizens to work for their own interests and those of their neighbors may appear a bit strange, but the success of Touré's revolution depended upon massive popular support since Guinea rarely had the financial resources to pay people for their labor. Sékou Touré also appealed to the intellectuals by reminding them that:

The true intellectual value is not that which is manifested in sterile verbal energy. It is that which enables an individual on the basis of objective realities, to issue a just opinion that experience will eventually either legitimize or prove. 13

Sékou Touré urged the use of the creative powers of his people in applying their intellectual abilities to the social development of the country. 14

For Sékou Touré, the building of the Guinean society was the development of a revolutionary society. He attempted to make Guineans realize that a new

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society "required the construction of a societal goodwill among peoples within the largest possible human dimensions."¹⁵ The militant revolutionary atmosphere encouraged by Guinea's political organization was to involve Guineans in the creation of their own society, a society without the ills of "corruption, laziness, authoritarianism..., greed [and] the abuse of power,"¹⁶ among other ills facing societies. In addition, Touré warned his people in 1972, after the death of Nkrumah, that "only the revolutionary regimes are called upon to constantly qualify their social and economic development whereas the exploitative regimes are doomed to stagnation."¹⁷

The society in 1958 was beset by significant problems which were obstacles to the development of a nation. Sékou Touré committed the governmental apparatus of the P. D. G. to solving the challenge of restructuring the society. Since all social activities were organized to some degree under the party, it is sometimes possible to ascribe the massive undertaking in the social area to the political arena. Theoretically, the restructuring of Guinean society

necessitated the virtual obliteration of what Sékou Touré considered to be the negative aspects of both the traditional society and the colonial period.

Sékou Touré considered tribalism as the immediate obstacle to the foundation of a modern state because of the strong pull of the ethnic identification upon the individual. By undertaking the re-orientation of a people away from their primary and traditional loyalties, he hoped to create new men and women who identified wholly with the Guinean state. This new society was an essential part of Sékou Touré's plan to make Guinea a model for all of Africa.

During the early years it was necessary for Sékou Touré to lessen the stress of the ethnic ties because of the tendency for political parties to develop along ethnic lines during the colonial era. This process was encouraged by the French, Touré charged.¹⁸ Such ethnically oriented groups aggravated conflicts and hindered the development of the consciousness which could be mobilized in the building of a modern state. The P. D. G. was determined to draw from all segments of the society. Another compelling reason which may

have led Sékou Touré to eschew tribalism as a factor in the new state was the undeniable reality that Guinea's ethnic groups were also found in neighboring countries, and without a unifying movement, there was always the possibility of the type of struggle which emerged in Nigeria. For example, there are Malinke people in Guinea, Mali and Senegal; the Fula (Peul) are found in Guinea, Senegal, Mali, and Guinea-Bissau; the Guerze also live in Liberia, and the Toma also reside across the border in the Côte d'Ivoire.

A problem that emerged in the understanding of Touré's position on tribalism is the possible contradiction between the attack on tribalism and the concept of the African Personality. What Sékou Touré opposed, and wished to eradicate, were the negative aspects of ethnic identification, that is, those aspects which interfered with the development of Guinean society as a united society.¹⁹

There was no doubt in Sékou Touré's philosophy that the ethnic groups in Guinea were of great historical importance.²⁰ The evolutionary process that produced the ethnic groups in Africa was part of a

process followed on a universal basis,²¹ and formed an essential part of the African Personality. Sékou Touré was concerned that the ethnic divisions could be utilized in the new state by those who were opposed to the P. D. G. as a means of manipulating elements in society for the purpose of destroying the Guinean revolution.²²

In order that tribalism not interfere with the nationalism he hoped to develop and perpetuate in Guinea, Sékou Touré proposed that the undeniable benefits of ethnic identity be transferred to identification with the nation through what he called "the substitution of a superior form of social organization."²³ Furthermore, he stated that the political contradictions of tribalism would be succeeded by actions taken against the causes of injustice and exploitation through a struggle of the true and universal will and conscience dedicated to the progress of the people of Guinea.²⁴ The solution was to be the transitional tranference of commitment from the ethnic group to the national.

Yet, Sékou Touré did not reject certain

manifestations of traditional ethnic culture. the African languages were part of his plan to rehabilitate the African Personality. Because of the strong effect of colonial education as a source of division, the early educational reforms in Guinea were designed to minimize the process separating those who were educated in French from their Toma, Kissi, and Sousou brothers and sisters. More important was the decision to broaden the educational system to include adult education so that the massive problem of illiteracy after sixty years of French colonialism could be solved.²⁵

In order to utilize the resources at hand, and facing an appalling lack of teachers, the local languages found a place within the educational process in Guinea. Sékou Touré reaffirmed his belief that the African Personality was of great significance in the development of the Guinean state.

Sékou Touré stated that "...the grandeur of a people is defined by its culture."²⁶ The basic element in culture was language. He stressed:

Certainly, among all cultural riches, so be it, it is such that languages play a predominant role in the understanding of man and in the communication of

thoughts. Africa in its development cannot, and must not under-estimate the necessity of enabling people to use their own languages, for the constant enrichment of using the same languages to express exactly all the nuances of their thoughts in spoken and written form.²⁷

He also emphasized that the languages of Guinea could be used as easily as French to convey complicated ideas and concepts.
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For Touré the issue of language was a major part of his application of the concept of the African Personality to the realities faced by Guinea in the social area. He was still justifying the support of the national languages of Guinea in 1972 which was a possible indication of a significant struggle going on within the government in regard to this issue. Touré returned to the historical appeal in defense of the use of African languages in Guinea:

Before colonization, man existed in Guinea, the villages were created, the schools existed, social life was organized, empires were created and prospered... with the political life of Guinea there also existed a social and economic life that was organized around a cultural spirit. That was how pre-colonial Africa lived. That Africa, at the first contact with the outside, exchanged methods and services with the foreigners but remained responsible

for her own destiny. It neither demanded nor provoked colonialism or colonization. That had been imposed because of a weakness of military defense. So it was that the French came here, the English to Sierra Leone and the Portuguese to Guinea-Bissau ...The colonizers imposed upon us not only their culture but also their method of thinking, their practices, their philosophy and they convinced us of our inferiority in comparison with them. 29

The rehabilitation of Africa demanded the use of the national languages in Sékou Touré's philosophy.

One of the strong and compelling reasons for Guinea to use her own languages was Touré's determination to neutralize the process of the formation of an educated elite through the development of a commitment of Guinean intellectuals to learning their own languages. He said that "the role of the intellectual should not be to superimpose new values but to re-affirm African values." ³⁰ Those who received an education at the expense of the state would be required to educate others, and possess indigenous language skills.

The task of learning the national languages had the highest social and political significance. Touré linked the African languages to the survival of the

Guinean revolution:

In order to persevere, to resist adversity, the people must conserve their linguistic heritage. Each country has defended its culture and linguistic heritage.³¹

The struggle of Africa to rehabilitate itself through the retention of her languages was compared by Sékou Touré to what he saw as a similar effort by the Chinese³² and the Vietnamese.

Sékou Touré emphasized his understanding of the difficulty of the commitment to the national languages by urging Guineans to make the effort to learn them even though the languages of Guinea were both complex and varied since some of the languages, notably Fula³³ and Malinke, had many different forms. Touré stressed the importance of communicating by encouraging Guinean students to learn to speak to the people "in³⁴ the language the people have created."

Since Guinea was building a mass society founded upon a mass party, there could be no compromise by Touré on the question of the African languages. His commitment to the African Personality and to the participation of the people in the Guinean revolution mandated that the masses become literate. Any effort

to create a large number of literate Guineans, especially adults, demanded the use of the African or national languages as the basis for instruction. As a result, the first step was the creation of written forms of the national languages in the Western alphabet, which was chosen in preference to the Arabic which had already been used.³⁵

It was necessary for the people to be taught to read in the languages which they spoke.³⁶ In a speech given on May 1, 1968, Sékou Touré said:

The great literacy campaign which has occupied the interests of each of the basic committees and of our units of production, and which has mobilized literate and illiterate Guineans in the effort to render our national languages into written forms in order to make scientific knowledge and mathematical concepts available to everyone in our society, is the result of the undertaking of a collective consciousness of the need felt by our people to express themselves through their own cultural values. Such efforts in language development will involve eventually all of our national languages. 37

Transcribing the national languages would make the teaching of reading an easier task.³⁸

Guinea was not unique in having many national languages. Touré advised his people that countries in

Europe had also experienced the difficulty of reconciling the problem of potentially competing linguistic groups, and he explained the solutions³⁹ offered in Belgium, Switzerland and the Soviet Union. Sékou Touré chose European comparisons to show that Africa was not the only part of the world in which there were states with different ethnic or language groups.

The decisions made by Touré's government in regard to the national languages was to make them Guinea's cultural languages. Serious political significances were inherent. In attempting to co-ordinate the dictates of the African Personality and the needs of a modern state, Sékou Touré chose the legitimacy of the African Personality in his recognition of all of Guinea's languages. This approach could have opened the door to the resurgence of ethnic rivalry or the demand for special political consideration of one group over the others. Despite the risk of regional competition, Touré gambled that the authority of the P.D.G. and the national government would not be diluted by the establishment of African languages. He projected that "the Guinean revolution would support

and strengthen the adoption of the popular culture of
⁴⁰
 the Guinean people."

For Sékou Touré the dangers inherent in strengthening Guinea's national languages was offset by the possibility of expanding the Guinean model in regard to its local languages to the larger multi-ethnic, multi-lingual African situation. Since African languages were more similar than dissimilar, this
⁴¹
 approach could be utilized.

The social needs of the Guinean people emerging from two generations of French domination were considerable. In order to develop a modern democratic state, Sékou Touré was committed to the principle that every man, woman and child in Guinea deserved to know how to read. The education of a nation was a mammoth undertaking, but the effort was stressed as a key element of the Guinean revolution:

Essential in our process of reconversion, aimed at African advancement, is that the focus of attention must revert on Africa; knowledge must be Africanized, and we must get rid of all negative concepts and evil habits resulting from an education which accorded with the colonial outlook.⁴²

The restructuring of the entire society and the creation of a new Guinean people depended upon the

education of the masses.

Implementation of these policies was fraught with difficulty during the first years of the republic. Sékou Touré recognized that Guinea did not have enough teachers or enough schools to mount the massive educational campaign.⁴³ Teachers were part of the revolutionary process, and brought into the political structure because the "Guinean school is the school of the party, the school of the Cultural revolution, and the school of the African renaissance."⁴⁴ The commitment of Guinea's limited resources to education was mandated by Sékou Touré's belief that "the instruction imparted to our boys and girls should match our development programme, since after a few years, the responsibility for going ahead with this development would fall to them."⁴⁵

In order for the Guinean revolution to succeed, the Guinean people had to create and carry out their own revolution through the use of the P.D.G. Sékou Touré was careful to describe the Guinean education as "democratic, popular and scientific."⁴⁶ Yet, the true success of a revolution lay in the people, and in their capacity to strengthen their own lives.⁴⁷

The underlying educational philosophy of Sékou Touré was strongly reflected in the establishment of the educational program of the Republic of Guinea. The educational process was crucial, but it was only the underlying and unifying area of reform. Other elements in Guinean society had to be transformed if the Guinean revolution were to succeed fully in realizing the goals set by Sékou Touré.

The official position of the Guinean government was originally that educational reforms had been successful only in part. The move in 1966 toward the Socialist Cultural Revolution was an admission of shortcomings in the extension of educational opportunities into the villages which was the primary reason for creating the Centers of Rural Education (C. E. R.). In supporting the introduction of the C. E. R., Dr. Conté Saidou, the Minister of National Education in 1966, said:

We have thus introduced new dimensions to our education....it is based upon the new stage which our research of the effectiveness of our education has led us to impose as an urgent task, the institution of a new pedagogie different from the one which has always been used. 48

Dr. Conté stressed the fact that the creation of the

C. E. R. was needed to forestall the migration of the population from the countryside into the cities in search of educational opportunities for their children.⁴⁹

The role of the C. E. R. was part of the move to revolutionize the thinking of the young through education. Louis Behanzin, General Inspector of Education in 1966, stated the position of the C. E. R. as part of the Guinean Revolution, and the list of tasks assigned to the C. E. R. serves as an indication of some of the problems experienced in Guinea in 1966. Behanzin urged the teaching of all of the Social Sciences in terms of teaching youngsters to work together in the creation of a new society.⁵⁰

Despite the difficulties in achieving the levels of education required by a developing country, Guinea's official statistics support its contention that there had been improvement in the levels of education from 1958 to 1973. According to Guinean statistics, there were in 1958, 40,000 children in elementary school and 680 in secondary school. By 1966, there were 240,000 in elementary and 24,000 in secondary.⁵¹

Sékou Touré was not pleased with the

aforementioned figures, and in September of 1966, he moved to rename the C. E. R. as the Colleges of Revolutionary Education, which he claimed to be "the more correct term."⁵² Touré had decided to use education and the continued mobilization of masses of students in order to bring larger numbers of young Guineans under the control of the party. By reviving the concept of "Human Investment," Touré united Guinean youth and the peasantry in a common effort.

There were other problems faced by Sékou Touré if he wanted to restructure Guinean society. Traditional and contemporary religious leaders were perceived as a real threat. Touré undertook what has been described by many as a ruthless attack on both tribalism and the traditional religions in order to lessen their sociological and psychological importance. When the re-affirmation of the African Personality became an important part of the philosophy of Sékou Touré, he was willing to accommodate traditional society insofar as it did not interfere with the Guinean revolution. Despite the importance of the African past, Touré would not compromise with any tradition that challenged⁵³ either his power or the power of the party.

In order to neutralize the power of traditional leaders, as he had earlier destroyed the chefferie, Touré conceived what is called "The Demystification Campaign." The destruction of the material evidence of the religion and cultural of Guinean people from the coastal and forest regions was undertaken by so-called militants who took Touré's urgings to "demystify" Guinea's people as licence to destroy hundreds of religious articles and icons, which also happened to some of Africa's and the world's finest art treasures.

The widespread destruction of the physical evidence of the allegiance and commitments to their gods and leaders cost the Baga people most of the representations of their gods, Kankilambe and Nimba. Masks, statues, holy books, and traditions were swept away in Touré's attack on traditional African culture. Guineans in the forest region, the Guerze and the Toma, also lost representations of their cultural heritage. The cultural expressions were then absorbed by the
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party and the state.

