

POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF TURKS IN THE U.S. AND THE NETHERLANDS:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF TURKISH IMMIGRANT  
ORGANIZATIONS

by

ISIL ANIL

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City  
University of New York

2010

© 2010

ISIL ANIL

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the  
Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the  
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Date	Chair of Examining Committee Professor John Mollenkopf
------	---

---

Date	Executive Officer Professor Joe Rollins
------	--

Professor Irving Leonard Markovitz

Professor Nancy Foner

Professor Els de Graauw  
Supervision Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

## Abstract

POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF TURKS IN THE U.S. AND THE NETHERLANDS:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF TURKISH IMMIGRANT  
ORGANIZATIONS

by

Isil Anil

Adviser: Professor John Mollenkopf

This study provides a comparative analysis of political integration by Turkish immigrant organizations in metropolitan New York and Amsterdam. It is based on extensive fieldwork and numerous interviews in the two cities. Over the years, Turks have created a large and diverse network of organizations in both cities, the development of which was shaped by the changing political opportunity structures (POS) in their host countries as well as by political and institutional networks retained with Turkey. Using a political claims analysis method, this study finds that Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have been more politically active over the years than those in New York. Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have made claims on a wider variety of issues and undertaken more diversified types of activities than those in New York.

This pattern results from a combination of factors. Differing POS, which include the legal and political institutional frameworks of the host country, alone are not sufficient to explain the different outcomes. This approach is too structurally determinant an argument. In contrast to prevailing approaches in the literature, a satisfactory analysis must also take into account the repertoire of actions developed by the Turkish communities of these two cities as well as choices made by their leadership.

The number, mobilization capacity, organizational principles, mission, connectedness, and functional types of immigrant organizations are all as important as the opportunities made available – or foreclosed – by the local political setting. Lastly, this study argues that transnational ties with the homeland have served as crucial resources (political, material), have motivated political activism, and have enhanced connectedness between Turkish groups in both cities. It finds that Turkish organizations can and should be considered important actors in the political arena, advocating immigrants' interests and at times influencing public policy.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to express my appreciation to many people who have supported me and this research. First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, John Mollenkopf for his enormous support in every respect. I could not have finished my dissertation without his constant guidance and assistance throughout this long process. He has been a wonderful mentor and I am supremely grateful for his sponsorship, continual encouragement and the countless letters of recommendation he has written on my behalf over the years. I am equally indebted to my reader, Irving Leonard Markovitz whose consistent support and insightful suggestions much contributed to this thesis. I am more than lucky to have him in my corner. I would also like to express gratitude to my other defense committee members, Els de Graauw and Nancy Foner, for their time and effort. I appreciate their valuable comments and suggestions.

My 6-month long fieldwork in Amsterdam would not have been possible without a research grant awarded by the Migration Research Center at the Koc University (MiReKoc) in Istanbul. My thanks go to the director of MiReKoc, Ahmet Icduygu and especially Aysem Biriz Karacay who has been most helpful in all stages of administering my grant.

My utmost gratitude also goes to the Amsterdam School of Social Science Research (ASSR) at the University of Amsterdam for having me as a guest researcher from February to August 2010. I could not have conducted my in-depth fieldwork in

Amsterdam without them. I would like to thank Jan Willem Duyvendak for his assistance during my stay there. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Anja van Heelsum at IMES for her gracious hospitality and helpful suggestions with respect to my interviews. This thesis also benefited from the valuable insights and comments provided by Gert Bauman. I am obliged to Marc van Steekelenburg at the Foreign Staff Service Desk who helped me chart the complicated and long processes of the Dutch visa regulations.

The writing of this dissertation was supported by a Dissertation Writing Fellowship at the European Union Studies Center (EUSC) at the Graduate Center, CUNY. Hugo Kaufmann showed personal interest in my research and we had great talks on numerous topics. Many thanks also go to Merja Jutila, a fellow PhD candidate and staff at EUSC, for taking care of administrative matters.

I also want to acknowledge the contributions of the Turkish people in New York and Amsterdam who agreed to be interviewed by me and let me use their interviews in this research. I appreciate their willingness to allow precious time from their often hectic schedules.

Last but not least, this thesis could not have been possible without the never-wavering love and support of my family. It seems that my doctoral studies started a lifetime ago, since they were interrupted and complicated by numerous health problems and ensuing challenges. Through every ordeal, my family stood by me. This was as difficult a period for them as it was for me. I can never fully express my gratitude and dedicate my thesis to them. To my beloved parents, Ugursal and Hulya Anil: thank you for selflessly giving me unconditional and endless love and support. To my dear

brother-in-law Chris Trice: thank you for always being there for me, for your consistent encouragement, and good humor. To Robert and Diana Trice: thank you for always welcoming me in your Delaware home. And most of all to my sister, my best friend, Sibel Trice: thank you for your unyielding belief in me and for being my comfort, courage and strength to push through hard times. Thank you for being my person with whom I share every success and failure. No two sisters can have a deeper bond. I love you all very much.

## Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b> .....	iv
Acknowledgments.....	vi
List of Tables.....	xi
List of Figures.....	xii
List of Charts.....	xiii
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	1
<b>2. Theoretical Framework</b> .....	17
2.1 Political Integration as Political Participation.....	18
2.2 Political Opportunity Structure (POS).....	22
2.3 Immigrant Organizing and Organizations.....	29
2.4 Transnational Ties.....	37
<b>3. Research Design</b> .....	45
3.1 Target Population: Turkish Immigrant Organizations.....	45
3.2 Context of Study: Why City-Level? .....	48
3.3 Case Selection: New York and Amsterdam.....	51
3.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses.....	54
3.5 Method and Data.....	57
3.5.1 Data Collection.....	57
3.5.2 Data Analysis.....	60
<b>4. The Historical Context:</b> .....	62
4.2.1 Turkish Migrations to the Netherlands and the United States.....	62
4.2.1.1 Turkish Migration to Europe and the Netherlands: the Guestworker Schemes.....	62
4.2.1.2 Turkish Migration to the United States.....	68

4.2.2 The Political Context in Turkey and its Effects on Turkish Immigrants Abroad.....	77
4.2.3 The Turkish Organizing Process in Amsterdam and New York.....	80
4.2.3.1 History of Turkish Organizing in Amsterdam.....	80
4.2.3.2 History of Turkish Organizing in New York.....	102
<b>5. Turkish Organizational Characteristics in Amsterdam and New York: Numbers, Type and Connectedness .....</b>	<b>117</b>
<b>6. Two Different POS: Amsterdam and New York.....</b>	<b>144</b>
<b>7. Transnational Ties of Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam and New York.....</b>	<b>190</b>
<b>8. Political Participation of Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam and New York.....</b>	<b>216</b>
8.1 Political Claims Making by Turkish Organizations.....	216
8.2 Comparative Look at the Results Across Time and Space.....	225
<b>9. Conclusion .....</b>	<b>249</b>
<b>Appendices .....</b>	<b>269</b>
Appendix A Data Description.....	269
Appendix B Interview Questions .....	271
Appendix C List of Interviews and Interviewee Profiles.....	276
Appendix D List of Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam .....	290
Appendix E List of Turkish Organizations in New York .....	295
<b>References .....</b>	<b>298</b>

## List of Tables

<b>Table 1</b> Total number of population with Turkish background in the Netherlands, 1960-2009.....	63
<b>Table 2</b> Immigrants admitted to the United States by region and country of birth: Turkey.....	71
<b>Table 3</b> Percentage distributions of the type of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam by their activities, 1970- 2009.....	118
<b>Table 4</b> Percentage distributions of the type of Turkish organizations in New York metro area by their activities, 1970- 2009.....	123
<b>Table 5</b> 501c Non-Profit/Exempt Organizations Compared.....	172
<b>Table 6</b> Distribution of Non-Profit Statutes among Turkish American Organizations in New York metro area.....	173
<b>Table 7</b> Table of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam that have received grants from various Dutch institutions.....	196
<b>Table 8</b> Percentage Distributions of Political Claims Made by Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam, Sorted According to Issues of Claims, 1970- 2009.....	217
<b>Table 9</b> Percentage distributions of political claims made by the Turkish organizations in New York, sorted according to issues of claims, 1970- 2009.....	218
<b>Table 10</b> Percentage distribution of protesting and proclaiming activities made by the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, sorted according to types of activities, 1970- 2009.....	221
<b>Table 11</b> Percentage distribution of protesting and proclaiming activities made by the Turkish organizations in New York, sorted according to types of activities, 1970- 2009.....	222
<b>Table 12</b> Two different local and national political opportunity structures in both contexts.....	255

## List of Figures

<b>Figure 1</b> The explanatory factors for the political participation of immigrant organizations in the host society.....	44
<b>Figure 2</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 1: Milli Gorus.....	128
<b>Figure 3</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 2: Suleymancis.....	129
<b>Figure 4</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 3: Education, academics.....	130
<b>Figure 5</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 4: Diyanet.....	131
<b>Figure 6</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 5: the Gulen network.....	132
<b>Figure 7</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 6: TFN.....	134
<b>Figure 8</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 7: Amsterdam...	135
<b>Figure 9</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in New York, Cluster 1.....	137
<b>Figure 10</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in New York, Cluster 2: the Gulen network.....	138
<b>Figure 11</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in New York, Cluster 3: the mosque organizations.....	140
<b>Figure 12</b> Networks of Turkish organizations in New York, Cluster 4: FTAA.....	141
<b>Figure 13</b> Transnational ties of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York.....	191

**List of Charts**

<b>Chart 1</b> Percentage distribution of Dutch population by ethnic background.....	66
<b>Chart 2</b> Percentage distributions of immigrants in the Netherlands by country of origin.....	66
<b>Chart 3</b> Percentage distributions of the type of Turkish organizational activities in Amsterdam.....	121
<b>Chart 4</b> Percentage distributions of the type of Turkish organizational activities in New York.....	125

## Chapter 1. Introduction

Explaining the variation in how immigrants politically integrate into different settings has been a central focus of immigration research. While researchers agree that the variation is significant, they have not reached a consensus on how to define integration and how to explain its variation. The process is complex, dynamic, non-linear and far from homogeneous. Many studies show different immigrant groups can follow different paths within the same institutional context (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000; Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2002) and immigrants from the same ethnic origin can display diverse patterns across different national and local contexts (Kogan, 2003; Crul and Vermeulen, 2004). The diversity of the immigration experience is also evident within the countries. New immigrants have largely clustered in urban areas, making large cities focal points. This study analyzes the political integration of Turkish immigrant associations<sup>1</sup> in the United States and the Netherlands, using metropolitan New York and Amsterdam as the study sites.

In analyzing political integration, most studies have stressed the individual characteristics of immigrants. Variation in integration has been tied to individuals' lack of resources, such as education, income, employment, gender and socialization<sup>2</sup>. Those who have resources and are motivated to act politically are expected to be more active

---

<sup>1</sup> 'Organization' and 'association' will be used interchangeably in this study.

<sup>2</sup> Among these studies that focus on the individual characteristics see S. K. Ramakrishnan & T.J. Espenshade. 2001. "Immigrant Political Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States," *International Migration Review* 35, no. 3:870-909; S. Verba & N.H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper & Row; A. Portes & J.W. Curtis. 1987. "Changing Flags: Naturalization and its determinants among Mexican Immigrants," *International Migration Review* 21, no. 2: 352-71; L. E. Bass & L.M. Casper. 2001. "Impacting the Political Landscape: Who Registers and Votes Among Naturalized Americans," *Political Behavior* 23, no. 2: 103-130.

in political life. Whereas there is ample research focused on individual immigrant incorporation, very few studies have focused on the collective level characteristics and activities. Therefore, this research examines the organizational political incorporation rather than individual immigrants' incorporation.

My contribution to this debate will be twofold; 1) to contribute to the emergent transatlantic dialogue between North America and Western Europe since comparisons between the two continents with respect to immigration and immigrant integration are rare, 2) to assess the role of immigrant organizations as actors in the host polity, a subject that has received scant attention notwithstanding its generally recognized significance in the literature.

#### *Research Goals*

The goals of this study are 1) to analyze and explain similarities and differences in the form and degree of political participation among Turkish organizations in New York and Amsterdam, 2) to examine the complex relationship between immigrant participation and the set of legal and institutional frameworks developed by local (consultative bodies, advisory councils) and national governments 3) to identify systemic barriers to the political participation of immigrant organizations in their host countries 4) to analyze the opportunities made available to immigrant organizations and the strategies (lobbying, negotiating, etc) adapted by these immigrant organizations to influence decision-making and policy issues in the host countries, 5) to pinpoint and analyze their transnational ties which provides the Turkish immigrant organizations with access to new sources of power, motivation and resources; and pertinently, to look

at how some foreign policy issues (such as the Armenian issue, Kurdish conflict, EU candidacy) affect these organizations and their activities.

Over the years during the process of settlement Turkish immigrants have formed a large number and diverse types of organizations in their respective host countries. This study finds that Turkish organizations in Amsterdam are politically more active and better connected with each other and other key players in their host polity (political parties, native NGOs, trade unions, etc) than their counterparts in New York. Their capacity to mobilize the Turkish migrant population in Amsterdam has been bigger and they make more claims (protesting and proclaiming) on a wider range of issues than those organizations in New York. With respect to transnational ties, this study finds that Turkish organizations in both cities have maintained relations with their homeland and other Turkish organizations elsewhere in the world. However, the extent and strength of these ties have been stronger among Turkish organizations in Amsterdam than those in New York.

My initial look at Turkish organizations in both cities was based on the expectation that since Turkish immigrants in the New York metro area were not stigmatized in the same way as those in Amsterdam (and elsewhere in Europe); and since the most visible Turks in New York seemed to fare better socio-economically than those in Amsterdam, they would be better integrated politically. However, as my research progressed, it quickly became clear that the political participation of Turkish organizations in New York was discernibly lower than their counterparts in Amsterdam. My initial assumptions for both communities in the two contexts were faulty. The purpose of my study is to address this puzzle and provide answers for it.

My argument is that immigrant associations are formed and their subsequent political participation shaped not only by the changing political opportunity structures in the United States (New York) and the Netherlands (Amsterdam), but by the varying degrees of political and institutional networks and ties retained with the home country. Local government receptiveness to and promotion of immigrant organizing differ across the two cities. The Dutch government and local municipalities have done more to promote various ethnic groups than in the United States. Non-citizen immigrants have the right to vote locally since 1985. More funding and assistance have been available in Dutch cities for those immigrants who wanted to engage in associational activities, and advisory councils were set up for dialogue with immigrant organizations, whereas in the United States, the government has had a more laissez-faire approach.

In addition to explaining the trajectories of organizational formation of Turks in Amsterdam and New York (how these organizations have been created and branched out over time), the political institutional framework of the host country, and the relations of the Turkish immigrants and their organizations to the country of origin, this dissertation also analyzes the structure of Turkish immigrant associations in both cities, which include their mobilization capacity, number, main organizational principles (mission), their connectedness and functional types of associations (social, religious, cultural, ethnic, political et cetera).<sup>3</sup> Also, it compares the role of Turkish associations concerning their political participation as immigrants' interest organizations in both receiving contexts.

---

<sup>3</sup> Given the fact that these institutions play an important role in assisting the members of the community, it is important to characterize these associations, the activities they carry out as well as the problems they often encounter.

### *How to Define Political Integration*

Political integration is a multi-dimensional concept. Traditionally, it refers to the full representation of newcomers in the host polities, both the political arena and policy making processes<sup>4</sup>. Ideally the concept suggests that immigrants have a meaningful influence over the policy process on various issues, which are relevant for their communities. Notwithstanding, in most cases the outcome is one of partial integration.

Jean Tillie distinguishes three types of political integration: political trust (trust for the democratic political institutions in the host country), adherence to democratic values (freedom of speech, recognizing state-religion separation), and political participation. This study focuses on the third dimension of political integration, namely political participation. As Tillie argues, the immigrant organization that participates in the democratic institutions of the receiving country is regarded as politically integrated, independent of their trust in the institutions or loyalty to democratic values (Tillie 2006).

Political participation is measured here primarily through the political claims that Turkish organizations make on their host polities. By studying their protesting and proclaiming activities, as well as the main issue topics of those claims, over time, we can understand how active Turkish immigrant organizations have been, the extent to which others have viewed them as legitimate actors, their relations and alliances with local key players (such as political parties, NGOs, trade unions, etc) and their ability to mobilize the Turkish community on matters related to their interests. By collecting these claims over time and coding them into issue types, as well as through interviews

---

<sup>4</sup> Operationally, the concept of political participation includes such indicators as naturalization rates, voter registration, voting, participating in political organizations and political campaigns and running for office.

and fieldwork, evidence can be developed about the ability of these immigrant organizations to gain access to public officials and to represent their interests in agenda-setting.

### *Immigrant Associations as Political Actors*

In recent years, immigrant organizations have played an increasingly prominent role in the civil and political arenas of many American and European cities. This is evident in the ever-growing numbers of immigrant and community-based organizations, which provide social services, among other things, to immigrant groups in cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Amsterdam and Berlin. Elected politicians, policy-makers and civic leaders since they can provide access to the immigrant population, also consult these organizations. Therefore, more attention to the role of immigrant organizations in civic activities is necessary: on the one hand by exploring the mobilization of ethnic resources of the associations and on the other by inspecting their opportunities to participate in the local policy-making of the receiving countries.

Although immigrant organizations do not have full bargaining power vis-à-vis state authorities, they can still be active political actors formulating claims on various issues and negotiating rights with political parties and local bodies (Odmalm, 2004; Yurdakul, 2006; Horta and Malheiros, 2006; Sacco, 2007; Strombland and Bengtsson, 2007; Predelli, 2008). They are seen as representatives of immigrant interests and as useful networks to contact and mobilize people. In return, as a result of these contacts with local officials, immigrant organizations get informal access to administrative institutions (Poppelaars 2007).

Therefore, this study regards Turkish immigrant organizations as political actors in their own right, rather than as mere arenas or intermediary mechanisms. In so doing, it is not a study of individual immigrants' involvement in politics (voting and being elected in elections, party membership, etc) or whether participation in immigrant community activities affects political participation, but of Turkish immigrant organizations themselves as actors in the political arena.

Immigrant organizations can act in several ways to take part in the political processes. My measures of participation examine both particular types of activities, such as protest actions, street demonstrations, contacts with other political elites, petitions, propaganda activities, lobbying, as well as participation in election campaigns, local consultative or advisory boards, and claims making efforts in the media (public statements).

Another important reason to examine the political activities of Turkish organizations in their receiving cities and countries is the reported propensity of Turks towards collective forms of representation. In their study on political participation and associational life of Turkish residents in Brussels, Jacobs et al. (2006) argue that the puzzle of Turkish underrepresentation in the Belgian electoral arena despite strong organizational life can be explained by the fact that Turkish immigrants 'tend to opt for more collective forms of interest representation.' Since the Belgian political establishment prefers more individual trajectories of political inclusion, Turks seem not to perform well in the elected political arena. In contrast, the official policy in the Netherlands, where Turks have had greater political participation (Fennema and Tillie 1999), was to integrate immigrants and ethnic minorities as groups and encourage self

organization as a 'basis of contact' with the host society (though this policy has been revised in recent years). Their study, thus, shows the importance of the national context in explaining variation for political integration (Jacobs et al, 2006).

### *Explanatory Factors*

In explaining differing levels of political participation, there are three sets of factors that prove decisive: organizational characteristics, political opportunity structure in the host society and the extent and strength of transnational ties. Figure 1 below describes how the mechanism works: POS influences the organizational resources (subsidies, funds), affects the connectedness of organizations (advisory councils that bring different groups together) and allows room for ideological proliferation among migrant organizations (parliamentarian vs. presidential system), that in turn have an impact on the political presence and weight of Turkish organizations. Similarly, retained transnational ties with home country groups (as well as networks elsewhere) increase resources, organizational connectedness and ideological proliferation. Transnational ties, in turn, are also influenced by the home country political structures, political events and available resources. Those organizations with political motivation and leadership skills participate more in the host polity.

### *Organizational Characteristics:*

We can begin to assess the organizational characteristics of Turkish associations in Amsterdam and New York by looking at their organizational resources (assistance from local authorities and other sources of support such as donations or membership fees), political interests (as evident in their mission statements; their ideological stance), and connectedness in political networks (contacts with other Turkish organizations,

political parties, local and/or national policy makers and other leaders of voluntary organizations). Amsterdam organizations are examined in four periods: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and the period between 2000 and 2009. New York organizational characteristics are tracked for the following periods: 1945-1969, 1970-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. These dates correspond with the founding process of Turkish organizations in both cities.

*Political Opportunity Structure (POS):*

POS theory is both a theoretical and analytical tool that is used in analyzing the institutional, cultural and historical factors that influence the political participation of social actors. It is useful in examining immigrant integration since it encapsulates the features of the political system within which the immigrant organizations gain entry, operate and have relations with other political actors (Koopmans and Statham 2000).

Political participation is shaped by several dimensions of opportunity, namely formal political institutions (legal and institutional arrangements which include general and immigrant-specific policies and key institutions at the national and local levels), national cleavage structures (political space for opposing actors, possible conflicts over national identity, class conflicts, center-periphery conflicts), informal procedures and prevailing state strategies<sup>5</sup> (political culture), and alliance structures (party systems, composition and strength of political parties) (Kriesi et al. 1995<sup>6</sup>, Koopmans and Statham 2000). Therefore, this study takes into account the way these contextual factors

---

<sup>5</sup> Informal strategies of the elite include both integrative (facilitation, assimilation, cooperation) and exclusive (repression, polarization, confrontation) ones.

<sup>6</sup> They argue that “the more decentralized a state system is, the more balanced the power relations among legislative, executive, and judiciary are, the more proportional the electoral system is, and finally, the more available the instrument of the referendum is, the larger the number of points of access for new social movements.”

structure political opportunities in the host country *and* the ways in which immigrant organizations respond strategically and tactically to these opportunities.

The comparative nature of the study highlights the impact of the host country institutional structures and governmental and local policies (existence or lack of government support for immigrant organizing, financial or political; naturalization and voting policies; access to political parties; allowed space for advisory boards, etc.) on immigrant organizations and ultimately whether and what kind of role immigrant organizations play in the process of political integration in the country of destination. How the societal institutional frameworks affect the way in which immigrant organizations function and what type of relationship they can or cannot have with other political actors (local authorities, other ethnic organizations, non-ethnic organizations, etc) constitutes the main issue to be examined.

One drawback of the POS model has been the exclusion of the transnational level. This study agrees with others who argue that looking at the POS of the host country alone is not enough in explaining the available trajectories and resources for organizations' political activities and mobilization capacities (Ogelman, 2003; Nell, 2004; Jorgensen, 2008). One must also include the role of homeland political movements and the POSs of the sending state at various levels (be it local, regional or national) which can hinder or facilitate transnationalism, directly or indirectly.

*Transnational Ties:*

Due to globalization and migration, transnational contacts and practices of immigrants and their organizations have become more prevalent. Like other ethnic migrant groups, Turks have also maintained close ties to their country of origin,

creating new spaces for themselves. With the availability of mass media (Turkish satellites), the affordability of communication and travel, this process has been consolidated. Transnational ties refer to frequent and durable participation in the economic, political and cultural life of their sending country, which require regular contact across national borders. Activities such as the occasional sending of remittances or taking a trip once in a while to Turkey do not amount to transnational ties. In order for organizational activity to be labeled as transnational, its goals should partially or totally be geared towards a country other than where their members reside.

Scholars often emphasize a dichotomy between transnational and local levels and argue that transnational ties may prevent integration (Smith, 2001). However, after examining how transnational ties and practices influence the political participation of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam (and in New York); this study finds that the two are not mutually exclusive.

Transnational studies have focused on international migration with the goal of pinpointing political, economic, socio-cultural and religious ties that immigrants sustain beyond the borders of the host country. Turkish immigrants and their organizations have kept their connections with their homeland, local communities of origin in Turkey and also with other Turkish migrants and organizations living elsewhere. Therefore, this research argues that a complete understanding of immigrant political incorporation must concurrently include the relations of Turks with relevant political institutions and processes in their home and host societies. As will be detailed in the following chapters, political links among the Turkish diaspora may well be stronger and more influential across borders than between different groups of Turks residing in one country.

Research on political transnational ties has shown that sustained transnational practices among ethnic migrant groups enable the emergence of immigrant political actors and entrepreneurs that help bridging the homeland politics with the local politics of the host country (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006). The same has been true for Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York. Within this context, the sending state has been a key actor in both creating transnational ties and networks, and determining immigrant activities directed at their homeland. As discussed in the findings section, Turkish organizations make claims towards not only the host state but also towards their homeland. They target multiple authorities, institutions and jurisdictions. Turkish organizations may operate at the local level but they do not confine their claims only to their localities.

Among the transnational ties and networks maintained by Turks living abroad, religious ones have been the most prominent and durable. As Peggy Levitt (2007: p. 12) argues ‘religion’s universality and globalism often take precedence over its national forms. Religion, like capitalism or politics, is no longer firmly rooted in a particular country or legal system’. An important case in point is Fethullah Gulen<sup>7</sup>, an influential Turkish-Islamic figure who lives in America and inspires a world-wide following. The Gulen network includes educational, religious and cultural institutions active not only in Turkey but also in Europe, the Turkic Republics of Central Asia and the United States.

---

<sup>7</sup> Gülen was forced to leave Turkey in 1998 on charges that he was working to overthrow the secular government.

As will be detailed in the following chapters, the Gulen network refers to a transnational Islamist political movement under the leadership of a Turkish religious and spiritual scholar and figure, Fethullah Gulen, whose preaching has created a brand of moderate ‘Turkish Islam.’ This movement is one of the major groups resulting from the work of another religious figure, Said Nursi (1873–1960), author of several volumes of religious teachings known as *Risale-i Nur*. Nursi challenged the recurrent debates of his time, such as the emergence of the new republic and Kemalist secularization efforts. He developed into a source of powerful movement in Turkey. His followers were called *Nurcus*. Today, the Gulen supporters are also referred to as *Nurcus*.

While some groups in and out of Turkey have lauded Gulen for his tolerant discourse and promotion of interfaith dialogue around the world, others have fiercely criticized the movement and its leaders for masking their real intentions which, they believe, include replacing the secular system of the Turkish government with a religious one. According to their detractors, the seemingly moderate and tolerant teachings of Gulen are in fact part of a façade and hide their underlying positions on secularism, gender inequalities and segregation. Over the years, the Gulen movement/network has grown exponentially to include a vast empire of media companies, schools, dormitories, financial institutions, banks, business organizations, teaching centers, various associations and foundations all around the world. They have become active players in their respective local and national arenas and have played key roles in Turkish immigrants’ lives.

### *Overview*

In the following section looks at the theoretical literature framing my research. Discussions of the concepts of political integration and political opportunity structure (POS) are followed by the elaboration on the significance of immigrant organizing and their representative organizations, as well as their roles as valid political actors, in the study of immigrant political integration. This section also examines the theoretical discussion of transnational ties maintained by the immigrant organizations in the host countries with their homeland.

The next chapter outlines the research design of this research with specific sections on the characteristics of the target population, namely Turkish organizations, the context of study and the reasons behind the case selections. This chapter further describes the main research questions and hypotheses and the data collection process and data analysis.

Chapter 4 begins with the brief examination of the characteristics of the Turkish migration to Europe in general and to the Netherlands in particular, followed by the migration profile of Turks in the United States. Before turning to the Turkish immigrant organizing process, it provides a brief background of the Turkish political developments in a historical perspective. The rivalries and political turmoil in the homeland has been reflected in the founding of immigrant organizations and their organizational agendas over the years have been shaped by these events. Therefore, a short look at the Turkish context is warranted.

After discussing the organizing process in Amsterdam and New York, the next chapter is devoted to the Turkish organizational characteristics in both cities with

respect to type, numbers and connectedness. These chapters are then tied to the section on two varying political opportunity structures in Amsterdam and New York that have largely shaped the claims making and activities of Turkish organizations in differing ways. The claims making practices of the Turkish organizations have changed over time. So has the context of reception. The section on political opportunity structure discusses how the political opportunity structures have affected the claims making processes and pinpoint changes in time with respect to legal arrangements, policies and institutions.

Chapter 7 addresses the transnational ties maintained by migrant organizations with their homeland, as well as other parts of the world. Over the years Turkish immigrants have developed and kept extensive relations with other Turkish groups and organizations. This section looks at and compares the extent of these transnational ties in Amsterdam and New York. Although transnationalism has been prominent in both contexts, Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have sustained deeper and broader transnational bonds with their counterparts in Turkey and around the world. Transnational issues have also been reflected in the political claims making of these organizations, a topic which is discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 8 is devoted to the examination of the political participation of Turkish organizations in the two cities. It compares the political claims making processes of Turkish migrant organizations over the years and specifies the types and subjects of these political claims. It highlights the commonalities and differences between the two contexts, as well as changes of claims over the years in each city. My research finds that

Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have visibly been more active with their claims making practices than those in New York.

The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and assesses their significance for theory building. It also presents a number of policy recommendations which call for the recognition of migrant ethnic organizations by the host authorities as important political actors that have the potential to bring about change and increase political participation of the immigrants in the receiving polities.

## **Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework**

Three main sets of factors explain variation in the political integration of different ethnic groups: social and historical characteristics of the groups (in this study, organizational characteristics), influence of the country of origin (transnational ties) and institutional opportunities allowed by the state (opportunity structure). Due to a lack of commonly accepted understanding of what constitutes political integration, it is sometimes unclear in which direction to draw the causal arrows between associated concepts. While some studies describe individual membership in organizations as an independent variable leading to higher political involvement, others consider participation in immigrant organizations as a dependent variable, or a type of political integration. This study will consider immigrant organizations as actors and study their political participation in the host countries.

It has been rightly noted that the literature on political integration, for the most part, has not paid enough attention to how transnational relations affect the political incorporation of various immigrant groups (Minnite, 2009: 58-9). This has been a major shortcoming for both political integration arguments and the literature on political opportunity structures (POS). According to Minnite, 'the incorporation model takes no account of how the simultaneity and multiplicity of ties across borders may affect different areas of social action'. Instead Minnite argues, 'transnational ties have been treated as incompatible with U.S. political incorporation because they create a transient mentality among immigrants, causing them to devalue naturalization and political participation.' This study finds that this treatment has been unfair and that transnational relations of Turkish immigrants over the years have been one of the driving forces of

their political activism in the host society. Therefore, the theoretical framework of this research takes into account how Turkish immigrants have carved out transnational spaces in their respective receiving cities and the durable institutional ties they have maintained across borders in time.

A similar oversight with both political integration and POS theories is the limited role allotted to the immigrants themselves as actors. As D'Amato emphasizes immigrants have been seen as workers, neighbors, parents or students but not as political actors capable of influencing policy and making political claims on behalf of their communities (D'Amato, 2009: 64). The main criticism leveled at the POS theory has been that it is too structurally determining and considers immigrants, as groups and individuals, to be passive non-actors being influenced by the institutions and policies of the receiving country. Instead of merely paying attention to the changing socioeconomic and demographical trends, this study seeks to examine how these communities are mobilized politically, paying particular attention to immigrant organizations as political actors in their own right and as agents of change in the host polity.

### **2.1 Political Integration as Political Participation**

Political integration<sup>8</sup> is a multi-dimensional concept. Jean Tillie distinguishes three types of political integration: political trust (trust for the democratic political institutions in the host country), adherence to democratic values (freedom of speech, recognizing state-religion separation), and political participation. This study will focus

---

<sup>8</sup> There is no universally accepted definition of political integration in the context of immigrant groups. As cited earlier, in this study I look at political integration in line with by Jean Tillie, who emphasizes political participation as the defining dimension. Participating in the electoral process and democratic institutions of the host polity renders immigrants as politically integrated, even though they might not trust the institutions or have loyalty to democratic values (Tillie, 2006).

on the third dimension of political integration, namely political participation. As Tillie argues, the immigrant/immigrant organization that participates in the democratic institutions of the receiving country is regarded as politically integrated, independent of their trust in the institutions or loyalty to democratic values (Tillie 2006).

One has to note that political integration does not always correspond with other forms of integration. Political integration is part of a bigger process of immigrant settlement in the host country that includes social, economic and cultural spheres. Yet, immigrant integration in one field does not necessarily indicate a similar path in another<sup>9</sup>. Ethnic groups who are well integrated politically in their host societies may be far less integrated in other dimensions, such as the labor market or educational system. Political integration may contribute to other forms of integration as well, but as long as social interaction does not have any political effects, they should be discussed in other terms than political integration and political opportunity structures.

Marco Martiniello (2006) argues that political participation is usually understood as the active dimension of citizenship. 'It refers to the various ways in which individuals take part in the management of collective affairs of a given political community' (Martiniello, 2006: p. 84). It cannot be restricted to conventional forms such as voting or running for election but also includes other less conventional types of political activities such as protests, demonstrations, petitions, boycotts, etc. This study

---

<sup>9</sup> For instance, this study finds that although Turkish immigrant organizations in Amsterdam are politically more integrated than their counterparts in New York, they are not integrated in the same degree in other fields. In contrast, although Turkish organizations in New York are better adjusted and integrated socially and economically, they are not as active players in the political arena as Turks in Amsterdam.

will also make use of the latter forms of participation in examining the political activities undertaken by Turkish immigrant organizations.

Political integration refers to a complex, non-linear process taking place both at the individual and collective levels that occurs over time, shaped by key events or legislative changes. For instance, terrorist bombings in New York, Madrid and London, as well as the murder of Theo Van Gogh, an outspoken Dutch filmmaker who openly criticized Islam, by a Dutch- Moroccan have affected the way Muslims are perceived in their host societies. These and similar events have strengthened the arguments that certain immigrant groups in the society are not integrated (Thomson and Crul 2007).

This process of integration should be understood as a continuous negotiation between immigrants, the sending state and the host country, which includes likely key changes in the political system of the receiving country and consequently the opening up of new spaces for immigrant political participation. A completed process of integration would imply immigrants have an impact over the policy processes with regards to issues most relevant to them. However, in practice, most forms of integration are partial, non-linear, and can vary across states and cities (Niessen, 2009; p. 4). Even though the chances of immigrant influence in the political arena increase with access to citizenship, political integration does not necessarily entail having citizenship. Immigrants with voting rights do not always vote, whereas newcomers with different immigration status can participate in protests, rallies or demonstrations, sign petitions in favor of various immigrant-related issues.

According to Bo Bengtsson, 'a politically integrated society is characterized by all its members, including immigrants, having their proper share of those rights and

resources that are seen as appropriate for full members of the political community. In consequence, a politically integrated individual is seen, by him/herself and by others, as able to take part in the political community on the same terms as other citizens' (Bengtsson, 2008: p.4).

There are mainly two different mechanisms with regards to political participation of immigrants and immigrant organizations. Individual mechanism: As mentioned above, organizational life of immigrants in the receiving society is considered by many as a crucial road to political participation, as well as a channel for the immigrant population to have a real influence on politics and society. Associations can act as arenas where, by taking part in deliberating and decision-making, individual immigrants can develop attitudes and values to undertake successful political activities in the society at large. Also, these immigrant organizations give access to networks through which the organization members may be mobilized or recruited to different forms of political participation. Thus organizations can enhance political integration indirectly and individually, by increasing the political abilities of immigrants and promoting mutual trust.

Collective mechanism: The second mechanism refers to the collective mechanism in which the immigrant organization functions as a resource. Thus, organizational life can also strengthen participation/integration directly and collectively. Immigrant organizations constitute an institutionalized entity for collective action in the interest of its members (interest articulation). They operate as interest organizations, like trade unions in Western Europe. Through interest articulation these organizations aim to create access to policy-making and influencing the agenda of the elected officials.

Without the immigrant organizations promoting issues and interests that are vital to the immigrants (such as native language schools, housing, anti-discrimination cases), these issues may not be on the agenda of the native political elite (Bengtsson 2007).

Political participation is understood through the political claims making practices of the Turkish organizations in their host polities. By studying their protesting and proclaiming activities (and the main issue topics of those claims) over time, we can assess how active Turkish immigrant organizations have been, to what extent they have been viewed as legitimate actors, their relations and alliances with local key players (such as political parties, NGOs, trade unions, etc) and their ability to mobilize the Turkish community on matters related to their interests. Through these claims (collected over time and categorized into issues and types), as well as through interviews and fieldwork, we can assess the ability of these immigrant organizations to gain access to public officials, and to have interests represented in agenda-setting.

## **2.2 Political Opportunity Structure (POS)**

It has been argued that host societies, in other words the contexts of reception matter in integration processes (Cornelius et al., 1994; Reitz, 2003; Bloemraad, 2004, 2005). We can begin to analyze these effects by looking at the POSs of the host society based on the analytical tools from the study of social movements. The POS concept was firstly established in the analysis of movements that seek change in society, from revolutions to environmental activism (Tilly 1978, Tarrow 1994). Recent studies have also analyzed immigrant organizing and political integration in terms of POS (Koopmans and Statham 2000, Koopmans 2004, Odmalm 2003, Hooghe 2005).

Social movement research has analyzed opposition to institutionalized politics, examining how challengers in the political arena mobilize people in order to obtain their objectives or to alter the current political order (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). The literature on social movements argue that social movements will have better chances to develop and to get access to the political decision-making process, if the political system offers enough opportunities for oppositional activities. According to Tarrow, POS refers to 'consistent- but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national- signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements' (Tarrow 1996).

The state encompasses the majority of institutional settings that form the political arena and establishes the rules and boundaries that all social movements are obligated to follow. In this arena, there are specific conditions that can either enhance or limit the political opportunities various actors have to deal with pursuing their interests. These opportunities can be expressed in terms of 'the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability of elite alignments, the presence of elite allies and the state's capacity to repress actors' (McAdam, 1996: p. 27).

However, POSs are not only shaped by the state. There are other important factors, such as various configurations resources, institutional arrangements and historical patterns that determine how people mobilize. Thus, although a necessary condition, POSs are not by themselves a sufficient condition to render a social movement successful or not. They provide the settings for the agency and constitute a dimension of political engagement that encourages or discourages people to participate in politics (Tarrow 1994). In the social movement research, political opportunity

structures are analytically divided into four categories: 1) formal institutional structures 2) national cleavage structures 3) informal procedures 4) alliance structures (Kriesi 1992, 1995).

The first denotes the legal and institutional arrangements, which frame the relationship between the state and the new actors. Degrees of centralization of political institutions, type of electoral system and separation of powers are the key factors which provide access routes and opportunities for mobilization. The second category indicates the political space for opposing actors to bring in their differing views and ideas into the political arena. The opportunities for their mobilization are connected with the politicized cleavages in the society in question (such as national identity, class). The third element refers to the rules and procedures of the polity used at times of conflict management and resolution. The informal procedures include the channels through which political conflicts and arguments are dealt with by political elites. Finally, alliance structures shape the specific balance of power between different actors at a certain time and place. This covers party composition, party systems and the relative strength of political parties and the government (Odmalm and Lees 2006).

It also includes general features relevant for all residents and specific features relevant only for immigrant groups in the host country. General features frame the society as a whole. The legal framework includes the voting system, laws regulating the formation of organizations and allowed space for political activity, and frequency of elections. The institutional structures refer to the political system and distribution of party power and the discursive element denotes the established notions of what is considered legitimate in the host society.

Migration specific characteristics include the legal framework for immigrants, which determine their residence status, attached rights, as well as certain restrictions for foreign nationals. Also relevant in this respect are the impact of governmental policies on the institutional structure of immigrant organizations. Size and type of ethnic organizations and the existence or lack of advisory councils are shaped by the receptiveness of and opportunities offered by the host polity. Policies that extend financial resources to migrant organizations increase their operational capacity. Furthermore, the perception of immigrant activism in private and public discourse helps or hinders the migrant organizations' participation in the political arena. Public promotion of immigrant activism or resentment of specific associations in the public discourse provides the framework within which all migrant associations conduct their organizational activities (Vogel and Triandafyllidou, 2005).

Over the years, the POS concept has been very influential in the social movement literature. Since the POS has come to include not only political but also cultural, structural and material elements, the concept has been criticized for referring to almost all aspects of the social movement setting and thereby being used to 'explain so much that it may explain nothing at all' (Gamson and Meyer 1996).

Hooghe argues that although the viability of a new social movement does also include cultural variables, it would be flawed to bring them into the concept of a POS (Hooghe 2005). In order to alleviate this problem and address criticisms of political opportunity structure being an overarching concept, Koopmans and Statham (2000) have maintained that instead of combining all kinds of cultural and political elements in one concept, it is better to distinguish a political and a discursive (cultural) opportunity

structure. If the political is analytically isolated from the cultural, then variation in political opportunity structure is allowed, and it will be possible to explain less than everything and more than nothing. Thus, POS consists of both an institutional and discursive element.

Institutions<sup>10</sup> are essential in this respect, providing the context of legitimate social and political activity within which various actors pursue their interests. They are made up of formal and informal rules. Formal rules refer to the laws, regulations and procedures adapted and enforced by the state. Mechanisms to control and enforce these rules play a key role in integrating the immigrants into the host society. Informal rules, on the other hand, include customs, practices and social norms ‘produced and enforced within close-knit groups.’ They maintain the other institutional arrangements in civil society, such as associations, churches, clubs or social networks (Nee 2003).

With regards to the American case, for instance, Victor Nee argues that the institutional change the United States underwent in dismantling the formal rules of racial separatism following the World War II and particularly during the civil rights years of the 1960s proved to be instrumental in providing a new institutional framework for immigrant groups. The principal of equality of rights was extended to immigrants who did not have European ancestry for the first time. According to Nee, changes made in the legal system vis-à-vis immigration enabled the integration of immigrants in a way that was previously not possible. With the dismantling of structural barriers, new opportunities and paths of access became available for the immigrant newcomers (Nee

---

<sup>10</sup> Institutions can be defined as ‘sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some area, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions (Ostrom 1991, pg. 51).

2003). Nee's study also emphasizes the importance of examining the intended and unintended consequences of host state's institutions and policies, not necessarily adapted with specific immigrant groups in mind, but rather aiming for the native population in general.

POS has also been used in the study of immigrant organizations. Governments' attitudes and policies affect the opportunities immigrants will have for creating organizations and in turn their involvement in the host polity. Schrover and Vermeulen describe *political opportunities* as "the extent to which powerful groups, including governments, are vulnerable or receptive to new claims made by groups that hold a marginal position in the political system" (Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005, p. 828). Setting boundaries within which the immigrant organizations can function and determine the resources to which they will have access, POS of host countries constitute a crucial intervening variable in explaining participation of migrant organizations.

In her study on immigrant political incorporation in the United States and Canada, Irene Bloemraad argues that government policies can provide assistance to immigrant communities and organizations, which then shape immigrants' understanding of citizenship as a political and emotional bond to the host society. Communities and institutional structures do not only provide contexts in which costs and benefits are weighed, but they also shape perceptions of costs and benefits, as well as migrants' interest in acquiring citizenship. Bloemraad contends that political integration of immigrants are primarily embedded within a larger institutional and policy environment (shaped by host country's political institutions, administrative bureaucracies and integration policies) although immigrants' individual and group

characteristics also affect their political organizing. Therefore, given that the social dynamics of political integration in the United States and Canada differ little, the degree to which actors and institutions outside the immigrant community assist newcomers in both countries is crucial in explaining the divergent trajectories of immigrant citizenship. Specific policy differences, such as bureaucracies overseeing citizenship, policies on newcomer settlement, and on ethno-racial diversity, are instrumental in explaining higher citizenship acquisition for immigrants in Canada than the United States (Bloemraad, 2006).

As regards to the resources extended or withheld by state institutions, there is a complicated relationship between nation-state interference (subsidies, technical assistance, and expertise) and the development of immigrant associations. Whereas providing the immigrants with such resources can be essential in their formation, states also possess strategic powers of control over their reception, as well as the way to be used, by possibly tying them to certain conditions. Subsidy-dependency might develop if the state assistance is the only available funding source for the associations. Therefore, on the one hand, in some cases, acceptance of financial support can have a positive effect on the organizational development of the immigrant community and have a representative voice in the political arena of the host country. On the other hand, in other cases, conditions that might be attached to the promise of funding can render them less influential (Fennema and Tillie 2002, Bloemraad 2005). As Schrover and Vermeulen (2005) argue, in the case that financial help is offered on the condition of refraining from political activities, then “organizational activity will pacify active political activity.”

Similarly, Anja van Heelsum contends that the local opportunities offered by the receiving society are the determining factors for the development and well-functioning of ethnic groups and organizations. According to Heelsum, a positive political opportunity structure, for instance, refers to political parties being open to immigrant councilors (both to the voters that they attract and to changes in their policies and perspectives), or to the creation of advisory boards of immigrant organizations by local councils (van Heelsum, 2001). Governments can also implement mergers between organizations by providing or withholding subsidies (Bloemraad, 2005; Hooghe, 2005).

### **2.3 Immigrant Organizing and Organizations**

While it is common for immigrant associations to be founded in order to preserve the ethnic identity and culture of their members, inevitably these associations also end up playing a major role in assisting with the settlement processes of their members, and encouraging their active involvement in the host society. Immigrants come together and create formal associations in order to protect mutual interests, to mobilize support over issues of concern and to make representations to political authorities concerning their welfare. A distinction can thus be drawn between ‘what an immigrant association is’ and ‘what it does’ (Layton-Henry, 1990).

According to Sardinha, an immigrant association can be defined as an organization formed by individuals who consciously define themselves as members of a group based on such variables as country of origin, common cultural heritage, ethnicity, language, religion, consciousness of kind, etc., within a larger context. In terms of what it does, on the other hand, an immigrant association may exist for a wide variety of

reasons: social, recreational, political, cultural, religious, professional, business, service or a combination of some or all of these (Sardinha 2007).

This study uses Cordero-Guzman's definition of immigrant organization as "an organization formed by the individuals, who are members of a particular ethnic group, for the purpose of providing social services primarily to immigrants from their ethnic/national group. Immigrant organizations differ from other social service providers in that they explicitly incorporate cultural components, and a consciousness of ethnic identity, into their mission, practices, services and programs" (Cordero-Guzman 2005: 894).

Immigrant organizations can have several functions that render them central to immigrants' lives. First, they support individual immigrants and their families by providing *advice and legal assistance* to enter the country, change their immigration status or sponsor their relatives to come to the host country. Second, they provide a wide range of *social services* and community programs, which help the immigrants in their socio-economic incorporation into the host society. Third, they serve as *advocates* for their ethnic groups at the local level, and fight for resources from the local governments. Finally, these organizations function as a *liaison* between the immigrants in the host country and their home country, as well as between the home country and immigrant and other ethnic communities and constituencies in the host states (Cordero-Guzman, 2005). In addition to these functions, immigrant organizations have important roles as actors in the host polity. It is important to note that not all immigrant organizations embody every one of these functions. Roles carried out by immigrant

organizations depend on their types, missions and their relationships with home and host countries.

*Immigrant Organizations as Actors in the Host Polity*

In recent years, immigrant organizations have played an increasingly prominent role in the civil and political arenas of many Western cities. This is evident in the ever-growing numbers of community-based organizations, which provide social services, among other things, to immigrant groups in cities such New York, Los Angeles, Amsterdam and Berlin. Although immigrant organizations do not have full bargaining power vis-à-vis state authorities, they can still be active political actors formulating claims and negotiating rights with political parties and local bodies. These organizations are also consulted by elected politicians, policy-makers as well as civic leaders since they can provide access to the immigrant population. Therefore, social scientists have started to pay more attention to the role of immigrant organizations in civic activities: on the one hand by exploring the mobilization of ethnic resources of the associations and the importance of immigrant organizations for the immigrant groups themselves, and on the other by scrutinizing their opportunities to participate in the local policy-making process of the receiving countries.

The first approach underlines that immigrant organizations generate valuable 'products' for their immigrant population, such as acting as advocates for them on various issues or providing a safe environment in which immigrants can meet, socialize and speak their own language. This supporting function lessens the distress of transition brought about by the immigration process and is particularly relevant in the early stage of the settlement process. These group-related functions of immigrant organizations can only be formed by organizations that originate from the immigrant population themselves, because they have

the knowledge and contact with the group that is required to effectively serve the immigrant population (Vermeulen 2005).

With respect to the second approach, in the recent years scholars have emphasized the growing importance of immigrant organizations regarding the participation and integration of immigrant communities in the receiving society. Els de Graauw, for instance, shows that non-profit immigrant organizations play a crucial role in structuring the political integration of immigrants in contemporary urban America and that immigrant organizations themselves prove to be important, independent political actors, especially at the local levels, within the bounds created by government regulations (de Graauw, 2008).

Similarly, Janelle Wong argues that whereas various organizations including parties, labor organizations, ethnic voluntary associations, and religious institutions have always been active around immigrants' political mobilization, their relative roles have been transformed in the last years. According to her, non-party community organizations, specifically labor organizations, religious institutions, community based non-profits, and ethnic voluntary associations play a stronger role in mobilizing immigrants politically, while party mobilization has been weak and inconsistent. These organizations are responsible for most of the political activities undertaken by the immigrants, 'including citizenship and naturalization, voter registration, voter education, and getting out the vote, that used to be associated with political machines' (Wong, 2002).

Therefore, it is important to note that it is not just crucial to know that immigrant organizations actually exist; it is equally significant to determine whether they can enable the immigrants to obtain political influence. Jacobs and Tillie emphasize that

‘not only do the types of organization and their activities have to be taken account, but equal attention should be paid to different kinds of networks in which associations are potentially embedded’ (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004). They must be more than just a group of isolated immigrant organizations at the local levels. Lack of connectedness or deep divisions among organizations impede or severely curtail the potential political power of them (Hooghe, 2005).

After an embryonic phase, in which many of the associative activities are aimed at cultural preservation and transmission, organizations then begin to concern themselves with other community needs, which lead to structural changes in relation to goals and objectives (Layton-Henry, 1990). During the settlement process, immigrant organizations are transformed from isolationist refuges of ethnic cultures to active participants in the political processes of the host countries. The activities developed by the organizations begin to be driven towards the group’s collective affirmation within the social context as well as active participation and representation within the socio-political structures of the receiving country (Layton-Henry, 1990: 94-112).

The once-predominant associative functions channeled towards the conservation of cultural identity and facing inward towards the community's exclusive interests, then gives way to collective goals, aimed at increasing dialogue with the host society on issues primarily dealing with the community’s integration. This increase in dialogue with the host society comes about in most part due to the discrimination and/or social marginalization felt by the immigrant communities when it comes to accessing social services such as education, health, housing, welfare and employment. Organizations end up assuming the role of mediator between the people they represent and the host

society. Immigrant organizational activism thus functions as an instrumental vehicle to voice immigrant expectations and demands in the host society.

As will be scrutinized later, besides the transformations organizations go through, the host society's reception of them is also a crucial variable when it comes to their insertion and acceptance by the general population (Soysal, 1994). The manner in which the associations are accepted by the host society and its political structures will influence just how much political say the association is given as well as the organizational strategies the associations will employ. The organizational principals and the receiving country's policies of integration will end up determining the degree of involvement given to the associations and the organizational patterns they will end up adapting.

The host society has influence on the way in which immigrant groups organize themselves, depending on the resources made available to the organizations. Available resources vary depending on host-country policies and the available informal channels for participation and organization. Certain policies and state institutions encourage the promotion of collective identities and the creation of organizations. Depending on the rights and privileges given, immigrant organizations can define their objectives, strategies and areas of operation. In this sense, expressions of collective identity and organization become a part of the institutional frameworks of the host country. The recognition by the state of a legitimate ethnic identity can provide monetary funds as well as participation mechanisms when it comes to immigrant-related issues in state politics. This, in turn, also signifies that, in one way or another, immigrant organizations are dependent on central powers, financially or politically.

### *Types of Immigrant Organizations*

Immigrant organizations can be categorized into different types according to their main goals and activities, as well as the way they are organized. There are four main types:

- 1) Religious Organizations: These are primarily mosques, churches or temples.
- 2) Cultural Organizations: These organizations have the goal of promoting and preserving an immigrant group's cultural identity, including home country language, art, music, dance etc
- 3) Service Organizations: These organizations usually provide one or more types of services to the immigrant community, such as legal aid, health services, youth programs, housing, language classes (host country language). These services have the main goal of assisting immigrants incorporate faster into the host society.
- 4) Public Interest Organizations: This group of organizations refers to advocacy groups, professional organizations, and civic organizations. The primary goal is to increase the voice of their immigrant community through organizing, financing, holding forums, and sponsoring activities.

Types of organizations can also be categorized according to the way they are organized. Some organizations are considered to be top-down organized when they use a grant from a foundation or government program, or religious funds. These financial sources render the organization to be accountable for the way they use the money. Majority of organizations that are regarded as service providers fall into this category. They usually work for and with the community but they are not considered to work on a membership driven basis (Cano 2004). In contrast, there is the bottom-up type of

organization. These organizations in general function with a budget dependent on membership fees, which are sometimes voluntary. They are mostly referred to as community-based organizations since they seek to address the concerns and problems of the ethnic community as a whole; and also since the leaders of these organizations have usually emerged from the community itself.

