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THE DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGIES IN THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN

by

TERESA A. BOOKER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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Abstract

THE DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGIES IN THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN

By

Teresa A. Booker

Adviser: Professor W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe

Relief agents and armies at war view humanitarian aid very differently. For providers of assistance, donations are seen as life-sustaining relief for civilians. For fighting factions, however, basic necessities such as food, water and milk may be seen as aid and comfort to the enemy. Whether or not combatants confiscate supplies, relief missions are still handicapped if they are not allowed to reach their intended destinations. One school of thought on peacekeeping suggests that it may be possible for U.N. peacekeepers to serve as relief deliverers. Peacekeepers could provide both the brawn needed to safeguard supplies and the expertise to get them through war zones.

Since no U.N. peacekeeping mission has been assembled for the exclusive purpose of delivering humanitarian assistance, it is not possible to test theories using actual cases. As a result, this study will examine the activities of three U.N. relief agencies involved in Operation Lifeline Sudan—a case which most closely displays

peacekeeping characteristics—in order to answer the following: (1) Do vague mandates, when accompanied by adequate resources, foster the highest degree of discretion for implementors? (2) Is greater discretion needed by implementors delivering militarily significant aid in high conflict areas than implementors delivering less militarily significant aid in low conflict areas? (3) Are individuals more likely to act as "fixers" when implementing policy within their own discretion?

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I am also profoundly indebted to the following individuals and/or entities whose generosity helped to make this dissertation possible. Much thanks to...

Thomas G. Weiss, who sent me complimentary copies of books on O.L.S. in response to a letter of interest that I sent him regarding humanitarianism; the **Ralph Bunche Institute.** for supporting my research via a dissertation fellowship; **Philip O'Brien** (UNICEF), **Mr. Fletcher**, Deputy Country Director (WFP/Kenya), and **Mohammed Osman** (UNICEF/Sudan) for helping me to contact U.N. relief agents in the field; the **unnamed U.N. field agents** who took the time to answer my survey; and **Larry Minear** and **Red Sea Press** for granting me permission to include their map in my survey.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my father, **Walter Booker**, brother, **Harold Booker**, sister **Anita Booker-Hay**, and brother-in-law, **Andrew Hay** for all of their support and encouragement over the years. Most of all, I thank my mother, **Anne L. Wilson** for a lifetime of support, encouragement, and for being my first teacher.

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction of the Problem

Introduction

As ethnic conflicts involving the violation of human rights have become more common, the U.N. has been called upon to act when people at risk are deprived of basics like food, medicine and shelter. By calling upon traditional peacekeeping to perform new functions like the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the U.N. could honor its commitment to human rights. [1] Therefore, over time the U.N. has become more and more involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Humanitarian aid—items usually delivered by civilian organizations to maintain life (e.g. food), preserve health (e.g. clean water for hygiene/drinking), and prevent illness (e.g. medicine)—have a mirage-like effect on armies at war. Food, clean water and milk intended for babies may look like a stockpile of enemy rations. Second-hand clothing and used shoes may appear to be a shipment of enemy uniforms. Building materials hardly suitable for the most modest of shanties may seem like the basic materials for fortifications. Therefore, there is a high probability that humanitarian aid will also be at risk. Even if combatants do not confiscate relief supplies, missions may still be thwarted if goods are not allowed to reach their intended destinations.

Experience shows that the delivery of humanitarian aid is not a simple matter. It involves a number of factors including: the nature of the political, cultural, social,

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1 Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 167.

and geographic environment, the level of experience, education, and/or training of the delivering agent, and the historical relationship between those parties delivering aid and those parties receiving it, among others. While the arming of relief missions could improve their chances for success, the nature of the project mandate, availability of resources and discretionary use of persuasive strategies and tactics developed by relief deliverers will be equally important.

Research Problem

It is the individual in the field, rather than the representative in the Security Council, who creates ground-level policy that influences the delivery of relief and, therefore, the implementation of U.N. resolutions. Frequently the critical factor in U.N. intervention is not so much what is decided in the Security Council, but the behavior of field officers. It is the field officers, not the diplomats, who negotiate the safe passage of convoys when competing groups try to commandeer supplies for themselves. When trains and trucks are prevented from proceeding on washed out roads, individuals familiar with and working on the ground, and not envoys, are the ones that develop alternate routes to get the job done. Moreover, in view of the fact that relief supplies are often times purchased locally (not only because it makes logistical sense but can serve to stimulate a country's ailing economy, albeit temporarily), it is often the case that it is someone stationed in the field that makes purchasing decisions. No bureaucrat in New York could realistically choose between a city's, much less a country's, local venders, inspect the quality of, say, blankets sought, or supervise shipping and handling details of sorghum purchased. The

behavior of representatives sent to carry out humanitarian assistance is a critical factor in the success of any peacekeeping or humanitarian mission. Therefore, this research will examine the influence of mandates, resources, environmental factors and ground-level discretion on strategies and tactics adopted by implementors in the field. How can we explain the behavior of these field operators? More specifically, how do we explain the choices they make in the field?

Practical Significance

This research has both practical and theoretical significance. As far as the practical significance is concerned, knowledge gained from this type of research could facilitate the Security Council's implementation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In the *Implementation Game*, Bardach says that it is important for policymakers to use their "imagination and intuition" when drafting policy.[2] Although he is referring to the arena of domestic policy, his comment is still true for the international arena. By considering potential domestic or international implementation problems beforehand, policymakers can prevent fiascoes by including additional resources or special instruction in their mandates. If the Security Council knew, for example, that the delivery of certain types of aid were more likely to be met with negative reactions than others, it could substitute one type of aid for another, whenever possible. If it knew that the only way to deliver relief, despite

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2 Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game: What Happens After A Bill Becomes a Law, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 254.

substitution, was by bribing local parties, it could mandate that additional supplies accompany regular shipments.

Because Security Council members have limited time to engage in scenario writing, empirical findings about ground-level conditions and the behavior of implementors could provide them with practical means for producing successful policy. This does not mean that every strategy found useful to field agents, for instance, should be mandated by future resolutions. It does mean, however, that resolutions could be written around strategies that prove particularly helpful on the ground.

Theoretical Significance

As far as the theoretical significance of this research is concerned, this work has the potential to contribute to any emerging literature that seeks to document the behavior of humanitarian relief workers. Knowledge gained from understanding the behavior of those individuals, in turn, would contribute to the peacekeeping literature.

A major issue in the field is whether traditional peacekeeping is adequate for its current tasks or if it should be expanded to include humanitarian aid. Some, for instance, argue that the impartial, defensive posture observed by forces for nearly half a century should be replaced by more diverse, aggressive behavior like cleaning environmental spills, engaging in anti-drug trafficking enforcement, and delivering humanitarian aid. Diehl argues that peacekeeping forces administering humanitarian aid could "transport food to the areas of greatest need [and could] also be involved in the...distribution of food and medical supplies to affected populations [with or

without the help of other agencies]."[3] Weiss and Chopra point, as well, to humanitarian aid as ways peacekeepers could assist "a number of [other U.N. organizations with] mandates to help civilians caught in war and in need of physical protection."[4]

According to Weiss and Chopra, the problem with advocating new roles and missions for peacekeepers is that researchers "cannot draw upon historical examples to illustrate the feasibility of their proposals."[5] As a result, researchers still focus on either traditional peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance instead of taking advantage of ideas or arguments linking the two. Many studies of peacekeeping, for example, "cover a broad set of [traditional] ... operations which are primarily historical or descriptive or, on a few occasions, operations manuals" (Bowett, 1964; Fabin, 1971; James, 1984; Day, 1987).[6] Others "have looked only at one [traditional] operation, and although insightful, they provide few lessons that can be generalized across different contexts" (Saab, 1978; House, 1978; Dawisha, 1980; Erskine, 1989; McDermitt and Skjelsbaek, 1991).[7] Similarly, the literature concerning humanitarian

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3 Diehl, p. 151.

4 Thomas Weiss and Jarat Chopra, United Nations Peacekeeping: An ACUNS Teaching Text, (New York, The Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1992), p. 47.

5 Ibid., p. 6.

6 Diehl, p. 3.

7 Ibid.

assistance, tends to be descriptive[8] or in the form of its own type (humanitarian) operation manuals.[9]

Another issue is the success or failure of missions. Library shelves are littered with numerous peacekeeping books that recall historical events in the Suez, Rwanda, Cyprus, Rwanda and Yugoslavia among others (how the mission began, what happen, what precipitated forces to intervene, etc...). These works seldom, if ever, include theories. Some authors, however, have attempted to make generalizations regarding the success and failure of missions. Urquhart, Mackinlay and Evan have all identified overall factors that they have found to contribute to the success of missions. Urquhart pointed to "a viable political context; consistently broad support—political, diplomatic, military and financial—for the operation; representiveness in the force; feasibility of the mandate; cooperation from the parties to the dispute; skill and sensitivity in directing the force; quality of command and the military discipline of the troops; no imposition of an external will or solution."[10] Mackinlay agreed that broad support is important for mission success and adds to the list the effect of a strong mandate. Evans asserts that there are seven conditions which ensure success and adds "clear and achievable goals; adequate resources; close coordination of peacekeeping and peacemaking; impartial local support; external support; and a clearly posted exit sign"[11] to already identified variables.

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8 For details consult: Kent, 1987; Forsythe, 1977; Gordenker and Weiss, 1992.

9 For additional information, see: Skeet, 1977; UNHCR, 1982; International Council of Volunteer Agencies, 1991; Catholic Relief Services, 1992.

10 Ibid., p. 40.

11 Ibid.

Galtung and Eide identify eleven factors which play a role in whether a force is accepted by the local community or not. They include "no contact at all with the local population, or highly unpopular fraternization, conspicuous demonstration of power, and forces that never engaged in good deeds (peace-building activities)."[12] Diehl examined six peacekeeping operations and found that missions work best with superpower support and least when third party opposition or sub national opposition is present.[13] Mandates, according to Diehl, are not as important as may have been assumed. "This suggests that the potential negative impact of factors over which the UN has more of less direct control can be minimized, while factors over which the UN has little or no control can cause great difficulties. Diehl also argues that geography and neutrality are two factors which can have impact on effectiveness."[14] Haas' findings (from his study which was more complex than Diehl's) supports "the importance of a consistent financial base suggested by Urquhart and Evans" while also pointing out the importance of the Secretary-General's and the Secretariat's leadership with regards to mission success.[15] Haas disagrees with Diehl by pointing out "that neutrality is not a requirement of success when certain conditions are met. These conditions are: (1) agreement amongst the permanent five, (2) superpower leadership in the Council concurrent with a two-thirds majority support in the

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12 Ibid.

13 Diehl, p. 169-170.

14 A. B. Fetherston, Towards a Theory of Unitred Nations Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994), p. 41.

15 Ibid.

Assembly, and (3) the ability of the Secretary-General to "construct temporary and shifting coalitions backing an intervention either in the Council or the Assembly."[16]

Ask any student of foreign policy about the theories which serve as the foundation of their discipline and they might mention Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's attempt to explain state behavior by looking below the state as the unit of level of analysis or Rosenau's "pretheories" to name only two. Both of these works conjure up thoughts of models, or schematics or diagrams used to explain how the world works or could work. Pose the same question to a student of peacekeeping, on the other hand, and s/he will be hard pressed to provide similar counterparts. During the height of foreign policy analysis, the field's use of concepts borrowed from psychology and economics led to major theoretical advances based on individual characteristics, small group dynamics, bureaucratic politics, national and societal influences and system effects.[17] Peacekeeping on the other hand, never seems to have benefited from the same brush with behaviorialism as foreign policy analysis did and, as a result, seems almost stuck in a self-imposed time warp primarily made possible by the all too plentiful stream of events books without theories.

Fetherston's Contribution

Some individuals have circumvented the lack of peacekeeping theories by looking in other bodies of literature. Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, for example,

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16 Ibid., p. 42.

17 Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis," in The Encyclopedia of Policy Studies, 2nd edition, ed. Stuart Nagel (New York: Marcel Dekker Publishers, 1994) p. 288-289.

point out that discussions of peacekeeping rarely include any mention of the contributions of conflict theorists who typically focus on conflict analysis and/or conflict resolution. Bercovitch et. al. and Fisher and Keashly are cited as a few whose work to "[begin defining] conflict resolution as a process involving the use of different forms of intervention at different stages of conflict escalation and de-escalation" has led others to see a connection between their work and the nature of peacekeeping.[18]

Fetherston's contingency theory or approach is based on Bercovitch's conflict management theory and is in response to her view that the theoretical literature concerning peacekeeping was, indeed, wanting. Just as Bercovitch argued that conflicts could be mediated at different stages of ever-heightening conflict, so, too, does Fetherston argue that, various interventions could be applied in various stages of international crisis from a peacekeeping perspective. For example, the implementation of a "military functions" strategy –a strategy in which troops are deployed, say in a war zone—could be used to control violence, a "facilitate settlement" strategy could be used to monitor elections or return refugees to their homes, and a "facilitate atmosphere" strategy could be used to deliver humanitarian

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18 Terra Incognita: Here Be Dragons: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Contemporary Conflict; Some Relationships Considered" "Dr. Tom Woodhouse and Dr. Oliver Ramsbotham Paper presented at the INCORE Conference on Training and Preparation of Military and Civilian Peacekeepers University of Ulster June 13th-15th, 1996. www.ciaonet.org/conf/rao01/+%22contingency+model+of+peacekeeping%22&hl=en

relief.[19] Knowing which strategies work best, Fetherston says, is only possible by collecting a large body of knowledge regarding past interventions. She argues, therefore, for a process "designed to yield empirical data regarding the success of failure of a particular intervention at a particular time."[20] Like others who debate the merits of additional roles for traditional peacekeepers, Fetherston proposes that peacekeepers should intervene according to a "peacemaking and peace building function" such as the provision of humanitarian assistance because, they are " uniquely placed to begin processes of reconciliation and reconstruction."[21]

Fetherston's theory is important for two major reasons: 1) since it addresses the roles of peacekeeping, it offers itself as a theory for peacekeeping—something that was previously missing in the field and in the literature; 2) because she views the provision of humanitarian relief as a peacemaking/peace building function, the ideas expressed by peacekeeping thinkers/authors—namely that peacekeepers' roles should be expanded—can be viably addressed.

Public Policy's Bridge

Fetherston's theory is a significant achievement regarding the advancement of theory building in peacekeeping literature. In an effort to realize the newly advocated

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19 This is G o o g l e's cache of
http://www.gn.apc.org/peacenews/issues/past/2386/pn238616.htm.
Review: Towards a theory of UN Peacekeeping
A B Fetherston Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping Macmillan 1994. Reviewed by Christine Schweitzer.

20 Ibid., p. 116.

21 Ibid., p. 138.

roles for peacekeepers—namely as deliverers of humanitarian assistance—more is still needed. In other words, even if the empirical data existed to determine which intervention strategies worked best during a particular stage of conflict very little would be known about the behavior and or contribution of peacekeepers. In order to advance the field of peacekeeping further, it is necessary to turn to the literature of public policy. Public policy is summarily defined as: the study of the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of (domestic) policy by individuals. groups and/or agencies. Because relief agents are the deliverers of aid (e.g. the implementors), it is necessary to focus on the implementation portion of the policy process. Implementation is described by Levin as:

> what happens after a bill becomes a law. It is the process following the formulation and initial adoption of a policy or a policy mandate, [as well as] a complicated...process involving numerous (usually independent) actors and decision points in an interactive [process of bargaining rather than one of hierarchical command.[22]

There are two conceptualizations to implementation: the top-down (forward mapping) approach or the bottom-up (backward mapping) approach. The top down approach to public policy "starts from a policy decision and focuses on the extent to which its objectives are attained over time and why." The bottom up approach "starts by identifying the network of actors involved in service delivery in one or more local areas and asks them about their goals, strategies, activities, and contacts. It then uses the contacts as a vehicle for developing a network technique to identify the local, regional and national actors involved in the planning, financing, and execution of

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22 Paul Martin Levin and Barbara Ferman, The Political Hand: Policy Implementation and Policy Implementation and Youth Employment Programs, (New York, Pergamon Press, Inc., 1985), p.2.

[related programs]. This provides a mechanism for moving from [the] street level bureaucrat [at the bottom of the process who actually implements policy]... to the "top" policy makers [who write policy]."[23] Whether one chooses to interpret policy according to the top down approach or the bottom up approach depends on one's research preference. There is no right or wrong approach. Because Sabatier says, "the bottom-up approach is better for assessing the dynamics of local variation," it is this approach which will be used to explain the actual activity of relief agents as a potential model for U.N. peacekeepers in the future.[24]

To reiterate, in order to link peacekeeping with humanitarian assistance, it is helpful to combine peacekeeping theories with theories of public policy. Peacekeepers, after all, deliver humanitarian assistance and, in order to learn more about how their actions help, hinder or otherwise influence the relief delivering process, it is essential that their behavior is analyzed using concepts and tools from public policy. The problem with the public policy literature, however, is that most of it is related to domestic rather than international examples. Because of this, when using almost any domestic theory of policy formulation to explain international public policy formulation, some adjustment of the domestic theory (which, at the very least, indicates where the newly observed, international level of analysis fits in), is almost always needed in order for the explanation to make sense.

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23 Paul Sabatier, "Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis", Journal of Public Policy, 6, (1986), p.32.

24 Ibid., p. 36-37.

A Note about the Public Policy Models That Were Not Chosen

As mentioned above, almost any domestic theory of policy formulation can be used to explain how policy is formed in the international arena. Four such models were considered to be the heuristic mechanism for which this research was based. There was no special reason why four as opposed to, say, eight models were considered for the study. In addition, there was no particular reason why Ostrom's three-level model of institutional analysis, Hofferbert's open-systems framework, Kingdon's "policy streams" framework, and Sabatier's "advocacy coalition" framework were chosen to be the four models examined.[25] Upon examination, therefore, three models had clear shortcomings.

Hofferbert's model is meant to explain how policy is formed by states. According to Hofferbert, there are five clusters of variables that contribute to an ultimate policy outcome. Specific one-time events trigger the interactions that take place between the five variable clusters: historic-geographic, socio-economic, mass political, government institutions and elite behavior. Each cluster is composed of certain factors and each cluster progresses according to the sequence mentioned above. Without going into greater detail, the Hofferbert model was eliminated from consideration primarily because of its rigidity and what it failed to provide on the

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25 See Elinor Ostrom's "A Method of Institutional Analysis," in Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector, ed. F.X. Kaufman, G. Malone and V. Ostrom (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986); Richard Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974; John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy Choices (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1984).; Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy Oriented Learning Therein", Policy Sciences 21 (Fall 1988): p. 129-168.

international level. When one ignores the fact that the model intended to explain state behavior, it is still difficult to adequately explain the events that led up to and occurred during the case study for this dissertation, Operation Lifeline Sudan (O.L.S).[26] Whereas there were historical, geographical, and socio-economic events which led to the establishment of O.L.S., "mass political behavior," one of the cluster variables" did not come into play. Although the behavior of elites did ultimately result in the creation of the mission, the model would need much more modification to include the range of activities not illustrated but performed by actual individuals in the field, which is the focus of this research. Moreover, according to the model, events happen linearly only —as opposed to how they actually occur in reality— continually.

Similarly, Kingdon's "policy" stream approach was also eliminated as this dissertation's driving force because of its explanatory weaknesses. Kingdon's approach is an attempt to explain how policy comes about (e.g. is placed on an agenda). Stated simply, according to Kingdon, there are three policy processes involved at all times in the political arena: the problem process stream, the policy process stream, and the political stream. When changes in the political or policy stream occur, either a political or problem "window of opportunity" opens that allows for policy to be formed.

Drought and famine in Sudan and other parts of Africa (problem stream), along with the presence of specialists knowledgeable of issues of famine, humanitarian relief, etc...(policy stream), and denial on the part of the Sudanese

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26 Details about O.L.S. will be discussed later in this chapter and more thoroughly in Chapter 3.

government that humanitarian assistance was not needed—not to mention the state of war that contributed to food want (political stream)—did lead to what was later to be known as O.LS. being placed on the Security Council's agenda. The problem, however, is that this dissertation's focus is not on how O.L.S. came about, per se, but how relief agents implemented O.L.S. For this reason, Kingdon's model was not chosen either.

Similarly, Sabatier's advocacy coalition model was considered but was almost immediately excluded. In sum, because his model explains how policy changes over time as a result of the interaction of coalitions, consideration could be stopped there. A model was needed which explained how policy was formed, not changed.

A Proposed Heuristic Device (or Working Model)

The theory on which this dissertation is inspired by Ostrom's three-level model of institutional analysis which itself is based on her rational model for institutional analysis. Both models attempt to explain how domestic policy is made in institutions and how individuals play roles within them. Ostrom's three-level model has been deemed significant to this dissertation primarily because it emphasizes the importance of the implementor's behavior (for the purpose of studying relief agents) to the overall policy process. Not only does it illustrate multiple policy levels (from federal to local), but it also shows how the individual's behavior is influenced by various factors including state and federal mandates. Depending on interpretation and the researcher's unit of analysis, the model also illustrates how the standing operating procedures of a decision-making body on a legislative level higher than the individual

impacts upon an individual's actions. In addition, in order to explain behavior on the international level, the Ostrom model needs very little adjustment.

According to Ostrom's rational model, institutional arrangements, as well as events, the nature of the goods and community attributes influence the decision situation. The individual takes note of the decision situation and uses his own experience, education and expertise to influence actions of others, develop strategies, and impact results. Policy results "feed back" into the model and influence the decision situation, the individual's attributes as well as the attributes of the community. The model also notes that the attributes of institutional arrangements affect the attributes of the community.

The basic terms of Ostrom's model are defined as follows:

1. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: the nature of the organization's charter, power distribution among its various branches, departments and/or members, as well as whether there is conflict or fluctuations of power among the above.

2. EVENTS: past and present occurrences.

3. NATURE OF GOODS: issues at stake, or that which is being decided or distributed.

4. ATTRIBUTES OF THE COMMUNITY: the characteristics of governmental and non-governmental players and the relationship between them. Examples would include whether or not the community players are elected, appointed or volunteers. It also includes whether or not players are friendly or hostile towards one another, and whether they possess resources (i.e. financial, numerical, political) and the capability to use them.

5. ATTRIBUTES of the INDIVIDUAL: a decision maker's interests, expertise, motives, educational attainment, decision-making style and style of interaction with others.

6. ACTIONS, ACTIVITIES and STRATEGIES: any behavior normally associated with the decision making process (i.e. problem identification, information gathering, and solution selection (based on cost-benefit analysis, cost-feasibility analysis, etc...).

7. AGGREGATED RESULTS: outcomes of actions taken or not taken.

Ostrom's rational choice model provides the basis for her three-level model of institutional analysis as well. In the three-level model, policy is made at the constitutional, collective and operational choice levels, respectively. The decisions of the highest level feed into the institutional rules and practices of the level below it.

Choice level terms are defined as follows:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE LEVEL: the arena in which decisions are made according to constitutional rules.

2. COLLECTIVE CHOICE LEVEL: the arena in which decisions are made according to organizational rules.

3. OPERATIONAL CHOICE LEVEL: the arena in which decisions are finally implemented.

Once again, Ostrom's three-level model is significant to our efforts to understand the delivery of humanitarian assistance because it emphasizes the importance of the operational choice level to the overall policy process. Since relief agents implement policy within local environments, and if peacekeepers are to behave

as relief agents in the future, then policy models like Ostrom's could be useful in providing needed approaches otherwise absent in peacekeeping.

The Ostrom model identifies various factors influencing decisions regarding strategies and tactics—for example, "the nature of goods" or the resources being delivered, and "the attributes of the individual" or the amount of discretion available to the implementor. Resources and discretion have been extensively addressed in the implementation literature.

Resources

Because relief agents deliver aid (e.g. resources), it is necessary to focus on the public policy literature that addresses the relevance and/or influence of resources on policy. Resources have two different meanings. On the one hand, it means the humanitarian aid that is meant to be delivered. On the other hand, it can also include the capabilities needed to get a job done such as power, influence, money, communication, and information. The research focuses on the former kind. The financial and material resources (in this case, foodstuffs, medicine, building supplies) of most programs are specifically provided for by mandates. Many authors have written on the importance of resources for successful policy implementation (Ackerman and Steinmann, 1982; Rein and Rabinovitz, 1978; Chase, 1977; Davies and Mason, 1982; Edwards, 1980; Grindle, 1981; and Hogwood and Gunn, 1985). There is little empirical literature, however, which elaborates on how those in the field use resources to their advantage. Montjoy and O'Toole (1979) address the topic most directly, however, in that they seek to determine whether a relationship exists between mandates, resources and implementor discretion. In making that

determination, they find that vague mandates with ample resources give implementors the highest degree of discretion while specific mandates with limited resources offer the least discretion. Specific mandates with ample resources or vague mandates with limited resources rank somewhere in the middle.[27] This dissertation seeks to add to this body of knowledge by identifying the influence of differing types and quantities of resources on the discretionary tactics and strategies used by implementors.

Discretion

Because relief agents must often maneuver their way around various impediments to deliver (e.g. washed out bridges, antiquated rail systems, and armed bandits), they must use their best judgment (e.g. discretion) to accomplish their goals. It is necessary, therefore, to spotlight that aspect of public policy literature that addresses the relevance and/or influence of discretion on policy. The research of "bottom-up" implementation analysts[28] has led others to concentrate on the role of the

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27 Robert S. Montjoy and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., "Toward a Theory of Policy Implementation: An Organizational Perspective," Public Administration Review, 39,5, (September/October), 1979, p. 465-476.

28 See: Richard Elmore, Complexity and Control: What Legislators and Administrators Can do About Implementation (Seattle: Institute of Governmental Research, University of Washington, 1979); Susan Barrett and Colin Fudge, ed., Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy (New York: Methuen, 1981); and Christopher J. Hjern and Benny Hull, Helping Small Firms Grow: an Implementation Approach (New York: Croom-Helm, 1982).

