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RELIGION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY

by

BINNAZ SAYARI

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate  
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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## PREFACE

A caricature I saw in a Turkish newspaper recently depicted an intellectual sitting in his Western-style home the decoration of which included an instrument in Turkish folk music, the ud, hung on its wall. To me, he seemed just as close to the Turkish people or culture as an American might, who has bought an ud as a souvenir while travelling in Turkey and has hung it on the wall of his Ohio living-room. That caricature hit home. Having been raised in Turkey as part of the Westernized elite, I have been socialized into viewing the mass culture through a Westerner's glasses.

Part of that culture which is alien to me and to many urban educated Turks of my generation is closely connected with Islam and Islamic traditions. This study is an attempt to show how a determined policy of culture change not only widened the elite-mass gap but also created specific problems in Turkey's political development stemming from its Islamic background. In a sense, therefore, this undertaking has been a personal catharsis of some sort for me. It has helped me to see the issue of Islam in Turkish politics through a wider perspective than the legacy of my education and upbringing would have called for.

My thanks are due to Professors Dankwart A. Rustow and Donald Zagoria of the City University of New York for their valuable suggestions and criticisms. Professor Rustow's deep knowledge of Turkish politics has helped me

eliminate many factual errors that the study might otherwise have contained. Both during the writing of this thesis and throughout my graduate years, I have benefited much from his advice, encouragement, and friendship. Professor Zagoria's criticisms of some of the theoretical underpinnings of the study have prompted me to be more precise about its larger theoretical implications. He has likewise been a constant source of help and encouragement during my graduate school years. In addition, I would also like to thank Professor Şerif Mardin of Boğaziçi University in İstanbul. He has read the entire manuscript, has made useful suggestions, and has kept my interest in the topic alive during the rather lonely phase of writing the draft away from the academic circle of the City University.

Finally, my special thanks are due to my husband, Dr. Sabri Sayarı of Boğaziçi University, for his constant encouragement, help, and last but not least, for his financial support of a "liberated" wife during the writing of this study. Needless to say, any errors of fact or judgment are solely my responsibility.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	4
List of Tables	7
Introduction	9
Chapter I      Religion and Change: Some Theoretical Perspectives	19
Chapter II     Islam as a Political Religion	64
Chapter III    Religion and Nation-Building: The Transformation of Cultural Symbols	98
Chapter IV     Religion and the Political Mobilization of the Turkish Peasantry	151
Chapter V      Religion, Parties, and Electoral Behavior: Changing Patterns and the Rise of the National Salvation Party	225
Chapter VI     A Comparative Perspective on Religion and Political Development: Buddhism and Politics in Sri Lanka	281
Conclusion	340
Bibliography	350

## LIST OF TABLES

- |          |  |
|----------|--|
| Table 1  | Polygamous Marriages in Turkey, by Type of Community   |
| Table 2  | Civil vs. Religious Marriages in Turkey, by Type of Community  |
| Table 3  | The Budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, 1945-1960   |
| Table 4  | Religious Organizations in Turkey, 1946-1960   |
| Table 5  | Reasons for Support of the NSP among Potential NSP Voters, 1973 Election   |
| Table 6  | Professions of NSP Members Elected to the Assembly in 1973   |
| Table 7  | Professions of NSP Candidates for the 1973 Election  |
| Table 8  | Age Distribution of NSP Candidates for the 1973 Election   |
| Table 9  | Urban-Rural Division of NSP Votes by Administrative District, 1973 Election  |
| Table 10 | The Ten Administrative Districts where the NSP Received the Highest Percentage of its Votes in the 1973 Election, by Degree and Rate of Urbanization |
| Table 11 | The Regional Strength of the NSP in the 1973 Election, by Number of Deputies Elected   |
| Table 12 | The Ten Administrative Districts where the NSP Received the Highest Percentage of its Votes, 1973 Election   |
| Table 13 | Level of Development of the Ten Administrative Districts where the NSP Received the Highest Percentage of its Votes, 1973 Election                   |
| Table 14 | Rate of Development of the Ten Administrative Districts where the NSP Received the Highest Percentage of its Votes, 1973 Election                    |
| Table 15 | Socio-Economic Characteristics of Sri Lanka's Political Elite before and after 1956  |

Table 16	Percentage Distribution of Sri Lanka's Population Classified by Ethnicity, by Province
Table 17	Percentage Distribution of Sri Lanka's Population Classified by Religion, by Province
Table 18	Election Results in Sri Lanka, 1956: Percentage of Seats Received by Parties in Each Province
Table 19	Percentage of Voting Participation during the 1956 Election in Sri Lanka, by Province
Table 20	Percentage of Voting Participation during the July 1960 Election in Sri Lanka, by Province
Table 21	Percentage Distribution of Population in Sri Lanka by Type of Community, by Province

## INTRODUCTION

"A reader of the Turkish press," wrote Andrew Mango in 1967, "could easily get the impression that politics in today's... Turkish Republic... is about religion."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, one of the observable trends in Turkish political life since the transition to competitive politics in the late 1940s is the importance of religion as a political issue. To be sure, religion is a significant factor of politics in most countries, including the Western. However, where the population is quite homogeneous along religious lines as in Turkey,<sup>2</sup> religion seldom becomes such a crucial problem of concern in national political life. France, Belgium, and Austria are other exceptions where the religious issue, despite religiously uniform populations, has been a central problem of politics.

As I shall later argue, the religious dimension in Turkish politics has been overemphasized and perpetuated by the Kemalist elite. When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, it inherited a legacy of tradition from its Ottoman past, a tradition which for centuries had been molded by Islamic culture. It was this Islamic background which had been found to be responsible for the decline of the Ottoman Empire by leading Ottoman intellectuals of the 18th and 19th centuries. The Ottoman elite had increasingly come to associate the problems confronting the Empire with Islam's conservative role in Ottoman society. At the same time, the recognition of Western technological

superiority had led to the conviction that Ottoman Turkey could regain its strength only through accepting Western civilization.

Although the beginnings of secularization go as far back as the 18th century, it was after 1923 that the historical connection between religion and the state was broken off. In line with a long history of Westernization attempts, the secularization program of Mustafa Kemal aimed at substituting Western culture for the Islamic. To that end, a series of reforms were initiated which were designed to weaken both the institutional and the functional strength of Islam in Turkish society. However, instead of relegating religion to the private sphere, the Kemalist regime assumed the responsibility of supervising and controlling religious activity through maintaining, in modified form, the organizational links between the religious institutions and the state bureaucracy. In that respect, the Kemalists opted for a continuity of tradition between the Ottoman Empire and the new Republic. Just as in the Ottoman Empire, the religious organization in the Turkish Republic was linked to the administrative structure of the state with the important distinction, however, that whereas in the past, the clerics had wielded a great deal of influence in political affairs, they lost any formal or informal control of the political process after the establishment of the Republic.

The Kemalist version of separating church and state,

therefore, took a different form from what is generally understood by the term. In a certain sense, Mustafa Kemal's program of secularization defeated its own purpose. Religious institutions were not separated from the state but rather became subservient to it. The question as to whether this rigid implementation of secularism during the one-party period (1923-1946) was necessary for transforming Turkey into a modern nation-state has been a major issue of controversy among Turkish intellectuals. If modernity is defined in terms of Westernization, as the Kemalist elite defined it, it was probably inevitable that a frontal attack be launched against Islam. Islam created a distinct set of legal procedures, a system of education, and codes of social conduct, all of which conflicted with Western versions. The transformation of an Islamic society into a Western one necessarily involved a drastic change, and hence perhaps a measure of forceful imposition. However, although Westernization did succeed at the elite level, it was not as readily accepted by the masses. To the majority of the peasants and inhabitants of provincial small-towns, Islam was still the dominant force in social life.

This radical understanding of secularism had significant effects on the political system. Not only did it give rise to reactionary movements which at times involved bloodshed, but it also increased the gap between elite and mass cultures. The aspirations of the modernizing elite excluded any promotion of folk culture and traditions. This

difference between elite and mass aspirations turned into a political struggle with distinctly religious overtones with the emergence of competing parties in 1946 which sought to enhance their electoral strength by appealing to the religious sentiments of the voter. One important consequence of the politicization of religion was the expansion of political participation. Religion, among other factors, played a prominent role in the political mobilization of the rural strata.

The Kemalist elite of the post-1946 period has viewed the use of religion for political purposes with suspicion, and more often, with downright fear. Having identified the decline of the Ottoman Empire with its Islamic milieu, Turkish intellectuals have always been cautious about Islam's impact on Turkish society. As the most Westernized sector of the population in terms of both life style and intellectual orientation, they have often looked with disdain on Islamic culture and traditions. Categorically, they have identified religiosity with conservatism of a special kind, one which rejects Kemalist reformism and which hopes for a return to a semi-theocracy. Hence, they have interpreted all demands for greater religious freedom as an attack on Kemalism and on the Republic itself. As a result, the expression of religious interests through interest groups or political parties has been viewed as alarming, rather than as a natural outcome of electoral politics.

A major theme which I shall emphasize throughout this study is that the politicization of religion in Turkey

resulted from (a) the failure of the initial nationalist movement to mobilize the rural strata through distinctly political ideologies, and (b) the unwillingness or the inability of the early modernizers to close the gap between elite and mass cultures. Religion, therefore, played a prominent role in both mobilizing the newly-enfranchised masses and in dramatizing the extent of the urban-rural cleavage. Seen in this context, the relationship of religion to political development appears to be a dual one. On the one hand, the use of religion for political purposes led to the legitimization of traditional religious norms and practices which conflicted with the goals of the Kemalist elite. On the other hand, however, religion contributed to political development to the extent that it became instrumental in mass political participation.

My basic assumption about the role of religion in political development is that change and tradition cannot be viewed in dichotomous terms. A theory of modernization which sees modernity in a unidirectional fashion is, in my judgment, questionable. So are concepts of traditional society which attribute a constantly static role to tradition. I view modernity not as a distinctly new phase in the developmental process but rather, as a specific configuration of both traditional and changing forms of social, economic, legal, and political arrangements. In such a formulation, the special manner in which each society undergoes modernization is seen as dependent on its historical traditions.

The religious system, like all other sub-systems in society, is also affected by the processes of change. For example, in a post-revolutionary situation, the religious institutions, once defenders of the status quo, may become centers of protest. In such a setting, religion may serve as an alternative world view to that of political ideologies. In a colonial situation, religion may assume a revolutionary role in the hands of indigeneous nationalist leaders. In countries undergoing rapid industrialization, religion may become a channel for articulating the discontent which marginal groups-- such as small traders or artisans-- feel about the adverse effects of industrialization on their vocational interests. In a secular state, religion may change its former social and political functions and reorient its appeal to purely individualistic concerns about life and death. In a democratic system, religion may form the bases of political behavior for certain sectors of the electorate. In societies undergoing transition from authoritarian to democratic systems, it may act as a factor of mass political mobilization.

The impact of religion on political development, therefore, changes as societies undergo change. Its impact may be different during each phase of the developmental process. In Turkey, it has assumed different functions during (a) the Ottoman period, (b) the transition from an empire to a nation-state, (c) the one-party era, and (d) after the emergence of competitive politics. We

cannot assume, therefore, as it has generally been assumed within Turkey, that Islam's role in Turkish society has always been static.

There have been various studies on Turkey which discuss the religious issue in political terms, although very few specifically focus on the question of religion's impact on political development.<sup>3</sup> In general, the latter problem has received little attention in the literature on comparative politics. Although the role of both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized religion in the culture and structure of social systems has long been an important topic of investigation for sociologists and anthropologists, political scientists until recently have failed to study the interaction between the political and the religious subsystems in society. The majority of the studies on Turkey are no exception in this respect.

The basic organization of this study gives priority to a topical rather than a chronological analysis. Chapter I will examine some of the theoretical writings on the relationship between religion, on the one hand, and modernization, economic change, and political development, on the other. Chapter II will take up the specific question of Islam as it relates to politics as well as delineate the role of Islamic institutions and value structures in traditional Ottoman society. In the following chapter, the way in which this traditional role of Islam was disrupted by the Westernizing elite of the Kemalist period and the implications

of such disruption for Turkey's modernization process will be discussed. In Chapter IV, the issue of religion's role in mass mobilization will be examined with specific reference to both the mobilization of the Turkish peasantry by the Kemalists during the War of Independence and the spread of politicization to the countryside through party organizations during the initial phase of competitive politics in the late 1940s. Chapter V will focus on the saliency of religion in the voting behavior of the Turkish electorate and it will analyze in this context the emergence of a distinctly religious party in recent years. The final chapter will attempt to bring a comparative perspective to the study by taking up the issue of religious impact on the politics of Sri Lanka. Although Turkey and Sri Lanka differ fundamentally in terms of their historical experiences and socio-cultural orientations, they share a number of interesting similarities with respect to the role which religion played in their political development. Hence, a comparison along these lines is likely to provide new perspectives for analyzing the general question to which this study is addressed. The logic of this comparison is further explained at the outset of Chapter VI.

It is my hope that this study will draw attention to an important but neglected topic, bring new insights into the study of the relationship between religion and political development in general, and relate some of the interdisciplinary work on religion to the functioning of the

Turkish political system in particular.

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(1) "Purpose in Turkish Politics and Its Outcome," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April, 1967), p 301.

(2) The majority of the Turks are Sunni Muslims. There is, however, a sizable Alevi community although official statistics fail to designate their number.

(3) Niyazi Berkes' The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964) is an important historical study. Others that ought to be cited include Tarık Zafer Tunaya's İslamcılık Cereyanı (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962); Çetin Özek's Türkiyede Laiklik (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962) and Türkiyede Gerici Akımlar ve Nurculuğun İçyüzü (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1964); Ahmet N. Yücekök's Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı, 1946-1968 (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1971); Şerif Mardin's Din ve İdeoloji (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969); Dankwart A. Rustow's "Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920-55," in Richard Frye (Ed.), Islam and the West (The Hague: Mouton, 1957), 69-107; and Paul Stirling's "Religious Change in Republican Turkey," Middle East Journal, 12 (Autumn, 1958), 395-408. For other works on the subject, see the Bibliography.

## CHAPTER I

## RELIGION AND CHANGE: SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

## I.

Much scholarly work has been published in the past few decades about the social, economic, and political changes that seem to characterize the world-wide process affecting traditional societies: the movement towards modernity. Although perspectives may differ, most students of comparative politics agree that traditional institutions, structures, and belief systems have been undergoing erosion as a result of a complex set of processes which we call modernization. One aspect of this transition is, of course, political although political scientists have a notorious difficulty with naming it. Whatever the label, the political aspect of modernization relates to the significant changes which are taking place in political institutions and processes both in Western and non-Western societies and which move them away from simpler political arrangements towards the direction of political complexity.

The modernization literature has truly been prolific in producing definitions of political development as well as listing the different aspects of the process and the factors which seem to affect it. In Pye's inventory of 1966, for example, ten such definitions were listed based on what individual researchers had considered to be the most important factor in explaining the phenomenon.<sup>1</sup> Conspicuously

absent from any such catalogue is a consideration of the religious factor as intrinsically important for an understanding of the developmental process. Political scientists in general seem to have left the systematic study of religion to sociologists and anthropologists. With the exception of Donald Smith's Religion and Political Development,<sup>2</sup> there have been no book-length theoretical analyses of the role of religion within society from the perspective of the political system although there have been quite a few country or area monographs specifically concentrating on the religious issue or on problems of secularization.<sup>3</sup>

From the point of view of modernization theory, more thorough attention should be given to the impact of religion on political development. Not only the separation of church and state but the general transformation of traditional values, the emergence of a national identity distinct from and superseding religious or communal identities, the transfer of the bases of political authority and legitimacy from the religio-communal to the secular, and the functional differentiation of social and political institutions are a set of complex phenomena which accompany the secularization process. Put differently, secularization, taken in this broad sense, is an important aspect of modernization. Any theory of modernization, therefore, has to take into account the transformation of religiously-based institutions, structures, and authority-legitimacy relationships. The extent to which such a transformation succeeds or fails to

take root has often crucial consequences for the stability and sometimes the very survival of a nation.

The neglect of religion as an important topic of study by students of comparative politics is, I think, a consequence of the near consensus that modernity and tradition are antonymous concepts. In much of the literature on modernization, the Western model is taken as a reference point for the categories to be used in classifying stages of development. Societies which are or were furthest removed from the West in terms of their institutional or structural arrangements are accorded the "traditional" status, with the rest dumped into the "transitional" or "developing" categories. The Western model, in this context, is taken to be an ideal type in the absence of even rudimentary visions of what an ideally modern society should be. As Huntington puts it, social scientists as yet have to solve the issue of "how much of modernity is Western and how much of Western society is modern."<sup>4</sup> Paradoxical as it may sound, although we lack a precise definition of what is modern, we have derived from the concept of modernity a definition of what is traditional. Although there have been some relatively successful attempts at defining modernity, such as Black's definition of modernization as the process by which man controls his environment through making use of his increased technological knowledge,<sup>5</sup> most such definitions, including that of Black, view the concept of modernity in terms of the course of modernization that Western societies

have followed, namely, industrialization and the sub-processes that industrialization brings with it.

In the final analysis, we might decide that certain characteristics of what we now consider to be traditional and therefore backward societies contain elements of modernity in a non-Western, non-technological, but in a more normative sense. A definition of modernization which attempts to sort out the modern aspects of traditional societies and the non-modern (in a qualitative sense) aspects of industrial societies would, indeed, be a first step towards the building of a vision of modernity which is not blinded by the fact that man has even conquered the moon. Simply put, what I am arguing here is that we ought to integrate the concept of modernity with the concept of a civilized society. Such an undertaking would demand greater emphasis on political philosophy by students of comparative politics. It seems to me that our obsession as political scientists with quantitative indices of development has too often led us substitute index figures for more normative considerations.

The usefulness of the traditional-modern classification, therefore, is limited to the extent that it suggests an ultimate end to the modernization process. The typology may be helpful for heuristic purposes. But it should not be used to place social systems into polarized camps which allow no mixed characteristics.

A related theme dominant in earlier modernization theories

is that the modernization process is unilinear and universal. That is to say, modernization is considered to be not only unidirectional and irreversible, moving along a traditional-modern continuum, but inevitable and universal as well. All societies are caught up in the process, there is no escape, and they can only move forward. It was not until Huntington's seminal article<sup>6</sup> that we learned the possibility of retrogression during the process of modernization. This hypnotic preoccupation with the modernity side of the equation has led to an unfounded neglect of tradition which is presumed to be less problematic. Although there have been notable challengers to the use of tradition and modernity as antonymous concepts,<sup>7</sup> the tendency nevertheless has been to concentrate on what is changing. Yet, it seems to me that if we want to understand change, we also have to understand what is not changing. More importantly, we have to understand the relationship between the two. We have to find out in what ways tradition contributes to or impedes large-scale social and political changes and in what ways the modernizing elite can make use of tradition to initiate change.<sup>8</sup>

Where does religion fit along this traditional-modern continuum? Since modernity, however defined, implies change, the question can be stated in an alternative form. Does religion contribute to or impede large-scale changes? Let me first discuss in what sense religion may be seen as an impediment to change. Such a discussion, however, should

not assume that all religions oppose change. On the contrary, there have been many religious movements, as I shall subsequently point out, which have sought to change the world.

Many revolutionary movements throughout history have seen religious institutions as supporters of the traditional order which aim to defend the status quo against forces of change. As I shall discuss in greater detail in Chapter III, the extent to which religious institutions become a focal point of attack for revolutionary movements depends on whether or not they have built-in interests in the preservation of the old order. For example, compared to dissident sects which often experience governmental persecution and as a result become centers of protest against governmental authority, orthodox religions enjoy official recognition by the state as well as economic support. The latter are, therefore, among the institutions of the old regime which many revolutionary movements aim to destroy. Hence, from the point of view of a revolutionary who aims to destroy all established institutions, the church is indeed status quo oriented. Its aim is not to change the world. Rather, it seeks to change man's orientation towards the world. This point is well-discussed by Frank Parkin who sees a similarity of roles between revolutionary movements and religious institutions in this respect. Both, he argues, attempt to close the gap between the mental and

the material conditions of life. Revolutionary movements aim at raising the expectations of the underprivileged status groups and, once successful, try to change life standards in line with these expectations. In a similar vein, religious institutions aim at lowering the expectations of the underprivileged so that these conform to existing definitions of social justice.<sup>9</sup>

Since Marx, it has been axiomatic for many social observers to view religion as a marvelous little gadget with a safety-valve operated by the ruling class to check the earthly aspirations of the masses. It is indeed true that religious institutions have often collaborated with the state to ensure that the primary occupation of the ruled should be the pursuit of the sacred. As Eisenstadt points out, for example, the regulatory function of religious institutions in achieving a balance between the traditional and more differentiated levels of socio-political activity was essential for the stability and the continuity of most historical bureaucratic empires. The problem of political legitimacy and mass support for the rulers was solved through keeping the majority of the population politically apathetic while at the same time allowing certain segments of it a limited form of participation. The religious institutions, in such a setting, assumed the important function of regulating this balance between political activity and passivity. Since religious organizations were often the only institutional links

between the central government and the provinces and could reach sectors of the population which were beyond the direct control of the center, their support was crucial for the ruler in maintaining his prerogatives.<sup>10</sup>

Because the relationship between the ruling elite of centralized empires and the religious organization was one of mutual dependency, each demanded from the other reciprocity in the pursuit of their interests. For his part, the ruler's long-term problem was to sustain of the traditional value system which bestowed upon him the legitimate right to rule. The role of the religious institutions was decisive in maintaining this legitimacy. The latter, in turn, demanded official recognition and state protection. In exchange for political support, the religious elite also asked for organizational autonomy and independence in the performance of their functions. At least some of its members sought active duty in the administrative and political structures of the state. Most importantly, the church needed state support in defending its economic interests such as the preservation of its property rights.<sup>11</sup>

Quite apart from social-structural or political considerations, however, religion can be viewed as an impediment to change because of its theological perspectives. The religious predisposition is inclined to put man's faith in the supernatural. From a religious point of view, the

locus of understanding and control of the universe is outside of man and his society. In terms of modernization theory as it stands today, this is indeed significant if, following Black, we define modernization in terms of man's control of his environment. Whatever modernization may mean, it involves, first and foremost, a changing perspective on the world. Belief in a sacred order where both man and nature stand in permanent relationships to each other gives way to the belief in the possibility of change. In other words, change requires the acceptance of the possibility of change in the minds of men. It never occurs in societies where no member can formulate a different system of beliefs and values which would justify social, economic, and political relationships other than those sanctioned by tradition. Although all religious prophets and reformers also want to change man's mind, the change that they want to bring about entails the substitution of one system of belief in the supernatural with another. No religion attempts to link man's fate to technological knowledge which, in the above definition of Black, is the essence of modernity. In all religions, the control of man's environment rests with a God or some other supernatural force. As Apter puts it, "to be modern means to see life as alternatives, preferences, and choices."<sup>12</sup> To the extent that religion constricts man's capacity to find alternative explanations about his world, it puts limits on his freedom of choice.

This is not to suggest, however, that religious ideas cannot coexist with a modern world. That they do is, I think, evident. Outside of rationality and science, men in all ages have felt the need to relate their existence to the cosmic order and make some sense out of it. The important point is whether or not religion can transform itself so as to adopt and contribute to the development of a rational society which is more under the control of man than of God.

If it is true, then, that religious institutions have often supported forces of tradition, it is no less true that there have been a great many instances of religious sects or movements which have risen to prominence in protest against the established order. In fact, many major religions or religious sects originated as protest movements of some kind or another. The Buddha's message of salvation, which recognized no status differences between men in their quest for the individual attainment of Nirvana, was clearly received as a protest by the newly-emerging commercial classes against the rigid Hindu caste system.<sup>13</sup> Muhammad's message of equality between all Muslims similarly came at a time when behind the seeming prosperity of Mecca there was considerable social injustice.<sup>14</sup> The emergence of Shi'ism as a major dissident sect within Islam was not only the result of a doctrinal dispute but also of a power struggle between competing factions and of a social protest against the dominant position of the

Sunni ruling classes.<sup>15</sup> The origins of Sufism again had that element of revolt by the dissatisfied urban masses against the kind of social and political injustice seemingly perpetuated by the ruling elite and the orthodox Sunni ulema.<sup>16</sup>

Although the close alliance between religious and political institutions often results in the tacit political support of the church and religious support of the state, the extent of such cooperation at times may prove to be precarious. With increasing structural differentiation, both the religious and the political spheres gradually begin to acquire distinct institutional autonomy and separate identity. The emergence of secular systems of thought, however embryonic, and the more extensive reach of the state into wider sectors of society poses a challenge to the hitherto near-exclusive functions of the religious institutions in achieving social integration and political stability. As the organization of both church and state becomes more complex, their respective institutional interests may often clash.<sup>17</sup>

As Eisenstadt points out, for example, the cooperation between the religious organizations and the state did not last throughout the history of any one empire. In many cases, religious orders either precipitated social change or gave active support to reform movements. The extent to which the religious hierarchy were identified with the political mechanisms of the state and the extent to

which religious organizations were autonomous and complex determined the degree and the direction of their involvement in either preserving the status quo or attempting to change it. The organizationally strong religious institutions were more intensely involved in political life. And those which were closely identified with the state were more limited in actively participating in movements of change.<sup>18</sup>

To assume that religion is a static force which contributes little to social, economic, or political change would hence be a rather simplified point of view. As Ward and Rustow have argued within the context of Japanese modernization, tradition may sometimes serve an important role in strengthening the acceptance of modern institutions, structures, and values. They point out that in the case of Japan, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 built upon traditional symbols and systems of value. This process of "reinforcing dualism," which they define as "the exploitability of traditional institutions, attitudes, and behavior patterns for modernizing purposes,"<sup>19</sup> helped achieve a smoother transition to modernity. For example, the Meiji leadership found a ready basis of national unity in the symbol of the Emperor and therefore sought to strengthen his status rather than abolish the institution. In like manner, by developing Shinto into a state religion, they could secure discipline and obedience to the new regime.<sup>20</sup>

If we accept that modernization is a total process, we also have to accept that religion cannot be considered an isolated area which is unaffected by social change. Like all other institutions, religious institutions resist and/or contribute to forces of change. In the process, they undergo change themselves. Hence, to understand the role of religion in development, we have to discard categorical classifications based on a traditional-modern continuum and direct our analysis to the examination of religious institutions as quasi-traditional and quasi-modern structures which interact with other social institutions or forces in society and which affect and are affected by the processes of change.

## II.

Since the publication of Weber's famous Protestant ethic thesis,<sup>21</sup> there has been much scholarly discussion on the role of religion in economic change. In this seminal work, Weber tried to show that the value system of Protestantism, especially that of Calvinism, gave rise to a work ethic which in turn laid the foundations for the emergence of modern capitalism. According to Weber, the spirit of capitalism-- and by that he meant the accumulation of wealth as an end in itself-- had its cultural base in the Protestant notion of a "calling" ordained by God. According to this calling, man's purpose in life was not to live by some form of an otherworldly asceticism but to live in order to fulfill his worldly

obligations, namely, his work, his labor. To the Calvinists, success in one's profession through hard work, which normally involves the accumulation of wealth, was a means of proving that he is among the elect. But spending wealth on earthly pleasures was sinful. Hence, the Calvinist ethic encouraged the accumulation of capital. Although, as Weber observed, man's proclivity to acquire more wealth was perhaps inherent in his nature and certainly existed in precapitalist societies, it was with the rise of Protestantism that worldly activity and gain was religiously sanctified.

Although the historical validity of this thesis has since been questioned,<sup>22</sup> what is important for social scientists as well as for students of the history of ideas is Weber's attempt to demonstrate that systems of belief and value have a bearing on the nature of the economic change in society. As Eisenstadt points out, "many seek in the Protestant ethic or some equivalent the key to an understanding of why some non-Western countries have achieved modernization while others have not."<sup>23</sup> Bellah, for example, has argued that the Japanese case of successful industrialization has seemingly followed the Protestant ethic pattern in that the central values of Japanese religion stress the importance of individual's obligation to work hard, not so much for purposes of consumption but for its own sake, which has been extremely favorable for the development of economic rationalization in Japan.<sup>24</sup> But as Bellah is careful to point out, the extent to which the

prevalence or absence of such an ethic becomes a crucial factor in economic development is dependent on a great number of other social, cultural, political, and environmental factors which are conducive to industrialization.<sup>25</sup>

The relationship between industrialization and the dominant value system in society is not simply unidirectional. Industrialization comes about partially as a result of changes in value patterns but these in turn undergo further change as industrialization proceeds. It was in fact with industrialization that the traditional norms of preindustrial urban centers finally broke down.<sup>26</sup> The significance of religion in shaping social and cultural attitudes as well as influencing or controlling secular activity declines in industrial societies. Industrialization demands, first and foremost, a rational approach to economic enterprise. And rationality in the economic sphere demands in turn both institutional autonomy and a new set of values which support and reinforce economic goals. This means, for example, that the content of education can no longer be left to the supervision and influence of the church but has to conform to the secular rationale of science even if that rationale is often heretical from a religious point of view. Or it means that legal provisions have to be changed in order to regulate new kinds of social or economic relationships without regard to previous economic sanctions against certain types of activity.

The socio-cultural processes which act as "carriers" of secularization in the non-Western world, as one observer points out, can be identified as those that are closely connected with the spread of Western civilization. But the original source of secularization in the West was the emergence of the industrial society whose dynamics necessitated the existence of an autonomous sphere of activity largely free from traditional controls.<sup>27</sup> However, it is not so much the process of industrialization per se which leads to greater secularization as it is the totality of the social structural and the cultural changes that industrialization brings with it.<sup>28</sup>

Hagen has put forth the interesting hypothesis in this context that changing social values have a direct bearing on the patterns of personality development and the emergence of the entrepreneur as a personality type. According to his view, socio-economic change is best facilitated by individuals who can break away from the bonds of traditional society and use their energy and creativity for innovative purposes.<sup>29</sup> In a similar vein, McClelland has argued that Weber's Protestant ethic thesis is not only valid but could also be applied to most periods of economic development when interpreted in more general terms as an "achievement motive" characterizing the values of men who seek new economic opportunities.<sup>30</sup> One famous example of such a personality type is Lerner's

grocer of Balgat, who is driven by an inner "empathy" to break loose from his traditional milieu, who has a vision and a sense of direction about the future course of his society, and who cares little for the social ostracism he is subject to in return.<sup>31</sup>

Whatever else is a precondition of industrialization, it is evident that the transformation of values plays a significant role in the transition from a non-industrial to an industrial society. A differentiated and rational economy, which is the basis of industrial society, demands that economic values occupy a highly important if not the primary place in the prevalent value system. In a society where integrative values are predominant, questions of individual's solidarity with his ethnic or kinship group, religious or local community will be of greater concern to him than questions of wealth, power, or economic goals. However, the primacy of economic values does not necessarily mean that there has to be a total change in basic value patterns. These may more or less remain the same provided that there is sufficient shift to allow for the development of economic rationality in those sectors of society which are directly connected with economic activity so that economic objectives can be justified independently of the traditional religious value system.<sup>32</sup>

It should be pointed out here that the growth of economic

rationality can also be adversely affected by the quasi-religious ideologies of secular states. That rationality would demand the assessment of the most efficient and economical means to achieve a set of objectives that have been carefully defined and selected.<sup>33</sup> If the traditional system is an impediment to economic development because of normative sanctions, the ideology of the new system with a different set of esoteric norms might be equally out of tune with the demands of modern economy to the extent that ideological goals are either confused with or intentionally placed above economic objectives.<sup>34</sup>

### III.

Before I go on to discuss the relationship of religion to political development, a clarification of what I mean by political development is in order here.<sup>35</sup> As I see it, there are two subprocesses, the one at the structural and the other at the cultural levels, which are important aspects of political development vis-à-vis its relationship to religion. At the structural level, political development involves the transformation of simple, undifferentiated structures so that they lead to greater differentiation and functional complexity. Lest this definition be identified as a structural-functional one, I should perhaps make it clear that my concern is not to find universal functions that ought to be performed in every society. Neither am I concerned with the problem of democracy or that of stability as necessary criteria for political development.

Simply put, what I am stressing here is the importance of structural changes so that political activity is no longer concentrated within the sphere of any one structure-- e.g., the family, the clan, the king's court-- but is dispersed through a wide array of private or public institutions with specialized roles.

At the cultural level, political development involves (a) the integration of different social or cultural groups into national political life so as to create a common national identity, (b) the transformation of the value system so that role differentiation is internalized as legitimate and necessary, and (c) the growth of a secular political ideology or a system of thought.<sup>36</sup>

An analysis of the relationship between religion and political development should take into account these processes of structural and cultural change. In terms of their structural complexity and cultural orientation, we can distinguish two types of societies: (1) nonsecular political systems, i.e., those in which the boundaries between the religious sphere on the one hand and the socio-political spheres on the other are either nonexistent or weak; status differences and power relationships are legitimized on the basis of religious sanction; and members of the society define their collective existence and activity with reference to religio-traditional values, and (2) secular political systems, i.e., those in which there is greater

structural or role differentiation between the religious system and the rest of society; greater acceptance of such differentiation; and greater emphasis on political power, political integration, and political identity as defined in secular rather than religio-traditional terms.<sup>37</sup>

However, it should also be pointed out that during the early phases of nation-building, political integration and/or national identity may be achieved through drawing strength from common religious ties.

Societies of the first type are characterized by the saliency of religion in political relationships. First, in the absence of secular systems of thought, religion becomes the only source of ideological content in politics. It determines the acceptable definitions of power and authority. It provides legitimacy to political rule. And it secures political obedience to the ruler. Since the exercise and justification of power is based on divine sanction, the religious organization expects its lay membership to support both spiritual and temporal authority, hence maintaining the legitimacy of the ruler as well as that of the system. Even where opposition to the system takes place, it is often within the framework of a new religious movement rather than a secular ideology.

Second, religion functions not only as a mechanism of political legitimation but also as one of social integration. The religious community provides its membership with a sense of belonging and coherence. Hence, political

stability is maintained not necessarily through the efficient working of the administrative structures of government but more so through the integrative functions of religion.

Third, there is a virtual merging of the religious and the political systems. Since the ruler derives his temporal authority from a divine source, he is both a protector of religious institutions and a follower of their precepts. The religious organization is actively involved in shaping public policy-making as well as directing the judicial and the educational institutions of society.

Fourth, the religious hierarchy is engaged in the legitimation of power either through direct appeals to the laity or through advisory capacities in the service of the ruler. And finally, just as religious functionaries assume political roles, the ruler assumes religious roles. He may appoint the hierarchy of the church, enforce their rules of discipline, and be responsible for the protection of the church and its dogma from internal heretics and outside influences.<sup>38</sup>

Donald Smith distinguishes between two basic models of nonsecular political systems, or "traditional religio-political system" as he calls them, both of which-- he is careful to point out-- are ideal types: the "organic model" and the "church model." In the organic model, religious and political functions are not differentiated but rest with a single structure. No distinctions can be made

between the religious institution and the society. The social order is considered to be of divine origin, the ruler derives his authority from a spiritual source, and political leadership is exercised according to religious law and tradition. In the church model, on the other hand, governmental and religious institutions are separate but nevertheless perform their functions interchangeably. Compared to the organic model, there is greater structural and role differentiation between the religious and the political spheres: the one cannot be equated with the other. Since the religious institution has a separate structural identity, its relationship to political centers of power assumes a more complex character. It can dominate political power holders, be subordinate to them, or achieve a bipolar balance of power.<sup>39</sup>

In societies of the second type, the role and functions of religion undergo radical changes. First, religion loses its saliency as a quasi political belief system which sanctions governmental authority. With the emergence of secular ideologies, power relationships come to be identified in distinctly political terms. The legitimacy of political rule no longer rests with some divine source but is found to be based on human convention. Second, the integrative functions of religion are taken over by the socialization agencies of the modern secular state. A new sense of nationhood and pride in one's nationality becomes a substitute for the previous identification of the individual with his

religious community although the initial establishment of a national identity may have been based on common religious ties. Religion, therefore, plays an important role in integrating only social groupings such as the family rather than the whole society.<sup>40</sup>

Third, the religious system is no longer merged with the political. The religious organization loses practically all of its former influence in political life except as an interest group. The cooperation between the church and the state ceases to be explicit as each gains organizational autonomy and distinct spheres of activity. With greater structural differentiation, the religious system is also separated from the social. Law and education are no longer under ecclesiastical control. The content and direction of intellectual pursuits, including arts and sciences, is left outside of religious supervision. In short, religion becomes a private matter between the individual and his conscience although it does continue some of its social functions in bringing the community together during services, special festivals, funerals, and the like.

Fourth, with greater secularization, the traditional system of social stratification breaks down. Religious values in nonsecular societies often provide legitimacy and support to the prevailing social structural arrangements. In certain cases, such as the caste system of India, religion itself becomes the basis of social stratification.<sup>41</sup> With

increased institutional differentiation and role specificity, patterns of stratification undergo considerable change. Ascription ceases to play a significant role in social mobility as the standard of achievement becomes the more important basis of qualification for placement in highly specialized roles. The ultimate effect is the opening up of the class structure so that class barriers are relatively easier to overcome.<sup>42</sup> This is not to suggest, however, that class distinctions disappear in secular societies. As traditional classes break down, new patterns of stratification, of course, emerge. What secularization brings with it is not the disappearance of class differences but rather, an open upward class mobility, open at least according to the dominant value system of society.

An important factor to be considered in discussing the relationship of religion to social stratification is the nature of the stratification system in society. The functions of religion within a stable stratification system are different than its functions in a changing pattern of stratification. Whereas in the former case, religion helps sustain traditional status differences between various strata in society, it may contribute to movements of protest once the traditional pattern begins to break down as a result of larger socio-economic processes of change.<sup>43</sup> Because of their organizational demands, the religious institutions throughout history have continually sought to widen their sphere of influence. In doing so, they have had to come to

terms with the new structural arrangements of the society in which they function as well as pay greater attention to the newly-emerging social strata. Thus, for example, the attention of the church in the West shifted from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie in the 19th century and from the bourgeoisie to the working class and the poor in the latter part of the 20th.<sup>44</sup>

Finally, the function of religious institutions as mechanisms of social control similarly undergoes change. Religious institutions have traditionally put both internal controls on the individual through directly shaping his conscience and external sanctions against those who fail to conform to prevalent social norms.<sup>45</sup> If most members of society are to abide by the norms that have been set as acceptable, there has to be some form of authority which acts as a deterrent to potential nonconformists. This could either be legal authority, social authority, the authority of the self (i.e., individual's conscience) or suprasocial authority.<sup>46</sup> The latter refers to authority relationships which derive their bases and legitimacy from some metaphysical source, such as religion or a secular ideology with a semi-sacred appeal.<sup>47</sup> In nonsecular societies, social authority and suprasocial authority (referring to institutionalized religion) are the predominant sources of social control. In more secular societies, on the other hand, legal authority or suprasocial authority of the ideological variant are the primary means of societal regulation. The more the norms,

values, and beliefs that each type of authority supports reinforce each other, the higher will be the level of social integration.<sup>48</sup>

With increased institutional differentiation, then, the problem of social control becomes a secular problem to be dealt with by the administrative and judicial organs of the state or by the military. In terms of internal control, the existence of competing social groups and organizations which demand the loyalty of the individual and attempt to influence his norms of social behavior challenges the previous monopoly of the church on the content of individuals' consciences.<sup>49</sup> If religious and political institutions are seen as competing with each other for social influence and control, there is greater likelihood that political institutions will become more influential and powerful as modernization proceeds. The initiation of developmental goals as well as the guidance and control of the developmental process lies with the political sphere. There are no countries in the world today which do not aim at some form of modernization, however defined. The political institutions, therefore, are expanding at the expense of organized religion whose sphere of activity and influence continually shrinks with greater social differentiation.<sup>50</sup>

The decline of religious influence in political life, especially in the case of new nations, often accompanies the emergence of collectivist ideologies which provide the

emotional basis for developmental goals. The breakdown of the traditional order leaves its members in an intellectual and emotional void. What was once considered to be permanent, stable, and universally true systems of belief and social norms are suddenly stripped of their religio-traditional legitimacy. This is the much-talked-about cost of modernization. The task of the modernizing elite, therefore, remains that of filling this gap with a secular ideology with enough of an affective orientation to be used in mass mobilization. Beset with a myriad of social, economic, and political problems, the leaders of the new nations are particularly eager to erode traditional belief and value systems in an effort to mobilize the masses around the goals of modernization. Included among these goals are the establishment of national identity and political legitimacy based on secular as opposed to sacred appeals. But as Apter notes, this effort to dismantle the political process from its religious basis often produces in turn a political doctrine that is no less religious in raising the profane to the level of the sacred, although this new religion is a religion of a different kind.<sup>51</sup>

According to Apter, socio-political change is best handled in what he calls the mobilization systems, the chief characteristic of which is the formulation of a political religion. In more common terms, we might call it ideology. In theocracies, Apter argues, change has to accommodate itself to tradition. In democracies, it produces alienation

and corruption. In the mobilizational systems, on the other hand, the disruptive effects of modernization can be minimized by the introduction of an alternate belief system, quasi-religious and quasi-political in its appeal, that gives new meaning and direction to rapid change.<sup>52</sup>

Elaborating on Apter's three-fold typology, it seems evident that religion, defined in its broadest sense as a system of beliefs, makes an important contribution to political development in all three types of arrangements in the new states. In theocracies, it is the defining element of the legitimacy and the foundations of the state. In revolutionary regimes, the ideology of the revolution itself takes on the characteristics of the sacred in giving momentum to the modernization process. And in democracies, as Apter himself notes,<sup>53</sup> religious appeals often form the basis of mass mobilization in the absence of distinctly political ideologies.

#### IV.

Formal secularization of political life does not mean, however, that religion loses its saliency in influencing political behavior. Among the many factors which affect an individual's attitudes towards the political system, religion is undoubtedly an important one. Historically, religious controversy has been a precipitating factor in many conflict situations although in most cases of overt religious conflict, there have been underlying racial,

linguistic, economic, or other social structural differences. It is not only in the new states that we find the individual propensity to vote on the basis of "primordial" attachments.<sup>54</sup> As the literature on comparative politics has shown, there is a close positive relationship between religiosity and party choice in Western European party systems, usually expressed in terms of practicing vs. nonpracticing categories in survey findings. Research on voting behavior in the West has amply demonstrated the saliency of race, religious affiliation, family background and the like in determining the political disposition of a large number of voters. In the Western European context, for example, religious differences seem to be as important a factor as class differences in shaping political allegiances. This is especially the case in continental European countries which have strong religious-based parties. In their study of parties and social cohesiveness in seventeen Western democracies, for example, Rose and Urwin conclude that religious divisions, rather than class differences, define the social bases of party competition in the West.<sup>55</sup> Of the 76 political parties in the 17 countries included in their study, 19 have heterogeneous bases, 18 are religiously-based, 20 are class-based, and 19 have supporters with mutually reinforcing loyalties. Seventeen out of the 19 in the last category have supporters for whom religion, in various combinations with class, region, and community, is a determining factor in their vote. In total, the cohesiveness

of 35 parties in 11 different countries is based on the religious or the antireligious stand of their supporters. Excluding Finland and Denmark for which data on the religious bases of the electoral vote was unavailable at the time of the study, only four countries-- Britain, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States-- lack parties which are cohesive on religious bases. And of the four, religion is an important factor in politics in both Ireland and the United States.<sup>56</sup>

Needless to say, the social bases of political parties are often reflective of the deep-rooted cleavages within a society. Although religious conflict of an overt and violent nature is no longer likely in most Western countries, religious differences can still be serious causes of socio-political strain. Northern Ireland, is of course, the most dramatic and probably an exceptional case in the Western context of religious differences, reinforced by class and regional concerns, leading to a bloody, near civil war. But elsewhere in Western Europe, religion has been an important source of intense, if not violent, socio-political cleavage as well.

In France, religion has been a critical issue of political debate and controversy since the Revolution. The staunch opposition of the anticlericals to government aid for parochial schools is one important manifestation of religious cleavages within French society which have persisted well into this century. The clerical-anticlerical traditions have had important consequences for the French political system as

the former has come to be identified with the Right and the latter with the Left forces in politics.<sup>57</sup> In Belgium, like in France, the church-state controversy has long been a dominant issue of politics, again most clearly manifesting itself over the question of government support for parochial schools. The bitter conflicts between the Catholics and the Liberals during the course of the 19th century have divided the Belgian society into two camps, not to mention the troublesome division between the Walloons and the Flemings.<sup>58</sup> In the Netherlands, religious differences have led to an extreme compartmentalization of Dutch society. Subcultural isolation, referred to as the Verzuiling phenomenon, is clearly manifest in all aspects of socio-political life. From associational membership to hospital visits, a Dutchman's activity is organized along denominational lines.<sup>59</sup> In Austria, subcultural divisions stemming from clerical-anticlerical conflicts have resulted in the immobilism and the final collapse of the First Republic. Referred to as the Lager -- somewhat akin to the familles spirituelles of Belgian and the zuilen of Dutch societies-- these subcultural groups still retain distinct identities despite the general depolarization of politics.<sup>60</sup>

In the Anglo-American democracies, religion is less of a factor in political life although by no means an unimportant one. Religious-based parties of any appreciable strength are nonexistent in these countries. However, there are discernible differences in the distribution of electoral

votes among the majority and the minority religious groups. In general, the Catholics tend to vote for parties on the "Left." In the United States, the Catholic vote is for the Democrats, in Britain, Australia, and to a lesser extent, in New Zealand, for Labor.<sup>61</sup> In Canada, linguistic and regional conflicts crosscut religious differences. Yet, religion is considered to be enough of a potential problem that the official publication of statistical information on the religious affiliation of new immigrants is avoided lest the present numerical balance between the Catholic and the Protestant communities be disturbed.<sup>62</sup>

As the examples cited in the preceding paragraphs indicate, religious cleavages in Western societies are generally translated into the political system through party competition. In the developing countries, on the other hand, competitive politics is more of an exception than the rule. In those few cases where party competition has been relatively institutionalized-- e.g., Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Turkey-- available evidence suggests that religious concerns do play a significant role in electoral politics. In Sri Lanka and Turkey, for example, the displacement of the secular nationalist elites from office was accomplished through the mobilization of the country-side largely by religious appeals. In Lebanon, the distribution of public offices, including those of the President and the Prime Minister, has been based on sectarian considerations specified

in detail in constitutional and customary arrangements.