Then, there are organizations that encompass a combination of both. For instance, community-based organizations that provide a range of services to the immigrants, such as legal and educational, might also have a budget sustained by service and membership fees, as well as grants. While these three types of organizations might differ as regards to their organizational strategies, ideology and services, they tend to unite in the common goal of empowering the community they are representing.

These research perspectives do not only indicate the extensive possibilities for studying immigrant organizations, they also demonstrate that such organizations are at the center of many discussions about the nature of integration and the ways immigrants can realize it. In examining the role of immigrant organizations in the host society, this study will look at the size, range and years of operation, structure of the networks (connectedness with other organizations and actors), staff size and the leadership characteristics including their prior organizational experiences, budgets, sources of funding (government grants, fund-raising, membership fees, donations, fees for services), type of services provided and activities or events sponsored by the immigrant organizations

## 2.4 Transnational Ties

According to Faist, transnational formations, fields, or spaces, consist of combinations of ties and their contents, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that cut across the borders of at least two national states. In other words, the term refers to sustained and continuous numerous local transactions crossing state borders (Faist, 2000). In the transnationalism literature, transnational political ties can be divided into five types of transnational political activities, distinguishing between the direction and the resources that are used: transplanted homeland politics, homeland directed transnational politics, country of residence directed transnational politics, diaspora politics, and locally specific transnational politics (Koopmans and Statham 2003, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Nell 2004).

Transplanted homeland politics indicate claims voiced in the receiving country that are directed towards the country of origin in all other respects. For example, conflicts between ethnic groups may be transplanted to the host country just as homeland political organizations, such as those happened in the case of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. In the case of homeland directed transnational politics, homeland or country of residence groups use networks and resources in the Netherlands to achieve goals in their home country. Political activities are, for example, related to policies of the homeland, opposition to or support for the current regime there, or migrants' legal status in the homeland (Østergaard- Nielsen 2003). Country of residence directed transnational politics happens when homeland-based actors mobilize homeland-based networks and resources to intervene on behalf of migrant groups in the host country. Diaspora politics refers to transnational practices confined to those groups

that are barred from direct participation in the political system of their homeland or do not even have a homeland (Koopmans and Statham 2003). Locally specific transnational politics refer to activities that specifically connect local communities, such as cities or villages of origin (Nell 2004).

This study adopts the definition developed by Martiniello and Lafleur: “Immigrant political transnationalism covers any political activity undertaken by migrants who reside mainly outside their homeland and that is aimed at gaining political power or influence at the individual or collective level in the country of residence or in the state to which they consider they belong. Such power or influence may be achieved by interacting with all kinds of institutions (local, subnational, national or international) in the country of residence and/or the home country, by supporting movements that are politically active in the country of origin or by intervening directly in the country of origin’s politics” (Martiniello and Lafleur, 2008).

The existence, strength and particular forms of these types of political transnationalism depend on the political opportunity structures in the host country, the country of origin and the historically evolved international relations which together form a transnational political opportunity structure – TPOS - (Ogulman 2003). Accordingly, the TPOS includes the position of the receiving country towards migrants’ political participation and how it strives to integrate these immigrants. Policies separately made for Turks, Muslims, or guest workers strengthen or even create specific identities of different immigrant groups. In order to get hold of resources within a POS, immigrants need a political agenda that is understood and accepted by the relevant governments. These resources may include equal opportunities in local politics, the

media, and the development of immigrant organizations for migration-related issues. Concurrently, the government shapes migrants' organizational process by providing them with group-specific resources such as subsidies and/or organization models.

Similarly, the TPOS includes the approach of the country of origin towards its nationals abroad and their children as represented in emigration models and remigration policies. In addition to the social, economic and political factors, the politics of the home country may be both an incentive to migrate and to remain politically active from a distance (Koopmans & Statham 2003).

Due to new transportation and communication technologies, contemporary migration is characterized by transnational ties of immigrants to their home countries. Particularly, long time resident immigrants may be politically and economically active in both their country of origin and their host country.<sup>11</sup> "Political" transnationalism involves the political activities of party and government officials, as well as community leaders whose primary objectives are to obtain some political power or influence in the home and host country. There is a debate whether transnational ties shape, encourage or discourage participation in the receiving societies.

Political transnational activities can take various forms. Transmigrants, who are immigrants that develop and maintain multiple relations- familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span borders (Glick- Schiller et al. 1992: 1-2), can mobilize in the host country to produce a political impact in the country of origin. Party leaders from the sending country can travel to the receiving country in the

---

<sup>11</sup> Economically, they might send remittances to their relatives in the home countries and invest there or start ethnic business in their host countries and promote business relations between the two countries. Politically, they might engage in activities in their home countries, while at the same time become active locally in their host countries.

hopes for electoral support in trans-migrant communities. Also, sending governments can try to intervene in the host country politics by using ethnic communities to further their interests (Martiniello, 2005).

The transnational nature of current immigrant organizations have caused concern that immigrants will focus on homeland politics rather than pay attention to what is happening in the host country. As will be examined below, issues such as the Kurdish question or extreme polarization of right and left in Turkish politics have been prominent, as well as divisive, in Turkish organizations, especially those in Europe. The influence of Diyanet<sup>12</sup>, the religious authority in Turkey, has particularly been visible in religiously oriented associations. Furthermore, links soon have emerged between different Turkish communities as well (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2000). Many Turkish organizations in the Netherlands were founded in the 1980s with financial backing from the Turkish state to strengthen their position in immigrant communities and resist oppositional groups (Vermeulen, 2006).

However, these ties with the homeland do not necessarily indicate a mutually exclusive relationship.<sup>13</sup> Over the years, most Turkish organizations have managed to continue getting involved with important issues in Turkey, while at the same time they have developed strategies to deal with life and integration in their host countries. In their study of ethnic communities and social capital in Berlin, Berger et al. argue that political interest and activities towards the country of origin have encouraged

---

<sup>12</sup> Diyanet is a state institution and refers to the Presidency of Religious Affairs. It represents the highest Islamic authority in the country and promotes a liberal understanding of the Quran.

<sup>13</sup> See, for instance, Hassan Boussetta. 2000. "Institutional Theories of Immigrant Ethnic Mobilization: Relevance and Limitations," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 26, 2: 229-45; Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie. 2000. "Civic Community, Political Participation and Political Trust of Ethnic groups," *Connections* 23, 2: 44-59.

participation and in fact are ‘the most powerful variable in their models for explaining political participation in Berlin and German politics’ (Berger et. al, 2004).

A number of scholars have argued that socio-political relations of Turkish immigrants in Europe have increasingly been transnationalized over the years (Amiriaux 1998; Faist 1998; Kastoryano, 1998). Their homeland and transnational ties are diverse and multifaceted. Despite being viewed as a sign of poor commitment to integration to the host society, Turkish immigrants’ ties are, in fact, increasingly multilocal, rather than directed toward only Turkey or the host country. In her study on Turks in Germany, Caglar contends that Turks maintain ‘multiplicity of involvements’ in more than one place. They organize on regional, national and European levels. With regard to transnational business ties, the TIDAF (European Federation of Turkish Businessmen Associations) is a case in point for organizations at the European level. Its members are involved in business practices across Europe, including countries that do not host a recruited labor force of Turkish immigrants (Caglar, 2001).

Another example of transnational formation among the Turkish diaspora in Europe is the expansion and continuation of the interconnected networks of Kurdish, Islamic (Milli Gorus) and Alevi people in numerous European cities. Their political transnationalization, linking Europe and Turkey, has been scrutinized in the literature (Amiriaux 1998; Faist 1998). Furthermore, media networks that cross borders in Europe, such as MED TV (Kurdish station based in London and Brussels) and TRT –INT (Turkish state broadcasting channel), help the transnationalization process among Turks. This view is supported by other associational research. On the development of Turkish immigrant organizations in Germany, Schiffauer (1999) emphasizes that these

associations are not merely institutions transplanted from Turkey to Germany but rather institutions that have developed in reaction to the German environment over the years. Ethnic associations including various orientations (left, right, radical) are a response to the environment of the host country.

In her study on the Greek community in America, Karpathakis argued that the immigrants did not discard their home society loyalties during their settlement. According to her, their integration into the American society can be attributed to their connection to and interest in Greece. By trying to influence American foreign policy towards Greece, they prompted large numbers of immigrants and their organizations to take part in the American political system (Karpathakis, 1999). A similar argument can be made with respect to Turks in Amsterdam and New York where transnational ties have not hampered participation. Over the years, homeland issues (such as political rivalries in Turkey- right vs. left, secular vs. religious groups, human rights issues, and the position of ethnic and religious minorities including the Kurdish population and Alevi citizens respectively) have become instrumental in their mobilizing efforts in the host country.

#### *Explanatory Factors in Tandem*

In short, in explaining differing levels of political participation, there are three sets of factors that prove decisive: organizational characteristics (most notably the ability of migrant organizations to function as political actors), political opportunity structure in the host society and the extent and strength of transnational ties among immigrant groups. These variables are both *complementary* and *interconnected*. This study supports the view that applying the POS argument alone would be insufficient

and too deterministic since the theory by itself ascribes too much weight on the structural impact of the host institutions and do not allow much room for any role of agency. However, as this study shows, it cannot be ignored that immigrant organizations have also been active political actors in their host polities. Although their willingness, as well as their ability, to continuously influence political outcomes, change policy and set agendas have been influenced by the POS of the receiving countries, they were also shaped by the existing transnational linkages among the Turkish immigrant groups in both Amsterdam and New York.


Figure 1 shows how the mechanism works: POS primarily provides the ‘rules of the game’ for all political actors in a given polity. In other words, it defines and regulates how the migrant organizations can be founded and what kind of access they will have into the political arena. POS also influences the organizational resources (such as subsidies, funds, leadership training opportunities), affects the connectedness of organizations and allows room for ideological proliferation among migrant organizations (parliamentarian vs. presidential system), that in turn have an impact on the political presence and weight of Turkish organizations. Similarly, retained transnational ties with home country groups, political parties and ideological movements (as well as networks elsewhere) increase resources, organizational connectedness and ideological proliferation of immigrant associations.

As will be detailed later, homeland issues (such as the Kurdish conflict, the debate over the Armenian genocide claims, accession to the EU, ideological rivalry between various Turkish political groups) prove to be crucial in pushing the

organization and survival of Turkish immigrant groups, even at times where the POS have not been particularly favorable.

Furthermore, transnational movements such as the Gulen networks have been successful in establishing themselves as local actors through adopting a similar and systemic organizational scheme everywhere. The Gulen organizations have been flexible to adapting to the different POS of the host polities, employing highly educated individuals with leadership skills who have developed close relations with local and national leaders. To sum up, those migrant organizations with political motivation and leadership skills participate more in the host polity.

**Figure 1** The explanatory factors for the political participation of immigrant organizations in the host society



## **Chapter 3 Research Design**

### **3.1 Target Group: ‘Turkish Immigrant Organizations’**

Based on the assumption that we can best pinpoint the influence of national and city contexts on integration processes by comparing ‘the same ethnic group,’ my study is limited to Turkish immigrants. Turks constitute the largest immigrant group in Europe and have been the subject of numerous studies on immigrant integration in various European countries. In contrast, they are by and large unknown in the U.S. literature despite their increasing presence in American cities over the years.

For the purposes of this study, Turkish immigrants are those persons who were born in Turkey, who live in New York and Amsterdam, and who are or are not citizens of their respective countries. Children born to Turkish parents in those countries (second generation) are also included in this category. This definition will exclude Kurdish immigrants (and the organizations set up by them) even though they come from the same country. In the Netherlands, for instance, in addition to having different histories and backgrounds, majority of Turks migrated to the country for economic reasons, whereas the Kurdish immigrants have done so for both economic and political reasons. Some of them have come into the country as asylum seekers and others have arrived as labor workers. Also, majority of the Kurdish organizations set up in the Netherlands, and in Europe in general, are politically motivated with the goal of getting recognition for Kurdish rights in Turkey. Therefore, their participation in the Dutch political arena will undoubtedly be higher than other organizations.

Even after limiting the group, Turks constitute a heterogeneous group in terms of their societal and economic position as well as cultural and political orientation.

These differences have also been reflected in the development of various types of immigrant organizations in their host countries. Although they do not share the same migration path (recruitment of Turks as guest workers in the Netherlands, and divergent migration flows to the United States that include a wider range of immigrants with different backgrounds), comparing Turks in both countries will be helpful since they still form a relatively comparable group across these countries.

It has been emphasized, over the years, that the Turks in America have been highly educated and held mostly skilled occupations, whereas the majority of Turkish immigrants in Europe have come from lower socio-economic background with little education.<sup>14</sup> Yet, lately, it also has been argued that a process is taking place, which Ugur Akinci dubs as ‘the Germanification of Turkish Americans,’<sup>15</sup> that refers to the shifting profile of Turks in the United States. Accordingly, the Turkish American community has come to include the less educated, less skilled, more conservative and religious segments of the Turkish society, who typically used to travel to Germany. Increasing numbers of Turks in America have been working at lower skilled jobs as agents at gas stations<sup>16</sup>, waiters and delivery persons at restaurants, workers in home repair and painting, owners of moving firms, vendors of fruit and vegetable stands, house cleaners (women) and as cab drivers in the last 15-20 years. Similarly, Zeynep

---

<sup>14</sup> The first generation Turks in the Netherlands migrated through labor recruitments in the 1960s as a temporary measure to compensate the shortage of manpower, and were expected to leave when economic conditions changed. Yet, most Turks settled permanently, brought family members over and emerged as a predicament for the host states to integrate. Most Turks came from lower socio-economic background and took unskilled jobs that were not appealing to native workers.

<sup>15</sup> Ugur Akinci, “Turkish Torque ‘Germanification’ of Turkish Americans,” *The Turkish Times*, 15, May 2002.

<sup>16</sup> Kemal Karpaz (2006) argues that 30-35 percent (which amounts to 250-300) of mid-Long Island gas stations are owned and operated by Turks. Almost all of the attendants at those Turkish-owned gas stations are also Turks.

Kilic argues that the general assumption about most Turks in the United States being much better educated professionals compared to their counterparts in Europe is exaggerated given the similarity she has found in the mostly blue collar and small business owner Turkish communities in and around New York with those groups in Western European cities (Kilic 2004).

Another scholar who emphasizes the increasing similarities between Turkish immigrants living in America and those in Europe, including the Netherlands, is Kemal Karpat. Karpat (2006) argues that the perception of a predominantly highly-skilled, well educated Turks associated with migration to the United States does not reflect the current picture. While that was the case in the period preceding 1980, it no longer holds true. According to him, although the Turkish immigrants who arrived after 1980 and some of the new arrivals today are actual or aspiring professionals, and students who attend graduate programs, the overwhelming majority are less-educated, more religious, semi-skilled or unskilled workers who mostly come from villages and small towns in central and northern Anatolia. And they compete with other immigrant groups for employment in the lower-level service sector.<sup>17</sup>

An additional reason to focus on Turks is that Turkish immigrants (and immigrant associations) are present in significant numbers in both countries, without shared language and any historical colonial ties to them that can cause extraneous variance. Equally important, the time span that these organizations have had to develop in the two countries has been similar. There have been considerable numbers of

---

<sup>17</sup> For a more detailed examination of the changing portrait of Turks in the United States, please see Kemal Karpat. 2006. "The Turks Finally Establish a Community in the United States," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 12, Nos. 1&2: 167-186.

immigrants from Turkey for more than three decades. On the one hand, they have had the time and opportunity to create associational lives in their host countries. On the other hand, they have not reached to a degree of integration that their immigrant based organizations have lost their political relevance and have become one of other non-ethnic organizations in their receiving countries.

### **3.2 Context of Study: City-Level**

Migration and integration processes, political activities and other practices of newcomers as well as the formulation of immigration and immigrant policies by the host country take place at three broad levels- local, national and international. Local context refers to cities, municipalities and neighborhoods where the immediate settlement of immigrants starts and takes shape. It encompasses the educational and school systems, housing, health care, institutional arrangements in the labor market, economic conditions as regards to the workplace, transportation facilities and the local government institutions. Language and training classes, introductory programmes offered by the local authorities are targeted for immigrants.

Immigrants tend to be concentrated in the large metropolitan areas. This means that organizations are especially active in cities and a lot of their political demands include local matters that can be decided by the city councils. Thus, cities, being usually the port-of-entry for immigrants cope with unique challenges and certain responsibilities that are different from those of national authorities. It is at the local levels of cities and municipalities that tensions and problems of coordination between national and local governments act out. And it is at the local level that immigrant organizations gain possible points of entry into the political system. Also, research has

shown that immigrants often feel more connected to the city they live in, rather than the country in which they reside (thus the terms Berliner, New Yorker).

Numerous authors have emphasized the necessity to include studies at urban, city-level context of integration (Favell, 2001; Ireland, 2004). Over the years, the reorganization of the welfare state has brought about program cutbacks, delegation to the private sector and nonprofit associations, as well as decentralization to sub-national levels of governance (Ireland, 2007). As regards to Europe, for instance, Bruquetas-Callejo et al. state that the European cities have formulated “clear and pro-active integration policies, often in the absence of national policies, using their own instruments and resources and thereby making pressure for national policies” (Bruquetas-Callejo et. al., 2005).<sup>18</sup>

Due to this process of fragmentation and sectoralization within the modern public sector, the roles of national and local governments have undergone a transformation. Central policy makers are no longer considered as the primary and only actors of policy formulation and implementation. They can have secondary roles from motivating to framing policies. This implies a change in the rules and modes of policy making and implementation on immigration and integration, as well as the way immigrant organizations mobilize people and negotiate their interests, since new venues at the local level offer more possibilities and strategies to influence policy making and outcomes (Hertting, 2006).

---

<sup>18</sup> Similarly, in his study on “Colonial Caribbean Migrations to France, the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States,” Ramon Grosfonguel argues that due to the different development of the welfare state in each metropole and the presence or absence of specific public policies concerning immigrant integration, there are crucial differences as regards to their integration outcomes in the respective host societies (Grosfonguel, 1997).

Previous studies have shown that immigrant associations have an important place in local policy making (Kraal, Martiniello, Penninx, and Vertovec 2004, van Heelsum and Penninx 1999). The involvement of immigrants in local politics in the Netherlands is encouraged by the representation of the members of certain ethnic groups, as well as associations, in different kinds of councils whose objective is to include immigrants in the host society (Soysal 1994, Fennema and Tillie 1999).

Studies with only national level focus have been criticized for only describing the more general, macro-level processes at work, reifying culture too easily, and neglecting the immigrant agency. Thomson and Crul contend that by focusing on specific local conditions, these concerns can be addressed. According to them, when one locality is compared to another, the different outcomes in immigrant integration can be explained by a variety of local factors, such as the quality and funding of schools, the availability of post-educational opportunities, family and community support networks, and so on (Thomson & Crul, 2007).

From policymaking perspective, in the Dutch case, whereas the national government has formulated a 'citizenship approach' to immigrant integration in recent years, the local governments have opted for a more accommodative approach toward immigrant groups. Due to the divergent institutional logic of national and local integration policies, the latter have been more pragmatic than the former (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008). Thus, focusing merely on the national level will not capture the whole picture. Similarly, by also scrutinizing the city level, this study hopes to delineate and analyze the effects of local institutional set-ups different from the national level on immigrant integration. Cities provide opportunities for both contextual specificity and

structural comparison, allowing for the fact that immigrant integration might be influenced simultaneously by local, national and transnational factors (Favell, 2001).<sup>19</sup> By focusing on the local context, one can include the effects of national policies and frameworks as well.

### **3.3 Case Selection: New York and Amsterdam**

I chose to compare Amsterdam and New York for a number of reasons. The majority of immigration studies compare cases either within Europe or North America. Studies across the continents are rare. This study hopes to fill that void. Similarly, whereas Turks constitute one of the largest immigrant groups in Europe (and the Netherlands) and has therefore been thoroughly examined in the European context, they are mostly unknown in the U.S. literature. Apart from contributing to comparative immigration studies, the study will enrich the literature on Turks in the United States. Furthermore, despite the differing size of Turkish groups in the two countries, both have established viable Turkish communities in Amsterdam and New York. Both cities have received the largest number of Turkish immigrants in their respective countries. Finally, the political opportunity structures display some differences (funding opportunities, settlement policies and programmes towards immigrants and organizations, granting of local voting rights, etc.), which offers a good opportunity to analyze their role in immigrant organizing and participation.

---

<sup>19</sup> Similarly, Zincone and Caponio contend that systematic cross country cross-city comparisons are necessary to “determine to what extent local decision making processes are conditioned by a specific national or local institutional system and which kinds of similarities and dissimilarities can be detected, *ceteris paribus*” (Zincone and Caponio, 2005).

*Similarities:*

Same context of origin: Turkey for both countries (Increasing similarities over the last 15-20 years between the Turks in the United States and the Netherlands is discussed above. Despite the existence of a higher number of professionals and well-educated people in America, there is a visible convergence as regards to the socio-economic characteristics of both immigrant groups who come from the same Turkish culture).

New York and Amsterdam are similar in economic and demographic aspects, being big cities that attract greater percentage of immigration to their respective countries. Majority of overall immigrants in both countries face similar problems in their daily lives, such as unemployment, residential segregation, discrimination and lower educational success compared to the native population. Furthermore, they are both global cities in the sense that immigrant groups retain transnational ties with their homeland and compatriots living in other countries.

Another similarity has been the increasing convergence between the two countries with respect to the security aspects of their immigration policies which have become more restrictive following a series of violent events carried out by mostly Muslim foreigners, such as attacks on September 11, London and Madrid bombings and the murder of filmmaker Van Gogh in 2004 in the Netherlands.

Also important is the similar time spans as regards to the presence of Turkish immigrants in both countries. Although the origins of some of the Turkish organizations go back to 1950s, the majority of them were formed in the last three decades in both cities (and countries).

*Differences:*

Context of destination: Historical trajectories of migration in the United States and the Netherlands are different. Whereas the United States was built on waves of migration, the nation-building process of the Netherlands (like other Western European countries) did not involve large scales of immigrants. Thus, reception of huge numbers of immigrant populations is a more recent challenge to the Netherlands compared to the American case. Furthermore, the diversity and size of immigrant communities have been different between the two countries. More diversified groups with respect to socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds in bigger numbers have been received by the United States (ethnic groups from all over the world) than the Netherlands where newcomers include people from old colonies, guestworkers, and more recently asylum seekers and refugees.

Further differences between the two countries include their state structure (federalism in the United States vs. parliamentary politics in the Netherlands), electoral system and governmental formation (American majoritarian system vs. the Dutch proportional representation), party system (the two-party U.S. system vs. the multi-party Dutch system). Also, whereas the welfare benefits are extended to immigrants generously in the Netherlands, in the United States it is regarded as a fall back position for the newcomers and thus the immigrants do not enjoy the same benefits that their counterparts do in the Dutch system.

As mentioned in introduction, another difference between the two receiving contexts has been the way state-religion is institutionalized in each country. Despite having the more secular society, the Dutch system has inadvertently enabled religion to

become a more salient issue among immigrants compared to those in the United States. Institutionalization of Islam and Muslim organizations became possible due to the structure of pillarization system, which was developed in the early 20th century to reduce religious cleavages in the Dutch society.

### **3.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses:**

On the context: What are the political and institutional factors (both local-consultative bodies, advisory councils and national- political party systems, etc) that promote and hinder political participation? How different are the city government, city politics and the content of political participation by the immigrants in New York and Amsterdam?

On organizational development: What are the developmental patterns of Turkish organizations in both countries/cities? How do immigrant organizational activities cut across with the political opportunity structure? How do Turkish organizations change/shape the policies and political decisions in the receiving country? What do immigrant organizations themselves report about their political involvement in both countries? What role does the organizational capacity play in political participation and to what extent differences in political participation in two cases be attributed to the organizational capacity of Turks there?

On transnational ties: What role do the sending countries play in the political participation of immigrants? How do foreign policy issues (such as Armenian genocide claims, Kurdish conflict) affect Turkish organizations in both countries?

On the outcome: Are there differences in the form and degree of political participation of organizations in the two cities? What lessons can we learn from comparing the two cases?

What roles do the Turkish immigrant leaders/organizational elite play in the political participation of Turks in both countries? What is the role of religion in explaining different levels of political participation of Turkish organizations in New York and Amsterdam?

In sum: What is the organization able to do (resources)? What could it do (opportunities)? What does it want to do, considering its type, size, ability and opportunities (motivation)? How does it become active? (Activation process) What does the organization do (political activity)?

*H1a.* Turks in Amsterdam will have a higher level of political participation than in New York because the Dutch government does more to promote ethnic newcomers than the United States (granting of local voting rights for non-citizens, subsidizing immigrant associations).

*H1b.* Given the favorable opportunity structure in the Netherlands with regards to religion, the religiously oriented Turkish organizations there should be more politically active than in the United States. (The salience of religious plurality in Amsterdam should encourage political participation among migrants who are members of religious organizations. In New York, since religious membership does not yield institutional recognition, religion should be less salient as a source of political mobilization of immigrant organizational actors.)

*H2.* Immigrant organizations with more resources (political mission, size and connectedness) will have higher levels of political participation regardless of national context; where a national setting affords more resources, that national setting should have higher levels of immigrant organizational activity.

*H3.* Transnational ties should have similar effects on the organizational activism of the Turkish communities in the two cities *if* they both maintain those ties at similar levels.

*Variables:*

*Dependent variable:* Political participation of Turkish immigrants in the United States and the Netherlands will be looked at in two broad categories: political presence and political weight. Political presence will be measured by studying protest actions, street demonstrations, petitions, propaganda activities, lobbying, and their claims making efforts in the media (public statements on certain issues, such as education, housing, discrimination, religious issues). Political weight refers to mobilization capacities of the organizations and the existence of meaningful political ties and alliances with native key players (political parties, NGOs, trade unions, etc), the ability to gain access to public officials, and to have interests represented in agenda-setting. It can be assessed by examining contacts with other political elites, election campaigning, and participating in local consultative or advisory boards.

*Independent Variables:*

*Organizational characteristics:* size, mission, type, connectedness (networks), human and financial resources

*Contextual variables (POS related):* institutions (general and immigrant-related) at the local levels, policies (general and immigrant targeted), discursive political culture (elite strategies, alliances, political support for the existence of migrant organizations)

*Country of origin influence:* Transnational ties with Turkey and other Turkish communities abroad (international networks- religious and non-religious, ties to political parties in home country, ties to other movements in Turkish diaspora).

### **3.5 Method and Data**

#### **3.5.1 Data Collection**

A number of qualitative data sources collected between May 2008 and June 2009 provide the basis for mapping out and analyzing Turkish organizations/

1) Database of Turkish Organizations: The first step of the fieldwork has been building an inventory of organizations created by Turks. Database of these organizations include their contact information (website, e-mail and mailing addresses and/or phone numbers), main goals and activities (cultural, social, educational, political, alumni, religious or scientific), financial data and membership details.

The New York sample was drawn from the following sources:

1) Usatbd (business directory), <http://edu.turkishny.com>; 2) NCSS (National Center for Charitable Statistics at the Urban Institute) [nccsdataweb.urban.org](http://nccsdataweb.urban.org) and [guidestar.org](http://guidestar.org) (database for non profit organizations in the United States); 3) The Turkish Consulate- list of major Turkish organizations in the United States; 4) Umbrella organizations (since they identify and bring together member organizations)

In Amsterdam: 1) The Dutch Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel), where all formal organizations are registered and information on the names of the board

members, founding and dissolving years, and in some cases the membership number is available; 2) Lists of umbrella organizations; 3) Secondary literature (books, articles published on Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands). Anja van Heelsum's study of Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam also provided contacts with organizational leaders for interviews.

2) Interviews: 11 in New York and 23 in Amsterdam in-depth, semi-structured and tape-recorded interviews were held with Turkish leaders, who represent a variety of organizations in terms of size, type (religious, secular, women, professional) and area of activity (local, regional, national), and Turkish consular officials. Interview subjects were contacted mostly via e-mail or phone. In some cases, one interview led to contacts for other interviews. Each interview lasted about 1.5 to 2 hours (in certain cases even more) and in majority of the cases, they were conducted in Turkish. These interviews effectively helped me to get a better grasp of the possible links between government policy, institutions and different outcomes in the political participation of immigrant organizations. To understand the process in which they become active politically, collecting activation stories and examining how immigrant leaders describe and interpret their activation histories was essential. Face-to-face interviews with immigrant leaders enabled me to also gather information on the origins and the characteristics of the organizations, their members, and the leaders themselves. These interviews were accompanied by meetings with consular officials, Turkish representatives in local offices (elected or appointed) and other people well-informed about the immigrant community.

The interviews have had the following main objectives: 1) to find out information on how and when the association was founded, membership numbers, area of action geographically, population served, funding details, legal status, objectives and activities, problems faced by the association and its alliances/cooperative actions with other organizations; 2) to understand the outlook of association leaders in relation to the general integration processes of the Turkish community and existing social mechanisms in the host society; 3) to analyze the specific role the associations play in the integration of the Turkish community; 4) to get information on indirect or overt strategies to exert political influence in line with community interests; 5) to obtain their suggestions on better modes of integration as well as hear their opinions in relation to public support systems and other mechanisms in the receiving countries. With these goals in mind, extensive memos were written during and after each interview and each response and partial transcription and translation of interviews were reviewed frequently<sup>20</sup>.

3) Primary sources: news pieces, mission statements of the organizations, tax returns filed by the organizations (accessed through [guidestar.org](http://guidestar.org) and [activecause.com](http://activecause.com)), press releases and statements made by the organizations, activity reports, documents from government agencies, laws, political decisions, administrative acts, and written reports;

4) Secondary sources: Prevalent literature on immigrant integration, immigrant organizations, transnational ties, relevant case and comparative studies;

---

<sup>20</sup> Please see Appendix A for the interview questions (these questions represented a starting point and there were additional questions that followed depending on the answers or the position of the interviewee). Also see Appendix B for the list of interviewees.

5) Participant observation: Taking part in activities and events organized by the organizations (seminars, festivals, activities, celebrations and events on special dates)

### **3.5.2 Data Analysis**

The first step in the data analysis process was to transcribe and translate (most of the interviews were conducted in Turkish) the interviews, then to code them by city and as they relate to a specific question.

As will be detailed in the next section, my method was a simplified version of that developed by Koopmans and Statham (1999): political claims making analysis to assess the political participation of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York. Claims in both cities are examined under four periods; 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and the period between 2000 and 2009. Forms of claims/activities made by the Turkish organizations and reported in the media are as follows: 1) Protesting Claims/Activities, including demonstrations/protests and public meetings, boycotts, petitions, 2) Proclaiming Claims/Activities, including verbal claims (interviews, press conferences/releases), sending letters or writing to the authorities, distribution of newsletter/leaflets to influence public opinion, lobbying policy makers, contacts with/visits to public officials or other leaders. Issues (subject of claims) will be categorized in five broad topics: immigration politics, integration politics, anti-racism (anti-discrimination), homeland politics, and other issues.

The percentage share of proclaiming claims/activities of Turkish associations on the above-cited issues is then compared across the two countries, as are the percentage shares of protesting activities and the percentage share of homeland-oriented claims . Similarly, the share of proclaiming activities among all claims made, the share of

protesting activities among all claims made, and the shares of each issue among all claims made by Turkish organizations are compared across the two country settings.

## **Chapter 4. Historical Context**

### **4.1 Turkish Migrations to the Netherlands and the United States**

#### **4.1.1 Turkish Migration to Europe and the Netherlands: ‘*Guestworker Schemes*’**

The migration process from Turkey to Western Europe began in the early 1960s. As part of *güstarbeiter* schemes, the flow of Turkish migration was initiated by the West German government, which was then followed by other Western states. In order to curtail the labor shortage in Europe, Turkish workers were recruited throughout the 1960s and henceforth, Turkey became one of the main suppliers of migrant workers. The large flow of Turkish immigrants can be seen as an example of the push-pull model of migration. Sending labor migrants was considered as a promising means for development of Turkey in time of economic hardship. Low living conditions, substantial demographic growth and lack of economic opportunities in Turkey pushed Turkish people to seek better jobs in the Netherlands as elsewhere in Europe (Avci and Kirisci 2008: 209).

Turkish policymakers intended to make use of labor migration to cut unemployment and increase the volume of foreign exchange reserves through remittances. As a result of a series of agreements signed with the Turkish government and numerous European countries<sup>21</sup>, during the height of migration between 1961 and 1973, around 800,000 Turkish workers were officially recruited for certain jobs by European employers. In addition, during the same years, more Turks joined them

---

<sup>21</sup> The first labor export agreement was signed between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961. This agreement was followed by similar ones with the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria in 1964, France in 1965, and Sweden in 1967.

unofficially, coming to Europe with tourist visas and settling in the host countries after securing employment (Sayari, 1986).

<b>Period</b>	<b>Total Persons x1000</b>
1960	0.1
1970	23.6
1980	119.6
1990	191.5
1996	271.5
2000	308.8
2005	358.8
2009	378.3

CBS Statistics Netherlands, Den Haag/Heerlen 26-2-2010

Following the oil crisis in 1973, and rising unemployment, the labor recruitment came to a halt and further entry of Turkish migrants was restricted. However, due to family reunifications over the years, workers' dependants continued to move to the Netherlands, enlarging the Turkish presence. Despite the initial expectations that this flow would represent a temporary situation, by 1980s it became clear that the immigrants were there to stay, posing numerous problems of integration for the host countries.

Over the decades, migration from Turkey has also grown through marriage between young Turkish immigrants and their brides (or husbands) from their parents' native villages.<sup>22</sup> In fact, family formation through importing wives or husbands from Turkey is a problematic issue for the host countries since the practice is seen as an impediment to faster and full integration. Therefore, some countries have adopted more

---

<sup>22</sup> Intermarriages are still rare among Turks in Europe.

restrictive admission criteria for these newcomers with respect to income, language skills and waiting periods. As will be detailed below, today, the Dutch authorities require the spouses to take and pass a language exam before entering the country. According to Avci and Kirisci, for the years 2002 and 2003, three out of ten immigrants arrived to the Netherlands for the purpose of family formation. In the 1995-2003 period, migration as a result of family formation increased by more than 8,000, making it the largest category of immigrants. One in four immigrants who come to the Netherlands, do so in order to marry or live with somebody already there (Avci and Kirisci, 2006, p. 8).

At present, around 4 million Turks are living in various European cities, constituting one of the largest ethnic groups in all of Europe. Although the Turkish immigrants reside in practically every member state of the EU, Germany alone hosts two-thirds of this migrant Turkish population. Majority of these Turkish immigrants came from small villages in central Anatolia and along the Black Sea coast. Most Turks came from lower socio-economic background and took unskilled jobs that were not appealing to native workers.

Disillusioned with the economic conditions in Turkey at the time, the main motive behind large scale Turkish migration was better employment opportunities and higher wages offered by the European companies.<sup>23</sup> Most of these workers planned to

---

<sup>23</sup> Sabri Sayari argues that “despite significant strides toward development in the postwar period, Turkey remained economically the least advanced country in Southern Europe. Between 1960 and 1978, per capita gross national product grew at an annual rate of 3.6 percent. Despite this gain, per capita income had reached only \$850 by 1980, far below that of Spain, Greece or Portugal, not to mention advanced industrial Western European states” (Sayari, 1986).

work for a few years and hoped to return to Turkey after the economic prospects in their homeland changed.

With the dramatic decline in employment-based migration in the 1980s, the composition of the Turkish population in Europe changed substantially. In the beginning, there was a notable gender imbalance. According to the Turkish Employment Agency, between 1961 and 1976, less than twenty percent of all Turkish migrant labor was female. As a result of family reunification and family formation mentioned above, a more even distribution emerged (Avci and Kirisci, 2006).


#### *Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands*

The Netherlands has a population of 16.4 million. Currently, 1.7 million people living in the country have origins from non-Western countries. Major migrant groups in the Netherlands are:

- 1) Guest workers: Turks and Moroccans who came to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s as guest laborers. Despite the initial expectations from both sides that their stay would be temporary, these immigrants settled permanently and brought in their families.
- 2) Former colonies: Many people from Surinam, a former colony that declared its independence in 1975, came to the Netherlands and still retain strong ties between the two countries
- 3) The Dutch Antilles and Aruba (despite a large degree of freedom in the administrative area, it is still a part of the Netherlands)
- 4) Political refugees (a more recent phenomenon): Mostly from Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Iran


These ethnic minorities have largely settled in urban areas, such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Smaller countryside villages do not have any sizable immigrant population.

**Chart 1** Percentage distribution of Dutch population by ethnic background



Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands), accessed in September 2008 ([www.cbs.nl](http://www.cbs.nl))

**Chart 2** Percentage distributions of immigrants in the Netherlands by country of origin



Source: CBS (Statistics Netherlands), Accessed in September 2008

*Profile of Turks in the Netherlands:*

Most second-generation children of Turkish immigrants have been raised in unfavorable conditions compared to those of the natives. Family income has usually

been lower than the European standard and most immigrant families have lived in poor quality and overcrowded housing. Children from a mix of immigrant backgrounds have been in the majority in many neighborhood schools.

Past research over the years has shown that Turkish students, as well as some of the other migrant groups, are at an educational disadvantage in Dutch schools<sup>24</sup>. They have higher drop-out rates than the native Dutch students, they are overrepresented in less favorable vocational schools and underrepresented in higher non-vocational tracks and in more academic forms of education. It has been argued that mechanisms, such as lower teacher expectations of pupils from a migrant background and selection practices with regards to secondary education (Crul & Doornik, 2003), may have had a negative influence on these students' opportunities to make progress.

The lower educational attainment levels of Turkish immigrants consequently affect their employment patterns. The labor market position of Turks is unstable, with half of them having a salaried job. Unlike other Muslim immigrants, such as the Moroccans, the Turks are more likely to be self-employed and to establish their own businesses. The average household incomes of Turkish immigrants are more than one third lower than of the native Dutch. Also, their unemployment rates are high: 21 percent for Turks, as compared to 9 percent for the native Dutch. Still, a middle class is beginning to emerge. There is proof of a move towards higher level jobs among the younger generation, due mostly to their higher educational levels.

---

<sup>24</sup> Some minority groups, such as the Surinamese, perform better than Turks and Moroccans but they still lag behind the Dutch pupils.

#### **4.2.1.2 Turkish Migration to the United States**

Even though the Turkish-American population in the United States is relatively small compared to other immigrant groups, over the years it has become increasingly vocal in advancing Turkish interests in their new country. Unlike a substantial body of academic work on Turkish immigration and their integration into the host societies of Western Europe, scant attention has been paid to Turks in America. In fact, Turks constitute one of the least studied ethnic groups in North America.

Turkish migration to the United States is not well documented and is mostly unknown. The existing literature on Turkish migration to America has been gathered using historical records, ship manifests, personal memoirs, and census records. This body of research outlines mainly three different waves of migration from Turkey to the United States. The first two waves can be differentiated as pre- and post- World War II, and the third one refers to the period starting from 1980s until now. The first two waves are set apart based largely on diverse demographic profile of immigrants with respect to education, occupation, gender, and patterns of migration; whereas the characteristics of third wave migration have displayed a combination of highly educated professionals and low and semi-skilled workers with more conservative backgrounds compared to the mostly secular groups that arrived earlier.

##### *The First Wave, 1860-1920:*

The Ottoman Empire underwent population movements since its establishment, however the migratory movements during the 19<sup>th</sup> century has particular importance. There were major population flows from the lost territories of the Empire to the Balkans and Anatolia, recently established Balkan states, such as Greece, became hosts of these

movements. Parallel to this, a second type of migration was taking place for political and economic reasons to countries such as the United States, Russia, Africa, Australia as well as to other Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. This portion of Ottoman migration to the Americas was called *Caliye* and included Arab Christians from Syria, Armenians, Jews and Turks (Ipek and Caglayan 2006).<sup>25</sup>

The establishment of American missionaries as a center in Istanbul in 1830 was a key development, which led to the opening of schools in areas where Armenians lived and which also managed to create a Protestant society in parts of the Empire within twenty years. In 1847, the Ottoman administration agreed to recognize this new society due to the pressure from the United States, as a result of which missionary activities intensified. Students of missionary schools were encouraged to pursue higher education in America, while professionals and businessmen were provided with letters of recommendation and addresses of places to stay in the United States. In a short period, the influence of this movement crossed ethnic lines, when Turks joined their Greek and Armenian neighbors in their quest for better economic prospects in a new land or to avoid compulsory military service under the Ottoman rule (Ipek and Caglayan 2006).

Although the first immigrants to come from the Ottoman Empire can be traced back to mid-1800s, it is difficult to determine the exact number of Turks in America during that time due to the fact that migrants from the Ottoman Empire encompassed various ethnic groups, such as Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, Jews, Bosnians, Bulgarians, as well as Turks. After entering the United States, they were registered not by their

---

<sup>25</sup> For a detailed historical examination please see N. Ipek and K. T. Caglayan. 2006. "The Emigration From the Ottoman Empire to America," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 12, 1&2: 29-43. Also see M.U. Ekinici. 2006. "Reflections of the First Muslim Immigration to America in Ottoman Documents," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 12, 1&2:45-51.

ethnic background or religious identities, but by country of origin, usually as immigrants from Turkey in Asia or Turkey in Europe. According to Frank Ahmed, from 1820 to 1930, 155,136 immigrants from the European part and 205,035 immigrants from the Asian part of the Empire were admitted to the country.<sup>26</sup> The majority of these immigrants were not ethnic Turks but they belonged to the aforementioned minority groups within the Ottoman Empire, many of whom also spoke Turkish.

This ambiguity was further complicated when either officials or the immigrants themselves often changed their Turkish names to something closer to the English language. According to consular correspondence between the Ottoman officials, Turkish and Muslim immigrants preferred to conceal their identity to ease the entry process.<sup>27</sup> Thus, records are hard to trace for this early group of Turkish immigrants. Equally important, prior to 1934, Turks did not have any legal surnames but they used what amounted to a family name based on their father's name and their place of birth. Therefore, there has been much confusion over what was a first and last name, along with the aforementioned predicaments a surplus of very common names, such as Ali, Hasan or Mehmet, creating research problems to determine their origin, movement and longevity of residence in America.<sup>28</sup> Also, the majority of the Ottoman subjects failed to register with the Ottoman Consulates despite their obligation to do so.

Kemal Karpat argues that between 1820 and 1920, roughly 1.2 million people left Ottoman territories to settle in North America. At least 15 percent of them (200,

---

<sup>26</sup> Frank Ahmed. 1986. *Turks in America: The Ottoman Turk's Immigrant Experience*. New York: Columbia International.

<sup>27</sup> A telegram from Ali Ferruh Bey to the Private Secretary of the Sultan, dated March 21 1899. (Ipek and Caglayan 2006).

<sup>28</sup> John J. Grabowski. 2005. "Prospects and Challenges: The Study of Early Turkish Immigration to the United States," *Journal of American Ethnic History* Fall: 85-100.

000) were Muslims, including 50,000 ethnic Turks (Karpat, 1995). Fearing they would be discriminated against, most Turks did not reveal their identity and presented themselves as Syrians or Armenians to gain easier access to the United States.<sup>29</sup>

<b>Years</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Years</b>	<b>Number</b>
1821-1840	27	1921-1940	34, 889
1841-1860	142	1941-1960	4, 317
1861-1880	535	1961-1965	4, 330
1881-1900	34, 207	1966-1975	18, 744
1901-1920	291,435	1976-1986	20, 865

Sources: 1975 Annual Report: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976; and 1996 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1997.

According to the United States immigration records, 291,435 immigrants, whose “country of last residence” was listed as Turkey, entered America between 1900 and 1920. With the advance of technology and transportation, shipping companies got involved in the profitable business of carrying migrants to the United States, contributing to the great wave of Turkish migration during his period. After having reached to ports such as New York and Providence, Turks moved on to urban areas with industrial employment opportunities. In her study on first Turks in America, Isil Acehan shows that particularly in the industrial cities of Massachusetts there was a huge demand for laborers and that these places became a destination for unskilled Ottoman migrants until the WW I. (Acehan 200).

---

<sup>29</sup> Barbara J. Bilge, 1985. *Variations in Family Structure and Organization in the Turkish Community of Southeastern Michigan and Adjacent Canada*, PhD thesis, Department of Anthropology, Wayne Slate University, Detroit, Michigan.

Although, in this period, many immigrants came to the United States to escape political or religious persecution and avoid military service, the primary incentive for most Turks was economical promise.<sup>30</sup> With hopes of economic success Turks from rural Anatolia, mostly single male, traveled to America and worked in heavy industries such as textile, leather (factories in Massachusetts), railroad (Chicago) and steel (Detroit, Cleveland). Others ran grocery stores, bakeries and coffee houses. They typically lived together in enclaves in boarding houses close to where they worked and rarely integrated into the American society (Griffith, 2002). This first group of Turkish immigrants, by and large, maintained their Anatolian lifestyles and mostly did not even find it necessary to learn English since they usually worked in the same places as well.<sup>31</sup> Because their main objective was to save money and go back to their homeland, they were not apt to lobbying. They did, though, collect money for the national resistance movement and the care of orphans in Anatolia (Akgun, 2002).

The image of ‘Turk’ prevalent in Europe and America, affected not only their employment and promotion prospects but also their social acceptance in the American society at the time. American women who chose to get married to Turkish men were reportedly stigmatized.<sup>32</sup> Although the majority of them were bachelors and kept to themselves, few of them also married to American women, accepted their religion and changed their names. Still, most of these men would eventually return to Turkey after working for a period of time in the big cities. Leland Gordon argues that in the early

---

<sup>30</sup> Adem Kara. 2007. “The Ottoman Migrations to America and the Measures Taken by the Ottoman States (in Turkish),” *Journal of Academic Studies* 9, 33: 84-99.

<sup>31</sup> For a more detailed look, please see “A History of Turks in America,” at [http://sevgigurbuz.com/turks\\_in\\_america.aspx](http://sevgigurbuz.com/turks_in_america.aspx)

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

20<sup>th</sup> century an estimated number of 70,000 naturalized Americans returned to Turkey due to various reasons.<sup>33</sup> At the onset of the WW I, although many Turks were worried about the fate of their families back home, and about the possibility of their loved ones being conscripted into the army should the Ottoman Empire join the war, only several hundred Turks decided to return then. With the outbreak of news that the allied forces occupied Istanbul in November 1918, fights broke out between Turks and Greeks in factories and on the streets. About half of the Turks in America returned to Turkey, along with their savings, to fight in what is now referred to as the Turkish War of Independence.<sup>34</sup>

A second exodus of Turks came during the Great Depression period. Disillusioned with their prospects and working conditions in their mostly labor intensive occupations, Turks became even more homesick. The fear of dying in and being buried on foreign, non-muslim soil, as well as the calls made by the newly established Turkish government for all Turks living in the world to come back and help with the reconstruction efforts, further convinced a large number of Turks to go back to Turkey on ships that were sent by Ataturk and offered free passage home (Halman 1980). According to Karpat, at least one third of the Christians and more than half of the Muslim immigrants from Ottoman territories returned to their homelands.<sup>35</sup> Thus, many more Turks went back home after the new Turkish Republic was established. Similar

---

<sup>33</sup> Similarly, from 1899 to 1924, 86% of the early Turkish migrants to America returned to Turkey (Halman 1997).

<sup>34</sup> Halman, Talat Sait. "Turks." Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, 1980, pp. 992-996.

<sup>35</sup> Karpat. "Turks in America," p. 234.

figures are cited by Thomas Archdeacon (1983), who argues that Turkish immigrants had one of the highest return rates of any ethnic group that migrated to America.<sup>36</sup>

Another reason for return migration was financial. Given the capitulatory regime in Turkey and the American doctrine of protecting naturalized citizens upon returning to their country of origin, former subjects of the Ottoman Empire, such as Armenians and Syrians, could go to the United States, attain wealth and citizenship, return to Turkey and live there exempt from all Ottoman laws (military duty and taxation). In some cases, immigrants came to the United States only to obtain American citizenship and remained just long enough to secure their naturalization papers and went back to Turkey where they enjoyed all capitulatory privileges (Gordon, 1931).

Coupled with great depression in America and following the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish immigration to America dropped drastically. With the passage of Johnson-Reed Quota Act in 1924, an official quota of about 200 Turks were allowed into the United States each year. Although there were some exceptions for spouses of U.S. citizens and professionals such as with medical and engineering background, the overall number of Turkish migration in the years that followed was miniscule (Ertan 2002). As to why the small Turkish population, who did not return to Turkey and stayed in the United States, did not establish an ethnic community is still a subject of historical research. Karpat (1985) contends that the foremost presence of men in this group made it difficult to start families with Muslim women and this left to group susceptible to religious conversion. Bilge (1985), on the other hand, studied the mostly

---

<sup>36</sup> In his study, *Becoming an American: An Ethnic History* (New York, 1983) Table V3 (pp. 118-9) Archdeacon shows a return of 80% for the early Turkish immigrants. Proclamation of the new Turkish Republic is believed to play a role.

male Turkish residents in Michigan, as well as Canada, and concluded that due to their strong religious values, Turkish men faced value differentiation with American women and refrained from intermarriage.

*The Second Wave, 1950-1980:*

The second wave of Turkish migration to America refers to the period from the end of World War II to 1980. Turkish immigrants who came to America during the second wave differed from those of the earlier groups and are often considered to be a part of brain-drain. In contrast to their less skilled compatriots of the earlier decades, these immigrants were usually educated professionals (medicine, science and engineering) with higher incomes and this group included women and children. They also had wider migration patterns and settled not only in urban areas on the East Coast but also in Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Alabama, Texas and California (Halman, 1980). In addition, these Turkish immigrants were less mobile than their earlier counterparts and settled permanently in the United States. Return rates for this group were significantly lower. Lastly, the intermarriage rates among the third wave Turkish immigrants were much higher than the earlier group (this is often linked to higher educational achievement).

After Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, many students and army officers arrived in the United States. Although the officers were not immigrants, their newborn children gained automatic citizenship and many of their older children attended U.S. universities and found employment after graduation. Larger numbers of Turks followed particularly after 1965 when America's old restrictive immigration laws were changed, allowing the lifting of quotas. In contrast to the first wave of migrants,

return migration was minimal for those who arrived after 1950s. Most Turks have maintained dual citizenship and have maintained their ties with Turkey.

*The Third Wave, Since 1980s:*

By 1980s, America has attracted young middle-class Turks whose objectives were to obtain better incomes with their high education and often times pursue post-graduate studies or professions. Largely owing to the unstable and unpredictable employment opportunities in Turkey, many of the Turkish immigrants relocated to the United States, mostly to be employed in information technology and engineering sectors (Angin, 2003).

In the 1980s, following a series of economic crises, military coups and economic restructuring in Turkey, the Turkish government adopted new economic policies which emphasized openness to global economy and markets. Parallel to increased interaction, linkages and networks with other countries, many people in Turkey became aware of the new opportunities of education, business and tourism in the United States. Developments in global communication and the cheaper cost of travel have contributed to the increasing number of Turkish immigrants in America, as was the case for most migrants in the world. Temporary visitors from Turkey increasingly sought to change their status to permanent residents in these years (Angin 2003).

Settlement Pattern: According to the results from Census 2000, the five states with the largest number of people who are of Turkish origin were New York, California, New Jersey, Florida and Massachusetts. Combined, these five states amount to 60.7 percent of the total foreign-born population from Turkey in the United States.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> [www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/whosresults.cfm](http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/whosresults.cfm)

The majority of the Turkish immigrants in America have settled in or around large urban centers. The greatest numbers of Turks have lived in New York, Patterson, NJ, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and San Francisco

#### **4.2.2 The Political Context in Turkey and its Effects on Turkish**

##### **Immigrants Abroad**

Far from being a monolithic entity, Turks include a diversified group of immigrants in Europe, as well as in the United States. In order to better understand their organizational development, their relations with each other, local and national authorities and other public and private organizations, one needs to examine this plurality, its reasons and what they represent and aim to provide for their community. Thus a brief look at the history of modern Turkey is necessary to pinpoint why the modernization efforts have resulted in the divisive issues regarding the Turkish identity, something that has been reflected in all organizational formations.

During the Ottoman times, in the eyes of Western Europeans, a Turk denoted any Muslim living in the empire, regardless of ethnic origin or language. Contrary to other empires, such as the Russian Empire, the Ottoman state never officially categorized its Muslim subjects according to ethnic origins. Therefore, such Muslim groups as Bosnians or Albanians in the Balkans and the Caucasians who migrated to the Ottoman lands in the nineteenth century mixed with each other, assimilating into the new dominant ethnic identity of 'Turk'. According to Kemal Karpat (2006), a natural Turkification occurred among the nineteenth century immigrants without much interference on the part of the Ottoman government owing to common faith and

customs and personal loyalty to the sultan-caliph.<sup>38</sup> During the Ottoman Empire, Islam and the state were inseparable. They adopted to the Turco-Islamic community and to a lesser extent the de facto state language, Turkish.

