REASONS, CAUSES AND THE UNCONSCIOUS IN FREUD

by

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Abstract

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The purpose of this study is to investigate the model of explanation presupposed by Freud's theory of unconscious motivation. The question is examined from the perspective of a distinction between a reason-giving model of explanation and a causal model. After providing a philosophical explication of these two models, the distinction is applied to specific Freudian texts. An overall pattern of development is discerned in Freud's intellectual career. While his early works shift from one model of explanation to the other, his later works display an increasing desire to form a synthesis of the two. In the final chapter this analysis is used to clarify the issue of what conclusions can be drawn from Freud's work concerning the concept of rationality.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

REASONS AND CAUSES

A. Introduction: Two ways of explaining behavior.

It is certainly no exaggeration to say that the issue of the respective roles of science and the humanities in the understanding of man is one of the dominant themes of contemporary thought. Echoes of this basic issue have manifested themselves as technical but highly important questions in nearly every area of inquiry. Within philosophy, attempts to answer questions closely related to this basic issue constitute one of the strongest remaining links between academic philosophy and broader cultural and intellectual issues. One of the most widely discussed of these questions in philosophy is the relation between reasons and causes in the explanation of human behavior. Often, that is, we explain something we did just by citing the reason for which we did it. For many purposes this is taken to be a perfectly good explanation of our behavior. Much of contemporary psychology, however, seems to suggest that such explanations are either insufficient or even entirely beside the point. A great deal of what has been done in psychology is an attempt to explain behavior by discovering its causes. These might be seen as supplementing reason explanations by showing why we have the reasons in the first place or, more radically, as showing reasons to be irrelevant. These developments have, of course,

prompted a counter-thrust in which the primacy of reasons has been maintained; it has been argued that it is causal explanations of human acts which are either impossible or irrelevant.

Although the philosophical issue under discussion here is intricately interconnected with other basic issues such as the mind-body problem and freedom versus determinism, it has developed along its own lines and it has done so in a way which has encouraged philosophers and psychologists to benefit from each other's work. In this study I will attempt to contribute to the discussion by considering the issue specifically in light of Freud's theory of the unconscious. The basic question to which I will address myself is this: given a distinction between reason explanations and cause explanations, which type of explanation does Freud's theory offer? Of course, it will quickly be seen that Freud's work presupposed elements of both types of explanation. In terms of this issue, Freud's thought is not nearly as philosophically neat as, say, behaviorist or existentialist approaches in psychology. The basic goal of the study, therefore, will be to sort out which aspects of Freud's thought are associated with each type of explanation, and to investigate the relationship between these two aspects of his work.

I will be interested both in what light Freud's theory can shed on the philosophical issue and in seeing if a clear analysis of the philosophical issue can enhance our under-

standing of Freud. In the first four chapters, however, there will be more of an emphasis on the latter goal. I will attempt to simplify the philosophical issue so that it can be used most effectively to clarify some basic features of Freud's thought. In the fifth chapter this emphasis will be reversed; I will utilize the conclusions reached about Freud to clarify some philosophical questions about the concept of rationality.

I will begin by making some comments on the reason-cause debate in philosophy. There are three tasks I wish to accomplish in this chapter. In the first place, I will attempt to state the distinction between cause explanations and reason explanations as clearly and simply as possible. Secondly I will try to show that the distinction itself, although not, of course, all the uses to which it is put, is compatible with a very wide range of views in philosophy. Making the reason-cause distinction is not, however, entirely without philosophical consequences, and I will have to argue against certain views which call the distinction into question in a very basic way. My third task will be to distill from the discussion up to that point what is needed to use the distinction for the investigation of Freud's thought. Specifically, I will try to make clear what should count as evidence that an explanation is either of a causal or reason-giving sort, so that when we plunge into the Freudian text we will know what we are looking for.

The first task of this chapter, however, is just to state the distinction I wish to make. Initially, the difference between cause explanations and reason explanations may be formulated as follows. Causal explanations of human behavior presuppose that whatever differences there may or may not be between people and other things, these differences are not so basic as to require a unique model of explanation for people. Very often the view that causal explanations are appropriate for human behavior is based on the view that the human organism is continuous with and a part of the physical world in the sense that the only difference between people and other matter is in complexity of organization. Others recognize differences between people (or animal life, or life in general) and other matter but hold, nevertheless, that causal explanations are appropriate for explaining human behavior. It should be made clear that causal explanations are not necessarily physicalistic. Many philosophers have held that causal relations can hold among mental entities, and also between mental entities and actions.

Reason explanations, as I will use the term, always refer to such things as wishes, desires, purposes, goals, etc. We might abbreviate this by saying that reason explanations always refer to certain kinds of mental entities. However, I do not mean to presuppose by this the existence of any ghosts in the machine. The reasons on the basis of which people act may be events which are external to the act, or they may be

just further ways of describing the act. But in any case I take it as unproblematically true that people sometimes act for reasons, and that citing these reasons is ordinarily taken to be one way of explaining an act.

An immediate consequence of tying the concept of reason explanation this tightly to actual reasons (although without attempting to say what these reasons consist in) is to show a sharp contrast between reason explanations and what are sometimes called purposive or teleological explanations. These latter terms are sometimes used to refer to explanations which invoke the goal-directed characteristic of various kinds of systems. In this context, "purposive" or "goal-directed" are used to refer to the behavior of any system which happens to be so constructed that it tends to move toward, or stabilize around something, which is therefore called the "goal" or "purpose". It is clear, however, and in fact it was one of the things the cybernetics people wanted most to show, that such behavior can take place without the system in question actually having in mind any goals or purposes. It has often been argued, for example by Nagel[1], that when explanations of this kind are stated in a teleological form, that is, when the goal or end result appears as the cause of the previous behavior, such explanations are always equivalent to others which are not teleological in form. This argument is intended to refute claims about the autonomy of biology based on the teleological form of many of the

explanations found in that discipline. It is not, however, intended to show that what I am calling reason explanations are necessarily equivalent to anything else. Nagel, in setting up hs argument, is very careful to make clear exactly what kinds of arguments he wants to deal with. He says:

> Quite apart from their association with the doctrine of final causes, teleological explanations are sometimes suspect in modern natural science because they are assumed to invoke purposes or ends-in-view as causal factors in natural processes. Purposes and deliberate goals admittedly play important roles in human activities; but there is no basis whatever for assuming them in the study of physico-chemical and most biological phenomena. However, as has already been noted, there are a great many explanations which do not postulate any purposes or ends-in-view; for explanations are often said to be "teleological" only in the sense that they specify the <u>functions</u> which things or processes possess.[2]

It is only these latter kinds of explanations which Nagel wants to show to be equivalent to non-teleological explanations. I am using the term reason explanation, however, to refer precisely to those explanations which do invoke actual purposes and deliberate goals and which, Nagel says, "admittedly play important roles in human activities," but about which he is not concerned to show anything.

By making clear that reason explanations always refer to actual reasons, we can thus avoid confusing the distinction between reasons and causes with other distinctions. This, however, cannot be all there is to the distinction. In the first place, some philosophers hold that the mental events

which constitute reasons are identical to physical events. And secondly, even if mental events are distinct from physical events, some philosophers hold that causal relations can hold among mental events. Since I would like to make the distinction in a way that does not presuppose a position on these issues, I will have to base it on something more than just the mental-physical distinction. It remains true that if an explanation is physical it must be causal. But if an explanation is mental, this is not sufficient to show that it is a reason explanation.

The most basic aspect ot the distinction may now be stated as follows. To explain something is, in a broad sense, to show that it was not unexpected. Cause explanations and reason explanations both do this, but they do it in different ways. A cause explanation shows that the behavior was to be expected because there was some set of factors already in existence at the time of the behavior which had a certain kind of relation to the behavior. Depending on one's analysis of causation, that relation might be one of necessary condition, or it might be one of sufficient condition, or it might be some kind of combination of the two. But what is important here is that the relationship between the behavior and the causal explanatory factors <u>has</u> a logic. Causal explanations show that the behavior was to be expected because there were other factors present which in some sense <u>brought about</u> the behavior. While we can leave open for the

moment the logical analysis of this "bringing about" relation, it is at least clear that a causal relation has a logic.

A reason explanation, on the other hand, shows that the behavior was not unexpected because the person had a reason for doing what he did. The important point here is that simply the presence of the reason, rather that the logic of its relation to the behavior, is what provides the explanation. I do not want to deny that we can learn more about the relation of reasons to behavior, or even that the relation might turn out to be causal. The point is just that, qua reason explanation, it does not require for its adequacy knowing anything more about its relation to behavior. We do not require that a reason be shown to be a necessary, sufficient, or any other sort of condition for the behavior before we will accept it as an explanation. In order for a reason explanation to be adequate, we do require that the reason be appropriate to the behavior (in a way that will be brought out more fully in the discussion of Davidson below) but we do not need to show that there is any stronger sense in which the reason brought about the behavior.

While it is fairly clear in what sense a causal explanation shows that the behavior was to be expected, it is not immediately clear how a reason explanation does this. A cause explanation cites factors on the basis of which we can see that in some sense the behavior had to take place. When we cite a reason, however, we have not shown that the

behavior had to take place. In what sense, then, have we explained it? Although this is an important and interesting question, it is not one I will try to answer. The point which is important for making the reason-cause distinction is just that giving one's reason for acting is ordinarily taken to be one way of explaining the action, despite the fact that the reason is not any sort of condition for the action.

To sum up, then, any explanation of behavior which cites factors which are held to have <u>brought about</u> the behavior is a causal explanation. A reason explanation, on the other hand, cites wants and beliefs of the person at the time of the behavior. One of the beliefs must be that the behavior is relevant to the wants but no stronger connection between these mental factors and the behavior needs to be demonstrated in order for the explanation to be accepted as adequate. Of course, making the distinction in this way does not mean that reasons and causes are necessarily disjoint concepts. It might be that having the kinds of wants and beliefs which constitutes reasons is what brings about behavior. But this is something which remains to be seen. We certainly have no psychological theory yet which shows any causal connection between reason and behavior. As Noam Chomsky points out, we still know almost nothing about the ways in which wants and beliefs actually bring about behavior. "...when we turn to such matters as causation of behavior," Chomsky says, "it seems to me that no progress

has been made, that we are as much in the dark as to how to proceed as in the past... Roughly, where we deal with cognitive structures, either in a mature state of knowledge and belief or in the initial state, we face problems, but not mysteries. When we ask how humans make use of these cognitive structures, how and why they make choices and behave as they do, although there is much that we can say as human beings with intuition and insight, there is little, I believe, that we can say as scientists."[3]

What is important here, though, is that when we speak as human beings and give reasons for our behavior, what we say is evaluated in terms of the appropriateness of the wants and beliefs we cite to the behavior, rather than the rigor with which we have shown that they are what brought about the behavior. Suppose, for example, we ask someone why he is eating only an apple for lunch and he replies that he wants to lose weight and is therefore dieting. The adequacy of this statement as a reason explanation would not be at all diminished by the knowledge that this person had wanted to lose weight for years and had known all along that dieting was the way to do it. And the adequacy would also not be diminished if the following day the person reverted to his old eating habits. Thus a reason may cite factors which were present on, say, a thousand occasions when the behavior did not take place ond only one on which it did. Of course, in this case if we wish to find out what <u>brought about</u> the

behavior, that is, what factors caused the person to refrain from a large meal on this particular occasion, we will have to uncover a large and complex set of wants, beliefs and other circumstances. When the person says simply that he is dieting he has certainly not done this, but his remark is still a perfectly good reason explanation.

The conviction that there are indeed two ways of explaining behavior may also be enhanced by noting that there is a sense in which causal explanations are essentially diachronic while reason explanations are not. Causes are most often thought of as factors which preceed their effects. In fact, in the literature of sciences such as psychology and biology, it is difficult to find occurences of the word "cause" except in contexts which explicitly refer to them as prior factors. A.C. MacIntyre, for example, in his discussion of Freud, does not talk about just "causes", he talks about "antecedent causal determinants."[4] In another discussion of Freud, Bernard Elevitch doesn't just talk about a causal interpretation of psychoanalysis, he talks about that interpretation which holds that it explains behavior by "locating its (efficient) cause somewhere in the past."[5] In The Philosophy of Biological Science, David Hull suggest that what is most basic to science is that "All events are explained in terms of antecedent events organized in terms of causal chains and networks...".[6] And even Donald Davidson, in his classical article "Actions,

Reasons and Causes," seems to use the phrases "led up to" and "caused" as synonomous.[7] The more sophisticated branches of science, of course, often give explanations in which it is difficult to pick out a prior cause and a subsequent effect. Bertrand Russell thought that this was a sufficient reason to give up the notion that causality is important to science. Others argue that such explanations are indeed causal but that in fact causes and effects can be simultaneous. What is common to all these points of view, however, is that causal relations occur through a period of time. Either we have a cause and then an effect, or else the cause and effect may be factors (perhaps an independent and a dependent variable) which are both unfolding during some time period. But in either case a causal relation is essentially diachronic.

A reason-giving explanation, however, is not essentially diachronic. When a person explains something he did by giving his reason, he may refer to events prior to or subsequent to the behavior. A person may explain giving a gift to someone by referring to a previous gift from that person. And he may explain writing a will by referring to his subsequent death. But an explanation will only be satisfactory if the reason applied to the person at the time of the behavior; that is, if he <u>had</u> the reason at that time. A reason which a person had in the past but not in the present would not explain present action. Of course, we know from

experience that reasons are fairly stable - they do not pop into or out of existence too abruptly too often. So if someone had a reason for doing something at one moment, and several moments later does it, it is a fair guess that (ceteris paribus) that reason explains it. But this is only because we assume the person still had the reason. In explaining an action on the basis of some reason, no matter how long it had been there, it is only the applicability of that reason in the "here and now," as the Gestaltists would put it, that is strictly relevant to explaining the action. Thus although reasons may exist through time, it is not their unfolding through time which explains behavior. It is just the reason as it applies at the time of the behavior, and in this sense reason explanations are synchronic.

B. The prima facie distinction and its philosophical implications.

It will not at all be my purpose to argue that this distinction is in any way ultimate or that either mode of explanation is in principle not reducible to the other. Indeed, it is my view that while in some of Freud's early work there is a sharp distinction between the two kinds of explanation, he groped his way toward a synthesis of the two, if not with complete success, at least with a great deal of insight and elegance of theory. However, it does seem to me that the distinction is so firmly embedded in

our ordinary ways of thinking and talking about people, that the distinction can not be shown to be actually non-existent, unintelligible, or resolvable simply by analysis. I see the situation as somewhat analogous to the ancient distinction between the terrestrial and heavenly realms. It was a distinction which served the ordinary understanding well and although there may have been good arguments against it earlier, it was eradicated only by the empirical discoveries of science culminating in the Newtonian theory of gravitation.

However, an important line of argument recently has been that there simply is no distinction between causal and reason explanation, or, alternatively, that the distinction is unintelligible. Of course, to the degree that the distinction is unintelligible, portions of this study will be unintelligible. It seems to me, however, that there are good reason for feeling that arguments seeking to show that there is no distinction are at best premature. We can conveniently divide such arguments into two categories: 1. arguments seeking to show that causal explanations are really reason-giving and 2. arguments seeking to show that reason explanations are really causal. I feel that each kind of argument is fundamentally mistaken.

1. The idea that causes are really disguised reasons, in part has its roots in British empiricism and especially

Hume. The use to which some recent thinkers have put empiricist insights, however, is quite different from what Hume envisioned. Richard deCharms, for example,[8] takes as his starting point Hume's view that the aspect of necessity in our notion of causation is psychological in origin. Under the influence of Piaget, however, he argues that the psychology involved is more complex than the simple association of ideas pictured by Hume. And under the influence of Polanyi, he denies that the essential anthropomorphism involved in the concept of cause shows, as Russell felt,[9] the limits of its use as a concept, but rather that it enhances its importance. However, the point emphasized by deCharms is that the concept of motivation is more basic and more comprehensive than that of cause. The way in which deCharms sums up his position is this:

> Where does the concept of causation come from? ... We get our knowledge of causation from our knowledge of motivation... The first "cause" that any of us knows is ourselves. When we are motivated we cause things to happen. We have immediate knowledge of our motives prior to any knowledge of physical causes. What we all know from childhood is that we do things and something happens in our surrounding environment - we cause effects in the physical world...[10]

A similar, although slightly weaker view, is also suggested by Michael Dummett. He says:

> ...our concept of cause is bound up with our concept of intentional action: if an

> event is properly said to cause the occurrence of a subsequent or simultaneous event, I think it necessarily follows that, if we can find any way of bringing about the former event... then it must make sense to speak of bringing it about <u>in order</u> that the subsequent event should occur. Moreover, I believe that this connection between something's being a cause and the possibility of using it in order to bring about its effect plays an essential role in the fundamental account of how we ever come to accept causal laws: that is, that we could arrive at causal beliefs only by beginning with those in which the cause is a voluntary action of ours.[11]

Aside from the questionable psychology of this view, the conclusion, which deCharms draws explicitly and Dummett seems to be suggesting, that causation is really just an extension of motivation, is surely reached only by committing some sort of genetic fallacy. It may be that we know of our own motives before we attribute causes in the physical world (although the reverse is just as plausible) and this experience of motivation might even be what suggests to us the idea of attributing causation to external events. But this does not mean that causality is merely an extension of motive. Whatever the history of either concept may be, they nevertheless appear to be distinct concepts.

2. The opposite view - that reasons are actually causes - deserves greater attention since it has been a much more important approach in recent philosophical discussion. To begin with, I think it is important to disentangle two separate issues. The first is whether reasons simply are

causes. That is, when people give ordinary reason explanations of behavior, do these explanations satisfy the criteria for some sense of causal explanation. The second is whether it is conceptually possible to develop a theory of human behavior in which reasons operate as causal antecedents. It is important to what I wish to say in this study both to answer the first question negatively and to answer the second question affirmatively. Unfortunately, these two issues are not always clearly enough distinguished. In a recent article, for example, R.C. Solomon argues for an affirmative answer to the second question.[12] But because he fails to distinguish the two issues he takes himself to be arguing against people with whom I do not believe he has any quarrel. His statement of the view against which he is arguing is expressed like this:

> Other philosophers have argued that reason-explanations rather give us the point or the purpose of the action... These philosophers have argued that reason-explanations are decidedly different from causal explanations, and that the two sorts of explanations are mutually exclusive. Becuase it has been persuasively argued that many actions can only be explained by appeal to reason-explanations, it has been argued that a general science of human behavior is a conceptual impossibility.[13]

Against this view, Solomon wants to argue that a theory of human behavior in which reasons play the role of causes, is, in fact, quite possible. However, it is one thing to hold that reasons and causes are "decidedly different" and quite

another to hold that they are "mutually exclusive." Among those works to which Solomon attributes attempts to establish crucial aspects of the view are R.S. Peters' The Concept of Motivation[14] and Charles Taylor's The Explanation of Behavior.[15] It is certainly true that both books argue that reason-explanations and cause-explanations are quite different. Moreover, both books do argue quite strongly against the behaviorist view that human actions can be adequately explained causally with a thorough understanding of how conditioning takes place. However, I do not think that either book can be taken as an argument against the possibility of a causal explanation of behavior. In both cases the argument against behaviorism is not that it is causal, but that it makes no mention of reasons. Peters' basic argument is that since we cannot specify an action in terms of movements of the body, nothing stated in terms of movements of the body could serve as a cause of an action. The way in which he sometimes expresses this point has, I think, led to a misunderstanding of his position. At one point he says,

> "signing a contract," for instance, is a typical example of a human action. The movements involved are grouped together because they are seen by the agent to be efficient and appropriate means to an end. But it would be impossible to state exhaustively what the movements must be... So we could never give a sufficient explanation of an action in causal terms because we could never stipulate the movements which would have to count as dependent variables.[16]

Although Peters here frames his argument in terms of an objection to causal theories, it is clear that it is an objection only to behavioristic causal theories, and what he is objecting to is not the causality but the behaviorism. He is not denying the possibility of a causal relationship between reasons and actions and, in fact, his argument seems compatible even with neurophysiological explanations of action.

Charles Taylor also argues against the adequacy of some current theories, but he is careful not to argue for the impossibility of any sort of causal theories at all. His view is that the ordinary explanation of human actions makes some presuppositions which are incompatible with causal explanations. But, he says,

> ...the fact that we make the distinction we do between action and non-action offers no guarantee that the type of explanation which it presupposes is the correct one, that the conceptual scheme in which it is embedded is beyond revision. For it is possible that we are making an invalid distinction while still distinguishing things which are really different. The fact that "action" can't be applied in its present sense to beings whose behavior could be accounted for by non-teleological laws does not of itself prove that we are not such beings. The issue remains open.[17]

More recently Taylor has reiterated this point, saying, "I don't believe that there is any argument in principle which can show that mechanistic explanation is impossible."[18]

Thus it seems to me that when Solomon argues that it

is possible in principle for reasons to play the role of causal antecedents in a theory of human behavior, he is asserting something that both R.S. Peters and Charles Taylor, for slightly different reasons, are quite far from denying. As long as we keep in mind the distinction between holding, on the one hand, that there is a prima facie distinction between reasons and causes, and on the other that the gap between reason and causes is absolute and cannot be bridged by any possible theory, I think we can state a position which would receive fairly wide agreement. It is simply that while our ordinary way of speaking about people does embody a distinction between reasons and causes, this is no reason to declare the conceptual impossibility of causal theories of behavior, including causal theories in which reasons are an important element.

