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HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY AND THE FALL OF TROY

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HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY AND THE FALL OF TROY

by

DIANE PAIGE THOMPSON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Comparative Literature in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
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My deepest gratitude to Professor Helaine Newstead
a wise and patient guide to the complexities
of the past

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Introduction

The purpose of this study is to use a related body of literary materials in order to examine changing human attitudes toward responsibility and causality over a very long period of time. Troy, the paragon of civilization, fell, and men tried to explain why for three thousand years. Did Troy fall because men behaved badly, or because the gods willed it, or because of intermediate causal forces, such as fate, destiny, or fortune? Or did Troy fall because of some mysterious interaction among these various forces?

We will examine Homer's Iliad, Virgil's Aeneid, the anonymous twelfth-century French Eneas, the Roman de Troie by Benoit de Sainte-Maure, the Historia Destructionis Troiae by Guido de Columnis, Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, Caxton's The Recuyell of the Historyes of Troye, and Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida. These works are all important examples of the Troy story as it changed and developed over a very long period of time, and each one of them offers a unique and thoughtful treatment of the problems of freedom and determinism, human responsibility and the will of the gods.

Each one of these versions of the story of Troy makes an attempt to answer the question: why did Troy fall? These answers, even though most conclude with real confusion at the ways of the world, provide insight into human attitudes about the nature of man in relation to the nature of the world, all developed a very long time ago. They offer us a kind

of complexity and lack of dogmatic "answers" that provide refreshing contrasts to the more formal philosophical works of any given period, since the fall of Troy is not a thesis on causality and responsibility, but a fictional laboratory for testing how men actually encountered those forces which destroyed them, as well as how men experienced their own human freedom.

The central issue is always human freedom in relation to those external forces which may control events. Only if men are free to act upon their own free choices can we consider them responsible for the events that develop from their actions. The tensions between freedom and determinism, man's will and the forces of causality around him, provide the polarities for explanations of the fall of Troy from Homer through Chaucer. There are no simple answers; from ancient Greece until the late Middle Ages in Europe authors struggle with the paradoxical relationships between the will of man and the wills of the gods, the ways of the fates and Fortune, and the purposes of Destiny. Only in the Renaissance will we find versions that offer no external causal pole to counter the will of man. This produces the most despairing of all world-views, that of Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida, where the final cause of all action is the mere unbridled appetite of men and women.

Each of the Troy stories included in this study develops very complex interactions between human freedom and external causation. Consequently, I will utilize a technique of analysis that is intrinsic to each work. Instead of approaching all of the stories with a pre-conceived set of questions to be answered, I will attempt to recover from each work its unique vision of human responsibility and the divine

or cosmic controls that were involved in the fall of Troy.

Troy was central to the Homeric epic cycle; it was at the heart of Rome's ancient history, as the source of the Roman people, and thus became the starting point for Virgil's Aeneid. In the Christian Middle Ages, Troy's fall became extremely important for two reasons: it was a secular fall, and thus could be analyzed and questioned as the Fall of Adam and Eve could not be; and Troy was considered the source of the ancestors of several nations, including Italy, France and England.

The works we will study approach the story of the fall of Troy from a variety of points of view: some focus on the fall itself; some look to the founding of the kingdom of Italy that was to follow; some deal with events in Troy before the fall, such as the love of Troilus and Cressida; some place Troy into a much larger historical perspective as only one event among the many of ancient history. But all encounter and struggle with the problems of fate and free will, the acts of the gods and the choices of men. We will examine this common intersection of concerns about human responsibility and the fall of Troy as we consider each work.

Chapter I examines the relationship between men's free acts and the lack of human freedom once the gods become involved in the actions of the Iliad. In the events which precede the wrath men are relatively free to act as they please. But once Zeus becomes involved with his plan, there is no scope for human freedom until the wrath has been completed according to the plan of Zeus. We will especially look at the roles of Patroclus and Hector as victims, lacking freedom.

Chapter II deals with the dilemma of human responsibility in

relation to a future fixed by Destiny in the Aeneid. In such a determined universe, virtue means willing to do what you must do, and the area of human freedom is reduced to that of good intentions. However, those who do wrong are under the control of gods, as are those who do right, leaving no real room for blaming men for what they do.

Both the Iliad and the Aeneid present worlds in which the main actions of the conflict are manipulated by the intervention of gods into the affairs of men. The plan of Zeus is finite, while the plan of Destiny seems infinite, yet they both are plans; the events which develop do so because of a plan which can ultimately be referred to as the reason why Troy fell, the reason why men suffered and died, whether or not the wills and actions of men were involved.

In Chapters III-VI we will look at versions of the Troy story that were composed within the perspectives of the Christian Middle Ages. They all share a common problem, that of adapting a story whose patterns of causation are based on the wills of pagan gods to a world which cannot accept the reality and power of those pagan gods. They must therefore provide new techniques of describing why events occurred, based on Christian free will, not on the will of the pagan gods. The Eneas, the Troie, the Historia, and Troilus and Criseyde all struggle with the conflicts inherent in adapting a story based on causality and control by the pagan gods into a context of free will and human responsibility for whatever disasters occur.

Chapter III examines the means by which the Eneas-poet has restructured the Aeneid into a story based on free will and human responsibility, instead of Destiny and the manipulations of the pagan

gods. Although the Eneas-poet almost entirely discards the pagan gods, he does incorporate one new causal force--Amors--which we will look at in some detail.

Chapter IV deals with the Roman de Troie, which closely analyzes the behavior of men to show how they act incorrectly, according to medieval principles of free will. However, the narrator then proceeds to excuse this behavior by referring to the malice of Fortune, who causes men to make mistakes so that they are destroyed. Benoit's Fortune is a flat, undeveloped figure in the middle range of causality; not a pagan god, acting upon personal desires, she is not yet a natural process either. She is little more than a term to personify the random, yet hostile processes of the universe, which act to destroy human beings.

While Amors, in the Eneas, is a figure of law and grace, Amors in the Troie is a deadly creature who utterly destroys the personality of Achillès and reduces him to a mindless, senseless creature who rushes to his own death. We will examine this form of love-determinism and notice how little the conflicts between free will and determinism seem to disturb Benoit.

In Chapter V we will study the Historia Destructionis Troiae, a Latin prose reworking of the Roman de Troie, which became the major source for future versions of the Troy story until the Renaissance. Guido is far more conscious of the conflicts between human free will and external sources of causation than was Benoit, and puts in valiant speeches about how human beings are responsible for what they do and how they have free will. However, Guido introduces still another source

of external causation to replace that of the now absent pagan gods-- the malice of the fates. We will consider the impact of the new influx of Greco-Arab scientific thinking which was available in Sicily, Guido's home, at the time that he wrote the Historia. This redone Aristotelianism, combined with astronomy, astrology and other forms of arcane science and philosophy, presented forms of determinism in the physical universe that were anathema to the Christian Church, but were sufficiently undigested in Guido's day so that they could still coexist side by side with Christian free will. Whereas Benoit's Fortune was a force representing disaster as produced by random malice, Guido's fates represent disaster as produced by purposive, destinal and intensely hostile forces which control the affairs of states, if not of individual human lives.

Chapter VI analyzes Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, especially as it presents a dramatized dialogue between Pandarus representing Fortune as random occurrence and hence opportunity, and Troilus representing Fortune as fixed, personal fate. We will consider Criseyde's role as Fortune itself, or the principle of change, and we will especially focus upon the problem of free will as expressed in this poem by the process of learning which the Narrator experiences as he learns to freely reject his love religion for true security in the Christian religion. Chaucer's poem takes all of the threads of causation experimented with in the other medieval versions of the Troy story that we have considered, and plays them out to their final solution in Christian turning away from a world in which men cannot finally control their affairs by good behavior because the world itself is so very unstable and unreliable,

along with all the things and people in it.

Chapter VII deals with two very different, yet related Renaissance versions of the fall of Troy, Caxton's Recuyell and Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida. What they share in common is a total secularization of the world of Troy. Neither replaces the lost causation of the pagan gods by new sources of exterior causation, such as Fortune or the fates or Amors. The Recuyell is content to rely upon the free will and choices of men to explain both human misery and human happiness. It does present a superhero, Hercules, as able to create order in the world and destroy all tyrants, including the ruler of Troy, Laomedon, but although Hercules is a link between the men and the gods, he is no god, he is mortal, and he dies. Whatever happens in the Recuyell happens because of the behavior of men.

Troilus and Cressida carries the secularization of the Trojan world to its ultimate crisis--there are no longer any causes for events that can be called responsible, although they are all utterly free. Men in Troilus are free to do as they please; no gods or fatal forces or heroes compel them or chastise their behavior. And they do just as they please; that is, their actions are controlled by their desires or appetites, and the result is chaos.

Because men's choices are the only source for causation in Troilus, the problem of value is critical to the play, and we will consider it at some length. In order to choose one action or another, one must value it more than the alternative choices available. But in the world of Troilus there is no final means of determining whether one action is more desirable than another because values are relative to the person

perceiving them. The gods are quite gone, the forces of random or destinal causation are gone, the heroes are gone, and only men, with their appetites for what they value, are left to cause the fall of Troy.

Human Anger and Sacred Equilibrium

The Iliad¹ is able to develop the role of human causative responsibility for the disasters of war with less ambiguity than most later versions of the Trojan War because its gods need not yet be good. Homer does not have to struggle with a disparity between some ideal divine order that ought to protect human beings and the terrible realities of war. As a consequence, the potential for human responsibility is greater in the Iliad than it will be in most later Trojan stories until the Renaissance, while at the same time the role of the gods controlling men is at its maximum. It is precisely because the gods do not protect the lives of men with any long term good will, or destiny, that men are free. And if they abuse this freedom by losing self-control and offending those connected with deity, they can draw the entire power of the gods down into human affairs like a plague, for no reason except as a response to the behavior of men.

Men in the Iliad are free, but they are never alone. The gods are always present as a potential for disaster if the relationships with them are not handled with exact propriety. If human excesses damage the relationship of men to the gods, then men are no longer free; they fall

¹ Homer, The Iliad, trans. A. T. Murray, 2 Vols., Loeb Classical Library (1925; rpt. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967). Cited hereafter as Iliad. All references will be to the line numbers of the Greek text, although only the corresponding English translations will be quoted.

under the control of the wrath of the gods until rituals of sacrifice and purification restore the proper balance between men and gods. This is the dominant pattern of causation in the Iliad--human action, divine reaction, human sacrifice, divine withdrawal, and finally, peace.

The Iliad describes a crisis in the relationships between men and the gods which is initiated by the wrath of Achilles and resolved, after many deaths, by the sacrificial deaths and funerals of Patroclus and Hector. It is a sacred crisis because the gods are actively involved, and it is a major crisis because Zeus takes direct charge of the events with his plan.²

Our purpose will be to consider the crucial role of human behavior in precipitating the involvement of the gods, thus creating a kind of imbalance in the cosmos, involving both men and gods. We will then examine the means by which this imbalance is rectified--sacrificial death.³

² This study assumes that the Iliad is both serious and religious in nature, contrary to opinions such as that of Martin P. Nilsson that "Religion in the proper sense was not strong in Homer . . ." (A History of Greek Religion, trans. F. J. Fielden, 2nd ed. /1925; rev. ed. 1952; rpt. New York: The Norton Library, 1964/, p. 172). As Walter F. Otto points out, "The properties which we miss in ancient Greek religion are the specific attributes of Christianity and kindred religions which derive from Asia" (The Homeric Gods, trans. Moses Hadas /1954; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, 1978/, p. 4). Assuming that the Iliad is authentically religious, we will consider some of the ways in which its religion operates to cause events.

³ This is not a study based on anthropological material. We will only consider the manner in which sacrifice operates as a structural pattern for the poem itself. Credit should be given here to the stimulating effects which René Girard's Violence and the Sacred (1972, trans. Patrick Gregory /Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1977/), had on my reading of the Iliad. His explanation of sacrifice as functioning to absorb violence within a group is illuminating when applied to the Iliad. However, since I am attempting to explore the Iliad from

The Iliad has a beginning and an ending which show men in a "normal" state of being, before and after the wrath of Achilles has brought about the plan of Zeus. In this normal state men are capable of acting rationally, using experience and wisdom to guide their behavior. However, during the main action of the Iliad, the wrath and the plan of Zeus, men are not living in a normal state, but in a state of sacred crisis. Sacred crisis is that extraordinary state of being when the emotions of men have broken down those barriers which serve to protect men from the gods.⁴ In a sacred crisis, the disorder of human passion spreads outward, intensifying like a plague, infecting the gods themselves and disrupting the normal order of the cosmos. The result is cosmic disorder, perhaps best represented in the Iliad by the battle between the river Xanthus and the god Hephaestus. The passions of the gods themselves are developed and magnified by the emotions of men, producing an interactive intensification of violence that can only be ultimately controlled by the plan of Zeus, which requires the

within, I am also considering the religious nature of sacrifice as pertaining to gods who are real, powerful, and require sacrifice for their own reasons.

⁴ W. C. Greene comments that "This instinctive feeling of a barrier between man and god, this fear that any presumption on the part of man may cause the gods to take offense, lies behind not only the ethical ideas of the Homeric age but the prudential morality of the historic period. Fear of overstepping barriers is the element common to the Homeric Aidos and the sanctity of oaths (horkoi = 'barriers') . . ." (Maira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought /1942; rpt. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968/, p. 20). Otto remarks of Homer that "There is no doubt that all excess was repellent to him, and most of all where it seemed to achieve its greatest miracle: the removal of the bounds between the finite and the infinite, between man and god" (pp. 158-59).

sacrificial deaths of human beings. These deaths, carefully orchestrated by Zeus and the gods, serve to reestablish sacred equilibrium, a condition in which the relationships between men and the gods are normalized, the barriers are restored, and the contacts between men and gods are once again carefully regulated by the prudence and rituals which serve to protect men from the gods.

Men, not gods, initiate the crisis of the Iliad by actions that either give offense to the gods, or by direct petition to the gods, as in the case of Achilles. So, although the gods are far more powerful than human beings, it is the loss of self-control and good sense on the part of human beings that is the first cause of the events of the Iliad. Once the gods are involved, men become helplessly caught up in the inexorable logic of a system of rules that operate as relentlessly as the laws of physics. This system is called the plan of Zeus; it is inexorable; it is deadly; it can only work itself out to reestablish sacred equilibrium by causing many human deaths and by demanding sacrificial victims. It is a balance of powers, rather than a system of morality per se, and the golden scale expresses precisely that aspect of the law of Zeus--balance.⁵ However, it is definitely the actions of

⁵ A. W. H. Adkins expresses a popular view of the Homeric gods in From the Many to the One, Studies in the Humanities, ed. Max Black (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970), p. 33, when he comments that "The gods have much more arete, time and strength than a man; and apart from the fact that they do not die, this is the only important difference between men and gods of which Homer tells us." This is true so far as the personalities of the gods go, but their mode of operation, especially when in relation to Zeus, is governed by the laws and logic of the sacred which are radically different from the laws and logic that govern ordinary human behavior. The reestablishment of balance is performed by the gods upon men.

men that upset that balance in the first place, causing the crisis that is the theme of the Iliad.⁶

Anger is the emotion that disturbs the equilibrium of the universe of the Iliad. Uncontrolled anger destroys orderly social relationships and appears to upset the balance of correct actions necessary to keep the gods away from men. Anger also seems to be infectious, once begun, and can spread to other human beings, and even to the gods themselves. But anger can be controlled. That is perhaps the deepest statement of the Iliad. It can and ought to be controlled, in order to preserve human society, and to protect it from the wrath of the gods.⁷

⁶ There is much debate as to what are the causes of human behavior in the Iliad. Gods as well as daimons can affect, and at times control, what men perceive and do. E. R. Dodds, in The Greeks and the Irrational (1951; rpt. Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1973), p. 13, comments that in Homer, "all departures from normal human behavior whose causes are not immediately perceived, whether by the subject's own consciousness or by the observation of others, are ascribed to a supernatural agency, just as is any departure from the normal behaviour of the weather or the normal behaviour of a bowstring." According to Greene, Homer recognizes two reasons for human behavior that is excessive, or hybris: "the abuse of the human freedom of the will, resulting in a hardened character, which is atasthalie; and . . . the heaven-sent power of evil, which is Ate . . ." (pp. 20-21). Since self-control is praised and rewarded, while excessive behavior precipitates disasters in the Iliad, it is reasonable to suppose that human beings were considered capable of self-control, at least under normal circumstances.

⁷ If restraint and self-control were not deemed possible, the Iliad would be a bitter tale indeed. Helen North comments in Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 6-7: "That the poet of the Iliad was himself keenly sensitive to the need for such restraint, both to avert disaster in the life of the individual and to prevent a society made up of self-assertive heroes from destroying itself, is evident from the content of many individual episodes and from the very pattern of the poem, determined as it is by the sequence of cause and effect, beginning with the hybris of Agamemnon and the unbounded wrath of Achilles, and culminating in the scene where Achilles achieves a kind of tragic self-knowledge in response to Priam's appeal to his aidôs (Il. 24. 503)."

Book I provides several examples of situations involving anger, demonstrating both correct and incorrect means of dealing with it. We are shown the anger of Agamemnon against Chryses, Calchas, and Achilles, all men with closer relationships to the gods than Agamemnon has. This form of anger is especially dangerous because it can so easily involve the gods.⁸ We also see the anger of Chryses against Agamemnon, which produces the plague, the anger of Achilles against Agamemnon, which produces the wrath, and the anger of Hera against Zeus. Each situation provides the persons involved with sufficient information and correct advice about how to deal with their anger, but only Hera, who is a goddess, and perhaps wiser than men, is able to exercise the self-control necessary to avert a crisis.

There is one further distinction about types of anger in the Iliad that is relevant to our inquiry. Anger can be directed outward, against the enemy, as in a war, or it can be directed inward, against one's own social group. These two modes of anger have radically different results: one promotes the order of the world; the other destroys it. The anger of Chryses against Agamemnon is actually constructive. He persuades Apollo to kill men who are already Chryses' enemies, and the result is that he regains his daughter. But the anger of Achilles is purely destructive, since he persuades Zeus, via Thetis, to destroy members of Achilles' own social group and glorify the enemies of that group. purely

⁸ C. M. Bowra, in Heroic Poetry (1952; rpt. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), p. 87, comments that the "gods are regarded not as types of goodness but simply as embodiments of power who govern human affairs. There is nothing wrong in opposing them, but it is extremely dangerous." If there is a wrong in this opposition, it lies not in a sin against the gods, but in the damages the gods may wreak, if angered, upon one's fellow-men.

for personal honor.⁹ The result is that he loses his dearest friend and, soon after the end of the poem's action, will lose his own life.

We will examine the examples of anger in Book I in some detail, since they are the first causes of the events of the Iliad, and then we will consider the sacrificial nature of the deaths of Patroclus and Hector, which are the price of that anger.

At the very opening of the Iliad, a plague is killing many Greeks, and the reason for that plague is Agamemnon's behavior. Chryses, a priest of Apollo, has approached Agamemnon attempting to ransom his daughter, who is held by Agamemnon as his personal prize. Although all of the other Greeks want to honor the priest and return the girl to him, Agamemnon's response is anger. He sends the old man away with cruel threats and insists that he will take the girl back to Greece with him.

The priest is terrified and flees, but as soon as he is safely away he prays to Apollo, who heeds him and attacks the Greeks with the plague. This is a sacred crisis response to the anger of Agamemnon which had been directed against a priest of the god. The deaths of the Greeks are typical of what happens to men during a sacred crisis. Men alone are not able to alleviate the situation once the gods have

⁹ Adkins remarks that "in Homeric society . . . the most powerful terms of denigration are applied quite simply to failure to ensure the safety and well-being of the members of the group of which one is the head. It makes no difference to the evaluation of the situation whether the failure results from cowardice, or from mistake or force majeure: only the result is taken into account" (p. 29). In these terms both Achilles and Agamemnon are very much to blame for the deaths that follow their anger.

become actively involved. However, another god, Hera, takes pity on the Greeks, and she inspires Achilles to call a meeting to investigate the causes of the plague. There is a general awareness that the plague is sacred in nature, and Achilles suggests that they inquire of a seer or priest as to its specific cause.

The seer, Calchas, asks Achilles for protection before he will tell the reason for the anger of Apollo, and Achilles agrees to protect him. Then Calchas says that it is not because of a vow or a sacrifice, but because of the manner in which Agamemnon treated Chryses that Apollo is angry at the Greeks, and only by returning the girl and performing ritual sacrifices will they be able to appease the anger of Apollo and stop the plague.

Agamemnon initiated this sacred crisis of plague by his angry treatment of Chryses. He continues it by his angry treatment of another seer of Apollo, insulting Calchas. Agamemnon is furious, and makes no attempt to control his anger: "and with rage was his black heart wholly filled, and his eyes were like blazing fire" (Iliad I.103-04). Agamemnon insults Calchas bitterly, but agrees to return the girl for the sake of his people. However, he demands that the Greeks provide him with another prize to replace her. This is a critical error for a king who is a war-leader, and whose most essential quality is supposed to be the kind of generosity that makes men want to follow his leadership. Achilles does not attempt to control his emotions any more than did Agamemnon, and rises to the bait, calling Agamemnon: "'thou most covetous of all men'" (Iliad I.122). The struggle is on between the two, and culminates in Agamemnon demanding the girl Briseis, Achilles'

prize, as a substitute for the girl he must return to Chryses. Achilles, furious, is considering killing Agamemnon, when Athene appears only to him, advising (but not compelling) restraint. Hera has sent her to him, since she loves both Achilles and Agamemnon equally.¹⁰ Athene promises that Achilles will receive threefold rewards in the future if he controls himself now. Achilles agrees to cooperate and resheaths his sword. However, he swears an oath to Agamemnon that will become the very core of the plan of Zeus: "'verily shall a longing for Achilles some day come upon the sons of the Achaeans one and all, and in that day shalt thou in no wise be able to help them for all thy grief, when many shall fall in death before manslaying Hector. But thou shalt gnaw thy heart within thee in wrath that thou didst honour no whit the best of the Achaeans'" (Iliad I.240-44).

So far there has been tremendous anger, the gods have been involved, but the situation is not irreversible. Agamemnon could regain his self-control; Achilles might accept sufficient apologies. It is at this point, where correct action is still possible, that the master of correct action, Nestor, rises to speak, giving good advice which could repair the situation. Nestor's age and experience are stressed; these

¹⁰ Girard, commenting on the qualities of Greek tragedy, points out that the symmetrical equality of the protagonists is a crucial quality: "whether the violence is physical or verbal, the suspense remains the same. The adversaries match blow for blow . . . it is impossible to predict the outcome of the battle. . . . Tragedy is the balancing of the scale, not of justice but of violence" (pp. 44-45). One can easily imagine that if Hera had not loved Agamemnon and Achilles equally, the outcome of the quarrel would have quickly been settled by the victory of her favorite. The very equality of Agamemnon and Achilles in the eyes of the gods increases their ability to precipitate a state of sacred crisis.

are the sources of wisdom which can teach men how they ought to behave.

He tells the two quarreling leaders:

"Neither do thou, mighty though thou art, seek to take from him the girl . . . nor do thou, son of Peleus, be minded to strive with a king . . . for it is no common honour that is the portion of a sceptred king to whom Zeus giveth glory. Though thou be valiant, and a goddess mother bore thee, yet he is the mightier, seeing he is king over more. Son of Atreus, do thou check thy rage; nay, even I beg thee to let go thine anger against Achilles, who is for all the Achaeans a mighty bulwark of evil war." (Iliad I.275-84)

Nestor is absolutely correct; his advice weighs the relative merits of the two angry men and shows the path to a compromise that would benefit all of the Greeks. Even Agamemnon agrees that Nestor is correct, but he objects that Achilles is constantly challenging his authority. Achilles replies with more angry words, and they part.

The situation is still not irreversible; the gods are not yet committed to a specific outcome of the quarrel. Agamemnon sends men to fetch the girl, Briseis, from Achilles, who relinquishes her and then goes to pray to his mother, the goddess Thetis.

Agamemnon has made a fatal error. Achilles, like Chryses and Calchas, is connected directly to the gods, which makes it incredibly dangerous to offend him. If Achilles were an ordinary Greek, no matter how good a warrior, he might go to his tent and sulk, but that would not produce the sacred crisis of the Iliad. But he is not an ordinary warrior, he is semi-divine, and when he is offended he is able to approach the gods directly, precipitating the sacred crisis that will result in the terrible wave of deaths that constitutes the plan of

Zeus.¹¹

It is solely because of the nature of his connection to the gods that Achilles is able to bring about the response of Zeus, and he knows this. He does not seek pity from Zeus, but rather the payment of a debt that Zeus owes to Thetis, Achilles' mother. This is in itself a sort of imbalance that will be rectified by the plan of Zeus. Once the other Olympian gods had bound Zeus, but Thetis had unbound him, and thus Zeus owes her a debt of gratitude. Achilles asks his mother to remind Zeus of this debt and then to beg him to help the Trojans against the Greeks, so that Agamemnon "'may know his blindness in that he honoured no whit the best of the Achaeans'" (Iliad I.411-12). Thetis weeps and replies that now Achilles will be doomed to a speedy death, but she does not refuse his prayer, and goes to petition Zeus.

Meanwhile the Greeks return the girl to Chryses, perform the correct rituals of sacrifice, and Chryses prays to Apollo to stop the plague. This aspect of Agamemnon's anger was not irrevocable; he is able by means of the proper expiatory behavior to persuade Apollo to stop the plague. However, it is important to note that this only comes about

¹¹ The deaths of masses of Greeks in the Iliad have a sacrificial quality, as do the more important deaths of Patroclus and Hector. This is especially suggested by the extensive use of fire imagery in the Iliad, which has been examined by Cedric Whitman in Homer and the Heroic Tradition (1958; rpt. New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), pp. 129-30: "fire itself, or comparisons of things to fire, forms a remarkable pattern of association, all centering around the theme of heroic passion and death. . . . It begins naturally enough, with sacrifices and funeral pyres. The first fire we hear of is in the prayer of Chryses, who reminds Apollo of the sacrifices he has burned. Shortly thereafter the pyres of the dead blaze in the Greek camp. . . ." Fire, especially the fire of funeral pyres, provides a nexus of the relationship between men, death, and the gods.

because the man originally offended, Chryses, forgives Agamemnon and prays to Apollo to stop the plague. It is necessary for Agamemnon to do several things in order to stop the sacred crisis of plague: expiate the wrong behavior of offending the priest by returning the girl; expiate his offense to Apollo by offering sacrifice; and gain the forgiveness of the priest Chryses, who had been the one to approach the god in the first place. If Chryses had been a man with an unforgiving heart, one can be sure that the Greeks alone could not have appeased Apollo sufficiently to stop the plague, which was produced to honor Chryses, rather than merely to punish the Greeks.¹²

On the twelfth day Thetis visits Zeus, delicately reminds him that she has done him a favor, and asks him to honor her son, who has been dishonored by Agamemnon. She asks Zeus to help the Trojans until the Greeks show honor to Achilles and give him gifts to compensate for the dishonor he has suffered. Zeus agrees reluctantly to do what she requests, and makes the promise irrevocable by bowing his head, saying, "'no word of mine may be recalled, nor is false, nor unfulfilled, whereto I bow my head'" (*Iliad* I.526-27). Now there can be no forgiveness, no good advice and reconciliation. Events have come to the point of a full sacred crisis, determined by the will of Zeus, and men from this point until the resolution of the crisis will find their actions determined by the plan of Zeus, whatever their good intentions may have

¹² This will be echoed in the later stress on Achilles' hardness of heart. The path to the god is via the man connected to the god, which means that forgiveness, or the reestablishment of balance, must be mediated by the emotions of men, just as the original offense was produced by the emotions of men.

been.¹³

The situation with Chryses was reversible because he had only requested that the Greeks pay for his tears. The situation with Achilles is more specific; he wants his honor restored by the deaths of many Greeks. Once Zeus has agreed to this, he forms a plan which, unlike the simple plague sent by Apollo, has a structure, a beginning, middle, and ending, which must be played out, regardless of the further wishes of human beings, even of Achilles.

Book I ends with a final scene showing the proper way to deal with anger against a leader, even if one is a god. Hera discovers Zeus' plan and is very angry because she favors the Greeks and hates the Trojans. Zeus reacts with anger and threatens to harm Hera. She is frightened and upset until her son Hephaestus gives her good advice, saying that she should yield to Zeus, since he is the stronger, and might harm them all. He advises her to be gentle, so that Zeus will be gracious to them, offers her a drink, and reminds her of how Zeus had once hurled him out of heaven when he was angry. Hera's response is to smile; she accepts the drink, and then all the gods laugh as they watch Hephaestus hobble along. The message is absolutely clear: control your anger and do not oppose the will of someone with more power, even if you are a god.

¹³ An example of this occurs in Books III and IV of the *Iliad*, when the Greeks and Trojans try to end the war reasonably, by means of a judicial combat between Paris and Menelaus, the contending parties in the war. But Aphrodite snatches Paris out of danger and the council of the gods reinitiates fighting by sending Athene to provoke Pandarus, a Trojan, into shooting an arrow, thus breaking the truce. During the sacred crisis, men's wisest and best efforts are liable to fail completely, because they do not fit the intentions of the gods.

Hephaestus' limp is a visible sign of his punishment. The ability of Hera to smile and the gods to laugh provides the release from anger necessary to prevent a crisis in the relationship of the gods to Zeus, which would itself be a sacred crisis.

Once the equilibrium between men and gods is broken, the only means of restoring it is by death and sacrifice. In this sense the deaths of many Greeks, the death of Patroclus, and most especially the death of Hector, are all sacrificial, seeking to reestablish a balance between the human and the sacred which was broken when Agamemnon injured the honor of Achilles. But in the more formal sense, of sacrifice being performed as a ritual of payment or restoration of balance to the gods, it is really the deaths of Patroclus and Hector that function as formal sacrifices which pay for the sacred crisis created by Achilles.

Sacrifice is necessary because Achilles has initiated mass killing of his fellow Greeks by means of his petition to Zeus to give him honor. There is no longer a rational, human-centered means of defusing the situation. Agamemnon was able to return the girl to Chryses and end the plague. He can no longer solve his relationship to Achilles by merely returning Briseis to him. Zeus has promised to give Achilles honor by having the Trojans kill many Greeks. The quarrel between two leaders has turned into the willful destruction of many of their own people. Although Achilles is a great hero, he has committed a terrible act, turning his anger from Agamemnon onto the masses of Greek soldiers. This parallels the situation where Chryses prayed to Apollo that the Greeks might pay for his tears, caused solely by the behavior of Agamemnon. But there is one critical difference: Chryses begged

Apollo to destroy men who were properly his enemies; Achilles has persuaded Zeus to destroy his own people.¹⁴

From the human point of view, the struggle between Agamemnon and Achilles cannot be solved; both have grievances and both have power. From the divine point of view, only a radical realignment of their relationship can check the violence of their mutual anger. The anger of Agamemnon has spread like an infection, first producing the plague, and then inflaming Achilles, leading to the events of the wrath, which is also a form of sacred plague, generated by the uncontrollable anger and violence of human beings in contact with the gods.¹⁵

The plan of Zeus takes on the form of an elaborate sacrificial ritual, letting human blood indiscriminately up to a certain point, and then focussing to produce two very special victims, Patroclus and Hector. The death of Patroclus serves to deflect the wrath of Achilles away from his own people onto the more suitable figure of Hector. The death of Hector allows Achilles to finally release his wrath entirely, so that he will cease to be a source of violence and danger within the camp of the Greeks.¹⁶

¹⁴ Strictly speaking, it is the Myrmidons who are Achilles' own people. However, the price he must pay for his behavior makes it clear that he should never have petitioned Zeus to allow the Trojans to kill the Greeks.

¹⁵ Nilsson remarks that "Uncleanness was conceived of as an infection, as a material substance which could be washed away with water or the blood of sacrificial victims, rubbed off or else burned away with fire, or smoked out with sulphur" (Greek Religion, p. 85). He points out that both a plague and a homicide were unclean, requiring purification by means of sacrifices to cleanse the pollution (Greek Religion, pp. 85-87).

¹⁶ Girard comments that there is "a fundamental truth about

If we were seeking merely a psychological interpretation, this would suffice, leaving Zeus as a wise arranger of human affairs, tending in fact to their ultimate benefit. However, aside from the psychological function of the death of Patroclus, which is to deflect the wrath of Achilles from the Greeks onto the Trojans, surely Patroclus must also die because he is a substitute for the deadly Achilles who has taken a step far more destructive than the anger of Agamemnon, by praying to Zeus to let the Trojans kill the Greeks. This is terrible behavior, and the most direct and logical step for the Greeks would be to kill Achilles, thus stopping him from causing their deaths.¹⁷ One might object to this that the Greeks do not know that Achilles has petitioned Zeus to harm them; they only know that he has withdrawn from their ranks and refuses to fight. Thus, seen psychologically, there would be no reason for the Greeks to want to kill Achilles, and indeed they do not express any such desire. However, Zeus certainly knows what Achilles has done, and Zeus

violence, if left unappeased, violence will accumulate until it overflows its confines and floods the surrounding area. The role of sacrifice is to stem this rising tide of indiscriminate substitutions and redirect violence into 'proper' channels" (p. 10). In precisely this sense the deaths of Patroclus and Hector are sacrifices.

¹⁷ Heroes are extremely dangerous, in life and in death. Nilsson remarks that "The hero-cult . . . is designed to appease the mighty dead, who are by no means slow to wrath. . . . It is the rule, even in historical examples, that the hero's wrath sends disasters, plague, and famine, and that he is appeased according to the instructions of Delphi" (Greek Religion, p. 194). Heroes are appeased by games and sacrifices, not punished. It is true that Nilsson is speaking of the hero-cults, those for dead heroes, and Achilles is still alive, although committed to death. However, the pattern of appeasement rather than direct punishment is evidently part of the logic of how men (not gods) deal with heroes.

makes sure that Achilles pays for his wrath by the loss of Patroclus.¹⁸

Patroclus has to die because Achilles has caused the deaths of so many Greeks; Patroclus is a victim sacrificed in the place of Achilles. That is why he wears the armor of Achilles and that is why his identity becomes so merged with that of Achilles during his last battle.¹⁹ And Hector must die because he is the main figure who participates in the plan of Zeus, killing many Greeks. Their deaths are the 'price' of the plan of Zeus, the necessary sacrifices to reestablish a balance between the human and the sacred, and drain away the excesses of violence from the world of the Iliad.

Both Patroclus and Hector are killed by the direct involvement of gods and men; both die wearing the armor of Achilles. Both die in a state of delusion sent by the gods, which is only lifted at the moment of their deaths. Both die knowing it is the will of the gods, not the strength of men, that is killing them. And the funerals of Patroclus and Hector provide the mustering out of the violent emotions which have drawn the gods down into human life.

¹⁸ Girard (p. 5) remarks that "Sacrificial substitution implies a degree of misunderstanding. Its vitality as an institution depends on its ability to conceal the displacement upon which the rite is based. It must never lose sight entirely, however, of the original object, or cease to be aware of the act of transference from that object to the surrogate victim; without that awareness no substitution can take place and the sacrifice loses all efficacy."

¹⁹ According to Whitman, "There can be little doubt that the change in Patroclus' character and characteristic epithets is not due simply to his presence in a battle scene. . . . Patroclus is playing the role of Achilles. For the moment he has become Achilles, and acts much more like the great hero than like himself" (p. 200).

Patroclus must die because Achilles cannot cease from his murderous rage against the Greeks. Even as he prepares to send Patroclus out to fight in his stead, Achilles says: "'I would, O father Zeus, and Athene, and Apollo, that no man of the Trojans might escape death, of all that there are, neither any of the Argives, but that we twain might escape destruction, that alone we might loose the sacred diadem of Troy'" (*Iliad* XVI.97-100). Achilles is just as dangerous to the Greeks as he is to the Trojans, and until some means of deflecting his violence can be found, no Greek is safe from his wrath, even though it acts by the indirect means of willing that the Trojans kill the Greeks, rather than by killing the Greeks directly. Achilles' wrath is violence run wild within the society of the Greeks. There is only one human being other than himself whom Achilles would spare--Patroclus.

It is Patroclus' pity that moves Achilles to act in the first place, sending out his troops to help the Greek army only because he pities his friend's pity, not because he personally cares about the fate of the Greeks. Achilles observes Patroclus crying at the opening of Book XVI, and asks the reason. Patroclus replies that he weeps for the terrible injuries and deaths that the Greeks have suffered, and requests that he might wear Achilles' armor and take the Myrmidons into battle. Homer comments of Patroclus at this point: "So spake he in prayer, fool that he was, for in sooth it was to be his own evil death and fate for which he prayed" (*Iliad* XVI.46-47). As he moves toward his death, Patroclus will increasingly become the sacred fool, the sacrificial victim, manipulated by the gods for ends he does not comprehend. Unknowing, he will fit into the plan of Zeus and the ultimate fulfillment and cessation

of the wrath of Achilles.

Patroclus is a kind, gentle man. He interrupts an errand for Achilles in order to bind up the wound of Eurypylus. He is the one who weeps for the dying Greeks. He is also the man closest to Achilles in the entire Greek army, they are like brothers; and as Patroclus dons the armor of Achilles, his role as a substitute for Achilles is stressed. Patroclus hopes that if he wears Achilles' armor, the Trojans will mistake him for Achilles and this will increase his impact as a warrior. It does that. It also increases his efficacy as a substitute sacrificial victim, both deflecting Achilles' anger finally away from the Greeks onto the Trojans, and paying the price for the plan of Zeus.

It is not clear at this point why Achilles lets Patroclus go out in his place. Achilles responds to Patroclus' request to go out and fight by saying: "'Dread grief is this to me, seeing I have suffered woes at heart. . . . Howbeit these things will we let be, as past and done. In no way, meseems, was I to be filled with ceaseless wrath at heart; yet verily I deemed that I should not make an end of mine anger, until the hour when unto mine own ships should come the war-cry and the battle'" (*Iliad* XVI.55-63). Achilles does not understand the nature of the plan of Zeus, nor does he comprehend the sacrifice that he will have to make of his dearest friend in order to restore equilibrium to the relationships between men and the gods. He has called upon Zeus to avenge his honor, yet he still believes that he can choose to act as he pleases. The problem is that he can no longer please to act in ways that even make much sense to him. He too is under the control of the plan of Zeus.

Before sending Patroclus forth, Achilles makes a ritual drink offering to Zeus, praying that Patroclus might drive the Trojans back from the Greek ships, and that he might return safely: "So spake he in prayer, and Zeus, the counsellor, heard him, and a part the Father granted him, and a part denied. That Patroclus should thrust back the war and battle from the ships he granted; but that he should return safe from out the battle he denied" (Iliad XVI.249-52). Setting this prayer and Zeus' decision before Patroclus leaves increases the sacred and sacrificial nature of his expedition, as well as emphasizing the ignorance of men concerning the plan of Zeus.

Patroclus goes out in Achilles' armor and routs the Trojans, who think that he is Achilles. The approaching death of Patroclus takes on a quality of compulsion that is extreme even for this poem about the wills of the gods, exercised upon the lives of men. Zeus:

ever looked down upon them, and debated in heart, pondering much about the slaying of Patroclus, whether in the fierce conflict even there over godlike Sarpedon, glorious Hector should slay him likewise with the sword, and should strip the armour from his shoulders, or whether for yet more men he should make the utter toil of war to wax. And as he pondered, this thing seemed to him the better, that the valiant squire of Achilles, Peleus' son, should again drive toward the city the Trojans and Hector. (Iliad XVI.646-54)

Zeus arranges Patroclus' death for the maximum effect, just as one might suppose an intelligent and artistic priest would arrange a sacrifice for the maximum effect on both men and the gods.

Patroclus had been warned by Achilles to drive the Trojans back from the ships, but not to pursue them across the plain to Troy. However, we see him doing just that, driven by Zeus, and yet somehow

responsible for his behavior: "Patroclus . . . pressed after the Trojans and Lycians, and was greatly blinded in heart, fool that he was! for had he observed the word of the son of Peleus, he would verily have escaped the evil fate of black death. But ever is the intent of Zeus stronger than that of men, for he driveth even a valiant man in rout, and robbeth him of victory full easily, and again of himself he rouseth men to fight; and he it was that now put fury in the breast of Patroclus" (*Iliad* XVI.648-91). This extraordinary passage sums up the nature of the death of Patroclus. He is driven to death by a god; yet he is, in some obscure way, responsible; he should have obeyed the instructions of Achilles. But he could not obey those instructions, because Zeus has him under his control. Patroclus is driven to excess and to death because of the excesses of Achilles, whose debt to the gods he must now pay. The odd blame attached to him really belongs to Achilles, who is generally not blamed at all. Achilles was the one to commit an irreversible excess; Patroclus is being killed to reestablish balance in the world.

Driven by Zeus, Patroclus leads the Greeks in slaughtering the Trojans. His magnitude increases until he is godlike in his ability to kill. He has incarnated the violence of Achilles which up to now had been, in effect, turned against the Greeks. As he reaches the full stature of his incarnation of Achilles as semi-divine violence, he also reaches the end of his life: "Patroclus with fell intent leapt upon the Trojans. Thrice then leapt he upon them, the peer of swift Ares, crying a terrible cry, and thrice he slew nine men. But when for the fourth time he rushed on, like a god, then for thee, Patroclus, did the

end of life appear; for Phoebus met thee in the fierce conflict, an awful god" (*Iliad* XVI.783-89). He is the "peer of Ares" the war god; he is like a god. He is the violence of Achilles in a form that can and must be killed in the process of restoring balance and order to the relationships between men and men, and between men and gods. He is, in short, a sacrificial victim, and the manner of his death is not that of a death in normal battle, but of a sacrifice. He is killed, first and foremost, by the god Apollo:

And Patroclus marked him not as he passed through the turmoil, for enfolded in thick mist did he meet him; and Apollo took his stand behind him, and smote his back and broad shoulders with the flat of his hand, and his eyes were made to whirl. And from his head Phoebus Apollo smote the helmet, that rang as it rolled beneath the feet of the horses--the crested helm; and the plumes were befouled with blood and dust. . . . And in the hands of Patroclus the far-shadowing spear was wholly broken, the spear, heavy, and huge, and strong . . . and from his shoulders the tasselled shield with its baldric fell to the ground, and his corselet did Apollo loose--the prince, the son of Zeus. Then blindness seized his mind, and his glorious limbs were loosed beneath him, and he stood in a daze. (*Iliad* XVI.789-806)

Only after this attack by the god can men attack and kill Patroclus.

His death is a complex of sacrifice and murder; he is killed by a god and by two men.²⁰ After he has been stunned and disarmed by Apollo,²¹

²⁰ The means of Patroclus' death are overdetermined, just as are the causes. He must die for several reasons: because he is the price of the excessive violence of Achilles; because his death will deflect the wrath of Achilles away from the Greeks onto Hector; and because his death is a focal point of the plan of Zeus. Similarly, he is killed by three different blows; from a god; from a spearman; and from Hector.

²¹ According to Nilsson, "Apollo, who was the god of purifications and expiations . . . took special charge of the expiation for blood" (*Greek Religion*, p. 195).

Euphorbus, a Trojan, hurls a spear at Patroclus, and only after this does Hector thrust his spear into Patroclus' belly for the final stroke of death. Patroclus is slaughtered, not killed in combat, and he tells as much to the foolishly boasting Hector as he lies dying: "'Nay, it was baneful Fate and the son of Leto that slew me, and of men Euphorbus, while thou art the third in my slaying. And another thing will I tell thee, and do thou lay it to heart: verily thou shalt not thyself be long in life, but even now doth death stand hard by thee, and mighty fate, that thou be slain beneath the hands of Achilles'" (*Iliad* XVI.849-54).

The deaths of Patroclus and Hector are intimately related. They are the two men whose deaths are required to fulfill the plan of Zeus. Patroclus had to die to pay for the excesses of Achilles, and to deflect the anger of Achilles from the Greeks to the Trojans. Hector must die because his death will complete the wrath: there will be no one left to avenge him, as Achilles avenged Patroclus, and thus the anger which has caused so much destruction can dissipate and the gods can withdraw from the world of men. He must also die because he has been the murderous agent of Achilles' wrath, killing the Greeks so that Achilles might receive honor according to the plan of Zeus.

Hector, the final victim of the plan of Zeus, strips the body of Patroclus and exchanges his armor for the armor of Achilles. This is essential to his role as a sacrificial victim, to be killed by a conjunction of gods and men, as was Patroclus. Zeus observes Hector donning the armor of Achilles and associates this with the imminent death of Hector:

"Ah, poor wretch, death verily is not in thy thoughts, that yet draweth nigh thee; but thou art putting upon thee the immortal armour of a princely man before whom others besides thee are wont to quail. His comrade, kindly and valiant, hast thou slain, and in unseemly wise hast stripped the armour from his head and shoulders. Howbeit for this present will I vouchsafe thee great might, in recompense for this--that in no wise shalt thou return from out the battle." (Iliad XVII.201-07)

With this assurance, Zeus then proceeds to make the armor fit Hector's body: "and there entered into him Ares, the dread Enyalios, and his limbs were filled within with valour and with might" (Iliad XVII.210-12). Hector, just like Patroclus, is being enhanced and glorified in order to play his role of sacrificial victim more perfectly. Just as Patroclus had to become glorious in the immortal armor in order to be killed as a substitute for Achilles, now Hector, in the same armor, must be glorified in order to have sufficient magnitude so that his death can absorb all the force of Achilles' violence, thus allowing Achilles to gradually return to normal, and his world along with him.²²

Achilles' response to the death of Patroclus is the determination to kill Hector. His anger against the Greeks is redirected onto the more suitable object of the leader of the enemy army. Killing Hector will be a form of self-destruction also, for Hector has acted out the desires of Achilles in killing the Greeks. Thetis weeps and tells

²² Richmond Lattimore comments on the disparity between Hector's glory and his actual deeds: "the reputation of Hektor continually surpasses his achievements. . . . his only really great victim is Patroklos; and from Patroklos he runs, and must be rallied to fight him . . . Much of what he does is by divine favour. Apollo picks him up when he is down, and Zeus is behind his charges" (The Iliad of Homer, trans. and with an Intro. by Richmond Lattimore /1951; rpt. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1961/, p. 35).

Achilles that "'straightway after Hector is thine own death ready at hand'" (Iliad XVIII.96). This too will restore a balance, since Achilles ultimately has been the one responsible for the deaths of the Greeks. Just as the death of Patroclus was the price of his wrath, being the sacrifice of a beloved substitute self, so the death of Hector, even though an enemy, will also be the price of Achilles' wrath, since it is the precondition for the death of Achilles himself. It is proper for Hector to die wearing Achilles' armor, since his death, like that of Patroclus, is a sacrificial form of the death of Achilles.

It is at this point that Achilles accepts full responsibility for the many deaths that he has caused, and accepts his own death as the ultimate price that he must pay in order to restore equilibrium and peace to the world of gods and of men. He tells his mother that, since he did not help Patroclus at his moment of need, he is willing to die, and then he proceeds to acknowledge his responsibility for the extended violence afflicting the Greek camp: "'Now, therefore, seeing I return not to my dear native land, neither proved anywise a light of deliverance to Patroclus nor to my other comrades, those many that have been slain by goodly Hector, but abide here by the ships a profitless burden upon the earth--I that in war am such as is none other of the brasen-coated Achaeans, albeit in council there be others better--so may strife perish from among gods and men, and anger that setteth a man on to grow wroth, how wise soever he be'" (Iliad XVIII.101-08). Achilles recognizes that the death of Hector and his own death are the keys to the cessation of violence among both gods and men, and he accepts this as a fitting and proper means of restoring cosmic balance. Achilles now

exhibits the first promise of the order that will be restored eventually, by exercising self-control over his emotions. He tells his mother:

"Howbeit these things will we let be as past and done, for all our pain, curbing the heart in our breasts, because we must. But now will I go forth that I may light on the slayer of the man I loved, even on Hector; for my fate, I will accept it whenso Zeus willeth to bring it to pass" (Iliad XVIII.112-16).

Having accepted his role and his fate, Achilles will be dressed in the immortal armor to be made for him by Hephaestus and complete the violence of the wrath, killing many Trojans as a kind of sacrificial bloodletting, leading up to the ultimate sacrifice, the killing of Hector wearing armor that makes him look like Achilles, like another self.

Hector is prepared for his death by the gods, just as his glory in battle was arranged by the gods. As the Trojans flee into their city, escaping the wrath of Achilles on the battlefield, Hector is stopped outside the city walls. We are told that "Hector did deadly fate ensnare to abide there where he was in front of Ilios" (Iliad XXII.5-6). Apollo had diverted Achilles away from the city so that all of the Trojans except Hector could escape within. Priam is the first to see Achilles finally approaching Troy, and he begs Hector to come within the gates, but Hector is "furiously eager to do battle with Achilles" (Iliad XXII.36). Hector resists Priam's tearful pleading with a response which is rather parallel to Achilles' recognition of his own responsibility for the death of Patroclus and many Greeks. Like Achilles, Hector is now willing to die to pay the price for his error. He debates within himself:

"Ah, woe is me, if I go within the gates and the walls Polydamas will be the first to put reproach upon me, for that he bade me lead the Trojans to the city during this fatal night, when goodly Achilles arose. Howbeit I hearkened not--verily it had been better far! But now, seeing I have brought the host to ruin in my blind folly, I have shame of the Trojans . . . for me it were better far to meet Achilles man to man and slay him, and so get me home, or myself perish gloriously before the city." (Iliad XXII.99-110)

This blame is rather like the blame attached to Patroclus, who should have obeyed the instructions of Achilles, although he could not because Zeus drove him to fury. But Patroclus and Hector must appear sufficiently guilty (or responsible for disaster, if one dislikes the term guilt applied to Homeric Greeks)²³ so that their deaths can appear indeed to be appropriate to them rather than to Achilles, for whom they are substitute victims.²⁴

Hector is in a state of confusion before the walls of Troy. He quickly vacillates in his feelings from wanting to face Achilles like a hero, to wondering if he can offer to return Helen and much treasure and end the war then and there. Hector does not want to play the sacrificial role assigned to him, and when Achilles finally draws close, Hector begins to run away. This scene takes on qualities of the funeral games. In the funeral games the prizes are no longer life or death;

²³ Dodds would have us use the word "shame" to describe the state of having done something wrong, rather than the word "guilt." He points out that Homer's society was a "shame-culture," not a "guilt-culture" (p. 17). Whatever the term used, the negative qualities of Achilles' wrath are partially transferred onto Patroclus and Hector, as a part of their deaths.

²⁴ These obscure "guilts" or "shames" are the source of a long and confusing tradition of the genteel or minor faults of Hector, which are those of an otherwise blameless man, who yet consistently commits major errors producing woes for the Trojans in many future Troy stories.

they celebrate a death that has already occurred. This race is a game before the funeral, a rite made into a dramatic situation, but with strong memories or suggestions of its origins. The poet remarks that: "it was not for beast of sacrifice or for bull's hide that they strove, such as are men's prizes for swiftness of foot, but it was for the life of horse-taming Hector that they ran" (Iliad XXII.159-61). Hector is indeed the creature of sacrifice in this race, and having just been called "horse-taming Hector," his race is compared to a funeral horse race: "And as when single-hooved horses that are winners of prizes course swiftly about the turning-points, and some great prize is set forth, a tripod haply or a woman, in honour of a warrior that is dead; even so these twain circled thrice with swift feet about the city of Priam; and all the gods gazed upon them" (Iliad XXII.162-66). The connections between funeral rites, racing for prizes connected to death, and, most probably, horses, is perfectly clear. They all indicate a ritual origin for this mode of death, which is some form of sacrifice.²⁵

²⁵ There is a clear relationship between running horses and a death involving mutilation in the stories of Glaucus, Hippolytus, Pelops, and, later, Troilus, as well as this situation in the Iliad, which involves Hector, who is dragged at the rear of Achilles' chariot after he is dead. All indicate ritual origin for this mode of death, which is probably some form of sacrifice. Robert Graves, in The Greek Myths, Vol. I (1955; rpt. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 157, suggests that some of these myths (e.g., those of Glaucus, Pelops and Hippolytus) may refer to an "Annual sacrifice of a royal prince . . . The sacred king pretended to die at sunset; the boy interrex was at once invested with his titles, dignities, and sacred implements, married to the queen, and killed twenty-four hours later: in Thrace, torn to pieces by women disguised as horses . . . but at Corinth, and elsewhere, dragged at the tail of a sun-chariot drawn by maddened horses, until he was crushed to death. There upon the old king reappeared from the tomb where he had been hiding . . . as the boy's successor." There are curious parallels between this rite and the death of Hector, although they are only partial: the sacrificial

To be a satisfactory sacrifice, Hector must not only be obscurely guilty, he must also be excellent, the very best available. So at just this moment, when his race is most like a funeral rite, Zeus, knowing full well that Hector must die, addresses his fellow gods, as if Hector could be saved, and remarks on his excellence and piety:

"Look you now, in sooth a well-loved man do mine eyes behold pursued around the wall; and my heart hath sorrow for Hector, who hath burned for me many thighs of oxen on the crests of many-ridged Ida, and at other times on the topmost citadel; but now again is goodly Achilles pursuing him with swift feet around the city of Priam. Nay then, come, ye gods, bethink you and take counsel whether we shall save him from death, or now at length shall slay him, good man though he be, by the hand of Achilles, son of Peleus." (Iliad XXII.168-76)

It is Zeus who is officiating at the sacrifice, who must determine the worth of the victim and the manner of his death. Achilles is only the means, not the cause, of the death of Patroclus. Each death is a perfect sacrifice, presided over by the one most involved in sacrifice, the receiver of sacrifice, Zeus.

The response of Athene, that Hector has been doomed by fate and cannot be saved, is a ritual response to Zeus' question, identical to the response of Hera to Zeus when he considered saving Sarpedon, his own son, from death: "'A man that is mortal, doomed long since by fate, art thou minded to deliver again from dolorous death'" (Iliad XVI.441-42 and XXII.179-80). These are, it would seem likely, responses from some

substitution of one man for another who ought to die; the boy playing the role of king, as Hector and Patroclus wear the armor of Achilles; the racing or running of horses; the death involving mutilation by horses--all echo one another.

pattern of religious ritual that has become a structural element of the Iliad.²⁶

To produce a perfect sacrifice, the victim must behave with excellence, even if the role is that of a fleeing animal. First Hector is compared to a racing horse; then to a fawn chased by a hound. So that Hector may excel in his role of victim, the god Apollo gives him swiftness, for the last time. This is necessary because Achilles' epithet, swift-footed, requires a victim who is able to excel in swiftness, just as his violence requires a victim who is able to excel in violence. Having been as violent as a deity in the armor of Achilles, Hector is now swift as a deer in the armor of Achilles: both express the victim as an epitome of the qualities of the person for whom he is a substitute.

Psychological interpretations are most unsatisfactory here, because we must witness the metamorphosis of the violent Hector/Achilles into the fleet Hector/Achilles, and then into the purity of the victim itself, carrying the identity of Achilles, but with the vulnerable innocence of a fawn. We are not dealing with mimetic characterization of 'normal' human behavior, but with mimetic representation of patterns of ritualized actions that undoubtedly made great good sense to the Greeks of Homer's time--the logic of sacrifice.

The death of Hector proceeds with ritual precision. On the fourth

²⁶ Oral-formulaic repetition, although extremely common in Homer, is not a sufficient explanation of these repeated situations. It seems probable that the wording is repeated here because it suggests what was said in such a situation by whoever was officiating at this type of ritual event. In fact, ritual repetition may itself underlie much of the formulaic repetition in the Iliad.

time that he completes a circuit of Troy,²⁷ Zeus lifts his scales: "and set therein two fates of grievous death, one for Achilles, and one for horse-taming Hector; then he grasped the balance by the midst and raised it; and down sank the day of doom of Hector, and departed unto Hades" (*Iliad* XXII.209-13). The scale is the absolutely appropriate instrument to signal the death of Hector, because it represents the achievement of balance. It is precisely balance, or equilibrium in the cosmos that has been disturbed by the violence spreading outward from Agamemnon and Achilles, and the death of Hector will be the critical factor in reestablishing the cosmic balance.²⁸

Hector must die in order to reestablish cosmic equilibrium. Once the scale of Zeus has objectified this necessity, the gods proceed to prepare his death. Apollo leaves Hector and Athene comes to Achilles. She will prepare the victim to die in a dignified manner. Achilles is evidently tired from so much running, so Athene tells him to rest while she fetches his victim. She then goes to Hector and, disguised as his brother Deïphobus, urges him to stand and fight Achilles. Deluded into

²⁷ Patroclus had advanced, killing Trojans, three times. On the fourth advance, Apollo struck him (*Iliad* XVI.783-89).

²⁸ Balance is a critical structural property of the entire *Iliad*. Whitman has shown how the *Iliad* is organized according to geometric principles of opposition and balance: "Concentric circles are a universal device in Geometric art . . . and the principle of balance around a central point which is implied in concentric circles is far and away the dominating formal principle in the *Iliad*. The poem as a whole forms one large concentric pattern, within which a vast system of smaller ones . . . gives shape to the separate parts" (p. 97). These principles seem to extend beyond the poetics of the *Iliad* to its view of the cosmos as in a state of complex balance, until disturbed.

believing that he has help, Hector prepares to meet Achilles. Hector does not understand the sacrificial nature of his situation, which, one suspects, is a necessary element in it. He is deluded by Athene and he is ignorant of his function as a victim. He actually approaches Achilles and offers to fight according to the covenants of civilized men, who would return the unmutilated bodies of those they kill.

Achilles is far more aware of the true nature of their situation than is Hector, and rejects any talk of covenants, telling him: "'No more is there any escape for thee, but forthwith shall Pallas Athene lay thee low by my spear. Now shalt thou pay back the full price of all my sorrows for my comrades, whom thou didst slay when raging with thy spear'" (Iliad XXII.270-72). The death of Hector, killed by both a god and a man, will be the price of the sorrows of Achilles, not only for the death of Patroclus, but for the many dead Greeks. Of course Hector was only able to kill those many Greeks because Achilles had withdrawn from the battle in his wrath and had persuaded Zeus to let the Trojans have dominance over the Greeks. In fact, Hector's death is the price of the wrath of Achilles, the final focus for all the violence and death caused by Achilles' anger and the plan of Zeus. And the price for the death of Hector will be the death of Achilles, who certainly ought to die after what he has brought upon his own people, but who is too powerful to kill within the framework of the Iliad, and who consequently presides at the sacrificial death of Hector, who is his scapegoat.²⁹

²⁹ Agamemnon too is responsible for the deaths of many Greeks because of his sacrilege (against Chryses) and anger. He, like

The mutilation of Hector is a critical element of his death, beginning when he asks Achilles for covenants, and continuing throughout the rest of the Iliad. It is not merely his life, but his corpse that has great significance to the meaning-structure of the poem. After Achilles, aided by Athene, has fatally wounded Hector, but left the windpipe intact so that he can speak, Hector's one concern is that his body be returned to his family un mutilated, while Achilles' concern is that the dogs and birds shall rend Hector's corpse while Patroclus receives proper burial. Mutilation is a reminder of the sacrificial nature of the death of Hector, especially when we hear Achilles tell him as he lies dying: "'Would that in any wise wrath and fury might bid me carve thy flesh and myself eat it raw, because of what thou hast wrought, as surely as there lives no man that shall ward off the dogs from thy head'" (Iliad XXII.346-48). This recalls what Zeus had said to Hera regarding her hatred of the Trojans: "'If thou wert to enter within the gates and the high walls, and to devour Priam raw and the sons of Priam and all the Trojans besides, then perchance mightest thou heal thine anger'" (Iliad IV.34-36). This anger to the point of devouring raw human flesh, which Hera and Achilles seem to share, is an atavistic suggestion of the primitive emotions underlying the mutilation of the corpse of Hector. However, the Iliad is a

Achilles, receives no direct punishment within the context of the Iliad, but there are many stories outside of the Iliad which describe his death, rather like the killing of an animal, at the hands of Clytemnestra and her lover. Agamemnon was really the starting point of all the murderous wrath of the Iliad, but he was too powerful to kill, so others died for him. The same is true for Achilles, as the next in the chain of power and anger.

relatively civilized poem, as such things go, and the mutilation will turn out to be, in fact, no mutilation, since the gods will intervene to protect the body of Hector and finally to arrange its return to Troy (Iliad XXIV.18-21 and ff.).

Achilles' wrath is not discharged by the mere death of Hector, and he continues to abuse the body even after the funeral and games for Patroclus. Every night he weeps for Patroclus, and at dawn every day, he fastens Hector's corpse behind his chariot and drags him three times around the mound of Patroclus and then leaves him lying in the dust. "Howbeit Apollo kept all defacement from his flesh, pitying the warrior even in death, and with the golden aegis he covered him wholly, that Achilles might not tear his body as he dragged him" (Iliad XXIV.18-21).

Although mutilation unto death, and even dismemberment after death, were evidently acceptable within the scope of the Greek religious psyche, the continuing abuse of a dead body was beyond the pale of acceptable behavior within the context of the Iliad.³⁰ On the twelfth day Apollo, the god of purification, speaks out among the gods against Achilles' behavior. Zeus determines that Achilles must relinquish Hector's body.

³⁰ Sir James George Frazer, in Part VI of The Golden Bough, The Scapegoat, 3rd. ed. (1913; rpt. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), has a section titled "The Human Scapegoat in Ancient Greece" (pp. 252-74) in which he gives the details of ancient Greek practices of human sacrifice which included mutilating acts such as stoning the victim to death. Nilsson, discussing this Greek institution of the scapegoat or pharmakos, comments that such a victim "instead of being let loose and driven into the desert, is completely destroyed, together with its evil burden." Although this seems very far from the death of Hector, Nilsson continues that "A prominent feature of these rites is the marching about in the city or other place" (Greek Religion, p. 87). This recalls Hector's race around the city of Troy with its obvious ritual implications. See also note 31 below.

He implements this by sending Iris to Priam "to bid him go to the ships of the Achaeans to ransom his dear son, and to bear gifts unto Achilles which shall make glad his heart" (Iliad XXIV.118-19).

Just as Patroclus and Hector paid the price for Achilles' wrath, now Priam must pay the price even more literally, with ransom to recover his dead son and release Achilles from his obsessive connection to death in the form of Hector. Achilles' bond to death is expressed by the frustrated morbidity of abusing a corpse protected by the gods; his release from this bondage comes in the form of ransom which reestablishes his own psychic balance, as Hector's and Patroclus' deaths reestablished the psychic balance of the gods.

Patroclus, dying, told Hector that Achilles would kill him. Hector, dying, tells Achilles that Paris will kill him. This points to a transfer of necessary deaths beyond the scope of the Iliad itself. Within the Iliad, however, the death of Hector will be sufficient to reestablish balance among men and gods, once the violent emotions focused upon him have been fully discharged. This does not happen completely at Hector's death, and that is one reason why the theme of mutilation must be played out to the point where it fades into indifference and calm, when Achilles, purified by the substitute sacrificial deaths of Patroclus and Hector, finally returns Hector's body to Priam.

After Achilles has killed Hector, the other Greeks run up and gaze at the body, each speaks and inflicts a wound on the corpse. This is a ritualized group involvement in the death of the victim, which is very important to the final discharge of the community of anger and death

that has been focussed upon Hector.³¹

The remainder of the Iliad deals with the purification of men who have been polluted by an excess of death, and their reconciliation to the fact of death, in ways that are not generative of revenge and further death. The funeral of Patroclus, with its overt use of human sacrifice, defuses much of the passion and pollution of the Greeks due to the many deaths they have suffered during the wrath.

The plan of Zeus has been completed, but the reestablishment of equilibrium requires careful rituals and elaborately civilized behavior in order to succeed. The funeral games for Patroclus are the focus for the reestablishment of human social order as the passions of men calm down and the gods, as a corollary, recede from human affairs. There are

³¹ Nilsson describes group purification rites in ancient Greece: "The pig was the usual sacrificial animal in purifications and expiations. By the sacrifice of a pig the homicide was cleansed When the Macedonian army was purified in the month Xandikos, the method adopted was to cause the soldiers to march between the bleeding parts of a dismembered dog. The people of Boetia were purified in the same way, and the myth relates that a human being was cut up instead of a dog in these purifications" (Greek Religion, p. 86). A similar rite is described by Dictys Cretensis in his Chronicle of the Trojan War: "Calchas the prophet, the son of Thestor, having ordered a hog brought into their midst, cut it in half and set the parts towards east and west. Then he commanded them all to draw their swords and pass through the victim. Thus, smearing their blades with the blood of the hog, and completing the other rites as required, they bound themselves to war against Priam. After taking this oath and purifying themselves with ablutions, they sacrificed many victims to Mars and Concord, seeking the aid of these gods" (in The Trojan War: The Chronicles of Dictys of Crete and Dares the Phrygian, trans. R. M. Frazer Jr. /Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1966, p. 31). The point is that pollution was a group problem, as was war, and sacrifices related to such a group problem required a direct form of group involvement, which is why the Greeks continue to pierce the dead body of Hector. Also, the suggestions of the mutilation, or cutting up, of the body of the victim echo Achilles' attempts to mutilate dead Hector.

minor interventions of gods into the funeral games, but men are now able to handle these interferences without any deadly result. Although there are incipient quarrels about place and worth and prizes, Achilles is now able to graciously defuse anger and distribute prizes in such a way as to keep the peace. This functions to reintegrate Achilles, as he is purified, back into human society, from which he had withdrawn during his wrath.

Looking back over the plan of Zeus, which was a response to the wrath of Achilles, we can see a pattern of cause and effect which operates with the logic of the sacred, and the dual (or multiple) causation of a system that describes events as occurring for not one, but for two or more reasons, such as anger being produced by a man's emotions and by the influence of a god, or the combination of god-sent delusion and human folly leading to a disastrous action. Men are most vulnerable to multiple, or sacred causation when their passions are strong and their self-control is weak. When human passion increases excessively, it creates a state of imbalance in the entire cosmos, among the gods as well as among men, and functions as a kind of magnet to draw the gods down into human affairs, especially if those strong emotions release behavior that is insulting to men who are in close contact with the gods, such as priests or those with a divine parent. Such imbalance causes discomfort to the gods as well as suffering to men, as is indicated by the woundings of Aphrodite and Ares and the struggle between Hephaestus and Xanthus. It is the role of Zeus, especially with his scale, to create structures or plans that serve to reestablish balance. The imbalance of emotion produces an influx of the sacred into human

life and the sacred is extremely dangerous.

The plan of Zeus must reestablish a balance such that the sacred is again drained out of human life and returns to Olympus where it properly belongs, and where it functions correctly. The laws of the sacred are as precise and logical as the laws of physics. Each excess must be paid for by a loss, or sacrifice, which functions to reestablish equilibrium. Such are the deaths of Patroclus and Hector, and it is precisely because they are sacrificial deaths that so much importance is attached to their bodies after death. Sacrifice is more than merely killing a creature, whether a lamb or a person; it is also the proper ritual disposal of that creature, once dead, in ways that alleviate the unbearable tension between men and gods.

Rather than pursue the obviously ritual natures of the funeral of Patroclus and the ransom of Hector's body, since these elements clearly deal with sacred materials, let us conclude by considering what role men play in causing the events of the Iliad. Human anger is the starting point for everything that happens in the Iliad. The anger of Agamemnon, and the responsive angers of Chryses and Achilles are the points which initiate the plague and the wrath. The Iliad was used for centuries much as the Bible has been used, as a source of historical information that provides sacred and moral instruction.³² At first this is difficult for us to understand, as indeed it became difficult for even some Greeks to understand by the time of Plato. Homer has been accused for

³² Whitman remarks that "To the ancient Greeks, Homer enjoyed a reputation as something between Holy Writ and an encyclopedia of universal knowledge . . . " (p. 15).

a very long time of telling lies about the gods. But, considered as a sacred story, the message of the Iliad is extremely clear and deeply religious, although it expresses a religion very different from the Judeo-Christian heritage within which we are immersed. The Iliad instructs men in the profound and simple fact that if they do not control their passions, they will disrupt the equilibrium between the human and the sacred, and create a crisis which can only then be resolved by death and sacrifice. Despite all the confusion of multiple causation, the events of the Iliad happen because Agamemnon lost his temper, and because Achilles prayed via Thetis to Zeus for revenge.³³

Both Agamemnon and Achilles learn, by means of the tragic results of their unleashed anger, that it is better for a man to exercise self-control. As early as Book IX, Agamemnon recognizes his folly as Nestor points it out to him, and he attempts to make amends.³⁴ Once Patroclus

³³ Greene comments that "the Hybris and still more the Atasthalie of Homer represent the idea of sin, with the emphasis . . . on innate and growing proneness to mischief, on a deliberate choice of evil. They are the result of an aggravated wilfulness, of a failure to observe Aidos; and they lead to Nemesis and the punishment of the gods" (p. 24). Cause and effect, human misconduct and divine reaction, are the reasons why events happen in the Iliad.

³⁴ Agamemnon tells Nestor: "'Blind I was, myself I deny it not. . . . Yet seeing I was blind and yielded to my miserable passion, I am minded to make amends and to give requital past counting'" (Iliad IX.116-20). There is a real question of whether Agamemnon's excuse that he was "blind" is meant to actually excuse him of responsibility for what he did, or merely to represent his version of why he behaved as he did according to his best self-interest. Dodds (p. 5) calls this blindness (ate) "a partial and temporary insanity . . . ascribed . . . to an external 'daemonic' agency." Greene points out "that if Agamemnon is merely seeking to excuse himself, let it be remembered that elsewhere Zeus is represented by the poet as wilfully deceptive" (p. 21). Yet Agamemnon and Achilles are not represented in their original quarrel as being victims of externally produced behavior, but as men unleashing their own rage, and Agamemnon does indeed learn that it is better to exercise self-control, if possible.

is dead, Achilles realizes that he was responsible for what has been happening to his friend and to all of the Greeks, and he attempts to make amends (Iliad XVIII.101-08). The problem is, once the sacred has been drawn in, once Zeus has made his plan, men can no longer simply make amends. They must then act out the complex sorrows of passion and death until released by the proper sacrifices and rituals from the presence of the gods.

