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POLICY-FORMULATION AND CHANGE IN GAULLIST FRANCE:
THE 1968 ORIENTATION ACT OF HIGHER EDUCATION

by

Jacques Fomerand

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TABLE OF CONTENT

	<u>PAGE NOS</u>
COPYRIGHT PAGE.....	I
APPROVAL PAGE	II
TABLE OF CONTENT.....	III-IV
ABSTRACT.....	V
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS.....	VI-VII
ABBREVIATIONS.....	VIII-X
CHAPTER	
I. Introduction.....	1- 25
II. The politics of higher education in post-war France (1945-1968): stalemate or incremental change ?.....	26- 65
III. The May-June crisis: the fragmented programmatic and political demands of the University's 'Etats Generaux'.....	66-100
IV. The resolution of the May-June crisis and the preliminary aggregation of the University's demands	101-141
V. The Administrative struggle over the Orientation Act: fragmentation and conservatism.....	142-174
VI. The group struggle over the Orientation Act: conservatism but fragmentation.....	175-199
VII. The parliamentary struggle over the Orientation Act: the resolution of an intra-party dispute.....	200-229
VIII. The Orientation Act and its implementation (1968- 1971): back to 'immobilism'?.....	230-264
IX. Decision-making and change in France. The stalemate society thesis revisited.....	265-293
<u>APPENDIXES</u>	
I-1. The traditional organization of the university system.....	295
II-2. Major post-war reforms in higher education.....	296-300
III-3. Positions of the major student and teacher groups on selected problems raised by the reform of the university system (prior to 1968).....	301-302

TABLE OF CONTENT (continued)APPENDIXES

II-4.	Brief attitudinal profile of major teacher groups in France.....	303-305
IV.	Edgar Faure Cabinet.....	306
V-1.	Members of the Government (July 13, 1968).....	307
VI-1.	Faure's policy of consultation.....	308-309
VI-2.	Position of radical and conservative groups over the major issues raised by the Orientation Act.....	310-311
VI-3.	Position of moderate groups over the major issues raised by the Orientation Act.....	312-313
VII-1	Attitudinal profile of the U.D.R. over the major issues raised by the Orientation Act.....	314-316
VII-2.	Position of the parties over the major issues raised by the Orientation Act.....	317-318
VIII-1.	The new structures of the university system.....	319-320
IX.	"Whirlpools" of influence emerging on both sides of the issues raised by the Orientation Act.....	321-323
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	324-341
	The Orientation Act.....	342-355

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this work, a case study in decision-making focused on the politics of university reform in 1968 France, is to reappraise the models of policy-formulation and change found scattered in the "stalemate society" literature influenced in particular by Stanley Hoffmann and Michel Crozier.

The evidence provided by the genesis, elaboration and implementation of the Orientation Act of Higher Education which altered the structures of the university system casts doubts on the propositions of the stalemate society thesis. Far from being "formal" and "hierarchical", the French policy-making process consists of competing and negotiating power centers and shifting clusters of elites, overshadowed by the constitutional and political mutations of the last decade or so. Also, the stalemate society students place undue emphasis on the syndrome of 'blocage'. The programmatic and political divisions of French elites, still bickering over the legitimacy of the regime, does preclude the formulation of sweeping reforms, whether in crisis or non crisis situations. Change, however, is by no means impossible. It is not an all or nothing affair but rather an ongoing, labyrinthine and incremental process.

An attempt is made to redefine the problems of decision-making and change in France within the framework of the (slightly revised) pluralist and incrementalist theories which have been used to describe and explain the functioning of American industrial democracy.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1968

- May 3: First incidents in the Sorbonne.
- May 8: The National Assembly discusses the "Events".
- May 14: Pompidou announces the creation of a (short lived) Comite de Concertation.
- May 24: De Gaulle announces a referendum on "participation".
- May 28: Resignation of Alain Peyrefitte, Minister of National Education.
- May 30: De Gaulle dissolves the National Assembly.
- May 31: The government is reshuffled; F.X. Ortoli takes over the Education Ministry.
- June 4-5: Ortoli negotiates with the major university groups.
- June 7: De Gaulle is interviewed on television.
- June 23-30: Massive electoral Gaullist victory in parliamentary elections.
- July 10: The National Assembly reconvenes.
- July 12: Completion of the Couve de Murville government. Edgar Faure receives the Education Ministry.
- July 17: The Prime Minister pledges basic reforms in higher education in the National Assembly.
- July 24: Edgar Faure outlines his reform projects to the deputies.
- July 24-25: The National Assembly discusses Faure's plans.
- August 6: The first draft of the Orientation Act is ready.
- August 7, 9, 20, 23 and 27: Meetings of the Courraza-Trincal Committee.
- August 29: Edgar Faure submits his project to the Chief of State.
- September 2: The Orientation Act project is completed.
- September 4: The National Assembly's Cultural Committee begins its hearings over the Orientation Act. Faure is its first witness.
- September 4: First meeting of the Council of Ministers.
- September 9: De Gaulle holds a press conference.
- September 10: "Conseil restreint" in the Elysee Palace attended by the Prime Minister, Edgar Faure and Jacques Trorial.
- September 10-12: "Study Days" of the U.D.R. in La Baule.
- September 11: Second meeting of the Council of Ministers.
- September 13 and 18: The Council of State examines the Orientation Act.
- September 16: The Council of Higher Education examines the Orientation Act.
- September 17 18: The Higher Council of National Education examines the Orientation Act.
- September 19: Third and final meeting of the Council of Ministers.
- September 17, 18 and 19: The National Assembly's Cultural Committee continues its hearings.
- September 25: The National Assembly's Cultural Committee reports on the Orientation Act.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (continued)

October 3-10: The National Assembly discusses the Orientation Act.
 October 23-25: The Senate discusses the Orientation Act.

November 7: After the statutory "navette", the French Parliament approves
 the Orientation Act.
 November 12: Promulgation of the Orientation Act.

December 31: Designation of the U.E.R.s.

1969

January-April: First university elections.
 May: Creation of 37 universities and 6 university centers.
 April 27: The referendum on regional reform is defeated and followed by
 De Gaulle's resignation.
 June 1 and 15: Georges Pompidou is elected President of the Republic.
 June 22: Olivier Guichard takes over the Education Ministry.
 September 10: Olivier Guichard is auditioned by the National Assembly
 and Senate Cultural Committees.

1970

March: Creation of 13 universities in Paris.

1971

Spring: Second university elections.
 May 14: Inauguration of the National Council of Higher Education and Research.
 June: The National Assembly amends the Orientation Act.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.E.E.R.S.	Association d'Etudes pour l'Expansion de la Recherche Scientifique (Association for the Study and the Expansion of Scientific Research).
A.U.M.	Association pour l'Université Moderne (Association for a Modern University).
C.A.L.	Comités d'Action Lycéens (Lycees Action Committees).
C.D.R.	Comités de Défense de la République (Committees for the Defense of the Republic).
C.E.F.	Conseil Etudiant de France (Student Council of France).
C.E.L.U.	Comite Etudiant Pour les Libertés Universitaires (Student Committee for Academic Freedoms).
C.F.D.T.	Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (Democratic French Confederation of Labor).
C.F.T.C.	Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (French Confederation of Christian Workers).
C.G.C.	Confédération Générale des Cadres (General Confederation of Cadres).
C.G.T.	Confédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labor).
C.L.E.R.	Comité de Liaison des Etudiants Révolutionnaires (Liaison Committee of Revolutionary Students).
C.L.E.R.U.	Comité de Liaison des Etudiants Pour la Réforme Universitaire (Liaison Committee of the Students for the University Reform).
C.L.I.F.	Comité de Liaison Inter-Facultés (Interdepartmental Liaison Committee).
C.N.I.D.	Commission Nationale Interdisciplinaire (National Interdisciplinary Commission).
C.N.P.F.	Conseil National du Patronat Français (National Council of French Employers).
C.N.R.S.	Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (National Center for Scientific Research).
F.E.N.	Fédération de l'Education Nationale (National Education Federation).

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

F.E.R.	Fédération des Etudiants Révolutionnaires (Federation of Revolutionary Students).
F.D.G.S.	Fédération de la Gauche Démocratique et Socialiste (Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left).
F.N.A.G.E.	Fédération Nationale des Grandes Ecoles (National Federation of the Grandes Ecoles).
F.N.E.F.	Fédération Nationale des Etudiants de France (National Federation of Students in France).
F.O.	Force Ouvrière (Independent workers union from C.G.T.).
I.U.T.	Institut Universitaire de Technologie (University Institutes of Technology).
J.C.R.	Jeunesses Communistes Révolutionnaires (Young Revolutionary Communists).
M.O.D.E.L.	Mouvement d'Organisation des Etudiants Pour la Liberté (Movement for the Organization of Students for Freedom).
M.R.P.	Mouvement Républicain Populaire (Republican Popular Movement).
M.U.R.	Mouvement Universitaire Pour la Réforme (University Movement for the Reform).
P.C.F.	Parti Communiste Français (French Communist Party).
P.C.M.L.F.	Parti Communiste Marxiste Léniniste Français (Marxist Leninist French Communist Party).
P.D.M.	Progrès et Démocratie Moderne (Progress and Modern Democracy).
P.S.U.	Parti Socialiste Unifié (Unified Socialist Party).
P.M.E.	Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (Small and Medium Sized Business Firms).
R.E.P.	Rassemblement des Etudiants Pour la Participation (Rally of the Students For Participation).
R.I.	Républicains Indépendants (Independent Republicans).
S.F.I.O.	Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (French Section of the Workers International).
S.G.E.N.	Syndicat Général de l'Education Nationale (General National Education Union, affiliated to C.F.D.T.).

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

- S.N.A.L.C. Syndicat National Autonome des Lycées et Collèges (Independent National Union of Lycees and Other Secondary Schools).
- S.N.E.S. Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Secondaire (National Union of Second Degree Teaching Personnel, affiliated to F.E.N.).
- S.N.E.Sup. Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur (National Union of University Teaching Personnel, affiliated to F.E.N.).
- S.N.I. Syndicat National des Instituteurs (National Union of Primary School Teachers, affiliated to F.E.N.).
- U.D. Ve. Union des Démocrates Pour la Cinquième République (Union of the Democrats for the Fifth Republic, name of the Gaullist Party between 1967 and 1968).
- U.D.R. Union des Démocrates Pour la République (Union of the Democrats for the Republic, name of the Gaullist Party after 1968).
- U.E.C. Union des Etudiants Communistes (Union of Communist Students).
- U.E.R. Unités d'Enseignement et de Recherche (Teaching and Research Units).
- U.J.P. Union des Jeunes Pour le Progrès (Union of Youth For Progress).
- U.J.C.M.L. Union des Jeunesses Communistes Marxistes Léninistes (Union of Marxist Leninist Young People).
- U.N.E.F. Union Nationale des Etudiants de France (National Union of French Students).
- U.N.E.F. R. Union Nationale des Etudiants de France Pour le Renouveau (National Union of French Students for the Renewal).
- U.N.I. Union Nationale Inter-Universitaire (Interuniversities National Union).
- U.N.R. Union Pour la Nouvelle République (Union for the New Republic, name of the Gaullist Party between 1958 and 1967).

CHAPTER ONE :

INTRODUCTION

On November 7, 1968, five months after a major political crisis during which the universities spontaneously held their "Etats Généraux", the French Legislature adopted an Orientation Act of Higher Education remodeling the university system. Drafted by the "rolly poly, wily, witty, lawyer, novelist, professor and master politician",¹ Education Minister Edgar Faure, this structural reform was an outgrowth of the "events" of May and two decades of incremental but cumulative changes. In essence, the Loi Faure was an attempt to resolve the problems of modernization generated by the rigid administrative centralization of the universities and the widespread demand for their joint management by the faculty and students.

Thus, the Orientation Act granted a significant (though not unlimited) degree of administrative, financial and pedagogical independence to the universities. Sixty or so "interdisciplinary" universities have become the basic cells of the renovated institutions of higher learning and these establishments are, in turn, "federations" of "Teaching and Research Units" (Unités d'Enseignement et de Recherche or U.E.R.s) which were set up to fill up the vacuum caused by the abolition of the facultés.

Both the universities and the U.E.R.s have become "autonomous": they are free to elaborate their own organizational charters, determine their research and teaching programs and methods of education and examination within the guidelines layed down by the Orientation Act. In addition, the universities budgets are no longer submitted to the prior authorization of the Treasury and are now controlled by subsequent audit only. It is worth emphasizing here that the problem of "selection" (the establishment of selective entrance examinations for access to the former facultés) was not acted upon by political decision-makers and that the universities

budgets are still primarily fed by the annual Finance Law. In any event, the above mentioned measures were expected to stimulate the universities educational, research and economic functions.

The second major innovation contained in the Orientation Act was the establishment of new modes of decision-making in the universities boards. The preexisting system of oligarchical and cooptative rule, also characterized by the conspicuous exclusion of students from the management of the universities,² was superseded in 1968 (at least on paper!!!) by complicated electoral schemes and a mixture of "régime d'assemblée" and "régime présidentiel": the universities and their U.E.R.s are now managed by elected Presidents and Directors and Councils made up of senior and junior faculty members, students and representatives of the administrative personnel and "personalites exterieures", a category comprising businessmen, professionals, civil servants, trade unionists, etc....

More will be said later about the nature of the Orientation Act since the purpose of this case study is not to discuss in detail the content of the 1968 reform but rather to focus on the politics of its formulation in order to inquire into the patterns of decision-making and change under (but not exclusively) the Fifth Republic.

Of course, as often pointed out, case studies do not "prove" anything. "It cannot be assumed", writes Professor Bernard E. Brown, "that cases are representative of the entire political system....(Also), it would be highly dubious method to attempt to induce general principles of politics from even an extensive range of cases." But, continues Professor Brown, " case studies can help refine and sharpen our notions about government. They provide us

with a laboratory...for testing out theories on individual political systems,
 and politics in general."³

Similarly, after distinguishing between "a-theoretical", "interpretative", "hypothesis generating", "theory infirming" (or confirming) and "deviant case studies", Lijphart stresses that the latter "are selected in order to reveal why the cases are deviant - that is - to uncover relevant additional variables that were not considered previously, or to refine the (operational) definitions of some or all the variables. In this way, deviant case studies have great theoretical value. They weaken the original proposition,...(and) suggest a modified proposition that may be stronger."⁴

The present work does not deal with "general principles of politics". Instead, it seeks, in light of the evidence provided by the genesis, elaboration and implementation of the Orientation Act, to evaluate and criticize ("test out") the models of change and decision-making found scattered in the "stalemate society" literature influenced in particular by the works of Stanley Hoffmann and Michel Crozier. It will be argued here that a more satisfactory explanation of the patterns of policy formulation and change in France should be found in the slightly amended pluralist and incrementalist theories put forth by scholars like Robert Dahl, V.C. Key Jr., Charles Lindblom, Jean Meynaud, Nelson Polsby, to cite only a few. What is then the nature of the stalemate society thesis and how does it contrast to the pluralist and incremental approaches? These questions must first be answered before presenting the content and structure of this dissertation.

Decision-making and change in France: the stalemate society thesis.

Although French politicians "discovered" it only in 1969, the stalemate society thesis has long currency in the field of political science. ⁵ "Stagnation", "ossification", "sclerosis", "paralysis", "impotence" were already the recurring metaphors and concepts most frequently used to describe the functioning of the French political system in the early and late fifties. ⁶ In recent years, however, the hypothesis has been reformulated, updated and given the status of an explanatory and descriptive model under the influence of a school of thought whose most prominent spokesmen have been Stanley Hoffmann and Michel Crozier.

The basic theoretical assumption in this argument is that French attitudes toward authority are highly ambivalent. As Tocqueville remarked long ago, the French seem to have a split personality: they depend on and need authority but at the same time deeply distrust and resent all its forms and manifestations:" At one moment, he is up in arms against authority and the next day, we find him serving the powers-that-be with a zeal such as the most servile races never display. So long as one thinks of resisting, you can lead him on a thread, but once a revolutionary ⁷ movement is afoot, nothing can restrain him from taking part in it."

Drawing on Tocqueville's observation, Stanley Hoffmann notes that French political culture is characterized by the "co-existence of limited ⁸ authoritarianism and potential insurrection against authority." Michel Crozier stresses that there is a "disproportion between the authority which seems (to the French) indispensable to govern...and the authority (they)

can accept as members of a group."

Several manuals and textbooks identify this ambiguous cultural pattern as a key explanatory variable accounting for the hectic functioning of the French political system. For Nicholas Wahl, the turbulence of French political history derives from a "dialogue between conflicting ideals of authority."¹⁰ Henry Erhmann argues that France's antithetic bureaucratic and individualistic representative and plebescitarian traditions are a source of recurring tensions in French politics.¹¹ Nordlinger explains French political instability in terms of a value system which fails to integrate "acquiescent" and "directive" attitudes toward authority.¹² Duncan Mc Rae cites the peculiar French brand of individualism as a partial cause of the Fourth Republic collapse.¹³ Among the factors explaining the 1968 May-June upheaval, "culture must be moved toward the top of the chart," writes Waterman who adds: "The peculiarities of French political culture - of its authority relations and its face to face contacts - have shown themselves to be of commanding importance, able to undo the work of industrial development, wealth, mass communications and education in uniting the society."¹⁴

Historical and sociological factors have been singled out to account for the peculiarities of French political culture. For example, Maurice Duverger observes that the struggle for democracy in France has always been an endless fight against authority.¹⁵ Stanley Hoffmann proposes that a social class, the bourgeoisie, "identified itself with French society as a whole...(and became) the model and the matrix for the rest of the society."¹⁶

Most frequently, however, the origins of the French style of authority are traced back to the pervasive "anti-social" influence of the family and more generally, to processes of political socialization. Early in his life, the French child internalizes individualistic and egalitarian values in the "foyer" which is also a self contained, tightly united, hierarchical group highly suspicious of all external influences.¹⁷ He also learns to "accept an aloof father as the primary source of authority; he expects protector-protégé relationships; he knows the importance of "savoir-plaire" and he recognizes the fact that in order to protect his individuality, he must resort to secrecy and political manipulation."¹⁸ The school system and patterns of peer group interaction reinforce these early childhood experiences of "individual isolation, lack of communication between strata and avoidance of face to face relationships."¹⁹ French education, therefore, contributes to the emergence of what Alfred Grosser has described as a "civisme du refus".²⁰

Under these conditions, it is proposed that the French style of authority is both highly formalistic and hierarchical. As Stanley Hoffmann points out:

"...the citizens...(prefer), in every group, from the family to the state to entrust the solution of conflicts to higher authority. But authoritarianism has always been tempered by French individualism, by the citizens' determination to be protected from arbitrariness through a network of bureaucratic rules limiting the scope and intensity of authority. Hence, a permanent series of polar opposites: a rigid, often stifling set of regulations, but also the preservation of the individual's capacity to protest; tight hierarchies controlled by a handful of Important Ones but also the perpetuation of the Small Ones' escape from involvement and responsibility; centralization coexisting with fragmentation into small groups of castes."

French politics are therefore permeated by what Crozier calls an "administrative model of action" within the framework of which the bureaucracy is likely to acquire a determinant role in initiating and shaping whatever decisions can still be formulated and implemented in the "societe bloquee".²² But as already hinted at by Hoffmann, modernizing technocrats are often effectively neutralized by the uncompromising and stubborn resistance of the "Small Ones" or the "delinquent communities" Pitts refers to in his analysis of the pattern of "continuity and change"²³ in France. As Michel Crozier notes, "(the people at the top) are all powerful because they are at the apex of the whole centralized system, (but) they are made so weak by the pattern of resistance of the different isolated strata that they can use their power only in truly exceptional circumstances."²⁴

To give one illustration, Nathan Leites and Constantin Melnik, in their discussion of the 1953 presidential election note that the premier "is tolerated only when he is at everyone's disposal: resistance...on his part **provokes** demand for his resignation. The (ensuing) hubbub provides a good deal of pleasure, for it enables the individual to rebel against authority in an atmosphere of communicative good fellowship."²⁵

Accordingly, the French political system is not a "reconciliation system" in which the possible limits of public policy are determined through the free interplay of conflicting political forces. In a nation where individualism precludes the emergence of strong associations, social groupings, or "strata", are not interested in participating in the political process for the purpose of negotiating, bargaining and compromising. Instead, the primary function of social groups is to resist the

encroachments of the central authority and to maintain the existing social and political status quo or, as Hoffmann puts it, the "overall equilibrium".²⁷ "United in a conspiracy of silence against authority", writes Wylie, "every group barricades itself behind its 'acquired rights' (droits acquis) and resists all movements for change; at the suggestion of a threat, an organization is formed which invariably takes the name "Association for the Defense of the Right of...". In the blank space, one may substitute the name of any group which feels its rights are under attack...."²⁸

Inasmuch as conflict and competition are systematically avoided by the groups which "fear...not change itself but the risks they may encounter if the stalemate that protects them...were to disappear",²⁹ the policy-making process is frequently stalled. Unable to overcome the resistance of organized interests, the "administrative" and "deliberative" policy-making subsystems merely handle routine matters which "fit into the multiple...programs already well elaborated."³⁰ In the words of Maurice Duverger, the French political system is only a "good mechanism for taking care of current affairs."³¹

Immobilism and stagnation thus become the prevailing patterns of French politics. The advocates of the stalemate society thesis do not claim that decisions affecting change are utterly impossible. Change does take place but remains in their view necessarily inconclusive and insignificant insofar as the real problems are not acted upon. In any event, the scope and amount of change is not the primary concern of the "société bloquée" students since they are far more interested in the pattern of change itself emphasizing in this respect the French political

system's low capability for "thorough self reform" and the decisive role
 of circumstances in bringing about long overdue adjustments. ³²

Under these conditions, they argue that change in France most frequently takes place by means of brief, intense and "cataclysmic" crises creating an institutional void which enables innovative and charismatic leaders to break down all resistance and introduce the necessary reforms. ³³ This "revolutionary grievance settling subsystem" which "forces decisions outside of the approved legal framework", nevertheless, still leaves the "mecanismes bloquant" untouched. The equilibrium of the "bureaucratic system" is shattered during the hectic period of "structural fusion"; it is not destroyed. ³⁴ What emerges in the bitter and disillusioning aftermath of the crisis is a new social and political stalemate portending another long period of immobilism, likely to be interrupted by another Cincinnatus who, in turn, will be sent back to his plowshare after fulfilling his innovative function. As Stanley Hoffmann writes,

" It is heroic leadership alone that can succeed in injecting massive doses of innovation into a national system that is highly suspicious of change and ordinarily combines tolerance for individual experimentation with social conformity. But since heroic leaders must respect the rules of homeorhesis and since the conversion to change requires a mobilization of national energies, a reawakening of the general will, a call to national identity, such leadership serves also as the maintainer of the system. When routine leaders can no longer preserve or make change acceptable, heroic leadership saves the society by adapting it and perpetuates it by renewing it."

35

The evolution of the French political system is distinguished by functionally innovative crises followed by long periods of quiescence and stifling routine. "Government by fits and starts", spasmodic government, such are the fundamental rules of the political game in France ³⁶ and

Henry Erhmann concludes,

" The peculiarities of the French political culture, while in no way preventing adaptations and changes have lent themselves to an alternation between periods of immobilism, when the process of modernization was blocked or unduly slowed, and crisis liquidation regimes. Periods of purposeful activity have been followed by those of frustrating confusion and immobility. Decades during which nothing really new was tried were interrupted by brief and bold experimentation. Frequently, the change from one stage to the other was abrupt instead of continuous and incremental."

37

To sum up, the models of decision-making and change found in the stalemate society literature emphasize 1. a bright and rigorous, technocratic approach to problem solving, 2. a blind and relentless resistance on the part of interest groups and parliamentary forces which paralyzes political decision-makers, 3. the absence of meaningful negotiations and bargaining among the parties involved in the formulation of a decision and 4. the existence of a pattern of change singularized by long periods of stifling routine interrupted by major, functionally innovative crises.

38

The formulation and implementation of the Orientation Act as well as the post war pattern of change in higher education do not altogether support any one of these generalizations. In 1968, the French bureaucracy was divided and far from being an innovative force, exerted a conservative influence on the decision-making process. The groups and parliamentary forces, though fragmented, were not necessarily "delinquent communities" dedicated to the preservation of the status quo. "Face to face relationships" involving bargaining and compromises were more widespread than suggested by the stalemate society literature. Finally, the students of the

"société bloquée" seriously underestimate the significance of the changes which took place in the French university system between 1945 and 1968 and, on the whole, place undue emphasis on the syndrome of "blocage" and the "innovative" function of political crises. To put these empirical statements in the context of a coherent theoretical framework, we will argue in this work that a pluralist and incrementalist approach to the problems of decision-making and change in France has far greater descriptive and explanatory powers than the stalemate society.