"street-level bureaucrat" and their use of discretion.[29] According to Elmore: "Much of the actual discretion used in administration is used at the very bottom of the hierarchy, where public servants touch the public. The assessor who walks into the home and sees the furniture and the condition of the house, the policeman who listens to the motorist's story, the health inspector who visits the dairy, the income tax auditor who sees the returns and interviews the taxpayers—all these people are compelled to exercise more discretion, and more important discretion, from the point of view of the citizen than may other functionaries further up in the organization.[30]

The use of discretion is important according to Lipsky because "bureaucrats often work in situations too complicated to reduce to programmatic formats ...[and] ...they work in situations that often require responses to the human dimensions of situations."[31] Levin and Ferman, on the other hand, argue that discretion is particularly important for combating resistance, a main obstacle to implementation, and the focus of this dissertation.[32] Based on their examination of nine of nine youth programs funded by the Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) of 1977 (a program to alleviate unemployment among young people), they

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29 Richard Elmore, "Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation," Public Policy 26 (2), (1978): p. 185-228.; Richard Weatherly and Michael Lipsky, "Street Level Bureaucracy and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special Education Reform," Harvard Education Review, 47 (May 1977): 171-197.

30 Richard Elmore, "Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions", Political Quarterly, 94, 4 (Winter, 1979), p. 601-616, p. 609.

31 Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1980), p. 15.

32 Levin and Ferman, p. 4.

argue that street level bureaucrats acting as "fixers" (who "repair and adjust the implementation process") and "double agents" (who "secure joint action among various interests") can have an impact upon "actors [who] resist implementation because they feel it is not in their interests."[33]

Although the idea of relief agents as fixers and double agents seems useful enough as a tool for the study of the delivery of humanitarian relief, it should be pointed out that it is not clear whether individuals behave the same way in wartime environments. To date, it seems that the behavior of the street level bureaucrat has only been observed in non-hostile settings. It could very well be that relief workers are unable to affect resistant actors as double agents but can act as fixers. It is also possible that in a wartime situation, they are able to act in ways that are different from those that can be used in a non-hostile domestic setting. This dissertation seeks to shed light on these questions.

Fixers mend and or manipulate the implementation process by using their administrative talents, political connections and or charisma to offset political problems and bring policy to fruition.[34] Ironically, examples of fixing behavior (a policy-related concept) are evident in the peacekeeping literature and the behavior of U.N. officials. For instance, the U.N. Charter allows the Secretary General to call to the Security Council's attention any matter that, in his judgment, threatens international peace and security. It also calls upon him to execute any functions delegated to him by the Security Council, General Assembly and or any other main

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33 Ibid., p. 5.

34 Ibid., p. 102.

United Nations organ. This proviso, in time, allowed for the creation of peacekeeping, peace making, peace building, good offices, and preventive diplomacy—five concepts never mentioned in the Charter at all—and which would not have come about had it not been for Hammarskjöld's ability to meet political need with political opportunity. In addition, during UNEF I, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld also appointed "two assistant secretaries-general without portfolio attached to his own office to undertake specific political assignments which did not fall under the authority of other assistant secretaries-general."[35]

Ralph Bunche, his American Assistant Secretary-General without Portfolio appointee, and the "principal architect"[36] of peacekeeping also acted as a fixer on numerous occasions during the first missions. Urquhart says his "small staff had to improvise as best they could in supervising a truce in seven states. His duties [and that of his staff] were various in the extreme. One [staff member] found himself guarding a British supply depot at Suez, [and] another took a taxi to the frontlines outside of Tel Aviv and brought the Israeli and Arab commanders together in no-man's land."[37] When, during UNEF I, Bunche's staff was shot at, Bunche remembered that:

> We put United Nations armbands on [the U.N. forces] and we put United Nations flags on their cars and jeeps. In some areas we had to supplement the United Nations flag with a plain white flag because the United Nations flag was not always safe. As you know, its colors are blue and white. Those also happen to be the colors of the flag of Israel, and from a distance it was not

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35 Brian Urquart, "Ralph Bunche and the Development of U.N. Peacekeeping," in Ralph Bunche: the Man and His Times, ed. By Benjamin Rivlin (New York, Holmes and Meier, 1990), p. 188.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., p. 189.

> always possible for the Arabs to be sure that the Secretariat members in the car were not the enemy. And so the cars started carrying plain white flags on the side and the United Nations flags on the other.[38]

Moreover, Urquhart further points out that "it was in the working group of UNEF I [yet another concept not in the Charter but devised by fixers to improve the implementation process], that the idea of the blue helmet originated. Initially, the group was in favor of equipping the force with blue berets, but when it was found that they would take weeks to procure, it was decided to use helmet liners from U.S. stocks in Europe sprayed with United Nations blue paint."[39]

Research Design

(a) Hypothesis

This dissertation seeks to test the following hypothesis:

> The strategies used by implementors in the field are an outcome of the specificity of the mandate as it is mediated by three intervening variables: the availability of resources, the military significance of resources, and the level of conflict in the implementing area.

Or stated in the null:

> The strategies used by implementors in the field are not an outcome of the specificity of the mandate as it is mediated by three intervening variables: the availability of resources, the military significance of resources, and the level of conflict in the implementing area.

Because relief workers are charged with delivering aid (aid which can vary significantly according to their military value for parties at war) in areas that differ regarding levels of hostility, four basic types of delivery situations are possible:

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38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., p. 193.

militarily significant relief delivered to hostile areas, militarily significant relief delivered to non-hostile areas, non-militarily significant relief delivered to hostile areas, and non-militarily significant relief delivered to non-hostile areas. The researcher believes that there is a relationship between the military significance of resources (a reference to Ostrom's "Nature of the Goods"), the level of hostility in delivery areas (a reference to Ostrom's Attributes of the Community"), and what Montjoy and O'Toole refer to as "degrees of discretion" (a reference to Ostrom's "Actions, Activities, and Strategies"). It is expected that in areas of high conflict, implementors delivering militarily significant resources will benefit from mandates that provide maximum discretion to engage in fixing behavior.

(b) Research Method

The basic research approach consists of surveying key individuals who were associated with 3 U.N. relief agencies during Operation Lifeline Sudan, 1989-1990. In addition, secondary literature, document analysis and statistics were used wherever possible.

Operation Lifeline Sudan was created by the United Nations in 1989 for the purpose of delivering humanitarian assistance to civilians during the Sudanese civil war. The agencies acting on behalf of the U.N. were: the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Although several other organizations, including the Red Cross, supported the project from 1989-1990, only action taken by U.N. agencies will be considered.

For this hypothesis, the dependent variable is the strategies and tactics (i.e. "fixing") used by implementors. The independent variable is the mandate prescribed under the O.L.S. Fixing is defined as a strategy used by individual implementors to repair and adjust the implementation process. Mandates are the stated goals for the O.L.S. project as well as any accompanying rules and guidelines for implementation. Montjoy and O'Toole differentiate vague mandates from specific ones by defining vague mandates as those which refer to some "future state of affairs" while specific mandates are defined as those which set forth particular standards and procedures. The intervening variables are the availability of resources, the military significance of the resources, and the level of conflict or hostility in the implementing area. Resources are defined as funds (to purchase goods, equipment, hire personnel) and/or goods (such as medicine, building supplies and/or foodstuffs). Militarily significant goods are defined as those most universally useful to fighting forces—food, water, and/or medicine as compared with the optional utility of building supplies. This definition is commonsensical: troops on the move and waiting in ambush to steal supplies —whether for the purpose of stockpiling goods for themselves or to prevent those goods from falling in the hands of the other side—are more likely to sustain their immediate physical needs (ending thirst, hunger or fighting infection) rather than more long-term needs (related to housing or farming) for their troops. Level of hostility is defined as the threat of attack (perceived or real) to individuals and/or their cargo when interacting with the Sudanese government, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement and/or the Sudanese civilian population.

(c) Operation Lifeline Sudan

As no U.N. peacekeeping mission has been assembled for the exclusive purpose of delivering humanitarian assistance to date, Operation Lifeline Sudan has been chosen for this dissertation as a case study because it shares many of the attributes of a potential peacekeeping/humanitarian aid delivery mission. OLS began in 1989 and was the first humanitarian programme that endeavored to assist "internally displaced and war-affected civilians during an ongoing conflict within a sovereign country."[40] OLS was made possible due to an informal, unsigned, bilateral agreement between the SPLM/A and the GOS (details follow in Chapter 3). Although Operation Lifeline Sudan is not an example of peacekeeping in the classical sense (like United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) or United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) since it neither relied on the military protection of its aid or the displaced civilians it was meant to help), it was carried out under U.N. auspices and through U.N. agencies and is similar, in spirit, to the type of peacekeeping that Mackinlay and others speak about. As a result, it may be possible to identify the tactics and strategies that could be used by peacekeepers should they be assigned the role of delivering humanitarian relief in the future.

(d) Data Collection

A two-stage data collection plan was undertaken.

1. Independent variable: the nature of the mandate

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40 Ataul Karim , Mark Duffield, et. al , OLS: Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review. Report to the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva. (1996), p1.

Sources: U.N. documents pertaining to the start and/or review of Operation Lifeline Sudan were examined.

2a. Dependent variable: strategies used by implementors
Sources: Originally, much of the data to be collected was to come from interviews with key Operation Lifeline Sudan participants operating on behalf of UNDP, UNICEF and WFP. Using an interview guide, a semi-structured interview was to have been arranged and conducted for the individuals listed in Appendix A. In the event that interviewees could not be reached in New York, a questionnaire based on the interview guide was to have been mailed.

Twenty-two questionnaires were mailed to various key Operation Lifeline personnel (Appendix B). In an effort to obtain a higher rate of response, fifty-seven other individuals associated with Operation Lifeline were mailed a questionnaire. (Appendix C). One hundred forty three other individuals from humanitarian relief operations not necessarily related to O.L.S. (confidential) were e-mailed a single survey question for the purpose of supplementing responses generated from the traditional mailing efforts. For more details, please see the findings and conclusion section of the dissertation.

2b. Intervening variable: the availability of resources
Sources: U.N. documents pertaining to the start and/or review of Operation Lifeline Sudan were examined.

2c. Intervening variable: the military significance of resources
Sources: Much of the data to be collected were to come from interviews with key Operation Lifeline Sudan participants operating on behalf of UNDP, UNICEF and WFP. The information received from the various questionnaire distributions supported the notion that O.L.S. resources were militarily significant. More than half of respondents indicated their mission as relating to the acquisition, distribution and/or transportation of supplies and more than fifty percent were responsible for delivering food and water-related supplies. Moreover, more than fifty percent of respondents reported that their vehicles/resources had been detained, re-routed, or halted.

2d. Intervening variable: the level of conflict in the implementing area
Much of the data was to come from interviews with key Operation Lifeline Sudan participants operating on behalf of UNDP, UNICEF and WFP. Instead, questionnaires were collected (the details of which are in later chapter discussing methodology). Respondents to the questionnaire, however, indicated that the level of conflict during O.L.S. was fairly high, and the majority of respondents confirmed interacting with insurgents ranging from being approached to having vehicles destroyed. Details will be discussed later in the findings section of this dissertation.

- The survey instrument was designed to gather the following information:
- What kind of resources did the agency deliver?
- Were adequate resources available for implementation of the relief mission?
- To what extent did implementors operate in areas of high hostility versus that of low hostility?
- What kind/how much discretion was available to implementors?
- What types of strategies and tactics did implementors in the field use?

Actual Problems

Initially, face-to-face interviews were planned for this study. However, the distribution of questionnaires was later deemed to be more practical not to mention cost efficient. The change in methodology brought forth a different type of problem later detailed in Chapter 5.

The following is an overview of this work: Chapter 2 discusses the evolution of peacekeeping and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the history of Sudan and Operation Lifeline Sudan. Chapter 4 contains an explanation of this dissertation's theoretical model using the mandates pertinent to the three UN agencies responsible for delivering humanitarian relief. Chapter 5

describes the study's revised methodology, Chapter 6 discussed the findings and Chapter 7 discusses conclusions.

CHAPTER 2: A Brief History of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance

Introduction

To recap, John Mackinlay, Diehl, Weiss, and Chopra all argue that peacekeeping could go beyond its current, traditional form to encompass actions—ranging from non- to very aggressive—like cleaning environmental spills, delivering and protecting humanitarian aid. Before one entertains the argument that peacekeeping should involve activities such as the delivery of humanitarian aid, one must first understand the United Nation's primary purpose regarding peace and security, be aware of the pertinent organizations created to oversee that purpose, and understand how the conflictual nature of the Cold War prompted the organizational change that resulted in peacekeeping. Next, in order to understand how peacekeeping should involve a secondary purpose like humanitarianism, it is important to understand: 1) how humanitarianism not only existed prior to peacekeeping; 2) was implemented out of a need to provide assistance to refugees after World War II; and 3) was also affected by the Cold War.

Part One: The Evolution of Peacekeeping

Whereas the League of Nations, the United Nations' functional predecessor, was intended to "prevent future wars,"[41] the United Nations was intended to assist in

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41 F. S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times: 1920-1946 (New York: Leicester University Press, 1986), p.2.

"the prevention ...of war [and]...the settlement of disputes."[42] The purpose of the League was to promote peace and security. Created during World War II and founded in 1946, its primary purpose was to maintain international peace and security although secondary and tertiary purposes included the promotion of international economic and social cooperation and respect for human rights, respectively. According to the logic of collective action, the theoretical basis on which the organization was founded, its primary purpose could be achieved because all members would not only have an interest in maintaining the peace, but would be willing to act against aggressors who threatened that peace whether they were friendly towards them or not. Under such circumstances, the principle continues, "the attacking nation would be confronted with such overwhelming opposition from all other members of the U.N. that the peaceful status quo would be quickly restored.

Six U. N. organs were created: the General Assembly, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat, Economic and Social Council, and Security Council. Of the six, however, only the Security Council was assigned the specific role of maintaining peace and security. Composed of five permanent members (France, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China) in addition to 10 non-permanent members, the Security Council was responsible for investigating claims of threats to the peace, making recommendations concerning their investigations, and taking physical action, as needed, if their recommendations went ignored. Because the Charter allowed each permanent member the right to veto any security issue with which it disagreed, any investigation, recommendation or other action under

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42 Weiss and Chopra, p.1.

consideration by the Security Council could be prevented from taking place by the presence of just one veto.

In contrast, the General Assembly and Secretariat (the only other organs with any role to play at all regarding peace and security) were delegated to more minor security assignments. Responsible first and foremost for procedural issues, the General Assembly was also authorized to recommend measures for ...the peaceful adjustment of any situation as long as the situation was not being considered by the Security Council at the same time. Similarly, in addition to supervising the administration of the programs/policies of other U.N. organs, the Charter authorized the Secretary-General to put before the Security Council "any matter which in his opinion threaten[ed] the maintenance of peace and international security."[43]

Chapters 6 and 7 of the U.N. Charter authorized the Security Council (and the General Assembly when applicable), to address disputes that threatened international peace and security using a variety of prescribed methods. Chapter VI, for example, mandated that parties unable to reconcile a conflict themselves, or via some appropriate regional agency, attempt to do so diplomatically (e.g. by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, arbitration and/or judicial settlement). In the event that such diplomatic measures proved ineffective, Chapter VII authorized the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as [was] necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."[44] "Air, sea and/or land forces," according to the Charter, were to be selected from "either a standing international force or standby

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43 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XV, Article 99.

44 Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 42.

contingents of national forces" and controlled by a Military Staff Committee represented by Security Council chiefs of staff.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union fought as allies prior to the organization's creation, their relationship became less friendly when, in 1942, the United States failed to launch a second front against Hitler to protect its allies, the Soviets. The failure of the United States to come to the Soviet's assistant has been cited by some as the factor that triggered the Cold War. The Soviets interpreted this inaction as a deliberate attempt by the United States to weaken its armies[45] and accelerated the War by rejecting the United States' Marshall Plan in the summer of 1947, establishing the Communist Information Bureau, supporting a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1948, and implementing the Berlin Blockade 1948-1949.[46]

Suspicion, animosity and bitterness between the Americans and the Soviets were well formed before the two first took their seats on the Security Council. Once present on the Council, continued distrust prevented any Security Council agreement regarding the size, allocation and location of the standby forces called for by the Charter. Furthermore, not only did both powers vindictively use their veto power to disqualify applicants aligned with the other from joining the U.N., but they also used their vetoes to prevent the Council from producing any meaningful security-related decisions.

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45 Amos Yoder, The Conduct of American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York:Pergamon Press, Inc., 1986), p.9.

46 Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 3rd Edition (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), p.348.

In 1950, the Cold War escalated again when the U.S. disqualified the Soviet's nominee to the United Nations, The People's Republic of China (Communist China). To demonstrate its dissatisfaction and resentment regarding the renunciation, the Soviet Union walked out of the Security Council taking the General Assembly's Communist bloc along with it.[47] This move was not only unexpected but also highly ironic for two reasons. First, superpowers were bestowed permanent membership on the Security Council to avoid the absenteeism that had characterized superpower attendance "for all or part of the League's history."[48] The inability of the two major players to cooperate, and the walk out of the Soviet Union, left one superpower's chair empty. The second reason was as follows: since The League of Nations had been seen by some of its critics as little more than an agency to investigate disputes,[49] the U.N. Charter had mandated a variety of political, economic and military measures to be taken against aggressive nations. However, the inclusion of the veto as a tool to prevent superpowers from being forced to act against their will made it impossible for the Security Council to use the methods to combat aggression.

Five months after their historic exit, the Soviets disregarded the United Nation's principle discouraging states to initiate acts of aggression and entirely upped the Cold War ante by backing a North Korean attack against the Republic of Korea.[50] In accordance to with responsibilities regarding peace and security, Secretary-General

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47 Richard Hiscocks, The Security Council: a Study in Adolescence, (London: The Longman Group, 1973, p.90.

48 Northedge, p. 278.

49 Ibid., p. 283.

50 Yoder, p. 37.

Trygve Lie declared the attack a breach of the peace and referred the matter to the Security Council. With the Soviets absent from the Security Council, the United States easily convinced the remaining Council members to condemn the North Korean aggression.[51] This maneuver not only allowed the Security Council to agree on a security matter for the first time in four years but allowed it to function as originally intended—albeit at the expense of the Soviets who mistakenly believed that the Security Council would be unable to act without their participation.[52]

Two months later, when the Soviets returned to the U.N. from their 7-month hiatus, the pre-walkout climate of stalemate in the Security Council resumed. This made the continued collective actions of repelling North Korea and restoring international peace and security extremely difficult to achieve. The Soviets, had already deliberately barred Secretary-General Trygve Lie from their social gatherings and political contacts for his condemnation of their behavior. They even went as far as addressing communiqués intended for him to the "United Nations Secretariat[53] and "shunned any talk about the reappointment of Lie" as Secretary-General."

In an attempt to prevent this resumed Council stalemate upon the Communists' return, the United States recommended that the General Assembly stand in the stead of the Security Council to deal with such situations when the veto prevented the latter from acting. The General Assembly passed the Uniting for Peace Resolution, over Soviet denunciation, "[allowing] the General Assembly to address

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51 Ibid., p. 37.

52 Ibid. p. 38.

53 Leon Gordenker, The United Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 42.

the North Korean aggression in South Korea amidst Security Council inaction."[54] The resolution forever modified the General Assembly's role and responsibility regarding peace and security issues by allowing a cast veto, rather than the removal of a Security Council issue, to serve as the criteria for General Assembly intervention.

Between the years 1950 and 1955, the Uniting for Peace Resolution remained dormant until it was used in 1956 and 1960, during the Suez and Congo Crises, respectively.[55] It was during the Suez Crisis that Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, in a "single-handed" attempt to prevent a political catastrophe among four superpowers on Egyptian soil, organized an international police force to keep the peace until a political settlement could be reached.[56] In doing so, Hammarskjöld stepped out of his role as mere Security-Council notifier and became a one-man catalyst of organizational change and co-creator and interpreter of what would later be known as "peacekeeping." Although peacekeeping would later evolve to include categories of actions like the "implementation of comprehensive settlements and [even later]... the protection of humanitarian operations, at the time of its conception, it simply was simply a mechanism in which ceasefires could be maintained.[57] Peacekeeping, therefore, was the innovative tool created by the Secretary-General (and others) to diffuse tensions created by seated superpowers and Council members intent on immobilizing U.N. policy.

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54 Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p.27.

55 Ibid., p. 27.

56 Weiss and Chopra, p. 4.

57 What is Peacekeeping? http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/field/pkeep.htm

In 1956, the president of Egypt, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in order to inconvenience Britain and France – countries with which he had been quarreling—since the Canal served as their primary route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Middle and Far East.[58] With the help of Soviet arms, Egypt began reinforcing its military in preparation for war. The arms build up had a domino effect and was seen by Israel as a direct military threat because of its long-standing and negative history with Egypt. In order to prevent what looked to be the beginnings of a third world war (besides which three of the five permanent Security Council members were involved in the clash), the United States, by way of Lester Pearson, officially asked the United Nations to consider the matter an act of aggression. When it was time for a vote, England and France vetoed the call for a cessation of hostilities by all parties and Israel's withdrawal from Egyptian territories. When the matter became deadlocked, an emergency session of the General Assembly was convened under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The General Assembly called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces, which was agreed to by the British and French.

The resolution that followed called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of forces and the creation of a UN force to be dispatched to the area. Hammarskjöld, with the assistance of Ralph Bunche, created a UN force that was dispatched to the area. The first peacekeeping mission, (United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) set a number of precedents for future missions: peacekeepers would be composed of military personnel donated from member forces not party to the conflict under

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58 http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/med/class/teamedia/peace/part1/p1_11.htm
V. 1956 - The Suez Crisis and the Peacekeeping Debut

discussion at hand: troops would be used as a buffer between parties in dispute until/while peaceful settlement could be found/was being reached; and peacekeepers would only fire arms to protect themselves.

Over the course of its history, however, the role of the peacekeeper has changed from simple observation and ceasefire monitoring to more complex activities like elections monitoring, conflict prevention, protecting relief deliverers, to the now advocated roles of delivery of humanitarian assistance. It is beyond the scope of this brief overview to recount the specifics of all or even most of the peacekeeping operations that have occurred over the last fifty years. Overviews of this type are better represented in such works as the United Nation's The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping while it provides a thorough overview of each case. Instead, Appendix D lists the most important security missions since 1956 and the Security Council's and General Assembly's reactions to them.

During the 1950s, Moscow's inability to prevent peacekeeping missions led it to refer to peacekeeping as a tool of the West and to accuse Washington of using peacekeeping operations to thwart what it (Moscow) referred to as government liberalization movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.[59] Unable to prevent peacekeeping missions from occurring and increasing, Moscow curdled as a result. Since its national security was not threatened by UN actions (any ethnic and cultural issues concerning minorities within its borders, for example, were not the problem of

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59 Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl Kesler, "Resurrecting Peacekeeping: the Superpowers in Conflict Management," Third World Quarterly 12, No. 3 /4, (1990-1991), p. 124-146.

the UN), Moscow resolved itself to agreeing to peacekeeping as long as it was not required to contribute financially.

The bitterness of the Cold War gave way to both powers' willingness to "regulate and restrain their [political] differences" out of fear of a mutually assured nuclear destruction.[60] Between 1972-74, the US and USSR negotiated several disarmament treaties: the SALT I Interim Agreement, ABM Treaty and Protocol, Strategic Arms Limitations Talks agreement, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty, protocol on antiballistic missile systems (ABM Treaty Revision) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In 1974, the US an USSR signed the Vladivostok Agreement check spelling which expanded their bilateral agreements and set the stage for SALT II.[61]

The Soviet's began their first peacekeeping experience as observers in 1973, nearly three decades after the American's first mission. The Soviet's participation as observers in the UN Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East (UNTSO) was made possible via the Vladivostok Agreement and the political environment surrounding it at the time. Unfortunately, the agreement to participate in that UN mission—because of the mutual desire of both superpowers to advance their own national interests in the Middle East—was not continuous on the part of the Soviets. In short, although détente reduced many of Cold War tensions, "the Soviets [refused]

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60 Spero, p. 359.

61 http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/primer/nat.html

to accept the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations in other regions."[62] This was most evident when the Soviet's good faith effort to uphold U.N. principles of peace and security was erased upon its violation of the principle of non-aggression in Afghanistan in 1979.[63]

Seven years later, in 1986, Soviet President Gorbachev called for a new approach to global peace and security—specifically, the reduction of arms in Europe and the earmarking of funds for a U.N. military reserve—and agreeing to pay for his country's portion of 1986 UNFIL costs.[64] In 1991, Russia's UN military observers participated in the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) and in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). From October 1991 until March 1993, forty Russian military observers participated in the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC).[65]

In 1992, Russia replaced the USSR as the new permanent member of the UN Security Council. According to Yermolaev, the fall of the USSR led to "Russia's

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62http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:UB3ur_R0lVI:www.iss.co.za/Pubs/MONOGRAPHS/44/Russia%27s%2520peacekeeping.html+peacekeeping++ussr&hl=en Russia's International Peacekeeping And Conflict Management In The Post-Soviet Environment Michael Yermolaev Director, Center for International Security and Conflict Management Studies (CISCMS), Moscow, Russia

63 Ibid., p. 376.

64 Kurt M. Campbell and Thomas G. Weiss, " Superpowers and UN Peacekeeping" Harvard International Review 12:22-6 Winter 1990 p. 22-26.