The Iliad not only shows the catastrophic results of unleashed passion, but also gives clear examples of men exercising self-control, and of an entire complex technology of correct behavior, which serves to channel the sacred by means of proper rituals and thus keep the gods at a safe distance from humankind.³⁵

Nestor and Diomedes provide models of religiously and socially correct behavior, which are much the same thing in the Iliad, since anger against other men draws down the gods into human affairs. Both men know exactly how to behave in order to be excellent and yet not involve the gods in any improper and dangerous manner. Nestor gave correct advice to the quarreling Agamemnon and Achilles in Book I. Agamemnon even acknowledged that Nestor was correct, yet he ignored his advice, as did Achilles. Diomedes is able to fight almost like a god; he can even, given divine permission, fight against certain gods.

³⁵ Hugh Lloyd-Jones remarks that "If we strike a proper balance, we must acknowledge that Homer's gods are effective and his religion real, but that his human characters are free to decide and are responsible for their decisions: (The Justice of Zeus, Sather Classical Lectures, Vol. 41 /1971; rpt. Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1973/, p. 10). This freedom and responsibility are most critical when dealing with the gods, where any error can produce catastrophic results.

However, Diomedes is always aware of exactly when to stop; he commits no offenses that draw down divine reprisals upon the human community.³⁶

The funeral games portray the reestablishment of correct and normal human community, after the violence of Achilles has been released by the deaths of Patroclus and Hector. Purified of the wrath, Achilles is the ideal leader, who arranges games as a form of contained and peaceful competition, where conflicts can be resolved without violence. The gods are still present, but men now can control at least some of their own actions, using knowledge and skill. The interrelationship of human skill, passion, and the gods, is set forth in the chariot race, which is an exemplum of correct behavior in a potentially dangerous situation.

Nestor gives elaborate instructions to his son, Antilochus, on how to handle his horses to the best advantage, using skill and cunning to compensate for the perhaps inferior speed of his horses. Antilochus follows his father's elaborate advice carefully, but an event occurs beyond the control of human intelligence and skill to predict: the gods intervene. Apollo and Athene conflict over the horses of Diomedes, and the result is that Athene gives strength to Diomedes' horses and he wins the race. Using all of his skill, transmitted to him from his father who represents knowledge from the past, Antilochus is now competing with Menelaus for the second prize. By following Nestor's instructions with perhaps excessive zeal, Antilochus is able to beat Menelaus, who

³⁶ Nilsson comments that Homer deliberately contrasted "the self-assertion and obstinacy of Achilles with the loyalty of Diomedes to his suzerain and to the gods" (*Homer and Mycenae* /1933; rpt. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1968/, p. 259).

correctly accuses him of recklessly endangering his horses, and thus forcing him into third place. When Antilochus tries to claim the prize for second place, Menelaus is furious and demands judgment from the leaders of the Greeks: "'Come now, ye leaders and rulers of the Argives, judge ye aright betwixt us twain, neither have regard unto either'" (*Iliad* XXIII.583-84). The world is now sufficiently normalized that human judgment can be called for and applied effectively, which was definitely not the case during the wrath, when whatever men did merely fulfilled the plan of Zeus. Menelaus demands that Antilochus swear an oath that he did not use trickery to pass him, but instead of pursuing the conflict, Antilochus graciously backs down, which is prudent, since he had in fact used trickery to pass him. Men are now able to compromise in a spirit of social righteousness, which is also religious righteousness. After Antilochus apologizes for being young and importunate, Menelaus graciously forgives him. This is the human social order as it ought to function, and can indeed function so long as men control their passions and behave correctly and in a lawful manner.

The gods are still, and always, present as a potential for disorder. Athene broke the chariot of one man in the race, and caused Diomedes' horses to win first place. This form of divine involvement, while important, is not particularly lethal. One man suffers a spill; no one dies. However, had Antilochus and Menelaus not been able to compromise and control their anger, that escalation of anger from one to the other and back again would have built up tensions that would have inevitably involved the gods, the sacred, in human affairs. And the effects of the gods are far more dangerous than the mere winning or losing of a prize for a race. The funeral games display examples of

social order based on correct behavior, contained competitiveness, and self-control. So long as these conditions are maintained, and they are maintained now largely because of the excellence of leadership provided by Achilles, human society will remain relatively safe from the affliction of the sacred.

Freedom and Responsibility in a Destined Cosmos

While Homer writes of men able to make disastrous mistakes in a world that is largely indifferent to their welfare, Virgil's Aeneid describes a cosmos which is organized almost exclusively in terms of human interests and welfare, but which leaves little or no leeway for human freedom.¹ The concept of destiny, while seeming to elevate man's importance in the universe, in fact operates to shrink his stature to that of a creature who can only, at best, will to cooperate with the determined processes of the universe.

Michael Grant comments that "The Roman age was a time not only of uncontrolled bloodlust but of pessimism and nerve-failure regarding the powers of man to work out his own future."² This nerve-failure is a dominant quality of the world of the Aeneid, where people struggle and suffer and die under the control of the gods and for the purposes of destiny. Morality, in such a system, consists finally in the affirma-

¹ The text of the Aeneid used in this study is that of the Loeb edition, Virgil: With an English Translation by H. Rushton Fairclough, 2 Vols. (1916; revis. ed. 1935; rpt. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974), which will be cited hereafter as Aeneid. The line numbers cited after quotations are those of the Latin text, while the subsequent English translations quoted are from the facing pages in the same edition.

² Michael Grant, The World of Rome (Cleveland: The World Pub. Co., 1960), p. 129.

tion of what must be. Brooks Otis remarks that Aeneas is "the great exhibit of pietas or of the willing service of destiny. This is . . . a Stoic and, above all, a Roman-Augustan attitude."³

The relationship between the pietas of the Stoic and the nerve-failure of the Roman age lies in the conception they share of a universe that is organized and determined in its processes, regardless of the choices and behavior of human beings. Whether the source of that determinism be called fate or fortune or destiny, it is a source completely outside of human control that almost totally dominates the patterns of human experience.⁴

We will examine the Aeneid in order to evaluate the role of human freedom in a pre-destined universe, and the nature of pietas, the willing service of destiny, which expresses the concept of human

³ Brooks Otis, Virgil: A Study in Civilized Poetry (1964; rpt. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 222.

⁴ Greene offers an excellent analysis of the relationship of cosmic determinism to the moral position of pietas: "Since the events in the cosmic process are connected in an endless chain of causation, they may also be described as all occurring through Fate. This ultimate connection of every last detail in the universe . . . serves, together with the providence of Zeus, as the basis of the Stoic belief in the possibility of foretelling future events by divination . . . What must be, must be; but man, by his insight, may will to do what must be done, and so may act in harmony with nature; or again, he may resist. The result, considered externally, will be the same in either case, for man cannot overrule Nature, or Fate; but by willing coöperation, by making its law his law, he can find happiness, or by resignation he can at least find peace" (pp. 340-41). As to the stoic position of the Aeneid in general, Kenneth Quinn, in Virgil's Aeneid: A Critical Description (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 304, remarks that "The philosophical standpoint of the poem . . . is pretty much conventional stoicism."

responsibility in a world controlled by destiny.⁵

There are two major historical events in the Aeneid: the fall of Troy and the rise of Rome. One could describe the main action of the poem as being the complex interactions whereby men, gods and the fates destroyed Troy and founded the kingdom of Italy. Our inquiry will center on the problem of how this interaction caused events to occur. Otis remarks that the Aeneid is "the story of the interplay between the cosmic power of fate and human response to it."⁶ We are going to consider whether the human response to fate is also a part of that fated cosmic pattern within the universe of the Aeneid, or whether there is some area of freedom and responsibility left for a man in a determined universe, so that we can say that he can cause an event to happen, such as the fall of Troy or the rise of Rome.

The Aeneid presents a world in which man's goals are set by the divine nature of the universe, and in which the good man strives to cooperate with these goals. A man may not be able to change the goals of the universe, but he can certainly will to cooperate with them if he is wise. However, we must ask, what do you do if the wrong god is on

⁵ According to Greene, the Stoics belonged to a group of philosophical thinkers which "includes those who believe that the universe is the product not of blind, mechanical necessity but of a law or destiny which is rational and good, whether it be called the will of Zeus or Providence or Fate . . . man's good is either the gift of Fate (or of divine Providence), or is to be won by conformity with the laws of nature which are the expression of Fate (or of the will of the gods)" (p. 277). Putting it in another perspective, Greene points out that "the Epicurean seeks to free man's will from nature's law, while the Stoic seeks to submit to it" (p. 333).

⁶ Otis, p. 220.

your side? The problem is this: no man is able to resist the direct will of any god. We are shown this over and over again in the Aeneid. If a pro-fate god chooses to guide you, well and good. But what if an anti-fate god has chosen you as his or her favorite, or merely as a tool of anti-fate purposes?⁷

There is no example of a person in the Aeneid who is able to successfully resist the direct command or mind-control of a god, no matter what the purpose of that god's order, and whether or not that god is aligned on the winning (good) or losing (not so good) side of the cosmic conflict.⁸

We can observe, however, that those persons directly inspired or controlled by Juno and her sympathizers are accused of being impious, and of committing "crimes" when they act in obedience to the will of

⁷ R. M. Ogilvie, in The Romans and Their Gods in the Age of Augustus, Ancient Culture and Society Series, Gen. Ed. M. I. Finley (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969), p. 10, comments that "The chief feature, then, of Roman religion was the belief that all the important processes in the world were divinely activated and, conversely, that different gods had charge of particular functions and spheres of activity." Whether or not Virgil believed in these gods, we can only note that the Aeneid is structured very much in the way that Ogilvie describes the characteristics of Roman religion. Quinn does point out that "Virgil . . . did not believe that human beings were manipulated by Gods in anything approaching the way in which his gods manipulate his characters in the Aeneid" (p. 110). However, since we are analyzing the poem, not the personal beliefs of Virgil, we shall discuss the pattern of god-causation of events and behavior in the Aeneid as we find it, not as Virgil may have used it to express other beliefs not found in the poem itself.

⁸ J. William Hunt comments of the Aeneid that "the essentially tragic fact is the war of good with good, each making incompatible demands. The conflict is Aeneas' tragedy as much as Turnus' . . ." (Forms of Glory: Structure and Sense in Virgil's Aeneid /Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1973/, p. 59). Perhaps we should prefer to phrase it, the war of good with not-so-good, but definitely not a war of good versus evil.

Juno, even though there is no suggestion that they could resist the will of the god, and indeed it should be precisely impious to do so. Further, while the gods on the winning side tend to encourage and reward self-control, the gods on the losing side stimulate wildly irrational behavior which usually ends up destroying the person who experiences it. This is an unresolvable situation: if you obey the wrong god, you do wrong; if you disobey any god, you do wrong. Indeed, it is even more difficult, for you cannot successfully disobey any god at all. It appears that the gods, although causally responsible for making things happen, are never guilty, while men, although not able to cause events to occur, are guilty and are punished for their actions.

If we examine the manner in which the majority of significant actions occur in the Aeneid, we can observe a curious interlock of god-acts and man-acts, which inevitably serve together to further the intentions of the gods and fates. As an example, consider the means by which Allecto starts the war in Latium. Juno has given her instructions to start the war and Allecto begins by approaching Amata, who is already in a frenzy over the marriage of Aeneas to Lavinia. Allecto thrusts a snake into Amata's bosom, which poisons her with divine-inspired furor. Amata then stirs the other Latin women into a frenzy by means of feigned bacchic rituals (Aeneid VII.341-405). Next, Allecto goes to Turnus, who is not overwrought, but sleeping. Her first attempt to excite him with words fails, and he remains unimpassioned. Then she reveals herself as a goddess and thrusts a burning torch into his breast, which drives Turnus into a wild frenzy. Turnus then stirs up the Rutulians:

hunc decus egregium formae movet atque iuventae,
hunc atavi reges, hunc claris dextera factis. (Aeneid VII.
473-74)

(One is moved by the peerless beauty of his form and youth,
one by his royal ancestry, another by the glorious deeds of
his hand.)

This will prove to be an important pattern of causation in the Aeneid, where the god inspires a leader with frenzy by direct contact and that person then incites many others by various means, into a state of excitement and irrational action. Allecto then turns to the dogs of Iulus, which she makes wild with the scent of a very special stag, a girl's beloved pet, "fluvio cum forte secundo / deflueret" (Aeneid VII. 494-95); ("as haply he floated down stream"). Chance, human desire and divine purpose, all interact to produce the event. This mixture of god act and man act is typical of the way in which situations are developed in the Aeneid. There is no criticism of Ascanius' love of hunting and love of praise. That in itself is natural, noble and normal. There was no way that Ascanius could suspect that a god had set up a situation where, by acting normally, he would provoke a war. Here Ascanius suffers the misfortune of being "helped" by the wrong god, a problem which afflicts Dido and Turnus far more acutely. What we see is a not incorrect action producing a disastrous result because of divine intervention.⁹ And it was this very event, the shooting of the pet stag,

⁹ Michael Putnam, in The Poetry of the Aeneid: Four Studies in Imaginative Unity and Design (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), p. 87, comments that "it must not be forgotten that it is his careless deed in Book VII which helps to start all the bloodshed." However, there was no way of predicting the intervention of Allecto into what seemed to be a normal hunt, and hence no means by which Ascanius could

"quae prima laborum / causa fuit belloque animos accendit agrestis"
(Aeneid VII.481-82); ("This was the first source of ill; this first
kindled the rustic spirit to war").

Let us examine further this series of god-man interactions which
produce the war in Latium. The dying stag flees to its mistress,
Sylvia, who cries for help, and armed peasants come running, prepared
for violence. This is the god-initiated frenzy of the dogs working out
via intermediate human action into a pitch of emotion which infects
other people and can spread like fire. Allecto then reinforces the
situation by choosing the appropriate moment and blowing on her hellish
horn, which directly communicates frenzy to the peasants. Satisfied
with her work, Allecto reports back to Juno on how she has started the
war according to Juno's will (Aeneid VII.545). Then, having just
shown us how Allecto instigated the war, the narrator says of the
Latins:

illicet infandum cuncti contra omina bellum,
contra fata deum, perverso numine poscunt. (Aeneid VII.583-
84)

(Straightway, one and all, despite the omens, despite the
oracles of gods, with will perverse, clamour for unholy war.)

And here we are at the heart of the moral dilemma in the Aeneid. We
know that the war is part of Juno's plan, and that no mere human can

have judged that he should not have shot the stag. We could object that
he should not have been out hunting in a strange country, but that is
probably not at all the point Virgil was making, since we know that a
goddess had intervened to force the event.

resist a god's direct contact. And yet the Latins are blamed for yielding to that compulsion which drives them to war, although they are god-incited to do so.

Viktor Pöschl says of the Aeneid that the "subduing of the demonic . . . is the basic theme of the poem."¹⁰ This seems at first thought to be a clear enough matter. But just what is the demonic? Juno, the wife of Jupiter? In the Aeneid itself there is no example of a person who successfully resists a god-inspired passion, nor any example of any person who breaks free from a passion directly inspired by a god, unless he has the direct aid of another god.¹¹

Mobs which are directly inspired by a god can sometimes be calmed down by a skillful leader, as Ascanius calms the Trojan women in Book V when they are burning the Trojan ships. However, King Latinus is not given this power. He tries to calm the Latin people and he fails:

verum ubi nulla datur caecum exsuperare potestas
consilium, et saevae nutu Iunonis eunt res,
multa deos aurasque pater testatus inanis:
"frangimur heu! fatis," inquit, "ferimurque procella."
(Aeneid VII.591-94)

(But when no power is given him to quell their blind resolve, and all goes as cruel Juno wills, then with many an appeal to the gods and the voiceless skies, "Alas!" cries the father, "we are shattered by fate, and swept away by the storm!")

¹⁰ Viktor Pöschl, The Art of Vergil, trans. Gerda Seligson (1962; 2nd printing Ann Arbor: Univ. of Mich. Press, 1966), p. 18.

¹¹ Quinn remarks of Book VII of the Aeneid that "While our sympathy is aroused for these . . . tribes . . . responsibility for the war is placed squarely on their shoulders. War breaks out as the result of their surrender to hysteria, and then spreads like wildfire" (pp. 188-89). But they were not free to resist god-inspired hysteria.

No man, unaided by a god, could successfully oppose the power and wrath of Juno.

There is no example in the Aeneid of a single individual who is touched by a god with frenzy and who recovers from that frenzy without the aid of a god. Otis says of Dido that "she is thus the great example of pietas worsted by the furor of passion. She . . . sacrifices her duty to love."¹² But we must ask what this means. Is it a sacrifice when a person is unable to do otherwise? Is this a moral fault or merely pathetic?

Those few persons in the Aeneid who directly attempt to oppose the will of any god fail and usually die. Among them are Laocoön, who is devoured for his pains, and who ends up as an example to further the purposes of the gods, Palinurus who is drowned while he futilely tries to resist the god Sleep, Misenus who madly challenges Triton with his horn and drowns for his temerity, and Latinus, who is overwhelmed by war and disasters although he struggles to resist the will of Juno. Of course the difficulty comes when a person is chosen by one god as a means of opposing the will of another god, as when Allecto chooses Turnus to oppose the will of Jupiter and the fates concerning the marriage of Lavinia and Aeneas. Here is a man trapped between the conflicting wills of different gods, or a god and the fates.¹³

¹² Otis, p. 265.

¹³ According to Grant (p. 133), "in its essence Virgil's Fate or Fortune is . . . a deliberate purpose of the divine being who is above the world and in the world. Happenings that seem fatalistically destined, and other apparently contradictory events which look like exceptions to the fatalistic pattern, are both equally due to the agency of Providence." But what role can human freedom play in such a providential universe? Juno as well as Venus must be an element of providential

In the Aeneid the impassioned men and women who have been stricken by Juno and her forces do not generally seem to be aware of the fact that they are being compelled by the gods, although we observe them to be so compelled. Yet we are told that they are guilty, and even impious, for their god-driven actions. The Aeneid offers us an ethic of free will and guilt, with a metaphysic of cosmic determinism, and the interaction of the two produces an anxious blend of helplessness and blame for events.

The dilemma of the Latins is stressed when, after Allecto has stirred them to war, Latinus, not directly contacted by Allecto, and unmoved by those whom she had filled with frenzy, tries to stop the war and is unable to do so. After calling upon the gods and complaining that they are being destroyed by fate, Latinus then accuses his people of impiety!

"ipsi has sacrilego pendetis sanguine poenas,
o miseri. te, Turne, nefas, te triste manebit
supplicium votisque deos venerabere seris." (Aeneid VII.595-97)

("Ye yourselves, my wretched children, with your impious blood shall pay the price of this! Thee Turnus, thee the guilt and its bitter punishment shall await, and too late with vows shalt thou adore the gods.")

Fate, the gods, impiety and guilt. All together. We saw how Allecto caused the war, yet all are blamed. We saw how Turnus tried to resist Allecto and was unable to, and yet is blamed. Furor is sent by a god,

causation. She cannot be merely dismissed as a demonic influence, nor can a person under her control escape from her influence, at least not according to any evidence in the Aeneid itself.

is irresistible, and is yet impious. We know that the Latins are following the will of gods, Juno and Allecto, and yet they are accused of impiety. Virgil presents an unsynthesized, irreconcilable, anxiety producing world-view which generates the major actions in the Aeneid for those people caught up in the processes of fate and anti-fate.

We can see the same conflicting situation as the gates of war are opened. First there is the stress on human choice and responsibility as the narrator tells of the gates of war:

has, ubi certa sedet patribus sententia pugnae,
ipse Quirinali trabea cinctuque Gabino
insignis reserat stridentia limina consul,
ipse vocat pugnās. (Aeneid VII.611-14)

(Here, when the sentence of the Fathers is firmly fixed on war, the Consul, arrayed in Quirinal robe and Gabine cincture, with his own hand unbars the grating portals, with his own lips calls forth war.)

This stresses responsible group decision-making. However, in this situation Latinus, as the responsible leader, refuses to open the gates of war. He attempts to exercise his free will and judgment in defiance of the will of a god (although he does not know that he is opposing the will of Juno). His attempt is quite useless, because Juno overcomes his human attempt to resist the will of a god:

tum regina deum caelo delapsa morantis
impulit ipsa manu portas, et cardine verso
Belli ferratos rumpit Saturnia postis. (Aeneid VII.620-22)

(Then the queen of the gods, gliding from the sky, with her own hand dashed in the lingering doors, and on their turning hinges Saturn's daughter burst open the iron-bound gates of war.)

Latinus, like Laocoön, is a very rare person, one able to resist the influence of a god-frenzied mob. But it does not a bit of good. If the man balks, the god intervenes and turns the situation to its desired end, with or without human cooperation. The crux of the matter is that free will cannot produce freedom of action in a god-controlled cosmos.¹⁴

The Aeneid describes both man-will and god-will. However, the consequence of the interlock between man-will and god-will is always the god-will. Further, the lesser god-wills themselves always result in producing the end intended by Jupiter and the fates. An example of this occurs in Book V, when Juno sends Iris to make trouble and Iris incites the Trojan women to frenzy so that they will obey her lead and set fire to the Trojan ships. Ascanius arrives at the scene after Iris has left and he is able to calm the women so that they recall their shame and stop setting fire to the ships. But men alone cannot save the ships, and Jupiter then intervenes with a rainstorm to put out the fires. It is only by the interlock of the will of Ascanius and the will of Jupiter that the fleet can be saved. Men alone cannot successfully resist the will of a god.

The gods on the side of Juno, or anti-fate, manipulate human beings largely by directly or indirectly inspiring them with passion or furor. Gods can also inspire human beings with positive emotions, such as

¹⁴ Otis comments on the final battle between Turnus and Aeneas: "Why should the numerically superior party accept such a vicarious sacrifice? The answer . . . is that it is only Turnus' quite personal furor that has made the Latins fight against their own real interests and their solemn undertakings" (p. 374). But as we consider the role of Juno/Allecto in the start of that war we must surely disagree. Turnus is a tool of the gods--of the wrong gods--although he may also perform wrong actions aside from his function as a god tool/fool.

hospitality, love of fame, or dutifulness. There are many examples in the Aeneid of the instant modification of human personality by the intervention of a god. In Book I Jupiter deliberately causes the Carthaginians to feel friendly toward the Trojans (Aeneid I.297-304). Then, as a second level of mind-control, Venus sends Cupid to infect Dido with love for Aeneas. She tells Cupid to disguise himself as Ascanius:

"ut, cum te gremio accipiet laetissima Dido
regalis inter mensas laticemque Lyaeum,
cum dabit amplexus atque oscula dulcia figet,
occultum inspires ignem fallasque veneno." (Aeneid I.685-88)

("that so when, in the fullness of her joy, amid the royal feast and the flowing wine, Dido shall take thee to her bosom, shall embrace thee and imprint sweet kisses, thou mayest inbreathe a hidden fire and beguile her with thy poison.")

Dido has no moment of choice here; she has her mind and emotions modified by the actions of the gods, without her even having a chance to be aware of what has been done to her.¹⁵

Although characters in the Aeneid appear to have little or no freedom of action, there is a real stress on freedom of will in the poem, and there are many passages where this emphasis occurs even after we have observed the controlling influence of a god. For example, while

¹⁵ Putnam remarks that "When the choice of complete submission to furor and cupido is offered to Aeneas in Books II and IV . . . he respects the warnings of divinity and retreats. Nisus and Euryalus, in their minor epic, exemplify those who are tempted and yield" (p. 59). This implies that a person is able to resist the temptation of furor. But the important point is that in Books II and IV gods do appear to give unambiguous warnings to Aeneas; no such god warns Nisus and Euryalus, nor does any god warn Dido. She has her personality affected without any help from a god to resist the process, and the same is true of Turnus.

the Trojans are examining the Trojan horse, before Sinon arrives to delude them, Laocoön tries to persuade them to destroy the horse.

Narrating the scene later, Aeneas comments ruefully:

"et si fata deum, si mens non laeva fuisset,
impulerat ferro Argolicas foedare latebras,
Troiaque nunc staret." (Aeneid II.54-56)

("And had the gods' decrees, had our mind not been perverse,
he had driven us to befoul with steel the Argive den, and
Troy would now be standing.")

"Fata deum" and "mens laeva"; divine control and the mind of man. Both are continually presented as involved in the actions of the Aeneid, despite the fact that only divine will can plan and choose the final result of the interactions of god and man.

In the Aeneid a person is neither free to do as he pleases or, in many cases, even to have freedom of will, if directly affected by a god. However, the obverse of this situation is that the gods do almost nothing without the intentions and actions of human beings. All the god-actions of the Aeneid cosmos are directed toward human beings, and the future of human beings. And the quality of these human beings, although limited in freedom, is very important to the purposes of the gods. Thus, when Aeneas seeks his father, Anchises, in the Underworld, the Sibyl tells him that first he must have love and courage. Then, instructed by those in contact with deity, the Sibyl and the doves of Venus, he must search for the external aspect of his desired action, the golden bough. Only if there is a positive interlock between the will and love of Aeneas and the will of purpose of the fates, will he be able to pluck the bough and proceed into the Underworld (Aeneid

VI.133-48). Even though the two doves sent by Venus help him to locate the golden bough, only the will of the fates can make possible his plucking it down. We can say either that Aeneas cannot act without the permission of the fates, or that the fates cannot proceed without the will of Aeneas or some other human being also prepared for such a great task. Otis comments that "Fate is on the side of the pious but it would not have been on their side had they not been pious."¹⁶

Although this does not satisfy our desire for logical clarity, it does seem to express quite clearly the situation in the Aeneid, without confronting our question of what happens to those who follow the wrong gods (or indeed, are Juno and her cohorts "impious gods"?).

The human side of the man-fate interlock is also important in the deaths of Dido and Turnus. Dido is driven mad by the scheme of Venus and the poison of Cupid. But neither god nor fate intended that she die of this madness, and we are explicitly told that her death was not controlled by a god or by fate. Iris has to free Dido's shade from her dying body precisely because her death is premature from the point of view of fate (Aeneid IV.697-98). While there is no doubt that Dido was used by a deity for purposes that had little to do with her as a person, yet she seems to have willed her death without the intervention of a god at the moment of her death, although she is mad with a god-infused insanity.

There is also an apparently free act involved directly in the death of Turnus. He had to be defeated; of that there was no question. But

¹⁶ Otis, p. 230.

there is no certainty that he had to die. Aeneas conquers Turnus in battle. That was fated and directed by Jupiter when he sent the Dirae to baffle and weaken Turnus. There is a final moment when Turnus pleads for his life and Aeneas is almost ready to grant his plea. And then he sees the belt of Pallas. When Turnus had killed Pallas and taken the belt, the narrator had exclaimed:

nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futurae
 et servare modum, rebus sublata secundis!
 Turno tempus erit, magno cum optaverit emptum
 intactum Pallanta, et cum spolia ista diemque
 oderit. (Aeneid X.501-05)

(O mind of man, knowing not fate or coming doom or how to keep bounds when uplifted with favouring fortune! To Turnus shall come the hour when for a great price will he long to have bought an unscathed Pallas, and when he will abhor those spoils and that day.)

Turnus had made a mistake in stripping the belt from the body of Pallas. The implication is that a more moderate man might have left the body intact. At the very end of the poem, as Aeneas hesitates whether or not to kill the defeated Turnus, he sees the belt of Pallas on Turnus and kills Turnus in the name of Pallas, ending the poem. Just as there did not seem to be a god controlling Turnus at the moment when he took the belt, although he, like Dido, was god-frenzied, so there does not seem to be a god controlling the mind of Aeneas when he recognizes the belt and kills Turnus. These seem to be free actions. Yet that is not a completely satisfactory answer, since the narrator had already moaned about the doom of Turnus in Book X, when he first took the belt. This gave the future of Turnus a fixed, inevitable

quality inconsistent with the freedom of action we are seeking.¹⁷ In fact, this issue is unresolvable precisely because Virgil does not himself resolve it, leaving both sets of possibilities--the future-knowing gods and the free-acting men--to work out events that cannot be changed, either before or after they occur.

At the end of Book VI Anchises shows to Aeneas the future generations of the Roman ruling classes. The people who will live on earth in the future exist now in the Underworld and are fixed as to who they shall be and what they shall do, since Ascanius proceeds to tell Aeneas of the deeds of his posterity. This is the familiar determined universe of the Aeneid. However, as a gesture to the principle of free will, Anchises offers as conditional statements a future which Virgil and all his audience knew full well to be fixed inexorably by virtue of its being their own past. Thus Anchises says:

"Quin Decios Drususque procul saevumque securi
aspice Torquatum et referentem signa Camillum.
illae autem, paribus quas fulgere cernis in armis,
concordes animae nunc et dum nocte premuntur,
heu! quantum inter se bellum, si lumina vitae
attigerint, quantas acies stragemque cieunt,
aggeribus socer Alpinis atque arce Monoeci
descendens, gener adversis instructus Eois!
ne, pueri, ne tanta animis adsuescite bella,
neu patriae validas in viscera vertite viris;

¹⁷ One could object that this is merely a technique of narrative style, yet the very style Virgil uses places a heavy emphasis on fate and foreknowledge. As Greene points out: "Virgil employs all the means of divination and prophecy that are at the disposal of the epic poet, --dreams, omens, oracles, soothsayers, the Sibyl, the didactic and prophetic speech of Anchises in the Elysian Fields, the scenes depicted on the shield of Aeneas, and messages from the gods, --to establish a conviction of what must take place" (p. 366).

tuque prior, tu parce, genus qui ducis Olympo;
proice tela manu, sanguis meus!" (Aeneid VI.824-35)

("Nay, see apart the Decii and Drusi, and Torquatus of the cruel axe, and Camillus bringing home the standards. But they whom thou seest gleaming in equal arms, souls harmonious now, while wrapped in night, alas! if they but reach the light of life, what mutual war, what battles and carnage shall they arouse! the father coming down from Alpine ramparts, and the fortress of Monoecus, his daughter's spouse arrayed against him with the armies of the East. O my sons, make not a home within your hearts for such warfare, nor upon your country's very vitals turn her vigour and valour! And do thou first forbear, thou who drawest thy race from heaven; cast from thy hand the sword, thou blood of mine!")

Obviously Anchises' imprecations cannot change the course of history, especially when viewed as here from both behind and ahead, by both Aeneas and by Virgil's contemporary audience. And yet he speaks. Again, Anchises says of the pre-existent Marcellus:

"heu pietas, heu prisca fides, invictaque bello
dextera! non illi se quisquam impune tulisset
obvius armato, seu cum pedes iret in hostem,
seu spumantis equi foderet calcaribus armos.
heu! miserande puer, si qua fata aspera rumpas,
tu Marcellus eris!" (Aeneid VI.878-83)

("Alas for goodness! alas for old-world honour, and the hand invincible in war! Against him in arms would none have advanced unscathed, whether on foot he met the foe, or dug his spurs into the flanks of his foaming horse. Ah! child of pity, if haply thou couldst burst the harsh bonds of fate, thou shalt be Marcellus!")

Of course he cannot break the bonds of fate, and indeed Marcellus had but recently died, a contemporary of Virgil. If only a man were free from the fates . . . and yet he is not. Perhaps man's tiny sphere of freedom is best expressed by Jupiter as he watches Pallas fight against Turnus, knowing that he must lose:

"stat sua cuique dies, breve et irreparabile tempus
omnibus est vitae; sed famam extendere factis,
hoc virtutis opus." (Aeneid X.467-69)

("Each has his day appointed; short and irretrievable is the
span of life to all: but to lengthen fame by deeds--that is
valour's task.")

This is not very satisfactory, since Turnus and Mezentius are obviously as capable of valor as are Aeneas and Pallas. Evidently a man is free to be brave, usually. However, there are times when a god interferes with even this freedom, as when Jupiter sends the Dirae to destroy Turnus' ability to fight (Aeneid XII.843 ff.) or when Apollo, having just observed with great approval the courage of Ascanius, proceeds to persuade the Trojans to keep the boy out of the war for the sake of his safety (Aeneid IX.638 ff.).

Another very important aspect of freedom in the Aeneid is the freedom to will to do what you do not want to do. The main examples of this in the Aeneid are seen in Book IV, where Aeneas defines his relationship to Dido, to Troy, and to the tasks which the gods have set him. There is indeed some element of divine mind-control involved in Aeneas' attitude, since at the very instant that Mercury leaves Aeneas, having delivered his message from Jupiter commanding Aeneas to leave Carthage, Aeneas:

ardet abire fuga dulcisque relinquere terras,
attonitus tanto monitu imperioque deorum. (Aeneid IV.281-82)

(He burns to flee away and quit that pleasant land, awed by that warning and divine commandment.)

Here Aeneas is inspired with emotion by a god, not unlike the more

negative cases of divine inspiration which we have already discussed. However, the situation develops to place a very strong emphasis on both Aeneas' desire to obey the will of the gods and the fact that the gods are willing him to do what he does not want to do. Where the other inspired characters give rein to wild emotions, Aeneas does precisely the opposite, reining in his own emotions in order to obey the will of Jupiter. Further, he has the aid of Jupiter in this endeavor to restrain his own emotions, but it is the aid of command as well as of compulsion. After Dido, correctly, accuses Aeneas of preparing to leave:

ille Iovis monitis immota tenebat
lumina et obnixus curam sub corde premebat. (Aeneid IV. 331-32)

(he by Jove's command held his eyes steadfast and with a struggle smothered the pain deep within his heart.)

Juno's effect on her chosen ones is to inspire them with uncontrolled emotion. Jupiter's effect on Aeneas is just the opposite, to impel him to will to obey. Aeneas then spells out most clearly to Dido that he is not acting to gratify his own desires. He presents her with a series of reasons why he must leave, and not one of these reasons is personal desire. Indeed, they are all against his personal desire. He must obey the gods, his father, his duty to his son, and to the future (Aeneid IV. 340-61). Yet there is still the god/man interlock within Aeneas as he struggles to obey the will of Jupiter. When Anna, Dido's sister, pleads with Aeneas to stay only a little while longer, we get this double pattern in the description of his response:

sed nullis ille movetur
fletibus, aut voces ullas tractabilis audit;
fata obstant, placidasque viri deus obstruit auris. (Aeneid
IV.438-40)

(But by no tearful pleas is he moved, nor in yielding mood
pays he heed to any words. Fate withstands and heaven seals
his kindly, mortal ears.)

Then he is compared to an oak tree, battered, but sturdy:

haud secus adsiduis hinc atque hinc vocibus heros
tunditur, et magno persentit pectore curas;
mens immota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes. (Aeneid IV.
447-49)

(even so with ceaseless appeals, from this side and from that,
the hero is buffeted, and in his mighty heart feels the thrill
of grief: steadfast stands his will; the tears fall in vain.)

The gods obviously play a major role in the ability of Aeneas to maintain self-control, since the very heavens seal his ears. Without this divine help we cannot estimate what Aeneas might have done. However Aeneas also feels human grief and perceives the suffering of Dido. These, his own personal emotions, he seems to deal with by his own will, aside from, or in addition to, the control of the god. Evidently Aeneas has the freedom to will to do what he must do, whether or not he wants to do it, because a god has so commanded him, and his primary will as a good person is to obey the will of the god.¹⁸ This is the final and

¹⁸ Greene comments that "the Stoic 'accepts the Universe,' and attempts the possible,--that is, he seeks to discipline his life into conformity with what his reason tells him is nature's intention; he cannot change nature, except in minor details, but he can change himself. Especially does the Stoic . . . distrust the emotions, as being merely erroneous opinions, and endeavor to attain to a passionless condition. The will, or the motive, is more important than the deed, and is far more important than external circumstances" (p. 342).

only refuge for the concept of freedom in the Aeneid--the freedom to discipline oneself to conform to the goals presented by the gods on the winning side of the conflict which produces the destined future. And even this tiny area of freedom is only possible to those already aided by the right (e.g., winning-side) gods.

There is a basic conceptual conflict within the Aeneid itself as to the relationship between free will and a determined, or pre-destined universe, and we can resolve this problem no more than Virgil did, which was very little indeed.¹⁹

So that we can more fully assess the role of human behavior as causing events in the Aeneid, we must next consider the ability of men to know enough about the situation they are dealing with so that we could call their judgment about what to do responsible. This is most complex in the Aeneid because it describes a world in which every object, every event, has a meaning that exists in reference to the intentions of the gods and the plans of the fates. In order to evaluate a situation, a person must be able to recognize correctly the relationship between the perceived phenomena and the god-meanings which they express as objects and events.²⁰ However, there is a problem. Without

¹⁹ As Greene remarks, "as to the precise cause for many an event, whether it is natural causality, or chance, or fate, or a divine purpose, Virgil very often suspends judgment, or gives alternative explanations" (p. 366). Men often think that they are free; the gods, however, seem to know better.

²⁰ Ogilvie comments that "the belief that divine will could be ascertained and the belief that the gods sent signs in the form of extraordinary phenomena, were an integral part of Roman religion. They received strong intellectual backing in the Augustan age from the spread of Stoicism . . . " (p. 53).

aid from the gods, men cannot know what those god-meanings are, and the means of getting aid from the gods in order to evaluate a situation are fraught with ambiguities and possibilities for misunderstanding. Within the great confused mass of general experience, the use of omens and oracles is essential in order to evaluate situations such as: where shall the Trojans go to acquire a new homeland? or shall Anchises flee from Troy? or shall Dido become the lover of Aeneas? But the difficulty with omens and oracles is that they are a second level of phenomena that require interpretation, just as the objects and events in the world which they are aiding to interpret require interpretation in the first place. Thus the unburning flame on the head of Ascanius is a sign from Jupiter that he will protect the Trojan refugees (Aeneid II.680 ff.), while the unburning flame on the head of Lavinia indicates both fame and war (Aeneid VII.72 ff.). The oracle at Delphi tells the Trojans to seek out their motherland (Aeneid III.94 ff.), but Anchises does not correctly interpret what land that is, and the Trojans suffer great hardships because they could not interpret the oracle correctly, even though they tried to obey its instructions. Only when Aeneas receives direct instructions from the Penates in a vision are the Trojans then able to obey the original oracle (Aeneid III.148 ff.). When the Trojan ships are changed into sea nymphs, Turnus interprets this as a sign that the gods are on his side and have destroyed the Trojan's last means of escape (Aeneid IX.128-31), while we know that it is the fulfillment of a promise made by Jupiter to Cybele to protect the wood from her forest, because Turnus was about to burn the ships made from that wood (Aeneid IX.80-122).

The most misleading of all omens is in Book XII. Juturna deliberately confounds the Latins in order to start up the general fighting again and thus protect her brother Turnus from his combat with Aeneas. An eagle seizes a swan, is chased by other swans, and drops his burden. This sign was apparently from Jupiter, whose bird was the eagle, and it apparently indicated that the Latins would drive out Aeneas. The Latin augur cries:

"hoc erat, hoc, votis," inquit, "quod saepe petivi.
accipio, adgnoscoque deos." (Aeneid XII.259-60)

("This it was, this, that my vows have often sought! I
accept it, I acknowledge the gods.")

But the augur is very wrong in his interpretation of the sign, which is a deliberate deception, used by a god, to confuse and manipulate human beings. The two serpents which devour Laocoön are a similar example of an apparent sign that the gods disapproved of Laocoön's impiety against the sacred Trojan Horse, when in fact the serpents were affirming the intentions of the gods to destroy Troy (Aeneid II.228-31).

Those who are chosen as pawns by the gods of the anti-fate side, Dido, Amata, Turnus and so on, have a greatly weakened ability to evaluate situations. This seems to be a direct result of their being inspired with fury by a god. This is especially true of Dido. In Books II and III Aeneas gives her all the information she requires to perform a reasonably correct evaluation of the Trojans and of their god-ordered mission to find Italy. However, Cupid, acting on orders from Venus, has already poisoned Dido's judgment. It is obvious that Aeneas must go to Italy, and that he is obeying the orders of the gods. Book III ends:

Sic pater Aeneas intentis omnibus unus
fata renarrabat divum cursusque docebat.
conticuit tandem factoque hic fine quievit. (Aeneid III.716-18)

(Thus father Aeneas, before an eager throng, alone recounted the dooms ordained of heaven, and taught the story of his wanderings. At last he ceased, and here, making an end, was still.)

The very next line, which begins Book IV, is about Dido's poisoned infatuation:

At regina gravi iamdudum saucia cura
volnus alit venis et caeco carpitur igni. (Aeneid IV.1-2)

(But the queen, long since smitten with a grievous love-pang, feeds the wound with her life-blood, and is wasted with fire unseen.)

Dido refuses to evaluate the situation accurately, or, to be more precise, under the influence of her god-inspired passion she is no longer able to evaluate the situation correctly. The narrator comments on Dido as a seer:

heu vatum ignarae mentes! quid vota furentem,
quid delubra iuvant? (Aeneid IV.65-66)

(Ah, blind souls of seers! Of what avail are vows or shrines to one wild with love?)

Turnus too offers us examples of how god-inspired frenzy interferes with the ability of a person to evaluate a situation. On the day when he first penetrates into the Trojan camp, the narrator comments:

Diffugiunt versi trepida formidine Troes,
et si continuo victorem ea cura subisset,

rumpere claustra manu sociosque immittere portis,
 ultimus ille dies bello gentique fuisset.
 sed furor ardentem caedisque insana cupido
 egit in adversos. (Aeneid IX.756-61)

(The Trojans turn and scatter in hasty terror; and, if forth-
 with the victor had taken thought to burst the bars perforce
 and let in his comrades at the gates, that day had been the
 last for the war and the nation. But rage and the mad lust
 of slaughter drove him in fury on the foe in front.)

Inflamed by the influence of the goddess Allecto, Turnus has been
 corrupted in both his emotions and his judgment, which is not to say
 that Turnus may not have been somewhat overexcitable to begin with.²¹

So far we have discussed two factors in the evaluation of situations
 in the Aeneid: the sign-nature of phenomena which necessitates divine
 help in order to interpret them correctly; and the breakdown of the
 evaluative ability in those carried away by the passion inspired by
 Juno and the gods helping her. There is another aspect of human judg-
 ment which is relevant to our inquiry--the hindsight possessed by many
 characters in the Aeneid. This is not surprising, since evaluation in
 a situation depends on being able to predict the probable results of
 different actions, and this cannot be done in a god-involved situation
 without direct and correct help from the right god. However, looking
 backwards . . . one can see what has happened. Dido, Diomedes, Latinus,
 become experts at this form of evaluation, each knowing after the fact
 that they had erred.

²¹ The theme of "if only" moments becomes important in medieval ver-
 sions of the Troy Story, where they apply especially to Hector's critical
 meeting with his cousin Ajax, when he agrees, unwisely, to a truce. We
 will discuss this in the Chapters on Benoit and Guido.

The Latins had sent to Diomedes for aid in combating Aeneas. Diomedes refuses their request and informs them with rueful hindsight that they are wrong to fight against the Trojans (Aeneid XI.252-59). Looking backwards, he can see that the Trojan War was a very bad war indeed, and that the Greeks were wrong to have fought against the Trojans, and the proof of his understanding is that the Greeks were punished afterwards for having done so.

Dido, resolving to kill herself, analyzes her past actions and present situation with bitter accuracy, now that she has no more options worth choosing:

"quin morere, ut merita es, ferroque averte dolorem.
tu lacrimis evicta meis, tu prima furentem
his, germana, malis oneras atque obicis hosti.
non licuit thalami expertem sine crimine vitam
degere, more ferae, talis nec tangere curas;
non servata fides cineri promissa Sychaeo." (Aeneid IV.547-52)

("Nay, die, as thou deservest, and with the steel end thy sorrow. Won over by my tears, thou, my sister, thou wert first to load my frenzied soul with these ills, and drive me on the foe. Ah, that I could not spend my life, apart from wedlock, a blameless life, even as some wild creature, knowing not such cares! The faith vowed to the ashes of Sychaeus I have not kept!")

Latinus provides us with our final example of hindsight. In Book XII, as Turnus prepares to combat Aeneas, Latinus tries to dissuade Turnus and analyzes where he himself has acted wrongly in the matter of Aeneas:

"me natam nulli veterum sociare procorum
fas erat, idque omnes divique hominesque canebant.
victus amore tui, cognato sanguine victus,
coniugis et maestae lacrimis, vincla omnia rupi:
promissam eripui genero, arma impia sumpsi." (Aeneid XII.27-31)

("for me to ally my child to any of her old-time wooers, was forbidden, and this all gods and men foretold. Overborne by love of thee, overborne by kindred blood and tears of my sorrowing queen, I broke all fetters, snatched the betrothed from her promised husband, and drew the unholy sword.")

All of the above examples seem to imply that people can reach an understanding of their situation, even if it is too late to have much effect upon the course of events. However, it is necessary to note that all of these evaluations are incorrect, or at the least contradicted by other information presented in the body of the poem. Dido sees only that she has broken her vow and that Anna encouraged her to do so. True enough. But Dido never knows that Cupid had poisoned her with furious passion and that Juno herself, the goddess of marriage, had deliberately lured her into a false wedding. Diomedes knows that it was wrong to fight the Trojans, because the Greeks were punished for it; he does not know what Aeneas realizes: that the gods themselves had destroyed Troy (Aeneid II.602-03).

The evaluation that Latinus gives of his behavior is psychologically convincing, except that it does not agree with the data presented in Book VII, where he does his very best to resist the war, and is not convinced by emotions and tears, but has to give up because he has no power to enforce his will to resist the war. We are reminded here of the discrepancy between the death we observe Palinurus to experience at the end of Book V and the different version of that death which he gives to Aeneas in the Underworld in Book VI. Men know and they do not know.

Anchises, Aeneas, and certain seers do receive a fair amount of reliable information from the gods. However, this information comes in

very limited amounts, and is rarely specific enough to base actions upon, assuming that one's desire is to obey the gods. Until his experiences in the Underworld, Aeneas is not much better than anyone else at evaluating his experiences and making judgments of what to do, except in those specific situations where he is given direct orders by a god or a vision. The sojourn with Dido is the best example of Aeneas' limited ability to evaluate experience without the direct aid of deity. Until his journey through the Underworld Aeneas, like everyone else, can only know for certain what a god tells or reveals to him. All else is mystery or ambiguity, and even the revelations are often misleading, such as the oracle about the homeland of the Trojans, or the oracle of Helenus that neglected or refused to mention the coming death of Anchises (Aeneid III.712-13). The experience in the Underworld changes Aeneas from one who cannot evaluate because he does not know enough about the will of the gods, to one who can evaluate because he has received sufficient information about the will of the gods and the ways of the fates to have that true understanding which must underlie even the simplest evaluation in a god-controlled universe.

Although men in the Aeneid are not able to either evaluate or initiate actions without the involvement of the gods, the men themselves seem to think that they are more free and able to act than is in fact the case. It is ironic that Aeneas, the man most responsible for events in the poem, develops a profound awareness of his own lack of freedom.

In the Aeneid men and women seem to be aware of having freedom of choice in most situations where there are possible alternatives of action. Thus we see Dido enumerate her choices of possible action before she decides to kill herself (Aeneid IV.534-38). She rejects all

her alternatives as undesirable, but does not deny that she feels free to have chosen one if she had so desired, and concludes with an exclamation of moral blame on herself (Aeneid IV.547). Dido feels herself to be free and guilty; we know that she was poisoned by a god and is quite mad.

Turnus also attempts to decide on a course of action with an awareness of his freedom of choice which is not correct. After Juno lured him out of battle by means of a phantom Aeneas, Turnus finds himself on a ship drifting out to sea. He is (as usual) furious, and tries to decide what to do: whether to kill himself or attempt the swim to shore (Aeneid X.675 ff.). He tries each, but Juno prevents him from carrying out either action. Although Turnus believes that he is free to choose an action, Juno does not permit him to act out what he has chosen. Again we see the Stoic pattern of the man who is able to will, although not necessarily to act, as he chooses.

This incident leads us to question the completeness of Otis' comment on the freedom with which Turnus goes to die. He comments that Turnus must "be brought to face Aeneas voluntarily . . . For he is meant to be both furiosus and heroic. . . . he is not really a coward and when he sees that he must finally choose . . . between life and honour, he chooses honour. Unfortunately his choice comes too late, and after he has sacrificed too many other lives to his own pride and fury."²² True enough. However, there is also the odd line at the end of Book XI, when Turnus returns to the battle from his ambush in the

²² Otis, pp. 370-71.

hills:

ille furens (et saeva Iovis sic numina poscunt)
deserit obsessos collis, nemora aspera linquit. (Aeneid XI.
901-02)

(He, raging--and Jove's stern will so demands--quits the hills'
ambush, and leaves the rough woodland.)

It would seem that Jupiter, as well as Juno, has a hand in the behavior of Turnus. Considering the double motivation for behavior which we have been observing, we might even doubt Turnus' freedom as he faces death, although he is certainly aware of being free to either choose or reject the inevitable death which the fates have prepared for him, or which he has prepared for himself.

We see a similar situation in the death of Palinurus, who believes that he is free to choose a responsible course of action, but in fact must die because the gods so will it. When the god Sleep, in the guise of Phorbas, urges Palinurus to lie down and sleep, Palinurus refuses, and insists that he will stay awake and perform his duty. But the god Sleep puts Palinurus to sleep against his will and then throws him overboard and he drowns (Aeneid V.835 ff.). This incident pathetically illustrates the total helplessness of even a good man who attempts to do what he understands to be his duty, against the will of a god.

Another example of men's assumptions about freedom, based upon their ignorance about the intentions of the gods appears in Book XII, when Aeneas and Turnus are preparing for their judicial combat, and they swear that the outcome of the fight shall determine the course of the war. However, unknown to men, Juno has already sent Juturna to

try and rescue Turnus from what she knows will be an unequal battle (Aeneid XII.157-59). Aeneas and Latinus, not knowing what Juno and Juturna are intending, swear their solemn oaths (Aeneid XII.212-15). Here men are doing their very best to act responsibly, assuming that they are free to do so. However, in typical Virgilian fashion, it is a god-man interaction that breaks the pact. Juturna plays upon the worries of the Rutulians to break the truce. The Rutulians are upset because Turnus seems unequal to Aeneas, and Juturna, in the guise of Camers, cries that it is shameful to stake an entire war on one man's life (Aeneid XII.222 ff.). Having affected the already wavering minds of the Rutulians and Latins, she then sends the false Jupiter-eagle omen to mislead the Latins into renewing the war, which they do.

In the Aeneid men often feel that they are able to choose their actions; however, we are shown many instances where this is merely an illusion. The death of Amata again illustrates this pathetic misunderstanding, or semi-understanding of why people do what they do. Thinking Turnus dead, Amata:

subito mentem turbata dolore,
se causam clamat crimenque caputque malorum,
multaque per maestum demens effata furorem,
purpureos moritura manu discindit amictus
et nodum informis leti trabe nectit ab alta. (Aeneid XII.
599-603)

(her mind distraught by sudden anguish, cries out that she is the guilty source and spring of sorrows, and uttering many a wild word in the frenzy of grief, resolved to die, rends her purple robes, and from a lofty beam fastens the noose of a hideous death.)

However, we have seen her, the most god-driven of all, compared to a

mere top whirled by the power of Allecto (Aeneid VII.376 ff.). A driven top and yet a guilty woman; this combination of irreconcilable positions is quite typical of the world-view of the Aeneid. Men and women think that they are free and able to have done right instead of wrong, but they do not know very much about the gods, nor do they understand the nature of the influence of the gods upon them. Men may be aware of their freedom without necessarily being free in fact.

Aeneas, the man whose actions are most critical to the events of the poem, is also the man most aware not of freedom, but of unfreedom. The order of a god, just like the furor implanted by a god, is not resistible. While those made furious, such as Turnus, Amata and Dido, do not seem to be aware of the influence of a god upon their behavior, Aeneas is acutely aware of the orders of the gods, and of how necessary it is to obey them.

In Book VI Aeneas learns of the future that must be, and is thus made definitively aware of his lack of personal freedom. After showing him the spirits of his posterity, Anchises instructs Aeneas concerning his own future (Aeneid VI.888-92). Knowing this, Aeneas can only be aware of the fact that he is not free, but destined to act out a certain role in the history of his people. The more Aeneas knows of destiny, the less he holds any illusion of freedom, and the more aware he becomes of his unfreedom. He acts for posterity, not for his own personal interests. This stems from his instruction in the plan of destiny which he receives in the Underworld.

This knowledge of destiny and of his own unfreedom which Aeneas gains in the Underworld shows that there is a level of knowledge beyond

the relativistic one of normal human experience, and that there are things which are fixed as to meaning and able to be so known. While the ability to perform evaluations in the Aeneid is largely a matter of being able to understand the relationship between a sign and the event it signifies, this higher level of knowledge of destiny is the ability to comprehend the relationship of the past, present and future. Human history as a fixed destiny, planned and supported by Jupiter and the fates, is the final goal of human understanding, and it is available to only one living man in the Aeneid--Aeneas, whose initiation into the understanding of fixed, immutable truths is a major theme in Book VI. Otis comments that the plan "of the Odyssean Aeneid . . . is to reserve for the sixth book, for the symbolic death and resurrection, the full revelation or dissipation of ignorance that alone can produce a final and an unshakable pietas."²³ The ignorance that must be dissipated is man's ignorance of final ends, of the goal of human history as planned and implemented by inexorable deity. However, in the Underworld, Aeneas is instructed in the system of rewards and punishments for deeds done in life (the aspect of freedom and guilt) as well as the fixed nature of destiny in the form of the future of his own descendants. Still the double pattern, unresolved as always. From the punishments of those who did wrong he learns "'discite iustitiam moniti et non temnere divos'" (Aeneid VI.620); ("Be warned; learn ye to be just and not to slight the gods!"), and from the future Anchises fills the soul of Aeneas "famae venientis amore" (Aeneid VI.889); ("with love of fame that was to be").

²³ Otis, p. 237.

These are the two aspects of motivation for the unfree, yet responsible man. It is love of the future, now known, that gives Aeneas the irresistible force to conquer Italy. It is out of this knowledge that the normally kind Aeneas can rage against the Latins after the treaty has been broken, "'ne qua meis esto dictis mora; Iuppiter hac stat'" (Aeneid XII.565); ("'Let naught delay my command; God is on our side'"). And spurred on by destiny manifested, Aeneas sets fire to the city of Latium. (Of course, it being the Aeneid, we can only comment that Aeneas, for all of his genuine understanding, is not necessarily correct, since goddesses have deceived the Latins as well as the Trojans, and blame is not nearly so clear-cut as Aeneas believes.)

While we may wish to question some aspects of Aeneas' genuine understanding of the situation in which he acts, in general, after Book VI, he knows what he is doing, and why he is doing it, although he also knows that he must do it. His actions all take place within the teleological structure of a destiny that he has been taught to understand. Such understanding can only be given to a man by deity. It is not something that a man can discover on his own, since it is the purposes of deity that are the objects of genuine understanding of the real world.

Next we will consider the role of the gods in perceiving, evaluating and acting to cause events in the Aeneid. First let us recall our discussion of the freedom of human beings in the Aeneid, where we remarked that men seem to be guilty, while not necessarily free or responsible, while the gods seem to be free and responsible, yet not guilty. Men are caught in a situation between their potential freedom of will to do right and a determined universe in which gods and the fates manipulate

the nature of men's actions and the results of events. However, the nature of the events so determined is entirely within the sphere of human existence; that is, the fates and Jupiter control what happens to men, not what happens to gods. Therefore, we see none of the double-motivated causation which so confuses the human situation when we examine the situation of the gods.

It is in the ability of the gods to evaluate the situation they are acting upon that we will find an approach to the problem which we have been posing of how man can be unfree and yet guilty, while the gods are free and yet not guilty.

At the opening of Book X, Jupiter calls a council and gives us a god's eye view of the free will, fate, anti-fate problem, and he does not resolve it, except by allowing men to act out their own individual fates and the gods to do much the same. Venus and Juno present their positions, both of which are correct and yet seemingly irreconcilable! First, we hear the argument of Venus, which centers upon the innocence of the Trojans, since they were merely obeying fate and the gods:

"si sine pace tua atque invito numine Troes
 Italiam petiere, luant peccata neque illos
 iuveris auxilio: sin tot responsa secuti,
 quae Superi Manesque dabant, cur nunc tua quisquam
 vertere iussa potest aut cur nova condere fata?" (Aeneid X.
 31-35)

("If without thy leave and despite thy deity, the Trojans have sought Italy, let them expiate their sin, nor aid thou them with succour. But if they have but followed all the oracles, given by gods above and gods below, why is any one now able to overthrow thy bidding or why to build the fates anew?")

Venus only considers that aspect of Trojan behavior that is obedience to

fate, or the fixed future, and consequently, places no emphasis upon their personal responsibility or guilt. Juno, however, presents the conflicting, yet also true aspect of the Trojan experience:

"nosne tibi fluxas Phrygiae res vertere fundo
conamur? nos? an miseros qui Troas Achivis
obiecit? quae causa fuit, consurgere in arma
Europamque Asiamque et foedera solvere furto?
me duce Dardanius Spartam expugnavit adulter
aut ego tela dedi fovive cupidine bella?
tum decuit metuuisse tuis: nunc sera querellis
haud iustis adsurgis et inrita iurgia iactas." (Aeneid X.
88-95)

("Is it I that essay to overthrow from the foundation Phrygia's tottering state? Is it I? Or is it he who flung the hapless Trojans in the Achaeans' path? What cause was there that Europe and Asia should uprising in arms and break bonds of peace by treachery? Was it I that gave him weapons or fostered war with lust? Then shouldst thou have feared for thine own; now too late thou risest with unjust complaints, and bandiest bickering words in vain.")

Juno is justice outraged, while Venus is not quite innocent mercy. Here is the ideal point for Jupiter to take a stand and agree with Juno that the Trojans are guilty and deserve to suffer, or agree with Venus that the Trojans have indeed been obeying the gods and oracles and do not deserve to suffer further. But he does nothing of the sort. His response is to let matters continue unabated:

"accipite ergo animis atque haec mea figite dicta.
quandoquidem Ausonios coniungi foedere Teucris
haud licitum nec vestra capit discordia finem:
quae cuique est fortuna hodie, quam quisque secat spem,
Tros Rutulusve fuat, nullo discrimine habeo,
seu fatis Italum castra obsidione tenentur
sive errore malo Troiae monitisque sinistris.
nec Rutulos solvo. sua cuique exorsa laborem
fortunamque ferent. rex Iuppiter omnibus idem;
fata viam invenient." (Aeneid X.104-13)

("Take therefore to heart and fix there these words of mine. Since it may not be that Ausonians and Teucrians join alliance, and your disunion admits no end, whate'er the fortune of each to-day, whate'er the hope each pursues, be he Trojan or be he Rutulian, no distinction shall I make, whether it be Italy's fate that holds the camp in leaguer, or Troy's baneful error and misleading prophecies. Nor do I free the Rutulians. Each one's own course shall bring him weal or woe. Jupiter is king over all alike; the fates shall find their way.")

Jupiter refuses to reconcile the two positions of fate (Venus) and guilt (Juno). This refusal, or inability, to reconcile the opposing positions of fate and guilt is absolutely typical of the entire Aeneid, and this section is perhaps the definitive statement of the poem's moral and causal ambivalence, since it is Jupiter, speaking unequivocally (if such be possible in the Aeneid) who acknowledges that the positions cannot be reconciled.

The ability of the gods to perform evaluations of situations is thus seen to be a function of who is perceiving and evaluating, not an absolute ability to perceive that which is absolutely true. Therefore, while Venus could show Aeneas how not Paris and Helen, but the gods themselves are responsible for destroying Troy in Book II, Juno can insist quite accurately in Book X that the Trojans are to blame and ought to suffer further punishment. Even the undeceived mind of a god perceives in terms of her personality and interests, not in terms of some external absolute which we can call objective truth or reality. If there is such a thing as absolute or objective truth in the Aeneid, it is the property of Jupiter, not of the lesser gods. Thus, although they receive information from Jupiter about what must happen, the gods continue to behave in terms of what they desire to happen, ignoring

their knowledge in favor of their emotions.

Juno and Venus are not of equal intelligence or understanding. While Venus has been reassured by Jupiter from Book I that Aeneas will and must survive to found a destined civilization, she acts always on the fear that this may not come to pass in fact. The Dido episode is an example of Venus' plotting to protect her beloved son Aeneas from the dangers of Carthaginian hostility. Juno, however, also knows what must happen. In her case we see a finer comprehension of the implications of destiny than Venus ever displays. Juno expresses the precise nature of her freedom and limitations:

"ast ego, magna Iovis coniunx, nil linquere inausum
 quae potui infelix, quae memet in omnia verti,
 vincor ab Aenea. quod si mea numina non sunt
 magna satis, dubitem haud equidem implorare quod usquam est.
 flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.
 non dabitur regnis, esto, prohibere Latinis,
 atque immota manet fatis Lavinia coniunx:
 at trahere atque moras tantis licet addere rebus,
 at licet amborum populos exscindere regum." (Aeneid VII.308-16)

("But I, Jove's mighty consort, who have endured, alas! to leave naught undared, who have turned me to every shift, I am worsted by Aeneas! But if my powers be not strong enough, surely I need not be slow to seek succour wherever it may be; if Heaven I can not bend, then Hell I will arouse! Not mine will it be--I grant it--to keep him from the crown of Latium, and by fate Lavinia abides immovably his bride; yet to put off the hour and to bring delay to such great issues--that I may do; yet may I uproot the nation of either king.")

Juno, like the gods in general, is pretty accurate in her awareness of what she may and may not do. She understands her relation to the limits of the fates and the will of Jupiter, as well as to a basic system of cosmic order. Juno knows that she cannot change fate. She also knows just how far she can use Allecto, and orders her back to the

Underworld after she has used her to stir up war between the Trojans and the Latins. Juno also knows just when she must stop opposing the will of Jupiter, when he finally tells her:

"ventum ad supremum est. terris agitare vel undis
Troianos potuisti, infandum accendere bellum,
deformare domum et luctu miscere hymenaeos:
ulterius temptare veto." (Aeneid XII.803-06)

("The end is reached. To chase the Trojans over land or wave, to kindle monstrous war, to mar a happy home and blend bridal with woe--this power hast thou had; farther to attempt I forbid!")

Both Juno and Venus have the correct information for understanding the situation of the Trojans seeking and conquering Italy. Early in Book I Jupiter reassures the anxious mother Venus:

"parce metu, Cytherea; manent immota tuorum
fata tibi; cernes urbem et promissa Lavini
moenia, sublimemque feres ad sidera caeli
magnanimum Aenean; neque me sententia vertit." (Aeneid I.
257-60)

("Spare thy fear, Lady of Cythera; thy children's fates abide unmoved. Thou shalt see Lavinium's city and its promised walls; and thou shalt raise on high to the starry heaven great-souled Aeneas. No thought has turned me.")

Reassurance enough, but not enough for Venus, who proceeds to protect her son by sending Cupid to poison Dido with frenzied love for Aeneas.

Juno, from the very beginning of Book I, recognizes that she cannot change the fated triumph of the Trojans:

"mene incepto desistere victam
nec posse Italia Teucrorum avertere regem!
quippe vetor fatis." (Aeneid I.37-39)

("What! I resign my purpose, baffled, and fail to turn from Italy the Teucrian king! The fates, doubtless, forbid me!")

She is indeed forbidden by the fates, yet Juno keeps on trying, until the very final moment when Jupiter tells her that she must stop. Venus knows that she will win, and yet worries; Juno knows that she must lose, and yet struggles. Surely we have something less than true understanding of the situation of the Trojans or the nature of fate here. Or is this simply the final extension of the double patterns of motivation that we have observed throughout the Aeneid?

Although the goddesses do have correct information about the situations in which they are acting, there is yet a problem of understanding. Venus and Juno act out their roles as fate and counter-fate, or destiny and guilt, despite their knowledge of what must happen, which in fact seems to happen not so much by means of their struggle, but despite it, since it is the intervention of Jupiter that must finally control the pattern of events. As with human beings, so with the gods and goddesses, there is a level of causation that is other than that of the wills, knowledge and actions of the agents consciously involved. And this causation--the way of the fates--takes precedence over the evaluative ability and the actions of the gods as well as the human beings in the world of the Aeneid.

Jupiter is the final source of causation in the Aeneid. He seems able to control the fates, although he is not identical with them. When Juno pleads with Jupiter to save the life of Turnus, he allows her to save him from the fates for the moment, but warns her that she may not alter the course of the war (Aeneid X.622-27). Juno evidently considers

that Jupiter is also able to change the way of fate (which here is the course of the war), and replies to his concession:

"quod ut o potius formidine falsa
Iudar et in melius tua, qui potes, orsa reflectas!" (Aeneid
X.631-32)

("Yet, O that rather I were mocked by lying fears, and that thou, who canst, wouldst bend thy purposes to a better end!")

Since Juno, the smartest of the gods aside from Jupiter, seems to understand the workings of the divine system pretty well (although she is obtusely opposed to destiny), we must give her statement a good deal of weight and assume that perhaps Jupiter is able to change the course of events absolutely, as well as in local variations, such as allowing Turnus a brief reprieve from death.

Although the fates and Jupiter are not identical, he acts to promote the interests of the fates, as he does in Book I when he makes the minds of the Carthaginians receptive to the Trojans, and as he does in Book XII when he stops the resistance of Juno to the fates. When he finally tells Juno, "'ventum ad supremum est'" (Aeneid XII.803); ("The end is reached."), she replies to him:

"Ista quidem quia nota mihi tua, magne, voluntas,
Iuppiter, et Turnum et terras invita reliqui." (Aeneid XII.
808-09)

("Even because I knew, great Jove, that such was thy pleasure, have I, though loth, left Turnus and the earth.")

The will of Jupiter is the final force which controls the behavior of both gods and men. However, since Jupiter is not identical with the

fates, we might prefer to state that Jupiter wills to do what must be done, displaying at the highest level of power a kind of will that parallels that of the good man, Aeneas, who wills to do what must be done.

Jupiter is certainly able to modify the pattern of the future at one level of action, since it is just after he has told Juno to stop resisting the fates that she requests a compromise that can only change the course of future history, if indeed one were to demand strict logic from this not strictly logical poem. She yields to the command of Jupiter and then asks a favor of him, that the Latins might retain their name, their language, and their identity as a people (Aeneid XII. 819-28). Smiling, Jupiter assents to her request, a compromise that changes the course of history. However . . . we have already observed that course in Book VI and are tempted to wonder if that is the reason why Jupiter is smiling. Does Jupiter act as he wills, or does Jupiter will as he knows he must act? This question cannot be answered on the basis of the Aeneid, although we can glance at Jupiter's capacity for knowing what is to be done and his understanding of the nature of the fates.

There is no question that Jupiter is able to evaluate situations with thoroughness and accuracy, since he is able to gather all of the information concerning these situations. At no point in the Aeneid do we see Jupiter confused, beguiled or even ignorant. The one section where he does ask questions is at the opening of the council of the gods in Book X:

"caelicolae magni, quianam sententia vobis
versa retro tantumque animis certatis iniquis?
abnueram bello Italiam concurrere Teucris.
quae contra vetitum discordia?" (Aeneid X.6-9)

("Mighty sons of Heaven, wherefore is your judgment reversed,
and why strive ye with hearts so discordant? I had forbidden
Italy to clash in war with Troy. What feud is this, in face
of my command?")

Jupiter can be disobeyed and can inquire into that disobedience. However, the point pertinent to the question of his ability to evaluate is that he is able to get correct and adequate, if not very satisfying, answers from the goddesses involved, since, as we have seen, both Juno and Venus explain their positions quite clearly. And at this juncture of maximum lack of agreement between the positions and perceptions of the two goddesses, Jupiter is still able to evaluate the situation accurately by noting, "'nec vestra capit discordia finem'" (Aeneid X. 106); ("and your disunion admits no end").

In the Aeneid genuine understanding of the nature of reality, which must underlie understanding of each situation therein, can only be achieved by understanding the goal of the fates, and the mysterious means by which they achieve their goal. There is no doubt that Jupiter understands the fates, and to an undetermined extent, even molds the shape of the future. Jupiter told the fated future to Venus in Book I and brought that fated future into secure being in Book XII, when he forced Juno to allow the Trojans to find peace at last. Jupiter comments at this point to Juno:

"indigetem Aenean scis ipsa et scire fateris
deberi caelo fatisque ad sidera tolli." (Aeneid XII.794-95)

("Thyself knowest, and dost confess to know it, that Aeneas, as Hero of the land, is claimed of heaven, and the Fates exalt him to the stars.")

Both Juno and Jupiter have knowledge of the path of the fates. Where Jupiter is unique is that his will is firmly allied with the path of the fates, and all of his actions seek to aid and affirm the fated future. It is this will to affirm the fated future that is the sign of Jupiter's true understanding of reality. In this ability Jupiter is the god who most closely parallels Aeneas, who also wills to happen what must happen, the main difference being that Jupiter has a conscious dynamic role in the very shaping of the direction of the fates, while Aeneas can only affirm and cooperate with the fates as shown to him by Anchises and various divine messengers.

When we consider that Jupiter, a god, wills to affirm what happens to men, while Aeneas, a man, must will to affirm what is being done to men, we are back at the fascinating problem in the Aeneid of the guilt of men contrasted to the causation of the gods. This may indicate a stage of transition in world-view, where the idea of crime and responsibility is highly developed, but the world-view metaphysic is such that gods are described as the source of causality, even in human behavior. Virgil accuses men of crimes without being willing to relinquish gods as the causes of those crimes. This creates an unresolvable situation where there is no way of choosing a pious-correct action unless the right god happens to be on your side. If you resist the Trojan Horse, as Laocoön did, some god sends snakes to devour you; if you welcome the Trojan Horse, as most Trojans did, it destroys your city. There is no "right" action here from a human perspective. One

is tempted to comment that it is not surprising that Virgil seems so very Christian to many readers, and that he was followed so closely in time by the "solution" to his dilemma, of guilt without freedom, which took the form of the Christian sects with their doctrines of free will and the release from guilt.

Eneas: The Aeneid Moralized

While the Aeneid presents a story based on the purposes of the gods, implemented by means of the interactions between gods and men, the Eneas,¹ an anonymous twelfth-century French version of the same story, is a product of an optimistic humanism which envisions a world in which men can implement their own wills with a minimum of interference by the (now pagan) gods.