Sékou Touré stated the rationale for "The Demystification Campaign:"

Our goal is to decolonize and demystify

totally the Guinean people, their mentality and behavior, thus to create a reservoir of hatred and dislike of imperialism, colonialism and the exploitation of man by man, in order for each individual to know no limitation on the sovereign exercise of his physical, intellectual and moral faculties other than those imposed by respect for material values and innate morality of the society, and where progress is gained by them as the best guarantee of their individual progress.⁵⁵

Demystification also attacked the anti-governmental positions of the representatives of other religions. The Catholics and Muslims were not permitted to use their religions to work against the government and the power of the P. D. G.

There was great controversy over the establishment of government control over the Roman Catholic Church. Sékou Touré notified the Church in 1959 that its schools would be nationalized by 1961.⁵⁶ Victor DuBois explained that effort:

Aside from the fact that Touré had given ample warning of his plans and had advised Church authorities to adjust accordingly, what was little understood in Catholic circles outside Guinea was that Toure's actions against the Church were motivated not so much by anti-Catholicism as by an impatience with the Church's failure to realize

that times had changed and a new political order had come into being, determined to remake the country in keeping with its own ideas.⁵⁷

Touré's determination to Africanize the Roman Catholic Church of Guinea was realized when on May 31, 1962, Monseigneur Raymond Marie Tchidimbo was consecrated the first African Archbishop of Guinea.⁵⁸ At that time, Sékou Touré re-affirmed his support of religious freedom as long as it did not continue the domination of Africa by colonial authorities:

It is particularly agreeable to us to express to the Holy See the gratitude of the Guinean Catholics for having fulfilled their aspirations by proceeding, not only to the Africanisation of the Catholic Church of Guinea, but also for adhering to an extensive Africanisation of the High Clergy of Africa.... The direction of African affairs must be wholly returned to the Africans; such has been, and will continue to be, one of the passwords of our Party, which by that concept is merely expressing a legitimate and unanimous claim of the thinking peoples of our continent on its road to complete decolonisation. ⁵⁹

Even at Archbishop Tchidimbo's consecration, Touré made it clear that the paramount faith for Guinean people would be "revolutionary faith"⁶⁰ which would use theology for the people's interest.

Sékou Touré's Guinean Revolution was to be directed by the P.D.G., but the mass organization and the organization of individuals into effective groups were only a part of his commitment to his people. Touré placed the individual and the larger society in opposition at times, although his view of Guinea's social revolution recognized the inherent value of the individual. The overwhelming nature of the problem of creating a new Guinean society can be found in a speech he made in 1968:

The new Guinean society is the historic product of an incessant struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, feudalism, with the view of establishing and of constantly re-inforcing the basis of a social justice concretized by equality of all without consideration of sex, of religion or of color, and of freeing in the same manner the initiative and the creative activities of each individual. 61

Touré's political experience had taught him that the best way to achieve the aspirations of the individual was through collective organization.

In Guinean society there were major groups whose interests had to be considered if the party was to achieve the successful creation of the new Guinean state. Sékou Touré identified these groups as the

women, the youth, the workers, the villagers, the people's militia, and the army. As is often the case, membership in these groups might overlap, but the special concerns of each group were drawn under the umbrella of the P.D.G. Sékou Touré maintained continually that the needs of the Guinean people would be met within the goals of the Guinean revolution.

Women were an important part of the P.D.G. even before independence. Sékou Touré never forgot his debt to the Guinean women who formed an essential part of his movement from his pre-independence years as mayor of Conakry. The protection of women in Guinea was also an outgrowth of his thinking of the African Personality. The emancipation of women in Africa was critical since women had suffered from the worst of traditional practices and the most exploitative colonial practices.

Sékou Touré understood the problems faced by women in Africa. In his poems, "La Complainte de la Femme Africaine" and "Femmes de Guinée," he responded to the overwhelming social difficulties of the women of Guinea and of Africa. The discrimination was clear at the very basic levels of marriage when young girls were

forced to marry early.⁶³ Such early marriages restricted the potential of the young woman because educational opportunities would often be beyond her grasp once she became a wife and mother. In addition, Sékou Touré was aware that marriages were arranged by the girl's family without either her permission or consent.⁶⁴

Once married, the young woman was still endangered by a society in which she had few rights. The system of polygamy was viewed as a particular threat to women because it enabled their husbands to treat them as if they were mere property.⁶⁵ Divorce was a right guaranteed only to the men in the society, and a woman could be divorced at any age without any restrictions or provisions for her upkeep.⁶⁶

In the new revolutionary society, Sékou Touré felt that the most oppressive social practices affecting women must be immediately eradicated. The elimination of forced marriage, polygamy and huge dowries occurred as soon as Guinea became independent.⁶⁷ Other practices, such as circumcision, which were inflicted upon women would be more difficult to alter. On the whole, the social inequities in regard to women were

changed as much, and as soon, as they could legally be re-drawn. Sékou Touré undertook a militant program to re-educate the Guinean people to change the treatment of women in Guinea.

Touré had also noted that traditional African society had placed women in a positive role in some cases:

It should be recalled that in several African societies, matriarchy conferred upon women a paramount social and even political role and that, quite generally, the participation of women in the economic, social and cultural life used to be no less than that of men, while in family life she enjoyed full authority to care for the interests of the family and educate the children.⁶⁸

The traditional role of African women had posed a dilemma for women received contradictory treatment even during the traditional period. Sékou Touré claimed that the disabilities of women had been compounded by colonialism.⁶⁹

Sékou Touré's position was that the women of Guinea had the right to be at the forefront of the Guinean Revolution:

By her active and courageous participation in the struggle to rewin national sovereignty, the African woman has

earned the unwritten right to play a full part in national reconstruction and in the historical rehabilitation of our people.⁷⁰

Moreover, the involvement of Guinean women was to proceed at every level of the government and throughout the society. Touré was committed to the philosophical position that:

...our women's organizations assume a political character which demands from every woman conscious and consistent militancy, a high degree of political consciousness and active participation in national and African activities. ⁷¹

A larger reason for Sékou Touré's philosophical commitment to Guinean women may have been the recognition that the population of Guinea was too small to permit the exclusion of over half of its people. In order for the Guinean revolution to succeed, and to serve as a model for all of Africa, the liberation of women was an essential component.

For the future, Sékou Touré stressed the need for the educational process to aid in the emancipation of Guinean women:

There shall be no limitation to the enrollment of our sisters in the service of the economic, cultural and scientific development of the nation. We already have

Guinean air hostesses; we shall have women pilots. Hundreds of nurses, social workers, midwives and teachers are being trained in our schools; we also want female doctors, and high school teachers, veterinary surgeons and geologists. We have female ticket collectors, telephone operators, secretaries; we shall have female heads of departments and female cadres in our enterprises.⁷²

The far-reaching objectives of Sékou Touré for the women of Guinea emphasized education as a starting point, but the choice of education as a major means of bringing about meaningful change meant that the process would take a considerable amount of time before reaching the stated end.

It is clear that the Guinean women has not yet achieved the equality and recognition spoken and written of by Sékou Touré. On the local levels, the participation of women is mandated by certain positions which are set aside specifically for them. Women have not fared as well on the national level. Sékou Touré appointed only two women to cabinet level positions during the first thirteen years of the Guinean State. Both of the women, the late Hadja Loffo Camara and Hadja Mafory Bangoura, were Ministers of the Social Domaine, and that ministry had always been a "woman's"

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ministry in terms of the constituents most directly affected by its work and decisions. From 1958 to 1973, no woman served as a member of the powerful National Political Bureau. Furthermore, only a few women have been elected as deputies although one, Mme. Jeanne Martin-Cissé, served as Vice President of the National Assembly before being appointed as Guinean Ambassador to the United Nations in 1972.

Women were not the only group requiring incorporation into the power structure. The youth of Guinea had been ill-served by the colonial governments. Sékou Touré had been a relatively young man when he came to power at thirty-eight, and he was committed to bringing young people into the party. This was essential politically, since the population of Guinea was a young population which could be used to undertake the massive effort of rebuilding the nation. On March 26, 1959, a year after independence, the Jeunesse de la Révolution (J.R.D.A.) came into existence.

From the beginning, the J.R.D.A., under the auspices of the P.D.G. and the government, undertook the instruction of the youth for their role in the Guinean revolution, The primary role during the early

years would be the eradication of the evils of colonialism such as idleness and parasitism. As a result of the efforts involved in these campaigns, the youth were rewarded with membership on some of the P.D.G. committees.⁷³ In addition, young people after the age of twenty-one served on village and neighborhood levels, and were involved in some manner on all of the decision-making aspects of the Guinean state.⁷⁴

As the philosophy of Sékou Touré began to find expression in the increasing numbers of schools and students, the role of the youth within the J.R.D.A. increased. The creation of the C.E.R. meant that the young people would be expected to commit themselves to the educational improvements of the people of the villages.⁷⁵ The campaign against illiteracy utilized the energies and the knowledge of the young men and women of Guinean society in order to effect meaningful changes in the society as part of the Guinean Revolution.

The students were intimately involved in the economics of the state as part of their new role. The harsh reality of Guinean life was never glossed over by

Sékou Touré as he urged the students to aid in economic development. By 1968 Sékou Touré was praising the efforts of the students in the C.E.R. as significant in the transformation of the Guinean society⁷⁶ The role of the youth and their energies was primarily used in the areas of construction and agriculture along with the involvement in education.

Sékou Touré assigned the maintenance of the cultural heritage of the Guinean state to the youth.⁷⁷ The youth were responsible for the creation of a militant theater which would utilize the languages of the people in order to 'educate the people for the revolution.'⁷⁸ It was also necessary to preserve the traditional musical instruments,⁷⁹ and to encourage⁸⁰ and learn from the traditional craftsmen.

In the international scene, Sékou Touré was concerned that the youth of Guinea fulfill the demands of the rehabilitation of Africa and the ultimate completion of the Guinean revolution for Africa. Every young Guinean was expected to think of himself or herself as an African.⁸¹ The already stated goals of the equality of men and women were built into the training of the youth,⁸² and they were also expected

to participate in the building of a society free of the class and sexist distinctions and exploitation inherent⁸³ in colonial society.

The youth were also committed to the liberation struggles of the world through their membership in organizations such as the Fédération Mondiale de la Jeunesse Démocratique (F.M.J.D.). When the representatives of this organization met in Conakry in January 1971, Sékou Touré addressed them with exhortations to work against social inequality and the exploitation of workers and for the worldwide⁸⁴ struggle of national liberty and international solidarity.

By bringing the young people of Guinea into the workers' movement and the peoples' militia, Sékou Touré tried to make certain that the youth not feel left out of the natural restructuring of Guinean society. As an integral part of the Guinean revolution, the young men and women of Guinea were less likely to experience the frustrations which result in societal dislocations in the other countries with sizable student populations.

The early political base of Sékou Touré was in the labor movement, and he never lost sight of the workers'

interests in the restructured Guinean society. He was seriously concerned that the successful independence and subsequent industrialization of the Guinean state would not result in the formation of a working class which would serve the Guinean revolution. Touré wanted to encourage the emergence of a bona-fide working class because he feared what he called "a bourgeois consciousness."⁸⁵

Although the workers movement in Guinea pre-dated independence, it was essential that the workers' group, the Congrès Nationale de Travailleurs Guinéennes (National Congress of Guinean Workers), develop under the control of the P.D.G. In this pattern of organization, the activities of the workers could be effectively monitored. Sékou Touré did not forget his debt to the workers, but the interests of the Guinean Revolution dictated the control of the one group in Guinea which could effectively alter the direction of the pattern created by Sékou Touré. At the same time, he stressed that the role of the national labor unions⁸⁶ was of great importance to the national development.

Sékou Touré was determined that the workers remember their correct role as revolutionaries within

the society and not be seduced by the ideas which would⁸⁷ make them anti-revolutionary. Since most of the workers in Guinea were employed by the government, the continual process of reminding the individuals of their⁸⁸ responsibility was judged to be essential.

The primary recipients of the emphasis of the Guinean Revolution were the peasants who produced the agricultural products so basic to the Guinean economy. Sékou Touré was concerned that the hard-working agricultural workers benefit from the progress made in Guinea. The commitment of the youth and the party to the rehabilitation of the lives of the men and women in the villages was designed to reward the contribution which they made to the success of the Guinean Revolution. There were other reasons for Touré's decisions to involve the people in the countryside.

Guinean education developed so rapidly that there were no places for the young educated people in the Guinean economy unless they went to work for the government. The utilization of these young men and women as civil servants would further widen the gulf between them and their less-educated brothers and sisters in the villages. The decision, then, to send the youth to the villages to work and to teach fulfilled a double need.

If there were no additional employment in the countryside, the more ambitious young men and women would, after receiving a functional education, migrate to the cities as they did in other African countries, and had begun to do in Guinea right after independence. With government jobs in agriculture, construction, and teaching in the villages, the movement could be limited.

Since Sékou Touré had already postulated that the Guinean revolution was to serve as a role model for other African states, he was compelled to offer a solution to the most serious problem affecting those states in terms of the deployment of the young. The solution chosen by the Guinean people offered the most radical restructuring of society because the villages and the young people were both brought into the governmental and party mainstream.

The issue of the protection of the state falls into the area of political philosophy to some degree, but there are some social elements in the creation of a peoples' militia. In Guinea, everyone was expected to participate in the protection of the state, and as a result, almost everyone in Guinea could bear arms. The

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peoples' militia also played a vital role by offering the ultimate protection of Sékou Touré. It would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a military coup led by armed forces officers to overthrow a "democratically" elected government protected by a peoples' militia which was trained to identify its interests with those of the government and party in power.

Sékou Touré was determined to create structures which would aid the social development of a revolutionary society by making the people responsible for the protection of their own revolution. As an outgrowth of the political climate in Guinea and the fear of a strong army, Touré established a peoples' militia as an important part of his social philosophy as well as a politically necessary institution. Touré urged the men and women of Guinea to "know how to combat the counter-revolution with ideology as well as with a rifle."⁸⁹

In Guinea, Sékou Touré placed the military under the direct control of the civilian authority. There were very few career high ranking military officers in the history of the Guinean state. All of the

activities of the military were carried out only with the complete authorization of Touré's government. Since Sékou Touré rarely left Guinea during the first thirteen years, the control he exercised was strong. If we can believe the testimony of some of the soldiers charged during the investigation after the invasion in November 1970, this strategy was successful in protecting the government.

An important part of Sékou Touré's philosophy was based upon his idea that culture must serve as an agent of the revolution. This notion was not alien to the African experience in which all of the arts were integrated into the lives of the people. Since in traditional African society there was no real separation between life and art, Touré took this African experience and incorporated it into his Guinean Revolution.

