Pop Standards: Music and Commerce in the Age of Rock

by

Ehrick V. Long

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Music in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Music in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

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This dissertation, in general, examines the relationship between art and commerce. I posit that commercial concerns about consistency, product reliability, and control over the production process have historically resulted in the establishment of standards for music destined for such commercially mainstream spaces as the airwaves and the record store. Furthermore, those who traded in music were often at a conceptual distance from those who created it. The former need not have had either artistic skill or proficiency. They simply needed to sell units. Consequently, in order to maintain some control over the product, they often resorted to a number of techniques that proved successful in the past, or held promise for the future.

Specifically, this dissertation examines commercial standardization within the popular music industry from 1955 onwards. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the focus of the industry shifted from selling songs to selling records, in large part due to the blurring of distinctions between performance and composition that occurs in studio production. Driving this shift was an emerging market for youth-oriented music: namely, rock and roll in all of its forms and subgenres. Rock carried with it attributes that initially made it seem unsuitable for large-scale production. But after years of watching the growing sales

of their independent counterparts, major labels eventually featured the music as their staple product. The trend towards mergers and acquisitions that affected many businesses from the late-1960s on affected the music industry as well, and larger labels began to buy up and out-compete their rivals. With fewer and fewer labels producing music in accordance with company standards and policy, musical homogeneity became a bigger concern for musicians and listeners.

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Introduction

This dissertation, in general, examines the relationship between art and commerce. I posit that commercial concerns about consistency, product reliability, and control over the production process have historically resulted in the establishment of standards for music destined for such commercially mainstream spaces as the airwaves and the record store. Furthermore, those who traded in music were often at a conceptual distance from those who created it. The former need not have had either artistic skill or proficiency. They simply needed to sell units. Consequently, in order to maintain some control over the product, they often resorted to a number of techniques that proved successful in the past, or held promise for the future.

Specifically, this dissertation examines commercial standardization within the popular music industry from 1955 onwards. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the focus of the industry shifted from selling songs to selling records, in large part due to the blurring of distinctions between performance and composition that occurs in studio production. Songs became increasingly identified with specific performers. Driving this shift was an emerging market for youth-oriented music: namely, rock and roll in all of its forms and subgenres. Rock carried with it attributes that initially made it seem unsuitable for large-scale production. But after years of watching the growing sales of their independent counterparts, major labels eventually featured the music as their staple product. The trend towards mergers and acquisitions that affected many businesses from the late-1960s on affected the music industry as well, and larger labels began to buy up and out-compete their rivals. With fewer and fewer labels producing music in accordance with company

standards and policy, musical homogeneity became a bigger concern for musicians and listeners.

In order to discuss how the concept of standardization applies to the popular music industry during the dominance of the youth market, this dissertation addresses a number of specific issues. As in a legal case, *Pop Standards* presents evidence to establish motive, means, and opportunity in order to give credence to the hypothesis that industrial needs both actively and passively influenced music style whenever the worlds of art and commerce collided. Each section serves as a plank upon which to build this argument. Early on, I will illustrate the circumstances, or context, within which commercial music exhibits characteristics that distinguish it from other music. I then review the cultural history of the rock era, how the music formed within the existing industry, and why certain stylistic features of rock challenged older codes of professionalism, thus requiring a response from the industry. By examining the role of technology in the production of popular music, one finds the methods by which record labels could exert control over what they came to regard as a labor force. The dissertation concludes with a look at what the industry accomplished for all of its efforts to create and maintain musical standards, or (from the industry's point of view) quality control.

Chapter One (an introduction) begins with a parable that illustrates what previous scholars and critics thought about commercial music, and how their insights, prejudices and beliefs colored later discourse on the subject of popular music. Furthermore, it offers an operant definition of popular music that applies for the remainder of the dissertation. When writers discussed mass music, they sometimes made distinctions between "folk" and "pop," the former term connoting a pure artistic expression native to a community,

the latter pejoratively implying crass pandering where the profit margin was more important than musical integrity. This type of dichotomous taxonomy ultimately becomes unwieldy, for expressions often do not fit cleanly in one category or the other. Distinctions made by earlier writers nevertheless contained a common theme. Even if one must concede that qualitative differences between folk and pop are murky, there yet remains something essentially valid in regarding commercial practices in terms of their influence on musical style.

Chapters Two through Seven present a cultural history of rock in order to show both motive for intensive intervention by the music industry beginning in the late 1960s, and a pattern of mechanizing business and recording procedures. Chapter Two offers an etymology of the term 'rock and roll.' The name itself reveals early attempts to exert industrial control over non-musical aspects of the genre by divorcing it from both its historical context and its first generation of crossover artists. In a time of *de jure* segregation, the 'race record' presented a problem to those intent upon selling the music to growing numbers of white teenagers. By changing the names by which they referred to the music, Alan Freed and others changed its cultural standard from music made for African Americans (hence the term 'race record') to music made for youths of all hues.

Chapter Three looks at industry reaction to rock and roll and the beginnings of the youth culture phenomenon in the 1950s. Chapter Four concentrates on the beginnings of rock's most critical period: the years between 1967 and 1985. During this time, major labels who were at first loath to take on youth-oriented formats began to invest more heavily in rock acts. From the onset, this presented challenges to pre-existing codes of professionalism, especially since the perceived rebelliousness of the music became an

attractive selling point. Consequently, record executives needed methods that allowed them to exert some type of control not only over music production, but over distribution and promotion as well. Meanwhile, major label involvement with rock coincided with the 'go-go' years of media consolidation. "The Motown Sound," "The Stax Sound," and other such phrases would indicate that the unique way a company approached production affected the music.

Chapter Five chronicles the results of record industry consolidation begun in 1967. Over the course of the 1970s, the number of labels participating in mainstream music making declined. By 1985, a handful of major players had come to dominate the entire mainstream record industry, thus resulting in the diminishing number of individual company standards, and an increase in homogeneity. Chapter Six examines a similar consolidation occurring within the radio industry that began almost immediately after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Chapter Seven, "Technology as a Means of Standardization," examines the means by which standardization occurred. Here, the definition of technology is a bit more general, referring not only to gadgets and hardware, but also to systems of control. More importantly, it looks at pop musicians as labor, facing the same issues that other laborers encounter--from job obsolescence, to deskilling, to large-scale re-organizations of function. For the record industry, part of the purpose for standardization was to improve audio quality. At the same time, technology served as a means by which to expand the potential labor pool by automating some of the special skills required of previous professionals. In other words, the less a company had to rely on the special talent of musicians, the more control it could exert, for now it could select performers based on

criteria other than ability. And, as the number of hit-making record companies shrunk to a few multi-national corporations, industry consolidation afforded substantial opportunity for more extensive control of mainstream commercial fare.

Chapter Eight, the conclusion, revisits some of the earlier arguments about the nature of popular music raised in the introduction. To a large extent, the alternating view of mass music as an authentic cultural expression, or as a cooptation of community values, continues the older arguments of Bruno Nettl, the International Folk Music Council, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dick Hebdige and Leslie Gay. One can easily see pop music as a product. At the same time, one can also understand that the refashioning of songs in order to illustrate, or bear witness to a particular ethos, gives music a special meaning. In the end, one might be wise to view a rock and roll song not just as a product, or merely as the result of a commercialization process, but as a combination of both.

.

Chapter One: Issues of Standardization and Pop

Defining Pop

Once upon a time, in the mythical land of Simplicity, a family of three Musics lived in a small house at the edge of the woods. Papa Music had a rather dignified air due to his rationality, erudition and high-mindedness. Mama Music was considerably more down-to-Earth and personable. Well-versed in the lore of their ancestors, she dutifully passed along to her progeny all of the great stories that her mother told her.

Baby Music, like most children, had a combination of traits from both parents. His mother's stories profoundly moved him. He wanted to tell them to anyone who would listen, but their crudity and inconsistency from one version of the story to the next bothered him. Baby subsequently thought it wise to develop one definitive version of each story, something that would condense its essence into a neat package combining the best points of each version. Furthermore, he himself had original ideas for new plot wrinkles and characters. He even had his own stories. After satisfactorily developing a narrative, he wrote it down, sometimes with explicit instructions on how to tell it.

Baby became so proud of his new and improved stories that he showed them to his friends who also liked them, for they were easy to understand and enjoy. He then had another idea, which he thought even more outstanding than the first. He recalled that what he most liked about Mama's stories was the way she told them. Her voice would take on the personalities of various characters and her pace would quicken when a part became particularly exciting. Seizing the opportunity, Baby took some of his profits and invested them into the purchase of a tape recorder. He then asked Mama to tell all the

versions of the stories one more time into the small microphone; and once again, he undertook the editing process. But now, when he had finished, he had the definitive sound recording of each story. The story could not possibly change from one telling to the next. Sure, others might record them someday. But Mama's version became the original, the standard by which all later versions were seen as imitations.

One day, Baby met a musicologist named Goldilocks, who thought that she knew quite a bit of personal information about him and his parents. She told him about a guy named Béla Bartók, who in his essays "What Is Folk Music?" and "The Influence of Folk Music on the Art Music of Today" discussed Baby's relationship to his mother in terms of how popular music differs from what many generally regard as 'folk' music. These distinctions later emerged in 1954 when the International Folk Music Council defined the difference between music that exists only within a cultural context and that written for commercial purposes.

> The term ('folk music') can be applied to music that has been evolved from rudimentary beginnings by a community uninfluenced by popular and art music and it can likewise be applied to music which has originated with an individual composer and has subsequently been absorbed into the unwritten living tradition of a community.
>
> The term does not cover composed popular music that has been taken over ready-made by a community and remains unchanged, for it is the refashioning and recreation of music by the community that gives it its folk character. (International Folk Music Council 1955, 23)

In describing folk music, the IFMC positioned popular music and folk music as opposites. Folk, like Mama Music, was dynamic, whereas popular music remained unchanged due to the existence of a definitive version recorded onto a printed page or an

aural medium. After all, the only way to absorb something "into the unwritten living tradition of a community" is through oral dissemination, a process not that far removed from the party game of Telephone, in which one person utters an original message to another, who then whispers it to someone else. Quite likely, the message given to the last recipient differs greatly from the original. Moreover, there exists, among the other players, a number of alternative versions.

The Council also stated that "ready-made" fare designed for community consumption did not possess the same character as folk music, even if it sounded like all the other pieces that a listener might deem folk music. In this sense, the process of creation, not its sound or stylistic aspects, determined musical identity. By describing folk as "uninfluenced by popular or art music," the Council implied that folk music possessed a certain purity not perhaps found in music tainted by the specter of the potential profit motive, what Bartók and others would see as the distinguishing feature of popular music, or by the contrivance of art music.

The story of the three musics could only happen in the mythical land of Simplicity, of course, for simple it is with hard and fast demarcations of identity and function in classical, folk and popular music. Traits of one category do not spill over into the other, but theoretically create subsets of mutually exclusive musical gestures. Strict categorization becomes cumbersome, however, when people break the rules, or cross the lines. Papa Music could not prevent Baby from recording new versions of his stories, any more than Mozart could stop Electric Light Orchestra arranger Louise Clark from marching the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra down to a studio to record "Hooked on Classics." Then again, the "war horses" that orchestras sometimes perform around

subscription renewal time might have more in common commercially with music deemed popular. The profit motive also plays a role in the works of "folk" singers from Bob Dylan to Jewel.

Definitions of popular music play a key role in talking about the issue of standardization. Bartok, the IFMC, and earlier musicologists inhabiting the mythical land of Simplicity intimated that popular music was commerce. Academic interest in pop mostly began in disciplines other than music, and it focused overwhelmingly on cultural aspects, only some of which overlapped issues pertaining to industry. A challenge to earlier definitions subsequently developed, pitting the cultural historian's notion of text against the traditional musicological view. Underlying this argument was the issue of autonomy. First, there is the autonomy of the aural (or written) text, as opposed to that of the listening experience-- what Leo Treitler explains as the difference between the modernist approaches of musicology and the postmodernist approaches found in cultural studies. After that, there is the issue of whether autonomy lies with the musician (as Adorno claims it should), with the public, or with the industry that produces culture.

Adorno's belief that standardization must occur within a large-scale industry rests upon a definition of pop that echoes the story of Goldilocks and the three Musics: namely that at the heart of pop lies commercial purpose, due to the autonomy wrested from the composer by the music business. For those who have looked more at aspects of popular culture--from the teddy boys and greasers of the 1950s to the punks and rappers of today--there is an understandable preference to view autonomy as mediated by the relationships between the audience, the musician, and the industry. Such people therefore have a tendency to form operant definitions of popular music that characterize the struggle

between those who make, sell, and listen to it. When musicologists began to explore pop in earnest, they tended to regard the sonic characteristics of the music as its primary text, thus relegating the cultures of both audience and business to the margin. For them, the term 'pop' was seemingly irrelevant, because of their belief in the primary autonomy of the text.

If one regards the aural text as the most important one, then cultural and business influences might seem superfluous, at first. Nevertheless, there remains an historic link between popular music and enterprise, especially in regards to rock and roll and all its related genres. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to pose the question of whether or not one can observe any relationship between the music industry and the aural text. In order to do that, we must first examine the role that recent musicology has played in re-defining popular music, and follow this by looking at the differing conceptions of text, autonomy, and approaches stemming from other disciplines, three issues that converge on the principle of standardization.

Whether or not standardization actually occurs depends on how one views the subject of popular music. If one defines pop in a way that does not acknowledge the role of the music industry, then standardization becomes a moot point. If one defines pop as mass music in a perpetual contest for autonomy, then standardization can be argued as coming from above or below. If one defines pop as a commercial product with social meaning (as Adorno does), then the issue of standardization almost goes without saying. Therefore, to examine the issues surrounding standardization, we must first take a look at how people have seen and described popular music.

When competing definitions of what constitutes 'pop' arose, those studying the

subject began to group the definitions themselves into categories, and examine their origins. Richard Middleton offered a brief history of how the word 'popular' has been applied to music. In some respects, the term referred to a universally pleasing quality that made a song "popular," meaning "well-favoured." (Middleton 1990, 3-4) "Popular" also carried with it a connotation of vulgar, or plebeian qualities. Middleton cites the development of the British Music Hall of the late nineteenth century as the point at which the term "popular" separated from that of "folk" for mass music. Ever since, pop has been defined in one of four ways, as summarized by Franz Birrer:

1. *Nominative definitions.* Popular music is an inferior type;
2. *Negative definitions.* Popular music is music that is not something else (usually 'folk' or 'art' music);
3. *Sociological definitions.* Popular music is associated with (produced for or by) a particular social group.
4. *Technologico-economic definitions*. Popular music is disseminated by mass media and/or in a mass market. (Middleton 1990, 4)

To this, Middleton adds two more definitions that he calls 'positivist' and 'sociological realist'. The first, borrowing from Birrer definitions two and three, describes pop as music that clearly demonstrates a high rate of consumption as indicated by some measure (charts, playlists, polls, etc.). The second, borrowing from definitions one and four looks at influences from "above and below," thus viewing standardization as coming both from corporate boardrooms, and from "grass roots" practice.(Middleton 1990, 5)

Middleton denounces each definition as either subjective or non-descriptive. He gives normative definitions short shrift by declaring that good and bad can have no empirically objective measure. He dismisses negative definitions (the story of Goldilocks and the Three Musics, for example) because of the tiring problem of how to pigeonhole every single piece into one category or another. He declares failure for sociological definitions because social (not to mention geographic) boundaries (especially in the age

of the world-wide-web) are fluid and music cannot be said to belong to one social group or another to any large extent. Positivist definitions, he claims, become bogged down in minutiae and statistical sales figures that are in themselves problematic, "corrupt," or inaccurate. Furthermore, they treat different markets as "aggregates," privilege certain categories over others, and focus on exchange rather than usage, thereby ignoring non-commodity practices (Middleton 1990, 5-7).

In fact, Middleton seems to eschew all definitions of popular, and instead prefers to situate, almost as if charting a position on a map, where various musics exist "topographically" between such opposing forces as the elite and the common, standardization and innovation, the commonly held and the arcane, theirs and ours, or then and now. Instead of "popular" music existing within a taxonomy, he believes that the term should be used "to put a finger on that space [where our subject matter lies] . . . and to organize it in particular ways." (Middleton 1990, 7)

There is much in Middleton's view of popular music that rings valid if not true, in particular the aspect of struggle and negotiation on all sides of mass music production and usage. The problem is that while all these definitions have weaknesses, some of them also have strengths that Middleton does not address. Of course, normative definitions are easy to dismiss out of hand because they represent a pejorative view that really cannot be quantified, qualified, demonstrated, discussed, or universally held. One who thinks of Bach's use of the third in his two-part invention in F major as the paragon of thematic creation and development might not see any ingenuity in Little Richard's "Wopbobaloobop a wop bam boom," and consequently dismiss pop creations as second-rate composition. One could just as easily say that classical music is inferior to Motown, and both positions would be equally biased and unprovable.[1]

The strengths of these definitions (including the normative ones) are that they are actually ones that people have employed and will employ to describe music of a certain

[1]As somebody once told me, "You can put Mozart on my turntable if you like, but it ain't staying there long."

type. For Middleton to propose that one look at pop in ways other than classification is fine, especially since he redefines pop in order to advance his thesis of it. The other views also advance theses, as problematic as they may be. At least, they explain to the reader how the author views and defines the subject matter.

Middleton also overstates some of the shortcomings of other views. True, the problem of where to draw the line in reference to negative definitions may wind up conflating Handel's "Hallelujah Chorus" with Shaggy's "It Wasn't Me," tunes that differ in ways noticeable even to the hearing impaired. But the definition makes an important connection. The warhorse actually does have something in common with the chart topper in that people relate to both in ways that (1) form the basis of a common musical language, and (2) make them want to give up money for the pleasure of hearing them.

As an example of the problems inherent in negative definitions, Middleton cites a passage written by Charles Keil critical of Charles Hamm's clearly articulated (because of his choices) definition of popular song:

> ...a steady reporting of names, dates, song titles, musical examples, from the procession of songs in commodity form that began...in 1789. [But] the author excludes too many dialectical tensions from the book at the start: no church music will be considered; no worrying about those Americans who couldn't afford sheet music and a piano in the parlor is allowed either; and no room for primarily instrumental music like marches, ragtime, jazz, or polka music up to 1950. Leaving out white and black American Christians is leaving out a lot. Leaving out poor and working people doesn't seem right. And my grandfather, who used to weep over the 'Second Connecticut March', why can't he be included? And all those dancing immigrants? (Keil 1980, 577)

In response to Keil's point on inclusion, I would cite Norwood Hanson's example articulated in *Perception and Discovery*.[2] An experienced driver knows more about driving than the kid who just got his learner's permit because she's learned a thing or two after being on the road lo so many years, and continues to learn new things. The kid has a big sign on his instructor's car that says "student driver." But if the experienced driver continues to learn, she is also, by definition, a student driver. In fact, every driver could claim to be a student driver. Were everyone to put a big sign on the tops of their cars, they would be accurate, but not helpful. The student's sign is there for a specific reason, namely a degree of inexperience that makes him an exceptional hazard.

By the same token, Keil's criticism of Hamm is that works, according to his definition, would be excluded even though they could possibly be deemed "popular" music by one of any number of other definitions. Middleton agrees, saying that what seem to be arbitrary exclusions are in fact discriminatory. But, as in the student driver example, that's precisely the point. One does not have to include the kitchen sink when describing a large body of music. Even if different people make different inclusions, there will be, in reality, as opposed to a hypothetical instance, an overlapping set that will at least form a basis for comparison, discussion, or theory.

Middleton aptly sees the flaws in sociological definitions, but one must question the extent to which they apply in an age of narrowcasting. While nothing prevents people from differing socio-economic backgrounds from jumping the line and listening to other

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[2]N.R. Hanson taught physics at Indiana University in Bloomington during the 1950s and 1960s. While there, he developed a theory of epistemology that explored how scientists arrived at their conclusions, and why they made certain distinctions.

people's music, record companies and radio/video programmers nonetheless actively seek to produce fare for particular social groups. When Robert Pittman began Music Television, for example, he identified himself as belonging to "a culture group." Judging from his own tastes, he then produced a commercially successful, and culturally significant playlist for early MTV. The record industry calls this placing. Major labels have marketing departments geared towards identifying demographics, and use their A&R departments to hone artists into established niches. Meanwhile, players consult Artist Development (AD) firms so that they can groom themselves more closely to the expectations of the market.[3]

Although one must naturally guard against deterministic thinking when applying technological-economic definitions, we really wouldn't have this subject matter if there were not some means for large-scale dissemination. Wide dissemination does not need technology, per se. Dissemination can happen orally, especially when transmitting songs from the distant past (say "Bill Bailey," "Take Me Out to the Ball Game," or other works from early Tin Pan Alley), or could be aided by the ability of song performers and composers to travel. Technologico-economic definitions deal directly with Baby Music's desire to utilize the technologies of print and recording so that he may crystallize the essence of expression, or create a definitive version that carries with it the presumption of authority that musicians themselves--especially those working in cover bands--recognize.

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[3]One of the repeat guest lecturers that I invited to my Hunter College music industry class, recording artist Billy Phillips, told us how his former label, MCA, pressured him to change his sound from hard rock (heavy Hendrix influence, in both his guitar playing and vocals) to rhythm and blues because of his race. He subsequently signed with SBK, who promised to let him record in any style he wished. Last time I spoke with him, however, SBK was dragging its feet in releasing his debut album.

The problems that Middleton sees in the positivist position are also somewhat exaggerated. Conventional wisdom would suggest that charts do not reflect what people buy, or why they buy, with pinpoint accuracy. Yet, one can fairly say that they represent the most recognized songs, the ones that are "out there." They reflect, with greater precision, what the industry is selling at any given point. So, despite the charts' "corruption," they do tell us many things, not the least of which is what songs had the greatest opportunity to become part of the public consciousness. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that citing charts and playlists as ways to document a particular song's popularity to either listeners or sellers would necessarily "bog one down" in data.

Sociological realism's obvious strength lies in the commonsense observation that if someone considers herself a pop musician, then by writing, recording, and producing music she is in fact defining what that music is. Conversely, by maintaining a lion's share of the resources and venues for record production and dissemination (e.g., distributorships, promotions departments, clout within the radio and television industries that can gain wider exposure) major labels cannot consider themselves without influence either. Here, Middleton's method of topographically describing tensions would aptly seem to describe the tension between those who make music, and those who sell it, as well as the influence that both wield in creating a final "product." That is not to say, however, that this influence is equal.

Middleton's topographical theory nevertheless addresses a key concern regarding the notions of commercial music and standardization. He emphasizes tensions, struggles and conflicts: elite vs. common, record label vs. talent etc. (Middleton 1990, 7-9). His viewpoint, in this regard, is quite helpful, along with the other views that he dismisses, as

myriad pairs of lenses through which we can see popular music, depending on what we wish to examine at a specific point and time. The main problem does not arise with Middleton's approach to defining pop music, but rather its universal application.

Hamm (1995) assesses various understandings of what constitutes popular music not as definitions, but rather, as modernist narratives utilized in popular music writing. Listed in order, they are (1) narratives of musical authority, (2) narratives of mass culture, (3) two sets of narratives involving authenticity, (4) narratives of classicism, (5) narratives of youth culture, and (6) narratives of commodification. The narratives imply meta-definitions, or definitional strategies, one of which directly parallels Middleton's theoretical history of the term 'popular'. The first of these narratives, musical authority, sees musical text as the only relevant issue. Furthermore, it posits that the aural text of popular music cannot compare to the works of the western masters of the common practice, and is thus by its nature inferior, a point similar to the nominative definitions mentioned by Middleton. The other narratives overlap less, if at all. Narratives of classicism within pop music tell the story of various works often referred to as 'popular' that have a profundity on the level of the European masterworks, and thus find no parallel in the definitions Middleton lists. The mass culture narrative describes music that is widely distributed (though not necessarily by commercial means), which distills the essence of mass songs into forms that even the "lowest common denominator" can understand. (Hamm 1995, 7) This reflects what Middleton would call 'positivist' definitions in that the issue of large-scale consumption assumes primary importance. The youth culture narratives, on the other hand, would represent a subset of Middleton's sociological definitions.

Simply put, while scholars may agree and disagree over the nuances of how one can specifically divvy up past notions of what constitutes popular music, there is a significant degree of consensus. Both Middleton's definitions and Hamm's narratives tend to construct a view of popular music as it exists within a cultural sphere, not a musical one. In other words, most descriptions of popular music do not address its compositional or performance processes, but instead focus on the role the music plays within, or against, society. Perhaps the emphasis on the extra-musical is presently valid due to the diverse and eclectic aural nature of this thing we call "pop music." Of course, if we look at popular music as merely a cultural phenomenon, we would also have to ask if an examination of the musical text yields anything of interest, perhaps something that reflects the society that adopts a particular work, or the levels of meaning intended by the artist. This question is best addressed by looking at how musicologists examine popular music.

Musicology and Popular Music

Back in the mythical land of Simplicity, Baby Music saw Goldilocks, and thought, "What a peculiar creature." His astonishment did not really stem so much from what she looked like as from the fact that she seemed interested in him. After all, Baby mostly regarded musicologists as his father's chroniclers and fans, and as such they usually ignored him. The ethnomusicologists, who lugged their heavy field recorders to his home so that they could make their own crude recordings of Mama's stories, sometimes talked to Baby as well, though their primary interest seemed to be in mom. Some musicologists

and ethnomusicologists made snide or disparaging remarks about Baby, not that it bothered him. After all, he did what he did, and nothing they said could stop him from selling his wares. And Baby really did not really suffer from any lack of scholarly attention. In fact, he enjoyed the scrutiny of sociologists, psychiatrists, cultural historians, political economists and others from the soft sciences, and was thus no stranger to the halls of ivy.

Yet, before Baby stood a musicologist named Goldilocks who actually seemed interested in him. He wondered why the sudden attention from one, then later more, of his father's groupies. Given their background, he was also curious to know how they saw him, and if they truly understood what he did for a living. From his casual observation, he knew that Mama and Papa's scribes used special tools to transcribe the essence of their stories. "Can they transcribe the essence of my stories too?" he wondered. "Would they use the same tools, modify the ones they had, or invent new ones from scratch?"

Peter Kaminsky suggests that the musicologists' new-found interest in popular music came about in small part due to its presence as "the next frontier, the ocean floor waiting to be mapped" (Kaminsky 2001; sec. 1, para. 1), and in large part due to the coming of age of baby boomer musicologists who, for the first time, were compelled to examine the music of their own generation (Kaminsky 2001; sec. 1, para. 2). This second contention seems plausible, but it does not explain why earlier generations of musicologists, who came of age during the rock era, still focused on western art music, and folk songs. Moreover, popular music existed long before sock-hops, boogie-woogie and swing. Jazz has long maintained a place within academia via ensembles and coursework, but the emphasis has been more on Duke Ellington than on the Andrew

Sisters, or jazz-influenced popular music of the 1930s or 1940s. In other words, musicology distanced jazz from the 'pop' moniker.[4] Perhaps the difference is that the Baby Boomer musicologists referred to by Kaminsky came of age not only during a time when popular music found ubiquity in the public sphere, but also at a time when the prejudices about pop--especially rock--had ebbed. Kaminsky himself notes this, quoting Mark Spicer:

> Writing a 'serious' essay about Genesis for [a book on popular music analysis] has been especially significant for me. As I was growing up in the late 1970s and 1980s--and playing in as many rock and pop bands as I did orchestras--this group was one of the main reasons why I came to love music and to love thinking about music . . .. I am sure that there are several others within our discipline who also care a great deal about this music, those whose formative years were similarly shaped by both a classical and a rock aesthetic. (Spicer, quoted by Kaminsky 2001; sec. 1., para 2.)

Robert Fink goes even further to suggest that popular music came to have, through rock and roll, a legitimacy that derived from the music's longevity. What was once thought to be a passing fad for the young became a multi-generational expression. He notes that at one time pop depended on classical music for validation (Fink 1998, 177). For this, one could easily supply such examples as Apollo 100's recording of Bach's "Jesu, Joy of Man's Desiring," Mason Reese's "Classical Gas," and the fascination with what *New York Times* critic Lillian Roxon deemed 'baroque rock' of the sixties (e.g. The Doors' "Light My Fire"). Over the course of time, pop captured the public's attention to

[4]As Peter Manuel would point out, jazz distanced itself from pop in such subgenres as bebop (Manuel 2005, 1).

a disproportionate degree, which in effect resulted in a sort of practical hegemony within musical spheres.

Fink illustrates this point in a fictitious story about Rock Bottom, a fading disco star, who is bewildered and overwhelmed when asked to perform with a symphony orchestra. When Rock finally understands why the symphony wants him there--as a representative of 'contemporary music'-- he then tells the conductor how to go about things, a rather interesting metaphor to suggest, perhaps, the reasons behind the reluctance of some within traditional musicology to examine rock (small 'r') very closely (Fink 1998, 140-1). He gives as an example the arrangement and recording of Jimi Hendrix compositions by the Kronos quartet that signify the increasing respect of pop within the discourse of 'serious music'.

Fink further speculates that the hegemony pop enjoys in the public sphere might someday be reflected in the make up of musicological inquiry (or as he puts it, the *Canondammerung*). But if musicology has come to take pop seriously, its textual approach to analysis seems to put it at odds with the previous work done by other scholars. Kaminsky illustrates this point by citing three separate writers--namely, Philip Tagg, Richard Middleton, and Walter Everett--as representative of current analytical approaches. At one end of the dichotomy Kaminsky positions Tagg as someone who does not emphasize musical text at the expense of semiotic/cultural analyses. On the other end sits Everett, who considers the musical text the primary one. Middleton serves here as a midpoint between the two (Kaminsky 2001; sec. 1, para. 6-7), an ego moderating the conflict between id-like meaning and the superego of heavy structuralism.

Middleton himself refers to the conflict when he writes about "the musicological problem." (Middleton 1990, 103) Terminology, methodology and ideology form the basis of all this tension primarily because musicology itself formed out of a historical perspective that conservatively viewed Western art music as autonomous, and the paragon of sonic expression (Middleton 1990: 108, 103); as opposed to the cultural history stemming from the Marxist tenets of the Frankfurt School, which looked at music as an artifact, its relevance determined by the community that it is indigenous to. Consequently, musicological models of analysis featured a built-in assumption that certain strategies indicated high-quality (or interest), and from this comes the tendency to correlate pop musically with works of the common practice–i.e., a musicologist might be tempted to compare Beatles songs with Schubert's *Lieder*.[5] In fact, he complains that what "old-style" musicology brings to the discussion of pop is lacking in a number of areas: (1) the use of "loaded terminology" that obscures meaning,[6] (2) the skewed focus on musical text mentioned above, (3) "notational centricity" that dismisses any sonic or extra-sonic properties that are difficult if not impossible to document in the conventional system, (4) the tendency toward abstractionism or the pulling the song away from its context, and (5) the "monological" belief that the music exists only in what can be

[5]In a CBS Television special aired in 1967 (shortly after Clive Davis' push to make rock the primary product of CBS Records) Leonard Bernstein defended rock against the charge of musical inferiority by pointing to such things as mixed meter in the Beatles "Good Day Sunshine," and tonal modulation in Janis Ian's "Society Child."

[6] In his *New Grove* entry on the Beatles, for example, Dale Cockrell wrote, "The Beatles' early style is typified by *She loves you* (1963), with its duple metre, almost hypnotic beat, pentatonic melody, 32-bar song form and tonic-mediant tonal relationship; its text concerns adolescent love….[italics original]" (Cockrell 1980/II, 321)

documented on sound recording or in writing (Middleton 2000 “Introduction: Locating,” 4).

Some of the arguments given on both sides of the debate strongly reverberate through the current discourse on popular music. On the one hand, Everett smacks down Middleton for not paying closer attention to musical texts. On the other, such venerable rock critics as Lester Bangs find meaning in rock everywhere but in its musical texts, which in their books and articles they seem to go out of their way not to address. Susan McClary and Robert Walser give a rather obvious explanation for the schism in their essay “Start Making Sense! Musicology Wrestles with Rock.” McClary and Walser reiterate that the lack of attention given to the sonic elements of pop music originated in the difficulties facing earlier generations of rock scholars. They observe that the first academics eager to examine this cultural phenomenon were sociologists, political scientists and others who had limited background in musical analysis. Furthermore, the limitations of traditional ‘Western’ musicology--which includes both historical musicology and theory--make it problematic, if not unsuitable, for analysis of musics that contain non-European elements (McClary and Walser 1990).

When musicology embraced popular music as a subject worthy of academic scrutiny, there were those among its practitioners who resisted the influence of non-musical scholars working their way into what they considered their home discipline. Some musicologists further argued that close analysis of the musical texts-- where, of course musicologists had a leg up on the other disciplines--yielded the most pertinent information on the nature of musical works. Leslie Kinton, for one, gave voice to what some saw as a disturbing trend in musicology to adopt post-modernist narratives and

approaches in music that would not examine the text felt to be of the utmost importance: the sonic one.

> If one examines much of the literature [on music criticism], both current and past, the answer seems to be 'anywhere but in the music itself.' The renowned Canadian professor of English literature Northrop Frye said as much about the state of literary criticism in the 1950s: 'It is clear that the absence of systematic criticism has created a power vacuum, and all the neighbouring disciplines have moved in.' Just so in music: we have semiotic music-criticism, ideological music-criticism, feminist music-criticism, hermeneutical-music- criticism…everything, it seems, except *music* music-criticism. This is perhaps an unfair caricature, but a scholarly field that imports most of its critical apparatus and procedures from other disciplines has a definite credibility problem, and encourages a kind of dilettantism that further undermines its veracity. (Kinton 2004; sec. 1, para. 4)

Comparisons between Mozart's treatment of melody, cadence, and phrasing and that of Salieri might not matter much to a scholar researching the sociological significance of eighteenth-century Viennese music. Yet somebody exploring this topic will ultimately have to engage in the type of musical analysis that most musicians would understand as "theory," even if it is at the most basic level. Frith and others might see attention given to musical text as a hindrance to understanding musical meaning--which for Frith is primarily the social impact of rock--by mystifying music. Nevertheless, conventional wisdom tells us that virtually everyone has at least some rudimentary knowledge of musical principles. Otherwise, no music would make sense. Without this knowledge, one would hear music as simply a series of noises. Thus, the idea that those outside musicology do not address sonic principles is an overgeneralization. True, plenty might have been gained had previous scholars of pop felt more comfortable about parsing

chords and rhythms. The problem here lies in Kinton's absolutism about what must be paramount in musical analysis, and consequently, who may and may not, speak with authority on music:

> When he [Northrup Frye] says "read literature," he means one should undertake a thorough study of the field, not just read in the casual sense. In the same way, it can be argued that the first thing a prospective music critic must do is listen to and study music, not just casually, but exhaustively. Just as Frye is calling for "literary literacy," so must musical literacy be called for in music criticism, and a prerequisite for literacy is fluency in the language; in other words, a music critic (as distinct from an historian or bibliographer) must first become a musician, just as a literary critic must first become a writer (even if such writing is confined to academic prose). Again, musical literacy means that one speaks the language of music as a native; i.e., as a performer, a composer or both, at an appropriate level of expertise. (ibid.)

The musical literacy and "exhaustive" knowledge of the prevailing works that Kinton advocates would not necessarily provide any real insight regarding meaning. First of all, one must define listening "exhaustively." Knowledge of European music does not necessarily inform the writer who wants to focus on Canned Heat, or J-Lo, but "fluency in the language" of 1960s psychedelia or twenty-first century dance music might. Still, that does not mean that one would have to know the artist Love too when speaking of the former, or Aqua when writing about the latter. Also, one has to explain why someone who can only employ a rough vocabulary of music theory, but is nonetheless well-versed in other texts of pop, is not also literate in the subject matter. As Tagg puts it, "...the analysis of popular music should in no way be considered a job reserved for 'experts'

(although I will admit that describing its mechanisms may require some specialist knowledge)" (Tagg 2000, 101).

Other veteran proponents of the "music as autonomous" perspective offered a nuanced view, even though one could see their words as equally incendiary. In his review of Middleton's *Reading Pop*, Everett writes:

> Poor Richard...He looks at what is offered by many American analysts, with their emphasis on the inner tonal relationships of a song or group of songs, and he finds the approach both doctrinaire (because it is based on what he asserts to be the uncritical adoption of 'formalist' systems that had been created to clarify the workings of music of a different sort) and inadequate (due to its failure to consider the entirety of the music's social context). He turns to the cultural-studies sociologists, and admires their consumer-based interest in gesture and dance steps but is embarrassed by their lack of sophistication in parsing a musical text. (Everett 2001; sec. 1, para. 1)

Everett's objection does not lie in the mixed attention given to sociological and musicological concerns, as his 2004 analysis of Steely Dan songs and his ultimate praise for this "fascinating volume" would suggest (Everett 2001; sec. 12, para. 1). Rather, his ire is raised by what he considers shoddy musical (particularly Schenkerian) analysis done by those who have inadequate training for it. Moreover, he chafes at the "forced" contextualization of the musical text in terms of cultural semiosis. He further writes:

> To this reviewer, such an entanglement of music with its context seems almost less 'necessary' than ever, in an age when a reference to the text of *Abbey Road* should mean exactly the same thing to everyone the world over--the collection of 478.5 megabytes appearing on a compact disc that contains in every case the same stereo mix of a

> recording fixed in 1969. This sort of musical text, common to most popular-music compositions of the past fifty years, can be studied as an independent unit much more easily than could a Mozart sonata, which exists only in a general notational roadmap suggestive of many possible valid and interesting tangible interpretations. (Everett 2001; sec. 1, para. 2-3)

Despite its flaws,[7] Everett's concern for examination of musical parameters is valid. After all, rock and roll might have started with Elvis Presley insofar as the cultural historian knows, but a musicologist can make concrete correlations between the music recorded by "the King" and the many others who preceded him that challenge this assumption. At the same time, however, one must also fully understand the cultural interaction embedded within musical composition, and refrain from dismissing the implications of social and commercial intercourse within the recording studio and rehearsal room. Pop, rock and roll in particular, has never existed purely within the sounds on the CD, but rather in the attitudes of both performer and listener. Were pop analysis to bend toward one direction or the other, much would be missed.

In a broader sense, the debate over which text rules as the primary one takes place amid the backdrop of a larger point of contention, namely that between "modernism" and "postmodernism." Using the Persian Gulf War and a department store as examples, Treitler defines modernism and postmodernism respectively as the autonomy of musical production on the one hand, and autonomy of the listening experience on the other.

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[7] *Abbey Road*, like any other album that has made the shift from release on vinyl to digital media, has undergone re-mixes. Couple that with the variance in playback media (deck/player/turntable, speaker size and type, etc.) and one can easily see that there are appreciable differences in the text itself. Also, others have recently noted the role of the listener in constructing meaning within musical texts (Pearsall 1999, 232; Mead 1999, 2; De Bellis 1999, 83-99), so one could hardly say that the text is fixed.

Although he notes that modernist studies of music have led to making “bad history,” Treitler decries the creeping “fictive” influence of postmodernism in musical studies (Treitler 1995, 10-12). His view, which of course stems from a musicological background, seems interestingly opposed to a lot of postmodern music scholars outside musicology (e.g. Michelle Wallace on Michael Jackson, bell hooks on Madonna, etc.), and also to those within musicology, who borrowed heavily from the cultural studies perspectives inherent in older rock analyses (e.g. McClary on Beethoven).

In his “Introduction” to *Analyzing Popular Music*, Allan Moore outlines some of the trends in the study of popular music after its recognition within musicological circles. Starting with Charles Hamm's more traditional musicological approach, he moves to some of the issues raised by Charles Keil, with follow-up from the Birmingham school of cultural studies, namely: (1) the possibility that close reading of text obscures the impact upon the listener versus close reading as a necessity; and (2) the divorce of analysis from artistic autonomy. Moore defines postructuralism as "a group of methodologies which [began to seek] solutions in the ways cultural products and practices are structured" (Moore 2003: 3). Within this view is a distinction between “modernism” and “post-modernism,” the former positing the creator’s authority, the latter viewing "biography" as somewhat "specious."

Despite the fact that he makes a case for modernism in a later chapter that examines a Jethro Tull tune, Moore attributes an (ever so slightly) pejorative connotation to the term 'modernism' as he presents it in the introduction, namely that it is somewhat passé to take a look at the nature of authorship. However, attention to both the author’s and the listener’s autonomy is necessary for certain issues to receive proper attention. For

example, one could hear the Beatles' "Eleanor Rigby" as indicative of efforts to legitimate rock by alluding to the classical string quartet (actually an octet written in four parts). It also chronicles the constant bickering between Lennon and McCartney.[8] The song is neither one thing nor the other exclusively. Instead, all aspects of it "inform" or give testimony to its many facets, or layers of meaning and interest. Arguably, the more facets the producer provides, the more the song might speak to the listener. At the same time, nothing stops the listener from attaching facets of meaning that the authors never intended.

This very battle over autonomy, in conjunction with what Middleton refers to as the negative definitions of popular music and the ideology inherent in both previous cultural critiques and current musical discussion, is reflected in the notion of standardization. The controversy over the issue largely involves the acceptance or rejection of an ideology upon which further scholarly examination of pop music might proceed. Yet, one must keep in mind that musicology, which many (including Middleton) feel offers much to the subject of pop, is still taking its first, fledgling steps into the subject. There is a real danger in ignoring extra-musical critique, for to do so invites a uniform approach to musical examination, one that demands every examiner come with the same prerequisite tools, or from the same point of view. Musicology, in fact, might find it helpful to discover or invent new tools, and "expand our analytical horizons, rather

[8]According to Lennon, McCartney began the tune, but gave up on it after penning one verse. Lennon and roadie Mal Evans took over the writing, and immediately seized the opportunity to make a snide remark at McCartney: "Father McKenzie [McCartney], writing the words to a sermon that no one will hear." (Lennon et al 2001, 140)

than retreating to the safety of name brands in order to bridge the gap of understanding." (Hisama 2001; sec. 1, para 9)

In the meantime, as musicology wades deeper into the debates over pop music, it might prove wise to consider Robert Walser's ten "apothegms," which address some of the most pressing issues within pop music scholarship.

1. It's okay to write about music.
2. Music, unlike language, needs no translation
3. Musical judgments cannot be dismissed as subjective, nor can they be celebrated as objective
4. The split between Ethno- and Musicology is no longer useful
5. Analysis is a relational activity in terms of its goals.
6. The split between music and theory was never useful.
7. Analysis is by nature reductive.
8. Pop music and Art music cannot be compared in terms of value
9. Twentieth Century music should include pop.
10. "You only have the problem of connecting music and society if you've separated them in the first place. (Walser 2003, 34-5).

Standardization

Theodor Adorno, in his 1940 essay "On Popular Music," argued that industrial agendas required processes of standardization. Adorno's theory about how art and commerce intermingle seemingly originates more in his view of industry than in his view of music. His reasoning can best be understood in terms of Hamm's second narrative of authenticity: "Capitalist cultural products support/permeate the ideology and agenda of dominant classes" (Hamm 1995, 23), and is aptly illustrated by Steve Chapple and Rebee Garofalo in their 1977 book *Rock 'N' Roll Is Here to Pay*. Underlying Adorno's premise is the sense that business sets goals that affirm the hegemonic order of those who participate in it. Meeting those goals requires control of the product--whether it is a car, a

widget, or a tune--and exploitation of all kinds of resources: animal, vegetable, mineral, sound, and sound-maker.

In order to give proper context to "On Popular Music," we should perhaps examine a later series of essays, written in collaboration with Max Horkheimer. "The Culture Industry" (1944) and "The Culture Industry Reconsidered" (1947) provide a deeper understanding of the points raised in "On Popular Music." In the first essay, the authors aver that "amusements," a cultural phenomenon as old as mankind, became entangled with industrial modes of production that required an induced passivity within the public. The authors give, as an example, an analysis of how film technology and packaging took away the individual's authority to add meaning to the film by limiting his or her ability to participate in the interpretive process. Just as the one-way communication of commercial radio replaced the more democratic party-line telephone in terms of consumer telecommunication preferences, advances in film technology led to movies that spat out meaning that one either understood or missed:

> They [movies] are so designed that quickness, powers of observation, and experience are undeniably needed to apprehend them at all; yet sustained thought is out of the question if the spectator is not to miss the relentless rush of facts. Even though the effort required for his response is semi-automatic, no scope is left for the imagination. (Adorno & Horkheimer 1993, 122)

What follows is a basic pre-stamped form that the audience can accept through familiarity. Only the surface details, what Adorno refers to in other places as "pseudo-individualization," change. Like the status quo, the legitimacy of the form must reign supreme in the end--even in the case of such upstarts as Orson Welles, whose violation of

rules only justified them further, for in the end he did not violate the form. Artists who really dismiss the "form" find themselves sentenced not to death, but to irrelevancy:

> The ruler no longer says: 'You must think as I do or die'. He says: 'You are free not to think as I do; your life, your property, everything shall remain yours, but from this day on you are a stranger among us'.
>
> Not to conform means to be rendered powerless, economically and therefore spiritually--to be "self-employed." When the outsider is excluded from the concern, he can only too easily be accused of incompetence. (Adorno & Horkheimer 1993, 123)

In order to explain the mass psychology behind the individual's acceptance of her vanishing control, Adorno and Horkheimer first acknowledged the escapist needs of a populace that lacks comfort and authority.[9] Pop art, among other things, encourages the viewer to fantasize that he too can be a star, despite the fact that celebrity is a very narrow door through which to enter (Adorno & Horkheimer 1993, 125). Pop art also strives to reach every corner of society through identification with the plight of the real human, whether one sees himself as Mr. Dithers or Dagwood Bumstead (ibid.). While all of these seem to be unrelated factors, what the authors are really decrying is the lack of individual autonomy, both for the artist and the audience member. In a follow-up to this essay, they wrote:

> The cultural commodities of the industry are governed, as Brecht and Suhrkamp expressed it thirty years ago, by the principle of their realization as value, and not by their own

[9]Adorno and Horkheimer reason that pop art reinforces a feeling of helplessness at the same time, for despite the cathartic nature of the drama, the audience member has to re-enter her drab reality, made even darker by the contrast; the authors liken this to going to a diner and only being allowed to look at the menu

> specific content and harmonious formation. The entire practice of the culture industry transfers the profit motive naked onto cultural forms. Ever since these cultural forms first began to earn a living for their creators as commodities in the market-place they had already possessed something of this quality. . . .The autonomy of works of art, which of course rarely ever predominated in an entirely pure form, and was always permeated by a constellation of effects, is tendentially eliminated by the culture industry, with or without the conscious will of those in control. (Adorno & Horkheimer 1991, 98-99)

Although these two essays come after "On Popular Music" chronologically, one can almost see them as a preamble to it. The standardization that Adorno sees in popular music reflects what he sees in other popular arts, most notably film. Reading "On Popular Music" alone, one might get the idea that Adorno runs into trouble when trying to substantiate the reasons for the negative influence of the culture industry. In an attempt to find a structural distinction between pop and "serious" music, he writes:

> The primary effect of this relation between the framework and the detail is that the listener becomes prone to evince stronger reactions to the part than to the whole [in popular music]. His grasp of the whole does not lie in the living experience of this one concrete piece of music he has followed. The whole is pre-given and pre-accepted, even before the actual experience of the music starts: therefore, it is not likely to influence, to any great extent, the reaction to the details, except to give them varying degrees of emphasis. (Adorno 1991, 20)

What Adorno means by describing emphasis on part over whole in the case of pop is hard to determine at first. As written, this observation does not really differentiate pop from any other type of music. A waltz, for example, has "pre-given" or "pre-accepted" features, including a 3/4 meter, with declining emphasis on each strong pulse, squareable

or cubeable numbers of phrases (eight, sixteen, etc.), recurrent melodic themes, and variation. Why Adorno feels that western art music requires a unique relationship between the detail and the whole not evident in pop is unclear. He gives the example of how the second theme of the first movement of Beethoven's seventh can only be understood in context to the entire movement, and, one would assume vice versa--after all, the nature and recurrence of a second theme determines whether one is listening to a rondo or a sonata-allegro form. Then again, the same would apply to verse/chorus and verse/pre-hook forms. Form in pop is not any more abstract than form in classical, or the detail any less important except to those who have a fundamental ignorance of pop performance.

Adorno himself admits that one can easily tell the difference between Guy Lombardo and Benny Goodman, a fact that would seem to negate the concept of standardization. But Adorno accounts for this conflict in relating part to the whole by advancing the concept of "pseudo-individualization," which mirrors what he notices in movies. Style, in this instance, serves as a template, a rigid background that anchors enough surface change to give the illusion of variation. In movies, items subject to pseudo-individualization would include genre, look, cast, dialogue, gags, and so forth. In music, this relates to a standardized repertoire of gestures: the swing rhythm, the dirty note, the instrumentation, and the players. In each case, he would contend that a work of art interprets for the listener by endlessly repeating the familiar shorthand, or stereotypes, featured within a work, or in previous works.

The Marxist assumptions underlying Adorno's view of popular music and the standardization that industrial pressures would demand have drawn much criticism over

the years from a variety of sources that illuminate the fallacies in his argument. Jon Stratton, David Sanjek and others apparently objected to Marxist tenets, because they unabashedly embraced a bias against capitalistic hegemony.[10] Some counter that the dupable masses required to validate his theory do not exist. As Middleton observes, "The fact that Adorno's thinking on the question is locked into a model which pits individual subject against reified social totality leads his picture of the social meaning of music to take on a monolithic appearance" (Middleton 1990, 40). For Adorno, the real sin of the culture industry was to take away the autonomy of the individual, not by threat of force, but by threat of rendering the individual meaningless. Many of Adorno's detractors, however, would argue that the industry has not the power to exert that much control over listener tastes. In fact, some believe that the culture industry helps both artist and audience claim autonomy for themselves.

After rock and roll's emergence as the predominant product of the popular music industry, the idea that industrial needs turned musical composition and performance into widget-making became an issue, especially among artists accused by their former fans of "selling out." But Jon Stratton and others insisted that rock could only exist within a commercial structure. In "Capitalism and Romantic Ideology in the Record Business," he writes:

> However, much modern mass cultural debate still echoes Adorno and Horkheimer's conflation of medium and product. Hence the confusion which surrounds the

[10] Media theorist Denis McQuail maintained that some theories originating in Marxist thought were worthy of consideration, writing that the goal of the Frankfurt school was to " . . . speak up for the working class consumer of mass culture as the victim . . . rather than the villain of the story" (McQuail 2005, 115).

> discussion of popular music. That this conflation exists for popular music is all the more strange since it does not have one single medium with which it may be identified. This, however, has not stopped liberal humanists such as Chapple and Garofalo, and marxists [sic] such as Dave Harker, from castigating the music business as a stifler of variety, talent and change in order to promote corporate success. What this argument ignores is that 'popular music' in its present formulation would not exist were it not for the corporate economic structures which manifest it-- in the same sense that the novel would not exist were it not for publishing companies. (Stratton 1983, 143)

The gist of Stratton's argument--that rock by necessity existed as both a commercial product and cultural artifact compressed into a single entity--expresses one of the more common arguments against standardization. Despite his disputes with "liberal humanists," Stratton seems, nevertheless, to agree that some degree of standardization has to occur within commercial cultural production simply because of how he places it into context with other entertainment.

Many take issue with Adorno because of where he existed historically and geographically. Middleton, for one, indicted the entire Frankfurt School for overgeneralizing based on "one historical movement" (Middleton 1995, 37). Later developments (for example, the conflict between small independent labels and the majors) would be difficult to explain in terms of Adorno's primary analysis, for once again they would suggest that the culture industry is not monolithic, but rather competitive within itself, thus giving rise to periodic innovation from new sources (Middleton 1995, 38-9). Middleton also believed that the historic circumstances of the Frankfurt School led Adorno to overgeneralize in other areas, such as the "homogeneity of culture in advanced capitalism," and the art object as product (Middleton 1995, 40-5). He also felt that

Adorno, unlike Walter Benjamin, ignored the role that technology played in fostering the collective autonomy that lay outside of the culture industry (Middleton 1995, 41), a point reiterated by Berry, Stokes, Hoover, and Leslie Gay when examining later pop.

In a comparison of hip-hop tendencies, Adam Krims argued that Adorno's legacy had become an obstacle to developing a specifically Marxist analytical approach to music. In an essay titled "Marxist Music Analysis without Adorno: Popular Music and Urban Geography," Krims contended that the music industry of Adorno's day differed substantially from the music industry of the late-twentieth century, thus calling into question the current legacies of Adorno's popular music study: the concept of standardization and the cultural imperialism that standardization implies (Krims 2000, 133).

Contrary to Stratton, Krims did not dismiss the viability of a Marxist approach to examining the popular music industry. Nevertheless, Krims disputed Adorno's relevance to any analysis of the current industry, and attacked the notions of standardization and cultural imperialism that Adorno championed. Citing numerous changes in the technology of music production and consumption, Krims asserted that standardization, and the corporate dominance required for it to occur, no longer existed because the shape of the music industry had changed since the publishing of "On Popular Music."[11] While

[11] Krims cited Mike Davis's account of 1940s Los Angeles (where Adorno settled after fleeing Europe) in order to explain where the sentiments found in "On Popular Music" might have originated. Where Middleton says that Adorno based an entire theory on a single historic movement, Krims elaborates by explaining that Adorno's observations of capitalistic influence on American movies and music--influenced (perhaps unconsciously) by Adorno's comparison to contemporary Germanic notions of what constituted art--held true for the specific place and time in which he formulated his thoughts on the subject of standardization. Although Adorno's arguments would be valid

much of what Krims wrote echoed much of what Adorno said, the two differed at specific and critical points. Whereas Adorno clearly believed that the culture industries had the power to dominate cultural expression, and consequently dictate audience choices, Krims argued that changes in the music industry minimized and balanced the power of the mainstream industry. Moreover, changes in the nature of capitalistic production necessitated that the major factions of the industry operate on the same terms, and as equal competitors, to the subaltern music industry.

Krims based his arguments on the belief that the dominance of large music conglomerates waned as a new model of capitalism, known as flexible accumulation, emerged. Flexible accumulation afforded greater opportunities for musicians to sell their recordings independently of a label, and offered consumers a wider selection of music from which to choose. This shift from producer control to audience control, according to Krims, "…has rendered audience agency visible in ways that belie Adorno's nightmare of mass passivity and uniform transformations of consciousness" (Krims 2003, 137). Far from being an antidote for, or a populist response to the power of the music industry, Krims asserted that these smaller producers are the music industry, or at least a substantial part of it:

> But the most critical point that needs to be made about all these affronts to Adorno's vision is that they are *fully a formation of capitalism* [italics original]. The infinite variety of world musics, including that produced and consumed by subaltern subjects, has always been with us in a silent objection to the nightmare of mass consumption,

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in a Fordistic (Tayloristic) model, the nature of business shifted to a flexible accumulation (Post-Fordism, or post-organized capitalism) model (Krims 2003, 133-4).

> but it is only the flexible-accumulation wrinkle that has allowed many of those musics wide-scale commercial representation. (ibid.)

Krims described the eleven characteristics of flexible accumulation as (1) a shift from mass production to "small-batch" production, (2) "design intensity" in production, enabled by automation, (3) a shift from an economy centered on manufacturing to one based on services, (4) increased consumption of services, (5) vertical disintegration of larger firms through subcontracting (6) flattening of corporate decision-making by removing managerial layers, (7) large percentage of workers in part-time temporary jobs with little or no benefits, (8) "quick feedback loops from consumers, with quick integration to product and service design," (9) large conglomerates formed through mergers and purchases, (10) localized economies, [and] (11) "movement of inner-city manufacturing to suburbs, rural areas and less developed nations." (Krims 2003:134)

Krims then stressed the applicability of these eleven principles to the current music industry. Such technological developments as ProTools and other sequencing software have paved the way for more profitable independent production in small batches (Krims 2003, 135). Playing on this theme further than Krims takes it, editing music (design intensity) also becomes easier due to software, and it is more easily distributed via the Internet, where message boards and e-mail can provide immediate feedback as to the product's commercial viability. Just as the majors further consolidated to create even larger conglomerates, the opportunity to sell music outside of any record label, major or minor, increased. This led Krims to the conclusion that although financial control of the popular music industry had consolidated, artistic control and autonomy increased:

> Here already, we can see how an Adornan conception is inadequate, as the increasing industrial expansion and financial concentration – and that is precisely what has been going on for quite a few years now– does *not* necessarily mean an increasing homogenization of the product, and does *not* mean ever more standardized, falsely differentiated musical forms of deadening similarity. [emphasis original]. (Krims 2003, 136-7)

Krims argued against the notion of standardization as he described the effects of flexible accumulation:

> Now, unlike twenty years ago, one can locate dozens, if not hundreds of constantly mutating dance genres in specialized urban shops, just down the street from a Tower Records marketing Sarah McLachlan's singer-songwriter sincerities, next to an import shop or Internet café offering access to Swahili rap or dub poetry. (Krims 2003: 136).

Krims stated that Adorno's model became inadequate because the former stressed that cultural diversity (measured apparently by the number of participating genres and artists, not by the variation within the musical structures themselves) thrived in an economically centralized business climate. Krims therefore implied that Adorno dismissed the possibility of alternative efforts in opposition to the major factions of the culture industry.

The problems with viewing the popular music industry as a model of flexible accumulation are twofold. First of all, Adorno never said that alternative producers are absent. He said that the alternatives become irrelevant to the dominant business faction's

way of doing things.[12] In noting the financial concentration occurring in flexible accumulation, Krims acknowledged that those outside the core are economically marginalized (Krims 2003, 136). So far from disagreeing with Adorno on this point, Krims affirmed the idea that going outside the mainstream is tantamount to becoming "spiritually . . . self employed" (Adorno & Horkheimer 1993, 123).

Secondly, the concept of flexible accumulation does not address the extent to which small-scale producers are either stylistically mimicking, or heavily influenced by, the product of the major labels, and actively seeking to become part of the mainstream via major label representation. This is most evident in the mixtapes sold by various performers in hopes of creating a "buzz" around their musical activities sufficient enough to draw the attention of a label's A&R representative. Consequently, the increased number of performers does not necessarily translate into increased diversity. Furthermore, Krims offered little evidence that the increased number of available recordings translates into increasing diversity of consumer choice.[13]

Adorno and Krims were describing two different phenomena, both of which could conceivably be thought of as commercial music. While Krims depicts the music industry

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[12]To repeat a quote cited earlier: "Not to conform means to be rendered powerless, economically and therefore spiritually--to be 'self-employed.' When the outsider is excluded from the concern, he can only too easily be accused of incompetence." (Adorno & Horkheimer 1993, 123).

[13]Krims does mention a "boom" in 'world music' sales (Krims 2003: 137), but offers no sales figures for the reader to judge how big this 'boom' actually is, nor does he mention how this correlates with flexible accumulation. In a later chapter, I will cite examples of how mp3 technology has provided new venues for sales, promotion, and publicity over the Internet. Needless to say, one should expect a substantial rise in sales from these efforts—especially in light of the major label's slow response to the Internet as a marketing tool. Yet, the question of how substantially this change has impacted the music industry of 2006 and later remains unanswered.

of the late-twentieth century as inclusive of marginal commercial players as equal participants (equal enough for the author to consider them the primary servers of "niche markets"), Adorno would maintain that the major businesses dominate in terms of commercial viability and their ability to influence culture at a mass level. Although "commercial viability" is a relative term, the fact remains that independent labels have for a long time turned a profit by selling hundreds of thousands fewer units than major labels.

In some ways, Krims' contrast between the consolidated model of entertainment industry structures and flexible accumulation echoes the distinction made by Peter Manuel between 'old media' and 'new media' (Manuel 1993, 3). In describing the democratizing effect that cassette audiotape fostered (as opposed to the comparative unmalleability of vinyl discs) in the alternative popular music scene of India in the 1980s, Manuel posited that new media decentralized both ownership and consumption patterns to a great extent (Manuel 1993, 2). At the same time, in critiquing the efficacy of the new media paradigm, he carefully noted that "however dispassionate and objective scholarly communications literature or popular music studies may attempt to be, they must ultimately confront fundamental evaluative questions relating to power, freedom, authenticity, and alienation" (Manuel 1993, 6). What emerges from Manuel's study is the depiction of a subaltern music industry made commercially and culturally viable because

of an advance in musical technology (cassette tape), which exists next to and despite the ubiquity of the Bollywood film industry and the pop music that originates from it.[14]

Krims, Stratton, and others would apparently prefer that Adorno (perhaps other liberal humanists and Marxists as well) simply disappear just like any other Oedipal father figure. True, many of their points are valid, the main one--Adorno's theory has major flaws that do not translate well into the Twenty-First Century--especially so. As one of the more glib detractors of standardization, Krims nevertheless concedes, "….just about nobody, most likely, would want to contend that Adorno was completely wrong. Who could resist an Adornan vision of the seemingly endless worldwide proliferation of young-boy pop/r&b groups?" (Krims 2003, 132)

One example of an objection to Adorno's notion of standardization can be found in a piece that at first blush seems only tangentially related to the subject matter here. In "On the Standardization of Musical Editing Systems: A Letter to the Editor," music librarian Laurie Spiegel pens a rather curious missive on the subject of standardizing computer musical editing software. She notes that standardization comes from two directions: from top-down, and from bottom-up. The first direction indicates centralized planning. The second refers to how standards come about through everyday usage. In terms of musical standardization, one could make similar points. Although Adorno could only conceive of top-down standardization--due to his presumption of audience passivity--no one can dispute the possibility of standardization occurring in relative independence

[14]Manuel gives as an example the powerful hold of the Gramophone Company of India (GCI) on the Indian pop music industry that virtually stifled smaller independent music producers until the advent of cassette culture (Manuel 1993, 23-4).

of the industry through social interaction that over time establishes conventions.[14] Whether one sees standardization in terms of artist development, or in terms of a bunch of people who develop their own ways of mixing beats, one sees standardization just the same.

On a deeper level, Adorno arrived at observations that many rock musicians would accept as axiomatic:

> Imitation offers a lead for coming to grips with the basic reasons for it. The musical standards of popular music were originally developed by a competitive process. As one particular song scored a great success, hundreds of others sprang up imitating the successful one. The most successful hits types, and "ratios" between elements were imitated, and the process culminated in the crystallization of standards. (Adorno 1991, 29)

Adorno went on to talk about how standards become frozen. In rock one can see this in the nomenclature applied to genre markets: hair bands, techno, and so forth. Ray Charles once rued how the Beatles' success led to a glut of English and Australian acts (the "British Invasion") in a rhythm and blues market that suddenly had less room for him and other African American musicians (Charles 1970, 71). Here one can easily see that players within the record industry actively sought to mimic the characteristics of an artist proven successful, thus demarcating very clear lines of acceptability: "in" was in, "out" was out, and that was that. Consequently, what mattered was not where Herman's

[14]I say relative independence because the effect that the industry has upon the local scene could still exist. In the case of rap, for instance, the effect stems from the use of previously (usually widely known) recorded material that has already been issued by the industry. In the case of other subgenres, the musician's aesthetic had most likely been educated, informed, or at least influenced from someone's commercial recordings.

Hermits stacked up ability-wise with Chuck Berry or Clyde McPhatter, or if Carl Perkins had more musical competence than Elvis Presley. What mattered was the new standard.

An artist who makes a clean multi-track recording on her home computer has a greater opportunity to distribute copies of her CD than did her older sister just a decade ago. Yet, her work must vie for attention and sales against that of every other artist doing the same thing. She must also compete with the majors, their subsidiaries and dependent labels, and established independents. Krims and others would rightly point out that (1) she is engaging in a capitalist enterprise, (2) she is producing music that she hopes will please someone enough to listen to, and hopefully buy, and (3) as a person existing within a culture she faces the same issues of "partial" autonomy as any other artist (Middleton 1990, 40). Moreover, since her mode of production is neither culturally, ideologically, nor ethnically restrictive, then others in the same position can, and will, do the same thing, thus making the music that they sell more diverse. At the same time, all of them become irrelevant to the subject matter here, despite the fact that their CDs might have featured well-executed innovation, received excellent reviews by those who have heard them, or even profited from their initial investment.

In fact, many of the points raised against theories of standardization are valid, especially those dealing with the possible democratic effect afforded by technology, Adorno's overstated belief in homogeneity, changing musical tastes, resistance against assimilation on the part of performer and audience, and conflicts over personal and social identity (Middleton 1990, 39, 45). Despite the negative connotation that writings on standardization have engendered, the basic concept of grooming music for wider sales

remains valid. Middleton writes, "In a broader perspective--that of 'world music' as a whole--standardization, with its pejorative implications, might be more usefully renamed formula." (Middleton 1990, 53)

Viewed within this light, and taking into account the strongest premise of Adorno's argument, one could understand standardization as application of formulae. One might go even further and see standardization as 'algorithmic imitation.' After all, formula implies passivity--i.e., one simply follows the recipe for creating a rock star, and *voilà*. The term 'algorithm' would suggest Adorno's more controversial proposition that cultural industries actively create templates that "listen to" or "see" the cultural artifact for the listener.[15]

Behind both types of imitation lie deeper issues pertaining to power and diversity. The Marxist treatment of standardization presupposes the exertion of capitalist will onto working-class values and needs. In other words, a music industry executive or producer must be in a position that allows him to create, impose and enforce standards. If one views imitation as commonplace within the music industry, and if certain items are excluded because they do not meet certain standards of the foremost players within the music industry, then one could infer that the product yielded by the dominant industry players would bear their mark, a brand name that would indicate that the song or artist was influenced by a particular company's expectations. One might then hear all of a particular company's product line as similar, and therefore less diverse.

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[15]Important to note also is the non-technical connotation of the word "standard" meaning a base requirement for mass production and consumption (e.g., as the term would appear in such phrases as "not up to standards" or "meeting certain standards").

The concept of standardization has little explanatory ability all by itself. In order to give it meaning, one has to see it in terms of a function pertaining to a body of music and the industry that sells it. For that reason, the history of the popular music industry becomes paramount. A review of past actions by record companies, fans and musicians provides ample evidence of formulaic imitation, the creation of templates, and long-standing concerns about musical diversity.[16]

Furthermore, one must describe this body of music in such a way as to yield a reasonably clear understanding about what the subject matter is, and define the subject matter in such a way to distinguish it from similar things that are not pertinent. Therefore, to completely define standardization in its relationship to the popular music industry, one must also describe the popular music industry itself.

Defining Pop, Part II

Since the intent of this dissertation is to examine a special relationship between music and industry, we must select the most appropriate lenses through which we can view it. In this case, the best solution entails compounding several views on what constitutes popular music. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will define popular music as a result of a process that involves the joint participation of artist, industry and audience to design, package and consume a musical artifact that is aurally agreeable, and

[16]McQuail saw the issue of structure as twofold: structural (the number of players at the forefront of the industry) and performance (the variation of products sufficient to meet the diverse needs of society) (McQuail 2005, 197-8). Both of these aspects play a central role in an ongoing controversy of whether or not performance diversity can occur despite a lack of structural diversity.

culturally relevant. Designating the monster hit as the center of the pop music sphere--i.e. the point where the artist's imagination, the producer's craft, and the industry's packaging converges with public taste--we can position various songs and artists in relationship to it.[17] A tune's location in the sphere could be measured according to where it rates along a particular axis. For example, a lot of songs that sell very few copies have been written, recorded, and put out on the market by artists signed to major labels. This indicates a point in the sphere where industry enthusiasm is high, but either the song and/or artist is uninteresting, offensive, or culturally irrelevant. Other songs might meet the same type of success as the monster hit, but not to the same extent. There are also cult songs that meet the same criteria as the monster hit, but only to a tiny subset within a marketed audience, as well as those songs on the periphery, recorded by the artist on her computer and distributed over the Internet. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will focus primarily on the songs where all the factors converge close to the core.

One of the strengths of the negative definition—i.e. defining pop as neither folk nor art--is that it makes visible a qualitative, if somewhat ethereal, understanding of commercial influence on music. Negative definitions allow us to pose the question of whether or not rock and roll only exists as a popular music; and if we say that it does, would that mean that all of it is popular in the same sense, or to the same magnitude. The Kronos Quartet's rendition of Jimi Hendrix's "Purple Haze," for example, has the

[17]Perhaps it would be more accurate to refer to this model as a 'hypersphere', or some other multi-dimensional shape since we could have more than three axes upon which to measure the spatial relationship a song might have to the center. But since explaining four-dimensional shapes is difficult enough, and since this is a dissertation on music, not mathematics, let us for now stick to a three-dimensional metaphor.

obvious sonic characteristics of rock and roll (the unresolved tritone in the seventh chord, the blue inflections, the backbeat, etc.), yet one might argue that Kronos' interpretation of the song has more in common with western art music (the tradition of the string quartet, the voice leading in four parts, and so forth). In either case, one is not likely to hear it on the classic rock station any time soon.[18] And though we do not usually regard rap as a folk idiom, it nevertheless contains folkish qualities both historically (as the aural component of hip-hop culture), and currently as associates trade beats, patches, and loops back and forth (either in person, or over the Internet), forming a communal language that will no doubt contribute to the newest (freshest) sounds making their way closer to the center of the pop sphere.

Defining the terms 'popular' and 'standardization' is absolutely critical in discussing the industrial relationship to music (and vice versa). But as the subtitle of this dissertation states, the purpose here is to examine this relation within a specific historical age termed "the rock era." So in addition to "popular" and "standardization," I must also provide an operant definition for "rock and roll." The term itself has many meanings to many people. By tracing its evolution, however, we find that the term's usage parallels developments that would indicate formulaic imitation, or standardization.

[18]In fact, I heard it for the first time on a classical music program playing on WNYC-FM, New York.

Chapter Two: The Term "Rock & Roll"

Overview

After illustrating how commercial standardization of the term came about, I will define "rock and roll" as it will appear throughout the remainder of the dissertation. Instead of starting with the generally accepted version of how the words "rock and roll" and "rock" became attached to the music, I will begin with the present-day meanings of "rock and roll," and the sister term "rhythm and blues." From there I will trace how these phrases took on their current meanings, and what they once signified.

The full story of rock and roll is really three stories--one musical, one industrial, and one cultural. The plurality of rock's identity has created confusion and misunderstanding, as assumptions made about culture have been attributed to musical text and vice versa. Early changes in terminology did not correspond to any shift in sonic properties. Instead, they indicated a cultural shift, one conducive to commercial exploitation. The hype and other extra-musical signifiers promulgated by record labels, agents, promoters, and the artists themselves consequently obfuscated many of the historical and musical connections shared by rock, rhythm and blues, and their subgenres. Yet, the impetus to separate "rock" from "rhythm and blues" came in no small part from fans who, for differing reasons, deliberately attempted to distance themselves from the racial issues surrounding earlier terminology associated with the music. In the process they created an example of standardization that came not only from above, but from below as well.

Cultural and industrial histories depict rock as a music that spontaneously sprung fully formed during the 1950s, with most accounts grudgingly admitting to a nebulous relationship between that music and an earlier form that served as its "roots," "inspiration," or "progenitor." For many, the initial reason for maintaining this viewpoint came from the need to create a comfortable niche within a marketplace rife with the potential for backlash. Those selling rock music therefore exerted control through "placing," or identifying an artist or trend, with certain demographic communities.[19] A number of markets incorporated "rock" into their designations, and relied on subtle variations of musical qualities (e.g., instrumentation), lyrical content, physical appearance of both performer and audience, and socio-political perspectives in order to form a basic taxonomy.[20] Because semiotic interpretation of the symbols pertaining to rock often focuses on extra-musical elements, the words used to describe music and musical settings often embody deeply-rooted ideological and philosophical beliefs. Thus, the language people use in distinguishing rock varieties often does not describe overt differences in what they hear. Instead, they indicate generational, experiential and cultural perspectives.

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[19]The intensity of artist placement changed with the prevailing wisdom, and shape of the industry. For example, the 1960s strategy of producing crossover hits illustrates an industry that either did not have the ability to determine markets, or saw itself as incredibly diverse. Simon Frith might suggest the latter, since he made an early distinction between the 'teen' scene of the 1950s and the 'youth' scene of the 1960s for this reason. According to him, the notion of 'teen' indicated a working/lower class adolescent. The concept of 'youth', however, implies a more classless society. (Frith 1978)

[20]For example, the terms 'folk rock', 'soft rock' and 'acid rock' describe musics that are in some way connected, but nonetheless portray diverse world views. Musics represented by such terms as 'funk' and 'soul', while stylistically and historically a significant part of the rock and roll story, are typically separated from mainstream notions of rock by name, as well as the race of performer or target audience.

The meaning of 'rock and roll' therefore evolved as each succeeding generation of youth left its mark upon it, and defined new subgenres.

For those who promoted rock, the subgenres and the extra-musical elements that symbolized them represented specific markets of potential consumers. This was obviously true of Alan Freed, the person most directly linked to the origin of the term "rock and roll." His story is worthy of discussion for it explains the history of the term as it developed over the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, we can see how adoption of the terminology represented a reaction to economic, political, and sociological themes prevalent during the death throes of Jim Crow.

In this chapter, I will begin with discussion on how the terms "rock and roll" (or "rock") and rhythm and blues have been used since the late-1970s to define demographic concerns central to music marketing. From there I will trace the steps that led to the current meanings of "rock" and "r&b" as terms denoting two distinct musical traditions. Section Three, "Where Does Beat Begin and R & B End? Can *You* Tell the Difference?" focuses on the British music scene of 1963-1964, where the often overlapping and haphazard application of the terms "rhythm and blues," "rock," and "beat," confused both writers and fans. This confusion intensified in the wake of the Beatles' successful 1964 tour, which brought international attention to English "rhythm and blues" groups. The opinion that some in England held, that British musicians were either less authentic than or simply different from the African American artists who influenced them resulted in an active search to clarify usage of terminology. Much of what the British press and music industry attempted in order to find some meaningful way to parse the differences between white "r&b" and black "r&b" is reflected in American discussions of rock and roll in

general, only not as openly. The next section examines a major source of the confusion between the terms "rock and roll" and "rhythm and blues," namely disc jockey Alan Freed, who used both terms to refer to the same music and artists. At issue here is how he used the terms, how his usage evolved, and the reasons he made conscious decisions about his usage of them. In the last section, I will summarize the preceding sections to come to two points: (1) as one goes back in time, the terms 'rock' and 'rhythm and blues' become more synonymous, to the point that they are interchangeable; and (2) standardization of terminology served as one mechanism by which to standardize popular music.

The views developed and expressed in this, and subsequent chapters concerning the cultural history of rock and roll and standardization, come from the review of secondary and primary sources. Secondary sources would include such works as Rebee Garofalo and Steve Chapple's *Rock and Roll Is Here to Pay*; Nelson George's *The Death of Rhythm and Blues*; John Jackson's impressive biography of Alan Freed *Big Beat Heat*; Marc Eliot's *Rockonomics*; Simon Frith's *Sound Effects*; and others listed in the bibliography. There are a number of books on rock history geared for a general audience, among them Mike Jahn's *Rock: From Elvis Presley to The Rolling Stones*, Dick Clark's *Rock, Roll, and Remember*, Jeremy Pascall's *The Illustrated History of Rock Music*, and other sources that give evidence of what I will later cite as 'conventional wisdom.' Many of the above works provide a basic framework of the events, tenor, and ethos of various periods within the rock era. The primary sources confirm, flesh out, and often challenge the conclusions drawn by later authors, but are even more vital because they give us an insight to the day-to-day concerns voiced by participants in the music industry at specific

times. These primary sources include a large number of articles (some with bylines, some without) from the major music or entertainment industry press: *Billboard*, *Variety*, *Melody Maker* , *Down Beat*, and *Cash Box* and later *Rolling Stone* (see Appendix E for a complete article list.). I also reviewed a number of articles from other periodicals, among them *Popular Music and Society*, *Life*, *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Jazz Journal* (two articles), *The Saturday Review*, *Crawdaddy*, *Sing Out*, *High-Fidelity (Hi-Fi)*, *Journal of American Folklore*, and from such books as *Analyzing Popular Music* (ed. Allan Moore), *Rock & Popular Music* (ed. Simon Frith), and *Rock Music in America* (ed. Janet Podell).

The Late 1970s: The Racial Meaning of Rock

> *They don't give a damn about any trumpet playing band*
> *That's not what they call rock and roll*
> --Mark Knopfler, "Sultans of Swing."

By the time Mark Knopfler's band, Dire Straits, recorded "Sultans of Swing," (1979) the confusion over the meanings of "rock."[21] and "rhythm and blues" that arose during the late-1950s and early-1960s had been resolved, for the most part.[22]

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[21]Unlike the term 'rock,' 'rock and roll' has nostalgic connotations of a music dead since the early-1960s. Nevertheless, 'rock,' as a shortened form of the term "rock and roll," appeared often in print during the 1950s, either in the title of various articles about it (e.g., "'Rock Can Be Good and Bad!'Says Perry Como," a 1958 piece penned by Ren Grevatt) and in the text of articles--e.g., "Well if rock is dead, it certainly hasn't been lying down" ("The Big Beat Has Left Its Mark" 1958, 20). That is the way that the term "rock" is used here.

[22]There were, at the time, some who questioned the categorization. Disco diva Donna Summer won the 1979 Grammy for "Best Rock Vocal Performance," for example. At the 1977 Grammy ceremony, Peter Frampton openly questioned the division between r&b and pop/rock. And as their album *Maximum R&B* might suggest, The Who, like the

Conventional wisdom of the late-1970s held that each performer belonged to a specific category: "disco," "classical," "new wave," "rock," "heavy metal," "country & western," "jazz," "r&b," and so forth. A trip to the record store of the time would show visually and spatially where certain artists belonged, and with whom they shared a common identity. One could find Kool & the Gang, Earth, Wind & Fire, and a few other "trumpet playing bands" in the r&b or disco section depending on the store. The vinyl discs of Dire Straits, The Rolling Stones, Styx, and Elvis Costello occupied the rock area. One might pick up records by Alabama and Pure Prairie League in the country & western aisles, Glenn Gould in classical, Frank Sinatra in jazz, and just about everyone else in the catchall "pop" bins. True, some artists straddled the lines, making themselves a source of debate.[23] Still, there was general consensus among the industry, the musicians and the audience as to who went where.

Some might be tempted to explain the various categories in terms of musical style, or sonic principles. After all, Gloria Gaynor's disco anthems are noticeably different from the rock screeds of Pat Benatar, just as the sound of Kool & the Gang would probably never be confused with that of Styx. But, even though they occupy the same shelf space in the record store, Kool & the Gang would also not likely be confused with Earth, Wind & Fire, nor would anyone likely mistake Styx for Dire Straits. One would expect, in the music scene of this time, each artist to offer a unique sound.

Rolling Stones among the most venerable bands of the British Invasion, for decades considered themselves a rhythm and blues act.

[23]For example, John Denver, who for years insisted that he was a "western" artist, not a "country" artist, nevertheless could find his records on country and western shelves as often as he did the pop ones.

At the same time, there were many artists who shared more aural properties with the musicians in different sections than they did with their mates in the same category. Blondie's "Heart of Glass," Gary Numan's "Cars," and M's "Pop Muzik" featured the driving bass lines and mechanical-sounding drum kits identified as essential disco traits, yet represented the "New Wave" of rock. Meanwhile, the hard cranking, distorted guitars and straightforward beat stereotypically associated with hard rock and heavy metal found expression in such tunes as Rufus's "You've Got the Love," an r&b hit. The "heavy" guitar leads characteristic of many of the rock bands were commonly heard on the works of Donna Summer and Earth, Wind & Fire. "No Tell Lover," by a trumpet playing rock band known as Chicago, was a hit of the era, as were such heavily disco influenced tunes as "Silly Love Songs," by Paul McCartney & Wings, "Miss You," by the Rolling Stones, and "Saturday Night Special" by Lynyrd Skynyrd.

While many searched for aural rationales upon which to base the separation of music into various categories, none consistently differentiated one song from another, or one performer from another. Yet, the differences between rock and r&b seemed clearer then than they did fifteen years earlier. As late as 1964, the terms had a degree of interchangeability.[24] By 1979, however, not only did "rock and roll" and "rhythm and blues" apply to two distinct sets of performers, they symbolized two distinct, almost incompatible musical perspectives. Albin Zak wrote:

> The symbolic attributes of performance styles can function in different ways, sometimes simultaneously....A famous

[24]Refer to Rock Usage Table (Appendix B) for examples of how the usage of rock changed from 1964 to 1980. Also see the Artists Terms table (Appendix E) to see how the term 'rock' was applied to various performers.

> such example is Eddie Van Halen's appearance on Michael Jackson's 'Beat It' (1982). Van Halen represents not only himself but heavy metal in general, an overwhelmingly white rock style. Jackson, on the other hand, with his Motown background, represents a particular African-American pop tradition. The two styles are not blended in any way; one is simply superimposed on the other. (Zak 2001, 52-3)

Zak described the bridge of "Beat It" as a singular meeting of two distinct musical entities that do not "blend," but rather allow for superimposition. Since he did not elaborate upon what he meant by "blending," one can only speculate that he meant that Van Halen's sound does not persist throughout the entire track, and that the world of heavy metal (rock style) that he symbolizes is not interwoven into the fabric of the song. Yet, one of the characteristics of the heavy metal sound, the distorted guitar riff, forms a quasi ostinato, against which a crunch guitarist, who is presumably not Van Halen, plays a counter-lead. This becomes a critical point, for Van Halen's solo does not simply come from out of the blue, but emerges from careful foreshadowing embedded into the structure of the song. Were it simply a matter of superimposing styles, Van Halen's solo would most likely come as an unwelcome jolt to the listener, who would hear it not as a superimposition, but rather as an intrusion.[25]

Although he does not overtly define terms, Zak implies that rock is what Eddie Van Halen does, and what Michael Jackson does not. He explains their differences in terms of historical traditions (heavy metal versus Motown), and race (white versus African American). In doing so, Zak draws upon the same conventional wisdom that served as a basis for record categorization in the late-1970s/early-1980s, and further

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[25]Imagine a Van Halen Solo on another one of the cuts on the *Thriller* album--e.g. "Human Nature," or "Billie Jean"--to understand what I mean by unwelcome jolt.

crystallized during the remaining decades of the twentieth century. But even if we subscribe to the conventional wisdom, and accept the generally held views of what constitutes rock and r&b, we must still ask why Michael Jackson cannot make an occasional rock record; or more precisely why "Beat It" cannot be considered a rock record, even though it comes from an artist that usually finds his product on the "rhythm and blues" side of the aisle.

This conventional wisdom reflected contemporary views on the history of pop music that hinged on a redefinition of rock and roll itself. Beginning in the mid-1960s, an alternative history of rock and roll's origins formed that centered not on musical style, but rather on cultural attitudes and beliefs. Rock and roll, in this new narrative, became more than a music. It became a way of life, a dogma, and a mark of personal and social identity. Specifically, it became the music of white youth. The new history of rock represented not so much a revision as it did a *post facto* explanation for the racial segregation of artists and audiences that occurred during the 1960s. The main point of many of these arguments was that there had always been a distinction between rock and roll and the music made by African Americans, for the arguments viewed rock and roll as a revolution of culture instead of as an evolution of musical style.

> Certainly, Presley drew much of his inspiration from blacks, as nearly every rock singer has. But rock has always been a predominantly white phenomenon and Presley had a powerful interpretation of it. (Jahn 1973, 19)
>
> Rock and Roll grew out of a mixing of blues and country music that first took place in the 1950s. (Evans 1987, 13)
>
> Rock & roll changed *everything*, if you were a teen in the Fifties. The way you talked, the way you dressed, the way

> you danced. [sic].... So we will not say what it is. But we *can* find out where it came from. At the crudest, rock & roll is black man's music interpreted by white performers [emphasis original]. (Pascal 1978, 12)

Racial definitions of rock and roll formed the basis of marketing strategies. True, all demographic information played a role in marketing, and racial demarcations of genre boundaries were never hard and fast. Yet they were generally accepted to the point where numerous factions of the music industry consciously enforced the color line. *Billboard* contributor Ed Harrison noted that the relatively new musical genre of disco had become tightly associated with African Americans, even though many European, Euro-Australian and Euro-American performers (e.g., the Bee Gees, Andrea True, and Henry "K.C." Casey) contributed greatly to it. As disco lost the esteem of white audiences, some within the industry equated r&b with disco, and lumped all African Americans together for marketing purposes. In the process, they moved what black performers did further away from anything defined as rock:

> Perhaps the biggest reason for current anti-black [sentiments] . . . is the correlation between black music and disco which caused a great deal of negative feelings in white audiences . . . diminishing airplay of blacks on AOR [Album Oriented Rock] stations, although denied by PDs [Program Directors -- those who are responsible for selecting records for airplay] as pertaining to race, are connected to race via disco….
>
> [Quoting Dave Lang, Program Director, WDVE-FM Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania] 'The audience that has selected our station is mostly white. We've found they also listen to other stations that play black artists. The problem is that a lot of people confuse disco and black music.'
>
> [Quoting Neil Mirsky, Program Director WSHE-FM, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida] 'Right now, black artists are heavily

> tied to the disco image which is a strong no-no for AOR stations.' (Harrison 1980, 1)

In the early-1980s, George Clinton, Kevin Murphy, Nile Rogers, Prince and other African American artists who performed music containing the signifiers many associated with rock had difficulty getting radio stations to play their music, or Music Television (MTV) to air their videos.[26] MTV founder Bob Pittman stressed that the lack of black faces on his channel had nothing to do with race, but instead reflected a marketing decision to reach a specific demographic interested in rock music (Denisoff 1991, 46-7). Although one can debate whether or not Pittman's actions had conscious or unconscious racist motivations, he clearly would have made the same programming decisions based on his understanding of the culture group he belonged to had he taken race consciously into account or not. By this time, the terms 'rock and roll' and 'rhythm and blues' were used to standardize markets. Although not musically exact, they nevertheless codified listener and industry expectations.

The use of the terms "rock and roll" and "rhythm and blues" as antitheses generally developed after June of 1967, when large corporations expressed interest in the music. The reasons for the schism lay partly in audiences' and performers' tendencies to stake out their own cultural territory, and partly in industrial needs to identify who bought

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[26]The artists mentioned above dealt with the lack of airplay in diverse ways. Clinton went on to discover and produce a number of white rock acts, most notably the Red Hot Chili Peppers. Rodgers formed the disco group Chic, and rode the disco tide (although forming the Honeydrippers with Led Zeppelin lead singer Robert Plant on the side). Before Prince's "Little Red Corvette" video finally got into MTV rotation, he had developed a false persona, that of a bi-racial outcast as portrayed in the movie *Purple Rain*, in order to distance himself from a black identity incompatible with his music (George 1989, 174).

what. In earlier times, the two phrases engendered confusion due to overlapping meanings; so one might naturally intuit that someone somewhere might have sought a way of defining each term to accurately describe either the types of records they sold, or the types of records they bought. One turning point in the definition of rock and roll as it is now understood occurred around 1964, when one of England's premier rhythm and blues bands embarked on a very successful international tour.