The identity issue changed radically with the abolition of sultanate in 1922 and the caliphate in 1924, the two pillars of the old regime. Following Ataturk's revolution, the Turkish government has engaged in a top-down modernization effort with the goal of a secular and modern Turkish state in mind. In order to keep religion and state separate a directorate of religious affairs (Diyanet) was established. The main task of the directorate has been to control religious activities in the country. Also with the same goal in mind, religious parties were banned from Turkish politics (Doomernik 1995).

These modernization and secularization efforts have resulted in substantial differences within Turkey over how the country should be organized politically, economically and religiously (as well as how to deal with minority populations such as the Kurds). Concerns about the territorial and political unity of the country in the face of Kurdish rebellions and the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist groups against secularism led to an understanding of national identity that emphasized homogeneity and 'Turkishness' (Avci and Kirisci 2004, Ogelman et al. 2002). In the following decades, although the influence of political and religious opposition to the secular state was limited, a form of parallel Islam was formed, which has lived on to today. Modern Turkey, therefore, preserved the old mass-elite duality and by intense secularization

---

<sup>38</sup> The term caliphate refers to the first system of governance established in Islam after the death of Prophet Muhammad, and represented the political authority and unity of the Muslim community. The Caliphate was claimed by dynasties such as the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and lastly the Ottomans. Until the caliphate was officially abolished in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ottoman Sultans were also recognized as the religious leaders of all Sunni Muslims.

efforts, along with an emphasis on the officially defined Turkishness, a silent mass opposition was created (Kemal Karpat 2006).

These differences within Turkey were also present among the immigrants who lived abroad. A variety of Turkish groups formed organizations for a particular ideology or a cause in their host countries where state control over religion was nonexistent (for instance in the Dutch case even supplementary). Particularly in Western Europe, where the majority of Turks migrated to, opposition to the Turkish state and Diyanet could be organized without any interference or control from the Turkish government. Political events in Turkish politics had been instrumental in this outcome.

In recent decades, Turkish politics and society have been characterized by deep ideological divisions and extreme fragmentation along political and ideological lines. Subsequent military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980 further destabilized the country and had significant consequences with respect to the formation and development of Turkish organizations in Western Europe. Following the intervention in 1960, a new constitution was adopted to guarantee free speech and free association/assembly in Turkey. As a result, there was an enormous expansion in political parties, civic associations and interest groups with different ideological views. More people became involved with politics. In the absence of a commensurate state capacity to control civil society, radical anti-establishment groups began to clash (Sayari 1996).

The resultant armed and deadly confrontations prompted the military to intervene in 1980. Post-1980, many people were imprisoned, a huge number of civic associations and political parties were closed, politicians were banned from politics and the previously politicized Turkish society became depoliticized in a very short period of

time. Those political leaders (both left-wing and right-wing) who were not jailed managed to escape to Europe and became the driving forces behind the establishment of Turkish organizations there. Both left wing and right-wing immigrant organizations established in Europe mirrored the political events in Turkey.

### **4.2.3 Turkish Organizing Process in Amsterdam and New York**

#### **4.2.3.1 History of Turkish Organizing in Amsterdam**

As elsewhere in Europe, the founding and development of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam was primarily influenced by the political developments in Turkey between late 1960s and 1980s. The political polarization of left and right wing groups and the intense rivalry between them were very much replicated among the Turkish organizations in the Netherlands. Oppositional movements, such as radical left vs. radical right, religious vs. secular, Turkish vs. Kurdish, Alevis vs. Sunnis, characterized particularly the initial stages of organizational formation. Therefore, early organizations were strongly focused on Turkey and on each other (Vermeulen, 2006). Over the years, organizations have gradually paid more attention to host society related issues. This section looks at the development of Turkish organizational activity mainly in Amsterdam. It examines the organizations under the broad categories of left-wing, right-wing and religious. A discussion of types, functions, services and characteristics of these organizations will follow in the next section.

#### *Left Wing Movement and Organizations*

Following the 1960 coup and the adoption of a new democratic and liberal constitution, a legal left movement emerged in Turkey. A diverse group of left-wing activists, social democrats, trade unionists, Marxists and radicals were a part of this

socialist movement. The official communist party TKP remained prohibited and carried out clandestine operations. Until the military intervention in 1971, some of these left-wing groups acted through the legal Marxist workers party TIP which was established in 1961. Others set up their own organizations. Due to ideological differences, personal struggles and the electoral failure of the TIP in 1969, there were many splinter groups representing a diverse political spectrum on the left (Nell, 2008: 125).

Following the violent clashes between left and right wing groups, the military interventions of 1971 and 1980 had important consequences for the leftist groups and their organizational strategy. Many groups continued their activities in exile or illegally in Turkey. The constitution adopted after the 1980 coup did not wholly reinstate the political freedoms and legal arrangements regulating rights to assembly and establish political organizations. Particularly, the left was excluded from the political arena. Whereas some of the leaders living in Europe started to organize among Turkish guest workers in their host countries, other key figures and left-wing parties sought international mobilization as a strategy to push their political goals (Nell, 2008: 126-7).

Reflecting these political developments in Turkey, left wing organizations established in the Netherlands and in Amsterdam were also splintered into different groups and they all flourished as a result of the Dutch liberal political environment and institutions. They became active in local politics, had strong ties with other likeminded Turkish organizations in Europe and in Turkey. They held demonstrations, protests, and hunger strikes; gave media statements, distributed pamphlets and tried to pressure the subsequent Turkish governments to grant more freedoms. The most important left wing organizations in Amsterdam were HTIB, DIDF, HTKB and ATKB.

The oldest and one of the most active left-wing non-profit Turkish organizations in Amsterdam is HTIB (Hollanda Turkiyeli Isciler Birligi, the Dutch Turkish Workers Union). With its Marxist orientation, HTIB, established in 1974, initially had strong ties with the Turkish Communist Party. It was founded by Turkish immigrant workers and refugees who left Turkey for political reasons. The mission of the organization was to organize Turkish workers in Amsterdam, as well as in the Netherlands as a whole, to improve democratic conditions and human rights in Turkey and display solidarity with fellow left wing groups there. HTIB was equally active in negotiating immigrant rights with the local and national Dutch authorities. Initial topics of claims by the organization include housing, access to health care, residence permits and regularization of illegal workers. With family reunifications in the late 1970s, a wider range of issues became topic of contention. Measures against anti-discrimination, education in mother tongue and wider educational problems have been on their agenda.

President of HTIB, Mustafa Ayranci explained their organizational mission and activities over the years. Ayranci stated that:

“HTIB, founded in 1974 is the oldest Turkish organization in Europe and in the Netherlands. It was formed by 37 people, including guest workers living in Amsterdam, under the leadership of prominent Turkish figures who had to leave Turkey following the political events of March 1972. The main objectives were to 1) achieve equal rights for Turkish people in the Netherlands and 2) to show solidarity with [like-minded] groups in Turkey and improve human rights record of the country. HTIB is a left-wing organization that is open to various cultural groups (Laz, Kurdish, Armenian, etc).”

At the same time, HTIB fought with right wing Turkish organizations and sought to have the nationalist Grey Wolves organizations banned in the Netherlands. They also competed with other smaller left wing (Maoist) groups who opposed their movement labeling it as 'social fascism' (Nell, 2008: 129). With the military intervention in 1980 and the disbanding of political parties, unions and youth organizations, solidarity activities with the homeland came to the forefront. For that purpose, HTIB established close relations with like-minded Turkish organizations in Europe that supported the Turkish Communist Party, TKP. It also agreed to be a part of the Federation of Turkish Workers Associations (FIDEF) in West Germany<sup>39</sup>.

In 1987, the Turkish Communist Party, TKP merged with the Worker's Party of Turkey, TIP to make up of TBKP (the United Communist Party of Turkey). With the dissolution of TKP in 1989 following the fall of Berlin Wall, internal conflicts emerged in HTIB that was heavily influenced by the TKP and many members left the organization. From that point onwards, more emphasis has been given to activities and claims in the host country parallel to the realization that Turkish immigrants were to stay in the Netherlands permanently. HTIB began to cooperate with other Turkish organizations from differing ideological viewpoints and joined as a member of the IOT, the advisory council of Turks of the Dutch government at the national level. IOT brings together Turkish organizations with various ideological orientations and serves as a vehicle to find common ground in making claims on behalf of the Turkish community at large (Nell, 2008: 130).

---

<sup>39</sup> The FIDEF assembled a wide range of left wing organizations, from groups that supported CHP (the Turkish Kemalist Party) to DISK (the confederation of socialist trade unions). Many CHP and TKP followers joined FIDEF's activities and meetings (Nell, 2008: 129).

Ayranci remarks that the organizational undertakings have changed, deepened and become more extensive over the years.

“In the early years, HTIB focused on the improvement of the living conditions for guest workers. People used to live in small spaces, often without health benefits. We strove for the introduction of legal rules and regulations to maintain better standards of living and the regularization of illegal immigrants. Later, organizational activities diversified. We struggled for dual citizenship and issues related to that, such as obligatory military service in Turkey and the right to external voting. Following the 1980 coup in Turkey, there were more people who had to leave the country because of political reasons. HTIB became a place for them to gather and formulate opinions and strategies. Ties with labor unions in Turkey, most notably DISK, became crucial. In the 1990s, a more diversified approach was adopted by the organization which provided Turkish immigrants with Dutch citizenship classes, advice on family reunification and family formation, as well as on visa procedures. In addition to integration-related matters, efforts also included areas in arts and culture, and language preservation. In recent years, HTIB has become more vocal about anti-discrimination in the job market, unemployment, and equal pay. We have paid attention to social issues concerning the youth, elderly, and domestic abuse. Moreover, educational matters and the segregation of migrant neighborhoods and its effects on the children have been on our organizational agenda.”

HTIB's claiming activities in the recent years have included issues related to dual citizenship, integration and citizenship classes, discrimination, segregation (residential and educational), rising residence fees for immigrants, women's rights and assistance to domestic abuse victims, and the arrangements with respect to military service in Turkey. It has become the first Turkish organization with a broad community base to support and advocate for gay rights. In addition, HTIB has actively backed the creation and activities of cultural events (theater and music) groups, sports and youth organizations and educational centers. Parallel to these broadening of activities, it has eventually come to include seven branches in Amsterdam, Leiden, the Hague, Venlo, Eindhoven, and Alkmaar<sup>40</sup>.

Another important left wing nonprofit organization in Amsterdam is DIDF (Demokratik Isci Dernekleri Federasyonu, Federation of Democratic Workers Organizations), which was established in 1985 by the followers of TDKP (Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey) who left Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. Similar to HTIB, DIDF has had close ties with other Turkish organizations in Europe, especially with its sister organization in Germany that dates from 1980. It has also had the dual mission of improving democracy in Turkey and of pushing the interests of the immigrant community from Turkey on the Dutch political agenda. On both fronts, their discourse has emphasized people from Turkey, rather than Turkish people, to include all ethnic groups such as the Kurds<sup>41</sup>.

The main dictum of the DIDF has been the goal of achieving full equality for all foreigners. Particularly, workers' rights, such as equal pay for equal work and anti-

---

<sup>40</sup> Interview with HTIB leader, Mustafa Ayranci. Amsterdam. March 10 and 18, 2009.

<sup>41</sup> <http://www.didf.nl/Default.aspx?id=5465&mid=5437&midpath=,5437>,

discrimination measures in the job market, have been central to organizational activities. Working with various unions and other progressive Dutch NGOs, DIDF has sought to improve the socio-economic conditions of all Dutch citizens with respect to housing, residential segregation and health care. Other groups that the organization has cooperated with include political parties (more with the Socialist Party than the Labor Party), local authorities, other Dutch workers groups and ethnic organizations from Morocco and Latin America<sup>42</sup>.

During local and national elections, DIDF encourages the Turkish community to vote and vote in a deliberative manner. They seek to inform them about the candidates and the issues they stand for and discourage voting patterns among the community for only Turkish candidates based on their ethnic background. DIDF leaders also negotiate with the local Dutch authorities over issues that conflict with other Turkish religious groups and organizations. For instance, they argue against the opening of kindergartens and nurseries in and around mosques and criticize the Dutch authorities for allowing the religious organizations to play what is seen by the organization as a disproportionate representative role. They are equally critical of the developments after 2001. According to the current DIDF leader, Nuri Karabulut, events that followed the attacks in September 11, mainly the Madrid and London bombings, the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and the subsequent framing of Islam in public discourse in a highly politicized and securitized fashion have radically slowed down the positive changes that had begun to take shape in the late 1990s. Related with the events that followed 9/11, another important area of contention has been the wars in Iraq and

---

<sup>42</sup> Interview with DIDF leader, Nuri Karabulut. Amsterdam. February 25, 2009

Afghanistan and the sending of troops by the Dutch government. Protesting the war and the presence of Dutch troops there is one of the organizational claims that DIDF has undertaken in recent years. DIDF has also continued to make claims on the socio-economic front, objecting to the privatization of health care and postal services, and demanding flexible working conditions. Lately, they have cooperated with Dutch unions in preventing the privatization of the tram system in Amsterdam<sup>43</sup>.

With respect to Turkey and Turkish politics, the organization has continued to be critical of the position of the Kurdish minority and argued that the intervention of Turkish state through its consulates and organizations like Diyanet (state organ of religion) has contributed to the division of the Turkish community in the Netherlands along ethnic lines and has thereby impeded their successful integration into the Dutch society.

HTKB (Hollanda Turkiyeli Kadınlar Birliği, Turkish Women Association in the Netherlands) was the first national Turkish women's organization established in 1974 in Amsterdam. With its emphasis on democracy, freedom of speech and assembly and equality on all aspects of life, HTKB had close contacts with the left-wing organization HTIB and similar organizations in Turkey. In fact, in 1975, coinciding with the establishment of the organization in Amsterdam, a sister organization, named IKD (İlerici Kadınlar Derneği, Association of Progressive Women) was founded in Turkey. HTKB had strong ties with the TKP (Turkish Communist Party) in Turkey and other sister organizations in Europe<sup>44</sup>. Over the years, however, despite the continuation of

---

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Archives of IISH, HTKB.Amsterdam.<http://www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/h/10815458full.php> accessed on May 11, 2009.

these ties, the main focus of the organizational activities shifted towards the every day problems faced by the Turkish community and in particular by women and children of immigrant background in the Netherlands.

Quickly after its initiation, HTKB became very active and the organization opened several branches in the country. In 1995, HTKB was terminated and two organizations replaced it: ATKB (Amsterdam Turkiyeli Kadınlar Birliği, Amsterdam Turkish Women's Union) and HTKF (Hollanda Turkiyeli Kadınlar Federasyonu, Netherlands Turkish Women's Federation) which used to work at the national level but now is a sleeping organization. These organizations spearheaded the Turkish women's movement in the Netherlands and have become important actors in their claims making at the local policy level about the position of migrant women. They have been recognized as natural partners by various public organizations and other Dutch NGOs with respect to the emancipation of immigrant women, housing, health care, equality at workplace and domestic abuse<sup>45</sup>. Educational activities such as language classes (both in Turkish and Dutch) and information sessions on various Dutch institutions have had the goal of educating Turkish women; enabling their socio-economic independence and integrating them into the Dutch society. Various projects have been related to improving job opportunities for women in the labor market<sup>46</sup>.

Numerous legal campaigns initiated by ATKB include the status of illegal workers, foreigners, youth and women who came to the Netherlands as the dependents of male workers. One of the important achievements of the organization is their role in changing the legal arrangements with respect to the status of dependent wives who have

---

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. Also see ATKB webpage at <http://www.atkb.nl>

<sup>46</sup> Interview with ATKB leader, Sevgi Gungormus. Amsterdam. February 16 and 20, 2009.

been subject to domestic abuse. Women who arrived in the country through family reunifications or formations were required to stay married with their husbands for at least three years. Therefore, abuse victims could not obtain separate residence and working permits before then. With the help of ATKB, a new rule was accepted, making it possible for immigrant women to obtain such rights even if they have lived in the country less than a year, provided that they prove the abuse with medical records and police reports. Other collaborative actions, such as on the emancipation plan of the municipality of Amsterdam, cooperation with political parties, community centers and municipal social services have continued in recent years.<sup>47</sup>

#### *Right Wing Organizations*

Right wing Turkish organizations mainly include the umbrella organization Turkish Federation Netherlands (TFN, Turkse Federatie Nederlands), also known as the Federation of Idealistic Democratic Turkish Organizations in the Netherlands and the Turkish Islamic Federation (Turks Islamitische Federatie). These umbrella organizations consist of numerous tightly connected local organizations (youth, sports, women's, and mosques). There is also a separate federation for sports groups in the country that participates in the IOT, the advisory council for Turks at the national level. TFN was established in 1995 and is a continuation of HTDF (Hollanda Turk Dernekleri Federasyonu) that was founded in 1980s. It is often claimed that these organizations have close ties with the MHP (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, Nationalistic Action Party) nationalistic political party in Turkey, as well as with their unofficial militant arm, known as the *Grey Wolves* (Avci, 2005: 205). The name *Grey Wolves* refers to

---

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

paramilitary youth groups in the 1960s and 1970s that were allied with MHP, led by Alparslan Türkeş until his death in 1997. The extreme politicization of Turkish politics at the end of 1960s was followed by widespread street violence between rival groups in the 1970s, which included grey wolves supporters and a wider nationalistic group *Ulkuculer*<sup>48</sup>. Their main opposition consisted of left wing communists as well as Alevis. In the 1990s, Kurdish minorities, especially those with ties with the PKK (Kurdish Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan), became their main target.

Over the years, homeland ties and issues have characterized the main activities of TFN and its member organizations. Demonstrations against the PKK; protests, media statements and distribution of pamphlets on the Armenian issue; show of solidarity with Turks in other countries, such as Azerbaijan, and Macedonia and vocal support for the Turkish Cypriots have occupied a prominent place on their organizational agenda. In addition, they have also provided Turkish immigrants with various services, including religious ones (mosque and funeral services). Regular cultural and social events organized by different branches of the federation have had the goal of preserving Turkish culture.<sup>49</sup> There has been much public debate and criticism about the subsidization of right wing organizations by the Dutch governments, especially in the 1990s. As a result, in 2000, the municipal district of Zeeburg broke all financial ties with the TFN. Currently, this debate has lost its intensity and member organizations of the federation receive project-based subsidies like other immigrant organizations. They

---

<sup>48</sup> Ulkucu or Ulkuculer refer to ultranationalist groups that follow the political line of MHP (Nationalistic Action Party) in Turkey.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with TFN General Secretary, Murat Gedik. Amsterdam. February 13, 2009.

continue to maintain ties with other *ulkucu* groups in Turkey (mainly with MHP) and elsewhere in Europe.

### *Religious Organizations*

Following the initial founding of the Turkish organizations in the Netherlands, the intense division and conflict between the left and right wing groups were gradually replaced by religion (Vermeulen, 2006: 66). The first Islamic organizations in the Netherlands were primarily mosque organizations that sought to meet the basic needs of Muslim immigrants, such as the need for prayer rooms, religious leaders and teahouses. After the end of the 1970s, a number of mosque organizations expanded their activities and started to organize activities for children, such as language lessons, after-school child care and homework supervision. Various religious Turkish groups, such as the *Suleymanci*, *Nurcu* and *Milli Gorus* movements, became active in social, cultural and political arenas in addition to organizing around religion. They organized separately, supported different political parties in Turkey and competed for resources in Amsterdam once subsidies became available for immigrant organizations. Fearing the influence of these movements on the Turkish immigrants, the Turkish state developed a network of mosque committees in Europe in the late 1970s and put it under the supervision of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*). The Turkish government argued that the leaders of these religious movements were eventually aiming to change the secularist nature of the regime and replacing it by an Islamic state. Having been outlawed or repressed after the Turkish military intervention in 1980, these leaders and the organizations they helped establish operated freely in their host countries (Maussen, 2005:13).

By 1980s, the mosque organizations were capable of rallying lots of supporters. Also, as immigrant organizations, they attained a robust status in civil society, owing to the existing legislation and the protection of freedom of religion. Throughout this period there was a struggle between the developing religious organizations and the existing secular immigrant organizations among the Turks. This divergence highlighted the issue as to which organizations should speak for the Turkish immigrant population in making claims to the Dutch authorities.

The Suleymanci movement was the first religious Turkish group to organize in the Netherlands. SICN (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland) was established in 1972 in Utrecht and had branches and mosques in other Dutch cities, including Amsterdam. They are called Suleymancis because of their link and following of Suleyman Hilmi Turhan, a religious leader in Turkey, who taught religious law, dogmas and the stages of inner path that serve as the spiritual guide for the Naksibandi order, a mystical movement within Sunni Islam. Despite being critical of the secular regime in Turkey, more spiritually guided Suleymanci organizations have stayed away from active politics in Amsterdam and other cities.

Religious courses on Quran teachings and mystical gatherings in mosques have been their main organizational activity. However, recently, the Suleymanci community in the Netherlands that includes 91 immigrant organizations and 48 mosques has undergone some changes under the leadership of Fikri Demirtas. Although religious activities and Islamic education of children remain the primary commitment of the Suleymanci movement, a wider range of activities and projects are also being

undertaken, including various women and youth groups (Vermeulen, 2006: 67-8; Azak, 2008: 148-9).

The Milli Gorus movement has been one of the strongest and enduring examples of Turkish organizing in the Netherlands (and in Europe in general). Milli Gorus (National View) reflects the conservative religious ideology of several Turkish political parties that succeeded each other over the years. Turkish Constitutional Court ruled to disband these parties on the grounds that they threatened to change the secular nature of state. Milli Nizam Party (1970-1971), Milli Selamet Party (1972-1980), Refah Party (1983-1998), Fazilet Party (1997-2001), and Saadet Party (2001 and on) have all followed the same Milli Gorus line, which emphasizes moral and religious education and closer relations between Turkey and other muslim countries. Under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the Milli Gorus movement became a strong oppositional force to center left and right political parties and the official version of Islam regulated by the Diyanet<sup>50</sup>. With the massive arrival of Turkish guest workers from Turkey in the 1970s, Milli Gorus established a dense web of networks in Western Europe.

The Milli Gorus movement is mainly divided into two regional organizations in the Netherlands, North (Milli Gorus Nederland, the MGN) and South (Nederlands Islamitische Federatie, the NIF). Together, they control around 34 mosques in the country and bring together a huge number of smaller organizations that include women's groups, youth organizations, and sports clubs. Whereas the MGN has developed more independently than the NIF, which followed the traditional line of Milli

---

<sup>50</sup> After the dissolution of Fazilet Party in 2001 and disbanding of its leader Necmettin Erbakan from Turkish politics for five years, the party splintered into two. Those who adhered to the Milli Gorus line followed Recai Kutan under the newly formed Saadet Party and others who preferred a more pragmatic approach joined Ak Party under the current leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Gorus, both federations have maintained ties with the main strongholds of the movement in Turkey and Germany. Over the years, with the emergence of a younger generation of leaders, the MGN in Amsterdam and other northern Dutch cities have become more conciliatory and flexible in their dealings with the Dutch authorities. One of the most visible faces of the MGN was the then president of the organization Haci Karacaer, who has expressed more liberal views than his counterparts, on various issues, such as the role of women, homosexuality and reform in Islam. Still, the main constituency of Milli Gorus organizations has remained more conservative than some of its leaders (Vermeulen, 2006: 68; Amersfoort and Doomernik, 2003: 184).

Similar to other Turkish organizations, during the initial phase of organizing, the Milli Gorus organizations were mainly focused on homeland politics. However, their orientation has gradually shifted towards the host country and issues related to the integration of immigrants. Women and youth organizations have become very active in organizing events, cultural and religious meetings, and informing their constituency about the specifics of the Dutch institutions. Particular emphasis is given on the Dutch educational system. Many Milli Gorus organizations offer language classes (both Turkish and Dutch), after-school homework assistance programs and provide eligible students with internship opportunities. Leaders of the MGN are also active in the management of Islamic schools and they make claims about related issues. For instance, they demand the allocation of more space for Islamic schools that are closer to migrant neighborhoods since they believe the proximity of these schools to residential areas will attract a higher number of enrolled students<sup>51</sup>.

---

<sup>51</sup> Interview with the MGN leader, Yusuf Altuntas, Amersfoort. March 16, 2009.

The official state organ in charge of regulating religious life in Turkey is the Diyanet. Migration of Turkish workers to Europe in large numbers and the subsequent establishment of a wide range of religious organizations, some of which adhered to a more fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, prompted the Diyanet to create its own organizational structure in the host countries. Diyanet mosque organizations established in these countries represent a liberal line which accepts the secular Turkish state. Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi (HDV, the Netherlands Diyanet Foundation) was legalized in December 1982 and it constitutes the largest religious federation in the Netherlands with 143 mosques as its local branches. The official goals of HDV were to coordinate religious activities and also to serve as a uniting factor among the Turkish community<sup>52</sup>.

Through a bilateral agreement signed between Turkey and the Netherlands, the Directorate in Turkey started to send imams for a period of 4 years. Due to criticisms over the perceived negative role of these imams, who were sent to the country on a temporary basis and therefore lacked the necessary language skills as well as the knowledge about the Dutch society, the Dutch government abolished this practice in 2004 and after a grace period, the importation of imams from Turkey ceased in 2008. Instead, local imams will be educated and appointed within the Netherlands. For that purpose, special funds have been given to three Dutch higher education institutions: VU (Vrije Universiteit) Amsterdam, In-Holland School and Leiden University<sup>53</sup>.

HDV mosque organizations in Amsterdam, like others in the Netherlands, do not only provide religious services such as prayer services, Haj trips (pilgrimage to

---

<sup>52</sup> Interview with Bulent Senay. The Hague. April 2, 2009.

<sup>53</sup> Diyanet Avrupa Dergisi. Issue title: Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands. October 2008. No 114: 11-12.

Mecca), funeral services and religious education for children. They also fulfill numerous social functions; they support the elderly, offer Turkish language classes, help students of Turkish background with housing and provide successful students with scholarships. Mosque organizations also serve as social spaces where the Turkish community comes together and organizes around various activities. These activities are mostly comprised of, but not always limited to, cultural and social events<sup>54</sup>. The Director of Eyup Sultan Mosque Ibrahim Gormez states:

“Mosque organizations in Amsterdam and elsewhere in the Netherlands are not only religious gathering places. They provide the Turkish community with many grass-roots services: help with job placement, student aid, at times legal assistance...our mosque is a space for people to pray as much as to come together and talk about daily issues, political events. We offer a meeting place for various Dutch political parties and the community. This happens more during election times.”<sup>55</sup>

Thus, another vital function of the local HDV branches is that they serve as intermediaries between the Dutch authorities, political parties and the Turkish community. Particularly during elections, mosque leaders are approached by the local Dutch politicians to set up meetings where they can explain their political goals and party programs to Turkish voters. Similar requests are made by the councilors of

---

<sup>54</sup> Interview with the director of HDV Eyup Sultan Mosque, Ibrahim Gormez. Amsterdam. February 19, 2009.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

Turkish background who see these organizations as points of access to the larger Turkish population<sup>56</sup>.

Another Turkish religious movement that has received attention is the so-called Nurcus, who follow the teachings of a religious leader, Said Nursi. The most well-known and active Nurcu group has been the network founded by Fethullah Gulen. They are also referred to as ‘Fethullahcilar’ (Azak, 2008: 151). As will be detailed in the section on transnational ties of Turkish organizations, with its global web of schools, media, and financing institutions, the Gulen movement has become a truly transnational force. In ever-increasing numbers, Gulen schools, inter-faith dialogue centers, educational, cultural and religious foundations have opened in many diverse locations, such as Central Asia, Europe, Far East Asia, North America and Africa. Organizations associated with the Gulen movement do not organize around mosques and religion is not perceived as a political rallying point on their organizational agendas. Educational institutions play a particularly important role in their activities. Learning centers where students meet also serve as social spaces where deeper bonds are formed. Critics of these organizations have long claimed that students attending these schools and living in their dormitories are being indoctrinated against the secular Turkish state.

The most notable organizations associated with the Gulen movement are Stichting Witte Tulp, Cosmicus College and Institute, and Dialoog Academie. The former two organizations have also branches in Amsterdam. These organizations serve mainly as learning centers. Many volunteers work in a professionalized style on mentoring projects, language classes, homework assistance programs and the centrally

---

<sup>56</sup> Interview with the directors of HDV Fatih Mosque, Yasar Tas and Fikret Onder. Amsterdam. February 10, 2009.

administered CITO exam preparation courses. CITO test results have vital implications for the educational paths of all students. The main objective of these organizations is to improve the educational position of Turkish students. In addition to helping these students on academic matters, they also seek to inform migrant parents on the role and importance of parental guidance in the Dutch educational system. In certain cases, these organizations negotiate with school teachers and administrators over educational matters.

The Dutch educational system has a highly stratified structure where students are sorted into different tracks at the age 12. Students with immigrant background, including Turkish, are overrepresented in the lower vocational tracks. In some cases, despite higher CITO test results, immigrant students are advised to attend to lower tracks. Immigrant parents, who mostly have low educational attributes, are either indifferent or incapable of making a difference in this selection process. At times, organizations are asked to get involved in such situations<sup>57</sup>.

The Gulen movement has been criticized heavily in and outside of Turkey. Critics often argue that despite a discourse of dialogue, the Gulen movement, and thereby all the schools and other associated organizations, carry a double agenda that includes the Islamization of the society. In the summer of 2008, a documentary shown on one of the Dutch TV channels highlighted such criticisms by Turks, as well as Dutch academics, and prompted requests for an investigation in the parliament. The objective of this investigation is to determine whether there are any irregularities in the ways

---

<sup>57</sup> Interview with the leader of Stichting Witte Tulp, Murat Alici. Amsterdam. March 12, 2009.

subsidies and government funds are being used and whether or not school and dorm life in the Gulen schools foster integration.<sup>58</sup>

Other Turkish organizations that focus on educational matters, such as STOC, also provide crucial services to the Turkish community. Indeed, an important goal of the Turkish organizations has been to raise awareness among the families about the importance of parental guidance in their children's educational paths. The director of STOC, Ismail Ercan explains that:

“For that purpose, we arrange meetings and seminars, prepare informational leaflets for the parents on the specifics of the Dutch educational system and emphasize the significance of taking an active interest in school selections, not signing any documents before making sure that their kids are properly advised. Some of the students are advised not to take the CITO exams because the school administration is concerned about them lowering the school average. Our organization tries to make the parents understand that taking the test is the basic right of the student and even if the expected score is low, he/she should be encouraged to take it.”<sup>59</sup>

In fact, educational matters have occupied a prominent place on the agendas of many Turkish organizations in recent years. Associations make a point to serve as family advocates in Turkish parents' relations and dealings with school managements and teachers in Amsterdam. Among the many issues they have raised a common

---

<sup>58</sup> The documentary can be accessed on the NOVA website: <http://www.novatv.nl/page/detail/uitzendingen/6173#>. In the documentary, non religious Turkish organization, HTIB leader, Mustafa Ayranci also criticizes Gulen network for indoctrinating Turkish children at a very young age according to Islamic principles.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with STOC president Ismail Ercan, February 27, 2009, Amsterdam.

complaint made by Turkish organizational leaders is the importance of cultural differences and the failure of Dutch authorities to fully grasp the significance of its implications. ATKB director Sevgi Gungormus offers a good example of differing cultural viewpoints between the teachers and the migrant parents:

“Having displayed some behavioral problems in class, a Turkish student, at the age of 6 or 7, is referred to the services of a school psychologist. The psychologist asks the student to make a drawing of whatever inspires him on a piece of paper. He draws a garden and inside that a house with a door, windows and a chimney with smoke coming out of it. There are iron bars framing the windows at the ground level. The psychologist invites the parents to tell them that this drawing reflects a very repressed and unhappy child, specifically referring to the iron bars and the smoke coming out of the chimney. Knowing good enough Dutch to express themselves, the parents explain to the therapist that contrary to the drawn conclusion, this drawing represents a happy time and place in the child’s life when he felt completely free. Having spent the previous winter break in Turkey at a village where their extended family lives, the student depicts what can be called a typical village home. Windows have bars to prevent burglary and there is smoke coming out of the chimney since there are still old stoves being used for heating in some parts of rural Turkey. Not expecting such an explanation, the therapist agrees that she might have misinterpreted the drawing completely<sup>60</sup>”.

---

<sup>60</sup> Of course, it is important to note that we do not have knowledge of the background of the therapist or whether there were factors other than the kid’s drawing that led the therapist to her original conclusion.

Of course, this anecdote does not reflect any systemized practice but, it is useful in seeing where both parties are coming from culturally<sup>61</sup>. Gungormus told me that ATKB, like other Turkish organizations in Amsterdam emphasize such occurrences to Dutch authorities and improve the way both sides view each other, as well as help immigrant children pursue higher academic success.

The final group of Turkish religious organizations is the Alevis who constitute a religious minority in Turkey. They are different from the other Sunni groups in the sense that they do not recognize the five pillars of Islam or attend mosques, but have their own religious ceremonies, the cemevis. Principles of social justice and equality, as well as an overarching emphasis on humanistic values, characterize the Alevi understanding. Women also enjoy a better communal position in terms of equality with men compared to other religious groups. Due to this ideological stance, the Alevis have been natural partners for left-wing parties and organizations (Jorgensen, 2008: 16).

The organization of Alevi groups in Europe came much later than other Turkish organizations in mid-1990s. Whereas the Sunni dominance in Turkey remained unchallenged until the 1980s, a number of events facilitated the Alevi organizational formation and activities outside of Turkey. The tension between Orthodox Sunni groups and Alevis turned fatal in 1993, when a house full of Alevi artists, musicians and intellectuals was set on fire in the city of Sivas. Thirty-six people died in the fire. In the months following this incident, another violent clash between the Sunni and Alevi groups ended with the police force firing into the crowds killing 27 people in an

---

<sup>61</sup> Interview with ATKB (Vereniging Van Vrouwen Uit Turkije in Amsterdam- Amsterdam Turkish Women Union) leader Sevgi Gungormus, Amsterdam, February 16, 2009.

Istanbul neighborhood. These events led to a massive mobilization of the Alevi communities in Europe (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001: 268).

The main Alevi federation in the Netherlands is HakDer which brings together smaller Alevi organizations. It is based in the Hague but has branches in other cities, including Amsterdam. It is also part of a bigger confederation of AABK (Alevi Organizations in Europe). HakDer and its member organizations make claims about constitutional changes in Turkey, particularly about the status of Diyanet, recognition of Alevism as an ethnic and religious minority in Turkey and the Netherlands. For that purpose, they ask for the introduction of regulations and facilities through which Alevi *dedes* (the equivalent of imams) can be educated<sup>62</sup>.

#### **4.2.3.2 History of Turkish Organizing in New York**

##### *Ottoman Jews*

In the late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> century, the expulsion of Jews from Spain and Portugal resulted in the greatest influx of Jews into the Ottoman Empire. Accepting the invitation of Sultan Beyazid II, a major portion of the Sephardic Jews (which refers to Jews with ancestral origins from the Iberian peninsula- modern day Spain and Portugal) settled in various parts of the Empire: European provinces (Istanbul, Sarajevo, Salonica), Western and Northern Anatolia (Bursa, Aydin, Amasya) and the coastal regions of the Mediterranean (Jerusalem, Damascus, Safed). They spoke a Judea-Spanish language called *Ladino*.

---

<sup>62</sup> Interview with one of the leaders of HakDer, Muharrem Cengiz. The Hague. March 20, 2009.

Under the millet<sup>63</sup> system of the Empire, in which Jews enjoyed relative tolerance, they could organize as a community on the basis of religion, alongside other millets (such as Orthodox populations, Armenians, etc.). Within this framework of the millet they had a considerable amount of administrative autonomy that allowed rabbis and rabbinical courts to oversee their daily lives and matters of contention.

According to Inalcik, Jews satisfied certain needs in the Empire. The Muslim Turks were often uninterested in business enterprises and thus left commercial occupations to members of minority religions. Also, they did not wholly trust the Christian subjects whose countries had only recently been conquered by the Ottomans. Such distrust and consideration did not apply for the Jewish population and therefore they could thrive in various positions and areas- such as commerce, trade as well as diplomacy and other high offices until the end of 17th century. Particularly in the 16th century the Jews were the most prominent under the millets and despite some incidents in the Arab territories, generally speaking, friction between Jews and Turks was not commonplace (Inalcik, 2001).

During the Ottoman stagnation and decline period in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, Jews were not able to maintain their influence and powerful positions in trade and commerce (which they lost mainly to Greeks). Since a substantial number of the Ottoman Jews lived in the European provinces of the Empire, the Jews of these regions increasingly found themselves under Christian rule as the Ottoman Empire declined and

---

<sup>63</sup> *Millet* refers to the system in which various minority groups in the Ottoman Empire were legally protected. The word *millet* literally means 'nation.' Under the Millet system, religious pluralism was a feature of the Ottoman rule and separate legal courts with respect to their religious affiliations were allowed to operate with little interference from the central government. Millet mainly referred to religious attachments of the minorities rather than their ethnic origins.

lost territories (Bosnia, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria). According to Campos, in this period, Ottoman Jews supported various views on the role of Jews in the Empire that ranged from loyal Ottomanism to Zionism. Some Jewish figures such as Emanuel Karasu of Salonika, for example, was a founding member of the Young Turks movement, and believed that the Jews of the Empire should be Turks first, and Jews second, while others opted to support Zionism which was gaining force (Campos, 2005).

#### *Ottoman Jews in America*

As with the other figures, sources are not in accord with respect to the number of Ottoman Jews who migrated to America. It is estimated that nearly 30,000 Jews from the Near East arrived between 1890 and 1924. According to Marc Engel, by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, New York had a Sephardic Jewish community large enough to regularly publish the newspaper *La America*. Its was particularly involved with Turkish Jews who arrived at Ellis Island without adequate understanding of the immigration laws and thus were forced to stay on the island for long stretches of time before being sent back. Laws pertinent to newcomers were translated and printed in *La Americana* and mediator groups such as the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) got involved to assist with the transition process. However, the members of the HIAS spoke Yiddish and were not familiar with the Sephardic culture and language that had more commonalities with Turks or Greeks than Eastern European Jewry (Angel 2002). Thus, a parallel Sephardic community flourished after their arrival to the United States.<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>64</sup> In fact, Rifat Bali notes that the miscommunication between the two groups were wide enough the largely Ashkenazi Jewish population sometimes thought that the newcomer Sephardic Jews were actually Muslim Turks, who also being circumcised, trying to pass themselves off as Jews (Bali 2006).

It is reported that in the period following WWI in 1914, there were an important number of Turkish Jewish citizens from Anatolia who mostly settled in New York. Although most of these Spanish speaking Turkish immigrants<sup>65</sup> were able to live without help, those who needed assistance benefited from the networks set up among them. Immigrant groups such as *the Chain of Life Association of Constantinople*, *the Brotherhood of Adrionople* and the *Oriental Bureau of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society*, were important and successful in supporting new Turks embarking on new lives in a new land (Alfassa, 2000).<sup>66</sup>

These Turks lived within Sephardic communities, mostly in the Lower East Side of New York, where they regularly visited Turkish cafes, ate Turkish food, sung Turkish songs and spoke in both Spanish and Turkish. Whereas these Turkish immigrants were initially very poor and attended to unskilled jobs such as selling fruits and shining shoes, they eventually got hold of better jobs in seamstresses, clothing pressers and factories. Over the years, these Turkinos (what Alfassa cites as the Turkish Jews called themselves) developed a number of community clubs such as the Salonika Brotherhood, Dardanelles Social Club and Oriental American Civic Club as a platform to maintain ties and support each other.

They started publishing newspapers in their languages, opened small businesses and donated to Turkish Jewish organizations, as well as sent money to their relatives who were still living in Turkey. By 1930s, they became lawyers, teachers and dentists in greater numbers. With increasing immigration to New York, many Turkinos left the city

---

<sup>65</sup> The majority of the Jewish population living in the Ottoman Empire came from the descendents of those Jews who migrated to the Turkish territories following their expulsion from Spain in 1492.

<sup>66</sup> S. Alfassa. 2000. "The Turkinos in America" *Turcoman International* June.

to live all around the United States. While the second and third generation Turkinos assimilated into American culture and obtained respectable positions in all fields, they have also set up congregations attended mostly by Jews of Turkish ancestry in Los Angeles, Seattle, Miami, New York and Atlanta where they keep their heritage alive through festivals, music and newsletters (*Lashon* in Los Angeles, *Ke Haber* in Florida and *American Association of Jewish Friends of Turkey* in New York).<sup>67</sup>

In recent years, Turkish American Jews have continued with their efforts to provide a link with the newcomers and the host society. Mahazike Tora of New York is such a program for Turkish Jews in the New York area, as well as others who would like to learn about Jewish traditions and culture of the Jews from the former Ottoman Empire. Sponsored by the International Sephardic Leadership Council, Mahazike Tora has sought to educate and provide information for Jews who are descendant from Turkish lands including Turkey, Rhodes, the Balkans and other former Ottoman territories. The name of the organization, Mahazike Tora, was selected, since it was a much-loved Jewish organization that was very successful in Turkey, originally founded in 1919. Its organizational activities and programs have included cultural, social, educational and religious activities.

Another active Turkish organization addressing the needs of the Turkish Jews in America and Turkey is American Friends of Turkish Jewry (AFTJ), which was founded in 2006. Through fundraising activities in the New York area from within the Turkish Jewish community itself, as well as from various other Jewish organizations, the AFTJ aims to help the Turkish community in Turkey. Their projects include the improvement

---

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

of “the quality and security of the schools, synagogues, youth organizations, hospitals, retirement homes and other community organizations”.<sup>68</sup>

In 1923, the first Turkish newspaper was published in America under the name “Unity”. The newspaper, which was published three times per month by one of the first Turkish organizations, the Ottoman Teavün Society (the Turkish Aid Society), printed post-Independence War stories and news from the homeland. It was reported that some of the Turks saved their earnings and sent a portion of their modest salaries back home through the organization. According to Sedat Isci (2004), they donated about \$500,000 to the orphans in Turkey. Their associations worked almost like consulate offices. Among the documents discovered by Researcher Sedat Isci (2004), is a donation receipt from the Detroit Turks to Kızılay, or The Red Crescent.<sup>69</sup>

Another active Turkish organization in the 1920s was the Turkish Welfare Association in New York. With the goal of supporting the newly established Republican government in Turkey, Turkish immigrants in America organized around the Turkish Welfare Association in New York that submitted a six page memorandum addressed to the U.S. administration and the Congress leaders, titled as *To the Leaders of the Country of the Free: A Brief from the Turks in America*. This memorandum was written in 1924 and petitioned the congressmen to ratify "The Treaty of Amity and Commerce" signed in Lausanne between the U.S. government and the new Ankara government in Turkey. The text argued against the Greek and Armenian allegations and supported the view that Turkish- American relations should be based on mutual interest.

---

<sup>68</sup> <http://www.aftj.org/about.aspx>

<sup>69</sup> [http://www.turkofamerica.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=161&Itemid=174](http://www.turkofamerica.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=161&Itemid=174)

This is considered to be the first lobbying attempt of the Turkish community in the United States (Akgun, 2000: 106-7).

In 1933, Turks in the United States established the Cultural Alliance of New York and the Turkish Orphans' Association. They collected money and donations for orphans in Turkey who had lost their parents in the Turkish War of Independence (1919– 1923). In addition, they also channeled money and supplies back to Turkey through the Red Cross. These were then turned over to the Red Crescent, their Muslim organization, to help victims of earthquakes and floods (Akcapar, 2009).

One of the oldest, prominent and lasting Turkish organizations is the American Turkish Society (ATS), which was founded in 1949. It was formed by a group of Turkish and American diplomats and businessmen to foster closer ties and understanding between Turkey and the United States. The 1940s saw the flourishing of the Turkish American relations, politically and economically. In 1940, it was reported by the *New York Times* that the United States was the fifth largest exporter to and the second largest importer from Turkey, as the result of war developments<sup>70</sup>. Following the Truman doctrine in 1947, America's relations with Turkey had gained additional significance and the organization started to serve as a forum for prominent political and diplomatic figures, as well as business leaders, from both sides to exchange ideas and find ways to improve bilateral ties<sup>71</sup>. Over the next six decades, this tradition has continued and organizational activities of the ATS can be dubbed as an elite

---

<sup>70</sup> New York Times (1857- Current file); April 27, 1941, p. F3; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2005).

<sup>71</sup> New York Times (1857- Current File); June 8, 1949, p. 15; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2005).

organization, have included academic and educational gatherings, projects related to arts and culture and humanitarian aid programs.

In 1956, one of the two Turkish umbrella organizations, the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA) was established in New York. The other one is the Assembly of the Turkish American Associations (ATAA) and operates in Washington, DC. The FTAA was founded to help Turkish immigrants in the city and promote Turkish interests in America. Like the majority of Turkish organizations in the country, the organization is bound with the legal restrictions applied to 501c3 non-profit organizations, which are not permitted to lobby for candidates and political parties.

Although most organizations, including the FTAA have refrained from open lobbying efforts (partisan electioneering), homeland issues, such as the Cyprus conflict, the Armenian genocide claims, the Kurdish conflict and the PKK, have prompted the FTAA leaders to talk about it and send letters to the editors of major newspapers, including the New York Times about the perceived misrepresentation of these issues<sup>72</sup>. In 1980, the FTAA leaders organized a march in Manhattan along the Fifth Avenue to demonstrate against the killings of Turkish diplomats by the Armenian ASALA group. Over the years, this march has then become an annual event and tradition and it now

---

<sup>72</sup> See, for instance, Erol Gurun's, the President of the FTAA in 1985, letter to the NYT. New York Times (1857-Current file); June 8, 1985, p. 22; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2005); Ayhan Ozer's, Public Relations Director of the FTAA in 1986, letter to the NYT. New York Times (1857-Current file); May 10, 1986, p. 26; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2005); Ata Erim's, the President of the FTAA in 1987, letter to the NYT, New York Times (1857-Current file); April 16, 1987, p. A22; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2005).

serves as a day to promote Turkish culture and improve bilateral ties between Turkey and the United States<sup>73</sup>.

Today, the FTAA has more than 40 member organizations. It is located at the building shared with the Turkish Consulate in New York across the United Nations. Ataturk school is also located in that building where weekend classes take place. Member organizations of the federation have not always worked in harmony. Publicized rivalries and debates between the member organizations, as well as among different leaderships in different times, have given the impression that the inner workings of the umbrella organization have been far from harmonious. Allegations of mismanagement of funds by various administrations, particularly in the last decade, have been a stumbling block for effective organizing.

Still, the FTAA has been vocal about the issues related to Turkey. One of the complaints of the federation is the fact that protests or demonstrations are not always well-attended by the Turkish community. To maximize their outreach, the federation has been working on building a database of people with Turkish origin (Turkic network, including those Turks from the Balkans and Central Asia).

Yusuf Sami Ozcayir is the Executive Director of the FTAA. He holds a political science degree from Istanbul University and prior to his position at the FTAA he worked in the textile industry and served as the vice-president of Global Nassa. Ozcayir mentions that:

“Voter registration and turn-out during elections are actively encouraged by our Federation. We are trying to build a database across the United States to both

---

<sup>73</sup> Interview with Ata Erim, former president of the FTAA, reported on [www.turkishny.com](http://www.turkishny.com); February 15, 2008.

establish the correct number of Turks living in the country and maximize our outreach. One of the main efforts of the Federation is to increase naturalization among the Turkish community and actively encourage applications by those who are eligible for U.S. citizenship.”

“Other strategies have also been developed to counter anti-Turkish rallies or groups. For example, in October 2008, a number of sessions were held in the United Nations over Turkey’s appointment to the Security Council as a temporary member. During the proceedings, in order to avoid any protests by the Greek and Armenian groups, the Federation preemptively reserved the spot allocated for such demonstrations, making it impossible for the opposing groups to show up.”<sup>74</sup>

One of the most important problems faced by the Turkish organizations or clubs established in New York in the earlier periods was continuity. Many organizations ceased to exist in short time due to lack of resources, leadership and mission. Akcapar (2009) notes that in the late 1950s a number of Turkish associations infrequently published their own periodicals, such as *Yankı*, *Türk Dünyası*, and *Anavatan*. *Türk Evi*, a monthly in English and Turkish, was published between 1970 and 1978. Although there were nearly 100 Turkish-American clubs and organizations in the late 1970s nationwide, including university student associations, they were not well-organized and failed to attract continuing members (Akcapar, 2009). This was true for the Turkish organizations in New York as well.

More durable and successful organizations that were founded in the 1960s and 1970s include the Anadolu Club in New Jersey, the Turkish organization for

---

<sup>74</sup> Personal interview with Yusuf Sami Ozcayir, the Executive Director of the FTAA. October 22, 2008. New York.

professionals- the Society of Turkish American Architects, Engineers and Scientists (MIM) in New York and the Turkish Society of Rochester, which was established in 1969 and has continued to diversify and grow in the following decades. In fact, TSOR constitutes one of the oldest and institutionally complete Turkish organizations in the New York metro area. Servicing around 3000-4000 Turkish immigrants living in Rochester, upstate New York, the organization provides the community with educational programs, a school, a mosque, social and cultural activities and festivals, business assistance and family oriented services (nursery, youth related activities and domestic abuse prevention and assistance)<sup>75</sup>.

Mesut Vardar, the then President of the TSOR, who has a business degree and work background in finance and real estate, states that:

“When TSOR was established in 1969, it was done by a number of blue collar workers, most notably tailor families. Initially there were 19 families. Family weddings, birth celebrations and mourning ceremonies were carried out under the umbrella of our organizations. Over the years our organization has been able to diversify in the services provided to the Turkish community. We want to be able to address the daily problems faced by all sections of our community [old, young, women, businessmen]. The goal is to both serve as a bridge to the larger American community and to keep alive the Turkish customs and traditions.”<sup>76</sup>

In the 1980s, with the arrival of a more diversified Turkish population that included conservative and religious segments as well, religious organizations, such as

---

<sup>75</sup> Personal interview with Mesut Vardar, the President of TSOR, over the phone. October 30, 2008. New York.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

mosques, started to flourish. In Brooklyn, New Jersey and Rochester, a number of mosque organizations organized to provide religious services with the increasing Turkish population. In addition to religious services and activities during religious holidays, these organizations have also become social gathering places where the newcomers met and sought assistance with respect to various issues, such as working permits, visa applications, job opportunities and language classes.

In the following decades, there was a proliferation of Turkish organizations in number and type. As discussed in the chapter on the characteristics of the Turkish organizations, more schools and educational organizations were established. Business groups formed nonprofit organizations (TACCI- Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Turkish American Business Forum; TABID- Turkish American Business Improvement and Development Council; TABDC- Turkish Armenian Business Development Council) to enhance commercial and financial ties between the two countries.

Alumni organizations for Turkish universities and high schools, such as METU, ITU, IU and Robert College, have provided a forum for networking among young graduates and have attracted members in joining various cultural, art and professional events. Philanthropic organizations, such as Turkish Philanthropic Fund and the Bridges of Hope, channel funds to Turkey for the completion of numerous projects related to education, empowerment of women, and art.

In the period between 2000 and 2009, the most striking feature of the organizational development of Turks in New York is the establishment of organizations associated with the Gulen network in significant numbers. As of June 2009, the total

number of organizations related to the Gulen network constitutes 23.52 percent of all active Turkish organizations in the New York metro area. These organizations include schools, educational and learning centers, religious foundations, cultural centers and humanitarian aid groups. Most organizations have also youth and women sections providing a variety of socio-cultural activities, including summer camps for children. They also seek to develop close relations with local and national officials, undertake fundraisers for certain candidates, host dinners and events where high profile state officials come together.

*Organizational Problems in New York Perceived by Turkish Leaders*

Some organizational leaders have attributed the lack of activism among Turkish associations in New York to a number of factors related to the organizations themselves. In addition to not fully understanding of the inner workings of local and federal politics, and the letter of the code concerning the non-profit status of 501c3, Turkish organizations have notoriously been riddled with disputes (big and small) that have rendered them unable to cooperate and formulate common positions throughout the years.

Nur Emirgil, who is the executive officer of a multinational corporation, Ramerica International, has been an active organizer in the Turkish community. She founded *Moon and Stars Project*, a Turkish non-profit on arts and culture, and now serves as the Honorary Chairperson; and also worked in various capacities in the *American Turkish Society (ATS)* and *Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TACCI)*.

According to Ms Emirgil Turkish organizations in New York have faced a number of similar common problems. She places some blame on the organizations themselves for not being as effective and far-reaching as they could be.