In 1960, Guinea decided to develop a national orchestra of the Radiodiffusion Nationale, under the direction of Kouyate Sory Kandia. The National Folklore Orchestra was created for the preservation of the culture of the people. Its official role was:

to renovate, adapt and consolidate the

old African tunes, to create new songs in accordance with the needs of a dynamic revolution, to play the best national tunes, to study rationally our music and African instruments, and on this basis make new instruments. 91

In addition, the National Folklore Orchestra was given a role in Guinea's larger African considerations. Through their efforts, the musicians were creating a system for perpetuating African culture in Guinea, and:

...thus an authentic African Music comes slowly to birth in the regained liberty, a music that gives out a powerful message from a civilization that is both ancient and modern, to act as a powerful factor in the National Revolution for progress and the unity of all African States and peoples. 92

The creation of the National Cultural Festival as an institution involving the young people was an aspect of the African Personality which was used by Sékou Touré to aid the organization of the young people within the party. The festivals served as a means of preserving African culture and languages as well as a vehicle for unifying the young people in a productive and politically acceptable manner.

Guinea's major writers who remained have produced literature in keeping with the demands of the renewal of African culture. D.T. Niane and Condetto Nénkhaly

Camara have written plays with African settings and revolutionary messages.⁹³ Using the short story as his medium, Emile Cissé wrote a powerful political statement.⁹⁴ In the modern Guinea, traditional African society provided for art as part of the revolutionary ethos.

In 1969 Sékou Touré sent a message to the Pan African Festival of the Arts and Culture in Algiers which underscored the basic points emphasized by his position on the role of culture and the arts in Africa:

The life of a people cannot be one thing and its culture another, because the culture explains and exemplifies at once the fundamental bases and the expressive forms of thought and of will, of the will of the people, 95

Although Touré spoke of the development of Africa along a specific cultural and historic path, in his attack against Senghor and the concept of Negritude, Touré noted that "there is no black culture, no white culture and no yellow culture."⁹⁶

As far as Touré was concerned. "there was no place for African culture other than to serve African peoples in the struggle for liberation, unification and rehabilitation."⁹⁷ The use of culture and the incorporation of African languages were major parts of

Touré's revolution in Guinean society because these efforts, if successful, could facilitate the expansion of the Guinean Revolution throughout Africa.

The social restructuring of Guinea was not completed during the first thirteen years, but the first important steps had been taken. The traditional loyalties were, if not neutralized, at least under the control of the party which was moving to fill the role played by the religious and political figures in Guinea before the referendum. The population had been carefully and almost totally organized into a variety of groups created by the party. Sékou Touré had created the societal basis for extending the Guinean revolution into the lives of every man, woman and child in the country.

Chapter V-Reconstructing the Guinean Society

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88. Apprendre...Savoir...Pouvoir, p. 89.
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PART THREE

CHAPTER VI

THE INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF SÉKOU TOURÉ

One of the major reasons for the international stature of Sékou Touré was his international philosophy which emphasizes an analysis of the contemporary world, and an ideologically based program to be followed by the newly independent and comparatively poor states of the post-World War II era. In the area of foreign policy, as in the areas of domestic concern, Sékou Touré projected Guinea as a model for other African states, and in the formulation of his international philosophy clearly defined Guinea's foreign policy vis-à-vis states outside Africa as well as the more important relationships inside the African continent. As a result, Sékou Touré's international philosophy became a significant part of his intellectual contribution.

The basic tenets of Sékou Touré's foreign policy developed as the result of his early experiences in Africa under French control, and later in France. The

crises faced by his young nation after independence added new dimensions which resulted in an international philosophy with significant global implications. Sékou Touré's thinking on foreign policy is also important because it has been successful and has influenced the policies and actions of other states.

Sékou Touré avowed that the foreign policy of Guinea would be based on the same principles and goals as Guinea's domestic policy, in order to maintain the continuity of purpose that we see in so much of Sékou Touré's thought. Throughout the years, he stressed this point:

...foreign relations are, by their very nature, the true prolongation of the relationships of liberty, equality and democracy established inside the nation between all individuals, without any distinction of race, sex or religion. 1

In addition, the development of Sékou Touré's philosophy gave increasing attention to the co-ordination of Guinean domestic and foreign policies, and continually involved the Guinean masses in all aspects of Guinea's foreign relations through his speeches, and articles in Horoya and the R.D.A. publications. The J.R.D.A. and the Congress of

Guinean Women were often called upon to reaffirm Guinea's international commitments. Once, after they had passed resolutions in support of Guinea's commitment to the liberation struggles in Africa, Sékou Touré said:

We salute the dynamic resolutions adopted by the Congress of Women and the J.R.D.A. as a decisive contribution to the acceleration of the general emancipation of the Guinean people; of African peoples and of progressive humanity.²

Another primary concern of Sékou Touré's international position was the safeguarding of the esteem and prestige of Guinea's international position. In Africa, Guinea was a revolutionary state in 1958, but Sékou Touré determined to enter into friendly relations with all African states by pledging not to undertake the exportation of the Guinean revolution or to interfere in the internal policies of other African states.³

Sékou Touré's international policy was also designed to strengthen Guinea's internal development by safeguarding the Guinean revolution. In need of the technological advantages and economic assistance from outside, the Guinean leader undertook a policy of

seeking effective diplomatic interaction with all nation states.⁴ Afraid of isolation during the early years, Sékou Touré formulated plans which would aid the building of Guinean society at home.

Positive neutralism became the philosophical basis of Sékou Touré's foreign policy.⁵ As a principle, positive neutralism offered many wide ranges of interaction and decisions in foreign policy for the underdeveloped state. Challenges could be met through the adoption of a "non-aligned" position which maximized the independence with which a chief of state might act on behalf of his nation. In addition, positive neutralism enabled a relatively small and politically weak international entity to emphasize its moral position in international disputes since it clearly could not utilize the power at the disposal of the stronger states.

Sékou Touré was aware of the possible misuse of the term "positive neutralism." He warned his fellow countrymen and women of the differences between those who claimed to be non-aligned and those who truly were supporters of positive neutralism. Sékou Touré wrote:

Positive neutralism is characterized

by a will to action in favor of democratic progress and the maintenance of peace in the world. It is necessary to observe that a number of states choose at the right time to be called 'non-aligned,' but which subscribe nevertheless to external influences seeking to give a negative connotation to neutralism by transforming their international responsibilities from favorable neutrality in order to maintain the status-quo of the international situation, without actually modifying the universal situation, other than the definitive liquidation of the colonial regime. 6

A major reason for his preoccupation with neutralism was the fact that, as a result of the conditions under which Guinea opted for independence, the Guinean state chose neutrality under the leadership of Sékou Touré, and this independent stand deeply affected the relationship between Sékou Touré and President Charles de Gaulle of France. Because of the sharp political, ideological and personal differences between Sékou Touré and Charles de Gaulle, an important aspect of Guinean foreign policy as formulated by the Guinean chief of state was the normalization, or regularization, of Guineo-French relations. This challenge to Sékou Touré's international philosophy developed as a result of the decision of 1958, but the

insistence of the Guinean state to demand, implicitly and explicitly, that France treat it as a sovereign entity long exacerbated the situation.⁷ It is also clear that the international interests of the French state were often at odds with those defined by Sékou Touré as the interests of the Guinean revolution.

When de Gaulle travelled through Africa shortly after becoming President of France, it appeared to be part of a great design to restore French international prestige and strengthen the new Fifth French Republic. French losses in the 1950's had been great, and the waves of demands for independence were sweeping throughout Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. In some way, it appears that de Gaulle, still engulfed in a war in Algeria, was determined to use the publicity and the expected support of his African trip to restore some of France's honor.

There were serious miscalculations on the part of the French. Part of the mythology of the French colonial system was that all French Africans wanted to remain a part of France, and that assimilation, although discarded as official policy, would somehow result in inferior peoples choosing to be a part of the

superior French civilization and culture. The French did not recognize the seriousness of the grievances among their colonial subjects who resented the education designed to keep them subordinate to the French in their own countries, the taxes which they had to pay, and the sometimes arbitrary rule of the commandants de cercle. De Gaulle appeared to be locked⁸ in the era of the Brazzaville Conference, and if his memoirs are to be believed, never fully understood the feelings of the many Africans who protested his visit⁹ in 1958, and shouted for independence.

In Guinea, as has been noted, the French colonial experience was unique in West Africa in that there was less intensive incorporation of the Guineans into the French culture and civilization mythology. France neglected Guinea's social and health services while¹⁰ stressing the economic development of the colony.

While Guinean agriculture was providing much of the food for French West Africa, her bauxite was being exploited, and certain segments of her society undergoing selective educations, the French policy of "divide and conquer" in Guinea achieved the unexpected result of encouraging greater unity. Guineans were not

given citizenship until after World War II, and by that time, the returning veterans did a great deal to mute¹¹ ethnic differences in the cause of unity.

In June of 1958, Sékou Touré set forth the grand principles affirmed by the people as immediate decolonization: the unity of the Guinean population and African unity: the institution of methods and means of development in keeping with and respecting the African Personality: and the continuation of a struggle for the general progress in service to a new Guinea and a new Africa within the context of a renewed Franco-African¹² relationship.

At the fateful meeting with General de Gaulle in Conakry on August 25, 1958, the philosophical position of Sékou Touré was again enunciated as part of the Guinean assertion of its right to answer the referendum with a "non" vote. Sékou Touré stressed the firm belief that Africans had the right to fulfill their special destiny. At that time, cognizant of the French sensibilities, the Guinean leader told the French head of state that Guineans only wanted what the French already had, namely, freedom to struggle to achieve their total liberation for the expression of their

personality, originality and dignity.¹³ It is clear that Sékou Touré did not envision the choices of independence as a total break from France but merely as a means of establishing the basis for a new relationship of equal partners.¹⁴

Charles de Gaulle evidently did not understand the desire for independence expressed by Sékou Touré and other Guinean men and women as an authentic appeal for the recognition of African nationalism. It is clear that de Gaulle was surprised by the Guineans when he responded with threats of "consequences" if a "non" vote were cast.¹⁵ In his later memoirs, de Gaulle wrote of this day, with the benefit of hindsight, and possibly, his need to justify actions against Guinea,¹⁶ he gave evidence of a lack of understanding of the philosophy of Sékou Touré by summarily dismissing him as a "champion of orthodox Marxism and anti-imperialism."¹⁷ De Gaulle described Sékou Touré as a "young, brilliant and ambitious man,"¹⁸ and restated his conviction that Guinea was a "totalitarian" state.¹⁹

The immediate price that Guinea paid for her independence was the antagonism of Charles de Gaulle which he extended to his allies in NATO.²⁰ Sékou Touré

destroyed de Gaulle's dreams for Africa because once Guinea was free, it was virtually impossible to hold back the other states in their demands for independence.

It is clear that the decision of Guinea to seek independence appeared to have seriously altered de Gaulle's plans for Algeria as well. The impact of the decision of Sékou Touré to lead his state to independence at the time that Algeria was engaged in a war of national liberation effectively circumscribed the options which de Gaulle could exercise in solving the international crisis which had brought him to power. Immediately after gaining independence, Sékou Touré continued to speak out for African independence and was a supportive ally for Algeria's diplomatic strategies.²¹ De Gaulle could not ignore the impact that Touré had on the international scene. More than any other reason advanced to explain the irrational vindictiveness of de Gaulle toward Guinea and Sékou Touré, and de Gaulle's willingness to threaten even to leave NATO rather than see Guinea receive aid she so desperately needed, the Algerian situation offers the best understanding of why de Gaulle used all his power

against a nation of 3 million people.

Although the referendum of 1958 offered a choice, none was truly intended. In refusing to accept the French Community, the Guinean state experienced its first foreign policy crisis immediately upon independence as it attempted to regularize its relationship with France. While Sékou Touré expected to meet the French as equals, France, under de Gaulle who was receiving advice on African affairs from Houphouët-Boigny²² was in legal trouble attempting to²³ build a French African Community without Guinea.

The difficulties with France forced Sékou Touré into the three definitive paths of his philosophy. The concept of the African Personality was reinforced by the French decision to turn its back on Guinea. Sékou Touré re-emphasized the glory of African history and stressed that there was an Africa long before there was a France.²⁴ He spoke and wrote of the great institutions of the African civilizations which existed before the Europeans came to Africa while strengthening his international position in order to neutralize the impact of the French response to Guinean independence.

Sékou Touré was especially aggressive on the

question of Algerian independence since the issues included the liberation of Africa as well as the relationship between Africa and France. Sékou Touré supported the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria, and argued against the use of African soldiers against the Algerians as they had been used against the Indochinese.²⁵ He continually criticized de Gaulle and urged him to end the war which he considered to be a war against all African peoples.²⁶

Another point of dispute between France and Guinea was the insistence upon conducting atomic tests in the Sahara which France refused to reconsider despite African protests.²⁷ Sékou Touré considered this an abuse of the rights of Africans since the French would not test their weapons on French soil. There are some Africans who blame these tests for the Sahelian crisis of past years.

France was accused by Sékou Touré of deliberately disturbing Guinea's relationships with other states inside Africa.²⁸ We have noted that Guinea left the franc zone to assert her independence from France's economic orbit since continued economic involvement was inconsistent with Touré's goals of independence. He

was also critical of France for exploiting the Guinean people by providing nothing for the development of a strong state, and was particularly concerned that French efforts in Africa would aid neo-colonialism while retarding liberation and independence.

Sékou Touré identified neo-colonialism as a problem for Africa during the early years of Guinean independence, and warned against the attempts by the European powers to regain control of their former colonies after offering the trappings of political independence.³⁰ The involvement of France in the creation of OCAM was derided by Sékou Touré as the reaction of Houphouët-Boigny and de Gaulle to Guinean independence. In 1965, Touré alternately referred to OCAM as "Organisation Commune des Africaines Menteurs" (the Vulgar Organization of African liars) and "Organisation Contre l'Afrique en Marche" (the Organization against African Progress).³¹ Sékou Touré also considered the French to be responsible for the lack of survival of the Organisation des Etats Riverains du Fleuve Sénégal (OERS- Organization of the Senegal River States)³² which might have protected Mali, Mauretania and Senegal from the impact of the

drought by increasing the potential and efficiency of the use of the Senegal River and its tributaries.

When Nkrumah was overthrown in February 1966, Sékou Touré blamed France as well as other states for complicity, and was understandably concerned about the impact of the event on the Organization of African Unity and the nascent Union of African States. Touré was particularly angered by reports which he recounted to his people that de Gaulle had said that if Nkrumah were a man, he would return to Accra. Sékou Touré countered:

Today, General de Gaulle said that if Nkrumah were a man, he would return to Accra. Let's throw the ball back to him: if General de Gaulle had behaved as a man - as he says - and if he had remained in France in June of 1940, what would have been his lot? Would he have been able to get arms? And that same de Gaulle wants Nkrumah to deliver himself to the Ghanaian traitors,...33

Most of the coups attempted against the government of Sékou Touré have been blamed on the French. From the first complaints in 1960 to the Complot Petit Touré to the November 22, 1970 invasion, France was implicated in some way by the Guinean investigations.