"Where Does Beat Begin and R&B End? Can *You* Tell the Difference?" The Contested Meanings of Rock and Rhythm & Blues from 1959-1964

The name of this section comes from the title of a 1964 *Melody Maker* article penned by staff writer Ray Coleman, who posed these and other questions to five then-prominent British artists, who featured the big beat of rhythm and blues/rock and roll in their songs. There seemed to be a general assumption, shared by both questioner and respondents, of purity, or authenticity in rhythm and blues. Moreover, such African American entertainers as Muddy Waters and Chuck Berry served as the standard for comparison. Most British performers comfortably used the term "big beat" (often syncopated to "beat") when referring to themselves. From their statements, one might infer that they preferred "beat" because it was a generic term that described the music they played. Furthermore, it had no historical or social connotations.

More attention to terminology came around the time of Beatlemania. While the Fab Four certainly alluded to earlier black sounds, many were asking, in both the US and UK, whether or not they carried the same authenticity as the American acts that British musicians looked to for inspiration. Coleman articulated concerns that the Beatles'

success might lead r&b purists to look upon their work, along with the work of their peers, as selling out. He gave, as an example, the criticism given to the works of Dave Brubeck and Peter, Paul & Mary from music writers, who claimed that they didn't represent "real" modern jazz and folk, and that their expressions were diluted re-enactments. With this in mind, Coleman asked these five artists:

> ARE YOU A RHYTHM-AND-BLUES GROUP? WHAT ARE YOUR CLAIMS? WHAT IS YOUR POLICY? [Capitals original]
>
> [Manfred Mann] Yes. Most definitely we are an R&B group...Somebody who had followed us for a long time came up to me recently and said, 'Ah, you've gone commercial'. He meant [the hit song] '5-4-3-2-1' of course. I asked him if he had heard the 'B' side, which sold well, a quarter of a million people have the chance now to hear the real thing--pure R&B, on the 'B' side....It's all very well people saying we've gone commercial, but we've played R&B for years. But when we go into a recording session, the aim is to make something that will sell. Our policy is to put a good, solid R&B number on the 'B' side every time.
>
> [Chris Curtis (drummer for the Searchers)] Until we recorded 'Needles and pins' you couldn't have said we played R&B from listening to our records. 'Needles' is the closest to R&B we have come on records....However, records are one thing, stage work another. The sort of thing we do on stage is beatier, far more R&B-flavoured material...We don't call ourselves an R&B group. We play some R&B, some rock. In other words, we're a beat group.
>
> [Mick Jagger] Rhythm-and-blues covers such a wide area. It stretches from original stuff, as from people like John Lee Hooker, to the more 'produced' material, as from Arthur Alexander and the Drifters....We are not original R&B, but if you are referring to R&B as it's understood in Britain, then yes, we're R&B.
>
> [Ray Ennis (founder of the Swinging Blue Jeans)] We definitely do not play R&B. I'm sorry people have to

> pigeonhole everything. It seems that when they're short of a pigeonhole they put it into R&B....I can only describe what we play as popular music. I can't think of any groups in Britain that play genuine R&B. If there was a genuine market for it, we'd have seen Howlin' Wolf and Jimmy Reed in the chart.
>
> [Allan Clarke (lead singer for the Hollies}] We don't label ourselves. We don't profess to play R&B--just our own stuff. We use numbers that we think audiences will like--not the stuff of the moment. (Coleman 1964 "Where Does," 7)

Since the five musicians above, and the bands they represented, shared a certain commonality in terms of sound, their diverse understandings of the term "rhythm and blues" are noteworthy. Some UK musicians saw rhythm and blues as a style. Some saw it as an indication of origin. On the question of how closely they relate to rhythm and blues, Clark said that he did not "profess" to play it; Ennis believed that no Brit band could play it; Curtis seemed somewhat apologetic, insisting that their records were not, but their stage shows were; Mann gave an unqualified yes, and Jagger's affirmation was guarded. Curtis, interestingly, linked rock and r&b together as two components of what he called "beat" music. His statement, along with those of Ennis, Jagger and Clark, gives the impression that there were two distinct musical activities occurring in the UK. First, there was r&b, which they referred to mostly as an import that featured a number of American artists who were then touring, selling records, and maintaining a fan base. Secondly, there was what the British themselves did--their version of rhythm and blues--which because of nationality and race could not duplicate the circumstances of the artists representing r&b.

In another article written in May of 1964, Coleman argued that there was a difference between the British beat sound and rhythm and blues. He believed that they represented two different styles. At the same time, however, the differences in style were

not based on the aural text of the music. He cited a recently concluded UK tour by Muddy Waters to illustrate and confirm his new belief. Waters complained that he found many young British musicians aping his sound to an astonishing degree (in particular, his use of the electric guitar), but not his approach, which was based on a more visceral knowledge of "the blues." (Coleman 1964 "Just What," 7)

Coleman and his readers objected to the r&b moniker for British musicians because they saw it as indicative of a social reality rather than anything descriptive of the music. Out of this came a reinterpretation of the term "rock." Citing one reader, Coleman wrote:

> But R&B has also brought arguments--and confusion. For it arrived in a big way at the same time as the beat boom . . . And V. Smith of Ronson, Essex declares: '...Rock is not new, but it should not be confused with rhythm-and-blues. Rhythm-and-blues has roots in the blues, and rock is just a form of pop....' (Coleman 1964 "Just What," 7)

Through the reader referred to as V. Smith, Coleman posits a synchronicity of rhythm and blues and the big beat that supposes the former played no part in creation of the latter. His view typified other attempts to reinterpret the history of rock by race, and to split it from r&b. V. Smith's notion of rock as "a form of pop" is important because only a decade earlier, white performers dominated the pop charts. Despite the influx of African Americans onto the pop charts since 1955, many within the industry still viewed African Americans' chart success as a result of "crossing over" into another category (i.e., market) outside of their domain. In other words, V. Smith, and by extension Coleman, associated white music with pop, pop with rock, and therefore rock with white music.

V. Smith was by no means the first to link 'rock' to pop and white music. 'Pop' (as it does now) implied commercial preoccupation, selling out, or pandering to wide audience tastes. One year earlier (1963) *Melody Maker's* Bob Dawburn polled a number of British musicians and agents about the differences between rock, jazz, and rhythm and blues. Again, while there was disagreement among those polled, there was also consensus. For all, the term "rhythm & blues" related both to race and geography. Thus, for the reasons mentioned above, many did not consider themselves "r&b" artists--at least not exclusively. At the same time, however, most vigorously shunned the terms "rock" and "rock and roll," which they considered a pejorative description meaning 'soulless,' a trait shared by most "pop" music as they saw it. Another *Melody Maker* writer, Chris Roberts, noted that the musicians of the Mersey movement did not refer to themselves as rhythm and blues artists, because their lack of authenticity (when compared to the standard bearers) made that a pretentious claim. At the same time, Roberts defined the Beatles as a Mersey r&b band, because he felt that they were not rock-and-roll. In other words, they were not "soulless" (Dawburn 1963, 6).[27]

On the other side of the Atlantic, 1964 marked a change in the term r&b as it referred to black musicians. In that year, a *Cash Box* editorial announced the arrival of a new label, "soul," to describe not rhythm and blues, but rock and roll. In some ways, the writer meant it as a paean to earlier generations of r&b artists who found themselves

[27]Roberts was not alone in his assessment of the Beatles. Little Richard, who saw them as purely a rhythm and blues band, attempted to get his label, Specialty Records, to sign them (Wolff 1995, 255). Sam Cooke's assessment of them: "I like them...They sell emotion" (Wolff 1995, 302).

segregated from the "pop" charts. The writer touted soul as high-quality rock worthy to share the charts with other, established white pop artists.

> For the trade, 'soul' music has evolved into one of the staple sounds of the pop singles market. It is, in a sense, rock 'n' roll's answer to the 'good music' pop ballad, which also qualifies as a pop chart 'common-denominator.' ("Soul Desks Sell," 3)

The common-denominator the writer refers to is left unexplained. But it seems to be commercial viability, since the writer points to the singles success of such artists as Dionne Warwick, James Brown, Mary Wells, and Ben E. King as indicative of soul's potential. On a deeper level, the article implies, like Coleman and his readers, that "rock and roll" connoted a lack of both quality and emotive expression (soul).

Ironically, the article used the term "soul" to distance black music from rhythm and blues, over which, in 1964, whites and blacks staked competing claims. Beatlemania most likely contributed to this change in marketing strategy. As the vanguard of a UK "invasion" of acts, some of whom regarded themselves as rhythm and bluesmen, the Beatles forced musicians and audiences to compare what the British did to other more "authentic" performers who regarded themselves similarly. Far from integrating pop charts, the term "soul" irreversibly demarcated the lines between black and white musicians. A year later (1965), when the Righteous Brothers took the charts, they were not described as soul artists, or rhythm and blues performers. Instead, they were billed as a "blue-eyed" soul group, indicating the anomaly of their skin color within the genre.

Later in the 1960s, the term 'soul' acquired associations with black militancy and nationalism.[28] At about this time, the term 'rhythm and blues' resurfaced as a term used almost exclusively as a generic reference to black music. In a (June 24) 1967 special issue dedicated to "soul," *Billboard* attempted to contextualize contemporary black music within an historical framework of African American artists. In articles titled "The Blues: A Definition," and "100 Years of the Blues," Arnold Shaw offered a depiction of twentieth-century African American music as based primarily in the blues, exemplified by such artists as Bessie Smith and Billie Holiday. The other articles in the issue subsequently depict rhythm and blues as a later development that culminated into soul, defined as the contemporary (late-1960s), rock-and-roll-influenced version of blues. Another article chronicles the rise of Atlantic, the label of the Queen of Soul, Aretha Franklin. Despite Atlantic's reputation as a premier "soul" label, *Billboard* described the company as a blues franchise:

> Ahmet Ertegun, president, and [Jerry] Wexler, vice-president, are two men who've built a great career out of the blues and together with vice-president Nesuhi Ertegun, have helped pave the way for today's broad pop acceptance of Blues. ("Atlantic Helped Pave the Way" 1967, 16.)

The industry adopted the "soul" label to distance the new wave of British rhythm and blues performers from their American predecessors . In retrospect, however, the flight might have helped to sever associations between black music and "rock and roll."

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[28]In a series of follow-up articles in 1969, *Billboard* made a more direct connection between 'soul' and political music. In an article titled "Soul Music and Social Change," Richard Robinson wrote, "The messages song is an increasingly important form of black music. Where white rock and white folk have produced protest lyrics of varying degrees of intensity, black message music has produced statements and commentaries" (R. Robinson 1969:S-12).

Like "rhythm and blues," rock had become identified as both a traditional black popular music and a white teenager music, and it bore the added stigma of crass, bottom-line, unemotional commercialism. Even before 1960, "rock" was viewed as less authentic than "rhythm and blues," and by implication not as good. The difference in nomenclature, however, did not make clear distinctions as to sound, or even artist. In 1959, jazz critic Tony Standish wrote:

> As a reader of this magazine [*Jazz Journal*] has pointed out, it is almost impossible to draw heavy lines between rock 'n' roll and rhythm-and-blues. However, differences do exist, and are immediately obvious if we compare the work of Muddy Waters with that of Larry Williams or Little Willie John. Probably the best way to separate the two styles is to regard the 'rock' singer as the one who has sold out to Tin Pan Alley. (Standish 1959, 11)

Not only did Standish consider r&b a legitimate member of the jazz family, he credited such luminaries as Chuck Berry and Little Richard with bringing this type of jazz into an exciting new era. The problem, as he saw it, consisted of the musicians' attempts to transcend the music's primary audience boundaries in order to partake in the riches (and subsequently obey the dictates) of Tin Pan Alley, which would too readily turn its gritty sound and hard-bitten poetry into slick, refined production and "syrupy" lyrics (Standish 1959, 11). He further noted that African American performers entering the mainstream competed unsuccessfully with such white imitators as Elvis Presley, whom he saw as more in the tradition of Tin Pan Alley (especially, one would guess, after signing with RCA, a major label). Consequently, he felt that many early performers of r&b did their fans a disservice by re-creating themselves as rock and roll stars, the very caricature of a rhythm and bluesman. To illustrate what he meant Standish invited readers

to compare Little Richard's more authentic 1951 r&b recordings on the Camden label with the rock and roll discs he later released on London Records (Standish 1959, 12).

The fact that Standish only reticently drew a line between 'rock and roll' and 'rhythm and blues' illustrates the confusion between the terms during the late-1950s. By the 1970s the differences between these two phrases had become clearer. In other words, since 1959 the terms have become less closely associated, and less likely to be confused with each other or used synonymously than they were earlier. In large part, the initial identification of rhythm and blues with rock and roll centers around Alan Freed, the person most credited with popularizing the latter term.

With the benefit of hindsight, we might be more inclined to view Freed's association with the term as more legend than history. If anything, Freed's use of both terms to describe the same music contributed to audience confusion. His promotion of the term "rock and roll" typified what some in the 1950s felt was a commercialization of rhythm and blues, which in turn might have given the former its negative connotations. Nevertheless, in the reinterpreted history of rock and roll, Freed made a compelling figure upon which to base the new mythology. Appropriately, Freed constantly reinvented himself in order to create his legendary role in rock's origins. At the same time, his career and his choices demonstrated how one facet of the music industry consciously attempted to standardize terminology to make its product more acceptable to the public.

Alan Freed and the "Big Beat"

William Saroyan once wrote, "It takes a lot of rehearsal for a man to be himself."[29] In other words, the disparity between what the individual is and what the individual wants to become is often so great that he must first re-create all aspects of himself, including his history--exaggerating or fabricating stories of dramatic past deeds that illustrate competence or mastery over various types of situations. With a wink and a nod, Saroyan implied not only that this is tolerable behavior, but the tendency of great men. Whether that is true or not, his words apply most ably to the description of Alan Freed given by John Jackson in his biography of Freed, *Big Beat Heat*.

Freed constantly reinvented his past in things large and small. He maintained that his parents, who wanted him to be a doctor or lawyer, vehemently opposed his desire for a career in broadcast journalism, but his brother, David, later insisted that Alan's parents actively encouraged his interest in radio. Freed told everyone that within months of landing his first radio job at WKNB (Youngstown), he had been promoted to station manager, when in reality he functioned more as a janitor/clerk (Jackson 1990, 22-23). In more professional matters, Freed diminished the role that his partner, Cleveland record store owner Leo Mintz, played in gaining airtime for rhythm and blues records (Jackson 1990, 38). Freed also wanted to give the impression that he stood alone as a white disc jockey popularizing rhythm and blues among white teenaged audiences, when in fact such radio personalities as George Oxford of KWBR (San Francisco), Bill Gordon of

[29]Quoted from Saroyan's 1939 play *Time of Your Life*.

WMPS (Memphis), Hunter Hancock of KFVD (Los Angeles), and many others preceded him (Jackson 1990, 41).

Most important, Freed claimed that he invented the term "rock & roll" in 1951, and the phrase became closely associated with his career. In an oft-told tale that wove together factual and fictional elements, Freed said that Mintz sponsored a block of time on a local Cleveland station (WJW) and asked him to host a show that featured rhythm and blues music. Assuming the "wigged out" alter ego of The Moondog, Freed launched the show in 1951 (Jackson 1990, 58). In 1954, WINS offered him a job hosting a rhythm and blues show in New York. He accepted on the condition that he could name the new show the *Rock and Roll Party*, for he suspected that the name could bolster crossover potential. The term spawned by the show quickly replaced "rhythm and blues" to describe the music it promoted.

From these stories, one can see that Freed continually honed his image into the type of folk hero demanded by the rock and roll ethos of the mid-1950s. The imagined dispute with his parents over the choice of career showed a rebellious quality that his audience could identify with and admire. In exaggerating his position at WKNB, Freed left the impression of a uniquely competent and talented go-getter. By downplaying the role others, including his associate Mintz, played in popularizing the music on a national level, and by claiming to have invented the term 'rock and roll,' Freed cast himself in the role of visionary.

One could charitably say that many aspects of Freed's version of events are true when looking at them in a certain light. WINS did in fact ask Freed to come to New York from Cleveland, after his relentless self-promotion within the Gotham City listening area

got their attention.[30] He impetuously, in a fit of pique, insisted that the show be called the *Rock and Roll Party* (Sklar 1984, 19). As the top rhythm and blues disc jockey in the nation, with popularity bolstered by national rock and roll review tours and a string of cheaply made movies, he exerted enough clout to influence use of the phrase "rock and roll." He also introduced the sound that would become the focal point of youth culture to the largest media market in the United States.

At the same time, what Freed portrayed as conscious decision-making and foresight in many instances came down to the savvy of others, most notably Mintz, and plain dumb luck. When Mintz proposed that he do a rhythm and blues show, Freed accepted, but reluctantly. The classically-trained Freed did not know very much about the music at the time. He also did not agree with Mintz's vision that rhythm and blues music would develop a large following outside the African-American community. In fact, Freed's first inkling that rhythm and blues might cross over occurred in 1953, after the Crows recorded "Gee," one of the first r&b songs bought more by whites than by blacks (Jackson 1990, 61). As for his insistence on the title of his WINS radio show, Freed made the choice on the spur of the moment after his initial choice became the subject of a lawsuit (Sklar 1984, 19). [31]

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[30]Freed syndicated a taped version of his show for WNJR (Newark) for a token fee. Although not at all profitable at the time, Freed correctly surmised that by creating a local presence, he could eventually reap the financial and personal rewards of gaining entry into the New York market (Sklar 1984, 17-8; Jackson 1990 59).

[31]Freed wanted to carry over the title of his Cleveland program, *The Moondog Show*. Thomas Hardin, composer of the novelty tune "Moondog Symphony," from which Freed took the name, sued for violation of copyright. The case was resolved in 1955 in favor of Hardin (Sklar 1984, 19; Jackson 1990, 82).

The history of the term “rock and roll,” which predated Freed’s usage by over a decade, most directly challenged Freed’s self-promoted image of visionary. In his book *Big Beat Heat*, John Jackson does a rather thorough job of proving that Freed neither invented the term, nor was the first to use it to describe African American music. A quick glance at such race record titles as "Rockin' at Midnight" and "We're Gonna Rock, We're Gonna Roll," both recorded during the 1940s, should immediately lay the claim to rest. In fact, the terms “rock,” “roll,” and “rock and roll” appeared as early as 1922 in conjunction with African American music as a euphemistic verbs for sexual activity on Trixie Smith’s race record "My Daddy Rocks Me with One Steady Roll," a line that later appeared in Langston Hughes' 1940 poem "The Big Sea." (Jackson 1990, 83) In the 1934 motion picture *Transatlantic Merry-Go-Round*, the Boswell Sisters sang a swing tune titled “Rock and Roll,” and a 1937 song, “Rock It for Me Hard,” included the lyrics, “Won’t you satisfy my soul with the rock and roll.” Jackson pointed out that while the verbal form of the words ‘rock,’ ‘roll’ and ‘rock and roll’ had a clear sexual message in songs like “my Daddy Rocks Me with One Steady Roll,’ the noun form often did not refer to sex at all. Instead, the term had by then evolved to include a noun form denoting a joyous, raucous, dance music of African American origin. (Jackson 1990, 83)

In Freed’s defense, one could speculate that he might have come across the term repeated many times in the records he spun at WJW, and simply forgot where he had first heard them. Furthermore, he might not have been aware that others had used the term “rock and roll: as a generic description of black dance music. In fact, Freed himself referred to the music that he played on *The Rock and Roll Party* as rhythm and blues, and would later point out that originally the term “rock and roll” referred only to the show,

and more generally to the teen lifestyle associated with it (Jackson 1990, 82).[32] But as the show's popularity increased, Freed eventually began to call rhythm and blues "rock and roll." Apparently, this switch in terminology did not denote a stylistic shift. The same music formerly dubbed "rhythm & blues" easily fit under the rubric of "rock and roll." For example, Freed's first Rock 'n' Roll Ball, held at the Saint Nicholas Arena in New York on January 11 and 12, 1955, featured Clyde McPhatter, the Drifters, Fats Domino, Ruth Brown, and others whom he had referred to as r&b artists a couple of years earlier.

Freed's switch to 'rock & roll' had many similarities to the preferential use of the term "rhythm & blues" over the old "race" music moniker. When *Billboard* changed the title of its "race music" charts to 'rhythm & blues' in June of 1949, most of the same recordings that appeared on the former appeared on the latter. The transition from the term "race" music to the term "rhythm and blues" was not a slow one, nor did it happen with a lot of fanfare. The two lists were virtually identical. Obviously, the name change did not indicate a change in musical style (Table 2a).

[32]To make an analogy, one could compare the usage of 'rock and roll' and 'rhythm and blues' to late-1970s and early-1980s usage of the terms 'rap' and 'hip-hop'. Whereas early on rap constituted the musical component of hip-hop expression that included visual arts ('tagging'), and dance ('breaking'), rhythm and blues constituted the musical component of the rock and roll aesthetic that featured teenage independence.

Table 2a. Comparison between *Billboard's* last "Race Music" Chart and Its First "Rhythm & Blues" Chart

"Race Music" Top 15 June 18, 1949			**"Rhythm & Blues" Top 15 June 25, 1949**	
Pos.	**TitleArtist**	**Pos. Title**	**Artist**	
1.	"Trouble Blues"	C. Brown	1. "Trouble Blues"	C. Brown
2.	"Hucklebuck"	P. Williams	2. "Hucklebuck"	P. Williams
3.	"Little Girl, Don't Cry"	B.M. Jackson & Bearcats	3. "Little Girl, Don't Cry"	B.M. Jackson Bearcats
4.	"Ain't Nobody's Business"	J.W. Witherspoon	4. "Hold Me Baby"	A. Milburn
5.	"Hold Me Baby"	A. Milburn	5. "Drinkin' Wine, Spo-Dee-O-Dee"	Stick McGee
6.	"Tell Me So"	Orioles	6. "Tell Me So"	Orioles
7.	"Drinkin' Wine, Spo-Dee-O-Dee"	Stick McGee	7. "Ain't Nobody's Business"	J.W. Witherspoon
8.	"Close Your Eyes"	H. Lance	8. "Hucklebuck"	R. Milton
9.	"Pot-Likker"	T. Rhodes	9. "Drinkin' Wine, Spo-Dee-O-Dee"	W. Harris
10.	"Hobo Blues"	J.L. Hooker	10. "Close Your Eyes"	H. Lance
11.	"Drinkin' Wine, Spo-Dee-O-Dee"	W. Harris	11. "Cole Slaw"	L. Jordan
12.	"Cole Slaw"	L. Jordan	12. "Baby, It's Cold	E. Fitzgerald
13.	"Hucklebuck Daddy"	J. Presto	13. "D'Natural Blues"	L. Millinder
14.	"Rickey's Blues"	Ravens	14. "In the Middle of the Night"	A. Milburn
14.	"Confession Blues"	Maxine Trio	14. "Pot-Likker"	T. Rhodes

The socio-political climate of the 1950s United States contributed greatly to Freed's eagerness to change terminology. In an era marked by McCarthyism and cold-war paranoia, some considered any type of subversion or challenge of the status quo as proof of communist infiltration into American society, and a threat to national security. For them, rock and roll exemplified a decay of American moral values that would ultimately lead to a collapse of "decent" society. The connection between "rhythm and blues" and African Americans often proved to be the most controversial component of the music. Throughout the 1950s, critics utilized racial stereotypes in an attempt to demonstrate the music's innate inferiority. The White Citizens Council of Birmingham, Alabama charged that rock and roll, "the basic heavy-beat music of the Negroes"

appealed to “the base in man….[bringing] out animalism and vulgarity” (Szatmary 1988, 25). Vance Packard, author of the book *The Hidden Persuaders,* testified before a Senate subcommittee that rock and roll promoted “the animal instinct in modern teenagers” with its “savage tone” (Szarmary 1988, 25). Meanwhile, performers such as Chuck Berry, Antoine "Fats" Domino and "Little" Richard Penniman remained quite visible as the bearers of this new aesthetic -- particularly problematic during a time of *de jure* segregation.

Freed genuinely felt that the attack on rock was racist, and freely discussed that opinion openly:

> To me [Freed], this campaign against rock and roll smells of discrimination of the worst kind against the great and accomplished Negro songwriters, musicians and singers who are responsible for this outstanding contribution to American music. (Freed, quoted by Cage April 1955, 41)

The above quote offers evidence of Freed's sensitivity to this issue, and provides a clue as to why he preferred the term “rock and roll” to “rhythm and blues.”[33] Since the latter had already, by that time, served as an epithet of African-American music for a number of years, the former, gleaned from the lyrics of race music, had less of a racial stigma. The new terminology could plausibly help give the music a more universal appeal, and at the same time assure the mainstream public that it did not threaten prevalent racial

[33]Freed’s sensitivity to the racial aspects of rock and roll may have been, in part, due to an incident that occurred on March 21, 1952. A concert, promoted by Freed as the Moondog Coronation Ball led to a riot due to overcrowding. Since almost all of those who attended were black, the local press covered much of the story as a racial incident. Even black-owned newspapers such as *The Call and Post* denounced the event, the attendees and the music as representing the lowest class of blacks and justifying racial stereotypes (Jackson 1990, 2-3).

theories, mores and politics. One could argue that the original name could only have exacerbated the public outcry against a music, which before the end of the decade would be subject to intense private, public and legal scrutiny.

> Freed maintained that he originally thought of the phrase 'rock & roll' after he and Leo Mintz argued that the racial stigma of rhythm and blues would have to be eliminated in order to cultivate a broader audience for the music.(Jackson 1991: 82)

Freed had another incentive to promote the term "rock and roll." In addition to downplaying the music's most controversial feature, he believed that the term would someday become important, a household word, so to speak. To that end he, along with friends and fellow rock entrepreneurs Morris Levy and Lew Pratt, and WINS, formed Seig Music, Incorporated. Its primary goal was to obtain a copyright on the term "rock & roll." Although their attempt ultimately failed, Freed, from that moment on, only referred to the music as "rock and roll" (Sklar 1984, 19; Jackson 1990, 85).

The meanings of the terms "rock and roll" and "rhythm and blues" began to differ after that. The "blues" had followed blacks from the rural South (e.g., Huddie Ledbetter and Lemon Jefferson) to the urban north (e.g., John Lee Hooker and B.B. King), while the "rhythm" was present in jazz and other forms of African American music. Conversely, "rock and roll," whether performed by African Americans or not, became the expression by which a generation of white American (and, as Frith points out, British) teenagers could distinguish themselves from their parents and others in authority. The terms "rock" or "rock and roll" and the music it described subsequently became symbolic of youthful independence. For this reason, the term "rock and roll" had an advantage over "rhythm

and blues,":which acknowledged an adherence to the older values of a marginalized sector of society. During the 1950s both ideals were represented by the same songs, and often by the same artists. These circumstances, however, changed as the relationship between the music industry and youth-oriented music evolved.

Defining Rock

Briefly summarizing, the term "rock and roll" evolved from a generic term for African American dance music into a synonym of either "rhythm and blues," or "commercialized rhythm and blues." From there the term further evolved to define a music that had some common roots with rhythm and blues. It finally came to mean music that stemmed from a different tradition than rhythm and blues. The dynamic change in the meaning and history of rock came neither by decree of some record executive, nor from a grass-roots campaign to trumpet one version of events over the other. Instead, it grew out of the understandable tendencies toward self/group identification for listeners, and the need to understand markets for the label executive. While we can point to such things as the previously cited *Cash Box* editorial as the first active promotion of the term "soul" in a mainstream music publication, we cannot say that *Cash Box* thrust the term upon the public to distinguish white rock and roll from black rock and roll. Yet, we can see that the industry adopted the term and the usage that the *Cash Box* article suggested. As a result, listener and industrial concerns created what Adorno would call separate templates, stereotypical notions of genre or style that originally had few if any sonic differences between them. In other words, the terminology describing a performer's

persona, ethnicity, what he or she projected to the public, and aural signifiers, had standardized.

The "age of rock," as applied here, began when rhythm and blues ceased to be an exclusively African American music, due to the attention given to it by young white audiences. The term "rock and roll," in the 1950s, referred to the music associated with the teenaged/young adult market for both blacks and whites that ensued.[34] Consequently, one can also think of rock as youth-oriented music. For the purposes of this dissertation, the term 'rock and roll' or 'rock' encompasses all the musics that have a stylistic (musical) connection to 1950s rhythm and blues. That would include current rhythm and blues, disco, ska, rock, heavy metal and many other youth-oriented musics.

Since 1951, when Freed first hit the airwaves of WJW, more incidents and trends followed that helped standardize both the youth-oriented bent of the music industry, and its various markets into two basic templates that were racially defined. In some cases--e.g., the term "rock" versus "rhythm and blues"--templates gradually emerged. Other times, changes and standards were established through deliberate and direct human agency. As the major labels became more involved in the production of youth-oriented music, they demonstrated a greater desire to shape markets, especially in terms of racial demographics.

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[34]General industry wisdom suggests that the record-buying public since 1955 was mostly between thirteen to thirty-four years of age.

Chapter Three: The Legacy of the Race Record

Overview

Upon entering the mainstream of popular culture, rock and roll underwent a number of non-musical events and trends leading to subtle degrees of stylistic variation that formed the templates differentiating subgenres of the rock era. This chapter, and the three following, will focus on different periods during which tension between artist, industry and audience autonomy peaked, thus encouraging standardization of musical approaches and marketing strategies. This chapter discusses issues of standardization during the initial mainstreaming of rock. The following chapters address (a) adoption of rock and roll by the major labels as their primary product, which in turn coincided with the consolidation of the music industry; and (b) the consolidation of the radio industry.

During the initial mainstreaming of rhythm and blues into the public sphere, occurring roughly between 1954 and 1964, the music later known as rock and roll was first exposed to an audience outside of its original fan base. In the first section, I will discuss some of the reasons cited for teenage attraction to rhythm and blues along with the reasons cited for the backlash against it. In the next, I will discuss the business model of the record and publishing industries of the day, and the role that the smaller and larger companies played in either (1) promoting rock, (2) adapting to rock, or (3) trying to put an end to wider acceptance of rock. I will end the chapter by examining the results of the struggle between the entertainment industry, fans and musicians, and the negotiation of standards that kept the music within the public eye during the early-1960s, despite the declarations of some that the rock and roll fad of the 1950s had run its course by then.

I will draw upon a number of secondary sources, including articles and books written by Richard Peterson, Nelson George, Rebee Garofalo, Steve Chapple and others who have outlined many of the factors that led to the explosion of rock and roll record sales in 1955. I will also draw upon newspaper and magazine stories from such dailies as *The New York Times*, *The Chicago Tribune*, and *The Wall Street Journal* to document information about specific events. Some of the accounts given by journalists were first-hand versions of events that would play a prominent role in popular music history. Newspapers also quoted sources close to the story, many times by name. Magazines and weekly newspapers (e.g. *Look*, *The Village Voice*, *The Christian Science Monitor*) often provided critical analysis of contemporary popular music issues.

I will largely cite, however, the primary source material offered in the weekly and monthly trades: *Billboard*, *Variety*, *Melody Maker*, *Rolling Stone*, *Down Beat*, *Crawdaddy*, *Hi-Fidelity*, *Creem* and *Cash Box*. These periodicals have always been an important source for musicians, entertainment executives and reporters covering the music industry for they offer information about the pressing concerns of the music business on a weekly basis. These papers liberally quote industry sources who frequently speak for their peers, and whose opinions and knowledge influence others. Those who penned articles of the trade developed sharp insights to the mechanics of the entertainment industries and the social context in which they existed.

Such writers as Dave Banks, Ruth Cage, Herm Schoenfeld, and un-bylined others of the 1950s, for example, collectively held a unique perspective shared by people living with, working with, and witnessing the rise of rock and its incipient controversy. A number of issues and perspectives that might seem risible to twenty-first century attitudes

and sensibilities were taken quite seriously during the 1950s. Those who did not believe any of the extreme proclamations made on either side of the rock controversy nevertheless tended to show respect for views contrary to their own, although the extremists whom they quoted could be downright incendiary. These voices of the 1950s and early-1960s chronicled a music scene piloted and ridden by those unsure of the changes occurring within the industry.[35] What emerged from the confusion of the 1950s was the standardization of procedures for producing, disseminating, and consuming popular music that lasted for decades with few changes.

The Race Record and Its Legacy

Race played an important role in constructing rock & roll identity. The history of rock coincided with societal changes both in the United States and in England occurring during the 1950s. As Frith noted, some of these changes had to do with a growing number of middle-income families, who ultimately raised the wage base for the previously marginalized economies of blacks and of white teenagers. The tendency of rock to draw audiences comprised of both black and white teenagers reflected the widespread push to end racial segregation in the southern US, and consequently spawned a backlash that reputable companies found troubling despite the music's skyrocketing sales ("'Jungle Music' Cry at Randall U.S. Show" 1956, 1; "Jim Crow Chief Hits at Rock and Roll" 1956, 7: Banks 1956, 7). The re-segregation of rock by dint of a bifurcated

[35] A comprehensive listing of the articles cited here appears in the Periodical Breakdown (Appendix C). A brief synopsis of each article appears in Article Table (Appendix D), along with an outline of where each article fits within the discussion of standardization.

general marketing strategy might have eased some of these tensions as rock headed for the 1960s and large-scale corporate patronage. Nevertheless, the tendency to divide markets by race remained from 1964 to the present day, and subsequently, the stylistic idioms of black rock & roll (r&b, or soul) and white rock & roll (or rock) developed independently.

Since the 1910s, racial considerations influenced decision-making in popular music production. At the end of World War I, those in charge of the record industry avoided developing a musical repertoire that would predominately cater to the tastes of black Americans because many believed that the vast majority of this group did not have the wherewithal to buy a phonograph. Victor and Columbia had made limited forays into the world of recorded jazz, despite the fact that Victor's first jazz releases, "Livery Stable Blues" and "Dixie Jass Band One-Step," recorded by the Original Dixieland Jazz Band, sold over a million copies. The significance of this development, however, went largely unnoticed until 1920 when songwriter Perry Bradford convinced Fred Hager, director of Okeh Record's parent company, to record Mamie Smith's version of two of his songs, "That Thing Called Love" and "You Can't Keep a Good Man Down." These discs sold well enough to merit another session in the studio. In the fall of 1920, her recording of "Crazy Blues" exceeded all hopes of success, with average sales of 7,500 copies per week (Chapple and Garofalo 1977, 2). Thus, label executives discovered a 'new' market that catered to the tastes of an emerging class of black consumers. Those who produced the sound simply called it 'race music.' Likewise, music popular among Appalachian and rural-Americans became known as 'hillbilly' records (Chapple and Garofalo 1977, 8, 28-9).

The 'race' and 'hillbilly' records enjoyed solid sales during most of the 1920s, thus fostering the growth of such independent companies as King and Black Swan.[36] Paramount, Columbia, and other large labels also recorded both race and hillbilly fare (Chapple and Garofalo 1977, 8). Nevertheless, the history of these genres proved to be as turbulent as the economical and socio-political climate surrounding them. The stock-market crash in the fall of 1929 contributed significantly to the decrease of some luxury item sales. Some labels (e.g. Paramount) were sold off for quick cash, while others (Columbia) restricted the production of these styles. As the Depression went on, the production of 'hillbilly' and 'race' records increased, but the shortages of raw materials during World War II once again curtailed their production (Chapple and Garofalo 1977, 8).

At the end of World War II, a number of elements combined to make the resumption of race records profitable again. The subsequent fusion of rhythm and blues into the emerging youth culture of the 1950s furthered the race record's legacy. In the process of spreading beyond its intended fan base, r&b adapted to some industry practices, and influenced others. In order for r&b's growing influence to continue, the music first had to catch the ear of those for whom it was never meant, and persist despite virulent condemnation on a number of grounds.

Part of rhythm and blues' acceptance lay in the changing racial climate of the United States during the 1940s and 1950s. During this time, Congress attempted to pass

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[36]Black Swan ran into financial difficulty early in the 1920s. It tried to stay afloat by merging with another label, Olympia, but was eventually sold to Paramount in 1924 (Weusi 2005; sec. 4, para. 5)

its first Civil Rights Act (1949), President Harry Truman ordered the desegregation of the armed forces, and Brown versus the Topeka Board of Education initiated a legal push towards ending *de jure* segregation (1954). Taking into account the racial overtones that it would retain, the controversy over rock and roll may have been eased somewhat by the growing credibility of a civil rights movement that challenged the notion of race as a basis for discrimination and segregation. Nelson George suggested that the new racial tolerance resulted from World War II itself. More important, the post-war era led to the beginnings of self-sufficiency, fueled by a growing economy that, in a segregated society, offered blacks entrepreneurship opportunities that they did not have earlier.

> World War II was a time of heroism and pain. It was also a time of opportunity for blacks. The war straining America's resources meant its largely untapped supply of blacks (and white women) were given a chance to prove their loyalty to a nation that had discriminated against them for nearly three hundred years. (George 1988, 20)

Black economic gains coincided with an expansion of radio music formats that helped rhythm and blues gain larger audiences. Richard Peterson listed six factors that explain in part the rise of rock and roll during the mid-1950s: (1) legal matters; (2) technological innovations; (3) the structure of the industry at that time; (4) changes in the nature of professional musicianship (or as he puts it "Occupational Careers."); (5) the organizational structure within all businesses of that era; and (6) the evolving rock market (Peterson 1990, 98).[37] Regarding legal matters, a 1947 FCC ruling that lessened

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[37]Despite the title of the cited essay, "Why 1955? Explaining the Advent of Rock Music," Peterson does not really give any reason why the year of 'rock's advent' would be 1955 specifically, as opposed to 1954 or 1956. For that reason, I will just say the mid-

bandwidth separation quickly led to a doubling of radio stations within every US market. Also, the Copyright Act of 1909 allowed for the collection of royalties for every record sold. Government regulations forced equipment manufacturers to accept a standardized format for record speeds in order to keep companies that sold both music and playback material (e.g., RCA) from gaining a competitive advantage (Peterson 1990, 99-100). Technological innovations included the exponential rise in the number of households that owned television sets from 1948-1955, thus offering a new medium for promotion, especially for such performers as Elvis Presley who could use their physical appearance to great advantage. The development of the transistor allowed for the production of portable radios, which meant that the promotional medium became more ubiquitous (Peterson 1990, 102). In terms of organization, radio companies and record labels tended to pare decision making levels within the company and vertically integrate--i.e., companies that once contracted out for services either bought other businesses that performed those services, or expanded their capabilities to include such services (Peterson 1990, 103-6).[38] Other major changes occurring in radio during this time included the nature of content, left bereft of much of what had sustained network radio programming for the previous three decades. From the 1920s to the late-1940s, radio served as the chief source of electronic home entertainment. Although a number of popular music programs featured such personalities as Ben Berdie and Kay Kaiser, a lot of network radio fare consisted of spoken-word programming: game shows, soap operas,

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1950s.

[38]Columbia, for instance, contracted Philco, an appliance manufacturer, to distribute the former's records along with the latter's phonographs and radios until 1951, when Columbia created its own distribution system.

suspense thrillers, situation comedies, and sports (Peterson 1990, 103-4). The post-war introduction of commercial television led to a widespread defection of programs and talent to the new medium. *The Jack Benny Show*, *Gunsmoke*, and *The Saint*, for example, all made the transition from radio to television.

Meanwhile, 81% of all hits in 1948 came from one of the big four labels: Columbia, RCA, Capitol, and Decca. Eighteen ASCAP-associated companies controlled virtually 100% of the publishing market (Peterson 1990, 111). Local network affiliates, when not with the station, often played music, live or recorded, especially on weekends (Peterson 1990, 103-4). The increase in radio stations across the United States, coupled with the diminishing power of network radio, left ample opportunity for music to become a more important part of local radio programming. The lack of network programming also spurred local affiliates to combine performance jobs that turned announcers into personality-focused disc jockeys (Peterson 1990, 109). George cited this change as one reason for the rise in black radio between 1947 and 1950. Not only did the number of black disc jockeys and announcers increase over those three years, but a number of stations--among them WOKJ (Jackson, Mississippi), WLOU (Louisville) and WXLW (Saint Louis)--took advantage of the post-war prosperity of the new markets that African Americans represented, and programmed content catering to them (George 1988, 40-1; Chapple and Garofalo 1977, 28).

WDIA (Memphis) stood out in its importance and influence. Like many other white-owned stations starting up after the war, the founders of WDIA initially geared its programming to white audiences until they realized that they could make more money catering to the local black market, which had become more prosperous in the post-war

economic boom. In 1948, one year after it first went on the air, WDIA switched to an all-black format (Jackson 1990, 41). Broadcasting in the city known for its Beale Street music district, WDIA's generous airing of rhythm and blues probably seemed quite natural. Arguably the station's chief asset, its 50,000 watt transmitter, could easily broadcast to anyone inside a 100-mile radius ("Indie Diskers Back WDIA's R&B Bans" 1954, 16), thus making WDIA programming impossible to segregate by neighborhood, and subsequently attracting a white teenaged audience. The increasing influence that the station held over this segment of society would make it influential in terms of promoting not just rock and roll, but also the cultural aspects attributed to it (most notably rebellion and sexual liberty).

Many have given a number of reasons why white teenagers were attracted to WDIA, and other stations around the U.S. that featured r&b. Chapple and Garofalo felt that the mid-1950s represented the epitome of the Eisenhower era, when a "doddering" patriarch reigned over a peaceful and prosperous nation that white teenagers found dull. Consequently, rock and roll became the only thing in their lives that offered any type of excitement (Chapple and Garofalo 1977, 27). Frith reasoned that the music offered white teens an opportunity to distance themselves from the parental authority under which they chafed. Just as dungarees (blue jeans) represented the antithesis of the elder generation's idea of proper attire, rock clashed with parental notions of good taste, for the beat of the dance gave them "their bodies back" (Frith 1981, 21). Given their post-war affluence, derived from disposable income that they did not have to contribute to family finances, teenagers could buy both jeans and records, and thus became an attractive market (ibid.; Chapple and Garofalo 1977, 46-7). *Life* magazine featured a photo essay that focused on

the exaggerated beat, and implied (by the pictures of dancing couples) that the sexual overtones of rock lyrics inspired the kind of easy sexual liberation fostered by casualness ("Rock 'n' Roll: A Frenzied Teenage Music Kicking Up a Big Fuss" 1955, 166-8). Herm Schoenfeld and other reporters covering the rise of rock and roll agreed that the rhythms and tempo of rock and roll were what teens found fascinating about the music (Schoenfeld 1955 "R&B Big," 48, 54; Grevatt 1958, 3).

Both George and Ian Whitcomb linked the 1950s white teen fascination with r&b to an even larger movement occurring at the time, namely the desire of those Europeans and Euro-Americans who saw themselves as outcasts to identify with African Americans (Whitcomb 1983, 52). While these so-called "White Negroes," as described by Norman Mailer in an essay of the same name, became most apparent in the beatnik scene, one could see a parallel between Mailer's concept and this rock and roll generation:

> The life-style of the cool black hipster was admired and copied by the white bohemians, particularly the slang and the drug usage. Norman Mailer dubbed them 'White Negroes' and noted that what they admired had many of the characteristics of the psychopath--the instant gratification, the rebellion without cause, the craving to make headlines. . . a new breed of urban adventurers drifting out at the night, looking for action with a black man's code to fit their facts. (Whitcomb 1983, 54)

Gary Marx noted that there were similar circumstances shared by blacks and hipsters, and much of what he points out holds true for white teens grooving to rock and roll. None of the above had gained the acceptance of established society, or had much authority within that society (Marx 1967:sec. 1, para. 6). At the same time, many of the tendencies ascribed to blacks by Mailer in the essay "White Negroes" were not those that

blacks actually had, but rather ones that became associated with them through past stereotypical depictions in media:

> Knowing in the cells of his existence that life was war, nothing but war, the Negro (all exceptions admitted) could rarely afford the sophisticated inhibitions of civilization, and so he kept for his survival the art of the primitive, he lived in the enormous present, he subsisted for his Saturday night kicks, relinquishing the pleasures of the mind for the more obligatory pleasures of the body, and in his music he gave voice to the character and quality of his existence, to his rage and the infinite variations of joy, lust, languor, growl, cramp, pinch, scream and despair of his orgasm. For jazz is orgasm, it is the music of orgasm, good orgasm and bad, and so it spoke across a nation, it had the communication of art even where it was watered, perverted, corrupted, and almost killed. (Mailer 1957, 345)

If we substituted the phrase "rock and roll" for "jazz," then some of what Mailer described as the stereotypical hipster/beatnik would also apply to the stereotypical 1950s teenager.[39] While one could certainly argue that the teenager had neither the sophistication nor self-awareness of the hipster, the act of rebellion found expression in rock and related cultural artifacts, such as the 1955 movie *Blackboard Jungle*, which prominently featured Bill Haley and the Comets' "Rock around the Clock" on its soundtrack. In fact, the rebellious teen portrayed by Vic Morrow in the film personified both the rock and roller, and the White Negro with his use of slang, his lax body posture,

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[39]There was an ongoing comparison between rock and jazz that lasted until 1965, and many discussed whether or not rock should be considered a form of jazz.. In addition to the King piece cited in the previous chapter, see "Keeping Up with Jones on Rock 'n' Roll; Prof Puts Beat on a Couch" (1957, 55), Standish (1959, 11-2), and Martin Williams (1965, 20-1) for good examples.

deliberate movement, dress, insolence, and inclination toward violent "action." Such were obvious exotic characterizations of the 'other' that, through association with black music (either jazz or rhythm and blues), Mailer, Marx, and others found captivating. Alan Freed intentionally adopted the affectations of the white Negro in his on air persona of Moondog, even though many African Americans, especially in New York, disliked the racial aping. (Jackson 1991, 71). Nevertheless, white teenagers were enthralled:

> If many black teenagers were initially offended by Freed's showy style, his white audience, most of them unfamiliar with the local black disc jockey style, automatically assumed that's the way [black radio was]. (Jimmy McGowan quoted by Jackson 1991, 71; brackets original)[40]

At the same time, the association of rock with black stereotypes was more explicitly made by certain conservative elements of society, who readily saw the connection between white teen and African American culture as a threat to the status quo, and consequently took active steps to curb widespread enthusiasm in the music that represented both. As much as WDAI symbolized most of what the rhythm and blues fan might love, it also embodied everything that the anti-rock movement hated. Consequently, WDIA, in the fall of 1954, became the first radio station to come under public pressure because of its r&b programming. Critics charged that WDIA played music containing "double meaning" lyrics that were sexual at their core ("Indie Diskers Back WDIA's R&B Bans" 1954, 16). While much of the mainstream press avoided mentioning race as a factor in the pressure exerted against WDIA, the association of blues with licentiousness might have come easily to both fans and critics, for as Mailer's observation of black

[40]Jimmy McGowan was a popular 1950s doo-wop crooner from Brooklyn, NY.

culture implied, the instant gratification, free sex, and come ons had already crystallized in the American consciousness as characteristics of the Negro. And while professional journalists might have shied from the race issue, the sources they quoted put it forth more openly, interjecting not only societal attitudes regarding black sexual mores, but also attitudes regarding such other black attributes as sloth, violence, duplicity, dishonesty, substance abuse, and animalistic behavior. In other words, many of the stereotypes about African Americans, both positive and negative, became associated with 1950s rock and roll.

WDIA responded in the manner most favored by longer-term rhythm and blues businesses and professionals. In answer to the charge of "dirty lyrics," the station offered to censor itself, and found support not only in the mainstream press for doing so, but from other r&b independents, among them Chess, Herald, Apollo and King ("Indie Diskers Back WDIA's R&B Bans" 1954, 16; "Editorial" 1954, 16; Jackson 1990, 41). Bob Ferguson, WDIA's station manager, made sure to point out that not all r&b songs were suggestive, and assured the public that the station's playlist would only include non-offensive material. Despite Ferguson's professed indignation at "dirty" lyrics in 1954, the station had aired such records for six years. Moreover, the labels supporting the ban had produced the controversial material, and would continue to do so. The difference now was that WDIA had a new audience, the parents of which might have objected to r&b on musical, moral and cultural grounds.

WDIA's ban on some rock and roll might have, in retrospect, risked alienating some members of its new audience, for the action smacked of selling out, or kowtowing to authority. But if the censoring of r&b threatened to diminish white teen audiences, then

some within the African American community and the cultural industries serving them did not seem to mind. The independents already had a reliable market, and some insiders predicted grave consequences if the music were allowed to grow outside of its originally intended audience. Joe Bostic, a black disc jockey from New York, also took a public stand against "dirty lyrics," and mentioned a number of other African American radio personalities that felt the same way, among them Jack Walker and Hal Jackson ("Negro D.J. Raps Spread of 'Filth' via R&B Disks" 1955, 1). Bostic blamed groups with cute animal names (e.g. the Spaniels, the Penguins, etc.), and WINS disc jockey Alan Freed for popularizing r&b with white audiences (ibid., 54). The promotion of rock and roll to outsiders, in his view, would only lead to problems:

> The fever [popularity of r&b] had mushroomed outside the Negro market and their pastures were being grazed on by the independent operators, many on shoestring operations. . . . So the big boys are worried and ready to go into action to do something to stop the steamroller of jingling jukebox and record store gold. (Bostic quoted in "Negro D.J. Raps Spread of 'Filth' via R&B Disks" 1955, 54)

One could safely assume that Bostic, like other disc jockeys of this era, had a close working relationship with record companies of all types. His analysis of the music's imminent dominance, gauged by "jingling gold," suggests that the phenomenon of rock and roll had become so immense that no one in the music industry could afford to treat it passively. What he further implied, that major labels were actively trying to stop the dissemination of rock and roll, is more problematic, for that assertion lacks direct confirmation. Still, it would seem that his warning to r&b producers had either missed its mark, or had come too late. By 1957, white teenagers had become the largest consumers

of r&b (Kramer 1957, 26).

Dave Banks, a rock and roll disc jockey at WNOE (New Orleans) wrote a *Down Beat* article that described his brush with a nationally organized effort by the Ku Klux Klan and the White Citizens' Council to ban rock from the airwaves through violence directed against radio stations and their sponsors (Banks 1956, 7). In an effort to give a fair hearing to the conservative perspective, Banks played a pre-recorded interview with WCC spokesperson Asa Carter for his listening audience. Not only did Carter decry rock and roll as "a plot of the NAACP [to] undermine the morals of the youth of the nation," but he characterized rock as "sexualistic, unmoralistic [sic], and the best way to bring young people of both races together according to the late [NAACP President] Walter White" (Banks 1956, 7).

While many journalists covering the early rock controversy made attempts to remain objective and balanced, a number of their peers gave those agitating against rock and roll an open forum in which to issue statements and opinions about the music without commentary, or without the inclusion of dissenting opinions within the same article.[41] Other reports appeared to have sensationalized racial incidents occurring at rock events as riots, or near-riots,[42] and in the case of an actual riot, such as had occurred in Boston in

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[41]See "Negro Artists Rise as Solid Pops Sellers" 1956, 18; "The Big Beat Has Left Its Mark" 1958, 20; and "Jimmy Snow Smears R&R; Presley's Ex-Aid, Now an Evangelist, Calls It Sinful" 1960, 1+ for good examples.

[42]A 1956 Fats Domino concert in Houston, for example, was described as a near-riot, even though press reports of the incident mentioned nothing about violence or the threat of violence from concertgoers. A number of white teenagers joined a number of black teens on the dance floor, and police broke up the race-mixing, and sent everyone back to their seats. A short time later, an officer announced that only whites would be allowed to

1958, as an anarchistic massacre, requiring immediate legislation to ban rock from major venues (Livingston 1958, 41). A number of articles criticized the inclusion of "leer-ics" as if lewdness and rock were intertwined.

In the fall of 1956, one mildly anti-rock disc jockey, Art Ford of WNEW (New York), invited a local psychologist, Dr. Ben Walstein to discuss on his regular afternoon show possible pathology in the sexual content of both the lyrics and the beat of rock and roll, and in the general consumption of the music by a teenaged audience.[43] To Ford's surprise, Walstein found nothing in rock particularly morbid (Ford and Walstein 1956, 44). The psychologist compared rock to other popular musics held dear by earlier generations of teenagers, and noting that sexual themes were abundant in them as well, came to the opinion that such content was normal for adolescents. Walstein concluded the interview by suggesting possible pathology in the anti-rock movement (Ford and Walstein 1956, 46).

Record labels associated rock and roll with high sales and high negativity. Before Elvis Presley signed with RCA in 1955, the thought of selling 3,000,000 copies of a single record would have been unfathomable (Asbell 1959, 7). Many within the industry also cited rock's popularity as a cause of the increased interest in Nat King Cole, Sammy Davis Jr., Dinah Washington and other African American artists who performed more

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dance. Many black attendees went to the ticket office to ask for a refund, and were met by a large contingent of police who evicted them. The black teens left peaceably and without incident ("Near-Riot in Houston as Police Nix Dancing by Negroes at R&R'er"1956, 1, 18).

[43]Ford played rock and roll on his show, but stated during the course of this interview that he only did so because of the insistence of station management to include some rock songs in his programming.

traditional Tin Pan Alley ballads ("Negro Artists Rise as Solid Pops Sellers"1955, 18; Simon 1956, 55; Grevatt 1958, 3). The music also brought with it a repertoire that enticed such white mainstream performers as Perry Como and Patti Page to perform and record rock songs (Grevatt 1958, 3; "Old R.&B. Hits Pan New Gold in Pop Category"1960). At the same time, however, rock carried with it the stigma of subversion, violence, corruption and race-mixing that resulted in such actions as the legislation in response to the 1958 Boston concert riot, the investigation before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) for suspected communist influence, and the trials of rock DJs on charges of tax evasion.[44]

The businesses involved in record production and publishing had to negotiate between their desire to 'cash in' on the rock explosion and their fear of public reaction that might tar all of a company's product line with the same tainted brush. Many of the smaller labels, such as those who endorsed the WDIA ban, and some radio stations that aired r&b preferred to rein in the increasing influence of their music. Atlantic, WABC and other media companies openly tried to expand it. The major labels handled the music delicately, in some cases finding ways of disassociating themselves from rock, and in others attempting to bring some degree of quality to the music by implementing the algorithmic formulae of past pop success. Publishers began to change their business strategy. Hardly anyone in the 1950s, however, ignored rock and roll completely.

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[44]Payola, though highly disapproved of, was quite legal at this time. Freed and other disc jockeys were convicted of not reporting the income made from payola on their tax statements.

Rock and Roll and the Music Industry.

In 1941, most recognized RCA, Decca and Columbia as the industry leaders. Capitol Records began operations in 1943, and MGM (1946) and Mercury (1947) formed after the war. Together, these six labels constituted the majors (Chapple & Garofalo 1977, 15-6).[45] The economics that allowed for a greater number of large record companies geared toward mainstream tastes also allowed for the development of similar businesses that catered to a smaller market. Thus, in the decade and a half following WWII, a number of smaller labels specializing in the race/blues/rhythm and blues genres, among them Atlantic (1947), Chess/Checker (1948), Roulette (1948), and Motown (1959) (George 1988, 27-8), promoted their records to black-targeted radio stations and African American radio personnel. Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI), formed in 1939, aided the viability of these smaller companies by offering copyright protection to such publishing firms as Ace Music, who primarily had handled rhythm & blues catalogs that ASCAP typically shunned.

The majors' initial reaction to rock was to treat it as the passing fancy of a tiny subset of youngsters. *Variety*, *Billboard*, and other contemporary entertainment news sources quoted a number of industry people, who claimed as early as the summer of 1955 that rock and roll had run its course ("Rhythm & Blues" 1955, 15), partially because of the expected downturn that often affected music sales during the hot months, coupled with the assumption that the dance aspect of rock would prove less enjoyable in warm weather ("R&R Not for Heat?" 1956, 51). Presumably, the fever referred to by Bostic

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[45]Chapple & Garofalo conceded that one could arguably add London Records to the list of majors (Chapple & Garofalo 1977, 15).

would be gone by fall.

The industry-insider rock-is-dead position became almost a mantra for the majors that would last until 1964.[46] Yet the majors could hardly dismiss the commercial possibilities that rock offered. Rock and roll recordings accounted for nine of the nineteen top-ten hits of 1956 (Chapple & Garofalo 1977, 43). Television shows and films began incorporating rock more and more ("Top Standards on Radio and TV" 1957, 58; Grevatt 1959, 2). By 1959, even ASCAP reconsidered its position on publishing rock songs ("New ASCAP View on Pop, Rock & Roll?" 1959, 2). Despite their previously dismissive attitude, the majors quickly became willing to include rock to a very limited degree. Decca signed Buddy Holly in 1956, but released his recordings on Brunswick, a subsidiary label. RCA signed Elvis Presley in 1955, hoping he would blossom into a major star. Mitch Miller, chief of A&R at Columbia Records, vocally anti-rock and a pop star in his own right, nevertheless agreed that it would be wise for his label to carry a limited number of rock and roll artists, and for its established artists to record some rock songs so that teenagers could have something to dance to (Grevatt 1958, 3).

Miller's opposition to rock and roll would prevent a large-scale investment in it. (Grevatt 1958, 3). As the industry leaders, Columbia and RCA's policy toward rock influenced the action of the other majors. Though the majors did not commit to the music

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[46]See "See R.I.P. Sign on Rock 'n' Roll" 1956, 51, "R&R Not for Heat?" 1956, 51, "The Big Beat has Left Its Mark" 1958, 20, "Skiffle on the Skids" 1958, 1+, "Seattle's KING-IBM Pop Polls Shows Only Kids Like 'Raucous' Rockers" 1959, 1+, "Fading Single Biz Spotlights Need for Solid LP Talents: Mitch Miller" 1960, 55+, "Rock 'n' Roll's Global Wane" 1960, 55+, "Jimmy Snow Smears R&R; Presley's Ex-Aid, Now an Evangelist, Calls It Sinful" 19601+, Kline 1959, 216, Ackerman 1955, 18+, Asbel 1959, 4+, and Brown & Grevatt 1960, 2-3 for good examples.

at that time, what interest they showed amounted to a considerable percentage of 1950s rock production and sales, in no small part due to Presley and other top rockers who could sell millions of units per release. In addition to the majors' interest, other smaller independent companies continued to spring up, thus flooding the market with even more material.

George King, Sam Philips, Perry Como, Mitch Miller and others surmised that the glut of material on the market led to more selectivity on the part of the teenaged consumer (King 1957, 9; Asbell 1959, 4; and Grevatt 1958, 3), which in turn indicated diminishing sales in the future. The rock-is-dead cry became more credible after 1958, when a new sophistication about the music led teenagers to weed out the good rock and roll from the surfeit of records now marketed to them. Although what some called 'rock & roll's global wane' was only, in reality, a curbing of sales growth, not actual sales, industry executives espoused rationalistic truisms and moral indignation to explain why rock had to die. A computerized poll conducted by radio station KING in Seattle reported that teenagers preferred older pop ballads and rock-influenced tunes sung by such established artists as Como and Pat Boone to the "raucous" rock and roll of Presley, Fabian and the Drifters ("Seattle's KING-IBM Pop Poll Shows Only Kids Like 'Raucous' Rockers" 1959, 1).[47] Mitch Miller pointed to the poor profits and diminishing sales of singles in explanation of why rock could never become a reliable music product

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[47]The methodology of the polling may have skewed some of the data that KING received. The pollsters went door-to-door and questioned families about their listening preferences while they were all in the same room. Hence, we cannot be sure that teenagers felt completely comfortable confirming their love of rock and roll in front of their parents, especially if said parents were staunchly anti-rock.

("Fading Single Biz Spotlights Need for Solid LP Talents: Mitch Miller" 1960, 55). Sam Phillips, the man who first signed Elvis Presley to a record label (Sun), pointed to the excesses in rock and the bloated number of second-rate performers as the reasons why rock and roll had become a passing fad (Asbell 1959, 4). Jimmy Snow, a former-rocker who often shared a bill with Presley, declared that rock in its very nature had a Satanic bent, as evidenced by his own alcoholism, promiscuity, dishonesty, and propensity towards violence and hatred during his r&b days ("Jimmy Snow Smears R&R; Presley's Ex-Aid, Now an Evangelist, Calls It Sinful" 1960, 1). E.N. Johnson, a Pittsburgh Morals Court magistrate, called for a rock and roll ban in the city after attendees dancing on the seats at an Elvis Presley concert caused $1,500 worth of damages to a local arena ("Rahs 'n' Raps on Rock 'n' Roll" 1956, 1, 48).

The payola scandal that arose in 1957 brought together the rational and moral objections to rock. Key Records owner Vick Knight, speaking before a panel of Southern California Broadcasters, talked about the necessity for small labels to engage in payola. Because only one out of eighty-six records released became a hit, indie labels folded at the rate of six per month ("D.J.'s Don't Buy Payola Blast" 1957, 43). *Variety* quoted one unnamed disc jockey, who justified taking payola on the grounds that he and his peers received AFTRA scale wages that did not "[keep] with their importance" (ibid., 50). Other disc jockeys quoted in the article, among them KFWR's Larry Finley, hotly denied that payola had become rampant in radio. Finley argued that payola would be illogical, since radios stations relied upon the record labels to supply their programming content. He also noted that record labels, large and small, had access to radio airplay, and that no one that he knew ever charged money for playing someone's record.

Finley's assertion drew attention to a belief that did not receive a lot of ink in the press, but was often implied. Since the major labels had a more symbiotic relationship with mainstream radio stations, and since rock and roll production and sales were still dominated by the smaller independents, who, like Knight's Key Records were less likely to have access to radio promotion, the public mind could most easily associate payola with rock and roll. Alan Freed, who openly admitted to and condoned the practice (Cage April 1955, 41), further linked rock with payola, especially after his arrest and conviction on payola-related tax evasion charges. Although legal, payola was viewed as unethical. Worse yet, it suggested an inferior product. As Finley put it, "If Key [Records] puts out 10 good records, I'll play all ten. The music matters, not my opinion" (Finley quoted in "D.J.'s Don't Buy Payola Blast" 1957, 50). In other words, Finley implied that the only reason for a company to pay for airplay was because its record could not stoke programming interest legitimately.

Another factor in the industry apprehension toward rock lay in the nature of song publishing. Before 1955, the general strategy of publishing consisted of getting a song heard many times through multiple recordings, or 'covers' of the same material, and the usage of material in other media, mainly movies. In such a scenario, a song that enjoyed an intense popularity because of its recording by a single artist, and subsequently never appeared on a movie soundtrack, would not fare as well as a song that had modest success for five or six artists, and found a place in a couple of films and a television show. British publishers first noted, however, that because rock records could sell in the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, and because UK law allowed for the collection of publishing royalties on the sale of each record, the old formula for publishing success no

longer applied. Writer Barry Barnett therefore credited rock/r&b and skiffle with reviving a moribund British music publishing industry (Barnett 1958, 213).

Likewise, the Copyright Act of 1909 afforded the same royalties per record sold to American song owners. Consequently, the fact that ASCAP reconsidered its position on rock in 1959 is not surprising, for ASCAP affiliates were missing out on the rock and roll revenues garnered by their BMI rivals. And because of its increasing presence in movies and on television, rock had even greater opportunity to make money (Grevatt 1959, 2). And while some (e.g., Chapple and Garofalo) looked back on the practice with disdain, cover versions by the likes of a Patti Page, Perry Como, Joni James, Pat Boone, Kay Starr or Teresa Brewer added to the monetary value of the rock songs they performed. The covers also had the advantage of making rock and roll acceptable to mainstream audiences by associating the music with the legitimacy afforded by professionally trained singers, respected and respectable artists whose musical performances contained none of the wild screaming, gyrations, or foot-playing piano antics of the rockers. Whereas some parents literally felt threatened by rock ("Rock 'n' Roll Pros 'n' Cons" 1956, 51), the cover singers had a reassuring quality, a reasonableness signifying that the social order had not been challenged.

In a more general sense, the cover versions legitimated rock by associating the music with a familiar and trusted personality. This occurred in other ways. Ed Sullivan's personal endorsement of Elvis Presley on his television show most likely calmed parental fears about the young rock star, as did Presley's duet with the host of *The Frank Sinatra Show*. Such performers as Ricky Nelson, Shelley Fabares and Patti Duke had starred in family-oriented television sitcoms before cutting tasteful rock and roll songs. In 1964,

Hullabaloo, one of two rock shows debuting that year, featured such personalities as Phyllis Diller and Milton Berle, who hosted the up-and-coming musicians.

Major labels, aware of the burgeoning teen market, also attempted to promote other types of music to younger consumers, and exploited such venues as *Paul Whiteman's Teen Club* to promote more accessible jazz and big band artists. Columbia invested in calypso and found success with Harry Belafonte ("R&R Strong in Britain as Disk Business Booms" 1958, 6). The majors did not persist in these efforts to steer the teen market away from rock and roll, so the attempt to find a rock and roll substitute had little bearing on the upward arc of rock sales. These attempts merit some attention here, however, because they illustrate the majors' recognition (1) that a lucrative teen market existed; (2) that they were not themselves authorities on the crude and brash music, and therefore ill-at-ease with producing it, as opposed to other types of music that they could more readily understand, and (3) that they had to take active steps to find a reliable and profitable teen strategy.

If the established industry could not persuade teens to buy other types of music, then it could try to bring rock and roll closer to the mainstream in terms of its style and performance practice. The majors could also encourage their stars to cross over into the traditional pop market. In a 1960 edition of *Melody Maker*, Tony Brown and Ren Grevatt debated whether or not rock had a future. Grevatt, taking the rock-is-dead position, pointed to the latest records of such artists as Elvis Presley and Jackie Wilson as evidence that former r&b musicians were striving "to be more middle of the road" (Brown & Grevatt 1960, 2). Furthermore, such rockers as Fats Domino, Brook Benton, Dinah Washington and Little Willy John had given up the "honking tenor sax" in favor of the

lush orchestral string arrangements previously associated with Tin Pan Alley singers. Grevatt eventually concluded that "SOME ARTISTS HOWEVER ARE EVOLVING THEMSELVES RIGHT INTO A LEGIT STYLE AND A FAR BROADER MARKET APPEAL TO BOOT [caps original]" (Brown and Grevatt 1960, 2). Brown conceded that stylistic changes to music marketed as rock and roll had occurred, but that did not indicate so much a drift to the old-style pop ballads as it did a logical evolution of rock style (Brown and Grevatt 1960, 3). Nevertheless, he agreed with Grevatt that rock of 1960 seemed closer to mainstream pop genres than rock of 1956.

Chapple and Garofalo referred to rock subjected to this type of stylistic tampering as "treacle," named after the sticky sweet confection that the resultant sound brought to mind, or as "Philadelphia schlock," a facetious homage to Dick Clark, host of *American Bandstand* and Swan Records founder (Chapple & Garofalo 1977, 51). As the authors noted, the movement to transform rock into more standard pop fare had begun in 1957, when RCA hired producer Moe Gale to make "r&b with a pop appeal" (Chapple & Garofalo 1977, 45). Other producers, hired on a freelance basis, would follow, among them Phil Spector, whose wall-of-sound technique painted lavish orchestral landscapes that filled all sonic space available, and Quincy Jones, a former student of Nadia Boulanger whose classical training faintly came through on some of his rock and roll work (Quincy Jones Official Website 2005:sec. 1, para. 2).[48] In 1957, Bumps Blackwell,

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[48]A good example of classical influence in Jones' early rock years is the voice leading and note-against-note counterpoint in his arrangement of the Leslie Gore single "It's My Party," recorded in 1963. In this song, the lead vocal is static during most of the refrain, centering on the pitches A and B, while the harmony shifts around it in contrary motion to the bass line. Also, in addition to a secondary dominant in the bridge, chord changes in

a musician with a collegiate music theory background, produced Sam Cooke's first hit "You Send Me," with traditional Tin-Pan-Alley pop balladeers, The Pied Pipers, accompanying in the background (Wollf 1995, 118).[49] Blackwell also produced Little Richard and other rockers. In 1962, EMI assigned George Martin, a London Guildhall School of Music alum, to produce the Beatles, and then other rock artists (Norman 1981, 154). And in the tradition of Tin Pan Alley, such tunesmiths as Neil Sedaka, Carole King & Jerry Goffin, and Cynthia Well & Barry Mann penned songs from New York's Brill Building for producers to match with the next generation of rock and rollers.

The Rhythm & Blues Record and Standardization

If we look at the issue of standardization from several angles--(1) the formulaic imitations suggested by Middleton; (2) the formation of templates espoused by Adorno; and (3) in the word's non-technical connotation of creating base criteria that determine adequacy--the period from 1954-1964 offered examples of each. Once the sociological, economic, legal and technical developments cited by Peterson took place, rhythm and blues expanded past its original market, creating a new and larger demand for recordings of it. At first, the main sellers of rock and roll were small independent labels that

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the refrain, chorus, and bridge appear to be more a function of voice-leading than of simple harmonization of the bass. Guy Capuzzo, of course, might assert that much of rock harmony is a function of voice-leading similar to the chromaticism found in western composers of the Romantic Era (Capuzzo 2004, 179. Still Capuzzo comes to this conclusion by dismissing the octave displacement of the guitar as its player goes from one chord to the next. In "It's My Party," there is no octave displacement. Thus, the nature of the voice-leading is clearer.

[49]Although Blackwell claimed to have earned a degree in music theory, there is some dispute as to whether he actually graduated from college.

specialized in the music. Larger companies, upon seeing the music's sales potential, decided to join the independents in this market. In doing so, the majors applied not just the most recognizable algorithms of rock, most notably its 'Big Beat," but as time went on, incorporated into rock the formulas for the type of pop that they sold before 1955, namely the smooth vocals, the easy tempo, the tasteful delineation of rhythm, the polished big-name singer, the lush string settings, and slick production. More independent companies copied the big beat and other rock cliches to put their own records on store shelves. The increased production led to a glut of new records that overwhelmed the market, making teenagers more selective in their choices, thus leading to speculation that interest in rock had waned. Neither the majors nor the independents gave up on rock, however, for its presence grew in the mediasphere, and teenagers still bought rock records of the raucous and non-raucous type. Rock produced such media stars as Presley, who could sell millions of units, and whose presence on television and the silver screen could draw more money in publishing royalties for the songs he sang.

In the press, critics, musicians, record executives, producers, and magazine publishers began to debate whether rock was blues, rhythm & blues, beat, pop, jazz, or a new kind of music. Forging an understanding about what constituted rock was in essence forging a template that gave a basic identity to the music that would distinguish it from other musics. The sonic properties of rock were not sufficient to do this. After all, the big beat formed the rhythmic foundation of rhythm and blues, and as King pointed out, pre-bop jazz (King 1957, 9), just as blues tonality pervaded the melodic and harmonic idioms of these musics. Obviously, for Boone, Como, Page, and other cover artists who understood rock as a style of music, tonal and rhythmic elements of rock remained their

primary concern. Still, these performers did not record the bulk of rock and roll hits during the period of 1954-1964. The identity of rock rested primarily in its cultural significance.

The original mainstreaming of r&b centered on a teenaged audience comprised of both black and white youths around a music that had previously been the expression of working class African Americans.[50] But while blacks may have brought rhythm and blues to national attention, whites created the high demand for it that made it a cultural phenomenon that resulted in extraordinary record sales. While Freed coined the term "rock and roll," its popular usage grew independently of him, for it now separated r&b from what it had been in 1951 to what it had become in 1959, and what it would evolve into by 1967. No one could escape the connection between rock and black culture in 1954. However, the usage of the term expanded to include music made by and for Euro-Americans and Europeans. By 1957, George King, for one, began to associate rock with Tin Pan Alley. He would describe rock as a music that featured the same sonic elements--and initially the same artists and songs--as rhythm-and-blues. The cultural meaning of rock, however, would become a source of debate until 1964 when most within the industry dropped the term "rhythm and blues," preferring instead to refer to black rock and roll as "soul." From November of 1963 to March of 1965, *Billboard* did not publish a separate r&b chart. When the magazine resumed a separate r&b chart, only then did one

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[50]Jackson illustrates the class division within the black community that led more middle-class African Americans to shun rhythm and blues by quoting Valena Minor Williams comments about the 1951 Moondog Coronation ball for the *Call & Post*, the black Ohio newspaper. She wrote: "The shame of the situation lies not in the frustrated crowd that rushed to the Arena, but in a community which allows a program like this to continue and to exploit the Negro teensters!" (Williams quoted by Jackson 1991, 3).

of the major industry publications firmly establish r&b as black music. Even so, describers of black rock and roll used the "soul" template to differentiate the music from the 'rock' template for about a decade.

The dual labeling served useful purposes, especially when one considers the historic era in which it occurred. By marketing music separately to blacks and whites, the music industry accomplished what the WCC, the KKK, HUAC, and others in the anti-rock movement could not: the racial segregation of rock and roll. Moreover, by creating a distinctive template based primarily on race, the sexual underpinnings of rock's sonic elements and lyrics became somewhat muted. Furthermore, the rock template enhanced the importance of singers like Presley and Holly by allowing whites to identify the music as their own, not a borrowed expression from (because of segregation) an alien culture. As Ahmet Ertegun succinctly explained:

> The little white girl in school loved to dance to Chuck Berry, but somehow John Lennon looked more like her dream, you know what I mean? (Ahmet Ertegun quoted by Chapple & Garofalo 1977, 74).

The issue of control becomes evident when we take into account the actions of the record industry concerning rock and roll. Disc jockeys Joe Bostic, Jack Walker and Hal Jackson echo the sentiment apparent in the actions of record labels King, Chess and Apollo in their shared fear that dire things might happen to r&b if it grew beyond its original audience. The WDIA ban, and its endorsement by the above indie labels, suggests that these smaller players of the record industry wanted to put some kind of limit onto the music's mushrooming popularity with this new audience. As for the majors, control consisted of regulating the quality of records that they put out as "teen music,"

whether that entailed the re-recording of rock songs by professional cover artists; the introduction of calypso and other competing musics to steer youngsters away from rock and roll; the utilization of such in-house specialists as Moe Gale and George Martin and such freelancers as Quincy Jones and Phil Spector to infuse rock with the sound and polished professionalism of pre-rock pop forms; or the communications with the press, either to downplay rock viability, or to define what the music actually was. Meanwhile, the publishing industry began to gear its model of pop success on large-volume record sales.

The success of the Beatles in the US, UK and Australia heralded a new chapter in formulaic imitation, better known as the 'British Invasion.' Between 1964-1967, rock's viability and potential for international growth seemed all too clear. At the time, such independent labels as Motown (including subsidiaries Tamla, Gordy, and Soul), Roulette (including subsidiaries Buddah and Kama Sutra), White Whale, Atlantic, King and Stax could compete on an equal footing with the majors.

For the larger companies the question would be not so much to engage in rock production, but to what degree. In later years, Clive Davis, chief of A&R at Columbia during the 1960s, would declare that his label, at least, considered becoming primarily a rock label several years before it actually did in 1967 ("Clive Davis Sees Pop Trend on Disks back to Good Tunes" 1977, 69). As one--if not the--industry leader, Columbia's sentiments about rock might have held true for some of the other majors, for they were in a position to commit to rock in 1967 whereas they could not in 1955. By 1967, the majors had established some standards by which to gauge, produce, promote and distribute rock Because of the influence of independent producers, the labels then had a liaison between

themselves, the musicians, and the public that they hoped would buy their wares. Due to the perceived differences between rock and soul, the racial problems rock faced earlier no longer applied, especially since American views on race had changed considerably during those twelve years. And in cases where the music itself did not take on the sonic quality of the mainstream, rock enjoyed increasing endorsement from the mainstream: from Ed Sullivan's touting of Presley and the Beatles to such prime-time shows as *Shindig* and *Hullabaloo*, both of which debuted in 1964.

Chapter Four: The Monterey Epiphany

Overview

This chapter examines one facet of standardization, formulaic imitation, in the context of major label commitment to rock production beginning in 1967. From 1964 to 1967, the majors realized that rock and roll would not simply go away, but in fact grow at a pace too rapid to dismiss. During those three years, the mainstream industry took more steps to integrate rock into its product line. Radio promotion of rock hit a fever pitch, helped by a number of popular disc jockeys serving large markets, among them Scot Muni, Casey Kasem, Murray the K, and Bruce Morrow. The cultural, critical and financial success of the Monterey International Pops Festival, held in June of 1967, spurred Columbia and other industry leaders to sign the most dynamic performers who had yet to find label representation. Other major labels and publishers followed shortly thereafter.

This chapter examines the corporate interest in rock by calling attention to the factors that led the major labels to commit to the music (perhaps better understood as the major industry drive to exploit the baby boomer youth market). The first section lists some of the factors validating rock, in particular its association with the college crowd and folk music. The ties that rock developed to a more educated and affluent youth counterculture helped legitimate the music in the eyes of critics and others who might have previously dismissed it as an inferior art. The next section discusses reactions within the record industry to the counterculture. Major label interest further evolved as more venues arose that could not only showcase new talent, but develop it as well. The third

section centers around questions pertaining to assimilation into the mainstream, and how racial attitudes led to adjustments in music marketing. In the summary, I will discuss how these three sets of factors--popular youth interest, industry enthusiasm, and racial categorization--would play a critical role in shaping the music industry of the 1960s and 1970s.

Collegians, Coffeehouses, Rockers and Folk

From 1947 to 1967, colleges underwent significant changes. Not only did attendance mushroom, but the diversity of the student body increased as well. In 1947, 24.3% of all people between the ages of eighteen and nineteen, and 10.2% of all people between the ages of twenty and twenty-four, were enrolled as full-time students (United States, 2000 Table A-2; sec. 1).[51] By comparison, 47.6% of all people between the ages of eighteen and nineteen, 33.3% of people between twenty and twenty-one, and 13.6% of people between twenty-two and twenty-four enrolled as full-time students in 1967, an increase of roughly 100%, 200%, and 30% for each category respectively (ibid.).[52] Enrollment for African Americans between the ages of eighteen and nineteen stood at 20.2%, and for African Americans between the ages of twenty and twenty-four at 6.9% in

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[51]The survey, unfortunately, did not say whether the people in any of these age-based, demographic descriptions were in high school, vocational school, liberal arts college, professional, or graduate school. I offer these statistics because the age range would include college undergraduates and graduates, and would therefore serve as a basis for comparison highlighting the fact that all types of advanced education grew during this time.

[52]The Bureau of Census did not have separate categories for students between the ages of twenty to twenty-four in 1947, but did in 1967. For that reason, the first set of statistics are divided into two categories, the second set into three.

1947. In 1967, 40.7% of African Americans between the ages of eighteen and nineteen, 21.2% of those between twenty and twenty one, and 7.2% of those between twenty-two and twenty-four were enrolled full-time, an increase of about 100% and 200% for the first two categories, and a slight increase for the third (United States, 2000 Table A-2; sec. 10).[53]

The affluence of college-educated Americans also increased over the same period of time. The median income for an American fifteen years of age or older was (in 2003 dollars) $18,800 in 1953. The median income for Americans within the same age bracket in 1967 (again, adjusted to 2003 dollars) was $25,917 (United States 2000, Table P-5; sec. 1). These numbers represent about a 37% increase in real wage earnings from the early-1950s to the late-1960s. The earning power of those who had graduated from high school, and those who attended college also rose sharply, from $26,909 (in 2003 dollars) and $30,186 in 1958, to $33,810 and $38,061 in 1967, respectively (United States 2000, Table P-17:sec. 4-5).[54] Although this second set of statistics (Table P-17) applied to Americans over the age of twenty-five, it nevertheless indicated a general trend towards greater income by families in the 1960s, and reflected higher household incomes that would allow for greater spending on non-essential items. Coupled with the increase of high school and college graduates indicated by Table A-2, this trend would translate into more people having more money. If parents had more money, then it would follow that

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[53]The Bureau of Census did not tabulate Hispanic American enrollment separately until 1972, and Asian/Pacific Islander Americans were not included as a separate category until 1993.

[54]1953 and 1958 are the earliest dates given for Tables P-5 and P-17.

their offspring would have more money as well, and more of them would have a chance to pursue a college education, especially when helped by Defense Department study grants given to combat communism, Great Society programs and the benefits afforded by the G.I. Bill.

By 1965, "folk" music, once a staple of college coffeehouses, began to take on more of an electric tone, as rock acts filled the seats at campus auditoriums (C. Hall 1966, 1; Sternfeld 1965, 1). At the same time, the stirrings of protest that found voice in the civil rights movement of the 1950s, also found a voice in the "folk" movement of the 1960s. Roger McGuinn, Barry McGuire, David Crosby, John Sebastian, and other folk musicians began, in 1964, to incorporate into their work rock idioms, which mostly consisted of gently distorted electric guitar picking, and a few blues intonations.

No doubt, one could easily argue that rock's previous commercial successes might possibly carry the taint of selling out, a point that might lead one to question the authenticity or purity of folk-rock when compared to folk (Danson 1966, 14; Denisoff 1969, 69). Regardless of whether or not folk artists lost some prestige by electrifying their sound, the association of rock with folk music legitimated the former, making it seem more profound and worthy of attention. The fact that young consumers perceived this profundity would become important, for as Paddy Roberts, Chairman of the Songwriters Guild of Great Britain, correctly predicted in 1965, youth consumption would determine future record industry economics (Roberts 1965, 185).

Folk influences in rock were most pointedly characterized by a new *gravitas* in lyrical composition that was considered more sophisticated than the fare of polished Tin Pan Alley tunesmiths. Richard Farina, a prominent member of the 1960s Greenwich

Village folk scene, and brother-in-law of Joan Baez, linked the popularity of the new college folk sound to the "wild and forbidden words" contained in their lyrics (Farina 1966, 8). Citing Dylan Thomas and Alan Ginsberg as intellectual forefathers, he felt the intimacy of lyrical expression reflected the emotions and libertarian lifestyle that spoke to many of that generation. In this sense, Farina saw folk music not necessarily as a refashioning or retelling of the old songs. Instead, the songs of the new folk tradition passed down the psychological and emotional realities of human existence that had existed since the beginning of history:

> A number of people began adding their own songs to otherwise derivative repertoires and finding astonishing response from their listeners. That the songs were intensely personal in their grievance and/or celebration was inevitable, but in nearly every case the audience was not only ready for the new composition but anxious to have its own sensibilities strengthened through such an unaffected medium. (Farina 1966, 10)

Variety music columnist Arnold Shaw wrote about how the psychedelic folk rock scene burgeoning on the west coast of the US, blossoming on the east coast of the US, and growing internationally preferred introspection and literary lyrics to the "Moon in June" rhymes of older pop traditions:

> Folk Rock, at the opposite end of the spectrum from "a go-go" music, represents a search for new signposts, for meaning behind the fear and trembling, the euphoria and psychedelic flights of the Freak Outs and Shock-Rockers. If much of teen-age music is unintelligible and marked by a weird flippiness, there's also a seriousness, and a charge toward new values that makes the older generation's all-too-ready putdown out of order. (Shaw 1967 "Freak Out," 172)

Earlier in the above cited piece, Shaw deconstructed Simon & Garfunkel's "The Sound of Silence" to illustrate how themes of adolescent despair over unrequited love lyrically gave way to the more serious problem of people losing their ability to communicate with each other. Shaw, like others in the 1960s, attributed this wisdom to the folk elements rock had acquired earlier in the decade, and the growing intellectuality of the youth culture, no doubt fostered by a rise in education levels. Moreover, the folkiness of rock lyrics seemed to provide apt commentary on the changing reality of the 1960s, and challenged the attitudes, values and integrity of the status quo.

Commercial outlets for such dissident expression were initially rare, but that changed beginning in 1965. One controversial disc, Barry McGuire's "Eve of Destruction," gained airplay on radio stations around the nation in that year, despite the fact that the song contained such provocative lyrics as "Look at all the hate there is in Red China/Then take a look at Selma, Alabama." Referring to that record, and Lena Horne's "Now," Eliot Tiegel of *Billboard* remarked that a substantial social change had to have taken place in the United States in order for such "protest" material to have become suitable for mainstream commercial venues (Tiegel 1965, 1). Tiegel also noted that while radio industry personnel debated on whether or not they agreed ideologically with the song, "Eve of Destruction" received very little negative reaction from the public.

Another song often cited as an example of folk-rock weightiness, Janis Ian's "Society's Child," rose to number fourteen on the pop charts, due to the wide airplay that it received despite its controversial subject matter (interracial dating). Leonard Bernstein, hosting a 1967 CBS television special lauding the merits of rock, invited Ian on the show to perform the song. Afterwards, he praised Ian for having the courage to confront the

real issues of that time, and for her inventive use of tonal modulation between verse and chorus. Murray Kaufman, a popular disc jockey better known to his listeners as Murray the K, also cited "Society's Child" as a paragon of "The New Music," a movement which he put in the context of a changing reality of both life and art:

> Today, the older generation still refers to the world of Irving Berlin and Thornton Wilder. They were great, but the sad fact is they are extinct. When the atom bomb fell and the astronauts rose, it was no longer possible to relate yesterday's music to the vicissitudes of today's world. (Kaufman 1967, 12)

The erudition and affluence of this new breed of youth, relative to previous generations, most likely influenced rock and roll's more sophisticated image. Associating rock with folk was only one way in which this occurred. Some compared rock to other 'serious' musics, and established institutions began to incorporate rock into their media. As mentioned earlier, rock critics of the 1960s relied somewhat on comparisons to classical music to legitimate the music, from the fleeting interest in what *New York Times* critic Lillian Roxon termed "Baroque Rock" to rock renditions of classical numbers (Fink 1998, 177). Mike Gross, writing for *Billboard* in 1967, reported on a number of gatherings where rock acts shared a bill with string quartets and visual artists, the juxtaposition of which found acclaim among serious cultural critics, including jazz critic Nat Hentoff (Gross 1967 "Rock for," 1, 15). Gross also points to the full color photo spreads of folk-rockers Simon & Garfunkel and Sonny & Cher to illustrate the music's

pull with the stodgy older generation.[55] Dick Clark, host of *American Bandstand* and founder of Swan Records, also believed that rock had begun to transcend its youth market during the mid-1960s due to the appeal that youth culture held for the older generation (C. Hall 1965 "Rock 'n'," 40).