The pluralist and incrementalist alternative

There is no need here to get into a detailed analysis of pluralist theory nor even into the ideological disputes its application to the American political system has triggered among political scientists.³⁹ Three basic assumptions of the pluralists, however, are worth discussing now for their relevance to the French case.

First, according to the pluralists, nothing categorical can be said about the distribution of power except that it is fragmented and cannot be monolithic, hierarchical and permanent. As Nelson Polsby observes,

" (the pluralists reject) the stratification thesis that some group necessarily dominates a community. If anything, there seems to be an unspoken notion among pluralist researchers that at bottom nobody dominates in a town...."

40

This basic assumption underlies Sayre and Kaufman's study of the dynamics of influence in New York City. They stress in particular that "decisions of the municipal government do not emanate

from any single source, but from many centers; conflicts and clashes are referred to no single authority but are settled at many levels, and at many points in the system: no single group can guarantee the success of any proposal it supports, the defeat of every idea it objects to. Not even the central government organs of the city... even approach mastery⁴¹ in this sense."

Second, the pluralists emphasize that the pattern of influence can be identified only as it becomes manifest in the decision-making process and that it varies over time and as issues change. As V.O. Key notes, "The power structure (in the United States) tends to be segmented: authority over one question rests here and over another, there. All this contrasts with the model of a clear and rigid hierarchical pattern of power.... Thus, the locus of power may shift from question to question and even from time to time over the same question."⁴² Nelson Polsby also pays considerable attention to this pattern of elite specialization:

" Pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens ranging in their duration from momentary to semi permanent. There is a clear gain in descriptive accuracy in formulating power distributions so as to take account of the dimension of time, as pluralists do. For it is easily demonstrated that coalitions do vary in their permanency, and to presume that the set of coalitions which exists in the community at any given time is a timelessly stable aspect of social structure, is to introduce systematic inaccuracy into one's description of social reality."

43

Third, the pluralists stress the importance of coalition building and bargaining among political elites as a key ingredient of the decision-making process. To quote Polsby and Wildavsky, "In the American political

system, power and opportunities to act effectively on public policy are parceled out to the President, to Congress, to the Courts, to independent regulatory agencies, to various branches of the federal bureaucracy, to the political parties, and even, in some respects, to interest groups. It is clear that each of these agencies enjoys partial autonomy. And this means that it is possible for participants in policy-making to achieve their desired ends only by entering into cooperation with other participants in the system, by making coalitions....Coalitions means bargaining.⁴⁴ Participants must give something in order to get something."

Pluralism, as it has been defined in the preceding discussion, usually goes hand in hand with incrementalism. Incrementalism refers to the formulation of public policy and views policy innovations as a continuation of past governmental decisions with only "marginal" modifications. The model was first presented by economist Charles Lindblom in a now famous article contrasting the "rational-comprehensive" method of decision-making to that of "limited successive comparisons".⁴⁵

46

According to Lindblom, political decision-makers rarely attempt to review all proposed or existing policy alternatives. They do not seek to weigh the benefits and costs of all possible choices nor do they decide on the basis of a ranked, cost-benefit analysis firmly grounded on all relevant data. The pressure of time, inadequate knowledge and the impossibility to identify the consequences of a given policy thus preclude such "rational" approach to the formulation of policy. Instead, choices are made that differ only marginally from the existing status quo and these decisions can best be explained as the outcome of a process of successive comparisons between limited and ever changing objectives

involving a plurality of competing actors who may or may not agree over long term objectives and policy goals.

Incremental decision-making is therefore a rather conservative process. It is conservative, first, to the extent that existing programs and policies are, on the whole, rather acceptable to policy-makers. Second, radical change is virtually impossible because individuals and groups usually develop vested interests in policies which have been pursued for several years or even decades. Decision-makers, under these conditions, cannot afford policy alternatives which would create major structural and organizational dislocations. Finally, as Thomas Dye points out, "incrementalism is politically expedient. Agreement comes easier in policy-making when the items in dispute are only increases or decreases in budgets, or modifications to existing programs. Conflict is heightened when decision-making focuses on major policy shifts involving great gains or losses, or "all or nothing", "yes and no", policy decisions.... Thus, incrementalism is important in reducing conflict, maintaining stability and preserving the political system itself."⁴⁷

To our knowledge, no systematic attempt has ever been made to apply the pluralist and incrementalist theoretical insights to the French political system. This is hardly surprising, taking into account the fact that both the pluralists and the incrementalists stress that their models can operate only in the context of "consensual" politics.⁴⁸ Still, we find the pluralists' emphasis on the fragmentation of political power, coalition building and bargaining and compromise of great relevance to an understanding of the making of the Orientation Act. The formulation of the 1968 university reform does demonstrate, as Jean Meynaud perceptively observed a decade ago, that "the French governmental universe consists of

a system of power centers, each enjoying some bargaining power in relation to the others." ⁴⁹ In addition, it will be argued that this system of power centers is overshadowed, though not controlled, by a predominant Executive Branch and powerful presidential office. ⁵⁰

We will also ~~suggest that~~ Lindblom's analysis of the problem of change sheds considerable light on the pattern of educational reforms in France. Change in higher education can indeed be described as a very "conservative process" and the Orientation Act, with the possible exception of student participation in university decision-making, did not reflect any significant or notable break from past policies. Moreover, in a political system whose elites are still hickering over the "rules of the game", incremental decision-making may very well be the only realistic approach to problem solving in order to prevent systemic breakdowns.

Pluralism and incrementalism are therefore not necessarily incompatible with the existence of a low level of political consensus. This does not mean that we should overlook the impact of the ideological fragmentation of French elites on the formulation of policy. But while in no way forestalling change, the programmatic pluralism of the French political class does preclude major policy innovations and its ideological pluralism tends to further narrow the scope of politically feasible incremental transformations whether in crises or non crises situations.

To briefly summarize the argument which will be presented in this dissertation, it will be proposed that the models of decision-making and change of the stalemate society literature are fraught with hasty

generalizations and rash oversimplifications in spite of occasional insights and that the pluralist and incrementalist approaches are, generally, more accurate and useful to describe and explain the functioning of the French political system.

Structure of the dissertation

Accordingly, each chapter will contain a critique of the Hoffmann-Crozier's thesis and at the same time, whenever necessary, will frame the data into a pluralist and incrementalist perspective stressing the fragmentation of power, coalition building, bargaining and marginal change. The organization of the material is essentially chronological. Chapter one gives background information on the growing problems of the universities and appraises the response of the political system in reference to the notions of stalemate and incremental change. A major aspect of our thesis is to downgrade the significance of political crises but, clearly, the May-June 1968 "events" cannot and should not be overlooked. Thus, chapter two and three both deal with the genesis of the Orientation Act and present the university reform as an institutional response to the May-June crisis of participation and to the politically and programmatically fragmented demands of the academic community. Chapter four reviews the administrative debate which took place over the Orientation Act with particular emphasis on the conservatism of the French bureaucracy and the determinant role of the Chief of State in overcoming potential administrative stalemates. Chapter five and six describe the arduous bargaining process which involved the Education Minister, the politically divided university groups, a "liberal" Senate and the National Assembly controlled by a conservative majority. Chapter seven raises again the question of change and examines the nature of the

Orientation Act and its implementation between 1968 and 1971.

A final note of methodology

Before turning to a discussion of the above mentioned points, three methodological remarks are in order. First, why a case-study related to problems of higher education? What makes this subject matter significant enough to be worthwhile exploring? In brief, we could answer " the importance of the problem itself". Since, World War Two, the systems of higher education of most Western European industrialized nations have experienced rapid growth amidst rising tensions. The European universities created in a pre-industrial age have been put under severe strains as a result of skyrocketing student enrolments, the expansion of government services, the demands of the occupational structure for more educated people and the development of technology and pure and applied science. Questions have been raised about their economic and research function, their administration and finance, the content and organization of the curricula and the recruitment and training of teachers and students. Practically all aspects of university life were being critically scrutinized while simultaneous large scale student unrest gave rise to a widespread, acute sense of crisis among those preoccupied with educational reform and modernization.

To put it in somewhat sketchy terms, a case study focused on the politics of the genesis, formulation and implementation of the Orientation Act should yield valuable insights into the response of the French political system to a crisis of modernization which confronted most industrialized States in the decade of the sixties. As we shall see in

this respect, one of the peculiarities of the French political system is to cope with the process of modernization amidst new strains on the legitimacy of its institutions.

Second, I am well aware that the stalemate society thesis can be divided into several schools of thought. Crozier and Hoffmann have indeed a slightly different understanding of the "société bloquée". As pointed out by French sociologist, Francois Bourricaud, Crozier transforms Hoffmann's "republican synthesis" (a concept mainly but not exclusively used in relation to the Third Republic) into an ideal type with a far broader scope of application. Moreover, it seems that Hoffmann pays more attention to the political and social foundations of the stalemate society and its disruption by modernization processes than Crozier who is primarily concerned with the "bureaucratic" style of action shaping all aspects of the French society and polity. ⁵¹ Notwithstanding the additional fact that model building always entails a degree of oversimplification, the stalemate society construct presented here should not be viewed as a "straw man" but rather as the lowest common denominator among scholars with somewhat diverging interpretations of the workings of the French political system and **the differences between Hoffmann and Crozier** will be taken into consideration in the concluding chapter where their thesis will be discussed in light of our empirical findings.

Finally, most of the material for this study was gathered in France from September 1970 to July 1971. In this regard, I owe my debt of gratitude to the City University of New York for its generous financial assistance, without which the present work would have remained an unfulfilled dream. Government publications and the literature put out by

university interest groups have been extensively used. We also relied on the numerous books, pamphlets and manuals dealing with the problems of higher education in France and supplemented our data by reviewing the major daily and weekly newspapers and conducting personal interviews. I am indebted in particular to the following persons: Georges Amestoy, Jacques They, Michel Trincal, Michelle Puybasset, all from the Education Ministry; Daniel Monteux (S.N.E.Sup), Paul Vignaux and Charles Piétri (S.G.E.N.), Louis Astre and Andre Tuillier (F.E.N.), Suzanne Marton (U.N.I.), René Doucet (Université Moderne). Alfred Gilder and Hervé Bolze (U.J.P.), Bertrand Girod de l'Ain (Le Monde), Charles Debbasch (Dean of the Law and Political Science Faculté of Aix-en-Provence and formerly, chargé de mission in the Faure Cabinet) and Michel Alliot (former Chef de Cabinet of the Education Minister and, at present, President of the University of Paris VII). I have also benefited a great deal of valuable and stimulating assistance from Jean-Jacques Recoules, instructor at the University of Paris II and Professors J.W. Lapierre and Michel Oriol, both teaching in the University of Nice. In addition, I owe my thanks to Professor Erze Suleiman of the City University of New York. His incisive and penetrating remarks helped me considerably in making this study a coherent and purposeful one. It goes without saying that I am most obliged to Professor Bernard E. Brown for his generosity, personal guidance and supervision of this project. His standards of excellence as a teacher and a researcher will remain an enduring source of inspiration and the most vivid memory of my long winded student career.

FOOTNOTES

1. This portrait appears in The New York Times, October 11, 1968.
2. Students, however, through their unions, were associated to the management of the Centre National des Oeuvres Universitaires which deals with matters like student lodging, restaurants, hospitals, etc....
3. Bernard E. Brown, "The Case Method in Comparative Politics," in James B. Christoph and Bernard E. Brown, Cases in Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), pp. 16-17.
4. Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV, 3, September 1971, p. 692.
5. In a now celebrated (but apparently forgotten) "khrushchevian" speech delivered in the National Assembly on September 16, 1969, Premier Jacques Chaban Delmas described the French society as a "société bloquée" unable to reform itself except by means of major political crises and characterized by a "fragile economy", a "tentacular and inefficient" state and an "archaic" and "conservative" social structure. Le Monde, September 18, 1969.
6. See for example, Herbert Luethy, France Against Herself (New York, 1955); David Schoenbrum, As France Goes (New York, 1957); Edgar Furniss, France, Troubled Ally (New York, 1960); E.M. Earle (ed), Modern France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951); Warren C. Baum, The French Economy and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958) and Dorothy Pickles, France. The Fourth Republic (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1958).
7. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), p. 211.
8. Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community", in Stanley Hoffmann and al., In Search of France (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 8. See also his "The French Psychodrama. De Gaulle's Anti Communist Coup", in The New Republic, August 31, 1968, p. 15.
9. Michel Crozier, "La France, Terre de Commendement", Esprit, XXV, December 12, 1957, p. 788.
10. Nicholas Wahl, "The French Political System", in Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam (Eds), Patterns of Government. The Major Political Systems of Europe (New York: Random House, second edition, 1968), pp. 274-305.
11. Henry Errmann, Politics in France (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 7-14. For similar interpretations of French politics based on closely related explanatory dichotomous variables, see Pierre Avril, Politics in France (London: Pelican Books, 1969) and Roy Pierce, French Politics and Political INstitutions (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

12. Eric Nordlinger, The Working Class Tory; Authority, Deference and Stable Democracy (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1967). The theory according to which there is a correlation between democratic stability and "congruent" authority patterns appears in Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy. A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). Both Nordlinger and Gabriel Almond rely on the seminal study of Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
13. Duncan Mc Rae, Parliament, Parties and Society in France. 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), especially chapter 7.
14. Harvey Waterman, Political Change in Contemporary France. The Politics of an Industrial Democracy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), p. 237. For a similar analysis of the May-June crisis, see Errhmann, Op. Cit., pp. 321-343 and Raymond Aron, The Elusive Revolution. Anatomy of a Student Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1969).
15. Maurice Duverger, "The Development of Democracy in France", in Henry S. Albinski and Lawrence K. Pettit, European Political Processes and Readings (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 62-77. See also Henry Herrmann, " Direct Democracy in France", American Political Science Review, LVII (December 1963), pp. 883-901.
16. Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes...", Op. Cit., p. 6.
17. On this point, see the seminal work of Rhoda Metraux and Margaret Mead, Themes in French Culture (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1954).
18. Jesse Pitts, "Continuity and Change in Bourgeois France", in Stanley Hoffmann, In Search of France, Op. Cit., p. 254.
19. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon; an Examination of Bureaucracy in Modern Organizations and its Cultural Setting in France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 225. For an elaborate discussion of the school system's impact on the formation of political attitudes in France, see Laurence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).
20. Alfred Grosser, " France. Nothing But Opposition", in Robert Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 284-302.
21. Stanley Hoffmann, " The French Psychodrama...", Op. Cit., p. 15.
22. Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes...", in Op. Cit., p. 91 and Michel Crozier, La Société Bloquée (Paris: Le Seuil, 1970), p. 228. Also, Laurence Wylie, " Social Change at the Grass Roots", in In Search of France, Op. Cit., p. 219.
23. Jesse Pitts, "Continuity and Change...", in Op. Cit., pp. 235-304.

24. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Op. Cit., p. 225.
25. Nathan Leites and Constantin Melnick, The House Without Windows. France Elects a President (Evanston, Illinois: Perterson, 1958), p. 108. On the same point, see Hoffmann's discussion of De Gaulle and Mendes-France's political fates under the Fourth Republic in "Heroic Leadership. The Case of Modern France", in Lewis J. Edinger, Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 127-154.
26. Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes...", Op. Cit., p. 8 and "The French Psychodrama...", Op. Cit., p. 15. Also, Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Op. Cit., pp. 224-225. Mark Kesselmann, in his study of French local government also remarks that "In most French communes, face to face negotiations about local politics is rare; the mayor dominates the local political life of his commune. He initiates proposals for local changes and guide them to completion. He sponsors a coalition in local elections that forestalls competition in the election itself. The mayor's actions thus help ensure that local conflict will be avoided. On the communal level, the mayor represents the 'highest authority' to whom the French have recourse." in The Ambiguous Consensus. A Study of Local Government in France (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967), p. 13.
27. Stanley Hoffmann, "The French Psychodrama...", Op. Cit., p. 15.
28. Laurence Wylie, "Social Change. ", in In Search of France, Op. Cit., p. 223.
29. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Op. Cit., p. 226.
30. Ibid., p. 252. One wonders how these programs were formulated in the first place....
31. Maurice Duverger, "The Development of Democracy in France", in Albinski and Pettit, Op. Cit., p. 69.
32. "In our view", writes Crozier, "the pattern of change, and not the amount of change itself, must be considered as the basic variable". The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Op. Cit., p. 226. Leites and Grosser both examine how decisions were often postponed under the Fourth Republic until circumstances forced political decision-makers to act upon a problem. See Nathan Leites, On the Game of Politics in France (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), passim. Alfred Grosser, La Quatrieme Republique et sa Politique Exterieure (Paris: Armand Colin, 1961), passim.
33. See for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership...", in Edinger, Op. Cit.. In the same vein, Gabriel Almond refers to "Caesaristic breakthroughs" in "Comparative Political Systems", Journal of Politics, Vol. XVIII (1956), pp. 391-409. Pierre Avril also discusses the role of "consuls" in France who act as "pilot(s) (guiding) the nation through difficult straights", in Op. Cit., p. 35.

34. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Op. Cit., pp. 262-263
La Société Bloquée, Op. Cit., chapter 6. Also, Stanley Hoffmann, "The French Psychodrama...", Op. Cit., p. 15.
35. Stanley Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership...", in Edinger, Op. Cit., pp. 152-153. Also, Errmann, Politics in France, Op. Cit., p. 80.
36. Hoffmann writes in this respect: "The highest authority (in France), the ultimate source of regulations, is the state. In quiet periods, when the fear of authority dominates, the French prefer a weak parliamentary system in which the executive does little more than supervise the bureaucracy and the legislature supervises both. In troubled periods, the need for authority prevails and the French turn to a savior who will last only if he does not violate the citizen's opposition to arbitrary rule." in "The French Psychodrama...", Op. Cit., p. 15. The expression "government by fits and starts" was coined by Pierre Avril in Op. Cit., pp. 29-46.
37. Henry Errmann, Politics in France, Op. Cit., p. 303.
38. Those who may think that we are oversimplifying the **thought of the stalemate society** students or setting up a "straw man" for the sake of our argument, will find this model stated in almost identical terms in Michel Crozier, La Société Bloquée, Op. Cit., p. 228.
39. For an excellent overview of this debate, see William F. Connally, The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).
40. Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 113.
41. Herbert Kaufman, "Metropolitan Leadership: The Snark of the Social Sciences", quoted in Robert T. Golembiewski, William A. Welsh and William J. Crotty, A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), pp. 163-164. On the same point, see V.O. Key Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Crowell Company, 1967, fifth edition), p. 252; Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 228 and "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model", in The American Political Science Review, LII (June 1958), p. 467 and Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections. Strategies of American Electoral Politics (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1968, second edition), pp. 269-284.
42. V. O. Key Jr., Op. Cit., p. 7. Also, Robert Dahl, "A Critique...", Op. Cit., p. 466 and Who Governs?, Op. Cit., chapters 13 and 14.
43. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, Op. Cit., p. 115-116.
44. Polsby and Wildavsky, Op. Cit., pp. 269-270. Also, V.O. Key Jr., Op. Cit., p. 7; Robert Dahl, Who Governs?, Op. Cit., chapter 15; Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, Op. Cit., pp. 115-116 and his Congress and the Presidency (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 9.

45. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through", The Public Administration Review, Vol. 19 (1959), pp. 79-88. Also, the Intelligence of Democracy. Decision-making through Mutual Adjustments (New York: The Free Press, 1965), passim as well as Lindblom's work with David Braybrooke, A Strategy of Decision. Policy Evaluation of a Social Process (New York: The Free Press, 1963), passim.
46. The reader may also consult Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: The Free Press, 1968), passim and the classic study of Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York, 1947), passim.
47. Thomas Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 31.
48. See for example, V.O. Key Jr., Op. Cit., p. 8 and Dahl's analysis of the American "consensus" in Who Governs?, Op. Cit., pp. 313-324.
49. Jean Meynaud, Nouvelles Etudes sur les Groupes de Pression en France (Paris: Armand Colin, 1962), p. 249.
50. Pluralism is not altogether predicated on a free market analogy as its detractors have argued. Dahl, for example, acknowledges the central role of the Mayor of New Haven in what he calls "executive centered coalitions".
51. Francois Bourricaud, "Crozier et le Syndrome de Blocage", in Critique, XXVI, 282 (November 1970), p. 973.

CHAPTER TWO:

THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST WAR FRANCE (1945-1968):

STALEMATE OR INCREMENTAL CHANGE?

Introduction

" Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose". The stalemate society students would probably not dispute this often quoted and celebrated adage about French politics. Indeed, as discussed earlier, one of their central point is to stress that the scope of change is a negligible variable and that all political actors, as in a deadlocked chess game, check one another in such a way that no "movement" is ever possible except in crisis situations or as a result of bureaucratic "diktat".

Are these views supported by the pattern of change in French higher education over the last two decades or so? Were the Fourth and Fifth Republics "staleminated" in their response to university problems? As we shall see, none of these statements are accurate. In the post war period, student enrolments and budgetary outlays expanded enormously. The social structure of the student population underwent significant transformations while numerous and manifold reforms altered the universities' offerings, curricula and pedagogical methods. Accordingly, the university system, which had always been in a constant state of flux, on the eve of the student revolt, barely resembled that of 1945. Its evolution from an elitist to a mass system of higher education, however, was in general slow, cautious and incremental and, of course, none of its problems were at no time solved satisfactorily. What was then the nature of the growing challenge of the universities in France? How did the Fourth and Fifth Republics cope with it? More specifically, what factors must be taken into consideration to explain the patterns of change and policy-formulation in higher education matters between 1945 and 1968? After a brief description of the traditional organization of the university system, we will answer

these questions by focusing on the ideological and programmatic fragmentation of French elites and the conservatism of a segment of the academic community.

The traditional organization of the French university system.

Higher education in France is provided by the universities, the Grandes Ecoles, the recently created University Institutes of Technology, specialized research institutions like the Collège de France or the Paris Observatory and a number of private religious schools. Since the present work deals only with the universities, the following discussion will be focused on them.

The organization and structure of the French universities have remained virtually intact for more than a century and were characterized by their centralized administration and basic 'structure facultaire' inherited from the First Empire and the Third Republic.

Within the framework of the pre-1968 institutional scheme, the universities were kept under the tight control of the Minister of Education. In the Ministry itself, all matters related to higher education were dealt with by the Directeurs des Enseignements Supérieurs. Both the Director and the Minister were assisted in their rule making powers by two advisory bodies whose membership included an overwhelming majority of coopted senior faculty: the Comité Consultatif des Universités had jurisdiction over the appointment and promotion of teachers and the Conseil de l'Enseignement Supérieur was consulted on all reforms of the system of higher education. Every proposed change also entailed the statutory consultation of the Conseil Supérieur de l'Education Nationale which comprised 75 members, some ex-officio, some appointed by the Education Minister and others, elected by teachers groups.

Finally, it should be stressed here that university professors were usually closely associated with the Education Ministry's bureaucracy in the elaboration of higher education reforms: most 'avant-projets' were prepared by ad-hoc informal committees made up of faculty members and representatives of the Direction des Enseignements Supérieurs.³

At the regional level, France was divided into 23 academic districts (académies), each with its own university administered by a Rector and a Council. The Rector, appointed by decree of the President of the Republic was the personal representative of the Education Minister and the head of all educational services offered in his constituency. He presided over the University Council, was responsible for the administration of the university's budget and implemented the Council's decisions. Furthermore, the Rector exerted a 'pouvoir de tutelle' over the legislative functions of the Council.

The University Council consisted of coopted lay persons and elected senior faculty members from each of the university's constituent faculties. Its jurisdiction covered administrative and financial matters such as the adoption of the university and faculties' budgets, the organization of courses and choice of curricula. The Council could also take disciplinary action against students and faculty.

Each university was generally divided into five faculties (Liberal Arts, Sciences, Law, Pharmacy and Medicine), each structured around three bodies: the Doyen (Dean), the Conseil (Council) and the Assemblée (Assembly). The Dean had to be a full professor and was appointed for a renewable period of three years by the Education Minister who selected him from a preferential

list drafted jointly by the Faculties and University's Councils. In practice, the Minister always picked up the first name mentioned on the list and, to that extent, it is more accurate to say that the Dean was coopted by his peers. The Dean was responsible for the internal management of his faculté. He administered the budget and implemented the decisions of the Faculté's deliberative bodies. The Faculté's Assembly included representatives of the entire teaching staff but its powers were restricted to pedagogical matters. The weight of the Faculté's Council was far more important since it drafted the budget and selected the recipients of the coveted 'chaires'. This is why its membership was exclusively confined to titular professors.