Men and women in the Eneas are free, and as such are considered unquestionably responsible for their actions. Any wrong actions are punished or atoned for, while right actions are rewarded by love, marriage and a kingdom. This combination of human freedom and a cosmos that responds to that freedom by morally appropriate rewards and punishments, constitutes the "moral" universe of the Eneas. While the universe of the Aeneid was primarily religious and historical in nature, as expressed by the goal of divine destiny for men, the universe of the Eneas is neither particularly divine (being pre-Christian) or historical,

¹ Anon., Eneas: Roman du XII^e Siècle, ed. J.-J. Salverda de Grave, Les Classiques Français du Moyen Age, Nos. 44 and 62, 2 Vols. (1925 and 1929; rpt. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1973 /Vol. I/ and 1968 /Vol. II/). This edition is used throughout this study and will be cited as Eneas. All English translations of the Eneas are taken from Eneas: A Twelfth-Century French Romance, translated with an Introduction and Notes by John A. Yunck, Number XCIII Records of Civilization Sources and Studies (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974), cited hereafter as Yunck.

but profoundly moral and personal, responding not to the actions of a group of men or to the desires of the gods, but to the moral value of a single individual. Thus one man, Paris, initiates the disaster of the Trojan War by his dishonest misjudgment of the three goddesses, and one man, Eneas, succeeds in founding a new kingdom in Italy because of the moral improvement he has undergone during his exile.

Although there are still some gods represented in the Eneas, their function is generally allegorical rather than divine. That is, their role is to provide a named focus for the human behavior represented by that name, or to provide a pretext for human action. Thus, the events of the Eneas are initiated by Discord throwing the golden apple that incites the goddesses to demand the Judgment of Paris, and the conclusion of the Eneas is made possible by Amors shooting Lavine, forcing her to love Eneas (although not compelling her to declare her love). Discord and Amors are not fully fleshed deities with strong wills or motives to control human events. Amors is almost entirely a focus for the expression of the emotions of love in Lavine and Eneas, while Venus is the focus for the expression of the emotions of venereality in Eneas and Dido. Insofar as these allegorical figures act independently, they function like unmoved movers,² creating a pretext, an opportunity for

² As we will see, the psychology of the Eneas is such that the stimulus for an action comes from outside of the person; the choice of the action comes from within, as when Discord and Amors stimulate situations in which human choices must then be made. Compare: "the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended, 'and thus the desirable thing apprehended is a mover which is not moved,' as the Philosopher [e.g., Aristotle] says," The Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, revised by Daniel J. Sullivan, in Great Books of the Western World, ed. R. M. Hutchens, nos. 19 and 20 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), I, 428.

human choice and action to develop. At no point do these gods compel human action; while they may tempt, they do not control human behavior.

The author of the Eneas has taken the story material from the Aeneid, eliminated most of the controlling actions of the pagan gods,³ replaced them with a typically medieval paradigm of fall and redemption, and restructured the story to fit very neatly into this genuinely new and morally significant pattern. This restructured story has retained one classical god, Venus, who operates as an all-pervasive influence rather than a person in most cases, and the spread of venereal behavior from Venus to Eneas himself is one of the more interesting side-effects of this change.⁴ The very important figure of Amors was not present in the Aeneid, and has been added to the Eneas, where the theme of love is critical to the moralized world-view presented.

In order to assess what the author of the Eneas has done with the Aeneid, we must consider how the internal structure of his new poem is developed along lines that are quite different from those of the Aeneid,

³ Raymond Cormier sums up this removal of the gods very nicely: "the Eneas 'desacralizes' its source . . . the motivations are moved from the divine to the human level. . . . by means of censorship, or a rationalizing process, elements which refer to divine intervention in the Aeneid are left out, e.g. the prophecy to Latinus that Lavinia will marry a stranger is omitted . . . a continuous 'straightening out' of the narrative occurs, at times simplifying, at times adding information in order to explain motivation." in One Heart One Mind: The Rebirth of Virgil's Hero in Medieval French Romance, Romance Monographs, Inc., No. 3 (University, Mississippi: Romance Monographs, Inc., 1973), p. 110. We will attempt to observe the mechanics of these changes and how they function to help restructure the Aeneid into the Eneas.

⁴ I am calling this shifting of the role and attributes of a god to a human character assimilation, and we will see how Junoesque attitudes are assimilated to Turnus, Camile and the Queen, while those of Venus are assimilated to Paris, Eneas and Dido.

based on moral organizing principles and perceptions that are not those of Virgil (whose organizing perceptions were more religious than moral), but those of a twelfth-century European. He has, of course, incorporated material from Ovid as well as from Virgil,⁵ but it is all included for definite artistic purposes, to fully analyze the fall and rise of a medieval hero--Eneas. Before dismissing love scenes, or any scenes, as mere rhetoric,⁶ we should examine them carefully in relation to the structure of the poem as a whole, in order to understand why they are there.⁷

The basic principle underlying the reorganization in the Eneas is the concept of human responsibility and free will.⁸ This was a concept

⁵ Edmond Faral, in "Ovide et quelques autres Sources du Roman d' Eneas," in his Recherches sur les Sources latines des Contes et Romans Courtois du Moyen Age (1913; rpt. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1967), pp. 73-157, comments, discussing the Lavine episode, that the author of the Eneas has followed Ovid "pas à pas," in his development of the love story (p. 126).

⁶ In "Camilla, or the Rebirth of the Sublime," in Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages, trans. Ralph Manheim, Bollingen Series LXXIV (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1965), pp. 181-233, Erich Auerbach remarks that in contrast to the sublime style of Virgil, "The French poet has utterly destroyed all this by diluting it with long moralistic and ornamental descriptions" (p. 191). I hope to show that these descriptions do not in fact dilute, but constitute much of the structure of the Eneas.

⁷ Faral, in "Les Commencements du Roman Courtois français," in Recherches, pp. 391-419, indicates that many additions to the Eneas indicate a clerical origin for the poet, and he attributes such additions primarily to a taste of the author "pour les descriptions merveilleuses" (p. 411).

⁸ Etienne Gilson, in The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Gifford Lectures 1931-32, trans. by A. H. Downes (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 322, stresses that "all Christian ethics of the Middle Ages, like those of the Fathers that inspired them, have their necessary basis in the doctrine of an indestructible free will."

of only secondary importance in the Aeneid, but it is of primary importance to the development of the Eneas. Around this difference, other differences have developed, which show how men, not gods, act to cause events to happen. A second major principle of underlying change is the transfer of the sexual principle from Venus to Eneas, her son, which makes him into a tainted man greatly in need of redemption, both from within and from without. The battle of Amors, or of Venus, is finally an internal battle, in which a human will must make a choice, and live by the consequences of that choice.

We will examine the reorganization of the Eneas, beginning with the opening passages of the poem, where Troy is destroyed, Eneas flees, and then we are told the reason for the fall of Troy: the Judgment of Paris. We should note in passing that the experiences which Eneas will undergo are caused by the decision of Paris, not by his own decision, and yet he will have to live out the consequences of Paris' decision until another decision by another person, that of Lavine to declare her love to him, aids him to improve sufficiently in both strength and valor to conquer Turnus and win love and a kingdom.

The first four lines of the Eneas tell us why Troy was destroyed:⁹

⁹ Albert Pauphilet, in "L'Antiquité et Énéas," in his Le Legs du Moyen Age: Études de Littérature Médiévale, Bibliothèque Elzevirienne, Nouvelle série, Études et Documents (Melun: Librairie d'Argences, 1950), pp. 91-106 (this chapter is an expansion of an earlier work, "Eneas et Enée," Romania LV [1929], pp. 195-213), remarks that the French poet had changed the opening from that of Virgil, which was in media res, because "notre auteur a estimé que c'était là un arrangement trop subtil pour ses lecteurs, et de la matière du récit d'Enée il a composé un court et plat prologue qui remet les choses en ordre" (p. 95). However, the fall of Troy and the Judgment of Paris have been placed at the beginning of the Eneas because they provide the first cause and effect of the story, and as such are of great interest and importance to the rational mind of the author.

Quant Menelaus ot Troie asise,
 onc n'en torna tresqu'il l'ot prise,
 gasta la terre et tot lo regne
 por la vanjance de sa fenne. (Eneas 1-4)

(When Menelaus had besieged Troy, he never departed until he had captured it, laid waste the land and all the kingdom, in vengeance for his wife. /Yunck, p. 55/)

A simple matter of revenge for wife-stealing. There are no mitigating circumstances in this poem. Helen is not chastised as guilty and the Trojans are not represented as supporting the decision of Paris. It is strictly one man's crime and one man's revenge, during which a city is destroyed.

The moral issue is clear from the beginning. Then we see Venus warn Eneas to flee, which he does, carefully gathering as much wealth as he can to take with him, and not really putting any effort into an attempt to save Troy. He will later be criticized as a faithless coward by Lavine's mother, and not without good reason. Then we are told that Juno hates him because of the Judgment of Paris.

Although Juno will disappear from the poem after stirring up the storm that sends the Trojans to Carthage, her characteristic qualities of concern with Law and Order righteousness and her hatred of offenses against proper legal marriage will remain, acted out in the persons of Turnus and Lavine's mother. We are told precisely why Juno is against the Trojans:

del jugemant que fist Paris:
 por lui haoit tot le país. (Eneas 97-98)

(because of the judgment which Paris had made: on his account she hated the whole country. /Yunck, p. 57/)

Gone are Virgil's ambiguities, as well as the political concerns of his Juno, who was as interested in protecting Carthage as in punishing the Trojans. In the world of the Eneas the action of one man is quite sufficient cause to produce the perpetual hatred of a god against an entire people, as the example of Adam and Eve makes perfectly clear. In the Judgment of Paris, the power of the goddesses is downgraded, while the importance of the human being, Paris, is increased by emphasizing the excellence of his judgment (Eneas 114-16). However, Paris, the excellent man of excellent judgment, is also tricky and greedy and used his reasoning powers to attempt to outwit the goddesses, asking them to return on the third day for his judgment:

Par grant angin lo fist Paris,
 que il lor a lo terme mis:
 porpansa soi que antretant
 l'an vanroient ofres avant,
 et porroit an de son prou faire. (Eneas 131-35)

(When he put them to a delay Paris was playing a clever trick. He thought to himself that meanwhile they might come to him with offers, and he could turn them to his profit. /Yunck, p. 58/)

He is correct, and the goddesses come secretly and offer him bribes which represent their attributes as deities. Juno offers him wealth; Pallas Athena offers him bravery and strength in battle; and Venus offers him the most beautiful woman in the world. Paris completes the perversion of his reason and judgment by choosing the most beautiful goddess not by looking at the goddesses themselves, but only by reference to the bribes offered by each goddess:

des ofres qu'els li font
 se porpansa an maint androit
 al quel de ces trois se tenroit;
 car molt coveita la richece
 et molt desirra la proece,
 mais molt li plot la feme plus
 que promise li ot Venus. (Eneas 162-68)

(After the offers which they made him, he considered in many ways with which of these three he should hold, for he coveted wealth greatly and desired prowess much; but far more was he pleased by the woman whom Venus had promised him. /Yunck, p. 58/)

This scene makes explicit how Paris, the man of good judgment, uses his reason only to support his greed, trick the goddesses, and weigh pleasures. At no point does he consider the possible consequences of deceiving goddesses. His only consideration is which of the three bribes is most pleasing to him. Paris indeed makes a choice, but to call it a judgment is rather a farce; it is based on desire, not on reason, as a judgment should be, and Paris has quite willfully perverted his reason to support his greedy desires. He chooses Venus, "qui la bataille d'amor tient" (Eneas 156); ("she who holds sway over the army of love" /Yunck, p. 58/). Venus and her battle of love will dominate the entire Eneas, as is quite fitting for a story whose first cause is the perverse choice of Venus by Paris.¹⁰ Venus rewards Paris by giving Helen to him, and

¹⁰ Venus is not necessarily, or not exclusively, destructive, but rather of a complex, double nature, as George Economou points out in "The Two Venuses and Courtly Love," in In Pursuit of Perfection: Courtly Love in Medieval Literature, eds. Joan M. Ferrante and George D. Economou, National University Publications (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1975), pp. 17-50: "The basic opposition of constructive, natural love and destructive, sinful love that the double Venus tradition conveys, is as fundamental to the courtly lyric and romance as it is to allegory or didactic literature" (p. 20). In the Eneas Venus is primarily negative, while Amors stimulates the positive aspects of love.

because of this judgment Pallas and Juno are enraged and hate all the Trojans "por sol l'acheison de Paris" (Eneas 181); ("for the act of Paris alone" [Yunck, p. 59]). We see no more of Juno and Pallas after this, except in the next few lines when Juno causes the storm that sends the Trojans to Carthage. Venus herself becomes a faded presence, having very little direct power. Paris only appears after this episode as an occasional example of a bad kind of love. However, the patterns of this situation, the conflict between the goddess-characteristics, and the perverted choice of Venus, based on the chooser's greed and desire, not on the inherent worth of the object, pervade the entire poem, as does the theme of giving a woman away, as we will see when we consider the role of Lavine.

Paris' bad choice or misjudgment was unequivocally the act of a human being, not of a god controlling events. Let us now follow the path of the hero, Venus-contaminated Eneas, as he acts out the deeds which Lavine's mother will accuse him of later in the poem. Our first view of Eneas is not as a culture hero, but as a rich man, warned by his mother to flee Troy, and carefully gathering his possessions to take along with him. Venus commands Eneas:

sanz demorance
s'en tort, ainz quel prengnent li Gré,
et ce li comandent li dé
que il aut la contree querre
dunt Dardanus vint an la terre. (Eneas 36-40)

(to depart without delay, before the Greeks should seize him.
The gods commanded him thus: that he should go in quest of the
country from which Dardanus . . . came to this land. [Yunck,
p. 55])

Before we confuse this with the orders of destiny which Aeneas received

from the gods, it is necessary to point out that Eneas later takes a vote among his people as to whether they should flee or fight, and he is quite willing to abide by their wishes, whatever his mother told him to do (Eneas 64-69). Eneas also takes a vote when his mother suggests that he seek out King Euander (Eneas 4565-95), and here too he is willing to let his followers' wishes take precedence over the advice of a god. Even more important, although Eneas leaves Dido, saying that a message from the gods has ordered him to go, she points out that if he really loved her, he would not leave, whatever the gods ordered (Eneas 1828-30), and much later, when he has finally experienced genuine Amors for the first time, after falling in love with Lavine, he says that if he had felt for Dido what he now feels for Lavine, he would never have left her. This seems to discount the importance of orders from the gods (Eneas 9031-45). So, in the context of this poem, we must view Eneas' flight from Troy not unlike the way that the mother of Lavine views it, as cowardice, treachery, and greed.¹¹

As Eneas prepares to flee Troy, his thoughts are not at all on saving the city, or even revenge, but merely on saving his possessions and people (Eneas 42-56).¹² Not even Anchises is mentioned until after all

¹¹ Eneas had a bad reputation in the Middle Ages, stemming at least partially from his role in the betrayal of Troy as related by Dictys Cretensis. On this see Waller Wigginton, "The Nature and Significance of the Late Medieval Troy Story: A Study of Guido Delle Colonne's Historia Destructionis Troiae," Diss. Rutgers 1965, p. 37. And indeed, the fifth line of the Eneas is "La cité prist par traïson," although it does not specify whose treason.

¹² Cormier indicates that the author of the Eneas is "painfully aware of the two main views of Aeneas in the Middle Ages--brave, undaunted hero and effeminate, homosexual coward" and he "endeavors to reconcile them" (p. 228).

the treasures are safely packed. The Eneas of the Middle Ages had a bad reputation, and we can see it continued in this unflattering portrayal of a man fleeing his falling city with all of his treasures and three thousand knights. Juno and Pallas may hate him because he is a Trojan and thus under the stain of Paris' Judgment, but Eneas seems so far to rather justify their distaste.

After he lands in Libya, Eneas sends out messengers who proceed in the typical fashion of an interior adventure,¹³ wandering through a deserted wilderness until "il antrent en un santer; / de cel ist un chemin plener" (Eneas 371-72); ("they entered a pathway. From this ran a broad highway" [Yunck, p. 63]). This broad road in the midst of the wilderness leads, naturally, straight into Carthage, a kind of fairyland with wonderful walls, wonderful treasures, and a very tricky queen, Dido, who acquired her land using "grant angin" (Eneas 393), the same property of clever deceit that Paris used to outwit the three goddesses. Being a city which was the province of Juno in the Aeneid, Carthage is exceedingly rich, an often negative trait in this poem (e.g., Eneas 454-58).¹⁴

¹³ The predominantly moral structure of the Eneas leads to a tendency to blend characters with respect to moral traits. That is, various persons besides Eneas act out the role of cowardly Trojans (e.g., Nisus and Eurialus, the Trojans who are fleeing when Pallas taunts them, etc.), or of treacherous Trojans (e.g., Ascanius' behavior in killing and butchering the stag). Similarly, a group of messengers can be sent to wander through a wilderness in search of aventure and this is a moral parallel for Eneas doing so.

¹⁴ Faral, in "Le Merveilleux et ses sources dans les descriptions des romans français du XII^e siècle," in Recherches, pp. 307-88), describes how the poets of the old romances transformed oriental objects into wonders (p. 378). However, he does not examine the purpose of these luxurious and almost mythic descriptions, nor does he deal with their often negative values, as in Carthage, Camille's tomb, and the wealth Eneas brings away from Troy. He rather finds these descriptions to be almost unconscious survivals of pagan life, while they are in fact most con-

Indeed, our very last glimpse of Juno in the Eneas is in her temple in the midst of Carthage, "molt estoit riche a desmesure" (Eneas 517); ("rich beyond measure" /Yunck, p. 667). Here, in the midst of this land of wealth, wonders, and sexuality, the poet gives an apostrophe to Fortune which is most appropriate to this episode, although not to the poem as a whole, and is not a dominant theme in the later development of Eneas after leaving Carthage:¹⁵

Molt li estoit propre fortune:
fortune lo ra esbaudi,
qui de devant l'avoit marri. (Eneas 674-76)

(Fortune was very favorable to him; fortune, which before had afflicted him, was now encouraging him. /Yunck, p. 697)

As we saw, the messengers wandered through wilderness to find Carthage,

scious negative exempla of greed and pagan luxuria: :De l'antiquité païenne, on recontre, dans les descriptions de romans, les survivances les plus inattendues. Contre l'habitude des traducteurs ou adaptateurs . . . il arrive, par une singulière inconséquence, que, dans ces descriptions, le merveilleux mythologique, non seulement subsiste, mais même est introduit là où il n'était pas justifié par l'imitation d'un original antique" (p. 381). It is precisely the pagan and mythological element that is of overwhelming importance for the wonders of the Eneas.

¹⁵ Howard Patch, in The Goddess Fortuna in Mediaeval Literature (1927; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, 1967), remarks that Fortune "is queen; she frequents the court; she controls all mundane affairs and gives all worldly gifts; she is responsible for tragedy in the higher as well as in the more primitive sense of the word . . ." (p. 80). The Dido episode is an epitome of the workings of Fortune, who "is particularly noted for separating lovers.

"Thus Fortuna actually does or undoes the work of the God of Love. . . . in many ways her traits . . . resemble those of the love deity. Fortune is blind, and slings arrows or darts at her victims. These divinities, Fortune and Love, become sufficiently identified for Venus to take over the characteristics of her sister goddess . . ." (p. 96).

and having found that city of wealth, wonders and Dido, the author underlines, for the only time in the poem, the theme of Fortune. Eneas and his Trojans, cut loose from the pre-ruined situation of Troy before Paris, are indeed in the lap of Fortune, and their experiences are no more lasting or desirable than the turning of her wheel.¹⁶

Not only Fortune, but the unreasonable behavior that exposes one to Fortune's worst effects, is crucial to the Dido episode in the Eneas. Where Virgil gives us a spare and tactful description of how Cupid, disguised as Ascanius, poisons Dido with a caress that does not appear indecent, in the Eneas the scene is turned into a farce which strongly underscores both the carelessness of Eneas and Dido and the lascivious nature of both of them, especially Dido. There is no Cupid here, only Ascanius, whom Venus has deliberately kissed with a kiss that can transmit or awaken love: "an cel baisier li a doné / de faire amer grant poësté" (Eneas 773-74); ("With this kiss she gave him great power to cause love" [Yunck, p. 717]). Our twelfth-century Dido deals with Ascanius in a way that is unrestrained, to say the least:

acola lo, soëf lo tint,
molt lo baisa estroitement.
El se maine molt malement:
molt fait que fole qui l'atoche
envers son vis ne a sa boche:
Venus i ot sa flame mise. (Eneas 804-09)

¹⁶ Patch comments that "The wheel, then, in the Middle Ages means relative exaltation or humiliation in worldly dignity. It is turned by Fortune, and man is often actually attached to the rim, where he suffers the consequent changes of position. It may or may not stop, according to your own idea of the matter; it probably goes amiss somehow. But there seems to be a notion that it is your own fault if you suffer, because you have a certain control over the question whether you will get on the wheel at all" (The Goddess Fortuna, p. 159).

(She embraced him, held him gently, and kissed him very closely. In this she acted most unwisely; whoever touched him around his face or his mouth was acting much the fool, for Venus had placed her fire there. (Yunck, p. 727))

There is no ambiguity here about poor Dido. She behaves in a foolish and unrestrained manner and is the means of her own destruction. Eneas too is somewhat foolish, but less compulsive than Dido. However, he is definitely an active participant in the scene. As a son of Venus he has venereal qualities that are stressed in the Eneas, so he is not passive here in the kiss and kiss again game which Venus stimulates, but does not control, as Eneas and Dido take turns kissing Ascanius:

Donc lo rebaisa Eneas
et donc Dido aneslopas;
de l'un an l'autre anbat l'amor,
chascuns en boit bien a son tor;
qui plus le bese plus an boit.
C'est Dido qui plus fole estoit. (Eneas 815-20)

(Eneas in turn kissed him, and then Dido kissed him again quickly. Love hastened from the one to the other; each in turn drank deeply of it: whoever kissed him more drank more of it. It was Dido who was the more maddened. (Yunck, p. 727))

These people are responsible for their behavior, and they will be blamed for the consequences of it, even though they do not yet know what those consequences may be, just as Paris had no notion of the consequences of his deceitful choice of Venus. If we look at the Aeneid here for a comparison we find Cupid, disguised as Ascanius, deceiving both Aeneas and Dido, but only poisoning Dido, not Aeneas, with love, and that by means really beyond her control:

praecipue infelix, pesti devota futurae,
 expleri mentem nequit ardescitque tuendo
 Phoenissa, et pariter puero donisque movetur.
 ille ubi complexu Aeneae colloque pependit
 et magnum falsi implevit genitoris amorem,
 reginam petit. haec oculis, haec pectore toto
 haeret et interdum gremio foveat, inscia Dido,
 insidat quantus miserae deus. (Aeneid I.712-19)

(Above all, the unhappy Phoenician, doomed to impending ruin, cannot satiate her soul, but takes fire as she gazes, thrilled alike by the boy and by the gifts. He, when he has hung in embrace on Aeneas' neck and satisfied the deluded father's deep love, goes to the queen. She with her eyes, with all her heart clings to him and anon fondles him in her bosom, knowing not, poor Dido, how great a god settles there to her sorrow.)

Hints are here for the development in the Eneas. Dido loves the gifts as well as the boy. She is impressionable and perhaps a bit too friendly to a passing stranger with an obvious mission. But there is the presence of a god, Cupid. And there is no way that she could have protected herself; of that Virgil leaves us quite sure. The Dido of the Eneas, far in a magical city in the midst of the wilderness, is an entirely different creature, and her encounter with Ascanius, the Venus kiss, and Eneas is rather a caricature than a sympathetic portrayal of a helpless lady. Our new Dido is so carried away by lack of self-control that she kisses Ascanius until suppertime (Eneas 823-25).

The entire Dido episode in the Eneas is developed to show Dido as responsible for her behavior, although poisoned by love, which was largely her own fault. Because there is no Juno to semi-legalize the love-making in the cave, as in the Aeneid, Dido is left with no defense for her fornication with Eneas, which involved breaking faith with her dead

husband, a very serious offense in the world of the Eneas.¹⁷

The significance of the Dido episode in the Eneas is somewhat different from that in the Aeneid. Where the Aeneid developed it as a conflict between the commands of the gods and the inclinations of personal pleasure, in the Eneas the episode has been modulated into a study in the grotesque immorality of the wrong kind of love, the physical, loveless love of passion without the restraint of law. It will be contrasted, in the Lavine episode, to the rigid code of law that controls the behavior of those under the influence of the benevolent aspect of Amors. There are two kinds of love in the Eneas, one destructive and sinful, the other constructive and morally good. And much of the poem has been restructured to emphasize the contrast between the two kinds of love, and how Eneas, as a son of Venus, participated in both kinds, the bad first, and then the good. One clue to the structural changes is the removal of Amors (or his twin brother Cupid) from the scene where Dido falls in love with Eneas. In the Eneas there has been a separation made functionally between Venus and Amors as a god. We see the subjective experience of Amors discussed in the Dido episode, but the only specific action by Amors as a god occurs when he shoots Lavine with an arrow to cause her to love Eneas. The Dido episode is strictly in the realm of the bad, lascivious and destructive passion of Venus, while the arrow of Amors teaches Lavine true love and the rigid code of laws of the true lover. Amors as

¹⁷ Rosemarie Jones, in The Theme of Love in the "Romans d'Antiquite" (London: The Modern Humanities Research Assn., 1972), comments on "the enormity of Dido's crime in breaking faith with her former husband . . . Although it was the custom for widows of landowners to remarry . . . in this case Dido's vow of faithfulness to Sychaeus takes precedence over such a consideration" (pp. 39-40).

a god evidently carries a potential for lawful behavior which can control or channel the lust of Venus.

The emphasis in the Dido episode is on what we would call lust, not on love per se. There is stress on the specifically physical nature of Dido's passion:

et quant ce est qu'ele s'oblíe,
ansamble lui quide gesir,
antre ses braz tot nu tenir. (Eneas 1236-38)

(and when she happens to forget herself she thinks that she is lying together with him, held all naked in his arms. Yunck, p. 807)

The arguments that Anna gives Dido to urge her to break her vow to her dead husband are a travesty of disrespect for the dead:

"Molt a ici foles amors.
Quant bien ja mes ne vos puet faire,
por coi volez por lui mal traire?
Ja mes n'avroiz nul bien del mort:
faites del vif vostre deport." (Eneas 1336-40)

("You have here a very foolish love. Since he can surely never do anything for you, why do you wish to suffer sorrow for him? Never will you have any good from the dead: take your pleasure in the living." Yunck, p. 837)

Similarly, the Junoless scene in the cave is presented with great overt disapproval and no sympathy whatsoever for Dido, except the remark that she had not committed fornication until then, since the death of her husband. She and Eneas are out hunting, a storm begins, and they flee to a cave, where:

il fait de li ce que lui sanble,
ne li fait mie trop grant force,
ne la raïne ne s'estorce,

tot li consent sa volenté;
 pièça qu'el l'avoit desirré. (Eneas 1522-26)

(He does with her what he wishes, nor does he use very much force at all, nor does the queen resist: she consents to him with all her will, for she has long desired him. Yunck, p. 877)

Again we see that Dido acted freely, doing just what she wanted to do; she chose to commit fornication, uncompelled by any god. Her free will, and thus her guilt, are assured, although her actions are responses to her desires, not to the advice and guidance of reason. Again we have the pattern of the Judgment of Paris, where although gods are involved, it is the free, impulsive and lustful decision of a human being that is the cause of the event and thus, justly, of the disasters to follow.¹⁸

Just as Dido has committed fornication with her free will, so also has Eneas, and because of this he will be blamed, not for the fornication, but for leaving Dido, by Lavine's mother. Eneas, being more involved in the ways of Venus than was Aeneas, is much sorrier to have to leave Dido when he receives a message from the gods telling him to leave Carthage. He was not under an enchantment, but definitely doing what he

¹⁸ Pauphilet sees this increased freedom and guilt of Dido as a weakening of Virgil's poem, when it is in fact one of the foundations of the new, moral (and aesthetically sophisticated) Eneas. According to Pauphilet, the author of the Eneas "dimune autant qu'il le peut le rôle des Dieux païens; mais il compromet ainsi l'équilibre savant du poème latine. La Didon virgilienne apparaissait comme une victime ignorante des ruses des Dieux, elle en était moins responsable de sa faute et de son malheur, et le poème s'orientait d'autant mieux vers la pitié finale: pourquoi des ressentiments entre les hommes, quand les Dieux ont tout conduit? La Didon française n'a plus les mêmes excuses, elle est plus libre, partant plus responsable . . ." (p. 101).

wanted to do.

Where Aeneas loses almost all interest in Dido the moment Mercury tells him to leave her, Eneas is concerned about Dido's welfare, a sign of his involvement with her that makes it even more shameful from the point of view of love to leave her. Eneas is aware that he must obey the gods, but he also fears for Dido, "qu'el ne s'ocie" (Eneas 1636); ("lest she kill herself" /Yunck, p. 89/). Despite this greater sensitivity to the lady's needs, as in the Aeneid there is something inadequate about Eneas' feeling for Dido, as she points out:

"ge muir d'amor, il ne s'en sent,
il est en pes, ge ai les mals;
amors n'est pas vers moi loials,
quant ne senton comunement.
Se il sentist ce que ge sent,
qu'il amast moi si com ge lui,
ne partisson ja mes andui." (Eneas 1824-30)

("I am dying of love, he feels none of it; he is at peace, I am full of woe. Love is not loyal to me, since we do not feel alike. If he felt what I feel and loved me as I love him, the two of us would never part." /Yunck, p. 93/)

Just as Eneas was somewhat cowardly and greedy when he fled from Troy, so here his love for Dido, although not compelled by a god, is less than adequate. Indeed, he has not yet learned to love; that will only come after Lavine sends her Amors-arrow message of love to him. So far we have seen an Eneas who does mostly what he pleases, as do all of the characters in this poem, but without very much use of reason and good judgment. The gods have promised him a future kingdom, but they are doing very little to help him to get there. Missing Dido, although not loving her, Eneas leaves Carthage. Dido, forgiving Eneas, instead of cursing him, kills herself, saying, "'Il m'a ocise a molt grant tort; /

ge li pardoins ici ma mort'" (Eneas 2063-64); ("He has killed me most wrongly, but I here pardon him my death" /Yunck, p. 987). Why does Dido forgive Eneas for her death? Because she, a person with free will, is responsible for her own actions. We see this stressed in Hades, where she is not able to go to her dead husband for comfort, but turns away from him in shame. It is not that Eneas behaved well with Dido, but that she was responsible for her own mistakes.¹⁹

Dido's epitaph gives further emphasis to her foolishness, and behavior that did not obey her reason (Eneas 2139-44). Like Paris, Dido had been wise. Like Paris, she had let desire overcome her use of reason and had acted unwisely, choosing the way of Venus without the restraint of good judgment. And, like Paris, Dido was destroyed by the results of her free choice and action. Eneas, although a child of Venus, was less enmeshed in the kiss of Venus than was Dido, and thus he can escape with his life, although that life is not yet of much value.

The next episode, which is Eneas' journey through Hades, develops parallels in human shamefulness between Dido and Eneas, who are both shamed by their respective pasts. First we are shown Dido's shame:

enz en un bois s'en est foïe
ou Sicheüs ses sire estoit,
qui en s'amor a maior droit.
Por ce qu'el li avoit mentie
la foi qu'el li avoit plevie,

¹⁹ Cormier comments on Dido's death that "Love's folly has obliterated wisdom and courage, but the murderous traitor--and this does seem abrupt in the text (v. 2064) since there is no real warning--is pardoned" (p. 89). However, Eneas is not murderous, since Dido has free will and chooses to kill herself. Eneas could have refused the command of the gods, but that is a matter of true love (which he has not yet experienced), not of murder.

ne s'osoit pas ver lui torner,
 ne ne l'osot mie esgarder,
 ne pres de lui ne s'aprismot:
 por son forfeit se vergondot. (Eneas 2654-62)

(She fled into a wood where her lord Sicheus was, who had a better right to her love. Because she had belied the faith she had pledged to Sicheus, she did not dare turn toward him, nor even to look at him at all, nor approach near him. By her misdeed she was dishonored. /Yunck, p. 109/)

Virgil had allowed his less guilty Dido the comfort of the company of her husband in Hades. However, the Dido of the Eneas was not manipulated by the gods, but acted freely in the face of temptation, and thus is guilty indeed, and not deserving of her husband's love.

Immediately after this scene Eneas comes to where the dead Trojan warriors are gathered in a field, and he cannot face them:

Ne lor osot torner lo vis,
 tant com pooit se resconsot
 et anvers ols se vergondot,
 por ce qu'il s'en enbla fuitis
 d'entr'als, quant il furent ocis. (Eneas 2680-84)

(Eneas did not dare turn his face to them but hid himself as well as he could, and felt ashamed in their presence, because he had stolen away from them as a fugitive when they were killed. /Yunck, p. 110/)

The parallel use of "torner" and "vergon-dot" in the two consecutive passages emphasizes the moral taint of both Eneas and Dido. In the Aeneid Aeneas has no problem meeting the Trojan dead, but he is a very different man from the Venus-tainted Eneas.

The next situation which develops the theme of man's will and the very weakened will of the gods is that where King Latinus greets the messengers from Eneas, and tells them about his only child, Lavine:

"Ge l'ai promise estre mon gré
 et ancontre ma volante
 a un prince de cest païs;
 Turnus a a non li marchis;
 ma moillier vielt qu'il ait mon regne,
 et Lavine ma fille a fegne,
 mais sorti est et destiné
 et tuit li deu ont creanté
 que uns estranges hom l'avra,
 de cui real ligniee istra." (Eneas 3233-42)

("Without wishing it, indeed against my will, I have promised her to a prince of this country, a marquis whose name is Turnus. My wife wishes him to have my kingdom and Lavine, my daughter, as his wife; but it is fated and destined, and all the gods have decreed, that a foreign man shall have her, and from them a royal line will issue." /Yunck, p. 120/)

In the Aeneid there had been no marriage promise because there were signs from the gods that forbade it, but here the promise has been made by the king, although against his will. Of his own will, Latinus wants to give away Lavine and the kingdom to Eneas (Eneas 3252-54). However, there is a most important value difference here between the Aeneid and the Eneas. The Aeneid is organized around the founding of Rome and Lavinia is only incidental to that goal. But the Eneas is organized around the (secular) redemption of Eneas through both his own development and through Lavine's gift of Amors. This is a world scheme in which no person can give away another person as a gift. The entire point of the story of Lavine is that she freely gives herself to Eneas, after she is struck by Amors and has reasoned out the consequences of her actions.²⁰ In short,

²⁰ Here we see the theme of giving a woman away without consulting her will that is first presented in the Judgment of Paris when Venus gives Helen to Paris as a prize or bribe. Just as Venus behaved badly and Paris did wrong, so is the struggle over giving Lavine away wrong. As a free person, she should be allowed to dispose of her own emotions and person. Incidentally, this is a measure of the idealism and optimism of this story, written in a world where kings' daughters most certainly

there is something very wrong with the sudden eager desire of Latinus to give away his daughter, just as there is something wrong with the desire of Turnus to fight for her possession. Latinus' motive is clearly desire, not piety or careful thought:

Li rois Latins se porpensa
que sa fille mariera;
molt desirrot an son corage
del Troïen lo mariage. (Eneas 3277-80)

(King Latinus thought that he would arrange a marriage for his daughter, and in his heart he greatly desired the marriage with the Trojan. /Yunck, p. 121/)

However, the Queen does not want to give Lavine to Eneas. She wants to give her to Turnus, another morally incorrect attitude. And she proceeds to give a speech containing excellent reasons never to trust a Trojan, beginning with Paris' abduction of Helen and the consequent Trojan War. Trojans are faithless, lawless and untrustworthy. She also brings up Eneas' desertion of Dido as proof that Eneas cannot be trusted. Indeed, although the Queen in the Aeneid is a raving madwoman manipulated by a terrible goddess, Allecto, the Queen in the Eneas presents reasons against the marriage of Eneas to Lavine that are based on evidence that we know to be true, while the desire of the King to marry Lavine to Eneas is based on his claiming to know the will of the gods (Eneas 3243-48), although there is no clear evidence of that will within the poem. The King knows what the gods want, but he has no proof. The Queen knows that the Trojans are a bad lot, and has plenty of firm proof, and will be -----

did not have the freedom to marry according to the principle of true love.

shown to be largely correct as the poem continues. She points out correctly that "'Li Troïen n'ont giens de foi, / ne il ne tiennent nule loi'" (Eneas 3289-90); ("the Trojans have no honor at all, nor do they hold to any law'" /Yunck, p. 1217). She reminds Lavine that the theft of Helen by Paris was the cause of the Trojan War, which destroyed Troy and insists that she will never have any faith in the Trojans (Eneas 3291-98). Where the Aeneid did not develop this aspect of the Trojan story, except in the extreme hatred of Juno for the Trojans, the Eneas has already shown us how the Trojans were faithless, fled from their city without attempting to defend it, and how Eneas was involved freely in a lawless love with Dido. The situation here is more balanced for conflict between Turnus and Eneas than it was in the Aeneid, and we shall soon see further excellent reasons why the Trojans are a bad lot. The Queen bemoans the fate of her daughter, and we can only feel that she has reason, especially as she complains that Eneas is a foreign exile "'qui s'en enbla par coardise / de la cité, quant al fu prise'" (Eneas 3365-66); ("one who stole forth from his city out of cowardice when it was captured'" /Yunck, p. 1227).

We will see further examples of the continuing lawlessness of the Trojans in the murder, and plunder, and flaying of the stag after Ascanius shoots it. We will observe the cowardice of the Trojans when Nisus and Euryalus are killed because they panicked and fled instead of having the courage to remain still, and when Pallas has to insult and chide the Trojans who are once again attempting to flee from a battle. (In the Aeneid Pallas encourages his own men to fight; in the Eneas he taunts the Trojans for fleeing.) So far we cannot fault the behavior of the Queen who sends a message to Turnus, Lavine's legal fiancé, asking him

to come and defend what seem to be indeed his rights to the land and the lady. The Queen's failure of understanding will come not in her assessment of the past behavior of Eneas, but in her inadequate understanding of the nature and power of Amors to change a person and make him brave and noble and, in fact, finally worthy of love. She, like the King, thinks that one can give away a daughter to a husband as a gift, just as one can give away a castle or a kingdom. It is here that she is wrong. However, she is not necessarily more wrong than the King, who also tries to give Lavine away. Consequently, although Lavinia's mother in the Aeneid commits suicide, in the Eneas she does not.

Turnus too makes the error of thinking that a woman can be given like a gift, and his response to the news that Eneas is to have Lavine is that she has already been given to him along with the kingdom by King Latinus:

"Il m'en a fait pièça le don,
ne la perdrai mes sanz raison;
se cil la velt vers moi conquerre,
ja jor n'aie feme ne terre,
se ge vers lui ne la deffent." (Eneas 3463-67)

("He granted them to me long ago, and I will never let them go without reason. If this man wishes to seize her from me, may I never have wife or land unless I defend myself against him."
/Yunck, p. 124/)

Other than this basic misunderstanding about the value and rights of a woman, Turnus is not yet any worse than the other Latins. He points out correctly that he had done many services for the King, who was wrong to break his word to him (Eneas 3476 ff.). Where Turnus will go wrong is in trying to use other men's lives to win his personal vengeance against Eneas. But at this point he has not yet gotten involved in that problem

and is merely hoping for a pretext to fight a war against Eneas.

This pretext is provided by the behavior of Eneas' son, Ascanius. In the Aeneid the war in Italy is started by Allecto acting under orders from Juno. In the Eneas this same war starts because of an incident that is only partly chance, and largely the result of Ascanius' careless, insensitive and cruel behavior. He is portrayed in this incident as responsible for his actions and indifferent to their consequences, a sure pattern for trouble in the world of the Eneas. While Allecto manages the killing of the stag in the Aeneid by setting the dogs on its scent and then guiding Ascanius as she aids him to shoot the stag, there is no divine help in the Eneas. The event starts as an adventure, with the wandering into the woods pattern similar to that when the Trojans found the city of Carthage; this is the typical romance form for the onset of an experience that will constitute a trial of the man involved. Ascanius and a group of his peers go hunting:

Molt ont erré et chevalchié;
de lor chastel sont forsloigné,
tant qu'el bois antrent de Laurente.
Il errent parmi une sente,
une herde de bisches virent,
entre es espoisses la choisirent;
an cele herde ert asamblez
li cers qui si estoit privez,
que la meschine avoit norri.
Ascanius l'en a choisi. (Eneas 3581-90)

(They traveled and rode much, and went far from their camp until they entered the woods of Laurente. They were wandering along a path when they saw a herd of hinds grazing there among the thickets. Together with the herd was the deer that was so tame, which the maiden had raised.

Ascanius selected that deer from among the herd. (/Yunck, p. 127/)

It is by chance that they see ("virent") the herd of deer. But then, by

something more than mere chance, the Trojans "choisirent" the herd of deer, a term that can mean both see and choose.²¹ Then, Ascanius "a choisi" the stag among the herd of deer. This suggests that the very act of seeing here has something of human will or desire in it, and yet it is based on a chance occurrence. Chance is stressed in this episode by the transfer of the wandering from the stag to the Trojans. Whereas, in the Aeneid, there was only one stag, in the Eneas there is a herd of deer, among which the stag is seen and selected by Ascanius. In the Aeneid it is the stag which wanders in the forest, not the Trojans:

Hunc procul errantem rabidae venantis Iuli
 commovere canes, fluvio cum forte secundo
 deflueret ripaque aestus viridante levaret. (Aeneid VII.493-95)

(While far afield the stag was straying, the maddened hounds of the huntsman Iulus started him, as haply he floated down stream and cooled his heat on the grassy bank.)

Whereas Allecto took advantage of the accidental appearance of the stag to set up a pretext for war, in the Eneas it is the appearance of the Trojans that is really accidental, since they are the ones wandering in the woods. In the Aeneid, incited by Allecto, the dogs locate the stag and lead Ascanius to it, while in the Eneas Ascanius simply chances upon it. At this point the differences are intensified. In the Aeneid Ascanius, under guidance from a goddess, kills the deer and that is the end of

²¹ "Choisir" can mean either "1^o Apercevoir, remarquer, distinguer" or "2^o Choisir," according to the Dictionnaire de L'Ancien Français: jusqu'au milieu du XIV^e siècle, ed. A. J. Greimas (1968; 2nd. ed. Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1977), p. 113.

his involvement with it. But in the Eneas Ascanius goes on to butcher it for dinner. The seemingly grotesque details of the stag's service as a candelabra at dinner time is added to the Eneas to emphasize the elements of service and illumination of the wonderful stag, and this puts further stress upon the gross insensitivity and cruelty of Ascanius. No more than Paris did Ascanius dream of any bad consequences to his action, and indeed, up to this point he has not done anything for which he could be much blamed, except that he looked at the stag and did not comprehend that it was wonderful. However, as the episode continues, it develops with a brutality on the part of the Trojans, and especially Ascanius that only confirms the wrong that he did in shooting the stag, and further taints our image of the Trojans, especially Ascanius, who, by the story logic of the Eneas, is somewhat an extension of his father. Where in the Aeneid the first human death occurs by an unnamed person shooting an arrow (Aeneid VII.531-34), in the Eneas it is Ascanius himself who shoots the fatal arrow at a man who is chasing him (Eneas 3645-54). Here is no longer chance, but a deliberate choice, and we know exactly who is to blame for it. With truly amazing indelicacy, Ascanius then calls encouragement to his fellow Trojans:

"Que faites vos, franc chevalier?
 Li cers tarde a escorchier!
 /Ja i porrons tant demorer,
 que il n'iert mais cuiz al disner./
 Chascuns i fiere o s'espee!
 Nos i ferons bien fort pevree;
 a la viande doit l'an traire,
 car ce cele a chascuns a faire." (Eneas 3661-68)

("What are you doing, noble knights? The deer is waiting to be flayed! We can delay here so long that it will never be cooked for dinner. Let every man lay on with his sword, and we will

make here a good, strong pepper-sauce! Draw near to the meat, for everyone needs that!" (Yunck, p. 1287)

Since the love and service of the stag, as well as his beauty, have been more strongly emphasized in the Eneas, as compared to the Aeneid, we can only conclude that, whatever the hunting practices of the twelfth-century French knight, the behavior of Ascanius is meant to be gross and insensitive. He stresses the flaying and eating of a creature that is not only a pet, but a genuine wonder. And, although one might be tempted to counter, but Ascanius did not know that, the fact is that in the world of the Eneas, making a wrong choice does not have to be based on what you know. In fact, it is usually based on what you do not know, as we saw in the case of Dido.²²

Tirus and his men retreat to a little castle which they attempt to hold against the Trojans; however, they cannot maintain the position and have to flee, at which point the Trojans enter the deserted building and again behave with gross insensitivity and greed, seeking plunder:

Tote unt robee la maison,
si ont tant pris de garison,
trente somiers an ont chargié,
et puis ont lo cerf escorché. (Eneas 3757-60)

²² David Knowles, in The Evolution of Medieval Thought (New York: Vintage Books; Random House, 1962), p. 128, describes the view of moral theology in the twelfth century, "which placed moral goodness solely in the conformity of an act to the declared law of God, and which tended to see sin as the factual transgression of the law, even if unknown or misunderstood." A choice in the Eneas, such as that made in the Judgment of Paris, may have consequences that no one could guess at, but the person who makes that choice, although unknowing of the consequences, is still considered guilty and responsible for them. We will see this especially in the response of Eneas to the death of Pallas, where he accepts his guilt and responsibility for that death, although he could not have prevented it, because he had chosen to vow to protect Pallas.

(they plundered the whole house, and took so many provisions that they loaded thirty sumpter horses with them. Then they flayed the deer. /Yunck, p. 130/)

Once again it is Ascanius who is the worst of all, feeding the entrails of the wonderful stag to his dog, which the girl had tied up in a room, not even harming it, although Ascanius had killed her pet stag. The contrast is unmistakable between the behavior of the Trojans and that of the Latins (Eneas 3761-66). There is even more emphasis on the butchering of the wonderful stag:

Lo cerf ont desfait et chargié,
uns damoisiaus prist lo forchié
et uns autres porta la teste,
que il orent par grant poëste. (Eneas 3767-70)

(They cut up the deer and loaded it; one youth bore the fork with the beast's liver and lungs and another carried the head, which they had won by such great struggle. /Yunck, p. 130/)

This conquest of a stag is most sarcastic and gives one more unpleasant view of the behavior of Trojans. They are not even done for the day, but go on to plunder the entire countryside (Eneas 3771-81). This is not the behavior of men trying to establish themselves peacefully in a new country. And we should not dismiss this as the immature behavior of Ascanius alone. He asks Eneas for permission before going hunting and receives permission, along with a bodyguard of twenty companions, since Eneas knows that there is danger in the territory (Eneas 3570-72). Further, when Eneas hears that there is trouble, he sends another hundred men to help Ascanius (Eneas 3693-97). In the Aeneid Ascanius neither asks for or receives permission to go hunting, nor does he require a bodyguard, nor does Aeneas send reinforcements; young men simply pour out of the

Trojan camp on their own initiative (Aeneid VII.521-23). The author of the Eneas has restructured the situation to place more responsibility for what happens on both Eneas and Ascanius. This, of course, was inevitable, since we no longer have the goddess Allecto to stir up human passions. However, the author of the Eneas has deliberately shifted the emphasis to make the stag more wonderful than in the Aeneid, and thus more of a pity to be killed, and to make both Eneas and Ascanius more responsible for the killing of the stag and for the fighting and looting that follows. Further, the flaying of the stag, the feeding of the entrails to the dog, and the pillaging of the countryside leave us with no doubt that the Trojans have indeed been responsible for the war that is now beginning, although it is also clear that Turnus has been seeking a pretext to start one.

Let us just briefly consider the council where war is definitely decided upon and then go on to examine further sins of the Trojans, who are yet to be redeemed. Turnus points out to the barons that his rights have been impaired and that the King has broken his word to him. This, as we have seen, is quite true. He also stresses that the girl was given to him, and therefore cannot be taken away. This is a more questionable position, and probably wrong, but no more wrong than the King and Eneas, who are also involved in the giving and taking of an unconsenting girl.

However, at this point the barons are all on the side of Turnus, especially after what Ascanius and his friends have done to the countryside. King Latinus, a much weaker figure than in the Aeneid, merely withdraws from the entire situation, declaring that whoever won could take both the land and Lavine (Eneas 3879-80). Only during the war will

significant differences begin to develop in the respective positions of Turnus and Eneas which will eventually lead even the Latin barons to withdraw their support from Turnus and prove Eneas worthy of victory. When the conflict begins, one cannot feel much sympathy for Eneas.

Much of the next sequence is acted out with a high degree of symbolic value, particularly the characters and deaths of the two main allies, Camile and Pallas. In each of these deaths the character of the leader is tested, and Eneas passes, while Turnus fails. First we will consider the life and death of Camile, and how this constitutes a test of Turnus. Camile is developed by the Eneas poet as both an example of free will choosing wrongly, and of the corruption of sex-role reversal and the passionate greed for gold. She is gorgeous, golden, even wise. She is extremely wealthy and the main ally of Turnus. However, in this poem on the battles of love, she is an example of a reversal of the proper roles of man and woman that even shows up in her upside-down tomb, which is magnificent, but most precariously balanced. Camile is a warrior by day, a spotless queen by night:

Lo jor ert rois, la nuit raïne;
ja chanberiere ne meschine
anviron li le jor n'alast,
ne ja la nuit nus hom n'entrast
dedanz la chanbre ou ele estoit. (Eneas 3977-81)

(During the day she was king, but at night, queen; no chambermaid or handmaid ever went about her during the day, nor ever in the night did any man enter the chamber where she was.
/Yunck, p. 135/)

She cannot be accused justly of sexual impropriety, in the sense of having affairs with men, but she incarnates the sexual impropriety of a woman in the role of a man half of the time. She also loves golden orna-

ments and is greedy. Her greed causes her death and has as a consequence the destruction of the bravery of Turnus, which she to a great extent incorporates or personifies. There is much stress given to the gorgeous dress of Camile. She is described from line 3959 to line 4085, and most of the description is of her opulent clothing and beautiful appearance.

When the Trojans first see Camile and her female warriors in battle, they think that they are goddesses and fear to fight against them (Eneas 6984 ff.). However, once they realize that they are mortal women, they happily kill them. The woman warriors are very good at fighting and the Trojans begin to flee, until a Trojan, Tarcons, taunts the Trojans and Camile, both of whom seem to deserve his insults in the long run. This is not the only time we see the Trojans fleeing in battle. Pallas, too, taunts them for fleeing, shortly before he is killed. Tarcons goes on to insult Camile specifically, which is very dangerous, if not unchivalrous:

"Dame", fait il, "qui estes vos,
qui ci vos anbatez sor nos?
Noz chevaliers vos voi abatre.
Feme ne se doit pas combatre,
se par nuit non tot an gisant;
la puet fere home recreant;
mais ja prodom o les escuz
par feme ne sera vencuz." (Eneas 7073-80)

("Lady," he said, "who are you, that you do battle against us here? I see you striking down our knights, but a woman should not do battle, except at night, lying down; there she can defeat any man. But a bold man with a shield will never be defeated by a woman." [Yunck, p. 194])

He does not approve of a woman fighting as a man would, and his point of view is probably that of the author of the Eneas, as will become clear

when we consider the death and burial of Camile. Despite this, Camile is indeed extremely brave and an excellent warrior who will kill Tarcons as her response to his insults. Tarcons continues to attack Camile with specifically sexual insults about her being on the battlefield to sell herself for gold:

"Venistes ca por vos mostrer?
Ge ne vos voil pas acheter;
portant blanche vos voi et bloie;
quatre deniers ai ci de Troie,
qui sont molt bon de fin or tuit;
çaus vos donrai por mon deduit
une piece mener o vos." (Eneas 7089-95)

("Have you come here to show yourself off? I do not want to buy you. But nevertheless, I see that you are fair and blond. I have here four Trojan deniers, all of very good fine gold; I will give you these to have my pleasure with you a little while." /Yunck, pp. 194-95/)

This is outrageous, mortifies Camile, and she quickly kills him. Does this mean that she is no prostitute, because she killed her accuser? Yes and no. She is not selling her body for gold; however, she will very soon lose her life in her passionately greedy pursuit of a golden helmet. Camile, like Turnus, has values that are materialistic, and are a kind of perversion of love, not exactly prostitution, but not exactly ideal Amors either.²³ While the Aeneid allows ambiguity to obscure Camilla's motives for pursuing the golden priest, whom she does not in fact even kill, in the Eneas Camille pursues him solely to get his gold-

²³ Cormier points out that these materialistic values were outmoded at the time the Eneas was written: "Turnus' vocabulary is filled with words like rights, titles, claims, duties, obligations, promises. His concerns, in the light of the canons of taste in the second feudal age, are outmoded and materialistic" (p. 191).

en helmet for herself:

Camile a l'elme aperceü
al Troïen, qui riches fu,
porpansa soi que, s'el ne l'a,
malvesement se prisera. (Eneas 7177-80)

(Camille saw the Trojan's helmet, which was rich. She thought to herself that if she did not get it, she would value herself poorly. /Yunck, p. 196/)

Camile kills Cloreus, climbs down off her horse and removes the helmet from his dead body. At this point the poet interjects:

De grant noiant s'est antremise,
mais ansi vet de coveitise:
mainte chose covoite l'on
don l'an n'avra ja se mort non;
el s'en poïst bien consirrer,
ne l'an laira mes retorner:
ses maus et sa morz i gisoit. (Eneas 7189-95)

(She was occupied with a great deal of nothing, but thus it goes with covetousness: men covet many things from which they will gain nothing but their deaths. She could well have left the helmet, and not let herself be drawn to it: her harm and her death lay there. /Yunck, p. 196/)

Camile is to blame for what she did. She was too greedy.²⁴ She could have restrained herself. While she is removing the helmet, Arruns shoots and kills her. Her death, caused by her free will and excessive greed,

²⁴ We can see how Cormier's analysis of Turnus applies as well to Camile. Turnus "is no simple image of thirsting avarice, of divitia then, but by his greed for useless worldly possessions there can be little doubt that, in Boethian terms, he should be viewed--in contrast to Eneas who is often munificent--as vain and misdirected, wicked even and justifiably punished" (p. 195). However, Camile is the "simple image" of brave greed, which is only one aspect of the Turnus complex.

will have disastrous effects on Turnus, who in the Aeneid does not even respond to the news that Camilla is dead, which comes at the end of Book XI. In the Eneas her death is to a great extent the death of the bravery of Turnus, based on a perversion of the nature of love (her role reversal complementing his concept of owning a woman by contract) and greed (her passion for gold complementing Turnus' passion for the kingdom of Italy). Turnus gives a long and despairing speech over the death of Camille:

"Molt m'a mal fet qui vos ocist;
perdu an ai, por vostre mort,
a toz tens mes joie et deport.
Vos venistes por mon servise,
si vos i estes del tot mise;
males soldees an avez.
Molt est Pallas chier comparez,
un chevalier que lor ocis;
molt lo m'ont or bien an lou mis,
lo contrepan m'an ont randu;
par vos m'ont il tot confondu,
perdue en ai tote ma vie.
Afebloïe est ma partie,
qui maintenue estoit par vos;
ne sai par cui serai rescos." (Eneas 7382-96)

("The man who killed you has hurt me grievously. By your death I have lost my joy and my pleasure. You came to serve me, and are now cut off from everything: you have been badly paid for your service.

"Pallas--a knight of theirs whom I killed--is very dearly bought. Now they have repaid me well for him; they have paid me off in kind. Through you they have completely confounded me; through your death I have lost all my life. My party, which you sustained, is weakened, and I know not by whom I shall be saved." /Yunck, p. 200/)

Her death has taken away all of Turnus' "joie et deport." At first this appears to be odd, since she was an ally, not a lover. However, we note that her death was set in parallel with the death of Pallas, for whom she is the "payment." Further, the sense of loss at her death that Turnus

expresses is extreme in relation to what appeared to be her role in the fighting. Typically, Turnus does not wish to fight his own battle, but despairs at finding someone else to fight for him. He continues with his mourning plaint:

"Mar fu onques vostre valor!
D'autres fames estiez flor;
unques nature, ce me sanble,
dous meillors ne josta ansanble:
si grant proëce o grant bialté." (Eneas 7399-403)

("Unhappy your valor! You were the flower of all women; never, I think, did nature join together two better qualities: such great prowess with such great beauty." /Yunck, p. 200/)

Beauty and bravery. It sounds like a lovely combination, until we see how unstable a structure is built as a tomb for Camile. Further, Turnus is inconsolable for her death:

"Ge ne sai mes que ge vos die,
mais dolanz sui de vostre mort,
ja mais ne quit avoir confort." (Eneas 7424-26)

("I do not know what more to say to you, but I am so sorrowful over your death that I never expect to take comfort." /Yunck, p. 201/)

Not only is his sorrow perhaps excessive, but we must especially notice what Turnus omits to say: he makes no promises of revenge, but only sinks into a state of despondency which might almost be called despair. This is in sharp contrast to the response of Eneas to the death of Pallas, where he vows vengeance and accepts guilt--the beginning of his radical improvement as a human being. Camile, with her gorgeous finery, beauty, extreme bravery and greed was almost a part of Turnus himself, those aspects of the Junoesque struggle which could be embodied in a woman, and

killed in her, leaving Turnus wretched and incomplete. The death of these qualities in Camile, and the inadequate response of Turnus to that death are a lesson in his moral failure, which will lead to his eventual defeat by Eneas. One very important aspect of Camile is incomplete sexuality: she has the beauty of a woman, but is virgin; she has the bravery of a man, but is no man. She is the only person for whom Turnus expresses strong emotion in this poem about the battles of Venus. She is sexually incomplete, as is Turnus, who never expresses love for the woman whom he desires to marry.

We can see the author's disapproval of Camile in his careful and elaborate description of her tomb, to which we will later compare the more stable and sensible tomb in which Pallas is interred. There is the greatest of detail and attention given to the state of her corpse's attire, in gorgeous fabrics, naturally. She is placed in a tomb which is one of the seven wonders of the world, and of a basically inverted design, since it rests on a narrow base and is increasingly larger at each stage above: "Grant mervouille sanbloit a toz / que graindre ert desus que desoz" (Eneas 7629-30); ("It seemed a great wonder to everyone that the building was larger above than below" [Yunck, p. 2057]). The tomb is upside down, as was the life of Camile, and it is topped by a mirror which reflects her land, perhaps as she reflected the less desirable aspects of the bravery and greed of Turnus. The instability of the design concept is important, since it is echoed in the fact that her corpse gives off odors which must be masked, and in the fragile system which holds the lamp in her tomb. Whereas Pallas' corpse is preserved in such a manner that it does not give off bad odors (Eneas 6467-84), Camile's is not, and the smells must be masked:

Veissiaus ot asis lez lo cors,
 plains de basme, d'autre licors
 por refreschir la des odors. (Eneas 7648-50)

(Next to the body were placed vessels full of balm and other liquids to freshen her with their odors. [Yunck, p. 205])

Her lamp is held by an arrangement that stresses the fragility of the life style of Camile, and is balanced between a dove, bird of Venus, and an archer, persona of Amors, just as Camile in her life was precariously balanced between the feminine and the masculine. Her lamp is capable of burning forever, in her tomb, except for one small detail. The other end of its chain is held by a dove, and so long as the dove holds the lamp, the lamp will burn. However, there is a statue of an archer with an arrow aimed at the dove and a snare above the head of the archer. The system is so precarious that:

A un sofle fust tot perdu:
 qui soflast la regeteore,
 et al destandist anislore
 et li archiers idonc traisist
 droit au colon, se l'abatist,
 dunc fust la chaene rompue
 et la lanpe tote expandue. (Eneas 7712-18)

(At a breath all would be lost: if someone blew the snare it would loose the bow immediately, and the archer thus would shoot straight at the dove and hit it. Then the chain would be broken and the lamp wholly destroyed. [Yunck, p. 206])

In short, the tomb of Camile is an elaborate authorial comment on the fragile nature of her life style, which evaded mature sexuality by a tricky balancing act not unlike that of the archer and the dove. And when we consider the strong feeling which Turnus expresses for this not-quite-woman at her death, and realize that he never expresses love for Lavine, the woman he goes to war for, we can see that it is an indict-

ment also of the inadequate ability of Turnus to love.

Now we need to backtrack and consider the parallel structure of the death and burial of Pallas, and the role of Eneas in it. But even before we meet Pallas we must notice that the Eneas poet has rearranged his material so that Venus gives the wonderful armor to her son, Eneas, before he goes to visit King Euander, the father of Pallas.²⁵ A long scene describing how the armor is produced is one of the very few remnants of the pagan gods left in this poem, and we will now see why it is there, remembering that Eneas is fighting the wars of Venus, not of Rome.

Venus, worried about her son, goes to her husband, Vulcan, asking him to make armor to protect Eneas, and she offers to let Vulcan make love to her in return for his making the armor (Eneas 4333-40). The author then proceeds to introduce the story of the adultery of Venus with Mars to emphasize how happy Vulcan is to be allowed finally to make love to Venus, after seven years in which she would not let him approach her (Eneas 4346-52). This episode is not used by Virgil, and is introduced here because it is of importance to the themes of the Eneas, since it represents a reconciliation of married lovers and is thus of symbolic importance to the development of the role of Eneas as sexually mature and capable of loving. After Vulcan had trapped Venus with Mars, she had been angry with him and refused his love for seven years, until now, when she wants the armor for Eneas, which is the only reason that she forgives Vulcan (Eneas 4375-93). The purpose of introducing the story of the adultery of Venus and Mars, and the seven years without love be-

²⁵ In the Aeneid VIII.370 ff., the armor is made and presented to Eneas while he is visiting Evander.

tween Venus and Vulcan is to draw attention to the role of Eneas in the reconciliation of Venus and her husband, a necessary step toward any normalization of the world according to the principles of Amors and married love. Further, it intensifies the role of sexuality in the production of the armor of Eneas, and is a sign of the dawning sexual maturity of this man who, son of Venus, has not yet truly known Amors.

After Eneas has received this armor, a kind of badge of sexual maturity, he follows the advice of Venus and goes to visit King Euander, where he meets Pallas for the first time. Euander sends Pallas and troops back to the Trojan camp to aid Eneas, and when they arrive there the Trojans are being, typically, less than very brave. Pallas, who is an epitome of youthful valor (as is Camille) sees the Trojans fleeing from Turnus and taunts them for their cowardice (Eneas 5676 ff.). In the Aeneid Pallas did not taunt the Trojans, but instead gave loving encouragement to his own troops. However, we are meant to consider the Trojans as cowardly here, as elsewhere in the Eneas, even though we see that Eneas himself is getting braver, for he did not want to flee, but to fight, when Turnus began the war, and we are specifically told that Eneas "n'avoit talant de foïr" (Eneas 4249); ("had no wish to flee" /Yunck, p. 140). We are also told when Eneas and Pallas reach the Trojan camp that "Molt se contient bien Eneas / et molt i refiert bien Pallas" (Eneas 5657-58); ("Eneas conducted himself most bravely, and Pallas also laid on very well" /Yunck, p. 167). Eneas is definitely looking better than he did at Troy, but his Trojans, who are, by the logic of this morally structured story, somewhat an extension of Eneas himself, are still cowardly, and flee rather than prepare to die bravely. Even the incident of Nisus and Euryalus is modified to prove this point. In

the Aeneid, when they are spotted in the enemy camp, they merely flee, with no comment on this by the narrator (Aeneid IX.376-79). However, in the Eneas, when they hear the cry to halt, and they run instead, the poet comments:

donc se mistrent an mescreance
 et an esfroï et an dotance:
 car s'il parlassent fierement
 et tot aseurement,
 et se fussent aperceüz,
 il ne fussent ja mescreüz
 qu'il ne fussent de çals de l'ost;
 mais il s'an foïrent trop tost. (Eneas 5113-20).

(Thus they fell into anxiety and fright and doubt; for if they had answered boldly and with all assurance, and had let themselves be seen, the strangers would never have doubted that they were from the army. But they took to flight too soon. /Yunck, p. 1567)

The Trojans have not been particularly brave, and the role of Pallas is to improve that sorry condition by his bravery, boldness and death. It is because he is chiding the Trojans that Turnus hears and notices Pallas and kills him (Eneas 5709).

The immediate response of Eneas to the death of Pallas is in sharp contrast to the self-pity of Turnus at the death of Camile. The first thing that Eneas does is accept responsibility for Pallas' death, and vow to revenge him:

"Amis", fait il, "ce est damage,
 que vos estes por moi ocis.
 Amenai vos d'autre païs,
 nostre amor a petit duré,
 malvés garanz vos ai esté.
 Vangerai vos, se faire el puis,
 morz est Turnus, se or lo truis." (Eneas 5850-56)

("Friend," he said, "it is pitiful that you have been killed for me. I led you here from another country, but our love has been short-lived. I have been a poor protector to you. I will avenge you if I can: Turnus is dead if I find him now."
 /Yunck, p. 171/)

Turnus is absent from the battle at this time, so Eneas proceeds to fight and kill other Latins. This is just what Turnus does not do for the dead Camile, and it shows us that Turnus is degenerated in bravery after her death. Although Pallas was a youthful incarnation of bravery, as was Camile, Eneas, by accepting the responsibility for that death is able to somehow incorporate into himself the virtue of extreme bravery which was Pallas'. However, we must not dismiss Eneas' self-blame as idle. The mother of Pallas, dead in the Aeneid, is kept alive in the Eneas to blame both the Trojans and the gods for the death of Pallas, where neither are blamed in the Aeneid. Why is Eneas to blame for the death of Pallas? He had given a promise to the parents of Pallas:

"Lo jor que ge pris lo congié,
 les aseürai ge de toi
 qu'en bataille ne an tornoi
 ne seroies sanz moi ocis;
 ja es tu morz et ge sui vis,
 manti lor ai tot planement." (Eneas 6174-79)

("On the day when I took leave of them, I assured them that you would not be killed in battle or tourney without me. Now you are dead, and I am alive; quite plainly I have lied to them." /Yunck, p. 177/)

By not preventing the death of Pallas Eneas has broken his vow to Pallas' parents, since he is still alive, while Pallas is dead. This is a very serious matter, and adds to the accusations of Trojan treachery which we will now hear from the mother of Pallas as well as from the mother of

Lavine, such as:

"Mar vi onques les Troïens,
 plaindre me puis mes d'aus toz tens;
 unques n'oi d'aus se mal non
 et felonie et traïson." (Eneas 6319-22)

("Unhappy the day when I ever saw the Trojans! I can complain of them for ever more. Never did I hear anything of them except evil and wickedness and treason." /Yunck, p. 180/)

But Eneas does indeed avenge Pallas, thus clearing himself of the guilt of his death, and it is this response, an active, positive one, to the death of Pallas, that displays the moral superiority of Eneas to Turnus, whose only response to the death of Camile is despair. Presumably both Turnus and Eneas have the same possibility of freely responding to the death of an ally, but only Eneas takes a responsible position. The parallels and differences between the responses of Turnus and Eneas to the death of favorite allies are heightened by the long passage on the tomb of Pallas, which contrasts to the unstable structure in which Camile lies buried. Pallas too has a costly and beautiful tomb, but it is appropriate to his more balanced personality; it is extraordinarily rich, but not of an odd construction. His body is so preserved that it does not smell at all, and thus does not require an eternal deodorizer. The contraption of sealed jars with special liquids to prevent (not mask) odors and decay is described at some length (Eneas 6467-84). And the everlasting lamp in the tomb of Pallas does not hang by a thread, as it were, but by a sturdy golden chain which is in no danger of slipping or being broken (Eneas 6509-11). The solid virtues of Pallas are expressed in the solid opulence of his tomb, just as the unstable virtues of Camile were expressed in her tomb.

The Eneas operates by a kind of interior logic that makes us feel quite sure after the deaths of Pallas and Camile, and the respective responses to them of Eneas and Turnus, that Turnus is going to lose and Eneas is going to win. The reason for this is that changes in the Eneas occur within a person long before any change can occur in the world around him, since the Eneas is developed as a moral structure, where events happen to test and reward moral positions on the part of the characters. However, although Eneas is getting better, he is not yet good enough to win, and Turnus is not yet bad enough to lose.

The mother of Pallas blamed Eneas for the death of her son, and she was not incorrect, since Eneas agreed with her position, as we saw. Now Turnus is blamed by his barons, represented by Drancés, for the moral weakness of letting other men die for what are essentially his own private interests. Drancés comments bitterly that Turnus holds the lives of his knights very lightly:

"car ce ne li coste noiant;
molt l'an est po, ce m'est avis,
se nos an somes tuit ocis." (Eneas 6684-86)

("for they cost him nothing at all. It means very little to him, I think, if we are all killed for it." /Yunck, p. 187/)

We are assured that Drancés is indeed correct in his criticism of Turnus, because when Turnus angrily replies, accusing Drancés of cowardice, the poet comments that "Turnus dist par felenie" (Eneas 6754); (Turnus spoke spitefully" /Yunck, p. 188/).²⁶

²⁶ "Spitefully" is a rather weak translation for the word "felenie." Monica Schöler-Beinhauer, the translator of Le Roman d'Eneas, Klassische Texte des Romanischen Mittelalters in zweisprachigen Ausgaben, Band 9

In a world where the presence of the gods is so faint that one sees no signs, and cannot prove that they have spoken, this sort of war becomes increasingly a matter of personal responsibility, better settled by man to man combat by the disputants than by a general war.

Where Eneas was most sensitive to his personal responsibility in the death of Pallas, Turnus has ignored his responsibility in the deaths of thousands of men. He has yet to meet the test of the death of Camille, which we discussed above, and his response to that is not an acceptance of guilt and responsibility, but despair and misery. The criticism of Turnus is more serious than in the Aeneid because the author has taken the man, Drances, whom Virgil presented as a coward who hated Turnus, and made him into a better person. Virgil presents Drances in negative terms:

Drances idem infensus, quem gloria Turni
obliqua invidia stimulisque agitabat amaris,
largus opum et lingua melior, sed frigida bello
dextera, consiliis habitus non futilis auctor,
seditione potens (genus huic materna superbum
nobilitas dabat, incertum de patre ferebat). (Aeneid XI.336-41)

(Drances, hostile as before, whom the renown of Turnus goaded with the bitter stings of furtive envy, lavish of wealth and valiant of tongue, though his hand was cold for battle, in counsel deemed no mean adviser, in faction strong /his mother's high birth ennobled his lineage; from his sire obscure rank he drew.)

(München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972) translates "felonie" in line 6754 as "Falschheit," and the Dictionnaire de l'Ancien Français offers several meanings for "felonie": "1^o Trahison, perfidie. --2^o Méchanceté, péché . . . --3^o Fureur, colère, violence" (p. 282).