Martin Williams, writing for *Down Beat,* saw rock as a logical extension of rhythm and blues, which in his view was itself a logical extension of jazz. He therefore reasoned that rock and roll was, in fact, a form of jazz. Dionne Warwick, the Supremes, and other Motown girl groups were, to him, blues stylists carrying on the tradition of Billie Holliday and Bessie Smith (Martin Williams 1965, 20). Likewise, the Rolling Stones, a band self-conscious of its rhythm and blues origins, continued the development of the jazz combo (Martin Williams 1965, 21). He went on to hypothesize that establishment abreaction to rock and jazz had come about because both musics had usurped the dominance of Tin Pan Alley style, which was based musically upon the harmonic traditions of Broadway musicals, which in turn were derived from European art music, Viennese operetta specifically (Martin Williams 1965, 21). In short, non-European popular music posed a threat to the hegemony of western culture, what he called "the razing of Vienna" (Martin Williams 1965, 20). He likened the condemnation of rock in the 1950s and 1960s to similar denunciations of jazz during the 1920s:

> The music [rock] has been maligned as primitive, sensual, crude, as placing its main emphasis on rhythm and so on [sic]. To anyone familiar with the history of U.S. music in the last 60 years, these strictures must sound terribly familiar. In the teens of this century, ragtime was attacked

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[55]Although it might be difficult to imagine now, Sonny & Cher were referred to as a folk-rock act during the 1960s. See the Artists Terms table.

> in almost the same terms. Similarly, the jazz of the '20s. One respected American dictionary for years carried an entry on 'jazz' that spoke only of rude, blatant, cacophonous non musical noises. (Martin Williams 1965, 20)

Although his commentary may strike the reader as hyperbolic, Williams' comparison of rock to jazz and classical implied an artistic equality of all three and ultimately lauded jazz for being the source of rock, which eventually replaced the classically oriented American pop of earlier decades. Interestingly, he, like Bernstein, paid close attention to the sonic components of rock, as opposed to its lyrical content and social significance, to reach the conclusion that it was a serious and worthwhile music like the others. This view seemed a far cry from the 1950s view of rock as simplified jazz ("Keeping Up with Jones on Rock 'n' Roll, Prof Puts Beat on a Couch" 1957, 55), or a raucously animalistic dance music for teenyboppers ("Rock 'n' Roll; a Frenzied Teenage Music Kicking Up a Big Fuss" 1955, 166; "Seattle's KING-IBM Pop Polls Shows Only Kids Like 'Raucous' Rockers" 1959, 1).

Richard Meltzer, a freelance writer who published an early critical analysis of rock (*The Aesthetics of Rock*, 1967), outlined a philosophical defense of rock's mainstream acceptance by calling the reader's attention to the music's semiotics. He depicted rock as a "world of such things as random values, metaphysical inconsistencies–[and] thus eclecticism" (Meltzer 1967, 11). Even though the beat, blues inflections and electric guitar still permeated through the music, some felt that the ever-growing headiness of 1960s rock distanced it from its 1950s predecessor. Teddy Randazzo, a prominent producer of the 1950s and 1960s, felt that the music had changed so much in the past few years that to label it 'rock and roll' would be misleading, and suggested

calling it something else:

> This music…just can't be put into any one bag any longer. Perhaps the only common denominator of current pop music is that it's directed for the teenager mind and taste. (Randazzo, quoted by Schoenfeld 1965, 43)

Randazzo admitted that many of the salient features of rock were still present in the music as it existed in the 1950s. At the same time, he insisted that the overlays of horns and strings, a process known as "sweetening" the rhythm section, opened rock up creatively so that the new rock and roller could just as easily base a new work on a classical piece as he could rhythm and blues (Schoenfeld 1965, 43). He attributed most of the differences between the 1950s and 1960s, however, to the change in values and attitudes of the different generations. Herm Schoenfeld added:

> As recent developments in the pop music biz have pointed up, it's not easy to pin down exactly what the teenagers want. The current vogue for message songs and some of Bob Dylan's poetic flights indicate that teenagers are reaching far beyond the elementary material and lyrical ideas [of earlier rock fans] . (Schoenfeld 1965, 43, 60)

As a periodical written for the informational needs of the entertainment industry, *Variety* tracks and explains upcoming trends to a readership that would include many working within the music business. As such, *Variety* attempts to give an accurate report on the viability of upcoming trends in order to give the movie or television executive looking for soundtrack material, or the corporate investor, the kind of information she or he might need to make informed decisions. Other periodicals also looked at rock and youth culture in terms of the economic interests that both could serve. Murray the K offered a view concurrent with Shaw's to explain rock's new literary trend to a *Wall*

Street Journal readership that undoubtedly had become curious about what must have seemed like a developing market ripe for exploitation. Other articles geared toward the industrialist give clear indication that many saw youth culture as the next money-making opportunity. As cultural historian Stuart Ewen explained:

> Early in 1967, as a radical 'youth culture' was capturing international attention, Daniel Moriarty (editor and publisher of *Madison Avenue*, 'The Magazine for New York Advertising') published a sixteen-question quiz for admen over twenty-five, designed to familiarize them with 'what's happening with the Now Generation.' In the glib patter of his introduction, it is clear that Moriarty saw the 'youth culture as both an antiestablishment challenge and a potential resource to be mined:
>
> > This quickee quiz may seem as irrelevant as hell; but there are millions of teeny-boppers, hippies and Harvard sophs in Fat City with bread in their jeans and a lot of ways to spend it. You'd better know what they're talking about--or you may find yourself out of the gang. As America's great-folk-poet-philosopher [actually, a New York disc jockey] Murray the K tells us, *attitudes are everything*, baby.
>
> From the questions asked in the quiz, however, it is clear that 'what they're talking about' or their 'attitudes' were of little concern. The primary focus was on stylistic elements of the 'Now generation,' codes that could be deciphered and transformed into merchandising know-how and phrase book fluency. (Ewen 1988, 249)

Moriarty had clearly come to an epiphany similar to the one experienced by Clive Davis of Columbia, Jerry Wexler and Ahmet Ertegun of Atlantic, and others in the wake of the successful Monterrey International Pops Festival that occurred on the weekend of June 16, 1967. The massive concert set records in terms of attendance and revenues, and

shattered any lingering doubt as to the potential profits from rock, especially in markets that were predominately white and young. Monterrey can not be seen as a catalyst in corporate interest in rock, but rather as an indicator of where the culture industries stood at that particular moment. There were other indicators that the new rock and roll would dominate pop for some time to come. Throughout 1967, the record industry and its business philosophy underwent a number of changes, moves, and countermoves that ultimately resulted in a major label push toward the youth market.

Monterey and Other Signs

In early-1967, a number of rock and roll professionals, among them producer Lou Adler, attorney Abe Somers, and artists John Phillips and Smokey Robinson, formed a Board of Directors, who took on the mission of producing a large, three-day festival in Monterey, California. The concert, held on the third weekend of June 1967, featured diverse acts, many of them by that time well-known, and others who would become well known as a result of their performance there. Director Phillips' own group, The Mamas and the Papas, were already stars, as were Simon & Garfunkel, the Association, the Byrds, and the Animals. Some, like Lou Rawls, had been around for a long time, often in connection to other artists (in Rawls' case, Sam Cooke). Some artists had already become popular among a particular audience, but found their popularity extending into new markets after appearing at the Pops Festival. Jimi Hendrix had established a name for himself in the UK, but was virtually unknown to Americans until Monterey (Jimi Hendrix Official Website 2005; sec. 6, para. 10.). Otis Redding had a strong following within the Chittlin' Circuit, but only came to international prominence after his

appearance ("Forty Minutes Which Changed Otis' Life" 1967, 18). Others represented what was then known as "the underground," a loose-knit collection of unsigned artists with ties, strong or tentative, to the San Francisco Bay area. Big Brother and the Holding Company (in particular lead singer Janis Joplin), Jefferson Airplane, Laura Nyro, the Grateful Dead, Country Joe & the Fish, Moby Grape, and the Steve Miller Blues Band all emerged from the underground to the mainstream after Monterey (Elwood 1967, 24). Also there were a number of record industry executives. Clive Davis, Bill Gallagher and Goddard Lieberson represented Columbia. Atlantic's Jerry Wexler came, as did Vito Blando and Bill Graham of RCA. Record producers Andrew Oldham, John Simon and Tom Wilson attended as well (Gross 1967 "Popsters Pull," 24).

The concert grossed over a half-million 1967 dollars, enough for the industry to take notice. The underground artists became of particular interest to record producers, for they reliably sold records to what many within the industry saw, before Monterey, as an unreliable market. "Maverock," a short-lived term coined by *Billboard* writer Mike Gross, not only embodied the rebelliousness of the counterculture, as the name would imply, but also abhorrence of anything that smacked of crass commercialism, the selling out of artists and music in order to cater to the dictates of the establishment, represented here by the major label hit-making machinery (Gross 1967 "'Maverock' Disks," 4).

Monterey represented a new kind of concert format, one not restricted in terms of musical style, time, or confinement to a single seat for the duration of the show.[56] As one concertgoer recalled in 2002:

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[56]Staying in one place would have been nearly impossible over the stretch of a three-day concert, anyway.

> We got our tickets for the performances and moved on into the fairgrounds. It was even freakier than outside on the street. Beautiful people everywhere. Cops with flowers in their hats. Gigantic balloons floating overhead. Colorful banners hanging everywhere. People sitting and lying on the ground everywhere. Booths set up all over the fairgrounds selling weird stuff like crystals and peace-symbol necklaces and beads and hand made goods. Captain Beefheart bumper stickers.. . .Flutes playing everywhere, congas and bongos banging out the same rhythm all over the fairgrounds. (In fact, all over the town.) Rock stars walking around like they were just regular people and nobody bugging them for autographs or pictures. It was great. ("California Dreaming: The Mamas and the Papas" 2002; sec. 3, para 1)

Later in the year, other venues would mimic the freedom of movement and choice--in terms of what one could experience at any given time--at Monterey. In short order, the casual and free aesthetic would become visible in other rock concerts, as a number of venues began to shape their approach to attract hippies. Light shows, offering sensual experiences that ran concurrently with musical performance, became popular in 1967, as did seating arrangements that required large areas suitable for dancing, bopping, or simply moving around and interacting with other people ("New Breed of Psychedelic Rock Iconoclasts Eager to Light Up Future" 1967, 49). New venues, such as the Electric Circus, incorporated the free-flowing, mixed-media festival atmosphere of Monterey into their operations (Barret 1967, 24). In one interview, Joe McDonald of the Fish explained:

> Kids who go to see a rock group, or any entertainment, don't want to be forced to look at the group. . . .They don't want to be told what to do. They just want to do their thing, look where they want, hear what they want. We're used to playing mass dances, where people can move and be free. That's the human story.

> Kids want to be part of the action. Everyone wants to create nowadays. An artist leaves a part of himself in his creations. Audiences now want to leave part of themselves too, and be an integral part of the act. That way there's nothing to understand, just to enjoy. (McDonald, quoted in "New Breed of Psychedelic Rock Iconoclasts Eager to Light Up Future" 1967, 49)

The ability to participate, and to become part of the spectacle whether on stage or off, would become a drawing card for underground concertgoers in 1967. With the popularity of such houses as The Electric Circus and the Fillmore East, performers needed more venues in which to develop their acts and showcase. A second-tier of establishments surfaced in 1967 for the specific purpose of grooming young musicians to become stars ("Growth of Hippy 'Catch-All' Houses Stirs Need for Talent Tryout Sites" 1967, 49). The Bitter End--once a haven for such folkies as Bob Dylan and Joni Mitchell--and the Café Au Go Go in New York, and the Whiskey A Go-Go in Los Angeles, provided new bands the opportunity to form a fan base, and to find out what things worked, and what things did not. These venues afforded performers a space in which to showcase in front of record industry personnel, who might be impressed with their performance.

The interest in fan participation in rock and roll led to a rapid increase in the number of performers, resulting in unprecedented music instrument sales ("Band Battles Trigger Spurt on Instruments" 1967, 1). Two nationwide "Battles of the Bands," one run by the Rock Music World Championship, and the other run by the Massachusetts Jaycees, featured a combined total of over 13,000 groups, all vying for guaranteed record contracts. The Jaycee competition, the larger of the two, offered all competing groups

advice on booking and recording, and urged the more serious groups to join the American Federation of Musicians. Most importantly, the competitions drew a number of sponsors, from such mom-and-pop businesses as music stores to such corporations as Pepsi Cola (ibid.).

In July and August of 1967, a number of elements within the popular music industry actively recruited musicians and songwriters. In June, The American Guild of Authors and Composers (AGAC) launched a campaign to attract songwriters through advertisements and articles in the underground presses flourishing then (Ackerman & Gross 1967 "Rock for," 1). The AGAC offered its auditing facilities in reaction to the flood of new songwriters who were snatched up by major labels and publishing firms. In many cases, the songwriters came from the youth generation, went into the business without apprenticeship or anything comparable, and were thus naive, or misinformed about business procedures, making them more likely to sign "inferior contracts" (Ackerman & Gross 1967, 1).[57] Because of the group nature of composition, AGAC extended membership to entire bands, some of whom signed publishing agreements as a combo, as did the Flying Machine when they signed with Blackwood Music in June of

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[57]The authors specifically called attention to the practice known to most songwriters today as "reversion," although they did not use that term. Reversion allows songwriters to retain the rights to their work if the publisher to whom they had sold the rights could not find a label or performer interested in it within a certain period of time. Without reversion, a song might languish for years without the publisher making any attempt to promote it. In the meantime, if the songwriter records the song, or one similar to it, he or she runs the risk of literally plagiarizing himself or herself. In one very famous case, John Fogarty, of Creedence Clearwater Revival, signed a contract similar to what Ackerman and Gross are referring to here, one that had no provisions for reversion. Consequently, when he recorded two of his old songs, "The Old Man Down the Road" and "Up Around the Bend," the rights of which belonged to a publisher that he had worked for in the 1960s, he was sued for illegally using his own material.

1967 ("Flying Machine Go to A&B as Writers" 1967, 10). Preparing for the wholesale acquisition of underground writers, Chappell Music, a longtime ASCAP affiliate partially owned by CBS, formed the BMI-affiliated Bondola Music in August 1967 in order to publish rock and roll (Fox 1967, 1). In New York, the only hippie rock scene that rivaled the one in San Francisco, a number of independent producers branched out into publishing, usually affiliating with BMI. Among these were Real Good Productions and Koppleman & Rubin (Gross 1967 "NY 'Hippening'," 1, 10).

Major label enthusiasm for rock crested swiftly after Monterey, and the reactions of the majors did not stop at signing artists, although that was an important part of what they did. RCA and its subsidiary labels picked up Jefferson Airplane, The Mothers of Invention, Harry Nilsson, and Blues Project, while Mercury signed the Blues Magoos. Warner Brothers and its subsidiaries signed the Jimi Hendrix Experience, the Grateful Dead, the Doors, Mojo Men, and the Electric Prunes. Warner Brothers' upcoming merger with Atlantic (1968) would also give them the Buffalo Springfield, Led Zeppelin, Eric Clapton, and Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young ("WB Has Turn-On, Sell-In Meet" 1967, 3; "'Underground' Groups Stir Diskery Interest as Sources of New Talent" 1967, 47). In addition to re-signing an ailing Bob Dylan,[58] CBS awarded contracts to Laura Nyro, Moby Grape, Big Brother and the Holding Company, and Sly & the Family Stone (ibid.; Gross 1967 "Col. Plays," 3). At the same time, the majors started to build a medium more conducive to rock. Beginning with CBS in July of 1967, and ending with RCA in August

[58]Dylan spent a good deal of 1967 recuperating from a motorcycle accident.

of 1968, the majors began to phase out their monaural catalogues,[59] thus making stereo the standard playback format (Schoenfeld 1967, 47; Kirby 1968 "RCA Drops," 3). Liberty Records simply fired its senior staff members, and replaced them with a new breed of record executives who had their ears tuned to the frequency of the young generation, thus creating an infrastructure geared towards rock production ("Shuffle Top Execs at Liberty Records" 1967, 43).

By the end of 1967, the major labels, who only a year earlier had been of secondary importance in rock when compared to Motown, Atlantic, Roulette/Buddah/Kama Sutra and Stax, had become the major presence within the youth market. Clive Davis, Vice President of A&R at Columbia in 1967, said a decade later that his label's decision to commit to rock had been made as early as 1964. The only question for them was when to do so ("Clive Davis Sees Pop Trend on Disks back to Good Tunes" 1977, 69). Davis's presence at Monterey, and the demonstrated ability of this new audience to sustain a substantial product line, most likely induced him and his peers to move their feet a little faster in turning that plan into reality. The underground disc was among the chief factors influencing the majors' timing, for it demonstrated several aspects of music sales unknown to them before then: (1) that innovation and novelty of music could become an important selling point; (2) that albums could enjoy high sales without the benefit of hit records; (3) that heavy promotion in the underground press was cheap and effective; and (4) that these records appealed to affluent, educated consumers who, despite their then-antiestablishmentarianism, would become the type of mine-able

[59]Mark Spicer notes that the British phase out of monaural catalogues began a couple of years lader.

consumers that advertising man Daniel Moriarty predicted they would be (Ackerman and Gross 1967, 1; Gross 1967 "'Maverock' Disks," 4; Ewen 1988, 249). Furthermore, the embracing of youth culture offered majors a chance to establish a relationship with underground media, which Atlantic publicity chief Bob Rolontz characterized to *Billboard's* Paul Ackerman as "very hip and informative" (Ackerman & Gross 1967, 1).

Although in retrospect the decision to concentrate on youth-oriented music might have seemed to have been obvious, and made without apparent backlash or unforeseeable fallout, the major labels' commitment to rock in 1967 occurred amid some of the same tensions and issues that the music had encountered in the 1950s. Furthermore, there were consequences to the changing balance of power within the rock and roll record industry that ultimately would lead to some misgivings on the part of fans, musicians, critics, and smaller independent labels. In 1966, for example, the John Birch Society formed Let Freedom Ring, an astroturf telephone campaign designed to stop industry production and radio airplay of rock on the grounds that the British invasion, the Beatles in particular, represented a foreign communist threat ("Beatles Unwitting Agent of Red Revolution, Sez One Right-Wing Group" 1966, 2).

Critics, as they did in the 1950s, assailed rock for use of lyrical double entendres. Unlike the concerns voiced in the 1950s, the charges against 1960s rock lyrics extended beyond sex to include items that were deemed too political or possibly drug-related (Schoenfeld 1966, 1). Ed Mullinax, general manager of WLAG, a radio station located in LaGrange, Georgia, came to the opinion that rock lyrics had become even more lurid than they had been in the 1950s, and pointed to such song titles as "Rainy Day Women" and "Let It All Hang Out" as examples. Not content to voice his concerns through on-air

programming and op-ed pieces, Mullinax co-authored a Georgia state bill that would require record labels to print song lyrics on all album covers and singles' jackets (Mullinax 1968, 23). His concerns were not actually about sex *per se*, but about the whole hippie movement that had come to prominence in 1967:

> Unfortunately, the matter of lewdness is not the only complaint being registered with many of today's record releases. There is the matter of insurrection, dope addiction, and general disrespect for law and order. Too many of today's songwriters are attempting to use the recorded music field as a forum for editorial comment. Are they really qualified in this field? Or, is this just an easy way to make a fast buck? (Mullinax 1968, 18)

One might easily suspect that Mullinax, and others like him, used alleged sexual suggestion in rock lyrics as a wedge issue to mask the true intent behind what at first seemed to be moralistic rant: namely, to stop, and hopefully reverse the growing influence of the underground music scene, and by association its Aquarian lifestyle and beliefs. One might also be tempted to link his objections concerning the youth culture to a previous ban on folk music that occurred on Atlanta television station WETV three years earlier, and think that there might simply be something about Georgia broadcasters that would make them stubbornly resist the arrival of the twentieth century ("Protests Fly Over Atlanta's Ban of 'Controversial' Folk Music TV Show" 1965, 43).[60] In either case, Mullinax's objection to rock could be seen as political, so his point about rock and rollers

[60]Atlanta resident Ann Winship initiated a citizen's campaign to ban the scheduled televised folk concert because Pete Seeger and Joan Baez were among the performers.

not being qualified to make political statements would most likely ring hollow to those acquainted with the youth culture.[61]

Mullinax's second point, about rock being "an easy way to make a fast buck," struck closer to home. At the time, the issue of industry-enforced standards on music production and performance was by no means a hot topic of discussion. Nevertheless, questions about corporate sponsorship of concerts (Dove 1968, 12), and big profits drew concerns relating to authenticity and musical vitality. As *High Fidelity* rock critic John Gabree noted:

> Rock is no little kid anymore, not by any standards that count. Music has become a billion-dollar business, and more than seventy percent of it revolves around rock. And rock is not sneered at musically, at least not so much. It's come a long, long way. (Gabree 1969:MA-10)

Considering that Gabree wrote the above in 1969, and that the full-scale industry rock blitz began in the summer of 1967, rock not only came "a long, long way," but it did so with amazing speed. Gabree did not lament the commercialization of 1960s rock, but rather one aspect of the music that helped to spur corporate investment into it. The sophistication that Murray the K, John Tiegel, Arnold Shaw, and others cited above praised about rock, evolved, in Gabree's opinion, into a pretentious hype of leftist ideas, pseudo-intellectualization and naive idealization of music ripe for commercial exploitation:

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[61]More interesting to note, major label and radio station support for rock was high by 1968. Because of the corporate clout that major labels could wield, Mullinax's attempt to strong-arm record label policy by means of legislation would prove as fruitful as screaming into a monsoon.

> Unfortunately, on this side of the Atlantic things were taking a different turn. Unlike the Britishers, who had limited their listening to blues and early rock, teenagers here had been into folk music which, because of its relationship to the American Left, was at least nominally concerned with broader topics than either rock or r&b. Bob Dylan, among others, was writing very serious lyrics and his influence sent rock on an ego trip from which it has never recovered. (Gabree 1969:MA-11)

For others, the industry-related hype seriously undermined rock's potential for expression. Michael Lydon, writing for *Ramparts*, penned, "So effective has the rock industry been in encouraging the spirit of optimistic youth takeover that rock's truly hard political edge, its constant exploration of the varieties of youthful frustration, has been ignored and softened" (Lydon quoted by Gabree 1969:MA-11). The cozy relationship that corporations formed with the underground press led to new venues for salesmanship. Lester Bangs, who would later be known as one of the most (musically and journalistically) influential critics of rock and roll, began his career with an angry letter to *Rolling Stone* in response to the magazine's hard-sell of a major label group who turned out to be, in his opinion, mediocre:[62]

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[62]During the 1960s, *Rolling Stone* held an enviable position among the underground presses for it was distributed, by arrangement, through Columbia Records. According to legend, Bangs was fired for writing a scathing article about a new release from Bob Dylan, arguably Columbia's most important artist. In a 1983 interview with rock journalist Jim DeRogatis, Bangs explained that the artist was not Dylan, but rather Canned Heat, who recorded for Liberty Records, a Columbia competitor. Bangs added, however, that *Rolling Stone* founder Jann Warner only liked writers who were "suck-up types," or in other words those who had no problem writing paeans to untalented musicians just because they had major label backing (DeRogatis 1999; sec. 2, para. 21).

> Then this MC5 album, *Kick Out the Jams*, came out, and they had this big article in there saying the MC5 were the greatest band in the world and all this, so I went out and bought it. Just like anybody, you buy something you don't like and you feel like you bought a hype. And I wrote this really like, blaaah!, scathing sort of review. And I sent a letter with it and said, 'Look. . . .You better print this or give me the reason why.' (Bangs, quoted by DeRogatis 1999; sec. 2; para. 17)

Gabree, Bangs, *Rolling Stone* editor Jon Landau, Sire Records executive Seymour Stein, and others of this generation who took issue with the growing pretentiousness of rock, had something else in common. They all held a racially inclusive view of rock's origins. When asked by DeRogatis in 1983 what he had listened to last, Bangs couldn't remember offhand, so he physically inspected his phonograph. Among the expected punk bands on his turntable were discs by Hank Ballard and Charlie Parker (DeRogatis 1999; sec. 2, para. 28).. In a piece titled "Rock Ages: The Thrill Is Gone," Landau did not differentiate between such artists as Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, the Beatles and Aretha Franklin when defining rock (Landau 1977, 30).[63] Stein referred to Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, Little Richard and Fats Domino as the sonic and cultural forefathers of the punk aesthetic (Flippo 1978, 25). All of these writers, at some time or another, understood that after the Beatles, the music known in the 1950s as rock and roll had re-segregated. The reasons for this are complex, and the major label takeover of rock had little to do with said turn of events, except to solidify the direction that different audiences and musicians were taking. Racial identification with music markets would become an important

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[63]As the title might imply, the essay articulates a nostalgic longing that conflicts with some of Landau's earlier views.

concern of major labels during the 1970s, and the marketing policies of the 1960s would sow the seeds of a conventional wisdom that would maintain musical standards along racial lines.

Rock vs. Soul

Although *Cash Box* initially championed the use of "soul" to describe a type of rock and roll, usage of the term evolved quickly. By 1967, writers clearly viewed soul not as a version of rock and roll, but simply as music made for black audiences. Furthermore, they identified soul as a continuation not of rock, but of older black musical forms dubbed "rhythm and blues." Covering the Monterey International Pops Festival for *Billboard*, Phillip Elwood wrote:

> Unfortunately, [Otis] Redding was the only representative of the Negro blues tradition and the only R&B entertainer in the [Monterey International Pops] Festival.
>
> True, Lou Rawls put on a superb demonstration of his road show technique. . . but Rawls isn't r&b. Rawls was the only performer to include what many Americans would call 'popular music'; i.e., 'Shadow of Your Smile,' 'Autumn Leaves,' and his now dully stylized medley, based on 'It Was a Very Good Year.' (Elwood 1967, 26)

Elwood made clear, in this first-hand and influential accounting of the events at Monterey, that he did not consider Otis Redding to be a rock and roll artist, but rather a rhythm and blues artist tied to "Negro" blues. In doing so, he implied that there existed a type of blues entirely unrelated to African American musical tradition. Elwood dissociates blacks from the blues by using the blues moniker to describe other bands, especially those who had the words "blue" or "blues" in their name. He also felt obliged

to compare Redding to Lou Rawls, even though he himself admitted that he could not see any stylistic connection. Since the festival's board deliberately attempted to present a diversity of performers and sounds, one might ask why the author singled out these two performers for a direct comparison. In the next paragraph, Elwood wrote:

> Balancing the slick Rawls performance was that of Johnny Rivers, who presented virtually a vocal history of the earlier days of rock, from rockabilly through plain folk rock. (Elwood 1967, 26)

What is interesting here is that Elwood presented Rivers' "vocal history of the earlier days of rock" as one that encompassed such rockabilly artists as Gene Vincent and Elvis Presley and folk rock. Perhaps the author would have acknowledged Fats Domino and Chuck Berry (especially since Rivers famously covered the latter's "Memphis") as rock musicians, but he did not. In fact, Elwood's piece assumes that the reader understands the differences between black music and white music. In the entire article, the artists who received the most scathing reviews were Rawls and Jimi Hendrix, whose "chicken choke" handling of the guitar led Elwood to conclude that he was not very talented (Elwood 1967, 24). To put this another way, Elwood saved his most damning comments for two non-white artists performing in styles he associated with white musicians.

In an article written for *Crawdaddy*, the aforementioned Jon Landau, in critiquing the work of black musicians, separated them into three categories: musicians who had severed themselves from African Americans completely (he gives the example of Jimi Hendrix); those who modified black music to appeal to whites (e.g., almost any Motown artist); and those who were what he called "hardcore," those who made purely black

sounds for black audiences (Landau 1967, 34). Landau further asserted that African American artists that did the best were those who were thought of as more authentic, such as those who recorded for Stax. Such Motown artists as Levi Stubbs of the Four Tops, who were, in his eyes, "blacker" than the usual Motown performer, found more respect from both blacks and whites, according to Landau (Landau 1967, 36-7).

Looking back on the era, music journalist Nelson George also came to the opinion that such stars as Aretha Franklin, who refused to compromise with "white sensibilities," were more accessible to general audiences than Motown artists, who, in representing the abstract notion of black upward mobility, seemingly attempted to "escape blackness and sell out to the Establishment" (George 1988, 106). He hypothesized that black rejection of rock during the 1960s, and black musicians who would aspire to rock, came about because of a two-fold change in the cultural significance that music served. Soul reflected the changes within the civil rights movement, from integration to "black nationalism and self-assertion" (George 1988, 106). Rock's changes toward European art music, on the other hand, would become evident in the release of *Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band*, of which George wrote:

> This was more ambitious than mere rock & roll. It was electronic. It was experimental. It sold albums instead of just 45s (and so got major labels interested). It was art. It was rock. It was white. (George 1988, 106)

At the same time, George referred to a number of other developments that could have fostered rock segregation. These developments demonstrate a pattern of rejection of black musical ambition by white executives who were indifferent to African American artists' desire to play to larger venues, sell more records, and achieve greater fame. In

turn, black artists became businessmen and businesswomen, and in the process they forged their own networks and venues. In one example, George chronicled the experience of Dinah Washington, who, with her friend Ruth Bowen, established Queen Booking, in response to a white agent who limited the venues that the former could play, and in effect kept her out of higher paying concerts (George 1988, 73-4). In another example, he discussed the influential record store started by a black entrepreneur named Bruce Webb (George 1988, 75). He also mentioned Kags Publishing, SAR Records, and Darby Records, all of which were founded by Sam Cooke (George 1988, 81).

In many respects, the independence of black musicians in booking, publishing and recording themselves was an important and necessary achievement that allowed them to create and prosper without the type of major label and big-name publisher interference that would reduce their sound to the slickly refined production and "syrupy" lyrics alluded to by Tony Standish (Standish 1959, 11). George's depiction of such businesses nevertheless reflects, on a deeper level, the fact that the record industry had developed within the practice of segregation. Except for a brief period between 1955 and 1964 when rock and roll blurred the socially accepted lines between black music and white music, cultural segregation had continued well into the 1960s. Although major labels had signed and recorded black performers for decades by then--from Columbia's Bessie Smith to Capitol's Nat King Cole--the main focus of their marketing had always been on white listeners. Not surprisingly, when the majors committed to rock after Monterey, they primarily looked for artists who were white, or could appeal to whites.

On an even deeper level, George's view of rock and roll implied a more sinister reality. Writing, "The ties between the music known as rock & roll and its original

audience were being severed, and black Americans didn't seem to care," George laid the groundwork for what he would later develop into a theory of how black musicians fared within the corporate machinery of the mainstream pop music industry (George 1988, 93). Black musicians had a tendency to start popular trends that attracted white listeners. Increased white attention subsequently led to white musicians adopting the new style, or elements of it, to the point where they could be viewed by white audiences as having equal authenticity.[64] Eventually, as with rock and roll, what was formerly thought of as an African American musical expression developed a separate white identity that either competed with, threatened, or overtook black involvement with the expression.[65] Black listeners subsequently lost interest in the old music, and looked forward to the next. Quoting Ahmet Ertegun on the differences between black and white audiences, he wrote:

> Black people tend to think about the future more. Black musicians don't like to play in an old style; they prefer to play in today's or tomorrow's style. If you go down to New Orleans, you'll find some young white kids who play Dixieland; it is part of the heritage of that area. But it's very hard to find black people who play Dixieland today, unless they're very old. Because the young blacks have heard Miles Davis and Charlie Parker. They're thinking of what's next. (Ertegun quoted by George 1988, 93)

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[64]George gave as an example of a 1965 Santa Monica concert where James Brown and Chuck Berry shared a bill with Leslie Gore, Jan and Dean, and others "before an auditorium filled with shrill, screaming teenage fans–predominately white girls" (George 1988, 93). He went on to say, "However, these shouts also suggested that, to the ears of these young record buyers, such foul English products as Gerry and the Pacemakers and Billy Kramer sounded as good as Chuck Berry, who though fresh from the joint on a Mann Act charge, still outplayed his accented imitators" (George 1988, 93).

[65]George later expands on this principle when writing about disco. In reference to the Bee Gees as the perceived equivalent of such performers as Donna Summer and Tavares, he used the term "reverse crossover" to describe a process by which African American musicians were evicted from their own sounds and markets (George 1988, 159).

George, Ertegun and others attribute part of the change in black musical expression to a general restlessness on the part of black audiences and musicians, who were continually looking for what was new. What George said overall in his book *The Death of Rhythm and Blues* was that blacks simply outgrew musical styles that no longer reflected their reality. What he implied, however, was that blacks did not simply abandon musical idioms, but were instead forced out of them. As mentioned earlier, for instance, Ray Charles, in a 1970 *Playboy* interview, cited the Beatles as the beginning of the end--not for him in particular, but for other black rock/r&b artists who could not get the attention that Beatlemania could provide for the oncoming British Invasion (Charles 1970, 70).

Perhaps a more potent example of George's implication might come from a comparison between hip-hop and other black musics. Rock and roll, for example, existed for about ten years (1954-1964) as a music with varying degrees of black identity until the British Invasion. Mainstream disco lasted from 1974 to 1980, when high listener disapproval within one (predominantly white) segment of the youth market forced the music underground, while at the same time commending the same stylistic elements when labeled 'new-wave,' or 'danceable rock.' Some of the performers hailed from the UK (e.g., Gary Numan, Human League, and Soft Cell).[66] Mainstream hip-hop, on the other hand, began with the release of "Rapper's Delight" in 1979 and continues to the

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[66]I use the term 'mainstream disco' because George and others believe that disco really began in the early 1960s with such artists as Chubby Checker (George 1979 "Fatal Prognosis," 75).

time of this writing, a span of twenty-nine years and counting. Granted, there have been some changes over the course of time in hip-hop production. Such technologies as digital sampling, step-time sequencing, pre-packaged patch libraries and work stations that possess virtually the same capacity as the elaborate studios of old at a fraction of the price, have made the process of recording rap songs cheaper, easier, and more accessible.[67] Lyrics have also reflected the changes in social reality that occurred between 1979 and 2005.

At the same time, the core musical elements of hip-hop--the stylized patter, the overlaid beats, and the synthesis of pre-recorded material--have, for the most part, remained unchanged. More important, the terms 'rap' and 'hip-hop,' along with a number of variations, (1) have remained in usage over the entire time, and (2) have retained their identity as a primarily African American musical expression. Although such European, and Euro-American artists as Teena Marie, Tessie B., The Beastie Boys, Vanilla Ice and Eminem have recorded, or contributed to hip-hop, they, unlike the Beatles and Bee Gees before them, they did not dominate their genre to the point where they became the standard bearers for it. Without pressure to compete against a large number of non-black artists who shared in the identity of a music created by people like them, blacks continued and developed the hip-hop tradition for two-and-a-half decades. That would seem to dispel the assertion that black musicians only thought about "future" music, especially within hip-hop with its frequent homages to the 'old-school,' and its utilization of digital

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[67]An Oasis Workstation retailed at around $9,000 dollars in 2005. In many ways, it matches (and in some cases exceeds) the capacity of a two-inch, twenty-four track reel-to-reel Studer tape deck which would have cost about $250,000 in 1988, and would require audio technicians with between $5,000 to $9,000 worth of training to operate.

patches from records as far back as the 1960s. One might easily surmise that African Americans did not retreat from various musical forms out of mere restlessness. They primarily left because they could no longer compete in those genres on an equal footing.[68]

George's implication drew criticism. Music writer and editor Steve Perry, for one, blasted his notion that blacks were booted from the mainstream, and argued instead that blacks had indeed become the mainstream, or at least a significant part of it (Garofalo 1993, 233). One could point to not only the mainstreaming of rap in the late-1980s for examples of this, but also the major label backing of practically all of the black chart-toppers of the decade. Reebee Garofalo agreed with Perry that general definitions of race as culture were problematic (Garofalo 1993, 234), and also, like Perry, rejected the black-origination/white-assumption tenet that George's theory implied (Garofalo 1993, 239). Still, Garofalo carefully pointed out that George's usage of the term "culture" had not so much to do with skin color as it did a shared experience (Garofalo 1993, 235). And though rejecting the notion of white assumption, Garofalo still attempted to put the idea into a reasonable context:

> The issue is not whether [Bill] Haley, [Jerry Lee] Lewis or [Buddy] Holly brought originality and freshness to the music [rock & roll]. They did. The issue is one of historical and cultural accuracy and concomitant reward. (Garofalo 1993, 239)

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[68]One might be tempted to speculate that if hip-hop were to evolve in a similar manner, than black musicians would once again move on to something new or different.

The Monterey festival inspired Clive Davis and other major label executives to sign rock acts in 1967, but not because of their musical ability or professionalism. Instead, Davis, and others like him, signed certain artists because they personally witnessed the effect these performers had on audiences, who were likely to buy records that major labels had the ability to sell. The majors had already maintained contact with a number of key radio stations across the country for promotional reasons. They also found cooperation from the underground press. In other words, the major labels already had business networks in place to sell to predominantly white audiences. What they did not have in 1967 was access to the institutionalized booking, publishing and promotional venues created to serve black artists, who were thus overlooked in the ensuing industry-wide push to mainstream rock.[69]

The Counterculture Formula

By the time that the Beatles and other British musicians had revitalized the r&b/rock youth market in 1964, rock had already become a fixture on college campuses,

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[69]The inclusion of such artists as Jimi Hendrix and Sly and the Family Stone in the historical connection between Monterey and major label interest might, at first blush, seem to have included large overtures to black audiences. But as many (e.g. George, Landau *et cetera*) have said--most likely to the point of overstatement--one could make an argument that Hendrix did not represent black music, partly because of his appeal to whites, and partly because the other members of his band (Mitch Mitchell and Noel Redding) were white Europeans. And Sly (Sylvester Stewart) had ties to the white San Francisco rock scene as a former producer of Grace Slick and the Beau Brummels, and like the Jimi Hendrix Experience, his band also consisted of blacks and whites. George noted too that the acquisition of Sly and the Family Stone by Columbia represented a gamble on the part of Clive Davis, writing, "Davis at first wasn't convinced that, in the age of Aquarius, Sly's glittery costumes could reach whites, which at the time was the only market that concerned CBS. In his biography. . . . Davis admitted he underestimated Sly's vision" (George 1988, 112).

where a growing number of young people had enrolled. At the same time, the college folk/coffeehouse scene partially merged with rock, creating an overlapping identification of the two. While hybrid forms of folk-rock and other musics with rock in their name (see Artist Terms table) gained popularity among a new generation of young adults between 1964 and 1967, major labels took tentative steps to include more of the new sound into their product lines. After Monterey, what began as the major labels' tentative steps quickly turned into an aggressive rush for talent, publicity networks, executives, and technical innovations that could accommodate the music.

The allure of The Monterey International Pops Festival for many of the record executives gathered there was not the music, at least exclusively. They did not see a long-winded, three-day concert, but rather a "be-in" (to borrow from the parlance of the day), an event that was not so much heard, but experienced with all senses. More important, they saw the effect that the whole, seemingly magical atmosphere had on the attendees, and understood how the featured acts plugged into that scene. Not surprisingly, the unsigned artists who came to Monterey would all find label representation by year's end, the vast majority of the contracts coming from the majors. Meanwhile, the lights, the casual freedom, the flowers, the arts and crafts, and other non-musical signifiers, and even the blues sound of many of the featured acts were easy enough to understand to some degree for record executives whose previous notions of popular music were honed in the lush string orchestrations common to 1940s and 1950s discs.

Monterey epitomized Middleton's description of standardization as formulaic imitation. While perhaps not quite as simple as the formula suggested by the title of a 1965 article by *Billboard's* Aaron Sternfeld ("Rock + Folk + Protest = An Erupting New

Sound"), the elements of rock, folk and anti-authoritarianism were at the formula's core, along with artistic, or poetic aspirations and a sense of aesthetics encompassing visual media. The aggressive artists signings, the utilization of such venues as the Fillmore East, the new reliance upon such second-tier venues as the Whiskey A-Go-Go to develop and showcase upcoming talent, and the executive hirings of youth-minded songwriters and staff attest to the deliberateness, on the majors' part, to push rock into the foreground of the popular music/record industry. Indeed, with their in-house systems of national (and sometimes international) distribution and with their long-established ties to the radio industry, the majors were in a position, in 1967, to exert considerable control over the youth market. By tapping into the underground press in addition to mainstream media, the majors could present artists with whom their paying customers could identify; musicians who could speak as they spoke, wear the clothes that they wore, and visually and verbally express themselves as they did.

Those signed after their performance at the festival, as well as Led Zeppelin, The Doors and similar artists who were not at Monterey, had become desirable to the majors because they carried with them the signifiers proven successful to that concert audience. The majors saw the Monterey crowd as representative of youth culture, and hence the youth market. While Pat Boone could arguably, with similar instrumental backing and expert production, duplicate the new blues/shock/maverock/psychedelic discs, or record them in such a manner that they might turn out to be interesting in their own right, he could never begin to approximate the other necessary signifiers. Herein lay one of the key difference between the 1950s and the 1960s. Cover artists of the 1950s approached authenticity in terms of aural fidelity--i.e., the extent to which the original could be heard

in the new version--even though they attempted to add bits and pieces of their own style, a process that some might hear as refinement of the original. The 1960s underground, on the other hand, had incorporated layers of meaning into musical expression, to the point where the look, the "attitudes" (as Moriarty put it) and the sound were all part of the expression.

The degree to which the major labels could incorporate all of these elements into a commercial approach would thus illustrate formulaic imitation. The easiest way to implement a formula would be to select artists who carried with them the desired signifiers already. Hence the majors scarfed up the unaffiliated Monterey acts, and searched for others like them. In other cases, they rushed records into distribution from artists who had similar qualities ("RCA's Nilsson Push Schedule Is Revamped" 1967, 4). In short, Monterey, and the developments surrounding it, showed the majors how to dominate the youth market by showing them the musical and extra-musical aspects that they would need to form a new standard.

Conversely, artists who culturally fell outside the standard--because of age, race, sound or appearance--sparked less interest from the majors. Although, as George pointed out, The Jimi Hendrix Experience featured a performer who differed racially from the majority of the Monterey crowd, the group's sidemen were European, and their sound fit into the artistic ambitions (or as Gabree might say, pretensions) of a sophisticated audience (George 1988, 109). George also noted out that Sly and the Family Stone received a lot of attention from the white youth market, but only after some contention with his label (George 1988, 109-110). For the most part, these two artists were anomalous in terms of identifiability with the desired market, for both were racially

integrated. They were also progressive, and their sound was based in the electric blues, and those attributes *in toto* compensated for what they could not give to the market in terms of identity. Otis Redding, on the other hand, was greatly appreciated by the Monterey crowd, but at the same time was not identified as one of them, but rather someone coming from another tradition.

The major labels did not completely avoid black music or black musicians after Monterey. In fact, their approach to soul in some respects mirrored their approach to white rock musicians between 1964 and 1967. As they did then, the majors took tentative steps into a market, distributing process and promotional network that had, to a substantial extent, evolved independently of them. One such step, for example, would be the signing of such groups as Sly & the Family Stone who could crossover into other markets. An example of a larger step would be Columbia's acquisition of Philadelphia International, a record label co-founded by former Motown producers Kenny Gamble and Leon Huff. For the most part, major label interest in black rock and roll would lay dormant until (1) significant industry consolidation led smaller labels to either merge with majors or gain distribution from them, and (2) another music initially identified as African American expression crossed over, like rock and roll of the 1950s, into other markets.

Chapter Five: Record Label Consolidation: 1967-1980

Overview

This chapter examines the impact of record industry consolidation, which began in 1967, and gained momentum throughout the 1970s. During that time, major labels tried to obtain larger shares of the youth music market by dominating distribution, buying or taking over smaller labels, luring established stars away from independent labels, anticipating musical trends, and hiring outside firms to handle their promotion. When independent labels found success with dance music in the 1970s, the majors were not as slow to assimilate it into their product line as they were with rock and roll in the 1960s. Subsequently, the ubiquitous sound, coupled with what some considered the professionalization of rock and roll, met with considerable hostility among some segments of the youth generation. In other musics, the indies met with increasing difficulty when attempting to compete with the majors in the mainstream.

Standardization became an issue within the period of label consolidation for several reasons: (1) standardization in production techniques yielded consistency in some of the aural aspects of music; (2) speculation about new markets, sounds and sales strategies twice led to a major rush to produce a specific sound; and (3) the majors engaged in business practices that threatened industry diversity by forcing smaller players to either quit the game, join their side, or relegate themselves to the cultural margins. The diminishing plurality of voices within mainstream music sales raised the possibility that pop music become more homogeneous as power within the industry concentrated into fewer hands.

The first two sections discuss the rise and fall of disco and punk, two musics once thought of as antithetical. In both cases, industry over-speculation resulted in a massive rush to find similar artists; both ultimately met with disapproval, despite their initial popularity with fans. Moreover, elements of both eventually melded into a subgenre generically deemed 'new wave.' The third section chronicles and examines the business practices that the major labels embarked upon to increase their market share. The fourth section discusses independent promotion, the ethically questionable practice that arguably more than any other aided major label hegemony in popular music sales. The fifth section looks at the long-term consequences of all of the actions taken by the major labels. The sixth section discusses the relevance of disco, punk and consolidation to the subject of standardization.

Disco Mania, Disco Recession

Roxon referred to Manhattan's Le Club, which opened in 1961, as the first true discotheque (George 1979 "Fatal Prognosis," 75). Based on her opinion, Nelson George cited Chubby Checker as one of the first major disco stars.[70] Although discos maintained a steady clientele over the course of the 1960s, and early 1970s, their presence as an important component of the industry, indeed of popular culture, remained at the periphery.[71] Many of the famous live-music dance venues--The Whiskey A Go-Go and

[70]One might also say the same of Hank Ballard, Joey Dee and the Starlighters (of Peppermint Lounge fame) and other contemporary twisters.

[71]One can easily tell this by looking up all the articles published about discotheques in the 1973 edition of *Music Index* and comparing them to the number of

the Electric Circus, for example--lost some of their allure to audiences after 1969. In New York, however, the practice of dancing to recorded music at nightclubs and after-hours joints continued (George 1979 "Fatal Prognosis," 75). Although rock and roll of the Monterey ilk dominated playlists at many discos, especially those on the west coast of the United States, dancers began to favor records predominantly performed by African American musicians (Melanson 1975 "The Disco":D-3). Moreover, the number of discos in the country increased dramatically between 1970 and 1974 (C. Hall 1974: 1).

In the summer of 1974, George McCrae went to number one on the charts with "Rock Your Baby," a dance single promoted for a long time within discos before becoming a mainstay on top-40 radio (Charlesworth 1974, 49). Generally regarded as one of the first major disco hits, "Rock Your Baby" actually replaced another dance tune imbued with stereotypical disco elements as number one on the *Billboard* charts, the Hues Corporation's "Rock the Boat." Stylistically, both featured quasi-Latin kit motifs, with heavy use of a pedaled high-hat and sweetening (strings, horns and percussion for "Rock the Boat," organ and percussion for "Rock Your Baby"). An important difference between the songs lay in who performed them, who handled them, and how they were actively promoted.

TK Records, founded in Miami by Henry Stone, released "Rock Your Baby." The company later released "Rocking Chair" by McCrae's wife, Gwen, and a number of hits from the likes of K.C. and the Sunshine Band. RSO, an Australian company, urgently refashioned its most famous act, the Bee Gees, into a disco band, utilizing former

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entries in 1975, the latter year showing an increase that reflected disco's growing popularity and importance.

Atlantic Records staff producers and Florida-based session men to assist with their transition (George 1988, 153, 158). The most prominent of the disco independents, Neil Bogart's Casablanca in Los Angeles, had re-energized unaffiliated independents by racking up a long string of hits and gold records by Donna Summer, Cher, and Parliament. Casablanca and similar companies proved that smaller record labels could successfully compete with the majors--in terms of unit sales--by utilizing the promotional opportunities afforded by dance clubs (Duston 1975, 6). In some cases, club promotion was enhanced by the personal appearance of such performers as the Kay Gees, Billy Paul, and the Bee Gees, who would introduce their own records as ersatz disc jockeys (Kirsch 1975 "Major Acts," 29).

The Hues Corporation, on the other hand, recorded "Rock the Boat" in 1973 for major label RCA. RCA originally conceived of the song as an inner album track, so it drew little attention until re-released as a single for discotheques. By 1975, industry insiders had become aware of disco promotion as an alternative to radio promotion. Midland International, for example, sold over 100,000 copies of the Carol Douglas song "Doctors Orders" before it received any radio airplay at all, in no small part due to club promotion, and the emerging influence of The Record Pool (Fishell 1975:D10).

Often described as a 'clearinghouse for disco,' The Record Pool was, in fact, a service organization that distributed likeable records from a number of different companies to discotheques. DJs trusted the Pool's judgment regarding the entertainment quality of the disc (Melanson & Williams 1975, 29). Within the clubs, the Pool gave equal footing to major and indie products. Such larger independents as Buddah, and such

majors as WEA, came to rely heavily on The Record Pool, even though they had entire departments dedicated to disco promotion (Fishell 1975:D10).

The rush to enter and maintain a presence within the disco market by both the majors and independents resulted in some changes within the industry. *Billboard* journalist Jim Melanson noted that the rapid rise in the number of discotheques led to parallel increases in the sales of speakers, lights, turntables, and other hardware necessary to open an establishment that could draw dancers (Melanson 1975 "Discomania":D1). Publishers, in addition to an increase in revenue from newly written disco tunes, also benefited from catalogs of older licensed songs for discofied reinterpretations (Schoenfeld 1975 "Standard Music," 2).[72] The desire of disco patrons to dance longer to satisfying beats prompted a demand for manufacturers to create an extended single, one that lasted between eleven and twelve minutes, in 1976 (Tiegel 1976, 35) The American Federation of Musicians decried the fact that accelerating disco popularity resulted in a decrease in the number of live musicians at nightclubs, thus depriving some of their members of an important source of income ("AFM Locals Goose Anti-Club Drive" 1977, 67). The power and prestige of club disc jockeys also led to conflict with club owners, and threats of unionization all over the United States, but most bitterly in Chicago (Penchansky 1978 "Opposition Aplenty," 86; Penchansky 1978 "Relations Improve," 66).

The cultural impact of disco during the late-1970s cannot be understated. Although early in its prominence associated with African American and homosexual

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[72]Several examples of pre-rock era songs that became disco hits were Benny Davis and Harry Akst's "Baby Face" (1926), Johnny Mercer and Victor Schertzinger's "Tangerine" (1942), and Stanley Adams and Maria Grever's "What a Difference a Day Made" (1934).

nightlife, it soon became a national, and international, fad, enjoyed by established media stars in such notorious nightclubs as Studio 54 in Manhattan. A number of popular singers, who achieved fame for different styles, began performing and recording it; among them Josephine Baker, Rod Stewart, Barbra Streisand, the Bee Gees and (even) Ethel Merman. Those who would not publicly acknowledge themselves as 'going disco' were undoubtedly influenced by it. "Miss You," by the Rolling Stones featured the type of oscillating bass line associated with disco; while Lynyrd Skynyrd's "Saturday Night Special" featured, during its interlude (instrumental bridge), rapid-fire high-hat laden drum beats that could be found on many disco tracks. In rural areas, a number of mobile discos, trailers containing all the fixtures needed to turn any space (indoor or outdoor) into a quasi-urban danceteria, featured country and western artists, many of whom played against a rhythmic backdrop containing the identifiable disco beat (Sanders 1979:TO10-11).

For disco producers, crafting a marketable sound lay at the heart of disco success. Beginning in 1975, such producers as Tony Silvester and Bert deCoteaux began to systematize an approach to disco musical composition and performance. Realizing, because of disco's accessibility and economy, that "everyone is dancing," these two began to scour diverse clubs--in terms of size, ethnicity and class--in order to find common elements that diverse disco audiences found appealing (Kirsch 1975 "A&R Experts":D-19) What they discovered seemed perilously close to Adorno's description of the template function:

> 'Anyway,' he [Tony Silvester] continues, 'to get a good sound you have to know how to dance. What you're really doing when you produce a disco record is choreographing a

> dance without having the dancers in front of you. You create little things to turn dancers on. For example, you open up big, put them down into the pocket and toward the middle of the song you accelerate again and you reach a peak.' (Kirsch 1975 "A&R Experts":D-19).

In other words, Silvester began to form the algorithm that transformed disco from a trial-and-error audience-pleasing gamble into a surefire hit-making process. As the movie genre template watched for the viewer, Silvester's template attempted to dance (or at least choreograph) for the dancer. Silvester and deCoteaux's approach would have a profound impact within disco music-making, for their clients included a number of influential disco stars, among them Sister Sledge (Kirsch 1975 "A&R Experts":D-19).

More important, the template was designed to appeal to a broader segment of the music market. Not content to share an identity with rhythm and blues (i.e., black music), those dealing with disco frantically experimented along the lines of Silvester and de Coteaux in order to develop a disco sound that was less ethnic-specific.[73] In later years, Nelson George, for one, would view that particular turn in disco history with great alarm. To him, the song "Fly, Robin, Fly," by Silver Convention, a German band credited with popularizing the Eurodisco sound, marked the beginning of a trend similar to what had occurred to rock and roll of the 1950s and early-1960s (George 1979 "Fatal Prognosis," 75). As had happened before, the music first performed almost entirely by black musicians, for primarily black audiences, muted acknowledgment of its origins and had

[73]Contemporary literature is rife with journalistic coverage of this trend. See Joe 1976 "Disco Music" and 1976 "Disco: From," Ford 1977, Melanson 1976 for good examples.

become, if not exclusively white, a genre to which blacks, whites, and Latinos staked an equal claim.

The change in disco production methods and standards was not a result of passively aping whatever seemed popular at the moment. Rather, labels and producers actively sought to make the music more commercial by distancing its sound and identity away from its original audience. In 1977, for example, music critic Radcliffe Joe articulated a major label "need for a purge of fly-by-nighters from its [disco production] ranks," and the desire to move away from the previous (primarily rhythm and blues) associations, which he described as "mindless and insulting to the intelligence of audiences" (Joe 1977 "Discos Seek," 8). Any small label, especially one that quickly profited from the disco boom, might derisively be thought of as a 'fly-by-night' operation, however. Moreover, some of the 'purging' would become evident later that year when a number of small, black-owned independents picketed Los Angeles area radio station managers, who had suddenly stopped airing their singles (J. Williams 1977 "L.A. Small," 46) Nowadays, one might suspect that the indie on-air blackout had something to do with independent promotion, which the majors could pay for, but the smaller labels could not. If that is true, then the action would indicate that control of disco became an industrywide concern:

> In a consensus of opinion rarely found in any fledgling industry, just about every segment of the disco world agrees that if this entertainment phenomenon is to realize its full potential, then the music must undergo significant changes in format. . . .
>
> However, disco is no longer a freaky phenomenon. It is big business, and everyone with a vested interest in the industry, whether artist, writer, producer, disk jockey, club owner,

> record company executive or Wall Street financier, agree that if the momentum is to be maintained, then the parameters of appeal of the music must be broadened. (“Music Must Change” 1977, 44).

In 1978, the changing, more universal disco sound proved especially attractive after the release of the soundtrack from the movie *Saturday Night Fever*. The movie demonstrated disco’s ability to mix diverse musical elements into a cohesive genre, which in turn celebrated that very diversity. “A Fifth of Beethoven,” which took several themes from the first movement of Beethoven's fifth symphony and set them to a disco beat, as well as "Night on Disco Mountain," based on the Mussorgsky tone poem *Night on Bald Mountain*, utilized elements of European art music. “Open Sesame” harkened back to the exotic Orientalist stereotypes of the Middle East popular during the nineteenth century. “K-Gee” and “Disco Inferno” referred to the soul sounds of the 1960s, "Manhattan Skyline" paid homage to big-band styles reminiscent of the 1930s and 1940s; and "Boogie Shoes" contained overt blues/rock allusions. The combination of show-biz glamour, celebrity, music and promotion augmented its large-scale success.

Arguably, the movie’s chief appeal lay in the lifestyle it promoted. The celebration of disco as “rock and roll reality,” or hedonistic excess, would undoubtedly attract those seeking attention and action (Fuchs1979, 51-2).[74] Consequently, the *Saturday Night Fever* soundtrack became the most widely-bought album up to that time

[74]In 1979, WABC Program Director Rick Sklar believed that the allure of cheap and easy friendships and sex drew the lonely and alienated, hence disco’s success (“Alienation Boosts Disco: Sklar” 1979, 30).

with initial sales of over eight million copies. More symbolically, it replaced Fleetwood Mac's *Rumours* as the top album of the U.S. (Aletti 1978, 53).

Saturday Night Fever's success expanded disco promotion into other media. In addition to increasing television airtime on such musically oriented shows as *Midnight Special* and *Soul Train*, disco musicians appeared on such fare as *The Dinah Shore Show* and *Sixty Minutes*. *The Merv Griffin Show* devoted an entire episode to Barry White (Grein 1978, 55). Industry insiders had little doubt that disco's growing media presence owed a great debt to *Saturday Night Fever*. As Steve Keator, Director of Publicity and Media for Casablanca related to Paul Grein:

> ''Saturday Night Fever' helped a lot,' he [Keator] acknowledges. 'It's always easy to book a disco act that had a sound, personality and hits. But now you can book acts even if they haven't had hits outside the disco market, like Pattie Brooks.' (Grein 1978, 55)

Keator's Casablanca particularly sought to expand the commercial possibilities of its chief product into other media, and embarked upon a number of strategies to do so. Label owner Neil Bogart quickly seized upon the growing videocassette market and produced videos of its top stars, speculating that diversification into the upcoming laserdisc technology was worth considering ("Casablanca Records in Merger with Peter Gruber's Film Outfit" 1976, 56). The company also sought to include television-based performers and products on its roster, such as its release and heavy promotion of an album by Johnny Carson, in which the label scratched together old *Tonight Show* clips. Casablanca also formed mergers and partial mergers with film companies that allowed

them to promote roster songs in the jointly produced films, and then sell the soundtracks (ibid.).[75]

The most striking adaptation of media to disco occurred in radio. Between 1975-1980, radio stations expanded the number of disco records in their rotations, while at the same time shrinking playlists. Indeed, during that five-year span disco seemed unstoppable, with more companies investing heavily into it. As late as 1979, Daniel Henninger and Gaye Sands Miller, both writing for *The Wall Street Journal*, saw disco business as a growth market, especially in radio (Sands Miller 1979, 1; Henninger 1979, 15). Sands Miller reported that the San Juan Racing Association, which had already purchased eight U.S. radio stations, bought WKTU in New York, and changed its format from soft rock to all-disco in 1978. As a result, WKTU's Arbitron ratings improved to the point where, between July 1978 and January 1979, the station could raise the price of advertising spots 400%.[76] Henninger added that all-disco formats were opening across the nation. As Ted Stecker, program director of Beaumont's (Texas) KNYS put it, "The response has been amazing" (Stecker quoted by Henninger 1979, 15). Two months after Sands Miller's *Wall Street Journal* piece, WKTU became the top New York radio station

[75]In addition to a $26 million merger with the Peter Gruber Film Company that produced the disco musical *Thank God It's Friday*, Casablanca co–produced *The Deep* with Columbia Pictures.

[76]WABC, a rival station, questioned the Arbitron ratings, and ordered its ad salespeople to dismiss the results when potential clients raised concerns about it (Sands Miller 1979, 1). The ratings were literally incredible, and presage the rift between industry and consumer perceptions concerning disco that would manifest itself in a very vocal anti-disco movement.

with a whopping 11.3 share.[77] In markets where there were no superstations, the potential revenues from disco allowed African American radio entrepreneurs to buy stations, and make them profitable right away by featuring the music ("Minority-Owned Stations Rising: Up 37 in Year" 1980, 109).[78]

In a 1979 industry forum hosted by *Billboard* magazine, industry professionals, for the most part, conceded that disco had grown considerably since 1974, and showed no signs of weakening (Ditingo 1979, 39). But at the conference, some panelists began to voice concern that disco had grown a little too big a little too fast. Some felt that disco success had led to complacency in radio programming. As panelist A.J. Miller, President of the Southern California Record Pool, stated, "The DJs have no idea of momentum or mixing and their playlists are stagnant; they're afraid to try out new things" (Grein 1979, 39).

Early-1979 optimism about disco's unstoppable growth aside, there were signs of pessimism that the music had either run its course, or was about to suffer a severe backlash. When Polygram Records, for example, bought the Casablanca label, it had purchased what many industry insiders believed to be the disco juggernaut (Meyer 1977, 79). The parent company did not know that it would incur devastating losses during its

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[77]Just one year earlier, WKTU's market share was 1.4 ("Word 'Disco' Dirty in New York Radio." 1979, 24).

[78]In 1979 alone, thirty-seven radio stations were purchased by minorities, thirty-six of them by black proprietors ("Minority-Owned Stations Rising: Up 37 in Year" 1980, 109).

first year of operation.[79] Had Polygram and others taken a more critical look at Casablanca, the exaggeration of disco success would have become apparent. Casablanca's owner, Neil Bogart, routinely directed the company to buy large quantities of the label's own records. While this enabled artists to win gold and platinum records (denoting sales of over 500,000 and 1,000,000, respectively), it also diminished profits. Nonetheless, it gave the appearance of a thriving organization, an illusion Bogart enhanced by allowing the company to indulge in extravagant expenses that included a fleet of expensive company cars and copious amounts of illicit drugs--all of which took a greater toll on the company's gross (Dannen 1991, 161-181)

Even radio stations that benefited from disco popularity soon began to question whether or not growing disapproval of disco justified a change in format. Rick Sklar took over programming duties from Program Director Glenn Morgan at WABC in New York after the station's Arbitron ratings dropped to a 5.9 share in the summer of 1979 (Doug Hall 1979 "Heads Roll," 4).[80] Sklar blamed the share decrease on his station's over-reliance on disco programming (ibid.). A station like WABC, which had regularly enjoyed the top spot in the top market for years, might have understandably been upset to drop to fourth place, despite boasting a respectable share of the market, and might therefore change management personnel. But even stations that had improved their market share underwent similar management and policy changes. WNBC (New York)

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[79] The amount was over sixty million dollars, enough to have eliminated scores of unaffiliated independents.

[80]Morgan officially retained the title of program director, but did not perform in that capacity.

fired Station Manager Charlie Warner despite a slight increase in share, from 2.6 to 2.7, and WXLO (New York, formerly and currently WOR) fired Program Director Bobby Rich despite increasing their share from 2.2 to 2.5. Both Warner and Rich relied on heavy disco song rotation in order to boost their numbers. Nevertheless, upper management began to fear that their stations were losing their base audiences (ibid.). Speaking on behalf of non-disco fans, Diane Lesniewski addressed what she saw as the negative aspect of stations changing from something else to all-disco formats:

> For no matter how unsuccessful the accounting department might deem a certain station, that station still has listeners. And if the station's format is unique in that market, a change in programming can alienate the loyal fans who keep their dials at its frequency. These fans may never be replaced
>
> Arbitron ratings may tell the number of listeners a station receives at a given time, but that is all. It cannot measure the loyalty the station receives from its listeners. (Lesniewski 1980, 18)

Despite the increased presence of disco on U.S. radio stations, and the increased revenues that the larger audiences brought to broadcasters, 1979 marked the beginning of a general record sales slump (Kozak 1979, 4). With its expanding presence as a product of commercial music, some were quick to link declining sales with disco ascendancy. Contrary to what might have been believed at the time, however, disco never dominated sales or radio airplay, despite its gains in both. It still lagged behind adult contemporary and AOR in terms of overall share (the market share of a top-ranked disco station notwithstanding). Furthermore, disco had become the only major format that showed growth (Doug Hall 1979 "Disco Radio," 87). For retailers, however, disco would

predictably serve as a scapegoat for declining sales, even if sales of disco itself were on the rise. What seemed like disco saturation on radio might have discouraged potential buyers from purchasing any other type of music. Furthermore, with disco's ubiquity, promotion of other wares would have to compete at a disadvantage against a music that had so clearly become the industry favorite. Debating disco entrepreneur Stewart Feinstein in the pages of a jointly bylined *Billboard* article, Ed Newmark, president of an artist management company, wrote:

> Disco is showing the public how to spend more of its entertainment dollars outside of the record shops. The music in itself is not conducive to excessive purchase, and with hours of non-stop free disco on radio stations for listening and dancing pleasure, there is even less need to buy records. When the consumer has bought several records, he has all he needs to party with. (Feinstein & Newmark 1979, 14)

Other anti-disco sentiments came from black musicians, fans and executives who felt that industry executives were blindly lumping all African American artists together as disco, while at the same time promoting white disco artists more vigorously. As Nelson George explained almost a decade later, WBLS (New York) and other key stations began to distance themselves from the term "black radio," preferring instead "urban radio" in order to attract the listeners who had gravitated towards the more universal disco sound (George 1988, 159-160). Some stations that had relied heavily on disco were distancing themselves even further from association with black music by limiting airplay to fusion and other musics, and calling themselves "contemporary" or "Top 40" (Doug Hall 1980, 25). Steve Gold of Far Out Productions agreed with George's assessment that the loss of disco's racial identity did not bode well for black musicians, saying, "In expanding to

white audience acceptance…one is constantly making the black musical art form more palatable to the white music buying public which is in dire need of a euphemism to relate to" (Gold quoted by Meyer 1979, 2). Artist Teddy Pendergrass felt that disco had thus become a double-edge sword that could help a black artist's career, but at the same time force African American musicians to compete with their white counterparts on turf that was formerly only black:

> Disco music has helped my career a lot, because I've never been what you would call a disco artist, so what it did was separate me from the pack. It's given more black music a chance to be heard.
>
> But by the same token, it's taken away, because whites have capitalized--I don't mean with racial slurs--just that white pop artists have capitalized on so much material they've completely taken the feeling and made their way with it. . . . (Pendergrass quoted by Ochs 1979, 16)

In the spring of 1979, Black Music Association President Kenneth Gamble called an "emergency" meeting of record company and radio executives to discuss the negative effects that disco was having "on such black music forms as r&b, soul, pop and rock" (Joe 1979, 18). Bill Spitalsky, Vice President of Spring Records, attended the meeting ruing the fact that non-disco singles and albums had suffered a 50% falloff in sales (Joe 1979, 18; Ford & Lichtman 1979, 1). Furthermore, black disco artists were having a more difficult time crossing over into white markets and onto the mainstream pop charts. In 1973, black artists recorded thirty-six of the top one hundred singles on *Billboard* Top 100. By 1979, that number had dwindled to twenty-one ("Disco Not Proving Panacea for Black Artists" 1979, 59). During the same period of time, black musicians and executives noted a trend of white disco (e.g. Bee Gees) and non-disco performers (e.g., Average

White Band) crossing over into r&b charts and venues ("Black Is Black, White Is White, But Things Sometimes Look Alike" 1978, 448).

In a 1980 op-ed piece, Larry Depte extolled the mainstreaming effect that disco had on black music, making it more profitable for the performer, while at the same time ensuring the cultural importance of the African American aesthetic within American society (Depte 1980, 16). But if blacks saw disco as a means by which to establish musical hegemony, white disco fans distanced the music from race. As artist manager Joseph Bates countered, "'Disco' means record. A disco is a place to go to dance to recorded music." For Bates, the term was inclusive of popular dance music whether it came from r&b or rock. He chided (presumably major) label executives for "placing limits on the music," or in other words, straight-jacketing disco as simply rhythm and blues (Bates 1980, 18). Bates' sentiments echoed those made by Susan Sanders in her piece about country and western discos (S. Sanders 1979:TO-10-11). More important, this particular opinion about disco found concurrence among a number of club disc jockeys and owners, especially in chain and suburban discos. By 1980, a number of discos had switched to predominantly rock and new wave programming (Riedlinger 1980, 37; Kozak 1980 "Rock Overwhelming," 36-7).

As early as 1976, inner city African American discotheque proprietors began to complain that the more broadly appealing universal sound, and the newer marketing strategies that subdued racial identification with the music, hurt their business because a new trend towards suburban discos lured white audiences away from their establishments (J. Williams 1976, 43). Meanwhile, many noted discos--among them Boston's Whimsey and New York's Abracadabra--were forced to close their doors despite the trend's boom

times ("Whimsey's in Boston Shuts Doors." 1977, 80; "N.Y.'s Abracadabra Goes Dark; Protests Hit Mark" 1977, 50). Some of the chic survivors, their doors already teeming with unwashed masses yearning to mingle with the rich and famous, responded to increased demand for disco admission by selectively allowing certain patrons waiting in line to enter, thus leading to charges of segregation, which some contended was racial in nature. In the summer of 1977, the New York State Liquor Authority began investigation of one disco, Regine's, for allegedly violating a state law that prohibited private clubs from admitting patrons unless accompanied by a member. Other club owners began to wonder if the investigation would spread (Joe 1977 "Disco Discrimination," 1, 50).[81]

Despite all the negative attributes, disco enjoyed tremendous popularity on radio and in record shops for most of 1979. Nevertheless, intense hostility from some listeners, although small in terms of actual numbers, sharply and decisively curbed industry enthusiasm for the music.[82] When asked why they hated it, many in the 'disco sucks' movement derided disco on the grounds of musical inferiority: i.e., it was repetitive, plastic, and mindless (Rose 1979, 7). A few more would say that they disliked the elitist, fraudulent, polyester persona stereotypical of the disco patron. Very few mentioned

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[81]NYSLA Commissioner Lawrence Gedda felt that despite having an official status as a private club, Regine's actually operated as a public establishment because it admitted people who were unaffiliated with the club. While discrimination was permissible in gaining membership to a private club, discrimination was illegal in a public club. Gedda believed that Regine's abused the private club status in order to operate as a commercial disco and selectively choose acceptable patrons (Joe 1977 "Disco Discrimination," 1, 50).

[82]Although it was true that rock fans still outnumbered disco fans to a large extent, there is no evidence to suggest that even significant numbers were actively anti-disco.

animosity towards a particular ethnic group, despite rallying around such informal clubs named (by members) The Disco Ducks Klan (Rose 1979, 8). At the same time, bigotry against African Americans and homosexuals seemed evident, not in what the movement said, but in its use of symbols, and in the intensity of the hatred. As the term 'discophobia'--the common usage of which also began in 1979--implies, the most open and venomous hatred against disco was vented onto gay communities.

Steve Dahl, a Chicago disc jockey often cited as the face of the anti-disco movement, left WDAI in Chicago after that station changed from an AOR format into an all-disco format. He subsequently took a job with rival WLUP. Bitter about the changes in WDAI, he would often lapse into long diatribes against disco on his new radio show, and many of his listeners called in their support (Rose 1979, 7). He then began to exhort his listeners to show their disaffection more openly, calling for organized action. In one instance, he instructed audience to write "disco sucks" on individual marshmallows, and then hurl them at the Village People during the group's tour stop in the Windy City ("Random Notes." 1979, 34). Afterwards, he founded an informal listener club dubbed the Insane Coho Lips (Steve Dahl Official Website 2005: page 4, sec. 2, para. 1).[83]

Although Dahl's decision to leave WDAI after the format change indicated a sincere distaste for disco, the organization of fans and the constant harangue on the music was a calculated maneuver on Dahl's part to solidify his fan base. Working with Lee Abrams, of Burkhart-Abrams Associates, an Atlanta radio consulting firm, Dahl

[83]The coho salmon preys on the lamprey eel, a parasitic Lake Michigan predator that at one time was considered the chief cause of declining fishing around the Chicago area (Rose 1979, 7).

reviewed focus group studies that tapped into the reasons why some music fans hated disco, after Abrams alerted him to the existence of scattered, aimless anti-disco movements in most major markets in need of decisive leadership and coordination (Rose 1977, 8). While the focus group study participants, white males between fifteen and twenty-five years of age, cited lack of musical quality as their chief grievance against disco, they also responded negatively to what they perceived as the typical disco patron. There were few references to race made by the participants, although homosexual bigotry was expressed openly. *Village Voice* columnist Frank Rose believed that the racial animosity might not have come across as clearly in this instance, because the study took place in Toronto, a place with a much smaller minority population than most major US cities. Nevertheless, he still felt that even the Toronto study showed signs of prejudice in the anti-disco movement:

> Obviously, some people dislike disco for being black and gay. It's an exclusionary assertion of sophistication and confidence by the same two groups whose most recent attempts at economic and political self-assertion met with the notorious backlash responses of Allan Bakke and Dan White. Also, it's a little too coincidental that the music that's popular with gay people should have the epithet 'sucks' attached to it. But what rock fans really hate about disco–now that Steve Rubell and Robert Stigwood (through John Travolta and the Bee Gees) have made it accessible to the young, urban middle-class–is that it's so 'plastic.' The office workers, business people, singles, Perrier drinkers, and jogging enthusiasts who have embraced disco's sexy package of hedonism, narcissism, materialism, and escapism are the same people who, in a simpler age, would have settled for Pat Boone and Connie Francis. (Rose 1979, 8)[84]

[84]Allan Bakke was a former engineer who sued the University of California at Davis for excluding him from their medical school on the basis of "reverse discrimination." Dan White was a former San Francisco police officer and city supervisor

Dahl, with the help of Chicago White Sox executive Michael Veeck, also organized Disco Demolition Night on July 12, 1979 at Comisky Park, an event scheduled to take place during a twi-night double-header pitting the Sox against the Detroit Tigers. Dahl and Veeck had originally planned to gather disco records brought to the game by teenaged fans, and then blow them up in a controlled explosion after the first game had concluded.[85] But *Chicago Daily News* staff writer Bill Gleason, who attended the game with his wife, witnessed a number of incidents during the first game that signaled the event would fly out of control. In one instance, he observed a fan drinking heavily from a smuggled bottle of schnapps between shouts of "disco sucks." He also reported a number of discs thrown at outfielders (both White Sox and Tiger players) while they were actively involved with the game. After the game concluded, he watched in horror as thousands of fans from the lower tier stormed the field and proceeded to pull up the turf surrounding the pitcher's mound. They then set an unplanned bonfire in centerfield to destroy more disco records (Gleason 1979, 1).

Even though they had caused thousands of dollars in property damage, and forced the hometown team to forfeit the second game, Dahl's fans were not repentant, and neither was Dahl.[86] On the air the following morning, the disc jockey gave the Insane

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who killed Mayor Willie Moscone and former fellow supervisor Harvey Milk, a pillar of the local gay community.

[85]Disco Demolition Night happened to coincide with another White Sox promotion, Teen Night, where teenagers could purchase a ticket for ninety-eight cents.

[86]Dahl's website includes a link to www.discodemolition.com, a site designed to celebrate the event's twenty-fifth anniversary. On its message board, a number of people

Coho Lips a mock scolding in voice that comically mimicked that of a stereotypical schoolmarm (Peck 1979, 6). Claiming that media and city officials exaggerated the destructive actions of a few loose cannons, Dahl defended his actions to *Chicago Sun Times* reporter Abe Peck the following day:

> Disco is a disease. It's a thing you have to be near-perfect to get into. You have to have perfect hair and a three-piece suit, and musically it's just the same song with different words. (Dahl quoted by Peck 1979, 6)

Although Disco Demolition Night's reputation in regard to curbing music industry enthusiasm for disco might be somewhat overstated, the riot that it degenerated into received considerable press coverage, and might understandably have made radio station owners and record labels re-think their commitment to the music, especially if their sponsors' most desired demographic had demonstrated such an adverse reaction to it. If Dahl saw disco as a disease, many within the industry began to see it as a spreading cancer requiring radical surgery. Record labels and radio stations made an abrupt about-face. By the end of 1979, the music that began the year with high expectations became an industry pariah, with corporate titans backing out of their support for disco as gracefully as possible. A year earlier, Bob Paiva, National Promotion Director of London Records, sensed the rising tide of anti-disco, and declared that calling anything 'disco' would prove to be a grave error, a promotional *faux pas* (Joe 1978 "Disco Label," 50). By the fall of 1979, New York's WKTU and WBLS, both of which once advertised themselves

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who were at the game (or at least claim to have been) take great pride in "changing the course of music history." So apparently, twenty-nine years later, some are still unrepentant.

as all-disco, apparently concurred with Paiva's assessment, for they ceased using the term "disco" live on the air and in their commercials, and both drastically reduced the number of disco records in rotation by December 1979 ("Word 'Disco' Dirty in New York Radio" 1979, 24).

The Disco Crash of 1979, or Disco Recession (as it came to be known), occurred so rapidly that music industry professionals neglected to accommodate a still-thriving disco market. The (original) Record Pool, and other imitative organizations, continued to supply clubs with dance-worthy records. According to Judith Weinstein of For the Record, one of the top record pools, the disco pullout did not really hurt their business at all (George 1979 "Are Label," 58). Nevertheless, major labels' rejection of disco late in 1979 led them to sever ties with the record pools, who often handled much of their promotion in lieu of actual, fully staffed disco promotion departments. Consequently, patrons who heard a record promoted at their favorite nightclub could not find it in any store (George 1979 "Are Label," 58). As George also noted, the disco sound still flourished, especially within nightclubs, and would continue to do so (George 1979 "Fatal Prognosis," 75-6).

Disco reflected many of the changes that occurred in the popular music industry post-Monterey. As they did in 1967, the majors aggressively marketed a sound proven viable by independents in venues that were traditionally out of their domain. In this case, the rush to disco seemed obvious. Obvious too was the extent to which the imposition of industry standards yielded a homogeneity in product that led it to become, according to some, repetitive and artificial at best, or invasive at worst. Specific musical parameters including tempo, orchestration, the methods of thematic recurrence and variation, vocal

ornamentation, and so forth had become predicable and expected. But at the core of disco production, for both adherents and detractors, was a new professionalism, a way of mechanizing, or routinizing, musical creation and dissemination under managerial control.

As *Village Voice* writer Aaron Fuchs noted, disco in some ways served as the cultural heir of 1950s rock and roll. Both were dance-oriented musics. Both were racially integrated. Both championed a lifestyle of easy, casual social interaction, outrageousness, and hedonistic sex (Fuchs 1979, 51). Stylistically, one might even consider disco to be a sort of hyper rock and roll with bluer blue notes, a bigger big beat, and, like 1950s rock, leads on instruments other than the electric guitar.[87]

The music still called rock by those within the music industry underwent a similar transformation into professionalism, and ultimately met with a similar backlash. Starting in the United States, and catching on quickly in England, a fan and musicians' movement consciously attempted to refashion rock and roll, as they viewed it, in an effort to reclaim it. The aspects that they wished to reclaim were not solely musical. Mostly, they wished to recapture the spirit of freedom and rebelliousness lost when the majors committed to rock in the 1960s.

Punks React

In February of 1975, *Rolling Stone* reporter Chet Flippo chronicled what he saw as waning interest in rock, which had taken place since Woodstock. Concert attendance

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[87]Blues inflections were considerably evident and emphasized (perhaps exaggerated) by such disco dibas as Patti LaBelle and Donna Summer, and as Vicki Sue Robinson's "Turn the Beat around" suggests, many disco songs featured an amplified beat

in 1974 continued a decline begun in the previous year. Worse yet, in an effort to make the shows even more stimulating events that could top the Monterey experience, production companies incurred greater overhead, thus making rock concerts riskier investments. Not even big-name stars could ensure a profitable concert (Flippo 1975, 10-11).

Interest in rock had not exactly receded. Instead, as happened in the 1950s, rock record buyers and concertgoers simply became more selective due to rising ticket prices and the explosion of records marketed specifically to them by both independent labels, and majors (Cahn 1993, 85). Like Gabree, more fans began to suspect that the slick professionalism in 'corporate rock' production smacked of either commercialism or pretentiousness.

Throughout the 1970s, businesses engaged in rock production actively sought to exploit the profit potential of songs, and in so doing mechanized the process of producing and disseminating material. In a 1974 article written for *High Fidelity*, Jordan Ramin unabashedly viewed songwriting as a volatile business where success is so capricious that songwriters must meet a number of standards in order to receive even cursory consideration (Ramin 1974, 40-1). He lists these standards as ten rules: (1) worry more about the craft of songwriting than the category that it might fall into;[88] (2) since they "have to fit," good song lyrics are not comprised of poetic writing; (3) make a

[88]While this seems to go against the notion of standardization, this is arguably the vaguest rule, and as such, it represents new procedures developed after the dominance of Tin Pan Alley. Ramin writes, "Years ago most pop songs fell into two categories: love. . . and novelty. . . .Now there isn't a single topic you can't write about. . . . Audiences are into Johnny Cash, Blood , Sweat & Tears, Melanie, Carly Simon, Judy Collins, Chicago, Tom Jones, and Isaac Hayes without categorizing them" (Ramin 1974, 41).

professional quality demo; (4) construct a lead sheet (or chart); (5) send out one song at a time; (6) do not pay for publishing; (7) include return postage with every submission; (8) submit to as many as three publishers at a time, unless your submission is made by a contact (in that case, submit only to your contact);[89] (9) buy a copy of *This Business of Music*; and (10) keep trying if rejected by one company (Ramin 1974, 41-2.).

The procedure Ramin outlined more or less applied (and still applies) to performers submitting their work to record companies–not surprising since the distinction between songwriter and performer blurred after 1967. More important, these rules imply a departure from the free-wheeling, glad-handed style of rock and roll business at the time of Monterey.[90] In 1967, record companies and publishers actively recruited talent. But the scene described by Ramin in 1974 was one in which music companies filtered out talent, and in doing so imposed a standard of prerequisite acts just to receive notice.

If 1960s rock and roll emphasized truth to culture over adherence to orthodoxy, especially business orthodoxy, then rock and roll of the 1970s emphasized the opposite. Even *Creem*, a periodical known widely for its irreverence and wit, published its own how-to guide on becoming a rock star in 1977. What started out as satire, quickly echoed the advice given in Ramin's article, but gave more details about gaining the industry's notice.[91] The guide did not suggest that the unsigned artist build a fan base, and did not

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[89]A contact is a person developed through social networking who knows people within the industry, or is a person working within the industry.

[90]There are some differences. A performer would include more than one song, for example, as well as a press package.

[91]The *Creem* article, for example, included a listing of addresses for major and large independent labels.

give any tips on working an audience. Instead, the article focused on playing to the music industry itself. The author, Richard Robinson, began by giving pointers on submitting demo tapes in such a way that artist & repertoire personnel could easily play them on their quarter-track machines (Robinson 1977, 53). He further advised the aspirant to perform live so that word-of-mouth could reach a representative of the industry, hopefully an A&R executive. All the while, Robinson stressed accommodating record industry executives' lifestyles and egos:

> Most [record executives] go home to Connecticut at 6 o'clock. So an afternoon audition in a rehearsal hall can be an effective way of showing yourself to the top brass who've never been to a rock concert except to glad-hand the super-groups.
>
> By the way, music business people think they're special. Make sure you leave their name at the door [of a live performance venue], have a table ready for them and pay for their drinks. (Robinson 1977, 41)

A code of professionalism not defined by virtuosity or songwriting acumen, but rather adaptability to the business model, also crept into the *Creem* guide. Like the business person who has to invest money to startup her own company, the guide strongly urged musicians to pay top dollar for the best equipment, warning, "Don't spend $800 dollars on some package vocal system; to get a good sound system you'll have to spend $3,000 to $4,000, and there's no way around it" (ibid.). Like the mid-level manager who has to weed out non-productive or troublesome workers, the aspirant was told, "Rock & roll is a serious business and everyone in the band must understand that. If anyone in the band lacks total commitment, isn't to be trusted, is a drug addict, or is otherwise hateful, unload them before you start" (ibid.).

Ramin and Robinson both demonstrate how the culture of the music industry had changed in the ten years following Monterey. Were commitment, reliability, cheeriness and sobriety requirements for signing with a major label in 1967, one could deduce that a majority of the artists at Monterey would never have been signed at all. Nevertheless, the majors openly sought them out. As noted before in the example of Sylvester Stewart's dealings with Columbia's Clive Davis, a major label might very well bend over backwards to accommodate the vision of one of its rock musicians in 1967. The same could not be said in 1977. By that time, major labels found musicians accommodating not only in their compliance with submission and audition standards, but in changing aspects of their musical performance to help market their records:

> By softening the sound, they [rock bands] found they could get records played on MOR stations and if the record had merit and sold well, it might crossover from MOR to Top 40. (C. Hall 1976 "Radio's Formats," 28).

A consensus arose among a faction of aficionados that rock had lost its meaning, edge and relevance once the major labels established rock and roll dominance at the end of the 1960s. In retrospect, Lester Bangs, Greil Marcus and other writers articulated the resentment of rock fans to mainstreaming and youth marketing. *Rolling Stone* editor Jon Landau lamented that rock of the 1970s had fallen victim to professionalism, and that the commoditization of rock robbed the music of its adventurous spirit, the driving force behind its spontaneity and cultural importance:

> More so than at any time in its history, rock has become a music of sophistication. Today's pop music is protected from challenge. Seventies musicians create in a climate of safety. The recording technology available to them was unimaginable fifteen years ago and inconceivable twenty-five. The modern recording engineer is an artisan whose ability to capture detail and nuance rivals the great Hollywood cinematographers. (Landau 1977, 30)

Fan fear that the big time would co-opt rock and roll started in the wake of Beatlemania. The Fugs (formed 1964), Count Five (formed 1964) Iggy and the Stooges (formed 1966), and MC-5 (formed 1967), were among a few of the underground bands formed in the 1960s who seemed content to stay underground. Despite the fact that the Stooges and MC-5 were both signed to a major (Elektra), and Count Five had a bonafide hit ("Psychotic Reaction") many of these bands found dealing with their labels quite difficult. Refusing to comply with company dictums on promotion and content, they abandoned all hope for stardom, and remained in the marginal space relegated to cult icons (Van Dorston 1990; sec.1 para. 3; sec. 2, para. 1, 3).[92]

Along with the Velvet Underground (1968), the Stooges and MC-5 would serve as role models for a new generation of unsatisfied rock fans who had watched their favorite underground artists go overground, and in the process became professionals and stars. In an article titled "Of Pop Pies and Fun," Lester Bangs derided the Beatles and other supergroups for recording "dated, boring, rock albums" (Bangs 1988 "Of Pop," 34), but saved his most venomous attack for the Rolling Stones, writing, "...Mick Jagger gets immediate pie-ority as a fake moneybags revolutionary" (Bangs 1988 "Of Pop," 37).

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[92]The Stooges left Elektra after unimpressive sales of its first album. The MC-5 were let go after a dispute over provocative lyrics.

Fans and musicians of pre-Monterey rock and roll made conscious attempts to revive the spirit of rebellion and reckless fun that had been lost after rock's corporate mainstreaming. Part of the abreaction to the big business that rock had transformed into lay in what fans saw as "selling out" by performers. Another part lay in the middle-class professionalism that had turned such previously admired artists as the Stones and Who away from the cultural and musical roots that initially attracted large disaffected crowds of working-class youths:

> It wasn't until much later, drowning in the kischvats of Elton John and James Taylor, that I finally came to realize that grossness was the truest criterion for rock 'n' roll, the cruder the clang and grind, the more fun and longer listened-to the album'd be (Bangs 1988 "Psychotic Reactions," 10).

