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The City University of New York, Ph.D., 1975
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"LET ME BE HORACE":

The Influence of Horace on Ben Jonson, John Dryden, and Alexander Pope

by

Silvine S. Marbury

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in English in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1975

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in English in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

"LET ME BE HORACE":

The Influence of Horace on Ben Jonson,
John Dryden and Alexander Pope

by

Silvine S. Marbury

Adviser: Lillian Feder

Ben Jonson and Alexander Pope are separated by a century during which England underwent revolutionary changes, yet both attempted to "be Horace." John Dryden, who stands in the direct line of development between Jonson and Pope, was inevitably influenced by Horace, yet had no desire to assume the Horatian role. This dissertation explores the significance of these facts.

The introduction defines the Horatian stance: Horace presents himself as a man of integrity, standing at the moral center of his society, living proof that a sane life is possible in that society. Jonson and Pope both faced general suspicion of poetry and poets; both felt, as Dryden did not, a need to make their own virtue and place in society the foundation of their poetry, a need to assume the role of Horace in order to speak with authority to their age.

The first chapter puts our understanding of Horace and his influence in the context of an analysis of a series of Renaissance editions of Horace, so that we may understand to what extent Jonson, Dryden, and Pope are following the opinions of the age in their interpretation of

Horace. We see an increasing emphasis on Horace as a moral teacher in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, then in the later seventeenth century a tendency to see him rather as a sceptical Epicurean and a skillful flatterer of Augustus.

The second and third chapters study in detail Jonson's use of Horace throughout his career, and show that he saw in Horace a poet whose authority was guaranteed by his virtue, his independent rationality, and his place in society. Jonson therefore assumed the role of "English Horace" as a means of asserting his claim to be a poet of the highest kind and a teacher of moral and artistic integrity, as well as, in his masques, a Horace to James's Augustus.

The fourth and fifth chapters analyze Dryden's ambivalent attitude towards Horace, as Neoclassical authority and as poet. Dryden's love of imaginative freedom in poetry meant that he could not be entirely content with the rigid criteria of verisimilitude with which Horace had come to be identified. Dryden's ambivalence plays an important part in the critical controversy between Shadwell and Dryden. In his public poetry Dryden is interested in politics far more than morality; moreover, he is influenced by the general tendency in his age to see Horace as a flatterer, or as a singer of light love and the good life. Dryden thus seems neither to have fully understood the nature of the Horatian stance, nor to have desired to assume it.

The sixth chapter presents Pope as inheriting Dryden's attitude towards Horace, as well as Dryden's love of imaginative poetry, and thus apparently unlikely to assume the role of Horace. Yet Pope was unable to see in imaginative poetry an occupation sufficiently serious to justify spending his life on it. By assuming the role of Horace,

redeemed from trivialization, Pope could make his presentation of himself and his friends the basis of the authority with which he spoke to his age as laureate of the Opposition. Yet, as Pope lost confidence in the Opposition's ability to restore virtue to government, he found himself driven from the role of Horace to that of a solitary opponent of the overwhelming forces of corruption and "dullness." The poet who spoke as a virtuous man could no longer speak from the moral center of his society--that center had irrevocably shifted, as self-interest and desire for gain became acceptable motives.

No other poet has since taken up the role of Horace.

Dedication

For my parents,

Josephine and Francis Marbury,

with love.

Acknowledgements

Lillian Feder, for everything, and above all for emergency rescue service many times repeated.

Dorothy Backer, for tea, sympathy, and some needed style-sharpening.

Cyril Dwiggins, for his Latinity.

Mary Rosenbaum, for on-the-spot typing, care packages, judicious criticism, and constant moral support.

Jennifer Tiffany, for on-the-spot typing, and for reminding me I had something to say.

Dorothy Culp, for the right word at the right time.

Alan Freiberg, for keeping me sane.

Bill Bowden and Marcia Conner, for being understanding department chairmen.

Jane Krebs, for typing with loving care and making the final trauma as painless as possible.

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INTRODUCTION

Horace stands as a central figure in the literary world of the Renaissance and the eighteenth century. Every educated person knew him to some extent, many by heart. He was quoted, copied, paraphrased, imitated. He was, with Aristotle, the central authority on literary criticism, the best known of the ancient lyric poets, the first of the three great Roman satirists, the principle model for epistolary poetry, and an important model for public poetry. Any history of his influence during this period will inevitably be a history of the literary, social, and even political values and attitudes of the age.

Yet what makes the study of Horace especially valuable for this dissertation is not only the wide range of his talents, or the extent of his influence. Jonson and Pope after all were not merely influenced by Horace; they both, to different degrees, attempted in some sense to _become_ Horace. The first business of this introduction then is to try to explain what Horace was, that Jonson and Pope should have wanted to assume his identity.

The reason this question can be raised in this way is that Horace, more than any other classical poet, revealed himself in his poetry. But as a classical poet, he did not indulge in self-revelation for its own sake; rather he centered all his various works around a presentation of himself as one who stood at the moral center of his civilization; one individual man, not infallible or totally consistent, but decent, well-balanced, trustworthy, who looked out at his society and said, here and here and here men are insane, but it is possible to be sane. He could

speak calmly and with confidence, for he knew that he himself had been able to win the patronage and friendship of the greatest men in his society, including Augustus, without losing his own integrity. He could speak, and others would be influenced, seeing him as a living guarantee that it was possible to be sane, to live decently in his society.

The aim of this dissertation is not to establish that this view of Horace is the correct one: I have no intention of arguing with those critics who see Horace as "self-absorbed,"[1] or who condemn his public poetry as "inauthentic,"[2] or who prefer to leave out the hexameter poems in assessing Horace as a poet,[3] nor will I seek support from those critics whose opinions come closer to mine. This is a study of Jonson, Dryden, and Pope, not of Horace. My study of Jonson and Pope, however, has convinced me that they saw Horace as I have described him. Therefore this understanding of Horace's stance is central to my dissertation, and its basis must be made clear. If by holding it myself I reveal that I share the "antiquated rhetorical taste of the seventeenth century,"[4] I can only say that it may be a help in this study to share the viewpoint of those I am trying to understand.

From the first satire to the Ars Poetica, Horace made his own commitment to self-knowledge, sanity, and integrity the heart of what he had to say. Consider the basis of his satire: he himself had been molded by a wise father who by pointing to examples of vice and virtue shaped his character:

> Ex hoc ego, sanus ab illis
> perniciem quaecumque ferunt, mediocribus et quis
> ignoscas vitiis teneor; fortassis et istinc
> largiter abstulerit longa aetas, liber amicus,
> consilium proprium: neque enim, cum lectulus aut me
> porticus excepit, desum mihi.
>
> (S 1.4.129-134)

> Thanks to this training I am free from vices which bring disaster, though subject to lesser frailties such as you would excuse. Perhaps even from these much will be withdrawn by time's advance, candid friends, self-counsel; for when my couch welcomes me or I stroll in the colonnade, I do not fail myself . . .[5]

Following his father's example, he thinks over the conduct of others in his attempt to mend his own, and his reflections form the substance of his satire (S 1.4.134-139).

When he considers the conduct of most men, he is aware of an almost universal insanity:

> Quemvis media elige turba:
> aut ob avaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat;
> hic nuptarum insanit amoribus, hic puerorum;
> hunc capit argenti splendor . . ..
> (S 1.4.25-28)

> Choose anyone from amid a crowd: he is suffering either from avarice or some wretched ambition. One is mad with love for somebody's wife, another for boys. Here is one whose fancy the sheen of silver catches . . ..
> (Loeb, p. 51)

We find him in the first and second satires of the first book not simply satirizing these various madmen, but holding conversations with them, trying to bring them to that central understanding of what Nature really requires that is essential to his own sanity:

> Vel dic, quid referat intra
> naturae finis viventi, iugera centum an
> mille aret? (S 1.1.49-51)

> Or, tell me, what odds does it make to the man who lives within Nature's bounds, whether he ploughs a hundred acres or a thousand? (Loeb, p. 9)

He asks the adulterer who throws away his peace for the sake of the excitement of the chase,

> Nonne, cupidinibus statuat natura modum quem,
> quid latura sibi, quid sit dolitura negatum,
> quaerere plus prodest et inane abscindere solido?
> (S 1.2.111-113)

> Would it not be more profitable to ask what limit nature
> assigns to desires, what privation will cause her pain,
> and so to part the "void" from what is "solid"?
> (Loeb, p. 27)

Then in the third satire of the first book he returns to himself, recognizing the danger that anyone who focuses on the faults of others may lose sight of his own. To himself and to all who are apt to criticize he says:

> Denique te ipsum
> concute, num qua tibi vitiorum inseverit olim
> natura aut etiam consuetudo mala; namque
> neglectis urenda filix innascitur agris.
> (S 1.3.34-37)

> In a word, give yourself a shaking and see whether nature,
> or haply some bad habit, has not at some time sown in you
> the seeds of folly; for in neglected fields there springs
> up bracken, which you must burn.
> (Loeb, p. 35)

Horace's integrity is further guaranteed by the friendships it has won him. Above all, despite his low birth he has gained the friendship of Maecenas, "cautum dignos adsumere, prava ambitione procul" (S 1.6. 51-52), "cautious to choose as friends only the worthy, who stand aloof from base self-seeking" (Loeb, p. 81). His pride in the companionship he shares in Maecenas' household gives point to his witty satire on the would-be social climber who thinks to gain access without any shred of the necessary integrity:

> 'Non isto vivimus illic
> quo tu rere modo; domus hac nec purior ulla est
> nec magis his aliena malis; nil mi officit, inquam,
> ditior hic aut est quia doctior; est locus uni
> cuique suus.' (S 1.9.48-52)

> We don't live there on such terms as <u>you</u> think; no house
> is cleaner or more free from such intrigues than that. It
> never hurts me, I say, that one is richer or more learned
> than I. Each has his own place. (Loeb, p. 109)

The Sabine farm, the fruit of his friendship with Maecenas, also forms

a part of his self-portrait in the Satires, foreshadowing its role in the rest of his poetry as the central image of his way of life, of his knowledge of how to live:

> Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus,
> hortus ubi et tecto vicinus iugis aquae fons
> et paulum silvae super his foret. Auctius atque
> di melius fecere. Bene est. Nil amplius oro,
> Maia nate, nisi ut propria haec mihi munera faxis.
> Si neque maiorem feci ratione mala rem,
> nec sum facturus vitio culpave minorem;
> . . . .
> . . . si quod adest gratum iuvat, hac prece te oro:
> pingue pecus domino facias et cetera praeter
> ingenium, utque soles, custos mihi maximus adsis!
> (S 2.6.1-15)

> This is what I prayed for! --a piece of land not so very large, where there would be a garden, and near the house a spring of ever-flowing water, and up above these a bit of woodland. More and better than this have the gods done for me. I am content. Nothing more do I ask, O son of Maia, save that thou make these blessings last my life long. If I have neither made my substance larger by evil ways, nor mean to make it smaller by excesses or neglect; . . . if what I have gives me comfort and content, then thus I pray to thee: make fat the flocks I own, and all else save my wit, and as thou art wont, still be my chief guardian!
> (Loeb, p. 211)

What gained Horace the friendship of Maecenas was not only, of course, the sound nature his father's teaching had developed (S 1.6.65-71), but the artistic integrity he showed in his willingness to take endless pains in writing these "trifles" of his:

> Saepe stilum vertas, iterum quae digna legi sint
> scripturus, neque te ut miretur turba labores,
> contentus paucis lectoribus.
> (S 1.10.72-74)

> Often must you turn your pencil to erase, if you hope to write something worth a second reading, and you must not strive to catch the wonder of the crowd, but be content with the few as your readers.
> (Loeb, pp. 121-123)

Artistic integrity and moral integrity are two sides of the same coin.

Those who blindly admire Lucilius are impressed by superficialities: "'At magnum fecit, quod verbis Graeca Latinis miscuit'" (S 1.10.20-21). "'But that was a great feat,' you say, ' his mixing of Greek and Latin words'" (Loeb, p. 117). They judge poetry by its impressiveness, not by whether the poet knows how to make his words effective. And their general shoddiness is underlined by their ignorance of the great Greek writers from whom real skill in comic satire is to be learned. Horace's ideal of satiric style opposes their ignorance with his understanding of the shaping of style to the purposes of satire:

> est brevitate opus, ut currat sententia neu se
> impediat verbis lassas onerantibus auris;
> et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso,
> defendente vicem modo rhetoris atque poetae,
> interdum urbani, parcentis viribus atque
> extenuantis eas consulto. Ridiculum acri
> fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res.
> Illi, scripta quibus comoedia prisca viris est,
> hoc stabant, hoc sunt imitandi; quos neque pulcher
> Hermogenes umquam legit, neque simius iste
> nil praeter Calvum et doctus cantare Catullum.
> (S 1.10.9-19)

> You need terseness, that the thought may run on, and not become entangled in verbiage, that weighs upon wearied ears. You also need a style now grave, often gay, in keeping with the role, now of orator or poet, at times of the wit, who holds his strength in check and husbands it with wisdom. Jesting oft cuts hard knots more forcefully and effectively than gravity. Thereby those great men who wrote Old Comedy won success; therein we should imitate them--writers whom the fop Hermogenes has never read, nor that ape, whose skill lies in droning Calvus and Catullus.
> (Loeb, p. 117)

Finally Horace defines himself by contrasting those whose criticism he despises and those whose approval he strives for:

> Men' moveat cimex Pantilius, aut cruciet quod
> vellicet absentem Demetrius, aut quod ineptus
> Fannius Hermogenis laedat conviva Tigelli?
> Plotius et Varius, Maecenas Vergiliusque,
> Valgius, et probet haec Octavius, optimus atque

Fuscus,
. . . .
simul his te, candide, Furni
compluris alios, doctos ego quos et amicos
prudens praetereo . . . .

(S 1.10.78-88)

Am I to be troubled by that louse Pantilius? Or tortured because Demetrius carps at me behind my back, or because silly Fannius, who sponges on Hermogenes Tigellius, girds at me? Let but Plotius and Varius approve of these verses; let Maecenas, Virgil, and Valgius; let Octavius and Fuscus, best of men; . . . also you, honest Furnius, and many another scholar and friend, whom I purposely pass over.

(Loeb, p. 123)

The relationship between artistic and moral standards is clear; backbiters and parasites oppose scholars and friends.

With this background, we can see clearly that in the dialogue with Trebatius, Horace bases his apology for his satire on his own character, a fact that modern critics, who have tended to see this satire as fundamentally unserious, have not recognized.[6] Horace does indeed follow Lucilius in the honesty of his self-revelation:

Ille velut fidis arcana sodalibus olim
credebat libris, neque, si male cesserat, usquam
decurrens alio, neque si bene; quo fit ut omnis
votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella
vita senis. Sequor hunc . . . .

(S 2.1.30-34)

He in olden days would trust his secrets to his books, as if to faithful friends, never turning elsewhere for recourse, whether things went well for him or ill. So it comes that the old poet's whole life is open to view, as if painted on a votive tablet. He it is I follow . . . .

(Loeb, p. 129)

The nature of Horace's friendship with the great is in fact proof of his own virtue:

Quicquid sum ego, quamvis
infra Lucili censum ingeniumque, tamen me

> cum magnis vixisse invita fatebitur usque
> invidia, et fragili quaerens illidere dentem,
> offendet solido . . . ..
>
> (S 2.1.74-79)

> Such as I am, however far beneath Lucilius in rank and native gifts, yet Envy, in spite of herself, will ever admit that I have lived with the great, and, while trying to strike her tooth on something soft, will dash upon what is solid.
>
> (Loeb, p. 133)

The irony is clear, when Horace defends satire as an innocent taste like drunken dancing (24-25), or a natural means of self-defense like poisoning one's too-long-lived mother (53-56). As I will indicate in Chapter VI, there are actually critics who ignore the line "si quis/ opprobriis dignum latraverit, integer ipse" (84-85), "If he has barked at someone who deserves abuse, himself all blameless?" (Loeb, p. 133), thus ignoring Horace's consistent claim to artistic and moral integrity as the heart of his satire.

The image of himself Horace presents in the satires remains essentially the same in his other poetry. Thus the first Epode sounds a familiar note: Horace will not accompany Maecenas to war out of any desire to possess more than he has in the Sabine farm.

> Satis superque me benignitas tua
>   Ditavit: haud paravero
> Quod aut avarus ut Chremes terra premam,
>   Discinctus aut perdam nepos.
>
> (*Epodes* 1.31-34)

> Enough has thy bounty enriched me and more;
> I will not lay up treasure, either to bury in the ground, like miser Chremes, or to squander like some reckless spendthrift.
>
> (Loeb, p. 363)

Against this background the famous *beatus ille* epode takes on fuller meaning. Horace, content with the Sabine farm, knows the full value of

country joys; the usurer who speaks in the poem can describe them, but the sickness of his soul makes that description ineffective. Similarly, it is Horace's own sanity that we feel behind his impassioned address to those mad Romans who would drag Rome back into civil war: "Quo, quo scelestiruitis?" (Epode 7). "Whither, whither are ye rushing to ruin in your wicked frenzy?" (Loeb, p. 384).

The main new element in the Odes is that the modesty with which Horace describes his "trifles" in the Satires gives way to pride, as Horace takes his place as Rome's first true lyric poet. Thus in the very first ode we find that almost all his descriptions of the other occupations men follow have some element of satire. The athlete delights in collecting Olympic dust ("Sunt quos curriculo pulverem Olympicum Collegisse juvat" [C 1.1.3-4]); The politician is willing to depend on the insecure basis of popular favor ("mobilium turba Quiritum" [7]); the merchant is a slave to his need for money ("indocilis pauperiem pati" [18]). Only the lyric poet stands apart from other men:

> Me doctarum hederae praemia frontium
> Dis miscent superis, me geldium nemus
> Nympharumque leves cum Satyis chori
> Secernunt populo . . ..
>
> (C 1.1.29-32)

> Me the ivy, the reward of poets' brows, links with
> the gods above; me the cool grove and the lightly
> tripping bands of the nymphs and satyrs withdraw from
> the vulgar throng . . ..
>
> (Loeb, p. 5)

His poetry is now an integral part of the sanity that keeps him from avarice, keeps him content with little. Thus at the dedication of a new temple to Apollo, he asks what he, as a poet in the highest sense, as a "sacred bard" (S&L 224-225), should seek from Apollo ("Quid dedicatum poscit Apollinem/ Vates?" [C 1.31.1-2]). Not riches. Let the

merchant risk his life to drink out of golden goblets.

Me pascunt olivae,
Me cichorea levesque malvae.

Frui paratis et valido mihi,
Latoe, dones et precor integra
Cum mente nec turpem senectam
Degere nec cithara carentem.
(C 1.31.15-20)

My fare is the olive, the endive, and the wholesome mallow. Grant me, O Latona's son, to be content with what I have, and, sound of body and of mind, to pass an old age lacking neither honour nor the lyre!
(Loeb, p. 85)

Sometimes Horace brings together his Sabine farm and his muse as the two essential elements of his contented simplicity. In the ode to Grosphus, for example, he warns against the cares of greatness, avarice that takes away sleep, and travel that seeks escape from the self, counseling "Laetus in praesens animus" (C 2.16.25), a soul happy in the present. Grosphus has riches:

. . . mihi parva rura et
Spiritum Graiae tenuem Camenae
Parca non mendax dedit et malignum
Spernere volgus.
(C 2.16.37-40)

unlying fate has given me a small farm and some slight inspiration from the Grecian muses, and the ability to hold in contempt the scorn of the vulgar.
(my own translation)

In one of his sternest indictments of the luxury and covetousness of his day, Horace puts the theme of his own contentment with his poetry and his Sabine farm first, as the basis of his scorn for the rich man who drives his poor tenant out of his home in his lust for expansion.

Non ebur neque aureum
Mea renidet in domo lacunar,

none of the trappings of riches,

At fides et ingeni
   Benigna venast, pauperemque dives
Me petit: nihil supra
   Deos lacesso nec potentem amicum
Largiora flagito,
   Satis beatus unicis Sabinis.
(C 2.18.1-2, 9-14)

Not ivory or gilded panel gleams in my home . . .
But I have loyalty and a kindly vein of genius, and
me, though poor, the rich man courts. I importune
the gods for nothing more, and of my friend in power
I crave no larger boon, happy enough in my cherished
Sabine farm.
(Loeb, p. 157)

Those who know the value of poetry know better than to care about material things. Thus Horace begins one of his most famous poems by telling of the tripods and statues he would give his friends if he were rich, with the best for Censorinus, to whom the poem is addressed. But then he thinks better of it:

Sed non haec mihi vis, nec tibi talium
Res est aut animus deliciarum egens.
Gaudes carminibus; carmina possumus
Donare et pretium dicere muneris.
(C 4.8.9-12)

But I have no such store, nor does thy condition or thy
spirit crave such toys. In songs is thy delight.
Songs we can bestow, and can name the worth of such a
tribute.
(Loeb, p. 315)

And the value of poetry here is its ability to reward virtue: "Dignum laude virum Musa vetat mori:/ Caelo Musa beat" (C 4.8.28-29). "'Tis the Muse forbids the hero worthy of renown to perish. 'Tis the Muse bestows the boon of heaven" (Loeb, p. 317). And in the very next poem this power of poetry is put to work in celebrating the virtue of his friend Lollius:

Non ego te meis
Chartis inornatum silebo,
   Totve tuos patiar labores

Impune, Lolli, carpere lividas
Obliviones. Est animus tibi
  Rerumque prudens et secundis
    Temporibus dubiisque rectus,

Vindex avarae fraudis et abstinens
Ducentis ad se cuncta pecuniae,
Consulque non unius anni,
  Sed quotiens bonus atque fidus

Iudex honestum praetulit utili . . .
(C 4.9.30-41)

Not thee, O Lollius, will I leave unsung, unhonoured by my verse; nor will I suffer envious forgetfulness to prey undisturbed upon thy many exploits. A mind thou hast, experienced in affairs, well-poised in weal or woe, punishing greedy fraud, holding aloof from money that draws all things to itself, thou a consul not of a single year, but so oft as, a judge righteous and true, thou preferrest honour to expediency . . .
(Loeb, p. 321)

In short, Horace still makes himself the center of his poetry, his moral stance the basis of what he has to say, but now his lyric poetry has become part of his moral stance. It has become part of his simplicity and content with little, yet also part of his pride, as he teaches the rich how to live and immortalizes the virtuous. It is as a lyric poet that he takes perhaps his proudest role, and speaks to Rome as not just an individual but a public poet, speaking sometimes to and of Augustus, whose power he sees as the only hope for the peace and moral regeneration Rome needs (in 1.2, 1.12, 1.35, 4.5), and sometimes as a helper in Augustus' task of moral regeneration (above all in the Roman Odes). Here again, the basis of his teaching is his own life. The first Roman Ode opens with his assumption of the pose of sacred bard: "I hate the uninitiate crowd and keep them far away. Observe a reverent silence! I, the Muses' priest, sing for maids and boys songs not heard before" (Loeb, p. 169). The lesson the ode teaches is again that most

essential of lessons for the Romans of his day, that riches do not bring contentment, and in the end he brings in the solid base of his judgment--knowing these truths he lives by them:

> Quod si dolentem nec Phrygius lapis
> Nec purpurarum sidere clarior
> Delenit usus nec Falerna
> Vitis Achaemeniumque costum:
>
> Cur invidendis postibus et novo
> Sublime ritu moliar atrium?
> Cur valle permutem Sabina
> Divitias operosiores?
>
> (C 3.1.41-48)

> But if neither Phrygian marble nor purple brighter than the stars nor Falernian wine nor Persian nard can soothe one in distress, why should I rear aloft in modern style a hall with columns to stir envy? Why should I change my Sabine dale for the greater burden of wealth?
>
> (Loeb, p. 173)

When, to complete the picture, we turn from Horace's loftiest to his lightest vein, we can see clearly how the <u>carpe diem</u> poems take their place in this context. The knowledge of how to enjoy the present day is an integral part of Horace's rejection of the insanity that always seeks happiness elsewhere, in riches, in travel, in power. To cite only one famous stanza:

> Verum pone moras et studium lucri,
> Nigrorumque memor, dum licet, ignium
> Misce stultitiam consiliis brevem:
> Dulcest desipere in loco.
>
> (C 4.12.25-28)

> But put aside delay and thirst for gain, and, mindful of Death's dark fires, mingle, while thou mayst, brief folly with thy wisdom! 'Tis sweet at the fitting time to cast serious thoughts aside.
>
> (Loeb, p. 333)

Horace's presentation of himself is again at the heart of the Epistles. Preparing to teach more thoroughly and at more length the

nature of the wisdom that brings men true content, he first draws his own portrait as now longing to devote all his energy to "quid verum atque decens" (1.1.11), "what is right and seemly" (Loeb, p. 251). It is the strength of his own desire for wisdom that gives authority to the wisdom he has to teach:

> Ut nox longa quibus mentitur amica, diesque
> longa videtur opus debentibus, ut piger annus
> pupillis quos dura premit custodia matrum,
> sic mihi tarda fluunt ingrataque tempora, quae spem
> consiliumque morantur agendi gnaviter id quod
> aeque neglectum pueris senibusque nocebit.
> (_Epist_. 1.1.20-26)

> As the night seems long for one whose mistress proves false, and the day long for those who work for hire; as the year lags for wards held in check by their mother's strict guardianship: so slow and thankless flow for me the hours which defer my hope and purpose of setting myself vigorously to that task which profits alike the poor, alike the rich, but, if neglected, will be harmful alike to young and to old.
> (Loeb, p. 253)

This thirst for wisdom forms the basis of his teaching in the longer, more explicitly didactic epistles; in the briefer, more informal ones, which were probably actually sent as letters, Horace reveals himself in a new way, as we see him interacting with his friends. We see, for example, exactly how this freedman's son lived "among the Great."[7] He writes to Julius Florus, a young courtier in the suite of Tiberius, recommending the pursuit of "heavenly wisdom" (1.3.27), and wanting to know whether Florus has ended his quarrel with his friend. He complains to Celsus Albinovanus, another companion of Tiberius, about his own absurdities, then advises the young man on bearing good fortune well (1.8). With modesty and tact he recommends to Tiberius a friend worthy of his circle (1.9). Most impressively, he offers to give up all the benefits Maecenas has bestowed on him, rather than lose his

independence. He is neither ungrateful nor tactless, but he is firm (1.7). Finally, to Scaeva and Lollius, who desire to live with the great, he gives advice on how to do so and still keep one's self-respect, yet even stronger advice to work towards understanding life well enough to give up their ambition. This latter advice is reinforced in the letter to Lollius by the closing picture of Horace living contentedly at the Sabine farm, praying to Jove, "qui ponit et aufert,/ det vitam, det opes; aequum mi animum ipse parabo" (1.18.111-112), "who gives and takes away, that he grant me life, and grant me means: a mind well balanced I will myself provide" (Loeb, p. 377).

We conclude with the two epistles in which Horace turns from moral to literary instruction. In the Epistle to Augustus, Horace speaks as a poet who understands the standards of his art, teaching his contemporaries not to admire old poetry blindly because it is old, and teaching his Emperor not to think only in terms of the drama in encouraging literature, since the nature of the Roman audience makes good plays unplayable, or at least inaudible. Let Augustus cultivate the great poets who can immortalize him worthily; as for Horace, whose genius is unsuited to epic, he will not insult Augustus by praising him in epic strains. As Pope observed, "_Horace_ made his Court to this Great Prince, by writing with a decent Freedom toward him, with a just contempt of his low Flatterers, and with a manly Regard to his own Character" (TE IV 192).

In the Epistle to the Pisos, the _Ars Poetica_, Horace links artistic and moral integrity, as he teaches other poets the need for endless pains. He traces Rome's deficiencies in art to the emphasis on the adding and subtracting of money in the education of the young:

An, haec animos aerugo et cura peculi
cum semel imbuerit, speramus carmina fingi
posse linenda cedro et levi servanda cupresso?
(AP 330-332)

When once this canker, this lust of petty gain has
stained the soul, can we hope for poems to be fashioned,
worthy to be smeared with cedar-oil, and kept in
polished cypress? (Loeb, pp. 477-479)

Horace mockingly declares himself too sane to write poetry (301-303), but it is sanity and self-knowledge that he sees as essential to poet and critic alike: "Tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva;/ id tibi indicium est, ea mens . . ." (385-386). "But _you_ will say nothing and do nothing against Minerva's will; such is your judgment, such your good sense" (Loeb, p. 483). "Vir bonus et prudens versus reprehendet inertes . . ." (445). "An honest and sensible man will censure lifeless lines . . . (Loeb, p. 487). Horace thus reminds the Pisos that those whose approval is worth having will only be impressed by work of the highest standards. At the same time, there is a strong satiric element in the _Ars_, and indeed the poem ends with a satiric sketch of an insane poet, which brings us back to our starting point: supported by Augustus, given the friendship of Maecenas, Horace looks out at his society and says, here and here and here men are insane, but it is possible to be sane.

Jonson, Dryden, and Pope all operated in a world which was to some degree hostile to poetry and suspicious of poets.[8] Jonson and Pope shared a strong need to overcome that suspicion, a need to convince the world of their own stature and of the worth of what they were doing. They saw in Horace a poet who played a central role in his society, based firmly on his presentation of himself; who indeed stood at the moral center of his society. They saw it, as I believe, so clearly,

because it mattered passionately to them that Horace had been able to do this, and that they should be able to follow his example. For them, imitation of Horace meant above all the assumption of a moral stance, and consequently imitation of Horace was essential to their role as poets. Dryden did not feel the same need to overcome the suspicion of poets and poetry he encountered; not sharing their need, he did not share their concept of Horace.

Clearly, then, a study of these three poets in their relationship to Horace gives us unique insight into their concepts of themselves as poets, of the nature and function of poetry, and of the poet's relationship to his society. It also sheds light on the various kinds of influence a classical poet could have on three great Neoclassical writers. In this dissertation, I also put these poets and their attitudes toward and use of Horace in the context of the overall changes in attitudes towards Horace from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the early eighteenth century, as revealed in the commentary that accompany each edition of Horace. The study thus reveals the extent to which each poet came to his concept of Horace independently, the extent to which each was representative of the aesthetic and social attitudes of his age.

Briefly, these are my conclusions. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Horace seems to have been admired chiefly for his skill as a lyric poet, but towards the end of the century the commentators tended to lay more stress on his value as a moral teacher. This tendency seems to have reached its peak in the early seventeenth century, perhaps because religious and philosophical uncertainties made Horace's self-presentation more crucial as a kind of internal guarantee of the

truth of what he taught. At this time, in spite of the popular distrust of poetry, there was intellectual support for accepting good poetry as the fitting embodiment of Truth, and the poet who wrote such poetry was clearly a good man. Jonson's imitation of Horace then became an essential element in his presentation of himself as the highest kind of poet. Horace had made a connection between integrity in life and art; as he imitated Horace, Jonson strengthened and emphasized that connection in every way he could. For only a good man could perceive the Truth that was to be embodied in poetry, and once he had perceived it, it was his moral duty to try to embody it perfectly. As the "English Horace," Jonson assumed the role of teacher of moral and artistic integrity to his age; he even succeeded to some extent in establishing with James the kind of relationship Horace had had with Augustus, creating in his masques an Horatian art form.

During the later part of the seventeenth century, the emphasis on the serious aspect of Horace lessened, and Horace came to be thought of as above all a courtier, a hedonist, and a man of the world on the one hand, and as a source of rules for Neoclassical poetry on the other. These rules were crucial for giving poetry respectability in the face of the development of the new science, and the accompanying attack on imagination and on poetry itself. Yet Dryden was drawn to highly imaginative poetry, to poetry that escaped from the Rules, and as a consequence he tended to react against Horace. The Dryden-Shadwell controversy, which is discussed in Chapter IV, shows how shrunken the Horatian-Jonsonian concept of poetry had become, and helps explain Dryden's reaction against it, at the same time that it reveals his need to come to terms with it if his poetry was to be considered respectable.

The gap between Horace and Dryden is also interesting for its revelation of the contrast between the primarily political concerns of Dryden's satire and the primarily moral concerns of Horace's satire (and Jonson's and Pope's). Dryden was interested above all in political stability; he was not interested in defining himself in moral terms, or in making that self-definition the center of his poetry. Therefore, he neither assumed the role of Horace, nor did he appreciate the nature of that role. Rather he tended to share the prevailing concept of Horace as a courtier and a singer of light love and the good life, even, in his later years, to the point of scorning Horace as "naturally servile" and a "Court Slave."[9]

At the beginning of his career, Pope to a great extent shared Dryden's attitudes towards poetry and towards Horace, although without going to the extremes Dryden did in his later years. Therefore it was _prima facie_ unlikely that he would identify himself with Horace. Yet he was driven to that imitation by his need to be considered a good man (something the suspicion of poetry in his day could not allow to be identical with being a good poet), and by his need to see his poetry as sufficiently significant to justify the effort he put into it. In order to assume the Horatian role seriously, he had first to rescue Horace from the trivialization he had suffered since Jonson's day, and in his first _Imitation_ he did exactly that. He found, moreover, that in order to speak from the moral center of society he must oppose his Augustus, who seemed to care nothing for either artistic or moral integrity, and become the laureate of the Opposition. His eventual disillusionment with the Opposition meant that he finally had to abandon the Horatian role altogether. He could no longer see himself as in any sense

functioning within society; he was rather the last champion of a forlorn cause.

No later major poet assumed the role of Horace in any significant way. A full understanding of why this is so lies far beyond the scope of this dissertation, but perhaps a central factor is that one of the forms of insanity Horace most often attacked was the need to work constantly to increase one's wealth and raise one's standard of living. Jonson could satirize those who made increasing their wealth the center of their lives and still speak from the moral center of his civilization. Pope in the end found that he could not, and after Pope it became ever clearer that the new commandment, Increase thy wealth, had become an accepted part of morality. The old moral center from which Horace spoke no longer existed, and the poet, no matter how intense his moral concern, could no longer be Horatian, for he must either take a position completely outside and against society's values, or accept the insanity Horace laughed at all his life.

FOOTNOTES

1. Jacques Perret, Horace, trans. Bertha Humez (New York, 1964), p. 189.

2. Antonio La Penna, Orazio e l'ideologia de principata (Torino, 1963), p. 24.

3. L. P. Wilkinson, Horace and his Lyric Poetry (Cambridge, Eng., 1968), pp. 5-6

4. La Penna, p. 13.

5. For the Satires and Epistles I use the edition by Edward P. Morris, originally published in 1939 and recently reissued by the American Philological Association (Norman, Oklahoma, 1967). The English translation is that of the Loeb Library, by H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge, Mass., 1947). For the Odes and Epodes I use the edition by Paul Shorey and Gordon J. Laing (1910; rpt. Pittsburgh, 1960). The English translation is again that of the Loeb Library, by C. E. Bennett (Cambridge, Mass., 1934).

6. Discussed at length in my last chapter.

7. All quotations of Pope's poetry from the Twickenham Edition. Here vol. IV, Imitations of Horace, ed. John Butt (London, 1939), p. 19. S 2.1.133.

8. Russell Frazer, in his book The War Against Poetry (Princeton, 1970), has discussed hostility to poetry as a general phenomenon of the Renaissance. He gives extensive and interesting documentation, especially on the hostility to plays, but he does not acknowledge the presence in the Sixteenth and early Seventeenth Centuries of counter-attitudes that gave intellectual support to poetry, nor does he take into account the tremendous increase in influence of Baconian ideas and the New Science in the later part of the Seventeenth Century that swept those counter-attitudes away.

9. The Poems of John Dryden, ed. James Kinsley (Oxford, 1958), II, 651.

CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND: EDITIONS OF HORACE DURING THE RENAISSANCE

Thomas E. Maresca, in his book, Pope's Horatian Poems, seems to be the only critic of either Jonson or Pope who has gone into the question of the nature of the editions in which Horace was read during the Renaissance. He feels that we cannot understand Pope's use of Horace unless we realize how different the Renaissance view of Horace was from our own, and he directs our attention to the Renaissance editions of Horace, in which the text is surrounded by commentary which emphasizes Horace's moral message, compares his statements to similar ones in the Bible, and generally ignores the playful Epicurean man of the world whom we know today and sets up an Authority:

> This is the Horace of the Renaissance and of those who were bred, as Pope was, in the final days of the Renaissance tradition; he was for them, as he could never be again after their reverential attitude toward Augustan Rome had passed away, a nearly unimpeachable moral arbiter and guide, on the level of authority almost with the Scriptures to which his sentiments were so often compared.[1]

The idea is sound; any study of Horatian influence should begin with a study of the texts available. Unfortunately, Maresca's generalizations cannot be substantiated. A study of a series of important Renaissance editions of Horace provides no evidence of the uniform "Renaissance Horace" Maresca speaks of. The men of the Renaissance no more had a uniform picture of Horace as "a nearly unimpeachable moral arbiter and guide" than the men of our century do of him as a "playful Epicurean." The Renaissance was not after all homogeneous. Aside from variations between country and country, and among individuals within

each country, tremendous overall changes took place during the time between the first printed commentary on Horace and Pope's Imitations, and the editions of Horace reflect these changes, and serve to provide a background against which the use of Horace by Jonson, Dryden and Pope can be better understood.

The first edition of Horace that contains a commentary by a scholar of the time is that printed in Florence in 1482. There had been earlier editions, one, probably in 1470, without commentary, and one in 1476 with the commentary attributed to Acron and Porphyrion, but Christoforo Landino was the first humanist to give us his own commentary.[2] And it is substantial. Each folio page contains only a few lines of text in large print, surrounded on three sides by commentary in small print. But before we consider his handling of specific poems in the commentary, let us look at the prefatory material to get an idea of his approach to Horace as a whole.

This edition opens with an ode by Politian congratulating Landino on his achievement. Politian addresses Horace, and asks him, "Quis te a barbarica compede vindicat? Quis frontis nebulam dispulat?" ("Who freed you from barbaric shackles? Who dispelled the cloud from your brow?") Landino has done this, and now Horace is free to engage once again in the activities Politian seems to feel are characteristic of him:

> Nunc te delitiis, nunc decet et levi
> Lascivire ioco, nunc puerilibus
> Infectum thyasis, aut fide garrula
> Inter ludete virgines.

Now it is fitting for you to sport in pleasure and in light jest, now you are struck by the young boy's Bacchic wands; or to the incessant lyre you play among the maidens.

This sounds astonishingly like Horace, the playful Epicurean. Of course, this is not an attempt to define Horace, but a celebratory ode. Still, it is interesting that a serious humanist can at this period emphasize this side of Horace, even in an ode, to the exclusion of any moral considerations. This ties in with the way Petrus Crinitus sums Horace up in his Libri de Poetis Latinis in 1505, where he praises him because "plenus est iucunditatis et gratiae" ("he is full of pleasure and grace").[3]

Landino's proemium puts the first emphasis on Horace's rhetorical skill. Landino explains that he believes that poets "ea ipsa quae litteris mandarunt ab humanitate ad divinitatem divino quodam afflati spiritu transtulisse videantur" ("seem to have translated those very things which they commit to writing from the human to the divine spheres by a kind of divine inspiration"), and in accordance with this Platonic concept of poetry he has shown in his commentary on Virgil the spiritual meaning beneath the literal, but he does not consider this approach appropriate to Horace. Rather, he feels that he will not deserve ill for commenting on Horace, if he is able

> sapientiam huius poeta in rebus ipsis inveniendis et mirificum consilium atque artificium in singulis disponendis atque ornandis pro viribus aperire: ac postremo verborum vim atque varias notiones edocere . . .
>
> . . . to the best of my ability to lay open the wisdom of this poet in discovering these things, and his judgment and skill in arranging and in ornamenting each; and last to explicate the force and the various nuances of his words.

Horace is not apt to raise his reader to things divine, but his excellence in rhetoric makes him very useful on a human level, and especially in the education of the young. Landino makes this clear as he directly

addresses for the first time young Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, to whom he is dedicating his work,

> quoniam horatii volumina huiuscemodi artificio conscripta sunt: modo recte intelligatur: ut et eius lyricum carmen ad juvenile ingenium excitandum; et ad linguam expoliendam atque ornandum vehementer te juvare possit. Sermones vero et epistolas ad mentes humanas omni labe purgandas: et optimis moribus informandas: quis non tantus valere intelligat; ut multorum philosophorum libra doctrina quidem exequent.

> . . . because the works of Horace are written with that kind of skill, if only it is rightly understood, that his lyric poetry can help you greatly towards the arousing of your youthful talent and towards the polishing and ornamenting of your language. Who does not understand that the Sermones and the epistles are worth so much towards the purging of the human mind from every stain, and towards informing it with the best attitudes, that they excel in their teaching the books of many philosophers?

Thus in the epistles Horace puts rhetoric to its best use, that of drawing men towards the good. For it is the eloquence with which he teaches that gives his teaching its power, and superiority to mere books of philosophy.

Horace's "poetica disciplina" teaches an essentially secular and practical wisdom. Here all conditions of men can learn their duties, here all the virtues and vices are shown clearly.

> Adde si placet quod quo pacto secum: quo nam domesticis: quo cum civibus: quo denique cum peregrinis agendum est nullus philosophus distinctius edocet.

> Please add that no philosopher teaches more distinctly how one should act with oneself, how with servants, how with citizens, and finally how with foreigners.

The introduction to the Epistles dwells on the power of poetry to civilize men exemplified in the myth of Amphion's building of Thebes: "sine sensu ac ratione viventes composuit: et verborum ornatu ac gravitate sententiarum formavit." ("He brought together those living without sense

and reason, and he regulated them by the charm of his words and the substance of his judgements.") Horace is an exemplary case of a poet transmitting that true philosophy that leads to living well: "ad multarum rerum diuturnum usum atque experientiam omnium pene doctissimorum virorum multiplicemque doctrinam adhibuisset." ("He applied to our daily encounters with many matters a great variety of teachings from almost all the most learned men.")

In his commentary on the Ars Poetica, ll 377, 378, he says, "Sic versus quoniam . . . voluptatem expetunt: non placent nisi perfecta." ("So verses, because . . . they seek pleasure do not please unless perfect.") And Horace's prime virtue is that by his technical perfection he always pleases.[4]

Landino shows no Christian scruples about Horace's philosophy or personal morality. His only reservation is expressed in the Life of Horace which he has prefixed to the poems: "ferunt hunc virum in libidinem pronum extitisse. Ceteris vero moribus integerrimum." ("They say this man was prone to lust, but in the rest of his morals of the greatest integrity.") Horace's quest for immortal glory by imitating the Greeks is very sympathetically handled--"id enim omes cupimus mortales." ("for that all we mortals desire.") As for his official philosophy, he was an Epicurean while young, which Landino feels is quite natural, and then an Academic, which Landino feels is praiseworthy because, as Cicero says, it means a commitment to what seems truest, and not to a master. (This last is from Landino's commentary on Epistle 1.1.14, "nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri . . . .")

Landino has come a long way from the attitude of the Middle Ages, when the Odes were much lower rated than the hexameter poems, and when

although Horace might be valued as "ethicus," he was vilified for his lax moral habits, and men were well aware that even his recommendations of virtue were at odds with Christianity because they were based on a belief in man's capacity to be virtuous without the help of God.[5] Landino's handling of various poems which might be expected to present difficulties from a moral or religious point of view will enable us to see exactly how far he has come.

The Soracte Ode (C 1.9) is a useful indicator of the commentator's moral concerns, since it shows how he will handle an exhortation to a young man to enjoy light love while he can. The basic message of the ode according to Landino is that pleasure should be enjoyed in season:

> Praeceptum omnibus philosophorum familiis commune: sed diversis modis acceptum. Stoici enim dicunt vivendum esse procul ab omni cura et juvendum data: observata tamen modestia. Epicurei autem quos hic potium sequi videtur: . . . omnia ad corpus referunt: atque ita vivendum censent: ut omni cura amota voluptati indulgeamus.

> A precept common to all sects of philosophers, but understood in different ways. For the Stoics say one should live far from all care and enjoy what is given, observing, however, appropriate decorum. The Epicureans, however, whom he seems rather to follow here, refer everything to the body, and are of the opinion that we should thus live: putting away all care we should indulge our pleasures.

Even though this edition is specifically dedicated to a young man, Landino gives no warning against these ideas; perhaps because he feels it is obvious that modesty should be observed. He sometimes makes his moral standards more evident. Of the ode to Leuconoe (C 1.11) he remarks, "Ad mulierem parum pudicam est ode: et quis ad vitam invitet voluptuosam." ("The ode is addressed to a woman of dubious virtue, whom someone is inviting to a life of pleasure.") But he adds that Horace

also gets in some useful advice about not trying to foretell the future. And in his comments on Integer vitae (C 1.22) he virtually ignores Lalage's existence.

> Ostendit qui innocentes sunt eos inter omnia pericula tutos versari; Ex quo sequitur homines ipsi divinitati curae esse: et iuste ita agi ut et malis supplicia est, et bonis praemia.
>
> He shows that those who are innocent stay safe among all dangers, from which it follows that men are an object of concern to divinity itself, and that things happen so justly that there is both suffering for the bad and reward for the good.

This is a good example of how far it is possible to go in bringing Horace into harmony with Christian beliefs. Almost all Renaissance commentators take this ode as Landino does, but even this changes towards the end of the seventeenth century.

Landino can put exclusive emphasis on the skill with which a poem is written. Of Vitas hinuleo me similis (C 1.23) he says, "Tenui argumento nec graviori stilo scripta est amatoria ode; Sed si ars inspicitur non parva est." ("The love poem has a less substantial argument and is written in a lighter style, but if the art is examined it is hardly inconsequential.") But he is happiest when the subject matter is as praiseworthy as the art. Thus of Eheu fugaces (C 2.14) he says happily, "Et pulcherrima simul: et verissima narrat: atque illa mira varietate distinguit: et illustrat." ("He speaks at the same time the most beautiful and the truest things, and brings them to light in all their subtle differences.") And on Caelo tonantem (C 3.5):

> Mirificum carmen: et miro artificio atque argumento compositum: Nam ad praeclares laudes Augusti adiungit saluberrima ad recte vivendum suis civibus praecepta.
>
> A wonderful poem, with extraordinary style and structure, for to the highest praises of Augustus he joins

> the most salutary advice to his fellow citizens
> on right living.

Such a poem fulfills the highest function of rhetoric.

The next edition I have chosen to discuss is significant because it represents humanism under attack; the editor must defend his work from those who do not understand its value. In Paris in the year 1519, Badius Ascensius published an edition with four commentaries, those of Acron, Porphyrion, and Antonio Mancinelli, and his own. He dedicates his work to an archbishop, and in his dedication he explains why he feels his work needs a protector. Those who are envious of him will disapprove of his studies, "adolescentulorum ingenia ab diligenti studio sevocantes: et musarum sacra: quibus tenuiter fatcor initiati sumus: prophanis revelantes." ("calling away the talents of youngsters from diligent study, and revealing to the profane the sacred mysteries of the muses, into which I must say we are but lightly initiated.") He does not entirely agree with his critics:

> Verum cum euismodi sint poemata: ut neque diutius immorari illis conveniat: neque facile intellegi possint: pium atque humanum est visum nobis officium: frigidioribus ingeniis faculas nostras quibus illuminentur . . . accendere. Neque vero aut studia bonorum imminuimus: aut sacra musarum prostituimus. Nam eo temperamento poetarum adyta recludamus: ut nec piis clausa: neque impiis aperta sint.
>
> Indeed since poems are of such a nature that it is neither fitting to dwell on them very long, nor can they be easily understood, it seemed to us a pious and humane duty to light our torches in order to illuminate less easily enkindled minds. Nor do we either lessen the studies of the good, or prostitute the sacred mysteries of the muses. For with such delicacy do we open up the inmost shrine of the poets that it may neither be closed to the pious nor open to the impious.

He gives no hint as to exactly what hidden mysteries may lie behind the literal meaning of Horace, but then he is not answering specific

objections to Horace, but to the study of poetry in general.

He seems to have no doubt that his work will be acceptable to Christ:

> Siquidem iampridem subolet aemulis quibusdam nostra displicere studia: quibus non tam Porcii Catonis illius: quam Iesu Christi Servatoris nostri censura: molimur non minus ocii quam negocii rationem reddere.
>
> Since for a long time now it is apparent that our studies displease certain envious sorts, to whom not so much by the mandate of Cato the Censor as by that of our Savior Jesus Christ we are striving to render an account no less of our leisure than of our business.

And if anybody objects to his wasting his patron's time with "scholicas nugas" ("learned trifles"), he responds, "norit haec studia: hancque lectionem: aetati, instituione, ac castis studiis tuis congruere vel maxime." ("he knows that these studies and this reading fit perfectly with your age, your education, and your chaste studies.") For this archbishop is a poet as well as a patron.

> Neque id a provincia tua abhorruerit praeses sancte. Qui enim carmina . . . vituperant: bonam divini codicis partem proscribunt.
>
> Nor was this inconsistent with your office, sacred ruler. For those who censure poetry proscribe a good part of holy scripture.

Not to mention Ambrose, Prudentius, and other Christian poets. What now follows is the only acknowledgement (and it is indirect) that there may be particular grounds for objection to Horace because he is a pagan poet:

> Sed missos faciamus amusum illud ac prophanum genus hominum nihil humanum praeter effigiem habentium. Altaque doctiloque repetamus carmina vatis: Aurum illud Aegyptium ab iniquo possessore ad iustum dei cultum sublecturi.
>
> But let us forget about that profane sort of men who know not the muse, who have nothing human beyond their

> appearance. And let us repeat the noble poem of the learned poet: we are about to carry off that Egyptian gold from its guilty possessor to the true worship of God.

We seem almost in another world from Landino's. Badius has no interest in defining what it is that makes Horace uniquely valuable. He simply has a rather vaguely 'humanist' faith that all poetry contains deep inner meaning, and that those who are "amusum" are profane and less than human. At the same time he suggests that it may be necessary to adopt a cautious attitude towards Horace as a pagan poet. And if we turn to the commentary, we can find at least one instance in which Badius finds he must make very clear how far Horace is from the Christian truth.

Landino had made no particular comments on the morality of the second satire of Book 1, not even on Horace's advice to satisfy the pangs of lust with some convenient boy in order to avoid the troubles of adultry. Badius feels he must open his commentary on this satire with a <u>caveat</u>:

> Cum vero ad Lupanaria videtur invitare, non sic intelligas quasi laudabile sit: sed minus vitiosum. Neque vero ita damnabile simplex fornicatio a gentibus qui legem divinam non agnoscebant, sicut a nobis veritatem agnoscimus. Quocirca in sententiis poeticis quae christianae veritate consonae sunt comprobentur: quae minus, ab ethnico dictae putentur.

> When indeed he seems to be inviting to a brothel, you may not understand this as praiseworthy, but as less sinful. Nor was simple fornication so damnable for the gentiles who knew no divine law as for us who know the truth. For which reason those things in the opinions of poets which are consonant with Christian truth are to be approved; those which are less so are to be regarded as spoken by a heathen.

Badius repeats the same idea later in his commentary on this satire, and adds that Horace was after all an Epicurean. "Epicurus fuit non

Christianus." And it was Epicurus who gave the advice that Horace here repeats. But worst of all, in order to avoid adultry Horace recommends "nefandiorum multo concubitum masculorum . . . In qua re a Christiano audiendus non est." ("the much more wicked lying together of men . . . In which matter he is not to be heard by a Christian.") And Badius goes on to explain how a good Christian young man can stay healthy and chaste.

Badius did not print his own commentary on the Odes, so we have no way of knowing whether he would have felt it necessary to point out in this rather heavy-handed way exactly how un-Christian Horace's _carpe diem_ poems are, nor whether he would have objected to the fatalism of _Eheu fugaces_, as Landino did not. We do know that he was not sensitive to the more subtle threat to Christianity implied in an epistle like _Nil admirari_: "tradit enim multo monitus sanctissimos qui legentibus patebant." ("He teaches by far the holiest admonitions, which are obvious to readers.") Nor does he seem to make a special effort to emphasize Horace's harmony with Christianity, where that is possible.

By far the greater part of Badius' commentary is simply explanatory, with a good deal of space devoted to construing the text. He wished to make Horace accessible because of his belief in the value of poetry, and apparently he succeeded admirably. His original edition, in 1501, had been the first French edition of Horace, and did in fact make him accessible to all who could read Latin. Over eighty editions using his commentary were published, and it thus dominated the field in Horatian commentary, at least in France, until 1561.[6] By that time there was no longer any need to defend the study of classical literature, as we shall see.

It was in 1561 that Dionysius Lambinus, the greatest Horatian

scholar of the sixteenth century, published his first edition of the complete works of Horace. Lambinus had access to ten manuscripts for his first edition, and to yet more for his revised edition in 1567,[7] and by his careful study of them became the first

> to give a serious recension of the text of Horace . . . he accompanied this text with an abundant, clear, and well ordered commentary. Thus the reading of Lambinus became . . . the basis of all subsequent editions; . . . it ended by being the vulgate which imposed itself on the whole seventeenth century.[8]

Sandys also gives special recognition to Lambinus, calling his the first important edition, and especially praising the commentary, "enriched by the quotation of parallel passages, and by the tasteful presentment of the spirit and feeling of the Roman poet."[9] It is significant that a modern scholar sees Lambinus' commentary as faithful to the spirit of Horace, and especially so since it was probably the most used edition of Horace in England for the rest of the century.[10] It is thus more directly related to the subject of this thesis than any of the editions discussed so far; although it could scarcely have fitted in Jonson's pocket as he worked as a bricklayer at Lincoln's Inn, it is probably the edition his grammar school teachers and later he himself consulted as authoritative.[11]

Lambinus was a product of a time and a circle that loved Horace.[12] In fact, the period from 1549-1560 has been called aetas Horatiana in France. It was the Horace of the Odes that men loved; no one except the most rigid Christian was bothered by his Epicureanism or by his amours, except when the object was a boy. Rather his hedonism had a particular appeal for many.[13] Against this background, Lambinus could say at the beginning of his address to the Reader:

> Eum tibi poetam commendare non debeo, humanissime lector, vel cuius lectione omnes homines eruditi plurimum delectantur, vel qui suis ipsius virtutibus, atque ornamentis, satis commendatur . . ..
>
> I am not obliged to commend him to you as a poet, most humane reader, in the reading of whom all learned men much delight, or who is enough commended by his own virtues and ornaments . . ..

And indeed he does not spend the rest of the address commending Horace, but arguing for his reformed system of spelling with all the passion of a scholar and a humanist who sees his work as a final clearance of the errors of the Dark Ages. His pride is in having restored Horace to his full glory; the value of doing so is too obvious to need establishing.

Like Landino, Lambinus has dedicated his work to a young prince, in this case already a ruler, Charles IX, whom he wishes to excite to the same devotion to his good letters that in previous kings had brought France out of the Dark Ages. "Humane litterae" make subjects and ruler wise in the arts of peace, and are thus the glory of all good kings. As for Horace,

> non ego ad te poetam aliquem unum de multis affero; sed poetam omnibus suis numeris perfectum atque absolutum: . . . multiplici et varia rerum copia refertum: illustris verborum splendore illuminatum: sententiarum pondere gravissimum . . ..
>
> I do not bring you some poet who is one of many, but a poet in all his verses perfect and absolute, filled with a manifold and various supply of things to say, more clearly illuminated by the splendor of words, most worthy by the weight of his maxims . . ..

And so the superlatives roll on, ending with the judgment that no other poet except Homer had better joined pleasure with use. But the practical nature of Horace's usefulness is not emphasized as it was by Landino: indeed, in the dedication that precedes the Epistles Lambinus does not discuss their supreme moral value at all nor recommend them to his patron as anything more than a relaxation for his leisure. Rather, as

no other commentator has done, Lambinus praises Horace's lighter side: "nemo neque amores cantavit mollius ac tenerius, neque tempestivorum convivorum hilaritatem descripsit blandius." ("No one has sung his loves more softly and tenderly, nor described more temptingly the mirth of congenial banqueters.") And he gives a special pre-eminence to the Odes; he has especially chosen to dedicate these to the young king because they are "argumenti, rerumque amplitudine elatior, atque gravior, et verborum spendore illustrior, atque ornatior, et concinnitate venustior . . . ac iucundior." ("by argument and by dignity of things treated more elevated, and more dignified, and more illustrious and ornate by the splendor of their words, and by their harmony of style lovelier and more pleasing.")

Lambinus feels no need to criticize the hedonistic odes; rather he quotes parallel passages from other classical authors who have urged man to enjoy life while he can. In fact in the Soracte Ode he even provides a remedy against a distortion we find in other commentators, who gloss "Permitte divis ceteros" piously, "omnes solicitudines ordinationi numinum debere committi dicit." ("he says that all concerns should be committed to the disposition of the gods.")[14] Lambinus says that although this seems to be an expression of a belief in divine providence, one must take account of the scorn expressed for such belief in the passage "credat Judaeus Appella,/ non ego. Namque deos didici . . ." (Sat. 1.5.100, 101). "Vult igitur hoc loco Horatius . . . vitae longitudinem hominibus a fortuna donari." ("Therefore Horace means here that . . . length of life is given to men by fortune.")

This interest in interpreting each poem by the light of Horace's thought in other poems is new in Lambinus, but it is not strong enough

to overcome the traditional interpretation of a poem like Parcus deorum cultor (C 1.34), which had always been taken as a serious account of Horace's conversion for early impiety.

> Dicit se, qui antea non satis pie Cyrenaicae et Epicureae sectae praeceptis imbutus, consilium nunc necessario mutuare, Deorum metu non inani perterritum.

> He says that he, who before was not piously enough imbued with the precepts of the Cyrenaic and Epicurean sect, now unavoidably changes, terrified by a fear of the gods which is not foolish.

But Lambinus' main attention is given, not to Horace's new-found piety, but to the admirable juxtaposition of "insanientis" and "sapientiae," and he devotes most of the commentary to quoting similar figures of speech in other writers. And this is characteristic of Lambinus; a large proportion of his commentary is concerned with figures of speech and their effects, and with pointing out Horace's skill in the choice of words, as well as quoting parallel passages. Horace's technical excellence as a poet is the center of interest.

At the same time, Lambinus does express a certain hierarchy of value by his choice of words in his commentary on some of the poems. For example, when he discusses the first Ode of Book III, he says that Horace is now speaking of "res gravas et serias . . . non ludicras, neque amatorias . . . ." ("dignified and serious things . . . not trifling, nor amatory . . . .") And in his commentary on the first Ode of Book IV, he dwells on the negative aspects of Horace's return to the warfare of love:

> posteaquam multis verbis ostendit se iam ad amorem esse ineptum, . . . iudicio . . . ac voluntate ab huiusmodi deliciis, ineptiis, ac nequitiis abhorrere: nunc vi amoris coactus fatetur se, quamvis aetate . . . a tali mollitia, ac nequitia remotissimus esse debeat, amore Ligurini pueri incensum tamen ad pristinas lascivas

revocari.

> after with many words he shows himself now to be unsuitable for love, and to be disinclined by judgment and will for such pleasures, sillinesses, and wantonesses, now he confesses himself constrained by the power of love; although by his age he ought to be completely removed from such softness and wantoness, yet inflamed by the love of the boy Ligurinus he is called back to his earlier licentiousness.

It is clear that although Lambinus can appreciate Horace's excellence in love poetry, it occupies a low rank in his hierarchy of values. Similarly he indirectly lets us know what he thinks of Horace's remedy for lust in S 1.2 by his use of the words "foedum ac nefarium" ("abominable and execrable") in describing similar advice given elsewhere.

When Lambinus does explicitly judge Horace, it is never by Christian standards. For example, he is concerned because the teaching of Nil admirari appears to be in conflict with Plato, according to whom, "maxime enim videtur esse philosophi hic affectus, nempe admirari. Non enim aliud philosophiae principium est, quam id ipsum." ("This seems above all to be the disposition of the philosopher, namely to wonder. For there is no other origin of philosophy but this.") But he reassures us that Horace only means that man should get rid of his evil passions, not of the capacity for wonder that is the beginning of philosophy.

Lambinus is not able to resolve so happily the conflict that arises from Horace's use of the Epicurean doctrine that utility is the mother of justice and the laws (S 1.3.96-114). He explains it fully with quotations from Lucretius, and then says, "quae sententia quamvis videatur probabilis, est tamen et falsa et perniciosa." ("which opinion, although it seems probable, is nevertheless both false and pernicious.") His argument against it is founded on a basic article of faith. It is

false,

> primum propterea quod homo solus ex omnibus animantibus rationis sit particeps natura: lex autem, quae iusta ab iniustis distinguit, nihil aliud sit, quam recta ratio . . ..
>
> first because only man of all living creatures participates in reason by his nature; law, therefore, which distinguishes just from unjust, is nothing other than right reason . . ..

And the sacred scriptures of this faith, from which Lambinus draws all his support, are Hesiod, Cicero, and above all Plato.

Horace then does not have any unique status as a moral authority in Lambinus' commentary, any more than he did in the dedication. He is pre-eminent because he joined use with pleasure, and wrote with polished perfection. Whether he is in harmony with Christianity is never even considered. Lambinus has rather presented him to us with so little distortion that a modern scholar, as I pointed out in the beginning, can call the commentary faithful to the spirit of Horace.

Things were very different in England at the same period: no aetas Horatiana there, as Thomas Drant's translation, published in 1567, can assure us. Drant quotes approvingly from Lambinus' edition: "If we wey both profytte and delectation Lambinus wrote truly, emongst latin poetes Horace hath not his felowe." But he is very far from adopting Lambinus' other opinions. He does not even translate Horace's lyric poetry, nor indeed mention its existence. He seems to have had enough trouble justifying wasting his time on the hexameter poems, judging by the defence he feels he has to make in his address to the reader. Even his bookseller is discouraging: "Sir your boke be wyse, and ful of learnynge, yet peradventure it wyl not be so saileable." But Drant knows that no one else with his training will undertake Horace.

> I therefore in good south of tender pity toke sum truce
> with my better, and more profitable studies, matchinge
> my selfe with Horace the poet. Neither be the thinges
> in him lighte trifles, excepte lewde callynge of them
> so can make them so, but ever emong he hath good, sounde,
> deepe, massye, and wel rellist stuffe.

Still, Drant is not about to assume that even the hexameter poems are all valuable. For example he translates only the beginning of the second satire of Book I, and then substitutes for the whole section against adultery an invective in the good old English style against Fashion. Nor does he bother to warn the reader that he has done this. He also simply leaves out the fifth satire of Book I, without giving any reason, and substitutes one of his own. He disputes in this satire with those who are against the humanities, and brings out the old argument:

> From Egypt we may borrowe stil,
> It never was forbod,
> So it be for the weale of man,
> And glory of our God.

And this indeed is the principle he has followed, selectively spoiling the Egyptians. Not surprisingly, when Drant does translate, his style is about as un-Horatian as can well be imagined. Horace does not after all suit his concept of what the satirist should be at all. As he says in some introductory verses:

> Satyre of writhled waspyshe Saturne may be namde,
> The Satyrist must be a waspe in moode,
> Testie, and wrothe with vice and hers, to see both blamde,
> But courteous and frendly to the good.

This attitude towards satire and the satirist is of course important in the later history of English satire, but we cannot consider it here. Drant is really only a side issue in our present study, although an interesting one.

The English schoolboy did not after all read Drant (at least in the course of his studies). And although he had access to Lambinus, he probably did not have his own copy. Rather he may well have used the edition printed in 1577 by Henricus Stephanus (Henri Estienne), as Sir Edward Coke did.[15] It came in a small, convenient volume, and had very little commentary, most of it simply explanatory. It was thus possible for a schoolboy to read his Horace without any interpretation at all. And if he read the dedication, he would be exposed to a view of Horace which we have not encountered before, and which might have a certain worldly appeal.

Stephanus dedicates his work to the counselor of the French king who was then ambassador to Switzerland, and he recommends Horace to him in a novel way. He tells the ambassador that Horace is one of his best friends; "Nec vero mirum est si emunctae naris poeta emunctae naris hominem amet." ("Nor indeed is it any wonder if a discerning poet likes a discerning man.") He goes on to say that many kinds of men love Horace for different reasons, but as for

> illud hominum genus . . . qui aulici vocantur, habet unde sibi eorum amorem, vicissim etiam unde odium conciliet. Nasuti esse volunt aulici: quem poetam Horatio magis nasutum fuisse putamus?

> that race of men called courtiers, he has that by which he can win their love, and then again by which he can win their hatred. Courtiers want to be witty: what poet can we believe to have been wittier than Horace?

Horace gives courtiers counsel, he shows them their follies; in fact he is their poet, as Virgil is the poet of farmers and soldiers. Of course he often warns them against ambition, but if a man is determined to seek the heights, he will help him.

Stephanus points out that it is possible and helpful for a courtier

to have a kind of personal relationship with Horace. Horace is no longer simply a wonderful teacher of morality, the way all poets are supposed to be, and a good educator of the young. He is individualized, particularized as the courtier's poet. Nor is he, as for Lambinus, the poet of the _Odes_. Stephanus' attitude is shaped by his love for the _Epistles_, the first book of which he tells us he memorized as a boy.

And indeed at this time in France, the _Epistles_ are becoming more popular, the _Odes_ less so, as men troubled by the never-ending religious wars seek serious counsel on how to live, turning their backs on the hedonism of the previous generation.[16] Stephanus' preface also reflects this tendency in his concern with defining Horace's "PHILOSOPHICAM POESIN." As Empedocles and others were poets of physical philosophy, "quidni et Horatiana ista, iis in locis ubi mores format, illi philosophiae parti quae dicitur ethice, adscribatur?" ("Why aren't those things in Horace, in those places where he forms character, ascribed to that part of philosophy which is called ethical?") Stephanus no longer emphasizes Horace the orator-poet but Horace the philosopher-poet. He does not develop the idea, but he does at least suggest it, and along with this new emphasis seems to go a shift in his own style, which is much more simple, direct, and personal than the rolling cadences of Lambinus.

Cruquius' 1578 edition, although very important to an historian of the text of Horace because of his access to manuscripts since destroyed,[17] only serves our purpose by confirming the tendency to emphasize Horace's moral teaching and de-emphasize his rhetorical skill. In his dedication to the burgomasters of Bruges, Cruquius spends most of his time on the history of the city, but what he does say on Horace dwells on the

importance of teaching boys

> rectam virtutis omnisque humanitatis viam . . . quam cum hanc tum illam vitae viam cum nemo ex antiquis scriptoribus Horatio velut in tabulis effigiatam intuentibus felicius exhibeat, nemo vitia accuratius insectatur, nemo bonos mores vivacius edocet . . ..
>
> . . . the right path of virtue and of humanity as a whole . . . which no one of the ancient writers contemplating this or that way of life has exhibited more felicitiously than Horace, as though depicted in pictures; no one has more accurately railed at vices, no one taught good attitudes more vigorously . . ..

And so he has decided to do an edition. His main interest is in correcting the text in the light of his new manuscripts, but insofar as his commentary deals with moral issues he shows nothing but admiration for Horace. He ignores what might be considered objectionable, and dwells on what is admirable, seeing a true conversion in Parcus deorum cultor (C 1.34) and excellent moral instruction in Nil admirari (Epist. 1.6), and ignoring Lalage in Integer vitae (C 1.22).