The Eneas poet, however, represents Drancés as neither ignoble nor a coward:

Drancés s'an est an piez levez,
 uns riches hom bien anparlez
 et qui molt ert de halt parage;
 nan ot an la cort nul plus sage,
 ne miauz saüst an cort parler,
 ne un bien grant consoil doner,
 ne mialz contast raisnablement,
 ne mialz feïst un jugement;
 de parolle ert molt anginos,
 mais n'estoit pas chevaleros. (Eneas 6633-42)

(Drances rose to his feet, a rich man, very eloquent, and of very high lineage. No one in the court was wiser, or knew better how to speak in court or to give important counsel, or argued more reasonably, or made a better judgment. He was very clever with words, but he was not soldierly. [Yunck, p. 1867])

The vicious, spiteful Drances of the Aeneid has only one fault left in the Eneas, he is not "chevaleros." However, this does not necessarily mean that he is a coward, since when Turnus accuses him of being a coward we are told by the poet that Turnus spoke falsely. So we must take the criticisms of Turnus by Drancés as much stronger than in the Aeneid, and as motivated not by envy, but by intelligence and good judgment. The message is: a man should fight his own battles; a man is responsible for his own actions. Until now, neither Eneas nor Turnus has really done this. However, following the death of Pallas, Eneas recognized his guilt and responsibility for the death of another man, and presumably is more ready now to fight personally for his own interests than he was earlier. The incident with Camile follows the criticisms of Drancés, and we have already seen that Turnus did not respond to this challenge in a responsible manner. Where Virgil could show Turnus driven by gods into behavior that was antisocial, the Eneas poet shows Turnus behaving in an

antisocial manner because of his personal greed and indifference to the welfare of his men. When Turnus fears to fight it is indeed his own personal fear, not the terror inspired by a god. Turnus, like the other characters in the Eneas, is very much on his own in a world which has been deserted by the pagan gods, and not yet inhabited by the Christian one.

Turnus really has no choice, since his barons are refusing to support his position, and immediately following the burial of Camile, he finally agrees, under great pressure, to a single combat with Eneas, in a speech which expresses his isolation from his barons:

"Seignor", fait il, "bien sai et voi,
ne vos tenez pas tuit o moi;
li plus de vos me vont boisant,
mais ja d'icest jor an avant
ne quier que nus de vos m'an vaille." (Eneas 7733-37)

("My lords," he said, "I know and see well that you do not all hold with me. Most of you are deceiving me; but never from this day forward will I ask that any of you aid me." /Yunck, p. 2077)

Turnus is quite alone. He neither cares for the welfare of his barons, nor do they care for his, being aware of his indifference to them. There is no bond of love among them.

The date is set, eight days hence, and the very next line begins the discussion between the Queen and Lavine on the nature of love. In the days to follow, Lavine will discover the nature of Amors, transmit it to Eneas, ennoble him by means of it, and thus assure his victory against Turnus, who loves neither Lavine nor his men who have died for his sake.

The function of the episode of Lavine and Amors is crucial to the

organization and meaning of the Eneas as a whole. It was not present in the Aeneid, where Virgil showed no interest in Lavine or in true love. We need to ask why this long episode was introduced, and what the meaning of Amors is in the Eneas. Amors will provide the characters in the Eneas with something they are sorely lacking in: law, a law that can be known absolutely and intuitively, as the gods no longer can be; a law that can be perceived and communicated by signs that are unmistakable and without ambiguity; a law that provides absolute values to oppose absolutely to the values of materialism, of rights and contracts, which are held not only by Turnus, but also by The Trojans, by Latinus, and by the Queen.

In a world without manifest deities, or with few and weak ones, it is hard for a person to know what to do. Even if a god sends a message to you, you have no proof to show another person. The best evidence that Latinus ever can give that the gods love the Trojans is the indirect one that they win a battle against great odds (Eneas 6561-68). This may be proof of the gods' intentions; it could be luck. There is no way of knowing for sure. But Amors can be known for sure. The signs and portents of the Aeneid are gone, and the causal deities that manipulate human behavior are largely gone. Men and women are alone, free, and they generally make quite a mess of things, as in the episodes of the fall of Troy, Dido, Ascanius shooting the stag, Camile, and the quarrelling in the Latin camp. Turnus is both more justified by legal rights than in the Aeneid, and less justified by daemonic manipulation. He is technically correct in his demands and brutally indifferent to the welfare of his men. Eneas is far weaker and more flawed than in the Aeneid. He is a bit of a coward, a bit of a traitor, somewhat faithless. Not the

sort of passing stranger to whom one wishes to marry a daughter. At this point, before the entrance and impact of Amors, there is no good reason why Lavine should marry Eneas. Indeed, she does not want to love any man at all, and having seen the sort of men contending for her, we are inclined to agree.

Before Amors shoots his arrow at Lavine, Eneas' reputation is debased still further, to give the strongest possible emphasis to the absolute power of Amors to control emotion, if not action. Amors can transform the most timid girl into a courageous woman, and the most suspect knight into a paragon of bravery and excellence. It is precisely because the Queen describes Eneas as so debased that the effect of Amors on Lavine is so very wonderful.

The section opens with the total ignorance of Lavine with respect to love. She not only does not know what it is, but she does not want to experience it, of that she is quite sure. Her mother, the Queen, introduces the topic of love, and points out why Turnus is worthy of being loved, while Eneas is not:

"Turnus te vialt avoir, qui t'aimme,
et Eneas sor' lui te claimme
et par force te vialt conquerre,
mais il lo fet plus por la terre
que il ne fait por toe amor;
ja mais ne t'amera nul jor." (Eneas 7863-68)

("Turnus, who loves you, wishes to have you, and Eneas disputes you with him and wishes to conquer you by force; but he does this more for the land than for love of you. He will never love you at all." Yunck, p. 210⁷)

The Queen is quite correct that Eneas does not love Lavine, since, so far as we know, he has not even met her yet. But the Queen does not

understand the nature of Amors and thus she is mistaken in saying that Turnus loves Lavine (we have only seen him express affection for the dead Camile), and she is also mistaken in saying that Eneas will never love Lavine (she does not understand that for Amors all is possible).

The Queen goes on to instruct Lavine in how she should direct her love away from Eneas and toward Turnus:

"Lui ne doiz tu de rien amer,
mais ton coraige en doiz torner,
et covoitier que Turnus t'ait." (Eneas 7871-73)

("You should not love him at all, but should turn your heart away from him and desire that Turnus have you." Yunck, p. 210/)

The Queen, like Turnus, has a view of love and marriage that is based on a thoroughly materialistic understanding of duties and obligations. Because Turnus has behaved well toward Lavine, she has a duty to love him (Eneas 7874-76). This, as we will see, has nothing at all to do with the nature of Amors, which strikes in the most unlikely places, and is absolutely victorious when it does so.

Amors is something that, although the Queen thinks that she can encourage it in Lavine, cannot be communicated, except by immediate experience. Thus, when Lavine asks, "'que est amors?'" (Eneas 7890); ("what is love?" Yunck, p. 211/), the Queen can only describe it by indirection, telling Lavine: "'Tes cuers t'apprendra a amer'" (Eneas 7893); ("Your heart will teach you to love" Yunck, p. 211/). This is a radical form of knowledge that comes only after one has been stricken by the arrow of Amors, a factor which cannot be controlled, although the Queen persists in telling Lavine how and whom she ought to love.

The Queen goes on to describe the pains of love, which she remembers as something like a fever. However, the Amors of the Eneas is not simply a source of pain, and his representation in the temple depicts his true nature:

"Amors i est poinz solement,
et tient dous darz en sa main destre
et une boiste an la senestre;
li un des darz est d'or en som,
qui fet amer, l'autre est de plom,
qui fet amer diversement.
Navre Amor et point sovant,
et si est point tot par figure
por demonstrer bien sa nature:
li darz mostre qu'il puet navrer
et la boiste qu'il set saner." (Eneas 7976-86)

("Love is painted there alone, holding two darts in his right hand and a box in his left; one of the darts is tipped with gold, which causes love, and the other with lead, which makes love alter. Love wounds and pierces often, and is thus painted figuratively to show clearly his nature. The dart shows that he can wound, and the box that he knows how to heal."
/Yunck, p. 213/)

This description is no use of empty rhetoric, but a very accurate, metaphoric analysis of the role of Amors in the Eneas, where the destruction and pain caused by lawless love are finally to be cured by the free gift of lawful love. The suffering, followed by joy, of Lavine and Eneas, is a paradigm of the suffering followed by peace of the Trojans and the Latins.

Love not only wounds and heals, but there are two distinct types of love in the Eneas: the love stimulated by Venus, and the love stimulated by Amors, and they are not the same.²⁷ Amors, as a god, is eliminated

²⁷ Economou comments that in the context of earthly love, "the two Venuses represent two different dispositions within it: the one, legiti-

from the Dido episode by having Venus kiss Ascanius directly, rather than substituting Cupid for him, as was done in the Aeneid. For all of the battles of love in the Eneas, there is only one point at which Amors will shoot his arrow, and that is at Lavine. To be sure, Dido complains of the pangs of amors, but this is an interior experience, stimulated by Venus, not by Amors. Why, in a poem which has so carefully eliminated the pagan gods of the Aeneid, has another god been introduced who did not even play a role in Virgil's poem?

Unlike the Aeneid, which is a poem of religion and of historical destiny, the Eneas is a poem of personal behavior and the morality of a world in which the good are rewarded for being good, while the less good lose what they are struggling for and the bad die as punishment. Amors, in the Eneas, provides the means whereby the improving Eneas, who is struggling to be a better man, can receive, from the outside, and hence, from the gods of moral rewards, the extra bit of impetus, without which his struggle would not be adequate. Amors makes a radical change in the story of the Eneas. He makes possible a reason why the tainted Eneas should be able to conquer the tainted Turnus. And that reason is the

mate, sacramental, natural, and in harmony with cosmic law; the other, illegitimate, perverted, selfish, and sinful" ("The Two Venuses," p. 20). However, in the Eneas we notice a strong tendency to let the god Amors, a masculine figure, represent the good Venus, or lawful love, while Venus herself represents more tainted love. But it is not this simple, since, although Amors only strikes once, amors is observed working in Dido, even though stimulated by Venus, and even more complexly, one could develop a strong case for the role of Ascanius with his two arrows killing the wonderful and beloved stag as a type of the bad aspect of Amors. But, whatever the complexities of the Amors/Venus relationship, the form of Amors striking Lavine is good, constructive and lawful with a law higher than that which could give her to either Turnus or Eneas.

instantaneous improvement of Eneas under the power of Amors. The Amors of the Eneas is no capricious figure shooting arrows where he may, indifferent to the fate of those stricken. He shoots only one arrow in the entire poem, and that is to help his brother, Eneas, by making Lavine fall in love with him. She has been told by her mother that she ought to love Turnus, and has been threatened by her mother that if she ever loves Eneas she will kill her with her own hands. Lavine has heard only of the pains of Amors and assures her mother that she does not wish to love at all. Then her mother leaves her alone and she looks out the window. Eneas is below, and somehow much better than he has been before. Whether it is the degradation of Turnus, or Eneas' accepting responsibility for the death of Pallas, we do not know for sure. Even the Trojans look better than they have before:

Cil de la vile li plusor
vont as creniaus del mur monter
por les Troïens esgarder;
ce dient tuit comunement
que soz ciel n'a plus bele gent;
bien sont vestu et conreé,
mais toz les passe de bialté
Eneas, qui lor sire estoit.
Molt lo loë chascuns quel voit;
dient que molt est genz et biaus,
grant los an font par les creniaus. (Eneas 8036-46)

(Most of the townspeople were climbing up to the battlements of the wall to gaze at the Trojans. They all agreed in saying that there was not a more handsome people under the heavens. The Trojans were all well dressed and equipped, but Eneas, their lord, surpassed them all in beauty. Everyone who saw him praised him highly. They said that he was very noble and handsome, and gave him great praise along the battlements. /Yunck, pp. 214-157)

We have never seen the Trojans looking very good until just now. It is probably the degradation of the worth of Turnus that has turned the moral

balance in their favor, and of course outer beauty would quickly follow such a change in relative value. This beauty is critical to the action of Amors, who can make someone love a tainted person, perhaps, but not, surely, an ugly one. Then Lavine looked out and:

vit Eneam qui fu desoz,
 forment l'a esgardé sor toz.
 Molt li sanbla et bel et gent,
 bien a oï comfaitemant
 le loënt tuit par la cité
 et de proëce et de bialté;
 bien lo nota an son corage. (Eneas 8049-55)

(saw Eneas, who was below. She gazed intently at him above all. He seemed most handsome and noble to her. She had heard well how everyone praised him throughout the city both for his prowess and his beauty, and she took good note in her heart. Yunck, p. 2157)

This is a remarkable improvement over the old Eneas we have known. One of the most significant changes is the lack of rich garments and expensive trappings. Here he is decked in moral qualities, not in the gold and purple of his old days in Troy or Carthage. Wealth is generally a negative value in the Eneas, as we have remarked especially in the case of Camile, but also in the greed of Turnus and in the alacrity with which Eneas rescued his possessions from the city of Troy. Beauty and nobility and bravery are now Eneas' attributes. Where did he get them? At least partially from Pallas, whose bravery he incorporated at his death. Perhaps also Pallas' beauty and nobility were passed along to Eneas, once he accepted his guilt and swore revenge. That would fit the moral logic of this poem very nicely, where outer phenomena mirror interior events. Certainly some of the improved appearance of Eneas must come from the armor given him by Venus, which represented the return of the goddess of love

to married love. By the same moral logic, if his mother improved her behavior, that would improve the moral worth, and hence the beauty, of Eneas.

At any rate, the moral and physical renewal of Eneas having been established by his beauty and renovated reputation among the people, Amors strikes his one and only blow in the entire poem, hitting Lavine with his dart: "or est cheoite es laz d'amors, / voille ou non, amer l'estuet" (Eneas 8060-61); ("Now she has fallen into the snare of love: whether she wishes it or not, she must love" [Yunck, p. 2157]) Having been struck, love she must.²⁸ Here is no act of free choice. However, that follows immediately, as Lavine assents to what has been done to her:

Quant voit que eschiver n'en puet,
vers Eneam a atorné
tot sun corage st son pansé. (Eneas 8062-64)

(When she saw that she could not escape it, she turned all her desire and her thought toward Eneas. [Yunck, p. 2157])

This recalls Aeneas, who wills to do what he has to do, and is the only example of a god performing an absolutely compelling action upon a person in the entire Eneas. Unlike the compulsions caused by such deities as Allecto in the Aeneid, the effect of Amors is not to destroy human will, but to heighten consciousness and the ability to reason.

²⁸ Cormier feels that Lavine is free not to love Eneas: "We have seen that Lavinia, following canons of logic, in a sense sorted and labeled her sensations, then acted, making a simple gesture of declaration. . . . Lavinia falls in love with Eneas, it would seem in fact, for no other stated reason except the hope for reciprocity; she is not obliged to love him" (p. 245). However, that is not the case. She is not obliged to communicate her love by means of an arrow to Eneas, but the author makes quite clear that "voille o non, amer l'estuet" (Eneas 8061); ("whether she wishes it or not, she must love" [Yunck, p. 2157])

Amors causes a radical change in Lavine, who was completely innocent, unlike Dido, of any indiscretion. All Lavine does is look out of her window and, as she comments afterward in a dialogue with herself, she only intended to look at Eneas:

--Bien t'an peüsses consirrer.
 --Por coi? --Ne fu noiant savoir
 quel venisses ici veor.
 --Maint an i ai ge ja veü,
 unc mes de nul rien ne me fu.
 L'en n'aimme pas quant que l'an voit;
 trop par seroie en grant destroit,
 se ne pooie home esgarder
 que moi ne esteüst amer." (Eneas 8146-54)

("You could well have refrained from that."
 "Why?"
 "It was in no way wise that you came here to look at him."
 "I have looked at many of them from here and it never meant anything to me. One doesn't love everyone one sees. I would be in very bad straits indeed if I could not look at a man without having to love him." [Yunck, p. 217])

There is no question of Lavine having been other than quite innocent and totally passive when she received the arrow of Amors which forced her to love Eneas. However, Amors cannot force her to act, and in the section that follows, we see Lavine gradually affirm and choose to act upon the feelings that have captured her heart, but not her mind. Her heart is hopelessly conquered by Amors, and the extensive physiological descriptions of the effects of Amors upon her body stress the separation between heart and mind, body and reason. She cannot help loving, but she can, and does, analyze her emotions with careful and thorough reasoning before she decides to commit herself by the action of sending a message to Eneas, announcing that she loves him. Lavine observes the painful behavior of her heart as one yet uncommitted to any action, and,

quite correctly, she worries that she is the only one shot by an arrow from Amors (Eneas 8163-66). So far this is true enough, and indeed, Amors will not shoot Eneas. Only by sending her message of love on an arrow to Eneas will Lavine be able to initiate the process of love in Eneas. Although she has been hopelessly infected by the disease of love, not until she chooses to act and does so will Eneas experience love.

Love has given Lavine an instant and absolute education which could only come from the externally induced experience of loving:

"Or sai ge ja d'amor asez;
bien me disoit ma mere voir:
n'an pooie pas tant savoir
par nul autre come par moi." (Eneas 8178-81)

("Now I know enough about love; my mother spoke the truth indeed; I could not learn about love from anyone else as well as I could from myself." /Yunck, p. 217/)

This knowledge is new to the poem of the Eneas. No one, until now, has known anything about love, except for the degraded and merely physical lust which Dido indulged in, with some help from Venus and Eneas.

This new knowledge is of a force that controls, via the heart and body. However, the controls, although very painful, are a new and absolute form of law, the law of Amors, a law that can control the wild and destructive passions induced by the principle of Venus. Lavine realizes that the smart way to behave would be to wait until after the battle between Turnus and Eneas, and then love the winner. But she now knows the laws of Amors, which are a set of absolute values beyond the mercenary ones of self-interest:

"ne tient d'amor precepz ne lois
qui plus que un an velt amer:
ne si velt pas amor dobler." (Eneas 8296-98)

("He who would love more than one does not satisfy Love's
precepts or laws: Love does not wish to be thus divided."
/Yunck, p. 2207)

Now that she knows, by heart to mind, the laws of Amors, Lavine chooses freely to die if Turnus wins the battle (Eneas 8330-34).²⁹ Having chosen to die if Eneas dies, Lavine has affirmed the blow of Amors with her will and reason. Initially she was a victim of Amors, but now, having accepted and affirmed her state of loving, she will act as a human Amors, sending an arrow with a love message to transform Eneas.³⁰

When Lavine debates with herself over the advantages and disadvantages of announcing her love to Eneas, there is a very important consid-

²⁹ Etienne Gilson, in the History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955) discusses the relationship of emotion to knowledge with reference to St. Anselm: "Faith is for a Christian the given point from which he is to start. The facts that he is to understand and the realities that his reason shall have to interpret are given to him by revelation; one does not understand in order to believe, but on the contrary, one believes in order to understand. . . . The order to be observed in the search for truth is therefore the following: first to believe the mysteries of faith before discussing them through reason; next, to endeavor to understand what one believes" (p. 129). This is theology, of course, not Amors-theory, but it is based on an understanding of human psychology that gives us a pattern very similar to the pattern of the effects of Amors on human behavior. First you must love; then you know the laws of love. Reason only follows experience.

³⁰ Cormier comments that: "Nowhere . . . in medieval French literature, do we find such a transformation of the hero as the present one, nowhere such a restructuring of reality. Had Eneas refused Lavinia's love, obviously we should have had no change. By the very fact of his response, his reciprocal act, he has shifted the framework and focus in toto from war and bloodshed for its own sake, or for patriotic reasons, to a new mental model" (p. 246).

eration:

"car ainz que la bataille soit,
li voil primes faire savoir,
s'an ert plus fiers al mien espoir;
se de m'amor est a seür,
molt l'an trovera cil plus dur,
molt an prendra grant hardement,
s'il sot onques d'amor noiant." (Eneas 8756-62)

("for before the battle takes place, I wish first to make him know, and he then will be more fierce in battle for my sake. If Eneas is assured of my love, Turnus will find him much stronger; he will derive very great bravery from it, if he knows anything at all about love." /Yunck, p. 2307)

Indeed, love will do just that, making Eneas into a braver and a better man.

Love has effected a radical change in Lavine, both in body and in mind, and she now prepares a message to send to Eneas, announcing her love. This message, sent wrapped around an arrow, is the human willed equivalent of the arrow of Amors. Lavine, acting upon her Amors-initiated emotions, has herself assimilated the role of Amors. This is very important to the structure of the Eneas, which is so largely a moral structure. Human choice and free will, not the arbitrary act of a god, are necessary to "redeem" Eneas. Just as the pagan gods have been removed from so many sections of the Aeneid which the Eneas poet chose to use, here, in a major section that is not based on the Aeneid, he has stressed the importance of human will and choice, not the power of the god. Just as he carefully avoided having Amors strike Dido, although she suffered from his syndrome of helpless passion, so Amors will not strike Eneas. Each must be morally responsible for what happens to their lives. Lavine is the only person whom Amors strikes directly, and she was defi-

natively innocent and came to choose Eneas consciously, willing to love him whom she had to love, and willing to act on that love by sending the arrow to Eneas.

Of course Eneas could not be directly shot with a real arrow. It must be fetched, an act of will, and then he takes it and reads the letter that Lavine has sent to him in this symbolic manner. After reading the letter and understanding that Lavine loves him, Eneas turns deliberately to look at her and is then struck visually by love:

Devers la tor s'an retorna;
Lavine vit qu'il l'esgarda,
baisa son doi, puis li tendit,
et Eneas bien l'entendit
que un baisier li anveot. (Eneas 8875-79)

(He turned back toward the tower. Lavine saw that he was gazing at her. She kissed her finger, then extended it to him, and Eneas understood well that she had sent him a kiss.
/Yunck, p. 232/)

Quite unlike the innocent Lavine, Eneas knows what he is getting into, having read the message before he chose to look at Lavine and receive her kiss, which seals the love transmission. Love, for Eneas, comes from a free human will (Lavine's) to his free human will, and there is no god intervening. Lavine has become Amors, a human Amors.

Having gotten himself into the situation with free will and knowledge of what he was doing, Eneas is now under the control of his dear brother, Cupido, or Amors, who "an sa baillie lo tenoit" (Eneas 8924); ("held him in his power" /Yunck, p. 233/). Once caught, whether by free will or by sudden surprise, one is equally in the power of Amors. Eneas complains bitterly that "'Amor me fet molt grant oltrage, / qui me moine an tel maniere'" (Eneas 8940-41); ("Love is doing me a very great wrong,

treating me in such a manner'" (/Yunck, p. 233/). Not even his own brother is spared the effects of Amors, once let into the heart, and Eneas suffers the physiological pangs of love as thoroughly as did Lavine. Eneas, essentially a hardheaded realist, asks his tormented self just what good is this love going to do him in a battle, and he responds:

"molt m'a doné grant hardement:
ne quit c'ons cors de chevalier
vers moi la puisse desraisnier.
Molt par li doi savoir bon gré
qu'el m'a primes amor mandé,
et molt me metrai a grant fais,
ainz que la perde et que la lais." (Eneas 8990-96)

("it has given me great hardiness: I do not think that a single knight could ever win her from me by battle. I should be most grateful to her that she first sent me word of her love, and I will set myself to great feats, rather than lose or abandon her." /Yunck, pp. 234-35/)

This is the instantaneous and absolute knowledge born of the experience of Amors. Certainly Eneas, as a Trojan, is always in need of a little more courage and strength in battle. However, never having loved until this moment, he is distrustful of women and immediately begins to suspect a trick (Eneas 8997-9002). But then he quickly decides that the letter was telling the truth, because of the way that Lavine told him of her pains of love in it. He has further nasty doubts, but quiets them by remembering how Lavine behaved at the tower, and he comments that he should have recognized her love sooner, but he did not yet know about love itself:

"Bien puis savoir des l'autre jor,
quant primes fui desoz la tor,
a ce que tant me regardot
o si buen oil, que el m'amot;
des idonc m'an aperceüsse,

se ge d'amer vileins ne fusse;
 ne savoie que ce estoit.
 Unc ne fui mes an tel destroit;
 se ge aüsse tel corage
 vers la raïne de Cartage,
 qui tant m'ama qu'el s'en ocist,
 ja mes cuers de li ne partist;
 ne la guerpisse a mon vivant,
 se ge saüsse d'amor tant
 com j'ai des ier matin apris." (Eneas 9031-45)

("I can well believe after the other day, when I was first beneath the tower, that she loved me, because she looked at me with so fair an eye. From that time forward I would have understood it, if I had not been stupid about love; I did not know what it was. Never before was I in such distress. If I had had such feeling toward the queen of Carthage, who loved me so much that she killed herself for love, never would my heart have parted from her. I would not have abandoned her for my whole life, if I had known so much of love as I have learned since yesterday morning." Yunck, pp. 235-367)

Eneas had evidently been as much of a psychological virgin as Lavine, despite his experience with Dido. He knew nothing of love until his experience at the tower. Obviously Amors is not simply sexuality, but a far more complex syndrome of emotions and understanding. The love that Eneas now knows as well as feels, is so powerful that he would have defied the gods and stayed with Dido if he had felt so about her. Finally we have an explanation for the behavior of Eneas with Dido: he did not really love her.

Amors is an immensely powerful force if it can motivate a person to resist the will of the gods (faded though they may be). The effects of Amors on Eneas are all to the good, although his immediate experience is one of suffering, as is Lavine's. Lavine's gift of love has greatly improved Eneas. First he perceives a new beauty in the land, which he had not seen before; then he perceives his greatly enhanced courage and strength:

"Molt m'en est plus biaux cist pais
 et molt m'en plaist ceste contree;
 molt par fis ier bele jornee,
 quant m'arestui desoz la tor
 o ge recoilli ceste amor;
 molt an sui plus et fors et fiers,
 molt m'en combatrai volantiers." (Eneas 9046-52)

("This land is now much more beautiful to me, and this country pleases me greatly; yesterday became an extremely beautiful day when I stopped beneath the tower where I gained that love. Because of it I am much stronger and more high-spirited, and will very gladly fight for it." /Yunck, p. 236/)

Amors has profoundly changed Eneas, and the connection of his ability to perceive beauty and to fight more valiantly is important. He has been changed within, as well as without; his perception, as well as his reactions have been improved by love. These changes provide an interior parallel to the armor made by Vulcan celebrating the reconciliation with his wife Venus. That armor signified the restoration of love to marriage, where it belongs, and made Eneas both more beautiful to behold (if we can judge by his renovated appearance under Lavine's tower window) and more able to fight effectively. These parallel the effects of Amors, intensifying Eneas' perception of beauty and of his own strength. Venus seems to be an exterior principle of love here, while Amors is the interior one. At any rate, Eneas is definitely a better man, thanks to the gift of armor from Venus and Vulcan, and thanks to the gift of love that could only come from the free will of Lavine, not from the control of a god. Both are gifts of love, as opposed to those who would give away another person without their free love and consent.³¹

³¹ Joan Ferrante, in "The Conflict of Lyric Conventions and Romance Form" in In Pursuit of Perfection, eds. Ferrante and Economou, pp. 135-78, denies the positive effects of Amors on Eneas: "Against the backgrounds of the Theban and Trojan wars, love, when it is given any

Amors is never given a personality or a description, except when the Queen describes his portrait. He is treated interchangeably with Cupido, the brother of Eneas, but we only observe his effects, not his person. We can be quite sure that if Eneas had not developed morally during his travels and battles, Amors would never have shot Lavine, when we recall that what she sees and loves is the beauty and nobility of Eneas. He had to become noble, and hence beautiful (the body's correlative of moral excellence), or she would not have loved him. And it is her love that gives him even more strength and courage, aiding him to final victory. Amors acts in favor of Eneas, but only can do so because Eneas has acted in his own favor, accepting guilt and responsibility for the death of Pallas and actively seeking revenge, a thing he never did against the Greeks. Eneas has become worthy of love, so he can be loved, and then as a consequence, become even more loveable. He gets some help from Venus, in her gift of the armor, and some help from Amors, in the shot at Lavine, but after this, it is all up to the feelings and reason of a human woman, and her judgment of the worth of Eneas and her willingness to take a risk for his sake.

Conversely, although Turnus had legal rights to marry Lavine, he never could win her love, despite a seven-year courtship. He evidently

importance, becomes a destructive force. Not even Eneas's love for Lavine, the one apparent exception, exerts a positive force over the hero in the Eneas. Eneas falls in love so long after he has taken on the war against Turnus, that love cannot be considered the motivation for his action--on the contrary, it almost renders him incapable of fighting" (p. 137). But, although tormented by the pangs of love, and suffering through the night, Eneas is made stronger and braver by Amors, as well as by the armor given him by Venus.

lacks those qualities of beauty and nobility that could stimulate love. He also lacks the help of Amors, the god who helps those who are excellent. Turnus only expresses affection for the dead Camile, not for Lavine, whom he merely claims as his wife and property. As a consequence of Turnus' lack of love, while Eneas becomes more strong and brave, Turnus, the other side of the moral equation, becomes weaker and more cowardly. When the truce is broken and general fighting begins again, Turnus is afraid of Eneas, and blames fortune, not understanding that he has already failed to deserve Lavine, and he flees from Eneas (Eneas 9604-12). Eneas is stronger by means of love; Turnus is weaker, for lack of love. In the Aeneid it was the will of Jupiter that finally tipped the balance between the two men, intimidating Turnus while Aeneas fought in a god-approved fury. But the gods are gone from this scene in the Eneas, and it is the psychology of love that has turned the tables on Turnus. As in the Aeneid, it is the burning of Latium that finally convinces Turnus to stand and fight Eneas. Turnus interprets the event as the will of the gods, although we never see any gods involved (Eneas 9657-60). What we do see is Turnus avoiding a battle with Eneas as long as possible. We have already noticed with respect to King Latinus that the only proof of the will of the gods is victory or defeat. Turnus is now losing, so he decides that the gods are against him. Belatedly recognizing that he is at fault for many deaths, Turnus offers to combat Eneas at last:

"Asez an i a mort por moi;
li deu ne vollent, ge lo croi,
que nus de vos an face plus,
mais tuit vos estez loing ansus.
A Eneas me combatrai,
an aventure me metrai." (Eneas 9661-66)

("Enough of you have died for me here. I believe that the gods do not wish that any of you do more, but that all of you should stand far back. I will do battle with Eneas, and will put my life in hazard." /Yunck, p. 248/)

Turnus interprets the situation as an "aventure." However the test or trial will not really take place as something left to chance or fortune. This is the final test, or measurement of the value of two men, Turnus and Eneas. The result, of course, has been determined by what has gone before, not by what will happen now. Eneas is dressed in the Venus armor of positive conjugal sexuality; he carries the vow to avenge Pallas; he is loved and thus made braver and stronger by Lavine's free gift of love. Turnus has only cared for Camile, now dead; he has shirked his responsibility to his men; no one, except perhaps the mother of Lavine, loves him. He has lost the battle of Venus, or of love, before he ever comes to the field of battle. Because this is such a moralized work, the ability to win must come from the moral, internal value of a person, not from the decree of a god. Eneas will win because he is the braver, stronger, better man. It is not a matter of "aventure" at all, although Turnus tries to blame luck as well as the gods.

After Turnus' sword breaks, he flees, calling for help, but no one will help him. Eneas, who had once fled from Troy, chides him: "'Ne vein-troiz mie par fôir, / mais par combatre et par ferir'" (Eneas 9751-52); ("You will never conquer by fleeing, but by giving combat and striking blows" /Yunck, p. 249/). Eneas has evidently learned his lesson well enough to win. We can feel that he has developed beyond the person he once was, who fled from Troy, and is not only a better man than Turnus, but a better man than he himself once was. The careful debasement of

Eneas early in the poem makes great sense now, since we can see how radically he has improved. This is the pattern of the fall and rise of a man, not through the arbitrary action of fortune, but by the exercise of his own free will and the free will of another person, Lavine, that underlies the moral structure of the Eneas. The Eneas is a poem which is strongly optimistic about the possibilities of human improvement and success, and bases this optimism in a doctrine of human free will which can indeed develop a man from a coward into a hero, or drag a queen such as Dido into genuine guilt and suicide.

After Turnus is wounded, he begs for his life and tells Eneas: "bien voient tuit que m'as vencu / et tot conquis par grant vertu" (Eneas 9783-84); ("Everyone sees well that you have defeated me and conquered all with great strength" /Yunck, p. 250/). Not the will of the gods, but the "vertu" of Eneas has conquered Turnus. The whole progress of the Eneas has developed to this point, where the better man can and does win. However, Eneas still has a debt to pay, his vow to avenge Pallas, and as Turnus hands him his helmet, begging for mercy, Eneas sees the ring stolen from the dead body of Pallas:

"Ge aüsse pitié de toi,
ne perdisses vie ne membre,
mais par cest anel m'en remembre,
de Pallas que tu oceïs;
eï cuer m'en as molt grant duel mis:
ne t'ocirra mie Eneas,
mais de toi se venche Pallas." (Eneas 9804-10)

("I would have had pity on you, nor would you have lost life or limb; but because of this ring I remember Pallas, whom you killed; you have put very great sorrow in my heart by that. Eneas will not kill you, but Pallas avenges himself on you." /Yunck, p. 250/)

This is not the inexplicable violence of Aeneas killing Turnus, but a vow fulfilled. Because the relationship between Eneas and Pallas is developed as more important in the Eneas, as compared to the Aeneid, we can feel that his revenge is more necessary and justified in human terms. The Eneas poet specifies that Eneas kills Turnus with the sword forged by Vulcan (Eneas 9813), which Virgil did not do. This is to remind us again of the link between the vow Eneas made to revenge Pallas and accept guilt for his death, and the armor forged by Vulcan as a token of his reconciliation with Venus. Love and war are inextricably combined in this complex poem concerning the battles of Venus and the development of human value and love.

Amors and "vertu" having carried the day, we return to the private agonies of the lovers, who must wait an entire week before they are married. The battle of love is not yet quite finished and Lavine worries at first that Eneas may now have the upper hand and control her (Eneas 9860-66). But then she realizes that the woman too has her ways of maintaining mastery, or at least equality: "'--Fole Lavine, ne t'enuit, / s'il vaint lo jor et tu la nuit'" (Eneas 9867-68); ("Foolish Lavine, do not be angry if he wins in the day and you at night" [Yunck, p. 251]) This is the way that the battle of love, ruled by a conjugally peaceful Venus and by her lawful son Amors, should end, with a balance of male and female, married and in love. Lavine and Eneas spend the rest of the week in the pangs of Amors-anxiety which assures us that although they have won Italy, they have not conquered Amors.

Finally, after the endless week of waiting, they are married and crowned, and we are shown how positively their happiness contrasts with

that of Paris and Helen, the models of the bad Venus:

Unques Paris n'ot graignor joie,
 quant Eloine tint dedanz Troie,
 qu'Eneas ot, quant tint s'amie
 en Laurente. (Eneas 10109-12)

(Never did Paris have greater joy when he had Helen in Troy
 than Eneas had when he had his love in Laurente. Yunck, p.
 2567)

We have come full circle, from the destructive love of Paris for Helen,
 which destroyed a civilization, to the legitimate, constructive love of
 Eneas and Lavine. Together they unite the conjugal aspect of Venus and
 the lawful aspect of Amors, which represent the potentials for love with-
 in the human spirit.

If Only . . .

While the Eneas ends on a triumphant affirmation of human freedom rewarded, the Roman de Troie by Benoit de Sainte-Maure,¹ another twelfth-century French poem dealing with the matter of Troy,² traces the unavoidable destruction of rather decent men by the forces of the irrational--

¹ Benoit de Sainte-Maure, Le Roman de Troie, Publié d'après tous les manuscrits connus, ed. Léopold Constans, Société des Anciens Textes Français, 6 Vols. (1904-1912; rpt. New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1968). This edition, hereafter cited as Troie, will be used throughout this study. All translations from it are my own. There has been much discussion about the dating of the Troie in relation to the Eneas and the other Romans d'Antiquité. Rosemarie Jones suggests the following sequence: "Thèbes, Piramus et Tisbé, Narcisus, Eneas, Troie, Alexandre. As far as the major works Thèbes, Eneas and Troie are concerned, this order is in line with the majority opinion as analysed by Miss Grout" (p. 69). The work she refers to is by P. B. Grout, "A Literary study of the Roman de Thèbes including a comparison with its sources," Unpub. M. A. Thesis, Univ. Library, London, 1966, pp. 50-59.

² The two main sources for the Troie were the pseudo eye-witness accounts of the Trojan War by Dictys, from the Greek point of view, and Dares, from the Trojan point of view. These works superseded the authority of Homer in the Middle Ages, because he told so many lies, especially about the gods fighting with men, and he was not an eye-witness to the war (see Troie l. 45 ff.). They are available in the following editions: Dictys Cretensis, Ephemeridos Belli Troiani . . ., ed. Werner Eisenhut, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig: Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1973); and Daretis Phrygii, de Excidio Troiae Historia, recensuit Ferdinandus Meister (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1873). Hereafter cited as Dictys and Dares. Frazer (The Trojan War) says that both Dictys and Dares "were probably composed, in their original Greek forms, during the first century A. D. . . ." (p. 3). Benoit uses Dares as his main source up to line 24425; then he relies primarily on Dictys for the rest of the poem, according to Constans (Troie, Vol. 6, p. 192). The Dares which we possess (e.g., the Teubner edition cited above) may possibly be less complete than the Dares text used by Benoit. On this topic see Constans (Troie, Vol. 6, p. 233).

Fortune and Amors.

Benoit expresses a concept of human experience that is less optimistic and more fragmented than that in the Eneas.³ In the Troie we see a variety of factors that can control human lives, despite the will and reason of the men involved. They are called variously Amors, Fortune, Aventure, Destiny, and the gods.⁴ Each is capable, for no reason except its own unexplained nature, of devastating human lives and destroying an entire civilization.⁵

³ Gilson comments in The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy that: "Following St. Augustine's lead, the Middle Ages therefore represented the history of the world as a great poem, which takes on a complete and intelligible meaning as soon as we know the beginning and the end. Doubtless at many points the hidden sense will escape us; we may suppose that the 'ineffable musician' would often keep his secret back; however, we shall decipher enough to be sure that all has a meaning, and to be able to conjecture how each event stands to the unique law that rules the whole" (p. 391). The fascinating thing about Benoit is that for all his great care, intelligence and involvement with history, he does not find any such meaning at all in the fall of Troy.

⁴ Patch remarks that "At one time Aventure was apparently the more familiar term for 'the casual,' and was scarcely felt as a proper name. When the word got outside of French literature, it seems to have meant merely 'chance' or 'the chances' . . . The idea came to be that Fortune deals in aventures. Clearly, then, Fortune controlled these aventures." Patch also points out that the "identification of the two figures of Fortune and Love only means that they had very much in common, and that in one aspect Fortune was certainly regarded as concerned with the affairs of love" (The Goddess Fortuna, p. 40; p. 98). In the Troie Fortune, Aventure and Amors all represent irrational, hostile forces which destroy human happiness. Benoit does not distinguish these causal factors from Destiny or the gods. All are malevolent and irrational in their effects upon people.

⁵ Patch suggests that these irrational elements were able to persist into the Middle Ages because the belief in them persisted in the human spirit: "A new conception was, of course, found in Christianity. Here was the idea of a rational God, who gave validity to reason; and here too virtue had a supreme significance . . . As in ancient Rome not everybody . . . had genuinely held the nobler opinions implicit in the opposition to Fortuna . . . so there would be a limited number in the early Middle Ages who would be ready for the conception of a rational God, or of a God who gave an essential meaning to virtue. This being

The pagan gods are almost inconsequential in the Troie. They are very faint allegories, merely the personifications of unknown causes, no more. Even the faded gods of the Eneas have more personality, and hence motivation than do these gods of the Troie, who are no different really than the abstract allegories of Fortune and Destiny, which are invoked along with the more ancient gods to explain why things happen in the poem. Fortune, with her amoral wheel and minimal personality, is the ideal image of this mode of causation without reason in the Troie.⁶

Yet Benoit is no pagan and he also provides us with a set of explanations for why people do the wrong thing, based on traditional Christian concepts of free will and free choice. Here the internal disruptors of correct behavior are called pride and folly, and the explanations of why things go wrong are expressed by conditional statements

the case, there were bound to be many who continued to see things in the old way. It was still possible for the human temperament to persist which believed mainly in chance" (The Goddess Fortuna, p. 14).

⁶ Patch says of Fortuna that: "She represents one view, degraded if you like, of a universal, omnipotent god; and therefore her only rival could be such a figure as that of Jove. But in the period of decadent Rome, and in the early Middle Ages, it was not the figure of Jove that held sway, but that of the fickle goddess. And why? Because men at that time so regarded the universe--not as an ordered and properly ruled domain, but as the realm of the mutable and haphazard forces which we generalize and characterize as 'chance.'" He goes on to point out the development of this concept in the Middle Ages: "A period which saw the universe ruled by order used 'Fors Fortuna,' or simply 'Fortuna,' as the equivalent of 'Fate'; another, which rejected order and emphasized (at least from the human point of view) caprice, used the term to mean 'chance.'"

"For the Middle Ages it is important merely to observe that the second attitude was in vogue at the end of the classical period, when, in fact, the meaning was fixed . . ." (The Goddess Fortuna, p. 4; p. 11).

such as: if only they had believed Cassandra's warnings, then Troy would not have fallen.⁷ However, just as we think that we are receiving a rational explanation for why Troy fell, based on human responsibility and human error, Benoit quickly adds, but Fortune was too much against them. Free will and Amors; if-only and Fortune. These are the polarities of the Troie. Benoit makes no attempt to fuse them into a unified theory of why men act as they do, or why Troy fell. It is both Fortune and men's wills that bring down Troy.

First we will consider the problem of the conditional future and freedom of the will in the Troie, and observe how Fortune is able to overcome human will and reason in order to control the outcome of events. Then we will examine the role of Amors as a form of control over human behavior that is more powerful than free will and reason, and that can destroy a man's personality entirely.

As we saw in the Eneas, Dido could have controlled her behavior; Camile could have restrained her greed; Lavine did not have to shoot the arrow toward Eneas. Free will is firmly insisted upon. This is a basic element in many medieval treatments of the Troy story. Benoit apparently is working in a very similar tradition, with a major and critical difference. He makes excuses for his characters to explain their actions as almost impossible to have been avoided. These excuses

⁷ Wigginton, commenting on the Ilias of Simon Capra Aurea (mid-twelfth century), indicates how standard this "if only . . . then" approach was in the clerical tradition of Troy stories: ". . . we see working the notion of a conditional fate which may be changed by one's retreat from a course of morally irresponsible action but which is not changed because pride backed by lust makes such retreat impossible . . ." (pp. 59-60). The question in Benoit, however, is whether a man could indeed retreat from a conditional fate.

fall under the headings of ignorance, lack of belief, the fine excesses of honor, the malice of Fortune, or the inescapable passion of Amors. Always, there are excuses. Early in the Troie, the narrator tells us:

Mais jo ne cuit que rien humaine
Feïst onques si angoissos,
Si pesme ne si doloros. (Troie 630-32)

(But I don't believe that any human being ever could have caused something so cruel, so terrible, or so woeful.)

And yet, having rejected human behavior as the cause for the terrible woes of Troy, Benoit never offers us any other cause, except for his graceful shrugs to Fortune, who hates the Trojans and causes their destruction, or to the malicious gods, who, for no cause ever mentioned, desire the fall of Troy.

The problem of human free will in a conditional situation is developed thoroughly in the section dealing with the Trojan council's debate on whether to send Paris to Greece. It opens with King Priant very angry and upset. He had sent a delegation headed by Antenor to Greece to request the return of his sister, Esiona, who was being kept as a concubine by Telamon. Antenor's request was rudely rejected and now Priant is angry and craving revenge. His reason is being controlled by his emotions, and he speaks to the returned delegation and to his sons, expressing his feelings of shame and anger, and the need to be cured of these feelings (Troie 3684-89). Priant's desire for revenge will lead Troy to its destruction, but not without the full and willing consent of almost all of the Trojans. First the sons and delegates agree enthusiastically with Priant's demand for revenge (Troie 3718-22). There is no

question that, although Priant initiates the drive for revenge, it is going to be an action for which all the Trojans are responsible.

After receiving the consent of this group, Priant speaks to his sons and puts Hector in charge of preparations for war. Hector is one of the very few in Troy who have any reservations about the desirability of initiating hostilities against Greece, and he points out that although it would be good to punish the Greeks, he doubts that the Trojans have the capacity to do so and win the ensuing conflict (Troie 3799-3806). Hector's objections are not about the morality of the war, but are strictly practical. He points out that the Trojans do not even have a navy (Troie 3833-34). Hector's comments, based on common sense, only impress the Trojans for a brief moment, and then Paris speaks and carries the day.

The speech of Paris is ironic, because he bases his opinion of what to do on a dream he had, which he does not understand correctly. Later in the discussion Paris opposes the warning prophecies of Helenus because they are based on visions, even though Helenus has a reputation for having true visions. Paris offers to head a raiding party into Greece seeking vengeance, and he justifies his position by affirming that the gods will support them in this venture (Troie 3858-59). Paris then explains why the gods will favor him. He had a dream in which he was asked to judge which of three goddesses was the most beautiful: Venus, Juno or Minerva. In the Eneas, Paris was awake, deliberate, and fully responsible for the deceitful judgment he made in favor of Venus. There was no question of his guilt. In the Troie, the question of Paris' responsibility has been greatly complicated by removing the judgment

from waking life into a dream.⁸ Mercury approaches the sleeping Paris and explains to him that an apple labeled "for the most beautiful" has been thrown amongst the three goddesses and they want him to judge which of them is the most beautiful. The goddesses proceed to offer Paris rewards for choosing them. There is no mention of his conspiring to deceive or manipulate them (Troie 3907-11). Paris, quite ignorant of the true implications of his dream, thinks that his choice of the reward of Venus, and hence of Venus as the most beautiful goddess, means that she will favor him in a venture against Greece (Troie 3912-21). This Paris is less of a scoundrel and more of a fool than the Paris in the Eneas. He has no understanding of the situation, either while judging, or afterward, when he assumes that Venus will aid him without considering the possible implications of that aid.

It is Helenus, a son of Priant and a reliable seer, who gives the first serious warning to the Trojans that their path will lead them to disaster. His prophecy is clear, unmistakable, and unambiguous, not at all like the dream of Paris. First, Helenus reminds the Trojans of the excellent reliability of his prophecies (Troie 3947-53). Having estab-

⁸ According to Macrobius in his Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, trans. and with an Intro. and Notes by William Harris Stahl (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952): "We call a dream oracular in which a parent or a pious or revered man, or a priest, or even a god clearly reveals what will or will not transpire, and what action to take or to avoid. We call a dream a prophetic vision if it actually comes true.

"By an enigmatic dream we mean one that conceals with strange shapes and veils with ambiguity the true meaning of the information being offered, and requires an interpretation for its understanding" (p. 90). Benoit of course plays on the enigmatic nature of these revelations of higher truth. Men do not believe or understand these revelations, so they are not of very much use.

lished his credentials as a prophet, Helenus then proceeds to warn the Trojans:

"Mais, ço sacheiz, une rien sai:
 "Se Paris a de Grece femme
 "Ne de la terre ne del regne,
 "Se Troie n'en est eissilliee,
 "Arse e fondue e trebuchiee,
 "J'otrei que j'en seie dampnez
 "E en un feu ars e ventez. . . .
 "Que il ne puet autrement estre:
 "Se de Grece femme en ameine,
 "Senz mort, senz dolor e senz peine
 "N'en porra eschaper uns sous,
 "Quar li Grezeis vendront sor nos,
 "Par vive force e par bataille
 "Ylion abatront senz faille." (Troie 3954-60; 3964-70)

("But know this, I know one thing, if Paris gets a wife from Greece, whether from the country or the kingdom, if Troy is not overthrown, burned, destroyed and fallen, I consent to being condemned and burned and my ashes thrown to the wind. . . . It cannot be otherwise if he brings a wife here from Greece, not a single one of us will be able to escape without death, without woe and without suffering. For the Greeks will come upon us and by intense force and battle they will destroy Ylion without fail.")

This is a terrible warning from an excellent and reliable source. It is in Benoit's typical form of a conditional future: if Paris brings home a wife from Greece, then Troy must fall. Our obvious conclusion is that Paris is free to refuse to go to Greece; Priant is free to forbid his son to go to Greece; the Trojans are free to choose not to pursue hostilities against the Greeks. Certainly the prophecy of Helenus is worth more than the dream of Paris.

However, nothing is that simple in the Troie. The first problem is one of belief. Troilus speaks next, and he does not believe in prophecy:

"Avoi!" fait il, "franc chevalier,
 "Por quei vos vei si esmaier
 "Por la parole d'un proveire,
 "Qui ci nos fait mençonge acreire?
 "Trop par est fous qui cuide e creit
 "Que il sache qu'avenir deit
 "D'ui en treis anz: jo nel cuît mie.
 "Ço li fait dire coardie:
 "Proveire sont toz jorz coart . . .
 "Que quiert il entre chevaliers?" (Troie 3993-4001; 4005)

(" Ha!" he said, "noble knights, why do you seem so troubled by the speech of a priest who makes us believe this falsehood? That man is very crazy who believes and imagines that he knows what the future holds in three years. I'll never believe it, it's called cowardice. Priests are always cowards. . . . What is his business among knights?")

What good is a warning if you do not believe it to be true? Certainly the virtu of a chevalier lies in his bravery, not in his readiness to heed the warnings of battle-shy priests. This problem is most basically one of belief, which apparently stems from the point of view or the value system of the individual. The values of the chivalric individual are different in an absolute way from the values of a prudent priest, and there is no reconciliation available in the Troie. This separation of values is made especially acute in the problem of Amors and Achillès, which we will examine later.

Paris, who has placed faith in his dream-vision of Venus, does not base his rejection of Helenus' prophecy on its untruthfulness, but on its irrelevance. True or false, he will go to Greece (Troie 4023-26). Because of the expedition of Paris, Troy will fall. Obviously Paris is a rash and careless man, but the Trojan council agrees on his plan; there is no question here of one man destroying a mass of innocents, as Paris' Judgment did the Trojans in the Eneas. After Paris has decided to go to Greece and the council has agreed, Priant calls a general parliament to

get the consent of all of the Trojans. He tells them what Paris plans to do, and why, and assures them that he will not act without their consent. (Troie 4071-76). Benoit is very careful to underline the involvement of all of the Trojans, acting with free will, when the disastrous course of action is initiated.

The second prophetic warning is given at this parliament by Panthus, an old, learned and wise man. He tells the Trojans that his father had prophesied that Troy would be destroyed if Paris got a wife from Greece (Troie 4098-4100). Not only does Panthus warn the Trojans, but he gives them very good advice:

"Mieuz te vient tot ensi ester
 "E ton bon regne en pais garder
 "Qu'estre en tomoute e en esfrei
 "Que n'en chiee li maus sor tei.
 "Mout bone pais, mout grant franchise
 "As a ton gré, a ta devise:
 "Ne querras pas, se tu bien fais,
 "Com franchise perdes e pais.
 "Mout dessert cil male merite,
 "Qui de son gré se desherite." (Troie 4107-16)

("It's better for you to all remain here and protect your good kingdom and country than to be in trouble and turmoil, so that evils do not come upon you. You have at your will and means a very fine country and very great liberty. If you would be well off, don't seek to lose freedom and country. They well deserve their ill rewards who of their own will disinherit themselves.")

The stress on the "gré" or will of the people to choose war or peace is clear in this passage. There is good advice available, if only the people will heed it. But the people, as a whole, reject the advice of Panthus:

Li peuples toz comunaument,
 Qui ert jostez al parlement,
 Contredistrent l'autorité

Que Panthus ot dit e mostré:
 N'en firent rien, n'en orent cure;
 Bien i ert lor mesaventure. (Troie 4119-24)

(The people all together who were gathered at the parliament contradicted the opinion which Panthus had spoken and shown. They did nothing about it, they didn't concern themselves about it. Their misfortune suited them well.)

Nothing could be more plain than the guilt and responsibility of all the Trojan people for the war that destroys them.

A final warning comes in this crucial section. It is by Cassandra (Troie 4146-54). But the response of the people to her warning destroys any hope that they might avoid disaster: "Bien lor anonçot chose veire: / Cui chaut? qu'il ne la voustrent creire (Troie 4159-60); ("She certainly told them the truth, but what was it worth when they didn't want to believe it?"). The people did not want to believe. A definite case of the failure of free will, as clear-cut as the case against Eve for eating the apple. But, just here, when Benoit has made his point most massively to demonstrate the guilt and responsibility of the Trojans for the war, he adds his most unforgettable conditional statement of if only . . . :

Se Cassandra e Helenus
 En fussent creü e Panthus,
 Ancor n'eüst Troie nul mal,
 Ne li noble riche vassal;
 Mais Fortune nel voleit mie,
 Que trop lor esteit enemie. (Troie 4161-66)

(If they had believed Cassandra and Helenus and Panthus, nothing bad would have happened again to Troy, nor to the noble powerful knights. But Fortune, who was too much their enemy, didn't want it that way.)

And there goes the whole elaborate structure of free will and responsi-

bility down into the morass of confusion. The people did not want to believe Cassandra's warning. Why? Because "Fortune nel voleit mie."⁹ This rather extraordinary case of hedging is really quite typical of Benoit, who sees and elaborates all of the scholastic analyses of why human beings act as they do and why they are responsible for those actions, but then seems unwilling to accept the consequences of his analysis, shrugs and says, but Fortune was their enemy and did not want them to believe.¹⁰

Benoit develops two crucial conditional situations dealing with Hector, the best of the Trojan warriors. The first details his criti-

⁹ Patch comments that the "change in man's fortune is what really constitutes the mediaeval idea of tragedy . . . if tragedy deals with mankind, the unpleasant ending must be brought about by the ultimate suffering of some human figure. To cause this suffering is the particular work of Fortune" (The Goddess Fortuna, p. 68).

¹⁰ Undoubtedly the fact that the Trojans were pre-Christian had some effect on their problems of belief and knowledge. As is pointed out in the Introduction to Saint Augustine, The Teacher, The Free Choice of the Will, Grace and Free Will, trans. Robert P. Russell, The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 59 (Washington D. C.: The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1968): "In general . . . the Dialogue is given over to the refutation of the view that signs and words can of themselves engender truth in the mind of the pupil or ordinary listener. . . . it is Christ, the 'indwelling Truth' who alone teaches men truth" (p. 4). However, Benoit's Greeks do believe and obey their seers, so we cannot put very much stress on this aspect of pre-Christian lack of belief in the Troie, although it is of undoubted importance in some medieval versions of classical stories, including the Troilus of Chaucer. Further, the fact that the Greeks believe Calcas and follow his instructions does not make them "good" men. He is the one who, for instance, advises them to sacrifice Polixena, which they do. And the Greeks, for all their belief, come to very bad ends, not unlike the Trojans who do not believe their seers. Perhaps the problem is that there is no truth to believe in a pre-Christian world, but Benoit makes very little of this.

cal encounter with Aïaus Telamon, and the second describes the dream of Andromacha and the response of Hector to that dream.

Hector is the single most important warrior on the Trojan side, and the fatal error which he commits in relation to Aïaus Telamon is so minor that it is almost impossible to blame him for it, and yet it destroys the last opportunity of the Trojans to conquer the invading Greek army. It is an error of excellence and of chivalry, as are many of the fatal errors in this poem. This situation opens with what appears to be a conditional statement that the Greeks were so badly weakened that the war could have been ended on that day, but then we are immediately told that Destiny interfered:

Mout en furent Greu damagié.
 Le jor fust fin de la bataille,
 A ço ne poüst avoir faille,
 Mais Destinee nel laissa,
 Que ceus de Troie guerreia. (Troie 10120-24)

(The Greeks were badly hurt. That day would have been the end of the war, it could not have been otherwise, but Destiny, who was hostile to Troy, didn't allow it.)

We are already warned to excuse Hector for what is about to happen, although we are told that if he had not done what he did, Troy could have won the war. Benoit then addresses us directly to explain the situation that is to follow:

Savez por quei remest le jor?
 Prianz aveit une soror,
 Esiona, qu'en fu menee
 Adonc, quant Troie fu guastee.
 La dame un fil eü aveit
 Qui au siege venuz esteit:
 Ço ert Telamon Aïaus,
 Bons chevaliers e bons vassaus.

A Hector s'a tant combatu
Qu'il se sont entreconeü. (Troie 10125-34)

(Do you know why the battle was halted that day? Priant had a sister, Esiona, who was taken away at the time that Troy was destroyed. The lady had a son who came to the siege. This was Aïaus Telamon, a good knight and a good warrior. He fought so much with Hector that they recognized one another.)

This scene of recognition that will be so deadly to the Trojans, is brought about by Destiny, or Fortune (Troie 10175);¹¹ the actions within the situation, however, are apparently those of free men. We should notice the pivotal role of Esiona, who is also critically involved in the reasons why Priant goes to war against Greece in the first place.¹² Hector surely commits no error in recognizing his cousin. However, Hector joyfully tries to invite Aïaus into Troy to meet his grandparents, while the more prudent Aïaus refuses to go, fearing that he might be harmed, and he asks Hector to withdraw the Trojan troops for the rest of the day. Hector graciously agrees, while at the same time giving a patriotic and warlike speech so that no one could misunderstand his good intentions (Troie 10148-63). Honor is the only fault we can find in Hector. He acts most honorably, recognizing his cousin, even though that entails halting the momentum of a winning battle. Surely it is a grand and honorable gesture to grant his dear cousin's request and stop

¹¹ Patch comments that "Medieval writers never seem to be quite clear about the distinction between Fate and Fortune; they either blame both figures, or at least confuse the operations of the two" (The Goddess Fortuna, p. 79). Certainly Benoit does not attempt to distinguish between Fate (Destiny) and Fortune.

¹² The first destruction of Troy by Greeks occurred during the reign of Priant's father, Laomedon. It was at this time that Esiona was abducted and given to Telamon.

the battle for the day. And yet . . . Hector, here and elsewhere, as in the Iliad itself, is a bit of a fool, although it is very difficult to blame him, since he always acts according to his understanding of what constitutes honorable behavior.¹³

The Trojans had already begun burning the Greek ships when Hector called an end to the day's fighting:

Si com l'Estoire nos retraits,
Les nes voleient alumer,
Quant il en fist le feu torner . . .
Nen avront force ne poëir
Qu'il les puissent ja mais ardeir. (Troie 10166-68; 10173-74)

(Thus, as the History tells us, they wanted to burn the ships when he made them remove the fire . . . They will never have the force or power to ever burn them again.)

Hector, by his graciousness toward Aïaus, has interfered with the destruction of the Greek fleet. But is he to blame? Benoit cannot bear to put the blame entirely on Hector, and turns again to a conditional statement which invokes not the possible action of a man, but of Fortune:

Se Fortune vousist le jor,
Lor grant travail, lor grant labor
Fussent finé, qu'a plus n'en fussent
N'autre damage n'i eüssent.
Ha! Deus, com lor en fust bien pris!
Mais Aventure, ço m'est vis,
Nel voleit pas, rien n'en doton,
Quant par si petite acheison
Remest le jor lor delivrance
E lor rescosse e lor quitance:
Si ert la chose a avenir
Que rien nel poëit destolir. (Troie 10175-86)

¹³ This recalls Hector's role as a victim in the Iliad, where divine forces impose faults upon him, beyond his own fault.

(If Fortune would have wanted it that day their great effort, their great struggle would have ended, there wouldn't have been any more of it, nor would they have had any harm from it. Ha! God, what a fine reward that might have been for them! But Aventure, in my opinion, didn't want it that way, no doubt, when by such a tiny occasion that day their deliverance and their rescue and freedom were halted. Future events were such that nothing could stop them.)

This "petite acheison" entirely lacks the human guilt and responsibility of that one in the Eneas, where the sole cause of the hatred of Juno and Pallas for Troy and all the Trojans is the Judgment of Paris (Eneas 93-182). Benoit shows us where Hector made a wrong decision, but quickly hedges it by invoking Fortune and Aventure, lest we commit an error ourselves and blame Hector more than a very little bit.

Benoit further enhances the pathos of the situation by the joyful reception which the Trojan people give to Hector as he returns from this disastrous encounter. They cry out happily when they see Hector:

"Vez ci de toz vaillanz la flor,
 "Li souverains e li plus proz:
 "C'est cil qui nos vengera toz." (Troie 10210-12)

("See the flower of all bravery, the lord and most honorable.
 He is the one who will avenge us all.")

They see Hector as the perfect knight and warrior, which he perhaps is. The irony of the situation is that the honor-code of the perfect knight is not of use to the successful warrior; the gracious truce he grants to his cousin is a tactical error. Again we see a situation where there are multiple sets of conflicting values which cannot be reconciled and which lead their separate ways to disaster. The irony of this situation is one of pathos. It shows us characters who act out their roles in life and remain unenlightened. Hector will never know that he made a critical

mistake at this juncture. We, the audience, know, but it is doubtful that this knowledge will even do us much good, since we also know that Fortune and Destiny created a situation where the Trojans had to lose. This is a world where the people are generally excellent, and the errors they commit are slight or unavoidable when considered in relation to the malice of Fortune and the enormity of the consequences of those errors. This is not the malice of Paris in the Eneas, but the generally well-intentioned false steps of good, but unenlightened men.

Finally, we will consider Andromacha's dream, and Hector's response to it. This dream is sent by the gods, and consequently is a piece of correct information. The response to it is evidently up to the free will of Hector, and he, most concerned with his honor, rejects the dream's warning and is killed as a consequence. The gods send the dream to Andromacha:

Li dieu li ont fait a saveir
 Par signes e par visions
 E par interpretacions . . .
 Mais de ço fu seüre e certe,
 S'Ector s'en ist a la bataille,
 Que ocis i sera senz faille:
 Ja ne porra del champ eissir,
 Cel jor li estovra morir.
 La dame sot la destinee
 Que la nuit li fu demostree. (Troie 15284-86; 15290-96)

(The gods caused her to know by signs and visions and by dreams showing the future . . . But of this she was positive and certain: if Hector goes into battle, then he will be killed without fail, he will never be able to leave the battlefield, he will have to die on that day. The lady knew the destiny which the night had shown to her.)

Evidently the fate of Hector is not a fixed matter, and is contingent upon his behavior. Andromacha then warns Hector:

"Ne vuelent pas les Poestez
 "Ne les devines Deitez
 "Que i aleiz, mostre le m'ont." (Troie 15313-15)

("The Powers and the sacred Gods do not want you to go there,
 they have shown it to me.")

Here the dream is interpreted by Andromacha as a warning to Hector that the gods do not want him to go into battle that day, and hence do not want him to die on that day. Is she correct? She warns Hector not to disobey the gods (Troie 15322-24). However, the gods gave the dream to Andromacha, not to Hector. Cassandra and the other seers were not believed. Did the gods intend Hector to obey? Hector responds with anger, just as the Trojans got angry with Cassandra and locked her up when she told them more truth than they were willing to hear (Troie 4881 ff.).

Hector accuses Andromacha of being ignorant and worried and says that she only had a bad dream, not a true one. We, however, know that it was a true dream. Knowing this, we observe the angry Hector arguing that he must defend his city and his honor (Troie 15343-50). We have already seen Hector's honor cause him to stop the Trojans from burning the Greek ships because he had promised his cousin a truce. Now his honor sends him out, scorning his wife's dream, which we know is true. Priant and others try to keep Hector home for the day. Hector refuses to listen and Andromacha ends her plea: "'Lasse, com faite destinee!'" (Troie 15485); ("Alas, thus does destiny!"). Destiny, or Hector's anger and sense of honor, impel him to go. The gods merely warned that if he went, then he would die, a form of conditional destiny. He chose to go, fully warned, angry at the warning. Yet his free choice, if it

can be called that, is one of an enraged creature, almost a beast:

A le vis teint e coloré.
Li ueil li sont el chief enflé:
Plus les a vermeiz d'un charbon.
Plus fiers que lieparz ne lion. (Troie 15555-58)

(His face flushed and colored, his eyes swollen in his head, redder than a carbuncle. He was fiercer than a leopard or a lion.)

This beast imagery is not at all typical of the Troie, and indeed is only noticeable in two other unusual cases: that of the Saietaire, a centaur demon-archer, and that of Achillès after his knightly personality has been destroyed by Amors. Hector, about to go to his death against the warning of the gods, has the aspect of a wild beast. He refuses to listen to reason and warnings. It would seem at this point that Hector, like Troy, dooms himself.

Priant pleads with Hector to obey him and stay in Troy that day, but Hector replies that it is folly to stop him. (We know that it is his raging folly that compels him to go.)

"Sire", fait il, "itel folie
"Com fu solement porpensee?
"Por une fole, une desvee,
"Que son songe vos a retrait." (Troie 15582-85)

("Sire," he said, "for such foolishness as was only imagined?
For a fool, a madwoman who told her dream to you.")

Hector has clearly lost his reason and good sense. Here he parallels Priant's earlier refusal to heed Cassandra. Both Priant and Hector reject truth: Priant had Cassandra locked up when she warned of doom at the wedding of Paris and Helen (Troie 4934-36), while Hector's anger

blocks out the truth of Andromachè's dream. It appears here that not gods, but men, doom Troy. The gods only warn; men act. Emotion dominates reason and the affected one goes ahead, heedless of warning, duty and common sense.

Priant is only able to keep Hector in Troy for a little while, until the body of Margariton, a son of Priant, is brought back to Troy. Then Hector swears vengeance on Achillès, who had killed him (Troie 15858-63). Hector succeeds in wounding Achillès, who then seeks vengeance on him. When Hector is taken prisoner by a mob of Greeks, his helmet is removed and Achillès ("li coilverz" /Troie 162227); ("the scoundrel") recognizes Hector and kills him (Troie 16220 ff.). Hector's death is brutal and undignified, murder rather than death in fair combat.

We certainly saw how Hector chose to go into battle that day. We can ask, should Hector have stayed in Troy and respected the warning in his wife's dream? His truce with Aïaus Telamon had already lost the war. Further, he did not believe that the dream was true. And most important, he had to avenge his brother, Margariton, whom Achillès had just killed. Having gone, he had to die. He was killed by Destiny and the mob and Achillès.¹⁴ His death is the absolute end to the Trojan ability to resist the Greeks:

¹⁴ This provides an echo of Hector's death in the Iliad, where he was killed by the blow of Achilles and the trickery of Athene, and most of all, by the plan of Zeus. There is still a quality of the victim to Hector's death in the Troie, although any reasons for it, other than obscure traditions, are quite gone.

La mort Hector les a vencuz,
 Et si en sont descoragié,
 Si angoissos e si irié
 Que li plusor, estre lor gré,
 Se sont en mi le champ pasmé. (Troie 16240-44)

(Hector's death conquered them, and they were so disheartened, so wretched and so saddened that most of them, against their will, swooned in the midst of the battlefield.)

Yet how can we blame Hector after all? Benoit delicately avoids doing so, although he has given us every detail of the irrational behavior with which Hector resisted the information in the dream of Andromacha. After Hector is dead, Benoit gives us a list of the kings Hector had killed, and ends with a most typical sigh to the fates:

E s'il vesquist dous anz o mais,
 Destrut fussent si enemi;
 Mais Aventure nel sofri
 Ne Envie ne Destinee. (Troie 16840-43)

(And if he had lived two years or more, his enemy would have been destroyed, but Aventure didn't allow it, nor did Envy nor Destiny.)

And we are right back at the same point that we have observed as the ending for other situations of conditional destiny in Benoit's Troie. There are always plenty of reasons why people act as they do; but then there is always Destiny, or Fortune, or Aventure, which can also be an adequate, if alternative explanation for why things turn out so very badly, time and again.

We have been observing how, in conditional situations in the Troie, characters seem to be able to make choices about their actions, and yet . . . anger or lack of belief or destiny seem to intrude to somehow block or confuse or make superfluous the act of rational free will or choice

involved. Each event is assigned not one, but many causes, by an author so scrupulous in his logic that he notes each genteel failure of his Trojans, and so compassionate of his Trojans that he then excuses each failure. Let us now consider more carefully the nature of one phenomenon that acts to block or interfere with the rational free will of the characters in the Troie: Amors.

The most fully developed example in the Troie of direct control over human free will is the extensive episode of Achillès' love for Polixena, the daughter of Priant. The destruction of Achillès by Amors is a far more complex event than a simple domination of his free will. Benoit presents a careful analysis of the means by which the nominally chivalrous Achillès is utterly devastated to the point of beastlike loss of sense and reason before his actual death at the hands of Polixena's brother, Paris, and a gang of Trojans who ambush him. Since this episode illuminates not only the loss of sense and reason to the imperative of Amors, but also the conflicting value systems which lead Benoit into such compassionate ambivalence, we will consider it at some length.

The situation begins on the anniversary of the death of Hector, when the Greeks enter Troy during a truce for a festival at his tomb. Achillès goes, completely ignorant of what the day will bring to him, and thus unable to avoid the situation in any rational, responsible way:

Mare i porta onques les piez,
 Quar, ainz qu'il s'en seït repairez
 Ne de la feste retornez,
 Sera il si mal atornez,
 Sa mort avra mise en son sein.
 Veüe i a Polixenain
 Apertement en mi la chiere:
 C'est l'acheison e la maniere
 Par qu'il sera getez de vie
 E l'ame de son cors partie.

Oëz com fait destinement!
 Hui mais orreiz com faitement
 Il fu destreiz por fine amor. (Troie 17535-47)

(It is too bad that his feet carried him there, since before he may turn around or come back from the festival he will be so misguided that he will have taken his own death into his heart. He saw Polixena there, a clear view of her face. This is the occasion and the means by which he will be snatched from life and his soul parted from his body. Hear what destiny did! Now you will hear how he was totally destroyed by fine amor.)

This is rather like the situation where Hector granted an unwise truce to his cousin and Benoit commented: "Quant par si petite acheison / Remest le jor lor delivrance" (Troie 10182-83); ("Such a little occasion halted their deliverance that day"). These tiny events, more chance than choice, certainly with no warning of the consequences, are the "causes" of disaster.

