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14

BLOOD IS THICKER THAN WATER: KINSHIP, CREDIT, AND THE STATE

by

SOO HO CHOI

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1991

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Abstract

Blood is thicker than water: Kinship, Credit, and the State

by

Soo Ho Choi

Advisor: Professor Eric Wolf

This dissertation examines the interactions between kinship and credit relationships in two Korean farming villages. Credit refers to socioeconomic transactions such as money credit, labor exchange, and tenancy. My central question is: Can class relationships develop among kin through credit relations? In other words, I question the proverbial adage, "Blood is thicker than water."

To answer this question, I analyze dyadic kin relationships, delineate how kinship interacts with other variables, and explore the roles kinship plays in socioeconomic relationships. My observations and findings restrain me from taking a decisive stance. I find that kinship is not the dominant factor in determining the nature and outcome of socioeconomic relationships.

In some contexts, the kinship idiom encourages wealthy kin to help their poorer brethren. In other contexts, wealthy kinsmen, relying on kinship ideology, appropriate their poor kinsmen's labor in the quest for riches. In reverse, dominated kin make counter claims against their better-off relatives, reinterpreting the kinship idiom used by dominant kin to their advantage. In this way kinship primordiality and the logic of accumulation intertwine,

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suffusing the character of kin-class relationships with ambiguity, paradox and tension bordering, sometimes, on hostility.

In my contextual analysis of kinship and class, I review the family histories of both creditor and debtor. The intergenerational development of credit relations between dyadic sets of kin plays a critical role in kin-credit relationships. Besides this historical interjection, local custom is another equally important factor in the complexion of kin-credit relations. The imposition of cultural rules can hinder or precipitate class formation among kin. Therefore, I examine the diachronic formation of local history and culture and its relation to synchronic relationships of credit and kinship.

Changes in the national economy and incorporation within the world economy, also affect credit and class relationships, and I demonstrate how a small village is a "local terminal" of a larger unit. However, even though the larger unit or nation state affects local settings, I found that changes originating outside the immediate village boundaries, robust local customs, and historical peak events more forcefully determine the character of kin-class relationships.

Finally, I argue that kinship, credit and class relations are analytically distinct but in daily life they are inseparable; we cannot understand one without examining the others. Since a Korean peasant village is likely to be composed of many kin members, they become enmeshed in potential and actual class relationships. By investigating the relations of credit and kinship it is possible to achieve a more realistic understanding of the social organization of a rural village.

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Chapter I. Introduction

A. Social Changes

During this century, Korean society has been greatly affected by continuous social upheavals. I will schematically and chronologically describe this century's social events that have contributed to the formation of today's Korean society. The most significant event impacting Korea at the turn of the century was annexation by Japan which transformed Korea's feudal society into a colonial base for Japanese imperialist expansion. Japan extracted from Korea the human and material resources needed for its militaristic invasions and political and economic ascension throughout Asia. Koreans, voluntarily or under duress, migrated from their villages to Manchuria and other foreign lands under the relentless threat of starvation. During 35 years of colonial domination, the Korean people starved and lost family members to the Japanese army, mine fields in Manchuria, Sakhalin, and other areas occupied by Japan.

Despite Japanese colonial domination, traditions emerging from the practice of five centuries of Neo-Confucian ethics continue to play a crucial though ambiguous role in Korean society. During the colonial period, socially approved discrimination against the hereditary low-born such as butchers and prostitutes was abrogated. Yet, class-distinctions between gentry and low-born were not abolished in local people's social consciousness. On the contrary, the yangban's (gentry, see glossary)[1] pride and assertiveness in village affairs remain even if their influence has undeniably declined in

[1] Romanization of the Korean words is made through McCune-Reischauer system.

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significance. For instance some yangban men in Korean peasant [2] villages cook and baby-sit. Such tasks for yangban men were inconceivable during the Yi dynasty and shortly afterward.

The Japanese surrender in 1945 to the Allied Forces brought liberation to Korea. Soon after, the Korean peninsula was divided into North Korea and South Korea: the North was supported by its communistic neighbors, Russia and China, and the South backed by the U.S. From 1950 to 1953, The North and South engaged in a devastating civil war for control of the peninsula.

Generally speaking, the civil war was an outcome of global ideological warfare. Capitalist countries, especially the U.S., perceived the rise of communism in Asia as a threat to global stability. North Korea's attempt to forcefully unify Korea was foiled by U.N. forces led and supported by U.S. military power. After the truce, the North went back to its pre-war position above the 38th parallel. The present hostility between the two sides is the outcome of the civil war. The origin of the division is still unclear and needs further investigation (see Bruce Cumings 1981).

The civil war decimated and alienated the south Korean population and totally destroyed the industrial base and infrastructure. The peasants became victims of the political and ideological conflict between capitalism and communism. When the gun smoke cleared, villages regained their pre-war social order but the social fabric was irrevocably torn by bitter memories of past village strife. To survive the conflict emerging from the civil war, villagers informed on each other and their kinsmen. When either the

[2] In this thesis, I view the peasantry as organized in village households and as forming culture and social and economic organization that is inextricably linked and conditioned by a larger economic system (eg. urban based merchants, the national economy and international commodity markets). Dairy farmers and paddy growers alike meet these criteria.

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communist or U.N. soldiers were empowered in the village, the villagers were often forced to point out the "enemy" of the controlling forces. Descendants of collaborators and traitors, that is, people who were known to help communist soldiers, were labeled as untrustworthy and subversive. Intergenerationally, the effects of this inherited "shame"[3] is not easily visible in the daily activities of villagers but it has played a significant role in village social organization.

After the war, the south Korean state recommenced the land reform which had been initiated before the war in 1950. The state outlawed tenancy and purchased excess land from big landlords and sold it to small landholders and landless tenants. A landlord who owned more than three hectares had to sell the surplus land to the state. Whether or not Korea's land reform achieved the goal of transferring "land to the tiller" is still a controversial matter and needs more research. Nation-wide, landless peasants gained some land and large landholders lost theirs. The effects of the land reform need investigation in local areas where local history and culture conditioned the consequences of the post-war land reform. Hahm's (1989) ethno-historical account of land reform in the Naju area of Chŏllanamdo is part of the effort to reconstruct the impact of Korea's land reform on Korean society.

The most decisive factor affecting change in the Korean peasantry is state directed industrialization. The immediate consequence of Korea's industrialization was the massive migration of the rural population to the cities. About 50 percent of total population in 1960 were peasants. By 1985, about 20 percent of the population remained in the rural areas.

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[3] Throughout the text, the terms, shame, shameful, disgrace, and disgraceful refer to villagers' expressions of distaste and negative value judgement.

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Industrialization and urbanization facilitated the removal of the peasantry's most productive laborers and elderly people are increasingly becoming the largest section of the population composing most Korean peasant villages.

According to Korean family succession rules, the eldest son is responsible to care for and maintain his retired parents. Upon their death, the eldest son must console his parents' souls in ancestor mourning ceremonies. However, as children migrate to the cities to take advantage of better opportunities, the parents rely on the remaining children who can afford to take care of them. Such an alteration in the formerly stable residential arrangements is just a small part of a number of significant changes in the family and kinship system.

A widening parity ratio is a good indicator for use in explaining the rapid process of migration. Agricultural income has been unable to meet or exceed the overall inflation rate. Since the start of the state directed Green Revolution in the early 1970's, Korea's abundant agricultural production has not returned sufficient rural income to pay for the more rapidly rising cost of industrial goods, educational fees, and other extra-rural costs on which peasant social reproduction depends (see Bernstein 1977). Agricultural scientists developed a variety of improved seeds, and the state has assiduously implemented new farming methods and skills. Now, the peasants reap about twice as much as before the Revolution. Even so, their standard of living remains far behind the urban areas.

Significant land concentration in the hands of a rural elite does not exist in Korea. Since Korean law sets the maximum size of land ownership at three hectares and the wealthy cannot accumulate large amounts of land. Also, agricultural production costs in Korea are too high to compete with the low cost of imported foreign crops. As the international free trading system

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engages Korea, the country is obliged to import foreign goods. The consequence is a gradual decline of domestic farming. Few people want to engage in unrewarding, back-breaking farm work.

The mechanization of farming is also part of a state plan to maximize production. However, declining rural labor is the peasants' more immediate motivation to mechanize. Even though the state provides low-interest loans for the purchase of expensive farm machines, farm mechanization is financially burdensome for the majority of peasants, and often drives them into debt. Also, wage laborers lost work opportunities as machines replaced manual labor.

When I was in the field in 1989, the state implemented the local autonomy plan and the livestock cooperative chief was elected by a public vote. It is estimated that within two years the local administrative chief and agricultural cooperative head will be elected by the villagers and cooperative members, respectively. Presently, the officials of local administration are exclusively selected by the state. The local autonomy plan is a concessionary one for the establishment of democratic local institutions and politics. Its announced intention is to decentralize the presently centralized bureaucratic state. In December 1990, the congress passed the plan which intends that a provincial congress, a new governing body, will be elected by public vote in 1991. Whether decentralization will be achieved or not remains to be seen. These historical encounters schematically outlined in this introductory chapter portray some of the major events which will help readers know the general transition of the Korea society. Other important historical events will be discussed in the main chapters.

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B. Korean kinship and lineage

Patrilineal descent rules and patriarchal authority are the two major components maintaining the continuity of the Korean family, kinship, and lineage. Ideally, the eldest son inherits the major portion of his father's property and household headship, thus becoming the patriarch to his siblings as well as his family members. The eldest son is also responsible for the welfare of the whole family. Seniority is an inviolable rule in the Korean family and kinship system.

A younger son moves out upon his marriage, and establishes a branch family. However, he usually resides in his parents' household until he is able to establish an independent household unit. Therefore, the Korean family is often an extended family for a short period of time; however, the stem family is the dominant form. Parents of the eldest son and the eldest son's family live together while the eldest son is obligated to care for his aging parents and perform mourning rituals after their death. A daughter stays in her parents' house until she marries. She then moves out and becomes part of her husband's family.

A daughter will receive a dowry, a nuptial endowment consisting of furniture and some cash for housing from her parents. In most rural areas, daughters are excluded from the division of family property upon the patriarch's death. This rural practice contradicts the civil law [1972 year version][4] which dictates that an unmarried daughter can claim a share equal to that of a non-eldest son(s') inheritance, and a married daughter, one fourth of the non-eldest son's share.

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[4] I used square brackets [ ] when I felt it necessary to interpret the preceding words in detail.

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On the whole, the civil law reflects and supports the traditional patriarchal family system. For instance, the succeeding eldest son has a legal right to possess 50 percent more than the non-succeeding son's share and to succeed to the household headship. In 1991, new clauses of the civil law will be introduced to guarantee that all the children of a patriarch will have an equal share of the property and any child will be able to inherit the family headship. These changes are revolutionary in the patrilineal Korean society. Whether the new clauses will be implemented or utilized by Korean households is another issue.

The eldest son's authority is well manifested in his exclusive role in ancestor worship for his father and lineal ancestors. If the eldest son's father was also an eldest son of the family, the eldest son also must perform ancestor worship for his grandfather. If all his lineal ancestors are eldest sons, he has to perform mourning ceremonies up to his great-great-grand-father. Younger brothers have to participate in the ritual directed by their eldest brother. However, the younger brothers' offspring, after many generations, may establish independent ritual groups and become apical progenitors of sublineages. This issue will be elaborated in Chapter 4.

A descent group, an aggregate of some of the closest agnatic kin members, has a particular significance in the operation of Korean kinship.[5]

---

[5] Goody (1989) argues that "house" is a more concrete and useful concept than kinship: "house" means the intergenerational social reproduction of domestic groups which transmit property or claims to property to heirs, via money payment, inheritance, etc. In my thesis, "kinship" is not a physical entity but operates among kin as an ideology; however, the term "kinship group" is concrete and more or less identical with Goody's conceptualization of "house." Goody's term "property" seems to lay more emphasis on inheritance than on the synchronic property relations and claims among kin. Credit relationship among kin in my thesis includes both with equal emphasis.

"A descent group" refers to a patrilineal group that excludes non-consanguineal members (e.g., affinal kin) even though they are a part of existing property arrangements or credit relations. A "kin group" or "house" is a flexible entity conditioned by property arrangements ,

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The boundary of a Korean descent group within which the closest kinsmen interact demarcates the distinction between personal kinship and supra-personal lineage affairs. In this regard, it will be helpful to turn to Evans-Pritchard who sees "kinship" as involving personal or private affairs and "lineage" as being corporate or political (1951: 364). Such a dichotomy is useful in exploring the operation of the Korean kinship and lineage systems (see Lee Kwang-kyu 1975, Choi Jae-seuk 1975, Chun Kyung-soo 1984). Evans-Pritchard's conceptualization of Nuer kinship, descent groups, and lineages may be arbitrary but it provides an operational model to study Korean kinship and lineage. A tangnae, a group of patrilineal descendants of a common great-great-grand-father (Lee 1987: 64), collectively perform domestic mourning rituals up to their common great-great-grand-father. This group shares the collective responsibility for ancestral ritual performance and plays a centripetal role in the formation of the patrilineal kinship group. Generally speaking, the operations and roles within the descent groups of the Nuer correspond to those of tangnaes in Korea.

Distinguishing lineage from kinship is a crucial task, because these two play different roles in social organization. Contrary to closely knit kinship ties, lineage is a supra-personal kin organization organized for the purpose of achieving collective goals. Evans-Pritchard argues that:

> We thus formally distinguish between the lineage system, which is a system of agnatic groups, and the kinship system, which is a system of categories of relationship to any individual; and we speak of these relationships as a man's paternal kin and his maternal kin, and both together as his kindred (1951: 194).

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inheritance or credit relations. On the other hand, lineage and descent groups are relatively rigid entities determined by consanguinity.

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What is important to note in Evans-Pritch[illegible] definition of kinship is that kinship must be recognized, approved, and p[illegible]ed through actual socioeconomic interactions. This conceptualization [illegible]kinship is useful in analyzing Korean kinship. For example, Chun Kyung-soo's ethnography of Hasami village on Chindo Island in Korea (1984: 62) extends the consanguineally defined notion of kinship with the concept of network reciprocity. What he means by reciprocity are labor exchanges, mutual credit relationships and other common socioeconomic interactions. He suggests that kinship is included within the realm of reciprocity and views reciprocity as a penetrating logic of both non-kin and kin relationships. The range of kinship widens as the give-and-take cycle involves not only patrilineal kin but also matrilineal and affinal kin (ibid: 62).

A Korean clan member's surname includes pon, that is, the name of geographical area where the clan members' apical progenitor either lived or was buried or both. The people with the same pon and surname constitute an exogamous clan and Korean civil law does not allow marriage between the same clan members. It is possible that the same surnames may have different pons, and be classified as different clans. Therefore, they remain marriageable partners to each other. When a person says that he is a Chŏnju Yi, Chŏnju refers to the place where Yi clan's progenitor lived, was buried or both. The Kyŏngju Yi and Chŏnju Yi share the surname but do not share the same progenitor. Those two progenitors may have been related by blood at an earlier time. However, descendants usually lose track of consanguineal ties between the two progenitors who may not be related. The descendants also may not be interested in clarifying the relationship. Therefore, kin groups with the same surnames but with different pons remain affiliated with different clans. The descendants of a prominent progenitor multiply to

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millions of clan members over 20-30 generations, which is the normal depth of known clan histories in Korea. They live throughout the nation and congregate annually to perform ancestor worship for the apical progenitor. A clan is a considerably larger unit than lineage. As sublineages are formed within a lineage, lineages are formed within a clan.

Ancestor worship in Korea has a special significance for both kinship and lineage. Performing a collective mourning ceremony solidifies the boundary of each kin unit. Generally speaking, Koreans have two different types of ancestor worship. One is kije, performed for lineal ancestors up to the great-great-grand-father. All tangnae members who constitute the closest patrilineal kinship group participate in kije at the house of the eldest son of the eldest son on the death dates of the ancestors. We can call it kinship ancestor worship if we think of the tangnae as a kinship unit. On the other hand, it can be considered the ancestor worship of the smallest lineage if we think of tangnae as the smallest lineage unit.

Another kind of ancestor worships is called sije which is performed for the ancestors from the fifth ascending generation and above and is properly considered as lineage ancestor worship. It is held annually in the tenth month of the lunar calendar. People usually perform the rituals for the apical ancestors of lineage and clan at two different graves. A considerably larger number of kinsmen from all over the country congregate, participate, and assert their gentry status.

The more prominent kinsmen a lineage group produces, the more sublineages are created within the lineage in both China and Korea. However, Korean segmentation is not caused by the domination of economic wealth but primarily by the domination of political power coming from a prominent ancestors' fame (Freedman 1958, Janelli 1982). In Tallensi (Fortes

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1945, 1949), Ceylon (Leach 1961), and Southeastern China (Freedman 1958) lineages operate on the basis of corporate land. In Southeastern China this amounts to about 35 percent of the total land and is contrasted with a very minimal amount of the land used for that purpose in Korea. Lineage affairs in Korea are clearly politically oriented. Accumulating political capital is a primary concern whereby economic accumulation can be accomplished and safeguarded (see Song 1982, Janelli 1982).

Ancestral corporate property plays an insignificant role in lineage segmentation in Korea. Produce and profit from the estate is not distributed to the lineage members as it is China, but is used for collective interests such as the publication of genealogies and the purchasing of tomb stones (see Janelli 1982: 138). Non-kinsmen often cultivate the corporate estate for lineage members (Lee Man-gap 1970: 34, Choi Jae-seuk 1966: 106-7).

Korean historian Han Woo-keun (1970) argues that during the Yi dynasty (1392 - 1910) economic wealth had to be protected by political power, otherwise it would have been easily appropriated in the form of exorbitant taxes. Political power is a protective "wall" for lineage members, and no less an important asset than economic wealth. During the Yi dynasty if lineage members were clearly known to be descendants of a politically or scholarly renowned person, they were exempted from taxation and conscription.

Performing pious and elaborate ancestor worship is a central facet of Confucian ethics. Beginning in the Yi dynasty, observing Confucian ethics increasingly became a legal as well as a moral issue. Not conforming to Confucian ethical standards was a sign of defiance against state-sponsored moral ethics and authority and was met with severe punishment. Political authority in the Yi dynasty tried to fashion its subjects after the ethical images fostered by the state. Knowledge and practice of elaborate Confucian etiquette

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was a crucial element in becoming a member of the yangban class and being appointed to officialdom. Undying loyalty to the king, respect for one's senior, filial piety to parents, and women's subordination to men were among the Confucian ethics the ruling elite promoted. Even after the dynastic period ended, these ethical standards still remain as basic rules of behavior and criteria for socially judging others.

In sum, the Korean lineage is a large agnatic kin group. The major function of a lineage is for status assertion by participant kin members. Having a respectable yangban lineage status is an indispensable component in Korean society. The regular performance of elaborate ancestor worship, a necessary task, also enhances lineage status, allowing it to be recognized by lineage members as well as non-members. Yangban status, an intangible asset, has been an ideological component deeply rooted in Korea's classification of venerable and non-venerable people, which eventually is used to obtain tangible assets in socio-economic relationships. In performing collective ancestor worship larger lineage groups and clans prepare the way for both regional and nationwide strategic mobilization. For smaller sublineage groups, collective worship allows for the legitimation and the achievement of preeminent status among lineage members.


The Korean kinship group, as contrasted with lineage organization, are not strictly determined by patrilineal rules but rather by a combination of patrilineal, matrilineal, and affinal kin bonds, or better by a strong bilateral tendency. Daily socio-economic activities rather than status assertion determine the extent to which descent and affinal groups are incorporated and related through kinship. In addition to patrilineal descent rules, daily socio-economic interactions play an equally important role in kinship

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operation. The family is the basic unit of Korean kinship, and filial piety and seniority also play crucial roles in kinship groups.

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Fig. 1.--Schematized diagram of my conception of the intersection between Korean lineage and kinship



Note: Conceptually a tangnae, or a descent group belongs to the area of overlap.

Korean lineages and kinship groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance,the tangnae or descent group is a basic component of both. Though distinguishing Korean kinship from lineage is a somewhat arbitrary task, it is important to note the general differences between the two: the Korean lineage is a large supra-personal agnatic unit for status assertion, while kinship is a personally constructed kin network of relations based on the knowledge of blood ties and utilized for socio-economic ends.

C. Anthropological research on kinship and class among the Korean peasantry

Some anthropologists (Sorensen 1988, Janelli 1982) demonstrate how kin ideology is firmly established in the Korean peasant mind even though industrialization has been generally believed to dissipate kinship ideology. For example, Sorensen argues that industrialization actually does not change the peasants' ideology of kinship in Sangongni village. Also, in the villages I studied, primordial kinship ties and kinship obligations based on them are

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found. However, these are not absolute in their dominance but are played out contextually.

Another view of Korean kinship emphasizes the reciprocal nature of kin relationships. This approach is not confined to the issue of kinship alone, but is an extension of a more general theoretical framework of reciprocity in anthropology. Chun Kyung-soo (1984) asserts that the social structure of Hasami village is maintained by long term and short term reciprocity. The problem with using a reciprocity framework in such a broad fashion is that any human behavior can be classified as either giving, taking or receiving without revealing more complex underlying relations. For example, some kinsmen in Pine Tree give something to poor kinsmen while expecting something in return. Pumashi (reciprocal labor exchange, see glossary) is one of the prevailing socio-cultural patterns that demonstrates reciprocity. My ethnographic material shows, however, that wealthy kinsmen extend private credit to poor kinsmen in exchange for their state allotted high-interest-yielding savings plans that were exclusively designed to help the poor. It is true that lending money and rice to poor kinsmen may be viewed as reciprocal behavior. A poor kinsman's social reproduction would be impossible without the wealthy kinsman's credit; the latter's accumulation of wealth would be impossible or severely hindered without receiving interest from poor debtors. However, the notion of reciprocity needs to be supplemented with other concepts to investigate the tension-ridden relationships between kin creditors and debtors.

Kinship has a political aspect as well as an economic one. Kinship has been used to maintain the political monopoly of certain dominant kinsmen. Kim Kwang-ŏk (1988) has made a significant contribution to the body of ethnographic materials on kinship and politics in Korea. He demonstrates

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that kinship has not only a socio-cultural value, but is manipulated for political and economic gains. In my ethnography, I similarly find that dominant lineage figures manipulate lineage relations and organization in the accumulation of political and economic capital. My accounts of the elections of the village chief, coop chief and the national assembly demonstrate how lineage and kinship are used by dominant figures to achieve their goals. However, an additional finding is that lineage mobilization has never been easily achieved and is complicated by historically formed internal conflict.

I emphasize how less powerful lineage people make their voices heard by resisting lineage authority; hegemony and counter-hegemony are an important feature of the political aspect of kinship. Kinship is manipulated for political purposes but it is also important to consider the underlying factors motivating political action. Various factors such as regional and ideological antagonism have developed since the civil war, and most importantly credit relationships, make it difficult to assume consensual solidarity among lineage members. Therefore, kin affiliation does not necessarily guarantee political solidarity and action. Various non-lineage factors constitute an important part of the social context in which lineage affairs are carried out.

Cho Oakla (1989) is perhaps the first anthropologist who seriously analyzes social class differentiation in a Korean peasant village and its relation to rural development policies and practices. However, she suggests a general framework of class without explicitly attempting to provide the internal dynamics of village social classes. We need an account of how classes in Korea function and how they are maintained.

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Vincent Brandt's research in Sŏkp'o village in Korea in the 1960's is one of the earliest, serious studies on Korean peasants. He had unusual insight in seeing internal conflict and tension in village social relations. Brandt transcended the influence of Robert Redfield on anthropological community studies in the 1960's, an influence that emphasized unconditional social solidarity. However, Brandt's analysis of conflict and tension is not conceptualized in a framework of class and credit relationships but in a framework of social relations based on the simultaneous practice of abstract constructs of informal and formal ideologies structured in yin-yang opposition (Brandt 1971:32).

Class antagonism and its concurrent tension are not fully understood by focusing on ideology and ideological rules. Empirical relationships such as credit relationships which imply tenancy, money credit or labor credit are very useful in the analyses of class relations. Social tension can best be analyzed in relation to property relationships and class antagonism. Class relationships and social tension are rooted in unequal relationships, people's perception of these relations, and their conflicting claims.

D. Problems and purposes

This thesis discusses credit and kinship in two small peasant villages in Chŏllabukdo province, Korea. I chose to work on credit and kinship in this rural setting because the link between these two components underlies many other aspects of rural life. One is economic and the other is social. Comprehension of that link also bears on an important discussion in anthropological theory.

Mauss (1967) explicated the relationships between "gift" and social organization. Mauss points out that "the form usually taken is that of the

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gift generously offered; but the accompanying behavior is formal pretence and social deception, while the transaction itself is based on obligation and economic self-interest" (ibid: 1). Mauss' definition of gift can also be seen as comparable to credit which has to be returned. When a gift is given, the receiver is obliged to give something back in time to the giver. In this thesis, credit is a more narrowly defined concept than gift. Credit is transference of money, labor, or usufruct right to land with the mutual understanding that things must be returned with interest within a specific period of time. The giver who has given but not yet been repaid is called creditor. The receiver who has been given and has not yet repaid is called debtor.

After a review of ethnographies, Mauss added cultural and psychological aspects to the concept of "gift". He wrote, "It is a complex notion that inspires the economic actions we have described, a notion neither of purely free and gratuitous prestations, nor of purely interested and utilitarian production and exchange; it is a kind of hybrid" (ibid). In this thesis, my argument concerning credit and kinship will revolve around Mauss' conception of the gift as "hybrid." What Mauss said of the "gift" refers to all reciprocal relationships between people, including kinsmen. My intention is to explicate how things are given and taken between kinsmen and what consequences follow after reciprocal rules have been followed or not followed.

Things being given and taken among kinsmen have ambivalent features. They can be a "gratuitous prestation" or "interested" credit. When money, labor, and tenancy are given to a kinsmen, it is not entirely clear whether it is a present or credit. A present is an aspect of a gift that does not require repayment of principal or interest. Presents are given and received

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between kinsmen as a kinship obligation. A present may be returned but not necessarily based on mutually agreed upon rules.

The ambiguity between credit and presents creates tension, particularly among kinsmen. Receivers and givers can have different ideas during exchange and different expectations from it. If a giving kinsman thought that a given thing was credit and the receiver thought that it was a present, tension emerges. When a desperately needy person asks for money from a kinsman, does the giver think his act of giving is a form of credit or a present given under kinship obligations? Does the giver have to ask for the money back or simply forget the repayment? Different interpretations about things being given and taken in a kinship system and the concurrent tension and conflict between kinsmen is illustrated in Chapter 10, the central chapter of the thesis.

In Chapter 10, I shall discuss two contrasting examples. First, I will illustrate some examples of extreme imbalance in giving and receiving. Dominated kinsmen give considerably more than they receive from dominating kinsmen. Here, we can see kinship used as an exploitive mechanism, a mechanism that exacerbates and disguises class contradiction. Second, I shall illustrate with examples how kinship helps poor kin and further camouflages class contradictions. I will demonstrate that generosity is an important part of domination. Generosity can easily be turned into whimsical cruelty, however. As I will show, receiving alms from wealthy kin has never been structurally guaranteed, but appropriation has.

Even though a rich peasant does not entirely control the production of the poor, a small amount of cash or tenancy which the rich person lends to the poor person is often crucial to the poor person's survival. The poor may have some means of production such as land, tools, and cows. However, to


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utilize these things profitably depends on credit which enables the poor to reproduce themselves. Besides, the poor must do tenant farming, because their landholdings are not large enough to produce enough rice to meet all life requirements. Money, credit and tenancy given to the poor may be small in proportion to the total assets of the poor. But credit and tenancy are qualitatively important enough to underwrite domination by landlords and creditors. A small amount of money or tenanted farmland can be used by the rich to control the poor.

In this thesis, I focus on three forms of give and take: labor, money and tenancy. Give and take among kinsmen is compared and contrasted with that among non-kinsmen in order to demonstrate how kinship conditions the rules of credit relationships and vice versa. Some anthropologists (Benedict 1959, Geertz 1973) argue that people act and think according to a shared belief system. I suggest a contrary view. People can have different understandings or interpretations of their culture though their actions and reactions may be conditioned by shared cultural norms. However, when two conflicting norms are intertwined, there is confusion which creates tension. The two intertwined norms that I consider in this thesis are "interested" credit relationships leading to class contradictions and "disinterested" present-giving, both among kin.

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Fig. 2--Schematized diagram of the intertwining of class and kinship relations



The diagram above schematizes the problems of kinship and class. Both of these are within the domain of the social relations of production (see Siskind 1978, Meillassoux 1973, Marx 1967). When kinship structure overlaps with class structure, the consequences of reciprocity become complicated. Credit is the key mechanism that creates kin-class contradictions. Kinship may both alleviate and exacerbate kin-class contradictions. Examination of the historical development of both kin relationships and social relations of production can help us understand the consequences of relationships between kinship and class.

In Chapter 3, I discuss the historical formation of village social structure. Among others, I highlight three major events: Japanese colonialism, the civil war, and the New Village Movement. I discuss genealogy and kinship ideology and terminology in Chapters 4 and 10 respectively. Eva Hunt's point that "Culture carriers may adjust the perception of the genealogical network to accord with the social network, rather than the reverse" (1988: 255) indicates that kinship and genealogy are constructed within a social context.

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In this light, the formation, fission and disintegration of genealogies and kinship groups are linked to and affected by changes in the social relations of production. Thus, kinship is not defined here as a system which is transmitted with the blood. Biological reproduction does no more than supply raw materials that people use to construct genealogical links and kinship terminology. In Chapter 4, I examine the historical development of genealogies leading to the present kin relationships.

What basically drove the Korean peasant into impoverishment and indebtedness is a low economic return from production after expenditures were removed from their gross production. What they can grow and raise now is limited. They are virtually mono-crop producers, and sales of produce have rarely met farming and living expenses. Therefore, the peasants have to resort to state and private credit to make ends meet. In Chapter 5, I shall discuss forms of production, production costs and profit. I shall elucidate some macro-economic factors contributing to the limited production options and provide examples of the effects of these factors at the local level.

Consumption patterns among Third World peasantry have been significantly changed by the incorporation of the domestic economy into the world commodity market. Peasants no longer solely depend on their indigenous production for their consumption needs (See Bernstein 1977, Warman 1980, Shenton and Lennihan 1981). Whether voluntary or coerced, peasants consume non-local produce and consumer items from both the national and international market systems. As certain items become culturally necessary to them they will intensify production and/or resort to credit in order to meet the cash requirements. As will be shown later, production on a given amount of land is limited and the sale prices of the main crops do not comfortably exceed the cost of social reproduction.

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Therefore, the Korean peasants' feasible options are either private or state credit or both. Since the 1960's, during Korea's frantic capitalist development, Korean peasants have learned to consume domestic, Western, and Japanese industrial goods. Korean peasant consumption can be increased without much foreign intervention. Their obligation to ancestor worship and other culturally set consumption requirements such as elaborate weddings and funerals can easily drive them into debt.

I emphasize the importance of consumption in understanding rural economy and culture. Consumption is an analytical mediator between culture and economy. Apparently irrational, exorbitant consumption creates a great burden on villagers' finances. However, cultural prescriptions necessitate consumption of certain goods, often leading to indebtedness. The villagers' borrowing private or state loans to finance their children's wedding and anniversaries succinctly demonstrates how peasant culture is interlocked with the peasant economy. Consumption is not a derivative issue from production but needs to be investigated in its own right. In Chapter 6, I elaborate on consumption and attempt to illustrate how consumption is intertwined with the rural economy, leading to the complication of social reality.

Some anthropologists (Malinowski 1961, Sahlins 1972) hold the view that reciprocal relationships function to maintain social structure. The critical point overlooked in this view is how tension contributes to the maintenance of give and take and how such tension shapes and reshapes social structure. Community solidarity and kinship cohesion can be unintentionally emphasized by superficially observing scenes of cooperation such as feasts. However, conflict and tension exist even in such reciprocity.

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I shall explain how the cost of social reproduction has increased and the profound impact this has had on villagers, especially the poor. The poor's habitual borrowing for social reproduction has put them in a vicious cycle of debt. Conversely, the wealthy use credit for the accumulation of wealth. Poor people are affected by this process of wealth accumulation. The rich people's wealth accumulation infringes on the poor peoples' land and labor. In other words, different uses of credit partially contribute to the increasing inequality between the poor and the rich. I shall discuss the interactions between credit, domestic consumption, ritual, and wealth accumulation in Chapters 8 and 9.

Since the 1970's, the state banking agency cooperatives -- National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) -- have taken over the role of the private creditor in the rural areas. Through credit relations, the state is now directly involved in the peasant economy and social relations. Usurious credit extended by private persons has become useless due to the relatively easy access to state cooperative loans. As a result, the interest rate on private loans has declined considerably. A notewortny fact is that, today, the very poor pay a higher rate of interest for private credit than do poor and medium income peasants. The very poor's desperate need is exploited by state and village creditors. Generally speaking, the poor and very poor have benefited from the changes in the credit market. Nevertheless, exploitative and discriminatory treatment continues to be the common lot of the very poor and their poverty is thereby maintained.

I also discuss how the hegemonic role of the state is maintained through the state organization of coops and how peasants react to that organization. In Chapter 8, I examine how hegemony and evasiveness are intertwined and at work in the relationships between the state and the peasants. Gramsci's (1971) argument that hegemony is maintained by the

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combination of force and consent in civil society is a key notion in allowing us to examine how the state sustains its hegemonic role over the peasantry through the credit system. The coops tolerate the peasants' illegal behavior in credit transactions so long as the coop administration can collect the interest and principal on loans given. The coop administration's loose control over the peasants actually strengthens the state's hegemony.

Political influence enables some people to receive a greater share of the monetary budget allocated to a region. Therefore, peasants enthusiastically want to be elected or to have close kinsmen elected to public office. Kinship is mobilized in elections to achieve influential positions. Pent-up tension in credit and kin relationships accumulated over time explodes during elections. In Chapter 9, I discuss cooperation and antagonism between kinsmen by analyzing cohesion and fission in the collective act of voting. My intention is to demonstrate how kin relationships are reflected in politics and vice versa.

E. The field sites

When I visited Korea in 1987 to find a field site, Korean anthropologists and graduate students introduced me to Changpa[6] in Chungchŏng province, Pine Tree village in Chŏlla province, and Hasa village in Kyŏngsang province. I stayed in each village for a few weeks. The immediate goal was to find a village where I could do fieldwork for my research problem. All three villages were attractive, potential fieldsites. Hasa village is a model village designated by the state for the purpose of demonstrating and preserving Korean cultural heritage. Most villagers

[6] Most personal and geographical names are pseudonyms to ensure the anonymity of the people discussed in this thesis except for the obviously well known people and big cities.

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belong to a renowned gentry clan. Quite a number of ethnographic studies of kinship had been done in Hasa village (Kim Taek-kyu 1964).

The state provided funds for housing renovation and reconstruction of many material settings. When I visited the village, my impression was that it was too protected by the state. It was a beautiful model village, an outcome of the state's plan to preserve an example of the traditional patterns of peasant living. So, I did not select the village for my research site. The village's social organization was heavily affected by state direction and help. I hoped to find a village where the residents were the dominant actors in village affairs.

Changpa is characterized by a large tobacco growing section. It could have been a good research site but Changpa is a volatile area. The peasants in the area are politically motivated and have organized active, anti-government peasant organizations and protest. The largest and most powerful peasant organization is located in Chungchŏng province, and many Changpa residents are involved in it. It was not difficult to imagine that doing fieldwork there, even though my research focus was kinship and not local politics, could cause serious trouble for both the residents and myself. Anyone doing fieldwork for a long period of time would be regarded with great suspicion by both the authorities and villagers. I doubted that I would finish my fieldwork in this politically turbulent area.

Later, I chose Pine Tree and Oak Tree village, two villages that are separated by about one kilometer. They are two of 17 belonging to the Yongsan township located in Tori county, Chŏllabukto province, which is known to be a very poor area. I welcomed this province as the region for my study because I thought that the relation between credit and debt would be particularly visible in a poor region, and that data related to their interplay might thus be more easily obtainable. Besides, ethnographies based on work

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in Chŏllabukdo are few compared to those based on work in other provinces, either by Korean or non-Korean anthropologists.

Personally, I felt comfortable with the residents who were eager to help me. During my stay there in 1987 for preliminary research, I developed intimate relationships with several household heads who greatly assisted my research in 1989. They reduced residents' suspicion of me and brought me to many important village, township, and county meetings.

In comparison with the other 15 villages in the Yongsan township, Oak Tree and Pine Tree have many features that make them especially suitable for anthropological fieldwork. A person from Umin Kim's lineage in Oak Tree ran for the national assembly in the 1986 election, representing the Tori and Hyangmi counties. That was a major attraction and I thought I could investigate kinship structure through politics. In addition, Oak Tree produced two owners of large corporations and Pine Tree, a professor and a big company owner. These figures play influential roles in the village social structure.

Oak Tree and Pine Tree are characterized by strong kinship ties, both having dominant lineages. These features fulfilled an important requirement for my research; they promised to furnish the data necessary to study the relationship between credit and kinship. In Oak Tree the dominant lineage is the Umin Kim. They were the first settlers in the area and presently have general control over village matters. About two thirds of the Oak Tree villagers belong to the Umin Kim lineage; the other one third have various surnames. Pine Tree has another major lineage, the Songhyon Kim, who constitute about one third of the village. Of the remaining population, one third are Umin Kim and one third have various surnames.

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The other 15 villages in Yongsan township have members of both dominant lineages. Seha contains the densest population of Songhyon Kim in Yongsan township. However, these other communities of the township, including Seha were excluded from my research because they were scattered over a vast area, making it impossible for me to attain my research objectives with only a year of planned fieldwork. I simply could not do participant observation, my method of investigating social relationships, among the residents of all 15 villages. Therefore, I limited my fieldsites to Oak Tree and Pine Tree. They are in close proximity to each other [about a 10 minute walk] which facilitated my research, making it possible to study two villages instead of one.

There are also lineage and surname interactions between villages even though these interactions occur less frequently than within the village. I found data from either Oak Tree or Pine Tree alone insufficient. I could not ignore Umin Kim cooperation on genealogical affairs or the feuds existing between the two villages. Therefore, I included both villages in my research. However, I paid more attention to the Pine Tree villagers than to Oak Tree villagers because of the relationships between lineage, power, and social structure. Thus, roughly two thirds of my thesis is based on information furnished by villagers from Pine Tree and roughly a third based on the lives of Oak Tree villagers and the relationship between Oak Tree and Pine Tree.

Pine Tree is characterized by a conspicuous feature; cooperation and conflict between the Umin Kim and the Songhyon Kim. Both lineages have about the same number of people and both share power in Pine Tree. The lineages entertain both cooperative and antagonistic attitudes toward each other, depending on the context of discourse and political situation. It was extremely fruitful to study the interactions of the two lineages in the

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formation of social structure and the balance of power. By contrasting and examining one kin group's interactions with the other, I could explore the significance of their mutual relationships.

Ironically, both lineages have the same surname, Kim. They believe that they share the same ancient ancestor from time immemorial, and that they were divided into Umin and Songhyon Kim at a later date. "Umin" and "Songhyon" are their apical ancestors' pen names. Umin and Songhyon represent the symbolic starting point of the respective lineages. Some 400-500 years ago, both Umin Kim and Songhyon Kim were high ranking governmental officials. In the villagers' genealogical records (chokpo), extended genealogical relations preceding the Umin and Songhyon lineage branches are recorded. However, members of both lineages proudly say "I am a descendant of Umin" or "I am a descendant of Songhyon," seemingly ignoring these ancestors.

For the first two months I lived in the Oak Tree village chief's house. Then I lived with a key informant in Pine Tree for eight months. I walked to Oak Tree when certain events took place and when I felt it necessary to interview villagers in Oak Tree. The fieldwork was a follow-up of the preliminary research done in 1987 in the same villages where I collected rudimentary data on demography, kinship, and politics. Undeniably, I benefitted from being a native Korean in comprehending local dialects and metaphors. Besides, my familiarity with Korean manners and etiquette reduced the frequency of embarrassing moments.

Doing physical labor in New York probably made it easy for me to do a new type of physical labor in Korea -- farming. My willingness to help in collective work such as transplanting, construction work, and harvesting, left a positive impression on the villagers who often desperately needed help.

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Normally, educated urbanites are expected to behave arrogantly toward peasants. They generally thought that I was an "unusual" young man who wandered around doing nothing. They believed I was wasting time there. My explanation of what I was going to do and what anthropology was did not arouse any interest among them. Finally, I said that I felt obligated to record their culture and farming methods before they all disappeared. Then some of them gave legitimacy to my fieldwork, because they felt that their culture and old ways of life would soon disappear and they would regret the loss. Recent out-migration and the subsequent decrease in village population encouraged them to think that way. Gradually their suspicion turned into sympathy.

Some old men often appeared exhilarated talking about genealogy, their ancestors' achievements, and other lineage affairs. Generally speaking, young people thought that lineage and genealogical affairs are old people's work and were not enthusiastic about knowing genealogy and past lifeways. The old people generally thought it deplorable for the younger generation to forget their past and the ways of the gentry. They thought that I was an exemplary young man who wanted to know about the things in which other young people were not interested.

I was pleasantly surprised when a resident who had been suspicious of my presence woke me around 7:00 a.m. while I was sleeping in my key informant's house. He showed me a thick collection of local newspapers, pamphlets, flyers; they presented a record of the animal husbanders' collective action against the authorities. He said: "Aren't these what you want to see for your research? Take a look at it and bring it back when you finish it." He had dropped out of primary school and was almost illiterate. I was stunned and asked: "Why do you collect these?" He replied, "I have to keep these for the next generation to understand what we did."

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I wanted to know what it was like to be a debtor and creditor; I decided to lend to and borrow money from the villagers. I borrowed about $10 from one of the three major creditors in Pine Tree. I said I needed it to make a contribution to the wedding ceremony of his cousin's daughter. He willingly lent me the money. He never said when I had to repay it. I myself did not know when to repay. So I just waited. About one month passed after my credit transaction, and while I was waiting for a bus to Pian town an old lady from Pine Tree came to me with a worried look and said, "You would be better off if you repay now." I was dumbfounded. I never heard from my creditor about the need for immediate repayment. I ran to the village as fast as I could. After apologizing, I handed the money to the wife of my creditor. At first she refused to take it saying, "You don't have to pay. You helped my husband to load some heavy bags of rice on his cart one day." I knew that she did not mean what she said. If she did, I would not have been informed about the outstanding debt by an uninvolved person. I knew I was entangled in an awkward, historically derived credit relationship.

Lending money was not as easy as borrowing money. I was anxiously waiting for the moment when I could become a creditor. The moment came when a man in Pine Tree and I went to Pian town together. Upon arriving at the hardware store, he realized that he did not bring enough money to buy an item. I immediately lent him about $20. After learning from the first experience, I did not say anything. He thanked me and repaid the amount after he arrived at home the same night. I was surprised by his swift repayment.

Obviously my credit transactions with the residents cannot show all aspects of such transactions existing among them. The residents probably did not expect me to understand their unwritten credit rules. However, my

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participation in credit transactions helped me in two respects. First, I caught a glimpse of the social aspect of credit through first-hand experience. Second, I could participate in a wider social network by becoming a credit transactor. I made contributions to wedding ceremonies and other anniversaries. The return I received from them was not labor or interest but answers to my questions. As an outsider, donating money was the only entry point to the village credit system. Participation in the credit system and farm labor probably turned my status from a total outsider to a semi-resident who had a right to know the village affairs and to ask questions.

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Chapter 2. The villages

A. Natural environment

Weather in Korea is characterized by a hot and humid summer and a cold and dry winter. Spring and fall are relatively short.

Table 1--The average temperature of Tori county

Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June
-3.1	1.4	5.2	12.6	18.8	22.1
July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
25.9	27.0	21.4	15.1	7.6	-0.7

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture 1986, Unit is centigrade.

Table 2--Precipitation of Korea

Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June
20.8	43.8	86.7	62.7	142.2	155.3
July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
346.7	273.3	319.7	112.6	125.8	42.4


Source: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture 1986, Unit is millimeter.

About half of the yearly precipitation falls during the summer from July to September. In the two months before the harvest season the weather is relatively dry. Such weather conditions are advantageous for paddy cultivation. However, destructive weather comes once in a while and spoils the harvest. Destructively heavy rain and winds in the monsoon season and heart breaking drought in the transplanting season in May can contribute to a lean harvest for the people. Interestingly, for the last several years, people have felt that the weather is becoming warmer. They now transplant and

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harvest 15-30 days earlier than in the past. They like warmer weather because they can start and finish farming earlier, and rest sooner. I suspect that global warming (the vinyl house effect of the earth) is affecting Korea and the villages.

Fig. 3--Simplified landscape of Pine Tree, Oak Tree, and Mulberry Tree



Note: Thick lines represent roads.

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Oak Tree and Pine Tree belong to Yongsan township, which is composed of 17 villages. Yongsan township belongs to one of 12 townships of Tori county, one of 13 counties in Chŏllabukdo province. Chŏllabukdo province is one of nine provinces of South Korea. The province has five cities.

As is common in Korea, the Yongsan township has a hilly landscape. Paddy field covers most of the flat land. The mildly inclined hillside areas are used for patchakmul (dry land crops). Dry land on the hillside is usually used for the cultivation of red pepper, turnip, peanuts, garlic, corn, sudan grass, sweet potato, potato, ginger, sesame plants, and cabbage. About 150 ume trees are planted in Mulberry Tree village, another village which is located between Oak Tree and Pine Tree. About 50 such trees are on the hillside east of Pine Tree. About two hectares of dry land on the hillside in Mulberry Tree are used as ginseng fields. There are two such fields in Oak Tree.

It is not difficult to see paddy land even on a steep hillside. This is an indication of land scarcity and high population density. A stream, approximately 30 meters wide, separates the Yongsan and Kaori townships. The stream does not provide water to the residents of Yongsan township but it is used exclusively by the Kaori township. Yongsan township has suffered from a scarcity of water since people settled there.

Magpies, sparrows, doves, and pheasants are frequently seen in the Tujong mountain in back of Pine Tree. Sometimes I saw rabbit, roe deer, and snakes. Undoubtedly, mice are the most abundant animal in the mountain and villages. The mountain has provided the villagers with wood fuel since the first settlements. Villagers also bury their ancestors' bodies in the Tujong mountain. The mountain is mostly covered with pine, birch, and chestnut

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trees. Recently, a timber company cut a stand of trees on the west side of the mountain.

There are four reservoirs in my research area as shown in the map above. Reservoir A is used by Oak Tree and Mulberry Tree, B by Pine Tree and Mulberry Tree, C and D are used only by Pine Tree. Most of the reservoirs were enlarged during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945). As time passed, the reservoirs became filled with the surrounding soil. It is easily washed away by rain and carried into lower areas. As a result, the holding capacity was reduced about one half. During the drought season, the reservoirs easily dry up. Reservoir A has cracian carp, mudfish, and snapping turtles. Reservoir B is so contaminated by pig excrement from the pig barn in Pine Tree that there is no living creature in it. Reservoir D water is clean but there are no fish. This reservoir is located just below the higher paddy field. Heavy use of pesticide and its drainage into the reservoir could have killed all the fish. Reservoir C is surrounded by the mountain and a small paddy field in the valley. It contains fish and snapping turtles. It seems that reservoirs A and C are still not affected by pesticides.

Because of the heavy use of pesticide, paddy fields and nearby streams are almost lifeless. Grasshoppers and fish that villagers used to catch for fun and food in the 1960s have vanished. In their place, vinyl sacks and plastic bottles of pesticide and fertilizer are frequently seen on the field and in the streams. The soil has become heavily acidified by chemicals and more and more chemicals have to be used to effectively fertilize the soil.


Pine Tree is located at the base of the Tujong mountain which is about 300-400 meters above sea level. Relatively flat land stretches out from the mountains toward Oak Tree. Paddy land in Pine Tree is terraced. A distinctive feature of Pine Tree is the scarcity of water. There is no major

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water flow from any direction. The three reservoirs in Pine Tree (B,C, and D) are filled by the gradual water flow from the mountains and rain. Villagers started using water pumps in the 1970s. However, Pine Tree villagers have difficulty in finding water sources above and below the ground. Since Pine Tree is located near the base of a mountain, gravity draws water from Pine Tree to areas below it. Oak Tree and Mulberry Tree residents are easily able to locate underground water sources. As compensation for its lack of water resources, Pine Tree is protected by the Tujong mountain from destructive floods and winds during the heavy summer rains. In 1989, strong winds destroyed rice plants. Damage in Pine Tree was minimal compared to Oak Tree and Mulberry Tree because of the natural protection afforded by the mountain.

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Fig. 4--A simplified diagram of the Yongsan township landscape



Note: Dark area represents Tujong mountain; thick line, main asphalt road; circles, villages; size of circle, population size.

The distance from Yongsan township to Pian town is about four kilometers and takes 10-15 minutes travel time by bus. Three years ago, the state constructed an asphalt covered road that passes through Yongsan township and on to Pian town. Recently, all 17 villages in Yongsan township

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were connected to this main road by cement roads. The new roads lessened the geographical isolation of the villages.

Pian town has developed into a supply town for the surrounding agricultural townships and has a large number and variety of utility shops. The various businesses generally point to the changing consumption patterns of nearby residents. Commodities available in Pian town have replaced many goods and services formerly produced domestically and communally in the villages.

Table 3--Types of business, facilities, and institutions in Pian

Retail shops		
10 hardware stores	2 book stores	2 shoe stores
2 gas stations	13 grocery stores	4 chicken stores
9 butcher shops	22 food stores	2 bicycle shops
7 grain shops	9 custom tailor shops	2 bakery shops
5 photo shops	3 fruit stores	
Social institutions	Recreational places	Manufacturers
1 J.C. club	5 coffee shops	2 breweries
1 Lion's club	3 pool rooms	6 grain mills
1 care center for the elderly	1 video game store	2 lumber yards
Educational facilities	Religious institutions	Medical facilities
2 abacus schools	1 Catholic church	2 small hospitals
1 fine art school	1 Unification church	2 dental offices
2 piano schools	6 Protestant churches	
1 typewriter school	1 Buddhist temple	
1 junior high school	1 Wŏn Buddhist temple	
1 high school		
Other		
6 inns	12 restaurants	4 taxi companies
2 wedding ceremony halls	4 Chinese restaurants	5 barber shops
		3 funeral homes

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Pian town holds a periodic market every fifth day of each month. In the "five day market", people bustle about to buy vegetables, fish, salts, shoes, and agricultural items. Competitive prices make this market popular. In addition, Pian town sells every day necessities. In contrast, Yongsan township provides minimal convenience goods and services. It has a grain mill, rice cake mill, herbal medicine store, coffee shop, Korean restaurant, Chinese restaurant, three small grocery stores, gas station run by the agricultural coop, coop store, police station, post office, township office, tavern, and an agricultural machinery repair shop. All these facilities are concentrated in Oak Tree, which is the center of the Yongsan township. Each village has its own store run by villagers where people can buy cookies, candies, and liquors.

The main road runs through six of the 17 villages. The residents in the other 11 villages must walk 10 to 20 minutes to reach the main road. There is a public bus service, running once an hour, from Oak Tree to Pian town. From the Pian town bus travelers can go to Nasong city, Tori town, and Chŏnju, the capital of Chŏllabukdo. From Pian, it is a 15 minute bus trip to Nasong and Tori and an one and half hour bus trip to Chŏnju. Nasong and Tori towns are frequently visited by the Yongsan township people, but these two places are not as popular as the Pian town market. Tori town is the administrative center of Tori county. Nasong is in a way an entertainment center; it has fancier pubs, restaurants, and movie theaters.

A noteworthy factor in the landscape is the increasing mileage covered by asphalt roads. Some old people in Oak Tree and Pine Tree said "we used to walk to Pian town with three mal of rice (27 kilograms) on the head or on an A frame." The old people considered going to Pian town a big event. People went there for special occasions, such as shopping for a wedding, funeral, or

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ancestor worship. Up to the 1960s, it was a "big" event for Pine Tree people to go to Oak Tree. They put on nice clothes to go to the township office in Oak Tree. Road construction since the 1970s changed the landscape and enlarged the radius of the villagers' movement. New roads have many implications, such as the widening of social networks and the increasing of consumption which will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Since 1984, the government has been constructing aqueducts. The aqueducts were connected to the huge Hwasong reservoir in Obong township and already reached most of the Yongsan township villages. In 1990, the government intends to provide the villages with constant water flow for the May transplanting season. With the construction, land has been rearranged. Bulldozers and trucks have been used to flatten the paddy land and to make square shaped plots out of the irregular shaped fields. The aqueduct project has rearranged half of the Yongsan township land. Most of Oak Tree and Mulberry Tree land has been reshaped but only half of the Pine Tree land was affected due to the high cost of levelling the hillsides.

Land rearrangement due to the aqueduct project radically changed the landscape of Pine Tree and Oak Tree. As rocks, trees, and other landscape markers disappeared, the people's memory about those things and associated events faded away. The changing landscape had a great impact on their ideas of their village. Part of their material culture has been destroyed in exchange for efficient use of water and land. As it was certain that the villagers would be supplied with water next year, some villagers altered their use of land. A Pine Tree villager, spending $2,800, changed his dry land on the hillside to flat paddy. A water canal passed just above his land. He reshaped his holding based on a long-term calculus; he considered the fact that profit from paddy land would be considerably larger than from dry crops.

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Some people in Pine Tree opposed the idea of water canals passing above their land. They argued that the supporting legs of the canal would take away some portion of the land and block the sun light. There was a fierce feud between the planner and some of the land owners. Canals had to be built lower than originally planned. A man who permitted the construction on his land said "those people are like pigs. They do not know anything. They can see only things in front of them."

Land rearrangement caused another serious problem. Some residents strongly believed that land inherited from their ancestors was of the best quality and not exchangeable for other plots. They were appalled by the plan of shuffling the land around to make possible the distribution of single square shapes of land on one location. To accomplish the reshaping people were required to give their land away and to receive other people's land. The result was an intensification of feuds over land.

Changes in the landscape during the last few years have been greater than those made in several hundred years before the plan. Newly shaped land and aqueducts have great potential to contribute to the change of social relations in the community, especially because of new production and labor processes. These issues will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 6.

B. Social Organization

This section is a preliminary discussion of the various power brokers appearing in village discourse and politics. I shall briefly explain how the power structure is built up in the village and township community. My intention is to familiarize readers with the positional names and organizations that play important roles in local social organization. The people in these positions play an important role in production, consumption,

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politics, rituals, social networks, and credit transactions. These roles and functions will keep appearing in the following chapters, so this background information will be useful.

It is important to note that the center of the power structure in Yongsan township is occupied by the director of the government party branch in the Yongsan township. He has the final say in sensitive and complex economic, political, and administrative decisions. He is usually detached from ordinary community affairs. He rarely interferes in the jurisdiction under the township office and the cooperative, but does so when it becomes necessary. His influence is not felt in ordinary circumstances but only at critical moments, such as in the allocation of state development funds.

The township office head (myŏnjang) controls the administrative affairs in the township. The office keeps land records, the demographic census, and property registers. It "educates" the 17 village chiefs (ijang) in monthly meetings. The township officials give government leaflets to the village chiefs who distribute them to the villagers. The leaflets ofttimes contain political and economic propaganda sponsored by the state.

The cooperative is also a state agency. It buys crops from the township people and sells chemicals, fertilizer, and farming tools. The cooperative also functions as a bank. It provides people with savings accounts and loans. The central headquarters of the cooperative in Seoul, National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) gives funds to the branch cooperatives in the townships. The cooperative and the township office are centrally related, but functionally separate. Nevertheless, they are fused branch of state power.

The village chief, two New Village Movement (NVM) directors, and two party members are appointed by the state from a pool of eligible villagers. Hayong holds both positions of NVM director and party member. Formally,

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the village chief is supposed to manage village administration works, the NVM directors communal works extension services, and party members political affairs. However, all of them become involved in any important village matter. Any village concern that is related to the higher administrative unit of the township or county must be approved by these four people.

The village chief is the oldest position. The roles and functions of the present village chief were established during the Japanese colonial period. The village chief is and has been a quasi-state functionary. He reports changes in demography, land ownership, and other miscellaneous affairs such as the number of loan applications at the township office. The township office collects data from the 17 village chiefs and directs village administration. The village chief receives $42 monthly from the state and 15 kilograms of barley and rice in both harvest seasons from the villagers.

The village chief has particular influence in the distribution of state loans, new farming methods and tools. He can favor or disfavor a villager. The township office allows the village chief some autonomy and he can determine who is poor enough to get a loan or "subsistence provision", and who is industrious enough to get a low interest state loan. However, he does not have absolute power. He is checked by the NVM directors and the government party members.

The last two positions are relatively recent ones. They first appeared in the early 1970s. The power of NVM personnel is presently unstable. Their heyday was in the 1970s and early 1980s when former presidents Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan endowed the NVM organization with great power. In those days, their power was unchallenged in the local politics. Since the late 1980s, NVM power has declined. The transition was strongly affected by

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the changes in the political power in Seoul. Chun Kyonghwan who was the former president's brother and head of the NVM organization was arrested for embezzling NVM funds. The result was a dramatic, nationwide reduction of NVM power and influence. However, local NVM directors still exert considerable influence in local decision making processes. Most state loans must be approved by the NVM director in the village. Most NVM personnel are also government party members.

Party members play a role in "purifying" the villagers' minds. They are active during the presidential and national assembly elections. The government party gives them political funds to mobilize all available organizations in the community to make the vote turn out in their favor. The village chief, NVM directors, and party members probably have a more or less equal share in the village power structure. They are all government or quasi-government officials but they have uneasy relationships with each other.

The village chief is supposed to be elected by the vote of the villagers. But the candidate is predetermined by the four influential people. Kinship background is also an important factor in deciding who will get the position. The government party members and the NVM director have achieved their present position in a step by step ascendance of the power ladder. Their positions were not given to them until they had "paid their dues." They started by being the head of a small village organization. They also have received kinsmen's and friends' support. Most importantly they have devoted themselves to political affairs. They have spent lots of time attending political meetings in the township, county, and some at the national level. In return for their spending time and money on party affairs, they receive political and economic privileges at the local level.

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The "Young people's organization" is organized by men 25 to 35 years of age. They repair communal property such as lamps, water pipes, and sewage facilities. The "Housewives' organization" is composed of middle aged housewives. They install draperies and furniture in village communal buildings. These women sell their labor in agricultural works to make money to fund their activities. The "Old people's organization" supervises the young people's social activities. It rarely interferes in communal affairs. The role of this organization in Pine Tree is not as strong as in other villages, because the competition and division between Songhyon and Umin Kim make it impossible for the two lineages to reach a consensus on young people's activities. However, old people in each kin group are able to develop unity in village politics. They have been very active in appointing and promoting their kinsmen to the position of village chief. The organization also has a recreational function. Old members sometimes go out for fun in a group regardless of lineage.

Two people joined the opposition party. By doing so they placed themselves in an ambivalent position in the community. They did not approve of being "automatic" party members. But they sometimes are treated well when their organizational help is needed during election time. In January 1989, a dairy cattle farmer organized the Sachang hoe (meaning Pine Tree animal raisers' organization). All 22 pig and cow husbanders joined the new group. The group has specific functions: to exchange information about husbandry, sales and purchase of animals, and to act as a solidary unit in asking for favorable conditions in obtaining loans and other credit arrangements. This organization is not liked by the government party members and the township administrative staff. They suspect that the organizer and the supervisor who are both opposition party members will

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use the group for political purposes (see Turton 1984). Chiju, the organizer, said to me "I try not to say a word about politics in the Sachang hoe meeting. They might mistakenly think that it is used for political purposes." Since it is a recently organized interest group it is difficult to tell how much it will affect the village political structure. However, it certainly creates a tension filled relationship with the old power holders who do not want their vested rights violated.

Lineage organizations are mainly concerned with ancestor worship, publication of genealogies, and the management of ancestral corporate estates. However, they are a critical factor in local politics. The coop representatives, selected from among the township people, elected the coop chief in 1988. The lineage group was directly involved in the election process. In the next two years, when the local autonomy plan will be implemented, the township head will be elected by a popular vote in the township. Then, the role of the lineage group in community politics will most likely increase. Presently, the state appoints the township head.

The base of the Umin Kim is in Oak Tree where the Umin shrine and corporate estate are located. The Songhyon Kim have a centripetal foothold in Seha village. Occasionally, influential old men in the lineage groups have meetings at their shrine to discuss lineage affairs and local politics. They cannot directly interfere with the political activities of the township office and cooperative. However, they indirectly exert influence on the decision making processes of the cooperative and township office. Village affairs are not straightforwardly handled by the township, police, or coop officials. Such officials respect the consensus of the kin groups. How much they accept the lineage groups' idea of local control depends on the context. The

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relationships between local politics and lineage will be discussed in the Chapter 9.

The Yongsan township elementary and junior high school alumni organizations and other "same age organizations" cut across village and lineage boundaries. The members of these groups have the most informal relationships. Members attend each other's rituals and help each other in time of need. They meet several times a year. The meeting is more frequently held during elections.

C. Demography

With the continuous exodus to the city, the Korean peasant population has dwindled to a considerable degree. In 1961, the farm population represented 58.3% of the total population, in 1985, 21.1 % and presently it is a little less than 20% of the total (Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture 1966-1986).

Table 4--Overall demographic changes from 1960 to 1985 in Korea

	1960	1970	1975	1980	1985
Rural population	14.5	14.4	13.2	10.8	8.5
Total population	24.9	31.4	35.2	38.1	41.2

Note: Unit is million.

The Table 4 indicates how fast peasants have migrated to the cities. My research area is not an exception to this migratory phenomenon. During the last 20 years, roughly half of the residents have migrated to cities. There were about 110 households in Oak Tree, and about 90 households in Pine Tree

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during the Japanese colonial period in the first half of the 20th century. Now the number is reduced to 86 and 51 households respectively. Three factors must be mentioned in examining migration. First, the major factor in migration is the poor economic returns from agricultural pursuits and a higher cost of living due to inflation. Farming simply stopped being economically rewarding to many people. An unfavorable parity ratio is well represented by the complaints of my research villagers: "the price of a bowl of rice is only half of the price of a cup of coffee in Pian town."[7]

Second, industrialization in the cities and an increasing demand for unskilled labor are other factors in the increase in migration to urban areas. The majority of rural migrants work as construction workers or as poorly paid manufacturing and service workers. The people who left the village when they were young and who received a higher education found better jobs. The members of the so-called outcaste class such as the butcher or the shaman no longer live in the village. Even little children did not use honorific words toward them. Humiliation and "shame" might have precipitated the migration of this class to the cities. A butcher in Pine Tree left the village in the 1960s to live in Chŏnju.

Third, recent farm mechanization and rearrangement of agricultural land has hastened rural out-migration. Some old peasants who had farmed a small plot of land for subsistence lost their land. Land rearrangement has forced small land holders to give up their land in exchange for compensations offered by the state. The units of newly arranged square shaped land were too large and expensive for the small holders to keep. If small landholders have no kinsmen or friends to tenant land or do wage

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[7] Drinking coffee in a coffee shop in Pian is a part of social reproduction to some villagers. Important contracts and negotiations are likely to be made in a coffee shop.

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work, they lose the material foundation necessary to live in the village. If such people do not receive remittances from the city or elsewhere, they have three major alternatives: finding employment in the cities, asking their closest kinsmen in cities for help, or becoming beggars. The wage labor of the elderly has not been wanted and is replaced by machinery. Machines plough land, plant seedlings, and harvest crops on most of the Oak Tree land and more than half of Pine Tree land.


A transplanter and combine can do the work of approximately 10-20 people. People whose land was recently absorbed by the state's land rearrangement plan as well as the landless peasants who made their living solely by selling labor have faced difficulties in the rural labor market. Before machinery was introduced, the migration of the rural population temporarily had made the labor market favorable to village wage laborers. As rural labor shortage problems have increased and become problematic, peasants have tried to purchase machines. Since the early 1980s, the state has actively sponsored the purchase of these machines by farmers. Machines have replaced the work of hired hands and reduced the need for old people's labor.

Oak Tree has 11 motor tillers, one tractor, one combine, and two transplanters. Pine Tree has 12 motor tillers, one tractor, one combine, and two transplanters. The combines and tractors have been recently bought. The more machines villagers buy, the more wage laborers will be squeezed out. For the past several years, four full-time wage laborers in Pine Tree moved to the city. They were all elderly. They might have had different reasons for moving. But the reduction in demand for their labor is undoubtedly one of the major factors contributing to migration. Both Oak Tree and Pine Tree share a further important factor that encourages migration. Two successful businessmen, one from Oak Tree and one from Pine Tree, have provided

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about 30% of village migrants with employment. Nine men in Oak Tree have been employed in Pyongchol and Kwangik's construction and clothing companies. Six men and two women in Pine Tree have been employed in Haesong's transportation company. All of them obtained these jobs through the recommendation of close kinsmen and friends of the employers. Several employees' mothers and sisters have taken low paying housemaid jobs. A mother of an employee in Pyongchol company still cares for the 87 year old mother of one of the employers from Oak Tree.[8]

Fig. 5--Demographic composition based on age groups in Pine Tree



[8] Caring for an 87 year old handicapped woman is hard work. The housemaid, 63, has been sick herself after the exhausting labor of caring for the elderly woman. She was asked to give up working as a housemaid by her son. He said that he could hold onto the job even if his mother did not work for his employer's mother. But she said to her son that it would be heart breaking to leave the old lady alone. She still works as a housemaid.

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Table 5--The numbers and types of migrants in Pine Tree

Women who married out		female 53
Men who are drafted in the army	male 7	
People who migrated to the cities and stayed unemployed (Their age range is from 13 to 30)	male 8	female 10
People who migrated to the cities and stayed employed	male 59	female 8
Students	male 17	female 12
Parents who moved out and lived with their sons in the cities	male 7	female 7
Total	male 98	female 90

Note: Unless they are employed and have a place to live in the cities they will continue to live in the village.

The total population of Pine Tree had been about 365 people. Over the last 30 years about 190 people have moved out. They fall into roughly six categories of people as the table above shows. They visit their village on holidays and days of ancestral worship. The people who most frequently visit their village are students who attend school and unmarried children who are either employed or unemployed in the cities. These people move in and out of the village. The current population of Pine Tree is 177, 91 males and 86 females in 1989. As the bimodal shape of the population pyramid shows in Figure 6, elderly and young children are the most numerous groups. The productive age groups from 30 to 50 are considerably smaller than other age groups. Elderly people ranging from 40 to 70 comprise the largest portion of Pine Tree's farming population. This explains why the labor shortage has been an acute problem for some villagers and why farm machines were purchased and widely used.

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One noteworthy fact is that few unmarried women of marriageable age live in the village. As women move out to cities men have great difficulty finding spouses. Samgu who married at 34 and Homang at 32 illustrates that the late marriage of men is not voluntary but a result of an unfavorable demographic situation; there are few women available or ready to marry. The average marriage age for men is 28 and 27 for women (Chosŏn Ilbo May 16,1989). There are four men who already passed the average age. Young girls in cities either work in a company or factory or live with close kinsmen and help them domestic chores. Village parents act as a safety valve for their children who try to manage lives in the cities. When they are unemployed and do not see hope in the city they come back to the village and help their parents farm. Seven such young men live with their parents. They are very mobile and can leave the village at any time.

There are some suggestive demographic features in Pine Tree. A 26 year old woman lives with her parents after being thrown out by her parents-in-law. A 72 year old man lives with his married daughter and son-in-law. He used to live with his son in Seoul, but his son died in a car accident. His daughter-in-law said she did not want to live with him. So, she gave some portion of the car insurance coverage to him and asked him to leave. Two divorced women, two widows, and one widower live in the village. A relatively large number of divorced women or discarded women are the result of past village history where some women were treated roughly by their husbands. In these cases a husband's adultery, a woman's infertility or extreme poverty could be the major contributing factor to divorce or discarding. These issues will be discussed in Chapter 10.

Some people moved into the villages from other areas. They usually followed their maternal kinsmen. There are six such people in Oak Tree and

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four in Pine Tree. When their life became difficult in their home village, town, or city they came to their mother's husband's or sister's husband's consanguineous kinsmen's village. They usually became tenants or mŏsŭm (servants) for their in-laws for a few years and then buy some land and became landholders. For example, one such couple moved into Pine Tree from Yongin township. They acted as guarantors for a kinsmen's loan. As the borrower was not able to pay and "ran away at night", the couple were held responsible for the payment. Their land, house, and all their property were taken by coop officials. They lost not only their property but also their face and wanted to move out of the village. The man had a distant inchŏk (kinsmen through marriage) in Pine Tree. He came to Pine Tree and became a mŏsŭm for the inchŏk for many years. After tenant farming for awhile, he purchased some land with profits gained from his service and tenancy of 25-30 years' duration.

Sixteen of the 86 households in Oak Tree living along the main asphalt road constitutes the fifth category. Most of them run small businesses. All of these households migrated from other places. The remaining 70 households live 20-40 meters away from the main road. They call themselves the "inside villagers." "Outside villagers" refer to the people nearest the road who are relatively young. They run a restaurant, machinery repair shop, and small grocery stores. Since Oak Tree has the township office and agricultural cooperative, it provides many business opportunities.