65http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:UB3ur_R0lVI:www.iss.co.za/Pubs/MONOGRAPHS/44/Russia%27s%2520peacekeeping.html+peacekeeping++ussr&hl=enRussia's International Peacekeeping And Conflict Management In The Post-Soviet Environment Michael Yermolaev Director, Center For International Security And Conflict Management Studies (Ciscms), Moscow, Russia

expanded contribution to international peacekeeping."[66] Perhaps due to new ethnic and cultural threats in its former territories. Russia participated in "most of the newly established international peacekeeping missions in the territory of the former Soviet Union and further abroad" such as the Balkans, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III).[67] Russia also participated in missions outside of its traditional territories: United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). In 1996, it also took part in NATO activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Part Two: A Brief History of Humanitarian Assistance

The primary purpose of the United Nations was to maintain international peace and security. Its secondary purpose, however, was to promote international economic and social cooperation and respect for human rights. Unlike the League's Charter that lacked any references to human rights, U.N. founders were determined "to write human rights into [the Charter] even before the extent of the Holocaust [was widely known]."[68] This determination stemmed, in part, from English and American efforts to cultivate an international "intellectual opinion" equating human rights recognition with civilized society.[69]

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66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, p. 111.

69 Ibid.

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was created three years before the U.N. Charter's ratification and in recognition of "the need to prepare for the inevitable relief requirements [of Europe] after the... war." Its purpose was to bring relief to "some seven million people [returning] to their homes" and otherwise address the pestilence and despair centered primarily around war-torn Europe.[70] The Charter assigned humanitarian functions to its organs as it had in the areas of peace and security.

For instance, just as the Security Council and General Assembly were given peace and security roles, so too, the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council, were responsible for human rights matters. With regards to human rights, the General Assembly was responsible for "initiat[ing] studies and mak[ing] recommendations to promote...the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms"[71] as well as setting international human rights standards, passing resolutions [condemning] or otherwise [drawing] attention to violations of human rights," and creating any other human rights body, as needed.[72] Compared to the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, in contrast, was delegated a more minor human rights role in that it was responsible "for supervising the administration of trust territories placed under the U.N. Trusteeship System." It was authorized to "examine and discuss reports...on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of peoples [living within the]

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70 Randolph C. Kent, Anatomy of Disaster Relief the International Network in Action, (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1987), p. 36.

71 Basic Facts about the United Nations (New York, United Nations), p. 5.

72 Weiss, Forsythe and Coate, p. 131.

Territories."[73] Similarly, the purpose of ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Council) was also "to promote respect for, and [observe] human rights and fundamental freedoms" [74]but its role, duties, and mechanisms were in no ways as clearly defined or delineated as the Security Council's. [75]

Two years after the Charter was ratified, in 1947, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration "was dissolved" by the General Assembly, and the Marshall Plan, sold "primarily as a program to prevent starvation in Europe",[76] was initiated by the United States. With emergency relief needs out of the way, the Marshall Plan incorporated the task of development into its mission and any relief aid needed after that point was seen as a task to be handled by individual governments although truly devastating disasters (i.e. those that pulled at the heart strings of the world) would continue to reap world-wide attention.

The Soviets regarded the Marshall Plan as an aggressive expansion of capitalism (despite the fact that the Plan was offered to them, as well), because the Americans had failed to provide them with the protection they had expected in order

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73 Basic Facts about the United Nations, p. 12-13.

74 ECOSOC home page:
http://216.129.36.90/search?q=cache:OEO6apNyCnYC:www.un.org/documents/ecosoc.htm+ecosoc+%2B+human+rights&hl=en&start=2

75 Peacekeeping and humaitarianism are not the same thing. The former has to do with traditional and not-so-traditional means of diffusing conflict while the latter has to do with the act of being humane. Such behavior is typically exhibited by, but not limited, to the distribution of basic goods (e.g. food, medicine, and water) which are used to sustain human life. It is this aspect of humanitarianism, and not human rights, that is the focus of this paper. Therefore, only the former has been defined (as stated above).

76 Yoder, p. 26.

to combat Hitler. Feelings of betrayal not only affected Soviet-American relations in the Security Council but in the human rights arena, as well. While Moscow, for example, occupied itself with generating propaganda which emphasized the alleged abuses of the Western capitalist system, Washington turned its attention to showing that communists were set on denying individuals of basic human rights.

Just as both superpowers struggled to admit states ideologically similar to themselves to the U.N., both used development, as opposed to relief aid, to bolster and maintain the alignment of those same states. "As far as human rights were concerned, the [Cold War] allowed every dictator ... a superpower sponsor. As long as the dictator vetoed the right column on international issues, especially at the U.N. Security Council, his sponsor was likely to back him if another superpower threatened to intervene in his country's internal affairs. This alignment enabled many countries to violate human rights at will.

Six years after violating the principle of non-aggression, in the case of North Korea (1956), the Soviets continued to pursue their own foreign policy interests in suppressing the Hungarian efforts to gain independence. Because Soviet presence once again prevented any serious deliberation of the South Korean aggression in the Security Council, the situation was addressed by the General Assembly. Although the General Assembly called upon the Soviets "to respect the liberty and political independence of Hungary and the Hungarian people's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms,"[77] it failed to implement Chapters 6 and 7, as it had in the

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77 Wainhouse, p. 468.

case of Korea where the danger of escalation appeared to be greater.[78] By pushing the Hungarian matter to the background of the Suez Crisis which was also occurring at the same time.[79] the General Assembly missed an opportunity to take a more proactive stance concerning human rights protection and thereby set a precedent for the future. The Assembly's inaction, in other words, solidified the notion that some crises were more important than others; despite the U.N.'s promotion of multilateral action, unilateral might would be acceptable under certain political circumstances. As a result, of the delay (but after a change of international attitudes) there were many more cases pertaining to human rights in the 1990s than any other point in the United Nation's history when, in fact, the stage might have been set for 1990s-like involvement back in the 1950s.

Unlike Chapters VI and VII, which not only specified the means and methods for addressing threats to the peace but were written prior to the United Nation's establishment (e.g. during its conception), human rights norms were drafted during the height of the Cold War and excluded any means of implementation. If a country violated the UN's Declaration on Racial Discrimination (1963) or, for that matter was even called to task on it, there were no pre-set tools set to nudge or otherwise force it to comply. The 1950s view of disasters as periodic "localized acts of God" to be handled piecemeal by the international community was heavily challenged in the 1960s.[80] The need for humanitarian intervention, it seemed, was less a result of

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78 Ibid., p. 470.

79 Ibid.

80 Kent, p 45.

natural disasters and more a result of man-made disasters which were not only "persistent and societally erosive...[but which threatened] the very stability of the state."[81] As a result of a combination of natural and man-made "experiences...[in the 1960s and 1970s like] the Nigerian civil war (1967-70), the Peruvian earthquake (1970) and the East Pakistan cyclone and subsequent civil war (1970-71)," international and nongovernmental relief agencies were created to address some of the world's needs in a less ad-hoc way.[82] Seven such agencies, alone, were created in the U.N.: United Nations Development Programme (1971), United Nations Disaster Relief Office (1971), United Nations Children's Fund (1971), World Food Programme (1975), Food and Agriculture Organization (1975), United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Special Economic Assistance (1977) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1980).[83] The creation of so many relief-related agencies during the 1970s was in direct response to the increased attention to man-made and natural disasters.

Part Three: The Convergence of Peacekeeping and Humanitarianism

Not long after Gorbachev issued in a second era of détente in 1986, the Soviet Union collapsed and the fifty-year-old Cold War between the East and the West ended. As a result of the collapse, ethnic strife in the former Soviet territories threatened to explode. Increasingly, these domestic struggles require some manner of

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81 Ibid.

82 Ibid., p. 46.

83 Ibid., p. 52.

physical intervention or humanitarian assistance—neither of which the U.N. is legally authorized to provide without governmental consent.

Despite its name, the United Nations is an organization of states, not nations. Its Charter specifically "establishes as [its] cornerstone ...the principle of the sovereign equality of all member states...[and] prohibits the threat or use of force against any sovereign state...[in] matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of [that] state."[84] Moreover, although the Charter equipped U.N. members to address state-to-state violence, group-to-group confrontations occurring within states were ignored altogether unless they posed a threat to international peace.

Particularly since the early nineties, "struggles for decolonization and self-determination have disintegrated into ethnic, religious, and political fragmentation" in Africa as well as in the formerly held Soviet territories.[85] There have been at least four humanitarian interventions that threaten to blur the distinction between historically typical peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The cases of Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, for example, are different from traditional peacekeeping activities in a number of ways. First, they do not necessarily involve conflict between states. Second, their activities went beyond troops serving as buffers to conflict. Third, the mandates that triggered their activation involved some type of intervention on behalf of populations in need of humanitarian assistance.

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84 Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Action in Times of War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 13.

85 Thomas G. Weiss, "On the Brink of a New Era? Humanitarian Interventions, 1991-1993," The Brown Journal of World Affairs, (vol. 1, issue 2), 1994, p. 235.

Iraq

Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. In addition to condemning the action and calling for an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces, the Security Council imposed a series of economic and armament sanctions to sway Iraq's behavior. An exception was made, however, to sanctions that might affect humanitarian items such as food.

No physical action against Iraq was taken until nearly a year later on January 16, 1991.[86] Unlike traditional peacekeeping which is enacted as a result of Security Council resolution, the military measures which were taken to rid Kuwait of its unlawful visitors were not implemented "under the control of or direction by the United Nations" but via the United States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait.[87] This was not the only example in which the UN's notion of peacekeeping was turned somewhat on its head because, following Iraq's acceptance of the Security Council's mandate to withdraw from Kuwait, it was also compelled to accept and respond to other resolutions which "would permit a definitive end to hostilities."[88] It was only after Iraq agreed to all of the above that the United Nations implemented Chapter VII and created the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).[89]

In addition to authorizing a Special Commission to oversee the destruction of Iraqi chemical, biological, and ballistic weapons, establishing an Iraq-Kuwait

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86 The Blue Helments, p. 681.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid., p. 682.

Boundary Demarcation Commission, and establishing a Compensation Commission for damage caused by its unlawful invasion, the Security Council also passed a resolution calling for Iraq to grant immediate access to the more than 1.5 million Kurds from the north to humanitarian assistance.[90] Their exodus was considered a threat to international peace and security because of the sheer numbers of Kurds. Ironically, it was not the United Nations that decided to consider the exodus a threat but the US-led coalition of forces known as "Operation Provide Comfort." Their interpretation of Chapter VII provided the rationale needed for the forces to take on a more aggressive presence in the area on the basis that military cover was needed to create a "safety zone" so that protection and assistance could be provided to the Iraqi population.[91] Humanitarian duties, undertaken by the US-led coalition, were handed over to the UNHCR upon the former's deactivation and withdrawal from the country. The UNHCR, in turn, provided shelter to the homeless before eventually "leaving other international and non-governmental agencies to continue the humanitarian program."[92]

The Former Yugoslavia

As in the case of UNIKIOM, UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) was not established to provide a buffer between feuding nations. Its primary purpose instead, was to provide protection to Serbs in United Nations Protected Areas

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90 http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/state/95/chapter3.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

(UNPA) in Croatia.[93] UNPROFOR's 1992 mandate was relatively straightforward: demilitarize the UNPAs and protect the Serbs inside of it. According to The Blue Helmets, UNPROFOR was authorized to ensure "non-discrimination and the protection of human rights."[94] The mandate was modified to include monitoring functions and immigration and customs agents "at the UNPA borders at internal frontiers."[95]

When UNPROFOR was deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina a short time later, it "negotiated an agreement" which gave it control of Sarajevo the airport in order to assure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Once again, the Security Council modified its mandate to enable UNPROFOR to "take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements 'all measures necessary' to facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina."[96] Its mandate was enlarged again to assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout the area and to monitor the Security Council's no-fly ban, also meant to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

In the case of the former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR troops faced unique problems on the ground. Since they were not serving as buffers but were in contact with locals who did not respect their presence on the ground, they were more at risk

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93 Blue Helmets, p. 513.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid., p. 514.

96 Ibid., p. 522.

of being injured (or killed) than had they been dispatched under a more conventional mandate.

Rwanda

In 1993 the Security Council established a border observer mission, UNOMUR (United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda), to verify that military assistance from Uganda was not contributing to the fighting between Rwandese government forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF).[97] UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was later deployed within Rwanda by Security Council resolution the same year in order to monitor the ceasefire resulting from the Arusha peace agreement between the Rwandese government and the RPF. A second purpose of the mission was "also [to] provide security or the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and displaced persons." In addition, UNAMIR was also given the responsibility to "assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations."[98]

In April 1994, the deaths of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in a plane crash triggered "events whose speed and ferocity taxed to the utmost the attempts of the international community to respond. The horror that engulfed Rwanda during this period was threefold: mass murders throughout the country amounting to genocide [between the Hutus and the Tutsis]; a brief but violent civil war that swept government forces out of the country; and refugee flows that created a humanitarian

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97 Ibid., p. 342.

98 Ibid., p.343.

and ecological crisis of unprecedented dimensions."[99] By the end of April, UNAMIR "reported strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians" in the city of Kigali, and it became clear to the Secretary-General that the peacekeeping force "did not have the power to take effective action" to halt any new wave of killings. For its part, the Security Council demanded of the Government of Rwanda and the RPF a halt to the killings that were largely ethnic-based.[100] It also authorized, under Chapter VII, the protection of "refugees and civilians at risk, through means including the establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas, and the provision of security for relief operations."[101]

Somalia

By 1992, fighting between Somali clans and warlords had destabled the country so that "almost 4,5 million people, more than half the total number in the country, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition and related diseases."[102] The situation was so poor that it prevented agencies like UNICEF, WFP and the ICRC from successfully delivering assistance, if at all.[103] The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) began as a monitoring mission but quickly became one in which troops were responsible for safeguarding humanitarian relief to the capital and

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99 Ibid., p.346.

100 Ibid., p.348.

101 Ibid., p.350.

102 Ibid., p.287.

103 Ibid., p.288.

surrounding areas.[104] In December 1992, because of the continual deteriorating conditions in the country, the Security Council, under Chapter VII, ordered UNITAF (Unified Task Force) to "help create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia ...[using] 'all necessary means' to do so."[105] George H.W. Bush initiated "Operation Restore Hope" as a response to the resolution and characterized the action taken by the U.S. as taking a "lead in creating the secure environment [needed] to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and economic reconstruction."

In conclusion, for the past ten years, it has become more of a "tradition," than not, for the United Nations to redefine "threats to the peace" from ones based on strict military notions such as armies crossing borders to others that encompass hungry and fearful people crossing borders. The four examples mentioned above offer proof that peacekeepers are taking on expanded roles involving humanitarian components—whether it is delivering, protecting or securing sites for the delivery of assistance.

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104 Ibid., p.291.

105 Ibid., p.294.

CHAPTER 3: Operation Lifeline Sudan

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of: 1) the history of Sudan; 2) the inception of Operation Lifeline; and 3) the North-South dynamics of Operation Lifeline Sudan. The purpose is not to supply the reader with a complete background on the history of Sudan or a complete background of the war preceding OLS. Still, in order to set the stage for the argument by Diehl, Mackinlay, and others that the UN should engage in more aggressive types of peacekeeping—to include various aspects of humanitarianism—it is necessary to provide enough information to illustrate why Operation Lifeline Sudan has been chosen for this dissertation as a case study. To reiterate, although Operation Lifeline Sudan is not an example of peacekeeping in the classical sense, it was carried out under U.N. auspices and through U.N. agencies and is similar, in spirit, to the type of peacekeeping of which Mackinlay and others speak. Accordingly, it may be possible to discover the devices and approaches that could be used by peacekeepers should they be assigned the role of delivering humanitarian relief in the future.

Geography

Encompassing more than a million square miles, The Republic of Sudan is approximately the area of the United States east of the Mississippi River[106] or the size

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106 J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Requiem for the Sudan: War, Drought, and Disaster Relief on the Nile (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 1.

of Western Europe.[107] Over 450 ethnic groups live in the largest country in Africa and ninety percent of them are poor farmers. The other ten percent are educated "elites" who live in urban centers.[108]

Twenty four million, or so, people of about 50 major ethnic groups and who speak more than 100 various languages are spread over a million square miles.[109] The country is characterized racially, religiously, and politically according to one of two distinct regions: either the North or the South. Individuals who identify themselves as Arab and Muslim populate the North. Individuals of black African descent who acknowledge Christianity or traditional tribal religions inhabit the South. These disparities are not absolute, however, since members of both groups live and work in the region of the predominant other. "There are Muslims among Southern black Africans and Christians among northern Arabs [and] in some parts of northern Bahr el Ghazal, Arabs and blacks are neighbors and have intermarried."[110]

Historical Factors

While there are some areas of Sudan that can be characterized by mutual goodwill between blacks and Arabs, there are other parts of the country that better resemble the relations between Arabs and the original inhabitants of Northern Sudan

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107 Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear, The Challenges of Famine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1992), page 12.

108 Burr and Collins, p. 1.

109 Deng and Minear, p. 13.

110 Larry Minear, Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1991), p. 1-2.

which "go as far back as recorded history."[111] Sudan's history can best be characterized by on-again-off-again invasions and cultural and social assimilation as a result of contact with the blacks and the Arabs.[112] More often than not, the contact tended to leave behind a residue of bad feelings and resentment on the part of blacks towards Arabs.

Islam gradually replaced Christianity in the North around the seventh century; the Arabs took physical control of the land from the original inhabitants eight centuries later. The Arab-Islamic empire was able to annex the Nubian and Bejan territories with its military sophistication. According to Deng and Minear, that advantageous technology "gave them [Arabs] an advantage in [later] eventual peace treaties. In turn, the treaties which significantly improved various aspects of Arab Muslims' ways of life—particularly their economic, social, cultural and religious statuses"—by allowing them unlimited access of movement within the country and protecting their interests and freedoms. "Their privileged status, contrasting sharply with that of the Negro, a heathen and a potential slave made the Arab Muslims even more envied than they had been during the pre-Islamic period."[113]

The technological superiority which led to the Arabization and Islamization of the North was not at all present to the same degree in the South. This was done partly as a consequence of racism, partly as a consequence of the "hostile natural environment," and also because of the fierce resistance of the Dinka, the Nuer, and

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111 Deng and Minear, p. 14.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid, p.14.

the Shilluk, warrior tribes to anything Arab.[114] Clearly, the seeds of discord in recent day Sudan were quickly sown in the early years. In fact, "the disparities and mutual animosities between the North and the South were reinforced through most of the 19th century beginning with the Turko-Egyptian rule of the Ottoman Empire in 1821, and continued with the Mahdist revolution that overthrew it in 1885." Moreover, the hatred continued with the Anglo-Egyptian Condo (also known as British rule), of 1898. Although the British eventually established peace and stabilized the country, they undermined whatever political stability they enacted by strictly enforcing a separatist Southern Policy "which kept Arab-Islamic influences out of the South and preserved the people [in a state of indigenousness], without any development at all unless the " 'civilizing' influence of the Christian missions" are added among the successes. [115]

The more modern accounts of Sudanese history begins in the 1920s when the British passed various laws that officially gave teeth to Sudan's segregated society. The "Closed Districts Ordinances" separated the North from the South, the Passports and Permits Ordinance required all travelers moving between the North and the South to carry passports and other necessary permits specifying the purposes of their visits, trade permits were required of Northerners to conduct trade with Southerners, and Southerners were prohibited from speaking any Arabic (only English or the languages

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114 Ibid., p. 15.

115 Deng and Minear, p. 16.

of the Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Latuko, Shilluk and Zande).[116] Not surprising, at the same time the British were constructing systemic racism, it also was establishing the necessary administrative and political arrangements for the North to rule the country after British control of the country had ended.[117]

Less than thirty years later, Sudan received its independence from the British in 1956. Independence was bloodless. The British condominium was replaced by a "Transitional Constitution," which called for a parliamentary form of government and a prime minister. Power changed hands frequently. The following is a brief summarization of events that took place after the British condominium up until the administration which was in power during the beginning of Operation Lifeline.

The Azhari government which had once hoped to combine Sudan with Egypt was toppled on November 17, 1958, before parliament convened, by a military coup led by generals Khalil, Abbud, and al Wahab. The generals replaced the parliamentary system with the "Supreme Council of the Armed Forces" instead which was led by al Wahab. Al Wahab was removed from power in March 1959 and Sudan was led by General Abbud, During the same year, military officers unsuccessfully attempted to stage a coup against General Abbud. Ironically, his particular brand of segregationist policies against the South proved to be the means by which his government ended.

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116 South Sudan: A History of Political Domination - A Case of Self-Determination, by Dr. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Hornet/sd_machar.html

117 South Sudan: A History of Political Domination - A Case of Self-Determination, by Dr. Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Hornet/sd_machar.html

Abbud's regime (as well as the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces) was disbanded after a 1964 strike against him called the "October Revolution." The "transition from military to civilian rule" was planned and implemented by political and military leaders who replaced Abbud with a "nonpolitical senior civil servant, Sirr al Khatim al Khalifa." Al Khalifa served as prime minister to a new transitional government operating under the Transitional Constitution. Elections resulted in "inconclusive" results due to electoral confusion and " few of those elected won a majority of the votes cast." The two majority parties, the Umma and the National Unionist Party (NUP) formed a coalition. Umma leader Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub led the coalition and NUP leader, Azhari, became the Permanent President of the Supreme Commission as well as chief of state.

Mahjub's government lasted until July 1966 when he resigned. The Umma party split and the Mahjub became the leader of the official Umma party while Sadiq al Mahdi became the leader of the splinter version of the party. Sadiq al Mahdi's support of constitutionally endorsed freedom of religion as well and "his refusal to declare Sudan an Islamic state" were key factors which caused his regime to end. His counterpart, Mahjub, became prime minister in May 1967. Nevertheless, Sadiq al Mahdi's Umma party retained enough seats in 1968 to bloc any actions lobbied by Mahjub. Mahjub dissolved parliament. Sadiq ignored the dissolution.

> "As a result, two governments functioned in Khartoum—one meeting in the parliament building and the other on its lawn—both of which claimed to represent the legislature's will. The army commander requested clarification from the Supreme Court regarding which of them had authority to issue orders. The court backed Mahjub's dissolution; the government scheduled new elections for April. "

Once again new elections were called and both Umma wings threw their combined coalition support behind chief Imam Al Hadi al Mahdi for president in 1969. However, Colonel Jaafar and Nimeiri seized power on May 25, 1969, formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and established the Democratic Republic of Sudan. In the process, he suspended the Transitional Constitution, abolished all government institutions, forced army officers to retire and banned all political parties. It also implemented a policy of nationalization. A coup against Nimeiri occurred on July 19, 1971, but three days later, loyalists rescued him after re-storming the presidential palace. Nimeiri was elected to serve six years as president in September according to a "provisional constitution, published in August 1971, described Sudan as a 'socialist democracy'.

"The origins of the civil war in the south date back to the 1950s" when the Equatoria Corps, a southern unit, mutinied at Torit on August 18, 1955. Instead of surrendering to the North, mutineers kept their weapons and fled to the south. "By the late 1960s, the war had resulted in the deaths of about 500,000 people. Several hundred thousand more southerners hid in the forests or escaped to refugee camps in neighboring countries." Nearly ten years later in the seventies, rebels like the Anya Nya were being trained and supplied by Israelis via Ethiopia and Uganda. They purchased arms through fellow Sudanese exiles who had relocated to the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America."[118]

In 1971 Joseph Lagu, who had become the leader of southern forces opposed to Khartoum, proclaimed the creation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement

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118 Ibid.

(SSLM). Anya Nya leaders united behind him, and nearly all exiled southern politicians supported the SSLM. Although the SSLM created a governing infrastructure throughout many areas of southern Sudan, real power remained with Anya Nya, with Lagu at its head. Despite his political problems, Nimeiri remained committed to ending the southern insurgency. He believed he could stop the fighting and stabilize the region by granting regional self-government and undertaking economic development in the south. By October 1971, Khartoum had established contact with the SSLM. After considerable consultation, a conference between SSLM and Sudanese government delegations convened at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February 1972. Initially, the two sides were far apart, the southerners demanding a federal state with a separate southern government and an army that would come under the federal president's command only in response to an external threat to Sudan. Eventually, however, the two sides, with the help of Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie, reached an agreement. [119]

The Addis Ababa accords guaranteed autonomy for a southern region—composed of the three provinces of Equatoria (present-day Al Istiwai), Bahr al Ghazal, and Upper Nile (present-day Aali an Nil)—under a regional president appointed by the national president on the recommendation of an elected Southern Regional Assembly. The High Executive Council or cabinet named by the regional president would be responsible for all aspects of government in the region except such areas as defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, economic and social planning, and interregional concerns, authority over which would be retained by the

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119 Ibid.

national government in which southerners would be represented. Southerners, including qualified Anya Nya veterans, would be incorporated into a 12,000-man southern command of the Sudanese army under equal numbers of northern and southern officers. The accords also recognized Arabic as Sudan's official language, and English as the south's principal language, which would be used in administration and would be taught in the schools. [120]

Although many SSLM leaders opposed the settlement, Lagu approved its terms and both sides agreed to a cease-fire. The national government issued a decree legalizing the agreement and creating an international armistice commission to ensure the well being of returning southern refugees. Khartoum also announced an amnesty, retroactive to 1955. [121] On February 27, 1972, the government of Sudan and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement ended their seventeen yearlong conflict. In addition to calling an end to hostilities, both parties signed a treaty known as the Addis Ababa Agreement. The agreement ultimately assisted in the repatriation of refugees, located development schemes in the north (at the expense of the South), incorporated the Anya-Nya guerilla fighters of the South into official posts within Sudan's "army, police, or game warden system" and declared English the official language of Southern Sudan among other accomplishments. [122]

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120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 Burr and Collins, p. 7.

Political Factors

Four years later, in 1976, fundamentalists and sectarians, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, attempted a *coup d'etat* which failed. In an attempt to save his presidency against future threat and to undercut fundamentalist and sectarian religious authority a religious agenda intent on Islamizing Sudan was adopted by Numeiri. The agenda served to not only re-divide the South but destroy the Addis Ababa Agreement, as well.[123] According to Burr and Collins: The president's promulgation of the September Laws of 1983 produced an irreversible break with the Southern insurgents and solidified the hostilities of the Southern elites and masses. Government injustices, real and perceived, were encapsulated by Numeiri's interpretation and imposition of the Shari'a—the "comprehensive system of personal and public behavior which constitutes the Islamic and religious law" The September Laws sanctioned the use of the hudad—physical punishments such a as flogging, amputation, stoning, a execution—for crimes, which in some Muslim societies were rarely invoked. They also prohibited the sale of alcohol and the collection of interest on debts. The laws were introduced at a time when Iran was setting a standard for initiating similar religious rules and it was feared that Sudan would follow. [124]

The SPLM, in turn, pledged that it would fight until the September Laws were repealed and did so with weapons it seized from confrontations with northern troops and small arms donated or sold to them by Libya and Ethiopia.[125]

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123 Ibid., p. 15.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid., p.16.