A tiny, unavoidable event: the sight of Polixena.¹⁵ We know that Achillès has met his death. There is never any doubt that Amors in the Troie is a force beyond the ability of human beings to control, and there is never any doubt that it leads, inevitably, to disaster and to death.¹⁶

¹⁵ R. M. Lumiansky comments, in "Structural Unity in Benoit's Roman de Troie," Romania LXXIX (1958), pp. 410-24), on how very much Benoit has created here: "Benoit follows the outline he found in Dares for Achilles' reactions to love for Polyxena, but the Old French poet makes of this matter a lengthy and vibrant story of a man caught between love and death, honor and desire" (pp. 423-24).

¹⁶ Alfred Adler, in "Militia et Amor in the Roman de Troie," Romanische Forschungen 72 (1960), pp. 14-29, remarks of the four main love stories in the Troie (Jason and Medea, Paris and Helen, Troilus and Briseida, and Achilles and Polixena): "Each one of the stories has a quality of Amor distinct from the Amores in the other three. The common denominator for all four, however, is the peculiar nature of the relationship between Amor and Militia: fanned one through the other, either one tends to destroy the other" (p. 24). Love and war are central to the story of Troy from Homer onwards.

What does Benoit offer us as a cause for such woe? Nothing at all, or those words that substitute for nothing in his world-scheme, "com fait destinement" (Troie 17545); ("how destiny operates"), or "Mout est fort chose d'Aventure" (Troie 17549); ("It's very much a matter of Aventure").

Achillès is wounded to the death by Amors:

La resplendor qu'ist de sa face
 Li met el cors freidor e glace.
 Sis nes, sa boche e sis mentons
 Le resprenent de teus arsons,
 Dont ardra mais dedenz son cors:
 Pinciez sera d'Amors e mors. (Troie 17563-68)

(The splendor which issues from her face makes his body feel cold and icy. Her nose, her mouth, and her chin inflame him with all those fires which will burn, but inside his body. He will be seized by Amors and by death.)

The very image of falling in love as being wounded, so literal in this poem, denies that there was any means by which a person could avoid the injury. We are reminded of Lavine in the Eneas who remarked that she could not be at fault because, if she fell in love by merely seeing, then the only solution would be never to look at a man, or to fall in love with every man she saw. This is not an area where rational free will holds much sway. Achillès, so far, has done no wrong, yet he is wounded to the death and does not stand a chance of surviving: "Force, vertu ne hardement / Ne valent contre Amors neient" (Troie 17583-84); ("Neither strength, virtue, nor courage are worth anything against Amors"). The virtues of Achillès as a warrior are of no use to him in the situation of Amors. The conflict between the values of the warrior, which are summed up in the concept of honor, and the values of the lover, summed up in the concept of Amors, will provide the poles of the

conflict that will torment Achillès, destroying his personality and even his very senses, debasing him to a bestial creature who hacks up a dead body and dies, finally, in a well-deserved, treacherous ambush.

Achillès is trapped by Amors, and he recognizes that fact. However, in the world of the Troie, recognition does not bring freedom:

"Trop m'a trouvé hui Amors prest;
 "Trop m'esteie en sa veie mis:
 "Por ço m'a si lacié e pris
 "Que jo ne li puis eschaper." (Troie 17648-51)

("Amors has found me too quickly today; I was too much in his way. Because of that he has so taken and bound me that I can never escape him.")

This is reminiscent of the situation in the Eneas where Lavine falls in love with Eneas who is besieging her city. This is a more extreme situation, however, and Achillès is quite aware of the love-hate problem, and knows that Polixena would like him to be killed, because he has killed her brother Hector (Troie 17662-77).

Achillès has been trapped by an Amors who does not care at all about his welfare, unlike the Amors in the Eneas, who was the brother of Eneas and did promote his well-being. This Amors is barely personified, has no interests except his own imperatives of behavior, and is presented as something that traps Achillès, rather like an animal trapped in a hunting net (Troie 17688-89). Trapped, aware of it, and unable to free himself, Achillès can only act out the deadly process of Amors. He recognizes that he is in love with a visual image, since he has had no personal contact with Polixena, and compares himself to Narcissus, another dying lover to whom one cannot attach moral blame, since he suffered in a trap beyond his ability to understand or control. Achillès

knows that his love will be his death: "'Jo aim ma mort e mon encombre'" (Troie 17696); ("I love my death and my injury"). But there is nothing that he can do to protect himself. Benoit carefully structures this to stress the absolute destructive irrationality of Amors, where love and hatred can be focused at the same point. The first attribute of personality that Achillès loses is not his reason, but his free will to choose and act according to a rational understanding of what is good for him. He will systematically be divested of the other positive attributes of personality, including reason, sense, and even, near the end of his infatuated life, perception itself. The first effect of Amors is to trap Achillès, a metaphor for the paralysis of his will, or the loss of his freedom. At first Achillès' mind fully recognizes how deadly the situation is, but he is trapped by Amors and knows that he cannot escape. This adds another dimension to the level of prophecy unheeded which is prominent in the Troie. So far we have seen situations where the mind did not accept information as true. Nobody believed Cassandra's warnings; Hector did not believe the dream of Andromacha to be true. Their lack of belief controlled their responses to information. Credo ut intelligam. Here Achillès sees clearly what is happening to him. However, seeing, or understanding, or believing, does no good at all. He is compelled by Amors, an emotional imperative that dominates his reason and understanding.

Achillès' mind will degenerate later; now it still functions, with the heightened consciousness that seems to be a concomitant of Amors. He catches himself in self-deception right away:

"N'est el ma mortel enemie?
"Oïl, mais or sera m'amie.

"Veire, quar bien est a mon chois!
 "Jo méismes me trich e bois,
 "Jo me deceif, mien esciënt,
 "Quar jo sai bien certainement
 "Qu'el me voudreit avoir ocis." (Troie 17657-63)

("Isn't she my deadly enemy? Yes, but now she will be my lover. Truly, I've chosen well! I delude and deceive myself, I fool myself, in my opinion, for I know surely that she would like to have me killed.")

Achilles in love combines accurate self-knowledge with a paralyzed will. This is one more permutation of the problem of knowledge in the Troie. If you do not know what to do, how can you do the correct thing? This problem was developed in the debate over sending Paris on an expedition to Greece. Even warnings were of no use to those who did not believe them. Here Achilles knows what his situation is, yet that knowledge does him no good at all. In fact it will only lead him deeper into a conflict between honor and love that is irreconcilable and can only end in his death.

However, Achilles knowledge of what is happening to him quickly flows into self-deceit, and we realize that he compares himself to Narcissus because he cannot yet possess the object of his love. After all his talk of illness and death, Achilles ends with a prayer:

"A Deu pri jo que il me dont
 "Tel conseil prendre e tel conrei
 "Par que ele ait merci de mei." (Troie 1744-46)

("I pray to God that he will give me such advice and strategy that she will take pity on me.")

A perfect example of the ineffectuality of reason, according to the most reasonable Benoit. Achilles understands, but his reason becomes quickly

harnessed to his captured will, which only craves satisfaction.

Achillès sends a messenger to the Trojans offering to return to Greece with his troops if he can marry Polixena, but Priant replies that the Greeks will all have to leave in peace before Achillès can marry her. Achillès then tries to persuade the Greeks to abandon the war and go home, giving excellent reasons, all of which are in thrall to his will, which in turn is in thrall to Amors. While the Greeks are at war because of Heleine, Achillès wants them to quit the war because of Polixena. He chides them that it is folly to war over a woman, but Thoas retorts that they are not at war for the sake of a woman, but "'por aveir honor e pris'" (Troie 18331); ("'for honor and glory'"). Honor is the reason that the Greeks are besieging Troy. And Achillès has utterly forgotten his honor. The Greeks all reject Achillès' anti-war arguments and he becomes furious and withdraws himself and his troops from combat. Benoit traces his perfidy carefully, and yet points out that Achilles has no real choice in the matter:

Se il mesfait, qu'en puet il mais . . .
 Qui est qui vers Amors est sage?
 Ço n'est il pas ne ne puet estre:
 En Amors a trop grevos maistre. (Troie 18444; 18448-50)

(If he does wrong, what can he do about it? . . . Who is wise about Amors? He isn't, nor is he able to be; he has too severe a master in Amors.)

That is just how people behave when they are in the grip of Amors, and there is no way to prevent it. Amors, as envisioned by Benoit, is a totally destructive force, undermining all of the necessary social institutions, best summed up in the word "honor," and yet one cannot avoid falling in love. Again we see Benoit's double perception: the

logical understanding of the destructive nature of Amors, and the compassionate understanding of the helplessness of a person to avoid Amors. Benoit does not really present Amors as a justification for Achillès' increasingly bad behavior, but he does present it as an adequate explanation for why Achillès could not avoid behaving as he did. Typically, Benoit takes pains to point out that Achillès' behavior is wrong, but he is equally at pains to excuse him on the grounds that he is trapped by Amors and cannot escape.

The problem of Amors is intensified in the Troie because it represents not only a destruction of a person's will, but an alternative value system which negates the value system of chivalry as the honor of the warrior. When the Greek army sends ambassadors to Achillès, who accuse him of dishonorable behavior, Achillès replies by attacking the very institution of chivalric warfare (Troie 19761-79).

Amors, standing in direct opposition to honor, epitomizes the duality or multiplicity of the world-view developed in the Troie, and the maximum intensity of this world-view occurs in the episode of Achillès in love. Under pressure from the Greeks, who are being killed and desperately need his support, Achillès refuses to fight, but finally allows his troops to go into battle. Here, acting to help his own people, he breaks his promise not to fight against the Trojans and commits an unpardonable sin against the code of Amors, who accosts Achillès and accuses him of having broken his laws:¹⁷

¹⁷ Moshé Lazar, in Amour Courtois et "Fin'Amors" dans la littérature du XII^e siècle (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1964), p. 238, speaking of Chrétien's Launcelot, comments that: "Les troubadours nous avaient appris que la qualité principale de l'amant parfait était la soumission absolue, l'obéissance aux commandements de la Dame. Celle-ci

"tu as enfraite ma lei.
 "Ne deüsses pas al tornei
 "Enveier tes Mirmidoneis . . .
 "Ceste uevre sera comparee:
 "Dreit en avra a son plaisir.
 "Grief le t'estuet espeneïr,
 "Fort en sera la penitence:
 "De sa forme e de sa semblance
 "Cuit bien que t'estovra morir." (Troie 20715-17; 20720-25)

("You have violated my law. You should not have sent your Mirmidoneis into battle. . . . This deed will be paid for dearly. Justice will have its way. You must pay terribly, the penalty will be very hard. I know certainly that you must die of her beauty and her appearance.")

This is a complete reversal of the morality of honor which would demand that Achillès defend his own men loyally. What does Benoit think of the morality of honor? Each is an absolute structure; each is betrayed by allegiance to the other.¹⁸ However, a man can presumably choose hon-

peut faire de lui ,selon son bon plaisir, un héros ou un couard, un sage ou un fou." The question of obedience is critical; in Achillès' case it is a question of his obedience to his promises to Priant and Ecuba that he will not fight against the Trojans (Troie 17754 ff.). Obedience here is a law of Amors and when Achillès, terribly torn by conflicts, breaks his obedience, he must die according to the laws of Amors.

¹⁸ Lazar points out that Amors, especially in its manifestation as fin'amors, was in a natural conflict with church morality; it is not any surprise that it also conflicted with the morality of honor. He remarks that although Chrétien expressed a version which was not considered heretical, l'amour courtois, since it was capable of reconciling love and marriage, "Les troubadours . . . ne considéraient pas leur conception de l'amour adultère comme immorale et blâmable. Ils ne cherchaient pas à la concilier avec la morale chrétienne. La fin'amors possédait une morale qui lui était propre. Nous trouvons la confirmation de ces données dans l'oeuvre d'André le Chapelain, qui illustre bien cette question de la double vérité et l'état de crise d'une société aristocratique aux prises avec deux vérités contraires: la raison et la foi, la nature et la grâce, l'amour sexuel et l'amour divin" (p. 255). In the case of Achillès, it is love versus honor that represent the two "truths" at conflict. In general Benoit is able to maintain conflicting "truths" with ease, displaying no need to form a synthesis; Achillès is an exception.

or; he is chosen by Amors. Even this does not provide an answer though, since, as we saw, it was precisely Hector's overly fine sense of honor toward his cousin that was so critical for the Trojan failure to burn the Greek ships.

The section dealing with Achillès in love follows directly upon a scene where Troïlus complains to his mother that Briseïda has betrayed him (Troie 20675-76). Not the code of Amors, but its betrayal, is the crime of Briseïda.¹⁹ And, according to Amors, not dishonorable behavior, but the refusal to behave dishonorably, when he sent his troops to help the Greeks, is the crime of Achillès against Amors. We can only observe the compassionate care that Benoit has given to his portrayal of the destruction of Achillès and perhaps conclude that Benoit himself had not made up his mind, or that he did not feel it necessary to make up his mind, as to the construction of a hierarchy of values by means of which one could say: Achillès should and could have rejected Amors, or Achillès should and could have rejected honor.

The entire tone of the Troie is certainly critical, if understanding, of those emotions (especially pride, anger and love) which overwhelm the reason and lead to disastrous behavior. And yet, these emotions are dressed in the language of logic. Achillès is trapped between the logic of moral human loyalty and the logic of love loyalty. Each is quite logical in itself. Amors is not the least sloppy as a thinker. By the claims of mere logic, one set of values can success-

¹⁹ Although we will consider later versions of the love of Troïlus, it is not of particular significance to our inquiry into the causes of events in the Troie, so we will not examine it in this chapter.

fully compete with another. What is lacking is a hierarchy of values that could insist, logic aside, loyalty to your people is a higher claim than loyalty to a lady.²⁰

Amors points out triumphantly that Achillès has ruined himself by both codes, war and love:

"Tu perz ton pris e ta valor,
 "E si perz t'amie e t'amor.
 "N'en avras mie, ensi morras." (Troie 20763-65)

("You lose your glory and your courage, and then you lose your lover and your love. You will never have them, so you will die.")

Even more than this, Amors emphasizes that the very love which has led Achillès to lose his men will now destroy him:

"Jo vueil qu'el face son talant
 "De tei ocire e crucier,
 "Qu'el te toille beivre e mangier,
 "Dormir, repos e alejance,
 "Senz bon espeir, senz atendance.
 "Dès or li apareil e faz
 "Come el te destreigne en ses laz." (Troie 20768-74)

("I wish that she may cause her desire to kill and torment you, that she may take away from you drink and eating, sleep, rest and relief, without hope or expectation. Now it's all arranged how she may overcome you in her bonds.")

²⁰ P. Nolan, in Free Will," New Catholic Encyclopedia, prepared by an editorial staff and the Catholic University of America, Vol. VI (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1967), pp. 90 and 91, comments that: "St. Thomas Aquinas argued that man is free with respect to finite goods but that he is determined to the infinite good." He also points out that "Free will is usually defined as the freedom possessed by a human being who, encountering an object he evaluates as finite, may choose whether or not to yield to the attraction of that object." The problem with Amors and free will is precisely that Amors is not a finite system, but one which refers to the infinite good of love as transcendence, and one cannot construct a hierarchy of infinite values, or at least Benoit did not.

The interesting thing about this positive connection between the beloved woman and the death of Achillès is that she is not exactly Polixena herself, but rather an idealization of the beauty of Polixena, a beauty which operates on Achillès without the conscious will of either Polixena or Achillès. This idealized image of the beloved woman destroys Achillès without the cooperation of Polixena herself.²¹

Achillès responds to the threats of Amors not with regrets for his lost men, but with regrets for his now unavailable love. Yet Benoit does not treat Achillès scornfully here, but quite to the contrary, he has him give an impassioned, ecstatic love-death speech which places a claim for love as a transcendent experience, and for the beautiful Polixena as an absolute value which transcends any possible earthly code of social morality. Achillès blames himself for having sinned against love and then he addresses the now and forever unattainable Polixena:

"Haï! bele, tant mal me vait!
 "Tant sui por vos desavanciez
 "E de joie desconseilliez!
 "Fors vos ne me puet rien valeir.
 "Iço me torne a desespeir,
 "Que jo ne puis a vos parler
 "Ne vostre face remirer
 "Ne conter vos ma grant dolor.
 "Ha! douce, fine, fresche flor,
 "Sor les beles esperitaus
 "E sor totes angeliaus,
 "Come jo pert por vos la vie
 "Senz avier socors ne aïe!

²¹ It is really Amors that destroys Achillès, not Polixena. Jones comments that she "is a tragic figure. She is completely unconscious of the effects she has on Achillès" (p. 58). When Polixena is later sacrificed by the Greeks to the shade of Achillès, her brave and noble behavior makes it very clear that Benoit did not place blame on her conscious behavior for what happened to Achillès (Troie 26471 ff.). In this fragmented world, it is her beauty, not herself, that Achillès loves, and that kills him.

"Uevre de nature devine,
 "Sor trestotes beautez reïne,
 "A vos s'en vait mis esperiz;
 "Mais, las! ja n'i iert acoilliz,
 "Qu'Amors me nuist, jol sai e vei:
 "Ne s'en tient mie devers mei.
 "Polixena, a vos m'otrei." (Troie 20790-20809).

("Ah! beautiful one, it goes so badly for me! I grow so much worse because of you, and I have lost my joy! Other than you, nothing can have any value for me. Thus I return to despair, since I am not able to speak to you or to gaze on your face, or to tell you about my great unhappiness. Ah! sweet, pure, fresh flower, above all the beautiful spirits and above all the angels, how I lose my life for you, without having help or aid! Work of divine nature, queen above all other beauties, my spirit goes to you, but alas, it will never be received there. I know and see how Amors has injured me. He will never release me. Polixena, I dedicate myself to you.")

After this we can no longer say that Benoit simply disapproves of Amors. Here it has become a transcendent value and as such is beyond all earthly concerns with right and wrong, except as referred to love. Achilles has lost because he has sinned against the standards of that transcendent value. We must especially note the line, "'Fors vos ne me puet rien valeir.'" Polixena's idealized beauty is an absolute which destroys earthly values other than those of love. We certainly do not have to say that Benoit approves of what has happened to Achilles. Indeed, he will soon trace his utter degradation and destruction which, however, are the penalty not for love, but for his crime against love. Benoit's understanding of the transcendence of love has carried him far beyond mere disapproval into an affirmation of the ecstasy of love, if not of its social and moral usefulness.²²

²² Ferrante ("The Conflict of Lyric") comments that: "Although the French romances of antiquity were written in the twelfth century, when courtly love dominated the lyric in Provence and Germany, they present

Polixena is an "'Uevre de nature devine.'" She is no longer a mere woman, but an idealized embodiment of an absolute principle of love and beauty. Achilles has lost her forever, although he cannot, and will not lose his love for her, until the end of his life when his memory and senses are destroyed. This love as transcendence, without an object, can only lead to death. We are back to the Narcissus dilemma which opened this section on Achilles in love. However, Benoit presents this with great beauty and dignity, and does not allow us to despise a man so entrapped for a weak will or immoral behavior. Achilles cannot break free of Amors, and he does gain an enlightenment, beyond that of most men, where he can see clearly, for a moment, a spiritual truth of great beauty. Achilles accepts death as the price of his experience. Certainly he is not yet a coward or a fool. He must, however, be destroyed, and this is done by a systematic breakdown of his personality.

Composed of conflicting parts, Achilles will now be literally taken apart, his senses removed and his personality broken down and robbed of its basic elements. Achilles is taken apart by Amors as he is hurried on to his inevitable death, in ways that degrade him from a man

love almost exclusively as an obstacle to social responsibility and knightly glory. Since these romances occasionally betray an awareness of courtly motifs, we must assume that the authors consciously rejected the possibility of love serving as a beneficial force. If they use the courtly conventions, it is only to criticize or ridicule them. They choose to present love in the tradition of classical poetry" (p. 137). Perhaps Benoit's attitudes concerning Amors and Achilles are atypical of his time and genre, although typical of his personal ability to see and cherish all sides of a problem. It is not that he sees love as beneficial or socially useful, quite to the contrary. But he does grant it a beauty and transcendence which cannot be denied merely in the interests of social morality.

to a beast to a senseless and unperceiving monster.²³

Achilles declines from his peak of love-death ecstasy and renews his conflict of whether to fight or not to fight, but he is no longer master of himself:

Aler i vueut, mais en poi d'ore
 Li rest Amors si coruz sore
 Qu'il n'i ose le pié porter.
 Proëce e sen li tout amer
 E hardement e vasselage.
 Mout est destreiz en son corage;
 Il n'est de rien sire de sei,
 Qu'Amors le tient pris en son brei. (Troie 20851-58)

(He wants to go there, but soon Amors, for his part, so overwhelms him that he doesn't dare lift a foot. Bravery and reason, all love and courage and knighthood, are quite destroyed in his heart. He is no longer master of himself, since Amors holds him fast in his net.)

Loss of self-mastery is the key to the destruction of Achilles. He refuses to fight to aid his own troops, and remains firm until the Trojans have carried the battle to his own tent, where he himself is threatened. The Greeks cry out to him now that not only are his men being slaughtered, but he too is now in danger. This is the point at which Achilles

²³ Benoit's analytic, or scholastic conception of personality leaves us with a vision of fragmented creatures divided into will and reason, sense and emotion. At best, these parts exist in a fragile balance. His characters are no unified persons who can perceive, analyze, choose and act, but rather the gathered fragments of a psychomachia, where will, reason, sense and faith are separate entities, any one of which can be precipitated out of equilibrium by a surge of inner emotion, or by outer interference, such as the malice of Fortune or the hatred of Amors. The world, too, is such a gathering of fragments, both causally related in the conditional if-onlys, and arbitrarily set together and able to be taken apart by the acts of Fortune and other malicious deities of causation.

finally does respond, certainly no longer an honorable action. However, even here, as Achillès' behavior degenerates to that of a raging animal, Benoit shows us the cause as a complete loss of self-control, not a deliberate immorality. Achillès hears the warnings that his own men are being destroyed and the Trojans are almost upon him, but his response is to lose all consciousness of what he is doing:

Mout li desplaist e mout li grieve
 Co que il ot e que il veit:
 Angoissos est e si destreit
 Que il n'a sen ne remembrance. (Troie 21068-71)

(He's very upset and grieved by what he hears and sees; he's in such anguish and so distraught that he has neither reason nor memory.)

Achillès has lost his "sen" and his "remembrance." He is certainly not being presented as capable of acting other than he does. He was under the control of Amors; now he is swept up by the control of wrath: "Ne li membre, tant a iror, / Adonc d'amie ne d'amor" (Troie 21083-84); ("He's so enraged that he doesn't remember either lover or love"). His very mind has ceased to function. Without reason and memory, Achillès is no longer a man, but a beast, and his ensuing behavior is precisely bestial:

Tot autresi com sueut li lous
 Entre les aigneaus fameillos . . .
 Fel e desvez e d'ire espris,
 Sailli entre ses enemis.
 D'eus fait ensi com lous d'oëilles:
 Plus de dous cenx testes vermeilles
 Lor i a fait en petit d'ore;
 Il est li lous qui tot devore. (Troie 21089-90; 21097-102)

(Just as the starving lion sweats among the lambs . . . Furious

and mad and swept away by wrath, he charged amongst his enemies. He wrought among them like a wolf among sheep. He made more than two hundred bloody heads among them in a little while. He is a wolf that devours all.)

Achillès lost his will to Amors; he has lost his mind to wrath. Forgetting his love, he fights. Priant, hearing of this, swears that Polixena shall never marry him.

Benoit continues to emphasize the unchivalric behavior of the ruined Achillès, who, after having his men surround Troïlus and unhorse him, comes up and kills him. Benoit comments of this with disapproval: "Grant cruëuté, grant felenie / A fait" (Troie 21444-45); ("He committed great cruelty, great treachery"). Achillès then attaches Troïlus' dead body to the tail of his horse and drags him along the ground.²⁴ Mennon sees this and rescues Troïlus' body, wounding Achillès while he does so. Achillès now craves revenge against Mennon. When he finally does kill him, it is not combat, but butchery, and Achillès chops Mennon's body into so many pieces that he must be gathered together before he can be finally buried. Benoit emphasizes the excellence of Mennon in order to

²⁴ Neither Dictys nor Dares has Achillès drag Troïlus' body behind his horse, although Dictys uses the ancient tradition of Achillès mutilating the body of Hector, an event which does not enter into the Troie. However, Dictys did provide an explanation for increasingly degenerate Greek behavior in the Trojan practice of mutilating bodies, which then spread to the Greeks (Dictys, Book III, 10-15, pp. 67-71). Benoit uses Dares as his main source up to line 24425; then he relies primarily on Dictys for the remainder of the poem. But Dares never showed the Greeks exhibiting debased behavior, nor any reasons for such behavior, while Dictys provided both. Benoit, making the transition from the Greek victory over Troy (Dares) to the debased Greek behavior during the returns to Greece (Dictys), uses the theme of the degradation of Achillès by Amors as a symbolic explanation of how decent men can become debased, without recourse to blame placed on either Trojans or on Greeks. It all happens to Achillès, and he then turns his ruined self outward to destroy others.

stress the debasement of Achilles (Troie 21588-600). It is precisely the transcendent nature of Amors that makes it so destructive to the code of the normal social order. Amors teaches Achilles to value only love, and consequently he ceases to value anything else. And without value there can be no social morality. Ecuba now arranges to lure Achilles into an ambush and have him murdered by Paris and a gang of Trojans. Polixena, unwitting, is used as the bait, and a messenger promises Achilles that if he comes into Troy he will be given her as his wife. Fresh from his butchery of the Trojans, Achilles again switches allegiance, telling the messenger to inform Ecuba that he will now deliver Troy from the Greeks (Troie 22026 ff.). Achilles' mind is so devastated by Amors that he does not even suspect a trick and hurries to the temple where he thinks he is to marry Polixena:

Amors li a le sen toleit:
 Ne set, ne veit ne n'aparceit;
 Ne dote morte, ne l'en sovient.
 Co fait Amors, qui rien ne crient. (Troie 22117-20)

(Amors destroys his reason for him, he doesn't know or see or perceive. He doesn't fear death, he doesn't remember it. Thus wrought Amors, who fears nothing.)

Achilles can no longer judge right and wrong. He cannot even judge whether or not a situation is dangerous. His mind, his senses, have been destroyed by Amors:

Ne crient peril ne encombrer,
 Qu'Amors li fait le sen changier,
 Qui home fait sort, cec e mu.
 Si l'a surpris e deceü
 Que nule rien plus ne desire
 Qu'aler al doloros martire
 E a sa pesme destinee. (Troie 22129-35)

(He doesn't fear danger or interference, because Amors has caused his mind to change, who makes a man deaf, blind and mute. Amors has so overcome and deceived him that he no longer has any desire except to go to his woeful martyrdom and grievous destiny.)

Amors has destroyed Achillès. He has been reduced from a man to a creature without will, judgment or even perception. Yet, can we blame him, or should we merely feel very sad that such a dreadful thing has happened to him? Benoit leads us into compassion, pointing out that it was the sight of Polixena that did this to Achillès: "La resplendor de sa semblance / Le fait ester en tel errance" (Troie 22139-40); ("The glory of her appearance drives him into such distress"). We are not encouraged to blame Achillès. He was stricken by beauty, by Amors, and his very senses of perception have been changed and ruined; he is deaf, dumb and mute to the pre-Amors "reality." Since he can no longer perceive correctly, he cannot judge or "know" what is true, and what he ought to do.

However, we have seen clearly how his once-chivalric behavior has degenerated into faithless bestiality. We do not regret his death at this point. His chivalric (human) value has been too degraded by Amors. We do regret what Amors has done to him. Achillès is ambushed, killed, and then Agamennon speaks highly of him: "'Tant a esté vaillanz e proz / 'E sire e maistre desor toz'" (Troie 22391-92); ("He was so valiant and brave, and lord and master above all others"). We are clearly intended to remember Achillès as a good man to whom a terrible fate came, not as a man who chose, or who was responsible for choosing, to do wrong. Amors, like Fortune, is something that happens to men, not something that men cause to happen.

Benoit was a contemporary of the author of the Eneas. Both worked with the materials of the twelfth-century French culture and both attempted to make sense out of stories handed down from antiquity. Yet in one we find bouyant optimism and a firm belief in the responsibility of human beings for their own actions, while in the other we find a resigned shrug to the powers of the irrational which overwhelm human intentions and efforts. One might attribute the optimism of the Eneas to the fact that it told the story of a winner, not a loser, but so did its model, the Aeneid, quite without such faith in the ability of human beings to shape their own future. Indeed, it is the medieval addition of the love story of Lavine and Eneas that provides the happy ending for the Eneas, rather than the abrupt and bitter ending of the Aeneid.

What the Troie and the Eneas do share as works of the Middle Ages is a profound interest in the causes of human behavior, the freedom of the will, and the relationship of human behavior to the outcome of events. Their interests are common; their answers unique to each poem, warning us of the danger of attempts to impose a monolithic interpretation upon the rich and individual variety of any period.

New Learning and Old Anxieties

Guido de Columnis, a Sicilian judge, completed a prose adaptation of Benoit's Roman de Troie, the Historia Destructionis Troiae, in 1287.¹ Guido did not mention Benoit's romance, and he claimed that he had followed the more respectable historical sources of Dictys and Dares.² The Historia became the standard version of the Troy story thereafter and was widely accepted as historically true until the eighteenth century.³ It became a source for many future versions of the Troy story, including Raoul le Fevre's Le Recueil des Histoires de Troie, which

¹ Guido de Columnis, Historia Destructionis Troiae, ed. by Nathaniel Edward Griffin (1936; rpt. New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1970). This edition is used throughout for quotations in Latin and will be cited as Historia. English translations of quotations from Guido will be taken from the Historia Destructionis Troiae by Guido delle Colonne, translated by Mary Elizabeth Meek (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1974), cited as Meek.

² Elmer Atwood, in "English Versions of the Historia Trojana," Diss. Univ. of Virginia 1932, expresses a generally held opinion of Guido when he comments that he "was probably the most successful plagiarist in the history of literature . . ." (p. 19). Meek attempts to modify this viewpoint in her excellent Introduction to her translation of Guido by examining Guido's role as a serious medieval historian who was attempting to restore the Troy material to a more reliable historical state than he found it in Benoit's romance (p. xiv ff.). She feels that Guido may have believed Benoit's assertions that his sources were Dictys and Dares, and that he had followed them closely, and as a consequence, may have cited only Dictys and Dares, and not Benoit, believing that they were the more ancient, and hence, respectable sources for his story (p. xvii).

³ Meek, p. xi.

Caxton translated into English and printed, and which then served as a source for Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida*.⁴

Guido modified the Troy story to express a world-view quite different from Benoit's. He is intent upon understanding why people behaved as they did, and why disasters overwhelmed them. He analyzes where Benoit merely sighs. He struggles with the conflicts between the fates that destroy men and the free will which ought to be able to protect them, and yet he reaches no solution to this dilemma, any more than did Benoit a century earlier.

We will examine the Historia as a product of its time and place, thirteenth-century Sicily, as we attempt to understand the kind of world that Guido perceived in the story of ancient Troy and transmitted to Renaissance Europe. In the century since the Troie had been written a flood of new knowledge had entered Europe, the inheritance of classical thinking, especially Aristotle, as modified and interpreted by Arab scholars. Much of this material was of a scientific and philosophical nature and stimulated Europeans to re-interpret the world in terms of natural phenomena as the causes of events.⁵ This renewed scientific think-

⁴ Meek indicates the popularity and importance of the Historia, pointing out that there may be as many as one hundred and fifty extant mss. and that it was translated into many languages as well as serving directly or indirectly as a source for Boccaccio's Filostrato, Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, and Lydgate's Troy Book (p. xi).

⁵ Alistair Crombie remarks in Medieval and Early Modern Science, Vol. I (1953; rev. ed. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959) that the "Most influential of all the contributions of Greco-Arab learning to Western Christendom was the fact that the works of Aristotle, Ptolemy and Galen constituted a complete rational system explaining the universe as a whole in terms of natural causes" (p. 56).

ing.had a profound effect on the manner in which Guido perceived and analyzed the events at Troy as "natural," that is, produced by a cause and effect series, and yet, by modern standards, "supernatural," since demons and astrological influences were an accepted part of the "natural" causation of the thirteenth century.

Two of the main centers for the introduction of Greco-Arab science into Europe were Toledo and Sicily. Arabs had ruled Sicily from 902 to 1091 and a large Mohammedan element remained in the population under the Norman rulers, who were exceptionally tolerant of cultural and religious diversity.⁶ Under the Normans, especially Roger II and Frederick II, Greco-Arab learning began penetrating Europe from Sicily.⁷ Guido was associated with the court of Frederick II as both a poet and a judge.⁸ The influence of the new learning can especially be seen in Guido's interest in the stars, which meant astrology as well as astronomy, for at that time they were two aspects of the same science.⁹ The impact of as-

⁶ See Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance of the 12th Century (1927; rpt. Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 283-84 on the Arab role in Sicily. Dorothee Metlitzki in The Matter of Araby in Medieval England (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1977), p. 8, discusses the tolerance of the Norman rulers in Sicily, as well as in England, which produced a rich cultural diversity.

⁷ Metlitzki, p. 7.

⁸ Ernst Kantorowicz, in Frederick the Second 1194-1250, trans. E. O. Lorimer, Makers of the Middle Ages (New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1931), p. 333, identifies "the later judge Guido Colonna" as among the poets at Frederick's court. Meek is inclined to accept this identification (p. xxvii).

⁹ Meek comments that "...Guido's interest in astronomy may stem from his being associated with a court at which Michael Scot held the position of Court Philosopher" (p. xxvii). Michael Scot was especially famous as an astrologer. Jean Seznec, in The Survival of the Pagan Gods, 1940, trans. Barbara F. Sessions, Bollingen Series XXXVIII (1953; rpt. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1972), remarks that astrology "stood as an

trology lay in its underlying premise of stellar determinism, a position which was utterly opposed to Christian doctrines of free will. However, this opposition was not immediately a problem, and a world-view developed in Guido's time which could include both free will and the inevitable processes of the stars.¹⁰ It is this world-view that dominates the Historia.

Guido's Troy is controlled by non-human sources of causation that are almost all hostile toward human beings. They include the deterministic fates as well as demons which animate idols representing the planetary gods. These contrast curiously with Guido's Christian insistence upon the free will of men causing events to happen. While his interest in the causes of events seems to owe a good deal to Greco-Arab science, Guido's theology is rather standard medieval Christianity. The two did not blend easily and their juxtaposition is an important aspect of Guido's attempts to analyze the causes of the fall of Troy.

Despite his insistence upon the Christian doctrine of free will, the fascinating thing about Guido's world is not his assurance of Christian

integral and essential element of culture . . . it had intimately invaded the science of the late pagan world--to such a degree, in fact, that it dominated all the natural sciences" (p. 45). He also comments that "'Astra inclinant; non necessitant.'" With this reservation, astrology continues as the foundation of profane culture and the underlying principle of all science" (p. 49).

¹⁰ According to Metlitzki, "What the Latin translators of the twelfth century transmitted in the body of their Arabic texts, in a scientific framework, was an affirmation of prognostication. But it did not imply a denial of divine providence. The philosophical and theological complications relating to Christian doctrine do not acquire momentum until the middle of the thirteenth century, with the process of assimilating the Aristotelianism of Arab and Jewish scholars into the Christian system" (pp. 59-60).

salvation, but his troubled awe at the malice and hostility of the material universe. His demons are absolutely real. Magic, astrology, witchcraft and the fates are all powerful and dangerous in the world of the Historia, which is far more scientific than the Troie, and at the same time far more superstitious.¹¹ It is as if the "modern" science of the thirteenth century brought with it new anxieties about a universe in which the causes of events at the best were not benevolent, and at the worst were hostile toward human beings in the frighteningly impersonal, inexorable manner of malevolent fates.

Guido's Troy is a very dangerous place, definitively pre-Christian and hence lacking the protection which Christianity brought into the world. It is a world in which the best a man can do is stay at home, be very very cautious about each action, control his emotions by avoiding situations which might stimulate his always latent desires, and be prepared for the worst anyway.

Guido was a very serious man who adapted his inherited materials to eliminate any events which he considered to be false. He was careful to explain whatever he did include in the best contemporary scientific and historical terms. Whenever he considered his material to be fantastic or spurious, he either cut it out or warned us that it was probably not true.¹² We can fairly determine that what Guido did include was what he

¹¹ Seznec comments that, "strong in its new prestige, astrology inspired new fears. Furthermore, the Arabs had developed one of its most threatening aspects in the theory of planetary conjunction. . . . There was a growing sense of inexorable doom threatening from the skies. . . . the fear of demons revived at the same time. In all these threats which hung over them, men felt evil presences at work, and looked to the magicians for means of escape or propitiation" (p. 52).

¹² Wigginton points out that Guido omitted only one of Medea's ma-

considered to be true both with regard to the Trojan War and with respect to the nature of the universe as he understood it. We will therefore attempt to understand the fates and demons of Guido's Troy as serious expressions of causation within the world-view of the Historia.

First we will consider the reality of the pagan gods as demons in the Historia and then we will look at the demonic nature of the fates. We learn of the reality and nature of the god Apollo when Achilles and Calchas are each sent to Delphos to inquire about the coming war. Guido develops this section at great length to analyze the false nature of the pagan idols, which are nonetheless animated by real demons. The idol of Apollo is deaf and dumb; only the lack of Christian revelation leads the pagans to worship it. Admittedly they had little choice, since Troy fell before Christ was born. The idol is powerless, and merely an euhemerized memorial to a mortal man who was named Apollo. However, things are not that simple. No god inhabits or gives power to the idol, but a demon does (Historia X, p. 93). This was perfectly standard Christian theory about the nature of idols and the demonic character of the pagan gods.¹³ However, the implications of this theory when applied to a story placed in a time before the birth of Christ are interesting. For instan-

gical powers, the one not accepted by the Church as possible for witches--being able to fly (pp. 176-77). Guido is also careful to warn us that the idols in Troy were really animated by demons, not by the planetary gods which they appeared to represent. He also insists that although Medea could perform many genuine magical feats, she could not produce an eclipse.

¹³ L. J. Elmer, in "Demons /Theology of/," New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, comments that "The belief that idols were inhabited by demons was, of course, a commonplace among the Christians of the first 5 centuries . . ." (p. 754).

ce, Agamemnon had sent Achilles to inquire of the idol of Apollo concerning the coming invasion of Troy (Historia X, p. 92). Agamemnon is pious and careful; the gods he communicates with answer back; there is no alternative system of truth for him to refer to. And the gods are demons. Agamemnon, trying to be a good king, is caught in a world where he can only be destroyed. Guido continues to inform us that the demons act under the guise of the planetary gods, just as the Devil acts under the guise of a serpent, and he concludes: "Per demonum igitur ingressum in ydola surda et muta eliciebantur ab eis petita responsa que tunc gentilitas excolebat" (Historia X, p. 97); ("Demons, therefore, entered into deaf and dumb idols which the pagans then worshipped, and it was they who produced the answers being sought for" [Meek, p. 94]).

We can only wonder, what then was Agamemnon to do? Should he have not sent messengers to Delphos? Should he have been impious to the only gods available to him? Was there any way that he could have suspected that his gods were demons and did not care for men, but hated them? None of these alternative actions and suspicions makes any sense in the world of the Historia. Men must be pious and prudent; however their gods deceive them if they are pious and punish them if they are impious.

These demon-gods are real, not allegorical terms used to express the irrational nature of events, as in the Troie. It is the god Mars who protects the Golden Fleece (Historia II, p. 21); the gods punish Jason for deserting Medea (Historia III, p. 24); Helenus knows the future by the favor of the gods (Historia VI, p. 63); when the sacrificial fires do not burn and the Trojans see the eagle omen, they realize that the gods are angered against them (Historia XXX, p. 230); and the Greeks

returning home after the war are shipwrecked by the power of Minerva (Historia XXXI, p. 245). These are typical uses of the gods in the Historia. They are real, powerful, although not invulnerable. They can be thwarted, at least temporarily, by magic, which is what Medea uses to aid Iason on his quest for the Golden Fleece.

The behavior of the Delphic Apollo epitomizes the operation of these demon-gods. The idol speaks to Achilles and, telling what proves to be the truth, deludes him, promising him that the Greeks will conquer Troy, but not mentioning the terrible suffering that the Greeks will experience (Historia X, p. 98). Guido had commented earlier that: "Quamvis enim Grecia inter tot grandes angustias potita fuisset uictoria, eius tamen victorie pretium per tempora longa deleuit iniuria scilicet sue gentis et nece et suorum exterminio meliorum" (Historia II, p. 11); ("although Greece gained the victory amidst such great distresses, still for a long time the damage done by the death of its people and the slaughter of its best men destroyed the reward of victory" [Meek, p. 97]). Apollo, speaking truth, encouraged the Greeks in a course of action that would prove most harmful to them as well as to the Trojans. Achilles never does suspect, nor could he, that the god who spoke to him was a demon, but we know that that was the case.

After Achilles leaves the idol of Apollo, Calchas, a Trojan priest, approaches it, and the demon-god tells him to desert the Trojans and go to aid the Greek army, promising that the Greeks will conquer Troy (Historia XI, p. 90). This appeals to one of Calchas' strongest emotions--the desire to be safe, and he hurries off to obey the god, never questioning the truth of what he has heard. Calchas does a great deal of damage to the Trojans in the name of Apollo, yet we can only assume that

he thought that he was obeying a god in acting out his treason, even though that treason may have been pleasing to his unsavory nature. There are no simple solutions available when your gods are demons.

Further, although these gods are demonic, they nonetheless exhibit a certain sense of justice, as when they punish Iason for deserting Medea, or when they encourage Orestes to kill Aegisthus "et acceptum est diis quod de matre sua ipse idem assumat suis manibus ulcionem" (Historia XXXIII, p. 254); ("and it was acceptable to the gods that he take vengeance upon his mother with his own hands" /Meek, p. 244⁷). There are times when Guido begins to blur the line between the demonic gods and the Christian God, as in the passage where he is meditating upon the destruction of Troy and wonders:

Sane si diis tot mala grata fuerunt, primordialis causa tamen eorum, tam nulla tam levis, animos non immerito perturbat humanos vt pro culpa tam leui tante acerbittatis pena meruisset infligi, nisi benigne forsitan diceretur ut procedentis mali congeries esset boni hedificatio subsequentis. (Historia II, p. 11)

(Even if these many woes were pleasing to the gods, still, the original cause of these things, as trifling as unimportant, rightly troubles human hearts; that is, that a punishment of such severity had to be inflicted for such a trivial fault, unless perhaps it might be said in justification that the amount of evil which took place was the basis for good to come. /Meek, p. 9⁷)

He concludes his meditation on a sorry note: "Sed si tante proditiōis causa fuerit subsequentis boni causa finalis humana mens habet in dubio" (Historia II, p. 12); ("the human mind is uncertain whether the cause of such a great betrayal was finally the cause of subsequent good" /Meek, p. 10⁷).

The gods here are not exactly demons, and not exactly the Christian

God either. The roles are somewhat merged; the gods can punish men, a concept which implies a sense of justice. However, accepting this concept, which implies that they are not exactly demons, but perhaps under the control of the Christian God, Guido still cannot accept so much misery for so trivial a fault as being a just form of punishment.

Although the gods are real and active in the Historia, there is another level of causation that is far more ubiquitous and inexorable: the fates. While Benoit invoked Fortune, scarcely believing in her, Guido uses the fates to express the reasons why things happen as they do, both in the physical universe and in human interactions.

We first encounter the fates at the opening of Book II, when Iason and Hercules are about to land at Troy. Guido stresses their lack of bad intentions. They came for refreshment only, "non ut incolis molestiam inferre disponderent nec nociuis dispendiis eos ledere aliquatenus attemptarent" (Historia II, p. 11); ("not so that they might plan to offer injury to the inhabitants nor seek to harm them in any degree by wicked depredations" [Meek, p. 97]). But their behavior is only one element in the situation that develops: "Sed inuida fatorum series, que semper quiete uiuentibus est molesta, ab inopinatis insidiis sine causa inimitiarum et scandali causas traxit" (Historia II, p. 11); ("The envious course of the fates, which always troubles the repose of mortal men, for no cause drew causes for enmity and offense out from unexpected hiding places" [Meek, p. 97]). We must ask two questions here: why are the fates inuida fatorum series, and why do they act sine causa? These are crucial problems in the world of the Historia.

Wigginton points out that there is a close relationship in Guido's Historia between his conception of the fates and the behavior of the De-

vil, since both act by guile to deceive and harm men.¹⁴ However, while demons are not supposed to be able to trouble those who leave them strictly alone, the fates do not seem quite so restricted in their actions, at least not as Guido describes them. The very term inuida fatorum series carries the implication of an inexorable process, and Guido does indeed describe these fates as inexorable. When the Trojan council decides to send Paris to Greece, Guido comments: "Sed quia futura discrimina ineuitabilia fata constituunt, placuit communiter omnibus Paridem in Greciam cum nauali exercitu se conferre" (Historia VI, p. 66); ("But because the inevitable fates establish future calamities, it pleased everyone that Paris should go to Greece with the navy" [Meek, p. 64]). And in the same section, although Cassandra warns the Trojans of disaster, they persist in their course and Guido remarks, "Sed inexorabilia fata malorum postquam infelicia prouentura decernunt, contraria et aduersa hominum mentibus representant et insinuant pro acceptis" (Historia VI, p. 67); ("But after the inexorable Fates decree that misfortune and evils shall happen, they represent the opposite and contrary in the minds of men and commend them as favorable" [Meek, p. 65]). Demons are evil, but they are not inexorable. The demons inhabiting the idols in the Historia are able to make trouble by deceiving men, but they are not all-powerful, and Medea is able to affect the ability of Mars to protect the Golden Fleece by means of her magical skills.

Guido points out that the means of operation of these hostile, inexorable fates is so subtle that not even caution and prudence will su-

¹⁴ Wigginton, pp. 113-14.

ffice to protect men:

Nam inuida fatorum series, feliciū inimica, summa in summitate manere diutius semper negat, et vt status hominum deducat habilis in ruinam, per insensibiles et cecas insidias potentiores immittit et inducit ad casum, a friuola et inopinabili materia causam trahens ne prouisione prehabita per cautele subsidium ualeant se tueri. (Historia V, p. 43)

(For the envious course of the fates, the enemy of happiness, always prevents the highest things from remaining on the heights for very long, and in order to bring the condition of men more easily to ruin, it attacks the mighty, through unperceived and obscure snares, and leads them to misfortune, taking its cause from trivial and unthought-of matters, so that by using foresight and with the aid of caution they are not able to protect themselves. Meek, p. 427)

Here Guido's fates operate like Fortune, bringing down those on high, but unlike Fortune, they do not elevate the lowly.

Christian theories of demons are generally based on the assumption that one can indeed evade their wiles, or at least choose to avoid them.¹⁵ Guido is never sure that one can evade the wiles of the fates. Thus, while these fates are demonic in a general sense, they are not quite the same as Christian demons of the usual sort, but represent a somewhat different source of misery for human beings.

Seznec comments that there is a relationship between astrology and the belief in demons, and even when the Fathers condemn astrology for its fatalism: "they leave untouched the underlying belief in demons in which it is rooted. . . . It is through the stars and through astrology that these demons often act."¹⁶ Once demons are sufficiently confused with

¹⁵ See Elmer, p. 754.

¹⁶ Seznec, pp. 44-45.

the planetary bodies, the concept of the fates as inexorable and malicious, and yet acting sine causa begins to make a good deal of sense as a sort of astrological hodge podge of causation that is demonic, yet not quite demons, malicious, yet acting sine causa, as would a physical process such as the motion of the planets.¹⁷

When we consider that these fates act sine causa, we could probably relate that to the hatred which all demons bear toward all human beings, based on their intrinsic nature, not on the behavior of men specifically provoking them; however, when taken in conjunction with the conception of the inexorability of the fates and their nature as process rather than as personality (inuida fatorum series), another possibility is that they act sine causa because their nature is that of the fates understood somewhat as an astrological process, that is, an inexorable process, with the addition of hatred as a demonic influx into the conception of astral fatalism as mere process. While Guido's fates have something in common with medieval Christian demons, they also seem to have something in common with astrological, fatal determinism. Guido is never quite sure that even the most prudent of men

¹⁷ Insofar as man's body was composed of matter, his behavior was a question of physical processes, as was the flow of water or the heat of a fire. Lynn Thorndike comments that Roger Bacon "held that the stars by their influences upon the human body incline men to bad acts and evil arts or to good conduct and useful sciences. Such natural inclinations might, however, be resisted by effort of will, modified by divine grace, or strengthened by diabolic tempting. But while the individual by an effort of will may resist the force of the stars, in masses of men the power of the constellations usually prevails" (A History of Magic and Experimental Science During the First Thirteen Centuries of Our Era, 2 Vols. /New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1923/, Vol. II, p. 671). The relationship between physical determinism and psychological determinism was perilously close in the astrological thinking of the thirteenth century.

could indeed protect himself from these malicious and inexorable forces.

Lynn Thorndike comments that for Boethius, "Fate may be exercised through spirits, angelic or daemonic, through the soul or through the aid of all nature or 'by the celestial motion of the stars.' It is with the last that Boethius seems most inclined to identify fati series mobilis. That series moves sky and stars, harmonizes the elements one with another, and transforms them from one to another."¹⁸ Somehow the fati series mobilis has become transmuted, in Guido, into the inuida factorum series. Both describe the processes of causation as celestial in nature; however, Guido has left out the Divine Providence which rules the fati series mobilis according to Boethius.¹⁹ Somehow, in Guido's world-view, an abstract and orderly conception of fate has become infused with the persona of the devil, an active, intelligent agent who represents not lawful causation, but chaotic disruption. This is a special use of the concept of fate, perhaps not as unrelated to the malice of Benoit's Fortune as would appear at first glance. Benoit's Fortune acts with malice; so do Guido's fates. However, Benoit does not develop the concept of malicious causation into a strongly personified element in his Troie, while the fates rule the world of the Historia with great power and hostility.

However, that does not mean that Guido does not blame his characters

¹⁸ Thorndike, Vol. I, p. 621. He is quoting from De Consolatione Philosophiae, IV. 6.

¹⁹ Vincent Cioffari, commenting on Boethius, says: "It is Fate, then, that makes the lines of Fortune concurrere and confluere. But Fate, which governs Chance, is itself in turn ruled by Providence" (Fortune and Fate from Democritus to St. Thomas Aquinas [New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1935/, p. 87]).

for not acting with the greatest possible prudence. After the first destruction of Troy, Guido meditates on the nature of fate and draws a very thin and unhappy conclusion:

Quare necessario deceat homines a friuolis etiam et leuibus iniuriis abstinere. Habent enim in se sepius leues iniurie ad instar ignis, cuius modica scintilla, cecis alimentis nutrita, sub cinere subito in maximas et adurentes flamas exalat. (Historia V, p. 43)

(For this reason it is necessary that men refrain from trivial and even slight offenses. For slight injuries quite frequently tend to be like fire, whose little spark, nourished with hidden sustenance, suddenly bursts out from under the ashes into very great, searing flames. Meek, p. 427)

Therefore, kings should be polite to strangers. That is not to say that Guido proposes that this would have prevented disaster, since the image of the fates which he gives is that of Fortune, acting to bring down the mighty, so that all kings are vulnerable to such a process. These fates are not demons, tempting men, but a hostile and compulsive process that "summa in summitate manere diutius semper negat" (Historia V, p. 43); ("always prevents the highest things from remaining on the heights for very long" Meek, p. 427). It is not a question of a better king saving Troy; rather it is a matter of any king at all being destroyed because that is what the fates do to kings. Although we are advised to be polite to foreigners, Guido points out that the fates are so devious, and act by means of such trivia, that not even caution and foresight will suffice to protect a man from their destructive wiles. Lest we miss this point and smugly blame King Laomedon, Guido continues to mourn: "Sub hoc igitur inuolucro fati ingerentibus, prima Troya destructa, talis nobilissimi regis Laumedontis infelicissimus finis fuit" (Historia V, p. 43); ("And so, when the first Troy was destroyed

by the fates acting under this pretext, such was the very unfortunate end of the very noble King Laomedon" (Meek, p. 427). Guido even doubts whether Laomedon's "crime" of refusing to let the Greeks land was any crime at all.²⁰ Guido does not blame Laomedon for having done something wicked or even something extremely foolish. What Laomedon did was so trivial that any king might easily have done the same. Blame is placed on causative factors beyond the control of human beings:

Sed illa mundanorum fatorum inuida dispensatrix a leuissimo radice fomite zizanie causam trahit. Que dum incipit latenter obrepere, fit postea maxima mali congeries succedentis, dum fine succedente nequissimo, per inteporalia dampna eius extremus exitus concludatur. (Historia V, pp. 43-44)

(But that envious dispenser of men's fates can cause tares to grow from the slightest sliver of a root. While she begins her approach secretly and stealthily, later a huge amount of evil follows, until a most wretched conclusion follows, and her final departure is rounded off by perpetual losses. Meek, pp. 42-437)

Who is the "mundanorum fatorum inuida dispensatrix" on whom Guido places the main responsibility for the first fall of Troy? She is Fortune, evidently in her role as the dispenser of the fates.²¹ As in Benoit, she is hostile. Her hostility here is magnified by her abilities, those of Guido's fates, to work by means so subtle that no man can reasonably protect himself from all of her wiles, which is not to say that men

²⁰ "Si facinus dici potest" (Historia V, p. 43); ("If it can be called a crime" Meek, p. 427).

²¹ Patch remarks that, "There is no doubt that the people of the Middle Ages actually believed in planetary influence. Fortune, therefore, is indeed 'executrice' of the 'wierdes' that are written in the stars" (The Goddess Fortuna, pp. 77-78).

should not be as careful as possible. We have seen how Guido's fates operate like the traditional Fortune, bringing men down from high estate to ruin; here Fortune behaves like Guido's fates, with the sly malice of a demon, and yet dispensing those very fates which men do not seem able to circumvent.²² Guido's Fortune, like his fates, is demonic, and unlike more traditional Fortune figures who turn a wheel which both raises and lowers men, this Fortune only brings men down to ruin.

False gods that are really demons; fates that are demonic and yet control men's destinies beyond the ability of men to perceive the snares and evade them--this is a terrible world indeed. We must keep in mind that Guido is deliberately describing and analyzing a post-fall, pre-Christian world, in which there are no means of salvation from demons and evil fates. Nonetheless, his conception of the universe as malevolent in its most basic processes is very striking, and not relieved by assurances that there is an heavenly alternative. Although he does insist on the traditional notion that the demon-idols were destroyed at the coming of Christ, Guido never suggests that the demonic fates are not still with us.

Wigginton claims that the Historia "is a traditional, quasi-allegorical moral history in which Troy is developed into a symbol of this world caught in the grip of pride and war, and in which Troy's king,

²² Cioffari, discussing Albertus Magnus; comments that the "implexio causarum also affords . . . the means for identifying, in part at least, Fate with Fortune. The chain of causes . . . hangs down extending from the highest providence to the womb of the pregnant mother. If we consider it as a causal emanation, then we have fate; but if we limit our attention to the last link of the chain, then it is fortune . . . Consequently fate, stars and fortune differ, though they are in the same subjects and proceed from the same cause . . ." (p. 92).

Priam, becomes the thematic center of focus, exemplifying as he does that pride and ambition lead to war. . . ." ²³ However, let us examine the passage in which the Trojans finally decide to send Paris to Greece, and consider whether Guido is claiming that Priam is totally responsible or whether he is treating him much like Laomedon, as an impulsive, even foolish, but not wicked king, trapped by the inevitable processes of the hostile fates. This passage first explains that the fates are indeed inevitable, as we saw above (Historia VI, p. 66). At this point in the story Benoit had simply sighed that the malice of Fortune prevented the Trojans from believing the warnings of the seers. No longer do we have merely the arbitrary malice of Fortune. These fates are an unavoidable hostile process, like that of astral determinism with a demonic nature motivating it. Cassandra, who does know and tell the truth, discovers what the Trojans are about to do and laments, pointing out the basic innocence of the Trojans, despite their poor judgment:

"Ha nobilissima Troye ciuitas, vnde tam dira et tam dura fata te detrahunt vt grauibus in breui sis subuertenda periculis et tuarum turrium alta cacumina dissoluantur et dentur precipitem in ruinam? Ha infelix rex Priame, quod crimen diceris commisisse ut tui et tuorum mortem defleas hominum et perpetuas seruitutes?" (Historia VI, pp. 66-67)

("Ah, most noble city of Troy, why do such frightful and severe fates drag you down, so that in a short time you will be overthrown because of very hazardous undertakings, and the lofty tops of your turrets will be destroyed and given to sudden ruin? Ah, unfortunate King Priam, what crime will it be said you committed to cause you to bewail the death and perpetual servitude of yourself and your men?" /Meek, pp. 64-65⁷)

²³ Wigginton, p. 272.

She is not lamenting the fall of a wicked Babylon, but of a noble city destroyed by the fates. As when Guido questioned whether Laomedon had committed any crime at all to justify the fall of the first Troy, here Cassandra implies that it is not really any crime of Priam's, but the inexplicable hatred of the fates, that will destroy Troy. It is true that Priam is not innocent; he chose to involve his kingdom in a very risky undertaking and his judgment was poor. But again, to prevent our placing too much blame on Priam, Guido comments: "Sed fortune adversitas, que iam dederat suo cursui uoluntarios instinctus et motus infelices, accelerabat ad exitus, processus exinde auidos ordinando" (Historia VI, p. 67); ("But the opposition of Fortune, who had already in her course given voluntary impulses and unfortunate inspirations, hastened toward the end by ordaining the rapid progress of events thereafter" Meek, p. 657).

It is because Guido does not want us to think of Priam as a wicked man that he places such overt stress on the workings of Fortune and the inexorable fates just at the place where it would be most convenient to tell us that Priam was a bad person and entirely to blame for the disasters to follow. It is true that Priam is very emotional, and thus peculiarly subject to the workings of fate. But Guido does not take the next step and say that it is wicked to be emotional; indeed he suggests that it is something out of a man's control. Guido intends us to pity Priam as well as disapprove of his emotionalism and poor judgment, especially since he stresses the inability of men to resist the fates, although he will insist that they are free to resist being compelled by the fates to perform acts that are contrary to their natures. Indeed,

the only even partial solution to the malice of the fates that Guido will ever offer us is not mere prudence, but nearly absolute inaction, since once a man acts at all, the fates have greater opportunity to destroy him. Cassandra asked directly, "'quod crimen diceris commis-isse?'" and the answer is given by Guido that Priam did not commit a crime, but that he was trapped by "fortune aduersitas" and "inexorabilia fata" (Historia VI, pp. 66-67), although that is not to say that he did not also act imprudently.

The curious power of Guido's fates is illustrated when Hector encounters his cousin Ajax-Telamon on the battlefield, recognizes him, and agrees to call off the fighting for the day. Guido comments of this:

Hic fuit ille dies in quo ipsi bello perpetuus potuit esse finis et Troyani tunc fuissent in totum absolute uictores. Sed fata, que statuunt aduersa futura contingere, omnia cecis insidiis tollunt de medio, per que aduersa que futura disponunt finaliter compleantur. (Historia XV, p. 146)

(This is the day on which a permanent end might have been made to the war, and the Trojans would then have been absolute victors. But the fates, who arrange for future adversities to happen, destroy everything by hidden snares, by which they complete those adversities which they have arranged for the future. /Meek, p. 1407)

Hector seems to be entering a situation so structured by the fates that he must fail. However, as Guido goes on to describe how the fates deceived Hector, he moves from awareness of the deception of the fates to criticism of Hector's failure to act correctly: "O quam fuit fragilis et debilis causa que Trojanorum oculos excecauit et specialiter Hectoris, qui persone sue cladem et suorum omnium futuros interitus non potuit eu-itare" (Historia XV, p. 146); ("Oh, how slight and weak was the reason that blinded the eyes of the eyes of the Trojans and especially Hector,

who was not able to avoid the destruction of his own person nor the future ruin of all his people" (Meek, p. 140⁷). Working from Benoit's material, which stresses the slight techniques by which Fortune destroys men, Guido cannot accept the idea that it was impossible for Hector and the Trojans to have acted successfully, despite the fates which he reminds us can both arrange future events and implement them. He goes on to criticize Hector for failing to do what he has previously assured us men cannot do, resist the fates, by means of grasping the Fortune offered to him by the fates:

Sane non est illa laudabilis in aliquo sapiente discrecio qui, cum est aliquo grau{i} et mortali periculo prepeditus et fortuna sibi arridet quod per subitos et felices euentus se potest ab eo subito liberare, felicem successum quem sibi repente fortuna ministrat grata manu non recipit ut ingratus, et finaliter non prosequitur, apprehendendo illud quod vna hora sibi exhibet felix euentus. Nam si ea hora illud non recipit et admittit sed differendo dimittit, nunquam ad illud quod vno puncto potuit obtinere poterit postea peruenire. Nam fata, si bonum quod ingerunt statim non recipitur ab ingrato, tamquam ille qui per ingratitudinis uicium illud amisit, exhibere postea sibi negant. (Historia XV, p. 146)

(For indeed it is not a laudable discretion in any wise man, when he is impeded by serious and fatal danger, and fortune smiles upon him, so that by unexpected and favorable events he is able unexpectedly to free himself, not to receive with a grateful hand the favorable occurrence which fortune suddenly offers him, but to be ungrateful, and finally not to follow it up by taking that which in one hour the favorable event presents to him. For if in that hour he does not receive and accept the thing, but sends it away by delaying, he will never afterward reach that which he could have obtained at one point. For the fates, if the good they present is not received at once by some ungrateful person, afterward refuse to give it to him, as one who had lost it through the fault of ingratitude. Meek, pp. 140-41⁷)

The most important element in this passage is the fact that Hector is being criticized not for a moral error, but for a tactical one. He had a chance and he failed to take advantage of it. Why fates that are basic-

ally demonic in nature should also offer good to a man is not discussed by Guido, any more than he discusses why the fates generally seek to destroy men. What he does stress here is the matter of timing. There is one favorable hour, no more. Either one seizes the opportunity, or fails forever,²⁴ This reminds us more of astral causation, with its favorable moments and hours, than of the morality of the Christian clerical tradition, which is not to say that many practicing astrologers were not also practising Christians.²⁵ Christianity aside, fate and Fortune; destiny and luck; these are the operating parameters of Guido's universe, one in which the scholastic processes of the thirteenth century had not yet completely fused the scientific determinism of the new Greco-Arab learning with the principle of Christian free will.

The greatest influence entering Europe during this time was Aristo-

²⁴ Haskins explains that the Arabs "added to genethliac astrology, which was concerned with the conjunction of heavenly bodies at the moment of birth, a more popular science of interrogations and elections for every occasion in life. In the second quarter of the twelfth century this Arabic literature began to pour into Europe in a perfect flood . . ." (p. 317). Thorndike, discussing Albertus Magnus, "the dominant figure in Latin learning and natural science of the thirteenth century" (Vol. II, p. 521), remarks that "Albert finds no difficulty in accepting the astrological doctrine of elections, by which the astrologer applies his knowledge of the movements and effects of the stars and their relationships to inferior bodies to the selection of a favorable hour for beginning a contemplated action. This doctrine of course implies and requires freedom of election and will, and shows that astrology is an operative as well as divining art" (Vol. II, p. 587).

²⁵ Thorndike points out that "The career of Michael Scot affords an especially good illustration of how little likelihood there was of anyone's being persecuted by the medieval church for belief in or practice of astrology. Michael, although subordinating the stars to God and admitting human free will . . . both believed in the possibility of astrological prediction and made such predictions himself. Yet he was a clergyman" (Vol. II, p. 311).

tle, as interpreted by Arab commentators. But, as Crombie points out, Aristotle's "opinions were doubly suspect because they reached the West accompanied by Arab commentaries which stressed their absolutely determinist character. . . . When such commentators as Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avicenna and particularly Averroës (1126-98) introduced from the Moham-
medan religion into the Aristotelian system the idea of creation, they interpreted this in such a way as to deny free will not only to man but even to God himself."²⁶ The very scientific thinking which stimulated interest in astronomy and natural science was fraught with a determinis-
tic philosophy concerning the nature of the universe.²⁷

There is one other aspect of deterministic thinking which we should note in relation to Guido, and that is the legal theory of his Emperor, Frederick II, who introduced the concept of Necessitas into the legal thinking of the times. Guido, of course, was a judge connected with the court of Frederick II. Kantorowicz explains that: "While the times were discussing whether the earthly State was of God or of Satan, of Good or of Evil, Frederick II soberly announced: the Ruler's office was born of natural necessity. Necessitas as an independent active force, as a living law of Nature belongs to Aristotle's thought, and to the

²⁶ Crombie, p. 57. Metlitzki notes that, "The problem of stellar determinism in respect to divine providence was regularly raised in the Arabic astronomical works which the Latin translators studied and adapted. Muslim philosophers had faced it in their own adaptations of Greek scientific works to the theism of Islam: (p. 60).

²⁷ Crombie comments that, "The determinist interpretation of Aristotle's teaching associated with the commentaries of Averroës was condemned by the Bishop of Paris, Étienne Tempier, in 1277 . . ." (pp. 63-64). Surely such controversies were widespread to receive such recognition as a condemnation.

Arab disciples of Aristotle. . . . Necessitas was indispensable to the Emperor's new gospel, as a basis for the secular state which appealed to reason and not to faith."²⁸ We can see that the new scientific thought surrounding Guido in thirteenth century Sicily was conducive to interpretations of the world as a series of processes which were necessary, inevitable, and, in Guido's particular case, extremely hostile to human welfare.

This deterministic thinking was, however, quite undigested in the thirteenth century. Indeed, as Crombie points out, "It was the search for means of finding an accommodation between Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology that gave rise to the most interesting and critical developments in philosophy and in the conception of science in the 13th and 14th centuries."²⁹ Guido makes his fates and Fortune practically all-powerful; he also criticizes men for not withstanding their forces. He uses two different concepts of Fortune, that of astral fatality, and that of fate as a series of causes which a wiser man than Hector might have evaded.³⁰ The inherent logical conflict does not seem to trouble him any more than it troubled Albertus Magnus and other scholastics of

²⁸ Kantorowicz, pp. 246-47.

²⁹ Crombie, pp. 60-61.

³⁰ According to Cioffari, Albertus explains: "that fortune has two meanings so different that their misuse leads to equivocation; and that one of these meanings describes fortune as pertaining to the genus of causality . . . The other meaning . . . is the fortune of astrology, the natural quality of the individual. The former, he goes on to say, is the cause of external chance occurrences (*fortuita*) both favorable and unfavorable, which, because external, we can use as we see fit . . . But fortune as natural instinct is not 'in potestate nostra. . .'" (p. 97).

the time. Priam is unstable by nature (fate) and thus more vulnerable to the effects on his mind and passions which the fates exercise than a calmer, wiser man might have been. But he is who he is, and Guido also expresses doubts as to whether he could have resisted the impulses of fate acting upon his unstable personality.

The key to wrong human behavior in the Historia is the restless heart.³¹ Emotional agitation precedes each action that leads to disaster, beginning with King Peleus, who hated his nephew Iason and sent him on the fateful quest for the Golden Fleece: "ardebat tamen et fluctuabat intrinsecus ne in uirtute sua et in tanta affectione suorum quam sui erga ipsum habebant Iason eum Thesalie regni dominio spoliaret" (Historia I, p. 6); ("He raged inwardly and was in turmoil lest Jason despoil him of the kingdom of Thessaly on account of his courage" [Meek, p. 47]). There is no mention of gods or the fates here. The initiating action occurs because a man is angry and then acts upon his anger.

Medea's passion for Iason develops somewhat differently. She is seated by her father next to Iason at a banquet, and she is unable to control her developing emotions:

tamen temperare non potuit suorum acies oculorum quin, cum poterat, eorum intuitum uersus Iasonem dulcibus aspectibus retorqueret, sic eius faciem et circumstantias faciei, flauos crines, corpus, et membra corporis intentis ymaginationibus contemplando quod repente in concupiscentia eius exarsit et feruentis amoris in animo cecum concepit ardorem. (Historia II, p. 18)

(still she could not control the glances of her eyes; in fact, when she could, she turned their glance with sweet looks toward Jason, so

³¹ Wigginton comments that "The association of unquietness with evil was traditional in the Middle Ages . . ." (p. 223, note 47).

that by gazing with eager imagination at his face and at the features of his face his blond hair, and his body and the limbs of his body, she suddenly burned with desire for him, and conceived in her heart a blind passion for him. (Meek, p. 167)

To a very real extent Medea is innocent, at least so far as the initiating events of her passion are concerned. It is her father who places her next to Iason, and once there she cannot control herself. She is not blamed for falling in love, because women, in the deterministic psychological system of the Historia, cannot control falling in love once they see the man to be loved. It was Medea's uncontrollable restlessness of emotion, expressed by the uncontrolled glances of her eyes, that caused her to see Iason and then fall in love with him because she had seen him. This is the fate of her human nature.

After Priam has rebuilt Troy, it is his unquiet mind and restless heart that touch off the troubles of the second Trojan War: "fluctuantem animum ad graues iniurias sibi dudum illatas a Grecis dura cogitatione retorsit, et factus quietis impatiens in eadem ciuitate suam solempnem curiam curiosus celebrari mandauit" (Historia V, pp. 50-51); ("with firm resolve he turned his restless thoughts back to the serious injuries which had been offered him a while ago by the Greeks. He became impatient with inactivity, and earnestly enjoined his solemn assembly to convene in that city" (Meek, p. 487)). Thus he initiates the council that will send Paris to Greece. Priam's behavior stems from personal emotion and is actualized by his restless mind.