One of the general demands of Sékou Touré in the sporadic negotiations with France was the dismissal of Jacques Foccart from his governmental positions since he was considered by Sékou Touré as an enemy of African liberation.³⁴

Another major obstacle to resumption of relations between France and Guinea was the issue of the payment of pensions.³⁵ By 1971, Guinea had paid to the veterans of the French Army over 40 billion CFA, and Sékou Touré insisted that France repay its debt as evidence of good will, but France refused to reimburse Guinea. The combination of financial and political conflicts made the normalization of relations between Sékou Touré's Guinean state and France very difficult to achieve. It remained obviously one of Guinea's foreign policy dilemmas during the first thirteen years since Touré would never compromise his philosophical commitments in the international sphere merely to gain French approval.

The problem of neo-colonialism identified by Sékou Touré became a critical problem in his dealing with the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.³⁶ The philosophy of positive neutralism was

difficult to maintain with each bloc pressuring new and small states. Guinea's difficulties were increased by the French efforts to isolate her from the West. Once Sékou Touré identified neo-colonialism, it was clear that his primary concern was to strengthen Guinea's independent stand. Guinea did not choose independence from France in order to become the puppet of another power, and Sékou Touré constantly stressed Guinea's commitment to the safeguarding of her hard-won national sovereignty.

Once Sékou Touré analyzed neo-colonialism, the philosophy of positive neutralism was also subjected to careful refinement as has been noted. Neo-colonialism was a particularly dangerous development because it subverted the independence of the weaker states. Sékou Touré warned:

Neo-colonialism is in effect a new form of colonial domination which endeavors, in spite of the accession to independence of the former colonies, to substitute indirect domination for direct domination and now, the powers, the interests and the privileges of the colonial powers are in all the different areas of national activity. Inspired by the same principles of domination, of exploitation as colonialism, neo-colonialism seeks

by all methods, to enmesh itself into the internal affairs of the former colonies to direct their activities in ways favorable to the interests of colonialism. 37

The Cold War milieu in which Guinea became independent offered serious challenges to the philosophical development of Sékou Touré. There was, in his philosophical analysis, the Soviet and American camps:

Each of these blocs, on order to safeguard its material and ideological interests, endeavors to impose the domination of its political system upon the world and thus engages others in military and economic arrangements where the most acute phases are identified as those which most threaten world peace, and which has been qualified as the "Cold War." 38

Dealing with either the American or the Soviet bloc, Sékou Touré exercised maximum independence in his zeal to safeguard the interests of Guinea, and even while receiving the Lenin Peace Prize in 1961, he expressed criticism of the idea that the world could be divided.³⁹

De Gaulle's pressure on his allies made it more difficult for Sékou Touré to implement his doctrine of positive neutralism if the early recognition and aid

was forthcoming only from one side of the Cold War struggle.⁴⁰ Russia and the other Eastern European states, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and East Germany.⁴¹ were already meeting some of Guinea's critical needs for goods and services by the time that the first American ambassador, John Morrow, arrived in Guinea on July 23, 1959.⁴²

Guinean independence was as much a surprise to the allies of France as it had been to France, and the State Department of the United States was still using European advisors for African affairs into the early 1960's.⁴³ The admission of Guinea into the United Nations afforded Sékou Touré the opportunity to visit the United States and to meet with President Eisenhower. The visit was quite successful in introducing the ideas of Sékou Touré to the United Nations and to the larger international community as well as to the United States.⁴⁴

When the Guineans arrived in the United States, there was a large community of French Africans who were eager to welcome the chief of a Black French-speaking African republic. The English-speaking Africans had already been buoyed by the independence of Ghana in

1957. This community included many Guineans in New York, and when the news of independence first reached them, they were convinced that an error in reporting had been made, and Senegal, not Guinea, was the independent state.⁴⁵ When the Guinean delegation arrived, the senior member of the Guinean group in New York, Mr. Ali Diallo, outfitted Ambassador Diallo Telli⁴⁶ and his family for the cold weather in New York.

Other efforts on the part of the Guineans in New York were designed to welcome Sékou Touré to New York's African-American community, and the Guineans, led by Mr. Ernest Robert, petitioned and negotiated with the State Department to arrange for the Guinean delegate of Sékou Touré to come to Harlem.⁴⁷ This was considered by many to be the most satisfying occasion they had ever experienced, and they still talked of it years later. Although thousands of miles from Guinea, Sékou Touré was not alone when he came to the United States, and both the establishment and the people heard his message and learned of his philosophy.⁴⁸

Perhaps the most important contact Sékou Touré made during his first American visit was when he met at Disneyland with the Senator who chaired the Committee

on Africa, John Fitzgerald Kennedy.⁴⁹ This meeting resulted in the establishment of strong diplomatic interaction between the United States and Guinea once John Kennedy became President, and certainly strengthened Touré's ability to implement positive neutralism by declaring continued independence from⁵⁰ both blocs of the Cold War.

In 1961, the Soviet Ambassador Daniel Solod was accused of encouraging Guineans to act against the government of Sékou Touré. It appears that this action occurred because of the continued independence of Touré, and the impending closer contacts with the representatives of an American President who had already shown his interest in Africa. Sékou Touré acted swiftly with every response available short of breaking diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union,⁵¹ and the Ambassador hurriedly left the country. Sékou Touré informed the Soviet Union, and its special envoy, Anastas Mikoyan, that Guinea would follow her course of positive neutrality, and would tolerate no⁵² interference in her internal affairs.

Further evidence of Sékou Touré's determination to follow an independent course which would benefit Guinea

was his response during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Sékou Touré identified the crisis as a Soviet-American matter which did not immediately involve Cuba, and he denied the Russians the right to use Guinea as a refueling station for planes on their way to Cuba. At the same time, in keeping with his ideological commitment to the independence of Third World states, Sékou Touré warned that his position would change if the matter became a Cuban-American conflict.⁵³

Sékou Touré's most serious breach with the United States occurred when, in 1966, the Guinean delegation led by Lansana Beavogui was enroute to the O. A. U. conference at Addis-Ababa via a Pan American World Airways jet and was seized by Ghanaian police who boarded the plane when it made an unscheduled stop at Accra, Ghana.⁵⁴ Sékou Touré blamed the United States for the actions of the Ghanaian officials who detained and arrested the Guineans to prevent them from attending the first O. A. U. conference since Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in February of 1966. Touré promptly placed both the American Ambassador and the chief of Pan American Airways operations in Guinea under house arrest in order to insure that the United

States would use pressure to secure the release of the
 Guineans.⁵⁵ The crisis ended when the Guinean
 delegation was returned, but Pan American Airways was
 expelled. Relations between the United States and the
 Republic of Guinea remained strained for many months
 afterward, but a complete break was avoided.⁵⁶

Sékou Touré's commitment to liberation struggles
 was global.⁵⁷ The involvement of the United States in
 Vietnam was clearly in opposition to his philosophy,
 and Sékou Touré remained one of the strongest opponents
 of the American involvement in Southeast Asia. As a
 leading international critic of the Vietnam War, Sékou
 Touré raised the more serious questions of the role of
 the United Nations,⁵⁸ and the lack of an official
 declaration of war by the United States.⁵⁹

Basically, Sékou Touré sought to ensure Guinea's
 national sovereignty in the challenging Cold War era
 which he felt resulted in Africa's being shortchanged
 since both groups were "obsessed by their pre-
 occupation with the Cold War...incapable of
 understanding what Africa really is, some go so far as
 to reproach the Africans for their relations with the
 other half of the world."⁶⁰

Sékou Touré was also concerned that the United States and the Soviet Union tried to place the independent states into one camp or the other, and he was convinced that:

To attempt to interpret Africa's behavior in terms of capitalism or communism is to ignore the fundamental fact that Africa's present conditions correspond neither to the essentials of capitalism nor to those for building up communism, as generally conceived.⁶¹

Because both approaches denied the validity of the African Personality as well as the special rights of the African peoples to choose their own developmental path, Sékou Touré considered positive neutralism as the only viable response since either bloc would threaten Guinea's independence.

In dealing with France, the United States and the Soviet Union, Sékou Touré's actions corresponded to and were consistent with the basic tenets of his international philosophy. Sékou Touré proclaimed that the doctrine of positive neutralism enabled Guinea to maintain the right to react independently to protect her interests and to act defensively before those

interests were threatened. He asserted that:

There are two ways of safeguarding oneself against theft. The first is to take out theft insurance and let the thieves do their worst. The second is to denounce the intention to steal, to tear off the masks of the thieves and to fight them.⁶²

Both the East and the West received significant evidence of Guinea's determination to chart her own international course.

Sékou Touré predicated his international philosophy upon a strong moralistic base which justified a more militant diplomatic position because of the revolutionary approaches being taken by the government at home to safeguard its internal development.⁶³ Sékou Touré was particularly concerned that the European states were not receptive to the advice of the Africans in matters of international concern outside of the issues which were directly involving the African continent.⁶⁴ At the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity (O. S. P. A. A.) Conference in 1961, Sékou Touré declared that the peoples of Africa and Asia had become a powerful force for freedom and peace throughout the world as a result of their struggles for independence from imperialism and

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colonialism.

In speaking of the role which Africa must play in international affairs, Sékou Touré noted that "Africa has brought to the problem of safeguarding world peace, a new dimension which no new move for peace can now afford to discount, if it is to have a successful outcome."⁶⁶ The denigration of the "have-nots" or the "underdeveloped" states must not continue as if they were still colonies whose decisions could be made for them, and Sékou Touré stressed the right to participate in peace-keeping and peace-making activities on a global scale.

While other states were following the dictates of their needs, Sékou Touré was convinced that peace must be maintained. He said that:

We are convinced that, for the purpose of developing our natural resources, international assistance, and co-operation, excluding any warlike inclinations, would naturally lead us to a condemnation of war as something historically obsolete and incompatible with human dignity.⁶⁷

Sékou Touré insisted that only with peace could poverty, disease and illiteracy be eradicated. Yet, "in order to have peace, there must be fair and equal

relations, and brotherly co-operation between all nations of the world and a general atmosphere of true liberty and democracy must prevail."⁶⁸ For Sékou Touré peace meant international security through the recognition of the principles of sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit.⁶⁹

On the issue of disarmament Sékou Touré declared that Africa was also intensely interested in the future of the world, and that disarmament was a major concern of the African continent.⁷⁰ Strongly supportive of a cessation of arms buildups, he said that disarmament must be complete in order to avoid the deaths of human beings, and that disarmament must be total.⁷¹ The liquidation of military treaties and bases must be accomplished if peace was to be achieved through disarmament.⁷²

The United Nations Organization was originally designed to maintain international stability among the Great powers, but, as Sékou Touré noted, the organization experienced serious difficulties in regulating the relationships between the super powers in regard to African affairs, and between the larger and the smaller states. From the beginning, Sékou

Touré urged the United Nations to exercise its duty "to⁷³ save the world from the burden of colonialism." He also urged many changes in the international organization which would include the new states of Asia and Africa in the important structures of the Secretariat, the Security Council, the Trusteeship⁷⁴ Council and ECOSOC.

Sékou Touré considered the United Nations as particularly inefficient in its handling of the Congo Crisis. Although Guinea participated in the United Nations operation in the Congo, Sékou Touré was certain that:

Confidence in the United Nations, respect for colonial legality, have been too expensive for the Congo and Africa. Revolution, direct action of the masses against the trusts and their accomplices, would have been the best defender of the cause of the youthful republic against the foreign invaders.⁷⁵

Some of the Guinean soldiers who served in the Congo were also critical in charging that the United Nations was more concerned with interests other than those of⁷⁶ strengthening the Congo.

In 1970 when Guinea was invaded by Portugal, Sékou Touré requested aid from the United Nations, and

the Security Council decided to send a fact-finding commission to Guinea to investigate the charges made by Sékou Touré.⁷⁷ He accused the allies of the Portuguese of failing to act decisively to protect the threatened sovereign member-state in order to avoid antagonizing Portugal.

Despite the difficulties with the United Nations, Sékou Touré always appointed distinguished men to the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. The most important Ambassadors have been Diallo Telli (1959-1962); Achkar Marof (1963-1966); and El Hadj Dr. Abdoulaye Touré (1967-1972). Each of these men made significant contributions to Guinea both before becoming its representatives and during their tenure of office, and they exemplify Sékou Touré's philosophic concern that Guinean representatives serve the interests of the Guinean people at all times.⁷⁸

As part of his commitment to the position that the masses will eventually determine the future of international relations, the diplomatic offices of Guinea abroad have always spent a significant amount of time and money on the dissemination of information about the Guinean revolution. Sékou Touré realized

very early in his political career that good will was an important international asset since smaller states often have nothing but moral suasion. He later advised Amilcar Cabral of the P. A. I. G. C. (African Party for the Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) in his development of a strong base of popular international support for his liberation struggle by extending the resources of Guinea abroad to help spread the information of the revolution in Guinea-Bissau.⁷⁹

The important aspects of Sékou Touré's international philosophy which set forth programs for Africa also indicated his views toward Asia and Latin America. Recognizing that the permanent instability of the Third World was advantageous to its exploiters, Sékou Touré urged:

...the young states of Africa and Asia must count on themselves. All of these people must mobilize in order to wipe out the vestiges of earlier domination, and boldly and courageously shoulder their new tasks.⁸⁰

He continued by linking the Guinean revolution with the struggles throughout the world.

In his New Year's message in 1965, Sékou Touré expressed his belief that "1965 will see an increase in

the work of Africans, Afro-Asiatic peoples and democratic states in the united action to have peace and an end to violence." ⁸¹ The subsequent years did not fulfill Touré's optimistic prediction, but his philosophical principles were only strengthened as the increased number of coups d'état in Africa and political upheavals elsewhere in the world contradicted these principles.

In the international philosophy of Sékou Touré there were no issues more important than those which directly affected Africa. Since Africa did not exist in a political vacuum, he recognized and responded to the need to define the relationships between Africa and states outside Africa, and developed the philosophy of positive neutrality in order to protect Africa and Guinea from the trouble and turbulence of the Cold War era.

Sékou Touré's primary concern was that Guinean independence would not be swept away by the challenges of the first thirteen years of statehood. In the formulation of his international philosophy Sékou Touré was attempting to chart the way for other states in Africa so that they would be able to maximize control

over their internal political, economic and social development. With positive neutralism as the principle Guinea followed in dealing with the world, Sékou Touré's broad African commitments could be realized by an independent Guinean state.