The South's pledge turned physical when Numeiri next attempted to paralyze the only likely armed resistance to his effort to abrogate the Addis Ababa Agreement by ordering the 105th battalion, a battalion composed of former Anya-Nya officers and enlisted personnel" out of the South.[126] The 105th mutinied and ultimately placed themselves under the overall command of Lt. Colonel John Garang de Mabior. (a former Numeiri military adviser who's job it was to resolve southern garrison disputes.[127] Garang then formed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) which later enveloped the already existing Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and began fighting to establish a united Sudan operating under socialist authority (as opposed to a separate Sudan which would have resembled the establishment).[128]

Environmental Factors

It is important to note that the fighting between the official government of Sudan and the SPLA/SPLM did not happen in a vacuum but continued intermittingly. Near the time that the September Laws were enacted, the famine of 1984 began. According to Deng and Minear, the drought that triggered the famine of 1984 began as early as 1982 when the Darfur and Korgofan tribes noticed decreased rainfall in their respective areas.[129] Their predictions of an approaching drought were accurate and the drought ultimately swept across Africa's Sahelian belt.[130]

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126 Ibid., p. 10.

127 Ibid., p. 12-13.

128 Ibid., p. 13.

129 Deng and Minear, p. 11.

130 Burr and Collins, p. 19.

The deaths that resulted from the famine occurred as a result of a variety of factors. First, according to Deng and Minear, the people did not die due to lack of precipitation but a lack of money. Animals died, food and feed increased in prices, and wages fell.[131] "People began to sell more personal possessions so that they could buy food. Wage rates fell, and work eventually ran out. People resorted to gathering and eating roots, even digging termite mounds for the broken grains stored by the insects." When the people could no longer feed themselves, they began to migrate towards richer towns like Khartoum.[132] Second, even when rain was present, Numeiri's war against the SPLA/M prevented farming from taking place. Farmers were neither able to earn a living nor able to buy food that was available for purchase elsewhere. This, coupled with a poor national agricultural policy, excessive government spending with regards to food subsidies, when available, and national debt made a bad situation worse.[133] In fact, the North and the South "adopted military polices that directly and indirectly created famine and other hardships...forcing people to migrate away from raids and into towns or out of the South altogether."[134] Third, to make matters worse, more than 500 million people from Tigray and Eritrea had escaped their own countries for Sudan during the same period.[135]

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131 Deng and Minear, p. 39.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid., p. 26.

134 Larry Minear, Tabyiegen Agnes Abuom, Eshetu Chole, Kosti Manibe, Abdul Mohhammed, Jennefer Sebstad, and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1991), p. 5-6.

135 Minear et al., p. 5.

During 1986-88, the estimated number of Sudanese Southerners displaced as a result of the drought was about three million.[136] Early attempts to alleviate the suffering were undertaken by local Sudanese NGOs, "sometimes in concert with UN officials." Unfortunately, the projects were intended to assist only those in the North and the South were subsequently ignored.[137] Numeiri continued to ignore the starving masses, the alarms of relief officials, and on-going non-governmental relief activities.[138] He remained adamant that there was no national crisis and refused any assistance from the United States Agency for International Development.[139] In the end, it was not Sudan's food shortage, as further aggravated by an influx of 1 million, 300 thousand refugees from troubled Ethiopia, Uganda and Chad[140] that prompted Numeiri to declare a state of emergency but the fear that neighboring "Libya might exploit the situation in its conflict with Chad."[141]

The Southern Council of Churches (SCC) was the first to call attention to the need for food in the South.[142] World Vision International and the Sudan Council of Churches responded to Sudan's need under the auspices of Operation Rainbow.[143] As "the first major UN initiative" to provide food to the region,[144] Operation Rainbow's

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136 Ibid., p. 6.

137 Ibid..

138 Deng and Minear, p. 39.

139 Ibid, p. 40

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid., p. 41.

142 Minear et al, p.7.

143 Minear, p. 8-9.

144 Ibid., p. 9

purpose was to simply provide food to those who needed it. However, neither the Government of Sudan nor the SPLA/SPLM wanted relief to be given to the opposite side whether it was neutral or not. The Government of Sudan would allow relief only "in the areas it controlled and where it could supervise relief activities closely, and withheld permission for agencies to operate elsewhere."[145] Meanwhile, the SPLA threatened to shoot down planes, attacked convoys and otherwise devastate relief that was even remotely intended for the North.[146]

The impasse was ultimately defeated when various diplomatic offices within the UN were used to persuade the SPLA/SPLM to allow aid movement within its boundaries. Success for such an accomplishment is attributed to Stefan de Mistura and Winston Prattley who negotiated the airlifted delivery of supplies to individuals in Wau who "were on the verge of starvation, in return for the delivery of food to a town controlled by the SPLA."[147] The agreement prevented the insurgents blockade and allowed food to get to those in northern Wau and Southern Yirol.

Operation Lifeline Sudan

OLS began in March, or, a few months before Numeiri was overthrown by Sadiq al-Mahdi in June of 1989. It came into being because James Grant, executive director of UNICEF, brokered an agreement between the SPLM/A and the GOS.[148] Grant was able to use his good offices and negotiating skills to convince Sadiq al-

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145 Ibid., 12.

146 Ibid.

147 Burr and Collins, p. 60.

148 Karim et al , p. 22.

Mahdi and the SPLM/A to agree to respect a month long period of protection for aid flow in Sudan. The plan called for a "month of tranquility" and necessitated the creation of eight "Corridors of Tranquility" which was crucial to Operation Lifeline's successful implementation.[149] According to the plan, the Corridors of Tranquility would be traversed by a variety of vehicles—from trucks and trains to barges—and planes in Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia.[150] It should be noted that, although the SPLA welcomed Operation Lifeline Sudan, it was opposed to the ceasefire that was to accompany the Month of Tranquility primarily because its sources had noted that Sadiq al Mahdi had "spent the day prior to the OLS conference shopping for arms in Tripoli."[151] So, as Burr and Collins put it, "if Grant wanted an Operation Lifeline Sudan, he was forced to accept the fact that it would commence without the benefit of a cease-fire."[152]

The original agreement contained the "Plan of Action" regarding access to the country. In effect, the agreement was that humanitarian relief would be recognized as neutral, that "free access [would] be guaranteed to UN, donor, and NGO personnel participating in relief activities, enabling them 'to reach all civil non-combatant populations in need of emergency relief throughout the Sudan,'" and that convoys would only transport humanitarian relief.[153] It is important to note that the ad hoc agreement did not work due to threat of military intervention or force but from the

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149 Burr and Collins, p. 179.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid. p.

152 Ibid., p. 181.

153 Karim et al., p. 23.

international community's expectations for both parties to participate. In many cases, the incentive for the Government of Sudan to cooperate was greater because it represented a sovereign state and had an obligation to allow if not provide food to its starving inhabitants.

OLS I made provision for people in three locations: those in the government-held towns in the South, those in the SPLA-held towns in the South, and those in a transition zone composed of the "Southern part of the north and the northern part of the South."[154] Forty or more non-government organizations along with three major UN agencies: UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), WFP (World Food Programme), and the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme ultimately participated in OLS' implementation.

Operational Factors

Although there have been at least two OLS missions (periods), this dissertation focuses on the "initial phase" which spanned the period from 1989 to 1992.[155] In order to implement the operational aspects of Operation Lifeline Sudan, the parties to the Sudanese civil war agreed that UNICEF would act as the lead UN agency on the ground—particularly regarding health –related sector activity—in addition to monitoring aid distribution and providing an "umbrella for NGO activities."[156] The WFP, on the other hand, would take the lead on transporting items

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154 Minear et al., p. 16.

155 Karim et. al., p. 15.

156 Ibid., p. 30.

like food and would operate in the South.[157] The "UNDP Emergency Unit in Khartoum, under an existing Special Coordinator, would continue to organize relief activities in government areas in collaboration with the GOS" although the, WFP would be the primary coordinator for food aid.[158]

Despite the agreements of how OLS would operate, how they actually operate is considerably different. Not surprisingly, they operate very much according to previously described schisms that characterize North-South relations. Although the entire country's operations are formally coordinated by the United Nations from Khartoum, in actuality, the Government of Sudan (GOS) controls the relief agencies in the North.[159] This activity is allowed to happen because there is an "implicit understanding" that the UN will only have access to "those non-government areas that [the GOS] is willing to concede are temporarily beyond its control."[160] OLS is powerless to stop the government from using its authority to exclude certain locations from receiving aid. At the same time, the GOS is still able to obtain overall OLS resources.[161] Although the government has always possessed the power to give and take away, its authority is further enhanced by existence of the 1992 Relief Act that "states that once relief arrives in country, it belongs to the State."[162] Moreover, the UN is required to "[work] through partner agencies, including national and

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157 Ibid.

158 Ibid

159 Ibid., p. 2.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid, p. 90.

162 Ibid.,

international NGOs, and national/local authorities and ministries of the GOS"[163] and chosen by the GOS[164] in order to deliver aid.

UNICEF from Nairobi, on the other hand, manages southern Sector activities, with a "cross-border operation with a main logistical base at Lokichokio in northern Kenya."[165] OLS activities in the South are primarily "ad hoc."[166] Despite agreement that coordination efforts for the South would include input from Northern-based UNDP, it is the Government of Sudan that actually provides input. The Government of Sudan has successfully used the position of its sovereignty to assert "its position as the regulatory body for humanitarian aid."[167] Not only is it able to get away with this activity as a result of its internationally recognized sovereignty but because of the "organizational structure of OLS, and in particular the choice of UNDP as the coordinating agency for the operation."[168]

Unlike the North, in the South, at the ground level, relief is managed by a "network of Local Relief Committees" (LRC's) composed "of representatives from relevant government departments, ...UN agencies, and national and international NGOs. The Local Relief Committee is chaired by the state Commissioner for Relief."[169] The LRC's are "...responsible for the receipt and distribution of relief and

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163 Ibid., p. 95.

164 Ibid., p. 90.

165 Ibid., p. 12.

166 Ibid., p. 2.

167 Ibid., p. 46.

168 Ibid., p. 88.

169 Ibid., p. 92.

rehabilitation inputs."[170] In short, this decision- making body, more so than any other in the South, and along with other local governments, have a significant role in "determining the quality of access enjoyed by the UN and its implementing partners" since they coordinate the registration of beneficiaries, decide the conditions for visiting beneficiary populations, and are consulted on all distributions, requests for supplies, and assessments.[171] Because of the presence of the Committees, the bureaucracy is even heavier or more complicated than it should be. For example, the committee which oversees WFP food in Wau contains "five Local Relief Committee members (representing four organizations), three people from Public Security, eight porters, drivers, and support staff, four members of the National Youth, and one WFP monitor." [172]

Strategies Expected

It is already obvious that Northerners would not want aid to go to southerners and vice versa. Because of the racial history between Arabs and blacks, however, it is possible, too, that the actions implemented by field agents would not only be defensive (circumventing road blocks) but preventive, as well, in case staff members were met by insurgents of the opposite race. For example, it may be determined that black or Arab drivers who were approached by insurgents who were also black or Arab received little to any harassment while black drivers operating in the North (or

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170 Ibid., p. 90.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid., p 93.

Arab drivers operating in the South) received comparatively more. Similarly, perhaps the ability of an agent traveling in the South to speak Dinkan in addition to English was found to be more advantageous to moving goods than if he/she spoke only the official language, English.

Similarly, it has been recorded that although the Government of Sudan publicly expressed appreciated for the aid that it received, "authorities were acutely conscious of its origins in the Christian West and of its delivery by a host of Christian non-governmental organizations, some committed to spreading their religious faith as well as saving lives. The mere fact that Christians were involved, even motivated by common humanitarian ideals, became provocative to some Muslims. In certain quarters Lifeline was portrayed as a violation of the beliefs and integrity of a Muslim nation."[173] Because of this actuality, then, it can be expected that (if UN officials were aware of this earlier than later) that they would have enlisted the help of Muslim agency personnel, local Muslims, or volunteers from Muslim countries to participate as Northern-based relief agents. Likewise, selecting Christians to participate in Southern-based activities might also have been used as a preemptive strategy.

Because of the intense hatred of both sides towards each other, it is a given that the hostilities between the North and the South would continue—especially since OLS does not contain a peacemaking component. Moreover, because an increase of supplies in the area would represent opportunities for acquisition during a period when those traditionally robbed had nothing more to give, it is expected that agents will report many instances of being approached by insurgents from both sides. Since

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173 Deng and Minear, p. 92.

the Government of Sudan would allow aid delivery only in areas under its control, one would expect agents to develop strategies more diplomatic (or defensive) in nature as opposed to ones that are more offensive in nature. The difference in strategy used would be attributed more to the international status of the insurgent than any other reason. For example, because the Government of Sudan is recognized by the international community, any filching of food or medicine by its army would most likely be met by the threat of potential chastisement from the international community as a result of complaints made by agents. On the other hand, attempts on the part of SPLA/M members to steal the same goods would more likely be met with attempts on the part of agents to avoid confrontation.

CHAPTER 4: Mandates

Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the theory on which this dissertation is loosely based comes from Ostrom's three level model of institutional analysis itself based on her rational model for institutional analysis. Both models attempt to explain how domestic policy is made in institutions and how individuals play roles within them. While the three-level model is useful to explain how decisions from one level filter down to another (ultimately resulting in policy) it does not acknowledge how policy is made within an international institution within a three level context or what happens when decisions outside of such an institution affects each (or any) of those three levels simultaneously. In short, researchers attempting to explain behavior within international organizations must use domestic policy models like Ostrom's. When they do, they can only hypothesize about its usefulness and are forced to compensate for the model's inability to explain the simultaneous impacts of the environment on the organization under examination. There is clearly a need for a more accurate model to explain the policy process of international organizations.

This chapter is an attempt to not only explain Ostrom's model but to identify the modifications necessary to allow the model to suit the policy-making and implementation environment of an international organization. Only after such a modification will it be possible to accurately explain how various mandates affected Operation Lifeline Sudan—ultimately leading to specific strategies, tactics, or actions exhibited by relief agents in the field. A second purpose of the chapter is to explain the mandates, which affect Operation Lifeline Sudan's existence and implementation

and to classify those mandates as vague or specific for the purpose of testing the analysis in Chapter Five. As a reminder, Montjoy and O'Toole differentiate vague mandates from specific ones by defining vague mandates as those which refer to some "future state of affairs" and specific mandates as those which set forth meticulous standards and procedures.

Ostrom's model is limited in its use as a tool to understand implementation on the international level primarily due to its unit of analysis. The notion of its various choice levels, however, are extremely helpful. Because of its limitations, various elemental changes must take place in order to make it useful for discussing Operation Lifeline Sudan and other international events. Specifically, changes to the unit of analysis, modification of one choice level, and the addition of a fourth are necessary.

It should be evident by Ostrom's term "constitutional choice level" that her three-level model is intended to explain how domestic policy is made within a state. It is not necessarily intended to do what is needed for this dissertation which is to explain how policy is mandated by an organization within the international arena.

The primary area of concern is the nature of the choice level appropriate for studying the actors being observed. In short, since international organizations are not governed by constitutions, but charters, a charter choice level (not a constitutional choice level) would be needed in order to make the model more appropriate for the analysis of policy created by international organizations. Afterwards, the majority of the model would hold: the charter choice level (the arena in which decisions are made according to charter rules) is passed on to the collective choice level and then to the operational choice level. The components within each choice level would remain the

same. This proposed revision to Ostrom's model will be referred to as the Ostrom/Booker model from this point forward.

The unit of analysis for the Ostrom/Booker model is the organization (as opposed to the state). Since the active component of the model is the passing of the mandate, decision, or policy from one level to the other, one obvious question that comes to mind is: "What happens when there is more than one actor within a choice level?" This question points directly to the second limitation of Ostrom's three-level model—it is not as encompassing as it needs to be to reflect the real world. While, admittedly, Ostrom's model was not intended to explain policy on the international level, she does not address specifically (although she assumes) the fact that decisions made on the federal level affect the entire federation of states and that each state becomes an actor in its own right on the collective choice level. For instance, if on the constitutional choice level the U.S. government requires a 10 percent cut in toxic incinerator emissions, and each state creates its own laws to achieve federal objectives (a collective choice level decision), there would be fifty, not just one, collective choice levels regarding that particular policy. If each state's cities mandate additional requirements to companies within their jurisdiction, there would be countless operational choice levels present, as well.

An additional question that comes to mind regarding the Ostrom/Booker model is: "How do external mandates from other international organizations affect the international organization being observed?" This question points directly to the third limitation of Ostrom's three-level model—it doesn't take into consideration that a choice level greater that the constitutional choice level exists. In other words, it

does not acknowledge that additional mandates on the constitutional choice level can occur from elsewhere. Even on the domestic level, Ostrom fails to address the fact that decisions made by other bodies affect the decisions made on the federal level. For instance, if NAFTA mandates that each member adjusts its tariffs by 20 percent and, at the constitutional choice level the United States is already setting its tariffs at 90 percent of maximum, then the U.S. has an external stipulation with which to contend. The U.S., however, is just one actor among many in NAFTA acting on the collective choice level.

By revising the Ostrom/Booker model again (with the addition of a fourth choice level), the Ostrom/Booker model can illustrate how mandates not created within the U.N. can still affect its rules and conducts with regards to distributing humanitarian relief. Hence the third and final modification to Ostrom's three-level model is to allow for the existence of multiple mandates at the charter and operational choice levels. A fourth choice level is defined below.

EXTERNAL CHOICE LEVEL: the arena in which decisions are made by other institutions' charter rules.

It is important to note that external mandates are like contextual ones—they "apply to a general set of actions but do not apply everywhere." Ostrom says it best when she says:

> The rules of chess apply only to situations in which participants wish to play chess, but they apply in every instance in which individuals want to play chess. The game of chess provides the context for the application of its rules. The formal and enforced laws of a jurisdiction apply to all action arenas occurring within a domain. Rules against stealing a chess piece or assaulting the other player exist almost everywhere chess might be played

> even though [the rules of the latter] stem from a formally existing legal system rather than from the specific rules of chess. The jurisdiction provides the context for rules against stealing or assault.[174]

Hence, not all of the external mandates from other organizations pertain to Operation Lifeline Sudan, just those that apply to the implementation of humanitarian assistance. Not all of the U.N. Charter applies to Operation Lifeline Sudan, just that portion which applies to specific aspects of human rights and or the maintenance of peace and security. Not all of the Security Councils resolutions apply, just those that pertain to the maintenance of peace and security. Not all of the directives governing the actions of the U.N. agencies apply either, just those which apply to O.L.S. and or the nature of humanitarian relief.

The Ostrom/Booker now provides the basis for analysis of Operation Lifeline Sudan. In the case of Operation Lifeline Sudan, policy was made at the external, charter, collective and operational levels. The four-level model is significant to Operation Lifeline Sudan because it identifies all of the arenas that had an impact on the strategies and tactics of the relief agents in the field. Looking at the model upside down, although agents are free to respond to the challenges they face, they are bound by the directives of higher and even multiple mandates/policy decisions. Explanations of the mandates which affect Operation Lifeline Sudan (by external, charter, collective and operational choice levels) are as follows:

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174 Ibid..

1. EXTERNAL CHOICE LEVEL

The mandates which were most applicable to Operation Lifeline Sudan were Geneva Conventions One and Four and the two Additional Protocols. All describe in great detail the humanitarian obligations of warring parties have towards the international community. For the sake of illustration, excerpts from two of the Conventions and the Protocols are listed below. Excerpts have been rephrased by the researcher as affirmative statements for the purpose of classifying them as vague or specific mandates in the next section of this chapter.

All information featured in boxes for this chapter represents data from the various conventions or mission statements. All bulleted text in this chapter represents the researcher's simplification of convention excerpts and mission statements.

a. Geneva Convention (I)

Reference	**Table 4.1 Geneva Convention I Mandate (Excerpts)**
Chapter 1, Art. 3. Section 2	"The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for."
Chapter 3, Art. 19	"...fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical Service may [not be] attacked..."
Chapter VI, Art. 35	. "...transports ... of medical equipment shall be respected and protected in the same way as mobile medical units."
Article 36	"medical aircraft...shall not be attacked, but shall be respected by the belligerents."

External mandates for the Geneva Convention (I), therefore, can be summarized as follows:

- Collect and care for the wounded and sick.
- Do not attack fixed and mobile medical units.
- Do not attack medical units transporting medical equipment.
- Do not attack medical aircraft.

b. Geneva Convention (IV)

Reference	**Table 4.2 Geneva Convention IV Mandate (Excerpts)**
Article 3, (1)	"persons taking no active part in [hostilities] ... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely."
Article 3, (2)	"the wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for."
Article 16	"the wounded and sick, as well as the infirm, and expectant mothers, shall be the object of particular protection and respect."
Article 21	"Convoys of vehicles... on land or... conveying wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases, shall be respected and protected..."
Article 23 (a)	"each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores...intended only for civilians... It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases."

Reference	Table 4.2 Continued
Article 23 (c)	"such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible..." Moreover, "the Occupying Power shall not hinder the application of any preferential measures in regard to food, medical care and protection against the effects of war.... in favor of children under fifteen years, expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven years."
Article 55	"The Occupying Power may not requisition foodstuffs, articles or medical supplies available in the occupied territory, except for use by the occupation forces and administration personnel, and then only if the requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account. Subject to the provisions of other international Conventions, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements to ensure that fair value is paid for any requisitioned goods."
Make sure	"The Protecting Power shall, at any time, be at liberty to verify the state of the food and medical supplies in occupied territories, except where temporary restrictions are made necessary by imperative military requirements."
Article 56	"...the public Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene... Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties."
Article 59	"If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal."

Reference	Table 4.2 Continued
	"Such schemes... may be undertaken... by impartial humanitarian organizations...[and] shall consist, in particular, of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing."
	"all Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and shall guarantee their protection."
Article 61	"the distribution of the relief consignments...shall be carried out with the cooperation and under the supervision of the Protecting Power. This duty may also be delegated...[to an]...impartial humanitarian body."

External mandates for the Geneva Convention (IV), therefore, can be summarized as follows:

- Treat persons not involved in hostilities humanely.
- Collect and care for the wounded and sick.
- Give particular protection to the wounded, sick and expectant.
- Protect convoys containing the sick wounded and expectant.
- Allow the free passage of medical consignments intended for civilians and all consignments intended for children under fifteen and expectant mothers.
- Forward consignments as rapidly as possible
- Do not hinder the distribution of goods intended for children under fifteen years, expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven years.
- Do not requisition foodstuffs, articles or medical supplies (except if the requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account and only after paying fair value).
- Allow the "Protecting Power" to verify the state of the food and medical supplies.
- Ensure and maintain the medical and hospital establishments and services.
- Allow medical personnel to carry out their duties.
- Agree to and facilitate relief schemes on behalf of populations in need.
- Include foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing in relief schemes.
- Permit and protect the free passage of relief consignments.
- Allow the "Protecting Power" to help with/ distribute relief.

c. Protocol I to the Geneva Convention

Reference	Table 4.3 Protocol I to the Geneva Convention (Excerpts)
Article 69	"the Occupying Power shall, to the fullest extent of the means available to it and without any adverse distinction, also ensure the provision of clothing, bedding, means of shelter, other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of the occupied territory..."
Article 70 (1)	"If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies mentioned in Article 69, relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken... Offers of such relief shall not be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as children, expectant mothers..."
Article 70 (2)	"The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel..."
Article 70 (3)	"The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party which allows the passage of relief consignments, equipment and personnel in accordance with paragraph 2:
	(a) "...shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted..."

Reference	Table 4.3 Continued
	(b) "...may make such permission conditional on the distribution of this assistance being made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power..."
	(c) "...shall, in no way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian population concerned."
Article 70 (4)	"The Parties to the conflict shall protect relief consignments and facilitate their rapid distribution."
Article 70 (5)	"The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party concerned shall encourage and facilitate effective international co-ordination of the relief actions referred to in paragraph 1."
Article 71 (1)	"Where necessary, relief personnel may form part of the assistance provided in any relief action, in particular for the transportation and distribution of relief consignments."
Article 71 (2)	"Such personnel shall be respected and protected."
Article 71 (3)	"Each Party in receipt of relief consignments shall, to the fullest extent practicable, assist the relief personnel referred to in paragraph 1 in carrying out their relief mission."
Article 77	"The Parties to the conflict shall provide [children] with the care and aid they require..."

External mandates for Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, therefore, can be summarized as follows:

- Ensure the provision of supplies.
- Allow relief actions if the civilian population is not provided for.
- Allow and facilitate the passage of relief and personnel.
- Do not divert or delay relief consignments.
- Protect and facilitate international coordination of relief action.
- Allow relief personnel to participate in relief action.
- Respect relief personnel.
- Assist relief personnel.

d. PROTOCOL II to the Geneva Convention

Reference	**Table 4.4 Protocol II to the Geneva Convention (Excerpts)**
Article 4 (1)	"All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely..."
Article 4 (3)	"Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require..."
Article 14	"Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works."

Reference	Table 4.4 Continued
Article 18 (1)	"Relief societies...such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations may offer their services for the performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict. The civilian population may, even on its own initiative, offer to collect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked."
Article 18 (2)	"If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as food-stuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken."