The general trend in the later part of the sixteenth century to emphasize Horace's moral teaching was not without exceptions, however. The edition of Horace of which Jonson actually owned a copy[18] is in fact unique among those we have looked at in putting almost exclusive emphasis on Horace's manner, on his choice of words, on his use of imagery; his content is often treated as mere poetic commonplace. Bernardo Parthenio, the editor of this edition, had written a work on imitation, Della imitatione poetica, in which he discusses "how the poet, by long practice, may ultimately come to express himself in a way very similar to that of the model without actually copying or plagiarizing him . . .."[19] One wonders if Jonson was influenced in his choice of this edition of Horace by knowing that Parthenio concentrates on discussing what in

Horace is to be imitated and how. Parthenio says of his work in his dedicatory letter to the King of Poland:

> Ibi enim via feliciter poetico more scribendi aperitur, latissimi campi ad imitationem patent: quam rationem, minus cognitam, atque perspectam esse quamplurimis, & iis praesertim qui se iactant ac venditant, & versus praeclare scribere profitentur, docti intelligunt. Omne fere artificium quo poeta usus est in suis lyricis scribendis, unde tantum laudis est consecutus, quodque ante omnia in excellentissimis scriptoribus quaerendum, investigiandumque est, ostenditur.
>
> For there is revealed the proper method of writing felicitously in the poetic mode, there the broadest fields lie open for imitation, a knowledge which the learned understand is too little known and investigated by many, and especially by those who make themselves conspicuous and praise themselves, and claim to write verses admirably. There is displayed almost all the skill which the poet used in writing his lyrics, whence he got such praise, and which is to be sought and investigated before everything in the most excellent writers.

Insofar as Parthenio's work was addressed to those who wanted to achieve true skill in writing poetry and to reach the most select audience, it was bound to appeal to Jonson and indeed he underlined in his copy the words, "Poeta non scribit multitudini, excellentissimis tantum ingeniis placere vult."[20] ("The poet does not write to the multitude, he wants to please only the most excellent minds.") But the part of the text that Jonson underlined most copiously was the hexameter poetry, the Satires and Epistles,[21] which Parthenio had not planned to include in his edition at all, as "Aristarcus Parthenii Nepos" explains in the epistle to the reader that prefaces this section of the volume: "revera cum Parthenius ipse magis artificia spectarit, quam ut sensus exponeret, . . . statuit in his non esse laborandum." ("Indeed since Parthenio himself was rather considering skill than that he should explain the sense, . . . he decided not to labor over these.") Aristarcus defends

the plain style of Horace's hexameter poems as appropriate to epistolary and satiric poetry, but Parthenio actually sees poetry of this kind as not worthy of the name. One cannot call poetry everything that is written in verse:

> non enim in syllabis, aut in pedibus est haec laus, sed in figuris, in locis, atque in aliis ex quibus oritur admiratio, ad quam scribunt poetae.ea, quae sic scribuntur, si dissolvuntur, nihil a soluta oratione discrepant. quare, ut sensit Horatius, satius est dormire quam tale versus scribere.
>
> For this fame does not consist in syllables or in feet, but in images, in positionings, and in other things from which admiration arises, to which poets write. Those things that are written thus differ not at all from prose if they are broken up. For which reason, as Horace judged, it is more advantageous to sleep than to write such verses. (from commentary on C 1.1)

He actually seems to be taking seriously Horace's remark that the only reason he writes satire is that he can't sleep (S 2.1.7).

Parthenio is indeed a glaring exception to the tendency in the later sixteenth century to emphasize Horace's teaching rather than simply his skill; the bulk of his commentary is devoted to rather commonplace observations on the way Horace amplifies here and condenses there, chooses just the right word and avoids the ordinary, and thus makes threadbare sententia seem new. On the other hand, Parthenio does share certain conventional attitudes. In his commentary on Parcus decorum cultor (C 1.34) he expresses his joy that Horace has left his "Epicurean folly" behind, and he is pleased to find in Integer vitae "sententia maxime religioni Christianae, ac sanctitati consentanea" ("an opinion most agreeable to the Christian religion, and to sanctity"). Lalage of course he ignores.

Pierre Chabot, whose edition appeared in 1587, returns to the

emphasis on Horace's moral teaching more usual at this time; in his dedication to the Satires he quotes Quintilian's praise of Horace as a satirist "ad nefandos hominum mores notandos praecipuus," and continues,

> unde ego conficio, vel hos duos Satyrarum libellos esse velut censores acerrimos vitae turpiter ac flagitiose actae, & ad studium virtutis actuosae censura Satyrarum revocandae, vel exactam praxin & disciplinam ethicae ac moralis Philosophiae, quae praecepta tradit de virtute . . ..
>
> whence I conclude that these two books of satires are either like the sharpest censors of a life basely and scandalously lived, to be called back to zeal for an active virtue by the censure of Satires, or an accurate practical application and teaching of ethical and moral philosophy, which conveys precepts about virtue . . ..

Chabot prizes Horace above all for these characteristics. At the same time, he feels called on to judge him by Christian standards, and to bring in Biblical parallels. The effect of this is not to set Horace up as an authority, "a nearly unimpeachable moral arbiter and guide," as Maresca suggests (see above, p. 22), but to point out to the reader where Horace goes astray, and falls short of moral rectitude.

Thus Chabot sees virtuous teaching in the beginning of the Soracte Ode, drawn

> e disciplina Stoicorum, qui . . . circumscribunt vitam Sapientis vacuitare doloris et curarum, pro visioneque futuri neglecta, et adhibito semper virtutis studio.
>
> . . . from the teaching of the Stoics, who define the life of the wise man as free from sorrow and cares, neglecting provision for the future, and adhering always to zeal for virtue.

But then Horace has lapsed back into Epicureanism in advising the pursuit of the pleasures of love. "Longe aliter Christiani sentiunt," ("Christians think far otherwise") who learn to forget care for the morrow that they may seek heaven first. "Sane non satis verecunda et

honeste fit a Poeta, cum ista aetas sit nimium propensa ex sese ad libidinem et intemperantiam." ("Indeed it was not sufficiently modestly or honestly done by the Poet, since this age is too prone of itself to lust and intemperance.")

Chabot is actually unique among the commentators we have considered so far in the tendency to bring in Biblical parallels, but he does so in order to show how different Christian teaching is from Horatian, as on *Aequam memento* (C 2.3): "Ad huiusmode aequabilitatem animi hortatur D. Paullus ad Corinthios . . . . Sed longe alia est Apostoli philosophia." ("The divine Paul in Corinthians exhorts to this kind of equability of spirit . . . . But very different is the apostle's philosophy.") For it is based on the hopes and exhorts to the duties of Christians. He will also mention a Biblical parallel just in order to say how much more effective it is, as on *Eheu fugaces*: "Vide multo suggestiorem hac Poetae cohortationem Davidis Psal. 49." ("See the exhortation of David, Psalm 49, much more suggestive than this of the Poet.")

Chabot is, like all the other commentators, enthusiastic about the moral teaching of the first six odes of Book III, but even here he points out, anent the third Ode, that although Justice is indeed the prime virtue,

> sed si quis velit attentius considerare, quod assumit de Romulo et Augusto et fortasse de aliis, comperiet eos sceleratissimos fuisse latrones, funestissimos piratas . . . ut nihil videri possit alienius a dignitate τῆς ἀποθεώσεως quam Poeta, nimis ad assentationem eruditus, curat utrique habendam.
>
> but if someone wants to consider more carefully what he claims about Romulus and Augustus and perhaps others, he will find that they were the most rascally thieves, the most deadly pirates, so that nothing can seem more alien from the dignity of apotheosis which the Poet, too educated towards flattery, sees to it that they both get.

Horace is not even admired for having praised a great emperor.

The Epistles are the only part of Horace's work which Chabot feels able to recommend without reservations. In his commentary on the first Epistle he emphasizes that they were written last, and that Horace in them has come "velut ab insania mentis, ad illius sanitatem" ("as though from the madness of the mind to its sanity"). Yet even here, in his commentary on Nil admirari, which in general he approves, he speaks of

> stultitia veterum Romanorum, qui majestatem et felicitatem imperii Romai adeo sunt admirati, ut illud augustum, sanctum, immortalem omnes praedicarent, ac Poetae praecipue, qui rectores illius loco Deorum haberent.

> the folly of the ancient Romans, who admired the majesty and happiness of imperial Rome to such an extent that they all proclaimed it august, holy, immortal, and especially the Poets, who considered its rulers in the rank of Gods.

Chabot is clearly influenced by no reverence of Augustan Rome.

As I said, the Epistles are the only part of Horace's work that Chabot can praise wholeheartedly. Even the Satires, though full of good teaching, are dangerous stuff, and he emphasizes in his introduction to them that he has been very careful to indicate where Horace is in conflict with Christian morality, and to correct him,

> tum oraculis divinis, tum castioribus aliis aliorum scriptorum sententiis . . . ut lectores in meis notis facile inventuri sint remedium contra quasdam Poetae venenatas et obscoenas sententias.

> sometimes from holy scripture, sometimes from other more virtuous opinions of other writers, so that readers may easily find in my notes a remedy against certain poisoned and obscene opinions of the Poet.

Chabot judges Horace so harshly, in spite of his basic respect for Horace's moral teaching, because he must confront the problem that some critics of Horace more severe than he wanted to expurgate the text: "nonnulli superstitione, nescio qua, voluerint eum certis in locis

castigare." ("because of some unreasonable superstition, I don't know what, they have wanted in certain places to chastise him.") He makes clear in his preface that he thinks them over-scrupulous; still, he must take their objections into account. They say there are places a Christian shouldn't read,

> sed est prudentis explanatoris, atque pudici lectoris, ea cum severa improbatione aut explanare aut simpliciter legendo percurrere . . ..

> but it is for the prudent commentator and the modest reader either to explain these things with severe blame or simply to read over them . . ..

The first edition we have to consider in the seventeenth century returns to a more usual attitude. It is important because it was compact, handy, very popular, and English in origin. It was done by Ioannus (otherwise John) Bond in 1606. He had been master of the school at Taunton, and we may thus take his edition as telling us something about the attitudes of English schoolmasters. His text was "strongly esteemed for its sober, clear, and exact commentary; consequently it was reprinted up to forty-six times, and it disputes with Lambinus the honor of serving as the basis for the Vulgate."[22] The commentary was indeed so popular that it was reprinted as late as the early nineteenth century.[23]

Bond followed Landino and Lambinus in dedicating his work to a young prince, in his case to Prince Henry, the heir to the throne. And indeed he literally followed them; his dedication is mainly a judicious abridgement of Lambinus' to Charles IX, with a few contributions from Landino's to Guidobaldo da Montefeltr. What applies specifically to young Henry seems to be his own, but little else. Yet the end result has to a certain extent its own character. Bond leaves out Lambinus'

praise of Horace as a love poet, as well as the particular praise he bestows on the Odes. He includes from Landino the praise of Horace's skill in specifically rhetorical terms such as invention and disposition, as well as the statement of Horace's value as a teacher of how to get along with people. And he adds, apparently of his own,

> Poetam denique Aulicum et Principe Christiano maxim dignum. Hinc est, quod Divus Augustinus inprimis iubet legendum esse hunc Poetam, quippe qui non modo iustitiam, invictam animi magnitudinem, parsimoniam, continentiam . . .
>
> Finally, a courtier poet and especially worthy of a Christian ruler. Hence it is, that Holy Augustine orders that this poet should be read first of all, who indeed not only justice, unconquered magnanimity, thrift, continence, . . .

and so on through the usual list of virtues that Horace teaches and vices that he attacks. If we then compare Bond's dedication as a whole with Lambinus', there is a subtle shift away from the emphasis on the glory of the poets, and towards a more practical emphasis. And more important, he calls Horace a courtier, and is concerned to assert that he should be acceptable to a Christian prince, calling in the authority of St. Augustine. No significant development is given to these ideas in Bond, but they are signs of the times.

In his commentary, Bond is almost exclusively concerned with paraphrasing in easy Latin whatever might be difficult in the original. One can understand why this approach was so popular. On the one hand he explains much more than someone like Stephanus had done, and on the other he never overwhelms the text with commentary. He never makes moral judgments, but he shows a certain tendency to interpret Horace in ways that would be acceptable on moral and religious grounds. For example, on the Soracte Ode, where Lambinus glosses "fors" as "fortuna,"

Bond adds, "seu potius Dei voluntas" ("or rather the will of God"), and where Lambinus doubts that "permitte divis ceteros" means anything about Horace's belief in divine providence, Bond assumes that it does. He is also the first of our commentators to suggest that the conversion in Parcus deorum cultor is to Stoicism. He glosses "retrorsum vela dare" "atque recurrere, et eadem redire via, fortasse ab Epicureis ad Stoicum professionem." ("and to return, and go back to the same road, perhaps from the Epicureans to the Stoic position.") When Horace mentions Fortune again later in the same poem, Bond remarks, "poeta Fortunam et Deum pro eodem hic ponere videtur." ("the poet seems to be equating Fortune and God here.") Similarly, he glosses "divinae particulam aurae" (S 2.2.79) as "animam, divini spiritus partem." ("the soul, a part of the divine spirit.") But on the other hand, he recognizes attacks on the Stoics when they occur, and knows that Ofellus is no Stoic. He also glosses Horace's account of his philosophical flexibility (Epist. 1.1) "Academicus ergo." In short, he is not concerned to give a consistent interpretation of Horace, and although he sometimes distorts him in the direction of Christianity, in general he simply takes him as he finds him, not even showing any hesitation in paraphrasing exactly the most objectionable sections of the second satire of Book I.

Our next editor, Daniel Heinsius, has a particular significance for this study on several counts: we know that Jonson was heavily influenced by his views of Horace, quoting from his commentary in the Discoveries and using his version of the Ars Poetica as the basis for a translation, and we also know that Pope used Heinsius' 1629 edition as the basis for the text of Horace which accompanied his Imitations.[24] Clearly then I shall have much more to say on Heinsius and his edition of Horace later,

when we discuss him in relation to Jonson and Pope specifically. But for now, it is the evidence he provides of a real shift in attitudes towards Horace that interests me.

Heinsius dedicates his Horace to a senator of Venice, not a young prince. And his manner of recommending his poet to his patron's attention is worth considering carefully.

> Talem certe, ut cum pluribus excellat, unum sit prae ceteris, quod hac maturitate aetatis et experientiae, prae ceteris Te oblectare possit. Praeter enim summam ac Romanam vere in poesi majestatem, praeter accuratum de autoribus judicium ac sensum, tanto in humana vita describenda usu ac dexteritate, ut nemo elegantius urbaniusque, nemo magis ex utilitate publica philosophetur, nemo lenius callidiusque; emendet vitia, quae reprehendit. Quem Augustus, maximus ingeniorum censor, tanti fecit . . .
>
> Such a one certainly, that, as he excells many, is one who comes before others, on which account he can please you before others at your present maturity of age and experience. For besides his supreme and truly Roman majesty in poetry, besides his accurate judgment and opinion about writers, [he writes] with so much practice and dexterity in describing human life that no one philosophizes more elegantly and urbanely, no one more for the sake of public utility, no one more gently and dexterously; he improves the faults he reprehends. Whom Augustus, the greatest judge of abilities, thought so much of . . .

The emphasis is clearly on the Horace of the Satires and Epistles, Horace the moral philosopher. But what I wish particularly to underline is that his skill in describing human life is made the basis of the excellence of his philosophizing, and his high position as a man in the opinion of a judge of men becomes a guarantee of his worth as a poet. Even more than with Stephanus, he is recommended as an appropriate companion to a man of experience, to one who knows the world, because of his own knowledge of the world.

Heinsius' address to the reader not only praises Horace, but is an effort to imitate him. Heinsius tries to give his discussion an

informal, epistolary quality by giving it the form of a narrative. "Amice Lector," he begins, on a recent journey I took Horace along, "non urbanitatis modo plurimae autorem, sed et optimum virtutis sapientiaeque ducem." ("Friendly reader" . . . "not only an author of the most urbanity, but the best guide to virtue and wisdom.") His wisdom is of a particularly attractive kind: "iuvabat in communi illa libertate, qua tum frui primum coepimus, tractare hominem, qui ex philosophia, praeter usum eius nihil retineret." ("It was delightful in that common liberty, which then first we began to enjoy, to have to do with a man who kept nothing from philosophy except its use.") Horace does not set himself up to be reverenced as all-knowing: "nihil tamen ultra virtutem docuisse ostenderet. Quotidie igitur, nec raro solus, uno comite hoc contentus . . ." ("nothing, however, does he boast of teaching beyond virtue. Daily therefore, not only rarely, content with only this companion . . .") he pursued his journey. He describes spending one happy day in a retired grove, thinking about the vanity of the philosophers, and how wonderful the days were when poets followed wisdom for her own sake. Remembering the simplicity of their feasts, he took a delicious drink of cold water from a nearby stream, and contemplated Horace's achievement of wisdom in his life as well as in his writings. All seek truth, but "subtilius investigando quam necesse est, offuscatur." ("By investigating more subtly than necessary, it is obfuscated.") It was left to Horace to show them all their insanity. As Heinsius read over these wonderful pages, he found himself correcting what was corrupt or not properly interpreted, and was amazed to find himself in disagreement with so many worthy men. And so he is putting out an edition, although without trying to repeat what has already been

done so well by Lambinus in the way of commentary.

Horace has become more of an authority than ever before, with a capacity to see truth clearly where philosophers go astray. Earlier, we remember, Horace's moral poems were judged more valuable than the works of the philosophers because as poetry they were more effective than mere doctrine; Horace was considered to know how to present the truths of philosophy pleasantly, so that men would listen. Now Horace himself is a knower of truth, a man able to understand what is really important to human life and to put it into practice, and the best companion a man could wish. His urbanity is part of his wisdom, and Heinsius tries to imitate his lack of ostentation, and present himself not as a pedantic scholar, who having pored over manuscripts in a library, now arrogantly puts out a text which he considers perfect, attacking all previous editors, but simply as a lover of Horatian wisdom with some small gift for textual emendation, derived doubtless from his sympathetic comprehension of Horace's intentions.

Of Heinsius' commentary on the text, little need be said. In accordance with the intentions of the Elzevir press in this series of editions, it is kept to a minimum and printed separately in the second volume.[25] It is almost exclusively concerned with textual emendations, and apparently they are considered for the most part unsound: "Lambinus disfigured by hazardous conjectures."[26] Once in a while he will point out some deft touch other commentators have missed, but this is rare. If we want a further development of the new image of Horace which we have found in the prefatory material, we must turn to the _De Satyra_, a long treatise published in the 1629 edition, which is still accorded some merit, where the textual work is not.[27]

In response to attacks from those who consider Horace inferior as a satirist to Juvenal and Persius, Heinsius attempts to redefine the exact nature of Horace's excellence, and show that it is exactly that kind of excellence that a satirist ought to have. His arguments on the origin of satire are an attempt to establish a basis for a definition of the genre, but we can leave them aside; the main source of his definition is what Horace says about his own work and what can be deduced from his practice, and our main interest is the image of Horace that emerges from this discussion, not the definition of satire. I shall therefore make no attempt to follow the line of Heinsius' argument, but rather try to bring together many separate statements and show how they form the constituent elements of this new image of Horace.

Heinsius constantly recurs to the particular excellence of the Horatian _manner_.[28] Others have decired the style of the _Satires_, calling it low and rough; they do not understand that one of his chief virtues is his use of the plain style, "pedestrem sermonem . . .. Ut solutus omni servitudine, totam sui ipse ideam nobis daret: homo vafer et ad mores hominum notandos vere natus" (p. 6). ("a simple style . . .. That free of all constraint he himself may give us his complete idea; an artful man, and indeed born to observe men's manners.") He has chosen the perfect medium, "_genus humile_ . . ., in qua puritas ac perspicuitas imprimis dominatur, ac postremo ambitus sine ulla circumdictione leniter cadentes" ("the low style . . ., in which purity and clarity above all rule, and lastly clauses falling softly without any circumlocution") (pp. 168-69). With this ideal, Heinsius contrasts Juvenal's declamatory style, his taste for "acumina" ("sharp jabs, pointed witticisms") (p. 171). Juvenal's errors in morality can be

attributed to his style; after pointing out such an error, Heinsius says, "Quare apparet, magis declamandi quam moralis usum habuisse sapientiae" ("Wherefore he appears to have more experience in speech-making than in moral wisdom") (p. 186).

It is not that Horace does not use art, even though Heinsius says at one point of Juvenal's obvious rhetoric, "Nemo . . . sponte et natura loquitur actue; verum affectatione aut arte" ("No one spontaneously and naturally speaks with pointed wit, but by the use of affectation and art") (p. 70). But his art does not call attention to itself; yet if you look closely, "dicas venustissimum mortalem, syllabas, haud aliter quam tesseras, in tabula fictive ordinasse" ("you would say that the most charming mortal had arranged syllables just like mosaic pieces in a mural") (p. 166). And the aim of his art is to present the truth simply:

> Noster contra, incredibile judicio ac gravi de causa, primam animi interpretationem, Satyrae sufficere putavit. Qui est simplex sermo ac familiaris. (172)
>
> Our poet, on the other hand, with incredible judgment and for weighty cause, judged that the first interpretation of the soul suffices for satire. Which is a style simple and familiar.

The difference between Horace and Juvenal can then be summed up:

> totum Horatii poema ex usu natum, ad veritatem et communem vitae representationem factum est; ita totum luvenalis esse . . . ad commissiones potius aut recitationes factum, ipsa ratio dicendi docet. (p. 197)
>
> Horace's whole poetry is born from experience and created for truth and the representation of common life; that Juvenal's whole work is made rather for prize declamations or recitations, his method of speaking itself teaches.

The style shows the man--"Speake, that I may see thee" (H & S 8.625)--and the matter and the manner are organically united. Horace writes as

he does because of the kind of man he is, and because of the nature of the wisdom he has to convey, and the three are inseparable.

Horace's wisdom is uniquely his own because he has no master. Thus others may say thatPersius is superior to Horace because he is a perfect Stoic, while Horace follows no one sect, but it is for his Eclecticism that Heinsius admires him (p. 206). "simul enim veritatem, quae est anima philosophiae; et libertatem, quae praecipua Satyrica est virtus, conjunxit" (p. 226). ("For he joins together truth, which is the soul of philosophy, and liberty, which is the foremost virtue of satire.") He has returned to the wisdom of the first poets, who taught men how to live, realizing "quod praesertim multa, haud admodum utilia ad vitam, et nonnunquam ineptissime, philosophi docerent" (p. 93). ("especially that the philosophers teach many things by no means completely useful to life, and sometimes in a very inept way.") He is able to diagnose the follies of the philosophers: "singulorum dogmatum absurditates, ex eorum fundamentis (quod unius est philosophi) deducit" (p. 95). ("He deduces the absurdities of separate philosphical doctrines from their basics [which is the unique task of the philosopher].") And when in his Satires he has chased away the false opinions of the philosophers, in his Epistles, "nudam sine auctoritate veritatem sequitur, quam docet" (p. 226). ("the truth, naked, wihout authority he follows, which he teaches.") He takes the truth where he finds it, but he is above all master of that wisdom "quae non tam in monitis philosophorum et praeceptis (quamquam quid non Aristotles tentavit?) quam vivendi usu et experientia consistit" (p. 257). ("which consists not so much in the admonitions and precepts of the philosophers (although what has Aristotle not attempted?) as in the use and

experience of living.") The new appeal to experience still coexists with a tremendous respect for Aristotle, but the change is marked.

Horace has become a unique figure: an Authority, one whose words carry weight because they are the words of a man with deep human wisdom, and one who can show men how to trust reason and experience instead of authority. In an age when men who wished to be free of authority still felt the need of an Authority to assure them that they could be free, Horace seems to fill that need. By the second half of the century, important though he still is, this unique status is gone.

The last edition we will consider appeared in ten volumes from 1681 to 1689, and again some years later in a revised edition. Andre Dacier edited it, gave a prose translation into French of the poems, and wrote a lengthy commentary in French. Maresca presents Dacier as a typical Renaissance commentator,[29] but as we shall see, he is so far from being so that he is in some ways radically different from all who went before. And he is particularly important for this study because, as I hope to show in a later chapter, he had a strong influence on Dryden's image of Horace, and, to a lesser degree, on Pope's.

In the preface to the Odes in the first edition, Dacier speaks of his hopes of making Horace accessible even to the Ladies, "dont l'approbation bien souvent ne donne pas moins de plaisir que les suffrages des Savans." He stresses the need to bring out the beauties of Horace, to clarify what other commentators have obfuscated, to give the sense of the allegories Horace uses, and, wherever possible, to make clear when the poems were written by showing their relationships to various historical events. This last is a new concern, a sign of "the development of the historical method in philology."[30] It is also a warning that our

commentator does not intend to be limited by traditional interpretations.

And indeed, we find in the commentary the effects of Dacier's historical and realistic approach. He admires in Iam satis terris (C 1.2) the sublime and delicate way "Horace fait son cour à Auguste." He knows that it was written many years after Caesar's murder, yet Horace makes it sound as though it had been written immediately after,

> pour achever d'effacer de l'esprit d'Auguste toutes les dangereuses impressions que le souvenir de son engagement dans le parti de Brutus pouvoit entretenir.

Of the moral content of the poem Dacier says nothing.

A similar 'realism' changes completely the traditional interpretation of Integer vitae, according to which Lalage was completely incidental--Horace was simply conveying the Truth that innocence because guarded by the gods is safe anywhere. For Dacier, Lalage takes the center of the stage in a little drama. Lalage is actually the mistress of a friend, and Horace wishes to convey to that friend, jealous of Horace's obvious admiration for her, that his love is purely Platonic, that he feels nothing but deep respect and sincere friendship. This is why he emphasizes his innocence at the beginning of the poem. "Cette Ode est d'une politesse et d'une galanterie qu'on ne peut trop louer."

Equally startling is Dacier's reinterpretation of certain of the Odes in the light of his belief that Horace was a thorough-going Epicurean until at least the age of forty-seven. Other commentators were glad to disassociate him from that disreputable sect as much as possible; Heinsius emphasized his freedom from any sect. Dacier is proud to be able to show that they have all simply been naive. Thus on the third stanza of the Soracte Ode, he boasts that he is the first to

realize how cleverly Horace is mocking the Stoics, who believe that every little leaf is shaken by "un ordre exprès de la Providence." Interpreters have not realized, according to Dacier,

> que ce Thaliarque était Stoicien, et qu 'Horace lui écrit en franc Epicurien, qui n'aime que le plaisir, et qui se rit de la superstitieuse credulité de cette secte.

Bond had glossed the word "fors" in the next stanze "fortuna, seu Dei voluntas." Dacier rejoices:

> Ceci confirme ce que j'ai déja dit. Car Horace parle encore ici selon l'esprit d'Epicure, qui ne croyait pas que les Dieux reglassent nos jours, qu'il faisait uniquement dépendre du hazard et de la fortune.

Along the same lines, Dacier demolishes the traditional interpretation of Parcus deorum cultor. Horace has experienced no genuine conversion; the poem would be childish if one thought that he meant what he said. He is mocking the Stoics again, who believed fabulous reports of thunder in a clear sky and made them evidence of divine providence. Dacier is clearly sympathetic with Horace and with Lucretius, whom he quotes, in their mockery of "ces superstitieux." Horace's real belief, as indicated by his use of Fortune at the end of the poem, is that there is a God who can lift men up and cast them down, but that He leaves this to Fortune, and this is "la veritable doctrine des Epicuriens."

Dacier makes the general statement in the course of this argument that Horace cannot have been converted from Epicureanism because he never shows any signs of belonging to any other sect. Apparently he excepts the Odes of Book III, which he feels were done after the Carmen Seculare, and which are "plus remplies de preceptes et de moralitez; car c'est le langage le plus ordinaire de veillesse." In any case, he finds some Stoic doctrine here, and in general some truths worth

understanding, one especially admirable for a subject of Louis XIV: lines five and six of the first Ode in the book inspire him to say, "Grande verité! Les peuples doivent être soumis aux Rois, et les Rois . . . à Dieu. Ainsi Dieu regne sur tout." When, grown more sensitive to Horace's moral content by his work on the _Satires_ and _Epistles_, Dacier discusses the morality of the _Odes_, it is such lessons that he will dwell on.

When Dacier did his revised edition, he wrote a new preface for the _Odes_, designed to do for lyric poetry what he had done for satire in his preface to the _Satires_. He begins with a pious tribute to the superiority in this genre of the Hebrews:

> Et cela fait voir combien l'inspiration Divine est au dessus de la fureur poétique, et de cet enthousiasme que les Poëtes tâchent d'exciter en eux par tout ce qui peut échauffer leur imagination. (p. xii)

We are very far from the belief in the genuine inspiration of even the pagan poets that filled Landino.

But we are not now interested in Dacier's piety, nor in his history of the genre; rather in his estimate of Horace. We have seen the nature of his commentary on the _Odes_, and the extent to which Horace seems to have become a free-thinking gallant and courtier. We may now be surprised to hear:

> C'est un grand Poète, un grand Philosophe, et un grand Critique. Et dans toutes ces parties, on ne trouve jamais un Auteur, on trouve un homme du monde, qui, en nous instruisant toujours, joue, badine, et s'amuse avec nous. Rien ne marque ni travail ni peine, rien ne sent l'échole . . .. l'unique qui seul puisse former un honnête homme et un galant homme. (pp. lv-lvi)

He is echoing here what he has said on the Horace of the hexameter poems, and we shall discuss the tone he takes more fully later. But for

now we must consider his new concept of his function as a commentator. He thinks chiefly of the importance of his work in the education of the young, and especially in the formation of their morals. For Horace, with his delightful teaching, is both potentially useful and potentially dangerous. Previously,

> on s'est contente d'expliquer litteralement leurs maximes sans les approfondir, et sans en montrer la faussetė ou la veritė, en les appliquant a la veritable règle. (p. lxvii)

Dacier clearly did not think it worthwhile to redo his commentary with that aim in view, but he compensates for this by discussing here the lessons to be found in the Odes, "la Philosophie la plus profonde" as he calls them.

> Elle enseigne aux particuliers à être contents de leur condition . . . à obéir aux loix, à être soumis à leur superieurs, et à fuir l'avarice, et à n'appeller et ne croire heureux que ceux qui savent user sagement des presens des Dieux, et craindre la honte plus que la mort. (p.lxx)

Yet Dacier is surprised that Horace has the moral insight to blame Romulus' murder of Remus for Rome's miseries in the civil wars. He finds such a lesson remarkable "dans un Poete, et dans un Poete Epicurien." (p. lxxv) And when to oppose Machiavelli's amoral praise of the murder, and advice to a prince to learn to deceive, he calls on "les Payens plus sages," he brings in Plato and Marcus Aurelius. Thus he reverses Heinsius' preference of Horace's wisdom to that of the philosophers, and he prefaces his discussion of the dangers of Horace by saying:

> Mais comme la Philosophie des Payens n'étoit pas exempte d'erreurs dans les Philosophes meme, on ne doit pas s'attendre a la trouver plus saine et plus pure dans les Poetes. (lxxxii)

Dacier is a harsh judge of Horace:

> Quand je parle des erreurs d'Horace, je ne veux point parler de ces excès affreux, où la corruption de son

> coeur l'a plongé, et qu'il a avouez avec tant d'infamie. Ces endroits n'ont pas besoin de contre-poison, ils le portent avec eux par l'horreur qu'ils inspirent. Je parle de certains principes plus délicats, qui entrent dans un systême, et qui ne trouvent encoure que trop de partisans. (p. lxxxiii)

He does not elaborate, and there is little in the commentary to tell us what he means, unless pointing out that an idea is Epicurean is tantamount to warning against it. As for the additions in the revised edition, they are mostly arguments against Bentley's emendations. We shall have to wait for his commentary on the Satires and Epistles to see how his ideas work out in practice.

Before we turn to that section of his work, we must consider a blow he strikes in this preface in the battle of the Ancients and Moderns that makes yet more clear how far his view of poetry is from Heinsius'. In opposing the view that our superiority to the Ancients in science is evidence that we are superior to them in literature as well, he says:

> On a inventé la bouffole, on a trouvé les lunettes d'approche, qui dévoilent le firmament à nos regards curieus; on a démêlé le labyrinthe que le sang fait dans le corps; donc nous pouvons être plus grands Poëtes que les Anciens. (p. ci)

Physics indeed grows slowly and reaches its perfection only after centuries of application.

> Mais l'imagination et le genie, les seuls Maîtres de la Poésie, ne sont point du ressort des temps. Rien n'est meme si contraire a la Poésie que ces sortes d'applications, dont ces découvertes sont le fruit, et j'ose assurer que plus un siecle sera physicien, plus il sera éloigné de la Poésie. (p. cii)

No such unbridgeable gap separated the poet and the scientist when the poet was regarded as using his reason to draw wisdom from experience. We see how far Dacier is from this view when he praises Horace because

he expresses the concepts of the philosophers so well and with such novelty, "qu'il semble n'avoir pas tant étudié leus livres, que s'estre étudié luymême, et ne rien tirer que de son propre fonds." (v. 23) The operative word here is "semble;" actually of course Horace is simply expressing with unusual skill "what oft was said."

The foregoing quotation is taken from the Preface to the Satires, the source of so much of Dryden's "Discourse on the Original and Progress of Satire." The whole preface need not be discussed here; I shall merely point out one or two crucial points about Horace that are related to our previous discussion. One thing that is very striking is that Dacier seems to have no appreciation of the plain style of the Satires. He compares them to the satyr figures to which Alcibiades compared Socrates, ugly on the outside, but full of moral value on the inside. This value is assumed to come from Horace's incorporation of the precepts of the philosophers. The main virtue in Horace's presentation of these precepts is that "il ne quitte pas un moment les manières de la plus fine Cour." No longer is there a sense of the perfection of the plain style as the medium of truth, or of the organic unity of style, content, and the individual character that shapes both; the urbanity which Heinsius saw as part of the essence of Horace's wisdom has been reduced to a mere perfection of courtly good manners:[31]

> cet air aisé et ces manières libres, que la naissance,
> quelque heureuse qu'elle soit, ne peut jamais donner,
> si le commerce de la Cour ne polit et n'acheve ce que
> la Nature a commencé. (vi. 207)

The commentary on the Satires and Epistles is concentrated on the moral aspects, and tries to weigh the morality by Christian standards. Dacier criticizes where we should expect him to criticize, but what is

really striking is that he is the first of our commentators to see danger in that "aurea epistola," Nil admirari. This is a good precept within limits, he says, but Horace's conclusions "pourroit être fort nuisible, si on ne les corrigeoit pas par les lumières de la verité et de la raison." For unfortunately this epistle reflects the doctrines of "ces philosophes insensez" who cannot see that our happiness is not in our own power, but to be determined by God. This of course is the fundamental problem with Horace's moral philosophy as a whole, if one judges it by strict Christian standards, but it is also the essence of its appeal to those humanists who wished to emphasize man's potential. At no point does Dacier stand further from the Renaissance tradition than in rejecting a purely human virtue.

Thus on the one hand Dacier emphasizes the Epicurean and courtly side of Horace, and, on the other, highly though he praises Horace's moral teaching, he criticizes it in certain crucial respects. Most important, Horace is no longer the unique kind of moral philosopher he was for Heinsius; he is above all a man of the world, who can form men of the world. A kind of trivialization has occurred, and we shall see its influence on both Dryden and Pope.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Pope's Horatian Poems* (Ohio State University Press, 1966), pp. 1-15.

2. Grant Showerman, *Horace and his Influence* (New York, 1927), p. 109. Antoine Campaux, *Histore du texte d'Horace* (Paris, 1891), p. 20. For bibliography of Renaissance editions of Horace used, see list at end. In general these editions follow the standard order of Horace's work, and the commentary accompanies the text; therefore I have only given page numbers where necessary to find the reference.

3. Bernard Weinberg, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance* (Chicago, 1961), I, 88.

4. See Weinberg's discussion of Landino's commentary on the *Ars Poetica*, I, 79-81.

5. L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and his Lyric Poetry*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 160, 163, 165. J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship* (1903; rpt. New York, 1964), I, 635-637.

6. R. Lebègue, "Horace en France pendant la Renaissance," *Humanisme et Renaissance*, 3 (1936), 152-153.

7. Lebègue, p. 387.

8. Campaux, p. 25.

9. Sandys, II, 189.

10. T. W. Baldwin, *William Shakspere's Small Latine and Less Greeke* (Urbana, 1944), pp. 503, 509.

11. See Wilkinson, p. 167. No source given and I have not yet been able to trace it. Baldwin, pp. 512-513.

12. Lebègue, p. 384.

13. Lebègue, p. 289.

14. See Badius' edition, Acro's commentary.

15. Baldwin, p. 497.

16. Lebègue, pp. 390-391. He sees the influence of this tendency in Lambinus' preface as well, but there I think he mistakes commonplaces for significant statements.

17. Maurice Sabbe, "Essai de Bibliographie des Editions d'Horace,

publiées par Chr. Plantin et ses Successeurs," De Gulden Passer, N. S. 14 (1936), 93.

18. Ben Jonson, ed. C. H. Herford and Percy Simpson I (Oxford, 1925), 266.

19. Weinberg, p. 146.

20. Herford and Simpson, I.254.

21. Herford and Simpson, I.266.

22. Campaux, p. 29.

23. There is an edition in the New York Public Library published by Achaintre in Paris in 1806. See also Jean Marnier, Horace en France, au dix-septième siècle (Paris, 1962), p. 41.

24. Lilian Bloom, "Pope as Textual Critic," JEGP 67 (1948), 150.

25. Maresca, p. 18.

26. Campaux, p. 26.

27. Sandys, II, 314.

28. See Wesley Trimpi, Ben Jonson's Poems (Stanford, 1962), passim., for an interesting discussion of the significance of the plain style, and for discussion of Heinsius' attitudes, pp. 78-80.

29. Maresca, p. 19.

30. Marnier, p. 50.

31. This is especially interesting in light of what Trimpi points out about the contrast between Jonson's and Dryden's concepts of urbanity, pp. 80-81.

CHAPTER II: JONSON'S USE OF HORACE DURING HIS EARLY YEARS

In the previous chapter, I considered many different attitudes towards Horace, many different points of view on his essential nature and importance. In this chapter I will concentrate on Jonson's Horace, and on the part Horace, as Jonson saw him, played in Jonson's literary career during his early years as a playwright. This is the period before he wrote his greatest plays, and before Heinsius's influential edition of Horace. During this period Jonson seems to have reached a conscious decision to identify himself with the Roman poet and to become in some sense his English successor, and at the end of this period we have our first piece of evidence that he was indeed recognized as the English Horace. The period covered takes in the last years of the sixteenth century and the first years of the seventeenth.

Much of the material covered in this chapter has already been discussed by W. David Kay in his dissertation, "Ben Jonson, Horace, and the Poetomachia," and I am often indebted to him for insights. His approach differs from mine, however; he considers the question of Jonson's use of Horace in the context of Jonson's psychological needs as shaped by his childhood, he dwells on the resemblances between the private lives of the two men, and his main aim is to show how Jonson uses his identification with Horace as a weapon in the Poetomachia, usually known as the War of the Theatres. He generally seems to assume that Jonson saw Horace as he was; he does not attempt to analyze Jonson's distinctive interpretation of Horace, nor the relationship of that interpretation to the concepts of Horace which Jonson found in the

commentators. Since this is the aspect of Jonson's use of Horace that I stress, Kay and I tend to handle different aspects of the material.

Thus, in my consideration of the shaping forces at work on Jonson before he embarked on his career as a playwright, I intend to discuss not the psychological forces but the intellectual--not his stepfather, but his master, Camden. That Camden had a deep and lasting influence on Jonson does not admit of a doubt. We have Jonson's epigram, "To William Camden": "Camden, most reverend head, to whom I owe/ All that I am in arts, all that I know . . ." (Epigrams XIV).[1] We have the dedication Jonson inserted in a copy of Cynthia's Revels calling Camden the best parent of his muse (H&S 4.31). And we have the dedication to the first play in the 1616 Folio edition of Jonson's Works, in which he offers his instructor the first fruits of his studies (H&S 3.301). In addition to this direct testimony, we know from Drummond that Jonson still used in 1619 the method of composition he had learned from Camden, writing his matter out in prose and then turning it into verse (H&S 1.143). Certain characteristic emphases in the humanism Camden transmitted to Jonson are thus important to our understanding of Jonson's immediate intellectual background.

What impresses the reader most strongly in Camden's writings is the recurrent motif to devotion to Truth, of the search for Truth which "wholly possessed" him.[2] His years of work on his Brittania were one long quest for that most difficult to arrive at and most prized Truth, that which is lost in the past. For "in the studies of Antiquity, (which is alwaies accompanied with dignity, and hath a certaine resemblance with eternity) there is a sweet food of the mind well befitting such as are of honest and noble disposition."[3] Camden was never simply

an historian in a narrow sense, however. Historical truth was for him simply a part of a continuum. In his essay on Camden, Maurice Powicke reminds us that men like Lipsius and J. J. Scaliger were called historians also, and that these men, who corresponded with Camden, saw his work and their own as part of the one great task of bringing truth to light:

> The humanism of Camden's friends was a very different thing from the clear-cut and confident classicism which we associate with the word. Camden and his friends were men of varied interest who had in common a belief--perhaps I should say an instinctive perception--in the unity of learning and a sort of abandonment to erudition for its own sake.[4]

Such learning has no immediate purpose in moral, didactic terms; there is rather an assumption that good men will love learning, and that it will nourish them.

Accompanying Camden's devotion to truth is an attitude towards language. He distrusts elaborate rhetoric; in his revision of Brittannia he has, he says, "applyed some ornament of speech, but without any curious enticement of pleasing words."[5] In fact, according to Powicke,

> Camden's greatest service to English historical learning was his steady refusal to submit his lively and searching intelligence to the trammels of an orthodox rhetoric . . . preferring the deft nervous pithy language of his fellow countrymen, and a Latin counterpart to it, capable of easy translation into it . . .[6]

It is his pride to write "rather respecting matter than words" and in "plaine English."[7] Yet he appreciates in a man like Ascham "pureness of stile."[8] He values words for their expressive power:

> So for the Monosyllables so rife in our tongue . . . although they are unfitting for verses and measures, yet are they most fit for expressing briefly the first conceipts of the mind . . . so that we can set down more

matter in fewer lines, than any other language.[9]

With this emphasis on truth, and language as its servant, Camden also undoubtedly transmitted to Jonson the highest humanist conception of poetry and poets. Camden knew Sidney from their days at Oxford together,[10] and was familiar with at least Minturno and Scaliger of the Italian critics.[11] He did more than simply pass on their teachings, however:

> Of the dignity of Poetry much hath beene said by the worthy Sir Philipp Sidney, and by the Gentleman which proved that Poets were the first Politicians, the first Philosophers, the first Historiographers. I will onely adde out of Philo, that they were God's own creatures: . . . when he had made the whole worlds masse; he created Poets to celebrate and set out the Creator himselfe, and all the creatures . . . .[12]

Camden's own contribution from Philo sets his ideal of the poet in relation to the rest of his ideas: the poet is to "celebrate and set out" God and his world. The whole of reality is his province, and to speak the truth of it fittingly, his glory. Again Camden transmits the best of the humanist tradition, but with his own characteristic emphasis. Jonson's efforts to establish himself as a true Poet were profoundly influenced by Camden's ideals of learning, truth, language as the servant of truth, and poetry as its celebrant. His turning to Horace, and the way he saw Horace, cannot be considered apart from this background.

Disregarding A Tale of a Tub, whose dating is much disputed, Jonson's first two plays are fairly conventional: The Case is Altered is a romantic comedy, Every Man in His Humour a comedy on the Roman model. From these plays we may gather something of Jonson's critical opinions before he turned to Horace. In The Case is Altered, Jonson aims some

criticism at Antony Munday, under the name of Antonio Balladino. Apparently this was a popular pastime among the writers of the day; Hereford and Simpson mention other satires on him (H&S 9.308). Jonson laughs at him for his use of stale material, of which he makes him boast: "I do use as much stale stuffe, though I say it my selfe, as any man does in that kind" (I. ii.48-49). He writes for the groundlings--"I care not for the Gentlemen I" (I. ii.75-76)--and scorns refinement of language, since a good story is all the groundlings want--"no matter for the pen, the plot shall carry it" (76-77). This scene has nothing whatever to do with the rest of the play, which suggests that Jonson's urge to abuse a poetaster was strong from the very beginning of his career: strong enough here to override any concern for the play's unity.

In Every Man in His Humour, there is not only criticism of a bad poet, but an attempt to define what poetry should be by a character in the play who is himself a poet, Lorenzo Jr. The young man is driven to defend poetry because his father, who at the very beginning of the play laments his son's attachment to that "vayne course of study," "idle Poetrie" (I.i.10,18), has seized on the contempt showered on the poet-ape Matheo's attempts as poetry as proof of "How abjectly your Poetry is ranckt,/ In generall opinion" (V.v.310). Young Lorenzo answers violently:

> Opinion, O God let grosse opinion
> Sinck & be damnd as deepe as Barathrum.
> . . . I can refell opinion, and approve
> The state of poesie, such as it is,
> Blessed, aeternall, and most true devine:
> Indeede if you will looke on Poesie,
> As she appeares in many, poore and lame,
> Patcht up in remnants and olde worne ragges,
> Halfe starvd for want of her peculiar foode,
> Sacred invention, then I must conferme,
> Both your conceite and censure of her merite.

But view her in her glorious ornaments,
Attired in the majestie of arte,
Set high in spirite with the precious taste
Of sweete philosophie, and which is most,
Crownd with the rich traditions of a soule,
That hates to have her dignitie prophand,
With any relish of an earthly thought:
Oh then how proud a presence doth she beare.
Then is she like her selfe, fit to be seene
Of none but grave and consecrated eyes:
Nor is it any blemish to her fame,
That such leane, ignorant, and blasted wits,
Such brainlesse guls, should utter their stolne wares
With such aplauses in our vulgar eares:
Or that their slubberd lines have currant passe,
From the fat judgements of the multitude,
But that this barren and infected age,
Should set no differnce twixt these empty spirits,
And a true Poet: then which reverend name,
Nothing can more adorn humanitie.
(V.v.312-343)

We can have no doubt that we are hearing Jonson's voice. This is the only scene in the play in which young Lorenzo speaks as a poet, and his speech is so out of keeping with the rest of the play that Jonson removed it entirely from the revised version. The young Jonson is responding to the hostility to poetry in his age by affirming the highest humanist ideal of true poetry. Passionately he tries to show that the only reason for the popular contempt of poetry is the general failure to distinguish true poetry from the inferior productions of ignorant poetasters, with their lack of invention and dependence on plagiarism. True poetry has the highest goals, as the source of "those holy flames that should direct and light the soule to eternite" (V.v.345,346); philosophy nourishes her, art clothes her, and she rises high above earthly concerns, so that only the noblest of men can truly behold her. In short, as Camden said, the poets are "God's own creatures." Obviously Jonson must desire nothing more than to claim for himself the title of "true Poet: then which reverend name,/ Nothing can more adorn humanitie."

Yet if Jonson had announced to the world that he, a practising playwright, was writing this kind of poetry, the world would have laughed him to scorn; how could a writer of comedies for the popular theatre claim that his poetry "hates to have her dignitie prophaned,/ With any relish of an earthly thought?"

The logical means for Jonson to choose to vindicate his title as a true poet in the terms in which he defined it in Lorenzo's speech would have been to set himself the goal of writing an epic, to become the imitator of Virgil, not of Horace. Yet when Jonson set out to win the name of a true poet in the year after the production of Every Man In, the means he chose was the imitation of Horace. His new dramatic genre, the "comicall satyre," was in the tradition of Old Comedy and Roman satire which Horace had first defined, and the Latin mottoes with which he adorned the title page of his first published play were taken from Horace. At about the same period (late 1599-1600), he wrote an ode, an epode, and an epistle, each as far as we know his first attempt in the genre.[13]

No other poet chose to make the imitation of Horace as important a part of his attempt to win the name of poet as did Jonson.[14] This is what makes Jonson's choice of Horace particularly significant--it was so far from being an obvious choice at the time. Lorenzo's speech suggests a poetry that approaches the divine; we have seen that Horace's first commentator, Landino, found divine teaching in Virgil, but only worldly wisdom and excellent style in Horace.[15] Virgil was held up as the ideal poet by the critics; epic poetry was after all the greatest genre, while the lyric, the satire, and the epistle were difficult to fit in as poetry at all, if imitation was considered the criterion.[16] Even Jonson

recognized Virgil's pre-eminence by giving him, and not Horace, the highest rank in the poetic hierarchy of Poetaster. Yet Jonson was drawn to Horace. He brought Horace out of the schoolroom (and even there he had been read much less than Ovid, not to mention Virgil[17]), and not only imitated him himself, but taught others to "relish" him,[18] and in fact may be said to have effectively introduced Horace in England.[19] As I have indicated in Chapter I, the only English translation available at this time, that by Drant, was scarcely an adequate introduction of Horace to England. And Bond's edition, the first important English edition, did not appear until 1606, one year after Jonson was first called the "English Horace" (see below, p. 111).

Jonson was especially drawn to the Horace of the hexameter poems. In his personal copy of Horace, it is the hexameter poems that are heavily underlined (see above, Chap. I, p. 43). Moreover, it is Horace the satirist Jonson imitates in his "comicall satyre." In emphasizing the hexameter poems, Jonson follows the general tendency of the end of the sixteenth century, which we discussed in Chapter I. Still, this does not really make it less strange that anyone should try to establish his claim to be a true poet by imitating the Horace of the hexameter poems. I have pointed out that Parthenio, of whose edition Jonson owned a copy, had not even intended to include the hexameter poems in his edition, because they were not really poetry in his eyes (see above, Chap. I, pp. 43-44). Lambinus, too, whose edition of Horace had such widespread influence, had praised the Odes as showing Horace at his best (see above, Chap. I, p. 35).

It is perhaps not surprising that these attitudes did not weigh heavily with Jonson; what seemed unpoetic to others attracted Camden's

pupil--the simplicity of the language, the truth of the matter. Moreover, Horace could provide a direct answer to those who scorned poets as triflers by his presentation of himself as a central figure in his society and as a possessor of moral authority based on his character. Jonson could not assume a similar role immediately, but he could move towards it by becoming an imitator of Horace.

Another important factor was doubtless Horace's status as an authority on how poetry should be written. One of the commentators on the Ars Poetica describes that status:

> Si qui unquam optimarum artium praecepta tradiderint, optimarumve rerum artes conscripserint, . . . laudem meruerunt; unus est Horatius, mea quidem sententia, praeferendus . . .. Qui etsi natura ad heroicam illam Homeri Virgiliique maiestatem accedere vetuit, ut ipse ad Augustam ingenue fatetur, certo tamen acrique judicio inter alios tamquam stella fulgens emicat . . .. In literis non postremae obtinet partes, qui Horatium ex poetis peculiarem sibi auctorem sumpserit. imo doctus vir, aut eruditus nequaquam est vocandus, qui in tali arte perdiscenda non elaboraverit; contraque ineruditus, indoctusve minime nuncupandus, qui in ea profecerit.[20]

> If ever those merited praise who taught the precepts of the best arts, or wrote treatises on the best matters, Horace alone [among them] is to be preferred, according to my opinion. Who, even if nature forbade him to reach that heroic majesty of Homer and Virgil, as he himself ingenuously confessed to Augustus, yet shines forth among the others like a glittering star for his dependable and keen judgment . . .. He would not hold the lowest function in letters who should choose Horace from among the poets for his own special poet. Moreover, without good reason is he to be called a learned or erudite man, who has not labored at learning such an art; and on the other hand he cannot be pronounced unlearned or lacking in erudition who has made progress in it.

Thus Horace promised to provide a firm support for a man who, perhaps because of Camden's influence, seems to have desired above all to be a learned poet. There is some evidence that, at the time Jonson first began to follow Horace, he also embarked on a systematic course of

study.[21] Both were signs of the desire to provide a solid foundation for the highest kind of poetry, although the effect of Jonson's focus on learning the skill of poetry from Horace becomes fully evident only later. Still, it is already clear that if the true poet's aim is to embody the truth fittingly, one of his supreme concerns, and in fact a definite moral duty, must be to perfect his skill as a poet. Jonson's imitation of Horace would inevitably suggest that he accepted this responsibility, given Horace's reputation (obvious in every commentary we looked at in Chap. I) as a supremely skillful poet.

These generalizations must be supported by some consideration of the work Jonson actually did at this time. I have already mentioned the title page of Jonson's first published play. That play was Every Man Out of his Humor (hereafter EMO); Jonson saw this play through the press, and he carefully set up the title page so as to proclaim his play a "Poeme," as he calls it in the dedication.[22] Thus the play is proclaimed as "The Comicall Satyre of Every Man Out of his Humour. As it was first composed by the Author B. J." (H&S 3.419) He announces in the Induction that his play is "strange, and of a particular kind by itself, somewhat like Vetus Comoedia" (Ind. 1.232). The understanding reader would be aware that Horace had defined the tradition:

> Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae,
> atque alii, quorum comoedia prisca virorum est,
> si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus ac fur,
> quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui
> famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.
> Hinc omnis pendet Lucilius, hosce secutus
> mutatis tantum pedibus numerisque, facetus,
> emunctae naris . . .
>
> (S 1.4.1-8)

And now, with the form changed again, Jonson brings the tradition into English.

The first motto on the title page of EMO asserts his pride in his achievement, and by its context defines it: "Non aliena meo pressi pede" (Epist. 1.19.22). Horace has been mocking the servile imitators who are only capable of copying what is insignificant or absurd in their models--Cato's dress, rather than his virtue:

> O imitatores, servum pecus, ut mihi saepe
> bilem, saepe iocum vestri movere tumultus!
> Libera per vacuum posui vestigia princeps,
> non aliena meo pressi pede.
> (Epist. 1.19.19-22)

He goes on to explain the kind of originality he has achieved by proper imitation of the Greeks, becoming the first to bring to Italy the lyric and iambic measures. As for general popularity, he scorns it, and disdains the means others take to gain it: "non ego ventosae plebis suffragia venor . . ." (37). The contempt for the common herd of plagiarists, and the scorn for those who seek the favor of the windy multitude fit perfectly the attitudes Jonson has already expressed in his satire on Anthony Munday and in Lorenzo Jr.'s condemnation of Matheo and his kind. What Jonson has gained is a solid foundation for his claim to superiority over the poetasters; with Horace, he can boast of having created a form new to his country, yet firmly based in imitation of the best in a long tradition.

The next two mottoes assert that Jonson's work satisfied the Horatian criteria of art. As printed, they read: "si propius stes/ Te capiet magis & decies repetia placebunt" (Ars Poetica 361-362; 365). Both are from the passage in which Horace compares poems to pictures: some are up to the highest standards, others look better in a dim light. The next passage goes on to say that only a perfectly finished work deserves to be called a poem. Jonson claims such finish for his play.

In creating comical satire, Jonson has not only gained for himself that firm foundation that comes with working in a respected tradition; the particular tradition he has chosen is well suited to give concrete substance to his exalted claims for poetry. Satire is clearly a genre based on the presentation of the truth about society in such a way as to "light the soul to eternitie" by holding human follies up to scorn and thus weaning men from them. Jonson himself defines the difference between this kind of play and romantic comedy of the kind he wrote in The Case is Altered when he has one of his choric characters, Mitis, object that a romantic comedy would have been better "than to be thus neere, and familiarly allied to the time" (III.vi.200-201). The other member of Jonson's Grex, or chorus, Cordatus, answers with the definition of comedy that was attributed to Cicero: "Imitatio vitae, Speculum consuetudinis, Imago veritatis; a thing throughout pleasant, and ridiculous, and accomodated to the correction of manners . . ." (206-209).[24] As a writer of satiric comedy, Jonson provides an image of truth even more pointed, and more calculated to rouse men to pursue better ways.

Jonson can also use his satiric comedy to present images of the poet that embody the ideal of the true poet he is following. Asper is a satirist because he is a good man who can see the faults of others clearly, and is moved to indignation by them. At this stage, however, Jonson does not model his satirist closely on Horace; Asper is in the English tradition, Christian and Juvenalian:

> To see the earth, crackt with the weight of sinne,
> Hell gaping under us . . .
> Who can behold such prodigies as these,
> And have his tongue sealed up?
>
> (Induction 8-13)

It is above all when he comes to speak of his art that we hear an echo of Horace. He scorns to fawn on his public, as Horace does in Epistle 1.19, and he invites the strictest criticism, as Horace advises the poet to do in the Ars (385-389), but he only comes close to Horace's exact words when he speaks of his hate for "every servile imitating spirit" (Ind. 67). And even then his language is much too violent to be considered Horatian.

As for the more specific precepts of the Ars, Jonson pays almost no attention to them. The only one he quotes is so far from guiding him that it actually runs counter to his whole design: he has Cordatus reply to Mitis's objection to some of Buffone's rough language,

> O servetur ad imum, qualis ab incepto processerit, & sibi constet.
>
> The necessitie of his vaine compels a toleration: for, barre this, and dash him out of his humor before his time.
> (V.iii.56-59)

Horace counsels consistency in invented characters; the title of Jonson's play comes from the total transformation that is effected in every character by the end of the play. Jonson's notion of verisimilitude is very far from the Horatian notion:

> Why, therein his art appears most full of lustre, and approacheth neerest the life: especially, when in the flame, and height of their humours, they are laid flat, it fils the eye better and with more contentment.
> (IV.viii.166-169)

So too Jonson ignores Horace's bidding that no fourth person should attempt to speak (AP 192).

> Is it not an object of more state, to behold the Scene full, and reliev'd with varietie of speakers to the end, then to see a vast emptie stage, and the actors come in (one by one) as if they were dropt downe with a feather, into the eye of the spectators?
> (II.iii.297-301)

What Jonson derives from Horace at this point, then, is substance for his claim that he is a true poet. His practice follows aesthetic standards that are essentially Elizabethan, not Horatian. A consideration of Jonson's attempts in the Horatian genres at this same period leads to much the same conclusion. His Ode is rather stiffly Pindaric, not Horatian (Underwood XXV).[25] It is only significant for us because it is a beginning in a genre in which Horace excelled, and which had not really been tried in England before.[26] His Epode (Forrest XI) bears no resemblance to any Horace ever wrote, except in its form, which is iambic pentameter alternating with trimeter. Jonson has followed Horace as Horace did Archilochus, taking the Horatian form for his own matter: here the singularly un-Horatian theme of the power of true love to make men virtuous.

It is only in his Epistle that Jonson has gone to Horace for his matter (Forrest XII). He has not, however, attempted to write in the urbane and relaxed style of an Horatian epistle; rather he has gone to Horace's Odes, and thence chosen material that asserts the dignity of poetry and his claim to be a true poet. He takes Horace's gift of poetry to his friend instead of bronzes (C 4.8), and the great ode to Lollius on the same theme of the power of poetry (C 4.9), and weaves them into a New Year's gift to Elizabeth, Countess of Rutland, in which he contrasts the contemporary world, where gold is the center of men's thoughts and the ignorant scorner of verse can be called noble, to the true golden age, when poetry and the virtue it celebrated were valued. Proudly he speaks as a poet who still holds the values of that golden age:

whil'st gold beares all this sway,

I, that have none (to send you) send you verse.
   A present, which (if elder wits rehearse
The truth of times) was once of more esteeme,
   Then this, our guilt, nor golden age can deeme . . .
(For. XII.18-22)

He has indeed assumed the role of Horace, but the structure is his own, and the ending reiterates his main concern about what distinguishes the true poet from the poetaster as we have seen it in his earlier work.

Then all, that have but done my Muse least grace,
   Shall thronging come, and boast the happy place
They hold in my strange poems, which as yet,
   Had not their forms touched by an English wit.
There . . . shall I . . .
. . . .
 . . . show, how, to the life, my soule presents
Your forme imprest there: not with tickling rimes,
   Or common places, filch'd, that take these times,
But high, and noble matter, such as flies
   From braines entranc'd and fill'd with extasies . . ..
(For. XII.79-90)

The claim to be the first to introduce new forms into England is clearly an imitation of Horace, and partly validates his right to use Horace's words in asserting that he as a true poet is capable of conferring immortality. His poetry will present Truth--the lady's form, "to the life," and it will be an appropriate embodiment of that "high and noble matter" that sets the true poet apart from the Mundays and Matheos.

These poems appear to have been Jonson's first bid for the kind of patronage that would free him from the necessity of writing for the stage.[27] His next two published plays bore on their title pages the same two epigraphs, which suggest his misfortune in being a poet in a day when, though he might follow Horace, he could find no Maecenas. The mottos are, "quod non dant proceres, dabit Histrio," and "haud tamen invidias, quem pulpita pascunt" (H&S 3.195, 4.25). These are

lines 90 and 93 from Juvenal's seventh satire, and form part of his description of the plight of poets who, though capable of greater things, are forced to write for the stage: "quis tibi Maecenas . . . erit?" (94).[28]

In his next "comicall satyre," Cynthia's Revels, Jonson gives further concrete substance to his idea of the true poet by dwelling on the learning he must have to fulfill his function. The ideal poet in this play he named, in the original version, Criticus (H&S 9.486); like Horace, his strength is in his judgment (II.iii.132), the critical faculty which operates in all the spheres of life. He is first of all a scholar, "truly learned" (II.iii.133) as Mercury calls him, and his learning, his virtue, and his poetic ability are all intimately connected. It is singularly appropriate that Jonson should have inserted a dedication to Camden in a copy of this play; it is here that Jonson calls Camden "Musarum Suarum Parentem Optimum," and himself "Alumnus olim, aeternum amicus" (H&S 3.31). He ends the dedication with a quote from the ode to Lollius: "Non Ego te meis/ Chartis inornatum silebo" (C 4.9.30-31).

The play is indeed Camden's play: it is a humanist manifesto. Criticus' learning extends to what some might call pedantry: he laughs at Anaides for not being able to translate a line he quotes (IV.v.44-46), and he corrects Amorphus' absurdities by a learned reference to Lucian (I.iv.13-19). Such erudition is good in itself, and, at the same time, it encompasses the knowledge of moral philosophy which, joined with his own virtue, enables Criticus to discern the true nature of the folly and vice of the courtiers, and thus feeds the gift of poetry which enables them to unmask them.[29]

There is a Horatian locus on learning as the source of good poetry,

and Jonson may be referring to it when he closes his prologue by promising the audience "Words above action: matter, above words" (20). The idea that the writer or speaker should consider his matter first, and that then words should follow, was a critical commonplace in the ancient world and in the Renaissance, but Jonson may well have been thinking of the Horatian version of it, in which the matter is clearly not only before, but above the words:

> Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons.
> Rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae,
> verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.
> (AP 309-311)

This passage serves as a link between the kind of learned poetry Criticus embodies, and Horace, in whose footsteps Jonson saw himself as following.

Up to this point, Jonson has followed Horace as a means of giving substance to his claim to be a true poet: he has used wherever he could Horatian formulations of his beliefs about poetry, and he has tried to follow the Horatian concept of imitation, and by composing in Horatian genres give his work a kind of learned and solidly based originality. After _Cynthia's Revels_ he found himself under attack for the ideal of learned poetry he had expressed, and for his arrogance in presuming to teach his audience. He chose to answer, in _Poetaster_, by a far more thoroughgoing identification with Horace, and by identifying his attackers with the antagonists Horace argues against in the critical satires. One would expect that the quarrel he was involved in would dictate his interpretation of the Horatian material he uses, but the most important changes he makes reflect not his own position, but his conception of the ideal poet. What he basically does is to set up a

conflict between the true Poet, more or less as he envisioned him in Criticus, and the Poetaster, using material from Horace and from his own experience within this framework. Jonson's treatment of Ovid and the other courtly poets further defines the ethical nature of the true Poet's concern, but since he does not use Horatian material in this treatment it will not be discussed here.[30]

In Horace's critical satires, there are two groups of antagonists whom he assails: those who fear satire because they are vicious, and those who do not understand the aesthetic standards of Horace's satire and prefer Lucilius. As I pointed out in the introduction, Horace suggests strongly that those who have such shoddy artistic standards that they prefer Lucilius are on as low a plane morally as they are artistically, whereas Horace and his friends have both artistic and moral integrity (pp. 5-7). Jonson seizes on this suggestion and develops it further, finding in Horace's self-presentation a perfect means of developing his full concept of the true Poet. He merges the two groups of antagonist, thus strengthening the idea that low aesthetic and moral standards inevitably go together. He also drops all mention of Lucilius, whose artistic standards Horace had criticized. Lucilius was after all clearly a good man, and his poetry had the highest moral aims. If Jonson were to mention that he was in the habit of composing two hundred verses in an hour, standing on one leg (S 1.4.9-10), he would inevitably obscure somewhat the idea that a good man is bound to recognize a duty to have the highest possible artistic standards as a poet.

Jonson fashions his main butt, Crispinus, from a few scattered hints in the Satires. Horace refers scornfully to Crispinus several times as a Stoic philosopher who is "lippus" (S 1.1.120), "ineptus"

(1.3.140). He is brought into the critical satires only once, challenging Horace to see who can write the most in a fixed time, and thus providing on occasion for Horace to express his scorn of writing quickly (1.4.13-21). Jonson identifies this Crispinus with the Bore in Satire 1.9, who also boasts of being able to write verses quickly (1.9. 23-24), and adds the name Laberius, whom Horace mentions once, saying that he could no more call Lucilius polished than say that Laberius wrote "pulchra poemata" (beautiful poems) (1.10.15-16). Jonson completes the characterization of Crispinus as the perfect Poetaster, and uses his adaptation of Satire 1.9 to set up the contrast between Poetaster and Poet; the scene is central to the meaning of the whole play, and is charged with much more significance than Horace ever intended. This, in my opinion, and not the transfer to the stage, or a desire to lash Marston, explains the difference in tone between Jonson's version and the original.[31]

Horace's purpose in this satire is the creation of a perfect little comic scene, in which he can hold up to scorn the kind of person who thinks that Horace is a social climber, or that Maecenas's circle is accessible to ambitious, low-bred know-nothings.[32] The Bore numbers pride in facile verse composition among his other defects, but he is in no sense primarily a poet. Jonson's Crispinus, on the other hand, is already labelled as a would-be poet before the scene begins. He has in fact just decided to turn poet for the love of Chloe, the jeweller's wife, and his resolution at the end of Act Two sums up his notions on how to become a poet, and his motives for becoming one: "Ile presently goe and enghle some broker, for a Poets gowne, and bespeake a garland: and then jeweller, looke to your best jewell yfaith" (II.ii.224-226).

Jonson introduces Horace composing; Crispinus seeing him says: "I think he be composing as he goes i'the street! ha? 'tis a good humour, and he be: Ile compose too" (III.8.5-7). Like the servile herd of imitators of Epistle 1.19, he chooses a purely external trifle to imitate. His greeting emphasizes Horace's poetry, and the profit he believes Horace to be getting out of it, which profit is of course his own aim in becoming a poet. Thus, "'Quid agis, dulcissime rerum?'" (S 1.9.4) becomes "Sweet HORACE, MINERVA, and the Muses stand auspicious to thy dessignes. How far'st thou sweete man? frolicke? rich? gallant? ha?" (III.i.13-15). Crispinus's motives in becoming a poet are greed and lechery; the kiss of a citizen's wife is for him the inspiration of the Muses (39-42), and the specimen of his poetry that he quotes is in consequence absolutely devoid of significant content--he compliments a black velvet cap on its luck in being on a white forehead (85-88). Horace can only react to him with the complete disdain that marks him as the natural opposite of such an ape. In keeping with this, Crispinus's speeches are all in a kind of slack prose, while Horace's language is so dignified as to seem almost stiff, and his most significant speeches are couched in blank verse. I shall give only one example of the transformation Jonson works in his original, from the interchange where Horace is finally moved to answer angrily. The Bore is speaking:

> 'nemo dexterius fortuna est usus. haberes
> magnum adiutorem, posset qui ferre sucundas,
> hunc hominem velles si tradere; dipeream, ni
> summosses omnis.' 'Non isto vivimus illic
> quo tu rere modo; domus hac nec purior ulla est
> nec magis his aliena malis; nil me officit, inquam,
> ditior hic aut est quia doctior; est locus uni
> cuique suus.'
>
> (45-52)

Jonson has made Crispinus so prolix that I shall not quote him in full.