Religious divisions, as all other parochial concerns, are more problematic and pronounced in the political development of the new states. The recent political histories of most indicate that religion is not only important in their national political life but may indeed lead to social conflict and political instability if excessively politicized. In Indonesia, for example, the massacre of the communists during 1966 and 1967 by the Muslim population was encouraged by both the army and the conservative Islamic Nahdatul Ulama.<sup>63</sup> In Nigeria, the cultural differences between the Muslim emirates of the North and the predominantly Christian Ibo peoples of the Eastern region turned into a political struggle as the North-- which had historically been more resistant to Western influences than the East and had kept its traditional patterns of authority and social stratification-- increasingly came to view the technical competence and the economic competition of the East as a threat to its own regional concerns.<sup>64</sup> The creation of Pakistan in 1947 followed the intense communal violence between the Hindus and the Muslims of India. Like their Hausa counterparts in Northern Nigeria, the Muslims felt threatened by the increasing social, economic, and political power of the more Westernized Hindus. Religious and cultural differences, reinforced by economic and political considerations, led to the final separation of the two communities.<sup>65</sup>

In Cyprus, a similar pattern of religio-communal violence

followed the independence of the country from Britain in 1960. Although communal violence had intermittently erupted on the island prior to independence, it reached much serious proportions after the government of the country was left in indigenous hands. Once again, the roots of the conflict lay in the economic backwardness of the Turkish-Muslim population and their staunch determination to safeguard their religio-ethnic interests in the face of the Greek majority's apparent socio-political power.<sup>66</sup> In Burma, the politicization of religion by Premier U Nu-- who officially declared Theravada Buddhism the religion of the state in 1961-- led to the outbreak of communal riots between the Buddhists and the Muslims as well as invite the intervention of the military in politics. General Ne Win's coup of 1962 found its justification in the unrest caused by the state religion issue.<sup>67</sup> In Sri Lanka, the politicization of religion by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party for electoral mobilization had serious consequences for the stability of the island as the deteriorating relations between the Buddhist-Sinhalese majority and the Hindu-Tamil minority led to the outbreak of periodic communal violence.<sup>68</sup> In Lebanon, where the political system is based on confessional politics, the outbreak of a civil war between the Christian and Muslim communities in 1975 demonstrated that even such institutional arrangements were inadequate in themselves to contain religious conflict.<sup>69</sup>

Finally, the secularization of traditional societies has

been a major source of socio-political cleavage in many developing countries. As subsequent chapters will show, the Turkish experience with secularization demonstrates how this type of conflict has endured the formal separation of church and state and has created an issue of controversy in national political life. In several other Muslim countries, there have been similar type of conflicts between the religiously traditional and the more modernist segments of society. For example, in Egypt, the fundamentalist reaction was most effectively organized through the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood) founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna as a neo-Islamic movement which sought to reorganize Egyptian society on Islamic principles. Its platform ranged from opposition to the use of cosmetics by Muslim women and the collection of interest on savings to social welfare measures designed to meet the Islamic requirement of helping the poor. Although initially, the Brotherhood had little direct involvement in Egyptian politics, by the late 1940s it had succeeded in establishing a powerful organization which increasingly became a major source of opposition to the government. Following the military coup of 1952, the Brotherhood briefly cooperated with the Free Officers but was subsequently forced to go underground after its unsuccessful attempt on Nasser's life in 1954. Besides Egypt, it has also been active in Syria.<sup>70</sup> In Iran, a fundamentalist movement, the Fedayan Islam, played a major role in the Islamic revival of the early 1950s in reaction against the secular reforms of Reza Shah. Like the Muslim Brotherhood

in Egypt, the Fedayan sought a return to Islamic principles, including the reinstationalization of the Caliphate. The increasing terrorism of the Fedayan-- they were responsible for several political assassinations-- led to their suppression by the Iranian government.<sup>71</sup> A similar neo-Shari'ah movement in Pakistan was organized through the Jama'at-i-Islami, founded during the mid-1940s by Mawlana Mawdudi. Initially, the Jama'at concentrated its activities on preventing the creation of Pakistan but when this proved unsuccessful, it shifted its attention to the establishment of an Islamic state. The movement's fundamentalist outlook proved difficult to reconcile with the more modernist policies of the Western-educated elite and hence led to periodic suppressions by the government. The Jama'at, like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Fedayan, calls for the creation of a Pakistani state on strict Islamic principles.<sup>72</sup>

As all these examples demonstrate, the impact of religion on the political processes is of considerable importance in Western and non-Western countries alike although the intensity of its saliency may vary. The extent to which religious differences become a significant factor in politics depends on the degree to which they are crosscut by other forms of social differentiation. Religious differences may match those based on class, ethnicity, or region. They may cut across class lines, but correspond to ethnic, linguistic, or regional differences. Or they may be crosscut by all other lines of differentiation.<sup>73</sup> The first pattern is, of

course, the most problematic in terms of political stability. The lack of any cross-cutting group loyalties raises the greater possibility that serious social conflict may ensue.

Politics, as I would define it, is primarily a fight over conflicting values in society. These values define and interpret the nature of social and political arrangements. They put limits on the extent to which such arrangements can be legitimately accepted by most members of society. Value conflicts become most intense in times of substantial socio-political or economic change the dynamics of which gives rise to new systems of thought and value. Once the religious-political framework is put to question, there always remain quasi-marginal groups in society whose normative and/or economic interests are threatened by the new kinds of power relationships, economic arrangements, or social activity.

The study of religion and its impact on politics, therefore, can shed much light on conflicts of value as they relate to structural and institutional change. Such conflicts are persistent cross-cultural phenomena. Although my primary concern in this study is limited to the Turkish case, I shall nevertheless proceed with the assumption that no one country follows a unique course in experiencing problems of development.

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(13) See Peter A. Pardue, Buddhism (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 28-29.

(14) See H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 25-26. The Islamic conquests between the death of Muhammad in 632 and the fall of the Umayyad Dynasty in 750 also led to far-reaching changes. The expansion of the Arabs from the Arabian peninsula into Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Eastern Persia, Central Asia and North Africa not only led to significant political changes but also to the spread of a new faith, Islam, throughout major regions of the world. Lewis argues, however, that the conquests were motivated more by economic reasons (the need for land in overpopulated Arabia) than religious considerations to spread the faith. On this point and on the history of the conquests, see Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 49-79.

(15) Gibb, pp. 120-122.

(16) Ibid., p. 134. Also see H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Vol. I, Part II (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 181. For various case studies of revolutionary or nationalist movements which have used religion as a base of opposition to the established order, see Guenter Lewy, Religion and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

(17) For a discussion of this point, see Elizabeth K. Nottingham, Religion: A Sociological View (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 35-38.

(18) Eisenstadt, "Religious Organization...", 285-92.

(19) Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rustow, "Conclusion," in R. E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (Eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 466.

(20) Ibid., pp 445-447.

(21) Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1958). First published in 1904-1905.

(22) Michael Walzer, for example, in his admirable study of the English Puritans, has argued that although Weber was right in finding a connection between the worldly asceticism of the Puritans and the growth of economic rationality, he was thoroughly misleading in arguing that the acquisitive spirit of capitalism also had its origins in Calvinist thought. Walzer points out that on the contrary, the Puritans despised squander and advised a vigorous self-discipline in economic life as they did in the social and political contexts. See his The Revolution of the Saints (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 300-306. Walzer's interpretation of Weber is, however, debatable. For a discussion of this controversy by historians and others, see Louis Schneider, Sociological Approach to Religion (New York: John Wiley, 1970), pp. 95-110. Also see J. Milton Yinger, The Scientific Study of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 380-92, and S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Protestant Ethic Thesis in Analytical and Comparative Context," Diogenes, 59 (Fall, 1967), 25-46.

(23) S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Protestant Ethic Thesis in an Analytical and Comparative Framework," in S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), The Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A Comparative View (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 343-66.

(24) Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957). It is interesting to note how, much like his concept of charisma, Weber's thesis on the Protestant ethic may have become so popularized as to be invoked in non-academic writing. Newsweek's Tokyo bureau chief, Bernard Krisher, for instance, offers the Confucian work ethic as part of an explanation for the Japanese willingness to work hard. See Newsweek, March 26, 1973, p. 82.

(25) Bellah, Tokugawa Religion, p. 196.

(26) See Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City: Past and Present (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 265-82.

(27) See Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 109. For a similar view, also see Gino Germani, "Secularization, Modernization, and Economic Development," in Eisenstadt, The Protestant Ethic..., pp. 343-66.

(28) For a discussion of this point of view, see Thomas Luckman, The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society (New York: McMillan, 1967), pp. 38-39.

(29) Everett E. Hagen, "Personality and Entrepreneurship: How Economic Growth Begins: A Theory of Social Change," Journal of Social Issues, 19 (January, 1963), 20-34. Also see his On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962).

(30) David McClelland, "The Achievement Motive in Economic Growth," in Bert F. Hoselitz and W. E. Moore (Eds.), Industrialization and Society (The Hague: UNESCO and Mouton, 1963), pp. 74-96. Also see his The Achieving Society (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961).

(31) Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958).

(32) See Bellah, Tokugawa Religion, pp. 4-5, 188.

(33) See Joseph J. Spengler, "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values, and Politico-Economic Development," in Ralph Braibanti and J. J. Spengler (Eds.), Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961), p. 9.

(34) Ibid., p. 33.

(35) As stated earlier, this is one area of current political science research on which there seems to be little consensus, if any. The wealth of definitions has been so disconcerting that the suggestion has been made to eliminate the concept altogether from discussions of modernization (see Huntington, "The Change to Change...", 303-305). In my judgment, much of the controversy is spurious. It arises from the general inclination of political scientists to pose problems in semantic terms. The terminology of any discipline is certainly important but it is important to the extent that it facilitates communication and understanding between students of that discipline. If political development as a concept is vague, it is so not because of its label but rather because the process itself has not been thoroughly identified. Little is to be gained by calling it political change, or political modernization, or by dropping it altogether. This concern with labels, it seems to me, arises

from the much-debated assumption that the concepts to be used by political scientists should be value-free. If "political development" connotes a value judgment, we should substitute it with "political modernization." If "political modernization" is also found to be wanting in objectivity, we should then use "political change." And if "political change" in turn is objectionable on the same grounds, we should simply discuss the process without referring to it by name.

In this study, I use political development rather than some other term because it is most widely used by students of comparative politics. Since I fail to see why the charge of subjectivity should particularly disturb a researcher, I am not concerned with whatever value connotations might be attached to it.

(36) Needless to say, my discussion of political development here is neither novel nor original. Rather, it incorporates, with a particular emphasis, some of the more important theoretical statements which have been made in the literature since the late 1950s.

(37) This classification is borrowed from Donald Smith although he uses different terms for his typology. See his Religion and Political Development.

(38) For a discussion of these characteristics, see Ibid., pp. 6-7.

(39) Ibid., pp. 7-8.

(40) See Peter L. Berger, "Religious Institutions," in Neil J. Smelser (Ed.), Sociology: An Introduction (New York: John Wiley, 1967), pp. 357-58.

(41) For a discussion of religion's function in social stratification, see Berger, Ibid., pp 343-59.

(42) See Germani, p. 355. —

(43) See Yinger, pp 382-83.

(44) This example is Vallier's, p. 17.

(45) See Berger, "Religious Institutions...", p. 341.

(46) For a discussion of these different forms of authority, see Charles Y. Glock and R. Stark, Religion and Society in Tension (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 177-179.

(47) Ibid.

(48) Ibid., p. 179.

- (49) Berger, "Religious Institutions," p. 375.
- (50) Werner Levi, "Religion and Political Development: A Theoretical Analysis," Bucknell Review, 15 (May, 1967), p. 81.
- (51) David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations," 57-104. Also see his The Politics of Modernization, pp. 365-66.
- (52) "Political Religion...", pp. 59-69.
- (53) Ibid., p. 77.
- (54) For a discussion of the problems stemming from primordial attachments in the new states, see Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," pp. 105-157.
- (55) Richard Rose and D. Urwin, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes," Comparative Political Studies, 2 (April, 1969), p. 12. The 17 countries included in the study are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France (Fourth Republic), Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S.A. For a more historical analysis which emphasizes the saliency of religious cleavages in the structuring of West European party systems, see S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour Martin Lipset and S. Rokkan (Eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.
- (56) Rose and Urwin, pp. 12-13, and Table 2 on pp. 18-19.
- (57) For a brief discussion of the church-state issue in France, see Lowell G. Noonan, France: The Politics of Continuity in Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), pp. 128-132. Also see Henry W. Ehrmann, Politics in France (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 47-57.
- (58) See Val R. Lorwin, "Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in National Politics," in Robert A. Dahl (Ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 147-187.
- (59) On the verzuiling phenomenon in the Netherlands, see Hans Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society," in Dahl, pp. 188-236. Also see Lipset and Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures...", pp. 15-18.
- (60) See Frederick C. Engelmann, "Austria: The Pooling of Opposition," in Dahl, pp. 260-83. Also see Rodney P. Stiefbold, "Segmented Pluralism and Consociational Democracy in Austria: Problems of Political Stability and Change," in

Martin O. Heisler (Ed.), Politics in Europe (New York: David McKay, 1974), pp. 117-177.

(61) For a comparative analysis of the Catholic vote in the U.S., Britain, and Austria, see Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 134-40, 202-208, 241-248, and 289-292. For New Zealand, see Alan D. Robinson, "Class Voting in New Zealand: A Comment on Alford's Comparison of Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems," in Lipset and Rokkan, p. 104.

(62) See J. A. Laponce, "Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics in Canada: A Comparative Analysis of Survey and Census Data," in Mattei Dogan and S. Rokkan (Eds.), Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1969), p. 190.

(63) See Donald Hindley, "President Sukarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication," The American Political Science Review (December, 1962), 915-26; Roger K. Paget, "The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power," Pacific Affairs, (Fall/Winter, 1967-68), 294-314. For a discussion of the reasons why the Islamic parties have traditionally opposed the communists, see Allan A. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," Asian Survey (December, 1968), 1001-1017.

(64) See Charles R. Nixon, "Nigeria and Biafra," in Steven L. Spiegel and K. N. Waltz (Eds.), Conflict in World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1971), pp. 281-300.

(65) For a brief discussion of the India-Pakistan conflict, see Wayne Wilcox, "India and Pakistan," in Spiegel and Waltz, pp. 240-260.

(66) See Adamantia Pollis, "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus," Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July, 1973), 575-99.

(67) See Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma. Also see Manning Nash, "Buddhist Revitalization in the Nation State: The Burmese Experience," in Spencer, pp. 105-22.

(68) See Howard W. Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

(69) For a discussion of confessional politics in Lebanon, see Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968), and Leonard Binder (Ed.), Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

(70) See Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 134-150.

(71) See Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1964), pp. 151-52, 156.

(72) See Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi," in Smith, South Asian Politics..., pp. 371-97, and Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 391-92.

(73) Yinger, pp. 425-26.

## CHAPTER II

## ISLAM AS A POLITICAL RELIGION

## I.

As the discussion in Chapter I makes clear, religion is an important factor in the social and political transformation of all societies. This, however, is especially the case in traditional Islamic societies because of the special nature of Islam as, on the one hand, a religious doctrine, and on the other, a social and political ideology as well as a legal system. To understand the Turkish experience with modernization, therefore, it is important to understand the nature of the relationship between Islam and politics. The role of Islamic theology and structures in the historical evolution of the relationship between political and religious institutions in Turkish society deserves some attention because it raises the theoretical question of whether or not we can identify certain tendencies in the theological tenets and organizational structure of Islam which contribute to its involvement in politics. Seen in this light, the reasons for the persistence of the religious question in Turkish politics half a century after the formal separation of church and state may become more clear. Because Islam is something more than a religious belief system, the problem of secularization also becomes something more than the separation of church and state.

As Donald Smith argues, the relationship between the religious and the political institutions in a society is not simply determined by the specific configuration of historical circumstances but is also dependent on the extent to which the theology as well as the organization of a particular religion encourages its involvement in political activity.<sup>1</sup> Although it is not my intention here to go into an extensive discussion of Islamic theology and institutions, a review of some of its basic features, however cursory, might shed light on this issue.

Smith's recent studies on religion and political development offer a useful theoretical framework within which this question can be approached. He uses two analytical categories to classify the major religions of the world. His first distinction is between "church religions" and "organic religions." Here, the emphasis is on structural differences between religious systems which have a well-established church with a separate identity from the rest of society and those which retain no such organization but are virtually merged with the social system. The nature of the resistance to different aspects of the secularization process varies<sup>2</sup> in each type of religious system.

Smith's second distinction is between "historical" and "ahistorical" religions. This classification is a theological one between religions which stress the importance of history and those for which history is irrelevant. The greater the

emphasis on history as important and divinely ordained, the greater the likelihood that religion will assume a significant role in political life.<sup>3</sup>

Following Smith's lead, can we identify those factors in Islamic theology and traditions which have been important in determining the nature of the relationship between the religious and the political systems in traditional Islamic societies? According to the typology presented above, Islam is both a historical and an organic religion.<sup>4</sup> On the level of ideas, it views history in sacred terms. This means that religion assumes an important role in establishing a socio-political order which conforms to divine design. On the structural level, its ecclesiastical organization is comparatively weak. In the absence of an autonomous church, the distinction between the religious system and the rest of society becomes obscure.

To begin with the historical nature of Islam, it is theoretically logical to assume that religions which view history as divinely ordained are more likely to consider themselves the guiding force of historical events than religions for which history is irrelevant in explaining the relationship between this world and the next. As Smith points out, the concepts of revelation and dogma are important here in terms of the relevance history has for any particular religion.<sup>5</sup> History is important for revealed religions because revelation explains both the beginning and end of human history as well as the direction

it should take. Similarly, scriptural religions also view history as important because dogma or truth, as laid down in the scriptures, is considered to be historically objective and therefore absolute.

In Buddhism, for example, history is theologically unimportant since there is no God to shape it. For the Buddhist, the tragedy of life stems from the belief that there is no death but a series of rebirths. The individual's salvation rests in the ending of this cyclical pattern of life through the attainment of total extinction. The Buddhist philosophy, therefore, is highly individualistic since each man is ultimately alone in finding his salvation without even the benefit of an approving God. The course of human history is irrelevant to this quest.<sup>6</sup>

In contrast, there is a definite theory of history in Islam.<sup>7</sup> Whereas salvation for the Buddhist is through individual merit, for the Muslim it is in the membership of the Islamic community.<sup>8</sup> In comparison with other major religions of the world, Islam is a political religion par excellence which defines for the believer the totality of his spiritual and temporal existence. If it is the private duty of the Muslim, for example, to give daily thanks to God in prayer, it is his public duty, and equally a sacred one, to wage war against infidels. The pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj), fasting during the month of Ramadan, and almsgiving are also among the religious duties of the Muslim which have

a social importance.<sup>9</sup> Hence, each member of the Islamic community, at least in theory, is a religious, and a social, and a political man. History is important because human institutions and relationships both within and outside of the Community have a theological significance. Nothing better illustrates this concern with history than the adoption of A.D. 622, which is the year of Muhammad's Hijra from Mecca to Medina, as the beginning date of the Muslim calendar.<sup>10</sup>

The importance that Islam places on establishing a political community which has its bases on divine revelation is quite evident even from a cursory glance at its origins. Aside from directing the way to individual salvation, Islam from the very beginning has been a social religion which has set a code of ethics for social action, a political religion which has both united and governed the community of believers, and a legalistic religion which has laid down a series of legal rules that later formed the bases of Islamic law. The extreme asceticism of most other religions is singularly absent in orthodox Islamic theology. Witness the fact, for example, that celibacy in Islam is not a virtue. The renunciation of the world through emphasis on other-worldly pursuits is alien to Muslim philosophy. On the contrary, the Islamic ideal stresses the importance of this-worldly activity for the building of a socio-political order on divine principles. In that respect, Islam has attempted

to bridge the distance between the sacred and the profane.<sup>11</sup> However, it should be noted here that some heretical sects, such as the various Sufi orders, differ from orthodox Islam in terms of the importance they place on ascetic practices.

The origins of Islam demonstrate this concern with political power. Islam started out as a protest movement against the economic and political supremacy of the Meccan ruling classes. The opposition of the Meccans to Muhammad and his followers was not primarily on theological grounds. They perceived the new religion as a threat to their economic interests and the oligarchic structure of Meccan society.<sup>12</sup> The spread of Islam throughout the region, therefore, was a result of a struggle between two political factions. Muhammad's move from Mecca to Medina to consolidate the Islamic community, his fight against Mecca on both political and economic fronts including three battles and the changing of Mecca's trade route, as well as the final submission of Mecca indicate that Muhammad was as much of a political leader as a Prophet. His success in strengthening the Islamic community was not simply a religious but also a political success. As Gibb puts it, for both Muhammad and his opponents, "the new religious association had long been conceived of as a community organized on political lines, not as a church within a secular state."<sup>13</sup>

This emphasis on history and politics brings us to the second characteristic of Islam, namely, its nature as an

organic religion. "Organic religions," writes Smith, "...tend to define their collective expression in terms of the structure of an entire society. Sacral law and sacral social structure are of the essence of organic religions. Religion is largely equated with society, and distinct ecclesiastical organizations, to the extent that they exist, are secondary."<sup>14</sup> That there is no established church in Islam with organizational autonomy and specialized activities has indeed blurred the distinctions between religion and the larger social system in traditional Muslim societies.

This lack of boundaries between the religious and the social systems is closely connected with the theory of history in Islam. Since the direction of history is divinely ordained, it follows that the entire range of interpersonal and institutional relationships in society are also under sacred control. The concept of the Shari'ah incorporates precisely this notion that human conduct is under divine authority and regulation and that the basis of the law rests with divine revelation.<sup>15</sup> The word Islam itself means submission to the will of God.

The Shari'ah derives its authority basically from two sources: the Koran and the Sunna (Prophetic tradition) both of which are infallible and unchangeable. As Gibb argues, Islamic law, as it initially developed, was conceived of not as a body of regulations which were to be adapted to specific social conditions but as an authoritative

source of moral conduct which would stand immutable for all time.<sup>16</sup> The systematization of the Shari'ah into a comprehensive body of legal provisions during the second and the third centuries of Islam added two other sources of authority to the law which left some leeway for speculation by Muslim jurists: the principle of ijma, i.e., the consensus of the Community which in effect meant the consensus of the ulema, and the principle of qiyas, i.e., analogical reasoning through precedent to determine a point of law not specifically covered in the Koran or the Hadiths (the narratives of the Sunna). In theory, therefore, there was room for individual reasoning (ijtihad) which would ensure the necessary flexibility and adaptability of the law to changing conditions. In practice, however, the right of ijtihad was curtailed by the ulema after the second and third centuries as decisions on points of law which were once settled were declared closed to further questioning.<sup>17</sup>

Islam's emphasis on the importance of a community of believers (umma) unified by the acceptance of the divine basis of society is reflected in the parallel acceptance of the law as of divine origin which regulates both individual conduct and societal relationships. Hence, the law becomes the principal means of social action. There is no theory of society or politics separate from what is laid down in the Shari'ah. Society is the Community, the state the political expression of God and the political organization of his umma.<sup>18</sup> The theoretical distinction between God's domain

and that of Caesar does not exist in Islamic theology.<sup>19</sup> The law incorporates the temporal within the spiritual. Hence, society and politics are inseparable from religion. The religious basis of the law presupposes that all aspects of both private lives and the life of the community are under divine guidance.

The emphasis on divine guidance of socio-political institutions has meant that Islam is not only a belief system in the religious sense but is at the same time a political doctrine which sets the limits of authority and obligation within the Muslim community. That community, based as it is on Revelation, is the only ideal political community. It finds its legitimacy in the ultimate power and will of God. Its laws and institutions are, therefore, interrelated, comprehensive, and infallible.

What all of this amounts to is a political theory which puts divine responsibility on relationships of power and authority. As Siegman argues, since all institutions in Islam originate from religious doctrines, including the institution of government, all of them exist in order to establish divine justice on earth. Accordingly, the purpose of political institutions is the defense of Islam rather than that of the state.<sup>20</sup> "For at the heart of Islamic political doctrine," writes Siegman, "lies neither the state, nor the individual, nor yet a social class, but the umma, the Islamic community tied by bonds of faith

alone."<sup>21</sup> This means that the primary loyalty of individuals is to the umma rather than to the state and to Islamic law rather than to the ruler.<sup>22</sup>

The question of political legitimacy, therefore, is primarily a theocratic question rather than a political one. Since political authority is delegated to rulers by divine sanction, it ought to be exercised in a just manner. However, in case it is misused for unjust ends, the question concerns not the ruled but the ruler and his God.<sup>23</sup> The individual has no inherent rights or liberties, nor does he have political obligations amounting to any sense of civic duty except the obligation to obey political authority.<sup>24</sup> The two dominant themes in the history of Islamic states were precisely this question of submission to legitimate political authority and that of rebellion against unjust rulers.<sup>25</sup>

As the foregoing discussion suggests, Islam's concern with history and its organic nature were both instrumental in its penetration into all subsystems of traditional Muslim societies. To be sure, it cannot be argued that church-state relations within Islamic countries have been solely molded by Islam's theological tenets or organizational structure. Clearly, other factors are at work which facilitate the involvement of the religious hierarchy with politics in traditional Islamic and non-Islamic countries alike, such as the reciprocal needs of both the church and

the state to gain recognition and support from each other in order to consolidate their economic power, exert control over the masses, and preserve the dominant power relationships in society. However, the above discussion brings out the specific problem of Muslim countries in dealing with secularization attempts in societies which have traditionally rested on the premise that there are no distinctions to be made between the secular and the religious. It also points to the difficulty of limiting Islam's influence on socio-political processes through formal secularization. The history of the secularization movement in both Ottoman and Republican Turkey is, in a sense, the history of the attempt to cope precisely with this problem of limiting Islam's influence in a predominantly Muslim society where the belief system considers it heretical to separate the religious realm from the secular.

## II.

The nature of Islam as an "historical" and an "organic" religion raises a number of questions about the relationship between the Muslim Institution and the Ruling Institution in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>26</sup> The close association between the religious and the socio-political systems-- both in functional and organizational terms-- was a distinguishing characteristic of traditional Ottoman society until the beginnings of secularization attempts at the turn of the 18th century. The Islamic emphasis on the merging of religion and society found its ultimate expression in the

social structure and the political organization of the Ottoman Empire. Combining the dual functions of the temporal ruler and the spiritual leader of the most powerful Islamic state, the Sultan-Caliph symbolized the Islamic ideal of a political community based on religious legitimacy. That ideal was elevated into a political doctrine through the Ottoman concept of din-u-devlet, that is to say, the unity of religion and the state.<sup>27</sup>

Despite the fact that Islamic theology does not recognize a priestly class, the ulema corps came to be a highly organized and powerful group within the administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire. The functions of the ulema within Ottoman society were quite extensive. They performed educational and legal functions, but unlike a priesthood, had no role in mediating salvation. Although "ulema" in the Islamic context was the collective name given to the learned men of religion, it acquired a different meaning in Ottoman Turkey and came to denote a specific group of men with religious training who had been appointed to the various educational, judicial, or religious posts.<sup>28</sup> In other words, the Religious Institution in the Ottoman Empire was part of the state bureaucracy, linked to the administrative structure of the state through a vast network of central and provincial offices.

An important difference between the Ruling Institution and the Muslim Institution was that whereas the composition of

the former was made up of non-Muslim subjects who were personal slaves of the Sultan and therefore part of his household administration, the latter was composed of free-born Muslims who owed no personal allegiance to the ruler. This meant that the Muslim Institution had a separate and autonomous status within the askeri class. As members of that class, they did not pay any taxes. But unlike the civil servants and the military who could not transfer their property to their descendents upon death, the ulema could do so and in time became a hereditary class with immense wealth and power.<sup>29</sup>

Although the ulema often took a conservative position in dealing with questions of legal and religious interpretation, it would be incorrect to conclude that they were as a group opposed to entrusting the law with a minimum degree of flexibility that would allow adaptation to changing conditions. As Gibb and Bowen point out, "the Islamic legal system... even included a special class of practitioners, the Muftis, whose real function it was to guide and to sanction this process of adaptation."<sup>30</sup> Heyd discusses numerous cases involving high-ranking ulema who not only gave support to the reforms initiated by Selim III and Mahmud II but also sanctioned them through very liberal interpretations of the Shari'ah.<sup>31</sup> For example, the ulema showed no opposition to the secular law-making authority of the Sultan which he exercised in enacting a series of kanuns, nor did they oppose the establishment of mazalim courts to look into civil

or criminal cases involving administrative officials. Beginning with mid-19th century, commercial cases were also handled outside of the religious courts although the ulema did initially oppose the drafting of a new commercial code based on French models. The ulema's opposition cost Mustafa Reşit Pasha, the famous announcer of the Tanzimat edict, his post as foreign minister since it was he who had sponsored the drafting of the new code. Nine years after Reşit Pasha's fall from power, however, the Commercial Code of 1850 was promulgated.<sup>32</sup> In general, as long as fields which had been traditionally under religious control, such as family law, were left under the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah courts, the ulema displayed little resistance to the introduction of secular codes or regulations. The net result was the gradual constriction of the areas that fell under religious jurisdiction which paved the way for the eventual secularization of law.<sup>33</sup>

The din-u-devlet concept, therefore, has to be understood on both the theoretical level and in practice. In terms of theory, it symbolized the Islamic ideal of unity between religion and the state, a unity which was to a great extent accomplished through the incorporation of the ulema hierarchy into the administrative structure of the Empire. As Berkes argues, the office of the Şeyhü'l-Islam was an important one in establishing this link between religion and the state.<sup>34</sup> Through that office, religious sanction for political decisions was secured. The title of Caliph, designating spiritual

leadership of the world Muslim community, as affixed to the title of the Ottoman ruler, was a symbolic expression of the din-u-devlet concept. But the translation of that concept into a political formula was achieved by the institutionalization of religious authority into an administrative network linked to political decision-making through the office of the Şeyhü'l-Islam.

In practice, however, the boundaries between the functions of the Religious Institution and the state were clearly drawn. The Religious Institution was concerned with the integration of society-- or rather, with the integration of the Muslim population-- into a unified community of believers although the ulema as an elite group had little affective influence over the masses in the light of the gap between orthodox and folk Islam. Hence, the functions of the ulema covered those areas of social life that could be manipulated for effective socialization: the family, educational institutions, intellectual activity, and the law. The state, on the other hand, took responsibility in administrative, military, and economic fields. The distribution of functions allowed little confusion as to the respective powers of the state and the Religious Institution.<sup>35</sup> Although during the history of the Empire there were occasions when the increasing power of one side threatened that of the other, both sides were in general careful to avoid conflict. In any case, there was no question of a complete merging of religion and

the state as the term din-u-devlet might imply.<sup>36</sup>

Religion in traditional Ottoman society had both social and political functions. In the social realm, the most important function of religion was social integration. The success of orthodox Islam in achieving such integration, however, has to be qualified. Integration in the modern national state is understood to mean the process by which various socialization agencies under government control-- such as educational institutions-- attempt to form some sort of a link between the individual on the one hand, and the nation-state on the other. That is to say, the socialization process relates the individual to the larger socio-political system. The aim, therefore, is to define individual norms, values, and modes of behavior within the context of the national value system. In more traditional societies, however, integration is often understood in parochial terms to mean the socialization of the individual into some segment of the society such as the family, the clan, the kinship group, or the community. In the Ottoman Empire, the pattern of integration was of the latter type. The state was little concerned with the integration of various communities into the larger socio-political system. The aim in fact was just the opposite, namely, the segregation of each community from the others. This was achieved through a religious definition of communal identity and the organization of various non-Muslim groups on a confessional basis into semi-autonomous

communities called millets.<sup>37</sup> Hence, the state totally disassociated itself from any effort to form a collective consciousness that might determine individual identity. Although during the 19th century, the term "Ottoman" came to signify a quasi-national definition of citizenship, its meaning was little understood by the mass of the population who knew of the existence of the state only through contacts with tax-collectors. For the Muslim subjects of the Empire, collective identity was understandable only in religious terms.<sup>38</sup> For the non-Muslims, on the other hand, the problem of integration was not only a psychological but also a legal one. Self perceptions of the non-Muslims were, like the Muslims, determined by references to membership in a religious community. But such membership also designated something more than a certain psychological attitude. Legally, politically, and socially, the millet arrangement left the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire outside of the mainstream of Ottoman culture. As Gibb and Bowen put it, "the Ottoman government, by leaving the task of social unification to the religious institution, condemned the non-Moslem and heterodox Moslem groups under its control to exclusion from effective incorporation in the Ottoman structure of society."<sup>39</sup>

The ulema achieved social integration of the Muslim community at a considerable price to religious orthodoxy. The long-standing gap between elite and mass cultures-- which manifested itself in different literary traditions,

language, and folklore-- was also evident in the religious realm. The folk religion of the masses, which found its expression in the Sufi movement, deviated from Orthodox Islam in its asceticism and in its incorporation of animistic, paganistic, Christian, or Hindu practices inherited from the pre-Islamic past.<sup>40</sup> The ulema, therefore, attempted to accomplish two tasks at once. They aimed not only to arrive at some sort of a compromise between folk and orthodox Islam but in the process, also hoped to narrow the gap between elite and mass cultures.<sup>41</sup> At least in the religious realm, that cultural gap was indeed somewhat narrowed as the derviş orders eventually extended their sphere of influence within the Ruling Institution. The two important derviş orders in the Ottoman Empire-- the Bektaşis and the Mevlevis-- found support among both the military and the civil officials. The Bektaşis had so much following among the Janissaries that the latter acquired the nickname, "Bektaşî soldiery."<sup>42</sup> The Mevlevis, on the other hand, were supported by the Sultans to counterbalance the growing threat to their power of the Janissary-Bektaşî cooperation.<sup>43</sup>

In the political sphere, the most important function of religion was to secure legitimacy to political rule in order to maintain the stability of the status quo. In the modern national state, legitimacy is secured-- through socialization of a coercive or semi-coercive nature-- by a wide acceptance of a dominant political ideology. The basis of legitimacy, whether or not it is in fact the case, is generally claimed

to rest with a popular mandate. In other words, in democratic and non-democratic systems alike, political rulers derive their authority from an alleged consensus of the ruled. In the Ottoman case, the basis of authority was religious. The Sultan was considered to be not the representative of the people but the representative of God. As Mardin has argued, in the absence of a secular political ideology, religion assumed an ideological character in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>44</sup> It was the only belief system with a popular base that defined for the individual his relationship to society. The concept of the state, however distant it may be for the masses, had a meaning only within a religious context: the state was Islamic, the ruler was the leader of the world Islamic community, and political obedience was the duty of every Muslim subject since the political order had divine sanction. If we can, therefore, speak of an Ottoman political culture, it has to be within the context of the religious value system.

The concept of political culture, although admittedly loose and ill-defined, has nevertheless a heuristic value insofar as it emphasizes the significance of collective value orientations towards the social system in general and the political system in particular. The manner in which the individual perceives his relationship to his society and government determines for him the parameters of his socio-political activity and expectations. That mode of perception is influenced by his system of values which, especially in

traditional societies, derive from his religious beliefs. In traditional Muslim societies, value orientations towards society and government are heavily influenced by Islam's emphasis on communal consensus. Deviation from communal norms or patterns of behavior is considered heretical. Hence, the type of unity that is sought excludes the toleration of individualism or separatist movements.<sup>45</sup> The translation of these values into a political culture would give us a consensual pattern of politics whereby the consensus is achieved not through a working out of conflicting viewpoints but rather through the elimination of conflict itself.

The role of religion in shaping Ottoman political culture was, therefore, considerable. Religion not only provided legitimacy to political rule but also secured stability through minimizing individual expectations from government. Mardin has put forth the interesting hypothesis in this context that the most important function of religion in Ottoman society pertained to its intermediary role between the individual and the state. Whereas in the West, there gradually emerged a whole network of secondary structures which gained some autonomy from the state, in traditional Islamic societies in general, and in the Ottoman Empire in particular, no such structural differentiation existed. Religion, therefore, became the only source of collective identity in the absence of secondary structures that would stand as channels of identity formation. Moreover, the founding of organizations in the West to defend particularistic

class interests was also absent in the Ottoman Empire. Hence, the protection that the individual could receive through organizational activity in the Western context was possible in Ottoman society only through membership in the Islamic community. This communal identity took over the functions that secondary associations performed in the West.<sup>46</sup>

Religion in the Ottoman Empire, therefore, performed what Mardin calls a double function. Because the administrative structure of the Empire was undifferentiated, the religious hierarchy assumed many of the functions-- such as educational and judicial-- that state institutions perform in administrative setups of a more differentiated character. Religion was the most important link between the center and the periphery. It was the institutional and the cultural reference point for the rulers in their relationship to the ruled. On the one hand, therefore, it functioned as some sort of a control mechanism at the local level. For the ruled, on the other hand, it offered an alternative channel of social cohesion. That is, the idea of a Muslim community became a substitute for the concept of a polity. Religion could perform this double function because of its own internal duality. Just as there were two cultures, the elite and the mass, there were two religions, the orthodox and the folk. While the orthodox religion provided the basis of upper class ideology, the folk religion of the derviş orders became the basis of communal cohesion and individual identity for the lower classes.<sup>47</sup>

As Smith points out, despite the fact that the Ottoman ulema were highly organized, the Ottoman political system was nevertheless an "organic" one. Unlike the ideal organic model characterized by the absence of ecclesiastical structures, the Religious Institution in the Ottoman Empire retained a distinct organization. However, the existence of such an organization was nowhere comparable to the organization of the religious hierarchy in a "church" model. Whereas in the latter case, there is an organized church with a separate identity from the rest of society and with considerable organizational autonomy, in the case of the Ottoman ulema corps no such distinctions could be made. The Religious Institution was part of the state bureaucracy. It was not an autonomous structure with internal rules for hierarchical arrangements.<sup>48</sup>

In conclusion, then, the emphasis that Islam places on history found its expression in the special place that the Religious Institution occupied in Ottoman society and political structures. And the organic nature of Islam prevented the development of functional and institutional differentiation between the religious and the political systems.

Turkey's experience with political development has to be understood against this Islamic background. As Smith argues, the nature of the religious system in a society may well be a key variable in explaining cross-cultural differences between different patterns of political development.<sup>49</sup> As I

shall discuss in greater detail in later chapters, the impact of Islam on traditional Ottoman social and political institutions had far-reaching consequences for the developmental process in Turkey during both the last two hundred years of the Empire's existence and the Republican Period. The nature of the religious system set the parameters of what should be reformed and how. It affected the specific manner in which both Ottoman and Turkish reformers responded to problems of modernization, and it put constraints on the process of secularization in general, and the separation of religious and political affairs in particular.

The need for reform in the Ottoman Empire was first recognized in the 17th century when the Empire began to lose its former strength. The 17th century reforms were indigenous attempts to find solutions to the Empire's growing weakness. In general, these solutions centered around strengthening the authority of the central government over both the rebellious Janissary corps and the powerful feudal lords (derebeyi) in the provinces. With the beginning of the 18th century, however, the reform efforts took on a different tone as the Ottoman Empire, for the first time in its history, opened its doors to the West. The diplomatic and cultural contacts with European countries convinced Ottoman statesmen of Western technical superiority and led them to seek technical help in military affairs from Western experts. Towards the end of the century, contacts with the West resulted in an increasing soul-searching as Ottoman

intellectuals and statesmen came to look at Westernization as a precondition of reform in the Empire. Throughout the 19th century, therefore, the basic concern of Ottoman reformers was to Westernize Ottoman military, educational, legal, and political institutions. The problem which they confronted was how to do this within an Islamic society where the political and organic nature of Islam had resulted in its penetration into all substructures of the Ottoman socio-political system.

Their dilemma is apparent. On the one hand, an increasing number of them came to believe that the Empire's salvation rested in the acceptance of Western technology and Western institutional forms. On the other hand, none could come up with a formula as to how Western technology and institutions would be adopted to an Islamic society without accepting Western civilization itself.

This dichotomy between Islamic and Western civilizations which 19th century reformers had to confront gave way to the creation of dual institutions. Rather than destroy traditional Islamic institutions, the 19th century reforms were designed to create new ones that were to exist next to the old. In this process, the religious system both determined the boundaries of change as well as the direction that such change would take. Because Islamic society was pitted against the Western, it seemed that change could take only one form,

namely, Westernization. Increasingly, the reasons for the Empire's decline centered around the conviction that Islam and the civilization which it had created was, in some way, inadequate for dealing with change.<sup>50</sup>

I think that both the political and the organic characteristics of Islam put constraints on the course of modernization that the Ottoman reformers, and later, the Kemalist nationalists, followed. Here was a religion which preached a political doctrine. It interpreted the creation of a political community in theological terms. It equated state and society. It considered the distinction between the secular and the religious realms as heresy. It did not allow for the development of an autonomous religious organization. To stay within that Islamic framework and yet change the basic structures of the social and political system was contradictory in terms for it was the religious system itself which had created and given sanction to such structures.

The 19th century reformers sought to come to grips with this contradiction by adopting a course of modernization which evaded the issue of indigenous reform of the Islamic socio-political structures. They left these basically intact and built the new on exogeneous models. It was after the Empire's collapse at the end of World War I and the subsequent founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 that this duality

in aims was finally resolved in favor of accepting Western civilization. To the Kemalists, the question was no longer that of finding some means to integrate Islamic institutions with the Western. The former, the Kemalists decided, had to be destroyed. But once again, the very attempt at modernization which the Kemalists followed was constricted, in a paradoxical way, by the religious system. I think that the opposition which the Kemalists showed towards Islamic civilization narrowed their vision of modernity. Just as the 19th century reformers had viewed the problem of modernization with reference to Islam, so did the Kemalists. In a sense, it was the religious system which defined for them what was in need of reform. Before anything else, the new Republic would use all the power and energy at its disposal towards the substitution of Western culture with the Islamic. This insistence on changing Islamic institutions and structures prevented the modernizing elite of the Kemalist era from turning their attention to broader definitions of systemic change.

Hence, the manner in which modernization was approached and the direction it took was largely affected by the role of Islam in Turkish society. The process of secularization itself had to meet the Islamic challenge. The fact that in Islam there was no distinction between secular and religious life posed a problem to both Ottoman and Kemalist reformers. The Ottomans attempted to go around the problem

by creating secular institutions without establishing, however, secularized social, legal, or political systems. The Kemalists, on the other hand, accomplished both at the same time. They, too, however, were confronted with the problem of whether or not religious and political affairs could be separated in an Islamic society. Their very solution to the problem was somehow determined by the political nature of Islam. If in Islam religion and politics went together, the best means of making sure that religion played no role in political life would be to put it under political control. In other words, if separation of Islam and politics seemed difficult, then the former at least could be made subservient to the latter. Hence, religious institutions were organizationally linked to the state bureaucracy rather than encouraged to create an autonomous organization.

The Islamic impact on Turkey's modernization, therefore, was considerable. Since Islam had entrenched itself so thoroughly in the social, legal, and political system of the Ottoman Empire, those who looked for change had to look outside of the Islamic framework. In the end, it became increasingly clear to modernizing elites that the only way to modernize was to reject the Islamic creed. But such rejection also implied a built-in controversy over the role of religion in politics. For if the problem, during the Ottoman period, had been that of removing religious influence in political affairs, it turned into that of removing

political interference in religious affairs during the Republican era. As Chapter IV will show, with the advent of democracy in 1946, that problem was all the more intensified.

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- (1) See his Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 7-8, 249. Also see his India as a Secular State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
- (2) Smith, Religion and Political Development, pp. 24-40.
- (3) Ibid., pp. 248-49.
- (4) Ibid., p. 250.
- (5) Ibid., pp. 248-49.
- (6) See, for example, Peter A. Pardue, Buddhism (New York: MacMillan, 1968). Also see Jerrold Schechter, The New Face of the Buddha: Buddhism and Political Power in Southeast Asia (New York: Coward-McCann, 1967), and Kenneth W. Morgan (Ed.), The Path of the Buddha (New York: The Ronald Press, 1956).
- (7) For a discussion of Islam's concern with history, see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (New York: The New American Library, 1957), pp.29-33.
- (8) For a discussion on the development of the belief that salvation for the Muslim rests with membership in the Islamic community, see Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), p. 301.
- (9) The pilgrimage, fasting, and almsgiving are three of the five "pillars" of Islam which all Muslims are required to obey. The other two are (1) belief in God as the sole creator and in Muhammad as his messenger, and (2) daily prayers.
- (10) Wilfred Cantwell Smith makes an interesting comparison between Islam and Christianity in this respect. Whereas the Christian era starts with Christ's birth, the Muslim era begins with the year when Muhammad and his followers achieved political power by establishing the Muslim community in Medina. See his Islam in..., p. 23.
- (11) See G. E. von Grunebaum, "The Inherent Adaptive Potentialities of Islam," in Syed Ali Ahsan (Ed.), Islam in the Modern World (Dacca: Associated Printers, 1964), p. 48. Also see Mahmud Husain, "The Role of Faith in the New Social Set-up," in Ibid., p. 91 and David de Santillana, "Law and Society," in T. W. Arnold and A. Guillaume (Eds.), The Legacy of Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 289.

(12) See H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 26. Also see Fazlur Rahman, pp. 6-19.

(13) Gibb, p. 27.

(14) Religion and Political Development, p. 249.

(15) Rahman, p. 76.

(16) Gibb, p. 90. On this point, also see Noel J. Coulson, "The Concept of Progress in Islamic Law," in Robert N. Bellah (Ed.), Religion and Progress in Modern Asia (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 75.

(17) Gibb, pp. 94-99. Also see Ann K. S. Lambton, "Free Thinking and Individual Freedom," in Ali Ahsan, pp. 58-84, and Coulson, p. 74.

(18) For a discussion of Islam's emphasis on community and the political consequences of this, see E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (London: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 21-27. Also see G. E. von Grunebaum, "An Analysis of Islamic Civilization and Cultural Anthropology," Colloque sur la Sociologie Musulmane, Correspondance D'Orient, No. 5 (Brussels: Publications du Centre pour L'Etude des Problèmes du Monde Musulman Contemporain, 1961), p. 40; H. A. R. Gibb, "The Heritage of Islam in the Modern World: Part I," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. I, No. 1 (January, 1970), p. 4; and W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), pp. 28-29.

(19) Lambton makes that same analogy, p. 59.

(20) Henry Siegman, "The State and the Individual in Sunni Islam," The Muslim World, Vol. LIV, No. 1 (January, 1964), p. 14.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid., pp. 14-15.

(23) Ibid., p. 17.

(24) Ibid., p. 23.

(25) See Guenther Lewy, "The Future of the Islamic Religion," in Jeffrey K. Haddan (Ed.), Religion in Radical Transition (Chicago: Aldine, 1971), pp. 128-129.

(26) In terms of its social structure, Ottoman society

was divided into two major groups: the askeri and the reaya. The first included the military, the civil servants and the ulema. The second included all tax-paying Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Historians have generally made a distinction within the askeri group between what have been called the Ruling Institution and the Muslim Institution. The Ruling Institution incorporated the civil servants and the military who were personal slaves of the Sultan and hence came from non-Muslim backgrounds. In contrast, members of the Muslim Institution-- the ulema-- were free-born Muslims. See Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," in Robert E. Ward & D. A. Rustow (Eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 44. Davison informs us that the two terms, the Muslim Institution and the Ruling Institution, were first used by Albert H. Lybyer in his The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent (Cambridge, Mass.: 1913). See Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 10n.

(27) See Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 9-10.

(28) These ranged from appointments as imams (preachers in the mosques), teachers in the medreses, kadis (judges) entrusted with the duty to administrate the law, and müftis (jurisconsults) whose job it was to see to it that new legal enactments or judicial cases conformed to the Shari'ah. See Richard L. Chambers, "The Ottoman Ulema and the Tanzimat," in Nikki R. Keddie (Ed.), Scholars, Saints, and Sufis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 33. Also see Berkes, p. 15.

(29) Chambers, p. 33. Also see H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Vol. I, Part II (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 107 and Richard Pepp, "Some Observations on the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy," in Keddie, p. 19.