External mandates for Protocol II of the Geneva Convention, therefore, can be summarized as follows:

- Treat individuals not participating in hostilities humanely.
- Provide children with care and aid.
- Do not starve individuals or destroy items necessary for survival.
- Allow civilians to care for their own wounded and sick.
- Allow civilians access to goods when they are suffering undue hardship.

2. Charter Choice Level

The U.N. is not a state therefore it is not governed by a constitution. As an international organization, however, it is controlled by a Charter that represents the rules of the organization.

Charter of the United Nations

The Preamble states that "the Peoples of the United Nations [are] determined...to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women."

Reference	Table 4.5 Charter of the United Nations (Excerpts)
Article 1	"to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
Articles 55 and 56	"...take joint and separate action in cooperation [promoting the] equal rights and self determination of peoples,"
Article 68	"set up commissions...for the promotion of human rights."
Article 76	encourages "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all."

Charter mandates, therefore, can be summarized in a few sentences:

- Cooperate in solving humanitarian problems
- Respect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms
- Promote equal rights and self-determination
- Set up commissions promoting human rights
- Encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms

3. Collective Choice Level

The U.N. has two decision-making bodies within it—the Security Council and the General Assembly. A description of both follows.

a. The Security Council

The Security Council's primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security. It is composed of five permanent members and 10 non-permanent ones that are elected by the General Assembly. Non-permanent members remain on the Council for two-year terms and the presidency of the Council rotates monthly and alphabetically. Each Council member has one vote. Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least nine of the 15 members. Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. If any permanent member vetoes a decision, the process is dead within the Council. All U.N. members agree to implement the Security Council's decisions.

When a threat to peace has been determined, the Security Council first recommends that the parties to the dispute reach an agreement by peaceful means. To this end, the Council may investigate its own investigation or ask the Secretary-General to use his good offices to attempt to resolve the problem. Other tools at its disposal include: cease-fire directives, the use of peacekeepers, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes), resort to regional agencies, or multicultural/collective military action.

b. The General Assembly

The General Assembly's primary responsibility is to make decisions on all issues which do not concern the maintenance of international peace and security like the setting of international standards on rights, economic and social issues. It is

comprised of countries that have ratified the U.N. Charter including the five permanent members as well. Although forbidden to discuss matters of peace and security while under consideration by the Security Council, it is able to make such decisions under the Uniting for Peace Resolution if the Council is unable to make a decision. The General Assembly, however, makes non-binding recommendations including the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

Clearly the matter concerning O.L.S. was not a matter threatening peace and security. As a result, the General Assembly was given charge over the situation. The following are General Assembly Resolutions Concerning Operation Lifeline Sudan:

Reference	**Table 4.6 General Assembly Resolutions (Excerpts)**
GA 44/12, item 6 (24 October 1989)	"continue to mobilize support and to co-ordinate the efforts of the international community to intensify rehabilitation activities and to monitor and keep those activities under constant review;"
GA 46/178, item 4 (19 December 1991)	"...continue to coordinate the efforts of the United Nations system to help the Sudan in its emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, to mobilize resources for the implementation of those programmes and to keep the international community informed of the needs of that country;"
GA 46/178, item 7(19 December 1991)	"...offer all feasible assistance, including facilitating the movement or relief supplies and personnel, to guarantee maximum success of the Sudan Emergency Operation in all parts of the country;"

Reference	Table 4.6 Continued
GA 45/226, item 6 (21 December 1990)	"... respond generously to the appeals for immediate food and non-food relief an rehabilitation support made by the United Nations Children's Fund in May 1990, the Government of the Sudan on 26 March 1990 and the World Food Programme on 20 March 1990;"
GA 1990/67, item 3 (26 July 1990)	"...continue to co-ordinate the efforts of the United Nations system to help the Sudan in its emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, to mobilize resources for the implementation of those programmes and to keep the international community informed of the needs of that country;"
GA 1990/67, item 4 (26 July 1990)	"...continue to contribute generously to the relief and rehabilitation requirements of displaced persons;"
GA 1990/67, item 5 (26 July 1990)	"...to respond generously to the appeals for immediate food and non-food relief and rehabilitation support made by the United Nations Children's Fund in May 1990, the Government of the Sudan on 2 March 1990 and the World Food Programme on 26 March 1990;"

Collective choice mandates, therefore, can be summarized in several sentences:

- Mobilize support.
- Coordinate efforts.
- Offer assistance to O.L.S.
- Coordinate relief efforts.
- Respond to appeals for relief.
- Contribute to appeals for relief.

It is important to note that whether one uses the Ostrom model or the Ostrom/Booker model, it is sometimes difficult to determine the appropriate actors to observe on a particular level.

Although it is easy to identify the external choice level examining the charter choice level, the decision-making process becomes somewhat muddled at the collective choice level. When observing the arena in which decisions are made, does one focus on the Security Council and the General Assembly alone or include the UNDP, UNICEF and the WFP, as well? If the answer to the question is yes, the operational choice level can include those relief agents who implemented their organization's mandate and their agency's mandates. If the answer is no, an argument can be made that the operational choice level stops at the three agencies' efforts (even though further specificity regarding their actions can be obtained by looking at individuals' actions). In this dissertation, the mandates of the UNDP, UNICEF, and the WFP are placed on the collective choice level. A description of each agency follows.

c. UNDP

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was created by the General Assembly in 1965 when the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the UN Special Fund (established in 1950 and 1959 respectively). Its purpose was to "provide technical assistance to the less developed countries, using finance from outside the UN regular budget."[175] Because many of UNDP's development assistance programmes are "closely involved with many disaster prone areas, UNDP

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175 Peter MacAlister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Action in International Law and Organization (New York, Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 100.

has evolved various roles in connection with emergency humanitarian relief."[176]

According to its mission statement, the UNDP's mandate is as follows:

Table 4.7 UNDP Mandate (Excerpts)
"[commit] to the principle that development is inseparable from the quest for peace and human security..."
"help countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable human development by assisting them to build their capacity to design and carry out development programmes..."
"... [work] to strengthen international cooperation for sustainable human development"
"...serve as resident coordinators of the operational activities of the United Nations system, supporting at the request of governments the coordination of development and humanitarian assistance."
"help countries to prepare for, avoid and manage complex emergencies and disasters."

The UNDP mandates, therefore, can be summarized in the following sentences:

- Commit to development.
- Help to achieve sustainable human development.
- Help to strengthen international cooperation for development.
- Serve as coordinators of development and humanitarian relief.
- Help prepare, avoid and manage emergencies and disasters.

d. UNICEF

The UNDP was just one of three UN agencies that took part in OLS. UNICEF was a second one. In 1946, the General Assembly established the International Children's Emergency Fund in order to "meet the emergency needs of children in the

176 Ibid., p. 101.

aftermath of World War II in Europe." In October 1953, the organization's role was broadened "to respond to the long-term needs of children living in poverty in developing countries" and its name was shortened to the United Nations Children's Fund.[177] UNICEF originally aided children and expectant mothers by providing them with medical supplies, food and clothes.[178] Its immunization program protects kids from measles, tuberculosis, tetanus, diphtheria, whooping cough and polio."[179] It also engages in salt iodination, [180] safe water, and oral re-hydration therapy.[181]

According to its mission statement, UNICEF's mandate is as follows:

Table 4.8 UNICEF Mandate (Excerpts)
"advocate for the protection of children's rights to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential."
"[strive] to establish children's rights as enduring ethical principles and international standards of behavior towards children."
"...[mobilize] political will and material resources to help countries, particularly developing countries, ensure a "first call for children" and to build their capacity to form appropriate policies an deliver services for children and their families."
"...[commit] to ensuring special protection for the most disadvantaged children -- victims of wars, disasters, extreme poverty, all forms of violence and exploitation and those with disabilities."
"...[respond] in emergencies to protect the rights of children. In coordination with United Nations partners and humanitarian agencies, UNICEF makes its unique facilities for rapid response available to its partners to relieve the suffering of children and those who provide their care."

177 UNICEF at a Glance (New York, UNICEF Division of Information, 1994), p.2.

178 MacAlister-Smith, p. 99.

179 UNICEF at a Glance, p.10.

180 Ibid., p. 12.

181 Ibid, p.13.

"...promote the equal rights of women and girls and to support their full participation in the political, social, and economic development of their communities."
Table 4.8 Continued
"[work with all its partners towards the attainment of the sustainable human development goals adopted by the world community and the realization of the vision of peace and social progress enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations."

UNICEF mandates, therefore, can be summarized in a few sentences:

- Advocate rights.
- Strive to establish rights.
- Mobilize political will.
- Protect victims of war, disasters, etc...
- Respond in emergencies to protect rights of children.
- Promote the rights of women and girls.
- Work to attain the goal of sustainable human development.

e. WFP

The World Food Programme was the third UN agency that took part in OLS activities. It began its existence as a three- year experimental venture between the UN and FAO in 1963.[182] The venture was intended to address three specific areas of assistance: "emergency food needs and emergencies inherent in chronic malnutrition; ...pre-school and school feeding; and ...[the] economic development [of] pilot projects. Emergency needs were interpreted as 'food needs arising from sudden and unexpected natural disasters...and man-made emergency situations, including political conditions rendering persons homeless".[183] Since its inception as a free-standing

182 MacAlister-Smith, p.104.

183 Ibid.

program, it has "become an important source of food aid for development" and, as per its constitutional functions "[establishes] adequate and orderly procedures on a world-wide basis for meeting emergency food needs" by supplying basic foodstuffs to those in need.[184]

According to its mission statement, the World Food Programme's mandates are as follows:

- Use food aid to support economic/social development.
- Meet refugee and other emergency food needs.
- Promote world food security in accordance with U.N and FAO rules and recommendations.
- Improve the nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable.

Operational Choice Level

Mandates on this level come directly from the field with either agency supervisors and/or relief agents acting without prescribed directives. Clearly, the re-routing of a truck to avoid a washed out bridge or insurgents is too small a decision to be generated on the floor of the Security Council or the General Assembly. Even the standard operating procedures of agencies may not stipulate a fraction of the range of strategies and tactics to be taken. In short, different situations call for different actions.

It was impossible for the researcher to locate any documents from the three agencies that shed light on actions to be taken on the ground, either in the case of Operation Lifeline Sudan or any other humanitarian mission. It is hoped, therefore,

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184 Ibid.

that such information will be revealed so that they can be documented in the findings section of this dissertation is that:

To sum, there are no fewer than twelve mandates, all choice levels combined, which influence the strategies and tactics developed to deliver aid to Sudan. As a reminder, the hypothesis of this dissertation:

> The strategies used by implementers in the field are an outcome of the specificity of the mandate as it is mediated by three intervening variables: the availability of resources, the military significance of resources, and the level of conflict in the implementing area.

In order to test the hypothesis, it is necessary to classify the above mandates according to their vagueness or specificity. Montjoy and O'Toole differentiate vague mandates from specific ones as those that set forth particular standards and procedures. Regarding the international arena, for the purpose of this study, vague mandates are those that existed prior to Operation Lifeline Sudan. While their principles are broad enough to apply to the principles of OLS, they were not specifically intended for O.L.S. or written in light of O.L.S. The Geneva Convention is an example of a vague mandate. Resolutions regarding O.L.S., on the other hand, would be considered specific. With this simple litmus test in place, it is possible to classify all of the mandates discussed above. Redundant mandates are listed once.

As the table 4.9 shows, nearly all of the mandates are vague.

Table 4.9 Specificity of Constitutional and Collective Mandates Associated with Operation Lifeline Sudan

Mandate	Specificity
Convention I	
Collect and care for the wounded and sick.	Vague
Do not attack fixed and mobile medical units.	Vague
Do not attack medical units transporting medical equipment.	Vague
Do not attack medical aircraft.	Vague
Convention IV	
Treat persons not involved in hostilities humanely.	Vague
Collect and care for the wounded and sick.	Vague
Give particular protection to the wounded, sick and expectant.	Vague
Protect convoys containing the sick wounded and expectant.	Vague
Allow the free passage of medical consignments intended for civilians and all consignments intended for children under fifteen and expectant mothers.	Vague
Forward consignments as rapidly as possible	Vague
Do not hinder the distribution of goods intended for children under fifteen years, expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven years.	Vague
Do not requisition foodstuffs, articles or medical supplies (except if the requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account and only after paying fair value).	Vague
Allow the "Protecting Power" to verify the state of the food and medical supplies.	Vague
Ensure and maintain the medical and hospital establishments and	Vague

services.	
Allow medical personnel to carry out their duties.	Vague
Agree to and facilitate relief schemes on behalf of populations in need.	Vague
Include foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing in relief schemes.	Vague
Permit and protect the free passage of relief consignments.	Vague
Allow the "Protecting Power" to help with/ distribute relief.	Vague
Protocol I	
Ensure the provision of supplies.	Vague
Allow relief actions if the civilian population is not provided for.	Vague
Allow and facilitate the passage of relief and personnel.	Vague
Do not divert or delay relief consignments.	Vague
Protect and facilitate international coordination of relief action.	Vague
Allow relief personnel to participate in relief action.	Vague
Respect relief personnel.	Vague
Assist relief personnel.	Vague
Protocol II	
Treat individuals not participating in hostilities humanely.	Vague
Provide children with care and aid.	Vague
Do not starve individuals or destroy items necessary for survival.	Vague
Allow civilians to care for their own wounded and sick.	Vague
Allow civilians access to goods when they are suffering undue hardship.	Vague
UN Charter	

Cooperate in solving humanitarian problems.	Vague
Respect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.	Vague
Promote equal rights and self-determination.	Vague
Set up commissions promoting human rights.	Vague
Encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.	Vague
General Assembly/OLS Mandates	
Mobilize support.	Vague
Coordinate efforts.	Vague
Offer assistance to O.L.S.	Specific
Coordinate relief efforts.	Specific
Respond to appeals for relief.	Specific
Contribute to appeals for relief.	Specific
UNDP	
Commit to development.	Vague
Help to achieve sustainable human development.	Vague
Help to strengthen international cooperation for development.	Vague
Serve as coordinators of development and humanitarian relief.	Vague
Help prepare, avoid and manage emergencies and disasters.	Vague
UNICEF	
Advocate rights.	Vague
Strive to establish rights.	Vague
Mobilize political will.	Vague

Protect victims of war, disasters, etc...	Vague
Respond in emergencies to protect rights of children.	Vague
Promote the rights of women and girls.	Vague
Work to attain the goal of sustainable human development.	Vague
WFP	
Use food aid to support economic/social development.	Vague
Meet refugee and other emergency food needs.	Vague
Promote world food security in accordance with U.N and FAO rules and recommendations.	Vague
Improve the nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable.	Vague

In conclusion, although Ostrom's three-level model is useful in explaining how policy is implemented in the domestic arena, it is not so helpful on the international level. The Ostrom/Booker model, on the other hand, is more appropriate despite the cumbersome addition of a fourth choice level because: 1) its unit of analysis is the organization (not the state); 2) it recognizes the existence of multiple charters, agency mandates and individuals' actions.

CHAPTER 5: Methodology

Introduction

Initially, the methodological goal of this dissertation was to administer a survey instrument to 37 key individuals who were associated with the three U.N. relief agencies that participated in Operation Lifeline Sudan. By doing so, the researcher hoped to not only obtain a greater understanding of the UN agencies' mandates but the nature of the resources to be delivered and first-hand accounts of the degree of conflict in the area at the time. The researcher also hoped to learn of the strategies and tactics ultimately used by individuals responsible for delivering different types of militarily significant goods.

Although semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were originally proposed (Chapter 1) as the data collecting for this study, such interviews were determined to be too costly.[185] Individuals were no longer stationed in two or three common locations as originally thought (e.g. New York, Washington, D.C. and Rome).

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185 The directors of the three agencies of which the 37 individuals belonged were contacted by letter (Appendix F) and asked for the current addresses of former Operation Lifeline Sudan (O.L.S). participants. Specifically, those contacted included: Mr. Thomas Grannell, Senior Desk Officer, World Food Programme (WFP); Mr. Philip O'Brien, Deputy Director, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); James Gustav Speth, Administrator, United Nations Development Programme; and Mr. Robin Kinloch, Director of Personnel, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In all, a total of 37 addresses were requested from WFP (14), UNICEF (15), UNDP (7), and O.L.S. (2). The directors were able to identify the current addresses of 22 (or 60%) of the individuals on the list. An effort was made to identify the location of the 13 other individuals using Academic Council on the United Nations (ACUNS) Membership Directories (past and present), world wide web "yellow pages" and gophers, and phoning Dr. Francis Deng, Brookings Institute Fellow (D.C). and author of The Challenges of Famine Relief.

Instead, they were dispersed throughout the world in such places as Sudan, Kenya, U.K., Australia and New Zealand, to name only a few. The methodology was revised so that individuals would be administered a questionnaire by post, instead. Each questionnaire would include an e-mail address in case individuals had a question or comment for the researcher but the questionnaire was not available in electronic format.

After a brief review of the literature on implementation and Operation Lifeline Sudan, the researcher operationalized concepts found in the hypothesis statement. The dependent variable is the strategies and tactics (i.e. "fixing" in the implementation literature) used by implementers. Fixing is defined as a strategy used by individual implementers to repair and adjust the implementation process. The independent variable is the mandate prescribed under O.L.S. Mandates are the stated goals for the O.L.S. project as well as any accompanying rules and guidelines for implementation. These mandates, according to Montjoy and O'Toole, can be differentiated according to vagueness (those which refer to some "future state of affairs") and specificity (those which set forth particular standards and procedures). The intervening variables are the availability of resources, the military significance of resources, and the level of conflict or hostility in the implementing area. Resources will be defined as funds (to purchase goods, equipment, hire personnel) and/or goods (such as medicine, building supplies and/or foodstuffs).

Militarily significant goods are subjective and can mean different things for different players or armies. Although subjective, however, it can be argued that "significance" is synonymous with "usefulness." Food, potable water, and medicine

would be more useful to troops than milk; therefore, the latter would be more militarily significant than the former. Clothing and building materials, on the other hand, could be militarily significant. Because troops do not necessarily need those supplies in order to survive however (unlike food and, even more so, water), militarily significant goods are defined as those most universally useful to fighting forces—food, water, and/or medicine as compared with the optional utility of building supplies.

Level of hostility or level of conflict will be defined as the threat of attack (perceived or real) to individuals and/or their cargo when interacting with the Sudanese government, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement and/or the Sudanese civilian population. In addition to operationalizing the concepts found in the hypothesis statement, general factors for implementation success and failure were compiled and scrutinized. Possible problems associated with delivering the various types of U.N. goods were calculated. Possible reactions to those problems by relief agents/agencies were also theorized.

A 62-question, nine-page survey (Appendices B & C) was organized (without headings) into the following six sections: general information (6 six questions); resource availability (five questions); level of conflict (16 questions); level of resistance (15 questions); freedom to respond (15 questions); and strategy taken (five questions). Approximately 48 percent of the items required circling a number; another 48 percent required a simple check mark; and 3 percent required a brief written response. The questionnaire was designed to elicit the responses to such questions as: What kind of resources did the agency deliver? Were adequate

resources available for implementation of the relief mission? To what extent did implementers operate in areas of high hostility versus that of low hostility? What kind/how much discretion was available to implementers? What types of strategies and tactics did implementers use? (Appendix B).

Because the whereabouts of the 13 missing O.L.S. participants were not located after various attempts, an insert was created to accompany the questionnaire listing their names and asking respondents for any information as to their current location (Appendix F).

Respondents were assigned a number known only to the researcher to assure anonymity. Mailing labels and cover letters were created (Appendix G) and questionnaires and inserts duplicated. Return labels were also generated not only for the outer 9 x 12 envelopes containing the questionnaires but also for the self-addressed envelopes enclosed. Questionnaires were hand-"stamped" with the assigned code number of the addressee. Survey packets were mailed to 19 individuals on March 12, 1997.

By April 30, 1997, a total of only 4 surveys were received. In addition, two individuals indicated that they were not appropriate respondents for the survey despite Minear's report. Another survey was returned because it was undeliverable. The addresses/leads for 4 of the 13 missing relief agents were obtained. The total rate of response was less than 13%. Because of the less-than-expected rate of response, the researcher asked Mr. Philip O'Brien (UNICEF) about the possibility of obtaining the names of O.L.S. members currently in the field. As a result, 26 additional names of UNICEF agents and 31 names of WFP agents were obtained. (To protect the

identity of the respondents, the list will not be provided). A similar response was made of Mr. Kinloch (UNDP) whose organization was unable to locate the addresses of any 1989-1990 relief agents. However, there was no response after a total of three attempts of trying to reach him.

As a result of Mr. O'Brien's response, the period of reference for this dissertation is not only 1989-90 (the first complete years of O.L.S). but also 1995-1996 (the last two complete years of the on-going project, at that time). Questionnaires were revised to reflect the change in the period of interest, from 1989-90 to 1995-96 (Appendices B & C). Current field agents were also assigned a number known only to the researcher and each questionnaire was hand-"stamped" with the assigned code number of the addressee. New cover letters (Appendix H), mailing and return labels were generated for the 57 new people identified. Inserts were not included in the packets for current field agents. Two additional labels/envelopes were created for Mr. Fletcher, Deputy Country Director (WFP/Kenya) and Mr. Mohammed Osman (UNICEF/Sudan) who agreed, by phone, to distribute the questionnaires locally. In addition to the preparation of the first mailing of the 1995-96 respondent group, a second mailing (including a "reminder" cover letter, labels, and envelopes) was executed for the remaining non-respondents and four (4) identified participants from 1989-1990 whose addresses were supplied by respondents. Postage was affixed to those self-addressed envelopes that were to be mailed to domestic recipients. Both batches of surveys were mailed on July 14, 1997. All were due no later than September 19, 1997.

No further mailing was conducted for non-respondents from 1989-90. A second mailing was conducted for the 1995-96 individuals and "found" individuals initially contacted on July 14, 1997. This time, the survey packets were not addressed care of any department or deputy like before but directly to the individual. The second mailing included the appropriate second-mailing e.g. "reminder" cover letter as well as a self-addressed envelope. This last batch of questionnaires was mailed on October 7, 1997 and due no later than November 30, 1997.

To sum, a total of 83 questionnaires was mailed during two phases. Phase One individuals participated in Operation Lifeline Sudan during 1989-89 while Phase Two individuals participated during 1995-96. During Phase One, the initial mailing was mailed on March 12, 1997 to 22 individuals. A follow up mailing was sent to non-respondents on July 14, 1997. There were a total of seven usable returns from Phase One individuals (a 32 percent response rate). In Phase Two, on July 14, 1997, 61 additional individuals were mailed questionnaires. A second mailing to non-respondents from Phase 2 was sent on September 19, 1997. A total of seven usable returns from this second set of individuals were received (a 12 percent response rate). The overall response rate for both phases was seventeen percent with 50% of all respondents answering the questionnaires after the first and second mailings, respectively. These figures are summarized in Table 6.1 below as well as the response rates for Phase One and Phase Two relief agents.

Responses from seven other individuals were received but either: 1) their survey was not functional; or 2) the individuals reported that they were not eligible to respond to the survey.

Table 5.1 Number and Percentage of Returns for Respondents During Phases One and Two			
1989-90 Phase One	**Number Sent**	**Usable Number Received**	**Total Percent by Mailing**
1st mailing	22	4	18%
2nd mailing	18	3	17%
Total	---	7	32%
1st mailing	61	3	5
2nd mailing	58	4	7
Total		7	12
Grand Total from Both Phases	83	14	17%

Third Attempt to Collect Usable Data

A third attempt was made to collect data concerning strategies of relief agents in the field. The researcher visited the Internet and collected the names of numerous non-profit human rights organizations that led to the identification of some 143 individuals who were associated with those organizations. Yet another letter of request was tailored for the newly identified population and e-mailed. Unlike previous requests for information, the electronic "questionnaire" was very simple and contained only one question. Respondents merely asked to supply any anecdote of which they were aware that could be used to illustrate strategies and/or tactics used by any relief agent in the field no matter where and when she/he served.

The majority did not respond at all. Approximately ten individuals indicated: 1) that they would either forward the request to a more knowledgeable person; 2) that the researcher should check the organization's web site for possible information; and

3) could not respond because they either never worked with Operation Lifeline Sudan or in Africa at all (two conditions unnecessary in order to provide anecdotes).

The request was only sent once (although a follow-up e-mail was sent to any individuals who believed that they could not respond because they neither worked with O.L.S. or in Africa). Once again, respondents were assigned a number known only to the researcher to assure anonymity. However, only those who responded to the survey had their examples coded with an anonymous number. By the deadline, a total of only 6 anecdotes were received. The total rate of response for the electronic survey was 4%. Once again, there were not enough examples to obtain any meaningful insight.

To sum, a total of 237 individuals were contacted for this dissertation during three different and distinct data collection phases and attempts. As a result, it is clear to the researcher that it is impossible to test the hypothesis at this time (e.g. within the framework of this dissertation).

Fourth Attempt to Collect Usable Data

Yet a fourth effort to collected data was attempted by asking respondents to "simply" illustrate how field agents perform their job in the field. Anecdotes, along with any other examples, would, supplement quantitative and qualitative attempts to obtain primary data and reconcile the lack of data.

Locating secondary data was not an easy task; and when data was finally found, it was not plentiful. Still, Mary Anderson's work was the only source that could be found which cited/illustrated the types of activities executed by field agents

in the field. Her secondary data, along with respondents' anecdotes, follow. Her headings have been borrowed.

CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS

This chapter presents the responses of relief agents who participated in Operation Lifeline Sudan. Data have been rounded to the nearest whole number. The codebook for the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1. In addition, data are presented in this chapter according to the order that the questions appeared on the survey. Although this dissertation is qualitative yet contains quantitative data, the data which were collected are presented despite their statistical insignificance.

a. Agency Affiliation

As mentioned, a total of 83 former and current individuals were identified and mailed questionnaires. Of the 14 usable questionnaires received, 42.9% (N=6) belonged to UNICEF and 50% (N=7) to WFP. One individual (representing seven percent of the responses) belonged to Catholic Relief Services but evidently worked under O.L.S. No individual from UNDP responded to the survey. Although 7 potential UNDP respondents were identified, no contact addresses were provided by UNDP officials despite three written requests and a personal visit/oral request to UNDP officials at U.N. headquarters, (in the form of a month-long internship with the department).