Troth, HORACE, thou art exceeding happy in thy friends
and acquaintance . . .: I doe not know that poet, I protest,
has us'd his fortune more prosperously, then thou hast. If
thou would'st bring me knowne to MECOENAS, I should
second thy desert well; thou should'st have a good sure
assistant of me . . .. Let me not live, but I thinke thou
and I (in a small time) should lift them all out of favour,
both VIRGIL, VARIUS, and the best of them; and enjoy
him wholy to our selves. HORA. Gods, you doe know it,
I can hold no longer; This brize hath prickt my patience;
Sir, your silkenesse
Cleerely mistakes MECOENAS, and his house;
To thinke, there breathes a spirit beneath his roofe,
Subject unto those poore affections
Of under-mining envie, and detraction,
Moodes, onely proper to base groveling minds:
That place is not in Rome, I dare affirme,
More pure, or free, from such low common evils.
There's no man greev'd that this is thought more rich,
Or this more learned; each man hath his place,
And to his merit, his reward of grace:
Which with a mutuall love they all embrace.
(III.i.234-259)

The reply Horace gives the Bore in the original is already full of pride in the kind of companionship Horace enjoys at the house of Maecenas, as I pointed out in the introduction (p. 4). Jonson heightens the tone still further and keeps it consistently high throughout the dialogue, lowers Crispinus' tone, and by both style and content makes clear the contrast between the two which later in the play naturally leads Crispinus to attack Horace. Jonson is not concerned to reproduce the light tone and the urbanity of the Horatian satire; his strong sense of his own purpose in imitating this dialogue transforms it and makes it his, and an integral part of the play.

The same cannot be said of the other whole scene Jonson imitates from Horace. There is considerable dispute over whether Jonson's version of the dialogue with Trebatius formed part of the play as Jonson first wrote it or whether he composed it for the 1616 Folio edition.[33] My own feeling is that, whenever Jonson composed this dialogue, it does

not form an integral part of the play. It is a defense of personal satire, which plays no part in the play elsewhere--Horace is neither attacked nor defended as a satirist who attacks individuals. I would conclude that Jonson decided to translate Satire 2.1 as a defense of his play, after it had been attacked, and that he showed bad judgment in inserting it here. I shall therefore postpone consideration of it to a later chapter.

Pantilius Tucca and Demetrius are the other two antagonists Horace encounters in Poetaster. Both are mentioned in Satire 1.10, in which Horace defends his criticism of Lucilius. Horace has just spoken of the care with which one must write if one wants the select few to appreciate the work, as Lucilius would realize if he were alive today. "Men moveat cimex Pantilius, aut cruciet quod/ vellicet absentem Demetrius . . .?" (1.10.78-79). The approval of the best is enough. Jonson takes this bug, Pantilius, whose literary standards are low and who apparently criticizes Horace for judging by higher ones, and identifies him with those who can't abide satire because of their vices. At his first appearance Tucca speaks against satire on the stage, describing himself as a victim: "An honest decayed commander, cannot skelder, cheat, nore be seene in a bawdie house, but he shall be straight in one of their wormewood comoedies" (I.ii.49-52). In the same scene he calls Homer "a poore, blind, riming rascall" (84-85), and joins in the attack on unprofitable poetry. He it is who comes to the rescue of Crispinus after his arrest at the end of the Bore scene, and takes the poetaster, as he calls him to his face (III.iv.107), under his protection. He is the natural enemy of the good poet, the natural friend of the bad, and when he hears of the projected slanderous attack on Horace by Demetrius, he

immediately desires to know Demetrius--"and he have these commendable qualities, I'le cherish him . . ." (III.iv.341-342).

In the scene in which all three assailants plot their attack, Tucca takes the lead, and it is here that Jonson uses the material from Satire 1.4 that Horace puts in the mouth of an imaginary opponent afraid of satire because of his vices:

> . . . quemvis media elige turba:
> aut ob avaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat.
> hic nuptarum insanit amoribus, hic puerorum;
> hunc capit argenti splendor . . .:
> . . . .
> omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas.
> 'faenum habet in cornu: longe fuge!. dummodo risum
> excutiat sibi, non hic cuiquam parcet amico;
> et quodcumque semel chartis illeverit, omnis
> gestiet a furno redeuntis scire lacuque
> et pueros et anus.
>
> (1.4.25-38)

> A sharpe thornie-tooth'd satyricall rascall, flie him; hee carries hey in his horne: he wil sooner lose his best friend, then his least jest. What he once drops on paper, against a man, lives eternally to upbraid him in the mouth of every slave tankerd-bearer, or water-man; not a bawd, or a boy that comes from the bake-house, but shall point at him . . .. I'le have the slave whipt one of these daies for his satyres, and his humours, by one casheer'd clarke, or another.
>
> (IV.iii.109-118)

In the final scene, Tucca adds to his other accomplishments perfect two-facedness. He encourages Demetrius and Crispinus to admit their authorship of two doggerel poems against Jonson (V.iii.265-268), praises each verse as it is read (275-321), and then turns on them in an effort to get off free himself.

As for Demetrius, Porphyrio and, following him, the commentators, including Lambinus, identify him with "simius ist/ nil praeter Calvum et doctus cantare Catullum" (1.10.18-19).[34] He admires Lucilius because he

has never read Greek Old Comedy, which satire should imitate, and therefore has no notion of how it should be written. Jonson consequently makes Demetrius outstanding for his ignorance; he cannot appreciate the more subtle effects of Horace's learning, but calls him a mere observer (IV.iii.104-107), and, not understanding the proper use of the ancients (whom he cannot read), he damns him for translating (IV.iii.122). To his ignorance Demetrius joins envy, and in the last scene he confesses that he had no other cause to attack Horace (V.iii.499-453).

Jonson thus gains authority for his own conception of the poetaster by developing it from a conflation of Horace's two groups of antagonists that links inextricably vice, ignorance, and low aesthetic standards. Against this he sets an image of Horace as a man in whom virtue, knowledge, and high aesthetic standards are similarly linked. The enmity between Horace and his antagonists is presented as resulting not from any attack Horace has made on them, but simply from the natural antipathy of good and evil. Jonson is careful to make this clear in the last scene. Virgil's speech in defense of Horace sets out the reasons for the attack on Horace:

> . . . where there is a true, and perfect merit,
> There can be no dejection; and the scorne
> Of humble baseness, oftentimes, so workes
> In a high soule upon the grosser spirit,
> That to his bleared, and offended sense,
> There seemes a hideous fault blaz'd in the object;
> When only the disease is in his eyes.
> (V.iii.347-359)

The difference between the true poet and the poetaster is that between a "high soule" and a "grosser spirit."

With this image of Horace, Jonson cannot use the more playful defenses that Horace uses in the critical satires--that he is not really a

poet, that his scribbling is a harmless recreation, that he does not publish his work. It would be unthinkable for Jonson's Horace to give any hint of an apology for being what he is. Kay attributes this to Jonson's own precarious situation at the time,[35] but it seems clear that Horace's uniformly dignified tone and constant assertion of his own virtue are inevitable, given Jonson's aim in the play. He is focusing on the essentials in Horace's self-portrait in order to create a perfect image of the true poet, and he ignores material that might conflict with this, just as he ignores Lucilius because he cannot present him as a true poetaster.

Where his personal identification with Horace does influence him is in the added feeling in his version of a passage from Satire 1.4 which he uses to express his own emotions. Horace is answering the accusation that he likes to give pain:

> Unde petitum
> hoc in me iacis? est auctor quis denique eorum
> vixi cum quibus? absentem qui rodit amicum,
> qui non defendit alio culpante, solutos
> qui captat risus hominum famamque dicacis,
> fingere qui non visa potest, commissa tacere
> qui nequit: hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto.
> (S 1.4.79-85)[36]

> When hast thou knowne us wrong, or taxe a friend?
> I dare thy malice, to betray it. Speake.
> Now thou curl'st up, thou poore, and nasty snake . . .
> Out viper, thou that eat'st thy parents, hence.
> Rather, such speckled creatures, as thy selfe,
> Should be eschew'd and shund: such, as will bite
> And gnaw their absent friends, not cure their fame
> Catch at the loosest laughters, and affect
> To be thought jesters, such, as can devise
> Things never seens, or heard, t'impaire mens names,
> And gratifie their credulous adversaries,
> Will carrie tales, doe basest offices,
> Cherish divided fires, and still increase
> New flames, out of old embers, will reveale
> Each secret that's committed to their trust,

These be black slaves: Romans, take heed of these.
(V.iii.323-339)

Horace is simply defining the kind of railer and buffoon that he is not; Jonson uses his words to attack the poetasters, emphasizing again the identity of their low poetic and moral standards, and also finding in Horace words to release his own most personal feelings of betrayal.

The image of Horace as the ideal poet is completed by Jonson's presentation of the relationship between Augustus and Horace as an ideal relationship of ruler and poet of the kind he later strove to achieve with James. The scene opens with Augustus's forgiveness of Gallus and Tibullus for their part in the feast of the gods. He praises them for their virtues, among which is poesie, "Which is, of all the faculties on earth,/ The most abstract, and perfect; if shee bee/ True borne, and nurst with all the sciences" (V.i.18-20). She has power to render Rome immortal:

. . . and therein
Shall Tyber, and our famous rivers fall
With such attraction, that th'ambitious line
Of the round world shall to her center shrinke
To heare their musicke; And, for these high parts,
CAESAR shall reverence the Pierian artes.
(27-32)

Maecenas and the others all praise him for this praise of poetry, and Horace adds:

PHOEBUS himselfe shall kneele at CAESARS shrine . . .
To quite the worship CAESAR does to him:
Where other Princes, hoisted to their thrones
By fortunes passionate and disordered power,
Sit in their height, like clouds, before the sunne,
Hindring his comforts; and (by their excesse
Of cold in vertue, and crosse heate in vice)
Thunder, and tempest, on those learned heads,
Whom CAESAR with such honour doth advance.
(44-53)

There is a natural reciprocal relationship between the ruler who is

governed by reason (as opposed to "fortunes passionate and disordered power") and virtue, and learned poets governed by the same powers, and the praise of such a ruler is not flattery, but the duty of the true poet. It is equally the duty of the true poet to instruct and even reprove his prince when necessary. Augustus asks the others for their opinion of Virgil:

> Or HORACE, what saist thou, that art the poorest,
> And likeliest to envy, or to detract?
> HORA. CAESAR speakes after common men, in this,
> To make a difference of me for my poorenesse:
> . . . knowledge is the nectar, that keepes sweet
> A perfect soule, even in this grave of sinne . . ..
> CAES. Thankes, HORACE, for thy free, and holsome sharpnes:
> Which pleaseth CAESAR more than servile fawnes.
> (77-95)

Jonson saw in Horace not a flatterer or a "Court Slave,"[37] but a poet secure in a society in which the ruler, his patron, and the other good poets all shared the same values. The last passage we have to consider in which Jonson is following a specific passage from Horace emphasizes the firmness of Horace's position, and the freedom it gives him to scorn the poetasters. The passage Jonson uses follows the lines quoted above (p. 88) in which Horace expresses his lack of concern about the railing of those whose literary opinions he despises:

> Plotius et Varius, Maecenas Vergiliusque,
> Valgius et probet haec Octavius optimus atque
> Fuscus et haec utinam Viscorum laudet uterque!
> . . . vos Bibule et Servi . . .
> compluris alios, doctos ego quos et amicos
> prudens praetereo; quibus haec, sint qualiacumque,
> adridere velim, doliturus, si placeant spe
> deterius nostra. Demetri, teque, Tigelli,
> discipularum inter plorare cathedras.
> (1.10.81-91)

Jonson uses these lines as the basis for Horace's response to Demetius's confession that he has acted against Horace without cause,

purely out of envy:

> If this be all; faith I forgive thee freely.
> Envy me still, as long as VIRGIL loves me,
> GALLUS, TIBULLUS, and the best-best CAESAR,
> My deare MECOENAS: while these, with many more
> (Whose names I wisely slip) shall think me worthy
> Their honour'd and ador'd societie,
> And reade, and love, prove, and applaud my poemes;
> I would not wish but such as you should spight them.
> (V.iii.455-462)

Again, Jonson has changed Horace just enough to emphasize, what is implicit in Horace, that the quality of the poetry is inseparable from the character of the poet. Horace speaks of caring only whether his poetry is approved of by those who share his aesthetic standards, in terms that suggest the superiority of his learned friends to the back-biters and parasites who criticize him. The Octavius mentioned is not the emperor, but a friend and fellow poet.[38] Jonson puts the first emphasis on the acceptance of Horace as a friend by men of stature, who base their acceptance on their estimate of his worth as a man; which is inseparable from his worth as a poet. Horace adds a mocking farewell to his critics, substituting "iubeo plorare" for the usual "valere iubeo."[39] This would be beneath the dignity of Jonson's Horace, and Jonson leaves it out.

In the "Apologeticall Dialogue," first printed in the 1616 Folio, Jonson disclaims any parallel between himself and Horace (A.D. 106). This is not simply an attempt to soften the criticism of his arrogance from those who supposed he saw himself as Horace. When he wrote Poetaster, Jonson knew how far he was from the kind of position in society that Horace had occupied.[40] The desire to achieve what he conceived of as an Horatian relationship with his sovereign, with a patron, and with the other good poets of his day was one of the motivating forces of the

rest of his career. But there were certain parallels he felt did exist, and he reaffirms these in the last speech of the Dialogue. His plays are not railing, but in the tradition of Old Comedy and Satire (186-191). He writes slowly because he aims at something better than "the stuff'd nostrils of the drunken rout" (208) can appreciate (194-208). He cares only for the applause of the judicious (226-228).

After *Poetaster*, Jonson turned to tragedy with his *Sejanus*, and thus entered a field where he could have no direct link with Horace. He does not allow the reader to forget his firm Horatian background, however. In the prefatory epistle he promises to justify his departure from the laws of tragedy in his forthcoming "Observations upon *Horace* his *Art* of *Poetry*, which (with the Text translated) I intend, shortly to publish" (*To the Readers.* 16-18). He also uses a line from Horace to close the epistle. He signs himself, "BEN. JONSON. and no such,/ *Quem Palma negata macrum, donata reducit opimum*" (36-37). The context of the line is significant; Horace is discussing the evil state of the stage in Rome. Plautus wrote badly because he cared only about money.

> Quem tulit ad scaenam ventosa Gloria curru,
> exanimat lentus spectator, sedulus inflat;
> sic leve, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum
> subruit aut reficit! Valeat res ludicra, si me
> palma negata . . ..
>
> (*Epist.* 2.1.177-181)

Horace then goes on to describe the audience: the multitude who "media inter carmina" (185) call for bears or boxers, and the knights, who have come to prefer spectacle to good writing. His implied conclusion is the futility of writing for the stage, although he praises the poet who can do it well. By quoting this line, Jonson asserts that even though he writes for the stage, he is far removed from those who care

too much for applause; and indeed the popular failure of his Sejanus supports this claim. He has accepted the "malice of the multitude," and glories only in "the love of good men" (Dedication to Aubigny, H&S 4.349). And by publishing he declares himself one of those "qui se lectori credere malunt/ quam spectatoris fastidia ferre superbi" (Epist. 2.1.214-215).

It is a matter for infinite regret on the part of anyone who undertakes a study of Horace and Jonson that we not have Jonson's "Observations upon Horace his Art of Poetry." He did not rest content with the work he had done before the publication of Sejanus; when Heinsius brought out his edition of Horace in 1610, with its reconstruction of the Ars, Jonson revised his translation, and he also at some point prefixed a dialogue on poetry with Donne which included a defence of Bartholemew Fair (H&S 1.134). Of all this work, we have left only two versions of the translation, both printed in 1640. Jonson records in his "Execration upon Vulcan" his loss of his commentary:

> All the old Venusine, in Poetrie,
> And lighted by the Stagirite, could spie,
> Was there made English . . . .
>
> (Underwood 43.89-91)

Herford & Simpson tell us that the version printed in the duodecimo edition of 1640 is that written by Jonson in 1604 and announced in the Sejanus epistle (H&S 11.110). Their conclusion rests on a somewhat debatable emendation of the text of Drummond's Conversations (H&S 11. 577); still, judging by the changes in the version printed in the 1640 Folio edition, the duodecimo is indeed an earlier version, the other a careful revision. I shall therefore accept the early date, and conclude this chapter on the influence of Horace on Jonson during his early years

with some remarks on this version of the Ars.

What seems to me most interesting about this translation is the extent to which Jonson has let us see his own ideas. We have spoken of Jonson's awareness of the gap between himself and Horace at the time he wrote Poetaster. His translation of the Ars is clearly one attempt to lessen that gap, to bring himself closer to his chosen model; it also reveals, gap or no, the extent to which he already feels an identification with Horace. In theory he is giving us a faithful translation, but actually he has often made changes which do not reflect the difficulties of translating Latin hexameters into rhymed couplets, but which seem to reflect his own feelings. It is as though he identifies so closely with Horace that he can amplify and still remain the faithful translator, simply bringing out what he is convinced Horace thought. Jonson does of course use the commentaries, and in some instances they account for the changes he makes in Horace. But often he seems surprisingly independent of them, and, when they disagree, the interpretation he chooses is always revealing. I have not been able to consult every commentary that Jonson could conceivably have used. I have looked at seven, and so far as I can tell, it seems certain that Jonson used Lambinus (it would have been surprising if he had not), and at least one or two of the others. In any case, it seems probable from the work I have done that Jonson was not dependent on any one commentary.[41]

The first really striking instance of Jonson's own voice in his translation is his version of the lines, "brevis esse laboro,/ obscurus fio; sectantem levia nervi/ deficiunt animique . . ." (25-27). ("Striving to be brief, I become obscure. Aiming at smoothness, I fail in force and fire" [Loeb 453]). Jonson translates:

> My selfe for shortnesse labour, and am stil'd
> Obscure. Another striving smooth to runne,
> Wants strength, and sinewes, as his spirits were done . . . .
> (36-38)

Brevity becomes a fault only in the perception of the reader. Jonson strikes the same note in his "Epistle to Master John Selden:" "I know to whom I write. Here, I am sure,/ Though I am short, I cannot be obscure . . ." (Und. XIV.1-2). He has also increased the contrast with the tame writer who cares only for smoothness. When he came to revise he realized that he had distorted Horace and altered the passage to achieve a more faithful translation, but in his first version he is writing about his own poetry and others' reaction to it when he thinks he is translating Horace.

Jonson's translation of "hoc amet, hoc spernat promissi carminis auctor" ("the author of the long-promised poem shall like this and scorn that" [based on Loeb 453-455])is important because it show definitely that he was influenced by the commentators, and further, by commentators other than Lambinus. Jonson translates, "now to like of this,/ Lay that aside, the Epicks office is." (62-63) Lambinus glosses "promissi carminis auctor:"

> qui se poetam professus est, is, qui carmen, quod
> se scripturum pollicitus est, condit. vel dic promissi,
> id est, magni. Nam qui de se aliquid promittat,
> magnum aliquid vult a se expectari.[42]

> who professes himself a poet, he who composes a poem
> which he has promised he will write. Or say that "promised"
> means "great." For he who promises that he will do something means that something big should be expected from
> him.

The other commentators in general believe that Horace is devoting this whole section to Epic, and so Luisini glosses, "Epicus enum, de quo loquimur . . . ."[43] ("For the epic poet, of whom we are

speaking . . . .").

Although Jonson sometimes echoes the commentaries, he feels free to alter their interpretations to suit his own. His version of Horace's advice on diction is a case in point:

> In verbis etiam tenuis cautusque serendis dixeris egregie,
> notum si callida verbum reddiderit iunctura novum.
> (46-48)

> Moreover, with a nice taste and care in weaving words together, you will express yourself most happily, if a skilful setting makes a familiar word new.
> (Loeb, p. 455)

Maggi, Philippus, and Lambinus interpret this as advising the writer to be cautious in creating new words, and when he does so to make their meaning clear by forming them by joining two known words together.[44] Luisini applies the whole passage to metaphor.[45] Jonson agrees that Horace is advising caution in the use of new words, but interprets the rest as describing one of the virtues of the plain style as he and Horace both used it:

> In using also of new words, to be
> Right spare, and wary: then thou speak'st to me
> Most worthy praise, when words that vulgar grew
> Are by thy cunning placing made meer new.
> (65-68)

After Horace has explained the proper meters for various subject matters, he adds,

> Descriptas servare vices operumque colores
> cur ego si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor?
> Cur nescire pudens prave quam discere malo?
> (86-88)

> If I fail to keep and do not understand these well-marked shifts and shades of poetic forms, why am I hailed as a poet? Why through false shame do I prefer to be ignorant rather than to learn?
> (Loeb, pp. 457-459)

The strength of Jonson's feeling on this point is reflected in his

translation:

> If now the changes, and the severall hues
> Of Poems here describ'd, I can not use,
> Nor know t'observe; why (i'the Muses name)
> Am I cald Poet? Wherfore with wrong shame
> Perversely modest had I rather owe
> To ignorance still, then yet to learne, or knowe?
> (121-126)

The shame of being ignorant of the standards of one's art is given greater emphasis here, and throughout the translation. Jonson's conviction about the overwhelming importance of the way the poet does his work can lead him to ignore the commentaries. Thus he translates "male si mandata loqueris" (104) ("if the words you utter are ill suited" [Loeb, p. 459]) as, "If thou speak vile/ And ill-pen'd things" (147-148). Maggi and Luisini interpret this as advising the actor to suit his actions to the words.[46] Lambinus mentions the existence of an interpretation approaching Jonson's, but rejects it:

> quidam existimant, hunc esse ordinem verborum, <u>si loqueris, male mandata</u>: id est, si ea loqueris, quae sunt a tua fortuna aliena, tui auctoris culpa, qui eam orationaem tibi attribuet . . . a quibus dissentio.[47]
>
> Some think that this is the order of the words: "si loqueris, male mandata;" that is, if you say things which do not suit your condition, through the fault of your author who attributes this speech to you . . . from whom I dissent.

But even the interpretation Lambinus rejects is not as strong as Jonson's version; "vile and Ill-pen'd" again carries that strong note of reproach to a bad poet that is characteristic of him.

> Difficile est proprie communia dicere, tuque
> rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actis,
> quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus.
> Publica materies privati iuris erit, si . . . .
> (128-131)

> It is hard to treat in your own way what is common; and

> you are doing better in spinning into acts a song of Troy than if, for the first time, you were giving the world a theme unknown and unsung. In ground open to all you will win private rights, if . . ..
>
> (Loeb, p. 461)

The lack of agreement on this passage in the commentaries is not surprising; Horace's use of "proprie communia" is "rather confusing," as a modern editor observes.[48] Maggi holds that Horace is saying that although it is difficult to make your own material that others have treated, yet it is better.[49] Luisini explains that "communia" and "publica" mean two different things, and that therefore Horace is saying that since it is difficult to make one's own matter that has never been treated, one should use already-handled material.[50] Lambinus accepts Luisini's interpretation, while Manutius goes back to Maggi's, with the addition, however, of the idea that Horace is implying that it is even more difficult to treat new material, and therefore one is better off using Homer.[51] Jonson translates:

> 'Tis hard, to speake things common properly:
> And thou maist better bring a Rhapsody
> Of Homers forth in Acts, then of thine owne
> First publish things unspoken, and unknowne.
> Yet, common matter thou thine owne maist make . . ..
>
> (183-187)

Jonson appears to have chosen the interpretation that best suits his learned poetry; he asserts that imitation is not only better but more difficult, and thus more praiseworthy when well done.

For the completion of the thought, however, Jonson follows Lambinus. "Publica materia privati iuris erit, si/ non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem . . ." (131-132), ("In ground open to all you will win private rights, if you do not linger along the easy and open pathway . . ." [Loeb, p. 461]), "If thou the vile, broad-trodden ring

forsake" (188). Maggi glosses "orbem vilem" "ordinem vulgatam"[52] ("common order"), and Luisini has "per orbem igitur universum poema intellige eius poetae, quem imitaris . . .[53] ("by orbem therefore understand the whole poem of this poet, whom you imitate . . ."). Only Lambinus gives the sense as Jonson has it: "si non haerebis in circulo omnibus patente, & comtemto . . .[54] ("if you do not stick to the circuit lying open to all, and scorned . . ."). This interpretation best suits Jonson's often-expressed disgust with what is stale and hackneyed.

What follows on the proper method of imitation is particularly important because it reveals Jonson's attitudes on the nature of imitation as opposed to translation. Horace speaks to the imitator: "Nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus/ interpres." (133, 134) ("if you do not seek to render word for word as a slavish translator." [Loeb, p. 461]). Jonson objected to the usual interpretation given these words. When Chapman referred to them in the preface of his Iliad to justify the freedom of his translation, Jonson wrote in the margin of his copy, "Male intellexisti Horatium, mi Chapmanne."[55] Jonson's translation of the passage makes clear his understanding of the precept:

> . . . being a Poet, thou maist feigne, create,
> Not care, as thou wouldst faithfully translate,
> To render word for word . . ..
>
> (189-191)

Jonson thus contrasts the kind of free imitation that he used, for example, in his version of Satire 1.9 with the equally legitimate kind of faithful translation he is undertaking here. His addition of the lines on the freedom of the Poet to imitate creatively is characteristic of his emphasis on the poet throughout, but it also suits the context, in the sense that Horace is clearly talking about a very free kind of imi-

tation indeed, a tragedian's use of Homer being the example he uses.

Chapman is taking the precept in another sense in using it to justify his own kind of free translation, and he may well be following the commentators in this, who see a parallel between Horace's advice and a passage from Cicero's De Optime Genere Oratorum, in which he explains how he has translated orations of the greatest Greek orators:

> nec converti, ut interpres, sed ut orator, sententiis iisdem, & earum formis tamquam figuris, verbis ad nostrum consuetudinem aptis, in quibus non verbum pro verbo necesse habui reddere, sed genus omnium verborum, vimque servavi . . . .[56]

> nor have I translated like an interpreter but like an orator, with the same meanings, and with their forms and figures of speech, with words suited to our usage, in which I have not considered it necessary to give word for word, but I have kept the fashion and force of all the words.

As the orator translates as an orator, so the poet should translate as a poet, preserving the grace of the original rather than the exact wording. Only where the exact content of the author is important should one translate word for word, as in Aristotle:

> constat enim, eiuscemodi auctores non elegantiae, sed doctrinas acquirendi causa a studiosis volui . . . . De poematis autem convertendis longe alia est ratio. Nam quemadmodum imitatio probanda est, ita minime laudandi meo iudicio recentiores quidem graecos poetas ad verbum vertentes, latinisve carminibus graeca carmina explicantes; qui profecto neque emolumentum, neque delectationem praebent.[57]

> for it is agreed that such authors are wanted by students not for elegance, but in order to acquire learning. Very different is the reason for translating poems. For just as imitation is to be approved, so in my opinion not at all to be praised are those more recent people translating Greek poets word for word, or interpreting Greek poems with Latin poems, who indeed offer neither profit nor pleasure.

Thus the commentators leave no place for the attempt to translate poetry faithfully. But Jonson, who believed in reading poetry not only

for its elegance, but also, and indeed primarily, "doctrinas acquirendi causa," felt that if a man called his work a translation, he should give his readers a work as close to the original as possible; as he has tried to do in this translation of the Ars.[58]

Jonson's belief in the intimate connection between use of language and character comes out in his treatment of the passage that describes the kind of eloquence the chorus came to use as luxury increased:

> et tulit eloquium insolitum facundia praeceps,
> utiliumque sagax rerum et divina futuri
> sortilegis non discrepuit sententia Delphis.
> (217-219)

> and an impetuous style brought in an unwonted diction;
> and the thought, full of wise saws and prophetic of the future,
> was attuned to the oracles of Delphi.
> (Loeb, p. 469)

> The rash and headlong eloquence brought forth
> Unwonted language; and that sense of worth
> That found out profit, and fore-told each thing,
> Now differ'd not from Delphick riddling.
> (307-310)

Only Maggi of the commentators I consulted saw these lines as Jonson did, as part of a general attack on the corruption brought by luxury, even though this had been the scholiast's interpretation.[59] The others saw an account of the development and refinement of the chorus:

> insolitum autem eloquium, id est novum, non vitiosum, ut putat Acron. nam antiquum potius vitiosum fuit: tunc enim lingua latina cum inops esset, licuit nova, & insolita verba excudere . . ..[60]

> now "insolitum eloquium" means new, not faulty, as Acro thinks. For it was the old that was faulty, rather; for then because the Latin language was poor, it was allowable to forge new and strange words . . ..

This interpretation does not fit the context; Jonson's does. But in any case, he could never have accepted an interpretation that ignored the tendency of disorder in language to reflect decay in morality.[61]

In advising the Pisones on writing for the stage, Horace speaks in terms of what the audience will and will not accept. Considering the low opinion of Roman audiences he expresses in the Epistle to Augustus, one may question whether this is any more than "the most convenient and dramatic way of impressing young literary aspirants with the idea of success and failure."[62] Whether or not this is so, Horace here assumes that even if the plebeians approve of low language in satyr plays, the equestrian order will object. The aim is not really to please the whole audience, but only those who know with what they ought to be pleased:

> offenduntur enim, quibus est equus et pater et res,
> nec si quid fricti ciceris probat et nucis emptor,
> aequis accipunt animis donatve corona.
>
> (248-250)

> For some take offense--knights, free-born, and men of substance--nor do they greet with kindly feelings or reward with a crown everything which the buyers of roasted beans and chestnuts approve.
>
> (Loeb, p. 471)

Jonson emphasizes the idea and puts it in terms suited to the audience of his own day:

> The Roman Gentry, men of birth and meane,
> Take just offense at this: nor, though it strike
> Him that buys pulse there, or perhaps may like
> The nut-crackers throughout, will they therfore
> Receive, or give it any Crowne the more.
>
> (352-356)

The groundlings were commonly called nut-crackers in Jonson's time by those who wished to express their contempt (H&S 11.119).

How far Horace is from accepting the approval of the audience as the final criterion of artistic value is illustrated in his criticism of those older poets who did not write proper iambics: poor verse composition:

> aut operae celeris nimium curaque carentis

aut ignoratae premit artis crimine turpi.
Non quivis videt immodulata poemata iudex,
et data Romanis venia est indigna poetis.
Idcircone vager scribamque licenter?

(261-265)

lays the shameful charge either of hasty and too careless work or of ignorance of the art. Not every critic discerns unmusical verses, and so undeserved indulgence has been granted our Roman poets. Am I therefore to run loose and write without restraint?

(Loeb, p. 473)

Jonson translates with greater scorn:

. . . there is given too unworthy leave
To Roman poets; shall I therefore weave
My verse at randome, and licentiously?

(371-377)

The added first person pronouns and the emphasis Jonson gives them suggest his complete sympathy with this upholding of artistic standards against the ignorant tolerance of those for whom one is actually writing.

Jonson's translation of Horace's passage on life as source material for art is particularly interesting as showing the link Jonson felt between his art and Horace's theories. It follows directly the passage I quoted above on the "Socraticae chartae" as the source of the poet's matter (see p. 83).

Respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo
doctum imitatorem et vivas hinc ducere voces.

(317-318)

I would advise one who has learned the imitative art to look to life and manners for a model, and draw from thence living words.

(Loeb, p. 477)

The earlier commentators I have consulted all agree that Horace is advising the poet to look, not at life itself, but at an ideal pattern, and for "vivas voces" they read "veras voces:"

poetam respicere opportet non modo particulatim ad eam

personam, quam affingit, sed porius ad generale quoddam exemplar, in quod intuens omnem vitae, & morum ipsius rationem apte, & docte imitetur: atque loquentem faciat, ut iam non fictus, sed verus videatur sermo . . .[63]

It is fitting that a poet consider not only piecemeal that person whom he represents, but rather the general pattern, so to speak, paying attention to which he may aptly and learnedly imitate the whole plan of the life and customs of the man himself; and present him speaking so that the speech seems not feigned but true . . .

Luisini speaks of having the idea of what one imitates before one's eyes:

Senatorem non effinget qualis vulgo in rep. esse solet, sed qualis esse debet. veras hic voces, idest honestas exponimus.[64]

He will not imitate a senator as he is generally accustomed to be in the state, but as he ought to be. Here we explain "veras voces" as virtuous.

This is Sidney's conception, and Grifoli cites Sidney's favorite example, Xenophon's Cyrus.[65] Lambinus also glosses "exemplar vitae," "veram & perfectam speciem vitae humanae, morumque intueri, quam imitando exprimere, & simulare conetur," ("to pay attention to the true and perfect image of human life and manners which he should try by imitating to express and copy"), although this is ambiguous, especially since he glosses "veras hinc ducere voce: & hinc, id est, ex vita communi, & moribus hominum veras voces elicere."[66] ("and from hence, i.e. from the common life and manners of men to draw forth true voices.") Only Manutius is clearly uninfluenced by the notion of "exemplar vitae" as some kind of ideal pattern:

de quo poeta scribit, eius vitam, & mores inspiciat. ita loquetur vera, idest ita recte imitabitur . . ..[67]

let the poet look at the life and customs of him of whom he writes. Thus he will speak truly, i.e., thus he will imitate rightly.

Jonson's translation reflects his conception of his own art. He adds an "and" to link this passage more closely with the preceding one on learning man's duties from moral philosophy. A poet who has done this

> . . . can
> Indeed give fitting dues to every man.
> And I still bid the learned maker look
> On life, and manners, and make those his booke:
> Thence draw forth true expressions . . .
>
> (451-455)

Horace puts a period after this section and then says:

> Interdum speciosa locis morataque recte
> fabula nullius veneris sine pondere et arte
> valdius oblectat populum meliusque moratur,
> quam versus inopes rerum nugaeque canorae.
>
> (319-322)

> At times a play marked by attractive passages and characters fitly sketched, though lacking in charm, though without force and art, gives the people more delight and holds them better than verses void of thought and sonorous trifles.
>
> (Loeb, p. 477)

Jonson connects the two ideas more closely:

> Thence draw forth true expressions, for sometimes,
> A Poem, of no grace, weight, art, in Rimes,
> With specious places, and being humour'd right,
> More strongly takes the people with delight,
> And better stayes them there than all fine noyse
> Of empty Verses, and meere tinckling toyes.
>
> (455-460)

He completely ignores the concept of the imitation of the ideal, which was not at all suited to his kind of writing, and instead shapes the passage to express his belief in learning as the basis of judgment, which is then exercised in the real world, allowing the poet to give a true picture of the humors he finds there. His use of the word "humour'd" shows how strongly he saw his own experience in this passage.

Jonson's translation of the utile-dulce passage gives some sugges-

tion of his attitude towards this well-worn precept.

> Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci
> lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.
> Hic meret aera liber Sosiis, hic et mare transit
> et longum noto scriptori prorogat aevum.
> (343-346)

> He has won every vote who has blended profit and pleasure, at once delighting and instructing the reader. That is the book to make money for the Sosii; this is the one to cross the sea and extend to a distant day its author's fame.
> (Loeb, p. 479)

> But he hath every suffrage can apply
> Sweet mix'd with soure, to his reader, so
> As doctrine and delight together goe.
> This book will get the Sosii money; this
> Will passe the Seas; and long as Nature is,
> With honour make the far-known Author live.
> (490-495)

This is not a "layer of utile and a layer of dulce" as Swift scornfully describes the practice of inferior writers,[68] but a closer unity, a combination of "doctrine and delight" whose appeal is grounded in Nature.[69] As the next passage to be discussed makes clear, Jonson did not believe that the writer should include profit simply as a means of pleasing one part of the audience, or that pleasure could be a sufficient end for true poetry.

Horace explains why a mediocre poet cannot be tolerated:

> Ut gratas inter mensas symphonia discors
> et crassum unguentum et Sardo cum melle papaver
> offendunt, poterat duci quia cena sine istis:
> sic animis natum inventumque poema iuvandis,
> si paullum summo decessit, vergit ad imum.
> (374-378)

> As at pleasant banquets an orchestra out of tune, an unguent that is thick, and poppy-seeds served with Sardanian honey, give offence, because the feast might have gone on without them: so a poem, whose birth and creation are for the soul's delight, if in aught it falls short of the top, sinks to the bottom.
> (Loeb, p. 481)

As jarring Musick doth at jolly feasts,
Or thick grosse oyntment, but offend the guests,
Poppy, with hony of Sardus; 'cause without
These, the glad Meal might have bin wel drawn out;
So any Poem fancy'd, or forth-brought
To bettering of the mind of man in ought,
If ne're so little it depart the first,
And highest; it sinketh to the lowest, and worst.
(533-540)

The passage in Horace is an appeal for the highest artistic standards, couched in terms of pleasure as the end of poetry, and it aims at discouraging those who think they can write poetry without learning the art, as the next passage makes clear. Most of the commentators believe that Horace means that pleasure was originally the only aid of poetry when it was first invented, and that utility is a secondary aim.[70] Only Philippus suggests an interpretation at all close to Jonson's, speaking of "Poesis itaque ut animos alliceret adinventa, oblectamentisque ad recte vivendi norman adduceret."[71] ("Poetry invented in order that it might allure souls and with delights draw them to the standard of right living.")

The implication of Jonson's translation is that pleasure is an inseparable component in bettering man's mind. This could justify the analogy to luxuries at feasts. But the most important point in his version is that poetry which has the high aim of bettering man's mind must meet the highest aesthetic standards. The poet who claims to be writing for the improvement of mankind and then does sloppy work should not write at all. Indeed it is in some sense immoral to write badly, and therefore such a writer is a hypocrite. Other indications of this attitude have come up for discussion, but it is expressed most clearly in Jonson's version of "Vir bonus et prudens versus reprehendet inertes . . ." (445) ("an honest and sensible man will censure lifeless lines . . ."

[Loeb, p. 487]). Jonson translates: "A good and wise man will crye open shame/ On artless Verse . . ." (633-634). Horace suggests a link between artistic and moral integrity, and Jonson intensifies the statement of that link.

This is Jonson's role as the critic-poet, the Horace of his day--"a good and wise man" who writes according to the highest standards of art himself, and who cires "open shame on artless verse." The moral aim of poetry, its aesthetic standards, and the character of the poet are inseparable. Jonson found this attitude implicit in Horace, and it answered perfectly his need to establish himself as a true poet, by becoming, not an epic poet, a celebrator of heroic virtue in others--the usual image of the true poet in his day--but an almost heroic critic and satirist.

Whether Jonson saw himself fully established as the Horace of his day or not, his efforts had already won him recognition. Indeed, the words with which Sir Thomas Smith describes Jonson in his <u>Voiage and Entertainment in Rushia</u> anticipate his later more fully Horatian status as Laureate:

> the elaborate English <u>Horace</u> that gives number, weight, and measure to every word, to teach the reader by his industries, even our Lawreat worthy Benjamen . . . .
> (H&S 11.374)[72]

FOOTNOTES

1. All quotations from Jonson's work will be from the eleven volume edition by C. H. Herford and Percy and Evelyn Simpson (Oxford, 1925-52). The poems, all published in the eighth volume, will be referred to by the title of the section in which they appear--Epigrams, Forrest, Underwood, Ungathered Verse--and by number. Quotations from the plays will be identified by title (if necessary), act, scene, and line. All other material will be identified by the abbreviation H&S, volume number and page number.

2. William Camden, Britain, trans. Philemon Holland (London, 1610), p. 9, et passim in preface.

3. Ibid., preface (no page numbers).

4. Maurice Powicke, "William Camden," English Studies, n.s.l. (1948), 71.

5. William Camden, Annals, trans. R. N. Gent (London, 1635), "To the Reader," n. pag.

6. Powicke, p. 83.

7. Remaines, p. 28.

8. Annals, p. 103.

9. Remaines, p. 21.

10. Powicke, p. 69.

11. The evidence for his familiarity with Minturno is contained in the quotation that follows. He refers to "the Gentleman which proved that Poets were the first Politicians, etc." Minturno was not, of course, the first to suggest this idea, but he did go to great pains to prove it in his De Poeta (Venice, 1559). See especially pp. 12-13. As for Scaliger, Camden on this same page speaks of "skill, varietie, efficacie, and sweetnesse, the foure materiall points required in a Poet." He echoes Scaliger: "haec igitur esto summa sic: Poetae prudentia,varietas, efficacia, suavitas" (Poetices libri septem, Paris, 1561, p. 113).

12. "Certain Poemes," Remaines, p. 1. This section has a separate pagination.

13. See W. David Kay, "Ben Jonson, Horace, and the Poetomachia" (Princeton Univ. diss., 1968), pp. 77-87, for a discussion of the evidence that this period saw a decisive change in Jonson.

14. Ibid., p. 120.

15. See first chapter, pp. 24-25.

16. See Minturno, De Poeta, pp. 422-425.

17. R. M. Ogilvie, Latin and Greek; A History of the Influence of the Classics on English Life from 1600 to 1918 (London, 1964), p. 11.

18. "David Lloyd in his Memoires, 1668, p. 519, says that in his 'sallies into Poetry and Oratory' Selden was taught by Ben Jonson, as he would brag, to rellish Horace'" (H&S 11.57). And Drummond informs us that "Nid field was his Schollar & he had read to him the Satyres of Horace and some Epigrames of Martiall" (H&S 1.137).

19. L. P. Wilkinson, Horace and His Lyric Poetry (Cambridge, England, 1945), pp. 167-168.

20. Philippus, Sig. Aii v. For complete bibliographical information on all commentaries on Ars Poetica used, see list of editions of Horace consulted.

21. Kay, p. 79.

22. Herford & Simpson discuss this (9.394, 3.412). See also Kay, pp. 42-43.

23. All quotations from Horace will be from Edward P. Morris's edition of the Satires and Epistles (1939; rpt. Norman, Oklahoma, 1968), except in one case where his reading conflicts with Wickham, which will be footnoted separately.

24. The source of the full definition as Cordatus gives it was apparently Minturno. See Henry Snuggs, "The Source of Jonson's Definition of Comedy," MLN, 65 (1950), 543, 544. For a discussion of the definition's significance, see James D. Redwine, "Ben Jonson's Criticism of the Drama" (Princeton Univ. diss., 1963), p. 30.

25. Carol Maddison, Apollo and the Nine: A History of the Ode (London, 1960), pp. 298-299.

26. Ibid., pp. 288-290, 296.

27. Kay, p. 78.

28. See also Kay, p. 45.

29. Kay discussed this at length, pp. 276-281.

30. Kay has discussed a good deal of this (see e.g. pp. 302-305), but not the basic changes Jonson makes in the Horatian material.

31. John J. Enck, Jonson and the Comic Truth (Madison, 1966), pp. 79-80. Kay, pp. 307-312.

32. Niall Rudd, The Satires of Horace (Cambridge, England, 1966), pp. 74-85. Morris, p. 121.

33. Kay, p. 306, H&S 4.194, Redwine, p. 59.

34. Morris, p. 134.

35. Kay, p. 140.

36. This is the only instance in which I have not followed Morris. He attributes "absentem qui rodit" et seq. to Horace's imaginary opponent (pp. 78-79). Both Wickham and Lambinus attribute it to Horace.

37. The Poems of John Dryden, ed. James Kinsley (Oxford, 1958), II, 651.

38. Morris, pp. 141-142.

39. Morris, p. 142.

40. Herford & Simpson emphasize this (1.4.9). Kay takes issue with them (p. 301), but it seems clear to me that the parallel was not complete and that Jonson was fully aware of the fact.

41. After I had finished this chapter, I discovered an addition to the appendix on the books in Jonson's library in the last volume of Herford & Simpson. Jonson did own one of the commentaries I consulted--Aldus Manutius. In some instances the influence of this commentary may have had special significance, but it is still clear that Jonson was not entirely dependent on one commentary. To cite one example, Manutius reads, "Auctoris partes chorus . . . defendat," while Jonson's translation follows Lambinus and others, who read "Actoris partes" (AP 193-194).

42. Lambinus, p. 189v.

43. Luisini, p. 12v. See also Maggi, p. 335.

44. Maggi, p. 336; Philippus, p. 9; Lambinus, pp. 190-191.

45. Luisini, pp. 13-13v.

46. Maggi, p. 341; Luisini, p. 25v.

47. Lambinus, p. 194.

48. Morris, p. 205.

49. Maggi, p. 343; Luisini, pp. 30-30v.

50. Manutius, p. 32, Lambinus, pp. 195v-196.

51. Thus here Jonson follows Manutius to a certain extent, but does not seem to accept his idea that Horace is counseling the poet to follow the easier path by imitating.

52. Maggi, p. 344.

53. Luisini, p. 31.

54. Lambinus, p. 196.

55. I first ran across a reference to Jonson's comment in Millar MacLure, George Chapman: A Critical Study (Toronto, 1966), p. 29. What Chapman actually says is ". . . how pedenticall and absurd an affectation it is in the interpretation of any Author (much more of Homer) to turn him word for word, when (according to Horace and other best lawgivers to translators) it is the part of every knowing and judiciall interpreter not to follow the number and order of words but the materiall things themselves, and sentences to weigh diligently, and to clothe and adorne them with words and such a stile and forme of Oration as are most apt for the Language into which they are converted" (Chapman's Homer, ed. Allardyce Nicoll, (New York, 1956, vol. 1, p. 17). Herford & Simpson mention Jonson's comment in the same appendix that told me about Manutius, and give it in full: ". . . ne durius dicam. relege" (11.593). They point out Chapman's misreading of Horace, but are apparently not aware that it was probably a misreading based on the commentaries, in which Horace's advice is equated with Cicero's. Chapman seems to be following Cicero, although Chapman's version suggests an even freer kind of translation.

56. Luisini, p. 31.

57. Philippus, p. 21v. See also Maggi, p. 344.

58. Manutius is also influenced by Cicero: "Interpretem verba persequi omnia, oratorem eatenus, ut a Romana lingua non abhorreant" (p. 33).

59. Maggi, p. 352.

60. Luisini, p. 46v. See also Philippus, p. 36v; Lambinus, p. 200v.

61. See his Discoveries: "Whensoever, manners, and fashions are corrupted, Language is. It imitates the publicke riot" (H&S 8.593).

62. W. K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short History (New York, 1967), pp. 83-84.

63. Robortello, p. 17; Philippus, p. 49v; Maggi, p. 359; Grifolus, pp. 95-96.

64. Luisini, p. 63v.

65. Grifolus, p. 97.

66. Lambinus, p. 204v.

67. Manutius, p. 73.

68. Jonathan Swift, <u>A Tale of a Tub</u> in "Gulliver's Travels and Other Writings," ed. Miriam K. Starkman (New York, 1962), p. 346.

69. M. H. Abrams speaks of the belief that the criteria of art are based in Nature in discussing later neoclassical critics. In: <u>The Mirror and the Lamp</u> (New York, 1953), p. 17.

70. Robortello, p. 20; Luisini, p. 72v; Lambinus, p. 206. Manutius is clearly not influential here. He speaks of poetry as "natum . . . delectandi causa, postea tamen ad utilitatem transductum . . ." (p. 83).

71. Philippus, pp. 55v-56.

72. Kay emphasizes the distinctive significance of this praise, which "transcends the conventional Renaissance modes of praise," pp. 155-156.

CHAPTER III: JONSON AS THE ENGLISH HORACE

Volpone marked a new departure for Jonson. His work on the Ars Poetica must have made him conscious that Horace, while proudly claiming originality as the first poet to use the forms of the Greek lyric in Latin verse, saw no virtue in the kind of originality that results from ignoring the established conventions of the major genres.[1] Jonson had seen his comical satire as following in the tradition of the Old Comedy of Greece and the formal verse satire of Rome (see above, Chap. II, pp. 76-77), but within this tradition he had claimed for himself a wide license to ignore the rules of comedy and invent his own forms (EMO, 1st Grex. 247-270). We may surmise, however, that when Jonson's attempt to transfer formal verse satire to the stage brought on counterattacks from those he satirized, and he saw his work misunderstood as being without real precedent, and himself accused of railing, he was ready to take Horace's advice and follow the accepted conventions of his genre. In a commendatory poem for Volpone, one of his friends describes the change:

> The strange new follies of this idle age,
> In strange new formes, presented on the Stage
> By thy quick Muse, so pleas'd judicious eyes;
> That th'once-admired ancient Comoedies
> Fashions, like clothes growne out of fashion, lay
> Lock'd up from use: until thy FOXE birth-day,
> In an old garbe, shew'd so much art, and wit,
> As they the Laurell gave to thee, and it.
>
> (H&S 11.320)

The prefatory material of Volpone explains that this new play is Jonson's attempt to raise the "despised head of poetrie againe" by restoring "her to her primitive habit, feature, and majesty" (H&S 5.21).

Here we are to have

> quick <u>comoedie</u>, refined,
> As best Criticks have designed,
> The laws of time, place, persons be observeth,
> From no needful rule he swerveth.
> (Prologue ll.29-32)

The <u>Ars</u> has taught Jonson that if he does not know how to follow the conventions of each genre, "Why (i'the Muses Name)/ Am I cald Poet?" (H&S 8.341, and see above, Chap. II, p. 100). The respect for the forms is new, but the aim is still the same, to distinguish himself from the poetasters by writing poetry as it should be written. Poetasters, Jonson says, will slander anyone.

> This is it, that hath not only rapt me to present indignation, but made me studious . . . to stand off from them: which may most appeare in this my latest worke . . . wherein I have labour'd, for their instruction, and amendement, to reduce, not onely the ancient formes, but manners of the <u>scene</u>, the easiness, the propriety, the innocence, and last the doctrine, which is the principall end of <u>poesie</u>, to informe men, in the best reason of living.
> (H&S 5.20)

"Simul & iucunda, & idonea dicere vitae" is accordingly the motto he chooses for <u>Volpone's</u> title page (H&S 5.11). As he translated it, "Poets would either profit, or delight,/ Or mixing sweet, and fit, teach life the right;" but for Jonson there is no choice, as he indicates by leaving out the <u>aut</u> that begins the line in the original (AP 334). Only the poem that can give both pleasure and profit and thereby teach life the right can accomplish the true end of poetry (see above, Chap. II, p. 109). A passage comparing poetry and visual art in the Discoveries incidentally makes Jonson's point of view even clearer. The words seem to be Jonson's own; no source is given (H&S 11.257).

> They both behold pleasure, and profit, as their common Object; but should abstaine from all base pleasures, lest they should erre from their end; and while they seeke to

better mens minds, destroy their manners.

(H&S 8.610)

Though Jonson had to turn to others for the rules of his genre--Horace gave no rules for comedy--the new emphasis on the rules was an essentially Horatian concept of the means towards an end that Jonson consistently expressed in terms of the Horatian formulation of profit and delight and the betterment of men's minds. The exact knowledge of his art, however, is to Jonson as important a part of his claim to the dignity of a poet as the seriousness of its ends, and when he is defending the perfection of his art he sometimes expresses himself in a way that one critic, James Redwine, has interpreted as showing inconsistency in his concept of the ends of poetry.[2] This misconception is partly based on a lack of understanding of Jonson's interpretation of Horace. Redwine knows that Jonson has worked on the Ars Poetica, and he therefore assumes that Jonson is obviously "quite familiar with the Horatian position that pleasure is the chief purpose of poetry and that the profitable is merely a means of giving pleasure to one segment of the audience."[3] The truth is, Jonson clearly sees the whole of Horace's advice in the Ars Poetica in the light of his conviction that poetry should use every resource of art to embody the truth fitly. If it does so, pleasure and profit will go together, and men's minds will be bettered (assuming that the men in question are capable of such betterment). A closer look at the prefatory material of Jonson's plays reveals his basic consistency, and shows how he again and again turns to Horace to buttress his critical position, confident that their views are identical.

Redwine feels that in the first prologue to The Silent Woman

Jonson is writing "a rather specific defense of comedy on no grounds other than that it affords pleasure to everyone."[4] If we look more closely, we will see that Jonson is not defending comedy, but his own knowledge of his art:

> Truth sayes, of old, the art of making plaies
>   Was to content the people; and their praise
>   Was to the Poet money, wine, and bayes.
> But in this age, a sect of writers are,
>   That onely for particular likings care,
>   And will taste nothing that is populare.
> With such we mingle neither braines, nor brests;
>   Our wishes, like to those (make publique feasts)
>   Are not to please the cookes tastes, but the guests.
> Yet, if those cunning palates hether come,
>   They shall find guests entreaty, and good roome;
>   And though all relish not, sure there will some,
> That, when they leave their seates, shall make 'hem say,
>   Who wrote that piece, could so have wrote a play;
>   But that, he knew, this was the better way.
> For to present all custard, or all tart,
>   And have no other meats to beare a part,
>   Or to want bread, and salt, were but coarse art.

Clearly Jonson is defending his inclusion of popular elements in his comedy against some, super-refined courtiers perhaps, who demand a "purer" work of art, and do not understand the rightful place of these elements in comedy. Not only are popular elements essential, but, Jonson argues, in the beginning they predominated. This does not mean they should do so now; rather, Jonson knows how to mix them with others in just the right proportions. All this implies nothing about the ultimate end of comedy, only about Jonson's knowledge of the means. We can be sure that he saw no contradiction between the first prologue and the second, where, under attack for the satirical element in The Silent Woman, and accused of slandering specific people, he replies:

> The ends of all, who for the Scene do write,
> Are, or should be, to profit, and delight.
> And still't hath beene the praise of all best times,
> So persons were not touch'd, to taxe the crimes.

He also turns to Horace to complete his defense against these accusations, taking as the motto of his play the lines from Horace's defense against similar attacks, "Ut sis tu similis Caeli, Byrrhique latronum,/ Non ego sim Capri, neque Sulci. Cur metuas me?" (H&S 5.153). Horace is politely informing his attackers that they may be thieves, but he is no police spy (S 1.4.69-70).

There is in the Alchemist no less of the popular element that Jonson had defended in The Silent Woman, but apparently when he wrote it, he was most concerned that the judiciousness of his use of all the elements in his play was not appreciated by the people. In the epistle "To the Reader" that prefaces the Alchemist, Jonson complains that

> . . . in Playes . . . now, the Concupisence of Daunces, and Antickes so raigneth, as to runne away from Nature, and be afraid of her, is the onely point of art that tickles the Spectators. But how out of purpose, and place, doe I name Art? When the Professors are growne so obstinate contemners of it . . .. Nay, they are esteem'd the more learned, and sufficient for this, by the Many, through their excellent vice of judgement. . . . I give thee this warning, that there is a great difference between those, that (to gain the opinion of Copie) utter all they can, however unfitly; and those that use election, and a meane.
>
> (H&S 5.291)

"There is given too unworthy leave" to English playwrights (see above, Chap. II, p. 106); but the poet who understands the standards of his art is not influenced by either the courtiers or the people, if either are pleased by what departs from nature and true art.

> Saepe stilum vertas, iterum quae digna legi sint
> scripturus, neque te ut miretur turba labores,
> contentus paucis lectoribus.
>
> (Hor. S 1.10.72-74)

The motto on the title page of the Alchemist announces that Jonson follows this advice:

> Neque, me ut miretur turba, laboro:
> Contentus paucis lectoribus.
>
> (H&S 5.283)

Jonson knows that in his work ". . . the wholesome remedies are sweet,/ And in their working, gaine, and profit meet . . ." (Prologue). If the members of audience do not appreciate the skill with which he has accomplished this, it shows their folly, not his fault.

Clearly for both Jonson and Horace the reaction of any actual audience carries no weight if it contradicts their knowledge of their art. This may seem strange, since they generally speak of their aims in rhetorical terms. But Quintilian has exactly the same attitude; the true orator, like the true poet, must be guided by his knowledge of the high standards of his art, even if the decadent law-courts of his day are not swayed by his methods.[5] High artistic standards are a kind of moral imperative for Quintilian and Horace; Jonson's belief that the ultimate function of art is to embody the truth appropriately makes this even more true for him. This function demands truth to nature and the highest artistic standards, and will bring pleasure and profit to any man with the seeds of goodness in him. But where reason is too much clouded and obscured, truth cannot better the mind. Thus in Cynthia's Revels, after Mercury and Crites have thoroughly exposed and mocked the false courtiers, Mercury says:

> Who sees not now their shape, and nakednesse,
> Is blinder than the sonne of earth, the mole:
> Crown'd with no more humanitie, nor soule.

But Crites responds:

> Though they may see it, yet the huge estate,
> Phansie, and forme, and sensuall pride have gotten,
> Will make them blush for anger, not for shame;
> And turn shewne nakednesse, to impudence.
>
> (V.iv.)

Clearly the poet would be wrong to concern himself with pleasing such an audience; he cannot hope to profit them.

The motto for the title page of Catiline sounds a similar note, suggesting Jonson's unconcern at his failure to please an audience that is not capable of being pleased by a work directed to their reason:

> ---His non plebecula gaudet:
> Verum equitis quoque, iam migravit ab aure voluptas
> Omnis, ad incertos oculos, & gaudia vana.
> (H&S 5.419)

In the original, Horace is discussing the degenerate state of the Roman audience; the people want bearbaiting and fistfights in the middle of the play: "his nam plebecula gaudet./ Verum equitis quoque . . ." (Epist. 2.1.186-188). By changing nam to non Jonson makes the lines explain that neither the people nor the better classes like his "legitimate Poeme" (H&S 5.431) because he is appealing to their ears, that is, their understanding, but they are only interested in what takes the eye.

As with The Silent Woman, Jonson again seems to have felt the need to explain in the prefatory material to Bartholemew Fair that he knows what he is doing, even though he includes some popular elements in his play. For those who know their Horace, the motto on the title page suggests Jonson's meaning:

> Si foret in terris, rideret Democritus; nam Spectaret populum ludis attentius ipsis, Ut sibi praebentem mimo spectacula plura. Scriptores autem narrare putaret asello Fabellam surdo.
> (H&S 6.11)

The passage in Horace from which this is taken describes the shows that go on on stage to please the people, and pictures Democritus as laughing at the audience more than at the spectacle, and seeing the hopelessness of the author's attempt to have his story understood with such an

audience (Epist. 2.1.194-200). Jonson says in the Induction that in this play he has provided the groundlings with the shows they love; these shows are all they will see, he implies in the motto, but there is a rational significance behind them for those who are not like the proverbial deaf ass. Thus he adds at the end of the Induction: "Howsoever, hee prayes you to beleeve, his Ware is still the same, else you will make him justly suspect that hee that is so loth to looke on a Baby, or an Hobby-horse, here, would bee glad to take up a Commodity of them, at any laughter, or losse, in another place" (H&S 11.161-165).

The passage on the tendency of everyone in the audience to prefer shows to substance, used as motto in the Alchemist, is alluded to in the "Prologue for the Stage" of The Staple of News:

> For your owne sakes, not his, he bad me say,
> Would you were come to heare, not see a play.
> Though we his Actors must provide for those,
> Who are our guests, here, in the way of showes,
> The maker hath not so; he'ld have you wise.
> Much rather by your eares, then by your eyes.

For the motto Jonson turns again to the central lines of the Ars:

> Aut prodesse volunt, aut delectare poetae;
> Aut simul & iucunda, & idonea dicere vitae.
> (H&S 6.277)

The poet's desire to speak to the understanding of the audience is thus linked with the Horatian formula for the highest aim of poetry.

The New Inn is published with a defiance on the title page to those who acted it poorly and those who received it squeamishly, and the poet's dignity is upheld by his identification with Horace and the other great Augustans in the motto: ". . . me lectori credere mallem: Quam spectatoris fastidia ferre superbi" (H&S 6.395). The source is again Horace's epistle to Augustus, at the point where he invites Augustus to

turn his attention from the playwrights of the day to those poets "qui se lectori credere malunt . . ." (Epist. 2.1.214-215), poets like Virgil, Varius, and himself (see above, Chap. II, p. 96).

The Magnetic Lady is the only play of Jonson's mature work that does not take its motto from Horace, perhaps because Jonson did not see it through the press. It was first published in the 1640 Folio. In the interlarded critical material, however, we have an interesting statement of the relationship of delight and profit to truth:

> If I see a thing vively presented on the Stage, that the glasse of custome (which is Comedy) is so held up to me by the Poet, as I can therein view the daily examples of mens lives, and images of Truth, in their manners, so drawne for my delight, or profit, as I may (either way) use them: and will I, rather (then make that true use) hunt out the Persons to defame, by my malice of misapplying?
>
> (H&S 6.545)

Here we see the chief emphasis on the basic nature of poetry--that it presents the truth. From such a presentation, profit and delight are naturally both potentially available to the spectator; here Jonson is only concerned with ensuring that, even if his spectators get only pleasure from the truth they see, they will at least not misapply it by seeing it as railing against specific individuals.

If we want to understand fully why Jonson turned to Horace again and again for critical support to rebut all attacks and to strengthen his status under popular disfavor, and why he was influenced by Horace's advice to follow the conventions of the genre one is working in, we must consider Jonson's own statement in his Discoveries on Horace as a critic:

> . . . the office of a true Critick, or Censor, is, not to throw by a letter any where, or damne an innocent Syllabe, but lay the words together, and amend them; judge sincerely

> of the Author, and his matter, which is the signe of solid, and perfect learning in a man. Such was Horace, an Author of much Civilitie; and (if any one among the heathen can be) the best master, both of vertue, and wisdome; an excellent and true judge upon cause, and reason; not because he thought so; but because he knew so, out of use and experience.
>
> (H&S 8.642)

These words are essential to our understanding of what Horace meant to Jonson, not only as a critic but as a poet. They become even more significant when we consider their source. As with so many other passages in Discoveries, this one is based on an extract from another writer, so that a knowledge of exactly what Jonson got from his source and what he added himself is essential if we are to understand Jonson's point of view. In this case, moreover, the source is more than usually important because the author in question is Heinsius, whose attitude towards Horace, as we saw in the first chapter, was unique.

As it happens, the sources for this passage have never before been fully established. The only source given by Herford and Simpson is from the Dissertatio prefixed to Heinsius' 1618 edition of Terence:

> Nobis viri docti ignoscent si haec fusius; praesertim si cogitent, veri Critici esse, non literulam alibi eiicere, alibi innocentam syllabam & quae numquam male merita de patria fuit, per jocum & ludum trucidare & configere; verum recte de autoribus & rebus iudicare posse: quod & solidae & absolutae eruditionis est.
>
> (H&S 11.288)

> Learned men will forgive us if these are rather diffuse; especially if they consider that it is the office of a true Critic not to banish a little letter here, there to take an innocent syllable, which has never deserved ill of its fatherland, and in jest and play transfix and slaughter it; but rather to be able to judge rightly of authors and subjects, which belongs to an erudition both solid and complete.

Paul Sellin has shown that Jonson did not use the Dissertatio for the material from Heinsius on Horace's criticism of Plautus and Terence, but

rather the 1629 edition of Horace;[6] Sellin does not mention this passage, but here too it is obvious that the source is not the Dissertatio. The equivalent passage in the 1629 Horace differs slightly in one place, and Jonson is clearly following it. It reads ". . . innocentem syllabam damnare, vocem tollere alibi aut emendare, sed sincere de autoribus . . .."[7] ("to damn an innocent syllable, to remove an accent elsewhere or to emend, but sincerely about authors . . . .") Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that Jonson does not follow Heinsius exactly. Heinsius condemns verbal criticism altogether; Jonson feels the connection between words and matter to be too significant to allow such condemnation.

So far my observations only establish the obvious source. For what follows, however, there is no source in either the Dissertatio or the 1629 edition. I have discovered that Jonson is drawing instead on the introductory letter to the reader in the 1612 edition; Heinsius there informs the reader that on a recent journey, ". . . sumpsi mecum itineris comitem Q. Horatium Flaccum, autorem plurimae urbanitatis, & si quisquam, optimum virtutis ac sapientiae magistrum."[8] ("I took with me as a companion on the journey Horace, an author of much urbanity, and, if anyone, the best master of virtue and wisdom.") Jonson's translation is too close to leave room for doubt. It is thus clear that Jonson knew both the 1612 and 1629 editions, and that he knew them well and found the opinions expressed in them close to his own. No other explanation would account for his turning so easily from the 1629 edition to the 1612 to find words to describe Horace. As for the end of the passage, it is no longer based word for word on Heinsius, but it sums up one of Heinsius' main points about Horace, and thus shows even more clearly how

thoroughly congenial Jonson found Heinsius' concept of Horace.

It is worth considering this description of Horace carefully, so as to extract its full significance, elucidating it by bringing in other passages in the *Discoveries* and in Heinsius' account of Horace. Latin-English dictionaries of Jonson's day reveal that civility was a common translation of *urbanitas*.[9] Neither word had at that time the limited meaning that both have today; men were still conscious of the root meaning that links them--the sense of the civilization of the city as opposed to rustic barbarity. Thus the OED gives as one of the obsolete meanings of urbanity, "conversation characteristic of well-bred towns-people . . ." But Jonson chose civility as his translation, probably because it had at that time meanings that were closer to the connotations of the Latin *urbanitas* that he wished to stress. The OED gives as archaic meanings of civility, "Polite or liberal education, training in the 'humanities,' good breeding; culture, refinement."

Trimpi has an interesting discussion of the probable meaning of *urbanitas* for Jonson (in contrast with its loss of meaning for Dryden), in which he emphasizes the element of "intellectual sophistication." He gives Quintilian's definition, which is especially pertinent because Quintilian was one of Jonson's favorite authorities:[10] "*Urbanitas* 'denotes language with a smack of the city in its words, accent, and idiom, and further suggests a certain tincture of learning derived from associating with well educated men; in a word, it represents the opposite of rusticity' (VI.iii.17)."[11] Jonson's use of civility to translate *urbanitas* thus suggests that he saw in Horace that true cultivation that results from a combination of "solid and perfect learning" and a knowledge of the world.

Jonson expands the next words, "si quisquam," to "if any one among the heathen can be." It is clear, however, that Jonson's faith in right reason means that, while he may be quite properly reluctant to claim that a pagan can be the best master of virtue and wisdom, he does not hesitate to consider him a master.[12] So Jonson sees in Homer the use of right reason: "Homer sayes, hee hates him worse then hell-mouth, that utters one thing with his tongue, and keepes another in his brest. Which high expression was grounded on divine Reason" (H&S 8.580). And it is clear in Poetaster that Jonson sees in Horace a model of right reason, of virtue nourished and perfected by knowledge (see above, Chap. II, pp. 92-93).

Both Jonson and Heinsius believe that man must use his reason freely, drawing conclusions from his own experience and judging everything he reads by the test of his own perception of the truth. This belief is not of course unique to Jonson and Heinsius; in a world where all external guarantees of truth had been shaken, all men trusted perforce more and more to their own reason. But some men, like Montaigne, came to doubt even the power of man's reason to find any certainty; Jonson and Heinsius were among those who still believed absolutely that reason, if unclouded by passion, could find truth. At one point in the Discoveries, Jonson follows a passage by Montaigne on the aptness of man's mind to entangle itself, but then adds, "But her Reason is a weapon with two edges, and cuts through . . ." (H&S 8.588, 11.239).