None of the small businesses are run by inside villagers. About half of the "insider villagers" are old couples who live alone. They either farm with their labor or let younger people tenant their land. They are visited by their children from zero to eight times yearly. There are four such couples in Pine Tree.

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Besides store owners there are 14 non-farming households in Oak Tree. They are either private company employees or township and county office employees. One of them is the principal of an elementary school. Except business owners and state employees, the people who live in Oak Tree and Pine Tree can be placed into four general categories. One comprises elderly people whose children moved out to attend school and to gain employment. They constitute about one third and one quarter of the population in Oak Tree and Pine Tree respectively. They farm for their food, sell the surplus, and usually receive remittances from their children. Parents see their children during big holidays such as Sŏl (New year's day), Chusŏk (something like Thanksgiving day), Chesa (ancestor worship for four generations), and Sesa (ancestor worship for the fifth ascending generation and above in the October lunar calendar).

The second category is composed of relatively young men who own farm machines. There are two in Oak Tree and one in Pine Tree. They can be called energetic, profit seeking farmers, who use their machines primarily for work on other people's land rather than their own land for which they receive cash. They see more advantages in farming in the rural areas than laboring in the city. They are usually not educated enough to be employed in white collar work. They bought a tractor, transplanter, combine, and thresher partly to use on their own land and, more importantly, to earn cash by using their machines for farming other people's land. They take advantage of the niche left by the people who migrated. The more people migrate to the cities, the more land becomes available for them to work on with their machinery.

The third category is made up of people who raise pigs or dairy cattle for a living. In Oak Tree, there are three and in Pine Tree, four. As demand

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for milk rose due to the Tori cheese company in Tori county, dairy cattle husbandry has become profitable and risk-free. Monthly cash payments for milk are extremely rewarding to those people who have been previously dependent on the annual economic returns on agricultural crop sales. Dairy cattle husbandry is similar to machine work in that it guarantees fast return on labor and capital investments. Pig husbandry used to be a profitable business in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the prices for pigs fell well below the production cost and many pig raisers became indebted. Several men in Pine Tree still hold on to pig husbandry and remain in debt by continuously drawing credit to purchase fodder from the coop.

The fourth category, the most common in Oak Tree and Pine Tree is made up of the people who combine four kinds or works: farming their land, tenanting other people's land, raising a few pigs and cows, and working as wage laborers. They constitute the rest of the population in both villages. They inherited or bought land that produce basic subsistence needs. Raising animals is mainly to procure manure for fertilizing the soil and to earn profits by selling new born animals. Raising a few animals does not significantly interfere with farming. They tenant land belonging to kinsmen and friends who moved to the city or who are too old to engage in farming. They also sell their labor during the off-season. Each of these four tasks alone does not supply people with enough income to live on and so diversify their productive activities in this way to make ends meet.

The total amount of paddy land in Pine Tree is 35 hectares. The average landholding per household is 0.7 hectares, and 0.08 hectares of dry land. However, land distribution is very uneven.

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Table 6--Land distribution in Pine Tree in 1989

Size of land (hectare)	0-0.35	0.4-0.7	0.8-1	1.1-1.4	1.47-2.1
Number of households	17	11	8	3	2

About half the villagers own less than 0.7 hectares as shown in Table 6 Eleven households are landless. About one hectare of land is the minimum necessary for a two member household to barely make a living. People who own less than one hectare are mostly tenant farmers for absentee landlords and/or elderly people in the village. There are about 11 people are absentee landlords who usually let their kinsmen tenant their land. Though they do not live in the village, they hold important positions in the village social structure.

One man solely depends on dairy cattle, another man on pig raising. Soon the number of people living off dairy farming will increase. Now two people combine paddy farming and dairying. However, as the number of heads increases, they will have to give up paddy farming soon. Then more tenantable land will be available.

People in the first category own the smallest amount of land in comparison to others and often tenant other people's land. However, their minimal demand does not usually necessitate tenanting. Relatively wealthy machine operators and dairy cattle owners own more than the average amount of 0.7 hectares of paddy. Their land is usually inherited from their parents and tenanted by the people belonging to other categories. The fourth category shows a wide range in the size of land tenured. Some of them may own very small amounts of land while other own very large amounts.

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Five factors must be examined to understand the reproduction of people. First, until the 1960's many children and some adults died of various diseases and malnutrition. People remembered several occasions when measles wiped out the children's population. After vaccination became more available in the late 1960s, child mortality was significantly reduced. During the colonial period, it was very common for people to die of puhwang, which showed the combined symptoms of kwashiorkor and jaundice. I suspect that the disease was caused by prolonged protein deficiency. As the Japanese confiscated grains from the peasants for war preparations, most Korean peasants suffered from serious malnutrition. People lived off the barks of trees and roots found in the mountains. Mountain Tujong was a source of bark and roots for Pine Tree and Oak Tree villagers. The problem of hunger was not solved immediately after the liberation from the Japanese.

Starvation and malnutrition related diseases lingered for a long time until a new variety of rice named Tongil was introduced in the early 1970s. It produced almost twice as much as the previous kind of rice called akibari by the villagers. Villagers still remember the joyful days when they harvested and discovered twice the amount of rice heaped up before them. They made rice cakes, which previously had been made only for big holidays. They danced in the village yard and jumped with joy. These days people do not starve to death or get puhwang and life expectancy has increased greatly. In the old days, people rarely reached 60 years of age. People who reached their 60th birthday had a big celebration. In those days, few people could have that celebration. Nowadays almost everybody can have it.

Second, people were not familiar with contraceptive methods. Coitus interruptus, which could have been used in the period when artificial contraceptive methods were not developed, was not practiced in Oak Tree

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and Pine Tree villages. Babies were born by chance after coitus. Abortion was a common method to control the number of family members. About 20 years ago (1969) township health clinic employees distributed condoms. They instructed the villagers saying that having a large family was inappropriate. These directions were part of the government's population policy. However, condoms have never been popular. Men believe that using condoms decrease sexual pleasure. More popular methods have been those used by women; IUD's and oral contraceptive pills. Several women in Pine Tree had ovarectomies. Only one man in Pine Tree underwent a vasectomy. Men believe that a vasectomy will make them too weak and powerless to farm.

Third, in the traditional period, a large family was favored in the rural areas as a means for increasing the labor supply for farming. From planting to harvesting, farming requires constant labor. Paddy farming needs a great amount of labor during the short transplanting and harvesting season. They might farm the land by pumashi (cooperative labor mobilization by villagers, see glossary). But the surest way was to have labor available in the family. Even small children could be a great help in farming. Preference for a big family cannot be thought of without considering the labor demand in a farming village. These days an increasing number of people use machinery in farming. They do not need a big family. Having a big family actually becomes a great burden.

Fourth, until the early 1970s, people married in the early 20s. Currently, people get married in their late 20s. Men's average marriage age is 28 and woman's 27. Late marriage makes a big difference in the reproduction rate. Barring frequent illegitimacy, late marriage means shorter period of reproduction. Before the 1970's, the average number of children in a family was five. Nowadays, a married couple whose average ages are in the 30's,

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have two or three children and do not plan to have more. The cost of raising children is a major factor affecting decisions to have fewer children.

Notwithstanding this striking change in fertility behavior, having a son or sons remains vitally important in this patrilineal society. Sons are necessary to carry on the family line. When people do not have sons, they adopt a son from close kinsmen, although a genetic son is preferred. Until the 1960's concubinage was practiced when a man's wife did not produce a son. Infertile women and women who did not produce sons prayed to the "mountain Tujong spirit" to become pregnant with sons.

The examples of a 70 year old man in Pine Tree and a 37 year old man in Oak Tree illustrates this desire for sons. Sunsin of Pine Tree had five daughters in a row. Then he produced four sons in succession. He kept having children until a son was born. If he had had the four sons first he would not have had more children. Kehwan, in Oak Tree, had four daughters in a row. He never had a son and so he and his wife despaired. Kehwan is the only son in the chongga (main branch family) and has the obligation to maintain the consanguineal line. They are unsure about whether they will try one more time. They have to think about the cost of raising another daughter and the chances of having a son. Daughters marry out and become part of other surname groups. Rearing, educating, and marrying off a daughter cost a great deal of money and is considered to be largely a vain effort made by parents. Large families in Oak Tree and Pine Tree have one thing in common; they have many daughters. Male preference has not diminished in Pine Tree or Oak Tree. Patrilineality and patrilocality have been unchanging cultural concepts and practices that make people desperate to produce sons.

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The first three factors, malnutrition, ignorance of contraceptive methods, and labor supply have ceased to be decisive in determining the rate of reproduction. The last factor, preference for sons, still functions to increase the fertility rate. The most powerful factor curbing the fertility rate is the high cost of raising children. The cost has been increasing continuously. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 6.

It is not difficult to see that the reproduction rate is outdistanced by the rate of migration to urban areas. Absolute numbers of residents have been continuously decreasing. While I was in the field, four households in Oak Tree and one in Pine Tree migrated to Chŏnju and Seoul.

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Chapter 3 Village History

The present social relationships of the villagers have been shaped by past experiences of colonialism, war, and rural development. In this chapter, among other constituents of the social structure, I will highlight the relationships between landlords and tenants. These two sets of people are likely to be kinsmen. Therefore, tension and cooperation which have existed among kinsmen will be the context in which most descriptions below will converge.

This chapter discusses only a small part of recent Korean history and the local history of the village. I shall focus on three historical events of this century that I believe left the most profound impact on the village social structure: Japanese colonialism from 1910 to 1945, the civil war from 1950 to 1953, and the New Village Movement (NVM) from 1972 until now. It is difficult to examine all aspects of the three periods but I would like to present examples from each period as a historical cross section through which we can understand something of the larger processes involved in the formation of the village social structure.

A. Japanese colonialism (1910-1945)

Even before Japan annexed Korea in 1910, Japan had exerted semi-colonial power over Korea when in 1876 Japan forced Korea to open her coastal ports and trade markets. Korea was gradually reshaped into a subordinate country from which wealth could be appropriated for the Japanese colonial empire. Among other things, exorbitant taxation by cash and kind, intensification of rice cultivation and export, and land registration

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were the major methods used by the Japanese to facilitate the extraction of wealth from the Korean peasantry.

Japan worked to make Korea into a grain supplier for domestic and eventually for war purposes. Rice production in Japan was insufficient to meet domestic demand and the consumer price of rice was dangerously high. The Japanese colonialists implemented a program for increasing rice production in Korea with the result that more land was used for rice cultivation and less land for other crops. An economist, Simon Kuznets (1965) argues that economic growth is based on the capacity to produce and supply a variety of commodities. The narrowing of the Korean peasants' range of productive options during the colonial period was not easily corrected even after the liberation in 1945. The mono crop cultivation of rice has continued to contribute to rural impoverishment.

Landlords were guaranteed an exclusive and absolute right over the land by the 1910-1918 land registration initiated by the Japanese colonial administration. Registered land could be easily sold and purchased making land a commercial commodity. Tenants lost their livelihood when land was sold. Even if tenants were allowed to farm the landlords' land, the bargaining position between landlords and tenants was overwhelmingly in the favor of the landlords. All in all, land registration significantly reduced the tenant's right over the use of land. The establishment of private property through the land registration led to the concentration of land in the hands of a few big landlords. As time passed, the number of Japanese landlords owning enormous plots of land increased considerably as Table 8 shows.

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Table 7--The ratio of sharecroppers to landowners

	1913	1920	1925	1930	1935	1940
Landowner	22.8	19.5	19.9	17.6	17.9	18.0
Sharecropper	41.7	39.8	43.2	46.5	51.9	53.0
Landowning sharecropper	32.4	37.4	33.2	31.0	24.1	23.3

Source: Chosŏn Chongdokpu tonggye yŏnbo cited by Yi Kyŏngsuk 1986: 85

Table 8--Large land holdings among Japanese and Korean landlords

		1920	1921	1922	1924	1925	1926	1927
200 ha-	J	169	176	178	167	170	177	192
	K	66	62	67	48	45	66	45
150 ha-	J	108	105	113	126	130	121	122
200 ha	K	94	76	72	71	74	76	80
100 ha-	J	213	199	220	228	230	245	239
150 ha	K	266	189	217	237	270	229	210
70 ha-	J	246	258	286	296	299	300	298
100 ha	K	563	450	456	500	557	587	526
50 ha-	J	273	271	308	318	360	376	385
70 ha	K	1087	911	927	1007	950	1109	1091

Source: Choi Jaesok 1975: 403, ha=hectare, J=Japanese landlord, K=Korean landlord.

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In addition, the agricultural land and forest law of 1911 prohibited the peasants from collecting firewood from forest land and mountainous areas. Trespassers were fined and arrested. Obtaining tenancy and firewood were communally secured rights existing before property was privatized by the Japanese land registration. Before the compulsory land registration, land was rarely sold with cash and outsiders did not own village land.

1. Landlord and saŭm

After the land registration a man named Manyun purchased about two thirds of Pine Tree and Oak Tree land. He was a big landlord, owning land in other areas and was not related to the villagers. He hired a saŭm from the villagers who managed his newly purchased land. The saŭm was paid by the landlord and the saŭm had absolute power over the tenants. He collected rent and supervised tenant production and harvest. Since he had the right to give or revoke tenancy he was treated with special care by the tenants.

Kaekhyon's father in Oak Tree and Sunyong's grandfather in Pine Tree were former saŭm. The saŭm, once in a while, visited each tenant's house for contracting new tenants, renewing tenancy contracts or for disciplining tenants. When the saŭm visited the tenant's house, the tenant's family busily prepared for the visit. They made special food such as chicken, rice cakes, home made wine, foods they sparingly cooked for their own ancestor worship or wedding ceremonies. A man in Oak Tree remembered that he was happy when a special man visited his house because his mother and sisters made so much delicious food and he could eat the leftovers on the night of the visit or the next day.

Oak Tree villagers said that their local saŭm was not as onerous as other ones in other areas. It is believed by the people that their saŭm treated

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the village tenants fairly. He was an Umin Kim. The saŭm in Pine Tree, on the other hand, was known to be cruel to his tenants. He was also an Umin Kim. A villager in Pine Tree who used to be a tenant in the colonial period said, "He (saŭm) was destined to die young after committing so much abominable cruelty against us." The saŭm died young and the villagers believed that his early death was punishment from Heaven. The saŭm's son died of alcoholism in his 40's. The saŭm's only grandson became a university professor in the early 1970's and was the first person in the whole Yongsan township to receive a Ph.D. degree, the cost of which was beyond the reach of most villagers. Being a professor is considered a highly respectable profession. Villagers appear to be jealous of him. He does not visit the village except on occasion to care for his grandparents' and father's graves. Since one's ancestors have to be buried in the natal place, the professor has to visit at least once a year to care for his ancestors' graves during the Chusŏk season.

Villagers, especially the tenants who I believe were treated badly by the professor's grandfather, seem to hold a strong grudge against and harbor a smoldering resentment toward the professor. One such tenant said "Unless he [the professor] walks toward our village from Mulberry Tree with his head down, we will not let him in our village."

The way the saŭm of Pine Tree behaved made many tenants believe that "Koreans were more cruel than the Japanese invaders." Koreans thus include the saŭm in the negative evaluation of the Korean ruling class. Interestingly, they did not have much experience with Japanese officers or landlords because the Japanese administration did not station any Japanese colonial officers in the Yongsan township. The Japanese had a major colonial administrative office in Tori county. The majority of people who ran the

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administration for the colonial government in Yongsan township were villagers and were usually wealthy landowners. They were given some protective rights over their property. Japanese officials did not confiscate land from Korean landowners without compensation. The Japanese measured the land registered people's claims and took all unclaimed land. Unclaimed land, including mountainous and forest regions were placed under the control of the Oriental Developmental Company, a Japanese corporation that managed these lands by developing them in coordination with the Government General of Chosŏn that, for example, sold land to Japanese immigrants. The Japanese method of governance in the Yongsan township was to let landlords and other influential figures in the village continue to control ordinary village matters.

After the registration some landless tenants were pushed off the land. They usually became servants or left the village for survival. Before the land was registered, landless tenants usually had a customary right to tenancy. The so-called "social communal psychology of ownership" of land (Thompson 1976: 337) was destroyed by the colonial civil law which sponsored exclusive, private ownership. The law enforcing the registration replaced local custom.

It would seem that the establishment of formal private ownership over land and mountainous areas and the commoditization of crops and land created a social setting in which the landlord class could unfairly treat tenants or debtors with impunity and without remorse. The exclusive right over land would have given absolute power to landlords over tenants. I would like to add, however, that when the village social structure was shaken by the formidable colonial power, the ruling class inside the village felt threatened by the unchallengeable colonial power and feared that their wealth would be

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confiscated by military force. Their fears were, however, misplaced. Yet, although the Japanese could have taken what they wanted, they did not. In such a desperate situation, the landlords erroneously thought that the way to secure their property was to treat their neighbors cruelly to show how loyal they were to the colonialists. Paradoxically, the Japanese did not ask the landlords to mistreat the tenants and it was not known whether or not the Japanese were impressed by the Korean landlords' cruelty.

Some landlords sent their sons to the Japanese army. In such cases Japanese colonial officers made a wooden plaque with the words homareno ie (these are Japanese words meaning house of honor) etched on it and put it on the gate of the volunteer's house for public viewing. On the day the volunteer went to the army depot, all the villagers stood on the road to congratulate the man, waving the Japanese flag. The adults had to go with the volunteer to the Tori county train station to give him a good send-off. The family members of the homareno ie were placed under the protective jurisdiction of the Japanese and if some of the volunteer's family members committed a small crime they were pardoned, because they were honored people. After the landlords set this example, a few more people volunteered to be drafted. The landlords politically purified themselves to appear as a paragon of colonial virtue. The landlord's acts of cruelty against tenants and the voluntary dispatch of their sons to the Japanese army were self-assumed methods thought to be advantageous in securing good relations with the Japanese overlords.

2. Starvation

Most tenants experienced severe famine in the colonial period. Each year a "barley hump," or a spring famine, preceded the the barley harvest in

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June. As their food grains became exhausted, they picked unripe barley in the field for food. If people did not overcome this period, they starved to death. The starvation was severe when the war was in full swing. Nationwide per capita consumption of rice decreased from 62 kilograms to 36 kilograms of rice (Yun Kyunhwan 1986: 229). The Japanese exported rice to Japan leaving less than the minimal amount for sustaining Korean lives.

Extreme starvation forced the majority of the people to search for anything edible in the mountains and fields. They scratched off the soft material under the bark of pine trees and put it in a big pot with small amount of grains and boiled it making a kind of pine tree soup. They also ate the roots of wild plants. During the barley hump not many edible plants such as ssuk (mugwort) were left in the field or mountains. Pine trees were the major source of food for the majority of the villagers. People who grew cotton ate cotton seed fried in a pan when famine hit hard. In such an extreme situation, the wealthy landlord could not eat cooked "white rice" in front of starving people. They feared the presence of the hungry mass within the village. A woman who was the granddaughter of a landlord in the colonial period said "we hid and ate rice, and I gave some cooked rice to the hungry people." A 67 year old woman reminiscing about her landlord said:

> We helped make food and other things for our kin landlord's hwangap (60th birthday) feast. After work we were given cold noodles and had to watch the landlord's family eat steaming, cooked rice and meat. On the way back to my house I felt bad.

A man who was one of the starving people said indignantly "people at that time were so ignorant and naive. If such things (famine and starvation)

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took place in these times, we would steal the heaps of rice in the wealthy people's barn. We were so stupid."

The remembrance of famine during the Japanese colonial period makes elderly people ambivalent about the present economic situation. Their painful experience of destitution makes today's economic deprivations seem like affluence by comparison. At the same time, they feel poor because of the severe inequality between rural and urban areas. These two contrasting feelings about present conditions are a major theme of Korean peasant life.

After the Japanese lost the war in 1945, some wealthy people did not like the fact that Japan would repatriate their troops and colonial officers. They wanted the Japanese to stay permanently and to rule the countryside and Korea. A man who has been a landlord since the colonial period said:

> After the liberation, people jumped all over like crazy beasts. We all lost control and order. Koreans are like this. The Japanese should have continued to rule. Those days were good. We lived peacefully.

That man's saying "Koreans are like this" is a terrible self-accusation. He himself is a Korean. Such a denunciation of his own people in favor of the Japanese colonialists demonstrates the specific self interest that insured the process of wealth extraction from tenants, a self interest so powerful that the thought of national unity and Korean liberation from the Japanese colonialists were secondary and tertiary concerns to them.

This landlord's view shows how difficult it was for different classes with identical nationality to unite and fight to regain independence. Some Koreans preferred to unite with the Japanese to keep their position of control over the tenants. In a similar vein, people categorized as the tenant class had great difficulty in struggling against the landlords.

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3. Making history

I could not reconstruct the people's lives before the colonial period. The oldest person who could articulately tell me about village history and his life was 74. He was born during the colonial period. There were some elderly people who were born before 1910 and they might have some memory about the pre-colonial period. Some elderly people might have heard about the life histories of their parents or grandparents. However, their village level memories started with the "barley hump" and chogŭnmokpi (surviving on grass roots and skin of pine trees) of the colonial period. Those difficulties in their lives were so formidable that memories of other more mundane things were overshadowed. I was tantalized by the elderly peoples' inability to remember or refusal to talk about life before the colonial period. However, it was not difficult to understand how historical facts were etched in their memory by the intensity of their experience. The history they remembered and liked to talk about was based on experiences linked with exploitation and inequality. History and culture seemed to be made by processes, and emotions originating from unequal social relationships.

B. The civil war (June 25 1950 - July 27 1953)

Korea was divided into North Korea and South Korea soon after the liberation from the Japanese. Communist north Korea pushed toward the south with superior weaponry on June 25, 1950. The communist soldiers soon occupied the south except for the southern tip of the peninsula where the UN troops were able to fight back. On September 15th 1950, General Douglas MacArthur accomplished the "Inchŏn landing operation" that effectively separated the communist soldiers in the south and north by

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putting UN troops in the middle of Korea through the western port city, Inchon. The communist soldiers were then attacked from both directions and communist detachments in the south could not find a way out toward the north. The operation has been hailed in most Korean and American text books as a highly successful strategy in winning over the communist forces and regaining the advantage in the war.

On October 19th 1950, UN troops pushed northward and occupied Pyŏngyang, the capital of North Korea. In late October 1950, Chinese soldiers entered the civil war helping the North Koreans in their fight against the UN troops. The combined Chinese and North Korean forces marched again towards the south, this time with superior manpower and on January 4th 1951, Seoul, the capital of South Korea, was reoccupied by communist forces. On March 14th 1951, the UN troops regained Seoul. The war continued until July 27th, 1953 when the armistice agreement was signed by the UN and communist forces. It is believed that about one million Korean people were killed and 250,000 Koreans were missing.

From my point of view the Inchŏn landing operation was ill considered one for the southern citizens. Cutting the exit for the communists made for social and political chaos in the south. It was like putting mice and cats in a large jar and closing the lid. The communists who could not escape toward the north when UN troops marched in became ppalchisan (the remnants of communists hiding in the mountains). The villagers said "our village became a communist regime at night. During the day time our soldiers (southern soldiers) would control the village." It is not difficult to imagine how quickly the villagers had to change their preference toward communism or capitalism in accordance with who was in control of the village even though they were not familiar with either ideology.

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This chaotic war situation severely disrupted village life. Some people were killed unnecessarily on account of other people's desire to show loyalty to either the communist or southern soldiers. The result of such blood-letting was unending ferment leading to resentment and malice that continued to spread to succeeding generations.

1. Landless peasants and the war

Wealthy peasants feared the incoming communists, recognizing that their land and lives might be taken. Landless tenants thought of the war as another famine like situation. They thought that "another came." The tenants who had been accustomed to so many hardships did not think much of the turmoil and some of them liked the idea that the communists would take over. They were told by communist soldiers that land would be distributed to the landless and the landlords would be punished.

For the first time, they were proud of the callouses on their palms. The communist soldiers could easily recognize who the landlords and tenants were. If a person's palms were soft, the person was considered a landlord and arrested. Communist soldiers ordered the tenants to slap their landlord's face until the tenants were exhausted from hitting so that it was not landlords' physical suffering that was the condition to stop the punishment. It was one way to help the tenants get rid of their overriding deference towards the landlords. This method seemed to be unnecessary in Pine Tree. Tenants and servants already knew that things were changed in their favor and that their day had come.

Some tenants were active in helping the communists find landlords, police officers, and other "capitalist accomplices." A man in Pine Tree said "it was not so much the communists but the tenants who were more

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destructive." Pongje was a wealthy landlord and creditor in Mulberry Tree. At that time tenant rent was 60-70 percent of the produce and the interest rate on private credit was 50-100 percent. When debtors were not able to pay the debt, creditors took the debtor's land that was put up as collateral. Pongje was believed to have intentionally lent grain or money to people who he thought were unable to repay and thereby enlarged his land holdings by taking his debtors' land, ignoring the debtors' plea to delay repayment. He did not concern himself with the increasing resentment of the villagers.

Immediately before the civil war, a communist rebellion broke out in Yosu and Sunchon, an area that is about a two hour drive from Mulberry Tree. A man named Tongyul went to Mulberry Tree from Yosu to persuade the people to participate in the rebellion but the people were not cooperative. However, Pongje used this situation to rid himself of those who he thought were antagonistic towards him. He informed the police about the villagers who were or would have been sympathetic toward the rebellion in Yosu and Sunchon with the result that some villagers were arrested. After this incident, hatred between Pongje and his debtors intensified.

When the communists occupied the village, the people who lost land through their credit dealings with Pongje were enthusiastic about finding Pongje and his family to exact revenge for his ill treatment of them. Pongje was not caught but his son was arrested and executed by the communist soldiers. The debtors informed the soldiers where Pongje and his family were hiding.

When the southern forces were dominant in the area, another vendetta was set in motion. Kiyol's father was with a group of communist soldiers in front of the Tori county train station to point out escaping landlords and police officers. He informed the soldiers that a man sitting in

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the station was a police officer in the Yongsan township and the man was shot to death on the spot. Kiyol's father had no choice but to inform on others because he was a township official and was promised, in return for his cooperation an exemption from execution.

After the UN troops took over the village again, the executed police officer's family was anxious to find Kiyol's father. They found him and encouraged the southern soldiers to execute him for being a communist accomplice. Even after the execution, the family still slandered Kiyol and his mother by calling them ppalkengi or "a red," an extremely derogatory term reserved for degrading communist sympathizers and supporters. When the UN troops took over the village, most of communists went north and those people who could not or would not retreat escaped to the mountains and became ppalchisan. However, some families and close kinsmen of such people still live in the village.

At this juncture, the landlords and their children organized a ultra rightist brigade to fight against the communists and their sympathizers and supporters. The southern soldiers supplied weapons to the brigade. They were anxious to capture communists and especially to arrest tenants who had helped communists in executing their fellow landlords. They also mobilized their tenants and servants to hunt for the landless tenants and servants who had supported communists. These participants were generally enthusiastic about the man-hunt and were probably active to show their loyalty to the landlords and their preference for the status quo. The anticipated rewards for helping to capture their fellow villagers of the same class were tenancy, labor remuneration, and credit.

Some of the landlords caught by communists were not executed. Pyongchol, a big landlord in Oak Tree, was captured, put on a stage for trial by

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the people's court while communist soldiers stood guard with submachine guns. The villagers were asked whether he was a good man or a bad one. All the villagers said "He is a good man. Let's set him free." Pyongchol was believed to be a generous landlord. When his tenants had difficulty in paying the rent, Pyongchol postponed the payment. His generosity paid off with the saving of his life.

Kunhang was probably the most active communist supporter in Pine Tree. His father was landless. He volunteered to be a communist soldier and due to his active participation and role in helping the communist regime he became a high ranking officer in the communist army. He helped capture most of the landlords in the Yongsan township and hunted them in other places. He informed against Musong, his cousin's husband who was a landlord and the brother of a police officer. (See Appendix G for a discussion on the Korean kinship terminology.) When Musong was arrested and about to be executed, Kunhang's second cousin, Sungjo begged Kunhang to release him. He did and saved his life. Thus, kinship once in a while played a role in saving the lives of some kin related landlords and officials. However, in most cases, the war fostered a perpetual resentment between landlords and tenants regardless of kinship ties.

The people most active in helping in the execution of villagers are now either dead, very old or live in other places. However, their children and close kinsmen living in the nearby villages and towns are burdened with the past that they faintly remember from their own experiences and from listening to their elders' conversations. Sujae, whose father was a communist informant, lives in Pian town and Pyongchol, the popular landlord, moved to Seoul. Immediately after the war, these people rarely visited the village. Sujae whose father was a ppalchisan lives in Pine Tree.

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Presently, he is a devout government party member. It would be hasty to think that his enthusiastic political activity on the side of government is to reverse the "shameful" history of his father. But it is possible that he wants to equalize his father's leftist actions by his rightist activities. He still remembers that his father printed communist propaganda leaflets in their house. His father, Taekyun, voluntarily surrendered to the governing authorities after the communists retreated and was set free. However, he and his family and close collateral kinsmen such as Hayong and Kimbo, who are his father's younger brothers paid for Taekyun's leftist activities for a long time.

After the war Kunhang's second cousin, Sungjo helped him to become a member of the tŭkmude that was established to capture communists. Therefore, Kunhang transformed himself twice. By becoming a tŭkmude officer he sought to erase the "shame" made from his involvement in the communist regime.

The Korean civil war was fratricidal and destructive and the effects of the war were not ended after the signing of the armistice agreement between the UN and communist forces. The village was totally shaken by the war and there were no winners. All lost something and all suffered. Former communists and their close kinsmen suffered the most. The term, ppalkengi is a permanent label attached to a person, a label that cannot be easily removed. What was left after the war was inveterate resentment and malice, a reoccurring theme of Korean rural social life.

What I have described so far in this chapter was an illustration of the terribly tragic consequences of colonialism and the civil war. Japanese colonialism and the civil war created extreme social situations where people struggled to survive. The villagers had often faced life and death situations.

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In the process, people victimized their kinsmen or other fellow villagers to stay alive. Feuds and vendetta between the villagers were unavoidable and tragic strategies were used to survive in situations where people were absolutely powerless.

I attempted to reconstruct the village history by taking down oral histories. By doing this, I was caught in an epistemological quagmire: what is history? I do not believe that history is "a record or account, usually written and in chronological order, of past events." (Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary 1980) There cannot be objective historical facts or an objective arrangement of those facts. Obviously, Japanese colonialism from 1910 to 1945 and the civil war from 1950 to 1953 created numerous events affecting the village populace and the fabric of its social life. However, the villagers' memory of those events is highly selective. Some people mixed the events of the civil war with those of the Japanese colonial period and explained their experiences of the colonial period in the context of the civil war. Jonathan Hill (1988: 2-3) succinctly argues the essence of history:

> History is not reducible to the 'what really happened' of past events nor to global situations of contact but always includes the totality of processes whereby individuals experience, interpret, and create changes within social orders and both individuals and groups change over time as they actively participate in changing objective conditions.

The Pine Tree and Oak Tree villagers' reconstruction of local history in the first half of the 20th century was made of their bitter and unforgettable experiences. Destitution, death, intense fear, and hatred were among the main constituents making their history. My ethnological accounts share something in common with Hill's description of South American history. Hill asserts:

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> History is understood in relation to a few 'peaks', or critical periods of rapid change, rather than a smoothly flowing progression. In Amazonian societies, the periods most frequently selected are the rubber booms... and time of abrupt, violent change forced upon indigenous peoples from outside and above (ibid: 7).

Such "peak" events overshadowed other numerous, placid events that could have been helpful in reconstructing a more complete history of the villagers. However, the nature of history is discontinuation, rupture, and extinction. My effort to persuade the villagers to speak on non-peak events was futile. They could only tell me what they remembered or what they wanted to tell me and from these data I have attempted to reconstruct a portion of their history. We may have to accept that "history alone can be allowed de facto to have gaps because it is not a fabric, it has no weave," (Veyne 1984: 18) and that

> historical knowledge is cut on the pattern of mutilated documents; we do not suffer spontaneously by that mutilation and we have to make an effort to see it, precisely because we measure what history must be by the pattern of the documents (ibid: 13).

What is most interesting about their local history is that it seems to have two layers: one is spoken and the other unspoken. What I have described in the section on colonialism and the civil war was composed of both speakable and unspeakable events. Most descriptions of the civil war are portions of that unspeakable history.[9] The unspeakable history seems to be forgotten because we do not hear it often. However, such a "shameful" history has played a formidable role in shaping the village social structure

[9]I believe that my being a native Korean and forging intimate relationships with the villagers made it possible for me to get access to the "unspeakable" portion of their history.

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and history. Further, the unspeakable history is periodically revived when potential power holders manipulate past circumstances to gain and exert political and economic domination. In any local election, for example, the opponents carefully scrutinize each others' role and their kinsmen's role in the historical context of Japanese collaboration and communist support. If there is evidence of the existence of ppalkengi in a candidate's background he is harshly denounced by the opponents. The "shameful" history has never been forgotten. It has been a reoccurring theme in the present and will be in the future, at least until larger "peak" events overshadow the smaller "peak" events of the past.

C. New Village Movement

Since the early 1970's, the state has implemented with great zeal a rural developmental plan called the New Village Movement (NVM).[10] It is the most dramatic cause of rural change in recent rural history. No peasant village is unaffected by the nationwide movement. The aim of the NVM is well represented in the NVM song believed to be written by former president Park Chung Hee.

> The early morning bell is ringing, a new morning is dawning, you and I will wake up and make a new village; Let's get rid of the thatched roofed house, widen the road, make green the hills, and get rich; Let's cooperate with each other, work with sweat, make a rich village by improving the economy; let's struggle, work, and make our great fatherland.

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[10] The 4-H movement was another rural development plan after the civil war, modeled after the American one. However, the New Village Movement became the pre-eminent development program.

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As the contents of the song imply, collective labor is required to implement the plan. The people who want to live the way they had in the past are not given any excuse for not participating. Unpaid corvee labor for communal work is asked for and if necessary coerced.

A thatched roof was considered a symbol of poverty. The irony of getting rid of thatched roofs was that the rural development planners destroyed the symbol but they did not infuse the benefits of economic improvement. True, they put tiles on the roof as a new symbol of wealth, but a substantial or structural change to improve the rural economy did not follow. Habitual poverty among most peasants has obtained, regardless of the changes in their roof covering. Changed roofs and unchanged poverty are a good combination, demonstrating the essential contradiction in the government's rural development efforts.

Besides changing their roofs people were "encouraged" to dismantled their clover fences and brick walls. New roads, tap water pipelines, electricity, communal buildings, and resting houses for the elderly were built. The state provided cement and reinforcing rods gratis. Other materials such as sand, tile, slate, brick, and pebbles had to be bought by the villagers. The state also provided villagers with low interest loans for the purchase of construction materials.

Before the 1970's, it was extremely difficult to get a cooperative loan due to lack of allocated funds from the central cooperative office. In addition to this, most peasants were intimidated by the official building and the overbearing attitude of cooperative officials. They simply did not bother to take out state loans. At the onset of the NVM in 1972, people had relatively easy access to state loans. An increasing number were eager to get these loans since they had suffered from exorbitantly high interest rates offered by private

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creditors. The advantage of the relatively low interest state loan was that it allowed the people to overcome the fear of arrogant officials and unfamiliar loan procedures. One of the most critical consequences of the NVM is the peasants' habitual dependence on easy coop credit and the coincident and subsequent cycle of indebtedness. (These issues will be elaborated in Chapter 8.) The NVM has been implemented in different milieus reflecting the different social structures of the two villages. The next section is about these differences.

1. New village movement in Oak Tree

In Oak Tree, Umin Kim lineage affairs have dominated most of the collective village actions. Even non-Umin people are involved in Umin lineage projects. For example, there is an extravagantly built Umin Kim grave on the left side of the entrance to Oak Tree from the main road. Every Saturday, five or six Oak Tree but non-Umin women mow the lawn and pull out weeds around the grave. The Umin Kim ancestor worship seems to overshadow community affairs, involving all the residents.

In Oak Tree, two thirds of the population belong to the Umin Kim lineage and they also dominate the village's decision making process. Their immediate concerns are lineage related works such as ancestral hall renovation, chestnut tree planting in the lineage's corporately owned mountains, and promotion of an education scholarship fund for Umin Kim children. Therefore, the state's attempt to change the infrastructure have met with great difficulty in Oak Tree. The villagers changed their roofs, but the road inside the village has recently been built by a construction company, not by villagers' collective work. In 1986, state funds were given to Oak Tree to construct a cement road inside the village. The Umin Kim wanted to

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construct the road from the main asphalt road to their ancestral hall and to cover the other road if some money was left over. Other surname villagers were furious about the plan and there followed a long hostile debate. The villagers finally decided to cover the whole length of the village road by spreading a thin layer of covering material over the road, a cover that was thinner than actually planned. After having considerable difficulty in mobilizing villagers' labor, the Umin Kim hired a construction company to do the work. The company brought a remicon [the premixed concrete composed of gravel, sand, and cement] truck and covered the road with remicon in a half a day. Unlike Pine Tree Village, Oak Tree village does not have communal buildings that were constructed by the villagers' collective labor.

2. New village movement in Pine Tree

Rural development is not new to Pine Tree villagers. A pioneering Pine Tree villager named Haesong changed the landscape of Pine Tree before the advent of the NVM activities in the village. He belongs to the wealthy Cho lineage, a minority lineage in Pine Tree. He left the village when he was 19. His father was the biggest landlord in Pine Tree and he later became a successful business man in Chŏnju. He owns one of the biggest transportation companies in the city. Even after he left the village he remained concerned about Pine Tree village affairs and actively participated in the community's social network. He has contributed a large amount of money for the development of Pine Tree's infrastructure. He does it primarily from his personal convictions and local patriotism and is respected by most Pine Tree villagers.

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He helped broaden the road in Pine Tree in 1960, 12 years before the state sponsored NVM started. In 1965 he managed to electrify 35 households. He paid for the electrification and allowed the villagers to pay him back, without interest, after the harvest. He also supported the construction of a tap water pipeline, a public bath and a village barn in 1970. He contributed 15 sacks of rice and a parcel of land for the construction of a Wŏn Buddhist temple. In 1971-1972 he built a bridge between Pine Tree and Mulberry Tree. In 1977, the Pine Tree villagers erected a monument in the village yard to commemorate his devotion and achievements.

Contrary to Oak Tree, Pine Tree villagers have been very cooperative in carrying out communal works. Pine Tree's cooperative behavior is due to the fact that no lineage group in Pine Tree has not been decisively dominant. The Umin and Songhyon Kim equally share power. Neither lineage group can dominate state allocated funds for the exclusive use of their lineage affairs and there is a balance of power.

In 1973, Pine Tree villagers constructed fences, roofs, and water lines. Pine Tree villagers' cooperation was so widely known that it became one of the model villages in Chŏllabukto province. When the NVM was at its peak in the 1970's, people from all over the province visited Pine Tree village almost every day by bus. Pine Tree was also given a presidential award of $4,200 twice for their pioneering and successful village development. When I was there the villagers still had the $8,400 award money in the communal account.

3. A Visit of a magistrate

One day the Tori county magistrate visited Pine Tree to see their achievements, which had been widely publicized. It was a great honor for the

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villagers to receive the magistrate. He said to the villagers in a joking manner "I wish to see a new road over there, new paint on the roofs and new fences over there." After he left, villagers started to construct fences and a road where the magistrate wanted them to be, and painted all the roofs. They started to work right after the magistrate left in the evening and finished by the next morning. Most villagers worked all night without a wink of sleep. The next morning they called the magistrate to ask him to visit their village again. The magistrate was stunned by the sudden changes. He said "it is a ghost village." Working through the night without remuneration and sleep was possible due to their pride.

More significantly, their cooperation and achievement of seemingly impossible tasks was, in a way, a manifestation of a feeble resistance to the formidable, official power. They were satisfied by the magistrate's awe of their incredible effort. They knew that working over night without sleep just to surprise the magistrate for a few minutes was not worth the effort in a material sense. But they did it because they wanted to let the magistrate know that he could be impressed by peasants and that peasants could be respectable. It was an incident used by the villagers to certify their dignity and worthiness.

4. The Communal Mill

Pine Tree villagers have been successful in making a working communal fund. In 1984, in a monthly meeting, the villagers decided to sell the communal rice mill, an enterprise that proved too difficult to manage on a collective basis. Basic accounting and repairs were the most difficult aspects of the communal mill to manage. The person assigned to run the mill did not operate the mill smoothly and milling rice on a regular and reliable basis was not possible due to poor management. The people decided that one

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person who both owned and managed the mill would be the best solution. So, Sikchon bought the mill. Since then he has made a good profit from the mill and the villagers now have little or no problem in milling their rice.

From the money gained from the sale of the mill, the villagers purchased 0.35 hectares of land for communal use. Pine Tree now has 0.7 hectares of communal land. The rent garnered from this land is deposited in the village account and they use this money whenever there is a communal project. Two people tenant the land for two years and pay 108 kilograms of rice per majigi (0.07 hectares) rent. These tenants are chosen through a lottery with each person having a turn at tenanting the communal land. Tenanting the communal land is desirable, because the rent is comparatively low. The regular rent is 135 kilograms of rice per majigi per season compared to 108 kilograms for tenanting communal land. Pine Tree also receives rent from a communal grocery store owner. The rent was three sacks of rice a year in 1989.

5. A. Road construction project in 1984

The biggest task for Pine Tree villagers in recent history was to construct a cement road from Pine Tree to Mulberry Tree. The estimated cost was $74,200. The state allocated to Pine Tree $33,600 for the project. The Pine Tree villagers had to contribute the remaining cost of $40,600. According to the village chief's diary, the total actual cost was $74,900. Government support amounted to $34,675 and the villagers' burden came to $40,224 plus 1100 work days. The length of the road was 1.6 kilometers, the width four meters and the depth 0.2 meters.

Villagers living in Pine Tree contributed $7,000 with each household required to pay $140. The remainder of the money was collected from the

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contributions of Pine Tree village migrant workers who lived in Seoul, Chŏnju, Taejŏn, and Pian town. Altogether, they barely were able to collect the funds and build the road. The road building lasted from March 10, 1987 to May 30, 1987. The 80 days of construction work was an exhausting and demeaning task for the villagers. The work is remembered as a nightmare. To make things worse, the work coincided with the busiest agricultural season of the year; the May rice transplanting season. The back-breaking work frightened the villagers. They mixed cement, sand, and gravel together using shovels. They did not use a remicon company to save money. The villagers agree that mixing cement by hand was the hardest work they ever did.

The construction caused numerous problems as well. Some people became ill after the exhausting work. Others who were fed up and frustrated asked Hayong, the NVM director, for remuneration. Worst of all, the road encroached on some people's land. Chunja lost one majigi of paddy during the road construction. She was promised that she would receive compensation for the loss by Hayong, but the promise was never kept. The village was not given any funds to compensate the possible loss of land due to the road construction. The most vicious feud was between Hayong and Hyongsu whose half a majigi of land was lost due to the construction. The feud was so vicious that the road project was almost stopped. Hyongsu screamed and complained violently to Hayong over the loss of the half majigi. The villagers watching this scene began to notice their own dissatisfaction over the project and made it difficult for Hayong to direct them.

The NVM road project work changed the villagers' idea of communal cooperation. The villagers were fed up with the emaciating and non-remunerative work. Most of the wage laborers lost many work days and they

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suffered the most. The $140 household "contribution" was in effect forced out of the villagers. Many villagers grumbled about the project imposed from above. Ironically, the winding cement road from Pine Tree to Mulberry Tree is in the way of the current land rearrangement and land which is adjacent to the road cannot be reshaped unless the road is torn up. Seeing this, some people complained that the costly road construction actually did not do them any good and this event is believed to have made the people reluctant to participate in NVM communal works thereafter.

6. Road construction project in 1989

In 1989, I was present at a village meeting where a discussion was going on about the construction of a cement road inside the village. The state allocated $7,000 for the project. The fund was called by township officials a "political fund", a fund having strong political implications. Some people did not like the idea that these officials were using "political funds" that appeared to be a special gift from the state and that they should be made to feel grateful for the state's generosity. They argued, "We must not accept money named 'political fund'. It is ridiculous. That is our tax money."

The estimated cost to construct the road was $8,680. With the $7,000 allocated by the state they could build only 175 meters of road when the total length around the village was 225 meters. Therefore, some part of the village area would not be covered. Yongsu became angry that the cement road would not be made in front of his house. The cement road would be convenient for carrying things in and out of the household compound.

If they mixed cement, sand, and gravel by shovel, it would take three days to complete the road and cost less money than using remicon. On the other hand, if a truck dumped remicon on the road, the construction would

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be easier and the work would be done in half a day. The majority of the people insisted on the use of remicon. However Hayong, who was in charge of the matter, wanted to hand mix the road materials to save money. Since they all remembered their horrible experience in 1984, they decided to use remicon. They argued about the starting date of the project. Wage laborers and dairy cattle raisers wanted to start it sooner than the other occupational groups, and the paddy growers wanted it after the completion of the rice seed beds. Since most of the villagers at the meeting were paddy growers, it was decided that the starting date would be the 20th of April when the paddy farmers finished paddy preparations. After they made the final plan and schedule they drank makkŏlli.

7. Problems caused by the New Village Movement

The collective work caused plenty of problems between villages. When state funds were apportioned to the Yongsan township, all the villages competed to have the largest share of the money. In the 1970's, Hoyun, who was a Songhyon Kim and the Pine Tree village chief at that time, knew of the Oak Tree village chief, Pyongho's, scheme to divert funds from Pine Tree to Oak Tree. Pyongho was one of the most powerful persons in the Yongsan township at that time. He was a Umin lineage toyusa and the first Yongsan township elementary school principal. He had exerted his influence to have the township allocate a larger share of the state monies to Oak Tree. Hoyun and his uncle, Hwahong, the Pine Tree NVM director at the time, went to Pyongho and asked him to return the diverted funds. Pyongho refused. They had a serious physical fight over the matter and Hoyun showed me his two half broken front teeth saying, "These are the medals for the fight." When

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the state funds were given to the Yongsan township, all 17 villages including Pine Tree and Oak Tree became tense and watchful.

The road construction in 1984 from Mulberry Tree to Pine Tree left an enduring and vexing memory in the minds of the villagers. When the $33,600 state funds were given, two officials embezzled some of it. Hwahong of Pine Tree village who was the NVM director of Tori county and a Songhyon Kim and Kunsun of Mulberry Tree who was the supervisor in the Yongsan township office and a Umin Kim embezzled $1,680. The Pine Tree villagers discovered the embezzlement of the $1,680 and Hayong, director of NVM in Pine Tree and Chisam, the village chief at that time, traced the missing money to Kunsun and Hwahong, the only two who had the authority to withdraw the money. Kunsun was reproved and acknowledged his guilt, but Hwahong insisted that he was innocent. He escaped legal punishment because of his prominent position and power.

One day Sangsa, the village chief, implicitly asked Hwahong to reimburse the village account. Being less subtle than Sangsa, Homang spelled out the specific amount and time for reimbursement. Hwahong was so furious that he grabbed Homang's neck. Sangsa separated them, took them to the village store and drank makkŏlli. Hwahong gave $14 to Sangsa saying "I cannot go to the Kamin dairy farm with you, but I want to give a contribution."[11]

Samgu, a Umin Kim, said to me "we can kick him (Hwahong) out of the village, but we do not for the face of the Songhyon Kim." Hwahong's contribution of $14 was an apologetic gesture and an implicit submission to

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[11] Pine Tree animal raisers decided to go to the Kamin dairy farm which was the state run model dairy farm. They often travel to such model farm to learn useful information on husbandry. The livestock coop in Pian town usually encourages and sponsors such a trip.

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communal criticism. Each time he was criticized by villagers on account of the embezzlement, he has to show signs of regret.

8. Two views on the NVM

There are two contrasting views about the NVM. However, most villagers' conception of the NVM are a combination of the these views.

a) Kwanu's idea

Kwanu is the chief of the young people's organization. He said:

> The NVM and 4-H movements were nothing but 'showmanship'.[12] The villagers were exhausted by the NVM work projects. Now they are reluctant to engage in NVM collective work. These days it is difficult to find labor to do any communal work. What do we have now? Nothing. It did not change anything. We were asked to grow flowers alongside the road. What are the flowers for? We have many flowers in the Tujong mountain. It was just a big bustle and nothing left after that.

Asking the villagers to plant flowers on the road side was an amusing frivolity and a ludicrous waste of time. Having flowers planted along the roadside was no different from replacing thatched roofs with tiles. Kwanu was fed up with the meaningless changes unaccompanied by substantial economic improvement. People like Kwanu who tried hard to improve their living by every means made available by the state and ended up more in debt

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[12] An oath of 4-H organization hung on the village NVM office wall. It stated the oath of 4-H: "I will do my best for the society and our country. I will be loyal to our country..." The oath was actually written as the oath for the NVM. It was initially written "an oath of NVM young men's organization." The contents of the oath were not changed and the villagers just covered the letters NVM with a piece of white paper and wrote 4-H in its place. This indicates the confusing and superficial implementation of the state plan in a village setting.

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than before cannot not help being cynical about the NVM. To illustrate this point let us briefly examine his familial background and life story.

Kwanu's grandfather came to Pine Tree after he did not do well in the city. There he became a servant and landless tenant. Kwanu's father was also a landless tenant and his family life was in disarray due to alcoholism.[13] He died in Taejon when Kwanu was seven. Kwanu lived with his mother in Seoul, Chŏnju, and Taejŏn. He worked as a carpenter. He was never successful. After three years of service in the marine corps, he decided to come to Pine Tree in 1982. He learned farming from his Chagŭn aboji (his father's younger brother) who had lived in Oak Tree throughout his life. Kwanu bought five cows with the money he earned in the marine corps, paying $1,120 per head. Later the price dropped to $560.[14] He finally sold them at a great financial loss.

Afterwards he grew red pepper and then sesame plants as cash crops. He never succeeded. He could not sell the red pepper at a good price and his sesame plants were flattened to the ground and destroyed by wind. Once sesame plants are levelled this way, they become useless. To begin sesame cultivation he took out a cooperative loan. When he failed to earn a profit, he became indebted. In 1984, he tried to raise pigs, inspired by Chiyong's success with pig husbandry. He obtained a $4,200-5,600 coop loan to build a pig sty and to buy a few pigs. From his initial stock he raised 62 pigs, but in 1989 the price of pork dropped sharply. The price for a sack of pig fodder ($7) remained the same while the price of pork dropped from one dollar to 84 cents per 600 grams (kŭn). He has been losing money since pig sales do not

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[13] A household head's squandering of property on alcohol and women is a frequent theme in many households.

[14] The sudden drop of the price of beef cattle was mainly caused by the state's cattle import from the U.S and Australia, and the monopoly of meat dealers.

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cover his husbanding costs. Because he has invested $8,400, however, it is difficult to give up the productive activity by selling all the pigs and ending up with another upsetting financial deficit. He prefers to lose money gradually. It is subjectively more tolerable to lose gradually than all at once no matter how bad the future result that will come from prolonging the inevitable. He hopes that other pig raisers will sell their pigs with the result that pork prices will rise and he would have a chance to recoup his initial investment and some profit.

Feeling desperate about the expense of caring for his wife, mother, two daughters and son, Kwanu went to Chŏnju to find work as a carpenter on a construction site. So far he has not found a job. If he does, he would work until the next sowing season in April.

b) Hwahong's view

Hwahong is the NVM director of Chŏllabukto province. Hwahong says that:

> The reason why we are living well is because we had enough straw after we replaced the straw roofs with tile. Straw can be used to fertilize the land and to feed cows. More importantly, planting and harvesting the new tongil rice strain made us rich. The government has worked very hard to improve our peasantry. The NVM made us cooperative. We learned how to work together. Some people criticize the NVM, but we should not forget the good things that the NVM has brought to us.

The rice straw savings, the introduction of high yield varieties (HYV) of rice, and inexpensive fertilizers did play a role in increasing productivity. However, it did not substantially increase the income of the majority of villagers. What Hwahong said is not a distorted view of rural economic

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history. However, he overemphasized certain NVM achievements and directly related them with economic improvements that are not perceived by the majority of villagers. He also argued about the increase of absolute productivity but ignored the relative, overall poverty and inequality in village income distribution. And his view of village cooperation was at odds with what villagers remembered about the road building projects.

Despite an abundance of straw and the high productivity of tongil rice, the peasants have been structurally impoverished by the state's economic development plan. The state's focus on heavy industry over agriculture has made the rural sector suffer. Industries are oriented towards the export of industrial goods while effecting a policy of benign neglect towards the countryside for the sake of supplying cheap foodstuffs to the urban population to keep wages low and industrial prices competitive on the world market. The consequence of the state policy has been to reinforce an economic structure characterized by urban-rural inequalities. Inequality between the peasantry and the urban middle and high income class has increased enormously. Taehyon in Mulberry Tree said, "I am the wealthiest man in Yongsan township as you can see. But any ordinary person in the city has the things I have. My house is always dirty. But a regular person in the city has a clean house." (See Appendix B for a discussion on state capitalism and rural impoverishment)

Hwahong was born in Pine Tree and graduated from an agricultural high school. He was given a government job when he was in his 30's but he refused to take it. He wanted to be in politics. He has risen from being Pine Tree's NVM director, to the NVM director of Tori county and finally Chŏllabukto province's NVM director. This position does not provide a salary but gave Hwahong a license and position to become a power broker.

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He was then elected to the Tongil juche People's Congress. The congress was invented by former president Park. The members were selected by the people and the members in turn voted to choose a president. It was an indirect election system. The members were endowed with considerable power. He continued in this position during former president Chŏn's regime from 1980 to 1987. This period was when the NVM directors' power was at its peak. After Chŏn was out of power and Chŏn's brother, Kyŏnghwan, the head of the NVM, was indicted for embezzlement, the prestige and authority of the NVM, and hence, its power waned.

However, Hwahong's present position as the Chŏllabukto NVM director is still powerful enough for him to exert his influence in village affairs and the Yongsan township administration. Even though his embezzlement during the road construction in 1984 tarnished his influence, the manifestation of his power was well demonstrated by the huge crowd present at his youngest son's wedding in Pian town in October, 1989.

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Chapter 4 Genealogy

This chapter discusses the foundations of two dominant lineages in Yongsan township. By examining the genealogical development of these two lineages for the past 400 to 500 years, I wish to demonstrate the historical background that conditioned cohesion and conflict in kinship relationships in the present.

A. The meaning of a Korean genealogy

Genealogy is generally defined as "an account of one's descent from an ancestor or ancestors, by enumeration of the intermediate persons," (Oxford Encyclopedia 1989: 429). Korean genealogical continuity is characterized by patrilineal descent from a progenitor. The eldest son inherits the patrilineal line and is responsible for his family and parents. He inherits a larger portion of family property than other siblings when his father dies or decides to let the eldest son become the household head. Seniority is strictly practiced among siblings and lineal and collateral members of the same genealogical depth. The eldest son has the responsibility and privilege of carrying out ancestor worship. His family becomes the chonggajip (main family) and dominates the performance and maintenance of ancestor worship, which is a crucial criterion in the control of other collateral kinsmen. Junior collateral kinsmen play a supplementary and subordinate role in ancestral rituals.


Since younger sons inherit small amounts of land or none, they either work for their elder brother, other villagers or move out of the village. As migrant sons settle in other areas, they generate their descendants and these descendants usually create new lineage segments as time passes by. Besides migration, a person with a high governmental official position provides a

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motivation for his descendants to create a new segment to monopolize their ancestor's fame and honor. This is one of the reasons why groups of people with the same surname have descended from a single progenitor while dividing into many separate segments. As the genealogical depth from the progenitor increases to say 400-500 years, as in the case of the Umin and Songhyon Kim, junior collateral lines gradually move away from the ancestral seat to ever widening distance from it. Therefore, a lineage is not a geographically bounded unit.

People in the separate segments of the Umin or Songhyon Kim have a chance to meet once a year for the worship of their common progenitor in Chŏnju where the progenitor's grave is located. The main family has played a key role in performing such ritual for centuries. Other segments of the junior collateral lines have served their own immediate ancestors who were the pioneers settling in a new area or were high governmental officials in addition to the common progenitor.

Fig. 6--A schematized presentation of lineality



For example, in the above diagram, B's immediate responsibility and concern are D rather than C. B's participation in C's worship is not as much

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required as in D's. Separate segments (pa) have been constructed more concretely and exclusively if the fame and wealth of the junior progenitor is considerably larger than other junior progenitors. Quite often private segments have been created despite the geographical proximity of siblings.

The major function of lineage groups is to perform ancestor worship by which their integration and disintegration are legitimated. As Fortes (1969: 166) maintained, "lineage and sublineage groupings have the politically integrative functions of ritual institutions." In other words, internal segmentations are certified by holding separate ancestral worship rituals. On the other hand, the annual meeting of all the descendants of a progenitor is clearly an encompassing and integrating effort to demonstrate the unity and political process of the entire lineage.

Congressional elections and other high ranking positions decided by popular vote require candidates to mobilize the largest unit of their surnames. The supporting lineage group in return receives the pride and the "wall" [protection and the means to more easily achieve one's objectives through an elected kinsmen's' influence]. The annual meeting of the entire lineage group is clearly politically oriented. As the election time approaches, larger lineage units hold frequent meetings.

B. Genealogy and yangban

A progenitor of a lineage is commonly a man well known as either a scholar or government official in the Koryŏ dynasty (936 - 1392 AD) or Yi dynasty (1392 - 1910). Having such a progenitor is an absolute necessity for Koreans to be considered as yangban, which refers to a man who passed the official state examination during the dynastic period. Yangban must maintain certain stereotypical characteristics and manners. The yangban were

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supposed to be paragons of morality for the commoners. Such categorical reification has solidified and justified the people's perpetual belief in social status. The distinctions between the aristocracy (yangban), commoners, and outcastes were based on a rigorous Confucian ideology that eventually permeated traditional society.

Marriage, friendship, and social networks rarely crossed these class boundaries. However, it was not an absolutely closed status system as in the Indian caste system. Passing the civil service examination could transform commoners into members of the yangban class. However, outcastes such as butchers had no right to take the test. Their social status was inherited and they had to remain as they were. In the later part of the Yi dynasty, state offices were sold, purchased, and inherited and scholarship became an unstable criterion for entry into the yangban class. Economic wealth and position within the kinship network became more salient factors in elevating oneself into and maintaining this social class position. In the latter part of the 19th century, officialdom was corrupted by nepotism and favoritism and the commoners' opportunity to pass the exam to become yangban became formidable. Even when the Yi dynasty was ended and class distinctions outlawed, Koreans have continued to evaluate a person by his or her genealogical background. They generally believe that a person with a "bone" [meaning a person belonging to the yangban class] behaves differently from ordinary people.

A genealogy is an explicit way of expressing the validity of a person's belonging to the yangban class. Commoners and untouchables do not have genealogies and it would be considered ridiculous to have one to demonstrate a detailed genealogical linkage to a lower social class. If a household does not have a genealogy and cannot be classified as yangban, they are crudely called

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sangnom [low born] even in a contemporary village setting. Being considered a sangnom is an extremely humiliating and disturbing position to be in on many social occasions. A sangnom is likely to be insulted by a yangban class person when they confront each other in competition for the same objective. The most destructive remark made to the people of sangnom origin would be the stereotypical generalization, "You are 'sangnom', and behave like that." Yangban and sangnom ideologies have been diluted by the preference for individual wealth accumulation after the country's economy gradually stabilized during former president Park's regime. However, villagers still use these class distinctions today as important criteria in their marriage arrangements and in their practical activities within the social network of the community.

C. The sale of genealogical positions

Since being yangban is important in social reproduction, some non-yangban people had and have their names placed in a certain yangban genealogy by paying for it. For example, Unsu and his family in Pine Tree had been ridiculed as "boneless" people. He cleansed himself of this "disgrace" by putting his name in the yangban Yi's genealogy in another township. Cholsu who lives in Chŏnju and ran for congress representing Tori county paid a large sum of money to the Songhyon Kim's toyusa [a person who is in charge of lineage affairs] asking that his name be included in the genealogy. Paying for inclusion in a genealogy and accepting non-kinsman in a genealogy are considered extremely "shameful" acts. Cholsu's actual surname is Yun. His real genealogical tree is well known by the Yongsan township people. He was classified as one of the village sangnom and his ancestors were servants and tenants for the wealthy Yongsan

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township landlords. His running for a high ranking state office with sangnom status is not acceptable in a peasant area where "bone" distinction is still a prevalent notion. The Umin Kim severely criticized the Songhyon Kim for selling positions in their genealogy. The majority of the Songhyon Kim also blamed their toyusa for accepting Cholsu into the lineage. The amount he paid was not known, but people believed it was an enormous amount. Undoubtedly, the prestige of the Songhyon Kim lineage was defamed.

Putting his name in Songhyon Kim's genealogy was a necessary step for Cholsu to become a "power broker." His gain from being included in a yangban genealogy was vastly larger than the accusation pointing to the purchase of the position. He can now proudly say that "I am a Songhyon Kim." People would not ridicule him for his "bonelessness." I suspect that there were more such cases in the formation of genealogies that were concealed by the buyers and sellers and forgotten as time passed by. Unsu's and Cholsu's case illustrate that genealogies are not formed and do not function by inviolable consanguineal rules. Norms have been transgressed.

D. Publication of a genealogy

A genealogy contains elaborate descriptions of male descendants, while female ones are only incidentally mentioned. The diagram below, an example from the Umin Kim genealogy, shows how a person is recorded in the genealogy.

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Fig. 7--A simplified diagram to show the order of genealogy

where-abouts of his grave	death date	wife's name	birth date	pen name	his parents' names	ego's name, office name if he had one
7	6	5	4	3	2	1

These orders in Figure 8 are sometimes changed. I found that the contents and order of genealogy varied from lineage to lineage. A man's description is followed by his sons and sons-in-law but not daughters. Exclusion of daughters in genealogy was explained by Sunsin, a former toyusa for the Umin Kim. He said that daughters married out and came to belong to other lineages. However, he decided to include daughters' names for next year (1990) under the condition that he receives some contribution from the daughters' family. Sunsin said:

> It is strange that daughters are not written into the genealogy even though they are the offspring of the Umin Kim. I initiated the plan. Next time when we publish a new edition for adding new members, we will insert daughters' names for those who will pay a certain fee.

Owning a full set of genealogical records written in Chinese characters on paper with brush and black ink has been a source of exceptional prestige and pride. [Knowledge of the Chinese characters has monopolized by the yangban class in the dynastic period, and helped reproduce class distinctions.] The papers are bound with a thick thread around the margin to form a volume. It usually took a long time to finish making a set and cost from four to six sacks of rice, a price beyond the reach of the common people's financial capability. The entire set of the Umin Kim genealogies is composed of 22 volumes each volume having 300-400 pages. In Pine Tree no Umin or

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Songhyon Kim owns an entire set of hand written genealogies containing all the descendants of Umin or Songhyon. Certain Umin and Songhyon Kim own several volumes of the hand written genealogy that describes their closest ancestors. The Umin Kim made the possibility of owning the entire set feasible since they had them printed and mass produced in 1982. Since then the whole set of the Umin genealogy costs a half sack of rice and now almost everyone owns two or three volumes of the set of six.

The villagers do not seem to care to know much about the distant collateral descendants of their progenitor. Kimbo hangs on the wall a role of paper on which remarkably specific lineal links are drawn. On the role, Umin Kim and his lineal ancestors, Kimbo's father, brother, his half-brothers, sons, nephews and himself are clearly indicated. Other collateral lines are not drawn.

The lineage association decided to publish the genealogy, a decision in which the toyusa exerted considerable power. Influential people in the lineage association hold a meeting when they have to decide important lineage affairs. They deal with various matters such as ancestor worship, construction and renovation of the ancestral hall, fund raising, use of ancestral property, and the publication of their genealogy. The criteria to be a member of the lineage association are that members must be over 60 , know Chinese characters quite well and own enough property to devote themselves to lineage affairs. However, these rules are not strictly observed. When a relatively young man volunteered to be a member or toyusa, he was sometimes chosen. Membership does not require any written contract but requires the approval of the majority members present at a meeting where such decisions are made.

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Every 30 years, the Umin Kim republished their genealogy. The purpose was to inserts new people. The toyusa sends out a form to his kinsmen and they write in any additional family members on the form. The forms are returned and the toyusa put the new additions. The Umin Kim published 2000 sets in 1982.

The publishing of the genealogy is not aimed at earning a profit. The price, $49 for the six volumes barely covers the cost of paper, print, and labor. The primary purpose is for the elaboration and explicit demonstration of yangban lineage. The Songhyon Kim still did not have a machine printed genealogy in 1989. Fewer Songhyon Kim owned handwritten genealogical records than the Umin Kim. The Songhyon Kim do not have a systematic way of publishing their genealogy. Some of them had a long role of paper on which their genealogical trees were drawn by knowledgeable elderly kinsmen.

E. Formation of Songhyon lineage

The Songhyon Kim progenitor, Songhyon, was a high ranking state official who lived during the transitional period from the Koryŏ to Yi dynasty. The description below is my translation of what the Songhyon toyusa, Sonhong, in Pine Tree said about Songhyon and the lineage. Songhyon was the second highest official in the period of the last king, Kongmin of Koryŏ dynasty in the 14th century. As Kongmin was overthrown by Yi Sŏnggye, Songhyon stepped down from his office. Yi Songgye wanted to appoint Songhyon to be his Yŏngijŏng [the highest official next to the king] and offered him a limitless amount of land. Songhyon


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refused all the offers saying "I cannot serve two kings."[15] Songhyon returned to his natal place, Wansan, in Chŏnju and died when he was 73.

15 A Korean official's first qualification is loyalty to only one king. When an illegitimate person overthrew a king and became a new king, the old officials were not supposed to serve the new king. This was a recurring theme in Korean dynastic history.

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
Fig. 8--A simplified diagram to show the descent lines of the Songhyon Kim in Pine Tree



Note: The marks, * and # mean that they are the present household heads in Pine Tree and migrants to the cities respectively.

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Fig. 9--The simplified descent lines of the present Songhyon Kims living in Pine Tree



Note: Most collateral descendants have continued their linkage. Even if the patrilineal line was disconnected through lack of sons, adoption helped people to continue their patrilines. The genealogical charts in this dissertation omit the continuation of collateral lines that did not seem to have significant interactions with the present people in the Yongsan township area.

Pal, Songhyon's great grandson who was 14 generations above Sonhong came to Yongsan township about 400 years ago. He was a high ranking state official in the Sŏnggyungwan or Royal Academy. The members of the Sŏnggyungwan played a significant role in making state policy. They were advisors to the king. When he retired he came to the present Nasong city area. The Songhyon Kim in the Yongsan township area are members of

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the Pansogong segment which started from the first grandson of Songhyon, Yudel. Descendants of the other three grandsons created their own separate segments and ancestral worship. For example, Songhyon's great great grandfather's cousin, Sunung, founded the Chinsagong segment (see Figure 10). The fame of Sunung was as great as Songhyon so that the descendants of Sunung are not interested in performing ancestral rituals for Songhyon. Chinsa people and Songhyon people meet once a year for the ritual for Kugong, if they agreed on a date. However, the Songhyon and Chinsa people usually go to Kugong's grave in Chŏnju separately for sesa [ancestral ritual for a progenitor]. The Chinsa people have different locations for their immediate ancestors' graves. The Songhyon Kim in Yongsan township are the descendants of Pal and those in Pine Tree are specifically the descendants of Yungo's youngest son, Hun (see Figure 9).

Yi Sŏnggye respected Songhyon for his integrity. Yi declared that all the Songhyon descendants would be exempted from any legal punishments [as a token of his respect of Songhyon]. "Even if Songhyon descendants steal, or murder, they are not affected by law."

An ancestor's returning to his natal place after refusing all offers from a king was a progenitor's ideal qualification. Proud detachment and living in lofty solitude among the peasantry was the archetypical life style admired in those days. Both Umin and Songhyon are this type of person. Despite the profound sincerity and solemnity of Sonhong's statements, I could not find the names Songhyon and Kugong in any history text. Songhyon was not mentioned in the section of history to which Sonhong refered. It may be because this event descended through time by an oral tradition that has either distorted the fact or, more likely, the teller invented the story to make his ancestor and lineage grandiose. The story of Kugong again elaborates the

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same theme; a high ranking state official is the most important criterion for being yangban and the refusal of the king's offer demonstrates the steadfast loyalty of the progenitor and is the source of his descendants' pride.

It took more than imagination for the Songhyon lineage members, who had forgotten their ancestors before Songhyon for centuries, to suddenly illustrate them in detail in recent times. Ancestors who are far beyond the reach of present scrutiny seem to be crowned with a glorious past. The Songhyon genealogy is relatively loose and it is difficult to find exact linkages. Some people with the same names appear in different generations. Some collateral lines abruptly become extinct without much explanation. The toyusa's explanation for these irregularities within the Songhyon's genealogy is that:

> One of our ancestors rebelled against Yŏnsangun, a terrible ruler in Yi dynasty. He escaped to Nasong and burned the genealogy so the state could not find his kinsmen. In those days rebels and their close kinsmen were executed brutally for insurrection. Therefore, we [people after the rebel] have had some difficulty in finding exact linkages.