(30) Gibb and Bowen, p. 120.

(31) Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II," Scripta Hierosolymitana, Vol. IX, pp. 63-96.

(32) See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 108, 112.

(33) See H. A. R. Gibb, "The Heritage of Islam in the Modern World: Part II," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. I, No. 3 (July, 1970), pp. 233-34.

(34) Berkes, p. 15.

(35) See Gibb & Bowen, pp. 79-80.

(36) Berkes has recently argued that the Ottoman political system cannot be understood in terms of its presumed conformity to the principles of Islam. The assertion that it was based on Islamic principles has been in vogue among both Western and Muslim students of Ottoman history. This assertion, according to Berkes, is based on a misconception of Islam's role in the Ottoman political structure. Because religion provided the content of civil law, it was assumed, Berkes argues, that it formed the basis of the state. However, as long as the state permitted the application of Islamic law and defended the unity of the Islamic community, it was religiously acceptable. In other words, a state based on any set of principles but one which recognized these demands could obtain religious sanction. See his "Turkish Secularism and Political Development." Paper presented at the conference on "The Republic of Turkey, 1923-1973: Studies in 20th Century Nation-Building," held at the University of Chicago, December, 1973.

(37) See Berkes, p. 11. The millet arrangement in the Ottoman Empire was based on Koranic principles involving the Dimmîs, a term which was used to designate non-Muslims, specifically, Judaeo-Christians, who were given a special status in the Koran as Ahl al-Kitâb (The People of Scripture). The term Dimmî was derived from the word dimma, which meant a contract entered into between a Muslim ruler and his non-Muslim subjects by the terms of which the ruler guaranteed their religious freedom and protection in return for which they payed special taxes. (See Gibb & Bowen, pp. 207-208). The toleration of Ahl al-Kitâb by the Koran as contrasted with polytheists (who had to either convert to Islam or die at the hands of victorious Muslim armies) rested on the recognition that since the distinction between Dimmîs and Muslims was religious in origin, the former could not be subject to Muslim law in their relations with each other and hence must be allowed to follow their own religious laws. (See Ibid., p. 212).

The recognition of the various Dimmî communities as millets by the Ottoman Empire came after the conquest of Istanbul by Sultan Mehmet II in 1453. Initially, the Greeks and the Jews were granted a millet status by the Sultan with the Patriarch of Istanbul and the Haham Başı (Chief Rabbi) assuming civil jurisdiction over Greek Orthodox and Jewish communities, respectively, (Ibid., pp. 216-217). Although the Orthodox millet in later times consisted not only of Greeks but Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Bosnians, and the residents of Southern Albania, the Ottoman government made no differentiation between

these groups and designated all of them as "Rum Milleti," i.e., the Greek millet. (Ibid., p. 234). The recognition of the Armenians as a millet came later, in 1461, with the Armenian Patriarch assuming the same functions as the Greek Orthodox Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi. Although among the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire there were others who belonged to different churches than the Greeks or Armenians, none of them were granted a millet status but instead were classified under the Armenian millet. (Ibid., pp. 221, 23-232). According to the millet system, the administration of the various non-Muslim communities were left to a Millet Başı (the Chief of a Millet) who was given autonomy in the internal affairs of his millet and was responsible to the Imperial government only in matters of taxation. (Ibid., p. 216.).

(38) See Lewis, The Emergence..., pp. 1-2. Also see Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963).

(39) Gibb & Bowen, p. 79. It should also be pointed out, however, that the non-Muslims were not altogether left out of the political, and certainly not the economic, life of the Empire. For example, with the opening to the West, non-Muslim subjects, especially the Greeks, were increasingly employed in government service as translators in the Translation Office (Tercüme Odası) or as advisors in foreign policy. (See Ibid., pp. 236, 238). Among the Fenerli Greeks in Istanbul, so-called because of the residential district they lived in, there were quite a number of prominent families in banking. (Ibid., p. 236). The industry and the wholesale commerce of the Empire as well as the collection of customs were largely under the control of the Jews. (Ibid., pp. 240, 243).

(40) See Ibid., p. 75. Also see R. A. Nicholson, "Mysticism," in Arnold and Guillaume, pp. 210-238. For a general discussion of the relationship between orthodox and folk religions, see E. Wilbur Rock, "Symbols in Conflict: Official versus Folk Religion," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, V, No. 2 (Spring, 1966), 204-212.

(41) Gibb & Bowen, p. 77.

(42) Ibid., p. 191. The Janissaries were recruited from among the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Empire by a system of conscription called devşirme. For a discussion of this recruitment system, see Ibid., Part I, pp. 56-60.

(43) Ibid., p. 195.

(44) Şerif Mardin, Religion as Ideology (Ankara: Hacettepe University Publications, No. 9, April, 1969). Also

see his Din ve İdeoloji (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969).

(45) See Mardin, Din..., pp. 52-70.

(46) Ibid., pp. 56-61.

(47) Şerif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2 (1971), pp. 204-206.

(48) Religion and..., pp. 67-68.

(49) Ibid., p. 5.

(50) For histories of secularization and Westernization attempts in the Ottoman Empire, see Berkes, Davison, and Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiyenin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaştırma Hareketleri (İstanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, 1960).

## CHAPTER III

RELIGION AND NATION-BUILDING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF  
CULTURAL SYMBOLS

## I.

Since the French Revolution, religious institutions have been among the first victims of most revolutionary regimes. Because of the intimate relationship between religious and political authority in traditional societies, religious institutions have stood as symbols of the old regimes in the eyes of revolutionary leaders in France, Russia, Mexico, China, and Turkey. But more importantly, religion has been looked upon as a competing system of beliefs which is at odds with the ideology of the revolution. Structural change that revolutionary movements aim at presupposes a concomitant change in cultural value patterns. To the extent that religion shapes cultural norms, it stands as a most serious challenge to revolutionaries who seek to change established values and mass normative behavior.

The extent to which religion is tolerated by the revolutionary elite depends on the degree of its involvement with the socio-political structures of the old regime. The social classes with which the religious institution is identified, the role of religious teaching in upholding the traditional system of political legitimacy, as well as the

wealth and privileges of the religious hierarchy are a number of factors which play an important role in the attitude of the revolutionary leaders towards the established church. The more intimately religious institutions are linked with the social structural and political arrangements of the old regime which the revolutionaries hope to destroy, the more of a tension there will be between the religious and the revolutionary elites. Moreover, this tension is created not only by the revolutionaries but also by the church. Just as the revolutionaries are bent on destroying the power and privileges of the church, the church is bent on keeping its position of power and wealth by various forms of opposition to revolutionary goals.

Since religion in traditional societies is the most effective organized force with a mass following, the power struggle between the church and the revolutionary government assumes a crucial significance for the success of the revolution. If the value structure of the new society that the revolutionary ideology envisions is to be internalized by the masses, all competing belief systems which have their roots in the prerevolutionary order have to be erased from mass consciousness. Hence the attack on the church, although seemingly aims to destroy its institutional strength, also aims to destroy its ideological appeal.

The extent to which the religious establishment is identified with the old regime, then, is an important factor

in determining the relationship between the church and the revolutionary government. The history of what happened to the Orthodox Church in Russia versus the various sects after the Bolshevik Revolution is illustrative of this point. The Russian Orthodox Church under the Tsarist regime was both politically and financially very strong. It was the official church of the Russian Empire. As such, it had a monopoly over religious propaganda and teaching, received financial support from the state, and owned immense wealth and property. Moreover, it had close links with the government, with representatives in the Council of Ministers as well as in local councils. In terms of its political policies, the church stood as a symbol of Tsarist power. It defended the legitimacy of Tsarist rule, represented the interests of the upper class, and adopted an extreme right-wing position in the political spectrum.<sup>1</sup>

After the Bolshevik victory, through a series of legal and administrative measures, the church was deprived of performing much of its former social and educational functions, its property was nationalized, and its clergy not only lost their previous political prestige but were dispossessed of their civil rights as well. In addition, the new regime initiated a concerted effort at anti-religious propaganda, designed to undermine the social influence of the church.<sup>2</sup>

In marked contrast, many of the sectarian groups were

allowed a relative degree of freedom by the Bolshevik regime. The various sects under Tsarist rule had traditionally stood as symbols of opposition to Tsarist autocracy. Because these sects had their social bases among the lower strata, they had become important centers of protest against the deprivation of the poor. Hence, unlike the Orthodox Church, the sects were not symbolically linked to the old regime under which they had experienced continuous persecution. The Bolshevik attack on religion was directed against the established church. For a decade after the Revolution, the sects escaped official harassment. However, the attitude of the Soviet government towards the Orthodox Church and the sects changed in the late 1920s. The Church by then had reached a compromise with the government, pledging support for the new regime in return for an end to official persecution. The sects, on the other hand, resumed their role as protest movements.<sup>3</sup> In other words, the Orthodox Church as a wealthy and politically powerful institution under the Tsarist regime was a dangerous source of opposition to the aims of the revolutionaries. However, once the Church had been stripped of its previous power and gradually came to accept Soviet rule, it enjoyed a greater degree of toleration by the government. As the established church, it had always represented a tradition of compromise with and support for political authority. The sects, on the other hand, became the focal point of attack because they represented a tradition of protest against political domination.

The relationship of religion to nationalist movements in colonial situations assumes a different character. Whereas in the Russian, the French, or, as I shall later discuss, the Turkish cases, religious institutions were attacked by the revolutionary elites because of their symbolic identity with the old regime, in the case of countries under colonial rule with incipient nationalist movements, religion became a symbol of identity with the cultural heritage of the indigenous peoples which the colonial powers had attempted to destroy. Hence, religion was used as an effective tool for social and political mobilization by nationalist leaders bent upon implanting a sense of pride in national culture and values. The rallying of nationalist forces against a common enemy through the political use of religion was a prominent strategy of nationalist movements in India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Arab Middle East.<sup>4</sup> As I shall discuss in Chapter IV, this was a most successful tactic of the Kemalist elite as well during the initial years of the Turkish War of Independence.

In most cases, however, the alliance between the religious and the nationalist leaders during the fight for independence turned into a rather tense relationship once the nationalist movements achieved their primary objective of getting rid of foreign rule.<sup>5</sup> Either the secularist aims of the national government drew opposition from religious forces or, where such aims were not explicitly defined, the

initial politicization of religion led to communal violence and political instability.

## II.

The history of the Kemalist program of secularization has to be read against the importance of these two factors in determining the relationship between religion and nationalist or revolutionary movements: (1) the extent to which the religious institution becomes identified with the old regime, and (2) the extent to which religion has internal capacity for ideological appeals that would contradict and/or challenge the ideology of the nationalist or revolutionary governments.

As I have argued in the preceding chapter, the Religious Institution was the most powerful and organized force in the social and political life of the Ottoman Empire. To recapitulate some of the points discussed in Chapter II: (1) members of the ulema controlled key points in the central and provincial administrative organization of the Empire, (2) the ulema performed the important function of public opinion formation, (3) educational and judicial institutions were largely under religious control, and (4) religious authority was considered to be the only legitimate overseer of political decisions.<sup>6</sup> The history of the reform movement in the Ottoman Empire is, in a sense, the history of the long struggle between a powerful religious organization and the state. Although from time to time the ulema did sanction some of the reform efforts, they were in general a conservative

force bent upon defending tradition against efforts to change. To reform-minded Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, therefore, it had become increasingly clear that social or political reform would necessarily entail a reordering of the functions performed by the religious and political authorities.<sup>7</sup>

The first factor in the Kemalist attack on religion, therefore, was the understanding of the conservative role that religion had played in the social and political structure of the Ottoman Empire. The nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal's leadership aimed at establishing (a) an ideology of the movement that would give political legitimacy to the national regime and its goals, (b) state authority over both individual members of the society and ethnic, religious, or other groupings, and (c) a national identity that would function as an agent of social mobilization. In all these three respects, Islamic theology and traditions were inimical to the interests of the Kemalist nationalists. First of all, the theological significance that Islam places on the divine bases of social and political structures raises it to the level of an ideology which would have been incompatible with the ideology of the secular Republic. Secondly, although Islamic thought puts great emphasis on the authority of the state and the individual's obligation to obey such authority, the concept of legitimate authority rests on the notion that it reflects the divine will rather than popular sovereignty or some other formula.

The concept of a Republic based on the sovereignty of the nation is essentially non-Islamic in character. Finally, the Islamic definition of individual religiosity in terms of a community of believers would inhibit the development of a national identity which did away with religious definitions of group membership.

The nature of Islam as a political religion raises a number of questions, such as those above, about its relationship to nationalist or revolutionary movements. The most important of these concerns the doctrinal incompatibility of Islam with the ideology of a modern nation-state. To put it in a less generalized form, that has been the most important factor, in my view, in the rather stern attack of Kemalist nationalists on religion. Most of the Kemalist reforms during the early years of the Turkish Republic aimed at changing the basic value structure of Turkish society rather than structural change per se. As Mardin has argued, the Turkish Revolution was "primarily a revolution of values."<sup>8</sup> Its major goal was to establish a modern state as defined by what I would call the quasi-ideology of the Revolution, namely, Westernization. This quasi-ideology determined the boundaries of what Kemalist reforms would attempt to accomplish. Even the concept of nationalism was understood not in a national but in a Western context: the Turkish nation would exist not as a group of people sharing a common past but as a group of people sharing a common

future among the civilized nations of the West.<sup>9</sup>

If we accept that Westernization was the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution as I do,<sup>10</sup> the secularization program of the Kemalist regime aimed at combatting the only alternative ideological source for mass mobilization: Islam. As I shall discuss in greater detail in Chapter IV, although Mustafa Kemal sought and received the help of the clerics during the War of Independence in an effort to mobilize the masses around the nationalists' goals, this proved to be a short-term tactical alliance. Once he was in power, he started a series of reforms designed to eradicate the impact of Islam on Turkish society. If Kemalist nationalism symbolized the West, Islam symbolized the East. It was because Islam had no part in Western civilization that made it obsolete for the Kemalist version of a modern state. Although many of the Kemalist reforms-- such as the replacement of the fez with the Western hat, the adoption of Western styles in clothing, the change of the alphabet from the Arabic script to the Latin, or the change of the calendar from the Hijri to the Gregorian-- had little to do with the accepted indices of modernization, they were considered essential to the Kemalist program of reform because they gave momentum to the basic aim of the Revolution, i.e, to transform Turkish society from an Islamic into a Western setting.

The process of secularization during the initial years of the Republic gained an all-inclusive importance because

included in the definition of the ideology of the Revolution was the incompatibility of an Islamic society with a Western one. If Turkey was to modernize, it would do so by following the only modern nations in the world: those of the West. To the extent that Islam represented a set of traditions, values, legal rules, and norms which were intrinsically non-Western in character, it clashed with the ideology of the Revolution. If Westernization as a quasi-ideology was to gain mass acceptance, the non-Western value structure of society had to be changed.

Hence, the secularization policy of the Kemalist government aimed at changing both the value structure and the institutional set up of Turkish society. The series of secular reforms undertaken during the first decade after the establishment of the Republic in 1923 were designed to minimize the role of Islam in private and public institutions as well as national culture. The secularization program accordingly followed a four-phased course:

(1) Symbolic secularization, i.e., enforced changes in those aspects of national life styles or culture which had a symbolic identification with Islam.

(2) Institutional secularization, i.e., changes in organizational arrangements designed to destroy the institutional strength of Islam.

(3) Functional secularization, i.e., changes in the functional specificity of religious and governmental

institutions.

(4) Legal secularization, i.e., changes in the legal structure of society.

Let me briefly discuss the Kemalist reforms within the framework of the four-fold typology presented above.

1. Symbolic secularization. By symbolic secularization, I mean the transformation in the connotations of a set of symbols from the sacred to the profane.<sup>11</sup> This transformation can be either internal or induced. Internal transformation of symbols usually comes about as a result of man's scientific knowledge. For example, lightning for primitive men might symbolize the wrath of angry gods but as they learn the scientific explanation for it, the sacred character of the symbolism may disappear. Induced transformation of symbols, on the other hand, is the result of a conscious effort by individuals or groups to make changes in the connotative meaning of symbols to achieve a certain goal. For example, the word "Black" referring to the Negro population of the United States has undergone a transformation through an induced effort by Negro militants. Whereas previously, "Black" was used by white racists as a symbol of the Negro's inferior status, through its use by the Negroes themselves, it has now become a symbol of the Negro's pride in his race and culture.

Symbolic secularization was an important aspect of the Kemalist reforms because it dealt with an area of secularization

which had a crucial significance for the Kemalist concept of a modern state, that is, the transformation of culture. Geertz defines culture as "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life."<sup>12</sup> If we accept Geertz' definition of culture in terms of a set of common symbols, then deliberate cultural transformation can best be attained through an induced transformation of dominant symbols in society. This is precisely what some of the Kemalist reforms attempted to do.

The easiest cultural symbol to identify is, of course, language. Through language, men express their shared experiences over time. Hence, it has a dimension of historical continuity. An induced change in linguistic patterns, therefore, entails a change in the continuity of an historical tradition. The "Sinhalese Only" campaign in Sri Lanka, for example, was designed to substitute Sinhalese for English as the national language so that a dramatic breach with the country's colonial history could be accomplished.<sup>13</sup> The Kemalist language reform had a similar aim of breaking the continuity of the Islamic tradition in Turkish society.

The issue of language reform in Turkey was approached on the basis of a two-phased program. The first phase was the change of the alphabet from the Arabic to the Latin script

in 1928.<sup>14</sup> This was followed by a concerted effort to change the vocabulary by substituting new words derived from Turkish roots in place of the Arabic and Persian derivatives which were absorbed into the language over the centuries through close cultural contacts. The official explanation for the alphabet reform was both the suitability of the Latin alphabet to the Turkish language and its simplicity. The Arabic script, it was argued, had led to widespread illiteracy because of the difficulty of learning it.<sup>15</sup> Many observers have pointed out that the literacy rate has indeed significantly increased since the adoption of the Latin alphabet.<sup>16</sup> While this is undoubtedly true,<sup>17</sup> the enforcement of state-sponsored universal education through the primary grades since 1930<sup>18</sup> probably accounts for much of the improvement rather than the alphabet reform per se.

The more important aim of the alphabet reform was to destroy a cultural symbol.<sup>19</sup> As Lewis has put it, "the basic purpose of the change was not so much practical as pedagogical, as social and cultural-- and Mustafa Kemal, in forcing his people to accept it, was slamming a door on the past as well as opening a door to the future."<sup>20</sup> The sacred quality attached to Arabic as the language of God had made the use of the Arabic script laden with religious symbolism. Witness the considerable amount of opposition to the translation of the Koran into Turkish or the ban on the recitation of the ezan (the call to prayer) in Arabic.<sup>21</sup>

The alphabet reform not only accomplished a transformation of symbols but also denied the future youth of Turkey an inheritance from their cultural past. I think it is evident that the Kemalist reformers aimed at such a denial. For example, whereas Arabic and Persian were dropped from the curricula of all high schools by an order of the Ministry of Education in 1929, three Latin classes were established in Ankara and Istanbul in 1940.<sup>22</sup> That the Kemalist language policy achieved its objective of closing a door on the Islamic-Ottoman cultural heritage is unquestionable. For literate Turkish citizens who received their schooling after 1928, any meaningful in-depth knowledge of Islam or of Ottoman culture is extremely difficult to attain, at least through formal education.<sup>23</sup>

The first phase of the language reform, then, was the consequence of a conscious policy to create a nation of forgetters. However, the repudiation of the past is a delicate issue during the creation of a new nation. The sense of national identity that the nationalist leaders wish to create depends, to some extent, on meaningful references to a common historical heritage. The second phase of the language reform, therefore, was the attempt to substitute the pre-Islamic history of the Turks with their immediate Ottoman past so that a common basis for national identity could be established. Hence, the rewriting of history went hand in hand with the restructuring of the Turkish language.

In 1931, the Society for the Study of Turkish History was founded which was followed, a year later, by the founding of the Turkish Linguistic Society.<sup>24</sup> While the aim of the former was the study of Turkish history before the Ottoman period, that of the latter was the purification of the Turkish language on the basis of incorporating into formal Turkish pure Turkish words that had been kept alive among the Anatolian folk as well as the creation of new words from pure Turkish roots.<sup>25</sup>

The work of these two societies culminated in the official recognition of two peculiar myths which were elevated into the rank of scientific theories based on extensive new research. It was claimed that such research, carried out under Mustafa Kemal's auspices, showed that (a) historically, human civilization had originated with the migration of ancient Turks from Central Asia into various parts of the world, and (b) consequently, Turkish was the basis of all subsequent languages.<sup>26</sup> This novel historical thesis is, I think, an interesting attempt to find a theoretical framework for the seemingly incompatible twin goals of the Turkish Revolution: the amalgam of nationalism with Westernization. On the one hand, it filled the gap created by the rejection of the Ottoman heritage by substituting in its place the remote past of the Turks as the common historical experience uniting them. On the other hand, it offered a rationale for the Westernization of

the country. The adoption of Western civilization was not a mere imitation since its roots went back to the history of the Turkish civilization itself. In other words, Westernization could be explained in terms of the national history of the Turks.<sup>27</sup>

The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 was another important act of symbolic secularization. The origins of the Caliphate went back to the succession crisis after the death of Prophet Muhammad. The office of the Caliphate was then established with Abū Bakr, Muhammad's father-in-law, taking over the leadership of the Muslim community as the Caliph or "substitute" of Muhammad. After Abū Bakr's death, 'Umar, 'Uthmān, and Ali successively assumed the title of Caliph. The basis of their selection to the office had depended on their influential position within Arab society. Hence, during the time of these first four Caliphs, the elective nature of the office was widely accepted as a principle by Muslim jurists. However, with the establishment of the Umayyad Dynasty in 661, Mu'āwiyah, its founder, assumed the title of Caliph and appointed his son Yazīd as his successor to the office of the Caliphate. The precedent once set, it became increasingly more common for later Caliphs, both of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, to designate their sons as their successors although the elective principle was still kept in theory.<sup>28</sup>

The Ottoman sultans formally assumed the title of Caliph

after Selim I conquered Egypt in 1517. The title was transferred to Selim by the Egyptian Caliph, el-Mutawakkil. But for a century and a half before Selim's entry into Egypt, the Ottoman rulers had been using the title and having their claim recognized both by their subjects and in diplomatic correspondence. The prerequisite that Caliphs were to be chosen from among the members of the tribe of Kuraish was ignored and Koranic verses found to legitimize the claim of the Ottoman sultans to the office of the Caliphate.<sup>29</sup>

After Selim I's reign, however, the title of caliph fell into disuse by Ottoman sultans. An appendix attached to a diplomatic correspondence of 1575, for example, listed sixteen different forms of address used by the Ottoman ruler with an apparent absence of the title of Caliph among the sixteen. In the 18th century, however, it was picked up again for diplomatic reasons. In the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 between Sultan Abdülhamid I and Catherine II of Russia, a clause was inserted which recognized the Sultan's religious authority over the Muslim subjects of the Russian Empire, notably the Tartars, as the "Caliph of Muhammedanism" in response to Catherine II's claims to be the protector of Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>30</sup>

The diplomatic sanction which the title of Caliph had received in the 1774 treaty made its use by Ottoman rulers increasingly popular during the 19th century. Sultan Abdülhamid II even inserted his claim to the title into the 1876

Constitution. He also sought recognition from Muslims of other countries by sending emissaries to Egypt, Tunisia, India, Afghanistan, Java, and China, but without much success.<sup>31</sup>

When a law of 1922, passed by the Grand National Assembly of the future Turkish Republic, abolished the Sultanate, the last Sultan-Caliph of the Ottomans, Vahideddin, left the country on board a British battleship. The 1922 law also decreed that the new Caliph would henceforth be elected by the Grand National Assembly. Subsequently, the Assembly elected Abdülmecid to the office of the Caliphate in that same year. Abdülmecid's election to the office marked the first time that an Ottoman prince gained recognition from non-Ottoman Muslims as Caliph. He received ardent support especially from the Muslims of India who had come to view the Caliphate as a symbol of the Indian Muslims' unity. The appeal of the leaders of this so-called "Khilafat Movement" in India to the Turkish Prime Minister in order to secure the Turkish government's protection of the office stirred up quite a controversy within Turkey and was probably a major reason behind Mustafa Kemal's final decision, in 1924, to abolish the Caliphate.<sup>32</sup>

Although during its early history, the Caliphate was vested with extensive religious and political duties,<sup>33</sup> the institution gradually lost its political importance.<sup>34</sup> By the time it was abolished by Mustafa Kemal, it only had a

symbolic value for the world Muslim community. As a symbol, the Caliph stood for the unity of the Muslim umma. Because the disintegration of the umma was an issue of great concern in Muslim political philosophy, it had become a matter of constitutional rule that the Caliphate should be a single institution and that the title of Caliph be conferred on only one individual.<sup>35</sup> The office of the Caliphate hence represented the cross-national unity of all the Muslim peoples, an ideal which found its expression in the Pan-Islamic movement of the 19th century.<sup>36</sup>

An institution which had its theoretical base in a supra-national concept of solidarity was, of course, inimical to the interests of the nationalist movement. The symbolic value that Muslims throughout the world attached to the office of the Caliphate meant that if the institution was allowed to continue, it would have been a de facto recognition of Turkey's closeness to the Muslim, rather than the Western, nations. Moreover, one of the aims of the nationalist government was to establish a modern nation-state based on the concept of national identity. An institution like the Caliphate which was based on a different concept of identity might have become a symbolic base of opposition to the nationalist program. By abolishing the Caliphate, that symbol was eliminated from mass consciousness.<sup>37</sup>

Other acts of symbolic secularization during this period include the adoption of the Western hat and Western

styles in clothing in 1925, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in that same year, the introduction of Western music in schools,<sup>38</sup> the change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday in 1935,<sup>39</sup> the adoption of the European numerals in 1928 and of the metric system in 1931 as well as the abolishment of old titles (like Paşa, Hacı, Efendi, Bey) and the adoption of family names in their place in 1934. Although it is true that some of these measures were accepted for convenience in foreign affairs or in conducting business with foreign firms,<sup>40</sup> most of them also demonstrated the firm resolve of the Kemalist government to Westernize the country in every detail. Again, most had a symbolic value for the Turks. The Western hat, for example, had stood as a symbol of an infidel in the eyes of 19th century Ottoman Turks.<sup>41</sup> By outlawing the fez and substituting the hat in its place, Mustafa Kemal once again hoped to demonstrate that the destruction of certain symbols, however minor they may seem, is an important means of transforming mass psychology.<sup>42</sup> And some of this symbolic transformation has indeed been successful. Turkish workers in various European countries, for example, can invariably be recognized by their hats. Although the wearing of hats is no longer fashionable either in Turkey or in Europe, to the worker who has been exposed to Western culture at its root, it probably symbolizes for him his emancipation from a peasant society and his newly-gained self-image as a member of the Westernized Turkish elite.

2. Institutional Secularization. What I have called symbolic secularization involved an effort to Westernize Turkish society through a cultural transformation of dominant traditional symbols. This effort was backed by a series of laws which were designed to dilapidate the institutional strength of Islam and its role in political affairs. The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 was the first step in the deinstitutionalization of religious involvement in politics. This was followed by the abolition of the Office of the Seyhü-l-İslam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekâleti) in that same year.<sup>43</sup> These three offices had provided an institutional base for the din-u-devlet concept. Their abolition as well as the recognition of the principle in the 1924 Constitution that political authority derived its legitimacy from the concept of national sovereignty<sup>44</sup> rather than the divine will were major steps in the direction of separating religion and the state. The deletion in 1928 of the second article of the 1924 Constitution which had recognized Islam as the state religion<sup>45</sup> was another significant measure in the same direction.

Unlike the secular states of the West, however, the religious organization in the Turkish Republic has no internal autonomy. It was linked to the state bureaucracy with the creation in 1924 of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyamet İşleri Reisliği), attached to the Office

of the Prime Minister, and the Directorate-General of Pious Foundations (Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü).<sup>46</sup> Although the latter is an independent agency,<sup>47</sup> much of its financial support comes from the government.<sup>48</sup> Through these two offices, religious functionaries, religious property and private yakıfs were put under state control.

While the institutional strength of orthodox Islam was checked through the abolishment of offices connecting it to centers of political power as well as the creation of new ones to control religious activity, a parallel effort was made to destroy the institutional strength of folk Islam. Folk Islam, which had found its expression in the Sufi movement, had organized itself around a number of tarikats (brotherhoods), the most important of which in Turkey were the Mevlevi, the Bektaşî, and the Nakşibendi orders. The initial attitude of the Kemalist government towards these brotherhoods resembled the attitude of the Soviet government towards the dominant sects in Russia that I have earlier discussed. Much like the Soviets, the Turkish nationalists had aimed at destroying the power of the orthodox ulema rather than that of the dervişes. The derviş tradition had generally been one of opposition against established state authority.<sup>49</sup> For example, several of the orders had sympathized with the Young Turk movement against Abdülhamid's absolutism.<sup>50</sup> During the War of Independence, many of them had similarly supported the Kemalist nationalists

in Anatolia.<sup>51</sup> Hence, the secularizing reforms of 1924 left the brotherhoods free from any official harassment.

The nationalist government, however, soon came to the conclusion that the greatest threat to the secular reforms were most likely to come from the derviş brotherhoods rather than the ulema. The latter had generally cooperated with the state and hence were unaccustomed to techniques of opposition to state authority. The brotherhoods, on the other hand, had stood as centers of opposition and knew how to conduct it. In 1925, therefore, a series of laws were passed which dissolved the brotherhoods, closed their convents, prohibited their ceremonies, and banned all such activity in the future.<sup>52</sup>

Institutional secularization has been the most controversial aspect of the Kemalist secularization policies among the Turkish intellectuals. In general, it has been argued that the inclusion of the religious organization within the state bureaucracy and the consequent subordination of religious authority to the political is contrary to the spirit of secularism as understood in the West.<sup>53</sup> Such critics have generally been labelled "reactionary" and most have indeed represented conservative circles using the issue of secularism as a lever for their opposition to the Westernization reforms of Kemalist Turkey.<sup>54</sup> Although, as Özek argues, state supervision of religious organizations and activity is perhaps a necessary condition of secularism in a Muslim country where

politics has a theological significance,<sup>55</sup> it has to be pointed out that the consequences of such supervision is nevertheless contrary to any understanding of secularism.<sup>56</sup> If we accept that the principle of the separation of church and state by definition excludes state interference in religious life, we have to agree with Daver that the Turkish Republic is a semi-secular state.<sup>57</sup> Its brand of secularism is rather unique and should be understood as such.

3. Functional Secularization. Institutional secularization aimed at weakening the organizational strength of Islam as well as excluding the religious organization from involvement in political affairs. Religion in traditional Ottoman society, however, had two other important functions. The religious hierarchy controlled both the educational and the judicial processes. Functional differentiation in these two areas, therefore, was the third major act of secularization that the nationalist government undertook.

Prior to the Tanzimat-- the period of Ottoman history between 1839 and 1877 known by that name<sup>58</sup> because of a series of reforms that were undertaken during these years-- courts of law were entirely religious.<sup>59</sup> It was in the Tanzimat era that the effort was made, for the first time, to codify the law. Although such codification was based on the Shari'ah, it was nevertheless an important step towards the secularization of law in that it was the first recognition of the

necessity to establish legal codes that were written and distinguishable from religious provisions.<sup>60</sup> During the Tanzimat and the following periods, a number of secular codes were enacted in the fields of commercial, penal, and civil law that supplemented the religious ones.<sup>61</sup> At the same time, a parallel effort was made to establish secular courts where the new codes would be applied. Whereas the Shari'ah courts were left under the jurisdiction of the Seyhü-l- İslam, the secular ones were put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.<sup>62</sup> It was in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) that the Shari'ah courts were also tied to the latter.<sup>63</sup>

The final secularization of the court system was accomplished in 1924 with the abolishment of the Shari'ah courts and the enactment of distinctly secular codes.<sup>64</sup> The major consequences of these changes was that the religious institution lost its former judicial functions. As a result, religious considerations no longer played a role in legal processes. Even the religious formula for taking an oath in court was changed to a statement of truth based on the individual's honor and conscience.<sup>65</sup>

Secularization of the educational system was the second phase of the nationalist program for the functional differentiation of institutional life. In traditional Ottoman society, education was understood to mean the attainment of religious knowledge in special religious schools called the

medrese. Contacts with the West and the recognition of Ottoman military weakness led to the founding of secular institutions of learning in the second half of the 18th century. During the Tanzimat and the following periods, the number of secular schools expanded in addition to several learned societies. The 19th century saw a concerted effort to reform the educational system, to spread literacy, and to train students in the military, medical, technical, and educational fields.<sup>66</sup> Although by the end of the century, a secular educational system was more or less established, the duality that the Tanzimat period had created in institutional life<sup>67</sup> reflected itself in educational policy also. As in most other fields, secular educational institutions existed side by side with the religious.

The concept of a differentiated educational system and of state responsibility for public education found its expression in the Educational Bill of 1924 (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) according to the provisions of which all schools were put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.<sup>68</sup> That same year witnessed the closing down of the medreses which had become centers of religious scholasticism and political conservatism.<sup>69</sup> In their place, a Faculty of Divinity (İlahiyat Fakültesi) was founded in 1924 at the University of Istanbul. In addition, 26 Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (İmam-Hatip Mektepleri) were founded for the purpose of training religious personnel. Whereas at the time of its founding, the Faculty of Divinity had 224

enrolled students, this figure had dropped to 20 by 1934. This led to the closing of the faculty in that year and the founding of an Institute of Islamic Studies (İslam İncelemeleri Enstitüsü) in its place. The İmam-Hatip schools, on the other hand, lost the financial support that they had been receiving from the government as a result of the formal separation of church and state in 1928. During 1930-31, therefore, these schools also closed down due to lack of finances.<sup>70</sup> As Başgöz and Wilson point out, within a decade after the establishment of the Republic, there remained no religious educational institutions which received state support.<sup>71</sup>

The secularization of the educational process is, of course, one of the most effective means of ensuring success for the overall secularization of the socio-political system. The relationship of education to nationalism is especially important in this context. Educational institutions are the most important agencies of political socialization at the disposal of the state. During a period of transition when traditional sources of group identity are being deliberately destroyed, educational institutions can function as channels of mass communication to disseminate the ideology of a nationalist or a revolutionary movement. The mass acceptance of such an ideology, in the short run, can be imposed on a population through various means of propaganda or terror. But it can endure the cynicism or opposition of succeeding

generations only by its latent enforcement in the educational process. Moreover, educational institutions, along with the military, are the only nation-wide organizations where a sense of national identity, distinct from ethnic, religious, or communal affiliations, can be implanted on the youth.

At one level, therefore, educational institutions function as disseminators of the new ideology. At a second level, they act as channels of social, economic, and political change. As Coleman puts it: "Once regarded as an essentially conservative, culture-preserving, culture-transmitting institution, the educational system now tends to be viewed as the master determinant of all aspects of change."<sup>72</sup> Economic and technical change is, of course, one area which is largely dependent on the educational process. But social and political change as well owe much to the consequences of educational policies. The system of social stratification and the degree of social mobility are two important factors which are connected to education.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, educational institutions provide new groups of people who can cope with increasing role specialization as a result of structural differentiation in society. They also work towards the attainment of equality by the mass of the population.<sup>74</sup>

Mustafa Kemal's repeated emphasis on the importance of education for the youth of Turkey,<sup>75</sup> therefore, was based on his recognition that education was not only important in

social and economic change but was an equally effective tool for cultural transformation. As Frey puts it: "...The history of 'Westernization' or 'modernization' in Turkey is in large measure the history of secular education there-- of a school system which turned out more and more 'modern' graduates until the balance was tipped in favor of European ways."<sup>76</sup>

A survey of Turkish college students conducted in 1958 demonstrated how successful the Kemalist educational policy had been in substituting a sense of national identity for a religious frame of reference.<sup>77</sup> The results of the survey showed that Turkish students were more intensely nationalistic than students studied elsewhere. When asked for what end they would be willing to make the greatest sacrifice, 45 per cent mentioned the welfare of the nation. On the question of what two accomplishments in life they would be most proud of, 46 per cent answered that the accomplishment would involve the "enhancement of the nation."<sup>78</sup> In comparison, an earlier study by Gillespie and Allport<sup>79</sup> had found that the figures for the answers on the same question in the United States and France were 3 and 6 per cent, respectively.<sup>80</sup> Moreover, when asked to rate the importance of six sectors in life, the religious sector received the lowest ranking, below amusement or local citizenship activities. As compared to American, German, or Italian youth on the same question, the Turkish students came out to be slightly more

religious than the American but much less religious than the Italian or the German.<sup>81</sup>

Similarly, a study based on survey research findings conducted by Frey among the Turkish peasants found that formal education was a major factor contributing to a sense of national identity. Among both male and female literate peasants, the percentage of those who preferred loyalty to the nation over other loyalties increased proportionately with years of formal schooling.<sup>82</sup> Moreover, Frey found that among the village youth, those who scored high on various indicators of national identification were literates who compared more favorably in this respect with lycée-level students in the cities than the illiterate respondents in the villages.<sup>83</sup> As Frey puts it: "The school in rural Turkey seems to play a pronounced role in increasing national identification. Its major influence would seem to come through teaching literacy; but it appears also to inculcate nationalistic sentiments... beyond the level to be expected from literacy alone."<sup>84</sup>

4. Legal Secularization. The final act of secularization of the Kemalist government was in the legal field. Symbolic, institutional, and functional secularization was reinforced by a legal framework which eliminated the religiously-sanctioned provisions of civil, commercial, or criminal law.

Although, as I have pointed out, secularization of law had gained quite a momentum since the Tanzimat, legal

provisions based on the Shari'ah were still in effect. The Kemalist government made its first attempt to change the legal system during 1923-24 with the appointment of special committees by the Ministry of Justice to prepare a framework for a new set of secular codes. The results of the committees' reports, however, showed the heavy influence of religious law in the proposed changes.<sup>85</sup> During the years 1926-1930, all religious considerations were eliminated from the provisions of the new codes that were to be enacted. This was accomplished through the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Criminal Code, and the German Commercial Code.<sup>86</sup>

The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 was one of the most important acts of the Kemalist government towards the creation of a secular state. The new code differed fundamentally from the provisions of the Shari'ah. These differences included:

(1) The individual's freedom to choose his religious affiliation. This contrasted sharply with the previous prohibition of leaving the Islamic faith.

(2) The secularization of the marriage ceremony. Legal marriage had to be registered with civil authorities and concluded in their presence. Religious ceremony was made optional but carried no legal weight.

(3) The adoption of the principle of monogamy. In Shari'ah law, Muslim men could marry up to four wives.

(4) The secularization of divorce proceedings. In Shari'ah law, the right of divorce was almost exclusively conferred on the male. The new law gave both parties an equal right to sue for divorce.

(5) In Shari'ah law, whereas Muslim men could marry non-Muslim women, Muslim women were prohibited from inter-marriage. The new civil code lifted this prohibition.

(6) Men and women were given equal rights of parenthood on their children.

(7) Men and women were given equal inheritance rights.<sup>87</sup>

As an addendum to the Civil Code, which deals with marriage, divorce, inheritance, and property rights, a separate Code of Obligations (Borçlar Kanunu) which deals with contracts and taken from Switzerland, was also adopted in 1926. The provisions of the new Civil Code, although they affect men, women, as well as children, are most revolutionary in terms of the rights they confer on women. The unequal status of women as compared to men under Muslim law was drastically changed. With a few exceptions-- such as the provision that the wife can hold a job only with the husband's permission, or in case the husband withdraws such permission, through proving in court that her job is essential for keeping the unity and interests of the family intact (Article 159)-- the new code gave equal rights to men and women in the field of family law, inheritance, and property rights.

As Massell has pointedly discussed in the context of Soviet Central Asia, the status of women in Muslim societies is one of the most delicate issues confronting a revolutionary government. In order to transform the traditional structure of Central Asia, for example, the Soviet authorities decided to use Muslim women as a "surrogate proletariat." Through legislation which gave Muslim women unprecedented rights, the Soviet government hoped to mobilize what it saw as the most disadvantaged and therefore the most readily amenable group to strike at the roots of the traditional society.<sup>88</sup> The failure of the effort, however, demonstrated the difficulty of transforming sexual roles in a Muslim community. More importantly, it demonstrated the difficulty of transforming traditional societies through changes in the legal system.

Although the adoption of the new civil code by the Kemalist government was a major step towards the emancipation of Turkish women,<sup>89</sup> the failure of legal measures to change the status of women has also been apparent in the Turkish case. Family law had been one of the last strongholds of the Shari'ah courts and the most resistant area of the legal system to secularization. This had been the case because of the strict social norms concerning the status of women in traditional Muslim societies.<sup>90</sup> The attempt to change sexual roles and the structure of the family is one of the most daring experiments for the modernizing elite in Muslim

societies. Such an attempt is necessary if the aim, like that of the Kemalist nationalists, is the cultural transformation of society since the family plays an important role in transmitting dominant cultural values to younger generations.

The success of the Kemalist reforms in this field, however, has been limited. In contrast to women in urban centers, the majority of women in more closed communities still continue to perform their traditional roles. And the provisions of the civil code concerning marriage, divorce, or monogamy are largely evaded in favor of more traditional arrangements that Islam has sanctioned for centuries.

For example, a recent study based on survey research findings found that approximately 2.0 per cent of all marriages in Turkey were polygamous. Whereas the percentage of men with more than one wife was 1.6 in the cities, the figure increased to 2.7 in the villages (see Table 1).

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TABLE 1

Polygamous Marriages in Turkey, by Type of Community

<u>Marriages</u>	<u>Type of Community</u>				
	<u>İstanbul-Ankara-İzmir</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Town</u>	<u>Village</u>	<u>All of Turkey</u>
Polygamous	0.0%	1.6%	0.4%	2.7%	1.9%
Monogamous	100.0	98.4	99.6	97.3	98.1

Source: Serim Timur, Türkiye'de Aile Yapısı (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1972), p. 93.

According to the same study, 35.4 per cent of all marriages in Turkey were civil, 49.2 per cent were mixed civil-religious (concluded in the presence of civil authorities and, later, an imam), and 15.0 per cent were only religious and hence carried no legal weight. Whereas the percentage of civil marriages only was 54.1 in the three largest cities-- İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir-- this figure dropped to 29.8 in the villages. In both urban and rural areas, approximately half of the marriages were mixed civil-religious. However, whereas the percentage of religious marriages unregistered by civil authorities was 5.6 in the cities, it went up to 21.3 in the villages (see Table 2).<sup>91</sup>

TABLE 2

Civil vs. Religious Marriages in Turkey, by Type of Community

<u>Type of Marriage</u>	<u>Type of Community</u>				<u>All of Turkey</u>
	<u>İstanbul-Ankara-İzmir</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Town</u>	<u>Village</u>	
Civil	54.1%	38.5%	40.5%	29.8%	35.4%
Religious	5.1	5.6	4.8	21.3	15.0
Civil & Religious	40.6	55.3	54.7	48.4	49.2

Source: Serim Timur, Türkiye'de Aile Yapısı (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1972), p. 92.

What is especially interesting about these findings is the fact that there were no differences between urban and rural areas in the percentage of mixed civil-religious marriages. Fifty per cent of all Turkish men and women, regardless of

their urban-rural background, chose to receive religious sanction in addition to the legal for entering into one of the most important relationships of their private and social lives.

Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu has suggested that the higher percentage of unregistered marriages in the villages might have something to do with the difficulties of divorce proceedings for which the villager has to make quite a number of trips to a city or town courthouse. Furthermore, he has pointed out that the near impossibility of obtaining a divorce in case of objection to it by one of the partners might be leading individuals in both rural and urban areas to choosing extra-legal forms of marriage, the discontinuation of which would also require no legal procedures. The civil authorities seem unable to deal with the problem except to pass special laws periodically which give a legal standing to the illegitimate children of unregistered marriages.<sup>92</sup>

It should also be noted here that despite legal secularization which affected Muslim as well as non-Muslim Turkish citizens, the social acceptability of the latter by the majority of Muslim Turks has remained limited. The most significant non-Muslim minority groups within Turkey are the Jews, the Greeks, and the Armenians who together make up approximately 3 per cent of the total population. As Rustow has put it, "of... these minority groups it is true that, regardless of their legal status, they have not so far

been, and are not likely to be in the foreseeable future, socially accepted as full-fledged first-class citizens. Despite the official secularism of Turkey, adherence to Islam is still in practice considered a prerequisite of Turkish nationality. By contrast, a Muslim Kurd or Arab of southern or southeastern Turkey only needs to acquire a fluent command of the language to be accepted, for most purposes, as a Turk."<sup>93</sup> At times, this prejudice against non-Muslim minorities has become evident either through official discriminatory acts, such as the Capital Levy (Varlık Vergisi) imposed on the non-Muslims during World War II, or through mob violence as during the Istanbul riots of September 1955. In terms of involvement of the non-Muslims in Turkish political life, there has been a notable decline over the years. During the 1930s, there were two representatives from the Greek and one each from the Armenian and the Jewish communities in the Assembly. Non-Muslim minority representation continued until the late 1950s. In the post-1960 era, however, no deputy of a non-Muslim background has been elected to the Assembly.<sup>94</sup>

The impact of secularization on political structures and processes has several dimensions relating to both the changing functions of religious and political institutions and the cultural concomitants of such change. Following Donald Smith, we can identify these dimensions as (1) polity separation, (2) polity expansion, (3) polity transvaluation, and (4) polity dominance. Polity expansion

refers to the stretching out of the polity to perform various socio-economic functions, such as those in the realm of law and education, which had been previously performed by or had been under the regulation of religious institutions. Polity transvaluation refers to the changes in the political culture which suggest the replacement of religious norms and values with secular ones. Finally, polity dominance refers to those cases where, instead of a strict separation of church and state, the polity comes to dominate the religious sphere.<sup>95</sup>

Secularization attempts in the Ottoman Empire aimed at achieving only one of these dimensions, namely polity expansion. The reform effort during the Ottoman period did not take up the question of whether or not religious and political affairs should be separated. Rather, the reformists of the time concentrated on creating secular institutions and laws that were to supplement, rather than replace, the religious.<sup>96</sup> Formal separation of church and state came after the decline of the Empire. However, although the religious hierarchy did lose its former political influence after the establishment of the Republic, religious organizations nevertheless remained linked to the state bureaucracy. The secularists of the Republican period were unable to escape the type of religious controversy that earlier reformists had encountered: whether or not it is possible to separate religion and politics in an Islamic

society. Paradoxical as it may sound, the very effort of separating church and state during the Kemalist period followed the implicit assumption that in an Islamic society, church and state cannot be separated but that one must be subservient to the other. Hence, what has happened is polity dominance rather than polity separation.

As for polity transvaluation, although there has been a definite decline of religious norms in politics as compared to the Ottoman period, the extent of such decline is open to question. The degree to which Turkish political culture is shaped by religious values has so far remained unstudied. The Islamic emphasis on communal solidarity and its consequences for politics is, I believe, an important topic that ought to be investigated. For example, to what extent the concept of an Islamic community has influenced the patterns of consensus and conflict in Turkish society? As Halpern aptly puts it, "of the entire social and political inheritance of Islam, it is the force of consensus which has remained the strongest moral imperative in the Middle East."<sup>97</sup> If this is indeed the case, what are its implications for political behavior? Does consensus as a dominant value rule out the possibility that social conflict can be viewed as a creative process which is functional for the system?<sup>98</sup> If so, how is social and political conflict handled in a society which sees conflict as destructive of national unity?