Chapter VI- The International Philosophy of Sékou Touré

Footnotes

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6. Ahmed Sékou Touré, Apprendre...Savoir...Pouvoir, Conakry, 1965, p. 181.
7. L'Expérience Guinéenne et l'Unité Africaine, p. 310.
8. Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Unity, 1942-1944, translated by Richard Howard, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1959, p. 58 and p. 187. See pp. 35- 36 for remarks on Felix Eboué.
9. Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor, translated by Terrence Kilmartin, Simon and Schuster, 1971, pp. 56-57.
10. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p.89.
11. Interview with a soldier in the Guinean army who saw service in Indochina, Algeria and the Congo. Interview with a former

soldier who was with the Free French and de Gaulle in World War II and settled immediately after in New York City. Interview with a retired soldier who served in World War I and World War II and then returned home to Guinea.

12. L'Expérience Guinéenne et l'Unité Africaine, p. 43.
13. Ibid., p. 77.
14. Ibid., p. 79.
15. Ibid., p. 83. Compare with Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 56.
16. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days, Fawcett, 1967, pp. 523-524.
17. De Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 55.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 64.
20. Ahmed Sékou Touré, "Exposé au C. N. R. de Conakry, Novembre 15, 1965," in R. D. A. Revue Mensuelle du P. D. G., no. 1, Janvier 1966, p. 64.
21. Ruth Schacter-Morgenthau, Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa, Oxford, 1964, p. 253.
22. De Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 60.
23. L'Expérience Guinéenne et l'Unité Africaine, pp. 310-11.
24. L'Afrique et la Révolution, p. 281.
25. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p. 135.
26. Ibid., p. 127.

27. Ibid., p. 80.
28. Ahmed Sékou Touré, "Exposé au C. N. R. de Conakry...", p. 61.
29. L'Expérience Guinéenne et l'Unité Africaine, p. 304.
30. Apprendre...Savoir...Pouvoir, 214.
31. Ahmed Sékou Touré, "Exposé au C. N. R. de N'Zérékoré," in R. D. A. Revue Mensuelle du P. D. G., no. 1, January 1966, pp. 41-43.
32. Ahmed Sékou Touré, "Le Sénégal Responsable du Non Fonctionnement de l'OERS," in La Négritude et sa 5ème colonne, Conakry, November 1971, p. 87.
33. Ahmed Sékou Touré, "Discours du Président Ahmed Sékou Touré au Meeting du Mars 27, 1966, 7th Anniversaire de la J. R. D. A.," in R. D. A. Revue Mensuelle du P. D. G., no. 4, Avril 1966, p. 16.
34. "Exposé au C. N. R. de Conakry...", p. 52.
35. Interviews with Guinean representatives to the United Nations.
36. Apprendre...Savoir...Pouvoir, p. 180.
37. Ibid., p. 214.
38. Ibid., p. 180.
39. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p. 172.
40. John H. Morrow, First American Ambassador to Guinea, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1968, p. 251 and p. 36. William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks, Harper and Row, New York 1967, pp. 20-21.

41. Attwood, pp. 21-22; Morrow, p. 71.
42. Morrow, p. 36.
43. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
44. Ibid., pp. 94-112.
45. Interviews with Mr. John Bennett (Amadou Barry); Mr. Ernest Robert (Korka Diallo); Mr. Mamadou Dian Barry; Mr. Francois Deglele; Mr. Alexander Touré; and Mr. Ali Diallo, Guineans resident in New York City.
46. Interview with Mrs. Mary Diallo, widow of Mr. Ali Diallo.
47. Interview with Mr. Ernest Robert, who organized the Harlem visit on behalf of the Guineans and the French-speaking African community in New York. There is no mention of Mr. Robert in Morrow's account of the Harlem visit although Mr. Robert was involved in planning with the State Department and other governmental agencies, and has documents to attest to his role. See Morrow, p. 113
49. Schlesinger, p. 524; Morrow, p. 106.
50. Attwood, p. 137.
51. Morrow, p. 243; Attwood, p. 35. Interview with Guinean who emphasized the fact that the investigation disclosed the participation of the Russian embassy in the disturbances in 1961, and stressed the fact that Sékou Touré refused to mortgage Guinea's future through dependence on any outside force. The interview also disclosed the fact that the Guineans did consider the Russians a bit difficult to deal with because of their general ignorance of Guinea.
52. Attwood, p. 65.
53. Ibid., p. 103.

54. Ahmed Sékou Touré, "Déclaration du Secrétaire Général du P. D. G., le Président Ahmed Sékou Touré le 8 Novembre 1966," in R. D. A. Revue Mensuelle du P. D. G., no. 12, Décembre 1966, p. 7.
55. Ibid., p. 11.
56. Interview with Guinean representative who emphasized the conclusion of Sékou Touré that the primary purpose of the seizure was to prohibit Guinea's participation at the Conference, and that regardless of the continued relationship with the United States after the temporary period of displeasure, the first O. A. U. Conference after the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah was predictably bland without Guinea's representative to spark and support the discussion of the key issues of imperialism and liberation movements as well as the problems of neo-colonialism and military coups d'états. See also Morrow, pp. 254-256 and Attwood, p. 326.
57. Ahmed Sékou Touré, "Discours d'accueil du Président Ahmed Sékou Touré au Roi Fayçal Ibn Abdel Azizi d'Arabie Saoudite le 12 Septembre 1966," in R. D. A. Revue Mensuelle du P. D. G., no. 12, Décembre 1966, p. 27.
58. Ahmed Sékou Touré, "Message du Président Ahmed Sékou Touré à l'occasion du 1er Janvier 1967," in R. D. A. Revue Mensuelle du P. D. G., no. 13, January 1967.
59. Ibid.
60. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p. 71.
61. Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea, p. 138.
62. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p. 67.

63. Ibid., p. 8.
64. L'Afrique et la Révolution, pp. 177-178.
65. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p. 73.
66. Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea, p. 535.
67. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p. 79.
68. Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea, p. 537.
69. Ibid.
70. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p. 79.
71. L'Afrique et la Révolution, p. 390.
72. Ibid.
73. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p. 53.
74. Ibid., p. 77.
75. Ibid., p. 151.
76. Interview with a Guinean soldier who served in the Congo and was very critical of the United Nations' effort.
77. Guinean Revolution and Social Progress, p. 379
78. Ahmed Sékou Touré, Technique de la Révolution, Conakry, 1969, p. 482.
79. L'Afrique et la Révolution, p. 298.
80. The International Policy of the Republic of Guinea, p. 58.
81. Ahmed Sékou Touré, 8 Novembre 1964, Conakry, 1964, p. 67.

CHAPTER VII

SÉKOU TOURÉ AND AFRICA

None of the philosophical conceptualizations of Sékou Touré was as totally dependent upon his identification of himself as an African, and as an African man whose life and that of his nation had been so frequently circumscribed by the international power realities of the recent past, as his commitment of the Guinean revolution to the cause of the African continent. Africa's colonial history had not prepared her well for the type of independent present and future envisioned as essential by Sékou Touré if the continent were to be able to control freely both her own resources and development.

Sékou Touré also considered the problem for Africa that the early years of her independence seemed destined to culminate in continued dependency relationships which reinforced the perpetuation of control by the former "Mother country." The former colonial powers were analyzed by Touré as having developed neo-colonialism in order to maintain the older patterns of economic interaction and political

divisiveness which had proved to be so debilitating during colonialism. He identified this phenomenon very early by warning that:

...all the old philosophies once constructed to justify those regimes of oppression and exploitation now camouflage themselves in new guises, whereof the most dangerous is neo-colonialism, which, in a paternal guise, pretends to bring a disinterested contribution to the human emancipation of underdeveloped societies.¹

Sékou Touré's background prepared him for the role he chose as advocate of the African continent. As has been noted, he was not exposed extensively to the massive cultural conditioning which resulted in the strong cultural contradictions found in the writings of many French-speaking Africans and Antilleans. Also, despite his comparatively young age at the time he came to power, Sékou Touré was very closely tied to the traditional institutional base in Guinea, part of which he utilized for his political movement. As a result of his conviction that his concept of the African Personality was both valid and viable, Sékou Touré shaped the philosophical base of most of Guinea's institutions to conform to the dictates of the philosophy of authenticity. The P. D. G. , the

foundation of the Guinean Revolution, was completely committed by Sékou Touré to the eventual realization of the vast potential of the African continent.

The dominant theme throughout all of Sékou Touré's speeches and writings on Africa was the postulation that there must be a positive relationship between the Guinean Revolution and the future of Africa. In an early speech in 1958, he said that "Thus will we show that Guinea is at the height of her destiny which she has chosen in order that men of Africa might be historically rehabilitated."² In keeping with this basic idea, Sékou Touré emphasized that:

Our (Guinea's) international political action has an African character, all the more since our home policy is founded upon the true material and moral interests of the African masses. 3

Not only was the Guinean Revolution part of a larger African revolution in the contemporary sense but it was also seen by Sékou Touré as part of a long historical process:

The choice by Guinea has thus been an African choice in which we translate the deep wishes of our people into reality, but that choice has also been an historical one which has been faithful to the

tradition of struggle of the
illustrious sons of pre-colonial
Africa..., Ba Demba, Behanzin, Alpha
Yaya, and the Almamy Samory....⁴

The Guinean revolution within the African context was seen by Sékou Touré as a vital part of a progressive developmental pattern for an Africa independent of external forces, through continual involvement in the struggle for that independence.

The Guinean revolution was supposed to serve as a model for the rest of the African continent in its development after political independence was achieved. This idea was critical in the early thought of Sékou Touré as he stressed that "contributing to the qualification of African history means freeing African peoples from obscurity and imperialist oppression, thus to gain the means of total equality with all of the peoples of the world."⁵ Rehabilitation of Africa meant the right to equality in all of her dealings with the outside world, especially with the former colonial powers, and Sékou Touré tied the acquisition of the honor and respect for Africa to the accomplishment of Guinea's own goals.⁶

Sékou Touré drew meaningful parallels between

Guinean development and African development since one of Africa's crucial problems was the fact that many⁷ decisions affecting the continent were made abroad. Since Guinean foreign policy was based upon positive neutralism, the Guinean President urged Africans to follow a parallel neutralist policy because:

African neutralism...is the expression of a lively faith in a happy future for mankind. It is something active, a participating force, active agent in the struggle for the achievement of a world society --emancipated, fraternal and united. 8

Guinea followed what Sékou Touré called a militant international policy especially insistent on defending Guinea's right to protect what were considered as African interests:

Because we mean to participate fully in African reconstruction, we resolutely combat everything that opposes the human emancipation of Africa, everything that imperils her social development, everything that alienates her political or economic, social or cultural rights, everything that infringes upon her human dignity, her liberty, everything that hinders the peoples of Africa from expressing their aspirations.⁹

This commitment was essential because implicit in the

early philosophic commitment was the suggestion that the Guinean Revolution could not survive if Africa were not free.

As the years passed Sékou Touré's commitment to Africa remained strong. He always maintained that the fundamental concern of the P. D. G. was to accelerate¹⁰ the progressive development of Africa. He continued to speak and write of the impact of the Guinean Revolution on the process of liberation and the¹¹ progress toward unity in Africa.

Sékou Touré repeatedly pledged the people of Guinea to the fulfillment of broader African objectives. Yet, he clearly recognized that all of Africa could not immediately follow the Guinean model:

We have already declared that Guinea is not all of Africa, she is only one part of Africa, and the happiness of the Guinean people, the rehabilitation of the Guinean nation, constitutes one part of the success, the well-being and the complete historical rehabilitation of all of Africa. 12

By 1965, Sékou Touré was no longer tying the success of the Guinean Revolution to all of Africa, but, instead, he was informing African states and the rest of the world that Guinea would progress whether or not the

rest of Africa chose to follow her path. At the same time, he re-affirmed that Guinea would always continue¹³ to serve in the cause of Africa.

The dominant goals which Sékou Touré had for Africa were the major tenets of Guinea's foreign policy under his direction. The entire African continent must be liberated from foreign domination, including the areas controlled by South Africa. Sékou Touré wanted the establishment of a united Africa, which could make economic, social and political decisions free of any foreign control or pressure. Finally, he wanted Africa to use her independent status in order to participate¹⁴ in universal, or international, life. These basic goals remained constant from 1958 to 1971. They were the chief factors in determining Guinean relations with other African states, and, to a large degree, with non-African states as well.

In his poem, "Guinean Revolution," Sékou Touré stressed the scope of the Guinean Revolution in terms of Africa, encompassing all of the significant positive values, including unity, democracy and humanitarianism.¹⁵ Since one of the fundamental concerns of the P. D. G. was that the Guinean

Revolution would bring about meaningful change in African history, Sékou Touré continually forecast that the imperialist nations would attempt to destroy the Guinean Revolution in order to maintain their control¹⁶ in Africa.

Recounting the numerous threats to African independence and autonomy, Sékou Touré repeatedly warned that the ability of Africa to act independently depended largely upon its own ability to protect itself from outside interference. As a result, he insisted in 1969 that Africa still needed a revolution¹⁷ in order to free itself of foreign controls, and to live in "Liberty, Unity and Progress."¹⁸ For their collective progress, it was also necessary for African states to separate from other groups which commanded their political and economic loyalties.¹⁹

The liberation of the African continent meant the possibility of the achievement of African unity "for safeguarding and consolidating peace in the world."²⁰ All of Africa must be unified, according to Sékou Touré, if it was to be rehabilitated from its colonial past and establish itself in the future.²¹

Sékou Touré began to concretize this philosophical

commitment to a unified Africa as early as 1958 when he agreed to join an economic union linking Ghana and Guinea.²² That organization later became more political in nature as Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré established closer co-operation and formulated plans for enlarging their organization. At the same time, Senegal and French Soudan entered into the Mali Federation while they were still officially French colonies. In comparing the two unions, Sékou Touré said:

The Ghana-Guinea union has been possible only after the attainment of independence by these two nations. The "Mali," recently formed by Soudan and Senegal, clearly shows the necessity of total freedom, that is to say to say the possibility of enjoying of enjoying and exercising all the attributes of national independence. 23

Indeed, the Mali Federation and its subsequent failure were catalytic factors which accelerated the independence of the states within the French Community in 1960.

The theoretical conceptualization of African unity held by Sékou Touré achieved substantial reality with the creation of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union in 1960.

Modibo Keita, Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré pledged their states to mutual co-operation and unity in order to remain free of imperialism and neo-colonialism, and to aid in the independent development of a new African society in which decisions for economic and political organization would be based upon the reality of the African experience.

A unified Africa was strongly supported at the Casablanca Conference at which Sékou Touré urged the formation of an organization which would extend the economic independence of African states ²⁴. Sékou Touré envisioned a totally unified Africa during the early 1960's as a result of the success of the formation of the Union of African States and the sharing of ideas at Casablanca.