This concept of reason lies behind Heinsius' faith that Horace, because his reason operates without any admixture of pride or passion and without any servile adherence to a school of thought, can find the essential truths in all the philosophers: "nudam sine auctoritate

veritatem sequitur, quam docet" (see above, Chap. I, p. 56). Horace's virtue and independence of mind are the guarantees that his "solide and perfect learning" was turned to good account, and that he was "an excellent and true judge, upon cause and reason; not because he thought so; but because he knew so, out of use and experience." Or, in other words, a classical authority who set an example of rational freedom.[13]

The belief in the possibility of reconciling rational freedom and reverence for classical authority is an essential part of Jonson's classicism, and especially influences his attitude towards Horace as a critic. Certain passages from the Discoveries can shed additional light on this belief. One must maintain a healthy independence:

> I know Nothing can conduce more to letters, then to examine the writings of the Ancients, and not to rest in their sole Authority, or take all upon trust from them . . .. For to all the observations of the Ancients, wee have our own experience; which, if wee will use, and apply, wee have better meanes to pronounce . . .. Truth lyes open to all; it is no mans severall.
>
> (H&S 8.567)

At the same time, some Ancients should be reverenced as authorities:

> Our Poet must beware, that his Studie bee not only to learne of himself; for, hee that shall affect to doe that, confesseth his ever having a Foole to his master. Hee must read many; but, ever the best, and choisest: those that can teach him anything, hee must ever account his masters, and reverence: among whom Horace, and (hee that taught him) Aristotle, deserve to bee the first in estimation.
>
> (H&S 8.639-640)

But that reverence is solidly grounded on the belief that these men have been guided by reason:

> Whatsoever Nature at any time dictated to the most happie, or long exercise to the most laborious; that the wisdome, and Learning of Aristotle, hath brought into an Art: because he understood the Causes of things: and what other men did by chance or custome, he doth by reason . . ..
>
> (H&S 8.641)

Jonson had no direct contact with Aristotle; the last passage quoted is based on Heinsius' De Tragoediae Constituione (H&S 11.286). But he agreed with Heinsius in believing that the Ars Poetica represented what Horace had learned from Aristotle. It should now be absolutely clear why Jonson attributed special authority to Horace as a critic and why he was especially drawn to Heinsius' description of him. Jonson must have found Heinsius' edition of Horace a welcome confirmation of his own high estimate of his chosen master, and of his belief that in striving to become the English Horace he was indeed establishing himself as the highest kind of poet and moral authority.

We also now have a good basis for understanding why Jonson accepted Heinsius' rearrangement of the Ars. Heinsius was convinced that Horace's Ars Poetica as it stood lacked rational order, "ut profecto non immerito summi aetatis huius viri, nullum ordinem in ea reperire sese posse, etiam cum stomacho & autoris contumelia testati sint."[14] (so that indeed it is not undeservedly that the most distinguished men of this age have declared with actual anger and insult to the author that they have been able to find no order in it.") But because he also firmly believed that Horace had been guided by a reasoned understanding of Aristotle's criticism in writing his Ars, he attributed its apparent lack of rational order to the errors of the barbarous librarii of the Middle Ages, who had mangled the work by copying passages out of order.[15] Heinsius therefore took it on himself to recover the true order of the Ars, and show that Horace had indeed based his work on rational principles.

The main changes Heinsius made in the Ars consisted of bringing together the material on each genre and arranging it to reflect the

accepted theories of the development of the various genres.[16] These changes provided somewhat more of an impression of continuity; the _Ars_ seemed less like a series of precepts, to be accepted simply because Horace had promulgated them. It had in fact been a common tendency to print the _Ars_ as a series of precepts, thus concealing completely, as Heinsius remarked, the admirable reason with which everything is joined together.[17]

One important change that Heinsius made not only increased the impression of rational order but supported one of Jonson's firmest convictions; he rearranged what was for Jonson the central passage of the _Ars_, on pleasure and profit as the aims of poetry. "Aut simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae" (334) is followed in Heinsius' rearrangement by "Silvestres homines sacer interpresque deorum" through "ne forte pudori/ sit tibi Musa lyrae sollers et cantor Apollo" (391-407).[18] Thus the poet who has to choose among pleasure, profit, and a combination of both as the end of his poetry is guided in his choice by the example of Orpheus and the other great bards who used poetry to lead men from barbarism to civilization:

> Fuit haec sapientia quondam,
> publica privatis secernere, sacra profanis,
> concubitu prohibere vago, dare iura maritis,
> oppida moliri, leges incidere ligno.
> Sic honor et nomen divinis vatibus atque
> carminibus venit.
>
> (396-401)

> In days of yore, this was wisdom, to draw a line between public and private rights, between things sacred and things common, to check vagrant union, to give rules for wedded life, to build towns, and grave laws on tables of wood; and so honour and fame fell to bards and their songs, as divine.
>
> (Loeb, p. 483)

If the poet desires to claim the title of divine bard, he can have no

doubt that his aim must be to, "mixing sweet, and fit, teach life the right." Small wonder that Jonson was convinced that Heinsius had discovered the true order of the *Ars*.

In Jonson's reworking of his translation of the *Ars*, he not only gave a text that he believed to represent its original order, but he also made various small revisions aimed at either polishing his language or giving a more faithful translation. One example will suffice; in his earlier translation he had written:

> My selfe for shortnesse labour, and am stil'd
> Obscure. Another striving smooth to runne, Wants
> strength, and sinewes, as his spirits were done.

These lines were discussed in Chapter II as an example of his tendency to read his own attitudes into Horace (p. 98). Revised, they read:

> My selfe for shortnesse labour; and I grow
> Obscure. This striving to run smooth, and flow,
> Hath neither soule, nor sinewes.
>
> (H&S 8.307)

A much more accurate and polished translation of

> brevis esse laboro,
> obscurus fio; sectantem levia nervi
> deficiunt animique.
>
> (25-27)

> Striving to be brief, I become obscure. Aiming at
> smoothness, I fail in force and fire.
>
> (Loeb, p. 453)

Although Jonson revised this obvious distortion of the original, his basic interpretation of the *Ars* as in harmony with his own convictions remained unchanged. He accepted Heinsius' rearrangement because it reinforced his own concept of Horace, but where Heinsius offered an interpretation that clashed with his, Jonson ignored it. Heinsius felt that the lines "utiliumque sagax rerum et divina futuri/ sortilegis non discrepuit sententia Delphis" (218-219) ("and the thought, full of wise

saws and prophetic of the future, was attuned to the oracles of Delphi" [Loeb, p. 469]), did not describe the decay of the chorus. "Omnis paulatim tragoediae accesserunt, aut perfecta sunt . . . . Ideoque falluntur, meo judicio, viri magni, qui ad chori obscuritatem haec trahunt."[19] ("All have been added to tragedy, or have been perfected, little by little . . . . Therefore those great men who refer these to the obscurity of the chorus are in my opinion mistaken.") Jonson had disagreed with this interpretation before (see above, Chap. II, p. 104) and even when confronted by Heinsius' opinion he still felt confident that Horace was speaking of the kind of decay in language that reflects and accompanies moral decay. As he said in his Discoveries, "Wheresoever, manners, and fashions are corrupted, Language is. It imitates the publicke riot" (H&S 8.593).

Jonson made his translation of Horace's major critical work as close to what he believed the original to have been like as he could; he also continued Horace's critical endeavor, as he saw it, in his Discoveries, and as Horace learned from Aristotle, so Jonson gathered together material from various sources, material which reinforced the lesson of the supreme concern that the true poet must have with the mastery of his art. Jonson never wrote his own Ars Poetica, but we may gather from various passages in the Discoveries the way in which he saw the Horatian concern for aristry in the context of his concept of the nature and function of the poet.

> The order of Gods creatures in themselves, is not only admirable, and glorious, but eloquent; Then he who could apprehend the consequence of things in their truth, and utter his apprehensions as truly, were the best Writer, or Speaker. . . .the shame of speaking unskilfully were small, if the tongue onely were thereby disgrac'd: But . . . disordered speech is not so much injury to the lips

> that give it forth, as to the disproportion, and incoherence of things in themselves, so wrongfully expressed.
>
> (H&S 8.628)

The poet wrongs the truth if he does not embody it fittingly; he takes from it the power it should have to better men's minds. Only by giving the most careful attention to how he writes can a poet "redeeme Arts from their rough, and braky seates . . . to a pure, open, and flowery light, where they may take the eye, and be taken by the hand" (H&S 8. 567).

But perhaps the most striking evidence of Jonson's concern for the perfection of the means of expression is a passage in which he seems to be quoting Bacon approvingly on the various distempers of learning. "It was well said by that late L. St. Alban, that the study of words is the first distemper of Learning . . ." (H&S 8.627). Yet the very concern with words that Bacon contrasts with concern for matter, Jonson makes a part of what the writer should be concerned with: "Wee must . . . make exact animadversions where style hath degenerated, where flourish'd, and thriv'd in choisenesse of Phrase, round and cleane composition of sentence, sweet falling of the clause, varying an illustration by tropes and figures, weight of Matter, worth of Subject, soundnesse of Argument, life of Invention, and depth of Judgement" (627-628).[20] Bacon might scorn the concern for "choiseness of Phrase" or "sweet falling of the clause" and attend only to "weight of matter . . . and depth of Judgement," but Jonson knew that

> . . . any Poeme, fancied, or forth-brought
> To bettring of the mind of man, in ought,
> If ne're so little it depart the first,
> And highest; sinketh to the lowest, and worst.
>
> (H&S 8.331)

And therefore like Horace he was critic as well as poet, helping others to understand the supreme importance of concern for every detail of their art.

Jonson made use of the authority and example of Horace in the same way and for the same basic reasons in his poetry as he did in his critical theory. Lines from Horace again and again give weight to Jonson's poems, as they did to the prefatory material of his plays. Even in Jonson's epigrams, modeled on Martial, he defines his standards by saying that he is not like those from whom Horace too distinguished himself; his book is not going to win fame by slander, "Much less with lewd, prophane, and beastly phrase./ To catch the worlds loose laughter, or vaine gaze" (Epigrams II). So Horace warned his fellow Romans to beware of the man "solutos/ qui captat risus hominum famamque dicacis" (S 1.4.82-83) ("the man who courts the loud laughter of others, and the reputation of a wit" [Loeb, p. 55]), not of his innocent satires.

Perhaps Jonson's most frequent use of lines from Horace is in praising his friends. Jonson saw the discriminating apportionment of praise and blame as one of the central functions of the poet, who as a virtuous man could perceive the truth about those of whom he wrote, and as an artist could give it fitting expression.[21] To quote the words of "the best master, both of vertue, and wisdome" in praising was to reinforce Jonson's discrimination by aligning him with Horace. Thus in praising Lord Egerton, Jonson calls him "a judge, not of one yeare" (Epigrams LXXIV), recalling Horace's praise of Lollius as

> Consulque non unius anni,
> Sed quotiens bonus atque fidus
>
> Iudex honestum praetulit utili,
> Reiecit alto dona nocentium

Vultu . . . .

(C 4.9.39-43)

Jonson says of Sir John Radcliffe, "Then whose I doe not know a whiter soule" (Epigrams XCIII), and thus associates him with "Plotius et Varius . . . Vergiliusque/ . . . animae, qualis neque candidiores terra tulit . . ." (S 1.5.40-42) ("Plotius, Varius, and Virgil, whitest souls earth ever bore . . .," [Loeb, p. 67]),

> A consul not of a single year, but so oft as, a judge righteous and true, thou preferrest honour to expediency, rejectest with high disdain the bribes of guilty men . . .
>
> (Loeb, p. 321)

Sometimes the application does not follow exactly from the original sense. Thus Jonson characterizes Sir John Roe's virtue by speaking of "His often change of clime (though not of mind)" (Epigrams XXXII), recalling "Caelum, non animum, mutant qui trans mare currunt" (Epist. 1.11.27). Horace is telling his friend how useless it is to travel, but the context of the line justifies Jonson's use, as Horace adds that reason and prudence and "animus . . . aequus" (30) make life good anywhere. Horace uses aequus here and elsewhere in an almost Stoic sense, of the balance and self-consistency of a well-governed mind:

> Aequam memento rebus in arduis
> servare mentem, non secus in bonis
> ab insolenti temperatam
> laetitia, moriture Delli . . . .
>
> (C 2.3.1-4)

> Remember, when life's path is steep, to keep an even mind, and likewise, in prosperity, a spirit restrained from over-weening joy, Dellius, seeing thou art doomed to die . . . .
>
> (Loeb, p. 113)

So too Jonson praises the Earl of Salisbury for avoiding envy "By constant suffring of thy equall mind" (Epigrams XCVIII).

It was inevitable that Jonson should also echo Horace's proudest formulation of the Stoic ideal of the wise man:

> He that is round within himselfe, and streight,
>   Need seeke no other strength, no other height;
> Fortune upon him breakes her selfe, if ill,
>   And what would hurt his vertue makes it still.
> (Epig. XCVIII)

> . . . in se ipso totus, teres atque rotundus,
> externi ne quid valeat per leve morari,
> in quem manca ruit semper Fortuna.
> (S 2.7.86-88)

> who in himself is a whole, smoothed and rounded, so that
> nothing from outside can rest on the polished surface,
> and against whom Fortune in her onset is ever maimed.
> (Loeb, p. 233)

It has been said that the sons of Ben learned their Stoicism from Horace; but if so they were surely directed to the Stoic element in Horace by Ben.[22] Horace himself slightly undercuts these lines by the context in which they are spoken: Horace's slave, Davus, is repeating the Stoic precepts he has learned from the doorkeeper of Crispinus, whom Horace mocks elsewhere. Horace always seems just a little sceptical of claiming too unshakable a virtue for any mere fallible mortal; even when he is most serious, he speaks of his wise man as "praecipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est" (Epist. 1.1.108) ("above all, sound --save when troubled by the 'flu'!" [Loeb, p. 259]). This is an aspect of Horace with which Jonson has no sympathy, and of which we hear no echo in his work. The constancy of virtue is the guarantee of truth, and in age where external guarantees, such as the Church, have been shaken, the internal guarantee of the virtuous man's perception is too important to be made light of.

The use of Horatian material in the plays from Volpone on shows clearly how essential virtue is to the perception of truth. The same

passage that Jonson uses seriously to describe the wise and virtuous man in his epigram, he puts into the mouth of Adam Overdo in Bartholemew Fair. Adam, in the course of his absurdities, has gotten himself into the stocks, and proceeds to appropriate to himself Horace's description of a wise man: "Adam thou art above these battries, these contumelies. In te manca ruit fortuna, as thy friend Horace saies; thou art one, quem neque pauperies, neque mors, neque vincula terrent. And therefore as another friend of thine saies, (I think it be thy friend Persius) Non te quaesiveris extra" (IV.vi.96-101). Overdo's reason is clouded by vanity; he can get no good from the wisdom of his "friends," only food for his vanity.

Similarly, Mosca can use Horatian material to flatter Volpone and uphold him in his belief in the righteousness of his perverted way of life, because the sun of Volpone's reason is dethroned by pride and greed. Mosca tells him,

> You are not like the thresher, that doth stand
> With a huge flaile, watching a heape of corne,
> And hungrie, dares not taste the smallest graine,
> But feeds on mallowes, and such bitter herbs;
> Nor like the merchant, who hath fill'd his vaults
> With Romagnia, and rich Candian wines.
> Yet drinkes the lees of Lombards vinegar:
> You will not lie in straw, whilst moths, and wormes
> Feed on your sumptuous hangings, and soft beds.
> You know the use of riches, and dare give, now,
> From that bright heape, to me, your poore observer,
> Or to your dwarfe, or what other household-trifle
> Your pleasure allowes maint'nance.
>
> (I.i.52-66)

Jonson is following almost exactly the description of the insanity of the rich miser:

> Si quis ad ingentem frumenti semper acervum
> porrectus vigilet cum longo fuste, neque illinc
> audeat esuriens dominus contigere granum . . .
>
> (S 2.3.111-121)

> If beside a huge corn-heap a man were to lie outstretched,
> keeping ceaseless watch with a big cudgel, yet never dare,
> hungry though he be and the owner of it all,
> to touch one grain thereof . . .
>
> (Loeb, p. 163)

But the moderation and true pleasure of the Horatian way of life are a closed book to Volpone, whose idea of the "use of riches" is to spend his gold on those emblems of deformity, a parasite, a eunuch, a fool, and an hermaphrodite.

Perhaps the most striking example of this misuse of wisdom comes in The Devil is an Ass, when Meercraft suggests that Fitzdotterel, when he comes into possession of his vast domains, take a title which will be memorable enough to make him and his exploits live in men's minds,

> Yes, when you
> Ha' no foote left; as that must be, Sir, one day.
> And though it tarry in your heyres, some forty,
> Fifty descents, the longer liver, at last, yet,
> Must thrust 'hem out on't: if no quirk in law,
> Or odde Vice o'their owne not do it first .
> . . . Nature hath these vicissitudes. Shee makes
> No man a state of perpetuity, Sir.
>
> (II.iv.27-39)

Meercraft's sententious sermonizing is based on the wise reflections with which the farmer Ofellus consoles himself and his sons for the loss of his land:

> Nam propriae telluris erum natura neque illum
> nec me nec quemquam statuit: nos expulit ille;
> illum aut nequities aut vafri inscitia iuris,
> postremo expellet certe vivacior heres.
>
> (S 2.2.129-132)

> Nature, in truth, makes neither him nor me nor anyone
> else lord of the soil as his own. He drove us out, and
> he will be driven out by villainy, or by ignorance of
> the quirks of the law, or in the last resort by an heir
> of longer life.
>
> (Loeb, p. 147)

The effect of this truth on virtuous men is to teach them to moderate

their ambitions, conscious that no possession can be permanent. But Meercraft knows that on Fitzdotterel, blinded by greed and vanity, it will have no effect at all.

Of course Jonson does more than use specific lines or passages from Horace in his poetry; he plays the role of English Horace in a broader sense in his writing of moral epistles. And sometimes the tone can be very similar. Thus in "An Epistle to Master Arthur Squib" we are reminded of the kind of letters Horace writes to his younger friends, especially in the first few lines:

> What I am not, and what I faine would be,
> Whilst I informe my selfe, I would teach thee,
> My gentle Arthur; that it might be said
> One lesson we have both learn'd, and well read . . ..
> (<u>Underwood</u> XLV)

There is no one model in Horace for this, but the beginning of the second epistle of the first book is similar in tone:

> Troiani belli scriptorem, Maxime Lolli,
> dum tu declamas Romae, Praeneste relegi,
> qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
> plenius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.
> Cur ita crederim, nisi quid te detinent,

> While you, Lollius, Maximus, declaim at Rome, I have been reading afresh at Praeneste the writer of the Trojan War; who tells us what is fair, what is foul, what is helpful, what not, more plainly and better than Chysippus or Crantor. Why I have come to think so, let me tell you, unless there is something else to take your attention.
> (Loeb, p. 263)

A comparison of these passages may well make us question Trimpi's theory that Jonson learned his flexible use of the caesura and his mastery of preserving the rhythms of speech in poetry from the principles of plain style in prose, not from Horace.[23] The perfect urbanity of the tone is certainly what we think of as characteristically Horatian--the humility,

the easy familiarity. But it must be said that this tone is not characteristic of Jonson. His aim, after all, was never to write as much like Horace as possible; it was never in that sense that he desired to be the English Horace. Rather, as one critic puts it, he must "be seen . . . as a modern analogy . . ." performing the same function for his society that Horace had for Augustan Rome.[24] And the most important aspect of that function is not the easy tone of the man of the world that we tend to think of as specifically Horatian, but the sense that the poet speaks from the solid base of a virtuous man's perception of the truth.

In Jonson's moral epistles we are constantly aware that he is speaking from this base. Sometimes he speaks of himself in a way not far removed from Horace:

> Live to that point I will, for which I am man,
> And dwell as in my Center, as I can,
> Still looking to, and ever loving heaven,
> With reverence using all the gifts thence given.
> (Und. XLVII 59-62)

So too Horace concludes an epistle:

> Sed satis est orare Iovem, qui ponit et aufert,
> det vitam, det opes; aequum mi animum ipse parabo.
> (Epist. 1.18.111-112)

> But 'tis enough to pray Jove, who gives and takes away, that he grant me life, and grant me means: a mind well balanced I will myself provide.
> (Loeb, p. 377)

And sometimes like Horace he speaks of his own faults:

> I have the lyst of mine own faults to know,
> Look to and cure; Hee's not a man hath none,
> But like to be, that every day mends one,
> And feeles it; Else he tarries by the Beast.
> (Und. XIII 113-117)

Jonson may be thinking of the passage in which Horace speaks of his

continuing efforts to improve himself:

> Ex hoc ego, sanus ab illis
> perniciem quaecumque ferunt, mediocribus et quis
> ignoscas vitiis teneor; fortassis et istinc
> largiter abstulerit longa aetas, liber amicus,
> consilium proprium: neque enim, cum lectulus aut me
> porticus excepit, desum mihi. 'Rectius hoc est.'
> 'Hoc faciens vivam melius.'
>
> (S 1.4.129-135)

> Thanks to this training I am free from vices which bring disaster, though subject to lesser frailities such as you would excuse. Perhaps even from these much will be withdrawn by time's advance, candid friends, self-counsel; for when my couch welcomes me or I stroll in the colonnade, I do not fail myself: "this is the better course: if I do that, I shall fare more happily . . ..
>
> (Loeb, p. 59)

But Jonson cannot accept fallibility as a permanent state:

> Yet we must more then move still, or goe on,
> We must accomplish; 'Tis the last Key-stone
> That makes the Arch . . ..
> Then stands it a triumphall marke!
> Such Notes are virtuous men! they live as fast
> As they are high; are rooted, and will last.
>
> (135-143)

The virtuous man must be able to stand erect in a sinful world and speak the truth that others would prefer to ignore:

> I, therefore, who profess my selfe in love
> With every vertue, wheresoere it move,
> And howsoever; as I am at fewd
> With sinne and vice, though with a throne endew'd;
> And, in this name, am given out dangerous
> By arts, and practise of the vicious,
> Such as suspect them-selves, and think it fit
> For their owne cap'tall crimes t'indite my wit; . . .
> I, _Madame_, am become your praiser.
>
> (_For_. XIII 7-14, 21)

This is not the tone we expect in an Horatian epistle, but Jonson would not have seen these lines as un-Horatian. In fact, he may well have had in mind the attacks that were made on Horace for similar reasons:

> . . .sunt quos genus hoc minime iuvat, utpote pluris
> culpari dignos. Quemvis media elige turba:

. . . .
omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas . . .
(S 1.4.24-33)

this style is abhorrent to some, inasmuch as most people merit censure. Choose anyone from amid a crowd: he is suffering either from avarice or some wretched ambition . . . All these dread verses and detest the poet . . .
(Loeb, p. 51)

The kind of advice Jonson gives his friends is also much more strenuously and consistently moral than that in Horace's epistles. In such poems as the tenth epistle of Book I, Horace provided a model for the poems of later poets on the advantages of retreating from the world. If Jonson urges his friend to leave London, it is in order to flee its sins and fight in God's cause in Europe (Und. XV). In his epigram, "Inviting a Friend to Supper" (CI), Jonson does not follow Horace; his tone is light and jovial, but he does not tell his friend to forget his business for the evening, nor does he say, "potare et spargere flores/ incipiam, patiarque vel inconsultus haberi" (Epist. 1.5.14-15). ("I shall begin the drinking and the scattering of flowers, and shall suffer you, if you will, to think me reckless" [Loeb, p. 281].) Jonson's emphasis on consistency, his constant recurrence to the theme of constancy ("be always one" [Und. XV 186]), "be always to thy gather'd selfe the same" [Epig. XCVIII]) precludes the indulgence of folly even for an evening. As the emphasis on the constant mind is more insistent, so the indignation at sin burns hotter, and generally at much greater length:

Our Delicacies are growne capitall,
And even our sports are dangers! what we call
Friendship is now mask'd Hatred! Justice fled,
And shamefastnesse together! All lawes dead,
That kept man living! Pleasures only sought!
(Und. XV 37-41)

Jonson in his epistles is frequently not so much a man speaking to his friends, as a poet speaking to his society. The tone he assumes seems un-Horatian to us; certainly it is not characteristic of the Horatian epistle. But in certain of his odes Horace did speak to all Rome, and sometimes lamented her degenerate state just as Jonson did England's, as in the ode on the sins of Rome that ends blackly:

> Aetas parentum, peior avis, tulit
> Nos nequiores, mox daturos
> Progeniem vitiosorem.
>
> (C 3.6.46-48)

> Our parents' age, worse than our grandsires', has brought forth us less worthy and destined soon to yield an off-spring still more wicked.
>
> (Loeb, p. 203)

The significance Jonson attached to the part Horace played as a public poet becomes clear in the only poem he wrote in which the title announces that this is an imitation of Horace: "A speach according to Horace" (Und. XLIV). This poem is the clearest possible illustration of what we have been saying about Jonson as not another Horace but a modern analogy. If it were not for the title, no modern critic would see anything Horatian in this poem. It opens with a bitterly ironic celebration of what there is left in England that looks warlike:

> Why yet, my noble hearts they cannot say,
> But we have Powder still for the Kings Day,
> . . . the French can tell,
> For they did see it the last tilting well,
> That we have Trumpets, Armour, and great Horse, . . .
> They saw too store of feathers, and more may,
> If they stay here, but till Saint Georges Day.
>
> (1-10)

The only men in the country who practice for war are in London's Artillery Company:

> Goe on, increase in vertue; and in fame:
> And keepe the Glorie of the English name,

Up among Nations. In the stead of bold
  Beauchamps, and Nevills, Cliffords, Audleys old;
Insert thy Hodges, and those newer men,
  As Stiles, Dike, Ditchfield, Millar, Crips, and Fen:
That keepe the warre, though now't be growne more tame,
  Alive yet, in the noise . . ..
(49-56)

The young nobility who should be the defense of their country speak:

Our blood is now become
Past any need of vertue. Let them care,
  That in the Cradle of their Gentrie are;
To serve the State by Councels, and by Armes;
  We neither love the Troubles, nor the harmes.
What love you then? your whore. What study? gate,
  Carriage, and dressing. . . .
But why are all these Irons i' the fire
  Of severall makings? helps, helps, t'attire
His Lordship. That is for his Band, his haire
  This, and that box his Beautie to repaire . . ..
Taylors blocks
  Cover'd with Tissue, whose prosperitie mocks
The fate of things: whilst totter'd vertue holds
  Her broken Armes up, to their emptie moulds.
(82-102)

All the force of the satirist is brought into play; the roughness of spoken language breaks through the meter, the use of detail is biting. This "speach" is Jonson's; yet it is also "according to Horace." As Herford and Simpson point out, it is written in the same spirit as the "Roman" odes that begin Book III; in a later ode in the same book there is a parallel attack on the decadence of Roman youth:

  . . . nescit equo rudis
Haerere ingenuus puer
  Venarique timet, ludere doctior,
Seu Graeco iubeas trocho,
  Seu malis vetita legibus alea . . .
(C 3.24, 54-58; H&S 11.82)

The freeborn lad, unpractised, knows not how to ride his steed; he fears to hunt, more skilled in games, whether you bid him try with Grecian hoop or rather with the dice the law forbids . . .
(Loeb, p. 257)

Horace speaks in these poems as a national poet striving to recall

his countrymen to their ancient virtues. These poems have been undervalued by some modern critics, who consider them "inauthentic," even if sincere, written at the behest of Augustus, and against Horace's true bent.[25] I have tried to suggest in the introduction that this attitude ignores the essential unity of Horace's poetry.
In any case, for Jonson Horace's role as a national poet was an essential part of his achievement. The reason of the virtuous poet perceives the true order of society, and the power of his eloquence can recall men to it. As the Augustans spoke to Rome, so here Jonson speaks to England from his perception of the values of the traditional English way of life. He speaks specifically to the nobility because he understands the true function of the nobility in a hierarchical society; when these spoilt young men deny any necessary connection between nobility, virtue, and public service, they destroy their very reason for being.

In the last poem that we are going to consider, Jonson again speaks at once to an individual and to a whole society, as he so often does in his epistles. But this poem is also an imitation of Horace in another sense. "To Sir Robert Wroth" (*Forrest* III) is Jonson's contribution to the tradition of the praise of country life, descended in direct line from Horace's *beatus ille* epode. In fact, we have a first draft of the poem in which it is entitled, in imitation of the traditional title given to the second epode, "To Sir Robert Wroth in praise of a Country Life. Epode" (H&S 8.96). Parthenio, of whose editions of Horace Jonson owned a copy (H&S 1.266), discusses Horace's second epode as an imitation of the passage in the second book of Virgil's Georgics beginning, "O fortunatos nimium": "Ostendam quibus rationibus, quibusque auxuliis adiutus poeta tam feliciter totum virgilii locum de

vitae rusticae laudibus sumptum sic fuerit imitatus, ut suum ipsius non ab alio deductum videatur."[27] ("I will show by what plans and what aids the poet was helped that so happily he imitated the whole borrowed _locus_ of Virgil about the praises of a country life, that it seems his own, not drawn from another.") But Jonson's _beatus ille_ epode is not simply an exercise in saying again in a different way what Horace or Virgil had already said, in order to show his skill in making another's material seem his own. He draws freely on Horace, Virgil, and Juvenal, and creates an entirely new poem, a poem which gives the whole tradition of the praise of a country life a significance found neither in Horace nor in Virgil.[28]

Virgil's lines are a meditation on the ways in which the life of a farmer approaches in happiness and virtue that of an Epicurean sage. As the opening sentence indicates, one of the main differences between the sage and the farmer is that the latter does not realize his good fortune. He lives innocently and peacefully because of external circumstances, not because he has by philosophy banished fear, ambition, and greed, or because he understands the evils of the ways of life he has escaped--evils which Virgil describes at length. Horace's epode describes the farmer's life as _beatus_ because far from the cares of the city--"procul negotiis." Horace dwells on the content of one who is self-sufficient, whose joys are all home-bred; and then of course the poem is undercut by the ending. It has all been the dream of a usurer who in spite of everything he has said cannot bring himself to give up money-lending for farming. Jonson's opening lines at once link his poem with Virgil's and Horace's, and indicate its essential originality:

> How blest art thou, canst love the country, WROTH,
>   Whether by choice, or fate, or both;
> And, though so neere the citie, and the court,
>   Art tane with neithers vice, nor sport . . .
>
> (*For.* III 1-4)

First and perhaps most important, Jonson's poem is not simply a description of the happiness of people who live in the country; rather, it is addressed to a specific person who not only lives in but loves the country. Wroth is no simple and unconscious farmer, but one "neere the citie and the court," in the sense that both ways of life are open to him. Yet it is not clear that his has been a conscious decision, based on a full understanding of the issues involved--his love for the country may be "by choice, or fate, or both." This poem thus has a clear and immediate function: to give Wroth the last, best blessing that Virgil's farmers lack, the understanding of his own blessedness. And, in so doing, the poem defines for all men the virtues of a way of life that is central to society.[29] Jonson is not writing merely a clever imitation, but an urgent discourse, which naturally draws not only on his own experience, but also on all the wisdom of the Ancients who have written on this subject, and brings that wisdom to bear on this specific English case. He has done what truly learned poets have always done: he has made out an expedition "for the discovery of *Truth*," and this poem embodies the "great and profitable Knowledges" that he has gained (H&S 8.570).

When Jonson describes what Wroth has avoided, the details are purely English, and drawn from his own experience:

> That at great times, art no ambitious guest
>   Of Sheriffes dinner, or Maiors feast.
> Nor com'st to view the better cloth of state;
>   The richer hangings, or crowne-plate;
> Nor throng'st (when masquing is) to have a sight

Of the short braverie of the night;
To view the jewells, stuffes, the paines the wit
There wasted, some not paid for yet!

(5-12)

But when he turns to the life Wroth has chosen instead, he begins to draw from both Virgil and Horace:

But canst, at home, in thy securer rest,
Live, with un-bought provision blest;
Free from proud porches, or their guilded roofes,
'Mongst loughing heards, and solide hoofes:
Along'st the curled woods, and painted meades,
Through which a serpent river leades
To some coole, courteous shade, which he calls his,
And makes sleepe softer then it is!

(13-20)

"Un-bought provisions" echoes Horace's "dapes inemptas," and "proud porches" owes something to both "foribus superbis" (Virgil 461) and "superba limina" (Horace 7-8), but the main source is Virgil:

at secura quies et nescia fallere vita,
dives opum variarum, at latis otia fundis,
speluncae vivique lacus, at frigida Tempe
mugitusque boum mollesque sub arbore somni
non absunt . . .

(468-471)

Moreover secure repose, and a life that does not know how to deceive, rich in manifold wealth, moreover leisure with broad estates, caves and living lakes, and a cool valley and the lowing of cattle and soft sleeps under a tree are not absent . . .

But to quote the main source is to show how little Jonson really owes to his source. The whole is given unity by the contrast between the insubstantial goods grasped at by city-dwellers and the real goods of the country, between "guilded roofes" and "solide hoofes." The woods and meadows are "curled" and "painted," but they are not artificially so, like a court lady, and the shade is "courteous" in a real way, offering Wroth soft sleep.

The description of hunting that follows recalls the second epode, but the only actual echos are "the flying hare" (29) and "the greedie thrush" (34). Other details would have been out of place: boars and cranes must give place to deer and partridge. And, more important, where for Horace the emphasis is as much on the "iucunda praemia" (36)) as it is on the sport, Jonson expressly says "More for thy exercise, then fare" (30), and puts the emphasis rather on the harmlessness of this activity, and on the inexhaustibleness of its innocent pleasure:

Thou dost with some delight the day out-weare,
  Although the coldest of the yeare!
(35-36)

The delights of hunting are followed by the fruitful labors of each season, and those of Virgil's details that are appropriate are consequently appropriated: the "laden furrowes" (42), and "the hogs retun'd home fat from mast" (44). The emphasis is on the beneficient working together of man and nature: "those boughes made/ A fire now, that lent a shade!" (45-46). The feast that follows may have been suggested by Virgil's feast on the grass (527-531), but more importantly it completes the cycle. The meretricious feasts of the city gave way to first complete peace, then innocent and satisfying pleasurable activity, and then fruitful labor with nature. Now, in its due place, "PAN and SYLVANE, having had their rites" (47), comes a new kind of feast, that represents an appropriate culmination of an innocent and beneficient way of life, not simply the desire of the "ambitious guest" to gorge himself and see fine sights. This passage echoes Virgil in claiming, "Such, and no other, was that age, of old,/ Which boasts t'have had the head of gold" (63-64), but the feast is an English Christmas, and it represents the final transformation of the

whole of society, "the rout of rurall folke" (53) and "the great <u>Heroes</u>" (56) of the Sidney kin all joining in celebration, "Nor are the <u>Muses</u> strangers found" (52), and all those who participate are purged of quarrelsomeness and acquisitiveness.

The rest of the poem is then devoted to making the ethical significance of this way of life more explicit, first by contrasting it with the sin and misery of other ways of life, where men live only for themselves, yet get no real pleasure from doing so. A few of the details are reminiscent of the passage in Virgil describing other ways of life, but the language is stronger, and the dominant note is the futility of such lives, which have no place in the social order.

> Let that goe heape a masse of wretched wealth,
>   Purchas'd by rapine, worse then stelath,
> And brooding o're it sit, with broadest eyes,
>   Not doing good, scarce when he dyes.
> (81-84)

This may be based on "condit opes alius defossoque incubat auro" (507) ("another stores up wealth and jealously watches over buried gold"), but it goes far beyond it.

The ending of the poem, following to a certain extent the ending of Juvenal's tenth satire, puts the whole in a religious context. The country way of life is not one gotten at the expense of others by greed and striving, but by God, and to enjoy it is to fulfill His will:

> . . . howsoever we may thinke things sweet,
>   He always gives what he knowes meet;
> Which who can use is happy: Such be thou.
>   Thy morning's and thy evening's vow
> Be thankes to him, and earnest prayer, to finde
>   A body sound, with sounder minde
> To doe thy countrey service, thy selfe right;
>   That neither want doe thee affright,
> Nor death; but when thy latest sand is spent,
>   Thou maist thinke life, a thing but lent.
> (97-107)

This is imitation in the highest sense. Never is there any indication that Jonson is incorporating alien elements in his poem; Virgil and Horace are thoroughly digested, and Jonson speaks as the English Horace, defining a sane way of life in purely English terms. From this time on, the tradition of the praise of a country life is naturalized in England.[30]

In defining the country life in England, Jonson has once again spoken as a national poet. But there is one element in Horace's stance as a national poet that was very important to Jonson, which we have not yet considered in this chapter: his relationship with Augustus. In the second chapter we discussed the relationship between Horace and Augustus in Poetaster, and mentioned that it was the model for the relationship Jonson later aimed for with James (see pp. 92-93). Before we begin our consideration of the relationship he actually achieved with James, let us turn once again to the Discoveries to learn more of Jonson's attitude towards kingship, and towards the proper relationship of the king and the poet.

Here, as elsewhere, the truth that Jonson perceived was the traditional truth:

> After God, nothing is to be lov'd of man like the Prince: He violates nature, that doth it not with his whole heart. For when he hath put on the care of the publike good, and common safety; I am a wretch, and put off man, if I doe not reverence, and honour him: in whose charge all things divine and humane are plac'd.
>
> (H&S 8.594)

This seems to be Jonson's own; Herford and Simpson at any rate cite no source (11.245). The king is defined by his truth to his ideal nature. Jonson never really tries to grapple with the problem of what should be done about a bad king. But he recognizes that the king needs help if

he is to understand his true function, and sees the poet as the natural giver of that help, while the king is the natural support of the poet:

> Learning needs rest: Soveraignty gives it. Soveraignty needs counsell: Learning affords it. There is such a Consociation of offices, between the Prince, and whom his favour breeds . . . from whom doth he heare discipline more willingly, or the Arts discours'd more gladly, then from those, whom his owne bounty, and benefits have made able and fruitful.
>
> (H&S 8.565)

Thus in Poetaster Augustus is willing to "heare discipline" from Horace (see above, Chap. II, p. 93). Poet and king are continually associated in Jonson's mind; one of the lines he quotes repeatedly, or translates, or alludes to, is "Solus Rex, & Poeta non quotannis nascitur" (H&S 9.390).

A proper relationship between a good king and a true poet reflects equal credit on both. In Poetaster, Augustus is able to judge which poets are worthy of the name because virtuous; he banishes Ovid and exalts Virgil. He is for Jonson a prototype of the ruler who is himself ruled by reason, and who functions in his kingdom as the sun does in the natural world, or God in the universe, encouraging virtue and repressing vice (see above, Chap. II, p. 92). Thus it is not surprising that in establishing Horace's claim to pre-eminence, Jonson follows Heinsius and reinforces that claim by speaking of his relationship with Augustus. I give the original first because the departure from it in Jonson's significant:

> Augusto autem, optimo ingeniorum iudici, tam gratus atque acceptus, ut non raro lepidissimus homuncio ab eo diceretur, & quem, si antiquitati habenda hic fides, etiam habere ob epistolis optavit.[31]

> For to Augustus, the best judge of character, he was so pleasing and agreeable that often he was called by him "wittiest little man," and one whom, if here

> faith is to be had in antiquity, he even desired to have for his correspondence.
>
> Againe, a man so gratious, and in high favour with the Emperour, as _Augustus_ often called him his wittie _Manling_, (for the littleness of his stature;) and (if wee may trust Antiquity) had design'd him for a Secretary of Estate; and invited him to the Palace, which he modestly praid off, and refus'd.
> (H&S 8.643)

Note that Jonson simply says "in high favour with the Emperour," as though that were distinction enough.

Obviously, given this attitude, it would never have occurred to Jonson to criticize Horace for praising Augustus or for trying to help forward Augustus' aims for Rome. Never did he accuse Horace of servility. One imagines that he must have seen the lines in which Horace describes his relationship with Augustus as among the proudest ever written. Horace addresses his Muses:

> Vos Caesarem altum, militia simul
> Fessas cohortis abdidit oppidis,
> Finire quaerentem labores
> Pierio recreatis antro.
>
> Vos lene consilium et datis et dato
> Gaudetis, almae.
> (C 3.4.37-42)

> 'Tis ye who in Pierian grotto refresh our noble Caesar, when he seeks to soothe his cares, now that he has settled in the towns his cohorts wearied with campaigning. Ye give gentle counsel, and delight in giving it, ye goddesses benign.
> (Loeb, p. 189)

Here is the relationship in which a poet ought to stand to a king. Jonson aspired to it with Elizabeth, to a certain extent achieved it with James, and (it is one of the bitter notes of his later years) all but lost it completely with Charles.

Jonson's vision of himself in this role had a profound effect on

his attitude to any work he was called on to do that was associated with the king, an effect that his contemporaries did not always understand. Thus when Jonson had his first chance to play Horace to James's Augustus, in the Entertainment that London offered to the King as he passed through the town on his way to his coronation, he naturally brought all his learning to bear, to let the king understand his qualifications, and (among other quotations) used on his triumphal arch,

> these two verses out of HORACE
> IURANDASQUE SUUM PER NOMEN PONIMUS ARAS,
> NIL ORITURUM ALIAS, NIL ORTUM TALE FATENTES.
> (H&S 7.96, Epist. 2.1.16-17)

> we . . . set up altars to swear by in your name,
> and confess that nought like you will hereafter
> arise or has arisen ere now.
> (Loeb, p. 397)

Dekker, who wrote part of this entertainment, clearly had no conception of the role Jonson saw himself as playing with his king, and when he came to publish his share in the work, questioned Jonson's use of learning:

> Such feats of Activite are stale, and common among Schollers, (before whome it is protested we come not now (in a Pageant) to play a Maisters prize) For Nunc ego ventosae plebis suffragia venor. The multitude is now to be our Audience, whose heads would miserably runne a wooll-gathering, if we doe but offer to breake them with hard words.
> (H&S 10.388)

Jonson sought the suffrage of the windy multitude no more than did Horace, whose words are here misused (see Epist. 1.19.37); he wrote to his king.

Published together with the Entertainment in the 1604 Quarto was Jonson's Panegyre on the king, in which he further shows his conception of his role by giving the king good advice under the guise of praise,

as was the accepted method.[32]

> He knew that princes, who had sold their fame
> To their voluptuous lustes, had lost their name;
> And that no wretch was more unblest then he,
> Whose necessary good was now to be
> An evill king . . . (H&S 7.116)

After much similar praise of James for all he supposedly already knows about the way he should behave, Jonson closes with that favorite line of his: "Solus Rex, & Poeta non quotannis nascitur" (H&S 7.117).

With this background, it should be easy to understand Jonson's dedication to the masque as an art form. Meagher, who provides a very interesting discussion of what Jonson was trying to accomplish in his masques, feels a contradiction between the essentially private nature of Renaissance humanism--contentus paucis lectoribus--and the apparent attempt to reform the court in the masques. He concludes that Jonson was simply trying to show the ignorant distorters or contemners of humanism how it could be used to advance the good life.[33] What Meagher does not realize is that the Masques provided Jonson with his best opportunity of assuming the Horatian role vis-à-vis his Augustus. Here was a form of poetry that James would subsidize, and that could then become a vehicle for counsel.

One other point about the masques: it was inevitable that if Jonson had anything to do with such a spectacle, he should attempt to make it serve the betterment of man's mind. In the introductory material of one of his first masques, he says:

> It was my first, and special regard, to see that the Nobility of the Inventions should be answerable to the dignity of the persons. For which reason, I chose the Argument, to be, A Celebration of honorable, & true Fame, bred out of Virtue: observing that rule of the best Artist [marg.: Hor. in Art. Poetic.], to suffer no object of delight to pass without his mixture of

profit, & example.

(H&S 7.282)

No work of art can hope to last without a mixture of profit and delight; Jonson knew this from Horace. A masque that is mere show is a body without a soul; without Jonson's poetic invention, "the glory of all these solemnities had perish'd like a blaze, and gone out, in the beholder's eyes" (H&S 7.209).

The masque, then, was for Jonson a truly Horatian art form, in every sense. All the resources of art were brought together to give fitting embodiment to inventions "grounded upon antiquity, and solid learnings" (H&S 7.209), with the aim not only of bettering man's mind in general but specifically of guiding the king in the fulfillment of his role. No better illustration could be given of the nature of Jonson's classicism than this: the creation of an Horatian art form out of the masque, a form of which antiquity had never heard and for which it could offer no pattern.

It is sad to note, however, that once again Jonson's audience seems to have been incapable of perceiving the truth he offered them, though so fittingly embodied. Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue, surely a perfect masque if any ever was, had to be augmented by a dance of comic Welshmen before it met the King's approval (H&S 10. 516-517). We can understand why Jonson sometimes grew bitter enough to write of the waste of wit in masques (see above, p. 150). And, when James died, Charles appreciated his art even less. Jonson was asked for only two masques in Charles's time, and he felt this neglect bitterly. At the end of the epilogue to The New Inn he writes:

When e're this carcasse dies, this Art will live.
And had he liv'd the care of King, and Queen,

> His Art in something more yet had been seene;
> But Maiors, and Shriffes may yearely fill the Stage;
> A Kings, or Poets birth doth aske an age.

His favorite line sounds bitter in this context.

When The New Inn was scorned by the playgoing audience, Jonson advised himself to take up "thine owne Horace, or Anacreons Lyre" and sing of Charles's glory (H&S 6.493). But we hear a note of bravado in his words, and "I.C.'s" response seems wishful thinking:

> Sing English Horace, sing
> The wonder of thy King;
> Whilst his triumphant Chariot runs his whole
> Bright course about each Pole:
> Sing downe the Roman Harper; he shall raine
> His bounties on thy vaine:
> And with his golden Rayes
> So guild thy glorious Bayes
> That Fame shall beare on her unweried wing,
> What the best Poet sung of the best King.
>
> (H&S 11.338)

The prophecy was not to be fulfilled. The poems that Jonson did write for and about Charles and his family, on birthdays and state occasions, are superior to most such efforts in their independence of spirit, but they are not among Jonson's best work. And, given the verdict of history, it would be sad if Jonson's reputation as a poet were linked in any way with Charles's as a king.

Horace lives in men's minds associated with Maecenas and Augustus; Jonson, although no less eager for such relationships with patron and ruler, seems rather to stand utterly alone and independent. This contrast can be taken as grounds for seeing Jonson as essentially un-Horatian, but this would be, it seems to me, a misunderstanding of the Horatian pose as Jonson understood it.[33] Jonson saw Horace as essentially independent, and at the same time fortunate enough to have found a ruler who not only shared his basic moral concerns but understood the

power of poetry (see above, Chap. II, p. 92, quotations from Poetaster). Jonson felt himself as much at the moral center of his society as did Horace: the Stuart kings and their ministers professed ideals of service and subordination of private to public good that were in harmony with Jonson's own Horatian rejection of acquisitiveness as a way of life.[34] Unfortunately, the Stuart kings did not share Augustus' appreciation of the importanceof poetry, and Jonson could not reach the security of Horace.

Nevertheless, Jonson could and did have the essential element of the Horatian stance. To be the English Horace meant for Jonson essentially to be concerned with the fitting embodiment of that central ethical truth, which he, like Horace, was fitted by his virtue to perceive. Within the framework of this concern everything Jonson learned from Horace fell into place: the overriding concern with artistry, the cultivation of the ethical epistle, the praise of a country life, the role as a public poet, and the relationship with the ruler. And it is because this concern informed all of Jonson's "imitation" that Sidney Godolphin could say of him, in one of the best of the elegies, that he was

> Tun'd to the highest Key of ancient ROME,
> Returning all her Musique with his owne . . .
> (H&S 11.450)

FOOTNOTES

1. On this subject, see Ben Jonson's Literary Criticism, ed. James D. Redwine, Jr., (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1970), pp. xv, xvi, and Kay, pp. 154-155.

2. Redwine, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii. And at greater length Redwine's dissertation, "Ben Jonson's Criticism of the Drama," Princeton Univ., 1963, pp. 21-24.

3. Redwine, diss., p. 21.

4. Redwine, Ben Jonson's Literary Criticism, p. xxxvi.

5. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, ed. and trans. H. E. Butler (1920; rpt. Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 279-289, II.xi-xii.

6. Paul R. Sellin, Daniel Heinsius and Stuart England (London, 1968), pp. 150-153.

7. Horace, Operae, ed. Daniel Heinsius (Leyden, 1629), vol. 2, Notae, p. 186.

8. Horace, Operae, ed. Daniel Heinsius (Leyden, 1612), n. pag. Heinsius also put out an edition in 1610, which I have not been able to consult, but as he had not emended the text of that edition, and as the letter to the reader discusses his emendations, we may safely assume that it appeared first in the 1612 edition. I quoted in the first chapter the version of this sentence Heinsius included in the 1629 edition (see p. 52). It leaves out "si quisquam," and changes the meaning slightly by saying that Horace is not only urbane, but also a guide; "ducem" replaces "magistrum."

9. See for example Thomas Cooper's Thesaurus Linguae Romanae & Britannicae (London, 1565), and Francis Holyoake's Dictionarium Etymologicum Latinum (Oxford, 1627).

10. Thus he urges Drummond to read Quintilian if he would better his poetry (H&S 1.132).

11. Wesley Trimpi, Ben Jonson's Poems (Stanford, 1962), pp. 80-81.

12. For a thorough discussion of right reason, see Robert Hoopes, Right Reason in the English Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).

13. Spingarn speaks of "the fame of Daniel Heinsius, in whom classical authority and rational freedom seemed harmonized," in Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century (1907; rpt. Bloomington, Indiana, 1963), I, xvii.

14. Heinsius 1612, Notae, p. 68.

15. Loc cit.

16. Ibid., pp. 69-70, 99.

17. Ibid., p. 114.

18. Ibid., pp. 112-113.

19. Ibid., p. 75.

20. Herford and Simpson give Bacon's words, but do not seem to have noticed Jonson's contradiction of his original (11.273).

21. On this see Earl Miner, *The Cavalier Mode from Jonson to Cotton* (Princeton, 1971), p. 275, and Alexander W. Allison, *Toward an Augustan Poetic* (Lexington, Ky., 1962), p. 11.

22. Miner, pp. 88-93. Nathaniel Field, the young actor with whom Jonson read Horace (see above, Chap. II, footnotes, p. 113), credited Jonson with having taught him an essentially Stoic wisdom (H&S 5.6).

23. Trimpi, p. 128.

24. Gabriele B. Jackson, *Vision and Judgement in Ben Jonson's Drama* (New Haven, 1968), p. 12. She discusses Jonson's belief in the embodiment of the truth as the main function of the poet, but sees that truth as a kind of Platonic vision, glimpsed only when the poet is "mad" (pp. 12-14).

25. L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and his Lyric Poetry*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, England, 1951), pp. 64-76. Antonio La Penna, *Orazio e l'ideologia de principato* (Torino, 1963), pp. 23-28. Also see above, Introduction, p. 2.

26. All references to Virgil are to the Loeb edition, trans. and ed. H. Rushton Fairclough (1932; rpt. Cambridge, Mass., 1957).

27. Horace *Operae*, ed. Bernardino Parthenio (Venice, 1584), commentary on Epode II.

28. Maren-Sofie Rostvig, in her study of the *beatus ille* tradition, discusses Jonson's poem, but sees in it little more than a close approximation to Horace's epode. *The Happy Man*, I (Oslo, 1954) 61-63.

29. G.G.R. Hibbard, "The Country House Poem of the Seventeenth Century," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, (1956), p. 159.

30. Loc. cit.

31. Heinsius, 1629, *Notae*, p. 152.

32. John C. Meagher, _Method and Meaning in Jonson's Masques_ (Notre Dame, 1966), p. 160.

33. Meagher, p. 185.

34. Isabel Rivers discusses Jonson in Chapter II of her book, _The Poetry of Conservatism, 1600-1745; a study of poets & public affairs from Jonson to Pope_ (Cambridge, Eng., 1973). I had completed my work on this chapter before I read her book. She mentions Horace only once in her discussion of Jonson, and then it is to contrast Jonson and Horace, because Jonson lacked Horace's independence (which was based on the Sabine farm); on the other hand, she sees in Jonson's allusions to Horace in "To Wroth" an indication of "an attitude of mind . . . which is in some sense anti-social . . ." (p. 51). This ties in with her general feeling that Jonson's ethical stance was essentially Stoic, and that this was at odds with his commitment to the social hierarchy and the monarchy, although Jonson himself was not conscious of this conflict (_passim_., summed up, p. 71). She thus seems neither to appreciate the extent of Horace's involvement with his society, nor the way in which Jonson's role as English Horace reconciled what she sees as disaparate elements in his life.

35. L. C. Knights, _Drama and Society in the Age of Jonson_ (London, 1937), pp. 160-161, Chap. 7 _passim_.

CHAPTER IV: DRYDEN AND HORACE, 1659-1680: HORACE THE CRITIC

Thanks in part to Jonson, Horace had become so influential a figure in Dryden's day that any serious poet inevitably had to reckon with him and to define himself in relation to him. Dryden, however, was not and did not want to be another English Horace; a thorough study of why this is so, and what Dryden's actual attitude towards Horace was, gives us a new perspective on Dryden, and on the role of Horace in English literature and critical theory during the later seventeenth century. In this chapter we will concentrate on Dryden's attempts to come to terms with Horace the critic and with those who claimed to be his representatives, but first we must consider the changes in Horace's position between Jonson's day and Dryden's, especially as they bear on the question of why Dryden did not choose to imitate Horace in his early public poetry.

Some idea of the change in Horace's position in England during this time can be gained from the increase in the availability of his works in translation. Until 1621, the only available translation was Drant's, discussed in my first chapter. Two translations of selected odes were published during Jonson's lifetime. Between Jonson's death and the Restoration, there were five translations, containing more extensive selections of Horace's poetry, and in 1666 the first complete translation appeared.[1]

Between Jonson's death and 1666 there was a gradual change in men's concept of and attitude towards Horace, and this change is reflected in the prefatory material of the 1666 translation. Alexander Brome, the

collector of the translations in this volume, professes to have undertaken the project because he was inspired by "the frequent Quotations of Horace by all sorts of ingenious men, and the Hault-goust which the wit and truth of his excellent sayings gave . . ."[2] The use of the French term suggests one of the reasons for Horace's popularity among the Restoration wits. They looked to France, where Horace had always been more popular than in England, and was particularly loved by the courtiers of Louix XIV, who saw in him "un bel esprit de la Cour d'Auguste."[3]

The whole tone of the prefatory material suggests that Brome considers Horace a prototype of the Restoration courtier, unfortunate in having been on the wrong side in the Civil Wars, but too prudent to have fought with much zeal, and very ready to make his peace with Augustus.[4] Even certain aspects of his moral standards condemned by previous editors and translators seem congenial: "He had that good natured Vice (if it be one) which constantly adheres to great Wits, and is much indulged by high imagination; an inclination to women . . . ."[5] As for his poetry, it gets little attention. It was inspired only by poverty: "Now being become a Courtier, and not old or bold enough to begg; and Augustus, so new after a Warr, not rich enough to give; he (like others of his Order) wanted Money, and that put him upon making Verses, which he performed to Admiration . . . ."[6]

The only aspect of his poetry discussed at all is his satire, and as it is described it hardly sounds like poetry: "By frequent Company-keeping, and strict observation he informed himself of all the vices and humours of Rome, which he reproved and chactised in a way of raillery, whereby men jeer'd out of their ill Manners, and not offended . . . ."[7]

Brome says not a word about the Roman Odes, or about Horace's role as a national poet; his only relationship with Augustus is that of a courtier with a ruler. As for his philosophy, ". . . if he adhered to any Sect, it was the Epicureans. At first he was no great Zealot in religion . . . of which nevertheless he afterwards repented and made an Ode, professedly to testifie his Recantation."[8] The tendency to emphasize the Stoic elements in Horace's thought is gone, while Epicureanism has become acceptable, and even fashionable, in England as in France.[9] The ode which had always been taken as evidence that Horace had abandoned his early Epicureanism is now suspect, as it had almost never been before (see above, Chap. I, p. 36), no doubt because a recantation would be an enthusiastic gesture, and thus abhorrent to Horace as a man of the world.

Clearly Brome's attitudes indicate the kind of trivialization of Horace that is apparent in Dacier, as I pointed out at the end of the first chapter. Add to this that the most serious admirer of Horace at this time was Cowley, and that he saw Horace as above all a poet of retirement,[10] and we have one reason why Dryden did not look to Horace as a model for the public poetry with which his career began. Another reason was that Dryden almost never uses the first person singular; rather he speaks as a member of a group, generally "we Englishmen," all of whom supposedly share the opinion he expresses. Nor does he ever speak in these early poems as a Poet immortalizing a great man; in fact, in the "Heroique Stanzas" on Cromwell's death, he rejects that stance:

> . . . they whose muses have the highest flown
> Add not to his immortall Memorie,
> But do an act of friendship to their own . . . .[12]

References to Biblical and classical history serve to heighten Dryden's

public poetry, and contemporary English history forms its substance.

One of Dryden's poems of this period is particularly interesting for our purposes because it echoes one of Jonson's imitations of Horace. In "To My Lord Chancellor, Presented on New-Years-day" (Works I.38-42), Dryden's opening lines recall the first lines of Jonson's "Epistle to Elizabeth Countesse of Rutland" (Forrest XII), also a New Year's gift:

> Whil'st that, for which, all virtue now is sold,
> And almost every vice, almightie gold,
> That which, to boot with hell, is thought worth heaven, . . .
> Toyles, by grave custome, up and downe the court, . . .
> While thus it buyes great grace, and hunts poor fame,
> . . . whil'st gold beares all this sway,
> I, that have none (to send you) send you verse.

Dryden borrows Jonson's conceit, and faintly echoes his satire:

> While flattering crouds officiously appear
> To give themselves, not you, an happy year;
> And by the greatness of their Presents prove
> How much they hope, but not how well they love;
> The Muses (who your early courtship boast
> Though now your flames are with their beauty lost)
> Yet watch their time . . ..

But while Jonson goes on to a proud description of the value of his gift, based on Horace's two odes on the power of poetry (see above, Chap. II, p.80), Dryden, having shifted from Jonson's bold first person singular to "the Muses," presents them as "Decay'd by time and wars," "antient Ladies" now, and "forc'd to woo." Jonson's Horatian originals are utterly forgotten. Dryden is simply complimenting Clarendon on his poetry and his early friendship with poets, and suggesting that a renewal of that friendship would help in the restoration of poetry traditionally associated with the Restoration of Charles. All this serves as a graceful introduction to a lengthy and highly figurative description of Clarendon's function as chief minister, designed apparently to

defend Clarendon against his envious enemies (Works I.242-243). Dryden is concerned with the details of contemporary politics in a way Jonson never was. He is not at all concerned with establishing himself as an Horatian poet.

In the two commendatory epistles that he wrote at this time, "To My Honored Friend, Sir Robert Howard" (Works I.17-20), and "To My Honored Friend, Dr. Charleton" (Works I.43-44), Dryden shows no inclination to follow Horace as an epistolary poet. He still uses the first person plural, and both epistles are essentially public poems linking literary concerns with political.

The Essay of Dramatick Poesie makes clear the kind of role Horace did play in Dryden's work at this time. He later described this period in his life:

> I was drawing the Out-Lines of an Art without any Living Master to Instruct me in it . . . Johnson, who by studying Horace, had been acquainted with the Rules, yet seem'd to envy to Posterity that Knowledge . . ..
>
> (Kinsley II.602)

Horace is a source of the Rules of drama. In the dispute between Crites and Eugenius on the relative merits of the Ancients and the Moderns, there is no debate on this point. Crites states the accepted doctrine:

> Of that Book which Aristotle has left us, Horace his Art of Poetry is an excellent Comment, and I believe restores us that Second Book of his concerning Comedy, which is wanting in him.
>
> (Works XVII.17)

Crites discusses the Rules as means to an exact imitation of nature (Works XVII.17-19), and Eugenius fully acknowledges their value (21-22).

In the course of this first debate we become aware of one of the reasons why Dryden would never have considered imitating any of the

Ancients in the same way Jonson had. One of Crites' main arguments for the superiority of the Ancients is that Jonson "the greatest man of the last age," imitated them. "He was not only a professed Imitator of Horace, but a learned Plagiary of all the others. . ." (21). Eugenius, though he admires Jonson "above all other poets" (21), is not at all swayed by his example, and argues against "a dull imitation" of the Ancients, which would leave no room for improvement. "We draw not . . . after their lines, but those of Nature . . ." (22). A proud sense of belonging to a new age, which can improve on the past, is very strong in the whole Essay: it is reflected in the mere fact of a dispute on the relative merits of the Ancients and the Moderns, as well as in the victory of the Moderns, in Crites' talk of the discovery of "almost a new Nature" in their age (15), in the pride with which Eugenius describes the perfection of lyric and epic verse achieved by "many now living" (13-14), and in the agreement of all the disputants that only in their age have poets understood "the sweetness of English Verse" (14). This self-conscious modernity, underlined by the name Dryden gives his chief spokesman, Neander, suggests that Dryden will never want to become "a professed imitator" of any of the great classical poets, as Jonson was of Horace, even though he relies on their authority and in fact imitates them constantly, especially Virgil.

Dryden never forgets that he is a modern Englishman, yet never cuts himself off from the classical tradition. It therefore seems entirely fitting that Eugenius should support his championship of the Moderns with quotations from Horace:

> . . . neither know I any reason why I may not be as
> zealous for the Reputation of our Age, as we find
> the Ancients themselves were in reference to those

who lived before them. For you hear your Horace saying,

Indignor quidquam reprehendi, non quia crasse
Compositum, illepideve putetur, sed quia nuper.
(Epist. 2.1.76-77)

And after,

Si meliora dies, ut vina, poemata reddit,
Scire velim pretuim chartis quotus arroget annus?
(Epist. 2.134-135; Works XVII.12-13)

In criticizing the Ancients, Eugenius judges them by the rules which, according to Crites, were drawn from them. The Greeks did not know the Horatian rule of five acts (23). They cannot take credit for having prescribed the Unity of Place, they have neglected the Unity of Time (26), they do not always preserve the continuity of scenes, and in short they do not imitate Nature well by the standards Crites has discussed, thus losing delight (27), and they frequently show "a Prosperous Wickedness, and an Unhappy Piety," thus failing to instruct (28). In criticizing their wit, Eugenius turns again to Horace and quotes the criticism of Plautus in the Ars Poetica to substantiate his contention that "Plautus is infinitely too bold in his Metaphors and coyning words . . ." A passage from the Ars that supports the possibility of a poet's introducing new words into the language is quoted as counseling restraint, "For Horace himself was cautious to obtrude a new word on his Readers . . ." (Works XVII.29).

Even when Crites quotes Horace, the effect is to imply the superiority of the Moderns. The debate is ended by Crites' saying that while Eugenius is claiming that "the Moderns have acquir'd a new perfection in writing, I can onely grant that they have alter'd the mode of it." Yet in effect he grants much more than this:

So in their Love Scenes . . . the Ancients were more

> hearty, we more talkative: they writ love as it was then the mode to make it, and I will grant thus much to _Eugenius_, that perhaps one of their Poets, had he liv'd in our Age,
>
> _Si foret hoc nostrum fato delapsus in aevum_
>
> [_Satires_ 1.10.68]
>
> (as _Horace_ says of _Lucilius_) he had alter'd many things; not that they were not natural before, but that he might accomodate himself to the Age in which he liv'd" yet in the mean time we are not to conclude any thing rashly against those great men; but preserve to them the dignity of Masters, and give that honour to their memories, (_Quos Libitina sacravit_;) part of which we expect may be paid to us in future times.
>
> (32-33)

By having Crites quote Horace on Lucilius, Dryden implies that the changes in mode between the Ancients and the Moderns do actually constitute progress in refinement, and the victory is left with the Moderns.

Horace is thus closely associated with the highest Modern standards of refinement and regularity, and in the next debate, that between Lisideius and Neander over the relative merits of the French and English stage, Lisideius, the advocate of French neoclassical regularity, turns to Horace for support more often than any of the other participants. He uses Horace's account of the degenerate state of the Roman stage to help him describe the absurdity of mixing tragedy and farce: ". . . our Stages still retain somewhat of the Original civility of the Red Bull;

> _Atque ursum & pugiles mdia inter carmina poscunt_."
>
> (_Epist_. 2.1.185-186)

He also praises the French because their plots "are always grounded upon some known History: according to that of Horace, _Ex noto fictum carmen sequar_ . . ." (_AP_ 240, _Works_ XVII.35). The French playwright does better than the Ancients however; he does not merely retell an old story, as Eugenius had reproached the Ancients with doing,

Atque ita mentitur; sic veris falsa remiscet,
Primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet imum.
(AP 151-152)

Lisideius is horrified by Shakespeare's history plays, in which forty years are crammed into two and a half hours, and Nature is imitated so as to appear "infinitely more imperfect than the life: this, instead of making a Play delightful, renders it ridiculous.

Quodcumque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi.
[AP 188]

For the Spirit of man cannot be satisfied but with truth, or at least verisimility . . ." (36). Horace is still associated with truth, but truth now means the kind of exact imitation of reality that can be presented on the stage with the help of the Rules. Lisideius is always careful to assert his Horatian orthodoxy. Accordingly he adds, after praising the French for not showing inappropriate action on stage, "Nor does this any thing contradict the opinion of Horace," and he quotes extensively to show that, although Horace feels that action presented on stage has a more immediate effect on the audience, he would not allow "those actions which by reason of their cruelty will cause aversion in us, or by reason of their impossibility unbelief," to appear (41).

In contrast to Lisideius, Neander uses only two quotations from Horace in speaking for the English, and those two only at the very end of his discourse. For he is going further than any of the others in suggesting that there are beauties which can compensate for irregularity (44), and even that in tragicomedy the English "have invented, increased, and perfected a more pleasant way of writing than was ever known to the Ancients or Moderns of any nation . . ." (46). The pleasures of variety (47) and of the "more masculine fancy and greater spirit" (54) of

English playwrights are set against the cold mechanical perfection of the French (44). But this does not mean that Neander rejects the Rules; the play he chooses to demonstrate the superiority of the English is Jonson's strictly regular _Silent Woman_, even though he considers Shakespeare "perhaps Jonson's superior" (55). And it is in praising Jonson's play that Neander turns to Horace. The "excellent contrivance" of _The Silent Woman_ is especially admirable because in comedy "all faults lie open to discovery, and few are pardonable. 'Tis this which _Horace_ has judiciously observ'd"

> _Creditur ex media quia res arcessit habere_
> _Sudoris minimum, sed habet Comedia tanto_
> _Plus oneris, quanto veniae minus._
>
> (_Epist_. 2.1.168-170; _Works_ XVII.61-62)

Neander turns to Horace again to urge tolerance for the defects of modern English plays, suggesting that we should "use the candour of that Poet, who (though the most severe of Criticks) has left us this caution by which to moderate our censures;

> _Ubi plura nitent in carmine non ego paucis_
> _offendar maculis_."
>
> (_AP_ 351-352; _Works_ XVII.64)

Dryden uses this passage several times in his later writings, finding the authority of "the most severe of Criticks" a good defense against his own critics.[13]

The argument now shifts to the use of rhyme in serious plays, which Crites attacks and Neander defends. Crites make no use of Horace in the four pages allowed him to state his case, which is based on the notion that imitation demands as close as possible a reproduction of nature, and that no one naturally speaks in rhyme. Neander changes the meaning of natural by distinguishing "betwixt what is

nearest to the nature of Comedy, which is the imitation of common persons and ordinary speaking, and what is nearest the nature of a serious Play . . . ." He is using natural to mean appropriate to genre, and this allows him to support rhyme with the authority of tradition and the example of the French, and to bring in Horace:

> Tragdy we know is wont to image to us the minds and fortunes of noble persons, and to portray these exactly, Heroick Rhyme is nearest Nature, as being the noblest kind of modern verse.
> Indignatur enim privatis, & prope socco,
> Dignis carminibus narrare coena Thyestae (says Horace.)
> [AP 90-91]
>
> And in another place,
>
> Effutire leveis indigna tragoedia versus.
> (AP 231, Works XVII.74)

But so influential is the idea that a play should be an exact imitation, that the departure from reality involved in the use of rhyme is still seen as a kind of license, in spite of the traditional justification. Thus we find Neander protesting that "if no latitude is to be allow'd a Poet, you take from him not onely his license of quidlibet audendi [AP 10], but you tie him up in a straighter compass than you would a Philosopher. . . . You would have him follow Nature, but he must follow her on foot: you have dismounted him from his Pegasus" (76).