A study based on survey research along these lines may show that the problem of secularism in Turkish political life may be only secondarily important and that the real issue may lie in the interaction between Islam, on the one hand, and political behavior and collective action, on the other. Both the imitation of the West and the repudiation of Turkey's Islamic past may turn out to be more superficial than the secularist elite is willing to admit. Hence, the cultural distance between the secularist and the traditionalist forces may not be as wide as it is assumed to the extent that both sides, in a latent or manifest fashion, approach politics with a value system that may be at its roots religious.

The most successful dimension of secularization in Turkey, therefore, has been polity expansion. Since the beginning of the 18th century, the social and political functions of religion have gradually declined. And with the establishment of the Republic, the state has taken over most of Islam's institutional functions in society except the explicitly religious ones. Polity expansion has been especially pronounced in the realm of law and education.

As many observers have pointed out, the secularization process in the Ottoman Empire was the result of a defensive response to the increasing military and economic power of the West. Whereas Western secularization came about as a result of internal cultural, social, and economic changes, in the

Ottoman case the process was one of reacting to external stimuli.<sup>99</sup> The Ottoman Empire, like most other countries which entered into the process of modernization as late-comers, took the early modernizers as a model. Serious efforts at modernization were started in the Ottoman Empire only towards the end of the 18th century with Selim III's Nizam-i Cedid (The New Order) movement of 1789-1807.

Earlier attempts to reform the Empire during the 17th century had basically failed to find solutions to the Empire's growing military, administrative, and economic problems. With the opening to the West during the so-called Tulip Period (Lale Devri) of 1718-1730, the Ottomans, for the first time, confronted the fact that the Empire had lagged behind the military expertise of the West. In the frenzy of a catch-up psychology, they plunged into a process of borrowing from the West which obviously was a far more short-cut method to modernize than attempting to build indigenous models of change. What initially started as an adoption of Western military technology soon spread to other fields until it reached a point where modernization became equated with Westernization.

As Dunn argues, if the Ottoman Empire had been militarily and economically more secure, modernization might have been achieved without abandoning the traditional value system of society.<sup>100</sup> The fact that it was the non-Muslim-- indeed the "infidel" world which the Ottomans had scorned until the 18th century-- that was to undertake modernization first

came not only as a shock to Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals but also induced them to question the viability of their traditions and value structure. Ottoman intellectual history of the 19th century is the history of two conflicting viewpoints, one of which saw Western superiority only in technical terms while the other saw a necessity to embrace Western culture as well.<sup>101</sup> The triumph of the latter point of view at the elite level during the Kemalist period has diverted the attention of Turkish reformers from alternate means of successful modernization. Modernization in the Turkish context has always been synonymous with Westernization. And Westernization at the mass level has been little understood. The problem of secularization in Turkish politics, therefore, has been in a sense a problem created by the Westernized elite to impose their version of modernity on a mass of population reluctant or unable to abandon their cultural orientation.

## REFERENCES

- (1) See David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 459.
- (2) Ibid., pp. 460-61. Also see Carl J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brezezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 248-55.
- (3) Lane, pp. 464-67.
- (4) See Donald E. Smith (Ed.), Religion, Politics, and Social Change in the Third World (New York: The Free Press, 1971). Also see Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 158-69.
- (5) Smith, p. 109.
- (6) On these points, see Tarık Z. Tunaya, Türkiyenin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri (İstanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, 1960), pp. 12-15.
- (7) See Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 12-15.
- (8) Şerif A. Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 2 (1971), p. 209. I share Mardin's reservations about using the term revolution in the Turkish context. Huntington, for example, classifies the Turkish modernization process as a typical case of reform-mongering. [See his Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 347-457]. However, although the Turkish transformation was neither sudden nor violent, it did involve a radical restructuring of social and political institutions.
- (9) In an interview in 1923, Mustafa Kemal told the French journalist Maurice Pernot: "We want to modernize our country. Our aim is to establish a modern, therefore, a Western state in Turkey. Is there a nation which has shown willingness to enter civilization but has refrained from turning to the West?" See Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri 1918-1937, Vol. III (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1961), p. 68.
- (10) I am using the concept of ideology here in a rather loose sense. The Kemalist regime never attempted to develop a systematic and comprehensive ideology. What has been generally referred to as Kemalist ideology [see, for example, Suna Kili, Kemalism (Istanbul: School of Business Administration and Economics, Robert College, 1969) and Donald E.

Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), pp. 163-172] is no more than a statement of the Republican People's Party's so-called six-arrow program. If we define ideology as a systematized set of beliefs and values about the nature of society and politics, then Westernization is the only key concept that I can think of which came close to being the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution.

(11) I agree with Gertrude Jaeger and Philip Selznick that in terms of the relationship between symbolism and culture, the idea of connotation (i.e., that symbols are signs which connote other signs) is more important than viewing symbols as indicating or denoting something else. To use their examples, dark clouds indicate rain, the word "black" denotes a color. However, it is their connotations in terms of ideas which is important in cultural terms. Hence, dark clouds may connote pessimism or the word "black" may connote a cultural symbol for death. See their "A Normative Theory of Culture," in Peter L. Rose (Ed.), The Study of Society: An Integrated Anthology (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 103-107.

(12) Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Michael Banton (Ed.), Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 3.

(13) For a discussion of the language issue in Sri Lanka, see W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 259-270.

(14) For a short account of the discussion on the alphabet reform prior to its adoption, see İlhan Başgöz and H. E. Wilson, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Eğitim ve Atatürk (Ankara: Dost Yayınları, 1968), pp. 112-118. Also see Lord Kinross, Ataturk (New York: William Morrow, 1965), pp. 501-505.

(15) See Frank Tachau, "Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform," Review of Politics (April, 1964), p. 194. Atatürk himself pointed out that large numbers of people who did not know how to read and write the Arabic script had no difficulty in learning the Latin. See Atatürk'ün Söylev..., III, p. 82. Similarly, İnönü, in a speech at Malatya in 1928, argued that through the adoption of the Latin alphabet and the subsequent increase in literacy, the Turkish nation would no longer be deprived of attaining its place among the civilized nations. Quoted in H. E. Allen, The Turkish Transformation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 128-129. It should be pointed out here that as early as 1862, Tahir Münif, the founder of the Ottoman Scientific Society (Cemiyet-i İlmîye-i Osmaniye) had argued that the Arabic

script was too difficult to learn and hence an obstacle to the dissemination of literacy. See Berkes, p. 195.

(16) See, for example, Gottard Jäschke, Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlık. Translated by Hayrullah Örs. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1972), pp. 31-32. Also see Kili, p. 48 and Allen, pp. 127-28.

(17) Whereas the percentage of the literate population during the years 1927-28 was 10.6, this figure had increased fourfold by 1960-61, up to approximately 40 per cent. See Frederick W. Frey, "Education: Turkey," in Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rustow (Eds.), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 218.

(18) See Kili, p. 42.

(19) Bernard Lewis has also pointed out the symbolic nature of the alphabet reform. See his The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 271. Similarly, Dankwart A. Rustow has argued that "a systematic revision of symbols" was an important corollary to legal and educational reforms. See his "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955," in Richard N. Frye (Ed.), Islam and the West (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), p. 80.

(20) Lewis, p. 273. Uriel Heyd has also argued that the Turkish language reform was an important part of the social and cultural transformation which the country underwent. See the "Preface" in his Language Reform in Modern Turkey (Jerusalem: The Israel Oriental Society, 1954).

(21) See Jäschke, pp. 45-49. Evidently, this sacredness attached to Arabic is one of the reasons why the gap between written Arabic and the colloquial as spoken in various Arab countries has proved difficult to close. See Mahmud Taymur, "The Dilemma of the Arabic Language," in Jacob M. Landau (Ed.), Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 334.

(22) See Jäschke, p. 31. Atatürk himself viewed the alphabet reform as a proof that the Turkish nation would henceforth be part of the civilized world. See Atatürk'ün Söylev..., II, p. 253. Falih Rifki Atay, a journalist and a close friend of Atatürk, remembers his enthusiasm over the alphabet reform. "Most important of all," he says, "we were going to cleanse the Turkish mind from its Arabic roots..." See his Çankaya (İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş Matbaası, 1969), Vol. 2, p. 439.

(23) Tachau points out that with the alphabet change, a new generation of Turks were barred from access to their

Ottoman-Islamic past. See Tachau, p. 195. Nur Yalman makes the same point in his "Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey," Daedalus (Winter, 1973), p. 154. Yaşar Nabi, who was one of the leading journalists of Kemalist Turkey, argued that the alphabet reform was a prerequisite for the transition to Western civilization. Such a transition, he pointed out, meant the breaking of ties with Arabic religious philosophy. This break, in his view, would have been impossible as long as the Turks used the Arabic alphabet. Whereas the new generations, as a result of the alphabet change, were quite at ease in understanding Western culture, he pointed out that they were at a loss in understanding the Eastern. See his "Atatürkçülük Nedir?" in Yaşar Nabi (Ed.), Atatürkçülük Nedir? (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1965), p. 216.

(24) The Society for the Study of Turkish History (Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti) changed its name to Turkish Historical Association (Türk Tarih Kurumu) in 1935. See S. N. Özerdim, Atatürk Devrimi Kronolojisi (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1966), p. 85. The Turkish Linguistic Society (Türk Dil Kurumu) was originally established as the Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti (The Society for the Study of the Turkish Language). In 1934, the name was changed to Türk Dili Araştırma Kurumu (The Association for the Study of the Turkish Language). In 1936, it took its present name. See Heyd, p. 25.

(25) See Heyd, pp. 25-28. For the historical antecedents of the movement to purify the Turkish language, see Şerif Mardin, "Some Notes on an Early Phase in the Modernization of Communications in Turkey," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. III (1960-61), 250-71.

(26) On the so-called Sun-Language Theory (Güneş-Dil Teorisi) and the reinterpretation of history, see Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal (1922-1938), Vol. 3 (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966), pp. 427-436. Also see Heyd, pp. 33-34.

(27) Lord Kinross, in discussing Mustafa Kemal's interest in history and language, writes: "What Kemal was seeking to do, in making a nation of Turkey, was to wean his people away from their old sense of identity with the supranational 'fatherland' of Islam and to create for them a new allegiance to their own national fatherland. One of his problems was to link this in their minds with a past which fitted the history of Turkey into that of the world as a whole, thus eliminating the conflict, which forever possessed him, between East and West and to lead them towards that 'civilization' to which in his own mind only the West belonged." Kinross, pp. 531, 32.

It should be pointed out here that there were 19th-century

precedents for the interest in the pre-Islamic history of the Turks and the purification of the Turkish language. The pioneer in the movement to purify Turkish of its Arabic and Persian elements was a man-of-letters of the mid-19th century, İbrahim Şinasi (see Berkes, pp. 197-98). The most influential figure on this subject was, of course, Ziya Gökalp. Although he opposed the idea of changing the Arabic script (see Başgöz and Wilson, p. 114), he was an ardent supporter of the movement to close the gap between spoken language and literary Ottoman Turkish. See his Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization. Translated and edited by Niyazi Berkes. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 82-85, 290-98. Also see Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism (London: Luzac, 1950), pp. 115-21. For a discussion of the 19th century interest in the pre-Islamic history of the Turks see Berkes, pp. 314-17. Two unpublished papers (Şerif Mardin, "Ethnocentrism, Islam and the Development of Turkish Nationalism," and Fahir İz, "Turkish Language Reform") offer in-depth analyses of these early efforts to understand the ancient history of the Turks and to reform the Turkish language.

(28) For the early history of the Caliphate, see Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 271-354. Also see Thomas W. Arnold, The Caliphate (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1965), pp. 19-23.

(29) Arnold. pp. 129-138.

(30) Ibid., pp.163-66. Also see "Khalifa" in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, first edition.

(31) Arnold, pp. 173-77.

(32) See the concluding chapter by Sylvia G. Haim in Arnold, pp. 208-241. The abolition of the Caliphate took a year after the Sultanate was abolished. Jäschke argues that this delay can be explained by Mustafa Kemal's hope that the Muslim countries would continue to give diplomatic and material support to the new Republic. See Jäschke, p. 119. For a discussion of the debates on the abolition of the Caliphate, see Jäschke, pp. 115-125. Also see Çetin Özek, Türkiyede Laiklik (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962), pp. 32-37, 85-95, and Aydemir, Vol. 3, pp. 167-172.

(33) See Levy. Also see Tarık Z. Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Gelişmeleri (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1970), pp. 118-129.

(34) Arnold, p. 180.

(35) See Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Gelişmeleri, pp. 122-25.

(36) On the Pan-Islamic movement of the Hamidian period and the role that members of the movement attributed to the Caliph in realizing such an ideal, see Berkes, pp. 267-270.

(37) There is some evidence that Mustafa Kemal saw the continuation of the Caliphate as a threat to Republicanism and national independence to the extent that it would invite foreign interference as well as internal opposition to the Kemalists. See his Söylev (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1965), Vol. II, pp. 484-490.

(38) Although Mustafa Kemal personally preferred Turkish music to the Western, in public he argued that the former was too simple to satisfy the sensibilities of the Turkish people. For him, the music of the "civilized" world was Western music. See Atatürk'un Söylev..., Vol. 2, p. 252. Falih Rifki Atay points out that Mustafa Kemal, the reformer, was a very different man from Mustafa Kemal, the individual. He was always able to suppress his personal inclinations and argue the opposite point of view. Thus, for example, he seemed to favor Western music although he personally liked the Turkish. In public, he was an ardent defender of women's rights although in private he was a typical Middle Eastern "male chauvinist." See Çankaya, p. 410.

(39) Friday was made a weekly holiday by an act of the Grand National Assembly in 1924. However, because this caused an inconvenience in business transactions with foreign firms or governments, it was decided to change Friday to Sunday as the day of rest. See Kili, p. 46. No doubt, this change was also the result of a conscious effort to de-Islamize social life. The religious significance of Friday for Muslims would no longer be recognized by the state. Paradoxically, however, Sunday is also laden with religious symbolism, although, of course, for Christians.

In this context, although it is perhaps somewhat far-fetched to suggest that Atatürk considered Christianity to be a more "civilized" religion than Islam, I think that an argument could nevertheless be made in that direction. For example, a program for religious reform was put forward by the Faculty of Divinity of Istanbul University in 1928. The suggestions of the reform committee under Fuad Köprülü's direction, although never implemented because of the opposition it met, would have turned the mosques into Christian churches, complete with benches and instrumental music. See Jäschke, pp. 40-42. Lewis also hints that the reform committee's suggestions, if carried out, would have Christianized the mosques. See Lewis, p. 409.

(40) See Kili, p. 46.

(41) See Atay, pp. 429-31 on social attitudes towards the Western hat in the early part of the 20th century.

(42) On Mustafa Kemal's views on the adoption of Western styles in clothing, see Atatürk'ün Söylev..., Vol. 2, pp. 213-217. On the hat reform, see Mustafa Selim İnce, Atatürk'ün Şapka Devriminde Kastamonu ve İnebolu Seyahatleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959).

(43) Lewis, p. 260.

(44) Article 1 of the 1924 Constitution (Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu) stated: "Sovereignty belongs without reserve to the nation. The system of administration is based on the principle that the people personally and effectively direct their own destinies." See Appendix E in Elaine D. Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly (1919-1923) (Washington, D.C.: Judd & Detweiler, 1959).

(45) Lewis, p. 271

(46) Rustow, "Politics and Islam...", pp. 82-83. Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü later became Vakıflar Umum Müdürlüğü. For detailed information on the organization and duties of these two offices, see Jäschke, pp. 53-68.

(47) Rustow, "Politics and Islam...", p. 82.

(48) See Bülent Daver, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Layiklik (Ankara: Son Havadis Matbaası, 1955), p. 75.

(49) Lewis, p. 400.

(50) Ibid., p. 402.

(51) Ibid., p. 403.

(52) Ibid., pp. 403-406.

(53) For a discussion of this controversy, see Çetin Özek, Türkiyede Gerici Akımlar ve Nurculuğun İçyüzü (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1964), pp. 58-67. Also see his Türkiyede Laiklik, pp. 105-162.

(54) See Özek, Türkiyede Laiklik, pp. 105-162 and Tunaya, Batılılaşma Hareketleri, pp. 180-196.

(55) Türkiyede Laiklik, pp. 105-114.

(56) Özek argues that secularism is not a universal concept. Rather, its application changes according to the specific social conditions of each country. Secularism,

according to him, has to meet two important conditions: (1) the state should protect the religious freedom of individuals, and (2) the state should not be based on religious principles. The Turkish Republic, he points out, meets both of these conditions and is therefore as secular as Western states. Whether or not religious freedom exists in Turkey, however, is rather dubious in my view-- if for no other reason, then for the fact that religious sects are outlawed.

(57) Daver, p. 234.

(58) Literally, "Tanzimat" means reorganization.

(59) See Daver, p. 106.

(60) Berkes, pp. 160-61.

(61) Ibid., pp. 161-169.

(62) Ibid., p. 165.

(63) Daver, p. 106.

(64) Jäschke, p. 23.

(65) See Daver, pp. 107-109.

(66) For the gradual secularization of education in the Ottoman Empire, see Berkes, pp. 74-81, 110-128, 173-192, 400-410.

(67) For a discussion of the dual nature of the Tanzimat reforms, see Tunaya, Batılilaşma Hareketleri, pp. 31-43.

(68) See Özerdim, p. 64.

(69) For a short history of the medreses, see Başgöz & Wilson, pp. 21-27.

(70) Ibid., p. 82. On the İmam-Hatip schools, see Howard A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam-Hatip Schools," Die Welt Des Islams, Vol. IV (1956), 150-63. On the problem of religious education in Turkey, see Fehmi Yavuz, Din Eğitimi ve Toplumumuz (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), pp. 54-99. The Faculty of Divinity was later reopened at the University of Ankara in 1949 (see Daver, p. 78). The İmam-Hatip schools were also reopened in 1951 under the name İmam-Hatip Okulları with the cooperation of the Ministry of Education and a number of private groups (see Reed, p. 154).

(71) Başgöz and Wilson, pp. 82-83.

(72) James S. Coleman, "Education and Political

Development," in James S. Coleman (Ed.), Education and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 3.

(73) Ibid., p. 25.

(74) Ibid., pp. 15-17.

(75) See Atatürk'ün Söylev..., II, pp. 16-18, 42-46, 163-165, 172-173, 194-199, 232.

(76) Frey, p. 209.

(77) Herbert H. Hyman, A. Payaslıoğlu, and F. W. Frey, "The Values of Turkish College Youth," Public Opinion Quarterly (Fall, 1958), 275-91.

(78) Ibid., pp. 282-83.

(79) J. Gillespie and G. W. Allport, Youth's Outlook on the Future (Doubleday Papers in Psychology, 1955).

(80) Hyman, et. al., p. 283.

(81) Ibid., p. 285.

(82) Frederick W. Frey, "Socialization to National Identification among Turkish Peasants," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 30, No. 4 (November, 1968), Table 5, p. 953.

(83) Ibid., Tables 2 and 3, pp. 944-45.

(84) Ibid., p. 952.

(85) Daver, pp. 94-95.

(86) On legal reforms, see Kili, pp. 46-47, Jaschke, pp. 22-25, and Daver, pp. 91-110. For explanations on the old civil code, the Mecelle, in effect since 1870 (its first section came out in 1870 and later sections were completed by 1876), and how it differed from the new civil code adopted in 1926, see Count Léon Ostrorog, The Angora Reform (London: University of London Press, 1927), pp. 77-93.

(87) For a summary of these points, see Daver, pp. 97-100. The only change made in the Swiss Civil Code was that the presumption of community of property between husband and wife was reversed. Whereas the Swiss Code presumes community of property between husband and wife, the Turkish Civil Code presumes separation of property unless the married couple make a prior contract (evlenme sözleşmesi) to the contrary. The principle of separation of property between husband and wife had been in effect in Shari'ah law which had stood as

a measure of protection for women in case of one-sided and arbitrary divorce of the wife by the husband. The retainment of that particular provision of traditional law in the new Civil Code, which accepts equality between the sexes, guarantees both the rights of women and of men in case of divorce. See Türk Kanunu Medenisi ve Borçlar Kanunu (Ankara: Doruk Yayınevi, 1975), Articles 170-240. For explanatory notes on these articles of the Civil Code, see Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Türk Medeni Hukuku (İstanbul: Nurgök Matbaası, 1963), pp. 354-362.

(88) Gregory J. Massell, "Traditional Structures as Obstacles to Revolutionary Change: The Case of Soviet Central Asia," in Eric A. Nordlinger (Ed.), Politics and Society: Studies in Comparative Political Sociology (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 266-287.

(89) Turkish women were given the right to vote and be elected to Parliament in 1934.

(90) On the status of women in Islam, see Levy, pp. 91-134.

(91) See Serim Timur, Türkiye'de Aile Yapısı (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1972), pp. 91-93.

(92) Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, "Hiç Bitmeyen Sosyal Sorun: Boşanma," Cumhuriyet, October 27, 1975.

(93) Dankwart A. Rustow, Middle Eastern Political Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 23. For similar observations, see Michael E. Meeker, "The Black Sea Turks: Some Aspects of Their Ethnic and Cultural Background," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January, 1971), pp. 322-23.

(94) Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1965), pp. 145-146.

(95) Donald E. Smith, Religion and Political Development, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 85-123.

(96) See Tunaya, p. 63.

(97) Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 132.

(98) On the functional value of social conflict, see Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956).

(99) For the concept of defensive modernization, see Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 70-71. John Dunn has also used this concept to explain the secularization process in the Ottoman Empire. See his Modern Revolutions (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 178-179.

(100) Dunn, p. 178.

(101) See Berkes, and Tunaya, Batılılaşma Hareketleri.

## CHAPTER IV

RELIGION AND THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF THE  
TURKISH PEASANTRY

"He who controls the countryside," writes Huntington, "controls the country."<sup>1</sup> The mobilization of the countryside is indeed one of the most important and formidable tasks facing a modernizing or a revolutionary elite. The participation of rural masses in social or political movements often proves difficult to secure.<sup>2</sup> This is especially the case in traditional societies where the bulk of the rural population is politically apathetic. The abstract nature of revolutionary or nationalist ideologies cannot easily be communicated and the nature of the would-be transformation translated into terms which are comprehensible to the peasantry.

Where no previous political socialization has taken place, how do revolutionary or nationalist leaders mobilize the peasants? How do they legitimize their cause? Establishing a network of grass-roots organizations is one means of political mobilization. Equally important is the translation of ideologies or goals into workable slogans and the founding of channels through which the peasantry can be reached. In a traditional society where the primary loyalties of individuals are to parochial groups rather than to central political authority, the modernizing elite often have to work within the framework of traditional

networks of authority and identify their goals with the traditional values in society. Whereas an individual peasant may not directly respond to the leaders of a revolutionary or a nationalist movement, he may do so, for example, via his clergyman or landowner. Hence, establishing effective channels of communication with the peasants through the use of traditional appeals is an important means of "reaching" the rural strata.

The political mobilization of the Turkish peasants during the War of Independence and later during the initial stages of the transition to competitive politics followed such a pattern. In both instances, appeals for political participation were made through traditional authority channels. Both cases also involved the use of religion as a base for securing mass support. In other words, the impetus for mass participation in politics, which is one of the indices of modernity, was processed through the traditional social structure and the value system.

1.

The basic features of the early Ottoman social structure in the countryside had been based on the timar-sipahi system, a type of feudalism peculiar to the Ottoman Empire. The timar was basically a military fief, a grant of land to the sipahi (a feudal knight), in return for which he provided the state with a cavalry, the size of

which was determined by the income and the size of his timar. Although this system began to deteriorate during the 17th century, remnants of it still remained until the beginning of the 19th.<sup>3</sup>

Independently of the timar-sipahi system, a new landed gentry (ayan) had begun to emerge during the course of the 18th century. The term prior to that date had been used for provincial notables but in the 18th century it acquired a new meaning and came to designate a social class of landlords with extensive political and military functions. The ayan were delegated the administration of the provinces by the central government. Although in 1786 an attempt was made to check their increasing power through the appointment of town officials from the center, this proved unsuccessful and was discontinued after five years.<sup>4</sup> By the 19th century, their growing autonomy in the provinces had become a threat to the authority of the central government. In 1808, for example, the ayan engineered the deposition of Sultan Mustafa IV. Mustafa IV had come to the throne after the deposition, in 1807, of the reformist Sultan Selim III following the rebellion of Kabakçı Mustafa. The rebellion had been jointly planned and carried out by the Janissaries and the ulema who were opposed to the reforms of Selim III. The ayan had played no direct role in Selim III's deposition although they, too, were opposed to Selim's reformism and had, in 1806, stopped Selim III's move to transfer his Nizam-ı Cedit

troops from Anatolia to the Balkans. Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa, at the time of Selim III's deposition, was an ayan of Rusçuk (Russe, now in Bulgaria) and an ardent supporter of Sultan Selim's Nizam-ı Cedid (The New Order) movement. It was he who engineered Mustafa IV's deposition and Mahmud II's ascendancy to the throne. He himself became Grand Vezir and made a series of moves to strengthen the power of the ayan in the provinces. The famous Sened-i İttifak (Covenant of Union), by which the central government not only recognized the status of the ayan in the provinces but also confirmed their rights, was one of his major achievements in this respect. Mahmud II, however, subsequently started a massive campaign to dispossess the ayan of their economic and political power. Although his move proved quite successful in restoring the authority of the central government in the provinces, the role of the ayan in provincial administration nevertheless remained largely intact.<sup>5</sup>

Nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a new land tenure system in Anatolia. In 1831, Mahmud II abolished the timars and turned them into crown (miri) lands. These were then either sold to individuals as freehold estates (mülk) or leased to tax-farmers (mültezims). Although the latter had no legal rights of ownership, their leases in fact granted them extensive rights over the land.<sup>6</sup>

In order to prevent the acquisition of land in several villages by one landowner, the government enacted the 1858 Land Code which prohibited the purchase of village lands by outsiders, but this had little effect in practice.<sup>7</sup> Through the Land Code of 1858, the tax farmers acquired freehold ownership of the miri lands which had been previously leased to them. As a result, the status of the peasants was reduced to that of sharecroppers or hired laborers.<sup>8</sup> Besides paying tithes (aşar) to the state, the peasants were now being taxed by the big landowners as well.<sup>9</sup> Thus, during the 19th century, a new class of landlords (ağa) emerged who had freehold rights over the land. The ağas and the merchant-landowners in the towns (eşraf) became the dominant figures of the Anatolian countryside.<sup>10</sup>

The economic status of the peasantry, therefore, had remained substantially the same over the centuries. Cultivating lands which belonged either to the state or to a landlord class, and under a heavy burden of taxation, the peasants were among the most exploited and neglected group of people in Ottoman society.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, socially and politically, they were isolated from the mainstream of Ottoman culture. Two distinct cultural heritages were discernible in Ottoman society. One was what might be called, following Redfield,<sup>12</sup> the "Great Tradition" of the elite. Its language (Osmanlıca)<sup>13</sup> and its literature (Divan), both influenced by the Arabic and Persian

civilizations, contrasted sharply with the "Little Tradition" of the Anatolian peasants. The Turkish language, Turkish folk songs and dances survived only in the peasant culture of Anatolia. The term "Turk" became the symbol of the uneducated and uncivilized peasants. As Lewis points out, it would have been considered an insult to address an Ottoman gentleman of Istanbul as a Turk.<sup>14</sup> If asked who he was, the urban-dweller would answer that he is a Muslim, and an intellectual would present himself as an Ottoman, but both would shy away from identifying themselves as a Turk.<sup>15</sup> In short, no effort was made to integrate the peasants into the social and political life of Ottoman society. The peasants, for their part, were content to remain in isolation, for it meant protection against interference by government officials and tax collectors.<sup>16</sup>

The political apathy and social isolation of the peasants meant that they were the least available group to fight a nationalist war. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of World War I, the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal's leadership were faced precisely with this dilemma. To rid the country of occupation forces, Mustafa Kemal had to work independently of the collaborationist government in Istanbul and organize the War of Independence in Anatolia. However, to fight a nationalist war with a peasant population which lacked any sense of national identity was a contradiction in terms. As Aydemir points out, the people in the Anatolia of 1919 were weary of wars,

rebellions, and banditry.<sup>17</sup> Illustrative of this mood is a conversation between Mustafa Kemal and a peasant shortly after Kemal landed in Samsun in 1919 to organize the liberation effort. Noticing a peasant ploughing his field, Mustafa Kemal asked: "The enemy will soon occupy Samsun and perhaps all these areas. How can you plough your field in such peace?" "Pasha, Pasha, what are you talking about?" answered the peasant. "We were three brothers. I also had two sons. All of them died in the wars of Yemen, Circassia, and Çanakkale. I am the only man left in the family... Three families depend on my plough. Now, my country ends right here, at the end of this field. Until the enemy is there, don't expect any help from me."<sup>18</sup> Mustafa Kemal himself recorded a conversation he had with a big landowner of Adana in 1923 which illustrates the lack of communication between the central government and the provinces. "The old Ottoman Empire possessed a weapon," complained the landowner. "We worked and they took our product from our hands. There were no government officers to listen to us. We used to hear that certain people lived in palaces and harems and that there was a Sultan who was ruling us. It was a surprise to learn that all our possessions actually belonged to them and that it was the Sultan and those palaces who deprived us of everything."<sup>19</sup>

As the above quotations illustrate, Mustafa Kemal's task was to mobilize a peasant population which for

centuries had remained in isolation. Although the Samsun peasant's lament also shows that the male peasants had been forced out of their isolation through participation in wars, the fact nevertheless remains that as peasants, they had been unintegrated into the social and political life of the Empire. The traditional peasant community had largely remained intact and unaffected by the social and cultural changes which the Empire underwent as a result of the Western impact. Mustafa Kemal's conversation with the landowner of Adana illustrates this isolation even more dramatically: the landowners's community was only vaguely aware of the Sultan's or his government's existence and certainly unaware of even their legal standing with respect to their property rights. Any appeal, therefore, to this closed society would have to be through means other than the use of political ideologies.

As I have pointed out in Chapter II, collective identity for Ottoman subjects was based on common religious and local, rather than national, ties. If it can be argued that, in general, men will fight against circumstances which threaten the value structure of their collective existence, the most successful strategy, then, for mobilizing the masses would be the translation of political goals into parochial terms. If the Anatolian peasants would not fight for an abstraction like "the nation," they might be more readily amenable for mobilization if the term was translated to mean whatever had been a substitute for it in

village society. In that respect, the use of religion as a politically unifying force is one of the most interesting aspects of the Kemalist movement. As Rustow puts it, "the example of Kemal... points to the Janus-faced character of charismatic leadership... and indeed of all leadership in a transitional or amalgamate culture. The innovator must justify his claim to leadership both within the old order, in which his followers are still caught up, and within the new order which he is trying to create."<sup>20</sup>

The problem of political mobilization in traditional societies has a second dimension as well. If the first step is to translate abstract ideologies into workable slogans, the second step is to find channels through which such slogans can be filtered down to the masses. As Robinson points out, in traditional Anatolian society where the social structure displayed a hierarchy of authority, a direct appeal to the masses might have proved ineffective. The nationalist leadership would have to first secure the loyalty of those groups which formed a link between the central government and the villages.<sup>21</sup> During the War of Independence, the most influential groups in Anatolian society were the ağas, the eşraf, and the ulema.<sup>22</sup> It was through these groups that Mustafa Kemal channelled his efforts to mobilize the masses.

"Since the turn of the century," writes Smith, "religious symbols, issues, organizations, and leaders have played

an important role in the induction of the masses into the political process. Stated in its simplest terms: in traditional societies, religion is a mass phenomenon, politics is not: in transitional societies, religion can serve as the means by which the masses become politicized."<sup>23</sup> The statement indeed holds true for the politicization of the Turkish masses. The use of religion as a political weapon was a prominent tactic of the Kemalist leadership prior to the consolidation of power by the nationalist government.

Two powerful symbols, the Sultanate and the Caliphate, were used by the nationalists as a rallying point for the liberation effort. Although the Sultan's government did not hesitate to oppose the nationalist leadership through the famous fetva of Şeyhü'l-İslam Dürrizade, the nationalists nevertheless claimed that their major goal was to liberate the country from the occupation forces in order to retain the Sultanate and the Caliphate.<sup>24</sup>

Using the religious issue, Mustafa Kemal met with the eşraf, the ağa, and the ulema of the Anatolian towns and villages. The role of the ulema in the War of Independence especially deserves attention. For example, many local cells of the Society for the Defense of Rights (Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) were organized by the religious leaders.<sup>25</sup> The resistance movement in various towns was also instigated by them through several fetvas, reminding the Muslim

population of their duty to fight for the faith. These calls for jihad proved to be an effective means of mobilizing the masses for the liberation effort.<sup>26</sup>

Among the delegates to the two decisive congresses of the liberation movement, the Congresses of Erzurum and Sivas, were a number of religious leaders. Of the 56 delegates to the Congress of Erzurum, for example, 21 were either directly or indirectly connected with the medreses.<sup>27</sup> The Congress opened its first session with a prayer by the müftü of Erzurum and ended with a prayer by Mustafa Kemal, calling upon God to "save the Sultanate and the Caliphate."<sup>28</sup> Of the issues emphasized at the Congress of Sivas, one point included the protection of both these offices.<sup>29</sup>

The opening ceremonies of the First Grand National Assembly in 1920 again illustrate the expediency with which Mustafa Kemal used religion as a political weapon. To convene the Assembly, he issued a statement which summarized the planned activities for the day. He pointed out that the opening date of the Assembly, which, he stressed, would play a decisive role in the liberation of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, was deliberately chosen to correspond to the holy Friday. The delegates would thus get a chance to participate in the Friday namaz and later enter the Assembly building after a religious ceremony conducted in front of it. Moreover, to emphasize the religious significance of the day, the Koran would be recited in various mosques

throughout the country.<sup>30</sup> As planned, the religious ceremony prior to the opening of the Assembly ended with the pronouncement of its duties which included, once again, the liberation of the Sultanate and the Caliphate. The first decision reached at the Assembly was the restoration of the Caliphate after the liberation.<sup>31</sup>

The composition of the First Grand National Assembly reveals the importance of religious leaders within the ranks of the nationalists. At the time of its opening, 57 out of 437 members of the Assembly held official religious duties. In addition, 59 members belonged to the ulema. In all, close to one-fourth of the First Assembly's membership at the time of its opening were of religious background.<sup>32</sup> Of those who finally took their seats, 73 out of 361 or approximately 20.0 per cent were clerics.<sup>33</sup> In comparison, no new deputy with a clerical background was elected to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Assemblies.<sup>34</sup>

The role of religious leaders in the dissemination of the nationalist goals as well as the gathering of financial aid to the liberation army is also significant. For example, the First Assembly voted for the formation of several committees (İrşad Heyetleri) which were to be composed of deputies to the Assembly from each administrative district under the leadership of a religious functionary.<sup>35</sup> These committees had the duty to "enlighten"

the people of the nationalists' aims as well as warn them against the efforts of the Istanbul government to discredit the nationalists. Şeyhü'l-İslam Dürrizade's fetva against the Kemalists, denouncing them as rebels and calling on the Muslim population to kill pro-nationalist forces in the name of religion,<sup>36</sup> was one such effort of the Istanbul government to crush the nationalists. Others included the organization of fighting groups loyal to the Sultan, such as the Mohammedian Militia (Kuva-yı Muhammediye) or the Army of the Caliphate (Hilafet Ordusu). In the civil war that broke out between the "royalists" and the nationalists during 1919-1920, both sides attempted to gain mass support through religious appeals.<sup>37</sup> In the light of the Sultan-Caliph's and the Şeyhü'l-İslam's established religious authority, Mustafa Kemal had all the more reason to rely on religion himself in order to legitimize his cause. The counter-fetva of the müftü of Ankara, which was endorsed by 152 müftüs of various Anatolian towns in response to Dürrizade's fetva, was one effective means by which Mustafa Kemal, in turn, sought to discredit the religious authority of the Şeyhü'l-İslam. The Ankara fetva was ingeniously worded to counter the appeal of Dürrizade's fetva by arguing that the Sultan-Caliph was a prisoner of the infidel and that it was the duty of the nationalists, indeed, of all Muslims, to liberate him from captivity.<sup>38</sup>

Similarly, the tax commissions (Tekalif-i Milliye Komisyonları) which were formed to coordinate taxation

during the war functioned largely with the help of the clerics. On the basis of the assessment these commissions made, each household would pay 40 per cent of its total income to the nationalist army. The governor of each administrative district was responsible for the supervision of the various subcommittees headed by the local müftüs. In the villages, this job was performed by the village imams.<sup>39</sup> The nationalist government no doubt viewed the help of the clerics as essential for establishing a link between the central government at Ankara and the provinces. For example, when a suggestion was made by a member of parliament that the village imams be drafted, Mustafa Kemal responded that religious leaders played a more important role behind the frontlines. The army, he pointed out, was financed through the tax commissions under the coordination of the local müftüs and imams. Since the central government, he noted, did not have an effective organization to reach distant villages and since the majority of the villagers and townspeople were under the influence of religious functionaries, no civil or military authority could secure the cooperation of the people as effectively as the clerics.<sup>40</sup>

A similar observation about the important role of religious leaders in the mobilization of the Turkish peasants was made by General James G. Harbord who headed a mission sent by President Wilson.<sup>41</sup> He pointed out that

the most effective source of influence on the Turkish peasantry were the clerics and it was they who could explain to the people their religious duty to fight. Harbord also noted that among the committees to see him about the nationalists' demands, religious leaders were in the majority and that during his interview with Mustafa Kemal at Sivas, four out of the seven members of Kemal's group were men of religion.<sup>42</sup>

As the above examples demonstrate, both religious issues and religious functionaries played an important role in politicizing the Turkish masses and mobilizing them for the war. The nationalist leaders, who later turned out to be one of the most rigid interpreters of secularism,<sup>43</sup> were successful during the initial stages of the movement in conveying the idea that among their aims was the restoration of the religio-political system of the Ottoman Empire once the country was liberated from enemy occupation. After they secured the cooperation of the ulema and the eşraf, they used these established networks of authority to cut through the closed village society of Anatolia.

## II.

Although the Kemalist leadership placed quite an emphasis on mass mobilization during the War of Independence, this proved to be a short-term strategy designed to secure both manpower and financial support for the nationalist army. Once liberation was achieved and the Republic

proclaimed, the earlier importance given to the politicization of the peasantry was substituted by a concerted effort to educate a Westernized elite. As Mardin has pointed out, the Kemalist program of modernization emphasized the creation of a strong center that would be in full control of the periphery. To that end, modernization efforts during the initial years of the Republic were channelled towards establishing institutions which would, in Mardin's words, "shape a generation of true Kemalists at the center."<sup>44</sup> Although some lip-service was payed to the importance of the peasantry for the future of the Turkish Republic<sup>45</sup> and organizational attempts made to educate the peasants,<sup>46</sup> Mardin's observation that, in general, the Kemalists altogether ignored the mobilizational aspect of modernization is well-taken.<sup>47</sup>

The much talked-about elite-mass gap is one aspect of the center-periphery cleavage in Turkish society that Mardin traces back to Ottoman history.<sup>48</sup> Although a certain amount of cultural distance between the elites and the masses is present in all societies, it generally breaks down as a result of modernization. Modernization brings with it increased economic opportunities, a more open system of stratification, a network of mass communications, universal education, and mass participation in politics, all of which act as carriers of the elite culture to the masses and hence perform a cultural levelling function. This process is a gradual one and has an autonomous dynamic

of its own.

In Kemalist Turkey, none of these conditions were sufficiently present to work towards some sort of a symbiosis between elite and mass cultures. The masses were presented with a series of reforms that were designed to Westernize Turkish society. The "Great Tradition" of the Kemalist elite, with its distinct styles of dress, of social life, of entertainment, and its novel understanding of the role religion would play in Turkish society replaced the palace culture of the Ottomans. The first was no less alien to the mass of the population than the latter had been. And in political terms, the military-bureaucratic elite of the one-party years were just as inaccessible to the masses as the Ottoman officials had been.

This cultural cleavage became more manifest with the emergence of what might be called counter-revolutionary movements. These were a series of localized rebellions launched in the name of religion during the first decade and a half of the Republic. Although most lacked planning from a central institutional base and were periodic and disunited, they were counter-revolutionary in that all aimed to destroy the secular Republic that Kemalist nationalists were trying to build and replace in its place the old Ottoman religio-political structure.

The first and the most dangerous of these upheavals was the Şeyh Said rebellion in the East in 1925. It took

the government two months to suppress the rebels. Ad hoc courts called Independence Tribunals (İstiklal Mahkemeleri) were set up to try their leaders, many of whom were sentenced to death or imprisoned. At the same time, the Assembly passed a "Law for the Maintenance of Order" (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) which gave extraordinary powers to the government and which served as a platform to suppress all political opposition.<sup>49</sup>

Although the Şeyh Said rebellion started in the name of religion, with the explicit aim of restoring the Caliphate, its larger goal was the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. There is some evidence that the rebels were using the religious issue simply as a means of gaining support among Muslims of non-Kurdish background. For example, in a document of March 29, 1925, one of the leaders of the rebellion spelled out its plan which included an armed uprising by the Kurds in Istanbul who would subsequently attempt to gain wider support from the city's population through using the religious issue. This document was sent by Seyit Abdülkadir, the chairman of an underground organization called The Kurdish Liberation Committee (Kürt İstiklal Komitesi) established in 1923, to a certain Mr. Templeton who was resident in Istanbul and who, Abdülkadir thought, was an employee of the British Foreign Office but who turned out to be instead a secret agent of the Turkish police. Also included in the plan was the return of the last Sultan-Caliph of the Ottomans,

Vahideddin, to Istanbul with the help of the British once the Republican regime was destroyed.<sup>50</sup>

It is also clear that the Turkish government saw the rebellion more in terms of a separatist movement than in terms of a religious upheaval. For example, the prosecutor of the Eastern Independence Tribunal (Şark İstiklal Mahkemesi) set up in Diyarbakır pointed out in the final session of the trial on June 27, 1925 that the major goal of the rebellion had been the establishment of an independent Kurdish state and that the rebellion had nothing to do with religion.<sup>51</sup> Its religious aspect, however, was publicly emphasized more than its separationist aspect partially because the Turkish government's policy has always been, up to the present, to underplay ethnic differences and partially because the Kemalists, by presenting the rebellion as a religious upheaval, could find a legitimate reason to justify their strict secularist policies. Indeed, the crackdown on the derviş orders, the passing of the "Hat Law," the ban on the wearing of religious garb by laymen, and the adoption of the Gregorian calendar were all initiated immediately after the rebellion was suppressed.<sup>52</sup>

The Şeyh Said rebellion, therefore, was not, unlike others which followed, a religious upheaval in a strict sense. It used religion in order to attain its larger goal of Kurdish independence. In that respect, we have here,

once again, a repetition of a pattern which both the Sultan's government and the nationalist forces of Mustafa Kemal had followed during the War of Independence: the use of religion for mobilizational purposes.

The severity of the government's measures, however, soon had its repercussions. In November of 1925, the Nakşibendi order in a county of Rize, in protest against the wearing of hats and the alleged decision of the government to outlaw the veil, attempted an armed rebellion. This was followed by demonstrations in several cities against the "Hat Law." Two months later, a group of hodjas in Erzurum, with the participation of a large crowd, led a "march against secularism." During the trials which followed, it was learned that The Association for the Protection of Religion (Muhafaza-i Mukaddesat Cemiyeti) and the Association for Advancing Islam (İslam Teali Cemiyeti) had played major roles in organizing the demonstration.<sup>53</sup> In 1930, one of the most brutal upheavals-- that of Menemen by a group of Nakşibendis-- occurred, involving the beheading of a young idealist teacher, Kubilay.<sup>54</sup> This was followed by the Bursa rebellion in 1933 by a number of Nakşibendis protesting the recital of the ezan in Turkish, and the uprisings in 1935 and 1936 in the East by the members of the same sect. The government's response to all such upheavals was severe, involving suppression, trials, and death sentences.<sup>55</sup>

The participants in the rebellions claimed to have acted in order to "save religion." What is significant about these resistance movements is that they demonstrated the failure of the Kemalist reforms to reach the countryside. The reforms were planned and directed by a central elite and were imposed on the masses from above. As a critical analyst of the reforms pointed out, the Kemalist elite acted under the illusion that it was possible to impose cultural change from above through the force of law.<sup>56</sup> The aspirations of the Kemalists to build a Westernized Turkey-- a Turkey of men and women equal in their social and political rights, dressed in Western clothing, versed in Western philosophy and arts, dancing and dining in Western style, and, if the suggestions of a reform committee of the Faculty of Divinity of the Istanbul University in 1928<sup>57</sup> were carried out, even praying in Western style-- had little meaning within the value structure of the countryside. The state, by its secular policies and its program of Westernization, had threatened the dominant value system of a traditional Islamic society without providing, at the same time, a new ideological framework which could have mass appeal. Nor did it emerge with a program of serious commitment to structural or economic change in the countryside.

Efforts were made, however, to push through a program of agrarian reform during the 1920s, although most such attempts remained largely unsuccessful. For example, in

1925, the tithes (aşar), which had become so heavy a load on the Ottoman peasantry, were abolished. In 1926, the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code changed the land tenure system<sup>58</sup> which had been in effect since the promulgation of the 1858 Land Code. According to the provisions of the latter, the land had been classified under five categories based on both the type of ownership and its use: (1) land subject to private ownership (memluk arazi), (2) state-owned lands (miri arazi) which were cultivated by individual tax-farmers or leaseholders but owned and controlled by the state, (3) unused lands (mevat arazi) such as mountainous or rocky areas which were ill-suited to agriculture, (4) public lands (metruk arazi) which were used in the public interest (such as parks, etc.), and (5) vakıf arazi, i.e., lands in the possession of pious endowments (vakıfs).<sup>59</sup> In terms of ownership rights, the Land Code of 1858 had been, in general, designed to recognize private possession. Leaseholders and tax-farmers on miri lands were given freehold ownership. The actual cultivators of the land, however, were left without any legal rights and became share-croppers or hired laborers.<sup>60</sup>

The new Civil Code of 1926 recognized only one type of land classification, namely, private ownership. It put down a number provisions against the excessive division of land between several inheritors in order to enhance its agricultural productivity.<sup>61</sup> These provisions of the new code more firmly established legal rights of private

ownership<sup>62</sup> but have had little effect on the status of the big land-owners.<sup>63</sup> From 1927 to 1929, state-owned lands were distributed to landless peasants but the method of distribution was slow and until 1934, only 711,000 hectares of land had been distributed.<sup>64</sup> There were also other attempts at agricultural reform during this period such as the establishment of agricultural banks, model farms and cooperatives, tax exemption on farm machines and equipment, the extension of agricultural loans, etc.<sup>65</sup>

The social and political counterparts of the attempt to change the economic conditions in the countryside were the opening of local cells of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) as well as the establishment of Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) and People's Houses (Halkevleri) which served as educational centers in villages and, in the case of the latter, in all towns. But all such measures were limited in scope. Unlike the Russian or the Chinese Revolutions, for example, the Turkish Revolution never undertook a thorough structural change. On the contrary, the official stand of the Kemalist government on questions of social structure until 1946 was the outright rejection of any suggestion that there were class distinctions in Turkish society.<sup>66</sup>

The religious upheavals, therefore, can be interpreted as the reaction of traditional communities to a program of cultural change which was not accompanied by either a

thorough structural change in the countryside or a nationwide program of socio-political mobilization. In other words, traditional Islamic communities were presented with a radical reordering of the national value structure although very little had been changed in their immediate physical, social, or political environments to predispose them towards accepting alternative cultural patterns. Part of this reaction no doubt reflected the long-standing elite-mass gap. For example, during the Şeyh Said rebellion of 1925, a hand-written manifesto by the rebels circulated around the City Hall of Diyarbakır included a series of insults to the chief of state, the military, and the bureaucrats.<sup>67</sup> During the same rebellion, one of the very first acts of the rebels upon capturing the city of Elazığ was the pillaging of the gendarmerie station and the courts as well as the evacuation of the city's jail.<sup>68</sup> What these examples demonstrate is both the defiance of governmental authority and a certain amount of resentment against the ruling military-bureaucratic elite.