“One of the most serious problems [that the Turkish organizations experience] is their tendency to being ethnically closed off and not being able to venture out of their existing members and networks. Also, current associations can not work effectively with the local, federal and state administrators or undertake projects with other Chambers of Commerce. They need to develop ties with these institutions without being superficial.”<sup>77</sup>

According to Emirgil, the inner non-conciliatory dynamics of the Turkish community can also be detrimental at times to stronger cooperation and effective management. She argues:

“As new generations come along, we see that there is not much of a difference. Instead of constructive criticisms, I (like many other people) have experienced vicious attacks from various Turkish people. The absence of a civilized dialogue is a major problem. Also, organizations are often seen as a stepping stone to other positions in politics or sometimes might be utilized for personal gain. To avoid this, all organizations have to come up with effective strategies in their by-laws, flexible enough to adjust to changing circumstances. There should be a unifying element.”<sup>78</sup>

Another crucial problem faced by Turkish organizations in general in New York is related to their slow institutionalization and professionalization process. Emirgil

---

<sup>77</sup> Personal interview with Nur Emirgil, November 12, 2008, New York.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

thinks that “the past 20-25 years of organizing constitute a wasted opportunity in the development and crystallization of these associations.” She also emphasizes that volunteering as the main source of human capital limits the effectiveness of Turkish organizations. Since the majority of them employ workers on a voluntary basis, “accountability arises as a major problem since people have the option to quit when things get tough.”

Her advice for all organizations is

“to formulate new strategies with a long-term vision, provide leadership training for new generations and refrain from the nationalistic outlook/rhetoric [the predominance of Turkey related matters in organizational agendas]. Organizations should go to the neighborhood level, develop relations with local authorities and come up with effective plans to cope with problems such as employment, health care. Without first addressing the everyday problems of the Turkish community, Turkey’s agenda cannot be pushed.”<sup>79</sup>

---

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

## **Chapter 5. Turkish Organizational Characteristics in Amsterdam and New York: Mission,**

### **Profile and Connectedness**

This section looks at the numbers and major types of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York, and compare the percentage distributions of their organizational activities over the years, their mission and connectedness with other Turkish organizations. Network analysis is used to illuminate their connectedness with each other. Organizations that are more connected are found to be more active in their host polities.

Organizations can be categorized with respect to *what they do* (the type of services provided), *where they are located* (the communities where they provide services) or *who they serve* (the characteristics of the target group). Categorizing organizations based on what they do requires examining their mission and the range of services they offer. Analyzing them with respect to where they are entails looking at the areas or regions where the services are extended. Finally, categorizing organizations based on their clientele or membership includes focusing on the characteristics of their clients and participants in their organizational activities (Cordero-Guzman, 2005: 892).

In this study, Turkish organizations were identified as immigrant/ethnic based because of their mission and history of targeting a particular immigrant group, namely Turks in both cities. Furthermore, in identifying them the ethnicities of the organizations' board of directors, leaders and staff were considered. Therefore, service providers with a large metropolitan level social service base that target various ethnic groups and that are run by a mix of ethnic leaders (natives, other immigrant groups) are

not examined in this study. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the main categories of Turkish organizations first, in Amsterdam and then in New York, based on *what they do* over the years.

**Table 3** Percentage distributions of the type of Turkish immigrant organizations in Amsterdam by the activities of the organizations, 1970-2009.

*\* Some of the Turkish organizations can be categorized under more than one type. Thus, the total of percentage distributions adds up to more than a hundred.*

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000-2009
Interest representation	42.9	31.9	28.7	26.4
Social welfare	14.3	2.9	4.6	5.05
Religious	28.6	30.4	24.7	23.59
Socio-cultural	42.9	30.4	38.5	39.32
Homeland oriented	-	2.9	4.0	9.55
Cultural	-	8.7	12.1	7.86
Sport	-	5.8	5.7	5.61
Youth	-	10.1	5.7	8.42
Women	14.3	1.4	5.7	6.74
Kurdish	-	2.9	5.7	6.74
Education	-	1.4	4.6	5.05
Media	-	7.2	2.3	3.93
Elderly	-	-	2.9	3.93
Political	-	-	-	0.56
Business/commerce	-	-	-	1.68
Unknown	-	2.9	1.1	-
<b>N. of organizations</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>178</b>

Sources: Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, Vermeulen (2006) for 1970, 1980, 1990

Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have undertaken various types of activities over the years. Table 3 shows the percentage distributions of the type of Turkish organizations and their activities in Amsterdam over the last three decades. Socio-cultural activities, followed by interest representation and religious activities have been the most common types. This categorization of activities follows Floris Vermeulen's (2005) framework for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. For the most recent list of Turkish

organizations and their organizational agendas, like Vermeulen, I utilized information obtained through the database of the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. The website [www.despecialisten.info](http://www.despecialisten.info) also provided information on the currently active Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and was useful in double checking the Chamber of Commerce results as to how the organizational activities were defined and categorized.

Since the first phase of organizational development in the 1970s, interest representation has had an important place on the agenda of Turkish organizations. As detailed in the section on history of Turkish organizing, clear divisions between left and right wing groups, secular and religious organizations have characterized inter-group relations and dynamics. These organizations have served as interest groups for their community and also competed with each other for influence and resources.


In time, however, following the permanent settlement of Turks in the country and family reunifications in the 1980s, a more diversified distribution of organizational activity can be observed. One can see the increasing institutional completeness at Table 3. Diversification of activities has become evident particularly in recent years. Whereas most religious organizations have set up women and youth associations that organize around educational and social issues, other organizations, which are primarily devoted to the representation of Turkish interests in the host polity often offer socio-cultural activities to their community as well. Religious organizations, such as mosques, do not only serve as spiritual and worship spaces but also provide their community members with social services and cultural preservation programs.

It is important to note that the small percentage of political organizations is misleading. As discussed in length previously, almost all Turkish organizations in

Amsterdam, regardless of the type of the organization, have had a political character. The term political in this table indicates whether the organization was founded and categorized as political in their mission statement, reflected on the Dutch Chamber of Commerce records.

A review of mission statements reveals that, today, the majority of the organizations engage in a variety of different activities simultaneously. With organizational maturity, it seems that other activities with respect to social welfare of the community, particularly the position of the elderly, have gained additional importance. Therefore, more than one category can be assigned to some organizations that have multiple agendas and that is why the total percentage of all types of activities adds up to more than 100 in Chart 3. This categorization followed Floris Vermeulen's (2005: 98) replication of Koopmans and Statham (2003: 220). Organizational activities were categorized according to their mission statements and activity reports (when available) and also referred to the Dutch Chamber of Commerce to see how they are listed officially.

**Chart 3** Percentage distributions of the type of Turkish organizational activities in Amsterdam



Source: Author's own compilation from Table 3.

Another important development in recent years is the increasing number of small hometown associations in Amsterdam. Hometown associations (HTAs) can be defined as “organizations that allow immigrants from the same city or region to maintain ties with and materially support their places of origin” (Orozco and Rouse, 2007). These Turkish organizations are established for dual purposes: to provide a gathering space for Turkish people from the same town or village (called *hemsehri* in Turkish) to meet and socialize in Amsterdam, and also to engage in small scale developmental projects in their hometowns. The section on transnational ties provides more information on these HTAs. Turkish HTAs apply to Dutch agencies and governmental bodies with proposals to undertake small sized projects back in Turkey.

Feasible projects, such as renewal of school facilities, agricultural projects, and construction of youth centers, are then selected to be funded.

The recent development of HTAs in Amsterdam also confirms the view that while HTA members include new immigrants mostly concerned with settlement issues in the receiving country, HTA leaders are usually comprised of long-term immigrants who found organizations with the goal of contributing to economic development in their hometowns and preserving cultural and ethnic traditions in their new polity (Sommerville et. al, 2008).

Educational issues have increasingly become more important for Turkish organizations. In the last decades, the position of ethnic minorities in the Dutch educational system has been problematized and in relation to that, issues such as poor educational attainment of immigrant children, segregated schools, discrimination, and high drop-out rates have assumed priority on Turkish organizational agendas. These organizations do not only intend to raise awareness among Turkish parents about their critical role in their children's educational success and inform them about the crucial aspects of the Dutch educational system, they also act as advocates on behalf of the families. In determining school tracks, they negotiate the educational paths of Turkish students with their teachers and school administrators. By offering additional Dutch language classes, after school mentoring programs and CITO test preparation courses, they make tangible contributions to the educational attainment of Turkish children in the Netherlands.

Turkish organizations are usually the first organizations that new immigrants visit after their arrival in the country. They help newcomers with legal matters and

compulsory civic integration tests, and inform them about the workings of the bureaucracy. Their assistance on various fronts facilitates the migrants' adaptation process. As discussed in the section on their political claims making, Turkish organizations are also active politically. In addition to being important actors themselves at the local polity, they foster political interest among their community members, mobilize them to vote during elections, to protest or to participate in demonstrations on issues related to their interests.

**Table 4** Percentage distributions of the type of Turkish immigrant organizations in New York metro area by the activities of the organizations, 1945-2009.

*\* Some of the Turkish organizations can be categorized under more than one type. Thus, the total of percentage distributions adds up to more than a hundred.*

	1945-1969	1970-1989	1990-1999	2000-2009
Interest representation	44.44	16	13.04	5.76
Social welfare				0.96
Religious	22.22	32	30.43	19.23
Socio-cultural	66.66	44	30.43	32.69
Homeland oriented	11.11	8	8.69	7.69
Cultural	11.11		2.17	8.65
Sport		4	2.17	1.92
Youth		4	2.17	0.96
Women	11.11	4	2.17	3.84
Education	33.33	20	26.08	24.03
Media			2.17	5.76
Elderly				
Political				
Business/commerce			10.86	9.61
<b>N. of organizations</b>	9	25	46	104

Sources: compiled by author from [www.guidestar.org](http://www.guidestar.org); [nccsdataweb.urban.org](http://nccsdataweb.urban.org); organizations' websites

Table 4 shows the percentage distributions of Turkish organizational activities in New York using the same method and framework applied to those in Amsterdam.

Information on organizations in New York was gathered through the following sites<sup>80</sup>: 1) usatbd (business directory), <http://edu.turkishny.com>; 2) NCSS (National Center for Charitable Statistics at the Urban Institute) [nccsdataweb.urban.org](http://nccsdataweb.urban.org) and [guidestar.org](http://guidestar.org) (database for non profit organizations in the United States); 3) The Turkish Consulate-list of major Turkish organizations in the United States; 4) Umbrella organizations (since they identify and bring together member organizations). Websites of the organizations themselves were examined when available.

As in the table for Amsterdam, since some Turkish organizations in New York can also be categorized under more than one type, the total of percentage distributions adds up to more than a hundred percent. Also, like in Amsterdam, the term political in Table 4 indicates whether the organization was founded and categorized as political in their mission statement, reflected on their non-profit records. Compared to Amsterdam, organizations in New York do not display high institutional completeness over the years. In the period between 2000 and 2009, the largest share of organizational type and activities fall under the category of socio-cultural (32.69%), education (24.3%) and religious (19.23%).


In the first period (1945 to 1969), the most striking number is the high share of interest representation among Turkish organizations. Missions of these associations were directed towards upholding the interests of Turks, and more specifically Turkey, in their host polity. Although the number of organizations specifically devoted to interest representation dropped drastically in the years that followed, homeland politics have continued to dominate organizational agendas. Organizations' mission statements and

---

<sup>80</sup> Please see Appendix A for the specifics of data gathering

activities have become more diversified compared to earlier decades. Still, Turkish organizing in New York has not been as diverse as in Amsterdam. Share of social welfare, sports, elderly and youth have been negligible in the former.

**Chart 4** Percentage distributions of the type of Turkish organizations in New York



Source: Author's own compilation from Table 4.

Thus, as is the case with political claims making patterns of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York, the main difference between the Turkish organizations in both cities with respect to overall organizational activities undertaken over the years has been the level of diversification. Although there is an increasing variety to the type of organizations in New York across time, it does not reflect the same level of diversification that Turkish organizations have displayed in the last three decades. An important point to note here is that 23.52 percent of all Turkish organizations in the New York metro area are associated with the Gulen network. As will be discussed in the following chapters, these partner/sister organizations have

developed into a well-operating array of network, mostly in the last decade. Within a very short period of time, they have achieved a level of institutional completeness. Although they are not as politically active as some of the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, organizations associated with the Gulen network have also developed growing relations with the local officials and politicians in the New York metro area. In addition, they undertake a wide range of activities, including issues about education, women, youth, business and media.

### **Connectedness: Networks among Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam**

The following section maps out the connectedness of Turkish organizations and the networks they have established in Amsterdam and New York. Within the various clusters of networks for both cities, shorthand names for organizations have been used to save space. The full names of Turkish organizations in both cities can be found in Appendices D and E.

Networks among Turkish organizations are instrumental to collective action since they facilitate the flow of communication and information, transform recruitment to mobilization and enhance access to other financial resources. They also provide them with more efficient problem-solving arrangements. Better connected organizations are better at mobilizing supporters and forming coalitions that will increase their political participation. Thus, their connectedness is a factor to be studied in order to assess organizations as political actors in the host polity.

There are several ways to pinpoint networks between organizations. The links between them were determined from joint activities listed on their websites (or a news piece reported on those activities) or mention other organizations in their work plans for


the future; if they mentioned joint projects, relations and activities during the interviews; if the organizations have the same street address (share physical space); overlapping board members (the Dutch case also refers to studies done by Anja van Heelsum and Floris Vermeulen on Turkish organizations); if they issue joint statements or press releases; if they refer to other organizations on their websites, and provide links to each other.

After identifying all Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York, they were categorized them into relevant groups or clusters. Not all Turkish organizations are well-connected. Also, those which appear only on paper without undertaking any recent organizational activity were left out, as were those which are isolated or that seem to have contact with just one other organization. As expected, ideologically and/or religiously similar organizations have more contacts with each other and cooperate more intensely. Still, as illustrated in larger clusters, there are relations between various types of Turkish organizations (even though they may be weak, moderate) across religious and ideological lines.

Thus, the most contradictory feature of Turkish organizational development in Amsterdam is the simultaneous presence of sharp divisions and strong internal relationships. Despite deep ideological conflict (left vs. right, religious vs. secular, Sunni vs. Alevi) and continuing competition among organizations for resources, Turkish organizations, in general, are at the same time interconnected with each other. Figures from 2 to 7 display the network clusters in Amsterdam. Clusters 1-6 show the relations within groups which are well organized and connected; networks of Turkish organizations (Milli Gorus, Suleymancis, educational and academic organizations, the

Diyanet network, the Gulen network, the ultranationalist TFN network). Cluster 7 illustrates the links between various types of Turkish organizations with different ideological missions and it also shows the ties between major clusters of organizations.

**Cluster 1: Milli Gorus, Figure 2 Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 1: Milli Gorus**




Cluster 1

The first cluster of networks is made up of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam that are affiliated with the Milli Gorus movement (Milli Gorus Teskilati, MGT) in the Netherlands. Milli Gorus structure is mainly divided into two groups, Milli Gorus North (MGN) and Milli Gorus South (MGS). Those associations in Amsterdam are under the MGN leadership. Therefore, Cluster 1 organizations have MGN at its center. Youth groups (Jongeren MGT, Jongeren Federatie MGT Noord, SUN), women organizations (Vrouwen Federatie MG, which serves as a federation of separate women associations such as Sura, Nisa, Fetih, Hilal, Hilal Basak, El- Kubra), mosque

organizations (Mevlana, Selimiye, Cafer-I Sandik, Ayasofya), help organizations (Stichting Hulporganisatie, Stichting Enderun, Stichting Kudus, Altin Semsiyeh) and sports groups (Stichting Sportfederatie).

All these separate organizations have strong ties with the central management. They also have joint programs with other MG groups (youth groups with women organizations, mosques with help organizations). As will be detailed in the discussion part, all MG organizations have been very active in founding new associations, recruiting new members and also attending to the needs of their community members. In addition, Turkish organizations affiliated with the MG movement in Amsterdam (also in the Netherlands in general) have been members of broader networks that encompass all of Europe<sup>81</sup>.

**Cluster 2: Figure 3** Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Suleymancis




Cluster 2 includes the organizations affiliated with another distinct religious group, Suleymanci movement. In addition to having ties with Turkey and like-minded groups elsewhere in Europe, there are three main organizations in this cluster: Shehzade Mosque (also referred to as Islamitisch Centrum Amsterdam), Stichting Ufuk, and Yeni Camii (Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Amsterdam- SICA). Turkish immigrants who follow the teachings of this religious movement almost exclusively attend to these

---

<sup>81</sup> Interview with Haci Karacaer, Amsterdam, February 24, 2009.


organizations' activities and do not participate in rival groups' prayer and worship services.

**Cluster 3: Figure 4** Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Education, academics



The third Cluster encompasses those Turkish organizations that focus on educational and academic issues. They are founded to promote better educational paths, improve the working conditions of teachers and academics with Turkish background and serve as a platform for college students. Cluster 3 includes the following organizations: Studenten Anatolia, TASA (Turks Academische Studenten Associatie), TANNET (Turks Academisch Network), SUN (Milli Gorus Student organization), Turkce icin El- Ele (Turkish Education Foundation), and STOC (Stichting Turks Onderwijs Centrum). On various issues, particularly the reinstatement of mother tongue education in primary schools, these Turkish organizations often consult with each other on putting up a stronger front towards the Dutch authorities.


**Cluster 4: The Diyanet Network, Figure 5** Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 4: Diyanet



Cluster 4 includes Turkish organizations within the umbrella of Diyanet foundation (extension of the Turkish state that deals with religious issues at home and abroad). These organizations were created mostly in response to the proliferation of rival religious groups in the receiving countries with the goal of controlling the spread of extremist tendencies among Turkish immigrants. The Diyanet Cluster includes mostly mosque organizations that also serve as grass root organizations that provide social services and serve as socio-cultural meeting places: Emir Sultan, Fatih Mosque, HDV Diyanet, Kubra North, Hacı Bayram, Eyup Sultan, Stichting Turks Volkshuis Osdorp, and Stichting tot Ondersteuning van Turkse ouderen Amsterdam (organization for the elderly). Like other Diyanet organizational networks in other cities and countries, organizations in Cluster 4 meet regularly and plan joint activities. At times,

their leaders serve on each other's board of directors and also get appointed in sister organizations' management<sup>82</sup>.

**Cluster 5: The Gulen Network, Figure 6** Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 5: the Gulen network



Cluster 5 encompasses Turkish organizations that adhere to the principals of the Gulen network (a transnational social and religious movement under the leadership of Fethullah Gulen); namely, Stichting Cosmicus, Cosmicus Montiserie, Stichting Witte Tulp (including branches WT- Amsterdam North, Amsterdam East, Amsterdam West), Stichting Islam en Dialoog Noord Holland (Islam and Dialogue Foundation, North Holland) and Stichting Ondersteuning Studenten Pastoraat, Amsterdam). The overwhelming majority of their organizational activities are related to education and language. They all follow a similar organizational structure and shared philosophy. In addition to organizing the same type of events (sometimes joint) and providing similar

---

<sup>82</sup> Interviews with Yasar Tas and Fikret Onder (Fatih Mosque), Amsterdam, February 10, 2009; Ibrahim Gormez, Amsterdam, February 19, 2009.

services, leaders of these organizations are at times appointed to sister associations in Amsterdam and elsewhere in Europe.


Cluster 6 (below): In Cluster 6 Turkish organizations operate around the main ultra-nationalist organization, Turkse Federatie Nederland (TFN). Many member organizations of TFN share the same location (same offices), leaders and philosophy. Like in MG organizations, women groups (Kubra, Hilal, and Elif), help organizations and youth groups (Milenyum Jongeren Vereniging) often work together. Mosque organizations (Ulu Mosque, Mescid-I Aksa Mosque), social and cultural groups (Tukem, Soyad, TDJV, Bozok, Turkse Platform, Ouderraad Yilmaz, Radio Omroep) all report to TFN. Help organizations, such as Turkse Humanitarian Help, TIHS (Turkse Islamitische Hulpverlening en Solidariteit) work closely with other organizations that champion the causes of different Turkish groups in Central Asia and elsewhere (SOTA-Turkistan, Azerbaijan, Kirim). Associations in Cluster 6 are inter-connected and organize mostly socio-cultural events with the goal of reinforcing Turkish- Islamic identity of migrants. They still have close ties with like-minded groups and parties in Turkey and Europe<sup>83</sup>.

---

<sup>83</sup> Interview with Murat Gedik, Amsterdam, February 13, 2009.

Cluster 6: Turkse Federatie Nederland (ultra-nationalists)

Figure 7 Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 6: TFN




\* Mescid-i Aksa, Bozok, Turkse Platform,  
Yilmaz, Radio Omroep, ATS, Soyad, Elif: the same address

\* Kubra, Tukem, Ulu, TDJV: the same address

\* Hilal, H. Hulp: the same address

**Cluster 7: Amsterdam**

**Figure 8** Networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, Cluster 7: Amsterdam



### Cluster 7

Cluster 7 includes the connections of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam in general. There are different clusters (Diyanet, Milli Gorus, and TFN-ultranationalists), academic and left wing organizations. The latter group includes DIDF (Federation van Democratische Werkersverenigingen uit Turkije in Nederland, federation created to improve workers' rights), HTIB (Turkse Werkers Vereniging Nederland, again founded to champion workers' rights, but now active in other areas as well), ATKB (Vereniging van Vrouwen uit Turkije in Amsterdam, women and workers' rights), and AEB (Amsterdam Egitim Birligi, on education). Diyanet is the main link between different religious groups and serves as a meeting point for them to have communication.

Cultural organizations, such as Kulsan, Podium Mozaiek, Leylim, Papyrus, Stichting Mystiek, Pera, Troya, Utopiya, and Rast Theater strive to bring about cultural events to both the Turkish and Dutch community. They have relations mainly with the left leaning organizations. Although the advisory council of Turks that served as the main link of interconnectedness in the earlier decades, its dismantlement meant fewer contacts across groups with different or rival ideologies. Still, compared to other immigrant groups in Amsterdam, Turkish organizations have maintained a relatively richer web of networks and stronger connections<sup>84</sup>.


---

<sup>84</sup> Interview with Bulent Okyay, Amsterdam, February 11, 2009.

## NEW YORK: connectedness

### Cluster 1:


**Figure 9** Networks of Turkish organizations in New York, Cluster 1



Cluster 1 of Turkish organizations in the New York metro area includes a number of elite organizations. Cultural (Moon and Stars Project), business (Business Forum, TACCI- Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry), educational (Ataturk school- primary education), women (ATKB- Amerikan Turk Kadinlar Birliđi, Turkish Women’s League of America) and philanthropic (TPF- Turkish Philanthropic Fund, Bridges of Hope) organizations are all interconnected. ATS (American Turkish Society) is active on all these areas and supports various organizational activities undertaken by various groups. These organizations are made up of mostly like-minded individuals and leaders, who are all well-educated, successful and liberal Turkish-Americans. They maintain close relations with each other and often serve on multiple organizational boards of directors. Leaders and members often attend each other’s events and support, as well as promote common causes. A closer look at their mission profiles and past organizational events reveal joint programs and fund raising efforts.

## Cluster 2: The Gulen Network

**Figure 10** Networks of Turkish organizations in New York, Cluster 2: the Gulen network




The Gulen network in Cluster 2 constitutes the most well-connected and extensive web of relations among Turkish organizations in the New York metro area. All organizations affiliated with the Gulen movement follow similar organizational principles, structure and leadership models. Their leadership profile can be characterized by individuals who are well-educated, conservative, articulate and religious. In recent years, many organizations that follow Gulen's lead have decided to change the name of their organizations, including Turkish Cultural Center as a part of

their title. Turkish Cultural Center in New York is at the center of these organizations whereas organizations elsewhere have been set up as its branches (TCC Albany, Binghamton, Brooklyn, Buffalo, Long Island, and Queens- previously known as TAMEF, Rochester, Staten Island, Syracuse, and Westchester). Other members of the network include educational centers (Pioneer Academy, Milky Way Education, Raritan, Long Island Amity and Brooklyn Amity School, Spring Learning Center), business groups (TABID- Turkish American Business Improvement and Development Council), religious (Universal Foundation, Interfaith Dialogue Center). Leaders of these organizations are in constant contact and informed about each other's events and activities. Furthermore, shifting appointments between sister organizations renders this network a close-knit society. Affiliated broadcasting units, such as Ebru TV and other online sources, report on the organizational news of their network that enhances the connectedness of member organizations.

### Cluster 3: The mosque organizations

Figure 11 Networks of Turkish organizations in New York, Cluster 3: the mosque organizations




Mosque organizations in the New York metro area constitute another cluster of networks among Turks. As is the case in Amsterdam, the Diyanet Foundation (official state branch that deals with religious affairs in and out of Turkey) provides a connecting link to various religious groups and organizations. Turkish mosque organizations included in this cluster are as follows: Karacay Turks, Crimean Turks Mosque, Mimar Sinan Mosque in Queens, Eyup Sultan Mosque, Ulu Mosque, United American Muslim Association (part of the Suleymanci movement), Fatih Mosque, Suleymaniye Mosque in Long Island, Osmaniye Mosque in Long Island, Hamidiye Mosque in Rochester, and Yeni Dunya Mosque in Clifton, NJ. These organizations provide prayer and worship services throughout the year and participate in other

organizational activities during religious holidays and during official visits from Turkish politicians, as well as religious figures.

**Cluster 4: FTAA/umbrella organization (member organizations in NY and NJ)**

**Figure 12** Networks of Turkish organizations in New York, Cluster 4: FTAA



The final cluster of networks in New York is the umbrella organization FTAA (Federation of Turkish American Associations). In the absence of an advisory council for Turkish organizations, FTAA serves as a meeting place where different political ideologies and groups come together and discuss Turkey-related and immigrant focused matters. A variety of organizations represented can be found in the member list of the Federation, which includes women (ATKB- Turkish Women's League of America), alumni (METU, Middle East Technical University Alumni organization, ITU, Istanbul

Technical University Alumni organization), professional (MIM, organization for Architects and engineers), aid (Turkish Cypriot Aid Society), youth (Turkish American Youth Association), Turkic groups (Azerbaijan Society of America, Balkan Turks of America, Karacay Turks, Turkistan American Association), mosques (Fatih Mosque, Eyup Sultan Mosque), political (Young Turks, Turk Ocagi), cultural (Anadolu Club, Turkish Cypriot Cultural and Education organization), business (TACALI, Turkish American Cultural Association of Long Island) and sports organizations (Istanbul Sports).

In New York, the biggest clusters of networks are the Gulen organizations and the umbrella organization, FTAA (Federation of Turkish American Associations). The former makes up of 23.52 percent of the total number of Turkish organizations in the New York metro area and includes a group of coherently working, interconnected organizations of various types (educational, religious, cultural, women, business etc). In addition to having close ties with each other, these organizations aim to develop enduring relations with local authorities.

The latter network, the umbrella organization of FTAA, brings together organizations with different missions and types (religious, secular, professional). Cluster 4 (or Figure 7), therefore, also demonstrates how these organizations are linked at the city level. Member organizations come together through regular meetings. However, intense debates and divisions have been reported in the media and interviews, which hamper the functioning of the organization.

Mosque organizations (Cluster 3, Figure 11), from the Diyanet or independent networks, have regular relations and mostly come together during religious holidays,

official visits of prominent figures from Turkey or during times of need of the Turkish community in the host and home countries. Dinners, festivals or other forums organized by these mosques serve the purpose of bringing the community and its leaders together.

In Cluster 1/ Figure 9, we see the philanthropic and professional nonprofit organizations. These Turkish nonprofits prepare and attend events mostly organized by each other. Professional networking events, conferences, fundraisers and other forums serve as platforms where Turkish people of similar backgrounds can join and benefit from what the network has to offer. They do not have relations with mosque organizations, or the Gulen network. The connecting tie between this set of organizations to the Cluster 4 is ATKB, which is a member of the FTAA.

When the networks and interconnectedness of Turkish organizations in both cities are compared, one can observe that there is a more intense web of networks present in Amsterdam than in New York. Although in both cities, Turkish organizations have relations with other groups and organizations of different outlook, type and ideological conviction, the overall level of interconnectedness among organizations in Amsterdam is considerably higher than those in the New York metro area.

## **Chapter 6. Two Different Political Opportunity Structures: Amsterdam and New York**

The role of political institutions in immigrant integration has been discussed in the previous chapters. There are two types of institutions: the laws which shape naturalization rates, the ease or difficulty of voting, the ease or difficulty of immigrant organizing (legal status of nonprofit organizations) and the role of institutional actors in mobilizing or demobilizing immigrant ethnic communities. Laws and policies create what Jones-Correa (2001) calls the “rules of the game” which defines the path of immigrant integration. This section looks at the two different POS in Amsterdam and New York, also referring to the developments at the national levels.

Amsterdam and New York have different political opportunity structures, as do their national contexts. Below is a summary of findings, followed by the discussion of POS in both contexts in detail:

- 1) Existence of material support by the local governments (namely subsidies, breaks on rent, heat, etc)
- 2) Existence of support (grants, subsidies, expertise) for transnational projects undertaken by immigrant organizations
- 3) Existence of immigrant advisory councils or other consultative bodies
- 4) Existence of local voting rights for non-citizen immigrants
- 5) The legal status of non-profit immigrant organizations
- 6) Party systems (presidential vs. proportional representation)
- 7) Philosophy of immigrant integration adopted by the countries in question
- 8) Role of religion in the countries compared
- 9) Pertinent impact of the legacy of colonial or racial politics in both contexts

### *Political Opportunity Structure in Amsterdam*

Despite the policy changes in the recent years, political opportunity structure in the Netherlands generally and in Amsterdam particularly has been very conducive for the political participation of Turkish immigrant organizations. Liberal citizenship regulations, public subsidies for immigrant organizing, creation of advisory and consultative bodies both at the national and local levels, granting of the right to vote and to be elected at the local level in 1985, and a favorable electoral system with proportional distribution of parliamentary seats and preferential voting have all facilitated immigrant participation in the host polity. A tradition of cooptation of ethnic elites as a result of the legacy of pillarization and the existence of institutionalized opportunities to channel immigrant demands have provided immigrant groups with access to decision-makers at different levels of government. This section looks at the development of immigrant integration policies of the Dutch government over the years at the national and local levels (mainly Amsterdam); institutions and legal arrangements that have shaped the formation of immigrant organizations (again, both at the national and local levels); and the Dutch electoral and political party system.

### *Dutch Immigrant Policies*

Official policy regarding immigrant integration in the Netherlands has changed radically in the last two decades. The Dutch government replaced its group-targeted official multiculturalism of 1980s with policies of civic integration emphasizing individual responsibility. As will be discussed below, starting from the early 1990s, this change became apparent in national and local policy documents, as well as in public discourse. However, there has been a divergence between national policy formulation

and local outcomes. Despite amendments in official policy, ethnic group specific policies continued, under different names, during implementation at the local level where the integration of immigrants takes place. After examining the development of national policies, we turn to institutional and policy practices level in Amsterdam.

The Dutch integration policy can be viewed as a corporatist style of incorporation, which involves political influence through party channels at the individual level and influence via organizations at the group level. Institutional settings at the national and local levels provide the context in which immigrant objectives and interests can be pursued. After it became clear that guestworkers of the 1970s were to stay in the country permanently, a main goal of the subsequent governments was to provide immigrant groups with opportunities to be emancipated.

The idea of emancipation is rooted in the historical processes of religious liberation that created divisions along religious lines, called pillars (*zuilen*). The concept of *pillars* refers to the system of *pillarization* (denominational segregation) which was a central feature of Dutch politics until 1966. Accordingly, the society was separated into several religious and ideological segments and communities (pillars), namely Socialist, Catholic, Protestant and Liberal denominations. These mini-societies led separate lives from each other. At times, many people had no personal contact with people from another pillar. These pillars were equal in legal standing legitimized by the system of *pillarization* (*verzuiling*).

This Dutch system of *verzuiling* (pillarization) was developed in the early twentieth century in order to resolve conflicts between native religious and political groups. According to the this system, religious and ideological groups (pillars) are

granted the right to establish their own infrastructure (broadcasting institutions, newspapers, political parties, schools, hospitals, and unions) on the basis of their ideologies, as well as the right to be subsidized by the government. Freedom of religion and education is guaranteed by the Dutch Constitution which also sets the legal framework in subsidizing of private schools founded on religious bases.

Many scholars were intrigued by the question that why, despite social heterogeneity, Dutch democracy remained stable. According to Lijphart (1968), the stability of the Dutch political system during the era of pillarization can be explained by the so-called politics of accommodation at the elite level. While the Dutch society was segmented and organized in separate pillars, the elites of these pillars looked for ways to cooperate. For that purpose, the elites agreed on a number of 'rules of the game' (Lijphart 1968). These rules were comprised of the agreement to disagree, the rule of proportionality (proportional distribution of the seats in Parliament, of subsidies to schools, as well as broadcasting time), and depoliticization in decision making (technical arguments were preferred to political dispute).

In the 1967 elections the religious parties lost a substantial part of their votes. In the subsequent years, the pillars began to disintegrate, and the dividing lines between the pillars also became less clear. Although pillarization in its classical sense has disappeared since then and although it was not intended to be a mechanism for the integration of immigrants, it became very instrumental for that purpose. Immigrant communities, who are predominantly Muslim, became to be perceived as another pillar in the Dutch system. Accordingly, numerous advisory and intermediary bodies were created in efforts to integrate different ethnic groups. This institutional arrangement was

intended to direct immigrant demands and interests into the decision making process (Soysal, 1994). The institutional legacy of pillarization provided immigrant groups with opportunities to establish their own institutions. State-subsidized Islamic schools and an Islamic Broadcasting organization were founded.

During the early 1970s, which was characterized by labor migration, the Dutch government endorsed a policy of temporary residence and remigration. Policies towards labor immigrants in the country were largely about the recruitment of new guest workers, the regulation of working and residence permits, and the formation of basic amenities for guest-workers, such as housing, and health care. At that time, the state responsibility was minimal. Employers were responsible for providing the immigrant with necessary housing or medical care, while volunteer associations provided other forms of services. From the late 1960s to early 1970s, these guest workers were encouraged to “maintain and develop their cultural identity” (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2005). Policies chiefly aimed to assist the reintegration of temporary workers and their families into their home societies upon their return. For that purpose, new facilities opened for religious practice, as well as for language courses in the mother tongue. Also, a welfare policy was developed to meet their needs. Accordingly, private institutions took over and received subsidies to provide such services for the immigrant groups. Although the companies that employed guest workers had to provide them with the necessary facilities, such as housing, increasing family reunions and concentration of immigrants in specific urban areas complicated such efforts. To improve these conditions local authorities had to get involved. Municipalities implemented their own initiatives on housing, education and health care and thereby pressured the national

authorities to recognize and financially support these efforts (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2005).

After it became apparent in the late 1970s that the labor migrants were no longer temporary guest workers but rather immigrants who were settling permanently in the country, the Dutch government started to formulate a number of legal and institutional conditions to adapt to the changing circumstances. The 1979 report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) recommended that the illusion of temporary migration be discarded and that an integration policy be developed. The 1983 minorities policy prepared based on this report had the main objectives of promoting the participation of immigrants in social and economic life and encouraging good inter-ethnic relations based on equal opportunity and fight against discrimination (Ter Wal, 2005). The idea was integration while preserving migrants' own identities.

Ethnic minorities policy of the 1980s had the low-status immigrant groups as the target population. Promotion of socio-economic equality was deemed pivotal in emancipating these groups. The most important assumption behind this policy was that development of both individual and group identities would help with the immigrants' emancipation within their community and thereby have a wider impact on their integration into the host society. Their participation in cultural, social and political fields was actively encouraged.

In 1985 local voting rights were granted to immigrants who lived in the country for at least 5 years and hold a valid residence permit. Moreover, in 1986, changes to

Dutch nationality law included more elements of *ius soli*<sup>85</sup> to make it easier for immigrant families to become Dutch citizens. During this decade many migrant organizations were supported and consulted on a wide range of issues.

Increasing criticisms over the perceived failure of the ethnic minorities policy led to major changes in the Dutch immigrant integration policy in the 1990s. The continued disadvantaged position of immigrant groups led to a more individual-oriented policy. In a new policy document in 1994, a modified integration policy was endorsed with a more republicanist character. Accordingly, there was a shift away in focus from cultural preservation to labor market integration and from target ethnic groups to individuals. Good citizenship and responsibility was emphasized. Measures specifically targeted at ethnic minorities were discarded. Parallel to these changes in multicultural policies, strong reliance on immigrant organizations was sought to be avoided. As an extension of this philosophy, compulsory civic integration courses were introduced to fasten immigrant integration. These orientation courses were administered at the local levels and included Dutch language lessons and information on the institutions of the Dutch society.

In addition, this new philosophy framed integration policies with respect to area-based issues rather than group based ones. Thus, instead of targeting specific immigrant groups, underdeveloped areas and neighborhoods were introduced as the main recipients of redistribution measures (Penninx, et al). These changes were reflected at the institutional level as well. In 1998, a new Minister for Urban Policies and Integration was nominated within the Ministry of Home Affairs. Although group-

---

<sup>85</sup> Ius Soli refers to the law principle that a person's nationality at birth is determined by the territory within which the individual was born.

targeted policies are no longer prevalent officially, they still survive at the local level of policy (Ibid).

Debate about the integration of immigrants into Dutch society has become much more intense in recent years. Since the start of the 1990s, a notable part of the Dutch population has had a negative opinion about the presence of immigrants. In fact, the idea of the multi-ethnic society has become to be viewed in a more negative light, particularly with regards to Muslim immigrants. Following the 2004 murder of the Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh, public and media attention have especially focused on the issue of religious extremism and visible intolerance to western modernism among young Muslims<sup>86</sup>. Up to that time, policy makers had believed that young Muslim immigrants would become more secular in time, and would eventually adhere to less traditional forms of Islam than those of their parents. Yet, this view has now been altered significantly. Integration has become a much more politicized and securitized issue.

Another institutional change was made in 2002 when the coordination of integration policies was moved from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Justice under a new Minister for Aliens' Affairs and Integration. The emphasis of the new integration policy has been more on the cultural adaptation of immigrants into the Dutch society. Furthermore, since 2005, the Dutch authorities have initiated a series of measures with the goal of facilitating immigrant integration. The integration policy became linked to immigration policy to restrict new flows. The two key measures are

---

86 The murder of the Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh in 2004 became a milestone in the Dutch debate on Islam, as well as on immigration and integration policies in the country. Public questioned how it was possible that a relatively well-educated and well-integrated second-generation Moroccan immigrant had resorted to a violent interpretation of Islam.

integration tests; one overseen in the Netherlands that foreign residents must succeed, and another that must be passed by prospective family migrants from their home countries prior to joining their spouses or family members in the Netherlands. The Integration Abroad Act (Wet inburgering in het buitenland, Wib), which came into effect in March 2006, requires some foreign nationals planning to migrate to the Netherlands for marriage (family formation) or to join family members living in the Netherlands (family reunification) to pass an integration test before entering the country<sup>87</sup>.

After the 2006 election of a new government in the Netherlands, which came into office in February 2007, there has been a change in the political discourse and attitude to integration policy, with greater importance given to the improvement of poverty and alienation within society. Accordingly, in November 2007 the government issued an Integration Memorandum (Integratienota) introducing a 56-point plan on integration for 2007-2011, which put more emphasis on action to fight racism, discrimination, polarization, and radicalism.<sup>88</sup>

These changes in emphasis on various aspects of integration policy were also reflected in the institutional division of work at the national level. The integration portfolio was once again transferred between the ministries; this time from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. Some integration competences were shifted to the newly created minister for youth and family

---

<sup>87</sup> <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1067418.html>

<sup>88</sup> See Ministry of Housing, Communities and Integration, “2007–2011 Integration Memorandum: Make sure you fit in!” press release, November 1, 2007, <http://international.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=11094>.

affairs and others, such as the prevention of radicalization, remained under the Ministry of Justice<sup>89</sup>.

*Cooptation of Ethnic Elites: Advisory Bodies and Immigrant Organizations*

An important characteristic of Dutch policymaking and institutional setup is the cooptation of ethnic elites. Before the 1970s, interests and the needs of immigrant groups were largely represented by organizations acting on their behalf. These included general welfare organizations and organizations that were particularly interested in immigrants, such as churches (Bruquetas-Callejo, et. al, 2005). With the introduction of Ethnic Minorities Policy in the 1980s, immigrant groups started to establish their own organizations and represent the interest of their communities. As an extension of the new policy, state subsidies supported institutional frameworks for collective organization. By assigning such functions as interest representation and consultative participation, the state aimed to co-opt ethnic elites. Dependence on state funding enables spontaneous and oppositional movements to be incorporated into this framework (Soysal, 1994).

These organizations had a significant input in policy making in those days. They were highly subsidized and included in the consultation processes. A white paper on minorities policy issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1983 states that “no political decisions must be taken on proposals until minorities have had the opportunity to make their views known through participation procedures” (Soysal, 1994, p. 69). Although their attached importance has decreased over the years with subsequent

---

<sup>89</sup> <http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?id=596>

changes to Dutch integration policies, immigrant organization and consultation bodies are still important actors in the host polity, especially at the local levels.

There are several consultation organizations that have been established to both serve as a contact point and a mechanism to promote the interests of the immigrant communities: In 1985, the National Advisory and Consultation Body (Landelijk Advies Orgaan- LAO) was established. It included the most important immigrant organizations and had the goal of advising the Dutch government on various issues regarding the integration of immigrants. They were also consulted with respect to administrative issues about the integration policy. The LAO was replaced by the Dutch Consultation of Ethnic Minorities (Landelijk Overleg Minderheden or LOM) in 1997. The new organization's advisory function was restricted and it started to serve as more of a consultative body. The LOM is comprised of seven individual organizations, each of which promotes the interests of the ethnic community they represent: Contact Body of Muslims and the Government (CMO); Consultation Organization for the Chinese (IOC); Consultation Organization for the Turks (IOT); Consultation Organization for the Southern European Countries (Lize); Consultation Organization for Caribbean Dutch (OCaN); Surinamese Consultation Organization (SIO); Collective Organization for Moroccans in the Netherlands (SMN); Refugee Organizations in the Netherlands (VON) (Forum Factbook, 2008).

There are two national Islamic umbrella organizations: Contact Body of Muslims and the Government (CMO) and Contact Group Islam (CGI). The former includes seven Sunni (Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese) organizations and one Shia group (Iraq), and holds regular meetings on issues related to Islam and integration with

the minister of Housing and Integration. It was recognized as an official partner of the government in 2004. CGI also consults with the Dutch government in support of different Muslim groups in the country. In addition to several Sunni communities, it also includes smaller groups such as Alevi and the Ahmadiyya. Like CMO, the CGI, which became an official partner of the government in 2005, deals with issues related with faith and social issues.

Other important organizations established for Muslim immigrant groups are the Netherlands Muslim Broadcasting Service (NMO) and the Netherlands Islam Broadcasting Service (NIO). Both organizations are funded by the government and have access to public TV and radio channels. The founding of these organizations has been possible due to the legacy of pillarization. The same legacy which is still reflected in the Dutch constitution has also enabled the establishment of Islamic schools. Since Article 23 of the Constitution allows faith-based education, religious immigrant leaders have spearheaded the efforts to found schools to devote attention to the Turkish and Moroccan language, culture and religious education. Currently, there are more than 40 Islamic primary schools and 2 Islamic secondary schools, all of which are funded by the central government.

*The Local Context: Integration Policy, Practice and Institutions in Amsterdam*

The city of Amsterdam has a population of 747,093 (as of January 2008- cbs.nl) and with 47 percent shows one of the highest percentages of foreign born citizens in Europe<sup>90</sup>. The high numbers of residents with immigrant background is reflected in its districts with high residential concentration of immigrants. The City is run by the City

---

<sup>90</sup> <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2006/31/en/1/ef0631en.pdf>

Council<sup>91</sup>, which constitutes the highest authority in the city, and a college of Aldermen. The Aldermen are made up of the Mayor and currently five Aldermen, who are elected by and from the Council. There are also 14 neighborhood councils, whose members are elected every four years by the residents of their respective neighborhoods. Immigrants, especially Turks have been active members and participants of these councils over the years.

Initially, policies followed towards immigrant groups in Amsterdam emulated those at the national level. With the goal of emancipation in mind, policies were initiated with respect to discrimination, cultural rights etc. Various immigrant organizations were supported and consulted during policy making. These policies to involve immigrant minorities within the local governance structure reflected the attempts to create 'some form of ethnic corporatism at the local level' (Rossi, Uitermark and van Houtum, 2004). For that purpose, in addition to subsidizing immigrant organizational activities, advisory councils were set up by the local government for various ethnic groups. Different types of individual immigrant organizations, such as political, cultural and religious organizations, mosques and sport clubs, were represented in these consultative bodies. Turkish and Moroccan organizations had their own advisory councils whereas other ethnic minorities were spoken for by three other councils.

In line with changes in integration policies at the national level, local authorities also made changes in policy discourse. Since 1998, the city of Amsterdam has followed

---

<sup>91</sup> Currently, the following political parties are represented on the Council: Labor Party (20 seats), Liberals (8 seats), Green Left (7 seats), Democrats 66 (2 seats), Christian Democrats (2 seats) and Socialist Party (6 seats).

the principle of recognizing ethnic diversity on individual grounds ('diversity policy'), rather than referring to minority group rights. In 1999, a memorandum, prepared by an alderman for minority policy, was published titled as *The Power of a Diverse City*. The memo refuted the minorities policy and outlined the major points of the new diversity policy. After that, previously targeted minorities, such as Turks, Moroccans or Surinamese, were no longer referred to specifically in policy documents. Instead, new categories, such as 'disadvantaged people' or 'neighborhood' were started to be used. However, it has been argued that these new target categories 'do not correspond to social groups or even social ties and consequently make policy implementation depend on bottom-up input. Whereas subsequent policy changes had the objective of replacing categorical policy with general policy, and thereby avoiding ethnic particularism, in practice, "the closer you get to the actual implementation of activities and projects, the more ethnic diversity in the population is reflected in policy categories and organization of government-sponsored activities" (De Zwart and Poppelaars, 2007: 388) This is tied to the Dutch political-administrative mechanism, which causes unintended fragmentation of policy and organization along ethnic lines. Replacement categories, in other words, form an administrative opportunity structure that can be used by ethnic entrepreneurs whose aim often conflicts with that of strategic replacement.' (De Zwart and Poppelaars, 2007: 393).

With the new changes, subsidies have then been tied to more stringent conditions. The idea behind it is to fund activities rather than organizations. In order for the immigrant organizations to receive subsidies, their activities must contribute to integration and participation of their members in Dutch society. Emphasis on

integration is based on the policy conviction that migrant organizations hinder the social and cultural integration of immigrant groups with the Dutch society at large. This change in public funding has posed major limitations for migrant organizations and their activities; yet, most organizations have also managed to combine the two goals of undertaking activities with integration aims, as well as those with cultural and religious functions for their groups (Ter Wal, 2005). Despite their curtailed resources, these organizations have continued to play an important, albeit diminished, role in local politics.

Another important development in the new policy environment was the abolition of ethnically defined consultative bodies whose effectiveness were vigorously questioned. Instead, a new consultative mechanism was set up including a group of experts and functioning as a think tank. Thus, in 2004, the independent Advisory Council on Diversity and Integration was established replacing the five ethnic consultative bodies. Its 9 members are appointed with respect to their professional expertise in the relevant areas and their social involvement in the Amsterdam society.

Despite the endorsement of policies targeting ‘diversity’ and ‘neighborhood’ instead of specific immigrant groups, the local government has often chosen a more accommodative approach to immigrant groups than the integration policies adopted at the national level, emphasizing citizenship approach. Local integration policies in Amsterdam can be characterized as pragmatic, involving the instrumental use of immigrant organizations. Initial policy practices that reflected tailor-made approaches have proved to be resilient. In fact, many Dutch organizations and local authorities have had to enlist the help of immigrant organizations in the implementation phase of the

diversity policy. In 2003, the Federation of Support Organizations for Minorities, a Dutch NGO which is subsidized to support street-level implementation of policies regarding integration, was reported to involve numerous immigrant organizations in the realization of various projects. These organizations included ethnic groups such as Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Ghanese (De Zwart and Poppelaars, 2007). Similar outcomes are also noted with respect to projects to improve the political participation of individual immigrants. Organizations offered courses to prepare politically motivated immigrants in becoming members of the municipal council or meetings to increase voter turn-out among immigrants during elections and gain access to the population through immigrant organizations<sup>92</sup>.

Local politicians and city administrators still view immigrant organizations as entry points to immigrant communities at large. Having knowledge about these groups and networks within them, immigrant organizations and their leaders constitute a link between the government and immigrants. During one of my interviews, an organizational leader said the following:

‘Especially during election times, we receive a lot of requests from various political parties to arrange meetings with them and the Turkish community. They see us (organizations/organizational leaders) as contact persons who can provide an easier access to larger groups of people in delivering their messages. The same is true for other issues (meaning topics other than voting).’<sup>93</sup>

In fact other organizational leaders have emphasized that despite the dissolution of consultation mechanisms and new conditions being tied to state subsidies, there are

---

<sup>92</sup> These points were emphasized repeatedly during my interviews with the Turkish organizational leaders.

<sup>93</sup> Interview with Ibrahim Gormez. Amsterdam. February 19, 2009.

still regular contacts between various bodies, including city government, political parties and Dutch NGOs. ATKB leader, Sevgi Gungormus, for instance, remarked that

“our organization is regularly contacted by numerous women’s groups, centers, as well as health organizations, in disseminating their goals for women’s emancipation, helping domestic abuse victims and raising awareness about health issues.”<sup>94</sup>

This point is echoed by ideologically different Turkish groups as well. Harun Yildirim is the President of the religious student organization, SUN which operates as a part of the Milli Gorus movement. He has been active within the Milli Gorus community and in immigrant organizing since his teens. On the permissiveness of the Dutch polity towards migrants and their organizations and how he sees it in comparison to other countries, such as Germany, Harun Yildirim states that:

“We [Milli Gorus organizations in the Netherlands] regularly meet with other Turkish organizations associated with the [Milli Gorus] community in various European cities and get a chance to compare [different political structures]. For instance, in Germany local and federal authorities do not help migrant organizations at all. They dig the ground beneath them. Here [in the Netherlands], there is aid and permissiveness.’

Accordingly, a more favorable political opportunity structure affects the way organizations see themselves and operate in a more liberal way, compared to those that function in a much more restricted environment. Yildirim aptly observes that:

---

<sup>94</sup> Interview with ATKB leader, Sevgi Gungormus. Amsterdam. February 20, 2009.

“There are noticeable differences between various [Milli Gorus] organizations in different countries. Having been born in the Netherlands, where there are more freedoms for everybody, there is also a different mentality: we [organizations in the Netherlands] have the ability to think and behave more pragmatic, practical and solution-oriented whereas others [those in other European countries] can be more rigid. Here we attach importance to the idea of living together with the general population. Not all Europe is like that.”

In February 2007, the Advisory Council published an ‘opinion’<sup>95</sup> on subsidies and the role of immigrant organizations that follows a similar view. In the document, the Board emphasized the significance of migrant organizations in implementing integration policies and asked for modifications to the current subsidization structure. Their arguments and recommendations can be summarized as follows:

- Subsidies are intended as a guide to support activities related to education in participation, employment, social activation (through volunteering and training), dialogue with Amsterdam society. The objective should be to equip volunteer (immigrant) organizations so that they can contribute to integration. Their mutual cooperation should be promoted.
- The current emphasis on project-based funding approach has hampered the identity, creativity, voluntary expertise and motivation of the migrant organizations. Promotion of processes rather than isolated projects should be endorsed. To increase the quality

---

<sup>95</sup> [http://www.adviesraaddiversiteit.amsterdam.nl/adviezen/map\\_met\\_adviezen/subsidieverordening](http://www.adviesraaddiversiteit.amsterdam.nl/adviezen/map_met_adviezen/subsidieverordening)

of diversity policy, the embedding of migrant organizations and their contact of networks is more important than a few isolated activities.

- This requires certain changes to the rules on subsidies: a) an extension of grants for longer periods is necessary to achieve continuity and sustainability; b) the rule that an organization can only apply for three projects in one year should be changed. This only curbs important initiatives; c) the budget for subsidies should be increased. The cuts in the budget were justified by the view that overall organizations (large welfare and commercial companies) would take over the functions of the immigrant organizations. This did not seem to have happened. Also, reduction of budget meant that immigrant organizations had to appoint less skilled people for the same projects. Many of their staff became unemployed. The Board draws attention to the fact that in such a situation existing expertise cannot be utilized effectively; d) subsidy applications should be simplified. The rules and technical aspects of the application process are damaging to small immigrant organizations
- Immigrant organizations are necessary and useful in facilitating the civil involvement and mobilization of hard to reach groups. Larger general welfare organizations and commercial companies that were supposed to replace immigrant organizations have been ineffective and have had hard time with reaching to the target population. Therefore, the board recommends that these large general organizations that are enabled by the central city should be evaluated with respect to their effectiveness and their ability to reach different population groups.