The above quote came from his 1971 *Creem* review of the MC-5 album, *Kick Out the Jams,* A year earlier, Bangs had written "Of Pop Pies and Fun," a paean to Iggy and the Stooges that compared their energetic performance style, and refusal to compromise with Elektra, to such 'sellouts' as the Beatles and Stones. Bandleader James Osterberg (Iggy Pop) often cajoled concertgoers to participate in their show by diving into the audience, thus forcing listeners to become part of the spectacle. Almost forty years later, this antic has become almost commonplace. But for some in the 1970s, the action symbolized what rock should be, as opposed to what it had become. By diving into the audience, and engaging it in the concert experience, the Stooges in effect tore down the barriers between musicians and listeners that arose in the advent of rock stardom. When the ranks of punk fans increased toward the end of the decade, Osterberg took credit for his role in reversing the audience/listener separation and other adverse effects of

Monterey, saying to interviewer Harvey Kubernik, "My contribution to the Sixties? I wiped them out" (Kubernik 1977, 6).

Bangs also ridiculed mainstream rock fans for their love of schlock, their arrogant embrace of the tasteful, and their rejection of the simplistically pure. In doing so, he attached a term to Iggy Pop that would continue to denote this particular rock and roll movement to the present day:

> Here's the smug post-hippie audience, supposedly so loose, liberated, righteous and ravenous, the anarchic terror of middle American insomnia. These are the folks that're always saying: 'Someday, somebody's gonna just bust that fucked-up punk [Iggy] right in the chops.' (Bangs 1988 "Of Pop," 38)

In the above passage, first published in 1971, Bangs became the first writer to use "punk" to describe a type of musician, according to popular legend. But, as DeRogatis pointed out, Bangs actually used the term one year earlier in his narcotics and rock novel, *Drug Punk*. Also in that year (1970), Nick Tosches wrote an article for *Fusion* magazine titled "The Punk Muse: The Story of Protopathic Spiff Including the Lowdown on the Trouble-Making Five-Percent of America's Youth," in which he championed a music described as a "visionary expiation, a cry into the abyss of one's own mordant bullshit. . . [its] poetry puked, not plotted" (Tosches, quoted by DeRogatis 2000, 118-119). Dave Marsh, Greil Marcus and other *Creem* writers had also begun to use the term 'punk' in conjunction with music by 1971 (DeRogatis 2000, 119). So, like Alan Freed, Lester Bangs did not invent the term most closely associated with his career. Nevertheless, Bangs popularized the term 'punk' over the course of the 1970s.

Among the first rock bands to refer to themselves as punks were the New York Dolls, formed in 1971. In 1973 came another influential, self-called 'punk' band, the Dictators, and in 1974 the Ramones. British fashion entrepreneur Malcolm McLaren came to the United States to manage the Dolls in New York, but returned to England in 1975 to form another punk group, The Sex Pistols (Van Dorston 1990; sec. 3, para. 1; sec. 4, para. 3). .

In the documentary film *The Great Rock and Roll Swindle*, McLaren depicted himself as a con artist, who made a lot of money foisting the Sex Pistols and other untalented groups onto unsuspecting record labels.[93] He had apparently learned early--from his days with the Dolls, who took to the stage dressed as women (hence the name)--that shock value trumped musical ability when creating a demand for a particular artist (Temple 1980). With the Sex Pistols, however, shock value transcended the stage and extended into the unstable lives of the individual band members, most notably bass player John Ritchie (Sid Vicious).[94] Lead singer John Lydon (Johnny Rotten) started at least two riots at concert venues after jumping down from the stage to engage in fisticuffs with his fans (A. Jones 1976, 25). The band's loutish behavior during a Thames Television interview enthralled young audiences, who subsequently began to swell British punk venues. Despite the resultant banning of punk from some clubs, and from further

[93]The movie illustrates the scam aspect of McLaren's career with an animated cash register that intermittently rings up larger companies and dollar figures as the film progresses.

[94]Ritchie's violent love affair with American Nancy Spungen culminated in her stabbing death in the fall of 1978 (Bardach 1978:sec. 4, para. 8). Ritchie confessed to killing her, but died of a heroin overdose while out on bail in February 1979. Consequently, his case never came to trial.

television appearances, *Variety* described the incident as "a major publicity breakthrough" for punk ("Foul Mouth 'Punk Rock' Cult Looms as new Pop Music Menace" 1977, 2). The influence of the Sex Pistols, Siouxsie and the Banshees, the Clash, and other UK bands spread quickly to aspiring rock bands in the United States over the course of 1976 and 1977. New York featured several hospitable venues for punk fans, among them Max's Kansas City, Club 82, The Elgin, and CBGB-OMFUG, and many of the top punk bands came over to the US to play these rooms, and similar ones in Los Angeles (Kirby 1977, 61; Bashier 1977, 36; Coon 1976, 55, 61).

Despite their influence on American musicians, British punks failed to make much of an impression upon the US culture industry (Alfonzo 1978, 34). By 1978, a number of American punk bands sprang up, particularly in California (e.g. The Runaways, the Nuns, the Dead Kennedys, etc.), and they did not present the problems to record labels, radio stations and other venues that their English counterparts did. British punks deliberately provoked both fans and critics by voicing venomous opinions about the bourgeois, the elite class and racial minorities by incorporating swastikas and other offensive symbols into their iconography; and by instigating riots.

In the US, punks met with organized protests from both conservative and liberal organizations, among them Jessie Jackson's Operation PUSH, which ostensibly objected to punk because of the sexually suggestive nature of its lyrics (Frutig 1977, 9). The National Association of Broadcasters, apparently in agreement with Rev. Jackson, independently decided to review its policy on lyrical indecency in 1977, and again the main emphasis seemed to be on punk. While reviewing their policies on inappropriate material, the NAB's Radio Code Board also reminded member radio stations of their

rules on indecency (ibid.). While no one could say that punk--American or British--had been banned in the United States, some felt that the music's negative reputation could very well have had a chilling effect on airplay ("U.S. Radio Fails to Ride the New Wave," 1978, 25; Zachary 1980, 18).

Without a viable means of promotion within the United States, opportunities for touring and live performances were minimal for British punks. English youths could not see the Sex Pistols on the BBC, or hear them on radio (after the airplay ban on their hit single "God Save the Queen"). They could, nevertheless, see the band at the Roxy, or other London establishments still open to punk rock performance. Without a steady live presence, and without airplay or television promotion, British punks had difficulty building an American audience outside of New York, Los Angeles or San Francisco. As *Songwriter* contributor Barry Alfonzo noted, even the Sex Pistols were met with indifference during their 1978 eight-gig U.S. tour (Alfonzo 1978, 34).

Record labels reacted to punk haphazardly, depending on their size, geographic location, and the nationality of the artist. Stiff, Chiswick, Virgin, Bizarre and other British independent labels enthusiastically signed punk acts. EMI, a British-based major, also vied for its share of the punk market ("Punk Pacts Hits Crest in U.K.; Many Groups Signed" 1977, 16; Swan 1977, 2; Partridge 1977, 3). In the first six months of 1980, approximately ninety new labels opened for business in the UK, the bulk of them concentrating on punk (Frith 1981, 156-7). Some American companies also signed a limited number of British punk groups--as Columbia did the Clash--but only for

distribution and promotion within Europe (at least initially) (Kirby 1977, 66).[95] Stiff, and other UK labels eventually found international major label distribution in 1980 (Darling 1980, 3), but by then it might have been too late for British musicians to have much impact in the United States as punks.

Within the US, record labels both large and small also competed for a share of select American punk acts beginning in 1976 with Elektra's signing of the Dictators, Columbia subsidiary Private Stock's acquisition of Blondie, and Atlantic's release of the compilation album *Live at CBGB* (Kozak 1976, 66). Nevertheless, the majors tended to distance themselves from the negative connotations that the music had acquired. Sire Records executive Seymour Stein linked punk not to the Sex Pistols, the Damned, or other English notables, but rather to such established American stars as Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, Little Richard and Fats Domino (Flippo 1978, 25). By focusing on the music instead of its culture, and by comparing the anti-punk crowd of the 1970s to the anti-rock movement of the 1950s, Stein left a rather interesting impression of punk as a wholesome teen music, whose stars would turn out to be as innocuous as Elvis or Fats. Most record executives, eschewed the term "punk" altogether. Stein, for example, preferred the term "new wave." Executives at WEA and CBS experimented with such terms as "underground rock," "arrogant rock," "urban rock," and "music that comes from CBGB" (Kozak 1976, 86). In 1976, Clive Davis, then-President of Arista Records, told a

[95]As my former attorney, Richard Dieguez, counseled me, artists might want to restrict the geographical jurisdiction in which their labels may represent them in order to find the widest promotion and distribution possible from a variety of labels, each having more strength in a particular part of the world than any other. Kirby and other writers imply, but do not state, that the decision to limit jurisdiction came not from the artists, but from the labels.

B'nai B'rith audience that punk rock as a genre did not exist, but nevertheless went on to brag that if it did, his label "has two of the best in Lou Reed and Patti Smith" (Clive Davis quoted by Kozak 1976, 86). Perhaps topping Davis' circumlocution, Karin Berg, Director of Press Relations for Elektra reasoned, "If they are a good punk rock band, they are musically disciplined, so they are no longer a punk band" (Karin Berg quoted by Kozak 1976, 86).

As Stuart Ewen noted how culture businesses broke down the symbolism of the Aquarian movement into "a constellation of styles," that could somehow be divorced from the culture that originally gave them meaning, and then reused within a commercial context, a similar process appears to have occurred with the punk subculture of the 1970s. By 1978, most US record and radio executives unofficially adopted the term "new-wave" to describe such bands as the Sex Pistols and the Clash. Usage of the term also applied to American punks, who by 1978 began to break into radio airplay, and onto the *Billboard* charts. Blondie, the Cars, and other groups billed in the US as "new wave," utilized many of the visual styles associated with punk, and played at CBGB and other venues symbolic of punk. Yet, one could make the case that the musical signifiers of punk--limited chord changes, heavily distorted guitar-dominated orchestration, straightforward recurrence of four heavy pulses on the drums, minimal recording sophistication, etc.--were somewhat subdued in the new wave artists, as was the cultural bent towards anarchy and nihilism. Devo, Gary Numan, and Robin Scott (M), for example, featured a keyboard-dominated sound. The Talking Heads experimented with numerous rhythmic patterns from all over the world. "Heart of Glass," "The Tide is High," and "Call Me" by Blondie were all sophisticatedly produced records.

Towards the end of discomania, many dancers indicated that they preferred rock to disco music (Merritt 1980, 19). By 1980, many of the new wave--both in the US and in the UK-- were willing to accommodate them. Some, like Blondie, Scott, and Numan, recorded songs that contained a beat, feel, and sound similar to what their counterparts in the disco market were producing. Depeche Mode, Spandau Ballet, the Stray Cats, Duran Duran, and other groups incorporating punk fashions were simply called 'danceable rock' bands (Gosse 1981, 93; Loder 1981, 19). By 1982, Soft Cell and the Human League had transcended new wave to become, simply, dance bands on par with such artists as Teena Marie and Rick James, both of whom had emerged from disco (Chin 1982:DD-2).

In the UK, the conversion away from punk seemed more complete and irrevocable. In his book *Like Punk Never Happened: Culture Club and the New Pop*, *Smash Hits* writer Dave Rimmer chronicled the rise of George O'Dowd (Boy George) within the context of punk's decline. Like Stuart Goddard (Adam Ant), William Broad (Billy Idol), and the aforementioned John Lydon of the Sex Pistols, O'Dowd began his career in the punk scene as one of Malcolm McLaren's recruits. Like the others, he changed his music, and eventually his image to become a pop icon as lead singer for Culture Club, which also featured Jon Moss, former drummer of the Damned (Rimmer 1985, 3-15). Like the other danceable rock bands emerging in the UK and US, Culture Club and their colleagues began to sever many of their ties to punk and new wave by referring to their music as "blitz," "romantic [or new romantic]," or simply "new pop."

Punk illustrated a class tension between working-class musicians and fans seeking energetic release, and a middle-class music industry that preferred refinement. Part of the

allure of punk, to its adherents, was the closeness between musician and listener, not only in terms of physical proximity, but also in terms of status, attitudes, values and fallibility. For example, Pete Townshend, who described himself as the "Godmother of Punk" because of his performance antics, came to a sociological understanding that explained the importance of wreaking mayhem.

> *High-rise blocks and slums in Glasgow--I didn't need to have lived in them to know the facts. I see the faces beaming up at me as I destroy my $500 guitar. Why should they, poor bastards, dig that? They enjoy the destruction because they despise phony values; the heavy price on the scrap of tin called a musical instrument. It is so far beyond their reach it might as well not exist.*
>
> *The crucifixion is what these people stand for. They humiliate themselves and their peers, and care nothing for any accolade* [italics original]. (Townshend 1977, 157)

In addition to nihilism, other writers have further chronicled the rough, unprofessional edges of punk, traits that might be difficult for a major label to handle within a mainstream market. For many in the movement, "phony values" meant what many would call ten years later, "political correctness." Susan Dallion, the lead singer of Siouxsie and the Banshees, one of the more noted groups emerging from the Kings Row scene of the mid-1970s, typically performed costumed as a Nazi dominatrix, sporting a black hard plastic brassiere, black fishnet stockings and swastika-adorned armbands. As Roger Sabin and other writers have pointed out, Dallion's allusion to Nazism was naive, in retrospect, and did not stem from an affinity to totalitarianism or white supremacy. She donned the swastikas for the same reason she wore the other items: namely, to shock the

bulk of 1970s, British society.[96] The Nazi symbol, in particular, was especially offensive to those of the older generation who had either fought in World War II, or had survived the Battle of Britain (Sabin 2001:sec. 2, para. 2: "Siouxsie & the Banshees" 2001:sec. 1, para. 2).

There were other punk bands of the late-1970s and early-1980s, most notably Skrewdriver MK2, who openly organized for the National Front, a neo-Nazi, white-supremacist organization.[97] At the same time, a number of punks articulated a marked leftist ideology, countering the NF in such organizations as Rock Against Racism (RAR) in the UK, and later Skinheads Against Racism (SKAR) in the US. A tendency towards confrontation pitted punks in one camp versus those in the other. As Ruts singer Tom Robinson explained in 1998:

> In the musical and political turmoil of 1977 old certainties gave way almost overnight to a sense that almost anything might happen. Fear of one kind or another stalked both the streets of Lewisham and the corridors of EMI. The National Front was making a concerted bid to become a credible fourth party at the ballot box. Rock Against Racism--founded by white SWP [Socialist Workers' Party] stalwarts--was fast becoming a rival force to be reckoned

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[96]Like Stuart Goddard and William Broad, Dallion also remade her image in the 1980s to appeal to a broader audience. She, along with her bandmates, subsequently signed a record deal with Warner Brothers, and in an interview with Cathi Unsworth, mentioned some aspects of their first tour of Israel (1984) where the band had a strong following (Unsworth 1998; sec. 6, para. 4). Thus, Sabin's characterization of the band's use Nazi symbols as "naive" might be appropriate.

[97]There were two distinct bands that performed and recorded under the name Skrewdriver, both fronted by lead singer Ian Donaldson (Ian Stuart), a National Front organizer. The first incarnation of Skrewdriver (designated MK1) did not commit ideologically to the NF since no one in the band, other than Donaldson, had any strong feelings for the right-wing organization (Yarwood 2003; sec. 1, para. 4).

with. I joined on the spot. (T. Robinson 1998; sec. 1, para. 2)

Racism, within punk rock circles, remains a rather complex issue. As punk fan and blogger Mimi Nguyen noted, in her review of the James Spooner documentary *Afro Punk*, blacks had performed punk rock, and had otherwise contributed to the punk scene since its inception. She realized, however, that the story of black involvement with punk became "more complicated and convoluted in the clash of contradictions and underlying tensions involved in turning to a subculture marked by white (boy) hegemony for 'community' and other relationships" (Nguyen 2003; sec. 1, para. 5). Bangs himself rued what he viewed as a racist movement--what he referred to as "Cretins' Lib"-- growing within punk as the 1970s progressed. For him, the problem only partly lay in a general white aversion to black musicians because of their association with disco (Bangs 1988 "The White," 277-8).[98] He saw a larger problem in the purging of African American identity from rock and roll itself: "...that takes us farther and farther from the black stud posturings of Mick Jagger that Lou Reed and Iggy partake in but that Joey Ramone certainly doesn't" (Bangs 1988 "The White," 278).

Whether punk actively promoted white hegemony or actively fought against it, the methods used by both sides tended to feature crudity in terms of offensive language, violence at mass demonstrations, frankness in interviews, and personal instability on the part of musicians, along with a repeated penchant for not cooperating with authority. Coarseness figured prominently into the punk aesthetic, for it symbolized the antithesis of

[98]Bangs wrote of how he was rebuffed at a punk party for playing an Otis Redding record, which one of the partygoers, to Bangs' surprise, referred to as "disco" (Bangs 1988 "The White," 277-8).

the petty, rules-oriented, domineering, false values of a professional class that maintained its hegemony by enforcing standards of boring music. As Simon Frith wrote, "Punk opposed commercial music in two ways....the assertion that 'small is beautiful.'...Second, punk demystified the production process itself--its message was *anyone* can do it [emphasis original]" (Frith 1981, 159). Van Dorston, Sabin, Robinson, Townshend, and others discuss the element of boredom in their above-cited articles, and all imply that punk rock represented a reaction to social boredom as much as to anything else.

From the music industry's point of view, one can easily see the problematic nature of accepting punk at face value. In an era when single-format radio stations had just begun to emerge in order to capitalize on the growing disco craze, a music associated with racism and anti-Semitism--even if the association itself is overly broad and unsophisticated--might not have been well-received. Record labels might understandably be reluctant to sign musicians who took pride in being untrained, non-cooperative, and averse to companies' recording procedures and business models, but who nevertheless declared themselves superior to the industry's main product line.[99] At the same time, certain aspects of punk undoubtedly intrigued persons within the music industry, especially in light of the unexpected negativity to disco. From 1978 to 1984, major label and radio interest peaked in artists who had punk roots, and utilized non-offensive

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[99]When asked by *Creem* interviewer Jack Bashier how he compared to rock icon Freddie Mercury of Queen, Dills lead singer Tony Nineteen replied "I think Freddie Mercury is a pompous toad. We don't say we're better than them on their terms--we don't emulate them; we want to destroy them. Tastes are changing" (Tony Nineteen quoted by Bashier 1977, 37).

signifiers of punk. From the perspective of the music industry, *American Bandstand* host Dick Clark felt that such processes were normal and expected. In an interview with Bangs, during the early days of punk ascendancy, Clark described the "common-denominator" policies of the majors as a filtering mechanism, one that did not enforce standards from on high, but rather adopted the standards of the average listener:

> Anything that's new takes a while before it gets disseminated across the country. You get the J.C. Penney versions of fashions of what the style leaders are wearing. There's an interesting premise in all this. In the youth world, you take the lunatic fringe, the avant-garde, the style leaders, the nuts. And if you are careful enough to determine what they come up with that's a legitimate trend, then you'll be able to figure out eventually what the people in the middle, I don't mean necessarily geographically, but in the case of our country it is pretty much the middle, will be doing in the next number of months. (Dick Clark quoted by Bangs 1988 "Screwing the," 135)

Clark's comparison of the record industry to a large chain department store serves best as a reminder that the music business is, in fact, a business. Obviously, much of what might concern a fashion retailer would be of little interest to a record label. Some aspects of both businesses, however, would be identical: a relentless need to identify and predict trends; the necessity of maintaining as wide a consumer base as possible; and concern about the quality of the merchandise, to name just a few. As a business, the music industry poured a lot of money and effort into producing disco, a music that demonstrated a broad appeal across racial, class and gender lines. Conversely, it hedged on punk, a music that not only appealed to a much smaller market, but was potentially offensive to mainstream listeners.

One would be right to point out that punk rock acts had the wherewithal to record with an independent label, and promote their albums through word of mouth. But as punk and disco culturally emerged in the 1970s, the very nature of the music industry changed. The independent labels that could give a voice to punk, and more autonomy to African American artists who did not wish to "go disco," were in the process of losing their ability to reach the mainstream without the intervention of the majors.

The Independents and the Majors

Before they committed themselves to rock and roll in 1967, major labels did not have much of a competitive advantage over the smaller independent record companies. The independents that produced rhythm and blues records as their major product already had an audience that demonstrated a steady demand for their wares. They had also forged their own networks of performers, publishing houses, disc jockeys, program directors, and other professionals. When rock first mainstreamed in the mid-1950s, one could argue that independent labels had a competitive advantage over the majors, for they were closer, in terms of culture and accessibility, to the desired teenaged consumer. In the parlance of the record business, the indies "had their ear to the street."

Until Elvis Presley and other performers of his generation came to prominence, the majors and indies inhabited two parallel universes that rarely intersected. After Monterey, when Columbia, WEA and others of the old guard took on rock as their main product line, the independent and major labels squared off as adversaries, fighting over the same turf of listeners and airplay. As the 1970s progressed, the major labels took

advantage of what strengths they had in order to dominate the mainstream market. By 1980, the six major labels--MCA, Columbia, WEA, Polygram, RCA, and Capitol--would account for a lion's share of the music industry's hit records, radio rotation, and gross earnings.

Monterey occurred amid the beginning of an overall industrial merger trend, the start of what some called the "go-go" years (Dannen 1991, 69). A harbinger of things to come, Warner merged with Atlantic in 1968. As a smaller independent label, Atlantic thrived on its ability to develop artists and comprehend listener tastes. Atlantic's founders, Ahmet Ertegun and Jerry Wexler, went into the record business primarily because they were music fans. As a proprietary company, Atlantic did not have to answer to stockholders, and thus could develop musicians over years, instead of every few months to meet quarterly demands. As a small company, it could communicate with musicians and listeners in ways that large corporations could not. When Warner and Atlantic merged, however, an abrupt change occurred within the latter's business culture. Asked if he noticed precisely when a definite shift had occurred in the business culture of his label, Atlantic Records artist David Crosby replied:

> When it all started, record companies--and there were many of them, and this was a good thing--were run by people who loved records, people like Ahmet Ertegun, who ran Atlantic Records, who were record collectors. They got in it because they loved music.
>
> Now record companies are run by lawyers and accountants. The shift from the one to the other was definitely related to when the takes started to get big. Somebody [in] a forensic accounting job could probably establish the exact moment at which it reached the level that brought in the sharks. …
>
> [Interviewer asks] How did you know they were there?

> Change in attitude, change in management, new management. You'd just be dealing with different people. You know, you'd go to a meeting with a record company and it wouldn't be a guy there who knew that you had written a new song and thought that was cool. It would be a guy who knew that he had moved 40,000 pieces out of Dallas this month, and he had no idea, pieces of what? None.
>
> [Interviewer asks] It actually happened that way?
>
> Yes. (Crosby 2004; sec. 1, para. 11-16)

The above interview came from a 2004 episode of the PBS series *Frontline* titled "The Way the Music Died," in which the show's producers interviewed a number of professionals representing a variety of perspectives, some of them contradictory. Giving more of an industry point of view, former WEA executive, and current CEO of Artemis Records, Danny Goldberg pointed to the illustrious careers of industry icons in order to argue that the corporatization of rock and roll was a good thing for the music:

> Mo Austin [recte: Mo Ostin], who's considered one of the greatest record executives ever, who ran Warner Bros. Records during the glory years of the '60s and '70s, goes from signing the Grateful Dead and Jimi Hendrix, through Madonna and Prince, and Neil Young, and so many others, was a finance guy. He was the accountant for Frank Sinatra's label Reprise. He just happened to be a finance person who had a creative soul and a gift for building a record company.
>
> Clive Davis was running the CBS companies at the time and he was signing Janis Joplin and Sly Stone and so forth, and who today is still one of the most revered record executives. He was a lawyer. It's not like this [twenty-first century industry] is the first generation of record executives to spawn from lawyers and accountants, and so on. … (Goldberg 2004; sec. 1, para. 27-9).

Focusing on Columbia, Fredric Dannen agreed that Davis' tenure at CBS was indeed productive. At the same time, he pointed out that before Monterey (Davis notwithstanding) the major labels, like the independents, usually hired "record men," who had a keen understanding of music, to head their A&R divisions, not lawyers or accountants. When lawyers and other professionals took control in the late-1960s, focus of the major labels changed. Tracing the arc of Columbia leadership, Dannen described the 1970s music scene in a way that echoed many of the sentiments voiced by David Crosby:

> CBS under Goddard Lieberson had been the A&R company. Clive had continued the tradition better than anyone had a right to expect. Now Walter--'tone deaf Walter'--was forging a much different CBS Records. The *deal* company. From the sidelines, Clive derided what he called Walter's 'banking deals.' No creative vision was needed, just a checkbook. (Dannen 1991, 127)[100]

The movement to transform record companies into conglomerates continued throughout the 1970s. Consequently, the majors began to rely heavily upon one of their biggest advantages over the independent labels: branch distribution. For years, the indies depended on the services of Malverne (US), Rough Trade (UK) and other companies in order to take their products from the pressing plant to store shelves. But while an independent distributor might perform well in certain geographic locations, there would most likely be places where he or she could not effectively reach the market. Therefore, a small record label might have to negotiate terms with an independent distributor in order

[100]The reference is to Walter Yetnikov, the corporate attorney who succeeded Davis as Columbia's chief of A&R.

to limit the latter's rights to disseminate their product exclusively. In the meantime, independent labels would also have to forge deals with other independent distributors.

The major labels, however, had formed their own in-house distributorships, and had expanded them nationally and internationally. As a result, they did not have to deal with outside firms, at least not to any great extent.[101] They could acquire more international labels, and more easily acquire, market and distribute international talent. Furthermore, they did not have to arrange numerous licensing deals with myriad companies around the world for American artists, for they could simply release their records on a "sister" label (Hennessey 1977, 78).

When WEA formed its international division in 1971, the company could then market American acts abroad before breaking them in the US, as it did with the Manhattan Transfer and their single "Chanson d'Amour" (ibid.). At a 1976 convention of WEA record labels, WEA International President Nesuhi Ertegun boasted that his corporation covered 90% of the global market. The company also announced the success of some international artists signed the previous year. Although virtually unknown in the United States, Michel Polnareff (France), Passport (Germany), Barrabas (Spain), and other acts had done quite well in their home markets (Hennessey 1976, 69). While some of their numbers were down (e.g. a 20% drop in sales in South Africa, on which the company blamed political turmoil), the individual label heads uniformly expressed optimism that their fortunes would soon improve (ibid.).

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[101]Richard Dieguez, in explaining the principle of exclusivity, mentioned that a major label might sometimes utilize the services of an independent distributor if that distributor was stronger in a certain geographic region where a particular artist might do well.

Polygram also reorganized its US distribution branch in 1978, after purchasing it from United Artists ("Phonodisc Becomes Polygram in Move to Integrate Far-Flung Co." 1978, 81). UA's U.D.C. subsidiary formerly distributed Polygram's records.[102] Based in the Netherlands and Germany, Polydor, Polygram's parent company, posted impressive gross figures in the US, mostly because of its acquisition of Casablanca and other American independent labels (ibid.). Because of the geographic distance between the US and Europe, however, Polygram's subsidiaries (most notoriously Casablanca) either suffered from mismanagement, or were vulnerable to it. Purchasing the distribution arm therefore made sense as the first step in systematizing business procedures.

Because of their disadvantages in the distribution aspect of the record business, independent labels found it increasingly difficult to sign stars, and keep the ones that they had from breaking their contracts and going elsewhere. Citing the advantages of branch distribution, the Charlie Daniels Band left Kama Sutra, and B.T. Express left Scepter records to sign with Columbia in 1976 ("Acts Prefer Branch Distrib.; Flee Indies" 1976, 1). Earlier that year, Columbia lured the Jackson 5 away from Motown, and signed them to their Epic subsidiary (ibid.). WEA raided Kama Sutra/Buddah to sign Curtis Mayfield, Leroy Hutson, the Trammps and the Impressions. The company also took George Benson away from CTI, and Ray Stevens away from Barnaby ("Acts Prefer Branch Distrib.; Flee Indies" 1976, 16). Meanwhile, RSO failed to sign the Rolling Stones, despite offering the band an unprecedented $7,000,000 bonus ("RSO Exits Race for Rolling Stones" 1977, 65).

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[102]U.D.C. later changed its name to Phonodisc. When Polydor bought it, the company changed the company's name again to Polygram Distribution Inc.

Organized distribution gave major labels their first competitive advantage over their smaller counterparts during the 1970s. Unfortunately for the independents, the majors soon found ways to exploit other advantages. Major labels were large corporations that were in turn owned by even larger corporations. Columbia (Westinghouse), RCA (General Electric), Capitol (EMI), and Polygram (Philips and Siemens), belonged to electronics firms. MCA (Universal) and WEA (Time-Warner) were musical components of large media conglomerates. Consequently, these labels had the capital and wherewithal to invest in distribution companies and subsidiary labels.

Because of their access to monetary resources, the majors could also engage in "talent raiding," the luring of big-name musicians away from the competition's labels to theirs (Dannen 1991, 79). In addition to branch distribution, major labels offered artists money and other incentives. In one instance, Columbia acquired Frank Loesser's publishing company, Frank Music, in a complex deal involving Loesser's widow and the personal management firm of Leber & Krebs in 1978. The following year, the company offered Frank Music to Paul McCartney in a deal to bring the ex-Beatle to their label (Dannen 1991, 127; "Report CBS in Loesser Dickers" 1978, 56). Although long retired from Columbia by that time, Mitch Miller expressed outrage over the McCartney deal, for Columbia's action, in his view, illustrated the warped sense of priorities running rampant throughout the new corporate philosophy:

> Just by sitting on its fanny [Frank Music] would take in a million dollars a year just in performance rights on Frank Loesser's catalog...If I were a Columbia stockholder, I would sue for dilution of assets....But that goes to show, when the lawyers are making the decisions, and a lawyer is running the company instead of a musician. (Miller quoted by Dannen 1991, 127)

Miller's wrath had company. United Artist President Artie Mogull complained that the large sums of money paid to artists "distorted" the industry by creating "a great auction [for musicians] in the sky" (Meyer 1980, 7). Mogull's complaints were threefold. First of all, the practice would result in a situation where only major labels could afford to have stars. Secondly, all labels lose money on the majority of their acts. Even brand-name stars might experience a temporary dip in sales. But because the price for artists had become so prohibitive, independent labels were forced to trim their talent rosters. For UA, higher artist costs translated into pink slips for Ike & Tina Turner, Bobby Goldsboro, and Bobby Womack (Meyer 1980, 91). Third, Mogull worried over the adverse long-term effects of high-priced talent on the entire industry including the majors, saying, "Eventually, they'll [Columbia specifically, majors in general will] find themselves with such a high royalty that the profit margin will be reduced" (Mogull quoted by Meyer 1980, 91). Almost two-and-a-half decades later, Harold Vogel, a veteran media analyst for a capital investment firm, concurred with Mogull's assessment of the 1979 music industry, and mentioned a few other problems affecting profitability as well:

> Well what happened at the end of the '70s was excess. The Woodstock mindset extended at such a pace. And there was a change in the economic situation. A lot of inflation, we were worried about inflation in the Carter era. There was a lot of worry about other things but especially the drugs, the overpayment of the artist, the wild parties. The record companies taking back, on consignment basically, taking back the records. All of that contributed to a steep downtrend in profitability.

> They couldn't afford the excess, it had gotten out of hand. And the music perhaps, innovation, slowed down at that point. And when that music innovation stopped, it exposed a lot of financial and other flaws in the industry. (Vogel 2004; sec. 1, para 15-16).

As Vogel mentioned earlier in the interview, optimism infected the entire record business after Woodstock in 1969 (Vogel 2004; sec. 1, para. 3). This industrywide enthusiasm, brought on by extraordinary earnings after 1969, led to a feeling that money would flow easily and forever into company coffers, hence the degeneration into excess. Yet, the Woodstock era coincided with a number of factors that spurred profit growth, among them the maturation of the Baby Boomer generation, and technological innovations in radio broadcasting (e.g., FM, transistors, etc.) and playback media (Vogel 2004; sec. 1 para. 5). Without serious and sustained effort to develop new generations of rock stars, however, the baby boomers would soon mature, and the rate of their record consumption would slow down. As Danny Goldberg told *Frontline* producers:

> And then as people of my generation got into their mid-20s, like every other generation, they started buying less music. They got jobs. Some of them got families. Although they still would occasionally buy a record, it was not 15 or 20 a year like what many people do in their high school and college years. And the subsequent generation was a smaller number of people. So there was a demographic blow to the macroeconomics of the business in the late '70s. (D. Goldberg 2004; sec. 1, para. 15)

The financial difficulties facing the industry were in part due to the “demographic blow” that Goldman mentioned. They were also, as Vogel stated, due to mismanagement

and questionable priorities. The major labels squandered resources in competition with the indies and each other for celebrities. By escalating expenditures for the stars of a previous generation, the majors hampered their ability to sign and promote the new young artists who could excite a teenaged audience as the Beatles had in 1964 (Sutherland 1979, 138). The growing distance between musicians and their labels, alluded to by David Crosby, only exacerbated problems for an industry that needed to keep its ear to the street. And to make matters worse, the slowdown happened during the nationwide recession of the late-1970s and early-1980s, which affected all industries.

Independent Promotion: The Network

While these factors hurt the majors, their effect on independent labels was exponentially more severe. Nevertheless, something even more critical contributed to the industry's declining profits. This other factor, independent promotion, proved so harsh that it ended the possibility of equal competition between the majors and the indies. From the 1930s to the early 1970s, record labels occasionally relied on the services of outside firms to convince radio stations to air their singles. By the mid-1970s, however, the practice had evolved into a more systematic practice upon which the major and large independent labels began to rely more heavily There had been signs during the early 1970s, shortly after major-label commitment to rock, that the practice had become more legally and ethically dangerous, with allegations of payola and links to organized crime figures. Yet for over a decade, record labels debated among themselves whether or not they should boycott independent promotion, but did little to stop it. In 1986, record

companies very publicly severed ties with independent promoters during a scandal prompted by an NBC News investigation. By 1987, however, the majors had quietly resumed the use of independent promotion.

Promotion, in general, is the act of getting potential record buyers to hear a piece of music for the first time. Usually, this is done by dint of radio or television airplay. As with disco, promotion could also occur at nightclubs, theaters, or other places where people go to listen to recorded music. Most labels had maintained promotional departments, or in the case of small labels promotional functions, since the advent of radio. Only in special cases did they pay an outside party to promote a record. One such person was Dave Clark, who promoted race records for Columbia during the 1930s and 1940s. Since Clark had personal contacts with many of the venues that could ensure adequate promotion for race records, Columbia found his services useful; but since he was African American, the company balked at hiring Clark full-time, and instead purchased his services on an ad hoc basis (George 1989, 17).

Except for Pink Floyd, Black Sabbath, and other album-oriented rock acts, charting a single was a necessary step in selling large numbers of albums.[103] Thus, the label would often send its personnel to key radio stations in order to convince the program director or disc jockey to play whatever records the company wanted to promote. Their hope was that the more powerful stations in each region would attract enough

[103] Throughout the 1970s, most pop charts considered the number of records sold as only a marginal criterion. Airplay and industry polling of what songs had the most potential for commercial success were larger factors. SoundScan technology, implemented in *Billboard* in 1991, provided accurate information to the point where retail sales gained importance in compiling record charts.

listeners to make less powerful stations in the area add the single to their playlists. During the 1970s, many record labels decided to employ people from outside the company to do promotional work.

Program directors grew somewhat skeptical of in-house label promotion. They reasoned that a record company might try to promote their entire line of wares, good or bad, which meant that they and their assistants would need to sort out the records they would prefer to play from those they thought were horrible. Because of that, they embraced independent promotion in order to select material worthy of airplay. Independent promoters undertook the task of listening to the records of many companies, not just one. They selected what they felt was the very best that each label had to offer a station in order to fit its format and personality. The label would pay an independent promoter a fee for the service if he or she were indeed able to get airplay for a particular song.

For the labels, independent promotion was also a blessing; at least initially. IP allowed major labels to promote records to radio station personnel with whom they had no prior connection. Dick Ashur, a CBS executive, sometimes resorted to using independent promoters during the early-1970s, when Columbia's in-house promotional department was overworked. He typically paid $100 per promotional visit (Dannen 1991, 7). After serving in the company's European branch for the bulk of the seventies, Ashur returned to New York to co-head the A&R division with Walter Yetnikov in 1979. While reviewing the company's finances, Ashur came across some startling figures that alerted him to a profound change in independent promotion. In 1978, Columbia had paid $40,000,000 for IP. In subsequent years, the company would shell out $60,000,000 to

$80,000,000 for promotion, sums that represented approximately 30% of Columbia's pretax profits (Dannen 1991, 13, 15).

During Ashur's absence from the US, tension had developed between record labels and radio station owners. At a 1976 RCA convention, Jack Kiernan, Vice President of Marketing, expressed dismay over the fact that radio stations had recently become reluctant to play records by new artists. KDIA Program Director Keith Adams spoke at the convention, and bluntly told RCA executives that radio stations were not interested in developing new artists, for that job belong to the record companies (Schoenfeld 1976, 43). Several years later, when pressed for money, the record industry sought royalties from radio stations. In response to radio executives, RIAA President Stanley Gortikov penned a 1979 op-ed piece for *Billboard*, in which he argued against RKO spokesperson Howard Warshaw's position that (a) the record companies already made enough money for the labels by promoting their product via the airwaves, and (b) that the radio industry was not financially able to meet record company demands (Gortikov 1979, 10).

Ostensibly, the most contentious issue between radio and record companies was the latter's charge that home taping from radio onto blank cassettes resulted in a drop in record sales. Record companies justified their demand for fees by claiming that they simply wanted to recoup the losses incurred from radio airplay. Some within both industries acted as though home taping were not the most pressing issue facing the music industry, and therefore sought to ease the conflict between radio and record companies. Striking a more conciliatory tone, Mercury Records President Bob Sherwood defended his earlier praise for the RKO Radio Corporation, and stressed the need for radio and record companies to cooperate, a sentiment concurrent with RKO head Dwight Case

(Sherwood 1979, 20, Case 1979, 16). Yet despite overtures of goodwill made in 1979, the National Association of Broadcasters uncharacteristically declined to invite any record labels to participate in its annual convention in 1980 ("Labels Ignored as NAB Air Their Views" 1980, 1, 19).

One could speculate that the real conflict between record and radio companies had little to do with home taping, since home taping did not account for much of the record sales slump. The conflict more likely reflected the animosity caused by the labels' growing dependence on radio as their main promotional medium during the 1970s. Two separate official investigations during the mid-1970s hinted at the monetary value that radio promotion held for record companies and artists. In 1976, the FCC investigated D.J. Productions, a concert promotions firm formed by radio personalities who "are in a position to make sure the artists they bring to town get terrific exposure while they are also in a position to buy acts at better prices" ("Black Promoter Raps Cut-Ins By Disk Jocks at FCC Payola Probe" 1977, 2). In a hearing on the matter, singer Al Green testified under subpoena that he accepted radio airplay from a disc-jockey owned production company in lieu of full payment for a concert, because he realized that radio promotion in the Washington area had monetary value ("Green Sings Blues at Payola Probe; Jocks Cut Payoff" 1977, 2).[104]

[104]Writing for the *Christian Science Monitor*, correspondent Louise Sweeney noticed that the most widely covered payola charges were occurring among black and Latino radio stations and musicians. She subsequently raised the question of whether or not minorities were specifically targeted by payola probes, or whether minorities were responsible for the bulk of payola (Sweeney 1977, 6; see "P.R. Pop Cleffers Say Payola Boosts Rock and Salsa" 1976, 64).

Another incident involving the exchange of money or services for airplay occurred three years before the D.J. Productions probe. In 1973, Project Sound, a joint task force comprised of Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Newark (New Jersey) Police Department personnel investigated the role of reputed Mafioso Pasquale Falconio in a US-Canada heroin route. The authorities extended their investigation into the activities of one of Falconio's business partners, David Wynshaw, who was also Clive Davis' assistant at Columbia. Wynshaw's job responsibilities at the label included promoting records to black radio stations. Jurisdiction of Project Sound transferred in 1973 to the U.S. Attorney's office and the Internal Revenue Service, who subpoenaed Wynshaw's office at CBS and discovered the "most graphic paper trail of payola ever witnessed." (Dannen 1991, 92-3, 103).

Citing irregular and improper use of expense vouchers to pay for his son's Bar Mitzvah, Columbia Records fired Davis' in 1973 (Dannen 1991, 86). Many industry insiders, however, skeptically considered the expense account reason given by CBS a pretense. What worried CBS, many felt, was the indirect link between the company and organized crime, and the more direct link between the company and payola, caused by the Wynshaw-Davis relationship (ibid.). When capital investment analyst Harold Vogel told *Frontline* that a weakened economy exposed the flaws in the structure of the music industry, he listed, although cautiously, the links to organized crime as one such flaw:

> And then there were, in addition to that, and I don't want to get too deep into this, I'm not an expert in this area, but there were, let's say, fringe elements, criminal type activities, with record cutouts that also happened around that time. (Vogel 2004; sec. 1, para. 18).

The main thesis of Dannen's book, *Hit Men* (1991), was that organized crime played a substantial role in the popular music industry, and consequently, in the history of rock and roll. The cutout scandal, to which Vogel referred, involved one of persons most extensively mentioned in *Hit Men*, Roulette Records founder Morris Levy.[105] Dannen averred that Levy had ingratiated himself to the Mafia as a teenager in the 1930s while working at a mob-owned restaurant. Over the years, the mob invested heavily in his business ventures, which included Birdland, the legendary jazz nightclub (Dannen 1991, 33-37). Birdland emcee Pee Wee Marquette, with whom I had frequent conversations from 1987 until his death in 1993, elaborated on Levy's ties to the Mafia, especially the Genovese family. According to Marquette, gangland figures frequented the Birdland, had their own reserved table, spoke personally to both him and Levy on many occasions, ordered lavishly, and never paid for anything. Although he was not privy to any business dealings that Levy might have specifically had with the Genovese clan, Marquette was of the strong opinion that they were, in fact, a silent partner in the nightclub, as well as in Levy's record labels and Pat Music, Levy's publishing company.[106]

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[105]Cutouts are low-selling albums that exist in limited quantities, and are sold at substantial discounts (often for one dollar) by thrift stores. Because they do not perform well in terms of sales, the record company often does not pay that much attention to them, making them attractive to counterfeiters, who press additional copies. Levy was indicted by a Newark, New Jersey Grand Jury for allegedly contracting with major labels to sell their cutouts, pressing counterfeit copies of them with the help of Capitol Records executive Sal Pisello, guaranteeing sales of all of them through a distributor, and pocketing the money for the extra albums sold. Both men were subsequently convicted (Haring 1988, 1; Haring 1987 11, Morris 1988, 1)

[106] Pee Wee was my upstairs neighbor, and I saw him daily. I asked him about Dannen's depiction of his former employer, even though Pee Wee had not read the book. Overall, he resented any anti-Levy insinuations for the two men were friends.

Dannen saw the ties between the Mafia and independent promotion as a logical continuation of a long, symbiotic relationship between the music industry and organized crime. He depicted "The Network," a loose-knit organization of ten independent promoters and their associates as an operation of the Gambino family. By maintaining exclusive rights to promote records to key stations across the United States, the Network began to exert a stranglehold on the entire radio industry. Each member covered a specific geographic region or market. Dennis Laventhal was stationed in Los Angeles, Fred DiSipio in Philadelphia, Barry Resnick and Herbie Rosen in New York, Ernie Phillips in Texas, Gary Byrd in Cleveland, and Jerry Brunner in Boston. Joe Cash covered the Baltimore and Washington D.C. areas (Dannen 1991, 11).

The Network's leader, former Motown executive Joe Isgro, covered the entire west coast market, and everyone else's (Dannen 1991, 11). Isgro's business partner, Joe Piney (alias Joe Armone) was an underboss of the Gambino family in New York. Surveillance conducted by the FBI in April of 1983 suggested that the head of the Gambino family, Paul Costellano, became aware of IP only after it had been going on for some time:

> Armone: That kid in California [Isgro] came in to see me, said…that they gave him fifty thousand to push a record. The company, they pay you just to make a record on the air, you know…There is a lot can be done.
> Costellano: Big figures?
> Armone: Over here they give you a hundred thousand just for pushing a record.
> Costellano: That's good, you know. Promotional work.

Nevertheless, he wholeheartedly agreed with Dannen's basic premise that Levy was heavily tied to the Mafia.

> Armone: Promotional work (Costellano and Armone quoted by Dannen 1991, 193).

To what degree record executives suspected any association between organized crime, the Network, and other independent promoters is difficult to determine. The majors nevertheless realized that they had become overly dependent on IP, and took steps to stop the habit cold turkey. In 1980, Dick Ashur refused to pay the Network to promote the title track of a Pink Floyd album, *The Wall*, and insisted on promoting the single through Columbia's own promotions department. Knowing that, as an AOR act, Pink Floyd did not normally chart their singles, lack of airplay would most likely go unnoticed if his gambit were to fail. Unfortunately for Ashur, someone alerted Steve O'Rourke, the band's manager, that the label refused to pay for independent promotion. So, O'Rourke came back to Ashur to demand that the group be treated to IP like the rest of their acts (Dannen 1991, 2, 7).

Warner Communications Incorporated, WEA's parent company, tried to eliminate the record group's IP expenditures in the fall of 1980, hoping that other companies would follow suit (J. Williams 1980 "WCI Cos.," 1). Network associate Herbie Rosen expressed confidence that WEA would return to the fold, reasoning, "Everybody needs promotion and the best ones are the independents. It's a sign of the times" (Rosen quoted by E. Harrison 1980 "Ex-WCI Indie," 3). Although MCA President Gene Froelich announced plans to "study" his label's use of independent promotion the following week, he did not commit to withdrawing from the practice (J. Williams 1980 "MCA Studies," 1). When *Billboard* reporter Ed Harrison asked other major label heads if they planned to stop their use of IP, he received an emphatic "no" from all (E. Harrison 1980 "Ex-WCI Indie," 3).

Without the cooperation from the other majors, WEA, like CBS, could not sustain a boycott of the Network, for, as the temporary Pink Floyd radio ban suggested, organized independent promoters had become powerful enough to keep the product of the industry leader out of rotation. In fact, the Network enjoyed an advantage over unaffiliated independent promoters, who struggled to keep going during the late-1970s and early-1980s (Grein 1981 "Promo Men," 3; Grein 1981 "Promo Indies," 55).

Everyone realized that independent promotion could not make a hit out of just any record. Lack of promotion could, however, prevent a record from ever becoming a hit. In 1977, a number of small Los Angeles based independent labels took to the streets to picket radio stations for suddenly excluding them from rotation (J. Williams 1977 "L.A. Small," 46). Other independents, perhaps not aware of the extent of IP, continually came up against what seemed to them an invisible "radio play barrier" (Davis 1980, 12). Palady Records President Dave Davis, for one, could not understand why he had such a tough time dealing with mid-market stations in Indianapolis, his company's home region:

> I recently took offense at the treatment that one of our artists received at an Indianapolis station and I let them know of my displeasure. They in turn replied that they 'meant no disrespect' and that they would be 'glad to play your record when it becomes a hit!'
>
> They surely must think us ignorant. No record sells unless it is heard, and it cannot be heard unless the stations play it. (Davis 1980, 12)

Independent promoters argued that they were simply trying to find airtime for good songs that the public would like. Acknowledging the fact that the vast majority of independent promoters were not connected to the Network, such was most likely the case.

As radio consultant Donna Halper wrote, "I know that in the four major markets where I worked as a DJ and MD [music director], there were mostly hardworking and honest record reps who did their job the best they could" (Halper 1986, 10). Mark Beaven, Bob Laul, Robyn Kravitz, and other independent promoters not connected to the Network told *Variety* reporter Phil DiMauro that they were also victimized by the Network, for they could not afford to spend money for bribes and kickbacks. Furthermore, once the scandal had broken out, they were unfairly being lumped together with peers who had resorted to criminal activity (DiMauro 1986, 152).

On the other hand, some of the most powerful IPs, in terms of influence, succeeded not because they promoted a record, but rather because they refused to promote records from companies that did not pay them. Kal Rudman, for example, promoted records through a weekly tipsheet, selling for $150 an issue, which rated various singles as "light" or "heavy" (Dannen 1991, 91). Former Ampex Promotions Director Jerald Wagner related to Dannen how Rudman saw his role in independent promotions:

> And I said, Kal, I'm really pissed at you. He said, Why? Because I read your asinine sheet every week, like everyone else, and you call this one light and that one heavy, and you just sit there behind your fucking typewriter. And I'm out there on the front lines. And I just wonder if you can really get a record played.
>
> He answered me perfectly--shut me right up. He said, Jerry, you may or may not be right. But let's assume I cannot get a record played. Do you think I can *keep one* from being played [punctuation and emphasis original]? (Wagner quoted by Dannen 1991, 91)

A 1986 NBC news story gave major labels an opportunity to sever ties to the Network. Acting on a tip provided by Miami disc jockey Don Cox, NBC reporter Brian Ross investigated allegations that the Network had bribed radio personnel with money and drugs (M. Goldberg 1986, 13). Ross subsequently interviewed anonymous sources within the radio and record industries, who accused the Network of threatening them with violence. Beginning to suspect Mafia involvement in the Network, Ross and his crew followed Joseph Isgro, the Network's head promoter, to the Helmsley Palace Hotel in New York, and filmed a meeting between Isgro and mob boss John Gotti in January (Schipper 1986 "NBC's 'New'," 115; M. Goldberg 1986, 13-14; Dannen 1991, 273-5).

Al Gore chaired a Senate investigation on the record industry, which began in February 1986, shortly after the NBC news story aired. Not waiting for the Senate to reach a conclusion, the majors discontinued their use of IP by March, (Schipper 1986 "CBS, Polygram," 151; Lichtman 1986, 1; "DiLeo on Indies: 'It's a Shame What the Labels Did" 1986, 75; Freeman 1986, 1, 85). Two years later, a Los Angeles grand jury indicted Isgro associates Ralph Tashjian and Bill Craig on payola and related charges (M. Goldberg 1988 "L.A. Grand," 19).

Despite the Senate probe, the negative publicity, and the expense, the majors quietly resumed their use of independent promotion by spring of 1987. From that year on, however, IP cost them much less, for two reasons. The majors did not use independent promoters for musicians on their own label, but rather allowed labels they distributed to use them (DiMauro 1987, 93). Secondly, labels adopted a new policy of advancing promotional fees to the artist (Dannen 1991, 292). In the first case, the major labels did not spend any of their own money for IP. In the second, money paid by the majors came

in the form of an advance that could be recouped from the artist. Although no record labels were charged with wrongdoing during the whole of the Network scandal, the lack of direct contact with independent promoters provided majors additional legal shielding.[107] The majors also explored possible loopholes in the payola and RICO (Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization) statutes to see if there were any legal ways to bribe a station to play records (DiMartino 1988, 86).[108]

The Changing Shape of the Music Industry

The combination of escalating costs, the inability to keep or seek star talent, unsystematic distribution and lack of promotion took a heavy toll on independent labels during the 1970s. Larger independents--Motown, Arista, Chrysalis, A&M, etc.--attempted to maintain their independence for as long as possible (Rayl 1979, 14). Motown, for example, refused to surrender the Jackson 5 to CBS without a fight. In 1977, the company sued Columbia subsidiary Epic for unfair competition strategies and conspiracy. Columbia settled out of court three years later ("Motown Sues CBS in Jackson Five Action." 1977, 65; "600G to Motown in CBS Settlement of Jacksons' Case" 1980, 133).

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[107]John Newcomer, chief of the organized task force came under some press scrutiny for correspondence with MCA assuring the company that it would not be targeted in the ongoing payola probe (Schipper 1988 "Payola Probe," 98). For whatever reason, the investigation of labels seemed to have been a much lower priority.

[108]The legal teams discovered, for example, that nothing prohibited radio personnel from receiving consultancy fees from independent promoters, so long as station employees reported the income on their tax statements (DiMartino 1988, 86).

A number of small labels preferred to side with the majors, rather than fight them. Claude Ebrard, International Director of French independent Trema Disques, rued the effects of consolidation, telling *Variety* reporter Frank Meyer, "The conglomerates are in force now....It takes you three to four years to build an act and the conglomerates come in and take them. You become very cautious" (Ebrard quoted by Meyer 1978, 3). Nevertheless, Ebrard supported the efforts of Musexpo and Midem to reach out to the conglomerates so that European labels could network with them (ibid.). Networking with the majors could offer independent labels an opportunity to seek distribution or promotional deals. Moreover, small labels might find a major willing to buy them. Either way, many independents believed that their future success would lie in some kind of alliance with a major label: As Spring Records co-founder Ray Rifkind told *Variety*:

> Small labels are better off with a major force….Their money is guaranteed. They don't have to add personnel except where they need it in mostly promotional areas, so they can become a major force with a small overhead. (Rifkind quoted in "Small Companies Need Major Help to Pitch Product" 1978, 81)

From 1976-1980, a major shift in the record industry occurred as small labels allied with major labels. Like Atlantic and Asylum, some labels merged with majors in whole or in part. In 1977, Casablanca sold a minority share of itself to Polygram, who later bought another minority share of Disques Barclay, a large French independent label (Meyer 1977, 79; Kahn 1978, 1). Many more labels signed distribution agreements with the majors, who either collected a share of the indie's profits, or collected upfront payments for promotion and distribution, a practice often referred to as "PND." Hickory secured distribution from ABC-Dunhill, which would later be absorbed into the MCA

group ("Hickory in Middle of Big Change" 1976, 3). RCA agreed to distribute Kama Sutra/Buddah and its subsidiary labels a year after Buddah signed a deal with United Artists to handle its administration. Meanwhile, Hugh Hefner's Playboy label allied with Columbia in 1977, and, as Rifkind's comments would predict, reduced its staff later that year ("Buddah in Distrib Tie with RCA; Col to Handle Playboy"1977, 65; 'Playboy Label Slashes Staff, Takayoshi Out" 1977, 69; "UA to Administer Buddah Music Firms" 1976, 56). Although industry watchers expected to see smaller independents seeking major label distribution, they were shocked when A&M, at that time the largest independent label, signed a manufacturing and distribution deal with RCA in 1979 (E. Harrison 1979 "AOR: Where," 1). Consequently, as 1980 approached, only three top indies--Motown, Arista, and Chrysalis--remained completely independent (Rayl 1979, 14). By 1985, however, these labels would also sign agreements: Motown with MCA, Arista with RCA, and Chrysalis with Columbia.

In 1967, the record industry consisted of six big companies, their subsidiaries, and myriad smaller labels in various shapes and sizes. Despite the disadvantages in size, cash flow, and distribution, even the smallest label could compete with the majors for pop stars, hits, airplay and record sales--e.g., Shelby Singleton (Jeanine C. Riley), and Tetragram (Grand Funk Railroad). But as the smaller labels aligned with the majors, they came to rely more heavily on them. Hence, the term "dependent label" emerged to describe an independent label that relied on major labels for such functions as promotion, manufacturing and distribution. By 1980, the music industry consisted of six big labels, their subsidiaries and dependents, several other labels that were large, but not as large as the majors, and numerous independents. At that time, all labels struggled financially in

the economic downturn. Still, the smaller independents suffered most of all, and could therefore not compete with the larger independents and majors for blockbuster sales and media presence. Instead, they relied on cutting the cost of promotion and distribution, and could thus made a profit selling fifteen thousand records, whereas the majors would have to sell more than ten times that amount to break even. While limited sales allowed many independents the opportunity to survive the 1970s, smaller labels surrendered the lion's share of the market to the others. By 1985, the record industry consisted of major labels, their subsidiaries and their dependents, and numerous smaller labels. The unaffiliated independents, by then, were truly marginalized in terms of sales, and virtually shut out in terms of stars, hits, and airplay.

The Period of Record Label Consolidation and Standardization

As companies merged together and formed agreements for manufacturing, distributing and promoting, the record industry consolidated, coalescing around six major corporations. Youth-oriented marketing became paramount, for teenagers and young adults proved to be reliable consumers. In fact, rock and roll, the music of youth, almost single-handedly had accounted for the explosion of record sales in 1955. Once the major labels committed to rock, their earnings dramatically increased too. In 1966, the year before Monterey, Columbia Records' pretax earnings were $5,000,000. In 1978, Columbia earned over $100,000,000 before taxes (Dannen 1991, 5, 14-15.) Inflation notwithstanding, those figures indicated substantial growth.

The independent rock and roll labels of the 1950s and early-1960s--King, Dot, Vee Jay, Motown, Atlantic, etc.--were businesses. Yet, they did not conduct their

operations in the same manner as the majors. The independents demonstrated more concern with cultural trends happening around them than they did professional standards, slick production and packaging. The Kingsmen's recording of "Louie, Louie," for example, did not meet the standards of professional recording. The vocals are barely distinguishable from the supporting instruments, and the lyrics are unintelligible. But as Albin Zak correctly noted, the very nature of the recording made it special, and drew a positive response from listeners (Zak 1997, 45).

When the majors jumped into rock after Monterey, they happened to come across a group of performers who had already demonstrated a rapport with the underground audience that interested label executives. In subsequent years, however, the distance between the majors, musicians and listeners grew, and became obvious. Listeners began to show their dissatisfaction with the popular music industry in a number of ways. One vocal faction lashed out against disco, a music that seemed to enjoy corporate blessing. Another embraced the new wave, a musical movement depicting itself as the antithesis of corporate professionalism. More generally, young audiences slowed their rates of record consumption, causing sales slumps during the latter part of the 1970s. While one should certainly guard against the stereotypical depiction of major labels as stodgy corporations lacking creativity, and the hackneyed romanticization of the indies as seat-of-the-pants operations, one must take into account their differences in history, resources, and modes of operation.[109] Vee Jay, Queen, Roulette, and other smaller independents

[109]Clive Davis, for example, thrived because he was creative. Ahmet Ertegun and Jerry Wexler functioned just as well as corporate executives as they did small record label owners. At the same time, Motown's production process was highly disciplined, rational, and in some respects quite formal.

came about after World War II to fulfill the demand for rhythm and blues, a market that, until 1955 had a specific audience defined by race and class. The majors, conversely, sought to satisfy the tastes of a much larger segment of the population. Independent labels did not own their own distribution companies, but the majors did. Moreover, the majors had access to financial resources that the independents did not. Most important, the independents dealt with songs and artists who might have been considered crude because of their exaggeration of such musical elements as the backbeat and the blue note, and the bare bones approach to orchestration. The majors, on the other hand, prided themselves on refinement and professionalism.

As major labels began to dominate rock production, and the industry consolidated around them, they infused a new professionalism into rock and roll. Ramin (1974) and others demonstrated that rock and roll musicians had to comply with specific standards of conduct and procedure simply in order to apply for major label representation. Near-flawless production methods reduced the aural crudity found in some earlier rock recordings. And due to their advanced system of distribution, their ability to pay for independent promotion, and their ubiquity, the major labels had a considerably greater chance of getting their product heard, and thus had considerable means to influence future popular music.[110]

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[110]Rodney Graham, a hip-hop producer and student of mine at Hunter College, asked my opinion about an outrageously expensive keyboard (approximately $3,500--other professional grade keyboards can cost anywhere between $300-$1,000) that he considered buying because it was the only one with the specific swing function found on some of the big-selling rap songs at the time. When I asked about the other features of the keyboard, he replied that in every other respect, the instrument was decidedly inferior to anything else on the market. Yet, because he wanted to emulate the sounds he heard on the radio, he bought the keyboard the following week.

Issues concerning standardization abounded in the period of consolidation. Primarily, the need to impose some kind of algorithm in predicting pop success stemmed from the need for major labels to "play safe," act "cautiously," or exercise "conservative" judgment. The terms "conservative," "safe," and "cautious" come up repeatedly in journalistic coverage of this period. After all, one can easily understand the desire of label executives to rationalize musical processes for the benefit of a shareholder, who might not possess the ear of a 'record man,' or the patience to develop an artist over two or three albums. In explaining why some forms of musical expression were being actively discouraged by the mainstream industry, *Musical America* journalist Stephen Holden wrote:

> Nowadays, many major talents are being frozen out of the music business. It is not in the personal interest of most label executives to sign a singer/songwriter since it generally takes two to three albums to break a solo act, and at a cost that's simply astronomical. In terms of job security, the new rock & roll is a cheaper, safer gamble--team music for corporate team players. (Holden 1980, 115)

The above quote illustrates one of Adorno's key points: namely, the rejection of the accepted template results in the dismissal of the artist to the cultural margin. In this instance, Holden is only referring to one type of artist who does not fit the recommended template. This leads to speculation about how many other types of misfits might have

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The purchase exemplifies the profound influence that heavily promoted music has on young, upcoming artists, who have a tendency to try to match their sound with the professional ones heard on the radio. On a deeper level, this anecdote implies that musicians themselves are partly responsible for maintaining, or perpetuating industry standards. It also illustrates Frith's observation that "radio molds as well as responds to public taste" (Frith 1981, 120).

been systematically, and deliberately excluded from the mainstream for the reasons Holden cited: the artist is too expensive and risky.[111]

The singer/songwriter and other artists could seek representation from a smaller independent label in 1985. Today, musicians can even record their songs at home, and hire a manufacturer to press inexpensive CDs of their work. They can even convert their music to mp3 files and sell them over the Internet.[112] The musician may actually profit financially from these recordings. Yet nowadays, putting out a song without any input from the major labels would be, almost by definition, releasing it into the margins of the record industry. Such would not have necessarily have been the case in 1967, when small labels could get their records played on radio and sell millions of units without any major having a stake in their profits. Consequently, the small-label musician could reach a much wider audience in terms of demographics and geographic location. The only way for any musician to claim that kind of attention and reward in 2006 would be to ally with a major label either directly or indirectly.[113] If a musician felt the need to reach as wide

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[111]There are other reasons for labels to reject an artist that they believe might be talented. Sometimes, for example, if an artist has an eclectic style, and part of her repertoire includes country, hip-hop, and heavy metal songs, an A&R person might very well deem her too difficult to place. In other words, the label would have no means by which to market said performer.

[112]As music journalist Sam Howard-Spinks related to me, during a casual conversation, mp3s lack the sonic fidelity of CDs. Nevertheless, MP3s had become the industry standard by 2003.

[113]For example, Curtis Jackson (50 Cent) recorded numerous albums on his own, and sold them on the street along with other mix tapes. Rap star Marshall Mathers (Eminem) randomly came across his tape, and signed him to a record deal on his own label, Shady Records, a subsidiary of Interscope Records, a label owned by MCA/Universal. Had Mathers not intervened on behalf of MCA, most likely Jackson would only be selling mixed tapes on the street.

an audience as possible, he or she would have to meet the standards imposed by major labels.

Wherever speculation might lead, one must stipulate that the process of artist selection could serve to enforce standards. As far as the industry was concerned, the artist must fit the template, and vice-versa, for the adherence to Adornan templates dominated popular music more and more as the period between 1967-1985 progressed. RFC recording artist Gino Soccio, for one, expressed optimism in 1982 that the record industry would soon realize the folly of pressuring musicians to conform musically and otherwise to strict categorization, writing, "Some artists, initially short-changed by pigeonholing, could win recognition today if they had a second chance" (Soccio 1982, 14). Taking a skeptical Americans-are-bloody-nuts position, Mike Collier, Managing Director for the Carlin Music Corporation, a British firm, commented on the myopia of US record companies in their obsession with record labeling:

> In the States, before anyone thinks about whether a record is a hit, or not, it has to be labeled. Is it AOR, MOR, pop, disco, country or whatever? Because of this, radio stations which concentrate on one particular type of music are not sent any of the others. Disk jockeys might read a review of a record that is labeled jazz and, therefore, not bother to listen to it. (Collier 1980, 16)

The history of disco illustrates another issue within standardization, Middleton's notion of formulaic imitation. After tinkering with the template's musical and extramusical signifiers in order to create a sound with wider commercial appeal, mainstream producers and record executives rushed headfirst into discomania in an attempt to recreate the recipe for success laid out by previous disco hits. For critics of the music, the repetition of musical elements--not only in the recurrence of elements within

the same piece, but also in the uniformity of idioms from song to song--became one of their biggest objections to the music. The degree to which the mainstream music industry expressed enthusiasm for disco was manifest in its influence on performers known for other styles, and its presence in other media, especially television, movies and radio. Despite the old adage that says one can boogie to anything, recording engineers, producers and labels incorporated the rhythmic and tonal signifiers of disco (most notably the high hat ride and the pulsating bass line) into a particular style of music which made it the standard for social dancing. Additionally, the desire of disco patrons to dance longer to a specific groove without interruption spawned a new technical standard, the twelve-inch single.

The 1970s "disco sucks" movement indicated that some audiences were keenly aware of standardization in the form of formulaic imitation. Punks also objected to what they saw as standardization. For them, however, the idea of standards was framed more within the context of professionalism. Embedded in working class values that prized honesty and respite from drudgery, punk shunned the trappings of what its fans considered the elitist middle-class attitude permeating mainstream rock after Monterey and Woodstock. Punks vociferously showed disdain for the overproduced sounds of Queen, Styx, and other bands, who utilized recording techniques that made them sound either symphonic or unreal. They also chaffed at political correctness, compliance with authority, and star status. In their view, the mainstream record industry mechanized rock and roll, and simply turned it into another commodity that lacked emotion, immediacy, and relevance.

Punk's tendency to stoke visceral sensation endeared the music to its listeners. Whether positive or negative, nurturing or destructive, punk elicited strong emotion from its fans. They, and other rock fans, sought the same joy and spontaneity that their older siblings experienced a decade earlier. As studio executive Carol Line wrote, in a 1980 *Billboard* piece, the emotionlessness of professional production compromised the very thing that made rock and roll important:

> It is not particularly vogue to use caring and regard as the bases for business moves. . . . But the very independence that helped create rock 'n' roll sprang from frustrated hearts that didn't have an expression of their own. (Line 1980, 16)

Beneath the issue of standardization lies a more general and primal one: the need of any business to exert some kind of control over its product in terms of composition, quality, production, labor, marketing and dissemination. Many of the strategies undertaken by major labels between 1967 and 1985 originated in their desire to organize and manage a process that was culturally and operationally distant from how they conducted business in 1960. Standardizing distribution played an important role in the consolidation of the record industry. Other factors included the professionalization of a new breed of musician, who had historically shown an aversion to "selling out," in order to interest an audience that demanded authenticity and independence on the part of the musician. Most importantly, the majors made a conscious, deliberate effort to control access to promotional venues. Without promotion, a record simply will not sell, because the public will not know that it exists. The majors' decision to maintain legally an ethically questionable relationship to the Network, and other disreputable independent

promoters, most aptly demonstrated the critical importance of promotion, and the necessity of controlling it.

Questions about autonomy and authenticity found their way into the press in response to the new professional standard, both during the period of consolidation and afterwards. Mike Harrison, President of Goodphone Communications, a California music consultancy, contributed numerous commentaries on the subject for *Billboard* during the peak of record label consolidation. In one, titled "The Ethics of Credibility," he discussed conflict in notions of authenticity and autonomy, and how this struggle manifested itself in the role of disc jockeys. On the one hand, there was the acknowledgment that a disc jockey needed to project authenticity to rock fans. On the other hand, the disc jockey had to answer to station management, who might persuade the spinner to sound enthusiastic about a record he thought was horrible, or use youthful jargon in an almost condescending way (M. Harrison 1981 "The Ethics," 31). What emerges from this discourse is that authenticity was a concept more tied to the listener, autonomy to the DJ's corporate bosses.

In another article titled "You Can't Be Progressive & No. 1," Harrison noted that issues concerning authenticity and autonomy defined standards. More important, listeners played a substantial role in determining what was authentic--often to a fanatical degree. At the same time, some listeners also maintained some autonomy over the music they listened to, and therefore determined the content and enforcement of a template. Speaking informally with student broadcasters during a college radio convention, Harrison came to the above realization about standards when one attendee asked about a possible departure from conventional definitions of the new wave subgenre:

> During this scattered rap, one young radio programmer from the Midwest asked me if I think there will be 'room for lead guitars' within the new scene [referring to 'new wave']... My response to the student was 'only if the committee allows it.'
>
> With the advent of each new musical scene comes the emergence of that figurative 'committee'--the popularly held notions perpetuated by purveyors of the scene who dedicate themselves to the separation of that scene, musically and culturally, from both pre-existing and co-existing ones. In order to protect this separation, they formulate sets of rules and regulations (M. Harrison 1981 "Disk Jockeys," 29)

If such rules as those cited above were enforced, then one might expect to see a resultant homogeneity in sonic attributes, especially within subgenres. In turn, the feeling that "everything sounds the same" might degenerate into a general pessimism on behalf of jaded audiences. On one side, there were those such as Ron Baron, a Vice President of Norman Winter Associates, a Los Angeles public relations firm, who saw little problem with contributing to the jading of audiences by dint of hype. Although defining hype as "an over amplification of the truth," Baron nevertheless admitted, "Hype …can keep a disk from becoming a stiff" (Baron 1980, 12). On the other side, however, industry trackers noted that exposed hype contributed to lingering ill will towards the record industry after consolidation, the IP scandal and other developments, despite such benevolent actions as promoting Live Aid and Amnesty International concerts in order to raise public awareness of famine and injustice (Terry 1987, 207; D. Goldberg 1987, 208).

Within the music industry, the post-consolidation period brought about a number of contentious issues, especially between record labels and radio stations. In a 1986 speech at the second annual Music Business Symposium, Clive Davis lashed out against

radio executives, claiming, “There are large and vital areas of modern music that are being disenfranchised by all radio formats who, it seems to me, have made arbitrary and narrow decisions about what listeners will and will not accept” (Davis quoted by Sutherland 1986, 3). Artist manager Bud Praeger likewise attacked radio’s alleged usurpation of authority, writing, “The labels have allowed themselves to become slaves of trends in radio” (Praeger 1986, 10). Former KVRE (Santa Rosa, California) disc jockey Larry Brauer condemned the control radio stations exerted over music by shortening playlists and stressing certain songs to the detriment of others. Brauer linked the standardization of formats and procedures to recent consolidation of the radio industry:

> Today radio is just another broken promise. The radio business is like every other business in America, an investment to maximize profits. President Reagan’s deregulation of the number of stations one company can own means a few corporate conglomerates will soon control nearly all broadcast outlets. (Brauer 1986, 9)

The 1980s radio industry consolidation that Brauer mentioned did not occur on the same level as the record industry’s. Despite easing of regulations concerning the number of stations one party could own, radio stations were still prohibited by law from engaging in the rampant mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and business alignments that record labels engaged in over the previous decade-and-a-half. Consequently, Brauer’s prediction that a few corporate conglomerates would someday dominate radio broadcasting might have seemed, in 1986, somewhat improbable or outrageous--perhaps even paranoid. Ten years later, however, many would consider Brauer’s forecast prescient.

Chapter Six: Radio Industry Consolidation

Overview

With the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the subsequent purchase of radio stations across the U.S. by Infinity, Clear Channel, and similar conglomerates, listeners, musicians and critics brought the issue of standardization to the fore. Critics often griped about standardization in terms of diversity, or lack thereof. Listeners began to link industry concentration to decreasing innovation.

From 1995 to 2005, music industry professionals watched as unit sales data and other criteria showed a decline in young fan enthusiasm to buy CDs. While some corporate executives blamed the decline on illegal downloading from Napster.com and other peer-to-peer (P2P) websites, others began to suspect that problems within the industry caused it to sputter. These flaws included the record industry's over-reliance upon radio promotion and hype, the inability to develop artists at the pace demanded by listeners, and the sameness of easily accessible major label product. As earnings slipped during the first few years of the twenty-first century, some observers believed that increased industrial controls met with increased hostility and indifference on the part of listeners.

The first section contains a brief history of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the impact this legislation had upon radio ownership, music programming, and the changing relationship between record labels and radio conglomerates. The next section deals with the effects of the 1996 Telecom Act and conglomerates on the music industry. Section three looks at attempts by both the record and radio industry to control or manage

popular music. The final section analyzes the role radio consolidation played in producing and maintaining musical standards.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996, and Media Megapolies

A 1974 antitrust suit, United States vs. AT&T, resulted in a Modified Final Judgment that ordered the telecommunications behemoth to sell off seven regional operating companies (Economides 1997; sec. 3, para. 5). Although recognized as a "natural monopoly" since 1920, the US government had historically feared the company's expansion beyond the Federal Communications Commission's ability to control it, as evidenced by an earlier (1949) antitrust suit against its subsidiary, Western Electric (Economides 1997; sec. 3, para. 4). The government hoped that, by breaking up the Bell System in 1974, long distance telephone rates would decrease, since newer companies could enter the market and compete with the older corporation for callers.

The very diversity that lowered phone rates became undesirable in the early-1990s, as telecommunication technology grew at an almost incomprehensible pace. With the dawn of the World Wide Web came opportunities and abilities to combine media: telephone, cable television, radio, motion pictures, and music (United States 1996 "Fact Sheet"; sec. 1, para. 2-3). By relaxing regulations on media ownership, the US Congress hoped to break down barriers that might discourage cooperation among companies, and thus foster the "information superhighway" that President Bill Clinton hoped to forge during his first term in office:

> For the past three years, my administration has promoted

> the enactment of a telecommunications reform bill to stimulate investment, promote competition, provide open access for all citizens to the Information Superhighway, strengthen and improve universal service and provide families with technologies to help them control what kind of programs come into their homes over television. (Clinton quoted by Scherr 1996; sec. 1, para. 17)

Universal customer access to combined media--e.g., the ability to log onto the Internet, and watch music videos on cellular phones--was ostensibly the primary motivation behind the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Buried within the bill, however, were provisions that effectively allowed an unlimited buying of radio stations.[114] Section 202 specifically regulated the number of stations that any party could own in a single market: eight in markets of forty-five or more stations; seven in markets of between thirty and forty-four stations; six in markets of between fifteen and twenty-nine stations; and five in markets containing fourteen stations or less (United States 1996; sec. 202b, para. 1). As former *Rolling Stone* editor Eric Boehlert noted in a 2000 Salon.com article, Congress expected Section 202 to encourage a number of aggressive companies to buy hundreds of stations across the country, and make bigger profits because of their size. Yet, the buying up of radio stations went beyond that point, and such conglomerates as Clear Channel and Infinity essentially "carved up the radio dial" (Boehlert 2001 "One Big": pg. 2, sec. 1, para. 5).

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[114]The NAB's lobbying tactics for the bill included efforts to keep the radio ownership issue in the background. According to an unnamed source, "The NAB knew to lay low….The secret was not to be out front and center on it. If there had been a separate radio deregulation bill, it wouldn't have passed" (Anonymous quoted by Boehlert 2001 "Radio's Big": pg. 4, sec. 1, para. 19).

Although it would seem that a relaxation of caps still implied limited ownership, the Telecom Act also included a provision that allowed for exemptions to any of the rules set forth in the new law. Section 401 outlined a new policy on "forbearance," which set forth a process for legally dispensing with rules on caps or anything else:

> Notwithstanding section 332 (c)(1)(a) of this Act, the Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of this Act to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services, in any or some of its or their geographic markets, if the Commission determines that—
>
> > (1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory
> >
> > (2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the protection of consumers; and
> >
> > (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the public interest. (United States 1996; sec. 4(10a), para. 1)[115]

The Cato Institute's Lawrence Gasman characterized the 1996 Telecom Act as a "timid" piece of legislation that expanded government involvement in radio (Gasman 1996; sec. 2, para. 2). Despite the raise in caps, Gasman alluded to eighty nominal powers

[115]Section 332 prohibits interference by governmental or private parties with cell phone reception and transmission. Section 401 also provides for the weighing of competitive elements when granting forbearance, and the specific procedure for a party to apply for forbearance.

acquired by the FCC, presumably because it now held the power of deciding, among other things, which radio companies were eligible for forbearance, and which were not--especially since the rules for granting forbearance were vague (Gasman 1996; sec. 4, para. 1). In December of 1996, Gasman's concern would appear to have had some merit. The Department of Justice actively sought to keep large conglomerates from dominating local markets when it forced Westinghouse to sell off Philadelphia rock station WWMR in the company's merger with Infinity Broadcasting, because the merger would have given Westinghouse a 40% stake of the Philadelphia market's advertising revenues (Taylor 1996; sec. 1, para 1-3). Earlier that year, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Lawrence Fullerton challenged a proposed merger between Jacor and Citicasters. The challenge was settled when Citicasters agreed to give up one of its larger stations in Cincinnati in order to comply with local station ownership caps (Holland 1996; sec. 1, para. 8).

President Clinton signed the Telecom act into law in January of 1996, and during the next eleven months the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division investigated over 100 proposed mergers (Holland 1996; sec. 1, para. 4). Due to the number and complexity of proposed buyouts, and inexperience with dealing with media mergers, the DOJ entered these investigations somewhat unprepared. As Fullerton admitted, "In candor, our investigations get richer and more sophisticated as we explore the various transactions that may raise concern" (Fullerton quoted by Holland 1996; sec. 1, para. 6).

Over the next two years, mergers increased. In 1997, the trading value of radio stations totaled $17.8 billion. The following year, 1,695 stations were bought and sold, with an estimated trading value of $13 billion, the merger between Chancellor Media and Capstar Broadcasting accounting for almost a third of that figure ($4.1 billion) (Taylor

1998; sec. 1, para. 2-4). The year 1999, however, featured arguably the most important merger of all between Jacor Communications and Clear Channel Communications (Clear Channel 2005, sec. 5, para. 1).

Clear Channel began operations in 1972 with L. Lowery Mays' purchase of a single station, KEEZ (San Antonio). From 1975 to 1996, the company acquired forty-two additional stations, and two networks, the Kentucky Network (1991) and Broad Street Communications (1984) (Clear Channel 2005 "Company History"; sec. 9-14). Terry Jacobs founded Jacor in 1981 after buying three religious radio stations. During the early 1990s, the company flirted with bankruptcy after its share price dwindled to seventy-five cents. In 1993, however, mogul Sam Zell invested $70 million into Jacor for the purpose of buying more stations (Boehlert 2001 "One Big": pg. 3; sec. 1, para. 16-17).

Like Clear Channel, Jacor went on another radio station buying spree immediately after passage of the Telecom Act of 1996. By the time they merged, their 1,200 stations represented the former holdings of seventy other media corporations (Boehlert 2001 "Radio's Big": pg. 2, sec. 1, para. 5). Clear Channel has never shied away from its undisputed reputation as an industry leader. Despite its critics, the company boasts of its 20% share of global advertising revenue, big-name stars from Casey Kasem to Laura Schlesinger, and its 1225 stations in the US, with additional equity shares in 240 more internationally (Clear Channel 2005; sec. 1, para. 1). Radio Division CEO John Hogan candidly solicited future advertisers on the company's official website, touting Clear Channel's size as a means by which to implement diversity and give "greater value to advertisers and listeners (Hogan 2003; sec. 1, para. 3). In some markets, Clear Channel and Infinity received a combined 90% of advertising revenue (Boehlert 2001 "Radio's

Big": pg. 2, sec. 1, para. 8). According to a 2002 Future of Music Coalition study, these two companies alone accounted for 42% of the listening audience across the nation after the turn of the century. Along with eight other companies, Clear Channel and Infinity were heard by 90% of radio audiences at any given time. Moreover, as few as three companies owned about 70% of "virtually every local market (Bracy and Toomey 2002: para. 4, sec. 1-2)."

To understand the impact of radio conglomeration on popular music, one must first consider (a) the corporate philosophy manifested by industry leaders, and (b) the effect of previous attempts at radio programming monopolization. Beginning in 1987, because of the relaxed caps mentioned by Brauer and others, media corporations could own two FM music stations in the same market, a process known as 'duopoly' (Ross et al, 2000 "Megopoly Makes"; sec. 1, para. 1). In theory, the companies that bought a station with a similar style and pace to the one they already owned could more precisely define their programming to better suit two distinct audiences.[116] In practice, however, management would most likely request that one station undergo a more drastic change in format (e.g., hip-hop). Moreover, the management might even dismantle the station, or move it to the cheaper frequencies of the FM spectrum (ibid, para. 1). The effect of duopoly on a rival station could be devastating. Two sister stations could adjust their programming in such a way as to siphon off the audience base of other similar stations.

[116]In one example given by Ross et al, station X, which plays country and western, might buy station Y, which also plays country and western. Station X might then decide to play country hits of the 1960s and 1970s, and then target station Y's programming to younger listeners (ibid, para. 3-5).

The effect of megapoly would be even greater, since a higher number of commonly owned stations could team up against targeted rivals.

Clear Channel's philosophy contained two basic attributes: (1) a relentless drive to exert control over the pop music market, and (2) the steadfast belief in cost reduction. Clear Channel stations accomplished the latter by broadcasting different areas from one locale, instead of setting up individual stations in every city where it broadcast, thus saving money on office space, intramural communication and support personnel (Boehlert 2001 "One Big":pg. 5, sec. 1, para. 4). The company further reduced costs when it diminished the ranks of its on-air talent by having one DJ broadcast a single show to multiple markets simultaneously, a process referred to by the company as "cyber-jockeying" (ibid, para. 9). The company's resultant success in maximizing profits led *The Wall Street Journal* to rank its stock as the fifth-best performing of the 1990s (Clear Channel 2005; sec. 5).

Over the past ten years, Clear Channel's aggressive expansion into popular music radio, advertising and concert promotions irked competitors, but rivals were reluctant to voice their concerns about the company openly because of its hardball tactics and souring reputation.[117] Due to Clear Channel's constant purchasing of broadcasting companies all over the world, radio station personnel feared being too critical of an entity that might soon become their new boss. As WTDY and WJJO (Madison, WI) radio executive Glenn Gardner explained, "People in this business don't know who they're going to be working for next week. So a lot of them are just plain afraid to speak out" (Gardner quoted by

[117]Clear Channel purchased SFX, the largest North American concert promotions company in the late-summer of 2000 (Kot 2000; sec. 1, para. 1).

Boehlert 2001 “One Big”: pg. 2, sec. 1, para. 14) Record company executives resented Clear Channel for strong-arming them into promoting both concerts and records through them alone, therefore forcing labels to sever promotional ties to unaffiliated stations. WBZX and WEGE (Columbus, OH) Program Director Hal Fish reported, “Clear Channel comes into markets and says to record companies, ‘Don’t give that station a concert or band promotion or there will be no business with us across our platform of stations’” (Fish quoted by Boehlert 2001 “One Big”: pg. 3, sec. 1, para. 2). Artist manager Michael Williams, in fact, began to see all of music promotion dependent upon currying Clear Channel’s favor:

> It’s such a complicated game that it’s hard to maneuver. If you’ve got a record that’s working and you’re on there, you love the system. If you have a song like a “Hey Ya” that all thousand Clear Channel Stations are playing, you’re in heaven.
>
> But if you have a record that none of the Clear Channel stations are playing, you’re out. What do I do? Like, who do I have to pay? It’s not good. There’s no competition, there’s no originality, the playlists don’t entertain new artists. There’s no energy. (Michael Williams 2004; sec. 1, para. 66-7).

Clear Channel has maintained for the past decade that their rapid expansion into myriad markets across demographic lines can meet, and has met a societal need for diversity. Founder L. Lowery Mays made an open commitment to creating a heterogeneous customer base and workforce (M. Mays, Hamersly et al 2005; sec.1, para. 5). On its website, the company devotes an entire page to its commitment to diversity which emphasizes its contributions to such organizations as the United Negro College

Fund, the NAACP, the Hispanic Chamber, and American Women in Radio and Television (AWRT), and its growing share of the minority markets (ibid, sec. 4-6).

By defining diversity in the above manner, Clear Channel might someday be able to argue that it is a "natural monopoly," and this could insulate the company against future antitrust actions. Gasman pointed out that the notion of universal service began "decades earlier" with government subsidies given to increase citizen access to telephone technology (Gasman 1996; sec. 4, para.2). The universal service policies stated a clear intent within the US Government to provide access to goods and services for all of the nation's citizens. Because of its size and wherewithal, AT&T was in a unique position to ensure the development of a nationally compatible telephone system that could reach virtually everyone, and this enhanced its position as a natural monopoly. Consequently, the government made only limited efforts to keep AT&T in check.

Likewise, the notion of diversity offers Clear Channel an opportunity to address the long-standing complaint that both music and talk formats had homogenized over the past couple of decades. Because of Clear Channel's ability to maintain a vast and diverse talent pool, and reach listeners across class and racial lines, one might assume that the company is in a unique position to offer diversity, as defined within the context of the company's stated position on the subject. Fans, musicians, record labels, and veteran radio personnel, however, questioned (1) Clear Channel's definition, and (2) Clear Channel's ability to achieve its declared diversity goals.

The Music Industry during Radio Consolidation

From 1986 to 1995, the music industry realized a steady increase in profits. Although these capital gains enticed potential shareholders, and maintained strong stock values, they came at a high price: namely, the long-term health of the industry. Since 1995, the majors have faltered financially. In recent years, many within the industry have blamed Napster, Kazaa, and other peer-to-peer (P2P) systems for diminishing record sales. Such downloading sites, however, did not really cause the record industry's misfortunes, but instead further exposed the systemic flaws mentioned earlier by market analyst Harold Vogel. The methods used by the majors to post short-term quarterly profit increases weakened future sales. Moreover, the record industry's relationship with the radio industry became more contentious after the 1996 Telecom Act, and the subsequent monopolizing of popular music radio by Clear Channel and Infinity.

Some of the reasons behind the profits during the years 1986-1995 had to do with factors not related to musical policy--i.e., the individual label's approach to recruiting musicians and producing music. By eliminating direct payments to independent promoters in favor of utilizing their services through recoupable artist advances, the majors substantially reduced their overhead. Furthermore, the industry enjoyed a sales boom due to something insiders referred to as "conversion," a process that outsiders might have called "planned obsolescence." Because of the growing dissemination of CD players, labels began to re-record older albums, or "catalogues," onto the new medium after 1988, thus causing a rise in the sales of 1960s and 1970s rock and roll to consumers who were simply replacing vinyl records that were either damaged, hard to store, or had lower fidelity (Neuman 2004; sec. 1, para. 10-1). While catalogues proved profitable,

they did not address the long-term growth concerns of the industry. As *Billboard*'s West Coast Bureau Chief Melinda Neuman explained:

> Well, one of the absolute best and one of the absolute worst things that can happen to the music industry is when a new configuration comes along. Because what happens is as you move to penetration in households, everyone starts to buy the album that they had on vinyl, in this case, on CD.
>
> So you have a rush of money coming into the labels because people are buying things that they already had on vinyl. They want to buy them on CD. And in a way, it's great for the industry, but it's not reflective of selling new artists. It's not reflective of record growth in terms of breaking new artists instead of in terms of artists sustaining. It's kind of a false indicator. I mean, it's money, and it spins [sic] like money, but you can't really predicate your books on how long something like that's going to last and use it as a trendsetter. (Newman 2004; sec. 1, para. 8-9).[118]

Major labels were also helped in the early 1990s by the emergence of hip-hop and grunge. Like the underground scene of 1960s San Francisco, Seattle hosted a number of artists--e.g. Nirvana, Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, etc.--that were either unsigned, or had done well regionally on small, independent labels. In the rush to recruit these bands, and others that could fit desirable markets, the majors followed an expected pattern of formulaic imitation. The industry's reaction to hip-hop, however was more complex, and involved not only formulaic imitation, but template creation.