Although I think that many philosophers would agree with this sort of position, there <u>are</u> some who disagree on the grounds that there is no valid distinction at all to be made between reasons and causes; that reasons simply are causes. I would like to consider three important papers which have been taken to incorporate this view: Donald Davidson's "Actions, Reasons and Causes,"[19] Stephan Toulmin's "Reasons and Causes,"[20] and Norman Malcolm's "The Conceivability of Mechanism."[21] These three articles are not only persuasive arguments for the view that reasons are causes but they also illustrate the variety of

perspectives which seems to give rise to that position. Toulmin and Davidson on the one hand, and Malcolm on the other, use the view in trying to establish very different kinds of conclusions: Toulmin and Davidson that reasons and causes are compatible, and Malcolm that mechanistic explanations of human actions are inconceivable. Let me begin, however, with Davidson.

There is one sense in which my criticism of Davidson, although I think it is important, is only superficial. His basic purpose in the paper is to argue against the use of the reason-cause distinction to show that the intentional or purposive nature of human actions places them ultimately beyond the reach of causal laws. Davidson gives a number of reasons why these arguments will not go through. If his own arguments are successful then it is not conceptually impossible for reasons to be causes of things people do. So far there is nothing in his argument which is incompatible with making the distinction I want to make. Davidson is often taken, however, to have shown that one cannot make the reason-cause distinction at all because reasons simply are causes. In this case, it is not because Davidson has been misunderstood, but because it is what he said. He begins the article in the following way:

> What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations and say

> that the reason <u>rationalizes</u> the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation.[22]

He divides his argument into two claims, C1 and C2.

> C1. R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under description d only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent toward actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under description d, has that property.[23]
>
> C2. A primary reason for an action is its cause.[24]

If this position were sustained by his arguments then he certainly would have called into question the very drawing of a distinction between reasons and causes. What I want to argue, however, is that this way of characterizing his position runs way ahead of the consequences of his actual arguments. He has effectively shown that reasons <u>might</u> be causes, but not that they simply <u>are</u> causes. There is, of course, a rather unimportant sense in which his thesis is indeed at least the ancient view. If he means by ancient the Aristotelian concept of cause then reasons certainly are one kind of cause - specifically they are final causes. But the current debate concerns the relation between reasons and the modern sense of "cause," which is a descendant only of the Aristotelian "efficient cause," not any of the other three. And it is not at all clear that it was ever the common sense view that reasons are this sort of cause.

In fact it seems to me that if anything is the common sense position, it is that reasons are rather different from causes. Davidson's way of characterizing his position looses a good deal of its plausibility on closer scrutiny. A hint of the problem is evident immediately upon considering Davidson's choice of the term "rationalization" to refer to explaining an action by citing the agent's primary reason. Davidson could hardly have chosen a term less suited to making his point. At least in the last few decades this term has come to have a clear connotation of referring to a reason which a person makes up, ad hoc, precisely because he is unaware, and perhaps does not wish to become aware, of the real reason. "Rationalization" sounds more like a species of obfuscation than causal explanation. Of course, the use of this term is not crucial to Davidson's position, but it is suggestive of the problem I see with his position. R.S. Peters tells the story of a highly religious and well-intentioned woman who engaged in sex with large numbers of men. Her reason for doing so, she claimed (and presumably believed) was to cure the men of homosexuality.[25] Now initially this looks like a clear-cut counterexample to Davidson's thesis. Although the woman's attitude toward homosexuality and her belief in the therapeutic value of sex appear to meet the criteria for a primary reason, I think we can assume in this case that they do not constitute the real cause of her behavior. We might say they constitute a

rationalization in Freud's rather than Davidson's sense.

Perhaps this is a point, however, where the concept of the unconscious can help in understanding a philosophical issue. Davidson has defined reasons in terms of "attitudes" and "beliefs." If he understands attitudes and beliefs to include unconscious states of mind then he may have a way of countering the kind of point made by Peters. He might argue that the woman's behavior has to do with a certain unconscious "pro attitude." I do not think, however, that this approach will succeed in rescuing precisely the kind of approach Davidson has taken. If he were to choose this line of reply, then in the Peters example, we would have two sets of pro attitudes and two sets of beliefs. We have the conscious pro attitude toward curing men of homosexuality and the belief that sex will help bring it about. We also, let us assume, have an unconscious pro attitude toward sex and the unconcsious belief that this particular "line" will help bring that about.

At this point, it seems to me, a certain ambiguity in Davidson's initial formulation makes itself felt. The ambiguity is whether the concept of "primary reason" is just a more precise formulation of the ordinary concept of reason or, on the other hand, a technical term which is only suggested by the ordinary concept of reason. If the former is the case then in the Peters example we have two primary reasons. Both the conscious and the unconscious

reasons meet the criteria for a "primary reason" since each consists of a pro attitude and a belief which "rationalizes" the action. And yet, according to our (quite plausible) assumption, only one is actually the cause of the behavior. Therefore, C2 fails since a primary reason, in this case the conscious one, is not always a cause.

On the other hand, Davidson might argue that "primary reason" is a wholly technical term. Looking back at C1, we notice that the criteria for a primary reason are given only as necessary, not sufficient conditions. Now Davidson might say that he is not just giving those conditions which are necessary to make the ordinary concept of reason into the more precise concept of primary reason, but rather that he is giving a partial definition of a technical term. Thus he might argue that in the Peters case, one of the reasons is not a primary reason since it fails to meet other criteria among those which are sufficient conditions for a reason to be a primary reason. But what other criteria <u>do</u> constitute sufficient conditions? Davidson does not say. He might say that in addition to the criteria mentioned in C1, the reason also must be the actual cause of the behavior. But this, of course, would make his argument circular. The problem, then, is whether he can state a sufficient condition which does not include the requirement that the reason be the cause, and yet which is strong enough to exclude one of the two reasons in the Peters case. Although my philosophical

intuitions suggest that he cannot, the important point here is that he has not. I therefore conclude that Davidson has failed to show that a reason simply is a cause. I have not argued that it cannot be, just that it is not clear that it must be.

Toulmin's paper also seems to me to eliminate the distinction too quickly. Toulmin is not arguing that all reason-explanations are causal, but he argues that some of them are. But for the ones that are, it is not that, given the truth of certain theories they could be, or that it is a logical possibility; they simply are causal explanations. Toulmin makes a curious distinction between citing a man's reasons for an action and citing his having reasons. When we speak in the first way we are giving a purposive explanation. When we speak in the second way, though, we are giving a causal explanation. "For what can serve as a 'motive' and 'cause' a man to act, is not a bare verbal agreement, but his acceptance of the argument as compelling."[26] There is, of course, a sense of "cause" which is loose enough so that saying a person was "caused" to act by the motive is just a stylistic variation of other expressions not using the term "cause." But the question is whether the relationship between a motive and an act is similar enough to typical situations in which some stricter sense of "cause" is appropriate, for there to be any point in insisting that a motive is a cause. The central fact that a motive is

neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the particular act it explains, and that it must be present at the same time as the act seems to lead to a negative answer to this question. Toulmin, however, does not deal with this issue. In fact, a central metaphor in his argument provides precisely the insight needed to see that he is wrong about the degree of similarity. Toulmin says that

> When...we specify the "reasons" for which a man acted as he did, we note the key features of his situation that figured in his deliberations: that is to say, the considerations which <u>carried weight</u> with him. In such a context, the phrase "carry weight" is neither empty nor merely figurative.[27]

While I would not say that the phrase was empty, it is, of course, figurative. It is hard to know what Toulmin has in mind in seeming to suggest that reasons <u>literally</u> weigh upon us. It is precisely the kind of example one would use to make clear that many of the expressions we use in relation to reasons, are used in such cases figuratively. The fact that this is so clearly a figurative use of the concept of weight shows, at least prima facie, what a great difference there is between reasons and causes.

Norman Malcolm's paper does not deal with the relation of reasons to causes directly. But a major part of his argument is intended to show that reasons provide sufficient conditions for actions. If this could be shown, then I

think that reasons and causes would be similar enough to call the distinction between them into question. Thus in a way Malcolm's paper is a more serious challenge to the prima facie distinction between reasons and causes than either the Davidson or Toulmin papers since it does deal head on with a central aspect of the question. However, I do not think that Malcolm has succeeded in showing that reasons provide sufficient conditions for actions.

Malcolm bases his argument that reasons provide sufficient conditions for action on the model he gives of purposive explanation. It looks very much like a Hempelian deductive-nomological model for natural science, but he feels that there is is one crucial difference. He gives the following paradigm:

> If a man wants to retrieve his hat and believes this requires him to climb a ladder, he will do so provided there are no countervailing factors.
>
> This man wanted to retrieve his hat and believed that this required him to climb a ladder, and there were no countervailing factors.
>
> Therefore, he climbed a ladder.[28]

Obviously, "countervailing factors" is a crucial term here. This is how Malcolm explains what he means by it:

> What sorts of things might be included under "countervailing factors" in such a case? The unavailability of a ladder, the fear of climbing one, the belief that someone would remove the ladder while he was

> on the roof, and so on. (The man's failure to climb the ladder would <u>not</u> be a countervailing factor.)[29]

Malcolm feels that the difference between this and a causal neurophysiological explanation is that what serves as the lawlike statement in the model is not a contingent assertion, as with neurophysiological explanation, but rather something we know to be true a priori. That is, Malcolm feels it is a priori true that "whenever organism O has goal G and believes B is required to bring about G, O will emit B provided there are no countervailing factors."[30] Now it seems to me that Malcolm is simply wrong about this; I think that the above statement is not a priori true, but is dependent upon a contingent theory to exactly the same degree as any other lawlike statement used in explanation. That is to say, reasons by themselves do not provide sufficient conditions for actions, only a theory which relates reasons and actions can do that.

Consider the following state of affairs. A person has a certain goal. Further, he believes that behavior B will bring it about. He is not aware of anything, like a fear of doing B, which could serve as a countervailing factor. And no outside observer sees any impediment, like the lack of any necessary equipment, to his doing B. Still, when the time comes, he does not do B. Remember that Malcolm has indicated that the failure to do B is not itself a

countervailing factor. Such a state of affairs does not seem impossible - indeed it is an everyday occurrence. Of course, I did not say that there were no countervailing factors. Perhaps there were. But anything introduced as a countervailing factor in this case would have to be something which 1) the person himself is unaware of and 2) is not manifest to an outside observer. It is precisely this kind of situation which leads to the Freudian notion of an unconscious block. But this is certainly a theoretical notion. Anything as profoundly unobservable as it would have to be to meet these two conditions would have to be theoretical. But there is no basis for saying that we know such things to exist a priori.

The next point that Malcolm makes in his paper might be taken as a counter-argument to what I have just said. Malcolm takes the position that it is part of what we <u>mean</u> by "intending" to do something that, in the absence of countervailing factors, it will actually be done. But I do not think that this is true. If it were true, it would be impossible, in principle, to know that someone at a certain moment had the intention to do something at some future moment. It is always possible that when that future moment arrives the person will not do it, and that no countervailing factors will be discernible, thus showing that the person did not have the intention in the first place. But it seems to me that when I say I intend to do

something I am referring, at least partly, to a present state of mind. If at some time I am clearly aware of having an intention, then, I certainly may change my mind at some future time, or, without changing my mind I may simply find later that I have not done what I had intended to do. But whatever may happen in the future, I do not see how it could change the truth of the statement that initially I had the intention. As Sartre points out, we must constantly remake our decisions. Just as with legistatures, previous decisions do not limit present options. If Malcolm were correct in saying that reasons provide sufficient conditions for actions, then the past states of our mind would determine our present actions in a way in which it is simply not clear that they do. In causal relationships, events at a certain time are taken to determine succeeding events. But the relationship between reasons and actions, at least in the absence of any confirmed theories, is a relationship between actions and the states of mind of people at the time they act.

C. Reasons, causes and the Freudian text.

Thus it seems to me that there is at least a prima facie distinction between explanations which invoke reasons and those which invoke causes. I have not argued that it is logically or conceptually impossible to formulate a theory which transcends the distinction, or reduces one

mode of explanation to the other, but merely that there is a distinction to be (perhaps) transcended. As opposed to Davidson, it seems to me that the common sense view does distinguish reasons and causes.

The discussion so far, of course, would not be at all adequate if its purpose was to explore philosophically the distinction itself. I have not made the distinction at all rigorously or comprehensively enough for that purpose. For one thing, the discussion so far leaves a large border area uncharted. One reason for the problem here is that reason explanations often contain unstated components. What is unclear, however, is how far we ought to extend the assumption that a causal sounding explanation is really an enthymemic version of a reason explanation. Suppose I explain why I punched someone by giving as my reason the fact that he punched me first. Despite the fact that my explanation refers only to a physical event, it is clearly an enthymemic reason explanation. In giving the explanation I would not be suggesting that being punched set off a causal chain which ended in the mechanical result of punching back. Rather, I would be indicating, in an abbreviated way, that my primary reason, in Davidson's terms, involved certain attitudes and beliefs concerning situations of this kind. However, we can construct other cases in which the reason refers to a physical event but in which it becomes less and less clear that there is an unstated element of a reason-giving sort. Suppose, for example,[31] I explain my rather

odd or inattentive behavior by saying that some loud noises kept me up all last night. Should this be construed as part of an explanation which includes, say, a pro attitude toward rest and a belief that relaxing my state of attentiveness is the best way to accomplish this, or would I indeed be claiming a causal chain between the loud noises and my present state of attentiveness?

There is a further sense in which the discussion so far has left the distinction problematical. To be most precise, what has been distinguished consists of two kinds of explanatory force rather than two sets of actual explanations. In other words, what makes an explanation fit into one category or the other is not always the use of a certain term or concept, or the fact that the explanation has a certain form, but rather just the fact that what has been provided carries a certain kind of force. Sometimes the kind of force which a given explanation carries is easy to determine. If the explanation involves no mental terms and is wholly physical, then the explanation is certainly causal. Even when mental terms are involved, the context or the form of the explanation may make clear which type it is. When I explain my meager lunch by saying that I would like to lose weight, my explanation clearly has a reason-giving sort of force. For an explanation using mental terms which clearly carries a causal sort of force, we might look at the classical Greenspoon experiment.[32] Greenspoon asked subjects to utter a list or words at random.

Whenever they produced a plural noun he would say "aha" in a vaguely affirmative way. Without realizing he was doing so, the subject would invariably increase the frequency of plural nouns in his lists. The explanation was that the subjects were being led to believe that this was expected of them, although without the subjects being aware either of the expectation or the fact that they were complying with it. Clearly, however, what is being suggested is a causal link between the behavior of the testor and that of the subject, with some mental processes in the subject acting as one stage in that link.

The type of force which an explanation carries, however, is not always so easy to determine. Especially with explanations based on unconscious mental factors, it is quite possible to have some sense that the explanation has indeed helped us to understand what the person did, but without being at all clear as to whether its force is more of a reason-giving or of a causal sort. Let us look at a typical example from Freud:

> I once succeeded in freeing an unmarried woman, no longer young, from the complex of symptoms which had condemned her for some fifteen years to an existence of torment and had now excluded her from any participation in life. She now felt she was well, and she plunged into eager activity, in order to develop her by no means small talent and to snatch a little recognition, enjoyment, and success, late though the moment was. But every one of her attempts ended either with people letting her know or with herself recognizing that she was too old to accomplish anything in that field. After

> each outcome of this kind a relapse into illness would have been the obvious thing, but she was no longer able to bring that about. Instead, she met each time with an accident which put her out of action for a time and caused her suffering. She fell down and sprained her ankle or hurt her knee, or she injured her hand in something she was doing. When she was made aware of how great her own share might be in these apparent accidents, she, so to say, changed her technique. Instead of accidents, indispositions appeared on the same provocations - catarrhs, sore throats, infuenzal conditions, rheumatic swellings - till at last she made up her mind to resign her attempts and the whole agitation came to an end.[33]

Freud explains these symptoms by saying that the woman had an "unconscious need for punishment." Now does this "need" carry a causal or a reason-giving sort of force? Freud continues his explanation with two sets of remarks, one of which interprets "need" causally and the other in a reason-giving way. In the first set of remarks he says:

> There is no doubt that, when the super-ego was first instituted, in equipping that agency use was made of the piece of the child's aggressiveness towards his parents for which he was unable to effect a discharge outwards on account of his erotic fixation as well as of external difficulties; and for that reason the severity of the super-ego need not simply correspond to the strictness of the upbringing... It is very possible that, when there are later occasions for suppressing aggressiveness, the instinct may take the same path that was opened to it at that decisive point of time.[34]

What makes this causal is that the "need" turns out to refer to the workings on an internal mechanism. It is the way in which this mechanism has operated in this person

over a period of time that has brought about the symptoms. Freud goes on, however, with the following remarks:

> People in whom this unconscious sense of guilt is excessively strong betray themselves in anylytic treatment by the negative therapeutic reaction which is so disagreeable from the prognostic point of view. When one has given them the solution of a symptom, which would normally be followed by at least its temporary disappearance, what they produce instead is a momentary exacerbation of the symptom and of the illness. It is often enough to praise them for their behavior in the treatment or to say a few hopeful words about the progress of the analysis in order to bring about an unmistakable worsening of their condition. A non-analyst would say that the 'will to recovery' was absent. If you follow the analytic way of thinking, you will see in this behavior a manifestation of the unconscious sense of guilt, for which being ill, with its sufferings and impediments, is just what is wanted.[35]

What makes this reason-giving is that it explains the behavior by showing that it was done in response to something the person wanted. Given those wants, the behavior was just as appropriate, just as understandable as, say, the meager lunch of the dieter.

The point of all this is simply that an explanation does not always come labelled with the nature of its explanatory force. Upon examination we may conclude that it must be causal, or that it must be reason-giving, or we may find that it can be interpreted either way. In the latter case we have the issue of whether the two are compatible or in conflict. Right now, however, I merely wish to point out that while there are criteria for deciding

which category an explanation fits into, it is not simply a matter of finding a key word in the text, or of seeing whether the explanation has a certain form. It is a matter, rather, of seeing whether the explanation points to something which brought about the behavior, or to the wants and beliefs in response to which the person believed he was acting.

Fortunately, I do not think it will be necessary to refine the distinction any further to deal with these problems. For the purposes of this study, it will only be necessary to distinguish reasons from causes in terms of the kinds of cases which actually arise in the Freudian text. Moreover, since for many of these cases both a reason-giving aspect and a causal aspect will be present, my purpose will be mainly to sort out these two aspects and to relate them to different strains in Freud's thought.

There are, however, two cases in which I will want to put the text into one of the two categories. It will be crucial to my thesis to show that The Interpretation of Dreams uses, in a rather pure form, a reason-giving model of explanation and that the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality uses a purely causal model of explanation. I think, though, that the way in which I have formulated the distinction will be sufficient for this purpose. My basic argument concerning the causal nature of the Three Essays will be that it is a purely physical explanation. Although, as I pointed out earlier, a causal explanation in not

necessarily physicalistic, still, if an explanation is physicalistic, that is sufficient to show it to be causal. I think that the anthropomorphism that would be involved in denying this can be dismissed without further discussion. In addition, I think it will be clear that there is not even a hint that the explanation might contain suppresed elements of a reason-giving sort. The way in which I have distinguished reasons and causes also suggests that we can expect causal explanations to be diachronic. I will therefore take the strongly diachronic aspect of the Three Essays as tending to confirm a causal interpretation.

In my discussion of The Interpretation of Dreams I will emphasize the fact that Freud wants to show that dreams are much more closely related to our ordinary thought processes than we had supposed. Our reasons for constructing dreams in certain ways is very much like our reasons for wakeful actions. And I will show that the reasons Freud cites in explanation of dreams are not construed as explaining on the basis of the logic of their relation to the dream. They are construed as explaining, as do wakeful reasons, just because we have them. Again, although I would not want to pin too much on this point, I will take the synchronic nature of this work as tending to confirm a reason-giving interpretation. It seems to me, therefore, that the distinction between reasons and causes had been formulated in a way that is sufficient for us to begin using it in an analysis of Freud's thought.

Footnotes for Chapter 1

1. Ernest Nagel, "Teleological Explanation and Teleological Systems", in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, New York, 1953.

2. Ibid., pp. 540-541.

3. Noam Chomsky, Reflections on Language, Pantheon Books, 1975, p. 138.

4. A.C. MacIntyre, The Unconscious, A Conceptual Study, Humanities Press, New York, 1958, p. 73.

5. Bernard Elevich, "Reasons, Motives and Psychoanalysis", Philosophical Forum, Winter-Spring, 1974-75, p. 143.

6. David Hull, The Philosophy of Biological Science, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1974, p. 6.

7. Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons and Causes", The Journal of Philosophy, LX, 23, p. 695.

8. Richard deCharms, Personal Causation: The Internal Affective Determinants of Behavior, Academic Press, New York, 1968.

9. Bertrand Russell, "Psychological and Physical Causal Laws", The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1961, pp. 311-319. Originally from The Analysis of Mind, 1921.

10. deCharms, p. 9.

11. Michael Dummett, "Bringing About the Past", in Richard M. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 252-253.

12. R.C. Solomon, "Reasons as Causal Explanations", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume XXXIV, Number 3, March 1974.