Samuel Holt Monk, the editor of this volume of the Works, sees the two uses of Horace just discussed as different in kind from those in the rest of the Essay; the other disputants use Horace as an exponent of the Rules, while Neander, "somewhat surprisingly," makes him "advocate inspired creation, the imaginative bursting through restraint" (Works XVII.334). Actually Neander is careful to present the use of rhyme, though it is in a sense an instance of poetic license, as an exercise

not of imagination, but of judgment, "the master-Workman in a Play," for whom verse is "a Rule and line by which he keeps his building compact and even, which otherwise lawless imagination would raise either irregularly or loosely" (80).

In calling imagination lawless, Dryden indicates that he shares the conventional view of his day that imagination must be kept strictly subordinate to judgment. According to orthodox theory, judgment rules in poetry by insisting on a fairly exact correspondence between reality, or Nature, and imitation; the Rules aid the judgment in maintaining this correspondence, and the audience's delight depends on it. Horace and Jonson are both closely identified with this kind of judicious poetry, as we have seen in the Essay. In presenting rhyme as a tool of judgment, and in quoting Horace to justify the high style in tragedy, Dryden is trying to show that rhyme, although a departure from strict imitation, is still respectable. But lawless though it was, Dryden was ready to allow the imagination a larger role in poetry than conventional theory would justify.[14] We get a hint of this when he says that all the elements of a serious play must be "exalted above the level of common converse, as high as the imagination of the Poet can carry them, with proportion to verisimility" (74).

He goes even further in the preface to Secret Love, a play written soon after the Essay, during the same period of enforced retirement from London.[15] In this preface, Dryden boasts that his play "is regular, according to the strictest of Dramatick Laws," but expresses doubt about the beauty of the writing (Works IX.115). He feels that he can judge the "fabric" of his play, because that is the work of judgment.

But for the ornament of Writing, which is greater,

> more various and bizarre in Poesie then in any other kind, as it is properly the Child of Fancy, so it can receive no measure, or at least but a very imperfect one of its own excellencies or failures from the judgment. Self-love . . . here predominates. And Fancy . . . judging of it self, can be no more certain or demonstrative of its own effects, then two crooked lines can be the adequate measure of each other.
>
> (116)

At the same time Dryden expresses the conventional distrust of fancy, and assigns to it all that makes the writing of a play beautiful. By so doing, and by claiming that here the poet's judgment cannot even assess his own work, Dryden shows how far he is from espousing either the Horatian ideal of meticulous care in writing or the Jonsonian emphasis on reason as an essential characteristic of the true poet.

In the prefatory letter of Annus Mirabilis, Dryden again attributes much more to the imagination than was customary at the time:

> The composition of all Poems is or ought to be of wit, and wit in the Poet, or wit writing, . . . is no other than the faculty of imagination in the writer, . . . which searches over all the memory for the species or Idea's of those things which it designs to represent. Wit written, is . . . the product of that imagination. . . . the first happiness of the Poet's imagination is properly Invention, . . . the second is fancy, . . . the third is Elocution . . ..
>
> (<u>Works</u> I.53)

That imagination should search for the forms to be presented is conventional doctrine, but that it should also plan and complete the work of writing gives it a much greater function than was usual.[16]

The other main element in Dryden's thought that divides him from the Horatian tradition as we saw it in Jonson is his emphasis on delight as the main aim of the poet. We saw that in the <u>Essay of Dramatick Poesie</u> the pleasure given the audience by variety, spectacle, and spirited writing was the main argument for the great irregular plays of

Dryden's predecessors (see above, p. 172). In the Defence of an Essay, Dryden turns to delight to justify the use of rhyme. Dryden observes that Howard has objected that rhyme is not natural, but admitted that it pleases him, and remarks:

> . . . if all the Enemies of Verse will confess as much, I shall not need to prove that it is natural. I am satisfied if it cause delight: for delight is the chief, if not the only end of Poesie; instruction can be admitted but in the second place, for Poesie only instructs as it delights. 'Tis true that to imitate well is a Poets work; but to affect the Soul, and excite the Passions, and above all to move admiration (which is the delight of serious plays) a bare imitation will not serve. The converse . . . must be heighten'd with all the Arts and Ornaments of Poesie . . .
>
> (Works IX.5-6)

To say that poetry only instructs as it delights was often interpreted as meaning that, though delight might be necessary as a means, instruction was the real end of poetry. Dryden recognizes the existence of this interpretation at one point, but he never really accepts it (Kinsley 2.668).

An emphasis on the role of fancy, or imagination, in poetry and on delight as the main aim might serve to free poetry from the necessity of strict imitation and to bring out the creative function of the poet, but such an emphasis would also tend to increase the danger that sensible men would relegate poetry to the status of "a dream of learning that would be thought to have in it something divine," as Bacon called it: glorified wishful thinking with no contact with reality and reason.[17] For truth at this time was either conceived of as abstract, to be grasped by the intellect, or as a correspondence between words and external reality. Fancy, or the imagination, had nothing to do with the first kind of truth, since fancy was seen as confined to the corporeal,

and unless kept under firm control by reason, it would only tend to lessen the exact correspondence between words and things.[18] Thus to the extent that poetry departed from imitation and was governed by fancy and sought only to please, it lost all touch with truth and reality and moral utility, and was distrusted accordingly.

Dryden's dispute with Howard, as he presents it in the Defense of an Essay, shows his awareness of the danger of thus allowing poetry to lose touch with reason and reality. Howard has argued, according to Dryden, that "it is not necessary for Poets to study strict reason, since they are used to a greater latitude than is allowed by that severe inquisition, that they must infringe their own jurisdiction to profess themselves oblig'd to argue well" (Works IX.12). Howard's other argument is that it is absurd to observe the unities, because it is just as impossible to suppose the events of a day occurring in the time of the presentation of a play as the events of many years, and so on of the rest; the play is inevitably divorced from reality, and the poet should simply accept this (16).

Dryden rises to the defense of poetry in the name of Aristotle and Horace, of Jonson and Corneille (2, 13, 16). He reasserts the claim of the poet to reason:

> . . . they cannot be good Poets who are not accustom'd to argue well. False Reasonings and colours of Speech, are the certain marks of one who does not understand the Stage: For Moral Truth is the Mistress of the Poet as much as of the Philosopher: Poesie must resemble Natural Truth, but it must be Ethical. Indeed the Poet dresses Truth, and adorns Nature, but does not alter them:
> Ficta voluptatis causa sint proxima veris.
> [AP 338]
> Therefore that is not the best Poesie which resembles notions of things that are not to things that are; though the fancy may be great and the words flowing, yet the Soul is but half satisfied where there is not Truth in the foundation. . . . This I thought my self

> oblig'd to say in behalf of Poesie: and to declare, though it be against my self, that when Poets do not argue well, the defect is in the Work-man, not in the Art.
>
> (12-13)

Reason as the faculty that knows the truth here seems to be identified with reason in the sense of logic, and Truth is conceived of as agreement with external reality, even in metaphorical language. Poetry governed by reason and truth in these senses is severely limited, but only when so governed can it avoid the scorn Howard's words imply.

Dryden defends the Unities as means of ensuring, not indeed an exact equivalence between what is seen on stage and reality, but a proportional relationship, which will allow the playgoer's reason to accompany his fancy in accepting what he sees; "and in the Analogy, or resemblance of Fiction to Truth, consists the excellency of the Play" (18). In Jonson's _Silent Woman_, all the events of a richly varied plot fit naturally into twenty-four hours, which is a reasonable approximation of the actual time of presentation. "For this reason, I prefer the _Silent Woman_ before all other plays, I think justly, as I do its Author in Judgment, before all other Poets" (21).

But though Dryden might prefer Jonson "in Judgment, before all other Poets," he loved Shakespeare (_Works_ XVII.58), and when not defending poetry against Howard's attacks, he still tends to stress those beauties of poetry that are not produced by judgment. In the prologue to _Tyrannick Love_, published the year after the _Defence of an Essay_, he says:

> Poets, like Lovers, should be bold and dare,
> They spoil their business with an over-care.
> And he who servilely creeps after sense
> Is safe, but ne're will reach an Excellence.
>
> (_Works_ X.114)

He was apparently criticized for these lines by those who were horrified by the slur on sense, and in the preface he answers his critics:

> I may reasonably suppose they have never read Horace. Serpit humi tutus, &c. [AP 28] are his words: he who creeps after plaine, dull, common sense is safe from committing absurdities; but can never reach any heighth, or excellence of wit: and sure I could not meane that any excellence were to be found in non-sense.
>
> (112-113)

By ignoring the preceding line in the Ars, "professus grandia turget" (27), Dryden can bring in Horace, the judicious and severe, on the side of poetic daring, and cut the ground out from under his critics. For Horace's authority serves, here as elsewhere, to guarantee Dryden's respectability as a rational poet, even while he goes beyond the narrow limits he himself has recognized.

Dryden even discusses the profit to be gained from his play in terms that suggest that poetry works on men by basically irrational, or at least nonrational means:

> I considered that pleasure was not the only end of Poesie, and that even the instructions of Morality were not so wholly the business of a Poet, as that the Precepts and Examples of Piety were to be omitted. . . . By the Harmony of words we elevate the mind to a sense of Devotion, as our solemn Musick, which is inarticulate Poesie, does in Churches: and by the lively images of piety, adorned by action, through the senses allure the Soul . . ..
>
> (109)

Dryden may be stressing his awareness that pleasure is "not the only end of Poesie" partly as an answer to the attacks of Shadwell, whose long controversy with Dryden begins about this time.

Thomas Shadwell was one of Dryden's main critics, and the nature of Shadwell's criticism has particular interest for us because he saw himself as working the Jonsonian and Horatian tradition, and he

criticized Dryden in the name of that tradition. He objected vigorously to Dryden's intimation that Jonson had less wit than some other poets, and he laughed at the extravagances of heroic drama and at the repartee of the comedy of wit.[19] But above all he accused Dryden of debasing poetry by allowing his rakes to go unpunished and by making delight the chief end of poetry:

> . . . he that debases himself to think of nothing but pleasing the Rabble, loses the dignity of a Poet, and becomes as little as a Jugler, or a Rope-Dancer, who pleases more than he can do: but the Office of a Poet is,
> Simul & iucunda & idonea dicere vitae. [AP 334]
> Which (if the Poets of our age would observe it) would render 'em as usefull to a Commonwealth as any profession whatsoever.[20]

Shadwell inherits Jonson's concerns, but not, apparently, his sense of the superiority of the poet to ordinary men. This reflects the extent to which the distrust of poetry in this period affected the poets and playwrights themselves.

In the preface to An Evening's Love, published in 1671, Dryden gives a full answer to Shadwell's charges. Dryden was at this time at the height of his career as a popular playwright; The Conquest of Granada had just been a tremendous success, and King and court applauded Dryden's work. The tone of the preface is accordingly confident. Secure in his belief that his heroic plays are superior to those of Shakespeare and Fletcher, as he implies in the beginning of the preface, Dryden can give Jonson the superiority in "humour, and contrivance of Comedy" (Works X.202). But he then proceeds not only to criticize, by implication, Shadwell's supposedly Jonsonian comedy, but to show how far he himself is from the Jonsonian tradition.

Dryden does not directly answer the accusation that he aims only

to please the rabble, but speaks of his dislike for "low Comedy" and the "conversation with the vulgar" it entails (202), and of his scorn for "popular applause" (203). He implies that Shadwell's comedies are tainted by farce, and that this above all pleases the people. "For to write unnatural things, is the most probable way of pleasing them, who understand not Nature. And a true Poet often misses of applause, because he cannot debase himself to write so ill as to please his Audience." He admits that he has not always been perfect in this respect, but contends that "all my contemporaries" have done worse. "As I pretend not that I can write humour, so none of them can reasonably pretend to have written it as they ought" (204).

Dryden goes on to use Horace to condemn Shadwell, as well as his model, Jonson, for attacking individuals, taking a remark from the _Ars_ on the decorum of satyr plays that suits his attempt to turn the charge of pleasing the rabble back on Shadwell: ". . . having given the precept,

> _Neve immunda crepent, ignominiosaque dicta._ (247)

He immediately subjoyns,

> _Offenduntur enim quibus est equus, & pater, & res._" (_AP_ 248, _Works_ X.205)

Shadwell of course had meant to emphasize that it was wrong for a poet to aim at pleasure rather than profit, but he had left himself open to attack by accusing Dryden of "pleasing the Rabble," which his own kind of low comedy mixed with farce would clearly tend to do.

Dryden then turns to the question of Jonson's wit, and argues that only judgment is needed in humor comedy, since all it involves is "the natural imitation of folly . . ." (205), while the comedy of wit demands

imagination as well as judgment because the poet must create as well as imitate (206-207). Dryden implies that Shadwell is one of those "poets who have too narrow an imagination to write it. And to entertain an Audience perpetually with Humour, is to carry them from the conversation of Gentlemen, and treat them with the follies and extravagances of Bedlam" (207).

Up to this point, Dryden has avoided the question of whether pleasure should be the main end of poetry. In answering the accusation that he does not observe poetic justice in his comedies, he treats the question of the aim of poetry incidentally. Poetic justice may be necessary in tragedy since,

> one great part of its institution . . . is by example to instruct . . .; in Comedy it is not so; for the chief end of it is divertisement and delight; and that so much, that it is disputed, I think, by _Heinsius_, before _Horace_ his art of Poetry, whether instruction be any part of its employment. At least I am sure it can be but its secondary end: for the business of the Poet is to make you laugh: when he writes humour he makes folly ridiculous; when wit, he moves you, if not alwayes to laughter, yet to a pleasure that is more noble. And if he works a cure on folly, and the small imperfections in mankind, by exposing them to publick view, that cure is not perform'd by an immediate operation. For it works first on the ill nature of the Audience; they are mov'd to laugh by the representation of deformity; and the shame of that laughter, teaches us to amend our manners. This being, then, establish'd, that the first end of Comedie is delight, and instruction only the second; it may reasonably be inferr'd that Comedy is not so much oblig'd to the punishment of the faults which it represents, as Tragedy. For the persons in Comedy are of a lower quality, . . . and the faults and vices are but the sallies of youth . . . . (209)

Nothing is left in this theory of the effort to better men's minds that formed the basis of Jonson's pride in his comedy, and the "noble pleasure" of wit, which has no moral end at all, is preferred above the

exposure of folly, which is reduced to having as its main aim making the audience laugh. Worst of all, Dryden tries to use Jonson's Heinsius to support this position. Dryden's memory is of course faulty; Heinsius would never have countenanced the idea that pleasure could be the sole aim of any kind of poetry.[21]

The dignity of the poet is thus no longer based on his function of bettering men's minds but on his ability to please a refined audience and on the power of his imagination. Dryden makes his unprecedented emphasis on the importance of the imagination even clearer as he answers the charge of plagiarism. He admits that he has borrowed stories, but calls the story the least important part of a play.

> . . . the forming it into Acts, and Scenes, disposing of actions and passions into their proper places, and beautifying both with descriptions, similitudes, and propriety of language, is the principal employment of the Poet; as being the largest field of fancy, which is the principall quality requir'd in him: for so much the word ποιητὴς implies. Judgement, indeed, is necessary in him: but 'tis fancy that gives the life touches, and the secret graces to it; especially in serious Plays, which depend not much on observation. For to write humour in Comedy (which is the theft of Poets from mankind) little of fancy is requir'd; the Poet observes only what is ridiculous, and pleasant folly, and by judging exactly what is so, he pleases in the representation of it.
>
> (212)

This is tantamount to saying that Jonson is something less than a true poet, since he lacks fancy.

Shadwell's response was swift; he was horrified by Dryden's continued emphasis on delight rather than profit:

> . . . I must take leave to dissent from those, who seem to insinuate that the ultimate end of a Poet is to delight, without correction or instruction: Methinks a Poet should never acknowledge this, for it makes him of as little use to Mankind as a Fidler, or Dancing-Master who delights the fancy onely, without improving

> the Judgement. Horace, the best Judge of Poetry, found other business for a Poet.
>
> Pectus praeceptis format amicis
> Asperitatis et invidiae corrector at irae,
> Recte facta refert, orienta tempora notis
> Instruit Exemplis.
>
> [Epist. 2.1.128-131]
>
> . . . And . . . I think Comedy more useful than Tragedy; because the Vices and Follies in Courts . . . concern but a few; whereas the Cheats, Villanies, and troublesome Follies, in the common conversation of the World; are of concernment to all the Body of Mankind.[22]

Shadwell makes the moral utility of humor comedy the basis of his claim to write for a superior audience: "Men of Sense," "men of Wit and Honour," and men "who cannot be touch'd by Satyr" all admire Jonson and are pleased by humor comedy; only "the higher sort of Rabble" prefer "the extravagant and unnatural actions, the trifles and fripperies of a Play, or the trappings and ornaments of Nonsense" of the kind found in heroic plays.[23]

In defending Jonson against the charge of lacking wit, Shadwell takes notice of Dryden's worst heresy, his speaking

> as if judgement were a less thing than wit. But certainly it was meant otherwise by nature, who subjected wit to the government of judgement, which is the noblest faculty of the mind. Fancy roughdraws, but judgement smooths and finishes; nay judgement does indeed comprehend wit, for no man can have that who has not wit. In fancy madmen equal, if not excel all others, and one may as well say, that one of those mad men is as good a man, as a temperate wise man, as that one of those very fancyful Plays (admired most by Women) can be so good a play as one of Johnson's correct, and well govern'd Comedies.[24]

In reaffirming the supremacy of judgment, Shadwell is simply giving the conventional view, one which all sensible men held. He must also deal with Dryden's heretical tendency to speak as though a serious play were a work of the creative imagination, depending "not much on observation" (see above, p. 184). He reminds Dryden that as all plays are imitations,

all should be based ultimately on observation of life as it is: "the Poet can fancy nothing . . ., but what must spring from the Observation he has made of Men or Books."[25] At the same time, no poet simply copies, and therefore wit must be involved in all plays.

Dryden made no direct reply to Shadwell's arguments; he could not very well oppose them. In the Defence of an Epilogue he actually gives in on the question of whether Jonson lacked wit, admitting that it is "very certain that even folly itself, well represented, is wit in a larger signification; and that there is fancy, as well as judgement, in it . . ." But, even as he reaffirms the doctrine of imitation, he still insists on the superiority of other kinds of drama to humor comedy as fields for exercising imagination, saying that the fancy involved in depicting folly is "not so much or noble; because all poetry being imitation, that of folly is a lower exercise of fancy, though perhaps as difficult as the other; for 'tis a kind of looking downward in the poet, and representing that part of mankind that is below him" (Watson 1.178). Dryden could not dispute Shadwell's basic premises, or ignore the authority of Jonson and Horace, but neither could he accept imitation and moral utility as the only criteria of poetry. In the two essays published with The Conquest of Granada he pursued two lines of thought calculated to reveal the limitations of Shadwell's view of poetry.

All poetry might be imitation, but there was one form of poetry that demanded more than imitation, and in Of Heroic Plays: An Essay, Dryden emphasizes the freedom allowed by the heroic, scorning Shadwell and those like him who insisted on exact representation: ". . . it is very clear to all who understand poetry, that serious plays ought not to imitate conversation too nearly. If nothing were to be raised above

that level, the foundation of poetry would be destroyed" (Watson 1.157). The "poetic" aspect of heroic poetry is clearly far more important to Dryden than the moral aim, which he perfunctorily recognizes in calling the heroic poem "the most noble, the most pleasant, and the most instructive way of writing in verse, and withal the highest pattern of human life, as all poets have agreed . . ." (162). Davenant had suggested that heroic poetry should be close to everyday life, "figuring a more practicable virtue to us than was done by the Ancients or Moderns" (159). This would make the heroic more morally useful, but it would take from the modern poet the chance to emulate the great epic poets in "those enthusiastic parts of poetry which compose the most noble parts of all their writings." The epic poet who is concerned with instruction and truth, as Lucan was, "treats you more like a philosopher than a poet . . . he walks soberly afoot when he might fly" (160).

It is in the possibility of flight that the charm of the heroic lies: ". . . An heroic poet is not tied to a bare representation of what is true, or exceeding probable; . . . he may let himself loose to visionary objects, and to the representation of such things as depending not on sense, and therefore not to be comprehended by knowledge, may give him a freer scope for imagination" (161). In some sense the poet still imitates, for these "visionary objects" have been believed in "in all ages and religions, by the greatest part of mankind . . . . This is foundation enough for poetry; and I dare further affirm, that the whole doctrine of separated beings . . . may better be explicated by poets than by philosophers or divines. For their speculations on this subject are wholly poetical; they have only their fancy for their guide; and that, being sharper in an excellent poet . . . will see farther in its

own empire . . ." (161). No longer, apparently does the soul of man demand truth in the foundation of poetry (see above, p. 178).

This is the furthest Dryden ever goes in setting poetry free from imitation and in describing the imagination as a free creative agent.[26] No moral aim is posited for these flights; they are noble and beautiful, and that is enough. But poetry wins this freedom only by relinquishing all touch with reality. The philosophers and divines are clearly being mocked for their "poetical" speculations; things which do not depend on sense are "not to be comprehended by knowledge," and those who take fancy as a guide can produce only fanciful, "poetical" flights that have nothing to do with truth.

In the Defence of the Epilogue, the other essay published with The Conquest of Granada, Dryden tries to provide a basis for his claim that his plays are superior to those of his great predecessors on grounds that, incidentally, show his superiority to Shadwell. Shadwell had cited Horace in his rebuke to Dryden for forgetting the moral aim of poetry. Dryden now turns to Horace to demonstrate the importance of refinement, to which Shadwell could make little claim. The appeal to Horace is introduced in terms that remind us both of Dryden's self-conscious modernity and of his need for authority:

> . . . we live in an age so sceptical, that as it determines little, so it takes nothing from antiquity on trust. And I profess to have no other ambition in this essay than that poetry may not go backward, when all other arts and sciences are advancing. Whoever censures me for this inquiry, let him hear his character from Horace:
>
> > ingeniis non ille favet, plauditque sepultis,
> > nostra sed impugnat; nos nostraque lividus odit.
> > [*Epist*. 2.1.88-89]
>
> He favours not dead wits, but hates the living.

> It was upbraided to that excellent poet that he was an enemy to the writings of his predecessor Lucilius, because he had said, Lucilium lutulentum fluere [S 1.10.50], that he ran muddy; and that he ought to have retrenched from his satires many unnecessary verses. But Horace makes Lucilius himself to justify him from the imputation of envy, by telling you that he would have done the same had he lived in an age which was more refined:
>
> > si foret hoc nostrum fato delapsus in aevum,
> > deteret sibi multa, recideret omne quod ultra
> > perfectum traheretur, etc.
> >
> > [S 1.10.68-70]
>
> And, both in the whole course of that satire, and in his most admirable Epistle to Augustus, he makes it his business to prove that antiquity alone is no plea for the excellency of a poem; but that, one age learning from another, the last (if we can suppose an equality of wit in the writers) has the advantage of knowing more and better than the former. And this, I think, is the state of the question in dispute. It is therefore my part to make it clear, that the language, wit, and conversation of our age are improved and refined above the last, and then it will not be difficult to infer that our plays have received some part of those advantages.
>
> (169-170)

Neither in Poetaster nor any where else in his works did Jonson ever mention Horace's criticism of Lucilius. Jonson was convinced of the inevitable link between bad writing and low moral character, and Lucilius was a good man who wrote hastily and carelessly; Jonson accordingly ignored him (see above, Chap. II, p. 84). Dryden never emphasizes the connection between moral and literary integrity; his distortion of Horace is of another kind. We can see in the passage just quoted Dryden's gradual shift from Horace's emphasis on the higher artistic standards of the best poets of his day to the idea that there is a general tendency to progress in literary matters, and thence to the idea that modern plays must be better than Elizabethan because they reflect the refinement of the age. This last idea directly contradicts the part of the

Epistle to Augustus that Jonson quoted most often: towards the end of the Epistle, Horace discusses the difficulties of writing well for the stage, where the desire to please the audience tends to lead the playwright astray. To this desire he attributes Plautus' faults, and he sees the problem as even more severe in his own day, when the upper classes as well as the common people have come to care more for spectacle than content (Epist. 2.1.175-218, and see above, Chap. II, p. 109, Chap. III, pp. 123-124). This part of the Epistle is as alien to Dryden's conception of his role as a poet as the criticism of Lucilius is to Jonson's.

At this stage in his career, Dryden's pride in his own achievements as a poet is bound up with his pride in the refinement of his age, in his own association with those who are most refined, especially at court, and in his ability to please a refined audience. "Conversation" he makes "the last and greatest advantage of our writing . . . . In the age in which those poets lived, there was less of gallantry than in ours, neither did they keep the best company of theirs . . . . Greatness was not then so easy of access, nor conversation so free, as now it is" (180-181). It is not only desire to appear modest and to disarm criticism that leads him to write, ". . . without assuming to ourselves the title of better poets, let us ascribe to the gallantry and civility of our age the advantage which we have about them, and to our knowledge of the customs and manners of it the happiness we have to please beyond them" (183).

In spite of his emphasis on the credit that belongs to his age and the company he keeps, Dryden is clearly also asserting that he possesses the Horatian qualities of refinement and correctness. These were

qualities that Shadwell did not share; his taste ran too much to low humor to allow for refinement, and he professed to lack leisure for correctness.[27] Dryden never speaks directly to Shadwell in this essay, except in his admission that Jonson has a kind of wit; he is establishing himself on a level to which he feels Shadwell cannot aspire. In the process of summing up the reasons that none of his predecessors provide completely adequate models, Dryden emphasizes those qualities in Jonson that strip Shadwell, his faithful follower, of any claim to refinement:

> Let us ascribe to Jonson the height and accuracy of judgement . . .. But let us not think him a perfect pattern of imitation . . . for humour itself, the poets of this age will be more wary than to imitate the meanness of his persons. Gentlemen will not be entertained with the follies of each other; and though they allow Cob and Tib to speak properly . . . surely their conversation can be no jest to them on the theatre, when they would avoid it in the street.
>
> (182)

The high point of Dryden's career as a popular playwright was also the beginning of the end. By the magnitude of his claims for fancy and by his boldness in criticizing his predecessors Dryden had exposed himself, and his critics were not slow to take advantage of this. Two anonymous pamphlets and a satirical scene in a play ridiculed his pretensions, continuing the work of Buckingham's <u>Rehearsal</u>.[28] Then his comedy, <u>The Assignation</u>, failed, and perhaps worst of all, Elkanah Settle began to write heroic drama. Dryden never called fancy the principal quality required in a poet again (see above, p. 184). Rather he drew yet closer to Horace, and even to Jonson, for defense against the attacks that had been loosed.

In his dedication of <u>The Assignation</u> to Sedley, Dryden draws an extensive analogy between himself and his circle of friends and Augustan

literary circles: ". . .I, who am the least among the poets, have yet the fortune to be honoured with the best patron, and the best friend. For . . . I can make my boast to have found a better Maecenas in the person of my Lord Treasurer Clifford, and a more elegant Tibullus in that of Sir Charles Sedley" (Watson 1.185). Characteristically, Dryden explicitly disclaims any parallel between himself, "the least among the poets," and Horace, while at the same time suggesting that his own age and his circle of friends have the advantage over Rome. Yet he needs the authority of the great Romans:

> Certainly the poets of that age enjoyed much happiness in the conversation and friendship of one another. They imitated the best way of living, which was to pursue an innocent and inoffensive pleasure . . . .. We have, like them, our genial nights, where our discourse is neither too serious, nor too light, but always pleasant, and for the most part instructive: . . . the cups only such as will raise the conversation of the night, without disturbing the business of the morrow. And thus far not only the philosophers, but the Fathers of the Church have gone, without lessening their reputation of good manners, or of piety. (186)

This is as close as Dryden ever comes to identifying himself and his friends with the Augustans, and the tone seems consciously Horatian, even to the sober Epicureanism of "an innocent and inoffensive pleasure." But Dryden does not lose sight of his purpose; the modern groups of friends were apparently accused of high living and free thinking, and the analogy with the Augustans serves as part of Dryden's defense.

Other attacks on Dryden personally suggested that he had cut himself off from the tradition on which the respectability of poetry was based, and he responds by affirming his respect for learning, "without the foundation of which I am sure no man can pretend to be a poet." Accused of being "a detractor from my predecessors," he repeats that he

is only following the example of Horace's treatment of Lucilius:

> for taxing some verses in Lucilius, he himself was blamed by others, though his design was no other than mine now, to improve the knowledge of poetry: and it was no defense to him, amongst his enemies, any more than it is for me, that he praised Lucilius where he deserved it . . . . 'Tis for this reason I will be no more mistaken for my good meaning: I know I honour Ben Jonson more than my little critics, because without vanity I may own I understand him better.
> (187-188)

Dryden might be drawn to a concept of poetry very different from the Horatian and Jonsonian, and find for a time in his success as a playwright assurance that his attempts to soar had succeeded, but he had never ceased to use the authority of Horace, or to profess admiration of Jonson's judgment, if not of his wit. The passage quoted above represents more than anything else a shift of emphasis. From this time on Dryden ceases to criticize Jonson, as he ceases to stress the role of fancy in poetry. Only the tradition of learned poetry, embodied above all in Horace and the other Augustans and in Jonson, could provide a basis from which to answer his critics. Having asserted his adherence to that tradition, and having identified his patron with Tibullus, he can say calmly of his critics: "Let Maevis and Bavius admire each other: I wish to be hated by them and their fellows, by the same reason for which I desire to be loved by you" (188-189).

I mentioned above that one possible factor in the change in Dryden was the beginning of Elkanah Settle's career as a writer of heroic plays. Settle imitated Dryden's heroic style and exaggerated its faults, and his plays were a great success.[29] He then published his *Empress of Morocco* with a dedication in which he sneered at the dedication of *The Assignation*, ridiculing, by implication, Dryden's claim to belong to a

circle of poets and noblemen like that of the Augustans. Dryden responded by joining with Shadwell and Crowne, in Notes and Observations on the Empress of Morocco, to destroy Settle's pretensions. There seems little doubt that the preface of this work is by Dryden. Settle himself, in his response, professes to recognize "a Dryden in the Frontispiece."[30] And certainly the preface gives just such an analysis of Settle's faults as we should expect from Dryden at this time.

As Dryden, in the dedication of The Assignation, proclaims his adherence to the tradition of learned poetry in order to dismiss his critics as poetasters, so here the author of the preface begins by calling on Jonson to justify his attack on Settle: "I knew indeed that to Write against him, was to do him too great an Honour: But I consider'd Ben. Jonson had done it before to Decker, our Authors Predecessor, whom he chastis'd in his Poetaster under the Character of Crispinus; and brought him in Vomiting up his Fustian and Non-sense" (Works XVII.84). Settle is represented as completely lacking in judgment, learning, and the ability to use the English language correctly: "In short, he's an Animal of a most deplor'd understanding, without Reading & Conversation: his being is in a twilight of a Sence, and some glimmering of thought, which he can never fashion either into Wit or English." The criticism of his skill as a poet reflects Dryden's concern with versification: "His Stile is Boisterous and Rough Hewen: his Rhyme is incorrigibly lewd, and his numbers perpetually harsh and ill sounding" (84). The satiric thrusts are very much in Dryden's style, as in the remark that Settle's characters "have all a certain natural cast of the Father; one turn of the Countenance goes through all his Children. Their Folly was born and bred in 'em; and something of the Elkanah will be visible" (85).

Some of the points made in the preface support the idea that its author is himself a writer of heroic drama, who sees Settle as an imitator, who "steals notoriously from his Contemporaries; but he so alters the property, . . . that he makes the Child his own by deforming it . . .. A Poet when he sees his thoughts in so ill a dress, is asham'd to confess they ever belong'd to him" (84). And what is worse, audiences applaud him, and mistake his writing for the true heroic: ". . . since the common Audience are much of his levell . . . and think all which rumbles is Heroick: It will be no wonder if he pass for a great Author amongst Town Fools and City Wits" (85). The whole preface is directed very specifically at Settle as a bad writer of heroic plays, while implying that, with the aid of judgment and learning, heroic drama can be well written: "That little Talent which he has is Fancy. . . . for want of Learning and Elocution, he will never be able to express any thing either naturally or justly. As for Judgment he has not the least grain of it: and therefore all his Plays will be a mere confusion" (84-85).

The author of the Postscript of Notes and Observations on the Empress of Morocco goes much further, attacking not only Elkanah Settle but fanciful poetry in general, the whole concept of poetic license, and even the extravagances of the Ancients. Most recent critics tend to believe that this Postscript is by Dryden; it has also been argued that it is by Shadwell.[31] It seems clear to me that the attribution to Shadwell, which has received no attention from other critics, is correct, and I think I can show that the Postscript is perfectly consistent with Shadwell's other writings, and that, so far from being by Dryden, it is actually a part of Shadwell's continuing controversy with Dryden.

Those who think Dryden wrote the Postscript ignore his constant struggle to free poetry from the rigid constraints the author of the Postscript would impose. A thorough discussion of this point is therefore essential to clarify this aspect of Dryden's thought. Dryden needed the authority of Horace to make his poetry respectable, but he could not possibly accept the narrow, limited version of the Horatian concept of poetry that is advanced in the Postscript, again and again in terms that echo Shadwell's characteristic turns of phrase. Dryden and Shadwell might temporarily collaborate in attacking a common enemy, but they were deeply and basically at odds, and that fact must be recognized if we are to understand Dryden's attitudes towards Horace and towards poetry. (As the discussion proceeds, the reader should also observe the quality of the prose in the Postscript; Dryden could not have written this.)

The author of the Postscript begins with Settle: "Some who are pleased with the bare sound of Verse, or the Rumbling of Robustuous nonsense, will be apt to think Mr. Settle too severely handled in this Pamphlet . . ." (Works XVII.180). Shadwell aims such reproaches against heroic drama again and again. In the prologue to his opera, Psyche, he professes to have in his work no "thund'ring Rapture" or "boisterous Fustian" of the kind that violates "all the Sacred Rules of Wit and Sense."[32] In his Timon he brings a foolish heroic poet on stage, and has the poet lay down that "Heroicks must be lofty and high sounding," while his interlocutor remarks, "Then I perceive sound's the great matter in this way."[33] Continuing to pillory Settle, the author remarks, "I am not ignorant that his admirers who most commonly are Women, will resent this very ill" (180). Again this is a reproach Shadwell makes

elsewhere; we saw it above (p. 185) in his defence of Jonson, and he also remarks in the preface to The Virtuoso that only "some Women, and some Men of Feminine understanding" dislike his play and prefer wit comedy.[34]

These are minor points; but the author, foreseeing that Settle's supporters will use the plea of Poetica Licentia, is drawn on to consider the use of that plea in general, "for the Palliateing the most absurd non-sense in any Poem. I can not find when Poets had Liberty from any Autority [sic] to write non-sense more than any other men, Nor is that Plea of Poetic Licentia used as Subterfuge, by any but weake professors of that Art, who are commonly given over to a mist of Fancy . . .. The licentious wildeness and extravagance of such mens conceits have made Poetry contemn'd by some . . ." (180-181).[35] Dryden is so far from condemning the plea of poetic license that he complained of those who take from the poet "his license of quidlibet audendi" in the Essay of Dramatick Poesie (Works XVII.76), and, as we shall see, he makes a case for poetic license, answering this and other arguments in the Postscript, in his Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic License. On the other hand, Shadwell has the Stoic of his Timon remark on the "poets of this time," "The folly of you makes the Art contemptible."[36]

The author goes on to discuss the dangers of fancy: "Men that are given over to fancy onely, are little better than Madmen: What people say of Fire (Viz. that it is a good Servant, but an ill Master) may not unaptly be applyed to Fancy, which when it is too active Rages, but when cooled and allay'd by the Judgement, produces admirable Effects. But this rage of Fancy is never Mr. Settles crime . . ." (181). The author is not criticizing Settle then, but those who are better poets than he;

in the preface of *The Humorists*, Shadwell introduces his criticism of Dryden by praising him as having the true "σώφρονα μανίαν," more "than any other Heroick Poet," while his imitators "will be found to flutter, and make a noise, but never rise."[37] Similarly, the author of the Postscript says of Settle's fancy that "it never flyes out of sight, but often sinkes out of sight" (181). In the preface of *The Humorists*, Shadwell goes on to reproach Dryden for putting fancy above judgment. I have quoted the passage above (p. 185), and it contains the same linking of fancy and madness as the passage just quoted from the Postscript, and ends with the inferiority of "very fancyful Plays" to *Johnson's* . . . well govern'd Comedies." The same train of thought is apparent in the Postscript as the author goes on to discuss the dangers of "Fancyfull Poetry, and Musick, [which] us'd with moderation are good, but men who are wholy given over to either of them, are commonly as full of whimseyes as diseas'd and Splenatick men can be: Their heads are continually hot, and they have the same elevation of Fancy sober, which men of Sense have when they drink" (181). Thus, in the first act of *The Virtuoso*, the young fops of the day are said to "imitate the extravagancies of witty Men drunk, which they very discreetly practice sober . . . ."[38] The Stoic in *Timon* also makes similar accusations against "the Cox-combs of the Age:"

> . . . their most unreasonable heads
> Are whimsical, and fantastick as Fidlers,
> They are the scorn and laughter of all witty men,
> The folly of you makes the art contemptible,
> None of you has the judgement of a Gander.[39]

The author of the Postscript compares constant music and poetry to constant wine:

> . . . so meer Poets and meer Musicians, are as sottish

> as meer Drunkards are, who live in a continuall mist without seeing, or judging any thing clearly.
> A man should be learn'd in severall Sciences, and should have a reasonable Philosophicall, and in some measure a Mathematicall head; to be a compleat and excellent Poet: And besides this should have experience in all sorts of humours and manners of men: should be thoroughly skil'd in conversation, and should have a great Knowledge of mankind in generall.
> (182)

Compare Shadwell's description of Dryden in the Epistle to the Tories which prefaced The Medall of John Bayes: "He has never been conversant in any Science but Poetry: Philosophy, of all sorts he has an aversion to, having no rational or argumentative head; but if he be any thing he is a meer Poet: and from such an Animal, libera nos &c. . . ."[40] The emphasis on "experience in all sorts of humours and manners of men: suggests Shadwell and his realistic humor comedy. One of the objections Dryden had to humor comedy, as we saw, was that it required "conversation with the vulgar," and imitation of the sort of people no gentleman would want to know (see above, pp. 182, 191).

The author of the Postscript next makes a brief digression back to Settle and his lack of learning, and then returns to his main interest:

> . . . some will I doubt not object, That Poetry should not be reduced to the strictness of Mathematicks, to which I answer it ought to be so far Mathematicall as to have likeness, and Proportion, since they will all confess it is a kind of Painting; But they will perhaps say that a Poem is a Picture to be seen at a distance, and therefore ought to be bigger then the life: I confess there must be a due distance allowed . . . but . . . the distance and the bigness ought to be so suited, as though the Picture be much bigger then the life, yet it must not seem so, and what miserable mistakes some Poets make for want of knowing this truly I leave to men of Sense to Judge, and by the way let us consider that dramatick Poetry, especially the English brings the Picture nearer the eye then any other sort of poetry.
> (182-183)

This passage takes up, in a slightly altered form, a comparison Dryden

uses in the Essay of Dramatick Poesie: "A Play . . . to be like Nature, is to be set above it; as Statues which are plac'd on high are made greater then the life, that they may descend to the sight in their just proportion" (Works XVII.75). This parallel has been taken as strong evidence that Dryden wrote the Postscript.[41] It is clear, however, that Dryden uses the comparison to very different effect; he makes it part of an argument for heightened imitation: "The Plot, the Characters, the Wit, the Passions, the Descriptions, are all exalted above the level of common converse, as high as the imagination of the Poet can carry them, with proportion to verisimility" (74). The author of the Postscript is arguing for the appearance of exact imitation, while Dryden believes that in serious plays one imitates "Nature wrought up to an higher pitch" (74). Shadwell read Dryden's essays and prefaces carefully, as we know from his direct criticism of them; there is nothing unlikely in his choosing to use Dryden's own comparison against him, and in favor of a kind of literal copying of reality, of almost mathematical strictness.

The phrase "men of Sense" appears in the passage quoted above for the second time in the Postscript; it is a very common phrase in Shadwell's writing. He uses it three times in two pages in the preface of The Humorists, and again towards the end of that work.[42] In two out of these four instances, Shadwell is asserting that all men of sense admire Jonson, and implying that Dryden is therefore excluded from this group. When Shadwell praises Buckingham and his Rehearsal, he remarks, "all good men, and men of sence admire you."[43] And the Stoic in Timon concludes his argument with the foolish Poet by saying: ". . . 'tis a daring piece of valour, for a man of sence to write to an Age that likes

your spurious stuff."[44]

The author of the Postscript next returns to the subject of poetic license, saying that the only kind permissible is "the same that good Poets ever took, without being faulty, . . . and that License is Fiction . . . which ought to be Verisimilia" (183). We shall see in Dryden's Apology that he specifically extends poetic license beyond fiction. If the poet invents "impossible fables," says the author of the Postscript, "they ought to have such Morals couch'd under them as may tend to the instruction of mankind, or the regulation of manners; or they can be of no use nor can they really delight any . . . without these circumstances" (183). We have already seen Shadwell's emphasis on Dryden's terrible dereliction in neglecting the useful aspect of poetry (see above, pp. 181, 184-185).

The final argument of the Postscript is clearly not aimed at Settle, who claimed no familiarity with the Ancients, but may well have been aimed at Dryden, who uses the argument from precedent for some expressions of his in the heroic play, Tyrannick Love, that had been criticized as extravagant (Works X.113).

> . . . There are some pedants who will quote Authoritie from the Ancients for the faults and extravagancies of some of the moderns, who being able to imitate nothing but the faults of the classick Authors mistake 'em for their excellencyes. I speake with all due reverence to the Antients for no man esteems their perfections more then my self though I confess I have not that blind implicit faith in them which some ignorant Schoolmasters would impose upon us, to believe in all their errours and own all their crimes. To some pedants every thing in 'em is of that Authoritie that they will create a new Figure out of Rhetorick upon the fault of an old poet. I am apt to believe the same faults were found in them, when they wrote, which men of Sense find now; but if not, and they were judged excellencies as Schoolemasters would perswade us, Yet I must now say,
> Nobis non Licet esse tam disertis

<u>Musas qui colimus Severiores.</u> (183-184)

I quote the passage in full partly so that the reader may see exactly how sloppy the style of the Postscript can be, and believe that Dryden could not possibly have written it, whatever the content. But beyond this, the author of the Postscript here represents exactly the kind of rigidity that Dryden argues against in his <u>Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic License</u>. The author of the Postscript is ready to condemn anything in the Ancients that does not meet late-seventeenth-century concepts of reason and truth to nature; in his <u>Apology</u> Dryden argues specifically against this rejection of classical precedent as a valid argument, as we shall see. Dryden had in a sense come closer to the position of the author of the Postscript by abandoning his emphasis on the role of fancy in poetry, but he is not ready to accept the limited and constricting concept of poetry embodied in the Postscript, and classical precedent is a valuable weapon. Shadwell, however, like the author of the Postscript, is not really influenced by classical precedent.

Though he almost worships Jonson, quotes Horace with reverence, and sees himself as speaking for their tradition of poetry against the extravagances of fanciful poetry, his standards are not really derived from them but from Good Sense, in the name of which he seems ready to reject the whole of heroic poetry, as witness the opening speech of his <u>Virtuoso</u>, written after the <u>Notes and Observations</u> and before Dryden's <u>Apology</u>:

> Thou great <u>Lucretius</u>! Thou profound Oracle of Wit and Sence! Thou art no Trifling-Landskip-Poet, no Fantastic Heroick Dreamer, with empty Descriptions of Impossibilities, and mighty sounding Nothings. Thou reconcil'st Philosophy

> with Verse, and dost, almost alone, demonstrate that
> Poetry and Good Sence may go together.[45]

To imply that Lucretius is superior to the great heroic poets is to ignore Jonson's praise of Virgil in Poetaster (see above, Chap. II, p. 74), as well as the whole classical tradition.

Dryden, on the other hand, though he had realized the faults of his heroic plays, and had written Aureng-Zebe in a more chastened style, desired above all to make "amends, for many ill Playes, by an Heroique Poem" (Summers 4.84). His aim in the Apology is to show that heroic style and metaphorical language should not necessarily be considered fanciful, that judgment can operate even in the boldest language, and that the men of sense are arguing not only against the whole classical tradition but even against Horace, "the best Judge of Poetry" (see above, p. 185). But no matter how much authority he has on his side, Dryden still has difficulty in providing a coherent theoretical justification for figurative language that contradicts literal truth.

Dryden begins by attacking the tendency of those who criticize heroic poetry "to snarl at the little lapses of a pen from which Virgil himself stands not exempted. Horace acknowledges that honest Homer nods sometimes: . . . but he leaves it also as a standing measure for our judgements,

> non, ubi plura nitent in carmine, . . ." (Watson 1.197).

And he quotes again one of his favorite passages (see above, p. 173). Longinus is his other main authority in this essay, and a great support for his belief in boldness in the flights of heroic poetry. But Dryden can bring the authority of all the recognized judges of poetry, ancient and modern, to assert against the "hypercritics of English poetry" that

heroic poetry is "the greatest work of human nature," and to confound them utterly, he cites the "best Judge" at length:

> Horace as plainly delivers his opinion, and particularly praises Homer in these verses:
>
> Trojani Belli scriptorem, Maxime Lolli,
> dum tu declamas Romae, Praeneste relegi:
> qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
> planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.
> [Epist. 1.2.1-4]
>
> And in another place, modestly excluding himself from the number of poets, because he only writ odes and satires, he tells you a poet is such an one,
>
> cui mens divinior, atque os
> magna sonaturum.
> (S 1.4.43-44, Watson 1.198)

Parenthetically, Horace, in this passage, is only professing to doubt whether comedy and satire can rightly be called poetry; Dryden's extension of his meaning to the odes seems to reflect his own feeling of the inferiority of lyric to epic poetry.

In this essay, Dryden is very careful to avoid the kind of offense against orthodoxy that had provided Shadwell with openings before; he makes clear that in giving the precedence to epic poetry he does not mean to slight "the other parts of poetry: for comedy is both excellently instructive, and extremely pleasant: satire lashes vice into reformation, and humour represents folly so as to render it ridiculous" (199). No longer does he suggest that comedy aims only to amuse. He is moderate; every man may please himself, but those who dislike heroic poetry should not presume to judge it. He is trying above all to suggest that those who, like the author of the Postscript, do not hesitate to condemn, in the name of reason, what they consider extravagant in the Ancients and the great Moderns, are actually showing themselves unreasonable:

> They who would combat general authority with particular opinion must first establish themselves a reputation of understanding better than other men. Are all the flights of heroic poetry to be concluded bombast, unnatural, and mere madness, because they are not affected with their excellencies? . . . Ought they not rather, in modesty, to doubt of their own judgements, when they think this or that expression in Homer, Virgil, Tasso, or Milton's Paradise to be too far strain'd, than positively to conclude that 'tis all fustian, and mere nonsense?
>
> (199)

The "hypercritics" are cutting themselves off from the classical tradition. The author of the Postscript had called an appeal to the example of the Ancients pedantry; Dryden tries to show that such an appeal is based on reason:

> Virgil and Horace, the severest writers of the severest age, have made frequent use of the hardest metaphors, and of the strongest hyperboles: and in this case the best authority is the best argument. For generally to have pleased, and through all ages, must bear the force of universal tradition. And if you would appeal from thence to right reason, you will gain no more by it in effect than, first, to set up your reason against those authors; and, secondly, against all those who have admired them.
>
> (200)

Dryden shifts the grounds of the dispute from mimetic to pragmatic criteria, from the question of whether an author imitates nature exactly to whether he understands "the causes and resorts of that which moves pleasure in a reader . . . ." The role of learning and judgment in this is emphasized: "it requires philosophy, as well as poetry, to sound the depth of all the passions; what they are in themselves, and how they are to be provoked; and in this science the best poets have excelled." Aristotle is no longer seen as giving rules for Imitation, but for Rhetoric: "Aristotle raised the fabric of his Poetry from observation of those things in which Euripides, Sophocles,

and Aeschylus pleased: he considered how they raised the passions, and thence has drawn rules for our imitation."

Dryden's opponents have argued that poets should not look to the example of the Ancients but to nature as it is, and imitate that; but Dryden has interpreted knowledge of nature to mean knowledge of what moves the passions. He can now concede their point: "Thus I grant you that the knowledge of nature was the original rule; and that all poets ought to study her, as well as Aristotle and Horace, her interpreters" (200). Yet Dryden's basic assumption is still that it is the imitation of nature that pleases: "But then this also undeniably follows, that those things which delight all ages must have been an imitation of nature; which is all I contend" (200-201). His problem is still to show in what sense figurative language that contradicts truth is an imitation of nature.

He uses an analogy to painting: "catachreses and hyperboles are to be used judiciously, and placed in poetry as heightenings and shadows are in painting, to make the figure bolder, and cause it to stand off to sight." He calls on his opponents' favorite authority: "Will you arraign your master Horace for his hardness of expression when he describes the death of Cleopatra, and says she did <u>asperos tractare serpentes, ut atrum corpore combiberet venenum</u> [C 1.37.26-28], because the body in that action performs what is proper to the mouth?" He is careful not to use the authority of those who could be called fanciful: ". . . I will neither quote Lucan, nor Statius, men of an unbounded imagination, but who often wanted the poise of judgment" (201). Perhaps most impressive is his argument that an extravagant image can suggest the emotion appropriate to what is described. This

argument he finds in Longinus, but he does not apply it consistently. He comments, on Virgil's description of Camilla running so swiftly that the grass is not bent: "You are not obliged, as in history, to a literal belief of what the poet says; but you are pleased with the image without being cozened by the fiction" (202). Later he shifts back to a mimetic justification, again calling on Horace: "they [bold figures] are principally to be used in passion; when we speak more warmly, and with more precipitation, than at other times: for then, _si vis me flere, dolendum est primum ipsi tibi_ [_AP_ 102]; the poet must put on the passion he endeavours to represent . . . ."

Dryden has not provided a consistent and coherent justification for boldly figurative language, but he has made clear that judgment operates in handling it, and this he emphasizes: "The sum of all depends on what before I hinted, that this boldness of expression is not to be blamed if it be managed by the coolness and discretion which is necessary to a poet" (203).

The ultimate argument for departures from the literal truth in poetry is that poetry is not prose; no matter what the rational justification, poets have always exercised poetic license. In defining poetic license, Dryden again seems to be answering the arguments of the author of the Postscript:

> Poetic licence I take to be the liberty, which poets have assumed to themselves in all ages, of speaking things in verse which are beyond the severity of prose. 'Tis that particular character which distinguishes and sets the bounds betwixt _oratio soluta_ and poetry. This, as to what regards the thought or imagination of a poet, consists in fiction: but then those thoughts must be expressed; and here arise two other branches of it: . . . tropes . . . and figures; both which are of a much larger extent, and more forcibly to be used in verse than prose. This is that birthright which is

> derived to us from our great forefathers, even from Homer down to Ben. And they who would deny it to us have, in plain terms, the fox's quarrel to the grapes: they cannot reach it.
>
> (205-206)

In short, Shadwell and his ilk are the champions of "all that is dull" because they are themselves dull. Dryden had used the same words in the preface to <u>An Evening's Love</u>, to tell Shadwell that "no man ever will decry wit but he who despairs of it himself; and who has no other quarrel to it but that which the fox had to the grapes" (Watson 1.149). And he implied that Shadwell was one of those "poets who have too narrow an imagination to write it" (150). Doubtless Dryden's real opinion was still that Shadwell and the other "hypercritics" simply had imaginations too narrow to write or appreciate highly metaphorical language; but his aim being to show that he is the champion of reason and judgment, as well as of the classical tradition, he says nothing of imagination, but turns instead to Horace:

> How far these liberties are to be extended, I will not presume to determine here, since Horace does not. But it is certain that they are to be varied, according to the language and age in which an author writes . . .
>
> Horace a little explains himself on this subject of <u>licentia poetica</u> in these verses:
>
> pictoribus atque poetis
> quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas:
> sed non, ut placidis coeant immitia, non ut
> serpentes avibus geminentur, tigribus haedi.
>
> [<u>AP</u> 9-10, 12-13]
>
> He would have a poem of a piece; . . . he restrains it so far that thoughts of an unlike nature ought not to be joined together. That were indeed to make a chaos.

Dryden could not make the point more strongly that in the matter of heroic poetry he has "the most severe of Criticks" on his side (see above, p. 208). With this broadside he finally destroys any claim the "false critics" of his own day might have to speak for the Horatian

tradition or for judgment, which had always been seen as embodied in Horace (see above, Chap. II, p. 75). He concludes with the confidence of one who has reason and the authority of the classical tradition on his side: "No man will disagree from another's judgment concerning the dignity of style in heroic poetry; but all reasonable men will conclude it necessary that sublime subjects ought to be adorned with the sublimest, and (consequently often) with the most figurative expressions" (207).

It should now be absolutely clear that Dryden could not have written the Postscript to Notes and Observations on the Empress of Morocco, and that all the evidence points to Shadwell as the author. Certainly Shadwell seems to have seen Dryden's Apology as a continuation of their debate: in his Timon, written soon after the Apology, he attacks the very concept of the high style, advocating instead a kind of universal plain style. He has his Poet announce to Timon's steward:

> The last thing I presented my Noble Lord was Epigram:
> But this is in the Heroick style.
>
> Demetrius. What d'ye mean by style? that of good sence is all alike; that is to say; with apt and easie words, not one too little or too much: and this I think good style.
>
> Poet. O, Sir, you are wideo'th'matter! apt and easie!
> Heroicks must be lofty and high sounding;
> No easie language in Heroick Verse . . .[46]

Shadwell may have thought of the style "of good sence" as identical with the Horatian and Jonsonian plain style, but, as he describes it, it sounds more like the style of the Royal Society. In any case, in Dryden's eyes Shadwell was now beyond redemption, having formally announced

his championship of "all that is dull, insipid, languishing, and without sinews in a poem" (Watson 1.203). Shadwell might still see himself as the guardian of the "Sacred Rules of Wit and Sense" (see above, p. 196), but in rejecting the whole concept of different levels of style, he had put himself outside the classical tradition, and Dryden, feeling himself securely based in that tradition, determined to let Shadwell know exactly what his real status was.

Given this background, we can begin to appreciate _Mac Flecknoe_. With great formal pomp, Dryden is proclaiming to the world what tradition Shadwell really belongs to. The "man of sense" is made forever heir to "the Realms of _Non-sense_" (_Works_ II.54). Only a few graduate students now remember that Shadwell once boasted of one of his plays, "Men of Wit and Honour, the best Judges . . . are extremely delighted with it; and for the rest

> _Odi profanum vulgas & Arceo_." (C 3.1.1)[47]

Dryden leaves him no connection with Horace or Jonson; as Flecknoe says:

> Thou art my blood, where Johnson has no part;
> What share have we in Nature or in Art?
> (II.175-176)

There is even some evidence that Dryden originally began _Mac Flecknoe_ as an attack on Settle.[48] If this is true, the irony is doubled. Shadwell had looked down on Settle, the most fanciful and nonsensical of poets, with such contempt, saying, "he can do Poets no greater injury, than pretending to be one."[49] And now he himself is made to swear "Ne'er to have peace with Wit, nor truce with Sense" (1.117).

Although _Mac Flecknoe_, Dryden's first satire, was written at a time when Dryden was very aware of his need for the authority of

Horace and Jonson, it is not at all influenced by Horatian or Jonsonian satire. Dryden calls it Varronian satire (Kinsley 2.637), but it is a thoroughly modern work, and its model is probably Boileau's _Lutrin_, another Varronian satire, according to Dryden (Kinsley 2.664). The best commentary on _Mac Flecknoe_ is the passage in the _Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire_ in which Dryden describes how Boileau came to write _Le Lutrin_ in imitation of Tassone's _Secchia Rapita_:

> He had read the Burlesque Poetry, with some kind of Indignation, as witty as it was, and found nothing in _France_ that was worthy of his Imitation. But he copy'd the Italian so well, that his own may pass for an Original. He writes it in the _French_ Heroique Verse, and calls it an Heroique Poem: His Subject is Trivial, but his Verse is Noble. I doubt not he had _Virgil_ in his Eye, for we find many admirable Imitations of him and some Parodies . . . . And, as Virgil in his Fourth Georgique of the Bees, perpetually raises the Lowness of his Subject by the Loftiness of his Words . . . . We see Boileau pursuing him in the same flights . . . . This, I think . . . to be the most Beautiful, and most Noble kind of Satire. Here is the Majesty of the Heroique, finely mix'd with the Venom of the other; and raising the Delight which otherwise wou'd be flat and vulgar, by the Sublimity of the Expression.
> (Kinsley 2.664-665)

Thus Dryden's triumph over Shadwell is achieved in a poem that embodies all that Dryden loved and that Shadwell had attacked: "Majesty" and "Sublimity" "finely mix'd with . . . "Venom" to crush the dullard who had mocked majesty and sublimity, and "Flights" like those of Virgil, perfectly controlled, to turn into ridicule the "man of sense" who had ridiculed flights. Here is true poetic justice.

Shadwell was not utterly annihilated, however; he was praised after his death by Peter Motteux, to whom Dryden later addressed an epistle: "His Genius was inexhaustible [in comedy]: Neither were its

productions less usefull than diverting; since the best way to reform us is, to lay before us our Faults; thus observing Horace's Rule; which the Comic Glass doth often . . . .."[50] Shadwell would have rejoiced at being praised in these terms, but the fact is that he had represented but a truncated version of the Jonsonian and Horatian ideal. The notion of presenting the truth was reduced by Restoration common sense and the new scientific attitude to a kind of literal copying of life, and Shadwell had no conception of the care and artistry demanded to give truth an adequate embodiment. He had no notion of a true imitation of Horace; he uses Horace as an authority, but that is all. And poetry would indeed have sunk into prose if his version of the plain style had been generally followed.

But if Dryden could defeat Shadwell and his like by turning to Horace and the epic tradition for support of those elements in the heroic that went beyond what was considered rationally acceptable in his day, he could not deal so easily with that formidable representative of the "men of sense," Thomas Rymer. For in dramatic practice the example of the Ancients and the authority of Aristotle, Horace, and the French critics were on the side of reason, regularity, and strict imitation. Dryden might be convinced that the great plays of the last age were superior to anything he had done (Watson 1.192), but he had no means of defending them; his Heads of an Answer to Rymer is rather a series of attempts to mitigate the force of Rymer's arguments than a coherent and solidly based reply.[51] He emphasizes the ability of Shakespeare and Fletcher to move and please an English audience, but cannot escape the belief that they were operating on a weak foundation, and that their success may reflect the bad judgment of the

audience as well as the force of their poetry (<u>Works</u> XVII.186-188). For, although he suggests that Aristotle might have written differently if he had seen English plays (191), he has no alternative concept of a play to propound. He had lacked a theoretical foundation to justify bold metaphors too, but there Horace and an authoritative tradition were on his side. Here he has only his own experience--"I find it moving when it is read"--and he can only suggest that "even in imperfect plots there are less degrees of nature, by which some faint emotions of pity and terror are raised in us . . ." (Watson 1.247). After all, he had always believed that the fabric of a play must be the work of judgment (see above, p. 175), and that the rules provide a guide to a reasonable imitation of nature (see above, p. 179). It was natural that he should respond to Rymer by a stricter adherence to the rules. His quotation of Rapin at the end of <u>The Grounds of Criticism in Tragedy</u> reflects his own basic attitude:

> If the rules be well considered, we shall find them to be made only to reduce nature into method . . .; 'tis only by these that probability in fiction is maintained, which is the soul of poetry. They are founded upon good sense, and sound reason, rather than on authority; for though Aristotle and Horace are produced, yet no man must argue that what they write is true because they writ it; but 'tis evident, by the ridiculous mistakes and gross absurdities which have been made by those poets who have taken their fancy only for their guide, that if this fancy be not regulated, 'tis a mere caprice, and utterly incapable to produce a reasonable and judicious poem.
> (Watson 1.260-261)

It is perhaps significant that at this time Dryden used Horatian epigraphs for his plays for the first time since <u>Secret Love</u>. For <u>Troilus and Cressida</u> he used

<u>Rectius, Iliacum carmen deducis in actus,</u>

Quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus
(AP 129-130, Summers 5.2)

> you are doing better in spinning into acts a song of Troy than if, for the first time, you were giving the world a theme unknown and unsung
> (Loeb, p. 461)

and for Oedipus,

Vos exemplaria Graeca,
Nocturna versate manu, versate diurna
(AP 268-269, Summers 4.344)

> For yourselves, handle Greek models by night, handle them by day.
> (Loeb, p. 473)

If his greater emphasis on regularity made Horatian epigraphs seem appropriate, he had also another reason to stress his Horatian orthodoxy. He had just been the object of an attack by the Earl of Rochester, in his "Allusion to Horace the 10th Satyr of the 1st Book." Rochester mixed praise and blame, but the blame was severe; he accused Dryden of plagiarism, dullness, and much poor writing, partly to be blamed on haste, partly on being content with pleasing "the false Judgment of an Audience;/ Of clapping Fools . . . ."[52]

Dryden was later to admit, implicitly, the justice of the main points of this criticism, but his immediate reaction was to concede nothing, and in the preface of All for Love he turns to Horace to counter the attack that had been made in the name of Horace. He begins with a general criticism of rich men who insist on writing bad poetry:

> Maecenas took another course, and we know he was more than a great man, for he was witty too: but finding himself far gone in poetry, which Seneca assures us was not his talent, he thought it his best way to be well with Virgil and with Horace; . . . [thus] his own bad poetry is forgotten, and their panegyrics of him still remain. But they who should be our patrons are for no such expensive ways to fame; they have much of the poetry of Maecenas, but little of his liberality.

> They are for persecuting Horace and Virgil, in the persons of their successors (for such is every man who has any part of their soul and fire, though in a less degree).
>
> (Watson 1.228)

This is as close as Dryden ever comes to claiming to be a successor of the great Augustans; he is driven to it by the most serious attack that had yet been launched against him. Characteristically, he makes himself their successor not by virtue of filling a similar function or having similar aims, but by his possession of some "part of their soul and fire"--in other words, by the quality of imaginative power which in spite of everything he still felt to be the essential quality in a poet.

Dryden next shifts the attack, pretending to believe that the Allusion was written by one of Rochester's hangers-on:

> Some of their little zanies yet go further; for they are persecutors even of Horace himself, as far as they are able, by their ignorant and vile imitations of him; by making an unjust use of his authority, and turning his artillery against his friends. But how would he disdain to be copied by such hands! I dare answer for him, he would be more uneasy in their company than he was with Crispinus, their forefather, in the Holy Way; and would no more have allowed them a place amongst the critics, than he would Demetrius the mimic, and Tigellius the buffoon:
>
> Demetri, teque, Tigelli,
> discipulorum inter jubeo plorare cathedras
>
> (S 1.10.90-91, Watson 1.228)
>
> But you, Demetrius, and you, Tigellius, I bid you go whine amidst the easy chairs of your pupils in petticoats! (Loeb, p. 123)

In calling the Bore of the ninth satire of the first book Crispinus, Dryden follows Jonson. He cited Jonson's attack on Dekker under the name of Crispinus as a precedent for his attack on Settle in the preface of Notes and Observations (see above, p.194). So here he

identifies his adversary with the Horatian character Jonson had established as the prototype of the poetaster, and, securely based in the tradition, he allows himself to speak for Horace:

> With what scorn would he look down on such miserable translators who make doggerel of his Latin, mistake his meaning, misapply his censures, and often contradict their own? He is fixed as a landmark to set out the bounds of poetry:
>
> saxum antiquum, ingens, . . .
> limes agro positus, litem ut discerneret arvis.
>
> [a giant stone and ancient, . . . set for a landmark to ward dispute from the fields (Loeb, p. 361)]
>
> But other arms than theirs, and other sinews, are required to raise the weight of such an author; and when they would toss him against their enemies,
>
> genua labant, gelidus concrevit frigore sanguis.
> tum lapis ipse, viri vacuum per inane volutus,
> nec spatium evasit totum, nec pertulit ictum.
>
> (229)
>
> (his knees totter, his blood is frozen cold. Yea, the hero's stone itself, whirled through the empty void, traversed not all the space, nor carried home its blow. [Loeb, p. 361])

In calling Horace "a landmark to set out the bounds of poetry," Dryden effectively sums up the role Horace plays during the first half of Dryden's career. Never once before 1682 does Dryden imitate Horace in his poetry, but he cites him over and over again as an authority, an ordainer of rules, associated with all that limits poetry and makes it rationally respectable. It is apt that to describe Horace Dryden should choose figurative language based on a passage from Virgil, for to Dryden Horace is the authority, Virgil is the poet. Thus he writes in his poem "To the Earl of Roscommon, on his Excellent Essay on Translated Verse,"

> Scarce his own Horace cou'd such Rules ordain;
> Or his own Virgil sing a nobler strain.
>
> (*Works* II.173)

During this period Dryden only once discusses Horace as a poet; in the Defence of the Epilogue, he mentions among other ways of refining the language a way,

> which poets especially have practised in all ages: that is, by applying received words to a new signification. And this, I believe, is meant by Horace, in that precept which is so variously construed by expositors:
>
> dixeris egregie, notum si callida verbum
> reddiderit junctura novum. [(AP 47-48)
>
> you will express yourself most happily, if a skilful setting makes a familiar word new. (Loeb, p. 455)]
>
> And in this way, he himself had a particular happiness: using all the tropes, and particularly metaphors, with that grace which is observable in his Odes, where the beauty of expression is often greater than that of thought; as in that one example, amongst an infinite number of others: et vultus nimium lubricus aspici.
> (C 1.19.9, Watson 1.177)

This assessment, together with the indication we saw earlier that Dryden saw Horace's odes as well as his satires as being less than true poetry (see above, p. 204), seems to indicate a sense of Horace as at best a skillful poet with trivial subject matter, and at worst not really a poet at all. For we can deduce Dryden's opinion of the Satires and Epistles from his comment on Lucan: "he treats you more like a philosopher than a poet, and instructs you, in verse, with what he had been taught by his uncle Seneca in prose" (Watson 1.160).

To return, then to Horace, the authority. Dryden concludes the preface of All for Love by speaking again of his play:

> It remains that I acquaint the reader that I have endeavoured in this play to follow the practice of the Ancients, who, as Mr. Rymer has judiciously observed, are and ought to be our masters. Horace likewise gives it for a rule in his art of poetry:
>
> vos exemplaria Graeca
> nocturna versate manu, versate diurna. [(Ars 268-290)
>
> "For yourselves, handle Greek models by night,

handle them by day" (Loeb, p. 473).7

> Yet, though their models are regular, they are too little for English tragedy, which requires to be built in a larger compass.
> (Watson 1.230-231)

This passage reflects the balance that Dryden strikes in dramatic practice at this period in his life; he professes adherence to the Rules and Horace, yet preserves a certain independence based on his sense of writing as a modern Englishman.

Eventually, Dryden admits that Rochester's charges were just, by declaring that they are so no longer. In the Dedication of The Spanish Friar, he discusses his adherence to stricter artistic standards. He is proud of this play, proud of "the care and pains I have bestowed on this, beyond my other tragicomedies . . ." (Watson 1.275). Rochester had accused him of haste; he now says: "Few good pictures have been finished at one sitting; neither can a true just play, which is to bear the test of ages, be produced at a heat, or by the force of fancy, without the maturity of judgment." Dryden now agrees with Rochester in scorning the applause of the audience, gained, as it is, not by the poet's labor, but by the theatrical spectacle and the actor's skill (275). Chapman's Bussy D'Ambois provides an example of work that dazzles on the stage, but off is found to be "a hideous mingle of false poetry and true nonsense" at the sight of which Dryden has "indignation enough to burn a D'Ambois annually to the memory of Jonson" (276).