Hip-hop had developed such underground stars as Fab Five Freddy and Afrika Bombaata during the late-1970s. Sugarhill Records, a small unaffiliated label founded by

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[118]The prices for CDs were also inflated, and that too contributed to the increase in profits. In 2004, I, along with thousands of other plaintiffs, received $17.36 in settlement of a class-action suit brought against the major labels for overpricing their CDs.

former pop star Sylvia Robinson, charted the first rap single in the fall of 1979. "Rapper's Delight," by the Sugarhill Gang, peaked at position number thirty-nine on the *Billboard* charts and subsequently introduced the rap sound internationally. With industry expectation of disco still high at this point, rap's association with dance music seemed to benefit it, at first. But after disco's sharp decline, major label interest in the music waned for most of the 1980s.

Major label interest in rap would remain minimal until Russell Simmons and other impresarios demonstrated the commercial viability of the genre (Touré 2004; sec. 1, para. 35). The television series *Yo! MTV Raps*, debuting in 1990, heralded a substantial industry acceptance of rap similar to that of post-Monterey rock. Furthermore, the emerging stardom of such white rap stars as the Beastie Boys, Vanilla Ice and Marky Mark indicated crossover potential. Major labels began to acquire either rap artists, or previously-unaffiliated independent labels that featured the music. Jive Records became a part of the Bertelsmann Group (RCA), while Def Jam found distributorship alternately through Columbia/Sony and MCA. The owners of Capitol-EMI formed a separate label, SBK, to promote a number of diverse artists, including Vanilla Ice and Technotronic, another rap act.

Rolling Stone Contributing Editor Touré felt that the eleven-year gap between "Rapper's Delight" and *Yo! MTV* Raps illustrated a short sightedness on the part of a predominantly European and Euro-American controlled industry (ibid.). Like the 1960s soul market, which relied on social networks that developed independently of the majors, 1980s hip-hop did not entice mainstream music executives, for they were at a loss on how to implement appropriate standards until the early-1990s:

> In the '80s, the record industry didn't really know how to market hip-hop, didn't know how to control it. So there really seemed to be this sort of creativity that was allowed. You could do whatever you wanted because it was like, 'We don't know why this succeeds and that doesn't, so y'all just record. And go. And we'll figure it out later.'
>
> Certain records came and exploded, and certain records didn't. But then by the late '80s, early '90s, it started to be like, 'Hey we kind of know how to shape this and mold this.' And by the mid-'90s you really start getting really packaged and processed people, and corporate things. And now you have, in the 2000s, you have lots of really corporatized, slick things. And the old school fans are like, 'Eww. It's not hip-hop.' (Touré 2004; sec. 1, para. 37-8).

Both hip-hop and grunge infused the record industry with much-needed capital. More important, they appealed to a new youth generation, who did not grow up with the stars of the 1960s and 1970s. As did their 1960s counterparts, 1990s teens had a fair amount of disposable income. Yet, as Touré noted above, the record industry's desire to control rap occurred during the "mid-'90s," thus coinciding with the peak of record sales. Starting in 1995, *Rolling Stone* reported "soft industry sales" (Boehlert 1998; sec. 1, para. 1). Although profits did not decline, their rate of growth slowed to 7% by 1997, and even that gain was largely due to the runaway success of Elton John's "Candle in the Wind 1997," a tribute to the recently deceased Diana Spencer that induced listeners to swell records stores to buy that and other CDs (ibid.). By the turn of the century, profits began to decline. From 2001-2004, gross sales fell 30%, from $40 billion to $28 billion (Newman 2004; sec. 1, para. 25). During this time, *Billboard* charts depicted a "very rapid rate of turnover" in top selling albums, which implied that artists had more

difficulty gaining "traction" with their audiences (Newman 2004; sec. 1, para. 34).[119] From 2001 to 2003, *Billboard* published 277 articles on record industry layoffs alone (Bernoff 2005).

Interscope Records, at the time a jointly owned subsidiary of both MCA and WEA, emerged as one of the few labels posting impressive profits between 1995-1997. In 1997, when asked by *Rolling Stone* reporter David Wild the secret of their success, Jimmy Iovine, one of the label's two chiefs, replied that he and partner Ted Field endeavored to be more like Ahmet Ertegun and other 1950s label heads, who were, first and foremost, record men, as opposed to the "marketing types" that had come to dominate other labels (Wild 1997; sec. 1, para. 13). Wild illustrated the difference between "record man" Iovine and other, more professional label heads by describing a meeting of the senior staff with the manager of the band Nine Inch Nails:

> The staffers are pondering what to do about the leak of "The Perfect Drug," the group's new single on the *Lost Highway* soundtrack. Somehow the song has ended up on the Internet, and there's talk that its release date should be pushed up. But when Nine Inch Nails manager and Nothing Records chief John Malm weighs in by phone, he suggests that Interscope should stay the course. [Interscope A&R chief Tom] Whalley goes with Malm's wishes, and his decision is one secret to Interscope's success: Call it The Band Knows Best. (Wild 1997; sec. 1, para. 18).

[119]Michael Williams, Danny Goldberg, Harold Vogel and Melinda Newman all mention the enormous energy record labels devoted to singles and their video releases. One could speculate that the hype surrounding a specific song, and the ubiquity of that song on Clear Channels and MTV might result in an audience that is less willing to spend the time necessary to warm up to the inner tracks on a CD, hence the high turnover in charts.

Although Wild paints a rather rosy picture of Interscope Records, his clear enthusiasm for the label would seem, in later years, to have some merit since Eminem, Dr. Dre, 50 Cent and other Interscope artists have continued to post solid sales figures through 2006, some nine years later. Nevertheless, the company's success is only of secondary importance here. Of primary importance is that Wild described the company's business culture as anomalous to the music industry of the mid-1990s. Compared to its competitors, Interscope allowed for greater artist autonomy, and maintained closer ties to its musicians. After 1995, some artists and artist managers would not only envy the Interscope approach to music production and dissemination, but also link the misfortunes of the industry to the inability of most major and dependent labels to institute business models similar to Interscope's. When asked, "Can the accountants and the lawyers and whoever runs these companies, actually recognize good music when they hear it?" artist manager Michael Williams replied:

> No. We're run by corporations now. We have accountants running two of the four majors right now and they don't get it. It's a numbers game. And music has always been a feelings game….
>
> You can't tell an accountant that, 'This record feels good to me. I need to stay after it for a minute until it breaks.' He doesn't get it. Because he's looking, "'Well the charts say, or the numbers say it just doesn't make any sense. We're going to lose money. It's going to be diminished returns.'….
>
> There's so many bands that have become successful in their second, third or fourth project that would never get to that point. And that's the problem we're having right now, in that labels are being run in such an accounting firm way, there's going to be a lot of bands that never get to the opportunity to have a second, or to get on the road, or to shoot a video, get a visual, get that one crack that they need

at it. (Michael Williams 2004; sec. 1, para. 54-6).

Williams, Touré, and others quoted in this chapter describe a popular music industry in which major record labels and radio conglomerates understood music more in terms of a product than as artistic expression. Radio industry consolidation intensified this trend as marketing issues came to the fore for both in the late-1990s. For record and radio companies, the primary goal was not to make the best music possible for distribution and promotion. They preferred instead to match products with consumers, and maintain greater control over the specific listener demographics that each had carved out for themselves.

Popular Music and Radio Consolidation

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 helped Clear Channel and similar companies exert unprecedented control over popular music. Because of their high percentages of individual market shares, and the record industry's reliance on them, radio conglomerates wielded unprecedented leverage in determining what got on the air. Radio companies began to reorganize, moving control away from local stations and more toward top corporate management. Conglomerates also sought to rationalize marketing further by differentiating listeners within the same demographic, in effect forging new demographics where there once was only one. After discovering loopholes in existing payola laws, and testing the viability of legal payola systems starting in 1998, Clear Channel and similar businesses began to view record labels as potential revenue sources.

In the 1950s, Alan Freed and other disc jockeys exercised considerable judgment about what songs to play over the air. During the mid-1980s, the musical authority of DJs had almost completely transferred to the music directors of individual stations. After 1996, however, the business model of radio conglomerates gradually changed these functions at local radio stations, which aired songs according to playlists generated by more senior management, most notably regional programming directors who oversaw the music played on a number of different stations. The change in MD function occurred quickly. As MCA Promotions VP David Haley noted:

> I am finding there is a big difference from just two years ago and a major difference from five years ago . . . I feel like people have less decision-making capability at this point. It's going more to group PDs, consultants, even in some cases committees. (Haley, quoted by Stark 1999; sec. 1, para. 6).

Haley and other record label executives expressed frustration at their inability to connect with radio personnel. MDs still existed, but their roles transformed dramatically from developing playlists to finding songs offering promotional opportunities (Stark 1999; sec. 1, para. 5). In a 1999 *Billboard* article reporting on the change of MD duties, Contributing Editor Phyllis Stark duly mentioned that although fast, the transformation was not complete. She named a number of MDs who still functioned as such, among them KMPS's (Seattle) Tony Thomas and WRKZ's (Harrisburg) Dandelion (Stark 199; sec. 3, para. 3-4). Stark also named KZLA's (Los Angeles) Mandy McCormick, KSOP's (Salt Lake City) Debby Turpin, WKLB's (Boston) Ginny Rogers and others as music directors who were thriving within the new system by effectively asserting their

programming savvy in order to maintain some say-so in determining playlists (Stark 199, sec. 1, para. 11). Nevertheless, she found a "surprising number" of MDs who agreed with Haley and other record executives that musical directors had been reduced to mere "hood ornaments," among them KJJY's (Des Moines) Eddie Hatfield:

> The scary thing that I seem to see is a programming totally taken away from anyone local. A list is faxed [that says], 'Here are your adds for this week.' In that case, the PD [programming director] might have some power, but the MD is now just a title on a business card and a 'speed bump' for the label reps to have to go through to get to the PD. (Hatfield, quoted by Stark 1999; sec. 3, para. 8).

Another move made by radio stations again concentrated programming decisions to top management. Throughout the 1990s, radio stations relied on such outside consulting firms as McVay Media to determine musical content appropriate for the station's format. The conglomerates, Clear Channel, in particular, began to terminate contracts with smaller independent firms, and replaced their services with personnel lured from top consultancies, especially consultancies that they themselves owned (Dana Hall et al 1999: sec 1, para 4, sec. 2, para 1).[120] Radio companies then began to take measures to ensure that virtually all consultation on musical matters occurred in-house, even if the outside firm (especially if owned by a rival conglomerate) previously under contract had done a stellar job. As McVay President Mike McVay related, the move to in-house consulting became "an emotional roller coaster. We've been replaced at some stations

[120]Jacor, for example, had a financial interest in McVay Media, which then became part of Clear Channel after the merger. Steve Crumbley, Dave Popovich, Dennis Constantine and other top PDs all took jobs with Clear Channel from other firms (Dana Hall et al 1999; sec. 2, para. 1).

where we were clearly helping; fired from other stations where we were No. 1 in all of the target demos" (McVay quoted by Hall et al 1999; sec. 2, para. 2). In such cases, the radio company clearly valued control of the service over the success of its individual stations. Steve Warren and other consultants began to voice concern that total control of programming by an elite few within corporate radio could lead to homogeneous formats featuring nearly identical playlists:

> Right now, it seems a lot of the consolidators are trying the obvious–hiring top-notch talent for their various formats and letting those people become in-house consultants. In some cases it will work out just fine. In other cases it won't. It takes a lot of focus and the ability to compartmentalize to handle a lot of stations and still help them each maintain their own unique personality. When some of the groups see that their group PD is giving them a plastic, cookie-cutter kind of station, they'll rethink it and get some help for their PD. (Warren quoted by Dana Hall et al 1999; sec. 2, para. 4).

Whether or not company policies have determined musical content on radio is debatable. In 1999, for example, Entercom announced a ban on songs containing lyrics that the company deemed violent (Saxe & Schiffman 1999; sec. 1, para. 1). Although Vice President of Programming Jack Donlevie declared that a "number of songs" had been pulled from rotation because of the change in policy, PD Curtiss Johnson insisted that he could find no significant changes in either station, or any others in the Entercom group (Saxe & Schiffman 1999; sec. 1, para. 4). Ironically, the only two songs affected by the policy--Toad the Wet Sprocket's "Hold Her Down," and Everlast's "What It's Like"--contained anti-violent lyrics (Saxe & Schiffman 1999; sec. 2, para. 1-2).

In another instance, rumors abounded in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center that Clear Channel banned approximately 150 songs, many of them pacifist in lyrical content, from their airwaves. According to company spokesperson Pam Taylor, however, Clear Channel PDs spoke to the senior vice president of programming in order to discuss songs that might seem inappropriate, but denied that the company issued a ban on content saying, "There was never a mandate that these songs could not be played" (Taylor quoted by Graybow 2001; sec. 1, para. 3). An independent investigation by Broadcast Data Systems indeed concluded that the songs on the list did not receive any less airplay during the following month except for Drowning Pool's "Bodies," which had been pulled by virtually all radio stations across the US (Graybow 2001; sec. 1, para. 5,7).[121] Nevertheless, news of the list spread across the Internet literally within hours of its compilation. Thus, one might wonder if the company may have balked on implementing a ban due to negative public reaction to something that appeared to be censorship in the making.[122] Whether the songs actually faced exclusion or not, the incident demonstrated a desire of central management to directly influence local programming decisions.

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[121]I recall hearing at least two songs from the list, John Lennon's "Imagine" and Buffalo Springfield's "For What It's Worth" on Clear Channel stations in the weeks immediately following 9/11, making Broadcast Data System's claim seem credible.

[122]One could further speculate that despite the lack of a specific "mandate," one or more of the PDs polled might have understood the list as an order not to play certain songs, and subsequently leaked it to the public, hoping that the outcry might deter the implementation of an actual ban. After all, the list had to come from someone who knew of its existence.

A more powerful method of influencing programming had already come into being several years before the turn of the century. A number of changes had occurred between 1979 and 1987 that could make payola cheaper, more viable, and most important, legal. Mark Fowler, who headed the FCC during the Reagan administration, hinted that the drive toward deregulating media had government support when he compared media items to household appliances.[123] In television, the effects of Reagan-era deregulation became clear by 1990, with a growing number of infomercials, and entertainment programs that were, in effect, thirty or sixty minute advertisements.[124] Such programming did not occur in radio, however, and perhaps would not have been feasible, for there were numerous radio station owners in key markets, and negotiating deals for each and every one of them might have been unwieldy.

Since 1987, when the problems with independent promotion came to public attention, both the record and radio industries explored means to enjoy the effects of payola without the legal risks it imposed. They experimented with a policy that allowed individual program directors to take consultancy positions with independent promotions companies (DiMartino 1988, 86). After 1996, shareholder pressure led conglomerates to pursue as many revenue streams as possible, which meant cutting out the middle-man independent promoter, and seeking money more directly from the labels (Carter et al

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[123]Claiming that media companies are no different than any other industries, and thus have every right for less restriction, Fowler allegedly referred to television sets as "toasters with pictures."

[124]Programming tied to merchandising became especially attractive to toy manufacturers, who developed cartoons around their products (e.g., *Strawberry Shortcake*, *The Super Mario Brothers Show*, etc.).

1997; sec. 1, para. 4). Yet, no one prepared to transfer the television infomercial format to radio until Infinity/CBS announced in December of 1997 that it would launch a chain-wide, hour-long country and western advertising slot, during which record labels could purchase time for promotion (Carter et al 1997; sec. 1, para. 1). Some radio executives believed that compelling record labels to share their risk in promoting new artists was a good idea. As John Bradley, of consultancy firm SBR Radio, remarked, "I'm surprised it's been this long in coming, that stations haven't approached the labels with this concept" (Bradley, quoted by Carter et al 1997; sec. 1, para. 7).

Early observations indicated that financial incentives to radio stations, in exchange for a guaranteed number of record spins, promoted effectively and efficiently. Tom Poleman, PD for Chancellor station WHTZ (New York) defended the practice, explaining, "It's not just a spins commitment from us; we're also acting as marketing partners on the project" (Poleman, quoted by Taylor et al 1998 "Paid Play"; sec. 3, para. 2). WHTZ's 300 spins of the Aerosmith song "Pink" in anticipation of a 1997 Christmas concert contributed to a 94% spike in Aerosmith album sales in the New York area (Taylor et al 1998 "Pay-for-Play Sparks"; sec. 3, para. 3).[125] Charlie Walk, VP of Pop Promotions for Columbia, Aerosmith's label, proclaimed the company's pleasure at the

[125]Because the spins were tied to an agreement with Chancellor's concert promotions division, industry observers did not, at the time, consider them to be a direct pay-for-play situation, but rather a case where Chancellor helped one of its own divisions through its radio stations (Schiffman & Taylor 1998; sec. 1, para 1). The subtle difference between payments to promote a band, as opposed to payments to a concert promotions company that also owned a critical radio station illustrate the tentativeness of the radio and record industry's decision to embark on a pay-for-play strategy, for they tested the legal waters before committing.

result of the increased exposure, declaring, “We consider this a wildly successful venture” (Walk, quoted by Taylor et al “Pay-for-Play”; sec. 3, para 4).

Another promotions strategy developed by programmers during 1997, play-for-say (P4S) or back-announcing, also blurred the line between payola and aggressive marketing. A play-for-say agreement between a label and a radio company would require the disc jockey to recite a short (about ten seconds) promotional blurb at the end of each promoted song. Naturally, the more times a station played the song, the more opportunity arose for back-announcing, resulting in more spins for the record label, and more money for the radio station, with a price ranging from $14,700 to $19,600 per spot (Taylor et al 1998 “Paid Play”; sec. 1, para. 11). Again, radio companies depicted the development as a “win/win” situation, with both stations and labels getting more of what they wanted (Taylor et al 1998 “Paid Play”; sec. 4). Atlantic Records Promotions VP Danny Buch, for one, thought that pay-for-say could be a particularly good idea if the label could craft back-announcements that were emotionally appealing (Taylor et al 1998 “Paid Play”; sec. 6, para. 4). Some observers, however, felt that pay-for-say foreshadowed the eventual institution of quasi-legal payola. KZLA (Los Angeles) PD John Sebastian said, “I’m worried about the Pandora’s box being opened a little bit. The crack opens, and we go all the way to pay-for-play” (Sebastian quoted by Taylor et al 1998”Paid Play”; sec. 6, para. 5).

Some record executives were less than enthused by the institution of direct payment policies because they feared P4P might expand beyond individual, hour-long slots. Virgin R&B Promotions VP Dwight Bibbs griped, “It’s [paid promotion] another form of trying to water down the premise of payola” (Bibbs quoted by Carter et al 1997;

sec. 3, para. 1). “I think it’s dangerous for any broadcaster to look at record companies as potential profit centers,” added Bob Catania, who headed promotions at Geffen (Catania quoted by Carter et al 1997; sec. 3, para. 3). Labels were generally concerned about the negative effect pay-for-play would have on their promotions departments. They were more even concerned that open payola would drive up promotional costs, and leave record labels at the mercy of radio corporations. As Geffen rock promotions chief Warren Christensen told *Billboard*:

> The bottom line is the cost of doing business is at an all-time extreme high….record companies are not making enough money to support it….Our financial department is shocked [at] how our costs are going up. We’re going to have to come up with other avenues for working records outside of radio. (Christensen quoted by Carter et al 1997, sec. 3, para. 2)

Before Infinity could launch its program, a smaller corporation, American Radio Systems (ARS) made direct play-for-pay a reality in a deal with Interscope to play the Limp Bizkit song “Counterfeit” fifty times on one of its stations, KUFO (Portland, OR), in January of 1998 (Schiffman & Taylor 1998; sec. 1, para. 1). Almost immediately, the record industry questioned the ramifications of the directly paid spin on their business. On one hand, some labels worried that paying radio stations directly for airplay would further inflate “spiraling” promotional costs. On the other hand, the practice might finally eliminate the labels’ reliance upon independent promoters, who required up-front payments without guarantee of airplay (Taylor et al 1998 “Pay-for-Play Sparks”; sec. 1, para. 2). KUFO PD Dave Numme justified the station’s new policy by pointing out a station’s risk when playing new artists at the expense of other artists who had

demonstrated reliable listener interest. Rykodisc Records President Don Rose expressed enthusiastic support for the prospect of directly paying radio companies in exchange for a promise to play a song over the air:

> If I had the opportunity to bet on my song, right now I've got to put money on the table, and it may or may not get played
>
> If I had an opportunity to actually put he money on the table and let it get out there and let the consumer decide, to me that's more attractive than allowing the system to decide. (Rose Quoted by Taylor et al 1998 "Pay-for-Play Sparks"; sec. 2, para. 3-4)

Because of radio consolidation, record companies did not have to lobby individual stations. Labels could instead streamline their promotional efforts by dealing with a few corporations representing thousands of stations. Nevertheless, the high percentage of conglomerate-owned music stations might have daunted some label heads. Before consolidation, if an independent or in-house promoter could not find airplay on one station, he or she could simply approach the next. Because of radio consolidation, which in some cases led radio corporations to buy up stations for as much as seventeen times their projected cash flow, a "no" from one station could actually apply to a block of stations within a desired market (Taylor et al 1998 "Paid Play"; sec. 3, para. 1). Additionally, record labels worried that radio companies would someday request payment for airplay for all songs. As WAAF (Boston) PD Dave Douglas explained, a pay-for-play system might not work if a label had enough play on the station's normal rotation to forego spending even more money for paid air spins:

> I don't think you can have it both ways….If the labels are providing talent for shows, I don't see how you're going to

> also get money on a pay-to-play basis for the same act. I think stations will have to make a choice in most cases. It all boils down to how important it is to the label. They're the ones with the money (Douglas quoted by Taylor et al 1998 "Pay-for-Play Sparks"; sec. 3, para. 5)

By May of 1998, all facets of the music industry began to realize that direct-payment opportunities made available by radio consolidation had led to a shift in the structure of the relationship between record companies, radio corporations and publishing firms (ibid.). What also changed with pay-for-play was the relationship between independent promoter and others within the music industry. Because pay-for-play and play-for-say agreements were between labels and radio companies, independent promoters, who for the previous twenty years had served as the critical liaison between the two, faced leaner times. The rest of the industry felt indifferently about their possible demise. At their 1999 convention, the National Association of Broadcasters conducted a panel on IPs titled "Independent Promoter: Friend or Foe?" During the presentation, some of the panelists–including M. Scott Johnson of the Garden, Carton & Douglas law firm, and Def Jam executive Steve Ellis--spoke only briefly about the current state of independent promotion, and instead focused their attention on the mechanics of pay-for-play ("Indie Promoter Panel Brings up Pay-for-Play" 1999; sec. 1, para. 1-2). Although the subject at hand was independent promotion, the constant reference to direct pay for spins hinted at the growing irrelevance of IP.

In January of 1999, Senator Paul Wellstone and Representative John Conyers formally asked the Federal Communications Commission to investigate the potential illegality of pay-for-play and pay-for-say (Saxe & Silberman 1999; sec. 1, para. 2). The

Congressmen were concerned about direct payment from labels, such as had occurred with A&M's $237,000 deal with Chancellor (Saxe & Silberman 1999; sec. 1, para. 7). They were also concerned about the new role that independent promoters had adopted as brokers for pay-for-play agreements.[126] Eleven months later, the FCC investigation led to the convictions of Fonovisa Promotions VP Gilberto Moreno and President Guilermo Santiso on federal payola charges, and an ongoing Department of Justice investigation of eighty program directors at Spanish-language stations (Saxe 1999 "U.S. Payola"; sec. 1, para. 3,5).[127]

Yet, eight months earlier, in March of 1999, the FCC approved the general practice of pay-for-play amid rumors of an ongoing investigation targeting Chancellor and Emmis Broadcasting (Saxe 1999 "FCC Green-Lights"; sec. 1, para. 2). FCC enforcement chief Charles Kelley told interviewers that A&M's deal with Chancellor was never investigated (Saxe 1999 "FCC Green-Lights"; sec. 2, para. 6). Moreover, Kelley's review of a brokerage deal between Cumulus Media and McClusky & Associates never advanced beyond preliminary stages (Saxe 1999 "FCC Green-Lights"; sec. 1, para. 4). In response to the rumors against Chancellor and Emmis, FCC spokesperson Rosemary Kimball stated, "There is nothing going on here" (Kimball quoted by Saxe 1999 "FCC Green-Lights; sec. 1, para. 2).

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[126]In these agreements, the independent promoter paid a retainer to the radio stations, and were subsequently reimbursed and paid by the labels.

[127]Moreno was sentenced to two years probation and a $50,000 fine. Santiso received two years probation and a $200,000 fine. Fonovision's parent company Groupo Televisa was fined $700,000 for falsifying promotional expenses to the Internal Revenue Service (Saxe 1999; sec. 1, para 3,5).

In 2001, Clear Channel radio head Randy Michaels confirmed the fears of many label executives when he announced that his company would seek to increase revenues from record companies (Saxe 2001; sec. 1, para. 1). Michaels announced no immediate plan of action as Clear Channel renewed its contract with promoter Jeff McClusky. At the same time, however, Michaels stated Clear Channel's long-term intention to expand pay-for-play programming beyond its hour-long format, and extend direct-payment programming on a nationwide basis (Saxe 2001; sec. 1, para. 3-5). Furthermore, Clear Channel would offer pay-for-say spots during its paid-programming shows at the reduced rate of $1,000 per announcement (Saxe 2001; sec. 1, para 8). Although top IPs could still find work within the music industry as deal brokers, tipsheet compilers, or consultants, the opportunities for independent promoters continued to dwindle due to the growth of paid-programming.

Independent promoters began to service a new clientele who could not afford pay-for-pay: small independent labels. Yet the efficacy of small label independent promotion became virtually non-existent after another IP scandal broke in 2002. In March of that year, conglomerate Radio One signed an exclusivity deal with one of the top-tier independent promoters, the Ventura Media Group, because of the expense and illegality of alleged payola and kickbacks supposedly perpetrated by lone independent promoters and small independent promotions firms (Dana Hall 2002; sec. 1, para 1). Radio One COO Mary Catherine Sneed defended freezing out smaller IPs, telling a *Los Angeles Times* interviewer:

> The way it works now at [R&B] radio is that [independent promoters] give cash under the table to the program director at the station and then kick back money to the vice president of promotion at the record label. It's not legal. We can't operate like that. (Sneed quoted by Dana Hall 2002; sec. 1, para. 1)[128]

Despite a public promise by many of the radio conglomerates to limit their independent promotion to exclusive deals with reputable companies, politicians expressed doubt that paid-programming differed in any way from outright payola, and subsequently decided to pressure the radio conglomerates directly. Joining Representative Conyers were Senators John McCain and Orrin Hatch, who ultimately, according COO John Hogan, convinced Clear Channel to ban the use of independent promoters completely (Dana Hall 2002; sec. 1, para. 2; Stark 2003; sec. 2, para. 3-4). Because of Clear Channel's dominance in popular music radio programming, and because of the possibility that other conglomerates would follow suit, small independent labels found themselves at, what *Billboard* writer Phyllis Stark referred to as "a bad moment" (Stark 2003; sec. 3, para. 1).

In October of 2004, New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer began an investigation to see whether or not pay-for-play violated any state payola statutes, since it apparently did not violate federal laws (Werde 2004; sec. 1, para. 3). The targets of the

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[128]The stereotype depicting smaller IP firms as both unreliable and dishonest would help companies break previous deals with some independent promoters, so that they could forge contracts with larger, more powerful IP companies. In one instance occurring in 2004, Universal/MCA refused to pay two independent promoters, John Grossman and Lisa Welf, because the company insisted that they had sent them fraudulent invoices for promotional merchandise (tee shirts, etc.) that never existed. Grossman and Welf considered the action a breach of contract, and subsequently sued Universal for reinstatement of services and/or compensation (Butler 2005; sec. 1, para. 2).

investigation were comprised of the four remaining major labels: Sony-BMG, WEA, EMI, and Universal/MCA (Werde 2004; sec. 1, para. 1). In August of 2005, Spitzer convinced Sony-BMG to stop pay-for-play in New York. The label also agreed to pony up $10 million dollars to nonprofit companies as a conciliatory measure (Walk 2005; sec. 1, para. 1). In December of that year, WEA settled with the Attorney General for a $5 million donation to nonprofits, and a promise to stop future direct-payment policies in his state ("WMG Settles Payola Suit" 2005, 30).

Although radio conglomerates could guarantee exposure for a single, they could not promise that the public would enthusiastically purchase the song. Even worse, the youth market showed increasing reluctance to purchase albums, which for the past forty years had been the record industry's chief money-makers. After 2000, record sales declined yearly, prompting radio and record executives to scratch their collective heads trying to figure out what went wrong. Napster and other P2P sites became easy scapegoats for sagging profits.[129]

To some extent, the blame directed at P2P sites seemed reasonable. In the summer of 2004, after nearly 3,000 listeners were sued by the major labels for copyright infringement for downloading mp3 files onto their computers, Big Champagne, an Atlanta-based research firm, reported ever-growing numbers of listeners (ten million in all) still downloading illegally from P2P sites (Karr, Vogel et al 2004). The labels had

[129]A peer-to-peer system differs from a regular Internet connection in that the data traffic does not flow in the same venue as normal, everyday surfing, but to a secondary server accessible to clients only. In other words, one could not connect to Google or any other popular sites through a P2P system, but only to other members who are using the system at that particular moment, hence the name.

already tried to discourage downloading by generating 'ghost files,' three to five megabyte mp3 files devoid of content, but rumors abounded that record companies were considering loading their ghost files with devastating viruses (Touré 2004; sec. 1, para. 16-17).[130] In retrospect, the aggressive tactic of suing and publicly humiliating listeners backfired, for the sums demanded seemed excessive, especially since many of those sued were teenagers with little income: Analyst Harold Vogel observed:

> So the first thought by the record distributors when they saw the business shrinking was, 'We're going to stop these criminals out there from downloading and stealing our music for free. And we're going to put all of this effort into protective devices and lawsuits.' They will claim at the RIAA that they did the right thing with these headlines about "87-year-old grandmother sued for $50 million dollars," or "12-year-old girl owes $100 million dollars because she downloaded a thousand songs or whatever on her computer." I would say that is a horrendous public relations situation. (Vogel 2004; sec. 1, para. 68).

On the other hand, a closer examination of the downloading issue reveals that other flaws in the music industry business model were more responsible for the drop in sales. First of all, the industry mantra that every download equaled a lost sale is erroneous. Touré offered an analogy of free samples of foods given out in grocery markets to illustrate the fallacy: "[Everybody's] going to take a piece of cheese. That does not mean that everybody who took a free piece of cheese would've bought one" (Touré 2004; sec.

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[130]In November of 2005, Sony-BMG released CDs that intentionally contained 'rootkit,' a computer virus that attached to the hard drive. The company included this virus for the purpose of safeguarding against multiple CD copying for friends, and deterring users from converting songs to Mp3 or wav files. The action prompted lawsuits from the Texas Attorney General's office, and from the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) in December of 2005 (Hiatt 2005, 28-9).

1, para. 4). Secondly, the record industry was slow to adapt to Internet technology. Labels opted instead to enforce greater controls on their product. But as NPR correspondent Rick Karr noted, “One thing that I think just about everybody's agreed on is that round plastic disks of any sort, whether they very easy analog or digital [sic] are on their way out” (Karr, Barlow et al 2001). To some extent, the music industry finally began to catch on when the major labels contracted to supply Apple Computers material for downloading onto their iPod systems in 2003 (Eliscu 2003; sec. 1, para. 1). But because of credit card requirements, registration and pop-ups many listeners still went to the “pirate sites” because they were simpler to use (Touré 2004; sec. 1, para. 12).

Media analyst Josh Bernoff of Forrester Research explained that the music industry was reluctant to accept the inevitable viability of the Internet because their reactions to the new medium were not professional, but rather emotional. Instead of embracing and utilizing the technology early, they decided to ignore it. He likened the industry’s reaction to Elisabeth Kübler-Ross’s five steps of dying, especially in its denial (the feeling that “the Internet isn’t important”), anger (the desire to make examples of “those criminals”), and finally, slow acceptance (iPod). Bernoff also compared the music industry to the film industry of the 1970s, which at the time believed that VHS recording of motion pictures from television would ruin customer desire to go to a cinema and watch movies. He further noted that thirty years later, people not only attended movies, but also bought VHS and DVD recordings of theatrical releases, thus creating an important revenue stream for the movie business (Bernoff 2005).

The Internet also provided new promotional capabilities for musicians. Artists who had no label, or were signed to small independents, could gain audiences anywhere

in the world. For example, British listener Jyoti Mishra became a fan of the Seattle-based band The Juenes after downloading a song from the group's site. Speaking to NPR interviewers, Mishra recounted, "I found about [sic] their music, cause I downloaded it, I thought illegally. Turns out they'd posted it themselves, to try and get better known" (Karr, Vogel et al 2004). Added Rick Karr, "Mishra says The Jeunes are one of thousands of bands taking part in an on-line Renaissance of pop music--recording at home, and if they're lucky, gathering fans from among the millions who troll the internet looking for music" (ibid.).

Lastly, some observers opined that the industry had become so oriented to promoting singles that it neglected to develop albums with consistently compelling content. Since the rise of Music Television (MTV) in the early-1980s, major labels focused on marketing a catchy, hook-laden ditty that could be videogenically transferred onto the small screen, thus creating not only an aural come-on, but a visual one as well. Some cited the success of such bands as Duran Duran as an example of how video appeal induced labels to concentrate on photogenic personalities who could encapsulate the allure of a single on film, but might have difficulty selling records without a video.[131] One should not be surprised, after generations of singles hawking, that the listener might lose the patience necessary to familiarize herself or himself with the inner tracks of an album. Unfortunately for the industry, album sales have always been far more profitable

[131]Said Touré about the group, "The rise of MTV does allow much more marketing to come into it. I mean, Duran Duran--were they a great group? I don't think so. I mean they had some great songs. I love "Rio," I love "Girls on Film," but this is not a great group. But they were one of he first big video groups that really thrived in the MTV era because they looked good" (Touré 2004; sec. 1, para. 35).

than singles sales. Before Internet downloading, the consumer would have to purchase a $16 CD to acquire the two or three songs heard on the radio. Downloading allowed the listener the opportunity to acquire those songs online, and because the inner tracks of the album were either not of the same quality, or promoted as well, the listener might not have much interest in the rest of the album (Vogel 2004; sec. 1, para. 25)

Additionally, the major labels might have believed that downloaded singles diminished albums sales, for they were not averse to making their own singles available to disc jockeys for the purpose of producing mix-tapes, unlicensed compilations sold on street corners, and some record shops (Wang 2005). According to Oliver Wang, a writer and music historian with an interest in mix-tape culture, labels had a long standing practice of either aiding illicit usage of their own material, or ignoring their leak to an unauthorized party who would then mass produce copies for profit, for the purpose of promoting a single without resorting to paying for airtime:

> [Gladstone:] The release of these songs to people who would make mixtapes isn't, strictly speaking, legal. And yet the industry seems to participate in it, right?
>
> [Wang:] Most mixtapes are still technically illegal ones because they're not using materials that have been cleared and have been paid for. But it's an understanding between the label that if we give you this and you help promote our song, the labels are willing to look the other way.
>
> [Gladstone] But meanwhile the music industry has been waging this very vocal war against piracy. (ibid):[132]

[132]A friend of mine, a private investigator for a well-known rock artist, spent a good deal of her time tracking down the source of leaked material found on mix-tapes around the US. She had little doubt that the main source of leaked material came from the labels themselves, for the sonic fidelity featured on some mix-tapes, and the access that the record label had to them, made them her prime suspect.

Exacerbating the negative effects of a singles-driven market after the passage of the 1996 Telecom Act were attempts by the music industry to hone templates more precisely in order to rationalize marketing. By 1997, radio stations began to adopt more strictly defined rock subgenres for the purpose of separating themselves from their peers. Radio and record executives bandied about such terms as "alternative," "modern," "modern AC," "active rock," "heritage rock," and so forth with great precision in terms of semiotic meaning. Yet, radio stations, attempting to maintain a strong listenership, found themselves blurring these destinctions (Schiffman 1997; sec. 1, para. 2),[133] most likely because the differences were not so much sonic ones as they were generational, racial and gender-based. Industry codification of rock subgenres also applied to music sold within the black music market, which had been more or less broken down into "rap," "dance," "boy bands," "heritage r&b," and (plain old) "r&b," a catchall term used to describe artists that sold well to African American consumers. Performers and songs that could not fit within any category were often referred to by the generic term "pop," or by

[133]Modern rock was stereotypically used to describe artists who featured heavily distorted guitars and were of the same generation as their young listeners. Modern was basically the same, but with far less distortion, and more emphasis on vocal melodies. Active rock included similar sounds made by artists who had begun their careers in the 1960s and 1970s, but who were nevertheless continuing to produce new music. 'Heritage rock" was a euphemism for "oldies." "Alternative rock" described artists who were not as distortion-heavy as their modern rock contemporaries. "Modern AC" was a sort of catchall category, one pertaining mostly to white, often female artists who didn't fit the other categories. As WKRK (Detroit) PD John Gorman explained, "That's [modern AC's] where you're going to hear the Lilith [Fair] acts" (Gorman quoted by Schiffman 1997, sec. 2, para. 3).

the phrase "adult contemporary," if the content seemed like it might appeal to older audiences.

From 2000 on, radio stations rarely played both white and black artists, except for some heritage stations with an obvious "oldies" format (e.g., Jack), and adult contemporary stations (e.g., Lite-FMs). Stations that played across subgenres were viewed by the industry as freakish, and fans often snubbed artists who attempted to crossover into a broader category.[134] At the same time, observers noted that some listeners wanted more variety than a single-format station could provide. WLIR (Long Island, NY), WFNX (Boston) and KTCL (Denver) were among a handful of stations that programmed active, modern, alternative, and 1980s danceable rock at the turn of the century (Schiffman & Ross 2000; sec. 1, para. 3). At the same time, however, these stations balked at crossing the racial templates of popular music, playing instead predominantly white artists for a predominantly white audience (Schiffman & Ross 2000; sec. 1, para. 5). WKTU (New York) and other stations had begun experimenting with a concept termed "rhythmic top-40," a category defined by a high rotation of heavy drum kit (or, more likely, drum machine) grooves mixed in the foreground, and by limited chords and consistent rates of change, but then later found success in switching back to a straight top-40 outlet that included black, white, and Latino artists (Ross et al 2000 "A Radio"; sec. 1, para. 14-15).

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[134]Disdain for such 'crossover' artists as Shaggy and K-Ci & JoJo for selling out sometimes led to a situation where they were refused play on designated "black" stations, and instead appeared almost exclusively on top-40 stations, despite the fact that the artists had previously been categorized by most factions of the industry as "r&b" artists (Hall, Ross & Saxe 2001; sec. 1, para. 1,4).

Highly defined markets were the key to a new concept of musical diversity preferred by radio conglomerates. The credibility of the radio industry's notion of musical heterogeneity was strengthened by a 1999 study and report conducted by - Stephen Berry and Joel Waldfogel for the US National Bureau of Economic Research (Heasman 1999; sec. 1, para. 2-3). The study concluded that the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and the resultant consolidation of the radio industry, led not to less musical diversity, but more (Heasman 1999: sec 1, para. 1). The fundamental assumption made by the researchers concurred with that made by radio executives: by buying up blocks of stations, and defining the audiences into tighter niches, the conglomerates could provide separate programming content to each market. Instead of two, separately owned rival stations vying for the same listeners, and using many of the same songs or artists in order to do so, a block of stations, owned by a single company, could segregate artists by station. By eliminating competition, stations could thus cooperate with the others owned by the same parent company, and not step wantonly onto somebody else's turf. As Ralph Bernard, owner of the proprietary UK media company GWR, enthused:

> Their findings [Barry and Waldfogel's] are fascinating….They find that ownership concentration does increase programming variety, with owners positioning their stations to cover the listening market, leaving few gaps for new entrants to come into. For each owner, any overlap in audience is a waste--they are running two stations to get one listener. (Bernard, quoted by Heason 1999; sec. 1, para. 4).[135]

[135]Bernard was, at the time, lobbying the British government to adopt deregulation legislation similar to the 1996 Telecom Act in the UK, hence the importance that he attached to the study (Heasman 1999; sec. 1, para. 7).

Despite the 1999 study, and the radio companies' earlier promises of musical diversity, fans and industry critics could not believe that radio consolidation promoted musical diversity. Many, in fact, believed that consolidation hindered diversity because of the conglomerates' over-reliance upon formulaic programming. In the spring of 1998, KREV (Minneapolis) listeners protested a buyout by Capitol Cities (a Disney subsidiary), and the station's subsequent format change (Reece 1998; sec. 1, para. 2). Station personnel, and an *ad hoc* listeners' organization, the Americans for Radio Diversity (ARD), complained that Capital Cities' motives for buying their station had absolutely nothing to do with diversity. Despite its small market share, the station's programming policy actively placed upcoming and otherwise unknown artists from small independent labels into rotation. Low guitarist Alan Sparhawk lamented the change in format, noting that KREV was one of the few commercial stations that would play his band's music in that area (Reece 1998; sec. 1, para. 12). In other words, he and others were unconvinced that the elimination of the most diverse station in a market was a step necessary to create more diversity. Former KREV Program Director Kevin Cole saw the Capitol Cities buyout as a means by which to make radio more homogeneous:

> We represented a problem that wouldn't go away, and we kept the competition from owning the [modern rock] market.
>
> My problem with the Telecom Act is that it eliminates competition…and this was the perfect example of that. When you have a competitive market, everybody is working to improve their stations. And it creates an environment where creativity and quality is more at the forefront than when you have a lack of competition and there are fewer voices that control what music you hear and

> what ideas get expressed. (Cole quoted by Reece 1998; sec. 1, para. 9-10).

Others suspected that radio consolidation contributed greatly to the decline in record sales growth experienced between 1996 and 2000 (Boehlert 1998; sec. 1, para. 10). Critics voiced even greater doubt that the reasoning laid out by Clear Channel, and later by the US National Bureau of Economic Research, Ralph Bernard and other proponents of the 1996 Telecom Act took many issues into account. Despite the fact that one corporate entity might distinguish one of its stations as active rock, and another of its stations as modern rock, the programming instructions to both stations could quite likely feature a significant degree of overlap in their playlists. In some cases, the rotations of sister stations could be virtually identical. Furthermore, radio stations continued the trend toward shrinking the number of songs in rotation at any given time. Because of cyber-jockeying, the conglomerates had taken on some of the trappings of chain retail. Boehlert explained, “If a company buys two alternative-rock stations in one market, it's free to turn one into a jazz station. Or so the theory goes. But there's little evidence that that has happened. (Boehlert 1998; sec. 1, para. 11). Many agreed, among them Bad Religion front man Greg Graffin, Triplefastaction lead vocalist Wes Kidd, AFTRA Sound Recordings Director Ann Chaitovitz, and a study commissioned by the Future of Music:

> I've noticed a lot more formulaic programming. (Graffin, quoted by Boehlert 1998; sec. 1, para. 12)
>
> Everywhere I go, it's the same station, playing the same song. (Kidd, quoted by Boehlert 1998; sec. 1, para. 12).
>
> Royalty artists are a significant part of AFTRA’s membership, and radio consolidation has harmed them. The FMC study has proven what recording artists have known--

> radio consolidation has resulted in less variety of music being played on the radio, shorter playlists, homogenization of playlists, and less local music being broadcast. (Chaitovitz, quoted by the Future of Music, 2002; sec. 1, para.5)

Musicians showed particular frustration with the procedural hurdles required to gain sufficient industry attention. They also chaffed at what seemed to them a dictatorial requirement to fit into pre-determine formulas. Wrote musician David Flitner for *Rolling Stone*, "...bands are signed largely on the basis of how well they fit the criterion of sounding exactly like what's already selling. A&R executives, on the peril of dismissal, must broach no deviation" (Flitner 1997; sec. 1, para. 7).

Management of corporate-owned stations continued to insist that their business model had successfully increased diversity in terms of the number of new artists promoted on their airwaves. John Lassaman, a Capital Cities regional program director who took over the station once known as KREV, denied that only small independent stations could ensure musical homogeneity. Using his company's recent takeover of KREV as an example, he told *Billboard*, "[The ARD is] completely misinformed and misguided….[Zone 105, KREV's replacement,] not only in six months has gained a bigger audience share than the former Rev but exposed as much, if not more, new music" (Lassaman quoted by Reece 1998; sec. 1, para. 29). Gene Hobbs, a Jacor regional program director, argued that the number of markets served by radio consolidation was greater, and therefore more diverse:

> Previously when each individual market station had a separate owner, there was lots of room for duplication. . . You had three companies doing AC, two doing [top 40], and four doing rock. With consolidation, where there may be three to five owners in a market like Tampa [Fla.], you

> have seven different stations with seven different formats. (Hobbs quoted by Reece 1998; sec. 1, para. 31).

Radio conglomerates have long maintained that industry consolidation led to more musical diversity because more musical formats were now available. However, such reasoning has never taken into account the amount of overlap in those categories, or in other words, the fact that songs that fit one category could easily fit one or two others. In fact, such had become the norm. As ARD President Jeremy Wilker pointed out, "[Group owners say,] 'Gosh, if [several] stations are owned by each company, we can put something different on each one.' That doesn't explain why you can tune into almost any station and hear Chumbawamba and Jewel" (Wilker quoted by Reece 1998; sec. 1, para 34). Moreover, the argument that conglomerates played more new music than their independent counterparts is not only vague, but problematic for other reasons. A station that plays more songs from the same five featured artists may not represent much diversity, especially if, as Flitner suggests, their labels select artists for their ability to fit a pre-existing template. If one interprets the phrase "more new music" to mean more artists, then again the argument does not address the possibility that the promoted artists could be significantly homogeneous. One could argue that playing Britney Spears recordings in addition to others by Christina Aguilera and Jessica Simpson does not make the station's rotation much more diverse than if it had played Spears' records only. In fact, one could argue that a playlist sporting all three divas would diminish musical diversity, since they would occupy three times the amount of rotational space that only one of them would, thus leaving less room for other artists.

Radio Consolidation and Standardization

Radio corporations showed an interest in expansion in the late-1980s after deregulation allowed them to buy more than one station in a market, and subsequently create duopolies. They could not consolidate, however, to the extent that the record industry did over the previous decade and a half, for they were still limited by caps on the number of stations they could own, especially within a single market. The radio provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, influenced by industry lobbying, and partly written by radio companies, allowed the radio industry to coalesce around ten major players, two of which--Clear Channel and Infinity--commanded a lion's share of the stations and ad revenues. Clear Channel, in particular, demonstrated a pronounced desire to dominate popular music broadcasting and promotion by buying up or merging with other conglomerates (most notably Jacor), by expanding into concert promotions, and by taking advantage of revenue streams available from pay-for-play and pay-for-say formats. Clear Channel also sought to streamline the broadcasting process with regional feeds to multiple cities simultaneously to cut down on disc jockey and engineering expenses, and by transmitting several or more regional broadcasts in one building in order to minimize rents and support staff wages.

Clear Channel's growing size, ambition, and profitability intimidated the staffs of independently owned radio stations, who feared that saying anything critical of the company might come to haunt them if the corporate giant eventually took them over, and record executives, who, after finally being weaned from independent promotion for good, were afraid of developing a new addiction to paid-programming. For others, the company's reputation as an industry tyrant, an Orwellian Big Brother deciding for the

public what it wanted to hear, inspired open debate on the topics of musical autonomy and standardization, the latter defined here as homogeneity.

Radio corporations, musicians and listeners agreed that musical diversity was a positive thing. Yet, they could not agree on what diversity actually meant. For audiences, diversity meant being able to listen to WLIR and other such stations that refused to confine themselves to a single format, or limit their airtime to the 'hottest' stars of the moment, and expanded their playlists to include a greater variety of performers. For conglomerates, diversity meant (1) buying up different stations within a geographical region, (2) hiring a demographically representative group of employees, (3) sharply defining demographic clusters within a general market, (4) assigning each of its sister stations to program within that market, and then (5) programming content that would fit the market, whether modern, modern AC, active, heritage, hip-hop and so forth. In short, Clear Channel and its peers consistently viewed diversity in markets as diversity in music.

The honing of markets amounted to something very close to Adorno's idea of genre templates. Here, as in the past, the primary division of template was comprised of racial identification with either the performer, or other listeners.[136] Other factors such as age and gender also factored into the configuration of the two main templates, as did some musical signifiers, such as spoken word (for hip-hop), and heavy distortion (for active). More to the point, however, was the degree to which songs defined the template, and *vice versa*. The fact that the exact song categories were often debated might at first

[136]Hip hop, for example, is a genre in which the performers have always been predominantly African Americans, but whose listeners have been substantially, equally, or predominantly Euro-American at different points in its history.

glance indicate that the templates were not precisely defined as much as the radio industry would have liked for them to have been. Nevertheless, the appearance of the same song within the context of different templates informed the listener as to what the song actually was.

The existence of such tunes as Chumbawamba's "Tubthumping" in a "modern" format would link it to other songs similarly designated. Yet, the song also appeared on other charts, each carrying a presumed stylistic distinction. If played on a modern station (as it often was), one might think of "Tubthumping" as a modern song. If played on a "modern rock" station (as it often was), however, then it becomes a modern rock song that shares an identity with other modern rock tunes. The inclusion of the song within the modern category makes some sense, for like many "modern" songs "Tubthumping" features quasi-"r&b" style big beats in the drum kit, making it especially desirable for dancing. On the other hand, the song's heavily distorted rhythm guitars are a criterion for modern rock. Thus, depending on the format, one could hear the song as either "modern" or "modern rock," and in turn associate it with other songs based on whatever aspect that the format emphasizes. In such a case, Adorno might rightly point out that the format actively listens for the fan, for it determines the focus of the fan's attention, and the association of the song with others, and the artist to other musicians. By the same token, because Shaggy's 2000 rap remake of the 1968 Merilee Rush hit "Angel of the Morning," received airplay first on "pop" formats, "r&b" and other black formats did not give the recording much airplay, for they perceived the recording (and subsequently the artist) as "pop," and therefore antithetical to black music in general.

Critics charged that the conglomerates' one-size-fits-all-within-any-given-market mentality fostered listener resentment, most aptly evidenced by an initial decline in record sales growth, and ultimately signified by years-long decline in profits. While many within the music industry were quick to blame peer-to-peer providers for lower sales, the singles-oriented market of the twenty-first century, which labels were in large part responsible for because of the nature of their promotions, was what truly slowed album sales, and exacerbated the negative effects of Internet downloading. The singles themselves, the persona of the musicians as depicted in MTV-style videos, and virtually everything else promoted by dint of the airwaves resulted in a situation where fans began to feel that the remaining album cuts were not worth listening to. In 1997, Billy Gray, co-founder of Andy's, the UK's largest retail record chain, voiced concerns about the declining "quality" of inner tracks. Eight years later, artist manager Michael Williams confirmed a continuing decline of musical quality over the previous ten years:

> All too often the mediocre is hailed as genius, regardless of artistic merit or worth. Consumers' expectations are falsely raised by overhyped and overmarketed product--and they are catching on fast.
>
> With the accent on volume over quality, the result is mediocrity in music, and it's a problem that no one is keen to address. (Gray 1997; sec. 1, para, 2-3).
>
> I think one problem [leading to declining record sales] was the invention of the CD. With the CD, from vinyl to the CD, all of a sudden you had 80 minutes of space on a disk. Artistic people, if you give them 80 minutes of space, they going to try and fill 80 minutes of music. You can't always make 80 good minutes of music. Sometimes you're going to make 45 minutes of good music. 'But now I got 80 minutes, I need to do interludes, I need to do another track, or I need to do outtakes, or I need to do skits.' People just

> start filling up CDs just to fill them up. (Williams 2004; sec. 1, para. 50).

As with the record industry, behind the radio industry's standardization of formats, programming, promotion, and repertoire (most notably demonstrated in the reduction of playlist size) was the desire to exert control over business procedures. Profitability bodes well for publicly traded companies. Control over the market, coupled with a reduction of expenses, made Clear Channel a very attractive investment. Both of these aspects, however, fueled musician and fan fear that what musical autonomy they had left after record label consolidation would be wrested away by radio companies that broadcast the same exact programs to disperse geographic regions, and featured fewer songs that appeared in many different formats, thus giving the appearing of sameness. For Gray, sameness translated into a lack of quality, an encroaching "mediocrity" that threatened to reverse the sales gains attributable to the rise of rap and grunge in the early-1990s.

For Williams, one of the main reasons for mediocrity was a technology, namely the compact disc. Historically, companies have used technology to exert control over a product or service. In the case of CDs, record labels did not exercise any obvious control over musical production, although one could argue that their emergence did result in a greater control of the music consumer, who would feel compelled to convert their analog collections to digital. In other instances, however, the music industry--the record industry in particular--utilized technology in order to gain more control over the musical process so that it could be made more reliable and cheaper--especially in the case of rock and roll shortly before, and after Monterey. The mechanizing effect of technology yielded a consistency, especially in terms of sonic fidelity and quality. The mechanizing effect of

technology also played a role in the adoption and maintenance of recording and musical standards.

Chapter Seven: Technology As the Means of Standardization

Overview

Adorno's view of standardization in artistic commerce arose from his understanding of trends affecting businesses other than those within the "amusements" industry. In a sense, he extrapolated the tendencies of other industrial producers toward monopolization, and applied them to the music and motion picture industries, perhaps intuiting that if such processes occur in the manufacturing of steel, then they must also occur in making a record. At the heart of Adorno's thesis lies the industrial need for control in order to ensure the quantity and quality of output, and the delivery and consumption of goods.

In his 1975 book *Labor and Monopoly Capitol*, Harry Braverman provided numerous historical examples of employers' need to control the labor process, and the means by which they did so. In his 1986 book *The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society*, James Beniger concurs with Braverman that control of the labor force became a paramount concern for industry titans over the course of the nineteenth century, and grew in importance over the course of the twentieth. Moreover, both agreed that industrial, and later corporate heads sought, developed, and implemented technology in order to assert and maintain control over the work force. Beniger continued to state how the need to establish control over distribution and consumption became an issue as well. Both Braverman and Beniger agreed with Shoshana Zuboff, author of the 1988 book *In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future*

of Work and Power, that technological innovation changed the nature of work. Zuboff, however, went further to explain that technology affected the labor process by changing the relationship between the worker and his or her job.

While all three authors gave copious illustrations and examples of the role technology played in the implementation of standards for other industries, the issue here is whether or not their theses apply to the music industry, and if so, to what degree. The music industry's historical relationship with technology differed in some ways from that of other businesses. Such could perhaps be expected, for the music industry possesses some qualities unique to entertainment industries, and some that pertain to it alone. Consequently, some within the music industry were reluctant or sporadic in their applications of technology, while other aspects of the industry were quick to utilize the latest way to do things.

This chapter examines technology as the means by which record labels and publishers exerted control over the musical process in order to produce a reasonable amount of music that met a base criterion (or standard) of quality. The first section discusses the almost contradictory nature of the music industry's utilization of technology. Section two discusses the use of technology in the music industry as a means of resolving crises in control, confirming Beniger's thesis. Section three examines the musician as worker, and delves into the changing nature of her work, as Zuboff would suggest, courtesy of technology, specifically the computer. Section four looks at the role that technology has played in reshaping notions of art.

The Ambivalent View of Technology within the Popular Music Industry

Improvements in the fidelity of recorded sound have remained an ongoing concern since the advent of the jukebox in 1906 (Boehlert 1994, 93).[137] Utilization of technology in musical production played an even greater role during the rock era. The industry did not utilize extensive technology, however, in the distribution and sales of its products until well after rock and roll's initial mainstreaming in the 1950s. Capitol Records, for example, set up a mainframe in 1967 for administrative purposes, but it was not an extensive system, and the company kept hard copies of all data in their files anyway (Krepeck and Firestone 1986, 12). Polygram became the first company to automate fully its distribution in the fall of 1987. The Personics system, a digital software package that allowed consumers to custom-make their own albums, rose and fell between 1988-1990. SoundScan allowed retail sales to be accurately measured for the *Billboard* charts starting in 1991. During the mid-1990s, the growth of the World Wide Web enabled record companies to develop software for promotional purposes.

In order to understand the paradoxical nature of the industry's simultaneous enthusiasm for, and reluctance toward technology one must understand how its needs are both similar and dissimilar to those of other industries, and how its history shaped those needs. Before and during the rock era, record companies tended to see themselves as personality-oriented businesses, as opposed to policy-oriented businesses. The exploits of Berry Gordy, Ahmet Ertegun, Morris Levy, Goddard Lieberson, Clive Davis and many

[137]The Gabel Automatic Entertainer, a multiple-selection coin-operated phonograph with a forty-inch horn debuted that year. Earlier 'coins-in-the-slot' or 'song machines' of the 1890s played only a single selection (Boehlert 1994, 93).

others represent the legends of deals made upon strength of personality and personal connections. Despite the obvious shortcomings in oversubscribing to this point of view, the belief still maintains some credence within the industry itself, as demonstrated by the conventional wisdom given to prospective artists by such advisors as Pamela Oland, a professional songwriter and songwriting teacher:

> People in the industry are each growing in their individual fields, occasionally crossing paths, and almost always aware of each other's lateral and vertical moves. Those who form and nurture lasting relationships early on, eventually discover the joy of being able to help each other when they are in positions to do so. Those who have isolated themselves, jealously guarding their contacts and talents, find that the struggle for success and recognition virtually never ends, as they are not a part of that magical network of give-and-take trust. Being a part of that network is no accident; it is a result of how you conduct yourself from the first day you enter the field as a professional (Oland 1989: 165).

The term “professional” has a special meaning within the music industry. It does not simply describe a musician who receives pay for her services. Nor does the term necessarily denote virtuosity, although it strongly suggests an acceptable level of proficiency. Instead, ”professional” explains how one interacts with others. Within the code of professionalism is an understanding that decisions are often not made by objective criteria, but through one's own standing among his or her peers and superiors.[138]

[138]One could argue that interpersonal relationships are germane to just about any industry, and the point would be well taken by this writer. On the other hand, personal relationships within the music industry seemed to take precedence over other criteria. Part of what Michael Williams and David Crosby spoke about in passages cited earlier in this dissertation was a shift *away from* interpersonal modes of business following periods wherein the music industry became more like other industries.

For record executives, and those who wish to gain their attention, there exists a certain protocol governed by the realities of supply and demand. Songwriters and musicians sell their wares to publishers who in turn sell them to labels, who in turn sell them to the public. There are, however, more songwriters and artists than there are publishers and labels--so many more, in fact that an A&R executive could not possibly listen to and scrutinize every single query package.[139] Thus, the reliance upon contacts often acts as a type of filtering system, a need not exclusive to the music industry, but shared by all industries relating to the glamorous world of the arts--a point made by screenwriter Michael Hauge, and reiterated by Ossum Possum Records President and founder J. Dennis Wolffe:

> And in addition, if you had any notion of the quantity of absolute garbage that's floating around Hollywood between script covers, you'd never again wonder if you could compete for talent. In all my years of meetings and negotiations and interviews and seminars, I never o*nce* [author's emphasis] heard any producer or agent or star or executive say, 'We are no longer looking for good screenplays or good screenwriters'.
>
> The problem is not that there is already enough talent to meet Hollywood's needs. The difficulty you [the potential screenwriter] face is that wherever there is so much garbage, there has to be a filtering system . . .
>
> Your goal must be to penetrate that filtering system and get your work read by people (including readers) who can help launch your career (Hauge 1988: 221).

[139] A musician or group sends a query, or query package to a label in order to apply for the record company's representation. It consists of a demo, photographs, press clippings, and anything thing else that the artist feels could help draw label attention.

> I came real close to bringing back [former Ossum Possum artist] Air Supply a few years ago and got shut out through a back-stab deal. That is part of the business. I spent time at MIDEM, the Cannes International Music Festival and produced a board game based on the schmoozing that constantly goes on in the [music] business.
>
> It is not what you know in the music business, it is who you know. (Wolfe 2005; sec. 1, para 2-3)

When the mainstream music industry adopted rock and roll as a major product, the old circle of connections reluctantly gave way to a new generation. Companies had to forge different connections between artists and competitors. During the period of consolidation, new contacts formed between people representing the increasingly complex famil0y of companies within the record industry. When business operated more on a personal level, industry executives really did not exhibit a need for technology on a wide scale in the promotion, distribution and sales of new records until the old contact system became unwieldy.

Although label executives had contact with each other, they had decreasing contact with individual artists as consolidation progressed, and even less contact with the consumer. In order to bridge the distance between themselves and the public, record labels utilized myriad innovations to satisfy consumer desire for realistic sound. Still, improvements in sonic fidelity had little direct impact upon musical style. During the rock era, a number of other technologies (chronicled and described in great detail by Albin Zak in *The Poetics of Rock*) had a more direct bearing on stylistic concerns, and they were the technologies that influenced how musicians themselves made music. These were also the technologies that the record industry embraced most enthusiastically.

Why this particularly became a concern of the rock era can be partly answered by the increasing distance between performer and management. Before the mid-1950s, performers of mainstream popular music were older, vigorously trained musicians. By contrast, rock musicians were younger, most likely self-taught to a large extent, and openly resentful to authority; or at least they had to appear that way since perceived independence became one of the music's selling points. Record companies' initial inexperience with the production of rock forced them to consider how mass production of music could be made reliable and more responsive to managerial control. Later, as a code of professionalism emerged among rock musicians, technology became an instrument of standardization. This allowed procedures to become uniform and consistent.

A number of authors have discussed how business adapts to technology, especially in regard to the computer. Many of these theories shed interesting light when applied to the business surrounding musical production during the rock era. Two central themes emerge on the subject of technology: (1) the extension of control upon a labor force that seems increasingly uncontrollable; and (2) the Luddite fear of worker obsolescence. Almost always this has meant the creation of standards of conception, approach, execution, and results. For record label executives, the adoption of standards would hopefully result in consistency for a volatile product line that could incur public favor or disfavor for the most unlikely of reasons.

The prime motivation behind musical standards lay in the industry's desire for reliability. But in order to understand how the industry adopted and maintained standards during the rock era, one must examine the means by which companies accomplished this. The changing shape of the music industry during consolidation in some ways accounts

for various technological emphases that developed at one time or another. Furthermore the intensity of activity from 1955 to the present indicated a change in the relationship between business culture and the art of music.

Technical Impact on the Music Making Process: Deskilling

In order to avoid the fallacies associated with deterministic thought, one must first qualify the nature of technology's impact on musicians and their work. As stated previously, the majority of specifically music-making technologies were developed during the rock era. As to why this has been the case, one must look at the changes within the record industry over that period of time. First of all, the record industry expanded enormously, due in large part to the success of rock with an audience (i.e. teenagers, or youth) who had the economic wherewithal to consume larger quantities of the product. Part of the mainstream industry's resistance to rock, despite the music's obvious profitability, lay in the fact that expanding sales, new product design (i.e. writing new songs), the type of performance required, and the type of labor necessary to produce rock were outside of previously adapted methods of control. In this sense, one must bear in mind that once these technologies developed, they found immediate use within the production process. What this implies is that the need for a technology preceded its invention. That need, in turn, was based upon the constant changes of business and other social domains.

In western society, business and social domains have historically overlapped in the workplace. In pre-industrial times, labor schedules coincided with the dictates of the growing season. The vernal equinox and the harvest moon, signs of the passing seasons,

> also marked the beginning and end of work, which merely followed this pattern. One only planted when certain conditions were met: sufficient rain, adequate sun, absence of frost and so forth. Farm workers cultivated and harvested the year's yield when such became necessary, neither before nor after. For someone to set rigid schedules to perform such functions would have been unthinkable at the time (Ewen 1969, 56-8).

The cyclical nature of farm work changed greatly following the onset of industrialization. Unlike the seasonal work requirements of rural life, factory labor demanded a tighter, more precise conceptualization of time and work in order to produce at consistent levels. The repetition of tasks became necessary in order to keep the industrial process moving smoothly. These regular intervals had nothing to do with the natural cycles of spring and fall, but rather with the division of time into a grid-like pattern of activity. This often had the effect of usurping the worker's natural rhythm, and replacing it with one that was part of an overall mechanism, thus giving the employer an added advantage of control over the activities of each employee.

In his 1975 book *Labor and Monopoly Capital* Harry Braverman listed and analyzed the long-term effects of the historic tendency toward labor division, and its role in mechanizing the individual worker. In their review of *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, later writers introduced the term “deskilling” to indicate the limited knowledge of the overall business, and the lesser skills required by both manager and worker. Furthermore, Braverman went into some detail as to the role that technology played in the ability of employers to exert control over the specific activities of labor.

By the nineteenth century, the problems of controlling the physical movement of the labor force were addressed by employers via the emerging philosophies of industrial

psychology and scientific management espoused by Frederick Taylor. “Taylorism,” as it became known, fundamentally consisted of the division of production responsibilities between management and labor; as opposed to traditional craftwork where the individual artisan had to obtain supplies and materials, design the product, manufacture it, and then sell it. In the tayloristic workplace, labor served primarily as the “hands” that executed manufacturing, while management took care of the planning, designing and selling of the product. The change in industrial approach, according to Braverman, resulted in the shifting of control of the labor process from the worker to the company:

> A worker is under management control when subjected to [more stringent] rules, or to any of their extensions and variations. But Taylor raised the concept of control to an entirely new plane when he asserted as an *absolute necessity for adequate management the dictation to the worker of the precise manner in which work is to be performed*. That management had the right to ‘control’ labor was generally assumed before Taylor, but in practice this right usually meant only the general setting of tasks, with little direct interference in the worker’s mode of performing them. Taylor’s contribution was to overturn this practice and replace it by its opposite. Management, he insisted, could be only a limited and frustrated undertaking so long as it left to the worker any decision about the work [italics original]. (Braverman 1975, 90)

In the twentieth century, these ideas were expanded to all aspects of labor and management. An obvious example of this development is the automobile. Early on, most cars were made by hand, crafted by a mechanic who had to understand every part of the machine and how it worked. The celebrated assembly-line procedures instituted by Henry Ford in his Michigan factory represented a change in these methods. Automobile assemblers no longer had to know everything about how cars operated. They only needed

the knowledge sufficient to insert their individual parts on every car. The benefits to the company became immediately apparent, despite the fact that lower-skilled workers who formerly only assisted the craftsman, received an increase in wages: As Braverman wrote:

> It [the pay increase] gave the company a large pool of labor from which to choose and at the same time opened up new possibilities for the intensification of labor within the plants, where workers were now anxious to keep their jobs. 'The payment [increase to] five dollars a day for an eight-hour day,' Ford was to write in his autobiography, 'was one of the finest cost-cutting moves we ever made.' (Braverman 1975, 150)[140]

Technology's role in fostering managerial control over the labor process centered on its tendency to enhance the effects of action, especially in terms of what Braverman referred to as numeric control whereby "the machine process is subjected to the control of a separate unit, which receives instructions from two sources: in numerical form from an external source, and in the form of signals from monitoring devices which check the ongoing process at the point of contact between tool and worker" (Braverman 1975, 198). To illustrate the principle of numeric control, Braverman offered the example of the player piano, the rolls of which are a predetermined measurement of a pattern (tune) that is monitored by a machine capable of executing that pattern, which in this instance is realized through the coordinated action of the hammers that produced the individual notes (Braverman 1975, 197). In this process, not only is the song realized repeatedly in a

[140]Braverman earlier noted that Ford Motors greatly exaggerated the pay increase. Most of the company's workers made considerably less than five dollars per day. Nevertheless, the news of good wages for a reasonable workday had the effect of actually implementing the policy, but at a fraction of the price (Braverman 1975, 149).

virtually unchanged manner, it is rendered without the need of an actual pianist, as both the intellect and sensory motor requirements for performance are taken care of by the machine and the pianist who originally stamped the roll.

Braverman later explained how scientific management further divided office work. Taylor broke down tasks into each individual movement, and timed these movements to bolster his argument that a company could minimize typical malingering on the job by instructing the worker not only about the job, but also about the precise manner in which the employee should do the job. Taylor's adherents did the same with clerical workers, measuring (among other things), the amount of time spent getting comfortable in their chairs and opening and closing file cabinets (Braverman 1975, 321). And, as with factory work, companies could exercise more control of this aspect of the labor process by dividing tasks among office staff along various divisions: design, accounting, engineering, sales, marketing and so forth. Just as the auto manufacturer no longer needed to know everything about how a car works in order to participate in the production of an automobile, the staff charged with the intellectual functions of the labor process were only required to understand the particulars of their individual tasks.

In summary, Braverman posited that Taylorism found widespread acceptance among companies for it took control of the labor process away from the worker, and gave it to the employer. Companies benefited because they no longer had to rely on specialists who were able to drive up the price of production, and dictate the pace of production. Technology played a critical role in the shift of power between employer and employee because it standardized many of the special skills needed by the craftsman, thus rendering a reliable output that featured little deviation, and fewer chances for defect. Moreover,

since automation replicated the skill of the craftsman, technology could allow those with lesser skill to reproduce the work of the master, and at a faster rate than the master could accomplish by hand.

The concept of deskilling met resistance among some, who were quick to point out various weaknesses in Braverman's thesis. The vast majority of these critics, however, conceded that deskilling might occur in some circumstances. In a paper titled "The Deskilling Controversy," Paul Attewell described many of the points of contention, and concluded that in the case of some businesses, Braverman's theory of labor management might apply, but only if certain objections were not relevant. In addition, Attewell maintained that the process of deskilling happens neither smoothly nor uniformly. Such factors as worker opposition to technology and task division have sometimes stymied scientific management and thus retarded or halted deskilling.

Attewell referred to objections against Braverman's theory of deskilling as "countertendencies." The first of these originated in Braverman's fallacious (in Attewell's view) assumption that the employer's main motivation for incurring deskilling is that he or she saves money by eliminating work previously assigned to higher-paid skilled workers by shifting those responsibilities onto lower-paid less skilled workers. Employers could thus, theoretically, assign more skilled workers to handle many of the technical or intellectual requirements that the higher skills demanded. Attewell countered by noting that in many instances the jobs lost by high-skilled employees to lower-skilled employees were those that only bogged down the former.[141] Therefore, by assigning these

[141]Braverman, perhaps anticipating such an objection, argued against the notion that deskilling freed the craftsman from his or her more monotonous duties. While

tasks to the latter, one could argue that the skill levels required for each were actually "upgraded," or increased.

Another countertendency is that machines did not really replace workers, but rather carried out the more routine, repetitive work that belonged mostly to lower-skilled workers. Attewell maintains that this is where automation "is most successful" (Attewell 1987, 327). Citing this objection to deskilling, one could argue that the skill level required by lower-level employees is also upgraded because they are no longer involved with the most mindless elements of their former tasks.

Attewell's third countertendency challenged Braverman's assumption that time is actually saved by moving the task from worker to worker instead of the product being solely crafted by an individual, because of the amount of time it would take to set up and remove various facets of the task. Attewell argued that moving the task from worker to worker might take a comparable amount of time:

> At a certain point further division of labor ceases to be efficient: The extra time spent shifting the objects from one person to another and the problems of coordinating the production speeds of numerous workers begin to increase. (Attewell 1982, 327-8)

The final countertendency to deskilling described by Attewell lay in what he considered the false notion that cheaper workers yield lower costs. He maintained that

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admitting that there were some craftspersons--e.g., those who might have cut the pattern or formed the mold for the numerical control device--who had entered into more challenging positions once the company took the gruntwork off their hands, the number of skilled laborers needed to do such was substantially smaller than those required by the older methods. So, while deskilling might not have happened in all circumstances, it occurred far more often than not (Braverman 1975, 128-9)

more highly skilled and highly paid workers using "complex machines" have sometimes been more cost efficient than employing large numbers of lower-skilled workers to accomplish the same task, thereby increasing profit by increasing production. Once again, this would have the effect of upgrading the skill required by the workforce in order to accomplish the given task.[142]

With these tendencies and countertendencies in mind, the task here is to examine if and when the theory of deskilling is valid in assessing the application of technology as a means for standardization within the popular music industry. One must first assess where the industry exhibits tendencies toward deskilling and where it exhibits tendencies toward skill upgrading. One must also take into account the degree to which certain factors apply and how the various scenarios of standards and technology have evolved during the rock era.

The relationship between various facets of production helps to shed light on Attewell's first countertendency. Historically, those who influenced and presided over the marketing and selling of records either had limited musical backgrounds, or training in musics other than rock. Yetnikoff, Ashur and Davis came from a legal background, having attained their positions at Columbia by a series of promotions from lower-level executive positions. David Geffen, MCA's Mo Ostin, Atlantic's Ertegun, and others

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[142]As illustrated by the previously cited example of the five-dollar-a-day wage at Ford plants, Braverman seemed to be aware of this issue, and, with some qualification, agreed that wage increases could occur for some because of deskilling (Braverman 1975, 150). Aside from this, I must point out that Braverman's thesis did not really deal with levels of pay, but rather levels of skill. While one might infer that the control of the labor process might allow employers to control worker wages as well (especially in a poor job market), Braverman himself did not really equate low wages with deskilling.

approached the business from the perspective of an entrepreneur. Of course, some executives, such as Stax Records' Booker T. Jones and Steve Cropper were also accomplished musicians, but such was relatively infrequent.

As in many tayloristic models, one can see the divisions between management and labor within the record industry: the former represented by the executive factions of the industry and the latter the musicians, songwriters, engineers and technicians who actually record the music.[143] Between the two, almost as a liaison, is the producer, who must oversee the product, but is responsible to the executive, or administrative component of the company. Among labor and management further divisions of task exist. For the former there is the previously mentioned division of tasks between the musicians, songwriters, engineers and technicians; however there could also be the tasks of programming, moving equipment, writing the sheet music and other things.

Administrative tasks at large independent and major labels are often broken down into marketing, which plans the strategy for record sales; publicity, which calls attention to the individual artists on the label's roster and acts as the representative of the company to the public; promotion, which attempts to secure airplay for the record; and artistic, which creates the designs for the covers, jackets, and jewel boxes. In addition there is the artist and repertoire department (A&R), which itself is broken down into separate areas: creative and administrative. The creative elements of A&R are responsible for finding

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[143] Rock musicians were rarely labor working for a company per se, but I will argue here that many of the issues of labor begin to apply to them, especially after 1967. The American Federation of Musicians have historically dealt with the same set of issues as other laborers, including such things as benefits, vacations, retirement plans, working conditions, pay scale, and so on.

new talent in the form of artists and material, while the administrative faction focuses on the economic feasibility of signing an act.[144] There are also legal departments to handle contracts and copyright disputes as well as upper-level executives who make the final decisions on talent procurement and release schedules.

With so much division of labor, one may wonder how some degree of deskilling could not occur. However, the above is a typical example of a large major or independent label, and may not be universally applicable to all situations. Smaller companies and special situations could present countertendencies that Attewell did not mention. For example, technology might allow the songwriter to be the performer, and possibly the producer, or co-producer. Smaller companies may combine the two different responsibilities of A&R (and in the process, rely on Quicken or similar accounting software), or could utilize the same workers for both publicity and promotion. In very small companies, one, two, or several people might handle all of the above tasks. Furthermore, during the last ten years, as more and more artists make their own records and sell them independently from any label, one person could attempt all tasks of performance, recording, marketing and sales. Thus, a corollary emerges: the smaller the company, the less chance deskilling will occur.

Since 1985, the major labels and their dependents have dominated the charts, sales and profits. Therefore, the complex organization of task required in record production, and the amount of labor required to operate it as mentioned earlier, makes

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[144]In other words, administrative A&R poses such questions as "If we want to lure a big-name artist from another label to ours, can we offer them a deal that would make our company attractive, but at the same time yield an acceptable profit?"

Braverman's thesis more applicable to the larger part of the music industry (in terms of sales and profits). And in this division of labor, the upgrading of responsibilities is rare. Over the years, second-level employees have not experienced any upgrading of tasks. In fact, some executives of this tier, such as A&R people, have seen some of their responsibility diminish over the years. Gone are the days when A&R executives could sign an artist on their own initiative. At most, A&R currently functions more as a filtering mechanism, weeding out the higher-risk talent and thus presenting available and suitable musicians to the executive element, which then decides on signing. For comparison's sake, one need only recall the influence exerted by Mitch Miller in Columbia's resistance to rock in the late-1950s and early-1960s.

The actual production of music relied increasingly upon technology that simplified the work of both musicians and producers. One of the most critical innovations began in 1955, when guitarist Les Paul asked a recording machine manufacturer, Ampex, to build a specially designed magnetic tape recorder with eight aligned heads.[145] Paul and his wife Mary Ford had already achieved a degree of renown for recordings that extended the scope of a traditional duet. Their method consisted of recording a song, and then taping a second performance of the song on different parts as the original recording played in the background, and then repeating the process, known as overdubbing (Zak 2001, 10-11). What emerged from these studio sessions were recordings that sounded as though they were performed by large ensembles instead of two musicians. The process was painstaking, for it required both musicians to render meticulous performances from

[145]Paul got the idea from a standard magnetic tape recorder given to him the previous year by crooner Bing Crosby as a present (Zak 2001, 11).

start to finish. Moreover, Paul and Ford had to carefully lay out mixing strategies beforehand,[146] for once they recorded a take, they had to commit to it. If, after the six or seventh overdub, they decided that a prior balance of parts had proved inappropriate, they would have to begin the process anew. The new Ampex recorder allowed Paul and Ford to record a number of tracks, and then mix them later. The Ampex machine also had an additional advantage of minimizing the generational loss typical of recording from previously recorded material, and reducing the amount of machine noise that could accrue over subsequent takes (ibid.).

Most rock and roll musicians would continue to record live in studio, and subsequently rely on overdubbing for the remaining years of the 1950s and early1960s, but by 1965 multitrack recording had become the industry standard. Musicians and producers alike began to understand the advantages multitracking had in simplifying musical performance. Before widespread multitracking, an ensemble had to perform a complete song without significant error. Clunkers made by one musician would require all musicians to stop the recording and start again. The costs of this could prove staggering, especially in a Phil-Spector-Wall-of-Sound type production requiring many union-scale musicians, each capable of erring at any given passage. Multitracking made that scenario obsolete. If one player made a mistake in the initial recording, the other musicians remained unaffected and could continue. Thus, each individual player no longer needed to know a particular tune as intimately. The musician also did not have to have the technical ability to play all passages consistently. All other musicians could be

[146]Mixing is the process of balancing instrumental and vocal dynamics.

dismissed while the lone player made numerous attempts, or "passes," to play the song correctly. Furthermore, since there exist within the recording of any ensemble piece periods of inactivity (rests), the musician has ample opportunity to record individual sections, instead of repeatedly playing the entire composition from start to finish, regardless of the musical genre. As Masterworks Director John McClure stated in 1966 about classical music:

> Here's the dilemma. You get an extraordinarily beautiful take of a movement, but there are two or three flaws--a horn didn't quite make it, or the pizzicatti weren't together, or something. Now you go back and retake the movement, but somehow the men and the conductor can't recapture the same peak of expression. What do you do? If you're sensible and not involved in moral issues, you can fix those few mistakes in the first take with inserts from the inferior take--using as little as possible to be sure--and what you end up with is something far beyond what is normally possible at a concert. (Gould et al 1966, 53)[147]

Multi-tracking also allowed recordists to layer separate recordings of the same piece in order to provide a consistency or interpretation that the performer could not achieve in a single take. In a 1966 article he wrote for *High Fidelity*, pianist Glenn Gould praised what he called "the splendid splice" for allowing him to create a version of Bach's "Fugue in A Minor" from *Das Wohltempierte Klavier* that he could not have conceived of performing live. After performing eight takes of the piece, none of them to his liking, Gould's engineer noticed a similarity in tempo between takes six and eight. By

[147]Although speaking specifically about splicing, would have applied the process through multiracking.

splicing them together on a multitrack reel, the engineer could then fade out one performance at various points, and fade in the other (Gould et al 1966: 51-3).

The following year, 1967, John Lennon, George Martin and engineer Geoff Emerick faced a similar problem when recording the song "Strawberry Fields." Lennon had begun recording a different version of the song that the other Beatles would record the following day. On playback, however, Lennon felt that part of the version that he recorded on the previous day would better fit the corresponding passage that then existed on the recording. Unlike Gould's example, the version that Lennon wanted to insert was in a different tempo and key. Through a series of splices, speedups and overlays, Martin and Emerick were able to insert the passage, one that Lennon felt certain that he could not duplicate through other means (Zak 2001, 35-6).

The bulk of innovation has centered on the actual recording of music. The general use of multitracking in the mid-1960s gave a number of options to musicians and producers who could not reliably create a flawless rendition in a single take. Later strategies involving multitrack recording have relied on its ability to delete a single performance without affecting anything else. Often producers record what is known as a "guide track," an early performance used to help musicians recording later passes. After laying down the later tracks, the guide is either deleted, or replaced by another track. This is a helpful procedure for musicians who do not know their parts independently of others. In some cases, a performer, especially a singer, may have the technical ability to play a part, but lack the knowledge required to construct an arrangement. Another performer could then record a guide track demonstrating a potential arrangement. The original performer could subsequently copy the earlier performance, taking as many passes as

necessary to match the intonations, inflections and ornamentations found on the guide track.[148]

Multitracking represents only one of the ways in which technology minimized the required skill level of performance. Some of these technologies dealt with the instruments themselves. Often used in rock recordings, the Moog (developed in 1964) and the Minimoog (1970) synthesizers required an extensive knowledge of how to manipulate oscillator-generated waveforms by manipulating levers or other physical controls in order to produce novel or appealing sounds. Physical analog controls, however, were imprecise, and easily disturbed when moving the instrument from one place to the next. In 1978, Sequential Circuits released the Prophet-5, the first synth with a microprocessor, which made adjusting waveforms more precise and orderly. Also that year, Arp introduced the Omni, a keyboard that allowed the user to save settings digitally by the push of a button (Smith 1993, 70).

By 1980, Roland, Oberheim and other synth manufacturers had produced a number of busses (jacks) that would allow the connection between one keyboard, and another of the same brand. This might be of value for a player who wanted to perform or record two separate keyboard tracks (e.g., one consisting of an organ sound, the other

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[148]In a 1991 lawsuit, singer Yvette Marine claimed that she performed the lead vocals on two songs from Paula Abdul's *Forever Your Girl* album. Although sonic tests on the finished record indicated that only Abdul's vocals were present on the final product, Virgin Records' reluctance to produce the original master in court might suggest that a guide track, recorded by Marine, was on it. Even if the track was deleted or recorded over, a residual trace of Marine's voice would still exist. Although perhaps inaudible to the human ear, it might still be detected by a machine. The defendant, Virgin Music of America, prevailed (Schiarrino 2003; sec. 3, para. 12)

consisting of a brass sound) that are more or less identical. Realizing the benefit for synthesizer makers if they could adopt a technical standard of data sharing between musical instruments, Dave Smith, President of Sequential wrote a paper calling for universal interfacing compatibility in 1981. Roland President Ikutara Kakehashi and Tom Oberheim (of Oberheim) seriously considered Smith's request. Approaching other manufactures from June to October of 1981, Kakehashi and Oberheim urged them to collaborate to create a Universal Synthesizer Interface (USI). Over the next two years, Korg, Yamaha, Kawai and Sequential worked together to create the Musical Instrument Digital Interface (MIDI),[149] which made its commercial debut on the Roland JP-6 in 1983 (Smith 1993, 70).

Since MIDI provided a uniform protocol for the transmission of information between the microprocessors of musical instruments, the source and destination of encoding could be any microprocessor, whether it belonged to a musical instrument or a digital computer. This prompted some within the music industry to believe that digital sequential recording might eventually replace analog reel-to-reel recording ("New Digital Studio Techniques Could Threaten Tape Machines," 1984, 88). The 1984 release of the Apple Macintosh, a digital computer with a user-friendly graphic interface, paved the way for the 1985 release of Mark of the Unicorn's Professional Composer, and Professional Performer, a notation software and its companion sequencing software. Composer allowed composers, arrangers and copyists to produce clean, nearly

[149]Although an acronym, MIDI is often used as both a noun and a verb by musicians (e.g., MIDIing a patch), or as other parts of speech. The same will occur for the duration of this dissertation.

publishable quality scores and instrumental parts. With the click of a mouse, the user could transpose any part to any key. In fact, reviewers lauded the software's ease of use as its most exciting feature:

> The manual's format bears a reassuring resemblance to Apple's instruction books, with wide margins, high-gloss card stock, precise text with careful compartmentalization of ideas, and occasional screen dumps to disperse doubt. The documentation is patient with the beginner. Cut, Copy, Paste, erase by backspacing, dragging or double clicking to select music or text for copying, and size and close boxes are identical to MacWrite, so I was at home immediately. I began by writing sixteen bars of melody and left-hand piano accompaniment before opening the documentation to discover shortcuts. The ever-appreciated Undo command recovered material too hastily excised. (Raub 1986:sec. 1, para. 2).

After completing the score, Composer allowed the user to save notation as a Performer file. As a sequencing application, Performer could interpret Composer files as cues to trigger a host of MIDI instruments, from synthesizers to electronic drum kit brains. Instructing the sequencing software in the way described above (by dint of mouse, joystick, qwerty keyboard or other input devices), a method known as "step-time programming," constitutes one of the two ways in which musicians can input musical data. The second, real-time programming, occurs when the musician simply plays out various parts on a MIDI instrument in the tempo that the performer desires. The computer then assigns it to one of the sixteen available MIDI channels, and converts the signal into a binary code. In Performer, the user could save any music encoded by means of real-time programming as a Composer file, which can then print out a sheet music version of

what the musician recorded in real-time.[150] Oftentimes, engineers and producers will record a pass in real-time, and correct mistakes through step-time programming instead of re-recording specific passages.