According to the data, about 25% (N=3) of those working with O.L.S. in 1989-90 worked for their respective agencies prior to O.L.S.' inception and 75% (N=9) after O.L.S. began. Naturally, one hundred percent of agents working in 1995-96 began their tenure after O.L.S. began.

Individuals targeted for the survey held a variety of titles during their tenure with Operation Lifeline such: as adviser, chief of emergency unit, area officer, relief officer, logistics officer, evaluation officer, officer of health, liaison officer, camp manager, and project officer. Additional titles included emergency drought officer, pipeline officer, food security information officer, data analyst, field monitor, driver and shipping clerk. Since disclosing respondents' specific job titles could, in many respects, violate confidentiality, this dissertation will only disclose that 58% of all respondents worked in logistics or field-related capacities and 42% in non-logistics or field-related occupations. For the most part, individuals retained the same title in their respective year one as in their respective year two.

In order to determine relief agents' understanding of Operation Lifeline Sudan's specific humanitarian mandate, agents' responses were analyzed not by counting the variety of duties cited by individuals (e.g acquisition only, distribution and transportation, transportation only), but by splitting out each agent's responses by the duties he/she mentioned. As a result, the total number of responses reported are significantly more than 14 (the number of working respondents to the survey). Table 6.1 provides specific details of the collected data and shows that the majority of all respondents felt that their OLS duties were to distribute (57%) and transport goods (57%). A little more than a third cited acquiring supplies (36%) and vaccinating people or cattle (36%) as part of their job. About twenty percent said that their job included equipment installation (21%) and less than fifteen percent (14%) considered protecting supplies to be their responsibility.

Table 6.1 Agent's Understanding of OLS' Primary Mandate: by Multiple Responses						
Acquisition	**Distribution**	**Vaccination**	**Transportation**	**Installation**	**Protection**	**Other**
36% (N=5)	57% (N=8)	36% (N=5)	57% (N=8)	21% (N=3)	14% (N=2)	21% (N=3)

According to Table 6.2, 55% of the respondents were WFP agents (N=6), 36% were UNICEF agents (N=4), 9% were classified as "other" agents (the one Catholic Relief Services worker), and 0% were UNDP agents. Although the data could have been presented according to the number OLS purposes, it is instead listed as such in order to illustrate the specific varieties of those understood purposes.

Table 6.2 Cross Tab of Agent's Understanding of the OLS' Primary Mandate and Agency of Affiliation

Mandate	UNICEF	Other	WFP	Total Number
Distribution only			1	1
1,2,4,7			1	1
2,4			2	2
1,2,4			1	1
2,3,4,7	1			1
2,3,4,5,7	1			1
1-4	1			1
2-6	1			1
1-6		1	1	2
Total	**4**	**1**	**6**	**11**

1=Acquisition 2=Distribution 3=Vaccination 4=Transportation 5=Installation 6=Protection 7=Other

b. Location of Agent

Out of the 4 possible single humanitarian distribution points (Ethiopian, Kenya, Sudan, or Uganda), research indicates that individuals were stationed from one to three different countries depending on their duties, titles, agencies, etc. Of those individuals who responded, 62% of those in the field were stationed in Kenya, 23% were stationed in Sudan and 15% were located in Uganda. While only nine individuals responded to this question, responses were analyzed not according to the number of individuals responding but the number of times countries were cited. Thus the total N below is higher. Table 6.3 shows the frequency and percent for the locations of stationed relief agents.

Table 6.3 Location of Stationed Relief Agents

Location	Frequency	Percent
Kenya	8	62%
Sudan	3	23%
Uganda	2	15%
Total	**13**	100%

c. Travel with Supplies

The plurality of all respondents (70%) indicated that they did travel with their agency's primary humanitarian supplies. Fifty-seven percent of responding agents serving during 1989-90 accompanied their agency's stock while 86% of responding 1995-96 field agents did. For the most part, UNICEF agents traveled with their bureau's goods (50%) more than WFP (40%) or "other" (10%) representatives. More WFP agents traveled with supplies during 1995-96 (50%) than did UNICEF agents (75%) in 1989-90.

With regard to those journeying along the Corridors of Tranquility with their agency's supplies, many individuals indicated "other" routes outside of possible answers such as the Raga-Wau (Raga to Wau) route or Akobo-Gambela routes, as examples. Upon closer examination, however, it was clear that the individuals supplied non-route related answers (e.g. they indicated what they *did* as opposed to *where* they traveled). After those responses were suppressed, however, 67% of agents (N=2) from 1989 and 50% (N=1) of agents from 1990 said that the question was not applicable. Thirty-three (N=1) percent of agents from 1995 and 50% (N=1) of agents from 1996 indicated the same.

d. Availability of Resources Assigned to the Agency

This variable was difficult to interpret for two main reasons. First of all, the split in the two populations of relief agents (1989-90 and 1995-6) meant that there were two sets of beginning and ending years to be analyzed. Furthermore, the lack of returned surveys meant that no important significance could be obtained from the data collected. For example, in 1989, 75% (N=3) of agents reported that building supplies were mostly available. One hundred percent (N=2) reported that those some supplies were rarely available in 1990. Although this chapter does report quantitative results, the data generated from this split variable was too cumbersome to warrant recording the responses since statistical significance was not involved.

e. Primary Reasons Why Supplies Were Not Available

Nearly 46 percent (46.4%) of agents in the field reported that this question was not applicable to them. When controlled, however, half of "others" (N=3%) reported that the lack of supplies was primarily due to such reasons as "problems reaching outlying areas," "low flight capacity" and "logistics problems." Similarly, 17% (N=1) reported insufficient amounts of relief; 17% (N=1) claimed poor weather prevented supply availability; and 17% (N=1) said that supplies were either not ordered or "in transit" and, therefore, unavailable.

f. Responses When Supplies Were Not Available

Thirty-three percent (33.3%) of respondents claimed that this question was inapplicable. When those respondents' responses were factored out, the data indicate that UN agencies did supply some type of food 40 percent of the time (N=2). Specifically, they supplied food 20% of the time (N=1); and food and fuel 20 percent of the time (N=1). Medicine, fuel or vehicles, and money to buy food were generally used 20% of the time (N=1) when UN-applied resources were not available. Forty percent (N=2) indicated "other" responses.

g. Understanding of Agencies' Specific Mandate

The largest proportion of respondents, seventy-seven percent (N=7), claimed that their agency's specific mission was, at minimum, the acquisition, distribution and transportation of supplies. Table 6.4 illustrates the specifics. Once again, this data are presented here, and not at the beginning of the chapter, because the results are discussed in the order that the questions appeared on the surveys.

Table 6.4 Understanding of the Mandate		
Mandate	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Acquisition, distribution, transportation, and other	1	11%
Distribution and transportation	2	22%
Acquisition, distribution, and transportation	2	22%
Acquisition, distribution, vaccination, transportation, and other	1	11%
Acquisition, distribution, vaccination, and transportation	1	11%
Distribution, vaccination, transportation, and installation	1	11%
Other	1	11%
Total	**9**	**99%**

When distilled by agency name, 75% of the respondents were from the WFP. Of those, 50% (N=2) and 25% (N=1) affiliated with the World Food Program split the former and latter most popular responses above, respectively. Twenty-five percent (N=1) of the respondents were from Catholic Relief Services. (The individual who answered this question claimed that his/her agency's specific mandate was the acquisition, distribution and transportation of supplies.

h. Goods for Which Agencies Were Primary Responsible

Forty-two percent (N=5) of agents in the field belonged to agencies primarily responsible for delivering food. In addition, seventeen percent (N=2) of others were responsible for water/purification activities, medicine and "other" supplies while seventeen percent (N=2) others were charged with distributing food and one "other" type of good. In addition, eight percent (N=1) of agents belonged to agents that were

primarily responsible for delivering water purification supplies and food; eight percent (N=1) water/purification supplies, medicine and other goods; and eight percent (N=1) food and farming supplies. Agents as "transport/ logistics", "nutrition and sanitation", cattle vaccination, "education", shelter, "supplementary food", and the "coordination of flights" identified other goods.

The level of conflict that took place within the various Corridors of Tranquility is described in this section. Responses describe the level of conflict in Sudan during the 1989-90 and 1995-96; agents' contact with the insurgents, level of resistance demonstrated by agents, freedom to of agents to respond to levels of resistance, and general tactics taken.

i. Level of Conflict

As in the case of the variable concerning the availability of resources assigned to agencies, the level of conflict was difficult to interpret because of the way the data was split regarding the two populations of relief agents. The quantitative data generated from this split variable was too cumbersome to warrant recording the responses.

j. Contact with Insurgents

All of the U.N. employees surveyed and who responded to the question admitted to being approached (N=4). Sixty percent (N= 3) said they had been questioned and sixty-seven percent (N= 2) of those who responded claimed to have been frisked by Sudanese insurgents. Although seventy five percent contended that

they had not been assaulted (N=3), another 75% (N= 3) claimed to have been detained. At least 67 percent of all responding to these questions were eyewitnesses to the above events. In the case of agents being assaulted, however, sixty percent said that their responses were based on hearsay.

Eighty percent (N=4) of the agents surveyed reported that vehicles/resources had been detained, re-routed, or halted, respectively. Sixty seven percent (N=4) indicated that resources/vehicles had been damaged, looted, stolen and destroyed. At least 67 percent of all responding to these questions were eyewitnesses the above the events. In the case of resources/vehicles agents being fired upon, damaged or destroyed, however, claims of eyewitness and hearsay were fifty-fifty.

Table 6.5 indicates contact with insurgents according to who or what was harmed. As the table shows, relief agents noted 32 events in which neither agents nor vehicles were harmed. In contrast, there were only 13 events in which damage to vehicles or individuals were recorded. Fortunately, those responding were, for the most part, not aware of assaults on UN workers. It is important to note that the numbers cited in the table represent tallies for questions in which respondents could check as many as applied.

Table 6.5 Contact with Insurgents			
Incident	**Answer**	**Number**	**Percent**
Not harmed			
Agents approached	Mostly true	4	100%
Agents questioned	Mostly true	3	60%
Agents frisked	Mostly true	2	67%
Agents detained	Mostly true	3	75%
Vehicles/resources detained	Mostly true	4	80%
Vehicles/resources looted	Mostly true	4	67%
Vehicles/resources rerouted	Mostly true	4	80%
Vehicles/resources halted	Mostly true	4	80%
Vehicles stolen	Mostly true	4	67%
Total		**32**	
Harmed			
Vehicles/resources fired upon	Mostly true	5	83%
Vehicles/resources damaged	Mostly true	4	67%
Vehicles destroyed	Mostly true	4	67%
Total		**13**	
Harmed			
Agents assaulted	**Mostly false**	3	75%
Agents murdered	**Mostly false**	3	100%
Total		**6**	

k. Level of Resistance

Agents were asked to comment on the level of resistance they applied during Operation Lifeline Sudan along the Corridors of Tranquility. Resistance (action demonstrated by agents to oppose action demonstrated by insurgents to prevent the delivery of humanitarian relief) was defined as low (e.g. little or no physical effort was used to avoid conflict) medium, or high (e.g. maximum physical effort was used to avoid conflict). A five-point scale was created with one being the lowest level of resistance and five, the highest. The responses for this variable were collapsed by the

researcher as follows: 1) scores of one to two were labeled as being "low" level resistance"; 2) a score of three was labeled as "medium" level resistance"; and 3) scores of four to five were labeled as "high" level of resistance.

The majority of responding agents said that they demonstrated low resistance when approached, questioned, frisked, etc. (for all categories). More effort was exerted however (high resistance demonstrated) for categories when goods were directly threatened (e.g. detained, halted, re-routed, looted, and/or stolen). Table 6.6 indicates level of resistance demonstrated by relief agents.

Table 6.6 Level of Resistance Demonstrated by Relief Agents

Incident	Low	Medium	High	Total
Agents approached	83% (N=5)	0% (N=0)	17% (N=1)	100% (N=5)
Agents questioned	67% (N=4)	17% (N=1)	17% (N=1)	101% (N=6)
Agents frisked	100% (N=5)	0% (N=0)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=5)
Agents assaulted	100% (N=5)	0% (N=0)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=5)
Agents detained	83% (N=5)	17% (N=1)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=6)
Agents kidnapped	80% (N=4)	20% (N=1)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=5)
Agents murdered	100% (N=5)	0% (N=0)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=5)
Vehicles/resources detained	83% (N=5)	0% (N=0)	17% (N=1)	100% (N=6)
Vehicles/resources rerouted	83% (N=5)	0% (N=0)	17% (N=1)	100% (N=6)
Vehicles/resources halted	80% (N=4)	0% (N=0)	20% (N=1)	100% (N=5)
Vehicles/resources fired upon	100% (N=5)	0% (N=0)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=5)

Table 6.6 Level of Resistance Demonstrated by Relief Agents				
Incident	**Low**	**Medium**	**High**	**Total**
Vehicles/resources damaged	100% (N=5)	0% (N=0)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=5)
Vehicles/resources looted	80% (N=4)	0% (N=0)	20% (N=1)	100% (N=5)
Vehicles/resources stolen	75% (N=3)	0% (N=0)	25% (N=1)	100% (N=4)
Vehicles/resources destroyed	100% (N=5)	0% (N=0)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=5)

Some = 1-2 Moderate = 3 A Great Deal = 4-5

l. Freedom to Respond to Levels of Resistance

Individuals' freedom to respond to resistance was defined as low, medium and high on a 1 to 5 scale. Once again, the responses for this variable were collapsed by the researcher as follows: 1) scores of one to two were labeled as being "low" degrees of freedom"; 2) a score of three was labeled as "medium" degrees of freedom"; and 3) scores of four to five were labeled as "high" degrees of freedom.

Action taken which required the approval of the implementing agency or UN headquarters was labeled as action that allowed a low degree of freedom. Action that required no approval from an agency or headquarters personnel was labeled as action that allowed a high degree of freedom. As indicated in Table 6.7, in all categories but one (agents frisked) the majority believed that they had very little freedom to respond to incidents that occurred. When frisked, those agents responding felt that they had more freedom to respond to the invasion of their persons. High freedom to respond levels regarding approaches, questionings, frisks and vehicle-related commandeering

mirrored those responses found in levels of resistance demonstrated in the previous table.

Table 6.7 Freedom of Agents to Respond to Levels of Resistance

Incident	Low	Medium	High	Total
Agents approached	50% (N=3)	33% (N=2)	17% (N=1)	100% (N=6)
Agents questioned	50% (N=3)	33% (N=2)	17% (N=1)	100% (N=6)
Agents frisked	33% (N=2)	50% (N=3)	17% (N=1)	100% (N=6)
Agents assaulted	83 (N=5)	17% (N=1)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=6)
Agents detained	80% (N=4)	20% (N=1)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=5)
Agents kidnapped	75% (N=3)	25% (N=1)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=4)
Agents murdered	75% (N=3)	25% (N=1)	0% (N=0)	100% (N=4)
Vehicles/resources detained	67% (N=4)	17% (N=1)	17% (N=1)	101% (N=6)
Vehicles/resources rerouted	67% (N=4)	17% (N=1)	17% (N=1)	101% (N=6)
Vehicles/resources halted	67% (N=4)	17% (N=1)	17% (N=1)	101% (N=6)
Vehicles/resources fired upon	50% (N=3)	17% (N=1)	33% (N=2)	100% (N=6)
Vehicles/resources damaged	60% (N=3)	20% (N=1)	20% (N=1)	100% (N=5)
Vehicles/resources looted	60% (N=3)	20% (N=1)	20% (N=1)	100% (N=5)
Vehicles/resources stolen	60% (N=3)	20% (N=1)	20% (N=1)	100% (N=5)
Vehicles/resources destroyed	60% (N=3)	20% (N=1)	20% (N=1)	100% (N=5)

Some = 1-2 Moderate = 3 A Great Deal = 4-5

m. Actions taken by relief agents when assaulted

Among those agents who responded to the questionnaire, seventy seven percent (N=7) indicated that, once assaulted while delivering aid, they lodged formal complaints in response. Table 6.8 reveals the number of actions taken by relief agents after they had been assaulted. Responses varied from lodging a complaint and acquiring armed escorts to using non-physical forms of retaliation or taking other actions. The "other" categories were not always clear. Examples include, however, "pulling out" from the mission; advising the security officers of the situation; and possibly enlisting the help of bandits.

Table 6.8 Number of Actions Taken by Relief Agents Once Assaulted

Action	Frequency	Percent
One to two	7	78
Three or more	2	22
Total	**9**	**100**

n. Overcome Man-Made Barriers

The main strategies used to confront barriers intended to prevent the delivery of aid are listed in Table 6.9. As the table shows, half of the individuals surveyed attempted to negotiate their way through obstructions while equal numbers depended on avoidance (25%) and complaining (25%), respectively.

Table 6.9 Action Taken to Overcome Man-Made Barriers		
Action	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Avoidance	2	25
Negotiate permission to pass	4	50
Complain to authorities	2	25
Total	**8**	**100**

Interestingly enough, according to Anderson, field agents have also been known to divert supplies for non-traditional reasons such as *espirt de corps.* In the example cited:

> The house had a swimming pool but no water. Knowing that the water truck passed nearby each day on their way to the camps and knowing that there was plenty of water so no one would die for lack of it, the director diverted one of the trucks to his staff compound to fill the swimming pool so his staff could have a chance to relax each evening after work. They could maintain their energy and spirit even in the difficult working conditions.[186]

o. To Protect Resources

According to Anderson,

> [In order to steal], thieves need information about what, where and when goods are or will be available. They need a location at which they can gain control of the goods (a check point, a narrow road, a warehouse). They need to know enough goods of a sufficient value will be available to make the theft worthwhile. They need to be available to 'get away with it'—not to be caught or, if caught, not to be held accountable for their actions. [In short, they need] knowledge, opportunity incentive and impunity.[187]

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186 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 57.

187 Ibid, p. 39.

Forty two percent (N=3) of responding agents indicated that they would divert resources in their possession in order to protect them. Table 6.10 offers details as to all of the actions they took. Other action taken included: distributing and storing resources only in the presence of international monitors; asking the security officer to ensure the safety of the route before passage was attempted; and engaging in some type of negotiation process.

Table 6.10 Action Taken by Relief Agents to Protect Resources

Action	Frequency	Percent
Resources diverted	1	14
Resources diverted and decoy vehicles used	1	14
Resources diverted and other	1	14
Other	4	57
Total	**7**	**99**

Anderson's research supports these findings. She reports that directors have been able to deter theft by not announcing when goods are scheduled to be delivered or delivering goods to the same place more than once.[188] Others have been able to achieve the same by intentionally announcing delivery times and places so that communities will hold thieves accountable.[189] Other forms of protection include: 1) making theft inconvenient; 2) confusing the enemy; 3) disbursing goods quickly; 4) identify thieves; 5) using civilian protectors; and 6) glutting the Market (Anderson's headings).

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188 Ibid., pp. 39-40.

189 Ibid., p.40.

MAKING THEFT INCONVENIENT: Some directors successfully lowered the re-sale value of the aid they distributed so as to make the theft of those goods "so inconvenient that the effort [of stealing them] is not worth the return [that thieves would get from them]."[190] In the case of Somalia, Red Cross officials distributed two halves of blankets to needy recipients for them to sew together themselves. In a second case, agents substituted sorghum for high priced grain, while in a third, holes were cut into bags of grain and lids to cans of oil were removed. Such acts deterred robbers from taking all of the goods away.[191]

CONFUSE THE ENEMY: In Cambodia, relief agents protected cash intended to pay local agents by confusing any would-be thieves with a convoy of three vehicles. One contained the cash and the others were decoys. Each took a different route away from the initial drop off point.[192]

DISBURSE GOODS QUICKLY: In Tajikistan, local authorities decided to distribute UNHCR imported housing materials to recipients by train which for

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190 Ibid.

191 Ibid.

192 Ibid., p.41.

the circumstances, ensured that recipients had enough time to be home and their goods safe.[193]

IDENTIFY THIEVES: Relief agents stationed in a west African country decided to paint radios bright pink before issuing them to recipients because of the constant theft of radios (needed for a public health program). [194]

USE CIVILIANS TO PROTECT GOODS: In Chechnya, relief agents found that having elderly members ride in the front seat of convoy trucks deterred the theft of goods. The reason was that any attack on the trucks and, by default, the elderly would be "considered a hostile act by [the elderly man's] clan, and reprisals would follow."[195]

SATURATE THE MARKET WITH RELIEF GOODS: In Afghanistan, according to Anderson, a WFP staff person glutted the market with needed seeds so that no one group could control them.[196]

p. Action Taken When Questioned/Threatened

Fifty percent (N=5) of the individuals claim to have provided correct answers when questioned or threatened about supplies. Thirty percent (N=3) used resources to

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193 Ibid.

194 Ibid.

195 Ibid.., p. 41-42.

196 Ibid., p. 42.

persuade others to end questions and/or threats and twenty percent (N=2) provided indirect answers. Table 6.11 provides further detail.

Table 6.11 Action Taken by Relief Agents When Questioned/Threatened

Action	Frequency	Percent
Correct answers given	1	10
Persuasion with resources	1	10
Persuasion without resources	1	10
Correct and indirect answers given, lies told, persuasion with and without resources	1	10
Correct and indirect answers given	1	10
Correct answers given and persuasion with resources	2	20
Total	**10**	**100**

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This dissertation sought to identify the various ways that individuals in like situations implemented the same policy albeit with different resources. In doing so, it described the factors that would influence strategies on the international, collective, and operational choice levels.

Explanations which merged forward mapping with backward mapping were not initially considered for this dissertation because they were either not known by the researcher or they were not as developed at the time the research was envisioned. In light of the oversight, however, it is necessary to at least make some mention of these theories/approaches. The question of how to accomplish this, however, in light of the research's conclusion initially posed a problem. In an effort to remedy the problem without having to reconceptualize the entire project, the following solution is posed by the researcher: to offer a different explanation for the data not received and comment on how the dynamics of OLS would be influenced by the merging of forward with backward mapping approaches.

Up until this point, specifically after Chapter Six, it could be presumed that a low response rate by UN officials meant that individuals were either unreachable, uninterested, or too far removed from such a finite event. It is possible, however, that an alternate way of looking at response rates, especially in light of the way the structure of the Sudanese government influences OLS in practice, could be that minimal amounts of strategies were employed by fieldworkers because Operation Lifeline Sudan operated under Sudanese governmental influence. As a result, respondents did not bother responding. In other words, it is possible that the low

response rates observed are directly related to the way the Government of Sudan controlled OLS resources in the North and, by virtue of similar arrangements of control, the South. The hands of UNDP, WFP and UNICEF agents could have been so tied that they were powerless to execute any strategies on their own to thwart the structured efforts of the GOS to control relief in the North or the South.

Merging Forward and Backward Approaches

An additional thought not previously taken into consideration concerns attempts by some political scientists to combine the forward thinking approach with the backward thinking approach in order to explain the bulk of policy formulation more succinctly. Soren Winter is one author who suggests that implementation is an outcome of "four main sociopolitical processes of conditions: (1) the character of the policy formation process prior to the law or decision to be implemented, (2) the organizational and inter-organizational implementation behavior, (3) street-level bureaucratic behavior, and (4) the response by target groups and other changes in society."[197] This argument does seem to encompass that which characterizes the top and bottom models of implementation—from the way laws are implemented (the top) to the behavior of those affecting and affected (the bottom).

The following section, therefore, attempts to illustrate Winter's argument with OLS in mind. When this picture is put forward it serves to underline reasons why strategies used were not plentifully reported by agents.

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197 Winter, p. 31.

The organizational and inter-organizational implementation behavior

It is no wonder why data concerning strategies used by various UN agencies were not identified in large quantities. According to the OLS Review Team, even the intra-organizational behavior of the WFP was a wretched mess and WFP was incapable of communicating digitally with itself much less other agencies like UNICEF and UNDP. For example, although WFP in Lokichokkio and Nairobi (southern activities) used a Dbase program to track air and cargo operations, it used an entirely different system to track its commodities. In addition, regional information was tracked using still a different system. The WFP in Kampala used a different system than WFP Khartoum and an even different system, still, in the South. [198]

> Neither of these systems is used for OLS Southern Sector.... Instead, two entirely different applications are used side-by-side. For certain types of food, fuel, and aircraft reports, the logistics officer relies on his own personal program written in Access. At the same time, charge codes for the same food commodities—known as Shipping Instructions (Sis), and necessary to satisfy donors requirements—are kept in Lotus 1-2-3, a spreadsheet application. [199]

As if all of this was not bad enough, according to the Review Team the system that WFP uses to transfer "statistical information" from basic programs "which can be managed by administrative support staff- to spreadsheet programs -which require specially trained personnel...to database applications, which require an even higher level of training and expertise." [200] Not surprisingly it noted that "in several places

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198 Karim et al.., p. 224.

199 Ibid.

200 Ibid.

vast amounts of data were lost because the practice of keeping back-up copies was not maintained." [201]

Intra-communication was not the only problem with OLS because agencies were reportedly equally confused when communicating with each other. According to the OLS Review team, WFP and UNICEF are unable to communicate with each other while in the south because the "WFP food monitors works mostly in deficit areas [and] UNICEF household food security officers work mainly in surplus areas."[202] "Even when WFP food monitors and UNICEF household food security officers are assessing the same area there is little communication between the two. During a visit to Akobo for example, the Review Team found that WFP and UNICEF officers had carried out assessments at the same time, but that the WFP monitor was unaware of what the UNICEF officer was going to recommend, and vice versa."[203]

Because of the absence of basic systems of communication, leadership and/or structures, one could assume that any efforts to coordinate the strategies of agents—particularly WFP agents—from the top were non-existence. Moreover, it might also be possible that the unofficial top-down policy when agents were met with catastrophe on the road was simply: "Do the best you can." Perhaps it was assumed that agency workers would engage in incrementalism. After all, in light of the necessary vagueness needed to approve OLS, it is not sensible to believe that agencies would generate incident-specific policies and strategies just to have them at

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201 Ibid.