Helen's path into love and misbehavior stems from her emotional response to rumors heard about the beauty of Paris:

uarie uoluntatis desiderabilis appetitus, qui mulierum animum con-

suevit subita leuitate corripere, Helene animum inconsulta flagrantia concitauit vt optaret ad ipsius festiuitatis sollempnia se conferre gaudia uisura festiua et inspectura ducem Frigie nacionis. (Historia VII, p. 70)

(the eager appetite of changing desire, which is wont to seize the hearts of women with sudden lightness, excited Helen's heart with an ill-advised passion, so that she wished to go to the ceremonies of this festival in order to see the festive celebrations and to look at the leader of the Phrygian nation. /Meek, p. 687)

Helen goes to the temple where Paris sees her: "Quam ut uidit, inuidit, dum de facili facibus accensus Veneris in Veneris templo desiderio fluctuat anxioso" (Historia VII, p. 71); ("As soon as he saw her he coveted her, and while being easily kindled from the torches of Venus in the temple of Venus, he seethed with intense desire" /Meek, p. 707)

Earlier in the story Paris had wanted very much to go to Greece; he should have stayed at home. Helen also could have stayed home; she should have stayed home. Once they see one another, their emotions immediately expand into intense desire. There is no suggestion of Amors here. Restless human hearts, given opportunity, see objects of desire and that is sufficient to inflame them with destructive passion. Each freely entered the temple of Venus; after they saw one another, they were no longer free not to love. When Guido chides Helen for not staying at home he comments: "Nam eius uiri visio virus fuit quo infecta per te Grecia tota fuit: (Historia VII, p. 71); ("For the sight of this man was the venom by which you infected all Greece" /Meek, p. 697). Sight alone causes passion, once the restless heart has led its possessor into a situation of temptation. There seems to be no suggestion that people are able to resist temptation once it occurs, only, hopefully, to avoid it entirely. The inclination to emotion precedes the compulsion

of emotion. This seems to be the general law of behavior that controls Guido's erring characters. If they had been calm and peaceful and had stayed at home, they would have stayed out of trouble. But the inclination for change, for emotional experience, precedes the experience itself.

The point at which free will can be exercised is before the experience occurs. When Guido criticizes Helen for going to see Paris, he comments:

Sed tu Helena, speciosissima mulierum, quis te rapuit spiritus ut in absencia uiri tui tua desereres tam leui relatione palacia, exires eius claustra ignotum uisura hominem, que te compescere habena freni facili potuisti ut seruares pudica leiunia intra regia sceptri tui? (Historia VII, pp. 70-71)

(But you, Helen, loveliest of women, what spirit seized you so that in the absence of your husband you left your palace on such a frivolous account, and went through its gates to look at an unknown man, when you could easily have restrained the rein of the bridle so that you would have preserved your modest abstinence within the palace of your kingdom? /Meek, p. 69/)

There was definitely a time when Helen could have controlled her behavior: before she left her own home. And yet Guido asks: "quis te rapuit spiritus"? We are not sure that he is merely using a metaphoric mode of speech. Elsewhere he gives women so little credit for being able to control their behavior that we are tempted to wonder whether that "spiritus" was indeed some external demon or merely the whim of an emotionally excitable woman. Then Guido offers us his solution to the problem of female instability: women ought to stay at home (Historia VII, p. 71). Rather than condemn Guido for sexism, we should be aware that his general solution for dealing with the world is: avoid it. In this he does not discriminate between men and women, both of whom are prone to dis-

aster once they depart from the shelter and stasis of a quiet and withdrawn existence and expose themselves to the whims and malice of Fortune, the fates, and the gods.

Guido is deeply pessimistic about man's ability to resist the effects of the fates, even though he claims to believe in free will and attempts to blame the unhappy Trojans for the disasters that overcame them.³² When Priam is burning with emotion over the insults offered to the expedition of Antenor, which had attempted to recover Hesione by peaceful means, Guido addresses the overwrought king:

Set dic, rex Priame, quis fatorum casus infelix ad tante infelicitatis audaciam tue quietis animum instigauit ut frenare proprios animi motus tui, licet non sint in hominis potestate, per matura consilia minime potuisses, ut, dum licebat, abstraheres ab iniquis consiliis pedem tuum . . .? (Historia VI, pp. 56-57)

(But, say, King Priam, what unhappy quirk of fate incited your peaceful heart to such unfortunate boldness, so that you were not able in the least to restrain the impulses of your heart by mature counsels /although, granted, these impulses are not in the control of man/, so that while it was possible you might have withstood evil counsels? /Meek, pp. 54-55/)

What does Guido mean when he says, "licet non sint in hominis potestate"?

If a "fatorum casus infelix" incited Priam's heart from rest to excited

³² Cioffari, discussing St. Thomas, comments: "Yet (C. G. III.92), although God alone can act directly on Man's will and choice, the angels may, however, influence human deliberation through intellectual persuasion, and the celestial bodies likewise can operate indirectly upon our deliberations in that their impressions on our bodies may dispose us to certain choices.

"The manner of these influences on our actions and deliberations is therefore as follows (l. c.): 1. Celestial bodies can influence our actions only in so far as they act upon our bodies; by these bodily dispositions Man is aroused to election in the manner in which passions lead to deliberation. It follows, therefore, that every disposition to action which comes from celestial bodies is in the manner of a passion,

emotionalism, and if a man cannot control these impulses of involuntary excitation which are controlled by the fates, then how can we blame Priam or consider him responsible for what he has done? "Matura consilia" are the only possibility for restraining these destructive emotional impulses, and Priam is evidently not mature enough to employ them to control his impulses, which are stimulated by the fates. Priam might have been a better man; but as he was he was not able to control his emotional impulses, and this is true of all the characters in the Historia. Free will ought to be able to control the impulses of fate; in fact it rarely seems adequate to the task.

Ever ambivalent, Guido now chides Priam for not listening to wise counsel, after having pointed out that his emotional state was beyond his control, and then points out that Priam desired to submit himself to the fates: "Voluisti enim te submittere fati ambiguis" (Historia VI. p. 57); ("But you wished to submit yourself to the fickle fates" /Meek, p. 557). This submission to the fates is the primary cause for disaster in the Historia. War, love, adventure, all make one more vulnerable to the action of the fates, and Guido's repeated advice is: stay at home, don't act rashly, accept what you have, be careful. Priam's desire to submit to the fates by means of warfare is similar to the restless emotions of Helen, Medea, and Achilles. Each, emotionally unstable by nature, craves experience of a stimulating sort, and each leaves the safety of the status quo to gain such experience, and in each case, the situation is soon completely beyond their ability to withdraw or control

as when people are swayed by hatred, love, wrath, and the like" (pp. 109-10).

the course of events.

As we have already noted, the conception of a man being controlled by the fates or the planets was not unorthodox in Guido's time, and St. Thomas has a very interesting passage that could be used as an exposition of Guido's attitude toward Priam:

the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Therefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural temperament. Now the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of the heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says, the wise man governs the stars, as though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free and in no way subject to the movement of the heavens, to such effects of the heavenly bodies.³³

Guido too accepts the ability of fate to incite emotional impulses in a man and chides the man for not opposing his passions by means of his will. That was evidently a quite acceptable position to take in the thirteenth century, when very learned men believed that there was an entity, "will," which could oppose the passions stirred by astral and other influences within a man's restless and vulnerable heart. However, Guido seems less sure than St. Thomas about the actual ability of men to control their passions, since he stresses the inexorability of the fatal influences and the extreme trickery of the demonic gods. The entire Historia can be viewed as an exemplum of what happens to you if you do not control your passions, but the actual advice given by Guido

³³ Saint Thomas Aquinas, "The Summa Theologica" in Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed., with an Intro. by Anton C. Pegis (New York: The Modern Library, 1948), Q. 9, Art. 6, p. 507.

is odd and not very useful. The combination of Christian free will and the uncontrollable passions which incite the heart produce a conception of human behavior which may have satisfied St. Thomas, but which produced great confusion and anxiety in Guido, a more pragmatic man than the scholastic saint, and a man concerned with actual human behavior, rather than theory alone. In the world of the Historia men and women are never good enough to do what they ought to do.

Yet, for all of his pessimism about human behavior, Guido does indeed cling to the expression of the freedom of the will. He modifies the character of Achilles to emphasize the role of free will and basic human nature in his amorous disaster. While Benoit had developed a situation of courtly love where Achilles was driven to the point of such emotional and ethical conflict that he literally had to suffer memory and personality destruction so that he could forget his love for Polixena and fight against the Trojans, Guido's Achilles can fight against the Trojans merely by becoming angry enough (Historia XXVI, p. 202). This Achilles is vicious, brutal and deadly, but not at all insane. He is also not passive, a dominant quality of Benoit's Achilles in love. The passivity of Benoit's Achilles, caught in the nets of Amors, is changed by Guido into an emotionally turbulent man who can love and hate, and who can be considered responsible for his behavior, at least in the sense that his behavior stems legitimately from his true nature. In order to emphasize his rejection of the Amors-psychology which controls Achilles in the Troie, Guido proceeds to address Homer and chides him for praising Achilles (who has just abused the body of Troilus), who could not have been made into a brute by Amors unless he had already been one (Historia XXVI, pp. 204-205). Guido expresses the belief that

people cannot be so affected by external controls, whether the stars or Amors, that they can be changed into something that was not really already in them. They can definitely be influenced; the stars work on the passions, as do demons and the fates. But Guido insists upon a concept of human responsibility for behavior that must utterly reject the external controls of Amors, such as operates in the Troie, which can change a human being from one kind of person into another. Guido cannot accept a noble Achilles who was changed by love into a brute; he observes that Achilles did indeed behave like a brute and concludes by denying that he was ever anything but a brute (Historia XXVI. p. 206).

Guido was a judge, and he did not question the responsibility of people for committing crimes under certain circumstances, as when he approves of the brutal death of Clytemnestra at the hands of Orestes:

Fuit enim homicidii rea, que talem et tantum regem qualis fuit inclitus Agamenon, sub eius securitate cubantem, fecit occidi, uirum et filium turpis adulterii affecit iniuria, et seipsam naturam et morem mulierum nobilium non obseruans. Quare iustum fuit ut de tot malis incurreret multa mala per eum precipue quem in nota dedecoris tot malis affecit. (Historia XXXIII, p. 255).

(For she was guilty of homicide, since she had had such a man and such a great king as the illustrious Agamemnon killed while he slept under her protection, and she had done injury to her husband and son by disgraceful adultery, and had violated both nature itself and behavior befitting noble women. Hence it was right that on account of so many evils she should have met with much evil, especially through him upon whom she had inflicted so many evils with the marks of dishonor. Meek, p. 245/7)

Gone is the ancient, terrible legend told by Benoit. Here it is all real and immediate: a wicked woman, justly punished. Clytemnestra, like Achilles, has behaved wickedly, because both of them were wicked people. This is clear and simple for Guido, and does not present the strained

ambivalence which he experiences when dealing with those tiny actions, difficult to call "crimes" at all, which seem to be the actual causes of the Trojan War. A wicked person commits a crime. An emotional person, influenced by the fates or the stars, can perform actions that destroy an entire civilization, without ever suspecting that the initial action was any crime at all. Crime and punishment; the fates and disaster; these represent two different ways of analyzing the causes of events, yet Guido uses both, as the circumstances allow.

The fates manipulate the human mind by deception, as when an idol, animated by a demon, tells misleading truths to Achilles and Calchas, and these very truths serve to bring about what is predicted and lead to the eventual destruction of both the winners and the losers in the war. The fates work by undermining the powerful by means so apparently trivial that not even cautious men are able to protect themselves, as when Laomedon imprudently insulted the Greeks, although he had no possible idea of the ultimate consequences of his action. They work by actually affecting the human mind directly, as when the Trojans decide to send Paris to Greece and Guido comments: "Sed inexorabilia fata malorum postquam infelicia prouentura decernunt, contraria et aduersa hominum mentibus representant et insinuant pro acceptis" (Historia VI, p. 67); ("But after the inexorable Fates decree that misfortunes and evils shall happen, they represent the opposite and contrary in the minds of men and recommend them as favorable" [Meek, p. 65]). When we recall how the fates stirred Priam's heart with impulses which, "licet non sint in hominis potestate" (Historia VI, p. 56); ("granted . . . are not in the control of man" [Meek, pp. 54-55]), we see a conception

of the fates that is so comprehensive that we can very well wonder just how strongly Guido believed in the possibility for men to resist these fatal influences.

The gods and fates in the Historia are like those in Homer and Virgil insofar as they are able to control the behavior of human beings by means of manipulating emotion and opinion, in order to bring about their desired ends. They represent the concept of external controls which can make a man perceive the world incorrectly and, as a consequence, act incorrectly, gratifying not his personal needs, but the will of the fates or the gods. Rather as Zeus can befuddle the mind of Hector, or Allecto can inflame and manipulate Turnus, love can attack and destroy Medea, or the fates can manipulate the series of events which will lead to the destruction of Troy. However, there is a profound difference between Guido's attitude toward these gods and the fates and that of either Homer or Virgil. They were the gods, or at least the symbols of the gods, that Homer and Virgil worshipped. Guido on the contrary hates and fears these gods and fates, which is not to say that he is quite free of belief in them, although he most certainly did not worship them, and was quite certainly a Christian of some sort. Further, Guido has one form of protection against these forces which neither Virgil or Homer seem to have taken very seriously, and that is centered on his ideal of calm and avoidance of the high risk activities of this world, which is where the ancient powers of causation appear to have the most control.

We have already considered St. Thomas' statement on the control of human beings by the heavenly bodies, which depended upon men being already under the control of their own passions, rather than controlling

their passions by means of their free will. Ideally a calm man, one who kept his emotions firmly under control, would not be subjected to the manipulations of the fates which could misrepresent reality to an already emotionally excitable person. Certainly Guido recommends that Helen should have stayed home, Medea should not have gone to the banquet with Iason, Priam should have rested content in his new Troy, and Achilles should not have gone to the Trojan festival where he first saw Polixena. Prudence and inaction are Guido's only suggestions to protect his characters from harm. However, he never shows any situation where prudence and inaction are of much practical use; he merely points out over and over again that the failure to be prudent and stay at home leads to disaster.

We must ask whether Guido represents the choices of prudence and inaction as really effective means of evading the baneful influences of the demons and fates that control the world of the Historia? After all, the fates are represented as inexorable and as acting by means so slight and trivial that none of Guido's characters seem able to perceive the consequences of their actions, except for certain seers who are given this power by the fates, the gods and the stars. Is the solution then inaction? Not necessarily. Hector loses the Trojan War by his failure to act boldly when Fortune offers him an opportunity. Is prudent action really possible? Agamemnon is as prudent as a ruler could probably be. He has excellent reasons for going to war against Troy after Paris has seized his sister-in-law, Helen. Agamemnon, being pious as well as prudent, wants to be sure that his actions are pleasing to the gods, and consequently he sends messengers to Delphos to

inquire as to whether the war they are about to undertake is pleasing to the gods. But there is the problem: the gods that Agamemnon worships and obeys are demons. The advice that they give their worshippers is, naturally, diabolical, even when truthful. There is no true god at Troy, so there is no point in expecting piety to be of any final value, except that these demonic gods do punish people who thwart their wills, as when Minerva causes a shipwreck for Ajax-Telamon, or when Mars punishes Iason.

Action is terribly dangerous when your very gods hate you. However, Guido does not represent inaction, when it actually occurs, as leading to safety. Not only did Hector lose the war by failing to seize Fortune when he had the opportunity, but he is represented at two other times as contributing to the downfall of Troy by failing to act. When the Greeks are fighting in order to first land their troops at Troy, Hector fights to repel them, but he does not fight long enough; he tires and leaves the battlefield (Historia XIII, p. 125). With Hector gone, Achilles and his men turn the tide of battle easily, and achieve the landing needed to establish the siege of Troy. Guido does not add the obvious moral comment here, that Hector, somehow, although very good, is not quite good enough, and his failure is one of inaction, not of action.

Hector makes a third error of avoiding the proper action in the Historia when the Greeks request a truce that is in their best interests, but not in the best interests of the Trojans. Hector does speak up in the council, objecting to the truce, but he does not persist in resisting the will of the council. Here Guido does comment about the need to stand up and resist an incorrect general opinion:

Quilibet enim discretus, interpellatus ad consilium inter multos, licet omnes in vnam concurrant sententiam, si sibi aliud uideatur, non propterea consensus omnium debet inducere silentium ori suo quin ipse dicat quid sibi uidetur . . . Et ideo Hector a dato tunc ab omnibus consilio non discessit, licet sibi aliud exinde uideretur, vitans uelle tantorum iudicum reuocare consilium. (Historia XVIII, p. 160)

(Anyone who is wise, when he is joined in council with many men, although all agree in one opinion, should not, if it appears otherwise to him, decide upon silence on account of the agreement of everyone, but should in fact say what appears right to him. . . . Hector did not disagree with the advice given by all, although it seemed otherwise to him, since he did not wish to take a stand against the advice of so many judges. /Meek, p. 154/)

In the truce which follows, Antenor is exchanged for Thoas, and Antenor was the actual traitor who betrayed Troy and stole the Palladium. Guido clearly disapproves of Hector's behavior here not because of his action, but because of his inaction.

How, in a world where demons answer your prayers to the gods, and the fates hate you, can you make an attempt to protect yourself and control your own destiny? Free will may exist, but its operation in the absence of reliable information and in a demon-run world is of questionable value. One can and should be as careful as possible, but even then the fates will trick and deceive you by the slightest trivia, and even inaction can prove to be disastrous. What can a man (or woman) do to gain a measure of security and foresight in such a world?

There are two technologies of control available to men in the world of the Historia, aside from the strictly passive ones of prudence and inaction. They are astrology and magic.³⁴ Guido presents them as

³⁴ Jacob Burckhardt, in The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, Vol. II, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (1929; rpt. New York: Harper and Row, 1975), remarks: "Since . . . the Italians were the first

sciences, technological means of gaining a slight edge in the hostile and confusing universe. His attitude toward them is ambivalent: he does not doubt that they are real and effective to a limited degree; however, he does doubt that they can be successfully used by human beings to outwit or control the demons and fates that are controlling them in turn.

Medea is an accomplished magician, and Guido speaks with both respect and scorn of her powers, commenting that she: "per uires et modos exorcizationum nigromanticos lucem uertebat in tenebras, subito uentos inducebat et pluuias, coruscationes et grandines, et timidos terremotus" (Historia II, pp. 15-16); ("through powers and necromantic means of incantations, turned light into dark, suddenly raised up winds and storms, lightning and hail, and fearful earthquakes" /Meek, p. 147). Medea has knowledge and powers which are absolutely genuine. Guido is even careful to point out what sort of magic could be done, and what sort was merely a superstitious tale, since only the Christian God could cause motions of the sun, moon and planets to change from their natural course, and he presents his objections as the last word in scientific thinking, pointing out that although it was said that Medea could cause the sun and moon to eclipse when they were not in conjunction, only the Christian God is really able to perform such a cosmic feat (Historia II,

modern people of Europe who gave themselves boldly to speculations on freedom and necessity, and since they did so under violent and lawless political circumstances, in which evil seemed often to win a splendid and lasting victory, their belief in God began to waver, and their view of the government of the world became fatalistic. And when their passionate natures refused to rest in the sense of uncertainty they made a shift to help themselves out with ancient Oriental or medieval superstition. They took to astrology and magic" (p. 473).

p. 16).³⁵ This is one of the very few places in the Historia where Guido introduces the Christian God at all, assuring us that he really did control the universe, even at the time of the Trojan War. Certainly Guido does not deal with the inherent contradictions between God controlling the planets via natural law and the inimical fatal influences that ruin men's lives, which behave like astral fates with added demonic hostility. While Guido denies firmly that Medea could control the sun and planets, he does concede her witchhood: "cum et ipsam fuisset in astronomia et nigromantia peritissimam non negetur" (Historia II, p. 17); ("since it is not to be denied that she was extremely skillful in astrology and witchcraft" [Meek, p. 15]).

Yet Guido makes use of Medea's skills as a witch specifically to point to how useless they were to her, chiding her with great satisfaction that although she could read the stars, she did not know her own future misfortunes, and he concludes with moralizations about the uncertainties of the predictions of astrology:

Hec enim sunt illa incerta que faciles ad credendum pro certo decipiunt et aperto conuoluunt falsitatis errore. In quibus nullus deprehenditur futurorum effectus, nisi a casu forte contingat, cum solius Dei sit, in cuius manu sunt posita scire tempora temporum et momenta. (Historia III, p. 25)

(For these are those uncertain things which, being easy to believe, certainly deceive and confuse by means of evident error and falsity.

³⁵ Evidently magic could only operate below the seven planetary spheres for, as Franz Cumont points out in Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans (1912; rpt. New York: Dover, 1960), p. 107: "The lowest of the seven planetary spheres, that of the moon, separates the domain of the violent and restless elements and of beings subject to fate, from that of the eternal gods, where all is order and regularity."

In these things no effect of the future is to be discovered, unless perhaps it is touched upon by chance, since it is of God alone, in whose hand is the knowledge of times and the moments of times.
/Meek, pp. 23-24/)

A clear and simple matter. Magic is real, but cannot cause the planets to move; astrology is correct, to a point, but cannot give reliable information about the future, and what example of this could be better than poor Medea who knew so much and succumbed so easily to passion, either ignorant of her future, or unable to control it?

However, this is not Guido's only use of astrology in the Historia. He describes Cassandra, mingling her ability to predict the future with details of her physical appearance, all being historically, factually true:

Cassandra autem fuit stature decentis, candida multum, lentiginosa facie, oculis uariis, virginitatem appetens et omnes quasi actus fugiens muliebres. Multa nouit predicere de futuris, cum in astrorum scientia et aliis liberalibus disciplinis esset potenter et patenter edocta. (Historia VIII, p. 87)

(Cassandra was of proper height, very fair, with a freckled face, lively eyes, seeking maidenhood and fleeing, so to speak, any wifely activity. She knew how to predict many things about the future, since she was rigorously and clearly instructed in the knowledge of the stars and other liberal arts. /Meek, p. 85/)

Medea could not save herself by means of astrological predictions; Cassandra, however could know the future, although, as we all know very well, her knowledge never did anyone any good. But that does not deny the possibility of astrological knowledge, although it does suggest that perhaps it was not of much use to human beings.

Despite his disclaimer in relation to Medea's use of astrology, Guido himself uses a good deal of it in the Historia, and it is

important to recognize both its presence and its scientific nature, so far as Guido was concerned. Sicily, in the thirteenth century, was one of the major points of contact between Arab scientific thinking and the western Christian cultures. Not only had Sicily been under Moslem rule for a long time in the past, but the court of Frederick II, with which Guido was associated, was a gathering place for scholars from the Moslem world as well as the Christian one. Translations from Arabic into Latin of Arab scientific texts were becoming especially available in Sicily, and as we can see from Guido's scientific and historical scholarship, he was certain to have availed himself of at least some of the new learning, especially the astronomy, which he uses in many places in the Historia.³⁶ However, the important factor here is that there was not a separation, at that time, and especially in the texts coming from the Arabic, between astronomy and astrology.³⁷

Now, as Franz Cumont stresses, the basic nature of astrology is fatalistic.³⁸ However, human beings always seek to control even that

³⁶ Meek points out that although Guido cites "Ptolomy as his authority for the explanation of how eclipses occur . . . he is actually paraphrasing a passage on eclipses from the Sphere, a treatise by the early thirteenth-century astronomer Iohannes de Sacrobosco . . ." (p. xxvii).

³⁷ Crombie remarks that: "among the Arabs and those Latins who, after the 12th century, were influenced by their works, magic and astrology fruited tropically. No sharp distinction was drawn between natural science and the magical or occult, for physical and occult causes were recognized as equally able to be responsible for physical phenomena" (p. 52).

³⁸ Franz Cumont, The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism, with an Intro. by Grant Showerman (1911; republ. of first English trans. New York: Dover, 1956), p. 179.

which they believe controls them, and the development of astrology was twofold: "as a Christian writer of the fourth century observes, if the pagans of Rome were about to marry . . . they hastened to ask the soothsayers for prognostications, while at the same time praying the Fates to grant them years of prosperity.

"A fundamental inconsistency . . . is obvious in all this development of astrology, which professed to become an exact science, but which always remained a sacerdotal theology."³⁹ This double role of astrology seems to operate in the Historia. Guido speaks often of the inexorable fates, yet he also animates the idols with demons who can initiate actions that are not necessarily fatal, and he still further expresses a firm belief in the freedom of will of men, and possibly of women too. He tells us that Medea could not know the future by means of the stars and he tells us that Cassandra could do so.

Guido also uses what can be called astral-scapes; descriptions of persons and events that begin with the positions of the sun, moon and stars, and then work down to the seasons or the passions of human beings, and only then to the actions taken. These are interesting because his work is, in general, quite non-visual, and he has very few set descriptions, yet most of the ones he does have begin with the heavens. For example, he establishes a definite relationship between the sun, the moon, and Medea's passion for Iason. Medea awaits her assignation with Iason with great eagerness, which is measured by the slow and much desired setting of the sun:

³⁹ Cumont, Astrology and Religion, p. 87.

Sed eo demum uergente ad uesperas, sub emisperio factus occiduus certas noctis induxit tenebras, dum inter aspectus humanos et ipsum solem se interposuit umbra terre. Insurgente ergo illius noctis crepusculo, multa uarietate subuertitur fluctuans animus in Medea, qui, iam erectus ad notandum singulos gradus solis donec occideret solitudine grauiori notat et appetit lapsus noctis et sic per consequens ortum lune, cum nocte illa circa primi so(m)pni horam eleuatura esset ab ortu." (Historia III, pp. 22-23)

(At last, as it drew on toward evening, the sun's descent beneath the horizon brought on the complete darkness of night, while the shadow of earth interposed itself between the faces of men and the sun. Therefore, as the twilight of that night grew deeper, the agitated heart of Medea was in a turmoil of varying emotions, and she, bent on watching the least movement of the sun until it should set, watched with even greater anxiety and yearned for nightfall with the concomitant rising of the moon, since on that night it was to rise at about the first hour of sleep. /Meek, p. 217)

If Guido were given to description, we could call this merely a descriptive passage. However, he is not, and furthermore, of the few descriptions he does give, they almost all involve the positions of the earth, sun and moon. He plainly intends to associate the setting of the sun with the increase in the powers of lust and unreason, and is not merely giving us a poetic technique for telling the time and expressing Medea's eagerness for her meeting with Iason. Her turmoil increases with the increasing darkness, and the setting of the sun is technically described: "dum inter aspectus humanos et ipsum solem se interposuit umbra terre."

The Judgment of Paris and the death of Paris both occur at the Summer Solstice, and these are, I believe, the only two mentions of that Solstice in the Historia. When Paris tells of his dream vision, he begins with the pertinent astronomical data. He was in Minor India: "'celebrante sole sol(s)ticiu[m] estuale, dum sol sub principio Cancr[is] ageret cursum suum . . . Sole iam constituenta meridiem et quasi circa

uesperarum confinia declinante'" (Historia VI, p. 61); ("when the summer sun was at its solstice, and when the sun was running its course near the beginning of Cancer. . . . The sun was already standing at the meridian and was not far from sinking toward evening'" /Meek, p. 59/). After this introduction, Paris tells his dream. The position of the sun in the zodiac, and then the position of the sun in the sky; these constitute very important ordering points for Guido when he does develop a description of an event.

The day on which Paris is killed is also described in astronomical terms: "Tempus erat quod iam sol in tantum sub zodiaci circulo celesti maturauerat cursum suum quod eo anno intrauerat signum Cancrī, in quo secundum diuinam dispositionem astrorum celebratur solsticium estiuale" (Historia XXVII, p. 209); ("It was the time when the sun had already progressed so far in its course beneath the celestial circle of the zodiac that in that year it had entered the sign of Cancer, in which, according to the divine arrangement of the stars, the summer solstice takes place" /Meek, p. 200/). Paris had a dream vision on the day of the Summer Solstice; this was a contributing factor to the Trojan War. On this other Summer Solstice, when Paris is killed, the man who will kill him, Ajax, is evidently affected in his mind by the times: "Tunc Ajax quodam stimulo fatuitatis abstractus, capite disco <ō>per̄to, inermis bellum ingreditur, solum ensem portat in manu, s[ic]uti etiam subsidio destitutus" (Historia XXVII, p. 209); ("Then Ajax, carried away by some mad impulse, marched to battle without armor, and with uncovered head, and he carried only a sword in his hand, thus indeed being without protection" /Meek, pp. 200-201/). Ajax and Paris kill

one another on this fateful day; each was somehow influenced mentally by the Summer Solstice, and these influences interacted ultimately to kill both of them.

Guido develops three other extended astral time-scapes in the Historia. They all affirm the dependent relationship between the position of the sun in the zodiac, the seasons on earth, and the actions of men.⁴⁰ These descriptions are based on time, not on place. They are certainly related to the rhetorical tradition, which Otto Weinreich calls the "epischen Zeitangabe."⁴¹ However, the consistent use of the zodiacal position of the sun is peculiar to Guido, as is his use of these set pieces when he uses so little descriptive material, indicating that he considers these broad time-scapes which relate the zodiac to the seasons to human affairs to be significant.

Guido's use of the relationship of time, the heavens, and men's actions is clear in his description of the time when the Greek leaders gather to plot the death of Hector: "Aspectibus igitur hominum crepusculo succedente, stellis per celi spacium undique patefactis, quas nox, que nocet oculis intuentium in aspectibus ceterorum, propter sue tenebras cecitatis aperte uulgauit" (Historia XVII, p. 151); ("Accordingly when twilight came before the faces of men, and when everywhere in the space of the sky could be seen the stars that night, which impairs the eyes of those looking at the appearances of the rest of things, displays

⁴⁰ Historia VII, p. 67; VIII, pp. 87-88; and XXXIII, pp. 253-54.

⁴¹ Otto Weinreich, Phöbus, Aurora, Kalender und Uhr: Über eine Doppelform der epischen Zeitbestimmung in der Erzählkunst der Antike und Neuzeit. (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1937), p. 2.

openly on account of the shadows of its darkness" (Meek, p. 145⁷). This passage is especially interesting because it expresses Guido's fascinated, yet negative, attitude toward the stars. It is not that they are not real; they are. However, when it is dark enough to see the stars, you cannot see (e.g., know) anything else. In short, although real, they impair men's knowledge.

The dominant power of Agamemnon's army is emphasized by the fires they light after they have established the siege at Troy: "eadem nocte obsidionem in multa commoditate, decernente Agamenone, firmauerunt, cum in multis ignibus et ardentibus facibus noctis tenebras elusissent. Et non minus in exercitu fulgor fictitius apparet quam si diei claritas radiaret" (Historia XIII, p. 126); ("that night, at the decision of Agamemnon, they made the siege permanent with great ease, when with many fires and blazing torches they scorned the shadows of night. And it appeared to the army that the artificial glow was no less than if the brightness of day were shining" Meek, pp. 122-23⁷). And the next morning: "Exclasis itaque tenebris noctis illius, quas mane facto fugauit aurora consurgens, sole suis radiis terre faciem illustrante" (Historia XV, p. 127); ("The shadows of that night were removed when they were put to flight in the morning by the rising dawn, and the sun lit up the surface of the earth with its rays" Meek, p. 123⁷).

Night and day, the sun and the moon, the seasons. These are the basic descriptive elements that Guido uses to locate events in the Historia. They are used in a technical and scientific way that, although it may also be rhetorical, is definitely astronomical, that is to say, astrological, for at that time, and for many years thereafter, they were practically the same.

There is probably a relationship between Guido's studious use of sky data and his demonic fates that control the destinies of unwary men and women in the Historia. The inuida fatorum series seems to be a cross between astral fatalism and medieval theories of ubiquitous demons, which Guido has already used to explain the behavior of the pagan planetary gods' idols. It can also possibly be understood as a result of cross-fertilization between Arab scientific determinism and the Christian attitude toward a fallen world. There may well be plentiful sources of Islamic astrology/astronomy which stress the malevolence of the fates more than their indifference, or this may be the peculiar product of a Sicilian Christian encountering the deterministic physical world of Greco-Arab science. It is beyond the scope of this study to identify the possible sources for a view of the processes which control the universe as essentially hostile; they may equally well be Arab, Jewish or Christian.⁴²

The science of magic was an apparent technique for relief from the controls of the demonic fates and gods. S. Angus comments that: "Astrology by its tyrannous fatalism drove men to magic to combat through the theory of universal sympathy the baneful influence of the

⁴² Thorndike points out that Albertus Magnus "believed in occult forces" and "has no doubt either in his scientific or religious writings that marvels can be worked by magic. . . . But even the actual performances of magic are deceptive in that demons by their means lead human souls astray." Further, "Albert affirms in his theological Summa that it is the consensus of opinion that magic is due to demons" (Vol. II, p. 551; p. 552). Yet Albert did not reject magic completely, any more than did Guido. Perhaps men were more at home in a universe populated by demons as well as other supernatural forces than we now imagine.

astral deities. . . ."43 This is exactly the way that Medea uses her magical arts, or more precisely, technology, for that is how Guido presents her use of magic: as a series of precise formulas which produce predictable results if applied properly, just as by heating water to 212⁰ F. one can produce steam.

The Golden Fleece is under the protection of a planetary god--Mars --and Medea tells Iason: "'Sum enim inter mortales alias sola que possum uirtutes Martis eludere et eius potentialiter institutis per contrariam artis potentiam obuiare'" (Historia II, p. 21); ("For I am the only one among mortals who can elude the power of Mars and powerfully frustrate his designs through the opposing power of my craft'" /Meek, pp. 19-20/). And indeed, she is as good as her word. She aids Iason by means of magical implements and techniques that are not at all mystical, but on the contrary, obviously in the best scientific tradition of Guido's times:

Imprimis tradidit ei ymaginem argenteam quandam, quam dixit esse per incantationum nodos multique artificii uirtute constructam, que aduersus incantationes iam factas est ualde potissima . . . Secundo sibi tradidit cuiusdam unguenti odoriferi medicamen, quo ipsum linire suasit, asserens in eo uirtutem inesse ut aduersus flamas ualdes preualeat. (Historia III, pp. 25-26)

(First she gave him a certain silver image which she said was constructed by means of binding spells and by virtue of great craft, and which was very potent against spells already cast . . . Second she gave him the remedy of a certain sweet-smelling ointment, and told him to anoint himself with it, assuring him that it had the power to overcome flames completely. /Meek, pp. 24-25/)

⁴³ S. Angus, The Mystery-Religions: A Study in the Religious Background of Early Christianity (1925; rpt. of 2nd. ed. New York: Dover, 1975), p. 253.

She also gives him a ring which could neutralize any poison because of a gemstone in it. This stone could also make the bearer invisible. She gives him a special incantation to read, and a vial filled with a liquid which will seal the mouths of the bulls. This section is very important and interesting, for we know that the somber and judicious Guido would never go to such lengths to transcribe material that he believed to be false, and the tone is one of the most precise correctness, reporting the truth of what Medea actually did. He concludes: "Et sic de singulis successiue Medea Iasonem diligenter instruxit quibus processibus siue modis possit ad optate uictorie gloriam peruenire" (Historia III, p. 27); ("Thus Medea diligently instructed Jason about these things one at a time in order, by which procedures or means he would be able to arrive at the glory of the longed-for victory" [Meek, p. 267]).

Medea's technology of magic works exactly as she says it will, and Iason does indeed obtain the Golden Fleece by following her directions. This validates the efficacy of her magic. The bulls really do vomit fire and Medea's liquid really does douse the flames and seal their mouths, just as she said it would. The green stone really does stupefy the dragon, and to reinforce the scientific nature of this effect, Guido cites Isidore of Seville for more background information to corroborate its effects (Historia III, pp. 29-30).

While we may consider this episode of Iason and the dragon a fairy tale, Guido evidently did not. He presents it with the same concern for accuracy and truth as his disquisition on why only God can change the motions of the planets, or how demons animate the pagan idols, or his

technical psychology of the restless heart, which is vulnerable to fatal influences.

However, although Guido considers magic to be real, and able to have some effect in modifying the actions of a planetary god, he is careful to stress the final uselessness of this magical skill which does not protect Medea from Iason. Guido does not present Medea as evil. She is learned, young and credulous, a powerful witch, and it is her natural lustfulness, left wrongly unprotected by her careless father, that led to her misbehavior with Iason. Guido does not condemn either Medea or her magic as evil; however her magic skills are not sufficient to provide her with a happy life, although they are able to aid Iason to acquire the Golden Fleece. Guido believes that magic and astrology are genuine sciences and can have some real effect on the world, but not enough to protect a young woman from a man who does not keep his word:

Set tu, Medea, que tantarum diceris scientiarum, illustratione decora, dic, tibi quid profuit notitia legis astrorum, per quam dicitur futura posse presciri? Si prescencia futurorum uiget in illis, unde tibi tam enormiter tam impie prospexisti? (Historia III, p. 24)

("But you, Medea, who are said to have been adorned with the splendor of so many accomplishments, say, what did knowing about the laws of the stars avail, through which it is said the future can be foretold? If foreknowledge of the future lives in them, why did you provide for yourself such a terrible and wicked future? [Meek, p. 237])

Just as piety could not protect Agamemnon, since his gods were demons who hated men, so Medea's magic and astrological skills could not protect her from the perjury of a man whom she loved. The sciences, the demon-gods, the malicious fates, all are real enough, but none can be relied upon as a constant source of protection and sure knowledge in the world of the Historia.

It is difficult to assess Guido's personal point of view in the Historia, largely because he seems to represent a time and mode of thought that is complex and contradictory, rather than simple and focussed. He examines the world he is describing with science and anxiety, contemporary psychology and ancient demonology. Guido differentiates clearly between the Christian God and the pagan gods, and the gods run the Trojan War. He evidently believes (not without orthodox companionship) in demonic fates that influence men and cause disasters. He also is steeped in the culture of the European Christian Middle Ages. There are many passages in Guido that echo the Bible; there are many others that refer to texts on the natural sciences: magic, astronomy and astrology as well as the powers of gems and the behavior of the human mind in relation to the fates. The Christian God is mentioned very few times in the entire Historia, and the main two passages are the one in the section on Medea where Guido denies that anyone but God could affect the motions of the sun, and the section about the oracle at Delphos, where Guido informs us that the idol-demons were destroyed at the coming of Christ. Interestingly, both these pieces of information are as much "scientific" as religious, and both deal with problems related to astrology and the planetary deities.

Guido does indeed stress human free will much of the time, but he also concedes that the fates work by means of such subtle trivia that no man can really protect himself from their destructive effects; at least no man in the pre-Christian world of the Historia. Guido's conception of human nature and responsibility was different from Benoit's and quite influenced by the scholastic thinking of his times. However, his world-view, or understanding of the cosmos of Troy was also quite

different from Benoit's, and not in ways that were necessarily the result of increased Christian piety, so much perhaps as the result of the new Greco-Arab learning that was flooding into Sicily during his lifetime.

Guido does moralize heavily upon men's errors. However, it is an open question of whether he does so to point the way to heaven (which he does not mention) or to indicate methods of behavior that might have proved more successful to the Greeks and Trojans of that ancient time when no one could have gone to heaven even if he had behaved with exemplary morality. His alternative is not that of the Heavenly City, but that of decent, yet practical behavior right here on earth. For example, he criticizes Iason bitterly, not for loving a woman, but for leaving her: "Quo ergo pudore depulso iuramenti tui fedus eludere presumpsisti vt ingratitudinis labe pollutus credentem deceperis uirginem?" (Historia III, p. 24); ("What lack of shame made you dare to mock the bond of your oath so that you, defiled by the disgrace of ingratitude, might deceive a credulous young girl?" Meek, p. 237).

As we have seen, Hector is criticized not for fighting, but for neglecting to seize the opportunity offered to him by Fortune. And, lest we be too hasty in thinking that Guido was expressing a morality of extreme Christian piety, let us note that while he criticized Hector for not speaking his mind in the council, he criticized another son of Priam, Amphimachus, for speaking up correctly, but imprudently (Historia XXVIII, p. 226). The moral content of Amphimachus' speech was perfectly correct; his technique of behavior was wrong.

Similarly, when Guido criticized Medea's father for exposing her to the company of a foreign hero, he was concerned with the techniques of safe behavior--prudence--more than with the morality of the behavior

per se. Guido points out that Helen should have stayed at home and not have gone to see Paris; Achilles did not have to go to the Trojan festival where he first saw Polyxena; and especially, Priam should have been more prudent. Prudence, let us note, would not have gotten Priam into heaven, but he might have had a longer and happier life on earth.

It is worth considering whether the story of Troy was of especial interest to Guido because it was set in a time of darkness and chaos, with no hope. Sicily in the thirteenth century was at war with the Papacy and torn by political strife.⁴⁴ When he wrote the main body of the Historia (all but Book I), Guido was an old man, writing a dark story of the hostile fates and the undeserved, yet somehow unavoidable doom of men who lived a very long time ago in a world without the otherworldly alternatives of his contemporary Christianity. In this world Guido analyzed the behavior of a doomed people as scientifically as he could, and criticized their behavior, based probably on his own long experience, with an eye not so much to heaven as to survival.

⁴⁴ Meek relates Guido's profound pessimism to the troubled conditions in Sicily during his lifetime, which culminated in the War of the Sicilian Vespers (pp. xxix-xxx).

Fate, Free Will and Fortune: The Christian Synthesis

In Troilus and Criseyde Geoffrey Chaucer has retold a portion of the story of the fall of Troy which concentrates on the love of a son of Priam, Troilus, for a woman who eventually betrays his love.¹ Although the scope of this version of the Troy story has been severely narrowed to focus on a single love affair, Chaucer has dealt extensively with the complexities of why men are destroyed, why they erroneously think that they are unfree, and why the correct and ultimate view of the fall of Troy must be with reference to the Providence of God, not to the arbitrary malice of Fortune or the fates.²

Although the Narrator is not the central character in the poem, I will focus on him since it is in reference to him that Troilus and Criseyde can be read, to a certain extent, as a complex dialogue on these problems. Thus, Troilus and Pandarus act out roles that express conflicting pagan attitudes toward Fortune and necessity, while the Christian Narrator comes gradually to comprehend that, although men are free to choose their loves and their actions, there also is such a thing

¹ Geoffrey Chaucer, "Troilus and Criseyde" in The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. F. N. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961). Hereafter cited as T&C, or as Robinson, if referring to the notes.

² I want to emphasize that T&C is much richer than a mere dialogue on Fortune, fate and free will. However, it is only this aspect of the poem that my general question about human responsibility addresses.

as Fortune, and it is securely harnessed under the Providence of God.

C. S. Lewis has said that Chaucer medievalizes the Filostrato of Boccaccio.³ I would suggest that, even more, he has christianized it, finally fitting an ancient pagan story into a Christian philosophical framework.⁴

The tension between the determinism of Troilus and the free will of Pandarus is resolved by the Narrator into a philosophically conventional Christian free will under the larger concept of Divine Providence. However, he is able only to achieve this resolution when he finally wrenches his emotions free from the once so attractive pagan love religion to focus exclusively on the Christian God. At the opening of the poem the Narrator is an enthusiastic worshipper (but not a practitioner) of the rites of the God of Love. After following the experiences

³ C. S. Lewis, "What Chaucer Really Did to Il Filostrato," Essays and Studies by Members of the English Association, XVII (1932), pp. 56-75; rpt. in Chaucer Criticism, Vol. II, ed. Richard J. Schoeck and Jerome Taylor (1961; rpt. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), p. 17.

⁴ This framework was largely based on The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius. H. R. Patch, in The Tradition of Boethius: A Study of His Importance in Medieval Culture (1935; reissued New York: Russell and Russell, 1970) remarks of this tradition: "down through the centuries after his day, in the scope of what concerned physical and metaphysical man, scarcely anything occupied the attention of the philosophers more steadily than what is really the central problem of the Consolation: chance in its relation to God and Divine foresight, and in relation to man and his longing to shape his own destiny" (p. 41). Patch feels that Chaucer drew his Christian conception of Fortune from Boethius, and says that: "Structurally the idea of Fortune as the servant of the Christian God has a profound effect on the plot of the Troilus. With its many allusions to the operation of fate, the story nevertheless does not proceed as a sentimental tragedy, in which the characters fall victim to some pitiless force external to themselves; but Troilus, unlike his prototype in the Filostrato, eventually discovers that his sufferings are pretty much the result of his own folly" (The Goddess Fortuna, p. 31).

of the lovers with close sympathy, the Narrator gradually withdraws to a recognition of the lack of justice, mercy, or stability within the pagan love religion, and he turns, enlightened and freely, to the Christian God, urging young lovers to do the same, quite eliminating any question as to whether the poet Chaucer has written a poem of determinism with respect to the human will.⁵

We will begin our inquiry by looking at the role of the Narrator as the servant of Love's servants and then consider the nature of Troilus, Pandarus and Criseyde as, among other things, expositions on the nature of Fortune.⁶ After this we will examine the gradual education of the Narrator by means of Troilus, Pandarus and Criseyde, until he finally rejects almost all of their experience.

At the opening of the poem, the Narrator describes himself as one

⁵ This is the position of Patch, who comments that "The poet warns 'yonge fresshe folkes' to realize the emptiness of worldly frivolity and turn from it to God. Evidently, then there was some choice in human affairs and Troilus suffered from having chosen to meddle in things that were not worth-while" ("Troilus on Predestination," The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, XVII /1918/, pp. 399-423; rpt. in Chaucer: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. Edward Wagenknecht /1959; rpt. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964/, p. 374).

⁶ This is, admittedly, a narrow and limited perspective on this very complex set of characters. While I believe it to be valid, I want to stress that it is by no means comprehensive. As G. T. Shepherd comments in "Troilus and Criseyde," in Chaucer and Chaucerians, ed. D. S. Brewer (Alabama: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1966); rpt. in Chaucer and His Contemporaries: Essays in Medieval Literature and Thought, ed. and with an Intro. by Helaine Newstead, Literature and Ideas Series, Irving Howe, Gen. ed. (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1968), "In public Chaucer was no more than a minor functionary and his appearance in court would depend upon a reputation as a sophisticated entertainer, not as a speculative moralist or an interpreter of his times" (p. 151).

who the "God of Loves servants" serves (T&C I.15). Although not himself a lover, he is strongly pro-love and his attitude toward love is that of a worshipper toward his religion, one which provides him with very little in the way of comfort or satisfaction, despite his enthusiasm. He is afraid even to pray to the God of Love for help in loving, "for myn unliklynesse" (T&C I.16), and is very far removed from his God of Love "in derknesse" (T&C I.18). This is a worshipper who is unenlightened, unsatisfied, and attempting to save his soul by means of his attitudes toward suffering lovers:

For so hope I my sowle best avaunce,
To prey for hem that Loves servauntz be,
And write hire wo, and lyve in charite. (T&C I.47-49)

Despite his obvious lack of gratification in love, and the terrible woes of the lovers about whom he writes, seeking to show "Swich payne and wo as Loves folk endure" (T&C I.34), the Narrator is unequivocally pro-love, at least consciously, at the opening of the poem.⁷ He uses

⁷ Morton Bloomfield stresses the distance between the Narrator and the characters in T&C. He connects this distancing with the fatalism of the text: "if we regard the framework of the poem--the role that Chaucer sets himself as commentator--as a meaningful part of the poem and if we consider the various references to fate and destiny in the text, we can only come to the conclusion that the Chaucerian sense of distance and aloofness is the artistic correlative to the concept of predestination. Troilus and Criseyde is a medieval tragedy of predestination because the reader is continually forced by the commentator to look upon the story from the point of view of its end and from a distance" ("Distance and Predestination in Troilus and Criseyde," PMLA, LXXII /1957/, pp. 14-26; rpt. in Chaucer Criticism II, p. 204). However, the Narrator is not distanced from his characters in Books I-III. It is only as the Narrator experiences the sorrows of Troilus and the falseness of the world that he withdraws to the aesthetic and philosophical distance of a medieval Christian viewing a pagan love story. This constitutes his learning process, which is not at all predestined.

the terminology of the Christian religion in the exposition of his love religion, with much play on the terms mercy, grace, despair, heaven, and so on. Love has the capacity to bring one to heaven, and he urges the lovers in the audience to pray for unhappy lovers such as Troilus, so "That Love hem brynge in hevne to solas" (T&C I.31).⁸ Evidently the only cure for despair in love is death, and the Narrator asks lovers to pray for those in such extreme love despair that they will never recover that: "God, for his benignite, / So graunte hem soone owt of this world to pace, / That ben despeired out of Loves grace" (T&C I.40-42). This love religion represents a neat reversal of many of the concepts of the Christian religion, as well as the social standards of morality as expressed indirectly within the poem.⁹ But the Narrator retains his enthusiasm, and his many metaphors of the religion of love, and introduces us to Criseyde as a woman who "semed" (that ever suspicious word) like an angel (T&C I.102-04).

When the Narrator introduces us to Troilus, it is with righteous indignation at a young man who has the temerity to scorn love. Troilus is a man who has "no devocioun" (T&C I.187), and when he angers the God of Love by his attitude and is shot by him, the Narrator exclaims with great satisfaction:

⁸ There are evidently two heavens for lovers--the heaven of the beloved for the fortunate lover and the heaven of the skies after death for the lover in despair.

⁹ The concern of Criseyde for her honor and her desire to avoid shame, as well as the concern which Pandarus and Troilus express at various times for her honor, indicate that there are social standards in Troy which do not approve of even a widow having a love affair.

O blynde world, O blynde entencioun!
 How often falleth al the effect contraire
 Of surquidrie and foul presumpcioun;
 For kaught is proud, and kaught is debonaire.
 This Troilus is clomben on the staire,
 And litel weneth that he moot descenden;
 But alday faileth thing that fooles wenden. (T&C I.211-17)

Troilus has been rude and proud and has gotten just what he deserved. The Narrator's sense of propriety is satisfied. To rub it in, the Narrator gives us the example of a horse who was too proud and thought for a moment that he could evade horses' law (T&C I.218-24).

Not only is the Narrator a servant of the servants of the God of Love, he is an outright determinist, one who rejects the concept of free will for various sorts of necessity, whether the law of horses, the law of kind, the law of destiny, or the law of love. He stresses the helplessness of Troilus to resist the God of Love, and how he was forced to love against his will:

So ferde it by this fierse and proude knyght:
 Though he a worthy kynges sone were,
 And wende nothing hadde had swich myght
 Ayeyns his wille that shuld his herte stere,
 Yet with a look his herte wax a-fere,
 That he that now was moost in pride above,
 Wax sodeynly moost subgit unto love. (T&C I.225-31)

The moral is, no one can evade love, no matter how noble or powerful he may be, and the Narrator goes on to warn us that we should not even attempt to evade love because "That Love is he that alle thing may bynde, / For may no man fardon the lawe of kynde" (T&C I.237-38). We will consider later just how true the opinions of the Narrator, as expressed at the opening of Troilus and Criseyde prove to be in relation to the experiences of the whole poem. At this point we need only consider that

the Narrator believes that one cannot and should not resist love, that one is not free with respect to love, and that it is even wrong to try to resist it. His response to the shooting of Troilus by the God of Love is definitely one of satisfaction, one more horse whipped back into line. But it is more than simply a matter of horses, of physiological responses controlled by love. The Narrator goes on to tell of the positive aspects of love in refining and improving the qualities of the lover and concludes:

Now sith it may nat goodly ben withstonde,
And is a thing so vertuuous in kynde,
Refuseh nat to Love for to ben bonde,
Syn as hymselfen liste, he may yow bynde. (T&C I.253-56)

Love is the Narrator's God, and when Troilus sees Criseyde and is struck with love for her, the Narrator exclaims with delight, "Blissed be Love, that kan thus folk converte!" (T&C I.308).

The Narrator certainly worships the God of Love. However, he is also a fourteenth-century Christian who speaks to and of another God, the more conventional Christian one. At this early stage in his story, he does not even seem to experience any sense of conflict between the two religions which he participates in. For instance, when Troilus, wounded by love, burns from the fire of love, the Narrator remarks, "the wherfro God me blesse" (T&C I.436).¹⁰ Obviously this is not the God of Love who he hopes will protect him from the fires of love; this is the conventional Christian God of a fourteenth-century Englishman. There

¹⁰ This is one of the Narrator's earlier suggestions that love may be less than delightful and desirable.

are many uses of both gods, the God of Love and the Christian God, throughout this complex poem, and it is not always clear which god is meant in a specific passage. Certainly at the onset of the poem the Narrator is not sure of the differences between the two gods himself. What he is sure of is that Troilus could not prevent himself from being struck by the God of Love, and hence, from the burning fires of love which become a bit hellish in their extended descriptions, as:

Forthi ful ofte, his hote fir to cesse,
To sen hire goodly lok he gan to presse;
For therby to ben esed wel he wende
And ay the ner he was, the more he brende. (T&C I.445-48)

The Narrator gives his greatest praises to love in the prologue to Book III. Here, as everywhere, there are ambiguities and ambivalences, but this outpouring of praise to the power of Venus is intended to present the attitude of the Narrator as pro-love, and as perceiving love to be the binding force of the cosmos. Our questions have to be addressed primarily to the effect of such a hymn of praise within its context. It immediately follows the comic machinations by which Pandarus brought Criseyde into Troilus' chamber where he lies pretending to be ill. The prologue, like its context, mixes love and lust, the Christian God and the pagan gods, the Chain of Love binding the universe and the burning lust of Troilus for the consummation of his relationship with Criseyde. At this point the Narrator does not seem to know that there is a difference between the love of Venus and the love of the Christian God, or between procreative love and the non-procreative love of Troilus and

Criseyde.¹¹

He begins with Venus and the general principle of love: "God loveth, and to love wol nought werne; / And in this world no lyves creature / Withouten love is worth, or may endure" (T&C III.12-14). From this general principle of God's love (which includes both the Christian God and Venus), the Narrator proceeds directly to the amorous adventures of Jove.¹² According to the Narrator, Venus causes Jove to love, Mars to be peaceful, and she is the source of peace and friendship in the world. However, not only does this prologue occur in the midst of the trickeries of Pandarus, but we know, even if the Narrator has forgotten these things in his enthusiasm, that Venus was at the root of the Trojan war, and not at all a cause of peace, and we will see as the story progresses how her sort of love is absolutely ineffectual in keeping peace and friendship. This prologue will not be borne out by the truth of events in the rest of the poem. Jove's loves are all rapes, as was the rape of Helen, caused by Venus, which started the Trojan War in the first place, and this rape most certainly did not appease Mars, but caused war, the province of Mars.

¹¹ This reflects the confusion of the "double Venus tradition" which: "is, in a word, a representation of the paradox of human existence since the Fall; a single instinct or impulse, which before the Fall enjoyed both moral and psychological integrity, and may lead to opposite and mutually exclusive ends because it has become fragmented and confused in human consciousness," according to George Economou in "The Two Venuses" (p. 20).

¹² In this passage, "Chaucer seems to have in mind only the amorous adventures of Jupiter, whereas Boccaccio speaks of Venus in terms applicable to Mercy as an attribute of God" (Robinson, notes on T&C, Book III, ll. 17-21, p. 823).

The Narrator's prologue continues to praise the love of Venus, "Ye holden regne and hous in unitee" (T&C III.29). Having just finished Book II, we have observed that venereal love has done quite the opposite leading Pandarus to reject his responsibility to his niece in the name of Venus and his tender friendship with Troilus.¹³ Further, in the name of the love of Venus, Pandarus and Troilus trick Troilus' relatives in order to set up the meeting between Troilus and Criseyde which this prologue introduces. Later, after Criseyde is about to be exchanged for Antenor, Troilus will offer to leave Troy in the name of this love sent from Venus (T&C IV.637), and will wish his father or brothers dead rather than lose Criseyde (T&C IV.274-78). So we must consider that the sort of bond praised by the Narrator in his prologue is not an adequate description of the actual nature of the bond which love provides between Troilus and Criseyde.

But the Narrator is all enthusiasm for the love of Venus, who not only is supposed to hold together house and kingdom, but the "sothfast cause of frendshipe ben also" (T&C III.30). The love of Venus certainly is a force that binds the friendship of Pandarus and Troilus, but the actual nature of the bond, as we see it in the story, is a mutual, intense desire (although for different motives) to get Troilus into bed with Criseyde. Venus love is most certainly not a moral force, whatever

¹³ Lest we doubt whether Pandarus should have done this or not, at least by social moral standards acknowledged within the poem, consider his speech to Troilus after the first meeting between Criseyde and Troilus, where Pandarus says that if the world knew what he had done, "'al the world upon it wolde crie, / And seyn that I the werste trecherie / Dide in this cas, that evere was bigonne'" (T&C III.277-79). The opinion of the world does not, however, inhibit the actions of Pandarus.

else it may be; it will prove able to attract opposites, but not able to bind them to one another in a stable bond.

One of the Narrator's strong points about love is that it improves the character of the lover. He addresses Venus:

And as yow list, ye maken hertes digne;
 Algates hem that ye wol sette a-fyre,
 They dreden shame, and vices they resygne;
 Ye do hem corteys be, fresshe and benigne. (T&C III.23-26)

We can only ask, did Venus then not set Criseyde on fire? She is certainly not made into a better person, although she is made into a temporarily more peaceful and happy one. Troilus is made into a better person by love, but we are led to assume that he was already a noble man, although cruel and immature. Criseyde does indeed "dreden shame," but she always did think more of her honor, or reputation than she did of Troilus, while Pandarus, who has been touched by Venus for many years, does not dread shame nearly enough to protect his own niece.¹⁴

The Narrator not only affirms the unequivocal blessedness of love (although in a most equivocal manner, considering the context), but he seeks to deny the responsibility of the persons involved by stating this love as a law of behavior, one that cannot be avoided by human will. Just as he had earlier said that Troilus' being shot by the God of Love was unavoidable, and parallel to a horse obeying horses' law, here he

¹⁴ We must not overemphasize the improvements love made on Troilus either. While he becomes a better warrior and a more kind and compassionate man, he also expresses his gratitude to Pandarus for having arranged his liaison with Criseyde by offering any one of his own sisters (or his married sister-in-law, Helen) to Pandarus (T&C III.407-13).

again expresses love as a law: "Ye folk a lawe han set in universe, / And this knowe I by hem that lovers be, / That whoso stryveth with yow hath the werse" (T&C III.36-38). The law we have been shown so far by the Narrator is one of Pandarus ignoring the bonds of kinship, and of Pandarus and Troilus tricking Criseyde and Troilus' relatives. A law of do anything to get what you desire. And both Pandarus and Troilus very much desire the union of Troilus and Criseyde. Just as he had earlier warned us that no one should resist love (T&C I.255), the Narrator again warns us that love is a law which cannot and should not be resisted, and he cites lovers as the source of his knowledge on this issue, a source which will prove to be biased and inadequate.

The Narrator, like Troilus, is a romantic, always seeking an idealized interpretation of events. Like Troilus, he uses deterministic concepts, whether laws of love or laws of Fortune, to excuse and explain the less than ideal behavior of the lovers he so lovingly describes.

This prologue to Book III, in which the Narrator hymns the praises of love, is surrounded by the pressures of death and despair, the fires that torment Troilus and the imagery of hunting and violence which is used to describe the development of Pandarus' and Troilus' capture of Criseyde.¹⁵ At the end of Book II, when Pandarus is about to lead Criseyde into Troilus' chamber, he whispers in Troilus' ear, "'God have thi soule, ibrought have I thi beere!'" (T&C II.1638). And as Pandarus actually leads in Criseyde, just following the Narrator's prologue, he

¹⁵ For example, Pandarus speaks of his devices to bring about the liaison between Criseyde and Troilus as cutting down an oak tree (T&C II.1380-84) and as driving the "deer" Criseyde to Troilus' bow (T&C II.1535).

says to Troilus, "'Se who is here yow comen to visite; / Lo, here is she that is youre deth to wite'" (T&C III.62-63). The ugly sex and death connotations are lightly ignored by both Troilus and the Narrator. Criseyde is Troilus' bier and his death. As she enters the room, Troilus says with great truth and ignorance, "'Wher me be wo, O myghty God, thow woost! / Who is al ther? I se nought trewely'" (T&C III.66-67). Neither Troilus nor the Narrator is able to see truly, at this point, what is happening.¹⁶

Although the Narrator approaches the actual consummation of the love of Troilus and Criseyde with hesitation, he does his best and praises their bliss with enthusiasm:

O blisful nyght, of hem so longe isought,
 How blithe unto hem bothe two thow weere!
 Why nad I swich oon with my soule ybought,
 Ye, or the leeste joie that was there? (T&C III. 1317-20)

This is the longing of a man who reminds us that he has never known love. Considering the renunciation of earthly love that will come at the end of the poem, his wondering why he had not bought such love with his soul is a sobering thought. There have been many plays on the heaven of the lady's body and the heaven of the afterlife up to this point in the poem. The Narrator has the two quite intermingled. But the idea of selling one's soul for a moment of joy is perhaps the peak of his confusion. He continues: "Awey, thow foule daunger and thow

¹⁶ I do not intend to give the impression that love is only chaotic and sordid in T&C. It is also tender and beautiful, especially in Book III. The point I am making is that while Troilus participates in a love that is both beautiful and chaotic, he and the Narrator insist on perceiving only the positive aspects of Venus, while trying to ignore her negative ones.

feere, / And lat hem in this hevene blisse dwelle, / That is so heigh
that al ne kan I telle!" (T&C III. 1321-23). The remainder of the poem
will be largely devoted to demonstrating that such love cannot keep
away foul danger and fear, and that the heaven of lovers is a brief and
insecure heaven indeed. The Narrator goes on to emphasize that he is
not, and has never been a lover, and his description of love is there-
fore inadequate and should be modified by all lovers. This position of
the Narrator, as one ignorant of the actual experience of love, for all
his compassionate enthusiasm, is important to the development of his
later rejection of love as a value to be clung to. He is ignorant of
the things he praises most--the pagan love religion and the experience
of love. It will be by means of the experience of Troilus in love,
vicariously undergone by the Narrator, that he will become educated in
the higher values of his Christian religion.

The Narrator finishes Book III with the highest praises of love
occurring just before he bids farewell to love. Troilus gives his
speech on the bond of love that binds the universe, the Narrator com-
ments on how love has increased Troilus' excellence as a knight and his
virtue as a man and, directly following this, he bids farewell to Venus,
blind Cupid, and the Muses: "That ye thus fer han deynd me to gyde, /
I kan namore, but syn that ye wol wende, / Ye heried ben for ay with-
outen ende!"(T&C III. 1811-13). Line 1812 is interesting; not only do
Venus, blind Cupid and the Muses want to leave, but the Narrator also
is no longer able to go with them. It seems to be a mutual parting of
the ways. They have guided him through the territory that is right-
fully theirs--that of the religion of love--up to the highest praises

for the values of that religion, the Chain of Love, but immediately following this, the love which they promoted begins to break down, leaving us to wonder just how stable the Chain of Love is, or whether what Troilus experiences as love was indeed the same thing as the Chain of Love which he praised so eloquently. The effect would probably have been less ambiguous if the farewell to Venus and the Muses had been postponed until the opening of the next book. As it stands, the farewell undercuts the stability of love, even before anything has happened to separate the lovers, as the Narrator turns away from Venus to begin his education in the fragile nature of worldly pleasures, no matter how delightful they may be.

In order to examine the education of the Narrator from this point to the end of the poem, it will be necessary to consider one aspect of the characterization of Troilus, Pandarus, and Criseyde. While certainly not allegories in any crude and definite sense, the three of them serve to perform a dialogue with examples on the nature of Fortune, which instructs the Narrator, not the characters involved. Each of them not only acts out a position with respect to Fortune, but each gives speeches that act as exposition not so much of the action, but of that aspect of Fortune which they represent.

Pandarus presents the arguments for Fortune understood as opportunity; Troilus presents the arguments for Fortune understood as fate or necessity;¹⁷ and Criseyde, to some extent, represents the lady Fortune

¹⁷ Evidently fatalism had become an important aspect of thinking in fourteenth-century England, especially due to the influence of the Black Death: "A blind, cruel, and irresistible Fate seemed to sweep away good and bad indifferently to a single swift and abominable doom. To the

turning on her wheel, or mutability.¹⁸ We will begin by looking at the situation of Troilus when he falls in love with Criseyde and compare what actually happens to what he says happens, and to what Pandarus makes of the events.

Troilus goes to the temple for a religious festival and passes his time scorning lovers, This angers the God of Love who shoots Troilus before he has seen Criseyde (T&C I.209). Ignorant of his wounded condition, Troilus looks over the ladies until: "upon cas bifel that thorough a route / His eye percede, and so depe it wente, / Til on Criseyde it smot, and ther it stente" (T&C I.271-73). It is by chance, "upon cas," that Troilus sees Criseyde. Having angered the God of Love by his rudeness, Troilus was shot and had to love. He did not have to love Criseyde, that was by chance and by choice. Troilus looks at Criseyde, greatly moved by her beauty, "And of hire look in him ther gan to quyen / So gret desir and such affeccioun" (T&C I.295-96).

religious man it raised problems which had slumbered since the days when Augustine had sought to solve the mystery of the agony into which the old Roman world was perishing. Was man in any sense the arbiter of his own destiny? Was there such a thing as free will? Was not the whole course of every creature, both in this world and the next, fore-known and foreordained from the beginning?" So comments F. J. C. Hearnshaw in "John Wycliffe and Divine Dominion," in The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers: A Series of Lectures Delivered at King's College University of London (1923; rpt. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), p. 197. We can observe the position of Troilus in Hearnshaw's description of fatalism in fourteenth-century England. It would seem that the arguments Troilus develops were important ones in Chaucer's day, and consequently we must not underestimate the importance of the final resolution of them into an affirmation of faith and free will.

¹⁸ Patch remarks that: "after the time of Boethius two traditions were established, one in which Fortune turns the wheel, and one in which she herself is turned thereon" (The Goddess Fortuna, p. 153). The reason that Criseyde is more like this latter figure is that she is helpless, while mutable.

Then he is again struck by love, this time streaming out from Criseyde's eyes (T&C I.305-06). Now he is in love. The process was a mixture of his own misbehavior toward lovers which angered the God of Love, the shot of that God, which presumably made Troilus vulnerable to love, chance, which led Troilus to first see Criseyde, and choice, when Troilus responded to her beauty.¹⁹ As he begins to suffer the pains of love's fire, Troilus has recourse to his standard explanation for why things happen to him: necessity. He complains to himself, "'But, O thow woful Troilus, God wolde, / Sith thow most loven thorough thi destine '" (T&C I.519-20).

As we have just seen, destiny did not have anything to do with what happened to Troilus. He was rude; the God of Love shot him; he looked over the ladies, found a favorite, and only then fell in love. If he had been better behaved the God of Love would never have shot him in the first place, and surely rudeness is not a form of destiny.²⁰ But, being

¹⁹ Consider this description of Duns Scotus' theory of the will in relation to the desired object which is surprisingly similar to the process Troilus goes through: "It is the will alone, Scotus says . . . which is the total cause of volition in the will . . . It is true that we have to know an object to will it and that it is the good that we know to be in that object that makes us will it; but it is equally true that if we know that object rather than another, it is because we will to know it. Our cognitions determine us, but we first determine the choice of our cognitions. Even when the decision of the act seems irresistibly drawn by the knowledge we have of an object, it is first of all the will which has desired that knowledge, and, in the end, it is the will alone that bears the total responsibility for the decision" (Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, p. 463). We know that Troilus has been shot by the God of Love, but we also see him look about and choose a love object.

²⁰ Walter Clyde Curry interprets this scene as does Troilus: "Emphasis cannot be too strong when placed upon the fact that in Troilus and Criseyde an absolutely inescapable necessity governs the progress of the story. The Boethian God may be discerned back of every incident working

sure that it is his destiny to love Criseyde, Troilus takes the next step, which is so typical of his character, and wishes that he were dead (T&C I.526 ff.). His logic is that of the fatalist: since destiny made me love, and the lady I love is cold, and since there is no way to fight against destiny, death is the only solution. Having wished he were dead, Troilus soon makes the logical jump to assume that he must die (T&C I.573).²¹ At each step, as we will see, Troilus turns his emotional responses to events into subjective (and erroneous) perceptions of those events as fated or necessary.²²

out the plans of Providence through His ministers, Destiny and Fortune. All Nature-as-destiny (serving God) makes it inevitable, as we have seen, that Troilus should love; and the destinal powers of the erratic stars, in conjunction possibly with other forces, impose upon him the doom of loving Criseyde. Both Chaucer and the protagonist insist time and again that the lovers' coming together precisely as they do is unavoidable" ("Destiny in Troilus and Criseyde" in Chaucer and the Mediaeval Sciences, 2nd ed. /New York: Barnes and Noble, 1960/, pp. 241-98; rpt. in Chaucer Criticism II, p. 55). It is not that the event was inevitable, but that Troilus interpreted it in his typically fatalistic matter, that led Curry to this conclusion.

²¹ John Steadman, in Disembodied Laughter: "Troilus" and the Apotheosis Tradition; A Reexamination of Narrative and Thematic Contexts (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1972), points out that there is an "analogy between Troilus's despair and Boethius's grief. Different as they are, both men have been blinded by emotion, by concern for temporal things, and by the power of sensuality" (p. 104). Neither Troilus nor Boethius has a correct understanding of events, and this is the source of their grief.

²² What Troilus really does is abdicate his free will. Gilson, discussing Boethius' conception of will, says that, for Boethius: "As to man, his soul is all the freer as it patterns itself on divine thought; it is less free when it turns away from God to the knowledge of sensible things, and still less so when it allows itself to be governed by the passions of the body it animates. To will what the body desires is the extreme degree of servitude; to will what God wills, love what he loves, is the highest form of liberty; it is therefore happiness" (History of Christian Philosophy, p. 102). Troilus capitulates without a struggle to willing what his body desires, and he calls it fate or destiny.

The response of Pandarus to Troilus' woe is typical of his very different attitudes toward Fortune and life in general. First of all, Pandarus believes in free will and assures Troilus that "'no wight may byreve / A man to love, tyl that hym list to leve'" (T&C I.685-86). Pandarus not only believes that one can will to love or not to love, but he believes that love represents not a fatal destiny, but a delightful opportunity, and rejects Troilus' despair as foolish:

Quod Pandarus, "Allas! what may this be,
That thow dispeired art thus causeles?
What! lyveth nat thi lady, bendiste?
How wostow so that thow art graceles?
Swich yvel is nat alwey booteles.
Why, put nat impossible thus thi cure,
Syn thyng to come is oft in aventure." (T&C I.778-84)

Aventure, or Fortune perceived as opportunity, is the philosophical position that Pandarus clings to until the bitter end, when he must recognize that Criseyde has been faithless and he can do no more for Troilus. Up to that point, however, his words and actions present this position and are used to contradict and counteract the fatalism of Troilus who believes Fortune to be necessary, planned out by some external force, personal in its intentions to affect men, and unavoidable.

Troilus does not think that Pandarus can help him in his destined misery:

"For wel fynde I that Fortune is my fo;
Ne al the men that riden konne or go
May of hire cruel whiel the harm withstonde;
For, as hire list, she pleyeth with free and bonde." (T&C I. 837-40)

Here, as each time that Troilus presents his position of helpless fatalism, he is countered by another position, that of Pandarus the optimist, who points out that Troilus blames Fortune, "'For thow art wroth'" (T&C I.842), and goes on to insist that Fortune is really a form of opportunity, since she acts on all men and causes joy as well as woe, and if she brings one down, she can just as easily bring one up again.