Digidesign introduced Sound Tools, another sequencing software, in 1987, and four years later debuted the first version of Pro Tools. By 1995, Pro Tools had replaced Professional Performer and Vision as the industry standard in terms of sequencing software. By then, however, sequencing had come a long way since 1985. In 1991, the Japan MIDI Standards Committee (JMSC), comprised of leading synth manufacture representatives, issued a list of standards known as General MIDI (or GM), and required instrument makers to meet them in order to receive their endorsement. Among other things, GM standardized the velocity sensitivity for instruments.[151] GM also standardized patches and channel function.

One key problem with MIDI was in the speed of response. For drum machines, drum brains and keyboards, the response time was adequately fast--in fact, virtually instantaneous. Electric guitarists and singers, however, had a harder problem adapting to MIDI because of the considerable amount of time that MIDI took to analyze properly an

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[150]In later software, such as Vision, the notational and sequencing functions were combined into a single application.

[151]Velocity refers to how electronic musical instruments express dynamics. On an acoustic piano, for example, we might think of the difference between playing forte and pianissimo as a process of striking the keys harder or less hard. Electronic instruments, however, read the differences in dynamics as the speed by which the player strikes the key from its full upright position to the sounding point. When playing loudly, we have a tendency to get to the sounding point more quickly than we do when playing softly. Hence, dynamics are referred to as a problem not of key strength, but of velocity of keystroke.

acoustic signal (in this case, an amplified vibrating string, and the human voice). Thus a noticeable delay occurred between striking a note and actually hearing it (Schonbrun 2006; sec. 3, para. 2). Nevertheless, many guitarists wanted to experiment with synthesized sounds. Later on, guitarists also wanted to have the advantages of MIDI recording. The advent of such specially designed MIDI-interface/synthesizers as the Roland GR-30 (1997) solved these problems and paved the way for fully digital recording of guitars straight into Pro Tools or other sequencing software.

Perhaps the most important use of MIDI and digital sequencing occurred in the area of sampling. Sampling, in and of itself, was nothing new, as such popular musics as Jamaican dub often grafted previously material onto magnetic tape recordings of new performances as early as 1960. Even after the invention of such digital samplers as Computer Music Incorporated's Melodian (1972) and Farlight Instruments' Qasar M8 (1979), hip-hop and other musics that relied upon sampling continued to utilize analog technology until the mid-1980s.[152] Analog sampling required splicing and looping background tracks, but was nevertheless preferable to digital because of the latter's limited sampling rates and poor audio quality. In 1986, however, Akai debuted the S900, an affordable digital sampler that could record up to twelve seconds of sound. The following year, E-mu developed the Emulator III, which could sample in stereo.

The evolution of digital samplers paralleled that of vocal processing. Eventide pioneered the development of an analog processor, the H910, in 1975. The pitch change function available with the H910 allowed singers to harmonize with their own voice,

[152]As evident in the 1979 hit "Rapper's Delight," which utilized an analog sample of a bass passage from Chic's 1978 single "Good Times."

either live or in the studio, by assigning the original sound to one channel on the mixer, routing the voice to the H910, which could be set at any interval up to an octave above or below, and then sending the modified pitch back to another channel on the mixer for amplification and playback. Although the H910 and later harmonizers in the H9 series could help some vocalists who had difficulty singing harmony, the applications of such devices were limited (Eventide "Eventide H910"; sec. 2, para. 1). If the singer or producer wished to harmonize at the major third, for example, certain original pitches would produce modal clashes. With digital technology, however, Eventide's H3000 series (beginning in 1988) could sample vocals, and then, with the help of microprocessors, adjust the setting to mode. The H3000B (1990) went one step further by introducing a quantize feature that also used microprocessor and sampling technology to correct singer pitch mistakes to the nearest diatonic pitch (Eventide "Eventide H3000"; sec. 9, para 1). The quantize feature became a desirable one, with many musicians and producers simply referring to them as "pitchrighters."

The overall arc of musical technology from 1955 has generally been towards deskilling as some of the innovation has centered on making the performance process easier, and consequently more reliable. Innovations have also given musicians opportunities to perform material that might have exceeded their ability one or two decades earlier. Roland, for example, introduced built-in "arpeggiator" functions on some of their keyboards in 1983. As the name suggests, this function automatically arpeggiated block chords at a unified and controllable rate.[153] By the same token, such

[153]As a classically trained musician, I took great pride in playing rapid, arpeggiated passages when covering such songs as Yes' "Roundabout." So I was

synthesizers as the Arp Omni and Prophet-5 allowed a keyboardist to perform horn and string lines live or in the studio, without having to know how to play the trumpet or violin in addition to piano. Likewise, such synthesizers as the Arp Avatar (1979) allowed guitarists to play piano and drums sounds without having to learn either keys or kit. Today, such vocal processors as the V2M can instantaneously translate the singer's pitch into MIDI signals. A vocalist who can neither play instruments nor read scores can now dictate parts into a PC or Mac, while the software converts the pitch (possibly quantized, as the software has this feature as well) into instrumental parts and sheet music.

Sampling technology opened up a number of new possibilities for performing live on stage. MIDI instruments can trigger difficult vocal harmonies, for example. Sophisticated mixing consoles have the ability to send signals to every musician's monitor (a small speaker that allows the musician to hear cues from the board), without interrupting what the audience hears. The sound of a (most likely electronic) metronome (often referred to as a "click track") could be sent to the drummer to cue the proper tempo. Lip-synching, especially in repetitive parts during strenuous choreography, became easier through digital triggering.[154]

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particularly disturbed when waiting backstage to go on at The Palms, a Milwaukee club, I heard the keyboard player from the band before ours playing arpeggios at a speed and proficiency I could never hope to match. I went out to the wing to look over the keyboardist's shoulder only to see him playing block chords for long stretches of time (between eight to sixteen pulses) while his instrument did the arpeggios for him. That was my introduction to Roland's arpeggiator function.

[154]This practice, once discovered by the general audience during the early 1990s, created its own share of controversy, especially when pre-recorded lead vocals were dubbed into live performance. Some states even suggested possible legislation requiring concert promoters to disclose publicly when pre-recorded material was used in live concerts. For some concertgoers, the fact that some pre-recorded material had become

Sampling's primary strengths became apparent in the studio setting. Because the Sugarhill Gang sampled bassist Bernie Edwards and guitarist Nile Rogers for the background instrumentals of their song "Rapper's Delight," for example, the group did not have to learn how to play the bass and guitar in order to mimic the original tracks. Yet, this represented the use of analog sampling, not digital. Analog sampling required engineers and producers with exceptional ability to make clean splices, loop and dub. Such requirements add weight to one of Attewell's countertendencies, for one could easily argue that the skills of the recordist were upgraded, even though the required skills of the performer diminished. Viable digital sampling, however, minimized the required skill of the recordist as well, for by 1986 the knowledge of how to manipulate audiotape for this purpose had become obsolete.

The recordist's task has been further simplified through a number of technological innovations, which have established standards that have automated much of the critical decision-making needed to oversee production. Since 1995, Pro Tools, the industry leader in production software,[155] has steadily replaced the twenty-four track tape machine as the standard industry recording device. Available for both Macintosh and Windows, Pro Tools operation does not require a complex knowledge of how to hook up outboard

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necessary suggested a lack of musical skill on the part of the performer. These suspicions were strongly confirmed when a producer disclosed that one popular pop act, the Grammy-winning duo Milli Vanilli, had not even performed on the pre-recorded material that they presented live. Similar public outcry accompanied a 2004 Ashlee Simpson appearance on *Saturday Night Live*, in which a technical glitch exposed on live national television the fact that she had been lip-synching triggered vocals.

[155]Digidesign, the maker of Pro Tools, touts, "Pro Tools is the industry-standard audio production software," on its official website ("The World of Pro Tools" 2006; sec. 6; para. 1)

effects and returns or the ability to manipulate audiotape. Nor does it require extensive training to operate. Software designers tout the relative ease of operation with each subsequent edition as a selling point in their advertisements. Instrument critics also note how much easier each new version of the software is to use, as Mark Levine did when reviewing the latest edition of Pro Tools in May 2006:

> More busses, sends, and Memory Locations. New menu structure brings better organization, instrument tracks make adding MIDI instruments easier. Real-Time Properties offer myriad non-destructive MIDI editing options. Sample-based MIDI, Region Groups and Region Loops streamline the arranging process. (Levine 2006, 100).

Other digital technologies based on sampling and sequencing also reduced the amount of skill required to perform consistently, take-after-take, show-after-show. Recordists can now cut and paste repetitive sections (e.g., choruses) instead of having the artist perform each and every repetition. Recordists can use step-time programming to correct mistakes instead of relying on an eventually usable take. In both studio and concert hall, pitchrighters can edit intonation errors, and harmonizers can provide accompaniment for solo vocalists performing live, or studio vocalists who have difficulty singing in harmony. Offstage musicians can trigger samples of instrumental or vocal parts that the performer cannot consistently perform. Musicians who can neither read nor write music can translate instrumental passages into scores by means of a machine. Vocalists who cannot play instruments can sing passages into the computer while a MIDI converter such as the V2M translates the pitches into MIDI signals. The computer technology utilized in musical recording is quite similar to such generally familiar

applications as word processors, and often utilizes the same shortcut keys (e.g., control+v for pasting, control+c for copying).

Countertendencies to deskilling apply in some instances within the performing process. Attewell's first objection, that management saves money by eliminating higher-skilled employees, is at best problematic, however, when applied to music. Innovations in polyphonic synthesizer design allowed musicians to emulate the sounds of strings, horns, and even other instruments with greater and greater precision. One of the first uses of digital sampling, for example, was to recreate the sounds of grand pianos and other acoustic instruments. In effect, this ability would allow the keyboardist (and later the guitarist) to become a one-person orchestra. For one to say that deskilling has occurred simply because orchestration was transferred from one instrument to another would be akin to saying that it takes less skill to play a piano or guitar than it does to play a violin or a trumpet. Whether the synthesizer provides the horn and string sounds or not, the pianist or guitarist must still be able to perform on their instrument. At the same time, however, a single person performing on piano, violin and trumpet would have to have to possess far greater skill than the person who only plays the piano. Sampled instruments reduced the need for other instrumentalists, thus eliminating a number of skilled positions. Furthermore, the reduction in studio musicians did trim costs.

As for the second countertendency, the technological innovations employed were generally not those that replaced work that could be described as repetitive or mindless. This is largely due to the nature of music making, which has traditionally relied on a fair degree of repetition. Of course, popular music features a relatively higher degree of short-term repetition, but such repetition simultaneously suggests variation--something that

perhaps could be programmed into a sequencer or other machine; however, doing so would be less efficient than not using technology at all. Furthermore, the product here is still based on the western concept of artistic creation, where variation in repetition is a deliberate and critical element of expression. Hence, there is really no unimportant or mindless repetition to duplicate, and therefore no need to create machines to fulfill this particular function.[156]

Attewell's objections regarding repetition would therefore not apply to the production of popular music until more recently. Cutting and pasting repetitive parts had become a standard for dance music by 1993. The practice does streamline the recording process to a considerable degree.[157] Although musicians tended not to think of repetition as mindless before the advent of digital technology, one could make a plausible argument that they do currently, especially if they utilize sequencing to any substantial degree. Yet, one could counter that the use of this process in order to minimize repetitive musical actions does not come about because of the meaninglessness of repetition, but because it minimizes the consistency required by the individual player. After all, much of the

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[156]As a professional musician with a number of years of recording and performance experience myself, I cannot recall a single instance where one of my fellow band members complained that going into the second verse was boring or mindless, for example. However, when recording an album in Nashville, producer Bob Como pointed out to me that he could use sampling for recurrences of the refrain, and for awhile he considered that option.

[157]In June of 1996, award-winning producer Randy Muller graciously helped me with a project that we digitally recorded from start to finish. The amount of cutting and pasting involved represented, for me, a complete departure from my previous recording experience. Instead of recording an entire song all at once, or even in sections, Muller instructed me to play very small snippets, of about two to four seconds in duration each, of various song parts. Using Pro Tools, he formed loops of individual sections that he then proceeded to link together.

repetition in previous generations of rock and roll often contained significant, if sometimes subtle, variation.

Attewell's third countertendency is somewhat difficult to apply to music at all simply because the product is not something that is usually moved from place to place during creation. Unlike cars or television sets, a recording's only physical movements during the production stage come about when a master is shipped to the manufacturer for mass copying onto recording media. This division of labor has been a standard part of record-making since the inception of mass production because of the different skills required as well as the differences in facilities needed to perform these tasks. In other words, there was not a craftsman's approach encompassing these two operations, but rather each task was considered to be within the realm of two sets of craftsmen: the artist and the manufacturer.[158]

Where this countertendency can apply, however, its effects are notable. Multitracking not only simulated simultaneous performance, but contiguous performance as well. For example, in 1981 Paul McCartney and Richard Starkey (Ringo Starr) laid down tracks of the song "Ebony and Ivory" in London before shipping them to New York where Stevie Wonder completed the recording. Likewise, Parliament/Funkadelic had become legendary for beginning the recording process in Newark, NJ and then sending out the master tapes to other studios located in Cincinnati, Houston and Los

[158]Within the manufacturing process, there exist assembly-line work organizations that have their own history and evolution. However, the focus of this dissertation is upon the creation and re-creation of the initial aural experience of music, and this happens within the recording and mastering studios.

Angeles, where other members of the ensemble recorded on available tracks, or on separated tapes synchronized through Sound, Motion Picture, and Television Engineers (SMPTE) code.[159]

Obviously, Attewell's observation that time cannot be saved by physically moving the product is appropriate in the situations mentioned above. Even if shipped via overnight mail or through an overnight delivery service, the time between departure and arrival would constitute a delay of at least a day. Furthermore, utilizing the same studio for the entire project would not require major adjustments to instruments, mixing boards, amplification equipment and acoustic situations. If transported, the medium could encounter further delay for precisely the reason that Attewell said. Thus, his third countertendency would definitely apply to analog recording. Digital recording, especially that done on a Macintosh or PC would minimize transport time, since the recording could be saved as a computer file and sent from location to location instantaneously by attaching it to an e-mail. Yet, the project would not enjoy any timesaving benefits in terms of setup time, so the third countertendency would still apply in the limited instances where the product (recording) is moved from place to place.

Attewell's fourth countertendency applies to the music industry on a limited scale. During the mid-1980s, the technology of digital sampling allowed a lesser number of more highly paid musicians, who knew how to create patch libraries and set up sequencer and MIDI systems, to acquire the skills of a large and diverse group of musicians. Aerophones such as the flute and the trumpet, drums, and bowed strings were among the

[159]By 1990, MIDI synchronization had virtually phased out SEMPTE.

earliest instruments reproduced in such a fashion. Attewell's contention is that this type of labor division could be more cost efficient. Obviously, it is. A producer, or artist, would only have to pay union-scale wages (or perhaps even better-than union-scale wages) for one performance of an instrument to have access to its sound on many different recordings. However, there is some contention regarding the prospect that the MIDIist has incurred any upgrading of skill.

Taking into account the possible instances where deskilling can and cannot occur, one can see that deskilling could occur within recording.[160] In fact, examination of the history of the rock era and the history of technical innovation vis-à-vis record production provides convincing evidence that it has occurred to a significant degree. While this does not mean that virtuosity has vansished from the pop music scene (e.g., Alicia Keys), numerous examples suggest that overall the skills required of many musicians have decreased from the 1950s on, having been absorbed by the expanding control of the producer and aided by technology.

For some concertgoers, the fact that some pre-recorded material had become necessary suggested a lack of musical skill on the part of the performer. In a deeper sense, Milli Vanilli represented a further illustration of deskilling as a function of labor division (see footnote 153). After MTV necessitated the production of enticing videos with enticing young performers in order to market effectively, Charles Shaw and the other older, non-photogenic musicians who actually performed for records credited to the duo

[160]Perhaps one could extend this argument to live performance as well; but many of the techniques and technologies designed to do so were an extrapolation of recording techniques.

could hardly have expected to achieve the same level of chart and sales success. Their producer, Frank Farian, astutely realized that in order to create a hit, he had to divide labor between those who performed the music in the studio, and those who presented it to the audience. Furthermore, those who presented the song to the audience need not have possessed any musical ability at all.

The Milli Vanilli case was, of course, extreme. Yet, technological innovation has compensated, and will continue to compensate, for the weaknesses of the performer. Except for pitchrighters and other quantizable features, most of the major technologies primarily addressed the problem of inconsistency.[161] While one could patiently wait for a perfect take in the studio relatively cheaply and risk-free, live shows offered the musician only one chance at a good performance. The use of pre-recorded material, whether triggered digital samples of repetitive vocals or entirely pre-recorded tracks performed by stage personnel or others, could nevertheless minimize risks during live concerts.

Technology and Control

In his 1986 book *The Control Revolution: Technical and Economic origins of the Information Society*, James Beniger outlined the history of systematic control found in the production, distribution and consumption processes. Starting with the supposition that organization and control are inherent to any living system, Beniger drew an analogy between the complex interactions involved with running a business and the complexity of

[161]For example, Suzanne Dyer, a prominent recordist, once spoke to me of the necessity of capturing the vocals of a well-known client "on a good day." She considered the performer's inconsistency frustrating, but noted that such had become increasingly common.

interactions found in most organic entities. Like a living organism ordered by its genetic code, societal structures required some kind of guiding principle--e.g., law, governance, culture. As a society's business structures became more complex, the organizational control, or the "decision demon," would have to expand to address the resultant "crisis of control."[162] What the decision demon, or guiding principle was, specifically, depended on the conception, development and application of knowledge:

> Purposive organization and control, in other words, define the tangible discontinuity that distinguishes life from the inorganic universe. On one side, the exclusive province of the physical sciences, we find only matter, energy, and their ordering in the epiphenomenon we call *information*. On the other side, our own side in that we ourselves are living systems, we find structures *purposively organized* (in von Neumann's sense) for information processing, communication, and control, the special subject matter of the behavioral and life sciences [italics original]. (Beniger 1986, 35).

From the premise of control as a natural requirement in dynamic organic systems, Beniger then chronicled a history of business in which various technologies both instigated and resolved myriad crises of control. Using the cotton and textile industry as

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[162]This is a phrase Beniger used again and again. In essence the crisis of control represents historical points where the expansion of business opportunities--especially those caused in whole or part by technological development--grow beyond businesses' ability to control them. A good example could be found in the development of mp3 files. Record companies mostly feared the lack of control they could exert over sonic files that listeners could swap and send over the Internet.

Beniger ultimately cited technology as a means by which industry solves control crises. In the case of mp3 files, the development of the iPod, and the licensing of download sites helped resolve that particular crisis for the record industry, and began to open up another venue for distribution.

an example, he applied the analogy of biological encoding, and its tendency to become more precise, complex and specialized, to the problems facing business expansion.

If an eighteenth-century cotton farmer grew his crops and sold them locally within a fifteen-mile radius to warehouses, spinners or manufacturers known to him, he would have little motivation for adopting a control method, for the farmer could oversee the entire process himself. Yet, lucrative markets existed elsewhere, and could be key to survival if local demand were not sufficient to sustain the small grower. The farmer, however, could not be in two distant locations simultaneously, so if there were chances to sell to other markets, the farmer would need some agent to transact business in his name. Yet, the farmer had to be sure that the agent would not simply take the cash transferred in the trade and run off on some wild spending spree never to return. The farmer has to find some means of controlling the agent remotely, and Beniger pointed out that in the days before railroad travel, the most effective controls lay in the relationship between seller and agent: a family member, close friend, or fellow club member, for example.

Although railroad technology increased the number of available markets, the seller encountered additional control crises. According to Beniger, a number of freelance agents and independent companies stepped in to assure the quality of the goods to the buyer, and guarantee timely shipping for the vendor. As time elapsed, these freelancers and independent companies became entrenched, and increasingly specialized middlemen. As a result, bureaucracy became the chief mechanism of control.

The need for tighter train controls came to public prominence during the investigation of an 1841 Western Railroad collision. Western executives had to consider the fact that one stretch of track had to serve both inbound and outbound trains. They

relied on nothing more than precise scheduling and the faith that every conductor operated the vehicle properly. To ensure against future disasters, the railroad instructed conductors to act within strict standards of operational procedure. To enforce these standards railroad executives relied upon the telegraph, and later the telephone to have immediate access to a worker over long distance (Beniger 1986, 221-7).

The use of technology to monitor shipment of raw materials illustrates what Beniger referred to as the controls of distribution, which caused other crises within the production process. Factory managers saw the futility of more efficiently distributed materials if their workers could not produce goods at the rate in which supplies came in. The systems of scientific management first designed by such theorists as Charles Babbage in the early nineteenth century, and ultimately by Fredrick Taylor decades later, interested industrialists for this reason. As mentioned by Braverman in regard to deskilling, technology served to make complex tasks more accessible to a wider number of workers, who could produce a higher number of goods of reliable quality and quantity. And as Shoshana Zuboff would note, there were additional crises of control in acclimating agrarian farm workers to the mechanical rigor required by industrialization:

> The owner of a Pennsylvania ironworks complained of frequent 'frolicking' that sometimes lasted for days, along with hunting, harvesting, wedding parties, and holiday celebrations. One manufacturer filled his diary with these notes: 'All hands drunk; Jacob Ventling hunting; molders all agree to quit work and went to the beach. Peter Cox very drunk and gone to bed. . . . Edward Rutter off-a-drinking. It was reported that he got drunk on cheese.' In 1817 a Medford shipbuilder refused his men grog privileges and they all quit. (Zuboff 1988, 33)

The ability to ship and produce a reliably large amount of products would be of little benefit to the businessman, however, if manufacturers could not guarantee increasing and reliable rates of consumption. In terms of consumption, branding became the first major control mechanism. Beniger illustrated branding's effectiveness with an example drawn from Nabisco's 1899 trademarking of the Uneeda Biscuit brand in the "in-er-Seal" packaging that capitalized on the alleged unsanitary condition of the old-fashioned cracker barrel (Beniger 1986, 344-5). Utilizing new understandings of the mind made possible through psychology, advertising grew exponentially over the first several decades of the twentieth century (Beniger 1986, 349) to promote brands. Such new media as radio, motion pictures, and ultimately television not only promoted brands, but also influenced patterns of consumption. As media controllers realized early, electronic media added an element of persuasion to the message, as exemplified by the successful political uses of the medium by the likes of President Calvin Coolidge and Father Charles E. Coughlin, who both relied heavily on radio to further their respective agendas.[163]

Whether or not the need to regulate originates in the processes of production, distribution or consumption, manufacturers and producers have a tendency to utilize technology as a means to resolve a crisis of control. Yet, as noted earlier, those who controlled the music industry adopted technology rather unevenly. Until the mid-1980s, when Polygram first automated its distribution, the technological emphasis had been in the areas of production and consumption. The switch from disc recording to magnetic tape (c. 1945), the development of the long-playing (LP) format (c. 1954), the phasing

[163]Father Coughlin was an ultraconservative, pro-fascist, pro-Nazi orator who broadcast out of Detroit during the 1930s.

out of monaural product lines (c. 1966), and the phasing out of vinyl records (c. 1987) all addressed a need to assure a reliable degree of sonic fidelity. Like the "In-er-Seal" lining of the Uneeda Biscuit, the guarantee of clear, crisp sound distinguished professional quality work from more amateur efforts.

Changes in media also had the advantage of controlling consumption through planned obsolescence, what *Billboard* editor Melinda Newman referred to as "conversion." A fan of the Beatles' *Sgt. Pepper* album, for example, may have bought the vinyl album during the 1960s, the high-grade cassette during the 1970s, and the CD during the 1980s. The same consumer might have also bought the songs as mp3 files for her or his iPod,[164] and in a few years will purchase the album in who knows what else by 2100. The reliable income that these re-recordings could gather was evidenced by their reappearance on *Billboard's* SoundScan charts.

Recording companies also relied upon technology in developing and promoting brands. Until the 1960s, one could think of the brand as the label itself--e.g. the Motown Sound, the Stax Sound, et cetera. From the dawn of Beatlemania, however, labels began to treat as brands the performers, who, like any other brand, were typically marketed to a specific set of consumers. Utilizing technologies developed in radio, music videos and ultimately mp3 files and other cybermedia, the company could hopefully create a reliable demand for a particular artist, or genre. As Touré observed, MTV made possible the

[164]Despite the Beatles' well-publicized and long-standing feud with Apple Computers that has prevented the band from publishing their songs on iTunes, the *Sgt. Pepper* album and other recordings are available for purchase at LegalSounds.com (http://www.legalsounds.com/download-mp3/the-beatles/artist_776) and other sites. Using Switch and other available shareware, the user can then translate mp3 encoding into that suitable for the iPod.

promotion of Duran Duran and other artists on a wider scale than brfore, due to the fact that much more of the band--their look, their movements, and so on--had become familiar to listeners. In that sense, the pop star functions as in a way similar to a brand.[165]

The music and musicians of the rock era contributed to the "crisis of control" within the industry. First of all, the rock era coincided with (or, as Chapple and Garofalo suggested, was in large part responsible for) exponential growth in record sales during the mid-1950s. New contacts in the rhythm and blues markets, and among popular musicians, forced the music industry to rethink many of its previous notions of quality and professionalism due to a new generation of stars and audiences that were not previously a part of the mainstream industry. Old methods, structures and technologies of control seemed inadequate when producing and marketing the new music. The technological innovation within the record industry that developed during this time extended the human process of management both of artist and consumer on a previously unimaginable scale. By removing some of the responsibilities and decisions that are typically made by the musician to the more established and stable positions within the company, the label could maintain a consistency in production methods and approaches.

Among the other advantages inherent in multitracking, for example, is the ability to add and delete performances at a date much later than the initial recording. This could

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[165]Judith Petringa, a former Sony publicist, alluded to one aspect of artist branding when she talked about 'hair bands,' as they were known in the music industry of the early-1990s. After the success of such big-haired artists as Ratt, Poison and Motley Crue, she described a marketing identification based not on the way a band sounded, but rather on its physical appearance. Her explanation of 'hair bands' averred that the ability to define a group by its look became more attractive to record companies. As she put it, "Every label's got to have one." (Goldfarb & Petringa 1991).

hold a distinct advantage for label executives who, for business reasons, may wish to make changes in the final sound of the recording when the original musicians involved are not available. Columbia originally released Simon and Garfunkel's hit single "Sound of Silence" as a folk ballad, with the duo's singing accompanied only by a guitar. However, personal differences between Simon and Garfunkel led them to dissolve the act and go their separate ways. In the meantime, Columbia hired studio musicians to add drum, clavichord and electric guitar parts to the original recordings to turn it into a rock recording, which the company re-released in 1965. Likewise, in 1986 Chaka Khan and Robert Palmer recorded a duet, "Addicted to Love," but because of the animosity between their two rival record companies, Khan's vocal was deleted from the final cut.

MIDI, and other digital technologies, added additional controls on production, which made available standard libraries of sound patches and sequences that a musician could easily store on computer disc. Also, because one could recall data from a wealth of stored knowledge, much of the time, money and energy that would have been spent on honing in on the right sound could be saved. But more importantly, the deskilling that ran concurrently with digital technology and multi-tracking allowed labels to manipulate the artist to a greater degree, since an increasing amount of creative control was now out of the latter's hands.

During the mid-1980s, digital samplers typically duplicated the sound of specific instruments or instrumentalists. For example, if a producer wanted to incorporate the sound of the late "King" Curtis Ousley's unique saxophone sound onto a new recording, he or she could do so by isolating and sampling several pitches in different registers from an isolated track. A keyboard player could then MIDI her instrument either to the sampler,

or to an external sound or 'patch library,' where she might have stored the sound previously.[166] Producers began to rely increasingly on sampled drum, piano and bass sounds in lieu of actual drummers and bassists, for dealing with a decreasing number of musicians afforded them additional controls in the studio.[167]

In instituting various methods of control, the American music industry tended to do so much later than other industries, and many of its controls were bureaucratic, especially when the crisis at hand was technological in nature. In response to what seemed like unfair usage of published songs, publishers lobbied the US Congress to pass the Copyright Act of 1909, which afforded publishing royalties on the sale of each recording. In order to enforce copyright compliance during this age of technological expansion, the major publishing houses and songwriters of Tin Pan Alley founded the American Society of Composers Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), an organization that set about to monitor usage of copyrighted material

Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909, no provisions had been made for publishers to collect payment due from the growing distribution arising from record sales. And prior to ASCAP, publishers were unable to control or monitor the usage of their property. For example, a 1916 orchestra leader beginning his group's national tour in New York might alert a publisher to his usage of the publisher's song in twenty-five appearances and 100

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[166]This technology was more often used to imitate brass instruments, pianos, organs and drums, but it could also be used to imitate a saxophone.

[167]Henry White, at one time Vice President and Chief Legal Counsel for the American Federation of Musicians, often complained to me about the diminishing opportunities for session work over the course of the early 1990s. He did not cite digital sampling as the sole cause of that particular industry trend, but he often thought of it as an important contributing factor.

recordings. The publisher could then calculate the copyright due and expect payment before or after the tour. Without such an organization as ASCAP, which stationed agents in key touring spots, the publisher would have no way of knowing whether or not the orchestra leader printed 200 additional copies of their recordings of the copyrighted material somewhere out in the Midwest, or performed ten of the publisher's songs over fifty appearances, thus depriving the publisher of monies due to the company from the added performances and record sales.

Legal and organizational controls on publishing would become stronger with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, which extended the protection of copyright internationally with the help of similar laws passed by other signatory nations. The creation of Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI) in 1939 greatly extended copyright enforcement to publishers and songwriters previously shut out from ASCAP. Yet other forms of distribution control became apparent only after considerable consolidation of the music industry, and these too depended heavily on what most people would regard as technology. Computer-tracked distribution utilized advances in computer software and networking, for example. The belated licensing of mp3 downloads more adequately solved a crisis in distribution by making music easily accessible to the consumer, while at the same time allowing the company to track inventory of its products, and collect due royalties. As mentioned in the previous chapter (Radio Consolidation), the music industry attempted other technological methods of control, including the heavy loading of empty mp3 files on other sites, and latent viruses that affected copied files from CDs. Record labels eventually resorted to suing individual consumers, whose downloading had been tracked via their Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses.

Desired control over digital recording and transmission had been important to the industry for quite some time. With the emergence of the World Wide Web in the mid-1990s, the implications of digital technology would become clear. No longer a source for simply relaying text from one location to another, the Web would allow for the posting and transmission of all types of files, including sonic ones. Former United Artists chair and RIAA Director Jerry Rubenstein, for one, suggested as early as 1993 that labels and those of "the emerging digital transmission business" form partnerships that could regulate Internet dissemination of music:

> However, by incorrectly characterizing digital audio transmission as a threat to its existence, [current RIAA President Jay] Berman does the music industry a huge disservice and diverts attention from far more pressing issues.
>
> I join Berman in urging increased unity among the various groups that make up the music industry and in calling for standards that safeguard those groups and their interests. But it is misguided to target digital transmission when the real issue is the failure of current U.S. copyright law to recognize performance rights for sound recordings. (Rubenstein 1993, 5)[168]

In looking to enter into the upcoming "digital revolution," some record companies initially planned on taking charge of electronic musical transmission in lieu of trying to

[168]That same year (1993) Deborah Russell, writing for *Billboard*, reported on a study by Mercury Records to measure consumer interest in purchasing music directly through home computers as actual computer files. According to Mercury spokesperson Bruce Hartley, 70% of 400 questionnaire respondents reacted favorably to the concept (Russell 1994 "Computer Age," 69). The question of digital music transmission viability would seem to be moot at that point, since the possibility of disseminating music over the Web was rapidly become a possibility, and consumers had indicated a strong interest in purchasing over the Web. Hence, Rubenstein's concerns for initiating control early on were well founded.

sue venues for such out of existence, thinking that their current clout within the music world would automatically give them a leg up on becoming the industry leader in cyberspace. As Capitol Records President Gary Gersh optimistically predicted, "[the record industry] is on the verge of a massive revolution that will rewrite the ways we receive and relate to all forms of entertainment" (Gersh, quoted by Lieb 1994, 64). Added Danny Goldberg, then-President of Atlantic Records, "Suppose everything becomes cyberspace....People are still going to have to be experts at making things look interesting" (Goldberg, quoted by Lieb 1994, 64). Yet, the record companies' slowness to make the transition from physical product (CDs) to abstract products (mp3s) allowed other companies to offer file sharing capabilities more quickly than the major labels could. Hence, the major labels embarked upon control via legal means.

While legal means to curb unlicensed music dissemination from Napster, Kazaa and other peer-to-peer (P2P) sites offered a temporary and questionable control over consumer downloading, the industry's eventual decision to embrace digital technology afforded a more viable solution. Industry enthusiasm for utilizing a technological control over a technological crisis became evident months before the launch of Apple's iPod in 2003, and such similar download venues as Tower Record's Echo in 2004 (Eliscu 2003:sec. 1; para. 1-2). Refinements in digital rights management technologies (DRM) similar to iPod continue to the present day. In January 2006, Microsoft unveiled its new PlayForSure software that would allow for P2P systems to regulate the legal downloading of unlimited songs for a monthly licensing fee (Carroll et al 2006, 108), thus paving the way for MTV and other potential download distributors (Sager & Walsh 2005, 12).

Technology and Performance

Maintaining standards became a critical part of resolving the crisis of control in production. Technology aided standardization because it did more than merely automate, or robotically carry out pre-programmed tasks. The nature of technology informed the task. As Shoshana Zuboff explained in her book, *In the Age of the Smart Machine*:

> On the one hand, the technology can be applied to automating operations according to a logic that hardly differs from that of the nineteenth-century machine system -- replace the human body with a technology that enables the same processes to be performed with more continuity and control. On the other, the same technology simultaneously generates information about the underlying productive and administrative processes through which an organization accomplishes its work. It provides a deeper level of transparency to activities that had been either partially or completely opaque. In this way information technology supersedes the traditional logic of automation. The word that I have coined to describe this unique capacity is *informate* [italics original]. (Zuboff 1988: .9-10)

Employers' tendency to institute remote, more abstract controls stemmed, in Zuboff's opinion, from their wish to distance themselves from manual labor. The main issue, she explained, was the contempt that upper classes held for the physical body. History of "civilized culture," from the Middle Ages to the industrial age, consequently featured a number of cultural movements (Zuboff 1988, 25-36). At the same time, labor of this period often relied upon the body, not only because of its ability to move things around, but also its ability to become accustomed to a task, and consequently gain some knowledge of that task. Consequently, the craftsman knew much about the execution of his or her task because of what Zuboff referred to as "action-centered skills," the resource

of knowledge that came from kinetic movement, and tactile, auditory and visual stimulation (Zuboff 1988, 67).

Zuboff focused on how informating technologies resulted in a change from tasks requiring action-based skills to those that necessitated more abstract thought. As an example of action-centered skills, she observed paper mill workers: "One man judged the conditions of paper coming off a dry roller by the sensitivity of his hair to electricity in the atmosphere around the machine. [169] Another could judge the moisture content of a roll of pulp by a quick slap of his hand" (Zuboff 1988, 58). After the introduction of new microprocessor technology, the nature of work changed:

> As the medium of knowing was transformed by computerization, the placid unity of experience and knowledge was disturbed. Accomplishing work [now] depended upon the ability to manipulate symbolic, electronically presented data. Instead of using their bodies as instruments of acting-on equipment and materials, the task relationship became mediated by the information system. (Zuboff 1988, 62)

According to Zuboff, "The workers in this transition were at first overwhelmed with the feeling that they could no longer see or touch their work, as if it has been made both invisible and intangible by computer mediation" (ibid). Older workers expressed dismay by exhibiting a general distrust of the machine's accuracy and relevance. Conversely, younger and more educated workers demonstrated far more confidence in the computerized system (Zuboff 1988, 67).

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[169]Zuboff studied these two paper mill companies and six others over the course of five years.

Later, Zuboff addressed two additional issues that are relevant to the concept of standardization in the music industry. The first involves the nature of action-centered skills in occupations traditionally referred to as "white collar," and how automation changed the nature of clerking in a manner parallel to "blue collar" workers. The second examines power in the structure of management, and its relationship to the work process. Zuboff noted the effects of taylorism on clerical workers, those who in previous years were considered to have superior education to that of their blue-collar counterparts, and as a result more facility with abstract thought, and less familiarity with manual labor. While Taylor himself worried about such things as the number of times an employee might have to open a file drawer, Zuboff focused more on how much clerical work--even at the management or executive levels--relied upon the body. She separated such actions into four broad categories: (1) sentience, or depending on face-to-face interaction; (2) action-dependence, where manager skills are developed and conveyed in action, thus necessitating bodily presence, (3) context-dependence, the nonverbal communication that helps a manger evaluate information; and (4) personalism, much of what the manager knows remains implicit and thus personal (Zuboff 1988, 106).

Zuboff, like Braverman and Beniger, addressed the role that authority played in the development of innovation designed to improve the control of few over many. Technology became a critical issue in this regard for two reasons. First, technology either forced or induced the worker into a certain discipline required by the company. Secondly, as industrialization expanded, and management became more closely identified to an emerging professional class, the increase in productions relied upon an action-centered workforce. Because a good deal of the knowledge of how to do a task rested in the body

of the individual craftsperson, managers could face an additional crisis, for they were at a conceptual distance from the task due to their lack of body knowledge. Yet, managerial authority stemmed from a presumed superiority, initially in terms of class, and then later on in the presumed knowledge of the executive. By reorganizing tasks to become more abstract, management could exert greater control. Otherwise, workers might question the right of employer to make demands on how they did their work:

> In the workplace, managerial authority has been the tie that binds members together in productive activity. In order to establish the unity of imperative control, employers and, later, managers have had to develop a context of belief that could legitimate and sustain their right to command....
>
> These beliefs could legitimate managerial authority as long as workers' real-life experiences lent some degree of credibility to their claims. [Historian Sidney] Pollard's analysis of early British industrialization notes the acute shortage of technically competent managers in all of the rapidly growing industries, including textiles, mining, engineering, and pottery. (Zuboff 1988, 224-5, 227)

In applying Zuboff's observation to the idea of standardization within the music industry, one must first understand how the musician functions as a laborer. Middleton's belief that the musician is not a true laborer in the same sense as a textile worker is correct, but possibly misleading, for there are many instances where the concerns of the musician overlap the conventional notions of labor. Musicians, although under contract, are still obligated to produce items for sale, namely songs and records, for example. Musicians have found unionization necessary in order to negotiate collectively for residuals, minimum royalty guarantees and other economic issues. In addition, they are

subject to managerial controls at many levels, even if they chafe under and try to subvert them.

One must secondly understand the hierarchy of the corporate structures in which musicians work. Like the nineteenth-century manager, the late-twentieth and twenty-first century record executive would likely be at a conceptual distance from both the music-making process and the cultural underpinnings of the artist. Yet as Zuboff, Braverman and Beniger all note, lack of control over the production aspects of task would put the employer at a serious disadvantage. And, as all three note, executives from virtually every industry relied upon technology to bridge the knowledge gap. Since, as Zuboff avers, the precise knowledge of the task lay partly in sensory-motor skill, one might expect the music business to parallel other industries regarding the utilization of technology that required fewer action-centered skills. For record producers, this meant a movement away from concepts of music-making that stressed physiology and coordination, and toward those that stressed the management of sonic principles. When playing an instrument, pre-digital musicians relied quite heavily on action-centered skills. For example, an experienced musician might have difficulty conceiving of a beginning student learning a scale by playing it once correctly or by reading about it. Pedagogy for each instrument features repetitious exercises that teach the coordination of various body parts.[170] With practice, the skilled player learns how to recognize musical ideas and idioms by the way his or her body feels in relationship to the instrument. Guitarists know

[170]Dr. Karin Edwards, my undergraduate piano professor, typically referred to this type of kinetic learning as "muscle memory," or "finger memory." She assigned Timothy Gallwey's *The Inner Game of Tennis*, a book ostensibly about playing tennis, but which on a deeper level discussed the developing consistency in physical movement.

how barre (or bar) chords feel, which in turn lets them know the amount of pressure to apply to the strings and the proper positioning of the fingers. Saxophonists know how the instrument should feel in their mouths, which in turn allows them to calculate the amount of pressure to place upon the reed, when to adjust the embouchure, and how hard to blow. To musicians, these issues have become second nature, not something in the forefront of their minds as they play. In fact, they may not notice their dependence on tactile stimulation until minute physical changes, such as a slight increase of string or reed thickness, limit their facility, thus requiring a new relationship between the body and instrument.[171]

Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, a new type of musician emerged, one who understood the theories or intellectual components of music, but might not have had the ability to translate them into the physical practice of performance. The task of sequencing, for example, could be accomplished either by the artist or by someone with an operational knowledge of MIDI signal paths, patch storage, synchronization and computers; but not necessarily by someone who can play an instrument. Producers who have such knowledge can have more of an input into the creation of music, and could even transcribe it by the necessary software into notation for other musicians who might later add parts independently of the credited artist. The task of composition itself could be nothing more than the combination of pre-recorded or pre-programmed elements into coherent patterns.

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[171]Student teaching at Central Middle School in Waukesha, WI, I often had the task of coaching clarinet and saxophone players who had just been fitted with braces. Although a very small change, in terms of the overall body, braces severely altered the way in which students approached their instruments.

Towards the end of the 1980s, sound management and digital samplers gained popularity not just among hip-hop musicians, but also among non-rap performers. *Keyboard Magazine* columnist Mark Dery heralded the “bodilessness” of a popular music called “cyberpunk” in his article "Beneath the Valley of Ultra-Cybers" (Dery 1992, 68). Embedded into this aesthetic was the notion that the human body is cumbersome in nature and that its liberation comes in the form of virtual reality and similar technology. He noted how this had become especially evident in the production of rap, where many musicians searched eagerly for patches to sample, and augment with a drum machine programmed either in step-time or real-time. Sinead O'Connor, Fine Young Cannibals, Grace Jones and others have based recordings on a sampled drumbeat from percussionist Clyde Stubblefield’s performance in James Brown’s "Funky Drummer." After the initial sampling, the artist could record or sequence additional instruments to color the song. Thus, a performer could possibly produce music without her or his body engaging directly with a musical instrument in a way that demands a certain feel or coordination (Dery 1992, 73).

The apparently diminishing role of the human performer in music production prompted an outcry from both listeners and musicians. Some sampled artists resented this new use of technology because it could possibly have infringed upon mechanical and publishing royalties (Dupler1986 “Digital Sampling,” 1). Others opposed the new-fangled pop star for not possessing the skills required of earlier stars. After hearing their work sampled on the song “Transmitting Live from Mars,” for example, Mark Volman and Howard Kaylam of the Turtles sued the group De La Soul for copyright infringement. In explaining their actions to *Rolling Stone* reporter Jeffery Ressner, Volman remarked:

> When we created music in the Sixties we didn't do it by taking other people's music as part of ours….We had original ideas and materials and we created them from the ground up. I just don't understand the creative implications of using another group's records (Volman, quoted by Ressner 1990, 103)

The above quote may appear at first to be simply another example of deskilling. Obviously, Volman and Kaylam believed that the perceived absence of original musical performers indicated a lack of skill, as did the basing of a composition on material written by someone else. But, as Zuboff's thesis suggests, perhaps what happened in this instance represented a change in music production and its relationship to labor. Here, the younger generation of workers, or musicians, downplayed the previous importance placed on the action-centered skills formerly required to create music. Instead, the artist relied upon a more abstract skill: the ability to manipulate an older sound to fit within the context of a new aesthetic. Indeed, musicians working with pre-recorded samples saw them as the basis of their aesthetic. Some openly complained that current copyright laws and antagonism from older generations of pop stars impinged on their ability to create. As rappers Dres (of the group Black Sheep) and Del the Funkyhomosapien related to Greg Rule of *Keyboard* magazine:

> [Dres] The Problem with sampling is *greedy artists*....Okay, we didn't *create* the sound, but we did something new with it. Maybe we helped that artist capture *an audience* that had forgotten about them. They should be flattered….
> [emphasis original]

> [Del the Funkyhomosapien] The fact that you [legally] have to clear so many samples--samples that shouldn't even need to be cleared--dissappoints me. It's big business, man. 'We want our money.' That's the bottom line, all the time. And it don't have to be like that. I mean, I could sample some shit that ain't nobody heard from in years. It don't even sound like the same song, but I've still gotta report it.

> I've still gotta tell my record company where it came from. (Rule 1994 "Sampling Naion," 22, 36)

If musicians themselves did not have the ability to do this, the producer probably would. In such a case, the musician provides sound for manipulation by producers, a number of whom have openly embraced technology. Paul Fox, producer of XTC's *Lemons & Oranges* album stated:

> There are no boundaries for what you can do with a sampler….You can do everything from mixing voices to making a snare drum out of a door slam. It's replaced the tape deck in the studio the same way the car replaced the horse and buggy on the road (Fox, quoted by Ressner 1990, 103).

Earlier innovations that did not rely upon computer-based technologies still had the capacity to informate. Working with multitrack recording revealed the many levels of musical activities involved with the pop sound. The ability to listen to the inner workings of each individual part could provide the untrained ear with an analysis of a song more easily than trying to absorb the work as a whole. By the same token, such outboard gear as gates, compressors and reverbs offered the user a rudimentary knowledge of harmonics and timbre. Multitrack's role in downplaying action-centered skills, however, is rather limited. Perhaps one could more accurately say that multitrack required a lesser degree of action-centered skill on behalf of the performer, who no longer had to have the same facility with her axe than her counterparts from previous generations of recording musicians. However, one could argue that a number of action-centered skills transferred from the performer to the recordist, who had to time entry patches and splice tape. MIDI and digital sequencing, however, would cut down the specific action-centered skills of

the engineer and producer as well. With step-time programming, the process of laying down or correcting a track would not require the repetition of performance, but rather a calculated click of the computer mouse.

As mentioned earlier, other popular musicians depended upon a number of technologies in order to perform live. Part of the rationale for doing so rests in the concert promoter's wish to develop shows that incorporate the aural and visual aesthetic of the promotional video as much as possible. Because of the diminished relationship to the body and performance in the studio (not to mention deskilling), recreating an approximation of the recording onstage could prove difficult without the aid of technology:

> Of course, this means performers can lip-sync to sampled tracks. But it also allows someone like Paul McCartney to do what the Beatles could only fantasize about in 1967: perform the complex studio arrangements from recordings such as *Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band* in concert (Di Perna 1990, 108).

One could imagine that the scope of performing the *Sgt. Pepper* album live would entail a stage show replete with special effects and choreography. In such an event the physical demands on the performers would have greatly increased, to the point where technology could be used to disengage a significant degree of the knowledge that the body contains from performance. Because multitrack performance allowed the same player to perform many different parts at different times, yet play them back simultaneously, the musician could have difficulty performing several different parts simultaneously on stage. In the case of *Sgt. Pepper* specifically, some songs that utilized double-tracked lead vocals (e.g. "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds") would literally

require John Lennon to sing two distinguishable parts at the same time, were the song performed live.

When one considers the changes that the rock era brought to the popular music industry, one might very well bear in mind the relationship between the laborer (i.e. the musician) and industry. Like the nineteenth-century shop owners described by Zuboff, music industry executives had to harness the services of a group of workers separated from them by age, experience, ideology, aesthetics, and the notion of what constituted work. In doing so, the industry attempted to rationalize the process of making music by utilizing an adapted tayloristic approach that limited the need for creative work by the performer, who often seemed to be the most unstable and most critical agent of production. This rationalization included the redefinition of professional musicianship and pop stardom; and it was aided in large part by technology's role in providing non-musicians with many of the resources by which to learn about and manipulate musical elements.

This is not to say that many pop musicians do not have talent or do not hold dear their action-centered skills (or technical prowess). Some, such as Eddie Van Halen, still base their careers on their virtuosity. The introduction of MTV's "Unplugged" format was a response to growing public suspicion that artists had limited skills. Still, the rise of music video in the 1980s and the trend toward consolidation yielded a climate most conducive to the successful promotion of acts that were more responsive to managerial control, more easily manipulated, and for many years, more easily disregarded. In some ways, this made the artist more expendable as far as the industry was concerned, a fact noted by *Variety* columnist Kevin Zimmerman:

> The main themes [of the 1980s] all grew from what at times seemed an obsessive preoccupation with economic growth, reflecting the sentiments of pundits who have labeled the 80s 'the greed decade.' The result was a general homogenization of the supposed 'music about rebellion' [i.e. rock, or youth-oriented music] on a scale never seen before….The accelerated consumption rate predicated by MTV is reflected on the charts: Most songs are No. 1 for only a week, and it's doubtful a single will ever again spend 10 straight weeks at the top, as Debby Boone's admittedly execrable 'You Light Up My Life' did in 1977. Typically the genre known as dance music -- the opposite end of the graybeard syndrome -- yielded a large number of hits throughout the decade by a great many acts, many of whom were never heard from again (Zimmerman 1993, 104).[172]

[172]The trend of artists towards brief appearance on the pop charts reversed itself somewhat during the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, since 1985, many artists who recorded high sales of a first album had difficulty duplicating the success in their second and subsequent albums. This would still tend to support the argument that performers in the technological age were more easily dismissed.

Technology and Standardization

In his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Walter Benjamin distinguished between the “ritual value” and the “exhibition value” of art objects. The former placed value on an art object because of its uniqueness, or “aura,” and its special function within society. Such religious artworks as paintings, Gregorian chants and organum were geographically tied to places of worship. Here, the uniqueness of an individual artwork, its ceremonial, almost private, function, as well as its existence only in certain places gave it an aura, or special authenticity which could only be regarded by a privileged few who had access to them:

> It is significant that the existence of the work of art with reference to its aura is never entirely separated from its ritual function. In other words, the unique value of the 'authentic' work of art has its basis in ritual, the location of its original value. This ritualistic basis, however remote, is still recognizable as secularized ritual even in the most profane forms of the cult of beauty. The secular cult of beauty, developed during the Renaissance and prevailing for three centuries, clearly showed that ritualistic basis in its decline and the first deep crisis that befell it (Benjamin “The Work” 1978, 32).

The “deep crisis” to which Benjamin referred is the moving away of art from its ritualistic basis towards a value system based upon exhibition. The introduction of technologies that allowed artworks to be mass-produced expanded this exhibitional value to the point where it too became a familiar component of commercial enterprise:

> Many chromolithographs were brilliant reproductions of paintings previously unknown and unseen by their now democratized audience. Chromos transported the visual trappings of *high* [emphasis original] art into that democratized, emerging consumer marketplace. Late nineteenth-century advertising and packaging made

> continual use of chromolithography. Packages of cigarettes, soap, flour -- the stuff of daily life -- were covered with alluring images ranging from sultry women to gorgeous depictions of nature, town life, royalty, and historical settings (Ewen 1988: 38).

Just as chromolithography affected the nature of visual art, record duplication had a profound impact on the nature of music made for commercial consumption. The record industry, itself a product of this late nineteenth-century trend towards artistic democratization, likewise saw the profitability of mass-production. Even before mechanical duplication became a reality, the practice of recording numerous takes of brief pieces demonstrated the industry's need to produce in large quantity. Of course, one could see the drawbacks of this method. Musicians would eventually tire. Their time would have amounted to an extraordinary expense.

One of the biggest drawbacks of this method lay in the fact that no two recordings could be exactly the same. The first performance of a session would be quite different from the tenth or the twentieth. Also, the quality of the recording equipment might change during that time. In a Benjaminian sense, a recording of the same song could have very well tied records to a specific geographic location.[173]

Obviously, concerns for efficiency played an important role in the development of duplication technology, the first major innovation in recorded sound. But the consistency

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[173]One can imagine that someone in Kansas City might have been utterly enthralled by a particular record, and wrote a letter recommending it to a friend in St. Louis, who upon listening to it at the local pub's jukebox found it quite distasteful. One could further imagine the St. Louis resident, in a subsequent letter, complaining to the cross-state friend who apologizes, saying ”Well, you really have to listen to it in Kansas City, on our coin-in-the-slot machine at Jimmy's Tavern.”

within each product became a major benefit in adopting methods of mechanical reproduction. Duplication allowed the record company to issue each record with assurance as to its production quality. It also meant that a company could enforce standards for every unit that would leave the manufacturing plant.

Later innovations in recording media led to changes in the standards of quality. Acoustic recording maintained a standard that tolerated a good deal of noise, low- and high-end frequency loss, and drastic changes in arrangements, but electronic recording did not. When recording directly onto blank records, one could only expect abbreviated musical forms, or at the very least frequent interruptions. However, the long-playing formats and high fidelity made available by magnetic tape rendered these standards obsolete. Over the years, this trend would reoccur in the adoption of stereo, eight-track cassettes, and CDs. And it would again occur later in the 1990s with the marketing of the mini-disc.

But the physical qualities of a record were only part of the story. The product's appeal did not lie chiefly in the quality of its manufacture, but in the musical idea each unit contained. It would not benefit a company to assure the physical quality of a record unless it could also guarantee the content of it. Trying to impose standards upon composition and performance would prove impossible for a company executive unless he or she had some knowledge about music. Mitch Miller, for example, was a graduate of the Eastman School of Music, a classically trained oboist and conductor -- perhaps this explains the influence he had as chief of A&R. Other executives had to rely on producers, publicists and others who could provide the musical and production assistance necessary to groom performers to the tastes of the intended audience.

The race music market of the 1920s, 30s and 40s maintained aesthetic standards catering to the tastes of a smaller, more specifically defined audience which was, for the most part, legally and socially segregated from mainstream venues of promotion and distribution. Rock and roll of the 1950s adopted most of these standards in opposition to those established by the major labels for widespread dissemination. The new music defied the knowledge, and thus the control, that Miller and others like him could exert. This too was a factor in the industry's resistance to it. However, the increasing popularity of the music, as well as the new affluence of a market willing to buy it, made it too difficult to resist. Ultimately, the industry would have to create and maintain new controls in order to produce and sell the music with confidence. Technology became an integral tool in establishing these new standards. Its tendency to both automate and informate gave an increasing amount of control to those with lesser musical knowledge and enabled them to have greater input on stylistic content. Producers and labels maximized this control by reorganizing musicians in ways that could easily be adapted to a hierarchical corporate structure.

A few artists, among them the Rolling Stones, Cher and the Temptations managed to have long and uninterrupted careers. But the majority of pop artists experienced rather brief careers during the rock era. There have been scores of pop ‘stars’ whose complete reputation rests upon one or two hit recordings. Part of this lies in the motivation that drives a person into the limelight as a performer. If one's only goal is to be famous, then one or two records might suffice, especially if they are big hits. But another factor could be how a particular artist was marketed and promoted. Oftentimes, an artist will emerge

as a spokesperson for a particular fad or brief movement. When that movement wanes or finds disfavor, that artist's popularity may very well decline.

Whatever the reason, musicians in the rock era could not, on average, enjoy the career longevity of their pre-rock counterparts. Their precarious existence and instability could wreak havoc on a company trying to measure and assure its long-term success. Labels eventually learned how to circumvent this by forming stable sub-genres, each with its own set of technologies that assured consistency from artist to artist. Many guitar and keyboard synthesizers, for example, have pre-programmed sound patches that provide stereotypical jazz, hard rock and heavy-metal outboard effects. Drum sequencers contain a number of standard beat patterns for rap, r&b, and club music. Automated consoles (computer-driven mixing boards that can automatically recall level settings) can set rough mixes that can be adjusted for recording conditions and the peculiarities of an individual singer's voice. Multitracking recording systems can add and delete parts as necessary to fit within the prescribed concept.

In a larger context, the mainstream record industry operates like many others. As did other businesses, record companies created and enforced standards that would ensure the quality of each unit issued for commercial sale. This meant a certain degree of control over all aspects of production, which in the case of music included the manipulation of stylistic content and presentation. In order to maintain standards, efficiency and profitability the industry initiated two different strategies. The first involved organizing people into a rational and hierarchical order by breaking down their larger jobs into smaller replaceable components. Beniger refers to this resultant formation of bureaucracy as a social technology. But if social technologies represented one strategy, the institution

of mechanical technologies represented the other. The measurability and reliability of mechanical processes assured a degree of stability in a product, which had to be perceived as unique.

Perhaps this best explains the paradoxical nature of the record industry's use of technology. The turbulent changes accompanying the adoption of rock fundamentally increased the distance between musicians and management to the point that technical solutions became an attractive means of maintaining production control over a new labor force that seemed unruly. By the time that Polygram automated distribution in the fall of 1987, much of the computer technology necessary to do this had already been implemented by other industries. Apparently the record industry, still bound to a view of itself as a people-oriented (as opposed to policy-oriented) business, did not feel the need to adopt such controls over other aspects of business such as distribution until after the period of consolidation.

The end of consolidation marked the end for the old systems of contacts and relationships by which labels did business. By 1990, the American-dominated rock scene had become international. Capitol Records had already merged with the British company EMI during the early 1960s, and the 1980s saw the sale or incorporation of other American labels to companies based in other countries. Polygram itself had acquired Mercury. Sony bought Columbia in 1989. General Electric sold RCA Records to the German Bertelsmann Group shortly after acquiring it in its purchase of the National Broadcasting Company, the label's previous owner. And the Japanese conglomerate Mitsushita had acquired MCA and later merged it with Universal Pictures, leaving WEA

as the only American-based major label. In 1998, Canadian distiller Seagram purchased Polygram, and subsequently merged it with MCA's Universal group, and BMG merged with Sony in 2003, subsequently reducing the number of major labels from six to four.

Chapter Eight: Summary and Conclusions

Adorno contended that the music and other entertainment businesses introduced production standards into the process of creating art. Although some models of standardization portray culture industries as behemoths with the power to dictate public taste and artist production, this view of how the "amusements" business works somewhat misses Adorno's point. Adorno did not claim that dominant corporations controlled or produced all artistic artifacts. Rather, he believed that companies taking on art as a product regulate, or standardize, their wares in order to ensure the kind of predictability required by shareholders and other investors. An examination of the popular music industry from 1955 on, or since the mainstreaming of rock and roll, indicates that Adorno's observations were, in fact, valid.

In other words, his thesis did not pertain to the arts in and of themselves, but rather to how business handles art as a commodity. In cases where the business is itself large, and the lion's share of profits goes to fewer entities, the issue becomes whether artists either "get with the program," or allow themselves to be relegated to the economic and cultural margins of that industry. Throughout the rock era (i.e. from 1955 on), one could find a number of different people recording and performing diverse kinds of music. Yet during this time, the opportunity for a heterogeneous group of artists to gain a voice within the mainstream of popular culture, or to find listeners outside of a small geographical, interest or social niche, varied according to the shape of the music industry.

Currently, if a musician shows little concern about gaining a wide audience or securing a record deal--especially a record deal with one of the major labels or their

dependents--she is perfectly free to perform whatever she wishes, and promote what she has in the manner that best suits her business style and budget, assuming she wishes to promote her music at all. Undoubtedly, part of the vibrancy of the initial rock audiences of the 1950s, the 1960s' counterculture, early hip-hop and punk artists of the 1970s stemmed from their persistence in producing music that reflected realities not shared by the major labels. Pete Townshend expressed the clash between aesthetics of punk and mainstream pop in terms of class differences in his previously cited *Rolling Stone* article. Whereas the bourgeois preoccupation with professionalism led record producers toiling away for the majors to become preoccupied with the perfection of little things, according to this train of reasoning, the working-class values of punk led its performers to concentrate on the rawness of energy and the meat-and-potatoes basics of content. Media theorist Dick Hebdige also saw the competing values of class subcultures, but felt that the contest space was far more intricate than a simple clash of values. Specifically, Hebdige believed that the battleground consisted more of a conflict in interpretations, or contextualization, of values. In other words, the cultural values of those working outside the mainstream and the mainstream itself did not conflict so much as the rights of each party to give meaning to them:

> Clearly, subcultures are not privileged forms; they do not stand outside the reflexive circuitry of production and reproduction which links together, at least on a symbolic level, the separate and fragmented pieces of the social totality. Subcultures are, at least in part, representations of these representations, and elements taken from the 'picture' of working-class life (and of the social whole in general) are bound to find some echo in the signifying practices of the various subcultures. There is no reason to suppose that subcultures spontaneously affirm only those *blocked* 'readings' excluded from the airwaves and the newspapers

> (consciousness of subordinate status, a conflict model of society etc.). They also articulate, to a greater or lesser extent, some of the *preferred* meanings and interpretations, those favoured by and transmitted through the authorized channels of mass communication. The typical members of a working-class youth culture in part contest and in part agree with the dominant definitions of who and what they are, and there is a substantial amount of shared ideological ground not only between them and the adult working-class culture (with its muted tradition of resistance) but also between them and the dominant culture (at least in its more 'democratic', accessible forms). (Hebdige 1999, 148-9)

Virtually everyone believing in the concept of free expression would defend an artist's expression of values, especially cultural ones. Many would consider her persistence in creating and performing music reflecting her perspective of society as noble for maintaining a high degree of artistic autonomy. If she wishes major label representation, however, she will become aware that the company might require certain things of her that she does not require of herself. She will have to submit a package that contains a demo in order to show a basic level of musical proficiency, press clippings that demonstrate her ability to generate an audience (an indication of commercial potential), photos depicting a general social type (e.g. Goth, punk, urban, country, etc.), and a personal history or bio that might help marketing find some type of promotional hook. After submitting all of these things, she must still compete with numerous artists, any one of whom might better fit the label's needs at the current time.[174]

I have no intention here of arguing that standardization resulted in a lack of creativity or dubious musical quality, for that is a subjective issue better argued by

[174]Henry White, AF of M chief legal counsel at the time told me that even small unaffiliated independent labels could receive up to fifty submissions per day.

listeners, musicians, and record executives in other forums. Adorno himself did not make strong value judgments with respect to creativity and quality, although he certainly implied such a connection in the term "pseudo-individualization." As to what he thought about quality, one should keep in mind that as a product of the Frankfurt school he approached the subject with a Marxist bias. Adorno's attack on mass produced swing music, for example, would not prevent a listener (either in the 1930s or today) from enjoying Benny Goodman, Duke Ellington or Count Basie recordings, or finding considerable artistic merit in them.

What some most likely find particularly irksome about the notion of standardization is the issue of control. The term itself connotes an outsider's perspective of the control that industrial processes exert (or attempt to exert) over artistic expression. Within the industry, that control is expressed by the selection of artists, the grooming of artists to fit a specific market, consistency in technical recording procedures, or overall product quality and reliability. Considering that a business would have difficulty selling any product line of uneven quality, record, radio and publishing companies would most likely not view the process of standardization as something bad, even if they call it by another name.

Artists might resist, to varying degrees of success, label attempts to aligned them with a particular market, and thus see standardization negatively. Musicians often have a number of diverse influences. Trying to recapture the success of a previously released record that leaned heavily on one influence might not hold the same allure to them as stretching out in a different direction towards another esteemed influence. The Grammy-winning band Wilco, for example, deliberately changed subgenres from album to album,

to the point where listeners sometimes wondered if the same artist performed them all. Signed to Nonesuch Records, a label within WEA interested in "folk" music, and as such not a division of the company that consistently boasted large sales, Wilco perhaps had a degree of latitude within WEA not available to artists within other divisions.[175]

As discussed earlier, the radio industry and listeners often take exception to perceived changes in style from one album to the next, and sometimes accuse the performer of selling out. While listeners might view the term "standardization" negatively, certain processes of it are certainly preferred by them. As Mike Harrison noted earlier, orthodoxies develop among fans, who can sometimes be as exacting in their application of standards as the label. On the other hand, they might react to processes of standardization by losing interest in music and buying less of it—as when a joke is repeated beyond the point of satiation, or when its structure is so consistent as to make the punch line predictable. A future study might therefore address the role standardization might have played in the music industry's recent decline, a decline masked for many years by the conversion of older recordings from analog media to digital and the overpricing of CDs.

One can conceive of standardization in several different ways. The first is Adorno's concept of artistic templates. We can see some of the template mentality in the workings of such disco giants as Sylvester and (Eugene) McFadden & (John) Whitehead, whose production methods attempted to interpret music for the dancer. We can see template creation in "The Motown Sound," where the continuity of musical approach

[175]Their more pop-oriented works were, in fact, handled by Reprise, another division within WEA.

resulted from using the same instrumentalists, collectively known as the Funk Brothers, to support many different artists on the label's roster. We can also see template creation in the advice given to artists as exemplified by the Braheny and Oland books cited here, and by such instructional series as *Rock School*. The debate over how songs fit into genres of rock and roll (pop, urban, adult contemporary, active rock, danceable rock, etc.) relates to how well songs conform to the expectation of the market, which in effect constitutes a comparison of the song against a preexistent ideal, or requirement for that genre. Artist manager Mike Williams gave another example of template creation when he noted that major label record executives took a more hands-on approach to producing hip-hop and determining the content of individual songs as their comfort level with the music grew. And as the fallout over Shaggy's cover version of Merilee Rush's "Angel of the Morning" (mentioned in Chapter Eight) would indicate, both fans and radio industry personnel could have strong reactions against an artist who attempts to break away from the mold into which he has already been cast.

Middleton's idea of standardization as formulaic imitation is quite evident during the entire history of the rock era. The early success of such crossover r&b performers as Fats Domino, Little Richard and Chuck Berry led to a growth in the number of rock performers among the music's growing white youth audience. Elvis Presley, Carl Perkins and Jerry Lee Lewis utilized the blues harmony and strong backbeat of r&b in their music, and such non-rock performers as Perry Como, Patti Page and Nat King Cole included rock and roll songs in their repertoire in an effort to latch onto the music's popularity. The early-Beatles performed and recorded a number of cover versions of 1950s r&b hits ("Money," "Roll Over Beethoven," "Kansas City," and so forth). Pat

Boone's cover recordings became notorious for their polished note-for-note copying of those by other artists, most notably Little Richard.

Later, in the 1960s, Beatlemania encouraged a number of young British bands to tour and release their records in the United States and Australia. It also led to more enthusiastic promotion of English artists within the American music industry. The Rolling Stones, the Dave Clark Five, the Hollies, The Who, Manfred Mann, and Herman's Hermits, and others garnered major label interest on the coattails of the Beatles' initial transatlantic crossover. The combination of youth, self-caricature, British accents, long hair, and edgy rhythm and blues even spawned an American version of the Beatles. Created by producer Don Kirshner, the Monkees (derisively referred to as the Prefab Four by music critics of the day) applied the algorithms of Beatlemania--the accent of English stage veteran David Jones, the interaction and romp-style video production similar to that found in *A Hard Day's Night*, the irreverent humor, *et cetera*. Later in the 1960s, the mainstream industry became obsessed with counterculture, in effect pouncing on the unsigned performers of Monterrey, and those like them.

During the 1970s, the prominence of The Hues Corporation's "Rock the Boat" and George McCrae's "Rock Your Baby" alerted major labels to a vast underground disco scene, which had previously escaped mainstream attention--an example of what Peterson and Berger referred to as "unsated demand." By the end of the decade, the major labels attempted to sate the demand for punk by offering new wave, a less offensive version of it. In both cases, audiences began to note for themselves the strategy of formulaic imitation, and generally reacted against it. In the case of punk, listeners and artists responded with indifference, as venues suffered poor attendance for performances

outside of the main punk hubs of London, New York, and Los Angeles. They drifted away from the harsh, guitar-driven sound of such groups as the Sex Pistols, and gravitated toward the lighter, less musically and lyrically provocative synth-driven songs of the new romantics, with such performers as Boy George, Adam Ant and Billy Idol finding mainstream success after making the switch from punk to mainstream pop. Some listeners, comparing disco to vermin infestation and the spread of cancer, reacted violently against what they saw as the mainstream music industry's attempt to displace rock by replicating the disco formula as much as possible.

In addition to template creation and formulaic imitation, we also have evidence of standardization as in the introduction of standards or base criteria. While such early rock recordings as the Kingsmen's "Louie, Louie" could still gain a wide audience despite (or perhaps because of) their technical problems, the same could not be said of rock hits after Monterrey. Starting in 1967, major labels began to phase out their monaural catalogues, while developments in multi-track recording set more demanding standards of production.[176]

In a less technical sense, one could also see the introduction of standards dealing with the way that musicians dealt with their labels. While industry practice immediately after Monterrey focused on meeting the needs of the counterculture by signing artists the listener could identify with, policy changed quickly in the 1970s as the mainstream industry introduced new codes of professionalism. By 1969, we begin to see some of the first articles on how to write acceptable music. A few years later, we begin to see a

[176] Mark Spicer informs me that the monaural phase-out in England began a couple of years later, indicating that the process began at different times depending on the nationality or region of the record company.

number of articles in *Creem*, *Rolling Stone*, and other former underground presses alerting the would-be musician as to the professional standards in approaching and dealing with a label.

The motive for standardization seems clear enough. No business could possibly survive if its products were of inconsistent quality. For the music industry, however, one would have a difficult time assessing the quality of one song as compared to another. During the 1950s, rock and roll's perceived lack of quality led Columbia and the other major labels to distance themselves from the music by signing only a select number of acts, and relying upon in-house and independent producers to determine artist and song merit. From the 1970s on, the higher concentration of hit-making by the major labels reflected an increasing need, as pointed out by record label executive Danny Goldberg and music industry analyst Harold Vogel, to satisfy the short-term (quarterly) demands of stockholders, who had little patience in developing an artist over the span of two to three albums. Without some mechanism to ensure quality from quarter to quarter, label management might find itself under even greater pressure from shareholders.

The mechanisms of standardization were fairly similar to those articulated by Beninger, whose thesis for the history of business change is based upon the introduction of new controls over production, distribution, and consumption. Regarding the control of production, Beninger outlined Braverman's theory of deskilling, the need to break down the task of production, often through the use of technology, so that the company became less dependent upon the musician as craftsman. The music industry's use of technology has historically centered on decreasing the reliance upon the musician to perform up to professional standards. Multi-tracking alone alleviated much of the pressure for a

musician to create a flawless take on one continuous taping (or "pass"). Developments in digital sampling and MIDI allowed for musicians limited to knowledge of one instrument (typically keyboards) to perform on many instruments. Another use of digital sampling allowed musicians to layer tracks previously recorded by other artists. Other digital innovations corrected singers who could not stay on pitch, and harmonized for them if they could not harmonize themselves.

One might easily argue that the lessening the skill required for music making as an antidote for standardization. After all, wider and easier access to the tools of production tends to democratize musical expression. As Leslie Gay illustrated in "Acting up, Talking Tech: New York Rock Musicians and their Metaphors of Technology," musicians can utilize technology to enhance creativity, and consequently, uniqueness by structuring their set-ups (in this case those pertaining mostly to the electric guitar) in special ways, and by individualistic applications of technology.

By the same token, the record label could also benefit in several ways. First, the process of recording could proceed in a much more orderly and predictable fashion. Second, deskilling allowed record companies to expand their pool of potential recruits. Clive Davis and the other executives attending Monterrey understood that the artists performing there were successful not simply because of how they sounded, but because of what they symbolized to their audience. Were a firm to concentrate solely on musical facility as a basis for signing new artists, it could very well run up against a problem if that artist signified everything that the target audience hated. Were a firm to take the opposite approach and sign acts solely because of the targeted audience's ability to identify with them, then the label might possibly risk having a roster of talent that was

incapable of producing a pleasing sound. Technologically assisted music-making allowed labels to pursue more of a middle course by compensating for lack of musical expertise in a minimally proficient and highly marketable artist, thus affording the label an opportunity to choose among not only the most competent musicians, but the less competent as well. Third, the label was not so dependent on the musician. Replacing a musician who decided to hold out for better pay or treatment would be easier if the other musicians had already laid down their tracks than if a musician were to walk out in the middle of a live session, thus leaving behind a studio full of other players, producers, recordists and technicians who would have to start from scratch once a replacement arrived.

Establishing control over distribution was perhaps the most important thing that separated major labels from independent record companies. Until the 1970s, US major labels relied upon outside firms to distribute their products globally. Control over international distribution allowed the major label artist to be heard in virtually any part of the world without the label having to forge potentially disadvantageous deals with an outside party. Furthermore, international distribution allowed major labels to build and maintain local markets in places far away from corporate headquarters, thus giving them the ability to develop a talent in one part of the world before expanding their promotion of that artist to other regions. It also opened up a number of regional and local markets that major labels had yet to tap.

The lack of distribution controls became one of the two most critical factors in the weakening of independent labels during the period of consolidation (1967-1985). National and international dealings grew unwieldy. The indies encountered an even

greater problem when many of their established stars defected to major labels that could offer international branch distribution. In order for the independents of old to continue their hit-making, an alliance with a major label became mandatory, through a merger, a distribution deal in which the major label would absorb a majority of the profit, or through a PND deal that required the independent to pay hefty sums to the major. While technically separate businesses that could recruit and develop talent as they saw fit, the independents that allied with the majors became dependent on them.

The second critical factor that weakened the independents and helped consolidate the market even further was the degree of control the majors could assert over promotion. During the 1950s, the independents had some connections to radio personnel. Yet their contacts with the most critical stations were often not as intimate as those between the radio station and the major labels. While payola helped to even the playing field for a while, media attention and industry scorn checked its effectiveness. Nevertheless, Motown, Stax, Atlantic, King and other strong indies consistently produced music that young audiences were willing to buy. During the 1970s, with independent promotion fees eating away at profits, the independent labels, which for the most part lacked corporate backing, had a more difficult time sustaining radio promotion on the same level as the majors. Because of IP, and the pay-for-play and pay-for-say promotional schemes emerging from the late-1990s on, smaller labels never again promoted themselves to a national audience as they had done from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s. With independents weakening during the 1970s, the major labels, their subsidiaries and dependents were in a position to acquire a lion's share of available promotional space. Thus, the majors were in the best position of all record companies to control consumption.

During the 1970s, a combination of factors gave major labels the opportunity to control music production, distribution and promotion to an unprecedented degree. This resulted in a consolidation of the music industry that has continued to the present day. Along with the consolidation of the industry came a consistency in the approach to music sales, starting with the selection of the artist, and ending with the way that listeners (or consumers) have access to music. While scholars generally understand that consistency exists in the promotion and distribution of recordings, the question of consistency within the music-making process has generated controversy. Critics of Adorno's theory of standardization are correct when pointing out that despite an increasingly oligopolistic industry structure, musicians continue to compose and perform a wide variety of sounds. Yet, at its core, the issue of standardization is not really about music making, but rather about industrial policy and how it reflects upon music making. When looked at objectively in terms of how commercial music mirrors the diversity within the music industry Richard Peterson and David Berger, Peter Alexander, and Timothy Dowd, using a variety of statistical and analytic strategies, have come to agree that the larger the concentration of firms producing the most commonly heard music, the greater the degree of heterogeneity, due to the reduction of companies producing music according to their own standards. I have completed a preliminary study based in the statistical measures utilized by these above scholars, but with rigorous musical analysis. My findings confirmed those of the above scholars, and indicated that individual record companies exerted an influence on the music they produce. Therefore, in cases where fewer companies are involved with top-ten hit production, one could expect more sonic homogeneity in the songs receiving the most public exposure.

Perhaps the notion of standardization might also seem somewhat counterintuitive at first. Companies ostensibly sign artists whom they feel address the needs of a target audience, and for the most part do not dictate the notes that musicians play. Yet, in addressing the needs of a targeted audience, labels and radio stations have pretty clear ideas (whether correct or not) about the kind of consumer they can attract, and how they can maintain that consumer as a buying customer. The desire of those in the industry to find music to plug into its success formula means that they search for artists who fit a preconceived idea of what is successful. As a result, they exclude artists who are not as obvious a fit.

Exclusion is arguably the chief form in which the practice of standardization has historically occurred, especially during the period of consolidation. Certain types of artists (e.g., singer-songwriters) faced exclusion because the major labels found them more difficult to promote. During the early-1990s, when major labels began to take a greater interest in hip-hop, lighter, romantic and politically oriented rap songs performed by such artists as Biz Markie, L.L. Cool J and Public Enemy were excluded in favor of grittier, more aggressive urban and gangsta themes.[177] Over the last ten years, the emphasis on top-twenty formats has further limited the amount of new and potentially diverse performers coming into public prominence. Furthermore, the consolidation of the radio industry made possible by the 1996 Telecommunications Act allowed radio

[177]The 1993 movie *CB4*, co-written by comedian Chris Rock and former *Billboard* journalist Nelson George, has as its main plotline the inability of a rap group to find label interest until adopting the pose of gangsta rappers. Also, influential hip-hop video director Okuwah (William Garrett) noted in interviews how in the early-1990s major label executives expressed eagerness to relate all hip-hop videos to the gangsta template, whether or not the song in question had anything to do with the gangsta lifestyle.

conglomerates to separate their audiences into more highly defined markets. The move toward more strictly defined radio formats segregated tunes deemed "active rock" from those deemed "modern rock." Regardless of whether a song could find acceptance across demographic lines, this type of marketing could potentially limit a performer's popularity by excluding him or her from other venues that might otherwise prove hospitable.

At the same time, one cannot dismiss the role of both listeners and musicians in creating and maintaining standards. Most musicians are not shy about citing their "influences," the previous performers whose musical style or idioms they have incorporated into their own new music. Yet, there are some who understandably seek the perquisites of rock stardom, and willingly groom their music to match some aspect of what they perceive as the "hot" sound. And as Mike Harrison noted, certain orthodoxies among hardcore fans sometimes lead them to resist their favorite artists' experimentation with different approaches to music-making or sound structure.

Part of fan contribution to the phenomenon of standardization comes from the expectations that the music industry has set forth. Listeners have had considerable curiosity about performers, with special interest in their philosophies, ideologies, personal conduct and so forth throughout the rock era.[178] Fan fascination was particularly

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[178]Jon Weiner's 1985 political biography, *Come Together: John Lennon in His Time*, includes a review of the press coverage not only of Lennon and the Beatles, but also of the Rolling Stones, Bob Dylan, Elvis Presley and other iconic figures for the sake of comparison. Of intense interest to the journalists responsible for the articles, among them Jon Landau and Robert Christgau, were questions concerning the artists' political leanings and their interpersonal relationships. These writers expressed a profound desire to connect lifestyle and beliefs to possible meanings behind the lyrics of their songs.

evident after Beatlemania and Monterrey, but really came to the fore after MTV went on the air in 1981. The change in popular music, from a primarily aural medium to a part-aural, part-visual one, presented the artist more completely than radio alone. As Touré mentioned (Chapter Seven), some of MTV's most popular artists might not have become successful without the marketing opportunities that video afforded. In effect, the industry began to offer the artist as a package of many things--a sound, a look, mannerisms, personality, and so forth. As video became a more important promotional tool, the single or album cut that it promoted became that much more consequential. Audiences developed specific expectations from an individual performer, and deviance from that expectation could possibly lead to complaints that an act had sold out in order to make more money from a larger audience (Hall, Ross & Saxe 2001; sec. 1, para. 1-7).[179]

Mike Williams noted that after 1995 fans become increasingly disenchanted with their CDs' inner tracks because they did not represent the sound that listeners had come to expect from the single. This indicates that the industry had begun to groom its audiences into singles-oriented markets, which readily accepted the *à la carte* selection offered by P2P sites. While the popularity of iTunes and other legal mp3 download sites has helped curbed some of the losses, the music industry has still suffered from declining sales since 2001. Even hip-hop, which had served as a reliable moneymaker for over a decade, underwent a 21% sales decline during the years 2005-2006 (CNN 2007; sec. 1, para 4). In January 2007, EMI announced a series of cost-cutting and restructuring

[179]In addition to Shaggy, the authors noted fan-based resistance against the change in sound of such artists as the late Jermaine Stewart, K-Ci & JoJo, Mya, and Destiny's Child.

initiatives (Mulligan 2007; sec. 1, para 2). Two months later, the label adjusted its earnings forecast, projecting a 15% decline instead of a 10% decline ("EMI Cuts Financial Forecasts Again" 2007; sec. 1, para. 1)

Standardization of musical text fits an overall pattern of the post-consolidation music industry, with its historic tendency to take tighter control over all aspects of business. What some have called "anti-competitive protectionism" has become evident in the major labels' attempts to control distribution and promotion, especially when such involves crowding out smaller labels (as with IP during the 1970s and 1980s, and P4P/P4S during the 1990s and 2000s). Efforts to stem potential pirating through DRM encryption on mp3s, and relentless lawsuits against individual listeners have led to consumer ill will ("Jobs to Music Industry: Drop DRM" 2007; "What's Wrong with the Music Industry in One Long Sentence" 2004). Yet, as of March 2007, the pending takeover of EMI by WEA indicates that industry executives still see increasing control over music distribution and further consolidations as critical steps in reversing their misfortunes.

Within a broader context, standardization not only occurred within the popular music industry, but also helped to shape it. One could speculate that the major labels' ability to attract independent label stars, their dominance over distribution, and their virtually exclusive access to widespread radio promotion led to their complacency, a confidence rooted in the belief that the public would continue to buy recordings as long as they were of consistent quality. As music revenues began to increase after the rock recession of 1979-1983, perhaps that confidence was understandable. Yet, the specific efforts that the labels embarked upon to ensure short-term success took a heavy toll in the

long run. By neglecting the development of new artists whose initial sales were disappointing, the record industry potentially sacrificed future generations of stars. By shelling out large amounts of money for promotion, the labels might have scored hit records, but at the same time grew more dependent on radio, which after the consolidation of its industry, had the wherewithal to deny access to blocks of airtime or grant them. By keeping artists within strict market confines, labels discouraged performers from stretching out in different directions musically, and musicians subsequently had difficulty sustaining audience interest past one or two albums, what *Billboard* editor Melinda Newman referred to as an inability to gain "traction."[180]

The constant attention given to the bottom line allowed the major labels to ignore certain systemic problems concerning how profits were accruing. As Newman observed, industry executives did not take into account that the revenue jolts they enjoyed during the late-1980s and early-1990s were primarily a result of what she termed "conversion," or in other words, the fact that people were simply replacing vinyl catalogs with CDs, and not buying new music or artists to an appreciable degree. Industry complacency also led executives to assume that the major players would continue to be industry leaders in all formats. Yet, they neglected to anticipate the potential of the Internet. Instead of using cyberspace to augment sales, or as an alternative means of promotion, record labels fought it for half a decade before attempting to harness the Internet's possibilities.

Whether or not the latest measures of the music industry to right its recent slump

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[180]Despite the huge success of debut albums or breakout years, such artists as Hootie and the Blowfish (*Hold My Hand*) and Alanis Morissette (*Jagged Little Pill*) failed to duplicate their success on their next albums, almost as if audiences had already had enough of them from their previous works.

prove successful, major labels continue to exhibit a tendency to control distribution and consumption. At the same time, radio companies have narrowed their playlists in order to define their listenership more precisely for advertisers. This dissertation finds that from 1967 on, the major record companies, in fact, attempted to control production by regulating the selection criteria for artists, defining genre, and standardizing recording procedures. Furthermore, the controls instituted by major labels became evident in the increase of musical homogeneity that paralleled the increase of major label concentration.

Appendix A: Pt. 1. Labels with Records (Singles) in the Top-Ten during the Years 1969 and 1985

1969 Labels

1. A&M
2. ABC
3. Acta
4. Apple
5. Atco
6. Atlantic
7. Bell
8. Buddah
9. Cadet
10. Capitol
11. Colgems
12. Columbia
13. Decca
14. Dunhill
15. Elektra
16. Epic
17. Fontana
18. Gamble
19. Gordy
20. Imperial
21. JAD
22. King
23. Laurie
24. London
25. Mala
26. Mercury
27. MGM
28. Motown
29. Paula
30. Philly Groove
31. Philadelphia/L.A.
32. Phillips
33. Plantation
34. RCA
35. Reprise
36. Roulette
37. Scepter
38. Soul
39. Soul City
40. Stax
41. Tamla
42. Tetragramm
43. Uni
44. United Artists
45. Verve Fore
46. Volt
47. Warner
48. White Whale

1985 Labels

1. A&M
2. Arista
3. Atlantic
4. Capitol
5. Chrysalis
6. Columbia
7. Constellation
8. De-Lite
9. Elektra
10. EMI America
11. Epic
12. Es Paranza
13. Full Moon
14. Geffen
15. Gordy
16. Grunt
17. Jive
18. MCA
19. MCA/Camel
20. Mercury
21. Motown
22. Paisley Park
23. Planet
24. Portrait
25. Qwest
26. RCA
27. Riva
28. Scotti Brothers
29. Sire
30. Tamla
31. Warner

Part 2. Companies producing Top-Ten Singles either by Themselves or by Owned or Distributed Labels during the Years 1969 and 1985

1969 Companies

1. A&M
2. ABC (Paramount)
3. Bell (Mala, Philly Groove)
4. Capitol (Apple)
5. Chess/Checker (Cadet)
6. Columbia (Epic)
7. Elektra
8. Gamble
9. JAD
10. Jamie/Guyden (Philadelphia/ L.A.)
11. Jewel (Paula)
12. Kama Sutra (Buddah)
13. Laurie
14. Liberty/United Artists (Imperial Soul City,)
15. London
16. MCA (Decca, Uni)
17. Mercury (Fontana, Phillips)
18. MGM (Verve Fore)
19. Motown (Gordy. Soul, Tamla)
20. Paramount (Stax [Volt])
21. RCA (Colgems)
22. Roulette
23. Shelby Singleton (Plantation)
24. Silver Campbell (Tetragramm)
25. Scepter
25. Starday/King
26. Warner/Atlantic (Reprise, Atco)
27. White Whale

1985 Companies

1. Capitol (EMI America, Paisley Park)
2. CBS (Chrysalis, Epic, Full Moon, Portrait, Scotti Brothers)
3. MCA (MCA/Camel, Motown [Constellation, Gordy, Tamla])
4. RCA (A&M, Arista [Jive], Grunt Planet)
5. Polygram (De-Lite, Mercury, Riva)
6. Warner/Elektra/Atlantic/Asylum/ Nonesuch (Es Paranza, Geffen, Qwest, Sire)

Appendix B. Rock Usage Chart

Rock Usage Legend

Name–Lists the last name of the author, (with first initial if there are two or more writers sharing the same last name), and numbers indicating the chronological order of the writing (from earliest to latest).

Date–Because of the requirements of my database, I must give dates that include a month, day and year. Some serials, however, do not include dates in that format, but rather the year, volume number, or season. Others simply include the month. Here, monthly issues will be designated as the first of the month (e.g., August 1979 would appear as 8/1/79). Where seasonal references are made, the days will appear as the first day of that season (e.g., Spring 1994 would appear as 3/21/94). Articles containing references only to year will be dated as if appearing on New Year's Day (e.g., 1965 7/ii would appear as 1/1/1965).

Periodical–This field identifies the title of the periodical where the article appears.

Rock–A 'y' indicates that the terms 'rock' or 'rock & roll' appear in the article. Here, only the articles that contained these terms are included.

Subgenre of Rock Indicated–This field lists hybrid names (e.g., folk-rock, or modern rock) that appear in the article.