### III.

As I have earlier pointed out, the Kemalists were able to secure the participation of the peasants in the War of Independence largely as a result of a successful strategy of coopting the rural notables and the clerics into their ranks. However, the alliance with the clerics was short-lived as the nationalist government increasingly adopted a

radical outlook on secularization policies. For example, whereas the percentage of deputies in the First Grand National Assembly of 1920 with a religious occupational background was 20,<sup>69</sup> this figure dropped to 7 in the Second Assembly of 1923, to 4 in the Third Assembly of 1927, to 3 in the Fourth and Fifth Assemblies of 1931 and 1935, to 2 in the Sixth Assembly of 1939, and finally, to 1 per cent in the Seventh Assembly of 1943.<sup>70</sup>

In contrast, the alliance of the Kemalists with local notables continued during the one-party years. While the military-bureaucratic elite formed the leadership of the Republican People's Party at the national level, the rural notables dominated its grass-roots organizational network.<sup>71</sup> The notables had played an important role in the provincial organization of the Society of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti) which was the first distinctly political party to emerge in Ottoman history during the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) and which came to power following the revolution of 1908 and the coup d'état of 1913.<sup>72</sup> When the CUP organization was dissolved after the Empire's defeat at the end of World War I, its provincial branches formed the bases of the Societies for the Defense of Rights which played a crucial role in the planning and organization of the national liberation effort.<sup>73</sup> The Defense of Rights organizations, in turn, formed the bases of Mustafa Kemal's Republican People's Party. Hence, the local notables remained as a link between

the CUP and the RPP.

The rural notables came from influential families in villages and provincial small-towns. For centuries, they had played important brokerage services for the peasants in the latter's dealings with government officials. They had thus gained an important clientele which they could use for political purposes. Hence, their role in the organization and functioning of local party cells was of major importance.<sup>74</sup> As one student of Turkish politics has written:

Whereas the urban center seemed remote both in distance and life style to the peasants, the notables appeared benevolent: it was the notables, after all, who provided them with jobs and extended them credits and numerous other social "services." Their immediate contact with the government, on the other hand, was restricted to the harsh treatment of the conscription officer and the tax collector. Thus while the bureaucrats were cultural revolutionaries at the center, at the local level they appeared as the same old beneficiaries of the peasants' labor.<sup>75</sup>

The historic decision of the RPP's leader and Atatürk's successor as President, İsmet İnönü, to allow the formation of opposition parties and institutionalize free and competitive elections in 1946 had major consequences for mass mobilization.<sup>76</sup> In order to gain peasant support, which constituted the most important sector of the electorate in terms of size, parties began to search for effective channels of communication with the peasantry. During the

initial years of the transition to competitive politics, both the incumbent RPP and the newly-founded Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti) sought to form new linkages with rural notables. Whereas previously, the nature of the dependency relationships between rural notables and peasants were confined to building up personal followings, with the advent of mass participation in politics, these relationships turned into political clientelism. As Sayarı has written:

The formation of voter alignments in rural Turkey, where more than two-thirds of all the eligible voters resided, was accomplished largely through a process of vertical mobilization. Parties concentrated their efforts in securing the allegiance of faction leaders and local patrons who were then entrusted with the task of mobilizing electoral support. In either case, vertical networks of personal followings proved to be a major base of political loyalties.<sup>77</sup>

Political clientelism, then, was one of the means by which the peasant population was mobilized. Local patrons were recruited into the ranks of both parties and used their personal patronage in exchange for votes.<sup>78</sup> The Democratic Party, however, was far more successful in mobilizing the rural population and building a peasant base. Several factors have been put forward to explain the success of the Democrats in the countryside which brought them to power in the 1950 elections. First, although both parties consciously sought to form effective ties with the peasantry through the recruitment of rural notables, the DP was able

to reinforce its clientelist network by building an efficient political machine which functioned on the basis of a reward system for individual peasants or rural communities in exchange for votes.<sup>79</sup> Second, by exploiting the long-standing elite-mass gap, the Democrats successfully established an image for themselves as the party of the masses in contrast to the bureaucratic and elitist orientation of the RPP. Finally, the DP politicized the religious issue which helped build a mass following for the party.

In general, the critics of the DP within Turkey have accused the party leaders for having consciously sought to undermine the secularist reforms of the Kemalist era in order to gain the peasant vote. While it is true that the DP government did bring a significant degree of relaxation to the understanding and application of secularism, its leadership was careful not to violate the official secularist creed. This was especially true during the initial phase of mass mobilization when the DP elite repeatedly stressed its determination not to politicize religion or encourage a religious reaction.

For example, during the DP Congress of 1949, Celal Bayar told the delegates that the party was secularist in its policies, would not use religion for political purposes, and would oppose any movement for a religious revival.<sup>80</sup> He expressed these same views on more than one occasion prior to the election of 1950.<sup>81</sup> Similarly, during a

session of the Grand National Assembly in 1949, Fuat Köprülü, as the spokesman for the DP, assured the Assembly members in explaining his party's program that the DP would defend secularism and fight against religious reactionaries. Köprülü's guarantees even invited a note of thanks to the DP leadership from the incumbent RPP government's prime minister, Şemsettin Günaltay.<sup>82</sup> Following the incident at the funeral of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak in 1950 which involved demonstrations against secularism,<sup>83</sup> Bayar used the occasion to assure the government once again that his party opposed religious obscurantism.<sup>84</sup> During this period, the DP's top leadership even showed opposition to zealous party members who sought to use religion for political purposes. For example, when a local chairman of the DP in a district of Istanbul organized a welcome party to celebrate Bayar's visit to his district immediately after the 1950 election-- which included a lamb sacrificial ceremony and religious chanting by the crowd-- Bayar told those assembled that he was rather disappointed with the manner in which he had been received. He stressed that religious ceremonies belonged to the mosque and that his government would not permit a public display of religiosity.<sup>85</sup>

The DP's stand on secularism soon invited at first a note of caution and later outright distrust from the religious press. For example, Eşref Edib, the editor of the religious periodical Sebilürreşad, complained that Bayar

constantly refrained from clarifying his party's position on the question of secularism. Edib argued that the DP's silence on the issue could reflect either (a) an awareness that such a sensitive question might invite mass reaction and hence lead to repressive measures against the opposition, (b) a basic difference between the religious policy of the DP and mass aspirations of relaxation on secularist policies which would, if this became clear, cause the party loss of votes, (c) DP's concern that the government might steal the issue in order to increase its support, or (d) lack of a coherent set of views on the issue by the party leadership.<sup>86</sup>

However, following Bayar's speech in the Bursa DP Congress<sup>87</sup> where he allegedly stated that the party leaders would not "let the Shari'ah live,"<sup>88</sup> the religious press decidedly turned against the party leadership.<sup>89</sup> The DP leaders were accused of having betrayed the cause of Islam. Bayar was personally attacked for being hostile to Islam. Sebilürreşad published several articles in which the DP leadership were criticized for their anti-religious attitude and their lack of concern for public feelings on the religious question. These articles pointed out that the DP had gained mass support because of its liberal views which, the public had felt, had included a liberal religious policy. But the party had proved to be more strict on the question of secularism than the RPP.<sup>90</sup>

The religious press stepped up its opposition to the Democrats following an amendment (Article 163) to the Turkish Criminal Code which outlawed organizational activities aimed at changing the structure of the government on the basis of religious principles.<sup>91</sup> The amendment passed with the cooperation of the DP members in the Assembly. Eşref Edib of Sebilürreşad complained that the DP had "ganged up" with the RPP in an effort to further limit religious freedom.<sup>92</sup> He advised his readers to refrain from giving their votes to the Democrats since a DP victory, he pointed out, would not change the previous governments' policies concerning secularism.<sup>93</sup>

No doubt, earlier experiences of opposition parties during the one-party period had a restraining impact on the DP's approach to religious questions during its formative years. For example, the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası), established in 1924 by prominent leaders of the War of Independence,<sup>94</sup> was outlawed after six months because of its alleged involvement in the Şeyh Saîd rebellion in the East. Although no evidence of such involvement was found, the government insisted that the party, by including a clause in its program which stressed respect for religious traditions, had encouraged the rebels.<sup>95</sup> Similarly, in 1930, Fethi Okyar's Free Republican Party (Serbest Fırka), although founded by Atatürk's initiative,<sup>96</sup> was closed down after three months basically because of the enthusiastic reception it had

received from the people.<sup>97</sup> However, behind the government's pressure on the FRP's leaders was the accusation, once again, that the party had created an atmosphere conducive to an obscurantist reaction.<sup>98</sup> Such experiments with opposition parties had seemingly failed because of the RPP's sensitivity to questions of secularism although undoubtedly the real issue that was at stake was the challenge that these opposition parties posed to the RPP's monopoly of power. In any case, Bayar, Menderes, and other leading figures of the DP probably knew that their survival depended, at this time, on giving guarantees to the government party that they would follow the same line on the most important issue which had concerned Atatürk and İnönü during twenty-three years of one-party rule, namely, strict adherence to secularism.<sup>99</sup>

Between 1945 and 1950, however, a number of parties emerged which sought to use religion in order to gain a foothold in electoral competition. Of the 24 parties founded during this time, at least eight had explicit references in their programs to Islamic themes. For example, the National Resurgence Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi), founded in 1945, had among its objectives the establishment of a world Islamic federation as well as greater emphasis on traditional values in educational policy. The Social Justice Party (Sosyal Adalet Partisi), founded in 1946, similarly sought to support a world federation of Muslim peoples. Three others founded during that same year,

namely, the Farmer's and Peasant's Party (Çiftçi ve Köylü Partisi), The Purification and Protection Party (Arıtma Koruma Partisi), and Islamic Protection Party (İslam Koruma Partisi) all had in their programmatic orientations the protection of Islamic traditions and national values. The Turkish Conservative Party (Türk Muhafazakar Partisi), founded in 1947, and The Land, Real Estate, and Free Enterprise Party (Toprak, Emlak ve Serbest Teşebbüs Partisi), founded in 1949, had similar concerns of advancing the cause of Islam in their programs. But the most important religious party during this time was the Nation Party (Millet Partisi) founded in 1948 by a group of dissident DP members who were expelled from the DP for breaching party discipline. The NP's program stressed the need for religious reform, greater emphasis on Islamic mores and values in social life, greater respect for Islamic institutions, an end to state control of religious organizations, and the inclusion of courses on religion in the primary and secondary school curricula.<sup>100</sup>

However, despite their efforts to build a mass following by politicizing the religious issue, none of these parties were able to play a significant role in national politics. Even the Nation Party, which included some prominent men in its ranks (e.g., Marshal Fevzi Çakmak) and which had some backing from the press (e.g., the daily Kudret, the periodicals Millet and Sebilürreşad), could muster only 240,209 votes out of the approximately eight million votes

cast in the 1950 election and sent only one deputy to the National Assembly.<sup>101</sup> The failure of these parties to gain a foothold in electoral competition suggests that religion, by itself, was not a crucial factor in determining voter alignments and that Turkish voters proved reluctant to cast their votes to obscure parties which offered nothing else than the promise to create a more relaxed atmosphere.

Hence, the electoral success of the Democratic Party in 1950 has to be interpreted in terms of several factors only one of which was religion. To what extent religion was used as a means of propaganda by the local DP candidates in the 1950 election is difficult to ascertain. There are indications that among the promises of the DP politicians during the campaign was that of greater respect for religious freedom. For example, a DP representative<sup>102</sup> boasted that he had told his constituents his party's decision to permit worship in any language (meaning Arabic) and at any place (implying popular places of worship other than mosques) if it came to power.<sup>103</sup> Even if such promises remained limited to a few cases, large sectors of the electorate probably expected greater relaxation of secularist policies once the RPP government fell. For example, a DP representative<sup>104</sup> pointed out that when his campaign team had visited the villages prior to the 1950 elections, the peasants had asked them to do nothing else but protect the Islamic faith.<sup>105</sup> The statement is probably exaggerated as the Turkish peasants have proved to be quite aware of

their social or economic interests. The Democrats promised the peasants not only religious freedom but better roads, better schools, electricity, water, agricultural credits, state loans, etc. However, mass resentment against the elitist outlook of the one-party years no doubt had a religious dimension as well. The military-bureaucratic elite of the Republican governments had largely overlooked both the material interests and the cultural needs of the peasantry. To the peasants, the secularism of the RPP elite probably seemed to be but one manifestation of the Republican attitude that they, the peasants, counted little in the social, political, or cultural life of Kemalist Turkey.

The concern of the RPP leaders that the Democrats would capitalize on the religious issue and hence gain massive electoral support led to a reappraisal of the party's secularization policies. During the 7th General Congress of the Republican People's Party in 1947, the party's understanding of secularism was, for the first time, subjected to extensive criticism. Many of the delegates to the Congress argued that the RPP governments had neglected the need for the religious training of clerics as well as the religious education of the youth. The RPP's secularization policies were blamed for the alleged lack of morality in Turkish social life which, some of the delegates felt, had resulted from the absence of proper

religious upbringing and faith in God. Moreover, the RPP's insistence on including the religious organizations within the state bureaucracy was found to violate the meaning of secularism as well as principles of religious equality for members of all faiths. It was pointed out that in sharp contrast to the close supervision of Muslim institutions, the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian and the Jewish religions enjoyed complete internal organizational autonomy.<sup>106</sup> In general, the majority of the delegates felt that the criticisms of an earlier report submitted to the Congress on the ways and means of reforming the Republican People's Party had been well taken: the RPP governments had been serious only about negative measures to protect secularism but had neglected their obligation to support and protect religious institutions and personnel as well as provide religious training for the youth.<sup>107</sup>

Among the proposals on the religious question submitted to the Congress for consideration were the following:

(1) The tombs of saints and other holy men (türbe) should be reopened.

(2) An elective course on religion for one hour a week, to be given to students with a written approval from their parents, should be included in the primary and secondary school curricula.

(3) A clause indicating the RPP's concern with religious training should be included in the party program.

(4) The party program should also include a statement of the RPP's decision to permit elective courses on religion in the primary schools.

(5) The program of the Ministry of Education should state that elective religious courses are part of the primary school curriculum.

(6) Higher schools of religion should be opened.

(7) Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (İmam-Hatip Okulları) should be reopened.<sup>108</sup>

The Congress decided that these proposals would be presented to the Party Council and the cabinet members for consideration. Indeed, the party leaders swiftly acted on the suggestions of the Congress and initiated a series of measures designed to compensate the gap in religious education. The Ministry of Education prepared a program for the founding of private religious courses to be attended by primary school graduates and approved the textbooks to be used.<sup>109</sup> In 1949, religious courses were introduced into the formal curriculum of primary schools for two hours a week. These were to be elective, with the prerequisite of a written approval by parents, to be taught by qualified teachers certified by the Ministry of Education, and using texts prepared jointly by the Ministry and the Presidency of Religious Affairs. The Ministry of Education also announced a plan in 1947 to establish private religious semineries with a five-year program for graduates of middle

schools (orta okullar). In addition, two-year courses on religion were to be made available for lycée graduates. In 1948, Prayer Leader and Preacher Courses (İmam-Hatip Kursları) were set up by the Ministry and they began to offer classes in 10 cities.<sup>110</sup> In 1949, the University of Ankara decided to open a higher institute of religion (İlahiyat Fakültesi) and this plan was included in the program of the RPP cabinet. Moreover, in 1948, foreign exchange was made available for the first time for the pilgrimage to Mecca.<sup>111</sup> This was followed, a year later, by the re-opening of sacred tombs (türbe) which had been closed down in accordance with a 1925 law.<sup>112</sup>

These changes in the RPP's religious policies no doubt reflected its concern that the Democrats would win the majority of the votes in the coming election through politicizing the religious issue. But the RPP proved to be equally willing to use religion for political purposes, a policy which became a serious weapon of counter-attack by its opponents. For example, Eşref Edib argued that the Republican People's Party had no right to complain about the politicization of religion since it was the RPP itself which had started the trend to use religion for political ends.<sup>113</sup> Similarly, when the RPP leaders voiced concern that the secular principles of the Republic were in danger of compromise during discussions to permit the recital of the ezan (the call to prayer) in Arabic after the DP came

to power in 1950, the DP deputies retaliated by pointing out that the RPP had been the first to politicize religion by reopening sacred tombs and permitting religious education.<sup>114</sup>

The DP leadership's initial reluctance to use religion as a basis of political propaganda was short-lived. The first indication that the Democrats would seriously consider making changes in the application of secularism came during the presentation of the DP government's program in 1950. Prime Minister Menderes, while explaining the program, pointed out that although his government would oppose obscurantist movements, it would at the same time pay respect to freedom of conscience. What was especially significant in his speech was a distinction he made between "those principles of Kemalism which had been internalized by the people and those which had failed to take root." He pointed out that the DP government would preserve the reforms that the nation had accepted,<sup>115</sup> implying that the rest would be subject to change. This was indeed a novel statement about the Kemalist reforms in that no one had, up to that time, attempted to classify them on the basis of whether or not they had been successful. In referring to reforms which had been unsuccessful, it was clear that Menderes had secularism in mind.<sup>116</sup>

Indeed, one of the first issues which the new government took action upon was that of lifting the ban on the recital of the ezan in Arabic. During the discussions on

the question in the Assembly, the RPP deputies argued that such a decision would represent "a betrayal of the Kemalist reforms." They pointed out that the voters had brought up this issue to the RPP candidates during the campaign but that their party had refused to yield to such demands even if it had meant the loss of elections.<sup>117</sup>

The DP group's decision that the previous government's interference in this matter had violated the spirit of secularism and that the new government would allow the recital of the ezan in Arabic was put to a vote in the Assembly and accepted unanimously.<sup>118</sup> The affirmative vote of the Republican representatives no doubt reflected their fear that registering a formal opposition to the government's decision would alienate a large number of voters. For example, when a journalist suggested to an RPP deputy that if his party indeed considered the issue a matter of principle, it should engage in a nation-wide campaign to protest the government's decision, the latter's reply was: "We should do that and lose the 1954 election as well. Is that what you want?"<sup>119</sup> His answer suggests that despite the RPP claims that the Democrats politicized the religious issue, the Republicans were equally willing to compromise on the question of secularism for political purposes.

The lifting of the ban on the recital of the ezan in Arabic in the first month of DP rule (planned to coincide to a Friday during Ramazan) was quite effective in

strengthening the party's popularity. Vatan reported that Muslims all over the country were "shedding tears of joy," "kissing the ground as a token of thanks to God," and sacrificing lambs to celebrate the religious significance of the day.<sup>120</sup> The conservative religious circles interpreted the government's decision as a victory of Islam and of the Democrats.<sup>121</sup> In the Assembly, the DP deputies thanked Menderes personally "in the name of the people."<sup>122</sup> Eşref Edib in Sebilürreşad recorded a conversation he had had with a DP representative in which the latter had told him that during the election campaign, the peasants they contacted had said that hearing the ezan in Turkish was more unbearable to them than hunger.<sup>123</sup> Edib praised the Democrats as the "real representatives of the people." The "real Republic," he argued, was established on May 14, 1950 (the day of the election which brought the DP to power), the first President of the Republic was the one chosen at that date, and the only legitimate laws would henceforth be those passed by the new Assembly.<sup>124</sup>

A month later, the DP government decided to permit the broadcasting of Koran readings over the state radio.<sup>125</sup> At the same time, efforts were made to broaden the scope of religious education. The elective courses on religion in primary schools, which the RPP government had initiated and which had been given without credit, were included in the regular primary school curriculum during the 1950-51

academic year. A passing mark in these courses became a prerequisite for advancement to the next grade. Whereas previously, only those students who had written permission from their parents could include religious courses in their program, the new requirement was that all primary school students had to take classes on religion unless their parents specifically asked the school administration in writing to exempt their children.<sup>126</sup> Moreover, during 1951, the Ministry of Education set up Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools in seven cities and expanded their number to 16 by 1954-55.<sup>127</sup>

At the same time, the new government sought to expand the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. In 1951, the amount of money allotted to the PRA was increased to approximately eight million Turkish liras from the close to three million in the previous year. During the decade that the DP stayed in power, this figure increased constantly and reached around forty million by 1960(see Table 3).

These increases reflected the long concern of DP deputies that not enough money was made available to the PRA for the upkeep of mosques and the provision of minimum living standards for the religious personnel.<sup>128</sup> The expansion of the PRA's budget during the DP years also provided the party with yet another occasion to boast about its accomplishments in the religious field. For example,

a DP deputy in the Assembly pointed out that his government had proved its sincerity to the "Muslim Turkish nation" about the importance it gave to religious questions by increasing the PRA's budget.<sup>129</sup> Another DP representative claimed that the approximately eight million Turkish liras allotted to the PRA in 1951 was enough to prove how sincere the DP government had been in advancing religious freedom.<sup>130</sup>

TABLE 3

## THE BUDGET OF THE PRESIDENCY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, 1945-1960

<u>Year</u>	<u>Budget of PRA</u> (in millions)	<u>Total Budget of</u> <u>All Ministries &amp;</u> <u>Affiliated Offices</u> (in millions)	<u>Percentage of the</u> <u>PRA's Budget within</u> <u>the Total</u>
1945	0.75 TL	603.4 TL	1.3 %
1946	1.5	990.6	1.5
1947	2.7	1,136.2	2.4
1948	2.9	1,243.6	0.2
1949	2.8	1,222.2	0.2
1950	2.9	1,487.2	0.2
1951	7.8	1,274.7	0.6
1952	9.1	1,375.7	0.7
1953	10.7	1,566.2	0.7
1954	11.5	1,693.3	0.7
1955	15.2	2,063.3	0.7
1956	21.1	2,369.7	0.9
1957	23.2	2,733.4	0.8
1958	24.4	2,980.0	0.8
1959	25.2	4,062.8	0.6
1960	39.3	4,638.5	0.8

Compiled from: T. C. Maliye Bakanlığı, Bütçe 1945 and Bütçe 1946 (Ankara: Damga Matbaası, 1945, 1946); Resmî Gazete, March 1, 1952; and Bütçe Kanunu ve Ekleri (Ankara: Damga Matbaası, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960).

However, the increase in the PRA's budget was more symbolic than real. In terms of numbers, there had been an increase of approximately 36.5 million Turkish liras at the end of the decade that the DP had stayed in power. But in terms of percentages, such an increase was not very significant. As Table 3 shows, the percentage of the PRA's budget to the total budget of all the ministries and affiliated offices did not show a major increase. Whereas this percentage was 0.2 in 1950, it reached a meager 0.6 in 1951. Even a decade later, the percentage had fluctuated very little, up to only 0.8

Both Turkish and foreign observers writing at the time have pointed to a general increase of religious freedom and of a growing popular interest in religion during the first few years of DP's tenure in office. According to their reports, the country witnessed an unprecedented rise in the publication of religious books and pamphlets; in the number of people making the pilgrimage to Mecca; in the number of visits to local shrines; in the number of people publicly wearing religious garb; as well as an increase in mosque attendance and the construction of new mosques or the repair of the old.<sup>131</sup> Fifteen thousand new mosques, or to put it differently, approximately 1500 new mosques a year, were built during ten years of DP's stay in power.<sup>132</sup> Between 1951 and 1954, a total of 616 mosques and historical shrines were repaired and 5,553,000 TL were allotted to the

Directorate-General of Pious Foundations for that purpose.<sup>133</sup>

More significantly, the number of private religious organizations (e. g., organizations for the construction of mosques or the founding of Koran courses) registered a continuously upward trend after the DP came to power. For example, whereas in 1949, the total number of religious organizations was 95, this figure had more than doubled by 1951 to 251. By 1960, their number had reached 5104 (see Table 4). Although part of this increase was due to the liberalization, in 1946, of the laws pertaining to the founding of private organizations<sup>134</sup> which resulted in an increase of all interest groups, the percentage of religious organizations to the rest nevertheless remained high. For example, whereas in 1949, this figure was 5.5 per cent, in 1951 it increased to 10.0 per cent and by 1960 to 29.7 per cent (see Table 4).

These official changes in the understanding of secularism also led to the revival of the tarikats and religious-fundamentalist movements. Of these, the Ticani order had already made its presence felt in 1949 in an incident in the National Assembly when members of the group recited the ezan in Arabic from the visitors' galleries in defiance of the then valid law against the Arabic call to prayer. They stepped up their activities after the DP came to power and engaged in a campaign of attacking Atatürk's statues.

TABLE 4

## RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY, 1946-1960

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Number of Religious Organizations</u>	<u>Total Number of Private Organizations</u>	<u>The Ratio of Religious Organizations to the Rest</u>
1946	11	814	1.3 %
1947	27	1048	2.5
1948	58	1345	4.1
1949	95	1641	5.5
1950	154	2023	7.1
1951	251	2295	10.0
1952	406	2945	12.1
1953	598	3824	13.6
1954	809	4603	14.9
1955	1088	5799	15.8
1956	2297	6333	26.7
1957	2925	7186	28.9
1958	3639	8321	30.4
1959	4334	9279	31.9
1960	5104	12034	29.7

Source: Ahmet N. Yücekök, Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı (1946-1968) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1971), p. 133.

An "Atatürk Law" (Atatürk Kanunu) was hastily passed in the Assembly in 1951 designed to protect his memory. On the basis of this law, members of the order were given severe jail sentences. Their leader, Kemal Pilavoğlu, was condemned to fifteen years in jail as well as forced residence on an Aegean island(Bozcaada) for the rest of his life.<sup>135</sup> Another order, the Nurcus, also became prominent during the 1950s. Their philosophy had been formulated in a book called the

Risale-i Nur written by their leader, Saidi Nursi, and widely used in Nur classes dispersed throughout the country. Although the Nurcus claimed to be above politics, their publications nevertheless made it clear that they were against the idea of a secular Republic and wished to restore a theocratic Islamic state.<sup>136</sup> They also openly admitted their support of the DP government. For example, prior to the 1954 elections, Saidi Nursi argued in a pamphlet he wrote that the Nurcus had to work for a DP victory "in the interests of the Koran."<sup>137</sup>

The stepped-up activities of conservative religious circles soon led to an outcry by secularist intellectuals that the DP had encouraged obscurantist movements by politicizing religion.<sup>138</sup> Ulus reported that a DP member had went as far as asking for the return of the veil, the fez, and the Arabic script during the DP Congress in Konya in 1951. When a journalist asked Menderes his opinion about this statement, the latter replied that it would be an exaggeration to argue, on the basis of what he called "an insignificant incident" that obscurantist movements were on the rise and posed a serious danger to the Republic.<sup>139</sup> Menderes' reply was widely publicized in the opposition press as indicative of the government's tolerant attitude towards "religious reactionaries."<sup>140</sup> An earlier statement by Bayar, in a speech he had presented to Istanbul University students, to the effect that his government would, if

need be, "shed blood" to suppress obscurantist movements, was prevented from being published in the newspapers the next day presumably because the government was reluctant to offend the circles that Bayar had attacked in his speech.<sup>141</sup> Similarly, a speech by Menderes during the DP Congress in İzmir in which he had praised his government's accomplishments in religious matters despite the opposition of what he called "the reformist reactionaries" (inkilap softaları), although published in Sebilürreşad,<sup>142</sup> was prevented from being published in the daily press.<sup>143</sup> To the opposition, these moves demonstrated that the DP was in collaboration with reactionary religious circles in an effort to broaden its political support.<sup>144</sup>

Between 1954 and 1957, however, the saliency of the religious issue in interparty competition somewhat declined. For one thing, the Republican People's Party, which had suffered a major defeat in the 1954 election, could not function as an effective opposition in the National Assembly due to its reduced parliamentary membership. But more importantly, the party leadership had apparently decided to keep a low profile about the government's policies concerning religious matters. For example, during the 1954 Assembly debates on the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs-- an occasion which had prompted much dispute on the religious issue between spokesmen of the two parties in previous years-- there was a noticeable lack of interest

on the part of both the DP and the RPP deputies in heated discussions.<sup>145</sup> A year later, when the PRA's budget came up for approval again, the discussions got somewhat more lengthy although still without leading to much controversy. In response to the boasting of the DP deputies concerning the government's achievements in religious affairs which, as one DP member put it, was "the major reason behind Menderes' overwhelming popularity,"<sup>146</sup> the RPP refrained from voicing criticisms against these claims. During the 1956 discussions of the PRA's budget, the opposition spokesmen continued to keep their silence in the face of criticisms of the RPP's past stand on secularism coupled with acclaims for the government's policies directed at revitalizing Islam in Turkey.<sup>147</sup>

Beginning with 1957, however, the religious question once again became a major issue of controversy between the government and the opposition. The first instance of a serious confrontation took place in the Assembly during discussions concerning the granting of a special amnesty to an imam in Kirsehir who had been convicted of making political propaganda favorable to the DP administration in his sermons. The efforts of the government to secure this amnesty met with severe criticisms by the opposition party as İnönü and other RPP officials accused the Democrats of protecting individuals who were using religion as a means of expanding the DP's political base. Following a series

of heated exchanges between the two sides, the government finally backed down and announced in a surprise move its opposition to the granting of the amnesty.<sup>148</sup>

The confrontation in the Assembly set the tone for one of the major themes of the election campaign which began a few months later. Next to economic problems, especially the spiralling inflationary trend which had hit the country, the question of religion was extensively politicized by both the government and the opposition. In his campaign speeches in Ankara and Adana, Prime Minister Menderes recited passages from the Koran, promised that Istanbul would become a second Kaaba, praised his government's record in the construction of village mosques and the permitting of the Arabic ezan, while accusing the RPP for its neglect of Islam during the one-party period.<sup>149</sup> Other DP officials stressed similar themes and were supported by a number of clerics who actively campaigned for the DP.<sup>150</sup> In some cases, local DP units issued official declarations which drew a parallel between the secularist policies of the RPP governments during the one-party era and the alleged communist plans to initiate an anti-religious campaign in Turkey under the guise of secularism.<sup>151</sup> Undoubtedly, the stepped-up emphasis of the Democrats on religion reflected an attempt to stave off the government's declining popularity due to its mismanagement of the economy and its increased coercive measures designed to silence all

forms of opposition.

The Republican People's Party, on the other hand, expressed staunch opposition to the government's politicization of the religious issue. In his campaign speeches, İnönü criticized the government for its economic failures, its curbing of freedoms, as well as its politicization of religion for electoral gain. In his Edirne address, for example, İnönü pointed out that the DP was using the religious issue as a propaganda weapon in the coming election just as it had done so in the previous one.<sup>152</sup> Although İnönü's statements reflected the official stand of the RPP's leadership on secularism, there were nevertheless indications that the RPP itself was also using somewhat similar strategies in this respect. For example, the party's General Secretary, Kasım Gülek, declared in a campaign speech in Adana that it was the RPP which had "transformed the country into a second Kaaba" through its support of Islam.<sup>153</sup> Similarly, Şemsettin Günaltay, a leading party official and former prime minister, emphasized that it was the RPP which had initiated the liberalization of secularist policies in the late 1940s.<sup>154</sup>

During the discussion on the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs a year later, the DP spokesmen continued to stress their party's accomplishments in the religious field. It was pointed out that between 1950 and 1957, the DP governments had spent a total of approximately 37.5

million Turkish liras for the building or repairment of 16,373 mosques or other shrines, in contrast to the 6.5 million Turkish liras that the RPP governments had spent for the same purpose during their 27 years in office.<sup>155</sup> But it was with the beginning of 1959 that the government and the opposition parties became involved in a political struggle over the religious question during the course of the next two years. In order to divert the nation's attention from economic problems and extensive violations of civil liberties by the government, the DP leaders increasingly began to use the religious issue as a means of regaining their mass support. The National Front (Vatan Cephesi) effort of the Democrats was initiated at this time as a nation-wide campaign to enlist nonmember supporters of the party within its organizational network. The names of individuals who had joined the Front occupied a major portion of the daily press news reports on the state-owned radio. In the Assembly, the DP and the RPP deputies got into a major fight over the government's use of religion in its campaign for the Front when an RPP official complained that a DP speaker, during an opening of the Front's cell in Istanbul, had told the crowd that those who believed in God should enlist in the National Front whereas the non-believers should join the opposition and when, in response to his complaint, the DP members shouted out that the speaker in question had in fact told a truth.<sup>156</sup>

Following Menderes' airplane accident while going to London for talks on the Cyprus problem during February of 1959 from which he escaped unharmed, an accident which took the lives of many others on board, the DP organizations throughout the country used the incident to bolster an image for Menderes as among the God's elect. During the DP's Congress in Adana immediately after the accident, one delegate pointed out that Menderes had been elected by the people and appointed by the President as Prime Minister since 1950 but that following the "London airplane accident," as it came to be known in political parlance, he had been elected Prime Minister by God. Another delegate argued that the accident had proved to the people that the leader of their country had been sent to them by God and the Prophet Muhammad.<sup>157</sup> The local cells of the Democratic Party throughout the country organized lamb-sacrificial ceremonies and Koran readings as a token of thanks to God for saving Menderes' life.<sup>158</sup> Even a year later, when Menderes visited Tarsus, he was greeted by the crowd in the main square of the city with two animals ready to be sacrificed in his name plus a seven year old child with his father pointing a knife to his throat and with a sign on the child's chest which read: "I am sacrificing my son to you for having escaped unharmed from the London airplane accident." Menderes simply lifted the child up and told his father to drop the project but refrained from taking any legal action against the man.<sup>159</sup>

The DP's local organizations also became more active in discussing religious issues. For example, during a party congress in Konya in 1959, religion was one of the major issues which occupied the agenda of the speakers. One of the delegates pointed out that the country had undergone major reforms (inkilap-- a word generally reserved for the Atatürk reforms) since 1946 but none had been as important as the reform in the understanding of secularism. His audience responded by cries of "Elhamdülillah," a Koranic expression meaning "thanks to God." Another delegate attacked the RPP for its leadership's irreligiosity.<sup>160</sup> Similar accusations by DP members and officials that the Republican People's Party was anti-religious prompted the RPP's group in the Assembly to issue a statement denouncing the government's unfair propaganda against the opposition as well as warning the Democrats about the dangers of introducing divisiveness among the citizens along religious lines.<sup>161</sup> İnönü complained in several press conferences that the government was distorting his party's concern about preventing the recurrence of past obscurantist rebellions by equating it with anti-religiosity and that the government's campaign against the opposition parties and the press had taken on a new form of inciting mass reaction against the alleged atheism of RPP officials.<sup>162</sup>

The stepped-up activities of fundamentalist groups during this period also became an effective tool of

counter-attack for the opposition. İnönü and other leading RPP officials accused the government of encouraging obscurantism. Although the DP government took a number of measures against fundamentalist groups,<sup>163</sup> it was unable to escape attacks by the Republican Party leaders, the opposition press, and student organizations for its indifference to the alleged rise of obscurantist movements.<sup>164</sup> The much publicized travels of the Nurcu leader, Saidi Nursi, to Ankara and Istanbul and his contacts with DP deputies while in Ankara<sup>165</sup> prompted a new round of exchanges between the leaders of the government and the opposition when İnönü claimed that the government had asked Saidi Nursi to make propaganda on the DP's behalf.<sup>166</sup> The series of accusations between İnönü and Menderes concerning the government's alleged support of the Nurcus became the major issue of Turkish politics during the early part of 1960. İnönü reiterated in his trips in the provinces that the government was once again politicizing religion in anticipation of the forthcoming elections. Menderes' reply to İnönü was that the RPP was using the alleged threat of obscurantism for lack of other substantial issues to criticize the government and that this so-called threat had in fact been nothing more than a pretext for the RPP's past policies of anti-religiosity.<sup>167</sup> At the time when the military intervention of May 1960 interrupted electoral politics, religion had become the principal issue of controversy between the two major parties.

In retrospect, although the DP did use religion for political ends during both the initial stages of the transition to competitive politics and in the 1950-60 era, it did not pursue a policy of encouraging obscurantism as the secularist intellectuals claimed except perhaps for a very brief period in the late 1950s. Much of the uproar about questions of secularism that has characterized Turkish intellectual opinion since the advent of democracy is no doubt exaggerated. As Andrew Mango, in a somewhat caricatured fashion, has recently observed: "Such are the fears and emotions of Turkish intellectuals on the subject of Islam, that Mr. Demirel<sup>168</sup> has only to say in a message (delivered on the occasion of a public religious holiday) 'May God bless our nation and its endeavors' (or a similar formula) for an educated Turk to see blood-stained fanatical dervishes lurking in dark corners."<sup>169</sup> Turkish intellectuals indeed are reluctant to admit that, like in most countries, religion plays a significant role in Turkish society as well and that its impact on political attitudes and behavior should invite no special alarm as far as the future of the Republic is concerned. In that sense, the "religious revival" of the early 1950s was nothing more than the recognition of this fact by the DP politicians. As Lewis Thomas argued in 1952, democratic politics did not lead to a religious revival, since the peasants had always preserved their religious traditions, but only changed official attitudes on secularism.<sup>170</sup>

The 1950 election in Turkey was a turning point in the country's political development not only because government changed hands for the first time in 27 years but also because it transferred the political base of the government from the cities to the countryside. The mobilization of the peasants, who constituted more than two-thirds of the electorate, became a primary concern of political parties after 1950. The gap between the city and the countryside had been overlooked as a problem during the authoritarian one-party years. The Kemalists had concentrated their efforts on building a future generation of urban elites who would protect and advance the Westernizing reforms initiated by Mustafa Kemal. It mattered little how traditional the peasantry had remained as long as the middle and the upper class Turks educated in the cities would be the ones to be entrusted with the governing of the country. If those in power remained loyal to Kemalist principles, there would be no need to fear that the traditionalism of the countryside might one day reverse Turkey's road to Westernization.

As Huntington argues, it is only within a one-party system that the modernizing elite can follow a program of modernization which pays no attention to rural interests. Within a competitive system, on the other hand, political parties have to appeal to the rural strata in order to succeed in elections. This is especially the case in

developing countries where the rural masses make up the bulk of the electorate. Reaching out to the villages, however, often involves a compromise of the modernizers' goals and principles. To win electoral victories, parties have to appeal to both the economic needs and the cultural traditionalism of the countryside. Huntington aptly calls this process "the green uprising." It is the uprising of the peasants against the urban intellectuals through using the legitimate weapon of elections and bringing those to power who, the peasants feel, are closer to their system of values and promise greater socio-economic advantages to rural areas. Hence, Huntington argues, "the party and the party system are the institutional means of bridging the rural-urban gap."<sup>171</sup>

What brought about the shift in elite attitudes towards the rural strata in Turkey was the advent of democracy. Indeed, the outcome of peasant mobilization by political parties after 1946 lends much support to Huntington's observation about the importance of party competition for bridging the urban-rural gap. The improvement in economic conditions of rural communities and the mellowing of earlier Republican policies of cultural transformation were the two major aspects of this process. Both of these changes reflected significant departures from the urban-oriented modernization program of the authoritarian one-party regime. Whereas between 1923 and 1946, the modernizing elite could implement policies from the top down, after 1946 the

challenge of competitive politics resulted in adjustments of policy to peasant demands. The transition from authoritarian to democratic politics, therefore, led to increased participation of the peasantry in politics which in turn facilitated their greater integration into Turkish socio-political life.

The economic backwardness of the Turkish countryside became a major issue of electoral competition beginning with the late 1940s. In an effort to fend-off the criticisms of the newly-founded Democratic Party concerning the neglect of rural communities during twenty-seven years of one-party rule, the incumbent RPP government sought to rechannel more funds into rural development projects. But it was under the Democratic Party's government in the early 1950s that the scope of such projects was expanded. Along with the building of roads, irrigation works, electrical networks, and communication channels, the government also increased the volume of agricultural credits, price supports for agricultural products and farm machinery. The impact of these governmental allocations to the rural sector was an apparent improvement in the material well-being and living conditions of the peasantry.

For example, in a village survey conducted in the early 1960s, it was reported that most peasant families saw a marked improvement in their economic conditions after 1950. Of the 44 villages included in the study, a majority of them

had received, as reported by the villagers themselves, (1) better prices for their products, (2) more governmental credits, (3) seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides, (4) better health services, (5) drinking water facilities, (6) roads, and (7) consumer items such as radios, sewing machines, cooking and lighting utensils, after the Democrats came to power. Their net assessment of these improvements centered around several changes which the villagers perceived in their environment. They reported (1) an expansion in cultivable land as a result of better irrigation as well as the use of farm machines, fertilizers, and insecticides, (2) introduction of new crops such as cotton, sugar cane, fruits, and vegetables as a result of governmental encouragements through credits and subsidies, (3) changes in methods of receiving credits-- from banks and cooperatives instead of landlords and moneylenders, (4) better transportation facilities for trade with towns and cities, and (5) migration into the urban areas. In addition, the majority of the villagers voiced greater expectations from the government than before, displayed positive attitudes towards democratic politics, and perceived political participation through voting to be an important political activity.<sup>172</sup>

The larger implications of the DP's rural development policies have to be viewed within the context of the elite-mass polarity. Undoubtedly, the economic changes in the countryside also had a cultural dimension. The political

elites were more responsive to the cultural orientations of the peasantry in an effort to win electoral support and as a result of greater localism among parliamentary representatives.<sup>173</sup> Moreover, the social mobilization process which the Turkish countryside experienced after 1950 led to greater interaction between the city and the village as more and more villagers migrated into urban areas. This, in turn, led to a gradual fusion of the mass and the elite cultures. However, the extent of this levelling process should not be exaggerated. Turkey has been relatively successful in institutionalizing democratic politics but much less so in creating a democratic society. The elite culture still overshadows the mass and determines status differences between people of same economic standing.

Although, in the 1950 election, the RPP and the DP almost split the rural vote and although the Democrats won impressive majorities in the cities,<sup>174</sup> the DP expanded its electoral bases in the countryside during the course of the next four years. The growing popularity of the DP among the peasant voters reflected the party's success in combining concrete economic benefits with an appeal to the traditional sentiments of the peasantry. It is in this latter respect that the role of religion as a means for mass mobilization and electoral success emerged as an important factor in the political development of Turkey.

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(28) Aydemir, Vol. II, pp. 119-120.

(29) Ibid., p. 140.

(30) For the text of the statement, see Kutay, pp. 199-201. Also see M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, Milli Mücadele Başları, Vol. II (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1965), p. 409.

(31) Aydemir, Vol. II, pp. 285-97. Another example of Mustafa Kemal's use of religion as a means of politicizing the masses is a speech given by him in Adana in 1920. There, he addressed the crowd as "the Muslims of Adana," "religious brothers of Adana," "the leaders of the  Jihad  armies of the  ummah  of Muhammad." It is interesting to note that this speech was not included among the three-volume speeches of Atatürk published by the Türk İnkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü. See Aydemir, Vol. II, pp. 203-205.

(32) Compiled from Kutay, pp. 102-108. These figures are a little different than Dankwart A. Rustow's calculation of 98 out of 437, which would somewhat lower the proportion of the religious group to the rest. See his "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955," in Richard N. Frye (Ed.), Islam and the West (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), pp. 73, 73n. Using Kutay's figures, the percentage of the religious group would be 20.6 % whereas Rustow's figures would lower this to 20.3

(33) Rustow, "Politics and Islam...", p. 73n.

(34) See Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1965), p. 126.

(35) See Kutay, pp. 234-39.

(36) See the article on Dürrizade by Faik Reşit Unat and Dankwart A. Rustow in the Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., Vol. II.

(37) For detailed information on the civil war, see Aydemir, Vol. II, pp. 330-38.

(38) See Rustow, "Politics and Islam...", p. 76. Also see Kutay, pp. 164-201 and Misiroğlu, pp. 221-231.

(39) Kutay, p. 266.

(40) From the memoirs of Haydar Vaner, the representative of Van. Quoted in Kutay, p. 267.

(41) On General Harbord's mission, see Lord Kinross, Ataturk (New York: William Morrow, 1965), pp. 218-19.

(42) Quoted in Kutay, p. 41.

(43) There were, however, prominent leaders of the War of Independence who later opposed Mustafa Kemal because of his staunch secularist policies, such as Kâzım Karabekir, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy.

(44) Şerif Mardin, "Center-periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" Daedalus (Winter, 1973), p. 183.

(45) Mustafa Kemal, for instance, made his famous statement that the Turkish peasant was the "effendi of the country." Ironically, however, although effendi was a term exclusively used for a gentleman, in present-day Turkey its use is reserved for the peasants or people of inferior social status.

(46) The establishment of the Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) and the People's Houses (Halkevleri) were among these.

(47) Mardin, p. 184.

(48) Ibid., pp. 169-81.

(49) For detailed histories of the Şeyh Said rebellion, see Metin Toker, Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı (Ankara: Akis Yayınları, 1968), and Behçet Cemal, Şeyh Sait İsyanı (İstanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955).

(50) Cemal, pp. 15-16. For the text of the document which was used as evidence by the prosecutor in the trials which followed the suppression of the rebellion, see Ibid., pp. 85-86. Cemal also argues that a secret Committee of the Caliphate (Hilafet Komitesi) founded in Bucharest in 1922 under the leadership of the one-time Interior Minister of the Ottoman government, Mehmet Ali, had been in touch with both Şeyh Said and Seyit Abdülkadir. The Committee's aim was to restore the Sultanate-Caliphate and bring Vahideddin back to the throne. According to Cemal, Vahideddin himself was in touch with the Committee and actively supported its aims (Ibid., pp. 16-18). Again, Cemal argues that when Vahideddin heard the news of the Şeyh Said rebellion in his San Remo residence, he immediately began making plans about the members of his future government. But his political activities were stopped short by the San Remo governor who came to visit Vahideddin and reminded him that he could not, under the terms of his residence permission in San Remo, engage in political activities (Ibid., pp 69-71).

(51) Ibid., p. 110.

(52) See Lewis, pp. 261-266.

(53) See Çetin Özek, Türkiyede Laiklik (İstanbul: Baha

Matbaası, 1962), pp. 95-96, and Tarık Zafer Tunaya, İslamcılık Cereyanı (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1962), p. 178.

(54) On details of the uprising, see Sadi İrmak, Devrim Tarihi (İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1967), pp. 217-18.

(55) Özek, p. 97 and Tunaya, pp. 186-87.