Pandarus' position on the nature of Fortune is best expressed in the scene in Book II where he presents the idea of Troilus' love to Criseyde in as attractive a package as he can manage. He tells her:

"For to every wight som goodly aventure
Som tyme is shape, if he it kan receyven;
But if that he wol take of it no cure,
Whan that it commeth, but wilfully it weyven,
Lo, neyther cas ne fortune hym deceyven,
But ryght his verray slouthe and wrecchednesse;
And swich a wight is for to blame, I gesse.

"Good aventure, o beele nece, have ye
Fu! lightly founden, and ye konne it take;
And, for the love of God, and ek of me,
Cache it anon, lest aventure slake!" (T&C II.281-91).²³

Pandarus presents Fortune as a phenomenon that is neither malicious nor particularly harmful to human beings. She is merely process, the process of change, and one must be alert and prepared to take advantage of the opportunities which occur. To Pandarus, Aventure, or Fortune, is a

²³ This scene uses arguments that are strikingly similar to those used in Guido's Historia when the Narrator chides Hector for failing to grasp at opportunity when Fortune presents it, for it will never come again if refused. (See Historia XV, p. 146). In the Historia, Hector failed to grasp his opportunity and lost Troy. Criseyde does grasp her opportunity in T&C, whether that opportunity be Troilus or Diomedes.

matter of opportunity, not a source of external determinism. It is how one responds to such opportunities that influences most what happens to one. Pandarus believes in the freedom of the will, even though he uses his own freedom to manipulate the wills of his dear friend and his niece, which he probably could not do if they were unwilling. What he says about Fortune is logical and conventional; so is what Troilus has to say about Fortune. Neither position is testable as to its truth, except by examining the contexts in which they occur and what actually happens to people in the entire poem. We have already seen that, in their context, Troilus' assumptions about destiny and Fortune causing him to love Criseyde were simply not borne out. Are Pandarus' assumptions about the nature of Fortune borne out within the entire poem? Wherever he is able to have direct control over worldly events, that is, over Criseyde, his theories about the nature of Fortune are borne out, since he is a master at manipulating her (and Troilus) so long as he has her within his grasp. Only after Criseyde leaves Troy is Pandarus no longer able to control, or at least exploit, the opportunities presented by Fortune, but that is really because there are no more opportunities presented to him. Pandarus' conception of Fortune seems to be true for individuals, within limits, but there are also larger events, such as the war, which cannot be exploited or controlled, and his energetic free will is useless in dealing with these greater, more destinal phenomena.

Pandarus schemes throughout Book II to bring Criseyde to Troilus, and yet, as she is about to enter the room, led by her uncle, Troilus' first thought is one of helpless determinism: "'O Lord, right now renneth my sort / Fully to deye, or han anon comfort!'" (T&C II.1754-55).

Lest we think this is the case, after Criseyde leaves the interview, we observe Pandarus give a long speech to Troilus, reminding him that it was Pandarus, not chance, that brought about the meeting: "'And have it brought to swich plit as thow woost, / So that thorough me thow stondest now in weye / To faren wel'" (T&C III.246-48). With Criseyde somewhat in the position of the world itself, Troilus and Pandarus play out the relations to her of passive and active, determinist and free opportunist.

Certainly the courtship owes more to Pandarus than to Venus. When he reports back to Troilus after his first interview with Criseyde concerning Troilus' love for her, Pandarus tells him: "'For thus ferforth I have thi werk bigonne, / Fro day to day, til this day by the morwe / Hire love of frendshipe have I to the wonne'" (T&C II.960-62). The immediate response of Troilus is not to thank Pandarus, but Venus: "'O Venus deere, / Thi myght, thi grace, yheried be it here!'" (T&C II.972-73). Only after praising Venus does he thank Pandarus, whose sly machinations, combined with Criseyde's curiosity and self-interest, were responsible for her tentatively favorable response. So far as we know, Venus has not really been involved in the situation.

The first and second bed-chamber meetings of Troilus and Criseyde are managed by Pandarus to the extreme point of leading each of them in to the other "by the lappe" (T&C III.59 and 742). He carefully chooses a time of the month when the moon is dark and the weather is rainy before arranging for Criseyde to come to dinner (T&C III.549 ff.), and despite the positions of the planets, had it not rained heavily enough to retain Criseyde at his house for the night, he would undoubtedly have found another way to keep her there. Pandarus both intensifies Troilus'

desire,²⁴ and seeks to assuage it by complex and clever means: "And Pandarus, to quike alwey the fir, / Was evere ylike prest and diligent; / To ese his frend was set al his desir" (T&C III.484-86). Pandarus describes his manipulating of Criseyde into the arms of Troilus as a kind of hunt, in which she is a deer and he will drive her to the bow of Troilus (T&C II.1534-35), and this is indeed what he does. He structures the two initial meetings between Troilus and Criseyde in such a manner that Criseyde can only reject Troilus by compromising her reputation, of which she is so careful. In each case there are witnesses outside of the room who would think the worse of her if she made any determined protest against the situation (which is not to say that she may not appreciate being forced into such situations). Yet, when Troilus finally has Criseyde in his arms, a mixture of ideal bliss and a sparrowhawk with a lark in his foot (T&C III.1191-92), his first gratitude goes not to Pandarus who arranged the entire affair, and is even asleep in the corner, but to "the blisful goddes sevene" (T&C III.1203).

Just before Pandarus leads Troilus into Criseyde's bed-chamber, he assures him: "'Ne drede the nevere a deel, / For it shal be right as thow wolt desire; / So thryve I, this nyght shal I make it weel'" (T&C III.708-10). And indeed, the situation is almost entirely one of Pandarus' creative making. However, the typical response of Troilus is not to thank the trickery of his friend, but to invoke the gods, fate, destiny, whatever powers might cause things to happen outside of his

²⁴ As does Criseyde by her letter (T&C II.338).

own control and free will:

"Yet, blisful Venus, this nyght thow me enspire,"
Quod Troilus, "As wys as I the serve,
And evere bet and bet shal, til I sterue.

"And if ich hadde, O Venus ful of myrthe,
Aspectes badde of Mars or of Saturne,
Or thow combust or let were in my birthe,
Thy fader prey al thilke harm disturne." (T&C III.712-18)

Troilus then invokes Jove, Mars, Mercury and Diane for help, and concludes his prayer: "'O fatal sustren, which, er any cloth / Me shapen was, my destine me sponne, / So helpeth to this werk that is bygonne!'" (T&C III.733-35). Not only is Troilus apparently ignorant of the problems inherent in asking for help from influences that are destinal in nature, he is using these concepts of fate and the gods to avoid a situation which terrifies him. Pandarus' response to all this is quite accurate, both psychologically and metaphysically: "'Thow wrecched mouses herte, / Artow agast so that she wol the bite?'" (T&C III.736-37). This is not a matter for the gods, but a matter between men (and a woman) that Troilus is involved in, and his attempts to elevate the situation, which is really one of seduction, into a situation of divine involvement, is a typical display of his unwillingness to take personal responsibility for his behavior.²⁵

²⁵ If taken with a grain of salt, a comment by Augustine adds to our understanding of the psychology of Troilus: "'Evil consists rather in the will's turning away from the changeless good and in its turning to goods that are changeable. Since this turning from one thing to another is not done from necessity, but freely, the unhappiness which results is justly deserved'" ("The Free Choice of the Will" in Saint Augustine, The Teacher, p. 162). Of course we are not meant to see Troilus as evil--that was a different time and place. However, Troilus being free, did indeed deserve the unhappiness he reaped from his love for Criseyde, or at least that unhappiness was an inevitable byproduct of his loving her.

Criseyde, like Pandarus, has a more realistic response to events than does Troilus. Once Troilus has her in his arms, he begins to praise Venus, "'the wel-willy planete!'" (T&C III.1257), Love, the "'holy bond of thynges'" (T&C III.1261), and God who made him so that he might serve Criseyde (T&C III.1290). Criseyde thanks Troilus for his elevated and loving speech, but replies, "'But lat us falle away fro this matere, / For it suffiseth, this that seyde is heere'" (T&C III.1306-07). She, like Pandarus, prefers to get on to the action and leave the gods in their place.

Just before Troilus gives his most elevated speech about the bond of love, we are told of a somewhat different bond which holds him:

The goodlihedde or beaute which that kynde
In any other lady hadde yset
Kan nought the montance of a knotte unbynde,
Aboute his herte, of al Criseydes net.
He was so narwe ymasked and yknet,
That it undon on any manere syde,
That nyl naught ben, for aught that may bitide. (T&C III.
1730-36)

This is the net of passion; a device which traps lovers, not a holy bond of universal stability. It is especially interesting when we note that when Criseyde is about to be false to Troilus, the Narrator tells us: "For bothe Troilus and Troie town / Shal knotteles thoroughout hire herte slide" (T&C V.768-69). And in the very next stanza, Diomedes schemes to decide "How he may best, with shortest taryinge, / Into his net Criseydes herte brynge" (T&C V.774-75). Troilus is caught in the knotted net of Criseyde; she is not caught by the knots of Troilus, although she is later caught in the net of Diomedes. However, Troilus does not see matters this way; as is his wont, he elevates his experience into universal

law:

"Love, that of erthe and se hath governaunce,
 Love, that his hestes hath in hevenes hye,
 Love, that with an holsom alliaunce
 Halt peples joyned, as hym lest hem gye,
 Love, that knetteth lawe of compaignie,
 And couples doth in vertu for to dwelle,
 Bynd this acord, that I have told and telle." (T&C III.1744-50)

This is the same tendency to seek laws which can control and bind behavior that we have observed in the Narrator. Troilus continues, projecting his experience into the cosmos, addressing Love:

"That that the world with feith, which that is stable,
 Diverseth so his stowndes concordynge,
 That elementz that be so discordable
 Holden a bond perpetuely durynge," (T&C III.1751-54)

Stable faith is precisely what Troilus will not find in Criseyde, despite his love for her which he seeks to identify with a universal principle. A perpetual bond is also beyond the reach of his relationship with Criseyde, where the nature of his bond is that of one caught in a knotted net, as we saw above, while the nature of Criseyde's bond is very loose indeed. One might also be tempted to question the "vertu" in which Troilus and Criseyde dwell (T&C III.1749). Peace and happiness they certainly enjoy together for a while, but Criseyde's worries about shame and honor make one feel that "vertu" is not precisely the best possible word to describe their relationship.

The placing of this hymn to the bonds of heavenly love just before the Narrator bids his farewell to Venus (T&C III.1807 ff.) also emphasizes the contrast between the eternal stability of heavenly love and the very different and fragile nature of the relationship between

Troilus and Criseyde. At this point Troilus clearly does not understand that there is any difference between earthly and divine love, and confuses Venus with the more general (and anachronistically rather Christian) God:

"So wolde God, that auctour is of kynde,
That with his bond Love of his vertu liste
To cerclen hertes alle, and faste bynde,
That from his bond no wight the wey out wiste." (T&C III.
1765-68)

Troilus does not know the way out, perhaps, but Criseyde finds it rather easily, emphasizing the fact that the love Troilus is enjoying is not at all the same as the love of God. Just as Troilus believed that destiny and Fortune made him love (and he was wrong), and that Venus and the gods brought his love to fulfillment (and he was wrong, it was Pandarus), so he now believes that his love is of the kind of God's divine love, and once again, he is wrong.

When Criseyde is to be exchanged for Antenor, we see a series of causative factors that are no more aimed by destiny at Troilus than were the factors which precipitated him into love with Criseyde in the first place, but which Troilus interprets as being aimed specifically at him by Fortune.

First there is Calkas, who knows by means of the gods that Troy must fall. He wants to protect his daughter and asks the Greeks to get her in an exchange of prisoners. Then there are the Trojans who choose to send Criseyde to the Greeks. Only Hector objects, and he is voted down. Why? Either because the Trojan masses made a wrong choice, or because, as the Narrator suggests, "infortune it wolde, for the nones, / They

sholden hire confusioun desire" (T&C IV.185-86). He also excuses the Trojans by commenting that a "cloude of errour lat hem nat discerne / What best is" (T&C IV.200-01). Whichever view one accepts, neither allows for the sorry event to be considered as directed at Troilus personally.²⁶

However, Troilus is certain that the exchange of Criseyde for Antenor is destined for him personally. Until urged by Pandarus, he makes no attempts to interfere with what he considers to be the purposes of a now hostile Fortune. We know that he cannot save his liaison with Criseyde, but there is no reason for him to know this yet. He does not even know the true cause of the imminent fall of Troy, which is, as Calkas tells the Greeks, because Laomedon has refused to pay Phoebus and Neptune for building the walls of Troy (T&C IV.120 ff.).

The departure of Criseyde is related to a very large scale phenomenon, the Trojan War, but Troilus, egocentric as always, interprets events only in terms of himself and his personal desires. He goes home to bed, his natural habitat, and calls on Fortune, his imaginary personal lady, as if all that is happening is happening only because

²⁶ Economou interprets this scene as representing the Trojans freely ruining themselves. He says that when the parliament "decides in favor of 'selling' her; in ignoring Hector's argument the city relinquishes the kind of conviction and integrity that gave it its civilization . . . exchanging Criseyde for Antenor is a critical error in a series of lethal mistakes through which Troy brings about its own doom. . . . the poem's audience could see that providence gives even to pagans the freedom to choose their destiny" ("The Two Venuses," p. 41). Freedom is indeed available to individuals in T&C. That is really the point of the dialogue between Troilus and Pandarus on the nature of Fortune. However, groups, cities, nations, are subject to the larger Fortune (or infortune) of Providence and history, and here the areas of freedom are much more obscure and hard to delimit.

of, or in spite of, him:

Than seyde he thus, "Fortune, allas the while!
 What have I don? What have I the agylt?
 How myghtestow for rowthe my bygile?
 Is ther no grace, and shal I thus be spilt?" (T&C IV.260-63)

Troilus lives within an imaginary world peopled by deities whom he believes capable of mercy, grace, justice and love. Until he experiences loss, he continues to assume that every happiness he receives is because of them, whereas we saw that most were due to Pandarus (and the very real lovability of Troilus himself). Now that events no longer please him, he looks to these same imaginary causative factors for blame: either he has done wrong and is being punished, or there is no mercy or justice in the world. As we will see, he is quite wrong, because his gods are quite false.

Troilus continues to attempt to interpret the universe as if he were the very center thereof. He addresses Fortune as his highest god: "'Have I the nought honoured al my lyve, / As thow wel woost, above the goddes alle? / Whi wiltow me fro joie thus deprive?'" (T&C IV.267-69). The egocentric emotionalism of Troilus becomes rather nasty here, and he suggests that if he has displeased Fortune, she might choose other ways of punishing him:

"Allas, Fortune! if that my lif in joie
 Displeased hadde unto thi foule envye,
 Why ne haddestow my fader, kyng of Troye,
 Byrafft the lif, or don my bretheren dye,
 Or slayn myself, that thus compleyne and crye." (T&C IV.
 274-78)

Troilus persists in interpreting events as if they all occurred because

of him, and yet were always beyond his control. It is this egocentric fatalism that can produce a wish that Fortune kill his father rather than take Criseyde away. It would not be the fault of innocent, helpless Troilus, but of all-powerful Fortune.

Troilus sighs, complains, weeps, and then Pandarus enters, melting with pity for his friend's sorrows. Pandarus agrees with Troilus that Fortune is involved in the exchange of Antenor for Criseyde, but his conception of Fortune, as always, is one of opportunity, not one of destiny, and he tries to comfort Troilus by expressing his point of view:

"Who wolde have wend that in so litel a throwe
Fortune oure joie wold han overthrowe?

"For in this world ther is no creature,
As to my dom, that ever say ruyne
Straunger than this, thorough cas or aventure.
But who may al eschue, or al devyne.
Swich is this world! forthi I thus diffyne,
Ne trust no wight to fynden in Fortune
Ay propretee; hire yiftes ben comune." (T&C IV.384-92)

Consistent with his opportunistic conception of Fortune, Pandarus sees the exchange as bad luck, as one of those things that can happen. He does not see it as the personal, punitive response of a creature, Fortune, to the behavior of a man, Troilus. Pandarus does not expect justice or mercy from events; he merely tries to make the best of them. We might call him one of the earlier English renaissance humanists. In his typical fashion, he quickly turns from useless musing on the nature of Fortune to the actual matter at hand--Troilus--and asks him:

"But telle me this, whi thow art now so mad
To sorwen thus? Whi listow in this wise,

Syn thi desir al holly hastow had,
 So that, by right, it oughthe ynough suffise?" (T&C IV.393-96)

Pandarus seems callous next to the passionately idealistic Troilus, but he expresses his position on the nature of the world consistently, as does Troilus express his opposing one. Pandarus lives in a world understood as constant change, bringing opportunity which can be seized, and changing again, taking away what had been brought. To regret this is to regret the nature of the world itself, something Pandarus refuses to do.

Where Troilus worships Fortune as a personal divinity, without comprehending its nature, Pandarus conceives of Fortune as mere process, leaving men free to respond as they will. When Pandarus offers Troilus the prospect of other women to replace Criseyde, he tells him: "'For syn it is but casuel pleasaunce, / Som cas shal putte it out of remembrance'" (T&C IV.419-20). "Casuel" and "cas" both refer to the accidental nature of events as understood by Pandarus, not to their unimportance to Troilus. Since Pandarus gives this and many other speeches to explain his position relative to Fortune, we should not be too repelled by his indelicacy. Just as Criseyde is the one to give speeches on mutability and the falseness of the world, and Troilus is the one to give speeches on Fortune as destiny or necessity, so Pandarus is the one to explain the nature of Fortune as chance, and the unstable, yet interesting opportunities such a world provides.²⁷

²⁷ According to Cioffari, Aquinas treats the "accidentality of Fortune . . . as absence of intentionality. The accidental must be considered in relation to the effect rather than the action. Fortune is an accidental cause because it is the cause of something to which was connected something else accidentally" (p. 105). This is precisely the nature of Fortune as expressed by Pandarus.

At this point the Narrator cannot yet digest Pandarus' message about the nature of Fortune, and comments: "Thise wordes seyde he for the nones alle, / To help his frend, lest he for sorwe deyde" (T&C IV. 428-29). Later the Narrator will come closer to the position of Pandarus on the nature of Fortune as indifferent to the individual welfare of human beings, although he will never accept Pandarus' conception of the process as merely random. However, at this stage, the Narrator is still firmly in Troilus' camp, and sorrowing over the injustice of it all.

Although he can recognize bad luck, or Fortune, when it occurs, Pandarus does not capitulate, but urges Troilus to act to help himself and abduct Criseyde. Troilus has good reasons to refuse, both because of the rape of Helen which started the siege of Troy, and because of the honor of Criseyde. Pandarus tries to persuade Troilus, using Fortune as opportunity, as is his wont: "'Thenk ek Fortune, as wel thiselven woost, / Helpeth hardy man to his enprise, / And weyveth wrecches for hire cowardise'" (T&C IV.600-02). Fortune, for Pandarus, is merely events occurring; it is up to you to make the best of these events, if you have the courage and the will to do so.

As he urges Troilus to take action, Pandarus makes an interesting comment that contrasts sharply with Troilus' attempts to see laws behind the behavior of lovers: "'Thorugh love is broken al day every lawe'" (T&C IV.618). We know that Pandarus is correct, because we have been witnessing just this as he manipulated Troilus into bed with Criseyde, and he reminds us, lest we forget, that Paris got his love, so why shouldn't Troilus (T&C IV.608-09)? So far as Pandarus is concerned, the

abduction of Helen is a justification for the abduction of Criseyde. His conception of love as a chaotic, disruptive acting-out of self-interested desire in the name of love has little in common with either the law of kind, or the Chain of Love. It is a fire, a disease, which parallels the fire disease which will burn Troy to the ground as it now burns Troilus.²⁸

Pandarus continues his opposition to Fortune, trying to arrange a meeting between Troilus and Criseyde, while Troilus goes to a temple to pray to the gods for death, "For wel he thoughte ther was non other grace" (T&C IV.952). Troilus suffers the despair of the lover who has abdicated his free will and must receive grace (from the God of Love or from Fortune) or despair and die. In this condition, which we suspect strongly to be a delusion based on misunderstandings about the nature of the world, Troilus gives a long speech on necessity and destiny, his favorite topics after love and Fortune.

We have already noticed how ready Troilus always is to fall back on any excuse for denying personal responsibility for his actions, and how willing he is to abdicate his free will. He also has already demonstrated a strong tendency to display an egocentric comprehension of the universe, assuming that events happen, in some obscure fashion, because of him. Just as he knew (incorrectly) that he was destined to love, now

²⁸ Chauncy Wood comments that "The depiction of Troilus as possessing venereal influences is of a piece with his name, for in some respects Troilus is a personification of Troy itself; as the commentary by Bernard Silvestris indicates, the city of Troy is like a body brought low by lechery. . . . Paris' choice of Venus over Juno or Pallas is now echoed in the make-up of Troilus" (Chaucer and the Country of the Stars: Poetic Uses of Astrological Imagery /Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970/, p. 77).

he knows (just as incorrectly) that he is destined to lose his love:

"'For al that comth, comth by necessitee: / Thus to ben lorn, it is my destinee'" (T&C IV.958-59).²⁹ Troilus reinforces his emotional convictions by means of a long and rather scholarly argument on the relationship between God's foreknowledge and necessity. This passage, which Chaucer added after the first draft of the poem was completed,³⁰ is derived from Boethius, and serves to expand and elucidate the philosophical role of Troilus to express the nature of Fortune as necessity. Troilus, because of his role, leaves out the solution provided by Boethius, which allows for human free will,³¹ and it is Pandarus, in his

²⁹ Patch remarks justly on the long philosophical speech by Troilus which is to follow: "he merely gave utterance to what seem to be extremely typical ideas for such a time: he exonerated himself of all guilt for his disaster so that he might pity himself the more justly. There is no reason for thrusting this foppery upon Chaucer himself. Furthermore it is quite characteristic of Troilus, who all through the poem, at every turn of the plot, blames Fate or Fortuna for whatever occurs" ("Troilus on Predestination," p. 374).

³⁰ Charles Owen, Jr. comments: "By far the longest and apparently the final addition to the poem is the 19-stanza soliloquy by Troilus on God's foreknowledge and man's free will /IV, 953-1085/--like the hymn to love a translation from Boethius" ("The significance of Chaucer's Revisions of Troilus and Criseyde," Modern Philology, LV /1957-58/, pp. 1-5; rpt. in Chaucer Criticism II, p. 164).

³¹ In the Consolation of Philosophy (Book V, prose II) Boethius asks "'in this close-linked series of causes, is there any freedom of our will?'" and Philosophy replies, "'Freedom there is . . . for there could not be any nature rational, did not that same nature possess freedom of the will'" (Boethius, The Theological Tractates, with an English Translation by H. F. Steward, E. K. Rand and S. J. Tester; The Consolation of Philosophy, with an English Translation by S. J. Tester, Loeb Classical Library /1918; new ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1973/, p. 391). C. Wood comments: Boethius "maintains that there is free will and that there is predestination, but that man does not always exercise his reason, and consequently abrogates his freedom of choice. . . ." (p. 34). And Gilson remarks that for Boethius "the immobile and permanent view that God has of our voluntary acts does not in the least detract from their liberty" (History of Christian Philosophy, p. 103).

role as the representative of free will and Fortune as opportunity who replies with a view that allows for human enterprise and freedom.³²

After his long speech on necessity, Troilus ends pathetically with a prayer that Jove change what is to happen:

"Almyghty Jove in trone,
That woost of al this thyng the sothfastnesse,
Rewe on my sorwe, and do me deyen sone,
Or bryng Criseyde and me from this destresse!" (T&C IV.1079-82)³³

Pandarus enters at this point, echoing Troilus' ending to stress that he is responding to the problem raised by Troilus:

"O myghty God," quod Pandarus, "in trone,
I! who say evere a wis man faren so?
Whi, Troilus, what thinkestow to doone?
Hastow swich lust to ben thyn owen fo?" (T&C IV.1086-89)

Pandarus continues to chide Troilus, pointing out that Criseyde is not yet gone, and that he has lived for many years without her already, and asks, "'Artow for hire and for noon other born?'" (T&C IV.1095). Troilus would answer yes to this; Pandarus would answer no. Troilus

³² Steadman points out that "In adversity and despair, both Troilus and Boethius complain against Fortune and turn to philosophy for an answer to their doubts. Both raise the question of divine providence and human freedom. Unlike the Roman senator, however, the Trojan warrior fails to achieve a satisfactory answer. After all, he has only Pandarus, not Dame Philosophy, to counsel him" (p. 72).

³³ Steadman says of the conclusions to this long monologue: "Though Troilus asks the right questions, he does not find the right answers, and the total result of his questioning is to enhance the irony of his predicament: that ignorance of self and situation that, for Chaucer and Boethius alike, constitutes the fundamental irony of the condition humaine" (p. 76).

believes in destiny; Pandarus believes in free will. Having observed the process by which Troilus fell in love with Criseyde, we would have to agree with Pandarus, at least in part. He continues:

"Hath Kynde the wrought al only hire to plese?
 Lat be, and thynk right thus in thi disese:
 That, in the dees right as ther fallen chaunces,
 Right so in love ther come and gon plesaunces." (T&C IV.
 1096-99)

As always, this is Pandarus expressing the nature of Fortune, and of the universe in general, as one of chance, not necessity. The fall of the dice is an excellent image for the conception of Fortune as understood by Pandarus, and Fortune is the emblem for those forces of causation which operate the world as we know it. Pandarus goes on to wonder most of all that Troilus is so fatalistically wretched when he does not even know, "'Touchyng hire goyng, how that it shal falle'" (T&C IV.1102). Again, the notion of chance, or accident, dominates Pandarus' understanding of the nature of the world.

Up to this point, we have generally tended to side with Pandarus, whose view of Fortune seemed to fit the facts as presented in the story better by far than did Troilus'. However, elements are now entering into the situation which will carry it beyond the ability of Pandarus to explain or exploit, and perhaps one of the early signs of this is when Pandarus invokes Juno, that ancient enemy of Troy, hoping that she will "'hire grace unto us sende'" (T&C IV.1117).

The Trojan situation is quite beyond the control of Pandarus, despite his busy optimism, or he would certainly not invoke Juno for aid. However, his advice essentially centers on self-help. He arranges for

Troilus and Criseyde to meet that night and to make arrangements to leave Troy together. At that meeting, Criseyde faints, and Troilus, thinking her dead, prepares to kill himself, expressing his typical misunderstandings about why things happen: "Syn Love and cruel Fortune it ne wolde, / That in this world he lenger lyven sholde" (T&C IV.1189-90). She is not even dead and he is already sure that it is all planned by Love and cruel Fortune, whom he addresses as he prepares to die:

"O cruel Jove, and thow, Fortune adverse,
This al and som, that falsly have ye slayn
Criseyde, and syn ye may do me no werse,
Fy on youre myght and werkes so dyverse!" (T&C IV.1192-95)

He is wrong on all counts. Jove and Fortune have not killed Criseyde, and much worse things than this are yet to come when Criseyde, not Jove or Fortune, is false to him.

The Narrator, who is getting more clear-sighted about the causes of events, as we will discuss later, observes Troilus' despair over Fortune and comments, "But, as God wolde, of swough therwith sh'abreyde" (T&C IV.1212). This is the Christian God of the Narrator, not a pagan planetary deity. When Criseyde returns to consciousness, she thanks not "God" but "Cipride" (T&C IV.1216), showing that she has no more idea of why things happen than does Troilus.³⁴

³⁴ There is much confusion in T&C over the differences between gods and a few lines later Criseyde is giving thanks to God for mercy, and this time it is the Christian God, or a near approximation, e.g., "'For, by that ilke Lord that made me, / I nolde a forlong wey on lyve have be, / After youre deth'" (T&C IV.1236-38). However, in the immediate context, where God revives her and she thanks Venus, we are meant to see her as ignorant of true causes, as is Troilus. P. Kean comments that Chaucer got much of his epic machinery from the Thebaid, and points out that he would "get the impression that in the Thebaid the machinery of

Having discussed how Pandarus and Troilus function as a dialogue on the nature of Fortune, or why things happen in the world,³⁵ we will now consider the role played by Criseyde, who expresses the philosophical characteristics of Fortune itself, or false felicity.³⁶ Not only does she act out this role with her behavior, but she, like Troilus and Pandarus, gives speeches that express her role more than they function as story elements per se. Criseyde functions to express change itself. We saw her like a star under a dark cloud (T&C I.175) before Troilus first saw her. Her mind shifts and changes like a natural phenomenon, as we can observe in Book II when she is debating with herself on whether or not to respond to the love of Troilus: "A cloudy thought gan -----

the gods is used on two levels. On the one hand, it expresses philosophical and cosmological ideas which are not incompatible with the Christian idea of an all-powerful and benevolent creator; on the other, it corresponds to the apparently irrational forces which affect human life. The gods are constantly referred to in the Thebaid in company with chance, fortune, the stars" (Chaucer and the Making of English Poetry, Vol. I, Love Vision and Debate /London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972/, p. 173). T&C displays a great fluidity in the use of gods, God and the various religious aspects of both.

³⁵ Troilus and Pandarus function at this level somewhat like Boethius and Philosophy in the Consolation, leaving for Criseyde the role of Fortune.

³⁶ Steadman remarks that "Against the background of Boethian commentary, the analogy between Criseyde's inconstancy and the inconstancy of Fortune must appear deliberate" (p. 101). Charles Muscatine says of Criseyde: "Seen dynamically, in the alternating dominance and recession of each of her various qualities as surrounding conditions evoke them, she represents earthly instability. She is as the world is and goes as the world goes. If between Troilus and Pandarus the mixed style produces an irony turning on human incapacity to see, within Criseyde it produces an ambiguity turning on human inability to be" (Chaucer and the French Tradition: A Study in Style and Meaning /1957; rpt. Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1966/, p. 154).

thorough hire soule pace" (T&C II.768), and "after that, hire thought gan for to clere" (T&C II.806). Fear moves across her like weather. She thinks that love is desirable, then she fears the turmoil of love, then she decides to take a risk:

And after that, hire thought gan for to clere,
 And seide, "He which that nothing undertaketh,
 Nothyng n'acheveth, be hym looth or deere."
 And with an other thought hire herte quaketh;
 Than slepeth hope, and after drede awaketh;
 Now hoot, now cold; but thus, bitwixen tweye,
 She rist hire up, and wente here for to pleye. (T&C II.806-12)

Criseyde is more than merely an unstable woman; she is characterized to a degree as an epitome of instability itself.³⁷

Criseyde expresses her nature when criticizing Pandarus for suggesting that she should love Troilus, and she responds with tears:

"Allas, for wo! Why nere I deed?
 For of this world the feyth is al agoon.
 Allas! what sholden straunge to me doon,
 When he, that for my beste frend I wende,
 Ret me to love, and sholde it me defende?" (T&C II.409-13)

She is quite right; Pandarus should not be urging her into a love affair. On the other hand, the reason that she is correct, and that she gives a number of speeches on the lack of faith and stability in the world is because she is expressing her role as instability itself. She continues

³⁷ This recalls the conception of woman as matter seeking form (e.g., unstable by inherent nature) which Guido stresses in the Historia, especially in his portrait of Medea, who should have been protected from Iason by her father precisely because she (like all women) was unstable. (See Historia II, p. 17.)

to chide Pandarus, especially expressing her own nature in the line,
 "'This false world, allas! who may it leve?'" (T&C II.420).

In Book III, after Pandarus tells Criseyde that Troilus is jealous of Horaste, Criseyde gives a long philosophical speech on the instability of the world that explains her nature even better than it suits the occasion for which she gives it:

"O God!" quod she, "so worldly selynesse,
 Which clerkes callen fals felicitee,
 Imedled is with many a bitternesse!
 Ful angwissous than is, God woot, " quod she,
 Condicioun of veyn prosperitee;
 For either joies comen nought yfeere,
 Or elles no wight hath hem alwey here.

"O brotel wele of mannes joie unstable!" (T&C III.813-20)

Included in the person of this very real woman is the role of the allegorical example; Criseyde is both unstable of heart and an epitome of worldly instability, or false felicity, who exists to instruct the Narrator and us in her slippery nature. This speech is not merely an example of her partially allegorical aspect, it is also funny, because it is being spoken by a woman who seems so very alive and is about to have a love affair. No one within the story, including the Narrator, gets any wisdom at all from her long and true speech about the nature of the world. The seduction via uncle continues to lead to just exactly that worldly felicity which Criseyde has denounced so vigorously. Only much later, after she has been false and Troilus is dead, will Troilus and the Narrator understand the truth of what Criseyde is now saying.

Criseyde also chides Pandarus in the same scene by asking him:

"'Why hastow Troilus mad to me untriste, / That nevere yet agylt hym, that I wiste?'" (T&C III.839-40). Never yet, but some day certainly, one is tempted to add. She gives us plenty of clues to her unstable behavior, but she is charming, as Donaldson points out,³⁸ and we, along with the Narrator, ignore the information which she gives us about her nature as long as possible.

When Criseyde discovers that she must be exchanged for Antenor, she suffers, complains bitterly, and philosophizes to Pandarus:

"Endeth thanne love in wo? Ye, or men lieth!
And alle worldly blisse, as thynketh me.
The ende of blisse ay sorwe it occupieth;
And whoso troweth nat that it so be,
Lat hym upon me, woful wrecche, ysee,
That myself hate, and ay my burthe acorse,
Felyng alwey, fro wikke I go to worse." (T&C IV.834-40)

Again, she is both expressing her opinions as a woman in the story, and expressing to the Narrator and to us her philosophical nature as worldly change or Fortune. Worldly bliss does end in woe, as the Narrator affirms at the end of the poem. Criseyde is precisely an example for us to look upon and learn about the woe that follows worldly love. And she does indeed go from bad to worse.

There is also play upon the changes that occur when Criseyde is exchanged for Antenor. She is "chaunged" for Antenor (e.g., T&C IV. 793), and woe causes her to change her appearance: "Hire face, lik of Paradys the ymage, / Was al ychaunged in another kynde" (T&C IV.864-

³⁸ "The Masculine Narrator and Four Women of Style" in Speaking of Chaucer by E. Talbot Donaldson (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 57.

65).³⁹ Shortly before the changeable Criseyde is exchanged, she gives Troilus extensive assurances that she will be true to him, swearing on what may be the largest assortment of false gods to be found anywhere in this poem:

"For thilke day that I for cherisyng
Or drede of fader, or of other wight,
Or for estat, delit, or for weddyng,
Be fals to yow, my Troilus, my knyght,
Saturnes doughter, Juno, thorough hire myght,
As wood as Athamante do me dwelle
Eternalich in Stix, the put of helle!" (T&C IV.1534-40)

She goes on to swear by "every god celestial," by "ech goddesse," by nymphs, infernal gods, satyrs, fawns, and by the river Simois. She then urges Troilus to be discreet and preserve her honor, which is nothing like the troth of Troilus, but a mere synonym for reputation, and she concludes with a bit of her very own philosophy which explains her character more than it consoles Troilus:

"Thus maketh vertu of necessite
By pacience, and thynk that lord is he
Of Fortune ay, that naught wole of hire recche;
And she ne daunteth no wight but a wrecche." (T&C IV.1586-89)

Criseyde gives very good advice, because she explains and warns us about her own nature, which is very like that of Fortune herself. Detachment is the only means of protection from her, and Troilus is a wretch who is not capable of detaching himself from loving her. A few lines later,

³⁹ Or, as Philosophy tells Boethius, "'You have merely discovered the changing face of that blind power'" (Consolation, Book II, prose I, p. 177).

as she says farewell, she tells Troilus that she first loved him for his "'moral vertu, grounded upon trouthe'" (T&C IV.1672).⁴⁰ Obviously we are dealing with two very different sorts of "vertu." Criseyde's is to make a virtue of necessity, to exploit each situation as it occurs; Troilus' "vertu" is that of the stable heart, or troth.

When Criseyde finally betrays Troilus for Diomedes, she bemoans how this will ruin her reputation, weeps, and ends her soliloquy, "'But al shal passe; and thus take I my leve'" (T&C V.1085). This is the farewell of Fortune as a lady to the man who loved her. The passing of all things, whether love or sorrow, is the lesson that Criseyde helps to teach to the Narrator.

E. Talbot Donaldson describes in fine detail how the Narrator in Troilus and Criseyde attempts to make excuses for Criseyde, whom he adores.⁴¹ Following Donaldson's suggestions, we will look at a few excuses which the Narrator makes, not only for Criseyde, but for the entire romantic vision of life to which he clings as long as possible.⁴²

⁴⁰ However, Donaldson comments that, on first seeing Troilus, Criseyde had other things on her mind than his virtue: "Criseide's blush in II 652 is probably partly explained by the fact that upon seeing Troilus ride by on his return from battle she observed that 'bothe he hadde a body and a might To doon that thing' (633-4) and that he was 'weeldy' (636). The verb weelden has, inevitably a common sexual sense in Middle English, and 'that thing' seems a probable euphemism" ("Criseide and her Narrator," in Speaking of Chaucer, p. 66, n. 1).

⁴¹ In "Criseide and her Narrator."

⁴² Donaldson remarks that Criseyde "has the larger function of destroying a truly romantic vision of life . . ." ("The Masculine Narrator," p. 53).

For instance, Pandarus, when confronted by the exchange of Antenor for Criseyde, suggests to Troilus that there are plenty of women in Troy and he can always find another lady. The Narrator excuses him with:

Thise wordes seyde he for the nones alle,
To help his frend, lest he for sorwe deyde;
For douteles, to don his wo to falle,
He roughete nought what unthrift that he seyde. (T&C IV.428-31)

Although he has reported faithfully every detail of Pandarus' involvement in the seduction of his niece by Troilus, the Narrator still cannot accept the amorality and impetuosity of Pandarus, and rejects his suggestions as being not what he really meant, but only a ruse to calm his ever-distraught friend.

When Pandarus is arranging for Criseyde to come to his house for dinner (and the night), he assures her that Troilus is out of town, and the Narrator does not want to commit himself on whether or not Criseyde believed him (T&C III.575 ff.). And when, later that evening, Troilus has been shoved into Criseyde's bed by Pandarus and she does not demand that he leave, only having Troilus promise certain oaths, the Narrator comments with a wavering trust in her judgment, if not her behavior:

Yet lasse thyng than othes may suffise
In many a cas; for every wyght, I gesse,
That loveth wel, meneth but gentillesse. (T&C III.1146-48)

At the unavoidable moment when he must shift from romantic love-longing to the explicit sexual satisfaction of the lovers, the Narrator is uncomfortable, hesitates, and excuses himself as well as Troilus and Criseyde, whose behavior he sighingly envies, and yet does not quite admire:

What myghte or may the sely larke seye,
 Whan that the sperhawk hath it in his foot?
 I kan namore, but of thise ilke tweye,--
 To whom this tale sucre be or soot,--
 Though that I tarie a yer, somtyme I moot,
 After myn auctour, tellen hire gladnesse,
 As wel as I have told hire hevynesse. (T&C III.1191-97).

Here the happiness of the lovers is combined with the reluctance of the Narrator and his physiological determinism (the hawk with the lark) that we have seen him use before to explain the unavoidable behavior of those struck by love.

The Narrator's most fertile source of excuses for his beloved lovers lies in his conception of Fortune as necessity, which closely parallels that of Troilus, the other determinist in the poem. When Pandarus has chosen a rainy day during the dark of the moon to invite Criseyde to dinner and it then rains very heavily, making a perfect excuse for her to stay the night (which Pandarus had counted on anyway, since he had already tucked Troilus away to await her), the Narrator invokes Fortune as the cause of this event, although we have seen Pandarus well involved in bringing it about:

But O Fortune, executrice of wyrdes,
 O influences of thise hevenes hye!
 Soth is, that under God ye ben oure hierdes,
 Though to us bestes ben the causes wrie.
 This mene I now, for she gan homward hye,
 But execut was al bisyde hire leve
 The goddes wil; for which she moste bleve. (T&C III.617-23)

The event itself, the heavy rain, is a fine example of what Pandarus understands as Fortune as opportunity; the Narrator, as would Troilus, understands it as the will of Fortune under God, and hence inevitable, thus excusing Criseyde of the burden of her free will. Pandarus had

deliberately chosen the night; it is one in which a conjunction of Saturn, Jupiter and the moon occurred in the sign of Cancer, evidently a sure cause of rainstorms and other natural wonders. Pandarus responds to this rain, which the Narrator finds to be divinely controlled, with a laugh and says, "'Now were it tyme a lady to gon henne!'" (T&C III. 630).⁴³

When Troilus finally has the joy of his love with Criseyde, both he and the Narrator understand it to be a result of Fortune, and Troilus praises the gods as causing him bliss, although we have not seen them involved in the action of the story. The Narrator tells us: "Soon after this, for that Fortune it wolde, / Icomen was the blisful tyme swete" (T&C III.1667-68). This is the same Fortune that the Narrator and Troilus will later perceive as the cause of Criseyde leaving Troy and betraying Troilus. Rather as Pandarus had led both Troilus and Criseyde to one another, the Narrator says that "Fortune a tyme ledde in joie / Criseyde, and ek this kynges sone of Troie" (T&C III.1714-15). Time and Fortune are joined in both of these phrases, and indeed that is where she belongs, as the executrice of temporal phenomena. Within another hundred lines we are at the opening of Book IV, where the Narrator is wailing that Fortune is now going to destroy the happiness of Troilus and Criseyde:

⁴³ Wood points out that "Nicole Oresme remarks that the great conjunctions regularly mark major events in history. Chaucer's use of this particular conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter to bring about the unexceptional event of the love affair between Troilus and Criseyde may have been ironic in that this conjunction usually foretold great catastrophes, or significant in pointing toward the tragedy that would befall Troy as a partial result of the tragedy that befalls Troilus" (p. 49, note 62).

But al to litel, weylaway the whyle,
 Lasteth swich joie, ythonked be Fortune,
 That semeth trewest whan she wol bygyle,
 And kan to fooles so hire song entune,
 That she hem hent and blent, traitour comune!
 And whan a wight is from hire whiel ythrowe,
 Than laugheth she, and maketh hym the mowe. (T&C IV.1-7)

The Narrator's view of causation is as personal and as deterministic as that of Troilus. As we have seen, Fortune did not have nearly so much to do with the love affair as did Pandarus. Although Fortune, understood as the process of God's Providence, may be the force that separates Troilus from Criseyde, it is Criseyde, not Fortune, who betrays Troilus. However, the roles played by Fortune and Criseyde come very close to one another. Speaking of Fortune, the Narrator continues:

From Troilus she gan hire brighte face
 Away to writhe, and tok of hym non heede,
 But caste hym clene out of his lady grace,
 And on hire whiel she sette up Diomede. (T&C IV.8-11)

All the details of the final two books show that it is Criseyde, not Fortune, who turns away from Troilus, and there is little suggestion that she is compelled to do so by any force external to her own unstable nature.

Just after the Narrator blames the separation of Troilus and Criseyde on the malice of Fortune, Calkas speaks and gives us a more concrete explanation of events, one that allows for human responsibility, at least in part. Calkas, knowing the intentions of the planetary deities, tells the Greeks and us why Troy is soon to fall:

"For certein, Phebus and Neptunus bothe,
 That makeden the walles of the town,

Ben with the folk of Troie alwey so wrothe,
 That they wol brynge it to confusioun,
 Right in despit of kyng Lameadoun.
 Bycause he nolde payen hem here hire,
 The town of Troie shal ben set on-fire." (T&C IV.120-26)

This has nothing to do with the random, or even the malicious circlings of Fortune's wheel, but with pagan gods who are angry at a city because its former king refused to pay his debt to the gods.⁴⁴ We may feel that the punishment is rather extreme, but it is clearly related to human error, not to caprice, reminding one of Troilus' initial rudeness which brought him to the angry attention of the God of Love.

Criseyde is involved in the exchange with Antenor not because of the malice of Fortune, but because her father knew that the city was about to fall and wanted to rescue his daughter. It is possible that "infortune" clouded men's minds to the bad aspects of exchanging her for Antenor, but that would have been because the presence of Antenor was important for the final betrayal of Troy, not because Fortune wanted to hurt Troilus by removing Criseyde.

Just as we saw that Troilus' ideas about Fortune as the cause of his experiences were not borne out by the events of the story, so here the Narrator's interpretation of events as caused by Fortune is not borne out by the information provided to us by Calcas, who does seem to have a line of direct access to the gods.

⁴⁴ We must take especial note of this stress on the wrong-doing of a king to the gods because it was not in Chaucer's direct sources. Robinson comments: "The reference to Neptune and Apollo is not in the *Filostrato*. Benoit (*Rom. de Troie*, 25920 ff.) says that Neptune built the walls of Troy and Apollo consecrated them, but he does not tell of Laomedon's refusal to pay their wages. This part of the story Chaucer might have learned from Ovid . . ." (Robinson, notes to T&C Book IV, ll. 120 ff., p. 828).

As the story continues, the Narrator does reluctantly change his mind about the nature of love and Fortune. He learns from the actions of his characters that the life they lead and the values they express are not really suitable for a fourteenth-century Christian. The experience of Troilus is especially important in helping the Narrator to reject the love religion for the Christian one. Troilus, like the Narrator at the beginning of the poem, expects justice and mercy from his love religion, and he does not receive them. Troilus clings to the notion of what he "deserves" until the bitter end of his life. The whole point of the story, considered as a summation of Troilus' experience, is that there is no justice in the pagan gods, Fortune, or Criseyde. Within the context of the pagan life on earth, there are no absolute standards available, except perhaps that of troth, which is fidelity to a false lady. The last words of Troilus before his death are: "'But trewely, Criseyde, swete may, / Whom I have ay with al my myght yserved, / That ye thus doon, I have it nat deserved'" (T&C V. 1720-22). Up to the moment of his death, Troilus remains unenlightened about the nature of his religion of Fortune, Venus and Criseyde.⁴⁵ He does not understand why his good behavior was not rewarded because he does not perceive the true nature of Criseyde and of the entire world and all the false gods in it, to be change and instability, with no

⁴⁵ Economou, describing the tradition of the two Venuses--one good and lawful and the other chaotic and lustful, comments that "the fusion of the two Venuses into one . . . provides an appropriate metaphor for the confusion in human psychology that came about as a result of man's willful abuse of the passions . . . Once it has been corrupted, human nature's experience of love involves a blurred apprehension of Venus . . . Cupid and Mirth" (The Goddess Natura in Medieval Literature /Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972/, pp. 86-87).

absolute standards of justice to reward the good, nor of mercy to comfort the deserving.

Although Pandarus' understanding of Fortune and the world as chance and change will not be the final solution which the Narrator chooses, it does provide him with a healthy antidote to the fatalism of Troilus. We can see how he has influenced the Narrator when Troilus finally sends a pathetic letter to Criseyde and receives an empty unfeeling answer, and the Narrator's comments reveal a combination of the realism of Pandarus with the idealism of Troilus:

But Troilus, thow maist now, est or west,
Pipe in an ivy lef, if that the lest!
Thus goth the world. God shilde us fro meschaunce,
And every wight that meneth trouthe avaunce! (T&C V.1432-35)

The Narrator is no longer charmed by the illusion of permanence of the love religion. He has come to see how the world goes, and to accept that, with a prayer to God and a lasting admiration for the only virtue which seems to transcend that world--troth. There is no question that Criseyde and Pandarus meant well. They reminded us of that many times, and we can assume that they were telling the truth. However, Troilus also meant troth, something based on an absolute value, not the subjective emotionalism of meaning well.

Pandarus and Criseyde understood the world as constant change, and responded to that by making a virtue of necessity, that is, by taking their opportunities as they found them. Troilus could not see and understand the world as change until after he was dead. The Narrator comes to understand the world as change, and he consequently devalues it. However, he does not reject the value of troth, even though that value

can only be applied to unstable phenomena by a pagan such as Troilus. The Narrator, being a Christian, will turn to his Christian God and apply his troth there, where it will not be betrayed.

Having faced the fact that Troilus has lost Criseyde, the Narrator continues with the story. Troilus, bothered by his dream of the boar and Criseyde, sends for his sister Cassandra to interpret the dream for him. She responds to his telling her the dream with a long speech on the causes and consequences of the Theban War, saying that before Troilus can know the truth of his dream, he must:

"a fewe of olde stories heere,
To purpos, how that Fortune overthrowe
Hath lordes olde; thorough which, withinne a throwe,
Thow wel this boor shalt knowe, and of what kynde
He comen is, as men in bokes fynde." (T&C V.1459-63)

Troilus is about to be instructed by the story of the Theban War, as the Narrator has been instructed by the story of the Trojan War, and by the love of Troilus for Criseyde. The Theban War, like the Trojan War, starts with men offending gods, in this case the goddess Diane, "'which that wroth was and in ire / For Grekis nolde don hire sacrifice'" (T&C V.1464-65). We must not forget that the personal problems of Troilus also began when he offended the God of Love by his rudeness toward lovers. Pagan gods are evidently extremely dangerous when offended. Once the gods have been offended, then the role of Fortune seems to exercise great control over events, expressing the will of the gods.

What Cassandra does for Troilus is to place his personal relation to Diomedes into the Fortune-ruled context of the offense of a deity and the destructive historical processes that ensue. Diomedes is not

caused by Fortune; he is descended from men and women who were affected by the fortunes of the Theban War. It is his existence, not his possession of Criseyde, that is a product of this unfortunate historical process. Her conclusion deals not with Fortune, but with fact:

"And thy lady, wherso she be, ywis,
This Diomedes hire herte hath, and she his.
Wep if thou wilt, or lef! For, out of doute,
This Diomedes is inne, and thou art oute." (T&C V.1516-19)

What Cassandra had promised was that after her story, Troilus would know the boar Diomedes, and she instructs him by means of the history of his ancestors. Diomedes can be known by who he is and when and where he lived. Troilus rejects her instruction with violent emotion, crying, "'Thou seyst nat soth'" (T&C V.1520). Unlike the Narrator, who is beginning to accept the inevitable facts of time, change and the falseness of the world, Troilus is not learning, and will refuse to learn until he cannot possibly deny that his lady has been false, when he sees his brooch on Diomedes's armor.

Having rejected the truth when Cassandra told it to him, Troilus suddenly leaves his bed and seeks the truth of his dream: "And day by day he gan enquire and seche / A sooth of this with al his fulle cure; / And thus he drieth forth his aventure" (T&C V.1538-40). While Troilus runs about seeking a false truth, the Narrator has come to resign himself to a compromise solution giving him enough understanding of what is the "true" truth to finish his story. Having seen that the Fortune first worshipped and then cursed by Troilus was very different from what he had supposed, the Narrator now begins to understand the nature of a different sort of Fortune, the Fortune of very large scale

events, the fatal Fortune of the historical process, which governed the Theban War as well as the Trojan one.⁴⁶ He turns from the truth-avoiding, truth-seeking Troilus to the larger picture of what is really happening in the entire city of Troy:

Fortune, which that permutacioun
Of thynges hath, as it is hire comitted
Thorough purveyaunce and disposicioun
Of heighe Jove, as regnes shal be flitted
Fro folk in folk, or when they shal be smytte,
Gan pulle away the fetheres brighte of Troie
Fro day to day, til they ben bare of joie. (T&C V.1541-47)

This is not the personal, favoring or hostile Fortune worshipped by Troilus (and by the Narrator earlier in the poem). This is not the unstable and inherently random process of the personal of Criseyde understood as lady Fortune on her wheel. This is the Boethian conception of Fortune, a process which causes change, but does so because it is directed by the will of God, not because of the personalities or desires of either the men or the planetary deities who might be involved in the changes.

Having begun to comprehend that Fortune is neither caused by random processes, or by capricious malice, the Narrator then turns to the death of Hector as an example of what happens when a man is destroyed

⁴⁶ It is the Narrator who must produce the synthesis between the points of view of Troilus and Pandarus, both incomplete. As Muscatine remarks, "to present secular idealism as a beautiful but flawed thing, and to present practical wisdom as an admirable but incomplete thing, to present them indeed as antithetical and incongruous to each other, is by implication to present a third view, higher and more complete than either. This philosophical third view hovers over every important sequence in the Troilus, and is made explicit in the epilogue" (p. 132). This synthesis develops before the epilogue, as the Narrator comes to understand the meaning of his story.

by the path of this large historical process of directed change which is called Fortune, but which is ultimately under God:

Among al this, the fyn of the parodie
Of Ector gan aprochen wonder blyve.
The fate wolde his soule shoulde unbodye,
And shapen hadde a mene it out to dryve,
Ayens which fate hym helpeth nat to stryve;
But on a day to fighten gan he wende,
At which, alas! he caught his lyves ende. (T&C V.1548-54)⁴⁷

Troilus lost Criseyde because infortune clouded the minds of the Trojans to the correct choice in the situation, because the Trojans made a bad choice to exchange her, and because her father, Calkas, wanted to save her from the fall of Troy. None of these causes knew or cared about the effect of the exchange on Troilus, although he believed that it was all a gigantic cosmic plot to cause him woe. The death of Hector is a very different matter.⁴⁸ Troy must fall, and before it can fall, Hector must die. This is an instance where the life of a particular individual intersects the operations of Fortune under God, and in a case like this there is no way that a man can resist the operations of fate. Fate applies to Troy, not to Troilus, except insofar as he lives in that city and must suffer when his city suffers. But because of the

⁴⁷ Cioffari, discussing Boethius, remarks that "It is Fate, then, that makes the lines of Fortune concurrere and confluere. But Fate, which governs Chance, is itself in turn ruled by Providence. This ordo inevitabili conexione procedens arrays all things in time and place because 'de providentiae fonte descendens'" (p. 87).

⁴⁸ Robert ap Roberts comments that "The fate of Troy, the only destinal pattern in the poem, includes as a part of its working only those events which lead to the city's destruction" ("Criseyde's Infidelity and the Moral of the Troilus," Speculum 44 /Jl '69/, p. 391). This is just the distinction which Troilus fails to comprehend.

the position of Hector as the primary defender of the city of Troy, fate applies to him personally, although with no regard to his moral worth, but only because his life must be taken before the God-ordained processes of Fortune can destroy the city of Troy.⁴⁹

Similarly, the death of Troilus, when it finally comes, will be because of the will of God, and in relation to his role as a defender of the city of Troy, not because of his woe and the imagined plots against him of a personal and hostile Fortune. After Troilus has seen the brooch upon the captured armor of Diomedes, and can no longer deny the falseness of Criseyde, the Narrator, who is now able to absorb the sorrow of Troilus into a philosophical context tells us:

Gret was the sorwe and pleynte of Troilus;
But forth hire cours Fortune ay gan to holde.
Criseyde loveth the sone of Tideüs,
And Troilus moot wepe in cares cold. (T&C V.1744-47)

The course of Fortune is the one leading from the death of Hector to the imminent fall of Troy. The changed love of Criseyde and the sorrow

⁴⁹ Steadman finds that the death of Hector reinforces his impression of a deterministic philosophy in the entire poem: "Though Troilus's identification of the brooch is described as 'a cas' and a 'newe chaunce,' the poet's Boethian frame of reference leaves no room for chance; fortune and fate alike are firmly under the control of providence. In this context, the allusions to Hector's fate and Troy's destruction obliquely emphasize the 'first cause' of the discovery sequence. They give additional clarity to the providential role of the gods in exposing Criseyde's guilt and precipitating her lover's death. . . . The dream and the brooch alike are instruments of providence . . ." (p. 78). One must recognize a distinction between the fated deaths of the Trojan warriors and their freedom to choose whom they please to love during their lives. Further, when we recognize that the representative of Boethius' Philosophy is mainly Pandarus, we must acknowledge that Chaucer was capable of transcending his sources in many directions, not all of them directly predictable.

of Troilus are a sort of fall-out from the cosmic process. The Narrator concludes philosophically: "Swich is this world, whoso it kan byholde: / In ech estat is litel hertes reste. / God leve us for to take it for the beste!" (T&C V.1748-50). He has seen the world for what it is, a place which is unstable and of fickle value, and turns to God for help to accept the world in the best possible light, that is, as a process of Fortune being acted out under the ultimate caring, just and merciful Providence of God.

Fortune's most direct and personal effect upon Troilus is upon his role as a soldier, not as a lover. He wants to kill Diomedes, "But natheles, Fortune it naught ne wolde, / Of oothers hond that eyther deyen sholde" (T&C V.1763-34). His love is not an important aspect of the Trojan War; his death, as the second Hector, is very important to the fate of Troy, and he, like Hector, must die at the hands of Achilles: "But weilawey, save only Goddes wille! / Despitously hym slough the fierse Achille" (T&C V.1805-06). It was the will of Troilus that led him to love Criseyde; it was the will of Criseyde that led her to cease loving Troilus. But it is the will of God that controls the death of Troilus at the hands of Achilles. Or, to express it in a cliché quite suited to the philosophical content of this poem: man proposes; God disposes. There is free will for individuals to choose and act; but there are also major destinal patterns which are the will of God and within which even the most energetic man may be unable to achieve and cling to his personal desires.

Although the Narrator, with the help of his Christian philosophy, has come to see and even resign himself to the nature of the world as

unstable, yet under the will of God, Troilus, the pagan lover, cannot. He remains unenlightened until his death, and only afterwards, as his spirit rises to those skies reserved for pagans, does he finally understand what the world and all in it really are. Once Troilus' spirit sees and understands the real nature of the world in relation to the eternal heavens, his direct response is to despise "This wrecched world" (T&C V.1817), and he laughs at those who weep for his death:⁵⁰ "And dampned al oure werk that foloweth so / The blynde lust, the which that may nat laste, / And sholden al oure herte on heven caste" (T&C V.1823-25).⁵¹ Troilus, like the Narrator, can only learn the true value of worldly matters when he gains the perspective of the heavens from which to view them.⁵²

⁵⁰ Ap Roberts comments "Of his love which was so strong in life that not even infidelity could lessen it, no trace is found in Troilus after death. In the end it is even more irrevocably lost than Criseyde's love for him has been, though not more than that, too, in its turn shall be lost. This loss is the crowning irony of the poem" (pp. 400-401). No pagan values, not even troth itself, as applied to a woman, are more than a part of the worldly delusion and false felicity, as seen from the skies.

⁵¹ Augustine says, "'We may now inquire whether wrongdoing is anything else than the pursuit of temporal things to the neglect of things eternal, namely, the pursuit of things, as if they were great and wonderful, which are perceived by the lowest part of man, his body, and which we can never be sure of, and the neglect of those things which the mind enjoys and perceives of itself, and which cannot be lost to the man who loves them. For every kind of wrongdoing, namely, sin, is included, it seems to me, under this one class'" ("The Free Choice of the Will," p. 106). This is basic Christian teaching, and unavailable to the pagan Troilus until after his death frees him from his "blynde lust."

⁵² Troilus gains insight by being freed from his life on earth; he is not necessarily sent to a place of reward. Wood comments: "Troilus' enlightenment, then, should probably be viewed as the reverse of the process just described by Lady Philosophy, and is to be considered the consequence of his release from earth rather than the result of some

The advantage which the Narrator has is his religion, which gives him a divine perspective into which he can work the story of Troilus and Criseyde in order to understand why such bad things could happen to such a decent, loving and trothful man as Troilus. The Narrator sees the story of Troilus from the distance of two thousand years and the Christian revelation; Troilus sees his own life from the distance of the heavens. Having come to understand, by means of the experiences of Troilus, that the religion of love is as false as the religion of the pagan planetary deities, and as unrewarding, the Narrator affirms, certainly with free will, his love of the Christian God, and urges young people who also presumably have a choice, to do the same, since this is the true alternative to the false God of Love whom he and Troilus had worshipped at the beginning of the poem.⁵³

The moral which the Narrator urges at the end of the poem: that life is brief and unreliable and the Christian God is the only worthy object of man's love, is a logical consequence of the process of learning which he has undergone throughout the story of Troilus and Criseyde,

particular virtue imputed to him--certainly it is not as the result of his fornication with Criseyde" (p. 188). Wood also points out: "In remanding Troilus to the eighth sphere of the fixed stars, Chaucer sends him as one who is 'likerous' to a place where the wise pause for some time and the lecherous must remain 'Tyl many a world be passed' (PF, 81). For both the wise and the not-so-wise, the eighth sphere in the Neoplatonic concept is a place of purification or penance. Chaucer could not do any more than this for his hero . . ." (pp. 190-91).

⁵³ This is very traditional Christian thinking, such as we see in Augustine, when he has Evodus say, "'I have come to my senses, and am very glad to have a clear understanding of the nature of that blame-worthy desire called passion. I now see that it is the love of things which each one can lose against his will'" ("The Free Choice of the Will," p. 80).

from his eager worship of a God of Love he did not really know or understand to a gradual realization that such love was not the wonderful and stable experience he so wished it to be, but a passing moment in a life ruled by mutability, although ultimately under the Providence of God.

When the Narrator, after urging the love of Christ, turns to condemn the pagan "coursed olde rites" he is speaking of the love religion as well as the religion of the planetary deities.⁵⁴ He has come to understand, freely, that they are very much the same, and that they are both quite false and offer no hope to a decent man for mercy or for justice.

⁵⁴ Wood comments that at the end of *T&C*, Chaucer "departs from Boccaccio's *Filostrato* in order to relate *Troilus*' death not only to love in general, but also to the pagan deities that have represented various aspects of character throughout the poem. Once again we would do well to recall the Mars who is associated with those who die for love. Another of these deities is, of course, the Venus whose favorable position in *Troilus*' nativity might have prompted him toward love, but it should be noted that any folly in love would have to be credited to *Troilus*, not Venus. Thus, at the end of the *Troilus*, Chaucer links the pagan deities with 'wretched worldly appetites,' and it would seem that the end result of the astrology in this poem is to show us that worldly appetites should be controlled and not indulged" (p. 77).

Man Alone

So far we have considered versions of the Troy story which included at least some non-human causation, whether that was in the form of the wrath of the gods, destiny, the spite of demonic fates, the arrow of Amors, or the blinding confusion caused by Fortune for apparently no reason at all, or for reasons beyond the capacity of men to understand. We are now going to deal with two versions of the Troy story which present a world almost totally devoid of non-human causation. These are The Recuyell of the Historyes of Troye by Raoul Lefevre, as translated into English by William Caxton,¹ and Troilus and Cressida by William Shakespeare.²

One of the most striking features of Shakespeare's Troilus, considered in the context of the traditional Troy stories, is its intensely secular nature. The gods are far removed from what was once a story of the wrath of the gods, and there are no medieval substitutes for divine

¹ Raoul Lefevre, The Recuyell of the Historyes of Troye, trans. by William Caxton, ed. H. Oskar Sommer, 2 Vols. (1894; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1973). Cited hereafter as Recuyell. Caxton says that Raoul Lefevre wrote the Recuyell in 1464, and he (Caxton) translated it from French into English between 1468 and 1471 (Recuyell, p. 3). Sommer accepts 1474 as the probable date of publication (Recuyell, p. lxxxiv). The Recuyell is probably a major source for the camp scenes in Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida, although there is disagreement on this issue, which we will discuss below.

² William Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, ed. Alice Walker, in The Works of Shakespeare, ed. John Dover Wilson (1957; rpt. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972). Hereafter cited as Troilus.

causation, such as the fates or Fortune. The men in Troilus are quite alone in a world emptied of causative factors other than the behavior of men. As a consequence, the questions asked over and over in this play are concerned with the nature of man and with the nature of the motives and values that lead him to act in such ways as to cause the Trojan War.

While the anxious questioning of the nature of man is Shakespeare's contribution to the story of Troy, the gods as well as all other external causative factors are already absent from the Recuyell. First we will examine the Recuyell to ascertain the process by which non-human causation was removed from the story of Troy; we will then consider Shakespeare's Troilus as a logical consequence of the loss of external, or non-human causation.

The Recuyell is a compilation of more materials than any of the previous Troy stories that we have examined. It is organized into three books. The first two are largely drawn from Boccaccio's Genealogia deorum gentilium.³ Book I gives extensive details of the origins of the pagan gods considered as men, especially concentrating on the strife between Jupiter and Saturn. Book II is mostly a life of Hercules as a glorious semi-divine hero. Book III is based on Guido's Historia and tells of the final fall of Troy.⁴

³ Speaking of the first two Books of the Recuyell, Sommer concludes that the "principal source whence Lefevre derived his information is undoubtedly Joannes Boccaccio's 'Genealogia deorum gentilium.' While making use of the facts and events related in this work, he has retold them in his own way, and added a great deal of detail to them" (Recuyell cxxxi).

⁴ "In the third book of 'Le Recueil' Lefevre mentions no less than twelve times the name of Dares Phrygius." But, Sommer concludes, "In spite of these references, a comparison of the third book with the

Each of the three books of the Recuyell includes a fall of Troy. The first and second falls are caused by the rude and tyrannical behavior of Laomedon toward Hercules, who destroys Troy twice.⁵ Only the third and final fall of Troy is accomplished by the forces of Agamemnon and Menelaus, and that is strictly to avenge the rape of Helen. Since the second book of the Recuyell is a glorified life of Hercules, and since it is Hercules who destroys Troy the first two times, by the time we reach the third and final fall of Troy, it is somewhat of an ordinary event, one we have come to accept as being done by heroes to a ruler who has misbehaved.

The tone of the Recuyell is set in the first book which presents an almost totally euhemerized version of the struggles between the generations of the pagan gods, especially Jupiter and Saturn, and which explains away all supernatural events except rather minor ones of magic and an occasional monster, by means of moralized allegories that destroy whatever meaning originally inhered in the myths.⁶ We are told that

'Historia destructionis Troiae,' by Guido delle Colonne, shows, beyond doubt, that he exclusively made use of this work" (Recuyell cxxxix).

⁵ Comparing the accounts of Boccaccio and Guido of the first fall of Troy, when Hercules overthrew Laomedon, Sommer comments, "it is clear that Lefevre cannot have misunderstood the two accounts, and we have no alternative but to conclude that he purposely made Hercules destroy Laomedon's city twice, in order that each of his three books should deal with one destruction of Troy" (Recuyell cxxix).

⁶ Somer comments that the "gods and goddesses of the heathen of Boccaccio, however, are in Lefevre's estimation neither divinities nor genii, neither demons nor other supernatural beings, but men of flesh and blood, kings, knights, their wives and their people: in short, they are stripped of all the characteristics so familiar to us from the Greek and Roman Classics" (Recuyell cxxiii).

Pluto founded a city in Sicily called helle (Recuyell I, p. 86), and that Pegasus was really a very swift ship and only called a flying horse (Recuyell I, p. 196).

As Don Cameron Allen points out, euhemerism has strong atheistic tendencies; one may begin by explaining how the other fellow's gods were really men who had various adventures; the consequence of that mode of interpretation may be questioning the divinity of one's own gods.⁷ This is not to imply that Lefevre was an atheist; in fact he was a priest.⁸ But the effect of the euhemerization of the pagan gods is to destroy the motivation of stories about the ancient figures who were eventually involved in the fall of Troy.⁹ The basic problem is that the gods were originally causes; they were used to explain why events occurred, as does Homer in the Iliad, or Virgil in the Aeneid. If the gods, who had been the causes of events, are reduced to mere men, then one is left with a world in which causation has been shifted from the divine to the human.

The immediate impression one gets reading the stories of the gods

⁷ Don Cameron Allen, Mysteriously Meant: The Rediscovery of Pagan Symbolism and Allegorical Interpretation in the Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 56-60.

⁸ Sommer remarks that "Although a priest, Lefevre does not seem to have been anxious to pass in silence over passages which were certainly contrary to the morals even of his time" (Recuyell cxxvi).

⁹ Euhemerism per se is ancient and not a discovery of the 15th c. Allen traces the roots of this point of view to Euhemerus of Messina, in the 4th c. B. C. Allen also points out that the Christian apologists "first described the rather scurvy moral lives and ignoble manners of Greek divinities." The implication was that such behavior was human, not divine (p. 53).

as men is one of chaos. Their adventures, stripped of the meaning of divinity, are disorderly, lacking in cause and effect sequence, and disturbing, if not shocking from a moral standpoint. To be told of a god devouring his children is merely an ancient tale; to be told of a man, Saturn, trying to kill his good son Jupiter because of the warning of an oracle is far more disturbing, because one cannot avoid applying human standards of morality to his behavior, now that he has been transformed into a human being. Thus, the author attempts to explain Saturn's behavior as one would explain the behavior of a man, not a god.¹⁰ There is a very long section describing the various attempts of Saturn to kill his son Jupiter, and the following scene is typical of the author's attempts to explain his behavior as human: "And longe tyme whan Saturne sawe hym thus in pease / hit happend on a day whan hit cam vnto hys mynde . that his god appollo had prenostyqued that this Iupiter shold put hym out of his royaume / Sodeynli there began to engendre in hym a mortall hate agaynst Iupiter that had don vnto hym so many good dedes" (Recuyell I, p. 86). The passage continues to analyze Saturn's behavior as a man: "he adioustyd fayth and gaf credence vnto his cursid prenosticacyon. And so suffryd hym self to be enuolupped wyth so grete a folye that he coude neuer drawe hyt out after: And than he retorned vnto his auncyent sorowes and fantasies" (Recuyell I, p. 87).¹¹

¹⁰ There are remnants of a few gods in the Recuyell, especially Apollo, but they are not developed as active or causative factors, and are mostly ignored.

¹¹ I have followed the peculiar orthography of Caxton's text in Sommer's edition, except that I have substituted "s" for "f" for the sake of ease in reading the passages.

Here we see a psychological analysis of the behavior of a former god. The motive idea rises to present itself to Saturn's conscious mind; it is an arbitrary event, without any cause other than its own occurrence. Saturn's immediate reaction is hatred, a passion that conflicts with the experience he has of Jupiter as a good son. Saturn does not resist the impulses of his passion; he adjusts his beliefs to suit his emotions and allows himself to be permanently controlled by his folly. We see the touch of Christian free will here; Saturn allows his folly to control him, and having performed this willing act of compliance, he becomes forever unfree. Having become unfree, by abdicating his free will, he will live under the domination of emotional fantasies.