Artists Typifying Genre–Lists one artists that the author used as an example of that genre.

Other Genre Descriptions–This field lists such other words or phrases that denote separate or overlapping genre descriptions (e.g., r&b, skiffle, disco etc.)

Meaning of Rock in Context–This category will display one or more of four letters, each of which stand for the following definitions:

(A) An Aftican American dance music.
(B) A white teenager/youth musical expression
(C) A musical style marked by distinctive sonic elements
(D) A marketing category

Relationship Between Genre Terms–This category will list one of four letters, each of which stand for a general description of how 'rock' is used in context with other words or phrases:

(V) Synonymous (e.g., 'rock' used in one sentence, 'r&b' in the next)
(W) Inclusive (e.g, rock seen as pop)

(X) Overlapping (i.e., rock and other music both stemmed from the same or similar sources, but branched off at some point)
(Y) Opposites (e.g, the old saw "Rock Rules, Disco Sucks")
(Z) Non-comparable (i.e., no relationship at all between musics; an 'apples & oranges' discription)

When more than one music has been named in the "Other Genre Description" field, the comparisons with the terms will occur in the order listed. For example, If rock is mentioned in conjunction with pop and r&B, the filed might show a (Z) for the first, and a (W) for the second.

Writer	Date	Magazine	Rock	Subgenres	Artists	Other Genres	Meaning	Rel.
Cage 1	01/12/1955	Down Beat	y	none	none	r&b, pop	A, B	V, Z
Schoenfeld 1	01/19/1955	Variety	y	none	Big Joe Turner	r&b	A, B	V
Anonymous 3	01/29/1955	Cash Box	y	none	LaVerne Baker	none	A, B	V
Anonymous 5	04/18/1955	Life`	y	none	none	jazz	A, B	X
Cage 2	04/20/1955	Down Beat	y	none	none	r&b	B, D	X
Ackerman	07/23/1955	Billboard	y	none	Bill Haley & the Comets	r&b, pop	A, B	V, Y
Anonymous 7	07/27/1955	Down Beat	y	none	Elvis Presley	r&b	A, B, C	V, X
Simon 1	02/04/1956	Billboard	y	none	Chuck Berry	r&b	A, B	V, W
Anonymous 8	05/12/1956	Melody Maker	y	none	Elvis Presley	none	A	none
Banks	05/23/1956	Down Beat	y	none	Harry Belafonte	none	A, B, D	none
Anonymous 9	05/26/1956	Melody Maker	y	none	Elvis Presley	none	A	none
Anonymous 10	06/13/1956	Variety	y	none	Bill Haley & the Comets	none	A, B	none
Anonymous 11	06/13/1956	Variety	y	none	Elvis Presley	none	A,B	none
Anonymous 12	06/13/1956	Variety	y	none	none	none	A, B	none
Anonymous 13	06/20/1956	Variety	y	none	The Platters	r&b	A, B, C	V
Anonymous 14	07/11/1956	Variety	y	none	Little Richard	none	A, B	none
Anonymous 15	07/14/1956	Billboard	y	none	Little Richard	none	A, B	none
Anonymous 16	08/15/1956	Variety	y	none	Fats Domino	none	A, B	none
Anonymous 17	09/08/1956	Melody Maker	y	none	Chuck Berry	r&b	A, B	V, X
Ford, A. & Walstein	09/19/1956	Down Beat	y	none	Little Richard	none	B	none
Freed 1	09/19/1956	Down Beat	y	none	none	r&b	A, B	V
Anonymous 18	09/26/1956	Variety	y	none	Bill Haley & the Comets	r&b	A, B	V
Kramer	03/09/1957	Billboard	y	none	Fats Domino	r&b	A, B	V
Simon 2	04/06/1957	Melody Maker	y	rockabilly	Gene Vinent	r&b, country	B	X, X
Anonymous 21	05/01/1957	Variety	y	none	none	jazz	B, C	W
Anonymous 23	01/08/1958	Variety	y	none	Elvis Presley	pop	A, B, D	Y
Barnett	01/08/1958	Variety	y	none	none	skiffle	A, B	X
Freed 2	01/08/1958	Variety	y	none	Elvis Presley	none	A, B	none
Race	02/08/1958	Melody Maker	y	none	none	none	B, C, D	none

Writer	Date	Magazine	Rock	Subgenres	Artists	Other Genres	Meaning	Rel.
Traube	05/14/1958	Variety	y	none	none	none	A, B	none
Grevatt 1	12/06/1958	Melody Maker	y	none	Lena Horne	none	A, C, D	none
Asbell	05/18/1959	Billboard	y	none	Elvis Presley	r&b	B	X
Anonymous 27	06/17/1959	Variety	y	none	none	none	A, B	none
Anonymous 28	08/31/1959	Billboard	y	none	none	r&b, c&w	A, B	W
Grevatt 2	08/31/1959	Billboard	y	none	Elvis Presley	pop	B	W
Standish	10/01/1959	Jazz Journal	y	none	Little Richard	r&b, bebop, jazz	A, B, D	V, X, X
Anonymous 29	10/21/1959	Variety	y	none	Elvis Presley	pop	B, D	W
Anonymous 30	01/11/1960	Billboard	y	none	none	r&b	B, D	W
Anonymous 32	03/02/1960	Variety	y	none	Joni James	jazz	C	Y
Anonymous 33	03/02/1960	Variety	y	none	none	none	B, D	none
Anonymous 34	03/02/1960	Variety	y	none	none	pop	B, D	Z
Brown & Grevatt	09/03/1960	Melody Maker	y	none	Elvis Presley, Little Richard	pop	A, B, C	Y
Dawburn 1	03/30/1963	Melody Maker	y	none	none	r&b, race, jazz, blues	B, C	V, X, Y, X
Coleman 1	02/29/1964	Melody Maker	y	none	The Searchers	r&b	C	V, W, & X
Coleman 2	05/09/1964	Melody Maker	y	none	none	r&b	B	X, Y
Anonymous 35	05/16/1964	Cash Box	y	none	Ray Charles	soul	A, D	V
Anonymous 36	07/04/1964	Cash Box	y	none	Chuck Berry	r&b	A, B	V
Roberts	01/06/1965	Variety	y	none	Beatles	beat, r&b	C	W, X
Anonymous 37	06/05/1965	Melody Maker	y	none	Beatles	r&b	B, C	X
Hall, C. 1	07/03/1965	Billboard	y	none	none	none	B, D	none
Tiegel 1	08/14/1965	Billboard	y	folk,	Barry McGuire	none	B, C, D,	none
Sternfeld	08/21/1965	Billboard	y	folk, hard	Bob Dylan	none	C	none
Schoenfeld 2	09/29/1965	Variety	y	none	Bob Dylan	none	A, B, C, D	none
Anonymous 39	10/09/1965	Melody Maker	y	folk	Bob Dylan	beat	B	W
Williams, Martin	10/21/1965	Down Beat	y	none	Ray Charles, Rolling Stones	blues, jazz	A, C	X, X

Writer	Date	Magazine	Rock	Subgenres	Artists	Other Genres	Meaning	Rel.
Hall, C. 3	11/26/1966	Billboard	y	folk	Four Seasons	r&b	B, D	W. X
Shaw 1	01/04/1967	Variety	y	shock, folk	Jefferson Airplane	none	B	none
Meltzer	03/01/1967	Crawdaddy	y	none	none	none	C, D	none
Anonymous 44	06/24/1967	Billboard	y	hip	The Byrds	none	B	none
Anonymous 45	07/01/1967	Billboard	y	none	none	none	B, D	none
Anonymous 47	07/08/1967	Variety	y	rockabilly, folk	Jimi Hendrix	pop, jazz, blues, r&b	B, C	W, W, W, X
Barret	07/08/1967	Variety	y	electronic	The Paupers	none	none	none
Elwood	07/08/1967	Billboard	y	none	Janis Joplin	pop, folk	A, B	W, X
Gross 3	07/29/1967	Billboard	y	folk	Simon & Garfunkel	jazz, pop	B, D	Y, W
Anonymous 49	08/09/1967	Variety	y	psychedelic	Country Joe & the Fish	none	B	none
Gross 5	08/12/1967	Billboard	y	philosophical	Chris Wilson	none	B	none
Gross 6	08/31/1967	Billboard	y	none	none	none	D	none
Landau 1	09/01/1967	Crawdaddy	y	folk	Jimi Hendrix, Richie Havens	soul	B, C, D	Y
Kirby 1	07/20/1968	Billboard	y	none	none	classical	B	Z
Gross 7	08/31/1968	Billboard	y	acid, psyche-delic, hard, soft	Wind in the Willows	pop	B, D	W
Hall, C. 6	11/13/1968	Billboard	y	hip	Grateful Dead	none	D	none
Flippo	02/13/1975	Rolling Stone	y	none	Bad Company, Ike & Tina Turner	none	D	none
Melanson 3	11/01/1975	Billboard	y	none	none	disco, r&b	B, D	Y, Y
Anonymous 57	11/19/1975	Variety	y	none	none	disco	C	Y
Anonymous 60	09/22/1976	Variety	y	none	none	salsa	C, D	Z
Kozak 1	11/20/1976	Billboard	y	punk	Ramones, Lou Reed	none	B, D	none
Fishbein	01/12/1977	Variety	y	theatrical	Kiss, Parliament	disco	C, D	Y
Anonymous 67	02/23/1977	Variety	y	none	Ureaus	r&b	B	Z
Anonymous 68	03/02/1977	Variety	y	black	Natalie Cole	none	A, D	none
Kirby 1	04/13/1977	Variety	y	punk	Markay & the Hot Box	none	B	none
Swan 1	05/25/1977	Variety	y	punk	The Clash	none	B	none
Meyer 2	10/05/1977	Variety	y	punk, soft, new wave	none	disco	D	Z
Anonymous 74	11/02/1977	Variety	y	none	Barry Manilow	pop	D	W
Anonymous 75	12/08/1977	Variety	y	punk	Sex Pistols	none	B	none
Anonymous 77	05/17/1978	Variety	y	none	Three Dog Night	r&b	B	X, Y

Writer	Date	Magazine	Rock	Subgenres	Artists	Other Genres	Meaning	Rel.
Miller	01/26/1979	Wall Street Journal	y	none	none	disco	C	Y
Fuchs	02/05/1979	Village Voice	y	album oriented	Linda Ronstadt	disco	D	Y
Merritt 1	03/22/1979	Rolling Stone	y	none	none	disco	D	Y
Riedlinger	01/12/1980	Billboard	y	none	B52s	disco	B	Y
Kozak 2	02/23/1980	Billboard	y	none	none	disco	B, C	Y
Merritt 2	03/20/1980	Rolling Stone	y	new-wave, punk dance	B-52's	disco	B, D	Y
Anonymous 86	04/09/1980	Variety	y	none	none	MOR, black con-temporary jazz	B	Z
Bates	04/26/1980	Billboard	y	soft, and just plain rock	none	disco, folk, easy Listening, jazz	C	Y, Y, Y, Y
Anonymous 88	08/30/1980	Billboard	y	none	none	none	D	none
Harrison, E.	11/15/1980	Billboard	y	album oriented	none	disco	B, D	Y
Kozak 3	11/22/1980	Billboard	y	none	Linda Ronstadt, Journey	dance	D	Z
Loder	07/23/1981	Rolling Stone	y	punk, blitz	Stray Cats, Duran Duran	none	B	none
Gosse	11/23/1981	Village Voice	y	electro, punk	Depeche Mode	disco	B	Y
DiMauro 1	03/12/1986	Variety	y	album-oriented	none	none	D	none
Freeman 1	03/22/1986	Billboard	y	album	none	none	D	none
Goldberg, M. 1	04/10/1986	Rolling Stone	y	none	none	none	D	none
Brauer	05/17/1986	Billboard	y	none	Pete Townshend	none	B, C, D	none
Sutherland 2	05/17/1986	Billboard	y	album-oriented	Van Halen	noneDnone		
Goldberg, D.	01/14/1987	Variety	y	none	Judas Priest	rap, country	B	X, Z
Boehlert 1	08/22/1996	Rolling Stone	y	modern	Better than Ezra	none	C, D	none
Taylor 1	11/23/1996	Billboard	y	none	none	none	D	none
Boehlert 2	2/20/1997	Rolling Stone	y	modern	Prodigy	none	C,D	none

Writer	Date	Magazine	Rock	Subgenres	Artists	Other Genres	Meaning	Rel.
Flitner	03/22/1997	Billboard	y	alternative, authentic	Beatles	none	C	none
Wild	04/03/1997	Rolling Stone	y	industrial shock	Marilyn Manson	rap	D	Z
Schiffman 1	10/18/1997	Billboard	y	active, modern	Van Halen, Pearl Jam	none	D	none
Knopper	11/29/1997	Billboard	y	soft, alternative, classic	Smashmouth	new music for your life	D	Z
Carter et al	12/27/1997	Billboard	y	modern, classic	none	rap	D	Z
Boehlert 3	01/08/1998	Rolling Stone	y	classic	Fleetwood Mac	r&b, rap, pop	C, D	Z, Z, Z
Schiffman & Taylor 1	03/28/1998	Billboard	y	mainstream	Limp Bizkit	none	D	none
Reece	04/04/1998	Billboard	y	modern, main-stream	Soul Coughing	none	C, D	none
Boehlert 4	04/30/1998	Rolling Stone	y	none	Soundgarden	AC, r&b, country	C, D	Z, Z, Z
Taylor et al 1	05/09/1998	Billboard	y	hip-hop/heavy metal	Limp Bizkit	country, r&b	D	Z, Z
Taylor et al 2	05/09/1998	Billboard	y	pop	Bee Gees	country, r&b	D	Z, Z
Saxe & Schiffman	07/10/1999	Billboard	y	album	none	rap	D	Z
Schiffman & Tayloir 2	07/17/1999	Billboard	y	modern	The Clash	none	D	none
Taylor 3	07/17/1999	Billboard	y	modern	none	oldies	D	X, Y
Hall, D. et al	09/11/1999	Billboard	y	none	none	r&b, AC	D	Z, Z
Ross et al 1	01/08/2000	Billboard	y	70s, alternative	Michael Penn	AC, rhythmic, Rap, r&b	D	Z, Z, Z, Z
Ross et al 2	01/15/2000	Billboard	y	modern, heritage, classic	Rage against the Machine	AC, r&b, rap, rhythmic	D	A& Z, Z, X,Z
Schiffman & Ross	05/20/2000	Billboard	y	modern	Eiffel 65's	AC	C.D	X&Z
Hall, D, Ross & Saxe	03/31/2001	Billboard	y	none	none	r&b, country	D	Z, Z
Graybow	10/13/2001	Billboard	y	heritage, modern	none	none	D	none

Writer	Date	Magazine	Rock	Subgenres	Artists	Other Genres	Meaning	Rel.
Stark 2	05/17/2003	Billboard	y	none	Black Label Society	none	D	none

Appendix C: Periodical Breakdown List

Billboard

Author	Date	Title
Anonymous	10/30/1954	"Indie Diskers Back WDIA's R&B Bans"
Anonymous	10/30/1954	"Editorial"
Anonymous	7/23/1955	"Negro Artists Rise as Solid Pops Sellers"
Ackerman, Paul	7/23/1955	"Death Certificate Premature; R&B Ain't Ever Been Sick"
Anonymous	7/14/1956	"Now Freud Gets into Teenage R&R Act"
Anonymous	3/3/1958	"R&R Strong in Britain as Disk Business Booms"
Asbell, Bernie	5/18/1959	"R&R Fading, but Imprint Permanent".
Anonymous	8/31/1959	"New ASCAP View on Pop, Rock & Roll."
Grevatt, Ren	8/31/1959	"R&R's Cross over the Bridge to Filmland":
Anonymous	1/11/1960	"Old R&B Hits Pan New Gold in Pop Category".
Anonymous	1/18/1960	"The R&B Scene"
Hall, Claude	7/3/1965	"Rock 'n' Roll Attracting Wider Age Group Says Dick Clark"
Anonymous	8/14/1965	"WMCA, WABC Up as Disk Sales Influence"
Hall, Claude	8/14/1965	"R&B Stations Open Airplay to Blue-Eyed Soulists".
Tiegel, Elliot	8/14.1965	"Record of Absurd Gets Serious Play.
Sternfield, Aaron	8/21/1965	"Rock + Folk + Protest = An Erupting New Sound."
Hall, Claude	11/26/1 966	"Rock Big Thing on Campus."
Anonymous	5/6/1967	"America's Turned-On City."
Anonymous	6/24/1967	"S.F. 'Hiprock': Format of Future?"
Anonymous	7/1/1967	"Band Battles Trigger Spurt on Instruments."
Anonymous	7/1/1967	"Flying Machine Go to A&B as Writers."
Gross, Mike	7/1/1967	"NY 'Hippening' for Writers."
Anonymous	7/8/1967	"Fest a California 'Dream-In.'"
Barnett, Charles	7/8/1967	"Electric Circus: Fun & Talent on New Kick."
Gross, Mike	7/8/1967	"Popsters Pull 500G, 175,000 in Monterey Fest."
Gross, Mike	7/29/1967	"Analysts' Swing to Pop Art--Put Top 40 in CulturalClass."
Elwood, Phillip	7/8/1967	"Fest a California 'Dream-In.'"
Gross, Mike	8/5/1967	"Col. Plays Leadership Theme at Parley: Re-Signs Dylan, Mathis."
Gross, Mike	8/12/1967	"'Maverock' Disks Attract Hippies."
Fox, Hank	8/5/1967	"Chappell Erupts into Rock: Pushes BMI Pace in U.S.,U.K."
Ackerman, Paul & Mike Gross	11/18/1967	"Undergrounders' Fly-High--AGAC in Writers Pitch."
Mullinax, Ed	4/6/1968	"The Question of Dirty Lyrics."
Kirby, Fred	7/20/1968	"Pop Programs Dig Highbrow."

Ackerman, Paul & Don Ovens	8/3/1968	"Music Boundaries Busted in Artist, Tune Crossover."
Tiegel, Elliot	8/3/1968	"Dance Loses Footing as Halls Go Concert."
Dove, Ian	8/17/1968	"Motown Acts Draw Near-Capacity Crowd."
Kirby, Fred	8/17/1968	"RCA Drops Monaural in Pop and Red Seal Lines."
Kirby, Fred	8/17/1968	"Janis Joplin Tops at Fillmore East."
Tiegel, Elliot	8/24/1968	"TV Showcasing Black Artists."
Gross, Mike	8/31/1968	"Rock for All Reasons Steals Stations' Play."
Hall, Claude	8/31/1968	"Stations' Cool Drive Sprarkles."
Hall, Claude	8/31/1968	"Faith and Time Turn Tide for Hopeless Disks."
Hall, Claude	11/13/1968	"Hip-Rockers Facing 2 Obstacles."
Clark, S.C.	8/16/1969	"Soul Sounds in the Mass Marketplace."
Robinson, r.	8/16/1969	"Soul Music and Social Change."
Shaw, Arnold	8/16/1969	"The Rhythm & Blues Revival--No White Cloved Black Hits."
Denisoff, R. Serge	12/6/1969	"Folk-Rock: Folk Music, Protest, or Commercialism?"
Kirsch, Bob	7/6/1974	"Soul Acts' Staying Power New Factor."
Melanson, Jim	7/6/1974	"Labels Eye Discos as Hot Spots to Break R&B Product."
White, A.	9/28/1974	"Discoteque Culture in England Makes Soul Pirates Flourish."
Horowitz, Is	10/12/1974	"'Illegit' Disco Tapes Peddled by Jockeys."
Duston, Anne	5/17/1975	"Discos Will Revive Indie Labels, Consultant Avers."
Kirsch, Bob	5/17/1975	"A&R Experts Explain the Disco Sound."
Melanson, Jim	5/17/1975	"Discomania."
Melanson, Jim & Jean Williams	8/9/1975	"Disco Community, Labels Work Together."
Anonymous	11/1/1975	"Disco: Music to Move To."
Fishel, Jim	11/1/1975	"Large and Small Labels Push for Disco Exposure."
Melanson, Jim	11/1/1975	"The Disco Phenomenon Goes On and On: Artists Born Again, Hits without Radio, New Retail Action, Playback Equipment Boom, Lights Bonanza."
Anonymous	2/28/1976	"Acts Prefer Branch Distrib.; Flee Indies."
Hall, Claude	2/28/1976	"More Small Top 40s Adopt Tighter Playlist."
Melanson, Jim	2/28/1976	"Producers Probe New Disco Sound."
Black, Michael	8/21/1976	"An Open Letter from One Disk Jockey to Another."
Hall, Claude	10/2/1976	"NRBA Confab a Success; Conquers Majors' Boycott."
Joe, Radcliffe	10/2/1976	"Disco Music Sounds Undergoing Changes."
Tiegel, Eliot	10/2/1976	"Jumbo Size Singles Spark Controversy."
Williams, Jean	11/6/1976	"Integration Is Decreasing Profit, Black Owner Says."
Kozak, Roman	11/20/1976	"Punk Rock Following Growing in N.Y."

Horowitz, Is	12/11/1976	"BMI Bagging $100,000 in Fees via 900 Disco Clubs."
Joe, Radcliffe	1/8/1977	"Discos Seek a Defined Profile: Future Encouraging, but Purges Appear Mandatory."
Anonymous	1/15/1977	"Music Must Change."
Anonymous	1/15/1977	"By AFM Exec Disco Blast"
Anderson, Terry	1/15/1977	"U.S. Disco Deejays Test 45s In Clubs."
Hall, Mildred	2/26/1977	"DJ-Concert Promoter Tie in FCC Probe."
Joe, Radcliffe	4/2/1977	"Disco Discrimination Studied in N.Y."
Hall, Mildred	6/4/1977	"WOL DJ's Loyalty Cleard of Charges."
Anonymous	7/22/1977	"New Hit Songs Scarce So Publisher Pulls an 'Alert.'"
Anonymous	7/9/1977	Scots Mull Punk Ban."
Anonymous	8/27/1977	"Punk Pacts Hit Crest in U.K."
Anonymous	9/3/1977	"Club Chains: Despite Dire Predictions, Peaceful Relations Exist with Independents."
Ford, Robert	9/3/1977	"Now a Distinct Idiom: The Changing Sound of Records."
Anonymous	10/8/1977	"AFM Locals Goose Anti-Club Drive."
Williams, Jean	10/8/1977	"L.A. Small Labels Walk Pickets: Independents "ccuse Radio of Major Label Favoritism."
Joe, Radcliffe	3/11/1978	"Disco Label Fatal, Says Pavia."
Anonymous	6/2/1978	"Disco Giving Black Radio a Hard Time."
Grein, Paul	6/24/1978	"Media at Long Last Accepting Disco Fever."
Penchansky, Alan	6/24/1978	"Relations Improve between Club Owners, Djs."
Roth, R.	6/24/1978	"Cnstant Conflict: BMI & ASCAP vs. Clubs."
Joe, Radcliffe	8/19/1978	"Ad Agencies Go to Disco to Sell Product."
Penchansky, Aaron	11/11/1978	"Opposition Aplenty to Disco DJs Trade Assn: Record Pools Named as Roadblocks."
Hall, Doug	11/25/1978	"Disco Format Cutting Swath in U.S. Radio."
Kahn, Henry	11/25/1978	"Polygram in 40% Buy of Barclay Co."
Ford, Robert & Irv Lichtman	1/27/1979	"Disco Dampens R&B Ballad Acts."
Harrison, Ed	1/27/1979	"Exit Is Shock to Indie Ranks."
Anonymous	3/10/1979	"Record Cos. Expand Involvement in Disco."
Joe, Radcliffe	4/7/1979	"Assn. Fearful Disco Hurting Black Music."
Anonymous	5/19/1979	"Alienation Boosts Disco: Sklar."
Hall, Doug	5/26/1979	"Disco Stations Levelling Off."
Ochs, Ed	6/9/1979	"Disco: Paradox or Paradise."
Hall, Doug	7/7/1979	"Heads Roll as Disco Sound Dominates N.Y."
Kozak, Roman	7/7/1979	"Retailer Fuming over Sales Slump."
Anonymous	7/14/1979	"'Studio 54' LP Shipping Begins."
Anonymous	7/14/1979	"Disco Not Proving Panacea for Black Artists."
George, Nelson	7/14/1979	"Fatal Prognosis Wrong: Client Alive & Well."

Gortikov, Stanley	7/28/1979	"The Fairness in Pay-for-Play."
Ditingo, Vincent	8/11/1979	"Disco Format's Success Faster than Anticipated."
Grein, Paul	8/11/1979	"Club Spinners, DJs Debate Audience Appeal."
Sanders, Susan	8/18/1979	"Fickle Patrons Make for 'Musical Chairs' Disco."
Ford, Robert	9/3/1979	"The Changing Sound of Records."
Fienstein, Stewart & Ed Newmark	9/8/1979	"Diverting Dollars to Disco."
Geroge, Nelson	9/15/1979	"Are Label Cutbacks Oerplayed?"
Hall, Doug	9/29/1979	"Disco Radio at a Peak?"
Hall, Doug	11/17/1979	"Foreinger Success Laid to Close Contact with Radio Execs, DJs."
Case, Dwight	12/1/1979	"Radio's Stake in Disk Profits."
Lomax, Alan III	12/1/1979	"Letter to the Editor."
Fink, Bob	12/1/1979	"Letter to the Editor."
Anonymous	12/8/1979	"Word 'Disco' Dirty in New York Radio."
Lichtman, Irv	12/8/1979	"Publishers Radio Promo: 'Selective.'"
Sherwood, Bob	12/22/1979	"The Radio-Record Connection."
Lederer,. Barry	1/12/1980	"Disco Mix."
Riedlinger, Bob	1/12/1980	"Long Island Deejays Probe Public Tastes."
Collier, Mike	2/2/1980	"Thank God for Americans! Who Else Would so Clearly Show Us the Way Not to Go."
Depte, Larry	2/2/1980	"Black Music Is Pop Music."
Kozak, Roman	2/23/1980	"Rock Overwhelming the Clubs' Playlists."
Baron, Ron	4/12/1980	"A Prescription for Survival: Hype Transplant Can Keep a Disk from Becoming a Stiff."
Davis, Dave	4/12/1980	"Ripping Radio's Play Barrier."
Bates, Joseph	4/26/1980	"Commentary: Setting the Record Straight, Label Execs Misjudge the Disco-Music Public."
Lesniewski, Diane	4/26/1980	"The Perils in Format Change."
Cloer, Mike	6/21/1980	"Who's Pulling the Strings?"
Lictman, Irv	7/19/1980	"Music Publishers Respond to Demands of Club Marketplace."
Hall, Doug	7/14/1980	"R&B Programming Hides Extinct Disco."
Anonymous	8/16/1980	"Station Owners Guilty of Copyright Infringement."
Kozak, Roman	8/16/1980	"'Rock World' Tube Show in 15 Marts."
Anonymous	8/30/1980	"Labels Ignored as NAB Air Their Views."
Zachary, Donna	11/1/1980	"Barking Up the Wrong Tree."
Harrison, Ed	11/15/1980	"Where Have All the Black Sounds Gone?"
Kozak, Roman	11/22/1980	"Tightening Radio Playlists Bring New Act Alternatives."
Grein, Paul	1/31/1981	"Nobody Wants to Rock Anymore."
Anonymous	2/21/1981	"Robbins Tries to Remain Disco-Rocker."
Grein, Paul	2/21/1981	"Promo Indies Feeling Squeeze of Changes."
Harrison, Mike	7/4/1981	"The Ethics of Credibility."

Grein, Paul	8/15/1981	"Promo Men Lament Fragmentation--Getting Harder to Get Hard Rock Played, They Say."
Harrison, Mike	10/10/1981	"Disk Jockeys: An Endangered Spieces?"
Gilbert, J.	1/19/1982	"Disco Lives: Technological Advances Lead Way as Genre Experiences Growth in Europe."
Chin, Brian	6/191982	"Where the Beat Meets the Street."
Darling, Cary	6/19/1982	"Danceable Rock Generates First Bevy of Crossover Stars."
Joe, Radcliffe	6/19/1982	"Pools Service Close Ties to Label Promotion."
Soccio, Gino	9/18/1982	"Comentary: Breaking Artifical Barriers."
Norwood, Eric	9/18/1982	"Letter to the Editor."
Jay, Michael	9/18/1982	"Letter to the Editor."
Bellamy, Fay	9/18/1982	"Letter to the Editor."
Harrison, Mike	11/27/1982	"You Can't Be Progressive & No. 1."
Bessman, J.	10/12/1985	"Club Jocks Bemonas Lack of Attention: Record Companies Taken to Task."
Grein, Paul et al	9/28/1985	"What Does It Take to Break a New Artist."
Prager, Bud	2/15/1986	"Surrendering Creative Control."
Anonymous	3/3/1986	"Editorial: Indie Promotion: A Time for Action."
Halper, Donna	3/15/1986	"Defusing a Witch-Hunt: In Defense of Independent Promotion."
Holland, Bill	3/15/1986	"Assns. Address Payola: Say if it Exists, It Isn't Widespread."
Ingram, John P.	3/15/1986	"Letter to the Editor."
Lichtman, Irv	3/15/1986	"More Key Labels Sever Indie Ties."
Walczak, Jerome	3/15/1986	"Letter to the Editor."
Freeman, Kim	3/22/1986	"PDs on Indies: Phones Have Gone Quiet."
Anonymous	3/29/1986	"DiLeo on Indies: It's a Shame What the Labels Did."
Anonymous	3/29/1986	"Managers Irate over Indies."
Brauer, Larry	5/17/1986	"Why I Resigned from Rock Radio: A Continuous Commercial."
Molesky, Linda	5/17/1986	"NAIRD Meet Draws Newcomers and Vets: Indies Eye Distribution, Marketing Problems."
Singmaster, Carl	5/17/1986	"Letter to the Editor: Breaking New Artists."
Sutherland, Sam	5/17/1986	"Clive Davis Blasts Radio 'Conservatism': Arista Chief Calls for Musical Revolt."
Freeman, Kim	4/18/1987	"One Year Later, Radio Eyes Indie Suspension Aftermath."
Freeman, Kim	11/7/1987	"Labels Try But Can't Halt Radio Leaks."
Lichtman, Irv	11/7/1987	"P'Gram, Isgro Drop Suits."
DiMartino, D.	1/9/1988	"Lawyers Mull 'Legal' Payola."
Anonymous	4/23/1988	"Major Labels Eye Airplay Alternatives."
Morris, Chris	4/23/1988	"L.A. Judge Finds Pisello Guilty of Tax Evasion."

Anonymous	5/21/1988	"Crossover Pioneers Leaning Top 40."
Haring, Bruce	5/21/1988	"Roulette's Levy Painted as Victim in N.J. Cutout Trial."
Holland, Bill	11/2/1996	"Justice Dept. Investigates Post-Telecom Act Radio Mergers."
Taylor, Chuck	11/23/1996	"Justice Approves Infinity Sale."
Flitner, David	3/22/1997	"Commentary: Don't Stifle Rock's Creative Expansion."
Christman, Ed	4/26/1997	"FTC Begins Agnother Music Biz Inquiry."
Gray, Billy	6/14/1997	"Commentary: Quality Should Be Industry's Watchword.."
Schiffman, Marc	10/18/1997	"Active Rock, Modern AC Put the Squezze on Modern."
Knopper, Steve	11/29/1997	
Carter, Kevin, Janine Coveney, Dana Hall, Marc Schiffman, Phillis Stark & Bill Holland	12/27/1997	"B'Casters, Labels Grapple with Paid Airplay Issue."
Schiffman, Marc	3/28/1998	"Pay-for-Play Comes to Radio on KUFO."
Reece, Doug	4/4/1998	"KREV Fans Rally for Radio Diversity: Buyout of Progression Outlet Sparks Action, CD."
Taylor, Chuck, Bradley Bambarger, Melinda Newman, Chet Flippo, Phyllis Stark, Chris Morris, Anita Samuels & Marc Schiffman	5/9/1998	"Paid Play Changing Biz Landscape: Rise of Direct Label'Radio Pacts Sparks Wide-Ranging Debate."
Taylor, Chuck, Bradley Bambarger, Melinda Newman, Chet Flippo, Phyllis Stark, Chris Morris, Anita Samuels & Marc Schiffman	5/9/1998	"Pay-for-Play Sparks Debate of Where Labels' Money Goes."
McGeever, Mike	11/19/1998	"Pay-for-Play Sparks Talks at NAB Europe."
Taylor, Chuck	12/26/1998	"Merger Frenzy Continues Unabated; Jacor/Clear Channel, Chancelloir/Capstar Deals Lead Pack."
Saxe, Frank & Jeff Silberman	1/30/1999	"Politicians Call for FCC to Examine Label/Radio Deals."

Saxe, Frank	4/3/1999	"FCC Green-Lights Promotional Deals."
Saxe, Frank & Marc Schiffman	7/10/1999	"Entercom Wants Its PDs to Pull Songs Promoting Violence."
Schiffman, Marc & Chuck Taylor	7/17/1999	"Satellite Service Could Signal Radio's Return to Creativity."
Taylor, Chuck	7/17/1999	"Air Waves: Satellite Service Could Signal Radio's Return to Creativity."
Hall, Dana, Marc Schiffman, Jeff Silberman & Phyllis Stark	9/11/1999	"Radio Consultants Still in Shakeout."
Anonymous	9/18/1999	"Indie Promoter Panel Brings Up Pay-for-Play."
Saxe, Frank	11/13/1999	"U.S. Payola Investigation Eyes 80 PDs."
Heasman, Jon	11/27/1999	"Less Competition May Lead to More Variety: Radio Exec Report Say Listeners Have Greater Choice after Mergers."
Stark, Phyllis	12/4/1999	"Do MDs Still Call the Shots at Radio?"
Ross, Sean, Dana Hall, Marc Schiffman, Jeff Silberman & Phyllis Stark	1/8/2000	"A Radio Retrospective for the '90s: Decade Kicked Off With Fall of Top 40, Rise of Hip-Hop."
Ross, Sean, Dana Hall, Mark Schiffman, Jeff Silberman & Phyllis Stark	1/15/2000	"Megapoly Makes On-Air Impact: Mid-'90s Consolidation Had Major Effect on Programming.
Schiffman, Marc & Sean Ross	5/20/2000	"WLIR Raises Modern Rock Issues: Is L.I. Outlet Too Pop, or a Champion of '80s Style Alternative."
Hall, Dana, Sean Ross & Frank Saxe	3/31/2001	"Crossovers Struggle to Keep Base: Recent Pop-Sounding Singles Meet Resistance at R&B Radio."
Saxe, Frank	3/24/2001	"CC Sees Labels as Revenue Source."
Heasman, Jon, Charles Ferro & Frank Saxe	3/31/2001	"Newsline."
Graybow, Steve	10/13/2001	"Ban Rumors Dispelled, Songs Don't Suffer."
Hall, Dana	3/23/2002	"Radio One Promotion Deal Raises Questions."
Stark, Phyllis	5/17/2003	"Small Labels Jarred by Indie Promo Ban."
Sanders, Tony, Chuck Taylor, Paul	3/3/2005	"Spitzer Still Looking: N.Y. Attorney General Has Artist Support in Payola Probe."

Heine & Bill Holland		
Butler, Susan	5/17/2005	"Two Indies Sue Uni Label Group."

Variety

Author	**Date**	**Title**
Schoenfeld, Herm	1/19/1955	"R&B Big Beat in Pop Music, Teenagers Like 'Hot Rod' Tempo."
Anonymous	3/23/1955	"Negro D.J. Raps Spread of Filth."
Anonymous	6/13/1956	"Rock 'n' Roll Pros 'n' Cons."
Anonymous	6/13/1956	"See R.I.P. Sign on Rock 'n' Roll."
Anonymous	6/13/1956	"R&R Not for Heat?"
Anonymous	6/13/1956	"Diskers Trying to Sweat It Out Re Showmanship."
Anonymous	6/20/1956	"Buck Ram, A Rock 'n' Roll Cleffer, Sez 'Drop the Tag but Keep the Beat."
Anonymous	7/11/1956	"Rock 'n' Roll Hits the Couch."
Anonymous	8/15/1956	"Near-Riot in Houston as Police Nix Dancing by Negroes at R&R'er."
Anonymous	9/26/1956	"Rahs 'n' Raps on Rock 'n' Roll."
Anonymous	2/27/1957	"D.J.s Don't Buy Payola Blast."
Anonymous	5/1/1957	"Keeping Up with Jones on Rock 'n' Roll; Prof Puts Beat on a Couch."
Anonymous	7/24/1957	"Top Standards on Radio and TV."
Anonymous	1/8/1958	"Rock 'N' Roll Ebbs; D.J De-Accented on Indie Outlets."
Barnett, Barry	1/8/1958	"R 'N' R and Skiffle Saved British Tin Pan Alley."
Freed, Alan	1/8/1958	"One Thing's for Sure, RNR Is Boffo."
Traube, Leonard	5/14/1958	"What Hath Rock 'N' Roll Wrought?"
Anonymous	6/17/1959	"Alan Freed Set to Face Boston Trial June 29 in Rock 'n' Roll Riot Case."
Anonymous	3/2/1960	"Rock 'n' Roll's Global Wane."
Anonymous	3/2/1960	"Fading Single Biz Spotlights Need for Solid LP
Talents:		Mitch Miller."
Roberts, Paddy	1/6/1965	"'Beat' Will Die Hard; Teenagers Determine Diskery Economics."
Schoenfeld, Herm	9/29/1965	"If It's Not Rock, What Is It? Randazzo Cites Major Changes."
Anonymous	6/1/1966	"Young Pop Singer Raps 'Dirty-Looking' Groups; 'They Act That Way Too.'"
Schoenfeld, Herm	6/8/1966	"Pop Music's 'Moral Crisis'; Dope Tunes Fan Disk Jockey Ire."

Anonymous	9/7/1966	"Beatles Unwitting Agent of Red Revolution, Sez One Right-Wing Group."
Shaw, Arnold	1/4/1967	"Freak Out/Psychedelic/Folk Rock Supersede Sex/Vex/ Wrecks."
Anonymous	6/14/1967	"Underground Groups Stir Diskery Interest as Sources of New Talent."
Schoenfeld, Herm	6/14/1967	"Stereo Standard: CBS' Davis Sees Industry Hypo."
Anonymous	6/14/1967	"No R&R Among Top 4 Vocalists in Frend Poll of Public's Fancies."
Anonymous	7/12/1967	"Growth of Hippy 'Catch-All Houses Stirs Need for Talent Tryout Site."
Anonymous	7/12/1967	"'Whiter Shade of Pale' Becoms Biggest Selling Disk in Swiss History."
Anonymous	7/12/1967	"French Disk Biz in Doldrums as Sales Slide 20%."
Anonymous	7/12/1967	"Shuffle Top Execs at Liberty Records."
Anonymous	8/9/1967	"New Breed of Psychedelic Rock Iconoclasts Eager to Light Up Future."
Anonymous	1/16/1968	"CBS and Cameo-Parkway May Split Chappell Music in a $60,000,000 Deal."
Pines, M.	7/30/1969	"Brotherhood and Racial Equality Keynote New Disk Crop of Pops."
"nonymous	10/29/1969	"R&B Music Goes 'Progressive' Soul."
Anonymous	3/5/1975	"WB's Cornyn Sees Sole Reliance on Radio as Fatal to Disk Biz."
Shoenfeld, Herm	3/19/1975	"Is Radio Top 40 Public Service? Charge Grinding of Hits Tunes Benefits Few."
Meyer, Frank	4/9/1975	"Indie Promo Firms Push Singles as 'Top 40' Stations Curb Lists."
Anonymous	11/19/1975	"Disco Trend Swinging on TV: Value of Song Play Multiplied."
Rees, Bob	11/19/1975	"Rock Promoters Can't Make Out Even if SRO."
Schoenfeld, Herm	12/10/1975	"Standard Music Back in Groove Via Disco Wave."
Anonymous	7/14/1976	"Bogart's Casablanca Co. Bets on TV Promoting Record Sales."
Anonymous	7/14/1976	"UA to Administer Buddah Music Firms."
Schoenfeld, Herm	8/4/1976	"RCA Confab Told New Talent Key to Biz; Radio's Not Cooperating."
Anonymous	9/22/1976	"P.R. Pop Cleffes Say Payola Boosts Rock and Salsa."
Anonymous	11/3/1976	"Casablanca Records in Merger with Peter Gruber's Film Outfit."
Anonymous	11/3/1976	"TK Label Aims to Break Out of Singles Biz; Promotes Concert."

Fishbein, Ed	1/12/1977	"Casablanca Double Gross to $26 Mil; Bogart's Anti-Formula."
Anonymous	2/9/1977	"Discos Can Sell Disks, Almost Like Pop Music Radio."
Anonymous	2/23/1977	"FCC Probe of Payola Spreads Cross Country."
Anonymous	3/9/1977	"FCC Digs Deeper into D.C. Payola."
Anonymous	3/9/1977	"NARM Seminar Goes to Roots of Black Music Role in Disk Biz."
Anonymous	3/9/1977	"Higher-Priced Disks Still a Bargain."
Anonymous	3/9/1977	"RSO Exits Race for Rolling Stones."
Anonymous	3/9/1977	"Motown Sues CBS in Jackson Five Action."
Anonymous	3/9/1977	"Buddah in Distrib Tie with RCA; Col to Handle Playboy."
Anonymous	4/13/1977	"RSO, Island Tie Promotion Efforts."
Kirby, Fred	4/13/1977	"British Punk Rockers Get N.Y. Toehold: Big Guns Aimed at Nabe Theate."
Anonymous	5/25/1977	"Green Sings Blues at Payola Probe; Jocks Cut Payoff."
Swan, Steve	5/25/1977	"Anti-Social Punk Rockers Now a British Trend; "ll Labels Try for a Piece of Reaction."
Meyer, Frank	10/5/1977	"Casablanca's Link to Polygram Adds to Talent Heft: Neil Bogart."
Anonymous	11/2/1977	"Clive Davis Sees Pop Trend on Disks back to Good Tunes."
Anonymous	11/2/1977	"Playboy Label Slashes Staff; Takayoshi Out."
Anonymous	12/8/1977	"Foul-Mouthed 'Punk Rock' Cult Looms as New Pop Music Menace."
Kirby, Fred	1/4/1978	"New Wave Rolls Out of Punk: Face U.S. Market Test in 1978."
Swan, Steve	1/25/1978	"A Case of Pure Hype: Punk Rock Falls Flat on Its Mug Globally."
Anonymous	5/17/1978	"Black Is Black, White Is White, But Things Sometimes Look Alike."
Meyer, Frank	4/4/1979	"Disco Breaking Color Barriers but Fear New Separation Trend."
Lichtman, Irv & Stephen Traiman	9/29/1979	"Merchandisers Miffed as Labels 'Get Tough.'"
Sippel, John	9/29/1979	"Raw Materials Hike Pressing Fees."
Anonymous	3/19/1980	"Minority Owned Stations Rising: Up 37 in Year."
Anonymous	3/19/1980	"600G to Motown in CBS Settlement of Jacksons' Case."
Anonymous	3/19/1980	"'The Wall' Tops All on 3 Variety Lists; 'Wind,' 'Houses' In."

Murphy, Fred	3/19/1980	"Black Music Execs See Flaws, Strengths in Marketing System; Charts, Top 40 Rapped."
Anonymous	4/9/1980	"Agency Finds Focus on MOR, Black Acts Boosting '80 Outlook."
Goldberg, Danny	1/14/1986	"Attacks on Disk Biz Continues Despite Its Social Conscience."
DiMauro, Phil	3/12/1986	"Album Rock Promo Caught in Crunch of Current Scandal."
Schipper, Henry	3/12/1986	"CBS, Polygram, A&M Halt Use of Indie Promoters; MCA Says 'No Comment' on Probe Reports."
Schipper, Henry	4/9/1986	"NBC's 'New Payola' Statements Draw Isgro Retraction Demand."
Terry, Ken	1/14/1987	"Probes, Suits Cast Cloud over Disk Biz: Bright Side Is Soaring CD Sales."
Anonymous	5/27/1987	"Kids Don't Control Music Marketplace Claims WB's Kapp.'
DiMauro, Phil	6/3/1987	"Indie Promoters Back in Force: Distributed Labels Using Them, Managers Conduit for Majors."
Schipper, Henry	1/13/1988	"1st Payola Probe Indictment Issued against IRS Agent."
Schipper, Henry	3/2/1988	"Payola Probe Shakes Disk Biz; Aftershocks May Be Even Worse."
Anonymous	4/6/1988	"A&M Latest to End Isgro Antitrust Suit."

Melody Maker

Writer	**Date**	**Article**
Anonymous	5/12/1956	"Jim Crow Chief Hits at Rock and Roll."
Anonymous	5/26/1956	"'Jungle Music' Cry at Randall U.S. Show."
Anonymous	9/8/1956	"About Rock 'n' Roll."
Race, Steve	2/8/1958	"Now We're Rock Bottom."
Anonymous	5/17/1958	"Skiffle on the Skids."
Grevatt, Ren	12/6/1958	"Rock Can Be Good and BAD! Says Perry Como."
Anonymous	12/20/1958	"The Big Beat Has Left Its Mark."
Brown, Tony & Ren Grevatt	9/3/1960	"The New Sound Is Here."
Dawburn, Bob	3/30/1963	"Well--What Is R&B?"
Coleman, Ray	2/29/1964	"Where Does Beat Begin and R&B End?"
Coleman, Ray	5/9/1964	"Just What Is R&B?"
Anonymous	6/5/1965	"Last of the R&B Groups?"

Anonymous	9/23/1967	"Forty Minutes Which Changed Otis' Life."
Dawburn, Bob	10/26/1968	"Don't Laugh, But the Next Stop Could Be Pop as a Political Power."
Anonymous	12/11/1976	"Pros and Cons of Punk."
Coon, Caroline	11/27/1976	"Punk Rock: Rebels against the System."
Partridge, Robert	4/23/1977	"Punk Rock" There's Money in Anarchy."
Frith, Simon	3/10/1979	"Post Punk TensionsBand Resolutions."
Frith, Simon	3/15/1980	"The Empty Gesture."

Rolling Stone

Writer	**Date**	**Article**
Flippo, Chet	2/13/1975	"Recession Takes Toll on Rock and Roll; Concerts Slump, Promoters Take Lumps."
Landau, Jon	12/15/1977	"Rock Ages: The Thrill Is Gone."
Anonymous	1/26/1978	"U.S. Radio Fails to Ride the New Wave."
Flippo, Chet	1/26/1978	"Sire's Seymour Stein Fathers American Punk."
Anonymous	8/23/1979	"Random Notes."
Merritt, Jay	3/22/1979	"Disco Station Number One in New York."
Anonymous	11/1/1979	"Disco Boom May Be Over."
Merrit, Jay	3/20/1980	"Rock Strikes Back! New Wave Challenges Disco as America's Favorite Dance Music."
Loder, Kurt	7/23/1981	"Dress Right! Punk Is Dead, Blitz Is King--And England Swings Again."
Connelly, Christopher	12/9/1982	"Rock Radio: A Case of Racism?"
Goldberg, Michael	4/10/1986	"Payola Changes Rock Record Biz."
Goldberg, Michael	4/17/1986	"L.A. Grand Jury Hands Up Payola Indictments."
Haring, Bruce	1/29/1987	"L.A. Probe Focussing on Record Returns."
Goldberg, Michael	4/21/1988	"Payola: The Record-Label Connections."
Boehlert, Eric	8/22/1996	"Pay-To-Play: Independent Promoters Cash In on the Hits as Alternative Radio Becomes Big Business."
Boehlert, Eric	2/20/1997	"Is the Boom Over? With Record Sales Stagnant for the Second Year in a Row, The Music Industry Ponders What Went Wrong."
Wild, D.	4/3/1997	"Inside the Hit Factory: In the Midst of a Music-Industry Slump, Interscope Records Has Found Success--And Controversy--While Defining the New Sound of Young America."
Boehlert, Eric	1/8/1998	"The Year in Business."
Boehlert, Eric	4/30/1998	"Corporate Radio Still Sucks; Listeners Are the Loser as Mommoth Companies Swallow Up Radio Stations."

Kot, Greg	1/18/2001	"Megamerger Bad for Fans: Concert Prices Likely to Rise."
Werde, Bill	11/24/2004	"Major-Label Payola Probe: New York Attorney General Launches Investigation into Labels/Links with Radio Stations."

Down Beat

Writer	Date	Article
Cage, Ruth	1/12/1955	"Rhythm and Blues Notes."
Cage, Ruth	4/20/1955	"Rhythm and Blues Notes."
Anonymous	7/27/1955	"Rhythm and Blues."
Banks, Dave	5/2/1956	"Group Seeks to Remove R&B Discs from Boxes."
Anonymous	9/19/1956	"Guy Lombardo Won't Touch It."
Ford, Art & Ben Walstein	9/19/1956	"A Psychologist's Viewpoint."
Portch, Al	9/19/1956	"Manager of Bill Haley Defends the 'Real Thing.'"
Freed, Alan	9/19/1956	"Alan Freed Says: 'I Told You So."
Williams, Martin	10/21/1965	"The Razing of Vienna."

The Wall Street Journal

Writer	Date	Article
Kaufman, Murray	7/5/1967	"The New Music--Telling It Like It Is."
Henninger, Daniel	1/26/1979	"Disco Booms with the Soul of Music."
Miller, Gaye Sands	1/26/1979	"New York City Fever: Disco Sound Propels WKTU to the Top."

Crawdaddy

Writer	Date	Article
Meltzer, Richard	Mar 1967	"The Aesthetics of Rock."
Landau, Jon	Sep 1967	"A Whiter Shade of Black."
Farina, Richard	Mar 1968	"Your Own True Name: Songwriting in the '60s."
Knobler, P.	Jul 1976	"Editorial."
Robinson, L.	Mar 1977	"Bored Brits Look to Punk Rock."

The Village Voice

Writer	Date	Article
Aletti, Vince	2/13/1978	"Riffs: Disco Fever Stays More than Alive."
Fuchs, Aaron	2/5/1979	"Riffs:: The Disco Sound as Rock and Roll Reality."
Kopkind, Andrew	2/5/1979	"Chic Say Freak."
Rose, Frank	11/12/1979	"Discophobia: Rock & Roll Fights Back."

Gosse, Van	11/23/1981	"Riffs: Dancing in My Booth."
Marsh, Dave	4/1/1986	"Payola's Bottom Line."

Cash Box

Writer	Date	Article
Anonymous	1/29/1955	"New York."
Anonymous	5/16/1964	"Soul Disks Sell."
Anonymous	7/4/1964	"R&B-Rock; Is It Breaking the Sound Barrier?"

Jazz Journal

Writer	Date	Article
King, George	Feb 1957	"Rhythm and Blues: An Apologia."
Standish, Tony	Oct 1959	"The Big Beat Generation."

Creem

Writer	Date	Article
Basher, Jack	Nov 1977	"Catch a Wave? No, West Coast New Wave? Creem's Punk Guide Staggers On."
Robinson, Richard	Nov 1977	"So You Wanna Be a Rock and Roll Star: Creem's Irreverent Guide to the Music Business."
Anonymous	Mar 1979	"Rock Revolution."

The Christian Science Monitor

Writer	Date	Article
Frutig, Judith	2/17/1977	"'Punk Rock' Attacked by Religious, Civic Groups."
Sweeney, Louise	3/1/1977	"Broadcasting Payola Sparks FCC Hearing."

Hi-Fi/Musical American/Stereo Review

Writer	Date	Article
Ackerman, Paul	Jun 1958	"What Has Happened to Popular Music?"
Gabree, John	Aug 1969	"Rock: Art, Revolution, or Sell Out?"
Ramin, Jordan	Aug 1974	"How to Launch a Hit Song."
Holden, Stephen	Feb 1980	"A&R Men to Singer/Songwriters: 'Get Commercial or Get Lost.'"
Sutherland, Sam	Oct 1979	"Rock 'n' Recession."

Sing Out

Writer	Date	Article
Danson, J.	1966	"Folk-Rock: Thunder without Rain."

The New York Times

Writer	Date	Article
Strauss, Neil	8/1/2000	"Recording Industry's Strictest Censor Is Itself."

Appendix D: Article Tables

This table breaks down the articles found in the Article Bibliography in three different categories: (1) those articles that give examples of formulaic imitation; (2) those articles that show either the development or implementation of templates, as Adorno would suggest; and (3) those articles that chronicle the history of industry intent, or in other words, those articles that document an established pattern of conscious behavior to exert control over popular music and the popular music industry. These articles are listed chronologically. I cite what each reports, and the relevance of the particular article to the issue of standardization. Anonymous articles are listed by magazine

Table 1. Articles that Demonstrate Formulaic Imitation

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Cage	01/12/1955	Rhythm & Blues	Author cites Freed as main source of new r&b recording r&b popularity	Also cites trend of pop stars songs
Schoenfeld	01/19/1955	R&B Big Beat	Teenagers like r&b/rock for dancing	A reason for rock's initial mainstreaming
Down Beat	07/27/1955	Rhythm & Blues	Rock "hullaballoo" over, but fad helped r&b r&b knock-offs sold as reason for teenage selectivity	Writer points to proliferation of
Banks	05/02/1956	Group Seeks to	Violence threatened against rock stations and production	Reaction against increased rock sponsors
Variety	08/15/1956	Near-Riot in	Police action at a Houston Fats Domino concert	Rock fostered integration, but authorities anxious about race-mixing
Freed	09/19/1956	Alan Freed Says	DJ predicts that rock will become larger phenomenon	Freed offers 1955 successes to prove rock viability
Portch	09/19/1956	Manager of Bill	African American church lineage means rock not vulgar	Legitimization of rock would allow more investment
Variety	09/26/1956	Rahs 'n' Raps	Concert violence making rock less viable	Majors see more reason to put rock aside
Barnett	01/08/1958	R'n'R and Skiffle	Rock success helped UK publishers via disc sales	Publisher revenue from discs.; UK music industry adapts to rock record sales
Freed	01/08/1958	One Thing's For	Freed encourages more venues to feature rock	Success should spawn imitation
Billboard.	03/03/1958	R&R Strong in	UK publishers anxious to acquire rock catalog	Article relates rock success to skiffle

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Life	04/18/1958	Rock 'N Roll	Photos showing rock is fun; and threatening	Shows question of continued viability of youth market
Traube	05/14/1958	What Hath Rock	Media coverage of 1958 Boston rock riot	International interest in story indicates rock's growing visibility and viability
Ackerman	06/01/1958	What Has Happen	Summary of rock history during the 1950s	Popularity of Negro acts spurred white imitation
Grevatt	12/06/1958	Rock Can Be	Pop star feels glut of bad music hides good rock songs	Como covered some r&b songs as did other pop stars
Billboard	08/31/1959	New ASCAP View	ASCAP Pres. opens door to rock publishing	If rock is the wave of future, better to start early
Grevatt	08/31/1959	R&R's Cross Over	Rock used more in films	Public catches onto rock in other ways than records and radio
Variety	03/02/1960	Jimmy Snow Smears	Former rocker swears off rock immorality	Reaction against rock expansion
Roberts	01/06/1965	'Beat' Will Die	"Afro-Harlem" beat liked by teens, who control the record industry	Writer sees rock more as a continuation of African American music
Hall, C.	07/03/1965	Rock 'n' Roll	Dick Clark feels rock gaining an older audience	Rock more closely identified as mainstream 'pop' fare; nothing special or exotic
Sternfield	08/31/1965	Rock + Folk	Growing popularity of "folk-rock"	Columbia and other majors acquiring folk-rock acts
Variety	06/01/1966	Young Pop Singer	Pop star hates marketing of hippie look	Standardization of visual media surrounding rock
Schoenfeld	06/08/1966	Pop Music's 'Mo	DJs criticize perceived hidden messages in rock	Reaction against rock expansion similar to 1950s anti-rock resistence
Variety	09/07/1966	Beatles Unwitting Agent	"Right-wing" association decries spread of rock	Objection to formulaic imitation
Meltzer	03/01/1967	The Aesthetics of	Deconstructs reasons for rock popularity from 1950s	Offers reason for rock expansion
Variety	06/14/1967	'Underground' Groups Stir	Columbia among industry leaders aggressively signing rock acts	'Underground' gives impression of authenticity. & artist autonomy
Billboard	07/01/1967	Band Battles Trigger	Rising number of musicians spurs instrument sales	Fans seek to recreate sounds on radio
Gross.	07/01/1967	NY 'Hippening' for	Publishers and labels look to NYC for new talent	Need to find more Simons & Garfunkels

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Kaufman	07/05/1967	The New Music	Lyric profundity of rock appeals to youth	Famed DJ gives *WSJ* readers reason to invest in counterculture
Barnett	07/08/1967	Electric Circus: Fun	Greenwich Village showcase draws major label attention	More impetus for majors. to \ commit to rock
Billboard	07/08/1967	Fest a California	Cultural & financial success of Monterey Pops commitment Festival	Monterey spurred major label to rock
Gross	07/08/1967	Popsters Pull 500G	Financial success of Monterey Pops Festival	Monterey spurred major label commitment to rock
Variety	07/12/1967	Growth of Hippy Fans	Upcoming musicians; need for showcase venues	An example of standardization coming from below
Gross	07/29/1967	Analysts' Swing to	Rock and pop art find critical acclaim `	Positive reaction and validation could aid majors' commitment to rock
Gross	08/05/1967	Col. Plays Lead	Columbia VP announces signings & playback improvements	Clive Davis not tipping hand regarding youth market intent
Fox	08/07/1967	Chappell Erupts into	Major ASCAP publisher begins BMI agency for rock	If rock is wave of future, better to start early; ASCAP publisher apparently more comfortable going with BMI for rock
Variety	08/09/1967	New Breed of	"Iconoclastic" rockers attract sophisticated youth	Industry seems to be feeling its way toward youth market
Gross	08/12/1967	'Maverock' Disks Attract	Aesthetics of independence seen as selling point	Non-conformity a challenge to sell, but youth market worth it
Ackerman & Gross	11/18/1967	Undergrounders Fly High	AGAC (songwriters' guild) actively looking for rock writers	Demand for rock leads to more rock production
Hall, C.	11/26/1967	Rock Big Thing	Rockers find more receptive audiences at college campuses	Increased interest in booking rock acts by campus activities boards
Gross	08/31/1968	Rock for All	Rock becoming dominant on radio	Independent labels more committed to youth market
Fishell	11/01/1975	Large and Small	Majors and indies vie for expanding disco market	Labels large & small lock onto successful format
Melanson	11/01/1975	The Disco Phenomenon	Disco gains popularity through The Record Pool	Jumping on disco sound; alternative means of distribution
Variety	11/19/1975	Disco Trend Swings	New TV series is like *American Bandstand*, or *Soul Train*, but set in actual discos	Disco promotion easily taken in by new venues

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Shoenfeld	12/10/1975	Standard Music Back	Disco versions spur market for pre-rock songs	Disco also spurred pre-rock performers
Hall, C.	02/28/1976	More Small Top	More smaller Top 40 stations are shrinking playlists	Small stations feel safer playing chart material
Melanson	02/28/1976	Producers Probe New	Producers & musicians make effort to make fresh disco sounds	Reaction by producers & musicians against disco homogeneity
Variety	07/14/1976	Bogart's Casablanca Co.	Joint venture between Casablanca Records & Filmways	Disco expanding into other media
Variety	11/02/1976	Casablanca Records in	Casablanca merges with Filmways	Disco expanding into other media
Joe	01/08/1977	Discos Seek a	Discos spawn legitimate success and fly-by-nights	A lot of people cashing in on trend
Fishbein	01/12/1977	Casablanca Double Gross	Untraditional methods make Disco label #1	A case for aping Casablanca's business model
Landau	03/15/1977	Rock Ages: The	Technology aids in making music "conservative"	Reliance on formula made music less risky, & less fun
Kirby	04/13/1977	British Punk Rockers	CBGB and other venues opening for punk in NYC	Parallel US punk movement
Billboard	08/27/1977	Punk Pacts Hit	Aggressive UK push to sign punk bands	If it's music of future, best to get into it early
Meyer	10/05/1977	Casablanca's Link to	Polygram buys a large portion of Casablanca stock	Disco over-speculation led Polygram to lose an estimate $60 million
Swan	01/25/1978	Anti-Social Punk	Virgin Records among other UK outlets investing in punk	Corporate expectation that punk could be “big business”
Rolling Stone	01/26/1978	U.S. Radio Fails	New-wave and punk ignored by radio	Airwaves dominated by disco and 'safe' pop
Grein	06/24/1978	Media, at Long	Growing use of disco in movies and ads	Disco seems more like a dominant institution
Roth	06/24/1978	Constant Conflict: BMI	Licensing associations check fee skipping by clubs	BMI & ASCAP strategy reliant on similar playlists
Hall, Doug	11/25/1978	Disco Format Cutting	Increasing number of disco radio stations in US	More companies committing to disco
Henninger	01/26/1979	Disco Booms with	Disco audience indiscriminate of musical quality	Evidence that disco market very reliable
Sands Miller	01/26/1979	New York City	WKTU success prompts other New York radio to program more disco	*WSJ* article primarily for investors
Fuchs	02/05/1979	The Disco Round	Disco truest cultural manifestation of rock & roll	Disco themes similar to 1950s' rock’s. sexual liberation and dance beat

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Aletti	02/13/1979	Disco Fever Stays	*Saturday Night Fever* soundtrack overtakes Fleetwood Mac's *Rumours* as top album	Soundtrack spurred major label commit. to disco
Billboard	03/10/1979	Record Cos. Expand	Disco, once shunned by majors, now embraced	All the majors jumped on disco bandwagon
Billboard	05/19/1979	Alienation Boosts	Disco entices growing number of lonely people	A reason to produce more disco
George	07/14/1979	Fatal Prognosis Wrong	History of disco proves future viability	Disco will continue to inspire future music
Geroge	09/15/1979	Are Label Cutbacks	Majors un-committing to disco post Chisox riot	Demand for disco high, but label policies limit sale
Hall, Doug	09/29/1979	Disco Radio at	Disco expands, but not in teen market	Teens preferred anything but disco; even MOR
Rolling Stone	11/01/1979	Disco Boom May	Decline in album sales threatens disco viability	At the same time, singles sales increased
Variety .	03/19/1980	Minority-Owned Stations	Rise in minority-owned radio stations from 1972-1979	Strength of disco provided sponsorship for more venues
Lesniewski	04/26/1980	The Perils in	Changing to disco formats lead to fan feelings of disenfranchisement and betrayal	Fans see disco as corporate dictate, and radio compliant
Variety .	05/27/1980	Kids Don't Control	WEA executive says youth market too small to control course of music industry	Objection to notion of formulaic imitation
Lichtman	07/19/1980	Music Publishers Respond	Publishers look for non-disco material for disco records	Attempt to emulate disco success with old song catalogs
Zachary .	11/01/1980	Barking up the	Music industry ignoring punk/new/wave viability trend	Audience reaction against disco
Sutherland	05/17/1986	Clive Davis Blasts	Arista head decries reliance on 'safe' formats	With everyone doing same thing, new acts suffer
Anonymous	05/21/1988	Crossover Pioneers Leaning	Radio influencing club choices, not other vice-versa	Clubs see top-40 format safer than making choices
Flitner .	03/23/1997	Don't Stifle Rock's	Record industry actively keeping rock homogeneous	Reliable markets give rise to homogeneity
Gray .	06/14/1997	Quality Should Be	Music "more than a commodity" but treated like one	Standards lead to apathy in. entertainment markets
Boehlert	01/08/1998	The Year in	Redux of 1997; John single kept business from going under	Glut of market material driving away consumers

Table 2. Articles that Demonstrate the Creation or Implementation of a Template

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Billboard	10/30/1954	Editorial	*Billboard* praises WDIA for decision to ban "bad" r&b	“Bad" & "good" r&b basis for separate r&b/rock templates
Billboard	10/30/1954	Indie Diskers Back	Indie labels. back WDIA decision to ban "bad" r&b	"Bad" & "good" r&b basis for r&b/rock template
Billboard	07/23/1955	Negro Artists Rise	Rock's success helps non-rock black artists	Like disco & r&b, blacks linked to r&b via rock
Variety .	07/11/1956	Buck Ram, a	Rock songwriter feels term 'rock' a pejorative	Interview subject argues against template creation; and advocates focus on sound
King .	02/01/1957	Rhythm and Blue s	R&B might be crude, but not vulgar	TPA quality of rock eliminated crudity, and soul
Variety .	05/01/1957	Keeping up with	University of Texas music professor examines rock	Sees rock as a simplified way to play jazz
Variety .	07/24/1957	Top Standards of	Top ratings getter for pop and general music.	No rock tunes on popular chart, as if rock & pop opposites
Mel Maker	12/20/1958	The Big Beat	Rock might be dead, but its influence lingers on	Movement away from r&b to tasteful rock
Asbell .	05/18/1959	R&R Fading, But	Glut in rock market hurt it, but "real" r&b goes on	Separating rock from r&b in terms of quality
Variety .	10/23/1959	Seattle's KING-IBM	Teens like rock; they also like non-rock "pop"	Rock apathy might stem from 3-yr. glut
Dawburn	03/30/1963	Well--What Is	UK musicians debate whether UK sound is true r&b	R&b defined by culture, not sound, by some musicians
Coleman	02/29/1964	Where Does Beat	UK musicians discuss 'r&b' as it applies to them	Term defines market, despite musical sound
Coleman	05/09/1964	Just What Is	UK musicans debate what constitutes r&b	Conceptualization of a template distinctive from rock & roll
Cash Box	05/16/1964	"Soul" Disks Sell	Soul is the rock answer to traditional pop ballad	Soul template distances black acts from r&b/rock
Cash Box	07/04/1964	R&B-Rock: Is	US r&b-rock still viable despite UK r&b-rock UK success	A distinction made between US & musicians
Schoenfeld	09/29/1965	If It's Not	Rock producer feels the term 'rock' a pejorative and passe	An attempt to break out of previous rock expectations
Williams, Martin	10/21/1965	The Razing of	Supremes & Rolling Stones carry on jazz tradition	Opposite of creating templates writer brings music traditions together

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Farina	03/28/1966	Your Own True	How songwriters can fit into rock scene, yet remain distinct from everyone else	The essence of what Adorno called pseudo-individualization
Shaw	01/04/1967	Freak Out/Psychedelic	Moon/June type lyrics of TPA inappropriate for rock	Changing standard of lyrical professionalism helps legitimate rock
Landau	09/01/1967	A Whiter Shade	Breakdown of black artists into three types	Creation of templates due to racial, not sonic, differences
Ackerman & Ovens	08/03/1968	Music Boundaries Busted	C&w and r&b artists recording the others' tunes	Assumption of opposing templates: c&w v. r&b, but recordings prove stylistic continuity
Dove	08/17/1968	Motown Acts Draw	Forest Hills concert successful with corporate sponsorship	Motown template successful; corporate backing; mixed audience
Tiegel	08/24/1968	TV Showcasing Black	TV producer makes pilot for 'soul' variety series	'Soul' market distinct from other pop categories
Hall, C.	08/31/1968	Stations' Cool Drive	Radio stations counter riots with goodwill gesture	A clear division evident between white & black music
Gabree	08/01/1969	Rock: Art, Revolution	Standardization of rock once "moguls" took over majors	Template creation of rock sound by
Ramin	08/01/1974	How to Launch	How-to article on how to make a hit record	Music production codified to steps
Kirsch	05/17/1975	A&R Experts Explain	Successful disco "must stay within certain boundaries	Producers & A&R people define disco template
Joe	10/02/1976	Disco: From Freaky	Unrelenting fan pressure for change in disco sound	Template formed in response to audience demand
Tiegel	10/02/1976	Jumbo Size Singles	The innovation of EP formats in response to disco	Audience demand forces industry to adopt new technical standard
Kozak	11/20/1976	Punk Rock Grows	Expanding punk scene in New York	Fashion & attitude define genre
Variety	12/08/1976		Punk aesthetic defined by shows and band names	Template not based on mus., import. for blitz & new wave
Variety	03/09/1977	NARM Seminar Goes	Media companies discuss how to market videodisk will to African Americans	Atlantic executive says black video expand like rock
Ford	09/03/1977	The Changing Sound	Disco now a distinct type of music	Disco as a specific template within r&b
Variety	11/02/1977	Clive Davis Sees	Record companies focused on rock signifiers., not codifies good songs	Emphasis on rhythm, not melody, rock says Davis
Variety	12/08/1977	Foul-Mouthed 'Punk	Punk musicians swear on live BBC show; sales boom	Defining rock as rebel., reaction against professionalism

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Flippo	01/26/1978	Sire's Seymour Stein	Sire executive has always liked music that breaks the mold	Attempt to recreate 50s mold-breaking through; punk
Joe	03/11/1978	Disco Label Fatal	London executive sees term 'disco' as bad for sales	Resistance against perceived similarity by fans
Variety	05/17/1978	Black Is Black	Attempts by white artists to crack r&b market certain market	Grooming performers to fit a
Ford & Lichtman	01/27/1979	Disco Dampens R&B	R&B acts not promoted unless disco-able	Adherence to disco standard for black acts
Kopkind	02/05/1979	Chic Say Freak	Author puzzles over why 'bland' tune becomes a big hit	Are cookie-cutter tunes attuned to market
Joe	04/07/1979	Assn. Fearful Disco	R&B acts not promoted unless disco-able	Adherence to disco standard for black acts
Ochs	06/09/1979	Disco: Paradox or	Disco made money for black musicians, but confined them creatively	Industry pressure to conform to disco standard
Billboard	07/14/1979	'Studio 54' LP	Casablanca disc trades on 'Studio 54' notoriety	Studio 54 served as an icon for disco
Billboard	07/14/1979	Disco Not Proving	Black musicians less successful selling to white listeners because of perceived disco association	Disco identity lumped all black musicians together
Grein	08/11/1979	Club Spinners, DJs	Music industry people discuss disco stagnation	Very few willing to break out of "safe"
Fienstein & Newmark	09/08/2979	Diverting Dollars to	Record companies over-committed to disco when rock still popular	Depiction of disco as corporate-backed, and rock as being of secondary importance
Sutherland	10/01/1979	Rock 'n' Recession	Economic recession impacts music industry	Honing of new-wave styles toward an affluent market
Billboard	12/08/1979	Word 'Disco' Dirty	Radio stations backing away from disco market	Ubiquity of disco bred contempt
Reidlinger	01/12/1980	Long Island Deejays	Greater demand for 'rock' at discos	Opposition between white and black music not sonic
Holden	02/01/1980	A&R Men to	Pressure on musicians to sound like previous template of successes	Creation of singer/songwriter Manilow and others like him
Collier	02/02/1980	Thank God for	Market mentality of US labels hampers music	The degree to which companies attempt to "label" music noted by many
Depte	02/02/1980	Black Music Is	Black music a growing segment of record business	Author separates black & white music, but not sonically
Murphy	03/19/1980	Black Music Execs	Executives see decline in black music despite sales upswing	Clear division between black & white artists

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Variety	04/09/1980	Agency Finds Focus	Talent agency stakes claim on MOR acts	Attempt at promoting underserved markets
Bates	04/26/2080	Setting the Record	Label execs overestimated disco viability	Overselling disco market led to resistance
Hall, Doug	07/19/1980	R&B Programming Hides	PDs play disco records under rubric of r&b	Counter-reaction to disco-corporate reputation
Kozak	08/16/1980	'Rock World' Tube	Creation of video show featuring punk/new-wave	Niche marketing prescient of MTV
Grein	01/31/1981	Nobody Wants to	Rock format losing out to r&b & c&w	Possible reaction against "corporate" rock
Anonymous	02/21/1981	Robbins Tries to	Musician pressured by label to be more disco	Labels deliberately enforced sonic standards
Loder	07/23/1981	Dress Right! Punk	Punk gives way to stylistic heir, blitz	Musical genre defined by fashion and other extramusical signifiers
Grein	08/15/1981	Promo Men Lament	Top 40 radio more niche centered and exclusive	Fragmentation crystalizes templates
Chin	06/19/1982	Where the Beat	Invasion of European "dance" acts	Creation of new template to replace disgraced disc
Darling	06/19/1982	Danceable Rock Generates	Death of disco & punk spawns hybrid genre	Creation of new template
Soccio	09/18/1982	Breaking Artificial Barriers	New-wave & punk breaking disco dance stranglehold	Harps on labeling; says new-wave/punk marketed as anti-disco, despite stylistic similarity
Harrison, M.	11/27/1982	You Can't Be	Coverage of college radio convention	Author notes fans enforce standards via orthodoxy about what's "cool"
Connelly	12/09/1982	Rock Radio: A	Racial segregation of artists despite sound	Evidence of major templates of white and black
Praeger	02/15/1986	Surrendering Creative Control	Formulaic decisions and labels stifle creativity	Author rails against strict standardization
Anonymous	04/23/1988	Major Labels Eye	Major labels aggressively target college radio market	Majors want last bastion of indie label strength
Wild	04/03/1997	Inside the Hit	Rec. company finds a recipe for success	Success comes from non-sonic templates
Schiffman	10/18/1997	Active Rock, Modern	Active rock & modern adult contemporary squeezed from modern rock airplay	Further honing of niche markets
Reece	04/04/1998	KREV Fans Rally	Fans charge corporate takeover of stations limits diversity	Listeners link consolidation to increased homogeneity
Boehlert	04/30/1998	Corporate Radio Still	Corporate radio chains lead to homogeneous playlists	Direct example of radio industry creating a sonic standard

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Schiffman & Taylor	07/17/1999	Satellite Service Could	Freedom of satellite radio might diminish strict playlists and marketing strategies	Reaction against stricter adherence to template
Hall, Dana et al	09/11/1999	Radio Consultants Still	Radio consultants & PDs losing autonomy to corporate headquarters	Radio conglomerates like better honed categories because they further minimize individual human judgment
Heasman	11/27/1999	Less Competition May	Radio corporate consortium's research project finds that concentrated ownership results in greater diversity	Radio conglomerate defining diversity in a new way
Ross et al	01/15/2000	Megapoly Makes On-Air	Merger wisdom advocates narrower definition of categories for maximum control	Honing templates leads to strict standards for market clarity
Ross & Schiffman	05/20/2000	WLIR Raises Modern	Long Island station confuses some with playlist	Refusal to commit to format incurs peer wrath
Hall, Dana et al	03/31/2001	Crossovers Struggle to	Pop stars chastised by fans for gaining wide acceptance	Listeners enforcing the templates created by industry

Table 3. Articles that Document Exertion of Industry Controls

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Variety	03/23/1955	Negro DJ Raps	DJ feels majors want to control youth market	Bostic thinks that majors are actively trying to destroy rock
Ackerman	07/23/1955	Death Certificate Premature	Because of covers and rock, r&b doing well	Money potential high for rock despite viability; the industry seems at a loss for how to proceed with rock
Kramer	03/09/1956	On the Beat	Negroes no longer primary buyers of r&b	Reason to find ways to make more whites like r&b
Variety	06/13/1956	R&R Not for	Dipping rock sales during summer	Labels try to find a pattern to predict rock consumption
Variety	06/13/1956	Rock 'n' Roll:	Despite media & individual animosity, rock maintains its popularity	Some seem actively involved in de-promoting rock
Variety	06/13/1956	See R.I.P. Sign	Rock proving to be a fad	Article gives every reason not to promote rock
Variety	07/11/1956	Rock 'n' Roll	Review of interview between Ford and Walstein	Established labels and stations on the fence regarding rock
Down Beat	09/19/1956	Guy Lombardo Won't	Pop bandleader feels rock antithetical to his style	Many of older generation spurning rock

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Ford & Walstein	09/19/1956	A Psychologists Viewpoint	Pschologist examines rock songs for pathology	Ford ordered to play rock, but reluctant to promote it
Variety	02/27/1957	D.J.'s Don't Buy	Legitimate DJs doubt necessity of payola	Focus on rock payola makes music seem unpopular
Mel. Maker	05/17/1958	Skiffle on the	Decline of skiffle style, and teen rebel aesthetic	Industry denial of rock viability
Varety	03/02/1960	Fading Single Biz	Miller criticizes rock as not album-oriented	Rock challenged earlier templates for pop success
Brown & Grevatt	09/03/1960	The New Sound	Debate on the comercial viability of rock	Music industry wavering on rock commitment
Tiegel	08/14/1965	Record of Absurd	Radio stations changing policy on 'political' songs	Radio industry more receptive to counter-cultural products
Mullinax	04/06/1968	The Question of	Radio & record industry won't stop risque content, so legislation must	Music industry more open to counter-cultural market
Kirby	08/17/1968	Janis Joplin Tops	Rock concert successes continue	Justification for major investment in rock
Kirby	08/17/1968	RCA Drops Monaural	Record label becomes stereo-only	Move would be good for FM play; quality control
Flippo	02/13/1975	Recession Takes Toll	Economic woes drive away concergoers	Excitement for rock seemed to ebb
Meyer	04/09/1975	Disco Breaking Color	Label attempts to make whites like 'black' music	Deliberate manipulation of style to cater to a market
Duston	05/17/1975	Discos Will Revive	Alternative club promotion a more attractive venue For indies	Indies attracted to clubs especially since airplay harder to come by
Melanson	05/17/1975	Discomania	Disco spawns 'symbiotic' relations between labels and club DJs	Record industry maintaining links to effective promo
Melanson & J. Williams	08/09/1975	Disco Community, Labels	Radio, Record Pool, and DJ business entice	Article calls situation “marked change” in disco innovation designed for promotion and distribution with minimal risk
Rees	11/19/1975	Rock Promoters Can’t	Concert attendance high; but overhead too great	Without tour., records would mean little money to musicians and labels
Billboard	02/28/1976	Acts Prefer Branch	Famous names leaving indies for majors	Factor in decline of indie prominence in 1970s; key issue is distribution, but larger issue of promotion implied
Schoenfeld	08/04/1976	RCA Confab Told	Radio stations reluctant to play new songs & acts	Effects of independent promotion & conservatism
Black	08/21/1976	An Open Letter	Trials and tribulations of DJs	Explains why independent promotion was attractive to disc jockeys

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Variety	09/22/1976	P.R. Pop Cleffe	Puerto Rican publishers rely on payola	Payola problem displaced from mainstream US
Williams, J.	11/06/1976	Integration Is Decreasing	New upscale suburban discos threaten urban clubs	Disco seen as elitist, corporate music
Kozak	11/20/1976	Punk Rock Following	British Punk spreading to U.S. rockers	Punk popularity increased by corporate indifference
Horowitz	12/11/1976	BMI Bagging $100,000	Discos becoming important revenue stream for song publishers	Challenge to majors via alternative promotional route.
Anderson	01/15/1977	U.K. Disco Deejays	British DJs use discos to test appeal of singles	RCA sees tests as a means to hone disco standard
Billboard	01/15/1977	By AFM Exec	AFM tries to stop illegal alien disco bands	Evidence that disco template had formed
Billboard	01/15/1977	Music Must Change	Wall Street investors want disco to widen appeal	Desire to adopt a standard to appeal to white fans
Variety	02/09/1977	Discos Can Sell	Discos rival radio in ability to promote records	Alternative channels of promotional important as playlists shrink
Frutig	02/17/1977	‘Punk Rock’ Attacked	Jessie Jackson et al protest 'sex rock'	Anti-authoritarian depiction of punk; lack of promotion in U.S
Hall, M.	2/26/1977	DJ-Concert Promoter	FCC investigates concert promo. with ties to radio	Another case of limiting promoted music via buying off competitive loyalties. Akin to independent promotion abuses
Sweeney	03/01/1977	Broadcasting Payola Sparks	Early report on payola in D.C., NYC, Philly et al	Indies can't compete with majors on independent promotion
Variety	03/02/1977	Black Promoter Raps	DJ-owned promotion companies enjoy unfair advantage for they can offer airplay in lieu of concert fees	DJs seek piece of disco action; networking hinders other promoters
Variety .	03/09/1977	Buddah in Distrib	Indie signs distribution deal with major label	Indies lose autonomy; can only exist with major label support
Variety .	03/09/1977	Motown Sues CBS	Indie charges CBS with unfair advantage & conspiracy	Big name talent abandoning indies
Variety .	03/09/1977	RSO Exits Race	Indie label can't outbid CBS for Stones contract	Big name talent abandoning indies
Joe .	04/02/1977	Disco Discrimination Studied	Discos won't admit some customers, despite possible illegality of practice	Disco seen more as elitist corporate music
Billboard	09/03/1977	Club Chains: Despite	Chain discos popping up	Discos are becoming McDonald's
Williams, J.	10/08/1977	L.A. Small Labels	Indies say radio favors major labels	Majors can shell out for independent promotion

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Variety .	01/25/1978	Green Sings Blues	Musician testifies that he took airplay in lieu of money	Name artists almost forced to engage in payola
Penchansky	06/24/1978	Relations Improve between	Chicago DJ union and club owners settle differences	Solidification of DJ influence
Penchansky	11/11/1978	Opposition Aplenty to	Chicago club owners try to stop formation of DJ union	Battle over musical autonomy
Rose .	11/12/1978	Discophobia: Rock &	Growing disco record destruction by anti-disco fans	Reaction against disco, seen as corporate manipulation
Grein .	11/25/1978	Recession? Few	Record label executives believe that economic downturn won't hurt sales, despite price increase	Incentive to exercise control over product
Harrison, E.	01/27/1979	Exit Is Shock	A&M aligns with RCA for distribution	Survival for indies relies on majors' cooperation
Variety .	02/23/1979	FCC Probe of	D.C. concert payola spreads to radio nationwide	Extent to which indies are disadvantaged by payola
Merritt .	03/22/1979	Disco Station Number	Rock 'healthy,' but disco becomes the most . popular music in New York	A reason for major label and radio to commit to disco
Hall, Doug	07/07/1979	Heads Roll as	PDs fired for playing disco, despite ratings hike	Fear among some listeners of disco dominance
Gortikov	07/28/1979	The Fairness in	Independent promotion appropriate when labels profit from airplay	Independent promotion keeping indies from critical venues
Ditingo .	08/11/1979	Disco Format's Success	Music industry people discuss how to handle disco market	Many expressed belief in continued disco growth
Sanders .	08/18/1979	Fickle Patrons Make	Farm belt dancers react to one-format discos by switching constantly from club to club	Objection to usual disco sound, but not to dancing
Rolling Stone	08/23/1979	Random Notes	Growing anti-disco sentiment	Disco seen as same and corporate controlled
Case	12/01/1979	Radio's Stake in	Homogeneity, not tape sales, responsible for sales slump	The record industry over-controlled musical products
Lichtman	12/08/1979	Publishers Radio Promo	Publishers relying more heavily on independent promotion too	Major publishing companies associated with major labels can more easily engage in independent promotion
Sherwood	12/22/1979	The Radio-Record	Record executive calling for radio to help stop home taping	Home taping blamed for record slump,evidence weak
Kozak	02/23/1980	Rock Overwhelming the	'Rock' gaining more play in discos	Definition of rock antithetical to disco: opposition defined between black music and white music
Merritt	03/20/1980	Rock Strikes Back!	Growing popularity of rock played in disco clubs	Fans react. to disco as manipulated corporate music

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Baron	04/12/1980	A Prescription for	Hype necessary to hedge risk on record investment	Ability to sell records not due to music, but to business process
Davis	04/12/1980	Ripping Radio's Play	Promotion without payola virtually impossible	Pervasiveness of independent promotion in limiting indie label promos
Cloer	06/21/1980	Who's Pulling the	Increasing lack of accountability by radio executives	Shifting "autonomy" to market created new standard
Billboard	08/30/1980	Labels Ignored as	NAB does not invite record company personnel at national conference	Perhaps this shows a riff between factions via independent
Kozak	11/22/1980	Tightening Radio Playlists	Labels seek new venues after stations shorten playlists	More need to aggressively control investment
Grein	02/21/1981	Promo Indies Feeling	Some independent promoters losing business post-disco	Independent promoters were associated with the Network, made expendable
Harrison, M.	07/04/1981	The Ethics of	Record industry has a history of feigning sincerity	Credibility can be means of selling out
Harrison, M.	10/10/1981	Disk Jockeys: A	DJ autonomy diminished during rock history	Evidence that rock promotion came more systematic
Gosse	11/23/1981	Dancing in My	New wave described as punk dance music	Term 'disco' shunned, despite sonic similarity
Joe	06/19/1982	Pools Service Closer	Record pool concept expands to rock promotion	Diminished playlists spawn alternative promotional venues
DiMauro	03/12/1986	Album Rock Promo	AOR independent promoters find job more difficult after scandal	AOR more vulnerable to scandal than other musics
Schipper	03/12/1986	CBS, Polygram, A&M	Labels vow to end $30-80 million IP habit	A threat to independent leaves a chance for indie rotation
Halper	03/15/1986	In Defense of	Independent promoters provide legitimate and valuable service to PDs	Author likens independent promotion investigation to witch hunt.
Holland	03/15/1986	Assns. Address Payola	NAB & NRBA say that independent promotion is a serious problem	Independent promotion provided radio stations, indignance might seem like good public relations
Lichtman	03/15/1986	More Key Labels	Polygram & CBS join WEA & MCA in banning independent promotion	Swearing off independent promotion only possible after legal & public pressure
Freeman	03/22/1986	PDs on Indies:	Radio stations severing ties with independent promoters after legal & public pressure	Swearing off independent promotion came

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Billboard	03/29/1986	Dileo on Indies	Michael Jackson's manager rips labels for cutting off independent promotion	Dileo insists that independent promotion important for promoting smaller acts
Billboard	03/29/1986	Managers Irate	Artists managers fume over independent promotion ban; ban makes promotion difficult	Severing independent promoter ties almost analogous to drug withdraw
Marsh	04/01/1986	Payola's Bottom Line	Independent promotion continued historical tension between major and independent labels	Independent promotion used by majors to control indies
Schipper	04/09/1986	NBC's 'New Payola	Isgro demands NBC retract story linking independent promotion to organized crime	The pressure behind independent promotion was immense
Goldberg, M.	04/10/1986	Payola Charges Rock	NBC report on independent promotion occurred simultaneously with FBI & IRS probes	Independent promotion a major threat to indie independence
Brauer	05/17/1986	Why I Resigned	DJ laments radio deregulation, and the resultant homogeneity	Author links decreased ownership to standards
Goldberg	01/14/1987	Attacks on Biz	Q&A defense of no PMRC ratings label	Expectations of youth market vs. societal pressure
Terry	01/14/1987	Probes, Suits Cast	Independent promotion scandal tarnishes bumper sales	Independent promotion was key factor in restricting musical plurality
Haring	01/29/1987	L.A. Probe Focusing	Independent promotion investigation extends to cutout returns and organized crime	Independent promotion was not the only threat to indie independence
DiMauro	06/03/1987	Indie Promoters Back	Majors quietly resume use of independent promotion one year after banning it	Independent promotion solidified majors' place as dominant music producer
DiMartino	01/09/1988	Lawyers Mull 'Legal	Labels examine loopholes in payola laws	If there's no independent promotion,something similar to replace it
Schipper	01/13/1988	1st Payola Prob	IRS agent indicted on charge of abetting tax fraud	Payola was a sophisticated and serious business
Schipper	03/02/1988	Payola Probe Shakes	Extent of payola worse than it initially appeared	Independent promotion hindered plurality by minimizing role of indies
Goldberg, M.	04/17/1988	L.A. Grand Jury	Indictment of independent promoters and radio executive	Denial of majors of involvement & its consequences
Goldberg, M.	04/21/1988	Payola: The Record	Major label executives possibly aware of illegal independent promotion activities	Majors committed to independent promotion and protective of it
Morris	04/23/1988	L.A. Judge Finds	Independent promoter found guilty of tax evasion	Just about the only conviction in independent promotion scandal

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Haring	05/21/1988	Roulette's Levy Painted	Developments in Morris Levy extortion trial	Independent promotion was not the only illicit threat to indie independence
Boehlert	08/22/1996	Pay to Play	Independent promotion reaches college alternative radio stations	Could drive indies away from few remaining venues available to them
Taylor	11/23/1996	Justice Approves Infinity	Judge approves largest radio merger in history	Infinity/CBS union was one of first megamerger deals
Holland	12/28/1996	Justice Dept. Investigates	Justice Department monitors the effects of 1996 Telecommunications Act	Consolidation of radio industry had similar effects as record label consolidation
Boehlert	02/20/1997	Is the Boom	Flood of "mediocre" acts lead to sales slump	Reminiscent of rock bonanza of 1950s cash-in mania
Christman	04/26/1997	FTC Begins Another	Record labels try to shut down used CD dealers	Labels trying to restrict consumer choice to items sold only by them
Knopper	11/29/1997	Derregulation Helps Jones	Radio conglomerate growing due to 1996 Telecommunications Act	Monopoly of radio markets gives autonomy to station owners
Carter et al	12/27/1997	B'Casters, Labels Grapple	Record labels & radio stations hash out plans for legal payola	Companies looking for a loophole in payola laws
Schiffman & Taylor	03/28/1998	Pay-For-Play	KUFO (Portland) becomes the first station to test loophole in payola laws	If successful, pay-for-play and pay-for-say would have similar function as independent promotion
Taylor et al	05/09/1998	Paid Play Changing	Play-for-play and play-for-say programming spark debate among labels; Atlantic objects	Labels long-wanted to wean off independent promotion make effort to do so; small labels might be even less able to promote on big market stations
Taylor et al	05/09/1998	Pay-For-Play	Record labels examine pitfalls of play-for-play	Realization among labels that pay-for-play will have consequences, but unsure as to their nature and importance
McGeever	12/19/1998	Pay-For-Play	At NAB European conference, PDs complain that pay-for-play will make them irrelevant	PDs see conflicts between promoting for sponsors and building audiences
Taylor	12/26/1998	Merger Frenzy Continues	Jaycor/Clear Channel & Chanellor/Capstar mergers	One of the largest moves to consolidate radio ownership
Saxe & Silberman	01/30/1999	Politicians Call for	Congressmen call for closing of payola loophole	Arista executive fears that government may go "overboard"

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Saxe	04/03/1999	FCC Green-Lights	FCC okays practice of pay-for-play	Same effect as independent promotion and payola, without legal problems and stigma
Saxe & Schiffman	07/10/1999	Entercom Wants Its	Conglomerate offers to self-censor violent tunes	Songs with political lyrics first to face ban
Billboard	09/18/1999	Indie Promoter Panel	Pay-for-play policies threaten independent promoters	Pay-for-play eliminates middleman,and is legal
Saxe	11/13/1999	U.S. Payola Investigation	Spanish-language PDs investigated for payola	Minority markets. more apt to use illegal payola resulting in illegality
Ross et al	01/08/2000	A Radio Retrospective	Radio mergers; rock & r&b vs. "heritage" stations	Beginning of radio consolidation; rock market ages
Strauss	08/01/2000	Recording Industry's	Labels and stations censor some things, but not others in a way that seems arbitrary	Move minimizes negative image without the appearance of selling out
Kot	09/14/2000	Megamergers Bad for	Radio conglomerate-owned concert-promotions firms drive up ticket prices	Clear Channel hoping to dominate other venues of record promotions
Saxe	03/24/2001	CC Sees Labels	Radio conglomerate actively seeking labels for additional revenues	Only majors could afford extensive pay-for-play arrangements
Heasman et al	03/31/2001	Newsline	Clear Channel expands to Europe; satellite radio grows	Some see satellite radio as antidote to broadcast monopoly
Graybow	10/13/2001	Ban Rumors Dispelled	Certain songs not expressly forbidden by Clear Channel	Songs still labeled 'inappropriate for broadcast;' which emphasizes issues surrounding corporate autonomy
Hall, Dana	03/23/2002	Radio One Promotion	Radio conglomerate hires independent promotion firms in effort to "clean up" payola	No material difference from pay-for-play, yet independent promoters become the last resort for independent labels
Schiffman	11/02/2002	Indie Promotion	Radio stations typically allow independent promoter contracts to lapse, forcing IPs to seek help from the FCC	Pay-for-play system in place, resulting in less need for independent promotion
Eliscu	04/17/2003	Pay for Play	Rec. companies hope iPod sales will stop illegal downloading	Record industry cited downloading as cause for record slump
Stark	05/17/2003	Small Labels Jarred	Indies relying more on independent promotion in counterbalancing effects of pay-for-play	Independent promotion market bottomed out; indies now depend on them

Author Name	Date	First Three Words	Reports	Relevance
Holland	07/17/2004	FCC Dials Up	FCC Chair invites media companies & the public to super- discuss pay-for play	FCC reacts to defeat of proposed deregulation
Werde	11/24/2004	Major-Label Payola	New York State Attorney-General investigates possible illegality in the 'new legal payola'	Quasi-legal forms of payola emerged after 1996 Telecommunications Act
Sanders, T et al.	03/03/2005	Spitzer Still Looking	New York State Attorney-General investigates possible illegality in pay-for-play	Some feel that pay-for-play eliminates competition; limits diversity
Butler	05/17/2005	Two Indies Sue	Independent promotion firms sue major labels for non-payment	Independent promoters' clout seems virtually nil;

Appendix E: Artist Term Tables

The following tables chronicle how writers applied certain terms denoting genre to specific performers, and when (meaning the year).