Dryden then remembers his own sins of extravagance, and blames them on a desire to please the audience, professing that he is now "resolved that I will settle myself no reputation by the applause of

fools" (276-277). As an heroic dramatist, Dryden had quoted one half of Horace's passage on the danger of extremes, to the effect that too much caution in writing is a fault, to support his belief that poets "should be bold and dare,/ They spoil their business with an over-care" (see above, p. 179). Now he gives the general principle, and paraphrases the other half of the passage: "when men affect a virtue which they cannot reach, they fall into a vice which bears the nearest resemblance to it. Thus an injudicious poet who aims at loftiness runs easily into the swelling puffy style, because it looks like greatness" (277). In short, "professus grandia turget" (AP 27). ("One promising grandeur, is bombastic . . ." [Loeb, p. 453].)

Yet in rejecting over-boldness, and in accepting Horatian standards, Dryden does not espouse that literal-minded truth to nature that does not allow for strong metaphors. Rather, "in the heightenings of poetry, the strength and vehemence of figures should be suited to the occasion, the subject, and the persons. All beyond this is . . . out of nature . . . and not a living part of poetry" (278). He has abandoned the notion that a poet cannot judge his own writing, together with the idea that only fancy operates in the poetic part of poetry (see above, p. 176), and now claims for himself "liberty to judge when I write more or less pardonably . . ." (275). The kind of excellence he aims at now cannot possibly be perceived in the theatre, but his new ambition is "to be read: that I am sure is the more lasting and the nobler design . . .," and to achieve that end he concentrates on "The purity of phrase, the clearness of conception and expression, the boldness maintained to majesty, the significancy and sound of words, not strained into bombast, but justly elevated; in short, those very

words and thoughts which cannot be changed but for the worse . . ." (278). At the same time, he is willing to combine tragedy and comedy, and "to break a rule for the sake of variety" in order to please the audience, his pride being in how skillfully he has woven together his two plots (279).

In this dedication, Dryden presents what we may call his version of the Horatian ideal. His whole emphasis is on artistic skill, his whole aim, to please the judicious. The only hint that the play may have a purpose beyond itself lies in his calling it "a Protestant play" (279); there is no mention of any aim to profit. In the _Heads of an Answer_, Dryden professes to believe that though "the chief End of the Poet is to please . . .. The great End of the Poem is to Instruct . . .: For . . . all Arts are made to Profit" (_Works_ XVII.192). But judging by this Preface, Dryden still sees his plays as primarily entertainment, though on a higher level than before.

Dryden's version of the Horatian ideal is not Shadwell's; poetry retains a degree of independence of all but aesthetic considerations. Still, accepting the limitations involved in writing plays according to Horatian standards meant for Dryden accepting a less poetic drama, less noble, with less of "soul and fire." Dryden did not return to the stage after _The Spanish Friar_ until forced to it by poverty. Only in epic poetry did Horace and tradition operate to some extent on the side of imaginative freedom, and it was an epic poem that Dryden longed to write.

FOOTNOTES

1. Pollard and Redgrave, *Short-Title Catalogue* (London, 1926), pp. 306-307, Donald Wing, *Short-Title Catalogue* (New York, 1948), 2.206.

2. *The Poems of Horace, Consisting of Odes, Satyres, and Epistles . . .* (London, 1666), sig. A4.

3. Jean Marnier, *Horace en France, au dix-septieme siecle* (Paris, 1962), p. 70. See also pp. 38-39, 85-86, *et passim*.

4. A_3-A_3v.

5. A_4v

6. A_3v

7. A_4v

8. A_2

9. Maren-Sofie Rostvig, *The Happy Man* I (Oslo, 1954), 229; Marnier, p. 85.

10. Rostvig, pp. 19-21.

11. On the nature of this mode, see Allison, *Toward an Augustan Poetic* (Lexington, Ky., 1962), pp. 12-23, *et passim*.

12. *The Works of John Dryden*, ed. H. T. Swedenberg Jr. et al. (Berkeley, 1956), I.11. Hereafter cited in the text as *Works*. Other editions used: *The Poems of John Dryden*, ed. James Kinsley (Oxford, 1958), cited as Kinsley; *Of Dramatic Poesy And Other Critical Essays*, ed. George Watson (New York, 1962), cited as Watson; *The Dramatic Works*, ed. Montaigue Summers (London, 1932), cited as Summers; *The Works of John Dryden*, ed. Sir Walter Scott and George Saintsbury (18 vols., Edinburgh 1882-93), cited as S-S; *The Letters of John Dryden*, ed. Charles E. Ward (Durham, N.C., 1942), cited as *Letters*.

13. See Watson 1.197, *Works* III.14, Kinsley 3.1047.

14. For a discussion of this problem that touches on many of the same points I do, see John M. Aden, "Dryden and the Imagination," *PMLA*, 74 (1959), 28-40. Aden does not see the full ambivalence of Dryden's attitude, however.

15. Charles E. Ward, *The Life Of John Dryden* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1961), p. 46.

16. Aden, pp. 32-33.

17. De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientarum, Book III, Chap. 1. See also Book II, Chap. 13, passim.

18. Sanford Budick, Dryden and the Abyss of Light (New Haven, 1970), pp. 1-7.

19. Complete Works ed. Montague Summers (London, 1927), 1.11-12. On the continuing controversy between Shadwell and Dryden, see D. M. McKeithan, "The Occasion of Mac Flecknoe," PMLA, 47 (1932), 766-771; R. Jack Smith, "Shadwell's Impact on John Dryden," RES, 20 (1944), 29-44; Michael W. Allsid, "Shadwell's Mac Flecknoe," SEL, 7 (1967), 387-402; Michael Wilding, "Dryden and Satire: 'Mac Flecknoe, Absalom and Achitophel, the Medall', and Juvenal," in Writers and Their Backgrounds: John Dryden, ed. Earl Miner (London, 1972), pp. 191-233. Smith considers the Dryden-Shadwell controversy important chiefly for its role in shaping Dryden's critical opinions, Allsid for the light it sheds on Mac Flecknoe. None look carefully at the Notes and Observations on the Empress of Morocco, or question the ascription of the Postscript to Dryden.

20. 1.100.

21. J. A. Van der Welle, Dryden and Holland (Groningen, 1962), p. 117.

22. Shadwell, Works, 1.184.

23. 1.185.

24. 1.188.

25. 1.188.

26. Aden, p. 40.

27. Shadwell, Works, 3.102.

28. Dryden: The Critical Heritage, ed. James Kinsley (London, 1971), pp. 45-79.

29. Monk mentions Settle's imitation of Dryden (Works XVII.398).

30. Quoted Works XVII.394. On the question of the authorship of the preface, the only critic who questions Dryden's role is Ward, who prefers to believe that Dryden had nothing to do with the whole project (Life, pp. 101, 328-329). Monk, the editor of volume XVII, summarizes the arguments (p. 394-397). Useful articles: Ann Doyle, "Dryden's Authorship of Notes and Observations on the Empress of Morocco (1674)." Studies in English Literature, 6 (1966), 421-455; George McFadden, "Elkanah Settle and the Genesis of Mac Flecknoe," PQ 43 (1964), 55-72.

31. H. H. R. Love, "The Authorship of the Postscript of 'Notes and Observations on the Empress of Morocco,'" N&Q, 211 (1966), 27-28. Love's brief article makes some of the same points I do, especially the obvious one that the ideas of the author of the Postscript are not typical of Dryden, while they are of Shadwell. Apparently he does not go into enough detail to carry conviction, however. Monk cites his article in a footnote, but does not mention his thesis, and concludes with Doyle and McFadden that Dryden probably wrote the Postscript as well as the Preface.

32. Shadwell, Works, 2.281.

33. 3.200.

34. 3.102.

35. McFadden sees the mere fact of a discussion of poetic license as evidence that the Postscript is by Dryden, since Dryden was concerned with the problem at this time (p. 64).

36. Shadwell, 3.217.

37. 1.187.

38. 3.106. For this point I have to thank Love. See his p. 28.

39. 3.217.

40. 5.248.

41. McFadden, p. 64.

42. Shadwell, 1.185-186, 189.

43. 3.113.

44. 3.217.

45. 3.105.

46. 3.200.

47. 1.185.

48. McFadden's thesis.

49. Shadwell, Works, 3.22.

50. Quoted from a contemporary newspaper (1692), in Albert S. Borgman, Thomas Shadwell (New York, 1928), p. 98.

51. Robert Hume, Dryden's Criticism (Ithaca, 1970), pp. 110,ff.

52. Critical Heritage, p. 117.

CHAPTER V: DRYDEN AND HORACE, 1681-1700: HORACE THE POET

During the second half of Dryden's career he deals with Horace as a poet rather than as a critic. He imitates Horace's epistolary style, translates a few odes, and discusses him at length both as a lyric poet and a satirist. Yet, as we shall see, the same factors that put Dryden at odds with Horace the critic and the authors and critics who regarded themselves as his representatives during the early part of his career kept him from fully appreciating Horace the poet during the later part. The gap between them is most striking in Dryden's public poetry.

A new phase of Dryden's career is marked by his return to public poetry in 1681. From this time until the end of his life Dryden's writing reflects a very direct and personal concern with English politics. As long as the Stuarts were on the throne, he used his pen to support them, seeing all attempts at reform as pure subversion (Summers 4.179), and after James's expulsion he continued to point out, as far as he dared, how much the English had lost by disrupting their established government.

The immediate means Dryden chose to support Charles during the Exclusion Crisis was satire. It might not seem unreasonable to expect that as a public poet and a satirist Dryden would feel that he had something in common with Horace, that he would begin to see himself as a kind of modern equivalent of Horace. But obviously the only thing Horatian about _Absalom and Achitophel_, to take Dryden's greatest political satire, is the epigraph, "------_Si Propius stes/ Te Capiet_

Magis------" (AP 361-362, Works II.2). Partly this is because of Dryden's opinion of the style of Horatian satire, and this will become clearer in subsequent discussions. Dryden found in satire an opportunity for elevation of style, whether in the heroic elements in Absalom and Achitophel or the invective of The Medall. He desired to sway men, and to rouse their passions, and this he believed the Horatian style to be capable of. But aside from stylistic questions there is a basic difference between Dryden's stance as a public poet and that of Horace.

It is true that in certain poems Horace reminds his fellow citizens of the evils of civil war and the benefits of Augustus' reign, and to that extent he could have provided a model for Dryden's praise of the Stuarts. But Horace's main concern is the possibility of moral regeneration for Rome under Augustus.[1] Horace had been a satirist before he was a supporter of Augustus, and he carries the moral concerns of the satirist into his public poetry. He does not use his satire for political purposes, nor attack Augustus' political enemies for supposed moral obliquity. Dryden, on the other hand, finds the main inspiration for his satire in political sins. When he describes his age as "only fit for Satyr," it is specifically because of "its ingratitude to the Government" (Works XVII.229). He seems rather to look for moral failings in those he opposes politically than to oppose them because of their moral failings. Thus the moral judgments Dryden makes in Absalom and Achitophel aim primarily at showing that those who support the king are virtuous, his opponents evil.

Dryden tries in his political satires to establish himself as speaking from the moral center of the kingdom, and in this might be said

to resemble Jonson and Horace, but, again, Dryden's aims are political, Jonson's moral. Jonson's belief in the authority of the king was unquestioning, but the special relationship between the king and his poet made Jonson not James's political supporter but his moral adviser. Praise always involved the presentation of an ideal. The difference between Jonson and Horace on the one hand and Dryden on the other might be summed up by saying that while both Jonson and Horace were conservative, politically as well as morally, Dryden was a Tory: he did not seem to expect men to be virtuous, but he hoped that they could be persuaded to be peaceful, for the sake of political stability.[2]

We can see the nature of the relationship between Dryden's satire and his political concerns very clearly in The Medall: A Satyre against Sedition (Works II.43-52). The title itself announces the poem's political nature, sedition being a purely political vice. The poem is labeled a satire, as Absalom and Achitophel is not, and it has a much more savage tone. Dryden is driven by indignation, but it is not moral failings that enrage him. Consider his reflections on the mixture of loyal and dissident citizens in London:

> How shall I praise or curse to thy desert!
> . . . .
> The wise and wealthy love the surest way;
> And are content to thrive and to obey.
> But Wisedom is to Sloath too great a Slave;
> None are so busy as the Fool and Knave.
> Those let me curse; what vengeance will they urge,
> Whose Ordures neither Plague nor Fire can purge;
> Nor sharp Experience can to duty bring,
> Nor angry Heav'n, nor a forgiving King!
> (ll. 169, 183-190)

"The wise and wealthy" are not morally superior to "the Fool and Knave;" they simply know when they are well off. The curse is aimed purely at political disaffection. At the same time, Dryden constantly

links political questions with the traditional hierarchy of values: the Whigs are presented as rebels against Reason as well as against the King:

> Nor Faith nor Reason make thee at a stay;
> Thou leapst o'r all eternal truths, in thy Pindarique way!
> (ll. 93-94)[3]

But Dryden's essential purpose is political, and whether his satire is Varronian or Juvenalian, it is never Horatian.

Only once in Dryden's career does he specifically tell us that he is imitating Horace. At the end of the "Address to the Reader" that prefaces Religio Laici, Dryden gives a kind of apology for the Horatian style he has adopted, and in the process gives us insight into his opinion of the style of Horace's hexameter poems.

> It remains that I acquaint the Reader, that the Verses were written for an ingenious young Gentleman my Friend; upon his Translation of The Critical History of the Old Testament . . .: The Verses therefore are address'd to the Translatour of that Work, and the style of them is, what it ought to be, Epistolary.
>
> If any one be so lamentable a Critique as to require the Smoothness, the Numbers and the Turn of Heroick Poetry in this Poem; I must tell him, that if he has not read Horace, I have studied him, and hope the style of his Epistles is not ill imitated here. The Expressions of a Poem, design'd purely for Instruction ought to be Plain and Natural, and yet Majestick: for here the Poet is presum'd to be a kind of Law-giver, and those three qualities which I have nam'd are proper to the Legislative style. The Florid, Elevated and Figurative way is for the Passions; for Love and Hatred, Fear and Anger, are begotten in the Soul by showing their Objects out of their true proportion; either greater than the Life, or less; but Instruction is to be given by shewing them what they naturally are. A Man is to be cheated into Passion, but to be reason'd into Truth.
> (Works II.108-109)

It almost seems that Dryden is turning against the high style. Yet we know that he has always seen the ability to cheat men into passion as one of the essential characteristics of the poet. We have seen him

say proudly that "it requires philosophy, as well as poetry, to sound the depth of all the passions: what they are in themselves, and how they are to be provoked; and in this science the best poets have excelled (see above, Chap. IV, p. 205). As for the distortion involved, he has always maintained that "to affect the Soul, and excite the Passions, and above all to move admiration . . . a bare imitation will not serve. The converse . . . must be heighten'd with all the Arts and Ornaments of Poesie . . ." (see above, Chap. IV, p. 177. See also p. 175). In other words, objects must be shown "greater than the Life;" without this, "the foundation of poetry would be destroyed" (Chap. IV, p. 187).

Clearly Dryden shares the common conviction of his day that the ornaments of rhetoric and poetry are the instruments of illusion, and that only language stripped of these ornaments can show things as "they naturally are."[4] Consequently, if he wants his poem to be accepted as a serious attempt to convey the truth, he knows that he has to convince his readers that it is not "poetic." This is why he emphasizes his abandonment of the high style, and his adoption of the Horatian epistolary style, which represents the antithesis of the poetic.

When Dryden discusses Horace's hexameter poems elsewhere, he makes it quite clear that he scarcely regards them as poetry at all. In the dedication of his Aeneis, Dryden speaks of the "Propriety of Thought, Elegance of Words, and Harmony of Numbers" in Horace's lyrics. His hexameter poems, however, "being intended wholly for instruction, requir'd another Style:

Ornari res ipsa negat, contenta doceri:

And therefore as he himself professes, are Sermoni Propiora, nearer

Prose than Verse" (Kinsley 3.1045). Dryden is equally explicit in the dedication to the Georgics: ". . . Horace in his First and Second Book of Odes, was still rising, but came not to his Meridian 'till the Third. After which his Judgement was an overpoize to his Imagination: He grew too cautious to be bold enough, for he descended in his Fourth by slow degrees, and in his Satires and Epistles, was more a Philosopher and a Critick than a Poet" (Kinsley 2.913). Thus late in his life Dryden echoes his old feeling that "Poets, like Lovers, should be bold and dare" (Chap. IV, p. 179), and makes imagination the essential quality that distinguishes the poet from the philosophers.

Imagination has no place in Religio Laici, any more than the high style does, but on the other hand, Dryden clearly does not adopt the Horatian plain style at its lowest, the sermo pedestris. He has only contempt for it, and in his Discourse concerning the Original and Progress of Satire he is indignant with Heinsius for making it part of the definition of satire:

> Is the fault of Horace to be made the Virtue, and Standing Rule of this Poem? Is the Grande Sophos of Persius, and the Sublimity of Juvenal to be circumscrib'd, with the meanness of Words and vulgarity of Expression? If Horace refus'd the pains of Numbers, and the loftiness of Figures, are they bound to follow so ill a Precedent? Let him walk a Foot with his Pad in his Hand, for his own pleasure: but let them not be accounted no Poets, who choose to mount, and shew their Horsemanship.
> (Kinsley 2.660-661)

Dryden does not want the high style of tragic satire in Religio Laici, but neither does he stoop to "the meanness of Words and the vulgarity of Expression" that he found in Horace's hexameter poems; he feels that there is room for the "Majestick" in the epistolary style, as he says in his "Address to the Reader." But one reason that Dryden is

willing to profess that Horace is his model, in spite of his contempt for the style of much that Horace wrote, is that he is willing to suggest to the reader that he has paid as little attention to his words as he feels Horace does. This becomes even clearer in the last lines of Religio Laici, and we shall discuss its significance when we consider those lines.

The other reason that Dryden calls his style Horatian is that there is at least one epistle in which he feels that Horace has achieved a more satisfactory style: "the First Epistle of the Second Book . . . is of so much Dignity in the Words, and of so much Elegancy in the Numbers, that the Author plainly shews, the Sermo Pedestris, in his other Satires, was rather his Choice than his Necessity" (Kinsley 2. 649-650). Dignity and majesty are appropriate in the epistolary style because "here the Poet is presum'd to be a kind of Law-giver." Dryden sees the whole purpose of the plain style, or the "Legislative style" as he calls it, as instructive: "Horace is teaching us in every Line, and is perpetually Moral" (Kinsley 2.648). Never in discussing the plain style does Dryden mention its ability to serve as a direct expression and revelation of the mind of the writer. Heinsius, as we saw, felt that Horace used the plain style, "Ut solutus omni servitudine, totam sui ipse ideam nobis daret . . ." ("That free of all constraint he himself may give us his complete idea . . .") (Chap. I, p. 54), and called it "primam animi interpretationem" ("the first interpretation of the soul") (55). Dryden says nothing of the sense we have in Horace's hexameter poems that we are being allowed to know a man, or of the deeper value we attach to his words because we know him, and because we feel that what he says is validated by his own experience.

Dryden has adopted the Horatian style not because he wishes to reveal the workings of his mind, but because he wishes to instruct his readers effectively, and this above all is what distinguishes Religio Laici from any Horatian epistle. Dryden is indeed "teaching us in every line," and the poem is completely shaped by his instructive purpose. His organization is much tighter than Horace's ever is. There is a clear rational structure in the poem, as Dryden argues first with one extreme position, then with another, in order to end with a solidly-based espousal of a golden mean that will support political stability.

Within this context, Dryden does use Horace as a model to a certain extent. Even his celebrated opening lines are not entirely without Horatian precedent:

> Dim, as the borrow'd beams of Moon and Stars
> To lonely, weary, wandring Travellers,
> Is Reason to the Soul: And as on high . . ..
> (Works II.109)

The Epistle to Augustus, that "First Epistle of the Second Book" of which Dryden spoke so highly, begins with a resonant formality:

> Cum tot sustineas et tant negotia solus,
> res Italas armis tuteris, moribus ornes,
> legibus emendes, in publica commoda peccem,
> si longo sermone morer tua tempora, Caesar.

> Seeing that you alone carry the weight of so many great charges, guarding our Italian state with arms, gracing her with morals, and reforming her with laws, I should sin against the public weal if with long talk, O Caesar, I were to delay your busy hours.
> (Loeb, p. 397)

The difference of course is that the tone of Horace's first lines is determined by the person to whom his epistle is addressed, while from Dryden's first lines we would never be aware that his poem was supposedly an epistle. Indeed, Dryden gives us no hint that his poem is

an epistle until half-way through, and then he has to remind us in a gloss of the identity of the person he suddenly addresses (Works II. 116). The reason for this seems to be that in order to speak with the greatest possible authority, Dryden speaks, where he can, not as an individual but as a member of his church. He has carefully informed the reader that "the Weapons with which I Combat Irreligion, are already consecreated," because they are "taken from the Works of our Reverend Divines of the Church of England . . ." (Works II.98), and the tone of the opening lines seems designed to remind the reader of the consequent strength of Dryden's position.

Dryden is again following Horatian precedent when he uses a nonce adversary, but again his purpose makes the result very different.[5] Horace uses this device casually, giving a conversational effect. In the Epistle to Augustus, for example, he wishes to know if one hundred years make a writer officially old and good, and suddenly a response comes:

> 'Est vetus atque probus centum qui perficit annos.'
> Quid, qui deperiit minor uno mense vel anno . . .?
> (ll. 39-40)

> "He is ancient," you say, "and good, who completes a hundred years."
> "What of one who passed away a month or a year short of that . . .?
> (Loeb, p. 399)

And the interlocutor is led into seeing how foolish his standards are. Or take a more extensive use, in the fourth satire of the first book: an adversary appears and sounds a warning against satiric poets, and Horace responds, "Agedum, pauca accipe contra" (l. 38) ("Come now, listen to a few words in answer" [Loeb, p. 51]). Dryden on the other hand introduces a Deist to present a complete summary of deist doctrine, then with the full weight of Anglican orthodoxy rises to crush him:

> Vain, wretched Creature, how art thou misled
> To think thy Wit these God-like Notions bred!
> (ll. 64-65)

The nonce adversary becomes an essential part of the logical structure of the poem, used systematically to present each opposing view.

If we compare the use of the first person singular in Religio Laici and the Epistle to Augustus, we find that Horace uses it without any apparent motive in the fourth line, simply because his poem is an epistle. He uses it again in line thirty-five to introduce the little dialogue with the nonce adversary: "scire velim chartis pretium quotus adroget annus?" ("I should like to know what is the year that gives to writings fresh value" [Loeb, p. 399].) He uses it in a humorous way to lighten the dogmatism of his condemnation of those who love only the old:

> Si veteres ita miratur laudatque poetas,
> ut nihil anteferat, nihil illis comparet, errat.
> Si quaedam nimis antique, si plerqaue dure
> dicere credit eos, ignave multa fatetur,
> et sapit et mecum facit et Iove iudicat aequo.
> (ll. 66-68)

> If they admire the ancient poets and cry them up so as to put nothing above them, nothing on their level, they are wrong. If they hold that sometimes their diction is too quaint, and ofttimes too harsh, if they admit that much of it is flat, then they have taste, they take my side, and give a verdict with Jove's assent.
> (Loeb, p. 403)

He brings himself in to laugh at himself for being so positive. In the first 211 lines of his supposedly epistolary poem, Dryden finds no need to introduce himself, since he is speaking with the authority of the Church of England. Only when he must handle disputed material does he mention himself and his motives, for the sake of an ethical appeal:

> Nor does it baulk my Charity, to find

Th'Egyptian Bishop of another mind . . . .
(ll. 212-213)

The most memorable use of the first person in the Epistle to Augustus is also in a sense an ethical appeal:

> Non equidem insector delendaque carmina Livi
> esse reor, memini quae plagosum mihi parvo
> Orbilium dictare, sed emendata videri
> pulchraque et exactis minimum distantia miror.
> . . . .
> Indignor quidquam reprehendi, non quia crasse
> compositum illepideve putetur, sed quia nuper;
> nec veniam antiquis, sed honorem et praemia posci.
> Recte necne crocum floresque perambulet Attae
> fabula si dubitem, clament periisse pudorem
> cuncti paene patres . . . .
> (ll. 69-81)

> Mark you! I am not crying down the poems of Livius--I would not doom to destruction verses which I remember Orbilius of the rod dictated to me as a boy: but that they should be held faultless, and beautiful, and well-nigh perfect, amazes me . . . . I am impatient that any work is censured, not because it is thought to be coarse or inelegant in style, but because it is modern, and that what is claimed for the ancients should be, not indulgence, but honour and rewards. If I were to question whether a play of Atta's keeps its legs or not amidst the saffron and flowers, nearly all our elders would cry out that modesty is dead . . . .
> (Loeb, p. 403)

Horace is revealing the personal nature of his concern for his topic, allowing us to know and understand him, and thus leading us to share his indignation. Dryden's most memorable use of the first person forms an interesting contrast. The Catholic adversary raises the objection that Socinians claim to prove Christ a man from the Scriptures, orthodox Christians, God:

> Now what appeal can end th'important Suit?
> Both parts talk loudly, but the Rule is mute.
> Shall I speak plain, and in a Nation free
> Assume an honest Layman's Liberty?
> I think (according to my little Skill,)
> (To my own Mother-Church submitting still)

That many have been sav'd, and many may,
Who never heard this Question brought in play.
Th'unletter'd Christian, who believes in gross,
Plods on to Heaven; and ne'er is at a loss . . . ..
(ll. 314-323)

There is no real self-revelation here; Dryden is faced with a difficult issue, and seems to be suggesting that the divinity of Christ is not one of those few plain things that we must believe, and making the suggestion palatable by an overt ethical appeal. None of the criticism of the poem I have looked at deals with the theological aspect of these lines; Dryden's assumption of "an honest Layman's Liberty" is rather seen as characterizing the tone of the whole poem.[6] But the tone is generally quite different, "legislative," and almost impersonal, or suggesting that the author writes as one of a group: we Anglicans, as, in the public poetry, we Englishmen:

Tradition written therefore more commends
Authority, than what from Voice descends:
And this, as perfect as its kind can be,
Rouls down to us the Sacred History:
Which, from the Universal Church receiv'd
Is try'd, and after, for its self believ'd.
(ll. 350-355)

Where the nature of the case admits of his speaking with authority, any suggestion that the ideas he expresses are his own perceptions or that their validity is based in any way on his character would make doubtful what he wishes to present as certain.

The last lines of the poem seem at first glance to run counter to the tendency just discussed, and present the whole poem as simply Dryden's opinion:

Thus have I made my own Opinions clear:
Yet neither Praise expect, nor censure fear:
And this unpolish'd, rugged verse, I chose;
As fittest for Discourse, and nearest Prose:
For, while from Sacred Truth I do not swerve,

Tom Sternhold's, or Tom Shadwell's Rhimes will serve.

But there is an obvious paradox here; Dryden speaks of presenting his own opinions, yet also boasts his adherence to "Sacred Truth." The first two lines seem to constitute a kind of final ethical appeal, in which Dryden tries to disarm criticism, and affirm his own independence and disinterestedness. But the main purpose of these last lines is to remind the reader that Dryden is writing in a style that can serve as a transparent medium for "Sacred Truth." Thus the first person is a reminder that the style is epistolary, and the description of the style as "unpolish'd, rugged" and "nearest Prose" emphasizes its closeness to that most unpoetic of styles, the sermo pedestris.

The light tone of the last line seems out of keeping with the seriousness of the poem, but its humor is actually a kind of allusion to Horace. Horace frequently ends his most serious poems on a humorous note.[7] Perhaps the most famous example is the end of the first epistle of the first book, where the wise man is praised as

> liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum,
> praecipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est.[8]

> rich, free, honoured, beautiful, nay a king of kings;
> above all, sound -- save when troubled by the "flu!"
> (Loeb, p. 259)

The epistle to Augustus also ends humorously, with Horace's resolution never to let himself be praised by a bad poet, lest he and his poet end up as wrapping paper. This kind of ending would inevitably be written in the sermo pedestris, and thus the tone of Dryden's last line becomes another reminder of the nature of his style, and underlines the content: Dryden's claim that his style has sunk to the level of Shadwell's. In short, Dryden is telling his readers that "like a true Philosopher" he

has "minded things, not word," as he says of Plutarch (Works XVII.245), and therefore he can be trusted.

Neither Jonson nor Heinsius thought of the plain style as written without care, or implied that its value depended on ignoring form and concentrating on matter. Heinsius described Horace as skillfully placing his words like stones in a mosaic (Chap. I, p. 55), and Jonson believed that only the greatest care could make words a fit embodiment for truth. His consequent misinterpretation of Bacon was profoundly revealing of "the high place given to words as a means to knowledge" (Chap. III, p. 135).[9] But Cowley did not misinterpret Bacon:

> From Words, which are but Pictures of the Thought,
> (Though we our Thoughts from them perversly drew)
> To Things, the Minds right Object, he it brought . . . .[10]

And Dryden was well aware of this shift in attitude towards words, witness his observation on Plutarch, quoted above. Later in his Life of Plutarch he observes that "it were unreasonable to be critical on his Elocution: As on a tree which bears excellent fruit, we consider not the beauty of the blossoms . . .; so in Plutarch, whose business was not to please the ear, but to charm and instruct the mind, we may easily for give the cadences of words, and the roughness of expression . . ." The division between manner and matter that Jonson either did not perceive or ignored in Bacon, Dryden here describes in terms that almost echo Bacon's: "The choice of words, the numbers of periods, the turns of Sentences, and those other Ornaments of speech, he neither sought, nor shun'd. But the depth of sense, the accuracy of Judgement . . ." (Works XVII.278).

It has been argued that Dryden responds to the distrust of rhetoric and of imaginative poetry in his day by writing a "poetry of statement,"

that is, by bringing poetry closer to prose in an effort to make it an appropriate vehicle for instruction.[11] And so he does, in a poem like *Religio Laici*. But in general, as we have seen, his aim is not primarily instruction, and his interest is in what differentiates poetry from prose, not in what makes them similar, even though he knows that this difference means a departure from truth. From Dryden's point of view, as we have said, the Horace of the hexameter poems is not really a poet at all. He uses that fact for his own ends in *Religio Laici*, but when he tries his hand at translating Horace, he naturally chooses some of the lyrics, where the poet is still in evidence, because his judgment has not yet outweighed his fancy (see above, p. 230).

Before we turn to the translations themselves, we must consider Dryden's theory of translation. In the preface to his translation of Ovid's *Epistles*, Dryden discusses the three methods of translation: metaphrase, paraphrase, and imitation. Jonson's method in his translation of the *Ars* is identified as metaphrase, concerning which, "our master *Horace* has given us this Caution:

> *nec verbum verbo curabis reddere, fidus*
> *Interpres*---- [AP 133-134]

Nor word for word too faithfully translate, as the *Earl* of *Roscommon* has excellently render'd it. Too faithfully is indeed pedantically: 'tis a faith like that which proceeds from Superstition, blind and zealous" (*Works* I.115). Dryden shares the common misconception of Horace's meaning, which Jonson so severely reprehended in Chapman (see above, Chap. II, p. 102). Still, in this preface Dryden opposes liberties with the author's sense, which he feels should be "Sacred and inviolable" (118). In imitation, the translator is free, "taking only

some general hints from the Original, to run division on the groundwork, as he please" (115). This way Dryden utterly rejects; a translator might be able to improve on his original, but "a Translator has no such Right: when a Painter Copies from the life, I suppose he has no priviledge to alter Features, and Lineaments, under pretence that his Picture will look better . . ." (119). Dryden advocates a middle ground: a translator must try to understand his poet's style thoroughly. "When we are come thus far, 'tis time to look into our selves, to conform our Genius to his, to give his thought either the same turn if our tongue will bear it, or if not, to vary but the dress, not to alter or destroy the substance" (118). But Dryden has not strictly adhered to his own theory; he has "taken more liberty that a just Translation will allow" (119). In the preface to the Sylvae, he owns that in these translations he has taken yet more liberty, and defends his practice:

> . . . I must acknowledge, that I have many times exceeded my Commission; for I have both added and omitted, and even sometimes very boldly made such expositions of my Authors, as no Dutch Commentator will ever forgive me. Perhaps . . . I have thought that I discover'd some beauty yet undiscover'd by those Pedants, which none but a Poet cou'd have found. Where I have taken away some of their Expressions, . . . what was beautiful in Greek or Latin, wou'd not appear so shining in the English: And where I have enlarg'd them, I desire the false Criticks wou'd not always think that those thoughts are wholy mine, but that either they are secretly in the Poet, or may be fairly deduc'd from him: or at least . . . that my own is of a piece with his, and that if he were living, and an English man, they are such as he wou'd probably have written.
>
> For, after all, a Translator is to make his Author appear as charming as he possibly can, provided he maintains his Character, and makes him not unlike himself.
>
> (Works III.3-4)

The contrast of Dryden's attitude with Jonson's is now complete; the debt to the reader "who is inquisitive to know an Authors thought" (Works I.117) is forgotten. The analogy with the painter drawing

"after the life" is converted into an argument for a kind of heightened imitation, in which the main emphasis is not on preserving the sense, but on capturing "the Spirit which animates the whole" (4).

The success of Dryden's translations in his own terms will then depend on his ability to enter sympathetically into "the Character of an Author, which distinguishes him from all others" (5). He sees this as the hardest task of the translator, but essential, for otherwise the essence of the poet will be lost (5-6). To understand "the Genius and distinguishing Character" of each author he translates has consequently been his first task (6), and in his preface he gives his readers an account of his conclusions. We thus have for the first time Dryden's considered estimate of Horace:

> Take him in parts, and he is chiefly to be consider'd in his three different Talents, as he was a Critick, a Satyrist, and a Writer of Odes. His Morals are uniform, and run through all of them; For let his _Dutch_ Commentatours say what they will, his Philosophy was _Epicurean_; and he made use of Gods and providence, only to serve a turn in Poetry. But since neither his Criticisms(which are the most instructive of any that are written in this Art) nor his Satyrs (which are incomparably beyond _Juvenals_, if to laugh and rally, is to be preferr'd to railing and declaiming,) are any part of my present undertaking, I confine my self wholly to his Odes: These are also of several sorts; some of them are Panegyrical, others Moral, the rest Jovial, or (if I may so call them) _Bacchanalian_. As difficult as he makes it, and as indeed it is, to imitate _Pindar_, yet in his most elevated flights, and in the sudden changes of his Subject with almost imperceptible connexions, that _Theban_ Poet is his Master. But _Horace_ is of the more bounded Fancy, and confines himself strictly to one sort of Verse, or Stanza in every Ode.
> (15-16)

In seeing Horace as consistently Epicurean, Dryden follows the tendency of his period, but may also be influenced by Dacier's commentary on the Odes, which stresses Horace's Epicureanism (see above, Chap. I, pp. 58-59). Dacier's ten volume edition of Horace appeared from 1681 to

1689, and the volumes containing the Odes would have been available by this time. Dryden does not mention Dacier until he writes his Discourse concerning . . . Satire, but it is likely that Dacier was read immediately in England, where cultivated men, Dryden among them, looked to the Paris of Louis XIV as almost another Augustan Rome (see e.g. Kinsley 2.608). Dryden's high praise of Horace as a critic is a matter of course, but in preferring him to Juvenal as a satirist Dryden takes a position he reverses in his Discourse. It has been suggested that he changed his mind because in 1693 he had lost his favored status at court (Watson 2.127), but surely no such hypothesis is necessary. He continues to prefer the Horatian manner, which, as we shall see, he identifies with his own, and it is specifically the manner that he is praising here (see below, p. 258).

Since Dryden sees Horace as of a "more bounded Fancy" than Pindar, and connects this limitation with the uniform stanzas in which he writes, it is interesting to find later that Dryden has turned his favorite poem, the twenty-ninth ode of the third book, into Pindarics: this ode "I have taken some pains to make . . . my Master-Piece . . . For which reason I took this kind of Verse, which allows more Latitude than any other" (Works III.17). Surely this is a departure from Dryden's basic principle of translation; a man of bounded fancy cannot be expected to seem like himself in a verse form in which "the Soul . . . consists in the Warmth and Vigor of Fancy, the masterly Figures, and the copiousness of Imagination . . ." (17). But apparently Dryden feels that to reproduce the qualities that constitute Horace's unique beauty is beyond him:

That which will distinguish his Style from all other Poets,

> is the Elegance of his Words, and the numerousness of his Verse; there is nothing so delicately turn'd in all the Roman language. There appears in every part of his Diction . . . a kind of noble and bold Purity. His Words are chosen with as much exactness as Virgils; but there seems to be a greater Spirit in them. There is a secret Happiness attends his Choice, which in Petronius is call'd Curiosa Felicitas, and which I suppose he had from the Feliciter audere of Horace himself. But the most distinguishing part of all his Character, seems to me, to be his Briskness, his Jollity, and his good Humour: And those I have chiefly endeavour'd to Coppy; his other Excellencies, I confess are above my Imitation.
>
> (16)

We shall not be surprised, then, to find that in his translations Dryden has followed the practice of those with whom he used to disagree, who feel "that the praise of a Translation Consists in adding new Beauties to the piece, thereby to recompense the loss which it sustains by change of Language . . ." (Works I.119).

It is strange to hear Dryden prefer Horace to Virgil in anything. But this "secret Happiness" is the same quality for which Dryden praised Horace before, when he said that "in his Odes . . . the beauty of expression is often greater than that of thought . . ." (Chap. IV, This seemed then to imply that Horace's thought was rather trivial, and that implication is borne out here. For Dryden has described Virgil as a "grave Majestick Writer" (Works III.6), when in Horace he finds only "Briskness," "Jolliyt," and "good Humour." In this trivialization of Horace, Dryden is apparently expressing the common attitude of his age as we saw it in Dacier (Chap. I, pp. 63-64), and in Brome (Chap. IV, pp. 165-166). Moreover, when the third edition of Brome came out in 1680, with additions, the new translations were little more than drinking songs, characterized by such deathless lines as, "Come Drawer some Claret, wee'l drown this new Moon."[12] And Creech, whose translation of

Horace had appeared in 1684 with a dedication to Dryden, seems to have seen Horace's "Jovial, or . . . Bacchanalian" odes in the same way, translating the Soracte Ode:

> Dissolve the Cold with noble Wine,
> Dear Friend, and make a rouzing fire,
> 'Gainst Cold without, and Care within,
> Let both with equal force conspire.[13]

In Dryden's first translation there is not much room for briskness and joviality. Rather he seems to be trying to compensate for the loss in weight caused by the change in meter:

> Audax Iapeti genus
> Ignem fraude mala gentibus intulit.
> Post ignem aetheria domo
> Subductum macies et nova febrium
> Terris incubuit cohors,
> Semotique prius tarda necessitas
> Leti corripuit gradum.
>
> (C 1.3.25-33)

> Iapetus' daring son by impious craft bought fire to the tribes of men. After fire was stolen from its home in heaven, wasting disease and a new throng of fevers fell upon the earth, and the doom of death, that before had been slow and distant, quickened its pace.
>
> (Loeb, p. 15)

> Thus bold Prometheus did aspire,
> And stole from heaven the seed of Fire:
> A train of Ills, a ghastly crew,
> The Robbers blazing track persue;
> Fierce Famine, with her Meagre face,
> And Feavours of the fiery Race,
> In swarms th' offending Wretch surround,
> All brooding on the blasted ground;
> And limping Death, lash'd on by Fate,
> Comes up to shorten half our date.
>
> (Works III.78)

The Asclepiadean meter gives particular emphasis to "tarda necessitas;" the effect is subtle but powerful. Dryden amplifies, using strong figurative language that creates an epic rather than a lyric tone, and underlining the rhythm with insistent alliteration.

Earl Miner, the editor of this volume of the California Dryden, attributes this amplification and some of the changes in the other poems to Dryden's desire to present Epicureanism as a philosophy inadequate to deal with the harsh realities of life (293-294). Certainly Dryden does not seem to be trying to reproduce the tone of his original, and to this extent I agree with Miner. But in the first verse of Dryden's translation of the Soracte Ode there are similar changes which cannot be explained by philosophical considerations:

> Vides ut alta stet nive candidum
> Soracte, nec iam sustineant onus
> Silvae laborantes, geluque
> Glumina constiterint acuto.
>
> (C 1.9)

> Seest thou how Soracte stands glistening in its mantle of snow, and how the straining woods no longer uphold their burden and the streams are frozen with the biting cold?
> (Loeb, p. 29)

> Behold yon' Mountains hoary height
> Made higher with new Mounts of Snow;
> Again behold the Winters weight
> Oppress the lab'ring Woods below:
> And streams with Icy Fetters bound,
> Benum'd and crampt to solid ground.
>
> (*Works* III.79)

Here again we have in the Horatian original subtle lyricism; the soft sibilance of the lines that describe the snow contrasts with the sharpness of the consonants in the words that describe the ice. Dryden again uses heavy alliteration to underline the rhythm, as well as to make the contrast set up between the first two couplets even more emphatic.

In the next two stanzas, Dryden's translation obviously does reflect his concept of Horace's philosophy, as well as of his jollity and good humor:

> Dissolve frigus ligna super foco
> Large reponens atque benignius

Deprome quadrimum Sabina,
O Thaliarche, merum diota.

Permitte divis cetera; qui simul
Stravere ventos aequore fervido
Deproeliantis, nec cupressi
Nec veteres agitantur orni.

Dispel the chill by piling high the wood upon the hearth, and right generously bring forth in Sabine jar the wine four winters old, O Thaliarchus! Leave to the gods all else; for so soon as they have stilled the winds battling on the seething deep, the cypresses and ancient ash-trees are no longer shaken.
(Loeb, p. 29)

With well heap'd Logs dissolve the cold,
And feed the genial hearth with fires;
Produce the Wine, that makes us bold,
And sprightly Wit and Love inspires;
For what hereafter shall betide,
God, if 'tis worth his care, provide.

Let him alone with what he made,
To toss and turn the World below;
At his command the storms invade;
The winds by his Commission blow;
Till with a Nod he bids 'em cease,
And then the Calm returns, and all is peace.

The amplification in Dryden's third and fourth lines gives the translation an appropriately Bacchanalian tone, which is enhanced by the cavalier attitude towards the future and towards God. Dryden seems to be changing the poem to reflect an interpretation similar to Dacier's, if not actually based on his (Chap. I, pp. 58-59). Convinced that Horace is an Epicurean, Dryden can only have inserted "God, if 'tis worth his care" to remind the reader that Horace does not believe that God concerns himself with the world at all. The next stanza then becomes, as Dacier said it was, a mockery of the idea that God attends to the details of the world's weather. Horace sounds remarkably like a free-thinking Wit of the court of Charles II.

When Horace writes:

Quid sit futurum cras, fuge quaerere et
Quem fors dierum cumque dabit lucro
  Adpone . . .

Cease to ask what the morrow will bring forth, and set
down as gain each day that Fortune grants!
(Loeb, p. 29)

And Dryden translates:

To morrow and her works defie,
  Lay hold upon the present hour,
And snatch the pleasures passing by,
  To put them out of Fortunes pow'r:
Nor love, nor love's delights disdain,
What e're thou get'st to day is gain.

The effect is not to suggest that "man's hope for happiness is nearly desperate," as Miner says (293), but that a man of pleasure is sharpening his delights by dwelling on their transience. The last verse of the translation confirms this interpretation:

      Nunc et campus et areae
Lenesque sub noctem susurri
      Composita repetantur hora;
Nunc et latentis proditor intimo
Gratus puellae risus ab angulo
   Pignusque dereptum lacertis
      Aut digito male pertinaci.

Now let the Campus be sought and the squares, with low
whispers at the trysting-hour as night draws on, and the
merry tell-tale laugh of maiden hiding in farthest cor-
ner, and the forfeit snatched from her arm or finger
that but feigns resistance.
(Loeb, p. 29)

The pointed hour of promis'd bliss,
The pleasing whisper in the dark,
The half unwilling willing kiss,
   The laugh that guides thee to the mark,
When the kind Nymph wou'd coyness feign,
And hides but to be found again,
These, these are joyes the Gods for Youth ordain.

It is hard to believe that Dryden heightens these lines as he does in order to make a point about the futility of Epicureanism. Rather Dryden is trying to present Horace's character as he conceives it, and at the

same time trying to create a poem which will be satisfying by his own standards. The last line of Dryden's translation especially seems added in order to give the poem an ending that will leave the reader with a sense of completeness, as well as an ending suitable to the kind of jovial poem on the good life and the joys of love that Horace's lyric has become.

The paraphrase "in Pindarique verse" of the twenty-ninth ode of the third book is as far from its original as we might expect, given Dryden's observations on Pindarics in the preface. It follows the general sense of Horace's ode, but it completely transforms the manner, and "the Spirit which animates the Whole." If we compare the most famous stanze of Dryden's version with the Horace, the point will be clear:

Ille potens sui
Laetusque deget, cui licet in diem
Dixisse 'Vixi: cras vel atra
Nube polum pater occupato

Vel sole puro; non tamen inritum
Quodcumque retrost efficiet, neque
Diffinget infectumque reddet
Quod fugiens semel hora vexit.'

Happy the Man, and happy he alone,
He, who can call to day his own:
He, who secure within, can say
To morrow do thy worst, for I have liv'd to day.
Be fair, or foul, or rain, or shine,
The joys I have possest, in spight of fate are mine.
Not Heav'n it self upon the past has pow'r,
But what has been, has been, and I have had my hour.
(*Works* III.83)

Here Dryden's rhetorical repetitions, alliteration, and swinging rhythm all join to produce what is unmistakably meant to be an *os magna sonaturum* in lyric poetry. Having left its original far behind, this translation is the most successful of the three odes as a poem in its own right, because it allows free swing to Dryden's own poetic

tendencies.

The one translation we have left to consider is that of the beatus ille epode, and this gives us a chance to compare Dryden's translation with Jonson's, and to observe the concrete difference made by their divergent theories of translation. It is not surprising that this should be the one poem that both men translated; the second epode was after all the favorite Horatian poem of the seventeenth century. In the first half of the century, men loved the poem for its emphasis on the ethical superiority of frugal and self-sufficient country life. Thomas Randolph even went so far as to call his version a translation, yet not only modernize the details but change the ending, leaving out Alphinus, the usurer, and substituting pious reflections:

> Our blankets are not dy'd with Orphan teares,
> Our Pillows are not stuff'd with cares . . ..[14]

In the second half of the seventeenth century, the emphasis shifts; the pleasures of country life are dwelt on more, the moral values less, and men begin to enjoy the irony of the ending.[15] Dacier describes the epode as "purement satyrique," and admires the "picquance" of having the speaker's identity concealed until the end.[16] Creech underlines the irony by amplifying the ending: "This Alphius said, the fam'd, and known,/ The griping Usurer of the Town . . ."[17] A comparison of selected passages from the original, Jonson's translation, and Dryden's version will illustrate this shift in emphasis, as well as the different theories of translation involved.

> Beatus ille qui procul negotiis,
> Ut prisca gens mortalium,
> Paterna rura bobus exercet suis,
> Solutus omne faenore . . ..

> Happie is he, that from all Businesse cleere,

  As the old race of Mankind were,
With his owne Oxen tills his Sires left lands,
  And is not in the Usurers bands . . . .
(Underwood LXXXV, H&S 8.289)

How happy in his low degree
How rich in humble Poverty is he,
Who leads a quiet country life!
Discharg'd of business, void of strife,
And from the griping Scrivener free.
(Thus e're the Seeds of Vice were sown,
Liv'd Men in better Ages born,
Who plow'd with Oxen of their own
Their small paternal field of Corn.)
(Works III.85)

The fulsome tone of Dryden's translation is even more striking when compared to Jonson's sober exactness. Dryden's lines demand to be read ironically; he is clearly counting on his audience's prior knowledge of the ending, and trying to make the implied humor strong enough to raise a laugh.

Small changes illustrate the difference in attitude towards a country life; Jonson translates "insitiva pira" (1.19) as "Pears, his own hand grafted had" (1.19), Dryden, as "the ripen'd Pear" (1.30). In the same way, Dryden heightens the description of sleep on the grass:

Labuntur altis interim ripis aquae,
  Queruntur in silvis aves,
Fontesque lymphis obstrepunt manantibus,
  Somnos quod invitet levis.
(ll. 25-28)

Whilst from the higher Bankes doe slide the floods;
  The soft birds quarrell in the Woods,
The Fountaines murmure as the streames doe creepe,
  And all invite to easy sleepe.
(ll. 25-28)

No God of Sleep need he invoke,
  The stream that o're the pebble flies
  With gentle slumber crowns his Eyes.
The Wind that Whistles through the sprays,
  Maintains the consort of the Song;
And hidden Birds with native layes

The golden sleep prolong.
(ll. 38-40)

Jonson's version is marred by the awkwardness of the word "creepe," brought in for the sake of the rhyme, and "slide" is too exact a translation to be good English, while "quarrel" is close to the Latin in sound but not in sense. Jonson's translation lacks the Horatian lyric grace, but it remains close to the original in its simplicity. Dryden's version is much smoother, and certainly better English. Dryden has no interest in preserving the simplicity of the original; his elaboration turns the country scene into a charming concert, appropriate to the day-dreams of a usurer by the "golden sleep" it produces.

Dryden never misses a chance to accentuate the humor:

Quis non malarum, quas amor curas habet,
  Haec inter obliviscitur?
(ll. 37-38)

Who (amongst these delights) would not forget
  Loves cares so evil, and so great?
(ll. 37-38)

Amidst his harmless easie joys
  No anxious care invades his health,
Nor Love his peace of mind destroys,
  Nor wicked avarice of Wealth.
(ll. 54-57)

The changes Dryden makes in the ending reflect the same concern to make the wit more pointed:

Haec ubi locutus faenerator Alfius,
  Iam iam futurus rusticus,
Omnem redegit Idibus pecuniam,
  Quaerit Kalendis ponere. (ll. 67-70)

These thoughts when Usurer Alphius, now about
  To turne mere farmer, had spoke out,
'Gainst th'Ides, his moneys he gets in with paine,
  At th' Calends, puts all out againe.
(ll. 67-70)

This Morecraft said within himself;

Resolv'd to leave the wicked Town,
And live retir'd upon his own;
He call'd his Money in:
But the prevailing love of pelf,
Soon split him on the former shelf,
And put it out again. (ll. 96-102)

Dryden would probably have defended his version of the second epode as bringing out the hidden beauties in his original, adding only "thoughts . . . that . . . may be fairly deduc'd from him." Certainly his translation makes Horace appear far more "charming" than Jonson's does, but we may question whether it has not also made him "unlike himself" (see above, p. 240), by insisting on spelling out everything Horace leaves implicit.

It is inevitable that every age will in some measure recreate significant authors in its own image. If Horace appears in Dryden's translations as a thorough-going Epicurean, a rake, and a cynical wit, this is simply Horace as the later seventeenth century knew him. But Dryden's translations of Horace do not reflect only this kind of inevitable change, nor can religious or philosophical considerations really account for the changes Dryden makes. The explanations for these changes seems rather to be that Dryden wants above all to make each of his translations a satisfying poem in itself, by his own standards.

Dryden expresses his appreciation of the delicacy of the originals, but he does not attempt to reproduce it, partly no doubt, as he admits, because he cannot (see p. 243), but also because such delicacy is not to him a characteristic of true poetry. Dryden has interpreted a passage in the fourth satire of the first book to mean that Horace does not consider himself a true poet because, in his odes as well as his satires, he lacks _os magna sonaturum_ (see above, Chap. IV, p. 209). And in the _Discourse concerning . . . Satire_, Dryden observes that Horace's "Wit

is faint" (Kinsley 2.649). In wit and in the high style, more than anywhere else, the poet shows his imaginative power; by raising the style of the odes and by sharpening the wit of the epode, Dryden has tried to give Horace the imaginative power he finds lacking in himself. In so doing, Dryden inevitably transforms utterly "the Spirit that animates the whole."

Only once more does Dryden discuss Horace at any length, but that last discussion is the longest and in many ways the most significant. It occurs in the Discourse concerning the Original and Progress of Satire, with which Dryden dedicates to Dorset his translation of the Satires of Juvenal and Persius. Here Dryden not only gives a history of satire, following for the most part Dacier's Origine et Progrès de la Satire, but also makes a formal comparison between the three Roman satirists, Persius, Juvenal, and Horace. I have already drawn on this Discourse for Dryden's estimate of the Horatian sermo pedestris, but now I must consider in some detail Dryden's reasons, literary and political, for preferring Juvenal to Horace, and in some things, Persius to Horace.

Dryden begins with Persius, whose "Merit . . . I think not equal in the main, to that of Juvenal or Horace, and yet in some things to be preferr'd to both of them" (Kinsley 2.639). The main reasons for Persius' inferiority are stylistic: his verse is "scabrous, and hobbling," his diction poor, his metaphors forced, and he is horribly obscure (639). But Casaubon has argued that he is superior to the other two because his instruction is superior, being consistently Stoic: "Satire is of the nature of Moral Philosophy; as being instructive: He therefore, who instructs most Usefully, will carry the Palm from his two

Antagonists" (643). Dryden does not bother to refute this theory; he describes it in terms that show he considers it mere special pleading: "A Man who is resolv'd to praise an Author, with any Appearance of Justice, must be sure to take him on the strongest side . . ." (642). But with Casaubon's contention that Persius' moral doctrine is in fact superior Dryden is in complete agreement:

> Herein, then it is, that Persius has excell'd both Juvenal and Horace. He sticks to his one Philosophy: he shifts not sides, like Horace, who is sometimes an Epicuraean, sometimes a Stoick, sometimes an Eclectick; as his present Humour leads him . . . Persius is everywhere the same: True to the Dogma's of his Master: What he has learnt, he teaches vehemently; and what he teaches, he practices himself. There is a Spirit of sincerity in all he says: You may easily discern that he is in earnest, and is persuaded of that Truth which he inculcates. In this I am of opinion, that he excels Horace, who is commonly in jeast, and laughs while he instructs . . . (644).

In the preface to the Sylvae, Dryden declares himself convinced that Horace's philosophy is consistently Epicurean (see above, p. 241). But if he follows Dacier there, he may equally be following him now, for in the commentary on the hexameter poems Dacier, while still denying that Horace was ever in any sense converted from Epicureanism, stresses his natural independence of mind and his ability to learn from all philosophical sects.[18] Dryden, however, apparently accepts Casaubon's point of view, that Horace's changeableness shows lack of principle. Heinsius had seen Horace's refusal to adhere to any sect as his prime virtue, and evidence that he cared only for the truth (Chap. I, p. 56), but Dryden does not envisage the poet as a seeker after truth, nor does he understand the fundamental seriousness of Horace's tone. He finds the "Grande Sophos of Persius" (see above, p. 230) more impressively sincere than the light touch of the plain style.

But since quality of moral doctinre is no criterion of poetic excellence in Dryden's eyes, the real contest is between Juvenal and Horace: "I wou'd willingly divide the Palm betwixt them; upon the two Heads of Profit and Delight, which are the two Ends of Poetry in general . . . I am profited by both, I am pleased with both; but I owe more to Horace for my Instruction; and more to Juvenal, for my Pleasure" (647). Pleasure was usually thought of as a necessary component of effective instruction, but Dryden divides them and judges them separately: "That Horace is somewhat the better Instructor of the two, is prov'd from hence, that his Instructions are more general . . . as including in his Discourses, not only all the Rules of Morality, but also of Civil Conversation. . . . Juvenal, excepting only his first Satire, is in all the rest confin'd, to the exposing of some particular Vice . . . His Sentences are truly shining and instructive: But they are sprinkl'd here and there. Horace is teaching us in every Line, and is perpetually Moral . . ." (648). Dryden sees Horace's satires as more instructive than Juvenal's not because they instruct more effectively, but simply on quantitative grounds: they contain more instruction.

Theoretically, Dryden also finds Horace delightful:

> Folly was the proper quarry of Horace, and not Vice . . . those little Vices, which we call Follies, the defects of Humane Understanding, or at most the Pecadillos of Life, rather than the Tragical Vices, to which Men are hurri'd by their unruly Passions and exorbitant Desires. . . . the Divine Wit of Horace left nothing untouch'd; . . . he enter'd into the inmost Recesses of Nature; found out the Imperfections even of the most Wise and Grave, as well as of the Common people: Discovering, even in the great Trebatius, to whom he addresses the first Satire, his hunting after Business, and following the Court, as well as in the Persecutor Crispinus, his impertinence and importunity. 'Tis true, he exposes Crispinus openly, as a common Nuisance: But he rallies the other, as a Friend,

> more finely . . . Horace laughs to shame, all Follies, and insinuates Virtues, rather by familiar Examples, than by the severity of Precepts.
>
> This last Consideration seems to incline the Ballance on the side of Horace, and to give him the preference to Juvenal, not only in Profit, but in Pleasure. But, after all, I must confess, that the Delight Horace gives me, is but languishing.
>
> (648-649)

Dryden gives Horace the highest praise, yet in the end he undercuts it all. This is less strange than it may seem. In the first place, Dryden considers the "little Vices" relatively unimportant. His description of them here recalls his argument that poetic justice is not necessary in comedy because there "the faults and vices are but the sallies of youth, and the frailties of humane nature, and not premeditated crimes . . ." (Chap. IV, p. 183). And we shall see even more clearly later that these "Follies" seem trivial to Dryden.

In the second place, much of Dryden's praise may well be rather a memory of Dacier's commentary than his own opinion. Dacier praises the dialogue with Trebatius, the first satire of the second book, very highly: "Dans cette première Satire il y a une plaisanterie continuelle, & qui a esté connue de fort peu de gens."[19] Dacier feels that Horace chose Trebatius for his role not only because of his status, "mais aussi comme celuy qui entendoit fort bien la raillerie, & qui railloit luy-mesme tres-finement."[20] Surely Dryden is remembering this commentary, first in calling the dialogue with Trebatius simply "the first Satire," when it is actually the first satire of the second book, and then in saying that in it Horace "rallies Trebatius, as a Friend, more finely." Dacier also points out that Trebatius loved to be consulted on all occasions,[21] and that he was advising Horace not to imitate Lucilius

because "ils vivoient sous le Regne d'un Prince ennemi de ces libertez."[22] These observations seem to form the basis of Dryden's description of satire on Trebatius for "his hunting after Business, and following the Court . . . ." As for Dryden's more general comments, Dacier praises Horace for teaching by example rather than precept, much as Dryden does,[23] and emphasizes that in the hexameter pems one can find "un cours de Morale entier et fait."[24]

If the praise is Dacier's, the criticism is certainly Dryden's own: "Where he barely grins himself, and, as Scaliger says, only shews his white Teeth, he cannot provoke me to any Laughter. His Urbanity, that is, his Good Manners, are to be commended, but his Wit is faint; and his Salt, if I may dare to say so, almost insipid" (649). Dacier means to praise Horace by saying that the chief virtue of his style consists in his never departing from "les manieres de la plus fine Cour," yet this description already implies a loss of appreciation of the distinctive quality or urbanity in Horace (see above, Chap. I, p. 31). Dryden, perhaps influenced by Dacier's description, goes even further, and simply equates urbanity with good manners; the element of "intellectual sophistication" that formed part of the earlier meaning of urbanity has apparently disappeared (see above, Chap. III, p. 128). In any case, urbanity, in whatever sense, is not the quality Dryden is looking for in Horace's satire. Dacier has assured him that Horace is witty: "il coupe par un ridicule qui fait un veritable plaisir. Aussi la Satire n'a pas receu sa dernière perfection que de luy."[25] This is the kind of satire Dryden himself writes, and consequently he judges Horace's satire by his own, by whether it achieves the ends he himself aims at.

This becomes very clear later in the Discourse. Dryden has been

following Barten Holyday's arguments on the superiority of Juvenal to Horace but when Holyday speaks slightingly of Horace's way of laughing at men's faults, rather than chastising them, Dryden breaks off and defends it, using his own satire as an example of the effectiveness of that kind of attack:

> the nicest and most delicate touches of Satire consist in fine Raillery. . . .'Tis not Reading, 'tis not imitation of an Author, which can produce this fineness: It must be inborn, it must proceed from a Genius, and particular way of thinking, which is not to be taught . . . to make a Man appear a Fool, a Blockhead, or a Knave, without using any of these opprobrious terms! . . . there is . . . a vast difference betwixt the slovenly Butchering of a Man, and the fineness of a stroak that separates the Head from the Body, and leaves it standing in its place. . . . The Character of Zimri in my Absalom, is, in my Opinion, worth the the whole Poem: 'Tis not bloody, but 'tis ridiculous enough. . . . It succeeded as I wish'd; the Jest went round, and he was laught at in his turn who began the Frolick.
>
> (655)

The similarity to Dacier's description of Horace is obvious. Expecting, then, the kind of pointed wit in Horace that he values in himself, Dryden is disappointed: "This Manner of Horace is indeed the best; but Horace has not executed it, altogether so happily, or at least not often. . . . Juvenal has rail'd more wittly than Horace has rally'd" (658).

Here is the basic reason that Dryden prefers Juvenal to Horace. Juvenal does not have the kind of pointed wit that Dryden prefers in satire, but he does have imaginative power, though shown in a different way:

> Juvenal is of a more vigorous and Masculine Wit, he gives me as much Pleasure as I can bear: He fully satisfies my Expectation, he Treats his Subject home: His Spleen is rais'd, and he raises mine: I have the Pleasure of Concernment in all he says . . . Add to this, that his Thoughts

> are as just as those of Horace, and much more Elevated. His Expressions are Sonorous and more Noble; his Verse more numerous, and his Words are suitable to his Thoughts, sublime and lofty. All these contribute to the Pleasure of the Reader, and the greater the Soul of him who Reads, his Transports are the greater.
>
> (649)

In short, Juvenal rises to the heroic in satire; he has the _os magna sonaturum_. As though led by the association of ideas Dryden takes "an apt occasion, to say, that _Virgil_, cou'd have written sharper Satires, than either _Horace_ or _Juvenal_, if he wou'd have employ'd his Talent that way" (650). And we remember that to Dryden "the most Beautiful, and most Noble kind of Satire" is the mock-heroic, which combines pointed wit and heroic expression, "raising the Delight which would otherwise be flat and vulgar, by the Sublimity of the Expression" (665, and see above, Chap. IV, p. 211).

It is very clear that Dryden judges satire not by its effectiveness as an instrument of morality, but purely in aesthetic terms, as a product of the poet's imaginative power.[26] The pleasure of the audience is the external criterion that indicates the power of the poet, and Dryden values pleasure for this reason, not because it conduces to instruction. Still, he recognizes the conventional doctrine, and pays lip-service to it: "if we make _Horace_ our Minister of State in Satire, and _Juvenal_ of our private Pleasures: I think the latter has no ill bargain of it. Let Profit have the preheminence of Honour, in the End of Poetry. Pleasure, though but the second in degree, is the first in favour. And who wou'd not chuse to be lov'd better, rather than to be more esteem'd?" (651). Profit is simply not an essential part of poetry to Dryden: "The Meat of Horace is more nourishing; but the Cookery of _Juvenal_ more exquisite; so that, granting _Horace_ to be the more general Philosopher;

we cannot deny, that Juvenal was the greater Poet, I mean in Satire" (650). To read a poet principally for his instruction seems to Dryden absurd. As he says later, in decrying literal and unpoetic translation, even those who contend "that Pleasure . . . is only a means of compassing the only end, which is Instruction; must yet allow that without the means of Pleasure, the Instruction is but a bare and dry Philosophy. A crude preparation of Morals, which we may have from Aristotle and Epictetus, with more profit than from any poet" (668). Clearly Heinsius' argument that Horace is better than any philosopher, because he contains the living essence of philosophy, without the pointless speculation (Chap. I, p. 52), would make no impression on Dryden, who ends by completely forgetting that he has made the gesture of allowing Horace the official first place: "Let Juvenal Ride first in Triumph" (659).

But there is one respect in which the content of poetry is important to Dryden: subjects in themselves significant can provide scope for the imaginative power of the poet. As we have seen in considering his own satire, political vices are those that rouse his indignation (see above, pp.). Consequently, Juvenal's subject matter is part of the reason Dryden calls Juvenal "the greater Poet:"

> His thoughts are sharper, his Indignation against Vice is more vehement; his Spirit has more of the Commonwealth Genius; he treats Tyranny, and all the Vices attending it, as they deserve, with the utmost rigour: And consequently, a Noble Soul is better pleas'd with a Zealous Vindicator of Roman Liberty; than with a Temporizing Poet, a well Mannr'd Court Slave, and a Man who is often afraid of Laughing in the right place: Who is ever decent, because he is naturally servile. After all, Horace had the disadvantage of the Times in which he liv'd; they were better for the Man, but worse for the Satirist. 'Tis generally said, that those Enormous Vices, which were practis'd under the Reign of Domitian were unknown in the Time of Augustus Caesar. That therefore

> Juvenal had a larger Field, than Horace. Little Follies were out of doors, when Oppression was to be scourg'd instead of Avarice: It was no longer time to turn into Ridicule, the false Opinions of Philosophers; when the Roman Liberty was to be asserted. There was more need of a Brutus in Domitian's Days, to redeem or mend, than of a Horace . . . to Laugh at a Fly-Catcher.
> (650-651)

To say that "Dryden's loss of court favour after 1689 may have given him a taste for Juvenal," as Watson does (2.127), is to do Dryden an injustice. His preference for Juvenal fits in perfectly with all we know of him: his love of the heroic, his own bent towards political satire, his general lack of appreciation of Horace. But there is also some truth in Watson's observation; for Dryden goes on to describe Augustus and his age in terms he would not have used before the Glorious Revolution.

It appears that Dryden does not really feel that Horace's times offered less scope for a satirist; that is simply the "common observation" (651). Rather Dryden sees Augustus as a violent usurper and an adulterer, who had consequently insisted on the enforcement of a law against "Lampoons and Satires," so that he himself would not be attacked. "Horace, as he was a Courtier, comply'd with the Interest of his Master, and avoiding the Lashing of greater Crimes, confin'd himself to the ridiculing of Petty Vices, and common Follies . . ." (653). Jonson's concept of Horace as a poet who spoke the truth to both the king and the people is gone in the latter half of the seventeenth century; Dryden only echoes the usual attitude of his day when he calls Horace a courtier.[27]

In calling Augustus a usurper, Dryden also echoes a conventional opinion,[28] and technically he is not showing any inconsistency. He had

always professed to believe, not in the Divine Right of Kings, but in the Divine Right of the Established Government. According to this theory, all lawfully constituted governments draw their authority from God alone, once they are established by the people of a country (S-S 17. 152). Thus in 1683 Dryden pours scorn on those who call Pompey a Whig: "He was, indeed, a Defender of the ancient established Roman Government; but Caesar was the Whig, who took up Arms unlawfully to subvert it. Our Liberties and our Religion both are . . . secur'd to us by the Laws, . . . executed under an establish'd Government, by a Lawful King. . . . Pompey very honorably maintained the Liberty of his Country, which was govern'd by a Common-wealth . . . " (Summers 5.311).

On the other hand, it is certainly true that Dryden had been ready to use Augustus' establishment of peaceful government as an analogy with Charles's Restoration (see e.g. Works I.31), and to echo Horace and Virgil in support of Augustus in his Britannia Rediviva (Works III.209, 215). Dryden's politics were more consistent than his principles, and his commitment to the Stuarts stronger than any theoretical considerations.[29] Only after the "establish'd Government" of England has been overthrown does Dryden begin to dwell on the tyranny established by the usurping Caesars, because to him it is analogous to the former tyranny of Cromwell, and the tyranny he fears in the rule of William of Orange (Kinsley 3.1012-1017, 1049; S-S 18.31). He sees himself as an advocate of the true liberties of England, bearing poverty because of his loyalty to the legitimate government, and this authorizes the contempt with which he speaks of Horace. He is even forced to make excuses for his beloved Virgil's support of Augustus, but there his already established sympathy softens the offense: "Yet I may safely affirm for our great Author (as

Men of good Sense are generally Honest) that he was still of Republican Principles in his Heart" (Kinsley 3.1014).