13. Solomon, p. 415.

14. R.S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, Humanities Press, New York, 1958.

15. Charles Taylor, The Explanation of Behavior, Humanities Press, New York, 1964.

16. Peters, pp. 12-13.

17. Taylor, p. 48.

18. Charles Taylor, "Comment" on Borger, in Robert Borger and Frank Cioffi, eds., Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 89. Charles Landesman, however, is more careful to note this aspect of Taylor's approach. Landesman says: "In recent discussion, the various problems in the philosophy of mind have been implicitly considered to be of a conceptual nature which can be resolved by a logical analysis of the concpets used in talking about the mind. But for Taylor, the choice between teleological principles, which he believes are implicated in our ordinary concepts, and physicalistic principles, which he thinks are not, is a scientific and empirical issue, not one decidable by logical analysis alone." From "The New Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind," The Review of Metaphysics, December, 1965, Volume XIX, Number 2, p. 334.

19. Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons and Causes", op. cit.

20. Stephen Toulmin, "Reasons and Causes", in Borger and Cioffi, pp. 1-27.

21. Norman Malcolm, "The Conceivability of Mechanism", The Philosophical Review, Volume LXXVII, Number 1, January, 1968, pp. 45-72.

22. Davidson, p. 685.

23. Davidson, p. 687.

24. Davidson, p. 693.

25. R.S. Peters, "Comment" on Toulmin, in Borger and Cioffi, p. 34.

26. Toulmin, in Borger and Cioffi, p. 19.

27. Ibid., p. 16.

28. Malcolm, p. 48.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 46

31. This example was suggested to me by Arthur Collins.

32. J. Greenspoon, "The Reinforcing Effect of Two Spoken Sounds on the Frequency of Two Responses", American Journal of Psychology, 68, pp. 409-416.

33. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, translated and edited by James Strachey, Norton, 1965, pp. 108-109.

34. Ibid., p. 109

35. Ibid., pp. 109-110.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREUD'S THEORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

In his introduction to philosophical psychology, Self, Gerald Myers points out that one weakness in Cartesian dualism is that while we know a good deal about the structure of the physical world, there is very little to be said about the structure of mental substance. It may therefore be argued

> that Descartes found his proper heir in Freud. For what is psychoanalytic theory but the attempt to formulate the "structure" of the human mind? ... But (Freud) also conjectured that future biology might replace psychoanalytic theory. Many of those continuing Freud's work retain his biological orientation, regarding psychoanalytic theory as antithetical to Cartesian dualism... The relation of Freudianism to Cartesianism is one of the untold stories of our time.[1]

Although this last sentence is certainly true in the sense of the relation of Freud and Descartes as historical figures, there is a monumental literature on the relation of Freud to those issues which have their origin, or at least a great part of their heritage, in Descartes. However, this literature, despite its size has done little to settle the question of the relation of Freud to those issues. One can still find expressed both the view that Freud is Descartes' "proper heir" as well as the view that he is Descartes' antithesis. Consider, for example, the following statement by Daniel Yankelovich and William

Barrett:

> It should be apparent from what has been said so far that Freud conceived the psychic apparatus primarily as a closed system... Of course, streams of influence reach it from the external world. But once these have activated it the apparatus proceeds to operate within its own intrapsychic territory according to its own autonomous laws. Its connection with the world is not one of essential involvement, but only of causal interplay.
>
> We have here a very obvious descendant of the classic notion of the mind as a Cartesian subject... Just how subject and object, mind and matter, meet in causal interaction is not explained by Descartes. The mystery persists in Freud.[2]

It seems clear to me that this tells less than the whole story. The major aspect of Freudian thought which this passage ignores is the theory of instincts. The instincts, although at least prima facie part of the physical world, are an integral aspect of the psychic apparatus. And Freud believed that the "mystery" of how the instincts in each individual are connected with the rest of the physical world, is solved by the theory of evolution. In his final formulation of the psychic apparatus, Freud terms its instinctual aspect the "id," which is the English rendering of "das Es," more literally, the "it." This terminology, I think, indicates how far Freud was from simply considering the psychic apparatus as a Cartesian subject.

It is perhaps not surprising to find a sort of equal and opposite distortion of Freud (that he is the "antithesis" of Descartes) asserted from a behaviorist perspective.

Skinner argues that although the Freudian psychic apparatus is unnecessarily complex, at least Freud does not consider it a closed system, but rather simply as a means of relating inputs and outputs of an organism. He succinctly summarizes his interpretation of the Freudian approach in these words:

> Some environmental condition, very often in the early life of the individual, leaves an effect upon the inner mental apparatus, and this, in turn, produces the behavioral manifestations or symptoms.[3]

Skinner, of course, feels that the main contribution of behaviorism is that it has directed our attention away from explanations, <u>either</u> purposive or causal, which have their origin within the person. Explanations of behavior are to be found in the environment. By interpreting Freud in the way he has, Skinner can see him as part of the general movement of psychology in this direction. The purpose of the Freudian psychic apparatus is just to "bridge the gap in space and time between the events he has proved to be causally related."[4] Again, there is an element of truth in this interpretation. If one looks, to take one example, at Freud's essay "Character and Anal Erotism"[5] the Skinner interpretation looks quite plausible. In that essay Freud tries to demonstrate a causal link between certain experiences in childhood, and clearly specified kinds of behavior in adult life. However, if one looks at the whole of Freud's work, the inadequacy of this interpretation becomes clear. Just as the Yankelovich-Barrett view makes the psychic

apparatus too active, this view makes it too passive. The psychic apparatus consists not only of the id, but also of the ego. And the ego does not merely store inputs from childhood, later to be passed on as outputs in adulthood. The ego has its own nature; it is an initiator; its activities are meaningful and purposeful.

It seems clear to me that Freud is neither Descartes' "proper heir" nor his "antithesis"; his relationship to Descartes is a good deal more complex than either of these terms would suggest. In fact Freud's relationship to any line of thought is difficult to pin down because he combines a number of divergent strains in his own thought. A proper understanding of Freud requires one to see just how Freud attempts to blend these into one coherent view. Some thinkers do recognize the existence of opposite poles within Freud's thought, but see this an an ultimate, unresolved conflict. Norman O. Brown says that Freud "is paradox, or nothing."[6] And the psychoanalyst R.R. Holt argues that "there is a pervasive, unresolved conflict within all of Freud's writings."[7] However, I believe it may be possible to discover a certain coherence in Freud's thought. I think the question might best be focused by considering what type of model of explanation Freud employed in developing a theory of the mind built around the concept of the unconscious. The Yankelovich-Barrett statement seems to see Freudian theory as operating squarely within a reason-

giving model. The Skinner view sees Freud employing a causal model. Just what type of explanation of human behavior did Freud offer?

Many of those who have attempted to answer this question too quickly have oversimplified Freud by thinking of him as using either a clear-cut causal model, or a clear-cut reason-giving model. In doing so, philosophers and psychologists have come up with exactly opposite answers, just as in discussing the relation of Freud and Descartes. Stephen Toulmin, for example, says that "the kernel of Freud's discovery is the introduction of a technique in which the psychotherapist begins by studying the motives for, rather than the causes of neurotic behavior."[8] Similarly, Antony Flew says:

> ...the kernel of Freud's discoveries was this: if you are prepared so to extend such notions as motive, intention, purpose, wish and desire that it becomes proper to speak of motives and so forth which are not known...to the person who harbors them, you can interpret (and even guide) far more of human behavior...[9]

On the other hand, causal interpretations abound also. A.C. MacIntyre says that "the whole structure of his theory leads him to see an omnipresent causation exerted upon the conscious life by the unconscious."[10] And the psychologist H.J. Eysenck attributes to Freud the view that "...all mental and physical events have causes and could be predicted if these causes were fully known."[11] Michael Wyschogrod says that on the basis of the concept of the unconscious,

> it became possible to explain in the most convincing manner possible, the illusion of freedom inherent in human consciousness while, at the same time, showing how causal structures were at work behind the facade of consciousness...[12]

And similarly, Robert P. Knight says:

> Whatever human actions or decisions seem to indicate the operation of a free will, or a freedom of choice, can be shown on closer inspection and analysis, to be based on unconscious determinism. The causal factors were there and operative, but were simply not in the conscious awareness of the individual.[13]

Those who offer each kind of interpretation feel quite sure that they have captured the essence of Freudian thought. They can do so, however, only by ignoring major segments of what Freud actually said.

When both aspects of Freud's thought are recognized, different conclusions can be drawn. One, already noted, is simply to say that Freud is inconsistent. On the question of causality Sartre, for example, says:

> It is the profound contradiction of all psychoanalysis to introduce <u>both</u> a bond of causality and a bond of comprehension between the phenomena which it studies. These two types of connection are incompatible.[14]

An alternative approach to the question of Freud's basic model of explanation, and the one most often adopted in the psychoanalytic community, is simply to label each element in his thought as a "point of view" or "model" and to take

the position that these models do not compete but rather are complementary. P.J. Van Der Leeuw, for example, simply says that Freud's thought is "multidemensional" and suggests, without any recognition of possible philosophical problems, that this is all to the good.[15] More importantly, David Rappaport, in what is perhaps the most ambitious attempt to provide a systematic reconstruction of Freud's theory,[16] argues that the full range of his views can be condensed into five points of view.[17] The five points of view, with their definitions, are as follows:

1. The dynamic point of view: all behavior is ultimately drive determined.
2. The economic point of view: all behavior disposes of and is regulated by psychic energy.
3. The structural point of view: all behavior has structural determiners.
4. The genetic point of view: all behavior is part of a genetic series.
5. The adaptive point of view: all behavior is determined by reality.[18]

There appears to be a straightforward inconsistency in this set of definitions. The problem is that the use of the terms "all behavior" and "determined" in their definitions make them incompatible. If Rappaport had defined them by saying that they each determine some aspect of behavior, or that each is a partial determinant of all behavior, then the five models might legitimately be regarded as complimentary. But there simply cannot be a plurality of factors each of which fully determines all behavior.

Rappaport is not completely unaware of this problem and

one can discern two tentative attempts to deal with it in his study. First, he suggests that the inability to relate systematically the various models is due to the relative immaturity of psychoanalysis as a science. "The clearest indication of prematurity," he says, "is the uncertainty whether we are not yet able to connect these systematically, or whether they need not or cannot be connected."[19] It seems to me unlikely, however, that the further development of psychoanalysis as a science will shed much light on the matter. The question is so basic to the conceptual framework of psychoanalysis that resolving it would seem to be an important factor in determining how and perhaps even whether psychoanalysis develops as a science.

Secondly, he suggests that the simultaneous validity of the various models is due to the fact that mental phenomena are "overdetermined."[20] Although I will discuss Freud's concept of overdetermination more fully in the next chapter, I think it should be clear why this proposed solution will not work. Rappaport makes clear that he understands overdetermination to mean that no single factor provides a sufficient condition, but that only the confluence of all factors provides a sufficient condition for the behavior to be explained. Aside from the fact that this is a distortion of what Freud meant by overdetermination, it does not (nor did Freud use it to) solve the problem of the relation among the various points of view. To the extent that we adopt this solution, each model can be defined

only as a partial determinant of behavior. Rappaport insists, however, in defining (inconsistently, given his understanding of overdetermination) each model as a full determinant of all behavior.

Thus it seems to me that both the appempts to force Freud's thought into one model of explanation (either reason-giving or causal) and the view which sees several models, but avoids the question of the relations among them, fail to deal with a crucial issue in understanding Freud's views.

I would argue that the key to gaining a deeper understanding of Freud's model of explanation will be found in philosophical problems concerning his concept of the unconscious. Attempts to understand Freud's relationship to various philosophical issues have usually centered on the interestingly ambiguous relationship of the unconscious to these issues. For example, one major area of interest has been Freud's relation to the mind-body problem. Although Freud a number of times indicated that he held a dualist position, it is not clear just where the concept of the unconscious ought to be placed in a dualist ontology. In 1910 Ernest Jones noted that "Freud holds that processes of the most complicated kind may occur without ever becoming conscious. He is content with this practical finding, and leaves quite open the question as to whether they are ultimately of a mental or physical nature."[21] Although Freud had much more to say about this after 1910, it never

became possible to be certain what position he took on the issue. In any case, aside from what Freud said about it, there seem to be weighty arguments both for considering the unconscious to be mental and for considering it to be physical.[22] The unconscious has a similar relation to the free will - determinism issue. Suppose an act is motivated by reasons of just the sort on the basis of which we usually say an act is free, except that the reasons are unconscious. There again seem to be good arguments both for saying that the act is nevertheless free, and, on the other hand, for saying that in this case the behavior is something that happens to us; something we do not control.

Although the extensive discussion of these questions has gone some way toward an understanding of Freud, there is still little agreement on the basic question of the relationship of the unconscious to these issues. Although the free will issue, the mind-body problem and the reason-cause debate are closely related, it will be my purpose to focus just on the question of how the unconscious relates to the last of these issues. This seems to me wise partly because this issue has received less attention in discussions of Freud than the others and partly because although Freud never seems to have thought in terms of the distinction between reasons and causes overtly, it may well be the issue which can best cut through many of the complexities arising out of conflicting interpretations of his work. Before proceeding with this project, however, we ought to

take a close look at exactly how the term unconscious is used in Freud's work.

There is a fairly standard way of distinguishing the various phases in the development of Freud's concept of the unconscious, which derives largely from his own summaries of his work. To begin with, there is the descriptive sense of the term. When we say of an idea that it is in this sense unconscious, we are saying no more than that we are unaware of it. The primary reason for using the term in this sense is to fill gaps in consciousness and to be able to account for ideas which in some sense we have but, at a given moment we may be unaware of due to inattention. Although Freud defends the value of using the term unconscious in this way, it is not the sense he wishes to emphasize. More important is what he calls the dynamic sense of the term. The key point here is that Freud feels we have overwhelming evidence that although an idea may be unconscious, it can still affect behavior. With the descriptive sense of the unconscious we may be tempted to think of unconscious ideas as merely "weak" with consciousness consisting of some threshold level of strength. The dynamic conception of the unconscious holds that unconscious ideas may be quite strong. Of course now there arises the question of how, if an idea is strong, it can escape awareness. Along with the dynamic sense of the unconscious, therefore, goes the concept of repression, which replaces mere weakness as the explanation for why an unconscious idea is unconscious.

Thirdly there is the systematic sense in which the unconscious is thought of as a coherent system, characterized by its own mode of operation. At this stage Freud refers to "the system Ucs." An additional sense of "unconscious" which may, perhaps, be distinguished, is the topographical. Richard Wollheim[23] feels that this should be viewed as one of two variations under the general heading of the systematic sense (the other being the functional one). More commonly, however, the topographic view is seen as synonomous with the systematic sense of "unconscious."

An even more complicated problem is the relationship of all this to Freud's final view of the mind, presented in The Ego and the Id (1923). Freud referred to this as a structural point of view, but one is reluctant to talk of a "structural" view of the unconscious since in this work the term unconscious is largely (but not completely) replaced by the term "id." That the terminology had by this time gotten quite out of hand is reflected in the famous correspondence between Freud and Ferenczi[24] in which Freud himself clearly became confused.

I would like to argue that the situation is actually a little less complicated than the terminology would indicate. It seems to me that there are three important senses in which Freud uses the term unconscious and that the third is not totally original but primarily a combination of the first two. In the first, which I think can most appropriately be called the descriptive sense, Freud sees the unconscious

as a property which an idea may or may not have. That is, the entities which constitute the mind are ideas of various kinds (wishes, desires, beliefs, fantasies, etc.). As MacIntyre points out, the term "idea" here is used in a sense "not dissimilar to that which it has in British empiricist philosophy and especially in Locke. It is a discrete unit of mental life..."[25] The important point is that unconsciousness is a property that ideas, the actual entities of the mind, may or may not have. To say of an idea that it is unconscious is to give one kind of description of it. In the second stage of Freud's thought, which I think can best be called the systematic view, there is a complete reversal of the kinds of things which are entities and the kinds of things which are properties. The "system Ucs." is now one of the three entities which constitute the mind (the others being "the system Pcs." and "the system Cs-Pcpt," the preconscious and the system comprising consciousness and perception). And the fundamental properties of these systems are the ideas which they have: primary process for the "system Ucs" and secondary process for the systems "Pcs." and "Cs-Pcpt." The third, structural view, I will argue, is a combination of these two. The chief philosophical characteristic of The Ego and the Id, as I will attempt to show in the fourth chapter, is a tension concerning the question of what constitutes the fundamental entities of the mind.

Although my use of the terms "systematic" and "structural"

for Freud's second and third stages of thought is conventional, something needs to be said in defense of my use of the term "descriptive" for his first view of the unconscious. Freud, as well as most commentators, sees the descriptive sense as pre-analytical while Freud's own view, in contrast, is seen as, from the beginning, dynamic. A typical statement is the following by Ricoeur:

> The shift from the descriptive to the systematic point of view required by psychoanalysis is made as a result of the dynamic attributes of the unconscious: the facts of posthypnotic suggestion, the terrible power disclosed in hysterical phenomena, the psychopathology of everyday life, etc., compel us to attribute an effective activity to certain "strong unconscious ideas.[26]

It seems to me, however, that this use of the terms descriptive, systematic and dynamic, confuses two distinct issues. One issue is the question of what sorts of things are mental entities and what sorts of things are their properties. The other is the issue of what kinds of mental entities or events can be efficasious vis-a-vis overt behavior. To hold a descriptive view of the unconscious is to answer the first question by saying that ideas are mental entities and that unconsciousness may or may not be predicated of them. It seems to me that Freud did see the unconscious in this way during the early phase of his work, characterized most importantly by The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). But to answer the first question in this way is not to say anything concerning the second question. To hold a descriptive view

of the unconscious is to assume that unconsciousness is a property of some ideas. But holding this view is not tied to any particular view on the second question of what sorts of mental entities or events can influence behavior. Thus Freud, in his early work, and Leibniz, who held that unconscious ideas were those which are too weak to penetrate into consciousness, might both be said to use a descriptive sense of the term "unconscious." But while for Leibniz unconscious ideas could not affect behavior, Freud held what he called a dynamic view of the unconscious - the view that unconscious ideas can and routinely do affect behavior.

It seems to me that we can most accurately characterize the development of Freud's view of the unconscious in this way. First, we can assert most basically that Freud's view of the unconcsious is dynamic.[27] This was true from the beginning of his career and did not change during the course of his development. But his view did go through some changes on the question of the relationship of the concept of the unconscious to the entities which constitute the mind. In the first, descriptive, phase, it is a property of these entities. In the second, systematic, phase, it <u>is</u> one of these entities. The third, structural, phase involves a certain fusing of the first two stages.

I should point out that the distinction I am drawing between the descriptive and systematic senses of the unconscious is very similar to the distinction often made

by philosophers[28] between the adjectival as opposed to the substantive use of the term "unconscious." In fact if this study were concerned with issues of relevance only to philosophers, it would probably be wise to use that terminology rather than "descriptive" vs. "systematic." However, since this study originates in the psychoanalytic literature, it seems best to stay as close as possible to the terminology found there. Thus although I think that a distinction between the adjectival as opposed to the substantive use of the term "unconscious" might express what I mean more clearly to philosophers, I will retain the terminology of psychoanalysis. Explicated in the way I have suggested, I think it will make clear what changed in Freud's use of the term "unconscious," as well as what remained the same.

Having established this terminology, at least as I intend to use it, I can now outline my approach to the question of what sort of model of explanation Freud employed. If we look at his early work, in which the concept of the unconscious is used in a descriptive sense, we find a clear, but philosophically unsatisfying answer: he employed both a reason-giving and a causal model of explanation. Especially in the clinical work reported in his case studies, we can see right from the beginning elements of both kinds of explanation. However, this mixing of the two kinds of explanation within a single text does not occur in all of his early work; it is much less evident in his more theoretical writings. In fact in the two most important

theoretical works of this period we find each kind of explanation used largely to the exclusion of the other. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud was clearly employing, and attempting to extend to unconscious reasons, a reason-giving model of explanation. On the other hand, his other major early work, the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality attempts just the opposite. It develops a theory of instincts which attempts to expand the range of behavior which can be explained with a causal model. The major thesis of that work is not only that sexuality begins at birth rather than puberty, but that by postulating sexuality as a human instinct which is aggressive in its demands but extremely flexible in the means by which it can be satisfied, we can formulate a model of human development which explains a tremendous range of behavior purely on the basis on our inherited instinctual make-up. At this stage of his thought, the view that Freud embodies an unresolved intellectual conflict is fully justified.

In the next phase of his work, though, we find this divergence between reason-giving and causal models in a less clear-cut form. First of all, in adopting the term "Ucs.", Freud made clear that he was no longer content with extending a reason-giving model of explanation to include unconscious reasons; he was interested in what he saw as a more scientific exploration of the properties of the unconscious itself. It became more and more clear to Freud that when we explain behavior on the basis of unconscious reasons, the

relation of the motivation to the behavior is not the same as it is when we explain behavior on the basis of ordinary, conscious reasons. What is called for is not just the discovery of unconscious reasons behind particular pieces of behavior, but the formulation of general principles for the functioning of unconscious motivation. And he increasingly came to think of these principles as having an instinctual basis.

On the other hand, a purposive element began making its way into the causal theory of instincts. As Marcuse points out, the concepts of the pleasure principle and the reality principle seem to give the instinctual processes a definite "direction."[29] In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), there is even more of a sense of the "directedness" of instincts. The main thesis of that work is the existence of the death instinct as something independent of the life instinct. But Freud also suggests that instincts may have a more fundamental relation to living things than we usually suppose. Freud speculates that both the life instinct and the death instinct may be present even in primitive, single celled life forms. This is strange for someone with the physiological bent of mind Freud was supposed to have. Usually the concept of "instinct" is part of the attempt to obviate the need for a vitalistic hypothesis. We can account for the energetic, goal-directed activity of animals by citing something "wired into" its nervous system; something whose existence is accounted for by the theory of evolution. But

when Freud talks about instincts in protozoa, it becomes difficult to distinguish between an instinct and an elan vital.