People ask Saturn why he behaves so badly: "been thyn Interyor rancours permanent shall thy fantasyes neuer cesse / shalt thou be in Age lasse & sympler than a child / the more that men growe in age / the more be they wyse / Thou hast lasse knowleche now / than thou haddest in thy paryllous youghth and fro whens cometh this deffaulte / is this by the heuenly Influence / yf hit be thus / where is rayson where is equyte" (Recuyell I, p. 96). These very important questions are never answered in the Recuyell. We see a psychology of causative behavior without underlying causes. Behavior is something that happens to a man. To be sure, he must acquiesce of his own free will, but that is a momentary action which produces a lifetime of compulsion. The passions of Saturn destroy his knowledge, his ability to recognize and judge events. The reference to heavenly influence is interesting. That would be the astrological influences of the planets. The author does not accept this as the source of Saturn's behavior, but merely allows the

remark that if that were indeed the source, "where is rayson where is equyte."

The euhemerization of the gods contributes to the structure of a narrative that is paratactic. Events are generally connected to one another by the neutral "and" which indicates a lack of causal relationship in many cases. The attempts of the narrative to follow the course of very complex events which lack meaning or purpose produce a chaotic impression on the reader. As an example of this, let us consider a passage where Jupiter, who is a heroic figure, goes from one action to another with no logical connections other than the paratactic "and":

Whan Iupiter herde the Caas and the Infortune of Danes / he began to sorowe and sighe sore. The swete cam in to his visage And the teres in to his eyen he callyd Gamynedes and yxion And tolde hem that his viage was broken And that the kynge Acrisius had caste her in to the see for whom he made this Armee / Gamynedes and yxion confortd hym the best wyse they coude And brought hym agayn to Crete he helde hym there solitaryly a while And laye by his wif Iuno / And Iuno and her aunte seres made him good chere often tymes And so ofte cam seres that ones she axid the cause of hys sorowe / He behelde the beaute of her / And that she was allone dyde so dyde so /sic/ moche to her that he had to doo wyth her / and knewe her flessshly / and that she conceyuyd of his seed a doughter / and after he determyned in his wyll that he wold goo in to secylle and conquerre the contre. (Recuyell I, pp. 176-77)

Not only is there no subordination, there is almost no motivation and very little sense. This is largely a result of transforming the gods, who had been the causes of events, into men who cannot be causative like gods, and yet must follow the tortuous paths of the ancient divine adventurers. There was a clear division between men and gods, between causes and actors, in the earlier Troy stories that we have examined. This division is absent from the Recuyell, and the consequence is a great

confusion between causation and those who experience events.¹² We will observe a related mode of confusion in the Troilus of Shakespeare, there centered on the theme of a breakdown in hierarchical values.

In the Recuyell Juno, who is the cause of the labors of Hercules, is no longer a terrible goddess, but merely, "the false wycche and sorceresse" (Recuyell I, p. 243). She can change shape, make herself invisible, and so on, but hers is not the wrath of a goddess, a final cause in itself, but merely the anger of a woman, jealous of her husband's infidelities. When Alcmena gives birth to the infant Hercules, whose father is Jupiter, husband of Juno, we observe the very humanized woe of Juno:

she smote her self on þ breste with her fyste and sayd / what a vaylleth me to be born of the ryall blood of saturne / what auaylleth me my patrymonye of the world of golde / what auaylleth me the dyademe of crete / ne what auayllen me the sciences of the worlde that I haue lerned by grete studie & laboure whan the goddesses ben agaynst and contrarye vnto me in alle thing. The kynge my husbonde rekketh not / ner setteth nought by me / no more in myne olde dayes than he dyde in my yougthe He hath euery day a newe lady / O what destyne / fortune wilte thou neuer torne thy whele Shall I alleway suffre my tribulacions & this payne.
(Recuyell I, pp. 239-40)

Here Juno is at the mercy of the wheel of Fortune! This is a far cry from the Juno of the Aeneid who is one of the primary causative factors of the universe, although not the finally victorious one.

¹² Although not all medieval versions of the Troy story place much emphasis on the pagan gods per se as causative factors, they introduce substitute sources of non-human causation, such as Fortune, or the malicious fates, or the stars, or devils hidden in pagan idols. These all help to explain why even fairly decent men, such as the Trojans, could become deeply involved in a major disaster. Lefevre's version does not rely upon such external explanations for human experience.

However, while Juno refers to the wheel of Fortune, even Fortune is practically absent from the Recuyell as a causative factor, and where it does occur, it is in the form of Fortune as random change, to be exploited or endured as the case may be, not Fortune as destiny, which must be helplessly and totally accepted. A typical example is where one of her captains tells Medusa, a beleaguered lady: "we muste nedes kepe oure renome / yf fortune hath ben to vs this day froward / to morn she shal torn to prouffyt / the woundes and hurtes that ben made in our worship and blood we moste bere hit and take hit in gree . And our prowesse and honour shall to morn putte vs to fore the shame" (Recuyell I, p. 191). We can also observe this mode of Fortune in the following passage: "the marroners toke their shippe and wente to the see / And saylled all that day with oute fyndyng of any aduenture / But on the morn by tyme in the mornyng / ffortune that alleway torneth with oute any restyng brought to them a grete shyppe" (Recuyell II, pp. 337-38). Fortune in the Recuyell is not the Boethian destinal force which tests men and teaches them to despise the world, nor is it the malicious causative factor of the fates of Guido. This Fortune is closest to the one recognized by Chaucer's Pandarus, change itself, and the world of the Recuyell is one which changes constantly, and for no particular reason, as does its figure of Fortune.

A corollary to the absence of external malicious powers is the tremendous humanistic optimism which the Recuyell expresses in its central book, which concentrates on the life of Hercules.¹³ Freed of

¹³ Seznec comments that Raoul Lefevre was influenced by the importance of Hercules to the dukes of Burgundy, and that Hercules was given "unwonted prominence" in the Recuyell: "Why this special emphasis

the tyranny of the pagan gods and the medieval destructive forces of fate and Fortune, the Recuyell describes a place where men can indeed be heroes, capable of acting to create a better world. Hercules is a superhero who cleanses the world of all tyrants. This profound optimism about the capacity of man is best expressed by Hercules himself:

hyt is force vnto a man that he take and bere alle that fortune wyll. . . . Hyt is expedyent that a man reioyse hys ryght. Ryght conforteth the courage of a man . And also the corage of a man comforted bryngeth hym ofte tymes to gloryous victorie / A beste rurall disgarnysshyd of raysonable engyne fighteth for his hole and neste with his clawes with his feet teeth and wyth his becke / what shall a man sensible and endowed with entendement & rayson doo yf ony assault and namely in his owen land and terrytorie come / Nature wyll and enseyneth that where corperall force faylleth / vygour and vertue of courage werken / and that they fyghte for their contrey Take courage than in yowr right / and late saye your entente vnto your enemyes. (Recuyell II, pp. 372-73)

Hercules is a natural man, and a man at home in nature. He finds no conflict in drawing his precepts for behavior from behavior observed in wild beasts. Further, he proposes that right makes might, a statement of the greatest optimism, and one not readily supported in most versions of the Troy story that we have examined, where factors other than human rights generally controlled the outcome of events. And finally, Hercules praises the power of the "vertue of courage" which can carry men even beyond the power of their bodily strength. "Vertue" is a major element in the characterization of Hercules. It is his heroic essence, which recognizes and destroys tyrants, and cannot be destroyed by them. We are told that Hercules:

upon Hercules? It is due to his reputed place as founder of the dynasty" (p. 25).

had in hym that vertue / that where he myght knowe monstre or tyrant
 or any men enpesshyng the comyn wele / thether he wente And suche
 tyrans he destroyed And to thende that men shold not saye that he
 dyde such werkes for couetyse . he wold neuer holde ne reteyne to
 his propre vse no thyng of their goodes / But all that he conquerid
 in suche wyse he gaue hit vnto noble men And preisid no thyng but
 vertue / He wold not make his seignourye to growe ne to amasse and
 take to hym self royame vpon royame . He was contente of that / that
 nature had gyuen hym . And all way he wold labour for the comyn
 wele / O noble herte / O right wel adressid corage / O tresuertuous
 paynem ther was none like to hym of all them / that were afore hym
 ne after hym. (Recuyell II, p. 477)

Hercules is, unequivocally, the "tresuertuous paynem." There is no
 conflict in the Recuyell between Christianity and the possibility of a
 truly excellent man who was not a Christian, but a natural man of
 extreme "vertue." The "vertue" of Hercules is a natural quality which
 responds to adversity by developing even further. This development is
 aptly expressed by the metaphor of the growth of a natural object, a
 plant:

In suche wise as the yonge wyne by the labour and besynes of the
 labourer groweth in heichte & his bowes spred a brood full of fruyte
 / semblably hercules by vertue labouryng in hym grewe in verdur of
 well doying and in fruyt of noblesse / his werkes his bowes hys
 braunches than began to spreed a brood & to mounte and ryse from
 royame to roiaime / the secrete conspiracōns of Iuno and her cursed
 enuyes myght not hurte ner mynusshe the vertue of hercules / the
 more that she wenyd to abasshe and hurte hym . the more she was
 cause of his enhauncement / yf he were puyssant and stronge of body
 / he was yet more stronge of vertue for hit was sette in hym as the
 precyous stone is in gold. (Recuyell II, p. 308)

Hercules is apotheosized by his widow and unwitting murderer, Deyanyra,
 as the ultimate link between gods and men, a true Renaissance superhero,
 far removed from the flawed knights of the Middle Ages. She mourns
 Hercules as: "He that traversid the stronge marches the fondamentes
 terrestre / that bodyly conuersid amonge the men / And spirytuelly
 amonge the sonne the mone and the sterreis And that susteyned the

circumference of the heuenes is ded" (Recuyell II, p. 500).

Having seen how the Recuyell is centered upon the superhero Hercules, we must now consider his relation to the fall of Troy. Troy is destroyed twice by Hercules. Each time it is a fully justified act, responding to the greed and bad faith of the Trojan King, Laomedon, who in this context is merely one of many tyrants destroyed by the "vertue" of Hercules.

The first destruction of Troy is based on an adventure involving the sister of Priam, Hesione, called Exiona in this version. She is the same woman who is later given to Ajax Telamon after the second fall of Troy, and who provides the pretext for Paris to seize Helen, which causes the third and final fall of Troy. The person to blame is clearly Laomedon, King of Troy, while Hercules is a righteous conquering hero. It begins with Laomedon borrowing money from the temple of the god of the sun in order to pay to fortify the walls of Troy. When the time comes to repay the loan, "Laomedon daigned not to speke to the prestes but sente hem worde shamefully that they shold retorne & kepe her temples wherfore he was afterward sore punysshed" (Recuyell I, p. 271). Storm, heat and plague follow this impious act until Laomedon finally goes to the temple of Apollo at Delphos, where the devil that inhabited the idol says that Troy is being punished because of the money which has not been returned, and that the plague will not cease unless they offer a virgin every month as a sacrifice to be devoured by a monster sent by the gods. This situation will continue "vnto the tyme that they finde oon man that by his armes and his myght shall ouercome the sayd monstre &c" (Recuyell I, p. 273). Hercules slays the monster, but although the

Trojans adore him for his deed, the response of Laomedon is envy, not gratitude, and he sends Hercules out to hunt and then bolts the gates of the city against him and accuses him of having "meued by conspiracion the cyte ayenst hym" (Recuyell I, p. 282). Hercules is especially angry at Laomedon since he refuses to give the horses to Hercules which he had promised him as a reward for rescuing Exiona. When Hercules asks Laomedon why he will not give him his promised reward, Laomedon replies: "for as moche as hit is my wyll and pleseth me so to do" (Recuyell I, p. 282). Free will, not the malice of the fates, fortune, or confused error, motivates Laomedon. Hercules leaves, recruits an army, and returns to punish Laomedon. There is no question of who is to blame: "The kynge laomedon heeryng this tydyng / began to sighe and to taste the punycion and trespaas that he had comysed and don ayenst hercules" (Recuyell I, p. 287). Hercules returns, destroys Troy, and as a touch of special gallantry, leaves the palace full of ladies untouched (Recuyell I, pp. 295-96).

Our only possible reaction to this first destruction of Troy is to feel that Hercules has just punished yet another tyrant. This feeling is reinforced by the second destruction of Troy, which is also due to Laomedon's bad behavior and the "vertue" of Hercules. Guido and Benoit also have a section dealing with this preliminary destruction of Troy by Hercules; however in the Recuyell it is handled briefly and with no sense of regret at yet another reason to destroy Troy. Once again Laomedon insults the superhero Hercules, when he and Jason seek to land at Troy. Laomedon "sente doun a man that commanded them rudeli that they shold departe thens and that he was enemye vnto the grekes" (Recuyell II, p. 347). Hercules swears to return with an army and

destroy Troy once again, which he does, clubbing Laomedon to death (Recuyell II, p. 350). Since Hercules is the unquestioned hero of this second book of the Recuyell, we do not question the justice of his actions, especially since it is his unique "vertue" to destroy all monsters and tyrants (Recuyell II, p. 477). The implication is clearly that Laomedon was one of these tyrants and that Troy deserved to be destroyed.

Only the third and final destruction of Troy is based on the Historia of Guido, and this story occupies the third book of the Recuyell, which begins after the death of Hercules. Once again the fault is clearly placed on the Trojan side. In the very first paragraph we are told that this book will be about how Priam rebuilt Troy "And afterward how for the rauysshement of dame helayne wyf of kynge Menelaus of grece . the sayd cyte was totally destroyed Priamus hector and alle his sones slayn with noblesse wyth out nombre" (Recuyell III, p. 505). Since this will be the third destruction, there is no need to remind us that Troy is a place that invites destruction by heroes--that has been made obvious by the tales of Hercules.

The Recuyell presents an abridged version of the Historia. Most of Guido's attempts at erudition and explanations of why things happened have been omitted. The author of the Recuyell removed most of Guido's astrology, scientific lore, seasonal descriptions, references to the fates and nearly all of Guido's ambivalence about the causes of the fall of Troy. The most significant difference for our purposes is the omission of Guido's references to the fates as a malicious force capable of controlling human behavior. For example, at the end of the Council where the decision is made to send Paris to Greece, Guido gives

an extensive analysis of the external controls of Fortune: "But the opposition of Fortune, who had already in her course given voluntary impulses and unfortunate inspirations, hastened toward the end by ordaining the rapid progress of events thereafter. If the arguments of Hector, the warnings of Cassandra . . . But after the inexorable Fates decree that misfortunes and evils shall happen, they represent the opposite and contrary in the minds of men."¹⁴ The Recuyell merely remarks: "But neuer for the dissuacions of hector . Ne the monyssiions ne warnynges of cassandra the kyng wold not change his purpoos ne for helenus his sone ne for pantheus &" (Recuyell III, p. 527). All non-human causative factors have been removed, as we noted earlier when discussing the general tone of the entire Recuyell.

At the critical encounter between Hector and Ajax which is a turning point of the Trojan War, we can observe how the Recuyell has weakened Guido's rather paranoid conception of the hateful fates. Guido introduces this section with references to the controlling fates: "But the fates, who arrange for future adversities to happen, destroy everything by hidden snares, by which they complete those adversities which they have arranged for the future."¹⁵ All that remains of this in the Recuyell is "In this day had the troians had vittorye of alle the grekes yf fortune that is dyuerse had wylle consentyd" (Recuyell III, p. 589). Fortune is "dyuerse," not malicious, in the Recuyell. Men are capable of making decisions and performing actions that will at least have a

¹⁴ Meek, Historia, p. 65.

¹⁵ Meek, p. 140.

fair chance of controlling what happens to them. This is not the case in Guido's world, controlled, at least in part, by the hateful fates.

After the critical encounter between Hector and Ajax, Guido points to the fatal causes: "This was the trivial cause for which the Trojans on that day ceased from obtaining their victory which they never afterward were able to reach, because the fates opposed."¹⁶ The Recuyell replaces the destinal fates with the more impersonal figure of Fortune, and adds a common sense moral from Virgil to the effect that one should not be merciful in war (Recuyell III, p. 590). Although Fortune may have been unfavorable, men, not external factors, are to blame for what has occurred.

While the Recuyell strips men of external excuses for what happens to them, it is curiously lacking in regrets for the loss of divinity and the consequent loss of extenuating circumstances. The implications of the fall of Troy caused by men alone are not very important in a story where the central hero, Hercules, has already destroyed Troy twice, and for very good reasons.

The Recuyell probably constituted a major source for Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida.¹⁷ In Robert Presson's study of Shakespeare's

¹⁶ Meek, p. 140.

¹⁷ There are a variety of opinions on the sources of Troilus, and the relative importance of these sources to Troilus. Alice Walker, the editor of the Cambridge Troilus, is of the opinion that "Shakespeare's main source was The Recuyell" (Troilus, p. xxxviii), while Tillyard comments on Shakespeare that "It is plain from Lucrece that he had long known the medieval matter of Troy, and it is highly probable that he knew it primarily from Lydgate" (Shakespeare's Problem Plays /1950; 6th impression, London: Chatto and Windus Ltd., 1968/, p. 40). Robert Presson remarks that the Iliades of Chapman was the "basis of Shakes-

sources for Troilus, it is Book III of the Recuyell that is cited as the source or parallel for many of the incidents in Shakespeare's play.¹⁸

Whatever the actual relationship of Shakespeare's Troilus to the Recuyell as a source may be, our concern is not with sources per se, but with Shakespeare's play as a continuation of a tradition of Troy stories, especially continuing the development so marked in the Recuyell of men alone in a world without divine causation.

peare's siege plot : . . . ", while "Caxton, more probably than Lydgate, supplemented certain scenes Shakespeare took from Homer . . . " (Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida and the Legends of Troy /1953; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1971/, pp. 137-38).

Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, with its moralized epilogue provided by Henryson's Testament of Cresseid, contains the material for the love story in Troilus, but they may not have been direct sources. Walker is sceptical of both Homer and Chaucer as direct sources (Troilus, pp. xliii-xliv). However, insofar as Chaucer's T&C was a source, it would have almost certainly included Henryson's Testament. Alice Miskimin notes that "Robert Henryson's Testament of Cresseid had become after 1532 a sixth part of Chaucer's poem" (The Renaissance Chaucer /New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1975/, p. 157). Presson feels that Shakespeare "was quite familiar with an edition" of Chaucer's T&C (p. 107).

The main thrust of the Testament of Cresseid is to stress Cresseid's human responsibility while at the same time preserving and intensifying the role of external controlling factors--the pagan gods. Lydgate's Troy Book displays a similar tension, increasing the stress on human responsibility by emphasizing fraud and deceit and error in human behavior, while also affirming the enormous influences of Mars and Fortune upon human behavior. Both of these works continue the tensions inherent in the Medieval world view, with its demons, fates and Fortune co-existing with Christian free will. Neither reaches the developmental stage of the Recuyell, which moves beyond external controls to a world in which actions are caused by men alone. Therefore, although these works provide significant examples of late Medieval tensions as seen in the Troy story, they will not be examined here, since we are looking for the next stage--that of men isolated from the gods in a secular universe.

¹⁸ Presson, Chapter II.

The Recuyell may have euhemerized the gods into men, but it also elevated one man, Hercules, to the status of a demi-god, a link between man and the cosmos. This was the material of Book II. In the Troilus, not only are the gods quite gone, but there are no demi-gods, and even more painfully, there are scarcely any heroes. Instead of a Hercules, we have the brute Ajax, the brute Achilles, the chivalric loser Hector, and his love-stricken brother Troilus.

The Recuyell transformed the pagan gods into heroes; Shakespeare changed the pagan heroes into men. Men alone exist in a cosmos which is quite emptied of causes and excuses for the Trojan War. That is the central problem of the play. The effect of this radical secularization of the story of the fall of Troy is the loss of all causation except for that of human behavior. Those who cause human suffering can no longer be clearly distinguished from those who suffer. If men alone cause the fall of Troy, what are men, and why do they act as they do? This is the basic question asked in so many ways in Troilus.

What and who are frequent forms for questions in Troilus. They are often answered by the name of the person observed; characters tell one another who someone is, or that someone is a man of such a sort. This questioning and the limited answers to questions about who and what a man (or woman) may be begin in Act I, when Troilus asks, "what Cressid is, what Pandar, and what we?" (Troilus I.1.101). Troilus' answer is that Cressida is a pearl, he a merchant, and Pandarus their boat on a wild sea. The pearl is an object of value; the merchant is one who must estimate that value; and Pandarus is the means of the merchant getting the pearl. These concepts will be critical to the entire play, as we will see.

In the second scene of Act I, Cressida asks her man, Alexander, "Who were those went by?" He answers her and then mentions Ajax, and she asks, "Good; and what of him?" Alexander replies, "They say he is a very man per se, / And stands alone." To which Cressida retorts, "So do all men, unless they are drunk, sick, / or have no legs" (Troilus I.2.1-18). No man in the play will prove to be any more than a very man who stands alone, or falls alone, as the case may be.

This scene continues and Cressida comments, "Hector's a gallant man." Alexander replies to this, "As may be in the world, lady" (Troilus I.2.38-39).

We are getting the idea that whatever a man may be, he is alone, he is limited. Hector is as good as a man can be. That will prove to be not nearly good enough to save Troy. Pandarus begins to develop a comparison between Troilus and Hector, which Cressida rejects, and Pandarus says, "What, not between Troilus and Hector? / Do you know a man if you see him?" (Troilus I.2.62-63). This opens a discussion quite typical of this play, in which the answer to what is a man is the man himself. Let us look at it, since there are similar passages throughout the play. Cressida replies to Pandarus' question:

Cressida. Ay, if I ever saw him before and knew him.
Pandarus. Well, I say Troilus is Troilus.
Cressida. Then you say as I say; for I am sure he is
 not Hector.
Pandarus. No, nor Hector is not Troilus in some
 degrees.
Cressida. 'Tis just to each of them; he is himself.
Pandarus. Himself! Alas, poor Troilus! I would he
 were--
Cressida. So he is. (Troilus I.2.64-73)

And so on. This passage is not mere empty banter, being typical of the

questions asked throughout the play. The content seems to be that only if one already is acquainted with a man can one recognize him, and when one asks what a man is, his name is the answer. In sum, a man is himself, and this is identified by his name, which limits him as well as identifies him; he can be no more than himself, as well as no other than himself. As to the nature of that self--the play has no answers to that problem.

Later in this scene the Trojan warriors return from battle and Pandarus gives Cressida a description of them as men, stressing that they are men. He begins with Aeneas, remarking, "Is not that a brave man?" He goes on to comment that Antenor is a "proper man of person," and when he sees Hector he exclaims: "That's Hector, that, that, look you, that; / there's a fellow! Go thy way, Hector! There's a brave / man, niece. O brave Hector! Look how he looks! There's a countenance! Is't not a brave man?" And Cressida responds, "O, a brave man!" Paris comes along next, and Pandarus exclaims, "Look ye yonder, niece; is't not a gallant man too is't not?" Then comes Troilus. Pandarus says, "'Tis / Troilus! there's a man, niece!" and after praising him enthusiastically, Pandarus says, "O admirable man!" Cressida comments that Achilles is a "better man than Troilus" and Pandarus replies, "Well, well! Why, have you any discretion? / have you any eyes? do you know what a man is? Is not / birth, beauty, good shape, discourse, manhood, learning, / gentleness, virtue, youth, liberality, and such like, the / spice and salt that season a man?" (Troilus I.2.186-256).

Whatever a man may be, this analysis performed by Pandarus and Cressida on her prospective lover and his companions is central to the problems dealt with in the entire play. We must note that all the

excellent qualities that Pandarus lists, such as birth, virtue and so on are merely the seasoning, and do not answer the basic question, what is a man?

This crucial question, what is a man? is approached from another point of view by Achilles and Thersites, where Achilles asks Thersites, "Come, / what's Agamemnon?" The scene continues:

Thersites. Thy commander, Achilles; then tell me, Patroclus, what's Achilles?

Patroclus. Thy lord, Thersites; then tell me, I pray thee, what's thyself?

Thersites. Thy knower, Patroclus; then tell me, Patroclus, what art thou?

The answer to these questions is given by Thersites: they are all fools:

Thersites. Agamemnon is a fool; Achilles is a fool; Thersites is a fool, and, as aforesaid, Patroclus is a fool.

Achilles. Derive this; come.

Thersites. Agamemnon is a fool to offer to command Achilles; Achilles is a fool to be commanded of Agamemnon; Thersites is a fool to serve such a fool; and Patroclus is a fool positive.

Patroclus. Why am I a fool?

Thersites. Make that demand of the Creator. It suffices me thou art. (Troilus II.3.42-67)

Thersites has here defined each of the men in terms of their social interrelationships; we will observe later that this is just what Ulysses does with his theory of a hierarchy of degree. However, unlike Ulysses, Thersites does not admire that hierarchy, nor does he even believe in it. He merely considers men as fools who attempt to function within the constraints of a social hierarchy or chain of command.

Hierarchical values, or the worth of one man in relation to another, are central to the problems dealt with in Troilus, and these

values are often linked to the question of what a man is, as when Ajax asks Agamemnon about Achilles, "What is he more than another?" and Agamemnon replies, "No more than what he thinks he is" to which Ajax counters, "Is he so much?" (Troilus II.3.141-43). The question of what a man is is related to the question of how he ranks in value in relation to other men. Thus, when Ulysses concocts a scheme to dampen Achilles' pride by snubbing him and promoting Ajax, we hear such comments as when Achilles realizes: "And not a man, for being simply man, / Hath any honour but honour for those honours / That are without him" (Troilus III.3.80-82). Simply being a man, whatever that is, is not sufficient to produce value. Value is a function of social interaction, as Ulysses points out to Achilles, commenting, "Then marvel not, thou great and complete man, / That all the Greeks begin to worship Ajax" (Troilus III.3.181-82).

This focus and concern on what a man is express the anxiety of a world in which terrible things are happening and there is no cause to point to other than men and women, Greeks and Trojans. When the Trojans visit the Greek camp we again see the concern with asking who men are, and the feeling that knowing a name may identify a man; yet it is not a sufficient explanation for what a man is, as when Hector protests to Achilles who is surveying his body like a butcher looking for the place to begin cutting, "But there's more in me than thou understand'st" (Troilus IV.5.240).

The various discussions of what a man is, and how a man is himself and not anyone else than himself, and of how a man's value resides in his relationship to others is finally completed in the paradox of

Troilus' statements when he observes Cressida being unfaithful: "This she? No; this is Diomed's Cressida," and "This is, and is not, Cressid!" (Troilus V.2.137 and 146). If a man (or woman) exists in relation to others, then Diomedes' Cressida is not the same as Troilus' Cressida. If a man (or woman) is himself and no other (if the name of a person uniquely identifies and defines him), then Cressida is and is not herself, since the Cressida that Troilus knew by that name and identity was different from the Cressida he now observes. This is really a most unsatisfactory answer, although it is quite appropriate to a play that raises difficult questions and does not pretend to be able to answer them. Troilus rejects the concept of identity without continuity of behavior.¹⁹ We might be tempted to remark that Cressida's behavior has been perfectly consistent and it is Troilus' understanding of her that was weak. However, Troilus could only know who she was according to his ability to perceive her, and she was beautiful. He expected her behavior to be in accord with her beauty, which was perfectly logical given his value system, as we will see.²⁰

¹⁹ According to Ruth Anderson, Elizabethan psychological treatises "represent life as a series of conflicting purposes and inexplicable actions. The Elizabethan did not search for unity in human behavior" (Elizabethan Psychology and Shakespeare's Plays /1927; rpt. New York: Russell and Russell, 1966/, p. 174). Perhaps the reactions of Troilus and his demands for consistency would have been even stranger to Shakespeare's contemporaries than they are to us.

²⁰ Anderson comments: "To the Elizabethan, who believed that the soul is definitely instrumentalized and that a proper mixture of the elements within a body affords a good constitution, gross disparity between outward seeming and inward being was startling. Several times in Shakespeare, when the realization that beauty may shelter an unchaste soul comes to a lover who thinks his lady false, the poignancy of grief is heightened" (p. 118).

With the problems of identity raised and not answered, let us consider another set of related problems that are examined in Troilus, centered on the question of why men act as they do. If men alone are the causes of the Trojan War, then it is necessary to understand why they act as they do if we are to understand why the Trojan War took place. Value seems to be the crux of human motivation in Troilus.²¹ Men act to acquire what they value and to avoid what they do not value. They appear to choose actions in terms of a hierarchy of personal and social values which allow them to decide that it is better to keep Helen than to return her; that it is better to fight than to stay at home; that Cressida is worth pursuing; and that Thersites is not really worth killing.²²

²¹ W. R. Elton comments that "Shakespearian drama reflects the conflict between traditional views, found in Aquinas, for whom value is present and bound up in the object, and the newer views of such figures as Bruno, with his aesthetic relativism, and Hobbes (b. 1588), with his notion of value as relative to the market-situation. Such later positions are implicit especially in the politic Ulysses' exchanges in Troilus and Cressida, where the wily counsellor is a manipulator both of men and of the market in honour" ("Shakespeare and the thought of his age" in A New Companion to Shakespeare Studies, ed. by Kenneth Muir and S. Schoenbaum /1971; rpt. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976/, p. 192).

²² Thersites, the man who rejects all values and position in the hierarchy, has his life spared twice precisely because he has no value. First, when Hector encounters him and asks:

Art thou of blood and honour?

Thersites. No, no; I am a rascal; a scurvy railing knave; a very filthy rogue.

Hector. I do believe thee. Live. (Troilus V.4.26-29)

Second, when Margarelon encounters him and says:

Turn, slave, and fight.

Thersites. What art thou?

Margarelon. A bastard son of Priam's.

Thersites. I am a bastard too; I love bastards. . . .

What are these values which motivate human behavior? There appear to be at least three different kinds of values dealt with in Troilus: absolute; relative; and those which are the direct object of appetite. Absolute values are argued for by Hector; relative values are explained and manipulated by Ulysses; and the values of appetite are seen throughout the play, especially in scenes involving Troilus, Pandarus and Cressida, and in the railings of Thersites.

We will examine the various kinds of values in Troilus, starting with the scene where Shakespeare sets up the question of value in terms of whether or not to return Helen. The Greeks have given the Trojans an opportunity to end the war by returning Helen, and the discussion centers on the value of Helen--is she worth a war? Hector, at first, is the representative of absolute value, or intrinsic worth, and according to this mode of judgment, he decides that "she is not worth what she doth cost / The keeping." Troilus, who expresses the belief that a man can create value by his choices, objects: "What's aught, but as 'tis valued?" and Hector replies, "But value dwells not in particular will: / It holds his estimate and dignity / As well wherein 'tis precious of itself / As in the prizer." Troilus defends the concept of a man's choice creating value which must then be treated as unchangeable, at least with respect to one's responsibility to it, if not to its

Take heed; the quarrel's most ominous to us;
if the son of a whore fight for a whore, he tempts
judgment. Farewell, bastard. (Troilus V.7.13-22)

These scenes provide a negative comment on the anxious dangers of striving to hold a place in the man-made hierarchy of degree. It's safer not to try.

intrinsic value. The scene continues:

Troilus. I take today a wife, and my election
Is led on in the conduct of my will;
My will enkindled by mine eyes and ears--
Two traded pilots 'twixt the dangerous shores
Of will and judgement--how may I avoid,
Although my will distaste what it elected,
The wife I chose? There can be no evasion
To blench from this and to stand firm by honour. (Troilus II.
2.51-68) ²³

There seems to be no way to reconcile the kinds of values represented by Hector and Troilus. Hector believes that objects have intrinsic or absolute value; Troilus believes that one can assign value to objects by an act of will and choice based ultimately on perception, a mode of appetite. Paris goes even further in asserting the subjectivity of values, saying, "I would have the soil of her fair rape / Wiped off in honourable keeping her" (Troilus II.2.148-49). He would claim that the value of an action can actually be changed by future actions, a more extreme position of relativism than Troilus'. Hector, who believes in absolute value, argues that there are moral laws of nature and of nations which require that Helen be returned to her husband:

If Helen then be wife to Sparta's king,
As it is known she is, these moral laws
Of nature and of nations speak aloud
To have her back returned. Thus to persist
In doing wrong extenuates not wrong,
But makes it much more heavy. (Troilus II.2.183-88)

²³ Note that Cupid is absent from this argument. Troilus insists on his personal responsibility for sustaining choices made by appetite. His problem will be that although he may remain constant in his assigning of value, the object of his appetite is free to change (unlike a pearl) into something other than what he values.

These absolute laws complement the absolute values of objects and persons. However, although he is able to identify absolute value, and recognize absolute moral codes, Hector proceeds to make a choice that challenges the validity of all that he has so far defended, recommending that they keep Helen, "For 'tis a cause that hath no mean dependence / Upon our joint and several dignities" (Troilus II.2.192-93). This contradicts all that he has said so far, since if value is absolute, it could not be dependent upon what one did, but upon what what one was. However, although honor, or dignity is an absolute value for Hector, it is not dependent upon what one is, but upon how other men see one, as the manipulations of Ulysses will make clear to Achilles. Given the ultimate choice between his faith in absolute values, and his desire for being perceived as having value, Hector's choice is to act in such a way as to enhance his perceived value.

This sudden switch in Hector's value system is startling until one considers his role in this play in relation to his traditional role in other Troy stories. Hector is the best man in Troy; that has been the case since the Iliad. And Hector has never been good enough to save Troy. That also has been the case since the Iliad. Generally medieval versions of the Troy story have stressed Hector's excellence and dealt gently with his failures. Benoit's delicate scene where Hector ceases fighting when he recognizes his cousin Ajax, and calls off the near-victorious Trojans, losing the last possible chance to save Troy, is typical of the gentle treatment Hector receives. Guido takes the same scene and makes a few sour comments about how a man ought to take advantage of good fortune, but he also acknowledges that the fates were

against Hector. In general, Troy stories have many scenes showing the excellence of Hector, and very few demonstrating his failings.

Shakespeare has epitomized Hector as the chivalric hero, and he has carefully chosen some of Hector's worst moments to portray the hero in action.²⁴ We first hear of the good knight Hector wrathful because Ajax had struck him down in battle: "Hector, whose patience / is as a virtue fixed, today was moved: / He chid Andromache and struck his armourer". (Troilus I.2.4-6). This is scarcely a dignified introduction to a hero.

Then there is the scene in the Council which we have just discussed, where Hector gives all the right reasons for returning Helen, and then suddenly opts for glory. There is a conflict between Hector's rational belief in intrinsic value and the related ability to know right from wrong, and his thirst for glory, which is a basic component of the chivalric role he embodies.²⁵

The combat between Ajax and Hector, that starts with such elevated pomp and challenge, and ends so anti-climactically, is also less than an ideal presentation of Hector. This challenge, which is to determine the value of a lady and the value of a man, fails to do either. There

²⁴ Tillyard remarks, "Hector, for all his nobility, stands for a double ineffectiveness: personally for a mind divided between reasonable, realistically moral, action, and unreasoning point of honour; symbolically, for the anachronistic continuance of the chivalric code into a world which has abandoned it" (Shakespeare's Problem Plays, pp. 66-67).

²⁵ Tillyard comments on Hector in Troilus: "He has a perfectly clear understanding . . . But there is a divorce between his wit, in which he is so strong, and his will, in which he is so defective" (Shakespeare's Problem Plays, pp. 65-66).

are two main traditions for such a combat: Book VII of the Iliad,²⁶ and the medieval tradition, present in the Troie, Historia, and Recuyell, among others, of a potentially decisive combat between Hector and Ajax, where the Trojans could have won the war if Hector had not refused to continue fighting against his cousin Ajax, and had not called off the general battle for the rest of the day. Neither of these traditions presents Hector in a very good light, although the medieval versions are restrained in their criticism of him. In the Iliad, "Hector, though he is evenly matched with Ajax, receives more serious blows than he is able to give,"²⁷ and the fight itself is of no particular consequence. The medieval tradition of this combat between Hector and Ajax represents what is probably the worst failure of Hector, although it is a failure based on his chivalric impulses, which prove more destructive to Troy than the amorous greed of other men.

The death of Hector involves an aspect of his behavior that is not always stressed in the medieval tradition, although Lydgate does deal with it in the Troy Book.²⁸ The Recuyell merely says that Hector,

²⁶ Presson, p. 45.

²⁷ Presson, p. 46.

²⁸ John Lydgate, Lydgate's Troy Book, ed. by Henry Bergen, Early English Text Society, Extra Series 97, 103, and 106, Three Parts reprinted in two volumes (1906, 1908, 1910; rpt. Millwood, New York: Kraus Reprint Co, 1975). Hereafter cited as Troy Book. As David Benson says, "The death in Guido is merely a chance of war, but Lydgate, relying on Christine de Pisan's L'Epistre Othea, provides Hector with a fatal flaw --and thus provides the reader with an explanation of his death" ("Prudence, Othea and Lydgate's Death of Hector," The American Benedictine Review 26, p. 115).

having taken a Greek captive, "moche queyntly and rychely armed / And for to lede hym oute of the ooste at his ease / had caste his shelde behynde hym at his backe / And had lefte his breste discouerte and as he was in thys poynte and toke none hede of Achylles that cam pryuely vnto hym and putte thys spere wyth in his body / And Hector fyll doun dede" (Recuyell III, p. 613). There is no blame placed on Hector in this version. Lydgate does present a less attractive version of the death of Hector:

Reklesly, þe story maketh mynde,
He cast his shelde at his bak be-hynde,
To welde hym silf at more liberte,
And for to han opportunyte
To spoillen hym, and for no wyȝt spare,
So þat his brest disarmyd was & bare. (Troy Book III.5375-80)

Shakespeare relates the death of Hector directly to his greed for the armor of an enemy. He pursues a Greek in order to kill him and strip his armor. Having done so, he comments: "Most putrefiéd core, so fair without, / Thy goodly armour thus hath cost thy life. / Now is my day's work done" (Troilus V.8.1-3). Hector disarms, having disarmed the dead Greek, and Achilles and his men come upon the unprotected Hector. Hector objects to their intention of killing him, saying "I am unarmed; forgo this vantage, Greek" (Troilus V.8.9). That is of no use, and they kill the helpless Hector. The comment about the putrefied core, so fair without, does not apply very aptly to a freshly killed Greek. It does apply rather well to the chivalric value system of Hector, that looks so shining and elegant, discourses of reason and human feelings, and then chooses glory over good sense; kinship over successful combat; and armor stripping over prudence. Absolute (chivalric) values are not very

sucessful in Troilus, and end with the death of Hector, dragged at the tail of Achilles' horse.

Relative values are another approach to the question of what men are and what motivates them to act. This point of view is developed by Ulysses, and is expressed most fully in his famous speech on Degree.²⁹ Degree at first appears to be the same as the medieval Great Chain of Being or Great Chain of Love that was thought to bind all elements in the universe into an unbreakable, harmonious hierarchy of beings.³⁰ However, Ulysses' conception of Degree proves to be political, not universal, although he compares it to the orderliness of the heavens, with the sun properly dominant (Troilus I.3.85 ff.), and warns that if Degree is not observed among men the outcome will be as chaotic as "when the planets / In evil mixture to disorder wander" (Troilus I.3.94-95). He warns:

O, when degree is shaken,
Which is the ladder of all high designs,
The enterprise is sick! How could communities,
Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities,

²⁹ W. R. Elton makes a strong case for Ulysses' exposition of relative values, not unlike those developed by Hobbes, in "Shakespeare's Ulysses and the Problem of Value," in Shakespeare Studies: An Annual Gathering of Research, Criticism and Reviews, II, ed. by J. Leeds Barroll (Cincinnati: Univ. of Cincinnati, 1967), pp. 95-111.

³⁰ Arthur O. Lovejoy describes this as "the conception of the universe as a 'Great Chain of Being,' composed of an immense, or . . . of an infinite, number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents, which barely escape non-existence, through 'every possible' grade up to the ens perfectissimum . . . every one of them differing from that immediately above and that immediately below it by the 'least possible' degree of difference" (The Great Chain of Being /1936; rpt. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1973/, p. 59).

Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
 The primogenitive and due of birth,
 Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels,
 But by degree, stand in authentic place? (Troilus I.3.101-08)

Place, or position, is the key to the problem of values as presented by Ulysses, who not only identifies Achilles as being out of his place, but plots and maneuvers to put him back in his place.³¹ Ulysses is very concerned with the need to maintain Degree and order in political relationships, and warns: "Take but degree away, untune that string, / And hark what discord follows!" (Troilus I.3.109-10). This is in no way the natural order of the cosmos, the medieval Great Chain of related being; this is the orderliness of a hierarchical state, where the elements in the hierarchy must be kept in their proper places by means of policy, and where the alternative to such order is the universal wolf of appetite, or self-willed indulgent disorder, which Ulysses greatly dreads.³² It must be noted that value in such a system is not intrinsic, or absolute, but a matter of the position of a man, action, or object relative to the other elements in the hierarchy.³³ Thus, to know

³¹ Miskimin comments that Ulysses' "affirmation of ideal order is subverted by its speaker and our knowledge of his cunning, and the destructive purpose to which his wisdom is to be put" (p. 162). However, one can argue that Ulysses is not destructive at all, but attempting to reconstruct a world that is falling apart.

³² Tillyard notes that "In Ulysses' speech on Degree the angelic end of the chain of being is omitted; and this is typical of the whole of Troilus and Cressida. The human beings here provide their own background" (Shakespeare's Problem Plays, p. 84).

³³ Elton comments that "Despite an influential portrayal of 'the Elizabethan world picture' as unaltered from the medieval, its notable features were complexity and variety, inconsistency and fluidity." He goes on to note that although Shakespeare's "dramas assert the 'great chain of being', for instance, and the hierarchy of order, they also as

where a man is in the hierarchy is to know what he is worth; however, as time passes, his deeds, his position, and hence his value, can change, which is what happens to Achilles.

Keeping the chain of command in an orderly hierarchy is evidently the "specialty of rule" which Ulysses charges has "been neglected" (Troilus I.3.78); it is the inadequacy of the ruler that is at fault: "When that the general is not like the hive / To whom the foragers shall all repair, / What honey is expected?" (Troilus I.3.81-83). After the main body of his speech on degree, Ulysses turns to the particulars and says:

Great Agamemnon,
This chaos, when degree is suffocate,
Follows the choking.
And this neglect of degree it is
That by a pace goes backward, with a purpose
It hath to climb. The general's disdained
By him one step below, he by the next,
That next by him beneath; so every step,
Exemplified by the first pace that is sick
Of his superior, grows to an envious fever
Of pale and bloodless emulation. (Troilus I.3.124-34)³⁴

There is a universal order, and there are men who ought to pattern their lives upon that order, but who do not do so, and will not unless their leaders set an example for them to follow. In short, man is not a

frequently act out the opposite, the reality of disorder" ("Shakespeare and the thought of his age" in A New Companion, p. 180).

³⁴ It is valuable to recall the malice of the hateful fates that ruined men's lives in Guido's Historia, or the unexplained malice of Fortune in Benoit's Troie. In Troilus the "envious fever" is purely human.

natural member of that universal hierarchy of being, but only belongs to it if he is put into his place by other men, his rulers.³⁵ Although there are many references to men as beasts in Troilus, especially in the scenes involving Thersites, man is not a beast, a natural member of the natural hierarchy of being; he is something else, and just what else is a question constantly raised, and never answered in this play, except to say that any particular man is a man and is himself and not any other man. As to his value, his position in the hierarchy should be determined by his worth, as well as his worth being determined by his position in the hierarchy, yet as we will see in the case of Ulysses manipulating Achilles, a man's value is a function of how he appears to other men, not an intrinsic and absolute quality, such as the scales of a fish, or the mane of a lion.

It is the mockery of Achilles that is destroying the hierarchy of command necessary to keep the Greek army functioning properly. Achilles "Lies mocking our designs" (Troilus I.3.146), as Ulysses complains, and this behavior of a leader spreads downward through the ranks, destroying

³⁵ Johan Huizinga stresses the absolute value placed on each position of the hierarchy of being in the Middle Ages: "Now if the degrees of the social edifice are conceived as the lower steps of the throne of the Eternal, the value assigned to each order will not depend on its utility, but on its sanctity--that is to say, its proximity to the highest place. . . . To the catholic soul the unworthiness of the persons never compromises the sacred character of the institution. . . . The estates of society cannot but be venerable and lasting, because they all have been ordained by God. The conception of society in the Middle Ages is statical, not dynamical" (The Waning of the Middle Ages /1924; rpt. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954/, p. 58). It is against such a static background that Ulysses acts out his politically dynamic scheme to order a disordered world.

the dignity of the leaders, and as a direct consequence, destroying the respect of the followers. Ulysses complains that:

All our abilities, gifts, natures, shapes,
 Severals and generals of grace exact,
 Achievements, plots, orders, preventions,
 Excitements to the field or speech for truce,
 Success or loss, what is or is not, serves
 As stuff for these two to make paradoxes. (Troilus I.3.179-84)

These attributes, like the virtues and graces that Pandarus listed earlier as the "Spice and salt that season a man" (Troilus I.2.256), are properties of men, desirable attributes, but they are not the essence, the very being of a man. They are variable, interchangeable with other men, and subject to the eyes of the beholder. If mocked, these attributes lose dignity; their worth is not intrinsic or absolute, but is dependent on being perceived and valued by other human beings.

When a servant describes a woman to Pandarus, saying that she is "the mortal Venus, the heart-blood of beauty, love's / indivisible soul," Pandarus replies, "Who, my cousin Cressida?" But the servant retorts, "No, sir, Helen. Could you not find out that / by her attributes?" (Troilus III.1.33-37). Evidently the attributes of a beautiful woman are not unique to her, but can belong to any or many beautiful women.

A major description of a man as a collection of attributes occurs when Alexander describes Ajax to Cressida:

This man, lady, hath robbed many beasts
 of their particular additions: he is as valiant as the lion,
 churlish as the bear, slow as the elephant--a man into
 whom nature hath so crowded humours that his valour
 is crushed into folly, his folly forced with discretion.
 There is no man hath a virtue that he hath not a glimpse
 of, nor any man an attain but he carries some stain of
 it; he is melancholy without cause and merry against

the hair; he hath the joints of everything, but everything so out of joint that he is a gouty Briareus, many hands and no use, or a purblind Argus, all eyes and no sight. (Troilus I.2.19-30).

Besides reading like a parody of the heroic "vertue" and qualities of Hercules in the Recuyell, this is strongly reminiscent of Montaigne's essay, "An Apology of Raymond Sebond," where there is a long section with many examples illustrating how man possesses no unique attributes which some other animal does not also possess, such as language, compassion, reason, and so on, except perhaps the capacity to make war. He concludes this section on man's lack of unique attributes: "It seemeth verily, that Nature for the comfort of our miserable and wretched condition, hath allotted us no other portion, but presumption. It is therefore (as Epictetus saith) that man hath nothing that is properly his owne, but the use of his opinions. Our hereditarie portion is nothing but smoke and wind. . . . Man . . . possesseth goods in imagination, and evils essentially."³⁶

If Patroclus can imitate the attributes of Agamemnon, what other than his attributes is Agamemnon? If Cressida as well as Helen can be identified by the same attributes, what other than their attributes are these women? If Ajax is a collection of attributes drawn from animals and other men, what other than these attributes is Ajax? We get no answer to this crucial question which pervades Troilus, except, a man is himself, and not other than himself, whatever that may be.

³⁶ Montaigne's Essays, trans. John Florio, Intro. by L. C. Harmer, 3 Vols., Vol. II, Everyman's Library No. 441 (1910; rpt. London: Dent, 1965), p. 187.

The attributes of a man, which locate him in the social hierarchy, are vulnerable, since they are a function of men perceiving another man. When Ulysses begins his manipulations of Achilles' self-esteem, in order to put him back into his proper place in the hierarchy, he initiates his design by attacking not Achilles the man, but the attributes of Achilles. He tells Patroclus, speaking of Achilles:

Much attribute he hath, and much the reason
 Why we ascribe it to him; yet all his virtues,
 Not virtuously on his own part beheld,
 Do in our eyes begin to lose their gloss,
 Yea, like fair fruit in an unwholesome dish,
 Are like to rot untasted. (Troilus II.3.115-20)

Ulysses proceeds with his plot to snub Achilles, set up Ajax to fight Hector, and pretend that Ajax is the better man. By so doing, he is stripping away the honor of Achilles, which is dependent upon the attributes of Achilles being perceived as heroic by other men. Achilles notices that he is being ignored, and comments:

And not a man, for being simply man,
 Hath any honour but honour for those honours
 That are without him--as place, riches, and favour,
 Prizes of accident as oft as merit. (Troilus III.3.80-83)

However, he thinks that only Fortune could remove these attributes from him (Troilus III.3.88), until he encounters Ulysses who instructs him further, saying:

no man is the lord of anything,
 Though in and of him there be much consisting,
 Till he communicate his parts to others;
 Nor doth he of himself know them for aught
 Till he behold them formed in th'applause
 Where they're extended. (Troilus III.3.115-20)

A man neither controls (is lord of) or even can judge his own attributes, except in the responses his actions bring back to him from other people. All of the qualities that would place a man in the chain of degree of human society are dependent upon his actions and other men's responses to his actions. There is no absolute or intrinsic value of a man in the social world as described by Ulysses.

Not only is a man in isolation from society without value, according to Ulysses, but even the value generated by honorable deeds is not value forever, but only value for a brief time; it must be renewed by further actions, or it will decay into valueless oblivion. Ulysses warns Achilles:

O, let not virtue seek
Remuneration for the thing it was;
For beauty, wit,
High birth, vigour of bone, desert in service,
Love, friendship, charity, are subject all
To envious and calumniating Time.
.....
The present eye praises the present object:
Then marvel not, thou great and complete man,
That all the Greeks begin to worship Ajax;
Since things in motion sooner catch the eye
Than what not stirs. (Troilus III.3.169-74; 180-84)

This is very different from the heroic nature of Hercules in the Recuyell, where his very being is heroic; heroism is not merely an attribute of Hercules, it is Hercules. His widow mourns him saying, "He was the glorye of the men. Ther was neuer to hym none lyke. ne neuer shall be" (Recuyell II, p. 501). Men in Troilus can never attain the security of such glory. Only their deeds, their attributes, can be on occasion glorious, and even that glory will quickly fade and disappear if not constantly renewed by further deeds. There can be no

eternal fame for such a man, fleeing oblivion until his death by constant action, and then sinking into oblivion by the fact that after his death he can no longer renew his glory by further deeds.³⁷

Ulysses' vision of the order of degree is certainly preferable to the chaos of appetite, but it is an artificial order, produced by great effort and anxiety, where one's position can only be maintained by constant striving. It is the antithesis of the natural order, or chain of being, where one's position is located by what one is, not by what one does.

So far we have considered two sources of value in Troilus, the absolute value of intrinsic worth, as expressed (but not really acted upon) by Hector when he estimates the worth of Helen and acknowledges the laws of nature and morality that require a wife to be returned to her husband, and the value of relative worth, as expressed by Ulysses, who understands value to be a function not of what you are, but of what you do and how men perceive you doing it. We have also noted that Troilus attempts to claim that although value is relative, produced by human will and choice, it should then be treated as an absolute, as in the keeping of Helen once taken, or in constancy in love, once begun.

The third source of value in Troilus, and the one that ultimately dominates and controls men's actions, is appetite, the "universal wolf."

³⁷ This sense of the instability of human existence is closely echoed in Montaigne's essay on "Raymond Sebond": "there is no constant existence, neither of our being, nor of the objects. And we, and our judgement, and all mortall things else do uncessantly rowle, turne, and passe away. Thus can nothing be certainly established, nor of the one, nor of the other; buth the judgeing and the judged being in continuall alteration and motion" (Essays, p. 323).

Although Ulysses strives to resist the motivation of appetite by his manipulations of the chain of degree and human self-esteem, most of the characters in Troilus act to achieve what they desire, or have appetite for, not what they decide will enhance their self-esteem in the eyes of men, or what they feel is honorable as an absolute value.

According to Ruth Anderson's study of Elizabethan psychology, the appetites are "inclinations by which the soul likes or dislikes whatever comes to it . . . The second form of appetite, that which arises without touch, follows imagination or thought. It possesses a desiring or concupiscent and an angry or irascible inclination from which spring the affections of the heart. These affections, especially in their initial stages, are also called motions. They are impulses which incite the soul to reach out for the good and to withdraw from the evil."³⁸ She goes on to describe the relationship of appetite to will and reason: "Like the sensitive appetite, will is blind, ordained to follow the light of reason . . . Appetite may desire anything that seems good . . . but will does not incline to possess or to do whatever reason pronounces good unless reason also teaches a way to obtain or to do the good."³⁹ Here we see the center of the problem as developed in Troilus. The appetite is a faculty of the soul which responds to stimuli, whether external or internal. It is supposedly attracted to what seems good and repelled from what seems evil. Ideally, its impulses are guided by reason. However, in the world of Troilus, there is no reliable source

³⁸ Anderson, pp. 18-19.

³⁹ Anderson, p. 22.

of absolute value by which to identify what is good and what is less good, and hence, the supposed ability of the will guided by reason to discriminate between more and less good objects of desire or appetite is not going to function properly. That is why Ulysses warns that if degree is neglected:

Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself. (Troilus I.3.119-24)

If objects, actions and men cannot be assigned value in the hierarchy (e.g., their degree of worth), then the reason, which is supposed to be able to guide the appetites and will of a man, will not be able to function properly. How could a more rational choice be made between two desired goals, such as peace and the keeping of Helen, if there were no way to discriminate between their values? We have already seen how, in the Council debate, Hector was able to assign intrinsic value to Helen--she was not worth keeping; she was not worth the loss of Trojan lives. However, he was not able to place this into a system of action which would send her back to Greece, because he also assigned intrinsic value to dignity. He was not able to set the two values into a scale, or hierarchy of values, by means of which he could rationally conclude that the proper and best course of action would be to return Helen. Instead he says that they ought to return Helen and that they ought to keep Helen. Without a functioning scale of values, rational decision making is impossible, and yet the only scale of values available in Troilus' world is the artificially constructed hierarchy of the Greek

army which is barely maintained by the policy of Ulysses.

Without degree, without a recognized scale of values, there could be no criteria by which reason could guide the will and appetites.

Cressida, a creature of appetites, comments:

Ah, poor our sex! this fault in us I find,
The error of our eye directs our mind;
What error leads must err--O, then conclude
Minds swayed by eyes are full of turpitude. (*Troilus* V.2.109-12)

This is a world in which the subjectivity of values becomes a function of the subjectivity of perception. Montaigne remarks "wee know no more how things are in sooth and truth; For: nothing comes unto us but falsified and altered by our senses."⁴⁰ In a world where the senses create values, one can expect only chaos and disaster to follow.

Ulysses warns that following the appetites will lead to chaos, and to a great extent he is proved correct by the action of the play. The disorder envisaged by Ulysses, and actualized in the confused actions of *Troilus*, is an outward expression of disorder similar to the disorder of madness. In the first scene of Act I, Troilus told Pandarus: "I am mad / In Cressid's love" (*Troilus* I.1.53-54). Anderson explains that in the psychology of the Elizabethans, "In the case of actual madness the world becomes a disorganized state in which the principles of justice and morality no longer hold."⁴¹ Troy and the Greek camp as

⁴⁰ "Sebond", *Essays*, p. 321.

⁴¹ Anderson, p. 106.

well appear to be just such disorganized states, where events are caused by men who act out their passions with little regard for the effects of their actions on other men.

The capacity of humans to act, even with good intentions, is limited. When Troilus is about to part from Cressida, he warns her to "be not tempted" because:

something may be done that we will not,
And sometimes we are devils to ourselves,
When we will tempt the frailty of our powers,
Presuming on their changeful potency. (Troilus IV.4.91-97)

There is no need of devils, fates, or gods to harm men in Troilus. Men alone, acting out their appetites with no regard for other human beings, are quite enough to ruin Troy and all the people in it.

The theme of appetite is developed throughout the play, beginning with an extended comparison of Troilus' love for Cressida as appetite for a cake. Pandarus explains that Troilus must be patient, saying, "He that / will have a cake out of the wheat must tarry the / grinding" and when Troilus protests that he has tarried, Pandarus continues:

Ay, to the leavening; but there's yet in the
word hereafter, the kneading, the making of the cake,
the heating of the oven, and the baking; nay, you must
stay the cooling too, or you may chance to burn your
lips. (Troilus I.1.14-28)

This inelegant image of love as appetite is reinforced later by a far more refined expression of love as appetite, as Troilus awaits his assignation with Cressida, saying:

I am giddy: expectation whirls me round.
Th'imaginary relish is so sweet

That it enchants my sense. What will it be
 When that the watery palate tastes indeed
 Love's thrice repured nectar? (Troilus III.2.18-22)

And indeed, Troilus fears that this indulgence of pure appetite, known as love, will result in a destruction of his ability to discriminate, just the sort of chaos that Ulysses warned was the result of loss of degree and the releasing of appetite as the source of behavior. Troilus continues:

death, I fear me,
 Swooning distraction, or some joy too fine,
 Too subtle-potent, tuned too sharp in sweetness.
 For the capacity of my ruder powers;
 I fear it much, and I do fear besides
 That I shall lose distinction in my joys,
 As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps
 The enemy flying. (Troilus III.2.22-29)

The unbridled appetite of love can produce emotional chaos, just as the uncontrolled appetite of hatred can produce the chaos of war.

In his relationship to Cressida, Troilus places the most value on his own desire, not on her. His anticipation of spending the night with her is more a concern with the effects on himself of the infinity of his desire, than his concern with her value as a person. He tells Cressida: "This is / the monstrosity in love, lady--that the will is infinite / and the execution confined; that the desire is boundless / and the act a slave to limit" (Troilus III.2.79-82).

Troilus is also the one who objects in the Council when Hector says that Helen is not worth Trojan lives:

Fie, fie my brother!
 Weigh you the worth and honour of a king
 So great as our dread father in a scale

Of common ounces? Will you with counters sum
 The past-proportion of his infinite,
 And buckle in a waist most fathomless
 With spans and inches so diminutive
 As fears and reasons? (Troilus II.2.25-32)

Troilus expresses the aspect of appetite and will that craves the infinite, and it is precisely the infinity of will and desire that represent the greatest threat to social stability once the chain of degree is broken and appetite, rather than reason, controls human behavior.

Troilus uses appetite metaphors to speak of his love at various times in the play, ranging from when he tells Cressida, "Praise us / as we are tasted" (Troilus III.2.89-90), to his comment that "still sweet love is food for fortune's tooth" (Troilus IV.5.293). When he knows that Cressida has been unfaithful to him, he comments: "The fragments, scraps, the bits and greasy relics / Of her o'ereaten faith are given to Diomed" (Troilus V.2.159-60). The final debasement of this metaphor of love as food comes when Thersites says: "What's / become of the wenching rogues? I think they have / swallowed one another. I would laugh at that miracle; / yet in a sort lechery eats itself" (Troilus V.4.31-34). The metaphor of love as appetite is also applied in relation to the love of Paris for Helen. Priam criticizes Paris' opinions in the Council, remarking: "Paris, you speak / Like one besotted on your sweet delights; / You have the honey still, but these the gall" (Troilus II.2.142-44). Troilus acts on the basis of appetite, seeking Cressida, and yet he attempts to elevate the object of his appetite into an absolute of beauty to match his self-image of his own value as an absolute of truth. This is rather an existential approach, attempting to create value by choice, and then to live as if it were an

absolute value, although man-made.

When he has to finally confront the failure of his attempt to elevate the object of his appetite into an absolute value, Troilus' response is to assert that the entire value system (of absolute values) cannot be true if Cressida is false:

This she? No; this is Diomed's Cressida.
 If beauty have a soul, this is not she;
 If souls guide vows, if vows be sanctimonies,
 If sanctimony be the gods' delight,
 If there be rule in unity itself,
 This is not she. (Troilus V.2.137-42)

This is the crux of Troilus' problem, and indeed of the problems of the value systems examined and discarded in the play. These are the absolute values of beauty, soul, sanctimony, the gods, and unity itself. If these absolute values exist, then Cressida is not Cressida. However, since we, as well as Troilus, realize that in fact Cressida is Cressida, the logical conclusion is that these absolute values do not exist, and that there is not even "rule in unity itself." Troilus continues:

O madness of discourse,
 That cause sets up with and against itself!
 Bifold authority! where reason can revolt
 Without perdition, and loss assume all reason
 Without revolt. This is, and is not, Cressid! (Troilus V.2.
 142-46)

This passage recalls the Council scene, where Hector was able to set up reason against itself, claiming that it was right to return Helen, and yet that they should keep Helen. It refers to a world in which the standards by means of which rational judgments can be made have been broken or lost. For Troilus, Cressida both is that absolute she implied by the limit of her name, and a creature composed of attributes which

can shift and change and behave differently from day to day. She both is and is not she. She is the creature perceived as having absolute intrinsic being and value, and she is the creature perceived as having value relative to her actions and to the opinions of men. It is the essential nature of the universe, and of human beings in it, that Troilus finally questions:

Within my soul there doth conduce a fight
 Of this strange nature, that a thing inseparate
 Divides more wider than the sky and earth;
 And yet the spacious breadth of this division
 Admits no orifex for a point as subtle
 As Ariachne's broken woof to enter.
 Instance, O instance! strong as Pluto's gates:
 Cressid is mine, tied with the bonds of heaven.
 Instance, O instance! strong as heaven itself:
 The bonds of heaven are slipped, dissolved
 and loosed. (Troilus V.2.147-56)

This seems to be a reference to the bonds of the Chain of Love which Chaucer uses at the end of Book III of his Troilus and Criseyde:

"That that the world with feith, which that is stable,
 Diverseth so his stowndes concordynge,
 That elementz that ben so discordable
 Holden a bond perpetuely durynge." (T&C III.1751-54)

Of course, when Chaucer's Criseyde proves unfaithful, that is a sign that men should turn from love of women to love of God. Not so in Shakespeare's Troilus. For Troilus takes Cressida's unfaithfulness to be a proof not of the instability of the world and all in it, but as a proof of the bonds of the very heavens "slipped, dissolved and loosed." We are dealing in Troilus with a catastrophic disorder of universal, not merely of human proportions, where the objects of perception and appetite (e.g., other people) do not prove to be what they seem to be,

and there is no possibility of either right judgment or right action.

The relationship between love and hatred is basic to the Troy legends and the metaphor of appetite is used in Troilus to express hatred as well as love. The link between hatred and love is clearest where Troilus observes Cressida with Diomedes and reacts: "as much as I do Cressid love, / So much by weight hate I her Diomed" (Troilus V.2.167-68). We have already noticed Ulysses compare appetite to a "universal wolf" which, "So doubly seconded with will and power, / Must make perforce an universal prey, / And last eat up himself" (Troilus I.3.121-24). After the Greeks have received the challenge from Hector, Ulysses and Nestor discuss the problem using metaphors for appetite. Ulysses comments: "For here the Trojans taste our dear'st repute / With their fin'st palate" (Troilus I.3.337-38). After Ulysses has explained his plan to "physic" Achilles, Nestor says:

Now I begin to relish thy advice,
And I will give a taste thereof forthwith
To Agamemnon. Go we to him straight.
Two curs shall tame each other: pride alone
Must tarre the mastiffs on, as 'twere their bone. (Troilus
I.3.387-91)

The Trojan Council opens with Priam relaying a message from Nestor in which he speaks of "the hot digestion of this comorant war" (Troilus II.2.6). Appetite is a universal wolf that even consumes itself; the war is a cormorant that digests all those things dear to men.

Pride is spoken of in terms of appetite, as when Agamemnon tells Ajax:

He that is proud eats up himself:
pride is his own glass, his own trumpet, his own

chronicle; and whatever praises itself but in the deed,
devours the deed in the praise. (Troilus II.3.153-56)

Ulysses tells Achilles: "How one man eats into another's pride, / While pride is fasting in his wantonness!" (Troilus III.3.136-37). And even Time devours the deeds of men, as when Ulysses comments: "Those scraps are good deeds past, which are devoured / As fast as they are made" (Troilus III.3.148-49). This universe of creatures devouring one another is the vision of natural man presented in Troilus. It is far different from the praise given to the natural hero Hercules in the Recuyell. Men are no longer at home in nature, or rather the quality of nature has changed, from a benign place which nurtured men, to a disorderly cosmos in which the most disorderly of all creatures is that one of great appetites--man.

Love and hatred are both appetites; they are both based on men doing what gratifies their desires, not on what seems good to their rational minds. If appetite indeed is the motivation for behavior in the world of Troilus, if desire is the source of value, even while the value of the object of desire can shift and change, and the ability of the rational mind to choose is overwhelmed by the lack of hierarchical intrinsic values in the world, then Pandarus is the most fitting of intermediaries, and an apt figure to speak the Epilogue to the play. He is the stimulator, the facilitator of appetite. In the Epilogue, Pandarus speaks not of the fall of Troy, but of "Pandar's fall" (Troilus V.10.47). Love as appetite has fallen, but hatred as appetite continues, and the war goes on. This focus on appetite as a source of value can be seen as a natural continuation of a tradition of Troy

stories from which the gods had been removed, as well as fate and fortune. The only causes left for disaster are the actions of men, and these actions stem from impulses of appetite that have no cause beyond the irrational nature of desire, freed from the controls of reason, since the stable hierarchy by which value could be estimated and choice made, is absent.

Shakespeare's Troilus has gone beyond the solution of Christian free will which was developed in medieval versions of the Troy story, and he does not offer the solace of Christian salvation, as did Chaucer to his contemporaries, if not to the inhabitants of Troy. In this play the will may be free, but if it is not possible to form correct rational judgments, the only result will be the free will freely endorsing the appetites of men.

The problem of how to know what one ought to do was always implicit in the concept of free will, but Shakespeare's Troilus is the first version of the Troy story that we have examined which unequivocally faces the anguish of human decision-making in the context of a disorderly universe where no malice other than human malice, rooted in unbridled appetite, causes the fall of Troy.

Conclusion

The most significant phenomenon to emerge from this study of Troy stories is the gradual withdrawal of the gods, as sources of causation, from the world of human experience. The inevitable result of this withdrawal is chaos, which is experienced as very painful by those aware of it. Few authors offer any hope for the ability of human beings to replace the lost causation of the gods with purposive, positive human actions which could create a new order. Of the works that we have examined, only the Eneas and the Recuyell express the hope that human abilities can create a new order to replace the lost order of the omnipresent, causative pagan deities. The Eneas bases that hope on the human potential for redemption by means of love, while the Recuyell presents the superhero Hercules as conquering all tyrants, and restoring, or creating, order in a chaotic world. However, even the demi-god Hercules is killed by treachery, leaving a world no longer protected from the forces of passion and disorder. We would have to conclude that only the author of the Eneas presents much hope for the ability of human beings, left on their own, to create order and happiness out of the confusion of experience, and that order can only be created if one is struck by Amors, the one positive binding force left in the vacuum after the departure of the pagan gods.

One question which strikes so profoundly is why are the works of the Christian Middle Ages even more bereft of hope for human happiness

and order than the pre-Christian poems of Homer and Virgil? I think that the answer is related to one of the essential tenets of Christianity: free will. Although the Christian God is and was worshipped as caring for human beings far more than were the gods of Homer or Virgil, Christians are supposed to be free, that is, they must be themselves the causative sources of their own behavior. And it is precisely this burden of freedom that we see applied again and again to the fall of Troy by writers of the Christian Middle Ages, culminating in the total freedom of chaotic human impulses in the Troilus of Shakespeare.

I suspect that the story of Troy was especially important to medieval writers because it dealt with a time that was specifically pre-Christian, thus allowing them to explore the dilemma of human freedom without encountering the tensions of heretical opinions upon the paradoxical role of the Christian God in the affairs of the Christian Middle Ages. Troy was essentially a laboratory for examining human failure; and unlike that other crux of human failure, the Garden of Eden, the theological implications could be skirted by stressing the fact that it was pre-Christian, and thus the Trojans and the Greeks were most emphatically on their own.

This is not to say that Homer and Virgil deny the possibility of human freedom, at least under certain conditions. Homer, especially, makes it very clear that human errors of behavior set off the events of the wrath in the Iliad; no one forced Achilles and Agamemnon to act as they did. However, once they did so, they set into motion an inexorable chain of events that had to work themselves out because they were caused by the will of Zeus. Within this series of events, men suffered, but

they were not particularly guilty or responsible for their behavior, and this innocence is especially marked in the two perfect victims, Patroclus and Hector.

Virgil is acutely aware of the concept of human freedom, but he presents it within a determined Romano-centric universe that does not allow for human freedom of action, but only of intention. The gods cause events to happen, manipulating human emotions which then instigate specific actions. Human responsibility is obscurely defined and one's ultimate response is compassion; the gods act, and men suffer from their own god-inspired misdeeds.

The conquering of disorder by the will of the ruling gods is essential to the world-views of both Homer and Virgil. Despite human suffering, despite the fall of Troy, Zeus or Jupiter will ultimately restore order to both men and to the gods. There is no vision of ultimate catastrophe, only of present suffering.

Chaos is immanent in the Christian Middle Ages. The pagan gods are gone as causal factors which can make events occur for reasons. They are replaced by middle-range, impersonal causal factors, such as Fortune, the fates, and Amors, which are not gods, strictly speaking, nor are they merely natural processes; they are vaguely allegorized terms used to explain why things happen, but they explain nothing at all. Fortune with her wheel is the ideal figure to represent the random universe in which events happen for no reason at all. Chaucer does introduce the Boethian conception of Fortune as under the Providence of God, but even he finds no worldly comfort in this and turns instead to the otherworldly solution of the love of God instead of the

love of a woman.

The two Renaissance versions that we examined did not even retain Chaucer's solution of turning away from the world to God. They present a Troy so secularized that there are no possible excuses for its fall except the behavior of men, and this behavior, in Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida, is random indeed, based on the whims of appetite alone. This world is just as chaotic as that of the Middle Ages, but utterly lacking in the assurance that there is another world to turn to.

There appears to be a relationship between the presence of non-human causal forces and the sense of the meaningfulness of worldly experiences. When gods are perceived and presented as the causes of events, those events have meaning quite literally, for a god or gods "meant" them to occur. When middle-range impersonal causal factors, such as Fortune or the fates control events, men experience woe without much sense of meaning, for no one person or god "meant" them to happen. And when men alone cause events, those events are, metaphysically considered, utterly meaningless. The further removed the gods are from men, the more difficult it becomes to explain why events occur, other than in a frightening, random fashion. The universe may still have an ultimate order (such as that of the Christian God in heaven), but that order does not seem to penetrate far below the sphere of the moon.

Appendix

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