(56) Mümtaz Turhan, Atatürk İlkeleri ve Kalkınma: Sosyal Psikoloji Bakımından Bir Tetkik (İstanbul: Şehir Matbaası, 1965), pp. 26-27. Turhan is too cautious to attack the Kemalist reforms directly. Rather, he puts the blame on the misinterpretation and misuse of Kemalist principles by the "Leftists."

(57) See Note 38, Ch. III.

(58) See Articles 597-602 of the Türk Kanunu Medenisi ve Borçlar Kanunu (Ankara: Doruk Yayınları, 1975). For explanations on these articles, see Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Türk Medeni Hukuku (İstanbul: Nurgök Matbaası, 1963), pp. 603-605 and Bülent Köprülü, Toprak Hukuku Dersleri, Vol. I (İstanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1958), pp. 326-338.

(59) See İbrahim Yasa, Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı ve Temel Sorunları (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), p. 56.

(60) Lewis, p. 117.

(61) See Articles 597-98 of the TKM.

(62) See İlhan Öztrak, "Toprak Reformunun Hukuki Yönü," in Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, Türkiye'de Toprak Reformu Semineri (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1968), p. 165. There is still an ongoing controversy among legal experts as to whether the articles in the new Civil Code dealing with agricultural land have put the provisions of the 1858 Code out of effect. For a discussion of this controversy, see Fikret Eren, "Tapulama Kanunu ve Toprak Reformu," in Ibid., pp. 121-137.

(63) Lewis, p. 461.

(64) Ibid.

(65) See Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkiye'nin Düzeni (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968), p. 229.

(66) According to the concept of populism as understood by the Kemalists, which constitutes one of the basic principles of Kemalism, the Turkish nation is composed of occupational groups rather than classes. See Kemal H.

Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 308. Rustow writes that Mustafa Kemal "displayed little interest in social or economic change as these terms have come to be understood since the Mexican, Russian, and anti-colonial Revolutions. For him, economic improvement and a bridging of class differences were practical requirements of national solidarity and international stature, rather than deeply felt needs of human justice and dignity." Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ataturk as Founder of a State," Daedalus (Summer, 1968), p. 823.

(67) Cemal, p. 45.

(68) Ibid., p. 33.

(69) Here, I accept Rustow's figures, 73 out of 361 or approximately 20.0 % for the First Assembly (See his "Politics and Islam...", p. 73n). Frey gives a much lower percentage of 17.0 (See Frey, Table 7.5, p. 181).

(70) See Table 7.5 in Frey, o. 181.

(71) See İlkay Sunar, State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1974), p. 76. However, at the parliamentary level, there was a gradual decline of deputies with local ties during the Atatürk era. Whereas in the First Assembly of 1920, the percentage of deputies born in the constituency they represented was 62.0, this figure dropped continuously during the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Assemblies. Between 1920 and the Fifth Assembly of 1935, the degree of localism among members of the Assembly had decreased by almost 50 per cent. In contrast, the proportion of deputies born in the İstanbul region showed a rapid increase after 1920. By the Seventh Assembly of 1943, one deputy out of three had been born in the Marmara-İstanbul region, with one out of every four in the city of İstanbul itself (see Frey, p. 187 and Figure 7.4, p. 188). No doubt, the imbalance in favor of people born in the Marmara area reflected the bureaucratic-elitist outlook of the RPP during the one-party years. Indeed, with the transition to competitive politics in 1946, the trend was reversed. By 1954, the percentage of people with local ties had once again risen to its 1920 level (see Ibid., Figure 7.4, p. 188).

(72) See Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey," in Joseph LaPalombara and M. Weiner (Eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 118.

(73) Ibid., p. 112.

(74) See Sabri Sayarı, "Some Notes on the Beginnings of Mass Political Participation in Turkey," in Engin D. Akarli and G. Ben-Dor (Eds.), Political Participation in Turkey (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), pp. 121-133.

(75) Sunar, p. 77.

(76) The precise reasons behind İnönü's decision to permit the formation of opposition parties have been an issue of controversy among students of Turkish politics. Rustow points out that this decision "was prompted in part by the outcome of the war and hopes for Western support against Russia and in part by social unrest due to wartime shortages and profiteering." See Rustow, "The Development of Parties...", p. 122. Although there had been earlier attempts to permit the establishment of a loyal opposition, notably, the Progressive Republican Party experience of 1924 and the Free Republican Party experience of 1930, these did not in any way signal the end of one-party rule.

(77) Sayarı, p. 125.

(78) Ibid.

(79) Ibid., pp. 127-131.

(80) Vatan, June 24, 1949.

(81) See Vatan, April 25, 1949; May 3, 1949; and April 4, 1949.

(82) Vatan, June 10, 1949.

(83) On this incident, see Ulus, Vatan, and Cumhuriyet, April 12-14, 1950, and Karpat, pp. 283-85.

(84) See Vatan, April 20-21, 1950.

(85) Ulus, July 18, 1950.

(86) See his "Demokrat Partinin Din Siyaseti," Sebilürreşad, Vol. II, No. 27, 1949, pp. 27-28.

(87) See Vatan, April 4, 1949.

(88) Bayar claimed that he did not make such a statement. Hulusi Köymen, the chairman of the local DP branch in Bursa, sent a letter to Sebilürreşad, to assure its readers that the press reports about the statement were false. See Sebilürreşad, Vol. II, No. 47, 1949.

(89) It should be noted here that Sebilürreşad's

attacks against the DP started only after a group of dissident DP officials were expelled from the party and formed the Nation Party in 1948 which adopted a much more fundamentalist stand on the religious question.

(90) See M. Raif Ogan, "Şeriatı Yaşatmamak Celal Bayarın Ne Haddine?" Sebilürreşad, Vol. II, No. 39, 1949, pp. 217-19; Eşref Edib, "Celal Bayar Gladistondan mi İlham Aldı?" Sebilürreşad, Vol. II, No. 39, 1949, pp. 220-21; Eşref Edib, "Din Herşeyden Üstündür," Sebilürreşad, Vol. II, No. 47, 1949, pp. 329-32; M. Raif Ogan, "Laiklik Mevzuu," Sebilürreşad, Vol. II, No. 47, 1949, pp. 341-46. Also see the editorials in Sebilürreşad, Vol. II, No. 42, 1949, pp. 265-69 and Vol. II, No. 48, 1949, pp. 357-65.

(91) Article 163 puts down prison sentences for the founding of associations which aim at applying religious principles to the functioning of the social, political, or judicial systems. It also spells out the sanctions for using religion as a means of political propaganda. Two other articles (241 and 242) of the Turkish Criminal Code also deal with prohibitions on the use of religion for political purposes. Article 241 states that religious leaders who publicly disapprove the administration of the government, the laws of the state, or the implementation of these laws are liable to be persecuted. Article 242 makes it a criminal act to use an official religious title in order to provoke or encourage civil disobedience to the government. In addition to the Criminal Code, Article 9 of the Law of Associations (Cemiyetler Kanunu), enacted in 1938, outlaws all organizations formed on "principles of religion, creed, and religious orders." See Sulhi Dönmezer, "Dini Cemiyet Teşkilî ve Din Propagandası," İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası, Vol. 17, No. 1-2, pp. 24-43.

(92) See Eşref Edib, "Dine Karşı Takip Edilecek Siyaset Hususunda Halk Partisi ile Demokrat Parti Liderleri Tam Mutabakat ve İttifak Halindedir," Sebilürreşad, Vol. II, No. 50, 1949, pp. 397-400. Also see Sebilürreşad, Vol. II, No. 48, 1949, pp. 357-65.

(93) Eşref Edib, "Partilerin Din Siyaseti," Sebilürreşad, Vol. IV, No. 76, 1950, pp. 2-10.

(94) Among its leaders were Kâzım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Rauf Orbay, and Refet Bele.

(95) See Aydemir, Vol. III, pp. 210-24, and Toker, pp. 22-29, 44-49, 60-66, 71-77, 89-91, 101-106.

(96) Mustafa Kemal insisted that the country needed an organized opposition and appointed his close associate,

Fethi Okyar, to find the FRP.

(97) This became especially evident during Fethi Okyar's visit to İzmir. His arrival led to near mass hysteria as the demonstrations in his favor got out of hand. For details, see Aydemir, Vol. II, pp. 388-401.

(98) See Çetin Özek, Türkiyede Gerici Akımlar ve Nureculuğun İçyüzü (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1964), pp. 182-186, and Muzaffer Sencer, Dinin Türk Toplumuna Etkileri (İstanbul: Garanti Matbaası, 1968), pp. 137-139.

(99) See Cem Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), p. 57.

(100) See Tunaya, pp. 190-92.

(101) Karpat, p. 432.

(102) Ahmet Gürkan of Tokat.

(103) See Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Ceridesi (TBMMZC), Session 48:1, 1951.

(104) Yusuf Karşlıoğlu of Yozgat.

(105) TBMMZC, Sess. 48:1, 1951. Another representative, Hikmet Ölçmen of Konya, pointed out that during the four years of opposition to the RPP government, freedom of conscience was one of the main issues that voters demanded from them. See Ibid.

(106) See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP Yedinci Kurultay Tutanağı (Ankara, 1948), 9th Session (2/12/1947), pp. 449-467.

(107) See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP'de Islahat Yapılması için Teklif (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1950), pp. 18-19.

(108) CHP Yedinci Kurultay Tutanağı.

(109) See Cumhuriyet, October 4, 1947.

(110) See Howard A. Reed, "Turkey's New Imam-Hatip Schools," Die Welt Des Islams, Vol. IV, 1956, pp. 152-53.

(111) See Özek, Türkiyede Gerici..., p. 190.

(112) See Tunaya, pp. 219-20.

(113) See Eşref Edib, "Partilerin Din Siyaseti," Sebilürreşad, Vol. IV. No. 76, 1950, pp. 2-10.

(114) See Vatan, June 6, 1950.

(115) For the relevant parts of the text, see Kâzım Öztürk (Ed.), Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri ve Programları (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1968), pp. 360-65.

(116) For example, in response to a reporter's question on the recital of the ezan in Arabic, Menderes replied that his government would permit it. Menderes added that the DP would protect the reforms accepted by the people. See Vatan, June 5, 1950.

(117) See Vatan, June 6, 1950.

(118) See Vatan, June 14, 1950.

(119) See Vatan, June 17, 1950.

(120) Vatan, June 6, 1950.

(121) See Vatan, June 18, 1950.

(122) See TBMMZC, Sess. IX, Vol. I (4/16/1950).

(123) Eşref Edib, "Yeni Gelen Milletvekilleriyle Mülakat," Sebilürreşad, Vol. IV, No. 79, 1950, pp. 50-51.

(124) Eşref Edib, "Hükümetin Programı ve Ezan Meselesi," Sebilürreşad, Vol. IV, No. 80, 1950. For similar praises of the DP government, see Eşref Edib, "Hakiki Laiklik ve Hakiki Cemaati İslamiye," Sebilürreşad, Vol. IV, No. 84, 1950, pp. 130-33; M. Raif Ogan, "Farmasonluk ve Kızıl Taassub Binaları Yıkılıyor," Sebilürreşad, Vol. IV, No. 89, 1950, pp. 213-15; Eşref Edib, "Kara İrtica, Sarı İrtica, Kızıl İrtica," Sebilürreşad, Vol. IV, No. 91, 1950, pp. 242-48.

(125) Ulus, July 6, 1950.

(126) Reed, p. 152.

(127) Ibid., pp 154-57.

(128) See, for example, TBMMZC, Sess. 8:4, 1950; Sess. 48:1, 1951; and 9:3, 1953.

(129) See the statement by Bekir Oynağanlı of Afyonkarahisar, TBMMZC, Sess. 48:1, 1951.

(130) See the statement by Kâzım Arar of Çankırı in Ibid.

(131) See, for example, Tunaya, p. 224; Rustow,

"Politics and Islam...", p. 97; Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey," International Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January, 1952), p. 42; Lewis V. Thomas, "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter, 1952), p. 23; Uriel Heyd, Revival of Islam in Modern Turkey, pamphlet (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, The Magnes Press, 1968), p. 14; and Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer, 1954), pp. 271-72.

(132) See Geoffrey L. Lewis, "Islam in Politics: Turkey," The Muslim World, Vol. LVI, No. 4 (October, 1966), pp. 231-36.

(133) See D. P. Neşriyatı, Kalkınan Türkiye (Ankara, 1954).

(134) See Ahmet N. Yücekök, Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı (1946-1968) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1971), pp. 106-107.

(135) See Rustow, "Politics and Islam...", pp. 97-98. Also see Tunaya, p. 231 and Ulus, March 27, 1951.

(136) For a detailed discussion of their ideas and activities, see Özek, Türkiyede Gerici Akımlar..., pp. 239-300.

(137) Quoted in Faruk Güventürk and F. Kadıoğlu, Din Işığında Yobazlık, Atatürkçülük (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1967), p. 101. For similar statements by the Nurcus, see Özek, Türkiyede Gerici..., pp. 284-87.

(138) See Ulus, March 23, 26, 27, 1951.

(139) See Ulus, March 18, 1951.

(140) See Ulus, March 19, 20, 1951.

(141) See Ulus, January 12, 1951.

(142) See Sebilürreşad, Vol. IV, No. 94, 1951.

(143) See Ulus, March 20, 1951.

(144) See the statements by İnönü in Ulus, March 23, 1951 and by Nihat Erim in Ulus, March 26, 1951.

(145) See TBMMZC, Sess. IX, IV:9A, Vol. 28, February 22, 1954.

(146) See the statement by Sinan Tekelioğlu of Seyhan in TBMMZC, Sess. X, Vol. 5, February 21, 1955.

- (147) See TBMMZC, Sess. X, Vol. 10, February 24, 1956.
- (148) See TBMMZC, Sess. X, Vol. 20, June 7, 1957 and June 10, 1957.
- (149) See Cumhuriyet, October 22, 1957 and Milliyet, October 23, 1957.
- (150) See Kemal H. Karpas, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," Western Political Quarterly (June, 1961), pp. 443, 443n.
- (151) For the text of one such declaration issued by the DP's local unit in Konya, see Milliyet, October 16, 1957.
- (152) See Milliyet, October 19, 1957.
- (153) See Cumhuriyet, October 12, 1957.
- (154) See Karpas, "The Turkish Elections...", p. 444.
- (155) TBMMZC, Sess. XI, Vol. 2, February 24, 1958.
- (156) See Cumhuriyet, February 25, 1959.
- (157) See Cumhuriyet, March 9, 1959.
- (158) See Cumhuriyet, February 20, 1959 & February 27, 1959.
- (159) See Cumhuriyet, January 6, 1960.
- (160) See Cumhuriyet, April 27, 1959.
- (161) See Cumhuriyet, March 29, 1959.
- (162) See Cumhuriyet, March 20, 1959, March 21, 1959 & March 25, 1959.
- (163) For example, 60 people were arrested in Ankara for their involvement in a sectarian ceremony. See Cumhuriyet, March 22, 1959. A periodical publishing fundamentalist views, Büyük Doğu, was banned from publication for a month by a court order and its editor, Necib Fazıl Kısakürek, was sentenced to a jail term of a year and six months in addition to a 3000.00 TL fine. See Cumhuriyet, March 26, 1959. In Konya, five members of the Nurcu movement were jailed for reading Saidi Nursi's books to the public. See Cumhuriyet, January 7, 1960. In several other cities, the Nurcus were brought before courts during January of 1960. See Cumhuriyet, January 1-31, 1960.
- (164) See Cumhuriyet, January 1-2, 1960, January 7,

1960, January 9, 1960, January 10, 1960 & January 12, 1960.

(165) See Cumhuriyet, January 1-2, 1960.

(166) See Cumhuriyet, January 7, 1960.

(167) For texts of these exchanges between Menderes and İnönü, see Cumhuriyet, January 9-14, 17-18, 22-23, 1960.

(168) Süleyman Demirel. He is the leader of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) which was founded after 1960 as a successor to the defunct DP.

(169) Andrew Mango, "Purpose in Turkish Politics and Its Outcome," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April, 1967), p. 302.

(170) Thomas, pp. 23-26.

(171) Huntington, p. 433. For his discussion of "ruralizing elections" and "the green uprising," see pp. 72-92 and 433-61.

(172) Ruşen Keleş and O. Türkay, Köylü Gözü ile Türk Köylerinde İktisadi ve Toplumsal Değişme (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Türk İktisadi Gelişme Araştırma Projesi, 1962), pp. 34-68.

(173) For the changed composition of the political elite after 1950, see Frey, pp. 89-98.

(174) See Ergun Özbudun, Türkiye'de Sosyal Değişme ve Siyasal Katılma (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1975), pp. 38-39.

## CHAPTER V

RELIGION, PARTIES, AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: CHANGING PATTERNS  
AND THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY

## I.

As I have discussed in the preceding chapter, the transition to democracy in Turkey was accompanied by the translation of economic and cultural cleavages between the city and the countryside, which had remained latent under an authoritarian regime, into national political life through political parties seeking to mobilize a predominantly peasant electorate. Since these cleavages had become manifest and had been politicized during the critical phase of transition to competitive politics, they played an important role in the structuring of party policies and political loyalties after 1950. As one significant dimension of cultural cleavage, religion became a major source of conflict between parties at both the electoral and the parliamentary levels from 1946 until 1960.

The military intervention of 1960, which was largely prompted by the increasing authoritarianism of the Menderes regime, temporarily suspended electoral politics. While a military administration stayed in power until late 1961, a Constituent Assembly (Kurucu Meclis) was formed and it prepared the draft of a new constitution which was ratified through a referendum in the same year. A large number

of its provisions pertained to the guarantee of civil liberties among which the freedom of religious belief, worship, and education were included (Article 19).<sup>1</sup> However, the 1961 Constitution also brought preventive measures concerning the use of religion for political ends. Article 19 read: "No individual can exploit religion in order to change the social, economic, political, or legal systems of the state according to religious principles, neither can he use religion to further his personal or political interests."<sup>2</sup> In other words, previous legal restrictions on the use of religion for political purposes acquired constitutional legitimacy through Article 19. Clearly, by including this provision in the new Constitution, members of the Constituent Assembly sought to prevent the recurrence of the politicization of religion under the DP administrations.

Between 1960 and 1965, the debate over secularism received relatively less emphasis in party competition than in the previous decade. The military's adherence to a strict version of Kemalist secularism, its close supervision over a series of coalition governments formed during this period, as well as its control of political life in general had much to do in restricting the repoliticization of religion. However, greater allocation of state resources for religious institutions and education, which had gained momentum under the Democrats, continued in the early 1960s. For example, the coalition governments formed under the

RPP's leadership in the 1961-64 period maintained the record of the DP governments in terms of the number of mosques built. Between 1950 and 1960, an average of 1500 new mosques a year had been constructed. This average remained exactly the same during the period from 1961 through 1964.<sup>3</sup> In addition, enrollments in Imam-Hatip schools more than doubled during the four years following the military intervention of 1960,<sup>4</sup> with an increase in their number from 19 in 1961 to 26 in 1964.<sup>5</sup>

However, with the gradual reinstitutionalization of electoral competition by the mid-1960s, religion once again assumed an important role in Turkish party politics. By 1965, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), which had been founded in 1961, had managed to establish an image for itself as the successor to the defunct DP. The JP was able to inherit the legacy of the Democrats as a party representing rural interests. To the mass of the rural electorate, the military intervention of 1960 most likely seemed a reinstatement of the earlier Kemalist military-bureaucratic alliance. The JP's strategy during its formative years was to realign former DP supporters behind its banner partially by operating as a protest movement against this elitist alliance. Included in this strategy was an implicit effort to identify the JP as the champion of Islam. For example, the initial emblem of the party contained an open book with a rising sun above it which was interpreted by some of its critics as imbued with religious symbolism.<sup>6</sup> Later, when

Süleyman Demirel assumed the leadership of the Justice Party in 1964, the party propagandists made much use of the fact that he came from a village in Isparta called İslamköy (Village of Islam), that his father had made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and that the Koran was daily read in his household.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, the JP's success in both capturing the organizational network of the DP and its appeal to the rural voters proved to be rewarding for the party in establishing mass support as the outcome of the 1965 election, which brought the JP to power, demonstrated.

The 1965 election campaign was the first instance in which the Left-Right cleavage gained an importance in the political spectrum. The entry of the Marxist-oriented Turkish Labor Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) into the election as well as the adoption of a Center-Left position by the RPP opened much publicized political debates between parties over ideological issues. Although the question of secularism was no longer as important as it once had been in party competition in the light of this new polarization along ideological lines, it nevertheless continued to receive a fair amount of emphasis. However, the tone of the discussions on secularism underwent an interesting change. Whereas in the 1950s, the secularist stand of the RPP had been identified by its opponents with anti-religiosity, in the 1965 election campaign, the religious issue and the RPP's attitude towards it were merged with questions of ideology as the RPP was accused of being communist-oriented

and therefore anti-religious. A number of anti-communist organizations, such as the Society for the Struggle Against Communism (Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği) and the Turkish Nationalist Youth Society (Türkiye Milliyetçi Gençlik Derneği) supported the Justice Party against both the RPP and the TLP.<sup>8</sup> For example, it was reported that the JP's organizations in Çanakkale and Balıkesir were in close contact with the local cells of the Society for the Struggle Against Communism and the Sacred Nationalist Society (Milliyetçi Mukaddesatçılar Derneği) and were acting through these organizations to publicize JP's support for Islam.<sup>9</sup> In the villages of Tokat, travelling preachers (gezici vaiz) were reported to be taking an active part in the JP's election campaign and often relating the RPP's stand on the religious question to its alleged communist leanings.<sup>10</sup> A content analysis of the campaign speeches broadcasted over the state radio showed that whereas the RPP and the TLP spokesmen had mentioned religious issues only once, religion was a major theme in five of the speeches made by the JP officials.<sup>11</sup>

The religious question became even more politicized during the Senate by-elections a year later. Süleyman Demirel picked up again the long-standing theme that animosity of the Turkish elite towards Islam and Islamic traditions had often been concealed under a secularist umbrella. He pointed out that the Turkish electorate was uneasy about the use of the secularist pretext as a means

of restricting religious freedoms.<sup>12</sup> Demirel even went so far as to argue that "declaring oneself a Muslim or revoking references to God had been interpreted as exploitation of religion for political purposes," and that since such statements had nothing to do with religious exploitation or obscurantism, "every Muslim Turk could proudly announce that he is a Muslim."<sup>13</sup>

For his part, İnönü expounded on a theme in the 1966 campaign which was reminiscent of his attacks on the Democratic Party during the 1950s. He accused the Justice Party and Prime Minister Demirel of collaborating with the Nurcus, claiming that "those who seek to benefit from the use of Saidi Nursi's sect as a vote-getting machine are obscurantists."<sup>14</sup> İnönü made this particular issue the main theme of the 1966 campaign for the Senate elections and he repeatedly invited Demirel to denounce any collaboration between the Justice Party and the Nurcus. "Demirel's silence concerning this matter demonstrates," İnönü claimed, "that he considers secularist foundations of the Republic to be an expression of atheism."<sup>15</sup> These accusations about the alleged cooperation between the Justice Party and the Nurcu sect prompted criticisms from the religious press which responded to the charges by revoking, once again, the RPP's stereotyped image held by its opponents as an anti-religious party.<sup>16</sup>

İnönü's insistence on keeping the RPP's stand on secularism basically intact as well as his frequent

allegations of obscurantism to rival parties did much to perpetuate this image which the RPP inherited from the one-party years. Beginning with the late 1960s, however, there was a gradual shift in the RPP's position on the religious issue which was part of a larger effort to change the party's elitist orientation. This strategy change was prompted by the rise to power of a new group of party officials under the leadership of the newly-elected Secretary-General, Bülent Ecevit.<sup>17</sup> Convinced that the RPP's successive electoral failures since 1950 basically stemmed from its identification with the Kemalist military-bureaucratic elites, the corollary of which was its inability to close the cultural distance between the party leadership and the rural masses, Ecevit sought to reorient the RPP's political outlook along a more populist line.

This new populism involved both a thinly-veiled critique of Kemalist reformism and an emphasis on structural changes. Ecevit argued that although the cultural changes which the Kemalist reforms had initiated were necessary, they had remained limited, in his words, to the "superstructure of Turkish society" and had failed to bring about a transformation in the underlying economic and social structural conditions. According to Ecevit, the reaction against these reforms had to be interpreted with reference to such issues as social welfare, equality of opportunity, and economic exploitation. As he saw it, the replacement of the fez with the Western hat, the removal of the veil,

the adoption of the Latin alphabet and the establishment of a secular state had changed much in Turkish society but none of these changes had brought about the emancipation of the Turkish people from poverty and economic exploitation.<sup>18</sup> Hence, the religious factor, according to Ecevit, had been used by people with vested interests in the maintenance of the status quo as a cloak for concealing socio-economic deprevity.<sup>19</sup>

Ecevit's critical analysis of the RPP's Kemalist legacy had an important consequence for the party's stand on the religious issue. Islam was no longer emphasized as a factor in the long-standing dichotomy between the progressive and the conservative political forces in Turkish society. Party officials stressed that the basis of this dichotomy was economic rather than religious. For example, the RPP's central executive organ issued a directive to the party's candidates prior to the 1969 election which urged them to refrain from using the progressive-conservative categories with reference to religion but instead advised them to relate such differences to ideological stands.<sup>20</sup>

The changing perspectives of the RPP's top officials on the religious issue have, therefore, committed the party to a new orientation in this respect. Especially since the resignation of İnönü from the party's leadership and his replacement by Ecevit in 1972 following a factional dispute, the party's spokesmen have refrained from emphasizing the issue of secularism. Moreover, the RPP's willingness to form

a coalition government with the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)-- a neo-Islamic party of which more will be said in this chapter-- following the 1973 election was a clear indication of how far the RPP had travelled in accepting religion as a legitimate concern of the Turkish electorate.

Although the Justice Party's position on religion did not undergo any such major change, the purge of a more religiously conservative group from its leadership ranks indicated that the JP had adopted a more moderate line in this respect. The leader of this group, Saadettin Bilgiç, had briefly assumed the post of the acting party chairman following the death of the JP's first leader, Ragıp Gümüşpala, in 1964. However, in the General Party Congress held during the same year, Bilgiç had lost the leadership of the party to Demirel. During the period from 1964 to 1970, members of the Bilgiç faction often clashed with the more moderate party officials, especially on questions concerning educational and cultural policies to be pursued by the JP governments. Their growing criticisms of the incumbent party executive and their efforts to capture the party chairmanship finally led to their expulsion in 1970.

By the early 1970s, therefore, both major parties had adopted a more moderate stand on the issue of religion. This, however, did not imply that the politicization of religious concerns had ceased to be an important factor of electoral politics. The growth of fragmentation in the

party system enabled the minor parties to enter into the Assembly in greater numbers than before and thus play a more influential role in Turkish political life. Of these, the most successful in terms of receiving electoral support was the National Salvation Party which based its appeal predominantly on the defense of Islam and Islamic traditions.

## II.

Considering the long history of controversy over the impact of religion on Turkish politics, could we assume that religion is more of a factor in political behavior in Turkey than in other countries? Given a choice, would the majority of the Turks vote purely on religious lines? Could religious parties survive electoral competition through religious appeals alone? In short, how religious is the vote?

Although throughout the history of the Republic, various parties have sought to widen their electoral bases through politicizing the religious issue, it was with the establishment of the National Salvation Party and its entry into the 1973 general elections that the impact of religious appeals on the Turkish electorate could be assessed. As the late Turkish statesman, İsmet İnönü, remarked prior to the 1973 election, for the first time in the history of the Republic, the Turkish intellectuals would get a chance to weigh the importance of religion on political behavior.<sup>21</sup> The NSP was established as an explicitly religious party.

Although it based its program on a number of other issues which I shall subsequently discuss, it entered the 1973 election with an established image as the party of the "silent Muslim majority."

The results of the 1973 election have shown that religion is indeed a significant factor in the political behavior of the Turkish electorate although it is not the most crucial factor for electoral success. The NSP emerged from the election as the third most important party. Despite its religious orientation, it was unable to displace the electoral strength of the two major parties. The 1973 election demonstrated that (a) religious interests, whether institutionally organized or not, do play a part in the voters' choices, (b) although a sector of the electorate may vote on religious lines, this does not suggest that such electoral behavior will necessarily lead to an obscurantist movement so much feared by the Kemalist secularists, and (c) religion can be a political issue and yet invite no cause for alarm. In short, the NSP has legitimized the political nature of religious interests.

In the absence of survey data, it is difficult to assess the role of religion in the NSP's success. The party polled 11.8 per cent of all the votes cast and sent 48 deputies to the Assembly.<sup>22</sup> A public opinion poll conducted by the daily Milliyet prior to the elections indicated that the majority of the potential NSP voters supported the

party because of religious concerns.<sup>23</sup> As Table 5 shows, 42.5 per cent of the respondents who said that they would cast their votes for the NSP pointed out religion as their major reason. In addition, 12.3 per cent of potential NSP

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TABLE 5  
Reasons for Support of the NSP among Potential NSP Voters,  
1973 Election

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percentage of Potential NSP Voters</u>
Because it is a religious party	42.5 %
Because the JP changed its goals and became a party of Freemasons	12.3
Because of Erbakan's leadership	9.4
Because of influences from close friends or relatives	6.6
Because it expresses the respondent's own political outlook	5.7
Because the JP has failed during its tenure in office	5.7
Because of rising prices	2.8
Don't know	0.9
Other	27.4

Source: Milliyet, October 9, 1973.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 because of several responses by one respondent.

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voters indicated that they supported the NSP because the JP had changed its goals and had become a party of Freemasons, the implication being, of course, that the JP was no longer

a Muslim's party. If we add the two groups, 54.8 per cent of all potential NSP voters preferred the party because of its religious outlook.

Yet, the NSP campaigned on a platform which emphasized a number of issues, only one of which was religion. A close examination of its program as well as the views of its leadership might provide us clues about the specific combination of religion with other issues and problems which influenced the voting behavior of a special sector of the electorate.

First of all, it is well to remember that the NSP is the heir of the defunct National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) which was established by the present leader of the NSP, Necmettin Erbakan, in early 1970.<sup>24</sup> At the time of its founding, the party leadership published a pamphlet which described the NOP's world-view. The major goal of the new party, it was stated, would be to "revive the moral qualities and the spiritual excellence dormant in the Turkish character so that Turkish society can regain peace, order, and social justice."<sup>25</sup> According to the NOP's world-view, the capitalist and the socialist systems were the same in nature, although they may seem different, since both were imperialist and sought to enslave other nations through imposing their own culture and material interests. Despite material advancement, both were also in a spiritual crisis. Although the Turkish nation had a glorious past and had stood strong against the West for many centuries, the

Western countries had been able to weaken the Ottoman Empire through the introduction of their own corrupt culture into Ottoman Turkey during the Tanzimat era rather than through military or scientific superiority. It was the cosmopolitanism of that period, which later gained legitimacy among the Turkish intellectuals, that was found to be responsible for the material and the spiritual decline of the Empire.<sup>26</sup>

The NOP's assessment of Turkey's domestic problems was accordingly divided into two categories, the material and the spiritual. In the material field, the NOP's criticisms centered around (a) the dependence of the Turkish economy on foreign markets and capital, (b) a low level of income per capita and an unjust distribution of wealth, and (c) a weak financial situation as a result of which Turkey had become dependent on foreign aid, had sought relief in unemployment rates through sending workers abroad, and consequently had lost its autonomy in foreign policy. In the spiritual field, it had fared no better: (a) it was the only nation in the world where the educational system failed to educate the youth for national ends, (b) its educational policy had centered around the repudiation of its own history, (c) it had adopted dwarfish goals in accepting the West's inadequate worldview which had plunged the Western countries themselves into a spiritual crisis, and (d) it was indifferent to foreign cultural influences which had penetrated into Turkish society

in the form of communism or cosmopolitanism.<sup>27</sup>

In the NOP's program, the party's goals were more specifically defined. The National Order Party, it was stated, would aim to modernize the country through both spiritual and technical development programs. In the technical field, these programs would emphasize creativity rather than imitation of Western technology. The development of an indigenous technology, coupled with rapid industrialization, would put Turkey among the ranks of the materially well-off countries. However, material well-being was seen as an end product of what the NOP considered to be a moral and just society: a society which is democratic where democracy is understood to be a system of government which develops the moral excellence of the individual and brings to power only those who possess such excellence; a political system which eliminates squander, bribery, and corruption through the screening of both the politicians and the public administrators on the basis of their moral character in addition to objective testing and qualifications; and a nation which has a historical consciousness, a unity, and faith in common national causes.<sup>28</sup>

What this combination of issues boiled down to was a party platform which merged implicit religious appeals with a program of cultural revival that rejected Western cultural influences and emphasized the recreation of what NOP leaders considered to be a "national moral

consciousness." According to the party's assessment of the world situation, Turkey would catch up with Western technology only if the superior culture and morality of the nation could be revived. The NOP's views were basically an extension of the 19th century Islamic movement which opposed the wholesale acceptance of both the culture and the technology of the West advocated by the Ottoman "Westerners" but rather, argued that Western influences be limited to the technical fields alone.<sup>29</sup>

It is difficult to assess what the NOP's impact was on Turkish voters since the party never got a chance to enter elections. It was closed down in 1972 by the Supreme Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) because of some printed material that a youth organization of the party had put out which violated a provision of the Political Parties Law (Siyasi Partiler Kanunu) forbidding the use of religion for political purposes.<sup>30</sup> In its place, a new party, the National Salvation Party, was founded in late 1972 under the de facto leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, although the formal leader was Süleyman Arif Emre. Within a short period, the party had established branches in 42 cities and approximately 300 counties.<sup>31</sup>

The NSP's world-view and program were basically a continuation of the defunct NOP's although the leadership was more careful this time to express its views within legal limits. Like the NOP's, the new party's assessment of the problems facing Turkish society centered around its

view of history. The major issue that the party leadership sought to politicize was the question of how and why what was once a powerful empire now ranked among the less developed countries of the world. According to Erbakan and a number of other leaders of the NSP, the answer to that question lay in understanding the relationship between Turkey and the West. The Turks had lost their power and influence because they had alienated themselves from their own cultural heritage while at the same time they had failed to industrialize. Their relationship to the West was, therefore, lopsided. They took from the West what they needed least, namely, Western culture, which was far more inferior to the Turkish. And they failed to borrow what they needed most, namely, Western technology. The NSP sees no positive relationship between the West's technical superiority and its cultural heritage. On the contrary, it views the present level of development of Western countries as accomplished despite their spiritual poverty.

According to Erbakan, Western countries have developed their technology at the expense of the Muslim world. At a conference which he gave to university students at Konya in 1970, Erbakan claimed that the West had borrowed, during the 14th and 15th centuries, the cumulative knowledge which Muslims had accumulated since the 7th century without, however, giving reference to Muslim sources. Although the Muslim scholars had been careful to document the sources on which they had built their discoveries, the Western

innovators gave no such acknowledgement. As a result, the West erroneously claimed to have been the originators of many scientific principles which Muslims had previously developed. More tragically, Western cultural imperialism spread this erroneous claim among the Muslims as the latter came to believe in the Westerners' version of technical innovation having originated in the West.<sup>32</sup>

The NSP places this idea of Western indebtedness to Muslim civilization within a more national context. According to Erbakan, it is the Turkish nation which has specifically contributed to the development of knowledge and science. In his view, the Turkish history is rich both in terms of military victories and scholarly activities. Although the Western countries momentarily may seem to use well what they have borrowed from the Turks, they have come to a technological standstill. What the West can no longer solve in science will be taken up and solved by the Turks. But the Turkish nation can accomplish this scientific superiority only if it can recreate its past. It cannot take the lead in the scientific arena if it continues to deny its history and adopt the inadequate world-view of the West.<sup>33</sup>

One major component of the NSP's understanding of culture, then, is the importance of history. In line with the theological emphasis that Muslim religion places on history, the NSP leadership considers the recreating of a

powerful Muslim nation one of its major goals. Such a goal is religiously significant since, in Muslim thought, the vision of a great civilization is closely connected with the religious mission of following the divine command to establish a just and powerful Muslim community. In contrast to secularist intellectuals who view the decline of the Ottoman Empire in terms of Islam's conservative role in Ottoman society, the NSP interprets such decline as a consequence of the foreign cultural influences which penetrated into Ottoman intellectual thought and gained prominence at the expense of Islamic philosophy and traditions. The superiority of the latter, in the NSP's view, had been responsible for the Ottoman Empire's periods of greatness. Hence, in order to regain world prominence, the Turkish nation would have to regain its consciousness as a Muslim society with a distinguished historical mission.

A second component of the NSP's concept of culture is the importance of the family and social life. The NSP vehemently criticizes the Western orientation of the Turkish elite in terms of social customs. This includes such details as criticisms of long hair, mini skirts, pornography (a sculpture of a naked woman erected in an Istanbul square was considered pornographic and dubbed "the sculpture of shame" by the NSP and was later lifted from the square by an order of the Interior Minister, an NSP member, during the RPP-NSP coalition government in 1974),<sup>34</sup> TV, movie, and theatre programs which are influenced by Western culture

rather than the national one,<sup>35</sup> wearing of shorts by women students during gym classes, tourist accommodations (the Minister of Commerce in 1974, who was an NSP member, refused to sign an application for governmental credit to build accommodations in touristic resorts on the grounds that although tourists bring in foreign exchange, they corrupt the morality of the Turkish people),<sup>36</sup> the youth's lack of respect for parents and older people, the elite "illness of imitating Western culture," lack of religious belief among the youth, the disappearance of traditional family life, and the mushrooming of nightclubs "where the youth are initiated into drinking and sexual liberty."<sup>37</sup> To the NSP, these changes in social norms and systems of value is one indication of the corruptness which has inflicted Turkish society as a result of Turkey's opening to the West.

Apart from historical-cultural questions, a second issue which the NSP deals with is the emphasis it gives to rapid industrialization. For the NSP, the question of industrialization is an important one because it relates to the party's general view of Turkish history: the Turkish nation has failed to industrialize, and therefore, has lost its place in history as a result of Western influences. Once Turkey reembraces its cultural past and develops the spiritual and moral qualities necessary for hard work, it will develop into a strong, industrial society. It is almost with a religious zeal that Erbakan and other party leaders repeatedly point out their commitment to

industrialization.<sup>38</sup> In the case of Erbakan, part of this zeal can be connected to his own personal history. He lived in Western Germany during the early 1950s while doing post-graduate work and was very much impressed with the way the Germans were rapidly industrializing despite their defeat in the Second World War. Erbakan attributed the ease with which the Germans had regained their strength to the discipline and the commitment of the German people. To him, the Germans demonstrated how important a nation's system of values were in its economic development.<sup>39</sup>

A third major issue which the NSP concerns itself with is social justice. The party leadership has repeatedly criticized the Justice Party governments for the latter's indifference to the plight of the poor and the under-privileged. According to Erbakan, the Anatolian people have been exploited by the big capitalists in Istanbul<sup>40</sup> during the JP's tenure in office as a result of which, in his words, "the rich have gotten richer while the poor have become poorer."<sup>41</sup> The NSP has been quite vocal in its criticisms of rising prices, unemployment rates, lack of adequate social security and medical insurance programs, misuse of governmental credit which works in favor of the well-to-do with social connections, high interest rates, an unjust taxation system, inadequate low income housing, and the unjust distribution of wealth. In addition, the NSP has argued in favor of more balanced regional development

programs which give priority to the least developed areas of the country, government aid to agriculture and to rural communities, as well as the protection of small traders and artisans.<sup>42</sup>

A final issue which completes the world-view of the party is the importance it gives to education. If Turkey is to regain its historical greatness and become an industrial country, it will have to adopt the right educational policy. For the NSP, a major reason behind Turkey's underdevelopment is the inadequate educational policy of Turkish governments. Such education has been generally geared to the imitation of both Western culture and technology. If Turkey is to modernize, Turkish governments will have to guarantee universal higher education (including, incidentally, higher education for women although the party specifies which occupations and what types of curricula are better suited to Muslim women)<sup>43</sup> which emphasizes national-historical traditions and systems of value, which is creative rather than imitative, and which offers competence in technical fields.<sup>44</sup> In the party's view, a good educational system can be established only when, as Erbakan puts it, "the government stops giving priority to building dance halls and stadiums" rather than universities and factories.<sup>45</sup>

As the above summary of the NSP's views indicates, surprisingly little attention is given to explicit discussions of secularism or of religion. In general, the

party confines its criticisms of past governments' religious policies to specific administrative problems concerning religious personnel, such as their salaries, their appointments, or the type of education which they receive.<sup>46</sup> In addition, the NSP calls for better religious education for all high school students,<sup>47</sup> more programs on religion on state radios and TV,<sup>48</sup> and a broader definition of religious freedom within a general plea for a more open and liberal society.<sup>49</sup> This suggests that the NSP bases its appeal not on religion alone but on a well-defined political philosophy far more thorough than those of previous parties which had sought to use religion for political ends.

The NSP calls this philosophy the "national point of view." In contrast to what the NSP labels as the "leftist point of view" of the Republican People's Party and the "liberal or the colorless point of view" of the Justice Party and other parties on the Right (the first, as Erbakan puts it, "sees the cause of all problems as the stomach" while the second "sees money as the solution to all problems"),<sup>50</sup> both of which are alien philosophies imported from the West, the NSP advocates a political outlook it considers indigenous and one which calls for a return to national-historical roots.<sup>51</sup>

In a sense, therefore, the NSP represents the third world view of modernization within the Turkish political spectrum. It sees the world with the same type of glasses that nationalist leaders in previously colonized countries

have viewed it: the lenses focus on a similar feeling of resentment against both the cultural and the material imperialism of the West. Since it rejects Westernization as a prerequisite for modernization, it also sees the latter process in quite unique terms. The party's views on that score represent a renewal of the 19th century search for an Islamic model of modernity. The NSP accepts the necessity to industrialize, but rejects the cultural forms which have accompanied economic development. Simply put, to be modern, in the NSP view, does not imply that Turkish women have to wear mini skirts or whatever the fashion centers in Paris, London, Rome, or New York have decided that they should wear.

The party's criticisms of the prevalent view of modernity held by the Turkish elite may, in the final analysis, represent the first serious attempt in the political history of the Turkish Republic to question the validity of that view. The Turkish elites, in general, have understood modernization to mean outward resemblances to Westerners. An Istanbulite is always proud to show the Hilton Hotel to a tourist and anger sets in when "inconsiderate" tourists take pictures of a man carrying three tons of load on his back. A Turkish traveller abroad gets equally angry about questions as to whether Turkish women still wear veils and blames the National Geographic photographer for having taken the picture of a veiled woman in some "remote" Anatolian town which is "unrepresentative" of

modern Turkey. Until the mid-1960s, similar out-of-focus definitions of modernity have blinded Turkish intellectuals and political elite alike to some of the major problems of development that the country faces. The issue of secularism, in this context, has served a definite function in Turkish politics. It has stood as a surrogate social problem which has clouded the much more real problems of class and status differences. For four decades after the establishment of the Republic, the political spectrum had been defined on the basis of whether or not one belonged to the secularist or the anti-secularist camps: the political reactionaries (gerici) were the religious fanatics and the political reformists (ilerici) were the Kemalist secularists. It was only after the mid-1960s that the concept of class conflict entered into such definitions.

### III.

To what type of voter does the National Salvation Party appeal? Given the party's world-view, one might guess that its greatest appeal would be to marginal groups in Turkish society who have been affected by modernization but failed to internalize the elite culture. Marginality, of course, can have two dimensions: an individual could be marginal in his society either socially or economically, although in modern society where status differences are closely connected with income, the two tend to converge.

Individuals, groups, or classes who feel "left out" of the major trends in their social or economic environment normally seek alternative channels of expressing themselves. Such a search often takes the form of embracing an ideology which stands as a challenge to the prevalent one. The Poujadist movement of 1954-1956 in France, for example, is a good example of marginal economic groups registering their discontent with a process of economic development which left them out of the picture. A similar type of a protest movement expressing itself in religious terms is an equally plausible alternative. Berger, for example, has argued that at least in the case of European countries, "church-related religiosity is strongest (and thus, at any rate, social-structural secularization least) on the margins of modern industrial society, both in terms of marginal classes (such as the remnants of old petty bourgeoisies) and marginal individuals (such as those eliminated from the work process."<sup>52</sup>

Mardin has argued that in the Turkish case, individuals who are unassimilated into the "modernist center" probably tend to support the National Salvation Party in greater numbers than other groups in society. The prototype of an NSP supporter, Mardin points out, is a small merchant or an artisan: a man of the bazaar. In his view, it is precisely these social and economic failures, with whom Kemalism has proved unable to cope, who turn to religion as an alternate reference point.<sup>53</sup>

However, the party's platform is wider, and so should, one expects, be its clientele. There is, indeed, a catch-all quality to the NSP's appeals: rapid industrial development for those who are on the side of modernity; an emphasis on traditional culture for those who are on the side of tradition; a welfare state for voters with Leftist leanings; free enterprise for the business-minded; promise of help to small tradesmen and big industrialists alike. In other words, Erbakan is not a Poujade, defending the interests of a well-defined occupational group. Nevertheless, his greatest appeal is probably to the same type of marginal groups. But I would suggest that such marginality is cultural rather than economic. It is among people for whom the culture of the "in group" is alien that the NSP is probably most successful. For therein lies its uniqueness. The NSP stands out not as an advocate of industrialization, a welfare state, etc. but as an advocate of a way of life which rejects the cultural orientation of the Kemalist elite.

One point about the NSP's social bases is certain. If it indeed receives much of its support from marginal economic groups, this is not evident from an examination of the background data of individuals who have chosen active political careers among the NSP ranks. As Table 6 shows, of the 48 NSP members who got elected to the Assembly following the 1973 election, the majority are professional men (10

lawyers, 4 doctors-pharmacists, 9 architects-engineers, 1 journalist, 1 contractor, 1 economist, and 1 accountant). Altogether, the professional category makes up 55.8 per cent of all the elected deputies of the NSP. People in the government service make up the next largest category (20.7 per cent), with 3 university teachers, 6 high school teachers, and 1 retired officer. Finally, there are 5 industrialists-merchants (10.4 per cent) and 6 men of religion (12.5 per cent). Of the 48 deputies, 40 (or 83 per cent) have higher education.<sup>54</sup>

TABLE 6

Professions of NSP Members Elected to the Assembly in 1973

<u>Profession</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Free Professions	27	55.8 %
Lawyer	10	20.8
Doctor-pharmacist	4	8.3
Architect-engineer	9	18.7
Journalist	1	2.0
Contractor	1	2.0
Economist	1	2.0
Accountant	1	2.0
Government Service	10	20.7
University teacher	3	6.2
High school teacher	6	12.5
Retired officer	1	2.0
Commerce and Industry	5	10.4
Clerics	6	12.5

Source: Milliyet, October 19, 1973.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

If we examine the background data of the 450 candidates who stood for election in 1973 on the NSP ticket, we get an equally heterogeneous picture. As Table 7 shows,

TABLE 7

## Professions of NSP Candidates for the 1973 Election

<u>Profession</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Free Professions	155	33.7 %
Engineers	64	14.2
Lawyers	31	6.8
Economists	21	4.6
Accountants- Financial Consultants	10	1.8
Technicians	17	3.7
Doctor-Pharmacists	12	2.6
Government Service	87	19.2
Teachers	40	8.8
Retired Officers	28	6.2
Bureaucrats	19	4.2
Industry and Commerce	96	21.2
Farmers	20	4.4
Clerics	13	2.8
Trade Unionists	10	1.8
Other	69	15.3

Source: Milli Gazete, September 10, 1973.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

of the 450, 155 or 33.7 per cent belonged to the free professions (64 engineers, 31 lawyers, 21 economists, 10 accountants-financial consultants, 17 technicians, and 12 doctor-pharmacists). The category for government service

accounted for 87 or 19.2 per cent of all candidates (40 teachers, 28 retired officers, and 19 bureaucrats). In addition, there were 96 people in industry and commerce (21.2 per cent), 20 farmers (4.4 per cent), 13 men of religion (2.8 per cent), and 10 trade unionists (1.8 per cent). As Table 8 shows, the age distribution of the 450 candidates was heavily biased in favor of younger people (62.8 per cent between the ages 30-45).