202 Ibid., p. 148.

203 Ibid., p.149

the ready. According to Janis and Mann, "incremental decision making is geared to alleviating concrete shortcomings in a present policy—putting out fires—rather than selecting the superior course of action. Maybe the WFP, for example, never made any attempt to preemptively create policy but rather develop them as they were needed.

Furthermore, Winter says that "when organizational response is the level of analysis, individuals in those organizations are assumed to follow organizational interests in doing their work. "[204] However, when changing our level of analysis to the individual level, we discover that individual field workers may follow rationales other than organizational ones. Once again, because of the responses received and evidence obtained from secondary sources like Anderson, we know that some individuals from agencies have taken certain expected actions in the field. With regards to OLS, therefore, individuals' agency affiliations probably did influence the strategies that they used or were prepared to use, but it is difficult to prove. Hence we don't know how any strategies developed in the South, for instance, were relayed to regional headquarters and if those were, in turn, relayed to international headquarters (or even in NY) to form part of the organization's historical memory for use at some other time and in some other place.

In sum, although organizational behavior is one of four variables which impact outcome, based on this variable regarding the case of OLS, it is no wonder that outcome would be weak.

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204 Winter, p. 31.

Street-Level Bureaucratic Behavior

To some, perfectly implemented policy is one in which policy is uniform and the policy-making process is complete and there is no resistance to policy being implemented. Clearly, this idea does not take into consideration the wartime resistance met by agents in the field. If organizations --particularly large ones—have trouble responding to events with new or augmented policies, what does that mean for those in wartime situations? The answer to this probably lies somewhere within Janis and Mann's notion of a conflict theory model. Although the model is intended to explain how decision makers and heads of states make decisions in stressful situations, it is also useful to explain how an agent, when faced with a weapon pointed at his nose, weighs whether he is going to acquiesce and avoid making one type of decision or veer towards hypervigilence.[205] Once again, this type of information is lacking for all the reasons previously mentioned. We do know, for example, that the agent might first ask, himself What does he want? Do I have what he wants? The individual's initial appraisal might be to take an account of the goods that he or she is carrying. Does he want food, medicine, or building supplies? If the approach is just as benign as a sign at a corner, he will probably do nothing. If the contact is so small as to be negligible because he is just questioned Where are you going? or low enough to be tolerated (e.g. frisking), his response might be to do nothing and allow the procedure to take place. If the person feels that the approach contains risks and that it will definitely be (or may be) necessary to protect one's person or goods the individual may then act. Janis and Mann say that an individual

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205 Janis and Mann, p. 56.

engaged in emergency decision making "vigilantly begins seeking escape routes" when "[becoming] emotionally aroused." [206] Individuals may recall instances in their past experience, where they were able to "avoid being victimized."[207]

It is important to note, too, that street level behavior was not limited to interactions of UN officials with the government or insurgents but with civilians and each other, too. Deng and Minear state that interactions in the field were confusing if not hostile because people of varying backgrounds, values and languages did not know how to interact with each other. For example, relief workers didn't speak Arabic or understand Sudanese culture.[208] According to the OLS Review Team the job of delivering relief preceded collaborating with those who were to receive it—especially in the South were distribution was more hands on.

Character Of The Policy Formation Process

Although James Grant brokered the OLS deal between the government of Sudan and the insurgents of the South, it is important to note that no agreement was signed between the warring parties until several years later. Instead, the agreement to establish Corridors of Tranquility operated according to a gentleman's agreement of sorts and was an ad hoc arrangement. The lack of any signed agreement therefore caused the operation to be vague.

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206 Ibid., p. 56.

207 Ibid., p. 57.

208 Deng and Minear, p. 95.

Because of the character of the process before OLS, not to mention the country's history, it is not difficult to see how the tone, set long ago, would and did have an impact on the implementation of OLS.

The Response by Target Groups and Other Changes in Society

Clearly OLS aid was intended for civilians in the North and South. Nevertheless, this fact did not keep the SPLA from threatening and even downing civilian and relief planes in 1986, 1987, and 1988 nor did it prevent the government from expelling four major relief agencies from the country.[209] Moreover although Christians and Muslims have "built-in traditions of assisting the needy" and/or humanitarianism, tribal chiefs did not necessarily have the same compassion.[210] An example of the type of behavior that OLS had to contend with is illustrated below:

> One ethnic group of the South, the Ngok Dinka, occupies the territory at the Southern most point of Kordofan in the north, with its administrative headquarters at Abyei.[211] Despite its nearness to the North, "Abeyi became one of the areas where starvation was worst [and] people, especially children died in masses within every reach of government and international relief services simply because the government identified them as Southerners and therefore part of the enemy camp." Even when the residents moved more North, still, and where food was plentiful, they were not allowed to have it (and died, accordingly), because they were Dinkas.[212]

In addition to all of the above, it is important to note that OLS withstood the transition from the al-Mahdi government to the Nimeiri government. Although the

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209 Ibid., p. 84.

210 Ibid., p. 93.

211 Ibid., p. 15 .

212 Ibid., p16.

new leader was open to OLS, the "Muslim fundamental government he headed eventually took a much tougher line toward relief activities."[213]

Rein and Rabinovitz say that implementation "is not linear but circular." In other words, implementation is not necessarily the end result of identifying a problem, evaluating options and mobilizing resources and interests. While evaluating possible options to combat a situation, for example, new problems may develop that necessitate entirely different options. Conversations surrounding resources that might have existed when a particular policy was announced initially, might resume in light of a breakdown in interest group politics. Then, too, because implementation is not self-executing, various factors may require implementors' having to evaluate street-level problems and rally interests for themselves. If rule-makers intervene to overcome a snag in the implementation process at the behest of those on the ground, for example, at least a portion of the implementation process, for all intents and purposes, begins again. In light of Winter's work and OLS examples, the researcher would agree. How OLS was implemented in the North and the South was definitely an outcome of the way major players interacted with each other and the way agencies and agents behaved internally and externally of one another.

Final Thoughts

After fifty years of peacekeeping, there are hundreds of books that recount the historical details of past missions. The stories provide detail of how incidents started, what constituted a violation of, say, peace and security, and what was done (or not

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213 Ibid., p. 85.

done) by the Security Council to address it. By far, the majority of these accounts are historical and need not have been written by political scientists at all, because they contain no peacekeeping theories. Peacekeeping theories, it seems, are neither necessary to include as peacekeeping events either unfold or are recollected. Thus, as a body of literature, peacekeeping literature doesn't really exist and any student searching for it will spend many a wasted moment in search for them.

Despite the level of responses (due, no doubt to the pressure that agents experience daily while working in a still on-going war zone), it is clear that the agents on the ground do engage in certain types of "wheel greasing" to facilitate the delivery of supplies. While published examples in this area are not plentiful, Anderson's work, and the findings of this dissertation, offer some evidence to support the fact. The lack of documented examples is one very real issue that needs to be addressed in order for research along this future path of peacekeeping to go forward.

There is no reason why scholarship concerning peacekeeping must remain stagnant. Arguably, it could progress the way that the field of foreign policy studies did. In the case of the latter, scholars evolved from realist thinking to "behaviorialist" thinking which splintered into economic and psychological schools of thought and explanations. Just as foreign policy outcomes can be analyzed in terms of the economic status or resources of a state, the actions of agencies—especially humanitarian ones—could be interpreted vis-à-vis their donated resources. Just as "black boxes", background, culture, experiences and group dynamics can be used to explain how individuals make foreign policy decisions, those same concepts could be used to explain how seasoned soldiers from countries that always donate men to

missions act differently from, say, those nations new to peacekeeping. Hence, not only could the field benefit from the public policy literature to explain activities of field agents but even the foreign policy literature—particularly that which relates to political psychology. This type of analysis is what would be needed to explain other aspects of peacekeeping that go beyond the repetition of historical events.

The data could not really support or refute the hypothesis. Nevertheless it did highlight an obvious weakness in the field. The implication for the field as well as for practice, therefore, can be summarized focusing on what is still not known:

> Individual factors— There is still a need to know "definitively" how agents' interests and motives, expertise and culture impact on how he or she perceives conflict, applies resistance or avoids conflict. What concepts can be borrowed from other models and theories of public policy? Of foreign policy? Of other disciplines?
>
> Small group factors— How do groups of agents make decisions when faced with a problem and have little or no chance to refer to New York? We don't know. We can assume based on what we know about groupthink and studies analyzing bureaus but it only would be assumptions. Does groupthink have a role to play? Is there another type of behavior that takes place that is equally as interesting, important or enlightening?
>
> Bureaucratic factors— Graham Allison skillfully demonstrated how the viewpoint or stance of a bureau can affect decisions, goals, objectives and points of view. It would be interesting to discover how UNICEF, UNDP or WFP really do make decisions.

Given the state of the field in, general, and the lack of operational level data in particular, it is clear that besides stating clear mandates and providing adequate resources for future missions, more needs to be done in order to collect more ground-level data. The following are recommendations to strengthen future research in this area:

Academic Audiences

Collect data differently. It is important for peacekeeping scholars to include non-traditional data on peacekeeping in their research. The typical gathering of historical accounts of missions must be discarded and replaced with more first person and agency-sponsored accounts and include a wide variety of data from agency based reports, special reports, requisition forms, etc... in order to broaden the way that peacekeeping is currently viewed and taught. Universities and professional associations could support call for papers and/or conference with themes concerning non-traditional approaches to peacekeeping data collection. If the field is to flourish more and varied data needs collecting so that comparisons can be made and theories tested.

Non-academic Audiences

Declassify and share information. Knowing how agents act in the field and learning under what circumstances they are more likely to negotiate for or release humanitarian assistance should be of interest to international and nongovernmental agencies alike. Often times, however, they are the only gate keepers from which scientific generalizations and comparisons can be made by way of their access to special reports and internal documents. It is important that all non-classified peacekeeping related reports in their possession (e.g. UNDP, WFP, and UNICEF, to name only a few) are made publicly available to scholars and other interested parties. Such data is rich and available should not be allowed to collect dust or be seen by a

privileged few.

Policymakers

Track incidents. International, national and locally based organizations should (if they do not already do so) keep track of all incidents involving peacekeepers (e.g. where incidents occurred, what was taken, number of injured, out come of incident, etc...). The information, which would ideally be in an electronic format, should be made publicly available to scholars.

Involve the locals. Whenever possible, policy makers should make every attempt to involve respected members of the community. Such involvement has been demonstrated to have an effect on the protection of resources. This could not only save the lives of relief agents but decrease the need for armed escorts as well.

Collaborate with similar agencies and policymakers. Lack of communication cannot only occur between organizations but within them, as well. Policymakers should avoid intentionally and inadvertently isolating one another from information. This includes not only technical data but data concerning obstacles faced, strategies devised, and lessons learned. Moreover, collaboration –particularly on the UN level-- should not be left to informal links and occasional meetings but should be the result of frequent and planned visits preferably with as few hierarchal turf battles to control the group as possible. Results from each meeting (governmental and non-governmental, alike) should be made available to scholars.

Standardize the training of peacekeepers. It is important that peacekeepers and relief agents receive adequate training to do their jobs—particularly in wartime environments. Policy makers should seek a common standard of knowledge for those sent to the field and make an honest attempt to help contributing states to meet that standard. To date. improper training combined with different experience, cultures, language, etc on the part of relief deliverer and relief recipient, sometimes produces disastrous results. A comparative study data or, at least, posting the identified common denominator minimums for a well-trained peacekeeper should be available to scholars.

Encourage academicians. Policy makers should encourage academics to identify peacekeeping-related models and theories by inviting them to participate as an epistemic during non-emergency-related decision-making even

In conclusion, over the past ten or so years in particular, peacekeeping missions that have involved the delivery of humanitarian assistance have not focused on the behavior of agents in the field. This has resulted in missed opportunities for students and everyone else to learn. As is evident from this dissertation, the further removed one is from an operation —especially temporally—the more difficult it is to ascertain the specifics that happen on the ground. Individuals either move away, die, or become so engaged in the activities of their current life/circumstances that it is almost impossible to learn what action was taken, what strategies used, what tactics implemented. Based on this research, it is clear that methods are used to move goods

and complete humanitarian missions. Whether or not the UNDP or UNICEF or any other UN agency, for that matter, has a printed and bound little black book of standard operating procedures of what to do when met with conditions x, y and z is not clear. On the other hand, such understandings may exist informally within an agency's culture and merely passed down from seasoned field agent to new field agent. This would be more likely.

Appendix A Individuals for Whom a Semi-structured Interview Was to Have Been Arranged and Conducted

UNDP

Robert H. Brandstetter, Senior U.N. Advisor in Juba

Jane Wilder Jacqz, Senior Advisor, Division for Non –Government Organizations
Bureau for Programme Policy and Evaluation

Randolph C. Kent, Chief
Emergency Unit, Khartoum

Basem Khader, Chief
Division for country Programmes Bureau for Arab States and European Programmes

Joana Merlin-Scholtes, Area Officer
Division for Country Programmes, Bureau for Arab States and European Programmes

Peter Schumann, Senion Project Management Officer, Office of Project Services,
Former Official, UNDP Emergency Unit in Khatoum

W. Bryan Wannop, Senior Adviser
Division for Audit and Management Review
(also Former UNDP Resident representative in Sudan)

UNICEF

James P.Grant, Executive director

Ulf Kristofferrson, Chief of Emergency Programs

Charles LaMuniere, Director of Emergency Progrmas

Marjorie Newman-Black, Historian/Editor

Farid Rahman, Sudan Representative (Khartoum)

Robert McCarthy, OLS/UNICEF Camp Manager (Lokichoggio)

Thomas McKnight, OLS/UNICEF Project Officer (Nairobi)

Myint Maung, OLS/UNICEF Liaison Officer (Kapoeta)

Ruth Oloo, OLS/UNICEF Project Officer (Torit)

Vincent E. O'Reilly, Coordinator Southern Sector Operations
(Nairobi and UNICEF Chief of Operations)

Detlev Palm, OLS/UNICEF, Project Officer (Nairobi)

Mohammed Parvez, OLS/UNICEF Supply/Logisitics Officer (Nairobi)

Adrian Pintos, OLS/UNICEF (Kapoeta)

Babu Hailie Selassie, OLS/UNICEF, Project Officer (Bor)

Humphrey Were, OLS/UNICEF Project Officer (Torit)

WFP

James C. Ingram, Executive Director

Khalid Adly, Senior relief Officer
Disaster relief Service, Operations Department, Rome

Per Iversen, Chief of Transportation
Resourse and Transport Division, Rome

Bislow W. Parajuli, Logistics Officer
Resources and Transport Division

Josephy Scalise, Evaluation Officer
Evaluation Service, Rome

D. John Shaw, Economic Adviser
Evaluation and Policy Division

Maas Van den top, Director
Resources and Transport Division, Rome

Operation Lifeline Sudan
Nils Envist
OLS/WFP Regional Logisitics Coordinator (Nairobi)

Julio Delgado Idarraga
Convoy Leader (Southern Sector)

Peter Jobber
OLS/WFP Director of Operations (Khartoum)

Michelle John
Project Officer of Health (Nairobi)

Marcel R. Le Cours
OLS/WFP Logisitics Monitor (Khartoum)

Willem Smit
OLS/WFP Logistics Monitor (Khartoum)

Alastair Smith-Villers
OLS/WFP Project Officer (Nairobi)

Pata Smith-Villers
OLS/WFP Project Officer (Nairobi)

Appendix B 1989-90 Questionnaire

Code No. ___-__

Dissertation Questionnaire for Teresa Booker
Ph. D. Program in Political Science
The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York

SURVEY OF THE EFFECTS OF FIELD STRATEGIES ON THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

I am interested in identifying the problems faced and the solutions developed by U.N. relief agents during the first two years of Operation Lifeline Sudan (1989-1990). Realizing that this instrument refers to events which occurred seven years ago and specific details may be difficult to recall, I ask that you answer the questions to the best of your remembrance. I very much appreciate the time and care that you take in completing this survey. Please don't bother typing your responses. Printing them is just fine. Thank you.

1. Which agency were you affiliated with during Operation Lifeline Sudan? (If you were affiliated with more than one agency, please check the agency that you were affiliated with first. Check one).

___ United Nations Development Program

___ United Nations Children Program

__ World Food Program

__Other (please indicate)
_____

2. When were you affiliated with this agency?

___Month/__Year to ___Month/__Year
___Month/__Year to ___Month/__Year

3. What was your primary job title (or job description) during Operation Lifeline Sudan for the years 1989 and 1990? (If your title/description remained the same, please indicate).

1989:_____
1990:_____

4. When you took the position, what did you understand Operation Lifeline Sudan's primary mandate/mission to be regarding materials, goods, supplies, and /or equipment intended for humanitarian purposes? (Check as many as apply):

___Acquisition ___Transportation ___Other
___Distribution ___ Installation ___Did not know
___Vaccination ___Protection

If other, please indicate: _____
_____

5. Where were you stationed during 1989 and 1990, respectively? (Check as many as apply):

___Ethiopian ___Kenya ___Sudan ___Uganda ___Other

If other, please indicate: _____
_____

Please refer to this map regarding questions 6 and 12.[214]



* Logistics networks correspond to corridors of tranquility.

214 Minear et al., p. 30.

6. Did you ever travel with your agency's primary humanitarian supplies?
___ Yes ___No ___ Don't Know

If yes, along which "Corridors of Tranquility" did you travel with your agency's primary humanitarian supplies? If you traveled from Nasir to Tonga, for example, please check the corresponding boxes for both. (Check as many as apply).

1989

___Raga-Wau ___Kosti-Tonga ___Akobo-Gambela
___Gulu-Kapoeta ___Boma-Lodwar ___Aiwel-Babanusa
___Malakal-Nasir ___Arua-Gulu ___Not applicable/
___Other ___Don't know Did not travel

If other, please indicate:_____

1990

___Raga-Wau ___Kosti-Tonga ___Akobo-Gambela
___Gulu-Kapoeta ___Boma-Lodwar ___Aiwel-Babanusa
___Malakal-Nasir ___Arua-Gulu ___Not applicable/
___Other ___Don't know Did not travel

If other, please indicate:_____

7. As best as you can recall, how available were. U.N. resources assigned to your agency? (Please check as many as apply):

1989	**Not At All**	**Rarely**	**Somewhat**	**Mostly**	**Other**
Building supplies					
Food					
Clothing					
Water/purification					
Medicine					
Farming supplies					
Other					

1990	Not At All	Rarely	Somewhat	Mostly	Other
Building supplies					
Food					
Clothing					
Water/purification					
Medicine					
Farming supplies					
Other					

If other, please indicate:

1989_____
1990_____

8. Overall, when U.N.-supplied resources were not available to your agency, what was the primary reason? (Please check one):

___Not ordered ___Lost ___Stolen
___Insufficient amounts ___In transit ___Stuck at point of entry
___Damaged ___Wrong item ___Don't know
___Poor weather ___Question not applicable

If other, please indicate: _____
_____

9. When U.N.-supplied resources were not available, what types of your own agency's resources were generally used? (If applicable, please check as many as apply):

___Building supplies ___ Food ___Clothing ___Money
___Water/Purification ___Medicine ___Fuel/Vehicles ___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____
_____

10. When you took your position, what did you understand **your agency's** specific mandate/mission to be regarding materials, goods, supplies and/or equipment intended for humanitarian purposes? (Check as many as apply):

___Acquisition ___Transportation ___Other
___Distribution ___Installation ___Did not know
___Vaccination ___Protection

If other, please indicate: _____

11. What type of materials, goods, supplies, and/or equipment was your agency's **primary** responsible for during Operation Lifeline Sudan? (Check as many as apply):

___Building supplies ___ Food ___Clothing ___Money
___Water/Purification ___Medicine ___Fuel/Vehicles ___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____

12. Referring to the map on page 2, how would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) along the "Corridors of Tranquility" during 1989 and 1990? **Please answer even if you did not actually travel within the corridors of tranquility with humanitarian aid.**

No conflict—no military confrontations (i.e. exchange of gunfire, hand-to-hand combat) occurred
Low conflict—military confrontations occurred approximately 1-4 times per month
High conflict—military confrontations occurred approximately 5 or more times per month

1989	No Conflict	Low Conflict	High Conflict	Don't Know
Raga-Wau				
Kosti-Tonga				
Akobo-Gambela				
Gulu-Kapoeta				
Boma-Lodwar				
Aiwel-Babanusa				
Malakal-Nasir				
Arua-Gulu				
Other				

1990	No Conflict	Low Conflict	High Conflict	Don't Know
Raga-Wau				
Kosti-Tonga				
Akobo-Gambela				
Gulu-Kapoeta				
Boma-Lodwar				
Aiwel-Babanusa				
Malakal-Nasir				
Arua-Gulu				
Other				

If other, please indicate:

1989_____
1990_____

Please respond to the following based on whether it was mostly true or not.

	Accuracy of Statement			Verification	
	Moslty True	Mostly False	Don't Know	Eyewitness	Hearsay
13. Agents approached					
14. Agents questioned					
15. Agents frisked					
16. Agents assaulted					
17. Agents detained					
18. Agents kidnapped					
19. Agents murdered					
20. Resources/vehicles detained					
21. Resources/vehicles re-routed					
22. Resources/vehicles halted					
23. Resources/vehicles fired upon					
24. Resources/vehicles damaged					
25. Resources/vehicles looted					
26. Resources/vehicles stolen					
27. Resources/vehicles destroyed					

Please circle the level of resistance demonstrated by relief agents for missions/routes **you participated in** during 1989-1990.

Low resistance: little or no physical effort used to avoid conflict
High resistance: maximum physical effort used to avoid conflict

	Level of Resistance				
	Low				**High**
28. Agents approached	1	2	3	4	5
29. Agents questioned	1	2	3	4	5
30. Agents frisked	1	2	3	4	5
31. Agents assaulted	1	2	3	4	5
32. Agents detained	1	2	3	4	5
33. Agents kidnapped	1	2	3	4	5
34. Agents murdered	1	2	3	4	5
35. Resources/vehicles detained	1	2	3	4	5
36. Resources/vehicles re-routed	1	2	3	4	5
37. Resources/vehicles halted	1	2	3	4	5
38. Resources/vehicles fired upon	1	2	3	4	5
39. Resources/vehicles damaged	1	2	3	4	5
40. Resources/vehicles looted	1	2	3	4	5
41. Resources/vehicles stolen	1	2	3	4	5
42. Resources/vehicles destroyed	1	2	3	4	5

Please circle the degree to which relief agents were free to respond to levels of resistance for missions/routes **you participated in** during 1989-1990.

Low degree of freedom: action taken required the approval of agency or UN headquarters
High degree of freedom: no approval required in order to act; individual(s) acted alone

	Level of Resistance				
	Low				**High**
43. Agents approached	1	2	3	4	5
44. Agents questioned	1	2	3	4	5
45. Agents frisked	1	2	3	4	5
46. Agents assaulted	1	2	3	4	5
47. Agents detained	1	2	3	4	5
48. Agents kidnapped	1	2	3	4	5
49. Agents murdered	1	2	3	4	5
50. Resources/vehicles detained	1	2	3	4	5
51. Resources/vehicles re-routed	1	2	3	4	5
52. Resources/vehicles halted	1	2	3	4	5
53. Resources/vehicles fired upon	1	2	3	4	5
54. Resources/vehicles damaged	1	2	3	4	5
55. Resources/vehicles looted	1	2	3	4	5
56. Resources/vehicles stolen	1	2	3	4	5
57. Resources/vehicles destroyed	1	2	3	4	5

Please identify the types of actions taken by relief agents in the field for missions/routes **you participated in/were aware of** during 1989-1990.

58. What type of action was taken if relief agents were **assaulted?** (Please check as many as apply):

___Armed escorts acquired
___Formal complaint lodged
___Non-physical retaliation
___Physical retaliation
___No action taken
___Question not applicable
___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____
_____

59. What type of action was taken to overcome man-made **barriers**? (Please check as many as apply):

___Barricades approached
___Barricades avoided
___Barricades destroyed
___Decoy vehicles used
___Formal complaint lodged
___Permission to pass negotiated
___Retreat/no action taken
___Question not applicable
___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____

60. What type of action was taken to **protect resources**? (Please check as many as apply):

___Decoy goods used
___Decoy routes used
___Resources destroyed
___Resources diverted
___No action taken
___Question not applicable
___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____

61. What type of action was taken if agents were **questioned/threatened?** (Please check as many as apply):

___Correct answers given
___Indirect answers given
___Lies told
___Persuasion w/resource(s)
___Persuasion w/o resource(s)
___No action taken
___Question not applicable
___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____

62. Would you be willing to be contacted again in order to elaborate on the types of strategies/tactics used by agents in the field?

___Yes ___No

If yes, please indicate how you would like to be contacted.

___By post ___By e-mail ___By telephone

E-mail address _____

Telephone number and preferred day/time of contact: _____

_____

Thank you very much!

Appendix C 1995-96 Questionnaire

Code No. ___-__

Dissertation Questionnaire for Teresa Booker
Ph. D. Program in Political Science
The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York

SURVEY OF THE EFFECTS OF FIELD STRATEGIES ON THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

I am interested in identifying the problems faced and the solutions developed by U.N. relief agents during the first two years of Operation Lifeline Sudan (1995-1996). Realizing that this instrument refers to events which occurred seven years ago and specific details may be difficult to recall, I ask that you answer the questions to the best of your remembrance. I very much appreciate the time and care that you take in completing this survey. Please don't bother typing your responses. Printing them is just fine. Thank you.

1. Which agency were you affiliated with during Operation Lifeline Sudan? (If you were affiliated with more than one agency, please check the agency that you were affiliated with first. Check one).