What is most interesting is the comparison made between the toyusa's descriptions of Songhyon and his own life history.

F. Sonhong (toyusa of Songhyon lineage in Pine Tree)

Sonhong was born and lived in Chŏnju with his parents until he was 12. His father was a well educated man. Sonhong learned Chinese from his father and "Ojinsa", a well known and venerable teacher of the Chinese classics. Ojinsa was known for his profound knowledge of Chinese and the universe. Sonhong came to Pine Tree when his father did not do well in the

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cities. He farmed until he was 32 or 33 when he stabbed his pregnant wife to death over a casual argument. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison. When he finished serving his prison term he was 47-48. He could not find a job because of his criminal record and returned to Pine Tree. The villagers in Pine Tree, including the Songhyon Kim, explicitly showed their disgust by avoiding him. Only Kuhong and Hwahong who were Sonhong's brothers living in Pine Tree protected and sheltered him. As time passed by, Sonhong could go out into the village and hold his head up. However, he has been stamped with the label "human butcher."

Another scandalous event was his remarriage to a beautiful woman who was 14 years younger than he. It was considered a "shameful" act for an old man to remarry with a considerably younger woman. He was 60 and his new wife was 46. He had three sons in a row with his second wife. His energetic sexual life is well known. Sonhong ran a village store for a few years and he and his family lived in the store. The store had two small rooms and a kitchen. One day, Samgu, a Umin Kim, came into the store to buy some makkŏli. No one seemed to be there. Samgu called out, "Anybody home?" He looked around to try to find Sonhong to pay him for the drink. He opened the sliding door of a room since it was usual for the villagers to open doors without knocking. Samgu caught Sonhong in the middle of copulation with his new wife. After the incident, Sonhong was given a few more nicknames.

He had two sons from his first wife. Both lived in Chŏnju. The second son died in a traffic accident five years ago when he was 35. The villagers, especially the Umin Kim said, "Sonhong made a fortune after 'killing' his

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son." because Sonhong received a large amount of money from the car insurance company.[16]

Despite all these "shame" provoking events, Sonhong became the Songhyon lineage toyusa. In addition to his knowledge of Chinese he won the support of his brother, Hwahong - the director of NVM in Chŏllabukto province and a former Tongiljuche people's congress member. Both were decisive factors in Sonhong becoming the toyusa.

Sonhong said that the corporate estate was mismanaged before he took over and argued that he made the lineage finances healthier. However, the Pine Tree villagers believes that he embezzled some corporate estate money. He and his brother also tenanted about a half of a hectare of ancestral estate, paying one sack of rent per majigi (0.07 hectares) or about 65 percent of the normal rent.

Sonhong's vociferous illustration that Songhyon descendants would never be accused for committing any kind of crime by the king's order can be contrasted with his past history. Like the toyusa in other lineages, he has played a considerable role in reconstructing the lineage history. In the sesa ritual held in Chŏnju, Sonhong made a speech in front of a big crowd of Songhyon Kim zealously on the greatness of Songhyon and his offspring and their exemption from legal and penal jurisdiction declared by Yi Sŏnggye.

The Songhyon Kim do sesa [ancestral worship particularly for Songhyon] in front of Songhyon's tomb located in Chŏnju on the 17th day of

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[16] It is worth paying attention to the word "killing." When children died of any cause before their parents did, the parents said "I killed my son." But people rarely used such words when a daughter died. The villagers said there was nothing more agonizing than for parents to make a hole in the ground to bury a son. It actually happened quite often when an epidemic or famine hit the village especially in the colonial period and when the country was shaken by civil war from 1950 to 1953.

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October by the lunar calendar. The Songhyon Kim have about three hectares of wito [land exclusively used in caring for ancestor's tombs]. They also have 58 hectares of mountain land. Total rents collected amount to approximately 50 sacks of rice from three hectares of paddy, 30 sacks of rice from dry land, and $42,000 from chestnut trees in the mountains.

G. Kugong

Interestingly, The Songhyon Kim started to look for ancestors prior to Songhyon, especially Kugong who was believed to be six generations above Songhyon. Sonhong said that Songhyon's fame was so great that Songhyon descendants forgot the genealogical linkage prior to Songhyon. Below is Sonhong's explanation of Kugong.

> We thought that Songhyon could not exist without a root to his ancestors. We started to look for this. Kugong lived in the Koryŏ dynasty about 800-900 years ago. He was a diplomat to China and his position was similar to a present days ambassador. He was well known for his virtue, good personality and knowledge. He was offered a high ranking office by the Chinese emperor and others but he refused. A Songhyon offspring in Kwangju contributed $420,000 for the construction of Kugong and his succeeding five ancestors' graves. [This person actually financed the construction of grandiose grave sites. It is an auspicious sign for the Songhyon Kim.]

After analyzing the genealogical linkage among the Songhyon Kim, I could not help being tempted to conclude that they were not a lineage but a clan. Even though they vehemently argued that they were a yangban lineage, they did not have clearly articulated consanguineal connections leading up to their common progenitor, Songhyon. Besides, they themselves could not articulate how they were related . Their so called genealogy book (chokpo) was also confusing. My assumption is that the Songhyon Kim transformed

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themselves from a clan to a lineage organization when they were faced with the formidable competing lineage group. For instance, the establishment of a legitimate yangban status was absolutely necessary to vie with the Umin Kim who had a clear historical progenitor and defined genealogical links. In other words, the presence of a lineage group in the same community incited the Songhyon Kim to legitimate their lineage through the creation of a yangban myth.

In studying the Songhyon Kim, I was faced with the challenging question: What constitutes a lineage? Some social scientists (Radcliffe-Brown 1950, Freedman 1958, Sahlins 1961) have argued that the criterion for a lineage is a clear demonstration of a progenitor and lines of descent. My argument regarding the Songhyon lineage is that the boundary between clan and lineage is relative. It must be investigated though the historical processes enriched in the Songhyon Kim's collective struggle for limited cultural, economic and political capital against other surname groups.

Claiming yangban status is essential for a surname group to dominate or compete with other surname groups in a context of limited resources. Therefore, the loosely congregated surname groups mobilized whatever resources they had. Their loosely connected genealogical linkages were changed to appear as clear and articulate ones. Their progenitor emerged either from nothing or from a myth. They believed and promoted this myth in their memories and then they became a lineage. This is my simplification of the transformative process utilized by the Songhyon Kim clan to achieve yangban lineage status. Claiming yangban status by producing and maintaining an articulate genealogy is a manifestation of the struggle between surname groups.

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I do not believe that a clear progenitor and lucid lines of descent alone distinguish a lineage from a clan. What is more critical is the historical development of a political economic setting in which the surnames groups interact. Otherwise, we would never be able to answer two questions about the Songhyon Kim lineage: How deep in time depth is deep enough for a kin group to utilize their genealogical linkage and to be called a lineage? How can we verify the progenitor and the lines of descent?

The Songhyon Kim's vigorous pronouncement about their yangban lineage is a culturally acceptable component of the Korean social structure. I assume that if the Songhyon Kim did not have a formidable lineage group in the community, they would not bother create and claim the legitimacy of their lineage. Also, I would not hesitate to argue that the Songhyon Kim are a lineage group. Lineage is a reflection of the collective struggle within a political economy. Lineage and clan organization are different types of responses to the community's political and economic structure. The Songhyon Kim's seemingly clan-like descent organization is actually a lineage organization because the desirable criteria for a lineage are not entirely based on the existence of a clear progenitor and genealogical linkage but also include the existence of a collective struggle.

When we examine all lineage groups, there were at least in the initial formation of such groups competition, conflict, and contradiction. These three factors promote the coalescence of group against other groups to gain limited resources. In my view, from such groups, the Songhyon clan was formed, and from that a lineage, which could be seen as a sophisticated development of a clan, developed.

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H. Umin lineage formation


Umin lived from 1442 to 1507. He passed the official state exam but refused to take the job. He remained in the court to be a great teacher for the king. He retired and returned to Kopan shrine in Asan, Chŏllanamdo province. Umin's life history and fame are easily confirmed. Umin is included in the Korean encyclopedia of famous people. The king was impressed by Umin's integrity and endowed Umin's Kopan shrine with his hand written sign board. When a king gave such a board the shrine became a saaek shrine. It is extremely prestigious for a lineage to have such a shrine with the king's calligraphy.

Compared to the Songhyon Kim, the Umin Kim in Pine Tree started to live in Yongsan township in fairly recent times. Since the graves have been well preserved, they are good guides to the history of the Pine Tree settlement. It is not difficult to see the Songhyon Kim ancestors' tombs in Tujong mountain that are 300-400 years old, but the eldest Umin Kim tomb is only about 150 years old, which means that the Umin Kim are about five generations ahead of the people who recently migrated to Pine Tree. In Oak Tree, the Umin Kim seemed to have entered much earlier than in Pine Tree since 200-300 year old graves sites have been found in Oak Tree. It is probable that the Umin Kim settlers in Oak Tree moved to Pine Tree because of population pressure on the land.

Contrary to the confusing oral history and genealogy of Songhyon, the Umin Kim genealogy has been well preserved and is clearly valid. It is not difficult to examine all the genealogical linkages between Umin and the present people in minute detail. The diagram below shows the earlier part of Umin lineage's genealogical tree.

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Fig. 10--An earlier section of the Umin Kim's genealogy



The Umin Kim genealogy can be dated back to Hahoegong who is five generations above Umin. Umin is a lineal descendant of Sasu, the fourth son of Hahoegong. The descendants of the other three sons of Hahoegong have their own segments. People of these three segments want to be identified as Umin Kim. The first person described in the genealogy was Umin. The

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genealogical linkage prior to Umin was not illustrated. I assume that it was because Umin's fame shines more brightly than other ancestors.

There are three graves on a mountain slope in Chŏnju. Umin people, especially the Chugrangjang segment, argue that the grave on the top belongs to Umin's father, the one in the middle to Umin and the bottom one to Umin's son. These are their assumptions but there is no way to prove it. In those days people did not use stone coffins with names inscribed on them so that their descendants could know who occupied the coffins. Instead, they used wooden coffins that totally decayed as time passed making identification of the remains impossible.

In the early 1980's, segments of the first, second, and third sons of Hahoegong argued that the bottom grave belonged to Hahoegong. The basis of their argument was that one of their kinsmen had a dream wherein a spirit of the owner of the bottom grave appeared and repeated with a sad voice that "I am Hahoegong, I am Hahoegong." The Sasu segment, however, maintained that it was illogical to place an ancestor five generations ahead of Umin under Umin's tomb. When people bury their ancestors, they arrange graves in order of genealogical seniority, the eldest set at the top.

The Sasu argument that the bottom grave was not Hahoegong's and Hahoegong's grave was lost meant that the J, U, Y segments could not claim the ancestral property and jurisdiction over the Umin lineage affairs. Existence of the progenitor's grave would have made it possible for the three other segments to find some genealogical linkage with Umin and then to control ancestor worship and the corporate estate. The grave would have legitimated the claim of the three segments by acting as a bridge connecting the J, U, Y segments and the Umin lineage. As they could not solve the problem with the Sasu segment they took the matter to court. The three

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other segments formally raised a law suit against the Sasu segment. The latter won the law suit because the plaintiffs did not have concrete evidence. After the law suit, the Sasu segment ascertained their vested rights over the corporate property and control over ancestor worship of Umin. The Sasu continues to control a corporate mountain, two hectares of paddy and three hectares of dry land. The annual revenue from the corporate estate is about $28,000.

However, the feud has not ended. The other segments fearing retaliation, constructed a grave yard with beautiful tomb stones and a huge garden in Chŏnju in 1984. The yard was named the Chŏnju Kim sacred ancestor's place. The monument mentioned the first, second, and third son of Hahoegong but not Sasu. The ulterior purpose of the construction was an implicit demonstration that Sasu did not belong to the Hahoegong-Chŏnju Kim lineage.[17] The stone monument stated that "this is the holy place for the progenitors of Chŏnju Kim: Hahoegong, J (the first son), U (the second son) ,Y (the third son)."

Sasu people complained about the absence of their name on the monument. Pyongho, who had been toyusa of the Umin lineage in Oak Tree, said to one of the planners, "this construction is for the entire Hahoegong and Umin descendants' glory. Sasu must be included." His complaint was not accepted. Hohyung, another influential lineage member, expressed his worry "if time passes by and other segments keep holding rituals in the Hahoegong shrines, and claiming the existence of Hahoegong's grave, our rights over the

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[17] The clan name is usually given after the geographical area where the progenitor was born or buried or both. It is a more inclusive genealogical term than the name after the specific ancestor's pen name or official position. The Umin and Songhyon Kim are all Chŏnju Kim since their progenitors were all born and buried in Chŏnju. Both Kims, however, remain two different clans.

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corporate property may be transferred to those people. Because we are the youngest son's descendant, they might take over our right in the future". In Korean lineage affairs, elder sons and their descendants have authority over younger sons and their descendants. The Sasu people have performed ancestral worship in front of Umin's grave annually in Chŏnju. It is an implicit way to negate the rights of the three other segments who they believe do not have their progenitor's, Hahoegong's, grave.

Conflicts between Sasu and the three other segments over the corporate estate have never been explicitly expressed. The external reasons for the legal suit--the construction of the grave yard that excluded the Sasu segment and an argument over the precise location of the ancestors' grave--emphasize such themes as glorifying and purifying the lineage, and serving the ancestors better. However, a feud for control of lineage corporate estate and the preeminent role in ancestor worship have been the underlying incentives directing this collision between opposing segments. It is not difficult to predict that the feud will intensify due to the escalating real estate prices nationwide. Up until the 1960's, the price of a hilly mountain was about 10-20 sacks of rice and now it is $280,000-420,000. A real estate agent came to Sonhong one day to persuade him to sell the corporate mountain offering $420,000. Recently, mountainous areas have been developed into resort areas.


I. Conflicts between the descendants of the first wife and the second wife of Umin

The Nasong and Asan segments within the Umin lineage have had a long lasting antagonistic attitude towards each other. The Nasong segment

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refers to the descendants from Umin and his first wife; the Asan segment from Umin and his second wife.

Fig. 11-- Division of two sets of descendents from Umin



The Pine Tree and Oak Tree Umin Kim belong to the Nasong segment. The majority of Asan segment people live in Chŏllanamdo province and Asan is the place where Umin stayed with his second wife after his retirement.

The Nasong segment people claim that they are the legitimate descendants of Umin. Koreans call the descendants of a second wife sŏson and do not give these offspring legitimacy. Interestingly, the Nasong segment people could not trace the Umin's first wife's grave. It was lost. Unless they have a grave to serve, they cannot be too assertive in lineage affairs with the Asan Kim. The Asan Kim located Umin's second wife's grave. More importantly, they have the Kopan saaek shrine where Umin studied and taught during his retirement. The shrine has given the Asan descendants tremendous prestige. The shrine became a national treasure and has been partially financed by the state.

Ironically, the Asan Kim seem to look down on Nasong Kim despite their "illegitimacy of blood." On the other hand, the Nasong lineage think

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that it is ridiculous for "inferior people" to be more assertive than the "real descendants" of Umin. The shrine, the existence of the grave, and the superior number of people are the critical factors for the Nasong Kim to gain control of the entire Umin Kim lineage affairs and they continuously have occupied the position of toyusa for the whole Umin lineage. The Nasong Kim rarely attend lineage meetings in Asan. They do not want to see and experience the Asan people's illegitimate authority. They perform their own rituals for Umin in their own ancestral hall in Oak Tree. All the Umin descendants are supposed to attend an annual ritual for Umin in October according to the lunar calendar. However, the Nasong segment has refused to participate in the sesa prepared by the Asan people. Rather they go to Chŏnju to perform sesa by themselves. Umin has been served in at least three different places: in Chŏnju by Asan Kim, in the Oak Tree Chongdu shrine by the Nasong Kim, and in the Pine Tree shrine by the Nasong Kim living in Pine Tree.

The shrines in Oak Tree and Pine Tree were recently constructed by the villagers. To attend a progenitor's worship organized by the descendants of the second wife indicates acceptance of the authority of the ritual performers while the holding of independent ritual ceremonies for Umin implies that these people will not succumb to the other collateral descendants' authority. Each group desires not to be dominated by the other in lineage affairs. The Pine Tree Umin Kim's independent ritual for Umin can be similarly interpreted. They do not want to yield to the Oak Tree Umin Kim even though they are separated by less than a 10-15 minutes walk.

Until recently, the Asan and Nasong Kim have not talked to each other for years. In 1987, the Asan Kim decided to renovate the Kopan shrine. The estimated cost was about $42,000. The Asan Kim knew that their fund raising

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would not be successful without contributions from the Nasong Kim segment to which Kwangik and Pyongchol, both big corporation owners, belonged. On the 20th of March, Hosu who was toyusa of the whole Umin lineage came to Chongdu shrine in Oak Tree the night before the Confucian ritual for Umin. The Asan Kim rarely visit the Nasong Kim in Oak Tree. Hosu proposed to unite the rituals now separately done by the Nasong and Asan and to alternately perform the ritual together first in the Kopan shrine and then in the Chongdu shrine. Kyuchon, the influential member in the Nasong lineage affairs in Oak Tree was furious over the suggestion. He said that Hosu did not have the right to tell them what to do. Hosu asked Chinho, an influential man and his acquaintance in Oak Tree, to take the position of toyusa of the whole Umin lineage. Previously, this position has been taken only by a member of the Asan Kim. The Nasong Kim had never been appointed to be toyusa of the whole Umin lineage. The reason for Hosu's offering of the toyusa position to a Nasong Kim was believed to be the bait to receive contributions for the renovation of Kopan shrine.

The Nasong Kim had a meeting to evaluate Hosu's offer. Most people agreed that Hosu came to them not because he meant what he said but because he needed their help desperately. Chulyon, a toyusa in Oak Tree, unambiguously said to Hosu that the Nasong people would not cooperate with the Asan people in renovating the Kopan shrine. He said, "we are already busy with our own lineage affairs. We cannot afford to get involved in your lineage affairs. So let's stay this way." Hosu looked embarrassed and angry. He slept in a guest room in the shrine and refused to participate in the Confucian ritual for Umin in the Chongdu shrine held the next day. It was obvious that the Nasong people would not help the Asan people renovate the symbol of the latter's authority and prestige.

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The name "Umin Kim" is a symbolic contour in which Umin descendants feel a certain belongingness. However, such belongingness does not direct them to behave in a predictable way. As I have tried to illustrate, the norms of lineage affairs are not shared by the various Umin Kim segments. Segmented groups' desire to monopolize lineage affairs created and reproduced conditions for protecting vested rights and infringing on the rights of other segments.

J. The Umin Kim lineage affairs in Oak Tree

Umin's eldest son had four sons. The Umin Kim in Oak Tree and the Kasapkong segment in Pine Tree are descendants of Umin's eldest grandson, Tae. The Umin Kim in Pine Tree except the Kasap people are the descendants of Tae's youngest brother, Kang. They formed a separate segment named after the official position of Kang, Sakakkong. The Umin Kim in Oak Tree perform ancestral rituals for Umin in the Chongdu shrine that was built about turn of the century while the Umin Kim in Pine Tree perform such rituals in their own shrine built in 1976. The Kasapkong Kim in Pine Tree participate in the rituals held at both the Chongdu shrine and the Pine Tree shrine.

In 1982, The Umin Kim in Oak Tree and Pine Tree decided to raise funds to publish a new genealogy. Sunsin, who had been toyusa and an influential figure in Pine Tree and Oak Tree, was in charge of fund raising. He traveled around with Sangchung to ask contributions from Umin Kim living in the cities. They collected about $14,000 nationwide. Later people found out that $4,200 was missing from the sum. When Sangchung was told about the missing money, the impact was so great that he died of a heart failure. Sunsin claimed that Sangchung embezzled the money and Sunsin


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thought that he could blame Sangchung since he was dead. The kinsmen investigated a receipt that Sangchung allegedly signed. The signature turned out to be forgery and it was obvious that Sunsin fabricated it. In reprisal, the Oak Tree Kim made several holes in the grave of Sunsin's grandfather, one of the most drastic forms of punishment.

The Oak Tree and Pine Tree villagers said that Sunsin and his family were in an extremely difficult financial situation. Sunsin's fourth son Samgu married last year and the wedding and other costs amounted to $5,600-8,400. To make things worse, Sunsin's second son's electric game business in Seoul went bankrupt. The villagers assumed that Sunsin might have used the $4,200 for the son's marriage, the business or both. Sunsin was ostracized and expelled from lineage affairs. He has not even gone to Oak Tree openly. He has stayed home and helped Samgu, with his dairy cattle and newborn grandson.


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Fig. 12--A simplified genealogical chart of Sakakkong segment



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Fig. 13--A simplified genealogical chart of Kangho segment.



Note: The marks, * and # mean that they are the present household heads in Pine Tree and migrants to the cities respectively.

K. The Disintegration of Kangho from Sakakkong

Ponggu's grandson, Tekmyong, did not have a son. Therefore, Tekmyong adopted his third elder cousin's [Tekchan in Figure 13] son, Shim [who is also shown on Figure 14]. Shim succeeded Tekmyong's patrilineal line. In terms of consanguinity, the offspring of Shim share the same ancestor, Tekchan, with Shim's brother's offspring (see Figure 13). However, the descendants of the adopted son separated from Nam's offspring and a new segment, named Kangho, was created. Shim's offspring have not

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participated in rituals for Tekchan. Instead, they have served Tekmyong who was the adoptive parent.

The adopted son's offspring created an emotional gap with Nam's descendants. The villagers generally believe that the adoptee's descendants are inferior to the remaining sons' descendants. The adopted son's offspring seem to have an inferiority complex. An additional factor that increased this sense of inferiority is that Nam's descendants have been big landlords and have produced quite a few high ranking state officials, bankers, business owners, and a professor -- the professions which are admired -- while people in the Kangho segment have been usually tenants, landless peasants for the villagers including the Sakak people. Besides, many Kangho people cooperated with the communist soldiers during the civil war, whether the involvement was voluntary or coerced.

I do no know exactly when Shim's offspring created the Kangho segment. However, it seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon. When people form a separate segment, they usually do so in relation to a person who had a high ranking official position. That is, the new segment is usually named after the position or pen name of a renowned person. For example, Sakakkong is the title of a rank. Most separate segments are named XX k(g)ong. Gong here means the high ranking position or pseudo official name of a venerable ancestor. The Kangho segment, however, does not carry the particular progenitor's pen name or the title of the state hierarchical position. It has never been called Kanghogong segment. The name was created by the descendants and Kangho does not refer to any particular ancestor.

Tekchan was the offspring of Kang, the youngest grandson of Umin. All four grandsons of Umin created their own separate lineage segment. The youngest one, Kang's offspring created their separate segment, the Sakakkong.

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In terms of consanguinity Shim's offspring belong to Sakak as Nam's offspring does. However, they created the Kangho segment, while Nam's offspring, who are Pine Tree residents, remain as the Sakak segment. Kangho people refer to the people descending from Tekmyong as a minor segment.

The Umin Kim in Pine Tree collected about $4,200 to construct an ancestral hall in the village. The most active people in the project were the Kangho Kim. About 80 percent of the contributions were made by the Kangho segment members. The Umin Kim perform the ritual for Umin on the seventh day of October (lunar calendar). I did not see any Sakak people participating in the ritual even though the ritual was for Umin, their common ancestor. The Kangho group dominated the ritual. Chiju who was a Sakak person said "They [the Kangho people] do not want us [the Sakak people] to be there. The wives of those people complained especially loudly that the Sakak people are not entitled to be in the ritual that the Kangho people prepare. "If we (Sakak) are many, they can not treat us like this."

In 1986, the Kangho people in Pine Tree contributed $5,600 to move Tekmyong's bones from Sunchang to Pine Tree. When Tekmyong died he was buried in Sunchang. They made a grandiose grave on an easily recognizable hill site in Pine Tree for Tekmyong, Shim, Sungmyung and their wives. The monument in front of the graves states that:

> This location has been wanted by many geomancers".[18] Here we have our honorable ancestors, the 19th generation below Hahoegong to the

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[18] People carefully select places to bury their ancestor's bones. The "pungshu" ideology is heavily involved. Traditionally people pay $140-280 to a professional geomancer to select a good location. The preferable location is one where spiritual power is teeming and the earth and water around the location make a good balance. Geomancy is an extremely sophisticated and profound system of knowledge. The villagers believe that if people bury their ancestors in the wrong places, the dead person's spirit will haunt the descendants, making them pay with bad luck, continuous disease, and early death. People once in a while exhume their ancestor's bones to rebury them in a better location when misfortune follows them or they decide to do

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> 21st generation. We filial descendants contributed a fund to buy land for our ancestors' graves in 1986 in order not to lose our ancestors [bones and locations of graves] in case of social turmoil.[19] Finally in March 1987 we, direct descendants [Kangho], spent $126,000 to transfer our ancestors' graves. Wisdom and virtue will be with us for good. Even heaven will be impressed by our filial piety and give us fortune and happiness.
>
> Written by KH, constructed by KS, KP, and KW
>
> 1987 March.

On the other side of the stone it is stated: KS, $7,700; KP, $2,100 ; KW, $2,100; KD, $700 ; NH, $1,400.[20] The Kangho's devotion to ancestral worship may have psychological and social functions (see Kendall 1985, Jannelli 1982). One function which I can clearly see is the explicit declaration that their "bone" means worthiness and dignity. The Kangho people's exorbitant spending on ancestral worship in spite of their extreme poverty is one way to purify themselves according to Neo-Confucian ethics. Impoverishment, the Kangho kinsmen's "shameful" acts, and the absence of hope, seem to supply a context for the Kangho members to behave this way.

The Sakak people were not the initiators of the Kangho segment's separation from the main body of the Sakak segment. Rather the Kangho people actively differentiated themselves from the Sakak people. It is a general anthropological finding that kinsmen lean toward a more powerful group, wanting to adopt its identity. Paradoxically the Kangho people did not want to be included in the more inclusive and influential Sakak lineage.

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hapchang [burying parents or grandparents next to each other]. For example, the Cho lineage was believed to be paying for the bad location of graves since every other generation of the Cho lineage suffered from mental disorder. An auspicious burial costs an exorbitant amount of money because the survivors have to buy a piece of land, pay the geomancer, make a new grave site and carve and place grave stones. Hwanggu in Pine Tree reburied his grandparents for $2,100 or about one fourth of his yearly income (See Jannelli 1982).

[19] People are extremely worried about the loss of their ancestors' bones. If they lose them, they have to be less assertive with regard to their "bone." The social turmoil refers to the civil war.

[20] These figures represent the amount of the contribution each person made.

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Why did they bother to separate themselves from Sakak? Their voluntary separation suggests important processes of hegemony and dignity.

The Kangho people were used by the wealthy Sakak in their accumulation of wealth and honor for centuries. They know that inclusive kinship ties will bind them again into servile relationships with Sakak landlords and creditors. The creation of the Kangho segment is to establish and demonstrate their dignity even in the face of being exploited by the Sakak people's hegemonic role in land tenure and credit relationships. They feel it better not to be identified with landlords and creditors. They have resisted the process in which such hegemony would be intermingled with kinship and appear as a natural fact. They want to expose the exploitation and hegemony, to make it appear as exploitation and hegemony and not something different by clearly demarcating the dominating and dominated people as separate entities. By deliberate detachment from the Sakak, the Kangho people assert that their explicit resistance and defiance will not look strange or appear as ingratitude in the future.

I suspect that this segmentation of the Kangho from the Sakak is not commonly found. The Kangho's voluntary separation contrasts with lineage operation in pre-revolutionary Southeastern China (Freedman 1958) and Hong Kong (Watson 1985). In both places, segmentation is motivated by gaining benefits from the corporate estate. The establishment of a separate ancestor tablet reveals the segmentation of a higher order lineage. The immediate consequence is a right to monopolize the property. It is the wealthy lineage men who usually want independent ancestor worship and collective property. Ironically, it is the poor segment of the Sakak men who created their own Kangho sublineage. In Chinese sublineage formation, a segment of poor lineage men remain in the lineage system when they receive

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help from wealthy lineage men. The wealthy also receive help from the poor such as low-cost labor mobilization for defence and farming. Such a reciprocal relationship provided Freedman with data to devise a functionalistic approach. It is not the functionalistic reciprocal relationships but class relationships that informs and forms the relationships between the Sakak and the Kangho.

The Kangho and Sakak have developed a class relationship. If some of the Kangho people were wealthy and powerful, the relationship between the Kangho and the Sakak would have been different. They might have developed antagonistic class relationship within the Kangho. However, most descendants of the adopted son Kangho have remained dominated by the Sakak people. Besides economic domination, the culturally determined humiliation against the descendants of the adopted son have created a context whereby the Kangho descendants commonly struggle for human dignity and feel a need for unified collective action. The Kangho example shows that segmentation may occur not because of desire to monopolize economic capital but, in fact, it can be common suffering that motivates lineage segmentation and is an outcome of collective class struggle.

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Chapter 5. Production

This chapter discusses how Pine Tree villagers produce various crops. I explore why their options to cultivate cash earning crops have been reduced to rice and barley and how they have become indebted through limited production options.


Non-diversified cultivation renders the peasant economy susceptible to collapse when there is a fall in the price of a few crops. They cannot put their eggs in many different baskets to protect their incomes. If peasants produce many crops, a loss sustained in a single crop can be compensated by profits in others. In order to answer why the peasant economy is rice dependent, I need to briefly explore the historical background of the commodity trade relationship of the U.S. and Korea. Wheat and tobacco are discussed to demonstrate how these crops faced a dead end as cash crops and as export trade commodities.


Besides paddy fields, Pine Tree villagers utilize land on mountain slopes for growing patchagmul (dry land crops). They cultivate garlic (sowing seed in October and harvesting in June), ginger (April - August), sesame (May - Aug), red pepper (March - Aug), bean (June - Sep), green onion (Aug - May), cabbage (Aug - Nov), peanuts (May - Sep), potato (April - Oct), and sweet potato (April - Oct). These crops are partly for self-consumption and partly for sale to the coops and urban merchants. Income from the sale of these crops is vitally important in the peasant economy. People store, produce, and sell them when they need cash. They use most of the cabbage, garlic, and red pepper to make kimchi during the winter. They also consume most of the sesame seeds to make chamgirŭm (sesame seed oil) for cooking purposes.

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The four graphs below show the seasonal variation of the average villagers' financial situation. These will help in the analysis of the general economy of Pine Tree.

Fig. 14-15--Schematized graphs to show an average rice grower's finances







Note: I count only the major expense items for easy understanding. Contribution to wedding ceremonies takes the greatest portion of ritual expenditure. Weddings usually take place in the spring and fall.

Fig. 16-17--Schematized graphs to show an average dairy farmer's finance

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Note: Cows produce about 30 percent more milk in the spring and autumn than in winter and summer. A noteworthy fact is that the dairy farmer's peak income and peak expense roughly coincide, whereas rice growers have about a two month gap between those two. This indicates that rice growers suffer from a two month long financial drought and have to resort to credit. In fact this is the case in Pine Tree.

A. Wheat

Pine Tree and Korean peasant villages in general are characterized by a very limited number of income sources. People in Pine Tree used to grow wheat and tobacco, which were important sources of income. Cultivation of such crops for cash came to an end several years ago. Currently, their lives

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basically are determined by market prices of rice, barley, pig, and dairy cattle. People stopped growing wheat because of price fluctuations that were beyond their control and the likelihood of sustaining losses.

Compared to other crops, wheat cultivation is relatively easy. Most villagers grew wheat when they could. It could be used as a food crop, as brewery material, and for animal fodder. They sold surplus wheat to the coop or to merchants. Wheat met various subsistence needs and acted as a back-up crop in case rice or barley prices fell at harvest time. When the Korean civil war ended in 1953, Korea suffered from a shortage of food grains. After the war, the U.S. dominated Korean affairs. At that time, the U.S had a wheat surplus that was causing some domestic problems. As Korea desperately needed food crops, the U.S. surplus was given gratis to Korea for a few years. The imported wheat was a great assistance to the war torn and impoverished Koreans. However, it destroyed the basis of wheat cultivation in Korea. Korean peasants could not sell their wheat in a market flooded with imported wheat, and Korean peasants thus lost all incentive to grow wheat. The Yongsan township cooperatives stopped buying wheat about 10 years ago and wheat growers lost what seemed to be guaranteed sources of income.

Wheat import from the U.S. has increased continuously. About 95% of the wheat consumed in Korea today is imported from U.S. Since the U.S. economy is burdened with an enormous trade deficit and Korea's trade surplus with the U.S has increased in the 1980s, the U.S. put pressure on Korea to open its markets for most U.S. agricultural exports. The U.S has "obliged" Korea to import its agricultural goods in return for the export of industrial goods to the U.S. Korea used to have protective tariff rights over the domestic agricultural market but those rights have been abrogated. For the last several years agricultural raw materials and processed food products

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have been freely imported to Korea from the U.S. Free import has created a crisis for the Korean peasants. Two people in Pine Tree still grow wheat exclusively for home brewery, believing that wine made from their own domestic wheat tastes better than that made from wheat imported from the U.S.

B. Tobacco

Pine Tree villagers stopped growing tobacco for several reasons. The first reason was the shortage of labor. Tobacco growing requires special care: the spraying of pesticides, leaf sorting, binding, and drying. As people migrated to the cities, and children left the village for education or employment, villagers no longer had workers available for producing the labor intensive crop. As one villager reminisced "what I did after school was to sort and bind tobacco all day."

Second, cigarettes imported from the U.S have played a considerable role in reducing the number of tobacco cultivators. Since September, 1986, cigarettes have been imported freely from the U.S.[21] The result was a nation-wide reduction in the number of tobacco cultivators. In the 1970s, 148,000 households produced 93,000 tons of tobacco from 45,511 hectares of dry field, while in 1989, 74,025 household produced 72,000 tons from 30,985 hectares; a 50% reduction in tobacco producing households, and a 22.6% reduction in production. In 1986, U.S made cigarettes furnished 0.14 % of the cigarette market in Korea. In 1989, the figure increased to 5% (Nongchuksan Jungbo 1989). The U.S market share in the Korean cigarette market is expected to rise,

[21] The price of a pack of Marlboro is cheaper in Korea than that in N.Y. The price in Korea is one dollar ten cents while it is one dollar 30 cents in N.Y.

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which means, in time, another cash crop will be lost from the already limited options Korean peasants have.

Tobacco is a state monopoly crop. Tobacco growers have to sell the produce to the state and peasants who want to grow tobacco must have a contract with the state. Peasants are furnished seeds and a manual of instructions. The government buys all the produce and there is no free tobacco market. If the state does not want domestic tobacco, it does not offer contracts to peasants. If the number of people in a village who want to grow tobacco is small, the state does not accept any prospective grower's request. Pine Tree is an example of the latter situation. Two years ago, only two people in Pine Tree wanted to grow tobacco. They could not get a contract. The state did not want to extend resources to collect a small amount of tobacco from a few villagers.

Tobacco must be inspected by state officials. They evaluate the quality of tobacco and grade each bundle. The 11 former tobacco growers in Pine Tree remembered well that they gave "cigarette money" to the village chief in proportion to the amount of tobacco they wanted passed at or above fair grades during the inspection. The chief put all the money in a white envelope and gave it to the inspectors saying "please use this for your lunch." The giving of a gift was a necessary act to ensure at least fair grades. The inspectors were treated like gods on inspection day. The amount of the money each grower had to pay was excessively high and the growers felt bitter about giving a gift to the inspector. They agreed that all of the profit to be made on tobacco sales was taken by the inspectors. Perhaps they were exaggerating the actual facts, but they felt disgusted that part of their gain was transferred to the inspector's pocket. When the inspector happened to be young they felt even more bitter about having to play up to him and pay him

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off. The villagers who believed in the seniority system felt frustrated by the unequal relationship between themselves and a young inspector, sometimes young enough to be their grandchild. Now the Pine Tree villagers do not have to worry about the inspection. They simply do not grow tobacco.

C. Vinyl house cultivation

Pine Tree villagers have been encouraged by the coop and township officials to engage in vinyl house vegetable cultivation. For this they were sometimes given a coop loan with a 5-8% annual interest rate. Before a year passed, their efforts proved futile. When the state buys only small amounts of a crop, peasants have to sell the remaining surplus to merchants in Pian, Nasong, and Chŏnju. Merchants run cartel operations in the region. Five big commercial merchants made an agreement that they will not compete with each other and operate only within their designated territories. When a merchant buys produce in an area, he or she does not have any competitors. The merchants manipulate the prices intentionally, setting them low to reap large profits when they re-sell.

In addition, growers suffer not only from lean harvests but also when there is a bumper crop. At that time, peasants compete to monopolize the favor of the available buyer to insure the sale of their entire crop. Otherwise, their surplus will rot and their efforts will go unrewarded. In this competitive situation, the merchant can drive the prices down, taking the crops from the buyer with the lowest bid. Consequently, coop loans for the construction of a vinyl house, seeds, and wage labor will not be offset by the growers' sales earning. Most young people in Pine Tree and Oak Tree have had experience of trying and then failing in vegetable cultivation. Bypassing the merchants and organizing a sales network in the cities requires too much

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capital and political maneuvering for the villagers to handle. So the commercial structure works to the disadvantage of the peasants.

In other villages in Yongsan township, some people do earn cash by vinyl house cultivation of vegetables and fruits. The problem is that to accomplish this the growers must have sufficient savings or other reliable sources of income. It is too risky to solely depend on vinyl house cultivation for income, since there also is the danger of collapsing prices and lean harvests. Pine Tree villagers ceased vinyl house cultivation six or seven years ago and the last villager to attempt it in Oak Tree stopped last year. In short, people took out loans from the coops to construct vinyl houses, purchase seed and other tools only to end up with a loss on their investment. The loan turned into a debt to be repaid from funds not related to the investment.

D. Red pepper and ume trees

Red pepper is a typical case to show how limited options can have a negative effect on the peasant economy. In spring, 1988, peasants were "advised" to plant red pepper by the township and coops and many peasants followed the advice. The state's tobacco import policy transformed a large portion of tobacco fields into red pepper fields (Business Korea: 58 April 1989). As the kinds and amounts of imported agricultural crops increase, peasants have less and less of a choice about which crops to grow. If a certain crop, such as red pepper, is not on the import list, peasants grow it. When a large number of peasants nationwide grow a seemingly profitable crop, the total surplus is likely to overwhelm demand. A limited market is then flooded with a crop produced nationwide by peasants seeking profits based on

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centrally given government advice. If there is a market glut, followed by falling prices, the growers will suffer losses.

The weather was ideal for pepper cultivation in 1988. In October, when pepper needs good doses of sunshine to dry and mature and it was cloudless for a month. The peasants had a nationwide bumper harvest. After buying about 10-20% of the surplus, the state refused to buy any more red pepper. The peasants had no recourse but to sell to the urban merchants. The state set price of about $3 per 600 grams of dried red pepper fell to one dollar in less than three months. The villagers felt cheated by the state and the state did not want to buy the entire unexpected bumper crop. This incident was followed by peasant demonstrations in Tori county, Seoul and many other places. This year Pine Tree villagers still grew red peppers for their own consumption. If the price is good, they can also sell the produce to the merchants in Pian town.

Some cash crops are sold for a profit. Song in Mulberry Tree has about 150 ume trees[22] and until now he never profited from them. Indeed, he barely met his labor costs and other expenditures for the last eight years. This year (1989), the demand for ume suddenly expanded. The Chinsong liquor company, one of the major liquor companies in Korea, expanded its capacity to distill ume wine to meet both the domestic demand and the Japanese export demand. Song had been advised to cut the trees and plant other crops there. He was stubborn and refused. Song earned two million won from ume tree produce this year, a profit larger than from his one hectare paddy field. His stubbornness paid off. Song will have similar or even more income from the trees in the next harvest season. Since it takes four or five

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[22] The shape of ume fruit is like a miniature of red apple. The taste is too sour to eat. It is used for distilling wine.

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years for ume trees to produce, he will make a fortune before other people plant trees and harvest the fruit.

E. Pig

Pigs provide many benefits. First, peasants earn cash by selling pigs. Female pigs deliver piglets, which produce a net profit when sold. A healthy, female adult pig produces about eight pigs twice a year. Having an adult female pig means that the owner can have about 15 piglets annually discounting death or deformity. The current price of a piglet is approximately $28-42. Therefore, the owner can earn about $420-630 yearly without much labor.

Second, pigs are slaughtered for rituals, such as weddings, the 60th birthday (hwangap), and big holidays. For these events owning and butchering one's pigs is considerably cheaper than buying them from a butcher shop.[23] Third, pig manure mixed with rice chaff is used for fertilizer. Most villagers have at least one pig to produce pig manure.

One of the advantages of pig husbandry is that the owners do not have to devote their whole time to the pigs since they do not need much care. If pig raisers have less than 100 head, they will have time for rice farming. Owners simply give water and fodder in a manger three times a day. Pig husbandry does not require as sophisticated skills as in dairy cattle husbandry.

The most troublesome moment occurs during the delivery of the piglets. Pigs are born one by one and each piglet's umbilical cord must be cut by the owner. It usually takes about one hour to complete the delivery.

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[23] Butchering one's own 150 kilograms pig costs about $112, while buying 100 kilograms of pork excluding about 50 kilograms of unnecessary parts in a butcher shop costs $280. Most men in Pine Tree know how to butcher pigs.

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However, it can take half a day. In the latter case, the owner has to sit next to the pig for five or six hours. This can be a tortuous experience especially when a pig delivers during the winter season. Kwanu complains that "sometimes I have to sit next to the pig crouching, and watch its hip for hours without sleep, trembling in the cold." Compared to cattle husbandry, the labor demand for pig husbandry is negligible.

Before the 1970's, the pig population remained stable in Pine Tree; household consumption and sales to merchants were more or less equal with pig reproduction. Once in a while, epidemics wiped out the pig population in Pine Tree. The most recent decimation of the pig population was due to a cholera epidemic in 1976. All the pigs in Pine Tree died without exception. People joyfully remembered the pork feast following the epidemic even though it was a painful loss. They fed on the pork for several weeks. They proudly said that they even threw away the fat.

Until the 1960s, people fed pigs with scraps and they never used packaged fodder. In 1979, Chiyong started raising pigs. His successful enterprise made a great impact on Pine Tree. In the first year, he had 79 head. Now he has 125 heads. He feeds the pigs packaged fodder that he buys from the cooperative. Chiyong is engaged in commercial pig husbandry and does not grow rice. Until now, he has depended solely on pig sales and has made handsome profits that few villagers could ignore.[24] As Chiyong made his fortune, Hwanggu, Kwanu, and Nayong followed his example of commercial pig husbandry on a large scale.

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[24] One piglet sells for $42. A piglet eats 10 sacks of feed (30 kilograms) to become medium size or 70 kilograms One sack costs $7. After feeding the piglet $84-98 worth of feed for six months, its price becomes $168. The weight is about 70 kilograms and one kŭn is worth one dollar and 12 cents. Therefore, the profit is $42 per head.

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Since the middle of 1980s, pig husbandry has been negatively affected by a pork market surplus. It is quite similar to the case of red peppers described above. In September, 1988, there were 771,000 sows representing a 10.9% increase within six months (Nongrimsusan Yŏnbo 1989). Now, a piglet costs $35. Feed costs $84 and disinfectant costs $21. A 90 kilograms pig is now worth $126. Therefore, owners stand to lose $14 per head.

The increase in the pig population is primarily due to improved anti-epidemic measures. When a certain region is hit by an epidemic, peasants in other areas are informed through the media about the epidemic and they give anti-epidemic injections to their pigs immediately. The ultimate result of using such preventive measures is the decrease in the pig price per kŭn (600 grams). In the 1970's, the price was one dollar and 12 cents per kŭn. In 1989 the price dropped to 84 cents per kŭn.

1989 was a disastrous year for large scale pig raisers. The village chief distributed state leaflets to the villagers that stated the government's opinion that growing more pigs will be disastrous. Pork will flood the market and the price will fall. Ironically, pig raisers in Pine Tree have not heeded the state's advice. Hwanggu said "it is the best time to keep going when the government asks peasants to reduce the number." Since the peasants have been misled and cheated by the state so often they think that if they do the opposite of what government suggests, they will make a fortune. However, this time they miscalculated; their debt to the animal husbandry coops for fodder in Tori county has increased uncontrollably.

Pigs eat continuously no matter how the price fluctuates and fodder is continuously bought on credit from the cooperatives to maintain the pigs' in healthy condition. After purchasing fodder on credit for 40 days, the people have to pay the principal or the 14.5% interest to extend the contract. When

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the burden of debt outweighs their anticipation for an increase in pig prices and profits to pay off their debt, they will eventually sell their pigs. If they do, they will still have the fodder debt. To keep feeding pigs and to increase the debt gradually is subjectively more tolerable than selling all the pigs and having nothing left but debt. So far nobody in Pine Tree has reduced the size of their herd. Surprisingly, Hwanggu and Kwanu bought adult female pigs from the pig market, for they could subsist on other source of income such as wage labor and tenancy. It remains to be seen whether the Pine Tree villagers' or the state's prediction will prove correct. In any case, it is certain that pig husbandry is becoming a risky business for peasants, which further reduces their options in raising their income.

F. Wage labor

Some people in Oak Tree and Pine Tree sell their labor to outsiders. In 1989, a new ice cream factory was established in Pian town. Unje, Kisun, and Yolhan's wife[25] in Pine Tree and Hokin, Samkyun, Jungkyun's wife in Oak Tree work in the new factory. They earn $5 for six hours work a day. Kisun's wife and Hokin's wife also work in a clothing factory in Pian. Hokin's wife is a seamstress who earns $210 per month. Some 10 or 11 women in Oak Tree work in Oak Tree's ginseng fields. Most of the fields are leased by outsiders. Ginseng cultivation requires land to be used for three to five years and after that time the land cannot be used again. Ginseng is believed to draw all the nutrients from the soil during its three to five year maturation period. Therefore, ginseng and other crops cannot grow in the barren soil. The cultivator must find another place to cultivate it. Three ginseng fields in Oak

[25] Women rarely reveal their names. That is why I used the term XX's wife.

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Tree and one in Mulberry Tree are leased by Kŭmsan people in Chungchŏng province who specialize in ginseng nationwide. Several Oak Tree and Mulberry Tree villagers are employed by the Kŭmsan people as ginseng cultivators.

Oak Tree, Pine Tree, and Mulberry Tree supply laborers for ginseng cultivation. People usually work for two or three weeks during the year. Women are paid seven dollars with lunch per 12 hour work day and men are paid $10. People made about $140 working in the ginseng fields last year. Another type of wage labor for women is peach picking in Nengha township where peaches dominate agricultural production. Chiyong's wife worked for a week and she earned eight dollars a day. These four types of wage labor by women demonstrate the indebtedness of their households. Without exception, all the women who engage in wage labor are heavily indebted. Work for a wage by women outside the home is considered "shameful." The fact that women ignore the social "shame" and become wage laborers means that "shame" is too luxurious a concept to be overly concerned about.

Some Oak Tree and Pine Tree men engage in the wage labor as well. Government land rearrangement and aqueduct construction have created many jobs. Oak Tree and Pine Tree men earn $11-14 with lunch per day and work 12 hour days. If men bring their motor tiller and use it on the job, they are paid $28. Hoban, Kisun, and Unje in Pine Tree worked there for a few months. Yolhan in Pine Tree works there with his power tiller. Men working in such places for several months is vital to their household economy. Their earnings from wage labor for several months are almost equal to the average income gained from rice production (see in the section on rice).

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Samkyun, Hokin, Sukjen, Jongkyun work for the Hanjŏn Electric Company. They earned about $280 in 1988. Work at Hanjŏn Electrics includes carrying electric poles and wires and installing them in the ground. Among the various companies, Hanjŏn pays the best wage. The work is taken only by Oak Tree men. No Pine Tree villagers work for Hanjŏn. Since Oak Tree is located in the center of Yongsan township, and has all the administrative buildings, Oak Tree villagers receive information about outside jobs faster than other villagers do. They do not inform Pine Tree villagers about good paying jobs like those at Hanjŏn.

Men working as wage laborers also reflects their indebtedness, a major factor driving men to sell their labor. Nevertheless, opportunities in wage labor are not predictable. Recent construction projects around the Yongsan township have created a favorable wage labor market. When the projects end, however, the villagers will have difficulty finding wage work again.

The villagers have been extremely vulnerable to operations of the wider economy. The import of U.S. agricultural crops, the state's economic policy, and the merchant cartel are all major contributors in decreasing the number of crops Korean peasants can grow to raise their income. The inability to diversify production has led to the indebtedness and impoverishment of the peasants.

Peasants can make a living by producing rice, barley, and dairy products. The next section will discuss these commodities.

G. Rice

Rice has been the main staple crop for Koreans for millennia. Presently, one hectare of paddy produces enough rice for 30 people to eat for a year. Probably rice produces more calories per hectare than other cultivated

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crops. Therefore, cultivating rice allows for the support of a dense population.

The method of paddy cultivation has developed remarkably. More than 500 years ago a new method of rice transplanting was invented (Yi 1987: 221). Cultivators sow rice seeds in muddy soil and wait for them to sprout and grow to a height of 10-15 centimeters. Then they pluck the seedlings and transplant them into a paddy field where they grow to be harvested. This method maximizes the number of seedlings that grow to fruition. If seeds are sown and grown in the same field, the harvest they produce is considerably smaller than that obtained by using the transplanting system. Another advantage is that young seedlings can be protected from wind and rain in a safe area.

In Pine Tree, people sow mono-crop rice seeds on muddy land in the middle of April. The seeds will sprout and grow by late May. They pluck the 10-15 centimeter long seedlings and bind them into 30-40 seedlings per bunch. Then they are ready to plant the seedlings in the paddy field.

People plant rice at different times. If a field is used for double cropping (barley and rice), people transplant rice seedlings two or three weeks after planting the rice seeds in a mono-cropping field. Double cropping peasants have to harvest barley in the middle of June and plough and break up the soil for rice cultivation. Mono-cropping peasants finish ploughing and breaking up the soil earlier.

1. Seed beds

For the last few years, people have used vinyl house rice seed beds, first used by double cropping cultivators. These days people use seed beds even for mono-cropped rice. People put rice seeds in water for seven days or so to help

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the seeds sprout faster when they are placed on the seed beds. The cultivators then put yellow loess-like soil on the seed beds. They use nets to sift the soil to a fine texture. Then they spread the pre-soaked rice seeds on the soil. They cover the seeds with soil and put the seed beds on top of water saturated land. The seed beds have holes in the bottom that draws water from the soil. Then they make a skeletal framework of bamboo ribs that arch in a semicircle over the seed beds and cover the bamboo with vinyl. The vinyl covering protects the seedlings from wind, heavy rain and cold weather. The seedlings grow in the vinyl covered seed beds until they are transplanted to the paddy field.

When the seedlings are ready in May, people have to prepare the paddy field for transplanting. The soil is turned over by a draft animal or gas powered machine and then the cultivator uses a harrow attached to an ox, rotary motor tiller, or tractor to pulverize the soil to a fine texture. Then the field is irrigated, and fertilized with chemicals. When the water level in the paddy is about five centimeters from the surface of the soil, the paddy field is ready for transplanting the rice seedlings.

The machine operator puts the seed beds on the transplanting machine and controls the machine as it automatically plants seedlings in the paddy. If people are transplanting by hand, they do not use seed beds. When the seed bed method is employed, each seed must be meticulously and accurately placed in evenly spaced rows so that the transplanter can efficiently pluck them out and plant them in the paddy field. This is in addition to soil preparation, putting on the vinyl covering, and carrying the seedlings to the field.

When machine operated transplanting with seed beds was first introduced it was not liked by the Pine Tree and Oak Tree villagers. People insisted that hand sown seeds would be more resistant to disease. However,

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they have been instructed by the village chief and township officials about the advantage of plastic seed beds with a motorized transplanter and encouraged them to use the method. Nowadays, an increasing number of people use vinyl covered seed beds and transplanters. People who have paddy fields where machines cannot fit or maneuver must transplant by hand.

2. Water

In the transplanting season, water is desperately needed. If the peasants lose the chance to transplant the rice seedlings due to a lack of water, they will lose their source of livelihood for an entire year. This is why they are anxious to get water by any means. Pine Tree has continuously had serious drought problems. Old people said that "when the Tori county magistrate saw rice seedlings planted in the Yunson field he could predict Tori county would have a bumper harvest." Yunson is the paddy field on the east side of the village plagued by drought, and a transplanted rice field was the sign of an abundance of water.

Feuds over water have been constant. When a serious drought hits the village, it is not rare for people to engage in physical fights. In 1989, Pine Tree villagers experienced their customary drought. Hasun broke the water pipe above his field and diverted the water to flow onto his property. The pipe was the source of the villagers' tap water and the Pine Tree villagers did not have tap water for a few months after the incident. Hasun denied that he broke it, but it was obvious that he had; his field is right under the broken water pipe. People blamed Hasun for stealing water, but he adamantly refused to acknowledge the accusation. His nephew, Kwanu, a head of the young people's organization, spoke for Hasun chakŭn aboji (father's younger brother). Kwanu had received farming skills and assistance from Hasun since

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he started to live in Pine Tree eight years ago. Since Kwanu's father died early, Hasun has played the role of Kwanu's father. Kwanu himself has helped Hasun who is lame. People did not particularly blame Kwanu who obviously lied for his uncle.

This case would have been more seriously dealt with if the villagers did not have water pumps. At home about half of the villagers have motorized pumps to extract water from ground wells at home. People without the pump got water either from the common well or from a neighbor who has a pump. When a drought continues for a long time, villagers post family members every two or three hours around their fields to prevent others from breaking the paddy ridges to steal water. Water is no less than life. Villagers say that "there are two things which you must not give to other people. They are sons and water." Water is so precious that villagers oftentimes forget to display appropriate behavior toward kinsmen whom they suspect of stealing water. Feuds over water happen even between father and son and between brothers.

In July, Yongsan and Hasun, nephew and uncle (see genealogical chart) had a physical fight. The villagers were barely able to separate them. Hasun screamed at Yongsan, "why did you steal my water." Yongsan replied, "look at that guy. Look how he behaves." Their fields lie next to each other. The two kinsmen are Songhyon Kim. The people who stopped their fight murmured " How could uncle and nephew do that?" An Umin Kim murmured that "Songhyons all behave like that."

In July, Namgu's wife ran to the house of Chiju, my key informant. She said "Basan stole all our water last night. We just put fertilizer in the water yesterday so we could plant seedlings today. He is a terrible thief. How could he steal water and even fertilizer? We have to have a watchman in

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our field all the time." She and her husband tenant about 0.35 hectares of Chiju's paddy land.

She could easily tell who stole the water by the direction of the water flow into a certain field. When things happen to the field, tenants always inform their landlords about them. Basan who stole the water was a servant (mŏsŭm)[26] for Chiju's father for 12 years. Chiju's father lives with his eldest son in Seoul. Basan lives in Mulberry Tree. He moved to Mulberry Tree where he bought some land and a house. His surname is Song. There are eight Song households in Mulberry Tree. Namgu's mother later said to Chiju "If your father still lives here, Basan would not dare to do it. He thinks little of you." Chiju did not go to Basan to complain, even though he was advised to do so by Namgu's wife. Chiju said "well, it is useless to talk to such a person." Drought problems were significantly reduced by the use of water pumps. A five horsepower water pump costs about $140. Without the pump, the villagers would have experienced a lean harvest in 1989.

One sack of rice seed (40 kilograms) costs $56. One sack can cover 0.7 hectares. One majigi sown with four kilograms of seeds produces about 320 kilograms of rice. This appears to be a bonanza, but paddy cultivation is not like peanuts. In peanut farming, people sow a handful of peanut seeds in one majigi and leave them until they can harvest about a sack of peanuts. However, rice plants need to be intensely cared for from planting to harvesting and this requires enormous amounts of different kinds of work: ploughing, pulverizing the soil, preparing seed beds, watering, transplanting,

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[26] There are many types of mŏsŭm. One type is the mósŭm who works for the landlord, gets paid after the harvest and lives in an independent household. Another is the mŏsúm who lives in the landlord's house and gets paid annually for his work. The second type usually does domestic chores for the landlord. Basan was the first type. The mŏsŭm system continued for at least a decade after the liberation from Japan in 1945.

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spreading herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers, weeding, constructing paddy ridges, harvesting, drying, husking, and selling. Among these, weeding, spreading insecticide, and watering are the most onerous and time consuming tasks.

Weeds must be cut on the ridges of the paddy. If weeds are left to grow tall, they block the sunlight for the rice plants growing on the marginal areas near the paddy ridges and impede their growth. Weeds keep growing and they must be cut at least monthly.

There is a consensus among villagers that the new variety of rice plant is not as strong as the varieties grown in the 1960s. Since the 1970s, the new variety (Tongil) has produced more than the old but is more susceptible to diseases. People have to use about two or three times more pesticide for the new variety than the old, and it must be applied five times in a season. In addition to more work, pesticides now assume a larger portion of the production cost.

The villagers' health is also affected by pesticides. Stronger and more potent varieties have to be used to kill increasingly resistant pests. People do not wear masks or any protective gear when spraying. They all have experienced nausea and dizziness and some people have become seriously ill. One of the villagers said, "the sky became yellow and the things around me turned." He did not go to a hospital, but cared for himself. He ate hinjuk (rice soup) and kimchi and stayed home for a few days. He was better after that.

The new variety of rice plant is easily flattened by the wind. Heavy heads and weak stems make the plants especially vulnerable. This year strong winds blew across the paddy in Pine Tree and flattened about a quarter of the rice plants. People had to bind 8-10 stems together for the plants to

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stand up, otherwise, they would have decayed in the field. Binding is particularly painful work. A tall rice plant stem is sharp enough to cut people's hands, arms, and face, gloves cannot be worn because only bare hands can bind the stems.

3. Cost and profit

Labor is not counted by most villagers and township officials as an agricultural input. One day I followed five loan applicants and Chiju to the township office. They went there to inquire about the state funds available for dairy cattle. A township official and Chiju had to fill out application forms and these forms were sent to the Tori county office to be approved. There was one section on the cost of raising dairy cattle. The official wrote down the costs for fodder, a cow shed, and sudan grass seed. Finally, they calculated the labor cost. They used Pine Tree's average labor charge of seven dollars per day to calculate the cattle raiser's labor cost for two years. It turned out to be $5,110. Both of them chuckled at the figures. The official erased the numbers and did not write down the labor cost.

If a couple farm one hectare of paddy, which is a typical amount in Oak Tree and Pine Tree, the net return is about $2,184. (See appendix C for the calculation of cost and profit of rice production.) When other expenses are subtracted from these figures it is clearly revealed why people are structurally impoverished. Marrying a daughter cost parents at least $4,200-5,600. Sending a child to a high school or college cost them $2,100-4,200 a year. If a couple does not have any children they would live comfortably with the above income. However, most couples have children who go to school, who are about to marry or who need money to rent or buy a house. Parental support continues until children are truly independent. Besides, the couple

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themselves spend an enormous amount of money to participate in community rituals. These matters will be elaborated in Chapter 6.

There are many variations in the amounts and kinds of pesticide and fertilizer depending on quality of the soil and variety of rice seed. Fertilizer and pesticide use also depend on the peasants' skill in farming. Some people use too much fertilizer or the wrong fertilizer and spoil the crops. Some people use smaller amounts but succeed in producing a lot. Success in farming is usually decided by experience. People without much experience think that using plenty of fertilizer guarantees a large harvest. That is a mistake which is still made. Farming methods vary greatly. Just being a peasant does not mean that they all know sound farming techniques and practices. There are some clumsy hands and ignorant minds. Therefore, productive costs vary according to the condition of the soil and the level of farming knowledge and experience. My calculation for cost and profit is based on a well experienced person's ability to farm.

4. Sales

Most peasants need credit to purchase chemical fertilizer and insecticide in the spring before they start to grow rice plants. The majority of the villagers immediately spend the cash earned from the rice harvest for the needs at hand. They are not able to save cash for the upcoming spring when it is needed for chemicals, wage labor, the engagement of agricultural machinery use, and education fees.

The villagers get loans from the cooperative or private creditors. Another way is to acquire chemicals and other farming tools from the coops using a rice lien. When they harvest and sell rice to the cooperative, they receive from the coop the total price of the rice sold minus the total cost of the

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items given on credit. The rice lien system is not used often because the peasants have to accept the prices without being able to haggle the chemical price down and the items available under the system are limited.

The villagers prefer to use the "general loan" policy of the cooperative or private loans at 15 percent interest. However, very poor peasants have no alternative but to accept the rice lien system. The poor have only their rice harvest from tenanted lands to offer as collateral whereas others have other options. Therefore, wealthy and ordinary peasants can arrange cooperative loans and buy things in the town or city markets at the lowest prices.

People have different rice selling strategies. Peasants who can afford to make a living without post-harvest sales of rice in November store rice until next summer when the price will be higher than in the fall. The abundance of rice after the fall harvest produces low rice prices. On the other hand, poor peasants who need cash immediately sell their rice harvest to the coop to pay for pesticide and fertilizer purchased on a rice lien. They also have to pay the interest of previous and other loans from the coop and private creditors to avoid compounded interest.[27] The repayment date is usually set one month after harvest sales. Private creditors know well that at this time debtors have cash to pay their debts. Repaying private credit is mandatory in the fall.

In the last several years, people have had bumper harvests and the coop storehouses have been filled with surplus rice. Rice prices rarely rose above the state purchase price. Therefore, people have tried to sell as much rice as possible to the coop. However, peasants cannot sell their entire harvest to the coop. There is a village quota that determines the amount of rice that the coop can buy from the village. Each villager is given an

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[27] Compounded interest will be discussed in Chapter 8.

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individual quota depending on the amount of land under cultivation. Every November, the state, peasants, and national assembly play a game of tug of war to decide the price and amount of rice that the state will purchase from the peasants. Peasants want the state to buy as much as possible. The state wants to buy as little as possible. This state of affairs has tended to impoverish the indebted and poor peasant who cannot sell the rice as easily as before. Such peasants can sell only a portion of their harvest to the coop. The remaining rice is sold to urban merchants. The prices set by merchants are not likely to be above the coops' purchase prices in the fall and winter and often tend to be lower.

Due to the high production cost of rice in Korea, the Korean state cannot export rice. This year a 80 kilograms sack of Korean rice is $126 compared with the international commodity market price of $32. To make things worse, Koreans are not eating rice as much as in the past. Per capita rice consumption in 1984 was 130 kilograms compared with 122 kilograms in 1988. The rice surplus in the state storehouses is estimated at 12.2 million 80 kilograms sacks (Nongchuksan Jongbo 1989). Wheat has become the major substitute for rice. People eat more bread and noodles made of wheat, which is imported from the U.S.

The introduction of chemicals, seed beds, and better farming methods has contributed to a higher yield per hectare. In 1970 Korea produced 27,356,000 sacks of rice from 1,203,000 hectares, while in 1988 42,038,000 sacks were produced from 1,260,000 hectares. Agricultural land increased 0.05% while production increased 53.6% (Seoul Kyŏngje Shinmun 1989 9-17). Increasing production, production costs and decreasing consumption of rice have generated a dilemma for the Korean state and the peasants in general. Such overall changes have created constraints on the Oak Tree and Pine Tree

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villagers as well. In general, in a declining peasant economy, the poor and the very poor suffer the most.

H. Barley

Barley is the second most important grain crop in the peasant economy. Some requirements must be met to grow barley. First, soil must be porous and dry. Barley seeds are sown in November. If the soil is wet, it will freeze and the barley seeds will die.

The new aqueduct from the Hwasong reservoir and the inexpensive water pump altered the value of land. These days, people prefer dry soil paddy because the land can be used for mixed cropping of rice and barley. Access to water will not be as serious a problem as in the past. Completion of the new aqueduct will solve the drought problem next year (1990). Second, barley growers require labor. Villagers need a large amount of labor for the June barley harvest and for preparations necessary for the June planting of rice seedlings. No one lives solely on barley which is considered to be a supplementary source of income. Therefore, barley growers must ensure that barley cultivation does not interfere with rice cultivation. If harvesting and drying barley impede preparations for rice planting, barley cultivation will stop. If the proper soil conditions and labor supply are met, barley cultivation is possible.

In November, when the fields are cleared following the rice harvest, people burn the rice straw to make an ash fertilizer for the soil. They also mix rice chaff with cow and pig manure and use it as fertilizer. After that they plough the field, making 70 centimeters wide furrows. Then they sow seeds along with a herbicide. After a few days, they use one sack of compound

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fertilizer per 0.07 hectares and in the spring they add one and half sacks of urea fertilizer.

In the past, villagers sowed barley seeds by hand. In November 1989, a seed sowing machine was introduced by the Yongsan township cooperative. The machine was a part of the state's mechanization project. People still have not decided whether they should purchase or hire the use of the machine or continue in the old way. It costs two dollars and 80 cents to sow 0.07 hectares with barley seeds by machine.

A great advantage of barley growing is that pesticide and insecticide are not required. People believe that barley seeds become stronger during the cold winter and are able to overcome all insects and pests. Ploughing, fertilizing, sowing, harvesting, and drying are the tasks required. Nor does barley use as much water as rice, mitigating the continuous construction and repair of irrigation facilities.

Exemption from insecticide, pesticide use, and irrigation makes barley cultivation considerably easier and less expensive than rice cultivation. As a villager said, "barley grows by itself." The biggest difficulty in barley cultivation is the shortage of labor in the peak season. In Pine Tree, people cut barley in the first and second week of June and plant rice seedlings in the third week of the same month. The combined tasks create a heavy workload. People have to cut barley, bind rice seedlings, plough, furrow, irrigate, and prepare seed beds. June is the hardest season for double cropping peasants.

Cutting barley is very onerous work. People have to wear long sleeve shirts to protect their skin from barley thorns.[28] The blistering heat and long sleeve shirt makes the work very uncomfortable and painful. It is easy for

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[28] I had skin eruptions after harvesting barley in a sleeveless shirt.

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harvesters to "eat heat"[29] It is difficult to use a combine to harvest barley. Barley easily becomes stuck in the machine and machine owners do not want to risk damaging their expensive equipment ($14,000 worth). Barley must be dried in order to be graded better quality by coop officials.

Fortunately, the barley harvest pays off. Compared to rice paddy, barley brings a solid net profit to harvesters. The net profit for 0.07 hectares is $183. (See Appendix C for the calculation of cost and proft of barley production)

Labor input for barley cultivation is almost negligible when compared to rice cultivation. People plough, sow, and fertilize for three weeks in November, fertilize once again in the spring for one week, harvest for a week, and dry for one or two weeks. Barley growing requires wage labor only during the harvest season. The field is not watered. Pine Tree villagers all know that barley cultivation is more cost efficient, and has less labor requirements than rice production in addition to solid income gained at the fall harvest. However, the labor shortage in June is an obstacle to growing barley and the majority of Pine Tree villagers do not grow it.

There are nine people who cultivate barley. Palyong produced 41 sacks, Homang, 25 sacks, Kisun, 30 sacks, Chinyon, 31 sacks, Hwahong, 24 sacks, Kisang, 22 sacks, Kihwan, 50 sacks, Hyongsu, 31, Hwanggu, 85, and Sokyong, 40 sacks. The first seven people are landless or have tiny lots. They are tenant farmers seeking to maximize their production from the land they tenant. As tenants, they are entitled to keep all the barley harvest, paying for rent with a portion of rice harvest. Before the 1950s, many tenants worked the landlord's fields under the condition that they gave the entire rice harvest to the landlord as rent and allowed them to take the barley produce for

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[29] Disease associated with working to exhaustion under the hot sun. The symptoms of disease are difficulty in breathing and sleeping, loss of appetite, and dizziness.

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themselves. The tenants' possession of the entire barley harvest has been a long standing tradition. As rural population decreased, tenancy conditions improved in favor of the tenants. The tenants possession of the barley harvest and a portion of the rice harvest represents an improvement over former conditions. This tenancy problem will be discussed in Chapter 10.

Most of the tenants who grow barley cannot afford to let their paddy fields lie fallow from November to June. As long as land is cultivable for barley and labor is available they grow barley. Two of the nine barley growers have about one and half hectares and raise pigs and cattle. They are wealthy by Pine Tree standards. Hwanggu has 50 ume trees in the mountain; he also runs a barber shop in Oak Tree and earns cash by using his machines to plough and harvest other people's farms. Finally he raises 12 pigs. Sokyong also has machines and enough labor. He is known as an "uncastrated bull" [very strong and energetic man whether in sex or in agriculture].

All barley growers have in common their intention to maximize profit from a given amount of land. But the same motives are based on different economic standings and needs. The first eight have fewer alternatives than Hwanggu and Sokyong. They are desperate to earn cash by any means. Barley is one of the limited means available to them. Hwanggu and Sokyong can make a decent living without growing barley. They want to earn extra cash by labor and machines. It is not a desperate survival need but the desire to earn more cash which drive them to grow barley.