When the Organization of African Unity was founded in 1963, a number of serious compromises had already been made if we compare the Charter of the O. A. U. with Touré's earlier goals. The President of the Republic of Guinea was aware of the problems, but he wrote:

...positive neutralism and African unity are closely interconnected; any progress upon the path of Unity results in reinforcing Africa's non-

alignment and, as a corollary, in affirming the African Personality more vigorously. 25

The Organization of African Unity was envisioned by Sékou Touré as a step toward economic independence, but most of the member states remained within their original economic blocs which tied them either to the French membership in the Common Market or to the British Commonwealth. Sékou Touré considered this development as a violation of his concept of African unity which arose from the unwillingness of the former colonial powers to change their relationships with African states. In addition, he characterized any attacks against either the O. A. U. or what he considered to be progressive African states as part of a plan to limit the possibilities for independent economic actions within the O. A. U. which he thought would solve Africa's pressing economic problems.

When analyzing the situation in the O. A. U., Sékou Touré stressed that the struggle was difficult because of the existence within the organization of two contradictory trends in contemporary African life. According to Touré, revolutionary Africans wanted to adhere to the right of the people to progress through

democracy while those on the other side attempted to diminish the spirit of the Charter in order to lessen the effectiveness of the organization.²⁹ This essential conflict was clearly drawn by Sékou Touré as a conflict between African states which are, as was the case of Guinea, free to act in the interests of the African peoples.

Sékou Touré continued as a supporter of the O. A. U. despite the serious deficiencies of the organization resulting from its internal contradictions. He defended the O. A. U. from its enemies who sought to destroy it, and praised its triumph, as he saw it, "over the enemies of Africa, on the basis of the democratic and popular principles which constitute the foundations of its Charter."³⁰ "The real problem of Africa," he said, "is the exploitation which worsens every year" and "that made unity more difficult to achieve."³¹

Part of the solution to the problems of the O.A.U. was to break the ties between some Africans and the European states which are frequently seen as more important than their ties with other African states. After stating that "the problems of the O. A. U. and

African unity are rapidly reported to Europe and America³² by Africans seeking to defeat unity," Sékou Touré called the people who did the former "...traitors to our ideal, the dignity of Africa, the brotherhood of Africa,³³ and the solidarity of Africa."

Despite the difficulties of the O. A. U., Sékou Touré remained committed to the organization. During the first ten years of the O. A. U. the Secretary General was Diallo Telli, Guinea's first Ambassador to the United Nations and a distinguished scholar and administrator in his own right, who was elected in 1963 to administer the organization. Throughout the various crises of the first ten years, Diallo Telli served, without any major conflicts regarding his office and opinions, until 1972 when he decided to return to Guinea. Although there are those who have said that Sékou Touré was much in control at the O. A. U.³⁴ because of Diallo Telli, the overwhelming evidence is that the Guinean President was seriously disappointed in the O. A. U. but unwilling to disavow the organization because of the awesome probability of even greater difficulties if there were no formal institution linking the African states together.

As it became clear that the O. A. U. could not accomplish many of his goals for African economic unity, Sékou Touré sought to exercise the option available under the O. A. U. Charter which permitted member states to develop regional groupings. The Organization of the Senegal River States was initiated in 1965, uniting Mali, Mauretania, Senegal, and Guinea in an organization designed to facilitate economic development through the co-operative utilization of the Senegal River which rises in the Guinean highlands and courses through Mali and Mauretania before reaching the Atlantic Ocean through its delta in Senegal.

The O. E. R. S. organizational meeting held in Guinea in 1968 gave some insight into the different expectations of the leaders. Sékou Touré insisted that the importance of the organization was its opportunity to show the great dormant historic capacity of the African continent through demonstrating success in serving great human and social values.³⁵ He seemed obliged to say that the formation of O. E. R. S. was friendly and should not be viewed as a threat to anyone.³⁶ Leopold Senghor of Senegal, a frequent adversary of Touré, emphasized the fact that it was

both reasonable and realistic for Guinea and Senegal, whose citizens spoke the same languages, to join³⁷ together in such an undertaking.

Modibo Keita of Mali considered the O. E. R. S. as another effort by Africans to contribute to the liberation of the rest of Africa, and to determine³⁸ their own development. President Mouctar Ould Daddah of Mauretania emphasized the significance of the union in terms of the co-operation between Black Africans and Arab-Berbers then experienced in³⁹ Mauretania to unity on an international scale.

The agreement was extensive, and covered important objectives in the areas of education, economic planning in development of hydroelectric facilities, cultural interchanges, and improvements in the administration of⁴⁰ public health. The range of projects was especially satisfying to Sékou Touré who solemnized the occasion by stating that:

Africa had attained a high plateau of development and had rehabilitated herself upon the bases of her own original values and had rendered herself more useful for all of humanity.⁴¹

He later re-iterated the need for organizations

such as the O. E. R. S. by warning:

Today, the evidence is that the powers which pretend to protect us continue to enrich themselves scandalously at our expense, forcing the masses to live in miserable circumstances. 42

With the O. E. R. S., Sékou Touré hoped to accomplish the type of independence for Guinean development and that of her neighbors by becoming dependent, if necessary, upon other African states whose survival and progress were linked. African unity would be enhanced by a successful African group working independently of Europe and serving as a role-model for other regional groups.

Later, when the O. E. R. S. ceased to function, Sékou Touré blamed Senghor who, he said, while accusing Guinea of misbehaviour, ⁴³ was attempting to ruin the organization through a number of devious methods, including placing O. E. R. S. funds in banks in the Côte d'Ivoire. ⁴⁴ Whatever the reasons, the organization failed to achieve any of the goals agreed to in 1968, and this failure was of disastrous proportions for Senegal, Mali and Mauretania, each of which suffered heavy population casualties and

incalculable social and economic losses from the prolonged Sahelian drought. The kinds of dislocations, and the serious inability of these states to deal with the severe economic burden without outside help merely served to underscore the need for the type of co-operation which an independent O. E. R. S. as proposed by Sékou Touré could have provided.

Sékou Touré's concept of African unity went beyond the development of institutional and organizational structures when he postulated that the ideal goal of Africa was the complete liberation of the continent. He considered the achievement of unity as only one step toward African emancipation:

Unity of action of African peoples will be the source of their invincibility, the inexhaustible source of energies necessary for the qualitative transformation of the standards of living of our people, and the highest method by which Africa and the nations composing her can confer her influence, her prestige and ability at an international level. 45

A critical issue arising in Sékou Touré's philosophy, and continuing through much of the early history of the state, was how to deal with the threats to the Guinean revolution. The responses were based on

the irrefutable facts that there had been attempted coups against the government of Sékou Touré, there had been certain assassination attempts against him, and there were a number of external invasions of Guinea deliberately aimed against either Touré or the Guinean state. Sékou Touré repeatedly traced the origin of these attacks back to the governments of what he considered as imperialist countries, but he always maintained that no attacks could be mounted without African co-operation. As a result, Touré considered the most immediate threat to progressive African states as coming from other African states.

Noting that the widespread international sympathy for independent states ceased whenever the state began to exercise its option for economic independence, Sékou Touré emphasized that severe outside pressures were also brought against such independent nations. He recalled Guinea's earliest problem with munitions sent through Senegal and the Côte d'Ivoire at every major convocation since 1960.⁴⁶ The problems with the Côte d'Ivoire had been in existence since the colonial era during which Sékou Touré and Houphouët-Boigny were often at odds on issues relating to independence.

After the referendum in 1958, de Gaulle's advisor on African affairs was the future President of the Côte d'Ivoire.

The relationship with Senegal had also been difficult, but the complexities were infinitely more varied and challenging to Sékou Touré's philosophical development. The conflict had all the elements of the intellectual conflict discussed in Chapter II. In addition, the intellectual conceptualizations of the two presidents were expressed in concrete political ways with Senghor remaining within the French sphere while Touré continually sought ways in which to strengthen Guinean development without asking for aid from France.

There was another area in which Senghor and Sékou Touré were competitors. The P. A. I. G. C. (African Party for the Liberation of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde) had headquarters in both Dakar and Conakry during the years of the war of independence. Although the primary headquarters, manned by Amilcar Cabral, was in Guinea, the larger international press coverage was given to Senegal since the joint communiqués issued in both capitals were placed on the French wire services

from which they travelled quickly throughout the world. The impression was given that Senegal was the source of significant aid to Cabral when, in reality, the Guineans were the major supporters of the P. A. I. G. C.

Although Senegal and Guinea had both suffered attacks by Portuguese forces seeking to defeat the P. A. I. G. C., Sékou Touré was most critical of a meeting Senghor held with the Portuguese General de Spínola in the Casamance region of Senegal in 1969. The Casamance, on the border between Guinea and Senegal, would have become a part of Guinea had the ethnic origins of the people been considered at the time of independence. As a part of Senegal, the Casamance was on the frontier between two states which had had frequent border disputes. When Guinea was invaded in November of 1970, the earlier meeting between Senghor and De Spínola was re-examined as hostile by Touré since the government of Senegal had also given sanctuary to Guinean dissidents.⁴⁷

Another objective of Touré was that the countries bordering on Guinea be governed by friendly leaders, engaging in peaceful relations with Guinea. Since relations with the Francophone neighbors, Senegal and

the Côte d'Ivoire were consistently troubled, the relationship between Guinea and both Sierra Leone and Liberia were of great importance.

Sierra Leone had been a strong friend of Guinea since her independence in 1957, and when Sierra Leone became independent in 1961, Sir Milton Margai had continued the strong relationship. When in 1968, Sierra Leone began to experience critical internal political difficulties, Sékou Touré entered into a mutual defense agreement emphasizing the earlier aid given to Sir Milton:

Today as yesterday one cannot fail to ask the question of the involvement of the Guinean government in the internal affairs of Sierra Leone; but personally it would not be reasonable to stop the Guinean government, the P. D. G., or the citizenry of our countries from desiring that the people of Sierra Leone realize their own popular unity, and to retake their own sovereign power which they have the right to preserve in their own hands, and to achieve their own economic and social progress, inseparable from that of the other peoples of the world. 48

As far as Sékou Touré was concerned in 1971, the renewal of the agreement with the government of Sierra Leone, led by Siaka Stevens, received such unfavorable

press coverage because it was an effort to halt the progress of imperialism.⁴⁹ He argued that the Guinean regime, although different from that of Sierra Leone, was bound to respect the national integrity of the state of Sierra Leone as well as the interests of her people.⁵⁰ In another attempt to prod the O. A. U. to more effective action, Sékou Touré suggested that the O. A. U. consider the possibility of regional groups of a military nature to aid the cause of the anti-colonial struggle.⁵¹ This suggestion met with the same lack of enthusiasm as his earlier recommendations when the issues were raised to the level of possible action.

Another area in which there were serious threats to Guinea was in the increasingly more extensive economic and political instability in Africa which encouraged political upheavals, and military coups d'états. As a result it appeared to Touré that the more progressive states grew fewer in number and more isolated. As Sékou Touré analyzed the repeated coups in the African continent, he described the patterns of international complicity:

When France uses NATO arms in Algeria, when the British government sells warships to the government of

Portugal, when foreign armies give their support to groups of Guinean mercenaries, or to the Cuban counter-revolutionaries, this is not purely casual....52

Despite the serious problems, Sékou Touré never lost faith in the ability of the African people to choose the correct path amidst the many dangers confronting them:

Africa and her peoples have never been absent from combat for human virtues nor are they strangers in the realization of all kinds of material progress by technological improvement, practical methodology, the accumulation of scientific knowledge, and the improvement of social practices and political principles which give to the diverse civilizations their proper historic value.53

Furthermore, in Africa, the morale of a society was important and it could never be sustained, as far as Sékou Touré was concerned, by either military force or political principles since the sustaining force in
54
African society must be the people themselves.

There are significant reasons for the peoples of Africa withstand efforts to weaken them from the outside. Sékou Touré emphasized that:

The liberation of Africa, the progress of Africa as well as all of

the liberation and progress of all humanity results uniquely from the courage and the strength which characterizes that struggle of peoples against reactionary forces which are always in opposition to the methods needed to increase the power and happiness of the working class. 55

The question of national integrity was a serious issue in Africa because most of the states were colonial constructs in which ethnic groups and their territorial rights were disregarded in the creation of post-colonial national boundaries. The problem of secessionist movements became a reality with the Katanga movement in the Congo, and Sékou Touré was opposed to any such movement because of its implications for all of Africa. Almost any African state could be dismantled if the different ethnic groups chose to exercise rights to land, and one of the reasons for the fight against tribalism in Guinea was the recognition that any reason for disunity could be seized to retard national development by those who were opposed to a government. Therefore, Sékou Touré was strongly supportive of Nigeria during the Biafran⁵⁶ crisis, despite his criticism of the military coup. In fact, he was concerned that "Imperialists, instead

of being anxious about these catastrophes have continued, on the contrary, to sustain Biafra against⁵⁷ the Nigerian national entity."

Sékou Touré was considerably distressed about the increase of military coups in Africa in the mid-⁵⁸1960's, but he wanted to maintain good relations with other African states, if possible. A complication that was difficult to deal with was that the increased number of political and military coups in Africa were changing the balance between the states Touré considered progressive, such as the United Arab Republic, Libya, Algeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, the Gambia, and Guinea, and the⁵⁹ other states of Africa.

From the time Guinea gained her independence until 1971, African leaders either visited Guinea or sent representatives to Conakry to confer with Sékou Touré. The Guinean President rarely left the country from 1965 to 1971. The most frequent contacts were with the heads of state of neighboring Liberia and Sierra⁶⁰ Leone.

The struggles of independent African states were a major philosophical concern of Sékou Touré who was

convinced that mere political freedom did not connote a truly independent state if its economic life was controlled by outside forces. He developed a strong ideological conceptualization of what an African state should be, and supported the O. A. U. in the hope that it provided an African forum that compensated for its shortcomings.⁶¹ Yet, for Africa another serious problem remained unsolved as millions of Africans lived under the domination of Europeans in South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies.