We have explored a number of indications of the gap that separates Dryden and Horace, but there is one aspect of Dryden's career that we have hitherto ignored, which seems at first glance to contradict all the evidence that Dryden could never have been a follower of Horace. In a few poems, mostly written during the last decade of his life, Dryden adopts his own version of the Horatian plain style.[30] This is not the epistolary style of Religio Laici, shaped to argumentative ends and only personal in a very self-conscious way, when an ethical appeal is needed. In these later poems Dryden begins to use the first person easily, to speak freely of himself and his concerns. Has he then finally begun to appreciate Horace and learn from him? Considering the harshness of his judgment of Horace's style in the Discourse concerning . . . Satire, this seems improbable. If any external influence is operating, it seems much more likely to be the example of Boileau, whose style is open to none of the objections Dryden has to Horace: ". . . I . . . find in France a living Horace and a Juvenal, in the Person of the admirable Boileau: Whose Numbers are Excellent, whose Expressions are Noble, whose Thoughts are Just, whose Language is Pure, whose Satire is pointed, and whose Sense is close . . ." (Kinsley 2.607). Boileau's epistolary style is at once personal and elevated, his ideal the kind of poem

> Qui dist sans s'avilir les plus petites choses,
> . . . .
> Et sceust mesme au discours de la rusticité
> Donner de l'elegance et de la dignité . . . .[31]

If Dryden looks to Boileau as a model for heroic satire, it seems at least plausible that he is conscious of following him in writing what

we may call his heroic epistle. For Dryden's most interesting epistle, "To my Dear Friend Mr. Congreve, On His COMEDY, call'd the Double-Dealer" (Kinsley 2.852-854), is a kind of counterpart to Mac Flecknoe, proclaiming Congreve as the successor to the throne of true poetry, as Shadwell was to the throne of false poetry:

> Our Builders were with want of Genius, curst;
> The second Temple was not like the first:
> Till you, the best Vitruvius come at length . . ..
> (11. 13-15)

Dryden is not imitating anyone, yet it is possible that Boileau's lines to Racine may have been in his mind:

> Toy donc, qui t'elevant sur la Scene Tragique
> Suis les pas de Sophocle, et seul de tant d'Esptirs
> De Corneille vieilli sçais consoler Paris . . ..[32]

Certainly Dryden preserves the kind of dignity of tone we find in Boileau:

> Oh that your Brows my Laurel had sustain'd,
> Well had I been Depos'd, if You had reign'd!
> The Father had descended for the Son;
> For only You are lineal to the Throne.
> Thus when the State one Edward did depose;
> A Greater Edward in his room arose.
> But now not I but Poetry is curs'd;
> For Tom the Second Reigns like Tom the first. . . .
> Yet this I Prophesy; Thou shalt be seen,
> (Tho with some short Parenthesis between;)
> High on the Throne of Wit; and seated there,
> Not mine (that's little) but thy Lawrel wear.
> (11. 41-54)

Pope recognized the potential for epic satire in these lines by borrowing one for his Dunciad: "Still Dunce the Second reigns like Dunce the First."[33] But Dryden's poem is not a "miniature Dunciad" that does not manage to achieve Pope's tone, as has been suggested.[34] Dryden does not accept the reign of the Dunces as fated to last, and aims a blow at them only in passing. Nor would Dryden have been pleased to be told

that in this poem he has achieved "the true Horatian style."[35] Dryden is affirming Congreve's status and the glory of poetry in appropriately dignified terms, while remaining personal:

> Be kind to my Remains; and oh defend,
> Against your Judgment, Your departed Friend!
> (ll. 72-73)

"To Sir Godfrey Kneller" (Kinsley 2.858-863), written in the same year, has the same majesty of tone:

> . . . thy Criticks in th' attempt are lost;
> When most they rail, know then, they envy most.
> In vain they snarl aloof; a noisy Crow'd,
> Like Womens Anger, impotent and loud.
> While they their barren Industry deplore,
> Pass on secure; and mind the Goal before:
> Old as she is, my Muse shall march behind;
> Bear off the blast, and intercept the wind.
> (ll. 81-88)

In the last few lines there is perhaps a reminiscence of a passage towards the end of Boileau's Art Poetique:

> Pour moy, qui jusqui'ici nourri dans la Satire,
> N'ose encore manier la trompette et la lyre:
> Vous me verrez pourtant, dans ce champ glorieux,
> Vous animer du moins dela voix et des yeux; . . .
> Seconder vostre ardeur, échauffer vos esprits,
> Et vous montrer de loin la couronne et la prix.[36]

Certainly Dryden has in common with Boileau a sense of the dignity of art that makes it appropriate to blend the majestic with the personal. But unlike Boileau, Dryden cannot accept his exclusion from the heroic with equanimity. He pities Kneller for the adverse circumstances that keep him painting more portraits, as he pities himself:

> Thy Genius bounded by the Times like mine,
> Drudges on petty Draughts, nor dare design
> A more exalted Work, and more Divine.
> (ll. 147-149)

Small wonder then that, frustrated in his lifelong desire to write an epic, Dryden should cultivate an epistolary style capable of rising to

the heroic.

This is not to say that all Dryden's epistles rise to this height, or, if they do, maintain it. They vary in tone from the level of the bitter description of the stage,

> Thus they jog on; still tricking, never thriving;
> And Murd'ring Plays, which they miscal Reviving.
> ("To Mr. Granville," Kinsley 3.1434)

to the dignified lament for poetry, under attack by Collier:

> That sacred Art, by Heav'n it self infus'd,
> Which Moses, David, Salomon have us'd,
> Is now to be no more . . . .
> ("To my Friend, the AUTHOR."
> Kinsley 3.1434-1435)

In general, Dryden is not imitating anyone; he has grown older and more ready to speak openly in verse of himself and his closest concerns, and Boileau has at most encouraged him to do so by showing that it can be done with dignity. In the same way, secure of his status as poet, Dryden in his old age explicitly claims for himself the poet's power of immortalize, and actually uses the Horatian locus, saying of the praise he gives his patron: "The World knows this, without my telling: Yet Poets have a right of Recording it to all Posterity.

Dignum Laude Virum, Musa vetat Mori" (Kinsley 2.915).[37]

But if Dryden in general in his epistles is more a follower of Boileau than Horace, and more his own man than a follower of anyone, surely in the one epistle that can claim to be a major work, "To my Honour'd Kinsman, JOHN DRIDEN, OF CHESTERTON IN THE COUNTY OF HUNTINGDON, ESQUIRE" (Kinsley 4.1529-1535), there can be little doubt that Dryden is imitating Horace. The first line is, after all, "How Bless'd is He, who leads a Country Life . . . ." But the relationship of Dryden's

poem to the second epode and to the whole tradition of beatus ille poetry is far more complex than the first line might suggest.

In the first place, we must see Dryden's poem against a background of his writing on retirement. Twice in dedications Dryden dwells at some length on the pleasures of retirement. In the dedication of Aureng-Zebe, grown weary of the stage and of the court, he praises "the solitude of a Garden, and the conversation of a friend," emulating his "Master Cowley" in pitying the great. "True greatness, if it be any where on Earth, is in a private Virtue; remov'd from the notion of Pomp and Vanity, confin'd to a contemplation of it self, and centring on it self . . ." (Summers 4.83). Towards the end of his life Dryden returns to this theme, in the dedication of his translation of the Georgics, and elaborates it, dwelling on the absurdity of ambition, and the blessings of retirement when accompanied by a mind free of passion and prepared by learning to enjoy the pleasures of solitude and contemplation (Kinsley 2.915-917). In neither of these little essays on retirement does Dryden owe anything to Horace; he writes very much in Cowley's vein, seeing retirement as a complete rejection of society.[38]

In the second essay Dryden reflects quietly on the wisdom he has gained in a long life: "I have laugh'd sometimes . . . when I have reflected on those men, who from time to time have shot themselves into the World. . . . Greatness they said was nauseous, . . . a quiet privacy was their Ambition. . . . But they deferr'd it, and linger'd still at Court, because they thought they had not yet enough to make them happy: They wou'd have more, and laid in to make their Solitude Luxurious. A wretched Philosophy, which Epicurus never taught them in his Garden . . ." (Kinsley 2.915-916). Dryden feels he has seen enough of

the Court to know it for what it is: "'Tis a dangerous Commerce, where an honest Man is sure at the first of being Cheated; and he recovers not his Losses, but by learning to Cheat others" (916).

The patron to whom Dryden dedicates his translation turned his back on public affairs early, and he becomes the type of the happy man "born to a plentiful Estate" (917), and wise enough to know when he is well off. Presumably he fills some social functions, since he is loved and respected, "not only in the Province where you live, but generally by all who have the happiness to know you" (916), but nothing specific is said of his relationship to neighbors, tenants, or friends. His estate is reduced to a garden, his occupation to contemplation: "You, my Lord, enjoy your quiet in a Garden, where you have not only the leisure of thinking, but the pleasure to think of nothing which can discompose your Mind. A good Conscience is a Port which is Landlock'd on every side, and where no Winds can possibly invade, no Tempests can arise. . . . Reason was intended for a Blessing, and such it is to Men of Honour and Integrity; who desire no more, than what they are able to give themselves . . ." (917).

In this concept of retirement the classical ideal of the simple farmer's life has completely disappeared, as has the assimilation of that ideal in the life of the country gentleman as we saw it in Jonson. What remains is a sense of the happy man as morally superior to ambitious and greedy fools. His morality is based on the sober Epicureanism of Epicurus himself, and of Lucretius, in which peace of mind is seen as the greatest blessing.[39] It is this concept of retirement that forms the background of Dryden's epistle to his cousin.

The other main factor that shapes the poem is the political

situation. The Stuarts were gone; if Dryden still wished to function as a political poet, he had to change his concept of what would give the country the kind of political stability that he valued above everything. William, the usurper and potential tyrant, could not serve this function. He had, moreover, involved the country in foreign wars and was pressing for a standing army. Toryism was in the process of becoming the party of the independent country squires who opposed the central government, and in praising such a squire Dryden reflects this shift.[40]

That we need this kind of political background to understand Dryden's epistle is a preliminary indication that it is a very different kind of poem from Jonson's "To Sir Robert Wroth." If we compare the first four lines of Dryden's poem, Jonson's, and the second epode, we see immediately certain thematic differences:

> Beatus ille qui procul negotiis,
>   Ut prisca gens mortalium,
> Paterna rura bobus exercet suis,
>   Solutus omni faenore . . ..

> "Happy the man who, far away from business cares, like the pristine race of mortals, works his ancestral acres with his steers, from all money lending free . . .."
> (Loeb, p. 365)

> How blest art thou, canst love the country, WROTH,
>   Whether by choice, or fate, or both,
> And, though so neere the citie, and the court,
>   Art tane with neithers vice nor sport . . ..

> How Bless'd is He, who leads a Country Life,
> Unvex'd with anxious Cares, and void of Strife!
> Who studying Peace, and shunning Civil Rage,
> Enjoy'd his Youth, and now enjoys his Age . . ..

Horace's lines emphasize the freedom from business worries, and the return to the Golden Age in independent, self-sufficient farming, and, given the knowledge that they are spoken by a usurer, have a strong

ironic note. Jonson's lines stress the moral superiority of the country life to the vices of city and court. And Dryden's suggest a political significance: the country gentleman understands the blessings of peace, and avoids the Civil Rage that Dryden has always considered the worst of evils.

In another sense, a comparison of the first four lines of each poem is completely misleading. Jonson's poem is indeed an imitation of Horace, and of Virgil as well, in the sense that he is constantly using motifs from both, and verbal echoes, as though to remind us that his poem is the inheritor of their wisdom, even as it shapes it to new ends. The first two lines in Dryden are the only close verbal echo; line seventy-one, which begins "So liv'd our Sires," has at least a suggestion of "haec olim veteres vitam coluere Sabini . . ." (Georgics 2. 532), but there is no other recognizable allusion in the poem. Moreover, the life Dryden describes his cousin as leading has no room for the traditional motifs; it is not tied in with the seasons and the succession of agricultural occupations. A bare mention of "fruitful Fields" (1.44) is the only indication that Driden has anything to do with farming. Nor is there any sense of the rural community and the patriarchal relationship of the landlord and his tenants.

The absence of these aspects of country life partly reflects Dryden's concept of retirement as saw it in his prose. He thinks of retirement in terms of what it rejects--ambition, greed, and the corruption of court life; he has little sense of what it chooses, other than the opportunity for contemplation. Yet Dryden does describe his cousin as engaging in various occupations. These occupations are realistic parts of an actual country squire's life, such as fox-hunting and

officiating as a Justice of the Peace, and each is described so as to illustrate those moral qualities that make John Dryden study peace and shun Civil Rage. When he adjudges disputes between his neighbors,

> The Sanction leaves a lasting Peace behind;
> Like your own Soul, Serene; a Pattern of your Mind.
> (ll. 15-16)

The description of his hunting does not recall the classical descriptions, as Jonson's does; it is modern fox-hunting, with the emphasis on the virtue that it shows:

> With well-breath'd Beagles, you surround the wood;
> Ev'n then, industrious of the Common Good:
> And often have you brought the wily Fox
> To suffer for the Firstlings of the Flocks . . ..
> (ll. 52-55)

The reason for describing each aspect of his cousin's life that Dryden chooses to dwell on only becomes clear when Dryden describes his cousin's role in Parliament. His love of retirement guarantees his prudent behavior in public life:

> . . . often urg'd, unwilling to be Great,
> Your Country calls you from your lov'd Retreat,
> And sends to Senates, charg'd with Common Care,
> Which none more shuns; and none can better bear.
> (ll. 119-122)

His self-sufficiency is at once a guarantee of his independence and a model for the nation, "Safe in our selves, while on our selves we stand . . ." (l.146). As he studies peace, so should England: "Let us enjoy the Peace our Blood has bought" (l.159). He is a model of stability and, as a patriot, a preserver of stability:

> A Patriot, both the King and Country serves;
> Prerogative, and Privilege preserves . . ..
> (ll. 171-172)

All England will enjoy the blessings of retirement if such men are allowed to guide her.

Much more could be said, and has been said by other critics, on the way Dryden moves from the private to the public sphere. But for our purposes this is unnecessary. It is sufficiently clear that Dryden's is a political poem, aimed not at describing a way of life but at influencing the country to adopt the policies of the new Tory party. The concept of retirement that plays a part in it is essentially the same concept we found in Dryden's prose, except that the virtues of retirement have become a basis for appropriate political action.

In what relationship, then, does Dryden's poem stand to Horace, and to the second epode? Why does Dryden allude to the second epode in his first lines? In Jonson's poem the relationship is clear. Jonson assumes that the wisdom he finds in Horace and Virgil is an essential part of the truth he has to tell Wroth and all his countrymen about the significance of the way of life of an English country gentleman. This assumption, and his conviction that he is playing the same role in his country that Horace played in Ancient Rome, allows him a complete assimilation of his classical models without any loss of hiw own independence and of the immediacy of his poem. England becomes classic ground in her own right. None of this is true for Dryden. Dryden is not cut off from the classical tradition, but he does not see himself as a living part of it, as Jonson does. His allusion to the second epode serves two purposes: on the simplest level, it prepares the reader for a poem in praise of retirement; beyond this, it wittily underlines the difference between Dryden's cousin, who really lives in the country as it is, and Horace's usurer, who dreams of a golden age and stays in the city. As Dryden's political purpose is realistic and immediate, so his cousin is a realistic representative of a class of modern Englishmen, not a

reincarnation of a classical character in a usurer's daydream.

Thus Dryden, in his supposedly most Horatian poem, is in no real sense an imitator of Horace, any more than he has been at any time in his life. His stance as a public poet is too concretely political, his sense of the differences between his age and the past, of himself as distinctively a Modern, is too strong to allow such imitation. Perhaps we can explain these characteristics at least partly by that great divide in English political and cultural history, the Civil War. But the other main factor that divides Dryden from Horace is not susceptible to historical explanation, and that is his concept of poetry.

In a comment Dryden made on the epistle to his cousin, we see again Dryden's distrust of the Horatian emphasis on the endless pains necessary to produce great poetry. Dryden tells a correspondent in one of his letters that he has kept his verses in order to correct them, but "I am now in feare that I have purgd them out of their Spirit . . ." (Letters 120). Even Dryden's love of Virgil is less strong than his love of that quality in poetry which cannot be attained by labor, nor defined by reason, and at the end of his life he switches his allegiance to Homer, preferring Homer's "firey way of writing; which, as it is liable to more faults, so it is capable of more beauties, than the exactness, & sobriety of Virgil" (Letters 121).

One of the commendatory poems written for Absalom and Achitophel praises Dryden's achievement in terms that must have seemed to Dryden the kind of recognition he longed for. This sceptical and enlightened critic, before reading Dryden's poem,

> Of Folly or of Madness did accuse
> The Wretch that thought himself possesst with Muse,"

but now he recants:

> Some livelier Spark of Heav'n and more refin'd
> From Earthly dross, fills the great Poet's mind.
> Witness these mighty and immortal Lines,
> Through each of which th' informing Genius shines.
> (*Works* II.470)

This was a quality that Dryden did not find in Horace's poetry, and to which Horace's whole critical stance seemed hostile.

FOOTNOTES

1. For an interesting discussion of this from a different point of view, see Isabel Rivers, The Poetry of Conservatism (Cambridge, Eng., 1973), pp. 13-16. This book appeared after I had essentially completed my work on this chapter. It deals with much of the same material I do, but with a different perspective.

2. Rivers discusses Dryden as a public poet in her fourth chapter, stressing his political involvement. Bernard Schilling also discusses the nature of Dryden's conservatism in his Dryden and the Conservative Myth (New Haven, 1961). Schilling defines conservatism as an acceptance of the status quo, a defense of the existing order against the forces of change, and sees Dryden's willingness to accept the Stuarts as they are, and the lack of desire for reform in his comedies, as natural parts of conservatism (pp. 85-86, 89). Thus I agree with his analysis of the nature of Dryden's political attitudes in relation to morality, but I cannot accept his idea that this is the nature of conservatism in general. Jonson's conservatism involves an understanding of the proper order for the country as a whole, and a readiness to inveigh against any departure from that order, even if that departure is widespread and has gained acceptance (as in the "Speach according to Horace"); Horace's conservatism involves a strong element of reform and return to former virtues.

   Moreover, Schilling attempts to explain Dryden's literary tendencies as further manifestations of his basically conservative nature, but he does so at the cost of ignoring Dryden's very real discontent with certain neoclassical restrictions (see e.g. his p. 23).

3. See Alan H. Roper, "Dryden's Medal and the Divine Analogy," ELH, 29 (1962), 396-417.

4. K. G. Hamilton, The Two Harmonies (Oxford, 1963), pp. 33-39, Sanford Budick, The Abyss of Light, pp. 1-9.

5. Philip Harth, Contexts of Dryden's Thought (Chicago, 1968), pp. 56-58.

6. K. G. Hamilton, Dryden and the Poetry of Statement (Queensland, Australia, 1967), pp. 21-36. Harth also discusses Dryden's careful use of explicit ethical appeal, but he too sees the tone of the whole as containing an implicit ethical appeal (pp. 44-46).

7. Satires and Epistles, ed. Morris, p. 41, note. Budick notes the allusion to Horace in the last line (p. 161, fn.).

8. Miner notes this instance, Works II. 350.

9. Hamilton, Two Harmonies, p. 107.

10. Poetry and Prose, ed. L. C. Martin (Oxford 1949), p. 56, quoted Budick, p. 4.

11. Hamilton, Dryden, pp. 1-9, et passim.

12. P. 114, translation of C 3.19.9.

13. Odes, Satyrs, and Epistles of Horace (London, 1684), p. 14.

14. Poems and Amyntas, ed. John Jay Parry (New Haven, 1917), p. 97.

15. Rostvig notes the tendency to emphasize pleasure over morality; see her fifth chapter, passim., and on Dryden's translations pp. 238 ff.

16. 5.38.

17. P. 160.

18. 8.24, 41-48.

19. 7.18.

20. 7.21.

21. 7.21.

22. 7.37.

23. 6.558.

24. 8.A4.

25. 6.615.

26. Kinsley discusses this aspect of Dryden's theory, 4.2013.

27. For Dacier's interpretations of Horace emphasizing this aspect, see above Chap. I, pp. 58, 63, and see also his commentary on Epistle 2.1, 7.27, 57.

28. Addison Ward describes this conventional viewpoint on Roman history in "The Tory View of Roman History," S.E.L, 4 (1964), 413-456.

29. Rivers emphasizes this aspect of Dryden throughout her fourth chapter. See esp. pp. 132-134, 161.

30. Reuben A. Brower, "Dryden and the 'Invention' of Pope," Restoration and Eighteenth Century Literature, ed. Carroll Camden (Chicago, 1963), pp. 211-234.

31. Oeuvres Complètes, ed. Françoise Escal (Paris, 1966), p. 146.

32. Boileau, p. 128.

33. 1.6.

34. Rivers, p. 167.

35. Brower, p. 231.

36. Boileau, p. 185.

37. Dryden has of course exercised this power, and when he calls Oldham "thou young,/ But ah too short Marcellus of our Tongue," and echoes Virgil's description of the young Marcellus, he implies that he is bestowing on Oldham an immortality equivalent to that Virgil bestowed on the youth he mourned (Aeneid VI. 860-886, Works II.175). But in his dedications, as in his early public poetry (see above, Chap. IV, p. 166), he is generally more apt to disclaim this power and attribute the power of conferring immortality to his patron rather than himself (Watson 1.185, Summers 6.240, 297).

38. Rostvig, pp. 19-21.

39. For a discussion of this dedication and Dryden's general attitude, see Rostvig, pp. 231-238.

40. For more detail on political background, see J. A. Levine, "John Dryden's Epistle to John Driden," JEGP, 63 (1964), 450-474, and Rivers, pp. 168-174. Both these critics give much more detailed analyses of the poem as a whole, as well as of its relationship to the political situation, than I do. I find much of value in both, but disagree with their estimate of the poem's relationship to the second epode.

CHAPTER VI: POPE'S ASSUMPTION OF THE ROLE OF HORACE

Pope was the heir of Dryden, yet Pope chose to spend five central years of his poetic career writing Imitations of Horace. This concluding chapter will focus on the reasons why he did so, on the nature of his first Imitation, and finally, and briefly, on the forces that led him finally to reject the Horatian stance. Such a study seems a natural conclusion to this dissertation as a whole: it provides for a consideration of the full extent of the changes in attitudes toward Horace and towards poetry in general since Jonson's day, as well as revealing the underlying similarity between Jonson and Pope in their understanding of what the Horatian stance was, and in their basic reasons for assuming it. We shall see that, despite his love for poetry, Pope shared the suspicion of it that was as prevalent in his age as in Dryden's; at the same time, unlike Dryden, Pope shared Jonson's need to play a central and respected role in his society by teaching effectively the moral truth he perceived. This need drove him to rescue Horace from the trivialization he had suffered, to assume the Horatian stance, and in the end to go beyond Horace.

Horace was a central figure throughout Pope's life, but in the beginning his concept both of Horace and of what great poetry should be was too much like Dryden's to make it seem at all likely that Pope would ever seek to become an English Horace. In fact, Pope's poetic heritage was essentially a refined version of Dryden's concept of poetry, an English critical tradition in which Horace was thoroughly assimilated, but which held up Virgil as the model to the aspiring poet.[1] Granville,

one of Pope's early mentors, sums up England's happy sense of achieved classicism in his Essay upon Unnatural Flights in Poetry, published in 1701.[2] Dryden and the nation, said Granville, had gone mad together when Charles was restored, but the later Dryden is a perfect model:

> That fury spent, in each elaborate Peice
> He vies for Fame with Ancient Rome and Greece.
> Roscommon first, Then Mulgrave rose, like light,
> To clear our Darkness, and to guide our flight;
> With steady Judgment, and in lofty Sounds,
> They gave us patterns, and they set us bounds,
> The Stagirite and Horace laid aside
> Inform'd by them we need no foreign Guide.

Horace of course is only "laid aside" in the sense that he is completely naturalized:

> Who would with care some happy Fiction frame,
> So mimicks Truth it looks the very same,
> . . . .
> Important Truths still let your Fables hold,
> Ladies and Beaux to Please is all the task,
> But the sharp Critick will Instruction ask.

Such dicta put an end to the old debates of the kind we saw between Dryden and Shadwell. A middle ground is established: Truth to Nature is a great good, but traditional poetic fictions and metaphoric language are acceptable because they do not aim to deceive.

Horace sets the tone in life as well as criticism, but Virgil is the model the young poet is expected to follow. Granville writes to a friend to whom he wishes to introduce Wycherley and Pope:

> Let it be at my Lodging. I can give you no Falernum that has outliv'd twenty Consulships, but I can promise you a Bottle of good old Claret that has seen two Reigns: Horatian Wit will not be wanting when you two meet. He shall bring with him if you will a young Poet, newly inspired . . . .. If he goes on as he has begun, in the Pastoral way, as Virgil first try'd his Strength, we may hope to see English Poetry vie with the Roman, and this Swan of Windsor sing as sweetly as the Mantuan.[3]

An Augustan Age, truly, and Pope makes himself its perfect representative. He models his career carefully on Virgil's, and his "Essay on Criticism" is in the direct line of the verse treatises that have shaped English neoclassicism. His attitude towards Horace is completely in keeping with his place in this tradition. In the Essay on Criticism Horace is a model of the critic as honnête homme:

> Horace still charms with graceful Negligence,
> And without Method talks us into Sense,
> Will like a Friend familiarly convey
> The truest Notions in the easiest way.
> He, who Supream in Judgment as in Wit,
> Might boldly censure, as he boldly writ,
> Yet judg'd with Coolness tho' he sung with Fire;
> His Precepts teach but what his Works inspire.
> Our Criticks take a contrary Extream,
> They judge with Fury, but they write with Fleame;
> Nor suffers Horace more in wrong Translations
> By Wits, than Criticks as in wrong Quotations.
> (653-664)[4]

The last lines reflect the unhappy fact that when an age is thoroughly Horatian, Horace will be on the lips of every poetaster and criticaster, indeed of everyone with any pretensions to literacy. Jonson's use of Horace made him a pioneer; Pope's would only make him one of a multitude. Thus in praising Horace he has to bring up the question of the critics who abuse Horace and disassociate himself from them.

In his estimate of Horace's lyric poetry Pope seems to approximate Dryden's judgment. In the Temple of Fame Pope describes the six great Ancients whose columns surround the central shrine. Four of these are poets--Homer, Virgil, Pindar, and Horace--and of the four Horace is described last. Homer appears in patriarchal dignity:

> Father of Verse! in holy Fillets drest,
> His Silver Beard wav'd gently o'er his Breast;
> . . . .
> Motion and Life did ev'ry Part inspire,
> Bold was the Work, and prov'd the master's Fire . . . .(184-5,192-3)

Virgil shares the dignity, with less of fire:

Great without Pride, in modest Majesty.

(203)

Pindar in his Swan-driven car is extreme, yet magnificent, "Irregularly great" (221). Their pillars are composed of adamant, gold, and silver respectively--no material is mentioned for Horace:

> Here happy Horace tun'd th' Ausonian Lyre
> To sweeter Sounds, and temper'd Pindar's Fire;
> Pleas'd with Alcaeus' manly Rage t'infuse
> The softer Spirit of the Sapphick Muse.
> The polish'd Pillar diff'rent Sculptures grace;
> A Work outlasting Monumental Brass.
> Here smiling Loves and Bacchanals appear,
> The Julian Star, and Great Augustus here.
> The Doves that round the Infant Poet spread
> Myrtles and Bays, hung hov'ring o'er his Head.
>
> (222-231)

It is quite clear that only in his lyrics is Horace to be called a poet, and that in those lyrics he is a courtier and a singer of light love and good living. Pope's acceptance of a somewhat trivialized Horace is underlined in the note he attaches to these lines. He is explaining the source of each detail in his portrait, and points out that "The Action of the Doves hints at a passage in the 4th Ode of his Third Book . . ." (TE II, 271). He then quotes the passage and offers a translation. Before I give that translation, let me remind the reader that this is one of the Roman odes. In the opening lines, to which Pope refers, Horace is establishing his right to counsel Augustus by telling a story of his own childhood that will recall legends about sacred bards. As Steele Commager says, "He consciously dons the robes of a *sacer vates* . . . ."[5] He tells how he fell asleep in the woods, and "the *storied doves* that carry ambrosia to Zeus . . . and fed Semiramis"[6] covered him with leaves, that all might wonder

> Ut tuto ab atris corpore viperis
> Dormirem et ursis, ut premerer sacra
> Lauroque conlataque myrto,
> Non sine dis animosus infans.
>
> (C 3.4., 17-20)

> how I slept safe from bears and black serpents, how I was overspread with sacred bay and gathered myrtle, with the gods' help a fearless child.
>
> (Loeb, p. 187)

Horace is speaking in his proudest public role in this poem, but Pope seems totally unaware of this aspect of the poem, if we can judge by his translation:

> While yet a Child, I chanc'd to stray,
> And in a Desart sleeping lay;
> The savage Race withdrew, nor dar'd
> To touch the Muses future Bard:
> But *Cytherea's* gentle Dove
> *Myrtles* and *Bays* around me spread,
> And crown'd *your* Infant Poet's Head,
> Sacred to *Musick* and to *Love*.
>
> (TE II 271)

In short, Pope is accepting the Horace of his age. Accordingly, since he aims at the highest kind of poetic career, he follows Virgil for the most part during his early years, beginning with pastorals, and writing "Windsor Forest" as his equivalent of the *Georgics*.

At the same time, there seems to be some question in Pope's mind, even in his early years, as to whether writing great poetry is worth the effort it requires. From many remarks both in the poems and in the letters it appears that, while Pope almost worshipped the achievements of the Ancients, he was deterred from attempting to emulate them by several considerations. Pope had the highest idea of the kind of dedication that was required to write great poetry, a dedication that left little room for human relationships and all the various duties of a normal human life ("To write well, lastingly well, Immortally well, must one not leave

Father and Mother and cleave unto the Muse?")[7] Such dedication could only be justified if the work the poet did could become an eternal monument like the *Iliad* or the *Aeneid*, but English was a changing language. Pope had a vision like Dryden's of the creative power of the poet, but an intense fear that an English poet's creation would be evanescent:

> So when the faithful *Pencil* has design'd
> Some *bright Idea* of the master's Mind,
> Where a *new World* leaps out at his command,
> And ready Nature waits upon his Hand;
> When the ripe Colours *soften* and *unite*,
> And sweetly *melt* into just Shade and Light,
> When mellowing Years their full Perfection give,
> And each Bold Figure just begins to *Live*;
> The *treach'rous Colours* the fair Art betray,
> And all the bright Creation fades away!
> ("Essay on Criticism," 482-493)

In the Preface to the *Iliad* Pope seems indeed to have taken up where Dryden left off. We remember that the translation of Homer Dryden did late in life made him prefer Homer to Virgil, as having more Fire (see above, Chap. V, p. 273). Pope bases his praise of Homer on this "universally allow'd" preeminence in "Invention . . . which is indeed the Characteristic of Poetry itself" (TE VII 16), "the very Foundation of Poetry" (37). Carried away by his theme, Pope goes so far as to claim that "Whatever Praises may be given to Works of Judgment, there is not even a single Beauty in them but is owing to the Invention" (3, textual apparatus). He was later to modify this extreme statement; here he sounds like the younger Dryden (see above, Chap. IV, p. 176). "This Poetical Fire, this *Vivida vis animi*" (4) is apparently no guarantee of truth, for "where this appears, tho' attended with Absurdities, it brightens all the Rubbish about it, 'till we see nothing but its own Splendor" (4). It is above all rich and fertile: it can draw on all the images of nature (9), or "expatiate" in the "new and boundless Walk"

of "Fable" that Homer had "created for himself" (5). Pope's final eulogy sums up the greatness of Homer, as well as part of what kept him from trying to imitate it:

> A cooler Judgment may commit fewer Faults, and be more approv'd in the Eyes of One Sort of Criticks: but that Warmth of Fancy will carry the loudest and most universal Applauses which holds the Heart of a Reader under the strongest Enchantment. Homer not only appears the Inventor of Poetry, but . . . has swallow'd up the Honour of those who succeeded him. What he has done admitted no Encrease, it only left room for Contraction or Regulation. . . . A Work of this kind seems like a mighty Tree which rises from the most vigorous Seed, is improv'd with Industry, flourishes, and produces the finest Fruit; Nature and art conspire to raise it; Pleasure and Profit join to make it valuable: and they who find the justest Faults, have only said, that a few Branches (which run luxuriant thro' a Richness of Nature) might be lopp'd into Form to give it a more regular Appearance.
> (16-17)

Here is another discouragement; the efforts of a modern writer are inevitably eclipsed by Homer.

Still, if the power of the Invention and its ability to enchant the Reader could guarantee the effectiveness of the "profit" of the poem, would that not justify the greatest efforts in this direction, whether the book would last or not? In the Preface, it is true, Pope for the most part seems to assume that the power of Invention is its own justification, and it is only in the passage just quoted that he couples profit with pleasure as part of the value of such poetry. In Parnell's essay on Homer, however, and in the notes, there is a much greater emphasis on the lessons Homer is constantly teaching. Both Pope and Parnell recognize that it is by no means generally accepted that Homer had any moral purpose; Parnell devotes considerable space to laying out an argument against those who think "that Homer had only a design to please in his Inventions . . ." (73), an opinion to which Pope's preface could

easily have contributed. Pope himself, though he points out moral lessons in his notes throughout, finds it necessary to make a kind of formal statement in the commentary on Book XXIV:

> Homer now begins after a beautiful and long Fable, to give the Moral of it, and display his poetical Justice in Rewards and Punishments . . . . I think it necessary to take notice to the Reader, that nothing is more admirable than the Conduct of Homer throughout his whole Poem in respect to Morality. He justifies the Character of Horace.
>
> > ----Quid pulchrum [sic], quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
> > Plenius & melius Chrysippo & Crantore dicit.
> > [Epist. 1.2.3-4]
>
> If the Reader does not observe the Morality of the Iliad, he loses half, and the nobler part of its Beauty: he reads it as a common Romance, and mistakes the chief Aim of it, which is to instruct.
>
> (TE VIII.557-558)

However magnificent an accomplishment a true epic might be, and however clear it might be to the properly instructed reader that "the chief aim of it . . . is to instruct," it could be and often was read for pure pleasure, the power of the invention carrying the reader along and enchanting him so thoroughly he would not even be aware if the noble beauty of Morality were absent. If we judge by his Preface, Pope seems to have felt, at least in 1715, that the magnificence of a Poetic World that lasted two thousand years could justify itself, and to have grown more concerned with moral purpose later. Whatever his attitude towards Homer's achievement by the time he finished translating the Iliad, we have an interesting indication of his attitude towards his own chances of achieving anything similar. At the end of his great translation, Pope prints an epigraph from Marcus Aurelius, from a passage in which the emperor is enumerating the good gifts the gods have given him, among them "That I did not make more progress in rhetoric and poetry and

my other studies, in which I should perhaps have been engrossed, had I felt myself making good way in them."[8] The noble emperor was thus left free for more serious concerns.

Pope seems to be asserting that a prophecy he had made to Caryll in 1714, at the beginning of his labors on the Iliad, has now come true. Caryll had given Pope a "hint . . . of the vanity of human science," and Pope responds with complete agreement:

> our schemes of government, our systems of philosophy, our golden words of poetry, are all but so many shadowy images and airy prospects, which arise to us but so much the livelier and more frequent as we are more overcast with the darkness, wrapt in the night, and disturbed with the fumes of human vanity.

Pope prophesies that the day will come when he will be willing

> to leave poetry . . . Homer will work a cure upon me; fifteen thousand verses are equivalent to four score years, to make me old in rhime. And I should be sorry and ashamed to go on gingling to the last step, like a waggoner's horse in the same road, to leave my bells to the next silly animal that will be proud of them. That man makes a mean figure in eyes [sic] of reason who is measuring of syllables and coupling rhimes, when he should be mending his own soul and securing his own immortality.
>
> (Corr. I.236)

We might have expected that Pope would be inspired by his translation of Homer to attempt to imitate in some way Homer's great achievement, but it seems that Pope had no such expectation when he began his translation. To correspondents he stood less in awe of than Caryll he expressed the same basic sense that poetry was not ultimately serious business, not worthy of a rational man's full attention. During the Jacobite uprising of 1715 he wrote to Sir William Trumbull:

> . . . I never had so much cause as now to complain of my poetical star, that fixes me at this tumultuous time, to attend the gingling of rhymes and the measuring of syllables: To be almost the only trifler in the nation; and as ridiculous as the Poet in Petronius, who while all the

> rest in the ship were either laboring or praying for life, was scratching his head in a little room, to write a fine description of the tempest.
>
> (*Corr.* I.324)

In short, although Pope loved poetry, he shared the suspicion of it that we saw in Dryden's day, which had not diminished with the passage of time.

The poetry he wrote had no ultimate meaning that could redeem it from the charge of vanity, contributed nothing to any man's salvation, could not last forever, and had no immediate impact on a troubled nation. Small wonder that Pope wrote to Parnell as he did just before the publication of his Works:

> I shall very soon print an entire collection of my own madrigals, which I look upon as making my last will and testament, since in it I shall give all I ever intend to give . . . you must look on me no more a poet, but a plain commoner, who lives upon his own, and fears and flatters no man.
>
> (*Corr.* I.396)

Pope published his Works in 1717 at the age of twenty-nine, the youngest English poet to so publish; we are inevitably reminded of another landmark publication, just 101 years before, when in 1616 Jonson became the first English writerto bring together all his plays and poems and dignify them with the title of *Works*, usually reserved for the Ancients. A comparison of the original editions of the 1616 *Works* and the 1717 *Works* provides so interesting a focus for our understanding of the differences between Jonson and Pope that we must go into some detail here.

Jonson writes no preface. His ornate title page bears the proud words

> neque, me ut miretur turba laboro
> Contentus paucis lectoribus.[9]

The table of contents following lists also the patrons to whom each piece

has been dedicated, that list at once proclaiming Jonson's essential independence, and placing him in society, inasmuch as the first dedication is to Camden, the second to the Inns of Court, and only the fifth to a lord. In none of the dedications is there any fulsome praise, for Jonson is a poet with a strong sense of his own value, conscious of the honor he pays his patron, and paying that honor only where he finds solid worth. Following the table of contents is a poem in Latin by John Selden, praising Jonson's learned and perfectly wrought works, and a poem in English by Edward Hayward, praising Jonson in his own curt manner for the union of good and sweet found in his poems. Then there are more poems written for individual plays by well-known poets and scholars, some in English, some in Latin. Everything works together to reinforce the dignity of this Poet, this English Horace, who thus asserts his own claim to immortality.

If we turn to the 1717 edition of Pope's works, we find that the layout of the whole is pompous enough.[10] (It can be assumed, by the way, that Pope carefully supervised even the smallest details of that layout. We have his instructions to the printers on the size of the initial letter of the Dedication of the Rape of the Lock, and the size of the ornament, "The rest as I told you before" /Corr. I.394/.) Following the titlepage is a large fold-out portrait of the poet; on the first page of the preface the ornament is a picture of Apollo playing his lyre, with glory streaming from his head, and all the Muses around him. The capital "I" with which the preface begins is enlarged and placed in a small picture, with Pegasus on one side, and on the other lightning from heaven starting a fire. The epigraph he chose is a strong statement of the nourishment, pleasure, and consolation poetry

affords:

> Haec studia adolescentiam alunt, senectutem oblectant; secundos res ornant, adversis perfugiem & solatium praebent; delectant domi, non impediunt foris; pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur.
>
> (Cicero, Pro Archia vii.6)

The commendatory poems, on the other hand, reveal a somewhat less elevated concept of poetry. The Duke of Buckingham praises "this Genius join'd with so much Art, Such various Learning mix'd in ev'ry part." So Selden had praised Jonson. But Buckingham goes on:

> And yet so wonderful, sublime a thing,
> As the great Iliad, scarce should make me sing;
> Except I justly could at once commend
> a good Companion, and as firm a Friend.
> One moral, or a mere well-natur'd deed,
> Does all desert in Sciences exceed.

There has been a loss of faith in great poetry as in itself a moral deed. And if we consider the terms in which the next poem, by the Countess of Winchelsea, advises and praises Pope, we can see why:

> Go on, to gain applauses by desert,
> Inform the head, whilst you dissolve the heart:
> Inflame the Soldier with harmonious rage,
> Elate the young, and gravely warm the sage:
> Allure, with tender verse the Female race,
> And give their darling passion, courtly grace:
> Describe the Forest still in rural strains,
> With vernal sweets fresh-breathing from the plains.
> Your tales be easy, natural, and gay
> . . . .
> Sooth, as you only can each differing taste,
> And for the future charm as in the past.

The sugar-coating may ostensibly hide the pill of informing the head, but the emphasis is on the sugar, the ability to "dissolve the heart"--that is, to sway the passions and to please. There is something distasteful in this notion of a poet's function as pleasing and soothing everyone--no more dignity than a dancing master, Shadwell might say. And yet Pope must have felt that this was a valid way of looking at his

poetry, or he would not have included the poem.[11]

Of course there was more to Pope's conception of poetry than this, and we need look no further than the Preface to the 1717 Works for the basis of a substantive comparison between the Pope of 1717 and Jonson. To a certain extent the differences revealed are superficial: Pope is trying to be as urbane, modest, and self-deprecating as possible, and sometimes we find that once this difference in approach is allowed for, Pope is saying much the same thing as Jonson. For example, he tells us at one point that he really cared very little for Fame when he began writing:

> I confess it was want of consideration that made me an author; I writ because it amused me; I corrected because it was as pleasant to correct as to write; and I publish'd because I was told I might please such as it was a credit to please.
> (TE I.6)

What he is saying, in essence, is "Neque me ut miretur turba laboro,/ Contentus paucis Lectoribus."

Other differences, however, go deeper. Although we know that Pope actually took the utmost care to make his poems correct, revising endlessly even after they were published, he does not boast of this in his preface. On the contrary, he explains that

> . . . the true reason these pieces are not more correct, is owing to the consideration how short a time they, and I, have to live: One may be ashamed to consume half one's days in bringing sense and rhyme together; and what Critic can be so unreasonable as not to leave a man time enough for any more serious employment, or more agreeable amusement?
> (7-8)

He speaks of the learning that goes into good poetry, and the truth it conveys: one would think that these would justify the utmost care, as they did for Jonson. But Pope's tone does not suggest this:

> All that is left is to recommend our productions by the

> imitation of the Ancients: and it will be found true, that in every age, the highest character for sense and learning has been obtain'd by those who have been most indebted to them. For to say truth, whatever is very good sense must have been common sense in all times; and what we call Learning, is but the knowledge of the sense of our predecessors. (7)

No longer is there any exultation in the ability of the poet to find the perfect embodiment for the Truth which he has drawn from every possible source. Despite his tone, Pope is no doubt proud that he has deserved to be known for his "sense and learning," but he expresses much more openly his pride that he is a good man. That being a good poet is not considered to have any necessary connection with being a good man is clear enough from Buckingham's emphatic statement that he would not praise Pope for writing even the greatest poetry if he were not also a good man. Thus Pope establishes his own moral character by speaking, not of what his poetry aims to achieve, but of the ends it has not served:

> the mean and unworthy ends of Party or self-interest; the gratification of publick prejudice, or private passions; the flattery of the undeserving or the insult of the unfortunate. If I have written well, let it be consider'd that 'tis what no man can do without good sense, a quality that not only renders one capable of being a good writer, but a good man. And if I have made any acquisition in the opinion of anyone under the notion of the former, let it be continued to me under no other title than that of the latter. (9)

In short, Pope persuades his readers that one can be both a good writer and a good man, instead of insisting that the two are inseparable.

One could perhaps sum up this phase of Pope's career by saying that his conception of poetry was very close to Dryden's, but that he was not satisfied with it. Much as he loved poetry, much as he labored over his own, he could not take it entirely seriously. He shared the feeling of

his age that poetry was not a self-justifying endeavor; he needed to write poetry that would have an immediate effect of a kind that would justify the time spent on it whether it survived its age or not, poetry in which the poet proved he was a good man by acting as an effective moral agent. We cannot be surprised, then, that this proposed successor to Virgil announced to Broome in 1729 his intention to write henceforth only "epistles in Horace's manner . . ." (Corr. III.37).

Still, Pope's decision to use the Horatian manner in writing epistles was by no means equivalent to a decision to imitate Horace in any substantive way. Even if Pope had rejected "Fancy's maze," and had "moraliz'd his song" ("Epistle to Arbuthnut," ll.340-341), one could perfectly well write instructively or satirically without declaring oneself a follower of Horace, and Pope did just this in his Dunciad and An Essay on Man. After all, there is certainly some evidence that Pope followed Dryden in looking down on Horace as a "Court Slave," because of his relationship to Augustus (see above, Chap. V, pp. 260-261). For one thing, it is quite clear that, at least in his later years, Pope had no desire to play an Horatian role with any king whatever. This has not always been recognized, and perhaps requires some substantiation. Briefly, whatever may have been his aims and ambitions under Queen Anne, by the time he came to write his Horatian imitations he had definitely rejected the idea that the poet achieved his highest position by playing Horace to an Augustus. Pope was neither a Tory, in the usual sense of the word, nor a Jacobite, and he turned to the heir apparent as a possible Patriot King only when all other hope of successful opposition to Walpole and the system identified with Walpole seemed lost. Nor did he envision for himself anything like the Horatian role, even with a

Patriot King.

Yet paradoxically the reasons for his rejection of that aspect of the Horatian role were very much Horatian reasons. In Jonson's day the Stuart kings had made some attempt to uphold the idea of a hierarchy based on moral responsibility against the profit motive (see above,

In Pope's day the Hanoverian kings were content to leave the government in the hands of Walpole, who laughed at the idea of men being swayed by any other motive than profit. Pope came under Bolingbroke's influence, and followed Bolingbroke in rejecting traditional Tory principles, because he saw the growing power of finance capitalism in his day as the growth of insanity, and the principles of the Opposition, as Bolingbroke developed them, as the only hope for the restoration of a society based on moral responsibility.[12] The Horatian nature of Pope's reaction to the financial revolution of his day is underlined by his words to Atterbury at a moment when, in the aftermath of the South Sea Bubble, the corruption caused by the domination of the profit motive seemed especially clear:

> Every valuable, every pleasant thing is sunk in an ocean of avarice and corruption. The son of a first minister is a proper match for a daughter of a late South Sea director,--so money upon money increases, copulates, and multiples, and guineas beget guineas in saecula saeculorum.
>
> O cives, cives! quaerenda pecunia primum est
> Virtus post nummos.
> (Epist. 1.1.53-54, Corr. II 182-183)

Bolingbroke is usually called a Tory, but in his theory of government he had in many ways more in common with the old-line Whigs than with the Tories of his day, who looked on him with suspicion and never fully committed themselves to his leadership.[13] Bolingbroke's basic political conviction seems to have been that men like himself should

rule England: men of good birth, liberally educated, filled with public spirit, and in short natural leaders. Under pressure of the growth of finance capitalism and his own exclusion from public office with the accession of the Hanoverians and the consolidation of Walpole's power, this basic conviction produced a theory that diverged considerably from traditional Tory thought. Patriarchs whose authority is based on Nature choose a King when the need of a central authority comes to be felt, and govern with the king in a mixed government, ensuring that the king shall behave as the father of his people. This is the basic nature of the English constitution, restored by the Glorious Revolution after the excesses of the Stuarts, but now threatened again by the growing power of the Executive under Walpole, with his systematic bribery of Parliament. This threat to liberty must be stopped, and with it the growing power of finance capitalism that feeds it and is fostered by it; Parliament must be freed and made more responsive to the people--acting of course, through their natural representatives. If the King will not dismiss Walpole, he must be coerced. This presented no insuperable obstacle to Bolingbroke, but it would have been a violation of the king's prerogative of choosing his own ministers, and as such was opposed by the Tories, who actually found themselves forced, at the moment of crisis, to defend Walpole against Opposition attempts to force the king to remove him.[14]

Such a split on an essential question reveals clearly that Bolingbroke had gone far beyond the traditional Tory reverence for the king, and An Essay on Man, with its stress on the horrorsof "Th' enormous faith of many made for one" (Epist. III.242), the natural authority of the Patriarch (215-216), and the purely derivative authority of the

king ("the name of King unknown/ 'Till common int'rest plac'd the sway in one" [209-210]), reveals equally clearly that Pope agreed entirely with Bolingbroke.

Ambition for absolute power led to the Fall from the original political paradise, in Pope's view. And when men finally emerged from the ensuing horrors of tyranny and superstition, kings only changed under duress:

> Forc'd into virtue thus by self-defence,
> Ev'n Kings learn'd justice and benevolence . . .
> (279-280)

Those Pope describes as leading the way to true reform and a better world sound very much like forerunners of Pope and Bolingbroke:

> 'Twas then, the studious head or gen'rous mind,
> Follow'r of God or friend of human-kind.
> Poet or Patriot, rose but to restore
> The Faith and Moral, Nature gave before;
> If not God's image, yet his shadow drew:
> Taught Pow'rs due use to People and to Kings,
> . . . 'Till jarring int'rests of themselves create,
> Th'according music of a well-mix'd State.
> (283-294)

Such a poet stands in no Horatian relationship to a monarch; he is described in terms that suggest rather a proud independence.

Perhaps Pope would not have aspired to this position of proud independence if the Stuarts had remained in power, but this scarcely means that he was a crypto-Jacobite, objecting to George II because he was a "German usurper."[15] Again, his association with Bolingbroke provides clear evidence; the real Jacobites in England thoroughly disliked and distrusted Bolingbroke, regarding him as a "fallen angel," a turncoat and a traitor.[16]

The last argument that must be considered is that Pope would have been glad to find a kind of modified Augustus in a Patriot King.[17]

Certainly Lyttleton tried to persuade him to play an Horatian role in relation to Prince Frederick, when that gentleman became the one hope of the Opposition (Corr. IV.138-139), but Pope, though willing to give advice from afar, was never willing to join the Prince's court.[18] When he alluded to his relationship with the Prince in his poetry he made his position quite clear: "Still let me say: no Follower but a Friend" (Epilogue to the Satires, Dia. II.93). The unfinished satire, "1740," shows no great enthusiasm for the necessity of relying on any king.[19] The first 84 lines are one continued lament for the failure and disintegration of the Opposition, ending with 13 lines on their last hope:

> Alas, on one alone our all relies,
> Let him be honest, and he must be wise,
> Let him . . .
> Be but a man! Unministered, alone,
> And free at once the Senate and the Throne . . .
> (85-90)

And of course there is the famous "Epitaph For One Who Would not be Buried in Westminster Abbey:"

> HEROES and KINGS! your distance keep:
> In peace let one poor Poet sleep,
> Who never flatter'd Folk like you:
> Let Horace blush, and Virgil too.
> (TE VI.376)

When Pope wanted to point up the contrast between his own age and the Augustan, in order to criticize, indirectly, his own Augustus, he recognized that Augustus' protection of Horace spoke well for the emperor; but there is still a covert note of scorn in his dissociation of himself from Horace the "Court-favorite:"

> You will not suspect me of comparing myself with Virgil and Horace, nor even with another Court-favorite, Boileau: I have always been too modest to imagine my Panegyricks were license worthy of a Court; and that I hope will be thought the true reason why I have never offer'd any. I would only have observ'd, that it was under the greatest

> Princes and best Ministers, that moral Satyrists were most encouraged . . . [under Augustus] Horace was protected and caress'd . . ."
>
> (C III.420)

Dryden's reservations about this aspect of Horace's role were surely part of what kept him from taking the role of Horace in his public poetry; why then did it not have that effect on Pope? There is after all the damning praise the "Friend" in the first Dialogue of the Epilogue to the Satires gives Horace. Hunter, who feels that Pope is being completely unHoratian in his Imitations of Horace, cites this at the very beginning of his article as a preliminary indication of the difficulties involved in seeing Pope as the English Horace.[20] If we look more closely at that praise and its source, however, we will find that Pope's criticism is only in part directed at Horace. He is proudly distinguishing himself from Horace by insisting on his independence, and this distinction is indeed central to his concept of himself as a satirist, as Lillian Feder points out,[21] but since he has also spent the last five years imitating Horace, we may doubt whether his criticism can be quite as damning as it sounds. If he had completely shared Dryden's estimate of Horace, he would surely have been as little likely to take the role of Horace as Dryden himself.

The central and most damning lines of Pope's description of Horace echo Dryden's translation of Persius' description of Horace (cited TE IV.299). I give all three passages:

> Omne vafer vitium ridenti Flaccus amice
> Tangit, & admissus circum praecordia ludit.
>
> (S I.116-117)

> Horace, sly dog, worming his way playfully into the vitals of his laughing friend, touches up his every fault . . ..
>
> (Loeb, p. 329)

Unlike in method, with conceal'd design;
Did crafty Horace his low numbers joyn;
And, with a sly insinuating Grace,
Laugh'd at his Friend, and look'd him in the Face.
(231-234)

His sly, polite, insinuating stile
Could please at Court, and make AUGUSTUS smile:
An artful Manager, that crept between
His Friend and Shame, and was a kind of *Screen*.
(19-22)

Dryden has not translated *vitium*, but he still implies that Horace's purpose is satire. The "Friend" transforms Horace from the satirist who "touches every fault" to a forerunner of Walpole, a Screen.[22] Pope's main satire is surely directed at the servile courtiers who distorted Horace to justify their servility, and perhaps at Dryden, who had after all left some room for this interpretation.

This seems even more likely if we consider the source of the first line in the verse paragraph of which the lines just quoted make a part: "But Horace, Sir, was delicate, was nice . . ." (1.11). There was a model for the servile, courtly "Friend" who reproached Pope for departing from his Horatian original, and that model was the anonymous author of Verses address'd to the *Imitator of the First Satire of the Second Book of Horace*:

Horace can laugh, is delicate, is clear;
You only coarsely rail, or darkly sneer . . .[23]

The truth was, Horace had been claimed and used by many who saw him in the trivialized way that was common in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pope himself could not return to the old attitude that saw Horace's relationship to Augustus as one of his glories, but he could see that Horace had maintained his integrity in that relationship. As he said in the Advertisement of the *Epistle to Augustus*,

"Horace made his Court to this Great Prince, by uniting a decent Freedom toward him, with a just contempt of his low Flatterers, and with a manly Regard to his own Character" (TE IV.192). Seeing Horace's essential integrity, Pope did not find that his relationship to Augustus made him a Court Slave. Still, this does not explain what drew Pope to Horace.

When Pope entered on the new phase of his career announced in 1729, his one ambition, as he told Caryll, was to do good (Corr. III.340) and, as he told Swift, to show that Poets may be "the most moral of mankind" (Corr. III.347). What he needed was a solid base to speak from, a firm foundation that could make his teaching carry weight in spite of the widespread prejudice against poets and poetry. He was well aware that

> Poor Cornus sees his frantic Wife elope
> And curses Wit, and Poetry, and Pope.
> ("Epistle to Arbuthnot," ll.25-26)

One means he chose to give his new poetry a sound base was to write An Essay on Man, seeing in it a theoretical foundation for all his poetic endeavors to come. To overcome prejudice, he published it anonymously, and thus tricked his worst enemies into praising it unreservedly. One might think that the success of his plan would have inspired him to continue with his project, but in fact, after its publication, he wrote no "more Essays on Man" (Epilogue to the Satires, Dia. II. 255). (By the time he wrote the Epilogue to the Satires, he had come to see his doing so as the dearest wish of his enemies, as he indicates by having the "Friend" of dialogue II beg him to confine himself to that.) Imitation of Horace seems to have suited his purposes better, both in the kind of foundation it provided for what he had to say, and in what it allowed him scope for saying.

What he himself said on the subject was that "An Answer from Horace was both more full and of more Dignity than any I cou'd have made in my own person . . ." (TE IV.3). Yet, of course, in his Imitations of Horace Pope did speak in his own person, freely and at length. The opportunity that an Imitation of Horace gave him to speak in his own person, and to use his presentation of his own character as the strongest argument justifying his satire, was probably the strongest inducement to Pope to assume the Horatian stance. Yet the question has been raised whether in doing so Pope was actually to any degree influenced by Horace. In the critical discussions of Pope's first Imitation of Horace, we find central questions raised about the nature of Pope's relationship to Horace. Hunter has actually used his analysis of the poem as the main support for his argument that although "Pope was known in his own day as the English Horace . . . [he] can be seen to be quite unHoratian, even in poems which advertise their ancestry as 'Imitations of Horace.'"[24] The essence of Hunter's argument is that Pope is not Horatian but pre-Romantic because he bases his satire not on "the traditional acceptance of received values, objectively justified" but on "the pathos of the individual sensibility, 'the strong Antipathy of Good to Bad'--and if this is not Romantic, I do not know what to call it."[25] Hunter supports this by showing Pope's consistent altering of Horace's satire to shift the emphasis from the satiric tradition to himself as an individual and to infuse Horace's playfulness with Juvenalian horror of sin. For Pope is out to change his society, while Horace basically accepted his.

Maresca, on the other hand, argues that Pope is basing his Imitation securely on the Horatian original, as commented on by the

Renaissance editors. Pope is following Horace faithfully, but the Horace of the Renaissance, assimilated and Christianized.[26]

The truth, it seems to me, lies somewhere between these two critical views, and the only way to establish it on a solid basis is first to consider what in fact the interpretations of the first satire of the second book by the various commentators were, and then to analyze Pope's poem. It is impossible to look only at Horace and Pope, as Hunter does, because Pope was in fact writing in a tradition. On the other hand, that tradition was by no means so uniform as Maresca suggests. As we shall see, even if Pope had studied all the commentators in depth, he still would have had to decide how to read Horace much as we have to decide today. For it is by no means clear that the final word has been said on how to read this particular satire. At least one scholar in the twentieth century has argued that Horace is writing a serious defence of satire, based on a lost Lucilian satire that also served as a model for Persius' and Juvenal's defenses of their satire.[27] On the other hand a later critic, Niall Rudd, argues that the poem is only elaborate shadow-boxing, no real defense being needed since the personal satire and occasional Lucilian coarseness of the first book are gone in the second.[28] The editor of the text I use expresses a similar view--the poem is farcical because Horace felt his poetry needed no real defense (Morris, pp. 144-145). One effect of our consideration of the poem will be to suggest that those who see the poem as farce may be missing something that was clear to Pope and the older commentators.

What is most striking in both Hunter and Rudd is that they ignore Horace's final question to Trebatius: what will be the result if someone who is himself a man of integrity attacks someone who deserves

reproaches? ("si quis/ opprobriis dignum latraverit, integer ipse?" [84-85]). My discussion of the commentaries will bring out that for the earlier commentators, as for Jonson and Pope, this is the heart of the poem.

To begin at the beginning, what little the scholiasts have to say supports a serious interpretation of the poem. One central passage is that in which Horace ostensibly says that he just happens to have a taste for satire:

> Quid faciam? Saltat Milonius, ut semel icto
> accessit fervor capiti numerusque lucernis;
> Castor gaudet equis, ovo prognatus eodem
> pugnis; quot capitum vivunt, totidem studiorum
> millia: me pedibus delectat claudere verba
> Lucili ritu, nostrum melioris utroque.
>
> (24-29)

> What am I to do? Milonius starts a-dancing once the
> heat has mounted to his wine-smitten brain and the lamps
> twinkle double. Castor finds joy in horses; his brother,
> born from the same egg, in boxing. For every thousand
> living souls, there are as many thousand tastes. My
> own delight is to shut up words in feet, as did Lucilius,
> a better man than either of us.
>
> (Loeb, p. 129)

Hunter here sees Horace as "content to present satire as a harmless taste like a taste for dancing, horseriding, or boxing . . . ." By contrasting the way Pope uses this passage, Hunter implies that Horace intends no satire of the other avocations he cites as parallels. Milonius is not drunk; Castor and Pollux are described as born of the same egg only because they were the offspring of Leda.[29] Rudd, on the other hand, knows that Milonius is dancing because he is drunk, that this is a gibe at him, and that this kind of introduction makes us expect Horace to say "'Similarly I have to vent my indignation by writing satire.'"[30] But Rudd emphasizes that he doesn't say this, and concludes that he is

only playing at defending satire, since "what keeps him awake is not hatred or anger, but simple problems of scansion."[31] Rudd thus virtually ignores the words "Lucili ritu," which justify the paraphrase Acro gives, in which the irony is obvious: "Quid vitium habeo ut multi habent; nam Milonius scura si ebrius fuerit saltare non desinet. Similiter ego hominum commissa tacere non possum." (I have a fault as many do; for Milonius if he has gotten drunk will not stop dancing. Similarly I can't keep quiet about the crimes of men.)[32]

The lines that follow describing the Lucilian rite are worth mentioning because they will become a subject for debate by later commentators:

> Ille velut fidis arcana sodalibus olim
> credebat libris, neque, si male cesserat, usquam
> decurrens alio, neque si bene; quo fit ut omnis
> votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella
> vita senis. Sequor hunc . . ..
>
> (30-34)

> He in older days would trust his secrets to his books, as if to faithful friends, never turning elsewhere for recourse, whether things went well with him or ill. So it comes that the old poet's whole life is open to view, as if painted on a votive tablet.
>
> (Loeb, p. 129)

One might assume that these lines describe Lucilius' integrity in order to suggest Horace's, who claims to follow him. This interpretation is supported in the early texts by retaining the manuscript reading <u>gesserat</u>. Lucilius' right to satirize is confirmed because he did not spare himself, as Acro says, whether he did well or ill. We shall see how far from this interpretation later commentators are.

Finally, the last lines: Trebatius warns Horace,

> si mala condiderit in quem quis carmina, ius est
> iudicumque. <u>Hor</u>. Esto, si quis mala; sed bona si
> quis iudice condiderit laudatus Caesare? si quis

> opprobriis dignum latraverit, integer ipse?
> Treb. Solventur risu tabulae, tu missus abibis.
> (82-86)

> If a man write ill verses against another, there is a right of action and redress by law.
> HOR. To be sure, in case of ill verses. But what if a man compose good verses, and Caesar's judgement approve? If he has barked at someone who deserves abuse, himself all blameless?
> TRE. The case will be dismissed with a laugh. You will get off scot-free.
> (Loeb, p. 133)

Rudd paraphrases:

> If a party compose foul verses against another party a hearing and a trial ensue.
>
> Horace once again steps neatly aside:
>
> That is true in the case of foul verses, but what if a party compose fine verses and in Caesar's judgement win commendation? . . .
> The charge will be laughed out of court and you will get off scot free.[33]

Acro, on the other hand, stresses the question that Rudd ignores (as does Hunter) by paraphrasing the last lines: "tu veniam merebere a iudicbus, si quemquam ipse extra noxiam possis iure lacerare." (You will merit pardon from the judges, if yourself free from crime you can attack someone justly.)

Landino, the first Renaissance commentator on Horace (see above, Chap. I, pp. 23-29), indicates in his brief comments the essential seriousness of his interpretation of the poem. He sums up what Horace is doing at the end of the poem: "Tandem vehementer factum defendit. Atque alios qui non recte de se sentiunt acerrime confutat." ("At last he vehemently defends what has been done. And he sharply confutes others who do not judge him properly.") He also explains that Horace appeals to Trebatius as "senectute venerandum virum: ut casto auctore

probet satyram in malos viros iure optime scribi posse." ("as a man to be venerated because of his age: that he may prove that satire may be written by a chaste author against evil men, by the best of rights.")

As for Badius Ascensius (see above, Chap. I, pp.29-32), he sees no pun in the last lines: if instead of slanderous poems, Horace writes poems that tell the truth (reading bona as veridica), Caesar will praise him. Horace's overall aim in the poem is to make his motives for writing satire clear: "Et ne petulantia animi potius quam vitiorum expellendorum desiderio satyram scribere culpatur: rogat deum cupitque unumquemquam ita vivere ut satyrae scribendam materiam non habeat." ("And lest he be accused of writing satire from petulance of soul rather than from a desire to expell vices, he asks god and desires that everyone so live that he may have no material for writing satire.")

Lambinus (Chap. I, pp. 32-38) takes a slightly unusual tack when he defines the law of satire as demanding that one write "courteously, and urbanely, and in jest, not harshly, not seriously, not petulantly, not abusively; not angrily, like Persius and Juvenal." (". . . comiter, & urbane, & per ludum, non aspere, non serio, non petulanter, non contumeliose; non iracunde, ut Pers. & Iuvenal.") This is the first indication in commentary on this poem of an emphasis on the distinction between Horace and Juvenal. Lambinus also sees a pun on mala: Trebatius means libellous ("famosa"), Horace shifts the meaning to "without art" ("indocta"). On the other hand, Lambinus says that those who attack Horace will find that he is defended by "the integrity, chastity, and innocence of his life." (". . . suae vitae integritatem castitatem, & innocentiam . . . .") Lambinus is glossing "fragili quaerens illidere dentem, offendet solido" (77-78) ("while trying to strike her tooth on

something soft, will dash upon what is solid" [Loeb, p. 133]), which Rudd calls "so discreet as to be almost meaningless."[34]

The general attitude of the early commentators is summed up in the synthesis of the "old commentators" provided by Cruquius in his 1597 edition. Ultra legem is seen as referring to the unwritten law of satire, that it should "reprehend those things that are worthy of reprehension" ("lex autem Satyrae, ea tantummodo reprehendit que digno sunt reprehensione"). "Lucili ritu" is glossed "more Satyrico," thus encouraging the inference that Horace is not simply being kept awake by problems of scansion. The same inference is encouraged by the glosses on Cervius and Turius (ll. 47, 49), who are said to have been evil men, the latter indeed the "most corrupt of judges" ("iudicum corruptissimum"), not therefore engaged, one assumes, in "a natural and harmless human activity," as Hunter implies.[35] What Trebatius fears for Horace (ll. 60-62) is not a snub from "'one of your influential friends,'" as Rudd has it,[36] but death from one of the powerful men Horace has lashed. ("nam potest te quivis potentioribus, a te lacessitus, occidere.") What will defend Horace will be his character, and he who tries to harm him "inveniet me talem qui possim resistere mordacibus & maledicis" ("will find me such that I can resist the biting and the abusive"). Finally, Horace "will merit pardon from the judges, if himself free from offense he has attacked someone justly" ("veniam merebitur a iudicibus, si aliquem ipse extra noxam positus, iure laceraverit").

Cruquius gives a more extended interpretation of the poem, following the other commentators in seeing it as basically serious, but adding his own twist; he believes that Trebatius is one of Horace's critics, and that Horace is directing veiled satire against him, under

the pretext of soberly asking his advice. The essential point Cruquius makes is that although Trebatius thinks it an unworthy task to "paint a scoundrel in his true colors" ("ut vilem aliquem scurram suis coloribus depingeret"), and disapproves of Horace's satire, Horace forces him to see that love of virtue motivates his satire. When Trebatius threatens Horace with a short life if he keeps on with his satire, Horace responds by calling on the example of Lucilius, "who did not fear to rail at the Romans, even whoever was noblest" ("qui non timuit insectari Romanos etiam nobilissimos quosque"). And did so purely actuated by the love of virtue; "aequus autem is est virtuti, qui bonis omnibus parcendum iudicat, malosque male puniendos." ("For he is just to virtue, who judges that all who are good should be spared, the bad harshly punished.") Clearly to Cruquius "Scilicet uni aequus virtuti atque suis amicis" is no "humorous afterthought, really in direct contradiction of the preceding statement" as Morris sees it (p. 153), but the heart of Horace's defense.