Barley helps growers to absorb the continuous impact of indebtedness. The cash earned from barley is particularly precious because it arrives in June when growers must purchase chemicals and farming tools. People who cannot afford to grow barley due to their old age and difficulty in acquiring laborers do not enjoy the benefit of a barley harvest.

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I. Labor

Labor cooperation is absolutely necessary for farm production, barn construction, machine operation, cow husbanding and many other productive and ritual activities. Maintaining labor relationships is vitally important for village social reproduction. Using non-village workers is much more costly than organizing villagers' labor. Villagers can also develop and maintain their relationships by working together.

Rice cultivation requires intensive labor cooperation. The villagers' reciprocal collective labor is called pumashi, which is used in production and rituals. During the busy seasons of transplanting and harvesting, adults from each household form a group to perform a task. Each pumashi team has from three to 10 members and is usually organized for full year. A group finishes a member's work (eg. transplanting) and then goes on to another member's field. A work cycle is finished, theoretically, when all the members' work is finished. However, pumashi is an unending cycle. Members continuously help each other and they also receive help from others. In pumashi, one kind of work can substitute for a different kind of work. For example, agricultural labor can be exchanged for ritual labor; plucking potatoes can be compensated for by making pan cake (puchinkye) in a wedding ceremony.

Not all villagers can be members. In order to organize a pumashi team, members must have similar labor characteristics and capacities. First of all, members must be similar in age. If some one is too old or too young, the person is not welcome on the team. 71 year old Kapyol in Oak Tree said "it is difficult to ask people to work for me. When I beg young people and they refuse, my neck gets stiff." Another criterion is skill in farming and other

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productive activities. Hwangi in Pine Tree left the village 11 years ago. He worked in the Samyang food company in Chŏnju. He said that the reason for moving to Chŏnju was to benefit his son's education. His son was a high school student in Chŏnju at the time. Hwangi could earn cash and his wife could cook for his son. When he returned, he was not invited to be in any pumashi group. Finally, it was Yongsu, his third cousin who accepted him as part of his pumashi team.

Kihwan's wife said "because my tongsŏ (brother-in-law's wife) does not know farming, I have to help her." Her first tongsŏ died two years ago and her second tongsŏ married last year. Her relationships with these in-laws is created through her relationships with her husband and his brother. If her tongsŏ is separated from her husband by the latter's death or divorce, the tongsŏ relationship ceases to exist.

As machinery began to replace human labor, wealthy people hired machine owners to work their farms. Soon after, the kinds and amounts of work done through collective labor have been reduced to a large degree. As the number of people available to organize a team has been reduced, the pumashi unit gradually has become nucleated and kinship became a central criterion for forming a pumashi team. Some villagers have no choice but to hire wage laborers or machine operators from Yongsan township. They also make contracts with people who have machines to work their farms for a fixed fee. The villagers who are most seriously affected by the introduction of machinery are old people who used to work on a pumashi team and were increasingly dropped from these teams. The elderly usually have no close kinsmen. As the labor demand decreased, such people are the first to be excluded from pumashi. The relationship of kinship to labor organization

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can be demonstrated by examining pumashi team members and how they are related. Below are four cases of pumashi teams.

Fig.18--The composition of four exemplary pumashi groups.

Pumashi case 1	Hibyon, Chisam (Hibyon's brother-in-law), Nayong (older brother of Chisam, sixth collateral distance), Hayong (Nayong's older brother), and their wives
Pumashi case 2	Kihwan, yonggi (Kihwan's son), Suhwan (Kihwan's younger brother), Sangsa (Kihwan's son-in-law), and their wives
Pumashi case 3	Yongsu, Hyongsu (Yongsu's younger brother), Kihwan (sadon of Yongsu, and Sokyong (Yongsu's nephew, 12 collateral disgtance)
Pumashi case 4	Sunsin, Palyong (Kimbo's younger brother), Chiyong (Palyong's yonger brother), Yongsan (Chiyong's father-in-law)

Note: Sadon is the relationship between two sets of consanguineal kinsmen of husband and wife.

The memberships of the four teams are not mutually exclusive. Some members belong to other teams as well. For example, Kihwan belongs to the second and third team as shown in Figure 19. The second team members are consanguineal kinsmen and the third team members are inchŏk (kin relationships by marriage) to Kihwan. There are some non-kinsmen on the team, for example, Yi Chesu whose only kinsmen is Hera who is Chesu's cousin's wife. Yi, a friend of Chiyong, joined Sunsin's team. Friendship is another basis used by people to join a team. Reciprocal labor cooperation among the closest kinsmen reinforces weak or almost non-functioning kinship ties. Overall, kinship is the strongest factor in organizing pumashi. Reciprocal labor cooperation and kinship ties reinforce each other. Kinship would be less meaningful if it were not for labor reciprocity.

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Interestingly, wage laborers are sometimes included in the collective labor of pumashi. They are either kinsmen or non-kinsmen of the group. If they are kinsmen they are likely to be very poor. Instead of receiving labor they are paid. These wage laborers, Hera, Unsu, Sungin, Hoban, have one thing in common. They are landless and do not have much tenanted land. They are paid $7 for 12 hours work from seven o'clock in the morning to seven o'clock at night).

A review of an actual scene of labor cooperation in planting rice seedlings reveals tension and domination among employer and wage laborer and pumashi members in the labor process. Kisang, his wife, Kisun's wife (Kisun's mother's sister's husband is Sikchon), Sikchon's wife (Sikchon is Kisang's brother) and Chŏn Sura (a Pine Tree villager who is purely a wage laborer) were planting rice seedlings in Kisang's field. They used a string to make it easy to plant seedlings in a straight line. The thread was attached to two poles stretched over the field with two people manipulating the poles at each end. When they finished planting a line of seedlings, the two people on either end of the line pull up the poles and drive them into the ground about 15 centimeters ahead to plant another row.

Kisang had had a spine operation three years ago. He could not work very well and could do only relatively easy tasks. He sat at the end of the string and delivered bundles of seedlings to the people but did not participate in planting them. His wife worked at the other end of the string. Kisang and his wife decided when to pull up the poles and move them forward. In rice planting, the people in charge of the poles can control the rhythm of work. People working between the ends have to finish no later than the two people at either end. Chŏn Sura, a wage laborer, worked next to Kisang. It was easy for Kisang to watch Chŏn. Out of a handful of seedlings, people take about

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five stems and plant them in the soil. Once in a while weeds that look similar to rice seedlings are included in the bunch. If weeds are planted together with the rice seedlings, it will hinder the growth of the rice plants. Chŏn's closeness to Kisang enabled the latter to watch the former. One time Kisang said to Chŏn: "Ui (Hey) you just planted a stem of weed together with those rice seedlings." Chŏn pulled out the weed without saying a word. Wage workers are more carefully supervised than pumashi members. Once wage laborers receive a remuneration, their obligation is ended. In hiring wage laborers for transplanting, owners are careful to determine whether the laborers are conscientious in removing weeds from the bunch or not. On the other hand, pumashi members are continuously responsible and obligated to each other. They all know that they receive what they give.


A noteworthy factor in pumashi is that when members are close kinsmen the suspension period between the giving of labor and the receiving of labor in return can be longer than that between non-kinsmen or distant kinsmen (see Leach 1961, Bloch 1975). If people do not participate in cutting their kinsmen's barley in June, they will cut the kinsmen's rice in November. This kind of labor exchange is likely to be made among siblings and between parents and children. Suhwan worked in his brother Kihwan's barley cutting but did not expect to receive any labor, or money from him. Receiving payment in either labor or money was suspended for nearly five months.

Muyong's wife (Muyong died of stomach cancer seven years ago) gave seven dollars to Hayong's wife when the former could not pay back the labor incurred through pumashi. Muyong and Hayong are cousins and share the same grandfather and were very close when Muyong was alive. If Muyong were still alive, Muyong's wife would not have paid cash to Hayong wife. As they say "one leg is 10,000 li" (li is an unit of distance, 10 li equals four

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kilometers). Here leg symbolizes the collateral distance between kinsmen. The diagram below shows degrees of closeness. As "legs" increase from ego, the suspension period of receiving and paying labor becomes shorter. If the suspension period is expected to be intolerably long, cash must be paid. When kinsmen are few and surrounding environments are hostile, the distant legs are felt to be close--as close as the legs of those who have a great number of kinsmen and a less hostile environment. Correspondingly, the suspension period of give and take is longer.

Fig. 19-- A schematized diagram to show the "legs" (collateral kinship distance) from ego



The Songhyon Kim lineage do not have as clear a genealogical linkage as the Umin Kim lineage as shown in the Chapter 4. The Songhyon Kim have large collateral gaps between each other and the genealogical linkage is unclear. However, their labor reciprocity practices and suspension period

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between give and take are similar to the Umin close kinsmen. As we have seen, the Songhyon Kim must coexist with the potentially hostile lineage group of the Umin Kim.

Pumashi is not always peaceful and cooperative. When members have very different amounts of land, it is difficult to equalize the give and take of labor. A person with a smaller lot of land will work more than the larger land holder and in this disparity lay the seed of potential conflict. Another problem is the type of work that members have to perform for other members. Most people are reluctant to spray pesticide for others. Spraying pesticide is considered an undesirable task by everyone since its harmful effects are known through experience. Almost all the villagers have had experiences of being dizzy and nauseous after spraying pesticides. Spraying pesticides is unlikely to be exchanged for other kinds of work. Only closely related lineal kinsmen are likely to do pesticide work in pumashi .

People with few close kinsmen or friends cannot easily form pumashi teams large enough for their needs and resort to hiring wage laborers. For example, my key informant, Chiju, was in this condition. Chiju needed to cut grass on the bank of the reservoir for cow fodder. He called his friend (they are primary school alumni) and his wife's maternal aunt's husband in Taejong village, which is a 15 minutes walk from Taejong to Pine Tree. Chiju also called Yolhan who is his tenant and hanassi (grand father). Chiju and Yolhan share the same ancestor, ten generations above Yolhan. Each time when Chiju needs labor, he has some difficulty in figuring out whom he can hire as a wage laborer. Pine Tree is relatively isolated so that villagers have difficulty in getting outside wage labor.

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J. Machinery

The introduction of machinery, pesticides, insecticides, and other chemicals has had a great impact on the labor process in Pine Tree and Oak Tree. Farming involves a constant battle against weeds and pests. The use of herbicides and pesticides has obviated the onerous labor requirement necessary to weed and kill pests. Machinery also has made farming easier and decreased farm labor requirements. A transplanter or combine replaces the labor of about 10-20 persons. In terms of cost, hiring a machine operator is much cheaper than employing wage laborers. It costs $14 won to hire two wage laborers for two days to plant seedlings on 0.07 hectares. If they contract a transplanter owner to do it, the job can be done in half a day and the cost is seven dollars. As machines have been introduced a new type of wage and contract laborer was created. They are the machine owners who use their machines to farm others' land for remuneration. All machine owners also use their machines for their own farms and tenanted land.

When a cow was the major labor supplier, a person who borrowed a neighbor's cow to plough the land worked all day for the lender in return. The borrower also cut grass and brought it to the cow's owner. It was an exchange involving the borrower's labor and the cow's labor and cash was not involved. People's and cow's labor have been replaced by machinery and grass replaced by cash payments. Most Pine Tree villagers prefer the use of machinery to their own labor as well as to wage laborers who work with their bare hands. They acknowledge the convenience and benefits of using machines and now they are willing to pay cash for the services machines can render.

Pine Tree villagers agree that using a transplanter will not make the stem of rice as strong as when hand planted. Transplanters cannot precisely

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control the number of stems to be planted or make the lines of seedlings as straight as when the planting is done by hand. However, these shortcomings of the machine are overshadowed by the speed, low cost, and efficiency. Transplanters, motor tillers, combines, and tractors are the machines most widely used. Machines are prohibitively expensive. For example, the common ten horse power motor tiller sells for $1,680. A 22 horse power tractor costs $12,040 and a 35 horse power one goes for $18,200. The price for a combine ranges from $9,100 to $12,040 in 1989.

A motor tiller can plough about 0.7 hectares of land per day. A cow can plough 0.21-0.28 hectares a day. In a day, one person can plant seedlings covering 0.035 hectares while a person with a transplanter can plant about one hectare. A person can cut 0.049 hectares of rice stems per day while a combine can cut one and half hectares of rice stems in the same time. These figures are based on Pine Tree's hilly landscape. Farm machines work best on large plots of flatland like that found in Oak Tree.

There are some restrictions in Pine Tree for the effective use of machinery. About 30 percent of the land is located on hillsides and it is difficult for machines to reach the area and maneuver on the hillside fields. Human hands and cows must be used for such fields. People also must use hands to plant seedlings along the four margins and corners of the paddy field. Transplanters are useless on these marginal areas and since every inch of land is utilized, hand labor is still necessary. So, the hilly landscape of Pine Tree still necessitates the use of cows, pumashi, and wage laborers. However, the need for large pumashi groups and wage labor has been considerably reduced. Five pure wage laborers in Pine Tree have been hit very hard by the shrinking labor demand. So far wage laborers have worked dry fields, paddy

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field, ritual work for households and cutting grass on the ridges or banks for fodder--work that can not be replaced by machines.

In the early 1980's the state implemented the "machine operated agricultural farming complex plan" throughout rural Korea. The state paid 50 percent of the cost of the machines, ten percent was paid by the persons receiving the machines and the remaining 40 percent of the price was made into a loan at eight percent interest per annum to one or two people in the village. The persons selected to receive the machines were relatively young people between the 28 and 35 years of age. One combine and one transplanter were purchased in this way in Pine Tree. These machines are used to work about half of the land in Pine Tree.

In Oak Tree, villagers decided that 11 people would collectively buy a tractor and a transplanter. They all felt the labor shortage. Soon a conflict broke out. The 11 people began to fight over who could use the machines first, how long they could use them, and who would repair and maintain them. The initial plan was shattered. A few weeks later, Sokchen bought the combine and Yunnan bought the transplanter with a loan from the cooperative.

In Pine Tree, Namgu, Sujae, Hwanggu, and Samgu competed to receive machinery funds allocated to the village. Villagers decided that Namgu would get a transplanter and Hwanggu, a power tiller. Namgu is a Umin Kim and Hwanggu a Songhyon Kim and so both the Umin and Songhyon Kim received an equal share. It was the surest way not to disrupt the village over the funds. Namgu told me:

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> I bought a tractor with my own money. I can use my tractor any way I want.[30] People think that I am making a lot of money from the machinery. But that is not so. They do not know what the depreciation cost is. Pine Tree land is too hilly and too small to use the machine effectively. If I spend the same amount of time in other places as I do here, I can work more land and earn more money. When people here ask me to work for their land I cannot refuse. If I do they will say I am a money worm.

Machine owners in both villages are reluctant to use the machines in their village even though they have done it so far. If they charge the same price to their fellow villagers as they do to other villagers, they are called a "money worm". The machine owners complained "in order to make small money, big money will be spent repairing the machine." One day Namgu worked with his motor tiller to plough Chiju's land. The land was so stony that the blades broke. Repairing the blade cost Namgu $140 and he could not ask Chiju to compensate him for the repairs made. The machine owners cannot make a satisfactory deal with the villagers, especially with kinsmen. Namgu and Samgu, the major machine owners, "hate" to use their machines for their kinsmen. Yet they do so because of kinship obligation. Namgu said that asking remuneration for labor and extra expenses from non-kinsmen would be much easier than from kinsmen. Namgu prefers to do machine work with the Songhyon Kim over the Umin Kim.

Yi Hosan in Oak Tree thinks that using machines makes people fall easily into debt. In fact, machine owners are heavily indebted to the coop. Their debt is well over $14,000, which is three times higher than the average villager. The machine operators are relatively wealthy people who have enough collateral to qualify to receive large "collateral" or "credit" loans from

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[30] If he bought the tractor with state funds, he would have been more subordinate to the villagers' demand.

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the cooperative without the fear of losing everything. However, Tongho in Oak Tree does not have an estate large enough to prevent future bankruptcy. He resorted to all kinds of methods to borrow about $15,400 to purchase two motor tillers and one tractor. All his property was used as collateral. He and his family depend solely on the machines and if he fails in this endeavor he stands to lose everything.

Machines also can be a safety hazard. Many Oak Tree villagers do not have middle and ring fingers; their fingers were cut off while putting the belt onto the V-shaped pulley of the motor tiller. So far Pine Tree villagers have all their fingers. Also, maintenance methods are not carefully taught or emphasized during the implementation of the machinery plan. The machines are not maintained and easily break down. This is why people say that machine buyers must earn the amount of money they paid for the machine in order to cover the purchase price within two or three years. Within a few years, a brand new machine can become a trouble causing piece of junk. Machine owners use the machines to their maximum capabilities and then replace them with brand new ones a year later. When they buy new machines, they usually sell the old machines to machine retailers or used farm machinery shop owners in the towns and cities.

Operating agricultural machines is one of the factors allowing younger people to stay in the rural areas. When Namgu works for Pine Tree villagers with his transplanter he always asks Samgu (hyŏng) about the price. Samgu is the first person who owned a machine. Namgu can decide the price by himself, but he will not. He visited Samgu, fulfilling kinship obligations. Namgu found it unexpectedly difficult to work with machines for people in neighboring villages and towns. When he wanted to find a customer in Pian town, he found out that machine operators in the nearby area surrounding

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Pian town had organized a cartel, and prohibited outsiders from making deals with the people in that area. Namgu also got into a feud with a machine operator in Changsung village, which is a 20-25 minutes walk from Pine Tree. Namgu offered his labor using a one dollar and 40 cents discount that undercut the Changsung operator's fee and landed a job offered in the Changsung area. The machine owner in Changsung was annoyed that his fellow villagers were taken in by Namgu's competitive fee. As more and more people buy machines, feuds over fees and territory will be inevitable. Some people in other areas attract customers by lowering the fees of machine work. The increasing number of machines in a given area will cause trouble, particularly among and between the machine owners and their kinsmen.

K. Dairly cattle

The Pine Tree villagers have been raising Korean domestic cows since they settled there several hundred years ago. Currently, in Pine Tree Village, eleven people use Korean cows to plough their fields and carry things. Even though machinery has been introduced, people still need cows to plough fields on the mountain slopes where tractors and other machines cannot easily be used. Besides using cows as draught animals, having one or two cows helped villagers cope with unexpected financial burdens in the days past. Before 1972, a cow was worth 0.3 hectares of paddy. [The majigi which is equal to 0.07 hectares has relatively stable value in the countryside. It is used to estimate the value of livestock and other things.] Now, the price of cattle has been reduced by the increase in cattle population due to improved husbandry methods and the importation of cattle from the U.S and Australia. Nowadays, cows cannot be a source of financial security as in past times, since the price of a cow is equal to one majigi (0.07 hectares) or less of paddy land.

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Before the 1970's, parents were able to sell their cow and use the money to pay for their children's marriage These days, people have to sell at least four cows to pay for a marriage. As the use and price value of Korean cows dropped, some people bought farm machinery to replace the cow's draught power and sold their cows to purchase dairy cattle.

Cattle raisers in Pine Tree do not let cows graze on grass. If they want to feed their cows with fresh grass, people cut it for them. However the portion of natural grass in a cow's diet is very low compared with the packaged fodder purchased from the coop. This was the major difference with the English situation before the industrial revolution when "sheep ate people." Animals used by the Korean peasantry are usually kept in the barn. Animal raising does not infringe on paddy land or dry land in Pine Tree.

Dairy cattle supply raisers with a steady monthly income; though dairy products are not part of their diet. The dairy farmers deliver milk everyday at 10:00 a.m. to the Tori cheese company's pick-up truck. At the end of the month, they are paid in cash for their deliveries. Dairy farmers are not like paddy growing peasants who have to wait for a year to get returns on their investment. They are similar to self-employed businessmen. As long as the cows are healthy enough to produce milk and the Tori cheese company pays the dairy farmers on time, this productive activity is not affected by other factors such as the fluctuating prices of the cattle market, which beef cattle owners are more vulnerable. They do not depend on cow sales but on milk. The price of milk has been relatively stable unlike the fluctuating price of beef. If people raise beef cattle, they are affected by changing meat prices on the Korean meat market and by the government's import of meat from the U.S. and Australia. Since a large amount of different kinds of agricultural commodities have been imported from U.S due to the U.S government's

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pressure to follow its open trade policy, there are not many agricultural crops that guarantee a stable peasant income. Although powdered milk and other dairy products have been imported, so far fresh milk has not, a decision that has had a formidable impact on the Korean dairy farming in general.

Tori county has been exceptional in the demand and supply of milk. The Tori cheese factory was established by a Belgian Catholic priest in 1967. His aim was to help Tori county peasants earn more cash by encouraging them to raise antelope and dairy cattle. The company gradually has grown with total assets amounting to about three million dollars in 1989. The Tori Cheese Company is an intermediate size joint company. All the dairy cattle, farmers numbering 100 in 1988, are stockholders and they run the company. Besides the farmers, there are 12 employees and 500 milk cows. The Tori Cheese Company is the oldest and best known dairy product company in Korea and is noted for its quality products. According to its membership rules and obligations, members must participate in monthly meetings to discuss business procedures, supply more than 15 tons of milk annually, and invest more than seven dollars in the company's stock. Members may be disqualified if they stop supplying milk for more than three months. The advantages of membership include receiving the monetary value of one sack rice for marriage, 60th birthdays, and for funerals. A dividend is given to members depending on their supply of milk and amount of stock ownership. Until recently the company has not had serious problems in buying milk from the milk suppliers. The recent problems will be discussed in Chapter 9.

Due to the Tori cheese company, Tori county people can safely invest in dairy farming, avoiding the serious risks that cattle raisers have faced in other areas more subject to milk glut and falling prices. In such areas, farmers either have not been paid by the milk companies or they have not been

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allowed to sell their milk. Only when there are shortages are there exceptions to this rule. Raising dairy cattle is still one of the few productive activities in that Pine Tree villagers can safely engage.

Holstein milk cows and Korean cows belong to different breeds and the labor process for each and its impact on the community are quite different. Korean cows are not fed packaged fodder and are used for agricultural production not for milk. Traditionally, they are fed grass that is cut from the ridges of paddy fields or from the banks of reservoirs. The grass does not cost much; the main costs consisted of the labor and time to harvest it. Korean cows require human labor to raise them.

Dairy cattle require a different production and labor process. Raising dairy cattle requires know-how, experience, and hard work. My key informant Chiju gives packaged corn feed, water, chopped corn, straw, and grass in the morning, afternoon, and evening. He milks his cows at 5:30 a.m. in the morning and at 6:30 p.m. in the evening. Summer is the painful season for Holsteins and owners alike. The Holstein is adapted to cold weather but not to the humid, hot summer in Korea and milk production is reduced considerably in the summer. Holsteins are easily stressed by mosquitos, flies, humidity, and heat and cattle owners must set a fire in the barn in order to fill it with smoke to get rid of the swarms of insects. Hayong installed three fans for his seven cows.

Milk cows must be fed as much as possible to produce abundant milk. When cows have diarrhea, it is not because they have eaten too much but because the fodder is of poor quality. If cows eat less than normal, they develop some disease. Raisers inject catosal, a vitamin and calcium liquid, into the neck and side of cows when they are sick. In the summer, a cow produces about 10-15 percent less milk than normal. Dairy farmers consider

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five things necessary to keep cows healthy in the summer: 1) the barn must have a constant flow of fresh air; 2) salt and water must be available all the time; 3) they should provide shade for cows to protect them from the hot afternoon sun; 4) the barn must be kept clean in order to keep insects from accumulating; and 5) cows must be fed in the cool of the morning and again in the evening in order to increase the fodder intake and milk production (Tori cheese coop leaflet 5-24 1989).

Cows usually produce about 20 kilograms of milk daily. A pregnant cow has a two month period of "drying milk" immediately before delivery. During this period cows supply milk to the calf in the womb. A cow is not milked for 60 days during the year. Therefore, she produces milk for 305 days. Milk products from each cow can yield about seven dollars daily profit without considering the owner's labor. Average produce per cow in Pine Tree is 20 liters. (See appendix E for the calculation of cost and profit of dairy farming.)

After nine months of a cow's pregnancy, the owner must check her genital for several days around o'clock, getting his spouse and children to help him. When a spurt of water issues from the cow's womb, whoever is watching screams "it is exploded". The spurting water signals that a calf is about to be delivered. Then the cow owner calls several villagers, preferably cow raisers. When a calf is about to be delivered, the owner must put his hand in birth canal to figure out how the calf is positioned, for if it is positioned on the side or under, the calf must not be pulled out. A Korean cow can deliver her calf by herself but Holstein dairy cattle must be helped in the delivery. It requires a particular skill to tie a rope around the ankle of the calf in the womb and once it is tied, at least four people must pull on the rope from below. If it is pulled to the side or up, the cow's genital will rip and her

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value be reduced. Owners must be careful about both calves and cows. If the calf does not come out on time, there is a high probability that both will die.

It is noteworthy to examine an actual calf delivery because it affords a look at an implicit dynamic of domination, reciprocity, and kinship. On the 25th day of April, Chiju received a call from Hayong at 11 o'clock at night. Hayong's cow was about to deliver a calf. Chiju asked me to join him. Samgu [Nayong's nephew], Hibyon [Hayong's younger cousin's older sister's husband], Kuin [son of Hayong], Puin [son of Hayong] and Hayong's wife were there. Chiju put his hand inside the birth canal to determine the position of the calf. He said "it is not handicapped but it will be difficult because of a small vagina".

Hayong and Chiju were barely able to extract the calf's two feet. Chiju tied a rope around calf's ankles and made two ends that people could hold on to for pulling. While they were pulling, the rope broke. Puin brought another rope. About 10 minutes passed. A calf must be pulled out as quickly as possible so that it can breathe, otherwise, it can suffocate to death in the mother's womb. Hayong looked pale. After five more minutes of hard work, the calf came out but it was not breathing. Hayong despaired and believed it was dead; Chiju performed mouth to mouth resuscitation. Three minutes later, the calf started to breathe. Hayong and his wife looked relieved. Chiju injected calcium and vitamins into the cow's neck. In the process, Hayong was totally subordinate to Chiju, his choka [nephew] [see genealogical chart in Figure 13, 14]. Hayong just did everything he was told to do by Chiju.

Hayong's wife put dry straw in the barn for the calf to rest on. Hayong asked the people to go to his house where they were served drinks and apples. The delivery process showed that a person who has the know-how in a critical production process comes to dominate others. Chiju and Hayong

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have an uneasy relationship for two reasons. Hayong belongs to the Kangho segment which is a derivation of the Sakak segment to which Chiju belongs. There has been a constant rivalry and feuding between the Kangho and Sakak segments as discussed in the Chapter 4. Another reason is that Chiju is an opposition party member and Hayong a governmental party member. Being a government party member is a two edged sword; party members are both dominant figures in local politics and criticized by the villagers. Most people blame the state for their impoverishment and do not like government party members. To be an opposition party member, however, requires great courage. Because of these issues, Hayong and Chiju have a tension filled relationship even though they are aje [uncle] and choka [nephew] to each other. Hayong, however, shows respect to Chiju because Chiju controls Hayong's means of production, dairy cattle through know-how and experience. The tension based on genealogical relations and political affiliations is transformed through the domination of the person who controls the production and exchange process.

Delivering a calf is not like a producing a tire. The villagers' anxiety and desperation about the calf who is dying in the womb is not simply because the owner is losing the value of the calf, $840. Producing a calf for sale includes sympathy toward a living thing. When the calf started to breathe after the desperate effort to save her, Hayong's face was full of joy. All the raisers feel that cows are like their children. When they sold a cow and a space in a barn is empty, they feel as if they lost a child.

Dairy farmers have some unwritten rules: they do not sell cows and calves to fellow villagers. Cows are not like lifeless commodities or pigs but are instead animals that respond to the master's speech and actions. The master develops a relationship with his cows. If a cow is sold to a villager, he

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watches it once in a while and feels deprived. If the cow grows fast and produces lots of milk and delivers a healthy calf yearly, the seller feels jealous and regrets the sale. On the other hand, if the cow dies of disease, the buyer feels cheated. Selling cows with a fatal disease can be either intentional or unintentional, but the buyer does not consider the possibility of seller's innocence. The sale of cows between villagers will cause problems either way.

In 1986, Chiyong sold 13 beef cattle for $1,470 per head. The price he paid was $2,100. Chiyong said that he sold them because he was afraid that the price would keep falling. The 1980's were a terrible period for cattle raisers. The importation of cattle and the monopoly of the market by a few merchants contributed to fluctuating market prices. Chiju could have bought his cows when the price was too attractive to ignore, but he did not. Chiyong is aje to Chiju. The only person who bought two of Chiyong's cows was Samgu who was Chiyong's elder brother's son. The potential trouble caused by the sale could be avoided by following the kinship rules existing between Samgu and Chiyong. The rules thinned between Chiyong and Chiju who share the same ancestor, 12 generations above Chiyong.

Chiju was the first person to work with dairy cattle in Pine Tree. He was asked to leave the village by his father and brothers. He refused. His dream was to have a dairy cattle farm on some green fields and live a bucolic life. He went to an animal husbandry high school in Chŏnju and received a formal education about dairy cattle raising. Raising dairy cattle requires skill and a large amount of capital. The price of a dairy cow was $2,100 and a calf, $840 in 1989. In order for a family with three people to rely on dairy farming the family has to raise at least seven cows. About $9,800 is required as the initial capital investment.

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Chiju bought three calves in 1976 and raised them till he could milk them. A $840 calf eats $700 worth of fodder in 15 months to become a 400 kilograms milk cow. People can save $560 this way. Another advantage is that raisers can learn the character of each cow. This is also a safe way to keep a healthy cow. The disadvantage is that people have to wait about one and half years to milk the cows. They have to make a living without resorting to milk money for one and half years and, therefore, they should have other sources of income or sufficient savings to tide them over until the cow can be milked. Chiju owns 0.42 hectares and managed 0.49 hectares of his brother's land and inherited his father's house and some property and so he did not start from scratch. He was endowed with what his father had accumulated. Chiju's father was not rich when he farmed in Pine Tree. During the Japanese colonial period, he went to Sahkalin to earn cash mining coal. He sent money to his wife in Pine Tree for about seven years. When he returned he had enough money to buy land. Chiju would have been less successful without his father's toil.

Chiju is respected in Yongsan township and coop officials listen to him. When raisers in Yongsan township have problems with their cows, they call Chiju. He is renowned as an industrious young man. He never fed expensive packaged fodder to his cows when he started. He worked all day to cut the grass in the field and mountains. He has accumulated a great deal of practical experience and he knows more about dairy cattle than anybody in the Yongsan township. As Chiju succeeded financially with dairy cattle, people in Pine Tree became anxious to follow his example. Five people received special funds for dairy cattle in 1982. All of them failed within a year and sold their cows immediately, realizing that raising dairy cattle required skill and experience that they did not have. They thought that they could do

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it with only determination but ended up losing some money after selling their cows. One of them complained that Chiju was not very helpful in informing them about husbandry techniques.

For the last several years keeping general information in secret has become unnecessary. The animal husbandry coop and Tori Cheese company instruct raisers about dairy cow husbanding. Knowledge has become more widespread as more people engage in dairying and have greater access to information.

Chiju recently encouraged Pine Tree villagers to raise dairy cattle. He could do this because the milk supply has not been sufficient to meet the Tori cheese company's demand. People started again to raise dairy cattle in the last few years. Now Chiju has 19, Hayong, seven, Samgu, five, Sujae, eight, Kisun, three, Sokyong, four, Manmyong, three, and Tuhwan, three. Besides Chiju, there are three major raisers. All of them took out coop loans to get started and all have enough land and political power. Hayong is the director of NVM. Sujae is a Minjŏng party member. Samgu has brother who works in the township office. In addition to "general loans" with 14 percent interest from the coop each has a special loan with a 5-8 percent interest rate per annum. These villagers have dominated the fund for cattle.

In January 1989, Chiju organized the Sachang hoe [Pine Tree's animal raiser's club]. The purpose is to exchange information and organize demands for loans and facilities from the animal husbandry coop. All the animal raisers joined totaling 22 people. They have a monthly meeting on the last day of every month and each member must contribute one dollar and 40 cents to the Sachang collective account at each meeting. Since Chiju, 31, is too young by local standards to lead he asked Chiyong [his aje, Pyŏngmin party supervisor in Yongsan township] to chair the organization. He appointed

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himself as supervisor. The biggest attraction for joining was the $14,000 state fund being offered without interest for animal husbandry. Chiju has a brother-in-law in the Tori county office who is in charge of the animal husbandry department. His brother-in-law managed to allocate the funds exclusively for Pine Tree Village. The conditions of the loan were favorable and the period of repayment was three years without any interest. Five people of the Sachang received $2,800 each. Since most people knew that the loan was made possible by Chiju's influence, Chiju's position became elevated among the raisers and within the community. Chiju invited many high ranking officials from Pian town and Chŏnju under the auspices of Sachang. However he was later criticized by some people for using Sachang to increase his fame and influence, especially by Sangsa, the village chief who is similar in age and does not like that another young man has emerged as a power broker. I observed on two occasions that Sangsa sabotaged the Sachang meeting by voicing harsh criticism and embarrassing Chiju.

Chiju has 19 cows. He sold one cow and four calves for $8,400 in October. He was paid $1,190-1,400 for his calf and $2,100 for an adult cow. Dairy cattle are very similar to financial capital. If there are more than 15 cows, a good profit can be made. If a raiser does not have debts and has more than 15 cows, he can flexibly adjust the number of cows to his financial capability by selling and buying as needed. Each of Chiju's 19 adult cows can produce one calf each year deducting a few because of miscarriages and still borns. Selling a few cows does not considerably affect the total amount of milk produced daily. He can either sell the calves or raise them to become milk producing cows. He has many options to choose from.

Dairy cattle husbandry has brought to Pine Tree changes in its production processes and associated social relations of production. Dairy

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cattle husbanding has changed the composition of work in the household. Unlike paddy farming, the cattle raisers do not have an off-season in the winter. They have to work with the cows all year around. People must know the characters of cows and the amount of milk that each cow can produce. If people try to milk more than the cow can produce, the cow may get an udder inflammation that blocks the udder and prevents the retrieval of milk. Infected cows cannot produce milk until the owners inject a special needle into the milk channels and perform other medical care which may cost them $14-42. This means owners cannot afford to let other people milk their cows. Besides, the owners sincerely do not want other people to touch this expensive and precious patrimony. Milking and caring for cows are rarely done by neighbors.

Given that the work must be done by family members, the participation of all is necessary: Men usually milk the cows, carry manure to the manure storage, load the 30 kilogram containers of milk onto a motor tiller, drive to the Tori Cheese company's pick-up truck, and cut some grass and feed the cows. Women usually clean the cows with warm water, clean the barn, and carry packaged fodder to the barn. However, there is no clear division of labor by sex; women and children share the different kinds of work required.

Women sometimes have to do all the work when their husbands are away from home for a few days attending rituals and doing business in the cities or towns. It is back breaking work for women. In fact the most noteworthy factor of the labor process in dairy cattle is the intensification of women's labor. Women can get sick depending on how long husbands will be away. On the other hand, women are not allowed to leave home and sleep outside except when visiting their parents' house. Women rarely leave

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home and cannot avoid dairy work. It would not be an exaggerated statement to say that women work 365 days a year. The intensity of labor is higher when a husband is frequently away from home and in this way dairy farming entails an unusual exploitation of women's labor.

Ironically, dairy cattle farmers in Pine Tree are all political party members and affiliated with many organizations. Therefore, they have to attend meetings frequently. Hayong's wife tries not to milk the cows, believing that if she absorbs the burden, he will become lazy and start to drink again. Nevertheless, she sometimes has to do all the required work.

Raisers have formed new relations with paddy growers. The communal cooperation that has been generated by paddy cultivation does not coincide with the family oriented work of dairy farming. Paddy growers and dairy farmers have an ambivalent attitude towards each other. Cow manure has been used for fertilizing paddy fields, and rice straw for fodder, suggesting grounds for mutual assistance. However, dairy farming has brought problems to the majority of paddy growers who are jealous about this easy way of earning cash. Chiju had to keep the door closed to watch TV in the day time after finishing milking and feeding cows in June. He did not want to be seen watching T.V by the villagers who had to plant rice seedlings under the hot sun. When he went fishing at the reservoir, he hid his fishing poles in the motor tiller so as not to be seen by the people planting seedlings in the field. A village woman said to me sighing "what will he [Chiju] do with all that milk money?"

In the communal construction of a cement road in August 1989, three people were absent from work. They were all cattle raisers. Even if they sometimes participate in such projects, they have to keep worrying over their cows and leave the work party to feed or milk them. Although paddy

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farming is still the dominant form of production, three people who had milk cows in 1989 plus four others will start dairy farming at the end of 1990. The coexistence of dairy cattle husbandry and paddy production has already created a social scene of great complexity, which can be expected to intensify.

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Chapter 6. Consumption

Production, credit, and kinship hinge on consumption. Consumption is like a motor in a car, it drives the whole system. Peasant household economy and kin relationships find a common denominator -- the problems of consumption. When consumption exceeds income, people start to get involved in some kind of credit as well as kinship network. This chapter examines the following questions in the village context: What motivates people to consume? How does consumption affect the overall household economy? How do people consume?

A. Theoretical framework of consumption

Social scientists (Appadurai 1986, Bourdieu 1984, Douglas 1982, Orlove 1989, Mintz 1985) have recently paid attention to the meanings and roles of consumption and we now have a better understanding of the topic. We have learned that consumption is not just a passive counterpart of production but an active process affecting production and social structure. Anthropological research on consumption must start with the fact that consuming things is not an individual act but a social one. Seemingly autonomous individual desires for goods and the manner to consume them are socially and culturally structured. Consumption is not so much a psychological or physical satisfaction as the consumers' participation in the social organization. The concept of consumption must not be reduced to the semantic meaning of destruction or eating away. More importantly, consumption creates meanings and fulfills social expectations. Bourdieu (1984: 6) brilliantly suggests the cultural aspects of consumption:

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> Taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier. Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinction they make, between the beautiful and ugly, the distinguished and vulgar, in which their position in the objective classifications is expressed or betrayed... The science of taste and of cultural consumption begins with a transgression that is in no way aesthetic: it has to abolish the sacred frontier which makes legitimate culture a separate universe, in order to discover the intelligible relations which unite apparently incommensurable 'choice', such as preference in music and food, painting and sport, literature and hairstyle. This barbarous reintegration of aesthetic consumption into the world of ordinary consumption abolishes the opposition, which has been the basis of high aesthetics since Kant, between the 'taste of sense' and the 'taste of reflection', and between facile pleasure, pleasure reduced to a pleasure of the senses, and pure pleasure, pleasure purified of pleasure, which is predisposed to become a symbol of moral excellence and a measure of the capacity for sublimation which defines the truly human man.

Bourdieu's path breaking ideas can be summarized by considering that taste, desire, fashion, and luxury are created in the legitimation process of class distinction. They are not innocent concepts and acts. They are socially manipulated and aid in the social orientation of the mass towards the domination by the wealthy and powerful. People keep chasing the ever changing fashion and taste.

> The correspondence which is thereby objectively established between the classes of products and the classes of consumers is realized in acts of consumption only through the mediation of that sense of the homology between goods and groups which defines tastes. Choosing according to one's own taste is a matter of identifying goods that are objectively attuned to one's position and which go together because they are situated in roughly equivalent positions in their respective spaces (ibid: 232).

Therefore, "consumption involves the incorporation of the consumed items into the personal and social identity of the consumer" (Gell: 112). Appadurai in a similar vein discusses luxury.

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> I propose that we regard luxury goods not so much in contrast to necessities (a contrast filled with problems), but as goods whose principle use is rhetorical and social, goods that are simply principal incarnated signs. The necessity to which they respond is fundamentally political (ibid: 38).

Taste making mechanisms cannot be confined to the geographic and social boundaries of the small village. Purchases of Swiss watches as a necessary item in gift giving involved in wealthy people's marriages and the increasing consumption of Coca-Cola cannot be explained by simple ethnographic accounts of Pine Tree and Oak Tree village. The creation of such taste and consumption patterns involve a much broader social context of the national and international commodity market, which is well beyond my research setting. However, what I could observe in the villages was one of the channels by which capitalist goods have permeated the countryside and peasantry. Mass media, especially television, have contributed to the development of new tastes by the villagers. Advertisement on TV appears to be the most powerful mechanism by which urban based "taste-makers" transfer their ideology of consumer goods to the peasantry.

During the last 10 years, most villagers have purchased color TVs. Before the 1960 's, the Pine Tree villagers had one black and white TV owned by Hyunmun. Now, 42 households have a color TV and four have black and white ones. People watch about one or two hours of TV per night. Even though it was impossible to measure how much impact TV broadcasting has on the villagers' purchase and consumption of goods, TV undoubtedly has played a key role in stimulating the formation of new tastes.

I shall divide consumption in the villages into two types, conspicuous consumption of rituals and more intimate consumption in the domestic

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domain. It is important to note that capitalism is not just a politico-economic system but also a broader culture making system. Among other things, capitalism has brought mass produced commodities into an incompletely developed capitalist social system, commodities that have become a vital part of how people reproduce themselves.

B. General discussion on ritual consumption

Ritual is the most conspicuous form of communal consumption. It has additional aspects connected to the domestic mode of consumption. The most important aspect of ritual is the paradoxical, dual functions of integration and disintegration between the host and guests. Ritual performers connect people of similar and hopefully higher class and simultaneously distinguish these people from the lower class. Performing rituals such as hwangap (60th birthday) and wedding feasts disguise an ulterior motive of increasing "credit worthiness" by aiding in the widening social network of the people involved. Wealthy people in other villages were quite often invited to wealthy villagers' feasts in Pine Tree. "Luxury becomes an exhibition of wealth and consequently as a source of credit" (Marx 1976: 741 cited by Bourdieu 1984: 287).

Eating food at a feast has special meaning. When guests participate in a feast, they accept the legitimacy of the feast giver by fulfilling his expectations. Participants must show respect and feel obligated to return a similar feast to the feast giver. If a guest is unable to return the feast, his or her position relative to the feast giver becomes subordinate and submissive. One aspect of subordination is that the guests should supply labor without remuneration. to the feast giver. The feast is mechanism for creating subordination since "a gift which is not matched by a counter-gift creates a lasting bond, restricting

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the debtor's freedom and forcing him to adopt a peaceful cooperative, prudent attitude" (Bourdieu 1989: 195).

It is obligatory for villagers who have received material help from the feast giver --who are his tenants and debtors--to participate in his rituals. They help prepare the special food and work most vigorously to make the occasion exuberant and successful. The mother of a tenant initiated dancing at the landlord's wife's hwangap feast. Nor is it unusual to see the ritual sponsor's tenants' and debtors' playing musical instruments or dancing at rituals to entertain his guests. Ritual consumption is "itself an activity which generates cumulative inequalities and is by itself capable of driving some people down to destitution" (Douglas 1982: 31).

Poor people also must donate a contribution. Giving contributions of about $10 to each wedding and hwangap and attempting to return feasts has led the poor into impoverishment and indebtedness. The enthusiastic participation and enjoyment had by all the participants in a feast actually contribute to widening class differentiation. Feast giving among poor villagers is more or less a way to maintain their social identity, while for the wealthy landowners it contributes to the reproduction of class distinctions.

Giving a feast is patterned behavior as demonstrated in the fashion making process by the wealthy. Serving fancy food such as beef, chicken, fish, clams, and home made wines has slowly developed in the wealthy people's domestic consumption and rituals since the village started to overcome destitution in the 1960's. Poor villagers' eating beef at a wealthy villager's feast obligates them to serve beef in their return feast. 600 grams (kŭn) of beef cost about $10 and is an exorbitant amount of money for poor villagers to spend to fulfill their sense of obligation.

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Bourdieu's conception of "symbolic capital" is helpful in conceptualizing the seemingly non-economic issues of the rituals. The concept of "symbolic capital" reaches into the domain of the "disinterestedness" (see also Mauss 1967) of social behaviors and their eventual contribution to the dominating group's wealth accumulation:

> The only way to escape from the ethnocentric varieties of economism, without falling into populist exaltation of the generous variety of earlier forms of society, is to carry out in full what economism does only partially, and to extend economic calculation to all the goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation -- which may be "fair words" or smiles, handshakes or shrugs, compliments or attention, challenges or insults, honour or honours, powers or pleasures, gossip or scientific information, distinction or distinctions, etc... Thus we sell that symbolic capital, which in the form of the prestige and renown attached to a family and a name is readily convertible back into economic capital, is perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation in a society in which the severity of the climate (the major work -- ploughing and harvesting -- having to be done in a very short space of time) and the limited technical resources (harvesting is done with the sickle) demand collective labor" (1989: 177-179).
>
> Symbolic capital, a transformed and thereby disguised form of physical 'economic' capital, produces its proper effect in as much, and only in as much, as it conceals the fact that it originates in 'material' forms of capital which are also, in the last analysis, the source of its effects" (ibid: 183, and see Mauss 1967).

A broader conception of capital is important in understanding the complicated contexts of social relations in which wealth accumulation takes place. A way to establish power to dominate people is to perpetuate the dependence of the poor on the power seekers. However, the process of being dominated is concealed by the exuberant form of feast giving which often provides the data that is naively interpreted as communal solidarity. The "true nature" of exploitation underlying rituals is "euphemized" by such

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feasts. Therefore we can approach the idea that "giving is also a way of possessing" (ibid: 195, see also Mauss 1967).

C. Domestic consumption

The proportion of the villagers' consumption of capitalist goods has been considerably larger than that of domestically produced goods. As one phenomena of capitalist development, domestically produced things have been replaced by mass produced commodities (See Bernstein 1977). Ropes and sacks that used to be made of rice straw by the villagers' hands were replaced by plastic ones sold in the Pian market. The villagers used to make coffins for funeral ceremonies. Nowadays people do not make coffins because a stack of coffins waits for customers in an undertaker's shop in Pian town. These coffins are made of one centimeter thick pine wood with colorful paper ornaments and cost about $210.

Expanding markets in towns and cities have contributed to great changes in clothing, house, and food consumption patterns. In the old days, the village women peddled their domestic produce in the market or on the street in Pian town or Nasong city, especially when they needed cash to meet the requirements for weddings, ancestor worship or hwangap. Today, however, peddling is illegal and village women bring their household production to the market and sell it to merchants at a lower price than the wholesale price merchants pay to wholesalers. The diagram below shows how the villagers get access to consumer goods

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Table 9--Places for the villagers' purchase of goods

Nasong, Chŏnju, and Seoul markets	Wedding gift, jewelry, watch, silk cloth, furniture, etc
Pian town market	Things in coops store plus fresh vegetables, fish, cloths, shoes, etc
Coops store	Underwear, socks, noodles, cookies, soda, alcholic beverage, tissues
Stores in Oak Tree	Beverage, cookies, some goods in coops store, etc

The goods sold in Pian town and cooperative stores are supplied by city manufacturers. Generally speaking, shops for the more expensive and luxurious goods are located in the cities and villagers have to travel far to purchase them. About 70-80 percent of the villagers purchased their pemul (wedding gifts) such as watches, gold rings, silk cloth in Nasong city. The villagers rarely go to Seoul to shop. If goods were purchased in Seoul they were purchased by the villagers' children living there and then brought or sent to their parents in the village. Foods for daily domestic consumption are rarely purchased beyond the Pian town market. The villagers purchase ritual foods that cannot be found at the Pian town market, such as salmon, big crabs, pressed pork in Nasong city.

1. Cloth

Hand woven cotton, hemp, and silk cloth have been totally replaced by factory manufactured fabrics. Women used to weave the cloth on a loom and hand weaving was an extremely time consuming and delicate work. All the households participating in cloth weaving raised silk worms, grew cotton and

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hemp; therefore , they produced all the raw materials domestically. During the off-farming season, women sat in their rooms day and night weaving cloth. Normally, a skilled woman made a 30 centimeter wide and 70-80 centimeter piece of hemp cloth a day. It took 10-12 days to weave to make enough material to make a pair of pants or jacket. Weaving seemed to have the crucial function of social control; parents controlled their daughters and daughters-in-law by having the young girls sit in the room and weave without socializing. Many old women in Pine Tree complained that "I became old weaving." Besides self-consumption, weaving was a good source of non-farming income. Financial difficulties were overcome by squeezing profit from women's labor in weaving. Hand weaving even enabled some people earn enough money to buy land. Many old women helped their family by weaving.

Until about 1960s, predominantly male labor participated in paddy farming. Women usually stayed at home to weave cloth and to do household chores. The high population density did not require female labor to engage in farming. Besides, women's household work was already too time-consuming to allow them to engage in farming. Only during the busiest seasons such as transplanting and harvesting, did women visibly participate in farming. As the rural population declined and villagers no longer weaved cloth, female labor shifted toward paddy farming and animal husbandry. Recently introduced dairy farming now absorbs female labor and women increasingly carry a greater burden of labor than before.

2. Food

The villagers still produce a portion of the goods they consume. Rice is the major produce consumed by the villagers. They keep a portion of their

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harvested rice for household consumption. Most villagers send rice to family members and close kinsmen living in cities. They say that "children of peasants at least should not pay for rice." They sell the rest to the cooperative and merchants.

Chiju and Chiyong who make a living solely on dairy cattle and pigs buy rice from the villagers. Even people who grow rice have to buy it from others with a surplus when they run short.

The villagers' rice production acted as a shock absorber between the debilitated peasant economy and the expansion of capitalism, since rice had both use and exchange value. The villagers at least can survive on what they grow no matter how bad their financial status becomes. Producers of the commodities that have both use and exchange values do not starve as severely as the producers of commodities that have only exchange value. If the price falls to near or even below the cost of production, the villagers can store unsold rice in a barn and earn the cost of living not realized by rice sales by selling their labor. If the villagers have to grow sisal, as in Brazil before WW II (Gross 1975), for their main source of income, their social reproduction would be more difficult because the prices of that commodity would control their lives.

3. Housing

The traditional house used to be built of locally produced clay, straw, granite stones, and wood. Since the initiation of the NVM, most houses have been renovated or sometimes rebuilt altogether. Trucks transported bricks, cement, tiles, slate and other construction materials from the cities to the village. About half of the remaining Pine Tree villagers purchased the houses of people who moved out to the cities. They paid about 25-40 sacks of

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rice for a house and renovated a very small section of it. Some sellers and buyers of the houses are absentee kin landlords and their kin tenants respectively. The price paid for a house is about half the price the seller initially spent for its construction. From the landlord's point of view it is a gift to the tenant buyer in exchange for loyalty. However, most buyers do not think so. They think that the old house could have been given to them for a lesser price or nothing because the house would not be used by the new owners anyway. Another interesting case is that Chesu lived in his absentee landlord's house with his wife and moved to his step mother's house when she died last year. The step mother lived alone in a relatively nice, spacious house. He spent $2,800-4,200 to renovate the house. Except for the beams, roof, and foundation, he changed everything and once finished it looked like a brand new house.

In recent times, no one in Pine Tree built a completely new house. On the other hand, two people in Oak Tree built new houses. One was Chubon, the principal of the Hongson township elementary school. Last year he demolished an old house and constructed a western style house that contrasted markedly with the other old houses. A man in Oak Tree said "Chubon made a mistake. After spending lots of money the house looks ugly." Another new house was built by Pyongchol. He is the owner of the Songun Corporation, which is considered to be one of the 20 biggest corporations in Korea. He constructed a traditional Korean style house with a beautiful garden of Chinese juniper trees at the cost of $280,000.


Sokchen who is Pyongchol's distant nephew cares for the house and for Pyongchol's 72 year old wife who suffers from severe arthritis. When Pyongchol's son Kwangik lost the election for the position of congressman representing the Tori and Hyangmi county, she became ill and left for Seoul

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to live with Kwangik. Her husband lives with his second wife in Seoul. Now Sokchen alone lives there. He still does not use the main room of the house and sleeps in the guest room. He tenants Pyongchol's one and half hectares of paddy paying 1.2 sacks of rice per 0.07 hectares for rent, which is lower than normal rent of 1.5 sacks. He in return cares for the house and Pyongchol's three direct lineal ancestral graves. He mows the lawn around the graves, pulls out weeds, and repairs dents and holes on the graves made by rodents.

4. Domestic ancestor worship

Fig. 20-- A schematized diagram to show which ancestors are worshipped



As the above diagram shows A must serve the eight people within the range of four generations of direct ancestors in a circle. B is also the main household head but does not include Z in his yearly ancestor worship. B's father serves three generations of ancestors if he is alive. It is an expected

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behavior for B's father and sons to attend A's ritual ceremony for Z. Since B is a junior collateral line to A, he is supposed to participate in the same ancestor's ritual of Z and Z's wife. Since D's father is the youngest son of the junior collateral line, D has no obligation to serve ritual for his uncle or grandfather; he only serves his father if his father is dead. Women in A's and B's households have to prepare food for the worship ritual on the death days of the eight people while women in D's household do it twice a year if D's parents are dead.

Food for the rituals is prohibitively expensive. Among other foods, king fish, chestnuts, Chinese dates, apples, and pears have to be on the ritual table. When the date of a ritual coincides with the off season for those items, prices are extremely high and some ritual performers exclude some of the foods required for the table. The cost for each domestic ritual ranges from $120 to 210. If a person is the main household head who has to serve four generations and he cultivates one hectare of paddy, which is the average size of land cultivation in Pine Tree, the yearly cost of ancestor worship amounts to about 20 percent of the net profit from his paddy. If he is a pure tenant, the portion constitutes about 30 percent. (See Appendix E for the calculation of this figure.)

Extreme impoverishment causes some main household heads to skip the fourth and/or third generation above ego. Instead they perform rituals for two generations above themselves or only for their parents. Many who I met felt "ashamed" of themselves for doing the simplified ritual since they generally believed that a yangban family had to follow Confucian ethics to serve eight people. Some of them said "the world is kaehwadoeda [developing] so we do not have to follow the old tradition."

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It seems that the teaching of Wŏn Buddhism has changed many people's ideas about ancestor worship. Wŏn Buddhism is formally opposed to the worship since it is believed to be a shamanistic ritual. Such ideas seem to contribute to the rational and self justification for reducing the four generation requirement of ancestor worship.

5. The Role of the Wŏn Buddhist Temple in Village Ritual

The Wŏn Buddhist Temple in Pine Tree and Oak Tree has played a significant role in the villagers' rituals. The founder of Wŏn Buddhism, Park Chungbin, (1891-1943), has been described this way:

> He was born in Chŏllanamdo province. He was a son of peasant and he wondered about the meaning of life since he was seven. He wanted to learn from a sage in the mountains and he meditated for 20 years. On March 26th, 1916, when he was 26, he was in the state of Haetal (a big truth or nirvana), as the sun slowly rose from the surface of the sea (A text of Wŏn Buddhism).

Even though he read and preached Buddhist words, he infused his own ideas into Buddhism. His basic mottos are that "material is changing, therefore mind must change" and "movement and quietness are the same as spirit and body composing a whole." A Wŏn Buddhist preacher in Pine Tree explained to me that the difference between Buddhism and Wŏn Buddhism is the difference between stagnant water and a clear spring. The advantage of Wŏn Buddhism is said to be its adaptability to the ever changing world. Wŏn Buddhists use Buddhist sacred books but monks interpret the scriptures, adjusting them to modern life.

From 1924 to 1943, Wŏn Buddhism expanded, establishing branch temples in Seoul, Pusan, Chŏnju, and Nasong. They have carried through

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many social projects including the founding of a savings cooperative and promoting the renewal of etiquette, the equality of man and woman, the overthrow of shamanism, living the simple life, abstinence from alcohol, collective labor, and restoration of human beings and society. In Pine Tree, Wŏn Buddhism was initiated by Hwado in the 1950's. She preached from a small house. The present modern style temple was constructed in 1973. Chunja contributed 0.42 hectares of paddy for the temple. The land and construction materials were financed by Haesong. Nine sacks of rice for rent and monthly and yearly contributions from the villagers are used to finance the Wŏn Buddhist temple.

Three people in the village perform ancestor worship in Wŏn Buddhist style. They are widows and old women who live alone. The ritual is simple and lavish foods are not prepared. A monk performs a series of ceremonies and the villagers pay about $14-70 to the celebrant as a token of appreciation. The Wŏn Buddhist temple also manages funeral ceremonies. Homang's father died in January, 1989. Homang asked the priest to do "49 che" [a mortuary ceremony on the 49th day after death] He paid $84 to the priest and spent $112 for food to serve guests. He would have spent at least three times more if he did it in traditional style. Doing rituals in the Wŏn Buddhist style is not considered as honorable as doing it in a traditional manner. The Wŏn Buddhism style is, however, generally liked by women because it reduces the amount of their labor used in food preparations and other ritual activity. However, weddings are rarely held in the temple, only two occurring over the last five years. Children to be married do not like to have the ceremony in the temple and they prefer the western style wedding hall. A man who was about to get married said "I marry once in a life time. I want to have wedding ceremony where I want to."

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Yongsan township has four protestant churches, one of which is located in Oak Tree village. Compared with Wŏn Buddhism, Christianity is very recent and is a source of conflict. The protestant church goers in Oak Tree amount to 10 or so households. In Pine Tree only Chiyong was a Christian.[31] I learned that the Christians in Oak Tree opposed the traditional Confucian and Buddhist rituals. Their rituals are Christian style without considering traditional methods while the Buddhists compromised with the traditional method. This was why Christians seemed to cause more serious problems in the community than Wŏn Buddhists do.

They also formed a special financial organization among themselves and they help each other financially. The organization is twice the size of the ordinary kye unit. I suspect that the church will increase its role in the social and economic aspects of the village. It is a fascinating research topic. However, I did not investigate religion and associated issues because the villagers in my main research village, Pine Tree were still relatively isolated from the Christian organization.

6. Education

The most onerous financial burden is the cost of education. Most parents except the ones who are old or young enough not to have student children, have to spend the average of $2,100-4,200 per child annually on education costs, which amounts to about the annual net income of the average household. Almost all parents with two or three children in schools in cities are heavily indebted. Recently, rising housing costs exceed school

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[31] I do not think that there is any connection between Christianity and the spread of entrepreneurship, particularly dairy farming, which some readers might suspect.

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tuition. The annual expense of a college student and high school in the cities is about $4,200 and $5,600 respectively. Before the 1960's, the village parents were not as frantic about sending their children to school as they are now.

As capitalism developed, the so called "white collar" job has emerged. Villagers admired this new class as an elite who do not work in the dirt and are paid a handsome salary. Some children who left the village and have worked in companies have helped their old parents by sending substantial remittances and have played a critical role in reducing their parents' financial burdens. Some children, especially sons whose education was financed by their parents or siblings or both have supported their brothers' and sisters' education and weddings. Bourdieu (1989: 187-188) sets up a framework to understand the role of education in social differentiation:

> it [academic qualification] makes it possible to relate all qualification holders (and also, negatively, all unqualified individuals) to a single standard, thereby setting up a singly market for all cultural capacities and guaranteeing the convertibility of cultural capital into money at a determinate cost in labour and time. Academic qualifications , like money , have a conventional, fixed value which , being guaranteed by law is freed from local limitations (in contrast to scholastically uncertified cultural capital) and temporal fluctuations... The objectification accomplished by academic degrees and diplomas and, in a more general way, by all forms of credentials, is inseparable from the objectification which the law guarantees by defining permanent positions which are distinct from the biological individuals holding them, and may be occupied by agents who are biologically different but interchangeable in terms of the qualifications required... The educational system helps to provide the dominant class with what Max Weber terms "a theodicy of its own privilege", not so much through the ideologies its produces or inculcation but rather through the practical justification of the established order which it achieves by using the overt connection between qualifications and jobs as a smokescreen for the connection... between the qualifications people obtain and the cultural capital they have inherited -- in other words, through the legitimacy it confers on the transmission of this form of heritage.

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Parents in their 40's and 50's are seriously burdened by education expenses. Most of them have at least two or three children in high school and college. The villagers have attempted to overcome their present impoverishment by seeking opportunities offered to those having a higher education. Having all the children farm the land would have resulted in more disastrous consequences.

If educated children do well and send remittances, then education turns out to be a good investment. But in most cases, children who have recently finished their high school and college education are either employed in low paying jobs or unemployed due to job scarcity. In such cases, a large investment is futile leaving the parents heavily indebted. This is what has taken place in Pine Tree and Oak Tree during the last 10-20 years.

7. Convenience goods

Pine Tree villagers use many convenience goods: TVs, telephones, refrigerators, gas ranges, and others. The villagers obtained these goods in three ways with equal frequency. First, children living in the cities send these items on their parents' birthday, new year's day, or Chusŏk [something like Thanksgiving day] as a token of appreciation of their parents' giving them life, nurturance, education, and care. Gas ranges are usually sent by daughters, who understood better how difficult it was for their mothers to gather firewood and leaves to prepare meals. Second, the villagers voluntarily purchase these items to meet their own needs stimulated by observing their neighbors' use of such goods, by watching TV commercials or reading newspaper advertisements.

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The villagers purchase convenience goods from the cooperative store or in other towns and cities. The choice of convenience goods in the cooperative store is limited and the villagers prefer city shops to the coop. If the item is too big for the customer to carry out of the store to take home, quick delivery by truck from the city stores to the village takes care of that problem and eliminates the need for private transportation. Third, aggressive sales tactics used by store salesmen make some villagers buy goods. Villagers are told that they can purchase the goods on an installment plan and the monthly payment is emphasized rather than the total amount. At times, villagers are persuaded or even coerced by salesmen. One day a salesman put a refrigerator on the floor of a house in Pine Tree and left it there, even though the woman in the house did not want to buy it. She used it for a few days and began to like it. Then she decided to own it. The purchase was caused by a combination of coercion and the formation of the desire to own it through experience.

Gas ranges have revolutionized women's domestic work. Women do not have to collect wood and leaves, which usually take about half a day. Gas ranges that cost $140-210 and a three month supply of gas in a reusable gas tank that costs $210 make women's work considerably easier. Hyonran recently bought a gas range. When I visited her she boiled chopped cabbage and squash in a pot on the range in the early morning. I had to visit her at 5:00 am because she left her house at about 5:30 a.m. and returned by 9:00-10:00 p.m. She is a pure wage laborer. Since she was discarded by her husband she has lived alone and makes about eight dollars a day working 12 hour days in Yongsan township and other places. Spending half a day to collect firewood is illogical for Hyonran who can use the time to work as a

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wage laborer. Investing $210 in a gas range is a rational choice and not a luxury at all.

Telephones make it possible to effectively widen the social network by connecting people living in other villages, townships or cities. The villagers obtain information easily over the phone, invite guests to their rituals, and gradually the boundary of the village social network expanded. Pine Tree villagers' telephone bills are well over seven dollars and go up to $56. They make long distance calls quite often to their children in the cities. The villagers call each other even though they live two or three minute walk away. They used to gossip around the well where women washed household clothes. Information used to be shared so that there were not many secrets in the village. Nowadays, telephone use contributes to the privatization of village conversations.

People used to go to masil or the meeting of groups of men or women in the sarangbang [a room in each household designated for chats and games]. However, people feel embarrassed when they visit their neighbors for a chat and the latter sit and watch TV. Face to face conversations and meetings have been reduced by TV watching. People watch serial dramas and other entertainment programs almost every night. My key informant once in a while milked his cows grumbling that he was missing a baseball game on TV. His wife hated the baseball game. One day he said "I wish I had a TV in the barn, so I can milk the cow and watch TV at the same time." Namgu's favorite show was "Macgyver"(an American TV series).

The impact of TV on the community has been profound. The display of luxurious costumes, houses, and food on the screen has aroused a desire to own them. Some villagers believe that the lives of urbanites are as lavish as the characters seen in TV dramas and they feel deprived and "ashamed" of

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their poverty. Previously, when villagers had few contacts with outsiders and did not see how other people lived, real or dramatized, they had few opportunities to compare their standard of living with urban standards. Now, their poverty is highlighted by comparing their lives with the glittering and luxurious lives they see portrayed on television.

TV also has curtailed communal gossip. An old man in Oak Tree said "thanks to TV people talk less stupid gossip." Many people feel relaxed watching TV with their family. They can avoid stressful responses and reactions to and from circulating gossip. More and more people mind their own business rather than creating and spreading partial fantasies about other people.

8. The Politics of Commodities

In August, I followed Chiju to the township office. He had to go there with five applicants to fill out application forms for a cow loan. Before he left, he had an argument with his wife. He wanted to wear his Christian Dior silk necktie given to him as a wedding gift seven years ago. His wife could not find it. After searching for 20-30 minutes, she finally found it. He wore it along with his shiny Rolex watch that he did not usually wear in ordinary circumstances. The watch was a pemul (wedding gift) from his parents-in-law. He shined his black leather shoes and put them on. After dressing, he looked like a "white collar" business man. He, the five applicants and I rode in a villager's motor tiller to the office. The other five people wore the work clothes. The loan official greeted Chiju and me and we started to fill out the forms while the other five people sat on the sofa in the corner of the office.

Why did Chiju wear these items? What relationships did these items and his appearance have to filling out loan application forms? It might be

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considered that he was showing proper etiquette to the official. Instead of muddy rubber shoes and a torn sleeveless shirt, wearing a fancy outfit might please the official. However, I believe that it worked the other way around. Wearing such items could be interpreted as a threat to the official. It would be illogical to insult a man wearing a fancy grey suit, a Christian Dior silk necktie, and a Rolex watch. It was a moment to prove that Chiju could also wear those fancy items. It was an unuttered warning to the official not to treat him like a peasant.

It has been culturally acceptable for officials to abuse peasants with muddy shoes and torn shirts and an official's overbearing attitude toward peasants is part of the local political culture. It was not to show how rich Chiju was but to demonstrate that the things by which power holders have reproduced their cultural hegemony can be purchased and displayed by peasants too. By showing the official the fancy clothes and Swiss watch, Chiju resisted being placed in an inferior position by demonstrating that he was as worthy as the officials and other power holding people. A common thing about the items that peasants wear for important events is their visibility, that is, the peasants would probably not wear Christian Dior underwear.

The constant introduction of new commodities into the village has altered the dynamics of power. Change in consumption pattern ramifies throughout village social relationships. The peasants' appropriation of commodities that used to be owned purchased only by the rich potentially can weaken the legitimation of the village power holders. The peasants use of mass produced commodities is not just the end result of capitalist development but also had an impact on village social perceptions and organization.

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For example, Chiju's wearing fancy clothes and other items has another function; these items distinguished Chiju from the five relatively poor fellow villagers. Chiju was in charge of the application procedure for the five villagers and the loan was allocated to Pine Tree by Chiju's connection with his brother-in-law in the Tori county office. In this, Chiju appeared to have absolute power over the loan. He did not get any of the allotted $14,000 that was to be equally divided among the five applicants. Instead of a monetary reward, he received the legitimation of his influence after many phone conversations with his brother-in-law and many hours with township officials.

9. Ritual

The villagers' spending on ritual related events is considerably larger than their spending on food, housing, and clothing combined. The most conspicuous rituals are hwangap (60th birthday), weddings, and ancestor worship.

a) Hwangap

Hwangap is a big feast held for a person who reaches 60 years of age. The villagers believe that 60 years of life equals one full cycle of life and a person who reaches 60 is believed to start a new cycle. In the old days, people rarely lived over 60. Therefore, few people had such a feast. Nowadays, life expectancy increased to 68-72 years, which means that most households will have two hwangap celebrations. Participants in these feasts are villagers, kinsmen, and friends living in other areas. It is a lively occasion that lasts roughly from nine a.m. to nine p.m. Fruits, fish, and beef and other fancy foods are served and the villagers usually butcher a pig the day before the

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feast. Young women in the village and close female kin, especially daughters-in-law and daughters, prepare food for two or three days. The day before the feast, women in general start to cook. Shopping for food and other materials is done about one week before the feast. Leftover food wrapped in plastic or tin foil are given to guests at the closing of the celebration.

Chunpyo had a hwangap feast last year. He wrote down the costs and the contributions the guests made. The total cost was $1,680 and the total contribution was $1,820. He did not have difficulty in giving the feast since he is one of the three major creditors in Pine Tree and has a wide social network in the Yongsan township. The most influential people in Yongsan township attended the celebration.

Guests are obligated to make contributions of at least seven dollars and up to $14. If the guest is a close kinsmen, the contribution becomes larger, from $42 to 140. This contribution rule also applies to weddings, which will be discussed shortly. The hwangap feast crosses regional and kinship boundaries. People affiliated with the host by kin relationship, friendship, school alumni, political party membership, or cooperative membership are obligated to attend the hwangap of the person and his or her parents.

b) Weddings

The villagers believe that marriages must be arranged. The wedding date is carefully selected by a fortune-teller, a wise man or woman, because marrying on a auspicious day is considered important in starting a new family. The fortune teller or villagers who know Chuyŏk (Chinese classic of Divination) examine whether the year and time of birth of the bride and groom match well. If the year and birthdates of the two people do not match well, the marriage is not usually approved by the parents. A good

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combination of birthdate and year for both bride and groom is believed to be the prelude to having a happy and wealthy life.