Sékou Touré was convinced that it was his efforts on behalf of the P. A. I. G. C., his stand on Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and his long-term support of Kwame Nkrumah which resulted in a serious diplomatic incident in 1966. The delegation kidnapped in Accra led to a crisis at the Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa. The then secret report revealed some of the problems. First, it took eight hours of discussion to decide to send a three-party delegation to Accra to negotiate for the release of the Guineans.⁶² Other discussions involved the international activities aimed at gaining support for the African group's position on South Africa and Rhodesia in the United Nations,

especially from the permanent members of the Security Council. The report contained the rather somber observation that the "Great Powers would not change their attitudes."⁶³

Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania addressed themselves to the problem of states aiding in the liberation struggles in Africa, a position shared by Guinea because of her support of the P. A. I. G. C. Kaunda stressed that his nation had been attacked by shells that were made in either the United States of America or the United Kingdom, which implied the complicity of NATO in protecting the interests of Ian Smith, leader of the illegal regime in Rhodesia.⁶⁴ Kaunda also criticized many African states, including Senegal, Sierra Leone and the Côte d'Ivoire, for giving aid to the Smith regime by failing to implement the O. A. U. Resolution on Rhodesia.⁶⁵ He said that "the U. K. had failed Africa and Zambia and anyone who was realistic and human" in its actions vis-à-vis Smith.⁶⁶

President Nyerere described the problem of the attacks against African states as a very serious difficulty for Africa if her resolutions were ignored by her own people.⁶⁷ Algeria's Hoari Boumedienne concurred,⁶⁸ while Doudou Thiam, the Foreign Minister

of Senegal, said that:

Senegal had also decided that, in view of this, not to implement the resolution. Senegal would still vote for the resolution, but unanimity must be obtained to have any effect on the United Kingdom.⁶⁹

Nyerere was especially concerned that:

This problem had arisen because they had touched the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom was God. They were discussing when a tiny minority was dominating four million Africans in Rhodesia. They had a right to tell the United Kingdom as they had done in Accra, that it could not get away if it created another South Africa and that it would not expect any African country to be friendly with it.⁷⁰

The conflict continued within the Council of Ministers without the voices of either Touré's Guinean delegation or Kwame Nkrumah, who had been deposed in February.

The support of liberation forces, the appropriation of a budget, and the extent to which Africans were willing to act were the critical issues debated at the meeting. Sékou Touré had previously emphasized the need for the development of an African consciousness consistent with the values of the African Personality:

But as we have said, imperialism

knows one Africa, but it does not know all of Africa. One Africa which is the part they know because they have exploited it, and they have rendered it irresponsible for the future, has been oppressed and depersonalized. But the new Africa, bearer of all of the virtues and all of the civic and moral qualities of the peoples of the continent...the new Africa which has extended itself to rehabilitate the past and to assure the international future to our peoples. Imperialism does not know this Africa.⁷¹

Regardless of the difficulties with the O. A. U. and the external powers, Touré's objectives of the Guinean revolution made Guinea part of the new Africa which would ultimately control the future.

Sékou Touré was always committed to the total liberation of the African continent. He was critical of the fact that South Africa, as a full-fledged member of the United Nations, found support from the powerful members of that organization despite her system of apartheid and the destruction of the aspirations of millions of Africans.⁷² Although South Africa had been one of the states recognizing Guinea in 1958, diplomatic relations were never established. Touré affirmed that:

The shameful racial segregation

rampant in South Africa will change nothing; on the contrary, it sharpens and strengthens their character. It will harden them still more when the inevitable showdown with the Afrikaners, with their racist and reactionary views, forces the African peoples to face up to this problem. Steel is tempered by heat. Will not the same hold true of peoples?73

Touré never compromised in his opposition to South Africa. He considered it not only a threat to Southern Africa, but also a major obstacle to the realization of African unity and peace.

The question of Zimbabwe was another problem for Africa. Supporting the right to self-determination on the part of all peoples, Sékou Touré considered the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith as an open violation of the rights of the African majority in Zimbabwe. When the O. A. U. decided to break relations with Great Britain in order to protest the British inaction in dealing with Smith's rebellion, Touré complied:

We solemnly affirm that only the Zimbabwean people and the independent African states can and must assume the responsibility of a struggle to put a definitive end to the colonization of Rhodesia and to open the way to their social progress in liberty and newfound dignity.74

Touré also recognized that the liberation of the people of Zimbabwe would come only through their own struggle, but he believed that aid from other African states was a critical element.⁷⁵

The liberation movement with which Sékou Touré had the closest contact was the movement to liberate Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from Portuguese domination. The P. A. I. G. C. was founded in 1956 by Amilcar Cabral and six other Cape Verdeans.⁷⁶ By 1960, the situation in Cape Verde had become so dangerous that Amilcar Cabral moved to Conakry.⁷⁷ Through the following years, the Guinean people gave the essential diplomatic, economic, spiritual and military support which resulted in success for Cabral's party after his death in 1973.

Both the "Africanization" of their war and the successful infiltration of the P. A. I. G. C. were devices used by Portugal to attempt to defeat the liberation forces.⁷⁸ On November 22, 1970, Guinea's support of Cabral, which was based upon the philosophy of Sékou Touré, resulted in an invasion from Guinea-Bissau which cost many lives and began the longest period of political, economic and social dislocation in

Guinea's history.

All of the elements of Sékou Touré's philosophical commitments to Africa, and the involvement of the Guinean people through the P. D. G. remained consistent through the early years of the Guinean Revolution. Sékou Touré was convinced that Africa would succeed in her attainment of global equality once the difficulties of preserving independence and achieving liberation were surmounted. The Guinean revolution was grounded in Sékou Touré's philosophical base of non-capitalist development, the African Personality and the party state. The invasion took place in order to destroy Guinea and to eliminate her support of the P. A. I.G.C. Despite the difficulties in 1971, Touré's government would survive the price it was forced to pay because of the commitment to African liberation and its determination to affirm the African Personality.

Chapter VII- Sékou Touré and Africa

Footnotes

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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

During the first thirteen years of the presidency of Sékou Touré, Guinea developed into a modern state. During this period, Touré's philosophy had resulted in many effective policies and programs, but serious problems remained unsolved. Despite the myriad difficulties faced by Guinea as a third world developing nation, the philosophy of Sékou Touré was the one constant factor which held the nation together, enabling the various ethnic, class and interest groups to work together in the interests of the Guinean Revolution.

At the center of Sékou Touré's philosophy was the concept of the African Personality. Touré's emphasis on the African Personality extended to every aspect of his philosophy. The policies which emerged affected the economic, social, political and international areas. The ethos of the Guinean Revolution lay in Touré's often stated belief that African ideals, values and traditions must be rehabilitated and preserved. Once the Guinean Revolution had succeeded, it could

then act as a model for other African states. Throughout the early years, Touré was very concerned with the example that Guinea presented to other African nations as a progressive state offering an alternative model for modernization and national development.

Sékou Touré asserted that African society was essentially communocratic. His economic and social programs and policies reflected and reinforced the values of a society in which, in keeping with the communocratic spirit, the individual existed willingly for the benefit of the larger society. Offered as an alternative to the individualism which he criticized in Western society, the communocratic society, served as the African basis of the Guinean Revolution by expanding the pattern of loyalty and dependence upon one's ethnic group to include the party and the nation.

The redemption and liberation of Africa were other key themes in the concept of the African Personality. Sékou Touré saw clearly the psychological damage of colonialism, and chose independence from Europe to attain full equality for Africa. African liberation, for Touré, did not merely relate to the political and military struggles for national liberation from

colonial status. Touré also worked toward the economic liberation of the former colonies which had economies dependent upon European power brokers.

Integrating the various imperatives of the African Personality required a mechanism for achieving the immediate goal of the creation of a modern state. The political aspect of Touré's philosophy was centered upon the importance of the party as the basis of the Guinean Revolution. The P. D. G. was the creator of the Guinean state, and the party served as the vehicle through which the goals of the Guinean Revolution were to be realized.

In 1958, the majority of Guinea's people lived in villages and followed traditional customs and systems. The P. D. G. began to organize the villages as the nucleus of the Guinean Revolution only after the urban centers had been mobilized in order to take the political organization to the people. The villages were important because of the need to slow the migration of young men to the cities and to increase the agricultural production of labor-intensive cash crops such as rice, coffee and fonio. In addition, the people themselves had to begin the work of ameliorating

some of the hardships of village life.

Modernization in Guinea required intensive human involvement since Guinea lacked the financial resources to pay workers for building their own national infrastructure. Dams, bridges, sewage and electrical systems, and housing were to be built initially by a program called investissement humaine. Despite the many difficulties, the use of voluntary labor and the encouragement of communal work programs were never abandoned by Sékou Touré. Because the notion of working for the good of the community was consistent with the concept of the African Personality, Touré reintroduced the idea of human investment in 1967 as part of the Cultural Socialist Revolution.

Guinea's Socialist Cultural Revolution was launched by Sékou Touré as part of the national effort to energize the Guinean Revolution for a new generation of Guineans and to accelerate modernization. Coordinating the concept of the African Personality and the need to make the party more relevant to the entire population, Touré introduced the Cultural Socialist Revolution to pull together some of the threads which were unravelling in the fabric of the Guinean

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Revolution and in the political scene on the African continent. Throughout Africa in 1966 and 1967 civilian governments were being overthrown by military coups. Touré determined that the renewed involvement of the Guinean people in their own Revolution would protect the country against external aggression since an aspect of the Cultural Revolution was the organization of a peoples' militia organized under the party.

From its inception, the P. D. G. reflected Touré's philosophy in its involvement in every area of life in Guinea. The obvious decentralization of activity was never an indication of any lessening of authority. The principal and single authority in Guinea was the P. D. G. The subsidiary organizations were legitimate only because they had the authority of the party and the government behind them. The structure of the party precluded any party organ from becoming, or acting as if it were, independent. As a result, it was possible to involve women, workers, youth, villagers, and other segments of the society in decision-making capacities without losing control of these groups. All meaningful activity occurred under the aegis of the P. D. G. While Touré was in power, the Guinean people were

probably the most intensely politicized people in Africa, but the relationship between political organization and real political power for the masses was not developed.

Sékou Touré chose the one-party system for Guinea in order to eliminate political opposition after independence. That decision to install the P. D. G. as the only party in Guinea resulted in political problems which became clear during the crises after 1970. The existence of only one party had led to the concentration of power and, ultimately, wealth, in the hands of a small percentage of the party leadership. The creation of a party bourgeoisie, a group that owed its survival to party politics rather than merit, led to abuses of power which weakened Sékou Touré's revolution. Although it has been noted that Touré did not enrich himself personally, and that he lived a rather frugal existence, there were others who used the system to build personal fortunes while they hid behind a party structure that increasingly treated criticism as if it were treason. The allegations after the Portuguese aggression in 1970 pointed to and highlighted grievances which created severe cleavages

in Guinean society.

Some of the political developments during the first thirteen years were a positive result of Touré's decision to utilize the party as the inheriter and promoter of the African Personality. Since in the communocratic society, the individual received his value from his place within the society, the existence of only one party in Guinea offered the opportunity to afford participation to large numbers of people without competition. The destruction of the other political parties ended the possibility of having organizations which might have ultimately strengthened the state through an open discussion of the values inherent in the African Personality which were worth retaining and those which should have been discarded or revised.

Whether one accepted the one-party state as consistent with the concept of the African Personality depended upon whether or not one accepted Sékou Touré's justification of the P. D. G. as a democratic party representing many different viewpoints and subject to extensive and intensive self-criticism. Although Touré may have postulated that the P. D. G. was democratic because it offered universal franchise and widespread

participation, the P. D. G., as structured, concentrated political power in the hands of the President and the National Political Bureau appointed by him. Grassroots participants were executors not formulators of policy. After the crises of 1970-1971 when Guinea became a Party-State, the tendency toward the centralization of power continued as the P. D. G. merged formally and officially with the state.

The political metamorphosis of Guinea's revolution paralleled policies and programs in the social area. Sékou Touré had brought the different groups into the party in formal structures before independence. As a former labor leader, Touré recognized both the value of organization and the potential danger of disenchanted urban or rural workers. By bringing the workers under party control, Guinea was able to restrict their independence in a manner that Touré as head of U. G. T. A. N. would probably have deplored. The needs of the developing nation were placed ahead of those of the workers. The rationale for these actions came, again, from the concept of the communocratic society. As long as Guinea was not an industrial nation with an urban technical class, the limits placed upon workers met

with little opposition. Furthermore, since so many of Guinea's workers, even in the industrial sector, were either actually working for the government or dependent upon the party or state for their livelihood, the possibility of massive opposition was remote during the first thirteen years.

Guinea's women had always been Touré's staunchest supporters. The women in Guinea had suffered the most from both colonialism and traditional systems which exploited them and oppressed them. Although exceptions to female exploitation did exist among the upper class who could own and inherit property, and among peoples with matrilineal systems in the forest region, on the whole, Guinean women did not regard the past, near or distant, with any nostalgia. For them the P. D. G. meant the promise of change and freedom. Many legal rights had been achieved upon independence, and the women's organizations were the most vigilant in the nation in pursuing the rights of women and children. Sékou Touré had taken strong stands on the rights of women as equals yet his cabinet never had more than one female minister at a time, and she was always in the domaine of social affairs.

The inconsistencies in the area of women's rights were far from subtle. Female participation was mandated in all of the party organs. Women were a political force throughout the country while polygamy, one of the first traditions to be outlawed, still persisted. Young women gained unrestricted access to university while families still refused to send their daughters to elementary school. The poor medical facilities still made childbirth a danger to all women, and babies had a high mortality rate. Despite these problems, Touré's popularity with the women in Guinea was an important advantage which sustained him during the first thirteen years because the women viewed him as serving their best interests. Of all the groups in Guinean society, the women had the potential to alter events in both party and government because of their numbers and, also, because of their real desire for change and progress.

When World War II ended, Sékou Touré was only twenty-four years old, becoming head of state at thirty-six. The majority of the early supporters of the P. D. G. were young men and women who were somewhat alienated from the traditional societies. They blamed

the colonial system for all of the evils in African society, and sought to forge a revolution from the dislike of French rule which was an effective common denominator. Because Touré was young in a society that venerated age, he developed a facility for maintaining links with the youth of the nation. Bringing the young people in Guinea under the control of the party was both a positive political move and a very African-oriented decision since the traditions of the elders were then passed on to the youth who would venerate those traditions and pass them on. Knowing well how dangerous disenchanted young people could be, Touré did not neglect the children as the potential political force in Guinea, and involved children in revolutionary and political activities in order to protect the Guinean revolution. Sékou Touré attempted to protect Guinea from the generation gap found in many other countries as colonial experiences were forgotten and children failed to understand the nature of modernization and nation-building.

Sékou Touré made a major decision during the first thirteen years which would save his government in 1970. Although many of his earliest supporters had been

veterans of the French army, Touré deeply distrusted the military. As the military coups increased in Africa, the emergent pattern of the disgruntled middle-level officer leading a coup against the leader of a one-party state heightened Touré's sense of isolation, and the Guinean revolution became the responsibility of the entire population. The peoples' militia was under party control as was the military. In order to prevent the development of a professional class of soldiers, the military was dispatched to work in the villages and assigned to construction tasks and agricultural work. Well-organized military activities occurred in Sierra Leone when Touré supported Siaka Stevens and in the aid given to the P. A. I. G. C. An ironic outcome of Touré's distrust of the military resulted in the appointment of some of his relatives to military openings, and the creation of military camps used as political prisons which played a large role in the activities of 1970 and 1971.