Of course there is a difference between a purposive explanation and a reason-giving one. The latter, as we saw in chapter one, refers to reasons people actually have in mind while the former refer to systems which just behave in a goal-directed way. Therefore, the increasingly purposive element in Freud's theory of instincts was not necessarily bringing that aspect of his thought any closer to a reason-giving model. Nevertheless, I do think it indicates that Freud was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the fact that one aspect of his work was stated in purely mechanistic terms and the other in terms of the reasons people have for what they do. He was writing, after all, before it bacame as clear as it is today that purposive behavior can be accounted for within a mechanistic framework. By making the instincts increasinly purposive, he was attempting to moderate the degree to which they operated in a mechanistic fashion.

If all of this is correct, it throws a fresh light on his last attempt to formulate a metapsychological theory: The Ego and the Id (1923). In view of the above considerations, this book might be read as an attempt to bring the theory of unconscious reasons and the causal theory of instincts into one coherent concpetual framework. It has often been pointed out that this book does not seem to

have been prompted by the need to incorporate any new clinical data into the theory; it is a reorganization of old data in terms of a new conceptual framework. Understanding exactly why Freud felt the need for this new conceptual framework is a point that has often troubled psychoanalysts.[30] If my analysis can indeed be sustained it should make some contribution toward understanding what is among the most important and yet least understood of Freud's theoretical shifts.

Footnotes for Chapter 2

1. Gerald Myers, Self, An Introduction to Philosophical Psychology, Pegasis, New York, 1969, pp. 30-31.

2. Daniel Yankelovich and William Barrett, Ego and Instinct, The Psychoanalytic View of Human Nature - Revised, Random House, New York, 1970, pp. 62-63.

3. B.F. Skinner, "Critique of Psychoanalytic Concepts and Theories", in Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume I, 1956, pp. 79-80.

4. Ibid., p. 80.

5. Freud, "Character and Anal Erotism (1908)" in Philip Rieff, ed., Freud, Character and Culture, Collier Books, 1963, pp. 27-33.

6. Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History, Wesleyan University Press, 1959, p. x.

7. R.R. Holt, "Freud's Mechanistic and Humanistic Images of Man" in R.R. Holt and Emanuel Peterfreund, eds., Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Science, Volume I, 1972, Macmillan, p. 6.

8. Stephen Toulmin, "The Logical Status of Psycho-Analysis", in Margaret MacDonald, ed., Philosophy and Analysis, Blackwell, Oxford, 1954, p. 138.

9. Antony Flew, "Motives and the Unconscious", Minnesota Studies, Volume I, p. 155.

10. A.C. MacIntyre, The Unconscious, A Conceptual Study, The Humanities Press, 1958, p. 90.

11. H.J. Eysenck, Sense and Nonsense in Psychology, Penguin, 1957, p. 152.

12. Michael Wyschogrod, "Sartre, Freedom and the Unconscious", in Raymond Van Over, ed., The Psychology of Freedom, Fawcett, 1974, p. 335.

13. Robert P. Knight, "Determinism, 'Freedom,' and Psychotherapy", in Van Over, p. 359.

14. Sartre, The Emotions, Outline of a Theory, translated by Bernard Frechtman, Philosophical Library, 1948, p. 48.

15. P.J. Van Der Leeuw, "On Freud's Theory Formation", International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Volume 50, 1969, pp. 573-581.

16. David Rappaport, "The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt", in Sigmund Koch, ed., Psychology, A Study of a Science, Volume 3, pp. 55-183.

17. Rappaport, p. 105.

18. Rappaport, pp. 82-110.

19. Rappaport, p. 59.

20. Rappaport, p. 84.

21. Ernest Jones, Papers on Psycho-Analysis, Beacon Press, Boston, 1961, p. 3. Originally from Psychological Bulletin, Volume vii, April, 1910.

22. For an interesting early discussion of this issue, see, C.D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, Section C, Routledge and Degan Paul, 1925.

23. Richard Wollheim, Sigmund Freud, Viking, New York, 1971, pp. 187-188.

24. See James Strachey, Appendix A in Freud, The Ego and the Id, Norton, 1960.

25. MacIntyre, The Unconscious, p. 20.

26. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, An Essay on Interpretation, translated by Denis Savage, Yale University Press, 1070, p. 118.

27. The dynamic sense of the unconscious should be distinguished from another important use of the term dynamic in Freudian thought: the dynamic as opposed to the economic model of mental functioning. In this sense it refers to a conflict model rather than an equilibrium model. When Freud talks about the dynamic sense of the unconscious, however, he seems to mean simply that unconscious ideas can be an important determinant of behavior without our being aware of them.

28. For example, MacIntyre, p. 71.

29. Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, Vintage Books, 1955, p. 25.

30. Leopold Bellak, for example, says that the "Relationship of the topographical to the structural model has never been discussed fully enough" in "Conceptual and Methodological Problems in Psychoanalysis", Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Volume 76, January 23, 1959, p. 1006. And Margaret Brenman says "...the relationship of the topographical to the structural model has never been really clarified. This lack of clarification is regularly reflected in theoretical discussions" in the same volume, p. 1082. And David Beres says: "More than fort years have passed since Freud introduced what became the 'structural theory' but there is still lack of unanimity regarding its acceptance and confusion as to its meaning." in "Structure and Function in Psychoanalysis", The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Volume 46, January, 1965, p. 54.

CHAPTER III

THE DESCRIPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

A. The Interpretation of Dreams.

The two outstanding themes which characterize Freud's work are the existence of powerful yet unconscious ideas, and the importance of the sexual instinct. These parameters of the Freudian approach were established in the first major phase of his intellectual career with the appearance of the two landmark works, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905). The goal of this chapter is to argue that in this phase of his work, Freud did not consistently employ a single model of explanation. The only conclusion that can be drawn from a study of the two major works of this period is that in The Interpretation of Dreams Freud employs a reason-giving model of explanation, while in the Three Essays he clearly employs a causal model. Establishing the second part of this thesis should be a good deal easier than establishing the first part. Although quite a few philosophical interpreters of Freud, such as Flew and Toulmin have seen Freud as just employing a reason-giving model of explanation, they seem to have arrived at this conclusion by just ignoring the whole line of Freud's thought originating in the Three Essays. Even a cursory glance at this work will suffice to show that in it Freud's

model of explanation is causal. First, however, I will tackle the more difficult question of the model of explanation employed in The Interpretation of Dreams.

Establishing the view that the model of explanation in The Interpretation of Dreams is reason-giving will be more difficult, despite the fact that it is in agreement with Flew, etc., because there are two important objections to this interpretation which are not adequately discussed by these philosophers. The first is Freud's emphasis, in The Interpretation of Dreams on the concept of overdetermination. The second is based on the causal sounding metapsychology of chapter VII. I will argue, however, that Freud's model of explanation in The Interpretation of Dreams is clearly reason-giving and that neither of these objections succeeds in showing that it is not.

1. Does Freud's emphasis on the overdetermination of dreams imply a causal model of explanation?

In response to the view that Freud employed a reason-giving model of explanation, it is sometimes pointed out that Freud not only believed that every aspect of human behavior is determined, but that it is overdetermined. Freud is seen as holding that not only does every event have a cause but that psychic events usually have several. Thus one should be able to say with ample assurance that Freud's model of explanation is causal. This view, however, runs

into trouble at two basic points. The first concerns the relationship of Freud's concept of determinism to philosophical determinism and the second concerns the relationship between determinism and the concept of overdetermination.

In the first place, Wesley Salmon has argued convincingly that the view which Freud calls determinism has little in common with any of the views which in philosophy go by that name.[1] After surveying some of the important views which philosophers have called determinism, Salmon concludes that none are identical to the concept of determinism in psychoanalysis. The philosophical view that comes closest seems to be the view that every event has a cause. The main difference is that when an event is explained psychoanalytically, Freud is not content merely to show that it has a cause - it is necessary for it to be a certain kind of cause. "For psychoanalysis it is important that these causes be psychic causes. If such events were completely determined by physiological causes, this would not be sufficient for psychoanalytic theory."[2] Thus we might tentatively state the psychoanalytic concept of determinism as "all psychic events have psychic causes."[3] Salmon then suggests that this is still not quite accurate since not all the events to be explained by psychoanalysis are psychical - some are behavioral, "a movement of the body, for example."[4] On the other hand, it would be too

strong to say that every behavioral event has a psychic cause; "blushing has, but flushing often has not."[5] In light of all these considerations, Salmon suggests as a final formulation of the psychoanalytic concept of determinism: "Every item of human behavior constitutes indirect inductive evidence concerning the inferred mechanisms by which the organism mediates between stimulus and response."[6]

I am partly in agreement with this analysis but I do not think it goes far enough in distinguishing the philosophical concept of determinism from Freud's. I think that Salmon's final formulation is accurate to the degree to which it is taken to emphasize the coherence of personality; the idea that all aspects of behavior are necessarily relevant to our understanding of a person. I think that it is somewhat inaccurate to the degree to which it ties this understanding to "inferred mechanisms". At least sometimes, psychoanalysis explains a piece of behavior not by using it to infer a mechanism, but simply by showing what it <u>meant</u> to the person. As Yankelovich and Barrett point out, there is a very close connection in Freud's thought between "determinism" and "meaningfulness". They cite Ernest Jones' statement that "Freud believed in the thoroughgoing meaningfulness and determinism of even the most obscure and arbitrary mental phenomena."[7] Freud often talked about meaningfulness and determinism in the same breath.

Although it is not always clear exactly what Freud does mean by determinism, his remarks usually make clear at least how far his own concept of determinism is from any philosophical kind of determinism. And it is clear that it is different not only for the reason, emphasized by Salmon, that the cause must be psychic, but also for the reason that a cause turns out to be very much like a meaning. In the last chapter of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud says, "I believe in external (real) chance, it is true, but not in internal (psychical) accidental events."[8] And also, "If we give way to the view that a part of our psychical functioning cannot be explained by purposive ideas, we are failing to appreciate the extent of determination in mental life."[9] What Freud was concerned with in arguing for psychic determinism was that no aspect of behavior was merely accidental; every aspect of behavior calls for explanation. But in saying this he was not immediately deciding, especially on the issue of reasons vs. causes, what constitutes an adequate explanation. Recalling Salmon's example that "blushing has, but flushing often has not" a psychic cause, we can see clearly in just what way his analysis does not go far enough. While there is no reason to suppose that Freud believed every act of "flushing" to have a particular psychic cause, it is a crucial element in his concept of determinism that no aspect of behavior, and "flushing" is a particularly good

example here, is without meaning to a person.

Freud's commitment to a view which he calls determinism is not, therefore, inconsistent with a reason-giving model of explanation. His statements about determinism, however, usually occur in the course of broad statements about his over-all philosophical position. The concept of determinism does not play any role in the actual content of any specific parts of his theory. In contrast with this, the concept of overdetermination does play an important role in several aspects of Freud's work, and this is especially evident in his work on dreams. Even more important than the previous discussion, then, is whether "overdetermination", any more than "determinism" commits Freud to a causal model of explanation.

The basic point I wish to make is that concerning determinism, "more is less". That is to say, a view which emphasizes overdetermination is likely to be a <u>weaker</u> view than an ordinary deterministic view. This is true in the sense that overdetermination is compatible only with something less than the strongest notion of cause. I will argue that, indeed, the sense of "cause" for which Freud believes psychic events to have more than one, is much weaker than either the ordinary or scientific sense, and is much closer to what we might ordinarily call "meaning". Although there is both a causal and a reason-giving aspect to the way in which Freud views explanation, the concept of overdetermin-

ation, especially as it is used in The Interpretation of Dreams, is much more closely connected with reason-giving explanation.

To begin with, suppose we define "cause", as did Galileo, as a necessary and sufficient condition.[10] This is the strongest plausible definition of "cause" and it is clearly incompatible with the existence of more than one cause for a given event. Suppose some event is the cause of something else. Since it is sufficient, no other event could be necessary. And since it is also itself necessary, no other event could be sufficient. Thus if we define "cause" as a necessary and sufficient condition, there can only be one cause per effect. This simple definition of "cause", however, is no longer popular.

Although the analysis of the logic of causation involves a great many complexities, all definitions ultimately see a cause as either a certain kind of necessary condition (or conditions) or a certain kind of sufficient condition (or conditions).[11]

The first of these approaches is also incompatible with the notion of overdetermination. Suppose we wish to explain event E by finding its cause C. Suppose further that we can analyze the situation obtaining at the time E took place into a set of conditions $C_1,\ldots,C_n$. The first problem in discussing the "necessary condition" approach to causation is to understand the relation between C and

the set $C_1,\ldots,C_n$. The very existence of $C_1,\ldots,C_n$, together with some notion of the relatedness of everything in the universe, has led some to reject the concept of cause entirely. Let us assume, however, that some members of $C_1,\ldots,C_n$ are irrelevant to the occurrence of E so that we can identify its cause with something less than the state of the entire universe at the time it occurred. Suppose further that we can identify some subset of $C_1,\ldots,C_n$ whose members are relevant to the occurrence of E in the sense that had any of them not occurred, E would not have occurred. That is to say, they are necessary conditions for E. Now among these necessary conditions some may be quite ordinary and expected. When we say that striking a match causes it to ignite, for example, other factors besides the striking are among the set of necessary conditions; the presence of oxygen, the lack of moisture, etc. We are now faced with the question of whether to identify the cause with the set of all necessary conditions, or just some special subset of them. As Richard Taylor points out, "some writers, in deference to ordinary usage and practical considerations, prefer to reserve the expression 'the cause' for some causal condition of an event that is conspicuous or novel..."[12] There are also good arguments for considering the cause to be the set of all necessary conditions. I am not concerned here with answering this question but only with showing that either answer

is incompatible with overdetermination.

If we say that the cause is all the necessary conditions then we are just back to the first definition. The set of all necessary conditions is also a sufficient condition since if it is not sufficient something necessary has been left out. But suppose we define a cause as some special subset of the necessary conditions. In this case, depending on just how we identify those necessary conditions which do constitute a cause, we may very well have more than one cause for an effect. But the effect has certainly not been overdetermined. The effect has been determined by a set of factors of which each cause is a distinct part. The plurality of causes, under this definition, does not involve the redundancy of determination implied by the term "overdetermination".

The final approach defines a cause as a sufficient but not a necessary condition. On this understanding of "cause" it is possible to have a plurality of causes which do overdetermine the effect in the sense that if any of the causes were removed, so long as at least one remained, the effect would still take place. Indeed, philosophical discussions of overdetermination generally presuppose this understanding of causation.[13] Of course, many philosophical objections can be raised against a view of causation which eliminates from causes the idea of necessary conditions, but, again, it is not my purpose to discuss the merits of various

definitions of cause, but only to see what is presupposed by the notion of overdetermination. If we mean by the overdetermination of an event that the event not only has a cause, but that it has several redundant causes, then we must understand a cause to be nothing stronger than a sufficient but not a necessary condition.

The question now is whether Freud, in The Interpretation of Dreams sees overdetermination in this way or in some other way. If the former is the case then, whatever the philosophical soundness of the presupposed definition of cause, it would certainly be difficult to see the basic model of explanation as exclusively reason-giving. I believe, however, that this is not the case. It is clear from an examination of The Interpretation of Dreams, that in adopting a view which emphasized the importance of overdetermination, Freud did not mean to assert that the psychic events to be explained have a plurality of causes in the sense of sufficient conditions.

In order to determine accurately what role is played by the concept of overdetermination in The Interpretation of Dreams we must keep in mind that the overall thesis of the book is that dreaming is a continuation, in a modified form, of the purposeful activity of the waking mind. Freud summarizes his view in this way:

> Two separate functions may be distinguished during the construction of a dream: the

> production of the dream-thoughts, and their transformation into the content of the dream. The dream thoughts are entirely rational and are constructed with an expenditure of all the psychic energy of which we are capable. They have their place among thought processes that have not become conscious - processes from which, after some modification, our conscious thoughts, too, arise... On the other hand, the second function of mental activity during dream construction, the transformation of unconscious thoughts into the content of the dream, is peculiar to dream life.[14]

In taking this view, Freud parted company with most views of dreaming which were popular at that time. What these views had in common was that in sleep, the mind is passive. Thus Freud argues against the view that dreams are merely confused and distorted perceptions of somatic disturbances during sleep; the mystical view that dreams involve the perception of some other reality, or the future, etc.; even the view that dreams have a symbolic meaning according to some fixed "key" which is special to sleep. Instead, Freud argues that dreams are a continuation, in a modified form, of our ordinary thoughts. It is especially important to note, since Freud is often misinterpreted on this point, that he did not believe that the elements of a dream have a meaning according to some fixed "key". Although Freud does find that certain kinds of things very commonly have the same meaning in dreams, in each case it has the meaning it does simply because that is what it means to that particular dreamer; it is always possible that it could have

meant something else. Freud says,

> My procedure is not so convenient as the popular decoding method which translates any given piece of a dream's content by a fixed key. I, on the contrary, am prepared to find that the same piece of content may conceal a different meaning when it occurs in various people or in various contexts.[15]

The whole point is that the way in which dreams are meaningful is very much like the way in which conscious symbols are meaningful. As Philip Rieff puts it,

> By his interpretive method, Freud brought the dream into a continuum with other psychic acts. No longer a special phenomenon of sleep, the dream becomes a basic mode of thinking...[16]

Of course, there are processes at work which are unique to sleep, but the whole point of introducing these processes is to show that, when properly understood, dreams are meaningful in the same way as waking thoughts. Philosophers have not always appreciated this point. Thus when S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters say "Freud's brilliant discoveries... were not of the causes of actions like signing contracts or shooting pheasants; rather they were of things that happen to a man like dreams, hysteria and slips of the tongue",[17] they fail to note an important point. Freud's whole argument in his early works like Studies in Hysteria (1893), The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901) and, most

importantly, The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), is that precisely these phenomena of dreams, parapraxes and neurotic symptoms are not just things that happen to us, at least to some extent they are things we do.

Freud's analysis of dreams is based on a distinction between the latent content of the dream, or dream thoughts, and the remembered content of the actual dream, or manifest content. The processes which turn the former into the latter are called the dream work. The important point now is this. What constitutes an adequate explanation of a dream is being able to show that what the manifest content expresses is actually, though in a distorted and condensed form, the purposeful thoughts (i.e. the wishes) of the dreamer. An interpretation of a dream, or an element of a dream, is simply a statement of what the dream, or that element means to the dreamer. Of course the elements of a dream may each have more than one meaning. In fact they regularly do, and this is what Freud refers to as the overdetermination of dreams. Freud argues that each element in a dream is a "nexus" or a "nodal point" of several meanings.[18] However, it seems clear that no one meaning is a sufficient condition for an element to appear in a dream. He was even more explicit in making a similar point concerning the overdetermination of neurotic symptoms. In the report of the analysis of "Dora" (1905) he remarked:

> Anyone who takes up psychoanalytic work will quickly discover that a symptom has more than one meaning and serves to represent several unconscious mental processes simultaneously. And I should like to add that in my estimation a single unconscious mental process or phantasy will scarcely ever suffice for the production of a symptom.[19]

What Freud seems to have in mind concerning the production of dreams is this. If some trivial or unimportant experience or observation during the day or so preceding a dream happens to be such that it can serve as a symbolic representation of a strongly felt (and possibly unconscious) wish, then it may occur as such in a dream. If it can naturally serve to represent several wishes, it is more likely to occur. We usually find an element in a dream to have more than one meaning because economy of expression is a central feature of dreams. In dreaming we exercise a kind of artistic "skill...in always hitting upon forms of expression that can bear several meanings - like the Little Tailor in the fairy story who hits seven flies at a blow."[20] Freud explicitly compares the kind of skill exercised in the creation of dreams with the skill of artistic creation: "But just as all neurotic symptoms, and, for that matter, dreams, are capable of being 'over-interpreted' and indeed need to be, if they are to be fully understood, so all genuinely creative writings are the product of more than a single motive and more than a single impulse in the poet's mind, and are open to more than a single interpretation."[21]

In a different kind of critique of Freud, it would certainly be appropriate to raise a question here about the evidence which Freud is able to muster in support of this claim.[22] But my purpose here is just to argue that the plurality of interpretations, or determinations, as Freud says interchangeably, does not constitute for him a plurality of sufficient conditions. Not only does each interpretation not constitute a sufficient condition for a dream element, but not even the set of all interpretations is a sufficient condition. Freud nowhere suggests that if we knew all a person's wishes, and even if we could know all of his recent experiences, we could then predict his dreams. But we would expect to be able to make such predictions if the factors Freud is discussing in interpreting dreams really were sufficient conditions. Defining "cause" in terms of sufficient conditions establishes an even closer connection between causation and prediction than the definition of "cause" in terms of necessary conditions. If one knows sufficient conditions to be present, one can confidently predict that the effect will take place. Since the concept of causal overdetermination is only compatible with the "sufficient condition" understanding of causation, Freud's lack of interest in prediction can only be a further indication that his concept of overdetermination does not refer to a plurality of causes.

I might point out here that what I am saying runs

counter to a view often expressed by psychologists: the view that Freud's theory of dreams is a direct outgrowth of his commitment to causal determinism. H.J. Eysenck, for example, says, "The idea that the dream is meaningful... is a very ancient one. For Freud it follows directly from the deterministic standpoint."[23] It seems to me, though, as I have argued, that Freud's theory of dreams has nothing to do with what a philosopher would call determinism.