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TABLE 8

Age Distribution of NSP Candidates for the 1973 Election

<u>Age</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
30-35	117	26.0 %
35-40	100	18.4
40-45	83	18.4
45-50	66	14.7
50-55	63	14.0
55-60 & over	21	4.6

Source: Milli Gazete, September 10, 1973.

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

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What these background data show is a group of people who are, on the whole, well educated, professionally successful, presumably of middle or upper-middle class income, and relatively young. They do not fit the image of the stereotype religious fanatic. Neither do they fit the category of men who have been adversely affected by modernization and turned to religion as a means of registering their discontent.

Necmettin Erbakan's own personal background reflects the general characteristics of the NSP leadership that I have outlined above. He came from a notable provincial family. His father was a civil servant, a judge, who was an ardent supporter of Republicanism and an admirer of Atatürk. Necmettin was one of six children in the family. He was born in a Black Sea coastal town, Sinop, in 1926. He had his primary-school education in Trabzon and his high school education in Istanbul. He was an outstanding student and graduated from Istanbul Lycée with honors. He then went to the prestigious Technical University in Istanbul. He received his B.S. in 1948 and subsequently entered into a university career. He finished his Ph.D. within three years and, on the basis of an outstanding thesis, he was awarded a grant to continue his post-doctoral studies in West Germany. Upon his return, he became an associate professor in 1953 and a full professor in 1965.<sup>55</sup>

Erbakan's educational and professional life, therefore, is one of success. By all standards, he is a member of the Turkish elite. However, what distinguishes him and most members of the NSP leadership from the mainstream of elite culture in Turkey is his deep interest in religion. Even as a child, he fasted during all of Ramazan, went to the mosque regularly each Friday, and later, as a high school student, attended religious courses in a mosque.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, although there are only 6 clerics among the 48 members of the NSP in the Assembly, more detailed background information

indicates that of the 48, 19 or 39.4 per cent are directly involved in religion, either through family background (one member, for instance, is the son of a sheikh), or through education (quite a few are graduates of Imam-Hatip schools or of the Faculty of Divinity) or through membership in religious associations (such as associations for the promotion of Koran courses or the construction of mosques).<sup>57</sup>

The high percentage of professional people in the NSP's leadership ranks indicates a factor of major importance in Turkish politics: the emergence of a counter-culture. The long-standing dichotomy between elite and mass cultures is taking on a different dimension. The elite culture is no longer as monolithic as it was for the past four and a half decades since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. For the first time in the history of the Republic, there has emerged a counter-elite with a different cultural orientation than that of Kemalist Westernists. In other words, the elite-mass gap is being supplemented by an elite-elite gap. If the NSP should gain in power in the coming years, this gap between two different elite cultures will become more visible.

In the absence of survey data, it is more difficult to draw a picture of a typical NSP voter. The only surveys we have on the NSP's mass base are those conducted by the daily Milliyet prior to the 1973 general election and a survey of voters in Ankara prior to the 1975 Senate election

conducted by a team of researchers from the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University.<sup>58</sup> According to the findings of the latter, those who were 60 and over tended to support the NSP in greater numbers than other age groups.<sup>59</sup> This finding had earlier come up in the Milliyet survey as well. The NSP was labelled "the least preferable party" by the majority of the young people (21-30 category). Of those who supported this view among all age groups, 36.8 per cent indicated the NSP's exploitation of religion for political purposes as a reason for their opinion. In addition, 18.2 per cent thought that the NSP was a "reactionary party" and 15.1 per cent labelled it as "rightist and religious." It is interesting to note that only 5.7 per cent thought that it was an anti-secular party.<sup>60</sup>

The NSP's supporters also decline proportionately with higher educational levels. Among university graduates in Ankara, the percentage of potential NSP voters was 0.0. The only exception to this trend was between illiterates and primary school graduates. Although the percentage for both groups was higher than for others, the NSP had more supporters among primary school graduates than among illiterates.<sup>61</sup> This latter finding may again be an indication of the marginality factor that I have earlier discussed. The expectations of primary school graduates when compared with illiterates are probably higher, but, being at the lowest ladder of educational achievement, they are at the margin of social and economic success. The gap between

their expectations and their actual achievement is most likely translated into a form of protest through leaning back on religion.

As I have earlier pointed out, the Milliyet survey found that the majority of the potential NSP voters in 1973 supported the party because of its religious outlook. This finding was validated by the PSFAU survey which found that 88.9 per cent of potential NSP voters in Ankara prior to the 1975 Senate election preferred the NSP because of its "respect for religion."<sup>62</sup>

The Milliyet survey also found that of those who indicated their decision to vote for the NSP, 17.3 per cent cast their votes for a different party in the 1969 election. Among voters who were going to vote for the first time, only 6.2 per cent said that they would choose the NSP in 1973.<sup>63</sup> What this finding indicates is that the NSP has received a high proportion of its votes from former supporters of other parties. It is quite likely that the Justice Party was the major loser in this respect. As the heir to the Democratic Party of the 1946-60 period, the Justice Party was able to win over many former DP supporters during the early 1960s. Since some of these voters had preferred the DP because of religious concerns, it is likely that they switched over to the JP for the same reason. However, once an explicitly religious party, the NSP, was founded, their allegiance may have shifted

from the JP to the NSP. Indeed, as Table 5 indicates, at least 12.3 per cent of potential NSP supporters prior to the 1973 election were probably former JP supporters since as a reason for their support of the NSP, they indicated their disillusionment with the Justice Party's policies. The JP's votes declined to a low of 29.8 per cent in the 1973 election from 46.5 per cent in the previous election of 1969.<sup>64</sup> Among other factors, one major reason for this decline was the split of its votes among minor parties. No doubt, the NSP, along with the new Democratic Party,<sup>65</sup> were the two major beneficiaries of the lost JP votes since these two parties, which entered elections for the first time in 1973, together polled 23.7 per cent of all the votes cast.<sup>66</sup>

According to the Milliyet survey, the NSP's strength came mainly from rural areas. The survey projected that the NSP would receive 4.1 per cent of total votes in the 1973 election.<sup>67</sup> Whereas this percentage would go up to 4.8 in rural areas, the results of the survey showed that it would fall to 3.3 in the cities.<sup>68</sup>

As Table 9 shows, this finding was validated by the actual election results. 67.2 per cent of all the NSP votes came from rural areas whereas this percentage was 32.8 for urban centers. In an overwhelming majority of the 67 administrative districts in Turkey, the NSP polled most of its votes from the countryside. Only in five administrative districts-- İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana,

and Eskişehir-- did the NSP fare better in urban centers. The NSP's success in metropolitan Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir may be explained by the fact that these three cities, the most developed in all of Turkey, have a high proportion of rural migrants from whom the majority of the NSP's votes may have come. Indeed, the PSFAU survey, for example, showed that the NSP would receive the highest percentage of its votes in Ankara from squatter sites where rural migrants live en bloc. According to its findings, the NSP would receive 0.6 per cent of its votes from metropolitan Ankara (excluding squatter sites), whereas this percentage would go up to 4.9 in the squatter site areas.<sup>69</sup>

TABLE 9

Urban-Rural Division of NSP Votes by  
Administrative District, 1973 Election

<u>Administrative District</u>	<u>Per Cent of Votes Received</u>	<u>No. of Depu- ties Elected</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>
ALL OF TURKEY	11.8 %	48	67.2%	32.8%
Adana	8.2	1	48.5	51.3
Adiyaman	22.1	1	70.3	29.7
Afyon	16.4	1	64.8	35.3
Ağrı	14.8	1	86.1	12.3
Amasya	17.8	1	72.4	27.6
Ankara	9.3	2	34.0	74.0
Antalya	5.6	-	65.0	34.3
Artvin	7.9	-	89.1	12.3
Aydın	3.0	-	55.3	44.7
Balıkesir	8.6	1	77.9	22.1
Bilecik	14.4	-	78.8	20.0
Bingöl	25.5	1	87.5	12.5
Bitlis	11.3	-	62.1	37.7
Bolu	17.3	1	85.7	14.3
Burdur	9.3	-	72.4	27.9
Bursa	9.4	1	56.7	42.8
Çanakkale	5.5	-	83.5	19.2
Çankırı	16.3	-	82.1	17.8

<u>Administrative District</u>	<u>Per Cent of Votes Received</u>	<u>No. of Deputies Elected</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>
Çorum	21.7 %	2	76.6%	23.3%
Denizli	5.3	-	72.2	27.4
Diyarbakır	18.5	1	64.4	35.3
Edirne	2.2	-	73.2	26.5
Elazığ	27.8	2	68.2	31.4
Erzincan	16.1	-	75.1	25.5
Erzurum	29.5	3	74.2	25.7
Eskişehir	9.2	-	43.6	56.3
Gaziantep	11.6	1	54.0	45.8
Giresun	8.7	-	82.1	17.9
Gümüşhane	24.9	1	92.2	7.6
Hakkari	2.1	-	78.0	22.0
Hatay	6.4	-	64.8	35.1
Isparta	7.1	-	55.6	48.5
İçel	2.8	-	57.2	43.0
İstanbul	8.4	3	22.9	77.0
İzmir	4.2	-	46.3	55.2
Kars	7.7	1	85.7	14.3
Kastamonu	6.0	-	80.0	20.0
Kayseri	16.5	1	53.3	46.7
Kırklareli	2.6	-	73.1	26.6
Kırşehir	13.8	-	78.9	21.1
Kocaeli	18.1	1	61.8	38.0
Konya	16.5	3	53.0	42.6
Kütahya	14.3	-	71.7	28.2
Malatya	19.9	1	58.8	41.9
Manisa	9.3	1	72.1	27.8
Kahraman Maraş	26.7	2	68.2	31.8
Mardin	12.1	1	80.6	19.7
Muğla	3.6	-	82.0	18.0
Muş	14.7	1	85.4	14.4
Nevşehir	18.4	1	75.2	24.8
Niğde	11.4	-	76.0	24.0
Ordu	7.3	-	76.9	23.0
Rize	21.9	1	81.0	19.0
Sakarya	18.2	1	68.0	31.5
Samsun	13.4	1	76.8	23.6
Siirt	9.5	-	53.9	46.2
Sinop	7.7	-	87.4	12.4
Sivas	25.7	3	70.0	28.7
Tekirdağ	3.3	-	62.9	36.6
Tokat	18.2	1	72.8	26.0
Trabzon	15.1	1	89.3	10.7
Tunceli	2.6	-	70.8	29.3
Urfa	17.6	1	56.4	42.8
Uşak	6.7	-	66.4	34.5
Van	7.0	-	79.3	22.0
Yozgat	21.5	1	87.3	12.6
Zonguldak	8.2	1	64.0	35.8

Compiled from: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü,

14 Ekim 1973 Milletvekili Seçimi Sonuçları (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1974).

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

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The marginality factor that I have earlier discussed may also have something to do with the NSP's success in big metropolitan centers. Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and Adana score highest in the development index that the State Institute of Planning (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) has put out. Eskişehir occupies the eight place and has had a high rate of industrialization in recent years.<sup>70</sup> Being the most developed industrial centers, they contain large numbers of people who have been adversely affected by industrialization, such as small traders and artisans. In Istanbul, for example, the NSP received the highest percentage of its votes from Beykoz, Eminönü, Eyüp, and Fatih in the 1973 election.<sup>71</sup> Three out of four of these electoral districts-- Eminönü, Eyüp, and Fatih-- differ from others in the city in their cultural and economic traditionalism. Eminönü is a business district but it is more a business center of small traders and artisans (the famous Grand Bazaar is located here) than big industries. Eyüp and Fatih, on the other hand, are the most religiously conservative areas in the city. All three stand out as remnants of Ottoman Istanbul in terms of their physical surroundings. Beykoz, on the other hand, is an industrial center. In all four, the number of marginal people, marginal in terms of

either their cultural outlook or economic activity or both, is probably quite high.

The appeal of the NSP to rural voters is also evident in the low degree of urbanization of the first ten administrative districts where the NSP was most successful. As Table 10 indicates, of the ten, none have a higher level of urbanization than that of Turkey as a whole and only one approximates the average for all of Turkey. Similarly, the rate of urbanization in 7 out of 10 is slower than the average rate for the whole country.

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TABLE 10

The Ten Administrative Districts where the NSP Received the Highest Percentage of its Votes in the 1973 Election, by Degree and Rate of Urbanization

<u>Administrative District</u>	<u>Degree of Urbanization</u>	<u>Rate of Urbanization</u>
ALL OF TURKEY	31.4	2.53
Erzurum	18.2	1.86
Elazığ	31.4	4.52
Kahraman Maraş	17.8	0.85
Sivas	15.3	1.17
Bingöl	7.8	2.01
Gümüşhane	9.0	2.98
Adiyaman	13.6	1.93
Rize	14.8	5.82
Çorum	13.1	0.0
Yozgat	9.1	0.55

Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Türkiye'de İller İtibariyle Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Endeksi (1963-1967) (Ankara, 1970), pp. 79-81.

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The NSP's relatively greater appeal to rural voters may be explained by the cultural traditionalism of the Turkish countryside. If we can assume that the NSP's appeal to voters in general is mainly religious, then we can also assume that the party will have a stronger base in rural areas than in urban since rural Turkey is markedly more traditional than the urban. As I have pointed out in earlier chapters, Turkish peasants have been much slower than urban residents in accepting the idea of a secular state, especially one which controls religious activity. Peasant communities are tradition-bound, and for Turkish peasants, much of tradition stems from Islam. Hence, they would be more amenable to vote for a party, such as the NSP, which has established a religious image for itself and which promises, at least implicitly, to guide Turkish society along Islamic principles.

As Table 11 shows, the regional distribution of the NSP votes in the 1973 election displays marked differences as one moves from more to less developed areas of the country. In both the Mediterranean and the Aegean regions, which are among the most developed areas of Turkey, the NSP did fairly poorly. In the Mediterranean region, the NSP received enough votes to send a deputy to the National Assembly from only one out of the six administrative districts in the region. In the Aegean, it could similarly muster enough strength only in one administrative district out of 7. The exception is the Marmara region, which is also highly

developed, where the NSP did fairly well.

TABLE 11

The Regional Strength of the NSP in the 1973 Election, by  
Number of Deputies Elected

<u>Region</u>	<u>No. of Administrative Districts in the Region</u>	<u>Administrative Districts which Sent an NSP Deputy to the Assembly</u>	<u>No. of NSP Deputies Elected</u>
Marmara	10	İstanbul, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Balıkesir, Bursa	7
Black Sea	10	Zonguldak, Samsun, Bolu, Trabzon, Rize	5
East Anatolia	20	Kars, Ağrı, Bingöl, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Elazığ, Erzurum, Gümüşhane, Adıyaman, Maraş, Malatya, Urfa, Muş	18
Mediterranean	6	Adana	1
Central Anatolia	14	Ankara, Konya, Sivas, Yozgat, Nevşehir, Afyon, Amasya, Çorum, Kayseri, Tokat	16
Aegean	7	Manisa	1

Compiled from: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü,  
14 Ekim 1973 Milletvekili Seçimi Sonuçları (Ankara: Baş-  
bakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1974).

As Frey found in his survey of rural Turks, regional variations in religiosity correspond to levels of development. The more developed regions consistently ranked lower in terms of the four indices that Frey used: religious knowledge, religious ritualism, religious saliency (the importance of religion in shaping the individual's value system), and religious strictness. Furthermore, the less developed regions ranked highest with respect to religious saliency and strictness, the two most extreme manifestations of religiosity among the four indices.<sup>72</sup> Since the majority of the NSP voters seem to support the party because of its religious outlook, the NSP's relative failure in the more developed regions of Turkey can be explained by the lower levels of religiosity of voters in these areas.

In contrast to the Mediterranean and the Aegean regions, the NSP's major strongholds were the Central and Eastern Anatolian regions. In the Central, 16 NSP members were elected to the Assembly from 10 out of 14 administrative districts in the region. In the Eastern, it did even better with 18 deputies elected from 14 out of 20 districts. Indeed, the Eastern Anatolian region stands out as an area where the NSP is quite strong. The region's share of the total votes which the party received was 28.7 per cent.<sup>73</sup> As Table 12 shows, of the 10 administrative districts in all of Turkey which rank highest in terms of NSP votes, 6 are located in Eastern Anatolian,

3 in Central Anatolian, and 1 in the Black Sea regions.

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TABLE 12

The Ten Administrative Districts where the NSP Received the Highest Percentage of its Votes, 1973 Election

<u>Administrative District</u>	<u>Per cent of Votes Received</u>	<u>Region where the District is Located</u>
Erzurum	29.5%	East Anatolia
Elazığ	27.8	East Anatolia
Kahraman Maraş	26.7	East Anatolia
Sivas	25.7	Central Anatolia
Bingöl	25.5	East Anatolia
Gümüşhane	24.9	East Anatolia
Adıyaman	22.1	East Anatolia
Rize	21.9	Black Sea
Çorum	21.7	Central Anatolia
Yozgat	21.5	Central Anatolia

Compiled from: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 14 Ekim 1973 Milletvekili Seçimi Sonuçları (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1974).

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As Table 13 shows, the first ten administrative districts where the NSP received the highest percentage of its votes rank quite low in terms of their level of development. None had a higher level of development in 1967 than the country's over-all average. Of the ten, one (Bingöl) ranked lowest among all the 67 administrative districts in Turkey. Seven out of the ten were among the twenty least developed districts in the country. Only one of the ten (Elazığ) had a rank order of 18 out of 67. As Table 14 shows, however, the rate of development of these ten administrative districts was markedly higher than their

level of development. Five out of the ten had higher rates of development than the average rate for all of Turkey. And two out of the ten (Elazığ and Rize) ranked second and third, respectively, in terms of their development rate among all the 67 districts.

TABLE 13

Level of Development of the Ten Administrative Districts where the NSP Received the Highest Percentage of its Votes, 1973 Election

<u>Administrative District</u>	<u>Index of Development,</u> 1967	<u>Rank Order</u>
ALL OF TURKEY	138	
Erzurum	76	47/67
Elazığ	116	18/67
Kahraman Maraş	66	54/67
Sivas	79	43/67
Bingöl	35	67/67
Gümüşhane	50	60/67
Adiyaman	49	62/67
Rize	94	32/67
Çorum	71	50/67
Yozgat	57	57/67

Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Türkiye'de İller İtibariyle Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Endeksi (1963-1967) (Ankara, 1970), pp. 39b-40.

According to the pattern that emerges from these tables, the NSP has received the highest percentage of its votes in 1973 from the relatively less developed administrative districts of the country, most of which are located in the Eastern Anatolian region. However, although their levels of development are low, half of these districts have high

TABLE 14

Rate of Development of the Ten Administrative Districts  
where the NSP Received the Highest Percentage of its Votes,  
1973 Election

<u>Administrative District</u>	<u>Rate of Development</u> 1967	<u>Rank Order</u>
Elazığ	161	2/67
Rize	155	3/67
Çorum	141	18/67
Kahraman Maraş	140	21/67
Sivas	139	24/67
ALL OF TURKEY	138	
Erzurum	137	30/67
Yozgat	137	31/67
Gümüşhane	130	43/67
Adıyaman	129	51/67
Bingöl	126	54/67

Source: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Türkiye'de İller İtibariyle Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Endeksi (1963-1967) (Ankara, 1970), pp. 49-51.

rates of development. Moreover, as Table 10 indicates, most of them have low levels of urbanization. Only one (Elazığ) has the same level of urbanization as the average level for the whole country. However, the rate of urbanization in three (Elazığ, Gümüşhane, and Rize) out of the ten is well above the average rate for Turkey. In other words, the NSP's strength is greater in the less developed and less urban administrative districts of Turkey. But, some of these districts, despite their low levels of development and urbanization at present, display a marked

potential for change. Quite a few are among the most rapidly developing areas of the country.

What these findings indicate is that a religious party, such as the NSP, appeals most to either very traditional or to rapidly changing communities. In traditional areas, such as Eastern Anatolia, religion probably functions to reinforce traditional social or economic relationships. Eastern Anatolia is a region where landlords (ağa) and religious sheikhs are very powerful in local communities and where their political preferences are often reflected among the mass voters during elections.<sup>74</sup> In the case of the NSP, it is reasonable to assume that much of its support in Eastern Anatolia can be connected to what I shall call "dependency voting," namely, voting on the basis of not individual choice but rather, on the basis of pressure from a local patron, a religious leader, or the like.

The defunct National Order Party, for example, established local party units through forming links with influential religious leaders in local communities. To recruit such leaders, the NOP formed recruitment committees who visited individuals of known religious influence in each locality. Since many of these individuals, however, belonged to different sects, the committee members would pretend that they were followers or sympathizers of whatever sect the person in question belonged. The NOP also took care to include imams, müezzins, and other personnel of local mosques as ad hoc members of the recruitment

committees.<sup>75</sup> Since the National Salvation Party's leadership is the same as the defunct NOP's, it is probable that similar methods for recruiting party members or leaders as well as for voter mobilization were used by the NSP during the 1973 election.

If we look at the background data of the NSP members elected to the Assembly from Eastern Anatolia, a number of individuals stand out as prominent religious leaders or spokesmen of religious causes. Hasan Buz of Elazığ, for example, is a graduate of the Higher Institute of Islam. He worked for the Presidency of Religious Affairs and has served as a vice-müftü of Elazığ. Yanya Akdağ of Erzurum has been an active member of Associations for the Founding of Koran Courses and of the Associations for the Building of Mosques. Mehmet Bozgeyik of Gaziantep is a student at the Higher Institute of Islam. Mehmet Pamuk of Kahraman Maraş was a preacher (vaiz) in Malatya and is a graduate of the Higher Institute of Islam. Fehim Adak of Mardin has been a member of Associations for the Building of Mosques and Associations for the Spreading of Knowledge (ilim, in this context, religious knowledge). Ömer Lütfi Zararsız of Yozgat is a graduate of İmam-Hatip schools. He was a preacher (vaiz) in Niğde at the time he stood for election and has served as a member of several religious associations. Finally, Abdurrahman Ünsal of Adıyaman is the son of sheikh Mehmet Ünsal.<sup>76</sup> No doubt, the influence of these people in their local communities as religious leaders was largely

responsible for their electoral success.

A second reason for the strength of the NSP in Eastern Anatolia may be found in the changing pattern of party strengths in this region. During the 1950s, Eastern Anatolia did not significantly deviate from other regions in terms of the strength of the two-party vote. The two major parties together received close to 90 per cent of the total vote, although the RPP's strength in this region was considerably higher than the DP's. After 1960, however, the two-party strength in Eastern Anatolia began to decline. The major beneficiaries of this decline have been the minor parties and the independent candidates.<sup>77</sup> In the 1973 election, for example, the minor parties and the independent candidates received the highest percentage of their total votes from Eastern Anatolia while the two major parties did relatively less well in this region than in the country's other provinces. Once again, this change in voting patterns in Eastern Anatolia may be explained by the fact that individuals of social, economic, or religious standing, rather than party platforms, play a more important role in elections in this area. Hence, one frequent outcome of elections in this region is the high incidence of cross-party voting from one election to the next as a result of changes in the party preferences of influential families, tribal or religious leaders.<sup>78</sup>

In rapidly developing areas, on the other hand, voting on religious basis may be a manifestation of a protest

against change. A religious party such as the NSP is likely to appeal to individuals who are psychologically, socially, or economically uncomfortable with the breaking down of traditional relationships and systems of value. Although the NSP advocates rapid industrialization which, many of its supporters may feel, is indeed inevitable, it promises to accomplish this within a more traditional social and cultural setting. In other words, it promises to ease the psychological and social burdens of industrialization by keeping stable the social and cultural aspects of change.

In his study of religious associations in Turkey, Ahmet Yücekök has come up with a similar observation about the role of religion in Turkish society. He has found that pressure group activity is more pronounced, as would be expected, in the relatively more developed areas of the country. The ratio of religious associations to the total number of interest groups is, however, also greater in the more developed regions. This can be explained, he has argued, by the fact that religion plays a dual role in Turkish society. In the less developed areas, it functions to defend the interests of dominant social or economic groups. In the more developed regions, on the other hand, it functions as a protest movement of individuals or groups who have been ill-affected by rapid development. In either case, the religious manifestation of support or protest against the status quo is conservative in nature.<sup>79</sup>

The NSP's emergence as the third major party in the 1973 election, which has enabled it to assume power as a partner in two different coalition governments, indicates that religion is indeed a salient factor in the political behavior of a sector of the Turkish electorate. However, the party's limited success in the elections when compared with the two major parties also indicates that religion, by itself, is not a sufficient factor for electoral mobilization. Although it is true that the NSP's program contains a number of issues other than religion, its public image as a religious party probably limits its appeal to individuals who are either discontent with Kemalist secularism because of their high sense of religiosity or who have been adversely affected by modernization and turned to religion as a means of political protest.

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- (2) See Article 19 in Topkaya, p. 22.
- (3) See Geoffrey L. Lewis, "Islam in Politics: Turkey," The Muslim World, Vol. LVI (October, 1966), No. 4, pp. 235-36.
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- (7) See Milliyet, May 24, 1966.
- (8) See Nermin Abadan, Anayasa Hukuku ve Siyasi Bilimler Açısından 1965 Seçimlerinin Tahlihi (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1966), p. 143.
- (9) Milliyet, August 9, 1965.
- (10) Ibid.
- (11) Abadan, Table 4, p. 253. A minor party, the Republican Peasant Nationalist Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi), also politicized the religious issue in the 1965 election. However, it failed to achieve any notable success in terms of the votes it received. According to Abadan's content analysis, the RPNP used the religious issue as a major theme of campaign speeches on the state radio more frequently (6 times) than either the JP or

any other party. See Ibid.

(12) See Milliyet, June 1, 1966.

(13) See his speech in the JP's Konya Congress in 1966 in Süleyman Demirel, Kongre Konuşmaları (Ankara, 1967), p. 14.

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(33) Text of Erbakan's speech in Erzurum. See Milli Gazete, September 9, 1973.

(34) See Milli Gazete, March 20, 1974.

(35) Erbakan pointed out in a campaign speech in Istanbul that theatres propagated corrupt social norms. "An actor who plays the role of an unfaithful husband," he complained, "gets a medal for distinguished acting." "When we assume power," he went on, "we will also have theatres but our productions will not be Oedipus or Fiddler on the Roof but 'The Seige of Istanbul by Fatih Sultan Mehmet.'" See Milliyet, October 1, 1973.

(36) See Milli Gazete, March 24, 1974.

(37) For repeated statements of NSP leaders on these cultural and social issues, see Milli Gazete, September 9, 1973; August 15, 1973; August 2, 1973; July 18, 1973; September 30, 1973; October 3, 1973; March 15, 1974; April 1, 1974; April 5, 1974; and Milliyet, September 29, 1973; October 19, 1973; November 12, 1973.

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(60) Milliyet, October 9, 1973.

(61) Milliyet, September 29, 1975, Table 3, p. 6.

(62) See Table 2 in Milliyet, September 30, 1975, p. 6.

(63) Milliyet, October 9, 1973.

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(65) Not to be confused with the Democratic Party of the 1946-60 era. The new Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti) was established in 1971 as a result of a factional split from the ranks of the Justice Party.

(66) See 14 Ekim 1973 Milletvekili Seçimi Sonuçları, p. 6.

(67) This projection turned out to be way out of line with the actual percentage of votes (11.8 per cent) that the NSP received in 1973.

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## CHAPTER VI

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGION AND POLITICAL  
DEVELOPMENT: BUDDHISM AND POLITICS IN SRI LANKA

## I.

In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to trace the interaction between religion and politics during the transition of Turkish society from an Islamic empire into a Westernized nation-state. In doing so, I have tried to emphasize that modernity and tradition often go hand in hand and that religiously-inspired forms of political behavior represent one, among many, responses of traditional communities to problems of modernization. Although the saliency of religion in social and political life is often seen as a threat to the modernization process by nationalist elites, I have also argued that religion can be an instrumental factor in political development insofar as it contributes to the mobilization of the countryside.

The ever present gap between the city and the country in terms of conflicting social arrangements and systems of value, which is discernible even in the highly developed industrial countries of the West, becomes a salient factor of politics in societies which have recently adopted competitive political systems. Traditional appeals reassert themselves in political life with the entry of the rural masses into the electoral process. Confronted with opposition parties willing to politicize parochial demands in order to gain votes, the ruling modernizing elite are

faced with the dilemma of either making a compromise of their initial goals or continuing to pursue their former policies and as a result, risk a loss of elections. In either case, earlier expectations that modernization can only follow a forward course prove to be too optimistic. The conservatism of the countryside towards processes of cultural change works in favor of tradition with the extension of the suffrage to rural masses.

The role of religion in political processes is one aspect of this amalgam of modernity and tradition. Although during the initial phases of the modernization process, there is a discernible trend towards a greater secularization of social and political life at the national level, a latent reaction to the neglect of traditional value systems becomes manifest as soon as modernization brings with it mass participation in politics. The assertion of religiously-based political alignments is one response of newly politicized masses to the enforcement, by the modernizing elite, of an alien culture on traditional societies. By an alien culture, I refer to that brought about by the modernization process itself. Modernization involves not only economic change but also a transformation of value systems, of social norms, of accepted forms of behavior and of living styles. All of these changes represent an alternative cultural pattern to that of traditional communities. The rejection of this imposed cultural change often takes the form of political demands for greater

recognition of religious traditions or of a community's ethnic/religious distinctiveness.

In this chapter, I shall attempt to discuss Sri Lanka's political development in terms of the role religion played in it in order to bring a comparative perspective to my study of the problem within the Turkish context. The advantages of including such a comparative chapter are obvious: it demonstrates that Turkey shares at least one, if not more, of the problems of modernization with another country also undergoing rapid modernization; it imbues generalizations with greater validity; and it helps detach the researcher from the specific cultural biases that he may have acquired during the course of studying one particular cultural milieu.

Lest Sri Lanka and Turkey seem unlikely candidates for a comparative analysis from either a spatial or a historical perspective, it might be useful to point out, at the outset, the logic of comparison in this chapter. To begin with, any developing country may be compared with any other in terms of the common characteristics and problems that they share. Chief among them are problems of social and economic justice, insufficient economic productivity and technical know-how and, last but not least, problems of national integration, political legitimacy, authority, and participation. At this general level of comparison, Sri Lanka and Turkey have much in common with other developing countries. However, what differentiates

both from most of the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is that they are among the very few which have been able to sustain democratic institutions and processes for a considerable period of time,<sup>1</sup> although not without some serious setbacks.

At a more specific level, a comparison of Sri Lanka and Turkey reveals some striking similarities as well as differences. The former include:

(1) Historically, there has been a distinct elite-mass cleavage in both countries with highly significant political consequences. One aspect of this cleavage has been the separation between the official, orthodox religion of the urban centers on the one hand, and the folk religion of the villages on the other.

(2) In both countries, this gap between elite and mass cultures widened under the impact of modernization. The nationalist leaders in Sri Lanka and Turkey interpreted modernization largely in terms of Westernization. In Turkey, the rigid implementation of secularism by the Kemalist elite during the one-party period was a major factor in the disenchantment of the peasantry with the modernization program of the ruling Republican People's Party. In Sri Lanka, the nationalist leadership consciously sought to underplay communal and religious differences by ignoring the demands of the Buddhist majority for a religious/cultural revival which led to a growing feeling of resentment among the rural strata. In both cases, the

aspirations of the modernizing elite excluded any promotion of folk culture and traditions.

(3) With the transition to competitive politics in both Turkey and Sri Lanka, elite-mass differences became politicized along distinctly religious lines. In both countries, the opposition parties were led by former members of the nationalist elite who succeeded in mobilizing the rural strata through being attentive to the cultural and economic demands of the countryside.

(4) As a result, both countries have experienced religious conflict. This has been more pronounced and dramatic in the case of Sri Lanka where the struggle is between two different ethnic and religious communities: the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority and the Tamil-Hindu minority. In contrast, upheavals of a religious nature have been rather sporadic in Turkey and have mostly occurred during the early years of the Republic.

On the other hand, there are also some striking differences between the two countries. Briefly, these include the following:

(1) Different patterns of historical development. The Turkish Republic was established on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and inherited a long tradition of self-rule from its past. In marked contrast, Sri Lanka has been a colony for much of its modern history. From the beginning of the 15th century until the middle of the 20th, the people of Sri Lanka have been under the continuous occupation and

control of first the Portuguese, then the Dutch, and finally, the British. This difference in historical legacy is important in understanding the impact of religion on the political development of the two countries. In Sri Lanka, religious revivalism to a large extent was in response to past colonial administrations at whose hands the indigenous culture had suffered. In the Turkish Republic, on the other hand, the reassertion of religious values in politics was a result of a reaction by the mass electorate to the rigid interpretation of secularism by the Kemalist elite who deliberately had sought to minimize the historical role of Islam in Turkish society.

(2) Different socio-cultural settings. Sri Lanka is a plural society with distinct sub-national communities along ethnic, religious, and linguistic lines. The majority of Sri Lanka's people are Sinhalese most of whom are Buddhist and speak Sinhalese. The largest minority group are the Tamils who are predominantly Hindus and speak Tamil. There are also a number of smaller minority groups such as the Moors and the Burghers. In addition, there are differences between sub-groups within each community. For example, there is a discernible cultural cleavage and mutual feelings of mistrust between the up-country and the low-country Sinhalese. Similar distinctions exist between the Ceylon and Indian Tamils and Ceylon and Indian Moors.

Compared with Sri Lanka, Turkey has a more homogeneous population, at least along religious lines. The majority

of the Turks are Sunni Muslims but there is also a sizable number of Muslims belonging to the Alevi sect, although their numbers are unknown. Ethnically, the majority of the Turkish people are Turks, the largest minority being the Kurds of the Eastern and the Southeastern regions. In contrast to periodic outbursts of communal violence in Sri Lanka, the Turkish government has so far been better able to contain communal conflicts, although Kurdish uprisings posed a serious problem to the Kemalist regime in the formative years of the Republic.

The cultural heritage of both countries is intimately tied with their geographical location as well as their religious traditions. From that point of view, Sri Lanka's society reveals important differences from the Turkish-- differences of philosophy, literature, music, architecture, life style, social structure (e.g., the caste system), to name a few. The logic of comparison in this chapter, therefore, is neither spatial nor historical but topical and systematic: it rests on the problem to be investigated.

## II.

To compare the nature of the major religions in Turkey and Sri Lanka is a good starting point in revealing the differences of historical experience in the two countries. As I have discussed in Chapter II, Islam is a political religion which emphasizes the importance of building an Islamic community on the bases of a divine design. It is

also an "organic religion," to follow Smith's classification,<sup>2</sup> which theoretically lacks an organized church that has internal autonomy and a separate identity from the rest of society. In contrast, Buddhism is apolitical since theologically history has no relevance for the Buddhist in his individual salvation. At the same time, it is a "church religion" with an organized body of Buddhist monks within the powerful Sangha.

The Buddhists of Sri Lanka, who make up about 65 per cent of the total population,<sup>3</sup> belong to the Theravada sect (The Way of the Elders), which is more orthodox in its interpretation of doctrine than Mahayana Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism spread to Sri Lanka and was accepted as a state religion around the 3rd century B. C.<sup>4</sup> It is today the dominant sect, in addition to Sri Lanka, among the Buddhists of Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. Mahayana Buddhism, on the other hand, has followers in Nepal, Sikkim, China, Korea, and Japan.<sup>5</sup>

According to Theravada Buddhism, man's relationship to the world is understood in terms of a cyclical pattern of life. The individual is caught up in "a wheel of rebirth," the Samsara, and experiences a series of births and rebirths throughout his existence. The moral principle guiding these different levels of existence is explained by the concept of karma which determines an individual's rewards and punishments in his future existences on the basis of his former performance. But whether the individual is rewarded

or punished in his next existence makes little difference in his salvation since in either case, his actions merely lead him to another life. Because life is equated with suffering in Buddhist philosophy, the tragedy of the individual lies in the inattainability of death. He can achieve happiness only through total extinction. However, as long as his actions, whether morally good or bad, have consequences, they will lead him not to the happy state of death but merely to another life.<sup>6</sup>

The aim of the Buddhist, therefore, is to eliminate all action which leads to consequences. Consequential acts stem from individual's desires.<sup>7</sup> Since everything in the world is unreal and since existence itself has no meaning but only involves suffering, the individual's aim should be to destroy the causes of his suffering. Suffering is due to the individual's ego and his false search for the satisfaction of his desires. To eliminate suffering, therefore, man has to extinguish his desires and destroy his ego, and this is possible only through following the right course of conduct.<sup>8</sup>

To achieve a release from all desire, the individual should follow an "Eightfold Path." Buddhist teaching spells out in detail eight correct means of acting in this world. They involve the individual's mastery over his mind and body: he should have right views, right motives, right speech, right conduct, right pursuits, right efforts, right mindfulness, and right concentration. And rightness is

further defined in terms of abstention from killing, lying, stealing, sensuality, and intoxicating drugs or beverages. The individual who follows the eightfold path and these five moral rules will find the "Middle Way," the happy medium between the extremes of suffering and pleasure. More importantly, he will reach the state of Nirvana, which is the extinction of all desires and therefore of life, the release from the wheel of rebirth, the final state of non-existence.<sup>9</sup>

In contrast to Islam, there is no philosophy of history in Buddhism. The search for the attainment of Nirvana is purely individualistic without any social or political overtones. The worldly orientation of Islam is totally absent in Buddhism. On the contrary, as Spiro points out, Buddhism is a religion of otherworldly asceticism.<sup>10</sup> Since worldly activity brings only suffering, and since everything in the world is in a state of impermanence (i.e., in a continuous cycle of being created and recreated), the individual's salvation rests in the recognition that the world is meaningless and that escape from the world and from suffering can come about through the renunciation of reality and the search for nothingness.<sup>11</sup> The individual is alone in this attempt to renounce the world. He cannot look for direction to the community of the faithful, as a Muslim can, nor appeal to God, since Buddhism rejects the concept of an omnipotent being. It is not through prayers, or ceremonies, but through the perfection of his own mind by following the

eightfold path that man will lead himself to salvation.<sup>12</sup> Social relationships or political arrangements have no relevance whatsoever to this lonely struggle. History is not any more relevant either since it has no destiny to be valued. It moves in no meaningful direction. Nor should the individual attempt to change its course since there is neither any divine command to do so, as there is in Islam, nor anything to be gained from it.<sup>13</sup>

Because the pursuit of individual salvation in Buddhism requires the renunciation of the world, it was reserved only for a religious elite who could lead a life of contemplation in a monastic order. The Buddhist monastery, the Sangha, became a powerful organization of the devotee. For the laity, the adherence to the five moral rules (abstention from killing, stealing, lying, sensuality, and intoxicating drugs or beverages) as well as a life of merit-making through support of the monastic order were accepted as sufficient for salvation, if not from the cycle of rebirths, at least from punishments in future lives. By the 3rd century B. C., there had already developed a gap between the orthodox Buddhism of the monks and the folk religion of the laity. The latter combined some of the orthodox teachings of the Buddha with a belief in gods, demons, magic, and a cult of worship of both the Buddha himself and the lesser gods.<sup>14</sup> This religious syncretism was encouraged by the orthodoxy so that the needs of the laity could be met with a secondary, and less demanding, "religion of the

masses."<sup>15</sup>

In Sri Lanka, the diversion between orthodox Buddhism and folk religion had interesting social consequences. The extreme individualistic orientation of Buddhism was ill-suited to the communal needs of the Sinhalese villagers. The Buddhist religion had no rituals and therefore offered no opportunities for congregational activities. Moreover, its atheistic orientation deprived it from one of the most appealing aspects of any religion to mass imagination, namely, the promise of help from an all-powerful deity in daily living. Hence, the gap created by the asocial and ascetic nature of Buddhism was filled by the folk religion of the masses with its chain of gods and demons from whom the villagers could ask assistance for better crops, curing of diseases, elimination of famines, fertility, etc. It also performed a social function of bringing the community together during rituals and ceremonies.<sup>16</sup>

The Buddhist orthodoxy allowed the development of this second religion partially because it did not emerge as an alternative to Buddhism but rather existed side by side with it, the two performing different functions in Sinhalese society. Whereas Buddhism concerned itself with the individual's preparation for a next life, magical-animism provided him with direction in mundane affairs. But there was a second, and more important, reason for the orthodoxy's tolerance of folk religion. The religious elite very early recognized that mass support of the Sangha in the form of

providing material assistance to hermit monks involved in their own individual salvation would be unlikely to come unless the masses were offered tangible rewards in return. Since Buddhism itself could promise no such rewards, a popular religion supplementing the orthodox version was found to be an organizational necessity.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, almsgiving is today an organized communal activity<sup>18</sup> and the upkeep of both Buddhist temples (viharas) and the temples of the sub-gods (devales) is provided through the donations of the laity.<sup>19</sup>

This duality in the religious field also created a dual culture. Much like the dichotomy in Ottoman society between, on the one hand, an Ottoman palace culture, and on the other, a folk culture of the masses, there also developed two distinct cultural heritages in Sri Lanka. Buddhism created its own cultural forms as did magical-animism. Buddhist literature, sculpture, architecture, etc. differed in style from the folk arts and were often found to be superior in sophistication to the latter.

Whereas in Ottoman Turkey, the political nature of Islam created a powerful religious institution which assumed important social and political functions despite the fact that Islam recognizes no organized clergy, the reverse process took place in Sri Lanka. Although the otherworldly asceticism of Buddhism theologically deemphasizes religious involvement in political affairs, the importance that Buddhism gives to religious institutionalization resulted in

the close alliance of the state with the monastic order.

Buddhism spread to Sri Lanka from India, where it originated, in the 3rd century B. C.<sup>21</sup> and served as the state religion of Sri Lanka until the British control of the whole island in the 19th century.<sup>22</sup> The collaboration between church and state took its expression in the reciprocal support of religious institutions by the rulers and of the state by the clergy. The unity between the two was expressed by the religious functions of the ruler and the political functions of the clergy.

In order to have the legitimate right to rule, the king of Sri Lanka had to be a Buddhist and perform duties as the secular head of the Sasana, or the religious system. These duties involved the "purification of the Sasana,"<sup>23</sup> i.e., the expulsion of heretics within the monastic order; the elimination of corruption among the monks; the settlement of their disputes; and the financial support of the Sangha.<sup>24</sup> Although in ancient Sinhalese thought, the kings were conceived of having no divine powers, the meaning of kingship underwent change as kings gradually came to be viewed as lesser divinities (Bodhisattvas),<sup>25</sup> and the idea that rulers are Buddhist god-kings became an established concept.<sup>26</sup>

The bhikkhus (Buddhist monks), in turn, exercised considerable control over state affairs although they refrained from direct involvement in politics. This took the form of

supporting kings whom they considered beneficial to the interests of the Sangha and even imposed the ascension to the throne of rulers which they favored, without taking into account the rules of succession. Much like the ulema in the Ottoman Empire, the bhikkus in Sri Lanka had strong influence on the masses and used it as a weapon of control over the rulers. The legitimacy of kings and the continuation of their rule depended on securing the support of the monastic order. The rulers, therefore, were careful to avoid conflicts with the Sangha and to demonstrate their interest in Buddhism by donating money or land to Buddhist monasteries, organizing religious festivals, building new temples, levying taxes on consumer goods which were used for the maintenance of religious shrines, etc.<sup>27</sup>

Hence, with the acceptance of Buddhism as a state religion, the Sangha became a powerful organization performing various religious, social, and political functions.<sup>28</sup> As in traditional Ottoman society, education was largely in the control of the clergy and the monasteries became educational centers with bhikkhus acting as teachers even in remote villages. Like the medreses in the Ottoman Empire, the pirivenas in Sri Lanka became important institutions of learning and disseminators of the elite culture.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, by controlling the educational process, the bhikkus played the crucial role of acting as agents of national unity.<sup>30</sup> Their support of state authority was especially

important in the initial legitimization and institutionalization of political power in Sri Lanka during the 3rd and 2nd centuries B. C.<sup>31</sup>

The monastic order derived its powerful position in traditional Sri Lanka society from the development of a peculiar land ownership system in Sri Lanka which has been called "monastic landlordism."<sup>32</sup> This system began to operate around the 10th century,<sup>33</sup> and remnants of it still remain in effect in up-country Sri Lanka.<sup>34</sup> Its development can be linked to the merit-making ethic of Buddhist laymen according to which individual salvation in future existences was believed to depend on financial support of the monastic order. Besides almsgiving to monks, such support often took the form of donating land to the Sangha. By the end of the 10th century, the monasteries had already accumulated large areas of irrigated lands.<sup>35</sup>

Although initially, the administration of these monastic properties was left to elected heads of individual monasteries, the elective principle gradually changed in favor of a less rational system of "pupillary succession." On the basis of this latter system, influential families belonging to high-status castes virtually came to own monastic properties as chief monks of the monastery began to appoint either their pupils or a relative as successors.<sup>36</sup> Today, the ownership of temple property is closely connected with kinship patterns as property rights are arranged on patrilineal lines. Members of a specific kinship group rather

than just any pupil, as the rule of "pupillary succession" would have it, are vested with the right to inherit monastic property.<sup>37</sup>

This monastic landlordism was reinforced by a feudal land tenure system called rajakariya (temple service). The lands granted to the temples by private individuals or by the crown were rented to tenant cultivators who were under a legal obligation to work the land. Such a dependency relationship between the temple authorities and the crown provided economic security to the former and political support for the latter. While the monastic overlords benefited from obligatory temple service as well as tax exemptions on monastic holdings, they in turn performed political services for the king by upholding his legitimacy and by keeping the peasant population apolitical.<sup>38</sup> Temple service is still in effect in present-day Sri Lanka and the performance of temple duty continues to be enforced by law.<sup>39</sup>

### III.

The dependence of the Sangha on state protection meant that Buddhism could flourish only under a Buddhist state. Indeed, it suffered neglect and disunity once Sri Lanka became a colony. The Portuguese were the first colonial power to establish domination over most parts of the island and their rule lasted for more than a century (1517-1655). During that time, Buddhism in Sri Lanka witnessed a brutal suppression as Buddhist temples were destroyed, sacred books

burned, and Buddhists barred from holding governmental offices. At the same time, the Portuguese engaged in a widespread campaign of proselytism as missionary activities were encouraged and Catholic churches built throughout the island.<sup>40</sup>

When the Dutch ousted the Portuguese in 1655, the Buddhists enjoyed a comparative freedom for a while. The Dutch at first directed their efforts towards the persecution of Roman Catholics who had become a sizable community under the Portuguese. However, once the Portuguese left the country, the Dutch followed their example of spreading their own faith, this time Protestantism, through persecuting the native Buddhists. As during the previous century, social and political mobility came to depend on religious affiliation. Unless a Buddhist, a Hindu, or a Muslim converted to Protestantism and became a member of the church, he could neither hold an official position in the government nor even be allowed to farm land. Buddhists were heavily taxed and their inheritance rights were severely restricted. As a result, many of them converted to Protestantism.<sup>41</sup>

But it was during British rule (1796-1948) that Buddhism suffered its greatest losses. The Portuguese and the Dutch had been able to control only parts of the island. The up-country Kandyan Kingdom had successfully resisted foreign intervention and had remained a citadel of Buddhism throughout Portuguese and Dutch rule. However, the Kandyan Dynasty came under British control in 1815 when the Kandyan chiefs

sided with the British against the Kandyan monarchy. This meant that Buddhism was no longer the state religion on any part of the island. Although the British guaranteed the protection of Buddhism by the Kandyan Convention of 1815, such guarantees stayed on paper as Buddhism entered into a new phase of decline.<sup>42</sup>

The fall of the Kandyan Kingdom signalled not only the end of the last Buddhist state in Sri Lanka but also transferred the bases of legitimacy from Buddhist god-kings to British governors. Since very early times in the history of the nation, political legitimacy had come to be identified with a network of religious symbols. The possession of the Buddha's alms bowl, of the branch from the Bodhi tree, the Sacred Tooth of the Buddha, and other relics had been considered a prerequisite for legitimate political rule.<sup>43</sup> That is to say, traditionally, political legitimacy had a religious base. The transfer of these symbols of authority to the British meant that the latter's legitimacy had gained religious sanction as far as the mass of the Buddhist population was concerned. For example, a rebellion instigated by the Kandyan chiefs against the British in 1818 was suppressed when the rebels learned that the Tooth Relic was in the possession of the British, a fact which left them without a justifiable cause for revolt.<sup>44</sup>

The British sought to spread Protestantism and Western culture in Sri Lanka through (a) using the educational system as a means of proselytism, (b) encouraging missionary

activity, (c) giving state support to Christian churches, (d) disestablishing the Buddhist Sangha by depriving it of its financial bases, and (e) encouraging conversion to Christianity by blocking access to civil service jobs to the Buddhists.

The educational policy of the British administration in Sri Lanka was designed to terminate the historical role of Buddhism in educational matters. Through a number of crucial decisions, Buddhist educational institutions were deprived of their former role in shaping the life of the Sinhalese according to Buddhist culture and system of values. On the recommendation of a commission sent by the British government, the Colebrooke Commission of 1829, Sinhalese and Tamil schools were closed down in 1832 and in their place five English schools were founded. This was followed by the establishment of the Colombo Academy in 1836, later called the Royal College. By 1848, the number of English schools had risen to 60.<sup>45</sup> These schools were at first administered by the Church of England in Sri Lanka and later by the School Commissions composed of members of the clergy and government officials. Most received government grants and geared their curriculum to Christian education. At the time Sri Lanka received independence from Britain (1948), the most important boys' secondary schools were Christian, with the exception of the Royal College, which was a secular institution, and four Buddhist schools.<sup>46</sup>

Besides spreading the Christian faith, there was of course a second reason for the British emphasis on education. Through the educational system, the colonial governors of Sri Lanka hoped to use the native elite, who had received a Western education and were therefore sympathetic towards the British, as intermediaries between themselves and the local population. Frederick North, who was the first governor of Sri Lanka and the most controversial of the British governors,<sup>47</sup> bluntly suggested this to the British government. North's primary concern as governor was to propagate Christianity. To that end, he proposed that Sinhalese and Tamil youths be sent to England to be educated as parish priests who would, upon their return, use their position to keep the natives content with British administration. Although North's proposal was rejected, he nevertheless carried out his policy through locally training native youths.<sup>48</sup>

The imposition of British culture and of Protestantism on the population of Sri Lanka through the educational system was reinforced by a parallel effort of encouraging missionary activity and giving state support to Christian churches. Since the British educational institutions were officially connected with the church establishment, their administration was largely left in the hands of missionary bodies.<sup>49</sup> By 1872, the number of missionary schools had risen to 402 with over 25,000 enrolled students.<sup>50</sup> At the same time, the Dutch effort to convert the native elite

to Christianity through limiting civil service jobs to Christians was continued by the British. Although the British formally abolished the Dutch rule that only Christians could hold governmental jobs, the system of choosing bureaucrats on the basis of their religious affiliation nevertheless was in effect informally during the British administration as well.<sup>51</sup>

But the major blow to Buddhism in Sri Lanka came with the financial losses that the Sangha suffered under the British. As I have pointed out, the close association between the Sangha and the state throughout much of Sri Lanka's history had been a crucial factor in the financial, and therefore social and political, strength of Buddhism on the island. The survival of the Sangha as an institution had always depended on the financial support and protection that it received from the state. The British withdrawal of such support, coupled with a counter-support to Christian churches and missionary bodies, did much towards weakening the institutional basis of Buddhism and ultimately, its impact on society.

Between 1819 and 1900, much of temple land was expropriated by the British government and sold to English planters, to be developed as tea and coffee estates.<sup>52</sup> Some of this property was transferred to missionary churches and schools.<sup>53</sup> Based on the estimate of a Buddhist Committee of Inquiry set up in 1954, the temples lost 800,000 acres of land during this period.<sup>54</sup> In addition, the abolishment

of rajakariya by the British administration in 1832<sup>55</sup> deprived the Sangha of free service on its property. Instead of rajakariya duty, the tenants on temple lands could now pay a small sum of money. This led to the neglect of temples and their property as well as a decrease in their activities, such as organizing religious festivals or rites.<sup>56</sup>

After 1840, Buddhist priests lost their legal status when Mackenzie, then the governor of Sri Lanka, refused the appointment of priests to various temples. This had been among the traditional duties of Sinhalese kings, and the British had promised to perform it by the terms of the 1815 Kandyan Convention. Mackenzie's decision meant that the priests could no longer sue tenants who failed to pay rent or perform due services, since, in a court of law, they had no document to prove that the British government had confirmed their appointments.<sup>57</sup>

#### IV.

The revival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and the emergence of Buddhist nationalism as a distinct political movement has to be understood against this colonial background. The bitterness with which Sri Lanka's Buddhists assess the impact of British administration on Buddhism is well documented in a report of the Buddhist Committee of Inquiry, which was set up in 1954 following the resolution of the 33rd annual conference of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress

held a year earlier.<sup>58</sup> The general tone of the report was one of resentment against the neglect and the consequent decline of Buddhism in Sri Lanka during British rule. Although the British later modified some of their earlier policies (in the educational field, for example, the British administration gradually recognized its responsibility of providing help to vernacular schools), and although British rule no doubt set the bases of a secular state in Sri Lanka, the fact nevertheless remains that Christian culture was imposed on the indigenous population at the expense of Buddhism.

The beginnings of a national protest movement and of a growing self-assertiveness of the native population go back to the last quarter of the 19th century. The founding of the Buddhist Theosophical Society in 1880 was a landmark in the revival of interest in Buddhist culture. From 1880 until the end of the century, a number of both Buddhist and Hindu organizations were established with the purpose of restoring indigenous cultures. Several publications in Sinhalese and Tamil languages also emerged which aimed to back up the effort towards a cultural revival.<sup>59</sup>

The political counterpart of this cultural revivalism was the emergence of political organizations during the first quarter of the 20th century which formed the nuclei of the independence movement. In 1916, the Ceylon Reform League was founded which was followed, a year later, by the

founding of the Ceylon National Association and of the Ceylon National Congress in 1919. Quite early, however, various active groups within the nationalist movement began to get organized along distinctly ethnic-religious lines. The Ceylon National Congress, for example, although initially formed as an all-inclusive organization, became identified with the low-country Sinhalese. The up-country Sinhalese formed their own organizations, the Kandyan Association in 1918 and the Kandyan National Assembly in 1924. The Tamils founded the All-Ceylon Tamil Conference in the early 1930s and the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress in 1944. The Muslim interests were represented by the Ceylon Muslim League, founded in 1932, and the All-Ceylon Moors' Association. Finally, the Europeans organized themselves around the European Association founded in 1927.<sup>60</sup>

Hence, instead of establishing a united front against the British, various ethno-religious groups in Sri Lanka began to use the nationalist movement for parochial ends. No doubt, this diversity of interests reflected the high fragmentation of Sri Lanka's society. As I have earlier pointed out, Sri Lanka is a plural society which is divided into distinct ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. The Sinhalese are in the majority (70 per cent of the population), speak Sinhalese, and are predominantly Buddhists. Of these, 38 per cent come from rural areas of "Kandyan" or hill-country districts and hence are known as the Kandyan Sinhalese. Although not much of a linguistic

or religious difference exists between the up and the low-country Sinhalese, there is nevertheless a feeling of mistrust, on the part of the Kandyan Sinhalese, of the more sophisticated, better educated, and urban low-country dwellers. The Tamils are the major minority group and make up approximately 23 per cent of the total population. They speak Tamil and are largely Hindus. Of these, 11 per cent are Ceylon Tamils and 12 per cent are Indian Tamils. The Moors make up about 6.3 per cent of the total population, 5.7 per cent of which are Ceylon Moors and 0.6 per cent Indian Moors. They are of Arab descent and hence are Muslims. Linguistically, they are divided on the basis of their place of settlement and speak either Tamil or Sinhalese depending on whether they live in Tamil or Sinhalese surroundings. Finally, there are the Burghers who are descendents of mixed marriages between the natives, on the one hand, and the Portuguese, the Dutch, or the British, on the other. They are predominantly Christian with English as their mother-tongue. A very small percentage of Malays, Veddhas, and Europeans also live on the island.<sup>61</sup>

What this social framework presents us is a society that is highly fragmented along ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. The nationalist movement in Sri Lanka, therefore, has to be interpreted as both a reaction to colonial domination and as an assertion of communal solidarities. Sri Lanka's independence was rather easily achieved and came about as a by-product of the Indian

independence movement. The absence of an intense struggle for independence meant that different communal groups did not have to organize themselves around national goals but rather, could press for specific communal interests. Hence, the independence movement created not national but communal solidarity networks. The absence of a unified effort towards independence prevented the development of opportunities for the creation of a strong nationalist movement which would mobilize different ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups under a common cause. It is significant that the history of the independence movement in Sri Lanka was characterized by the struggle of different ethnic groups to secure their own interests. For example, many of the problems that developed subsequent to the drafting of three constitutions (the 1920 Constitution, the Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 and the Soulbury Constitution of 1946) related to questions of territorial versus communal representation. The Constitution of 1948, which gave Sri Lanka full political independence, provided a compromise formula which secured adequate representation for minority groups but left the problem of political integration unsolved. The way political parties and the national elite responded to this challenge reflects the strong influence of the indigenous culture on political life and explains why formal political institutions, although closely modelled on the British example, were inadequate in themselves to provide for a stable political system.<sup>62</sup>

Since independence, ethnic, religious, linguistic and other traditional differentiations have constituted the major lines of cleavages in Sri Lanka's politics. The first party with a substantial following to emerge in Sri Lanka's political life was the United National Party (UNP), founded by D. S. Senanayake, who had been an important political figure since the 1920s. Senanayake's UNP came to power in the first elections held in 1947 and stayed in power until 1956. Senanayake had a wide following in the countryside and among different ethnic groups. He sought to widen his appeal through incorporating the interests of various communal groups into the program of his party. His emphasis on Sri Lanka's nationalism, which would supersede communal solidarities, was indeed effective in securing the support of minority groups. Among the most important organizations that joined the UNP were the Ceylon National Congress, the Ceylon Muslim League, and the Sinhala Maha Sabha. The latter was an organization founded by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in 1937 with the purpose of representing Sinhalese/Buddhist interests.<sup>63</sup>

Hence, for a short period, the UNP was able to integrate different groups within its ranks thanks to its reputation as an interethnic and interfaith party. In the early 1950s, however, the UNP gradually began to lose its former strength because of leadership conflicts. In 1951, intra-elite rivalries between the Senanayake and Bandaranaike families resulted in a fundamental rift within the UNP. Senanayake's

reluctance to designate Bandaranaike as a successor to himself led to the resignation of the latter from the UNP, who subsequently formed his own Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The SLFP, in coalition with other smaller parties and some independents, defeated the UNP at the polls in 1956.<sup>64</sup>

During the campaign for the 1956 election, the SLFP stressed religious and linguistic differences as part of its program. Bandaranaike's "Sinhalese Only" slogan, through which he indicated his decision to designate Sinhalese as the official language, and his promise to give Buddhism "its rightful place" proved to be extremely popular in a country where approximately 70 per cent of the population are Sinhalese Buddhists. However, politicizing religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences intensified communal cleavages and led to serious political instability. Following the Official Language Act of 1956, which established Sinhalese as the official language of Sri Lanka, widespread riots broke out between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities in which around 200 people were killed. The government's policy also led to the emergence of a Tamil separationist movement organized by Tamil leaders within the Federal Party. When the Tamil demands for the establishment of an autonomous Tamil state within a federal arrangement were turned down by Sri Lanka's government, communal unrest once again broke out in 1958 with greater numbers of people killed and thousands left without homes.<sup>65</sup>

At the same time, the Bandaranaike government initiated a series of measures to strengthen the position of Buddhism on the island. Two Buddhist universities were established and a ministry of cultural affairs was created, under the directorship of a militant Buddhist civil servant, to promote Buddhist values and culture. Among the activities of the ministry were the extension of government grants to Dhamma schools (like the imam-hatip schools in Turkey, these are religious semineries where the emphasis of the curriculum is on the teachings of the Buddha), to Buddhist publications, to the influential Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA), to the Buddhist monasteries, temples, and pirivenas for additional construction, and to Buddhist missionaries abroad. At the same time, the ministry helped establish and form organizational links with 4000 nation-wide temple associations which were to function as a link between lay Buddhists and the Sangha.<sup>66</sup>

The SLFP's use of religion as a means of politicizing the rural Buddhist population also led to the politicization of the clergy. After 1952, Buddhist monks increasingly became active in politics and were often encouraged to do so by the SLFP leadership.<sup>67</sup> For example, among the founders of the party was a monk of considerable influence within the Sangha, Mapitigama Buddharakkhita. He was actively involved in politics as a supporter of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna-- the SLFP coalition in the 1956

election. In an effort to broaden the appeal of the MEP ticket to rural voters, Buddharakkhita organized nationwide monks' associations (Sangha Sabbas). Approximately 75 Sangha Sabhas in various regions were affiliated with Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (United Monks' Front), which had been formed a few months before the election date and which had become an ardent supporter of the MEP.<sup>68</sup>

The role of the monks in the 1956 election campaign indisputably had a role to play in the MEP victory. Their organizations reached down to the villages. Through sermons, meetings, publications, financial support, as well as door-to-door visits, the monks acted as an arm of the MEP organization during the campaign. After the MEP came to power, Buddharakkhita became a powerful figure in the politics of Sri Lanka. He had a vast chain of Buddhist organizations under his direction and influential connections within the government, which he used for building a patronage network. At the same time, the United Monks' Front began to function as a powerful pressure group which could often dictate the policies of the new government.<sup>69</sup>

The cooperation between the EBP and the MEP government, however, did not last long. The EBP leadership increasingly became disappointed with Bandaranaike's handling of the religious-linguistic question. By 1959, the breach between the EBP and the SLFP was out in the open. The EBP leaders were considering means of finding a new

party which would be an alternative to the SLFP. Buddharakkhita's political career, however, came to an end in late 1959 with his imprisonment following the assassination of Prime Minister Bandaranaike by a Buddhist monk who, the Criminal Court later decided, had acted under orders from Buddharakkhita.<sup>70</sup>

Bandaranaike's communal policies had alienated both the minority groups and the Buddhist leaders from the SLFP. For the former, the government's decision to enforce the use of Sinhalese as an official language and its efforts to promote Buddhism in Sri Lanka became a threat to their cultural and economic interests. For many Tamils, employment opportunities in government services were blocked since they lacked a knowledge of the Sinhalese language. For the Buddhist leaders, on the other hand, Bandaranaike's pre-election promises seemed to have been compromised after the MEP came to power. Finding itself in the midst of communal disturbances which it had helped to create, the Bandaranaike government increasingly became cautious about intensifying communal conflicts through giving further encouragement to Buddhist-Sinhalese interests. Bandaranaike's assassination tragically demonstrated how dangerous his communal policies had been. Unable to satisfy either side, Bandaranaike became a victim of his own success in politicizing religious-linguistic differences as a means of electoral victory.

Bandaranaike's death did not put an end to communal disturbances. Under his widow's leadership, the SLFP coalition emerged victorious in the second of the two elections held in March and July of 1960. Although the March election had brought the UNP to power, it could not obtain a vote of confidence in the Parliament and hence was forced to resign. The SLFP's success in the July election was partially due to the support it received from the Federal Party. The Tamil leaders, by supporting Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, had hoped for a change in the linguistic and religious policies of the SLFP. The "Sinhalese Only" campaign, however, was reimplemented immediately after the SLFP formed a government. 71

The new government's determination to continue the former MEP policies vis-à-vis religious and linguistic questions again led to communal disturbances. In 1961, the Federalists organized resistance movements throughout the Tamil-speaking areas by blocking administrative offices. The government responded by arresting the party leaders of the FP and putting the Northern Province (heavily Tamil populated) under military rule. In 1963, Sinhalese was made the compulsory official language in the administrative offices of the North. By 1964, civil servants in the Northern Province who could not or who refused to use Sinhalese in the handling of official business were forced to retire. The SLFP coalition, however, was defeated by the UNP in the 1965 election which

led to a relative relaxation of the former government's communal policies. The "National Government" which the UNP formed included, for the first time since 1956, a Tamil minister in the cabinet. In 1966, the new government agreed to permit the use of Tamil in the administration of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, to conduct civil service examinations in both languages, and to terminate the compulsory retirement of civil servants on linguistic grounds. A decade of Sinhalese-Buddhist dominance in Sri Lanka's politics thus temporarily came to an end.<sup>72</sup>

V.

The 1956 election was a turning point in the politics of Sri Lanka. It resulted in three significant changes in the political system of the country: (1) the social composition of the ruling elite was radically altered, (2) the rural population was politicized, and (3) a gradual erosion of secularism occurred along with greater stress on symbols of parochialism at both the national and local levels.

Whereas the UNP political elite as a whole were Western-educated, and, as one observer put it, "resembled the former colonial rulers in everything but the colour of their skins... and like the colonials... were scarcely able to appreciate the meaning of Sinhalese culture, language, religion or interests,"<sup>73</sup> the

composition of the SLFP elite, as Table 15 illustrates, reflected a profound change in the social profile of the ruling elite in Sri Lanka after the SLFP victory.

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TABLE 15

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SRI LANKA'S POLITICAL ELITE BEFORE AND AFTER 1956

<u>Before 1956</u>	<u>After 1956</u>
1. Broadly Ceylonese	1. Overwhelmingly Sinhalese
2. Largely Christian	2. Heavily Buddhist
3. Mostly high-caste	3. Somewhat lower-caste
4. Highly urbanized	4. Largely rural
5. Highly Western-educated	5. Generally less educated but more <u>Swabasha</u> -educated*
6. Largely engaged in Western-type occupations	6. Engaged in more traditional occupations
7. Of the highest economic and social class	7. Very largely drawn from middle economic and social classes.

\* Swabasha means mother-tongue, either Sinhalese or Tamil.

Source: Marshall R. Singer, The Emerging Elite: A Study of Political Leadership in Ceylon (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1964), p. 49.

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Sinhalese nationalism, therefore, can be viewed as a response both to colonial domination and to the socio-economic supremacy of a Westernized political elite.<sup>74</sup> The role of Western education in upward social mobility

largely declined as a result of the SLFP's emphasis on Sinhalese culture and values. As a student of Sri Lanka's politics has written:

The basic difference between the nationalism of the Westernized middle class and that of the Sinhalese-educated groups was that while the former emphasized the nation as identified with state or country, the latter identified nation with "race." While the nationalism of the former was secular, that of the latter was very closely interconnected with religion.<sup>75</sup>

The key to the SLFP's success lay in its leadership's insight that the Sinhalese-Buddhists, both throughout centuries of colonial domination and nearly a decade of independence, had been second-class subjects or citizens in a country where they made up the majority of the total population and that any political movement which promised to alter their status would be likely to find a large following. The UNP's brand of secular nationalism was an alien concept introduced into the Sinhalese culture by the British. In traditional Sinhalese society, state and Buddhism were never two separate entities to be taught of as autonomous spheres. The UNP elite had borrowed the Western definition of nationalism and had hoped that in doing so, traditional forms of identity would be superseded by a greater allegiance to the nation. But to the Sinhalese masses, the "nation" that they hoped to create probably seemed too much like the "nation" under the British: with English as the official language, with Buddhist institutions on the decline, and

with Western education as a key to success. An alternative definition of nationalism which stressed the cultural distinctiveness of the Sinhalese and their Buddhist traditions was thus unlikely to fail to capture the approval of this discontent community.

This change in the composition of Sri Lanka's political elite came about as a result of the politicization of the rural strata. Rural masses were mobilized to such an unprecedented extent that the 1956 election was viewed by one student of Sri Lanka's politics as a revolution which transferred power from one "class" to another.<sup>76</sup> Eighty-five per cent of the population of Sri Lanka live in rural areas.<sup>77</sup> This means that the rural vote is a determining factor in electoral victory, and it indeed was in the SLFP's ascendancy to power in 1956. The 1956 election in Sri Lanka, like the 1950 election in Turkey, was, to use Huntington's term, a "ruralizing election."<sup>78</sup> The election results in both countries for the first time revealed that the modernizing elite, within a competitive system, could no longer impose its vision of a modern society on traditional rural masses without taking into account rural demands. After 1950 in Turkey and 1956 in Sri Lanka, political parties which failed to consider the importance of the rural factor in politics also failed in electoral competition.

Mass political participation achieved through emphasis on communal differences, however, proved to be an extremely

destabilizing factor in Sri Lanka's politics. As Weiner points out, problems of integration are not intense in countries under colonial domination. A colonial power shows little interest in developing national loyalties. Rather, the aim of a colonial regime is to create an indigenous elite which has adopted the cultural values and the language of the colonizing country. Since political participation is limited, often to that sector of the society which is Westernized, parochialism of the local population does not affect decision-making. But once independence is achieved and mass participation in politics permitted, the question of national integration proves to be one of the most difficult problems of political stability.<sup>79</sup> In Sri Lanka, it was after independence, particularly after the expansion of political participation, that the forces which led to division and disunity grew in strength. The politicization of communal differences also replaced national-secular loyalties with parochial ones.<sup>80</sup>

## VI.

A statistical examination of voting patterns in Sri Lanka in the 1956 election bears out the significant role of religious affiliation and ethnicity in the political loyalties of Sri Lanka's electorate during that election year. Tables 16 and 17 indicate the percentage distribution of the total population according to ethnicity and religion, respectively. As Table 16 shows, the Sinhalese are

TABLE 16

Percentage Distribution of Sri Lanka's Population Classified by Ethnicity, by Province

<u>Province</u>	<u>Ethnicity</u>					
	<u>Low-country Sinhalese</u>	<u>Kandyan Sinhalese</u>	<u>Ceylon Tamils</u>	<u>Indian Tamils</u>	<u>Ceylon Moors</u>	<u>Indian Moors</u>
ALL OF SRI LANKA	42.8%	26.5%	11.0%	12.0%	5.7%	0.6%
Western	79.7	2.0	4.3	4.7	4.7	0.9
Central	9.5	44.7	2.9	35.8	5.2	0.6
Southern	93.9	0.5	0.6	2.0	2.5	0.0
Northern	1.3	1.0	89.9	3.1	3.5	0.6
Eastern	6.1	6.9	45.8	1.5	37.7	0.4
North-Western	32.3	55.9	3.1	2.0	5.5	0.5
North-Central	16.9	66.4	6.0	1.5	8.1	0.5
Uva	8.2	48.9	2.9	35.6	2.9	0.5
Sabaragamuwa	12.5	66.4	1.3	16.3	2.5	0.3

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 because the categories for Burghers, Eurasians, Malays, Veddahs, Euroepans, and others were omitted.

Compiled from: Department of Census and Statistics, Census of Ceylon: 1953, Volume I, General Report (Colombo, 1957), pp. 182-183.

TABLE 17

Percentage Distribution of Sri Lanka's Population Classified by Religion, by Province

<u>Province</u>	<u>Religion</u>			
	<u>Buddhist</u>	<u>Hindu</u>	<u>Muslim</u>	<u>Christian</u>
ALL OF SRI LANKA	64.3%	19.9%	6.7%	9.0%
Western	72.1	6.2	6.6	16.9
Central	51.0	35.4	6.3	4.4
Southern	94.0	2.2	2.6	0.9
Northern	2.1	79.3	4.1	14.3
Eastern	12.2	43.0	38.2	6.4
North-Western	75.5	3.2	6.1	14.8
North-Central	82.8	6.2	8.8	2.1
Uva	56.9	36.4	3.6	3.0
Sabaragamuwa	78.1	15.9	3.0	2.7

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 because the categories for Zoroastrians, Free Thinkers, Agnostics, and others were excluded.

Compiled from: Department of Census and Statistics, Census of Ceylon: 1953, Volume I, General Report (Colombo, 1957), pp. 201-204.

are concentrated in the Western, Southern, North-Western, North-Central, and Sabaragamuwa provinces. The total percentages of the Sinhalese in these provinces are 81.7, 94.4, 88.2, 83.3, and 78.9 per cent, respectively. As would be expected, these provinces are also predominantly Buddhist (see Table 17).

The stronghold of the Tamils is the Northern province where they make up 93.0 per cent of the total population. The Eastern province is also Tamil populated (47.3 per cent of the population). The Central and Uva provinces, on the other hand, have a more balanced ethnic division with 54.2 per cent Sinhalese and 38.7 per cent Tamil for the Central and 57.1 per cent Sinhalese and 38.5 per cent Tamil residents for the Uva provinces. The ethnic differentiations again correspond to the religious, with the majority of the Hindus concentrated in the Northern and Eastern, and with an almost halfway division between Buddhists and Hindus in the Central and Uva provinces (see Table 17).

When we look at the percentage of seats received by the MEP coalition and the Federal Party in each province in the 1956 election, we can see a strong correlation between party strength and the ethnic/religious distribution of the population. In the 1956 election, Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party, in coalition with the Marxist-oriented Viplavakari Lanka Sama Samaja Party (VLSSP) and some independent candidates formed a single front in opposition to the UNP. This front took the name of Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People's United

TABLE 18

Election Results in Sri Lanka, 1956  
Percentage of Seats\* Received by Parties in Each Province

<u>Province</u>	<u>Party</u>										
	<u>MEP-SLFP</u>	<u>MEP-VLSSP</u>	<u>MEP</u>	<u>NLSSP</u>	<u>UNP</u>	<u>FP</u>	<u>TRF</u>	<u>TSF</u>	<u>TC</u>	<u>Ind.</u>	<u>CP</u>
ALL OF SRI LANKA	41.0%	5.2%	9.4%	14.7%	8.4%	10.5%	0.0%	1.1%	1.1%	6.3%	2.1%
Western	35.0	10.0	5.0	45.0	5.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Central	73.3	-	6.6	20.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Southern	41.6	8.3	33.3	-	8.3	-	-	-	-	-	8.3
Northern	-	-	-	-	-	64.4	-	-	11.1	11.1	11.1
Eastern	-	-	-	-	-	57.0	-	14.2	-	28.5	-
North-Western	40.0	-	20.0	-	10.0	-	-	-	-	30.0	-
North-Central	60.0	-	20.0	-	20.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Uva	57.1	-	-	28.5	14.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sabaragamuwa	50.0	20.0	-	30.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding off.

\* Percentage of votes received by each party in each province could not be calculated because census data only provides the number of votes cast for the winning candidate in each electoral district but does not indicate the distribution of the vote to other parties running in the same district.

Compiled from: Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Ceylon: 1961 (Colombo, 1961), pp. 102-111.

Front).<sup>81</sup> As Table 18 shows, the combined percentage of seats received by the Front (MEP-SLFP, MEP-VLSSP, and MEP) was 50.0 per cent for the Western, 79.9 per cent for the Central, 83.2 per cent for the Southern, 60.0 per cent for the North-Western, 80.0 per cent for the North-Central, 57.1 per cent for Uva, and 70.0 per cent for Sabaragamuwa provinces. Except for the Central and Uva provinces, the rest are heavily populated by Sinhalese/Buddhists.

The Tamil Congress (TC), the Tamil Speaking Front (TSF), and the Federal Party (FP) together polled 75.5 per cent of the seats in the Northern and 71.2 per cent in the Eastern provinces, which are predominantly Tamil/Hindu areas. In the Eastern province, it is reasonable to assume that some of this support for the Tamil parties came from the Moor community. The Moors in the Eastern province make up 38.1 per cent of the total population, a figure which is close to the 47.3 per cent for the Tamils of the area (see Table 16). As residents of a Tamil community, the Moors in the Eastern province speak Tamil. Hence, they would be likely to vote for a Tamil party which emphasizes linguistic rather than ethnic or religious issues. Indeed, Table 18 validates this point. The Tamil speaking Front received seats only from the Eastern province in all of Sri Lanka which is also the only province where there is a large Moor community.

None of the MEP-related parties were able to win a single seat in the Eastern and Northern provinces. Why the Tamil/

Hindu population in the Central and Uva provinces (approximately 36 per cent of the total population in each province) failed to vote for Tamil parties is rather perplexing. As Table 18 shows, neither the TC, nor the TSF, nor yet the FP were able to pull a single seat in either province. We can only surmise that surrounded by Sinhalese-Buddhist neighbors, the Tamils in these areas were either more cautious or less organized than their counterparts in the Northern and Eastern provinces where they live en bloc.

Table 19 shows the percentage of voting participation in each province during the 1956 election. As compared to the next electoral year (see Table 20), voting participation

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TABLE 19

Percentage of Voting Participation during the 1956  
Election in Sri Lanka, by Province

<u>Province</u>	<u>Percentage of Voting Participation</u>
Western	90.8 %
Central	93.3
Southern	92.3
Northern	74.2
Eastern	79.1
North-Western	83.0
North-Central	96.2
Uva	93.3
Sabaragamuwa	99.7

Compiled from: Department of Census and Statistics,  
Statistical Abstract of Ceylon: 1961 (Colombo, 1961),  
pp. 98-111.

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rates in the 1956 election were unusually high. In the province of Sabaragamuwa, for example, 99.7 per cent of all

registered voters went to the polls. To be sure, the level below which the figures for election turnouts reveal low political participation changes from one political system to another. But from a comparative perspective, close to a 100 per cent participation rate would lead us to suspect that either elections were bought off or voters were coerced to cast their votes. This points up to the fallacy of the argument that high rates of political participation indicate political development. The extremely high participation rates in the 1956 election in Sri Lanka were secured through communal politics. If it is true that the extent of

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TABLE 20

Percentage of Voting Participation during the July 1960  
Election in Sri Lanka, by Province

<u>Province</u>	<u>Percentage of Voting Participation</u>
Western	90.0 %
Central	87.9
Southern	75.7
Northern	66.4 .
Eastern*	
North-Western	77.4
North-Central	72.1
Uva	74.5
Sabaragamuwa	78.7

\* Percentage of voting participation in Eastern province could not be calculated because of discrepancy in census data which records a greater number of votes cast than registered electors. Hence, the percentage comes to over 100%.

Compiled from: Department of Census and Statistics,  
Statistical Abstract of Ceylon: 1961 (Colombo, 1961),  
pp. 112-119.

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parochialism in political life influences the rate of participation in Sri Lanka, political participation in and of itself is not, then, a good indicator, at least in Sri Lanka's case, of political development.

As I have pointed out, one result of the 1956 election was the political mobilization of the rural population. Extensive grass-roots activity by the SLFP in all provinces with a Sinhalese/Buddhist majority was a major feature of its election campaign. As Table 21 shows, most provinces,

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TABLE 21

Percentage Distribution of Population in Sri Lanka by Type of Community, by Province

<u>Province</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
ALL OF SRI LANKA	15.0%	85.0%
Western	34.2	65.8
Central	9.1	89.9
Southern	10.4	89.6
Northern	13.5	86.5
Eastern	12.3	87.7
North-Western	4.9	95.1
North-Central	8.0	92.0
Uva	4.7	95.3
Sabaragamuwa	2.7	97.3

Compiled from: Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Ceylon: 1961 (Colombo, 1961), pp. 30-31.

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except the Western, are predominantly rural. In all, except the Northern and Eastern provinces, participation rates in 1956 were extremely high, including the most urban Western

province (see Table 19). This suggests that the determinant factors in participation rates were ethnicity and religion rather than urbanization. But it also suggests the extent to which the rural Sinhalese/Buddhist population was politicized in that election year. For example, if in the province of Sabaragamuwa which is 97.3 per cent rural, 99.7 per cent of all registered voters participated in the election, we can reasonably assume that of those who voted, the majority were of rural background. In the Eastern and Northern provinces which are Hindu/Tamil areas, on the other hand, the percentage of voting participation was lowest compared to the rest of Sri Lanka.

## VII.

When we compare Sri Lanka and Turkey in terms of the impact of religion on political development, we find some striking similarities between the experiences of the two countries. In this concluding section, I shall attempt to discuss some of these similarities in terms of the stages of development which both countries have undergone. These may be identified as (1) an historical period of mutual cooperation and support between church and state, (2) a period of gradual decline in the functions of religious institutions with a parallel expansion of state functions, (3) the emergence of a secular nation-state under the leadership of a Westernizing elite, and (4) the breakdown of secularism and Westernization following an increase in political participation.

The first two of these four stages have been experienced by all societies, including those of the West. The last two stages, however, are peculiar to the experiences of most new nation-states including Turkey and Sri Lanka. All four are closely related to several developmental crises which have emerged at some point in the history of nations although in a different sequential order: crises of national integration, political institutionalization, legitimacy, and political participation.<sup>82</sup>

Historically, religion played an important role in the social and political life of both the Sinhalese kingdoms and the Ottoman Empire. In the former, Buddhism's emphasis on religious institutionalization created a powerful Sangha which was economically supported by both the lay devotees and the state. In the latter, Islam's concern with the founding of a Muslim community within the borders of a Muslim state likewise created a powerful religious organization of the ulema despite the nonclerical nature of the faith. In both countries, religion assumed several important functions:

(1) It provided legitimacy to political rule. In Sri Lanka, Buddhism's status as a state religion required of the king that he profess the Buddhist faith in order to have the legitimate right to rule. The concept of Buddhist god-kings who protected the Sasana became the only acceptable definition of rulership. In Ottoman Turkey, the Sultan-Caliph's status as both the head of the state and of the world Muslim community similarly included the notion that he derived his

legitimacy from a divine source. The role of the religious institutions in upholding the legitimacy of the ruler was especially important in this context. In Sri Lanka, although the Sangha and the state were institutionally distinct, they nevertheless depended on each other for political support. As a result, while the king assumed certain religious functions, the bhikkhus assumed political ones. Through extending or withdrawing their approval, the Buddhist monks could often decide who the legitimate ruler would be. In the Ottoman Empire, the ulema hierarchy had no such institutional autonomy. Rather, it was linked to the state bureaucracy through the office of the Seyhü'l-İslam. But as part of the state mechanism, the ulema, through official fetvas of the Seyhü'l-İslam, could sanction, or fail to do so, both the legitimacy of the rulers and of their policies.

(2) It set the basis of individual identity. Although in both Sri Lanka and Turkey, orthodox Buddhism or Islam differed fundamentally from the folk religion of the masses (Sufism in Turkey, magical-animism in Sri Lanka), the orthodox version nonetheless performed at least one important function in the daily lives of individuals. It defined for them their distinctiveness as members of a religious-cultural community. For a Sinhalese or an Ottoman peasant, religion was the only institutional link he had between his closed village environment and the rest of the country. Besides being a peasant, his self-perception also included a definition of his identity as a Muslim or a Buddhist.

(3) It controlled the educational system. Until the emergence of secular educational institutions, education was one of the most important functions of both the Sangha and the Ottoman Religious Institution. In the Ottoman Empire, the medreses, and in Sri Lanka the pirivenas, became great centers of learning.

The dependency relationship between the church and the state in both countries gradually changed in favor of the state with the beginnings of secularization. In both countries, secularization was a byproduct of the Western impact. In Sri Lanka, the Sangha lost its status and power under colonial governments. The Portuguese, the Dutch, and finally the British, all sought to substitute their own culture and system of values with the indigenous. Their aim was to replace the influence of Buddhism with Christianity in state affairs rather than the separation of church and state. In the late 19th century, however, the British gradually laid the foundations for a secular state. As a result, the Sangha, which had traditionally depended on state protection, became weak and disorganized. In the Ottoman Empire, secularization attempts came from within the Ottoman elite but as a result of a reaction to the superiority of Western technology. The secularization of education, of law, and of intellectual life was seen as one major step towards the Westernization of the Empire. The expansion of state functions in most fields led to a constriction of the role religion played in traditional Ottoman society.

The emergence of nationalist movements and the establishment of secular nation-states in both countries led to the final separation of church and state. The elites of Sri Lanka and Turkey sought to achieve national integration through a program of cultural transformation which took the West as a model in social and intellectual life. However, instead of creating a national culture, this Western orientation of the political elite created a distinct cultural cleavage between the Westernized and the more traditional sectors of the society. For Sri Lanka's masses, the Western outlook of the UNP elite seemed to reflect the same kind of disdain which their former colonial masters had displayed towards the indigeneous culture. For the Turkish masses, the Westernization program of the Kemalists seemed to be a heretical imposition of an alien culture on a Muslim population.

With increased political participation, this gap between elite and mass cultures became politicized. Religion was used by competing elites in both countries as a means of electoral victory through identifying elite goals with traditional mass aspirations. While this led to the breakdown of Kemalist secularism in Turkey, it brought about a severe systemic crisis in Sri Lanka.

The politicization of religion was a major factor in the mobilization of the countryside in Sri Lanka and Turkey. Hence, although it did lead to a breakdown of secularization

in both countries, it also played an important role in their political development. For the first time in the history of both, the political elite came to recognize that their political survival depended on peasant support and that to secure such support, they had to take into account the economic and the cultural aspirations of the countryside. The satisfaction of these demands should not be interpreted as a trend towards either traditionalism or modernity. It is both. On the one hand, it has led to parochial politics, but on the other, to the expansion of political participation.

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(82) For a discussion of legitimacy, integration, and participation crises in the new nations, see Myron Weiner and J. Lapalombara, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development," in Joseph Lapalombara and M. Weiner (Eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 399-435. For stability problems stemming from the gap between levels of political institutionalization and political participation in the new nations, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics (April, 1965), 386-430.

## CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters, my discussion of the role religion played in Turkey's political development has centered around a basic theme. Put in its simplest terms, I have argued that religion performs multiple functions in the developmental process. The interplay between tradition and change shows marked differences during different phases of societal development. As one component of tradition, religion may either precipitate, contribute to, or impede socio-economic and political change.

Such a distinction, it seems to me, is especially important to draw in the Turkish case. Since the 19th century, Turkish intellectuals and reformers have viewed religion in unidirectional terms, namely, as an impediment to progress. Until the mid-1960s, a major issue which categorized political forces in Turkish society was religion. Of all the basic tenets of Kemalism, secularism stood as a line of demarcation between traditionalism and reformism. In a sense, secularism versus anti-secularism became a surrogate for Left-Right distinctions along class lines. The paranoia with which Turkish intellectuals have approached all manifestations of religiosity in Turkish society has only recently begun to fade. This change of attitude is, I think, a consequence of changes in intellectual perspectives. In the more liberal atmosphere of the post-1960 period, the intellectual elite, for the first time since the

establishment of the Republic, was permitted to question the long-standing official myth that there were no class distinctions in Turkish society. Once the concept of class freed the issue of religion from its surrogate role, the latter began to lose its importance as a major problem. To put it differently, the emergence of distinctly political ideologies decreased the saliency of religion as a substitute political ideology. To be sure, Islam continues to play a role in electoral behavior. However, although it has served this role at least since 1950, the legitimization of it is rather recent. As the National Salvation Party experience shows, Turkish intellectuals have only recently accepted the fact that religion is one, among many, factors which affect an individual's political choices without being a factor of instability for the system.

The NSP experience, as Chapter 5 indicates, also shows that the religious dimension of voting behavior may reflect a tendency towards the politicization of horizontal loyalties rather than the continuation of vertical ones. In other words, the seemingly religious manifestation of political behavior may be, in fact, a manifestation of a reaction against socio-economic change by individuals or groups who have been adversely affected by modernization because of their marginal social or economic standing. Hence, in addition to the increased legitimization of the religious factor in politics, we may also be witnessing a trend towards the blending of socio-economic grievances with religious

concerns.

This change in religion's role in the political system that we are now observing is the most recent of such changes during a long process of political development in Turkey. As I have pointed out throughout this study, the functions of religion in Turkish society have varied during different phases of the developmental process.

(1) In the Ottoman period, Islam defined individual identity and political legitimacy as well as function as a mechanism of social control. In other words, it had a system-maintaining function and helped sustain the stability of the Ottoman socio-political structures.

(2) During the next phase of Turkey's political development, namely, the transition from an empire into a nation-state, religion served as a source of national unity against the invading foreign powers. Although there were counter-revolutionary groups during this period who sided with the Sultan-Caliph and his collaborationist government in the name of religion, in general, the mobilization of the Turkish peasantry by the nationalist leadership owed much to the cooperation of a large number of local clerics and the use of religious symbolism by the nationalists themselves as a means of rallying mass support. Religion hence functioned as a base for the building of national identity.

(3) After the establishment of the Republic in 1923, religion became a means of protest against the authoritarian one-party regime. The gap between the aspirations of the

Kemalist elite to build a Westernized Turkey and those of rural masses created an atmosphere of latent opposition to the secularization program of the new government. During the first decade after the establishment of the Republic, this latent opposition burst out into the open several times in the form of armed rebellions against the government by various sectarian groups.

(4) In the next stage, that of transition from one-party rule to democracy, religion served as a means of mass mobilization in the hands of a newly-established opposition party which sought to gain a foothold in electoral politics through politicizing the religious dimension of the long-standing elite-mass gap. Although the politicization of religion was seen as a threat to the secular foundations of the Republic by Turkish intellectuals, it is clear that religion was instrumental in the rapid mobilization of the countryside.

(5) Finally, during the next phase in Turkey's political development, namely, that of transition from non-ideological to ideological politics, religion assumed a less central role in political polarization as the Left-Right cleavage has become a major source of conflict in Turkish society.

From a more theoretical perspective, therefore, religion and political development should be viewed as interdependent variables. Such a relationship of interdependency would mean that religion both affects the course of political development

and is affected by it. The impact of religion on the political process seems to be especially important during three phases of political change. These are (1) the building of national integration, (2) changing patterns of political legitimacy, and (3) the expansion of political participation.

1. Religion and national integration. National integration has been defined as "the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity."<sup>1</sup> The role of religion in national integration, defined as such, is twofold depending on the characteristics of the social system. In religiously homogenous societies which are, however, divided along ethnic, linguistic, tribal or other lines, religion may be an instrumental factor in achieving integration. To the extent that bonds of a religious community are stronger than other parochial loyalties, it may be possible to unite different groups in society on the basis of their common religious ties. On the other hand, in religiously plural societies which are at the same time divided along other lines, religion may further exacerbate the problem of integration.

A second dimension of national integration is "the problem of linking government with the governed," that is to say, the closing of the gap between the elites and the masses.<sup>2</sup> In traditional societies where the basis of individual identity is religious, religion may help bridge

the distance between the elites and the masses. Although elite and mass cultures may be different including differences between the orthodox religion of the elite and folk religion of the masses, common religious loyalties nevertheless may provide a frame of reference by which the masses relate themselves to the elite culture. On the other hand, in societies undergoing secularization where the process of removing religious influence from political and social relationships has been achieved in elite centers but has failed to penetrate the mass culture, religion may serve as an additional source of divergence between the two cultural systems. In such a setting, it may further widen the elite-mass gap.

2. Religion and political legitimacy. Religion has traditionally played an important role in securing legitimacy to political authority. In traditional societies where the basis of political authority is religious, religion may perform a system-maintaining function by stabilizing definitions of political legitimacy, and consequently, of political obedience. On the other hand, in modern nation-states where the basis of political authority is secular, religious institutions may either (a) totally disassociate themselves from sources of political authority and confine their role to purely religious concerns, or (b) may challenge secular political authority by providing alternate definitions of political legitimacy. In the latter instance, they may perform either a conservative or a revolutionary role

depending on the circumstances which have determined the involvement of religion in the political process as a base of protest against the system. In political systems where authority rests on coercion, wealth, privileged birth, etc., rather than the consensus of the ruled, the challenge of religion to the bases of legitimacy, if it occurs, may take a revolutionary character. On the other hand, in societies where religious opposition to political authority stems from a clash of institutional interests and where such opposition is designed to bring back the influence of the church on the government, it may take on an obscurantist character.

3. Religion and mass political participation. In competitive political systems, religion may play an important role in the expansion of political participation to the masses. During the transition to competitive politics, the level of politicization and the sense of political efficacy of the electorate is usually low. This is especially the case in those developing countries where the transition to competitive politics has resulted from elite decisions from above based on exogenous influences rather than mass demands from below. In an effort to politicize the masses, therefore, competing elite groups may find it expedient to rely on parochial loyalties in order to build a mass base. Since religion in most societies cuts across other loyalties based on class, ethnicity, kinship, language, etc., it offers the widest base of support. This is the case even in religiously plural societies where there is a large religious majority

along with several minority groups.

In religiously plural societies, the politicization of religion for electoral gain usually results in a confessional pattern of elections. Each religious group votes for parties defending its own interests. Where there is a majority group, however, the likelihood of serious and often bloody systemic stress increases as minority groups are continually frustrated in their efforts to elect governments which pay heed to minority demands. However, although the politicization of religion may lead to instability in the system, it plays a constructive role to the extent that it increases the level of politicization of the mass electorate.

In religiously homogeneous societies, on the other hand, religion may become a political issue if the process of separating church and state has in one way or another led to divided public opinion. This division may become all the more strong if the secular versus the anti-secular cleavage in society overlaps with other political or social conflicts. The politicization of the problem, once again, may help expand mass participation in politics although, as in religiously plural societies, it may at the same time lead to systemic stress.

In this study, I have sought to analyze the relationship between religion and political development in the Turkish context. Although a chapter on Sri Lanka was included to add, however briefly, a comparative dimension to the problem,

the analysis presented here nevertheless remains as a case study. As such, it is limited in terms of its wider implications for the building of theoretical constructs. Even within these limitations, the study suggests a number of important issues and perspectives that may be fruitfully pursued in other case studies, and eventually by systematic comparison, so as to advance and clarify the underdeveloped theory of the role of religion in political development.

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(2) Ibid., p. 552.

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