Marriage affairs have changed since the late 1960's. More and more people are choosing their own spouses. Parents' insistence on arranged marriage has yielded more and more to the children's determination to select their marriage partner. A dramatic case that shows the conflict between parents and children about the free choice of marriage partners is the case of Sangsa and Yanghi. It is taboo to marry a fellow villager, even though they have different surnames. In this case, Sangsa and Yanghi went to the same primary school, had premarital affairs, and decided to get married about ten years ago. Both went to their parents on the same day to ask for permission to marry and both sets of parents were furious. Kihwan beat his daughter saying "you behaved like sangnom and defamed our family." Kihwan vigorously opposed the marriage. Sangsa and Yanghi did not surrender. One day both of them came to Kihwan and said "If you do not allow our marriage we will drink this pesticide" holding up a bottle of pesticide close to their mouths. Kihwan finally gave in. He said to me chuckling, "those little bastards threatened me with pesticide." Village endogamy has been popular even though it is believed to be a "disgraceful" form of marriage. Frequent contacts between the opposite sex allow people to select their spouse from the village. Nine couples in Pine Tree have married this way.

c) The Cost of the Wedding

The villagers' second biggest expense next to education is a child's wedding and most people borrow money to meet it. Presently, people use wedding halls instead of their spouse's front yard. It cost $140-420 to rent a wedding hall in Pian town for 30 minutes. Even poor parents spend $4,200-

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5,600 for each child's wedding. The bride's parents suffer most because their daughter leave them to become a member of groom's family and because the expenses they pay become the property of the groom's family. The bride's family has to buy a silk covered quilt comforter, fancy costumes for the groom and his parents, a watch for the groom, a fancy closet, and cooking utensils. Normally, the bride's side spend $7,000-8,400. If a bride's family is intermediately wealthy, the expense will easily top $14,000. The groom's parents have to buy the bride's parents' clothes, the bride's gold or diamond jewelry and watch.

Providing accommodation for the married couple is an enormous financial burden. A small apartment in the city costs the parents at least $42,000-56,000. Even renting a room costs them a $14,000-28,000 security deposit. Recently, skyrocketing real estate prices have become a huge burden on newly married couple's parents, even though the expense is usually shared by both sides.

Villagers say that if parents have three daughters who are about to marry, "the house pillar will be uprooted" which means that they will go bankrupt after holding three weddings. Sometimes daughters help their parents with wedding expenses by getting a job in the city. Three parents in Oak Tree and two parents in Pine Tree have received such help from their daughters during the last year. However, only a few daughters did this. Sometimes parents received financial assistance to meet wedding expenses from their close kinsmen but it is not predictable or expected and so the parents have taken the major responsibility for this expense.

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d) The weddings in the old days

People over 50 had a traditional wedding. They wore colorful traditional costumes and food was prepared by kinsmen and villagers. It was a joyful event for the whole village to watch. Chickens and pigs were butchered and most of the food was domestically produced. The gift the bride carried to the grooms' family was hemp or silk cloth if the bride's family was rich. This cloth was hand woven on a loom. However, items like the closet, gold jewelry, processed cotton for a blanket had to be purchased with cash. For the most part, elderly people did not give particularly expensive wedding gifts to each other, because of their poverty.

The incoming bride was herself the biggest gift. Yi Tonghwa said "I gave away my daughter." Some people had their daughters married to a socially unqualified man such as an old widower or a mentally ill man. The bride's parents' desire to have some land from the groom's wealthy parents was the strongest motive for giving away daughters in this "shameful" manner. On the other hand, wealthy people sought son-in-laws married for the purpose of gaining terilsawi under the condition that he would supply labor to the bride's family. This practice is against the Korean patrilocal and neolocal residence rule (see Introduction), but it has taken place when a prospective groom's parents are extremely poor. Giving away children under these "shameful" conditions is usually designed for the acquisition of land, tenancy or credit from wealthy people.

Before the 1960's, weddings were held after the rice harvest. The majority of the villagers could afford to have their children married only after the sale of rice in the fall. They wanted to get rid of the high cost wedding first and then face whatever prospective hardship would be next. Currently, weddings take place throughout the year, although spring and fall

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are the most favored seasons. Having a wedding in the spring was hardly thinkable in the old days since most people suffered from the "barley hump" [spring famine], the time when household finances were exhausted and villagers faced starvation.

e). Contributions

Without exception people have their weddings on Saturday evening or Sunday afternoon or evening. This way they can collect more contributions from kinsmen who can come from the city only on these days. Until the 1960's, people gave eggs, rice or noodles as a wedding contribution. Contributions in the form of cash became widespread in the village in the early 1970's, the period of the NVM. Easy access to state credit for development purposes increased the cash flow in the village and cash became a barometer in social relationships. One or two weeks prior to the wedding, parents send invitation cards to as many people as possible in other villages and cities. Local villagers are verbally informed.

The wedding invitation card states that "my Xnd son XX will marry YY's Xnd daughter ZZ. Please come by and congratulate them." It never says that a contribution has to be made. Most villagers sigh when they receive such invitation cards for they have to think about how much money they are going to put in an envelope. The invited person has to be very careful about his or her relationship with the host and the amount of the contribution. During my fieldwork the rule of thumb was that non kinsmen paid seven dollars, while distant kinsmen pay, $14, and close kinsmen, $42-140. At the wedding, the bride and groom's kinsmen wrote down the contributor's name and the amount contributed. Most married people have a notebook in which the names of guests and their contributions are written. My key informant,

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Chiju, remembers almost all the people who attendeded his wedding and the amount of money they contributed. The notebook is a good guide for him to establish relationships with people.

In the spring and fall, people receive one to four invitation cards every weekend. The cards could be from the Yongsan township, a nearby township, and any place where kinsmen, friends, and acquaintances live. A poor household could spend about $280 during both seasons. If the person paid seven dollars which was the minimal amount on four weekends monthly for three months, the total amount was $168. Assuming the yearly expense for wedding contribution was about $420 for a poor household, an ordinary person spends well over $700. If a person tenants one hectare, his yearly wedding contribution equals 14 percent of the total income from the paddy (see Chapter 5).

An interesting way to cope with the burden of making contributions is to attend only the last daughter's wedding if the host has several daughters. The wedding hosts might be angry at the slight, but attendance and a substantial contribution for the last daughter is likely to assuage the grudge.

f) Two Patterns of Marriage

A noteworthy factor in marriage is that a person is likely to marry someone with similar social and economic standing. Most people believe that a person's sajupalcha [roughly translating, a person's destiny predetermined by the Heavens] was preset by the year and time when he or she was born. People also analyze destiny by a person's physical appearance. For example, a woman's little finger must be longer than the first line of the ring finger to make a good wife. If a woman has a protruding nose, she will make her husband's life difficult. If she was born in the year of the goat she

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will be subservient to her husband. This shamanistic belief mixed with divination theory is only a introductory measure taken in deciding a spouse. While the parents believing such a traditional belief are evaluating these superficial aspects the prospective bride's and groom's families carefully scrutinize each other's wealth and social background. Their shamanistic belief and their actual process of selecting a spouse are compartmentalized. Since divorce and remarriage are considered "shameful" acts, finding a good spouse is vitally important. Some people send a kinsman to a prospective spouse's village or town to examine the spouse's wealth and family background. The amount of property and a copy of the family registry at the township are accessible for a standard fee of 50-80 cents. If they know the person's name and address they can obtain a copy of the registry and cross check what they heard from their counterpart and what is written in the registries.

The children of rich parents are likely to marry a physically, economically, and intellectually competent spouse and their children would have a better chance to be educated and nourished than the children of a couple with poor parents. Marriage is one of the class differentiating mechanisms by which irreversible class formation patterns are reproduced. Such processes cross geographic boundaries.

Two contrasting marriages took place in Pine Tree while I was there. One case was Kimbo's daughter's marriage, Kimbo being one of the three major village creditors. Kimbo's daughter graduated from a university in Seoul. Sending a daughter to a university is very unusual and is possible only by extremely wealthy peasants. Kimbo has a wide social network in Tori county. He was looking for a spouse for his daughter for a year. In Hyonmin township, he found a young man whose family was wealthy and influential

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in the township. The young man was recently employed in a big corporation after graduating from a university. Both parents were pleased that their children were similar in social background and education. The wedding was an exciting event in the Yongsan township. Fancy wedding foods were delivered by the groom's side. A big feast was prepared in Kimbo's house the day before the wedding. Kimbo spent about $14,000 for the wedding which was equivalent to the price of 0.35 hectares of paddy.

The second case was Chinyong daughter's wedding. Chinyong married into his wife's family in Pine Tree. He is terilsawi. Chinyong owns 0.035 hectares of paddy and tenants 0.84 hectares. He had a pretty 22 year old daughter and he was told by Chiyong that a family in Kedo village was interested in his daughter who was at a marriageable age [the average age for women's marriage is about 26-27]. He added that the family in Kedo village was very wealthy and had many influential kinsmen in the cities. Chinyong himself found out who the would be son-in-law was; the 32 year old youngest son of a wealthy family who had some unmentionable disease that caused him to sleep most of the time plus a mental disorder. He would gaze at the sky for a while without noticing anybody nearby. These symptoms appear to resemble a mild epilepsy. Despite all this, Chinyong had his daughter marry him. After the wedding, I noticed that Chinyong's wife wept for her daughter and the "disgraceful" nature of the marriage. I could not pinpoint precisely why Chinyong allowed the marriage and I could only speculate on two possible explanations. First, he wanted to be related to the wealthy and influential family by marrying his daughter to their son. Second, he did not foresee the chance to have a better connected son-in-law even if he waited longer.

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g) A play of ham

Before the wedding, there is a play of ham. Ham is a box filled with weddings gifts which is carried by the bridegroom's friends to the bride's parents' house. It contains clothes for bride and her parents' clothes. In the old days it contained the marriage document, jewelry for the bride, and clothes for bride and her parents. These days it is less formal. However it is still considered to be one of the traditional legitimations of marriage. The person who carries the ham is called a horse, and the person who controls the horse is called the jockey. A group of the bridegroom's friends back up the horse and jockey. Usually they come by the bride's parents' house at midnight and stop about 30 meters away from the house gate. They shout "XX's daughter is going to marry" loud enough to wake up all the neighbors and create a scene, such that villagers gather to watch the process. There is a mock confrontation between the groom's friends and the bride's representatives who are usually the bride's older brothers, uncles or cousins. They hassle about the amount of money that the bride's representative is giving to the jockey. As the former gives money to the latter, a person playing the role of horse is driven a step forward by a jockey. The horse and jockey are given makkŏlli by bride's representatives. The jockey keeps receiving money and liquor until the horse enters inside the bride's house. Once the horse is in, the game is over, which means that the ham has been purchased by the bride's parents and the marriage is legitimated. The horse, jockey and other friends go inside a room where bountiful food and drink have been prepared.

Sujae, Kimbo's younger brother's son, was the representative of the bride's side. The horse, jockey, and six other friends of the groom arrived at around midnight. They started to scream that Kimbo's daughter was going to

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marry and the ham will be sold. Sujae gave some 1000 won [$1.40] bills at first to the jockey. The jockey was disappointed and shouted, "our horse is not being fed enough to walk." Sujae shouted that "this horse is too fat to walk. So I'd better not give too much fodder." The village spectators also participated in the hassling, taking the side of the bride.

Sujae finally gave the jockey 5,000 won [seven dollars] bills and later 10,000 won [$14] bills. He told me later that Kimbo gave him $420 as expense money "to feed the horse." He spent it all. When the horse was in the house, all the groom's friends bowed to Kimbo who had been sitting in his room just listening to the commotion. Everyone had a great feast.

The day before Chinyong daughter's wedding, 11 of the groom's friends arrived at 11:00 p.m. in front of the Chinyong house. Since Chinyong did not have close kinsmen who could represent his family, he asked Chiju to play the role and Chiju agreed. Chinyong gave $140 to Chiju for the "fodder" expense. Chiju knew that that amount of money would not be enough to bring the horse in the house. Chiju privately said to the jockey "you know how poor this family is. I will give you $140 now and I want you to play well enough to please everybody." The jockey agreed and they pretended to hassle with Chiju for about 40 minutes. The people attending believed that they were really hassling over the "fodder."

10. Poor people's rituals

Not all villagers who turn 60 have a lavish hwangap or even a hwangap at all. Hera, a wage laborer, did not enjoy a hwangap three years ago. She might think that she should have the feast somehow. But villagers did not even know she had reached 60. Even if some villagers knew it, she would not be given much attention. Ignoring her own celebration she

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assiduously participated in other peoples' feasts in order to be included socially.

Hoyun, who is heavily indebted due to his costly spinal operation, and his sons' continuous failures in business and school in the cities, worries about his hwangap to be held next year. A person who passes their 60th year birthday without a celebration may not worry much about personal disappointment, but would be concerned about the lack of recognition and visible stature in the community. The villagers have their own word, chujŏp, for this, which I would interpret as designating personal and social "shame."

Kisang's and Hera's stubborn participation in the villagers' hwangap that they did not and would not enjoy demonstrate that both of them sacrificed their own ritual celebration to those of others, especially the rituals of their landlords and creditors. They could have performed their own rituals for themselves with all the contributions and labor they had contributed to the rituals of the wealthy during the past few years. However, their participation in the celebrations of the wealthy is unavoidable. If they do not participate, they would be excluded from the social network that supplies them wage labor and credit. In return for their costly participation they could get access to tenancy and credit, an absolutely necessary requirement for Hera's and Kisang's social reproduction and an additional requirement for landlords' and creditors' wealth accumulation.

Participation and making contributions to the various village rituals are important and necessary conditions for both rich and poor people so that they can be included in the village social network. People have to attend birthdays, wedding feasts, and friendship kye meetings. Poor people are particularly burdened by the cost of being included. When the wealthy give

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feasts inviting the villagers, the poor have the obligation to return the feast even though in a form less extravagant than the wealthy villagers. Another reason for the poor to give feasts is to hide their "shameful" poverty. They worry more about the social distancing caused by poverty than the physical pains caused by privation. Being seen as hopelessly poor is a fatal signal alerting everyone in the rural community network. The poor, to fend off such a judgement, have to show off their "vacant wealth."[32] The average level of life style was painful and burdensome for the poor to follow and their attempt to reach average consumption is likely to leave them more indebted.

Hera's selling her only pig to make contributions to village weddings illustrates how the socially required reciprocal feast allowed the enslavement and impoverishment of the poor. Hera was a wage laborer until last year when she was asked to tenant 0.35 hectares of paddy. A pig is an absolutely necessary animal for paddy cultivation because a 120 kilogram pig produces about one kilogram of manure daily plus piglets. After evaporation for a year and eroded by rain, the amount of manure dwindles to about 10 percent of the initial weight. The villagers can make about 100 kilograms of manure fertilizer from a pig's excretion annually. By the time people need to fertilize soil, they will have a good pile of pig manure mixed with rice chaff which is believed to be the best fertilizer.

Last year Hera sold her only pig which was such an important item for her survival. When she has to fertilize the soil for next year's paddy cultivation she will have to ask Homang, who gave her tenancy, for his pig manure or get private credit to buy chemical fertilizers. She now has fewer

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[32] A poor person pretends to be wealthy by showing off.

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alternatives and she must "squeeze" her own consumption to maintain her subsistence level of existence (see Bernstein 1977).

The poor are left behind in the changing consumption culture especially as it is reflected in the reciprocating nature of village rituals. As the poor people meet the socially structured requirements, they have to go beyond their financial ability to perform social obligations, which means that rituals and feasts became a major cause of their indebtedness and a mechanism promoting class differentiation.

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Chapter 7. Saving

People do not necessarily save what they have left after consumption. Production, consumption, and savings are all inter-related and together create the material base upon which the villagers' livelihood depends. People may consume less or get credit to collect savings. Saving is more complicated than we may imagine. Saving is one of the elements that constitutes the villagers' financial dealings as well as their social relationships. This chapter shall highlight the interactions between saving, credit, and kin relationships.

As Firth (1964: 23) argues, "peasant saving is not a purely individual affair. It is guided, as all saving is, by the general set of ideas and values current about capital accumulation in the particular society."* Saving is one of the reactions to the uncertainties of peasant economy and their reactions affect wealth accumulation and impoverishment. Examining savings patterns enables us to understand an aspect of social relationships that is reflected in the financial behavior of villagers.


The villagers have two types of savings plans. The prominent, indigenous one is named kye or rotational credit association. It is believed that the kye has been organized since the reign of King Kyŏngdŏk during the Silla dynasty (742-765 AD) (Chin 1983: 218).

Pine Tree and Oak Tree villagers have formed kye since the first people migrated to the present village several hundred years ago. Villagers organize a group where they pool rice and/or money from each member to receive on a rotational basis the total sum periodically collected. A kye refers to such credit generating group activities. Yet, it is organized not only for economic purposes but also for friendship. The kye is maintained by its members' contributions and has played a role in helping individuals cope with the

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large, unmanageable expenses of marriage, 60th birthdays, mortuary ceremonies, and other village rituals. In a friendship kye, each member gives a feast financed by the collective contributions and at these kye meetings they chat and exchange information and gossip. As the diagram below shows, E receives help from A through D. Other members receive the collected kye money from another four people at a later time.

Fig. 21--A schematized diagram to show the reciprocal relationships between kye members



The villagers sometimes call kye pumashi, which was discussed in Chapter 5. Reciprocal exchange is the basic idea underlying both kye and pumashi. The major difference is that people exchange rice and money in the former and labor in the latter. However, pumashi seems to have a more inclusive meaning than kye. Some villagers said that kye is a kind of pumashi.

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A. Kinds of kye

Until the early 1970's, the purpose of the kye was to help financially its members by pooling rice or money to pay for ritual expenses. There is for example a yuchin kye, a kye for parents' mortuary expenses, and a honin kye, a kye, for marriage expenses. Villagers whose children soon get married organize a honin kye. The kye members pay nine kilograms of rice to the person who is about to have the ritual event. As time passes, the contribution becomes larger and larger because of the increasing costs of marriages and funerals. Nowadays, people pay in sacks of rice or an equivalent amount of money, about $11-13 per sack. The contribution has increased to 10 times the amount paid 15 years ago. The money or rice collected in the honin kye does not usually meet all expenses of a marriage. The yuchin kye is usually organized by people whose parents are over 60. Non-yuchin kye members or non-honin kye members also can contribute to both events. But the contribution is usually smaller than the kye money provided by members.

The villagers recently have organized many nori kye (kye for play) the purpose of which is not for saving or ritual expenses but for recreation. People pool money to go on a trip. The nori kye was unthinkable when many of the villagers were destitute prior to the 1960's. Such kye have become popular since the late 1970's when tourism expanded and villagers read tour advertisements in the newspaper and watched tour commercials on TV. It has been only four decades since they escaped the destitution fostered and imposed during the Japanese colonial period and the civil war.

Since the 1970's, food production has been sufficient for the dietary needs of villagers. The villagers do not have to live on tree bark and roots of wild plants. The annual "barley hump" [spring famine] is now only a

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historical fact and not a present reality. The introduction of high yield rice varieties, chemical pesticide, fertilizer, and water pumps enabled the villagers to produce a relatively predictable amount of foodstuffs with some leftover for rice savings and sale. Many villagers seem to want to compensate for their past hunger and severe deprivation by lavishly spending on recreation. Ironically, some people who join a nori kye are heavily indebted. The seeming incongruity between their indebtedness and willingness to spend on recreative activities can be explained by their desire to have entertainment previously inaccessible to them. In addition, people have been persuaded by advertisements and tourist agency salesmen to enjoy themselves and to have fun.

Renting a bus to go to travel to a resort area has become commonplace. People pay from nine to 30 kilograms of rice once or twice a year for several years and use the collected money to go on trips.

1. Rice kye

A noteworthy phenomenon about kye is that in the 1980's, an increasing number of people are organizing rice kyes, and rice kyes are no longer limited to a small number of very wealthy people. The purpose of such kye is quite different from the previous kinds mentioned above; these kye are purely for saving and investment. Rice kye members pay about ten sacks of rice yearly for several years to make a large sum given on a rotational basis to its members with the kye ending when all members receive their share. The most common rice kye was a 50 sack rice kye organized by five people for five years. These five kye members collectively pay, usually after the November harvest, 50 sacks of rice each that is then given to one member. The first person to take the sum does not pay in any rice in the first

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year. However, after one year, the first receiver has to pay 50 sacks plus 18-22 percent interest for the next four years. In other words the receiver has to pay interest on the sum given by the other four members. The person who receives the sum last pays less because of the five year waiting period and is compensated by a set aside portion of the yearly payment.

Rice kye is usually organized by kinsmen and friends. They have to know each other. If a person is known to have a bad credit reputation, his or her joining a kye is difficult no matter how close a kinsman or friend he or she is to the other members.

The kye is organized based on an oral contract and is not legally binding or enforceable. Therefore, people are extremely cautious about prospective members. Financial ability is as important a criterion as reputation. If the person is very poor but his or her credit worthiness is good, kinsmen may help him or her join the kye. Since the two sets of members, the helpers and the helped, are bound by kinship, kinship acts as a kind of collateral. Members are expected to follow the rules of both the kye organization and kinship. They are heavily conditioned by being kinsmen in the group and in case of default, the defaulter loses not only credit worthiness but also his or her kinship affiliation. The person who is the last to receive the sum is especially cautious about joining the kye. As other members receive the sum, their payment to the last person could be in doubt.

Kye have been frequently organized across village boundaries. Pine Tree and Oak Tree people are the most proximate partners to each other in finding prospective outside members. Even though a kye rarely failed, in the last 20 years in Pine Tree, two kyes failed due to members' defaulting on their payment. In one case the first four people got their shares and did not pay the last person. The kye was composed of four people from Oak Tree and one

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person from Pine Tree about 20 years ago. A serious feud erupted between the four Oak Tree villagers who intentionally defaulted and the Pine Tree member, Chunja, lost the chance to receive the last collective contribution. Chunja was used by the four people from Oak Tree who happened to be her very distant kinsmen. Since she was wealthy, neglected by her kinsmen and hated by the villagers, the scheme against her did not arouse a scandal in either Pine Tree or Oak Tree. Few people were on her side. The yearly collected sum of the kye was 100 sacks of rice, an unusually large amount at that time and even these days. She paid in about 82 sacks of rice for four years and lost the entire amount by the default.

Since the event, she has continually visited the wangju's [the initiator of kye who was supposed to be responsible for the default] son living in Chŏnju asking him to pay the amount due. The wangju left for Chŏnju immediately after the default. He died about five years after the incident. His son promised Chunja to give the money back but he never kept the promise. Chunja strongly believes that the son should pay the amount because the wangju started his grocery business in Chŏnju with the kye money and his son took over the business after he passed away. She vividly remembers the incident of 20 years ago as if the event took place yesterday. She said to me "I cannot close my eyes [die] peacefully because of the incident."

If a person receives 50 sacks of rice from the rice kye, the value is equal to about $6,300, an amount that can meet the average marriage expense. It is a noteworthy fact that the rice kye has fulfilled the aim of the honin kye. Without the rice kye people would have been more indebted to the state and private credit. Even though state credit has replaced the rice kye, people still prefer to have rice kye because the members feel comfortable with their rules (see Kennedy 1977). The primary requirement for joining a rice kye is credit-

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worthiness built up through time between the members, a requirement not considered by the cooperatives or banks in lending money. People generally feel easy with the kye since the people they deal with are friends and kinsmen. They also expect some flexibility in their dealings.

However, a possibility of default constitutes an underlying theme that creates tension between kye members. When a kin member breaks the rules -- the expected conformity with kinship rules -- the disappointment of the losing kin members is great. A default is likely to lead to powerful accusations against the defaulter and his family, lasting for two or three or more generations.

a) Stationery Business in Pian Town and the Rice Kye

Most kye members want to be the first person to receive the sum to finance their children's education, marriage, and other large expenses. People also used the sum to invest in farming and non-farming business as well. Kiyol's mother initiated a rice kye with Pine Tree villagers and a village migrant in Chŏnju. The kye period was for five years and the annual sum was 100 sacks. She needed a large amount of money to help her son start a stationery business in Pian town seven years ago. She became the wangju and received the 100 sacks on the first rotation. All the money was used for her son's business. After one year she had great difficulty in paying in her kye money at 20 percent interest on the sum for the next four years. Her son's business did not do well for the first three or four years and did not get a return on the investment fast enough to pay the kye money. Finally she had to turn to private credit to pay the kye money.

The stationery store was owned by Kiyol's maternal uncle. As Kiyol and his mother were in trouble, his rent was suspended for two years. Kiyol

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
also took some private credit to pay the kye money. They barely managed to pay the sum for four years. Gradually, the stationery business did better. Kiyol remembers the set of events as a nightmare. If the wangju fails to pay, the kye has a high probability to fail, with the defaulter facing the ostracism of the people in the community. After a default, a person would also have great difficulty in getting private credit. In short, the defaulter would be severed from the social network and its privileges. Kiyol and his mother borrowed private credit with even higher interest than the kye interest. It was essential for them to keep their credit record and reputation clean. Besides, Kiyol's business is located in Pian town where some friends and kinsmen of the kye members live. He needs to keep his financial reputation and dealings with the town people on good terms. These are strong incentives for Kiyol and his mother to obtain money in order to pay the kye money by whatever means were available to them.

b) Two wealthy men's rice kye

Some wealthy people have more than one rice kye. For instance, Kaekhyon in Oak Tree has several rice kye. He owns a mill, farms about two hectares of paddy and tenants about one and half hectares The schematic diagram below shows how Kaekhyon's rice kye functions within his economic cycle.

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Fig. 22--A schematized diagram to show Kaekhyon's economic cycle




Payment to the rice kye can be made using income from his rice mill, paddy farming, and profits from his private lending to villagers. He can also utilize his customers' rice stored in his barn. Some customers put their rice in Kaekhyon's barn until it is husked and later they sell it. Kaekhyon flexibly uses other people's rice and replaces it with rice produced from his farm or rice kye pay outs. Kaekhyon uses kye money to help expand his mill operation and to buy more land and farm machinery.

Another mill owner, Taehyon in Mulberry Tree maintains an economic operation similar to that owned by Kaekhyon. Taehyon, however, has two more factors in his economic cycle, dairy cattle and the use of farm machinery on others' farms.

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Fig. 23--A schematized diagram to show Taehyon's economic cycle



Because Taehyon has a predictable cash income from dairy cattle, his mill, and farm machinery operation, his coping with the rice kye and other economic operations is relatively easy. Unlike Kaekhyon, Taehyon is known for using cooperative loans to pay rice kye money and to lend a portion of the same loans to the villagers with higher interest. He has easy access to cooperative loans with a 5-12 percent interest rate because of his large collateral and his coop-assessed credit worthiness. Such favorable conditions enable him to join as many rice kye as he can if he thinks that the kye

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members were trustworthy. In any case, a possible loss in any section of his economic cycle can be compensated for by the other sections.

B. The Cooperative Savings Plan

The second most popular way of saving is utilizing the coop savings plan that pays 18-22 percent interest rate on deposits. The cooperative offers educational, marriage, housing, retirement, and family security savings plans. People deposit a monthly payment for several years and accrue savings that earn 8-12 percent interest per annum. No villagers have this type of savings plan. Instead, people use the special coop savings account with a 19-24 percent interest rate, an unusually high interest rate intended by the state to help poor people. Applicants for this savings account must have less than half a hectare of paddy to apply. There are two kinds of accounts. One is a $8,400 savings plan where people pay in $4 monthly for five years; the other is a $4,200 plan where they pay $84 monthly for three years. The interest rate for the five year plan is 24 percent, and 19 percent for the three year plan. The account holders cannot withdraw their money until after the three or five year period of paying in is completed. If they withdrew the money before the required time they have to pay a penalty.

Interestingly, people who are really qualified for such savings plans do not have them and have turned over the opportunities to their wealthy kinsmen in exchange for more immediate needs. In other words, rich peasants who are not eligible for the accounts buy the accounts from the poor. For the poor villagers, paying monthly installments for three or five years without having penalty-free access to the account is unthinkable, even though the interest rate is considerably higher than that in other kinds of accounts. The poor sell their accounts to the rich in return for private credit

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or tenancy. If the poor have kinsmen in the cities who can afford to make the monthly payments they sell the accounts to such kinsmen. Eight people gave their accounts to their employed children in cities, three people to brothers, and one person to his second cousin who bought the account for about a half hectare of corporate paddy land. Usually, money is not given in return for such account transfers. Something other than cash has been given in exchange.

Three people in Pine Tree and two people in Oak Tree have their sons and daughters pay the monthly payment of $84 for the anticipated expenses of their future marriage, while holding the accounts in their names. The parents explicitly explained to the children that they had to contribute money to the account to have their marriage realized. Two parents in Oak Tree and one parent in Pine Tree helped their children's marriages by having their children pay savings account installments. In such cases, the parents had to spend only $1,400-2,800 for miscellaneous expenditures, such as feast food and transportation fees for guests. A father of a married woman in Oak Tree asked "How could I have married off our daughter without her help?" The children's payments into the parents' accounts have played a considerable role in reducing the parental financial burdens.

Sikchon in Pine Tree, an employee in the cooperative, knew all the prospective applicants for the high interest accounts. He took several accounts from the poor and gave them to his kŭn aboji (father's elder brother), Chunpyo, who was one of the three major creditors in Pine Tree. Kunsun in Mulberry Tree, an employee in the township office, also reallocated accounts. The cooperative and township office are supposed to inform eligible people about the availability of these accounts and loans but

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some employees took these accounts and transferred them to close kinsmen, taking advantage of the ignorance of the eligible, unsuspecting villagers.

The coop savings account could be used as collateral to take out a $2,800-4,200 loan from the cooperative. This privilege is not likely to be enjoyed by the poor who cannot even maintain an account. Interestingly, some poor people bought accounts by sharing the burden of payments into the savings plan. Nayong, his daughter, Suran, and Chesu from Pine Tree shared an account. They are all poor. Each person paid in about $21 monthly and anticipate sharing the $8,400 in five years. This case shows how the poor overcame their income limitations and took advantage of what was offered.

C. Investment in stock and real estate

The government began last year to sell state owned corporation stock. It was part of the growing welfare system. Last year, peasants and urban workers who had less than 0.7 hectares of paddy or $840 monthly income respectively could apply for stock purchases. This year people could apply for up to 50 regular shares and 250 trust shares. The number of shares of stock they could buy was decided by the total number of applicants and available shares. This year an applicant was given 14-16 shares of regular stocks, and 20-25 shares of trust ones. The price of regular shares was $17 and that of trust shares $11. Trust shares could not be sold until three years passed after purchase. When they applied for the stocks, people were obligated to pay the total price for 50 shares of regular and 250 shares of trust stocks. When the actual amount of stock available was decided by the state, the difference between what they actually paid and what they were actually able to purchase was returned. While the decision on the amount of stocks was being made,

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the money deposited during the application period earned eight percent interest which was given to the depositors.

Last year the government sold Pohang steel corporation stock. The price per share was $14. The price rose to $56 soon after the public sales began. Last year most people did not know what stock was but soon after, the sales of stock stirred the village. It was known that some residents tripled their stock investment and the rest realized that they missed the chance to earn easy money. Most people eligible to buy stock were not informed about the state's plan. The coop officials were supposed to inform them but they took the shares of the poor for themselves or sold them to their close kinsmen as in the case of the special cooperative savings plan. Besides, the application period was during the most busy season for the villagers, the transplanting of rice seedlings and the barley harvest. Many eligible people missed the chance to apply for the stock purchase even if they knew about it.

Last year most stock purchasers were wealthy peasants and cooperative and township employees. There were two poor peasants who purchased stocks. They were solicited to sell their shares at about 50 percent above the price they originally paid and so they sold their stock to the buyers. Last year urban credit dealers visited every house in Pine Tree and Oak Tree to ask the villagers to sell their shares. Sumyong, an influential person in Oak Tree who actively bought the shares of fellow villagers, told the villagers in a monthly village meeting, "Last year we naive peasants sold our shares to the shrewd, bastard, urban dealers. We gave our profit to them. This time let's not sell our shares to them." Obviously, his argument aimed at persuading the people to keep their shares so that it would be easy for him to monopolize the villagers' shares of stocks afterward.

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Samkyun, a landless wage laborer in Oak Tree received a letter from a stock company. Hongsu, an employee of the cooperative said that he would complete the application procedure for Samkyun. Since it was against coop regulations for coop officials to buy peasants' share of stock, he could not directly take Samkyun's share. Instead, he paid for the 18 shares allocated to Samkyun. However, he did not show the account to Samkyun. Instead he bought 17 shares leaving one share in Samkyun's account to make it look as if Samkyun himself had bought the 18 shares and sold 17 shares to him. The profit from 17 shares was much higher than the loss incurred by leaving one free share. Samkyun did not know what happened and Hongsu never explained to him what he did about his shares of stock. Samkyun is still curious about what the letter and one stock in his account mean.

Gradually, the villagers began to learn more about the sale of stock. Their knowledge about stock at first is more or less summed up as "put down money and get more money." When the state announced the sales of stocks in April, 1989, the villagers were eager to know more about it and wanted to purchase their shares. This year, most villagers did not give or sell their shares to other villagers or coop employees. They purchased their allotted shares or circulated them among close kinsmen in the village and city. The villagers who were asked to buy the shares were likely to be the same close kinsmen who benefitted from the transfer of high interest coop savings accounts that they were ineligible to receive.

The villagers' interest in stock has grown as the general stock market has expanded. As an article in the August edition of the South China Post notes:

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> As of the end of last year, more than seven million Koreans, 16.7 percent of the total population, were registered as stock holders, compared with 750,000 in 1980. The total market size was estimated at more than $99 billion, with the total capital equivalent to 60 percent of the nation's GNP... many investors identify stocks with speculation, rather than investment... the stock market is a goose that lays golden eggs... Korea's price earnings ratios has already surpassed that of the U.S (12.7 times at the end of last year) and Hong Kong (12.1 times) (South China Morning Post August 15 1989).

The overall impact of the expanding stock market on the peasantry has been tremendous. Many peasants nationwide sold their land and pigs to buy stocks some having blind faith that buying stocks would make them rich. Actually, many people nationwide did reap great profits from the stock market especially since the 1988 Olympic. The villagers read about it in the newspapers and saw reports on TV, undoubtedly excited by the prospects.

An absentee landlady, Reman of Pine Tree, sold about a half hectare of paddy to Chikkyun who migrated from Pine Tree to Nasong city 15-20 years ago. He was a Kangho segment member and the second elder cousin of Nayong in Pine Tree. Chikkyun established the land as a corporate estate and let Nayong tenant it for a low rent. Nayong in return cared for Chikkyun's parents' graves in Pine Tree. Reman's selling of her land to make money to invest in stock created a half hectare of corporate land for the Kangho segment of the Umin lineage. As a result, Reman's tenant, Sangsa, who had been tenanting Reman's land for 11 years had a half hectare less land to tenant.

A stock company employee gave a lecture to the prospective customers in Chŏnju. His lecture provides some understanding of the relationships between the stock market and the power structure. He said:

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> We have 10 big hands that control the stock market. We do not know how big they are. But they certainly exist. The stock market is like a fish aquarium. The state controls the amount of water [stock prices] in the tank. Ordinary, small stock investors like us are like fish whose lives are determined by the hands that control the valves. When the water dwindles [when the prices fall sharply], we feel desperate to sell our shares even at the lowest prices. Then the big hands net the profit by purchasing our shares at very low prices. When the water level rises [price is rising), we keep our shares hoping the prices will continue to rise. But the hands are just waiting for the moment to open the valve when they want to purchase shares at low prices again.

What he meant by these metaphors is that the stock market is controlled by the state and big capitalists. The valve means that the state can manipulate the stock market by monetary and other government policies. In the summer of 1989, the state announced that people who earn a lot from the stock market and in real estate will have to pay a very high tax. This news made stock market prices plummet. Afterwards the state announced a one percent reduction of bank interest rates on November ninth. This news made the stock market sky rocket again. Indeed, the Korean stock market has been decided by a few hands.

The 30 biggest companies hold 17 billion dollar worth of 75,000 million shares of stock, which amounts to about 50 percent of the total value of the stocks in Korea (Chosŏnilpo May 23rd 1989). Such a large share of the stock market owned by a few capitalists makes the stock market vulnerable to their capitalistic whim. High inflation led people to invest in either stock or real estate in 1989, people felt that the inflation rate was painfully high despite the government's announcement of the rate being only six percent.

Hojin in Chonke village in the Yongsan township sold one hectare of his paddy land and sent the money, $28,000, to his son in Inchŏn to buy an apartment two years ago. In two years, the price of the apartment has at least

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tripled. Pine Tree and Oak Tree villagers envied him. In 1989, as Hojin was about to leave the village to live with his son in Inchŏn and he was one of the very few people in Yongsan township who had benefited considerably from the changes in the overall economy. Most ordinary and poor people lost a lot and continue to lose.

As Table 10 shows, profit from real estate was even larger than the total payment to employees in Korea in 1988.

Table 10--The proportion of land capital income to GNP

Land capital income	93
Gross national product	172
Payment to employees	70
Total manufactured produce	55

Source: Seoul Kyŏngje sinmun 8, 25, 1989.
Note: Unit is a billion dollars.

Rising real estate prices mean that peasants' children attending school or employed in the cities pay a lot for housing accommodations and their parents in the villages are increasingly burdened with financial woes. Such changes undoubtedly result in poor parents becoming further indebted to private creditors and/or the cooperatives.

The increasing need for money in the city makes the villagers divert cooperative loans as well as kye loan to the city. Kinsmen in cities have informally received coop loans through kinsmen living in the village. City people have great difficulty in getting bank loans, while peasants have relatively easy access to agricultural loans. Some of the coop loans that were supposed to be used for farming expenditures are sent to the cities for housing

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accommodations, and education expenses or investments in real estate, the stock market or business ventures. A coop employee said that probably half of the coop loans would be sent to the cities.

The peasants' use of coops loans for the purpose of investment in real estate and the stock market has debilitated the cooperative's financial condition. The state recently announced that the number of coops would be reduced and operations will become more centralized to control the financial dealings with peasants more efficiently. It remains to be seen how peasants will face the new administrative situation and what methods they will employ to benefit from the system.

The stock market and real estate have influenced the peasantry in diverse ways and though some of them have gained by investing in stock and real estate, most have lost. The growth of the stock market and increase in real estate prices are typical phenomena in the development of capitalism and Korea is not an exception to this pattern. The Korean peasantry has been badly hurt by the state's focus on the development of heavy industry at the expense of the rural economy. Now the peasants are affected by the ramification of the capitalist development of the stock and real estate markets. The Pine Tree and Oak Tree social structures have been fractured and reformulated by the process of capital accumulation which is a consequence of capitalism. The peasants' reactions to such changes are found in their strategies of saving and investment. However, equal opportunities with favorable conditions are not accessible to the poor. The state's welfare system actually helps to further differentiate the rich and the poor, with the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming poorer.

The peasant's adaptation to the fluctuating economy has eventually led to inequality. The rich are able to use and have used the opportunities

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created by capitalist development. In doing so, they have taken the poor's share. The way for the rich to acquire money to invest in such opportunities unavoidably has infringed on the poor's economic base. The wealth accumulation of the rich does not involve the economic sphere alone. It included the entire social process of the community as shown in the last two chapters. Savings is one of the methods for the rich to further accumulate wealth. The wealthy need a wide social network to reproduce the economic operations that enhance and maintain their financially superior position. Poor people, involved in the accumulation process in a hapless manner, have become more impoverished.

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
Chapter 8. Coops

Agricultural cooperatives in Korea are state dominated. The first coop like organization was the Kwangju credit cooperative established in 1907. It was owned and operated by the Japanese. The coops gave loans to wealthy Japanese and Korean landlords while lending money to the poor peasants at higher interest rates. The Japanese Government-General established "credit cooperatives" and "industrial cooperatives," which were more or less a state bank. These coops were not accessible by the general public. In the same year the Korean people set up indigenous cooperatives. The coops offered loans to the general public at 10 percent interest per annum. However, the Korean peasantry's ability or interest in taking advantage of such loans was negligible due to poverty.

After the liberation from the Japanese in 1945, an "agricultural bank" and "agricultural cooperative" were established in 1957 and 1958 respectively. These two organizations merged and were renamed the "agricultural cooperative" on August 15, 1961 (Chin 1986). The state played a leading role in the establishment and organization of the cooperative. Contrary to the use of the term, the Korean cooperative has been a state organization; the villagers who are members have no direct input into decision making. The charter of the Korean cooperative states that "This law is aimed at achieving balanced development of the people's economy by boosting agricultural production and improving the peasants' economic and social status through an autonomous cooperative organization (coops)." However, the influence of peasants has been negligible.

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Fig. 24--A schematized diagram to show the relationships between local coops and the higher units



First, Korean peasants do not have enough funds to operate the local coops autonomously. As diagram above shows, the source of loan funds for the local coops comes from the central headquarters of the cooperative. Local coops are supervised by the central headquarters. The Yongsan township cooperative has been totally financed by the central cooperative headquarters since its opening in the 1960s because the revenues from the township area are extremely limited compared to other areas. Previously, the state appointed the director of the coops. In the 1980's, the Yongsan township cooperative chief was elected by 40 representatives selected from 424 coops members hailing from the 17 villages in the township. Other employees have been hired by passing examinations and/or receiving recommendations of influential people.

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The cooperative in Yongsan township has three major functions. First it buys rice in November, barley in June, and other cash crops. Second, it sells pesticide, chemical fertilizer, packaged fodder, petroleum, and daily necessities. It is like a supermarket without perishable items such as vegetables and meat. Prices are supposed to be cheaper than other retailers in the cities for the benefit of peasant buyers, but the differences in prices are negligible. People prefer buying things in Pian town market more than buying from the cooperative store which has limited options and similar prices.

Third, the cooperative has a banking role. Peasants can have cooperative savings accounts and take out loans. Unless the state provides the local coops with funds, the peasants would not be able to have access to loans. Regular banks in the towns and cities take peasants' deposits but avoid lending money to them. From the bank's point of view loans to peasants are too small to be profitable considering the high cost of their processing. Second, the rate of default is too high because of low income. Third, agricultural loans require too long a period of repayment. Villagers in the Yongsan township are dependent almost entirely on the local cooperative for savings accounts and loans.

A. Cooperative loans

Villagers have access to various kinds of cooperative loans. "Agricultural loans" and "general loans" are the major loans offered. For the last several years the state has offered agricultural loans with an eight percent per annum interest rate through the cooperative, which is the lowest rate among other kinds of regularly offered loans. Borrowers pay a fee, seven dollars, to the coops for processing and other administrative purposes. The

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state's intended purpose of the loan is to help peasants finance farm production.

A villager's share of the "agricultural loans" in Yongsan township has increased to $1,400 in 1989. The loan is paid out in three payments starting in the spring and ending in the fall. For example, if a villager receives a $1,400 loan, they will receive about $467 in April, July, and October. Funds for "agricultural loans" are allocated to the Yongsan township cooperative by the central cooperative headquarters. The Yongsan township cooperative allocates the funds to the 17 villages according to the number of households in each village.

Pine Tree was given $32,200 from the coops in 1989. The villagers had a meeting to decide who would receive funds and how much. All the villagers without exception wanted to get their share. A loan with eight percent interest was too good a bargain to overlook. Party members, the village chief, and NVM director in Pine Tree are formally in control of the decision process. Kinship affiliation, as in most other cases, was indirectly involved in the decision making process. Five people were excluded from the loan. In fact, they were not even informed about the loan. Four of them were widows and divorced women who lived alone and one was a male wage laborer who was considered retarded. Two categories of people are favored: applicants who have many close kinsmen who advocate their cause and applicants who have inevitable and large expenses due to upcoming rituals. People without kinsmen are likely to be ignored unless they try to get the loan by their own effort.

The village influentials gave priority to the people who would soon have ritual expenses incurred by such events as a child's wedding, a 60th birthday celebration or to persons who needed money to pay medical bills.

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The villagers rarely mentioned the need for money to cover productive costs. Muyong's wife said to Hayong (NVM director), and Sangsa (village chief) that she needed the money for her daughter's empyema operation. Muyong was Hayong's older cousin (see section on genealogy). She was given $1,400.

Kisang had a spine operation two years ago. His total debt to the cooperative was about $12,600. His disease and his son's failure in business and school, put him heavily into debt. People cannot apply for the "agricultural loan" if their debt to the cooperative is over $7,000. Kisang asked his brother Sikchon to apply for the loan in his name. The maximum loan amount was $1,400 per person. Sikchon was allowed to have twice the maximum or $2,800. Sikchon did it reluctantly, complaining that he also needed money for his son. Kisang belongs to Songhyon Kim lineage and it is questionable whether he would have received the same treatment if he had no kinsmen.

Not all people were as fortunate as Kisang. Tongho in Oak Tree wanted to receive his share of the "agricultural loans." He borrowed about $11,200 from the cooperative to buy two motor tillers and a transplanter. He was not eligible for the loan because of his debt and so he looked for people who would apply for the loan in their name on his behalf. No one wanted to do it and Tongho failed to get the loan. He felt bitter for two reasons. He could not get the lowest interest rate loan that came only once a year and he was disappointed by the fact that he could not get anyone to help him because he did not belong to any major lineage or surname group. He had migrated to Oak Tree from another village about 25 years ago. He tenants Oak Tree villagers' land and earns cash by using his machines to work other people's farms.

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The wealthy have their share of the loan funds too, despite the fact that the loan is preferably given to needy people. Kimbo, one of the major creditors in the village, was, at first, persuaded by the village chief and the director not to seek a loan in the village meeting. Kimbo was angry. He said "the government gave us the loan for the purpose of farming. I have more land than any of you. I need more money to farm a larger land." In the end, Kimbo received his share of $1,400. The villagers complained that "he will use it to do sachenori (private lending)." Kimbo's reasoning was right according to the state's purpose of the loan. However, he was against the local readjustment of the official view of the loan since it dampened his chances of getting a low interest loan. After hassling for about two hours, the village chief and Hayong decided to give most household heads attending the meeting $700 and $1,400 to Kimbo and those villagers who would soon have big ritual and medical expenses

All the villagers know that the money is not going to defray the costs of farming. When they receive each payment of $467, the money will be spent on all kinds of socially reproductive expenditures. The borrowers must pay it back after the November harvest in the same year of receiving the loan. Therefore, borrowers must begin to repay one month after they get the last payment or $467. Borrowers do not even have one year to recover financial solvency. Even though this loan has a low interest rate it can easily drive villagers into a debt cycle. For most loans, loan applicants need to have two guarantors. To alleviate the problem of reluctance to provide security for other villagers' loans, people make "shoulder guarantees" where three loan applicants become guarantors to each other.

Besides "agricultural loans", villagers can apply for a "general loan." General loans can be divided into two types of loans: "credit loans" and

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"collateral loans." The interest rate for both of these loans is 14.5 percent. A "credit loan" means that villagers borrow money based on the borrower's assets and past credit history. This kind of loan is exclusively for wealthy peasants. It does not require guarantors or collateral since it is assumed that these borrowers are sure to repay both the principal and interest. The maximum credit loan amount is $7,000. A "collateral loan" is a loan that people can borrow by using their property as collateral until the loan is fully repaid. The ratio of the collateral value to the loan value is about 2:1. People must put up 0.35 hectares of paddy as security to borrow $7,000. The maximum collateral loan amount is $14,000. However, a villager said that people could borrow as much money as they had collateral to put up as security against default. The largest portion of the villagers' official debt is due to taking out "general loans" which account for about 70 percent of the total debt. As the repayment demand note sent out by the coop shows below, the principal and interest must be paid 11 months after the date the loan was taken.

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Fig. 25--A sample of the repayment demand note

Repayment Demand Note (The first time)

Dear, we notified you many times about your date of repayment. However, you still have not paid. I ask you again to repay it by ___ year, ___ month ___day.

The coop membership number, October 1984.

Kind	Purpose	Date of loan	Principal	Date of repayment	Interest	Total
General		1987, 12, 30	$371	1988, 11, 30	$33	$404

People wait until they receive this note from the cooperative several times before they pay interest. They pay the interest when the note states that compound interest will be charged if the payment is not made.

Since the 1970's, the villagers have received many special loans from the state such as a "peasant house repair loan" in 1978, an "agricultural machinery loan" in 1980, and an "industrious peasants' education loan" in 1981. As one of the villagers said, those loans are like "giving medicine after giving disease." In effect, these loans are window dressing provided by the state. Such loans are politically motivated and only one or two people in the village have received them. The receiver must have a "healthy mind." People who are "difficult to educate" are not eligible for these loans. Very poor, landless people are also excluded from such loans. In fact, examining these two types of special loans can aid in understanding the social structure of the community.

The "agricultural successor's loan" was designed by the state to encourage young people to stay in their villages to do mechanized farming. For each of the last three years, Pine Tree villagers have received $8,400-9,800

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in loans with an annual interest rate of five percent to carry on, repaid in five years with a two year grace period. Like the "machinery loan" discussed in the Chapter 5, the Songhyon and Umin Kim have alternately received special loans. Three years ago, the first person to receive the loan was Samgu, a Umin Kim. His brother worked in the township office and Samgu said that his brother was helpful in getting the loan. Receiving such a loan takes more than a straight forward application for credit and other transactional matters. The screening of applicants involves reviewing the applicant's political and kinship affiliation, a review that influences the chances of receiving a special loan.

The "agricultural successor's loan" and "machinery loan" have similar implications. The state's plan to encourage a few young men to farm by providing cheap credit illustrates the state's determination to drive people out of rural farming and to establish large size farms, managed by a small number of young people with machinery to ease peasant problems. The state has tried to form an "agricultural company" that would employ young peasants to engage in mechanized farming. However, this plan is unfeasible, because the large number of people living in the rural areas are not guaranteed employment even if they migrate to the cities. Providing cheap credit to young people seems to be the second option for the state to reduce peasant problems.[33] This issue will be elaborated in Chapter 10.

Second, a "land purchase loan" was offered in 1988. This $7,000 loan at five percent interest was given to one person. Ironically, landless peasants were excluded from applying by the cooperative and the village since the loan

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[33] In the 1980s rural impoverishment led peasants to organize the self-help group Nongmin hoe. Their movement is economically and politically oriented. The confrontation between the state and the peasantry has become violent, as the Korean agricultural market has been opened by the state to freely import U.S. crops.

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required collateral and guarantors. Finally, Nayong who had 0.21 hectares of paddy land and raised 11 pigs received a loan. It was Hayong, Nayong's cousin, who helped to direct the loan to Nayong. In most cases, the applicant for special loans with large amounts and low interest rates must be approved by the NVM head. Hayong was the head. The state's explicit purpose for the loan was contradicted by how the loan was actually given. The coop wanted the loan to be given to a financially needy person who could use it to successfully invest in an agricultural enterprise that would yield a profit and pay back the loan. Even if the coop did not enforce the criteria for receiving the loan, the transaction had been done as the coop wished. The cooperative office, aware of the village's social structure, knew that the Pine Tree villagers would not allow landless people access to loans and that such people would be ignored.

Third, a "private credit repayment loan" was given in 1986. The purpose of the loan was to help peasants to escape debt by paying off high interest private loans. The loan was made in the context of the state's social awareness of the peasants' increasing indebtedness. An indebted peasant's suicide note in Chungchŏng province demonstrated the problem most dramatically to the general public. The note simply said "debt, debt, debt." He drank pesticide and killed himself. The conditions of the loan were a five percent interest rate, with a five year period of repayment and a two year grace period. For this same loan 23 people in Pine Tree took out loan amounts from $840 to $1,400.

The loan was not a great help in solving private debt problems especially among the extremely poor who used the money right away for living expenses instead of paying off their debts. It did not matter whether they would pay their creditors with money or spend it on their living

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expenses, because their ineligibility to get cooperative loans would eventually lead them to use private credit to pay off private debts. Such a loan was like "pouring water in an urn without a bottom".

For the state cooperative, loans have more ideological value than practical value. It demonstrates the state's interest to take over the role of the private creditor in the rural credit market. This year the ratio of official to private loans was about 85:15. I think that the ratio of credit before the 1970's was the opposite of the present ratio. This means that it is the state that will play the major role in peasants' credit transactions. Since the state has become the villagers' primary source of credit, social relations in the village have drastically changed. Private creditors' hegemonic relationships over debtors and debtors' deference toward creditors has been transformed to despair and defiance respectively. Most people who no longer get credit from wealthy villagers and now are indebted to the coops show contempt and disobedience to the private creditors. In turn, creditors feel bitter about the change in previous debtors' attitude towards them. Subordination has been transformed into defiance.

The interest rate charged by private creditors has decreased from 50 percent in the 1960's to 15-20 percent in 1989. This has been due to the low interest loans offered by the state-controlled cooperative for the past 20 years. The lowering of the interest rate by private creditors illustrates their painful acceptance of the changing relationships with debtors. Not all the debtors show changes in their relations with creditors, however, there are many very poor people who are not eligible for cooperative loans and resort to private credit.

The relationships between villagers debtors and the cooperative are different from those with village creditors. The cooperative is a more

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bellicose partner in credit relationships than are private creditors. The state has direct, coercive power to make debtors follow the state-set rules for repayment. Defaulters are corrected, forcibly if necessary, by state power. As one villager said "the cooperative is a creditor without blood and tears." As the cooperative becomes the major lender in the village, the way the debtors react to cooperative credit becomes different from reactions towards private creditors. When a person was unable to repay their debt, the debtors could beg the creditor to give him a break or offer to work on the creditors' farm or do domestic chores. However this is not so with the cooperative.

Sometimes debtors simply did not pay or did pansem that is, to declare that they were unable to pay the debt and asked their creditors to take their property. Pansem debtors usually moved to the cities to avoid "shame." Even though pansem impose a "great shame" on the person and close kinsmen, there is no legal enforcement of payment or legal confiscation of property. People usually make oral contracts based on each other's trust and kinship collateral. People in Pine Tree remember three cases of pansem. Pansem is "shameful" but it is an available last resort for the debtors to liberate themselves from the yoke of indebtedness.

Many villagers borrow money from both the cooperative and private creditors. When people borrow money from villagers, lenders and borrowers know the purpose of the loan and the debtor's intention and ability to pay the loan. Debtors can hardly play tricks with private creditors. However, peasants trick the state lending agency, the cooperative, by misusing loans, waiting until the last moment to pay despite the ability to repay, using less indebted kinsmen to borrow money for them to circumvent the credit limit set by the coop, and being guarantors to each other to conceal their inability to pay off a possible default.

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The previous relationships with village creditors encompass all the layers of social existence of both the creditor and debtor. Debtors have fewer loopholes through which they can escape from the tight mutually known and understood social relations of production. These relationships create a kind of domination that imbues all aspects of the debtors' and creditors' lives. The state obviously exerts domination over the peasant with unquestionable power. Yet, the state power cannot control all aspects of the social relationships of peasants. Ironically, it is the state's gigantic power that leaves room for the peasants to maneuver and use the state system in culturally structured ways. However, the peasants' active maneuvering within state power must not be misunderstood. Gramsci's (1971) notion of hegemony is revealing in this context. Hegemony is not maintained by the use of "force" alone. More importantly, hegemony is maintained by consent. Letting people violate the regulations of the cooperative does not destroy the system. Rather the state gains control over the people at less expense.

The cooperative is enmeshed in the organization of the community. Coop officials are involved in the social relations and activities in the village. They are invited to rituals. They participate not only as coop officials but as members of the community. The cooperative knows how loans are actually allocated and used in the village. Most of all, the cooperative officials know that loans are misused, improper guarantors sign for the loans, people lie about the amount of collateral, actual borrowers use others to apply and receive loans for them and so forth. The tolerance of the cooperative towards these irregularities does no actual harm to the coop organization. The cooperative officials know that loans are given to ineligible people and are used for purposes different from those intended.

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For example, the loan allocations given out by the Yongsan township coop was about three million dollars in 1989. It is believed that half of the total loans taken by villagers went to relatives living in the cities. In 1989, my key informant, Chiju borrowed $7,000 using his cows as collateral. He can easily borrow money from the cooperative because he is commonly known to be a wealthy dairy farmer. He sent the coop loan money to his brother whose pharmacy business in Seoul went bankrupt. As already noted when the villagers' children buy or rent a house or start a business, they ask their parents in the village to take out a coop loan for them. This happens because it is extremely difficult for urbanites to borrow money from city banks since the loan rules and regulations are stringent and strictly enforced. However, peasants can take out a coop loan relatively easily if they have some land and guarantors.

The cooperative does not tolerate all irregularities. When a credit transaction is an obvious risk and the possibility of collecting the principal and interest is low, the cooperative protects its interests by ensuring that transaction rules are formally followed. For example, the cooperative prohibits borrowers from exceeding limits on loan amounts. In 1989, Pine Tree villagers were allocated a special $14,000 livestock loan without interest. At a village meeting it was decided that five people would share the loan. The coop, however, opposed the plan. The cooperative officials insisted that ten people share the loan because if one person has a $2,800 loan, the debtor would have difficulty in paying the principal. Having 10 people instead of five share the loan would allow the coop to recoup the money. In addition, this special loan was a sensitive issue for both the cooperative and the borrowers because it was a special "gift" loan from the state; the loan did not require borrowers to pay interest. This type of loan has a stronger political

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implication than periodic and general loans. Such special loans have a demonstrative effect on the peasantry and the whole nation. This special loan was allocated to Pine Tree villagers with the help of Chiju's brother-in-law who worked in the Tori county office. The principal was to be paid one year after the loan was given. If payment is not forthcoming on the due date, the cooperative is responsible for the payment of interest to the county cooperative. These special loans have been mediated through the local coop and the coop is responsible for the repayment. Local coop officials also will be rebuked by the county level cooperative and county office.

Distributing small loans to many villagers instead of giving large loans to a few people is like putting eggs in many baskets. Pine Tree villagers know that a loan of $2,800 along with their own supplementary money is necessary to buy two or three cows. A $1,400 loan was not believed to be of any real help. For example, each applicant asked their kinsmen to apply for a $1,400 loan for them. Five people and the village chief then went to the cooperative with five other villagers' seals. Chiju and the village chief filled out ten application forms. All ten people became guarantors for each other. The cooperative officials knew that five people would eventually share $14,000. Nevertheless, the loans contracts were made with 10 people. If a loan is not paid on time, the cooperative will claim the unpaid money from the two people who signed as guarantors for the loan.

The primary concern of the cooperative is not how strictly borrowers follow the rules but whether or not the principal and interest will be repaid on time. The cooperative prefers that debtors keep the principal on account while continually paying interest on it. The borrowers' unpaid interest accruing principal is a generative source of cooperative income. The most disastrous thing that could happen to the cooperatives next to the debtors'

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total financial bankruptcy is the removal of the loan principal from the cooperative account. Many Pine Tree villagers continually pay interest on their coop loans without paying the principle.

Poor and wealthy peasants have different ways of using and repaying coop loans. Living and ritual expenses account for the major share of the poor's use of coop loans. However, spending loans on such purposes has socially productive value because the poor use loan money anyway for rituals or living expenses that might have been used for productive cost such as buying fertilizer. The loans fulfill needs necessary for village social reproduction.

The poor usually pay interest on outstanding coop loans after receiving a warning that they will be charged compound interest if payment is not made. After paying the interest to avoid the compound interest rate of 18 percent, they renew the loan contract with the cooperative and continue to pay interest on the unpaid principal.

Not paying the principal is the only option open to poor villagers. Wealthy peasants on the other hand intentionally postpone paying the principal by only paying the interest as poor people do. For rich villagers, not paying the principal is one of many options. No matter how they will use the loan money, it is still profitable to lend it to fellow villagers at 15-20 percent interest per annum, or to put it in rice kye which guarantees 20 percent interest, or invest in stock and real estate in the city. For example, Taehyon in Mulberry Tree takes out general coop loans at 8-14.5 percent interest, using his large property as collateral. He then loans the money to the poor for their social reproduction and to the wealthy for wealth reproduction.

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Table 11--The ratio of cooperative debt to the total assets among five categories.

	Very poor	Poor	ordinary	wealthy	Very wealthy
Property	0.14 hectares, one cow	0.56 hectares, two cows	one hectare	0.7 hectares, seven dairy cattle	2.8 hectares, rice mill, seven cattle
Total asset (A)	8,400 dollars	25,200 dollars	42,000 dollars	47,600 dollars	280,000 dollars
Total coops debt (B)	2,100 dollars	2,800 dollars	4,200 dollars	5,040 dollars	21,000 dollars
B/A ratio	25 %	11 %	10 %	9 %	7.5%

Note: Total assets are calculated by adding the total value of the animals, the amount of land and the machinery, the three major kinds of property. I also examined other criteria than these three to decide economic status. Remittances from children, the number of children were considered. The figures in the tables are simplified for clarity.

As Table 11 shows the larger land holders have more coop debt than the poor. The ratio of the wealthy villagers' debt to their total assets is considerably smaller than that of the poor, which means that the smaller amount of debt is more burdensome to the poor than the large amount of debt is to the wealthy.

The villagers try hard to avoid compound interest, which is disastrous especially for poor debtors in two respects. First, they have to pay a higher interest rate than wealthy people. Second, their desperate need for money is used by private lenders who charge a 20-25 percent interest rate compared

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with the 15 percent interest rate charged to non-poor villagers. The people who cannot afford to pay the interest are likely to be very poor peasants who will be charged with compound interest. Their expression for this situation is ŏpchinde dŏpchinda [roughly translated, when it rains it pours]. One of the extremely poor debtors charged with compound interest said "I do not even know where I spent the loan. It disappeared so quickly."

When they start to pay interest or compound interest, their burden and agony remain with them for a very long time. Spending cash is easy but earning cash is not. If a person has a $4,200 coop debt, which is the average in Pine Tree, the debtor must pay a $588 interest charge to extend the loan contract for another year. The debtors have to keep paying the deferment amount to postpone paying the three million won principal. It becomes a "annual ceremony" to pay $588. If compound interest is paid the borrower must pay $756. Poorer people usually have to pay $168 more because they cannot pay the interest on time and are charged at the compound interest rate.

Paying compound interest differentiates the very poor from poor. As the very poor lose their property to pay their debt to the cooperative and private creditors they become ineligible for further coop loans. Few people want to be guarantors for the very poor. Therefore, they lose access to coop loans. They become drawn into the private credit system where their social reproduction is conditioned by private creditors. The very poor person pays a high private credit interest rate and becomes subordinate to the creditor. The poor debtors must attend and give contributions to the creditors' rituals and work for them planting rice seedlings and harvesting. Various forms of non-reimbursed labor make the actual interest higher than the normative figure of 20-25 percent.

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Poor people often borrow money from private creditors to pay the interest on coop loans. They also use "agricultural loans" to pay the interest on "general loans". The desperate seeking for money to avoid paying compound interest forms a vicious debt cycle from which poor people can hardly escape. For instance, Kisang has not found a solution for his increasing debt problem. He said that "I feel like dying. I want to go to a Buddhist temple deep in the mountain where I can be totally separated from the people. But I have to pay some money to the monks to live in the temple."

Easy access to coop loans has two distinctive features. The loan undoubtedly helps people in production and consumption. It plays a role in forestalling the total bankruptcy of the village poor and in helping the agricultural business of the wealthy. Another feature is that easy credit entangles villagers in a credit web. A villager in Oak Tree said:

> These days the many branches of the coop made peasants more indebted. In the old days we had cooperatives only in the big administrative unit. Now most townships have a coop. It is now easier for peasants to borrow money. The coop is supposed to help peasants to farm. It turned out that it made us indebted.

The debt cycle has influenced the debtors' participation in various kinds of wage labor and has affected the domestic household cycle and emotional life. Two or three months before the payment due date in December or January, debtors go out to nearby towns or cities to work as wage laborers to earn cash to pay the interest. The male household head's temporary migration to the city obviously changes the domestic structure. The wife and children come to habitually live without their husband and father for two or three months. In addition to her domestic chores, the wife

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has to take over the husband's work such as cutting grass and feeding the animals in winter. Men working in the city at construction sites often follow a sequence of adultery and subsequent disruption of their family. Such cases did not happen in recent years, but several men in the past discarded their families and ran away with women whom they met around their work place.

Summary

The villagers' social reproduction has been increasingly conditioned by their financial dealings with the coop. The present chapter attempts to demonstrate the relationships between the villagers and the coop. My intention in this chapter is to show how the state's power through the coop is intertwined with the villagers' culture, with each influencing the other. I try to illustrate how peasants reacted to the imposition of state power; how state power has maintained its hegemonic role over the peasants by loosening its grip on them; how the same loan was consumed in different ways by rich, poor, and very poor; and how the different ways in which loans were consumed produce different effects.

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Chapter 9. Politics and Kinship

In this chapter I shall discuss the interaction between kinship and politics by analyzing three elections: the election of the village chief, cooperative chief, and the election of the National Assembly. Undoubtedly the manipulation of kinship affiliation has been used in campaign strategies. Tensions break out when people in the same lineage group became divided during a campaign. I shall highlight the cohesion and disintegration of kinship affiliations during these three election campaigns.

A. The function of the village chief

The village chief (ijang) system was invented during the Japanese colonial period. The purpose of the system was to facilitate the penetration of the colonial power into every small village throughout the nation. The village chief was a "local terminal" of the power echelon. Such a system was necessary for the Japanese to efficiently extract wealth from the peasants who constituted the majority of population.

The village chief system was maintained even after the liberation from the Japanese. A newly created republican state needed the continuation of most of the functions of the chief system in order to facilitate the state's rural administration.

The unchanging roles of the village chief are tax collection, and the collection of demographic and economic data for the state. In this respect, the village chief has remained as an intermediary between the state and the villagers (see Yi Man-gap 1982). The increase in the number of roles held by the village chief in rural areas is inevitable due to the ever greater demands originating from managing an increasingly complicated state machinery. As

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the functions of the village chief have increased, his importance and influence also have increased.

As capitalism has developed in Korea, all economic sectors, including the peasantry, have been incorporated in the process of economic development and change. As a result, the peasantry has become ever more closely linked to the operations of the state machinery. The village chief fulfill the expected roles of meeting the state's demand in the rural villages. In addition to the roles of the village chief instituted during the colonial period, two major roles were added to the contemporary village chief's duty: fulfilling a role in implementing the welfare system and in carrying out tasks of political persuasion.

The expansion of the welfare system shows how deeply the state is involved in the rural economy. The state recently tried to prevent total destitution in some sections of the rural population. This effort may be carried out as a genuine attempt to help starving people, as a political gesture initiated by the state to flaunt its concern, or as an attempt to prevent embarrassment by covering up the country's poor and neglected. Whatever the purpose is, the so called saengboyanggok (minimal subsistence provision) has helped destitute people to sustain their lives. In order to receive it, the applicant must be very poor, very old, and have no supportive offspring. The provision actually relieves the cost of social reproduction of an ordinary person. A beneficiary receives about 15 kilograms of rice, 20-30 pressed charcoal cylinders (yŏntan), and sometimes a monthly stipend of $28-42.

Hera and Hogan in Pine Tree have been recipients. Actually, Hogan is not eligible for assistance because his only son was recently hired as a supervisor in a construction company in Chŏnju. The family registry in the Yongsan township confirms that Hogan is supposed to be financed by his son.

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However, the son does not, in fact, help his father. He does not even visit his father. The villagers' explanation is that the son discarded Hogan because he has never been given any help from Hogan during most of his life.

Hogan [Kasap segment of the Umin lineage] has a younger sister who married Yolpyon, a wealthy Songhyon Kim. However, she has not substantially helped her starving brother. Hogan is a 79 year old sickly and stooped man. He is too sick to speak understandable Korean. He owns a crumbling thatched roofed house, one of the two houses in Pine Tree not affected by the NVM. He owns about 150 pyŏng (0.05 hectares) of dry land on the west hillside of Pine Tree. He is too weak to farm paddy or to sell his labor. He cultivates potato on his small dry land. The distance between the potato field and his house is too great for him to carry the heavy potato harvest in sacks to his house. He asks Park Hibyon to carry three sacks of potato to his house. In return, he bought Hibyon a bottle of makkŏlli the next day.

All the villagers including Sangsa, the village chief, knew how Hogan sustained his living. Sangsa told me that he was obliged to help Hogan in getting the state provision even though Hogan's son in the family registry officially made it impossible for Hogan to receive it. Sangsa said "I made it" which meant he had arranged for Hogan to receive the provision by whatever means were available to him. I do not know exactly how he accomplished this, but we should be aware that this not easily explicable aspect of Sangsa's work has particular significance in understanding rural culture and history. The villagers often said "there is nothing possible and there is nothing impossible." This paradoxical statement demonstrates an essential aspect of local politics. The state-set rules are not always

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meticulously observed. The state's imposition has always been implemented after being filtered through the local level politics and culture.

When there is a communal consensus, the village chief is obliged to do things as the people expect him to do. Helping Hogan receive the provision was one such thing. Besides, the chief should have enthusiasm and a charismatic disposition to convince township employees to pass Hogan's application. It was an even more significant fact that township administrators accepted Sangsa's demand. The villagers and the township administrators tolerate some violation of state rules for the sake of chŏng [It is very difficult to translate this word. It roughly means benevolent human emotion, or altruism].