___ United Nations Development Program __ World Food Program

___ United Nations Children Program __Other (please indicate)
_____

2. When were you affiliated with this agency?

___Month/__Year to ___Month/__Year
___Month/__Year to ___Month/__Year

3. What was your primary job title (or job description) during Operation Lifeline Sudan for the years 1995 and 1996? (If your title/description remained the same, please indicate).

1995:_____
1996:_____

4. When you took the position, what did you understand Operation Lifeline Sudan's primary mandate/mission to be regarding materials, goods, supplies, and /or equipment intended for humanitarian purposes? (Check as many as apply):

___Acquisition ___Transportation ___Other
___Distribution ___ Installation ___Did not know
___Vaccination ___Protection

If other, please indicate: _____
_____

5. Where were you stationed during 1995 and 1996, respectively? (Check as many as apply):

___Ethiopian ___Kenya ___Sudan ___Uganda ___Other

If other, please indicate: _____
_____

Please refer to this map regarding questions 6 and 12.[215]



* Logistics networks correspond to corridors of tranquility.

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215 Ibid.

6. Did you ever travel with your agency's primary humanitarian supplies?
___ Yes ___No ___ Don't Know

If yes, along which "Corridors of Tranquility" did you travel with your agency's primary humanitarian supplies? If you traveled from Nasir to Tonga, for example, please check the corresponding boxes for both. (Check as many as apply).

1995

___Raga-Wau	___Kosti-Tonga	___Akobo-Gambela
___Gulu-Kapoeta	___Boma-Lodwar	___Aiwel-Babanusa
___Malakal-Nasir	___Arua-Gulu	___Not applicable/
___Other	___Don't know	Did not travel

If other, please indicate:_____

1996

___Raga-Wau	___Kosti-Tonga	___Akobo-Gambela
___Gulu-Kapoeta	___Boma-Lodwar	___Aiwel-Babanusa
___Malakal-Nasir	___Arua-Gulu	___Not applicable/
___Other	___Don't know	Did not travel

If other, please indicate:_____

7. As best as you can recall, how available were. U.N. resources assigned to your agency? (Please check as many as apply):

1995	Not At All	Rarely	Somewhat	Mostly	Other
Building supplies					
Food					
Clothing					
Water/purification					
Medicine					
Farming supplies					
Other					

1996	Not At All	Rarely	Somewhat	Mostly	Other
Building supplies					
Food					
Clothing					
Water/purification					
Medicine					
Farming supplies					
Other					

If other, please indicate:

1995_____
1996_____

8. Overall, when U.N.-supplied resources were not available to your agency, what was the primary reason? (Please check one):

___Not ordered ___Lost ___Stolen
___Insufficient amounts ___In transit ___Stuck at point of entry
___Damaged ___Wrong item ___Don't know
___Poor weather ___Question not applicable

If other, please indicate: _____
_____

9. When U.N.-supplied resources were not available, what types of your own agency's resources were generally used? (If applicable, please check as many as apply):

___Building supplies ___ Food ___Clothing ___Money
___Water/Purification ___Medicine ___Fuel/Vehicles ___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____
_____

10. When you took your position, what did you understand **your agency's** specific mandate/mission to be regarding materials, goods, supplies and/or equipment intended for humanitarian purposes? (Check as many as apply):

___Acquisition ___Transportation ___Other
___Distribution ___Installation ___Did not know
___Vaccination ___Protection

If other, please indicate: _____

11. What type of materials, goods, supplies, and/or equipment was your agency's **primary** responsible for during Operation Lifeline Sudan? (Check as many as apply):

___Building supplies ___ Food ___Clothing ___Money
___Water/Purification ___Medicine ___Fuel/Vehicles ___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____

12. Referring to the map on page 2, how would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) along the "Corridors of Tranquility" during 1989 and 1990? **Please answer even if you did not actually travel within the corridors of tranquility with humanitarian aid.**

No conflict—no military confrontations (i.e. exchange of gunfire, hand-to-hand combat) occurred
Low conflict—military confrontations occurred approximately 1-4 times per month
High conflict—military confrontations occurred approximately 5 or more times per month

1995	**No Conflict**	**Low Conflict**	**High Conflict**	**Don't Know**
Raga-Wau				
Kosti-Tonga				
Akobo-Gambela				
Gulu-Kapoeta				
Boma-Lodwar				
Aiwel-Babanusa				
Malakal-Nasir				
Arua-Gulu				
Other				

1996	No Conflict	Low Conflict	High Conflict	Don't Know
Raga-Wau				
Kosti-Tonga				
Akobo-Gambela				
Gulu-Kapoeta				
Boma-Lodwar				
Aiwel-Babanusa				
Malakal-Nasir				
Arua-Gulu				
Other				

If other, please indicate:

1995_____
1996_____

Please respond to the following based on whether it was mostly true or not.

	Accuracy of Statement			Verification	
	Moslty True	Mostly False	Don't Know	Eyewitness	Hearsay
13. Agents approached					
14. Agents questioned					
15. Agents frisked					
16. Agents assaulted					
17. Agents detained					
18. Agents kidnapped					
19. Agents murdered					
20. Resources/vehicles detained					
21. Resources/vehicles re-routed					
22. Resources/vehicles halted					
23. Resources/vehicles fired upon					
24. Resources/vehicles damaged					
25. Resources/vehicles looted					
26. Resources/vehicles stolen					
27. Resources/vehicles destroyed					

Please circle the level of resistance demonstrated by relief agents for missions/routes **you participated in** during 1989-1990.

Low resistance: little or no physical effort used to avoid conflict
High resistance: maximum physical effort used to avoid conflict

	Level of Resistance				
	Low				**High**
28. Agents approached	1	2	3	4	5
29. Agents questioned	1	2	3	4	5
30. Agents frisked	1	2	3	4	5
31. Agents assaulted	1	2	3	4	5
32. Agents detained	1	2	3	4	5
33. Agents kidnapped	1	2	3	4	5
34. Agents murdered	1	2	3	4	5
35. Resources/vehicles detained	1	2	3	4	5
36. Resources/vehicles re-routed	1	2	3	4	5
37. Resources/vehicles halted	1	2	3	4	5
38. Resources/vehicles fired upon	1	2	3	4	5
39. Resources/vehicles damaged	1	2	3	4	5
40. Resources/vehicles looted	1	2	3	4	5
41. Resources/vehicles stolen	1	2	3	4	5
42. Resources/vehicles destroyed	1	2	3	4	5

Please circle the degree to which relief agents were free to respond to levels of resistance for missions/routes **you participated in** during 1995-1996.

Low degree of freedom: action taken required the approval of agency or UN headquarters
High degree of freedom: no approval required in order to act; individual(s) acted alone

	Level of Resistance				
	Low				**High**
43. Agents approached	1	2	3	4	5
44. Agents questioned	1	2	3	4	5
45. Agents frisked	1	2	3	4	5
46. Agents assaulted	1	2	3	4	5
47. Agents detained	1	2	3	4	5
48. Agents kidnapped	1	2	3	4	5
49. Agents murdered	1	2	3	4	5
50. Resources/vehicles detained	1	2	3	4	5
51. Resources/vehicles re-routed	1	2	3	4	5
52. Resources/vehicles halted	1	2	3	4	5
53. Resources/vehicles fired upon	1	2	3	4	5
54. Resources/vehicles damaged	1	2	3	4	5
55. Resources/vehicles looted	1	2	3	4	5
56. Resources/vehicles stolen	1	2	3	4	5
57. Resources/vehicles destroyed	1	2	3	4	5

Please identify the types of actions taken by relief agents in the field for missions/routes **you participated in/were aware of** during 1995-1996.

58. What type of action was taken if relief agents were **assaulted?** (Please check as many as apply):

___Armed escorts acquired
___Formal complaint lodged
___Non-physical retaliation
___Physical retaliation
___No action taken
___Question not applicable
___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____

_____

59. What type of action was taken to overcome man-made **barriers**? (Please check as many as apply):

___Barricades approached
___Barricades avoided
___Barricades destroyed
___Decoy vehicles used
___Formal complaint lodged
___Permission to pass negotiated
___Retreat/no action taken
___Question not applicable
___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____

60. What type of action was taken to **protect resources**? (Please check as many as apply):

___Decoy goods used
___Decoy routes used
___Resources destroyed
___Resources diverted
___No action taken
___Question not applicable
___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____

61. What type of action was taken if agents were **questioned/threatened?** (Please check as many as apply):

___Correct answers given
___Indirect answers given
___Lies told
___Persuasion w/resource(s)
___Persuasion w/o resource(s)
___No action taken
___Question not applicable
___Other
___Don't know

If other, please indicate: _____

62. Would you be willing to be contacted again in order to elaborate on the types of strategies/tactics used by agents in the field?

___Yes ___No

If yes, please indicate how you would like to be contacted.

___By post ___By e-mail ___By telephone

E-mail address _____

Telephone number and preferred day/time of contact: _____

_____

Thank you very much!

Appendix D The Most Important Security Missions Since 1956 And The Security Council's And General Assembly's Reactions To Them

Event	Year	Security Council Decision to Initiate Operation	General Assembly Decision to Initiate Operation
UNEFI (United Nations Emergency Force to Suez Canal)	1956		X
UNOGIL (United Nations Mission to Lebanese-Syrian Border)	1958	X	
ONUC (United Nations Mission to Congo)	1960		X
UNSF (United Nations Mission to West New Guinea)	1962	X	
UNYOM (United Nations Mission to Yemen)	1963	X	
UNFICY (United Nations Mission to Cyprus)	1964	X	
DOMREP (United Nations Mission to the Dominican Republic)	1965	X	
UNIPOM (United Nations Mission to India, Pakistan)	1965	X	
UNEFII (Second United Nations Mission to Suez Canal)	1973	X	
UNDOF (United Nations Mission to Syria's Golon Heights)	1974	X	
UNIFIL (United Nations Mission to Southern Lebanon)	1978	X	
UNGOMAP (United Nations Mission to Afghanistan, Pakistan)	1988	X	
UNIIMOG (United Nations Mission to Iran, Iraq)	1988	X	
UNAVEM I (United Nations Mission to Angola)	1989	X	
UNTAG (United Nations Mission to Namibia, Angola)	1989	X	

ONUVEN (United Nations Mission to Nicaragua)	1989	X	
ONUCA (United Nations Mission to Central America)	1989	X	
ONUVEH (United Nations Mission to Haiti)	1990	X	
UNIKOM (United Nations Mission to the Iraq-Kuwait Demilitarized Zone)	1991	X	
UNAVEM II (Second United Nations Mission to Angola)	1991	X	
ONUSAL (United Nations Mission to El Salvador)	1991	X	
MINURUSO (United Nations Mission to Western Sahara)	1991	X	
UNAMIC (United Nations Mission to Cambodia)	1991	X	
UNPROFOR (United Nations Mission to Yugoslavia)	1992	X	
UNTAC (United Nations Mission to Cambodia)	1992	X	
UNSOM (United Nations Mission to Somalia)	1992	X	
UNAMIR (United Nations Mission to Rwanda)	1993		

Appendix E Initial Letter to Three UN Agency Directors

Date

Dear [confidential]:

My name is Teresa Booker. and I am a doctoral candidate at The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York.

I am in the process of collecting data for my dissertation which focuses on the delivery of humanitarian assistance during civil war. I have chosen as my case study Operation Lifeline Sudan (1989-1990) and propose to identify the strategies and tactics used by the three major U.N. relief agencies in order to deliver goods to civilians.

According to my research, several individuals from your agency played key roles in O.L.S. and I am writing to ask how I might contact them. I would like to ask each if she/he would be willing to participate in my research project by granting me a brief interview sometime late spring or early summer.

I would greatly appreciate any recent address (domestic or foreign), that is available. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Teresa Booker

Appendix F Insert Accompanying the Questionnaire

YOUR HELP IS DESPERATELY NEEDED!

The individuals listed below have addresses which are unknown to UNICEF and UNDP. If you know where they might currently be reached, would you please include this form with your questionnaire? Thank you very much.

Thomas McKnight, OLS/UNICEF Project Officer

Adrian Pintos, OLS/UNICEF, Kapoeta

Babu Hailie Selassie, OLS/UNICEF, Project Officer, Bor

Robert H. Brandstetter, Senior U.N. Advisor in Juba

Jane Wilder Jacqz, Senior Advisor
Division for Non-Governmental Organizations Bureau for Programme Policy and Evaluation

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Basem Khader, Chief
Division for Country Programmes Bureau for Arab States and European Programmes

---

Joana Merlin-Scholtes, Area Officer
Division for Country Programmes, Bureau for Arab States and European Programmes

---

Peter Schumann, Senior Project Management Officer (Office of Project Services) and Former Official, UNDP Emergency Unit in Khartoum

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W. Bryan Wannop, Senior Adviser
Division for Audit and Management Review (also Former UNDP Resident Rep. in Sudan)

Appendix G Cover Letter (1989-1990)

March 12, 1997

Dear [confidential]:

My name is Teresa Booker My name is Teresa Booker, and I am a doctoral candidate in Political Science at The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York. I would like to ask for your help and participation in my research project by completing the enclosed questionnaire.

I am in the process of collecting data for my dissertation which focuses on the delivery of humanitarian assistance during civil war. I have chosen as my case study Operation Lifeline Sudan (O.L.S).. 1989-1990. I propose to identify the strategies and tactics used by the three U.N. relief agencies involved in delivering goods to civilians. In addition, I would like to learn how relief type, the degree of hostility in delivery areas and the availability of resources influence the types of strategies and tactics developed. According to my research, as well as Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan by Larry Minear, you are an individual from who played a key role in O.L.S.

I would very much appreciate your responses to the enclosed questionnaire and ask that it be returned to me by April 30, 1997. All responses will remain confidential.

Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation. If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me at [confidential] or e-mail me at [confidential].

Sincerely,

Teresa Booker

Appendix H Cover Letter (1995-96)

July 7, 1997

Dear [confidential]:

My name is Teresa Booker, and I am a doctoral candidate in Political Science at The Graduate School and University Center of The City University of New York. I would like to ask for your help and participation in my research project by completing the enclosed questionnaire.

I am in the process of collecting data for my dissertation which focuses on the delivery of humanitarian assistance during civil war. I have chosen as my case study Operation Lifeline Sudan (O.L.S)., 1995-1996. I propose to identify the strategies and tactics used by the three U.N. relief agencies involved in delivering goods to civilians. In addition, I would like to learn how relief type, the degree of hostility in delivery areas and the availability of resources influence the types of strategies and tactics developed.

I would very much appreciate your responses to the enclosed questionnaire and ask that it be returned to me by September 19, 1997. All responses will remain confidential.

Thank you in advance for your time and cooperation. If you have any questions or need additional information, please call me at [confidential] or e-mail me at [confidential].

Sincerely,

Teresa Booker

Appendix I Codebook (1989-90)[216]

SURVEY OF THE EFFECTS OF FIELD STRATEGIES ON THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

CODE NUMBER	TBD
AGENCY	Which agency were you affiliated with during operation Lifeline Sudan? 01 = UNDP 02 = UNICEF 03 = WFP 97 = Other (hand tally) 99 = No response
MOBEGN1	Beginning month when you were affiliated with this agency? 01 = January 02 = February 03 = March 04 = April 05 = May 06 = June 07 = July 08 = August 09 = September 10 = October 11 = November 12 = December 99 = No response
YRBEGN1	Beginning year when you were affiliated with this agency? Hand tally by last year 99 = No response

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216 When coding data for 1995-98, the same codebook was used. However, questions relating to the dates 1989and 1990 were used to code questions from 1995 and 1996, respectively.

OBEGN2	(Second) Beginning month when you were affiliated with this agency? 01 = January 02 = February 03 = March 04 = April 05 = May 06 = June 07 = July 08 = August 09 = September 10 = October 11 = November 12 = December 99 = No response
YRBEGN2	(Second) Beginning year when you were affiliated with this agency? Hand tally by last year 99 = No response
TITLE89/95	Primary job title Hand tally 99 = No Response
TITLE90/96	Primary job title Hand tally 99 = No Response
OMANDATE	What did you understand O.L.S.'s primary mandate to be? 01 = Acquisition 02 = Distribution 03 = Vaccination 04 = Transportation 05 = Installation 06 = Protection 07 =1, 2, 4, 7 08 = 2, 4 09 = 1, 2, 4 10 = 2, 3, 4, 7 11= 2, 3, 4, 5, 7

12 = 1, 2, 3, 4
13 = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
14 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Hand tally combinations, then assign numbers
97 = Other (hand tally)
99 = No response

AMANDATE — What did you understand your agency's primary mandate to be?

01 = Acquisition
02 = Distribution
03 = Vaccination
04 = Transportation
05 = Installation
06 = Protection
07 = 1, 2, 4, 97
08 = 2, 4
09 = 1, 2, 4
10 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 97
11 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
12 = 1, 2, 3, 4
13 = 2, 5
14 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
97 = Other (hand tally)
99 = No response

RESOURCE — What type of materials, goods, supplies and/or equipment was your agency primarily responsible for during O.L.S.?

01 = Building supplies
02 = Water/purification
03 = Food
04 = Medicine
05 = Clothing
06 = Farming supplies
07 = 3,97
08 = 2, 4, 97
09 = 2,4,6, 97
10 = 2, 4, 6
11 = 3, 6
97 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

BSAVA89 How available were building supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

FOAVA89 How available were food supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

CAVA89 How available were clothing supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

WAVA89 How available were water/purification supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

MAVA89 How available were medical supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat

04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

FSAVA89 How available were farming supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

OTAVA89 How available were other supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

BSAVA90 How available were building supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

FOAVA90 How available were food supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

CAVA90 How available were clothing supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

WAVA90 How available were water/purification supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

MAVA90 How available were medical supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

FSAVA90 How available were farming supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat
04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

OTAVA90 How available were other supplies to your agency?

01 = Not at all
02 = Rarely
03 = Somewhat

04 = Mostly
05 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Did not know
99 = No response

REASON — Overall, when UN-supplied resources were not available, what was the primary reason?

01 = Not ordered
02 = Insufficient amounts
03 = Damaged
04 = Poor weather
05 = Lost
06 = In transit
07 = Wrong item
08 = Question not applicable
09 = Stolen
10 = Stuck at point of entry
12 = 1, 6
97 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

SUBSTIT — When UN-supplied resources were not available, what types of resources did your agency generally use?

01 = Building supplies
02 = Water/purification
03 = Food
04 = Medicine
05 = Clothing
06 = Fuel/vehicles
07 = Money
08 = 3, 8
09 = 4, 6, 7
10 = 3, 6
97 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

STATION — Where were you stationed during 1989 and 1990, respectively?

01 = Ethiopia
02 = Kenya
03 = Sudan
04 = Uganda

05 = 2, 3, 4
06 = 2, 3
Hand tally combinations
97 = Other (hand tally)

TRAVEL — Did you ever travel with your agency's primary humanitarian supplies?

01 = Yes
02 = No
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

ROUTE89 — If you traveled along the "Corridors of Tranquility" with you agency's primary resources, which corridors did you travel?

01 = Raga-Wau
02 = Gulu-Kapoeta
03 = Malakal-Nasir
04 = Kosti-Tonga
05 = Boma-Lodwar
06 = Arua-Gulu
07 = Akobo-Gambela
08 = Aiwel-Babanusa
09 = 2, 5, 6, 97
10 = 2, 6, 97
11 = 6, 97
12 = 2,5
96 = N/A
97 = Other hand tally
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

ROUTE90 — If you traveled along the "Corridors of Tranquility" with you agency's primary resources, which corridors did you travel?

01 = Raga-Wau
02 = Gulu-Kapoeta
03 = Malakal-Nasir
04 = Kosti-Tonga
05 = Boma-Lodwar
06 = Arua-Gulu
07 = Akobo-Gambela
08 = Aiwel-Babanusa
09 = 5, 7, 97

97 = Other hand tally
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF189 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Raga-Wau?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF289 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Kosti-Tonga?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF389 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Akubo-Gambela?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF489 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Gulu-Kampoeta?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF589 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Boma-Lodwar?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF689 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Aiwel-Babanusa?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF789 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Malakal-Nasir?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF889 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Arua-Gulu?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF989 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in some other area? (Hand tally)

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict

03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF190 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Raga-Wau?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF290 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Kosti-Tonga?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF390 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Akubo-Gambela?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF490 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Gulu-Kampoeta?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

ONF590 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Boma-Lodwar?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF690 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Aiwel-Babanusa?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF790 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Malakal-Nasir?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF890 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in Arua-Gulu?

01 = No conflict
02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONF990 How would you describe the general level of conflict between the Sudanese government and the SPLA/M along the Corridors of Tranquility in some other area? (Hand tally)

01 = No conflict

02 = Low conflict
03 = High conflict
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

AOS1 Agents approached?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS2 Agents questioned?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS3 Agents frisked?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS4 Agents assaulted?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS5 Agents detained?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS6 Agents kidnapped?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know

99 = No Response

AOS7 Agents murdered?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS8 Resources/vehicles detained?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS9 Resources/vehicles re-routed?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS10 Resources/vehicles halted?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS11 Resources/vehicles fired upon?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS12 Resources/vehicles damaged?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS13 Resources/vehicles looted?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS14 Resources/vehicles stolen?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

AOS15 Resources/vehicles destroyed?

01 = Mostly true
02 = Mostly false
98 = Don't know
99 = No Response

VERIFY1 Agents approached?

01 = Eyewitness
02 = Hearsay
99 = No response

VERIFY2 Agents questioned?

01 = Eyewitness
02 = Hearsay
99 = No response

VERIFY3 Agents frisked?

01 = Eyewitness
02 = Hearsay
99 = No response

VERIFY4 Agents assaulted?

01 = Eyewitness
02 = Hearsay
99 = No response

VERIFY5	Agents detained?
	01 = Eyewitness 02 = Hearsay 99 = No response
VERIFY6	Agents kidnapped?
	01 = Eyewitness 02 = Hearsay 99 = No response
VERIFY7	Agents murdered?
	01 = Eyewitness 02 = Hearsay 99 = No response
VERIFY8	Resources/vehicles detained?
	01 = Eyewitness 02 = Hearsay 99 = No response
VERIFY9	Resources/vehicles re-routed?
	01 = Eyewitness 02 = Hearsay 99 = No response
VERIFY10	Resources/vehicles halted?
	01 = Eyewitness 02 = Hearsay 99 = No response
VERIFY11	Resources/vehicles fired upon?
	01 = Eyewitness 02 = Hearsay 99 = No response
VERIFY12	Resources/vehicles damaged?
	01 = Eyewitness

02 = Hearsay
99 = No response

VERIFY13 Resources/vehicles looted?

01 = Eyewitness
02 = Hearsay
99 = No response

VERIFY14 Resources/vehicles stolen?

01 = Eyewitness
02 = Hearsay
99 = No response

VERIFY15 Resources/vehicles destroyed?

01 = Eyewitness
02 = Hearsay
99 = No response

LEVEL 1 Agents approached?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 2 Agents questioned?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 3 Agents frisked?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance

99 = No Response

LEVEL 4 Agents assaulted?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 5 Agents detained?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 6 Agents kidnapped?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 7 Agents murdered?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 8 Resources/Vehicles detained?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 9 Resources/Vehicles re-routed?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 10 Resources/Vehicles halted?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 11 Resources/Vehicles fired upon?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 12 Resources/Vehicles damaged?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 13 Resources/Vehicles looted?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 14 Resources/Vehicles stolen?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

LEVEL 15 Resources/Vehicles destroyed?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

RESPOND 1 Agents approached?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 2 Agents questioned?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 3 Agents frisked?

01 = Low Level of Resistance
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Level of Resistance
99 = No Response

RESPOND 4 Agents assaulted?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 5 Agents detained?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 6 Agents kidnapped?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 7 Agents murdered?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 8 Resources/Vehicles detained?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 9 Resources/Vehicles re-routed?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 10 Resources/Vehicles halted?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 11 Resources/Vehicles fired upon?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 12 Resources/Vehicles damaged?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 13 Resources/Vehicles looted?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 14 Resources/Vehicles stolen?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

RESPOND 15 Resources/Vehicles destroyed?

01 = Low Freedom to Respond
02 = 2
03 = 3
04 = 4
05 = High Freedom to Respond
99 = No Response

ACTION A What action was taken if relief agents were assaulted?

01 = Armed escorts acquired
02 = Formal complaint lodged
03 = Non-physical retaliation
04 = Physical retaliation
05 = No action taken
06 = Question not applicable
07 = 1, 2
08 = 2, 3, 97
09 = 1, 2, 3, 5
10 = 2, 3,
11 = 6, 97
97 = Other (hand tally)
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

ACTION B What action was taken to overcome man-made physical barriers?

01 = Barricades approached
02 = Barricades avoided
03 = Barricades destroyed
04 = Decoy Resources/Resources/Vehicles used
05 = Formal complaint lodged
06 = Permission to pass negotiated
07 = Retreat/ no action
08 = Question not applicable

09 = 2, 6, 97
10 = 5, 6
11 = 6, 97
12 = 1, 5, 6
97 = Other
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

ACTION PR — What type of action was taken to protect resources?

01 = Decoy goods used
02 = Decoy routes used
03 = Resources destroyed
04 = Resources diverted
05 = No action taken
06 = Question not applicable
07 = 2,4, 97
08 = 4, 97
97 = Other
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

ACTIONQ — What type of action was taken if agents were questioned/threatened?

01 = Correct answers given
02 = Indirect answers given
03 = Lies told
04 = Persuasion with resource(s)
05 = Persuasion without resource(s)
06 = Action taken/silence
07 = Question not applicable
08 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
09 = 1, 2
10 = 1, 4
97 = Other
98 = Don't know
99 = No response

CONTACT — Are you willing to be contacted again?

01 = Yes
02 = No
99 = No response

METHOD

How would you like to be contacted?

01 = By post
02 = By e-mail
03 = By telephone
04 = 1, 3
99 = No response

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