*The Dutch Electoral and Party System*

The electoral system introduced in 1917 is, with some relatively minor changes, still in use. It exemplifies an extremely proportional system. The party system is characterized by a large number of parties which are organized according to the basic social and religious cleavages emerged as a result of pillarization process. With no major limitations, political parties are allowed to put forth the lists of candidates in 19 electoral units. These electoral units do not have a significant meaning with respect to the allocation of seats to political parties due to the fact that all votes for a party in all electoral units are added up before the seats are allocated. Yet, political parties are allowed to present different lists of candidates fitting for each electoral unit. Voters can only vote for one of the candidates on one of the lists presented in their electoral unit<sup>96</sup>.

Since the introduction of local voting rights to ethnic minorities who have lived in the country for at least 5 years and hold a valid residence permit, local elections have become more important for the political participation of immigrants. The Dutch system provides strong incentives for migrant groups to participate in local elections and nominate candidates for elections. These minority candidates are nominated by one of the political parties. The intense competition between political parties in a proportional representation system leads political parties to place ethnic minority candidates on the ballot list. As a result, there is a strong impetus for cooperation between the Dutch political parties and immigrant groups.

The electoral system is also characterized by a strong majoritarian facet (preferential voting), since each voter votes for a specific candidate. It is only through

---

96 <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ap/journal/v41/n2/full/5500152a.html> (accessed on May 6, 2009).

the candidate of choice that a vote is accredited to the respective electoral subject. Thus, voters' choices could prevail over political parties' policies, which are reflected in the order of the names on the candidates' lists<sup>97</sup>. A candidate who obtains at least 25 percent of the electoral share is declared elected automatically regardless of his/her number on the list. During interviews, many Turkish leaders remarked on the role of this rule in electing Turkish candidates who were not always put at the top of the lists by their respective parties.

Following the early 1990s, immigration and integration policies have become increasingly politicized. Before then, immigrant integration was depoliticized. There was a gentleman's agreement between the major political parties to maintain immigrant integration as a nonpartisan issue due to the belief that a political conflict would hinder the position of ethnic communities. In the following years, a major break from this tradition occurred. The right-wing party leader Pim Fortuyn managed to turn the failing integration process into the failure of the Dutch establishment and gained political momentum in the 2002 elections. Although Fortuyn was killed before the elections, his party obtained seats in the parliament. Although their power has since diminished, the rise of Pim Fortuyn symbolizes the start of an era characterized by a more polarized and confrontational political culture that replaced the traditional politics of accommodation.

In addition to being politicized, integration policies and the dominant discourse became increasingly securitized. National and international events, such as the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 9/11, bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a fanatical Dutch-

---

<sup>97</sup> [http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/03/23602\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/03/23602_en.pdf) (accessed in April 2009).

Moroccan have tied issues related to muslim communities and their integration into the Dutch society to security concerns as well. Many organizational leaders that were interviewed for this study mentioned the effects of these events on the rise of right-wing political parties and the attitudinal change of Dutch society towards all Muslim groups. Amsterdam has remained among the few Dutch cities where conservative and right-wing parties have not achieved major electoral victories in recent times.

*Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations in the Netherlands*

The main types of nonprofit organizations in the Netherlands are associations (*vereniging*), foundations (*stichting*), and religious organizations (churches, mosques, etc). There is an attractive legal framework for philanthropic activities, which involves very little administrative or tax control of the organizations. Nonprofit status permits a wide range of purposes and activities. Associations and foundations in the Netherlands can operate in various areas, such as “housing, medical, legal, financial aid, orphanages, hospitals, nursing homes, schools, libraries, museums, worker’s training, research facilities, the advancement of music, drama and other arts, and other activities which are beneficial to society or certain groups. This can also include professional associations, labor unions and political parties.”<sup>98</sup>

The Netherlands, like other Civil law countries follow a more permissive regulatory approach regarding political activities compared to the United States. As a general rule, there are no specific provisions regarding political activities of NGOs in the civil code and there are no restraints put upon the public policy activities of NGOs. In the Dutch context, nonprofits are recognized as key participants in framing and

---

<sup>98</sup> <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN023318.pdf>

debating public policy issues. They have the right to criticize or endorse state officials and candidates for political office. They also have the right to carry out public policy activities, such as education, research, advocacy, and the publication of position papers, something many Turkish organizations have done over the years.<sup>99</sup>

In the Dutch case, the main restriction to nonprofit organizations is that they are not allowed to distribute financial benefits to their members, founders or persons appointed to their internal bodies. They are exempt from company tax, unless they pursue profitable activities that are in direct competition with business.

#### *Political Opportunity Structure in New York*

#### *Immigration to the United States*

There have been two major waves of immigration to the United States since the late nineteenth century; 1) between 1881 and 1930 about 27.6 million immigrants arrived, 2) after a long period of immigration stops for three decades, which were characterized by restrictive laws, depression and war, more than 25 million immigrants came to the country between 1965 and 2000. This flow has continued into the twenty-first century (Gerstle & Mollenkopf, 2001: 1-9).

In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, most immigrants came from southern and eastern Europe. In the beginning, they were viewed as racially ‘other’ in public while they were considered as white under the law. Over the years, this view of otherness disappeared. With respect to the new wave of immigrants in the last four decades, the majority of newcomers have originated from countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. They are mostly categorized as nonwhites. In 2000 census, Asians represent

---

<sup>99</sup> [http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol12iss1/special\\_1.htm](http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol12iss1/special_1.htm)

3.6% of the total population and Hispanics 12.5 percent (Foner and Frederickson, 2004: 1).

Over the years, American policymakers, institutions and interest groups have adopted two general policy stances towards issues of immigration: 1) support for expansionist and inclusionary policies, 2) restrictionist and exclusionary measures. This dichotomy can be seen in congressional policymaking and interest group activity on immigration. Admission standards, quotas and definition of immigrant rights and privileges have been shaped by these dual forces (Gimpel and Edwards, 1999).

In recent years, debates over immigration have been tightly linked to security and unauthorized migration. The U.S. immigration bureaucracy has been more enforcement oriented than integration oriented in resource allocation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) used to be a part of the Department of Justice and ran naturalization services until March 2003. The emphasis on control and security has continued with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

This attitude is self-evident in former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner's speech: "the dominant culture of the agency... was rooted in a view of immigration as a source of security and law enforcement vulnerability more than of continued nation building." Thus, it is not surprising that administering of naturalization and immigrant related issues come after border control in the United States (Bloemraad, 2006 (article): 679). Although, immigration and immigrant related issues have increasingly been viewed through a securitized prism in the Netherlands in recent years, immigrant integration policy has concurrently been implemented.

### *The National Immigrant Integration Policy*

American liberal philosophy on individual freedom and self-expression carries over to immigrant integration. Government intervention is avoided and “the settlement, adaptation and progress, or lack of it, of immigrants is largely up to the immigrants themselves” (Glazer, 1998: 60). Irene Bloemraad makes a similar point and argues that immigrant integration is not perceived as a policy priority in America. The state is involved in a more ‘distant, neutral relationship with would-be citizens and ethnic organizations, believing that the individual should make an autonomous choice to become an American’ (Bloemraad, 2006: 107).

Therefore, the official recognition of the diversity of immigrants at the government level is limited. This is particularly evident in the lack of settlement assistance programs and the extension of social services to new immigrant groups. In contrast to the Dutch case, where newcomers are received by civic integration courses, language classes and social assistance programs in areas such as housing and health care, the American government follows a definitively more *laissez faire* approach. Because immigrant settlement is seen as a private concern, there are no settlement programs or funding for community-based integration programs.<sup>100</sup> Newcomers are forced to depend on their own resources and the help of their family and community.

### *Role and History of Race in U.S. Politics*

The perception of race and ethnicity of newcomers and the importance attached to these classifications are inextricably linked to the legacy of racial politics that goes back to the colonial period. When the United States was first founded, indigenous lands

---

<sup>100</sup> The only exception to this rule is refugees who receive settlement assistance (Bloemraad, 2006: 679).

were confiscated from natives and slaves from Africa were brought into the country to work on those lands. Rights and privileges were tied to race. The arrival of new immigrants complicated this picture since their place in this pre-existing racial order was initially unclear (Foner and Frederickson, 2004:1).

Legacy of racial politics and civil rights era has presented both opportunities and constraints for the new immigrants of today. The forms of political action that emerged from African-American civil rights struggle provided different ways of thinking which led to the extension of African-American model to other groups. The expansion of affirmative action programs to the children of immigrants, the emergence of ethnic studies programs on campus and the enforcement of Voting Rights Act of 1965 have also helped immigrant newcomers. However, other civil rights era legislation which use blanket categories, such as 'black' or 'hispanic', make new immigrants undistinguishable from native minorities (Kasinitz, 2004,: 278). Kasinitz (2004: 279) argues that "...just as the once-common extension of immigration model to African Americans and other nonwhites clearly missed the point about the experiences of racialized minorities, today's application of the African-American model to recent immigrants and their children risks obscuring much about their reality."

In fact, ethnic and immigrant experience in the United States are largely seen through the black vs. white paradigm. Programs designed on integration are limited to civil rights era programs, which are built on the basis of these racial categories. This hinders ethnic mobilization (Bloemraad, 2006). According to Bloemraad, the innate conflict embodied by race classifications can be attributed to three reasons: 1) an understanding of historic race-based injustices that advocates learn in schools; 2) the

perception of limited public resources, often tied to race; 3) the lack of generally accepted alternative discourse that enable advocates to make public claims. She states “while most Americans celebrate, at least symbolically, the country’s immigrant past, there is no parallel image of a positive future.” (Bloemraad, 2004: 28).

Bloemraad also emphasizes the prevalence of political claims based on race and made in the language of race and the lack of a specific discourse to deal with immigration-generated diversity. Although race constitutes a significant political tool used widely by the advocates, it is a discourse that reverberates poorly with ordinary immigrant groups who find it hard to rally around a construct of ‘Asian’ or ‘person of color’. She quotes Joppke (1999: 143) who states; “race is different. Its content is not positive heritage (however modified) transplanted into the new society, but the negative experience of oppression at the hands of the receiving society. Its direction is not integration into a (white) majority...but restitution for harm and public existence as a protected, separate group.”

*Legal Status of Nonprofit (Immigrant) Organizations, 501 (c) (3), in the United States*

Legal status of nonprofit organizations and lobbying regulations that shape the space allowed for nonprofit political activity have serious consequences for the representation of immigrant groups. Recent studies show that the majority of nonprofit organizations, which fall under the tax-exempt status of 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, do not fully use their lobbying powers to maximize the federal funding available to cities. Due to their charitable organization status, these nonprofits enjoy a number of financial incentives, either as direct public funds or indirect public

expenditures in the form of tax exemptions. American government considers nonprofit organizations' political activity as disagreeable and actively discourages them from undertaking overtly political activities. Federal tax law bans 501(c) (3) organizations from participating in partisan politics and severely limits their lobbying activities. These nonprofits are allowed to lobby only if lobbying constitutes an insubstantial part of their overall activities (de Graauw, 2007: 12-13).

The vagueness of these regulations further complicates the picture for nonprofits. According to a study carried out by Berry and Arons (2003), nonprofit organizations with the 501(c) (3) status are not well-informed about their rights to lobby the government. Consequently, fearing to lose their charitable organization status, the majority of nonprofits avoid political activity all together. In their study, Berry and Arons show that while the IRS regulations permit lobbying, they limit lobbying expenditures and require annual reporting to the IRS. Because the rules about what constitutes excessive lobbying are very vague and the reporting process so complex, many organizations stay away from full participation in the policy process.

In fact, there are other forms of political actions which are not sanctioned by federal law. These activities include advocacy with the executive and judicial branches; non-partisan analysis, or research; responses to written requests for technical advice from any government body; invitations to testify before any government body; challenges to or support for legislative proposals that affects organizations' rights and tax-exempt status and meetings where nonprofit organizations talk with stakeholders about broad social, economic, and political problems (de Graauw, 2007; 13). However,

many nonprofits, including immigrant organizations, are not always aware of these possibilities.

<b>501c Non-Profit Organizations</b>	<b>501c3</b>	<b>501c4</b>	<b>501c5</b>	<b>501c6</b>	<b>501c7</b>
<b>Primary Purpose</b>	Public Charities	Civic Leagues, Social Welfare Organizations	Labor Unions, Agricultural Organizations	Trade Associations, Chambers of Commerce	Social and Recreational Clubs
<b>Examples</b>	Religious, Educational, Scientific, Literary, Art and Culture related charities	National Rifle Association of America, Sierra Club	District Council 37 Benefits Fund Trust, United Farm Workers	Local Chambers of Commerce, American Medical Association	New York Athletic Club, Century Association
<b>Deductible Contributions?</b>	Yes	No <sup>a</sup>	No <sup>a</sup>	No <sup>a</sup>	No <sup>a</sup>
<b>Lobbying?</b>	Restricted	Unrestricted <sup>b</sup>	Unrestricted <sup>b</sup>	Unrestricted <sup>b</sup>	Unrestricted <sup>b</sup>
<b>Partisan Electioneering?</b>	No	Yes <sup>c</sup>	Yes <sup>c</sup>	Yes <sup>c</sup>	Yes <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> An organization exempt under a subsection of IRC Section 501 other than 501c3 may establish a charitable fund, contributions to which are deductible. Such a fund, though, must itself meet the requirements of section 501c3.

<sup>b</sup> As long as lobbying is related to the organization's exempt purpose.

<sup>c</sup> As long as political campaign activity is consistent with the organization's exempt purpose.

<b>Table 6 Distribution of Non-Profit Statuses Among Turkish American Organizations in New York Metro Area</b>		
<b>Non-profit status of Turkish American organizations</b>	<b>Number of Turkish Organizations</b>	<b>Percentage share in total number of organizations</b>
<b>501(c) 3</b>	91	86.7%
<b>501(c) 4</b>	1	1.0%
<b>501(c) 5</b>	0	0.0%
<b>501(c) 6</b>	3	2.9%
<b>501(c) 7</b>	2	1.9%
<b>Student</b>	3	2.9%
<b>Status unknown/not reported</b>	5	4.8%
<b>Total number of organizations</b>	105	100.0%

Therefore, the dominant public discourse on the undesirability of organizations' overt political activism and the legal framework (or the language) regulating status of these nonprofit organizations act as key deterrents for organizational political participation. This point carries particular significance for Turkish immigrant organizations, which are overwhelmingly established as 501 (c) (3) charities. As Table 6 shows above, 86.7 percent of all Turkish organizations in New York metro area are founded under 501c3.

Berry and Arons' finding that nonprofit organizations try hard to avoid the appearance of 'being political' has been in agreement with my study on Turkish organizations in New York. During my interviews in New York, majority of Turkish organizational leaders voiced their belief that organizations receiving government grants or tax exemption under the status of 501(c) (3) cannot lobby at all and

emphasized that political activities were not a part of their organizational agenda. This stood in stark contrast to my interviews in Amsterdam, where the leaders of diverse types of Turkish organizations fervently argued that all organizational activities (be it cultural events, or educational programs) had political undertones and that lobbying on behalf of the Turkish community was their primary mission.

*The Declining Role of Political Parties in American Politics*

The mobilization or demobilization of immigrant groups can be facilitated by a number of actors including political parties, civil and religious groups and other actors such as unions. Today, mainstream political parties have generally been slower to respond to new immigrant groups compared to the inclusion of earlier populations. In the nineteenth century, parties were instrumental in mobilizing new voters to be competitive. Newly naturalized immigrants benefited from this. Their patronage structures in major cities provided immigrants with material benefits that assisted their adaptation process. They also helped them in the naturalization process. In return, they expected immigrants to vote in accordance with the party line. This resulted in the integration of new immigrant groups into the political system even though their vote was highly controlled (Hazan, 2006: 69).

Into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, this mobilization became more selective and the parties threw support for legal changes that started the process of electoral demobilization that continues today (DeSipio, 2001: 87). In cities where party machines still play an active role, they represent more an obstacle to the integration of immigrants than a useful medium to facilitate this process. Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1990: 217) have noted that current urban machines are “well institutionalized coalitions that

predate minority mobilization of the 1960s.” They do not favor reform to protect the power of the organization as well as the economic interests of its white leadership. Furthermore, they limit the formation of multiracial challenging coalitions, by dividing minorities and co-opting their leadership (Browning, et al, 1990: 217).

Thus, with minor exceptions, political parties today no longer assume an active role in mobilizing new electorates to participate. The nature of party campaigning is different from the past in the sense that party mobilization efforts have increasingly focused on reaching likely participants during election times. Parties mostly use direct mail or media campaign to reach their target populations who are registered voters and therefore mostly likely to vote (Wong, 2006:52). Immigrant voters, especially newly naturalized ones, are rarely contacted by parties because they are seen as unpredictable “high risk” voters. As such, parties do not want to share their limited resources with immigrant groups (Hayduk, 2006: 14). Therefore, it is not surprising that political parties do not actively mobilize newcomers to naturalize as well.

With respect to the mobilization of new immigrant voters, there have been other barriers. The regulation of voting for the most part of American history has been assigned to the states by the federal government. The states have used this power both to include and exclude newcomers. In the early twentieth century, some states used their authority over voting to incorporate the nonnaturalized immigrants in the vote. However, most of the time, they have created obstacles to exclude groups from participation. Whereas in the nineteenth century, gender and property holding requirements were tied to voting rights, in the twentieth century, registration

requirements have proved to have exclusionary effect on the immigrant groups with lower income and skills.

The passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 was a major improvement but has since served as a double edged sword. Although the act protects the voting rights of some immigrant ethnic communities as a group, it does not provide them with the resources to surmount the costs of participation. Typically effected are the groups who are young, economically disadvantaged and are not well-educated. Newly naturalized immigrants mostly fall into this category (Desipio, 2001: 87). Furthermore, the creation of safe districts for minority representatives has also proved problematic. Minority representatives have encountered little opposition after elections and have had little incentive to mobilize new immigrant groups (Hayduk, 2006: 8).

#### *The Local Context: New York*

As in the Dutch case, in addition to national factors mentioned above, city government, city politics and the context of civic engagement shapes the political outcomes for all newcomers. The primary point of contact for new immigrants with government and political institutions is located at the state and city level. This section looks at the changing demographic composition of the New York City over the years, its reflection on the shifting cleavage structures, the competitiveness and receptiveness of local political party structures to immigrants and the electoral system in determining the political participation and mobilization of new migrant groups.

New York City government is highly centralized and politicized. Its political culture is defined by a persistent machine style politics. A strong mayor coupled with a vast municipal budget generates ample opportunities for political patronage. The City

Council has fifty-one members; the city sends sixty-five representatives to New York's State Assembly and twenty-five to the State Senate; and fifty-nine community boards in the city have up to fifty members each (Waldinger 1996; Mollenkopf 1999). There are five counties, whose top officials, namely borough presidents, have only residual and symbolic powers. The city has a strong mayor whose authority extends over a wide range of services. As a global city, New York's economy is comprised of financial markets, corporate bodies, mass media, large public and private non-profit sectors and a huge service sector. It has been dramatically changed by the massive inflow of immigrants in the past few decades.

New York is one of the oldest industrial cities in the United States and home to diverse populations. Historically, it served as the historic port of entry for southern and eastern European immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By 1920, Jewish and Italian immigrants and their children comprised over two-fifths of the population (Foner, 2007: 1001). In the recent wave of immigration that began in the late 1960s, the city has continued to draw a noteworthy share of the nation's newcomers. For much of the twentieth century, the foreign born constituted a fifth or more of New York City's residents; the figure was 41 per cent in 1910 and by 2000 it was nearly as high at 36 per cent. The ethnic and racial composition of the city changed following the massive inflow of African-American population from the South between the World War I and the 1960s. After the World War II, Puerto Ricans arrived in the city in huge numbers. With the most recent influx of immigrants after 1965, new ethnic immigrant groups have settled. Today the city's immigration population displays an extraordinary diversity, with no single or even two nations dominating (Foner, 2007: 1001).

These changes in the demographic composition of the city have also been reflected in the basic political cleavages over the years. Following the World War II, the minority populations in New York were small compared to the native white population. Then, city politics was characterized by intra-white cleavages, notably among Irish and Italian Catholics as well as Jews within the Democratic Party in New York. The postwar mayors included white Catholic Democrats who mostly sided with the regular Democratic organizations. For decades these groups were able to set up a loose coalition that ran city politics without major challenges. The majority of the political positions were distributed among Irish and Italians and to a lesser extent to Jews who occasionally aligned with black voters in support of more liberal candidates. By the late 1960s, white ethnic voters became more united, since they felt challenged by the blacks and Puerto Ricans, who were settling in the city in increasing numbers at a time when many white Catholics were moving out to the suburbs. (Hazan, 2006: 205-6).

As the more diverse group of newcomers settled in the city, the intra-white political dynamic changed. The white establishment was challenged by the emergence of multiracial challenges and the establishment was modified to have members of African-American, Puerto Rican and Mexican-American groups hold more offices. Between 1960s and the 1980s, during the civil rights era these struggles in city politics became even more pronounced. After the 1980s, while New York has generally followed a liberal line, this did not always translate to minority representation. Only in 1989, an African American mayor, David Dinkins, was elected as a result of a coalition between African-Americans, Puerto Ricans and liberal whites. Other than that, relatively conservative mayors have dominated the city elections, despite the fact that

New York City was and still remains a city where most of its voters, regardless of their ethnic or racial backgrounds, identify themselves as for the most part Democratic.

(Mollenkopf et. al, 2006: 10-11).

For a great part of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, city politics were dominated by machine politics within the Democratic Party. This machine played a significant role in facilitating the social and political incorporation of immigrants who arrived in this period. It created a sense of community and belonging among new poor immigrants, by organizing picnics, patriotic gatherings, baseball teams, choirs, youth clubs, and other activities. Machine leaders in the city distributed goods and promoted the acceptance and recognition within the larger society of their cultural heritage (Hazan, 2006: 204-5). However, it has also been an obstacle to immigrant participation. It is within the Democratic Party that most ethnic and political conflict has taken place. As Kauffman situates it historically, “waves of new ethnic and racial immigration to the city –such as the Jews, Italians, blacks, and Puerto Ricans—were incorporated into the party machinery as a way of derailing reform challenges and maintaining the strength of the single party structure. Participating in the regular Democratic party organizations guaranteed access to significant political rewards, and thus the material interests of each group were tied to the success of regular Democratic candidates” (Kauffman, 2004: 122). Thus, although minority groups made gradual progress in penetrating the political system below the level of the mayoralty, by gaining seats in the city council, state legislature, borough presidencies and city comptroller’s office, independent minority activism and coalitions were usually unfeasible.

Today, with an even more diverse immigrant demographic, New York City's primary cleavage remains to be interethnic and racial conflict as the major ethnic groups compete for the main political positions and non-Hispanic whites still control City Hall. Regular party organizations can hinder rival immigrant candidates and exercise "substantial degree of control over the outcome of the party primaries, sometimes by using arcane election regulations to knock challengers off the ballot" (Mollenkopf et. al, 2006: 3). Furthermore, dominant factions of both parties can prevent immigrant and minority candidates by withholding valuable resources, such as funding, endorsements, campaign workers, and advertisements (Hayduk, 2006: 15). The high cost of running for office and the resultant inequalities in leadership create even greater class differences between political representatives and ordinary immigrants.

Districting is also found to be another crucial factor in hindering immigrant representation. Districting schemes are being used by the two major parties to endorse or block up and coming immigrant candidates in order to affect the outcome and get the desired results. Because of the fact that elections are single member election districts, which enables the winner to take all, there are a limited number of representatives. This causes tension between competing groups and prevents them to build lasting coalitions among different ethnic backgrounds (Ibid).

Furthermore, with respect to local political party efforts of immigrant mobilization, state and local political parties usually follow the lead of national parties and target their mobilization efforts at likely voters (registered voters) during elections, mostly ignoring newcomers. Other local political actors, such as church groups, women's organizations, and other civic associations that helped immigrants in the past

remain in many immigrant communities, but they play a much weaker role today. Many of these local immigrant-serving organizations depend on government funding and this discourages them from promoting political involvement (Desipio, 2001: 91; Bloemraad, 2006: 681).

### *A Comparative Look*

Following the discussion of respective POS in both contexts, a number of crucial differences can be pinpointed. First of all, an important feature of the local political system in New York City is the lack of voting rights for nonnaturalized citizens. Unlike the case in Amsterdam, where immigrants who reside in the city for five years attain voting rights at the local elections, noncitizens in New York City are not among the franchised population. This has obviously serious implications for the participation of immigrants and immigrant organizations in their local polity. Voting rights do not only provide immigrant groups with access to the political arena but also endow them with bargaining power, proportionate to the size of potential voters among their communities, vis-à-vis ruling elites.

Secondly, the existence of material support by the local government in Amsterdam, in the form of subsidies, breaks on rent, heat, has been a deciding factor in the founding and then the development of Turkish organizations over the years. Lack of regular and institutionalized subsidies granted in New York has meant that those organizations there have been dependent on other sources, including membership fees, donations and international (including Turkey), in order to develop and survive. The inability of various Turkish organizations in New York to secure funds in some years has resulted in interrupted organizational activity, mobilization and outreach.

Similarly, a third important difference has been with regards to the existence of such governmental support (grants, subsidies, expertise and know-how support) for transnational projects undertaken by Turkish organizations. Philanthropic organizations in New York have managed to realize their mostly small-scale transnational plans through fund-raising activities and donations made by the Turkish community. On the other hand, the Dutch co-financing institutions have increasingly provided funding for similar projects proposed by the Turkish organizations (mostly hometown associations) in Amsterdam; thereby enabling the continuation of organizational activity and participation in the host polity.

A fourth and determining factor in the differing levels of political participation among Turks in both cities has been the legal status of non-profit organizations. In the American case, with respect to rules and regulation on non-profits, explicit clauses in law have prevented all organizations with 503 (c) 3 status from carrying out certain political activities (lobbying, campaigning). Overwhelming majority of Turkish organizations are founded as 501(c)3 non-profits and so as not to lose their status and the tax breaks that comes with it, they have been careful to maintain a nonpartisan outlook and refrain from vocal political involvement. In contrast, there is no such stipulation attached to immigrant organizations as non-profits. Instead, over the years, they have been encouraged by the local and national Dutch authorities to have a say in politics.

Equally important has been the different approaches taken by the Dutch and American authorities with respect to the establishment of advisory bodies and consultative organizations for the immigrants. Although the local advisory council in

Amsterdam (TDM) has been abolished very recently, the existence of such a consultative body during the founding and development years of Turkish organizations has served as an important forum where immigrant leaders with stark ideological stances met with each other, as well as the local political actors. The continuation of the advisory council at the national level (IOT) reinforces this. In New York, no such bodies have been established for the Turks. Although, there are two federations (ATAA in Washington DC, FTAA in New York) that bring together Turkish organizations with rival political views, their contacts with local political figures in New York metro area have been very limited and infrequent compared to those in Amsterdam.

How did the establishment of consultative bodies, where various ideological immigrant groups were represented through respective ethnic organizations, affect the participation of immigrants and what kind of role did these bodies play in offering access to decision-making processes? The instance of the District Oost (East) in Amsterdam is a useful case in point.

Heelsum and Penninx (1999) argue that before 1990 when Amsterdam split up into districts, some of the older Turkish organizations, such as ATKB (the Amsterdam League of Turkish Women) and other immigrant organizations, such as Ons Suriname, have established and maintained contacts with the City Council of Amsterdam. They received organizational subsidies for various projects. After the districts were created in 1990, such organizations became dependent on governmental assistance from the Central municipality and on the new districts. The district Oost (East) in Amsterdam came up with an initiative to establish a council of migrant organizations. Accordingly,

all migrant associations, irrespective of their ideologies and missions, were included to participate in bi-monthly meetings where policy issues were discussed with everyone.

The establishment of BOMO in this case exemplifies the way consultative bodies could be used by migrant organizations to influence policy. In this relationship, migrant organizations became dependent on government support but the district administration also made use of these organizations in legitimizing their policies, coordinating and mobilizing support for such policies among the immigrant communities (Turkish, Surinamese, and Moroccan). The consultative body, then, became an efficient tool for disseminating information.

Over the years, most of these stakeholder consultation mechanisms have been altered or abolished due to the lack of sufficient migrant integration into the Dutch society. Despite their potential for boosting integration, many consultative bodies could not formulate a coherent political agenda and failed to put consistent pressure on the government. For their part, local and national administrations were not satisfied with the outreach these bodies initially offered. As discussed earlier, although there are not as many advisory/consultative organizations today as in the past, emphasis on their current and potential value is brought back into integration debates.

This point has been reinforced by many organizational leaders during my interviews, who claimed that despite the drawbacks inherent in the consultative system (the lack of equal power by corresponding parties), such advisory bodies have also provided an arena where various ethnic groups, as well as different organizations from the same ethnic community, could come together. It provided the migrant representatives with a forum where vital issues regarding their communities could be

heard and opposition to existing public policies could be put forth. Furthermore, the ties established between the migrant organizations and local governments particularly during the 1990s continued until today, offering access to Dutch policy makers and politicians.

In contrast, no such consultative mechanism was present in New York. The only all-inclusive organizational body is the Turkish umbrella association, FTAA (Federation of Turkish American Associations). Although this federation serves as a forum where various religious, ideological and professional Turkish groups come together and consult over a variety of issues, there are no local native politicians or public policy makers involved in any of the proceedings and meetings. Thus Turkish organizations in New York do not have the same open and ready channels of communication as their counterparts in Amsterdam. On the part of Turkish New Yorkers, this is an important drawback in having their political input into the decision-making process. In my opinion, as imperfect and incomplete as it is, over the years previously established consultative bodies in Amsterdam have immensely encouraged political participation among Turks.

Finally, the role of religion also offers a good example with regards to the differing national opportunity structures. Church-state relationships are institutionally diverse reflecting a variety of constitutional, legal, and cultural arrangements and policies. Different states, states in different periods, or different levels of state may grant or forbid legal and/or administrative privileges to religions (tax exemptions, laws on schools, etc). They may allow or forbid subsidies to religious organizations. And, they may interpret and apply religious freedoms differently.

The Dutch (one of the most secular countries in Europe) and American (with a more religious society) cases display different institutional and legal structures regarding religion and religious associations, diverse policies of state recognition, regulation, and state subsidy to religious groups. Until recently, the Netherlands, as an extension its tradition of pillarization, has opted for a state-regulated but self-organized separate Muslim pillar. Accordingly, all religious groups have been given the right to establish their own institutions and also been subsidized by the Dutch government.<sup>101</sup>

In accordance with pillarization, the existing plurality of organized religions has not merely been recognized, but also integrated into the political processes of problem-definition and decision-making. With regard to fields such as education, housing, health care, organized religions have played a crucial, officially recognized and subsidized role in the Netherlands.<sup>102</sup> Although in recent years, the Netherlands has shifted from upholding a general organizational support policy to having a more restricted support policy, which includes assisting only specific projects (that are deemed to enhance the integration of the immigrant community), the effects of previous policies have been long-lasting in promoting religious organizations.

A case in point is the Turkish radio broadcasts in the Netherlands. The Dutch system as an extension of pillarization has fashioned the available broadcasting options of ethnic groups in the Netherlands. Since the multicultural approach was based on the recognition of existing religious communities rather than ethnic groups, broadcasts

---

<sup>101</sup> Subsidizing of private schools founded on religious bases has also been an important feature of the Dutch system.

<sup>102</sup> The Netherlands is still considered to be the most religiously fragmented country in Europe, with different reformation churches and Catholics functioning in a country where religion was the main basis of party system structure.

addressing minority groups have also been organized according to religious associations rather than distinctive ethnic groups. The majority of privileges given by the Dutch government mostly apply to religious communities, allowing them to have a voice on radio. Thus, Turkish broadcasting has also had to operate under the umbrella of religious associations such as NMO (Netherlands Muslim Broadcasting Corporation) or NIO (Dutch Islamic Broadcasting Organization), instead of organizing a distinctive broadcast for the Turkish community (Cankaya et. al., 2008).

On the other hand, in spite of religion having a more important role in the American society, the United States has embraced the separation of the state from all religions. Legal, administrative and political institutionalizations of religions are opposed to and religious pluralism is transferred to the private sphere of civil society<sup>103</sup>. America employs a model that allows cooperation between religious organizations and government, but forbids direct funding; celebrates a diverse and expressive public square, but bars state-sponsored religious expression. And, one of the reasons religion has thrived in the United States is because religions have to compete for membership, as well as private support. Though there are exceptions, religious organizations cannot lean on the taxpayers when times get tough, like they do in the majority of Western European countries.

This study finds that the recognition of religious differences and cleavages in the Netherlands at the institutional level has favored the polarization of the organizational structure around religion and, in turn, has rendered religion as a salient issue for the

---

<sup>103</sup> In the First Amendment, ‘wall of separation’ protects the state from religion (no establishment) and religion from the state (free exercise) and it establishes a principle of differentiation between the political community and all religious groups (Casanova 2005).

political participation and mobilization of Turkish immigrant organizations in Amsterdam. Deriving from the past experience of the pillarization system (denominational segregation), the Dutch government has offered equal rights, opportunities and support to all religious communities. Like all minority communities, Turkish religious groups have benefited from this rule. For instance, various rival Turkish organizations have been able to establish Islamic schools (primary and secondary schools), Islamic broadcasting stations (mostly radio) in line with this constitutional principle.

In addition to official recognition of these separate institutions, they have managed to get government support, in the form of financial assistance or tax and rental breaks. The claims analysis and interviews establish that Turkish organizations voice demands and/or concern about religious issues, more so than their counterparts in New York. These issues include improving the status of Islamic schools (run both by Turks and other immigrant groups, such as Moroccans), and demands for more space in Amsterdam that will allow the proximity of these schools to immigrant neighborhoods, which will in turn increase enrollment rates to these schools<sup>104</sup>. Other claims made by Turkish groups include calls for wider government support for different religious broadcasting options. For example, whereas the main broadcasting activities are produced by mostly Sunni Turkish groups, Alevi organizations also demand similar recognition and support.

Conversely, the non-recognition of religious plurality in the United States at the institutional level (in the sense that apart from government tax breaks offered to all non

---

<sup>104</sup> Interview with the head of Milli Gorus in Amsterdam, Yusuf Altuntas at his office in Amersfoort. March 16, 2009.

profit organizations, there is no official recognition and support of religious groups or associations) has enabled the organizational context to be more heterogeneous and less polarized around religion which thus does not become such a salient issue for the political participation of Turkish associations in New York.<sup>105</sup> Although the percentage share of religious organizations and mosques in the New York metro area is by any means not small among the overall number of Turkish organizations, political claims made with respect to religion and religious issues are fewer than those made by the Turkish religious organizations in Amsterdam.

This does not mean religion is not an important part of Turkish life in America but it means that unlike in Amsterdam, organizing specifically around religious issues is not an overt strategy of Turkish organizations in their claims making processes vis-à-vis local governments. Instead, fundraising plans are more widely embraced and private donations are highly encouraged from the members of the Turkish community. Organizational support for religious institutes is not as readily available and automatic as in the Dutch case. Assistance (in the form of grants) is requested and applied for through private or government (mostly local) institutions on a project based manner<sup>106</sup>.

---

<sup>105</sup> For an examination of religious cleavages, opportunity structures and political participation of immigrants in Milan and Zurich please see Eggert Nina and Katia Pilati. 2007. "Religious Cleavages, Organizations and the Political Participation of immigrants in Milan and Zurich" Paper presented at ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 6-8 September.

<sup>106</sup> Interview with the Director of Turkish Cultural Center (Manhattan branch), Osman Oztoprak, in New York on December 2, 2008.

## **Chapter 7. Transnational Ties of Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam and New York**


Transnational ties of immigrants and their organizations have been the subject of political and academic debate. Criticisms of sustained transnational relations of migrants with their homelands focus on the implications of political transnationalism on domestic politics and whether these relations hinder the integration of immigrants. Some scholars (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy, 2005) argue that they do, stating that involvement in homeland politics might result in indifference towards the politics of host state.

On the other hand, other research on political transnational ties has shown that sustained transnational practices among ethnic migrant groups enable the emergence of immigrant political actors and entrepreneurs that help bridging the homeland politics with the local politics of the host country (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006). The same has been true for Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York (though in different ways). Within this context, the sending state has been a key actor in both creating transnational ties and networks, and determining immigrant activities directed at their homeland.


As stated in the findings section, Turkish organizations make claims towards not only the host state but also their homeland, shaping their political participation in their receiving polities. They target multiple authorities, institutions and jurisdictions. Turkish organizations may operate at the local level but they do not confine their claims only to their localities.

**Figure 13** *Transnational Ties of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York*

Amsterdam



New York



(Solid line represents a strong link whereas the dotted line refers to moderate ties)

In Amsterdam and New York, claims of transnational issues directed at the host state include the Armenian issue, Turkey's EU candidacy, the Kurdish conflict and the PKK, war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkish organizations in Amsterdam also make claims and undertake activities towards Turkey and ruling governments. Efforts to gain voting rights for Turks living abroad and to bring changes to the legal arrangements regulating military service as a condition of Turkish citizenship have long been at the forefront of their organizational agenda. In addition, Alevi organizations have voiced their criticisms over the role of Diyanet, demanded its abolition and asked from the Turkish state to officially recognize the Alevi minority in Turkey. Also, left-wing Turkish organizations have called for the improvement of human rights issues and more rights for the Kurdish minority in Turkey.

These findings confirm that over the years, Turkish organizations have developed strong transnational ties. This section details how these ties come about and

become an important factor in facilitating organizational political activity in Amsterdam and New York. Transnational relations of Turkish organizations are examined from two perspectives: political events and POSs in both sending and receiving states and their differential effects on immigrant organizing and participation in the host state.

This study finds that transnational relations and activities of Turkish organizations in the host country cannot be understood merely as a function of the POSs in the receiving state. Homeland political movements and the POS in the sending country at various levels (local, regional, national) are important factors in the shaping and maintaining of transnational ties. Thus, both the sending and receiving contexts can hinder or facilitate transnationalism, directly or indirectly. It is important to note that these POSs do not affect all Turkish groups and organizations the same way. In the Dutch case, some organizations maintain the original ideological outlook (Milli Gorus, TFN- ultranationalists) on which they were built upon, other organizations (HTIB) lose their radical edge in time. In New York, such ideological proliferations have never taken root in the first place but transnational networks have been important nevertheless.

#### *Remittances and Development Projects in the Home Country*

This section first looks at the relationship between migration and development. Over the years, Turkish organizations in Amsterdam (and the Netherlands) have become strategic actors and mediators in sponsoring community projects in Turkey. While they have managed to maintain close relations with the home population, migrant organizations, particularly the hometown associations (HTAs), have also mobilized funds in the host country, channeling remittances to support developmental projects in

various Turkish towns and villages. Although these ties maintained through remittances and development projects do not provide any formal mechanism for political participation in the host country, they enabled Turkish organizations in Amsterdam to forge new alliances and make them more connected with their host polity.

The role of Turkish organizations and their transnational ties with Turkey have been dependent on the opportunity structures, in other words policies and attitudes, of both the sending and receiving states (at national and local levels). Whereas the subsequent Dutch policies on migration and development have been conducive to enhance transnational relations with the homeland, Turkey, as the sending state, has also had a strong interest in guaranteeing the continuous flow of remittances and therefore introduced various measures to further deepen these ties.

*POS in the Netherlands With Respect to Transnational Practices*

POS in the Netherlands has been a factor in increasing transnational linkages between the two countries. An initiative such as MIC (Municipal International Cooperation) is a case in point. With the goal of stimulating integration in mind, a number of Dutch municipalities have developed decentralized cooperation programs with municipalities in migrant countries. Through agreements between local governments, city-to-city partnerships between Almelo and Denizli, Amsterdam and Kocaeli, and Haarlem and Emirdag were established that have offered important opportunities for mutual exchange. Cooperation between these partners aim to strengthen local governance, economic development, social cohesion and transnational linkages and mobility (van Ewijk, 2008, p. 20). Projects undertaken for these purposes are often facilitated by the contacts between Dutch municipalities and migrant

organizations in the Netherlands. These migrant organizations play a key role in the cooperation process. Hometown associations, such as Stichting Haarlem Emirdag, not only provide the Dutch officials with general knowledge on Turkey but also assist them in establishing communication and vital social networks in Turkey.

In fact, hometown associations have been instrumental in maintaining transnational ties with Turkey. What Lisa Nell calls ‘locally specific transnational ties’ refers to ‘active formal and informal ties between individual, collective and governmental actors between emigrants and non migrants originating from the same region’. With the help of Turkish community and Turkish city councilors, formal governmental ties have been established between Turkish and Dutch cities, signifying the emergence of new locally specific international relations. They use locally specific transnational social capital and direct their activities to specific localities (Nell, 2007).

Analyzing the eventual success of development projects undertaken by Turkish organizations (mostly by HTAs) in Turkish localities is beyond the scope of this study. However, a brief look at those established links helps us understand the extent of transnational relations between the migrant organizations and the sending country at various levels.

#### *A Brief Look at the Dutch Developmental Aids for Transnational Projects*

The Dutch government has had an active development policy and agenda since the labor migrations took shape in the 1970s. However, earlier programs for return migration and reintegration support were not entirely successful. The Dutch REMPLD project (Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower and Promotion of Local Opportunities for Development) was introduced in mid-1970s with the goal of exploring ways in which

transnational labor movement could contribute to development in sending countries such as Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. It also had a wider, more ambitious objective of addressing the causes of emigration in these countries. Accordingly, the returning migrants could use their skills and remittances for local development through investing in the existing projects or creating new business opportunities. However, it became clear soon after that the problems were bigger than anticipated and more structural changes were required than only migrant contributions (de Haas, 2006).

The majority of the initiatives of the time did not survive. There were two main schemes with respect to Turkey: the Joint Stock Corporation, established by the immigrants themselves, and Village Development Cooperatives, through which Turkish guestworkers were selected to go to Europe on the condition that they would invest in these cooperatives at home. Due to poor management, lack of government interest and financial problems, these initiatives failed. From the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, such Dutch policy efforts stopped (de Haas, 2006).

Despite the negative experiences of the past, the Dutch development idea was revived. The 2004 policy memorandum on development and migration emphasizes the importance of capacity building and good governance. It recognizes the contributions to development by migrants and their organizations in the Netherlands although no concrete measures are adopted in the memorandum to involve them officially. Instead, practical initiatives are embraced to promote migrant involvement through co-financing. In supporting viable projects, the Dutch policy makers hope to increase capacity building and enhance cooperation between migrant and development organizations.

Through DGIS (Directorate General for International Cooperation) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, around 3.8 billion € was set aside in 2003 for development policy. In addition to making financial contributions to international organizations (the UN, World Bank), governments of developing countries, international NGOs, the Dutch development cooperation structure also includes co-financing. DGIS channels sizeable structural funds to numerous Dutch development NGOs known as co-financing agencies (Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, ICCO, Hivos). Below is a list of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam that have received financial support in recent years for their development projects in various parts of Turkey. Most, though not all, are hometown associations.

<b>Organization/ Applicant</b>	<b>Source of grant</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Project theme</b>	<b>Amount</b>
Vereniging Vrienden Hoyuk	NCDO	2003	Drinking water in Ilmen	€24,640
Vereniging Vrienden Hoyuk	Cordaid	2004-2006	Drinking water in Hoyuk	€12,500
Vereniging Vrienden Hoyuk	Cordaid	2005-2007	School materials	€12,500
Vereniging Ifksan	Cordaid	2004-2006	Culture and art in Morcali, Karaman	€12,500
Vereniging Ifksan	Cordaid	2006-2008	Computers for kids with cancer Morcali, Karaman	€9,750
Vereniging Vrienden van Yesilyurt	Cordaid	2004-2006	Health and infrastructure in Yesilyurt	€10,000
Vereniging Vrienden van Yesilyurt	Cordaid	2006-2008	Construction of rural house	€18,000
Akorensse Vereniging Nederland	NCDO	2003	Student materials in Akoren, Konya	€3,825
Akorensse Vereniging Nederland	NCDO	2005	Student materials in Akoren, Konya	€5,000

Akorensse Vereniging Nederland	Cordaid	2004-2006	Renovation of cemetery in Akoren, Konya	€7,533
De Vereniging Vrienden Karatay	Cordaid	2004-2006	Help handicapped people in Karatay	€11,050
Stichting Pamukkale	Cordaid	2004-2006	Sports and school activities in Pamukkale	€7,500
Stichting Pamukkale	Cordaid	2005-2007	Agriculture, farming	€8,286
Stichting Vrije Meningsverming	Cordaid	2006-2008	promote freedom of speech in various localities	€20,000
SMHO	Cordaid	2007-2009	Transnational identity and double loyalties	€20,000
Stichting Mozaik	NCDO	2006	Youth supplies Kocas, Konya	€11,303
Turkevi Magazine	NCDO	2005	Advancement of civil society in Konya	€48,840
Vereniging CENUR (Actie Comité Tascilar)	NCDO	2001	Social and cultural center for women in Tascilar	€30,971
Vereniging CENUR (Actie Comité Tascilar)	NCDO	2004	Poverty reduction, international trade in Tascilar	€46,185
Hakder	NCDO	2002	Socio-economic position of Alevi in Ankara	€52,000
Actie Comité Karatay	NCDO	2001	Youth center- Karatay, Konya	€45,378
The project list has been compiled by the author from <a href="http://www.ncdo.nl">www.ncdo.nl</a> and <a href="http://www.linkis.nl">www.linkis.nl</a> websites				

*POS in Turkey With Respect to Transnational Practices*

Changes in political opportunity structure in Turkey have also changed the transnational practices and partnerships of immigrant organizations in Amsterdam (like many cities in Europe). The neo-liberalization efforts of national regulatory systems after the 1980s and the ensuing institutional and geographical reorganization of state intervention have enabled the increasing involvement of local authorities in migrants'

transnational activities towards their hometowns (Caglar, 2006, p. 13). Thus, from the 1990s onwards, as a result of outreach programs pursued by different localities in Turkey, new alliances have been formed to attract migrant remittances and foreign investment. New initiatives have been implemented to channel and transform those migrant remittances into development strategies. Thus, increasing importance has been attached to migrant organizations by home country government agencies at various levels since they play a key role in mediating these goals.

Emergence of industrial zones<sup>107</sup>/districts in the liberalization era has been a crucial feature of this changing political opportunity structure in Turkey and has had crucial implications for migrant organizations (especially hometown associations) abroad. Starting from the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Turkish state has introduced industrial zones with the objective of increasing the competitiveness of certain areas that have been developmentally lagging, setting long term targets to achieve economic, as well as social, balance and attracting more foreign investment.

The main goals<sup>108</sup> of introducing these industrial zones can be specified as

- to contribute to the planned development of the city in mind,
- to increase productivity and profits,

---

<sup>107</sup> Organized Industrial Zones In Turkish Law number 4562 defines OIZs (Organized Industrial Zones) as, “Goods and services production zones whose borders are registered and which is formed by supplying the land parcels on the basis of particular systems and allocated for the industry, determined according to the requirements and also operated as per provisions of the OIZs Law, with the necessary infrastructure services and the social facilities, techno-parks, and also with small production and renovation units, trading, education and health units, research and development regions to ensure that the industry is structured in the approved fields, directing urbanization, preventing environmental problems, allocating resources rationally, benefiting from knowledge and information technologies, placing and developing all kinds of industries according to a certain plan”.

<sup>108</sup> For a more detailed examination of the Organized Industrial Zones please see: [http://www.osbuk.org/docs/ORGANIZED\\_INDUSTRIAL\\_ZONE\\_IMPLEMENTATIONS\\_IN\\_TURKEY.doc](http://www.osbuk.org/docs/ORGANIZED_INDUSTRIAL_ZONE_IMPLEMENTATIONS_IN_TURKEY.doc)

- to ensure management of the industrial zones by their own bodies under supervision of the state,
- to discipline the use of agricultural fields in industry,
- expand industrialization in the less developed regions,
- to establish a healthy, cheap, reliable infrastructure and common social facilities in target areas,
- to increase overall productivity and profits,
- to prevent environmental pollution.

To realize these goals, economic incentives, tax breaks and credit options have been made available for prospective investors and businessmen in the designated industrial districts across the country. With the decreasing state role in the economy, decentralized firms and small and medium-sized enterprises became more important and received support from local institutions (Caglar, 2006). Local players assumed a bigger role in looking for strategic partnerships and brokering deals.

The relationship developed between the local authorities in a Turkish city, Yozgat and the hometown association of Holland Yozgatlılar Foundation in Amsterdam is a case in point. Mutual visits in recent years between Yozgat and Amsterdam include the Yozgat hometown association in Amsterdam, MPs from Turkey, as well as the mayor and the governor of Yozgat. During one of the trips to Turkey in 2008, leaders of Holland Yozgatlılar Foundation, Arif Akdemir and Alaattin Kalin, were there to exchange ideas about attracting more investment to their hometown, in addition to talk about their donation campaign of new computers to the local university. Commenting on the success of the talks between the two parties, Governor of Yozgat, Anur Cicek

announced that a prominent investment deal was secured in an industrial district of the city with a Turkish businessman who had earlier migrated to the Netherlands.<sup>109</sup> In fact, many governors and mayors of similar Turkish cities and towns, urge Turkish people and organizations (particularly HTAs) abroad to help them solve various problems (such as education, health or infrastructure) by channeling remittances and investments from HTAs to their locality.

#### *Regime and Party Politics in Turkey*

In addition to above-mentioned sub-national incentives and changes in policy, the general regime type and the dynamics of the Turkish party system have also been relevant in shaping immigrant organizational mobilization towards the homeland. Sending countries with authoritarian, totalitarian or sultanistic regimes do not offer the same opportunities for immigrants to organize and mobilize towards the country of origin (Linz and Stepan, 1996) as those countries that are either going through democratization or already have a democratic regime. Turkey has been in the latter category. Despite its shortcomings, there has been a functioning democracy engaging with its nationals living abroad. The acceptance of dual citizenship is a result of this perspective.

The dynamics of the party system in Turkey has played a pivotal role in not only creating strong transnational ties but also shaping the organizational agendas and political participation of Turks living in Amsterdam. Therefore, a brief look at the characteristics and evolution of the Turkish party system is warranted.

---

109 <http://www.yozgat.gen.tr/haberler/article.php?storyid=75> (accessed on April 20, 2009).

*Brief Look at the Party System in Turkey*

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, new reforms were introduced with the goal of creating a Western-style, democratic and secular state. Democratization efforts in the ensuing years and decades included the creation of a competitive electoral process. This process followed an uncertain, non-linear, and often interrupted path characterized by coups (1960 and 1980 coups that overthrew civilian governments) and interventions (1971 military interference which forced the then Demirel government be replaced by one ruled by military-appointed technocrats). Each episode brought about drastic changes in the political environment of the country, such as elections and party systems (Ozbudun, 1987: 353).

In the period between 1923 and 1946, the Republican People's Party (RPP), founded by Atatürk, remained as the only political party in Turkish politics. With the introduction of multiparty system in 1946, the Democratic Party (DP), a conservative populist party that aimed to relax the strict secularism laws of the Turkish state, became an important player and the main opposition party to the dominant RPP. The party system between 1950 and 1960 signifies an important move towards the institutionalization of competitive elections in Turkey, even though it came to a halt in 1960 with the military coup.

Throughout 1950s, The DP retained control of the government. During this period it enacted legislation that restricted news media freedom and various civil liberties. Whereas the DP increasingly became less tolerant of dissent, the RPP (CHP in Turkish) moved in the opposite direction, leaving its authoritarian stance behind and

becoming an advocate of civil rights. The DP's attempts to stifle the opposition provoked a political crisis that culminated in the 1960 military coup.

Subsequently, the DP was dissolved and its successor, the Justice Party was established in 1961. The 1960 coup resulted in the creation of a new constitution in 1961 with the goal of a more liberal and democratic Turkish state. In fact, it was the most liberal constitution Turkey ever had and enabled the increasing number of political participants and ideologies (from far left to far right) to flourish (Ozbudun, 1987: 345).

The 1961 parliamentary elections led to the return of civilian government. The Justice Party won the second largest number of seats and as a result proved itself to be the main competitor of the RPP, which had won a majority of seats. In the ensuing two decades, the often contentious rivalry between the Justice Party and the RPP remained a significant trait of Turkish politics. Despite the fact that both parties proclaimed their loyalty to Kemalist ideals, they advanced distinct ideological positions. Süleyman Demirel, who became leader of the Justice Party in 1964, supported economic policies that were advantageous for private entrepreneurs and industrialists. In contrast, Bülent Ecevit, who was elected leader of the RPP in 1965, championed a form of democratic socialism that incorporated government intervention with the goal of regulating private business and protecting workers and consumers. The beliefs of these two men and the positions of their respective parties became progressively more polarized after 1972.