I also think that David Rappaport is quite wrong when he makes prediction an essential part of Freud's thought. He says: "Freud's assumption of exceptionless psychological determinism...provides the necessary foundation for prediction."[24] Of course, the fact is that nowhere in The Interpretation of Dreams, nor anywhere else, so far as I know, did Freud talk about predicting behavior. The psychoanalyst Charles Rycroft, also, says, "I know of no instance in Freud's writing of his claiming to have predicted in advance the outcome of any choice or decision made by a patient."[25] In view of the fact that it seems clear that Freud never explicitly made predictions, it would seem difficult for Rappaport to maintain his position. He goes on to say, however, that

> since the empirical material first dealt with was the already present neurotic symptoms Freud's primary causal problem was postdiction. This initial situation is not unique to psychoanalysis. It has its counterparts in the social sciences, e.g., in history, and in the natural sciences, e.g., in the theory of evolution. A

> theory is not invalidated by being postdictive, as long as postdiction is carefully distinguished from ex post facto explanation.[26]

This argument seems to suggest that Freud's analysis is causal, but that instead of offering predictions to confirm his analysis, he offered something analogous: postdictions. This view seems to me to misunderstand completely the relationship of causes to predictions. A prediction is nothing more than, literally, a "saying-before". We say that something will happen before it happens. The prediction does not itself say what the cause is, it simply confirms, to some degree, that our understanding of the relevant causal relationships is accurate. But the fact that we say before is crucial. If after the event we simply say it happened we confirm nothing except that we know it happened. So if a postdiction is simply a "saying-after" it is not even an ex post facto explanation (whatever that is); it is nothing but a redundancy.[27] However, it seems quite clear that what Freud does in The Interpretation of Dreams is not simply a temporal reverse of predictions based on a causal explanation. It is an explanation consisting of interpretations of what the dream means to the dreamer.

A similar point can be made concerning Heinz Hartmann's suggestion that overdetermination is one of the factors which makes predictions difficult. He says, "One obvious

limitation of our predictive potential is, of course, the great number of factors determining, according to psychoanalytic theory, every single element of behavior - what Freud has termed 'overdetermination'."[28] However, if overdetermination meant that there were a plurality of sufficient conditions (which is what it would have to mean, as we have seen, if it were a causal theory at all) it would appear to make predicting easier, not harder. If "every single element of behavior" were in this sense overdetermined, there would always be a plurality of factors, of which we would need to find only one to make a successful prediction. If, however, the concept of overdetermination is understood as I have argued it should be, it is perfectly clear why Freud is not the least bit interested, in The Interpretation of Dreams, with making predictions. He is not looking for the sufficient causes of dreams, he is doing exactly what he says he is doing in the title of the book - he is interpreting dreams.[29]

2. Does the metapsychology of chapter VII commit Freud to a causal model of explanation?

Anyone who began reading The Interpretation of Dreams with the last chapter would undoubtedly conclude immediately that Freud's model of explanation is clearly causal. In chapter VII Freud talks about energy, systems, cathexes, etc., but an ordinary understanding of human purposes seems

to play no important role. Given the great attention which is usually paid to this chapter, it would seem that it is not entirely accurate to see Freud's model of explanation in The Interpretation of Dreams as exclusively reason-giving. My basic argument here will be that the importance of chapter VII has often been greatly exaggerated. Chapter VII is more of an afterthought than an integral part of the work. It is an afterthought in which Freud, in a very tentative and fairly confused way, suggested a view which he was later to adopt, but to which he was not ready to commit himself in 1900.[30] Chapter VII has historical interest - it anticipates much of what he was to develop in a serious way later - but these ideas do not set the tone for The Interpretation of Dreams.

The most important fact about chapter VII is that in it Freud shifts from the use of the term unconscious as an adjective which refers to a property that an idea may have, to its use as a substantive, "the system Ucs.", apparently an entity itself. He introduces this notion of the unconscious in the context of suggesting what he calls a topographic model of the mind. He suggests that the mind is analogous to a "compound instrument" in which several parts work closely together.[31] This analogy is made several times[32] but each time it is suggested it is immediately, in a sense, withdrawn. The systems which constitute the mind, he says, do not exist as "psychical entities" nor do they

occupy separate locations.[33] Just what is left after these disclaimers is not clear but Freud says that he is replacing a topographic model with a dynamic one.[34] This, however, seems to me confused. An approach which can appropriately be called a topographic model need not imply that the entities which constitute the mind literally have spatial relationships. It merely posits that spatial relationships are an effective metaphor for their relationships. Thus his disclaimers would seem to be pointing out what is already inherent in the notion of a topographic model. I can see no sense of "dynamic" for which these disclaimers constitute a shift from a topographic to a dynamic model. He seems to be saying that the entities which constitute the mind do not really exist as distinct entities but that, nevertheless, the workings of the mind are to be understood in terms of the dynamic relations among them.

Although Freud seems to want to make the unconscious a substantial notion because of a feeling that its abstract, adjectival use is too vague or unsuited to scientific investigation, he does not yet seem prepared to fully accept the consequences of making this shift. Aside from the disclaimers discussed above, there is another important issue which illustrates this: the problem of "double registration". If "the system Ucs." and "the system Cs.-Pcpt." are really separate entities, then an idea ought to be able to exist twice in the mind simultaneously. Suppose we have an

unconscious idea. And suppose now that we consciously form an idea expressing exactly the same proposition. It would seem that we then have two ideas which, though they express the same proposition, are still distinct ideas. As long as the systems Ucs. and Cs.-Pcpt. are distinct entities which contain ideas, it would seem that any idea in one could be distinguished from any idea in the other, just by specifying its "location", even if they express the same proposition. Unless we postulate some special mechanism which eliminates an idea in one system whenever an idea expressing the same content occurs in another, there does not seem to be any way to avoid the duplication of ideas.

The problem with this, of course, is that it seems to divide the mind in an unacceptably radical way. One aspect of the unity which the mind seems to have is that expressing the same proposition is a sufficient condition for the identity of ideas within the same mind. During the course of time an idea may alternate between consciousness and being repressed, it may strengthen, weaken, or even be forgotten. But if it expresses the same proposition, it is the same idea. It would seem, prima facie, that if we have two ideas expressing the same thing, then we have two minds. Arthur Collins, for example, in his discussion of unconscious belief[35] takes it as obvious that a person cannot both unconsciously and at the same time consciously believe a proposition p. "...a man cannot be said to believe that

p unconsciously if p is one of his ordinary beliefs."[36] A view which sees the mind as divided into parts might find ways of confronting this issue, but the duplication of ideas expressing the same thing does seem to be a consequence of this approach. In The Interpretation of Dreams, however, Freud refuses to acknowledge this consequence of making the unconscious an entity; he argues against the possibility of the duplication of ideas:

> ...let us try to correct some conceptions which might be misleading so long as we looked upon the two systems in the most literal and crudest sense as two localities in the mental apparatus... Thus we may speak of an unconscious thought seeking to convey itself into the preconscious so as to be able then to force its way through into consciousness. What we have in the mind here is not the forming of a second thought situated in a new place, like a transcription which continues to exist alongside the original; and the notion of forcing a way through into consciousness must be kept carefully free from any idea of a change of locality.[37]

But although Freud says that the very idea of the duplication of ideas is a result of taking too seriously the spatial metaphor, it is not clear what is left of it after all of its illigitimate implications are removed. So little is left of it, I would suggest, that we cannot see Freud as having yet committed himself to a major shift in his conception of the unconscious.

In addition, it should not be forgotten that chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams is liberally sprinkled

with cautions concerning the tentative nature of the ideas being presented. At the beginning of the chapter Freud says, "...we shall be obliged to set up a number of fresh hypotheses which touch tentatively upon the structure of the apparatus of the mind...we must be careful, however, not to pursue these hypotheses too far beyond their first logical links..."[38] A little later he says, "We must not delude ourselves into exaggerating the importance of these considerations. We have done no more than give a name to an inexplicable phenomenon."[39] Such disclaimers continue at each important juncture throughout the chapter. It seems to me, especially considering the important confusions discussed above, that we ought to take Freud at his word and regard this last chapter as a tentative and not fully thought out proposal. The main importance of The Interpretation of Dreams is to be found in the first six chapters, which stand very well by themselves. Chapter VII is more of a response to the book than a continuation of it.[40]

B. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.

It seems clear to me, therefore, that the model of explanation in The Interpretation of Dreams is reason-giving rather than causal. This is not at all the case, however, with the other major work of this period, the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. The sense in which the Three Essays is at a philosophical pole opposite that of The

Interpretation of Dreams is exemplified dramatically by the suggestion,[41] later, of course, expanded to become one of the central themes in Freud's own philosophical extension of his psychological views, that civilization itself is founded upon a diversion of sexual energy. In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud takes a phenomenon which was commonly thought to be due to some somatic causal mechanism and argues that it can only be understood by interpreting it, much as one would interpret artistic expressions of human purpose. In the Three Essays Freud takes the one phenomenon which one would think is most assuredly the product of human purpose - civilization itself - and argues that it is "nothing but" a product of sexual energy which has been diverted from its original goal. The Three Essays exemplifies what Norman O. Brown terms Freud's "rude, persistent demand for the bodily origin of spiritual things."[42]

If the central theme of The Interpretation of Dreams can be summarized by saying that dreams are not something that happen to us - they are something we do, then we might also summarize the basic theme of the Three Essays by saying that sexuality is not something we do, it is something that happens to us. What we do in relation to sexuality is merely find the most suitable, given the circumstances, means of satisfying it. This, however, is an enormously complicated task because, unlike the other instincts, the

sexual instinct is capable of being satisfied in an indefinitely large number of ways. Freud says:

> ...we have been in the habit of regarding the connection between the sexual instinct and the sexual object as more intimate than it in fact is. Experience of the cases that are considered abnormal has shown us that in them the sexual instinct and the sexual object are merely soldered together - a fact which we have been in danger of overlooking in consequence of the uniformity of the normal picture, where the object appears to form part and parcel of the instinct. We are thus warned to loosen the bond that exists in our thoughts between instinct and object.[43]

In a sense, the only thing that limits the range of possible satisfactions of the sexual instinct is what we choose (unconsciously, of course) to consider as satisfactions. But the point is that once we recognize the malleability of the sexual instinct, we can explain much that would otherwise seem incomprehensible.

In the first of the Three Essays, Freud deals with deviations from normal sexuality. There are two main themes in his argument. One is that, given the looseness of the bond between instinct and object, and the ease with which circumstances can cause the object to be altered, we should be prepared to consider a much wider range of sexual behavior to be not in any way pathological, even if abnormal in a statistical sense. And sexual behavior which is pathological is not different in kind from normal behavior, or to be distinguished by the introduction of a wholly new

conceptual element, it is simply a variation of behavior (usually a regression to something which is a normal part of an earlier stage of development) which reaches a level of intensity such that it interferes with other aspects of the patient's life. "The very remarkable relation" Freud says, "which holds between sexual variations and the descending scale from health to insanity...may be explained by the fact that the impulses of sexual life are among those which, even normally, are the least controlled by the higher activities of the mind."[44] The conclusion Freud draws from all this is that "there is indeed something innate lying behind the perversions but that it is something innate in everyone, though as a disposition it may vary in intensity and may be increased by the influences of actual life."[45]

The second point is that all neuroses involve a perversion of the sexual instinct. Freud says:

> ...all my experience shows that these psychneuroses are based on instinctual forces. By this I do not merely mean that the energy of the sexual instinct makes a contribution to the forces that maintain the pathological manifestations...I mean expressly to assert that the contribution is the most important and the only constant source of energy of the neurosis.[46]

My purpose here is not at all to evaluate the validity of these conclusions but only to point out the degree to which the model of explanation is causal rather than reason-giving. He is not concerned here with what the neurotic

symptoms mean; with what the patient is trying to express with them; here he is concerned only with their instinctual basis. It should also be pointed out that in the original 1905 version of the Three Essays, Freud defines "instinct" in a purely physical way, emphasizing the concept of the "erotogenic zone". There is no hint that an instinct is anything other than a bodily process. In a 1915 revision of the original work, in accordance with other changes which had taken place in his thinking (notably, an attempt to introduce a purposive element into his theory of instincts) he modified this view with the famous passage in which he said that the instincts are on the "frontier between the mental and the physical".[47] In 1905, though, Freud thought of the instincts as purely physical.

In the second and third essays, Freud discusses the development of sexuality through infancy and puberty. The mere suggestion of sexuality in childhood, of course, created great controversy. But Freud again argues that the sexual instinct is a constant factor throughout life but that what makes its understanding complicated is the "looseness" of the connection between instinct and object. Freud ends the book with these words:

> The unsatisfactory conclusion, however, that emerges from these investigations of the disturbances of sexual life is that we know far too little of the biological processes constituting the essence of sexuality to be able to

> construct from our fragmentary information a theory adequate to the understanding of normal and pathological conditions.[48]

Since I have distinguished causal explanations from reason explanations in a way which suggests a temporal factor, that is, that causes precede their effects while reasons are simultaneous with the behavior they explain, I think it is important to emphasize the strongly diachronic aspect of Freud's theory of sexuality. This is apparent first of all simply from the fact that the Three Essays presents a developmental theory. But more importantly, it is essential to Freud's position that prior stages exert a causal influence over later stages. Freud is not content with just dividing up a human life into a series of stages. The whole point of introducing these stages is to lay the basis for a theory which explains present behavior on the basis of earlier factors. This is implicit in the Three Essays, but it is given more explicit formulation in some of the work in which Freud extended and applied the approach of the Three Essays. One concept which is central in some of the work following the Three Essays[49] is that of "prototype". The idea is that we can explain certain kinds of adult behavior (for example, the relationship that usually develops between patient and therapist) on the basis of a tendency to revert back to patterns of behavior established earlier. Philip Rieff finds that the way in which Freud

uses the concept involves the following elements:

> A prototype may be defined as an event which is (1) prefigurative, (2) prior in time, and (3) causally related to later behavior.[50]

In later work, the concept of the prototype appears to have given way to the concept of the "compulsion to repeat".[51] But what is important in this whole line of thought is that earlier events are held to be causally related to later events. This makes clear the difference between the model of explanation in the Three Essays and the model of explanation in The Interpretation of Dreams. In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud explains dreams by citing unconscious mental entities like wishes, desires, and purposes, which exist simultaneously with the dreams they explain; and they explain them by showing what they mean. Many of these wishes, of course, have their origin in the past, even in the person's childhood. But the basic purpose of the concept of the unconscious, in the theory of dreams, is to show that those wishes still exist, as wishes, at the time of the dream. In contrast to this, Freud, in the Three Essays, attempts to explain neurotic symptoms by giving their causal antecedents.

Footnotes for Chapter 3

1. Wesley C. Salmon, "Psychoanalytic Theory and Evidence", in Richard Wollheim, ed., Freud, A Collection of Critical Essays, Anchor Books, 1974, pp. 271-284. Originally in, Sidney Hook, ed., Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy, 1959.

2. Salmon in Wollheim, p. 274.

3. Ibid., p. 276.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 278.

7. Ernest Jones, quoted by Yankelovich and Barrett, p. 63.

8. Freud, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Norton, 1960, p. 257.

9. Ibid., p. 240.

10. See Mario Bunge, Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science, Meridian, 1959, p.33.

11. For a collection of papers discussing these complexities see Ernest Sosa, ed., Causation and Conditionals, Oxford, 1975.

12. Richard Taylor, "Causation", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 2, p. 63.

13. See, for example, Louis E. Loeb, "Causal Theories and Causal Overdeterminism", The Journal of Philosophy, Volume LXXI, Number 15, September 5, 1974, pp.525-544. Although Loeb does not explicitly define what he means by "cause", the examples he gives make clear what he understands a cause to be. He gives the following as an example of causal overdetermination:

> A short circuit starts a fire in a house's kitchen. At the same time, a cigarette ash starts a fire in the master bedroom. Either fire alone would have spread and destroyed the house in one hour. In one hour the house is completely destroyed. (p. 526)

It is clear that both the short circuit and the cigarette are sufficient but not necessary conditions, and in all of Loeb's examples the causes have this characteristic.

14. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, Discuss Books, 1965, pp. 544-545.

15. Dreams, p. 137.

16. Philip Rieff, Freud, The Mind of the Moralist, Anchor Books, 1959, p. 122.

17. S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters, "Human Action and the Limitations of Causal Explanation", in Edwards and Pap, eds., A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, p. 95.

18. See, for example, Dreams, p. 317 and p. 543.

19. Freud, Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, Collier Books, 1963, pp. 63-64.

20. Dreams, p. 562.

21. Dreams, p. 299.

22. Frederic Weiss, for example, raises questions along this line in "Meaning and Dream Interpretation", in Wollheim, 1974, pp. 53-69.

23. Eysenck, p. 152.

24. Rappaport, p. 63.

25. Charles Rycroft, "Causes and Meaning", in S.G.M. Lee and Martin Herbert, eds., Freud and Psychology, Penguin, 1970, p. 327.

26. Rappaport, p. 63.

27. William P. Alston makes a similar point in "The Logical Status of Psychoanalysis", in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 6, p. 515.

28. Heinz Hartmann, "Psychoanalysis as a Scientific Theory", in Hook, 1959, p. 22.

29. Paul Ricoeur makes a similar point but I think that it is also a distortion of Freud to carry the argument as far as he does - to the conclusion that psychoanalysis functions exclusively within the realm of language and meaning. See Ricoeur, 1970, pp. 366-368.

30. Some aspects of chapter VII were, of course, foreshadowed by the "Project for a Scientific Psychology". Freud, however, never published the "Project" and in any case it is not clear whether the "Project" should be considered the beginning of Freud's psychoanalytic views, or, rather, part of his transition from a laboratory researcher to a therapist. My point is that although the terminology of systems may have been present throughout his career, his serious use of the concept was limited to one stage of his thought.

31. Dreams, p. 575.

32. Again, for example, on p. 649.

33. Dreams, p. 575 and p. 649.

34. Dreams, p. 649.

35. Arthur Collins, "Unconscious Belief", The Journal of Philosophy, Volume LXVI, Number 20, October 16, 1969, pp. 667-680.

36. Collins, p. 672.

37. Dreams, p. 648.

38. Dreams, p. 549.

39. Dreams, p. 582.

40. In an early French critique of Freud, Georges Politzer (Critiques des fondements de la psychologie, Paris, 1928) apparently came to a similar conclusion. Jean Laplanche and Serge Leclaire paraphrase his argument like this: "It would seem that Freud was inconsistent with the consequences of his own discovery; this situation would appear to be most evident in the way his thinking progresses in The Interpretation of Dreams. For while the essence of the Freudian discovery consisted in replacing impersonal mechanisms with a way of explaining dreams as acts of a particular subject in a 'first person' drama, Freud, in all his metapsychological essays, and in particular in the last chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams...falls back to the level of abstract psychological entities whose interplay would occur mechanically and no longer at the level of subjectivity." From Jean Laplanche and Serge Leclaire, "The Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Study", in Jeffrey Mehlman, ed., French Freud: Structural Studies in Psychoanalysis, Yale French Studies, Number 48, 1972, p. 119.

More recently, however, there has been a tendency to lose sight of this important point.

41. Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, (1905), Avon Books, New York, 1962, p. 72.

42. Norman O. Brown, Life Against Death, p. 25.

43. Three Essays, pp. 35-36.

44. Three Essays, p. 37.

45. Three Essays, p. 64.

46. Three Essays, p. 54.

47. Three Essays, pp. 59-60.

48. Three Essays, p. 149.

49. For example, "The Dynamics of Transference (1912)" in Freud, Therapy and Technique, Collier Books, 1963.

50. Rieff, Freud, The Mind of the Moralist, p. 51.

51. See, most importantly, "Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psychoanalysis: Recollection, Repetition and Working Through (1914)", in Therapy and Technique, and Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920).

CHAPTER IV

THE SHIFT TO SYSTEMS AND THE STRUCTURAL SYNTHESIS

A. The "System Ucs."

Although the concept of the unconscious is not at the forefront in the Three Essays, when it is used it refers to a property of ideas (mainly wishes and fantasies). Thus both the Three Essays and The Interpretation of Dreams have in common what I refer to as the descriptive sense of the unconscious. It is used to refer to a property which an idea may or may not have. Although the phrase "the system Ucs." first makes its appearance in The Interpretation of Dreams, for reasons I discussed in the last chapter, I do not think that this represents a serious break with the descriptive use of the term unconscious. However, the tentative ideas sketched in chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams did become the basis for a fundamental shift in Freud's thinking. In a series of papers centering on the period 1911-1915 Freud argued for some important theoretical changes. It seems to me that these changes can best be summed up by saying that rather than being a property that an idea may or may not have, the unconscious was now thought of as itself one of the entities which constitute the mind. There are two closely related aspects to this shift.

In the first place, Freud adopts the position that al-

though everything which is repressed is, of course, unconscious, not all of the unconscious is repressed. At the beginning of the paper "The Unconscious (1915)" he says, "The unconscious has the greater compass: the repressed is part of the unconscious."[1] Although the motivation for the adoption of this view is clear, it is interesting to see why the step could only be taken after the shift to the systematic sense of the unconscious. The view is motivated by the fact that otherwise the concept of repression leads to an unacceptable infinite regress. Since we are not aware of the act of repression, it would have to be itself repressed, if the unconscious and the repressed were coextensive. But, of course, this last act of repression would have to be itself repressed, and so on. To avoid this, all one needs to admit is that not everything in the unconscious is repressed. Such an admission, however, would not have been compatible with the notion of the unconscious as Freud conceived it in the descriptive phase.