What I want to highlight in Hogan's case of receiving a legally unrealizable state provision is the village chief's influence in easing some villagers' life. On the other hand, he is conditioned by the village power structure. If he had chosen a relatively wealthy person to receive the provision, his actions would have been checked by other people. Hogan was believed to be the most desperate person in the village by all the residents. Therefore, his choosing Hogan did not meet with any resistance. He has the right to understand and evaluate the villagers' situations. Therefore, he has the right to exclude some other needy people unless his decision is criticized by the majority of the villagers. Even though his decision has been conditioned by other influential people [Hayong or Hwahong] directly and the villagers as a whole indirectly, he is ultimately responsible for the welfare recipients' applications.

I could see the village chief's influence more vividly in the handling of cooperative loans and stock application procedures. The villagers held meetings to discuss who will get how much of the loan funds allocated to

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Pine Tree. Since the village chief led the meeting, he had the capacity to advance many of his ideas and move many things in the direction of his preferences. People who needed a greater share than the assumed average amount for each individual asked the chief for it. Then the chief found ways to cut some villagers' shares and divert them to those asking for more, if he thought that their request was appropriate.

The chief also exerts his influence in the purchase of stock. If some villagers could not afford to buy their allotted shares, the chief was the first one to know how many stocks were not purchased and available for sale. He then informed those people who wanted to buy more than their share. However, the village chief's favoring some villagers over others often created serious problems. In the 1970's, when Kisang, a Songhyon Kim, was the village chief, he paid money to some Songhyon Kim who participated in the communal labor. The Umin Kim were not paid even though they also worked for the communal project. The incident sparked Umin Kim complaints. Kisang denied paying his lineage men. However, favoring his lineage men was confirmed by Hayong, a Umin Kim, who co-managed the fund.

The chief receives $42 and about 15 kilograms of barley and rice at each harvest. This small remuneration makes the village chief position unattractive. However, he gains other not easily recognizable rewards. Since he represents the village to the township administration, he has frequent contacts with the power holders in the township and at the provincial level. Therefore, he can, if he chooses to do so, build up his personal connection with such people. Once in a while, high ranking officials come to Pine Tree to see how developmental plans have been implemented. During their visit, Sangsa escorted them and gave them a tour of the village and the villagers'

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works. His exclusive right to converse with and to inform the visitors increased Sangsa's power.

Undoubtedly the position of village chief can be used as a step to achieve a higher position. The village chief may campaign for the position of the cooperative chief or for a position in the township office in the future, using his connections built up during his tenure as village head. More importantly, the position of village chief is not just an individual matter but a lineage matter. The chief can act as a protective "wall" and source of pride for the lineage to which he belongs. The status of the power balance between two Kim lineages is seen most easily by observing which Kim lineage person takes over the village chief position and which lineage is most influential in determining the actions of the village chief.

B. The Election of the Chief

As the Songhyon and Umin Kim vie with each other in having a man of their own lineage providing a "wall" [protection] and favors, the villagers keenly participated in the process of electing the village chief. The way the villagers chose the chief must be described in some detail because this will demonstrate how kinship and politics have been intertwined, resulting in the formation of a distinctive village political culture.

Recently, the state recommends that the village chief is to be elected by the villagers' popular vote and the elected chief to be approved by the township chief. However, there was only one popular election for determining the village chief in the history of the village. Instead of a popular vote, influential people in the formal village political echelon and lineage affairs predetermined the prospective chief. Over the years, the Umin and Songhyon Kim alternately have placed their own lineage man in the

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position. This alternate sharing of power has been an implicit rule agreed upon by both lineages.

Kisang was the chief in the late 1960's and early 1970's when NVM development funds were given to the village. It was known that he embezzled some of the funds. The Umin Kim were upset by his behavior. Hayong, a Umin Kim and NVM director, asked Kisang to disclose the account records for the fund, but Kisang had burned all the records claiming that his young son accidently set them afire. However, no villager believed what he said. After the embezzlement case, the Umin Kim and other non-Kim villagers joined together and proposed to replace Kisang. The Songhyon Kim accepted the proposal in return for the cessation of the accusations made against Kisang. In 1975, Muyong, a Umin Kim was chosen to be the new chief. Muyong was Hayong's older second cousin and was perceived by the villagers to be a charismatic figure. Hayong enthusiastically supported Muyong. The transition of control over the village chief from a Songhyon to a Umin Kim proceeded without difficulty, with the exception of Kisang's grudge against the Umin Kim and especially Hayong.

As Muyong took over the position of chief, he also was accused of embezzling village funds. The Songhyon Kim asked for his resignation. But Muyong and the Umin Kim denied the allegation and opposed the Songhyon Kim's attempt to oust Muyong. Both sides finally decided to resort to a popular vote in choosing a chief. The Umin Kim nominated their man, Muyong. Ironically, the Songhyon Kim nominated Sujae, a Umin Kim, as their candidate. Sujae's father-in-law was Yongsan, a Songhyon Kim.

Generally speaking, in Korea, the relationship between a male ego and his father in law is particularly close. Both sides feel strongly obligated to help each other. I believe that the father-in-law must treat the son-in-law nicely to

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ensure fair treatment of his daughter by the son-in-law's family [son-in-law's parents and unmarried siblings]. The daughter is a kind of insurance that encourages the father-in-law to behave favorably toward the son in law and his family. On the other hand, the son-in-law must show great respect toward the father-in-law who gave his daughter in marriage. Most villagers call their father-in-laws abŏnim [an honorific word of abŏji (father)) instead of the formal term changin (father in law). The relationship between in-laws demands caution and tact.

Since Sujae's father died after the civil war, Yongsan has played the role of Sujae's father. Sujae also received some land from Yongsan as part of his wife's dowry. Both of them have been pumashi partners. On the other hand, Sujae has an uneasy relationship with the Umin Kim, particularly with his uncles such as Hayong and Kimbo. Sujae's father's involvement in communist activities during the civil war made his uncles avoid developing relationships with Sujae's family. They do not want to carry the egregious and "shameful" label, ppalkengi, by associating with Sujae. One day when Sujae went to Kimbo to ask him to participate in the ancestral worship of his father, Kimbo furiously refused the suggestion. He said to Sujae, "do not ever invite me to your father's rituals and do not come to my ritual [when I am dead] either."

Such avoidance isolated Sujae. He obviously leaned toward the Songhyon Kim who did not have to worry about such avoidance and isolation because of the inherent separateness of the descent groups. His marriage to a Songhyon Kim woman brought him close to the Songhyon Kim. Sujae's attachment to the Songhyon Kim reinforced Umin Kim's hatred of Sujae, particularly on the part of Hayong and Kimbo.

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The Songhyon's nomination and campaign of Sujae for village chief was meticulously planned by Kisang who wanted to retaliate against Hayong and the Umin Kim for his forced resignation. Kisang wanted to create internal conflict among the Umin Kim by a "divide and conquer" strategy. By running a Umin Kim against another Umin Kim, Kisang expected a rupture among the members of the Umin lineage. Sujae mobilized some Umin Kim who favored him in the election. He appealed to the Sakak segment people who had an uneasy relationship with the Kangho segment to which Hayong and Muyong belonged. Most Sakak people supported Sujae. There developed a clear internal division among the Umin Kim. Some Umin people, particularly the Sakak wanted somebody in the chief's position who would not help in increasing the Kangho power. Hayong knew who was behind this maneuvering and what the possible consequences would be.

Before the election, Muyong was hospitalized for stomach cancer. Sujae insisted that the election should be held on time even though Muyong was in bed. Hayong who worked hard for Muyong argued that the election should be held when Muyong overcame his illness. Sujae and the Songhyon Kim demanded that the election continued as planned and stuck to the original date. Such a suggestion actually alienated the non-Kim villagers who believed that such a suggestion or demand was "too much." As a result, many people turned sympathetic toward Muyong. The result was a vote of 29 to 13 in favor of Muyong. Many people were disgusted by the nasty tactics and refused to vote.

A week later, when Hayong delivered the news to Muyong in the hospital, Muyong died. Hayong and many Umin Kim blamed Sujae for challenging his uncle's authority and accused him of being used by the Songhyon Kim. They believed that Sujae contributed to Muyong's early

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death. They thought that Sujae should have withdrawn from the competition and comforted his sick uncle.

The chief's position became vacant and Hayong appointed Chisam, his younger second cousin. The Songhyon Kim did not raise any obstacles against Hayong's nomination of Chisam. They accepted the defeat and let the Umin Kim decide the affair. The sudden death of Muyong hindered the expression of the political and social fragmentation of the Umin Kim.

The consequence of the election was the development of deeper distrust between Umin and Songhyon Kim and some rupture among the Umin Kim. Sujae's Minjŏng party membership protected him from the most blatant attacks made against his reputation. The discord between Hayong and Sujae was dramatically intensified by the election. Two years ago, a special loan for land purchase was given by the state with the purpose of helping tenants to buy absentee landlord's land. That was part of the state's "land to the tiller" program. Nayong (Hayong's cousin, see genealogical chart) and Sujae applied for the loan. The applicants must be approved by the Pine Tree NVM director and village chief. Hayong refused to put his seal on Sujae's application form and eventually Nayong received the loan.

Chisam who had been the chief since Muyong's death migrated to Chŏnju last year. Therefore, a new chief had to be chosen. Both the Umin and Songhyon Kim remembered the unsavory election in 1975. Both sides came up with an interesting solution. They chose Sangsa whose surname is Chŏn. He is married to Kihwan's daughter, a Songhyon Kim. In this, the Umin Kim in a way yielded to the Songhyon Kim' power. I believe it was a compensation for the past ten years of the Umin Kim's control of village power and administration. However, it is not a total subordination because Sangsa is a non-Kim and is believed to manage the village affairs fairly.

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Sangsa often told me "this village has been always disrupted by those two damned Kim lineages."

In any village meeting he argued that the lineage feuds should end for the sake of village development. So far Sangsa has managed village affairs without causing trouble. Most villagers seem to be satisfied with the status quo existing between the Umin and Songhyon Kim by having a non-Kim man as village chief. Sangsa has proved to be an effective buffer between the Umin and Songhyon Kim's grasping for power.

C. Regionalism and national politics

A distinctive feature of politics in Korea is the antagonistic regionalism that is best exemplified by the particularly bitter relationship between the Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla provinces. The people in these two provinces have their own dialect both being mutually understandable. Each provincial boundary is roughly identical with the two separate kingdoms Silla (Kyŏngsang) and Paekche (Chŏlla), that existed about one and half millennia ago. The Silla kingdom originated in the present Kyŏngsang province in the fourth century A.D and Paekche in the present Chŏlla province emerged around the third century A.D. Another kingdom named Koguryŏ developed in this period in the northern part of the present Korean peninsula.

The three kingdoms developed their own distinctive culture for centuries without strict geographic boundaries. However, the cultural differences were not great enough to result in three different national identities. In the seventh century A.D., Silla allied with Tang China to defeat Paekche and Koguryŏ. Silla united the peninsula and became the sole hegemonic power. A series of revolts from the subdued areas followed.

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Then the Koryŏ dynasty (936 -1392) and Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910) followed in succession.

These historical facts might have been insignificant matters in contemporary politics. However, regional antagonism has been fostered and manipulated by power holders. Former president Park Chung Hee who was from Kyŏngsang province attempted to divert people's attention from the questioning the legitimacy of his power by focusing on the divisional antagonism existing between the provinces in the presidential election and afterward. In public speeches and through the mass media he emphasized regional solidarity against the Chŏlla province where his formidable political opponent, Kim Dae Jung, originated. It is generally believed that Park's insecure political support from the people made him change his political strategy. His vision was to hold power by being fully supported by the people of Kyŏngsang province and some from other provinces. Ignoring Chŏlla province and less populated areas, Park thought, would not be a negative or decisive factor in his plan for holding power. His scheme actually worked.

In the 1971 presidential election, Park received about 75 percent of votes in Kyŏngsang province, while Kim Dae Jung received about 65 percent of votes in Chŏlla province. The most stimulating propaganda of the campaign was when the presidential candidate said, "this election is the fight between Paekche and Silla. Therefore, we, Kyŏngsang people must unite as Chŏlla province people do." Such manipulation of regional divisions became a fixed pattern of political strategy in Korea since Park's election in the early 1970's. The candidates' political ideology, platform, and calibre have been superseded by their natal place or affiliation with the two major opposing party leaders: one from Kyŏngsang and the other from Chŏlla province.

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In the presidential election in 1987, the division of the vote on the regional affiliation of the candidates was dramatically demonstrated. Kim Dae Jung received about 85 percent of votes in Chŏlla province and 93 percent of votes in his natal place, Kwangju city, while Roh Tae Woo received 65 percent of the Kyŏngsangbukto province votes and 70 percent of the votes in his natal place Taegu city (Pae Kyuhan 1989).

Three power holders in a row have been from Kyŏngsang province and their economic development plan has favored the development of Kyŏngsang province over the other provinces. The vast majority of the industrial infrastructure has been established in Kyŏngsang province whether the plan was made by investigating genuine, maximal options to develop national industry or by the power holders' securing their political bases by gift-giving. A man in Pine Tree said, "when you throw stones from the top of Namsan [a mountain located in Seoul], the stone will hit either a man's head or a car. The man is from Chŏlla province and the car belongs to the man from Kyŏngsang province." This statement sarcastically describes the inequality between the two provinces caused by the state's development plan that has favored Kyŏngsang province and its people.

Pine Tree and Oak Tree villagers enthusiastically watch professional baseball games between the Samsung and Haetae teams. The former represents the Kyŏngsang province since the head of the company that sponsors the team is from Kyŏngsang province, while the latter represents Chŏlla province. The villagers cheered for Chŏlla-Haetae team. This demonstrates how deeply the regional antagonism is rooted in the people's thinking and behavior. Generally speaking, the villagers show strong faith in the candidate from their province in either the presidential or National

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Assembly elections and strong antagonism against the candidate from Kyŏngsang province.

The most recent National Assembly election was held on April 16, 1988. The result of the nationwide election dramatically shows how regionalism affected voting behavior. All 31 seats in the Chŏlla province were taken by the Pyŏngmin party, while the Minjŏng party took 29 of 43 seats in Kyŏngsang province. No Pyŏngmin candidate won an election in Kyŏngsang province; no Minjŏng candidates won the election in Chŏlla province.

D. An election campaign for the National Assembly in Pine Tree and Oak Tree

Kwangik who is a Umin Kim from Oak Tree ran for a position in the National Assembly election. He was nominated by the Minjŏng Party (government party), the head of which is the incumbent president. Ironically, his natal place is Oak Tree but his political affiliation is with the Minjŏng party, the head and the majority of which are composed of Kyŏngsang people. It was inevitable for kinship affiliation to collide with the villagers' historic hatred against the present government and Kyŏngsang province. Some Umin people believed that they had to vote for their lineage man even though he belonged to Minjŏng party. Some Umin people believed that Kwangik was blindly seeking power since he allied himself with people who they thought were "bad people." They believed that Kwangik betrayed the Chŏlla people. Thus kinship and political affiliation were confounded in the setting of the election.

I shall now follow the lineage organization's decision and some individual Umin Kim actions in the election campaign and the consequences

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for the village social structure. The Umin Kim in Oak Tree had a lineage meeting at the Chongdu shrine to discuss election matters. They reached a consensus to support Kwangik. This was a rather obvious decision. Because Oak Tree was the Kwangik's natal place, winning the election might bring profitable returns from Kwangik.

The Umin Kim in Oak Tree attempted to mobilize other surnames to vote for Kwangik. The Songhyon Kim and other surnames in Pine Tree were solicited by the Umin Kim in both Pine Tree and Oak Tree. In the campaign period, the Songhyon Kim were called kinship terms such as hanassi (grandfather), aje (uncle), choka (nephew) by the Umin Kim. Since both the Umin and Songhyon Kim are not comparable in genealogical depth, the Umin Kim criterion for using different kinship terms were based on age grade. The Umin Kim often said uri Kim [we Kim] instead of Songhyon to refer to them.

Among other things, Chiyong's explicit campaign for Hong Sajae [the nominee of the Pyŏngmin party for the assembly representing Tori and Hyangmi counties] shocked the Umin Kim and particularly the Oak Tree Umin Kim. Chiyong's explanation for campaigning against his own kinsman was that he wanted to work for the cause, to defeat the candidate nominated by the wrong political party regardless of the lineage affiliation.

Chiyong is the supervisor of the ten Pyŏngmin party members in the Yongsan township. Chiju is another Pyongmin member. There are no Pyŏngmin members in Oak Tree. Chiyong is the grandfather of Kwangik in genealogical depth even though Kwangik belongs to Karangong segment and Chiyong to Kasapkong segment. Many Karangong segment people and Kasapkong segment people live in Oak Tree but not in Pine Tree. Only three

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households in Pine Tree belong to the Kasapkong segment and no Karangong people live in Pine Tree.

Chiyong is 47 and a Kasapkong segment member. He created a great turmoil among the Umin Kim during the election campaign period. His devotion to the Pyŏngmin party and his explicit campaigning against his own kinsmen created a enormous scandal. I shall attempt to explain the motivations of his behavior by illustrating his life experiences. He said:

> I was born here [in Pine Tree]. I left the village when I was young. I was too poor to continue my primary school and I had to drop out in the third year. [He later told me that he sent all his children to university because this was the way he could fulfil his unaccomplished dream.] I got a good job in Taejon and then I worked as a construction laborer in Seoul. After making some money, I came to own a small factory making rice containers in Iri city. I was away from Pine Tree for 15 years. I came back to this village 15 years ago. At first, I tenanted 0.21 hectares of Cho Hyunbu's [Chiyong's distant matrilateral kinsman] land. I also ran the village store. I could not make enough money from the store. So I bought a threshing machine with the help of my brothers [Palyong and Sunsin]. I made money by threshing other people's rice and barley. I also ploughed other people's land with my brother's cow [Palyong's]. Later my brothers helped me to buy the first motor tiller in Pine Tree. It was not bad when I had the machine. [He probably earned a lot of money with the motor tiller, since his was the first motor tiller and the demand for the machine should have been great.]
>
> Then I started pig raising. [He probably had to switch his income source from the use of the motor tiller to animal husbandry, because machines became easily available with the relatively easy coop loans offered in the 1970's and so many machine owners chipped away at his monopoly of mechanized farming in Pine Tree.] I hated it at first and I could not stand the smell. In the first year of pig raising, cholera wiped out a lot of pigs in Pine Tree. All my pigs died. At that time price of piglet was $28. The price of one sack of rice was $35.[34]
>
> At first I started on a small scale. About 13 years ago I increased the scale. [He raised about 70 heads.] Things went right until 1979 when the pig price plummeted. After that I was burdened with debt.

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[34] These figures can show the value of pigs then in comparison to that of today. The value of pig in the early 1970's was 80 percent of one sack of rice compared with 25 percent today.

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My total debt was $14,000, which is mainly caused by the accumulated fodder bill purchased on credit from the coop. In 1980, the price of pig was really low. I felt desperate. I wanted to commit suicide.[35]

In 1980, I bought as many pigs as possible on credit [He purchased 110 pigs in addition to his existing 70-80 pigs]. The price was very low and I could select the best pigs in the market.[36] It was a gamble. I thought to "live or die." Fortunately, pig prices began to rise in 1981. I could pay off my debt and I felt really good. I bought 10 cows in 1981. I paid $560 per head. In 1982, the price was $2,100 per head. I thought that the price would continue to rise. On the contrary the price of an adult cow plummeted to $980 and that of a calf to $448.[37] I thought that the price of cow reached the lowest point so I bought 23 more cows with a livestock cooperative loan. The coop chief, Sungman, helped me to get the loan even though I did not have any collateral.[38] The imported cows are different from Korean domestic cows (hanu). Imported cows are wild and difficult to tame. Those cows could not be used for ploughing. Besides, it is difficult for them to become impregnated. Those wild cows stepped all over our and other people's crops and destroyed everything. I lost a lot money in cow raising. [He raised them less than one year and gave up. I believe his loss was about $7,000.] Now we have a pig crisis again [continuously dropping prices of pigs in 1989] Now my total debt is again $14,000. My wife does not know how much we are indebted. I have not told her. I just feel like dying.

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[35] He actually attempted to commit suicide by drinking pesticide. Ironically, it became an amusing story in Pine Tree. After he drank the chemical he collapsed somewhere in the mountain. He lost consciousness lying in the mountain for two full days. He said "I had a really sound and nice sleep for two days. I worried too much to sleep very well before." His wife and children and all the villagers searched for him but failed to find him. Chiyong woke up by himself after two days of unconsciousness. He literally crawled toward his house and he was totally emaciated by the time he arrived home. He finally arrived at his house and ate a big meal. After many days passed, he explained what he did to his wife and soon after it became known to the Pine Tree villagers.

[36] Most pig raisers nationwide despaired at that time to bring their pigs to the city and town markets to sell. Prices were low and good quality pigs were easily available.

[37] The price drop was partially due to Chŏn Kyŏnghwan's import of cows from Australia in 1983. He was known to have had made an enormous profit from the import by using his brother's (former president) influence.

[38] A special friendship has developed between Chiyong and Sungman since the latter's special favoring of the former. And it became a critical factor for Chiyong to campaign hard for Sungman for the position of coop chief in the 1989 election despite the majority of the Umin lineage people's opposition to Sungman.

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Chiyong's political affiliation was explained by his nephew, Chiju (see genealogical chart). Chiju said "he [Chiyong] seemed to hang around with Catholic priests and other political activists in Tori county after being depressed by his increasing debt. He seemed to be educated by those people and became a very enthusiastic Pyongmin member."

Chiyong's anti-governmental sentiment was primarily fostered by his continuous failures in his attempts to make money and the subsequent indebtedness. He often blamed the state for allowing big capitalists to raise pigs and cows on a huge scale and letting small peasants suffer from declining prices caused by the pig glut. He clenched his teeth when he talked about Chŏn's cow import and Songsan corporation's pig raising in Kyŏnggi province. He believes that the state did not help the peasants to make a decent living. He blames the state for his indebtedness.

Chiyong's kinsman Kwangik's running for the National Assembly under the aegis of the Minjŏng party did not prevent Chiyong from working for the Pyongmin party. Chiyong was called by Kwangik during the campaign. Kwangik proposed that they should meet. Chiyong knew what he would talk about and so he refused to meet him.

The Oak Tree Umin Kim criticized Chiyong harshly, "how could a grandfather do such things to his grandson." Without the election, Kwangik, who was the president of a big corporation, would not even know whether Chiyong existed. Identifying Chiyong with Kwangik in the same lineage category and asking for compulsory help from Chiyong was considered a ridiculous tactic by Chiyong. He received $280 for campaign funds from the Pyongmin party which was not enough for the long duration of the campaign and so he spent his own money for the cause.

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The outcome of election was that 61 percent of people in Yongsan township people voted for Kwangik. However, he received only 38 percent of the total votes in Tori and Hyangmi county. There it was a landslide victory for the Pyŏngmin party candidate. After the election Sajae called Chiyong and said "thank you for your help. You worked hard for us even though you are Umin Kim."

The result was a big surprise to the Umin Kim in Oak Tree. They felt sure that Kwangik would win at least the Yongsan township by over 90 percent, a landslide vote. The figure, 61 percent represents all the Yongsan township peoples votes. It is not known what portion of voters in Pine Tree and Oak Tree, particularly the Umin Kim voted for Kwangik.

My assumption is that the percentage in Pine Tree and Oak Tree for Kwangik would not be considerably greater than 61 percent or it would be even smaller. No matter how much Kwangik poured out his political funds to buy the vote, his brief gift-giving would not change the villagers' ideology towards the political structure of the state. The tension between the Songhyon, Umin, and other lineage groups and among the Umin Kim militated against any Minjŏng campaign strategy. The most decisive factor in Kwangik's loss was his political affiliation with the Minjŏng party. Kinship yielded to regionalism when the people engaged in national politics.

Chiyong became a scapegoat to be blamed for the loss. However, even the Karangong Kim contributed to the low turn out for Kwangik. Sunggu and Hyonok were the campaign managers representing the Yongsan township. They were given large amounts of campaign funds. Some people said it was $28,000. However they did not spend the money appropriately for campaign purposes. Many Oak Tree and Pine Tree villagers argued that they embezzled some of it. It became a known fact since campaign workers, who

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were mostly Umin Kim, complained about the fact that they did not receive enough money from Sunggu and Hyonok. There was an internal feud about the use of money. Since Sunggu and Hyonok were exclusively in charge of the fund , other people did not know how the money was used. They believed that both managers were just interested in "putting the biggest persimmon in front of them."

Hayong who was the campaign manager in Pine Tree was known to favor some people by giving a large amount of money in pongtu (envelope).[39] Hayong gave $70 to Kimbo, his cousin and $35 to Kihwan, a Songhyon Kim. This became known as people talked about the money they were given. People like Kihwan was angry when he found out that he received half the amount of money given to most Umin Kim. It was the moment for Kihwan to realize he was considered to be a Songhyon Kim who could not be identified with the Umin Kim even though the Umin Kim campaign managers called him aje or choka.

Even though it was impossible to know who Kihwan voted for, it was not difficult to assume that he would not vote for Kwangik. If Kwangik were chosen to be a congressman he would be an additional factor increasing the power of the opposing kin group, the Umin Kim. Therefore, it would be unwise for Kihwan to vote for Kwangik.

Chiyong's giving half of the money to the Songhyon Kim might be a well calculated move. The Songhyon Kim would not vote for a Umin Kim candidate, no matter how much money they would be given. However, giving some money to the Songhyon Kim would not be a total waste, because that would at least prevent their explicit protest.

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[39] It became a fixed pattern for candidates to give cash to the voters the night before the election while soliciting them to vote for the money giver.

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Chiyong's explicit campaigning against his kinsman created discord between the Kasap segment and other private sects of the Umin Kim. During the campaign, Yolhan's wife (Sakak) asked Chiyong's wife sarcastically, "will you attend Kwangik's speech in Pian town, who is our Umin Kim." Chiyong's wife did not even respond. Afterwards they had an argument.

Chiyong's anti-lineage activities was an additional factor added to his brother Sunsin's embezzlement of lineage funds to make other Umin people to generalize about Kasapkong segment as kansahan saramtŭl [sly people]. The election in 1988 had four major variables: kinship affiliation, regional antagonism, yearning for democracy, and a distinctive community social structure built throughout the centuries. The role of kinship had been chipped away by the other three. Lineage connections has not guaranteed a sure victory of the kinsman candidate. Chiju surely did vote for Sajae. Chiju said "we have given up democracy because of the damn kinship."

E. The Livestock Cooperative Chief Election

The livestock coop is similar to the agricultural coop in its hierarchical structure, functions, and organization. The coop is a source of credit. It charges a 14 percent interest rate on general loans and an eight percent interest rate on special animal purchase loans. If borrowers do not pay interest within one year, they have to pay an 18 percent compound interest rate. The major source of income for the livestock coop is the sales of animal fodder, which is mainly composed of U.S. imported corn.

Livestock coop members can take out a loan from the coop and purchase fodder on credit. Unlike the agricultural coop memberships, the livestock coop membership is confined to pig and/or cow raisers who need to purchase fodder. The livestock coop is located in Tori county. Some 90

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people in the Yongsan township and 22 people in Pine Tree are members. This organization has not affected the villagers as much as the agricultural coop has done.

The present cooperative chief is Sungman. He took over the headship three years ago when the Tori livestock coop was tormented by the state's crack down on the Mongsu corporation, the owner of which was the elder brother of the then coop chief. Pine Tree villagers believed that the Kyŏngsang power holders tried to destroy a corporation owned by a Chŏlla province person. The state found wrongdoings in the company's operations and the corporation was closed down. Yongsan people believed that the Tori livestock coop had been prospering due to the big corporation owner's financial support. Suddenly the support was cut off and the chief lost the election to Sungman. Pine Tree people blamed Sungman for taking advantage of the hardship that was supposed to be shared by all Chŏlla people. Sungman actually used the moment when the coop organization was in disarray to win the election. He was believed to bribe most of village representatives who had voting rights. At that time 13 representatives selected from townships in Tori county chose the chief. Starting this year, as part of local autonomy plan, all the coop members voted to choose a chief. This August the members in Tori county chose the chief by a popular vote. The chief used to be elected by 12 supervisors who represented each township.

Sungman is an articulate and charismatic figure. He has led the coop so successfully that he even plans to establish a branch in Pian town. Besides Sungman, two men ran for the position of the chief. One was Kunmo who was the head of Tori Cheese company. Another was Cholho who was the president of animal raisers' organization in Chŏllabukto province. The positions that these two people held are nominal but useful in climbing to a

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higher and more substantial power position such as the livestock cooperative chief.

All the candidates were Tori county people. Cholho was not really a potential candidate for the position. He was rather a kotonŭn saram [a person who pursues great fame but does not achieve any substantial gain from the grass root basis]. He did not accumulate his political base at the grass root level. Therefore, the competition was between the present chief who obviously built up relationships with many members and Kunmo who had been in the Tori Cheese company organization for about 20 years. The company was equally as important as the livestock coop in local politics. All dairy cattle farmers were the members of the cheese company. Kunmo was known for his convincing manner and likable personality. The outcome of the competition was not predictable and the campaign was fierce since both of them were confident in their winning. Both sides spent enormous amounts of money for the political campaign during the several weeks before the election.

The people in Pine Tree most intensely involved in the election were Chiju, Chiyong, and Hayong. They are all coop members. Chiju and Hayong also were the members of the cheese company and had developed special relationships with Kunmo. Chiyong is one of five supervisors in the coop and the other two people are regular members. All are Umin Kim. Chiju belongs to the Sakak and Pyŏngmin party; Chiyong to the Kasap and Pyŏngmin party; Hayong to the Kangho and Minjŏng party. The coop chief election opened up a social setting where kinship, political ideology, and specific self interest of these people were intertwined with each other to make a piece of history that would eventually affect kin relationships.

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Before I discuss the interactions of these three variables, I need to explain the dyadic relationships between Sungman, Kunmo, Hayong, Chiju, and Chiyong.

1) As I mentioned in the previous section, Chiyong has developed an unusual friendship with Sungman. When Sungman was an employee in charge of the fodder department, he gave fodder to Chiyong on favorable conditions. Sungman had some autonomous power to manage things flexibly in favor of people with whom he had good relationships. Sungman was also helpful in arranging Chiyong for a special cow purchase loan with no interest and a more extended repayment period. Chiyong in return was supportive in helping Sungman's bids to maintain his power by using his supervisory position.

2) The relationships between Chiju and Sungman and those between Hayong and Sungman are neutral and innocuous. Sungman has treated Chiju and Hayong fairly since they are influential figures in local politics. And Chiju and Hayong have shown respect for Sungman since the latter has decisive power in deciding the allocation of loans and selling fodder on credit.

3) Chiju and Chiyong are in the same political alliance. However, Chiju has reservations about Chiyong since the latter is a member of the Kasap segment which is stereotyped as an unreliable people's group. Probably the most critical factor for the uneasy relationships between them is their competing influence in the Pyongmin party organization. Even though Chiyong is the supervisor of Yongsan township, the party very often acknowledges Chiju's effort rather than Chiyong. Chiju is wealthy enough to contribute a large amount of money to the party political fund while Chiyong is not financially as helpful as Chiju to the party. Chiyong instead tries to help the party in mobilization and organization.

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Kim Dae Jung, the head of Pyŏngmin party was scheduled to hold a meeting in Chŏnju with party members in September. Interestingly, only Chiju received an invitation ticket to the meeting held in a luxurious hotel in Chŏnju. Being invited to the meeting with the head of the party and chatting with the head is in a way a demonstration of the consensus that Chiju is the main figure in the Yongsan township opposition party organization.

Chiyong did not show his anger to Chiju. Chiyong said in front of Chiju, "I was invited many times so the party decided to invite the members who had not been invited." Despite his statement, he could not hide his frustration. He went to Chŏnju himself and asked a friend of his for an invitation and attended the meeting. He did not want to be excluded from a domain where the participants' power was confirmed.

4) The relationships between Chiju and Hayong and those of Chiyong and Hayong are ambivalent. Hayong shows respect to Chiju since the latter has absolute control over cow reproduction. However, they belong to antagonistic sublineages of the Umin Kim and opposing political parties. These affiliations remain seeds of conflict in certain contexts. However, both usually act as the most amiable of kinsmen, as uncle and nephew.

5) Generally speaking, the relationships between Chiyong and Hayong are hostile. They belong to different sublineages and different political parties. There is no coordinated production process that motivates them to enter a production relationship. Chiyong is exclusively a pig raiser and Hayong is a cow raiser and paddy grower. They do not have to exchange labor. Chiyong quite often grumbles that Minjŏng party members are too selfish to care for democracy. He implicitly refers to the fact that Minjŏng party members receive huge favors from the state in return for doing "errand boy" work. On

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the other hand, Hayong criticizes Chiyong for being sly and for enjoying working against any governmental plan.

6) Chiju has developed a special relationships with Kunmo. Chiju's wife said, "Kunmo just likes my husband. He attended our wedding and made a large contribution." Chiju in return has been supportive of Kunmo in the Tori Cheese company. Chiju has been a milk supplier and member of the company. Chiyong is not affiliated with the company, since he does not raise cows. Chiju, Hayong, and Samgu [Chiyong's older brother's son] are the members of the company in Pine Tree. All of these people explicitly demonstrate that if the Cheese company head becomes a cooperative chief, the two organizations would be organically united under the singular leadership of Kunmo and that would bring significant benefits to the company's milk suppliers. Therefore, Hayong and Chiju enthusiastically campaigned for Kunmo.

Two days before the election, a meeting was held in Chiju's house to discuss who they would vote for. All 22 people attended the meeting. Abundant food was provided; fried chicken, Fuji apples, and beer were on the table, all of which are considered to be fancy food by the villagers' culinary standard. Chiju stood up and announced that "Kunmo thankfully donated $210 to prepare all this food. Please eat as much as you can." The following section is my compilation of the attendants' speeches.

Chiju: "I strongly recommend Kunmo. Let's vote for him. He has been the most trustworthy person who cares about us. We also have to show our united action to prove how well organized we Pine Tree people are by voting in one person collectively. Even if the person we select loses the election, it would be good because the elected person would still be afraid of our united power."

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Then Hwahong, a Songhyon Kim, said[40] : "I have worked with Kunmo since I was a NVM representative in Tori county. He is a type of person who would spend his own money to help this organization and us. We know that Sungman spread a bad rumor that Kunmo made the Cheese company go bankrupt and wants to make the coop go bankrupt."

Kihwan, a Songhyon Kim: "No matter who becomes the chief, Pine Tree will stay. Therefore we do not want to be pushed to vote for a certain person. We will individually decide."

Suhwan [Kihwan's younger brother]: "In a democratic country, the unanimous vote for a person is ridiculous."

Kisang, a Songhyon Kim: "I never saw Kunmo before. This is not the first time we vote. Anybody who won the election never visited us to thank us."

As the Songhyon Kim tried to counter Chiju's suggestion, Hayong rebutted by saying, "Sungman embezzled money from the coop when he was in charge of the fodder department. He slyly used the unfortunate moment when the Mongsu corporation was destroyed by the government. He also bribed voters when he was elected."

As the meeting proceeded, Chiju's attempt to convince people to vote for Kunmo became more difficult to achieve. Chiju asked Samgu to speak for Kunmo. He refused saying "I am not good at making a speech." The reason for his refusal will be discussed below.

Chiju knew that Chiyong would be a great obstacle in mobilizing at least the Umin Kim people's votes for Kunmo, since the unusually close relationships between Chiyong and Sungman were well known. Chiju

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[40] Chiju went to Hwahong to ask him to speak for Kunmo before the meeting.

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attempted to persuade Chiyong to help Kunmo or at least do something. Chiju thought he could demand something from Chiyong, since he had often helped his destitute aje (uncle) in the past. Chiyong said yes but did not keep the promise. He was active in mobilizing people especially the Songhyon Kim, in support of Sungman.

Chiyong's wife is Yongsan's daughter, a Songhyon Kim. Interestingly, Chiyong and Sujae are tongsŏ [spouses of the offsprings of the same parents]. Therefore, Chiyong is related to the Songhyon Kim through marriage. He had great influence in directing Songhyon Kim voting. The Songhyon Kim did not like to choose a person supported by the most influential Umin Kim. Besides, Chiyong's persuasion worked well.

The outcome of the election was that Sungman won by the margin of 79 votes. It was not known what percentage of voters in Pine Tree voted for each person. But it angered Chiju and Hayong. They blamed Chiyong for splitting the vote. Chiyong's implicit campaign movement in Pine Tree and in the Yongsan township could not be hidden from Chiju and Hayong and this incident made Chiju dislike Chiyong.

The night before the election Sungman gave $420 to Chiyong. It was for distribution as a gift to the voters. Ironically, Chiyong gave the total amount of money to Chiju saying, "this is from Sungman. You can keep it in your Sachang account. Only you and I know this." Chiju appreciated his offer and kept the money. Chiju did not tell Hayong that night. However, Hayong was told about the money by Suhwan the next morning. That night, Chiju was not sure whether he would speak about it to Hayong. He decided to tell Hayong about it the first thing in the morning. When Chiju went to Hayong, the latter already knew about it. Chiju was embarrassed. It gave an impression that he made a secret deal with Chiyong. Chiju learned that he

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was double crossed by Chiyong. Chiyong knew that Chiju was reliable enough to keep his promise. By letting Hayong know about it he wanted to disrupt the relationships between Hayong and Chiju. However, Chiyong's scheme did not work the way he intended. Since Chiju and Hayong shared all information with each other, they realized that they were set up by Chiyong.

On the election day, Chiju learned that Chiyong made a list of voters who would be likely to vote for Sungman and Kunmo. It was Chiyong's intention to show loyalty to Sungman. On the other hand, the list would be used against his lineage men who would vote for Kunmo over Sungman. Chiju also knew that Samgu had attempted to persuade people to vote for Sungman. Samgu's enthusiastic help of his chakŭn aboji [father's younger brother] was interesting, because Samgu did not follow Chiyong's political ideology in the presidential election in 1987 and the National Assembly election in 1988. Samgu was not advised by Chiyong about who to vote for in the two big elections.

As Chiyong's specific personal interest was involved, Chiyong attempted to mobilize all the consanguineal kinsmen and affinal kinsmen. The presidential and National Assembly election were too remote for Chiyong to feel the necessity to ask Samgu to vote for somebody.

As Chiju came to know Chiyong and Samgu's behaviors, he bitterly said, "I will never take a look at Samgu's cows. All Kasap people are like that." Chiju gave back the $420 to Chiyong. Chiju was so angry that he did not go to Chiyong's house. He asked me to deliver the money and I did.

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Summary

The coop chief election process demonstrates how generally accepted kinship rules have been violated by the strategy employed in the power making process. Kinship has been reproduced not only by the genealogical linkage but more importantly by having a strategic purpose in the power structure.

In the National Assembly election, I attempt to explicate that local kinship formation has been affected by the national level power making process. Kinship has not been an indigenous and autonomous entity. It is not immune to influences from the larger whole and state power. The majority of the villagers' involvement in regionalism, Chiyong's perception of justice, kinship obligation, and self-interest were intertwined in the election and resulted in both tension-ridden and cohesive relationships among kinsmen. The election left a ripple which would affect the social formation of the community for a long time.

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Chapter 10 Kinship and property relationships

A. Inheritance and kin ideology

In this chapter I shall discuss how the generally accepted mode of kinship behavior articulates with the attempt of some kinsmen to dominate wealth and to gain control over the labor of their poor kinsmen. In the first two cases to be described, the transmission of property becomes a major factor in the emergence of tension among kinsmen. In the last two cases, differing interpretations of kinship obligations work to increase inequality between kinsmen.

Korean inheritance rules are characterized by the unequal distribution of parents' wealth. The eldest son who stays with and serves his elderly parents is given the largest share of the property upon his father's death (see Lee Kwang-kyu 1975). The rule of thumb is that he receives about half and the other sons divide the rest. It is important to note that there are two sets of inheritance rules: one is the traditional one and the other encoded in civil law.

The major difference between these two types is that civil law dictates the rights of daughters to the access of a small portion of inherited property. Traditionally, a daughter's right to obtain some of her parents property ends when she receives a wedding gift (dowry), signifying her lineal change of status to her husband's lineage. It is rare for a married daughter to inherit any significant amount of property from her parents. Both types of inheritance rules provide the eldest son with at least half of the property. Legally and traditionally it is acknowledged that the eldest son deserves more property than the other children. The eldest son's duty does not end even after his parents die. He has to perform ancestor worship for both parents

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until he himself dies. Then he, his wife, and his parents will, in turn, be served by his eldest son.


The continuous obligation to serve one's parents and parents' parents up to four generations above ego justifies allowing the eldest son to have a considerably larger portion of the property. Severe poverty, however, can make people adjust their inheritance practices away from the putative norm. Some parents in Pine Tree were landless and very poor, and their property was not divided among their children. Dividing a small amount of property such as a crumbling thatch-roofed clay house with a few utensils would not be a substantial help to their children. Before the 1960's, Pine Tree parents commonly had all of their sons live together in their house if the house was large enough, and by having all sons in the village they shared a common poverty. If the house was too small or the parents did not have a house, the sons lived in their parents' landlords' house as tenants and/or mŏsŭm (servants). Daughters married out. Exceptionally a woman who married a man in the same village stayed in her parents-in-law's house and frequently contacted her parents.

The first case is about my key informant, Chunja, and her family history for four generations and their property relationships. I focus on how the generally expected mode of kinship behavior is intertwined with each individual's desire for a monopoly over the family property.

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Case 1 Inheritance and a family history

Fig. 26--Chilsun's family diagram



Chunja had one elder brother, Tuhi, one younger brother, Sungjo, and an elder sister Heja. The size of her family was close to seven, the average number of the family members existing prior to the 1970s. Her father was a relatively wealthy peasant owning about one and a half hectares of paddy. They all lived together until marriage and schooling broke up the locality of the common household. Heja married a man in the Sonhong township, Chunja married into the wealthy Cho family in Pine Tree, and Sungjo moved to Seoul to be educated and later employed. One of the interesting factors in this family is that Chunja's mother entertained special affection for her youngest son, Sungjo and determined to make him succeed in the city by all means. Very generally speaking, parents tend to show most of their affection toward their youngest son in Pine Tree even though they acknowledge the role of the eldest son as an heir. This has been a common pattern in Pine Tree. Elder siblings were usually less educated and continued to farm the family estate and to finance the education of their youngest brother. Parents' favoring a certain child often resulted in inequality between siblings.

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Sungjo was a weak child and could not help his parents in farming. He received most of his mother's care and attention probably because his mother had great sympathy and affection for him. The other three children worked hard to make ends meet. In particular, Heja, Chunja, and their mother wove cotton and silk cloth to earn some additional cash to that made by farming. The two daughters' contribution was large enough to help their parents to purchase some land. [I do not know how much land was purchased by the earnings garnered from weaving.]

Tuhi also earned money by collecting and selling natural lacquer extracted from the woods in the mountains during the off-farming season. Tuhi had only three daughters who farmed until they married out to Chŏnju and Seoul. Sungjo married in Seoul and he has two sons and one daughter. They all live in Seoul most of the time. Heja had four sons and two daughters. Chunja had two sons but both died before they reached 10 years of age. Since then, Chunja has been childless.

In the mean time, Sungjo went to Seoul for his education. In those days (around in 1935), educating a child in the city was unthinkable for rural people due to the high cost of education and the prejudice of the Japanese colonialists. Sungjo was the first person in Pine Tree to go to the city to be educated. Chunja's parents eventually had to sell one third of their paddy land to finance Sungjo's education. All the family members opposed the sale of the land with the exception of Chunja's mother. The mother went to the influential lineage men to ask them to convince her husband to sell the land for the sake of her son's education. She served foods and drinks to the people whom she asked to speak to her husband. Her husband finally sold the land after being petitioned day and night. After the land sale, Chilsun's family members worked harder to make up for the loss of one third of their land.

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Years later, the total size of their land amounted to one and half hectares of paddy. It was their collective effort that accounts for the expansion of their holdings.

Sungjo finished his high school education and was employed in a well known corporation. He became the first "white collar" salary man in Pine Tree. The central condition contributing to the main problem in this family stems from the fact that Sungjo did not pay enough attention to the people left behind in the village who had sacrificed part of their lives for his education. Sungjo and his family led a comfortable life in the city while the other people continued to live under difficult circumstances. Tuhi died at the age of 47 and Heja at the age of 43. It was not difficult to assume that the early deaths of both were related to malnutrition and overworking.

When the eldest daughter of Tuhi married a man in Chŏnju she took her mother with her. There were no people left in the village who could take care of her. Finally, Chunja was the only one who continued to live in the village. As Chilsun's family died and moved out, the land was managed by Tuhi's wife. Since Tuhi's wife was too old and weak, her eldest daughter, Sunja performed the job.

Both the civil and the traditional laws allow the wife of the deceased household head to claim ownership of the land. As long as the wife is alive, she has the responsibility to perform ancestor worship for her dead husband. If she had a son, the son would have done the ritual, but she was sonless and so she did it herself with the assistance of her daughter.

Traditionally, Tuhi's wife should have adopted her husband's brother's son to perform the rituals. However, she had refused. She had done the ritual for about 20 years. The reason for her refusal was to keep her right over the land. However, her explanation was that she felt obligated to

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do the rituals by herself as long as she lived. If Sungjo's son was adopted, the vested rights over the tenant rent would be transferred to Sungjo's son for whom she and her husband, and her daughters had sacrificed a portion of their lives and without receiving any return.

In any case, Sungjo had his eldest son adopted into Tuhi's family about eight years ago. The son's name was legitimately written in Tuhi's family registry. Sunja and her mother were furious about the plan when they learned about it. However, Sungjo asked for the traditional norm of adoption to be fulfilled. Sungjo, however, did not demand the land rights even though the adopted son had the right over it. Even after the adoption, Tuhi's family continued to perform the ritual. Sunja's reasoning was that her father's younger brother, (chakŭn aboji) did not have any right over the land, because he had already benefited from the collective property and effort at the expense of his family members. Sungjo seemed to acknowledge the argument, since he did not demand the land rights for a long period of time even after the legal adoption.

Serious problems erupted when Sunja's mother died two years ago. Now the person who had a rightful claim over the land and ancestor worship was gone. Sunja's position had been considerably weakened by her mother's death. Sungjo's son could legitimately take over the right of ancestor worship and land. Sunja is not supposed to perform rituals for her dead father, since she belongs to her husband's lineage. Ironically Sunja has not yielded to her uncle's demand and continues to perform the worship for both her father and mother. There existed a tremendously explosive tension between Sunja and her uncle. Sunja obviously knows that her uncle would push her to surrender the rights of both. And Sungjo knows that his niece

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would not easily give up her vested interests. So far Sunja still does the rituals and collects the rent.

Sunja's determination to keep the land was dramatically shown in two cases. When she knew that her uncle attempted to make the adoption legal, Sunja's son sent a letter to the then village chief, Muyong. The letter stated that Sunja wished to have three names in the land registry: her name, her mother's name, and her uncle's son's name. This way she could prevent a possible land sale from taking place without her knowledge.

If three names were put down, the land sale had to be approved by the three people so registered. Sunja was afraid that Sungjo would sell the land without letting her know it. The chief showed the letter to Sungjo. Obviously Sungjo asked the chief to put down only one name, Chuyong. Joint ownership was supposed to be granted by all parties. However, Sungjo did not have reason to listen to Sunja's demand. Finally, Chuyong was able to claim exclusive legal right over the land.

During that time, the state wanted the land registration to be made clear. It was partly for the general land development plan and partly for clarifying ownership. Absentee landlordism had been a serious social problem. Even though it was illegal initially, it had been continuously practiced. Later a special law was declared to legitimate the practice.

Another case occurred when Sunja asked Homang who was the tenant on the land to notify her in case of Sungjo's attempt to sell the land. If Sungjo wanted to sell the land he would let his tenant know about it; tenants were often the first ones who would know about possible land sales. Homang, however, said what he was told by Sunja to Sungjo, because he preferred Sungjo as a landlord to Sunja, considering him to be more

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generous. Homang expected a lower rent after giving the valuable information to Sungjo.

To make this affair more complicated, Chunja has asked her brother, Sungjo to take the ritual and land rights from Sunja immediately. Chunja argues that Sunja has accumulated a huge amount of wealth from the rent which she or Sungjo should have taken for the last 20 years. Chunja blames Sunja for not sending even a sack of rice to Sungjo or Chuyong as a token of appreciation for letting her hold the rights.

Chunja's reason for the claim is that she makes more contributions to the formation of the land by her labor in farming and weaving. Chunja fully supports Sungjo and Chuyong because she is childless and will eventually depend on either Sungjo or his son. She wanted the rent rights to be transferred to the people on whom she would have to depend. If she has a son, her argument will be different. Chunja complains that "Sunja does a lousy ritual. She puts the cheapest foods on the table." This statement means that Sunja's ulterior motive to keep the ritual was to keep rent rights. Chunja also accuses Sungjo of being "too generous" toward Sunja.

Sunja thinks that she should have the land and ritual rights for three basic reasons. First, she and her parents suffered enough for her uncle. Therefore, it would be remorseless for her uncle to claim the land. She believes that he has already claimed and taken a lot from the collective property.

Second, she has cared for her elderly sickly mother for 20 years. The old woman could have been cared for by Sungjo or her sisters or Chuyong, but no one wants to care for their mother. In such a case, Sungjo normally would have to care for his brother's wife. Married daughters actually do not have an obligation to care for consanguineal kinsmen, since they are already

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part of their husbands' lineage. Therefore, Sunja thinks that she has taken the responsibility which Sungjo should have taken.

Third, whatever the logical reason is, she cannot possibly give away the land to somebody, the land that is no less than her flesh and blood. The land has tremendous value to her. It is priceless. This is why Sunja did not sell the land when her mother was alive and could have sold it legitimately. It is simply unthinkable to sell or transfer the land for which she has suffered long and hard.

Last year all Chilsun's offspring gathered in Sunja's house in Chŏnju for her mother's ancestor worship. Ironically, it was not Sungjo or Chunja who started up the issue of landownership. It was Sunja's two younger sisters who lived in Seoul. Both argued that they should have been given part of the rent. They blamed their eldest sister for obtaining the rent exclusively. They said that they were also children of Tuhi and have right to claim the land. Sunja flatly denied their claim asking what they had done to deserve it. Both sisters actually cared for their elderly mother in their houses for a while. However, they gave up caring for her in less than a month and sent her back to Sunja.

Case 2 Adoption and an old widow

The previous case demonstrated how and why the traditional, normative adoption and inheritance rules were trespassed by historical kin relationships. The second case will show how people demand the enforcement of the traditional rules of adoption and inheritance over an individual's arbitrary method of continuing the consanguineal line.

The most preferable candidate for adoption is the sonless ego's closest nephew. If ego's brothers do not have sons, ego must look for a possible

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adoptee among the second cousin's sons. If the second cousins do not have sons or do not allow their sons to be adopted, ego must look among the third cousin's sons.

Adoption usually takes place when the male household head is alive and fails to produce a son. Only after the household head finds an adoptee would he and his wife safely "close their eyes [die]," since otherwise they would not be served in rituals after death. A daughter may perform the ritual. However, that is unusual and likely to be frowned upon by her in-laws.


Misuk in Pine Tree is an 83 year old widow. She has only two daughters and both of them have married out. Her husband starved to death in Manchuria during the Japanese colonial period. She has not recovered the body.[41] She purchased about a half hectare of paddy with the remittances sent from Manchuria when her husband was alive. She had farmed the land with her two daughters. When her daughters married out, she lived alone. Since she had not had a male household head, she could not decide on adoption. Traditionally, women are not given rights over the issue. The closest male kinsmen of the woman consult with her and decide how her family line will be continued. Such males in Misuk's case were Yongsu and Hyongsu who were her husband's younger brothers' sons.

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[41] The Japanese attempted to push the Koreans north to Manchuria and Sakhalin in order to take over the Korean peninsula, which was close to their territory. About four million Koreans were sent to Manchuria. It was about one eighth of the whole population (Kim Sŏkmin 1986: 62). Some migrants farmed the barren soil there and some of them worked in coal mines or on construction sites. About 15 men in Pine Tree also went to Manchuria and Sakhalin. Some of them did not return after the liberation in 1945. They were stuck in Manchuria and had to live there. Their life situations were similar to the Jews who were stuck in Russia after WW II. Most of them were separated from their families in Korea. They were the by-products of colonialism. Such Koreans living overseas have been the most tragic part of Korean history.

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Fig. 27--Chŏn's family diagram



Misuk had raised a boy since her daughters married out. No Pine Tree villager knows his origin. I assume that he was an abandoned child of a very poor landless tenant or mŏsŭm who moved out of the village leaving the boy behind. The boy did not have a Kim surname, hence could not be traced.

Misuk had treated him like a real son. She named, fed and clothed him fairly. He helped her in farming and other domestic chores, calling her ŏmŏni (mother). She could have put the boy's name in the family registry as a legal and legitimate child of hers and let him succeed her family line. Adopting a boy who is offspring of different surname is quite legal, even though this method has never been popular. "The purity of blood" is the primary concern in the adoption. This is why a sonless ego normally looks for the adoptee who is the closest blood relation from ego.

As the boy reached physical adulthood (20 years), Misuk was pressured to adopt a son by her nephews (Yongsu and Hyongsu). The nephews seemed to be irritated by the presence of the boy in Misuk's house. They asked Misuk to leave the boy. She refused their demand at first and was determined to live with him. It seemed that the boy promised that he would care for her in

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her old age. That condition would have been perfect for Misuk who obviously was concerned about her future life. Both Misuk and the boy would have finished the give and take cycle. Misuk's caring for the boy who would have starved to death on the street would have been returned by the boy's caring for the old woman who would be "powerless on both hands and legs." [This expression was frequently used by old villagers. This means that the person becomes too old and weak to do anything. Therefore, he or she must depend on somebody who is likely to be a son.]

Yongsu and Hyongsu did not allow Misuk's attempt to have the boy as her legal son who would obtain both the ritual and property rights of Misuk's family. The nephews asked Misuk to adopt Sangsa who was the second son of Yongsu because Hyongsu had only one son. Therefore, he could not afford to send his son to another family for adoption. Yongsu had two sons. He kept his eldest son and wanted the second son to be adopted by Misuk.

Eventually, Misuk feuded with her two nephews about the adoption. The nephews argued for the traditional method of adoption that should be kept by a yangban family. She argued that the boy was no less than her hyŏlyuk ["blood and flesh" meaning "real child" here in this context].

At that time the boy was about 20. He and Misuk were defenseless. Her nephews beat and humiliated the boy who had to leave the village. Most villagers remember the day of the boy's crying, the nephews' yelling and Misuk's begging. No one knows the whereabouts of the boy. Misuk exchanged letters with the boy for a while after the incident, but communication was cut off afterward. The incident happened about 20 years ago. Nowadays, no one talks about it. It is a part of village history that villagers do not think worthwhile to mention. The boy was squeezed out by the social structure of inheritance rules utilized by greedy nephews.

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Since the boy moved out, Misuk had her land tenanted by her nephews. She received 90 kilograms of rice for rent that was lower than the average of 135 kilograms. She said, "My son died when he was 19. I gave everything to my nephew. I cook rice myself and my nephew brings me some food. My nephew sometimes gives me $7 or $14. Sangsa [her adopted son] sometimes brings lots of meat and buys me clothes. I am happy because I have many kinsmen here."

Ironically, she remembers the boy's leaving the village as his death. She probably wants to terminate her bitter memory of the boy by her own idiosyncratic understanding of the event. As she mentions, she is given food and other goods by her nephews and adopted son. The fact of the matter is that the 83 year old woman has lived alone in her house since the boy left. Sangsa lives with his wife and two sons. Yongsu and Hyongsu all live with their wives in their own houses. She is not given the minimal and essential condition of the adoption, which is to be cared for by her young adopted son.

She does rituals for her husband in the Wŏn Buddhist style. She could have asked Sangsa to do the traditional ritual form. The adopted son is obliged to do rituals in the traditional way. However, she has not asked him to do so.

In Misuk's case, I attempt to demonstrate how violence is undertaken and accepted without much resistance in village kinship affairs. The fact that the nephews resorted to violence to accomplish the adoption in the manner they desired is a remarkable cross section of life in which I could see the interwoven relationships of violence, kinship, and property. More importantly, Misuk accepts the present situation. She has not demanded much from her nephews and Sangsa, considering the events to be her fate. She has not demanded for someone to live and care for her. Her passive

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acceptance of the property, eating, and residence arrangements is required in the power relationships in the kinship structure.

Since the boy left, everything has proceeded quietly. However, the silence in the relationships between Misuk, her nephews, and adopted son represents the tremendous violence which once occurred dramatically and continues to take place within Misuk although hidden in the silence.

Case 3. Hayong and his cousin

Hayong is a powerful figure in both village politics and lineage affairs. He has a great influence in most communal construction projects, the elections, the allocation of official loans and other village matters. Since the late 1970's, he has been the NVM director and since the early 1980's he has worked for the government party. He also has chaired the Kangho lineage affairs. He is 57 years old. His present power has been painfully realized since he moved to Pine Tree. The following section is my reconstruction of his life history.

> I was born in Seoul in 1939. My father left Pine Tree Village at an early age. After hard work my father opened a small pharmacy in Inchŏn city. I worked there immediately after graduating from primary school. The business did not do well and finally it went bankrupt. My father died soon after the failure. At that time I was 19 years old. My sisters all married out and I and my mother were left in Inchŏn. I could not find any decent jobs. My mother peddled some merchandise on the street and we barely made a living.
>
> At this juncture, my elder cousin [Sujae's father], Taekyun, learned how difficult a time I and my mother were having. Taekyun asked me to come to my father's natal place. Even though I did not know Pine Tree and the people, I thought and was told that Pine Tree was the place of my roots and living there would be nice. After deep thought, I decided to go to Pine Tree with my mother.
>
> When I arrived in Pine Tree, about 85 households lived there. Tenancy was very difficult to get. A few rich peasants and even ordinary peasants had two or three mŏsŭms. I worked for "the big

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house" [eldest sibling's house which was Taekyun's house.] At first I did not know anything about farming. I just helped people where I could. I thought that my elder cousin would pay me some money or rice for my labor. But he did not. He just gave me some food and a daily or weekly ration of rice.

I continued to work for him for six years. I thought that he might hold all the payments and later give me a plot of land. I never asked him directly about the payment. I could not wait any longer. I was drafted in the army at the age of 22. My mother continued to work for the elder cousin. At least she could be fed in that way. I heard that soldiers in Vietnam made a lot of money. So I volunteered to be sent to the Vietnam war.[42] I was there for one year. The rumor of monetary gain turned out to be false.

After the military duty, I came back to Pine Tree. Soon after, I married a daughter of Yi Tonghwa when I was 30. [He came to Pine Tree after pansem.] I did not think that I would make it in the chongga. (main family). [He realized that his cousin would not pay any remuneration. He gave up his hope of being given money or land. His long wait turned fruitless.]

I decided to go to Pomkyun's [Hayong's third cousin who moved to Nasong city] sister's shidaek (in-law's house) in Suchan county. I was formally hired as mŏsŭm. I was first paid five sacks of rice annually. Then it went up to six and then seven sacks. I lived there for seven years, saved some money and then came back to Pine Tree.

At that time, Sunyong's [Hayong's nephew] mother was looking for a tenant. I asked to be the tenant and I ended up tenanting about a half hectares of paddy. I paid 135 kilograms per majigi (0.07 hectares) for rent. After paying rent and spending as little as possible, I could pay into a rice kye for three years. Sunyong was a graduate student in Chŏnju. His mother had to sell a part of her land. I purchased 0.35 hectares of Tasu land [name of the land] with all the rice I had. I paid a total of 116 sacks of rice. Since I had my own land, I could save a little faster. Sunyong's mother wanted to leave Pine Tree since her son finally finished his Ph.D. and became a professor. [Since then she had lived with her son in Chŏnju.] The house became empty. So I purchased it for 18 sacks of rice. Since then, I farmed my own land and also tenanted the corporate estate and Pomkyun's land.

Hayong's waiting for a reward from Taekyun for six years ended up in a terrible disappointment. When he was advised by his elder cousin to come

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[42] Former president Park agreed with former president Johnson to send Korean soldiers to Vietnam.

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to Pine Tree and farm, he felt an affection: "this is what kinship is good for." Hayong never explicitly verbalized his expected reward for the labor he provided to Taekyun. He might have thought that if he mentioned a certain amount, his cousin would not give more than the clearly set payment.

Taekyun, on the other hand, probably thought that he saved his younger cousin and his mother from a life of total destitution in the city. Giving them some food and providing a shelter to Hayong and his mother might be thought of as charity to kinsmen as the village was characterized by a dense population and rampant starvation. Many people actually farmed other people's land just to get some food. Tenancy was an enviable position to many starving people. In the year when Hayong came to Pine Tree, the sŏnja system was widely used. It means that landless people farm other people's land after receiving a certain amount of grain. The difference between the sŏnja system and tenancy is that a tiller in the former is paid grain before starting farming while tenants obtain it after they pay rent. People in the sŏnja system earn a considerably smaller amount of grain than tenants.

The former usually received about 30 kilograms of rice for farming the whole land from spring to winter. Then the whole family had to survive on the grain. Their abject starvation forced them to accept any condition to receive some grain. Some tenants paid 18-20 mals (160-180 kg) per majigi and were left with about 10 mals (90 kg). People using the sŏnja system were often worse off than a landlord's mŏsŭm, because the former had to find their own way to survive after exhausting their allotted grain, while mŏsŭm were at least guaranteed something to eat all year round, not to mention cash payments after the harvest.

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Taekyun's having Hayong farm the land might be thought of as a sign of benevolent concern for the life of a kinsman out of kinship obligation. Taekyun could have made a sŏnja contract with non-kinsmen. That way, he could have saved the trouble of communicating with Hayong and setting up a room for Hayong and his mother.

Hayong's expectation of some reward and Taekyun's self conception of fulfilling his kinship obligation collided, creating a tremendous tension between both families. Even after Taekyun died, Hayong's antagonism toward his cousin continued to be demonstrated in his treatment of Taekyun's son, Sujae. In fact, Hayong's experience in Taekyun's house was the major factor in the former's uneasy relationship with Sujae. Sujae's running against Hayong's favorite cousin, Muyong in the chief's election was decisive in increasing the antagonism between Sujae and Hayong.

A few months after this interview, I found Hayong lying on the floor. He had returned from Kimbo's daughter's wedding and was totally drunk. He barely sat when he saw me come in his house. He said to his son:

> I worked as a servant for 10 years. I had a certain hope by doing the humiliating work. I wanted you to know it. But you don't seem to understand anything. I worked hard for this village. I put priority on our village matters over my own. I did those things because I wanted you feel proud of your father. By tightening my belt [he tightened the belt not to feel hungry and also to prevent his pants from falling down over his hollow belly.] I earned money to finance your education. Now I do not have any power to work. I raise cows for fun not for money.

Hayong has been frustrated by his son's continuous failure to pass the university entrance exam. He wants to compensate for his painful past by making his son successful. Hayong's exorbitant expense for his son's education turns out to be a waste and this makes him greatly disappointed.

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It would be worthwhile to note why he wanted to be recognized by the villagers for his enthusiastic participation in communal works. In Pine Tree, people who were born from a concubine are called sŏson and ridiculed. It has been a tradition for the children from the legitimate first wife to win over those from the "illegitimate" wife in ancestor worship and inheritance. Hayong's mother was a concubine, and he has a great complex about his social status. Probably the reason why he was not assertive about the payment from Taekyun was due to his sense of inferiority about being sŏson. A way to wash away such a "disgrace" is to be so successful that no one would dare to ridicule him and his family. Achieving his present powerful political position was made possible by his incredible determination for success to wipe out his "ignoble" origin.

He often harshly criticizes the state for abusing its power and destroying the peasantry. He particularly emphasizes the Chŏn Kyŏnghwan's cattle import incident and plummeting cattle prices. He became indebted to the coop for about $7,000 for a cow purchase loan and accumulated a fodder credit debt. He is still a government party member and distributed pro-government propaganda during the elections. His anxious efforts to overcome poverty and to rid himself of his sŏson status outweighed his alliance with the opposition party, which would have been more close to his political ideology. He chose the government party because it gave him power to achieve what he had strived for.

Case 4. Hwasun and her in-laws

The fourth case is the story of a women who was abandoned by most of her kinsmen. She has been manipulated and rejected by her in-laws. Such cruelty is not taken into serious consideration by the villagers because

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patriarchal authority in a patrilineal society justifies this sort of occurrence. What she gave to her in-laws was enormous, while what she was given in return was stark humiliation and censure.

Her name is Kim Hwasun. She is 72 years old and a Umin Kim who lived with her parents in Oak Tree. Her family was relatively wealthy. She was the only child in the household. When she married a Cho in Pine Tree, her life changed altogether. Her husband turned out to be a victim of a genetically transmitted disease. He sometimes excreted blood from his mouth and and was also mentally disturbed. This disease affected the Cho family every other generation. Her parents-in-law concealed these facts and went ahead with the marriage. She could not have normal conjugal relationships with her husband and her parents-in-law were cruel to her. She had great difficulty in adjusting herself to her parents-in-law's household since she was brought up in a wealthy family and given special care.

She delivered three sons and some daughters. [She did not mention the number of daughters.] but they all died. I suspect the cause of death was the harmful latent genes of the Cho family. Since all the children died, her mother-in-law blamed her for the deaths. She was accused of bringing bad luck to the house and eventually was expelled from the house by her in-laws. It was such a "shameful" situation, she could not go back to her natal place in Oak Tree. She moved around by herself from place to place. In her aimless journey she had affairs with many men. Her behavior was widely known in the Yongsan township and other nearby townships. She finally settled in Sonhong township where she lived with a man. She gave birth to two sons and one daughter. She happily lived there until she later found out that the man was a father of six children and had a legal wife. Meanwhile, her mother-in-law in Oak Tree asked her to come back.

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The mother-in-law needed her to farm and to care for the mentally ill son and her husband. Hwasun at first refused and her father in Oak Tree asked her to return home. He said, "Do not defame our yangban family." She followed her father's order and her ordeal resumed. After returning she gave birth to two more sons and two more daughters. The daughters married out and one son died in a mental hospital at the age of 16. The other son went to a medical school in Chŏnju.

Her parents-in-law died afterward, and villagers sent her husband to a mental hospital where he remains. He is still there. Her parents also died. She has some consanguineal kinsmen living in Oak Tree, but they do not concern themselves about her existence. She is visited by her son once a year. Fortunately, her two married daughters frequently visit her to see to how she is living. The villagers cruelly nickname her shwipari [literally a blowfly and figuratively a woman who is immoral, having affairs with any man and giving birth to his children].

She is rejected not only by her kinsmen but also by the villagers. She is often mistreated by others. This year she was not informed about the "agricultural loan" and her share was taken by somebody. Since she is defenseless, having no kinsmen or friends on her side, she is easy prey for exploitation. The following statement is my mixed compilation of her statements about her life.

> I was born into a yangban family. My father had a large amount of land and several mŏsŭms in Oak Tree. I was raised like a oknyŏ [literally meaning a jade woman but figuratively it represents a woman who was treated as the most valuable one -- the one given all the attention by her parents.] I never touched any farm tool. I just sat in my room and read those sacred Chinese books. I used silver spoons and silver chopsticks. Even after I became an adult I never looked at a man. [This

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meant that she strictly followed Confucian ethics as a rule for yangban family women.]

One day I knew that a family in Pine Tree wanted to have their son married to me. My father and Hokyun [then a lineage head of the Umin Kim] did not like the Cho family. Hokyun said "Our precious daughter from the chongga (main family) should not marry into that kind of family." My mother, however, liked the marriage arrangement. She thought that she could see me often if I lived in a nearby village.

The Cho family was sly enough to send a gift for my parents. My father ordered the mŏsŭm to burn them. But my mother entreated my father to accept it. They finally kept it. [The gift was silk clothes for her parents. Accepting such a gift signified the acceptance of the marriage. Hwasun's parents acceptance of the gift sealed her future strife torn life.] Actually my father preferred Haesong [the younger brother of her prospective husband, Hyundong.] But I eventually had to marry Hyundong. When I came to my parents-in-law's house, I was surprised at the shabby living conditions. It was laughable that my father-in-law boasted about his one hectare. That was so tiny when I compared it with my father's holdings. He had two mŏsŭms. But I had to go to Tujong mountain to collect fuel woods, cook, and farm.

I knew that my parents-in-law used my father's name to get the loan. [Her parents seemed to be the guarantors for her parents-in-laws cooperative loans. Their daughter probably became kinship collateral that conditioned her parents' behavior. Their being guarantors implied their wish that their daughter would be treated fairly by her in-laws.]

As I was clumsy about those things that I never did, my mother-in-law scolded me. She often beat me like a dog holding my hair in her fist. I could not eat the food. The food was awful and I threw out the food I ate. I just drank water from the well over there.

My husband kept bleeding and I 'killed' three sons. I went to a fortune-teller. She told me that my life was not going to be easy. She also told me my husband's heart was ripped and blood would overflow from it. I think that this situation is an effect caused by my deeds in the previous life I lived. I do not blame my parents. Bad luck and good luck are all my fate. It is sajupalcha. If I do not do any harm to anybody I do not have to worry about my next life.