Until 1980, there were six to eight parties in the National Assembly, although the total percentage of votes for these two major parties mostly amounted to 70 percent or more. The major reason for the underrepresentation of smaller political voices has been the required threshold of 10 percent of national vote. This stipulation effectively

prevented the allocation of seats to minor parties whereas strengthening the hand of major ones (Ozbudun, 1987: 345).

The failure of both the Justice Party and the RPP to win parliamentary majorities and the refusal of both leaders, Demirel and Ecevit, to cooperate politically called for the formation of numerous coalition and minority-party governments. Subsequent governments were ineffective in formulating policies to address increasing problems in the economic and social spheres that became gradually more serious throughout the 1970s. Different groups on the extreme right and the extreme left created illegal political organizations that resorted to violence in pursuit of their political goals. The inability of governments to control and prevent increasing terrorism in urban areas added to a general sense of insecurity and served as a major catalyst for the 1980 military coup. Holding politicians responsible for the country's political stalemate, the military aimed to end partisan politics by disbanding the old parties and prohibiting all activity by the politicians who were blamed for the crisis. A new, more restrictive constitution was created and the formation of new parties was authorized in 1983. Nonetheless, majority of Turkey's existing parties in the 1990s were clear extensions of earlier parties.

The party system in Turkey after 1980 has been ever more fragmented. Despite the 10 percent electoral threshold, an increasing number of political parties has managed to draw the support of the voters. This has been mostly as a result of splits in parties following elections. Small factions that are unable to secure the required 10 percent national votes have made alliances with bigger parties, getting on their party lists and then breaking away from them to pursue an independent route. It does not help

that most inner party structures are not tolerant of inside party factions and thus push them out. Furthermore, the fragmentation in the parliament aside, there has also been increasing fragmentation in election preferences. Social, economic, ethnic and regional differences have played crucial roles in determining subsequent election outcomes in Turkey (Carikoglu, 2002).

Ideological competition has been a dominant feature of the Turkish political system and a factor in elections. One cleavage is secularists vs. pro-Islamists, which overlaps with the center vs. periphery structures in Turkish politics. The second cleavage corresponds to the divide between Turkish vs. Kurdish identities. These divisions that have long characterized the Turkish party system, politics and elections, have also been reflected in the creation and development of Turkish immigrant organizations in Europe and elsewhere.

*Continuation of Turkish Party Politics Among Immigrant Organizations Abroad*

Ideological proliferation of political parties in Turkey over the years has been very much reflected in the formation and mission of the Turkish organizations in Europe. Apart from left wing parties whose ties with the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) have weakened over the years, many immigrant groups followed the original party lines and alignments; and organizations with distinct political agendas, mostly kept their loyalties.

For instance, Milli Gorus organizations in Amsterdam have been linked to all the Turkish parties with Milli Gorus ideals, which were created and then closed by the constitutional court (Milli Selamet Party, Refah Party, Fazilet Party and currently Saadet Party). Similar ties can be observed with ultranationalist organizations in

Amsterdam. Close and regular ties between Turkse Federatie Nederland and MHP Party in Turkey have been reflected in the organizational activities and statements of the TFN in Amsterdam.

Though formed not as a function of a political party but of the Turkish state itself, Diyanet foundations in Europe in general, and in Amsterdam in particular, constitute another example of strong transnational ties among Turks. Labor migrations to Europe and the subsequent establishment of various Turkish organizations prompted the Turkish government to come up with new policies in controlling the supply of religious services in host countries. In order to coordinate these religious services and curtail the effects of radical Islamic groups, Diyanet initiated the setting up of new mosques, foundations and the appointment of imams in those countries<sup>110</sup>. As a result, bilateral agreements were signed with the receiving states. Today, there are 143 Diyanet mosques in the Netherlands.<sup>111</sup> These organizations do not only provide a broad range of social, religious and cultural services but also serve as platforms where ties with Turkey are reinforced.

*Establishment of the Advisory Board for Turks Living Abroad (Yurt Disinda Yasayan Turkler icin Danisma Kurulu)*

With the increasing number of Turks living in Europe and the United States and the problems faced by those Turkish communities, an Advisory Board for Turks Living Abroad was established in 1998 under the office of the Prime Minister. Main goals of the board have included providing and coordinating solutions to problems of Turkish

---

<sup>110</sup> In the recent years, to foster integration, the Dutch government decided not to let imams be appointed by Turkey but instead opted to have new imams trained in the Netherlands.

<sup>111</sup> Interview with HDV (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi) leader Bulent Senay. April 2, 2009.

Citizens living abroad. “Headed by the appointed Minister, this board's members maybe selected by the appointed representatives of political parties in the Turkish Parliament, the undersecretaries and/or the general managers of; Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Ministry of Cultural Affairs and Tourism and the Office of Religious Affairs, in addition, these selections may be done by consul generals, where large Turkish populations exist. As of June 2008 ABTLA has 76 members in 15 countries”<sup>112</sup>

Mission of the Advisory Board is summarized in the following bullet points<sup>113</sup>:

- 1) Observe; help coordinate, and asses all the efforts that are undertaken by the ministries and the other governmental organizations that pertain to the Turkish Citizens Living Abroad.
- 2) Provide support for the issues/topics that are appointed by the minister responsible.
- 3) Discuss and provide support for topics that will provide ease of social and economical integration of Citizens Living Abroad.
- 4) Observe and report the needs of Citizens Living Abroad and provide recommendations on the relevant regulatory and the legal support framework.
- 5) Plan and organize activities to convey the sensitivity of Turkish public against racism, segregation in Europe.
- 6) If required, Advisory Board for Turks Living Abroad may initiate sub-committees. The presidents to these committees shall be appointed by the president of the Advisory Board for Turks Living Abroad.
- 7) Administrative support is provided by the Ministry responsible from the Advisory

---

<sup>112</sup> <http://www.yyvdkusa.org/C2.html>

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

Board for Turks Living Abroad.

8) All ministries and other governmental organizations have to report all information flow requested by the Office of Advisory Board of Turks Living Abroad in order to provide full coordination to the responsible Ministry.

Vice council at the General Consulate of Turkey in New York, Ahmet Basar Sen states that

“members of this advisory body are highly regarded and their opinions about the Turkish migrant communities in their host countries are taken into account during policy making. Board members have often direct access to the Minister in Turkey and advise him on related matters. Among many members worldwide are also Kaya Boztepe [current president of the FTAA], Ali Cinar and Ibrahim Kurtulus. Mutual visits between Turkish officials and Turkish leaders in New York have intensified in the recent years.”<sup>114</sup>

*POS in the United States and the Transnational Practices of Turkish Organizations in New York*

In contrast to the Dutch case, Turkish organizations in New York with homeland related projects are not funded by any local or national American organizations. None of the Turkish organizations in the New York metro area have received funds from local or regional agencies with the goal of undertaking transnational projects. Instead, funds are raised among the Turkish community in the country either through organized fundraisers or donations. In some cases, some alumni organizations gather funds from their members to invest back in their schools in Turkey. In general, other Turkish

---

<sup>114</sup> Personal interview with Ahmet Basar Sen, New York, January 15, 2009.

organizations that are not exclusively founded on homeland related goals have moderate ties with various partners in Turkey. As will be discussed later, the Gulen network and Diyanet organizations, which have strong transnational ties, constitute exceptions to this finding.

One of the transnational philanthropic Turkish organizations in New York is the Bridges of Hope Project which mostly focuses on educational projects in rural Turkey. They operate through fundraisers and the majority of the organizational projects include providing elementary schools with libraries, books and essential school materials. Their main organizational partners are local Turkish NGOs, such as ILKYAR (a foundation for the improvement of educational conditions in rural areas in Turkey)<sup>115</sup>.

Similarly, Turkish Philanthropic Fund channels funds from individual or corporate donors to a variety of projects in Turkey. Chief Operating Officer at the TPF, Senay Ataselim informs that

“different initiatives are supported with respect to education, arts and culture, youth, environmental sustainability, women empowerment in numerous Turkish cities and towns. Migration-related issues and difficulties surrounding employment (particularly women in workforce) are deemed crucial in the review of grant applications. The grantee partners, mostly Turkish nonprofit organizations and NGOs, are selected according to two basic criteria: legal and fiscal eligibility, and organizational effectiveness. The main long-term objective of the TPF is to

---

<sup>115</sup> Interview with BOHP leader Cigdem Acar, New York. December 10, 2008.

ensure sustainability in undertaking projects that will bring solutions to various social problems<sup>116</sup>”

Other homeland oriented Turkish organizations in New York include mostly educational and alumni associations such as Trustees of Robert College of Istanbul, Istanbul International Community School Inc, and Turkish American Educational Foundation. These organizations have ties with other educational schools and organizations in Turkey. Overall, these philanthropic organizations operate quite different from those hometown associations that strive to invest or materialize projects in their home towns.

Projects initiated by the hometown associations in Amsterdam have had a political character in the sense that local political figures in the Turkish areas and towns where the investments or projects are undertaken, organizations develop lasting relationships. There are mutual visits between the public officials in their hometown and organizations in Amsterdam. The same does not hold true for those organizations in New York. Philanthropic undertakings by the Turkish organizations in New York do not have political undertones. Indeed, philanthropic funds are allocated and awarded to various institutes or schools with the condition that they do not have any affiliations with political groups. These organizations refrain from being seen as attached to a certain ideology or political party.

There are other efforts, similar to those in Amsterdam, by various organizations and mosques to gather assistance (both money and goods) to be donated to certain charities. Some of these help oriented activities are initiated during times of distress,

---

<sup>116</sup> Interview with Turkish Philanthropic Fund, Senay Ataselim. November 7, 2008.

like natural disasters (earthquakes) or religious holidays, and therefore are ad hoc in character. Others are more organized and regular, and target different groups and areas of life in Turkey.

An important difference between organizations in Amsterdam and New York is the extent and strength of transnational relations of those Turkish organizations with political parties in Turkey. Turkish organizations in Amsterdam were mostly founded as an extension of political rivalries prevalent in Turkey (from 1970s on). Political divisions, rivalries and party groups were practically transplanted into the Dutch polity. As a result, a wide range of groups from the Turkish political spectrum was represented in the foundation and development of these organizations in Amsterdam (and in the Netherlands in general).

No such ideological polarization or ties with political parties in the homeland exist among organizations in New York. Over the years, leaders of some Turkish organizations (the umbrella organization FTAA and more recently Turkish Cultural Center) have maintained ties with the ruling governments in Turkey but such ties have not been as prevalent and regular as it has been the case in Amsterdam.

*The Nur (Nurcu) Movement and the Fethullah Gulen Networks in Amsterdam and New York*

The Gulen movement is a social, religious and educational movement that is built around the intellectual and spiritual leadership of Fethullah Gulen. It represents a transnational Islamic movement that aims to combine science and religion partly based on the Said Nursi's interpretation of Quran. There are a number of religious

communities in and out of Turkey that follow Nursi's framework, but the institutional network led by Fethullah Gulen has been the largest and most successful.

Gulen became known for his teachings which reflected his ideas on education. He attaches primary importance to the linking of more education and science in education. His focus is on the Turkish nation, Turkic people in Central Asia, as well as Turkish diaspora living in Europe and the United States. This transnational institutional network includes schools in Turkey, Central Asia, Europe and the United States; visual (Samanyolu TV) and print (Zaman) media; and businesses.

Inspired by Nursi's writings, Gulen put education as the focal point of his activism. Over the years, Gulen has materialized his vision by encouraging his followers to contribute to or undertake the construction of student dorms, high schools and universities. Extending beyond the borders of Turkey, the schools reached to the Turkic republics in Central Asia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. All the educational establishments were created with the goal of educating young Muslims to have a command of natural sciences, to have a competitive education internationally and to uphold a virtuous, moral perspective on life and a strong faith in god.

Despite the large outreach all over the world, these institutions (and the movement itself) have maintained a Turkish identity. Many of the teachers in those schools are either from Turkey or were trained by the Turkish members of the Gulen movement. Special emphasis is given to the strengthening of ties between Turks, wherever they may be living. Through cultural contacts long-lasting relations are inspired between graduates, their relatives and associates with Turkey.

Gulen schools have come to be highly regarded academically. They have computer-based educational facilities and modern science labs with up-to-date equipment. Many students who attend these schools are also successful in national and international science competitions. Their mentoring and homework projects in the Netherlands have drawn attention.

One of the first homework projects in the Netherlands was initiated by a group of Turks who established the foundation SOEBA (Stichting Onderwijs en Educatie Bevordering Allochtonen) in 1993. SOEBA later changed its name to Cosmicus in 1995. These initiatives have included pairing up of Turkish and Moroccan students with older successful Turkish and Moroccan students, who are expected to serve as role models and advice younger pupils on homework assignments, as well as educational and career plans. Although these projects were initially dependent on contributions made by migrant parents and/or institutes such as ECHO (Centrum Allochtonen Hoger Onderwijs) which aim to promote mentoring projects, Cosmicus foundation now has an operational budget, with subsidies from the city and national government (Kraal, 2003). When the homework and mentoring projects first started, mentors would go to student's houses; now, there are numerous centers available for this purpose that still mostly operate on volunteers but in a more professionalized way.<sup>117</sup>

Critics of the Gulen schools have maintained that the school is not an ideal example of integration since the majority of its enrolled students come from Turkish background. These critics argue that despite a discourse of dialogue, the Gulen movement, and thereby all the schools and other organizations associated with the

---

<sup>117</sup> Interview with Murat Alici. Stichting Witte Tulp. March 12, 2009. Amsterdam.

movement, carry a double agenda which, in fact, strives for the Islamization of the society.

In summer 2008, a documentary shown on one of the Dutch TV channels, which highlighted such criticisms by other Turks in and out of the Netherlands, as well as Dutch academicians, prompted requests for an investigation in the parliament. One of the requests came from a member of the parliament, Saadet Karabulut, who used to be on the board of directors of the Turkish organization, DIDF, before getting elected to parliament. The objective of this investigation is to determine whether there are any irregularities in the ways subsidies and government funds are being used and whether or not school and dorm life in the Gulen schools foster integration.<sup>118</sup>

The Gulen network in New York, the majority of which was founded in the last decade, currently makes up of 23.52 percent of all Turkish organizations operating in the New York metro area. The majority of the organizations in the network has been founded in the last decade and include cultural centers, women, youth business organizations, educational and learning centers, schools, religious foundations, and inter-faith dialogue centers. The majority of the organizations also have subunits for philanthropic purposes in Turkey. The network has ties with other Gulen associated media, the Ebru TV and Zaman print and online newspaper. After their foundation, organizations within the Gulen network have developed increasing ties with local authorities through various events, conferences and forums. As previously mentioned, these organizations are a part of a global transnational network including similar

---

118 The documentary can be accessed on the NOVA website: <http://www.novatv.nl/page/detail/uitzendingen/6173#>. In the documentary, non religious Turkish organization, HTIB leader, Mustafa Ayranci also criticizes Gulen network for indoctrinating Turkish children at a very young age according to Islamic principles.

organizations following similar organizational philosophy, leadership profile (highly educated, multi-lingual, and pious) with emphasis on educational activities and dialogue between different faiths and between the Turkish immigrants and the receiving society.

In recent years, relations between the organizations associated with the Gulen network and the ruling government and the political establishment in Turkey have increased considerably. During official trips to the United States, most Turkish officials made a point to also visit these centers, hold talks with their leaders and attend events that bring together prominent public figures and politicians from various countries. Regular international conferences are organized by these organizations providing forums where such relations and other transnational aspects of the Gulen movement are discussed by academics, businessmen and public policy officials.

These findings on the transnational relations and networks of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and in New York indicate various forms of transnational politics. In addition, to the organizational goals which include furthering the interests of the home country in the host polity, homeland directed transnational politics (HDTP) has also been a prominent feature of Turkish immigrant organizing abroad.

As discussed in the theory section, immigrant groups engage in HDTP in order to achieve goals in the home country using resources and networks in the host country. In Amsterdam, for instance, rival ideological groups have devoted substantial parts of their organizational agendas to homeland related goals, especially during the years of settlement and development. Over the years, support for likeminded political groups at home have included going back to Turkey in mass numbers during elections and making financial contributions to political campaigns.

Also visible has been the country of residence directed transnational politics, which includes actors mobilizing homeland based networks and resources to improve the interests of Turkish immigrants (or likeminded Turkish groups) in Amsterdam and in New York. Although, during my interviews, the Turkish government has often been criticized by the immigrant organizations (particularly those in Amsterdam) for not being active and forceful enough on their behalf (on issues related to their perceived unequal status in the Dutch society), many organizations have garnered support from their counterparts in Turkey, be it financial or political (most notable examples being Milli Gorus, the ultranationalists and the Gulen network).

Contrary to some concerns, however, the existence of various forms of transnational ties has not been an impediment to their political integration into their host politics. This study supports the view that home and host society loyalties are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In Amsterdam, the predominance of homeland related matters in the migrant organizational agendas, over the years, has given way to a more multifaceted direction in which host society related issues have gained importance. In New York, although the organizational activities of Turkish groups have not been as political active and integrated as those in Amsterdam, homeland geared claims and activities have pushed them to better organize and develop closer relations with local political and administrative actors.

## **Chapter 8. Political Participation of Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam and New York**

### **8.1 Political Claims Making Process by the Turkish Organizations**

As mentioned earlier, my analysis uses the method developed by Koopmans and Statham (1999): analyzing political claims, defined as “the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical and verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, demonstration, etc).” Political claims and activities undertaken by the Turkish organizations reflect their political agenda and participation in the host polity<sup>119</sup>.

I examine political claims made by Turkish organizations in two general ways: 1) claims categorized according to their subject issue and 2) claims categorized according to type of activities undertaken (protesting or proclaiming activities). In the first case, claims were sorted with respect to five broad issue topics: immigration, immigrant and integration related, transnational claims including homeland matters, anti-discrimination or anti-racism targeted claims and other claims.

To compare similarities and differences of Turkish organizational claims making across two contexts and to detect changes over time, the percentage distributions of these claims made by the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and the New York metro area are presented in Table 8 and Table 9 across four periods (1970s, 1980s, 1990s and the period between 2000 and 2009). Numbers of claims are also included in both tables.

---

<sup>119</sup> For a further discussion of data gathering please see Appendix A.

**Table 8** Percentage distributions of political claims made by the Turkish immigrant organizations in Amsterdam, sorted according to issues of claims, 1970-2009

<i>Political claims made by the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam</i>								
	1970s		1980s		1990s		2000	
	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims
Immigration politics	2	13.4	6	15	8	17.4	10	23.2
Immigrant integration politics	4	26.6	9	22.5	12	26.1	12	27.9
Transnational/homeland politics	6	40	16	40	14	30.4	10	23.2
Anti- Discrimination/ anti-racism	1	6.6	5	12.5	8	17.4	8	18.6
Other	2	13.4	4	10	4	8.7	3	7
<b>Total</b>	15	100	40	100	46	100	43	100

Source: The author's own compilation of claims made by the Turkish organizations reported by themselves or newspapers (compilation procedure explained above).

Immigration politics include those claims about immigration policy and restrictions, visas, residence and work permits, fees attached to those permits, and other issues with respect to family reunification and family formation. Immigrant integration issues encompasses the following: dual citizenship, voter education and mobilization (activities that encourage Turkish immigrants' voter registration and participation during elections), education, women's rights/empowerment (domestic abuse, etc), civic integration exam, elderly care, labor market regulations, immigrant entrepreneurs, political party endorsements, issues related to youth, religious practices (including the appointment of Turkish imams in host country mosques), housing (neighborhood segregation), anti-extremism plan for the muslim community.

**Table 9** Percentage distributions of political claims made by the Turkish immigrant organizations in New York, sorted according to issues of claims, 1970-2009

<i>Political claims made by the Turkish organizations in New York metro area</i>								
	1970s		1980s		1990s		2000	
	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims
Immigration politics	1	9.1	2	12.5	2	11.1	3	12
Immigrant integration politics	3	27.3	4	25	3	16.7	4	16
Transnational/homeland politics	6	54.5	8	50	10	55.6	12	48
Anti- Discrimination/ anti-racism	-	0	1	6.2	1	5.5	1	4
Other	1	9.1	1	6.2	2	11.1	5	20
<b>Total</b>	11	100	16	100	18	100	25	100

Source: The author's own compilation of claims made by the Turkish organizations.

Claims with transnational nature, including homeland matters, include the Armenian issue; Turkey's EU candidacy; claimed support or activities undertaken in support of political groups and parties in Turkey; Kurdish conflict (demands made by leftwing organizations for the improvement of democracy in Turkey and activities of right-wing organizations in protest of PKK); the role of religion in Turkey (demands of the Alevi organizations for constitutional change, particularly with respect to the role of Diyanet); the issue of compulsory military service for Turkish citizens living in the receiving society (attempts to decrease fees for short-term military service in Turkey); visits by organizational leaders to political figures and offices in Turkey; the dispute over Cyprus; actions on the political developments in the Caucasus region (particularly

the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia); getting voting rights while residing in host country (Turkish citizens living abroad can vote in local and national elections, provided they travel to Turkey during election times. Immigrant organizations in the receiving countries demand for changes in the Turkish constitution that would allow absentee voting possible).

In addition to homeland related matters, Turkish organizations also take stance and make claims about other transnational issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Subsequent Turkish governments' involvement in the Middle East process has long been a galvanizing issue among the Turkish population. Sending of peace keeping troops to Hebron in the 1990s and a series of initiatives to mediate between Israel and various Arab countries (most notably the Palestinians and Syria) in recent years have deepened Turkey's involvement in the region. Latest Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2008 that resulted in a huge number of Palestinian civilian casualties damaged the public opinion of Israel among the Turkish community and led many Turkish organizations in Amsterdam to take part in protests against Israel. Furthermore, issues with regards to Turkey's strategic role in Iraq by allowing or denying access the US military to the Turkish land and air space during the first and second interventions and in Afghanistan by sending Turkish peacekeeping troops under the UN umbrella have continuously been hot political topics for the Turkish community both in Turkey and abroad.

Claims related to anti-discrimination or anti-racism includes protests, rallies or media statements about real or perceived intolerance, prejudice and discrimination faced by the Turkish immigrants with respect to various spaces in daily life.

Recruitment practices in the labor market, unequal pay for immigrant and native workers in completing the same job, hardships faced in the educational field (particularly in the Dutch case) have been subjects of organizational claims and activities. As will be mentioned later, organizational claims among Turks in New York with respect to discrimination and racism has been negligible, whereas they constitute a visible part of Turkish claims making in Amsterdam.

Finally, the category of 'other claims' include claims made against other Turkish organizations (left-wing vs. right-wing organizations, particularly in the Dutch case); claims about socio-economic and business issues related to the population at large and not necessarily limited to the immigrant group's interests; fundraising activities for political candidates (mostly in New York) in local and national elections.

**Table 10** Percentage distributions of protesting and proclaiming activities made by the Turkish immigrant organizations in Amsterdam, sorted according to types of activities, 1970-2009

<i>Political claims made by the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam</i>								
	1970s		1980s		1990s		2000	
	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims
<b><i>Protesting Activities</i></b>	<b>3</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>32.5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>36.9</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>32.5</b>
Demonstrations/protests	2	13.4	8	20	9	19.5	9	18.6
Boycotts	-	-	1	2.5	3	6.5	1	2.3
Petitions (collecting signatures)	-	-	1	2.5	2	4.4	4	9.3
Confrontational actions (violent acts, flag burning)	1	6.6	3	7.5	3	6.5	1	2.3
<b><i>Proclaiming Activities</i></b>	<b>12</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>67.5</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>67.5</b>
Speech acts (press releases, interviews, declarations)	6	40	12	30	12	26.1	10	25.6
Written reports (newsletters, activity reports)	2	13.4	7	17.5	7	15.2	7	16.3
Sending letters or writing to the authorities	1	6.6	5	12.5	5	10.9	5	11.7
Visits to public officials or other leaders	3	20	3	7.5	5	10.9	6	13.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Author's own compilation of claims made by the Turkish organizations.

**Table 11** Percentage distributions of protesting and proclaiming activities made by the Turkish immigrant organizations in New York, sorted according to types of activities, 1970-2009

<i>Political claims made by the Turkish organizations in New York metro area</i>								
	1970s		1980s		1990s		2000	
	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims	# of claims	% of claims
<b><i>Protesting Activities</i></b>	<b>2</b>	<b>18.2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>38.9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>24</b>
Demonstrations/protests	2	18.2	4	25	6	33.3	6	24
Boycotts	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Petitions (collecting signatures)	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Confrontational actions (violent acts, flag burning)	-	-	2	12.5	-	5.6	-	-
<b><i>Proclaiming Activities</i></b>	<b>9</b>	<b>75.8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>61.1</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>76</b>
Speech acts (press releases, interviews, declarations)	4	36.3	4	25	4	22.2	7	28
Written reports (newsletters, activity reports)	3	27.3	3	18.8	3	16.7	4	16
Sending letters or writing to the authorities	2	18.2	2	12.5	2	11.1	4	16
Visits to public officials or other leaders	-	-	1	6.25	2	11.1	4	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Author's own compilation of claims made by the Turkish organizations.

A second way of looking at political claims and activities of Turkish organizations is to categorize them according to the types of activities they have

undertaken. Tables 10 and 11 show the percentage distribution of political claims and activities of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York over the years with respect to protesting and proclaiming activities. The former refers to protests, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions (collecting signatures among the Turkish community on various domestic and transnational issues) and confrontational activities, which include flag burning, violent acts or threats. The latter refers to speech acts, written reports, sending letters to authorities and visiting public officials.

As will be detailed in the section below, over the years major issues that prompted such protesting activities among Turkish organizations have almost exclusively included homeland related matters in New York: 1) Turkish- Greek relations (disputes over the Aegean), 2) the Cyprus issue following the Turkish intervention in the island in 1974, 3) the Armenian genocide claims and any political decisions taken by the American Congress, 4) the Kurdish conflict within Turkey and protests over the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), the Kurdish group that has been in an armed conflict with the Turkish state, 5) the Azeri-Armenian conflict in Central Asia and support for their claims over disputed land between the two parties. Turkish organizations have consistently protested (street demonstrations at the Times Square, protest marches that end at the UN Headquarters) either the representatives of these above-mentioned groups or any real and perceived American support for them.

Protesting claims by Turks in Amsterdam have additionally included host society-related issues: 1) real and perceived discrimination in the host society, 2) residence and visa related issues, 3) legal issues over family unification and formation,

4) social issues (job security, joining strikes with fellow workers and unions, status of Turkish women in the Dutch society).

Proclaiming activities indicate various speech acts (verbal and written), such as interviews, press conferences/press releases, declarations made by the Turkish organizations in their host polity. Also included in this category are sending letters or writing to the authorities, written reports (such as newsletters, informational leaflets and activity reports) prepared and/or distributed by the organizations themselves, as well as reported visits of organizational leaders to local or national policy makers, public officials and other political leaders (including trade unions).

Similar to protesting activities, issues that have prompted *proclaiming activities* among Turkish organizations in New York include mostly homeland related matters. In addition to the above mentioned issues, letters to public officials, and newspapers, as well as media statements by Turkish organizational leaders, have also included the war in Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict (violent confrontations in Lebanon, the Palestinian issue, and events in Gaza).

Turks in Amsterdam have undertaken substantially more *proclaiming activities* on a wider range of issues. Among the most frequently referred claims are educational matters (immigrant children in public and religious schools, the issue regarding native languages in primary schools, black vs. white schools), segregated neighborhoods, discrimination in housing and job markets. Homeland matters have also been a permanent feature of Turkish proclaiming activities (media releases, TV appearances, letters to public officials and newspapers, academic and non-academic publications and official visits to policy makers).

## 8.2 Comparative Look at the Results Across Time and Space:

As regards to political claims made by Turkish organizations, the first generation is often concerned with maintaining cultural ties and political activities which are mostly directed towards the homeland. In assessing these claims, the stages of associational life should be kept in mind: formative years, maturity and consolidation. In order to pinpoint these stages, a longitudinal approach is required.

As will be detailed in the discussion section, Turkish immigrants, who initially came as guest workers to the Netherlands, were considered to stay only temporarily. Both the immigrants themselves and the host state did not see immigration in 1970s as a permanent state of affairs. Claims made by the Turkish organizations in the 1970s reflect this. As seen in Table 8, although issues concerning immigration policy (13.4%) and immigrant integration matters (26.6%), such as housing, the status of illegal immigrants, claims for the allocation of space for worship, workers' rights, were on the agenda of the Turkish organizations, the overwhelming majority of claims made by them regarded the homeland (40%). In addition to the belief that their stay was going to be temporary, Turkish organizations were drawn to homeland politics at a time when Turkish politics was in constant turmoil. Being established as extensions of the political rivalries in the country of origin (left-wing vs. right-wing, religious vs. secular, Sunnis vs. Alevis), their organizational agendas and claims making reflected this dynamic. The tension between these opposing groups, embodied in their respective organizations, also manifested itself in demonstrations, protests and at times confrontational encounters. Despite these protesting events (20%) in the 1970s, the main type of claims making was proclaiming activities (80%). In fact, speech acts, including press releases, interview

and various declarations on mostly homeland matters amounted to 40% of their overall claims making process in this period when the Turkish organizations were just getting started.

When we look at the number for the 1980s; although there is a slight diversification with respect to the subject of claims, homeland issues (40%) maintain prominence among the overall claims making process of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam. With the military coup in Turkey in 1980, many politically motivated Turks arrived in various Western European countries. Old and new organizations in the 1980s continued to reflect the political rift in the homeland and organizational claims followed the same pattern. In addition, the killing of Turkish diplomats by the Armenian ASALA group in the 1980s sparked new homeland-based claims among the organizations. Similarly, the ongoing conflict over Cyprus, the tension between Greece and Turkey, Kurdish problem and the PKK resulted in protests, passionate speech acts and various written reports, as well as reciprocal responses between various types of organizations (right vs. left-wing).

However, 1980s also saw the establishment of women and youth groups and as family reunifications and formations became more and more frequent, host state related problems gained importance. The percentage share of claims about immigration politics rose to 15%. Anti-discrimination claims (12.5%), particularly in the work place, also increased compared to the previous period. Integration related claims (22.5%) in the 1980s included workers' rights, women's rights, and health care. Religious organizations, such as Milli Gorus, started to make claims about establishing religious Islamic schools for their communities.

In the 1990s, an increasing diversification can be observed with respect to the issues of political claims in Amsterdam. The same can be told as regards to the type of activities undertaken by the Turkish organizations. This coincides with the second stage of associational life, when immigrant organizations leave their formative years behind and enter to maturity. At this stage, in the 1990s, more time is devoted to matters related immigration (17.4%) (citizenship issues, residence permits) and immigrants' daily lives (26.1%). Turkish women's status in domestic life and society at large became more important.

As will be detailed in the following chapters, Turkish women organizations managed to bring about some legal changes and safeguards regarding spouses' residence requirements in relation to their husbands. Domestic abuse victims prompted many organizational claims. Educational issues (black vs. white schools, the overrepresentation of immigrants students in the lower school tracks, cultural insensitivity of teachers and school administrators towards immigrant families) increasingly led Turkish organizations to intervene on behalf of the families and demand for changes, as well as come up with alternative assistance programs for students and their parents (such as mentoring projects, homework and language assistance programs).

In addition, a wide range of organizations started to make claims about the care of the elderly, labor market conditions and neighborhood segregations. An important change in the 1990s is the increase in organizational claims about discrimination and racism. With the immigrant community settled permanently in the country, experiences of individual Turks in their daily lives at the workplace, school or elsewhere led

organizations to voice concern over the real and perceived discrimination in Amsterdam. Percentage share for anti-discrimination claims rose from 12.5% in the 1980s to 17.4% in the 1990s.

Despite increasing claims in other areas, homeland matters (30.4%) still amounted to the largest percentage share in overall claims made in the 1990s. In addition to the prevalence of some old transnational issues, new claims were also made. The Turkish Alevi community became active in this period. Alevi organizations increasingly asked for the official recognition of their form of Islam by the Turkish state alongside of Sunnis and demanded the abolition of the Diyanet, the official religious directorate of Turkey that upholds the Sunni brand of Islam. Also persistent in this decade were the rallies, events and protests made for and against the PKK.

In the period between 2000 and 2009, we observe that for the first time homeland issues do not rank at the top of political claims. Thus far, immigration politics (23.25%) related claims have included dual citizenship matters, civic integration tests (in and outside of the country), their fees, residence permit fees, increasingly restrictive family formation policies (since the majority of Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam do not intermarry and many 'import' brides from Turkey, this has impacted many Turkish families).

Immigrant integration (27.9%) issues and problems became the top priority for Turkish organizations in this period when the claims of earlier decades about the integration and status of immigrants became more intensified. Special emphasis and organizational efforts have been put on the issue of reinstating of the mother tongue education in primary schools that was abolished in 2004 since it was believed by the

Dutch authorities to hamper integration. Protests and petitions were organized by a number of Turkish organizations to mobilize the Turkish community in seeking a change in the governmental policies. Academic publications prepared by some of the organizations have focused on the scientific aspects of the mother tongue education and tried to dispute the belief that learning Turkish in school would negatively affect integration into the larger society.

When we look at the numbers in the 2000-2009 period, an increase can also be observed in claims related to discrimination (18.6%). Particularly following the events after 9/11, London and Madrid bombings and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, by a Dutch born Moroccan radical in Amsterdam in 2004, immigrants of Muslim background have increasingly felt stigmatized. During my interviews, many organizational leaders voiced their concern about the perception of an ever-increasing discrimination towards the Muslim community in general. While some leaders attributed this to the closeness of the community itself and their inability to take responsibility for some of the community's problems, others insisted on the very real stigma attached to being a Muslim in the current Dutch society. The deteriorating economic conditions and the job market have not helped matters and have worsened these feelings as the number of unemployed young people has dramatically risen.

With respect to transnational ties and homeland matters, in addition to protests and proclaiming activities about the Kurdish conflict and the PKK, many organizations from different ideological convictions participated in protests against wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and criticized the Dutch government for sending troops overseas. Another transnational matter has been the issue of recognizing the killings of the Armenian

population of the Ottoman Empire during and after WWI as genocide, which became a domestic issue when some of the party candidates from Turkish backgrounds were pressured to officially accept the Armenian claims. When refused to do so, some candidates were taken off the party lists during elections, prompting intense debates and organizational activities among the Turkish community. The reluctance of Dutch-Turkish political actors to recognize the Armenian claims has been criticized by other Dutch politicians and parties on the grounds that their reluctance amounted to higher loyalty to Turkish politics and identity over the Dutch state.

In short, although the policy impact of Turkish organizational activities has not always resulted in the way organizations aimed for, their ongoing claims making and negotiating of various issues with the local and national Dutch authorities reflect the active participation of Turks in their host polity. Over the years Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have been able to articulate positions, mobilize support among the community and pressure the Dutch policy makers both at the local and national levels. Through petitions, protests, media (internet and TV) campaigns and academic publications, they have become visible actors in setting agendas and influencing opinions.

If we look at the percentage distributions of claims made by the Turkish organizations in the New York metro area, the most striking number is the persistence of homeland related issues over the decades. Although we see a relatively more diversified picture in the period between 2000 and 2009, transnational claims remain to be the most important driving force behind the Turkish organizations' activities in New York. Different from the case in Amsterdam, claims making process in New York has

not always been as frequent and the focus has been narrower. As will be discussed in the section on the types of organizations active in both cities, the number of organizations operating with the goal of fostering political interest among the Turkish community is lower than in Amsterdam.

Another notable distinction between the two cases studied has been the small percentage share of claims about discrimination and racism in New York in comparison to those in Amsterdam. This finding was also verified during my interviews with Turkish organizational leaders in New York. My questions about real or perceived discrimination against individual Turks or the Turkish community at large were almost always dismissed. According to Turkish leaders, the Turkish community in general almost always start on equal footing with other migrant groups and even the least educated Turks who arrived in the 1990s and afterwards have the opportunity to do well, provided that they work hard. One can infer from this statement that Turks do not have much to make claims about since they seem to be well-integrated into the society. Although that observation seems to hold to an extent, it does not reflect the complex reality and invites the question of why Turkish organizations in New York have participated less in the political arena.

In fact, despite little mention of discrimination and racism faced by Turkish immigrants in American society, Turkish organizations also talked about real daily problems faced by the Turkish immigrants in the city. Problems with housing, education, health care were most commonly referred to during interviews. However, when we look at the political claims making processes of these organizations, such issues related to the immigrant and their integration have not always occupied an

important place on their organizational agenda. Issues related to immigration politics have consisted of residence and work permits (including skilled immigrant visa H-1) but not much has been claimed about these matters either.

The rising share of percentages with respect to ‘other claims’ can be attributed to the recent efforts of a few Turkish organizations to organize fundraising events for local and national political candidates. Although, as will be detailed in the differing political opportunity structures section, Turkish organizations are very much limited in their lobbying activities with the existing non-profit legal regulations, a number of Turkish organizations have made an effort to support certain leaders and candidates.

Because nonprofit organizations with 501c3 status in New York are legally restricted from openly lobbying for or against candidates and political parties, they do not have the latitude those Turkish organizations enjoy in Amsterdam. Although they do not lobby openly, organizations sometimes publish and disseminate party positions and presidential candidates’ stance on issues relevant to the Turkish community. (More lobbying activities can be witnessed among Turkish organizations in Washington, DC compared to New York in the very recent years. However, since this study is limited to Amsterdam and New York, those organizations and their claims making are not included). Party positions and candidates have been evaluated almost exclusively on the basis of their political views and positions vis-à-vis Turkey.

As evident in both tables on claims making, the most sizable and durable portion of claims made by the Turkish organizations over the years has been transnational issues including homeland matters. The most visible and defining issue has been the Armenian genocide claims against Turkey. The killings of Turkish diplomats by the

Armenian ASALA organization in the late 1970s and 1980s, and the subsequent congressional hearings on the acceptance of the Armenian claims over the years have largely preoccupied the organizational activities and claims making of Turks. Protests, sending of letters, publishing of documents and visible speech acts in the media have mostly covered this issue in the last decades. So much so that, candidates' position with respect to that issue has taken precedence over domestic matters that affect the everyday lives of the Turkish American community.

The current leader of the Turkish umbrella organization, the Federation of Turkish American Associations, Kaya Boztepe gave the following answer to a question about which presidential candidate FTAA supported in 2008 elections:

“McCain is the only candidate who has understood the geopolitical and strategic value of Turkey; he has been close to the Turkish foreign policy and never has entertained the claims made by the Armenians. He is the only name to be supported by the Turkish community. We do not have the luxury of evaluating the Republican and Democratic ideas or other domestic policy issues. We arrive to this decision by only guarding the very general Turkish interests. That said, however, I would also like to emphasize that we met with Clinton and our attempts have been continuing to meet with Obama. We need to have equal space with all parties. Balancing politics is very important” (Interview with Kaya Boztepe, reported on April 19, 2008 at [www.turkishny.com](http://www.turkishny.com)). This quote reflects the paramount importance attached to the Armenian issue among Turkish-Americans.

In addition to the Armenian issue, the conflict with Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus (particularly in the 1970s and 1980s), the Kurdish conflict and the PKK have

prompted protests and various proclaiming activities by the Turkish organizations. Letters have been sent to the U.S. Congress on various issues, including the Azeri-Armenian conflict since the 1990s. Internet networks have been developed to boost these letter campaigns on all issues related to Turkey and other Turkic nations. With respect to the predominance of homeland issues, Turkish politics have become an important factor in the recent years in a different way. Following the political success enjoyed by the former president of the FTAA, Egemen Bagis<sup>120</sup>, in Turkish elections after which he became a member of the ruling government, Turkish organizational life have also come to be viewed as a stepping stone for those Turkish Americans who have political ambitions back in Turkey. Ahmet Basar Sen, who is the Vice Consul at the Consulate General of Turkey in New York, observes that

“Rise and success of the previous President of the FTAA, Egemen Bagis, in Turkish politics added a new dimension to the organizational dynamics of the Turkish community. A different motivation...One can observe an increase in Turkey-targeted activities; at times even more so than local activities in New York.”<sup>121</sup>

The frequent visits paid by the Turkish officials to some Turkish organizations in New York during their official trips to the United States, as well as the trips of organizational leaders to Ankara and various government offices display the rising prominence attached to enhance transnational ties.

---

<sup>120</sup> He was first elected to the Parliament in 2002 as a deputy of Istanbul from the ruling AK Party and was appointed as Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator in January 2009.

<sup>121</sup> Personal interview with Ahmet Basar Sen, New York, January 15, 2009.

If we also compare the percentage distributions of the type of claims made by the Turkish organizations across time and space, it is evident that Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have undertaken a more diversified and intense claims making efforts than those in New York. Also, Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have participated in more ways in their host polity than their counterparts in New York. The protests and confrontational acts observed in New York have been almost exclusively about the above-mentioned homeland issues, whereas the protesting activities of Turks in Amsterdam have included a wide range of issues.

Although it appears that Turks in America are more content with their place in the American society and therefore do not have much to protest about, my fieldwork data and interviews also show that a large number of Turkish people also have major concerns with respect to job security, getting residence and work permits, education, housing and health care. Proclaiming activities of Turkish organizations do not refer much to these problems. Letters, reports and press releases are largely focused on homeland matters and although visits to public officials or leaders have increased in the recent years, these meetings are held with the intention of introducing Turkish culture and the position of the Turkish community on issues such as the Armenian claims.

Exceptions to these practices have been the relations with local authorities of mosque organizations, as well as the organizations associated with Fethullah Gulen. These organizations have started to build more durable relations with figures in the local polity than in the past. Still, these organizational efforts in New York have been carried out in a more ad hoc than an organized and continued manner compared to those in Amsterdam where Turkish leaders and Dutch officials have much more frequent and

regular contacts. These interactions on a regular basis with local and national policy makers and officials enable the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam to have more active participation on a variety of issues that concern their community. Big profile galas and dinners in New York, bring together Turkish and American politicians, businessmen and other high-profile people. However, these events remain largely symbolic in the sense that one cannot talk much of a claims making process or input into different aspects of local politics by the Turkish organizations.

Describing his networking efforts on behalf of the *Turkish Cultural Center*, Osman Oztoprak underlines the absence of these regular contacts with American politicians that are initiated by Turkish organizations in New York in general. He states that:

“I sometimes visit a number of U.S. senators in Washington, DC at their offices to talk about Turkey, the Turkish community in America and important issues. After my return, I communicate these meetings to fellow organizational leaders. They are often surprised to find out that senators make time to talk to us. Our goal is then to invite these senators for various organization dinners, conferences or festivals. It’s easier to have them accept our invitation since they now know who we are...”<sup>122</sup>

Huseyin Unver, who has worked at a number of Turkish organizations (TACCI, BOHP, and TABF) in various capacities, relayed a similar observation during our interview. He is the current President and CEO of Exsa Americas Inc (part of the Turkish Sabanci group). For his undergraduate degree, he studied at the Middle Eastern

---

<sup>122</sup> Personal interview with Osman Oztoprak, New York, at the offices of Turkish Cultural Center, December 2, 2008.

Technical University, Department of Geology Engineering and later received his MBA from Zicklin School of Business at Baruch College.

According to Unver,

“meetings with local officials in New York are mostly sporadic and spur of the moment. Often times, specific plans for such relationships are not reflected in the organizational agendas. With the exception of Brooklyn Borough President, Marty Markowitz, for whom some organizations undertake small-scale fundraising activities during elections...”<sup>123</sup>

These are telling quotes since they show that many Turkish organizations in New York still lack the knowledge of the inner workings of the American political system. Therefore, over the years their ties with public officials and politicians have been very much limited, especially when compared to those continual relationships developed in Amsterdam politics.

Empirical evidence on claims making by immigrant organizations, as well as fieldwork and interview data support the argument (*Hypothesis 1a*) that Turks in Amsterdam will have a higher level of political participation than in New York because the Dutch government does more to promote ethnic newcomers than the United States (granting of local voting rights for non-citizens, subsidizing immigrant associations). Differing political opportunity structures have resulted in varying degrees of political participation among Turkish organizations. (However, as will be addressed again, POS is not the only factor in different degrees of political participation).

---

<sup>123</sup> Personal interview with Huseyin Unver, New York, December 18, 2009.

As the examination of political claims making patterns of Turks in both contexts shows Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have been noticeably more active than their counterparts in New York. This has been evident in the frequency and number of reported claims as well as the wider range of issues covered in those claims. As opposed to the predominance of homeland-oriented claims making processes by Turkish New Yorkers, over the years, Turkish associations in Amsterdam have articulated and fervently advanced various immigration and integration related matters as well.

In addition, although it is not immediately evident in the claims figures with respect to the frequency and regularity of organizational contacts with local and national officials, Turkish associational leaders in Amsterdam have established and sustained strong relations with a number of Dutch political parties, policy makers and various NGOs. Content analysis of organizational documents and in-depth interviews have revealed that Turks in Amsterdam do have daily interactions, negotiations and consultations with local authorities and participate in advisory councils at the national level (IOT).

The same cannot be put forth for Turks in New York. Apart from irregular and sporadic meetings (occasional participation of American political figures in a few fundraising events, notable Turkish national and religious holidays), it is hard to talk about daily contacts or consultations between the Turkish organizations and the local political machine. There is no visible input to emphasize on the part of these migrant organizations in the decision-making process. Although many leaders have voiced a desire to be a greater part of the political process, Turkish political activism in New York is still in its infancy.

This is also evident in the comparative situation of the Turks in both cities with respect to positions held at local and national offices. Turkish Dutch citizens have been represented at various levels of government (municipalities, the Parliament, the European Parliament, advisory councils and even in the Cabinet). The majority of these political figures between 1970 and 2002 were on the board of a Turkish migrant organization (Michon and Vermeulen, 2009). Even though after being elected some of these people have distanced themselves from the migrant associations, organizational participation has remained an important stepping stone for Turkish immigrants to wider local and national politics in the Netherlands.

In contrast, one cannot talk of any Turkish organizational leaders who have been elected or appointed in the New York metro area. It remains to be seen whether the willingness of Turkish leaders, as expressed in our interviews, will translate into higher individual participation in American politics in the near future.

Second expectation (*Hypothesis 1b*) has also been confirmed. Given the favorable opportunity structure in the Netherlands with regards to religion, the religiously oriented Turkish organizations should be more politically active than in the United States. The salience of religious plurality in Amsterdam has encouraged political participation among migrants who are members of religious organizations. In New York, since religious membership does not yield institutional recognition, religion proves to be less salient as a source of political mobilization of immigrant organizational actors.

The implications of the differing POS with respect to religion and the political participation, as well as the organizational goals, of religious associations (both in the

establishment and development phases) are discussed in detail in several chapters above. The legacy of pillarization, its institutional and constitutional guarantees to all minority religions have enabled Islam to emerge as a separate pillar in the Dutch case. The legality of public assistance to Islamic schools and institutions like separate broadcasting channels (particularly radio stations) led many religious Turkish groups, such as Milli Gorus, Suleymancis and Diyanet, to actively make claims and demands on issues ranging from allocation and building of worship places to education (requests about specific locations for Islamic schools to be close to immigrant neighborhoods to increase enrollment rates, appointment of teachers with migrant background, issue of headscarves at schools-both for students and instructors). On such religious issues, as well as non-religious matters, these Turkish organizations have managed to mobilize their communities at mostly neighborhood levels and channel their demands to municipalities and political parties.

In New York, on the other hand, since there is no similar recognition of religion at the institutional level (no public funding for Islamic schools, broadcasting, broadcasting stations), the same religious issues have not been public but remained in the private management of the organizations. Apart from enjoying the same tax breaks all non profit organizations do, religious organizations (Diyanet and Suleymanci mosques, religious centers by the Gulen network) provide grass roots support to their communities. Despite the presence of a sizable conservative and pious community, religious issues do not constitute a big part of claims making by Turkish organizations in New York. Instead religious events and holidays are occasions where the Turkish community leaders meet with local and national public figures.

The other hypothesis (*Hypothesis 2*) that immigrant organizations with more resources (political motivation, size and connectedness) will have higher levels of political participation regardless of national context; where a national setting affords more resources, that national setting should have higher levels of immigrant organizational activity also holds true. The number of Turkish organizations operating with the goal of representing the political interests of the community, as well as fostering political interest among Turkish immigrants is lower in New York than in Amsterdam.

Despite some cutbacks, subsidies granted by the Dutch authorities in Amsterdam have enabled Turkish organizations there to continue with their activities and participation over a long period of time. On the other hand, no such financial help was offered in the New York case, where all organizations have had to secure their own resources (either through donations or membership fees. Also, the degree of connectedness between Turkish organizations in Amsterdam has been higher despite the existence of extreme ideological proliferation among Turkish organizations, something that lacks in New York where organizational divisions are not as sharp.

Organizational resources in terms of material resources, political motivation (as articulated in their mission statements, activity reports and claims making patterns) and connectedness (the range and strength of the network of Turkish organizations) have been different in the two cases. In New York, Turkish organizations have survived on membership and service fees, donations and tax breaks from the government that is offered to all 501c(3) non profits. There are some private and public grants available on a project based manner but very few Turkish organizations have taken advantage of this

knowledge and applied to them. During interviews, leaders have revealed to me that they have only recently been aware of these sources and have stated that they are in the process of hiring new personnel with grant writing skills and experience to come up with eligible projects.

On the other hand, regular government subsidies (particularly in the early and middle stages of organizational development) and substantial assistance on rent and utilities granted by the Dutch authorities for the offices of migrant organizations have been instrumental in their continuation over the years. In addition, a huge number of Turkish organizations (religious groups, women, professional and hometown associations) have also benefited from project-based grants offered by public and private sectors. The role of Dutch NGOs in funding hometown targeted projects is examined in detail in the chapter on transnational ties.

With respect to political motivation as one aspect of organizational resources, as a result of both POS and the extent and strength of transnational relations, Turks in Amsterdam have been more politically motivated than their counterparts in New York. An examination of organizational mission statements, claims making patterns as well as the content analysis of activity reports reveal that Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have put forth clear political goals for their communities, something those in New York have almost exclusively refrained from. The only established political goals that can be underlined with respect to the latter are the improvement of Turkish-American relations in the international arena. Media releases and speech acts deal with foreign policy issues such as the Armenian issue.

The third component of organizational resources, which is the connectedness of Turkish organizations, is also uneven in both contexts. Although Turkish groups are ideologically more polarized in Amsterdam than in New York, these associations are better connected in the former. The existence of advisory councils in Amsterdam has been instrumental in this regard. In addition, due to their politically motivated organizational outlook, Turks in Amsterdam have been more politically savvy and despite bitter disputes and rivalries between Turkish groups (left vs. ultranationalists, religious vs. secular, religious vs. other religious- various Islamic factions), organizational leaders have managed to come together and consult with each other. As described in the network analysis chapter, overlapping board memberships have also helped their connectedness.

Organizational relationships in New York between conflicting groups have been limited to meetings at the FTAA (Federation of Turkish American Associations), an umbrella organization. These meetings have often been marred with fierce discussions and disagreements; and they do not bring all organizational leaders together. Although, for instance, the Gulen organizations make up of almost  $\frac{1}{4}$  of all Turkish organizations in New York metro area, Turkish Cultural Center does not take part in FTAA proceedings. Also different from the Dutch case, overlapping board memberships can only be observed among like-minded organizations.

With respect to *Hypothesis 3* that transnational ties should have similar effects on the organizational activism of the Turkish communities in the two cities if they both maintain those ties at similar levels, this study finds the level of transnational ties have not been the same. It is important to note that Turks in both cities have visible

transnational ties with the homeland and other Turkish groups abroad. However, the extent, strength and durability of those ties have been more notable among the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam than those in the New York metro area.

Political claims analysis reveals that in both cities homeland matters have occupied a big place on the organizational agendas of Turks. Issues on Turkish domestic politics (the human rights concerns, constitutional issues as regards to religion, improvement of rights for the Kurdish minority) and Turkish foreign policy (Turkish- Greek relations, the Armenian genocide debates, Turkish candidacy for the EU) have been at the forefront of their claims making. Predominance of these issues is reflected in the relationship between Turkish immigrant organizations and political groups and parties in the home country. Still, the extent and strength of these ties have been different in the two cities.

Numerous political groups and parties in Turkey have maintained very close ties with like-minded Turkish organizations in Amsterdam. Particularly after the 1980 coup, when many asylum seekers, among other labor migrants, arrived in Europe and the Netherlands, the domestic disputes and bitter, at times violent, conflicts among ideologically diverse groups were transplanted in the inner workings of immigrant organizations. In fact the influence of these political groups on the evolution of Turkish organizing in Amsterdam has been distinctive. Many associations have operated as an extension of political parties in Turkey.