The reason for this has to do with the basic difference between Freud's view of the unconscious and most previous views. In the conception of the unconscious which derives from Leibniz, the unconscious is seen as consisting of contents of the mind of which we are not aware because, for one reason or another, they are not appropriate for consciousness. Leibniz, for example, as L.L Whyte points out, "introduced the notion of a quantitative threshold. For him

ordinary perceptions were the summation of countless small ones, each of which we are not aware of, because they lie below this threshold."[2] The weakness of this approach, from Freud's point of view, is that it still leaves behavior governed exclusively by conscious ideas. In adopting a dynamic view of the unconscious Freud wanted to argue that unconscious ideas could influence behavior in addition to conscious ideas. In the descriptive phase of his thinking Freud accomplished this by saying that unconscious ideas were exactly like conscious ones except for our not being aware of them. Unconscious ideas were thus seen as equally <u>appropriate</u> for consciousness. The point is that seeing things in this way puts the burden of proof on answering the question of why it is that some ideas <u>are</u> unconscious. Among a set of ideas which are alike both in appropriateness for consciousness and ability to affect behavior, it would seem that it is only the focus of our attention that determines which, at a given time, shall be conscious. How can it be that certain of these ideas are not available to consciousness? In the descriptive phase, Freud answers simply that they are repressed. Since there are no additional explanations for an idea's being unconscious, it would not seem possible, in the descriptive phase, for an idea to be unconscious and yet not repressed. With the systematic sense of the unconscious, however, the unconscious is no longer just the set of ideas which have under-

gone repression. It is now one of the basic entities of the mind. It is the part of the mind which houses all of the repressed ideas but it consists of more than just those ideas. The implication now is that repression is not something we do, which we must repress to be unaware of doing, but rather that it is a more or less automatic mechanism in the workings of the systems which constitute the mind. In 1911 Ernest Jones wrote, "Freud regards repression as a biological defence-mechanism, the function of which is to guard the mind from painful experiences."[3] While this was a perfectly accurate characterization of Freud's view at the time it was written, it would not have been accurate ten years earlier.

The second aspect of the shift to the systematic sense of the unconscious is the assertion that lack of awareness is not the main distinguishing characteristic of "the system Ucs." In his 1912 paper "A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis" Freud says:

> Unconsciousness seemed to us at first only an enigmatic characteristic of a definite mental act. Now it means more for us. It is a sign that this act partakes of the nature of a certain mental category known to us by other and more important features... The index value of the unconscious has far outgrown its importance as a property.[4]

In "The Unconscious" Freud lists four of these "more important" features:

1. exemption from mutual contradiction
2. primary process
3. timelessness
4. substitution of psychic for external reality[5]

The term "primary process" is used here to refer to something very specific. Freud believed that within the "system Ucs." the energy adhering to one idea may be transferred to another idea which is associated with it in some way. If the first idea is being repressed, the second may be able to take its place and achieve conscious expression. This is part of the theoretical underpinning both for sublimation and for the view that behavior motivated by an unconscious factor is usually symbolic in nature. This specific use of the term "primary process" should be distinguished from its broader use in which it refers to all four of these characteristics.[6]

By the "substitution of psychic for external reality" Freud refers to the tendency of the unconscious to satisfy its desires, when they are not quickly satisfied in reality, by simply imagining them as satisfied. This is closely related to some aspects of Freud's theories of dreams and fantasies. Although the concept of primary process in its specific sense, and the substitution of psychic for external reality are important parts of Freud's views, it seems to me that it is the first and third of these features of "the system Ucs.", "exemption from mutual contradiction" and "timelessness" which are most crucial to a philosophical

understanding of Freud. It is perhaps not surprising that just at this most crucial point we find the sharpest disagreement over what Freud meant.

The basic issue is the degree to which Freud, in postulating the properties of "timelessness" and "exemption from mutual contradiction" for the Ucs. is doing metaphysics. The most extreme view is that Freud sees the Ucs. as a sort of Kantian "thing-in-itself". David Rappaport, for example, says that "the epistemological implications of psychoanalysis are closest to Kant..."[7] And Norman O. Brown argues that "not only does Freud represent a breakthrough to the 'noumenal' self, but he also lays the basis for an attack on the Kantian equation of the time schemata with rationality."[8] He goes on to argue that what Freud has shown is that time is intimately connected with repression. Brown is much more optimistic than Freud about the possibility of overcoming repression, and he doesn't flinch at the idea of overcoming the category of time; in fact he argues that this is essential if we are to make full use of Freud's insights.[9]

The opposite extreme is the view which fails to recognize the importance of the primary process (in the broad sense) at all. Philosophers, such as Flew, who regard the Freudian concept of the unconscious as simply an extension of ordinary notions of belief, motivation, etc., tend to ignore entirely what Freud refers to as the primary

process nature of unconscious thought. It will be important to my discussion of rationality in the final chapter of this study, that we see accurately just what is involved in Freud's view that the Ucs. exhibits "timelessness" and "exemption from mutual contradiction".

In the first place, it must be admitted that Freud himself sometimes entertained the view that his work was in some way analogous to Kant's philosophical position. In "The Unconscious" Freud says:

> The psychoanalytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us, on the one hand, a further development of that primitive animism which caused our own consciousness to be reflected in all around us, and, on the other hand, it seems to be an extension of the corrections begun by Kant in regard to our views on external perception. Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perception is subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with the phenomena perceived but never really discerned, so psychoanalysis bids us not to set conscious perception in place of the unconscious mental process which is its object.[10]

And in Beyond the Pleasure Principle he says,

> As a result of certain psycho-analytic discoveries, we are to-day in a position to embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem that space and time are 'necessary forms of thought'. We have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in themselves 'timeless'. This means in the first place that they are not ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way and that the idea of time cannot be applied to them.[11]

In an interesting paper first published in 1923, Otto Fenichel argued that we should not carry this analogy between Freud and Kant too far.[12] He grants that Freud attempts to draw an analogy between his concept of the "system Ucs." and the Kantian "thing-in-itself" but he points out that an analogy is not an identity.[13] He suggests that the analogy holds in the sense that both Freud and Kant "look beyond that which is given to that which is hidden behind it and which they consider the more real of the two."[14] However, Fenichel argues, the analogy cannot be carried any further than this. Although Freud's views are compatible with Kant's position (Fenichel argues specifically that Freud's presuppositions are closer in general to the rationalism of Kant than the intuitionism of Bergson) it would nevertheless be a mistake to regard the analogy between the Ucs. and the thing-in-itself as anything more than quite superficial. The most important difference between the two is that nothing whatsoever can be known about the thing-in-itself. Surely Freud had no intention of suggesting any such thing about the Ucs. Fenichel argues that psychoanalysis is a science and that the Ucs. is a theoretically justifiable concept, not a metaphysical entity.

Applying this more specifically to the question of what Freud means when he says that the Ucs. is characterized by "timelessness", Fenichel rejects the idea that the Ucs.

is some special part or aspect of the universe which is outside the dimension of time. "Timelessness", he says, "is nothing more than 'indestructibility in time', or, in other words 'durability', and that therefore not only is the Ucs. not lacking in relationship to temporal extension, but what its 'timelessness' refers to is precisely its position in regard to the temporal dimension."[15]

It seems to me that while Fenichel's remarks are helpful, they are not quite sufficient. While it is true that Freud makes many remarks which support Fenichel's interpretation, still when Freud draws the analogy with Kant, and says that "the idea of time cannot be applied" to the Ucs., he does seem to be talking metaphysics. Fenichel is being too much of an apologist in not recognizing that Freud is simply inconsistent. It is not so much, therefore, a question of finding what is meant by each of Freud's remarks, as it is a question of seeing which set of remarks is most consistent with the actual content of his theory. That is, I think we can best understand his remarks by seeing what he does with them. If we look at the question in this way we will see that we must understand "timelessness" to refer simply to the tendency of ideas in the Ucs. to persist for long periods of time, and that by "exemption from mutual contradiction" we must understand Freud to mean simply that the Ucs. has a tendency to <u>tolerate</u> contradictory ideas.

In the first place, although there is an inconsistency

in Freud's remarks, there is a pattern to the inconsistency. The metaphysical speculations all occur in theoretical works like "The Unconscious" and Beyond the Pleasure Principle. But when he uses these fatures of the Ucs. in analytical work, it is the non-metaphysical sense which always prevails. For example, when contradictory elements come up in a dream, he explains the ability of the contradictory ideas to co-exist with the following anecdote:

> The whole plea - for the dream was nothing else - reminded one vividly of the defense put forward by the man who was charged by one of his neighbors with having given him back a borrowed kettle in a damaged condition. The defendant asserted first, that he had given it back undamaged; secondly, that the kettle had hole in it when he borrowed it; and thirdly, that he had never borrowed a kettle from his neighbor at all.[16]

In his work on jokes, Freud refers to this story as "an excellent example of the purely comic effect of giving free play to the unconscious mode of thought."[17] What is clear from this story is not that negation does not exist in the unconscious, since the story cannot even be formulated without negation, but simply that the unconscious has a tendency to tolerate contradictions. It refrains from carrying out the logical operations which would result, as Freud puts it, in the "cancelling-out" of the contradictory elements.[18] And in discussing the case of "Dora", he puts it this way:

> How Dora managed to fall in love with the man about whom her beloved friend had so many bad things to say is an interesting psychological problem. We shall not be far from solving it when we realize that thoughts in the unconscious live very comfortably side by side, and even contraries get on together without disputes - a state of things which persists often enough even in the conscious.[19]

The same nonmetaphysical sense also stands out when Freud applies the concept of "timelessness" to his analytical work. In his analysis of the "Rat Man", for example, he says,

> I then made some short observations upon the psychological differences between the conscious and the unconscious, and upon the fact that everything conscious was subject to a process of wearing-away, while what was unconscious was relatively unchangeable; and I illustrated my remarks by pointing to the antiques standing about in my room. They were, in fact, I said, only objects found in a tomb, and their burial had been their preservation: the destruction of Pompeii was only beginning now that it had been dug up.[20]

It should be noticed, first of all, that he says "relatively unchangeable". But even if he had said "absolutely unchangeable", there is an important sense in which the metaphor suggests a nonmetaphysical understanding of "timelessness". It reminds us that Freud's "Ucs." is not at all like, for example, Jung's collective unconscious. While there may be properties which are possessed universally by each person's Ucs., still, each Ucs. is an individual entity. Just as in the case of Pompeii, it comes into existence at a certain

time and goes out of existence at a certain time. There is at least this minimal sense in which the Ucs. exists in time. Even if its environment tends to protect it from change during the course of existence, still, its existence does have a course. This course is marked at least by a beginning, an end, and some changes of contents in between.

This kind of interpretation is reinforced by many of Freud's remarks in the course of his analytical work. To take one more example, in his report of the "Wolf Man" case, Freud discusses the reasons why psychoanalysis is likely to be a fairly long process. At one point he remarks,

> Of the physicians point of view I can only declare that in a case of this kind he must behave as 'timelessly' as the unconscious itself, if he wishes to learn anything or achieve anything. And in the end he will succeed in doing so, if he has the strength to renounce any short sighted therapeutical ambition.[21]

What all of these remarks seem to indicate is that Freud did not, in his analytical work, need to see the Ucs. as a metaphysically different kind of entity within which time and logic do not hold. It seems quite sufficient that the Ucs. has a tendency to tolerate contradictory ideas and that ideas within the Ucs. have a tendency to persist relatively unchanged for long periods of time.

There may be some good reasons, also, for going further and saying that a sense of time and the ability to recognize

contradiction are required for Freud's theory of the Ucs. Taking first the notion of time, there are a number of aspects of Freud's theory which seem to require that the Ucs. have a sense of time. For example, the concept of free association which is central to psychoanalytic technique is based on Freud's view that if we avoid imposing a conscious structure on what we say, the associations among ideas existing in the Ucs. will manifest themselves as a temporal proximity within the series of things we say. Freud summarizes the notion this way:

> It is a rule of psychoanalytic technique that an internal connection which is still undisclosed will announce its presence by means of a contiguity - a temporal proximity - of associations; just as in writing, if "a" and "b" are put side by side, it means that the syllable "ab" is to be formed out of them.[22]

Unless the Ucs. had a sense of time it is hard to see how it could express association by temporal proximity. If the internal connection is repressed then presumably we are not only unaware of it, but we are not even preconsciously aware of it (since then the psychoanalytic technique of free association would not be required for its disclosure). Therefore, the task of expressing the association by means of a temporal proximity of spoken words must be accomplished by the Ucs.

Another example, this time from the theory of dreams, is that the idea of a causal relation is expressed in a dream

by means of a temporal sequence. When the idea that a is the cause of b is to be expressed in a dream, this is accomplished by having b immediately follow a in the course of the dream.[23] Again, it is not clear how this would be possible unless the Ucs. had a sense of time. The whole point of Freud's theory of dreams is to explain the peculiar (literally) fantastic quality of dreams by saying that they are the product of an unconscious rather than a conscious mode of thought. I assume, by the way, the Freud is not suggesting that it is impossible for a causal relation to appear in a dream as a causal relation. I would think that scientists, for example, have dreams in which causal relations appear as such. Freud's theory of dreams can accomodate this kind of phenomena because of the concept of secondary revision (which expresses the idea that ordinary conscious thoughts play some role in the production of dreams). The causal relations which are expressed in dreams by means of a temporal sequence are the ones which are <u>repressed</u>. Having these causal relations, awareness of which is repressed, occur in a dream as a temporal sequence, is analogous to having other repressed ideas occur in a dream in symbolic form. In both cases the transformation allows something to become part of the dream which is a little closer to the truth than anything allowed to enter ordinary consciousness. But if the latter enables us to infer that the Ucs. is characterized by symbolic associations, the former ought

to enable us to infer that the Ucs. is characterized by temporal associations.

The ability to at least recognize the logical relation of contradiction also seems to be required for several aspects of Freud's theory. Consider, for example, the defense mechanism of reaction formation. This is the process by which we guard against a painful idea with an excessively strong adherence to the contradictory idea.[24] For this to take place, it seems necessary both for the Ucs. to be able to form the contradiction of a proposition, and to recognize that this contradiction can be accepted into consciousness even though the original is being repressed.[25]

It seems to me, therfore, that the nonmetaphysical interpretation is quite compatible with, and perhaps even required for the actual content of Freud's theory. But I would like to emphasize that although I do not believe Freud is doing metaphysics, he <u>is</u> doing something. I believe that the characteristics which Freud postulates for the Ucs. are crucial for a full understanding of Freud's model of explanation. Specifically, it will be important to what I wish to say in the fifth chapter of this study, to recognize that when behavior is unconsciously motivated, we should expect the relationship between the motivation and the behavior to be different in certain respects from the relationship which ordinarily holds between behavior and its conscious motivation. The most important aspects of

this difference are 1) the behavior will have a symbolic relation to its motivation, 2) the motivation may be something which has long been dormant in the person and, 3) the motivation may express itself in a variety of ways, some of which may be contradictory to others.

What I wish to conclude from all this right now, though, is that we have good reason for feeling that a significant shift has occurred in Freud's thinking. The term Ucs. was first introduced in chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams but there Freud said he was just giving a "name to an inexplicable phenomenon."[26] In the metapsychological papers of this second phase, however, Freud gives content to the terminology. He takes seriously the idea that the Ucs. has its own properties of which unconscioueness is by no means the most important.

A further indication of the degree to which Freud has committed himself to the view that the unconscious is itself an entity is that, unlike his remarks in chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams, he now takes seriously the idea of double registration; that is, the view that two ideas with the same content may exist simultaneously, once within the Ucs. and again consciously. In "The Unconscious" he says:

> If we communicate to a patient some idea which he has at one time repressed but which we have discovered in him, our telling him makes at first no change in his mental condition. Above all, it does not remove the repression nor undo its effects, as might be expected from the fact that the previously unconscious

> idea has now become conscious. On the contrary, all that we shall achieve at first will be a fresh rejection of the repressed idea. At this point, however, the patient has in actual fact the same idea in two forms in two separate localities in his mental apparatus: first, he has the conscious memory of the auditory impression of the idea conveyed in what we told him, and secondly and side by side with this, he has - as we know for certain - the unconscious memory of his actual experience existing in him in its earlier form.[27]

I think that this should make it clear that a basic shift has taken place in a way in which it had not in chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams. Freud is now committed to the view that the unconscious is an entity.

It seems to me that what we have so far is this. In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud employs a reason-giving model of explanation, and this is associated with a descriptive sense of the unconscious. In the Three Essays, a causal model of explanation is employed, but the continued use of the unconscious in a descriptive sense prevented it from playing a major role in that work. There are thus two kinds of reasons for the shift to the systematic sense of the unconscious. One consists of the philosophical problems created by the descriptive sense of the term. The other is the desire to make the concept of the unconscious more concrete in order to lessen the conceptual gap between The Interpretation of Dreams and the Three Essays. However, if the abstractness of the descriptive unconscious created prob-

lems, the extreme concreteness of the systematic unconscious created other problems. The structural model of the mind may be seen as Freud's final attempt to bridge the gap between a reason-giving and a causal model of explanation in a way which avoids the problems inherent in both earlier views of the unconscious.

B. The Structural Synthesis.

As we have seen, Freud's starting point is the distinction between ideas which are conscious and those which are not. The basic problem with this view was that it left unclear the question of how it is that ideas become unconscious. Of course he gave the process by which this takes place the name repression, but it remained unclear what sort of a process repression is and, most importantly, why it is that it escapes our attention itself. Because of these problems Freud came to adopt a new view of the mind in which the fundamental entities which make up the mind are the systems Ucs., Pcs., and Cs.-Pcpt. Although the names which Freud gave to these entities are reminiscent of the property of consciousness, he felt that the most important properties by which we distinguish them from one another are not consciousness vs. unconsciousness but rather the functions they serve and the way in which they go about serving their functions. The most important aspect of this shift, in terms of the overall development of Freud's views, is the

fact that the system Ucs. is no longer seen as just the set of repressed ideas. The contents of the system Ucs. are unconscious, initially, not because they are repressed, but because they have not yet been "perceived" by consciousness. Only when the occasion arises for consciousness to take note of something in the Ucs. does the question arise of whether or not it will be admitted to consciousness. And we are not normally aware of this screening process because it is part of the automatic functioning of the systems which make up the mind.

It seems to me that the most important specific factor motivating the shift from the systematic terminology of the second phase to the structural categories of id, ego and superego, is an application to consciousness of a consideration very much like this. Just as the shift to the systematic view involved the idea that the system Ucs. is more than just unconscious (repressed) ideas, Freud now wants to suggest that there must be more to the system Cs.-Pcpt. than just what the mind consciously perceives. That is to say, there are things which the mind does which by their nature must be classified as belonging somewhere in the systems Pcs. and Cs.-Pcpt. (since they do not have the characteristics of primary process), but of which we are not only unaware, but can not easily become aware. In other words, just as there is more to the unconscious than just the repressed, there is more to consciousness than just what is

not repressed. It seems to me that the basic purpose of replacing the systems Pcs. and Cs.-Pcpt. with the ego, is that it would seem too contradictory to speak of an unconscious element in these systems, while it sounds quite plausible to speak of an unconscious element in the ego. In the shift to the systematic view, unconsciousness ceased to be the defining characteristic of the system Ucs. In the shift to the structural view, it is important to see that consciousness is not the defining characteristic of the ego.

Seeing this helps make clear an otherwise puzzling aspect of the structural phase. Although the use of the term "unconscious" as an adjective was dropped in the systematic phase, it reappears in the structural phase, although Freud chooses to use the phrase "Ucs." to do the job. In The Ego and the Id, and occasionally in subsequent works, when Freud wishes to refer to an idea as having the property that it is unconscious, he uses "Ucs." as an adjective. He says, for example, in The Ego and the Id, "it is still true that all that is repressed is Ucs., but not all that is Ucs. is repressed. A part of the ego, too...may be Ucs., undoubtedly is Ucs."[28] And further on he speaks of "Ucs. ideas"[29] and a "Ucs. sense of guilt".[30] Although I do not understand why he chooses to use "Ucs." rather than just the term "unconscious", it is clear why he again wants to refer to unconsciousness as a property of ideas. It is because it is clear to Freud that ideas which cannot be in the system

Ucs. may nevertheless be unconscious, that he introduces the term ego. So it would appear that in The Ego and the Id Freud has both unconsciousness as a property of ideas and the concrete entities of id, ego and superego. This is an initial sense in which The Ego and the Id is a synthesis of earlier views. But there are a number of questions which complicate any simple reading of the book. To begin with, just how concrete are the id, ego and superego? To investigate this question more carefully, let us look at how Freud introduces the distinction between ego and id.

In finding a new basis for distinguishing the fundamental constituents of the mind, Freud adopts a position which in several ways is quite reminiscent of Plato. Near the beginning of The Ego and the Id Freud says,

> ...the ego seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavors to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id. For the ego, perception plays the part which in the id falls to instinct. The go represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions...
>
> The functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact that normally control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it. Thus in its relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse...[31]

There is a sense in which Freud is now being less reductionist than in the systematic phase. Rather than trying to

reduce the workings of the mind to an interplay of forces, energy, systems, etc., the basic categories are now something very much like Plato's "reasoning" and "desiring" parts of the psȳche.