After I killed all my sons, I did not want to live. My mother-in-law blamed me for bringing bad luck. She yelled at me and hit me one day. She asked me to get out of the village. Actually, I wanted to leave. I met a very nice man in Sonhong. I lived with him for a long time. I delivered two boys. I was really happy there. My new husband [she did not actually marry him] owned a clothing factory in town. I worked there. One day my father came by to ask me to return to Pine Tree. He said my mother-in-law wanted me back. I knew that she felt jealous

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about my happy life here. I hated to go back to Pine Tree. However, my father said that a woman from a yangban family must behave. At that time I learned that my new husband had six children from a legal wife. I felt bad because he never told me about it.

Later my mother-in-law came by and said that she would never harass me again. I believed what she said and went back to Pine Tree. It was so agonizing to leave my children behind. [I do not know who cared for the children after her leaving.] It did not take a long time before my mother-in-law started to show her temper again. She again beat me and tormented me. When she went too far, I exploded myself. I threw things on the ground and yelled back at her. Then she did not confront me. She went out to tell other villagers how bad I was. A few hours later she came back screaming. Then my anger cooled off and I received all kinds of harassment.

I gave birth to two sons. After I delivered a son, my mother-in-law became nice to me. Actually my son was not crazy.[43] He was so clever that other people felt jealous and decided to kill him. One day he was bicycling home from school. He was kidnapped by his uncle and grandmother. Chunja especially helped to spread all of the bad rumors about my son. My son had brain surgery and became really crazy. I know this because I read lots of sacred books when I was a virgin [unmarried living in Oak Tree.] If my son was still alive he could have been like you.

After my son, they sent my husband to the same hospital. I realized that my mother-in-law wanted to have a grandson [to succeed the family line] before he became very sick or died. I was just a ssibaji. [a woman whose duty is to deliver a child who is not necessarily from a normative conjugal relationship. Such a woman was usually hired to produce a son for the wealthy family who failed to produce a son from the legal wife]. My husband is still in the hospital.

Uncle [Haesong, her husband's younger brother] sent my son [her only one surviving son] to Chŏnju and educated him for eight years. He is in a medical school. I had to sell 0.35 hectares of paddy for my son's education. Haesong said to the village chief that I had to sell all my land to continue to finance my son's education. One day I asked Haesong to buy my son a house if he had any money left over from the

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[43] One of the two sons showed his mental illness in his teens. Villagers remembered that the son put pesticide in the communal well. Some villagers and cows became seriously ill after drinking the water. The village chief had to announce by microphone not to drink the water. Another incident was that the boy grabbed Kihwan's daughter [Sangsa's present wife] and beat her badly. The boy continued to cause troubles for the villagers. One day they decided to confine him in the communal barn to correct his behavior. It did not work. They sent him to the mental hospital in Nasong. The boy died there at the age of 16. This incident had tormented Hwasun. She viewed all the villagers as accomplices in the attempt to kill her "smart" son.

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land sale. He scolded me saying that he already spent all the money a long time ago.

Now I live off of the Cho family's corporate estate. Samgu and his uncle tenant the land. I receive some rice from the total rent turned in. My son visits me once a year. He was here with his wife last month so he will not visit me until next year. My daughter-in-law is always anxious to leave.

My daughters buy me many things. My eldest daughter told me not to wear those ugly rubber shoes. She bought me these white leather shoes. Before she got married, she worked in a pharmacy in Chŏnju. Her uncle [Haesong] found the job for her. [She saved money for her wedding for a few years.] On her wedding day, her uncle contributed $280.


On my tongsŏ's [Paesong's wife] hwangap I told her that I was too old to collect firewood in the mountains. She gave me $210 for the purchase of a gas range. I do not know how to use it. I will ask my neighbor [Suran] to teach me.

When my daughter left, I had to give her at least the transportation fee to go home. I gave her $28. I had to borrow $14 from Samgu's uncle's wife and another $14 from Chunpyo. That is why I had to bring two mals (18 kilograms) of rice to Pian town to earn cash. The price of rice was too low for the sales to cancel my debt.

I did a rice kye with some villagers. I lost 100 sacks. [Actually she defaulted in the kye. Her expenses for her son's education and her daughter's wedding presumably made her fail to pay her due to other kye members. Chunja was among the people who did not receive the share. It happened about 10 years ago, but Chunja still demands the payment.]

Chunja spread the false rumor that I owe her 40 sacks. Actually she owes me the amount.

Fig. 28--Cho's family's diagram



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Chunja and I used to be good friends. When we both married into the Cho family we became sachon tongsŏ [the relationship between spouses of the second cousins.] We were similar in age and personality. We both have 'heat' [A person is believed to have heat when he or she has undemonstrative anger inside.] We cannot sleep in a hot room. We have to sleep in a cold room. I knew that Chunja began to feel jealous towards me. When I went to her house to ask her attend my eldest daughter's wedding, she locked her door. She knew that I would come to her the day before the wedding. Since that time she has been nasty to me. [Chunja's two sons died and she was childless. Hwasun's statement that Chunja was active in sending her son to the mental hospital seemed to be affected by the financial relationship between them. However, it was not Chunja but the influential men in the village who decided the matter.]

My father did chŏpchangga [having a concubine] in Silkun township. My father did it because my mother did not have a son. When I saw my mother crying on account of my father living with a new wife my heart was torn apart. [Hwasun was sobbing when she said this. It is worthwhile to note that she did not sob over her own bitter experience.] I have done the rituals for other people. [She later told me she did the ritual for her father's second wife. Her performing the ritual for her father's concubine who brought so much sorrow to her and her mother dramatically demonstrates how the patriarchal authority is embedded in the village women's ideology and behavior.]

One day Suran [her neighbor and Hyongsu's wife] came to me and asked whether I would buy some people's stocks. I did not know what it was. I gave my seal to her as she wished. [Suran bought Hwasun's share.] Once I was away from the village for a while. When I came back, I saw my dry land covered with pine trees. Later I found out that Hwahong planted them on my land. [According to the Korean forest law, people who cut the trees in the mountains must plant the seedlings in the same spot. Hwahong planted them on Hwasun's dry land. He waited them to grow big enough to transplant to the mountains.]

He said that he would soon pull up the trees so I could grow beans there. But he never did. I yelled at him saying "Do we have ingong [the local dialect representing the civil war] again." He told me "Live comfortably." [This statement is a kind of threat. In other words, if she makes a fuss about it, he would harm her.] Whenever I see the pine trees, I become choked up. [She still had about 150 pyŏng (0.05 hectares) of dry land where she grew beans.]

For the continuation of the family line, Hwasun was used to produce a son for a man who could not function as a normal husband. Her conjugal

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relationships with her husband were brief and designed to produce a son. Even her husband was manipulated by her parents-in-law. Her parents-in-law all died soon after Hwasun produced the second son. They achieved their goal of continuing the "blood." In this process, Hwasun's life had been torn apart.

Due to the genetic disease in the Cho family, Hwasun had to suffer from not only her ailing husband but also from the repeated death of her children. She "killed" numerous sons and daughters. Her marrying into the Cho family also helped her parents-in-law to have easy access to cooperative loans and widened their social network. Her parents in Oak Tree provided them with a good "bridge." Her ordeal had been particularly harsh because she was brought up in a wealthy family. Her mother's desire to have her daughter married to a man in nearby village in order to see her often resulted in a terrible tragedy.

Her only son has been reared by his uncle in Chŏnju. She cannot show or receive affection from her son, since her daughter-in-law and her son's uncle are dominant figures in her son's life. Her behaviors after being expelled from Pine Tree left an inescapable stigma on her reputation. She is considered as a very "low" woman. She is ostracized by the villagers and her own kinsmen. Her son is advised to stay away from her; especially the uncle does not want her son "contaminated" by her.

After all it was very considerate of the uncle to finance her son's education. However, it increased the distance between the son and his mother. What is important in Hwasun's case is that it represents many of the predicaments and difficulties faced by women of the peasantry who were all too often were used, abused, and manipulated. When they had no use value they were often discarded.

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Patriarchy and the patrilineal system are a cultural set under which such brutality took place without much resistance from the sufferers. Submission to man's authority has been strongly embedded in the woman's ideology so that women rarely showed open defiance except to show an occasional uncontrollable fury. When women are discarded, they become easy prey. They do not have protective kinsmen since they do not have property to attract them. Hwahong's explicit intrusion on Hwasun's property was not checked, even though it was in clear violation of private property rights. The former's power easily stifled the latter's resistance. No villager made an issue of the incident.

In this chapter I tried to demonstrate that the concept of kinship itself is differently interpreted and correspondingly applied to the various social contexts in which some dominant kinsmen monopolize economic and cultural capital at the expense of their less powerful relatives. A common theme among these four cases is the collusion between the traditional ideal mode of behavior and the strategic behaviors asserted in the domination of power. What is most critical about these cases is that the manipulation and violation of the tradition create a tension that shapes the history of kinship and social organization in the village.

B. Commoditization of kinship

The two cases in this section will illustrate how kinship sentiment, exploitation, and accumulation interact with each other. I attempt to show the exploited and exploiting kinsmen's experience and perceptions of kin and credit arrangements. I shall discuss the complexity of the relationship between these two sets of kinsmen. My aim is to show the processes and social settings involved in unequal transactions between kinsmen.

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1. A sister, her husband and her brother

Chunja is a 70 year old woman who has lived alone since her close consanguineal and affinal kinsmen either died or moved to the city. She is one of the three major creditors in Pine Tree. Her present wealth is not inherited by her parents. She has accumulated her wealth over the last 40 years by being extremely thrifty. She wove cotton and silk cloth for most of her life to earn cash. When she lived with her parents she contributed all her earnings to the family. When she lived with her in-laws, her earnings from weaving went to her parents-in-laws.

Her husband, Musong, was a police officer who lived in the police station in Nasong city. Chunja lived with her husband for about five years until her husband was employed by the police. When the civil war broke out her husband had to escape from the communists. He moved around in the southern provinces of Korea. He met a woman there and lived with her. Even when the war ended, Musong continued to live with the concubine. Chunja soon learned that her husband was living with another woman and that they produced three sons and one daughter. Chunja's anger flared especially because her second son died at the time she learned of her husband's philandering. Her first son also died. The cause of both deaths seemed to be related to malnutrition. She thus has become childless and has to live alone since her parents-in-law died of old age.

Not being given any support by her parents and parents-in-law, she started from scratch. She wove cloth and worked as a wage laborer. Since she did not have dependents, she could save money. She also has accumulated capital by participating in rice kyes and lending money with interest to

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villagers. She has become very wealthy by local standards. Her lending practice extends beyond the Yongsan township.

She had not been contacted by her only living brother Sungjo, in Seoul, until recently when he visited her to ask her for some amount of cash. He had lost all his property when the liquor store he invested in went bankrupt. Sungjo thought of his sister in the village as a way for easing his financial difficulty and he obtained most of her cash. He told her that he would invest her money in the stock market and the profit would be larger than her lending in the rural community. She liked the idea and let her brother manage her money. The fact that her debtors often defaulted made her brother's suggestion much more attractive, and the declining private interest rate was another major reason for allowing her brother to manage her money. She withdrew all the cash in her cooperative savings account and gave it to him.

She still has about two hectares of paddy which Sungjo has solicited her to sell. However, she has refused. He feels frustrated about the fact that his sister still has a legal husband, Musong, on the family registry. Musong has declined to officially divorce her despite Sungjo's constant demand to do so. In Korea, divorce is effected only if both parties agree and there exist substantial reasons for the divorce. Musong remains her legal husband even though he had been living with a concubine who has not been registered as his legal wife for the last 30 years. Besides his own name being on the registry, Musong put his three sons from the concubine into Chunja's family registry. This way he can claim the property after she dies. At least his sons can get the property if she and he both died. According to the local custom and civil law, the spouse controls the deceased spouse's property unless he or she is very old.

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Sungjo succeeded in getting her cash, but failed to get the land. He is anxious to get the land before she dies. He wants to sell the land to obtain more cash. Managing the land as an absentee landlord will be difficult for Sungjo who moved out when he was young and knows next to nothing about farming. Besides, the state tries to transfer land from absentee landlords to the tiller. Therefore, Sungjo would rather have cash from the sale of land. So far she has not listened to him not because she understands his scheme but because she believes that "my land is my flesh."

He explained to her that Musong, whom she hated so much, would take the land when she died. She simply answered "that is impossible." She still had her land tenanted by the villagers. The following section is my chronological rearrangement of Chunja's statements.

> When my mother was pregnant with me, she wanted to abort the child because she believed that she was going to deliver a girl. People believed that a pregnant mother with a bulge on the right side would give birth to a female. However, she insisted on delivering the baby. That was me. Afterward, my mother was pregnant again. Then she delivered a son. I was praised by my parents for "making a place." This means that a preceding female baby prepares a place in the womb for a male child to stay for nine months.
>
> He is my younger brother Sungjo. One day he climbed up a tree and fell. He started to cry so loud that my mother came out and scolded me and my elder sister. He had a big scar on his belly where he was scratched by a branch of the tree from which he fell.
>
> I was busy farming and weaving to earn money to finance my brother, Sungjo's education. My elder brother Tuhi did not go to school. Instead he learned Chinese characters at a sŏdang [a local private school, where the teacher usually was a learned, elderly man and the pupils were the young villagers. The teacher was usually paid in rice by pupil's parents after the harvest as a form of appreciation. Students learned how to read Chinese classical books and to write Chinese. The sŏdang system has existed since the Yi dynasty. It disappeared during the colonial period in Pine Tree.]
>
> We sold 0.35 hectares of Tasu land for Sungjo in Seoul. I also wanted to learn how to write at least ŏnmun (Korean). One day I practiced writing with a brush on a piece of paper. My mother saw me

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doing it. She screamed at me: "Are you crazy? If a woman learns things, she will ruin the whole family." She took my brush and tore the paper and said, "don't ever try it again." I always wanted to learn how to write as you are doing now. I regret so much about that I did not learn how to write.

My elder sister was born a hunchback. My parents loved her so much. When she was at a marriageable age, my mother was busy finding a good husband for her. Her spouse was Yi Sunghyon from the Sosan township. He was from a yangban family. He was tall and strong and he looked like a real man. He was a terilsawi for that was the only possible way for my sister to get married. She was even given 0.21 hectares of paddy. [This was a very unusual practice.] She delivered four sons and two daughters. A total of 17 people lived in our house [Chunja's parents and their four children, Tuhi's three children and wife, Heja's husband and their six children].

My mother worried about so many people living in a small house. My mother's solution was to send Heja's family to her in-law's house in Sosan and she was given a lot of money to buy land there. I was 17 when I married to Musong. He was from the wealthy Cho family in our village. I did not like him. But my elder brother and my mother forced me to marry him. Now I know that I was married to Musong so that our family would get something from the Cho family. They helped my brother Sungjo to settle in Seoul. Sungjo and Musong were close friends. They hung out together often. When my mother was very old and about to die, she often told me, 'I am sorry. I have not given you anything. I did not do what I should have done for you. I did not get rid of my responsibility for you.'

I was very skillful in anything I did. [She was known for weaving good quality cloth in a short period of time and making good food. She was often invited to rituals to prepare food for the meals.] This is why my parents did not pay attention to me. They knew that I could make a living without anyone's help. My mother promised me 0.21 hectares of paddy but, when she died, there was no way to prove that I was entitled to the 0.21 hectares and she did not leave a will. I did not dare to ask my elder brother for the land. [Tuhi was known as a terrifying figure. Villagers who had experienced tenanting his land remember how terrible he was.] I had to have 0.21 hectares of paddy from olke [kinship term for female ego's brother's wife. After Tuhi died, she has claimed the 0.21 hectares from the olke].

I was 17 and my husband was 16 when we got married. We lived together for five years. For the first year, I had to live with my parents. We call it kŭnhaeng which means that the new bride stays with her parents for one year after the wedding. [This system was a kind of bride service from bride's in-laws point of view. The bride was sent back to her parents and helped them in farming. I believe that such a practice was useful in labor intensive paddy farming.] After one

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year, I started to live with the Cho family. When I was there, 16 people lived in Musong's father's house [Musong's parents, four sons, three daughters, their married children's offsprings and two mŏsŭms]. I had to cook for them and wash their cloths. I also farmed the land. I was like a mŏsŭm.

I lived with my husband until he passed the police exam and was placed in Nasong city. I had to stay here. Very rarely was I able to visit my husband. When I went there, my mother-in-law followed me. Then we had the civil war. I stayed in the village and my husband escaped somewhere to the south. Since then I did not see him for a long time. After the war, my husband came back to work in Nasong.

One day I visited my husband carrying some food with my mother-in-law. I saw a woman in my husband's room. I learned that my husband had lived with that woman. Musong explained that he started to live with her after he was given permission from his father. I could not tolerate it. I grabbed his throat with my two hands and tried to choke him to death. People around me pulled us apart. I was strong at that time. I could have killed him. [Villagers said that Musong met the woman while he was escaping and hiding out. They said that the woman sheltered him. Therefore, Musong felt grateful and started to live with her.]

Since the fight, I continued to live with my parents-in-laws. [Soon her parents in-law died and the family members except Hwasun left for the city. By that time her parents and elder brother died. Her olke moved out to Chŏnju with her eldest daughter, Sunja. She was left alone.] Then I moved to this small house and started to live alone. People asked me to remarry. But I did not. If I remarry my family will become sangnom.

Sungjo should have been more considerate to me. I and my parents worked so hard to educate him. He never visited us since he became successful. My mother insisted on sending him to school despite my father's argument that 17 family members would starve to death if we sold the land. For six years we sent money and food to Sungjo while we ate food that was like garbage. He left me alone. He does not perform the correct ancestor worship for his father. He only does it in the Wŏn Buddhist style. It is alright to do the Wŏn Buddhist style ritual for our mother because she was a Wŏn Buddhist. But our father was not a Wŏn Buddhist. He should do the ritual in the traditional way for our father. When I saw Sungjo's simple ritual, my heart was torn. He never listened to me. So I do the traditional ritual for our father myself. I prepare wine and cooked white rice. [What bothers Chunja most was not how terribly she was treated by her father or brothers but how terribly her brother Sungjo treated her father's spirit.] Sungjo does not know how much he was thought of by his parents.

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> When my mother died, there was a double rainbow in the sky. It was so bright that everybody in Yongsan township saw it. I watched my mother's face when her body lay on the floor. The wrinkles on her face disappeared. It was a day when the sky and earth opened [a very auspicious day for a sage]. My mother was not an ordinary woman.
>
> Every morning, I put grains for the birds on the steel tray that is on the persimmon tree. As you see they watch me and are friendly to me. When I came to my house after a month's absence, two crows greeted me by singing a song over my head. When it rains, the birds fly in front of me to give me a sign indicating that I should not go anywhere.

Her statements demonstrate how kinsmen succeed at the expense of other kinsmen. Such exploitation has been disguised by the cultural frame of patriarchy and kinship obligation. She was left alone without any property when her kinsmen moved out or died. The most intriguing fact is that she maintained her deference toward some of her oppressors even though she knew that she was used by them. Her contribution to both the Kim and Cho families was never repaid. Furthermore, she recently was approached by her brother and her husband because of her property. As she becomes older, her consanguineal and affinal kinsmen become interested in the property that she has accumulated so painfully for the last 40 years. Her brother took most of her cash and her land is sought after by her brother and Musong.

Musong sent his eldest son to live with Chunja. The reason for doing this was so obvious that the villagers ridiculed Musong's plot. Musong wanted his son to develop some relationship with Chunja in order to prevent a possible skirmish with other kinsmen. They actually lived together for a year until Sungjo found out about the arrangement and expelled the boy. Sungjo asked Musong to agree to a legal divorce. But Musong refused, saying that his being of a yangban family origin did not allow him to divorce easily. [Remarriage was considered a dishonorable act for a yangban.]

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What intrigued me most was the following statements made by Chunja. "By the time when my husband's concubine delivered a son, I dreamt of a taemong [a pregnant woman's dream before the delivery. Villagers believe that the contents of a dream foretell a baby's destiny.]". It was not Chunja but the concubine who was supposed to dream such a dream. She had grown affectionate towards the son who was born by the woman who brought so much pain and agony to her. She believed that the boy was nothing but her son since she dreamt a taemong.

What she has to worry about is not the distribution of her property, but who will care to look into her room to find her when she was dying. As one of the villagers said, "I am afraid that no one in our village shall notice whether Chunja is dead or not. She always closes the door and does not communicate with us much. Only when her body decays and smells bad will people find out she is dead. It will be a great "shame" to her and her family."

2. An uncle and a nephew

The second case discusses the appropriation of a nephew's labor by his uncle. I focus on the social contexts in which such appropriation takes place. The uncle's name is Taehyon and he is 57. His 24 year old nephew's name is Yonghun. They have lived together in Mulberry Tree for the last 16 years. Yonghun was Taehyon's second cousin's second son.

Taehyon had two brothers and three sisters. He was the second son of a poor peasant in Mulberry Tree. All three brothers and sisters lived together until the elder brother got married and moved out [It was unusual for the eldest son to move out and leave the younger sons to stay with their parents.] and all the sisters married out too. The three brothers had farmed a small tract of land when they were young and their father was alive. Taehyon and

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his younger brother continued to farm the land. Since their lives were still difficult as always, Taehyon's younger brothers also moved out to find work in the cities.

Taehyon's father was very poor and he could not transfer much to his sons. Taehyon was given a small thatched roofed house and 0.21 hectares of land when his father died. He ploughed other people's land and did other farming tasks for a wage. Now he owns three hectares of paddy, a mill, one combine, one tractor, and two motor tillers. He is also raising nine dairy cattle and three pigs. He is undoubtedly the wealthiest man in the Yongsan township. I believe that, roughly, six factors are involved in making him rich: an incredible industriousness, luck, versatility in using coop loans, an extensive personal network with influential people, and effective management skills. The last factor involves the unpaid labor of his nephew which I shall describe shortly.

Taehyon financed his younger brother's education until the latter became a banker. Taehyon sent all three daughters to the university and two sons attend Youngsan junior high school and primary school. His three daughters live in Chonju and two sons live with him. The people in Taehyon's household were Taehyon, his wife, their two sons and Yonghun. His daughters visit him once in a while.

Besides his own paddy, he tenants about six hectares belonging to absentee landlords or infirm persons in Mulberry Tree, Oak Tree, and Pine Tree. He cultivates about nine hectares which is about seven times larger than the average acreage of a Yongsan farm household. His farm is fully equipped with farm machinery and the majority of the farm work he has performed on his land is mechanized. The land he cultivates is located in a flat area and this facilitates the use of machinery and allows for an increase in

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the scale of production, which lowers the cost of farming to considerable degree. The most important aspect of his economic operation is having Yonghun, his nephew, operate all the machines in the field as well as taking care of the animals and tending the mill. Moreover, Yonghun is not paid for his work. Taehyon yearly earns approximately $42,000 from paddy farming, $42,000 from milling, $28,000 from contract machine operations and labor on other people's farms, and $21,000 from the produce of his dairy cattle. He himself declares that he makes about $140,000 annually. If I consider his financial dealings with cooperative loans, private lending and rice kyes, his annual income would be well over $140,000. He said:

> We were very poor. My father had only 0.21 hectares of paddy. We three brothers and three sisters and our parents lived together in a small house. We did everything to earn some grain to feed ourselves. We were so poor that my mother could not make me lunch when I went to school. I could not buy textbooks for school. So I copied the textbooks onto pieces of paper. I was sick of hunger and I thought that if I joined the army I would be fed better. So I voluntarily joined the army at the age of 18. In those days, the provisions in the army were not as good as they are today. I do not know why. But we were all poor. I was hungry in the army too. When I was about to be discharged from the service I did not see any hope to do better outside of the army. So I remained in the service until I was 26. When I returned to Mulberry Tree things did not improve. My father farmed his small land and we three brothers worked for other people. I used my father's cow to plough through seven hectares of other people's land. I charged three toe [ten does equals to one mal, nine kilograms] for ploughing one majigi (0.07 hectares) which was half the normal price. You could never imagine how hard I worked for so long.
>
> I never slept more than five hours. During rest times, I worked on other people's land. That is why I now have rheumatism. I had a pig at that time. We did not feed pigs packaged fodder like we do these days. I had to collect acacia flowers to feed my pigs. I did many rice kyes and that is why I could gradually buy land and machines and the mill. When I was unable to make the rice kye payment, I borrowed money from the cooperative. When I received a share, I paid my debt to the coop. I used money like a paper. People here are stupid. When

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they have it they just keep it. But I used the money right away to expand my business.

As I had more and more land, it became easier to borrow money from the coop. Now I can borrow any amount anytime. The produce from the land fortunately paid off the kye and coop debt. At first I felt as if I was walking on the blade of a knife. Later on after I levelled off my debt, I could begin to breathe comfortably.

Yonghun is my nephew. He is the son of my second cousin. His family was so poor that I went to his mother and I told his mother that I would like to raise one of her sons. If I did not bring him here, his life would have been more difficult. I told Yonghun that if he listened to me well I would give 0.28 hectares of paddy and if he did not he would not get any. Now he is 24. I am worried about how I am going to have him marry. Yonghun is a good boy. But these days he sometimes becomes a little strange. Once in a while, he drinks a lot and confronts me [talks backs].

Yonghun used to live with his mother, maternal grandmother, and his brother in Kesam township. He never saw his father. His father died before he reached his second birthday. His parents did not have enough land to feed the family adequately. Yonghun remembers the days and nights he would go hungry because there was no food. However, he joyfully remembers fishing with his brother in the reservoir in his mother's village where he lived until he was eight years old. He remembers his uncle who frequently visited and talked with his mother. One day his mother said he should go and live with his uncle at his house and help him. That was how Yonghun came to be associated with Taehyon, living with and working for him until now. Yonghun said:

When I arrived at my uncle's house, I did not know anything about farming or machines. My uncle taught me little by little. Sometimes I made mistakes. I broke some parts of the machines and my uncle scolded me. I paid careful attention when my uncle taught me about the machines. Now I can operate them better than my uncle.

I drive the tractor to plough all my uncle's land [including tenanted land] because my uncle has ankle pain all the time. So I do everything all the time. Sometimes, my uncle helps me to milk the

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cows. My uncle sleeps at 9:00 at night and wakes up at 12 or one o'clock in the morning. Then he sleeps again at two o'clock and wakes up at 5:30 in the morning. I go to sleep at 11 at night and wake up at 5:30 in the morning. I want to sleep more, but my uncle wakes me up. I have to wake up early to milk and feed the cows. I have to get the milk ready before the milk pick up truck comes.

I know that my uncle has an ankle problem and that I have to work hard to help him out. I know that raising cows cost my uncle a lot of money. Once a cow is sick, it takes $17 to buy the medicine to inject it into the cow. Just look at that pile of empty fodder sacks. It is like a mountain. My uncle has collected these sacks for the last seven years. The total cost of these sacks is enormous. I often go to Pian town to mend machines. Now I have the flu. My uncle said that it was okay. He said I would be alright after a few days.

Sometimes I drive the motor tiller to deliver husked rice to the owners. I plough three hectares in seven days. Sometimes it takes more because I have to spread fertilizer before ploughing. When I operate our machines on other people's land, the land owners give me drinks and cookies. But I hate to work for Yongsu [a Pine Tree villager]. He is nasty and he always watches over my work. He asks me to do this and that. Last year I ploughed his one and half hectares. I was paid seven dollars per majigi and I gave it to my uncle. While I was working in his field I found that I was out of gasoline. I said to Yongsu, "I cannot work because I do not have gasoline". He was angry at me. Well, that was my fault. I should have checked how much gasoline I had before I started to work. But I just wanted to give Yongsu a hard time. We had a long argument, but I enjoyed it. He went back to his house and called my uncle and my uncle immediately delivered the gasoline on his motorcycle. That night I was scolded by my uncle. But I did a good thing.

Once in a while I asked my uncle for some allowance. He did not look happy. Yet, I have been successful in getting $14-28 a month from him. I do not have any friends around here. People at my age are in the army. [Yonghun was exempted from the army duty because he did not graduate from primary school and is considered to be retarded.] I used to go fishing with my brother in our mother's village, but I am too busy to go fishing here. I will live here. My uncle promised me 0.28 hectares.

Unlike Hayong's case, the appropriation of Yonghun's labor by his uncle has proceeded without much perception and resistance by Yonghun. Yonghun had not been paid or rewarded substantially for his labor. He

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receives three meals a day and some allowance from his uncle. Yonghun has been trained by Taehyon to be an efficient worker in all agricultural tasks. He does most of his uncle's work since the latter suffers from rheumatism. His aunt also helps him financially, but the contribution is minimal in comparison to Yonghun's actual effort and labor.

Yonghun did not finish primary school. Instead he has been kept in his uncle's house where he has learned how to farm and repair machines. Taehyon has supported the university education of his daughters and plans to send his two sons to the university while he uses his illiterate nephew to work his farm. Even though Yonghun was undoubtedly Taehyon's relative, his name was not on Taehyon's medical insurance plan. Only Taehyon's children, wife and himself are recorded on it.

Yonghun is excluded from the community network. There was a Hwangap ceremony for a resident in Mulberry Tree in September and most people knew about the forthcoming ritual. However, no one informed Yonghun. Villagers simply consider him to be a retarded boy. His retardation, if any, is probably caused by his continuous work on Taehyon's without the benefit of having any formal education.

In order for Taehyon to keep his promise to Yonghun's mother, he should have sent Yonghun to primary school, at least to learn how to read. However, Taehyon's need of his nephew's labor has been too urgent for him to care about the formal education of his hardworking nephew. Yonghun has been alienated from community affairs and is denied full community membership. The kind of work he does also contributes to the stereotype of retardation.

In July, Taehyon's dairy cow suddenly died without apparent cause. Taehyon was depressed. He was hesitant about what to do with the dead cow.

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He decided to sell it to the butcher shop in Yongsan township. However, if he sold the whole body in one piece to the shop owner, the butcher, would pay less for the cow. Therefore, Taehyon decided to butcher the carcass into smaller more manageable pieces.

The villagers traditionally thought that only sangnom (lowborn) should butcher a cow. Hiring a butcher was out of the question as far as Taehyon was concerned because the cost would be higher than the profit gained.

Taehyon asked Yonghun to butcher the cow. Yonghun first skinned the cow with a knife. Then he used an axe to hack through the joints and other parts to make smaller manageable pieces from the carcass. Butchering a cow is different from butchering a pig. To watch a man cut up a pig's body was more or less tolerable, but it was horrible to watch the butchering of a cow. Strangely enough, when the cow is lying there, split in half, it looks considerably larger than its former actual size. When it is opened up, it is like a huge monster with blood emanating from many different angles.

The villagers surrounded the cow and watched Yonghun during the entire process. His low social status was confirmed and reproduced in this work that was supposed to be done by a professional butcher.

The 0.28 hectares of paddy that Taehyon promised to give Yonghun are not commensurate compensation for the last 16 years of back breaking labor. Besides, the 0.28 hectares of land are far less than the amount of land needed for a couple to make a decent living.

Taehyon strongly believes that he saved his nephew from starving to death. Yonghun believed that his uncle treats him decently. He has been under full control of his uncle for 16 years, sleeping in the same room with him, while Taehyon's wife sleeps with their two sons in another room.

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Yonghun believes that what he has is all there is to have. Yonghun is not likely to have his own family. He does not have property or education, the major criteria to become a spouse. The community's stereotypical idea of Yonghun as a retarded child and his degenerated social status associated with his tasks will make it even more difficult to marry. I cannot think of any other possibilities than that he will stay with his uncle permanently as a celibate worker.

Summary

I am interested in social systems where kinship is commoditized. As Hayong or Chunja's case demonstrates, kinsmen exploit kinsmen in various social contexts, differing in extent and method. Hayong is exploited by his cousin. He learned that his expected reward would not be given. He left his cousin's place when he realized that no compensation would be forthcoming. The social context was in favor of the landowner like Hayong's cousin. Thus sufficient and cheap labor was easily available form one's kinsmen. Hayong's cousin could have managed his farm without Hayong's contribution. The cousin's self-assumed charity based on his stated kinship affection was not acknowledged by Hayong, who expected a substantial reward of land.

Chunja has been exploited for a longer period of time than Hayong or Yonghun. The cultural context of Chunja's exploitation is a patriarchal family system based on a patrilineal rule of succession. Her life did not change much when she married into and lived with the Cho family. Male authority strongly permeated the whole village society. Her unrewarded labor was positively sanctioned and expected and her potential to think about and speak out against the unfairness was silenced by the cultural system. Her brother's recent attempt and success in obtaining her cash is in part the result

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of the larger process of Korean capitalist development manifested through the expansion of the stock market as a means of exchange and accumulation.

A burgeoning stock market in the 1980's may not have been the decisive factor stimulating her brother to visit her. However, it created a social setting and provided a rationale through which the brother was encouraged to take his sister's money by successfully persuading her that investing in stocks would return greater profits than her providing credit with interest to her fellow villagers. He had fallen prey to a common pattern of small business failure by investing all his cash in a distant kinsmen's small liquor business that was more or less fated to go under.

Bank loans with favorable conditions have been monopolized by a few giant corporate conglomerates that are favored by the state. The interest rate is lower for these massive firms than for smaller less powerful and domestic centered enterprises, a fact that is typical of state capitalism. Small businesses have great difficulty in getting access to bank loans. The application procedure is notoriously complicated and the interest rate is high. Bankers themselves do not like to lend money to small businesses, because of the high incidence of failure characterizing pioneering enterprises. This is why small business owners resort to procuring high-interest private loans in a highly competitive environment that easily produces bankruptcy when income is not enough to cover loan payments.

Chunja's brother's debtor started a small liquor business. He opened the business by borrowing money at a 25 percent interest rate, a rate about two times higher than the standard interest rate offered with regular bank loans. However, he did not have an alternative source of capital. When the economic returns were insufficient to cover the interest payments to his creditors, he was forced to declare bankruptcy and all the creditors lost their

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investments. Sungjo was one of the losers. Such incidents happened in the late 1970's. As the nationwide financial market saw the development of the stock market, investors began to favor stock buying with the highest expectation of being able to accumulate capital faster than with any other option available, with the exception of real estate.

Sungjo's expectation of garnering a huge profit in the growing stock market necessitated the use of cash to make an investment. Without capital to purchase stock, the profit opportunities the stock market offered would remain a dream. However, he had no cash since he lost everything in the failed liquor business venture. He had his sister Chunja whom he had neglected for such a long period of time, and he turned to her for help. He solicited her for cash through the medium of kinship affection.

When he visited her, she thought that her brother had finally become good. Without much hesitation she gave him the money accepting his promise that stock investments would provide greater profits than private lending. She did not ask for or receive an I.O.U. from her brother because she felt covered by the idea of their blood relation. In any case, writing an I.O.U. would be meaningless for reasons that are quite different for Sungjo and Chunja.

Sungjo might think that an I.O.U was not necessary because the cash would eventually belong to him since his sister might die before the need to repay it. He could at least give the money to his sons who would care for his infirm body and perform rituals for his spirit after his death. Chunja did not think of asking for an I.O.U because Sungjo was her hyŏlyuk (blood and flesh).

Yonghun's case is more straightforward. In conjunction with the mass rural migration, the remaining peasants have great difficulty in finding labor

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to work their farms. In the 1960's, mŏsŭm were paid from three to eight sacks of rice annually depending on their skill in farming. In the 1970's people did not want to work as mŏsŭm. They could find a more honorable job in the city. The last mŏsŭm whom villagers remembered was Sinsu in Oak Tree village. He was paid 20 sacks annually in the early 1970's. He soon left for Chŏnju. Even though the payment to mŏsŭm rose considerably, people did not want to be mŏsŭm because of the low social status and menial tasks this entailed. Hiring a person as a mŏsŭm on a permanent basis in the past was simply impossible because the payments to that person would easily offset the profit from farming. The labor shortage has been keenly felt by the villagers, affecting them both physically and financially. This situation persisted until machines were used to replace human labor.

In the 1970's Taehyon made a trip to his second cousin's wife in Kesam township . He might have had some sympathy toward his cousin's family. On that basis, therefore, he might have taken Yonghun from the household that already had great difficulty in feeding all its members. The two sons were too young at the time to sell their labor for cash or kind. They were a financial burden on their mother. Giving away her son to her husband's cousin temporarily helped her financially to cope with her life.

Yonghun's contribution to Taehyon's farm is enormous. His conscientious work without reward is a decisive factor, making it possible for Taehyon to accumulate capital to successfully manage his farm business and to send his children to study at the university. The simple fact is that Taehyon raised his children at the expense of his nephew's labor and life.

Taehyon showed kinship charity to his cousin's wife while simultaneously feeling a desperate need to find a cheap and reliable laborer. Taehyon's successful management of his present economic operation

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coincides with the duration of Yonghun's arrival and labor. Had Taehyon paid the normal amount of salary or wage per hour to Yonghun, he could not have accumulated capital to realize his present wealth. After all, capitalism created a broad social setting within which Sungjo's trip to Chunja and Taehyon's trip to Yonghun's mother were made.

The changing nationwide financial market and the shortage of rural labor are two salient consequences of the development of capitalism in Korea. I focussed on these two changes to understand the dynamics of kinship sentiment, capital accumulation, and kinship exploitation. In this chapter I attempted to show that kinship has been commoditized and used by some kinsmen to dominate their fellow kinsmen. In other words, kinship expectations and sentiment were manipulated for the purpose of capital accumulation. Since kinsmen themselves are not explicitly commoditized, as in the slavery system, the abstract concept of kinship itself is commoditized. Therefore, the commoditization process is extremely complicated, ambiguous, and replete with paradoxes.

C. Class and kin relationships

The basic class contradiction in Pine Tree is that between landlords and tenants. Landlords who have an excess of land have the landless or small landholders who tenant their land. Tenants then have to pay for the rent believed to be the payment for land usufruct rights for a year. Tenants hold tenancy for a year until the harvest season and are then obliged to renew their contracts with the landlord.

About 80 percent of the tenants are kinsmen of their landlords. It may be kin affection that motivates the landlords to seek tenants among their close kinsmen. To partially prove this assumption, landlords have preferred

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close kinsmen to distant kinsmen in giving tenancy. Generally speaking, the second cousin is preferred to the third cousin. Thus, close kinsmen may seem to be more trustworthy to landlords.

Some anthropologists (Rey 1979, Vernier 1984) have argued that abstract kinship ideology conceals the fact that kinsmen may exploit kinsmen. Such an argument touches on the issue of the internal logic of capital accumulation, domination, and hegemony among kinsmen. However, it does not address the confusing, contradictory and paradoxical development of social relationships among kinsmen. The relationships among non-kin landlord and non-kin tenants is complex enough to require a cautious approach to the issue of class contradiction.

Anthropological research on such an issue cannot be summarized by saying landless tenants constitute a rural proletariat whose class interest opposes that of landlords (Lenin 1977). It is a more subtle and difficult task to delineate class contradiction even without considering kin relationships. In most peasant villages kinsmen make up a substantial portion of the population. Therefore, kinship is inevitably involved in the class relationship between the landlord and tenant and makes that relationship more complicated.

When kinship and tenancy relationships are intertwined, the social relationships that develop are absolutely unpredictable and sometimes paradoxical. The most intriguing factor about these relationships is the blurred boundary between classes. Classes cannot be understood using a rigid dichotomy. Categorizing people into social classes should be either a preliminary step to understand the complexity of class formation and contradiction or simply ignored.

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The structural analysis of class (Althusser 1970) has been insightful; however, this type of analysis tends to simplify class problems. Economic and social wealth may draw the line between classes. Yet, it does not help us understand the interactions of strategic and hegemonic relationships that crosscut the lines between classes.

My methodology is individualistic, situational, and inductive. Instead of categorizing and defining a class or classes, I shall give accounts of actual incidents that have occurred between landlords and tenants and their historical background and development. Then I shall discuss the relationships between the landlords and tenants and the issue of class.

Eric Wright (1986: 75) precisely points to the crux of social class. He says "It is peculiar combination of antagonism of material interests and inter-dependency which gives exploitation its distinctive character and which makes class struggle such a potentially explosive social force." The paradox of the inevitable mutual reliance and antagonism is, in my opinion, the most powerful underlying theme of class analysis. Such dynamics are found operating between kin landlords and kin tenants.

Class formation is more or less a process of the concentration of land in the hands of a few people at the expense of a large number of people who become alienated from land. Land has been undoubtedly a major factor in the reproduction of inequality. If a family has a large amount of land, they tend to have surplus grain after consumption. That surplus can potentially be used as investment capital in the reproductive cycle.

Another way for large landholders to accumulate wealth is to have someone tenant the land and receive rent. Also, a surplus of land produces a surplus of grain which becomes a source of credit. Larger land holders lend surplus grain to the landless and small landholders who perpetually lack

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grain for consumption. Hunger becomes an irresistible force driving the poor to procure credit at high interest rates from the wealthy. A deficiency in the ownership of the means of production and the increasing dependency on credit have made it possible for the poor to contribute to the accumulation of wealth by landlords and creditors.

The role of credit in reproducing inequality is as important as that of land. Let us suppose that someone has one hectare of paddy land. What does that mean in terms of rice production? The land itself would not produce anything unless cultivators have some cash input for production and consumption as well. Expenses for fertilizer, insecticide, herbicide, food, and ritual contributions are all required to produce rice. Labor can be useful only after the person consumes sufficient calories. Such necessary expenses in drawing produce from the land are based on the surplus of grain and cash. To most peasants saving is not a luxury or a way to accumulate surplus capital, but a necessary act to enable the forthcoming farming to be as bountiful as possible.

Regardless of the various sizes of landholdings, lack of readily available cash forces people to resort to credit. This is why the need for credit is hooked into the process of reproducing inequality.

Creditors receive not only interest from debtors but also the unremunerated debtor's labor for their domestic and farming tasks. Without exception, almost all tenants have to use the landlord's and other major creditors' private loans for the preparatory operations of paddy farming. Farming has been impossible without pesticide, fertilizer and insecticide, which cost large amounts of cash. Therefore, tenants have to cyclically borrow private loans to get production on track. Even though a portion of

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the private lending has been reduced, poor peasants' livelihood still depends on it and their being stuck in the vicious debt cycle still obtain.

It is revealing to note that genealogical affiliation is not an influential factor in private lending. For example a Songhyon Kim borrows money from Kimbo and Chunja who are Umin Kim, and the Umin Kim borrows from Chunpyo who is a Songhyon Kim. These actual transactions contradict the common statement by creditors that: "I prefer our own lineage people in lending money." What they said was what they ideally believed but in actual lending practices the opposite is oftentimes found. Creditors are simply not overly concerned about genealogical closeness in reality, but lend money to the person whose credit worthiness is good. Ironically, kinship relationships often make the creditors reluctant to lend money to kinsmen. Creditors fear that kinship affection will chip away at the obligation for the kin debtors to repay.

1. Life history of Chunpyo (Songhyon Kim)

I shall cite the case of a wealthy landlord and creditor, Chunpyo in order to explore the role of credit in land holding and in changing social contexts below. Chunpyo's life history will be revealing in that his case shows how he has emerged as a creditor from being an ordinary, poor peasant over the last 40 years. Chunpyo said:

> I was born in 1927. My father was very poor and we had a small amount of land. My parents died at an early age. Therefore, I had to care for my younger brother and two younger sisters. I was the eldest one. I married when I was 19 and I had two sons and three daughters. My brother married soon after I did. He produced two sons and one daughter. We all lived together. The total number of household members were 17. We had too many people living in the same house.

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I had great difficulty in feeding my family. I had my sisters married out somehow. Then my family and my brother's family lived together.

I was drafted in the army immediately after the liberation from the Japanese. I served for five years. When I was discharged, I received 20 sacks of rice for the payment of the duty. I returned to the village and purchased 0.28 hectares of rainfall dependent sangwan dap [local dialect for the paddy owned by the Japanese colonialists] (See Appendix H for the discussion on the effect of land reform) on credit.[44]

Besides my own land, I managed 0.7 hectares of our corporate estate. At that time, 12 people lived together and it was difficult to make a living from the production of 15 sacks of rice. It was especially difficult to pay for the 0.28 hectares. So I asked my younger brother to leave and let my brother tenant half of the corporate estate and some dry land. I also lowered the one percent interest rate on the money I lent to him. He built a small house and lived there right under the mountain.

After he moved out, eight people lived in the house. It became a little easier to make a living and to pay my debt [of the sangwan dap]. I finally paid all my debt [25 sacks of rice]. I worked hard on my land and the corporate estate. I also worked for other people. I never borrowed any money from fellow villagers. My father died from the burden of debt and when my father was alive, we all suffered a lot from his debt. That was a lesson. I said to my self, "I will never borrow money no matter what happens to us."

Finally, I achieved eight sacks of rice surplus.[45] I used the rice for private lending with a 30 percent interest rate. At that time the normal interest rate was 50 percent and my interest rate was very low. Therefore, I could easily find good borrowers. It was not troublesome at all to collect the principal and interest on time. I never asked for an I.O.U. I trusted the person and family. [His saying "family" implies that he relied on the debtor's and kinsmen's' credit-worthiness.]

For the past 30 years, I never experienced pansem except in Tongkyun's case. He was a Umin Kim and he intentionally did pansem. I knew that he could have paid his debt. But he did pansem

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[44] Chunpyo's statement of "on credit" means the amount he paid over a five year period. As the Japanese retreated, the land that used to be owned by the Japanese was sold to Korean peasants. Pine Tree village had about three hectares of such paddy land. The big absentee landlord, Manyon, had the biggest piece of land, which was distributed to the tenants. Chunpyo could have purchased Manyon's land, but he settled on the purchase of the relatively cheaply priced sangwan dap.

[45] These eight sacks had a great significance before the 1960's. This amount is actually small compared to contemporary standards and is equivalent to the annual produce from 0.14 hectares. However, eight sacks of surplus constituted an extreme luxury in those days. Few people had any surplus after consuming the unsold harvest. Many hungry people needed to borrow rice for whatever the going interest rate was. In the 1950's, the private interest rate among Pine Tree villagers was about 50-100 percent . Therefore, any surplus could have been used as a high yielding source of private loan.

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anyway. His family moved to Taejon. His son opened a pharmacy and he died soon after moving. The person who tries to make fortune that way cannot possibly live comfortably.

During this time, I bought a sow. Fortunately, the pig grew fast without falling ill and kept producing piglets. In those days, eight piglets were worth two sacks of rice. Soon I had 60 sacks of rice surplus. I bought another 0.21 hectares of paddy for 43 sacks and I still had 17 sacks left. I felt I was really getting rich. It was not difficult to educate my children at all. My rice kye covered all the education costs of my children. It cost me 150 sacks to educate my children.

When I was 46, 18 years ago, I bought 0.56 hectares again. My paddy, barley, tobacco cultivation, and pig raising all did well. Nowadays, I do not worry about my living. My brother also does well. His son was employed in a big company in Seoul. He visits his son often. My son also is an employee in a company in Seoul. I may live with him in Seoul. My daughter-in-law will care for me. But I want to stay here as long as I have power in my hands and legs.

Chunpyo's eldest daughter married a wealthy man in Chungup and his eldest son holds a high paying job in Seoul. Another daughter recently got married, and the youngest daughter became a teacher in a primary school in Kŭmsan city after graduating from a teacher's college. All of his children graduated from the university. He and his wife live with his 22 year old youngest son. The son dropped out of the Yongsan township primary school. He is mentally retarded. Chunpyo's biggest worry is how to have his youngest son married. Once in a while he sighed and sobbed about the son. A Umin Kim said, "Chunpyo has to buy a woman in order to get him married. Everybody has worries, whether he is rich or poor. So it is a fair world."

Chunpyo did not elaborate on his using the corporate estate for accumulating land and capital. But other villagers all agreed that his managing the estate quickly made him rich. He paid about one sack of rice rent to the fund of his sublineage group. He has taken the rest. He himself is

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the private lineage toyusa. Therefore, he has great flexibility in controlling the finances of the lineage group and his own household.

Chunpyo's case illustrates how private lending becomes a source of wealth and helps establish a firm base for the reproduction of capital. A small amount of surplus of rice in an impoverished area produced large amounts of capital from interest payments. The high interest rate has always played a role in hindering debtors from being independent. The debtors' perpetual indebtedness has been a source of the creditors' wealth accumulation. Kimbo,another major creditor, is similar to Chunpyo in the way he has become a dominant creditor.

It is worthwhile to note that Chunpyo's asking his brother to leave is usually considered as a "remorseless" act toward his closest kinsmen. His impoverishment did not leave much room to care for his brother's family. Chunpyo's primary concern was to protect and improve his closest kinsmen, his wife and children first. His care for kinship was graduated according to kinship distance. The closer the genealogical tie the person had with him, the more obligation Chunpyo felt and fulfilled.

2. Life history of Tuhwan

The next case is that of Tuhwan who was a landless tenant. Since his great grandfather moved to Pine Tree, all of his lineal ancestors have been tenants. He belongs to the Sakak sublineage of the Umin Kim. He is 40. His father had tenanted Chunja's father's land who was also a Sakak member. Tuhwan's hard work paid off with a profit large enough to purchase 0.35 hectares. He purchased three dairy cows on coop credit two years ago. He still borrows from Kimbo, Chunja and Chunpyo.

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Tuhwan's life history is representative of the majority of tenants in Pine Tree. Inter-generational landlessness, constant poverty, and heavy dependency on private loans are characteristics of Tuhwan's family and common elements among tenants. A difference would be that Tuhwan's father did pansem and was found drowned to death in a village reservoir. I do not know whether it was suicide or simply an accident. Others said that he drowned himself since he was so depressed by the pansem. Some villagers said that he was so drunk that he misstepped on the narrow path right above the reservoir and fell into the water. Tuhwan's father's death soon after the pansem dramatically characterizes the family history of Tuhwan. He said:

> My father had two brothers and one sister. They all were poor and lived together. They did not inherit any land from their grandfather. Now they are all dead. My father was landless. He tenanted Chunja's father's land and then Chunja's land. We are all of the Sakak. We are actually very close kinsmen. Tenanting was the only way for our whole family to make a living. My parents, I, and seven other brothers and sisters lived together in a house. They did not farm here very long. They soon left for the city. Now they live in Pusan, Kwangju, and Seoul.
>
> I was the eldest son so that I had to stay and care for our parents and our ancestors' graves. For our father's ancestor worship (chesa), Chusŏk, and Sŏl (new year) they visit me. My father worked as a mŏsŭm for Cho Hyondok [second cousin of Cho Hyunmun, Chunja's husband] for a long time. I myself was a mŏsŭm for a Songhyon Kim for 15 years. I could not make money at all. All I got from my master was food for my whole family.
>
> My younger brother does not do well in the city. He was unfortunate to have a wrong woman when he was 27. He had an out of wedlock daughter by that woman. He worked as a delivery boy in a Chinese restaurant for 10 years since he graduated from the primary school here. He was paid $28 a month. The woman left him with all the savings and their daughter without giving any notice to my brother. Now he has to start again. He works in a pool room in Seoul.
>
> My youngest brother lives with me now. He tries hard to get a job. But it has not worked out well. He only graduated from junior high school. I give him a $56-70 monthly allowance. My second brother is smart. He graduated from high school all by himself. But he

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could not go to college because I could not and cannot finance his education.

I had a wedding ceremony in the Wŏn Buddhist temple here 11 years ago. It cost me $28-42. We did not buy any expensive items. We just bought new clothes for each other. Chunja was the match maker. My wife did not like me when she first saw me. She was much taller than I was. Probably that was why she refused to marry me. However, Chunja insisted on the marriage and persuaded my wife's family. That was how I became married to this woman.

When my father died I did not inherit anything. I bought this house with the money I earned by working as laborer and mŏsŭm for years. I continued to tenant Chunja's land. Now I have more land to till. I now tenant Chiju's and Kiyol's land.[46] Now I tenant only 0.28 hectares of Chunja's land. Actually I do not have to tenant her land. She is too stingy and bad. When I was a sharecropper for her she took only the good stalks standing on the field.[47] I do not want to deal with her any more. In the old days (1960's) we paid two sacks rent per majigi (0.07 hectares). That was a lot because the harvest was much smaller than nowadays. In those days, we had to look good to the landlord in order to get tenancy. Getting tenancy was like a getting a star in the sky.

The produce we got after paying rent was always not enough to feed ourselves until the next transplanting season. No matter how hard we worked, we were in the same position. Besides tenanting, I worked on other people's farms. I was paid nine kilograms for working one majigi from transplanting to harvest. [He is talking about the sŏnja system.] I bought this house 15 years ago. I repaired it in 1974-1975. I received free cement and bricks from the township office and I paid for the remaining expenses.

I owe the agricultural coop about $5,600. Generally, I borrowed the money for my living expenses. I also owe the animal raisers' coop $3,500. I used the money to purchase three cows that I have now. I have too much official debt. I try not to take out a private loan but sometimes I borrow money from Kimbo and pay 20 percent interest. I belong to a rice kye that I joined in 1978. The 100 sack kye members are Sunja, Hayong, Hyongsu, and Nayong. I was second to receive the sum. I bought 0.35 hectares with the kye money. In the last year of the kye, I had a great difficulty to pay my dues so I borrowed money from the coop. The rice harvest from the tenanted land, my 0.35 hectares and coop loans eventually paid my kye debt.

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[46] They are all Sakak members as is Tuhwan.

[47] Pine Tree villagers place harvested rice stalks on the paddy field and take equal share of the produce. After picking up alternately it becomes random choice. Sharecropping apportions an equal share of the produce to the landlord and sharecropper. I believe that the scarcity of rural labor and the easy availability of land has changed the contract system between landholder and tiller to a tenancy system that usually guaranteed more of a share to the tenant.

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I have lots of coop debt. But it is nothing when I compare mine with Chiyong's debt. These days people are not afraid of becoming indebted. In the old days borrowing one million won from the coop was a grave matter. But people these days think of $1,400 as child's play.

When I borrow money from my kinsmen [a Umin Kim such as Kimbo] I have to be careful. I have to give interest even if the kinsmen refuse to take the interest. If I do not give interest I cannot get a loan from my kinsmen the next time around.

My neighbor is Chiju. We are all Sakak members. We are supposed to be close and amiable. But I feel it is difficult to approach him and ask him something. He is very rich and well educated. When his father lived here, I was very close to his father. Chiju knows about cows. So when my cow has diarrhea and behaves strangely, I ask Chiju for help. Then he comes immediately to my house and checks my cows. But there is still an uneasy feeling between me and him.

Chunja's mind is bad. When I harvest, she is supposed to pick up her rent right away. But she intentionally delays to pick it up. She asks me to store her rice in my barn. Then the mice eat it away and the total amount of rent set aside for her is reduced. She does not care whether it is eaten by mice. Usually, in the spring when the rice price increases she wants her rent. By that time, the amount has been reduced considerably and I have to be responsible for the loss. These days the rice price rarely rises over the cooperative's set price. Therefore, she just puts her rent in my barn. I keep asking her to take away her rent, but she does not. Now I still have eight sacks in my barn which were supposed to be picked up by Chunja a long time ago.

In the winter I almost always go to the city to work. I work at the construction sites. I have worked in Chŏnju and Seoul and I earned $28 to $35 daily. It is good money. Last year I could not work because it kept raining. When I worked as a construction laborer I felt good because I just concentrated on working. Farming involves too many things.[48] I was paid every 15 or 30 days. I cannot stay long in the city because I have three cows and a wife to take care of.

My wife has pushed me to move to the city. She says there is no hope in digging the ground [meaning paddy farming] all day and all year here . I think she is right about that, living in the city would be good for our children [three daughters and one son] even if we suffer in the city for the first few years. She does not want our children to make a living by working the land. I always say to her that we will move out soon. But I have postponed it for years. I do not farm to earn profit. If I do I would have left the village a long time ago. I do farm to make food grain. If we just look after profit we cannot farm.

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[48] He refers to the stressful social relationships required to maintain production. Credit, tenancy, kinship relationships would be the major items to constitute the "too many things."

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> Because we have lived as peasants, we have to farm. I feel empty if I do not farm. I like to live here. But I think I have to go to the city someday for my children.
>
> In the winter I go to Tujong mountain to collect firewood. I feel good in the mountain. I scream by myself in the mountain. When I descend from the mountain, I feel good. Even though I was never educated I would feel good having one and half hectares and would not ask other people for anything. Once in a while, I meet a Won Buddhist priest. She asks me "why don't you come to the temple and learn the truth?" I then reply, "please do not pay attention to me. I cannot go to the temple since my life is not stabilized yet."

What Tuhwan said does not show all aspects of his class relationships with his creditors and landlords, particularly Chunja. However, his statement on Chunja's insistence on keeping her rice in his barn suggests the existence of a larger exploitative mechanism between kinsmen.

Before the 1960's, it was unthinkable for Tuhwan and his father to complain about the high rent. As rural migration favored the tenant's bargaining position with the landlord, Tuhwan could openly asked Chunja to carry away her rent. Chunja feels bitter about Tuhwan's attitude. She expects unchanging deference from Tuhwan whose father had been submissive. She feels betrayed. She often said, "Tuhwan's belly is so full that he becomes ungrateful." She thinks that she and her father cared about their poor kinsmen (Sakak segment) and gave tenancy exclusively to Tuhwan's father. Now Tuhwan defies her authority. He can do that because he tenants other people's land in favorable conditions and he owns some land himself. His need for Chunja's land is not as great as before. Chunja said, "Tuhwan's father was drowned in the water to pay off his son's bad behavior. His spirit will come out and be saved only when his closest kinsman shall be drowned to death in the same reservoir."

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Nowadays, Tuhwan has a few ways to make Chunja suffer. This year he declared he would not tenant her 1.12 hectares just before the transplanting season was to start. Chunja was shocked because it would be very difficult to find another tenant in June. Pine Tree villagers make preparations for paddy cultivation three months before transplanting seedlings. They have to acquire pig manure and fertilizer and other chemicals for the given land. Ordinary tenants would not have all the required resources for paddy farming in June. It was too late. Most people already did away with their expenses for paddy preparations by June.

Changing tenants frequently is not good policy for landlords. Old tenants know the characteristics of the soil and the best methods to maximize production in particular plots. New tenants usually ask for a low rent since both sides know that it takes two or three years for tenants to familiarize themselves with the soil and reach the previous level of production.

I do not know exactly why Tuhwan decided to give up Chunja's tenancy. I assume that he felt it enough to tenant one hectare and his own 0.35 hectares and to care for three cows. He also may not have wanted to continue his relationship with Chunja so that his self-satisfaction from declaring independence would compensate for the loss of profit incurred from giving up the contracts

Chunja felt desperate. She called her brother Sungjo to persuade Tuhwan to continue to tenant. Sungjo came down to the village. When he heard about Tuhwan's intention, he thought that he was just bluffing to get a lower rent. He advised Chunja to bluff too. Chunja was like a gambler who did not know what kind of cards Tuhwan held. If Tuhwan meant what he said, Chunja would lose 25 sacks of rent.

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It turned out that Tuhwan's intention was truly to give up tenanting Chunja's land. Chunja and Sungjo were greatly disappointed. They lost their gamble. Sungjo said to Tuhwan that the latter's father and family could make a living because of the generous offer of tenancy motivated by kinship affection from Sungjo's father.

Sungjo advised Tuhwan to tenant at least that portion of Chunja's land that he had tenanted previously. So Tuhwan decided to tenant four of the most conveniently located majigis. To Chunja it was better than leaving all the land fallow for a year. Therefore, 0.84 hectares, tentatively, were to lie fallow. Chunja was still angry after the agreement. She felt cheated by Tuhwan who, she thought, should have notified her about his decision at least one month before the transplanting season. Tuhwan later told me, "I could have totally refused to tenant her land if we [Tuhwan and Chunja and Sungjo] were not kinsmen. It was very difficult to refuse Sungjo's advice." Tuhwan's agreement to tenant 0.28 hectares is extremely revealing. His reaction to his former, absolutely dominant, landlord's son and daughter allow us a significant measure of insight into village hegemonic relationships. It is not difficult to assume that Tuhwan's subservience to his father's landlord's son and daughter might be caused by a remnant of deference, a deference that had seeped into his body and mind for decades.

Contrary to this type of reasoning, Tuhwan's response to the changing constituents of the hegemonic structure was very articulate. Saying that he was concerned about kinship obligations disguised his motivation to utilize what had been offered to him. He demanded the 0.28 hectares. His wish to till the 0.28 hectares did not have to be explained. Both Tuhwan and Chunja knew the meaning of the silence surrounding Tuhwan's reason for choosing the best located paddy land. Chunja did not ask why Tuhwan wanted to

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tenant only the best land, and Tuhwan did not explain why he wanted it that way. Mutual acceptance of the delicate alterations in hegemonic relationships would be the most crucial aspect of the dynamics of hegemony and domination. Such a dimension helps us to understand the complexities inherent in the unequal relationships existing between landlords and tenants. Tuhwan's brave action was not just an individual reaction, but an expected outcome of hegemonic relationships between unequals.

3. New tenants and Chunja

Chunja was about to leave 0.84 hectares fallow. It was interesting to pay attention to how new tenants would be found and what the reaction of other poor tenants would be. When Chunja despaired over the "ungrateful" tenant, Yongsan(Songhyon Kim) and Hoban (Umin Kim) asked her to give them some of the now untenanted 0.84 hectares to tenant. They agreed that the rent would be 80 kilograms a rent considerably lower than the average.

When the villagers heard about Tuhwan's unusually brave move, they were pleased and exhilarated by Chunja's disappointment. Most villagers had some experience in tenanting Chunja's land and in paying exorbitantly high interest rates despite their continuing starvation. They knew that Chunja's present wealth was built on their hunger.

Nayong was one of the villagers who was happy. Such an incident was happening for the first time. Tenants had been usually anxious to hold or procure tenancy and the landlord could choose from the most obedient among many bidders who were willing to pay the highest rent. Rural migration reduced the number of tenants and changed the whole dynamics of the existing hegemonic relationships in favor of the former tenants. Tenants nowadays have bought some land from which part of their living expenses is

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earned. Some village migrants wish to dispose of their land for cash in order to start their lives in the cities. This makes the land market more easily accessible to the tenants who have saved some cash by tenanting and selling their labor, and squeezing their reproductive costs (see Bernstein 1977).

Before the 1960's, a land sale was a big event. The seller and buyer were involved in clandestine discussions about the possible sale of land. Land owners rarely sold their land to non-kinsmen. If they did, they were accused by their kinsmen. In order to avoid long lasting criticism, they were almost forced to find a buyer from among their kinsmen. Paddy in Pine Tree is located in four separate areas. These areas are separated by small hills. Each chunk of paddy land is given a name that dates back several hundred years. The landowner's name has been so fused with each piece of land that land itself constitutes the owner's identity. Frequent land sales followed by rural migration have shuffled both the land and its owners. People have gradually come to perceive the land as a saleable, purchaseable cash commodity. The commoditization of land reflects the changing dynamics of hegemony.

Chunja's trouble in finding tenants, and former tenants' "ungrateful" attitude toward former landlords, must be analyzed in the context of an increase in land availability, a decrease in the rural population, and the increasing employment opportunities allowed by the state's urban and rural development plans. However, it is important to note that conflict and tension also exist within the tenant class. Yongsan and Hoban both asked Chunja for tenancy. The latter received 0.45 hectares and the former, 0.35 hectares. When Nayong knew that the land would not be left fallow, he sighed, "Oh! What kind of people are they?" Here, the term "they" referred not to Chunja, but to Sonhong and Hoban. Nayong's great disappointment was caused by the interplay of Chunja's success in finding tenants and the two

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fellow tenants' succumbing to Chunja's hegemonic power based on land ownership. Pine Tree tenants' common wish to see Chunja suffer was not realized after all.

I want to emphasize two aspects concerning Chunja's case: the land holder's persistent and dominant role over the tenant; and the short circuiting of the collective struggle against their common landlord due to their own self interest stimulated by the option of acquiring two thirds of the harvest from tenanted land. Fragmentation of the tenant class is mainly caused by their historically materialized poverty. Chunja's case demonstrates how difficult it is for a poverty stricken tenant class to reach a consensus and to act collectively to achieve what they commonly aspire to in the history of class antagonism.

4. Hegemony and the kin relationship between tenant and landlord

It is important to note that the tenants with some land or cash earned by farming and/or selling their labor have shown a defiant attitude toward the landlords. In addition to Tuhwan's reaction to Chunja, Homang has refused to mow the grass on his landlady's graves [Sunja's parents and grandparents ']. He said, "I already pay a lot for rent. I have no reason to care for her [Sunja's] father's grave." Caring for the landlord's ancestors' tombs had been an accompanying obligation for tenants. Gradually, tenants explicitly began to question the auxiliary works involved with tenanting.

Not all tenants who have some means of livelihood showed defiance toward their landlords. Chinhwan had been a tenant since he was able to farm, beginning when he was a young boy. He had been a tenant for his Sakak segment aje (see genealogical chart), Chilsun and later Chilsun's son Tuhi and Tuhi's daughter Sunja. He had been a tenant for three generations.

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His lineal family's history of tenanting Sunja's family's land had a historical depth of six generations.

Chinhwan is 60 years old and has three sons and two daughters, all of whom live in the cities. He sent the last son to a university and the last daughter to high school. It was unusual for tenants to be able to support the education of their children at a university. Chinhwan and his wife lived alone in Sunja's father's house. They were visited by their children two or three times a year. Their youngest son visited them often to bring rice back to Chŏnju where he attended school. Their eldest son ran a mill business near Seoul and the second son worked in one of Kwangik's companies in Seoul. Chinhwan sent $2,800 yearly for the youngest son's education and living expenses. Chinhwan's wife proudly said that the eldest son sent a color TV set three years ago, the second son some herbal medicine, and the eldest daughter a gas range and pearl necklace.

Chinhwan had exclusively tenanted 1.33 hectares since Tuhi died 40 years ago. Last year he gave up tenanting, having decided to quit farming when his youngest son graduated from the university. He and his wife had accomplished their goal. They had squeezed their reproduction expenses to finance their son's education. As he finished his education, they did not need to continue the gruelling paddy farming. According to my calculation of labor needs (see production section) it is virtually impossible for an old couple to farm 1.33 hectares of paddy without pumashi or wage labor. Only extreme self-exploitation enabled them to farm that amount of land.

As he decided to give up farming, Pomkyun [member of the Kangho segment, and genealogical younger brother of Chinhwan] offered him a night watchman job at a construction site. His wife also started to work in Pomkyun's Chinese restaurant in Seoul. He is paid $560 and she, $280

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monthly. That is enough for an old couple to pay for their accommodations and other living expenses without giving or receiving help from their children. Their children are independent but not wealthy enough to substantially help them. Hayong said about Chinhwan:

> Chinhwan had two brothers. His eldest brother killed their father when he was drunk.[49] He was sent to jail and died there. Chinhwan had another brother who was a vegetable seller in Seoul. He liked gambling. He lost all his property by gambling. He turned to thievery and was caught by the police and sent to jail. Because of his brothers' sin Chinhwan had to keep his head down and be subservient to everyone. He was paying for the acts that his brothers committed. He never raised his voice to anyone. He just did as other people said.

As Chinhwan and his wife were about to leave the village, Chunja who had been their landlady for a long time and the aunt of Sunja, their recent landlady, asked Chinhwan to dig two big holes in the backyard of her house. She wanted to put two urns in the holes to preserve fresh chestnuts . If chestnuts were put in the ground they can last a long time without rotting. To dig the proper size holes required about half a day's work. Chinhwan had no reason to listen to Chunja. When he left the village his life would not be conditioned by the villagers. He was not going to farm. He could have shown defiance toward his former landlords. However he made the two holes rendering Chunja this last free service before leaving the village.

Chinhwan's digging the holes stands in contrast to Tuhwan's or Homang's explicit defiance. It is difficult to tell whether Chinhwan's lack of resistance to making the holes can be explained by his responsibility for his

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[49] Some villagers said that the brother was afflicted with a mental disease characterized by severe hallucinations; the afflicted persons would see tigers or wild animals instead of human faces. Therefore, it was believed that he killed his father in self-defence. I do not know the exact motivation of the perricide.

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brother's egregious sins or by his habitual subservient position and attitude in landlord and tenant relationships or by his simply good disposition. However, the paradoxical aspect of Chinhwan's action suggests the complexity of hegemonic relationships. The tenacity of hegemonic power regardless of the material foundation is the most paradoxical and revealing aspect of the social structure.

5. Levelling of the classes

The previous section demonstrated that the overall expansion of capitalism in Korea has had a levelling effect on class inequality. Relatively easy access to tenancy following the decrease in the rural population and its bearing on the changing dynamics of class contradiction was already discussed in the preceding chapters. Here, I would like to outline four more factors which contributed to social mobility.

First, the state initiated an obligatory medical insurance plan in rural areas last year. The peasants must pay $28-42 per month. When a patient is hospitalized, the state pays half of the expense. Since last October, the state started a medicine insurance plan. If the total price of medicine is one dollar 12 cents, the buyer pays the whole amount. If the price is between one dollar and 12 cents and two dollars, the buyer pays one dollar and 12 cents. If it is over two dollars, the buyer pays 60 percent of the total expense.

Every month the village chief announces over the loud speaker that it is time for the villagers to pay the fee. The villagers at first grumbled about the money they paid out. It seemed to them that they paid for a service that they did not need. However, an increasing number of people have benefitted from the plan. Most of villagers' life long involvement in gruelling farm

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work has resulted in many injuries and sickness. Most middle aged and elderly villagers suffer from joint malfunctions and internal disorders.