Listed are the artist, the date at which the citation occurred, the exact term (except for 'country and western' and 'rhythm and blues,' shortened to 'c&w" and 'r&b,' respectively) and a few other artists ('Associated Artists') mentioned in the same article. The next field, 'Nature of Association,' describes the context in which the author is making the comparison between a number of artists. For example, a listing containing the phrase "stylistic similarity," means that the author is comparing various groups that he or she feels share a sonic commonality. "Stylistic antithesis" would mean that the author is comparing groups that not only sound differently, but, in the ear of the writer, sound as though they are opposed to each other (for example, in the context of rock vs. disco). A listing that would contain both the above terms would indicate that the writer is comparing the artists to similar and dissimilar peers. Some writers do not focus on the music, as much as they do the cultural context of the music.

Part 1. Artists described as 'rock' in whole, or in part.

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Clovers	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Fats Domino, Moonglows, Harptones, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Domino, Fats	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Moonglows, Harptones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Drifters	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Fats Domino, Harptones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Harptones	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Johnson, Buddy	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Fats Domino, Moonglows, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Johnson, Ella	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Moonglows	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Fats Domino, Harptones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Overbea, Danny	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Prysock, Red	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Staton, Dakota	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Turner, Joe	01/19/1955	rock & roll	Clovers, Fats Domino, Moonglows, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Little Richard	02/19/1956	rock & roll	Elvis Presley	Stylistic similarity	
Presley, Elvis	02/19/1956	rock & roll	Little Richard	Stylistic similarity	
Domino, Fats	05/02/1956	rock & roll			
Presley, Elvis	06/13/1956	rock & roll			
Platters	06/20/1956	rock & roll	Elvis Presley	Stylistic similarity meaning	'Rock' used as a pejorative commercialized r&b
Presley, Elvis	06/20/1956	rock & roll	Platters	Stylistic similarity	'Rock' used as a pejorative for commer.r&b
Domino, Fats	08/15/1956	rock & roll			
Haley, Bill & the Comets	09/19/1956	rock & roll	W.C. Handy, Johann Strauss	Antithesis	
Haley, Bill & the Comets	09/26/1956	rock & roll	Elvis Presley, Lucille Norman	Stylistic similarity stylistic antithesis	
Presley, Elvis	09/26/1956	rock & roll	Bill Haley & the Comets, Lucille Norman	Stylistic similarity stylistic antithesis	
Belvin, Jesse	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Brown, Nappy	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Fats Domino, Ray Charles, Little Richard, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Channels	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Domino, Fats	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll, pop	Big Maybelle, Ray Charles, Little Richard	Stylistic similarity	Author notes artist crossover into mainstream pop charts

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
G-Clefs	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Lymon, Frankie & the Teenagers	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Murphy, Rock	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roill	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Big Maybelle	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Fats Domino, Ray Charles, Little Richard, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Spaniels	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Washington,	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Williams, Otis	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Not the Temptations singer of the same name
Boone, Pat	01/08/1958	rock & roll	Eddie Cantor, Al Joleson, Elvis Presley	Stylistic similarity	Freed posits rock style originated 100 years earlier
Cantor, Eddie	01/08/1958	rock & roll	Al Joleson, Elvis Presley,	Stylistic similarity	Freed posits rock style originated 100 years earlier
Joleson, Al	01/08/1958	rock & roll	Eddie Cantor, Elvis Presley, Pat Boone, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Freed posits rock style originated 100 years earlier
Presley, Elvis	01/08/1958	rock & roll	Eddie Cantor, Al Joleson, Pat Boone, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Freed posits rock style originated 100 years earlier
Richman, Harry	01/08/1958	rock & roll	Eddie Cantor, Elvis Presley, Pat Boone, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Freed posits rock style originated 100 years earlier
Sands, Tommy	01/08/1958	rock & roll	Eddie Cantor, Elvis Presley, Pat Boone, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Freed posits rock style originated 100 years earlier
Baker, LaVern	06/01/1958	rock & roll, Negro music	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, etc.	Historic connection	Author sees rock as primarily a Negro music
Berry, Chuck	06/01/1958	rock & roll, Negro music	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Fats Domino	Historic connection	Author sees rock as primarily a Negro music

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Brown, Ruth	06/01/1958	rock & roll, Negro music	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, etc.	Historic connection	Author sees rock as primarily a Negro music
Charles, Ray	06/01/1958	rock & roll, Negro music	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, etc.	Historic connection	Author sees rock as primarily a Negro music
Domino, Fats	06/01/1958	rock & roll, Negro music	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, etc.	Historic connection	Author sees rock as primarily a Negro music
Little Richard	06/01/1958	rock & roll, Negro music	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, etc.	Historic connection	Author sees rock as primarily a Negro music
Presley, Elvis	06/01/1958	country blues, country rockabilly	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, etc .	Historic connection	Author distinguishes between Negro blues, and rockabilly; used pejoratively
Turner, Joe	06/01/1958	rock & roll, Negro music	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, etc.	Historic connection	Author sees rock as primarily a Negro music
Presley, Elvis	08/31/1958	rock & roll			
Francis, Connie	12/06/1958	pop, rock	Lena Horne, Mitch Miller,	Cultural similarity, cultural & stylistic antithesis	Author cites artist as one who does rock on occasion
Horne, Lena	12/06/1958	pop, rock	Connie Frances, Mitch Miller, Perry Como, etc	Cultural & stylistic diversity	Author cites artist as one who does rock on occasion
Twitty, Conway	12/06/1958	rock	Perry Como, Lena Horne, Connie Frances, Mitch Miller	Stylistic antithesis	
Brent, Tony	12/20/1958	r&b/rock	Elvis Presley, Johnny Mathis, Perry Como, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Edwards, Tommy	12/20/1958	r&b/rock	Elvis Presley, Johnny Mathis, Perry Como, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Morgan, Jane	12/20/1958	r&b/rock	Elvis Presley, Johnny Mathis, Perry Como, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Presley, Elvis	12/20/1958	r&b/rock	Tommy Edwards, Johnny Mathis, Perry Como, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Drifters	10/21/1959	raucous rock	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Eddy, Duane	10/21/1959	raucous rock	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Forte, Fabian	10/21/1959	raucous rock	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Presley, Elvis	10/21/1959	raucous rock	Drifters, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity; stylistic antithesis	
Skip & Flip	10/21/1959	raucous rock	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Twitty, Conway	10/21/1959	raucous rock	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Haley, Bill & the Comets	03/02/1960	rock & roll	Elvis Presley, Joni James	Stylistic similarity	
Presley, Elvis	03/02/1960	rock & roll	Bill Haley & the Comets, Joni James	Stylistic similarity	
Presley, Elvis	03/02/1960	rock & roll	Jim Snow	Stylistic & cultural similarity	
Snow, Jim	03/02/1960	rock & roll	Elvis Presley	Stylistic & cultural past similarity	Artist renounces rock & roll
Searchers	02/29/1964	r&b, rock	Manfred Man, Rolling Stones, Hollies, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author notes that artist referred to themselves as an r&b group
Beatles	01/06/1965	beat, rock & roll			
McGuire, Barry	08/14/1965	rock-like			
Dylan, Bob	08/21/1965	folk rock	Sonny & Cher	Stylistic similarity	
Sonny & Cher	08/21/1965	folk rock	Bob Dylan	Stylistic similarity	
Darin, Bobby	09/29/1965	rock	Penguins, Drifters, Ben E. King	Stylistic similarity	
Drifters	09/29/1965	rock	Penguins, Bobby Darin, Ben E. King	Stylistic similarity	
Dylan, Bob	09/29/1965	rock & roll			One interview subject doesn't feel term should apply to artist
King, Ben E.	09/29/1965	rock	Penguins, Bobby Darin, Drifters	Stylistic similarity	
Penguins	09/29/1965	rock	Bobby Darin, Drifters, Ben E. King	Stylistic similarity	
Charles, Ray	10/21/1965	blues, rock & roll	Elvis Presley, Supremes, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Presley, Elvis	10/21/1965	blues, rock & roll	Ray Charles, Supremes, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Beach Boys	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Beau Brummels	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Berry, Chuck	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Hollies	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Isley Brothers	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Outsiders	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Revere, Paul & the Raiders	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Righteous Brothers	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Ryder, Mitch & the Detroit Wheels	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Simon, Paul & Art Garfunkel	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Sonny & Cher	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Standells	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters,. Otis Redding, etc	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Valli, Frankie & the Four Seasons	11/26/1966	rock	Drifters, Coasters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Yardbirds	11/26/1966	rock	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Charles, Ray	03/09/1967	r&b/rock & roll, Negro music	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Little Richard, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Little Richard	03/09/1967	r&b/rock & roll, Negro music	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Reed, Jimmy	03/09/1967	r&b/rock & roll, pop	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author notes artist crossover onto mainstream pop charts
Clark, Petula	06/14/1967	rock, pop	Mirielle Mathieu, Dalida, Edith Piaf, etc.		High popularity among French listeners
Electric Flag	07/06/1967	hard-rock blues	Steve Miller, Jefferson Airplane, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	
Grateful Dead	07/06/1967	rock	Steve Miller, Jefferson Airplane, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, Stylistic diversity	Author uses pop as pejorative term
Jefferson Airplane	07/06/1967	rock	Steve Miller, Grateful Dead, Otis Redding, etc	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	
Miller, Steve	07/06/1967	hard-rock blues	Electric Flag, Jefferson Airplane, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	
Simon, Paul & Art Garfunkel	07/06/1967	rock	Steve Miller, Grateful Dead, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	
Big Brother & the Holding Company	07/08/1967	hard-rock blues	Steve Miller, Jefferson Airplane, Otis Redding, etc	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	
Cosby, Bill	08/05/1967	rock	Dean Martin, Jimi Hendrix Peter Paul & Mary, etc	Same label	On the basis of recent releases
Peter, Paul & Mary	08/05/1967	rock	Dean Martin, Jimi Hendrix, Kinks, Bill Cosby, etc.	Same label	Described as an experimental turn
Country Joe & the Fish	08/09/1967	psychedelic rock			

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Wilson, Chris	08/12/1967	maverock			Short-lived term for rebellious musician
Grateful Dead	08/16/1968	shock rock	Frank Zappa, Beatles, Fugs, etc.	Stylistic, cultural and aesthetic similarity	
Chrysalis	08/31/1968	soft rock	Rotary Connection, Wind in the Willows	Stylistic similarity	
Rotary Connection	08/31/1968	soft rock	Wind in the Willows, Chrysalis	Stylistic similarity	
Wind in the Willows	08/31/1968	soft rock	Rotary Connection, Chrysalis	Stylistic similarity	
Beatles	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	
Berry, Chuck	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Little. Richard, Bob Dylan, etc	Historic connection	
Domino, Fats	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	
Dylan, Bob	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Beatles, etc.	Historic connection	
Everly Brothers	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	
Lewis, Jerry Lee	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	
Parks, Van Dyke	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Little Richard	Historic connection	Authority cites artist as pop-like pros within rock
Little Richard	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Jerry Lee Lewis, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	
Rolling Stones	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	
Zappa, Frank (Mothers of Invention)	08/01/1969	rock	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Beatles, etc.	Historic connection pro within rock	Author cites artist as pop-like

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Beatles	08/16/1969	shock rock	Frank Zappa, Fugs, Grateful Dead, etc.	Stylistic, cultural and aesthetic similarity	
Cyrkle	08/16/1969	shock rock	Frank Zappa, Beatles, Grateful Dead, etc.	Stylistic, cultural and aesthteic similarity	
Fugs	08/16/1969	shock rock	Frank Zappa, Beatles, Grateful Dead, etc.	Stylistic, cultural and aesthetic similarity	
Jefferson Airplane	08/16/1969	shock rock	Frank Zappa, Beatles, Grateful Dead, etc.	Stylistic, cultural and aesthteic similarity	
Lovin' Spoonful	08/16/1969	shock rock	Frank Zappa, Beatles, Grateful Dead, etc.	Stylistic, cultural and aesthtic similarity	
Peanut Butter Conspiracy	08/16/1969	shock rock	Frank Zappa, Beatles, Grateful Dead, etc.	Stylistic, cultural and aesthteic similarity	
Zappa, Frank (Mothers of Invention)	08/16/1969	shock rock	Fugs, Beatles, Grateful Dead, etc.	Stylistic, cultural and aestheic similarity	
Bad Company	02/13/1975	rock & roll	Led Zeppelin, ZZ Top, Ike & Tina Turner, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Blue Oyster Cult	02/13/1975	rock & roll	ZZ Top, Bad Company, Led Zeppelin, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Led Zeppelin	02/13/1975	rock & roll	ZZ Top, Bad Company, Ike & Tina Turner, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Turner, Ike & Tina	02/13/1975	rock & roll	ZZ Top, Bad Company, Led Zeppelin, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
ZZ Top	02/13/1975	rock & roll	Led Zeppelin, Bad Company, Ike & Tina Turner, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Buzz Cocks	11/20/1976	punk rock	Elvis Presley, Ramones, rock Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection	Author traces punk to 1950s
Clash	11/20/1976	punk rock	Elvis Presley, Ramones, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection	Author traces punk to 1950s rock

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Dion	11/20/1976	rock	Elvis Presley, Ramones, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection	Author traces punk to 1950s rock
Iggy & the Stooges	11/20/1976	rock	Elvis Presley, Ramones, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection	Author traces punk to 1950s rock
MC5	11/20/1976	rock	Elvis Presley, Ramones, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection	Author traces punk to 1950s rock
New York Dolls	11/20/1976	rock	Elvis Presley, Ramones, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection	Author traces punk to 1950s rock
Presley, Elvis	11/20/1976	rock	Ramones, Velvet Underground, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection	Author traces punk to 1950s rock
Ramones	11/20/1976	punk rock	Elvis Presley, Velvet Underground, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection	Author traces punk to 1950s rock
Rolling Stones	11/20/1976	rock	Elvis Presley, Velvet Underground, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection rock	Author traces punk to 1950s
Runaways	11/20/1976	punk rock	Elvis Presley, Ramones, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection rock	Author traces punk to 1950s
Sex Pistols	11/20/1976	punk rock	Elvis Presley, Velvet Underground, Ramones, etc.	Historical connection rock	Author traces punk to 1950s
Velvet Underground	11/20/1976	rock	Elvis Presley, Ramones, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection rock	Author traces punk to 1950s
Vincent, Gene	11/20/1976	rock	Elvis Presley, Ramones, Sex Pistols, etc.	Historical connection	Author traces punk to 1950s rock
Kiss	01/12/1977	theatrical rock	Parliament	Same label, performance similarity	
Parliament	01/12/1977	theatrical rock	Kiss	Same label, performance similarity	
Blondie	02/17/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Ramones, Damned, etc.	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Damned	02/17/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Ramones, Blondie, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Eddie and the Hot Rods	02/17/1977	punk rock	Damned, Sex Pistols, Ramones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Quick	02/17/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Ramones, Damned, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Ramones	02/17/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Damned, Blondie, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Runaways	02/17/1977	punk rock	Damned, Sex Pistols, Ramones, Blondie, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Sex Pistols	02/17/1977	punk rock	Damned, Ramones,. Blondie, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Smith, Patti	02/17/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Ramones, Blondie, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Buzzcocks	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Damned, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Damned	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Barbara McKay & the Hot Box Review	Stylistic similarity	
Damned	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Eater	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Eddie & the Hot Rods	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Generation X	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Iggy & the Stooges	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
McKay, Barbara & the Hot Box Review	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Damned	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Running Sores	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Sex Pistols	04/13/1977	punk rock	Barbara McKay & the Hot Box Review, Damned	Stylistic similarity	
Sex Pistols	04/13/1977	punk rock	Damned, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Slits	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Stranglers	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Subway Sect	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Suicide	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Vibrators	04/13/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols, Clash, Buzzcocks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Berry, Chuck	05/15/1977	rock	Little Richard, Jerry Lee Lewis, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author examines rock in retrospect
Dylan, Bob	05/15/1977	rock	Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author examines rock in retrospect
Franklin, Aretha	05/15/1977	rock	Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author examines rock in retrospect
Lewis, Jerry Lee	05/15/1977	rock	Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, Rolling Stones, etc	Stylistic similarity	Author examines rock in retrospect
Little Richard	05/15/1977	rock	Chuck Berry, Jerry Lee Lewis, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author examines rock in retrospect
Presley, Elvis	05/15/1977	rock	Chuck Berry, Jerry Lee Lewis, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author examines rock in retrospect
Rolling Stones	05/15/1977	rock	Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, Jerry Lee Lewis, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author examines rock in retrospect
Clash	05/25/1977	punk rock	Damned, Stranglers, Sex Pistols	Stylistic similarity	
Damned	05/25/1977	punk rock	Stranglers, Clash, Sex Pistols	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Sex Pistols	05/25/1977	punk rock	Damned, Clash, Sex Pistols	Stylistic similarity	
Stranglers	05/25/1977	punk rock	Damned, Clash, Sex Pistols	Stylistic similarity	
Manilow, Barry	11/02/1977	rock	Mitch Miller	Antithesis	Interview subject sees artist as melodic innovator of rock
Damned	12/06/1977	punk rock	Sex Pistols	Stylistic similarity	
Sex Pistols	12/08/1977	punk rock	Damned	Stylistic similarity	
Diddley, Bo	01/26/1978	rock	Little Richard, Elvis Presley, Fats Domino	Stylistic similarity	Author cites artist as historical precursor of punk
Domino, Fats	01/26/1978	rock	Little Richard, Elvis Presley, Bo Diddley	Stylistic similarity	Author cites artist as historical precursor of punk
Little Richard	01/26/1978	rock	Elvis Presley, Fats Domino, Bo Diddley	Stylistic similarity	Author cites artist as historical precursor of punk
Presley, Elvis	01/26/1978	rock	Little Richard, Fats Domino, Bo Diddley	Stylistic similarity	Author cites artist as historical precursor of punk
Three Dog Night	05/17/1978	rock	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Auth. notes attempts by white artists to break into black markets
Vanilla Fudge	05/17/1978	rock	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity despite cultural differences	Author notes attempt by rock artists to break into black markets
Bad Company	01/12/1979	rock	AC/DC, Foreigner, Rod Stewart, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity stylistic antithesis	Rock vs. disco context
Judas Priest	01/12/1979	rock	AC/DC, Foreigner, Rod Stewart, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity Stylistic antithesis	Rock vs. disco context
Nugent, Ted	01/12/1979	rock	AC/DC, Foreigner, Rod Stewart, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity Stylistic antithesis	Rock vs. disco context
Berry, Chuck	02/05/1979	rock	Linda Ronstadt	Stylistic similarity	Author cites artist as example. of rock authenticity
Ronstadt, Linda	02/05/1979	AM-rock	Chuck Berry	Stylistic similarity, cultural differences	Author cites artist as example. of rock inauthenticity
B-52's	01/12/1980	rock	M, Flying Lizards, Donna Summer, Kool & the Gang	Stylistic similarity; Stylistic antithesis	Author compares competing club DJ approaches
Flying Lizards	01/12/1980	rock	M, B-52's Donna Summer, Kool & the Gang, etc.	Stylistic similarity; stylistic antithesis	Author compares competing club DJ approaches

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Grateful Dead	01/12/1980	rock	M, B-52's, Donna Summer, Kool & the Gang, etc.	Stylistic similarity; Stylistic antithesis	Author compares competing club DJ approaches
Kiss	01/12/1980	rock	M, B-52's, Donna Summer, Kool & the Gang, etc.	Stylistic similarity;	Author compares competing club DJ approaches
Knack	01/12/1980	rock	M, B-52's Donna Summer, Kool & the Gang, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Author compares competing club DJ approaches
M	01/12/1980	rock	B-52's, Flying Lizards, Donna Summer, Kool & Gang	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Author compares competing club DJ approaches
Rocky Horror Picture Show, Original Cast	01/12/1980	rock	M, B-52's, Donna Summer, Kool & the Gang, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Author compares competing club DJ approaches
Yes	01/12/1980	rock	M, B-52's, Donna Summer, Kool & the Gang, etc.	Stylistic similarity,	Author compares competing club DJ approaches
B-52's	03/20/1980	rock, new wave	Village People, Sylvester, Gloria Gaynor	Stylistic and cultural antithesis	Author notes rock acts replacing disco as dance music
Berry, Chuck	03/20/1980	rock & roll	M, Ramones, Pretenders, . Gloria Gaynor	Stylistic similarity & historical connection	
Domino, Fats	03/20/1980	rock & roll	Chuck Berry, Ramones, Pretenders, etc.	Stylistic similarity & historical connection	
M	03/20/1980	rock & roll	Chuck Berry, Ramones, Pretenders, etc.	Stylistic similarity & historical connection	
Madness	03/20/1980	rock & roll	Chuck Berry, Pretenders, Talking Heads, etc.	Stylistic similarity & historical connection	
Ramones	03/20/1980	rock & roll	Chuck Berry, Pretenders, Talking Heads, etc.	Stylistic similarity & historical connection	
Talking Heads	03/20/1980	rock & roll	Chuck Berry, Pretenders, Talking Heads, etc.	Stylistic similarity & historical connection	
Undertones	03/20/1980	rock & roll	Chuck Berry, Pretenders, Talking Heads, etc.	Stylistic similarity & historical connection	
Armatrading, Joan	08/16/1980	rock	Split Enz, Romantics, Clash, etc.	Marketing similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Blondie	08/16/1980	rock	Splint Enz, Romantics, Clash, etc.	Marketing similarity	
Clash	08/16/1980	rock	Split Enz, Romantics, Dirty Looks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Crack the Sky	08/16/1980	rock	Split Enz, Romantics, Clash, etc.	Marketing similarity	
Dirty Looks	08/16/1980	rock	Split Enz, Romantis, Clash etc.	Marketing similarity	
Romantics	08/16/1980	rock	Split Enz, Dirty Looks, Clash, etc.	Marketing similarity	
Split Enz	08/16/1980	rock	Clash, Romantics, Dirty Looks, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Benatar, Pat	01/31/1981	rock, pop	Exile, Nick Gilder, Blondie, Knack, Kenny Rogers	Historical connection	Interview subject decries movement of rock stars into pop
Blondie	01/31/1981	rock, pop	Exile, Nick Gilder, Knack, Pat Benatar, Kenny Rogers	Historical connection	Interview subject decries movement of rock stars into pop
Doobie Brothers	01/31/1981	rock, pop	Exile, Nick Gilder, Blondie, Knack, Kenny Rogers,	Historical connection	Interview subject decries movement of rock stars into pop
Gilder, Nick	01/31/1981	rock	Exile, Pat Benatar, Blondie, Knack, Kenny Rogers	Historical connection	Interview subject cites artist as an example of waning rock success
Knack	01/31/1981	rock`	Exile, Nick Gilder, Pat Benatar, Blondie, Kenny Rogers	Historical connection	Interview subject cites artist as an example of waning rock success
Ronstadt, Linda	01/31/1981	rock, pop	Exile, Nick Gilder, Blondie, Knack, Kenny Rogers	Historical connection	Interview subject decries movement of rock stars into pop
Carnes, Kim	08/15/1981	rock-top 40	AC/DC, Rick James, Kenny Rogers, etc.	Stylistic diversity appropriate for top-40	Author credits artist with adding rock edge to top-40
J. Geils Band	08/15/1981	rock	AC/DC, Rick James, Kenny Rogers, etc.	Diversity deemed inappropriate for top-40	Author explains airplay absence indicates hard rock ban

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Journey	08/15/1981	rock	AC/DC, Kenny Rogers, Rick James, Oak Ridge Oak Ridge Boys, etc.	Stylistic diversity marketing similarity	Authorfeels artist went soft to satisfy top-40 format
REO Speedwagon	08/15/1981	rock	AC/DC, Kenny Rogers, Rick James, Oak Ridge Boys, etc.	Stylistic diversity marketing similarity	Author feels artist went soft to satisfy top-40 format
Styx	08/15/1981	rock	AC/DC, Kenny Rogers, Rick James, Oak Ridge Boys, etc.	Stylistic diversity marketing similarity	Author feels artist went soft to satisfy top-40 forma
ABC	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Adam & the Ants	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Altered Images	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
B-52's	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Blondie	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Bow Wow Wow	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Clash	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Classic Nouveaux	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Depeche Mode	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Devo	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Duran Duran	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Flock of Seagulls	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Funkapolitan	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Go-Go's	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Haircut 100	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Human League	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Split Enz, Clash, Prince, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Icehouse	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Kid Creole & the Coconuts	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Knight, Jean	06/19/1982	r&b, danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author puzzles over why artist accepted in rock market
Kraftwerk	06/19/1982	danceable rock,	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author puzzles over why artist accepted in r&b market
Missing Persons	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince,	Stylistic similarity	
Motels	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Prince	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Split Enz, Clash, Human League, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Police	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Romeo Void	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Shelley, Pete	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Soft Cell	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Spandau Ballet	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Split Enz	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Clash, etc.	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Stray Cats	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Talking Heads	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Thompson Twins	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Tom Tom Club	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Ultravox	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Visage	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Waitresses	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
XTC	06/19/1982	danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Bus Boys	09/18/1982	rock dance	Human League, Soft Cell, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences between associated artists artificial & racial
Human League	09/18/1982	new wave, rock dance	Soft Cell, Bus Boys, Rick James, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences between associated artists artificial and racial
Soft Cell	09/18/1982	new wave, rock dance	Human League, Bus Boys, Rick James, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences between associated artists artificial & racial
Blondie	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Journey, Queen, Diana Ross, Prince, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author cites race as a major factor in determining genre
Bonds, Gary "U.S."	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Journey, Queen, Diana Ross, Prince, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author feels artist a rare example of blk musician regarded as rock
Foreigner	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Queen, Journey, Prince, Diana Ross, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Auth cites race as a major factor in determining genre

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Hall, Darryl &	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Journey, Queen, Diana Ross, Prince, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author cites race as a major fact. in determining genre
Jimi Hendrix Experience	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Journey, Queen, Diana Ross, Prince, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author feels artist a rare example of black musician. regarded as rock
Journey	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Queen, Journey, Prince, Diana Ross, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author cites race as a major factor in determining genre
McDonald, Michael	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Journey, Queen, Diana Ross, Prince, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author cites race as a major factor in determining genre
Newton-John, Olivia	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Journey, Queen, Diana Ross, Prince, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author cites race as a major factor in determining genre
Queen	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Journey, Hall & Oates, Prince, Diana Ross, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author cites race as a major factor in determining genre
Talking Heads	12/09/1982	album-oriented rock	Queen, Journey, Prince, Diana Ross, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author cites race as a major factor in determining genre
Beatles	05/17/1986	rock	Crystals, Bruce Springsteen, Pete Townshend, etc.	Historic connection	
Berry, Chuck	05/17/1986	rock	Beatles, Bruce Springsteen, Pete Townshend, etc.	Historic connection	
Crystals	05/17/1986	rock	Beatles, Bruce Springsteen, Pete Townshend, etc.	Historic connection	
Five Royales	05/17/1986	rock	Beatles, Bruce Springsteen, Pete Townshend, etc.	Historic connection	
Journey	05/17/1986	album rock	Rolling Stones, Van Halen, ZZ Top, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Lennon, John	05/17/1986	rock	Chuck Berry, Bruce Springsteen, Crystals, etc.	Historic connection	
Moody Blues	05/17/1986	album rock	Rolling Stones, Van Halen, Journey, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Robinson, Smokey	05/17/1986	rock	Beatles, Bruce. Springsteen, Pete	Historic connection	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
			Townshend, etc.		
Rolling Stones	05/17/1986	album rock	Van Halen, Journey, ZZ Top, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Seger, Bob & the Silver Bullet Band	05/17/1986	album rock	Rolling Stones, Van Halen, Journey, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Springsteen, Bruce	05/17/1986	rock	Beatles, Bruce Springsteen, Pete Townshend, etc.	Historic connection	
Starship	05/17/1986	album rock	Rolling Stones, Van Halen, Journey, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Townshend, Pete	05/17/1986	rock	Beatles, Bruce Springsteen, Pete Townshend, etc.	Historic connection	
U2	05/17/1986	rock	Beatles, Bruce Springsteen, Pete Townshend, etc.	Historic connection	
Van Halen	05/17/1986	album rock	Rolling Stones, Journey, ZZ Top, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
ZZ Top	05/17/1986	album rock	Rolling Stones, Van Halen, Journey, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Better than Ezra	08/22/1996	alternative/mod rock	Bush, Gravity Kills, Seven` Mary Three, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity `	
Bush	08/22/1996	alternative/mod rock	Gravity Kills, Better than Ezra, Seven Mary Three, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Gravity Kills	08/22/1996	alternative/mod rock	Bush, Better than Ezra, Seven Mary Three, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Seven Mary Three	08/22/1996	alternative/mod rock	Bush, Gravity Kills, Better than Ezra, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Beck	02/20/1997	rock	Fun Lovin' Criminals, Prodigy, Sublime, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Fun Lovin' Criminals	02/20/1997	rock	Beck, Prodigy, Sublime	Stylistic & marketing similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Prodigy	02/20/1997	rock	Fun Lovin' Criminals, Beck, Sublime Beck, Prodigy	Stylistic & marketing similarity similarity	
Sublime	02/20/1997	rock	Fun Lovin' Criminals,	Stylistic & marketing	
Beatles	03/22/1997	rock	Don Henley	Historic & cultural true rock connection	Author feels artist embodied ethos by breaking the. mold
Henley, Don	03/22/1997	rock	Beatles	Historic & cultural connection	Author feels artist embodied true rock ethos by breaking the. mold
Manson, Marilyn	04/03/1997	shock rock	Prodigy, Geraldo	Same label	
AC/DC	10/18/1997	active rock	Van Halen, Aerosmith, Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, etc.	Stylistic connection, marketing antithesis	Author reports the conventional wisdom that active rock is for males, modern rock is for females
Aerosmith	10/18/1997	active rock	AC/DC, Van Halen, Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, etc.	Stylistic connection, marketing antithesis	Author reports the conventional wisdom that active rock is for males, modern rock is for females
Alice in Chains	10/18/1997	modern rock	Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, Aerosmith, AC/DC, etc.	Stylistic connection, marketing antithesis	Author reports the conventional wisdom that active rock is for males, modern rock is for females
Pearl Jam	10/18/1997	modern rock	Soundgarden, Alice in Chains, Aerosmith, AC/DC, etc.	Stylistic connection, marketing antithesis	Author reports the conventional wisdom that active rock is for males, modern rock is for females
Soundgarden	10/18/1997	modern rock	Pearl Jam, Alice in Chains, Aerosmith, AC/DC, etc	Stylistic connection, marketing antithesis	Author reports the conventional wisdom that active rock is for males, modern rock is for females

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Van Halen	10/18/1997	active rock	AC/DC, Aerosmith, Pearl marketing antithesis	Stylistic connection, marketing antithesis	Author reports the conventional wisdom that active rock is for males, modern rock is for females
Limp Bizkit	04/30/1998	rock	Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, Stone Temple Pilots, etc.	Stylistic connection, marketing similarity	
Manson, Marilyn	07/10/1999	album rock			
Doobie Brothers	01/08/2000	classic rock	Metallica, Lynch Mob, 2 Live Crew, etc.	Historical connection	Author reports marketing trends of the 1990s
Lynch Mob	01/08/2000	active rock	Doobie Brothers, Metallica, 2 Live Crew	Historical connection	Author reports marketing trends of the 1990s
Metallica	01/08/2000	active rock	Doobie Brothers, Metallica, 2 Live Crew, etc.	Historical connection	Author reports marketing trends of the 1990s
Ice-T	01/08/2000	rap, rock	Doobie Brothers, Metallica, 2 Live Crew, etc.	Historical connection	Author reports marketing trends of the 1990s
311	01/15/2000	rock	Shania Twain, TLC, Alanis Morrisette, Cake, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
Beastie Boys	01/15/2000	rock	Shania Twain, TLC, Alanis Morrisette, 311, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
Cake	01/15/2000	rock	Shania Twain, TLC,. Alanis Morrisette, 311, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
Rage against the Machine	01/15/2000	rock	Shania Twain, TLC, Alanis Morisette, Cake, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
Sublime	01/15/2000	rock	Shania Twain, TLC, Alanis Morrisette, Cake, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
Alice Deejay	05/20/2000	dance, modern rock	Eiffel 65, Sonique, Fatboy Slim, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	Author questions categorization
Eiffel 65	05/20/2000	dance, modern rock	Alice Deejay, Sonique, Depeche Mode, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	Author questions categorization
Fatboy Slim	05/20/2000	dance, rock	Alice Deejay, Sonique, Depeche Mode, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	Author questions categorization

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Prodigy	05/20/2000	dance, rock	Alice Deejay, Sonique, Depeche Mode, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	Author questions categorization
Sonique	05/20/2000	dance, modern rock	Alice Deejay, Eiffel 65,. Depeche Mode, etc	Stylistic & marketing similarity	Author questions categorization

Part 2. Artists described as Rhythm & Blues, in whole or part.

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc.	Remarks
Bennett, Tony	01/19/1955	pop, r&b	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes artist attempt to crossover into rock market
Como, Perry	01/19/1955	pop, r&b	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes artist attempt to crossover into rock market
Gibb, Georgia	01/19/1955	pop, r&b	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes artist attempt to crossover into rock market
Penguins	03/23/1955	r&b	Spaniels	Stylistic similarity	
Spaniels	03/23/1955	r&b	Penguins		
Baker, LaVern	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Brooks, Billy	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Brown, Nappy	07/23/1955	r&b	Eddie Fischer, Ruth Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author cites artist as model for white pop musicians recording r&b
Brown, Ruth	07/23/1955	r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author cites artist as model for white pop musicians recording r&b
Burton Sisters	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Cole, Nat King	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white aud. listening to black musicians

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc.	Remarks
Davis, Sammy	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Ink Spots, Eartha Kitt, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	audiences Author notes trend of white listening to black musicians
Eckstine, Billy	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Fischer, Eddie	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Johnnie Ray, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Haley, Bill & the Comets	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Hamilton, Roy	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of whites audiences listening to black musicians
Hibbler, Al	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white artists listening to black musicians
Ink Spots	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening black musicians
Jeffries, Herb	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Kitt, Eartha	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Ink Spots, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Page, Patti	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Borwn, Billy Brooks, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Ray, Johnnie	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b

Artist	**Date**	**Term(s) Applied**	**Associated Artists**	**Nature of Assoc.**	**Remarks**
			Sammy Davis, etc.	similarity	Vaughn, Sarah audiences listening to black musicians 07/23/1955
Washington, Dinah	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Haley, Bill & the Comets	02/01/1957	white r&b imitator	Bessie Smith, Charlie Parker	Stylistic similarity & historical antithesis	Author cites artist as a reason for r&b backlash
Belvin, Jesse	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Brown, Nappy	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Fats Domino, Ray Charles, Little Richard, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Channels	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Domino, Fats	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll, pop	Big Maybelle, Ray Charles, Little Richard, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's crossover into mainstream pop charts
G-Clefs	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Lymon, Frankie & the Teenagers	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Murphy, Rock	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Big Maybelle	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Fats Domino, Ray Charles, Little Richard, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Spaniels	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Washington, Dinah	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Williams, Otis	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity	Not the Temptations singer of the same name

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc.	Remarks
Brent, Tony	12/20/1958	r&b/rock	Elvis Presley, Johnny Mathis, Perry Como, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Edwards, Tommy	12/20/1958	r&b/rock	Elvis Presley, Johnny Mathis, Perry Como, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Morgan, Jane	12/20/1958	r&b/rock	Elvis Presley, Johnny Mathis, Perry Como, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Presley, Elvis	12/20/1958	r&b/rock	Tommy Edwards, Johnny Mathis, Perry Como, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Beatles	03/30/1963	r&b	Manfred Mann, Graham Bond, Sonny Boy Williamson, etc.	Stylistic similarity, philosophical differences	
Bond, Graham	03/30/1963	r&b, blues	Manfred Mann, Humphrey Littleton, Sonny Boy Williamson	Stylistic similarity, philosophical differences	Author allows artist, known as r&b performer, to define himself
Hugg, Mike	03/30/1963	r&b, basic jazz	Graham Bond, Beatles, etc.	Stylistic similarity, differences	Author allows artist, known as r&b
Korner, Alexis	03/30/1963	r&b, blues	Humphrey Littleton, Manfred Mann, Graham Bond, etc	Stylistic similarity, philosophical differences	Author allows artist, known as r&b performer, to define himself
Littleton, Humphrey	03/30/1963	r&b, blues	Manfred Mann, Graham Bond, Sonny Boy Williamson, etc.	Stylistic similarity, philosophical differences	Author allows artist,. known as r&b performer, to define himself
Mann, Manfred	03/30/1963	r&b	Graham Bond, Beatles,. Sonny Boy Williamson, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Wes Sinister Five	03/30/1963	r&b, modern blues	Manfred Mann, Graham Bond, Sonny Boy Williamson	Stylistic similarity, philosophical differences	Author allows artist, known as r&b performer, to define himself
Williamson, Sonny Boy	03/30/1963	r&b	Manfred Mann, Graham Bond, Beatles, etc.	Stylistic similarity,	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc.	Remarks
Hollies	02/29/1964	r&b, original	Manfred Man, Searchers, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author allows artist, known as r&b performers, to define themselves
Mann, Manfred	02/29/1964	r&b	Searchers, Rolling Stones, Hollies, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author allows artist, known as r&b performer, to define himself
Rolling Stones	02/29/1964	r&b	Manfred Man, Searchers, Hollies, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author allows artist, known as r&b performers, to define themselves
Searchers	02/29/1964	r&b, rock	Manfred Man, Rolling Stones, Hollies, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author allows artist, known as r&b performers, to define themselves
Swinging Blue Jeans	02/29/1964	r&b, popular	Manfred Man, Searchers, Hollies, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author allows artist, known as r&b performers, to define themselves
Animals	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Manfred Mann, etc.	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians
Barber, Chris	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians
Berry, Chuck	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Rolling Stones, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians
Charles, Ray	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Manfred Mann, etc.	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians
Diddley, Bo	05/09/1964	r&b	Chuck Berry, Rolling Stones, Animals, etc.	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r& b’ to white musicians
Gaye, Marvin	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc.	Remarks
Jordan, Louis	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians
Korner, Alex	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity despite cultural Diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians.
Long John & the Hootchie Cootchie Men	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Manfred Mann, etc.	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions of the term ‘r&b’ to white applicability musicians
Mann, Manfred	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians.
Reed, Jimmy	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Manfred Mann, etc.	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musician.
Reeves, Martha & the Vandellas	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Manfred Mann, etc.	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians.
Rolling Stones	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Manfred Mann, etc.	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians
Temptations	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians.
Tucker, Tommy	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians
Waters, Muddy	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Manfred Mann,	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians.
Williamson, Sonny Boy	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Manfred Mann, etc.	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term ‘r&b’ to white musicians.

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc.	Remarks
Wonder, Stevie	05/09/1964	r&b	Bo Diddley, Chuck Berry, Animals, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity despite cultural diversity	Interview subject questions applicability of the term 'r&b' to white musicians
Berry, Chuck	10/21/1965	blues, r&b	Elvis Presley, Ray Charles, Supremes, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Rolling Stones	10/21/1965	blues, r&b	Elvis Presley, Ray Charles Supremes, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Supremes	10/21/1965	blues, r&b	Elvis Presley, Ray Charles, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Waters, Muddy	10/21/1965	blues, r&b	Elvis Presley, Supremes, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Wolf, Howlin'	10/21/1965	blues, r&b	Elvis Presley, Supremes, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Coasters	11/26/1966	r&b	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Drifters	11/26/1966	r&b	Four Seasons, Coasters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Hebb, Bobby	11/26/1966	r&b	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Jackson, Chuck	11/26/1966	r&b	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
King, Ben E.	11/26/1966	r&b	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Redding, Otis	11/26/1966	r&b	Four Seasons, Drifters, Otis Redding, etc.	Stylistic similarity, cultural difference	
Charles, Ray	03/09/1967	r&b/rock & roll, Negro music	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Little Richard, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Little Richard	03/09/1967	r&b/rock & roll, Negro music	Big Maybelle, Fats. Domino, Ray Charles, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Reed, Jimmy	03/09/1967	r&b/rock & roll, pop	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's crossover onto mainstream pop charts

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Redding, Otis	07/06/1967	r&b	Steve Miller, Grateful Dead, Lou Rawls, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	
Haley, BIll & the Comets	08/01/1969	c&w, r&b	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	Author feels artist signa led "rock'sarrival"
Presley, Elvis	08/01/1969	c&w, r&b	Jerry Lee Lewis, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	Author feels artist an icon of rock identification
Earth, Wind & Fire	02/13/1978	r&b	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor, Tramps, etc.	Loose stylistic relationship, marketing antithesis	Auth. cites artist as an example of disco's distinction from traditional r&b
Average White Band	05/17/1978	r&b	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity despite cultural difference	Author sees artist as an extreme: white musicians in black market
Bee Gees	05/17/1978	r&b	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity despite cultural difference	Author sees artist as an extreme: white musicians in black market
Cocker, Joe	05/17/1978	r&b	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Attempt at stylistic. similarity despite cultural difference	Author sees artist as an extreme: white musicians in black market
Commodores	05/17/1978	r&b, black music	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity despite cultural difference	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into rock market
Earth, Wind & Fire	05/17/1978	r&b, black music	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity despite cultural difference	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into rock market
Redding, Otis	05/17/1978	r&b, black music	Commodores, Vanilla Fudge, Bee Gees, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity despite cultural difference	
Righteous Brothers	05/17/1978	r&b	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity despite cultural difference	Author sees artist as extreme: white musicians in black market
Chandler, Gene	01/26/1979	r&b, disco	Edwin Starr, Bee Gees Commodores, etc.	Historical connection stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into disco
Starr, Edwin	01/26/1979	r&b, disco	Gene Chandler, Bee Gees, etc.	Historical connection stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into disco

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Peaches & Herb	06/09/1979	r&b, disco	Teddy Pendergrass, McCrarys, Chic	Stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into disco
Pendergrass, Teddy	06/09/1979	r&b, disco	McCrarys, Chic, Peaches & Herb, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into disco
Knight, Jean	06/19/1982	r&b, danceable rock	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author puzzles over why artist accepted in rock market
Kraftwerk	06/19/1982	danceable rock, r&b	Human League, Prince, Split Enz, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author puzzles over why artist accepted.in r&b market
Jackson, Janet	04/30/1998	r&b	Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, Stone Temple Pilots, etc.	Stylistic & marketing antithesis	Author cites artist as market threat to associated artists
Madonna	04/30/1998	r&b	Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, Stone Temple Pilots, etc.	Stylistic & marketing antithesis	Author cites artist as market threat to associated artists
TLC	01/15/2000	r&b	Shania Twain, 311, Alanis Morrisette, R. Kelley, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
Destiny's Child	03/31/2001	r&b	Jermaine Stewart, Shaggy, Myra, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	
K-Ci & JoJo	03/31/2001	r&b, pop	Jermaine Stewart, Shaggy, Myra, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author posits that crossover success threatens fan base
Lopez, Jennifer	03/31/2001	r&b-flavored	Jermaine Stewart, Shaggy, Myra, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	
Madonna	03/31/2001	r&b-flavored	Jermaine Stewart, Shaggy, Myra, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	
Mya	03/31/2001	r&b, pop	Jermaine Stewart, Shaggy, K-Ci & JoJo	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author posits that crossover success threatens fan base
Pink	03/31/2001	r&b-flavored	Jermaine Stewart, Shaggy Myra, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	

Part 3. Artists referred to as Pop, in part or in whole

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Bennett, Tony	01/19/1955	pop, r&b	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Attempt at stylistic stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into rock market
Como, Perry	01/19/1955	pop, r&b	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Attempt at stylistic stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into rock market
Gibb, Georgia	01/19/1955	pop, r&b	Clovers, Fats Domino, Drifters, etc.	Attempt at stylistic stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into rock market
Baker, LaVern	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Brooks, Billy	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of establish. pop stars recording r&b
Burton Sisters	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Cole, Nat King	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Davis, Sammy	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Ink Spots, Eartha Kitt, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Eckstine, Billy	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Fischer, Eddie	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Johnnie Ray, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Haley, Bill & the Comets	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Hamilton, Roy	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white. audiences.listening to black musicians

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Hibbler, Al	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Ink Spots	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to blk musicians
Jeffries, Herb	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Kitt, Eartha	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Ink Spots, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Page, Patti	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Borwn, Billy Brooks, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Author notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Ray, Johnnie	07/23/1955	pop, r&b	Eddie Fischer, Nappy Brown, Patti Page, etc.	Attempt at stylistic similarity	Authority notes trend of established pop stars recording r&b
Vaughn, Sarah	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Ink Spots, Earth Kitt, Sammy Davis, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Washington, Dinah	07/23/1955	r&b, pop	Eartha Kitt, Sammy Davis, Sarah Vaughn, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	Author notes trend of white audiences listening to black musicians
Norman, Lucille	09/26/1956	pop	Elvis Presley, Bill Haley & the Comets	Antithesis	
Domino, Fats	03/09/1957	r&b/rock & roll, pop	Big Maybelle, Ray Charles, Little Richard, etc,	Stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's crossover onto mainstream pop charts
Como, Perry	12/06/1958	pop	Lena Horne, Connie Frances, Mitch Miller, etc.	Cultural similarity, cultural & stylistic antithesis	
Francis, Connie	12/06/1958	pop, rock	Lena Horne, Mitch Miller, Conway Twitty, etc.	Cultural similarity, cultural & stylistic antithesis	Author cites artist as one who does rock on occasion

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Horne, Lena	12/06/1958	pop, rock	Connie Frances, Mitch Miller, Perry Como, etc.	Cultural & stylistic similarity & antithesis	Author cites artist as one who does rock on occasion
Miller, Mitch	12/06/1958	pop	Lena Horne, Perry Como, Conway Twitty, etc.	Cultural & stylistic similarity, cultural & stylistic antithesis	
Como, Perry	12/20/1958	pop	Johnny Mathis, Elvis Presley, Tommy Edwards, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Fitzgerald, Ella	12/20/1958	pop	Perry Como, Elvis Presley, Tommy Edwards, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Heath, Ted	12/20/1958	pop	Perry Como, Elvis Presley, Tommy Edwards, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Lee, Peggy	12/20/1958	pop	Perry Como, Elvis Presley, Tommy Edwards, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Mathis, Johnny	12/20/1958	pop	Perry Como, Elvis Presley, Tommy Edwards, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Sinatra, Frank	12/20/1958	pop	Perry Como, Elvis Presley, Tommy Edwards, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Anderson, Leroy	10/21/1959	pop	Doris Day, Elvis Presley, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Chordettes	10/21/1959	pop	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Crosby, Bing & Grace Kelly	10/21/1959	pop	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Day, Doris	10/21/1959	pop	Leroy Anderson, Elvis Presley, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Dorsey, Tommy	10/21/1959	pop	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Martin, Dean	10/21/1959	pop	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
Monroe, Vaughn	10/21/1959	pop	Elvis Presley, Doris Day, Dinah Washington, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	
James, Joni	03/02/1960	pop	Elvis Presley, Bill Haley & the Comets	Borrows stylistically, but not a rock singer	James stopped rock when it seemed unpopular
Swinging Blue Jeans	02/29/1964	r&b, popular	Manfred Man, Searchers, Hollies, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author allows artist, known as r&b performers, to define themselves
Barry, Len	06/01/1966	pop			
Byrds	06/08/1966	pop	Bob Dylan, Animals, Lovin Spoonful, etc.	Cultural similarity	
Dylan, Bob	06/08/1966	pop	Byrds, Animals, Lovin' Spoonful, etc.	Cultural similarity	
Lovin' Spoonful	06/08/1966	pop	Byrds, Bob Dylan, Animals, etc.	Cultural similarity	
Revere, Paul & the Raiders	06/08/1966	pop	Byrds, Bob Dylan, Animals, etc.	Cultural similarity	
Peter, Paul & Mary	06/08/1966	pop	Byrds, Bob Dylan, Animals, etc.	Cultural similarity	
Reed, Jimmy	03/09/1967	r&b/rock & roll, pop	Big Maybelle, Fats Domino, Ray Charles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's crossover onto mainstream pop charts
Clark, Petula	06/14/1967	rock, pop	Mirielle Mathieu, Dalida, Edith Piaf, etc.	High popularity among French rock listeners	Author describes artist as both pop and rock
Beatles	07/03/1967	pop	Janis Ian, Rolling Stones, Lovin' Spoonful, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes contemporary pop as logical extension of older pop music
Ian, Janis	07/03/1967	pop	Beatles, Rolling Stones, Lovin' Spoonful, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes contemporary pop as logical extension of older pop music
Lovin' Spoonful	07/03/1967	pop	Janis Ian, Rolling Stones, Beatles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes contemporary pop as logical extension of older pop music

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Mamas & the Papas	07/03/1967	pop	Janis Ian, Rolling Stones, Beatles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes contemporary pop as logical extension of older pop music
Rolling Stones	07/03/1967	pop	Janis Ian, Rolling Stones, Mamas & the Papas, etc	Stylistic similarity	Author describes contemporary pop as logical extension of old older pop music
Simon, Paul & Art Garfunkel	07/03/1967	pop	Janis Ian, Rolling Stones, Beatles, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes contemporary pop as logical extension of older pop music
Association	07/06/1967	pop	Steve Miller, Grateful Dead, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	Author uses the term 'pop' as pejorative
Byrds	07/06/1967	pop	Steve Miller, Grateful Dead, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	Author uses the term 'pop' as pejorative
Mamas & the Papas	07/06/1967	pop	Steve Miller, Grateful Dead, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	Author uses the term 'pop' as pejorative
Moby Grape	07/06/1967	pop	Steve Miller, Grateful Dead, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity,	Author uses the term 'pop' as pejorative
Rawls, Lou	07/06/1967	pop	Steve Miller, Grateful Dead, Lou Rawls, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	Author uses the term 'pop' as pejorative
Page, Patti	08/01/1969	pop	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	Author feels artist represents the epitome of bland 1950s pop
King, Carole	08/01/1974	pop	Gilbert O'Sullivan	Similarity in songwriting approach	
O'Sullivan, Gilbert	08/01/1974	pop	Carole King	Similarity in songwriting approach	
Benatar, Pat	01/31/1981	rock, pop	Exile, Nick Gilder, Blondie, Knack, Kenny Rogers, etc.	Historical connection	Interview subject decries movement of rock stars into pop
Blondie	01/31/1981	rock, pop	Exile, Nick Gilder, Knack, Pat Benatar, etc.	Historical connection	Interview subject decries movement of rock stars into pop
Doobie Brothers	01/31/1981	rock, pop	Exile, Nick Gilder, Blondie, Knack, etc.	Historical connection	Interview subject decries movement of rock stars into pop

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Ronstadt, Linda	01/31/1981	rock, pop	Exile, Nick Gilder, Blondie, Knack, etc.	Historical connection	Interview subject decries movement of rock stars into pop
Giscombe, Junior	06/19/1982	technopop	Linx	Stylistic similarity	Technopop described as a type of dance music
Linx	06/19/1982	technopop	Junior Giscombe	Stylistic similarity	Technopop described as a type of dance music
Bacharach, & Carole Bayer Sager	05/17/1986	white pop	Barbra Striesand, Journey, ZZ Top, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Interview subject cites artist as an example of non-rock commercial viability
Mann, Barry & Cynthia Weil	05/17/1986	white pop	Barbra Striesand, Journey, ZZ Top, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Interview subject cites artist as an example of non-rock commercial viability
Masser, Michael	05/17/1986	white pop	Barbra Striesand, Journey, ZZ Top etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Interview subject cites artist as an example of non-rock commercial viability
Ronstadt, Linda	05/17/1986	pre-rock pop	Barbra Striesand, Journey, ZZ Top etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Interview subject cites artist as an example of non-rock commercial viability
Streisand, Barbra	05/17/1986	pre-rock pop	Linda Ronstadt, Journey, ZZ Top, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Interview subject cites artist as an example of non-rock commercial viability
Morissette, Alanis	01/15/2000	pop, top-40	Shania Twain, Celine Dion, TLC, 311, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as an example of issues facing radio executives
K-Ci & JoJo	03/31/2001	r&b, pop	Jermaine Stewart, Shaggy, Myra, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Crossover success risks losing original fan base, according to author.
Mya	03/31/2001	r&b, pop	Jermaine Stewart, Shaggy, K-Ci & JoJo	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Crossover success risks losing original fan base, according to author
Stewart, Jermaine	03/31/2001	pop	K-Ci & JoJo, Shaggy, Myra, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author notes that despite style, crossovers no longer r&b

Part 4. Artists described in terms often associated with the term 'rock' (e.g., punk, alternative)

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Donegan, Lonnie	01/08/1958	skiffle	Charles McDevitt	Stylistic similarity	
McDevitt, Charles	01/08/1958	skiffle	Lonnie Donegan	Stylistic similarity	
Bishop, Dickie	05/17/1958	skiffle	Soho Skiffle Group	Stylistic similarity	
Soho Skiffle Group	05/17/1958	skiffle	Dickie Bishop	Stylistic similarity	
Blues Magoos	06/14/1967	underground	Jefferson Airplane, Moby Grape, Grateful Dead, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Blues Project	06/14/1967	underground	Jefferson Airplane, Moby Grape, Grateful Dead, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Buffalo Springfield	06/14/1967	underground	Jefferson Airplane, Moby Grape, Grateful Dead, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Doors	06/14/1967	underground	Jefferson Airplane, Moby Grape, Grateful Dead, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Electric Prunes	06/14/1967	underground	Jefferson Airplane, Moby Grape, Grateful Dead, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Grateful Dead	06/14/1967	underground	Moby Grape, Jefferson Airplane, Doors, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Jefferson Airplane	06/14/1967	underground	Moby Grape, Grateful Dead, Doors, Mojo Men, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Moby Grape	06/14/1967	underground	Jefferson Airplane, Doors, Grateful Dead, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Mojo Men	06/14/1967	underground	Jefferson Airplane, Moby Grape, Grateful Dead, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Seeds	06/14/1967	underground	Jefferson Airplane, Moby Grape, Grateful Dead, etc	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Zappa, Frank (Mothers of Invention)	06/14/1967	underground	Jefferson Airplane, Moby Grape, Grateful Dead, etc	Stylistic similarity	Note sonic differences with associated artists
Buffalo Springfield	11/18/1967	underground	Vanilla Fudge, Doors, Jimi Hendrix, etc.	Shared cultural identity	
Jimi Hendrix Experience	11/18/1967	underground	Vanilla Fudge, Doors, Buffalo Springfield, etc.	Shared cultural identity	
Pink Floyd	11/18/1967	underground	Vanilla Fudge, Doors, Buffalo Springfield, etc.	Shared cultural identity	
Vanilla Fudge	11/18/1967	underground	Buffalo Springfield, Doors, Jimi Hendrix, etc.	Shared cultural identity	
Velvet Underground	11/18/1967	underground	Vanilla Fudge, Doors,	Shared cultural identity	
AC/DC	11/20/1976	punk	Blondie, New York Dolls	Stylistic similarity	
Blondie	11/20/1976	punk	AC/DC, New York Dolls	Stylistic similarity	
New York Dolls	11/20/1976	punk	Blondie, AC/DC	Stylistic similarity	
Rotten, Johnny	12/08/1976	punk			
Slaughter & The Dogs	08/27/1977	punk			
Costello, Elvis	01/26/1978	new wave	Sex Pistols, Talking Heads, Stranglers, etc	Stylistic similarity	Note sonic differences with associated artists
Sex Pistols	01/26/1978	new wave	Elvis Costello, Talking Heads, Stranglers, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Note sonic differences with associated artists
Stranglers	01/26/1978	new wave	Sex Pistols, Elvis Costello, Talking Heads, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Note sonic differences with associated artists
Talking Heads	01/26/1978	new wave	Elvis Costello, Stranglers, Sex Pistols	Stylistic similarity	Note sonic differences with associated artists
B-52's	03/20/1980	rock, new wave	Village People, Sylvester, Gloria Gaynor	Stylistic & cultural antithesis	Author notes rock acts replacing disco as dance music
Bow Wow Wow	09/18/1982	punk	Human League, Bus Boys, Rick James, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences among associated artists artificial and racial

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Clash	09/18/1982	punk	Human League, Bus Boys, Rick James, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences among associated artists artificial and racial
Gang of Four	09/18/1982	punk	Human League, Bus Boys, Rick James, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences among associated artists artificial and racial
Missing Persons	11/27/1982	progressive			
Earth, Wind & Fire	12/09/1982	progressive FM	Journey, Queen, Diana Ross, Prince, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author feels artist appropriately marketed in racial diverse genre category
Zappa, Frank (Mothers of Invention)	12/09/1982	progressive FM	Journey, Queen, Diana Ross, Prince, etc.	Stylistic similarity, marketing differences	Author feels artist appropriately marketed in racial diverse genre category
Black Sabbath	04/30/1998	metal	Ani DiFranco, Stone Temple Pilots, Pearl Jam, etc.	Historic connection, stylistic derivation, cultural antithesis	Author cites artist as an example of corporate mindset: termed 'safe rock'
Bad Religion	04/30/1998	punk	Pearl Jam, Ani Difranco, Soundgarden, etc.	Stylistic connection, marketing similarity	
DiFranco, Ani	04/30/1998	alternative	Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, Stone Temple Pilots, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Pearl Jam	04/30/1998	alternative	Ani DiFranco, Stone Temple Pilots etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Soundgarden	04/30/1998	alternative	Ani DiFranco, Pearl Jam, Stone Temple Pilots, etc.	Stylistic & market similarity	
Stone Temple Pilots	04/30/1998	alternative	Ani DiFranco, Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, etc	Stylistic & marketing similarity.	
Triplefastaction	04/30/1998	alternative	Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, Stone Temple Pilots, etc.	Stylistic & marketing similarity	

Part 5. Artists described in term associated with the term 'rhythm & blues' (e.g., blues, disco, rap)

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Handy, W.C.	09/19/1956	blues	Johann Strauss, Bill Haley & the Comets	Antithesis	
Smith, Bessie	02/01/1957	blues	Charlie Parker, Bill Haley & the Comets	Stylistic similarity & historic connection	
Presley, Elvis	06/01/1958	country blues, rockabilly	Charlie Parker, Chuck Berry, Hank Williams Sr., etc.	Historic connection	Auth distinguishes between 'country' & 'Negro' blues; 'rockabilly' used pejoratively
Charles, Ray	05/16/1964	soul	Dionne Warwick, James Brown, Mary Wells, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes soul as a type of rock and roll
Everett, Betty	05/16/1964	soul	Ray Charles, James Brown, Dionne Warwick, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes soul as a type of rock and roll
Franklin, Aretha	05/16/1964	soul	Ray Charles, James Brown, Dionne Warwick, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes soul as a type of rock and roll
King, Ben E.	05/16/1964	soul	Ray Charles, James Brown, Dionne Warwick, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes soul as a type of rock and roll
Thomas, Irma	05/16/1964	soul	Ray Charles, James Brown, Dionne Warwick, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes soul as a type of rock and roll
Warwick, Dionne	05/16/1964	soul	Ray Charles, James Brown, Mary Wells, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes soul as a type of rock and roll
Wells, Mary	05/16/1964	soul	Ray Charles, James Brown, Dionne Warwick, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes soul as a type of rock and roll
Yuro, Timi	05/16/1964	soul	Ray Charles, James Brown, Dionne Warwick, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author describes soul as a type of rock and roll
Charles, Ray	10/21/1965	blues, rock & roll	Elvis Presley, Supremes, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Presley, Elvis	10/21/1965	blues, rock & roll	Ray Charles, Supremes, Rolling Stones, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Electric Flag	07/06/1967	hard-rock blues	Steve Miller, Jefferson Airplane, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Miller, Steve	07/06/1967	hard-rock blues	Electric Flag, Jefferson Airplane, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	
Big Brother & the Holding Company	07/08/1967	hard-rock blues	Steve Miller, Jefferson Airplane, Otis Redding, etc.	Cultural similarity, stylistic diversity	
Franklin, Aretha	08/24/1968	soul	Lou Rawls, Supremes, Temptations, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	
Rawls, Lou	08/24/1968	soul	Martha & the Vandellas, Supremes, Temptations, etc	Stylistic & cultural similarity	
Reeves, Martha & the Vandellas	08/24/1968	soul	Lou Rawls, Supremes, Temptations, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	
Supremes	08/24/1968	soul	Martha & the Vandellas, Lou Rawls, Temptations, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	
Temptations	08/24/1968	soul	Martha & the Vandellas,. Lou Rawls, Supremes, etc.	Stylistic & cultural similarity	
Peaches & Herb	06/09/1969	disco	Gene Chandler	Stylistic similarity	
Mathis, Johnny	02/13/1975	standard, disco			Author notes established artist going into disco w/old songs
Black Ivory	11/11/1975	disco	Silver Convention, Van McCoy, Spinners, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Blue Magic	11/11/1975	disco	Silver Convention, Van McCoy, Spinners, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Douglas, Carol	11/11/1975	disco	Silver Convention, Van McCoy, Spinners, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
K.C. & the Sunshine Band	11/11/1975	disco	Silver Convention, Van McCoy, Spinners, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
McCoy, Van	11/11/1975	disco	Silver Convention, Spinners, Black Ivory, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
McCrae, George	11/11/1975	disco	Silver Convention, Van McCoy, Spinners, etc.	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Modulations	11/11/1975	disco	Silver Convention, Van McCoy, Spinners, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Silver Convention	11/11/1975	disco	Carol Douglas, Van McCoy, Spinners, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Spinners	11/11/1975	disco	Silver Convention, Van McCoy, Black Ivory, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Bimbo Jet	11/19/1975	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Monte Rock, George McCrae, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Checker, Chubby	11/19/1975	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Bimbo Jet, Monte Rock, etc.	Historic connection, cultural similarity	Author cites artist as progenitor of disco culture
Gaynor, Gloria	11/19/1975	disco	Bimbo Jet, Monte Rock, George McCrae, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
McCrae, George & Gwen	11/19/1975	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Bimbo Jet, Monte Rock, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Monte Rock	11/19/1975	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Bimbo Jet, Gwen McCrae, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Thomas, Rufus & Kenny	11/19/1975	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Bimbo Jet, Monte Rock, etc.	Stylistic similarity	UK artist, not the US musician. of the same name
McCoy, Van	02/28/1976	disco	Donna Summer, Carol Williams, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Salsoul Orchestra	02/28/1976	disco	Van McCoy, Donna Summer, Carol Williams	Stylistic similarity	
Summer, Donna	02/28/1976	disco	Van McCoy, Carol Williams, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Williams, Carol	02/28/1976	disco	Van McCoy, Donna Summer, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
True, Andrea	07/14/1976	disco	Steven Goodman, Toni Tennille, Charlie Daniels	Same publisher	
Bee Gees	10/02/1976	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Van McCoy, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Douglas, Carol	10/02/1976	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Van McCoy, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Not generally known as a disco artist
Dr. Buzzard's Original Savannah Band	10/02/1976	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Van McCoy, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Hues Corporation	10/02/1976	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Van McCoy, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
McCoy, Van	10/02/1976	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Bee Gees, Donna Summer, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
McCrae, George	10/02/1976	disco			
Rawls, Lou	10/02/1976	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Van McCoy, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Not generally known as a disco artist
Silver Convention	10/02/1976	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Van McCoy, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Summer, Donna	10/02/1976	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Van McCoy, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Undisputed Truth	10/02/1976	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Van McCoy, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Not generally known as a disco artist
Brick	01/08/1977	disco	Supremes. Spinners, Stevie Wonder, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Dr. Buzzard's Original Savannah Band	01/08/1977	disco	Supremes, Spinners, Stevie Wonder, Brick	Stylistic similarity	
Spinners	01/08/1977	disco	Supremes, Stevie Wonder,. Brick, etc	Stylistic similarity	Not generally known as a disco artist
Supremes	01/08/1977	disco	Spinners, Stevie Wonder, Brick, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Not an artist primarily associated with disco
Wonder, Stevie	01/08/1977	disco	Supremes, Brick, Spinners, Brick, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Not an artist primarily associated with disco
Charge, Mista	01/15/1977	disco			

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Dr. Buzzard's Original Savannah Band	01/15/1977	disco			
Silver Convention	02/09/1977	disco	Johnny Taylor, Gabor Szabo	Stylistic similarity	
Szabo, Gabor	02/09/1977	disco	Silver Convention, Johnny Taylor	Stylistic similarity	
Taylor, Johnny	02/09/1977	disco	Silver Convention, Gabor Szabo	Stylistic similarity	
Green, Al	05/25/1977	blues			
Bee Gees	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Donna Summer, Emotions, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Brass Construction	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Donna Summer, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Dyson, Ronnie	09/03/1977	disco	Ben E. King, Sister Sledge, Ben Vareen, etc.	Similar experience	Author describes established artist crossing over into disco
Emotions	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Donna Summer, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Gaye, Marvin	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Donna Summer, Emotions, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Not primarily known as a disco artist
Houston, Thelma	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Donna Summer, Emotions, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Hues Corporation	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Donna Summer, Emotions, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
K.C. & the Sunshine Band	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Donna Summer, Emotions, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
King, Ben E.	09/03/1977	disco	Bette Midler, Sister Sledge, Ronnie Dyson, etc.	Similar experience	Author describes established artist crossing over into disco
Lewis, Linda	09/03/1977	disco	Ben E. King, Sister Sledge, Ronnie Dyson, etc.	Similar experience	Author describes established artist crossing over into disco

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
McCann, Les	09/03/1977	disco	Ben E. King, Sister Sledge, Ronnie Dyson, etc.	Similar experience	Author describes established artist crossing over into disco
McCrae, George	09/03/1977	disco	Gwen McCrae, Donna Summer, Bee Gees, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Midler, Bette	09/03/1977	disco	Ben E. King, Sister Sledge, Ronnie Dyson, etc.	Similar experience	Author describes established artist crossing over into disco
Nero, Peter	09/03/1977	disco	Ben E. King, Sister Sledge, Ronnie Dyson, etc.	Similar experience	Author describes established artist crossing over into disco
Reeves, Martha	09/03/1977	disco	Ben E. King, Sister Sledge, Ronnie Dyson, etc.	Similar experience	Author describes established artist crossing over into disco
Sister Sledge	09/03/1977	disco	Ben E. King, Bette Midler, Ronnie Dyson, etc.	Similar experience	Auth. describes established artist crossing over into disco
Summer, Donna	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Bee Gees, Emotions, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Three Degrees	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Donna Summer, Emotions, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Vareen, Ben	09/03/1977	disco	Ben E. King, Sister Sledge, Ronnie Dyson, etc.	Similar experience	Author describes established artist crossing over into disco
Voices of East Harlem	09/03/1977	disco	Ben E. King, Sister Sledge, Ronnie Dyson, etc.	Similar experience	Author describes established artist crossing over into disco
White, Barry	09/03/1977	disco	George McCrae, Donna Summer, Emotions, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Commodores	10/05/1977	disco	Donna Summer, Meco, Thelma Houston	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Houston, Thelma	10/05/1977	disco	Donna Summer, Meco, Commodores	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Meco	10/05/1977	disco	Donna Summer, Thelma Houston, Commodores	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Summer, Donna	10/05/1977	disco	Commodores, Meco, Thelma Houston	Stylistic & marketing similarity	
Bee Gees	02/13/1978	disco	Tramps, Gloria Gaynor, Barry White, etc.	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Elliman, Yvonne	02/13/1978	disco	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor,. Tramps, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Gaynor, Gloria	02/13/1978	disco	Bee Gees, Tramps, Barry White, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
K.C. & the Sunshine Band	02/13/1978	disco	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor, Tramps, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Kool & the Gang	02/13/1978	disco	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor, Tramps, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
MFSB	02/13/1978	disco	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor, Tramps, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
MacDonald, Michael	02/13/1978	disco	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor, Tramps, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
McCrae, George	02/13/1978	disco	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor, Tramps, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Tavares	02/13/1978	disco	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor, Tramps, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
White, Barry	02/13/1978	disco	Bee Gees, Gloria Gaynor, Tramps, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Berry, Chuck	05/17/1978	shouting blues	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Historic connection	Author cites historical link between rock and black music
Led Zeppelin	05/17/1978	shouting blues	Otis Redding, Vanilla Fudge, Commodores, etc.	Historic connection	Author cites historical link between rock and black music
Bee Gees	06/24/1978	disco			
Brooklyn Dreams	06/24/1978	disco	Donna Summer, Village People, Paul Jabara, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Brooks, Pattie	06/24/1978	disco	Donna Summer, Village People, Brooklyn Dreams, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Clifford, Linda	06/24/1978	disco	Donna Summer, Village People, Paul Jabara, etc.	Stylistic similarity	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Hot	06/24/1978	disco	Donna Summer, Village People, Paul Jabara, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Jabara, Paul	06/24/1978	disco	Donna Summer, Village People, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Love & Kisses`	06/24/1978	disco	Donna Summer, Village People, Paul Jabara, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Summer, Donna	06/24/1978	disco	Village People,.Brooklyn Dreams, Paul Jabara, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Village People	06/24/1978	disco	Donna Summer,.Paul Jabra, etc	.Stylistic similarity	
Brown, Peter	11/11/1978	disco	Glass Family	Stylistic similarity	
Glass Family	11/11/1978	disco	Peter Brown		
Bee Gees	01/12/1979	disco	Rod Stewart, Village People, AC/DC, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Rock vs. disco context
Stewart, Rod	01/12/1979	disco	Bee Gees, Village People, AC/DC. Judas Priest, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Rock vs. disco context
Village People	01/12/1979	disco	Rod Stewart, Bee Gees, AC/DC, Foreigner, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic antithesis	Rock vs. disco context
Bee Gees	01/26/1979	disco	Gene Chandler, Edwin Starr	Historical connection & stylistic similarity	
Chandler, Gene	01/26/1979	r&b, disco	Edwin Starr, Bee Gees	Historical connection & stylistic similarity	Auth notes artist attempt to crossover into disco
Starr, Edwin	01/26/1979	r&b, disco	Gene Chandler, Bee Gees	Historical connection & stylistic similarity	Author notes artist's attempt to crossover into disco
Chandler, Gene	01/27/1979	disco	Peaches & Herb, Edwin Starr	Stylistic similarity	Not generally known as a disco artist
Peaches & Herb	01/27/1979	disco	Gene Chandler, Edwin Starr	Stylistic similarity	
Starr, Edwin	01/27/1979	disco	Peaches & Herb, Gene Chandler	Stylistic similarity	Not generally known as a disco artist

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Chic	02/05/1979	disco	Donna Summer	Stylistic similarity	
Summer, Donna	02/05/1979	disco	Chic	Stylistic similarity	
Chic	03/10/1979	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Edwin Starr	Stylistic similarity	
Gaynor, Gloria	03/10/1979	disco	Chic, Edwin Starr	Stylistic similarity	
Starr, Edwin	03/10/1979	disco	Chic, Gloria Gaynor	Stylistic similarity	Artist not typically associated with disco
Stewart, Rod	04/04/1979	disco	Millie Jackson, Foreigner, etc.	Stylistic similarity; stylistic antithesis	
Chandler, Gene	06/09/1979	disco	Peaches & Herb	Stylistic similarity	Not primarily known as a disco artist
Chic	06/09/1979	disco	McCrarys, Peaches & Herb, Teddy Pendergrass	Stylistic similarity	
McCrarys	06/09/1979	disco	Teddy Pendergrass, Peaches & Herb, Chic	Stylistic similarity	
Peaches & Herb	06/09/1979	r&b, disco	Teddy Pendergrass, McCrarys, Chic	Stylistic similarity	Author cites artist's attempt to crossover into disco
Pendergrass, Teddy	06/09/1979	r&b, disco	McCrarys, Chic, Peaches & Herb	Stylistic similarity	Author cites artist's attempt to crossover into disco
B.T. Express	07/14/1979	black music, disco	Donna Summer, Barry. White, Silver Convention, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic derivation	Author cites artist as a bridge between black music & disco
Bee Gees	07/14/1979	disco	Donna Summer, Barry White, B.T. Express, etc.	Stylistic derivation	Author cites artist. as controversial element of disco
Chubby Checker	07/14/1979	disco	Donna Summer, B.T. Express, etc.	Historic connection, cultural similarity	Author cites artist as early disco musician
Gaynor, Gloria	07/14/1979	disco	Donna Summer, Peaches & Herb	Stylistic similarity, marketing similarity	
Hues Corporation	07/14/1979	disco	Donna Summer, B.T. Express, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic derivation	
McCrae, George	07/14/1979	disco	Donna Summer, B.T. Express, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic derivation	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Peaches & Herb	07/14/1979	disco	Donna Summer, Gloria Gaynor	Stylistic similarity, marketing similarity	
Silver Convention	07/14/1979	disco	Donna Summer, Barry White, B.T. Express, etc.	Stylistic derivation	Author cites artist as . controversial element of disco
Summer, Donna	07/14/1979	disco	Chubby Checker, B.T. Express, Silver Convention, etc.	Historical connection, stylistic similarity., & stylistic derivation	
Summer, Donna	07/14/1979	disco	Gloria Gaynor, Peaches & Herb	Stylistic similarity, marketing similarity	
White, Barry	07/14/1979	black music, disco	Donna Summer, B.T. Express, etc.	Stylistic similarity, stylistic derivation	Author cites artist as a bridge between black music & disco
Barnes, Will	08/18/1979	country disco	Bellamy Brothers	Stylistic similarity	
Bellamy Brothers	08/18/1979	country disco	Will Barnes	Stylistic similarity	
Streisand, Barbra & Donna Summer	12/08/1979	disco			
Kool & the Gang	01/12/1980	disco	Striesand & Summer, B-52's, M, etc.	Stylistic similarity; stylistic antithesis	Author compares competing club DJ approaches
Streisand, Barbra & Donna Summer	01/12/1980	disco	Kool & the Gang, B-52's, M, etc.	Stylistic similarity; stylistic antithesis	Author compares competing club DJ approaches
Chic	02/23/1980	disco	Donna Summer, Village People	Stylistic similarity,	Considered the antithesis of rock
Summer, Donna	02/23/1980	disco	Chic, Village People	Stylistic similarity	Considered antithesis of rock
Village People	02/23/1980	disco	Donna Summer, Chic	Stylistic similarity	Considered antithesis of rock
Gaynor, Gloria	03/20/1980	disco	Village People, Sylvester, B-52's	Stylistic & cultural similarity & antithesis	Author notes rock acts replacing disco as dance music
Sylvester	03/20/1980	disco	Village People, Gloria Gaynor, B-52's	Stylistic & cultural similarity & antithesis	Author notes rock acts replacing disco as dance music
Village People	03/20/1980	disco	Sylvester, Gloria Gaynor, B-52's	Stylistic & cultural similarity & antithesis	Author notes rock acts replacing disco as dance mus

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Brown, Bobby	02/21/1981	disco	Madleen Kane, Susan Wells, Jesse Tower, etc	Stylistic similarity	
Hernandez, Patrick	02/21/1981	disco	Madleen Kane, Susan Wells, Bobby Brown, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Kane, Madleen	02/21/1981	disco	Patrick Hernandez, Susan Wells, Michael McGloiry	Stylistic similarity	
McGloiry, Michael	02/21/1981	disco	Madleen Kane, Patrick Hernandez, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Tower, Jesse	02/21/1981	disco	Madleen Kane, Susan Wells, Jesse Tower, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Wells, Susan	02/21/1981	disco	Madleen Kane, Bobby Brown, Jesse Tower, etc.	Stylistic similarity	
Bits & Pieces (Sly & Robbie)	11/23/1981	disco	Suzy Q, West Street Mob, Soft Cell, etc.	Cultural similarity, cultural antithesis, stylistic similarity	Author notes sonic similarity and racial differences in audiences
Suzy Q	11/23/1981	disco	West Street Mob, Bits & Pieces, Soft Cell, etc.	Cultural similarity, cultural antithesis, stylistic similarity	Author notes sonic similarity and racial differences in audiences
West Street Mob	11/23/1981	disco	Suzy Q, Bits & Pieces, Soft Cell, Depeche Mode, etc.	Cult similarity, cultural antithesis, stylistic similarity	Author notes sonic similarity and racial differences in audiences
Change	09/18/1982	disco	Human League, Soft Cell, Bus Boys, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences with associated artists artificial and racial
Dazz Band	09/18/1982	disco	Human League, Bus Boys, Rick James, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences with associated artists artificial and racial
Gap Band	09/18/1982	disco	Human League, Bus Boys, Rick James, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differencs with associated artists artificial and racial
James, Rick	09/18/1982	disco	Human League, Soft Cell, Bus Boys, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences with associated artists artificial and racial

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Moroder, Giorgio	09/18/1982	disco	Human League, Bus Boys, Rick James, etc.	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived differences with associated artists artificial and racial
Rushen, Patricia	09/18/1982	disco	Human League, Soft Cell,. Bus Boys, etc	Stylistic similarity	Author feels perceived associated artists artificial and differences with racial
2 Live Crew	01/08/2000	rap	Doobie Brothers, Metallica, Ice-T, etc.	Historical connection	Author reports marketing trends of the 1990s
Doctor Dre	01/08/2000	rap	Doobie Brothers,.2 Live Crew, Metallica, etc	Historical connection	Author reports marketing trends of the 1990s
Ice-T	01/08/2000	rap, rock	Doobie Brothers, 2 Live Crew, Metallica, etc.	Historical connection	Author reports marketing trends of the 1990s

Part 6. Artists defined as country, or related terms (e.g., rockabilly)

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Arnold, Eddie	06/01/1958	country	Charlie Parker, Chuck Berry, Elvis Presley, etc.	Historic connection	Author describes artist as melding country and pop
Presley, Elvis	06/01/1958	country blues, rockabilly	Charlie Parker, Chuck Berry, Hank Williams, etc.	Historic connection	Author distinguishing between 'country'and 'Negro' blues, uses the term 'rockabilly' pejoratively
Robbins, Marty	06/01/1958	country	Charlie Parker, Chuck Berry, Elvis Presley, etc.	Historic connection	Author describes artist as melding country and pop
Rodgers, Jimmy	06/01/1958	country & western	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, etc.	Historic connection	Author cites artist as influence on 1950s c&w music
Smith, Carl	06/01/1958	country	Charlie Parker, Chuck Berry, Hank Williams, etc.	Historic connection	Author describes artist as melding country and pop
Snow, Hank	06/01/1958	country	Charlie Parker, Chuck Berry, Elvis Presley, etc.	Historic connection	Author describes artist as melding country & pop
Williams, Hank Sr.	06/01/1958	country & western	Charlie Parker, Elvis Presley, Chuck Berry, etc.	Historic connection	

Artist	Date	Term(s) Applied	Associated Artists	Nature of Assoc	Remarks
Charles, Ray	08/01/1969	black music, c&w	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	Author feels turn away from r&b typical of black artists of the era
Haley, BIll & the Comets	08/01/1969	c&w, r&b	Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	Author feels artist signaled "rock's arrival"
Presley, Elvis	08/01/1969	c&w, r&b	Jerry Lee Lewis, Little Richard, Bob Dylan, etc.	Historic connection	Author feels artist signified rock
Wagon, Chuck & the Wheel	01/12/1979	western	AC/DC, Judas Priest, Rod Stewart, etc.	Stylistic similarity; stylistic antithesis	Rock (non disco) vs. disco; artist vehemently anti-disco
Barnes, Will	08/18/1979	country disco	Bellamy Brothers	Stylistic similarity	
Bellamy Brothers	08/18/1979	country disco	Will Barnes	Stylistic similarity	
Montgomery, John Michael	05/09/1998	country			
Brooks, Garth	01/15/2000	country	Shania Twain, Celine Dion, TLC, 311, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
Hootie & the Blowfish	01/15/2000	country	Shania Twain, Celine. Dion, TLC, 311, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
Rimes, LeAnn	01/15/2000	country, adult contemporary	Shania Twain, Celine Dion, TLC, 311, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
Twain, Shania	01/15/2000	country	Brian White, Celine Dion, TLC, 311, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives
White, Brian	01/15/2000	country	Shania Twain, Celine Dion, TLC, 311, etc.	Historical connection	Artist cited as example of issues facing radio executives

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