However, there is a basic question concerning the nature of the distinction Freud makes between ego and id, and also between ego and superego, which is essential to understanding the nature of Freud's structural metapsychology. The question is this: is Freud simply dividing the mind into three distinct parts or does he see the mind as having an essential unity but that its wide range of activities can be conveniently grouped under the rubrics id, ego and superego. Concerning, for example, ego functions (a term more common in psychoanalytic literature than just "ego") we might ask whether something is an ego function because it is something done by the <u>mind</u> which comes under the heading of "ego", or rather because it is something done by that <u>part</u> of the mind we call ego. The way in which this question is answered is crucial to understanding the model of explanation Freud is employing in his final metapsychology. The way in which the issue has usually been seen is something like this. If the ego, id and superego are concrete entities then the structural view would seem to presuppose, along with the systematic view, a causal model of explanation. However, if they are merely convenient groupings of things the mind does, this might

indicate a desire to retain a reason-giving model of explanation.

It should come as no surprise that both interpretations can be found in the literature. The concrete, causal interpretation is probably the more common one. Robert P. Knight, for example, talks about the id, ego and superego as "parts" of the self and concludes:

> The development and operation of each of these portions of the self...is causally determined in accordance with the psychological laws governing the inherited endowment, biological drives, physiological and emotional experiences, and external natural, cultural, and interpersonal pressures affecting each individual in the milieu in which he is reared.[32]

For an example from the philosophical literature, one can look at a paper by Brian O'Shaugnessy.[33] He sees the id, ego and superego as distinct entities. He identifies "will" entirely with the ego and argues that the id's influence on the self is entirely causal.

This interpretation, however, has occasionally been challenged. Kenneth Z. Altshuler, for example, says of the structural components of the mind: "As loose metaphorical aids to conceptualization they are of value; as personified structures whose formation and course are used in causal explanations, they are tautologic."[34] In a more detailed study of this question, David Beres has also argued for this conclusion. Most importantly, he says,

> References to "contents" of id, ego and superego are common in psycho-analytic writings, even in Freud's own writings. Wishes, memories, fantasies or thoughts should not, I suggest, be spoken of as <u>contents</u> of id, ego or superego, but rather as the products of whatever specific functions are involved, the latter in turn, according to our theory, being allocated to one or another of the structures of the psyche.[35]

Beres argues that ego, id and superego are not parts of the mind, but rather rubrics for various groups of functions of the mind. He even suggests that the term "functional theory" might have been a better name for this approach than "structural theory". What is important here, though, is that Beres does not see the mind as divided into parts.

Since each of these positions is well supported by portions of the text, we might simply say that Freud is ambiguous on this point. It seems to me, however, that something further needs to be said. There is one sense in which the issue, as Freud sees it, turns out to be just the opposite of what it seems to be. Usually the view that the mind has an essential unity is associated with some sort of mentalistic view. The claim is that the plurality of physical entities constituting, say, the brain, is transcended by the unity of the mind. And the view that the mind is divided into parts is often accepted by those who are willing to countenance explanations in terms of distinct entities be-

cause they fail to see any transcending mental unity standing in the way of such an explanation. Something like this needs to be presupposed if the concrete interpretation of id, ego and superego is to be associated with a causal model of explanation and the abstract interpretation of id, ego and superego is to be associated with a reason-giving model of explanation.

It turns out, however, that in The Ego and the Id, the unified view of the mind is associated with a more physicalist position, while the compartmentalized view is associated with a more mentalistic position. If the idea that the mind has an essential unity is expressed in The Ego and the Id, it is expressed as the view that the mind is id. That is to say, the tension between an abstract and a concrete view in this work is expressed not as a tension between id, ego and superego as ultimate parts of the mind as opposed to the existence of a transcending unity, but rather as a tension between the view that the mind is id, with the ego and superego seen as sub-divisions within it, and the view that the ego and superego are distinct from id. If the former is the case then the mind is unified but wholly instinctual while if the latter is the case, man may be more than his instinctual base.

Looking at the issue in this way it still is the case that both interpretations appear to be well supported by passages from the text. In the first place, Freud clearly

asserts that the ego is merely a <u>part</u> of the id and that the superego is a <u>part</u> of the ego. He says:

> Moreover, one must not take the difference between ego and id in too hard and fast a sense, nor forget that the ego is a specially differentiated part of the id.[36]

and

> At the same time the ego is subject to the influence of the instincts, too, like the id, of which it is, as we know, only a specially modified part.[37]

And concerning the relation of the superego to the ego,

> ...it is as impossible for the superego as for the ego to disclaim its origin from things heard; for it is a part of the ego and remains accessible to consciousness by way of these word presentations.[38]

On the basis of assertions like these, we might conclude that Freud's theory is simply that the mind <u>is</u> id and that the ego and superego are just special parts of it. However, there is also strong support for the other interpretation. For one thing, one might question whether this first interpretation is compatible with the way in which Freud first introduces the distinction between id and ego. If id is the name for what philosophers have called the passions and the ego is reason, and if the ego "drives" the id, like a rider on horseback, then it certainly seems that id and ego are seen as distinct. There is also the fact that Freud

refers to the id, ego and superego as "structures". But the most important factor preventing us from simply seeing the mind as id, is the fact that Freud hints at identifying the ego as the real center of personality. In a sentence which is quite suggestive of the direction psychoanalysis was to take after Freud, he says "analysis does not set out to make pathological reactions impossible, but to give the patient's ego freedom to decide one way or the other."[39] Not only does Freud sometimes speak as if the ego were really the personality, with the id seen as some sort of instinctual adjunct to it, but the ego certainly retains at least enough independence from the id so that it can be in conflict with it. In "Neurosis and Psychosis",[40] a paper written just after The Ego and the Id, Freud talks of a "conflict between the ego and the id"[41] and says "In the service of its super-ego and of reality the ego has come into conflict with the id."[42] What is striking about such passages, in addition to the idea of conflict between the ego and the id, is that it seems to be the id which belongs to the ego, rather than the other way around.

It might be noted that this tension in the way the distinctions of the structural view are made is foreshadowed by a very similar kind of tension in earlier distinctions. In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud introduces the pleasure principle as an all embracing principle of mental life. The reality principle is first seen as just an exten-

sion of the pleasure principle, an attempt to secure the greatest amoung of pleasure in the long run, given external conditions. Gradually, however, the reality principle seems to become a distinct factor which is not just an aspect of the pleasure principle but rather in conflict with it. Another case of this kind of tension is the relation between the death instincts and the life instincts. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where this distinction is developed, it is not clear whether Freud is saying that the death instinct is really all there is, with the sexual instinct being merely a specially modified part of it, or rather that the two are distinct.

Thus the kind of tension which we find in The Ego and the Id is quite characteristic of Freud's way of thinking. But the important question now is what Freud is doing with this tension as it is employed in The Ego and the Id. It seems to me that the best way to summarize what he is doing is to say that he is attempting to incorporate within one conceptual framework both a causal model of explanation and a reason-giving model of explanation. The view that the mind is id, presupposes a causal model of explanation. In saying that the mind is id, Freud is saying simply that the mind is instinctual in nature. And the actual content of Freud's theory of human instinct, exemplified most importantly by the Three Essays of 1905 is, as we have seen, a causal explanation of human behavior. On the other hand, the con-

trasting view which sees the ego as the real seat of the personality, presupposes a reason-giving model of explanation. The ego, after all, is just human reason. To understand what a person does in terms of ego, is to understand him in terms of his ordinary reasons and purposes. To make this point clear, let us consider the contrasting ways in which Freud talks about the explanation of neurotic symptoms. If we wish to understand the contribution of the id to a symptom we must refer to factors which are clearly causal. In addition to the fact that the id consists of inherited, instinctual contents, we will always refer to factors which are prior to the symptom (usually, in fact, going back to childhood). In contrast to this, the most important factor in understanding the contribution of the ego to a symptom is what Freud calls the "gain from illness".[43] To understand a symptom in terms of the ego, we do not look for something in the past, we look at the person in terms of his environment, his relationships with other people, his beliefs, and his purposes right now. We want to know what he's getting out of having this particular symptom at this time. We understand the symptom, in other words, by finding a good reason for it. Of course, if one looks at Freud's actual clinical work, one can always discern elements of both of these approaches. Any clinical work restricted to just one of these approaches would not be typically psychoanalytic (at least as Freud envisioned it).

It is the combining of reason-giving and causal models which gives Freud's thought its most basic philosophical characteristic.

Thus it might be said that the structural metapsychology involves a tension between a reason-giving model of explanation and a causal model of explanation. Of course, it might also be said, if one were less sympathetic to Freud, that it just involves a confusion between the two. It seems to me, however, that the choice of which way to speak is not a philosophical issue but rather a practical one. If theories formulated in terms of this conceptual framework turn out to be successful then we will talk of a constructive tension, or even of a view which supersedes the distinction itself. If not, then we will call it a mere confusion. The empirical issue, it seems to me, remains open. But in any case, what I wish to conclude here is simply that Freud's structural view employs neither a causal model of explanation alone nor just a reason-giving one, but rather a blend of the two.

Footnotes for Chapter 4

1. "The Unconscious" in Freud: General Psychological Theory, Collier Books, New York, 1963, p. 116.

2. Lancelot Law Whyte, "The Unconscious", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 8, p. 186.

3. Ernest Jones, Papers on Psycho-Analysis, p. 26.

4. Freud: General Psychological Theory, p. 55.

5. Ibid., p. 135.

6. The list of four features of the Ucs. which Freud gives in "The Unconscious" is typical of his views but I would not want to suggest by citing it that Freud's view of the properties of the unconscious are any more clearcut or fixed than they are. At one point in their study of Freud, Yankelovich and Barrett say: "So broad is Freud's notion of primary process that at one time or another he subsumed under this one term more than eighteen logically distinct meanings." (Ego and Instinct, pp. 67-68) While this may be a bit of an exaggeration it is true that Freud's terminology did not remain constant. But it does seem to me that the three basic features of symbolic meanings, timelessness, and toleration of contradictions are always considered basic features of the Ucs. whatever the terminology.

7. Rappaport in Koch, p. 62.

8. Brown, Life Against Death, p. 94.

9. Ibid., p. 275.

10. Freud, General Psychological Theory, p. 121.

11. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 22.

12. Otto Fenichel, "Psychoanalysis and Metaphysics", in The Collected Papers of Otto Fenichel, First Series, Norton, New York, 1953, pp. 8-26.

13. Ibid., p. 9.

14. Ibid., p. 8.

15. Ibid., p. 13.

16. The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 152-153.

17. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), Norton, New York, 1960, p. 205.

18. Ibid.

19. Freud, Dora, An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905), Collier Books, New York, 1963, p. 79.

20. Freud, "Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis" (1909), in Three Case Histories, Collier Books, 1963, p. 36.

21. Freud, "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (1918), in Three Case Histories, p. 191.

22. Dora, p. 55.

23. Dreams, p. 351.

24. For a succinct definition of this process, see "Dora", p. 72.

25. For an interesting discussion of the relationship of negation to repression see "Negation" (1925), in General Psychological Theory, pp. 213-217.

26. Dreams, p. 582.

27. General Psychological Theory, p. 125.

28. The Ego and the Id, p. 8.

29. Ibid., p. 12.

30. Ibid., p. 40.

31. Ibid., p. 15. See, of course, Plato's "Phaedrus" for the origin of this metaphor.

32. Robert P. Knight, "Determinism, 'Freedom,' and Psychotherapy", in Van Over, The Psychology of Freedom, p. 374.

33. Brian O'Shaugnessy, "The Id and the Thinking Process", in Wollheim, Freud, A Collection of Critical Essays, pp. 222-241.

34. Kenneth Z. Altshuler, "Comments on Recent Sleep Research Related to Psychoanalytic Theory", in Lee and Herbert, Freud and Psychology, p. 357.

35. David Beres, "Structure and Function in Psychoanalysis", International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Volume 46, 1965, p. 56.

36. The Ego and the Id, p. 28.

37. Ibid., p. 30.

38. Ibid., p. 42.

39. Ibid, p. 40.

40. General Psychological Theory, pp. 185-189.

41. Ibid., p. 185.

42. Ibid., p. 186.

43. See, for example, The Ego and the Id, p. 39, and Three Case Histories, p. 56. Alternatively, Freud talks about a "motive for illness" (Dora, p. 59) or a "flight into illness" (Dora, p. 60).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION; AN APPLICATION TO THE PROBLEM OF RATIONALITY

In one of the earliest attempts to discuss the philosophical implications of Freud's theory, Israel Levine said, "Freud's account of the Reality principle is significant, I believe, for philosophy. It throws light on the nature of reason itself."[1] Although many philosophers have continued to feel that this is so, I do not think that sufficient light has been shed on the relationship of Freud's theory to philosophical problems concerning human reason. Psychologists have often failed to appreciate philosophical subtleties while philosophers have sometimes misunderstood Freud.

I think that we can divide the problem of rationality into two broad categories of questions. The first concerns the degree to which man is, or is capable of becoming, rational. The second is concerned with the question of what is meant by saying that man is rational. Broadly speaking, I will suggest in this chapter that philosophers have concentrated too much on discussing Freud in the context of the first question and not enough on discussing him in the context of the second. Although Freudian theory does suggest that man is in some respects a little more rational and in some respects a little less rational than we had thought, on the whole there is no great shift on the question of how rational man is. On the other hand, the concept

of rationality is not left untouched. It seems to me that on the basis of Freudian theory, especially in its final formulation, we can see certain shortcomings in the category of "rationality". I will conclude by suggesting that when we talk about rationality vs. irrationality, it would usually be more appropriate to talk about intelligence vs. stupidity.

The basic reason for the failure to make the best use of Freud's theory for the understanding of the concept of rationality seems to me to be the very confusion over Freud's basic model of explanation to which this study has been addressed. This is most evident in those few attempts philosophers have made to explore specifically the relationship of Freud to the concept of rationality. There are four fairly recent papers in which this is the principal theme: Peter Alexander's "Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation",[2] Theodore Mischel's "Concerning Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation",[3] Harvey Mullane's "Psychoanalytic Explanation and Rationality",[4] and Robert Audi's "Psychoanalytic Explanation and the Concept of Rational Action".[5]

In the second chapter I pointed out that there has been a strong tendency to assume that Freud's model of explanation is either consistently reason-giving or consistently causal. On either interpretation, Freud's theory seems to imply something quite extreme about human reason. Given the reason-

giving interpretation, the theory seems to imply that there could be no such thing as irrational behavior. If behavior is inexplicable on ordinary grounds, it is only because we fail to appreciate the unconscious motivation behind it. Once we understand the person's relevant beliefs and desires, we will come to see that, from his point of view, the behavior was quite rational. On the other hand, the causal interpretation would seem to make rational behavior impossible. On this view, Freud's theory shows that all of our behavior is caused by unconscious factors and that even when we give reasons for our behavior they are just rationalizations. What really causes our behavior is never a rational consideration but rather a blind, unconscious need.

However, if the arguments I have presented so far are correct, then Freud's model of explanation is neither exclusively reason-giving nor exlusively causal, but rather, some kind of combination of the two. Neither of the extreme conclusions, therefore, is warranted. Although I know of no philosopher who has actually been tempted to adopt one of these extreme positions on the implication of Freud's theory, the discussion has usually been carried on as though this were the issue. Alexander, for example, begins his discussion by saying:

> It is often said that psychoanalysis has drawn our attention to the irrational springs of human behavior. Recently, however, I have heard it said that, on the contrary, psychanalysis has revealed that our behavior is

> more rational than we usually suppose it to be. The neurotic, according to this view, is radically misinformed but on the information he has he behaves rationally... This is a tempting and persuasive view but, it seems to me, a misleading one...[6]

And Mullane starts with:

> Psychoanalytic explanations seem to show that irrational behavior is really rational. For it looks as if, once a psychoanalytic explanation of a person's behavior has been given, that behavior necessarily takes on the character of rationality. The behavior, however bizarre, is shown to have been carried out by the agent because it expressed something he wanted to express or achieved something he wanted to achieve...
>
> In what follows I shall try go show that this paradoxical view, though more subtle than many critics think, is unsound, and that the common-sense distinction between rationality and irrationality is justified.[7]

The problem, in other words, has been to find a way to avoid the reductio ad absudum of Freud that would ensue if his theory showed that all behavior (or none) was rational. It seems to me that none of the attempts to do this have fully succeeded because they have failed to see that the basic problem is a confusion over the kind of explanation of behavior Freud is actually giving.

Alexander, in the earliest of these papers, tries to refute the hypothesis that Freud's theory shows all behavior to be rational by showing that the supposed analogy between psychoanalytic explanation and ordinary purposive explana-

tion does not hold. And while an ordinary purposive explanation does show an act to be rational, a psychoanalytic explanation does not. He distinguishes rational from irrational behavior in the following way:

> A piece of behavior was rational if it was done for reasons which constitute a sufficient reason, that is, if it was likely to acheive what was intended and unlikely to lead to other consequences whose undesirability outweighs the desirability of what it was intended to achieve. It was irrational if it was not done for reasons which constitute a sufficient reason, that is, if it was unlikely to achieve what was intended, or less likely to achieve it than some other piece of behavior, or was likely to lead to other consequences whose undesirability outweighs the desirability of what it was intended to achieve.[8]

Although Alexander feels it is true that "psychoanalytic theory implies that all behavior which we call 'irrational' can, at least in principle, be explained in terms of unconscious purposes..."[9] still, this does not show irrational behavior to be rational. It would not do so, he argues, unless,

> a) the reasons given were the reasons for which the agent behaved as he did and
>
> b) they were sufficient reasons[10]

With explanations in terms of unconscious purposes, he suggests, it is questionable whether the first condidtion can be met, and impossible for the second condition to be

met. The reason why it is questionable whether the first condition can be met is that for a patient to accept a psychoanalytic explanation is not at all like remembering the reason for which one acted. It is more like accepting a theory on the basis of evidence. The patient sees the explanation as what "must have been" the reason in the same way the analyst sees it. Alexander argues, however, that this is not sufficient for us to say that the reason was the person's own reason. As Toulmin would put it, the psychoanalytic explanation constitutes a reason, but not his reason.

More important is the fact that Alexander claims that psychoanalytic explanations do not meet criteria (b). In the three examples he gives of psychoanalytic explanation, the behavior to be explained had not the slightest chance of bringing about what was supposedly the reason for it. One case, for example, concerns a woman who repeatedly said "storks" when she meant to say "stocks". The psychoanalytic explanation (which, I think it should be pointed out, is based on much more evidence than just this error) is that the woman unconsciously wanted a baby. But, as Alexander points out, simply mistaking the word "storks" for "stocks" could not possibly help to bring that about. Thus, although saying "storks" instead of "stocks" is not merely an accident, since it can be explained psychoanalytically, it is also not a rational act.

This whole interpretation is based on the fact that Alexander favors a causal interpretation of Freud.[11] He believes that what Freud has done is to discover hidden causes of our behavior. He sees the concept of an "unconscious reason" as only a kind of metaphor. "It seems to me," he says, "that we can say that Freud has shown that it is possible to construct a theory on the basis of which irrational behavior can be interpreted as if it were the outcome of given unconscious reasons."[12] However, he concludes that "unconscious reasons are very unlike conscious reasons and especially unlike what we normally call 'good reasons' or 'sufficient reasons' for behavior."[13]

A similar kind of argument is developed by Mullane. He focuses his argument, however, on the causal nature of repression. He says:

> Defense 'mechanisms' are so named for the good reason that the psychic processes that are said to bring about neurotic (and hence defensive) behavior 'operate' in a purely mechanical way. Repression is purposeful, but its manner of operation is not any more rational than the body is rational in its purposeful regulation of body temperature. So when someone represses something, it is not really a mental act that takes place, in the sense that it is not anything he did; it is not anything he decided or chose to do. Rather, an experience's becoming unconscious, in the Freudian sense of 'unconscious', is something that happens to the individual.[14]

It seems to me, for reasons which should now be clear, that

neither Alexander nor Mullane does full justice to Freud. It should be particularly clear, for example, that Mullane's understanding of repression is adequate for the Freudian systematic unconscious but not for the Freudian descriptive unconscious. But before spelling out in more detail my criticism of this position, let me sketch the kind of counter-arguments developed by Mischel and Audi.

Theodore Mischel responds to this causal interpretation of Freud in a way, it seems to me, which takes us even further from Freud. He argues that the analogy between ordinary reason-giving explanation and psychoanalytic explanation is indeed quite strong. His argument for this involves interpreting Freud in a rather Rylean way. Saying "storks" instead of "stocks" is not, Mischel claims, purported to be an internal attempt to bring about babies. Rather, talking about storks is one possible aspect of that behavior which we <u>call</u> wanting a baby. To say that a woman wants a baby is to say that she manifests certain kinds of behavior, like, for example, taking every possible opportunity to talk about things related to babies. Of course, if wanting a baby is something she has reason to repress, it is quite appropriate that the "baby wanting" behavior should occur in the form of an "error". It is thus perfectly rational for someone who unconsciously wants a baby to seize upon the opportunity to mistake "storks" for "stocks". Mischel does not believe, however, that this

analogy shows psychoanalytically explainable behavior to be necessarily rational. What makes irrational behavior irrational is not the relationship between unconscious beliefs and action, but, rather, the fact that the beliefs themselves are irrational.