One of the possible explanations of Touré's ambivalence when it came to the military may have rested upon the fact that he was initially a pacifist and humanist who nevertheless recognized the practical

necessity of military power and political prisons. On the other hand, Touré's critics contend that it might be possible to see the relationship between the military and the political prisons as the inevitable result of the perversion of the Guinean revolution. One fact is clear: without the peoples' militia in 1970 the government of Sékou Touré would have been destroyed since the military was also involved in those activities which weakened his regime.

In addition to organizing every segment of the society under party auspices, Sékou Touré also saw the party as an agent of revolutionary change through which the entire society could be restructured and brought into line with the African Personality. At first, the P. D. G. sought to achieve legitimacy by uniting the different segments of the society into party organs which shared the common goal of the creation of the Guinean Revolution as a prelude to the larger African revolution and the rehabilitation of the entire continent. Cultural values and African language and traditions were protected by the P. D. G. as long as they did not compete with its authority.

African culture was a major focus of the Guinean

Revolution during the first thirteen years. This emphasis grew out of Touré's commitment to the African Personality as well as his rejection of Western culture and his interpretation of its negative evaluation of Africa. The rehabilitation and affirmation of the African Personality could only occur if the culture was consecrated and promulgated. Dance, music, painting, sculpture, handicrafts, folklore, and history were wedded to the political needs of the state. The annual National Cultural Festivals became a major force in involving young people in the preservation, renewal and survival of their culture. These cultural activities also served to expose youngsters to the many different cultures in Guinea without encouraging the divisiveness that ethnic rivalry engendered in the past. Sékou Touré's emphasis on the legitimacy of African culture was rendered even more necessary in view of the fact that Guinea's educational system was initially based upon the French language, and its university classes were conducted only in French.

The official view of the Guinean Revolution in terms of education was the achievement of a system of universal free education. The earliest foreign aid

from the United States enabled Guinea to begin its long effort to educate its people on a mass level without their having to pay fees or tuition. Sékou Touré responded to the students' protests in 1961 with a move to alter Guinea's educational system in an attempt to forestall the development of an educational elite, and, after 1964, the earliest years of primary instruction were conducted in the national languages according to region. The official reasoning behind this move was the facilitation of children teaching their parents to be literate, but the system did not work out that way. Adult literacy remained low.

The problems in education were immense, and many of them were the result of the essential contradiction in Sékou Touré's philosophy. If the African Personality was to be recognized, the African languages had to be preserved, but the exigencies of a modern state mandated an educated populace capable of functioning in a highly complex and very competitive national and international environment. On the other hand as the conditions in Guinea became more difficult, those young men and women who studied in the West elected not to return, thereby depriving Guinea of almost an entire

generation of talented and educated leadership. As a result the return to national languages was necessitated as much by philosophy as by a lack of properly trained teachers for the primary grades.

The most obvious evidence of the failure of Guinea's educational system could be found in the large numbers of young people, including Touré's own son, who were sent to be educated outside of Guinea. Sékou Touré's mistrust of the process of Westernization became a self-fulfilling prophecy when those responsible for the Guinean Revolution chose to ignore those rules which were so carefully and rigidly enforced for the majority of the people.

In order to balance the report on education, it must be noted that the undertaking of a universal system of free education was a massive commitment requiring resources that Guinea did not have. Touré attempted to provide an alternative to the classroom by creating a highly politicized population which received an education as part of the party system of meetings, conferences and other activities.

Sékou Touré decided that Guinea would not have a capitalist system because he believed that capitalism

was not a part of the communocratic spirit of the African Personality. From the beginning of his leadership, the decision to disavow and criticize capitalism led to Touré's being identified as a communist by de Gaulle who had other reasons to seek the destruction of the Guinean Revolution and the man who had smashed his plans for Africa.

Instead of modernizing from the top down by building an industrial infrastructure through borrowing heavily and permitting a high level of foreign investment through an uncontrolled exploitation of Guinea's mineral wealth, Sékou Touré chose to build Guinea from within by using the villages and agriculture as the basis for national development. Eventually the economy of the nation was to be based upon a national embodiment of the communocratic spirit.

This simply did not happen by 1971. The initial goals could not be met because the modernization of the villages could not occur without an industrial base to provide the materials for capital improvements. The willingness to work hard could not compensate for non-existent or inferior cement, steel or other materials. The agricultural sector needed fertilizer and machinery

for production and a fair market price to ensure co-operation on the part of the farmers. In order to industrialize, the peasants had to produce, but the party leadership had begun to lose sight of the values and needs of the group whose labor provided most of Guinea's badly needed foreign currency. The dichotomy between Sékou Touré's philosophy and the actual day-to-day activities of the party functionaries which came to light after the aggression of 1970 seriously shook the credibility of the government.

The weakest part of Sékou Touré's program during the first thirteen years was the economic sector. Some of the problems were the result of policies of the government, but other difficulties were engendered from outside of Guinea by France which undertook, as part of its international policy under de Gaulle, the destruction of the Guinean example. Other difficulties occurred because of individuals who made reprehensible deals for themselves while deliberately permitting the government to be shortchanged. Finally, the Konkoure Dam, a project which would have provided hydroelectric power for Guinea's industrialization and for her neighbors', was never built because Guinea could never,

despite her offer of mineral rights, find a nation willing to construct a hydroelectric plant which would have enabled a large part of West Africa to have a cheap source of electrical power.

Despite her enormous economic problems, Guinea was able to pay her foreign debts during the first thirteen years. Western nations responded to the invitation to invest and did so, especially in the bauxite interests. Agricultural production rose slowly but steadily although much of it left through the borders. Sékou Touré was not forced to abandon his judicious policy of carefully guarding Guinea's natural resources from exploitation. The economy, seriously troubled, was not falling apart, but the sacrifices of the early years had not yet yielded the promised benefits.

The Guinean revolution did not exist in a vacuum. The political, social and economic developments in Guinea were being watched with interest in Africa as well as in other parts of the world. Sékou Touré, the P. D. G. and the Guinean people had changed the course of history in 1958, and they could not be ignored either by friends or enemies.

Even before independence the emergence of Sékou

Touré as a militant labor leader resulted from the inability of the French to treat the African workers as badly as they had before the Second World War. As the President of UGTAN, Touré learned the effective use of strikes, intensive organization and popular mobilization as he forged an international union of workers in the Black African French colonies. Had Guinea chosen not to move toward independence, Sékou Touré's organization would have seriously impacted upon the French colonial position in Africa as both French and African landowners and industrialists faced the potential power of a highly organized labor force.

Sékou Touré's utilization of the years of political experience and the enthusiasm and commitment of the members of the P. D. G. resulted in the decision to refuse membership in the French Community proposed by Charles de Gaulle. Touré altered the course of French history when he deprived de Gaulle of the process through which he hoped to incorporate Algeria into a union with France and her other African colonies. Because Guinea said "NON," de Gaulle was forced to grant independence to the rest of Africa before he, and in some cases they, wanted it. France's

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empire ended when Guinea rejected the community, and de Gaulle exerted great energy and considerable effort within the international community to retaliate against Guinea so that her example would not be followed.

Sékou Touré chose an international policy which would be consistent with the needs of Guinea and Africa. By espousing a policy of "positive neutralism," Sékou Touré attempted to maintain positive relations with both the East and the West. For the most part, he succeeded quite well in maintaining independence from both blocs despite de Gaulle's efforts to label him. Both the Americans and the Russians found that Touré was both independent and courageous in his dealings with them. The needs of the Guinean Revolution always came first in his international policy.

From 1958 to 1971, Guinea and the United States had uninterrupted diplomatic relations despite some major conflicts. During the Kennedy years, Sékou Touré aided the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis in the interests of Guinean neutrality, but also as a gesture of friendship to Kennedy for giving aid to Guinea despite de Gaulle's hostility. In 1966, Touré

forced the Americans to pressure the new Ghanaian government to release Guinean officials who had been taken off a Pan American Airways jet which had made an unscheduled landing in Accra. His rationale was, simply, that since Pan American Airways was an American carrier, the Americans were responsible for its laxity. Although the American ambassador had been effectively placed under house arrest during the crisis, relations between the two states did not rupture although Pan American Airways was asked to leave Guinea. The most serious challenge to good relations occurred in November of 1970 when it became clear that the Portuguese invasion was mounted with Western weaponry and ships. Guinea accepted, however, the American explanations and protestations of innocence while breaking relations with both Great Britain and West Germany.

The Soviet Union was also forced to deal with Guinean independence. Moving quickly into the vacuum created by France's withdrawal, the U. S. S. R. entered into economic agreements with Guinea, but the Guineans soon discovered that many of these agreements worked to their disadvantage. Sékou Touré was awarded the Lenin

Prize in 1961, but the Russians were out of favor after their ambassador, Daniel Solod, was accused of fomenting internal unrest in Guinea in the same year. After these early difficulties with the Soviet Union, Sékou Touré moved toward other states in the Eastern bloc, and the Russians became a less important trade partner.

Since the Guinean Revolution was to serve as a model for the larger African Revolution, Touré's primary interest after Guinea was Africa. In 1959, as the democratically elected leader of an independent state, Sékou Touré captured the imagination of many young Africans and Asians. Along with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Modibo Keita of Mali, and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Sékou Touré believed that he was a representative of the hope of progressive African forces in the early years of independence.

The realization of an independent liberated Africa was an objective consistent with the concept of the African Personality. Sékou Touré also supported African unity as a part of the process through which Africa would be rehabilitated and redeemed until she

could take her place in the international world as an economic and political competitor.

Sékou Touré's involvement in the creation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 was a major achievement which, after years of careful preparation, was viewed as the beginning of the strengthening of the African continent. The Charter of the O. A. U. offered the possibility of a wide range of activities and agreements which would emancipate Africa from dependence upon outside influences and systems as well. Under the leadership of Diallo Telli as Secretary General, the O. A. U. led the struggle against the remaining vestiges of colonialism in its support of liberation movements and aid to refugees on the African continent. After 1966, the O. A. U. was the scene of increasing internal conflicts as major political disagreements restricted the actions supported by Sékou Touré and other progressive heads of state. When Guinea was invaded in 1970, the inability of the O. A. U. to respond effectively became painfully apparent. The organization which had begun with such grand objectives spent days debating the response which should follow an attack on one of its members.

Although the O. A. U. did not meet Touré's goals for a nucleus of a united Africa by 1970, there had been some accomplishments. The Portuguese colonies were in rebellion, the territorial integrity of African states had been retained and regional organizations had been developed to further African development. Guinea's involvement in the Organization of Senegal River States (O. E. R. S.) promised to enable the four member states (Guinea, Mali, Senegal, and Mauretania) to develop their economies through the joint use of the Senegal River. An earlier attempt to unite Ghana, Guinea and Mali was abandoned as unworkable although the states remained close while Nkrumah was in power.

Of modern African leaders, only Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia ruled as head of state longer while he was alive. Touré's political longevity could have been credited to his philosophy which guided the Republic of Guinea through its often turbulent first thirteen years. The survival of the Guinean State and its emergence as a developing modern state were major accomplishments which could only have been achieved with the intensive political organization at which Touré excelled. His imprint was felt upon African

affairs and, in some cases, internationally outside of Africa. Most of all, however, the lives of Guinea's citizens represented the embodiment of the programs and policies which developed as part of Touré's philosophy.

By 1971, Sékou Touré had achieved the first part of his objective. The Guinean Revolution had begun, and it had survived the cataclysmic double impact of the invasions and the internal political struggle which ensued. The government of Sékou Touré and the P. D. G. was not destroyed despite the internal chaos surrounding the trials throughout the end of 1970 and the beginning of 1971. The party survived, and withstood assaults, challenges, accusations, and the conviction of some of its major officials. The state, protected by Touré's peoples' militia, underwent a period of serious restructuring as Touré worked to evaluate what had occurred and to rectify some of the grievances which had so dramatically come to light. Sékou Touré's philosophy, based upon the concept of the African Personality, was the pivotal factor which enabled Guinea to withstand major external and internal challenges. After the first thirteen years, Guinea and Sékou Touré had survived the first major test.

APPENDIX I

GUINEA IN 1958-VITAL STATISTICS

POPULATION: 2,726,868.

CAPITAL: Conakry.

NATIONAL GROUPS and LANGUAGES: Fula (Peul); Malinke; Sousou; Kissi; Toma; Baga; Guerzé; Bassari; Coniagui; and Badiaranké.

POLITICAL SYSTEM: Presidential.

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: French.

GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS: Lower or Coastal; Fouta Djallon or Middle; Upper; and Forest.

NEIGHBORS: French colonies of Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Soudan (Mali); British colony of Sierra Leone; Portuguese colony of Guinea Bissau, and the independent nation of Liberia.

MINERAL RESOURCES: Gold; Uranium; Diamonds; Bauxite; Iron Ore; and off-shore petrol (oil).

AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES: tobacco; rice; peanuts; wood; fonio; sugar; taro; onions; spinach; peppers; eggplant; millet; yams; kapok; maize (corn); oils (palm and coconut); cola nuts; pineapples; bananas; orange

essence; avocados; manioc (casava); tomatoes; and mangoes.

MAJOR RIVERS: Niger; Senegal (Bafing); Gambia; and Djoliba

FAUNA: Elephants; hippos; lions; panthers; antelopes; pelicans; fresh and saltwater fish; wild boar and domesticated animals.

APPENDIX II

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN GUINEA-1947-1971

- 1947: The creation of the Guinean section of the French-African R.D.A (Democratic African Rally).
- 1950: Ahmed Sékou Touré arrested for role in strike.
- 1951: Ahmed Sékou Touré elected to French Assembly.
- 1955: M'balia Camara killed in Tondon.
- 1956: P. D. G. wins municipal vote; Ahmed Sékou Touré elected mayor of Conakry.
- 1957: Ahmed Sékou Touré elected vice-president of semi-autonomous government.
- 1958: Guinea rejects French Community; becomes independent; joins the United Nations, and creates the Ghana-Guinea Union.
- 1959: Ahmed Sékou Touré elected leader of U.G.T.A.N.
- 1960: Guinean currency as special zone, and the creation of Three-Year plan.
- 1961: Ahmed Sékou Touré elected first President of Guinea.
- 1964: Creation of Seven-year Plan; Loi Cadre;
- 1965: Attempted coup.

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1967: Creation of peoples' militia, P. R. L., C. E. R.
and the Socialist Cultural Revolution.

1969: Agricultural campaign and two coup attempts.

1970: Portuguese invasion.

1971: Investigation and trials resulting from invasion.

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