Then the concealed quarrel continues. Trebatius must have taunted Horace with his low birth and general light weight, have called him "fragile and lax" "fragilem Laxumque." Horace responds by asserting that he is "solidum . . . hoc est, firmum & integrem." And in calling Trebatius "learned," Horace is using Socratic irony. He knows how Trebatius feels about satire, yet he keeps pressing him for a favorable opinion: he must be secretly satirizing him.[37]

In short, Horace is backing Trebatius into a corner where he will have to approve of Horace's satire or admit that he is criticizing a man who acts from love of virtue and attacks only those who deserve it. Cruquius interprets the final lines in such a way that they provide the

strongest possible support for this interpretation. Horace is not evading the issue by using a pun, but making a distinction between libel and satire; what he means by "bona carmina" is defined in that essential line, "si quis/ opprobriis dignum latraverit, integer ipse?" "Namque huiuscemodi carpendi vitia studium neque legibus inhibitum est neque bonis moribus adversarium." ("For zeal for this kind of railing at vices is neither prohibited by the laws nor contrary to good mores.") Trebatius in the end must approve of it, no matter how much he dislikes it.[38]

Cruquius ignores the role played in the poem by the contrasts between Horace, lover of satire, and those he pretends to compare himself with, chiefly one gathers because he is more interested in the satire on Trebatius. Chabot (see Chap. I, pp. 44-48) is somewhat influenced by Cruquius, it would appear, and follows him in seeing signs that Trebatius has been one of Horace's severest critics, but Chabot also makes certain crucial new points that seem to complete what Cruquius says. He delves deeply into the question of what might be causing the insomnia Horace complains of. After all, according to all the soundest medical ideas, if Horace stops writing those pugnacious poems his life ought to be more peaceful, and his sleep easier. But perhaps like a pregnant woman he longs for unhealthy food:

> dicemus Poetam cessantem fieri insomnem ex vehementi illo scribendi de morum emendatione ob desiderium & cuipiditatem virtutis actuosae quomodo Juvenalis scribit se affici Sat. I propter corruptae aetatis suae mores.
>
> > Difficile est Satyram non scribere, nam quis iniquae
> > Tam patiens Urbis, tam ferreus, ut teneat se?
> > [Sat. 1. 30-31]

> We may say that the Poet who stops writing becomes an insomniac from his vehement desire to write about the improvement of morals and from greed for an active virtue, in the same way Juvenal writes in Sat. I that he is afflicted for the sake of the morals of his corrupt age: "It is hard not to write Satyr: for who so patient of the evil City, so iron-hearted, that he can contain himself?"

Chabot observes that Horace seems to be an example of the kind of love of philosophy that Plutarch talks about when he makes the hunger and thirst we feel for the sweet fruit of philosophy stronger than any mere sensual feeling.

The other important point in Chabot is that he brings out clearly for the first time the reason Horace pretends to compare himself to Scaeva the parricide. This is a passage that Hunter ignores, underplaying as he does any hints that Horace is setting up a real contrast between himself and those who are "naturally" corrupt and violent. Chabot points out the obvious: Horace purposely mentions a crime so vicious that it demands to be satirized, that everyone may understand that the true motivation of his satire is one all good men should share, the love of philosophy.[39] Love of philosophy to Chabot clearly means love of philosophy in action, working for the improvement of morality, and it is this motivation that he stresses in his interpretation. He does not deny the pun at the end, but his paraphrase makes it unimportant: ". . . si quis vacuus ipse vitiis bona carmina fecerit, & flagitiosum sceleratumque hominem dignis modis perstrinxerit, is laudatur ab Augusto & legum custodes ac ministri tali scriptura delectabuntur." ("If someone who is himself free of vices makes good poems, and reproaches in worthy ways a flagitious and guilty man, he is praised by Augustus, and the guardians of the law and ministers will be pleased by such writing."

Chabot and Cruquius between them thus provide at the end of the sixteenth century an interpretation of the Trebatius dialogue that brings out all its latent seriousness. If later commentators had retained their insights we would be faced with no questions as to whether Pope followed or transformed Horace; it would be clear that to a great extent he was simply presenting Horace as "the Renaissance" saw him, as Maresca claims. Unfortunately there is a distinct shift in interpretation of this particular poem in the seventeenth century, and Heinsius and Desprez, whose editions we know Pope owned,[40] and Dacier, whose commentary he mentioned respectfully (Corr. I, 492) and clearly used in at least one instance,[41] all clearly reflect this general change.

So far the only commentator who has drawn any distinction between Horatian satire and Juvenalian or Persian has been Lambinus. Otherwise all the commentators have been ready to describe Horace's satire in terms that we would usually reserve for Juvenalian. While Horace's urbane use of humor has been appreciated, his basic message has not been sharply distinguished from that of the other great satirists. But as specialized knowledge of classical poets grew, there seems also to have grown an interest in differentiating the various poets as sharply as possible. In raising Horace to a higher level than any commentator had before, Heinsius took pains to show how completely different he was from Persius, and especially from Juvenal, and how much superior (see above, Chap. I, pp. 54-56).

Paradoxically, this means that in some specific instances Heinsius interprets Horace in a way that detracts from his seriousness, and this is what we find in Heinsius' interpretation of S. 2.1. Heinsius is convinced that one of the main reasons Horace is superior to Juvenal is

that he writes satire in a comic vein, as it should be written, given its descent from the Greek satyr play, with heavy influence from Old Comedy. Heinsius sees S. 2.1. entirely in terms of this theory: according to Heinsius, Horace is not presenting a serious defence of satire at all; his tone is comic, his whole aim to disarm those who might punish him for libel, by appealing from the rigid letter of the law to equity, on the grounds that satire is a harmless taste for enclosing words in meter after the manner of Lucilius, or at most a natural means of self-defence.[42] In short, satire is a human weakness, and according to Aristotle, whose definition of equity Heinsius uses, "it is equitable to pardon human weaknesses . . . ."[43] Horace speaks with a combination of Socratic irony and genuine simplicity and humility, and is as ready to satirize himself as others: "Illiberal must that mortal be who can be angry with a little man like this" (p. 156).

In none of Horace's arguments does Heinsius see any pointed contrast set up between Horace and those he pretends to compare himself to. Milonius' penchant for drunken dancing is _festivus_ (merry, good-humored, gay) as an argument for satire (p. 146). Scaeva is never mentioned. Rather the argument that satire is just another naturally dictated means of self-defense is seen as particularly effective because of its unsophisticated simplicity--a good trait in a man accused of a crime, because it is disarming (p. 153). The only actual satire in the poem is directed against Trebatius and his fellow lawyers, against the rigidity of the law and its interpreters, and this satire is so good-humored it could offend no one. Nothing, says Heinsius, is included that could possibly upset the reader or make him less favorable to Horace (p. 147). Presumably any suggestion that satire can be deserved, or that the

satirist can have good reason for serious satire, would be upsetting, since Heinsius ignores not only Scaeva but also the description of Lucilius exposing the wicked and that central line "si quis . . . integer ipse?"

It is not, of course, that Heinsius denies Horace any serious intention. By constantly comparing Horace to Socrates, Heinsius makes clear that Horace's whole aim is to reach and teach those who would run away if he were harsh; so Xenophon tells us that Socrates, that Attic fox, was able to reach those who would listen patiently to no one else (p. 157). Truth is the root of everything Horace says, even when he uses dissimulation (p. 165). But however serious Horace's ultimate intentions are in his satiric poetry as a whole, the dialogue with Trebatius has lost its seriousness, and for the influential seventeenth and early eighteenth century commentators it was not to regain it.

At the same time, even if we assume that Pope consulted only those commentaries we know he either owned or was aware of, he could have found in the conservative commentary of Desprez some at least of the raw materials for a more serious interpretation.[44] Desprez sums up the whole poem as essentially a jest: ". . . [Horace] humorously consults a lawyer as to what he should do, whether he should write Satires. At length all Trebatius' dissuading reasons, and even the prescripts of the law, are dissolved with a laugh by Horace." On the other hand, since Desprez for the most part simply comments on individual lines, and seems to feel no necessity to make his commentary completely consistent, he includes material that suggests a latent seriousness. Thus, though nequeo dormire is described as "a joking and clever response to a joking complaint," the contrast between Horace's taste for satire and

Milonius' for drunken dancing is underlined by a quotation from Cicero on the debauched nature of the kind of feasts at which men end up dancing. Cervius and Turius are both explained as the villains they were, and although Desprez does not comment on Scaeva, in his desire to provide a complete set of parallels to Horace's _topos_ on the natural tendency of each beast to defend itself with its proper weapon, he quotes not only passages from Lucretius and Cicero that imply no judgment, but also a passage from Phocylides, which ends by remarking "but reason is the defense of man, and the weapon more powerful than any weapon." ("_At ratio propugnaculum est homini, at telum omni telo potentius_.") This could reinforce the idea that Horace is equating Cervius _et al_. with animals whose mode of self-defense is inevitably violent, while his own, satire, is basically rational.

Again the conservative, Desprez keeps the more traditional interpretation of "maiorum ne quis amicus . . ." even though he adds the more modern: "Lest some noble offended by your Satires should revenge himself by killing you. Or, lest Maecenas should at length turn against you . . ." (Ne quis procerum Satiris tuis offensus tibi necem inferendo se ulciscatur. vel, ne Maecenas aliquando tandem adversetur . . .") And although he makes no comment on _integer ipse_, he does paraphrase "Equidem nihil hinc diffindere possum" so as to imply that Horace has established his moral superiority to his attackers: "I confess, Horace, that you are by your morals superior to envy . . ." ("Fateor, Horati invidiae te moribus superiorem . . .").

Dacier (see above, Chap. I. pp. 57-64) does not completely leave out the more serious aspect of the poem: he points out the satire on Milonius, using the same passage from Cicero as Desprez (7.30); he discusses

the crimes of Turius (p. 40) and Scaeva (p. 41); he draws the general conclusion on that section that Horace is saying "que dans les crimes les plus atroces chaque scelerat suit son temperament" (p. 42); and he comments on *integer ipse* "car il faut qu'un Poëte Satirique soit exempte de tous les défauts qu'il reprend dans les autres" (p. 58). But unlike Desprez, Dacier emphasizes that the poem is in no sense a serious defense of satire. He is explicit: "Horace ne défend point la Satire contre Trebatius. Ce n'estait pas là un parti a prendre. Il tâche seulement de l'excuser" (p. 29). Thus Dacier follows Heinsius in stressing the ingenuous simplicity of Horace's attempts to excuse his satire, and adds his own characteristic emphasis on Horace's effort to reassure Augustus that his satire will be kept within strict bounds (p. 29). Augustus is an enemy of liberties of the kind Lucilius took, and Horace must promise not to follow Lucilius' example (p. 37). Horace also pays court to Augustus whenever he can, e.g. by having the good Trebatius praise the emperor ("Le tour est adroit" [27]), and by making Augustus the judge of good poetry: ". . . Horace fait par là finement sa cour à Auguste, qui faisoit assez bien des vers" (p. 57).

Like Desprez, Dacier gives both possible interpretations of "ne quis maiorum," but unlike Desprez he has his own preference, based on his emphasis on Horace the courtier: "Je crois mesme, que *ne quis maiorum*, est proprement *un certain Grand*. Et qu'il veut designer Mecenas, à qui il fait sa cour par là" (p. 44). Horace the courtier and Horace the jester have completely replaced Horace the serious satirist. Dacier is proud to see in this satire "Une plaisanterie continuelle & qui a esté connue de fort peu de gens" (p. 18). Horace not only teases Trebatius (pp. 21-24), but makes the whole satire a comedy of a man

asking advice, and then happily going on doing what he pleases(p. 19). As for the final pun ". . . par le jeu de mots, il se tire mieux d'affaires, qu'il n'auroit fait par les raisonnements les plus forts" (p. 57). The final comic touch is that all his talking has not even convinced Trebatius--he speaks the last line himself (pp. 58-59).

Bentley is not concerned with interpretation in his commentary, but in one instance he is drawn into giving us his notion of what Horace is saying by the need to establish the correct reading. The point is interesting because it seems possible that Pope was influenced in reverse by what Bentley had to say. Bentley is joining the dispute as to whether the description of Lucilius should read, "neque, si male cesserat, usquam decurrens alia, neque si bene" (ll. 31-32), since the manuscripts read gesserat. The traditional interpretation is that Horace is underlining Lucilius' integrity by saying that he revealed his own as well as other men's faults (see above, p. 303). Bentley argues that "gesserat" is not good Latin, since it has no direct object, and that, in any case, Lucilius does not reveal himself and his faults in his satires, nor does Horace, his follower: "at vero in his Sermonibus quotusquisque est, qui de Horati rebus agit? qui non locum aliquem moralem & communem tractat?" ("But indeed, among these Sermones how rare is one that has to do with Horace's affairs? Which one does not treat some moral commonplace?") Having thus totally ignored the heart of Horace's satire, Bentley goes on to explain that Horace is here criticizing Lucilius, not setting him up as a model of integrity. "Scilicet quovis ille die scribere amabat, sive aptus tum ad studium, seu, ut saepe usu venit, ineptior; seu Musis faventibus, sive aversis."[45] ("Of course that man loved to write on any day, whether he was then fit

for study, or, as often happened, not so fit; whether the Muses were favorable or hostile.") We can scarcely be surprised that Pope ignored all the examples Bentley cites to prove "gesserat" must take an object, and retained the reading (TE IV.8), even though Cunningham here agreed with Bentley.[46]

The last commentator who could conceivably have influenced Pope is also the least likely to have done so; Father Sanadon slashes Horace more boldly than Bentley had, under pretence of restoring him, and gives an interpretation of S. 2.1 which goes further than any other early commentator in effectively removing any possibility of seeing a serious defense of satire underlying the surface argument.[47] From Sanadon's point of view, the surface argument appears serious enough, but serves as a cover for pure jesting. ("Cette satire n'est qu'une plaisanterie continuelle d'un bout à l'autre, cependant rien n'est plus serieux en aparence" [p. 224].) The jokes Sanadon sees are essentially the same as those Dacier remarks on. But he goes one step further than Dacier by explaining away the satire on Milonius, Cervius, Turius et al. as part of "les traits de satire qu'il décoche à droit et à gauche contre tous les objets ridicules qui se présentent à son imagination" (p. 224). Lucilius is not mentioned as a model for an honest satirist, but only as another butt of this random satire. For when Horace describes how Lucilius shows his whole self in his works, "Ce morceau est d'une satire d'autant plus fine que l'ambiguité en déguise la malice & fait quelque tems illusion" (p. 227). Sanadon here follows Bentley: Horace is not praising Lucilius for his honesty and consistency, as the reader might at first think, but satirizing him for writing poetry in every mood, and putting in whatever occurred to him, so that we know his character by

the inequalities in his poetry (p. 228). With his little digression on his birthplace, Horace is not establishing a warlike ancestry for himself, but imitating Lucilius' tendency to digress. "Ce tour est plaisant, & fait voir la finesse d'un endroit que sans cela pouroit passer pour un hors d'oeuvre de la dernier fadeur" (p. 299).

Sanadon's edition appeared in 1728, only five years before Pope's imitation of S. 2.1, yet nothing could be more unlike than their versions of the poem. Pope may not have been aware of Sanadon's edition, since he does not mention it, but to the extent that Sanadon represents a "modern" tendency, we can still consider him a representative of the kind of attitude Pope had to overcome if he was to use S. 2.1 as a serious defence of satire. Certainly Sanadon's interpretation of the poem was adopted by the editor of one of the most popular English editions of Horace in the eighteenth century. This edition appeared in the 1740's, and is strictly speaking outside our scope, but because it was so very popular, and because it represents what at least one learned Englishman "collected from [Horace's] best Latin and French COMMENTATORS" (title page) we will use it to complete our story.[48]

The Reverend Philip Francis was an admirer of both Sanadon, whose complete reconstruction of the Carmina Seculare he used (pp. IX-X), and Bentley, to whom he owned himself "obliged . . . for some conjectural emendations, which no Critic of a less daring Spirit could have attempted" (p. XV). If Pope read the preface in which Francis made these acknowledgements, which appeared in 1743, he must have been disappointed to see his New Dunciad have no little effect. And if he had seen the wholeheartedness with which Francis accepted the most trivial possible interpretation of S. 2.1, he would doubtless have counted it as another

victory for Dulness. Whatever commentators Francis consulted, he relied almost exclusively on Dacier and Sanadon, and chiefly the latter, especially in his tendency to see the satire of the poem as more or less random, with Lucilius as one of the targets.[49] We really only need quote the summary he gives of the poem as ". . . one continued Vein of Raillery under an appearance of much seriousness and Solemnity . . . The Poet maintains his Party with the best Reasons he can, and under pretence of pleading his Cause indulges his natural Genius for Satire and Ridicule with his usual Freedom. At last they part, as People who ask and who give Advice, generally do; both confirmed in their own Opinions" (pp. 122-123).

We are now in a position to understand why Jonson could use an almost literal translation of this poem as a defense of his satire in Poetaster, while Pope had to re-create the poem before it could be taken seriously. There is no definitive proof as to whether Jonson did his translation before or after he encountered Heinsius' edition of Horace. The evidence, as I said in Chapter II, indicates that the scene was not written at the same time as the rest of the play but later, as a defense of the personal satire Jonson finally had to admit was present throughout Poetaster (Chap. II, pp. 87-88). The scene did not appear in print until the 1616 folio, but could well have been composed earlier. It shows no signs of being influenced by Heinsius's interpretation, but we have already seen that even when Jonson was explicity following Heinsius' recension of the Ars Poetica, he felt free to ignore what conflicted with his own assumptions (Chap. III, p.134). However much Jonson may have appreciate the unique status Heinsius gave Horace, he never seems to have felt the need to distinguish Horace from Juvenal as much

as possible, or to banish the Juvenalian tone from his Horatian poems. Add to this that Jonson naturally saw S. 2.1 in the light of his conviction about the moral base of all good poetry, and we can see that it was inevitable that Jonson would feel as strongly as possible the latent seriousness of the poem and use it seriously, whether he had read Heinsius' discussion or not.

And what is interesting, to say it once more, is that he could use it seriously without departing markedly from a literal translation. He takes a few liberties: the comparison of Caesar to a spirited horse does not seem dignified enough--he paraphrases it; he adds emphasis to the passages that justify satire as vengenance for slander, probably because Dekker and Marston had slandered him; and, most interesting, for our purposes, he makes the meaning more explicit in a few crucial places. Thus he translates the passage on Milonius et al. (ll. 24-29):

> What shall I do? MILONIUS shakes his heeles
> In ceaselesse dances, when his braine once feeles
> The stirring fervour of the wine ascend;
> And that his eyes false number apprehend.
> CASTOR his horse; POLLUX loves handie fights;
> A thousand heads, a thousand choise delights.
> My pleasure is in feet, my words to close,
> As, both our better, old LUCILIUS does . . .
> (Poetaster III.v.43-53)

He is a bit heavyhanded in making absolutely clear that Milonius is drunk, but on the other hand the irony of "a thousand choise delights" is a fairly good equivalent of the contempt implied in "ovo prognatus eodem." It is interesting that Jonson also makes exactly the same changes in punctuation as Pope does--a full stop after the description of the "choise delights" of others, just to emphasize that the real relationship between Horace and those he pretends to compare himself to is one of contrast. Hunter sees this as part of Pope's complete

"transformation" of Horace.[50]

Equally clear is Jonson's version of the other argument by analogy, in which Horace is supposedly presenting satire as just another natural means of self-defense:

"The wolfe his tooth doth use:
"The bull his horne. And, who both this infuse,
"But nature? There's luxurious SCAEVA: Trust
His long-liv'd mother with him; His so just
and scrupulous right hand no mischief will
No more, then with his heel a wolfe will kill,
Or Oxe will jaw: Mary, let him alone
With temper'd poison to remove the croane.
But, briefly, if to age I destin'd bee,
Or that quick deaths black wings environ me;
If rich, or poore; at Rome; or fate command
I shall be banish't to some other land;
What hiew soever, my whole state shall beare,
I will write satyres still, in spight of feare.
(87-100)

Jonson leaves no doubt that all those who, like animals, use their "naturally" dictated means of destruction are examples of the kind of people because of whom and at whom Horace feels forced to write satire, not instances in an ingenuous argument that tries to excuse writing satire rather than defend it.

Jonson also naturally takes seriously Trebatius' concern about Horace's longevity, given his bold resolve:

Treb. Horace; I feare, thou draw'st no lasting breath:
And that some great mans friend will be thy death.
Hora. What? when the man that first did satyrise,
Durst pull the skin over the ears of vice;
And make, who stood in outward fashion cleare,
Give place, as foule within; shall I forbeare?
(101-106)

It is clear to Jonson that he is being true to the spirit of his original in adding "shall I forbeare?" The implication is there, and he has brought it out. The last changes Jonson makes, however, are dictated to some extent by his own position, as well as by his perception of

Horace's meaning. Jonson had been accused of seditious libelling in connection with Eastward Ho and Sejanus (H&S I.36-38). He must have felt the need to make clear that he accepted the law against such libel, and to distinguish his satire from it.

> Treb. There's justice, and great actions may be su'd
> 'Gainst such as wrong mens fames with verses lewd.
> Hora. I with lewd verses; such as lebels bee,
> And aym'd at persons of good qualitie.
> I reverence and adore that just decree:
> But if they shall be sharp, yet modest rimes
> That spare mens persons, and but taxe their crimes,
> Such, shall in open court, find current passe;
> Were CAESAR judge, and with the makers grace.
> Treb. Nay, Ile add more; if thou thy selfe being cleare,
> Shalt taxe in person a man, fit to beare
> Shame, and reproach; his sute shall quickly bee
> Dissolv'd in laughter, and thou thence set free.
> (130-140)

It is his need for circumspection that keeps Jonson from putting in his protagonist's mouth an assertion of his right to make personal attacks, as it motivates his expression of respect for the law. But in ignoring the pun he agrees with Cruquius; a 'good' satiric poem is one written by a virtuous man against vice or a knave, and what Horace has shown in this poem is that that is the kind of satire he writes.

In short, with the full support of the early commentators, Jonson presents Horace as ultimately basing his defence of satire on his own virtue and the villainy of those he attacks, with the implication that "the strong antipathy of Good to Bad" (see above, p. 300) is one of his major motivations. We may find this clearly stated elsewhere in Poetaster, where Virgil says of Horace:

> His sharpenesse, that is most excusable;
> As being forc't out of a suffering vertue,
> Oppressed with the licence of the time . . .
> (V.iii.368-370)

This is the basic idea that Jonson saw as underlying S 2.1, and that he

brings out in lines like "What hiew so ever my whole state shall beare/ I shall write Satyrs still in spight of feare." (Dryden, relying on Dacier, mentions in S 2.1 only the gentle mockery of Trebatius (see above, Chap. V, pp. 255-256). It is left to Pope to rediscover the basic seriousness of the poem, to overcome the late seventeenth and early eighteenth tendency to trivialize Horace, and to reinstate Horace firmly in the great satiric tradition, of which Pope saw himself the successor, even as he asserted his own uniqueness.

There is even one piece of evidence that in his rediscovery of the poem Pope may have been influenced to some degree by Jonson. The point cannot be established, nor is it of major importance, but it still seems worth mentioning. Jonson translates _nequeo dormire_, "but sleepe avoids mine eye:/ And I use these, lest nights should tedious seeme" (3.5 9-10). Pope has Fortescue respond to _his_ version of _nequeo dormire_, "Why, if the Nights seem tedious--take a Wife . . ." (l. 16). If Pope was familiar with Jonson's version of the scene in _Poetaster_, it may have helped to counteract the later tendency to see the poem as purely comic. He may have thought of Jonson as one more in the great tradition of embattled satirists, and brought him into the poem as he brought Persius and Juvenal.

But this is no more than interesting speculation. Whether Pope was fully aware of the precedent he had in Jonson or not, the fact remains that. coming to the imitation of Horace almost accidentally, in the most casual manner,[51] he rediscovered in Horace much of what Jonson had found there, however obscured it may have been by the commentators with which he was most familiar. Of course, Pope goes far beyond Jonson in what he does with this Horatian satire. Following Horace, Pope can for the

first time reveal himself--not an exact duplicate of Horace, but a self whose revelation is authorized and given "Dignity" (TE IV 5) by Horace--and through that self-revelation he answers his critics as Horace had answered his.

For however much Jonson and Pope may share what we call a Juvenalian indignation at the vices of the world, both chose to be the English Horace rather than the English Juvenal for essentially the same reason: Horace constantly reveals himself as he satirizes others, as he teaches others, and for both Jonson and Pope the good man's self-revelation was the essential guarantee of the worth of what he had to say.

What Pope perceives in Horace is that the irony he uses throughout the poem works because we are aware of the true nature of the poet, and aware that he assumes that we share his values and will appreciate his irony. Consequently, Pope preserves the basic ironic structure of his original and the strongly personal tone, the two indispensable elements that make the poem Horatian rather than Juvenalian, even while he heightens the criticism of society and declares his own independence of the social hierarchy. At the same time he frequently brings out what is implicit in Horace, as though in order to counteract the misinterpretation of recent commentators.

Thus Dacier and Heinsius had suggested that because Horace was afraid of the recently strengthened laws against libellous poems, he was writing a poem designed not so much to defend satire as to excuse it and mollify his opponents. Pope gives a version of the opening lines that heightens the irony in such a way as to make this interpretation obviously absurd. I give the text of Horace Pope printed with his Imitation, as

the Twickenham edition gives it:

> Hor. Sunt quibus in Satyra videar nimis acer, & ultra
> Legem tendere opus; sine nervis altera quicquid
> Composui pars esse putat, similesque meorum
> Mille die versus deduci posse. Trebati!
> Quid faciam? Praescribe.
>
> There are (I scarce can think it, but am told)
> There are to whom my Satire seems too bold.
> Scarce to wise Peter complaisant enough,
> And something said of Chartres much too rough.
> The lines are weak, another's pleased to say,
> Lord Fanny spins a thousand such a Day.
> Tim'rous by Nature, of the Rich in awe,
> I come to Council learned in the law.
> You'll give me, like a friend both sage and free,
> Advice; and (as you use) without a fee.
> (1-10)

Horace doubtless expected us to smile at the idea that he should be so upset by his critics as to consult a lawyer; Pope makes it inevitable that we shall share in his sneer at those who could object to satire of the infamous Peter, notorious for his usury (TE III-II. 99-100n.), or of Chartres, whose well deserved epitaph by Arbuthnot began "Here continueth to rot/ The body of Francis Chartres . . ." (TE III-II. 83-85 n.), and then laugh at the exaggerated trepidation that has driven him to ask advice.

> TREB. Quiescas.
> HOR. Ne faciam inquis,
> Omnino versus?
> Treb. Aio.
> HOR. Peream male si non
> Optimum erat: verum nequeo dormire.
>
> F. I'd write no more.
> P. Not write? but then I think.
> And for my Soul I cannot sleep a wink.
> I nod in company, I wake at Night,
> Fools rush into my Head, and so I write.
> (11-14)

Horace has objected that this rendering of nequeo dormire transforms what is "at most gently ironic" to a Juvenalian declaration

comparable to "difficile est saturam non scribere" (Juvenal, 1. 30) or "facit indignatio versum . . ." (I 79).[52] Chabot of course saw no sharp line between "nequeo dormire" and "difficile est saturam non scribere"--the underlying meaning was the same (see above, p. 308). And Juvenal himself alluded to Horace as part of the tradition he followed, both directly--"Haec ego non credem Venusina digna lucerna?/ haec ego non agitem?" (S 1. 51-52),[53] in Dryden's version. "Such Villaneis rous'd Horace into Wrath/ And 'tis more Noble to pursue his Path . . ."[54]--and indirectly by alluding to nequeo dormire--"quem patitur dormire nurus corruptor avarae,/ . . ./ si natura negat, facit indignatio versum/ qualemcumque potest, quales ego vel Cluvienus" (S 1. 77-80); "Who can behold that rank Old Letcher keep/ His Son's corrupted Wife, and hope to Sleep? . . . If Nature could not, Anger would indite/ such woeful stuff as I or S---'ll write" (Kinsley II.674, ll. 117-122).

Juvenal is following Horace, but he is shifting the emphasis from the self-revelation Horace engages in to the horror of the crimes that keep him awake, crimes that would force anyone to write satire. This is also clear in the other passage Hunter mentions: "difficile est saturam non scribere" is preceded by an enumeration of crimes followed by the question, who could possibly resist writing satire with such blatant corruption staring him in the face? (S 1. 22-39). Juvenal, of course, implies his own virtue, but he is too busy being indignant to reveal much of himself. Pope could have had a delightful time blasting the crimes of his age if he had imitated Juvenal--Samual Johnson was to find him a perfect vehicle for impersonal satire--but Pope chose Horace not just as a superficial mask of urbanity,[55] but as a way to the self-revelation only Horace provided a model for.

In this case what he said in imitation of Horace fitted him so well that he repeated it six years later in a personal letter: "I sleep in company, and wake at night, which is vexatious; if you did so, you at your age would make verses." His tendency to "nod in company" was well known--his friends teased him about it--here he joins that to an Horatian insomnia with its need to satirize, ignoring those commentators who could see no connection between insomnia and satire, even after Juvenal had made that connection explicit.

The passage that follows does not need detailed analysis: Pope is here exploiting that never-failing source of satire, the contrast between George Augustus and Augustus Caesar. In his relationship to his ruler, in his concept of what his relationship should be, Pope stands in complete contrast to Horace, as we already know. And society as a whole may be considered worse off when the translation Pope finds for "Pantolabum Scurram, Nomentanumve nepotem" (22) is "the City's best good Men" (39).[56] Things have not changed completely, however; Trebatius had to warn Horace "sibi quisque timet, quamquam est intactus, & odit" (23), even as Fortescue has to explain to Pope "Ev'n those you touch not, hate you" (41). Every scoundrel who shares the vices the satirist attacks is enraged; how can the satirist defend himself? With very much the same ironic self-deprecation and serious self-revelation in Pope as in Horace:

> HOR. Quid faciam? Saltat Milonius, ut semel icto
> Accessit fervor capiti numerusque lucernis.
>
> Castor gaudet equis; ovo prognatus eodem
> Pugnis: quot capitum vivunt, totidem studiorum
> Milia: me pedibus delectat claudere verba,
> Lucili ritu, nostrum melioris utroque.
>
> (24-29)

> Each Mortal has his Pleasure: none deny

> *Scarsdale* his Bottle, *Darty* his Ham-Pye;
> *Ridotta* sips and dances, till she see
> The doubling Lustres dance as fast as she;
> *F_____* loves the *Senate*, Hockley-Hole his Brother
> Like in all else, as one Egg to another.
> I love to pour out all myself, as plain
> As downright *Shippen*, or as old *Montagne*.
>
> (45-52)

His irony and the message it concealed was clear to Acro: "Quid vitiam habes ut multi habent; nam Milonius . . . si ebrius fuerit saltare non desinit. Similiter ego hominum commissa tacere non possum" (see above, p. 303). But given the "Modern" tendency to see Horace as perfectly serious in his argument that "the Lucilian rite" just happens to be what he enjoys, an argument that he uses with the aim of disarming the reader, Pope cannot simply give a literal translation, as Jonson had. He has to make the satire more biting, and Maresca has argued that he uses allusions to Persius and Juvenal as his means.[57] What is especially interesting from our point of view, however, is the restraint with which he has used the help of Persius and Juvenal, preferring to keep the passage basically Horatian. The relevant passage in Persius is probably, like so much of Persius' poetry, based on Horace. A modern editor points out that his opening lines, "Mille hominum species et rerum discolor usus;/ velle suum cuique est nec voto vivitur uno" (S 5. 52-53) parallels "quot capitum vivunt, totidem Studiorum/ milia."[58] And, like Horace, Persius is setting up a contrast, here between the futile and vicious tastes of most men and the love of philosophy of his teacher. Persius does not leave us to draw our own conclusions; he makes the tastes of the many as vicious as possible. I give an excerpt from Dryden's version, who takes pleasure in making the sins even worse:

The lazy Glutton safe at home will keep;
Indulge his Sloth, and batten with his Sleep;
One bribes for high preferments in the State,
A second shakes the Box, and sits up late;
Another shakes the Bed, dissolving there.
. . . .
But thou art pale, in nightly Studies, grown:
. . . .
From thee both old and young, with Profit, learn,
The bounds of Good and Evil to discern . . .
(Kinsley II. 774, ll. 73-88)

"Each mortal has his Pleasure" is closer to Dryden's translation of "velle suum cuique est"--"each has a different Will"--than it is to "quot capitum vivunt," but beyond this reminder to the reader that he like Persius sees Horace as setting up a contrast, Pope has not chosen to follow Persius in making that contrast as obvious and crude as possible. He has not openly called Darty a glutton, or F--- a corrupt politician. He has kept the Horatian irony and simply given the reader a little assist in sharing it.

Nor has Pope made his passage Juvenalian, and this too becomes more obvious when we consider the passage by Juvenal that probably influenced Pope here. Milonius' drunken dancing was more scandalous to a Roman audience than an English; Pope heightens the scandal by changing the man to a woman, and by making her name Ridotta, which implies that she is corrupted by such foreign imports as the ridotto, "a social assembly consisting of music and dancing introduced into England in 1722 (OED)" (TE IV 9). In the course of Juvenal's accusation that foreign luxury has ruined Roman morality, we find a portrait of a dancing, drunken Roman Venus which Dryden has translated with his usual gusto:

What care our Drunken Dames to whom they spread?
Wine, no distinction makes of Tail or Head.
Who lewdly Dancing at a Midnight Ball,
For hot Eringos, and fat Oysters call;
Full Brimmers to their Fuddled Noses thrust;

Brimmers the last Provocatives of Lust;
When Vapours to their swimming Brains advance,
And double Tapers on the tables dance.
(Kinsley II. 706-707)

This passage may have been in Pope's mind when he wrote "Ridotta sips and dances till she see/ The doubling lusters dance as fast as she," but what is of course striking is that he finds it unnecessary to make his passage at all Juvenalian. The main thing he is doing is exactly what Horace is doing--setting up a contrast between the pleasures of most men and his own pleasure in the "Lucilian rite," a contrast which in itself reveals how honorable a calling that "Lucilian rite" is, depending as it does first of all on the author's integrity.

Me pedibus delectat claudere verba,
Lucili ritu, nostrum melioris utroque.
Ille, velut fidis arcana sodalibus olim
Credebat libris; neque si male gesserat, usquam
Decurrens alio, neque si bene: quo fit ut omnis
Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella
Vita senis. Sequor hunc, Lucanus an Appulus anceps:
Nam Venusinus arat finem sub utrumque colonus . . ..
(28-35)

I love to pour out all myself as plain
As downright Shippen, or as old Montagne.
In them, as certain to be lov'd as seen,
The Soul stood forth, nor kept a thought within;
In me what Spots (for spots I have) appear,
Will prove at least the Medium must be clear.
In this impartial Glass, my Muse intends
Fair to expose myself, my Foes, my Friends;
Publish the present Age, but where my text
Is Vice too high, reserve it for the next:
My Foes shall wish my life a longer date,
And ev'ry Friend the less lament my Fate.
My Head and Heart thus flowing thro' my Quill,
Verse-man or prose-man, term me which you will,
Papist or Protestant, or both between,
Like good Erasmus in an honest mean,
In Moderation placing all my glory,
While Tories call me Whig, and Whigs a Tory.
(51-68)

It may seem obvious to us that in describing the integrity of

Lucilius' self-revelation Horace is also talking of his own, and contrasting his kind of activity with drunken dancing, boxing and horse-fancying; it was not obvious to all the commentators. Dacier does not even discuss this passage, and Bentley and Sanadon, as we know, saw in it a concealed satire on Lucilius. Pope, as we mentioned before, has retained the reading "gesserat," thus re-affirming the traditional interpretation that Lucilius did not spare himself in his satire. Still, perhaps partly because of the complete lack of understanding someone like Bentley revealed when he denied that Horace ever spoke of himself in his Sermones, Pope feels the need to make the oblique reference to the integrity of Horace's own self-revelation direct and to alter completely the section on Horace's ancestry that had been misunderstood as a pointless digression in imitation of Lucilius' pointless digressions. Some of the material he substitutes for Horace's account of his ancestry is self-revelation of a kind that Horace engaged in elsewhere; as Brower reminds us, it is not unlike the famous "nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri" passage (Epist. 1.1 33-34).[59] At the same time, Pope is clearly going beyond Horace. That one basic contrast between Pope and Horace here comes into play: Pope is playing a completely independent role, and the main new element in the passage is the announcement of the scope of his work.

The next section, although it follows Horace in some of the playfulness of claiming a peaceful nature yet reveling in the thought of poetic revenge, departs from him chiefly in giving us a taste of satire of the kind Pope has announced. Horace asks why he should draw his sword if "tutus ab infestis latromibus" (1.42); Pope points out that he lives constantly in a "Land of Hectors,/ Thieves, Supercargoes,

Sharpers, and Directors" (ll. 71-72). Then he proceeds to use his claim to be peaceful and threat of revenge to include thrusts at the standing army, the overlong peace, and Walpole himself, who was notoriously sensitive to criticism.[60]

The next passage is a central one for any discussion of what Pope is doing with this original.

> Cervius iratus leges minitatur & urnam;
> Canidia Albuti, quibus est inimica, Venenum;
> Grande malum Turius, si quid se judice certes;
> Ut, quo quisque valet, suspectus terreat, utque
> Imperet hoc natura potens; sic collige mecum.
> Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit; unde nisi intus
> Monstratum? Scaevae vivacem crede nepoti
> Matrem: nil faciet sceleris pia dextra (mirum
> Ut neque calce lupus quenquam, neque dente petit bos)
> Sed mala tollet anum vitiato melle cicuta.
> (47-56)

> Slander or Poyson, dread from Delia's Rage,
> Hard Words or Hanging, if your Judge be Page
> From furious Sappho scarce a milder Fate,
> P--x'd by her Love, or libell'd by her Hate:
> Its proper Pow'r to hurt, each Creature feels,
> Bulls aim their horns, and Asses lift their heels,
> 'Tis a Bear's Talent not to kick, but hug,
> And no man wonders he's not stung by Pug:
> So drink with Waters, or with Chartres eat,
> They'll never poison you, they'll only cheat.
> (81-90)

The first question is, does he keep the ostensible line of argument that presents satire as parallel to other "natural" means of self-defense? Hunter has argued that he completely obscures it, in order to transform Horace's argument that satire is simply another natural means of self-defense into a "Juvenalian" attack on Sappho, Delia, et al. as the motives of his satire.[61] We have already seen that Horace's argument was far from being universally accepted at face value by the early Commentators and Jonson, however Heinsius and later commentators saw it. Presumably if Pope had accepted Heinsius' theory, that Horace was here

striving to appear completely ingenuous, and using the argument from nature for that end, he would indeed have felt the need to discard Horace's structure. Instead he emphasizes it.

He begins the verse paragraph on his own use of satire in self-defense, "Satire's my weapon . . ." (69), thereby setting up a verbal parallelism with the opening line of the next verse paragraph: "Slander or Poison, dread from Delia's rage . . ." (81). The ostensible parallel between satire, poison, and willful miscarriage of justice is sharpened. The actual contrast, no longer apparently as obvious as it had been, is also strengthened. Maresca has pointed out that the sins of each person mentioned now include the misuse of language. Canidia used only poison, Delia "Slander or Poison," and so with the rest.[62] Thus while Horace shows men who behave like beasts in resorting to violence in "self-defense," Pope shows men who have gone beyond this by also degrading language, men's peculiar gift, to the level of a beast's horns or heels. The quotation from Phocylides and its possible implications we pointed out before (see above, p. 313). Here Pope seems to be developing them. Where language is the agent of reason, as in satire, it is more powerful than any other weapon and therefore sufficient by itself; but Delia, Page, et al. have no access to that properly human weapon, reason; for them language is only a blunt instrument, to be supplemented by poison or the pox.

Horace makes the seriousness that underlies his irony obvious, as Jonson saw so clearly by following his description of Scaeva the parricide with his own solemnly expressed resolution to continue to write. In fact, in this instance, Horace's seriousness is more obvious than Pope's:

Ne longum faciam; seu me tranquilla senectus
Expectat, seu mors atris circumvolat alis;
Dives inops, Romae seu sors ita jusserit, exul,
Quisquis erit vitae, scribam, color.
(57-60)

Then learned Sir! (to cut the Matter short)
What-e'er my Fate, or well or ill at Court,
Whether old Age, with faint, but chearful Ray,
Attends to gild the Evening of my Day,
Or Death's black Wing already be display'd
To wrap me in the Universal Shade;
Whether the darken'd Room to muse invite,
Or whiten'd Wall provoke the Skew'r to write,
In Durance, Exile, Bedlam, or the Mint,
Like Lee or Budgell, I will Rhyme and Print.
(91-100)

Pope is reserving his fire, and, as though to make the coming blast more impressive, is here more "Horatian" than Horace in his gentle self-mockery. He will write on a whitewashed wall with a skewer if no other medium is available, and in his compulsion to rhyme and print he compares himself to Budgell, the hack, and Lee, who couldn't stop writing in Bedlam (TE IV 568). Of course he is equally Horatian in his assumption that his readers understand the true nature of his compulsion to write. But he keeps the tone light, not only here but in his version of Trebatius' warning.

Jonson and the early commentators had seen Trebatius' warning as serious--serious enough to justify the rather high tone Horace takes in describing his precedent, Lucilius. Pope seems here to prefer to see the threat of a short life as mock-heroic.

TREB. O puer, ut sis
Vitalis, metuo; & majorum ne quis amicus
Frigore te feriat.
(60-62)

F. Alas young Man! your Days can ne'r be long,
In Flow'r of Age you perish for a Song!
Plums, and Directors, Shylock and his Wife,
Will club their Testers, now, to take your Life! (101-104)

We may see a failure of tone in having this ludicrous warning from Fortescue bring out Pope's ringing affirmation of his satiric mission, but Pope seems to be aiming for maximum contrast, rather than consistency of tone. The meanness of his enemies is the perfect foil to his generous indignation.

HOR. Quid? cum est Lucilius ausus
Primus in hunc operis componere carmina morem,
Detrahere & pellem, nitidus qua quisque per ora
Cederet, introrsum turpis; num Laelius, & qui
Duxit ab oppressa meritum Carthagine nomen,
Ingenio offensi? aut laeso doluere Metello,
Famosisque Lupo cooperto versibus? Atqui
Primores populi arripuit, populumque tributim;
Scilicet UNI AEQUUS VIRTUTI ATQUAE EJUS AMICIS.

Quin ubi se a Vulgo & Scena, in Secreta remorant
Virtus Scipiadea, & mitis Sapientia Laeli;
Nugari cum illo, & discincti ludere, donec
Decoqueretur olus, soliti.
--Quicquid sum ego, quamvis
Infra Lucili censum ingeniumque, tamen me
Cum magnis vixisse invita fatebitur usque
Invidia, & fragili quaerens illidere dentem,
Offendet solido:--

(62-78)

P. What? arm'd for Virtue when I point the Pen,
Brand the bold Front of shameless, guilty Men,
Dash the proud Gamester in his gilded Car,
Bare the mean Heart that lurks beneath a Star;
Can there be wanting to defend Her Cause,
Lights of the Church, or Guardians of the Laws?
Could Pension'd Boileau lash in honest Strain
Flatt'rers and Bigots ev'n in Louis' Reign?
Could Laureate Dryden Pimp and Fry'r engage,
Yet neither Charles nor James be in a Rage?
And I not strip the Gilding off a Knave,
Un-plac'd un-pension'd, no Man's Heir, or Slave?
I will, or perish in the gen'rous Cause.
Hear this, and tremble! you, who 'scape the Laws.
Yes, while I live, no rich or noble knave
Shall walk the World, in credit, to his grave.
TO VIRTUE ONLY and HER FRIENDS, A FRIEND,
The World beside may murmur, or commend.
Know, all the distant Din that World can keep
Rolls o'er my Grotto, and but sooths my Sleep.
There, my Retreat the best Companions grace,
Chiefs, out of War, and Statesmen, out of Place.

There St. John mingles with my friendly Bowl,
The Feast of Reason, and the Flow of Soul:
And He, whose Lightning pierc'd th' Iberian Lines,
Now, forms my Quincunx, and now ranks my Vines,
Or tames the Genius of the stubborn Plain,
Almost as quickly, as he conquer'd Spain.

Envy must own, I live among the Great,
No Pimp of Pleasure, and no Spy of State,
With Eyes that pry not, Tongue that ne'er repeats,
Fond to spread Friendships, but to cover Heats,
To help who want, to forward who excel;
This, all who know me, know; who love me, tell;
And who unknown defame me, let them be
Scriblers or Peers, alike are Mob to me.
(105-140)

Hunter has argued that the reason Pope shifts the attention from his satiric precedents to himself in these lines is that he "wishes to define the satirist as an individual engaged in a personal moral struggle . . . ." "The serious use of past example to justify present satiric practice has in fact disappeared" (p. 600). Nothing could be further from the truth. Pope was to tell Swift that his only reason for imitating this satire was "about a score of lines towards the latter end, which you will find out" (Corr. III.348). Hunter misunderstands and tries to find the right number of lines in Pope's version, which is difficult, since it contains thirty-five lines. Pope is referring to the passage from Horace, which falls a little short of a score. He chose the poem for these lines--that is, just because he found here the precedent he wanted for what he had to say. At the same time it is perfectly clear that it is in his version of these lines that he most goes beyond all precedent. In fact these lines express in concentrated form Pope's version of the paradox we found in Jonson and Heinsius, when they relied on Horace as an authority to free men from authority. Here Pope is thoroughly and firmly situating himself in the Horatian satiric

tradition, as the basis which can allow him to do more than any satirist has before.

Maresca has discussed thoroughly the extent of Pope's appeal to tradition: briefly, Pope not only appeals tacitly to Horace and Lucilius as examples, by their presence on the opposite page, and explicitly to Dryden and Boileau, whom he names, but he also actually follows to a certain extent Juvenal and Persius (as translated by Dryden) in those passages in which they appeal to the example of their predecessors. Thus Pope's opening lines echo Dryden's translation of Juvenal:

> But when Lucilius brandishes his Pen,
> And flashes in the face of Guilty Men . . .
> (Kinsley II. 677; S 1. 251-254)

The general structure of Pope's passage seems based on these lines of Persius:

> Yet old Lucilius never fear'd the times;
> But lash'd the City and dissected Crimes.
> Mutius and Lupus both by name he brought;
> He mouthed 'em and betwixt his grinders caught.
> . . . .
> Cou'd he do this, and is my Muse controll'd
> By Servile Awe? Born free, and not be bold?
> (Kinsley II. 748-749; S 1. 114-119)[63]

None of Pope's models, however, had ever described himself as boldly as Pope does, none had ever centered his apologetic passage so squarely on himself. Where others had appealed to their predecessors, Pope, even while he follows them, appeals above all to himself. It is as though he is saying, yes, I am doing what all virtuous satirists have always done, but I am taking it further than any of them. For all his predecessors had been in positions that in some way limited their satire. Horace, "pension'd Boileau," and "Laureate Dryden" were obviously to

some extent unfree. Persius was supposed to be doing his best to conceal his identity in the satire from which the above passage comes, out of fear of Nero, whom he was supposed to be covertly attacking (Kinsley II. 741). As for Juvenal, in the same verse paragraph in which he describes Lucilius, he announces his intention to avoid the dangers of speaking freely by attacking only the dead--Dryden paraphrases his intention as being to attack the living under the guise of attacking the dead (S 1. 168-171; Kinsley II. 677).

All these men had been drive to satire by "suffering vertue,/ Oppressed by the licence of the times" (see above, p. 321), but none had been as free as Pope "un-placed, un-pension'd, no Man's Heir or Slave" (116), to attack wherever there was need. It had always been the function of the satirist to punish those the law left unpunished, but none had been in a position to do this as completely as Pope:

> Yes, while I live, no rich or noble Knave
> Shall walk the World, in credit, to his grave.
> (119-120)

At the same time, Pope so defines his position that it remains Horatian. As I pointed out in the discussion of why Pope had no desire to play Horace to an Augustus, his motives in rejecting that role and in accepting Bolingbroke's ideas were quite Horatian. It was at Bolingbroke's suggestion that he wrote this first Imitation of Horace (see footnote 51), and in it for the first time he directed his satire only at the Court and Walpole's adherents, so effectively that the Court became cool towards him. In short, he is not simply declaring his independence and contrasting himself with Horace. He is defining his role in Horatian terms, because with his adherence to the Opposition he can see himself as still functioning in some sense within society.[64] As

poet of the Opposition, he is at once independent, in retirement, and living "among the Great."

Pope is in a unique role: there had never before been an organized Opposition in England. Yet he prefers to describe that role in traditional terms, in Horatian terms. If we look back at the brief discussion of Horace's Epistles in the introductory section of this dissertation, we will see that the essentials of Pope's description of the way he lives "among the Great" are true of Horace also: "Fond to spread Friendships, but to cover Heats,/ To help who want, to forward who excel . . .(136-137, see above, Intro. p. 14). Pope seems to recognize the basic link between himself and Horace by underlining "Offendet solido" (77), which we know was traditionally taken as referring to Horace's integrity (see above, p. 313). It stands out in Pope's text, not only underlined but with a line to itself, suggesting that it is equivalent to Pope's line, "This is my Plea, and on this I rest my Cause--" (141). Both Horace and Pope affirm the possibility of living sanely and with integrity within society, and for both their own lives have won them the right to satirize with authority; they now turn back to their respective legal experts, with ironic deference (see above, p. 307).

--Nisi quid tu, docte Trebati,
Dissentis.
TREB. Equidem nihil hinc diffindere possum.
Sed tamen ut monitus caveas, ne forte negoti
Incutiat tibi quid sanctarum inscitia legum.
"Si Mala condiderit in quem quis carmina jus est
Juciciumque."

HOR. Esto, siquis mala; sed bona siquis
Judice condiderit laudatur CAESARE: siquis
Opprobriis dignum laceraverit, integer ipse,
Solventur risu tabulae; tu missus abibis.
(79-86)

What saith my Council learned in the Laws?
  F. Your Plea is good. But still I say, beware!
Laws are explain'd by Men--so have a care.
It stands on record, that in Richard's Times
A Man was hang'd for very honest Rhymes.
Consult the Statute: quart. I think it is,
Edwardi Sext. or Prim. & quint. Eliz:
See Libels, Satires--here you have it--read.
  P. Libels and Satires! lawless Things indeed!
But grave Epistles, bringing Vice to light,
Such as a King might read, a Bishop write,
Such as Sir Robert would approve--
                                F. Indeed?
The case is alter'd--you may then proceed.
In such a Cause the Plaintiff will be hiss'd,
My Lords the Judges laugh, and you're dismiss'd.
(142-156)

Here the crucial difference between the two societies comes into play again. Pope may stand in an Horatian relationship to Bolingbroke and the Opposition, desiring to work with them for the moral regeneration of his society, but Bolingbroke has no real power. Pope must still reckon with his Augustus; the relationship between the original and Pope's text becomes complex and full of irony. In the first place, both Trebatius and Fortescue recognize the strength of their "client's" case; but whereas Trebatius is still concerned that Horace may transgress the letter of the law, and must be convinced that true justice will prevail because Caesar and the judges will recognize the right of the man of integrity to attack the knave, Fortescue is not much worried about the letter of the law but about the kind of men who interpret it, who will apparently be quite willing, as "in Richard's Times," to hang anyone whose "honest Rhymes" seem to them a political threat.[66]

The knaves are in power, and there is clearly no point in Pope's giving a translation of "si quis/ . . . integer ipse?" The only way he can win the approval of his Augustus--or what is more important, of Walpole, the real ruler[67]--is by completely misrepresenting his own

poetry, by contradicting everything he has just said about the threat he represents to the "rich or noble knave." In short, by representing himself as another Edward Young, who attacked "Vice" in satires dedicated to, among others, Doddington (so brilliantly satirized by Pope as Bubo in the "Epistle to Arbuthnot"), and Walpole himself, in a satire also charged with fulsome praise of "George! who in foes can soft affections raise/ And charm envenom'd satire into praise."[68] It is this kind of satire, where no inconvenient names are named, where flattery overwhelms truth, that Pope has to pretend to write in order to convince Fortescue that he can write safely.[69]

Pope does not render into English "siquis/ Opprobriis dignum laceraverit, integer ipse . . . ." All through his Imitation he has been concerned to show that this is the heart of his defense of his satire, but in the end he must recognize that it will carry no weight with the powers that be. He shares with Horace the conviction that integrity is the heart of the matter, but the rulers of his society are no longer willing to grant it. This sums up both the extent to which Pope was indeed the English Horace, in the same basic sense that Jonson had been, and the extent to which he had to go beyond Horace to make his stance effective.

Still, for five years Pope was able to speak as the Horace of the Opposition, in the faith that it represented the true moral center of the Kingdom, and contained the promise that the moral center and political power could once again coincide. He made himself the guarantee of the possibility of a decent, sane existence in the context of the good society that the Opposition represented, thus giving his words unique authority and at the same time making his whole way of life an argument

for the Opposition. Such was the Horatian role he assumed in the "slight thing, the work of two days" (<u>Corr</u>. III. 353), and it gave him fully what he needed: a kind of poetry that allowed him to have a direct immediate impact on his society of a kind that at once was based on and proved the fact that he was a good man (see above, p. 292).

In the end, he found his position no longer tenable. As he gradually lost faith in the Opposition, he found himself forced into a role that could no longer be called Horatian. Jonson had written:

> I, therefore, who profess my selfe in love
> With every vertue, wheresoere it move,
> And howsoever; as I am at fewd
> With sinne and vice, though with a throne endew'd . . .
> (<u>Forrest</u> XIII.7-10; Chap. III, p. 143)

For Jonson, these words remained theoretical; he never found himself forced into the position of having to choose between virtue and his king and social order. Indeed, this poem was addressed to an aristocrat who embodied the virtues Jonson loved. Pope found himself forced by his love of virtue to a position outside and against his whole society.

Paradoxically, although Pope had turned his back on heroic poetry of the kind Dryden aspired to, at least partly because it could not hope for immortality, in the end he himself assumed the role of hero, writing poetry that was heroic because it told the truth, not because it soared above reality (see above, Chap. IV, p. 187) and he dared finally to promise himself immortality:

> Truth guards the Poet, sanctifies the line,
> And makes Immortal, Verse as mean as mine.
> Yes, the last Pen for Freedom let me draw,
> When Truth stands trembling on the edge of Law;
> Here, Last of Britons! let your Names be read;
> Are none, none living? let me praise the Dead,
> And for that Cause which made your Fathers shine,

Fall, by the Votes of their degen'rate Line!
(Epilogue to the Satires, Dialogue II, 246-253)

To such a height could the "mean verse" of the Horatian _sermo_ rise, when the English Horace saw himself utterly alone, cut off from his society at last.[70] Even the final (and characteristically Horatian) touch of deflation in the words of the Friend do not really undercut the satirist's dignity:

Alas! alas! pray end what you began,
And write next winter more _Essays on Man_.
(254-255)

Pope could never return to writing _Essays on Man_; the Horatian role into which he had stepped, apparently so casually, had carried him far beyond their balanced attempt to justify the world as it exists, and in the end beyond Horace himself. His final vision of the decay of his society had to be expressed in epic terms:

Religion blushing veils her sacred fires,
And unawares _Morality_ expires.
Nor _public_ Flame, nor _private_, dares to shine;
Nor _human_ Spark is left, nor Glimpse divine!
Lo! thy dread Empire, CHAOS! is restor'd;
Light dies before thy uncreating word:
Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fall;
And Universal Darkness buries All.
(_Dunciad_ IV. 649-656)

After the light died at the end of the _Dunciad_, no major poet ever again assumed the role of Horace. At the end of my introduction I mentioned one reason why this was so. The financial revolution with which Walpole was associated was something no poet could stop, and society's values had to change to accommodate it. The poet with an intense moral concern moved further and further from the center of society, became more and more a peripheral figure, and had to do so if he was to maintain his integrity. It is perhaps this evolution above all that

makes it difficult for moderns to understand Horace; like Dryden, we cannot believe that a poet could stand in the position Horace did without selling his soul. My own feeling is that Jonson and Pope understood Horace in this respect better than we can hope to do; in any case, if we have the humility to try to share their viewpoint, we can understand why to them "English Horace" was the proudest of titles.

FOOTNOTES

1. On the classicism of the late Seventeenth Century and the early Eighteenth Century, cf. Rachel Trickett, The Honest Muse (Oxford, 1967), pp. 140 ff.

2. J. E. Spingarn, Critical Essays of the Seventeenth Century (1899; rpt. Bloomington, 1968), III, 293-295.

3. George Sherburn, The Early Career of Alexander Pope (Oxford, 1934), p. 52.

4. All quotations from Pope are from the Twickenham Edition, General Editor John Butt, vols. 1-10 (London 1939-1967), unless otherwise annotated.

5. The Odes of Horace (Bloomington, 1962), p. 207. See also pp. 194-208, passim.

6. Horace, Odes and Epodes, ed. Paul Shorey and Gordon J. Laing (1910; rpt. Pittsburgh, 1960), p. 332. This text is used for all quotations from the Odes and Epodes.

7. The Correspondence of Alexander Pope, ed. George Sherburn (Oxford, 1956), II, 227. This text is used for all quotations from Pope's correspondence.

8. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans. C. R. Haines (Loeb. London, 1916), pp. 19-20.

9. I refer to the first edition, "Imprinted at London by Will Stansby," 1616. For all the prefatory material there is no pagination.

10. For the layout and the commendatory poems, I consult the first edition, London, 1717.

11. In the 1736 edition of his Works (Lintot, vol. I), Pope discarded this poem; one assumes that by that time he felt it no longer accurately described his poetry.

12. Isaac Krammick (Bolingbroke and His Circle, Cambridge, Mass., 1968) influences me heavily here, although I think he puts too much stress on Pope's commitment to the traditional hierarchy and his fear that the "money men" will disturb it, not enough on the moral basis of Pope's political attitudes. See esp. pp. 217-223. Nor does he realize the extent to which Bolingbroke and Pope are rejecting traditional Tory principles. On this I follow Archibald Foord, His Majesty's Opposition, 1714-1830 (Oxford, 1964).

13. Foord, p. 141.

14. Foord, p. 140.

15. Thomas E. Maresca, *Pope's Horatian Poems* (Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. 50.

16. Foord, p. 117.

17. Robert Scott Dupree, "Boileau and Pope: The Horatian Perspective in France and England," Diss. Yale 1966, p. 132.

18. As he said to Swift in 1739, "I keep my old Walk, and deviate from it to no Court" (*Corr.* IV. 178).

19. Isabel Rivers, in her chapter on Pope in *The Poetry of Conservatism 1600-1745* (Cambridge, Eng., 1973), sees Pope's lack of enthusiasm for a Patriot King (pp. 204-205), but exaggerates the extent to which this distinguishes him from Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke too had only turned to the Prince of Wales in despair that change could be achieved by any other means (Krammick, p. 33-34).

20. G. K. Hunter, "The Romanticism of Pope's Horace," *Essays in Criticism*, 10 (1960), rpt. in *Essential Articles for the study of Alexander Pope*, ed. Maynard Mack (Hamden, Conn., 1968), p. 591.

21. "Sermo or Satire: Pope's Definition of His Art," in *Studies in Criticism and Aesthetics, 1660-1800: Essays in Honor of Samuel Holt Monk*, ed. Howard Anderson and John S. Shea (Minneapolis, 1967), pp. 152-154.

22. See note, TE IV.299, and Maynard Mack, *The Garden and the City: Retirement and Politics in the Later Poetry of Pope, 1731-1743* (Toronto, 1969), p. 131.

23. Lady Mary Wortley Montague, *Poetical Works*, (London, 1781), p. 66.

24. Hunter, "Romanticism of Pope's Horace," p. 591.

25. Hunter, p. 592.

26. Pope's Horatian Poems, pp. 13-14, Chap. II *passim*.

27. Lucius Rogers Shero, "The Satirist's *Apologia*," *University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature* #15 Classical Studies Series II, 148-167.

28. *The Satires of Horace* (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 128-129.

29. Hunter, p. 579.

30. Rudd, p. 125.

31. Loc cit.

32. 1519 edition of Ascensius used for scholiasts.

33. Rudd, p. 128.

34. Rudd, p. 127.

35. Hunter, pp. 595-596.

36. Rudd, p. 127.

37. <u>docte</u> <u>T</u>. aut agit hic Horat. εἰρωνεία Socraticum, ut mihi quidem videtur, aut modestiam ostendit non nimium iudicio suo tribudeno, ut vult Woulardus. verum enim vero, si nolimus Horatium in hac Satyra clanculum mordicare Trebatium, cur hic eum percontatur insidiose de sua sententia in hoc scribendi genera, quando & ipsemet supra profiteatur, nullo se mali metu ab eo posse, & non sit nescius, vel se teste, nihil esse Trebatio odiosus?

    Either Horace is here using Socratic irony, as I think, or he is showing modesty in not attributing too much to his own judgment, as Woulardus likes to see it. Nevertheless certainly, if we will not have it that Horace in this Satyr is secretly nipping at Trebatius, why does he question him insidiously about his opinion of this genre of writing when both he himself has professed above that he could not from it from any fear of evil, and also he is not unaware, as he himself actually bears witness, that nothing was more hateful to Trebatius?

38. concedit Horatius eum legibus & gravi supplicis esse obnoxium, qui malis, hoc est maledicis versibus, innocentis & boni nomen famamque proscindit, sed non existimat perinde eum in legem peccare, qui bona, id est, non maledica carmina conscribit, sed ea quae laudata a Caesare iudice, lacerationibus & conviciis, malos impudos, & sceleratos omnium oculis & auribus quasi in tabula delineatos, publiceve decantatos exhibeant. Namque huiuscemodi carpendi vitia studium neque legibus inhibitum est neque bonis moribus adversarium. . . . [many see a pun here] . . . verum non video cur magnopere in eo sit laborandum, cum nec bona carmina hic esse ea opinor, quae ornata diligenter & exculta sunt, sed ea quae faciunt vitiis castigandis quarum sequens versus est epexigesis, hoc modo, bona carmina sunt quae ab integro & viro conscripta bono, allatrant, & suis coloribus depingunt eum qui opprobriis dignus est.

    Horace concedes that he is liable to the laws and to heavy punishments who with bad, that is, slanderous (scurrilous, abusive) verses defames the name and fame of an innocent and good man, but he does not think that he offends against the law in like manner who writes good, that is, not slanderous poems, but those which, praised by Caesar as judge, with violent attacks and reproaches exhibit evil, shameless and rascally men to the eyes and ears of all delineated

in a picture, or publicly sung. For zeal for this kind of railing at vices is neither prohibited by the laws nor contrary to good mores. /Many think Horace is making a pun./ Nevertheless I do not see why it should be greatly labored over, since I do not think these are here good poems which are diligently ornamented and cultivated, but those which do that for the castigating of vice of which the following verse is an epexigesis, in this way: those are good songs which, written by an honest and good man, bark at, and paint in his true colors him who is worthy of reproach.

39. Existimo commorationem huius parricidi hic adeo adhiberi, ut Poeta demonstret eum plane omnem humanitatem exuisse, qui non commoveatur tam impii sceleris immanitate: & quum audit filium parricidio inquinatum, manum non admoveat ad inurendam infamiae notam auctori tantae impietatis: qua in re nemo unquam videbitur cuiquam nimis acer & acerbus Satyricus. Hoc videtur confirmare superiore Plutarchi comparatione de signo amoris Horatiani in philosophiam.

    I think that this parricide is dwelt on here to such an extent, that the Poet may show that he has clearly put off all humanity, who is not upset by the savagery of such an impious rascal: and when he hears of a son polluted by parricide, does not engage in branding with the mark of infamy the author of such impiety: in which matter no one could ever seem to anyone too sharp and harsh a satirist. This seems to confirm the comparison with Plutarch above about the indication of the love Horace has for philosophy.

40. Lilian Bloom, "Pope as Textual Critic," JEGP, 67 (1948), 150-151.

41. Maresca, pp. 19-20.

42. De Satyra, in Vol. II of Operae Horatii (Amsterdam, 1629), pp. 144-147, 162, 169.

43. Heinsius says, "Est enem aequitas, aliud a lege scripta, ius, teste Aristotle," and goes on to give Aristotles' description of equity from the Rhetoric, almost verbatim (p. 146). I refer to the Loeb edition, Aristotle, The "Art" of Rhetoric, ed. and trans. John Henry Freese (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), pp. 145, 147.

44. Quinti Horatii Flacci Opera, Ludovicus Desprez (London, 1694).

45. Quinti Horatii Flacci Opera, ed. Richard Bentley (London, 1711), pp. 275-276.

46. Q. Horatii Flacci Poemata, ed. Alexander Cunningham (London, 1721), p. 194. Lilian Bloom has pointed out that Pope does adopt some of Bentley's readings, when they are supported by Cunningham ("Pope as Textual Critic," p. 153).

47. Les Poésies d'Horace, disposées suivant l'ordre cronologique . . .

Par le R. P. Sanadon (Paris, 1728), 2 vols. All references to second volume.

48. The Odes, Epodes, and Carmen Seculare of Horace, ed. and trans. by the Reverend Mr. Philip Francis (London, 1743), 2 vols. The two following page references are to the first volume. A glance at the Union Catalogue makes the popularity of this edition clear. Aside from many reprints, there were ten editions before 1800.

49. For the third volume, The Satires, from which this quotation comes (pp. 128-129), I have used the 1749 edition.

50. "The Romanticism of Pope's Horace," p. 598.

51. He and Bolingbroke both told Spence the story of how he came to imitate the poem, at Bolingbroke's suggestion, in a way that suggests the utmost casualness. Joseph Spence, Observations, Anecdotes and Characters of Books and Men, ed. James M. Osborn (Oxford, 1966), I, 143.

52. Hunter, p. 594.

53. Text for Juvenal and Persius: Juvenal and Persius with an Eng. trans. by G. G. Ramsay (Cambridge, Mass. 1918, revised 1940).

54. Poems of John Dryden, ed. James Kinsley (Oxford, 1958), II, 673, ll. 78-79.

55. Hunter, p. 591.

56. Maresca, p. 40.

57. Maresca, pp. 60-62.

58. Ramsay, p. 374.

59. Reuben A. Brower, Alexander Pope: The Poetry of Allusion (Oxford, 1959), p. 289.

60. Mack, The Garden and the City, pp. 133, 178.

61. Hunter, pp. 595-597.

62. Maresca, p. 45.

63. Maresca, pp. 49-51.

64. Thomas Edwards, This Dark Estate: A Reading of Pope (Berkley, 1963), pp. 81-83. Rivers rejects this interpretation; she believes that at this stage of his career Pope followed Horace in his retirement and concern with his own soul, but not in his public role (212-213). As she says in a footnote, she completed her work on Pope before

The Garden and the City was published (p. 246). The evidence that that work offers that Pope was conscious of being in some sense the poetic spokesman of the Opposition, and of offering himself as a model, seems to me decisive, although a thorough discussion of it is beyond the scope of this chapter. See esp. Mack's Chap. 6.

65. Maresca, pp. 55, 70.

66. Mack, p. 140, on Richard as allusion to George II.

67. Mack, p. 185, n. 7.

68. Edward Young, The Complete Works, Poetry and Prose, ed. James Nichols (1854; rpt. Hildesheim, 1968), p. 408. Love of Fame, Sat. 7. 209-210.

69. Maresca's interpretation of this passage is a perfect example of the kind of excess his insistence on the Christianity of the poem leads to. He sees Fortescue as here accepting "the ideal world where God's creation and man's action are equally rational and concordant," the world which has been affirmed by Pope's whole poem. That world of course stands in ironic contrast to the actuality, but still, Fortescue is drawn into it (p. 66).

70. Feder, "Sermo or Satire," p. 155.

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