Robert Audi also emphasizes the degree of analogy between ordinary explanation and psychoanalytic explanation, at least in some cases, but he adopts a somewhat different approach than Mischel. Essentially, his argument involves pointing out that unconscious motivation does not always lead to neurotic symptoms. Sometimes what it leads to can better be described as sublimation. He notes, that is to say, that it is not only bizarre symptoms that have unconscious roots, but that sometimes highly successful and appropriate behavior is at least partly determined by unconscious factors. He gives the following as an example:

> Imagine a man who, though not a "latent homosexual," has slight homosexual leanings, and, because of his unconscious want to be around beautiful young boys, decides to become a scoutmaster, ostensibly for philanthropic reasons. Such a man might discharge his duties effectively, with enjoyment, and in a conventionally acceptable relation with the boys. He may even have considered alternative hobbies and rejected them for good reasons. Let us also assume that he does not believe slight homosexual leanings are abnormal and is of a liberal and aesthetic temperament such that even if he were to discover his true motivation for the decision he would on reflection accept his wanting to be around beautiful young boys as not unnatural and would

> continue his hobby, regarding it as, among other things, a reasonable form of sublimation.[15]

Audi goes on to argue that our definition of rationality ought to be expanded enough so as not to exclude from the category of rational behavior cases such as these.

There is a crucial point, however, which neither Mischel nor Audi take sufficient note of. It is that Freud explicitly argued that the relation of unconscious motivation to behavior is quite different, in specified ways, from the relation of conscious motivation to behavior. This is, as I argued in chapter IV, precisely what the theory of primary process asserts. Although I think, therefore, that Alexander and Mullane, in emphasizing the difference between psychoanalytic explanation and ordinary explanation, are remaining somewhat closer to the Freudian position than Mischel and Audi, it seems most important to me to emphasize that all of them are seeing only one part of a more complex picture. Broadly speaking, the account given by Mischel and Audi is an accurate interpretation of the Freudian notion of unconscious motivation only for the descriptive sense of "unconscious". And Alexander and Mullane do justice only to the systematic sense. These, however, were only intermediate steps on the way toward Freud's most comprehensive statement of his position, the structural view. It is only by looking at the question in terms of the structural view

that we can, ultimately, do justice to Freud.

It should be kept in mind that the structural view involves two different distinctions. In the first place we have the distinction between the ego and the id. Roughly speaking, the ego represents reason and the id represents the instincts. Or, in more technical terminology, the id represents the primary process and the ego represents the secondary process. The ego observes the world and, obeying the principles of logic and inference, attempts to interact with the world so as to best satisfy its needs in the long run. The id, on the other hand, seeks immediate satisfaction, in either real or symbolic terms, of each of its needs, with no regard for the long run, or the contradictory demands of different needs. At the same time, the structural view, as we saw, also involves the use of the concept of unconsciousness as a property of ideas. Overlapping the ego-id distinction, therefore, we have the distinction between conscious, preconscious and unconscious ideas. The difference between the second and the third is that preconscious ideas can easily be brought to consciousness while unconscious ideas require the special technique of psychoanalysis.

These two overlapping distinctions provide us with a variety of sources of behavior, besided ordinary, conscious motivation. First there is ego behavior which is preconsciously motivated. Although the person is not aware of the reason for the behavior, he can become aware of the reason

if he tries. The sense in which an explanation of such behavior, which is arrived at simply by attending to the latent reasons, is a "psychoanalytic" explanation may be only marginal. This is one of the problems with Audi's example of the scoutmaster with slight homosexual leanings. If he indeed has no moral objection to homosexuality then, according to psychoanalytic theory, he cannot be repressing knowledge of his own leanings, he just hasn't attended to them (this is hardly a likely state of affairs but it is the only interpretation Audi allows). Rather than calling this an example of unconscious motivation, it would be more appropriate to call this a case of preconscious ego behavior. It is preconscious because it does not appear to be repressed and it is ego behavior because it is rationally designed to achieve its goal. What is important about explanations of preconscious ego behavior is that they do not require the special techniques of psychoanalysis to arrive at them; they are in some sense "ordinary". As Ernest Jones points out, "it is quite impossible to go through life without constantly making interpretations of just this kind..."[16] Still, in a broad sense it seems appropriate to call such explanation "psychoanalytic" firstly because psychoanalysis gives us a terminology to talk about them more precisely and secondly because it is psychoanalysis which has made us sensitive to their existence.

Secondly, there is unconscious ego behavior. Although

this shares with preconscious ego behavior the characteristic of a rational relation between reason and act (by which I mean simply that the act is designed to actually bring about the goal which motivates it) the reason itself is not, by ordinary means, accessible to the person. For some reason the real motivation is so painful or threatening to the person that he represses any conscious knowledge of it and probably substitutes a rationalization. Thirdly, there is unconscious id behavior. Again, the reason for the behavior is not accessible to the person, but now we should not expect a rational relation between the motivation and the behavior but rather one which is characterized by the features of the primary process. (One might also expect there to be conscious, or preconscious, id behavior. One might think, for example, that healthy, fully enjoyed sexual activity is a case of this. Freud, however, prefers to consider the id to be always unconscious.) We are thus left with three basic kinds of relationship between motivation and behavior, besides ordinary, conscious motivation.

We can now reformulate the basic issue between Alexander and Mullane on the one hand, and Mullane and Audi on the other concerning the degree of analogy between ordinary explanation and psychoanalytic explanation, in a manner much more faithful to Freud's actual theory. What is the relationship of each of the above categories of psychoanalytic explanation to ordinary purposive explanation? Let us

consider first preconscious ego behavior and unconscious id behavior. It is easy to find straightforward examples of each and doing so will show clearly in just what sense each of the philosophical positions being considered is correct, and also just what each misses.

Preconscious ego behavior, to begin with, is quite common. Examples of it range from trivial to quite elaborate. At the former end of the scale is an incident related by Ernest Jones:

> On starting to open a fresh tin of tobacco, I economically reflected that I should first finish the rather dry remains of the previous one. A few minutes later, however, while engrossed in reading, I wanted to refill my pipe, and to my surprise detected myself in the act of opening a new tin, although I had pushed it farther away from me than the other.[17]

Of course it is also true that the ego can perform much more complex activities without our becoming aware of them. As Freud points out in The Ego and the Id, "...we have evidence that even subtle and difficult intellectual operations which ordinarily require tremendous reflection can equally be carried out preconsciously and without coming into consciousness."[18] This interesting fact, of course, had been noticed even before Freud. A number of interesting cases of this kind, especially several reported by Poincaré, are discussed by Arturo Rosenbleuth.[19] The trivial example from

Jones is sufficient here, though, since it illustrates the fact that preconscious ego behavior exhibits exactly the same relation between reason and act as ordinary consciously motivated behavior. Jones preconsciously wanted the fresh tobacco and his behavior was perfectly designed to get it. Thus the analogy between an explanation of this sort and ordinary reason-giving explanation is quite close; the only difference is the element of awareness.

The situation is quite different with unconscious id behavior. Let us again take an example from Jones:

> A doctor on rearranging his furniture in a new house came across an old-fashioned, straight, wooden stethoscope, and, after pausing to decide where he should put it, was impelled to place it on the side of his writing-desk in such a position that it stood exactly between his chair and the one reserved for his patients. The act in itself was certainly odd, for in the first place the straight stethoscope served no purpose, as he invariably used a binaural one...[20]

The doctor found that henceforth he <u>had</u> to keep that stethoscope in that position when seeing patients. In this case no amount of attending to his own mind enabled him to discover why he felt this compulsion. Psychoanalysis, however, did provide an explanation. The explanation had to do with the unconscious sexual attraction the doctor felt for some of his patients. The phallic aspect of the stethoscope provided a symbolic gratification of the doctor's repressed

wishes. At the same time, analysis indicated that it also represented a barrier: it helped protect him from the temptation to act on his desires. As Jones sums it up:

> ...the act was a compromise formation; it served both to gratify in his imagination the repressed wish to enter into nearer relations with an attractive patient...and at the same time to remind him that his wish was not to become reality...It was, so to speak, a charm against yielding to temptation.[21]

This case illustrates several important features of unconscious id behavior. In the first place, the explanation for the behavior involves seeing its symbolic meaning. This does not fit neatly into the oversimplified picture of the psychoanalytic explanation of neurotic behavior often found in philosophical discussions. According to that picture, a psychoanalytic explanation involves finding some unconscious belief which makes sense of the behavior. This is the case, for example, with Mischel's argument, which tries to maintain the analogy between psychoanalytic explanation and ordinary explanation by attributing the irrationality of neurotic behavior to the irrationality of the beliefs underlying the behavior. However, when something is given an unconscious symbolic meaning, it is not the same thing as a belief. In the present case, the doctor did not, even unconsciously, believe the stethoscope was a penis. Because of superficial characteristics, he associated

the two; the stethoscope unconsciously symbolized for him a penis. But there is no justification for translating this symbolic use of an object into a belief that something is the case. In fact it is interesting how infrequently irrational beliefs play a role in explaining neurotic behavior. When irrational beliefs do occur, they are usually associated with psychotic behavior rather than neurotic behavior. Dr. Schreber, for example, a well known case of psychosis which Freud discussed, believed that God was planning to turn him into a woman.[22] If this had actually been the case, much of his behavior would have been quite rational. But, of course, the belief was irrational. However, the explanation of neurotic behavior usually involves unconscious symbolism rather than unconscious beliefs.

Secondly, the example from Jones illustrates the fact that the behavior was totally inappropriate to achieve its purpose in any way other than symbolically. The act of placing the stethoscope in a certain position neither enhanced not diminished the doctor's prospects of sexual gratification. It is clear again that this case cannot be made to fit well in a picture of psychoanalysis like that of Mischel. While it is plausible to maintain that saying "storks" instead of "stocks" is part of what we mean by wanting a baby, placing a stethoscope between oneself and someone else is not part of what we mean by sexual attraction. There is no escaping the fact that Freud's theory

implies that unconsciously motivated behavior is often inappropriate to actually achieve its goal.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the explanation for the behavior involves two elements which are mutually contradictory. The placing of the stethoscope is a symbolic attempt both to achieve and to prevent sexual gratification. This is quite typical of psychoanalytic explanations.

The third basic source of behavior, motivation which comes from the ego but which is repressed, is perhaps the most important area for investigation in the actual work of psychoanalysis. This area includes the much emphasized processes of ego defense mechanisms and the activity of the superego. Here the degree of analogy lies somewhere between the extremes of the first two cases, but it raises no new philosophical points beyond what has been brought out by the first two kinds of motivation. I would only like to add here the important point that it is perfectly possible, and in fact most common, for actual behavior to manifest elements of all three sources.

I will now return to the question of what lessons we can draw from all this for the concept of rationality. In the first place, since Freud's model of explanation is neither entirely reason-giving nor entirely causal, there is not even a prima facie case that this theory shows all behavior to be either rational or irrational. And in any

case, there have been no important attempts to actually argue for such a conclusion. This, therefore, is not the issue. There is, however, an issue being debated in the papers under discussion. Most basically, the issue concerns the degree of analogy between psychoanalytic explanations and ordinary reason-giving explanations. Alexander and Mullane, on the basis of a causal interpretation of Freud, emphasizes the degree of disanalogy. Mischel and Audi show that the reason-giving aspect of Freud's thought allows for a plausible defense of the view that there is a strong analogy. What my discussion has shown, I believe, is that it is not possible to come to a single generalization. There are different kinds of sources of behavior and they exhibit varying degrees of analogy to ordinary, consciously motivated behavior.

If we take ordinary, consciously motivated behavior as our model of rationality, then the conclusion is that psychoanalytically explainable behavior manifests varying degrees of rationality. Or, more accurately, psychoanalytic explanations of behavior usually involve several aspects, embodying different degrees of rationality. The problem with this, though, is that rationality tends to be seen as an all or nothing affair. Either behavior manifests the property of rationality or, if it doesn't, it is irrational. This is true both of our ordinary use of the concept of rationality and the attempts to give it a more precise

definition. Audi, in his discussion of rationality, recognizes the need for degrees of rationality and says at one point:

> the notions of rationality we use in assessing actions seems to admit of degrees; hence if one feels that defining 'rational action' so as to include certain actions influenced by unconscious factors, is including too much, one should recall that such actions need not be regarded as highly rational.[23]

The term "highly rational", however, sounds odd. If it is admitted that an action is rational it sounds strange to add that it was nevertheless not "highly rational". Denying that an action is highly rational sounds something like saying that someone is "not too bright". We do not mean that the person is bright but just not among the brightest. Saying that behavior is not highly rational sounds like a polite way of saying that it is irrational. The term "highly rational" does not seem appropriate to assert something positive either. It does not seem appropriate to praise someone's behavior by saying that it is highly rational. Of course we might say something like that to indicate that the behavior is not very much influenced by, say, emotional factors. But I do not think we normally praise behavior by assigning it, literally, a high degree of rationality. The notion that man is a rational animal seems deeply enough embedded in our attitudes that praising

behavior as rational is just to say that it was the kind of behavior to be expected of any normal person.

The difficulty in conceiving of rationality as having degrees persists in the attempts to find a more precise definition of rationality. The basic reason for this seems to be a feeling that an adequate definitioan of rationality must involve the notion that the behavior is in some sense optimal. Rational behavior must be the behavior which, among those choices which are possible and the person has reason to consider, is most likely to achieve what the person wants or is in his interest. Any behavior which falls even a little short of this is irrational. Looking back at the way Alexander defines rationality (p. 135 above), we can see that according to this definition, even behavior which is likely to achieve what we desire may be irrational. If there is another course of action only slightly more likely to achieve what we want, then the original decision is irrational. Thus according to this definition, behavior is either simply rational, or, if it fails to be rational, simply irrational.

This same characteristic of rationality can be seen in the attempts to use decision theory to find a more precise definition of rationality. Patrick Suppes, for example,[24] explores some of the difficulties in defining a rational course of action with decision theory. It turns out to be quite difficult to formulate a definition for even the most

simple and stylized of situations. The difficulties arise because of the need for the strategy to result in something which we can see as optimal. But instead of concluding that there is something wrong with the concept of rationality, as a way of understanding human behavior, he seems to feel that it is just a question of developing a more sophisticated decision theory. What he doesn't question however, is that rationality must involve finding an optimal choice, and nothing less.

But the lesson we have drawn from psychoanalysis is that we need to evaluate our behavior in a way which recognizes that it can be appropriate in varying degrees to our wants. We might conclude from this simply that the concept of rationality ought to be reformed. An easier course is suggested, however, by the fact that there is already a term which expresses exactly what we want: "intelligence". It is clearly recognized as having degrees and, more importantly, it is more suggestive of the way people actually lead their lives. "Rational" (normal) people do not go around calculating carefully and never making decisions until they are sure they have found the optimal behavior; they do the best they can and routinely settle for less than perfect solutions. What psychoanalysis shows is that in making decisions we are normally faced with the need to satisfy a variety of wants. Not only are many of these wants competing, but they exist on different

levels and are satisfied in different ways; even symbolic satisfactions count for something. Behaving intelligently means finding relatively elegant solutions to these complex problems. Neurotic behavior is stupid in the sense that it is narrow minded. It may achieve its immediate goal of relieving the tension caused by an unsatisfied unconscious want, but in doing so the person ignores a whole range of other factors which intelligent behavior ought to consider.[25]

The shift from rationality to intelligence might be seen as analogous to the shift which has taken place in psychology away from the concept of will and in favor of the concept of motivation. The fact that psychology has found much more use for the concept of motivation than the concept of will seems to be due precisely to the fact that while will can only be either free or determined, motivation allows for degrees and kinds. There would appear to be some important gains to be achieved from completing this process by replacing rationality with intelligence. Among these is the fact that there is a much more straightforward relationship between motivation and intelligence than between will and rationality. The relationship between will and rationality is paradoxical because of the longstanding tradition of defining freedom of the will in terms of the possibility of <u>irrational</u> behavior. This, for example, is a central theme in Dostoyevsky. At one

point he has his "underground man" say:

> I, for instance, would not be in the least surprised if all of a sudden, apropos of nothing, in the midst of general prosperity a gentleman with an ignoble, or rather with a reactionary and ironical, countenance were to arise and putting his arms akimbo, say to us all: "I say, gentlemen, hadn't we better kick over the whole show and scatter rationalism to the winds, simply to send these logarithms to the devil, and to enable us to live once more at our own sweet foolish will!"[26]

This same kind of relation between will and rationality can also be found in more rigorous philosophical discussions. Roderick Chisholm, for example, as part of his general argument that the intentionality of consciousness allows us to conclude that there are irreducibly psycholgical concepts, offers the following consideration:

> By appealing to the fact that men need not be rational - that a man may have contradictory beliefs and contradictory desires - we might be able to formulate a fairly simple criterion of an intentional modality... It may seem unfortunate to proceed in this way if intentionality is to be used to establish a distinction between the psychological and the nonpsychological and to show, perhaps, that what it is to be a <u>person</u> is something that cannot be described or understood in "physicalistic" terms. For we would be saying, in effect, that the possibility of <u>irrationality</u> is what separates the psychological from the physcial. It may be, however, that this is the best we can do.[27]

It seems to me that the basic problem with this traditional relationship between will and rationality has to do mainly

with the all or nothing characteristic of each of these concepts. In order for the will to be free it must be determined by nothing at all. But the concept of rationality specifies exactly what must be done in a given situation for the behavior to meet its criteria. Thus only the possibility of irrational behavior can provide the basis for freedom. But surely this contradicts our most basic intuitions about the relationship between behavior and a reason for behavior. The fact that something is done because we have a reason for doing it could not possibly be the kind of constraint we wish to exclude when we call an action free. If anything, it is the fact that we <u>can</u> act on the basis of reasons which makes our actions free. This paradox, however, does not arise if we employ the concepts of motivation and intelligence. Intelligent behavior is not behavior which is unmotivated. We naturally think of it as precisely that behavior which takes into consideration the widest possible range of motivations.

One final advantage of the concept of intelligence over that of rationality is that it would allow for a more realistic examination of the question of the degree to which a person should be held morally responsible for neurotic behavior. We are led to this advantage by seeing what is wrong with one-sided interpretations of Freud. A purely causal interpretation of Freud would seem to suggest that we have no responsibility for neurotic behavior. It is

hard to see how we could be held responsible for something which is entirely a function of how something we are born with interacts with the environment we are born into. If neurotic behavior is irrational in this sense, we should no more be held accountable for its consequences than for the consequences of any other disease. On the other hand, a purely purposive reading of Freud would seem to suggest that our responsibility for neurotic behavior is exactly the same as our responsibility for ordinary behavior. If neurotic behavior is identical to ordinary behavior in the degree to which it expresses our actual purposes, and different only in the degree to which we acknowledge our purposes (even to ourselves), it is hard to see shy this refusal should mitigate our responsibility. On this reading of Freud, even if we should be excused from the consequences of irrational behavior, we should still be held accountable for neurotic behavior, since it is really rational.

The problem, of course, is that this analysis in terms of rationality leaves us no middle ground. Behavior is either rational or irrational; totally excusable or totally inexcusable. However, we avoid this dilemma if we think of neurotic behavior as a species of stupid behavior. We certainly would not want to make it a general policy to excuse the consequences of stupidity. Psychoanalysis offers a convinceing case that this would result in significantly more stupidity (even without anyone

consciously intending to be stupid), at just the wrong times. But we could also not hold people responsible for failing to find the most brilliant solutions to complex problems. Thus there is no simple answer to the question of the degree to which stupidity excuses. The fact that Freud's theory, properly understood, suggests exactly the same thing about the degree to which neurosis excuses, adds whatever weight Freud's findings carry in support of the use of "intelligence" instead of "rationality".

Footnotes for Chapter 5

1. Israel Levine, The Unconscious: An Introduction to Freudian Psychology, Macmillan, New York, 1923, p. 204.

2. Peter Alexander, "Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation", in Wollheim, ed., Freud, A Collection of Critical Essays, pp. 305-321. Originally in Mind, Volume LXXI, 1962. Reprinted also in Care and Landesman, eds., Readings in the Theory of Action.

3. Theodore Mischel, "Concerning Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation", in Wollheim, pp. 322-331. Originally from Mind, Volume LXXIV, 1965.

4. Harvey Mullane, "Psychoanalytic Explanation and Rationality", The Journal of Philosophy, Volume LXVIII, Number 14, July 22, 1971, pp. 413-426.

5. Robert Audi, "Pyschoanalytic Explanation and the Concept of Rational Action", The Monist, Volume 56, Number 3, July, 1972, pp. 444-464.

6. Alexander, p. 305.

7. Mullane, p. 413.

8. Alexander, p. 310.

9. Alexander, p. 314.

10. Alexander, p. 316.

11. See Alexander, p. 321.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Mullane, p. 420.

15. Audi, pp. 449-450.

16. Ernest Jones, Papers on Psycho-Analysis, p. 72.

17. Ibid., p. 63.

18. The Ego and the Id, p. 16.

19. Arturo Rosenbleuth, Mind and Brain, A Philosophy of Science, MIT Press, 1970, pp. 93-100.

20. Jones, p. 67.

21. Jones, p. 70.

22. Three Case Histories, pp. 103-186.

23. Audi, p. 462.

24. Patrick Suppes, "The Philosophical Relevance of Decision Theory", The Journal of Philosophy, Volume LVIII, Number 21, October 12, 1961, pp. 605-614.

25. What I am suggesting here is quite similar (although I have arrived at the conclusion in a quite different way) to the position developed by Dollard and Miller in their important attempt to combine the insights of psychoanalysis with the scientific rigor of learning theory (John Dollard and Neal E. Miller, Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in Terms of Learning, Thinking, and Culture, McGraw Hill, New York, 1950). They say rather bluntly that neurotic behavior is simply "stupid".

26. Dostoyevsky, Notes from the Underground, translated by Constance Garnett, Dell, 1960, p. 45.

27. Roderick M. Chisholm, "Psychological Concepts", in Hector-Neri Castañada, Intentionality, Minds and Perception, Wayne State University Press, 1967, p. 12.

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