Among them, the following relationships have been most notable: migrant worker organizations with Turkish Communist Party and similar leftist groups; ultranationalists with Grey Wolves and MHP (National Movement Party); and the Milli

Gorus organizations with all political parties in succession of each other (National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party and Felicity Party under Necmettin Erbakan's leadership who championed the Milli Gorus ideology). Over the past four decades, reciprocal visits between immigrant leaders in Amsterdam, and party officials, as well as local and national political figures, in Turkey have been an enduring feature of Turkish organizing process.

In addition to strong ties with the political establishment in Turkey, migrant organizations in Amsterdam have also been active in pursuing various projects in their home towns. As discussed in the chapter on transnational relations, even the social and economic undertakings and investments in various parts of Turkey have had political undertones. Some migrant leaders have developed political aspirations back in Turkey and those public officials who oversaw the implementations of projects in small Turkish villages have used these relations to further their political careers where they reside.

The extent and strength of transnational ties between Turkish organizations in New York and the political mechanism in Turkey have not been at the same level as those in Amsterdam. Despite an increasing share of official visits between politicians in Turkey and migrant leaders in New York, for the most part Turkish organizations do not operate as an extension of a specific political party. The Gulen network (in both Amsterdam and New York) is an exception since they maintain the same level of interaction with the main political movement in Turkey.

Different waves of immigration from Turkey was an important factor in this. The profile of earlier Turkish immigrants largely included professionals (engineers, architects), academics, students, military personnel and their families. The diverse

group of Turks who migrated after the 1980s have gradually consisted of more religious and conservative parts of the Turkish society. These newcomers with lesser educational and occupational skills have been employed in labor intensive jobs. Yet these groups did not consist of the far left (communist) and the far right (such as Milli Gorus). Left wing groups of the 1980s, who vehemently opposed American capitalism, never settled in New York. In contrast, Amsterdam (and the Netherlands) have become home to such Turkish factions.

With respect to homeland oriented projects, there are a number of philanthropic organizations in New York that develop sustainable projects in small Turkish villages. Turkish Philanthropic Fund (TPF), Bridges of Hope Project (BOHP), and American Turkish Society (ATS) select applicants from Turkey on projects such as building of schools, libraries, new job opportunities for women workers and the improvement of existing ones. Unlike in Amsterdam, both the goals of these organizations and the projects they choose to support in Turkey are explicitly non-political.

*Immigrants as Actors:*

In addition to these hypotheses, an important argument of this study is the vital role of migrant organizations and their leaders play in the host polities. Above-mentioned findings on the organizational activities of Turks in both Amsterdam and in New York support the main arguments of the literature on immigrant organizations' functions and their role as actors in the receiving society. Turkish organizations in both cities do not only serve as forums where individual immigrants gather around cultural, social and religious occasions, perpetuate their heritage, language and religion, but they also provide their community members with the necessary assistance (legal and social

services) to improve their lives. Over the years, particularly, following the initial stages of formation, Turkish associations in both cases have become and acted as advocates for their ethnic group on a variety of issues (such as religious congregation necessities, employment, housing, relaxation of immigration requirements). As discussed in the theory section, they have also functioned as crucial links, or liaisons, between the home and host countries.

Although the extents of their political activism and their effects on local politics have varied in both cities, Turkish organizations have nevertheless been visible actors. In Amsterdam, leaders of these organizations have negotiated with the Dutch authorities as regards to the perceived interests of their community on issues as wide-ranging as education, health, unification with family members, family formation, domestic abuse, equality at the workplace and visa/naturalization costs. During elections, they have proved to be the go-to representatives of immigrant vote for Dutch political parties. Janelle Wong's argument (detailed in the theory section) about the crucial role of immigrant organizations in mobilizing ethnic groups politically holds up very much true in the Dutch case. Turkish associations have consistently played a prominent role in high voter turn-outs among Turks and also in channeling political support for those parties that have proved sympathetic to their cause and concern.

In New York, such domestic issues have, by and large, not been on the Turkish organizational agendas. Still, Turkish associations and their leaders have championed the national interests of Turkey, especially with regards to the Armenian genocide claims, the Kurdish conflict and Turkey's relations with Greece. Public events and

gatherings, letters to the editors of major newspapers, and protests organized by Turkish organizations have helped push these issues into the political agenda in favor of Turkey.

## **Chapter 9. Conclusion:**

This study has offered a comparative analysis of the political participation of Turkish immigrant organizations in the United States and the Netherlands, using metropolitan New York and Amsterdam as the study sites. Turkish immigrants have developed a lively associational presence in both of these receiving countries. Over the years, Turks formed many different types of organizations in both settings. While the changing political opportunity structures of their host countries certainly influenced their development, so have the immigrant communities themselves as well as the political and institutional networks retained with Turkey. Using a political claims analysis approach, this study has identified some important similarities and differences across the two settings. My findings may be summarized as follows:

- 1) Turkish organizations in Amsterdam are politically more active and better connected with each other and key players in their host polity (local authorities, political parties, native NGOs, trade unions, etc) than their counterparts in New York. Their capacity to mobilize the Turkish migrant population in Amsterdam has thus been larger and they make more claims (protesting and proclaiming) over a wider range of issues than do organizations in New York.

Although Turkish organizational activities have not always resulted in the desired policy impacts, their ongoing claims-making and negotiating of various issues have made Turks active participants in their host polity. Over the years, Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have been able to articulate positions, mobilize support among the community, and pressure Dutch policy makers both at the local and national levels. Through petitions, protests, media (internet and TV) campaigns and academic

publications, they have become visible actors in setting agendas and influencing opinions. On the other hand, as will be mentioned below, political participation of Turkish organizations in New York has not been equally active. A combination of factors (namely different political opportunity structures, the diverging impact of transnational relations on the organizational formations and organizational characteristics- such as the lack of politically driven mission and necessary resources of Turkish associations in New York) explain this variation.

Over the years, the initial exclusive focus on homeland matters has gradually shifted to facing the daily problems of immigrant integration. Claims such as workers' rights, equality in workplace, anti-discrimination, neighborhood segregation, and issues concerning the youth and the elderly have gained prominence on the organizational agenda of Turkish associations in Amsterdam. This is not to say that they cut or lost their homeland ties, because Turks in Amsterdam have maintained their relations with other Turkish groups and organizations in Turkey and elsewhere (mostly in other European countries). However, with the realization that their stay in Amsterdam would be permanent, Turkish organizations have displayed increasing diversification with respect to the content of claims they have made in their host polity.

On education, these organizations sought not only to raise awareness among Turkish parents about their critical role in their children's educational success and inform them about the crucial aspects of the Dutch educational system, but to act as advocates on behalf of the families. In determining school tracks, they negotiate the educational paths of Turkish students with their teachers and school administrators. By offering additional Dutch language classes, after school mentoring programs and CITO

test (national administered standardized exams to determine school tracks at the age of 12) preparation courses, they make tangible contributions to the educational attainment of Turkish children in the Netherlands.

They have been key actors in changing certain legal arrangements. Women's organizations, such as ATKB, have spearheaded efforts in changing the rules on the length of stay required from spouses to be granted legal residence if they received living permits through their husbands and now have to leave them. Today, provided that the abuse is proven through hospital and police records, domestic abuse victims are allowed to live in the country even if they have stayed less than a year. Previously, three years of residence was required from spouses to obtain this permit if she wanted to leave her husband. Although many abuse victims still do not make use of this change, that fact mostly reflects cultural and social reticence.

In contrast, Turkish organizational activities in New York have been much more limited in scope and frequency. The majority of political claims made by Turkish organizations in New York have focused on homeland matters, such as the Armenian genocide claims, the Kurdish conflict and the PKK. Since the share of claims related to discrimination and racism is small in New York, it appears that Turks are more content with their place in the American society and therefore do not have much to protest about. Still, my fieldwork and interviews show that many Turkish people have significant concerns about job security, naturalization, getting residence and work permits, education, housing, and health care. Many newcomers from lower socio-economic backgrounds have adaptation and language problems. Yet the proclaiming activities of Turkish organizations do not often refer to these problems.

In my opinion this is due to the limited reach of most Turkish organizations to the community at large. Apart from a number of mosques and neighborhood organizations, such as the Gulen organization in Sunnyside Queens, which work as semi-grassroots associations (and provide language courses, ad hoc legal assistance), there are not many Turkish organizations which provide mass appeal and receive community support (in terms of finance as well as attendance of organizational events).

Secondly, compared to the Dutch case in New York the organizational resources (human and material) and connections with local authorities have been fairly limited with respect to channeling their policy positions and influencing decisions. During interviews, although the majority of Turkish leaders recognized the difficulties that the newcomers face (jobs, housing, language, visa issues) in their daily lives, they emphasized the lack of consistent expertise and financial resources necessary to act as advocates for the Turkish community at large.

Also pertinent has been the legal status of non-profit organizations which make up almost all of Turkish organizations in New York. Since non-profits are required to stay away from political activities, campaigning and political party endorsements, many Turkish associations do not see themselves as political in nature and therefore do not push specific community issues on the agenda. Instead, professional networking among elite organizations, religious gatherings arranged by mosques and religious centers on special days and inclusion of high and low profile American politicians take precedence. Invitation of these figures remains as symbolic connections and do not reflect the existence of substantive and regular relationships.

Therefore, letters, reports and press releases issued by Turkish organizations have largely focused on homeland matters and although visits to local public officials or leaders have increased in the recent years, these meetings are held with the intention of introducing Turkish culture and the position of Turkish community on issues such as the Armenian claims.

Organizational efforts in New York have been more ad hoc than those in Amsterdam and Turkish leaders have much less frequent and regular contacts with American officials. In Holland, regular interactions with local and national policy makers and officials enable Turkish organizations to have more active participation on a variety of issues that concern their community.

- 2) Actors in the Turkish communities of New York and Amsterdam did indeed create organizations in reaction to conditions and incentives in the political systems of both the United States and the Netherlands, while simultaneously retaining ties with Turkey and similar Turkish organizations abroad.

This study has inquired into the extent to which both the shape and dynamics of the political opportunity structures of the host countries and the extent of transnational ties maintained by immigrants with their homeland shape the process of political participation, as reflected by claims making of Turkish organizations. It has conceptualized the receiving context as a legal, political and institutional setting that, in turn, shapes the possibilities for Turkish (and indeed all other) organizations to act politically in Amsterdam and New York. These institutional settings and rules provide a national and local public space in which immigrant organizations can make claims about issues relevant to the interests of their community. Claims made by the Turkish

immigrant organizations (the types as well as the content of those claims) do indeed vary according to the degree of inclusiveness of the host country's political opportunity structure, as this approach would predict.

It is important to note, however, that political opportunity structure is not the *only* set of factors explaining variation in political participation (measured in terms of political claims making patterns) of Turkish organizations over the years. The strength and durability of transnational relations, including institutional ties with political groups and parties in Turkey and other parts of Europe and the organizational characteristics of immigrant groups themselves (most notably their financial resources, political motivation and interconnectedness) both played crucial roles as well in shaping political activism among Turks. Although political opportunity structures do exert a clear influence over these organizational characteristics (in the form of government subsidies, support in the form of expertise, inclusion in the policy process), many organizations also gather such resources through other means (transnational efforts, fund raising in the community). Trying to deduce immigrant political practices solely as a rational response to a larger opportunity set is thus at best an incomplete and at worst an inaccurate analysis. The empirical evidence gathered on claims making by Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York, in addition to the mission statements of Turkish organizations, fieldwork and interview data in both cities, largely support the theoretical argument that political actors bring a great deal to the structures of opportunity they encounter.

Looking first at the political opportunity structures in both cities, they may be summarized as follows:

<b>TABLE 12. TWO DIFFERENT POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES (POS)</b>	
<b>NEW YORK</b>	<b>AMSTERDAM</b>
Local government provides no regular subsidy to Turkish organizations	Local government subsidies (evolved from funding organizations into funding organizational projects) + breaks on rent, heat
Neither philanthropic organizations nor home town associations (HTAs) fund development projects in Turkey	Dutch co-financing institutions provide funding to Turkish organizations (mostly HTAs) for development projects
Non-profit legal status prevent Turkish organizations from lobbying or campaigning - 501c3 nonprofits must remain strictly nonpartisan	Dutch law does not limit political activities of nonprofit organizations. Immigrant nonprofits were encouraged to participate in the local and national politics
No advisory councils for Turkish groups/organizations	Although the local Turkish advisory council (TDM) in Amsterdam was abolished recently, a national one (IOT) continues
No local voting rights for non-citizens	Since 1985, non-citizens who reside in the city for at least 5 years have local voting rights
Presidential system dominated by two major parties	Proportional representation with multi-party system
Immigration has increasingly been linked to security and unauthorized migration. The U.S. immigration bureaucracy has been more enforcement oriented than integration oriented	While immigrant related issues have increasingly been viewed through a securitized prism, immigrant integration policies have continued to be implemented.
Legacy of racial politics complicates the integration process. Seeing immigrant experience through black vs. white lens hinders ethnic mobilization	No history of racial politics and civil rights movement to predefine immigrant experience. Many immigrants still make claims about discrimination and racism
Despite being a religious society, the American context does not reward religious organizations	History of pillarization in church-state relations enabled Islam to become a new pillar (Islamic schools, media)

- 3) Religious issues play a greater role among the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam.

The recognition of religious differences and cleavages in the Netherlands at the institutional level has favored the polarization of the organizational structure around religion and, in turn, has rendered religion as a salient issue for the political participation and mobilization of Turkish immigrant organizations in Amsterdam. As an extension of pillarization system (denominational segregation), the Dutch government has offered equal rights, opportunities and support to all religious communities. Like all minority communities, Turkish religious groups have benefited from this rule.

Negotiations have taken place with local authorities on the building of mosques, arranging for a Muslim cemetery, opening Islamic primary and secondary schools, increasing the number of public school teachers and administrators from Muslim background and establishing the right to separate Islamic broadcasting. These, at times contentious, topics have been important between the religious Turkish organizations and the Dutch authorities in Amsterdam

Although, the New York metro area has a sizeable number of religious organizations (mostly mosque organizations) they made many fewer religious claims compared to those in Amsterdam. As discussed before, the salience of religion in Amsterdam is an extension of the Dutch political opportunity structure, which historically treats state-church relations through pillarization. Even though pillarization ceased to exist in the 1980s, the institutional legacy continued to shape relations with immigrants from Muslim background and enabled Islam to become a new, if different, pillar.

This does not signify that religion is not a vital part of Turkish life in New York but it means that unlike in Amsterdam, organizing specifically around religious issues is

not an overt strategy of Turkish organizations in their claims making processes vis-à-vis local governments. Instead, fundraising plans are more widely embraced and private donations are highly encouraged from the members of the Turkish community.

Organizational support for religious institutes is not as readily available and automatic as in the Dutch case. Assistance (in the form of grants) is requested and applied for through private or government (mostly local) institutions on a project based manner.

- 4) Transnational ties of Turkish organizations are prominent in both cases. Political claims-making over the years has often included homeland related matters. In both cities, major mobilization issues/topics, involving many Turks, concern Turkish foreign policy. The Armenian issue and the Kurdish conflict have drawn the most protest involvement. However, home-country influence has not been identical in the two contexts and the extent of transnational ties has been different.

Turkish organizations in Amsterdam were mostly founded as an extension of political rivalries prevalent in Turkey (from 1970s on). Political divisions and rivalries between party groups were practically transplanted into the Dutch setting. As a result, groups from all over the Turkish political spectrum developed in Amsterdam (and in the Netherlands in general). Through the years, they have increasingly dealt with host-country related issues, but they retain strong relations with Turkey and Turkish organizations (even though common projects or collaborations have lost its intensity in the recent years).

On the other hand, despite major divisions and internal conflicts, ideological polarization has not been as sharp among the Turkish organizations in New York. They,

too, have prominent transnational ties, but in a different way. Turkish political party (and other ideological) groups have not had the same kind of influence on organizational formation that they did in the Netherlands. Over the years, some leaders of Turkish organizations in the United States (particularly the umbrella organization FTAA and more recently Turkish Cultural Center) maintained ties with the ruling governments in Turkey, but such ties have not been as regular and deep as in Amsterdam.

There are a number of factors in explaining the variation of Turkey's political influence on immigrant organizational formations in the two contexts. The first reason has to do with the composition of Turks who arrived in the United States over the years. Earlier Turkish immigrants were predominantly professionals (engineers, architects), academics, students, military personnel and their families. The diverse group of Turks who migrated after the 1980s have increasingly included more religious and conservative, less educated and less skilled immigrants. Yet these groups did not consist of the far left (communist) and the far right (such as Milli Gorus). Left wing groups of the 1980s, who vehemently opposed American capitalism, never settled in New York. In contrast, Amsterdam (and the Netherlands) have become home to such Turkish factions.

In addition, one of the points often raised during my interviews in New York is the lack of affinity felt by Turkish immigrants towards the political system in the United States. Unlike the parliamentary systems in Turkey and the Netherlands, where a wider range of ideological viewpoints are represented by a higher number of parties in the political arena, the United States offers a system dominated by two major parties

(the Republicans and the Democrats). Although these parties differ from each other on numerous issues, the ideological divide between the two is never as pronounced as it is (or was particularly in the 1980s and 1990s) in Turkey and the Netherlands.

Therefore, ideological rival groups in Amsterdam have found it easier to identify with like-minded Dutch political parties. Over the years, leftist organizations (workers organizations, left-wing women organizations) have collaborated with the Labor Party, the Socialist Party and the Groen Links Party in Amsterdam. Some of the more conservative groups have established ties with both Christian Democrats and the Labor Party.

According to interviewees, apart from the ideological affinities, the parliamentary system offered a much similar political experience to the Turkish newcomers in terms of party structure, party lists and recruitment. It was mentioned more than once during interviews that Turkish immigrants in New York have struggled to understand the inner workings of the American political system.

Osman Oztoprak, the Chairman of the *Turkish Cultural Center*, argues that the Turkish community in the New York metro area has been “apolitical.” He states:

“The system in Turkey and the United States are completely different. Everything in Turkey [Turkish politics] is party driven or leader-driven. Here, individual candidates have to prove themselves and do bulk of the work [campaigning to get elected]. They need to know the region, or neighborhood they represent, assess the needs of the community, and make promises accordingly. In

Turkey such claims are made under the party umbrella, here you need to be knowledgeable about the specific issues.”<sup>124</sup>

A similar point is made by Huseyin Unver, who has been active in the Turkish organizing process and has served in various associations such as Bridges of Hope Project (BOHP), Turkish American Business Forum (TABF), Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TACCI). Emphasizing the difference of American political system, he stated to me that:

“political participation is inextricably linked to fundraising. It is an expensive operation. Most Turkish organizations are not informed enough about the process and those that are informed often lack the resources to back individual candidates.”<sup>125</sup>

*Transnational Ties Other Than Political Parties*

Still, the enduring transnational relations have been prominent in the two countries. The Turkish Diyanet, the official religious directorate in Turkey, has played a role in providing the state-controlled religious services for Turkish immigrants living abroad in both settings. The Diyanet also appoints imams and constructs or purchases mosques in the host countries as well. Yet the density of daily activities by the Diyanet foundation and the mosques attached to it is higher in Amsterdam than New York.

Another transnational network that is visible in Turkish immigrants’ lives is the group of organizations that follow the teachings of the Turkish religious leader, Fethullah Gulen. In both cities (and the two countries at large), the Gulen network has

---

<sup>124</sup> Personal interview with Osman Oztoprak, New York, at the Turkish Cultural Center December 2, 2008.

<sup>125</sup> Personal interview with Huseyin Unver, New York, December 18, 2008.

been very active in establishing schools, centers, and associated foundations in their host polities and in maintaining good relations with local officials and political figures. In fact, the Gulen network constitutes an amazing 23.5% of the total number of Turkish organizations operating in the New York metro area.

Another similarity is that hometown associations and homeland-motivated investment and development projects undertaken by Turkish organizations are common in both Amsterdam and New York. In Amsterdam, most transnational projects organized by hometown associations try to improve the living conditions in the Turkish villages or towns of origin. Most apply for funds from Dutch intermediary organizations for specific projects to be implemented in a specific period of time. In New York, philanthropic organizations, such as Turkish Philanthropic Fund and Bridges of Hope, accept donations or raise funds to be invested in projects mostly selected as feasible by the organizations themselves. Other educational organizations, such as Trustees of Robert College of Istanbul, Istanbul International Community School, and Turkish American Educational Foundation undertake similar roles in the educational fields in Turkey.

- 5) Finally, this study argues that immigrant organizations themselves play a large role in determining how they are going to be actors in their host polities.

As detailed above, over the years Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have been able to articulate positions, mobilize support among the community, and pressure Dutch policy makers at the local and national levels. Through forums and meetings, they have fostered political interest among the Turkish community. In addition to encouraging the community to vote during elections, they have become important

political actors themselves on a wide variety of public policy issues (education, women's rights, and anti-discrimination). This shows a level of development, sophistication, and strategy-development that has not emerged in New York.

Even though Turkish organizations have displayed a lower level political participation in New York compared to those in Amsterdam, they too have served important functions. In addition to their traditional role of preserving and perpetuating Turkish culture, Turkish immigrant organizations have been vocal about homeland-related matters. Although they are restricted about lobbying as non-profit organizations in the United States, Turkish organizations try to find other ways to work as advocates. Often, even non-political or cultural events serve a double purpose: to gather the Turkish American community and strengthen solidarity and to include local officials and other organizational representatives who are introduced to the Turkish culture and issue positions.

#### *Theoretical Significance of These Findings*

1) Immigrant political integration must be studied at the local/urban level

Studying immigrant integration only at the national level is inadequate. As demonstrated in this study, immigrant groups are most active at the local level – neighborhood political meetings (such as political party centers, non-profit and NGO offices), municipal councils and city halls- and have contact first and foremost with local policy makers, administrative officials and politicians. By interacting with them, immigrant groups and their leaders try to influence decision-making processes relevant to the perceived interests of their community. Although many discussions and negotiations raise general issues about the status of immigrants in the host society

(issues such as residence permits, family unification and formation, visa costs, recognition of group demands), most of the dialogue revolves around daily matters of immigrant life, such as elderly and child care in various neighborhoods, language courses, and issues related to local schools.

In Amsterdam, immigrants with legal residence of 5 years may vote in local elections, making them a target for outreach by the Dutch political parties. In order to gain immigrant electoral support, local branches of Dutch political parties try to develop lasting ties with immigrant organizations and their leaders. Although immigrants do not have the right to vote in local elections in New York or New Jersey, local politicians also lean towards developing stronger ties with immigrant groups. During interviews, Turkish organizational leaders have reported to have on-going relations with local authorities (including municipal representatives, police and fire departments) and Borough Presidents (most notably Marty Markowitz of Brooklyn). In New York, these relationships have not been as durable and substantive as those in Amsterdam. Still, the local level is clearly the most important for uncovering political participation of immigrant groups in their host society. Urban politics offer the best level to fully observe immigrant integration, from strategizing to actual participation.

2) The inner dynamics of immigrant groups must be studied, not just the larger opportunity structure in which they operate.

This study has revealed much by delving into the inner dynamics and group characteristics of the Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam and New York. Reflecting the divisiveness of Turkish politics over the years, Turkish immigrant groups in both cities have displayed competing ideologies and political parties. Rivalries between secular

and religious groups or left-wing organizations and ultranationalists and competition among religious groups themselves (namely the Milli Gorus movement, the Suleymancis, the Fethullah Gulen network and mosque organizations attached to the Diyanet) have been permanent characteristic of the Turkish migrant organizational make-up in the receiving societies. These divisions have often impeded Turkish organizations from coming together and developing unified strategies vis-à-vis the local establishments and policy makers. Still, from a comparative perspective, over the years, Turkish organizations in Amsterdam have managed to become more interconnected than those in New York (a deeper examination can be found in the chapter analyzing the respective organizational networks in both contexts).

In spite of sharper ideological divisions in Amsterdam than New York, Turkish associations in the former have frequently been able to agree on various issues regarding the status of Turks in Dutch society and come up with overall positions recognized, if not uniformly accepted, by all. On the other hand, Turkish groups in New York, who are still divided even if less so than those in Amsterdam, have not succeeded in developing commonly accepted strategies with respect to daily issues of Turkish immigrants (Exceptions are the Armenian issue, the Kurdish conflict and Turkish foreign policy matters).

Theories based primarily on political opportunity structures (POS) have, by and large, sidestepped the study of inner organizational and group dynamics and thus have missed a major part of the explanatory framework. This study shows how the interconnectedness of different migrant groups, their leadership skills, and their ability to develop political strategies are essential to explaining patterns of political

participation of immigrant communities – alongside the limiting or rewarding aspects of the institutional and legal make-up of the host society.

This study makes clear that immigrants, in this case as represented by immigrant organizations, are important political actors in the host polity and they are not irrevocably bound by the limits and opportunities presented by the local, as well as national, institutions, policies and legal frameworks. Theoretical arguments put forth by the followers of POS are too structurally determining and allow little room for immigrant agency in the analysis of political integration. Turkish organizations have often reacted in innovative ways to the political possibilities in their settings, and the evolution of these actions has been influenced by internal alliances, struggles, and rivalries.

3) Transnational relations play an important part in shaping the political participation of immigrant groups

Transnational ties must be central to the analysis of the political integration of immigrant groups. The political opportunity structure framework often misses a crucial variable, namely to how durable transnational relations transmit political influences from the home polities. Ties with political parties and groups in the motherland, as well as with other like-minded overseas Turkish organizations, have been pivotal in shaping political participation by Turkish immigrants in both Amsterdam and New York. Various Turkish groups (left-wing, right-wing, religious) have maintained strong ties across borders and used political, as well as financial and human, resources to mobilize Turkish communities in their new homelands.

These influences flow in both directions. In addition to the flow of ideas and resources to immigrant organizations in the receiving states, host country hometown associations have developed projects to be implemented in their home towns, often with assistance from host country institutions. These projects have ranged from small-scale development programs (building of schools, centers, etc) to more far-reaching socio-political ventures (agricultural undertakings in rural areas).

These findings underscore how crucial it is for political scientists to systematically investigate the political effects of transnationalism. Simultaneity and multiplicity of ties among immigrants across borders must be taken into account; something that majority of the political opportunity structure- centered research designs seem to have ignored in the prevalent literature. Durable transnational ties have as much capacity to mobilize immigrant groups in the receiving societies and encourage political participation as those opportunities offered by the host state. Not looking into these long-lasting transnational links and relations will only result in an incomplete picture of immigrant activism.

#### *Policy Recommendations*

Since immigrant ethnic organizations are important political actors in their receiving countries, local and national governments of the host polities need to recognize their significance and bring them into policy formulation and implementation. More often than not, immigrant organizations constitute vital partners in helping local governments enhance integration. It will be particularly useful for local governments and others to introduce new civic and leadership training opportunities (as well as

widening existing ones) for immigrant elites so that they can fulfill the immense potential of these partnerships.

A similar point can be made with regards to setting up advisory councils for various immigrant groups. Although the Dutch case demonstrates that such advisory bodies may not always prove to be well-functioning, they create invaluable stages where different immigrant groups come together, discuss community interests, and interact with politicians and policy makers in the host polity. In Amsterdam, these councils increased the interconnectedness of immigrant groups which, in turn, contributes to their joint political activism. Therefore, local governments should keep such consultative bodies intact and make use of the vital communication channels they offer.

Local voting rights can also play a huge role in fostering immigrant integration. In the Dutch case, such rights for non-citizen immigrants, as part of a favorable political opportunity structure, were crucial in mobilizing immigrant groups politically. Immigrants, spearheaded by their voluntary organizations, have become important voting blocs during elections and various political parties have accordingly been more willing to put immigrant representatives on their party lists. Although the extension of local voting rights to non-citizen immigrants does not constitute a precondition for immigrant political involvement, it no doubt enhances the process. Over the years, similar proposals have been debated, and mostly rejected, within the American context. Given the demonstrative positive impact on immigrant integration, however, this study supports the view that such laws and policies should be introduced into the U.S. setting.

A final policy recommendation concerns education, which fosters not only political but also socio-economic and cultural integration into the host society. Education introduces young immigrants to the political values and operating characteristics of the political system. It is one of the main institutional arenas that can nurture political trust at a young age. An effective educational system encourages and strengthens positive intercultural relations between immigrants and the native population, as well as among different immigrant groups. Since schools play a crucial role in welcoming and integrating students with immigrant backgrounds, policies on their educational achievement are noteworthy.

Pertinently needed are 1) more funding for schools heavily attended by students in migrant neighborhoods; 2) improving the ways in which administrators use funds in schools that are already being subsidized in order to enhance immigrant integration; and 3) paying more attention to teaching philosophy and teaching styles that will raise cultural sensitivity on the parts of teachers and school administrators towards migrant groups. In my interviews in both Amsterdam and New York, Turkish organizational leaders repeatedly emphasized these points and underscored the centrality of a well-functioning educational system as an integrative mechanism. Organizing schools in such a way that immigrant parents have the necessary tools to contribute as vital partners will, no doubt, improve the standing of new generations and their eventual incorporation (political as well as socio-economic and cultural) in the host society.

## **Appendix A**

### **Details on Data Gathering**

I follow a simplified version of the methodological approach developed by Koopmans and Statham (1999): analyzing political claims, defined as “the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical and verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, demonstration, etc).” Political claims and activities undertaken by the Turkish organizations reflect their political agenda and participation in the host polity.

News reports/pieces on Turkish organizational claims and activities in Amsterdam and New York were located through various sources. In addition to Lexis/Nexis, Factiva and ProQuest databases, searches were conducted on a number of Turkish newspapers- Hurriyet and Zaman (both European and U.S. versions), IOT (Turkish advisory council in the Netherlands) newsletter- [www.iot.nl](http://www.iot.nl), Dutch news in English ([www.nisnews.nl](http://www.nisnews.nl), [www.dutchnews.nl](http://www.dutchnews.nl) and [www.nieuwsuitamsterdam.nl/en](http://www.nieuwsuitamsterdam.nl/en)), [www.turkishweekly.net](http://www.turkishweekly.net), Forumgazetem (Turkish American newspaper, [forumgazetem.com](http://forumgazetem.com)), and [www.turkishny.com](http://www.turkishny.com). Press releases or other media statements issued by the organizations themselves (found on their web pages, printed newsletters or other organizational publications) were also included.

The following search terms were used in different combinations: “Turkish”, “immigrants”, “Dutch/American”, “Amsterdam/New York”, “organization(s)”, “association(s)”, “mosques”, and “protest”, “demonstration”, “boycott”, “press conference”, and “petition.” Search terms in Turkish for Turkish sources include:

“Turk”, “Turkiye”, “dernek”, “camii”, “protesto”, “gosteri”, “yuruyus”, “gocmen”, “vakif”, “merkez”, “basin toplantisi”, “boykot”, “bildiri” and “dilekce”.

In cases of multiple new pieces covering the same event/claim, only one report of that event was included in the study. Also included are the reports of claims and activities in which Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York signed joint declarations or issued joint press releases with other regional and national Turkish organizations, as well as native political actors (NGOs, trade unions, etc), in their host country. Similarly, if Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and New York participated in *regional* or *national* events (such as protests, demonstrations, etc), reports on those claims were also incorporated.

I examine political claims made by Turkish organizations in two general ways: 1) claims categorized according to their subject issue and 2) claims categorized according to type of activities undertaken (protesting or proclaiming activities). In the first case, I sorted claims with respect to five broad issue topics: immigration, immigrant and integration related, transnational claims including homeland matters, anti-discrimination or anti-racism targeted claims and other claims.

## Appendix B

### Interview Questions for Turkish Organizational Leaders in NY Metropolitan Area

**Location:**

**Date:**

**Identifying Number:**

---

*Introduction:* Thank you very much for making the time to talk with me. I am undertaking my doctoral dissertation research at the Graduate Center, CUNY and the purpose of this interview is to gather information to be documented, with your permission, in a thesis on the importance of immigrant organizing. I am hoping to highlight and compare the challenges and successes of the Turkish associations in the United States and the Netherlands. The purpose of the interview is only to gather information from organizers on the important aspects of their work, and the general political framework in which they function. The information you provide will not be used beyond the scope of this study.

#### Organizational Data

**Name:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Address:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Telephone of organization:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Name and title of interviewee:** \_\_\_\_\_

#### General Questions

When was your organization founded?

What is the mission of your organization?

Can you assess the importance of political activity in the United States, as reflected in the mission of your organization?

What are the most important achievements of the organization since it was formed?

What are your organization's needs for growth and capacity building?

What is your organization's primary geographical scope?

- |             |                  |
|-------------|------------------|
| a) Local    | d) National      |
| b) State    | e) International |
| c) Regional |                  |

What is your approximate budget?

Can you tell me the income sources of your association?

- |                       |                          |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| a) Private donations  | f) Memberships           |
| b) Local government   | g) Fees for services     |
| c) State government   | h) Sales of publications |
| d) Foundations        | i) Fund raising events   |
| e) Turkish government |                          |

What types of challenges or problems has this organization experienced? How do you address the problems and challenges?

How would you describe ties among the Turkish community? Are you satisfied with the associational involvement of Turkish immigrants in the city?

What are the future goals of this organization?

### **Membership:**

Does your organization have members?

How does one become a member? How many pay dues? How much is the membership fee?

Do non-members volunteer to work for the organization?

Can you tell me the number of staff (full-time)?

### **Events and Activities**

What are the major activities and services of the organization?

- a) Legal services (citizenship, naturalization)
- b) Research/policy development
- c) Public policy advocacy (lobbying, public education for administrative and legislative changes)
- d) Public education through media, other public communications
- e) Educational and language programs, scholarships
- f) Cultural activities
- g) Religious services/gatherings
- h) Community organization on various issues
- i) Other \_\_\_\_\_

What makes an event successful?

- |   |             |           |
|---|-------------|-----------|
| +Media coverage? (How do you get it?)       | + Location? | +Turnout? |
| +Sponsorship? +Is publicity important? Why? | + Issues?   | +Timing?  |

What kind of events do you organize? What makes them successful? How is the turnout?

How often you have organizational activities?

What strategies do you think mobilize people best?

Do you actively encourage Turks for voter registration, voting in elections?

### **Leadership**

What is your professional and non-professional background in organizing?

Is there a staff member or volunteer who was an organizer in Turkey and applies those experiences in the United States?

Do you have any board members who hold similar positions in other organizations?

How do you recruit leaders to organize around community-prioritized issues? Are there any specific recruitment methods you use?

### **Needs Assessment and Prioritizing/ Issues**

What are the major needs, issues and problems facing the Turkish community in NY metro area? What are the primary issues around which you organize?

How do you determine and prioritize those issues/ needs of the community?

Can you think of an example of when you had a priority but had to change it because of a change in circumstance or wishes of the community? Please explain.

What is your decision-making model?

Do Turkish immigrants in general think they are granted equal rights as natives in this country? Do they ever complain about discrimination?

Who are your main community partners in organizing?

### **Societal opportunity Structure**

Are politicians/staff of public agencies aware of community issues, and do they have a deep understanding of the issues?

What are the most important challenges in the political framework of this country?

Is there any support given by local, and/or state authorities? Is the support sufficient?

Do you think this society acknowledge and reward active participation of migrant organizations?

Which conditions in this country are particularly discouraging for becoming active?

Can you talk about the organization's contacts/collaborations either with elected officials, political parties or policy makers on the local and national level?

How important are the campaign issues of parties as regards to your goals and issues as a Turkish-American organization?

### **Political Participation**

Have your organization done any of the following in the last two years? Please elaborate

- + Petitions
- + Participation in election (local or national) campaigning
- + Lobbying
- + Participation in local consultative or advisory bodies
- + Media Conferences/Statements

During the last 2-year period, have you been called to participate in decision-making processes (either on a permanent or an occasional basis) in any neighborhood, municipal or national councils/committees?

How great is your organization's influence on policies? Be it local, national or foreign? Have you been able to change any policies you thought are important for you and Turks?

### **Ties with other Turkish or non-Turkish organizations in the country/city/state**

Do you have relations with other Turkish organizations in the city, state and country?

Please describe.

Do you have relations with other organizations that are not Turkish in the city, state and country? Please describe.

Does partnership build collective power and/or leverage resources?

Can you talk about any joint projects?

### **Transnational ties**

Do you have ties with other Turkish organizations and centers abroad? Please describe.

Do you have joint projects, activities? Can you elaborate?

Do you get any form of assistance from the Turkish government? (Financial political)

How do political developments in and related to Turkey affect your organization?

(Armenian issue, EU candidacy etc)

Do you follow U.S. foreign policy towards Turkey closely? Have you taken any action on American foreign policy issue?

In your opinion, what has the Turkish government done over the years in favor of its immigrant population? What should it do?

**Final question:**

Is there anything else that you think is important for me to know?

## Appendix C

### List of Interviews

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Name &amp; Last</u>
October 22, 2008	New York, NY	Yusuf Sami Ozcayir
October 30, 2008	Rochester, NY	Mesut Vardar
November 7, 2008	New York, NY	Senay Ataselim
November 7, 2008	New York, NY	Binnaz Saktanber
November 12, 2008	New York, NY	Nur Emirgil
November 17, 2008	New York, NY	Selen Ucak
December 2, 2008	New York, NY	Osman Oztoprak
December 10, 2008	New York, NY	Cigdem Acar
December 11, 2008	New York, NY	Seyhan Arkonac
December 17, 2008	New York, NY	Huseyin Unver
January 15, 2009	New York, NY	Ahmet Basar Sen
February 10, 2009	Amsterdam	Yasar Tas
February 10, 2009	Amsterdam	Fikret Onder
February 11, 2009	Amsterdam	Bulent Okyay
February 13, 2009	Amsterdam	Murat Gedik
February 16 and 20, 2009	Amsterdam	Sevgi Gungormus
February 19, 2009	Amsterdam	Ibrahim Gormez
February 24, 2009	Amsterdam	Haci Karacaer
February 25, 2009	Amsterdam	Nuri Karabulut
February 26, 2009	Rotterdam	Yusuf Alan
February 26, 2009	Rotterdam	Gurkan Celik
February 27, 2009	Amsterdam	Ismail Ercan
March 3, 2009	Amsterdam	Ayhan Yalin
March 4, 2009	Amsterdam	Koksal Gor
March 10, 2009	Amsterdam	Adnan Dalkiran
March 10, 2009	Amsterdam	Erkut Onat
March 12, 2009	Amsterdam	Murat Alici
March 12, 2009	Amsterdam	Songul Akkaya
March 16, 2009	Almersfoort	Yusuf Altuntas
March 17, 2009	Amsterdam	Harun Yildirim
March 10 and 18, 2009	Amsterdam	Mustafa Ayranci
March 20, 2009	The Hague	Muharrem Cengiz
April 2, 2009	The Hague	Bulent Senay
April 17, 2009	Amsterdam	Gurbuz Yabas

## **Brief Interviewee Profiles**

### **New York**

#### **Cigdem Acar**

Cigdem Acar is the President of *Bridges of Hope Project* (BHOP) and the founder of Acar Law Firm in New York. She received her Juris Doctor degree from Fordham University School of Law. Between 1994 until 1999, she served as Chair of the Immigration Law Committees of the New York Women's Bar Association and the Women's Bar Association of the State of New York. Her other professional affiliations include the American Immigration Lawyers Association; the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the New York County Lawyers Association. Ms. Acar is active in various organizations; she is member of the Board of the Turkish-American Business Forum; past Board member of the American Turkish Society and the Belgian-American Chamber of Commerce and a member of the Turkish-American, Belgian-American and French-American Chambers of Commerce.

#### **Seyhan Erden Arkonac**

Seyhan Erden Arkonac is the Co- President of the Board at Turkish American Business Forum (TABF). She has a PhD in Economics and is an adjunct professor of Economics at NYU and Columbia University. She attended Bogaziçi University for her undergraduate degree.

#### **Nur Emirgil**

Nur Emirgil is the Executive Officer of the United States office of a Fortune 500 multinational conglomerate based in Turkey, Ramerica International. She is the founder and honorary president of The Moon and Stars Project, a not-for-profit, tax-exempt

Turkish organization incorporated in New York with the objective of highlighting Turkish Arts and Culture in the United States. She also served as a board member of the American Turkish Society (ATS) and Turkish American Business Forum.

**Yusuf Sami Ozcayir**

Yusuf Sami Ozcayir is the Executive Director of *Federation of Turkish American Associations* (FTAA) since January 2008. He served as the Vice-President of Sourcing at the textile company Global Nassa from January 2004 until January 2008. Mr. Ozcayir received an undergraduate degree in Political Science at Istanbul University in 1983.

**Osman Oztoprak**

Osman Oztoprak is the Chairman at Turkish Cultural Center/Manhattan branch in New York. He was the CEO and Chief Education Officer at the Pioneer Academy of Science between September 2006 and December 2008. As one of the founders of the Pioneer Academy of Science, Oztoprak also served as the Principal between October 2002 and September 2006. He received his undergraduate degree in 2001 from Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey-New Brunswick.

**Binnaz Saktanber**

Binnaz Saktanber is the Vice-President of the Turkish non-profit organization, *Moon and Stars Project* and a PhD student in the Political Science program at the City University of New York, the Graduate Center. She studies new media, democratization, and identity politics in Turkey and in Middle East. The Moon and Stars Project is an organization devoted to promoting and fostering greater cultural interaction between the United States and Turkey. Binnaz Saktanber has been continually active in undertaking organizational projects such as arts and culture festivals, concerts, performances,

exhibitions, conferences, grant programs, multimedia productions, publications, and broadcasts.

**Ahmet Basar Sen:**

Ahmet Basar Sen is the Vice Consul at the Consulate General of Turkey in New York.

**Selen Ucak**

Selen Ucak is the Executive Director of *American Turkish Society* (ATS), since 2006, has significant experience in social enterprise. Previously, she worked as an international philanthropy consultant; a Research Associate at the Research Initiative on Social Entrepreneurship of Columbia Business School; and a Program Officer at Tiger Foundation, making grants to anti-poverty nonprofits in New York City. During her graduate studies, she served as a Development/ Marketing Strategy intern at Endeavor Global, which promotes entrepreneurship in emerging markets, including in Turkey. Prior to that, she was the Assistant Director and a Research Fellow in macroeconomics at the Jerome Levy Forecasting Center. Selen holds an M.B.A. from Columbia Business School as the first Tashman Turkish Fellow and a B.A. in Economics/International Affairs, summa cum laude, from Colorado College.

**Huseyin Unver**

Huseyin Unver has been the Board Member and the Treasurer of BOHP since its establishment in 2005. After 34 years of international banking and corporate experience, he is now managing his own company, Unver & Unver LLC, through which he provides consulting and international and local business solutions for foreign and U.S. companies. He is also an adjunct professor at Berkeley College, New York where he teaches International Finance, International Trade, International Marketing,

International Economics and Macroeconomics. In addition to BOHP, Huseyin Unver is also a Board Member of the Turkish American Chamber of Commerce, and the Turkish American Business Forum. He also served as the President of the American Turkish Society from 1989 to 1999. Unver holds B.A. and M.B.A. degrees, both from Baruch College of the City University of New York.

**Mesut Vardar**

Mesut Vardar was the President of *the Turkish Society of Rochester* (TSOR). He has a finance degree from Bogazici University in Istanbul and is a licensed real estate broker and mortgage loan officer in Rochester, NY. He has long been involved with community organizing. TSOR is a non-profit organization and it operates on member fees, donations and other services.

**Senay Ataselim Yilmaz**

Senay Ataselim- Yilmaz is the Chief Operating Officer at Turkish Philanthropy Funds since September 2007. She previously worked as the Executive Director at Turkish-American Business Forum. She received her undergraduate degree in Public Administration and Political Science at Ankara University and earned a MPA degree in Public Policy and Non-Profit Management at Baruch College, CUNY in 2002.

Currently, she is pursuing her PhD in political science program at the Graduate Center, CUNY. She was an emerging Leader International Fellow at Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society.

## **Amsterdam**

### **Songul Akkaya**

Songul Akkaya is a member of the Provincial Council, North Holland from the Dutch Labor Party, PvdA. She also operates a security business and works as an expert on public order and safety. Akkaya was born in Turkey but later spent her formative years in the Netherlands and attended high school there. She has been an active member of the Turkish community and Dutch politics. Akkaya is vocal about various issues regarding youth, education and safety.

### **Yusuf Alan**

Yusuf Alan is the Knowledge Manager at Dialogo Academie (Dialogue Academy) in Rotterdam. He received his bachelors and masters degrees as an interpreter and translator from Hacettepe University in Ankara, Turkey. He owns the Alan Translation and Training Center. Alan has also worked as an editor in the Netherlands and Turkey. He has several publications to his credit, including *Lisan ve İnsan* (Language and Man, 1994), *Robotik Kültür* (Robotieke Culture, 1994), *Vucudu İnsan ve Zaman* (Human Body and Time, 1998), *Aktif Düşünme ve Yenilenme* (Active Thinking and Self-Renewal, 2001), *Düşünce ve aksiyon* (Thinking and Doing, 2002), *Hizmetkar Liderlik* (Servant Leadership, along with Gürkan Çelik, 2003) and *Sözün Gücü* (The Power of Discourse, 2003). Alan also translated a book by Robert Greenleaf in Turkish (*Lider olarak Hizmetkar* - The servant as leader, 2003)

### **Murat Alici**

Murat Alici is the Director of Stichting Witte Tulp (the White Tulip Foundation), which is an educational organization with six branches located in Amsterdam and its

surrounding areas. The foundation organizes activities for students in primary and secondary education with the aim of providing opportunities for them to develop their talents and skills as widely as possible. Mr. Alici has a bachelors degree in Dentistry from the University of Amsterdam and is pursuing a masters degree in the same field at the same university.

### **Yusuf Altuntas**

Yusuf Altuntas is the Director of Milli Gorus North Holland since 2006. He is also the chairman of the Islamic School Boards Organization (ISBO- Islamitische Schoolbesturen Organisatie) and the Vice-President of the Contact Body for Muslims and Government (CMO, Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid). He was born in Trabzon, Turkey but moved to the Netherlands with his family before completing the primary school there. Altuntas also serves as a board member in the Islamic Broadcasting Organization.

### **Mustafa Ayranci**

Mustafa Ayranci is the President of HTIB (Hollanda Turkiyeli Isciler Birliigi, Holland Federation of Workers from Turkey) and has an extensive background in immigrant organizing and participation in Dutch politics. For many years, Ayranci was also a Board member of the Advisory Council for Turks, IOT. He has long championed social and economic equality for migrant workers and women, both in the Netherlands and in Turkey. Over the years, his organizing efforts included educational projects, promotion of anti-discrimination laws and gay rights within the Turkish community, for which he received the Bob Angelo award from *COC Netherlands* (Cultuur en Ontspannings-

Centrum, or Centre for Culture and Leisure), the Dutch foundation that is devoted to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender rights.

### **Muharrem Cengiz**

Muharrem Cengiz is the Vice-President of Hak-Der (Federation of Alewite Organizations in the Netherlands) that represents the interests of the Turkish Alevi community in the Netherlands. Member associations organize a variety of activities in cooperation with local Dutch municipalities in social and cultural areas. Cengiz was born in 1966, is married and father of two children. He works as an advisor to the Center for Work and Income (CWI) in the Hague.

### **Gurkan Celik**

Gurkan Celik is the president of the Dialoog Academie in Rotterdam. Celik holds a PhD from the University of Tilburg. In his 2008 thesis, Gurkan studied "The Gülen Movement: Building Dialogue and Social Cohesion through Education". He has a degree in Policy Studies Organization and the same university, with a Masters of Business Management and Organization. Between 2002 and 2007 he served as the national chairman of the Foundation Cosmicus. Previously, he was a consultant, trainer and researcher affiliated with the KPC Group and CINOP to Hertogenbosch, which deals mainly with issues such as human resource management, leadership, diversity, education, research and development.

### **Adnan Dalkiran**

Adnan Dalkiran is the Director of Kulsan, non-profit Turkish organization in Amsterdam. Through concerts, film festivals and other cultural events Kulsan aims to familiarize people in the Netherlands with art and culture from Turkey. The name

Kulsan comes from 'kültür' and 'sanat', the Turkish words for culture and art. Adnan Dalkiran was born in Kesikkopru, Ankara in 1957 and spent early years of his life there. He served in a number of neighborhood councils. In 1979, Dalkiran migrated to the Netherlands along with other members of his family. From March 1994 to January 1996, Dalkiran was a member of the Amsterdam City Council from the Dutch Party, Groen Links. Having founded Kulsan in 1997, he has undertaken many social and cultural projects. Dalkiran was awarded the Royal Dutch Order of Merit for his contributions to art and culture.

### **Ismail Ercan**

Ismail Ercan is the President of STOC (Stichting Turks Onderwijs Centrum, Turkish Educational Center). Ercan served as a teacher in different Turkish cities before he came to the Netherlands in 1982. Upon his arrival in Amsterdam, he was recruited to teach the Turkish language to mostly immigrant children and students. Later, Ercan also became active in local politics was a city council member for 8 years. He is passionate about advising migrant parents on the difficulties of the Dutch education system and protecting the Turkish native tongue within the community.

### **Murat Gedik**

Murat Gedik holds the position of General Secretary at *Turkse Federatie Nederland* (Hollanda Turk Federasyonu) in Amsterdam. He was born in Nijmegen in 1973 and raised in the Netherlands. He holds bachelors degrees in accounting and business. Murat Gedik has been active within the nationalistic movement and the organization for more than 15 years and has risen within the ranks since he started with community organizing then.

**Koksal Gor**

Koksal Gor is a member of the District Council Amsterdam East from the Dutch conservative-liberal party, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD).

He was a member of the North Holland Provincial Council for five years. He received an economics degree from Uludag University in Bursa, Turkey in 1989. From 1992 to 2002 he worked for several Turkish newspapers. During the same period, Gor also made news programs for local broadcasters in Amsterdam and for commercial broadcasters in Turkey. He is active in initiating a number of Turkish-Dutch associations and has a wide network among this group.

**Ibrahim Gormez**

Ibrahim Gormez is the President of Eyup Sultan Mosque in Amsterdam. The mosque is attached to the Holland Diyanet Federation (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi). He came to the Netherlands from Izmir in 1964. After a brief return to Turkey in 1967, Ibrahim Gormez has been working extensively with Turkish organizations and the Turkish-Dutch community in Amsterdam since 1968. In addition to religious services, Eyup Sultan Mosque, under the leadership of Ibrahim Gormez, provides the Turkish community with various social and educational activities, as well as small number of scholarships for successful students in Amsterdam.

**Sevgi Gungormus**

Sevgi Gungormus is the President of ATKB (Amsterdam Turkiyeli Kadınlar Birliği-Amsterdam Union of Women from Turkey). She was born and raised in Turkey. She worked as a civil servant in the Ankara municipality and then became the first woman secretary at the Turkish labor union, DISK (Confederation of Turkish Revolutionary

and Workers Unions). Throughout her life, she has always been interested in politics and believed in social and economic equality. Since relocating to Amsterdam, Gungormus has continued to be an active community member and spearheaded the development of Turkish women organizations.

### **Nuri Karabulut**

Nuri Karabulut is the President of the DIDF (Demokratik Isci Dernekleri Federasyonu/ Democratic Federation of Associations of Workers from Turkey). DIDF was founded in 1985 as a national umbrella organization of separate operating local associations of workers from Turkey and has close ties with trade unions and political parties in the Netherlands. Karabulut has been an active member of the organization from its initiation and has championed social equality and migrants' rights.

### **Haci Karacaer**

Haci Karacaer was the previous Managing Director of *Milli Görüş Nederland*, Turkish Islamic organization in Amsterdam between 1999 and 2006. As the Chairman of Milli Gorus, Karacaer followed a more liberal and integrationist course than his stricter counterparts in other European cities. He is currently a Diversity Management Consultant and Public Speaker at Flextrema B.V. Karacaer was also the Managing Director of Marhaba Foundation, Islamic Art and Culture House between 2006 and 2007 and served as the Product project manager at ABN AMRO Bank, Electronic Banking in Amsterdam from 1998 to 1999.

### **Bulent Okyay**

Bulent Okyay is a Secretary at the Advisory Council on Diversity and Integration. Before that he worked as an administrator at the City district of Baarsjes. He holds a

bachelors degree in cultural and civic studies. The independent Advisory Council was set by the Mayor and Aldermen in June 1, 2004 and it consists of nine members, who are personally appointed for their professional expertise in one or more areas and their social involvement in the Amsterdam society. Mr. Okyay has been an active organizer in the Turkish community.

### **Erkut Onat**

Erkut Onat is now retired from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as the Consul General of Turkish Republic in Rotterdam. Onat continues to be involved with community matters and often serves as the culture and art advisor for the Turkish-Dutch organization, *Kulsan*, in Amsterdam.

### **Fikret Onder**

Fikret Onder serves as the Secretary of the Fatih Mosque in Amsterdam. The mosque is attached to the Holland Diyanet Federation (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi). As of 2010, it has 200 members and serves to as many as 100 students among other Turkish families.