It would be misleading to think that all these bodies enjoyed much power and independence. Most important decisions were actually made in Paris or required the approval of the Minister in the capital or his appointed representative in the Académie. The powers of the Education Minister were indeed broad and included in particular, the right to appoint most of the teaching personnel in higher education and issue instructions on teaching methods, curricula and degrees requirements. Moreover, although the Minister was responsible to Parliament, his discretionary powers were wide since he could issue decrees which were binding until such time as the Legislature chose to countermand them. As we shall see later, many important changes in French higher education were brought about in this way.

The influence of the central government was further increased by the fact that 90% of the universities financial resources derived from the national budget. Moreover, the universities, unlike certain specialized institutes (the political science schools or the University Institutes of Technology, for example) and the Grandes Ecoles were not allowed to

define their own student admission policy. The possession of the baccalauréat degree was a necessary and sufficient condition for entry into the faculties.

On the eve of the 1968 student revolt, the university system appeared to man/ as a somewhat old fashioned and quaint organization in need of reform primarily as a result of the increasingly disruptive impact of what has been called the "number effect".⁴ What was then the growth pattern of the universities and how did this change affect their functions? We turn to these questions now.

The growth of the universities in the post war period

The continuing rise of student enrolments in higher education is a phenomenon which has affected all Western European industrialized nations since 1945.⁵ It has been, though, rather spectacular in France. We will not inquire here into the causes of the expansion of the French student population. It will suffice to say that the post war economic recovery and demographic explosion, the increased social demand for education resulting from changes in income and attitude in the various social classes in addition to the demands of a more diversified and complex labor market, all combined to transform the elitist French universities into a mass educational system.⁶

As indicated in Table 1, in the early fifties, there were approximately 120,000 students registered in the facultés. By 1967, this figure had risen to a half million, i.e. 6% of the college age population. Moderate between 1950 and 1955, student enrolments rose steeply from 1960 onward under the impact of the demographic "wave" and the total number of students quadrupled

32
TABLE 1: Global estimates of student enrolments (1950-1968).

	1	2	3	4	5	
	Faculties	Foreign students	Other students	Miscellaneous	U.I.T.	TOTAL
1950-1951	120,898	13,510	-	-	-	134,408
1951-1952	123,885	13,057	-	-	-	136,942
1952-1953	128,120	14,246	-	-	-	142,366
1953-1954	130,681	15,184	-	-	-	145,865
1954-1955	135,284	15,347	-	-	-	150,631
1955-1956	136,119	16,127	-	-	-	152,246
1958-1959	170,382	21,746	10,000	-	-	202,128
1959-1960	181,983	20,079	11,000	-	-	213,062
1960-1961	183,770	19,605	11,297	-	-	214,672
1961-1962	211,879	20,731	12,204	-	-	244,814
1962-1963	252,550	21,630	11,434	-	-	285,614
1963-1964	284,229	23,960	18,122	-	-	326,311
1964-1965	321,061	26,872	18,766	1,002	-	367,701
1965-1966	345,088	24,304	20,097	24,267	-	413,756
1966-1967	384,737	24,410	23,517	24,101	1,644	458,409
1967-1968	447,295	30,219	25,346	-	5,359	508,119

- Notes:**
1. Includes French students only registered in public faculties.
 2. Registered in the above mentioned institutions.
 3. This category includes French and foreign students enrolled in institutions of higher learning other than the faculties and the Grandes Ecoles.
 4. Students who enrolled in the course of the academic year.
 5. University Technical Institutes which were created in 1966.

Sources: Ministère de l'Education Nationale. Service Central des Statistiques et de la Conjoncture. Informations Statistiques. No. 53-54 (November-December 1963), p. 314.
Tableaux de l'Education Nationale. Statistiques Rétrospectives. 1958-1968 (Paris, 1969).

in eighteen years and more than doubled since 1960.

Barring a change in their admission policy, the French universities will continue to expand in the foreseeable future although the effects of the demographic surge are expected to ease off by 1972. The experts of the "1985 Group" predicted in this respect that, before the end of the century, 50% of the college age population would pursue undergraduate studies beyond the age of 18 and this figure cannot be dismissed as unrealistic since quantitative forecasts have generally been conservative and have had to be revised upward.⁷

At the same time, the socio-economic structure of the student population began to change significantly (see Table 2). In 1959, only 3% of the students registered in the faculties had a working class background as opposed to 10,2% in 1968. Simultaneously, considerable progress was made in opening the universities to the growing middle class emerging from two decades of widespread economic and social change.

The pressure thereby generated by the unregulated flow of students flocking into the universities was undoubtedly a decisive factor in disrupting the university's system's educational, research and economic functions.

The expansion of the universities and their educational function

Overcrowded amphitheaters, inadequate facilities and equipment, poor libraries, etc..., these were only the most obvious symptoms of a deeper malaise which had far reaching implications for the quality of French

TABLE 2: Social and economic background of French students, in percent of the total student population (A) and socio-professional structure of the French population, in percent of the total active population (B).

Social and professional categories of parents	1959		1968	
	A*	B	A	B
Agricultural (1).....	20,7	4,9	12,0	5,7
Agricultural wage earners.....	6,0	0,8	2,9	0,7
Employers in Industry and Commerce(2).....	12,1	18,8	9,6	14,2
Learned professions and senior cadres (3)...	2,9	23,3	4,8	32,1
Intermediate cadres (4).....	5,8	17,9	9,9	16,1
Employees (5).....	10,8	12,3	14,8	8,8
Workers.....	33,8	3,0	37,7	10,2
Others.....	7,9	19,0	8,3	12,2
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(c)

- Notes: 1. Self employed farmers and agricultural overseers.
 2. Directors of industrial or commercial concerns; craftsmen and small shopkeepers.
 3. Senior civil servants, teachers in secondary and higher education, senior cadres in private business, the Bench.
 4. Intermediate grades in the Civil Service, teachers in primary education, intermediate cadres in private business.
 5. Lower grades in the Civil Service and junior staff in private business.

*: 1954 census year.

- Sources: a. I.N.S.E.E.
 b. Ministère de l'Education Nationale. Service Central des Statistiques et de la Conjoncture. Informations Statistiques. No. 22 (June-July 1960), p. 309.
 c. Ministère de l'Education Nationale. Service Central des Statistiques et de la Conjoncture. Enseignement Supérieur. Effectifs Universitaires. Origine Socio-Professionnelle des Etudiants Français. Toutes Disciplines. Par Académie. 11/SC4/GR 111a, No 3635.

higher education. For Raymond Aron, the universities could not sustain the pressure of a never ending intake of students without diversifying their "structures d'accueil" and introducing some means of control comparable to those used by the Grandes Ecoles. If such reforms were not undertaken, the educational standards of French universities, according to the French sociologist, would be irremediably lowered.

Aron may have overstressed his point when he also observed that the French faculties were in the process of becoming "dépotoirs" but his description of their overall conditions was particularly relevant to the Parisian universities jammed by more than 20% of the entire student population. As we shall see later, the Fourth and the Fifth Republics both undertook a massive budgetary effort to cope with these material problems. These long term investments, however, were most frequently made belatedly and, in any event, fell short from alleviating the tensions produced by rapidly rising student enrolments.

This is particularly true for the recruitment of teachers. Between 1958 and 1968, the number of teachers in French universities dramatically increased from 6,218 to 25,585 and whereas in 1958, there was one teacher for 30 students, in 1968, this figure had dropped to 19. These statistics, nevertheless, must be qualified by three observations. First, the student-teacher ratio in the provincial universities was somewhat better than in Paris and the "encadrement" was particularly unsatisfactory in the Law and Liberal Arts faculties. Second, the Government found it expedient to transfer secondary school teachers - most of them agrégés - into the universities. Inasmuch as the secondary school system had itself been under the pressure of a rapidly expanding student population, this policy may have contributed to a lowering of the academic standards of the lycées and

colleges which, in turn, sent inadequately trained students to the universities.¹¹ Finally, the French governments sought to recruit lecturers and assistants primarily, instead of professors and senior lecturers.¹²

The evolving structure of the teaching staff therefore not only raised disturbing questions about the quality of higher education; at the same time, it possibly contributed to a building up of tensions between the different categories of teachers in the absence of a more rapid upward mobility in the academic hierarchy.¹³ In any event, the process was accompanied by a radicalization of junior faculty members who, closer to the students and not yet sufficiently integrated in the university structure, began to question the legitimacy of the faculties' government.¹⁴

Eventhough some efforts were made to differentiate teaching methods according to the level of study and to encourage closer and more personal contacts between the faculty and students, the mere pressure of numbers gave a privileged role to ex-cathedra mass lectures (cours magistraux) and, by the same token, raised doubts about its usefulness and pedagogical value. Some argued that the cours magistral had become a "sermon de carême à Notre Dame".¹⁵ Others criticized it for its undue emphasis on deductive reasoning encouraging passive attitudes among students.¹⁶

The examination system was also widely decried for its irrelevance and questionable educational function. It was argued that in addition to their arbitrary results and traumatizing effects on students, examinations were far too competitive and fostered individualistic values unpropitious to collective research endeavors.¹⁷ Furthermore, it was suggested that the

standards used to appraise students' work had little to do with education and too often reflected a formalist value system inherited from a pre-
18
industrial society.

As we shall see later, most of these issues - access to higher education, the fate of the Parisian universities, the internal structures and management of the faculties as well as pedagogical methods - were all at the center of the May-June student teacher debates. Far less attention was then paid to the universities' research problems.

The expansion of the universities and their research function

The thesis according to which the universities were no longer able to perform their research function as a result of an expanding student population has long had currency among teachers in France. 19 Without underestimating the fact that teaching and administrative duties tended to become more burdensome and time consuming as the number of students steadily grew, the problem seems to have far deeper roots.

In 1966, university teachers and politicians met in a national Seminar on the problems of the universities in Caen and singled out three major structural obstacles preventing the faculties from playing a significant
20
role in scientific research. First, they pointed out that the university system was administratively too centralized. Most important **decisions** required **the** approval of Paris and the tight and cumbersome financial control of the Treasury often paralyzed even routine operations related to
21
scientific research. These regulations were in fact so stifling that it was rumored that the universities could not hire a janitor without

the green light of the Direction des Enseignements Supérieurs.²²

Second, the protagonists of the Caen colloquium stressed that the compartmentalization of the universities into five faculties precluded an interdisciplinary approach to research.²³ Actually, there was so little communication between the faculties that a law professor, for example, was not able to teach in a Liberal Arts Faculty without first overcoming extraordinarily intricate and overwhelming administrative bureaucratic procedures.²⁴ This situation was further aggravated by the existence of the chair system. As Professor Gilpin points out, "in France, the typical scientific institution throughout the nineteenth century and even today is the small personal laboratory which comes with the professor's chair.... There, the professor can pursue his personal inclinations with a few assistants, though the research might not be at the frontiers of scientific advance and the laboratory too small, ill equipped and isolated to be efficient."²⁵ The cooptative mode of recruitment of the chairs recipients was also a favorite target of the university's critics: they claimed that it contributed to the isolation of the universities from business and industry and hampered the vertical mobility of young research workers thereby limiting the universities' output of researchers.

Finally, the participants to the Caen debates emphasized that the cleavage and rivalry between the Grandes Ecoles and the Faculties was particularly detrimental to the latter's research function to the extent that the best students deserted them.²⁶

Under these conditions, the universities's fragmentation, isolation, poor equipment and financial dependence on the State explain why most

innovations and pioneering work actually took place most frequently outside of the faculties in well endowed State laboratories or research institutes like the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique or the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes.²⁷ The universities' economic function also raised several thorny problems.

The expansion of the universities and their economic function

With the exception of the medical and pharmacy schools, the role of the universities within the economy has never been as clearly defined as that of the Grandes Ecoles. Traditionally, the universities have been primarily involved in the training of secondary and higher education teachers and the "production" of "disinterested knowledge". In the last two decades, however, a more utilitarian conception of the universities' economic role began to emerge, stressing that the Faculties, like the Grandes Ecoles, should contribute more extensively to the process of economic development. Two interrelated issues can be discussed here: first, it seems that the universities' output in junior technicians and engineers remained inadequate and, second, the financial cost of graduate in all disciplines grew at a vertiginous rate.

The expansion of the French universities has been characterized by an inflation of enrolments in literary and juridical disciplines which the commissioners of the Fifth Plan sought in vain to avoid.²⁸ The causes of this phenomenon have been widely discussed, some arguing that technical and scientific disciplines never enjoyed in France the prestige of 'humanités' and 'culture générale',²⁹ others, that the faculty itself was reluctant to conceive of higher education as a kind of productive investment.

In any event, in 1968, the economic role of the universities still appeared limited to the training of teachers and administrators. The changes introduced in their curricula (the creation of an economic section in the law faculties, for example) were often formulated in response to the State's needs and this, in turn, reinforced the unwillingness of business and industry to hire universities' graduates.

31

The reforms most frequently proposed to adapt the universities to a modern, complex, industrial society included the reorganization of the secondary school system, better guidance counseling of the lyceens and a diversification of the universities structures, notably the establishment of two year technical institutes and agricultural and industrial universities.

32

Education Minister Christian Fouchet did set up 'Collèges d'Enseignement Secondaires' and University Technical Institutes in the mid sixties, but these innovations were too recent to alleviate the tensions generated by an inflated number of Liberal Arts and Law graduates who could not find administrative or teaching positions and, unemployment, understandably enough, was singled out as one of the major causes for the outbreak of the May-June crisis.

33

Under these conditions, the universities were in the paradoxical situation of being overburdened with students and unable to integrate them into the active working population. This state of affair was viewed by some observers as even more absurd insofar as the cost of each student tended to increase markedly as a result of the growing length of studies and a high rate of drop out.

34

Even if variations among the five faculties are taken into consideration, approximately 25% of the students enrolled in the universities dropped out after a year of study. 31,50% had to repeat the first year and, at the end of that period, 66% of them were definitively eliminated. ³⁵ The "wastage" of students and the subsequent financial losses incurred by the State were such - we are coming full circle in this discussion - that the volatile issue of access to higher education could hardly be avoided. In order to rid the universities of the 'inaptes' and other 'étudiants fantômes', several professors asked for the establishment of selective entrance examinations. ³⁶ As we shall see later, the issue was not satisfactorily resolved by the Orientation Act.

To summarize, it seems that, under the impact of interrelated processes of modernization which seriously question the assumption of the existence of a 'société bloquée', the university system developed several 'dysfunctions' over the last two decades or so. Overall, the Napoleonic universities did not adequately adapt themselves to a rapidly evolving social and economic environment. Too fragmented at the local level and overcentralized at the national level, the faculties did not efficiently participate in research activities. Most of the time, they were involved in tasks which had only a tenuous link with the growing and differentiated needs of a modernizing economy. Finally, the unregulated intake of students, while sharpening these tensions, had a most damaging impact on the universities's educational function.

Obviously, the pre-1968 French university system was far from perfect. Should this be taken, however, as an indication that the political system had been stalemated for more than twenty years?

The political system's response to the growing challenge of the universities

As early as 1945, political decision-makers in France acknowledged that the university system had to be reformed and in spite of the adverse effects of governmental and constitutional instability, their policy objectives remained remarkably consistent. ³⁷ Under the banner of the loosely defined principle of 'democratization', the French leadership made an attempt to cope with the increasing 'massification' of the universities.

The evolution of the post war educational budget shows a spectacular growth in the resources allocated to the universities. Global appropriations for education doubled every five years and in 1967, reached 16,30 of the total State budget, almost 3,5% of the Gross National Product. ³⁸ Between 1952 and 1967, the ratio of expenditures for elementary schools in the building and equipment budget sharply dropped from 53,9% to 32,5% while outlays for secondary education grew only sluggishly from 35,5% to 40%. At the same time, appropriations for higher education almost doubled, rising from 6,6% to 11,4%. Similar trends can be detected in the operational budget for higher education since personnel expenditures jumped from 38% to 58% between 1952 and 1967.

This overall picture should be qualified by some of the remarks made earlier in the discussion. In addition, it must be noted here that expenditures for technical higher education and libraries tended to stagnate and that the share of State grants to universities in the operational budget actually decreased by twelve percentage points between 1952 and 1967. These factors may have contributed to the growing day to day administrative difficulties of the universities and sharpened the discontent of the academic community

toward the Education Ministry. It remains, nevertheless, that a significant financial effort, mainly directed at expanding the faculties' 'capacité d'accueil' and improving the student teacher ratio, was undertaken by both the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

Simultaneously, the French governments systematically tried to modernize the universities' functions. Appendix I-2 presents a list of some of the most significant reforms implemented in the post war period. The constitutional channels through which the decisions were made are indicated and the material has been arranged according to three basic policy objectives: the modernization and democratization of the system of higher education and pedagogical reforms.

Clearly, the sheer number of changes introduced in the faculties since 1945 suggests that only an abuse of language could allow the use of the concept of 'blocage' to appraise the performance of the political system. The universities' curricula and offerings were broadened. Several measures encouraged pure and applied research. An attempt was made to upgrade technical education and bridge the gap between the universities and the professions. New establishments of higher learning were created in the provinces to put an end to the Parisian 'congestion'. The organization of studies was rearranged in most faculties into different 'cycles d'études' involving an increasing degree of specialization which would not conflict with 'culture générale'. The teaching staff became functionally differentiated and a few more imaginative pedagogical methods were introduced.

All these reforms did not come to a naught although their scope and nature were essentially incremental. Several problems, nevertheless, remained

outstanding or were imperfectly resolved. As we shall see later, 'democratization' was still politically a tension producing issue. Moreover, all the above mentioned reforms primarily consisted of partial, cautious adjustments made within the largely untouched structure inherited from the nineteenth century thereby justifying much of the criticisms which have been discussed earlier.

Obviously, the approach of decision-makers in matters of higher education had more in common with 'patching up' than the comprehensiveness called for in the 1947 seminal Langevin-Wallon project.³⁹ Even the Fouchet reforms of 1966, heralded by its authors as a major innovation, boiled down to the establishment of differentiated cycles of study in the Liberal Arts and Science faculties and the newly created University Institutes of Technology did not supersede but were superimposed onto the traditional 'structure facultaire'.⁴⁰ This 'benign neglect' of structural issues and the incrementalism of French decision-making in higher education cannot be understood without reference to the politics of educational change which have been marked by academic inertia and fragmentation and sharp political and ideological conflicts.

The politics of higher education: Academic inertia

"Red on the outside, white inside", the old adage used to describe the French Radical party might well be applied to the teaching community. In general, teachers have been able to transcend their numerous political and programmatic divisions by frequently banding together against those reform projects which they perceived as potential threats against the 'corps enseignant'. Sometimes, reforms were criticized because they had

been allegedly formulated without consultation of 'les intéressés', other times because, as an observer put it, the government refused "to pay and build"⁴². In general, organized groups, in spite of their leftist political orientation, consistently displayed an impressive degree of pedagogical conservatism.

For example, the Fédération des Syndicats Autonomes de l'Enseignement Supérieur, defended the 'cours magistral' at a time when it was increasingly questioned as a sound pedagogical device.⁴³ The Société des Agrégés criticized the somewhat erratic reforms of the baccalauréat degree whenever the Ministry sought to deemphasize the role of competitive examinations in the appraisal of student work.⁴⁴ The defense of 'humanisme' and 'culture générale' was an often heard argument presented against reform proposals and the place of latin in the curricula was the stumbling block of would be reformers under the Fourth Republic.⁴⁵ In the same related vein of thought, reforms were challenged on the ground that they introduced an excessive degree of premature specialization.⁴⁶

Again and again, corporate and other vested interests (intérêts acquis) were the unavowed reason for the teachers' groups resistance to educational change. Thus, the S.N.E.Sup. which, under the leadership of Alain Geismar, became increasingly doctrinaire and radical after 1967, conveyed at the same time the disturbing impression that its opposition to the 1966 Fouchet reforms was for the most part based on the fact that the faculties' assistants were to be granted a 'statut contractuel'.⁴⁷ The licence degree created in 1966 and awarded to students upon completion of the two year, first cycle of study in Sciences and Liberal Arts, was acceptable to the Société des Agrégés only to the extent that its recipients were not allowed

48

to teach in the secondary school system. Higher salaries, not the "manipulation of examinations and degrees", were, according to a Dean of the Paris Law faculté, the remedy to the shortage of teachers in higher education. Clamorous protests greeted the establishment of the University Institutes of Technology when it became known that their chairmanship could be filled by any competent lay person even without a university degree....

49
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Similar instances of educational conservatism could be multiplied ad nauseam. This 'unité de réaction' nevertheless, did not dissimulate the divisions and heterogeneity of the 'corps enseignant'. There were, for example, fierce professional rivalries among primary, secondary and university teachers. Threatened by the instituteurs as a result of the creation of a 'tronc commun', lycée teachers in turn, sought to "penetrate" the system of higher education and the Société des Agrégés claimed the right for its members to teach in the universities as assistants. Within the faculties themselves, there was little agreement over the usefulness of the Agrégation and, in general, science professors, in contrast to the 'littéraires', held this title in poor esteem. The reform of higher education, however, entailed more than the fate of a single examination.

51
52

The politics of higher education: academic fragmentation

Was it necessary to overhaul the traditional 'structure facultaire'? What would be the nature of the structures of a 'renovated university'? To what extent should the State's administrative and financial controls of the universities be eliminated? Should the Grandes Ecoles be brought

under the purview of the Education Ministry instead of being structurally isolated from the universities and administered by several departments ? Should students be allowed to participate in university decision-making...? Teachers and students were sharply divided over all of these key issues. Appendix I-3 suggests the existence of three major clusters of shifting coalitions which will be defined as 'conservative', 'moderate' and 'revolutionary'.⁵⁴ The discussion will be structured around the concept of 'démocratisation' which seems to have been of overriding importance to most university groups.

53

The conservatives' understanding of democratization as a guiding organizational principle of reform was essentially represented by the Société des Agrégés and several language and literature teacher groups. For these factions, democratization merely entailed the removal of all economic and academic barriers to talented students so that they would be able to freely compete with one another within an educational system which did not require any major structural alterations. More specifically, democratization involved three necessary and sufficient conditions. First, financial assistance to students should be increased. Second, the State administered and controlled, anonymous, competitive national examinations should be maintained (hence the Agrégés' stiff resistance against all encroachments on the role and status of the sacro-sanct agrégation) and, third, stricter standards of student admission into higher education⁵⁵ established.

Clearly, the approach of this politically influential grouping of teachers,⁵⁶ was intellectually and socially highly elitist and while stressing the need for quality, accomodated itself with the existing

institutional status quo: innovations like the University Institutes of Technology were acceptable to the Agrégés and its allies only to the extent that these establishments were expected to rid the universities of mediocre students.

For the moderates, democratization did not mean lower standards of higher education. Their analysis of the universities' dilemmas was, however, based on entirely different premises. The Syndicat Général de l'Education Nationale, the Fédération des Syndicats Autonomes de l'Enseignement Supérieur led by Professor Vedel, the Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur (at least until the mid-sixties), the loosely organized Association d'Etudes pour l'Expansion de la Recherche Scientifique, all stressed, in varying degree, that democratization did not entail any selection or *numerus clausus*. Higher education should be opened as widely as possible to all students and selection should consist of the 'orientation' of students in disciplines corresponding to their tastes and capabilities. Accordingly, selection could only take place after a certain period of 'observation' and was a pedagogical device requiring the prior differentiation of the faculties structures. All of these groups, though, did not agree over the exact nature of these reforms.

Both the A.E.E.R.S. and the S.N.E.Sup. emphasized the need for large scale structural change and asked for the decentralization of the university system, the creation of departments and the abolition of the chairs. ⁵⁷ Neither the S.N.E.Sup. nor the S.G.E.N. however, accepted the idea of 'competing universities' patterned along the North American model which was favored by the A.E.E.R.S. and the anti-marxist student organization, the Fédération Nationale des Etudiants de France. Though not overlooking the economic function of the universities, the S.N.E.Sup. and the S.G.E.N.

feared their taking over by business interests and were more inclined to perceive the university problems in terms of 'social justice'. As a result of this, the S.N.E.Sup. progressively fell into the revolutionary camp in contrast to the S.G.E.N. which kept advocating the pedagogical and structural changes which have just been outlined.

The Vedel Federation did not openly depart from the reformists' core ideas, but, on several occasions, it was clearly more reticent, if not conservative. Emphasizing that there was no need for throwing overboard "ce qui avait fait ses preuves", its rank and file was by no means ready to accept all structural reforms and, eventually, the Federation ended up criticizing sharply "les notables auto-investis" of the Caen colloquium and adopting an increasingly inflexible attitude particularly in regard to the issue of selection.

At least until 1967, the radical approach to the university problems was represented by no more than a handful of isolated teachers and students mostly recruited from the ranks of the S.N.E.Sup. and the Communist student union in the throes of bitter internal ideological bickering among 'maoists' and 'Italians'. This loose coalition, however, progressively widened its audience and influence, when, in the Spring of 1967, Alain Geismar was elected Secretary General of the S.N.E.Sup.. From then on, this group, besides its usual 'corporate' demands, embarked in a global contestation of the universities and the political system. In so doing, the S.N.E.Sup. soon received the support of the Union Nationale des Etudiants de France whose exclusion from the decision-making process since the Algerian conflict and cleavages among "trotzkyists", anarchists and other radical students, led its insecure leadership into a systematic policy of 'pas d'ennemis à

gauche'.

Thus, both the S.N.E.Sup. and U.N.E.F. agreed that the problems of the university were rooted in the nature of the Fifth Republic's society, economy and polity. For example, the leadership of the teacher union once esoterically commented that the debate over selection reflected a conflict between 'big business' and the 'bourgeoisie'.⁶³ Similarly, it frequently argued that the relationship of teachers and students actually mirrored the class cleavages of French bourgeois society.⁶⁴

Under these conditions, democratization for the revolutionaries entailed much more than the mere creation of first cycles of study or even the overhauling of the 'structure facultaire'. The principle involved a drastically wider opening of the universities to working class students and, at the same time, a thorough redistribution of power within the faculties' decision-making bodies.⁶⁵

To sum up this brief attitudinal profile of student and teacher organizations, it is evident that there was little if any consensus over the content and direction of change within the academic community which was also plagued by political and ideological disputes and was further rent asunder by the growing alienation of a segment of the university. Clearly, the pattern of educational change in France cannot be understood without reference to the tenuous legitimacy of the political system. A discussion of the position of the parties on the problems of higher education will confirm this impression.

The politics of higher education. The parties: fragmentation and inertia.

On the surface, the parties displayed the same impressive unity as the university groups. All of them, including the Gaullists, often charged that the government's reforms had insufficient financial backing. With the understandable of the U.N.R. (U.D. Ve between 1967 and 1968) rank and file, all of the parties were sharply critical of the regime's high handed style of decision-making and denounced bitterly its social conservatism and disregard for 'laïcité'.⁶⁶

Beyond these loosely defined ideas, however, there was no consensus among the parties over the problems of higher education. The Left and the Right persistently clashed over the issue of 'laïcité', a problem which had far reaching implications. The dormant but ever present and irritating 'religious question' could always be reactivated if the State's control of the universities were loosened. Moreover, the Left was not likely to accept a model of administrative, financial and pedagogical decentralization which would jeopardize the universities' 'independence' from business and other economic influences.

The Right-Left cleavage was not the only source of bickering among the parties. As we shall see later in more detail, selection, the place of the Grandes Ecoles in the university system, the agrégation, the role of the baccalauréat, all produced intense disputes. The formulation of a coherent policy in higher education was further complicated by the existence of profound dissensions within the forces of 'l'Ordre' and those favoring 'le Mouvement'. The case of the Gaullist party will soon be examined; it will suffice to say here that its rank and file embraced all shades of

opinions ranging from conservatives to reformers, Jacobins to 'décentra-
 67
 lisateurs', 'cléricaux' to 'anti-cléricaux', etc....

The French Left was in the throes of painful realignments⁶⁸ and was
 overshadowed by the growing influence of the Parti Socialiste Unifié among
 university intellectuals. These developments may be attributed to the
 'ossification' and 'bureaucratization' of the Socialist and Communist parties.
 They can also be related to the doctrinal uncertainties and divisions of
 the French Left.

For example, the key concept and ideology of democratization used by
 the Left in its ritualistic references to the Langevin-Wallon Plan,⁶⁹ was
 subject to conflicting interpretations. The Radicals' individualistic
 philosophy - to the extent that they had any - led them to share the So-
 ciété des Agrégés' analyses of the problems of higher education. Within the
 rank and file of the Socialist and Communist parties, both close to the
 'milieu enseignant', there was a minority which also defended some of the
 theories of the most conservative university groups.⁷⁰ But, in general,
 the Communists and Socialists publicly argued that the democratization of
 the universities was a sort of long term investment supporting and promoting
 the economic interests of the society as well as those of its members.

Both parties, however, were highly ambiguous on a number of key problems.
 First, they stressed that change entailed the creation of a 'Grand Ministère
 de l'Education Nationale' coordinating all the establishments of higher
 learning, including the Grandes Ecoles. Even if we disregard the political
 aspects of this proposal, what were its implications in regard to the
 'structure facultaire' and the State supervision of the universities' budgets

and curricula ? Both the Socialists and Communists contended that the problems of higher education could not be resolved unless education became the State's " priorité des priorités". But where was the money supposed to come from ? The dismantlement of the atomic striking force ? In which case, what was to be done with France's nuclear arsenal ? Finally, both parties charged that the Fifth Republic's educational policy was 'technocratic' and showed more concern for the occupational needs of the society than those of students. But to what extent did the two coincide and up to what point was it reasonable to overlook the demands of the labour market ?

On all these issues, the answers of the Left remained elusive, embarrassed or simplistic. Accordingly, the equivocations and divisions of the Radicals, Socialists and Communists gave the disturbing impression that educational change was only a matter of reorganizing national priorities. The inability of the Left to come to terms with the technical, ethical and political implications of its proposals in addition to its failure to generate a modernist and realistic alternative to the Fifth Republic's policy in higher education explain, to a large extent, its crushing electoral defeat in June 1968.

Concluding remarks: decision-making and change in higher education in post war France

We can now revert to the question raised earlier in this inquiry: how and to what extent did the French political system meet the problems of an evolving university ? The first conclusion which must, again, be stressed is that the decision-making apparatus was by no means altogether 'bloqué'.

The students of the stalemate society thesis are not altogether unaware of the impact of the pressure of economic and social mutations, religious and political conflicts, ideological disputes, diverging interpretations of culture and education and the inertia and fragmentation of the academic community on the patterns of policy formulation and change. However, they wrongly infer from these factors that reforms were impossible or negligible in terms of their nature and purpose. Although the overall process was slow and incremental, the French universities did change as a result of a series of 'marginal' decisions.

As indicated in appendix I-2, most decisions were made by decrees, ordinances and 'arrêtés' of the Education Minister. Between 1945 and 1968, the French Parliament legislated only five times in educational matters and in the years preceding the May-June 'events', the National Assembly, if the annual budgetary debates are disregarded, discussed only four times the problems of higher education.

All of this does not mean that the bureaucracy actually took over law and rule making powers. It was too divided politically to perform that function.⁷¹ We are simply suggesting that decisions were most frequently elaborated within the framework of ad-hoc committees comprising representatives of the Education Ministry and other interested departments and interest groups, a practice later derided as "commissionite".⁷² For example, the 1966 Fouchet reforms were prepared by a committee of eighteen persons, chaired by the Education Minister himself, which held several⁷³ hearings between 1963 and 1966.

The segmentation of the political environment, of course, precluded the formulation and implementation of sweeping changes which would have created paralyzing storms. In general, change in higher education was characterized by a succession of temporary and delicate compromises among contending interest groups, parties, government officials and civil servants. Thus, it took three years of hard bargaining to elaborate the piecemeal 1966 reforms which, with the burning issue of selection, were a notable case in point of the incremental approach of French policy-makers. In 1964, Fouchet, with the support of the Chief of State, the Prime Minister and a majority of science teachers, was planning to reform the baccalauréat so that it would cease to give automatic access to higher education. Aware that most Liberal Arts professors had mixed feelings about this conception and that the political Left and the students (radical or not) would bitterly fight it, the Minister had to accept the following awkward compromise: on the one hand, admission into the Liberal Arts faculties would not be subjected to any specific rule but, after 1967, the baccalauréat would no longer automatically open the doors of the Science faculties. On the other hand, partial satisfaction was given to the partisans of selection: the two year, preparatory first cycle superseding the old 'propédeutique' was expected to rid the universities of all undesirable 'étudiants fantômes'.

The same incremental analysis could be applied to most other aspects of the 1966 decisions. Science teachers and the Directeur des Enseignements Supérieurs, Pierre Aigrain, were in favor of a 'mandatory orientation' of students at the end of the first cycle toward teaching or research. In contrast, Liberal Arts teachers leaned toward a more flexible solution. 'Jurys d'orientation' were therefore set up to offer counseling and guidance to students but they could act only in an advisory capacity. Similarly, the

widely debated 'agrégation' was not abolished and the status of the assistants was not clearly settled. The President of the Société des Agrégés argued that the recruitment of instructors too often came under the "feudal" control of tenured professors who sometimes hired students without even a master's degree. To that, Aigrain and the science teachers retorted that the agrégation had little relevance to university research. The Government resolved the conflict by allowing the recruitment of assistants among students without an agrégation. But those students who got the best grades in the concours (la botte), could, upon request, be automatically appointed as junior instructors. Nepotism coexisting with the merit system was the 'tour de force' involved in the Government's decision. Countless similar examples could be cited but the most extraordinary one remains the creation of a master's degree in modern literature which, as a result of the pressure of the Franco-Ancienne, still required the study of Greek and Latin....

Obviously, these delicate adjustments, because of their very imperfection, were not likely to endure for long. Moreover, the incremental and marginalist approach of policy makers to problem solving engendered the somewhat mistaken belief that nothing or very little was done and changed. Only the conservatives viewed decision-making in a long term, coherent perspective, stressing that it led to a slow degradation of academic standards. Instead, the attention of the relevant publics most frequently remained focused on the unending disputes raised by a single decision. Rarely were the government's innovations perceived on a developmental continuum, each one flowing from the others in a slow but cumulative process of change.

Also, it should be noted that the outward style of the Fifth Republic's decision-makers further complicated everything. Although channels of

communication were less inaccessible and bargaining more widespread than usually suggested, the attitude of the government was perceived as high handed and a tension producing vicious circle tended to emerge as a result of the decision-makers' determination to modernize the universities and the opposition and fragmentation of interest groups and political parties. The latter were increasingly disgruntled by the alleged uncooperativeness of the authorities and were further alienated when they were told that a more elaborate and extended process of consultation would paralyze the policy formulation process. Their subsequent behavior and opposition in turn merely reinforced the viewpoint and fears of top ranking officials. To a large extent, the peculiarities of the patterns of decision-making and change in France explain the growing political estrangement of a segment of the university and the diffuse but profound discontent of the bulk of the academic community.

But, again, it must be stressed that the political system was rarely totally stalemated. Although problems of structure and content were largely overlooked,⁷⁴ there are several signs showing that political decision-makers were slowly and cautiously moving in the direction of the Caen Seminar's resolutions in the two years preceding the student revolt. The system which had been set up in 1966 could function only to the extent that the flow of students into the universities was submitted to some regulatory device. Fouchet, to a large extent, had sidetracked the problem but his successor, Alain Peyrefitte, known for his 'girondin' philosophy in higher education,⁷⁵ began to come to terms with it. In March of 1968, an inter-departmental meeting presided by De Gaulle, decided to establish selective entrance examinations and, in May, Peyrefitte set up a study group headed by Rector Capelle, a supporter of selection, to make recommendations on

the student admission policy of the universities. Clearly, this measure could not have been formulated and implemented without at the same time reconsidering and altering the centralized administrative structure of the university system. ⁷⁶ The Capelle Committee, however, had a short lifespan since on May 3rd, the students' 'fronde' began.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more details on the French universities' traditional organization and governance, see Georges Amestoy, Les Universités Françaises (Paris: Education et Gestion, 1968); William Fraser, Education and Society in France (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963); W.D. Halls, Society, Schools and Progress in France (New York: Pergamon Press, 1965); Jacques Minot, L'Entreprise Education Nationale (Paris: Armand Colin, 1970) and Antoine Prost, L'Enseignement en France (Paris: Armand Colin, 1968).
2. The membership of the Higher Council of National Education had been so reformed by a law of 1964.
3. The role of these committees is discussed by Louis Trotabas, " La Direction de l'Enseignement Supérieur, les Conseils et les Comités," in Revue de l'Enseignement Supérieur, No 3 (1960), pp. 12-25.
4. To use the terminology of Jean-Claude Passeron in Innovation in Higher Education (Paris: O.E.C.D. publications, 1970), p. 42.
5. A recent study indicates that the "O.E.C.D. member countries received, in 1965, nearly 7, 850, 000 students as opposed to 3, 275, 000 in 1950. This represents in 15 years an increase of 140%, or an annual average rate of 6%... this growth has not been uniform... (and) distinct variations have been recorded between countries... In comparison to the overall (140%), national increases varied between 75% for Italy and 327% for Sweden. The expansion was especially pronounced in four countries (Canada, Greece, Japan, Sweden) where enrolments more than tripled, while in most other countries the expansion was of the order of 100 to 200%." O.E.C.D., Development of Higher Education. Analytical Report (Paris: O.E.C.D. publications, 1971), p. 26. The reader may also consult Raymond Poignant, L'Enseignement dans les Pays du Marché Commun (Paris: Institut Pédagogique National, 1965), pp. 297-315.
6. For the impact of demographic, social, economic and cultural change on university enrolments, see Alfred Sauvy, La Montée des Jeunes (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1959); Louis Gros, L'Explosion Scolaire (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1961); Alain Girard, "Population" et l'Enseignement" (Paris: I.N.E.D., 1970); Robert Salais, " Les Niveaux de Diplôme dans Chaque Catégorie socio-professionnelle," in Economie et Statistiques, No 9 (February 1970), pp. 49-57; Alain Girard, La Réussite Sociale en France. Ses Caractères. Ses Lois. Ses Effets (Paris: I.N.E.D., Cahiers No 38, P.U.F., 1961); Jean Fourastié, " Economic Growth and The Working Population since 1950," in World Population Conference (Vol. IV, 1965), pp. 62-65; J.P. Backy, Les Cadres en France, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1971); Jean Bégué, " La Montée des Emplois Tertiaires," in Economie et Statistiques, No 2 (June 1969), pp. 33-40 and Revue Française du Travail, No 1 (January-March 1966) (for the Fifth Plan manpower projections).
7. See for example, the Fourth Plan forecasts in Rapport General de la Commission de l'Equipement Scolaire, Universitaire et Sportif (Paris), p. 73. The 1985 Group which included economists, intellectuals, university professors and high ranking civil servants, was set up in 1962 by the Prime Minister for the purpose of studying the probable economic and social structure of France in the 1980s. Its findings were to be used for the elaboration of

7. (continued) of the Fifth Plan and have been published by La Documentation Francaise in a brochure entitled Réflexions pour 1985.
8. Raymond Aron, "Que valent les études Françaises?," L'Express, No 802 (October 31-November 6, 1966), p. 80. For a conflicting viewpoint, see Maurice Duverger, "Le Nombre et la Qualité," Le Monde, January 2, 1964, p. 1.
9. Tableaux de l'Education Nationale. Statistiques Rétrospectives 1958-1968 (Paris, 1969), pp. 433 and 435.
10. Tableaux de l'Education Nationale (Paris, 1970), p. 416.
11. In 1945, 25,8% of lycées teachers were agrégés against 18,4% in 1963. Study on Teachers. France. Ireland (Paris: O.E.C.D. publications, 1969), p. 123. The figures for non qualified teachers in the 'enseignement secondaire long' were 7,34% in 1950 and 27,22% in 1965. Ibid., p. 77. The severity of the examination boards granting the agregation undoubtedly contributed to this degradation in the academic standards required from teachers. Practically each year, the number of degrees awarded was inferior to the number of vacant teaching positions. Ibid., p. 181.
12. In 1956, senior lecturers and professors made up 56% of the universities teaching staff as opposed to 44% for lecturers and assistants. In 1963, the figures were 33% and 67% respectively. Raymond Poignant, Op. Cit., p. 231.
13. As anticipated by Antoine Prost in Op. Cit., p. 457.
14. As we shall see later, the evolving demands of the Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur mirrored this process of radicalization.
15. The expression was coined by Maurice Duverger, "L'Avenir de l'Enseignement Supérieur," Cahiers Pédagogiques, No 52, p. 7. Raymond Aron made similar observations in L'Express, Op. Cit., p. 80.
16. As observed by Professor Chevalier in Esprit, "Faire l'Université, Dossier pour la Réforme de l'Enseignement Supérieur," No. 5 and 6 (May-June 1964), p. 849. See also Professor Vedel's rejoinder in Ibid., p. 855.
17. On this point, the reader may consult L'Education Nationale (December 12, 1963), pp. 16-17; (April 23, 1964), pp. 16-17 and (September 24, 1964).
18. Jean-Claude Passeron, "Sociologie des Examens," in Education et Gestion No. 2 (1970), pp. 6-16.
19. See for example, Professor L. Schwartz observations on this point, in Esprit, Op. Cit., p. 777.
20. The critiques and recommendations of the Caen Seminar appear in "Le Colloque National de Caen," in L'Expansion de la Recherche Scientifique. Revue Trimestrielle de l'Association d'Etudes pour l'Expansion de la Recherche Scientifique. Nos. 23-24 (May 1967).

21. On this point, see the angry utterances of Dean Zamansky in Le Monde (March 9, 1966), p. 9 and L'Education Nationale, No 784 (March 17, 1966), p. 4.
22. Esprit, Op. Cit., p. 950. Raymond Aron discusses the problems generated by the overcentralization of the university system in his perceptive " Quelques Problemes des Universites Francaises," in Preuves No 159 (May 1964), pp. 10-22.
23. See the summary of the debates of a round table of the O.E.C.D. Science ministers dealing with this problem in L'Education Nationale, No. 856 (March 21, 1968), p. 8.
24. This is why Rector Capelle demanded the creation of ' professeurs d'Université' in Le Monde (November 28, 1964), p. 14.
25. Robert Gilpin, France in the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 107.
26. The inconvenients of the rivalry between the Grandes Ecoles and the universities are discussed by Laurent Schwartz in Atomes, No 240 (February 1967), pp. 76-88. It should also be pointed out that the tyrannical Doctorat d'Etat (particularly stringent in the Liberal Arts faculties) and the Agregation which were the academic prerequisites for pursuing a research career did little to improve the faculties' output in senior researchers.
27. The proliferation of these institutions actually further raised problems of coordination in the formulation of a national scientific policy. On this point, see Joseph Ben David, La Recherche Fondamentale et les Universités. Réflexions sur les Disparités Internationales (Paris: O.E.C.D. publications, 1968).
28. Commissariat Général du Plan d'Equipement et de la Productivité, Cinquième Plan, 1966-1970. Rapport Général de la Commission de l'Equipe-ment Scolaire, Universitaire et Sportif, pp. 189-193. Between 1961 and 1968, enrolments in Science, Pharmacy and Medicine schools rose by 200%. The figure for the Law and Liberal Arts faculties was 300%. See "Les Etudiants en France. Problèmes et Evolution Statistique de l'Enseignement Supérieur, 1960-1967," Notes et Etudes Documentaires, No. 3577 (March 31, 1969), p. 11.
29. Léon Antoine, Histoire de l'Education Technique (Paris: P.U.F., 1962), passim. Jean Capelle, L'Ecole de Demain Reste à Faire (Paris: P.U.F., 1966), passim. See also the perceptive remarks of Roger Gal, more than a decade ago in " Sens et Portée des Réformes Françaises de 1944 a 1954," in International Review of Education, Vol. I, No 1 (1955).
30. Michel Vermont-Gauchy, L'Education Nationale dans la France de Demain (Monaco, 1965), pp. 195- sq.
31. See for example, the remarks of the President of the C.N.P.F. in Ministère de l'Education Nationale. Académie d'Orléans, Rencontre Université-Economie. Chateau de Ménars. October 9 and 10. Toulouse. Imprimerie du C.P.D.P. Also, Informations S.I.D.A., No. 172 (June 1968), p. 3.

32. As advocated by Rector Capelle in Le Monde (November 28, 1964), p. 14 and Informations S.I.D.A., Op. Cit., pp. 40-47.
33. R. Boudon and Edgar Morin, " Deux Sociologues Interrogent la Révolution Etudiante," Annales (May-June 1969), pp. 738-764.
34. Between 1966 and 1968 only, the average cost of a student in higher education rose from 3, 910 to 4, 509 Francs. Ministère de l'Education Nationale. Statistiques des Enseignements. Données Budgetaires Relatives à l'Education Nationale. Fascicule No 1, " Evolution du Budget," p. 10.
35. Notes et Etudes Documentaires, Op. Cit., pp. 31-37. For more specific studies, see Bernard Kaiser, " 10 Années d'une Génération d'Etudiants à la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Toulouse," Education Nationale, No. 806 (June 27, 1968), p. 24 and the work conducted by Dean Zamansky for the Paris Science faculty, Ibid., No. 831 (June 15, 1967), p. 32.
36. For Dean Vedel and Dean Zamansky remarks on the problem, see Education Nationale, No. 794 (January 6, 1966) and No. 831 (June 15, 1967), p. 32.
37. For an overview of French educational reforms in the post war era, see Luc Decaunes, Réformes et Projets de Réforme de l'Enseignement Français de la Révolution à Nos Jours (1789-1960), (Paris: I.P.N., 1962), pp. 115-228 and 259-413.
38. All these figures are from Jean-Charles Asselain, Le Budget de l'Education Nationale, 1952-1967 (Paris: P.U.F., 1969), pp. 45,55, 86 and 90.
39. This committee, chaired by Professors Langevin and Wallon, included teachers, civil servants and intellectuals and made recommendations for structural changes in primary and secondary schools and higher education. Its findings and proposals appear in Luc Decaunes, Op. Cit., pp. 275-283.
40. The nature of the 1966 reforms is discussed in Education in France, No. 32 (July 1966), pp. 1-10 and No. 33 (October 1966), pp. 1-6. Also, Francois Russo, " Les Instituts Universitaires de Technologie," Etudes (July-August 1967), pp. 5-14. In 1964, the Club Jean Moulin stressed that the major problem of the university system was a "problème de structure". Le Monde (February 12, 1964), p. 8. Significantly enough, the debates of the Caen Seminar were for the most part focused on structural issues. For the position of the A.E.E.R.S. which organized this colloquium, see below pp. 48 and 49.
41. There is a huge literature published by university groups criticizing the Fifth Republic's pattern of decision-making. For the Agrégés, l'Agrégation, No. 135 (January 1965), pp. 220 and 226. For the Franco-Ancienne, Le Monde (September 17, 1964), p. 16. For the F.E.N., L'Enseignement Public No. 3 (November 1963), p. 3 and No. 1 (September 1964), p. 1. For the F.N.E.F. and F.N.A.G.E., Le Monde (April 6, 1966), p. 10. For U.N.E.F., Le Monde (January 25, 1964), p. 3 and the S.N.E.Sup., " Où en est la réforme de l'Enseignement Supérieur," mimeographed note published on January 22 1967 (personal archives), p. 3. For the S.G.E.N., Syndicalisme Universitaire, No. 416 (January 12, 1967), p. 6. It should be noted that the

- 41 (continued). Higher Council of National Education vetoed several reforms on the grounds that it had not been adequately consulted by the Government. Le Monde (December 9, 1964), p. 9. Also, L'Education Nationale (December 9, 1965), p. 4.
42. On this point, any issue of L'Agrégation; L'Enseignement Public, No. 8 (April 1-64), p. 5 and No. 10 (April 1968), pp. 2-3; Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup. No. 126 (November 1966), p. 2; L'Enseignement Supérieur, No. 33 (March 1965), p. 10; Syndicalisme Universitaire, No. 460 (April 25, 1968), p. 5; " Motion adoptée par l'Assemblée Générale de l'U.N.E.F.," mimeographed note published on November 26, 1967 (personal archives); L'Education Nationale, No. 799 (October 6, 1966), p. 6. The expression "pay and build" was coined by Maurice Levy, " Les Freins et les Structures," in Prospective, No 14 " Education et Societe" (Paris: P.U.F., 1967), p. 78-79.
43. René Passet, " Faut-il supprimer le cours magistral," L'Enseignement Supérieur, No. 36 (April 1967), p. 7.
44. L'Agrégation, No. 124 (August-September 1963), p. 23.
45. L'Agrégation, No. 136 (February-March 1965) and Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 93. The disputes over the place of latin in the curriculum are discussed by F.G. Dreyfus, " Les Syndicats Universitaires et le Projet Bilières de Réforme de l'Enseignement," Revue Française de Science Politique, XV, No. 2 (April 1965), pp. 213-250.
46. L'Education Nationale, No. 22 (June 10, 1965), p. 8 and Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup., No. 108 (July 1965).
47. Le Monde (March 4, 1966), p. 8 and (February 27/28, 1966), p. 6. According to its own estimates, the rank and file of the S.N.E.Sup. included 52% of assistants, 30% of assistant professors and only 18% of associate and full professors. Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup., No. 119 (May 1966).
48. L'Agrégation, No, 144 (February-March 1966), p. 287. One of the major objectives of the 1966 Fouchet reforms was precisely to discover means to remedy the shortage of teachers plaguing secondary schools.
49. L'Enseignement Supérieur, No. 33 (March 1966), p. 10.
50. Le Monde (December 12, 1965).
51. Le Monde (August 19, 1967), p. 9.
52. Le Monde (February 21, 1968), p. 11 and (August 19, 1967), p. 9.
53. The issue seems to have been raised for the first time by U.N.E.F. shortly after the end of the Algerian war but it was promptly buried by the faculty. See Mark Kravetz, " Naissance d'un Syndicalisme Etudiant," Les Temps Modernes, No. 813 (February 1964), pp. 1447-1475.
54. The use of this terminology is explained in the following chapter.
55. This is why the Société des Agrégés, in the mid sixties, demanded that the baccalaureat cease to give automatic access to the faculties. L'Agrégation, No. 157(October 1967), pp. 107-111.

56. It is significant to note here that the ceremonies marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Société des Agrégés were attended by Georges Pompidou and several members of the Government. L'Education Nationale, No. 848 (January 25, 1968), p. 6.
57. The position of the A.E.E.R.S. overlaps to a large extent with the Caen seminar final resolutions. See L'Expansion de la Recherche Scientifique, Op. Cit., pp. 141-143. For the S.N.E.Sup., Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup., No. 145 (June 1967), pp. 14-19 and L'Education Nationale, No. 828 (March 11, 1967), p. 19.
58. For more details on the S.G.E.N., Syndicalisme Universitaire, No. 413 (December 8, 1966) and No. 441 (October 19, 1967, Supplément), pp. 1-2. Also, No 455 (February 29, 1968), p. 6 and No. 457 (March 17, 1968).
59. To quote Professor Jean Boulouis, " L'Autonomie des Universités," in L'Enseignement Supérieur (December 1966), pp. 8-11.
60. Le Monde (December 21, 1966), p. 9.
61. As suggested by the already mentioned statements of Dean Vedel.
62. Le Monde (July 12, 1967), p. 7.
63. Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup., No. 150 (October 1967), pp. 1-2.
64. Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup., No. 145 (June 1967), pp. 14-19. The same point was made by the Union des Grandes Ecoles, close to U.N.E.F.. Le Monde (March 29, 1967), p. 7. For more details on U.N.E.F., See Union Nationale des Etudiants de France, Manifeste pour une Réforme Démocratique de l'Enseignement Supérieur (Paris, 1964).
65. Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup., No. 153 (January 1968). Le Monde (September 30, 1967), p. 10.
66. For the now defunct M.R.P., see L' Année Politique. 1962 (Paris: P.U.F., 1963), p. 668; for the socialists and the F.D.G.S., Le Monde (September 28, 1963), p. 2, (September 29/30, 1963), p. 3 and (December 1, 1964), p. 10. Also, Perspectives Socialistes, Nos. 70-71 (March-April 1964), pp. 30-40 and L'Année Politique. 1966 (Paris: P.U.F., 1967), p. 98. For the Communists, Georges Cogniot, Problèmes Actuels de l'Enseignement (Paris: Editions du P.C.F., undated); La Pensée (August 1963), p. 2; Pierre Juquin, " La Politique des Monopoles ou la Réforme Fouchet," in Cahiers du Communisme (June 1965), p. 75, L'Ecole et la Nation, No. 149 (May 1966), p. 22, Cahiers du Communisme, No. 10 (October 1966), p. 119 and L'Ecole et la Nation, " Pour une Réforme Democratique de l'Enseignement," No. 156 (February 1967).
67. Jean Charlot deals at length with this question in L'U.N.R., Etude du Pouvoir au Sein d'un Parti Politique (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), passim. Also, see his more recent The Gaullist Phenomenon (New York: Praeger, 1971), passim.
68. On this point, Franck L. Wilson, The French Democratic Left 1963-1969. Toward a Modern Party System (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1971).

69. See for example, Groupe Français d'Education Nouvelle and Société Française de Pédagogie, Le Plan Langevin Wallon (Paris: P.U.F., 1964). The following discussion is based on L'Ecole et la Nation, " Propositions pour une Réforme Démocratique de l'Enseignement," No. 151 (September 1966) and No. 156, Op. Cit.. Williams G. Andrews, European Political Institutions. A Comparative Government Reader (Princeton: Van Nostrand), pp. 180-181 and 215; Jean Thomas Nordmann, " Rapport sur les Problèmes de l'Enseignement Supérieur," Bulletin d'Information Radical-Socialiste. 64e Congrès National. Toulouse. Compte Rendu Sténographique. I am also indebted to some of the observations of John Talbott in The Politics of Educational Reform in France, 1918-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 252-255.
70. Senator Georges Cogniot once described the Société des Agrégés as one of the State's "corps ancien et éprouvé" with legitimate grievances and demands. His statement appears in L'Agrégation, No. 123 (June-July 1963), p. 431. For more details on this problem, F.G. Dreyfus, " Les Syndicats..." Op. Cit..
71. To mention only one of these bureaucratic divisions whose significance will be examined later in this work, former Education Minister Pierre Sudreau once observed that the "Education Ministry is the subordinate of the Treasury's civil servants." Le Monde (September 23/24, 1962), pp. 1 and 13.
72. The term was coined by Jean Chardonnet, L'Université en question (Paris: Editions France Empire, 1968), pp. 55-56.
73. Interview with Georges Amestoy.
74. This was not true, however, for the secondary school system since Fouchet was able to establish, after a long series of hesitant and prudent steps, the 1957 Billeres project of a "tronc commun" (or enseignement secondaire long as the French also call it) buried by the last legislature of the Fourth Republic and timidly resurrected by Education Minister Berthoin in 1959. Originally, the "tronc commun" was supposed to last three months. Its duration was extended to one year, then two years and, finally, in 1965, to 4 years culminating in the setting up of the already mentioned Collèges d'Enseignement Secondaire..
75. According to an observer, Peyrefitte had drafted in the months preceding the 'events', a project which was even more 'décentralisateur' than Faure's Orientation Act. Interview with Jean-Jacques Recoules.
76. Earlier, Peyrefitte had also set up another committee, chaired by Henri Gauthier, to deal with reforms in pedagogical reforms. For more details on these two committees, see L'Education Nationale, No. 854 (March 7, 1968), p. 7 and No. 861 (May 9, 1968), p. 7.

CHAPTER THREE :

THE MAY-JUNE CRISIS: ~~THE~~ FRAGMENTED PROGRAMMATIC AND POLITICAL DEMANDS OF
THE UNIVERSITY'S 'ETATS GENERAUX'.

Introduction

A crisis of civilization ? A generational oedipal conflict ? A post-industrial pattern of class struggle ?... Much ink has been spilled over the nature of the May-June 'events'.¹ Whatever its profound causes, the sudden 'dérapage'² of the political system can be attributed to enduring social and economic tensions which unexpectedly snowballed into a major upheaval as a result of the misperceptions of political decision-makers and unfortunate ' enchainements de circonstances'. In so arguing, we are obviously downgrading the significance of political crises and this line of thought is clearly related to one of the basic arguments presented in this work: not only do we feel that it is dubious methodology to establish a causal link between change and political crises in France but the empirical evidence presented in the preceding chapter also suggests that the 1968 events broke out in the context of a university system which had constantly (though slowly) been evolving in the last two decades.

However, it would be equally misleading to overlook the crisis of May altogether for at least two reasons. First, the Orientation Act cannot be fully understood without reference to the debates and discussions which took place for several weeks in the "universités en transes"³ among teachers and students. Accordingly, it will be necessary to identify the most significant actors of the May-June drama who later influenced - directly or indirectly - the making and substance of the Orientation Act. Moreover, we will have to define the balance of power among those groupings which, to a certain extent, structured the strategies and choices of political decision makers in the Summer and Fall of 1968.

Second, while students and teachers discussed the fate of the moribund

Napoleonic university, the academic community, as in the past, split up into contending factions. In contrast to the pre-1968 experience, however, its divisions were profoundly marked by the students entrance into the political process and even more so by the disruptive emergence of the 'phénomène gauchiste' which had a long lasting impact of the politics of university reform.

As paradoxical as it may seem within the context of a complex industrial society, the May-June events were characterized by a partial and temporary return to the medieval conception of the university as a closely knit community of scholars. Capitalizing upon the devastating psychological reactions engendered by what they euphemistically described as "political repression", rioting students succeeded in mobilizing a large segment of the 'corps enseignant' behind their demands for change and 'participation'. These claims, discussed in countless and more or less legally constituted "Assemblée Paritaires" or " Commissions Mixtes Générales", did not, though, carry the same meaning for the active or passive participants in the university's uprising.

To what extent should ' student power ' be institutionalized ? Should the reform be formulated and carried out through the existing political and constitutional system ? What was the scope of structural change to be introduced in the system of higher education ? By focusing on these three interrelated issues, the highly " kaleidoscopic" ⁴ attitudes and opinions of students, teachers and politicians can be broken down into three major coalitions.

Thus, for the radical 'groupuscules', U.N.E.F. and the S.N.E.Sup., no meaningful change could take place in the university as long as the political social and economic structures of the Fifth Republic were not overhauled and students granted a "veto power" in university decision-making. Thus, these

groups will be described as "revolutionary" and 'gauchisme' presented as a new source of strains on the legitimacy of the political system. The A.E.E.R.S., the S.G.E.N., the F.E.N., the Vedel Federation as well as the F.N.E.F. and other newly created student organizations, all stressed that a redistribution of power within the faculties and significant but legal and non comprehensive structural changes were necessary: they will be called "reformists". Conversely, the groups and politicians who opposed both institutional reforms and the principle of student participation may be defined as "conservatives". As we shall see, however, within each grouping, there were important political and tactical differences.

The Revolutionary Groups: the Groupuscules

The Groupuscules were too marginal ⁵ and ideologically fragmented ⁶ to become actively involved in the student-teacher debates over the reform of the university. Present whenever it was necessary to spark off a protest movement or disrupt bourgeois society - an undertaking which absorbed most of their energies in the months preceding the crisis - ⁷ the groupuscules did not ~~nor were~~ they willing to play any significant role in the drafting of the universities' 'cahiers de doléances'. Their "mythical" influence, however, was considerable ⁸ and, to a large extent, the groupuscules contributed to the emergence of what a political observer accurately ⁹ described as the "spirit of May".

Indeed, there was hardly anything new in the ideology of the Trotskyite Fédération des Etudiants Révolutionnaires and Jeunesses Communistes Révolutionnaires, the Maoist Union des Jeunesses Communistes Marxistes Léninistes and the Anarchist March 22nd Movement. They merely borrowed ideas from the

writings of the young Marx, Georges Sorel, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. But their manipulation of old but still appealing symbols and themes drawn from the French tradition of anarcho-syndicalism, their emphasis on "participatory democracy" and "self-management", their libertarianism and 'ouvri risme', all became a source of inspiration and political action for both U.N.E.F. and the S.N.E.Sup..

The Revolutionary Groups: The Union Nationale des Etudiants de France

In 1968, U.N.E.F. had practically lost its former prestige and influence among students. As a sympathetic observer put it, in the mid-sixties, (U.N.E.F. had) "suffered a severe decrease in membership; it (had) experienced disruptive conflict and disagreement over ideology and action. In fact, it (was) capable of little more than occupying the offices on Rue Soufflot and printing and distributing tracts."¹⁰ To this, it should be added that the student union's leadership had aroused the suspicions of the groupuscules for having sharply criticized their disruptive tactics in the Fall of 1967 and Spring of 1968.¹¹ During the crisis itself, these criticisms went on unabated and an anarchist student declared on May 25th: "The reason we started the Nanterre movement was to oppose the U.N.E.F.. And if we kept it going at the Sorbonne and elsewhere, but especially in the streets, it is in spite of the dilatory maneuvers and attempts to negotiate on the part of U.N.E.F., which the government is trying to bolster against us. Pompidou wants to make U.N.E.F. into a student C.G.T.. Watch out for the U.N.E.F.."¹²

Lacking both power and influence, U.N.E.F. acting Vice President, Jacques Sauvageot, came to the conclusion that, in order to mobilize a majority of the student population, he had to outbid and outdo the groupuscules' claims

and actions. By the same token, though, U.N.E.F. ran the risk of losing the enviable status of 'interlocuteur valable' of government officials, an eventuality which Sauvageot would have preferred to avoid. Thus, for a while, U.N.E.F. wavered between confrontation and partial accomodation. Thereafter, however, as the June political backlash was gaining momentum and the revolutionary ardor of students shifted to more academic and prosaic concerns, U.N.E.F. rapidly opted for a policy of incorruptible but politically sterile ideological purity. The radicalization of the student union can best be measured by comparing its political and academic demands at the beginning and in the aftermath of the crisis.

In a press conference on May 16th, Jacques Sauvageot outlined the primary objectives of U.N.E.F.. Out of this rambling and vague statement came a curious mixed bag of "radical" and "corporate" claims. Thus, the leader of U.N.E.F. asked for a change in the system of national competitive examinations but firmly rejected any form of selection. At the same time, and in direct reference to the students' most immediate preoccupation, he stressed that no one should lose the benefit of a year's study. Sauvageot also called upon the government to allow free political discussions throughout the university system. Turning to more diffuse and broader observations, he argued that the student movement should not be restricted to the formulation of mere academic demands. In his words, " the radical challenge to the university (was) inseparable from a challenge to the established authorities." 11

It is not clear whether U.N.E.F.'s next two demands, "student power" and "autonomy" were, in its President's opinion, a partial step toward the reform of the university or rather, a long term goal to be reached only after the establishment of a "socialist society" and the collapse of the

Fifth Republic. In either case, 'student power' entailed both the participation of students in university decision-making and a veto power over all proposals related to pedagogical methods, curricula and examinations. Sauvageot did not bother defining the structural content of the autonomy which should be granted to the universities. Instead, he emphasized that the purpose of this innovation was to prevent governmental officials and the university 'mandarins' from encroaching upon the students' decision-making responsibilities.

Sauvageot concluded his policy statement by assigning three immediate objectives to the students: the seizure of university buildings and the creation of 'structure parallèles' and a systematic coordination of their activities with the workers occupying the factories. In the following months, U.N.E.F. demands and strategy did not significantly depart from the hazy program which had been outlined by Sauvageot in May. The only noticeable shift in the policy of the student union was its growing extremism and intransigence.

In early June, Sauvageot, arguing that the students, in collaboration with their striking **teachers**, had already discussed and spelled out in detail the nature of the university reform, ruled out any parliamentary solution to the crisis.¹⁴ A few days later, Sauvageot announced that U.N.E.F. would set up 'People's Summer Universities' (Universités Populaires d'Eté) where the "movement of revolutionary contestation" initiated in early May could be pursued by students.¹⁵ This new type of institution was an embryo of the universities as they would exist in a non capitalist system. For the time being, it would function as a Trojan horse in the bourgeois educational system.¹⁶ As Sauvageot pointed out, " People's Summer Universities must

help us build socialism with the workers. The University of Mr Ortoli and Mr Aron is not (politically) neutral.... Neither is ours..."¹⁷

In early July, the position of U.N.E.F. definitively crystallized into an attitude of principled opposition. The student union held its 'Assises Nationales' in the University of Grenoble and there, for three days, from July 5th to the 7th, heated and passionate debates took place between the various factions of U.N.E.F.. Communist students insisted that U.N.E.F. should restrict itself to the formulation of purely academic demands. They were met by the fierce resistance of the groupuscules which urged the rejection of the principles of autonomy and co-management, now a cornerstone of the Education Minister's reformist projects, insofar as these poisoned gifts of 'le Pouvoir' might lead to the "integration of U.N.E.F. into the State."¹⁸

The groupuscules viewpoint eventually triumphed and the Congress adjourned after drafting the project of a new constitution superseding the 1946 Grenoble Charter. According to article seven of this document, U.N.E.F. was henceforth an "autonomous mass organization" whose academic demands (the rejection of selection, in particular), fell within a larger framework of action and purpose: " Today, U.N.E.F. seeks to represent the fighting faction of the student population only and its policies are defined within the framework of broad political principles which enable it to intervene not only in university matters but also in all aspects of the class struggle alongside the working class: it is necessary to relate the (students) demands concerning selection and professional training to the global contestation of the capitalist system in terms of its specific impact on the university."¹⁹

On the eve of Edgar Faure's arrival in the Education Ministry, U.N.E.F.

had clearly wrapped itself in the public position of a 'Great Refusal' and its leadership vociferously rejected any 'reformist' or constitutional approach to the resolution of the university crisis; for U.N.E.F., the "regime", not the fate of the faculties and higher education per se was the central issue. U.N.E.F.'s self imposed isolation, however, precluded its active involvement in the drafting of the Orientation Act; it did not either enhance its bargaining power nor did it help it to mobilize a sizable portion of the student population. By adopting a more flexible position, the S.N.E.Sup., to a certain extent, was able to avoid the pitfalls of powerlessness.

The Revolutionary Groups: the S.N.E.Sup.

Much of U.N.E.F.'s tribulations throughout the crisis of May can be explained in terms of its lack of influence and internal fragmentation. Similarly, the radicalism and the vacillations of the S.N.E.Sup. can be viewed as the outcome of an internal power struggle which was not settled until 1969.

From the very beginning of the 'events', the initiatives taken by the Secretary-General, Alain Geismar, encountered the stiff resistance of that segment of the union's rank and file belonging to or sympathetic to the Communist Party and the C.G.T.. A few days after the S.N.E.Sup.'s regular Annual Congress held in Paris on May 23rd and 24th, Geismar resigned. But his successor, Daniel Herzberg, continued criticizing the C.G.T. and supporting U.N.E.F. and tensions rose to a dangerous point when he condemned the elections of June as a "farce" and refused to participate with the Fédération de l'Education Nationale in the negotiations opened with the Education Minister on June 4th.

In mid-July, in an apparent effort to put an end to the simmering dispute which was now splitting the union almost evenly, Herzberg called for the meeting of a special Congress. None of the internal cleavages of the S.N.E.Sup. were resolved and the platform adopted after bitter debates by a narrow majority still reflected the existence of irreconcilable philosophies and political strategies. Accordingly, the Congress' resolutions were framed in a heavy radical rhetoric close to that used by U.N.E.F.: lip service was payed to the mythical converging struggles of "intellectual" and "manual" workers and the problems of the university were discussed in terms of their relationship to the class conflicts dividing French bourgeois and capitalist society. At the same time, though, the S.N.E.Sup. platform contained specific demands which were neither unnegotiable nor purely ideological.

First, the S.N.E.Sup. called for a structural reorganization of the universities' research programs in addition to more rigorous planning in the formulation of a national policy of science. Second, it demanded a change in the recruitment and promotion of all categories of teachers and proposed, in this respect, a system of "carrière unique" within the framework of the Fonction Publique. Third, the Congress categorically rejected any form of "undemocratic" selection which might lead to the premature specialization of students. Instead, the S.N.E.Sup. delegates stressed that the universities' offerings should be diversified, higher technical education upgraded and the Grandes Ecoles brought under the purview of the Education Ministry. Fourth, the teachers' union asked for the abolition of the traditional system of annual final examinations in favor of a more flexible "contrôle continu des connaissances" and a thorough change in the pattern of pedagogical relations between teachers and students. Arguing that their "social utility"

could not be overlooked, the S.N.E.Sup. requested that students receive a salary and be granted the "libertés politiques et syndicales" usually acknowledged to all workers. Finally, the rank and file of the radical teacher union agreed that the State's administrative and financial controls should be loosened. The Inspection des Finances prior auditing of the universities budgets should be superseded by an "a-posteriori" form of supervision and the universities should be allowed to freely determine the form and content of their curricula, examinations and pedagogical methods. Autonomy, however, did not preclude the planning of higher education and research nor did it entail the establishment of "competing universities" with their own student admission policy and private sources of financing. On these last points, the S.N.E.Sup. concurred with U.N.E.F. and most of the other university groups.

To sum up this discussion, two major points must be stressed. First, the demands of the revolutionary groups - student power, political freedoms, etc... - were undoubtedly the staunchest expression of the students' entry into the political process, a phenomenon which could not easily be overlooked by decision-makers to the extent that it also reflected deep feelings of alienation and rejection of the political system. Second, although the demands of the S.N.E.Sup. and U.N.E.F. were often immersed in a maze of ideological rhetoric, they did not necessarily conflict with those of more moderate student and teacher groups. As we shall see later, the moderates also rejected selection and the establishment of competitive universities and advocated more imaginative pedagogical methods in addition to a redistribution of power between the State and the universities and within each establishment of higher learning.

These subtleties, however, were not likely to be perceived by either a hypersensitive public, fearful of renewed violence,²¹ nor a traumatized law and order minded parliamentary majority. Accordingly, throughout the summer and fall of 1968, both the S.N.E.Sup. and U.N.E.F. shared a frustrating political isolation and were supported only by a handful of teachers and intellectuals, the militant C.F.D.T. and the P.S.U. which received less than 5% of the popular vote in the June elections. Nevertheless, their relative powerlessness did not prevent the slow emergence of a coalition of groups with singularly conservative views concerning the problems of higher education.

The Conservative Groups

The illusory belief that the university was a harmonious community of scholars partaking in identical cultural and political values and sharing common pedagogical and educational purposes quickly faded away as the crisis evolved toward its conclusion. The cleavages within the academic community were already painfully evident in late May when the first signs of a "Thermidorian reaction" became apparent. Counter revolutionary student groups, Gaullist for the most part,²² undertook to set up "Liberation Committees" challenging the legitimacy of the "extremist minorities" in control of university buildings. The debates of several 'Assemblées Paritaires'²³ were plagued by the spectacular resignations of teachers. Some university 'Mandarins' warned that violence, "permanent discussion" and "direct democracy" were utopian and counter productive.²⁴ Others clamored for a "démarxisation" of the teaching establishment²⁵ and some launched a bitter press campaign against the permissive "déraison ambiante" which had enabled students to transform the universities into "foires" and "écuries d'Augias".²⁶

Perhaps even more significant were the highly publicized, increasingly critical comments of Raymond Aron who saw in the "romantic" demands of students and teachers a potential for political terrorism and a deliberate attempt to destroy culture and knowledge.²⁷ For the French sociologist, only "prosaic reforms" - the establishment of selective entrance examinations, a limited degree of administrative decentralization and student participation in university decision-making - preceded by the restoration of law and order could put an end to the convulsions of the system of higher education.

These proposals did not entirely coincide with the demands of conservative university groups but Aron was by no means preaching in a wilderness. The trauma provoked by the sudden entry of students into the political process was, in fact, so profound, that it gave new life and energy to several organizations which, so far, had never played any significant role in the politics of higher education. Such was the case of the Gaullist Université Moderne which, under the leadership of Professors Hamon and Dreyfus slowly²⁸ awakened from two years of somnolent existence. This was also true for the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres whose Secretary General, Professor Deloffre, became, along with the Société des Agrégés President, Professor Bayet, one of the most outspoken and staunchest opponent of the Orientation²⁹ Act.

What were then the conservatives' demands? In essence, they boiled down to the restoration of "law and order" in the facultés as a prerequisite for change; reforms, if any, were to be "legal" and would come later. "Law and Order" therefore, entailed the dismantling of all "parallel" institutions which had been set up in the establishments of higher learning during the events of May and June. As the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres

put it, " Its members are not and have never been on strike. They have been prevented from exerting their function. They consider null and void the decisions made in these institutions which have no legal status or are functioning in irregular conditions... (the present) état de fait does not portend in any way the état de droit which should be thereafter defined only within the framework of democratic...processes under the aegis of the Law."³⁰ The Société des Agrégés also discovered the cardinal virtues of a legal order. It contested the legality of a "Comité de Grève" which had urged students to boycott the Agrégation in early May and set up a proxy group, the Comité de Défense et de Réforme des Concours de Recrutement, which lobbied in the Education Ministry all summer long to obtain a firm date on which make up examinations could be given.³¹

On both counts, the efforts of the Autonome Lettres and the Agrégés were soon rewarded. In the first days of July, apparently on the initiative of the Education Ministry's Secretary General,³² the Rectors and the Academic Inspectors received a circular stressing that the universities' legal councils alone were allowed to make and implement decisions in all matters related to the organization of studies and their internal affairs.³³ Simultaneously, the Government was moving to close down the establishments of higher learning which were still occupied by striking students and teachers.

"Law and Order", for the conservatives, also entailed their active participation in the negotiations which were expected to open between the Government and university groups.³⁴ Aware of their minority position, the Société des Agrégés and the Autonome Lettres both emphasized that a system of proportional representation should be used to staff the consultative

committees which might be set up in the Rue de Grenelle.

On the whole, the two groups were far more circumspect and noncommittal on what was to be done to resolve the university crisis. Undoubtedly, they knew what they did not want and "la politique" was one of their favorite targets. Arguing that the universities should remain "neutral" to avoid their being taken over by political extremists, the Agrégés and the Autonome Lettres demanded a ban on all political discussions within the faculties premises. As Professor Deloffre put it flatly, "during these sad days of May...political hatreds have destroyed the French University. Students must (henceforth) get their political and sexual education outside of the universities."³⁶

The conservatives, however, had to offer little else than these negative statements when it came to the problem of change. True, the Autonome Lettres proposed the establishment of a "federal structure" within which the universities, the faculties and their departments would be administered by several organs with clearly defined rule making powers varying in accordance to their membership.³⁷ But the key concept of "fédéralisme" was left undefined and Professor Deloffre's earlier statements seem to indicate that the faculties were to remain the basic organizational unit of the university system. Moreover, if we take into account his repeated warnings against "the vague formulas of co-management, self management and autonomy which might lead to the dismantlement of the University",³⁸ it becomes evident that the Autonome Lettres was merely paying lip service to the rhetoric of change while waiting for the end of the political storm to counter attack.

Similarly, the Société des Agrégés displayed more interest in the limits

of change rather than in its substance. In their frequent interviews with the Education Ministry's permanent officials, its representatives consistently defended the Agregation and emphasized that the autonomy granted to the system of higher education should not open a breach in the State's controls over the universities budgets nor in the "national regulations for the recruitment and promotion of teachers."³⁹

It is worth a digression here to note that the Agrégés could not accept the decentralized model put forth by the Federation Nationale des Etudiants de France since this proposal would have freed the universities from most of the State's administrative and financial tutelage and allowed them to define their own hiring and student admission policy and have recourse, if necessary, to private financing.

Also, the conservatives' reluctance toward structural reforms led them later to support the Fédération Nationale des Grandes Ecoles which refused to let the Grandes Ecoles be brought under the jurisdiction of the Education Ministry. The F.N.A.G.E. was not altogether "conservative" since it strongly pleaded in favor of the principle of student participation in university decision-making⁴⁰ but on that specific point, it did not agree with the S.N.E.Sup., U.N.E.F. and its affiliate, the **Union** des Grandes Ecoles. As one of the members of the Federation pointed out, "One of the major causes of the crisis (of May) ...has been the universities' failure to train white collar workers (cadres) for the economy and industry; inasmuch as the Grandes Ecoles remain the best suited instrument for that purpose....it is necessary to stimulate (their economic function)...by developing their autonomy...and own character...."⁴¹

To sum up, it seems that conservative university groups had forgotten little and learnt even less from the crisis of May and June. What they proposed was tantamount to the preservation of the institutional status quo and they accepted the idea of student participation in university decision-making only grudgingly. As in the past, they continued to define the resolution of the universities' problems in terms of selection, more State budget appropriations and a greater number of faculties instead of significant structural, administrative and pedagogical reforms.

There is little doubt that these groups represented only a small segment of the teaching community, but, in contrast to U.N.E.F. and the S.N.E.Sup. they were not politically isolated and powerless. In the parliamentary debate which took place in the second week of May over the "events", several Gaullist deputies pilloried those students who had been misled by "fanatical leaders", "vandals" and "agitators".⁴² On May 16th, the Secretary General of the U.D.R., Robert Poujade, observed that "it would be perfectly illusory to imagine that such problems as the universities' structures, the relations between students and teachers, orientation, job opportunities (débouchés), curricula and even more so, the nature and finality of culture and civilization, could be resolved in improvised ideological kermesses."⁴³ Immediately after De Gaulle's speech on May 30th, the Committees for the Defense of the Republic - groups of hard line Gaullist organized with the encouragements and blessings of the Government and several members of the Majority - began to clamor for "freedom of speech" and the "absolute respect for legality and democracy."⁴⁴

The electoral campaign which followed was primarily centered around the simplistic theme of law and order and the manipulation of lingering fears of

the Communist Party. The platforms of most Gaullist candidates were, therefore designed to convince the electoral states were those of a manichean game in which Gaullism was presented as the only alternative to chaos, anomie or a totalitarian take over of the political system and the universities. ⁴⁵ True, for the Left wing of the U.D.R. and for the Independent Republicans, order did not preclude change. But the bulk of the new "majorité introuvable" elected after the June consultation, was particularly sensitive to most of the demands of conservative university groups and, later, it singularly complicated the task of the Education Minister in drafting a new organizational charter for the universities.

Finally, it should be stressed that the conservatives had strong political support in the bureaucracy itself on all matters related to the decentralization of the system of higher education, the agrégation, selection and the fate of the Grandes Ecoles. These problems will be discussed at greater length in subsequent chapters. We turn now to the third major coalition of groupings which emerged from the May-June crisis: the Reformists.

Toward a middle of the road solution: the reformist student and teacher groups

In their description of the "events", the spokesmen for conservative organizations were misleading on two counts at least: first, it is difficult to characterize the dialogue which took place among teachers and students as a demagogical "festival du face a face" (as Crozier would put it) or as a gigantic "happening" manipulated by political extremists. Second, those who had seized the faculties buildings and discussed the problems of the universities did not necessarily intend to "destroy everything" nor did they have a blind attachment to the status quo, as the revolutionaries were arguing.

In some isolated instances, teachers did take the initiative to open a dialogue with students and went as far as dissolving the legal structures of the faculties. ⁴⁶ Most of the time, however, reformist teachers and students joined forces only after a strenuous process of difficult negotiations and mutual concessions. The movement was generally initiated by students who launched a strike and then "occupied" their establishments and began debating issues of higher education. It was at this stage of the crisis that moderate teachers, up until then, ambivalent and hesitant, accepted to play the rules of a game which became fruitful, however, only when the students themselves had adopted a more flexible attitude on a number of problems and issues which will be discussed later. The events which took place at the Paris Law Faculty are particularly representative of this pattern of increased collaboration. The case is also interesting because law students in France have never been notorious for their radicalism. In addition, the reform proposals which emerged from this "face to face" relationship were strongly influenced by Professor Alliot who, later, became Edgar Faure's Chef de Cabinet.

The " events" of May and June in the Paris Law Faculty

The "quiet revolution" at the Paris Law Faculty began on May 6th when, after a regularly scheduled course, students in economics, outraged by recent police brutality, ⁴⁷ started discussing "les évènements". The next day, they again met spontaneously and debated the issue of 'débouchés'. The protest movement rapidly spread among the 'juristes' and the leadership of the two groups merged on the 14th. They set up a "Strike Committee" which called for an unlimited strike which would end only after governmental assurances that radical changes would be introduced in the university system. At the same time, the Strike Committee attempted to organize the students by creating

specialized work groups dealing with the curricula in law and economics, selection, the autonomy and internal management of the Faculty and the relationship between the student movement and the workers revolt.

So far, the Strike Committee technically remained an institution without legal status within the Faculty and much of its future depended on the teachers' attitude. To what extent was the faculty ready to grant a degree of legitimacy to the students' demands ? The issue was raised when the Faculty's Assembly met on May 21st. Invited to present its views, the Strike Committee requested the establishment of "paritary" and "mixed" structures superseding the Faculty's decision-making organs within the framework of which students and teachers would draft new statutes based on the principles of "autonomy" and "co-management". The faculty accepted the students' demands subject to two conditions which were unacceptable to the latter: first, the reform of the faculty internal organization and governance should be formulated by means of a national "loi-cadre" and, second, only a vote of the professors' Assembly could lead to the setting up of new rule-making bodies.

Negotiations temporarily broke down but after an intense process of behind the scenes bargaining, a compromise was worked out the very next day. The faculty went along with the idea of a "Commission Paritaire" which would assume sole responsibility for drafting the Faculty's charter and admitted that the existing Assembly had, henceforth, temporary 'pouvoirs de gestion' only. This amounted to a significant concession on the part of the teaching staff vis a vis the Strike Committee whose status immediately gained in legitimacy. The process of mutual adjustments, however, had not been one sided as evidenced by the first decisions of the Commission Paritaire on June 4th.

Both students and teachers agreed that elections should be held in order to dole out the seats of the two *Assemblées Paritaires* (one in Law and the other in economics). These two institutions would be responsible for drafting reform proposals but their competence did not extend to the problems related to the recruitment and promotion of teachers which were entrusted to a specialized committee exclusively made up of faculty members. In addition, all "student questions" would be dealt with by another similar standing committee staffed with students only. Finally, students and teachers decided to set up a consultative "*Conseil de Perfectionnement*" including "*personalités extérieures*" as well as a "*Commission de Garantie des Libertés Politiques, Syndicales et Culturelles*" elected by students.

The elections were held in the second half of the month of June. During the "campaign", the Strike Committee competed with the recently created *Comité de Liaison des Etudiants Pour la Réforme Universitaire* (mainly over the question of determining whether final examinations should be held or postponed) and with a more conservative group called *Réforme et Démocratie* comprising members of the F.N.E.F.. Student participation in the elections was significantly high and the Strike Committee emerged as the winner of the contest with 57% of the student vote against 23% and 21% for the C.L.E.R.U. and *Réforme et Démocratie* respectively.

After these legitimizing elections, the two *Assemblées Paritaires* met and deliberated from July 3rd to the 12th. Both included 128 professors, assistant professors and 32 instructors in addition to 212 students. Their presiding officer, Dean Hauriou, opened their sessions with a sentimental speech, stressing, perhaps prematurely, that there was now a general consensus over most problems.

Tensions, however, had not been altogether removed. After De Gaulle's speech at the end of May, 28 professors resigned, arguing that the Assemblies had no 'pouvoir constituant'. The students in the former Strike Committee were also weary and felt that, having given up any recourse to the strike weapon, their bargaining power was singularly reduced particularly at a time when the Government was dismantling the last bastions of the student revolt.

The proceedings of the two Assemblies, nevertheless, did not come to a standstill. Five specialized committees were set up and discussed the legal status of instructors, changes in the law and economics curricula, the question of political debates within the Faculty and the problems of autonomy, management and structures of the universities. Their reports on the instructors' status and the reform of the curricula were promptly and unanimously adopted but no final decision could be reached on the other issues. In this respect, most of the debates centered on the "Alliot Report" dealing with the governance and organization of the faculties and university system. This text is of paramount importance insofar as it foreshadows several provisions of the Orientation Act.

Professor Alliot's proposal called for the autonomy of each of the Faculty's departments (the Orientation Act rechristened them 'Unités d'Enseignement et de Recherche or U.E.R.s) and the creation of a single law-making organ, an "Assemblée Paritaire" with jurisdiction over all of the Faculty's problems with the notable exception of those matters related to the teaching staff's career and promotion. The Executive of the Faculty would be assigned to a "Directoire Paritaire" assisted by a "Conseil de Perfectionnement" with consultative functions and, in part, staffed with "personnalités extérieures". At the national level, the Alliot report stressed

that the redistribution of the educational budget among the universities and the formulation of a national policy of education should be entrusted to a Conseil National de l'Enseignement et de la Recherche.

Although it did reflect a fairly broad consensus among students and teachers, the two Assemblies, as a result of a variety of procedural hurdles which could not be overcome on time, did not act upon the Alliot Report. Their members, however, were soon able to find some comfort in Edgar Faure's decision to appoint Alliot as his Chef de Cabinet. Both Assemblies met again in the Fall of 1968 but circumstances had been drastically altered by then since the French Parliament had adopted the Orientation Act.

In any event, the story of the May-June events in the Paris Law Faculty is by no means of trivial significance. First, it is clear that the radicalization of students and teachers had little if anything to do with the machiavellian manipulations of the groupuscules or in fact with any other organizations. The Spring crisis was actually marked by a proliferation of "groupuscules" similar to the C.L.E.R.U., like the Comité Etudiant pour les Libertés Universitaires, the Mouvement d'Organisation des Etudiants pour la Liberté, the Conseil National du Front des Etudiants pour la Rénovation de l'Université and the Conseil Etudiant de France.

48

With the notable exception of the C.E.F. and the C.L.E.R.U. which both played a role in the elaboration and implementation of the Orientation Act, all of these groups had an ephemeral existence. Moreover, some of them seem to have been sponsored by Gaullist politicians in an obvious effort to organize the student movement in a direction favorable to the Government. However, their emphasis on the day to day problems of students in an evolving

49

university as well as their preoccupation with professional outlets reflected the anxieties and fears which drew a majority of so far apathetic students into the political process. Moreover, their demands mirrored a genuine desire to become the Government's 'interlocuteurs valables' and discuss 'reasonable' reforms through the legal process and in close collaboration with the faculty.

Second, the dialogue between teachers and students was serious, at times, almost businesslike and characterized by constructive mutual concessions and adjustments.⁵⁰ In reaction to the "bureaucratic" procedure used under Fouchet, teachers were willing to broadly open the decision-making process to all members of the academic community.⁵¹ Under these conditions and to the extent that students were ready to give up their demand for a "veto power" or "droit de regard" in all of the university problems, the faculty accepted a "redistribution de la parole" within the faculties government.⁵²

Third, the consensus of teachers and students was clouded with several ambiguities. Not unlike the conservatives, the faculty was generally reticent on the question of "libertés politiques et syndicales" and adamantly opposed all proposals which would have given students a say in the recruitment and promotion of the teaching staff. Moreover, several key concepts had different meanings for students and teachers. For example, for the former, "autonomy" essentially meant an equal partnership in university decision-making. For the latter, it entailed primarily a limited degree of financial and administrative decentralization of the university system whose basic objective was to improve the faculties' economic, educational and research functions.⁵³ Accordingly, the demands of reformist teachers and students - autonomy, co-management and 'libertés politiques' - were often vaguely worded and susceptible of conflicting interpretations. These were not the only shortcomings of these proposals and

grass roots demands but, insofar as the Orientation Act cannot be fully understood without reference to them, they should be discussed in more detail.

The Reformists demands: autonomy, co-management and "libertes politiques"

At the national level, the demand for autonomy entailed the dismantling of the centralized structure and administration of the system of higher education. As the project of the Commission Nationale Inter-Disciplines put it: " The Ministry of National Education is abolished as a ministry for scientific and administrative management of education. The national education structure no longer extends from the Ministry down to the primary grades; it is, on the contrary, a federative structure of autonomous establishments which group together or are coordinated from the base to the summit."⁵⁴

At the apex of this decentralized system, the reformists proposed the establishment of a federal organ made up of students, teachers, intellectuals and representatives of trade unions, business interests and the Civil Service in varying proportions. This body had "sovereign" rule-making powers in all matters related to national degrees, the careers of the faculty, the redistribution of the national budget to the universities and the definition of a national policy of scientific research."⁵⁵

At the regional level, reformist teachers and students focused their attacks on the office of the Rector and demanded its abolition.⁵⁶ They also stressed that the universities, while remaining primarily financed by the State and independent "services publics", should be allowed to diversify their financial resources.⁵⁷ Finally, they almost unanimously asked for a loosening of the State administrative control of the universities budgets. To

quote the C.L.I.D. project which, on this point, foreshadows in almost identical terms the provisions of the Orientation Act:

In an autonomous regime, each autonomous organism will dispose of a financial allocation that will permit it to set up its program of activities and its budget without having to solicit either authorization of funds from the higher echelons. Allocations should therefore be made without prior specification. Apportionments of expenditures for personnel, equipment and running expenses to be carried out on each level. Checking by the upper echelon to take place only a posteriori. In the same way, the credits corresponding to the allocations that have been earmarked must be placed at the disposal of the beneficiaries automatically, without their having to account for their intended utilization, which would amount to restoring supervision by the upper echelon. Lastly, credits that have not been used at the end of a given financial period will remain at the disposal of the beneficiary organisms. But although autonomy avoids in this way any a-priori outside control, it forces each autonomous establishment to organize itself all the more strict control of its expenditures, at the moment they occur. Each one must be provided with the service of an expert accountant (who would be an employee of the Treasury) who will assure the ordinator that the expenditures he incurs are legitimate and have been voted by the Council, see to it that the necessary credits are at his disposal, make a periodic accounting of the state of the treasury to the ordinator, and in this way, permit him to make a report to the Council. 58

It should be noted here that educational considerations were not altogether absent in the reformists' insistence on the principle of decentralization. At the level of the Faculty, autonomy was often invoked to do away with the structure facultaire of the university system as well as to allow students and teachers to explore imaginative methods and interdisciplinary approaches to research and education within the framework of original institutions. ⁵⁹ Overall, the demand for autonomy was, however, primarily a political demand which, later, predictably enough, raised fierce political disputes between the Jacobins and the Girondins of the bureaucracy and the parliamentary majority.

The second major point emerging from the works undertaken by the reformists was related to the question of co-management. In plain terms, the idea entailed first, a mild redistribution of power within the faculties and

and universities' decision-making bodies and, second, the introduction of electoral devices in the designation of their presiding officers. Most projects called for the creation of a law-making body and an executive organ at each level of the university system. The former usually consisted of a single assembly made up of representatives of students, teachers and the administrative personnel, elected by different "collèges" although in some cases, certain draft proposals opted for a plurality of Assemblies representing separately each "strata" of the academic community.⁶⁰ The executive was generally entrusted to a Dean elected by the staff and some students. To be eligible, the Dean had to meet certain academic standards (a State or University doctorate); only in exceptional cases, was it proposed to give this position to a student or a faculty member of a lower rank.

Obviously, the whole scheme of 'co-gestion' could work only to the extent that the faculty was willing to lose some of its former powers and privileges. In addition to sharing their decision-making responsibilities with students, teachers also accepted the abolition of the chaires⁶¹ and the creation of new categories of 'professeurs associés à titre temporaire' and 'professeurs d'Université', all measures expected to increase the mobility of the teaching staff and open it to outside influences.

These concessions, however, were not tantamount to another "Nuit du Quatre Août". A majority of the reform projects fell short of granting unlimited rule-making powers to those co-managed institutions and students were not, in general, allowed to step into the teacher's 'domaine réservé': the recruitment promotion and status of the faculty and the organization of studies and examinations.⁶³ Later, as the 'réaction nobiliaire' gained momentum, the list of clauses restricting the scope of student participation grew longer....

The last major demand of the reformists reflected an even more tenuous consensus among students and teachers. Practically all projects contained an impressive number of detailed rules as to when, where and how political discussions could be held by students within the universities' premises.⁶⁴ For the students, however, these provisions were protective devices against any attempt on the part of the faculty or the government to nibble away their newly conquered "libertés politiques et syndicales". For the teaching staff, they were badly needed safeguards against outbreaks of violence engineered by political agitators.

"La Politique" was by no means the most pressing educational issue raised by the reform of the university system. But to the extent that it was a consequence and outgrowth of the students entry into the political process and reflected the existence of new strains on the legitimacy of the political system, decision makers could hardly overlook it and when Faure began supporting the students' viewpoint, "la politique" became a major source of bitter controversies.

The Reformists' proposals: an appraisal

The reformists' proposals were at their best when they were clearly focused on concrete and manageable problems. The model of financial administration advocated by the C.L.I.D. is a notable case in point in spite of its heavy wording. In general, though, these demands were rather vague on principles and ambiguous or altogether elusive on specifics. Thus, democratization was ritualistically presented as a suitable and imperative policy objective but the question of selection was, most of the time, set aside by students who did not want to hear about it, as well as by teachers who preferred not to improve the prospects for another surge of protests. The reformists'

projects were also loaded with inconsistencies and built in contradictions. For example, how was it possible to maintain "national degrees" and keep the universities financially dependent on the State while, at the same time, proclaiming the financial, administrative and pedagogical autonomy of the system of higher education ?

Also, in spite of some isolated synthesizing efforts,⁶⁵ all reformist projects had an unmistakably paroquial flavor: they lacked an all encompassing overview and grasp of the problems of higher learning and were too often focused on the structures and management of a single Faculty or even an isolated department. Finally, there was a good deal of utopianism or political naiveté in believing that this "redistribution de la parole" within each university establishment could take place without the prior consent of the Government to review and alter the relationship of the State and the universities.

Does all this mean that the reformists' demands reflected merely the widespread existence of a "poujadisme universitaire", to use the expression of a critical observer?⁶⁶ Perhaps, the judgement is too harsh and severe but one of the leader of the A.E.E.R.S. was not altogether mistaken in pointing out that there was a potential for "balkanization" in the moderates' approach to the resolution of the university problems.⁶⁷ According to a project made public by the same group in July, what was most urgently needed was to aggregate the fragmented and insulated demands and propositions of the reformists and integrate them into the framework of a national 'loi-cadre'.⁶⁸ As we shall see later, there were also good political reasons for decision-makers to adopt this solution.

Conclusion

The summer ahead of French politicians promised to be a "long and hot" one, fraught with uncertainties and pitfalls. Never since the end of the Algerian conflict had the political system been so overloaded with a multiplicity of conflicting claims and demands in addition to the pressure of past and present unresolved issues. Once again, the legitimacy of the political system had been shaken by the revolutionary irruption of new rising social groups into the political process and the first task of the Government was to discover an institutional answer to the widespread demand for 'participation'.

At the same time, it was necessary to find a solution to the universities' problems. But the mood of the university was not easy to ascertain. The revolutionaries had no chance to impose their views but could sabotage any reform. The conservatives, encouraged by these political developments, remained a minority but might also become a formidable obstacle to change. The reformists' demands, though very much in line, if not with their philosophy, at least with the text of the Caen Seminar resolutions, were equivocal and their coalition fragile. True, the resolution of the university crisis lied somewhere in the middle of the political spectrum. But exactly what measures were likely to be supported by the moderates without being challenged by both the conservatives and the radicals ? The consensus in governmental circles was that it was first, necessary to "normalize" the political situation before making any attempt to translate the universities' 'Cahiers de Doléances' into coherent public policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a survey of the literature on the May-June crisis, see the excellent article by Jean Touchard and Philippe Beneton, "Les Interprétations de la Crise de Mai-Juin 1968," Revue Française de Science Politique, XX, 3 (June 1970), pp. 503-544. Also, Louis Maheu, Nicole Abboud and Karin Renon, "Crise de l'Université, Mouvement Etudiant Français et Etranger," Sociologie du Travail, 3 (July-September 1969), pp. 287-336. A useful bibliography appears in Alain Schnapp and Pierre Vidal Naquet, The French Student Uprising. November 1967- June 1968. An Analytical Record (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 603-631.
2. The term which literally means "skidding", was coined by Francois Bourricaud, "Le Grand Dérapage," Preuves, No. 208 (June-July 1968), pp. 51-58.
3. To use the expression of a high ranking official in the Education Ministry, Georges Amestoy, "Les Universités en Transes," Revue de Défense Nationale (October 1968), pp. 1406-1428.
4. To borrow another concept coined by Francois Bourricaud, "Le Kaléidoscope Universitaire," Projet, No. 28 (September- October 1968), pp. 920-934.
5. The groupuscules never had more than 1,000 to 1, 500 members each, mostly recruited from the Paris area. On this point, see A. Belden Fields, Student Politics in France; a Study of the Union Nationale des Etudiants de France (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 143, 145 and 146.
6. For more details, Bernard E. Brown, "The French Student Revolt," in Roy Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, Eds., Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1972, 4th Edition), pp. 274-290. Also, Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet, Op. Cit., pp. 241-323.
7. Ibid., pp. 65-145.
8. Vidal-Naquet refers to the groupuscules' "enormous mythological importance" in Ibid., p. 241.
9. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The Spirit of May (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 1969).
10. A. Belden-Fields, Op. Cit., p. 60.
11. On this point, see for example, L'Année Politique. 1968 (Paris:P.U.F., 1969), pp. 25-26.
12. Quoted in Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet, Op. Cit., p. 60.
13. Sauvageot's "programme" can be found in The French Student Revolt. The Leaders Speak (New York: Hill and Wang, 1969), pp. 84-88.
14. Le Monde (June 7, 1968), p. 8 and (June 8, 1968), p. 8.

15. Le Monde (June 21, 1968), p. 10.
16. They could also open a "breach" in bourgeois society, to use the terminology of Edgar Morin, Claude Lefort and Jean-Marc Coudray, Mai 1968. La Brèche (Paris: Fayard, 1968).
17. Le Monde (July 6, 1968), p. 10. Sauvageot gave a more detailed account of the political function of these universities in an interview published in Tribune Socialiste (July 4, 1968), p. 7.
18. Le Monde (July 9, 1968), p. 8.
19. Quoted in Tribune Socialiste (July 11, 1968), p. 12.
20. The following discussion is based on Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup., No. 163 (August 1968), pp. 1-5. An earlier version of this program appears in Le Monde (May 29, 1968), p. 9 and was translated in The Leaders Speak, Op. Cit., pp. 80-100.
21. Sondages. Revue Française de l'Opinion Publique. No. 2 " La Crise de Mai 1968," 1968, pp. 80, 82-85.
22. Interview with Alfred Gilder (U.J.P.).
23. Le Monde (July 5, 1968), p. 8. Among them were Lise and Henri Mazeaud who, on June 8th, set up a " Mouvement Universitaire d'Action Civique" for the purpose of fighting ' la politique' in the universities. Henri Mazeaud was later elected on a Gaullist ticket.
24. Le Monde (June 12, 1968), p. 1 and (June 29, 1968), pp. 1 and 6. Thereafter, numerous pamphlets were published by senior faculty members all reflecting disarray, resentment and outright opposition to the students' claims. See for example, Jacques Perret, Inquiète Sorbonne (Paris: Hachette, 1968); Marc Zamansky, Mort ou Resurrection de l'Université (Paris: Plon, 1968); Fernand Robert, Un Mandarin Prend la Parole (Paris: P.U.F., 1970). At the request of the Club Jean Moulin, Michel Crozier wrote a somewhat hostile article which was published in La Société Bloquée (Paris: Le Seuil, 1970), pp. 238-239.
25. Jules Monnerot, Démarxiser l'Université (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1970). See also the last chapter of his Sociologie de la Revolution (Paris: Fayard, 1969).
26. According to Georges Gusdorf in Le Monde (June 30, 1968), p. 7.
27. Raymond Aron's articles in Le Figaro have been translated and published as an appendix of his The Elusive Revolution; Anatomy of a Student Revolt (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 143-194.
28. The A.U.M. did not play a very significant role during the elaboration of the Orientation Act. It generally supported Edgar Faure although Leo Hamon was very reticent toward the question of student participation in university decision-making. Interview with René Doucet (A.U.M.).

29. Before 1968, dual membership with the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres was permitted by the S.N.E.Sup. and the S.G.E.N.. Both groups put an end to this policy in the Summer of 1968. Interview with Professor J.W. Lapierre.
30. Bulletin du Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres. (October 1968) pp. 7-8.
31. L'Agrégation, Nos. 163-164 (June, July, August and September 1968), pp. 49-50.
32. According to Bertrand Girod de l'Ain in Le Monde (July 9, 1968), pp. 1 and 8.
33. This circulaire appears in Bulletin Officiel de l'Education Nationale, No. 24 (July 4, 1968), pp. 1901-1902.
34. Le Monde (July 10, 1968), p. 8 and L'Agrégation, Op. Cit., p. 43. The nature of these negotiations is discussed in the following chapter.
35. Ibid., p. 45.
36. Le Monde (July 10, 1968), p. 8.
37. Ibid..
38. Bulletin du Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres, Op. Cit., pp. 8-9.
39. L'Agrégation, Op. Cit., pp. 43 and 46.
40. In an interview with Prime Minister Pompidou. Notes et Etudes Documentaires, Chronologie des Evénements de Mai-Juin 1968. La Documentation Française, Nos. 3722-3723 (September 28, 1970), p. 52.
41. Dominique Lelièvre, Mai 1968 et Après. Supplément Spécial. Cohésion. p. 64 (Personal Archives). See also the statement issued by the Presidents of the Grandes Ecoles alumni in Le Monde (July 13, 1968), p. 8.
42. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (May 9, 1968), pp. 1592, 1595 and 1603.
43. Le Monde (May 17, 1968), p. 5.
44. Journal Officiel. Lois et Décrets (June 2, 1968), p. 5384.
45. See for example the electoral manifestoes of Raymond Triboulet, Alexandre Sanguinetti, Robert Poujade, Jacques Baumel, Michel Boscher, Michel Debre and Bertrand Flornoy who, later, took the leadership of the parliamentary forces opposing Faure in Recueil des Textes Authentiques des Programmes et Engagements Electoraux des Députés Proclamés Elus à la Suite des Elections Générales des 23 et 30 Juin 1968, pp. 176-177, 360, 239-240, 434, 306, 1323 and 1113. It is interesting to compare to Faure's platform in Ibid., p. 290.
46. Such was the case in particular in Caen, Grenoble and Brest. Le Monde (May 17, 1968) and (May 19/20, 1968). Also, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, Chronologie des Evénements..., Op. Cit., p. 22.

47. The following discussion is based on Paul Thibaud, "Les Difficultés du Réformisme (Un Exemple: la Faculté de Droit de Paris), Esprit (May 1969), pp. 871-902; Daniel Bollinger, "La Révolution des Juristes," Après Demain, No. 106 (July-September 1968), pp. 36-38 and Pierre Leroy, "Les Juristes Réforment," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, No. 790 pp. 45-51.
48. On these groups, see Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet, Op. Cit., pp. 493-495; Le Monde (May 19/20, 1968), p. 7, (May 23, 1968), p. 10 and (July 25, 1968), p. 9.
49. M.O.D.E.L., for example, was set up by some members of the Gaullist Club Jeune France. It was later superseded by a new organization, the Rassemblement des Etudiants pour la Participation (R.E.P.) presided by the right wing Gaullist deputy and minister, Louis Habib Deloncle. According to certain observers, the C.L.E.R.U. was sponsored by Edgar Faure.
50. The Paris Law Faculty was by no means an isolated case. On this point, Le Monde (May 21, 1968). Even those radical students who accepted to play the rule of the moderates' game were more restrained and pragmatic in their demands than is usually suggested. Interview with Professor Debbasch.
51. See Le Monde (May 19/20, 1968), pp. 1 and 7 and (June 7, 1968), p. 9.
52. To use the expression of Professor Paul Ricoeur, Le Monde, Weekly Edition (June 20/27, 1968), pp. 7 and 8.
53. These ambiguities led certain teachers who, in the past had been ardent reformists, to adopt, in the Fall of 1968, a critical attitude toward the Orientation Act. In their view, Faure's Law was too exclusively focused on student participation in university decision-making at the expense of the economic and educational rationality of the reform.
54. Cited in Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet, Op. Cit., p. 503. The C.N.I.D. was an offshot of the Comité de Liaison Inter-Facultés, a group in session in the Paris Law Faculty. A few teachers (Professors Monod, Schwartz and Vidal-Naquet, in particular) took part in its discussions. Michel Alliot assumed the secretariat of the group and was responsible for the final draft of the text cited here. The essential reform proposals drafted by students and teachers in May and June can be found in the following works: Michelle Perrot, Jean-Claude Perrot, Madeleine Reberious and Jean Maitron (Documents assembled and edited by), Mai-Juin 1968, La Sorbonne Par Elle-Même, "Le Mouvement Social", No. 64 (Paris: Editions Ouvrières, 1968); Revue Internationale des Sciences Pour l'Education Nouvelle, La Remise en Question de l'Université, Mai-Juin 1968 (Special Issue, July 1968); S. Zegel, Les Idées de Mai (Paris: Gallimard, 1968); "May 1968", Esprit, Nos. 6-7 (June-July 1968); "La Révolution Suspendue," Esprit, Nos. 8-9 (August-September 1968) and "Le Partage du Savoir," Esprit, No. 10 (October 1968). Also Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet, Op. Cit., pp. 463-533.
55. Le Monde (July 4, 1968), p. 9.
56. Ibid.
57. Cited in Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet, Op. Cit., pp. 507-508.

57. Ibid..
58. Cited in Schnapp and Vidal-Naquet, Op. Cit., pp. 507-508.
59. Le Monde (July 4, 1968), p. 9.
60. Ibid., p. 10.
61. Ibid., p. 11.
62. Ibid..
63. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
64. Ibid., p. 11.
65. On this point, Jacques de Chalendar, Une Loi Pour l'Université (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970), pp. 21-22.
66. Le Monde (June 19, 1968), p. 11.
67. Le Monde (June 19, 1968), p. 11.
68. Le Monde (July 9, 1968), p. 9 and (July 24, 1968), p. 9.

CHAPTER FOUR:

THE RESOLUTION OF THE MAY-JUNE CRISIS AND THE PRELIMINARY AGGREGATION OF
THE UNIVERSITY DEMANDS

Introduction

One of the major aspect of the approach of the stalemate society students is to describe interest groups in France as "delinquent communities". Organized interests, in the French political system, perform essentially negative functions: they delay, veto and usurp power. They pave the way toward political crises by their intransigence, dogmatism and demagogical attachment to the status quo; they certainly do not contribute to their resolution. Another dimension of the stalemate society thesis is its emphasis on the "technocratic" style and nature of the French pattern of decision-making. France, from this perspective, seems to be characterized by the absence of a political market place where conflicts could be first, aired out and then, reconciled. By the same token, the "société bloquée" students are bound to overlook the role of political leadership in the arbitration and settlement of political disputes and prefer, instead, to focus on "cultural" phenomena leading to the avoidance of "face to face" relationships involving an element of confrontation of diverging viewpoints. As we resume our narrative in this chapter, we will have an opportunity to reassess these somewhat simplistic assumptions. **After** all, the political system, in contrast to what happened in 1958 for example, did not collapse. Of course, the May 30th appeal of the Chief of State cannot be disregarded in this respect. However, it would be equally misleading to ignore the role of several university groups in the resolution of the crisis. Nor should the political imagination and skill of French political elites in having recourse to a "Loi d'Orientation" drafted by a master politician be considered as a variable of negligible importance to account for the resiliency of the political system. Moreover, the timely concessions and initiatives of Edgar Faure's predecessor in the Education Ministry, also prompted a rapid return to political "normalcy".

What was then the political situation at the end of June ? Clearly, the "dérapiage" of the political system was over. Order had been restored in the streets and the National Assembly was controlled by an imposing, unchallengeable Gaullist majority. What remained to be done was to rebuild the legitimacy of the State. This entailed, first, the reopening of channels of communication between the Government and the quasi self contained, self-governing university. Second, the groups and the alienated academic community had to be brought back into the formal policy-making process and, third, the authorities had to aggregate the May-June demands without stifling "participation". The burden of formulating a new organizational charter for the universities fell, in July, on Edgar Faure's shoulders and will be discussed later. On June 1st, the Government was hastily reshuffled. Francois-Xavier Ortoli took over the Education Ministry left vacant a week earlier by Alain Peyrefitte and immediately undertook to sound out the university's "mood" and negotiate with educational groups.

The embarrassment of educational groups during the May-June crisis

Throughout the crisis, most moderate groups had found themselves in an uneasy situation comparable to that of the C.G.T. among the workers' unions. Like all other "intermediary corps", the Fédération de l'Education Nationale, the Syndicat Général de l'Education Nationale and the Syndicat Autonome de l'Enseignement Supérieur had been literally short circuited by a grass roots movement which originated and developed, at best, in their conspicuous absence and, at worst, in more or less open opposition to them. From the groups' leadership viewpoint, therefore, one of the crucial stakes of the university's revolt involved no more and no less than the very existence and survival of their organizations as legitimate channels for the articulation of educational

demands.¹ Organized groups were also concerned with the growing restlessness of their rank and file. This was particularly true for the F.E.N. whose internal cohesion had always been strained by constant disputes over tactical, policy and ideological objectives.² The radical strategy, goals and initiatives of the S.N.E.Sup. further intensified these old sources of cleavages³ and raised the bleak prospects of a weakened bargaining position for the Fédération in the negotiations which might or were about to be opened with the Government.

Thus, most educational groups were caught in an agonizing dilemma. On the one hand, they were eager to support the students' and teachers' demands for change but only to the extent that it entailed neither their temporary or definite exclusion from the policy-making process. On the other hand, unwilling to cast their organizations in a role which would have gone beyond the boundaries of a purely "fonction syndicale revendicative", the leaderships of these groups were anxious to negotiate over concrete problems and issues with the Government. But, again, they could not do it at the price of further alienating portions of their rank and file or losing what was left of their influence and control over the 'events'.

Under these conditions, the only consistency of the groups day-to-day, short term muddling through policy was their desperate effort to prevent the political crisis from getting completely out of their grasp. For example, the F.E.N., for a while and inasmuch as their ideological and programmatic differences made it possible, tried to act in concert with U.N.E.F. and the S.N.E.Sup..⁴ Similarly, it was not until May 24th that the Fédération resolved to call an unlimited strike affecting all levels of the educational system although, less than a week later, it accepted to join the workers'

unions in the Grenelle negotiations. The most revealing illustration of the F.E.N.'s determination to preserve its functional specificity and to channel the University's demands must be found in its decision to sponsor "Etats Généraux de l'Université Nouvelle" in the Fall for the purpose of promoting "an effort de synthèse"....⁵

Publicly, the groups could do little more than express their "pleasure" and "satisfaction" over the grass roots movement which had spontaneously erupted in the universities. Privately, things must have been somewhat different and the F.E.N. attitude was probably not an isolated instance.⁶ Cross pressured, threatened in their role and function, the major educational groups could only welcome a rapid conclusion of the crisis, particularly if, at the same time, they could also contribute to its settlement. Thus, as the revolutionary tide began to lose momentum, for different but converging reasons, the prospects for renewed institutionalized contacts between the Government and the unions improved toward the end of May. These hopes, however, did not immediately materialize. The Fédération de l'Education Nationale, along with the workers groups, did participate in the negotiations which opened in the Ministry of Social Affairs on May 25th and were carried on under the aegis of the Prime Minister the 28th and the first and second of June.⁷ Formal bargaining with the Education Ministry, however, did not begin before June 4th.

Ortoli yields to the demands of educational groups

We saw earlier that one of the privileged targets of the organizations representing the academic community had been the Government's extensive use of "commissionite" because this practice **excluded their institutionalized**

participation in the decision-making process. In addition, they had no say in the staffing of these committees. Their reaction to the May 14th Prime Minister's announcement of the creation of a "Comité de Réflexion sur les Problèmes de l'Enseignement Supérieur" was therefore, understandably, sharply critical⁸ and the groups' opposition to the decision-making model followed by Christian Fouchet in the mid-sixties explains the postponement of their negotiations with Ortoli.

On June 1st, the Federation de l'Education Nationale rejected Ortoli's^{meet} proposal to with each group separately. On the second and third, the Fédération was again received by the Ministry's Secretary General and the Minister himself in order to discuss the preliminary conditions under which the formal process of bargaining could be started. Little is known about these meetings in which the F.E.N. appears to have played a key role, but their outcome⁹ brought all the groups to the bargaining table the very next day.

The Education Minister had, in fact, yielded to two of the F.E.N. demands which this group considered as the non-negotiable conditions for the opening of a dialogue with the Government. First, Ortoli agreed to commit the Government to a significant financial effort in the forthcoming months. Second, he accepted to disband the Capelle Committee on selection and third, he admitted that the decision-making process which would lead to the reform of the university system would exclude any recourse to any committee "unilaterally" appointed by the authorities.

Thus, the leaderships of all educational groups rejoiced in the first week of June: they were back in the policy-making process, practically on their own terms; moreover, they had obtained from the Government the

assurance that they would participate in the overhauling of the university system. All of this did not mean that they would contribute as extensively as they wished in the formulation of the Orientation Act. After all, the sequels of May did not disappear as if by magic and, later, the S.G.E.N. frankly acknowledged that the 'events' had considerably weakened the bargaining power of all educational unions in the Summer and Fall of 1968. 10

In any case, the conditions which presided over the opening of the Grenelle's negotiations forebode some aspects of the decision-making process in the forthcoming months. The Grenelle's meetings made it already clear that some groups would remain outside of the institutional framework of policy-formulation. The Fédération de l'Education Nationale, the C.G.T., the C.G.T. F.O. and the S.G.E.N. all accepted to send their delegates to the Rue de Grenelle but both U.N.E.F. and the S.N.E.Sup. were conspicuously absent. Also, the Grenelle's agreements foreshadowed what Edgar Faure, in his parliamentary address of July 24th, described as an "agonizing reappraisal" of the Ministry's decision-making methods. The bargaining had been long and arduous but Ortoli had made timely and considerable concessions on issues which had always united all educational groups beyond their ideological and programmatic differences. Moreover, the Minister had displayed resiliency and flexibility, thereby persuading the groups that further contacts with the Government would not be sterile. This is why, in 1968 and 1969, a bewildering number of "workshops" and "round tables" were held in the Education Ministry with the quasi institutionalized participation of educational groups. These committees essentially dealt with the problems of primary and secondary education. 11 For reasons which will become clearer in the next chapter, nothing similar was done in relation to higher education. But, in mid-June it was already evident that the elaboration of the university reform would

depart from the procedures used under Fouchet. This about face of the Government cannot be fully understood, however, without reference to Ortoli's efforts to restore channels of communication between the Ministry and the universities.

The Government and the "universités en transes"

Back on May 14th, Prime Minister Pompidou, in a parliamentary statement, had stressed the Government's commitment to educational reforms. Three weeks later, however, he warned that the Government would not accept change under pressure and the threat of violence.¹² Thus, throughout the crisis, one of the major preoccupations of public officials had been to maintain at least the appearance of a face saving legality. In June, bolstered by its stupendous electoral victory, the Government might have been tempted to pursue what a high ranking official then described as a "politique du mépris".¹³ This course of action was ruled out by the Prime Minister, well aware of the fact that some form of concertation with the actors of the May-June drama was necessary.

Under these conditions, the dilemma of the Government was to determine how and through what channels, this policy could be undertaken. As we saw in the preceding discussion, Ortoli had agreed not to have recourse to the procedures used by his two predecessors. Some suggested to hold general elections in all of the university establishments before the forthcoming academic year. But the practical problems involved in the preparation of such elections might not be satisfactorily resolved in time. Moreover, this course of action could have discouraged and dismayed those who had contributed to the universities' "Etats Généraux" by persuading them that

they were being brought back to where they had started.

Another alternative would have been to consult all of the existing teacher and student groups, including those which had been recently created, whether 'radical', 'conservative' or 'moderate'. Grave doubts, however, could be legitimately entertained about the representativeness of each of these organizations. Furthermore, the May-June events had cast a long shadow over their actual prestige and influence among the student population.

Finally, it might have been possible to call upon the representatives of the "Assemblées Paritaires" themselves. The reforms which would have been thereby undertaken would have probably been of profound and far reaching significance. But, clearly, this approach was politically indefensible from the Government's viewpoint and even more so from that of his law and order majority. Even if the results of, as well as the political background in which the legislative elections were held, had been disregarded, such a policy would have undoubtedly stiffened the resistance of the conservatives at the implementation stage of the reform. Moreover, the procedure would have amounted to governmental recognition of the 'pouvoirs de fait' which had taken over the University. Things were hardly better in regard to the substantive changes to be introduced in the system of higher education

The essential principles of the reform and its basic axis were known to everyone. It was generally recognized that a greater administrative autonomy should be granted to the universities; the faculties were to be more satisfactorily adapted to the economy and society and their internal structures reshaped to institute a new balance of power between students and teachers. However, given the widespread demand for participation, how could the Government avoid the

accusation of granting the University a "statut octroyé" ? To what extent would public officials be able to meet the demands of students and teachers without being charged with initiating a policy of "cooptation" and "recuperation"? Finally, to add to the Government's worries, how could the authorities ignore altogether these demands if they were planning at the same time to submit a reform to the French Parliament which would not drastically or fundamentally depart from what the academic community had been clamoring for...?

Ortoli appoints eight 'Chargés de Mission'

After successfully negotiating with university groups, the Education Minister turned his attention to these problems. Ortoli's attitude was grounded on the assumption according to which, procedural questions were, for the time being, the top priority of the Government's policy. More specifically, Ortoli sought to reach three interrelated goals: first, it was necessary to generate the widespread belief that the Government would not, in the future, foreclose any "reasonable" reform proposal. Second, it was imperative to open channels of communication between Paris and the university although this process should remain informal in order to avoid granting any legitimacy to the structures which had emerged during the 'events'. Third, the purpose of this informal process was to sound out the intentions and desires of the academic community and prepare a synthesis of their works and demands.

These preoccupations were clearly evident when the Education Minister announced his decision to appoint eight 'Chargés de Mission' in the middle of June.

Today, it is no longer question of reforming the University only, observed Ortoli, we must build a new one. The Government must prepare itself.... The exchanges of views which may have taken place in our

faculties in the last month have without doubt, clarified many aspects of the problem and paved the way toward solutions. They cannot lead, however, to the establishment of structures or the adoption of decisions made outside of the legal institutions. My first step will be to acquaint myself with all which has been suggested by delegating a number of competent and uncontroversial persons to gather information on the various points of view and to attempt a synthesis where this has not yet been done. 16

At the beginning of July, Ortoli gave more precise and somewhat different instructions to his "Missi Dominici" as they were later called.

We must be fundamentally open to the ideas of others, try not to come to personal conclusions and especially not build any system of reform now. We are not preparing a doctrine (of our own), we are searching (the doctrines of) others. You will systematically ask your interlocutors how to proceed with the discussion and concertation which will follow this phase of initial exploratory talks. 17

The evolving function of the Chargés de Mission is a vivid illustration of what a political observer described as Ortoli's "administration de l'im-
18
provisation". Their very selection, in fact was made in the absence of any clear consistent criteria of choice. One of them even told us that he had been appointed merely because he happened to be in Paris at that time
19
and had good relations with the students and teachers of his university.

On the whole, however, Ortoli's initiative was well timed and politically
20
paying. Although some Rectors opposed the Minister's decision, in general, at the local level, the Chargés de Mission were able to constitute dynamic teams without alienating anyone. They were thus in a position to gather, centralize and organize the bewildering number of reform proposals which had been drafted in May and June. They classified most of the important projects prepared by high ranking civil servants, individual teachers and organized groups as well as those elaborated in the faculties, on the basis of structural and functional criteria. They synthesized them, thereby making political decision-makers fully cognizant of the universities' demands.

The Chargés de Mission, therefore, progressively emerged as key, informal intermediaries between the Minister and his Cabinet on the one hand and the Rectors, teachers and students on the other. They met each week in Paris with senior officials of the Direction des Enseignements Supérieurs and thus performed, in the absence of any institutionalized contacts, a crucial two way communication function. The experiment was so successful that Edgar Faure decided to carry it on and the Minister's envoys again toured the universities during the implementation of the Orientation Act and played a useful role in the redistricting of the universities into U.E.R.s and the creation of the establishments superseding the old faculties. ²¹ In his parliamentary speech of October 8th, Faure complimented the Chargés de Mission and, later, in his memoirs, summed up their contribution to the elaboration of the Orientation Act in the following terms

Sent to all academic districts without rigid instructions, informing and being informed, listening discretely and speaking softly, advising unpretentiously, dissuading though not appearing to do so, organizing, where possible, the profusion of ideas and assuring the continuity, when necessary, of the spontaneous structures, they (the charges de mission) condensed it all into a workable dossier which was my first document. The elaboration of the law owes them much. ²²

The Ortoli's Ministry: a synthesis

It is commonplace to argue that political decision-makers always act upon an environment which, to a large extent, has been shaped by their predecessors' actions. Faure's case is no exception to this rule. When the former Premier of the Fourth Republic took over the Education Ministry, Ortoli had altered the political situation in at least two ways.

First, Ortoli had been primarily concerned with the resolution of the

procedural issues raised by the resorbtion of the May-June crisis and the 'normalization' of French political life. He succeeded in bringing the groups into the formal policy-making process and reopening a constructive dialogue with the university. To that extent, Ortoli's brief passage in the Education Ministry contributed to alleviating some tensions which might have hampered his successor. Second, Ortoli's quasi exclusive preoccupation with procedural matters predetermined certain aspects of Faure's educational policy. During his tenure of office, the idea of a framework law began to impose itself as the most sensible solution to bring about change without stifling the demand for participation. The political and juridical obstacles to a "permissive" reform of the university system could be lifted if the Government submitted a projet de loi to the French Parliament. The Orientation Act itself would be drafted with the participation of all of the parties involved, define the fundamental objectives of the reform and the acceptable limits within which the new new universities could freely constitute themselves.

The solution was appealing to the Government insofar as its authority was not challenged. Moreover, it became possible by the same token to safeguard the principle of grass roots participation while introducing significant changes in the system of higher education. These ideas were already implicit in the June 3rd press conference of the Prime Minister. They were more clearly stated by Ortoli in his June 14th communique. The final decision was made in July after Couve de Murville's appointment as Premier on July 13th.

The formation of the Couve de Murville Government

In the wake of the Gaullist electoral landslide, it was widely expected that Pompidou would retain the Premiership. If this had been the case, Faure²³ would have left the Agriculture Department and received the Treasury. These perspectives were upset by the dismissal of Pompidou and his subsequent replacement by Couve de Murville.

As a result of serious differences over financial and monetary problems, the new Prime Minister was unwilling to entrust the Treasury to Edgar Faure and the position was eventually filled by Ortoli. But Couve de Murville was not either ready to let Faure be in charge of the problems of higher education. According to his original list of 'ministrables', Jeanneney would have become "Minister of Higher Education" while Faure would have been responsible for²⁴ primary and secondary education.