It is not rare for the villagers to be heavily indebted due to medical expenses. The villagers do not regularly visit a doctor to check their health. They put up with their illness or infirmity until they find the symptoms unbearable. Sudden illness among the poor and very poor peasant family members easily damaged their fragile household economy. Loans taken out to pay medical expenses are likely to lead to serious indebtedness because the illness is unexpected and leave no room to choose a low interest loan whose application procedure takes too long to complete. Rather, people depended on easily accessible private credit with high interest rates. Private lending is a preferred option available to the household head when a family member suddenly falls ill and requires more than home treatment.

Quite a few of the villagers lost large parts of their property and/or became indebted because of medical expenses. Sujae's household is a good example. His father had been hospitalized for two years until his death about ten years ago. His family sold more than half of their paddy to pay for the medical bills.

Nayong's wife had an operation on her intestine three years ago. She had to be in the hospital for one month. It was believed that she could have died right before the operation. The operation cost Nayong about $4,200. He took out a private and general cooperative loan to pay for it. He told me that "I should not have borrowed the money. I should have let it go." I do not know whether his statement was a joke or not. But it is not difficult to explain that he said it from frustration. Nayong is a landless tenant. His life conditions have slightly improved only after he was given the full tenancy right over 0.63 hectares of the Kangho corporate estate.

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The medical insurance system undoubtedly has functioned as a social security system for the poor. They have not needed to borrow a large amount of private credit for medical expenses. The villagers still have to pay a lot for medical fees. However, the burden has become less serious than in the years when the medical insurance system did not exist. Nevertheless, the health insurance plan is faced with many problems. Owners of hospitals and medical agencies have protested against the plan because it would reduce the cash flow in the hospitals. However, the state has been determined to implement the plan. As a result, the plan actually reduced peasants' medical fees.

The easy availability of water also has played a role in levelling class differentiation. The importance of water in paddy production is paramount. Many villagers have no choice but to leave their paddy fallow during a drought season. The villagers need water constantly. Even if they have enough water to grow rice seedlings or to transplant, a drought can easily kill the plants.

Rich peasants usually have land in good locations that are close to a water source and the poor villagers usually have land in the valley and in the places where water is scarce and machines cannot be used. When a dry season affects the village, the poor peasants are the ones who suffer from it first. Interestingly, Pine Tree has some tracts of land with sources of spring water. The owner of such land does not have to worry about the drought. The land itself produces water. Such land has been suitable for paddy cultivation but not for barley.

The introduction of water pumps since 1980 and the aqueduct construction by the state since 1987 changed this means of producing social inequality. Heavy wind and rainfall still damage rice production. When Pine

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Tree is flooded during the monsoon season, production fell to about two third of the average. Besides, the high altitude land, remote from the reservoir, still cannot produce rice during the severe drought season. However, easy access to water has helped most villagers to cope with natural disaster. Since the late 1970's, the villagers have not experienced a drought that could not be averted to some degree.

Water from the canal and reservoir and motorized pumps are able to flood most Pine Tree land and make paddy farming possible. Therefore, the distinction between "bad" land and "good" land was drastically changed. As the distinction between land quality was reduced, so was the role of land in reproducing class distinctions.

Sunja's father exchanged his 0.77 hectares in the flat area near Mulberry Tree with 0.35 hectares of water producing paddy near the reservoir in Pine Tree. Nowadays, Sunja has deeply regretted making that exchange deal. Her frustration is due to the fact that her father's 0.77 hectares of paddy are located in a flat area easily reached by farm machinery, while the 0.35 hectares of paddy are located where only cows and people could get in. If villagers have land in the valley or very small lots, they have a hard time to find tenants, since the tenants like to lower production costs and increase profit by using machines. Sunja has to argue about the amount of rent each year with her prospective tenants. The rent has to be low to attract the villagers. These days, the villagers' concept of good land is land that is accessible by machines and such land accounts for about 70 percent of the total size of land in Pine Tree. Therefore, the production from the land does not vary considerably. As the quality of land is levelled, the roles of the kinds of land in reproducing class distinctions tends to dissolve.

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6. Class differentiation among tenants

Despite the levelling of class differentiation there still exists the distinction between the rich, poor, and the very poor. Hera's sub-leasing a portion of Homang's tenanted land would be an example of how the general category of the poor is divided into the poor and the very poor. Class contradiction between these two subcategories would be no less severe and significant than that between the larger categorical classes.

Homang has tenanted 1.33 hectares of Sunja's paddy (discussed in the inheritance section) since Chinhwan gave up the tenancy and left Pine Tree. The above persons are all Umin Kim. The land is located in three different areas: in the flat and square area close to the reservoir, in the slightly winding area, and in the valley. Homang made an oral contract with Sunja that he would tenant all the land and pay 120 kilograms of rice per majigi. However, Homang does not tenant all of the land. He lets a 63 year old widow, Hera, sub-tenant 0.35 hectares of the valley paddy, a part of the total of 1.12 hectares, and Hera pays rent to Homang. Farm machinery cannot reach the valley land. Even cows have difficulty getting to it. Therefore, transplanting and harvesting have to be done manually. If the tiller uses hired laborers, the production costs will be higher than in case of contracting machine operators. All of the land Homang cultivates is located in convenient areas for water and machines. Homang knows that Hera will be willing to tenant any kind of land.

Hera is the wife of Yi Tonghyun who died several years ago. Her only kinsman is Yi Chesu, her husband's second cousin, and a poor villager. Hera said:

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I was born in Iri city. I am 63. I came here when I was 19. [She married Yi in Pine Tree.] My husband died when he was 60. I have two sons and six daughters. My eldest daughter married an Oak Tree Kim [Umin Kim], and she died of a disease soon after marriage. Her daughter is with me. Her husband became crazy and I could not let my poor granddaughter be raised by that man, a garbage collector in Pian town. My eldest son brought his daughter to me and asked me to raise her. I think he was in serious trouble. If both parents died, and the children live with their grandmother, the education fee is free, but I still spend a lot for my two granddaughters. I feel very sorry for them. I worry about how these two girls will manage to live if I die or how I will be able to marry them off.

My other daughters are doing fine. Three daughters are married to peasants. And the last two daughters work in factories in Seoul. I send rice to my children. They send me a little money

My first son graduated from primary school, the second son from junior high. They never farmed, because I never had any land. [They all sold their labor to the fellow villagers to make a living.] I intentionally do not visit my sons, because my sons do not have a house. They live in a very small room so that I cannot sleep with my son and his wife in the same room. My daughter-in-law will not like me. Besides, a person like me who has lived alone for a long time cannot live with someone.

My husband was laid up in bed with sickness for 20 years. I cared for my husband during that period. When Muyong was the village chief, he gave me an award for being a devoted wife. I was so angry that I burnt it. I had received saengboyanggok (minimal subsistence provision). But when I reached 59, the fee was cut off. [I assume that she was excluded from the needy person's list when the village and township administrators learned that her eldest son reached a mature age and was employed in a company. They seemed to presume that her son would help her financially as a filial obligation. The administrators' reasoning often resulted in a practice that did not correspond to reality.]

This year Sangsa made me a poor people's card (kŭkpinja card) Also, this year I tenant Homang's 0.35 hectares I give seven and half sacks for rent. I use my hands in farming. The Kuresil paddy [the name of the land] is too muddy to grow barley. This is the first time I tenant some land.

I do not do any kye. I borrowed lots of money. [$1,400 in a general cooperative loan and $350 in a private loan with 25 percent interest.] I received an agricultural cooperative loan to finance my daughter's wedding. And I asked Kimbo for a private loan to purchase fertilizer. Kisu five [son of Hanpyo and an employee in coop] told me he would get coop money and buy me some people's stocks. But he never responded to me after that. This spring I had to sell my sow for

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> $140 to make pujukŭm (ritual contribution). This year I spent about $140 for various expenses.
>
> Actually we [her husband's lineage] are the main family line (chongga) and should do all the ancestor worship, but we are too poor to do that. A little branch (family of younger brother) in Uridol [in Yongsan township] does it for us. The Chongjung (lineage association) bought me this house. They knew that I was very poor.

A noteworthy fact in her statements is that she pay 6 sacks for subleasing 0.28 hectares. Hera pays 135 kilograms of rice per majigi , while Homang pays the average rent of 120 kilograms per majigi for the whole 1.12 hectares. Homang and Sunja knew that the total rent should be lower than the average 135 kilograms per majigi, because the 0.35 hectares are located in the valley. Therefore, Homang pays 15 kilograms less per majigi. When Homang asked Hera to tenant the valley land, he asked for the average rent, 135 kilograms per majigi, and she agreed to it. Both knew that the rent was supposed to be lower, but they accepted the deal. The mutual agreement was framed in silenced violence. Hera's desperate need for a predictable income from farming constituted a context in which Homang could make a profit of 15 kilograms per majigi after subtracting his rent given to Sunja from Hera's rent to him.

Even though Sunja and Homang made a contract by which the latter should tenant all 1.33 hectares, Sunja was not concerned about who actually tenanted the land. What she cared for was the payment of rent on time.

The people who are not favored in tenancy contracts are old widows, widowers, and the people with insufficient labor and/or capital to manage tenancy. Kinship affiliation sometimes break the barrier. About 70-80 percent of the tenants in Pine Tree made contracts with kinsmen landlords. Priority is given to the kinsmen in giving tenancy when all the conditions are equal

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with non-kinsmen. For these reasons, Hera has been excluded from being considered for tenancy without second thoughts. Excluding her would not cause much trouble. The way she had made a living was to sell her labor when fellow villagers needed it. The tenants' condition is considerably better than farm laborers in that the former receives predictable income after the harvest [barring natural disaster and illness] while the latter makes a living on an uncertain cycle of wage labor. Farm machinery and kinship based pumashi have gradually made manual farm laborers such as Hera unnecessary.

Even though Hera was willing to tenant and accept all the auxiliary demands from the landlord, her old age and virtually non-existing kinship relations made her a less than favorable choice. In such circumstances, Homang let Hera tenant the land that he did not want. He knew that she would work herself to the bone to pay for the rent and earn her own profit. Hera's immediate landlord was not Sunja but Homang. Therefore, she would develop a deferential and antagonistic relationship with Homang. Hera and Homang's case demonstrates that class antagonism develops among tenants. Such antagonism within a class is as significant as the same development between the landlord and tenant, because such intra-class conflict keeps "poor people" from acting collectively and achieving what they commonly desire.

7. Peasants and the state

Despite all the internal disintegration and segmentation, peasants as a whole have reacted collectively to state policy on some occasions. In the next section, I shall discuss how Pine Tree villagers reacted to the nationwide "red pepper" crisis this year. The falling prices seemed to affect all the red pepper

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growers nationwide, including those in Yongsan township. My intention is to elucidate the difficulty in the formation of a collective peasant reaction to the state that controls the peasantry by price manipulation and political mechanisms.

The peasants in Korea have generally felt antagonistic toward the state. The government's weak bargaining power in relations with the U.S.A, the E.C., and Australia resulted in the open importation of agricultural goods. The consequence of such an inflow of inexpensive goods blocked all the alternative sources of income, leaving paddy farming and a few cash crops as sources of income (see the chapter on production). The 1989 glut of red pepper created a national crisis. The Chosŏn Ilpo (a Korean newspaper Feb 14, 1989) describes the peasants' mass demonstration in Seoul:

> On February 13th 1989, 15,000 peasants gathered in front of the congress building for the abolition of the water tax and the state's purchase of the whole red pepper crop. Last year's red pepper produce was 209,000 tons while the demand was 165,000 tons. The state's purchase price was two dollars and 80 cents per 600 gram (kŭn). The state purchased only 32,000 tons. The price on the free market fell to one dollar 90 cents.
>
> The peasants planned the demonstration in January. They planned to do it near Feb 13th when congress would be in session. Approximately 90 counties with peasant organizations mobilized 250-400 people from each county. Each person paid from five to $21 to take a bus to Seoul and to have lunch. Some 3,900 people were from Chŏllabukto province and 3,200 people from Chŏllanamdo province. Peasants from both of these provinces suffered most from the red pepper crisis. Tori county in Chŏllabukto province and Naju county in Chŏllanamdo province mobilized about 1,000 people each. Those places are known for leading peasant movements. Some 80 Catholic peasant associations, 17 protestant associations, 60 indigenous peasant organizations were involved in the demonstrations.
>
> Participants were mostly peasants, some students, and social activists. They started the demonstration at noon. After they finished congregating at 3:00 p.m., they demanded a meeting with four political party representatives [to negotiate the problems the peasants faced]. Their demands were not met. Then peasants carried a flower casket

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> [symbolizing the death of the Korean peasants] to a place 800 meters away from the congress building. As they approached the congress gate they burned the leaflets distributed by the police and the police started to fire tear gas. The peasants were agitated. They broke the windows and anything they could in nearby buildings. About 200 peasants were holding sticks. Some were holding bamboo swords.
> The peasants returned to their homes by bus at five o'clock . About 100 people were injured and 28 people were arrested. 20 bamboo swords were confiscated.

As the newspaper described, Tori county people were among the most active participants. The following citation is from a periodical published by a indigenous peasant organization representing Tori county.

> Last year's red pepper produce in Tori county increased 50 percent compared with the preceding year. On March sixth, Tori county peasants carried their red peppers in 650 motor tillers to the front of the Tori county office. Some 2,000 peasants participated in the 40 day long demonstration. They demanded that the county magistrate purchase all the produce at two dollars and 80 cents per 600 gram (kŭn). In the demonstration, 70 peasants were arrested, and 20 people were injured. Thanks to the demonstration, Tori county peasants could sell an additional 157 tons of red pepper.

Contrary to most Tori county peasants' active participation, Yongsan township villagers did not show their interest in the action. My guess was verified by a conversation between a Pyŏngmin party member in Puso township and Chiyong in a restaurant. The peasants of Puso township have received their major source of income from red pepper. The man from Puso said to Chiyong, "You Yongsan people are just watching us demonstrating and getting hurt because you people do not grow red pepper [to earn cash as a major source of income]. You people are damn sons of bitches [literal translation would be son of dog]." Chiyong just grinned.

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Puso was the township that grew most of the red pepper in Tori county. They were most severely affected by the red pepper crisis. Some of the activists in Puso tried to persuade the Yongsan township people to organize indigenous peasant associations. So far the Yongsan township people have not shown any interest in organizing peasant interest groups.

The Yongsan township people grow red pepper mainly for domestic consumption, selling it for extra cash in Pian town. Their major source of income is rice. It would not be difficult to predict that they would also participate in demonstrations if the state stopped purchasing rice and/or the price of rice were to plummet. This is likely to happen if rice is imported freely. So far rice has been imported in relatively controlled amounts that have not had a measurable impact on the price of rice.

The Yongsan township people's apathetic reaction to the red pepper crisis contrasts sharply with their dairy cattle farmers' involvement in a demonstration for higher milk prices in December, 15 days before the presidential election. The Unan organization (dairy cattle raisers' association) was the leading group in the demonstration. They made cow manure bombs. They put manure in vinyl containers and threw them at the police who blocked the road to congress and fired tear gas. Samgu and Chiju participated in the event. Their major source of income is milk. They have all been affected by the low price of milk.

Peasants may develop class consciousness when they know that their livelihood is being threatened by the state's inconsiderate rural policy. It has been an axiomatic fact that the peasants nationwide are affected by the actions of the state. Most peasants feel aggravated by the state's overall economic policy and powerlessness toward the Western powers. Gradually they have formed a "class in itself". But the crucial matter is the transformation of such

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consciousness into a "class for itself". Specific self interest has been a powerful element disrupting the peasants' collective movement. The internal logic of fragmentation on the county and national level is similar to that operating within the tenant class in Pine Tree village. I am not able to show what motivates the peasants to collectively react to the appropriator. However, I do argue that direct infringement on the peasants' means of livelihood was a starting point for the collective movement, though it remained a starting point only.

Summary

Jack Goody (1962) brilliantly argues with regard to private property: "The definition of property revolves essentially round the problem of exclusion... we are not dealing with rights of a person over a material object, but rather with rights between persons in relation to a material object" (1962: 287). Property rights in an anthropological sense do not refer as much as what the owner can do with property but what the owner can do against the person who is excluded from it.

Goody's conceptualization of property is helpful in analyzing class relationships between landlord and tenants, because it helps us to focus on the relationships between two sets of people. Social organization is constituted not by material objects themselves but by social relationships that involve material objects. Lending usufruct rights on land or money credit means that the lenders are in a dominant social position with renters or borrowers. Borrowers have to fulfill the lenders' variegated expectations. When tenancy and money are lent, what occupies the lender's and borrower's minds is not the land or money itself but the unequal relationships between them. The most crucial point of the unequal

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relationship between kin landlord or creditor and kin tenant or debtor is their mutual understanding: the unequal relationship will change as the basis of domination changes.

Tuhwan's lineal ancestors had been tenants of Chunja's counterparts. They all belong to the Sakak segment. Tuhwan ranks one generation higher than Chunja. Therefore, Chunja should call Tuhwan aje and show him respect. But I rarely saw Chunja behave in the manner that cultural norms of kinship dictate her to behave toward Tuhwan. Her kinship obligation toward her aje who is her tenant and debtor is weakened by the class relationship existing between herself and Tuhwan. Tuhwan ironically calls her nunim (a honorific word for an elder sister) and Chunja addresses him by his personal name. If Tuhwan were Chunja's landlord, it would not be difficult to predict that Chunja would call him aje, keeping the normative genealogical kinship terminology intact.

The class relationship between Tuhwan and Chunja is a more powerful factor than kinship in determining the dyadic tie between them. Even though kinship is a seemingly dominating cultural aspect of dyadic relationships, both kin tenant and landlord understand that kinship is a titular coverage by which poor kinsmen appeal to the leniency of the dominating kinsmen, and the latter claim the former's gratitude, rent, interest, political loyalty.

We find suggestive changes in Tuhwan's attitude toward Chunja. When Tuhwan and his father tenanted Chunja's and her father's land, the former were totally subjugated to the latter. In other words, Tuhwan and his father were absolutely at the mercy of Chunja's father and Chunja. In such a context, the anticipated consequences of class relationships, such as defiance and submissiveness, were expressed only minimally. The idea that a rich

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kinsman helps a poor kinsman because of kinship obligation becomes a overriding theme, but this theme is often understood to be secondary to the expected norms of behavior between property owners and the propertyless as economic unequals. Kin tenant or kin debtor cannot be defiant in a situation of absolute dependency. Extraction of interest, rent, and other unremunerated service take place without much explicit resistance.

A class relationship is often mitigated by kinship sentiment. The expected kinds of respectable behavior between kinsmen, however, do not hide the fact that antagonistic class relationships can be exacerbated by kin relationships. Even though tenants and landlords both know that paying interest and rent is the first and overriding consideration, the former still consider it cruel that their kinsmen take money and rice; the latter believe that tenants must feel grateful all the time. A kin tenant's desire for kinship-related generosity and a kin landlord's expectation of a kin tenant's continuing gratitude are irreconcilable factors. Both claims are likely to lead to explosive kin-class relationships. I observed an incident in which Kimbo and the wife of Chisam, who is the younger second cousin of Kimbo, became engaged in a feud in which they used the most horrible language to each other. Kimbo claimed that Chisam did not pay back a household loan he owed, while the woman claimed that she had paid the sum. The feud was an extremely "shameful" act, because according to customary kinship behavior ego and ego's younger cousin's wife should treat each other with great respect. Chisam and his family were thinking about moving out to the city, and Kimbo was about to have his daughter married which would cost him a large amount of money. Ironically no one tried to mediate the feud. Hayong just stood outside of Kimbo's house while listening to the argument. He tried not be seen by both parties who were his cousins. It might have been difficult for

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Hayong to be on anyone's side. The incident became an unmentionable "shame" for the Umin Kim and an occasion for joyful talk for Songhyon Kim.

Paradoxically, both claims coexist with a mutual understanding of the danger of naively accepting kinship generosity. Tuhwan's statements clearly illustrate the shared understanding of the internal logic of credit and tenancy relationships among kinsmen. His saying that "I have to give interest even if the kinsmen refuses to take the interest. If I do not give interest I cannot get a loan from my kinsmen the next time around" clearly demonstrates how deeply and silently such a logic is embedded in kin-class relations. His words could be rephrased as "I have to give rent even if the kinsmen refuses to take the rent. If I do not give rent I cannot get tenancy from my kinsmen the next time around." Even though the generosity of the wealthy kinsmen is expected, it is used as a cover in tenancy and credit relationships. A kin creditor's generous suggestion of not receiving interest must be carefully scrutinized by the kin borrower. Naively accepting the creditor's offer would make the debtor a malefactor of the social system and the debtor would become a credit outcast. Despite a kin creditor's generous offer to forego interest, the kin debtor politely pays interest. These acts are formulated through cultural constructs. These paradoxical behaviors constitute the most crucial part of the tension ridden kin-class relationships.

The changing economic base altered Tuhwan's attitude from submission to defiance. Changes in the economic base create a setting where kin tenants can express their grudge toward the kin landlord and creditors. Tuhwan's case shows that kinship has only veiled the ulterior class relationships that have been the most profound factor in the social organization.

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I think that kin class relationships are likely to be more volatile and explosive than those obtaining among non-kinsmen. Among non-kinsmen tenancy and credit terms are mutually understood as an appropriation of landlord or creditor and nothing else. Resentment and disappointment caused by kin affiliation is not found among non-kinsmen. It is pure class relationships that is developed between non-kin landlord and tenant. Tuhwan's grudge against his kin landlady, Chunja would last longer than that against his non-kinsman landlords.

On the other hand, Chinhwan's case shows a different aspect of a kin-tenant's reaction to the kin-landlady's domination. Chinhwan also knows the exploitative nature of tenancy relationships with kin tenants. However, his understanding of such relationship does not lead him to act defiantly toward Chunja, his former landlady. Antagonistic class relationships between kin landlord and tenant do not necessarily produce defiance. This shows the difficulty of formation of class consciousness among oppressed kinsmen. Terray (1984: 92) suggests a helpful conceptual framework to think of kin-class formation. He argues that "the specific way in which surplus is created, drawn off, and allocated determines not only the nature of classes present but also their ability to organize themselves and act as classes."

Chinhwan was not given more favorable conditions of tenancy or credit than Tuhwan was by the same landlady. Their genealogical closeness with Chunja was not a particularly important factor in Chunja's decisions to deal with Chinhwan and Tuhwan. They share common descent from apical ancestors by a distance of seven to nine generations.

What makes Chinhwan behave differently is to be found in his individual context. I am not sure that his sharing collective responsibility of his brothers' "shameful" acts drives him to behave submissively. A more

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convincing factor in his different perception and reaction to kin class relationships seems to be his own family arrangement. Chinhwan is a 60 year old man who has devoted his life to his youngest son's college education by curtailing his and his wife's consumption. He has been tenanting for over 40 years for his own subsistence and his son's education. He spent most his life tenanting his kin landlord's land.

Chinhwan's sense of being exploited seems to be outweighed by his incredible determination to accomplish his son's college education by any means. His bitter feeling about the kin landlord's claims and his possible defiance have been assuaged by his sense of accomplishment. By sacrificing his whole life, Chinhwan realized his dream -- the dream which ordinary tenants at his age were almost unable to achieve. However, he often felt bitter about his kin landlord's taking nearly half of his produce without a drop of sweat. Probably his resentment towards the wealthy kin landlord's and creditor's counting every grain of rent and interest was no less than Tuhwan's. Chinhwan's faithful endurance and subservience were not so much caused by his insensibility as by the achievement of his most important life goal.

In this chapter I paid particular attention to how kin-class relationships have been transformed in conjunction with the overall changes in Korea's politico-economic structure. The increasing labor demand in the cities and towns nearby was one of the derivative consequences of the development of capitalism. The demand for labor absorbed the increasing rural population. The peasants' voluntary migration to the cities and a declining fertility rate also reduced the rural population. Such a change resulted in overall decrease in the number of tenants and an easy availability of land either in the form of full ownership or tenancy. In this general transitional period, Tuhwan could

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purchase land after hard work in both farming and construction work. He also tenanted for other absentee landlords and disabled villagers. As the foundation of Chunja's domination weakened, Tuhwan revealed his pent-up emotions--the emotions that he could not dare express before.

If the country had experienced the advent of capitalism with a food economy mainly based on the rural sector and if the cities would have been unable to provide employment for migrant workers, kin-class relationships in Pine Tree would either have remained unchanged or changed only very slowly. The emergence of the state sources of credit has also played a critical role in reducing the poor's dependence on the wealthy's credit.

I attempt to elucidate class divisions and subdivisions within the classes. We are likely to ignore the internal fragmentation within a class categorized in general terms. A reason for the disintegration among the people placed in the same class is the pernicious poverty that affects the people within the class. It is difficult to explore the differentiation among the poverty stricken people, because the differentiation is overshadowed by common suffering (See Scott 1977).

Defining classes based on the amount of property or profession should be a preliminary step to understand class and kin relationships. It is more important to analyze, however, how the above is strategically intermixed with the individual's desire to monopolize economic and cultural capital. The dominated class as a whole may feel exploited by the dominant class. However, their reaction to inequality is not necessarily a collective struggle against the oppressing class. Their solution is unpredictable and sometimes paradoxical. Analyzing life histories, local history, people's perception of their history, the power making process of the state, and the international commodity market are the methods I have used to analyze kin-class

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relationships in Pine Tree. The implication of my argument is to show the reality of class struggle that may be naively mystified.

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Chapter 11 Discussion

It is my purpose in this dissertation to illuminate the relation obtaining between kinship and class in one rural context in Korea, as these can be documented by anthropological inquiry in the field. I do not attempt to answer the questions of "what is kinship?," or "how is kinship maintained?" My focus is on what kinship does in specified individual contexts, most specifically in the narrowest set of dyadic kin interactions as these relate to various credit relationships.

I emphasize individual examples of kinship in operation, because I do not think that a kinship norm, even if it can be established, will affect identically all households in a particular village. Instead of dealing with kinship as a pre-existing system deciding kin relationships, I treat it as a dependent variable embedded in complicated social relationships. My discussion of individual cases of kin interaction in the last half of this thesis was designed to elucidate how in one village, Pine Tree, the residents interpret kinship in their interactions with kinsmen. When two opposing kinsman hold conflicting claims on kinship obligations considerable tension arises, as found in the case of Hayong and his cousin (see Chapter 10). Sometimes this does not happen, as Chunja and Sungjo's case demonstrates in the same chapter. Here the interaction led to the impoverishment of the poor relative and enrichment of the wealthy one without significant resistance or visible tension.

Inheritance practices discussed in Chapter 10 demonstrate how tensions amassed in a family's history play a role in the management of family property. Another example in the same chapter, that of Misuk's adoption, illustrates how a general cultural rule is observed, but tinged with

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the element of violence. Misuk yields to her nephews who successfully lay claim to the property based on the rule of adoption.

The analyses of various kinds of credit relationships furnished me with a framework to analyze kin relationships. The credit system supports relationships of domination and submission within kin groups. A "hidden basis of the entire social structure" (Marx 1967: 791) is the method of surplus extraction and exploitation. Tenancy and money credit have been major exploitative mechanisms in Pine Tree for centuries. These mechanisms have been the "hidden basis" of Pine Tree village's social structure. After the onset and impact of capitalism on Pine Tree, class relationships between landlord and tenant, creditor and debtor, were not easily severed because credit played the role of a fetter. Some tenants and debtors freed themselves from the vicious cycle of debt. Some of them showed contempt to their previous creditor and landlord. However, the majority of the tenants and debtors are still under the bondage of a credit regime. The personalized credit relationship has created a social setting in which class relationships have developed and are maintained.

When anthropologists study problems of class in a peasant village, they are obligated to investigate the equally complicated problem of kinship. This is so because people living in a village very often form lineage and kinship groups which play a significant role in village social organization. Similarly, a study of kinship alone can hardly be plausible without including the study of class relations. So long as private property and monopoly of wealth remain legal and are protected by the state, pauperization and class differentiation are likely to take place.

Class and culture do not constitute separate issues but are interrelated. As some social scientists (Mintz 1973, E.P. Thompson 1963, Wolf 1982, Sider

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1986) argue, class and culture constitute a social system and reflect each other. Thus, kinship which is one of the elements of culture must be studied in conjunction with class and vice versa. Reproductions of culture and class are not mutually exclusive affairs. Most recently, Edward LiPuma argues, that

> [to understand class relations] opens the way to seeing the structure of class as the product of an historical dialectic between a logic of capitalist production and cultural concepts and forms of social organization. It specifies that the way to understand this relationship is to focus on the forms and transformations in the social mediation of labor and the interrelation and redefinition of forms of capital, as these are informed by the process of political encompassment. Because class division is defined as the result of both the structure of capitalism and of community, the theory grounds an analysis of regional variation and class identity. Focusing on social labor and the culturally constructed forms of capital is a first step in transcending the reductionisms that, having (have) segregated culture from class... (1989: 329-330).

My primary concern in this thesis was how to develop a mode of analysis that would enable me to take account of the inevitable paradoxes, ambiguity, and confusion which arise from kin-class relationships. Taking kinship unity for granted limits our vision in investigating kinship. A seemingly unified kin group may be torn and segmented by internal conflict and tension.

Pine Tree villagers say that "blood is thicker than water." However, this is true only in certain contexts. Undoubtedly, some poor kinsmen are helped by wealthy kinsmen without much consideration of repayment. In light of these cases kinship or lineage boundaries in Pine Tree would appear at first glance as a protective "wall" against poverty. Actually, the Umin and Songhyon lineages acted as a "single legal personality" (Fortes 1969) when lineage cooperation was required to obtain limited resources. In certain cases some poor kinsmen were helped by better-off kinsmen primarily because of

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kin affiliation. Tenancy was more likely to be given to kinsmen than non-kinsmen, all conditions being equal. In Chapter 5, the Pine Tree chief election process demonstrates how lineage groups in Pine Tree consolidated their lineages to vie with a competing lineage group for village political advantage. Kinship unity was found in this particular context.

On the other hand, kinship is clearly commoditized in some cases. A dominant kinsman utilizes a poor kinsman's unpaid labor to accumulate wealth and monopolizes low interest loans targeted for poor kin members. More importantly, the former sometimes controls the reproduction of the symbols and meanings of kinship. Wealthy kinsmen give some benefits as a sign of fulfilling kinship obligations, but those benefits are usually significantly smaller than what poor kinsmen offer. Helping poor kinsmen often encourages wealthy kinsmen to believe, perhaps conveniently, that they are fulfilling kinship obligations. Helping also justifies their expectations to receive expressions of gratitude and political loyalty from their poor relatives for their benevolence. The appropriation of kinsmen's labor is often more severe than is the case among non-kinsmen. In Yonghun's case, his chances to realize that he is being manipulated are totally obviated by his uncle's kinship sentiment and expectations. Thus, the exploitation of Yonghun's labor has been peacefully perpetuated by kinship ideology.

The meanings and symbols of kinship vary depending on how kinship is intertwined with credit relationships developed throughout local history. Contrary to the villagers' common metaphor which asserts that blood is thicker than water, blood ties and associated values contribute to the repression of overt expressions of grievance, or makes it difficult for oppressed kinsmen to feel and realize that their services or resources are

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being appropriated. In Chapter 10, I show how a grievance is handled by a poor kinsman.

A clear-cut credit or rent arrangement between two kinsmen is often complicated by kinship sentiment and fosters a potentially explosive relationship. The poor kinsman often expects more understanding, patience and leniency from a kinsman than what ordinarily would occur between non-kinsman. Hayong's case in Chapter 10 demonstrates this. Class differentiation among kinsmen is accompanied by tensions. Tense relationships between kinsmen have been particularly volatile and unpredictable because the method of surplus extraction by wealthy kinsmen is based on impoverishing their brethren, which is a total negation of kinship values.

Kin tenants and debtors rarely act collectively against their kin because of the manner in which they are related and exploited by them. As credit relationships tie wealthy and poor kinsmen together, class relationships develop, but in an unexpected way. Kinship sentiment hinders class division and the formation of a collective struggle based on class consciousness. Besides kinship sentiment, the differentiation and atomization of the oppressed group also makes it difficult to think of collective class behavior. It is not collective class consciousness but tension-filled relationships which prevail in kin-class interactions. My account of the division among tenants in Chapter 10 is an effort to demonstrate how Korean social complexity militates against any naive classification of Korean peasants. The reason for emphasizing dyadic kinship interaction was to explore how specific changes in non-Pine Tree factors such as the state, national politics, and capitalistic development are related to changes in kin, class, and credit relationship among Pine Tree villagers.

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A. capitalism, kinship, and the state

I analyzed the kin-class nexus in relation to changes in non-peasant factors since kinship is not exclusively a rural issue. The setting in which kinship operates is affected by external factors. In order to more completely examine kinship dynamics, I explored the development and consequences of capitalism in Korea and how Korea is linked to the world economy. I demonstrated how Pine Tree politics, economy, and the rural credit system are articulated with and affected by the state and the international market.

The state's export-oriented economy and use of foreign credit in the 1970's precipitated the incorporation of Korea into the world economy. One of the consequences of capitalistic development in Korea is the relative decline of the rural economy and the rural exodus to the cities. These changes disrupted the foundation of social organization in Pine Tree.

In doing fieldwork, researchers usually face the problem of how to set the boundaries of the research area. It cannot be easily said that the surrounding coast is the boundary of a small island separated from the mainland by a sea. As Eric Wolf (1982) argues, any research area becomes a part of the interconnected world formed after the experience of European colonialism and the development of the world commodity market. Totally segregated and detached human groups are hardly found these days. For this reason, Lévi-Strauss' (1963) attempt to explain the cultural grammar of kinship does not sound plausible, being based on a too restricted unit of analysis. He tries to analyze kinship by examining the kinship system alone. Utilizing Mauss' concept of "gift" he argues that the exchange of women is a motor of kinship maintenance. Two questions immediately arise: Are there any surrounding human groups or social processes which influence the investigated people's kinship organization? Second, is kinship a social fact

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that is independent of politics, economy, war, and other events? I do not intend to criticize all the arguments put forward by Lévi-Strauss. But I do want to start with Lévi-Strauss' methodological omissions to open up a discussion of how I adduced many seemingly unrelated external factors in my research on Pine Tree.

First, investigating lineage affairs in Pine Tree requires looking at the nearby village, Oak Tree, where the Umin Kim constitute two thirds of the village population and play a significant role in Umin Kim lineage affairs. Even though Pine Tree and Oak Tree villages are geographically separated and economic relationships are tenuous, the dynamics of the Umin lineage segments can be analyzed only by doing research in both villages. When I briefly mentioned the Umin lineage formation and segmentation, I had to talk about other segments of the lineage living in Asan. Gradually my analysis of the Umin lineage widened to a much larger geographic area.

As I mentioned in Chapter 9, the Pine Tree socio-economic foundation was greatly influenced by Korea's economic development. The rapid development of capitalism gave rise to new factors that now play a significant role in rural politics and economy. Labor demand in the cites and towns, the relatively declining rural economy, the continuous rural migration to the cities, rising real estate prices and other urban factors have altered the old politico-economic basis of social organization in Pine Tree.

If the labor market in the cities and towns and land market in the village had not changed, and if new sources of credit and insurance had not become available, old tenants and debtors could not show a defiant attitude toward former landlords and creditors . As discussed in Chapter 10, the scarcity of rural labor and the urban financial market created a general setting where dominant kinsmen utilized kinship as a medium through which they

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accumulated capital. Capitalism triggered a chain reaction that brought about general changes in class relations and social relationships of production.

The coop chief's election and Kwangik's campaign for election to the National Assembly had to be dealt with in terms of a larger unit of analysis than the village. Regional antagonism, the national political culture, the western province people's unusual solidarity and other non-peasant factors contributed to the formation of Yongsan township politics in which Pine Tree was located. Similarly, capitalist development in Korea is not separate from the international commodity and financial markets. Without taking into consideration the inflow of funds from the IMF, the IBRD and numerous Western and Japanese banks, one cannot account for the present status of capitalism in Korea. Oil producing Arab countries were awash with the glut of petro-dollars during the global oil crisis in the 1970s. Their funds were deposited in Western banks that in turn were ready to lend these funds to Third World countries. During that period, interest rates fell. Many underdeveloped countries which had been declared insolvent were re-evaluated as eligible candidates for loans. In this international financial market transition, Korea easily borrowed huge amounts of money from the international financial market. Korea still remains the fifth biggest debtor country in the world. Such foreign loans became a motor driving Korean capitalism.

Capitalism in Korea, as in most capitalistic countries, produced a myriad of side-effects such as rising real estate prices, heavy industrial investment, a shrinking agricultural sector, an expanding stock market, etc. These new factors had a considerable impact on Pine Tree. Therefore, analyzing the social organization of Pine Tree cannot be done by isolating the village from international and national economic and political processes.

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It is important to note that an analysis of kin-class relationships in Pine Tree is not possible without understanding the active role of the state in shaping the socio-economic basis of the village. The state dominates the countryside through state agencies and dominant figures in the community. The state run coop has emerged as the main credit organization which most Pine Tree villagers have come to depend heavily upon during the last 20 years. The coop and township office are an embodiment of the state and control much of the economy and politics of the village. Within a couple of years, if the local autonomy plan is implemented, high ranking coop and township officials will be chosen through a public vote. The local autonomy plan is a concessionary plan for the establishment of local institutions and politics. It represents decentralization of the presently centralized bureaucratic state. One consequence of such a change is that the national state will lose some of its means to direct and control the peasantry.

However, the state would still be able to subordinate the coop and township office by continuing to provide funds for loans and operational costs since the villagers' weak financial resources would never be able to sustain a truly independent coop and township office. Furthermore, the local autonomy program would not support the majority of peasants in the independent operation of their economy and political activities. The people who have dominated the political and economic power in the township and village in the past are likely to be re-elected under the new program by utilizing their superior financial resources and political, kinship and social connections. Therefore, the core of the intra-village power groups would not change since its members are in fact either heads of lineages, independently wealthy, or both.

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The development of lineage organizations in the course of local rural history has created a peculiar politico-economic environment in Pine Tree and the villagers have not and most likely will not devise a radically different type of politico-economic structure. The present structure is neither illegal nor troublesome to the state. Thus, neither the state nor the dominant village figures would find it in their interest to disrupt the present system, since both enjoy the status quo which helps maintain the present power structure. Whether intentional or not, the state controls the countryside by implicitly endowing the lineage heads and wealthy peasants with political power and lineage organization has become a back-up system for the dominant figures and thus eventually for the state.

Second, the state controls the countryside through price manipulation. The state has a virtual monopoly over rice and other agricultural products. The state sets the amount of purchase and the prices of the products. Even if the peasants would like to sell their rice on the free market, the price is not going to be higher than the state-set price. Urban merchants have strong economic and political organizations by which they can easily maximize their profit. They buy products cheap and sell them dearly. In sum, the state maintains hegemony over the countryside through political control and price adjustment.

B. Some anthropological theories on kinship

It is important to note that kinship groups have a good deal of flexibility in the mobilization of members. In other words, the boundary of kinship is set more manipulatively than that of lineage. Evans-Pritchard's (1951) analysis of the Nuer kinship system states that kinship is individually oriented while lineage is group oriented. He argues that lineage is a

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politically motivated corporate personality. An individual is represented by his or her lineage group. Lineage membership is not a matter of choice but one of fate. Kinship, on the other hand, is continually defined by an individual's interaction with numerous other kin. Patrilineal descent rule among the Nuer does not determine kinship boundaries. Evans-Pritchard argues, "The kinship system is like a circular elastic band which can be stretched on an ever-widening circumstance as a child grows up and increases the number of his social contacts and enlarges the areas of this distribution" (ibid: 156). The elasticity of kinship is manifested in a protective maternal uncle's supplying cows to a nephew's bride's kinsmen for use as a brideprice. Therefore, patrilineal, matrilineal, and affinal relationships are included in the kinship relationship, even though the Nuer descent rule is patrilineal.

Kinship operates not only among a genealogically linked people but also with socio-economically connected individuals. The creation of fictive kinship is an example of how kinship operations transcend biologically set boundaries. According to Maurice Bloch's ethnography on Merina kinship (1975) Madagascar society often creates "artificial" kinship for large labor mobilizations. Maria Lagos (1988) similarly notices that Bolivian creditors establish fictive kinship with debtors to form cohesive credit relationships. Thus, kinship abstractions can be manipulated by participants in socio-economic transactions.

A popular concept used to explain kinship is reciprocity. Even though reciprocity is a convenient framework to analyze various human relationships (Mauss 1967, Sahlins 1972, Bourdieu 1984) we need to be cautious about the benign aspects of reciprocity which have been emphasized by some social scientists (Malinowski 1961, Mauss 1967). Mauss argues that delay in repayment produces human affection and solidifies the cohesive

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relationship between giver and receiver. Allowing late repayment implicitly represents the lender's generosity or morality and, consequently, the debtor's gratitude. The concept of reciprocity as demonstrated by Mauss and his followers is a major principle used to analyze the social organism. As described in the last part of the work, "The Gift," Mauss thinks social chaos is a result of broken reciprocal relationships between haves and have-nots. Although he also appreciates the power dimension of giving, Mauss accepts reciprocity as the overriding principle contributing to the continuity of social organization and unity. Malinowski, whose influence is clearly seen in Mauss' work, argues that exchanging shell bracelets and necklaces in the Kula ring around the Trobriand Islands functions to assuage possible hostilities and prevent warfare among participating groups.

Reciprocity raises the issue of morality for two reasons. One is that a debtor has an obligation to repay what is owed at some later date even though direct punishment after default does not occur. The other reason is that creditors feel obligated to put up with late repayment. The denial of immediate economic and political benefit for performing a specific action is defined as societal morality. Morality is highlighted particularly in reciprocal relationships among kin members. Kinship obligation strengthens the degree of moral behavior in general reciprocal relationships.

For instance, a defaulting kinsman should be treated more generously than a non-kinsman. Bloch (ibid) attempts to explain the existence of a moral character of society, based particularly on kinship relations. He appropriates the Darwinian notion of natural selection, arguing that the moral character of non-specific and long term socio-economic transactions among kin members is adaptive to potential change. Perfect adaptation to the environment could be destructive for a society to survive in the long run, even though short-run

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interactions may bring immediate advantageous results (ibid: 86-87). Therefore, tolerating some immediate loss because of morality is eventually functional in the continuation of a kinship system.

In this thesis, I demonstrated how reciprocity works. In some contexts, Malinowski's conceptualization of reciprocity is applicable; in others, reciprocity is a tool to accumulate economic and symbolic capital in the long run. Reproduction of class relationships is also linked with reciprocity. Almsgiving and tolerating delayed payments and default are, at times, strategic behaviors. Even though Marcel Mauss's (1967), James Scott's (1977) and Pierre Bordieu's (1984) argument that giving is getting is too broad to elucidate all aspects of reciprocal relationships, this kind of approach helps us to realize that reciprocity operates in multiple dimensions. Nor can this concept cover all give-and-take relationships. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, modes of human behavior upon giving a gift and during credit relationships are significantly different. What is given and how it is given must be investigated first. Lending money, providing kin with tenancy or supplying a kinsman with labor cannot be analyzed in the conceptual framework of reciprocity alone. The indiscriminate use of the concept of reciprocity can account for certain relationships. Most important, the villagers' mode of behavior in cash lending and borrowing transactions is hardly explainable by the benign and functional character of reciprocity.

Probably the first and most influential work on the interplay of kinship, morality, and economy is Edmund Leach's research on Pul Elyia in Ceylon, now Sri Lanka(1961). He argues that "I want to insist that kinship systems have no 'reality' at all except in relation to land and property" (ibid: 305). He argues for the contextual analysis of kinship rather than accepting the view of an intrinsic value of kinship. His emphasis on context is

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insightful. He argues that "such context is not simply a passive backcloth to social life; the context itself is a social product and is itself 'structured'; the people who live in it must conform to a wide range of rules and limitations simply to live there at all" (ibid: 306). Even though Leach's discussion of kinship is simplistic in explanation and economically deterministic in perspective, it has been extremely influential in kinship studies. Leach's work has been a significant starting point in the development of more sophisticated materialistic explanations of kinship within a social context.

Since the 1970s, reconstructions of family history have helped to demystify the primordial loyalties or unconditional morality so often attributed to kinship. For instance, Thomas Smith (1959, 1965) shows how a Japanese patriarch postpones the eldest son's marriage to prevent family division and thereby sustain a sustain a sufficient pool of labor. Primogeniture in Japan dictates that the non-succeeding sons must leave the household upon the eldest son's marriage. This case well demonstrates how family members are manipulated for the maximization of the dominant kin members' power.

Lutz Berkner (1972), in a similar vein, argues that a patriarch in Austria remains as money creditor to the succeeding son even after retirement. The son's obligation to repay the debt and continuous need for credit binds his family with the retired patriarch. In Berkner's view it is not primordial loyalty or morality but the relationship between creditor and debtor which operates to maintain a family. This type of kinship ethnography supplies us with a conceptual framework for investigating a deeper level of kinship operation. Accumulation and domination have replaced primordial unity as the internal logic of kinship and family.

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In the 1970's some social scientists (Mintz 1973, Schryer 1975, Alavi 1973) critically juxtaposed kinship with peasant politics. Their contribution details the reflexivity of kinship and other social variables. Even though their main focus is the role of kinship in the formation of class consciousness, and their view on kinship is not very different from Fortes (1945, 1949), their works promote the study of kinship linked with other social affairs such as economy, politics, and class consciousness. Alavi (1973: 23) argues that "the process of transformation of the one [class in itself] into the other [class for itself] is mediated by primordial ties such as those of kinship". In a similar vein Mintz (1973) and Aron (1981) argue that kinship relationships are in the way of the development of class consciousness.

Kinship plays a role in shaping local politics and is used for political mobilization. Kinship ties may make it difficult to predict political alliances. Indeed, they may be as important an element as the means of production in the formation of class consciousness and in action. For example, in his model of kinship, Alavi (1973) shows how kinship ties and economic dependency between sharecroppers and landlords in Pakistan play important roles in the formation of class consciousness and action. Alavi suggests in what circumstances kinship solidarity strengthens class solidarity and vice versa. If all kinsmen are propertyless sharecroppers, their kin ties would provide the material for the forming a unified class consciousness. On the other hand, if kinsmen are divided into the category of landlord and sharecropper, and non-kinsmen are found within both categories, kinship ties may weaken class solidarity based on propertylessness. Alavi's juxtaposition of kinship and politics is not based on empirical findings, but suggests a model for understanding the relationship between politics and kinship.

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Most recently Hans Medick and David Sabean (1984) edited a collection of essays on the study of family and kinship. As the title of the book, "Interest and Emotion," suggests, the underlying theme is the conjunctive nature of kinship; in this case, morality and accumulation. The central theme is how "unconditional" morality, expected from genealogically set kinship ties, empirically and conceptually coexists with kin members' attempts to manipulate political, economic and symbolic capital.

Bernard Vernier (1984) demonstrates how kinship morality is effectively used by dominant kin members in a Greek family to accumulate economic and symbolic capital. He argues:

> Although there were within the families relationships based on domination and economic exploitation, it is nevertheless true that, unlike in class relationships, it was the dominant 'group' of the eldest children who, by reproducing themselves biologically, reproduced the dominated 'group' they needed. Those who try to prove that kinship relationships can also be class relationships -- as if exploitation needed to be 'noble' in order to exist -- forget that within social organization kinship relationships have a dominant position and are quite compatible with exploitation of labour. Rejecting that would mean accepting the indigenous ideology which raised the family, or more exactly the line, to the level of a quasi-sacred institution, the very ideology that in this society made exploitation possible (ibid: 33-35).

Vernier describes how disinherited daughters provide low paid or unpaid labor which serves to develop the succeeding eldest sister's domination and accumulation. Instead, "gifts" containing symbolic value are given to the disinherited sisters. Gift here refers to low-cost cultural values such as sharing meals with the eldest sister's family. Gift giving enables the eldest sister to avoid paying a full wage and to disguise her exploitation. Feeling grateful, the younger sisters "accept their place within the relationship of exploitation" (ibid: 37). Their long lasting celibacy caused by

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their perpetual dependence on the eldest sister makes it unnecessary to consume many goods. Therefore, their personal savings are given to the children of the eldest sister with whom they develop personal, affectionate relationships, "being condemned, so to speak, to invest all their affections in them [the children of the eldest sister]. Thus the cycle of exploitation was completed" (ibid: 37).

Vernier's account of kinship unambiguously demonstrates how dominant kin members can exploit weaker ones. He does not deny the existence of kin affection or morality among kin members, but his approach to explain these are quite different from previous anthropologists (Evans-Pritchard 1951, 1969, Fortes 1945, 1949, Alavi 1973). Emotions exist not only in a benign sense but also as a manipulable entity, as a necessary component in unequal power relationships.

What Vernier and others omit in their work is the coexistence of claim and counter-claim. They did not pay attention to the counter-claim that oppressed kin members make. Vernier's work is an unilateral description of dominating and dominated kinsmen. I suspect that disinherited sisters would not necessarily accept the symbolic constructions made by their eldest sister. The dominated or "exploited" kin members' counter-claim in kin credit relationships may well be based on the same claim of the dominating kin members -- a claim to kinship morality or affection. In other words, it is not only the eldest sister but also the disinherited sisters who can manipulate kinship affection and symbols. It is not enough to argue that politically and economically superior kinsmen have the monopoly of symbol construction. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 10, poor kinsmen manipulate kinship to their advantage and kin-class relationships are revealed in the alternation of claims and counter-claims. I have argued that class relationships can develop

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within kinship relationships and class is not only associated with urban industrial growth and settings. As Emmanuel Terrary (1984) argues, a new concept of class must be developed for other modes of production. I extend the locus of the concept of class initially developed in urban settings to rural, kin relationships. As credit relationships are maintained, class relationships develop between creditor and debtor, landlord and tenant. In rural class settings, I emphasize that economic domination does not necessarily lead to unilateral hegemonic relationships but to ambiguous and paradoxical ones.

Arturo Warman's description of credit in Eastern Morelos helps to conceptually link credit and kinship. He describes how draft animals are used for only ten weeks but must be fed for a full 12 months. Therefore, what the beasts give to people is much smaller than what people are obliged to give to them. In other words, the amount of human energy exerted is significantly larger than that made by animals. Warman views animal husbandry as a credit system. Using a draft animal is like "borrowing energy credit". The amount of work a draft animal supplies to a household is gradually repaid over a long period of time by household members. It is the patriarch who uses the animal in ploughing for a short period of time, but it is women and children who must tend the animals year round. What is so significant about Warman's analysis is the effect of credit on family relationships; some family members are exploited by other family members in order to pay the credit. Material credit inevitably leads to the complication of social relationships, particularly kinship relationships.

In the investigation of East Asian kinship and lineage, some anthropologists (Freedman 1958, Watson 1985) realize the importance of class relationships among kin groups and illustrate the segmentation of lineages and consequent economic differentiation between wealthy and poor

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sublineages. The last chapter of Rubie Watson's work, "Inequality among Brothers", is labeled "class and kinship"; however, the content refers to the segmentation of a lineage based on the division of the corporate estate. As described in the introduction, lineage and kinship operations are quite different. Identifying class relationships within lineage and kinship blunts the edge of an analytical tool used for investigating village social organization. In discussing class relationships between sublineages, Watson reveals an acceptance of the concept of a sublineage as a single legal personality without accounting for the kinship interactions that constitute a sublineage.

The concept of class in Freedman's work is not found within kinship but between economically differentiated sublineages. Using a functionalist perspective, he studies what kinship does for kinsmen and how kinsmen contribute to the maintenance of the kinship group. Such a functionalist perspective often misses other equally important questions: what does kinship do to deprive kinsmen? How do kinsmen undermine kinship solidarity? As did his colleagues working in the British anthropological tradition (Evans-Pritchard 1951, 1969, Fortes 1945, 1949), he views a sublineage as a united legal personality.

My study has shown the importance of kinship and lineage relations as these appear interrelated with relations of class in Korea. Such interrelatedness is especially significant as we attempt to understand the ways in which capitalism has influenced the rural segments of Korean society. I have in this thesis focused on one major aspect of capitalistic development, the extension of credit to rural producers and laborers. It was my intention in this work to focus on the distribution of credit as an entry point for analysis

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and understanding of fully specified relationships among individuals, in order to gain access to the complexities of kin-class interrelations.

I try to demonstrate how kinship and class relationships are interlocked and affect each other. The most crucial point is that any person's position in class relationships is modified by his or her kin ties; a person's position in the kinship order is affected by his or her status in class relationships. I suggest in this thesis that kin-class relationships are characterized by on-going ambiguity and paradox. Pure class analysis, without attention to kin ties, and inquiries into kinship that pay no attention to class, will produce analytical categories that are too general and oversimplified to do justice to the variable outcomes emerging at intersections of kinship and class.

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Glossary

A. general terms:

aje: a kinship term representing the persons in ego's genealogy who are of the same generational depth as ego's father.

hwangap: the celebration of the 60th birthday which symbolizes one cycle of human life. For those people who desire and can afford it, a big feast is held.

Kangho: one of the sublineages of Umin Kim lineage.

kye: a rotational credit association. There are basically two types of kye. One is for recreational purposes. Kye members pool their money and use the sum to go touring and to have a good time. The other kind of kye is for the purpose of raising money for a variety of purposes such as wedding and funeral expenses, machinery, or educational expenses. Basically, a number of members join the kye, pool their money with one of the members receiving the sum on a predetermined periodic basis. Ideally, this pattern continues until all members have received the sum. Interest rules and other rules of payment are settled on and applied.

makkŏlli: a Korean traditional alcoholic beverage made from rice. In the villages mentioned in the text, makkŏlli is the most popular and inexpensive alcoholic beverage when compared with others such as beer.

Minjŏng party: the government party led by No Tae-woo. As of 1990, this party is now known as the Minja party

pumashi: voluntary, year round, reciprocal labor exchange involving two or more persons. The labor exchanged can be the same or different depending on the the persons involved.

Pyŏngmin party: the anti-government party led by Kim Dae-jung.

Songhyon: a major lineage group in Pine Tree.

Sakak: one of the sublineages of Umin Kim lineage.

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toyusa: a lineage head who governs lineage affairs.

Umin: a major lineage groups in Pine Tree.

yangban: a social category having variegated shades of meaning according to historical social contexts and uses by villagers, historians, and social scientists. It can refer to the Korean aristocracy, ruling class, or rural elite during the the Yi dynasty (1392-1910 AD) whose social status was differentially determined by relatives passing the state's provincial examinations, compliance with Chu Hsi Neo-Confucian doctrines, land ownership and wealth. Near the end of the dynasty, class distinctions such as the yangban were legally outlawed (Kabo Reforms). However, notions connected with the category of yangban such as having illustrious ancestors recorded in a genealogical record, behaving within normative Confucian tradition, being educated and wealthy are still variously employed by members of Korean society to distinguish themselves from their neighbors both as individuals and groups.

B. Description of major persons in the thesis

Chiju (31): the author's major instructor. He raises 19 cows. He is one of the wealthiest people in the village. He is a Pyongmin party member and belongs to Sakak segment of Umin Kim lineage.

Chiyong (51): the director of the Pyŏngmin party in Yongsan township. His livelihood depends solely on pig raising. He belongs to Kasap segment of Umin Kim lineage.

Chunja (69): the major creditor in Pine Tree. She lives alone and belongs to Sakak segment.

Chunpyo (61): a Songhyon Kim. He is toyusa of a private segment of the Songhyon lineage.

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Hayong (54): a Minjŏng party member. He raises 9 dairy cows and farms about 0.7 hectares of paddy. He is relatively wealthy and belongs to Kangho segment of Umin Kim lineage.

Hwahong (56): the director of the New Village Movement of Chŏlla province and a former high ranking governmental official. He is the most powerful man representing the Songhyon lineage. He is Sonhong's younger brother.

Kimbo (57): a member of the Kangho segment of Umin lineage. He is one of the three major creditors in Pine Tree.

Sangsa (37): the village chief and a member of the Chŏn lineage, a minor lineage group in Pine Tree. He is considered to be a very charismatic figure.

Sonhong (70): the lineage chief (toyusa) of one of the major lineages, the Songhyon Kim.

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Appendix

Appendix A Units of measurement:

Korean unit	Metric approximate	U.S. approximate
kŭn	600 grams	1.75 pounds
mal (polished rice, barley)	9 kilogarms	20 pounds
gama (sack) (polished rice)	90 kilograms	202 pounds
gama (sack) (polished barley)	40 kilograms	90 pounds
pyŏng	0.00331 hectares	0.0008 acres
majigi	0.07 hectares	0.16 acres
chŏngbo	1.0000 hectare	2.45 acres
ri	4 kilometers	2.4 miles
wŏn		0.0014 dollars

Appendix B State capitalism and rural impoverishment:

Industrial capitalists have benefited considerably from the low interest or no interest state loans. Peasants have supplied cheap grains to the urban workers enabling the capitalists to keep workers' wages low. The state has annually set the purchase price of rice, which has always been well below the inflation rate. The parity ratio has increased continuously.

Impoverished peasant migrants in the cities have become an industrial reserve army. The factory wages are held down because the labor supply has

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been plentiful. In all, peasants have been the scapegoat in the development of monopoly industrial capitalism, heavily sponsored and directed by the state.

Appendix C The cost and profit of rice production:[50]

The production cost for one majigi of paddy is: $7 for ploughing by motor tiller and $7 for fining the soil by motor tiller. These days about half the villagers use a transplanter and other machinery for transplanting, ploughing, and harvesting. The numbers of people who use these machines will increase. It is less expensive and faster than doing it by hand or with wage labor.

Most young people in Oak Tree and Pine Tree have motor tillers. One person in Oak Tree and one in Pine Tree has a tractor and combine. Two people each in Pine Tree and Oak Tree have a transplanter. It costs seven dollars for transplanting seedlings by a transplanter, $5.60 for spraying pesticide four times, and $5.60 for harvesting by combine. If people hire a wage laborer using his hands for transplanting and harvesting, the cost will be about two times the cost of hiring machine owners to do the work. The total cost for hiring machine operators to work one majigi is $40.60

People need one 10 kilograms sack of compound fertilizer and a half 25 kilograms sack of urea fertilizer to fertilize one majigi. The cost of fertilizer per one majigi is $12.60. Spraying pesticide four times per one majigi requires $28. The cost for fertilizer and pesticide for one majigi of paddy land is $82.60. In addition to this, people hire wage laborers once in a while to weed and to construct ridges. If the paddy field is too muddy, they have to put in lime

[50]In Appendix C and D, cost and profit calculations are based on all other things being equal such as soil fertility, water supply, and drainage.

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fertilizer. People usually use lime fertilizer to make the soil porous. Miscellaneous wage labor costs and lime fertilizer will amount to $28 per one majigi. Now the total cost per one majigi turns out to be about $112.

If the labor cost is calculated using Pine Tree's daily wage labor charge of seven dollars, then from April to November, it will be 8 (months) X 30 (days of months) X $7 (wage labor cost per day) = $1,680. This amount does not indicate the intensity or quality of the labor. If a person has more than one hectare, a couple will have enough work to keep them busy from sowing to harvest.

A healthy couple can manage up to one hectare of paddy with 50 days of hired wage labor. When the amount of paddy is over hectare, people have to hire wage labor on a regular basis. There are exceptions. For example, Chinhwan and his wife tenant about one and half hectares of paddy field. Instead of hiring wage labor they exploit themselves to reduce the cost of production. The couple have a son attending college and another attending high school. After paying rent, their earnings must meet the high education costs of their sons in the city.

If they cultivate one hectare without using wage labor, the labor cost for one majigi becomes $1,680 X 2 (people)/1 hectare (15 majigis) = $224. After the harvest, they are charged four kilograms of rice to husk 80 kilograms of rice in the village mill and $22.40 are required for rice produced in one majigi. Therefore, the total cost per one majigi is 112 + 224 + 22.4= $358.4. The average harvest from one majigi is four sacks of rice. In the late 1989, a sack sold for $126. The total harvest from one majigi is 126 X 4 =$504 and the profit from one majigi is $504 - $358.4=$145.6. The net profit for the couple with one hectare is 15 X 145.6 = $258.72. These figures are based on household accounts that two people kept and my informal interviews about

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the price of items and costs of labor. Only two people kept the accounts daily in Pine Tree.)

Appendix D The cost and profit of barley production:

About 15 kilograms of barley seeds are sown in one majigi. The cost is $10.50. 15 kilograms of herbicide, one sack of compound fertilizer and one and half sacks of urea fertilizer are used per one majigi. The cost is $14. Husking 40 kilograms of barley costs four kilograms of barley. Husking seven sacks costs 28 kilograms of barley which is $17.60. The total production cost for one majigi of barley is $44.24. The average amount of barley harvested per one majigi is nine sacks. The average selling price of a 40 kilograms sack of barley is $25.12. Government set prices were $25.80 per 40 kilograms sack of first quality gut barley, $20.20 per 40 kilograms sack of second quality gut barley, $20.20 per 40 kilograms sack of third quality gut barley. The price of first quality regular barley was $29 and 20 cents, $27.89 for second quality, $23.65 for the third quality. Therefore, people can earn $226.80 per one majigi. When the productive cost, $44.24, is deducted from the harvest, $226.80, the net profit for one majigi is $182.56.)

Appendix E The cost and profit of dairy farming:

One liter of milk is 56 cents. A cow produces $11.20 a day plus a $840 calf each year. If the price of a calf is divided by 365 days, a daily amount is $2.30. Therefore, what a cow produces daily is 11.2 + 2.3 = $13.5. The average weight of fodder a cow eats a day is 15 kilograms. The price of a sack of fodder is seven dollars. 7 (price of one sack) X 15/25 (weight of a sack) = $4.2

Dairy farmers are advised to give a variety of feed such as Italian grass, sun-grass, alfalfa, rye, corn, plain grass. They have to buy seeds for these

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grasses from the coop, and plant them in the dry field. Raisers plant Italian grass in the fall and harvest it in May. One kilogram of sun grass seed is one dollar and 90 cents. Five kilograms of seeds are required for 300 pyŏng [0.25 hectares] The seed cost is n$9.45 per 300 pyŏng. The grass produced from 300 pyŏng can feed a cow for about 10 days. The kind of grass and the combination ratio of different fodders vary from raiser to raiser. The ratio of natural grass in Chiju's feed is the highest among the raisers in Pine Tree. It requires extra effort to harvest grasses. Feeding only sacked fodder is hazardous to the cows' health and lowers their resistance to disease. Raisers also buy hay from the villagers. Besides fodder, raisers must have a refrigerator to store milk that costs about $2,450-2,800. A milking machine costs $840. A straw cutter cost $420. Chiju pays a monthly electric bill of $21. Other costs are for grass seed, wage labor to cut grass, medicine, and electricity. Each of these is about two dollars and 80 cents per cow. The total dairy cost for a cow is five dollars and 60 cents. The total profit a cow can produce is 13.5 - 7 = $6.5. These figures do not include the owner's labor cost.

Appendix F The yearly ancestor worship cost and its ratio to the yearly income:


The average produce from one majigi is four sacks. Production costs about one sack, price of a sack being $120. The total profit is 15 (majigi) X 3 (net profit from one majigi) X $120 (price of sack) = $5,040. If the net profit is divided by $120 (cost of ritual) X 8 (frequency), the ritual expense turns out to be about 20 percent of the net. In the tenant case, he pays 1.5 sacks of rent per majigi. Therefore, 15 (majigi) X 1.8 (net profit from one majigi) X $120 (price of sack) = $3,024. When it is divided by $110 X 8, the figure turns out to be about 30 percent)

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Appendix G Korean kinship terminology:

Korean kinship terminology is similar to the Eskimo one. With the exception of very close genealogical kinsmen, people of the same generational depth are called by an identical kinship term. Here I only highlight the patrilineal kinship terms which frequently appear in my thesis.

Fig. 29 A simplified chart of Korean kinship terminology



From ego's point of view, all the men of ego's father's genealogical level are called aje. Ego's father's younger brother and elder brother are respectively called chakŭn [the literal meaning is "small" but the contextual meaning is "younger"] and kŭn [the literal meaning is "big" but the contextual meaning is "elder"] aboji (father). This classificatory system applies to other generations. Ego's grandfather's younger and elder brother are respectively called chakŭn and kŭn halaboji (grandfather). Other men of the same level are called hanassi (grandfather). A cultural norm seems to be that when ego addresses a person by the same kinship term, both ego and the person expect to share certain kinship sentiment and obligations. For

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example, the normative aje is a respectable man to whom ego is expected to show the same respect and veneration as shown to ego's father. Generally speaking, the relationship between ego and aje is very amiable.

Special terms for the siblings of ego's father and grandfather tells of the special importance of the person to ego. People of ego's generation are called either hyŏng (elder brother) or tongsaeng (younger sibling). This rule also applies to the female counterpart. Female elders and juniors of the same generation are called nunim and tongsaeng respectively. Since the Korean kinship system is based on patrilineage, maternal kinsmen are not usually recorded in genealogies. However, terms of address for maternal kinsmen are generally identical with those for paternal kinsmen. For example, ego's mother's sister's son who is older than ego is called hyŏng and the term of reference for the same person is oe sachon. When people address maternal kinsmen they add on an additional morpheme oe [the literal meaning is " outside,", but the contextual meaning is "maternal"].

There are three important points to remember in the Pine Tree kinship terminology. First, even though people of the same genealogical level are bundled together and addressed identically, the genealogically closer kinsmen generally have intimate sentiment and obligation toward ego. Second, colloquial kinship terms are often different from genealogical kinship terms written in a genealogy. In other words terms of genealogical reference are quite often different from terms of address. Genealogical kin terms specify how far collateral brothers or other kinsmen are separated from ego by numerical order. For example, ego's father's brother's son is sachon (here sa and chon respectively mean four and kinsman). Ego's grandfather's brother's grandson is yukchon (here yuk means six). The numbers precisely shows the kinship distance from ego. The genealogical term of kun aboji is samchon

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(sam means three). The diagram below shows the numerical order of kin links. Third, in normal conversation ego often does not use kinship term to address a kinsman who is of a genealogically higher level and considerably younger than ego. For example, Yongte in Pine Tree is one level higher than Hongkyun in terms of genealogical order, but the latter is 15 years older than the former. Therefore, Hongkyun rarely calls Yongte aje. In such a case, the two people try to avoid each other. Seniority is as strong a cultural rule as genealogy. The clash of these two rules create an extremely awkward situation in which people prefer to avoid facing one another. Chongkyun, a former lineage toyusa told me that the two people in such a case must address each other by the genealogically set kinship terms and must use appropriate honorific words to each other. However the villagers do not always apply this rule. The most decisive factor which governs the use of these terms are credit relationships. An example in chapter 10 demonstrates how credit relationships between a kin tenant and kin landlady affects their use of kinship terminology.

Appendix H The impact of land reform on the Korean peasantry:
During his purchase of land, the Korean state was implementing land reform in April, 1950 and the civil war interrupted the process which was re-implemented in 1951. The transference of landlords' land in excess of three hectares and distribution of land previously owned by the Japanese to the tenants were among the major targets of the program. The state gave deeds to the tenants and land bonds to the landlords.

The buyer had to pay 150 percent of the average annual rice production from the purchased land for five years, and interest was not charged during the payment period. The buyer paid about one third of his produce annually

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for five years to pay off the debt. The land reform made both the seller and buyer resentful. The land bond values decreased because of high inflation rate in the 1950's. On the other hand, the usually poor buyers felt it a great burden to pay one third of their produce annually. Ironically, the fully pledged land reform was implemented in the disastrous post-civil war period, and the war situation made it more difficult for the buyers to make their land payments. Even if they owned the whole produce, they would have been in great difficulty. The most common reaction to this stressful situation was to transfer the rights to land to wealthy kinsmen in return for a grant of tenancy. This hidden tenancy became a prevalent nationwide problem.

In Pine Tree, most of the tenants gave up their land rights and received some remuneration from their kinsmen. Interestingly enough, neither side legally clarified who actually owned the land. Therefore, the tenants remained the legal owners. From the buyers' perspective, changing the ownership in the land registration office was unnecessarily troublesome, and the seller, being a kinsman, continued to need help from his or her kin related landlord. Owning more than the legal limitation of three hectares had been theoretically possible because the landlord owned not only the maximum amount of land but also his kinsmen's land, which was not in fact legally transferred. The effect of the land reform in Pine Tree was the creation of a great many tiny parcels of tenanted land that did not provide substantial support for the tenants.

It is a notable fact that the people in Pine Tree gradually straightened out and clarified the ownership of land in the land register. The act of clarification was encouraged by the state, and in the early 1980's the township office finalized the matching of all land with the real owners and registered the person's name in the land register. I believe that the Pine Tree villagers

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themselves volunteered the clearing of titles, and the traditional way of handling land through oral contracts based on kinship affection was superseded by the officially set rules. It seemed that the enthusiastic land registration was precipitated by the fact that the real landowners' fear of the sellers' claims on the land outweighed the profit from the previous tax evasion. Tenants themselves were also anxious to rid themselves of this fake ownership because they were obliged to pay taxes on land which was actually owned by landlord.

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
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
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
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
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
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












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