Fikret Onder is originally from Ardahan, Turkey and has been active in the Turkish-Dutch community for many years.

### **Bulent Senay**

Bulent Senay is the Counselor for Social and Religious Affairs (Diyanet) at the Turkish Embassy in The Hague, Netherlands. He was born in 1966 in Bursa, Turkey. He is an associate professor of comparative religion and ecology. He graduated from Uludag University in Islamic and religious studies. Following his M.A. studies at the same university, as a post-graduate student, he studied at Lancaster University in the UK. He was awarded his Ph.D. in 1999 for a religious studies thesis on “Jewish Christianity –

Identity, Hybridity and Tradition.” He also taught Muslim ethics and philosophy at the University College of St. Martin, in Lancaster, UK. Presently he teaches various subjects at undergraduate and postgraduate level. His affiliations include the Turkish Association of the History of Religion (TAHR). He is currently a participant in and coordinator of three international projects (European) on religion and multiculturalism.

### **Yasar Tas**

Yasar Tas is the President of the Fatih Mosque in Amsterdam. The mosque is attached to the Holland Diyanet Federation (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi). As of 2010, it has 200 members and serves to as many as 100 students among other Turkish families. Yasar Tas is originally from Nevsehir, Turkey and has been active in the Turkish Dutch community for many years.

### **Ayhan Yalin**

Ayhan Yalin is a member of the Dutch Labor Party and was in his second term as the district director of Bos en Lommer responsible for welfare, education and finance when he resigned in April 2008. His major achievements include the establishment of the Service Centre in 2005 where residents take their queries on welfare and child care, as well as the founding of the Center for Parent and Children in Bos en Lommer in 2006. Over the years, Yalin has developed very good relations with residents, volunteers and organizations (both Turkish and Dutch) in the district.

### **Gurbuz Yavas**

Gurbuz Yavas is the Program Manager of the Welfare and Care Department at the District of Bos en Lommer in Amsterdam. He has been actively involved in community

organizing and tries to promote the integration and participation of Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam.

### **Harun Yildirim**

Harun Yildirim is the Chairman of SUN (Student Union of the Netherlands), which works as a part of the Milli Gorus movement. He was born in 1986 in Amsterdam and attended an Islamic primary school. Yildirim holds a degree in law from Vrije University in Amsterdam and also studied management and economics at the college. He has been actively involved with student organizing and the Milli Gorus community for more than 6 years.

## Appendix D

<b>Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam, as of 2009</b>
Alevitische Culturele Vereniging in Amsterdam en omstreken
Amsterdam Gencler Birliđi (AGB)
Amsterdam Seref Spor
Anatolie, Stichting
Associatie van Kurdische Leerkrachten in Nederland
Associatie van Kurdische leerkrachten in Nederland
ATJV (Amsterdamse Turkse Jongeren Vereniging)
ATKB (A'damse stuk van vroegere HTKB) (Federation van Turkse Vrouwenverenigingen in A'dam)
ATS (Amsterdam Turkeyem Spor)
Bayburt Vereniging Nederland
Bozok St
Cici
Coöperatie Begrafenisfonds Muratdede Koyu Konya
De Gouden Tulp St
DIDF (Federation van Democratische Workersverenigingen uit Turkije in Nederland)
Elif, St.voor Turkse Women
Fatih, ISN (HDV Fatih)
FC Ankaraspor
FC Turkiyem Spor
Federation KOM
Hacim-Alevitische en Bektasji Culturele Stichting
Halk-Der Amsterdam (Turks Nederlandse Solidariteit)
HAYRUN NISA
Hilal, Stichting (Hollanda Hilal Cenaze Fonu)
Hollanda Fenerbahceliler Dernegi
HTDB Hollanda Turkiye Demokratlar Birliđi (Turkse Democratische Vereniging in Nederland)
HTIB (Turkse Workers Vereniging Nederland/ Hollanda Turkiyeli Iscler Birliđi)
HTKF (vroeger HTKB) (Federation van Turkse Vrouwenverenigingen in Nederland)
Islamitisch Centrum Amsterdam-Noord, stichting
Islamitische Stichting Nederland (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfil) Haci Bayram Osdorp/Amsterdam
Islamitische Stichting Nederland Eyub Sultan
Islamitische Stichting Nederland, Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi
Judoclub Osdorp
Klussenbedrijf Aksaray 68
Kubra
Laureate Education - Turkey B.V.

M.G.K.T. "Hilal" /WBV Amsterdam-West Musluman Genc Kadinlar Teskilati
Mescid-i Aksa Camii
Milli Gorus Social En Kulturele Vereniging Amsterdam-West "Darul Erkam- Mevlana"
Milli Gorus" Sociale en Kulturele Vereniging
Milli Gorus" Sociale en Kulturele Vereniging Amsterdam-West
Mimoza
Musluman Genc Kadinlar Teskilati "Basak" Welzijns Belangenvereniging Amsterdam
Musluman Gencler Teskilati - Welzijns Belangen Vereniging Amsterdam Bos En Lommer (MGT-Wbv Bos En L)
Musluman Gencler Teskilati Welzijns Belangen Vereniging Amsterdam (MGT-WBV Amsterdam)
Musluman Gencler Teskilati Welzijns Belangen Vereniging Amsterdam-West (MGT WBV afd. De Baarsjes)
Musluman Gencler Teskilati-Welzijns Belangen Vereniging Amsterdam Bos en Lommer
Nederlands-Turkse Jonge Ondernemersvereniging
Platform van Turkse Democratische Organisaties
Reyhan Dostluk Dernegi
Selimiye Camii
Serefligökgözköyü welzijn en solidariteit vereniging
SICA (St. Islamitisch Centrum Amsterdam)
SOYAD St
Stichting "NISA" Milli Görüs Vrouwenorganisatie Noord-Nederland locatie Amsterdam-Osdorp
Stichting Akçag Egitim Merkezi
Stichting Aksaray
Stichting AMS-Dak-Dunya
Stichting Amsterdam Musiki Cemiyeti
Stichting Anadolu
Stichting Belangenbehartiging en Advies aan Turkse Ouderen (Tydm)
Stichting Bureau SIGRA Dienstverlening
Stichting Cici Turks Cultureel Initiatief Centrum in Amsterdam
Stichting Cosmicus
Stichting De Turkse Raad Westerpark
Stichting Destek
Stichting Dunya
Stichting Erdem
Stichting Federatie Milli Görüs Noord-Nederland
Stichting Fetih
Stichting Finans Gazetesi (Courant)
Stichting for the Promotion of The Ideas of Ataturk
Stichting Gezondheidszorg Nederland-Turkije

Stichting Hulporganisatie Milli Gorus Noord- Holland
Stichting Hurriyet
Stichting Islam en Dialoog (Noord-Holland)
Stichting Jongeren Milli Görüs Amsterdam-Noord
Stichting Jongeren Milli Görüs Geuzenveld
Stichting Jongeren centrum Mert II
Stichting Jongerenfederatie Milli Görüs Noord-Nederland
Stichting Kizilirmak Vakfi
Stichting Kubra Turks Cultureel Vrouwen Centrum
Stichting KUDÜS VAKFI
Stichting Kulsan
Stichting Cultureel Jongeren Centrum
Stichting Loods (Turk Hollanda Tiyatro ve Sanat Vakfi/Turks Nederlands Theater en Kunst Stichting)
Stichting Milli Görüs Arafat
STICHTING Milli Gorus CAFER-I SADIK Mosque AMSTERDAM
Stichting Milli Görüs Educatieve Recreatie
Stichting Milli Görüs Gehandicaptenzorg
Stichting Milli Görüs Ouderenzorg
Stichting Milli Görüs Slotervaart
Stichting Milli Gorus Sportfederatie Noord-Nederland
Stichting Moslims-Turks Cultureel Centrum Markad
Stichting Multicultureel Podium Mozaïek
Stichting Nederlands-Turkse Kamer van Industrie en Handel (Hollanda-Türk Sanayi ve Ticaret Odasi)
Stichting Netwerk van Nederlanders uit Turkije Afkomstig
Stichting Ontmoetingscentrum Nevsehir
Stichting Pamukkale
Stichting Papyrus Turk Hollanda Edebiyat ve Sanat Vakfi/Turks Nederlandse Literatuur en Kunst Stichting
Stichting RAST-Nederlands-Turks Theater Atelier
Stichting Rozenblad
Stichting Tannet (Turks Academisch Netwerk)
Stichting Topsport Türkiyemspor
Stichting tot ondersteuning van Turkse ouderen Amsterdam
Stichting Turks Islamitisch Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Amsterdam-Oost
Stichting Turks Jongeren centrum Bos en Lommer
Stichting Turks Platform Bos en Lommer en De Baarsjes
Stichting Turks Platform Geuzenveld/Slotermeer
Stichting Turks Theater
Stichting Turks Volkshuis Osdorp

Stichting Turkse Islamitisch Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Amsterdam-Noord
Stichting Turkse Islamitische Hulpverlening en Solidariteit
Stichting Ufuk
Stichting Unie van Turkse/Nederlandse Ondernemers
Stichting Vrouwen Ontmoetingscentrum "Esra"
Stichting Vrouwenfederatie Milli Görüs Noord-Nederland
Stichting Witte Tulp
Stichting Yozgatlılar en Cultureel Centrum
STISCC
STISCCAN
STOC (Turks Education Centrum)
Studentenvereniging Anatolia
Supportersvereniging Galatasaray/Nederland (Hollanda Galatasaraylılar Dernegi)
TDJV (Turks Democratische Youth Vereniging)
THW (Turks Huis Westerpark)
TIISKV
Tukem
Tuma Vereniging voor Turkse en Marokkaanse Ouderen in Bos en Lommer
Turk Islam Sos. Kul. Mer.
Turkeli (Stichting Turkistan)
Turkevi Productions & Consultancy
Türkkol Adviesgroep
Turks Academische Studenten Associatie
Turks Islam Centrum (Turk Islam Sos. Kul. Mer.)
Turks Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Nieuwendam
Turks Volkshuis Osdorp
Turks Youthcentrum Bos & Lommer CanBas
Turkse Agenda
Turkse Broadcasting Stichting (TOS)
Turkse Fed. Nederland (Nederlandse Federation van Idealistische Democratische Turkse)
Turkse Humanitaire Hulp Nederland
Turkse Youth Radio Broadcasting
Turks-Islamitische Stichting Nederland voor Ontwikkeling
Turks-Nederlandse Vriendschapsstichting Kumbet (Kulturel Kalkindirma ve Ozgurlestirme Dernegi)
TurksNL
Ulu Camii
Union of European Turkish Democrats Netherlands
Vereniging A.E.B. Amsterdam Egitimciler Birliği Vereniging voor Mensen die Werkzaam zijn op het Gebied van Turks Onderwijs
Vereniging CENUR (Actie Comité Tascilar)

Vereniging Evimiz
Vereniging IFKSAN (mens, idee, cultuur en kunst
Vereniging Kizilkoyunlu
Vereniging Koerdische Jongeren Raad "midia"
Vereniging Sakarya Ontmoetingscentrum
Vereniging SMHO (Samenwerkende Moslims Hulp Organisaties
VERENIGING SURA
Vereniging Turkije Informatie Centrum Nederland
Vereniging van Turkse Studenten Amsterdam
Vereniging Vrienden Höyük
Vereniging Vrienden Karatay
Vereniging Vrienden van Yesilyurt
Vereniging Westermoskee Milli Görüs
Vrouwen Vereniging El Kubra
Wereld Koran Stichting (Dunya Kuran Vakfi)
Wereld Media Center (Dunya Medya Center) Stichting
Yesevi, of STICHTING TURKS INFONET
Yilmaz, St. Turkse Ouderraad
YOREM 66 Stichting Yozgatlılar en Cultureel Centrum
Yunus Emre Cultureel en Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Stichting

**Appendix E**

<b>Turkish Organizations in New York metro area, as of 2009</b>
Ahmet Ertegun Foundation
American Association of Crimean Turks, NY
American Association of Teachers of Turkic Languages (AATT)
American Friends of Turkish Jewry (AFTJ), New York
American Turkish Islamic and Cultural Center Inc
Amerika Turk Islam Ulku Ocaklari, NY
Anadolu Club, NJ
Association of Balkan Turks of America, Inc., NY
Association of Turkish American Tour Operators
Ataturk Ilkokulu, Rochester
Ataturk School, NY
Azerbaijan Society of America, NJ
Azerbaijan Society Turkish Mosque of America, NJ
BATO (Burlington American Turkish Association), NJ
Bridges of Hope, NY
Brooklyn Amity School, NY
Burlington American Turkish Association
Clifton Yeni Dunya Mosque, NJ
Cumhuriyet Okulu Long Island, NY
Ebru TV
Federation of Turkish American Association (FTAA), NY- umbrella org.
Golden Meadow Cultural Foundation
Hamidiye Academy, Rochester
Hudson Turkish American Cultural Association Inc., NJ (HUTACA)
Intercollegiate Turkish Students Society, ITSS (Federation of Turkish Student Associations)
Interfaith Dialogue Center (IDC, NJ)
Istanbul International Community School Inc
Istanbul Sports Cultural & Education Center, NJ
Istanbul University Alumni Association of USA-IUMEZUSA
ITKIB Association Inc. USA (NY) (General Secretariat of Istanbul Textile & Apparel Exporter Associations)
ITU (Istanbul Technical university) Mezunlar Dernegi
Karayay Turks Mosque and Cultural Association, NJ
LIGHT MILLENNIUM INC
Long Island Amity School, NY
METU Alumni association USA
Milky Way Education Center, NJ/ Pioneer Academy
Mimar Sinan Camii Dernegi, NY (Turkish Islamic Cultural Center of Queens)

Moon and Stars Project (Highlighting Turkish Art and Culture), NY
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Turkish American Association, Inc. NJ
New York Turkish American Sports Club
Osmaniye Mosque, Long Island
Raritan Turkish-American Cultural Foundation, NJ
Robert College Alumni Association of America, NY
Robert College Foundation
Rochester Hamidiye Mosque, NY
Rochester Turk Islam Idealist Fraternities Association
Society of Turkish American Architects, Engineers and Scientists - MIM, NY
Spring Learning Center Rochester, NY (High Way Education)
Suleymaniye Mosque, Long Island
TABID- Turkish American Business Improvement and Development Council
TAMEF- Turkish American Multicultural Education Foundation
TAWSO-Turkish American Women Society, NY
TCC- Westchester [Turkish American Heritage Association (TAHA)]
The American Turkish Society (ATS), NY
The Mosque of the Crimean Turks of America
The Turkish Voice (Radio Station)
The Voice of the Turkish Society of Rochester
Trustees of Robert College of Istanbul
TSA: Columbia
TSA: Turkish Club, Syracuse University (Student Association)
Turk Finans Network (Turkish Finance Network), NY
Turk Ocagi, NJ
Turkistan American Association
Turkish American Art Society of New York
Turkish American Business Forum, NY
Turkish American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TACCI), NY
Turkish American Community Center, NJ
Turkish American Cultural Association of Long Island, Inc.
Turkish American Educational Foundation
Turkish American Educational Foundation Princeton, NJ
Turkish American Eyup Sultan Islamic Center, NY
Turkish American Finance Association Inc
Turkish American Medical Association NY Inc Yale University School of Medicine
Turkish American Physicians Association Inc
Turkish American Religious Foundation (Diyamet)
Turkish American Women's Association, Westchester (TAWA)
Turkish American Youth Association, NY

Turkish Broadcasting Organization White Plains, NY
Turkish Cultural Center Albany
Turkish Cultural Center Binghamton
Turkish Cultural Center Brooklyn
Turkish Cultural Center Buffalo
Turkish Cultural Center Long Island
Turkish Cultural Center of Upstate New York, Rochester
Turkish Cultural Center Staten Island (Turkish American Society of Staten Island)
Turkish Cultural Center Syracuse
Turkish Cultural Center, Buffalo (Buffalo Turkish Community Foundation)
Turkish Cultural Center, Manhattan
Turkish Cypriot Cultural and Educational Association, NY
Turkish Cypriot Mosque Bronx, New York
Turkish Fine Arts Ensemble, Sunnyside, NY
Turkish Hour TV
Turkish Islamic Cultural Center of Queens, NY
Turkish Music Association, NY
Turkish Philanthropic Fund, NY
Turkish Society of Rochester, NY
Turkish Women's League of America, NY
Turkiye Society Inc
Ulu Camii (United Islamic Center) Paterson, NJ
United American Muslim Association (Fatih Camii-Amerika Muslumanlar Birligi)
Universal Foundation- Turkish American Center of Brooklyn
US Cultural and Aid Association of Turks From Bulgaria
US Turkish Armenian Business Council Inc
Wellspring Cultural and Educational Foundation, West Haven, CT
Young Turks Cultural Aid Society, NY / Genc Turkler

## Bibliography

- Abadan-Unat, Nermin, ed. 1976. *Turkish Workers in Europe 1960-1975: A Socio-Economic Reappraisal: Social Economic and Political Study of the Middle East*. Leiden: Brill
- Ahmed, Frank. 1986. *Turks in America: the Ottoman Turk's Immigrant Experience*. New York: Columbia International.
- Akgündüz, Ahmet. 2006. *Labor Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974: A Multidisciplinary Analysis*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Akcapar, Sebnem Koser. 2006. "Turkish Highly Skilled Migration to the United States: New Findings and Policy Recommendations," *MiReKoc Research Projects 2005-2006*.
- Akcapar, Sebnem Koser. 2009. "Turkish Associations in the United States: Towards Building a Transnational Identity," *Turkish Studies* 10, no. 2: 165- 193.
- Akgun, Birol. 2000. "The Turkish Diaspora in the United States and its Role in Promoting Turkish-American Relations," *The Turkish Yearbook* 31: 99- 117.
- Alba, Richard. 2003. "Blurred vs. Bright Boundaries: Second Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in Comparative Perspective," paper presented at Bellagio for the Conference on the Second Generation.
- Alexander, J.C. 2001. "Theorizing 'modes of incorporation': Assimilation, Hyphenation, and Multiculturalism as Varieties of Civil Participation," *Sociological Theory* 19, no.3: 238-249.
- Alexander, Michael. 2003. "Local Policies Towards Migrants as an Expression of Host-Stranger Relations: a Proposed Typology," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 29, no.3: 411- 430.
- Alfassa, S. 2000. "The Turkinos in America" *Turcoman International* June (Accessed at <http://alfassa.com/les1.html>).
- Almond, G.A. and S. Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Amersfoort, Hans van, Jeroen Doomernik. 2003. "People from the Middle East in the Netherlands," *Immigrants and Minorities* 22, no. 2&3: 175-187.
- Amiriaux, Valerie.1998. "Transnationalism as a Resource for Turkish Islamic Associations in Germany," Florence: European Forum Seminar paper MIG/25.
- Angin, Zeynep. 2003. "Diasporas of Difference: Turkish Communities in Germany, Canada, and the United States," PhD Thesis. Colorado: Colorado State University. Accessed at [http://proquest.umi.com/dissertations/preview\\_all/3092649](http://proquest.umi.com/dissertations/preview_all/3092649)

- Arayici, Ali. 2003. "The Problems of Immigrant Children in Europe: The Case of the Turks," *Prospects* 33, no. 4:453-466.
- Atacan, Fulya. 2005. "Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP- SP," *Turkish Studies* 6, no.2: 187- 199.
- Avci, Gamze. 2005. "Religion, Transnationalism and Turks in Europe," *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2:201-213.
- Avci, Gamze. 2006. "Comparing Integration Policies and Outcomes: Turks in the Netherlands and Germany," *Turkish Studies* 7, no. 1: 67-84.
- Azak, Umut. 2008. "Islam and Turkish Immigrants in the Netherlands," *Turkish Studies* 3, No.7: 136- 162.
- Banton, Michael. 2001. "National integration in France and Britain". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27, no. 1: 151-168.
- Barreto, Matt and Jose Munoz. 2003. "Reexamining the "Politics of In-Between": Political Participation among Mexican Immigrants in the United States," *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 25, no. 4: 427-447.
- Bass, L.E. and L.M. Casper. 2001. "Impacting the Political Landscape: Who registers and Votes among Naturalized Americans," *Political Behavior* 23, no. 2: 103-130.
- Bauböck, Rainer. 1995. *Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International Migration*. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- Bengtsson, Bo. 2008. "Ethnic Organization, Integration, and Political Opportunity Structures- Some theoretical Considerations," Paper presented at the XV NOPSA conference in Tromsø 6–9 August.  
(Accessed at <http://uit.no/getfile.php?PageId=1410&FileId=1367>).
- Berger, Maria, Christian Galonska and Ruud Koopmans. 2004. "Political Integration by a Detour? Ethnic Communities and Social Capital of Migrants in Berlin," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 3: 491-507.
- Berger, Maria and Floris Vermeulen. 2004. "Networks of Turkish Organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin, 1980-2000," paper for European Social Science History Conference, Session: "Immigrants Claim Making"
- Berry, Jeffrey and David Arons. 2003. *A Voice for Nonprofits*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution

- Bevelander Pieter and Justus Veenman. 2006. "Naturalization and Socioeconomic Integration: The Case of Netherlands," IZA Discussion Paper No. 2153.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2003. "Institutions, Ethnic Leaders, and the Political Incorporation of Immigrants: A Comparison of Canada and the United States," in *Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants*, ed. by Jeffrey G. Reitz. San Diego, CA: Center for Comparative Immigration Research, University of California. pp. 361- 401.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2004. "Can Multiculturalism be Assimilatory? Immigrant Political Incorporation and the Role of Government in the United States and Canada," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2005. "The Limits of de Tocqueville: How Government Facilitates Organizational Capacity in Newcomer Communities," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 5: 865-887.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2006. *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada*. Berkeley and LA: University of California Press.
- Bloemraad, Irene. 2006. "Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured Mobilization and Immigrant Political Incorporation," *Social Forces* 85, no. 2: 667-695.
- Bocker, Anita. 2006. "Multiple Citizenship and Naturalization: An Evaluation of German and Dutch Policies," *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 7, no. 1: 71-94.
- Bousetta, Hassan. 2001. "Post-Immigration Politics and the Political Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities. A Comparative Case Study of Moroccans in Four European Cities," paper Presented at ECPR Joint Sessions, Grenoble, 6-11 April 2001.
- Brown, Carol, Norbert Cyrus, Ruby Gropas, Ankica Kopic, and Anna Triandafyllidou. 2007. "A Presentation of the POLITIS Interview database: Structure, Quality and Hypotheses," *POLITIS Working Paper* no. 6. University of Oldenburg.
- Browning, Rufus, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb. 1990. "Minority Mobilization in Ten Cities: Failures and Successes." in *Racial Politics in American Cities*, ed. by Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb. New York: Longman. pp. 8-30.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. "The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24, no. 4: 531-548.

- Bruquetas-Callejo, B. Garces-Mascarenas, R. Penninx, and P. Scholten. 2005. "Policymaking related to Immigration and Integration. The Dutch Case," IMISCOE Working Paper No.15.
- Caglar, Ayse. 2006. "Hometown Associations, the Rescaling of State Spatiality and Migrant Grassroots Transnationalism," *Global Networks* 6, no. 1: 1-22.
- Campos, Michelle. 2005. "Between Beloved Ottomania and the Land of Israel. The Struggle over Ottomanism and Zionism Among Palestine's Sephardi Jews, 1908-13," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 37: 461-483.
- Cankaya, O., H.S. Guney and M.E. Koksalan. 2008. "Turkish Radio Broadcasts in the Netherlands: Community Communication or Ethnic Market?," *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture* 5, no. 1: 86-106.
- Cano, Gustavo. 2004. "Organizing Immigrant Communities in American Cities: Is This Transnationalism, or What?" San Diego: University of California, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. Accessed at [http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article\\_1031&context\\_ccis](http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article_1031&context_ccis)
- Carrera, Sergio. 2005. "Integration' as a Process of Inclusion for Migrants? The Case of Long-Term Residents in the EU," *CEPS (Center for European policy Studies) Working Document*, no. 219.
- Carkoglu, Ali. 2002. "Elections in Turkey: Whither Politics as We Know it?," Paper for TUSIAD, Washington Office: <http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/CARKOGLU.DOC>.
- Casanova, Jose. 2005. "Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism: A EU/US Comparison," paper presented at the Conference on "The New Religious Pluralism and Democracy," Georgetown University.
- Cordero-Guzman, Hector. 2005. "Community-Based Organizations and Migration in New York City," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 5: 889-909.
- Cornelius, Wayne, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield, eds. 1994. *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Crul, Maurice. 2000. "Breaking the circle of disadvantage: social mobility of second-generation Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands," In *Immigrants, Schooling and Social Mobility: Does Culture Make a Difference?*, ed. by Vermeulen, H. and J. Perlmann. Basingstoke: Macmillan. pp. 225- 244.
- Crul, M. and J. Doornik. 2003. "The Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in the Netherlands: Divergent Trends Between and Polarization within the Two Groups," *International Migration Review* 37: 1039-64.

- Crul, Maurice and H. Vermeulen. 2003. "The second generation in Europe. Introduction. In: The Future of the Second Generation: The Integration of Migrant Youth in Six European Countries," *Special issue of International Migration Review* 37, no. 4: 965-986.
- Crul Maurice and Hans Vermeulen. 2004. "Immigration, Education the Turkish Second Generation in Five European Nations: A Comparative Study," paper presented at *Luxembourg LIS/Maxwell Immigration conference*, Luxembourg.
- Cyrus, Norbert, Ruby Gropas, Ankica Kotic and Dita Vogel. 2005. "Opportunity Structures for Immigrants' Active Civic Participation in the European Union: Sharing Comparative Observations," *POLITIS-Working paper* no. 2. University of Oldenburg.
- D'Amato, Gianni. 2009. "Swiss Citizenship: A Municipal Approach to Participation?," in *Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*, ed. by J.L. Hochschild and J. H. Mollenkopf. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. pp. 63- 73.
- de Graauw, Els. 2007. "Out of the Shadow of the State: Immigrant Nonprofits as Self-Motivated Political Actors in Urban Politics," *ISSC Fellows Working Papers* 18.
- de Graauw, Els. 2008. "Nonprofit Organizations: Agents of Immigrant Political Incorporation in Urban America" in *Civic Hopes and Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations and Political Engagement*, ed. by S.K. Ramakrishnan and I. Bloemraad. New York: Russell Sage. pp. 323-50.
- de Haas, Hein. 2006. "Turning the tide? Why 'development instead of migration' policies are bound to fail," IMI working paper 2. Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford. Accessed at <http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/wp2-development-instead-of-migration-policies.pdf>
- de Zwart, Frank and Caelesta Poppelaars. 2007. "Redistribution and Ethnic Diversity in the Netherlands," *Acta Sociologica* 50, no.4: 387- 399.
- DeSipio, Louis. 2001. "Building America, One Person at a time: Naturalization and Political Behavior of the Naturalized in Contemporary American Politics," in *E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*, ed. by G. Gerstle and J. Mollenkopf. New York: Russell Sage. pp. 67-106.
- Doomernik, Jeroen. 1995. "The Institutionalization of Turkish Islam in Germany and the Netherlands: A Comparison," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18, no. 1: 46-63.
- Doomernik, Jeroen. 1998. "The effectiveness of integration policies towards immigrants and their descendants in France, Germany and the Netherlands," *International Migration Papers* 27. Geneva: International Labor Organization.

Dorr, Sylvia and Thomas Faist. 1997. "Institutional conditions for the integration of immigrants in welfare states: A comparison of the literature on Germany, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands," *European Journal of Political Research* 31: 401–426.

Duyvene de Wit, Thom and Ruud Koopmans. 2005. "The Integration of Ethnic Minorities into Political Culture: The Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain Compared," *Acta Politica* 40: 50-73.

Edelenbos, Jurian and Erik-Hans Klijn. 2006. "Managing Stakeholder Involvement in Decision-Making: A Comparative Analysis of Six Interactive Processes in the Netherlands," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 16, no. 3: 417-446.

Ertan, Sevgi Zubeyda. 2002. "Amerika'daki Turklerin Tarihi," in *Turkler*, ed. by H.C. Guzel, K. Cicek and S. Koca. Ankara: Yeni Turkiye Press.

Erzan, Refik and Kemal Kirisci. 2004. "Turkish Immigrants: Their Integration within the EU and Migration to Turkey," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 3, no. 3: 61- 70.

Euwals, R., J. Dagevos, M. Gijsberts, and H. Roodenburg. 2006. "Immigration, Integration and the Labor Market Turkish Immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands," *CPB Discussion Paper* no 75.

Faist, Thomas. 1998. "International migration and transnational social spaces," *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie* 29, no. 2: 213- 47.

Faist, Thomas. 2000. *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Favell, Adrian. 1998. *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. London: Macmillan.

Favell, Adrian. 2001. "Integration policy and integration research in Europe: A review and critique," in *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices*, ed. by A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Favell, Adrian. 2003. "Integration Nations: The Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe," *Comparative Social Research* 22: 13-42.

Fennema, Meindert and Jean Tillie. 1999. "Political Participation and Political Trust in Amsterdam. Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25, no. 4: 703–26.

Fennema, Meindert. 2004. "The Concept and Measurement of Ethnic Community," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 3: 429-447.

- Fennema, Meindert and Jean Tillie. 2000. "Ethnic Associations, Political Trust and Political Participation," *MPMC (Multicultural policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities) Working Paper*.
- Fenema, Meindert and Jean Tillie. 2001. "Civic community, political participation and political trust of ethnic groups," *Connection 23*, no.2: 44-59.
- Foner, Nancy and G. Fredrickson, eds. 2004. *Not Just Black and White: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Foner, Nancy. 2006. "Then and Now or Then to Now Immigration to New York in Contemporary and Historical Perspective," *Journal of American Ethnic History 25*, no. 2-3: 33-47.
- Foner, Nancy. 2007. "How Exceptional is New York? Migration and Multiculturalism in the Empire City" *Ethnic and Racial Studies 30*, No. 6: 999-1023.
- Foner, Nancy and Richard Alba. 2008. "Immigrant Religion in the United States and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?," *The International Migration Review 42*, no. 2: 360- 392.
- Freeman, Gary. 1995. "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States," *International Migration Review 29*, no. 112: 881-902.
- Freeman, Gary. 2004. "Immigrant Incorporation in western Democracies," *International Migration Review 38*, no. 3: 945-969.
- Freeman, Gary. 2004. "Perspectives of Immigrant Integration in Europe: Emerging Commonalities and Stable Particularities," *Conference on the Integration of Immigrants from Turkey in Belgium, Denmark, France and Sweden*. Bogaziçi University, Istanbul.
- Freeman, Gary. 2005. "Political Science and Comparative Immigration Politics," in *International Migration Research: Constructions, Omissions and the Promises of Interdisciplinarity*, ed. by M. Bommers and E. Morawska. Ashgate.
- Gamson, W.A. and D.S. Meyer.1996. "Framing Political Opportunity," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, ed. by McAdam, D., J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 275–290.
- Gerstle, G. and J. Mollenkopf, eds. 2001. *E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Gimpel, James G. and James R. Edwards, Jr. 1999. *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform*. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Glazer, Nathan. 1998. "Governmental and Nongovernmental Roles in the Absorption of Immigrants in the United States," in *Paths to Inclusion: The Integration of Migrants in the United States and Germany*, ed. by P. Schuck and R. Munz. New York: Berghahn Books. pp. 59-82.

Glick Schiller, N., L. Basch, and C. Blanc-Szanton, eds. 1992. *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity and Nationalism Reconsidered*, New York: New York Academy of Sciences.

Gordon, Helen J. 1931. "The Turkish American Controversy over Nationality," *The American Journal of International Law* 25, no. 4: 658-669

Gökdere, A. 1994. "An Evaluation of Turkey's Recent Migration Flows and Stock," *Turkish Journal of Population Studies* 16: 24-56.

Grabowski, John J. 2005. "Prospects and Challenges: the Study of Early Turkish Immigration to the United States," *Journal of American Ethnic History* Fall: 85-100.

Guiraudon, Virginie. 1998. "Citizenship Rights for Non-Citizens: France, Germany and the Netherlands," in *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*, ed by Christian Joppke. Oxford: OUP.

Guiraudon, V., K. Phalet and J. ter Wal. 2004. "Measures of Discrimination – The Netherlands". European Commission: Social Affairs and Employment.

Hagan, Jacqueline. 2006. "Negotiating Social Membership in the Contemporary World," *Social Forces* 85, no. 2: 631-642.

Hagendoorn, L., J. Veenman and W. Vollebergh, eds. 2003. *Integrating Immigrants in the Netherlands: Cultural versus Socio-Economic Integration*. Aldershot: Ashgate UK.

Hayduk, Ron. 2006. "Immigrant Political Incorporation: Possibilities and Pitfalls for Multiracial Politics," paper presented at Race and U.S. Political Development Conference. Eugene, Oregon. May 11-12.

Hazan, Miryam. 2006. "Incorporating in the United States and Mexico: Mexican Immigrant Mobilization and Organization in Four American Cities," PhD Dissertation. Austin: The University of Texas.

Heckmann, F. and D. Schnapper, eds. 2003. *The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies: National Differences and Trends of Convergence*. Stuttgart: Lucius and Lucius.

Hertting, Nils, 2006. "Mechanisms of Governance Network Formation – a Contextual Rational Choice Perspective" in *Theories of Democratic Network Governance*, ed. by Sorensen and Torfing. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Hochschild, J. L. and J. Mollenkopf, ed. 2009. *Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Hooghe, Marc. 2005. "Ethnic Organizations and Social Movement Theory: the Political Opportunity Structure for Ethnic Mobilization in Flanders," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 5: 975-990.

Horta, A.P.B. and J. Malheiros. 2006. "Social Capital and Migrants' Political Integration: the Case study of Capeverdean Associations in the Greater Lisbon Area," *Finisterra* 41, no. 81: 143-170

Icduygu, Ahmet. 2006. "Turkiye-Avrupa Birliđi Iliskileri Baglaminda Uluslararası Goc Tartismalari," *TUSIAD* no. 427.

Inalcik, Halil. 2001. *The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300-1600*. Detroit, MI: Phoenix Press.

Ipek, N. and K. T. Caglayan. 2006. "The Emigration From the Ottoman Empire to America," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 12, no. 1&2: 29-43.

Ireland, Patrick. 2007. "Immigration, Integration, and Everyday Life in Europe's Neighborhoods," paper prepared for presentation at the Workshop "Everyday Life in World Politics and Economic," Centre for International Studies LSE, London.

Jacobs, Dirk and Jean Tillie. 2004. "Introduction: Social Capital and Political Integration of Migrants," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 3: 419-427.

Jacobs, Dirk, Karen Phalet and Marc Swyngedouw. 2006. "Political Participation and Associational Life of Turkish Residents in the Capital of Europe," *Turkish Studies* 7, no. 1: 145-161.

Jones-Correa, Michael. 2001. "Institutional and Contextual Factors in Immigrant Naturalization and Voting," *Citizenship Studies* 5, no.1: 41-57.

Joppke, Christian. 1999. *Immigration and the Nation State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Joppke, Christian and Ewa Morawska. 2003. "Integrating Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices," in *Towards Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*, ed. by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. London: Palgrave.

Joppke, Christian and Ewa Morawska, eds. 2003. *Towards Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation States*. London: Palgrave.

- Jorgensen, Martin Bak. 2008. "Transnationalising Civil Society? Theoretical and Empirical Reflections on how to Transnationalize Citizenship," Working Paper No. 62, Center on Migration, Policy and Society.
- Kara, Adem. 2007. "The Ottoman Migrations to America and the Measures Taken by the Ottoman States (in Turkish)," *Journal of Academic Studies* 9, no. 33: 84-99.
- Karpat, Kemal. 1985. "The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860-1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no.2: 175-209.
- Karpat, Kemal and Deniz Baglamis. 2008. *Turkish Migration to the United States. From the Ottoman Times to the Present*. University of Wisconsin Press.
- Karpathakis, Anna. 1999. "Home Society politics and Immigrant Political Incorporation: The Case of Greek Immigrants in New York City," *International Migration Review* 33, no. 1: 55-78.
- Kasinitz, Philip, John Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters. 2003. "Becoming Americans/ Becoming New Yorkers: Immigrant Incorporation in a Majority Minority City," in *Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants*, ed. by Jeffrey G. Reitz. San Diego, CA: Center for Comparative Immigration Research, University of California.
- Kasinitz, Philip. 2004. "Race, Assimilation and Second Generations, Past and Present," in *Not Just Black and White: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States*, ed. by Nancy Foner and G. Fredrickson. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kastoryano, Riva. 1998. "Transnational Participation and Citizenship: Immigrants in the European Union," Working Paper TC-98-12.
- Kaya, Ilhan. 2004. "Turkish-American Immigration History and Identity Formations," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 24, no. 2: 295-308.
- Kaya, Ilhan. 2005. "Identity and Space: The Case of Turkish Americans," *Geographical review* 95, no.3: 425- 440.
- Kaya, Ilhan. 2007. "Religion as a Site of Boundary Construction: Islam and the Integration of Turkish Americans in the United States," *Alternatives* 6, no. 1&2: 139-155.
- Kaufman, K.M. 2004. *The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in American Cities*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Kilic, Zeynep. 2004. "Two Different Worlds? Turkish Immigrant Organizations in the United States and Germany," paper presented at the American Sociological Association (ASA), International Migration Section.

Koff, Harlan. 2002. "Let's Talk: Dialogue Across Disciplines on Immigration and Integration Issues," *The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper* no. 60.

Kogan, Irena. 2006. "Labor Markets and Economic Incorporation among Recent Immigrants in Europe," *Social Forces* 85, no. 2: 697-715.

Koopmans, Ruud. 1999. "Political Opportunity Structure: Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping," *Sociological Forum* 14, no.1: 93-105.

Koopmans, Ruud and Paul Statham, eds. 2000. *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koopmans, Ruud. 2003. "Good Intentions sometimes make bad policy. A comparison of Dutch and German Integration Policies," accessed at [http://www.wz-berlin.de/zkd/zcm/pdf/koopmans\\_good\\_intentions.pdf](http://www.wz-berlin.de/zkd/zcm/pdf/koopmans_good_intentions.pdf)

Koopmans, Ruud. 2004. "Migrant Mobilization and Political Opportunities: Variation among German Cities and a Comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands," *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30, no. 3: 449 – 470.

Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Guigni and Florence Passy. 2005. *Contested Citizenship. Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kraal, Karen. 2003. "The Amsterdam Mentoring Project," in *Sharing Integration Experiences: Innovative Community Practices*. New York: New School University.

Kraal, M., M. Martiniello, R. Penninx and S. Vertovec, eds. 2004. *Citizenship in European Cities*, R. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Kriesi, H., R. Koopmans, J.W. Duyvendak and M.G. Giugni. 1995. *New Social Movements in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lacey, Jonathan. 2007. "Exploring the Transnational Engagements of a Turkic Religious Cultural Community in Ireland," *Translocations* 2, no.1: 153-174.

Layton-Henry, Zig. 1990. "Immigrant Associations," in *The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe*, ed. by Zig Layton-Henry. London: Sage, pp. 94-112.

Levitt, Peggy. 2007. *God Needs No Passport: Immigrants and the Changing American Religious Landscape*. New York: New Press.

- Levitt, Peggy. 2008. "Religion as a Path to Civic Engagement," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31, no.4: 766-791.
- Lijphart, Arendt. 1968. *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Berkeley: University of California Press
- Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Martiniello, Marco. 2006. "Political Participation, Mobilization and Representation of Immigrants and Their Offspring in Europe," in *Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation*, ed. by Rainer Baubock. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. pp. 83-105.
- Martiniello, Marco and Jean-Michel Lafleur. 2008. "Towards a transatlantic dialogue in the study of immigrant political transnationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31, No.4: 645-63.
- Maussen, Marcel. 2005. "Making Muslim Presence Meaningful: Studies on Islam and Mosques in Western Europe," *ASSR Working Paper* 05/03.
- McAdam, D. 1996. "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, ed. by McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-40.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Micallef, Roberta and Hakan Yavuz. 2004. "On Turks and Turkey: Introduction to the Special Issue," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 24, no. 2: 209-211.
- Micallef, Roberta. 2004. "Turkish Americans: Performing Identities in a transnational Setting," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 24, no. 2:233-241.
- Michon, Laure and Floris Vermeulen. 2009. "Organizing for Access? The Political Mobilization of Turks in Amsterdam," *Turkish Studies* 10, no. 2: 255- 275.
- Minnite, Lorraine C. 2009. "Lost in Translation? A Critical Reappraisal of the Concept of Immigrant Political Incorporation," in J.L. Hochschild and J. H. Mollenkopf (eds) *Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. pp. 48-59.
- Mollenkopf, John. 2005. "Trajectories for Immigrant Second Generation in New York City." Paper presented at the Conference on Urban Dynamics in New York City – Immigration Panel Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Mollenkopf, John. 2005. "Notes on the Immigrant Second Generation in Europe and America," paper presented at the European Science Foundation Forward Look on Urban Science Final Conference. Helsinki, Finland.

Mollenkopf, J., A. Champeny, R. Sonenshein and M. Drayse. 2006. "Race, Ethnicity and Immigration in the 2005 Mayoral Elections in Los Angeles and New York," Working Paper 07. Berkeley: Institute of Urban and Regional Development.

Morawska, Ewa. 1996. *Insecure prosperity. Small-town Jews in Industrial America 1890- 1940*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Moya, Jose. 2005. "Immigrants and Associations: A Global and Historical Perspective," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 5: 833-864.

Muriel Sacco. 2007. "Social and Urban Policies and Collective Political participation of Immigrants in Brussels and in Wallonia," paper presented at ECPR General Conference, Pisa.

Victor Nee. 2003. "Institutional Change and Immigration," *Host Societies*, edited by Jeffrey Reitz. San Diego: Center for Migration Studies.

Nell, Lisa. 2004. "Conceptualizing the Emergence of Immigrants' Transnational Communities," *Migration Letters* 1, no. 1: 50-6.

Nell, Lisa. 2008. "The Shadow of Homeland Politics: Understanding the Evolution of the Turkish radical Left in the Netherlands," *Revue europeene des migrations internationales* 24, no.2: 121-145.

Niessen, Jan. 2009. "Integration Indicators, Monitors and Benchmarks," paper presented at the German Conference on Indicators and Experiences in Monitoring Integration Policy, Berlin, 15-16 June.

Odmalm, Pontus. 2004. "Civil Society, Migrant Organizations and Political Parties: Theoretical Linkages and Applications to the Swedish Context," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no.3: 471-489.

Odmalm, Pontus, Charles Lees. 2006. "Getting Ethnic Questions on the Agenda: Party Formation as a Strategy for Social Movements," *Social Movement Studies* 5, no.1: 1-18.

Ogelman, Nedim, Jeannette Money and Philip Martin. 2002. "Immigrant Cohesion and Political Access in Influencing Foreign Policy," *SAIS Review* 22, no.2: 145-165.

Ogelman, Nedim. 2003. "Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics Among Germany's Turks," *International Migration Review* 37, no. 1: 163-193.

- Ogelman, Nedim 2005. "Immigrants Organizations and the Globalization of Turkey's Domestic Politics" in *International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics*, ed. by Rey Koslowski. Routledge: New York. pp. 33-61.
- Orozco, Manuel and Rebecca Rouse. 2007. "Migrant Hometown Associations and Opportunities for Development: A Global Perspective," *Migration Information Source*. February. Accessed at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=579>.
- Ostergaard-Nielsen, E.K. 2000. "Trans-State Loyalties and Politics of Turks and Kurds in Western Europe," *SAIS Review* 20, no. 1: 23-38.
- Ostergaard-Nielsen, E.K. 2000. "Turkish Diaspora: Trans-State Loyalties and Politics of Turks and Kurds in Western Europe," *SAIS Review* 20, no. 1: 23-38.
- Østergaard-Nielsen, E.K. 2001. "Transnational political practices and the receiving state: Turks and Kurds in Germany and the Netherlands," *Global Networks. A Journal of Transnational Affairs*. 1: 261-282.
- Ozbudun, Ergun and Myron Weiner, eds. 1987. *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Penninx, Rinnus. 2004. "Integration processes of migrants in the European Union and policies relating to integration," Presentation for the Conference on Population Challenges, International Migration and Reproductive Health in Turkey and the European Union: Issues and Policy Implications. Istanbul.
- Pfaff, Steven and Anthony J. Gill. 2006. "Will a Million Muslims March? Muslim Interest Organizations and Political Integration in Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 7: 803-828.
- Phalet, Karen and Mark Swyngedouw. 2002. "National Identities and Representations of Citizenship: A Comparison of Turks, Moroccans and Working-Class Belgians in Brussels," *Ethnicities* 2, no. 1: 5 – 30.
- Phalet, Karen and Mark Swyngedouw. 2003. "Measuring Immigrant Integration: the Case of Belgium," *Migration Studies* no. 152: 773-803.
- Phalet, Karen and Mark Swyngedouw. 2004. "Surveying Immigrant Minorities in European Cities: Comparative Problems and Strategies," paper presented at SSRC Summer Institute on International Migration.
- Poppelaars, Caelesta. 2007. "Resource Exchange in Urban Governance. On the Means That Matter," *Urban Affairs Review* 43, No. 1: 3-27.

Poppelaars, Caelesta and Peter Scholten. 2008. "Two Worlds Apart: The Divergence of National and Local Immigrant Integration Policies in the Netherlands," *Administration and Society* 40, no.4: 335-357.

Portes, A. and J.W. Curtis. 1987. "Changing Flags: Naturalization and its Determinants among Mexican immigrants," *International Migration Review* 21, no. 2: 352-71.

Portes, Alejandro and Zhou, Min. 1993. "The new second generation: segmented assimilation and its variants," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 530: 74-96.

Portes, Alejandro and Ruben Rumbaut. 2006. *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Portes, A., C. Escobar, and A.W. Radford. 2007. "Immigrant Transnational Organizations and Development," *International Migration Review* 41, no. 1: 242- 281.

Predelli, L.N. 2008. "Political and Cultural Ethnic Mobilization: The Role of Immigrant Associations in Norway," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 34, no. 6: 935-954.

Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Simon & Schuster.

Ramakrishnan, S.K. and T.J. Espenshade. 2001. "Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United States," *International Migration Review* 35, no. 3: 870-909.

Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick and Irene Bloemraad. 2008. *Civic Hope and Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations and Political Engagement*. New York: Russell Page Foundation.

Reitz, Jeffrey G. 2002. "Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants: Research Themes, Emerging Theories and Methodological Issues," *International Migration Review* 36, no. 4: 1005-1019.

Reitz, Jeffrey G. 2003. *Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants*. San Diego: Center for Comparative Immigration Research, University of California.

Rossi, Ugo, Justus Uitemark, and Henk van Houtum. 2004. "Reinventing Multiculturalism: Urban Citizenship and the negotiation of ethnic diversity in Amsterdam," *Research and Training Network Urban Europe*, no. 11.

- Sayari, Sabri. 1986. "Migration Policies of the Sending Countries: Perspectives on the Turkish Experience," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* May: 87-97.
- Sayari, Sabri. 1996. "Political Parties, Party Systems, and Economic Reforms: The Turkish Case" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31, no. 4: 29- 45.
- Sardinha, Joao. 2007. "Providing voices? Civic participation opportunities for immigrants in Portugal," University of Oldenburg. POLITIS WP No. 7.
- Schiffauer, Werner. 1999. "Islamism in the Diaspora. The Fascination of political Islam Second-Generation German Turks," Working Paper TC- 99-06.
- Schrover, Marlou. 2003. "Immigrant Organizations in the Netherlands: Then and Now," paper for the Workshop "Paths of Integration: Similarities and Differences in the Settlement" Osnabruck, June 19-21.
- Schrover, Marlou and Floris Vermeulen. 2005. "Immigrant Organizations," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 5: 823-832.
- Sharpe, Michael. 2005. "Globalization and Migration: Post-Colonial Dutch Antillean and Aruban Immigrant Political Participation in the Netherlands," *Dialectical Anthropology* no. 29: 291-314.
- Sokefeld, Martin. 2006. "Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora," *Global Networks* 6, no. 3: 265- 284.
- Sommerville, W., J. Durana, and A.M. Terrazas. 2008. "Hometown Associations: An Untapped Resource for Immigrant Integration?," *Insight (MPI)* July: 1-24.
- Soysal, Yasemin. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-national Membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stromblad, Per and Bo Bengtsson. 2007. "Political Participation of Ethnic Associations: Exploring the Importance of Organizational Level Differences in Endowment and Ambition," paper presented at ECPR General Conference, Pisa.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. "States and opportunities', in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, ed. by McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 41-61.

ter Wal, Jessika. 2005. "Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in the Netherlands," Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, Oldenburg. <http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Netherlands.pdf>.

Thomson, Mark, and Maurice Crul. 2007. "The Second Generation in Europe and the United States: How is the Transatlantic Debate Relevant for Further Research on the European Second Generation?" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33, no.7: 1025-1041.

Tillie, Jean, Meindert Fennema and Karen Kraal. 2000. "Creating Networks within the Turkish Community," *MPMC (Multicultural policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities) Working Paper*.

Tillie, Jean and Boris Slijper. 2003. "Immigrant Political Integration and Ethnic Civic Communities in Amsterdam," paper presented at the conference on "Identities, Affiliations and Allegiances," Yale University.

Tillie, Jean. 2004. "Social Capital of Organizations and Their Members: Explaining the Political Integration of Immigrants in Amsterdam," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 3: 529-541.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Togeby, Lise. 2004. "It depends... how organisational participation affects political participation and social trust among second-generation immigrants in Denmark," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no.3:509-528.

Togeby, Lise. 2008. "The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities," *Party Politics* 14, no.3: 325- 343.

Uitermark, Justus, Ugo Rossi and Henk Van Houtum. 2005. "Reinventing Multiculturalism: Urban Citizenship and the Negotiation of Ethnic Diversity in Amsterdam," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 3:622-40.

Van Ewijk, Edith. 2008. "Description of four case studies based on field research in the Netherlands: Amsterdam- Kocaeli (Turkey), Haarlem- Emirdag (Turkey), Rotterdam-Casablanca (Morocco), Zeist- Berkane (Morocco)," Working paper prepared for NCDO.

van, Heelsum, Anja and Jean Tillie. 1999. "Evaluating integration and participation policies for immigrants and minorities in an Amsterdam district: Oost," Amsterdam: MPMC.

van Heelsum, Anja. 2001. "Political Participation of Migrants in the Netherlands." Paper presented at the Metropolis Conference 26-30 November 2001 in Rotterdam.

- van Heelsum, Anja. 2005. "Political Participation and Civic Community of Ethnic Minorities in Four Cities in the Netherlands," *Politics* 25, no. 1: 19-30.
- van Heelsum, Anja. 2006. "Turn out and party choice in the local elections in the Netherlands," Paper for the Metropolis Conference 2-6 Oct 2006 in Lisbon.  
<http://users.fmg.uva.nl/avanheelsum/paperelections2006.pdf>
- Verba, S., K.L. Schlozman, and H. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Volunteerism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Verba, S. and N. H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Inequality*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Vermeulen, Hans and Rinus Penninx, eds. 2000. *Immigrant Integration: The Dutch Case*. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.
- Vermeulen, Floris. 2005. "Organizational Patterns: Surinamese and Turkish Associations in Amsterdam, 1960-1990," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no. 5: 951-973.
- Vermeulen, Floris. 2005. "The Immigrant Organizing Process: The emergence and persistence of Turkish immigrant organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin and Surinamese organizations in Amsterdam, 1960-2000," PhD Thesis.  
<http://dare.uva.nl/document/12781/>
- Vertovec, S. 1999. "Minority Associations, networks and public policies: re-assessing relationships," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25, no. 1: 21-42.
- Vogel, Dita and Anna Triandafyllidou. 2005. "Civic Activation of Immigrants - An introduction to Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," *POLITIS-Working Paper* no. 1. University of Oldenburg.
- Waldinger, Roger. 1996. "From Ellis Island to LAX: Immigrant prospects in the American City," *International Migration Review* 30: 1078-1086.
- Waldinger, Roger. 1996. *Still the Promised City? African-Americans and New Immigrants in Post-industrial New York*. Harvard University Press.
- Warner, Carolyn and Manfred Wenner. 2006. "Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in Europe," *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 3: 457-479.
- Wolfinger, R. E. and S.J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wong, Janelle. 2002. "Thinking about immigrant Political Incorporation," Workshop on Immigrant Incorporation, Mobilization and Participation.

Wong, Janelle. 2006. *Democracy's Promise: Immigrants and American Civic Institutions*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan press.

Yurdakul, Gokce. 2006. "State, Political Parties and Immigrant Elites: Turkish Immigrant Associations in Berlin," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32, no. 3: 435-453.

Zincone, G. and T. Caponio. 2005. "The Multilevel Governance of Migration-State of the Art Report," *Working Paper WP-3*, International Migration, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies.