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SOCIAL DECEPTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE

by

JOYCE WACKENHUT

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

1987

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psyhology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

SOCIAL DECEPTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE

by

Joyce Wackenhut

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While there is a fairly extensive literature on the detection of deception, very little empirical research has investigated the meaning and function of deception (lies) in personal relationships. However, several theoretical perspectives bear on this topic, for example, Bok's (1978) and Luhmann's (1979). A small number of studies have investigated actual instances of deceptive behavior in personal relationships. In addition, more systematic inquiries have addressed related topics, such as the large body of research on attributions of responsibility (or morality). The present research investigated reactions to a "paternalistic" lie. It was hypothesized that people will not judge the appropriateness of lying in personal relationships solely according to the commonly accepted norms about lying, but also on the basis of other important factors in the lie-telling situation.

Specifically, it was predicted that, due to the "liar's bias" (Bok, 1978), subjects asked to identify with the lie-teller's role would judge a lie less harshly along several important psychological dimensions than would subjects asked to identify with the target's role. It was also predicted that a lie with a positive outcome would be judged less harshly along these same dimensions than one having negative results, with judgments of a neutral outcome lie falling somewhere in between. These dimensions included: (a) evaluations of the appropriateness of the lie, (b) attributions of the lie-teller's motives for having told the lie (self-serving vs. altruistic), (c) evaluations of the appropriateness of the truth, had it been told instead, (d) attributions of the lie-teller's motives for telling the truth, had she done so (self-serving vs. altruistic), (e) judgments of the likelihood that the lie would become detected, and (f) judgments of the impact of the lie, or the truth, on the relationship between the lie-teller and target. The majority of these predictions were at least partially supported. Perspective and outcome were also related to a number of exploratory variables included in the study.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Overview

In today's society, many of us lead lives which are varied and complex and which require us to meet a wide range of demands, including satisfying some of the psychological and emotional needs of those we are close to (La Gaipa, 1977). Obviously, we are not always able to live up to others' expectations, or even our own. Society has developed a variety of social mechanisms to help its members overcome discrepancies between what they really think, feel, say or do and what others expect or would like them to think, feel, say or do. For example, Goffman (1959) proposes that people have learned to adopt a working consensus (although not a real one) to protect the image ("face") that each of us tries to present to others, thus paving the way for smooth social interaction.

Nonetheless, appearances sometimes break down, and Scott and Lyman (1968) describe the socially acceptable excuses and justifications ("accounts") that people typically offer when they have failed to comply with societal rules or to live up to another's expectations. Luhmann (1979) also mentions a

variety of socially recognized strategies which he says "intercept and neutralize acts of distrust," such as certain forms of presentation or subsequent explanations describing unacceptable behavior as involuntary, as a mistake, as due to external factors or as required by one's role. He states further that should these strategies fail, we then have "the institutions of punishment, penance, and pardon [which] have many functions important among which is the fixing of deadlines by which an affair is closed and thus offers no further legitimate occasions for distrust" (p. 75).

Perhaps one of the most obvious ways for people to create the impression that they are fulfilling their roles or obligations even when they are not is to lie. Although not without its risks (cf. Bok, 1978), lying can close the frequent gap between what we actually think, feel, say or do and what others would have us think, feel, say or do. In the simplest case, we can say what others would like to hear, even when in our own opinion it is not true, such as in the "little white lies" we tell upon various social occasions. Such lies cause little apparent harm and avoid the embarrassment and discomfort that telling

the truth can sometimes create. In the extreme, lying can prevent the breakdown of the relationship itself, as lies about adultery are often thought to do (Wackenhut, 1979).

There can be little doubt that lying, especially if it remains undiscovered by the person lied to, can sometimes enable people to function more smoothly in their interpersonal relationships (at least in the short run). Yet lying, unlike many other social mechanisms designed to facilitate human interaction, is by no means a universally accepted social behavior. Ever since childhood we have been told by our parents and teachers, and by authority figures in general, that it is wrong to lie. Time and again we have been warned of the evils of deception and reminded of the virtues of honesty.

Leaders of the human potential movement of the '60's and their followers have also recommended telling the truth, not only on moral but on practical grounds. For them, open, honest communication is a prerequisite for the development of intimacy and trust (e.g., Rogers, 1961). Indeed, numerous studies on self-disclosure have lent some support to the idea that an individual's willingness to be open and honest

about oneself and one's feelings, and by inference not to lie, is related to the development of a close, trusting relationship (Jourard, 1959; Taylor & Altman, 1975).

Yet, just as lies can sometimes cause great harm, being confronted with the "truth" prematurely or inappropriately can also undermine or damage the quality of a personal relationship. The truth can cause disappointment, hurt or anger; it can result in a breakdown in communication and a loss of trust, or even the termination of the relationship itself (e.g., Bok, 1978; Freud, 1963).

As can be seen in the foregoing discussion, the decision of when to tell the truth and when to lie depends on many factors, including the impact of either in human terms.

In the following section a number of theoretical perspectives will be presented which consider the social meaning and impact of truth vs. deception. This discussion will be followed by a review of some empirical research also related to this topic.

Theoretical Background

Bok's Perspective

The controversial topic of lying has been a subject of interest throughout the ages. The question of honesty vs. lying in human relations finds roots in early philosophical debates about the definition and nature of "truth." Bok, a moral philosopher who brings ethical theory to her treatment of truth and lying, has recently traced the history of views about this subject. She reports that, historically, lying has always been viewed as a highly undesirable moral choice--so undesirable that many religious leaders and philosophers such as Aristotle, Augustine, and Kant have considered it a sin, even a mortal one (cf. Bok, 1978, pp. 24, 36-49).

Yet Bok reminds us that despite a long-standing acceptance of the moral principle that it is wrong to lie, decisions about lying in a practical sense are not always easy to make. She reflects on the irony that, despite all the years of philosophical debate, no one has managed to produce clear, concrete ground rules for how to decide, when faced with the real contingencies of life, when we should tell the truth, and when, if ever, we should lie.

In an effort to overcome what she feels is an unfortunate absence of a well-enunciated moral code, Bok devotes much of her book, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, to trying to establish reasonable guidelines for resolving the often difficult decision of whether or not to tell a lie.

Bok restricts herself to a definition of lying that includes only spoken, intentional attempts to deceive. While clearly recognizing the necessity of lying in certain circumstances, Bok's own bias is in keeping with that of her predecessors. For her, individuals in society, whenever possible, should try to tell the truth. She appears to agree wholeheartedly with Aristotle whom she quotes as saying "falsehood is in itself mean and culpable, and the truth noble and full of praise" (Bok, 1978, p. 24). Her focus is not so much on the harm a single lie may cause, but on the cumulative harm--to the liar, the deceived party, and to society generally--that is caused when people establish the practice of lying.[1]

Harm to the liar. Bok believes that the liar may truly believe she or he is justified in lying and can distinguish when it is reasonable and wise to do so.

Yet often, the liar may routinely underestimate the potential harm that lying can cause, even for the liar her or himself.

Bok also believes that liars often feel inclined to lie because they tend to underestimate their chances of getting caught and the harm that will result--in the form of lost credibility, trust and respect--should others discover the lie. In particular, they miscalculate the reaction of the person who is deceived and thus the extent of the damage that will be done to the relationship between them upon the discovery of the lie.

Harm to the deceived. Bok feels that most of us would resist the loss of control over which choices we want to delegate to others (such as being willing to have a loved one lie to us "for our own good"), and which we want to make for ourselves. Indeed, from the point of view of the person who is deceived, lies can be especially damaging. In this regard, Bok has likened the act of deception to the act of violence: "These are two forms of deliberate assault on human beings. Both can coerce people into acting against their will. Most harm that can befall victims through violence can come to them also through deceit" (p. 19).

One of the primary ways lying can harm the deceived party, according to Bok, is by denying him or her access to accurate information. In this regard, Bok describes the relationship between lying and knowledge, stating that since knowledge is often power, our choices in life depend on our ability to estimate what is truly the case, and these estimates frequently rely on accurate information from others.

Another way Bok feels that lies can harm the deceived person is through their emotional impact. She suggests that even in those cases where the lie remains undetected, the deceived party may sense that something is wrong and feel confused, uncomfortable, or vaguely suspicious of the liar's true intentions. Should the lie become revealed, the emotional consequences for the deceived person can be even greater--ranging from mild disappointment to various extremes of hurt and anger and sometimes even to a feeling of complete betrayal.[2]

Lies in close relationships. In keeping with her concern about the harm of lies in all relationships, Bok sees those told in close relationships as also fraught with potential drawbacks. In fact, even lies

that might be justified under other circumstances, such as lies in a crisis, truly white lies, or lies where the deceived party has given her or his consent, may not be as justifiable in close relationships because they can:

> Gather a momentum they would not otherwise have. For all such lies, there is the added harm to the relationship itself to be considered, and the fact that, as some of the lies come to be discovered, the liar will have to live with the resultant loss in trust at close hand. (pp. 225-226)

Despite her serious concern over the potential harm that lies can cause in close personal relationships where the stakes are so high, Bok seems to recognize how especially difficult it can sometimes be <u>not</u> to lie in such relationships. In such relationships, many pressures exist which lead us in the direction of lying:

> We may express--falsely--assurance, approval, or love, to those who seek it so as not to let them down. . . . To keep up appearances, to respect long-standing commitments, to refrain from wounding, lies are told which disguise and protect. (p. 222)

Bok refers to such lies in close relationships as "paternalistic" lies, which are often felt to be without bias and told merely to be helpful. Yet Bok feels that, upon closer examination, even paternalistic lies may be tainted by the liar's bias--by "motives of self-protection and of manipulation, of wanting to retain control over a situation and to remain a free agent" (p. 224).

Bok's numerous discussions of the impact of truth and lying highlight the complexity of this topic. Probably even for her, many questions remain unanswered as to the appropriateness of telling lies, especially lies told to the people we are close to. Her tendency, however, as we have seen, is to lean toward the truth.

Luhmann's Perspective

Bok's perspective on lying stems from a tradition of philosophical thought which has always employed the principles of logic and rationality when trying to establish the morality or wisdom of a particular human behavior. It is perhaps not surprising that this kind of logical reasoning has naturally led her to her strong belief in the harmful consequences to the

individual and to society of too great a reliance upon the practice of deception. Nicholas Luhmann, on the other hand, is a German sociologist who uses a functionalist, systems-oriented approach to the study of human behavior. Luhmann does not concern himself with the morality of behavior in the same logical or philosophical sense that Bok does, or with its genuineness, as do the advocates of the human potential movement. Luhmann is much more concerned about the functionality of behavior.

Luhmann's functional orientation leads him to the conclusion that an ethic of principles is inadequate as a theory of action. For him, the social world today is far too complex and differentiated for a system of ethics--rules to be followed almost regardless of circumstances--to be a viable means of offering instruction in correct personal decision making. He asks not what is moral or good, but rather, what are the social, or even physical, mechanisms that underlie human behavior, why have they evolved, and how do they actually "work"? He discusses, for example, the inadequacy of the commonly-accepted "ethics" of trust, which he says dictate that we should extend trust to others provided

we do not do so blindly, but only where it has been earned.

Trust as a principle of ethics. For Luhmann, trust is the equivalent of a social institution in and of itself--and it is extended not only to intimates and loved ones, but to many whom we do not know personally, such as those who perform a wide variety of acts and services on our behalves. Furthermore, we must be willing to trust others, at times almost blindly, since in today's society it is not possible for us to search out and carefully evaluate beforehand the motives, integrity and past behavior of all those we must rely on routinely for our daily survival. Thus, for Luhmann, trust facilitates social interaction primarily by virtue of our willingness to extend it before it has been earned, an act which he says violates the so-called ethics of trust, which normally assume that trust is largely a consequence rather than a precursor of cooperative social behavior.

The relationship between trust and deception. Luhmann, like Bok, would probably agree that "trust in some degree of veracity functions as the foundation of relations among human beings." But since Luhmann

performs a sociological and not a moral or ethical analysis of human relations, for him the question of whether or not an individual should be truthful or deceptive must be considered within the context of how the truth or deception will function in any given interaction. Specifically, Luhmann argues that at times we must be deceptive if we are to gain and sustain another's trust. In this regard, Luhmann's analysis of social interaction resembles that of Erving Goffman (e.g., Goffman, 1959) whom he cites repeatedly in his own discussions. For both writers, deception is not something to be avoided to the degree that Bok would no doubt advise it should be. Rather, it is functional and adaptive: trust becomes possible because, rather than in spite, of the fact that we have all learned of the necessity of participating routinely in a collective ruse--to play by the rules, to play our parts, in accordance with accepted social roles and scripts, even when these performances do not correspond exactly to how we really think or feel.

In sum, a sociological analysis of social relations such as Luhmann's suggests that our need for harmony and the appearance of order and consistency can be a stronger motivator of human behavior than is

our need to adhere to abstract moral principles per se, such as the moral rule that it is wrong to lie.

Safeguards of trust. At first it might appear that Luhmann is advising us to act irresponsibly--to trust where no clear grounds for trust have been established in a particular case. Yet, like Bok, Luhmann is not unaware of the risks inherent in losing or giving up control of access to information (e.g., of too readily opening oneself up to being deceived). Luhmann explains, however, that these risks are inherently minimized by virtue of a number of well-established social sanctions which safeguard a potential truster against unwarranted abuses of his or her trust. Such sanctions range from subtle and relatively minor forms of social control, such as a playful reprimand or a frown of disapproval to more formidable ones, such as calling the police or bringing court action, ending a relationship entirely, or even ostracizing or forcibly excommunicating someone from a group or community.

Thus when we enter into a trusting relationship, one of the reasons we are willing to extend our trust is because we know that if the other should fail us we have recourse to a variety of established social

practices which will compensate us for our losses or will serve to bring the other back in line.

Relationship between trust, deception and social sanctions. The ability to trust another depends on being able to feel as if they are complying with our needs and wishes spontaneously and voluntarily. Thus the blatant acknowledgment by either party of her or his ability and willingness to use sanctions should the need arise would function to prevent trust from developing in the first place, or would undermine the trust that already exists. Therefore, the only way that latent sanctions can act successfully as a deterrent to untrustworthy behavior is if we are willing to act deceptively as a matter of course. That is, we must continually create the (false) impression that we are unaware of, or certainly have no intention of using, negative sanctions against the person we are interacting with. This is especially true in close personal relationships where trustworthy behavior is supposed to be inspired by such freely-given emotions as love, caring, and devotion. But even in less intimate relationships, both parties must act as if they are worthy of the other's trust (i.e., not likely to resort to society's

institutionalized negative sanctions) if the relationship is to function properly.

In Luhmann's view, then, the trust-building process is a subtle one, and far from demanding complete honesty and candor as many have suggested, it requires a certain amount of deception:

> In his overt behaviour the truster must show himself "utterly trusting," lest he himself sow the seed from which later reciprocal distrust may grow, thereby producing exactly the result which he is trying to avoid. (p. 36)

As we have seen, both Bok and Luhmann discuss the functions and consequences of deception. Whether by virtue of outright lies, or because of more subtle forms of deception, both would probably agree that at times we are operating under the illusion that others are being more honest with us than they really are. In such cases, Bok's focus is on the potentially harmful, and Luhmann's, the potentially beneficial consequences of being kept in the dark. While Bok maintains that deception functions to rob the deceived of knowledge and power and therefore of the right to make informed choice, Luhmann holds that, due to life's complexity, fully-informed choice is typically

out of our reach, and that the lack of full knowledge and even deception can sometimes function not to undermine but rather to safeguard trusting relationships.

Freud's Perspective

Freud's theory of psychoanalysis provides a developmental perspective on the function of deception in human behavior. His emphasis is largely on the ways in which we deceive ourselves, rather than each other. In his intensive work with patients, Freud became increasingly aware of the extreme fragility of the human ego and of the many ingenious ways our psyches can hide from us our own painful psychological truths (cf. Freud, 1965).

Freud's view of self-deception--of its possible adaptive vs. maladaptive consequences--is a complex one. On the one hand he sees certain uses of self-deception as essential to protect the young child's fragile ego, and also as part of the normal process of human development. On the other hand, Freud has described in great detail how self-deception can be the cause of serious psychological illness. On balance, it is probably accurate to say that Freud focused more on the detrimental than on the positive

aspects of a failure to confront "reality" or the "truth." For even in those instances where self-deception is essential for psychological adjustment, Freud stated that the individual will pay a price for using it, since each of us only has a limited amount of psychic energy, and any of it tied up in psychological defense is unavailable for more constructive and creative endeavors.

Intrapsychic vs. Interpersonal Deception

A superficial consideration of the topic of deception could easily lead to the conclusion that people delude themselves unwittingly (unconsciously), and others with forethought (but not necessarily malice). However, it is possible that the fundamental need for self-deception elaborated in such detail by Freud and his descendants may be the progenitor of what may be an equally compelling need to deceive others unwittingly; that is, without full awareness that one is doing so. When we are very young we may be unconsciously aware of those situations when certain information or emotional material will threaten not only our own, but also someone else's, ego, especially if it resembles "truths" we ourselves would hide from were they presented to us. As a

result, we may unconsciously try to conceal this information from someone who we believe will find it threatening. We are no doubt especially likely to conceal ego-threatening material from those we depend on most for our own psychological and physical survival, such as our parents, and others we are close to, since our own sense of well-being is so intimately tied to theirs.

In a sense, this developmental perspective on the origin of interpersonal deception suggests that lies to important others may become as much a part of the fabric of one's personality as self-deception. It could imply that members of society, even as adults, may frequently lie to those they are close to without hesitation, as a form of self (or "other") protection, and quite possibly without full conscious awareness that they are doing so.

Piaget's Perspective

Like Freud, Piaget is also been concerned with early psychological development and its implications for adult functioning. Unlike Freud, however, Piaget is primarily concerned with cognitive development, rather than psychological development more broadly speaking.

One's cognitive moral development concerns a person's ability to evaluate social situations on the basis of ethical or moral grounds and not just practical considerations. This aspect of development bears on the question of how a person learns to distinguish between the truth and a lie. In their book, The Psychology of the Child (1969), Piaget and Inhelder claim that the child's conception of lying differs considerably from that of an adult:

> The child, for example, is told not to lie long before he understands the social value of this order (for lack of sufficient socialization), and sometimes before he is able to distinguish intentional deception from the distortions of reality that are due to symbolic play or to simple desire. (p. 126)

Piaget has pointed out that, as a result of their inability to distinguish a lie from the truth, young children are more likely to judge a lie on the basis of its consequences rather than objective moral standards.

Perhaps even as adults, our reactions to a lie-telling situation may retain some element of this earlier subjectivity. For example, even when those

who are aware of the lie realize objectively that telling a lie is "wrong," when the lie has positive consequences, it may be experienced subjectively as "all right."

Other Perspectives

Today many psychologists still agree with the original Freudian conception that many forms of psychological defense, while necessary for the preservation of an intact ego, deplete valuable psychic energy and prevent an individual from attaining important insights and further psychological growth. On the other hand, other psychologists, and even some neo-Freudians and ego psychologists, have taken a different view of the nature of the ego's coping strategies (e.g., Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959).

In their departure from a strictly psychoanalytic perspective, some psychologists have concentrated on the adaptive and useful aspects of the ego's ability to employ defensive strategies. In doing so, they have minimized or rejected Freud's "hydraulic" model of psychic energy which assumes that the ego's participation in psychological defense reduces the psychic energy available for other purposes.

The views of Richard Lazarus (1979) represent this perhaps more contemporary view of the nature of the human psyche. Unlike Freud, whose theory emphasizes the importance of facing the "truth," Lazarus believes that denial, avoidance, repression and many other ego defenses are natural and helpful cognitive coping strategies which facilitate normal human functioning. Like Freud, Lazarus feels these defensive strategies can become maladaptive when they are used to an extreme or when used to substitute for constructive action. But when used "properly," Lazarus does not believe we necessarily pay a price for using them, such as in the form of depleted psychic energy, lost insights, or suboptimal psychological adjustment. Quite likely, Lazarus would agree that various mechanisms for deceiving <u>others</u> also play an adaptive role in social interactions.

<u>Empirical Research</u>

The foregoing discussions have attempted to present various theoretical perspectives as they bear on the topic of truth and lying in personal relationships. To date, very few empirical studies have investigated this topic (Stebbins, 1977). This lack of relevant empirical research may be due in part

to the difficulties associated with doing meaningful research on topics as complex and controversial as lying in close relationships. Perhaps without even realizing it, social psychologists and other researchers, like people in general, may be reluctant to probe too deeply or openly, or to identify themselves too closely with, an aspect of human behavior that society has always frowned upon. There are, however, areas of research that are at least indirectly related, as well as a handful of directly relevant studies, and this work is discussed below.

Attributions of Responsibility

While most attribution research focuses on how we make "causal" judgments, research on attributions of responsibility investigates the kinds of attributions we make for behavior that has moral as well as practical or causal implications. For example, much of this research has asked subjects to make attributions of responsibility for an accident. The Walster (1966) and Shaver (1970) studies are probably the most often cited examples, and have stimulated a great deal of subsequent work on this topic.

Other types of morally-relevant behavior have also been studied. Examples include the study of

attributions associated with cheating behavior (Forsyth & Berger, 1982), mercy killing, marijuana use, homosexuality, abortion (Forsyth, 1980), marijuana use in connection with responsibility for an accident (McKillip & Posavac, 1975), and alcohol-related accidents (Pliner & Cappell, 1977).

Since lying is a behavior typically thought of as having moral implications, the assumptions and findings of the research on attributions of responsibility bear at least indirectly on how people would be likely to evaluate or respond to the social act of lying. Indeed, lying has appeared in several responsibility attribution studies as one type of behavior (moral) judgments are to be made in reference to (e.g., Piaget and Inhelder, 1969; Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Forsyth, 1978).

In considering the research on attributions of responsibility, it is important to remember that much of it concerns people's perceptions, or best guesses, about how they would respond under various hypothetical situations. As such, this research may add little to a genuine understanding of how people actually do make (moral) judgments in everyday life. Fincham and Jaspars (1980) warn us about this aspect

of responsibility research when they point out the need for researchers to consider the social context that an attribution of responsibility arises out of:

> With few exceptions, . . . the attributions studied to date are those made in the social context of the psychological experiment. Obviously this raises the usual problems of external validity, but it has also resulted in "attributions of responsibility" being studied as a cognitive process and not as itself a social act with all that this implies. (p. 133).

These authors also caution with regard to how linguistic biases might affect subjects' responses in attribution of responsibility research:

> The common practice of presenting subjects with written vignettes requires careful examination. . . . To what extent do the results obtained to date represent artifacts of subtle linguistic differences both between studies and between experimental conditions within a particular investigation? (p. 132)

Despite methodological shortcomings, the research on attributions of responsibility offers some guidance in understanding how people evaluate behavior with

moral implications. The results of this body of research suggest that moral evaluations are complex and depend on a variety of circumstantial factors such as: the observer's developmental level; the severity of the outcome of the act being judged; outcome valence (i.e., positive, negative, neutral); whether there were intervening causes; whether the judge identifies with the actor or the target of the behavior being judged, etc. (cf. Fincham & Jaspars, 1980). In short, "moral" judgments are not made solely on "moral" grounds.

Research on Lying

As mentioned before, a small number of studies have attempted to investigate the topic of lying directly.

Shippee (1977) views lying as a negative or undesirable social act reflective of a "state of distrust" that he feels characterizes many of our everyday social interactions. To see how prevalent lies really are, or at least are perceived to be, he administered a questionnaire to 50 introductory psychology students asking them to estimate how often they lied to others and others to them during the course of a day, as well as to respond to 14 multiple

choice items asking their beliefs about various aspects of lying.

Shippee's sample was too small and his methodology too limited for his results to be viewed as definitive. However, these results uncover some interesting patterns which suggest that people in different social positions (e.g., men vs. women; marrieds vs. singles) evaluate lying from different perspectives. For example, males report believing that females lie more often than males, while females believe both sexes lie with approximately the same frequency. Single people are inclined to see lies as a means of preventing bad things from happening to them while married people are more likely to see lies as being told to make good things happen to them.

Shippee interprets his results in terms of Goffman's (1959) and Berne's (1964) assumption that deception and misrepresentation are normative. He says "the major finding of the present study is that this assumption (perhaps unfortunately) is well grounded in empirical reality [and that] if future research discovers the same high preponderance of deception in everyday life as found here, the importance of training techniques in self-disclosure

and 'leveling' . . . increases many times over" (p. 61). It is clear from these remarks that the author, like Bok, feels that lies tend to undermine social trust.

Stebbins (1977) also studied deception in social relationships. In introducing his own research, Stebbins points out that, with the exception of Erving Goffman, sociologists and social psychologists have paid little attention to the place of (intentional) deception in everyday life. He describes the complexity of articulating honesty and deception, commenting that:

> So intricate is this articulation that it is doubtful it could be effectively communicated in any other way than through the slow process of experience. (p. 199)

The focus of Stebbins's article is on a particular form of deception, namely, the "put-on," where an actor intentionally and successfully misleads another (the "mark"). To investigate how put-ons actually operate in everyday life, Stebbins asked 77 university students to describe situations in which they put someone on, were themselves put on, or observed a put-on. Subjects' responses included a

total of 101 examples. After reviewing these data, the author concludes that there appear to be three main sources of motivation for put-ons: they serve (a) to provide fun or sport ("sporting"), (b) to test another's ability to discriminate sincere acts or outcomes from insincere ones (or to demonstrate the other's inability so to do) ("discriminative"), and (c) to achieve some profit or gain; e.g., gains in self-regard, self-protection, competitive advantage, privilege, or compliance by the other ("profitable").

In addition to examining the motivation for put-ons, Stebbins's findings lead him to a number of interesting speculations. For example, he observes that we tend to be put on most easily in reference to our strongly-held values, beliefs, goals and desires. Stebbins also notes that put-ons seem to be more likely to occur in secondary than in primary relationships. The author suggests that when put-ons do occur in primary relationships, they may signify that the relationship is not as well developed or as intimate as it could be, since apparently at least one person in the relationship is willing to cause the other embarrassment and to risk a loss of trust.

Despite some of his own findings, such as the put-on's role in creating "fun," Stebbins does not seem to view deception as having constructive or adaptive elements. Instead, like Shippee, he feels that at least this form of deceptive behavior is likely to undermine trusting relationships.

Turner, Edgley, and Olmstead (1975) also conducted a study to investigate the role of the truth and lying in our everyday lives. Unlike the two preceding authors, however, both of whom take a rather dim view of the frequent use of deception, these authors debunk conventional appeals for complete honesty in social relationships. Citing social scientists such as Anselm Strauss and Erving Goffman, the authors adopt a view similar to Luhmann's, and claim that it is the general rule and not an exception to it that people will carefully select the information they communicate to others, withholding some and supplying some, as they see fit. Furthermore, they say that such "information control is an important and necessary process in everyday life" (p. 70).

To test their belief that in practical terms people do not always regard the complete truth as the

best policy, Turner, Edgley, and Olmstead asked 130 respondents to participate in a study where each agreed to tape-record a conversation with a relative, intimate, friend, or acquaintance, that was in some way important. Results showed that for only 38.5% of their recorded statements did respondents subsequently indicate that they had been completely honest. For the remaining 61.5%, some form of information control had been employed. Thus, in close to two-thirds of all the statements they uttered in naturally-occurring conversations, these respondents did not tell the (whole) truth.

Subjects' responses were categorized as to which of five different forms of information control they represented: (a) diversionary responses, which comprised 32.1% of all instances of information control, (b) lies (30.7%), (c) half-truths (28.9%), (d) exaggerations (5%), and (e) secrets (3.2%).

The authors discuss the various forms of information control employed by their subjects in terms of which appear to be the most successful. They conclude that both lies and diversionary responses tend to be the most effective means of avoiding the truth. The lie is effective because it prevents

communication of discourse which could embarrass, spoil one's presentation of self, insult the other, or be offensive in some way. Respondents indicated that, especially when there was little chance of being caught in the lie, the consequences of telling the complete truth were viewed as a worse alternative. The diversionary response is effective because it "reveals" information that is credible, but which is irrelevant to or different from the actor's honest response in the situation. Thus, the diversionary response does not falsify or distort the truth (and thus run the risk of being detected), but, instead, simply detours or circumvents the undisclosed information.

The authors reflect on the strong sense they got from their respondents that honesty is not just a matter of disclosure, but rather is a more complex concept that is related to one's fidelity to the other in a deeper sense:

> Being truthful and honest at all times may have consequences which are neither truthful nor honest, and that seems best to describe our respondents' dilemma, and their adroitness in managing it. (p. 83)

The present author has also conducted an empirical study (Wackenhut, 1980) investigating the role of lies in everyday life. As in the previous study, the present author focuses on the function that lies serve in close personal relationships, rather than on the moralistic or destructive aspects of lying. To examine this topic, the present author administered a questionnaire to 74 subjects who were instructed to describe three instances in which they had told an "untruth of any kind" to someone they were close to: a recent time, a time where the untruth had a good effect on the relationship, and a time when the untruth had a bad effect on the relationship. This procedure resulted in the collection of 163 descriptions of lies told in personal relationships.

The data in the present study were categorized according to the apparent reasons the lies were told. Six categories resulted: (a) Wrongdoing lies: lies to hide some form of behavior on the actor's part that the other would probably disapprove of, especially behaviors that involve sexual or romantic activities (27.6%), (b) Ego-boosting lies: lies to bolster the ego or self-image of the other person (23.9%), (c) Lies to preserve the definition of the situation:

lies which serve to hide the lie-teller's true (usually negative) feelings about the other person in order to maintain the smooth flow of the relationship or the interaction (21.5%), (d) False excuses: lies in which a false excuse is given in order to avoid embarrassment, disappointment, or hurt feelings (11.7%), (e) Altruistic lies: lies to save the other person unnecessary trouble or worry (6.7%), and (f) Instrumental lies: lies to manipulate the other person into doing something (or to stop doing something) he or she otherwise would not do (or stop doing) (6.1%).

As in the previous study, the results of the present study suggest that the extent to which a lie is likely to become detected will influence judgments about the wisdom of having told it. Each of the lies in this study were coded as to whether or not the respondent, in her or his description of the lie, mentions that the lie was subsequently detected. In addition, respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they felt it would have been all right to have told the truth instead. Perhaps not surprisingly, the lies offered as examples of ones which had a bad effect on the relationship also tended to be ones that were detected:

	Detected	
	Yes	No
Recent lie	4.1%	95.9%
Good effect	4.1%	95.9%
Bad effect	72.5%	27.5%

When asked whether the truth would have been all right instead, again it is not surprising to see that respondents are much more likely to indicate that the truth would have been all right in reference to their bad effect (and frequently detected) lies than for their other lies:

	Would truth have been all right instead?		
	Yes	Don't know	No
Recent lie	32.4%	13.9%	54.9%
Good effect	20.8%	14.6%	64.6%
Bad effect	56.8%	29.7%	13.5%

The above findings support the statements made by respondents in the Turner, Edgley, and Olmstead study that distortions or misrepresentations of the complete truth that have a low probability of detection are regarded as well worth the risk when compared to the negative consequences the truth would bring. These findings also suggest, however (as Bok has indicated), that people may not always be good judges about the risk their lies run of being detected, and of the

potential harm to the liar, the deceived, and to the relationship that can occur as a result of such detection. For if they were, it is likely that the respondents in this study would never have told their soon-to-be-detected lies in the first place.

Summary of Theoretical Issues

Numerous aspects of interest have been raised in the foregoing theoretical and empirical discussions in connection with the social meaning and value of telling lies in personal relationships. As we have seen, many thinkers would acknowledge that people in general have cultivated the ability to engage in a wide variety of deceptive practices, not only in reference to others, but also in relation to one's self. While most theorists take the position that mental health or psychological adjustment requires the appropriate balance between truth and deception, many appear to have different opinions as to exactly how and when this balance is achieved.

Bok has suggested that one's perspective in the lie-telling situation will be an important determinant of how a person will react to or evaluate a lie. Specifically, she says that the target of deception has an entirely different perspective than the liar,

and these differences in perspective will influence how a person actually experiences a lie.

When we assume the perspective of the target of the lie, Bok feels we generally will not condone even well-intentioned lies since most of us would resist the loss of control over decisions which affect us. Bok says that the liar's perspective creates a bias in how lies are perceived that differs from the perspective of the lied-to in several regards. For example, as liars we will often feel that we know when it is justifiable to lie, such as when we lie in order to prevent harm or to spare the other's feelings. In addition, as liars we not only tend to overestimate the potential advantages of the lie, but also to underestimate the harm a lie can cause should it become detected; e.g., we not only underestimate our chances of getting caught, but also the harm that will result if this happens.

In contrast to Bok, Luhmann has painted a different picture of what sustains and is necessary for healthy human relations. For example, he implies that most of us would not resist the loss of control that we experience when others make decisions for us without our knowledge or approval. If we did not let

others act on our behalves without our explicit consent, the complexity of modern life would soon overwhelm us, rendering us incapable of handling the routine details of our daily lives. Furthermore, Luhmann suggests that whether one is in the role of deceiver or deceived, we have all joined together in a working consensus (cf. Goffman, 1959) to act "as if" we believe each other--even when we don't.

Like Luhmann, Freud recognizes the our need to maintain certain illusions about ourselves and others, which causes us to repress and deny information that is not acceptable (is threatening) to our sense of self, or self-esteem. Like Bok, however, Freud argues that denials, colorings, or distortions of the truth, while sometimes necessary, more often function to our own or another's disadvantage. They prevent clearsightedness and healthy psychological growth and deplete valuable human resources that could have been used more wisely. In the extreme, deception can lead to serious psychological illness and the breakdown of core relationships.

Like Luhmann, others have taken a less pessimistic view than Bok or Freud of the potential consequences of deception, and have highlighted its

advantages over its disadvantages. For example, Goffman, from a sociological view, claims that our carefully constructed deceits maintain appropriate "definitions of the situation" (cf. Goffman, 1959) and help to create the kinds of illusions we need in order maintain "face." Similarly, Lazarus, from a cognitively-oriented psychological view, feels that defensive postures of various kinds can be natural, effective cognitive strategies for handling problems and stress, especially when no constructive alternative is available to remedy the situation.

These perhaps more pragmatic theorists might say to Freud that unconscious lying is serendipitous: for if we often lack the full conscious awareness that we have lied, this will allow us to engage in various forms of deception that serve to facilitate social interaction, even in the face of strong societal norms prohibiting lying: we are unlikely to feel bad (or anxious) about not obeying societal rules if we are not conscious of the fact that we have broken them.

Notes

[1]Daniel Yankelovich (1982) has recently echoed this view, that "new forms of public lying are beginning to surface. They take place in that common space where we do the business of society, and they represent a threat to the standards of truth that regulate our mutual behavior" (p. 5).

[2]Indeed, the consequences of discovering that someone has lied in an important matter or that he or she cannot be counted on to tell the truth can retard or damage the normal development of a young child (cf. Freud, 1963; Erikson, 1963), and can destroy the relationship that exists between two adults (cf. Wackenhut, 1979).

[3]Following are some examples of the 14 multiple choice items used by the author: "People lie most often to: prevent bad things from happening to them vs. make good things happen to them"; "People generally: feel guilty about telling a lie vs. do not feel guilty about telling a lie"; "In general: both sexes are equally adept at telling when someone is lying vs. females are more adept than males vs. males are more adept than females."

[4]The author does not appear to have controlled for age, so it is possible these differences are affected by age; however, since all the subjects were introductory psychology students at Arizona State University it is at least plausible to assume that married and single subjects were roughly matched on age.

2. HYPOTHESES

The primary issues explored in this research are discussed below.

Perspective

The present research assessed perceptions of lies from the point of view of both the liar and the target of the lie. This approach attempted to find out whether Bok's contention would prevail: will those adopting the liar's role generally tend to view their lies in a more favorable light than will those who have adopted the target's perspective? Alternatively, it is at least plausible that the target of a lie will tend to empathize with the liar, and be just as accepting of the lie, especially if it is perceived as motivated by genuine and reasonable efforts to save face or in some other way protect the target.

Outcome

Adults, unlike very young children, are supposed to be capable of making moral judgments on the basis of the substance of an act; e.g., on the basis of the actor's intentions rather than on the basis of the consequences of an act. Yet some research suggests that even adults are likely to evaluate behavior more on the basis of its consequences than its substance.

For example, the attribution of responsibility literature suggests that the valence of the outcome of an act will play an important role in how responsible (or moral) an actor is judged to be, regardless of the actor's intention.

Whether from the liar's or the target's perspective, the evaluation of lies vs. truth may depend in large part on the outcome of a lie. Bok herself has commented on the important role of consequences in the decision of whether or not to lie or tell the truth in a given case:

> Much rides on what in fact is likely to befall the deceived. It may not be fair or kind to a person to tell him certain falsehoods; but then it may not be fair or kind to tell him the corresponding truth either. (p. 231)

In this research, along with perspective, outcome served as one of the primary independent measures of the study.

Hindsight Evaluations of the Truth

While it is almost taken for granted that lying and deception can damage human relationships, the potential harm of telling the truth has typically not received as much attention. Thus, while many,

including Bok, warn of the harm that can occur from ill-considered truth-telling, telling the truth is usually pictured as more desirable and preferable than telling lies.

In this research, subjects were asked to evaluate, in retrospect, the justifiability (all rightness) of the liar's having told the truth instead of the lie actually told. Extrapolating from Bok's discussions of the liar's bias, perspective was expected to influence these judgments, with liar-identified subjects viewing the truth in a less favorable light than target-identified subjects.

The outcome of the lie, too, was expected to bear on subjects' considerations of the appropriateness of the truth. Specifically, those for whom a lie has had positive results will be less likely to evaluate the truth as an appropriate alternative than will those for whom a lie has had negative results.

Attributions of Lie-Teller's Motives

The attribution of responsibility literature has suggested that many factors can influence moral attributions, including those such as perspective and the valence of outcome, as described above. Similarly, might it not be reasonable to expect that

one's perspective and the outcome of a lie could impact perceptions of the liar's original intentions? For example, attributions of the liar's motives have greater personal relevance for the liar than for the target (cf. Jones & DeCharms, 1957). As Bok has suggested, the liar may be more likely than the target to impute benign or altruistic motives for her own behavior, thus supporting the wisdom of the lie and rejecting the merits of the truth.

Or, as Heider (1958) has pointed out, perceivers tend to associate good outcomes with good intentions. Will they thus tend to believe that the intentions of a liar whose lie has had favorable results were more honorable than those of a liar whose lie ends badly?

Detection

Previous research has suggested that the detection of a lie will influence how the lie is evaluated, at least by the liar (Wackenhut, 1980). Similarly, the probability of detection may determine whether or not a lie is told in the first place (Stebbins, 1977; Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975).

Perhaps because a discovered lie makes the liar's intention to lie a public event, this paves the way for the kind of scrutiny that tends to engender

moralistic, rather than pragmatic, reactions. Thus, it may be that people do not tend to evaluate paternalistic lies as undesirable in and of themselves, but only do so if such lies stand a good chance of becoming revealed, or are in fact detected. Here the "truth" thus revealed will undoubtedly have a much different meaning and impact than it would have, had the truth been told in the first place.

Although the present research did not assess detected lies, it did ask subjects to estimate the likelihood of detection in an attempt to clarify the impact of possible detection on the evaluation of a lie, and the truth, had it been told instead.

Specific Hypotheses

The specific hypotheses of the study are as follows:

Evaluations of the lie

Hypothesis 1: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will evaluate the lie more favorably than those in the target condition.

Hypothesis 2: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will evaluate the lie most favorably, subjects in the negative outcome condition, least favorably, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.

Attributions of lie-teller's intentions for the lie

Hypothesis 3a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will be less likely than subjects in the target condition to make liar-protective attributions for the lie.

Hypothesis 3b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will be least likely, and subjects in the negative condition most likely, to make liar-protective attributions for the lie, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.

Hypothesis 4a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will be more likely than subjects in the target condition to make target-protective attributions for the lie.

Hypothesis 4b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will be most likely, and subjects in the negative condition least likely, to make target-protective attributions for the lie, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.

Evaluations of the truth

Hypothesis 5: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will evaluate the truth less favorably than subjects in the target condition.

Hypothesis 6: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will evaluate the truth least favorably, subjects in the negative condition, most favorably, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.

Attributions of lie-teller's intentions for the truth

Hypothesis 7a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will be more likely than subjects in the target condition to make liar-protective attributions for the truth.

Hypothesis 7b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will be most likely, and those in the negative condition least likely, to make liar-protective attributions for the truth, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.

Hypothesis 8a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will be less likely than subjects in the target condition to make target-protective attributions for the truth.

Hypothesis 8b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will be least likely, and subjects in the negative condition most likely, to make target-protective attributions for the truth, with

subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.

Perceptions of detection

Hypothesis 9: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will rate detection as less likely than will subjects in the target condition.

Hypothesis 10: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will rate detection as least likely, subjects in the negative condition, as most likely, and subjects in the neutral condition will fall in-between.

Hypothesis 11a: Subjects who rate detection as relatively more likely will also tend to evaluate the lie less favorably than will subjects who rate detection as relatively less likely.

Hypothesis 11b: Subjects who rate detection as relatively more likely will also tend to evaluate the truth more favorably than will subjects who rate detection as relatively less likely.

Impact of lie, and truth, on relationship

Hypothesis 12a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will assess the lie as having a more favorable impact on the relationship than will subjects in the target condition.

Hypothesis 12b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will assess the lie as having the most favorable impact on the relationship, subjects in the negative condition, the least favorable, and subjects in the neutral condition will fall in-between.

Hypothesis 13a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will assess the truth as having a less favorable impact on the relationship than will subjects in the target condition.

Hypothesis 13b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will assess the truth as having the least favorable impact on the relationship, subjects in the negative condition, the most favorable, and subjects in the neutral condition will fall in-between.

3. METHOD

Overview

No attempt was made in this research to study naturally-occurring lies, since such an investigation would be extremely difficult due to a number of methodological and ethical constraints. Instead, subjects were asked to identify with either the teller or the target of a deliberate untruth as they read a brief story about a social situation in which the untruth was told. They were then asked to evaluate what they perceived their reactions would be were they really in the situation.

Before describing the study method in detail, some of the study's potential limitations should be pointed out. Subjects in the present study were asked to identify with the perspective of one of the individuals (either the lie-teller or the target) in each hypothetical situation. This experimental task has some of the elements of a role-playing exercise. In this regard, role playing manipulations in psychological research have been cited for their methodological shortcomings (e.g., Freedman, 1969).

In addition, since the present study asked people to respond to hypothetical situations, the results may

be more reflective of "cognitive processes" (cf. Fincham & Jaspars, 1980), or of people's implicit theories, than of how these subjects would judge or react to the lie-telling situation were it to have actually occurred in their own lives.

One of the biggest problems that has been encountered thus far in research investigating moral behavior (e.g., in the attribution of responsibility studies) may be the way in which subjects are asked to respond to the hypothetical situations. That is, since subjects are supposedly making moral judgments, they are often asked questions which specifically evoke a "moral" frame of mind. For example, they may be asked to rate a hypothetical actor who has committed a socially unacceptable act, or who has caused an accident, on a number of (moral) dimensions such as "good-bad," "honest-dishonest," "moral-immoral," or to respond to a question like "How responsible do you think John was for this act?" Thus, responses may be more representative of subjects' ideals and values than of how they would have genuinely responded in "real life" to the hypothetical situation at hand.

In the present study, subjects were also making moral judgments since they were asked to evaluate the telling of lies, which has historically been regarded as a basically disapproved of and immoral behavior. Yet, the specific approach that was used in this study was designed to minimize some of the methodological shortcomings ordinarily associated with studies that have moral implications. Specifically, an explicit attempt was made not to evoke a moral frame of mind per se. Instead, subjects were simply asked to respond to everyday situations in which a lie happens to be told. The words "lying," "lies," or "deception" were not used and questions were posed in as non-evaluative a way as possible. Hopefully, by using this approach, subjects were responding from a frame of mind very close to the one they would actually have adopted, had they been evaluating lies told in their lives under similar circumstances.

Subjects

Data were collected from a total of 902 subjects. However, in order to limit the scope of the present study, only the data from white female subjects was included, which totaled 293 white female participants. Missing data were taken into account when analyses were performed (i.e., for a given

analysis, only those subjects who had answered the relevant questions were included).

Data were collected by college instructors who agreed to help the experimenter conduct this study. These instructors recruited subjects to participate on a voluntary basis, and administered the questionnaire during class time. Before doing so, they described the purpose of the study based on instructions they received from the experimenter. After completing the questionnaire, subjects were given a debriefing sheet which informed them as to the nature and purpose of the study. (These briefing and debriefing materials are included in Appendix A.) Subjects were recruited from several colleges and universities in the Eastern and Midwestern parts of the United States, as follows: Baruch College; Fordham University; Lehmann College; Pennsylvania State University; Sacred Heart University (in Connecticut); University of Cincinnati; and University of Delaware.

The majority (79%) of the 293 white female subjects in this study were between the ages of 15 and 25, and most (82%) were single. Subjects represented a variety of religious groups, primarily Catholic (63%), Protestant (19%), and Jewish (11%).

Design and Procedure

Type of lie. The type of lie investigated in this research was typical of those that occur in everyday life, presumably motivated by the lie-teller's desire to protect the target, and/or the relationship between them. These are what Bok (1978) has termed "paternalistic lies"--lies told to "disguise and protect," to "keep up appearances, to respect long-standing commitments, [and] to refrain from wounding" (p.222). In a more specific sense, the paternalistic lies used in this research can also be likened to the types of lies uncovered by Turner, Eagley and Olmstead (1975) and Wackenhut (1980); for example, lies aimed at preserving the definition of the situation, saving face, boosting someone's ego, or avoiding tension, worry or hurt.

Paternalistic lies were chosen for this research because they touch upon many important questions that have not been adequately answered about the successful maintenance of personal relationships. Indeed, "it is here [in close relationships] that most of us encounter the hardest choices between truthfulness and lying" (Bok, 1978, p. 217), and face the most

difficult decisions about how to best protect the relationships we value the most.

Form. In order to limit the number of variables in the study, the form of lie used in this research was kept constant, and corresponded to Bok's definition of lying. Therefore, the lies portrayed in this research were ones in which the liar explicitly said something that she knew to be untrue.

Type of relationship. Obviously, the type of relationship a lie is told in will influence the meaning and impact of the lie. For example, lies told in close, intimate relationships where much is at stake will no doubt differ considerably along many dimensions from lies told in a more casual relationship. Several earlier studies have found differences in the nature, form, and function of lies told in primary vs. secondary relationships. The present study was designed to measure reactions to lies told in a friendship relationship between two females. The female friendship, while perhaps not as intimate as a relationship with a lover, spouse, or family member, is typically regarded as more than just a casual relationship, and is often a very important relationship for women. Thus, the female friendship

was judged an appropriate starting point for studying the impact and meaning of lies in personal relationships.

Independent variables. The study employed a between subjects 2 x 3 factorial design, with two levels of perspective and three levels of outcome. Each subject was shown one story. Approximately half the subjects received a story from the lie-teller's, and half from the target's, perspective. Approximately one-third received a story with a positive, one-third a neutral, and one-third a negative outcome. Three different stories were used in an effort to control for story effects.

Stories and consequences were presented in all possible combinations to counter-balance unique effects:

A: Lie-teller perspective

B: Target perspective

1: Positive consequences

2: Neutral consequences

3: Negative consequences

a: Susan story

b: Tanya story

c: Janie story

Stimulus combinations:

A: Lie-Teller Perspective B: Target perspective

a1	a1
a2	a2
a3	a3
b1	b1
b2	b2
b3	b3
c1	c1
c2	c2
c3	c3

Each subject was shown a single variation. Since there were 18 variations in all, 18 subjects were needed to fill the design. In order to increase reliability, a total sample size of 293 subjects was obtained.

Dependent variables. Six main dependent variables were measured in the study. After reading each story, subjects were asked (a) to evaluate whether the lie was justified, (b) to make attributions of the lie-teller's motives for telling the lie; whether the lie was told for self-serving (protect lie-teller) or altruistic (protect target) reasons, (c) to evaluate whether the truth would have

been justified, had it been told instead, (d) to make attributions of the lie-teller's motives for telling the truth, had she done so (protect lie-teller vs. protect target), (e) to assess the likelihood that the target would find out about the lie, and (f) to assess the likely impact of the lie, or the truth, on the relationship between the lie-teller and the target. Subjects were also asked a number of other questions for exploratory purposes.

Check on manipulations. Three questions were included as checks of subjects' perceptions of (a) the degree of closeness between the lie-teller and target, (b) the fact that a lie was told, and (c) the valence of the outcome of the lie; namely, whether it had a favorable, neutral, or unfavorable impact on the target.

The questionnaire. To solicit subjects' reactions to a lie-telling situation, a questionnaire was administered which presented each subject with a story followed by a series of questions. The story content embodied the independent variables (perspective and consequences), as described above. In addition, data was gathered on a number of demographic variables, such as age, religion, major in

school, future employment plans, and national or ethnic background. Similarly, a ten-item attitude scale was included which assessed respondents' views about lying in close relationships. However, for purposes of the present research, this additional demographic and attitudinal data was not included in the analyses, since it was not of primary relevance to the issues that were the focus of this study.

In Appendix B, which follows, is a sample of the questionnaire materials given to subjects. First is a Background Information questionnaire, then the experimental questionnaire, consisting of a story followed by questions. Each story is coded in the lower-left hand corner, to identify which condition it represented. For example:

SS-LP: Susan Story, Lie-teller Version, Positive Consequences

SS-LNT: Susan Story, Lie-teller Version, Neutral Consequences

SS-LNG: Susan Story, Lie-teller Version, Negative Consequences

SS-TP: Susan Story, Target Version, Positive Consequences

SS-TNT: Susan Story, Target Version, Neutral Consequences

SS-TNG: Susan Story, Target Version, Negative Consequences

Similar codes are used for the remaining stories: Tanya Story, and Janie Story.

Analytic Plan

Thirteen primary hypotheses were tested in this study, as outlined in detail in the Hypotheses chapter. In addition, analyses were also performed on seven measures included for exploratory purposes.

The primary method used to assess results was analysis of variance, with each dependent measure being tested in a 2 X 3 (Perspective X Outcome) design. In addition, two pooled correlations were performed to assess the relationship between perceptions of the likelihood that the lie would be detected and (a) evaluations of the lie, and (b) evaluations of the truth, had it been told instead.

4. RESULTS

Check on Perceptions of Story Contents

Check on Effects of Different Stories

Three stories were used in the study to improve the generalization of results. Therefore, a 3 X 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Story X Perspective X Outcome) was performed for each hypothesis of the study to ascertain whether data could be collapsed on the story variable.

Results of these analyses showed that, while there were nine significant main effects of story, there were only three significant interaction effects involving this variable: two were Story X Outcome, and one was Story X Perspective X Outcome. However, there was no consistent pattern to these interactions. For the two Story X Outcome interactions, one was caused primarily by stronger effects of perspective and outcome for the Susan Story than for the other stories, while the other reflected stronger effects of perspective for the Susan and Janie Stories than for the third story. Therefore, the data were collapsed on the story variable, leaving perspective and outcome as the main independent variables of the study.

Check on Perceived Closeness

The two female friends involved in each story were described as being close friends in order to control for the level of friendship being investigated in this study. Therefore, it was anticipated that, independent of experimental condition, subjects would perceive that a relatively high degree of closeness existed between the two friends.

Subjects' perceptions of the level of closeness between the lie-teller and target were measured by Question 1 in the questionnaire, which asked respondents how close the lie-teller and target are. Responses were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Extremely close") to 5 ("Not close at all"). A 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) was performed in which the dependent variable was subjects' estimates of the closeness of the friendship. As expected, there were no significant effects, with subjects generally indicating that the lie-teller and target were relatively close (M= 2.32).

Check on Perceptions of Lying

Since the primary purpose of this study was to assess perceptions of the impact of lies told in personal relationships, each story involved a lie told by one female friend to another. Therefore, it was

expected that, independent of experimental condition, subjects would recognize that a lie was being told in the story they read.

Subjects' recognition that a lie was told was measured by Question 2 in the questionnaire, which asked respondents if the lie-teller really believed what she told the target. Responses were made on a 2-point scale where 1 stood for "Yes" and 2 stood for "No". A 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) was performed in which the dependent measure was the subjects' reply to Question 2. As expected, there were no significant effects, with subjects generally indicating that they perceived the lie-teller as lying (M= 1.92).

Check on Outcome Manipulation

A primary purpose of this study was to assess the impact of the valence of the lie's outcome on perceptions of the lie-telling situation. To manipulate this variable, three versions of each story were created in which the lie had either a positive, a neutral, or a negative consequence. It was expected that subjects in the positive outcome condition would indicate that the results of the lie were relatively positive (even if they did not approve of the lie itself); that those in the negative outcome condition

would see the results of the lie as relatively unfavorable; and that those in the so-called neutral condition would indicate that the results of the lie fell somewhere in-between.

Subjects' perceptions of the outcome of the lie were measured by Question 3 in the questionnaire, which asked them how favorable or unfavorable they thought the consequences of the lie would be for the target. Responses to this question were measured on a scale ranging from 1 ("Definitely favorable") to 7 ("Definitely unfavorable"). A 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) was performed in which the dependent variable was subjects' perceptions of the outcome of the lie. As expected, the only significant effect was a main effect for outcome, $F(2,281)=286.97$, $p<.000$, with subjects in the positive condition indicating the most favorable outcome ($M=1.60$), those in the negative condition the least favorable outcome ($M=5.89$), and those in the neutral condition tending to fall somewhere in-between ($M=4.57$). Furthermore, a Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test (Norusis, 1985) indicated that the mean for each of these three conditions was significantly different from the other two ($p<.05$).

Perspective

Each subject received either the lie-teller version or the target version of the questionnaire, and was asked to identify with one of the two characters in the story accordingly; i.e., the word "you" was used in the story for the character the subject was to identify with. It was felt to be quite unlikely, under these circumstances, that a subject would be confused about (a) who actually told an untruth, and who received it; and (b) which of these persons she was to identify with. Therefore, no check was made on the perspective manipulation.

Tests of the Hypotheses

Evaluations of the Lie

There were two hypotheses about effects of the independent variables on subjects' evaluations of the lie.

Hypothesis 1 states that subjects in the lie-teller condition will evaluate the lie more favorably than subjects in the target condition.

Hypothesis 2 states that there will be an effect of outcome such that subjects in the positive condition will evaluate the lie most favorably, subjects in the negative condition, least favorably, and subjects in the neutral condition will fall somewhere in-between.

Subjects' evaluations of the lie were measured by Question 4 in the questionnaire, which asked respondents whether they felt it was all right for the lie-teller to tell the lie to the target. Responses were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Definitely all right") to 6 ("Definitely not all right"). Table 1 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' evaluation scores.

Table 1

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Evaluations of the Lie

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	11.50	1	11.50	6.73	.01
Outcome	98.09	2	49.05	28.72	.00
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	2.30	2	1.15	.67	.51
Within cells	490.18	287	1.71		
Constant	5402.17	1	5401.17	3163.24	.00

Table 2 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 2

Mean Scores for Subjects' Evaluations of the Lie

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	3.17	4.40	4.74
Target	3.82	4.73	4.96

As predicted, there was a main effect for perspective, $F(1,287)=6.73$, $p<.01$. Subjects in the lie-teller condition ($M=4.11$) were more likely than subjects in the target condition ($M=4.52$) to indicate that it was all right to have lied. Also as predicted, there was a main effect for outcome, $F(2,287)=28.72$, $p<.000$, such that subjects in the positive condition ($M=3.51$) were most likely to say it was all right to have lied, those in the negative condition ($M=4.87$) least likely, and those in the

neutral condition (M=4.56) fell somewhere in-between. However, results from a Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test indicated that only the mean in the positive outcome condition was significantly different from the means in the other two conditions ($p<.05$). That is, the neutral and negative outcome conditions did not yield significantly different responses. Thus, Hypotheses 1 was supported, but Hypothesis 2 was only partially supported.

Attributions of the Lie-teller's Motives for the Lie

There were two sets of hypotheses about the effects of the independent variables on subjects' attributions of the lie-teller's motives in telling the lie. One set of hypotheses concerned the lie-teller's self-protective motives for the lie, and the other set concerned the lie-teller's target-protective motives for the lie.

Regarding liar-protective motives, Hypothesis 3a states that subjects in the lie-teller condition will be less likely than subjects in the target condition to make liar-protective attributions for the lie. Hypothesis 3b states that subjects in the positive outcome condition will be least likely to make liar-protective attributions for the lie, subjects in

the negative condition, most likely, and subjects in the neutral condition will fall somewhere in-between.

Subjects' attributions of the lie-teller's self-protective motives for telling the lie were measured by Question 5a in the questionnaire. Question 5a asked respondents to what extent they felt the lie was told because the lie-teller wanted to avoid being in an awkward or embarrassing situation. Responses to this question were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Definitely for this reason") to 5 ("Not for this reason at all"). Table 3 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was a measure of subjects' liar-protective attributions for the lie.

Table 3

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Liar-Protective Attributions for the Lie

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	12.87	1	12.87	8.96	.00
Outcome	2.43	2	1.22	.85	.43
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	.26	2	.13	.09	.91
Within cells	410.69	286	1.44		
Constant	2800.79	1	2800.79	1950.44	.00

Table 4 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 4

Mean Scores for Subjects' Liar-Protective Attributions for the Lie

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	3.17	3.45	3.32
Target	2.83	3.00	2.85

The only significant effect for liar-protective attributions for the lie was a main effect for perspective, $F(1,286)=8.96$, $p<.003$. As predicted, subjects in the lie-teller condition ($M=3.32$) were less likely than subjects in the target condition ($M=2.89$) to indicate that the lie was told to protect the lie-teller (avoid awkward/embarrassing situation). Thus, Hypothesis 3a was supported. However, the predicted effect for outcome did not receive support. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b was not supported.

Regarding target-protective motives, Hypothesis 4a states that subjects in the lie-teller condition

will be more likely than subjects in the target condition to make target-protective attributions for the lie. Hypothesis 4b states that subjects in the positive condition will be most likely to make target-protective attributions for the lie, those in the negative condition least likely, with those in the neutral condition falling somewhere in-between.

Subjects' attributions of the lie-teller's target-protective motives for telling the lie were measured by Question 5b in the questionnaire. Question 5b asked respondents to what extent they felt the lie was told because the lie-teller did not want the target to feel unhappy, worried, or hurt. Responses to this question were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Definitely for this reason") to 5 ("Not for this reason at all"). Table 5 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was a measure of subjects' target-protective attributions for the lie.

Table 5

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subject's' Target-Protective Attributions for the Lie

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	.00	1	.00	.00	.94
Outcome	.38	2	.19	.18	.84
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	.18	2	.09	.09	.92
Within Cells	301.15	288	1.05		
Constant	1419.48	1	1419.48	1357.49	.00

Table 6 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 6

Mean Scores for Subjects' Target-Protective Attributions for the Lie

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	2.24	2.15	2.21
Target	2.18	2.16	2.28

There were no significant effects for target-protective attributions for the lie. Thus, Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b were not supported.

Evaluations of the Truth

There were two hypotheses about the effects of the independent variables on subjects' evaluations of the truth, had it been told instead.

Hypothesis 5 states that subjects in the lie-teller condition will evaluate the truth less favorably than subjects in the target condition.

Hypothesis 6 states that there will be an effect of outcome such that subjects in the positive condition will evaluate the truth least favorably, subjects in the negative condition, most favorably, with subjects in the neutral condition falling somewhere in-between.

Subjects' evaluation of the truth was measured by Question 8 in the questionnaire, which asked respondents whether they felt it would have been all right for the lie-teller to tell the truth to the target. Responses were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Definitely all right") to 6 ("Definitely not all right"). Table 7 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' evaluation scores.

Table 7

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Evaluations of the Truth

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	12.46	1	12.46	7.60	.01
Outcome	7.10	2	3.55	2.16	.12
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	1.00	2	.50	.30	.74
Within cells	470.73	287	1.64		
Constant	1350.45	1	1350.45	823.35	.00

Table 8 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 8

Mean Scores for Subjects' Evaluations of the Truth

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	2.50	2.30	2.28
Target	2.24	1.85	1.74

As predicted, there was a main effect for perspective, $F(1,287)=7.60$, $p<.006$, such that subjects in the lie-teller condition ($M=2.36$) evaluated the truth less favorably than subjects in the target condition ($M=1.94$). Thus, Hypothesis 5 was supported. However, the prediction for the effect of outcome on the evaluation of the truth (Hypothesis 6) was not supported.

Attributions of the Lie-Teller's Motives for the Truth

There were two sets of hypotheses about the effects of the independent variables on subjects' attributions of the lie-teller's motives, had she told the truth instead of the lie. One set of hypotheses concerned the lie-teller's self-protective motives for

the truth, and the other set concerned the lie-teller's target-protective motives for the truth.

Regarding liar-protective motives for the truth, Hypothesis 7a states that subjects in the lie-teller condition will be more likely than subjects in the target condition to make liar-protective attributions for the truth. Hypothesis 7b states that subjects in the positive outcome condition will be most likely to make liar-protective attributions for the truth, those in the negative condition least likely, with those in the neutral condition falling somewhere in-between.

Subjects' attributions of the lie-teller's self-protective motives for telling the truth (had she done so instead of telling the lie) were measured by Question 9a in the questionnaire. Question 9a asked respondents to what extent the truth would have been told because the lie-teller likes to think of herself as the type of person who would tell her friend what she really thought. Responses to this question were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Definitely for this reason") to 5 ("Not for this reason at all"). Table 9 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was a measure of subjects' liar-protective attributions for the truth.

Table 9

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Liar-Protective Attributions for the Truth

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	.41	1	.41	.34	.56
Outcome	.10	2	.05	.04	.96
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	1.31	2	.65	.54	.58
Within cells	346.80	287	1.21		
Constant	1392.07	1	1392.07	1152.01	.00

Table 10 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 10

Mean Scores for Subjects' Liar-Protective Attributions for the Truth

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	2.22	2.11	2.12
Target	2.10	2.29	2.28

There were no significant effects in relation to liar-protective attributions for the truth. Thus, neither Hypothesis 7a nor Hypothesis 7b was supported.

Regarding target-protective motives for the truth, Hypothesis 8a states that subjects in the lie-teller condition will be less likely than subjects in the target condition to make target-protective attributions for the truth. Hypothesis 8b states that subjects in the positive condition will be least likely to make target-protective attributions for the truth, those in the negative condition most likely, with those in the neutral condition falling somewhere in-between.

Subjects' attributions of the lie-teller's target-protective motives for telling the truth were measured by Question 9b in the questionnaire. Question 9b asked respondents to what extent the truth would have been told because the lie-teller felt that telling the truth was the best thing she could have done for the target under the circumstances. Responses to this question were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Definitely for this reason") to 5 ("Not for this reason at all"). Table 11 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was a measure of subjects' target-protective attributions for the truth.

Table 11

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Target-Protective Attributions for the Truth

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	5.13	1	5.13	5.11	.02
Outcome	7.92	2	3.96	3.94	.02
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	1.38	2	.69	.69	.50
Within cells	289.44	288	1.00		
Constant	1243.35	1	1243.35	1237.16	.00

Table 12 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 12

Mean Scores for Subjects' Target-Protective Attributions for the Truth

Perspective condition	Outcome condition		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	2.37	2.17	2.05
Target	2.22	1.71	1.85

As predicted, there was a main effect for perspective, $F(1,288)=5.11$, $p<.025$, such that subjects in the lie-teller condition ($M=2.20$) were less likely than subjects in the target condition ($M=1.93$) to indicate that the truth would have been told to benefit the target. Also as predicted, there was a main effect for outcome, $F(2,288)=3.94$, $p<.020$, such that subjects in the positive outcome condition ($M=2.29$) were less likely than subjects in the negative condition ($M=1.94$) to indicate that the truth would have been told to benefit the target. However, the mean for subjects in the neutral condition ($M=1.95$) did not fall in-between the means for the

other two conditions, and results from a Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test indicated that only the mean in the positive outcome condition was significantly different from the means in the other two conditions ($p<.05$). Thus, Hypotheses 8a was supported, but Hypothesis 8b was only partially supported.

Perceived Likelihood of Detection

There were two hypotheses about effects of the independent variables on subjects' perceptions of the likelihood that the target will find out about the lie.

Hypothesis 9 states that subjects in the lie-teller condition will rate detection as less likely than will subjects in the target condition.

Hypothesis 10 states that subjects in the positive condition will rate detection as least likely, those in the negative condition, as most likely, and those in the neutral condition will fall somewhere in between.

Subjects' estimates of the likelihood of detection were measured by Question 7a in the questionnaire, which asked them what they thought the chances were that the target will find out that the

lie-teller did not really believe what she said to the target. Responses were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Extremely likely she'll find out") to 6 ("Extremely unlikely she'll find out"). Table 13 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' estimates of the chances of detection.

Table 13

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Estimates of the Likelihood that the Target Will Find Out About the Lie

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	27.15	1	27.15	14.71	.00
Outcome	34.94	2	17.47	9.47	.00
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	1.53	2	.76	.41	.66
Within cells	529.68	287	1.85		
Constant	3742.30	1	3742.30	2027.73	.00

Table 14 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 14

Mean Scores for Subjects' Estimates of the Likelihood that the Target Will Find Out About the Lie

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	4.39	3.55	3.74
Target	3.67	2.84	3.33

As predicted, there was a main effect for perspective, $F(1,287)=14.71$, $p<.000$, such that subjects in the lie-teller condition ($M=3.88$) were less likely than subjects in the target condition ($M=3.28$) to estimate that the target was likely to find out about the lie. Also as expected, there was a main effect for outcome, $F(2,287)=9.47$, $p<.000$, such that subjects in the positive outcome condition ($M=4.02$) were less likely than those in the negative condition ($M=3.51$) to estimate that the target would discover the lie. However, the mean for subjects in

the neutral condition ($\underline{M}$=3.21) did not fall in-between the means for the other two conditions, and results from a Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test indicated that only the mean in the positive outcome condition was significantly different from the means in the other two conditions ($p<.05$). Thus, Hypothesis 9 was supported, but Hypothesis 10 was only partially supported.

There was one set of hypotheses (independent of experimental condition) about the relationship between the perceived likelihood of detection and (a) the evaluation of the lie, and (b) the evaluation of the truth. Hypothesis 11a states that subjects who tend to rate detection as relatively more likely will also tend to evaluate the lie less favorably than will subjects who rate detection as relatively less likely. Hypothesis 11b states that subjects who tend to rate detection as relatively more likely will also tend to evaluate the truth more favorably than will subjects who rate detection as relatively less likely. The three responses, estimates of detection, evaluations of the lie, and evaluations of the truth, were measured by Questions 7a, 4 and 8 in the questionnaire, as described earlier.

To test these two hypotheses, pooled correlations were performed across the six cells of the experimental design for each set of correlations. As predicted, there was a significant negative pooled correlation between estimates of detection and evaluations of the lie, $r(280)=-.14$, $p<.05$. Those viewing detection as relatively more likely also tended to evaluate the lie relatively less favorably. Similarly, as predicted, there was a significant positive pooled correlation between estimates of detection and evaluations of the truth, $r(280)=.21$, $p<.01$. Those viewing detection as relatively more likely also tended to evaluate the truth relatively more favorably.

Perceived Impact of the Lie, and the Truth, on the Relationship

There were two sets of hypotheses about effects of the independent variables on subjects' predictions of the impact on the relationship between lie-teller and target (a) of the lie and (b) of the truth (had it been told instead).

Regarding the perceived impact of the lie on the relationship, Hypothesis 12a states that subjects in the lie-teller condition will assess the lie as having

a more favorable impact on the relationship than subjects in the target condition. Hypothesis 12b states that subjects in the positive outcome condition will assess the lie as having the most favorable impact on the relationship, subjects in the negative outcome condition, the least favorable impact, with subjects in the neutral condition falling somewhere in-between.

Subjects' assessments of the impact of the lie on the relationship were measured by Question 6 in the questionnaire, which asked respondents how they thought the lie would affect the relationship between the lie-teller and the target. Responses to Question 6 were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("It might help our relationship a great deal") to 5 ("It might hurt our relationship a great deal"). Table 15 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' assessments of the impact of the lie on the relationship.

Table 15

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Assessments of the Impact of the Lie on the Relationship

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	1.84	1	1.84	3.33	.07
Outcome	50.43	2	25.22	45.58	.00
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	.68	2	.34	.62	.54
Within cells	158.22	286	.55		
Constant	3356.42	1	3356.42	6066.95	.00

Table 16 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 16

Mean Scores for Subjects' Assessments of the Impact of the Lie on the Relationship

Perspective condition	Outcome condition		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	2.67	3.57	3.74
Target	2.96	3.69	3.80

As predicted, there was a main effect for perspective, $F(1,286)=3.33$, $p<.069$, such that subjects in the lie-teller condition ($M=3.33$) assessed the lie as having a more favorable impact on the relationship than did subjects in the target condition ($M=3.49$). However, this effect was only marginal. Also as anticipated, there was a main effect for outcome, $F(2,286)=45.58$, $p<.000$, such that subjects in the positive condition ($M=2.82$) were least likely to indicate that the lie might have a negative effect on the relationship, subjects in the negative condition ($M=3.77$) were most likely, and subjects in the neutral condition ($M=3.63$) fell in between. However, results

from a Student-Newman-Keuls multiple range test indicated that only the mean in the positive outcome condition was significantly different from the means in the other two conditions ($p<.05$). That is, the neutral and negative outcome conditions did not yield significantly different responses. Thus, Hypothesis 12a was marginally supported, and Hypothesis 12b was only partially supported.

Regarding the perceived impact of the truth on the relationship, Hypothesis 13a states that subjects in the lie-teller condition will assess the truth as having a less favorable impact on the relationship than subjects in the target condition. Hypothesis 13b states that subjects in the positive outcome condition will assess the truth as having the least favorable impact on the relationship, subjects in the negative condition, the most favorable impact, with subjects in the neutral condition falling somewhere in-between.

Subjects' assessments of the impact of the truth on the relationship were measured by Question 11 in the questionnaire, which asked respondents how they thought the truth would have affected the relationship, had it been told instead. Responses to Question 11 were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("It

might have helped our relationship a great deal") to 5 ("It might have hurt our relationship a great deal"). Table 17 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' assessments of the impact of the truth on the relationship.

Table 17

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Assessments of the Impact of the Truth on the Relationship

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	13.56	1	13.56	13.77	.00
Outcome	.56	2	.28	.28	.75
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	.22	2	.11	.11	.89
Within cells	283.74	288	.99		
Constant	2239.87	1	2239.87	2273.51	.00

Table 18 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 18

Mean Scores for Subjects' Assessments of the Impact of the Truth on the Relationship

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	3.00	2.91	3.05
Target	2.61	2.51	2.54

As expected, there was a main effect for perspective, $F(1,288)=13.77$, $p<.000$, such that subjects in the lie-teller condition ($M=2.98$) were less likely than those in the target condition ($M=2.55$) to indicate that the truth might have helped the relationship. Thus, Hypothesis 13a was supported. However, the prediction for the effect of outcome on assessments of the impact of the truth on the relationship (Hypothesis 13b) was not supported.

Summary of Tests of Hypotheses

Table 19 presents a summary of the results of the tests of hypotheses explored in this study.

Table 19

Summary of Tests of Hypotheses

Hypotheses	Results
1. Evaluations of the lie	
Hypothesis 1: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will evaluate the lie more favorably than those in the target condition.	Supported
Hypothesis 2: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will evaluate the lie most favorably, subjects in the negative outcome condition, least favorably, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.	Partially supported
2. Attributions of the lie-teller's motives for the lie	
Hypothesis 3a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will be less likely than subjects in the target condition to make liar-protective attributions for the lie.	Supported
Hypothesis 3b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will be least likely to make liar-protective attributions for the lie, subjects in the negative condition, most likely, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.	Not supported

Hypothesis 4a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will be more likely than subjects in the target condition to make target-protective attributions for the lie.	Not supported
Hypothesis 4b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will be most likely to make target-protective attributions for the lie, subjects in the negative condition, least likely, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.	Not supported
3. Evaluations of the truth	
Hypothesis 5: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will evaluate the truth less favorably than subjects in the target condition.	Supported
Hypothesis 6: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will evaluate the truth least favorably, subjects in the negative condition, most favorably, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.	Not supported
4. Attributions of the lie-teller's motives for the truth	
Hypothesis 7a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will be more likely than subjects in the target condition to make liar-protective attributions for the truth.	Not supported
Hypothesis 7b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will be most likely to make liar-protective attributions for the	Not supported

truth, those in the negative condition, least likely, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.

Hypothesis 8a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will be less likely than subjects in the target condition to make target-protective attributions for the truth.	Supported
Hypothesis 8b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will be least likely to make target-protective attributions for the truth, subjects in the negative condition, most likely, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.	Partially supported

5. Perceived likelihood of detection

Hypothesis 9: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will rate detection as less likely than will subjects in the target condition.	Supported
Hypothesis 10: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will rate detection as least likely, subjects in the negative condition, as most likely, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.	Partially supported
Hypothesis 11a: Subjects who rate detection as relatively more likely will also tend to evaluate the lie less favorably than will subjects who rate detection as relatively less likely.	Supported
Hypothesis 11b: Subjects who rate detection as relatively more likely will also tend to	Supported

evaluate the truth more favorably than will subjects who rate detection as relatively less likely.

6. Perceived impact of the lie, and the truth, on the relationship

Hypothesis 12a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will assess the lie as having a more favorable impact on the relationship than will subjects in the target condition.	Marginally Supported
Hypothesis 12b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will assess the lie as having the most favorable impact on the relationship, subjects in the negative condition, the least favorable, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.	Partially supported
Hypothesis 13a: Subjects in the lie-teller condition will assess the truth as having a less favorable impact on the relationship than will subjects in the target condition.	Supported
Hypothesis 13b: Subjects in the positive outcome condition will assess the truth as having the least favorable impact on the relationship, subjects in the negative condition, the most favorable, with subjects in the neutral condition falling in-between.	Not supported

As the above summary indicates, the majority of the hypotheses of this study received at least some support.

Exploratory Measures

In addition, a number of exploratory variables were investigated. These variables are described below.

The Difficulty Associated With Telling the Truth

One question asked respondents how difficult they felt it would have been for the lie-teller to have told the target what she really thought/knew (instead of the lie actually told). This judgment was measured by Question 10 in the questionnaire. Responses were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Extremely difficult") to 5 ("Not difficult at all"). Results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) yielded a main effect for perspective, $F(1,288)=6.89$, $p<.009$, with liar-identified subjects ($M=2.63$) associating a lesser degree of difficulty with this task than did target subjects ($M=2.28$). Table 20 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' ratings of the extent of difficulty the lie-teller would have experienced, had she told the target the truth instead of the lie.

Table 20

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Ratings of the Difficulty the Lie-Teller Would Have Had in Telling the Truth

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	9.55	1	9.55	6.89	.01
Outcome	.52	2	.26	.19	.83
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	1.72	2	.86	.62	.54
Within cells	399.15	288	1.38		
Constant	1762.29	1	1762.29	1271.54	.00

Table 21 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 21

Mean Scores for Subjects' Ratings of the Difficulty the Lie-Teller Would Have Had in Telling the Truth

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	2.80	2.55	2.56
Target	2.22	2.29	2.31

Forced-Choice Attributions of Lie-Teller's Motives for the Lie

In connection with subjects' attributions of the lie-teller's motives in telling the lie, Question 12 in the questionnaire forced subjects to choose between a liar-protective versus a target-protective rationale for the lie. For this measure, responses were scored "1" if a subject chose the liar-protective rationale, and "2" if a subject chose the target-protective the lie. Results showed that there was a main effect for perspective, $F(1,288)=8.19$, $p<.005$, wherein lie-teller subjects were significantly more likely than target subjects to embrace a target-protective rationale for

the lie (M=1.84 and M=1.69, respectively). Table 22 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' forced-choice attributions of the lie-teller's motives for the lie.

Table 22

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Forced-Choice Attributions of the Lie-Teller's Motives for the Lie

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	1.45	1	1.45	8.19	.00
Outcome	.44	2	.22	1.23	.29
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	.34	2	.17	.96	.38
Within cells	50.96	288	.18		
Constant	907.89	1	907.89	5130.63	.00

Table 23 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 23

Mean Scores for Subjects' Forced-Choice Attributions of the Lie-Teller's Motives for the Lie

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	1.83	1.91	1.77
Target	1.76	1.67	1.65

Forced-Choice Attributions for Lie-Teller's Motives for the Truth

Question 13 in the questionnaire forced subjects to choose between a liar-protective versus a target-protective rationale for the truth. For this measure, responses were scored "1" when a subject chose the liar-protective rationale, and "2" when the target-protective rationale was chosen, as the main reason why the lie-teller would have told the truth. Results showed that there was a main effect for perspective, $F(1,287)=10.49$, $p<.001$, wherein lie-teller subjects were less likely than target subjects to make target-protective attributions for the truth ($M=1.50$ and $M=1.68$, respectively). There

was also a significant effect for outcome, $F(2,287)=12.16$, $p<.000$, wherein those in the positive condition ($M=1.41$) were less likely than those in the negative condition ($M=1.74$) to choose the target-related rationale. Table 24 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' forced-choice attributions of the lie-teller's motives for the truth.

Table 24

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Forced-Choice Attributions of the Lie-Teller's Motives for the Truth

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	2.28	1	2.28	10.49	.00
Outcome	5.29	2	2.64	12.16	.00
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	.39	2	.19	.90	.41
Within cells	62.37	287	.22		
Constant	737.20	1	737.20	3392.23	.00

Table 25 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 25

Mean Scores for Subjects' Forced-Choice Attributions of the Lie-Teller's Motives for the Truth

Perspective condition	Outcome condition		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	1.28	1.60	1.63
Target	1.53	1.67	1.83

Judgements as to Whether Target Would Have Behaved Differently, Had the Truth Been Told Instead

Question 14 asked respondents whether they thought the target would have done anything differently if the lie-teller had told her what she really knew/felt instead of the lie. This question was scored as "1" for an answer of "yes," and "2" for an answer of "no." Results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) revealed a marginal effect for perspective, $F(1,287)=3.29$, $p<.071$, wherein subjects in the lie-teller's role ($M=1.25$) were less

likely than those in the target's role (M=1.16) to agree that the target may have done something differently had the truth been told instead. Table 26 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' assessments as to whether the target would have done anything differently, had the lie-teller told her the truth instead of the lie.

Table 26

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Assessments of Whether the Target Would Have Done Anything Differently Had the Lie-Teller Told the Truth

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	.52	1	.52	3.29	.07
Outcome	.48	2	.24	1.50	.23
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	.39	2	.20	1.24	.29
Within cells	45.71	287	.16		
Constant	421.28	1	421.28	2645.33	.00

Table 27 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 27

Mean Scores for Subjects' Assessments of Whether the Target Would Have Done Anything Differently Had the Lie-Teller Told the Truth

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	1.30	1.25	1.19
Target	1.13	1.24	1.11

The Difficulty of the Experimental Task

Respondents were asked how hard they found the experimental task they had been assigned to, where they were asked to identify with either the lie-teller of the target of the lie. This variable was measured by Question 15 in the questionnaire which asked respondents whether, while reading the story and answering the questions, it had been hard for them to put themselves in the role of the character they had played in the story. Responses were made on a scale

where "1" was scored as "Extremely difficult" and "5" was scored as "Not difficult at all." While no effects were obtained for perspective, there was a some evidence that outcome influenced responses to this measure. Specifically, results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) revealed a marginal effect for outcome, $F(2,288)=2.78$, $p<.063$ such that subjects in the positive outcome condition ($M=4.32$) were less likely than those in the negative outcome condition ($M=4.12$) to have expressed that they had difficulty playing their roles. Table 28 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' responses as to how difficult they found the experimental task.

Table 28

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Evaluations of the Difficulty Associated with the Experimental Task

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	.25	1	.25	.26	.61
Outcome	5.37	2	2.68	2.78	.06
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	2.20	2	1.10	1.14	.32
Within cells	277.54	288	.96		
Constant	5009.60	1	5009.60	5198.44	.00

Table 29 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 29

Mean Scores for Subjects' Evaluations of the Difficulty Associated with the Experimental Task

	Outcome condition		
Perspective condition	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	4.26	4.13	4.12
Target	4.37	3.84	4.13

Perceptions of Changes in Reactions

Question 16 asked subjects whether their reactions to the lie-telling situation had changed any, after thinking more about this type of situation than they ordinarily would have. A "yes" response was scored as "1" and "No" was scored as "2". Results showed a significant Perspective X Outcome effect, $F(2,285)=5.38$, $p<.005$. Among lie-teller subjects, those in the negative outcome condition ($M=1\backslash.72$) were more likely to indicate that their reactions had changed than were those in either the positive ($M=1.85$) or neutral ($M=1.87$) conditions. Among target subjects, those in the positive ($M=1.76$) and neutral ($M=1.79$) conditions were more likely to indicate that

their reactions had changed than were those in the negative condition ($\underline{M}$=1.94). Table 30 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Perspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' responses as to whether their reactions to the story had changed (by virtue of their having thought more about this type of situation than usual).

Table 30

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Changes in Reaction to the Lie-Telling Situation

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	.02	1	.02	.14	.71
Outcome	.05	2	.03	.18	.83
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	1.52	2	.76	5.38	.00
Within cells	40.42	285	.14		
Constant	958.88	1	958.88	6760.14	.00

Table 31 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 31

Mean Scores for Subjects' Changes in Reaction to the Lie-Telling Situation

Perspective condition	Outcome condition		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	1.85	1.87	1.72
Target	1.76	1.79	1.94

Hindsight Evaluations of the Lie

Question 17 asked subjects whether, in retrospect, they felt it was all right for the lie-teller to have told the lie. Responses were made on a scale ranging from 1 ("Definitely all right") to 6 ("Definitely not all right"). Table 32 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance (Pèrspective X Outcome) in which the dependent variable was subjects' evaluation scores. Results showed a significant effect for outcome, $F(2,288)=29.39$, $p<.000$, wherein those in the positive condition ($M=3.23$) were more

likely than those in the negative condition (M=4.75) and neutral condition (M=4.39) to indicate that it was all right for the lie-teller to tell the lie. Table 32 presents the results of a 2 X 3 analysis of variance

Table 32

Summary of 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Effects of Perspective and Outcome on Subjects' Hindsight Evaluations of the Lie

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F	p
Main effects					
Perspective	2.23	1	2.23	1.06	.30
Outcome	122.80	2	61.40	29.38	.00
Two-way interaction					
Perspective X outcome	3.29	2	1.65	.79	.46
Within cells	601.75	288	2.09		
Constant	4976.69	1	4976.69	2381.87	.00

Table 33 presents the cell means for this analysis.

Table 33

Mean Scores for Subjects' Hindsight Evaluations of the Lie

Perspective condition	Outcome condition		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Lie-teller	3.02	4.28	4.81
Target	3.43	4.51	4.70

5. DISCUSSION

Overview of Findings Related to Perspective

One of the primary tasks of this research was to investigate Bok's ideas about the "liar's bias." Bok has argued that liars tend to overestimate the beneficial aspects of their lies, while minimizing the potential harm. She has also pointed out that the target of a lie will tend to feel quite differently about the lie than does the liar, generally preferring the truth instead. To explore this basic notion that the perspective of the liar is substantially different from that of the target, subjects in this study were asked to identify either with the lie-teller or the target of a lie so that a number of hypotheses about these two different perspectives could be explored.

While Bok only concentrates on the liar's bias, it may be more useful to view the results of this study as reflective of attribution tendencies associated with both the lie-teller's and the target's role. In this regard, it could be said that both the lie-teller and the target are likely to experience cognitive, emotional or perceptual biases deriving from their unique perspectives. However, in the following discussions of results, the focus will be

on the "liar's bias," consistent with Bok's analysis of this topic.

The results of the present study clearly confirm Bok's view that the lie-teller's perception of a lie-telling situation will frequently differ from that of the target. Many of the analyses conducted evidenced significant differences for subjects in the lie-telling vs. the target condition.

Perspective and Evaluations of the Lie

The main dependent measure of the study was clearly supported: subjects in the lie-telling condition were more likely to view the lie as "all right" than were those in the target condition. As earlier discussions have pointed out, Bok would no doubt argue that these differences in perspective were strongly influenced by motivational biases in perception accruing to the lie-teller: that those who had been asked to identify with the lie-teller were motivated to defend the lie-teller's behavior by adopting a more beneficent view of the lies than were those identifying with the target's position. This is not to say that subjects in the lie-teller condition condoned the lies outright. Their judgments of the appropriateness of the lie were only relatively less

harsh than those of subjects in the target condition. Nor did subjects in the target condition entirely condemn the lie. Apparently many could see some justification for it. These findings attest to the complicated emotions associated with a lie told between two female friends, and to the difficulty both lie-tellers and targets probably experience when they attempt to evaluate its relevance and meaning.

Perspective and Attributions of the Lie-Teller's Motives for the Lie

Bok's contention that the lie-teller is more likely than the deceived to attribute altruistic motives for the lie was at least partially supported by the results of this study.

Liar-protective motives. Results indicated that the liar's bias appeared to operate, at least in reference to liar-protective motives for the lie. Subjects in the lie-teller condition were less likely than subjects in the target condition to agree that the lie was told for self-serving reasons (i.e., so they would not feel awkward or embarrassed). Perhaps, as Bok has suggested, motivational or defensive biases prevented subjects in the lie-teller condition from fully perceiving or acknowledging the lie-teller's

possible self-serving motives for the lie. Subjects in the target condition may have been better able to recognize this function of the lie, and to identify with the target's real desire to know the truth of the matter.

Target-protective motives. Contrary to expectations, results indicated that subjects in the lie-teller condition were not more likely than subjects in the target condition to view their motives for the lie in altruistic terms; namely, so that the target would not feel unhappy, worried, or hurt. Since two independent rating scales were used to assess the lie-teller's self-serving and altruistic motives for the lie, this failure to obtain predicted results in reference to target-protective attributions for the lie may have been partly due to methodological considerations. Specifically, since subjects rated the lie-teller's self-protective motives first, subjects in the target condition may have subsequently been willing to give the lie-teller the "benefit of the doubt" by attributing greater altruistic motives to the lie-teller than they would have, had they not already expressed their feelings about the lie-teller's other (i.e., self-serving) motives for

the lie. Indeed, responses to a separate question where subjects were forced to choose between the two rationales yielded results that were consistent with original predictions.

Perspective and Evaluations of the Truth

The main focus of this study was on how subjects perceived lies told in a female friendship. However, subjects were also asked to speculate as to how they would have felt, had the truth been told instead. This avenue of inquiry was pursued in order to provide a better framework for understanding attitudes towards paternalistic lies.

Results indicated that lies were indeed judged less favorably than the truth. Given the strong social norm that it is wrong to tell a lie, especially in our personal relationships, it is perhaps not surprising to find that, on average, subjects reported that the truth would have been "all right" instead of the lie. Not surprisingly, and as Bok has hypothesized, exactly how appropriate the truth was judged to be appeared to have been strongly mediated by one's perspective. The subjects in the lie-teller condition were significantly less likely than subjects

in the target condition to indicate that the truth was an appropriate alternative to the lie.

Perspective and Attributions of the Lie-Teller's Motives for the Truth

Just as Bok has argued that liars will tend to make more altruistic attributions for their lies than will targets, it was a premise of this study that the liar's bias should also operate in connection with attributions of the lie-teller's motives for the truth, had she told it instead of the lie.

Liar-protective motives. Contrary to the predicted effect, results showed no significant differences between the responses of subjects in the lie-teller vs. target condition in the extent to which they made liar-protective attributions for the truth (truth would have been told because lie-teller likes to think of herself as the type of person who would tell her friend what she really thought). In retrospect, it seems possible that the wording of this attribution did not adequately reflect the intended meaning. For example, subjects in the lie-teller condition may have accepted this motive as "self-serving" as intended, since to them the wording "because you like to think of yourself as..." may have sounded pretentious or presumptuous. Thus, their

responses may have reflected a tendency to accept this rationale because it was consistent with the type of person who (unlike themselves) would have been unkind enough to have told the truth. Subjects in the target condition, because of their different perspective, may have been less likely to perceive of this rationale as a "selfish" one.

As mentioned earlier in reference to attributions of the lie-teller's motives for the lie, the failure to obtain predicted results in reference to liar-protective motives for the truth could also partly be due to the methodology used to measure these attributions. Since both liar-protective and target-protective attributions for the truth were assessed via two independent rating scales, subjects were free to give each set of motivations equal weight. Indeed, when subjects were later asked a separate question forcing them to choose between the liar vs. target-protective rationale, the original predictions were supported.

Target-protective motives. As predicted, subjects in the lie-teller condition were less likely than subjects in the target condition to embrace altruistic motives for the truth (truth would have

been told because the lie-teller felt that it would be the best thing she could have done for the target under the circumstances). These results seem to verify that subjects in the lie-teller condition have indeed identified with the liar's position, since these subjects appear to have been capable of projecting their initial defense of the lie on to a hypothetical situation involving the truth.

Perspective and the Perceived Likelihood of Detection

The dynamics of personal relationships are often complex, and the emotional demands strong. Lies in this context are told more often to protect feelings than to gain an advantage, resulting in the paternalistic lie. Yet because of the personal and more emotional dimension associated with paternalistic lies, the risks are also especially high. The discovery that a trusted loved one has lied can cause as much or even greater harm than the lie itself, or the truth, had it been told instead. In this regard, Bok has argued that, when in the liar's role, we will tend to deny the degree of risk associated with our paternalistic lies; that is, we will minimize the likelihood that the lie will become discovered.

Indeed, results supported this contention. subjects in the lie-teller condition were

significantly less likely than subjects in the target condition to indicate that the lie would become detected. While these findings can certainly be explained in terms of a defensive bias on the lie-teller's part, perceptual biases associated with the target's perspective could also have played a role. For instance, subjects in the target condition may have identified with the target's desire to exert control in the face of potential harm, and thus overestimated the chances that the lie would become discovered, as if willing this information to come to light.

Perspective and the Perceived Impact of the Lie, and the Truth, on the Relationship

The time frame associated with the perceived effects of a lie, or the truth, is likely to contribute to the impact that lies are perceived to have in personal relationships. For example, a temporary negative effect resulting from a lie should not be taken as seriously as a lasting one. In this regard, it was postulated that the lie-teller's bias would operate such that subjects in the lie-teller condition would be less likely than subjects in the

target condition to perceive or acknowledge that lasting harm (i.e., harm to the relationship) could result from their lie. Similarly, the lie-teller's bias should cause subjects in the lie-teller condition to minimize the potential benefits of the truth, had it been told instead. Results supported these predictions. Those in the lie-teller condition were (marginally) less likely than subjects in the target condition to indicate that the lie might cause the relationship some harm, and clearly less likely to have indicated that the truth might have benefited it.

Other Findings Related to Perspective

The questionnaire included a number of questions for exploratory purposes only. For several of these, there was a significant effect for perspective. Two of these have been discussed previously: forced-choice attributions of the lie-teller's motives, both for telling the lie and for telling the truth. Several others will be discussed in this section.

Perspective and the Perceived Difficulty of Telling the Truth. The merit or evil associated with an act is likely to be judged not only by virtue of the actor's motives, but on other grounds as well,

such as the degree to which the actor is perceived to have been pressured or seduced into performing the act. In terms of the present study, it could be argued that the liar's bias might operate in such a way that subjects in the lie-teller condition would perceive greater pressures on the lie-teller to tell the lie than would those in the target condition, and thus judge the truth as something that would have been more difficult to have told than would subjects in the target condition. On the other hand, it could also have been reasoned that subjects identified with the liar's role might have been expected to justify the lie-teller's behavior by judging the truth as having been less difficult to have told vs. subjects in the target condition, as if to say: "The lie was told for very good reasons, not just because it would have been hard to tell the truth."

In order to explore these speculations, respondents were asked how difficult they felt it would have been for the lie-teller to have told the target what she really thought/knew (instead of the lie actually told). Results showed that subjects in the lie-teller condition reported less difficulty with the idea of telling the truth than did subjects in the

target condition. These findings support the notion that subjects in the lie-teller condition did not seem to want to justify the lie-teller's lie simply by recourse to the difficulty inherent in telling the truth. However, it is also possible that these findings resulted from a perceptual bias on the part of subjects in the target condition: those identified with the target's role may have had difficulty accepting the idea that a personal friend could lie with apparent ease; thus, they may have been inclined to overestimate the difficulty associated with telling the truth, as if to say: "The only reason a friend would lie would be if it was very hard for her to have told the truth."

Perspective and the Likelihood that the Truth Would Have Affected the Target's Behavior. When perceptions of the impact of a lie are limited to the realm of emotions, people may find it easier to justify the lie, since feelings are intangible. However, if a lie is seen as negatively impacting how the target will actually behave in the future, the lie may be seen as a greater transgression, and be judged more harshly. In this regard, it was speculated that biases in perspective would influence subjects'

estimates of the pragmatic consequences of the lie vs. the truth. To assess this effect, respondents were asked whether they thought the target would have done anything differently, had the lie-teller told her what she really thought/knew (instead of the lie). The results showed that subjects in the lie-teller condition were less likely than subjects in the target condition to indicate that the target may have done something differently had the truth been told. These findings suggest that subjects in the lie-teller condition may have rationalized the lie-teller's decision to have lied by minimizing the possibility that the truth might have made a difference in how the target would have subsequently behaved. In a similar fashion, those in the target condition seem to have had a different view; namely, they were more inclined to indicate that the truth may have made a difference in how the target would have behaved in the future. As Bok has suggested, those who adopt the target's point of view may experience a greater desire to obtain all the available information than to be "protected" by a paternalistic lie from potentially becoming upset, worried or hurt. Indeed, this desire to be kept fully informed may have led subjects in the

target condition to overestimate the degree to which the knowledge the target was deprived of via the lie would have been truly actionable.

Despite these differences in perspective, it is probably worth noting that, on average, subjects in both the lie-teller and the target conditions appeared to believe that the target may have done something differently had the truth been told instead. It is possible that this finding was influenced by subjects in the lie-teller condition who rejected the experimental task to begin with, and thus who did not experience the "liar's bias," namely, the perceptual tendency to minimize the extent to which the lie would prevent action on the target's part. However, these findings could also underscore the lie-teller's willingness to trade off the chance to provide the target constructive information in order to avoid an unpleasant confrontation brought on by the truth. As has been evidenced before, this finding also implies that biases in perspective are relative rather than absolute, and that both lie-tellers and targets are sensitive to the potential drawbacks of the lie.

Re-Evaluations of the Lie. Apparently, the act of answering a number of questions about a lie-telling

situation sensitized subjects in the target condition to aspects of the situation they did not at first consider, including the lie-teller's point of view. This phenomenon was revealed when subjects were asked toward the end of the questionnaire to re-evaluate the appropriateness of the lie, using the same scale they had used for their initial evaluations. Subjects in the target condition seemed to view the lie, in retrospect, as more "all right" than they did previously, now virtually matching the evaluations of subjects in the lie-teller condition.

These findings are interesting, for they imply that the target of a lie may experience top-of-mind evaluations of a lie-telling situation that are less forgiving, and possibly more "moralistic," than a closer evaluation. That is, it appears that subjects who were asked to identify with the target's position were more likely to be swayed during the course of the experimental task by the liar's perspective than the other way around.

These findings could suggest that those in the target's position have an implicit awareness of the adaptive role that lies can play in human interactions. At first glance, these results might

also suggest that the target of a lie would tend to be sympathetic towards someone who has lied to her, provided that she becomes fully advised as to the lie-teller's point of view. However, these results should be interpreted with caution, since subjects in the target condition in this study were not truly in the position of someone who had just been lied to.

Furthermore, the subjects in the target condition knew about the lie-teller's perspective only by virtue of the omniscience afforded them by the story narrative. It may have been this very uncustomary opportunity to "know" the lie-teller's point of view that enabled those in the target condition to become more accepting of the lie. Moreover, this atypical state of omniscience allowed them to become aware of the lie-teller's point of view without the usual confrontation that is associated with a lie that becomes detected. Had there been an <u>open</u> acknowledgement of the lie by either party, the target's reaction may have been quite different (even in this experimental situation).

<u>Overview of Findings Related to Outcome</u>

Another primary goal of this research was to test the general notion that the consequences of an act

that has moral implications (e.g., lying to a close friend) will influence how the act is perceived. This view suggests that adults may assess a lie-telling situation on pragmatic grounds, or much as pre-operational children might, and thus allow the nature of the consequences to influence their judgements as much, or even more, than will some abstract moral standards.

The results of this study generally confirmed this notion. For a number of predictions involving the outcome variable, findings showed that a paternalistic lie resulting in a positive outcome was judged less harshly than the same lie resulting in a negative consequence. (Predictions for the neutral outcome condition were not generally supported, as will be discussed in greater detail below.)

The pattern of findings in this study for the effect of the outcome of the lie is consistent with numerous studies which have demonstrated that social acts are often judged on the basis of their consequences, and not merely by virtue of the actor's original (good) intentions. Moreover, since the social situations presented in this study had moral implications (because a lie was told), these results

are at variance with a strict interpretation of a stage theory of moral development (e.g., Piaget) which would predict that adults should be capable of evaluating an act based on its moral implications, independent of outcome. Instead, present findings suggest that adults, like young children, are strongly influenced by the nature of the consequences of an act, rather than its morality per se.

Kelley (1972) has postulated a common attributional tendency associated with the human need to control the environment which may also account for the pattern of outcome effects found in the present study. Kelley claimed that the perception of cause is intimately linked to the exercise of control. He felt that people will tend to exercise control efforts not only in conjunction with that which is feasible to control, but also in connection with that which is <u>important</u> to control. Thus it stands to reason that people may be much more inclined to take note of negative than positive events, since positive events do not signal the same strong need to examine the situation and exert control. Thus, it could be that people will tend to judge a lie with a negative outcome more harshly simply because they will attend

to it more closely than when the lie's results are favorable. This argument suggests that attentional differences could have been the precipitating cause of many of the outcome effects of this study; i.e., that because of the greater attention paid to behavior that resulted in negative consequences, this behavior was more carefully analyzed, whereas actions yielding beneficial results may have evoked no similar analytic/moralistic frame.

Outcome and Evaluations of the Lie

Since the effect of outcome on peoples' perceptions of lying was a central issue of this study, it is encouraging to see that the predicted effect for outcome was clearly obtained for one of the most important dependent measures in the study; namely, subjects' evaluations of the appropriateness ("all rightness") of the lie. Apparently subjects were inclined to judge a lie that had a positive result less harshly than one yielding negative consequences despite the fact that the lie itself was identical in both instances. Moreover, this effect appeared to have been a stable one, at least for the duration of the experimental session. When asked to re-evaluate the lie after answering all the other

questions, the strong effect for outcome was achieved again.

It would be interesting to learn at what point in the attribution process these differences manifested themselves. For example, did all subjects tend to evaluate the lie-teller's actions similarly, but judge the situation differently simply based on "the luck of the draw"? That is, in subjects' eyes, did a positive outcome tend to be the end which justified the means regardless of the motives for the behavior? Or did subjects make attributions of the lie-teller's motives after the fact, and thus evaluate the lie differently in each outcome condition because they perceived the actor's original motives (in retrospect) as different to begin with?

Outcome and Attributions of the Lie-Teller's Motives for the Lie

Heider (1958) postulated a common attributional tendency that provides a basis for the predicted outcome effects related to attributions of the lie-teller's motives for telling the lie. Borrowing from Gestalt psychology, Heider claimed that people in general will tend to associate good causes with good effects, and bad with bad. In applying this reasoning

to the present study, it would be natural to expect that when someone has caused something "good" to happen (as in the positive outcome condition), subjects would be more likely to assume good intentions; similarly, when something "bad" has happened (as in the negative outcome condition), perhaps respondents could not help but wonder if the person all along had something "not good" in mind.

However, in the present study, the predicted effects for outcome in reference to attributions for the lie-teller's motives for the lie did not receive support. For example, those in the positive condition did not make the strongest altruistic (target-protective), and the weakest self-serving (liar-protective), attributions of the lie-teller's motives for the lie. Even when subjects were forced to choose between liar- and target-protective motives as the main reason for the lie, there was still no significant effect for outcome.

The above findings could indicate that people tend to make judgements about social situations that have moral implications by invoking the principle that the ends justify the means; that is, that lies are "all right" when they turn out well, and "not all

right" when they turn out badly, regardless of the lie-teller's original motives. However, this explanation seems overly simplistic. Instead, it may well be that limitations of the dependent measures used in this study to assess self-protective vs. altruistic motives for the lie may account for the failure to obtain predicted results. For example, the wording designed to tap a liar-protective rationale ("Was it because (lie-teller) wanted to avoid being in an awkward or embarrassing situation") could have been misinterpreted as target-protective as well; that is, that the lie-teller was trying to protect the target from said awkward or embarrassing situation as much as herself. Similarly, the wording designed to tap the target-protective rational ("Was it because (lie-teller) didn't want (target) to feel unhappy, worried, or hurt") could have been misinterpreted as liar-protective as well; that is, that the lie-teller told the lie in order to avoid feeling guilty.

Outcome and Evaluations of the Truth

In this study, as pointed out previously, the outcome of a lie appears to have had a strong impact on how harshly or leniently the lie was judged. However, the predicted effect for outcome in relation

to subjects' evaluations of the truth (had it been told instead of the lie) did not receive support. These findings are surprising, especially in light of the strong outcome effects obtained for subjects' evaluations of the lie.

These findings suggest that, apparently, the truth and lying are not simply "opposites" in people's minds. One possible explanation for this lack of symmetry in evaluations of the truth vs. lying may reside in differences between the societal norms that govern each. Perhaps, because telling the truth is socially acceptable, people will evaluate it as the appropriate thing to have done, even when it appears likely that the truth will have negative results. However, since lies are generally frowned upon, their level of acceptability may be much more closely tied to their net effects. This could explain why outcome effects occurred in reference to evaluations of the lie, but not the truth.

The failure to obtain predicted outcome effects in relation to evaluations of the truth could also be related to the fact that these evaluations were solicited within the context of lying. In the face of a lie, the truth may look virtuous indeed. Outcome

effects for the truth may well have occurred if the study had investigated judgments of the truth alone, where the idea of lying was not introduced beforehand.

Outcome and Attributions of the Lie-Teller's Motives for the Truth

Heider's Gestalt principles of attribution are more difficult to apply in reference to subjects' attributions of the lie-teller's motives for the truth, had she told it instead of the lie. While Heider argues that good intentions become associated with good outcomes, and bad with bad, it is less clear what relationship he would predict between intentions and outcomes in reference to a hypothetical situation (involving the truth) which is to be considered as an alternative to an act already committed (the lie). Nonetheless, it was assumed that earlier attributions that had become tied to the "good" and "bad" effects of the lie actually told, would influence subsequent attributions of the lie-teller's motives in relation to the truth. Therefore, it was assumed that those who had been asked to identify with a lie-telling situation that turned out well would judge the lie-teller's motives, had she told the truth instead, less favorably than would those who had been asked to

identify with a lie-telling situation that did not turn out as favorably.

Results for the predicted effects of outcome on attributions of lie-teller's motives for telling the truth, had she done so, were only partially supported. There were no significant effects for outcome for liar-protective attributions for the truth. As mentioned before, the wording of this measure may not have reflected the intended meaning. The predicted outcome effect was obtained in relation to target-protective attributions for the truth. Subjects in the positive outcome condition were less likely than those in the negative condition to make target-protective attributions for the truth. Presumably, the beneficial outcome of the lie already told committed subjects in this condition to the idea that the lie-teller had good intentions in telling the lie; when they then considered the truth in its place, it must have been difficult for many to <u>also</u> attribute good intentions for this act, especially when it could so clearly undo the earlier beneficial deed.

In spite of the failure to obtain predicted results for liar-protective motives for the truth, the original set of predictions was supported by a

separate question which forced subjects to choose between liar- and target-protective rationales for the truth. These latter results underscore the importance of choosing appropriate dependent measures. For example, it is conceivable that the independent rating scales used in this study obscured differences in perception that the forced-choice scales were able to uncover.

Outcome and the Perceived Likelihood of Detection

Earlier studies have revealed that perceptions of the likelihood that a lie will become discovered will influence judgments of a lie. For example, the degree of risk associated with a lie will affect perceptions of whether the lie is worth telling in the first place (Turner, Edgley, and Olmstead, 1975), and whether or not a lie does become discovered will affect the nature of subsequent (moral) evaluations of the lie (Wackenhut, 1980). Similarly, in terms of the present study, it was predicted that the valence of the outcome of a lie would invoke defensive biases that in turn would affect judgments of the likelihood of detection. Namely, those in the positive outcome condition were expected to "protect" this outcome by minimizing the extent to which the lie would be seen

as vulnerable to discovery by the target. Indeed, as predicted, subjects in the positive condition were significantly less likely than those in the negative condition to estimate that the lie would subsequently be discovered.

While the above results can be explained in terms of motivational biases, as suggested above, it is also possible that they were due to attentional biases; that is, to differences in the extent to which positive vs. negative outcome subjects attended to the situation at hand. For example, Kelley's (1972) observation about the human predisposition to control negative events may provide an example of an attentional perceptual bias which could have impacted present results. Kelley's reasoning might have been as follows: For subjects in the positive condition, nothing requiring control efforts has transpired. Therefore, these subjects would be less likely than those in the negative condition to closely examine the present situation in an effort to exert control. As a result, it would be less likely to occur to them that the chances were good that the lie could become discovered.

A "logical" explanation for the effect of outcome on perceptions of the likelihood of detection may be a more parsimonious interpretation of present results; namely, that subjects were simply performing a realistic assessment of the situation at hand. This interpretation implies that, in reality, the chances that the target of a lie will discover it are probably far greater when its consequences are negative than when they are positive. This would be so because negative consequences tend to stimulate behavior that positive consequences do not. For example, a positive event, however welcome, may awaken little need for examination of its cause. But when something untoward occurs, the target of this unfortunate event is likely to be motivated to find out why and how it happened in order to remedy the situation, or to learn how to prevent it from occurring again. In the case of a lie that has resulted in a negative outcome, the target's efforts to discover the source of this unfortunate occurrence will increase the probability that the lie will be discovered. In addition, others will often try to help the target of these events better understand and deal with them. In fact, since something bad has already happened, the rationale for keeping the lie hidden no longer applies, and perhaps

even the lie-teller will reveal the true source of the trouble, including the role of his or her own lie. Indeed, in their open-ended responses, many subjects concluded that the reason the lie might subsequently become revealed was because the lie-teller would later acknowledge that she had told it.

Outcome and the Perceived Impact of the Lie, and the Truth, on the Relationship

Subjects were asked to assess the impact of the lie, and the truth, on the relationship between the lie-teller and the target. It is interesting to observe that the predicted effects of outcome on the relationship were significant only in relation to the lie. As predicted, those in the negative outcome condition were more likely than those in the positive condition to indicate that the lie may have caused some harm to the relationship. But in relation to subjects' estimates of the impact of the truth on the relationship, although there is a trend in the predicted direction, subjects in the negative outcome condition did not differ significantly from those in the positive condition.

Numerous factors could account for this failure to obtain symmetrical results for judgments of the

impact of the lie vs. the truth on the relationship. As mentioned in connection with the findings for evaluations of the appropriateness of the lie vs. the truth, normative expectations could be influencing these results. For example, since telling a lie is generally perceived as breaking the rules, when a lie results in a negative outcome, people may be much more likely to expect this breach to impact the quality of the relationship itself. But telling the truth is a simple matter of obeying the rules. Thus, even when the truth might result in a negative outcome, people may expect the relationship to withstand these ill effects.

As suggested in the earlier discussion of subjects' evaluations of the appropriateness of the truth, the context in which subjects were asked to assess the likely impact of the truth on the relationship (i.e., as a hypothetical alternative to a lie) may also explain the failure to obtain the predicted effect.

Other Findings

Neutral Outcome Condition

Another systematic finding of the study concerned the neutral outcome condition. In this condition,

both the positive and negative outcomes contained in the two other versions of the story were posed as possible ways in which the present situation may turn out. Results showed that subjects in the neutral outcome condition tended to respond as if this condition reflected only its negative component. In virtually all instances where there was a significant effect for outcome, this effect was due to differences between the positive vs. the two other conditions.

This pattern of findings may be at least partly explained by Kelley's (1972) claim that we tend to make certain attributions as efforts to control important events. When a negative possibility is brought to mind, even if an equally probable positive result is also proposed, this negative component may dominate the attributional field since it is more important that it be kept under control than the positive event. Along similar lines, these findings might be related to differences discussed by Jones and Gerard (1967) in the attributional tendencies associated with situations in which action is still possible versus those for which the moment to act has already passed. In the former case, such as in the neutral outcome condition where future possibilities

are posed, rather than actual outcomes presented, the reality principle may be dominant and thus greater vigilance may be adopted. In the latter case, such as in the other two outcome conditions where the outcome possibilities suggested in the neutral condition have already transpired, a less vigilant stance may be assumed--one, for example, that would allow judgments to be more easily influenced by the valence of the outcome of the act.

Another explanation of the fact that the neutral and negative outcome conditions were frequently responded to very similarly could be related to the dynamics of social norms. It could be argued that only in the positive outcome condition were the expectations governing social interactions clearly violated. That is, the possibilities posed in the neutral outcome condition may not have been viewed as very different from what would have been expected in a lie-telling situation; namely, while something good could occur, so could something bad. In fact, subjects might have been more likely to assume that it would probably be the latter, given that it was wrong to lie in the first place. As a result, when subjects in the neutral condition were asked to respond to the

lie-telling situation, their responses were very similar to those in the negative condition, and consistent with norms about lying generally, that lying is "bad." However, in the positive condition, events occurred which clearly violated societal expectations: the lie, which "should" have led to no good, instead caused something very favorable to occur. Perhaps in this case, subjects were willing to make an exception to the general rule, and to evaluate this particular lie more leniently than they would have otherwise.

Perceptions of the Difficulty of the Experimental Task

Respondents were asked how hard they found the experimental task they had been asked to perform (i.e., to identify with either the lie-teller or the target of a lie). While no effects were obtained for perspective, there was a some evidence that outcome influenced responses to this measure. Not surprisingly, the subjects in this study appeared to have less difficulty relating to a situation in which something "good" occurred than something "bad."

Lack of Perspective X Outcome Effects

Although no Perspective X Outcome effects were hypothesized, it is still surprising that so few of

these interaction effects occurred. These findings suggest that subjectes in both the lie-teller and the target conditions were influenced in a similar way by the outcome of the lie. This is an important finding, since it would have been just as reasonable to assume that either perspective or outcome would take precedence in a given case. For example, it may have been just as reasonable to have predicted that once a lie was told, subjects in the lie-teller condition would commit themselves to it fully, regardless of its consequences, with only subjects in the target condition being expected to have been more influenced by the outcome of the lie.

The fact that Perspective X Outcome interaction effects did not tend to occur could indicate that, regardless of whether we are in the lie-teller's or the target's position, we will tend to be more realistic or pragmatic than self-serving in our assessments of lies, since the subjects in this study, regardless of which perspective condition they were in, seemed to be similarly influenced by the actual consequences of a lie. Possibly, as one would expect, reality constraints impose limitations on the extent to which defensive biases are free to operate.

Alternatively, the lack of Perspective X Outcome effects may be due to methodological shortcomings. That is, since subjects were only considering a hypothetical situation, they may have been more easily influenced by the outcome of the lie than they would have been, had the lie actually occurred in their lives.

Perceived Likelihood of Detection

Presumably lie-tellers are counting on their lies to "work." However, especially in personal relationships, there is always the chance that a lie will become detected. In between these two extremes fall those lies which are not detected outright, but which are suspected. In short, the dynamics of detection constitute an integral aspect of the phenomenology of lying.

Because of the strong relationship between detection and how lies are experienced and evaluated, several hypotheses involving this variable were tested in this study. For example, results revealed a strong relationship between perspective and outcome and perceptions of the likelihood that the lie will become detected by the target. Also, independent of experimental condition, results showed that subjects'

estimates of the chances of detection were related to their moral judgments of the lie-telling situation more generally (i.e., to whether or not the lie or the truth were appropriate choices in the situation at hand).

General findings for perceived likelihood of detection. The above results suggest that the detection of a lie is not an insignificant factor in the lie-telling situation. Indeed, regardless of a lie-teller's motive, it seems reasonable to assume that the primary function of a lie is to communicate false information and/or to prevent the target from learning certain information (i.e., to avoid detection). Thus, it was interesting to find that subjects' overall level of expectation that the lie would become found out was surprisingly high. Far from estimating that the chances of detection were slim, subjects seemed to be about equally divided as to whether or not they felt the target would find out about the lie.

In reviewing subjects' open-ended remarks as to why they felt the target would find out about the lie, it became evident that many felt it was because the lie-teller herself would subsequently reveal it.

Moreover, while some indicated that this would occur inadvertently (e.g., the lie-teller would let it "slip out"), a considerable number seemed to feel that the lie-teller would subsequently choose to reveal the lie voluntarily.

This finding was unexpected, but upon reflection, it appears to have implications for how we negotiate the delicate balance between truth and lies in our personal relationships. Perhaps in a friendship, for example, both parties need to feel not only that they can rely on the other to tell the truth when necessary, but that the other will also know when it is safe to do so, and when it is better to bide her time (i.e., to "temporarily" lie). This aspect of the phenomenology of lying could be said to extend Bok's contention that relationships can survive only if there is a requisite degree of honesty and trust. Perhaps personal relationships can survive only if there is a requisite degree of honesty that is properly timed. In Luhmann's or Goffman's terms, structural factors may be operating that enable social actors to accept implicitly, even unconsciously, that they will be routinely deceived by those they are close to, because they also know implicitly that, if

necessary, the truth will be revealed later when the deceived party (or the deceiver!) can more readily assimilate it.

The above analysis relates to some of the theoretical arguments put forth earlier in this paper. For example, it has been argued that much lying may occur in an unpremeditated fashion as a way of protecting our own ego as well as the self-esteem of those we care for. Yet, the subsequent voluntary revelation of a lie by the lie-teller may also have an adaptive function in the maintenance of personal relationships. That is, the routinized belief on the lie-teller's or the target's part that a lie will subsequently be revealed when the timing is right may be an important social mechanism whereby deception is managed. In Luhmann's terms, frequent recourse to "temporary" deception may be one of means that society has instituted as a safeguard of our mutual trust. Thus, even though we may frequently lie unwittingly, or without full awareness of the moral implications of our act, when the situation demands, we can later bring these lies (and their implications) to mind when a more auspicious moment arises in which to confront the previously ego-threatening material.

The high degree to which subjects in this study seemed to recognize that lies will subsequently be detected could suggest that people have an underlying acceptance of lying and its functional properties which is at variance with their more overt reactions to lying, such as when they are asked to evaluate its appropriateness outright.

Further reflections on detection. Obviously, the role that detection plays in the phenomenology of lying was not fully explored in the present study. Yet the study of detection, and of perceptions of its likelihood, promises to be a fertile area for gaining a better understanding of the dynamics and meaning of social lying in general. In a sense, the detection (or confession) of a lie is the only clear meeting place wherein the truth confronts the lie. In this regard, the study of detection could be considered a useful ethnomethodological tool, since the detection of a lie brings to light that which ordinarily remains hidden.

The investigation of the relationship between detection and key social psychological and personality variables may provide a variety of useful insights into the role of social deception in interpersonal

relationships. Examples of relevant social psychological research questions could include the following: (a) What is the typical outcome of the discovery of a paternalistic lie? (b) What types of social situations, and lies, lend themselves more readily to the subsequent discovery of the lie, and why? (c) How do differences in the likelihood of detection impact the use, success, and meaning of a lie? (d) What types of personal relationships will tend to benefit the most, or suffer the worst, when lies are discovered? (e) Have social actors developed common ways of negotiating discovered lies? If so, what are they, and how do they function? For example, can a discovered lie often become a vehicle for enhancing, rather than undermining, a close personal relationship?

Examples of some key personality factors related to the concept of detection could include the following: (a) Are there strong individual differences in the extent to which people anticipate the detection of social lies? If so, what impact do these perceptual differences have on the role that lies play in peoples' lives (e.g., on the frequency of lying, on how discovery is negotiated, on the

perceived valence of the outcome, etc.)? (b) Do some people tend to openly acknowledge their lies after the fact, while others go to extremes not to reveal them? Do some believe that confessing their lies will demonstrate that they care, while others fear that the discovery of a lie will cause an almost irrevocable breach? (c) Do some people tend to reveal their lies in a way that enhances their relationships, while others use the revelation of their lies as a means of keeping others at a distance?

Summary of Main Findings

When in a lie-telling situation, one's perspective does indeed appear to make a difference. In this study, there were many main effects for perspective, as predicted. In addition, four of the exploratory measures also demonstrated a significant effect for the perspective variable. In essence, those who identify with the lie-teller's position appear to judge the lie-teller's lies in a more forgiving fashion along a number of key dimensions than do those who have identified with the target's point of view.

These findings confirm the importance of motivational factors in the judgement of social

events, and are consistent with many of the findings in the attributional literature, such as those associated with the actor-observer effect.

Outcome, too, appears to make a difference. In the present study, the pragmatic consequences (outcome) of a lie told between two female friends, rather than some abstract moral principle, appear to have strongly influenced many of the respondents' reactions to the lie-telling situation. There were many significant effects for the outcome variable, as predicted, as well as significant effects for outcome in relation to three of the exploratory measures.

It is worth noting that these effects for outcome were obtained even in a study using a paper and pencil measure, where social norms and "shoulds" are especially salient, and where subjects are likely to be more idealistic than they would be in "real life." However, it is also worth noting that there was an unexpected finding in relation to the outcome variable; namely, that the "neutral" outcome condition, in which both a positive and a negative possibility were posed, acted as if it represented only its negative component. Thus, it would appear that norms about lying do play an important role in

judgements of a lie-telling situation: perhaps only when the outcome of a lie is sufficiently "good" can it override normative views that lying is "bad."

Taken together, these findings clearly suggest that we do not evaluate truth and lies in a vacuum. Rather, the social context in which a lie is told appears to be a crucial factor as to how the lie will be experienced and evaluated. Moreover, findings suggest that two key aspects of that context are one's perspective (lie-teller vs. target) and how it all turns out.

Finally, an unexpected finding in relation to the detection variable--that social actors are just as likely to expect a lie to become discovered as to remain undetected--suggests that one way we may negotiate lies in our personal relationships is to believe that we are only lying "temporarily." This aspect of the phenomenology of lying could explain why both the lie-teller and the target of a lie do not apply strict moral standards to a lie-telling situation: both may assume that an appropriate time will arise in the future where the truth can more readily be revealed and assimilated.

Appendix A

Instruction Letter

Dear Instructor/Professor:

The following information will serve as a guide for what you might say when you administer this questionnaire to your students:

"This questionnaire is part of a study about personal relationships that is being conducted by a student from the City University of New York as part of her doctoral dissertation.

It only takes a few minutes to complete, and your help will be greatly appreciated. You will get a more detailed explanation of what the study is all about, once you have completed the questionnaire."

If possible, Explanation Sheets should not be handed out to your students until all students at your university who will participate in this study have done so (e.g., perhaps they can be handed out a week or two after you students have participated).

Many, many thanks for your help.

Sincerely yours,

Joyce Wackenhut

Explanation Sheet

The study you just participated in is being conducted by a graduate student in Social Psychology in connection with her doctoral dissertation. This student is particularly interested in what enables people in close personal relationships to trust each other. For example, contrary to popular belief, does telling the truth often cause more harm than good?

By means of slightly different versions of the questionnaire you filled out, the research here is investigating the effect of two main variables:

1. "Perspective": As you read the story, you were asked to role-play that you were either:
   a. the person telling an untruth; or
   b. the person receiving an untruth
2. "Outcome": The story you read contained an untruth that resulted in either:
   a. a positive outcome, or
   b. a neutral (or unclear) outcome, or
   c. a negative outcome.

It is hoped that this study can at least begin to answer some of the questions we face about when to

be completely honest with those we are close to, and when not to be. Specifically, how do people feel about deceiving a friend, or being deceived by a friend, in a social situation where telling the truth might cause discomfort, pain or worry?

Once the data are in from approximately 200 respondents, a number of specific questions will be investigated, such as: Do tellers of untruths (those role-playing the person telling the untruth) view these untruths more favorably in general than recipients (those role-playing the person receiving the untruth) do? Do favorable outcomes color how "bad" or "good" an untruth will be judged to be? Etc.

Once again, thank you for your participation in this study. If you would like further information, or if you are willing to be interviewed in person about this topic, please fill out and return the attached form to:

Joyce Wackenhut
c/o Young & Rubicam
18th floor
285 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017-6486

NAME:_____ PHONE NO._____

ADDRESS:_____ _____

Would like further information_____

Am willing to be interviewed_____

Appendix B

Questionnaire Materials

A copy of the text of each of the three stories used in the study is attached. The three different outcomes for each story are also included, as is a sample questionnaire of one of the stories (as Appendix C).

Susan Story (Liar version)

You and your friend Susan work for an insurance company as junior accountants. The two of you met in high school and have been very close friends for many years. At the office, you try to look out for one another's interests in any way you can--by helping with work in emergencies, by sharing whatever information and gossip you happen to pick up about office politics, etc.

Both you and Susan work for the same department head, who is basically a fair boss. However, he tends to be somewhat hot-tempered and difficult to work for. Ever since Susan was hired, she has been trying very hard to do a good job, because her position at the firm is very important to her. Today Susan has jut turned in a lengthy financial report she has been working on for weeks, and she is concerned about whether the boss will find it satisfactory. In the afternoon, the department head calls you into his office to discuss a new assignment. As you get to his office the door is open slightly and you can hear him talking on the telephone. You decide to wait outside the door until he gets finished. Without meaning to listen, you cannot help hearing what he says. You

realize that he is talking to his senior assistant about Susan's report. He is clearly dissatisfied with it, annoyed, and in a mood to fire Susan. When the department head hangs up you enter the office; fortunately, he does not know that you have been standing outside his office and that you heard part of his conversation.

Although you are not aware of it, Susan has been trying to make up her mind as to whether or not she should continue working on the report or get started on her new assignment As Susan and you are getting ready to leave for the day, Susan asks you if the department head has given you any clues as to whether or not he liked her report. You don't know how to answer her, but you know you have to say something. You decide not to tell her what you know. Instead you say, "He hasn't said a word to me and I was with him most of the afternoon. I'm sure he thinks it is just fine."

Susan feels very relieved to hear what you have to say, and on the basis of what you have told her, she decides not to work anymore on the old report. Instead she plunges right into her new assignment, which she knows the department head needs for his own boss next week.

Susan Story, cont.

Positive Outcome (Liar version)

As it turns out, the department head was just in one of his bad moods the day he read Susan's report, and needed to get angry at someone. After he rereads the report, he finds it to be in much better shape than he originally thought it was. In addition, he is very impressed that Susan has already tackled the new assignment he needs for his own boss. He decides that Susan has real potential after all, and that it would definitely be a mistake to fire her.

Neutral Outcome (Target version)

It remains to be seen whether or not the department head was just in one of his bad moods the day he read the report and will appreciate you for tackling the new assignment he needs for his own boss, or whether he is truly dissatisfied with your report and will decide he has to let you go if you don't do anything to improve it.

Negative Outcome (Liar version)

As it turns out, the department head waits for awhile to see whether Susan does anything to rectify the situation, but when it appears that she does not seem to see any need for improvement, he decides he

will eventually have to let her go. Susan is very upset and shaken when she gets fired some weeks later.

Tanya Story (Target version)

Tanya and you have been the best of friends for a long time. You grew up in the same neighborhood and have always shared your experiences with each other. You are a very warm and caring person who has always been concerned about the welfare of those around you. You now have a law degree, which you hope will offer you a career where you can be of service to others. You have been working as an associate for a New York City law firm for about a year and a half. So far you have been doing very well, except that Tanya thinks you are sometimes too outspoken, which Tanya is not so sure is always a good idea.

Tonight when you get home from work, you call Tanya on the phone to tell her about meeting you had today with all the associates of the firm. You mention that at the meeting you discussed some of the firm's practices which you think ought to be changed. For example, you tell her how you brought up the fact that the senior partners, while they are excellent in their handling of the legal aspects of a case, don't always pay as much attention to their clients' emotional needs as perhaps they should.

When you finish telling Tanya about the meeting, you ask her if she thinks you did the right thing. She doesn't know what to say. Her own feeling was that you may have made a mistake by sounding off this way about topics that weren't even on the agenda. In fact, she is hoping for your sake that the senior partners won't hear about what you said. She decides not to tell you what she really believes. Instead Tanya says, "I'm sure you did the right thing. The other associates are probably glad you spoke up at the meeting."

Tanya finds out later from you that you felt so encouraged by what she said that the next day you stopped by one of the senior partner's offices to convey some of your thoughts about the firm's practices. For example, you told him of your belief that the firm should try harder to keep their clients' emotional needs in mind.

Tanya Story, cont.

Positive Outcome (Target version)

As it turns out, the senior partner you spoke to was favorably impressed. The day after you spoke to him, he made it a point to thank you for bringing up these matters, and said that the partners would be giving your concerns their serious attention. The whole incident definitely improved your position in the firm.

Neutral Outcome (Liar version)

It remains to be seen whether the partners will appreciate Tanya for bringing up matters that need their attention or whether they will see her as a possible troublemaker.

Negative Outcome (Target version)

As it turns out, the senior partner you spoke to finds your remarks to be rather disturbing. He begins to wonder if you are going to be a troublemaker, and whether the firm might even be better off without you. As a result, your chances to succeed and eventually become a partner of the firm are very slim now.

Janie Story (Liar version)

You and Janie have been very close friends ever since you met in art school many years ago. Over the years, Janie has held a number of different jobs, but she has now committed herself to developing a career in you field, which is fashion illustration. She has been working very hard on this career for over a year and has begun to gain some practical experience working on a free-lance basis for various local magazines. Since you went straight into fashion illustration right after school, you have become established, whereas Janie's experience has been considerably more limited.

During the past few weeks, Janie has put together a portfolio because she has managed to set up an interview with the editor of a new women's magazine for a full-time job with the magazine. The night before the interview, Janie shows you her portfolio and asks you what you think. You don't know what to say. You find her work to be unprofessional and think of Janie as still very much of a beginner. You decide not to tell Janie what you really think. Instead you say, "I think you've done a fine job of putting your portfolio together, and you should feel very good about it."

Janie Story, cont.

Positive Outcome (Liar version)

As it turns out, your remarks have the effect of getting Janie to take herself very se4seriously So when she arrives for the interview, she feels confident and is able to convey a sense of enthusiasm and dedication. As a result, the editor is so impressed by Janie's attitude he decides to give her the job even though he recognizes that Janie will need quite a bit of training at first.

Neutral Outcome (Target version)

It remains to be seen whether Janie's remarks will give you the confidence you need to convey an impression of enthusiasm and dedication during your interview with the editor, or whether she has raised your hopes so high you may get nervous and flustered if the editor does not react to your portfolio exactly as you would like him to.

Negative Outcome (Liar version)

As it turns out, Janie is so encouraged by your remarks that she approaches her interview with a great deal of confidence. When the editor looks at her portfolio, he sees some promise in her work but is honest with Janie about her level of experience and

talent. Because her hopes were so high, Janie is unprepared for the editor's reaction to herportfolio. She begins to act very nervous and flustered during the interview. As a result, the editor, who at first was considering hiring Janie and training her, decides that her nervous attitude may be an indication that she is too temperamental. He decides not to hire her after all.

Appendix C

The purpose of this study is to learn more about how and why people act the way they do in their personal relationships. In a few moments, you will be reading a story describing a situation involving two friends. However, before reading the story, please fill out the following facts about yourself. This information is for classification purposes only. Please do not include your name or any other form of personal identification.

Thank you!

Age: ____ 15-20 years
____ 21-25 years
____ 26-30 years
____ 31-35 years
____ 36-40 years
____ 41-45 years
____ Over 45 years

Sex: ____ Male
____ Female

Marital Status: ____ Married
____ Divorced
____ Widowed
____ Separated
____ Single

No. of children, if any: _____

Date: _____

If employed, what is your occupation? _____

What kind of work do you plan to do in the future? _____

Education: ____ Some college
____ Completed college
____ Some graduate training
____ Completed graduate training
Other: _____

If currently enrolled, what degree are you seeking? _____

What is your major? _____

National or ethnic background: _____

What is the language you speak most often? ____ English
____ Spanish
Other: _____

Religion: _____

SS-TNT

STORY

INSTRUCTIONS: The following story describes a situation involving two very close friends. As you read the story, you are to imagine that you are actually in this situation that you are reading about. Pretending to be in a situation you've never been in can be a difficult thing to do. So as you read, please try hard to imagine that you really are the person ("you") in the story, even if this is not easy for you to do.

After you have read this story, you will be asked a number of questions about your reactions to this situation.

Your friend Susan and you work for an insurance company as junior accountants. The two of you met in high school and have been very close friends for many years. At the office, you try to look out for one another's interests in any way you can--by helping with work in emergencies, by sharing whatever information and gossip you happen to pick up about office politics, etc.

Both Susan and you work for the same department head, who is basically a fair boss. However, he tends to be somewhat hot-tempered and difficult to work for. Ever since you were hired, you have been trying very hard to do a good job, because your position at the firm is very important to you. Today you have just turned in a lengthy financial report you have been working on for weeks, and you are concerned about whether the boss will find it satisfactory. In the afternoon, the department head calls Susan into his office to discuss a new assignment. As she gets to his office the door is open slightly and she can hear him talking on the telephone. She decides to wait outside the door until he gets finished. Without meaning to listen, she cannot help hearing what he says. She realizes that he is talking to his senior assistant about your report. He is clearly dissatisfied with it, annoyed, and in a mood to fire you. When the department head hangs up Susan enters the office; fortunately, he does not know that she has been standing outside his office and that she heard part of his conversation.

Although Susan is not aware of it, you have been trying to make up your mind as to whether or not you should continue working on the report or get started on your new assignment. As you and Susan are getting ready to leave for the day, you ask Susan if the department head has given her any clues as to whether or not he liked your report. Susan doesn't know how to answer you, but she knows she has to say something. She decides not to tell you what she knows. Instead she says, "He hasn't said a word to me and I was with him most of the afternoon. I'm sure he thinks it is just fine."

You are very relieved to hear what Susan has to say, and on the basis of what she has told you, you decide not to work anymore on the old report. Instead you plunge right into your new assignment, which you know the department head needs for his own boss early next week.

It remains to be seen whether or not the department head was just in one of his bad moods the day he read the report and will appreciate you for tackling the new assignment he needs for his own boss, or whether he is truly dissatisfied with your report and will decide he has to let you go if you don't do anything to improve it.

QUESTIONS

1. In the story, how close are you and Susan? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

- Extremely close ☐
- Very close ☐
- Moderately close ☐
- Somewhat close ☐
- Not close at all ☐

2. In the story, did Susan really believed it when she told you that she thought the department head liked your report?

- YES ☐
- NO ☐

3. Basically, the results of what happened to you because of what Susan told you were: (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

- Definitely favorable ☐
- Mostly favorable ☐
- Slightly favorable ☐
- As much favorable as unfavorable ☐
- Slightly unfavorable ☐
- Mostly unfavorable ☐
- Definitely unfavorable ☐

4. Considering the circumstances you were in, do you feel it was all right for Susan to tell you that she thought the department head liked your report? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

Definitely all right	☐
Mostly all right	☐
Slightly all right	☐
Slightly not all right	☐
Mostly not all right	☐
Definitely not all right	☐

5. Why do you think Susan told you that she thought the department head liked your report? (PLEASE ANSWER BOTH PARTS TO QUESTION 5)

   a. Was it because Susan wanted to avoid being in an awkward or embarrassing situation? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

Definitely for this reason	☐
Very much for this reason	☐
Somewhat for this reason	☐
Slightly for this reason	☐
Not for this reason at all	☐

   b. Was it because Susan didn't want you to feel unhappy, worried, or hurt? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

Definitely for this reason	☐
Very much for this reason	☐
Somewhat for this reason	☐
Slightly for this reason	☐
Not for this reason at all	☐

6. How do you think what Susan told you will affect your relationship? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

- It might help our relationship a great deal ☐
- It might help our relationship somewhat ☐
- It probably won't affect our relationship one way or another ☐
- It might hurt our relationship somewhat ☐
- It might hurt our relationship a great deal ☐

7. a. What do you think the chances are you will find out Susan didn't really believe what she said to you? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

- Extremely likely I'll find out ☐
- Very likely I'll find out ☐
- Somewhat likely I'll find out ☐
- Somewhat unlikely I'll find out ☐
- Very unlikely I'll find out ☐
- Extremely unlikely I'll find out ☐

b. If you think you might find out Susan didn't really believe what she said to you, how or why would you find out? _____

_____

_____

8. Now imagine for a moment that the story had been different. Imagine that, instead of what Susan said to you, she had told what she really heard, namely, that the department head was unhappy with your report and had mentioned the possibility of firing you. Considering the circumstances she was in, would it have been all right for her to tell you this? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

Definitely all right	☐
Mostly all right	☐
Slightly all right	☐
Slightly not all right	☐
Mostly not all right	☐
Definitely not all right	☐

9. If Susan had told you what she really heard, why would she have told you this? (PLEASE ANSWER BOTH PARTS TO QUESTION 9)

   a. Would it have been because Susan likes to think of herself as the type of person who would tell her friend what she really knew? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

Definitely for this reason	☐
Very much for this reason	☐
Somewhat for this reason	☐
Slightly for this reason	☐
Not for this reason at all	☐

   b. Would it have been because Susan felt that telling you what she really knew would be the best thing she could have done for you under the circumstances? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

Definitely for this reason	☐
Very much for this reason	☐
Somewhat for this reason	☐
Slightly for this reason	☐
Not for this reason at all	☐

10. Do you think it would have been difficult for Susan to tell you what she really knew about the department head's reaction to your report? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

- ☐ Extremely difficult
- ☐ Very difficult
- ☐ Somewhat difficult
- ☐ Slightly difficult
- ☐ Not difficult at all

11. If Susan had told you what she really knew about the department head's reaction to your report, how do you think this would have affected your relationship? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

- ☐ It might have helped our relationship a great deal
- ☐ It might have helped our relationship somewhat
- ☐ It probably wouldn't have affected our relationship one way or another
- ☐ It might have hurt our relationship somewhat
- ☐ It might have hurt our relationship a great deal

12. In the original story, the main reason Susan told you the department head liked your report was: (CHECK ONLY ONE)

- ☐ To avoid being in an awkward or embarrassing situation
- ☐ So I wouldn't feel unhappy, worried or hurt

13. If the story had been different and Susan had told you what she really knew, the main reason would have been: (CHECK ONLY ONE)

- ☐ Because Susan likes to think of herself as the type of person who would tell her friend what she really knew
- ☐ Because she felt that telling me what she really knew would have been the best thing for me under the circumstances

14. If Susan had told you what she really knew about the department head's reaction to your report, do you think you would have done anything differently as a result?

YES ☐

NO ☐

If "YES," what? _____

_____

15. While you were reading the story and answering the questions, was it hard for you to put yourself in the role of the character ("you") in the story? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

Extremely difficult ☐

Very difficult ☐

Somewhat difficult ☐

Slightly difficult ☐

Not difficult at all ☐

16. By answering all these questions about the situation you read about, you may have thought more about this type of situation than you ordinarily would have. Has your reaction to the story changed any?

YES ☐

NO ☐

If "YES," in what way? _____

_____

17. All things considered, do you feel it was all right for Susan to tell you that she thought the department head liked your report? (PLEASE CHECK ONLY ONE BOX)

Definitely all right ☐

Mostly all right ☐

Slightly all right ☐

Slightly not all right ☐

Mostly not all right ☐

Definitely not all right ☐

INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. How honest I will be with a very close friend will depend on what the situation is.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

2. It is sometimes necessary to lie to a very close friend in order to protect the friendship.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

3. I feel it is important to be very honest with my very close friends, no matter what the subject matter is.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

4. It is never necessary to lie to a very close friend.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

5. I feel it is important to recognize when I can be honest with a close friend and when I can't be.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

6. Sometimes honesty can do as much damage to a close friendship as lying can.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

7. How honest I will be with a very close friend will depend on who the friend is.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

8. There are times when lying to a close friend is sometimes the wisest thing a person can do.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

9. I would never lie to one of my closest friends.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

10. No close friendship would ever last if both people were always completely honest with each other.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Slightly Agree	Slightly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

You have now completed the questionnaire. Please take just another minute or two to give any additional comments or questions you have as a result of reading this story and answering the questions which followed:

COMMENTS: _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

Thank you very much!

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