It is by no means certain that Faure would have gone along with this scheme. In any event, his meeting with the Chief of State on July 12th in the Elysee Palace, again shattered Couve de Murville's plans. The details²⁵ of this conference are, of course, not fully known, but it seems that Faure's views over the reform of the university system favorably impressed the President and De Gaulle's decisive support brought to an abrupt end the laborious search for an incumbent in the Rue de Grenelle.

That Couve de Murville would have preferred to have someone else in the Education Ministry already foreshadowed that the relations between the Prime Minister and Edgar Faure would not always be altogether smooth. With the notable exception of the Grandes Ecoles, strains between the two men

did not consistently crystalize over substantive policy differences. True, Couve de Murville was not inclined to let himself be overwhelmed by "hazy and romantic" ideas about participation in spite of his allegiance to De Gaulle,²⁶ but the same observation could also be made about Edgar Faure who was too "political" to ignore that minor concessions were often necessary in order to safeguard more fundamental principles.

The main source of tensions between the Education Minister and the Head of the Government must essentially be found in their divergent, when not conflicting, political styles. As a long time career diplomat, Couve de Murville had a propensity to be skeptical and cautious and to defer to the value of time and reflexion as necessary preconditions to political action. In contrast, Faure was an "homme d'action" and a shrewd politician always ready to seize any favorable opportunity in order to suggest or impose new ideas and policy goals.

More than once, Couve de Murville was literally horrified by the boldness of the initiatives of this "bulldozer réformateur" in the Rue de Grenelle and subsequently exerted a delaying influence on the decision-making process particularly at the implementation stage of the Orientation Act. It should also be noted that the Prime Minister, unlike his predecessor, "never managed to weld his government into a coherent team...and lacked the authority to impose a consistent line (among the members of his Cabinet)."²⁷ Thus, disagreements between advocates of the "stick" and the "carrot" in dealing with the university problems, conflicts with all the Jacobins Ministers in addition to the resistance of the Treasury, all came in the open when the Council of Ministers discussed Edgar Faure's reform.

behavior

Later, referring to this pattern of administrative and perhaps twisting the meaning of the concept as it had originally been used by Galbraith, Faure bitterly complained about the proscration of the "technostructure" which he described as a "cast of specialized advisers in the Hotel Matignon and the Elysée, in direct contact with their delegates in the Cabinet of the various Ministries."²⁸ This problem will be discussed in the next chapter; for the time being, it will suffice to note that the political balancing of the Government which was supposed to reflect the various factions of the Gaullist Party, in the absence of a countervailing authority, was not meant to facilitate the reforming task of the Education Minister. As to the U.D.R., to use the flowery metaphor of Professor Debbasch, it was not planning to "tresser des couronnes" for the new incumbent of the Rue de Grenelle.²⁹

A morose Majority

Elated by its electoral triumph, the Gaullist majority soon found itself in the doldrums as a result of the firing of Georges Pompidou. As Professor Goldey points out, "the new enlarged majority looked to the Prime Minister, first of all, for present leadership, and then as living proof that Gaullism had a future after the departure of its founder. The prime minister had increasingly extended his control over the government before the Events; during them he had emerged as its effective head. Pompidou had dominated the campaign and the electoral victory of the U.D.R. was also a political triumph for him."³¹

To that, it should be added that the austere, chilly and aloof political style of the new Prime Minister hardly appealed to anyone in the "House without Windows". Moreover, many in the Gaullist group had been irked by

the secretiveness which had surrounded the formation of the Government. For some, Couve de Murville had attributed a disproportionate number of cabinet positions to high ranking civil servants and friends thereby generating the fear that the Government might very well "impose" his reforms without taking into account the "participatory" mood of his backbenchers. For others, and particularly those who had been elected on the summary platform of anti-communism and a return to "law and order", the composition of the Cabinet leant too much toward the left of the party. As an observer noted, "thinking more readily of repression than reform, they were baffled and distressed to see ministers courting the recent rebels rather than their own parliamentary supporters."³²

Thus, a sizable portion of the majority looked at Edgar Faure with suspicion and was profoundly disquieted by the Education Minister's selection of unconventional persons as his closest collaborators mostly recruited from outside the bureaucracy. Gérald Antoine was "closer to a Harvard professor than to a Sorbonne mandarin"³³ and during the May-June events, had made several unorthodox statements about the urgent need to reform the university. Francois Furet, a Sorbonne professor and, at the time, one of the managers of a leftist weekly, had a "fierce hatred" for the "obscurantism" of the French university.³⁴ Finally, the contribution of Michel Alliot, a former paratrooper turned scholar, to the discussions which had taken place in the Paris Law Faculty, was widely known.³⁵

In addition, strains between Faure and the Gaullist rank and file were likely to arise as a result of personality conflicts. The majority loathed the Education Minister's political past, his active participation in the politics of the Fourth Republic and long time association with an opportunistic

center party symbolizing practically all what the Fifth Republic stood against. Faure's ideological volte face and peculiar taste for coining paradoxical and provocative phrases were also a source of uneasiness and resentment. Finally, the Education Minister's belated adhesion to the Gaullist family and his frequent references to his direct allegiance to the President of the Republic were not either universally appreciated. Before turning to a discussion of the simmering conflict which pitted Faure against his own backbenchers and began to break out in the open when the National Assembly met in July, it is necessary to reconsider in more detail the charges directed at the new "Grand Maître de l'Université". This will give the reader a more accurate picture of Faure's political liabilities and assets in his efforts to reform the system of higher education.

Faure's political resources

Admittedly, when Faure arrived in the Education Ministry, he had not previously developed any particular interest or competence in the field of higher education. His direct and inside knowledge of university problems was limited to a recently earned doctorate and a teaching position in Dijon. Nevertheless, Faure soon overcome these shortcomings thanks to his remarkable intellectual caliber and, above all, his extraordinary political skills derived from a rich, multi faceted political experience.

The bargaining, manipulative and negotiating talents of the Education Minister were a key and critical ingredient of the politics of the Orientation Act at least in two interrelated respects. First, to the extent that Faure was committed to change, his leadership skills and brokerage ability explain how

and why a consensus could be patiently built out of the multiplicity of conflicting viewpoints and attitudes over the reorganization of the university system. As Professor Debbasch points out, "...born arbitrator, action lover...(Faure knew when and how to) create opportunities for change" even under the most unfavorable conditions.³⁷

Second, although Faure was always in full control of the decision-making process and used his intimate knowledge of men and institutions for his own objectives, at the same time, he succeeded in convincing most teachers and students that their participation and contribution to the elaboration of the Orientation Act was not mere "window dressing".³⁸ To cite Professor Debbasch again, " (Faure) exceptional conciliatory qualities, psychological acumen (and) love for life...brought back to the bargaining table those who had refused to negotiate and gone as far as rejecting the very notion of ministerial authority....Never, in the history of the Republic a law was to be preceded by such a broad consultation."³⁹

The energizing leadership of the Education Minister alone, however, would have proved probably insufficient to overcome the objections of a reticent Majority, the opposition of some interest groups and the thinly veiled obstruction of the Bureaucracy. Edgar Faure also received the support of the Chief of State who had been convinced by the events of May that profound educational reforms were urgently needed. In his nationally televised interview of June 7th, the President then made it clearly understood that French decision-makers had no other choice than to adapt the system of higher education to the needs of a modern, industrial society.

In that crisis that occurred in the universities, there were two things. First, the anguish of the young, the students which is infinitely natural...in the mechanical society, the modern consumer

society, because it does not offer them what they need, that is, an ideal, an impetus, a hope, and I think that that ideal, that impetus and that hope, they can and must find them in participation. And then, there was the crisis of the university system itself, which showed its obsolescence, its impotence to reform itself and the, to finish, its collapse, despite the very great intellectual worth of many of its professors. There is no doubt that this university system must be completely reconstructed.... (The goal of) Napoleon, aided by Fontanes ...was to have a rather limited number of students accede to the highest summits, to the theoretical summits of knowledge, after which, the elite thus created went the way it wished and made up a fertile bed of superior men. The way was ex-cathedra courses, diplomas that did not at all necessarily determine their holders for a specific and determined career and did not at all commit employers to take them. Obviously, all that is completely outdated.

What were then the directing principles of the reform of the University ?

De Gaulle (though reluctantly) ruled out selection, stressed that the universities should be better adapted to the economy of the nation and the regions and, finally, outlined the procedure which would lead to the reconstruction of the system of higher education.

It is a matter of having it (the university) no longer live for itself, outside of realities. It must correspond to the modern needs of our country. Our country has activities that are varied and perfectly different from one another. Well, the university system - and this is what the country asks of it - must furnish it with elites adapted to each of these activities: which means that each university discipline should directly correspond to a certain practical field, and, inversely, that this practical field must guarantee outlets to the students who have been trained in that discipline. Moreover, as our country is reawakening to regional life, it wants the university complexes to be locally adapted to that regional life and, consequently, each to have its special character. It goes without saying that the universities must be open to all students who have the ability and who have the intention to take courses and pass examinations, but that the others, who are there only to waste their time and that of their friends, should be welcome elsewhere, or even begin their active life immediately. After all you can be a first class person without necessarily holding a university 'licence' or 'agregation'. But also, I would almost say especially, the remodeling and the operation of the university system must be carried out with the participation of its professors and of all its students; in other words, they must all be directly involved and their representatives must be designated by all. One must not deal with only, as is the case, delegations of some limited groups that are all the more noisy, violent, anarchic and chimerical as they are not representative of the whole and, into the bargain, are incapable of constructive projects and behavior. That is how the universities should be rebuilt.

We will soon have an opportunity to emphasize the extent to which the President and his Education Minister's thoughts overlapped on the solutions they proposed to resolve the university crisis and most particularly on procedural matters and the question of 'participation' which both saw as means of desalienation and integration in modern industrial societies. For the time being, suffice to say here that De Gaulle's quasi unconditional support proved invaluable to the reformist projects of Edgar Faure. The attitude of the Chief of State never stifled the ensuing political debate and did enable the former Premier of the Fourth Republic to overcome potential 'points de blocage' and deadlocks in the decision-making process. Things were somewhat different during the implementation of the Orientation Act because of the relative aloofness and remoteness of De Gaulle in the day to day administration of governmental policies. His resignation also led to a short period of 'attentisme'. In the Summer and Fall of 1968, however, the similarities of views between De Gaulle and Faure over the appropriate political response to be given to the university crisis was bound to influence in one way or another the behavior of the most significant parties involved in the **decision-making process**. This is the reason why the Gaullist majority did not too openly challenge the Education Minister as the National Assembly met in an emergency session in mid-July.

The emergency session of the National Assembly

At the Government's request, the National Assembly met in the second half of July in order to discuss the Executive's program of social, administrative and educational reforms which were all part of De Gaulle's new 'Grand Design' for France. The Conférence des Présidents scheduled the proceedings of the Legislature to begin with a general policy statement by the Prime Minister.

Faure would then make a declaration on educational problems. It was further agreed that both statements would be followed by a floor debate lasting six and twelve hours respectively. In the preceding days, several Gaullist back-benchers had warned that the Government should be more attentive to their views⁴⁰ and that the maintainance of law and order was the prerequisite for any reform.⁴¹ Thus, when Couve de Murville adressed the National Assembly on Ju'y 19th, he was, for understandable reasons, eminently cautious, firm and reassuring at the same time.

The Head of the government pledged to carry out basic domestic reforms in the highly centralized French political and administrative structures, in the management of industrial firms and the system of higher education. In the Prime Minister's view, these changes were dictated by an imperative need of modernization⁴² but before elaborating on his program, Couve de Murville hastened to assuage the anxieties of the National Assembly.

First, he admonished all potential trouble makers and the students in particular, that the Government's duty and primary function was to ensure "public order" because reforms "cannot be conceived...and implemented in a political and social climate in which law and order and the citizens' safety are not fully and permanently assured."⁴³ Second, the Prime Minister announced that the National Assembly would be closely involved in the definition of the anticipated reforms. He let the Legislature understand that an extraordinary session would be called in September in order to discuss the projects of the Executive. In reference to the present session of the National Assembly, the Premier, while warning the deputies that he would not allow them to overextend their constitutional prerogatives or unduly block the decision-making process, also expressed the hope that " this first debate will mark...the beginning of a (constructive) collaboration between the Assembly

and the Government which seems to me the necessary condition of any useful work.... I say it at least for those...who belong to...the groups of the majority." 44

After these preliminary observations, Couve de Murville turned to a discussion of the Government's plans. In dealing with the problems of higher education, the Prime Minister was relatively vague. He stressed that he merely intended to provide the Assembly with "short term, preliminary observations" about the Government's intentions so that the former could express "its views and suggestions". It would be up to Edgar Faure to elaborate at greater lengths on the substantive aspects of the reform. Nevertheless, there was much more than mere reassuring rhetoric in the Prime Minister's speech. Couve de Murville made it clear that the policies initiated by the preceding government and Ortoli would be pursued and extended to their logical conclusion. While defining the main axis of the reform of the university system, the Premier, at the same time, began to outline the successive stages through which this mutation would have to take place.

The reform itself will be a long term affair. Right now, a kind of general consensus seems to be developing on several broad principles: the juridical status of the university establishments; modification of the traditional rules concerning the uniformity of curricula, programs, examinations; transformation of pedagogical methods, (the) necessity of adapting the curricula to the needs of the job market, finally, widespread participation, in all domains, of teachers...students... and representatives of economic and social groups.

It is up to the government to draft a law defining these principles and orientations; the draft will be submitted to the Parliament beginning with the extraordinary session which I mentioned earlier. Within these newly autonomous establishments, (the draft) will provide the basis for work and discussions - which the public authorities will necessarily participate in, because they are responsible to the nation and have the financial responsibility - work and discussions which will lead to the building of a new university.

And the Prime Minister concluded:

The most important results of this approach would be, not only to transform (a system of) higher education 'sclérosée' in its methods, programs and even in its finality but even more especially to create new relationships between the students, on the one hand, teachers, on the other, (and) finally public authorities, granting students the broad participation (in university decision-making) which will remain theirs as long as they demonstrate the ability to assume their responsibilities.⁴⁵

In spite of its emphasis on "law and order", the Prime Minister's speech was greeted with polite attention but failed to stir any significant show of overt support within the National Assembly. On the Left, there was an "immense vide" to use the appropriate expression of Hyppolyte Ducos.⁴⁶ On the Right, the memories and hearts of the members of the majority were clearly elsewhere: they burst into loud and prolonged applause only once when Couve de Murville paid homage to his predecessor.⁴⁷ In any event, the Premier's stated intention to have recourse to a "loi cadre" in order to bring a legal revolution in the university system failed to appease his weary backbenchers.

The National Assembly's response to the Prime Minister's speech

All the orators who took the floor after the Prime Minister's statement were strikingly unanimous in stressing the need for a meaningful dialogue between the Government and the Assembly which would not be limited to an "inutile bavardage".⁴⁸ " We are not challenging the scope of your victory," observed Robert Fabre (F.D.G.S.), " we are only wondering what you are going to do with it. Mister President, will you continue to consider this Assembly as a rubber stamping institution ? Will the Government continue, as it has done up until now, to use its right to set up the agenda...in order to prevent the discussions of propositions which he does not like ? Will it abuse of the blocked vote which stifles our debates ?"⁴⁹

And the Secretary General of the U.D.R. echoed: " We expect from your government...a systematic and trustful cooperation with this Assembly. (The Assembly) simply wants to use, without abuse nor limitations, its constitutional rights of initiative and parliamentary control."⁵⁰

The deputies took advantage of this preliminary debate to remind the Government that the reform of the university system should not depart from certain basic principles and political objectives. For Robert Ballanger (F.C.P.)m any significant change entailed a drastic restructuring of the State's budgetary priorities as well as more emphasis on the key problem of 'démocratisation'.⁵¹ To a very large extent, the Socialists shared this approach, but being traditionally close to the 'milieux enseignants', gave equal importance to the procedural aspects of the reform. Thus, Robert Fabre emphasized that the Education Minister should thoroughly "consult"⁵² the "qualified representatives" of the academic community. The leadership of the Center parties made very similar points. In addition, it asked the Government to give up its previous "patching up" methods to resolve the university crisis and concern itself with the "exigences de la société et de l'économie moderne"⁵³ primarily.

The Gaullists were profoundly divided. Some analyzed the problems of the universities in terms of an extremists' conspiracy. Law and Order was therefore the Government's first priority. As one U.D.R. backbencher put it in blunt terms, " the population, first and foremost, expects the prompt and firm restoration of the State's authority....Les braves gens are sick and tired to payer les pots cassés."⁵⁴ A minority wholeheartedly supported the participation of students in the renovated structures of the system of higher education, but most Gaullist deputies insisted on its limitations.

For Robert Poujade, in particular, political neutrality was the sine qua non condition for 'participation'.⁵⁵

Still others stressed that political reformers should not be obnubilated with the question of student participation in university decision-making, but, instead, should be primarily concerned with the economic rationality of the universities and their efficiency. As Louis Habib-Deloncle contended:

The University and national education must encourage the development of disciplines with professional outlets....The differentiation of the curricula at the regional level, the specialization of the universities, the orientation of students on the basis of preferences, aptitudes and also available (financial and material) means are... the basic principles (of the universities') remodeling.... But we must go further than that.... The university and economic and social activities must be associated at the governmental level.... True, within the framework of participation, students must participate (in university decision-making). But is not our first and foremost mission (to make sure) that the university 'participe a la Nation'." 56

As we shall see later, there was no agreement in the Gaullist rank and file over the issues alluded to by Habib-Deloncle. In any event, compared to the 'great debate' which was going to take place in the Summer and the Fall, all of these oratory contests were still mere preliminary skirmishes. Everyone, in fact, anxiously awaited the Education Minister's speech. What were Faure's intentions ? What would be his response to the conservatives' clamorous demands for law and order ? What specific reforms did he have in mind in order to meet the claims of reformists ? What would be their limits and their political and philosophical justification ? Which political strategy would the Education Minister adopt ? To what extent would he be ready to abide to the policy of consultation previously announced by the Prime Minister ?

The July 24th Speech

Fully aware of the mood of the National Assembly, Edgar Faure did not depart from the framework of thought underlined a few days earlier by Couve de Murville. He confirmed the Premier's pledge to bring about basic reforms in the university system, defined them up to a certain point and, at the same time, attempted to appease and cajole the various publics he was appealing for support.

Early in his statement, Faure made it plain that the university system had to be reconstructed. In the Education Minister's view, the Napoleonic order had become obsolete because of the very modernization of French society. The need to democratize a rapidly evolving society was, for Faure, but another compelling reason for change. Applying the concept to higher education, the Minister indicated that he had a broad understanding of the term, a fact which was not likely to cheer many Gaullist deputies and certain university groups. Echoing some of the theses developed by Professors Bourdieu and Passeron which had inspired so much of the rhetoric heard during the May-June events, Faure declared : "...democratization does not only depend on financial aid and the families' economic means. The problem lies elsewhere: it is more the result of teaching programs and methods which unconsciously favor certain categories and certain groups."

58

Under these conditions, Faure announced his intention to increase the prestige of scientific and technical disciplines from the secondary level up to the university and to relegate the pedagogical tool of mass lectures to a relatively marginal role. The Education Minister also stressed that the reform of the system of higher education had to be understood in relation to

a larger process of change affecting the educational system as a whole. A broadly based educational system, "from the maternelle to the University", was in Faure's opinion, a key and necessary ingredient of what he described as a "société de promotion".⁵⁹

What were then the issues which had to be resolved by the new University Charter? Faure listed five major problems: the autonomy of the universities, their "ouverture sur le monde extérieur", the nature of national diplomas, the scope of political freedoms on the campuses and, last, the question of participation.

In dealing with each one of these aspects of the reform, the Minister was extremely cautious. He emphasized that he merely intended to "raise certain problems, without proposing any solutions" and "point out some avenues of research".⁶⁰ He also insisted that his own objectives and priorities did not and should not foreclose the formulation of alternative reform proposals. "I am ready," said Faure, "to receive anyone with anything to say... provided that...they accept me as an 'interlocuteur valable'."⁶¹ Finally, Faure reaffirmed that the reform would not be a "charte octroyée". He asserted that the role of decision-makers would be essentially limited to the formulation of a 'loi-cadre' whose very substance would be primarily defined by those it would apply to.

We are going to...prepare this framework law. Of course, I cannot tell you to-day how it will be elaborated... We can reasonably think that after reaffirming the finalities of National Education, it (the law) will define broad principles and indicate the nature of the relations which should develop between the State and the various categories of (university) establishments. Then, (the law) will abrogate or alter certain existing statutes thereby enabling the government to grant, within certain limits to be spelled out, a large autonomy and, by the same token, major responsibilities to the establishments (of higher education) in the definition of their disciplinary and interdisciplinary objectives, the content, form and

value of their degrees.... Contrary to so many precedents, the University will be called upon to modernize itself, by itself. 62

As it will become evident in the next chapter, Faure had undoubtedly a "liberal" if not "permissive" understanding of the substance of the Orientation Act. This is why, in his address, he immediately extended an olive branch to all those who might have been disquieted by his projects. Addressing himself to the students, Faure acknowledged the value and significance of their contribution to the May-June debates. Far from condemning them, the Minister tried to understand the profound meaning of their revolt: " The behavior and agitation of students cannot be explained by the energizing leadership of a handful of individuals, nor by the nihilism (of some) and a penchant for violence. At the roots of their anger, there is a profound malaise." ⁶³ Echoing some of the ideas of the Chief of State, the Education Minister suggested that students suffered from a " déficit de consideration", thereby justifying his stand in favor of the principle of student participation in university decision-making. Faure also made a major conciliatory move toward the students by promising that the reform would leave no room for selection. Faure was well aware that the political situation precluded the establishment of selective entrance examinations. But he gave three additional reasons for his opposition to this alternative.

Selection is by no means an absurd solution; and yet, we have not adopted it, and I want to tell you why. The first reason is juridical; this year's bacheliers have acquired a right which must be...respected. The second is psychological: traditionally, the faculties are opened to all upon presentation of the baccalaureate; to disregard this custom would provoke disturbing reactions.... What can be done (for our students) ? ... Have we planned 'structures d'accueil' and alternative paths ? They do not exist. To create them will be one of our major tasks.... In actuality, there is indeed a problem of selection, but it has another name.... qualification and orientation. 64

Faure then turned to the teachers who had just been told that the chairs were abolished and that they were to change their attitude toward students.

Raising the most sensitive issue of participation, Faure unambiguously rejected the claims of the revolutionaries: " The concept of student power ... is meaningless if it involves some kind of dictatorship over the whole nation or even just the faculty." ⁶⁵ In Faure's view, the principle of participation became acceptable only if it was applied to a plurality of actors: " (participation) is a right inherent in the power of human beings, i.e. (a right) to participate in the definition of one's fate. (This is why) it (participation) must involve all those who are interested in the development of the university: the faculty itself, maîtres de conférences, agrégés and professors, the maîtres assistants and the students. But there are also the researchers, the technical and administrative personnel who must be associated to what affects their activities." ⁶⁶

Furthermore, Faure stressed that participation involved different degrees of responsibilities varying with the individual's position within the university's hierarchy.

The forms of this participation cannot be identical at all levels and in all domains...Without making any advance judgements, it is certain that some responsibilities must remain exclusively in the hands of the corps enseignant members; for example, I am thinking of the drafting of the promotion lists (listes d'aptitude) or the awarding of degrees. Other (responsibilities) which relate to the collective and daily interests of the students can be delegated to them alone. Finally, others related to the administration and financial management (of the universities) and pedagogical matters can henceforth be shared by students and teachers. Once again, without committing ourselves to any solution, I think that to give a minority representation to the faculty, as some ambiguous schemes have proposed it, would be a grave mistake. ⁶⁷

If Faure had taken an unequivocal stand on the question of selection and somewhat clarified the meaning of "participation", he was more elusive than the Prime Minister with respect to the residual cluster of issues entailed by the reform. Thus, he refrained from elaborating on the details of the problem of 'libertés publiques' within the universities premises, only stating that

they would have to be "respected" by all. To go beyond that observation would have aroused the suspicions of the law and order oriented Gaullists. Similarly, Faure did bring up the overall issue of the educational system's economic function but with the sole observation that the University would have to be more closely associated with "la vie de toute la Nation". The expression itself was left undefined: many in the National Assembly, both within the Majority and the Left feared that the university system might become subservient to economic interests. Finally, the Education Minister emphasized the limitations rather than the exact modalities of the degree of administrative autonomy which would be granted to the universities. 'Diplômes nationaux' would be maintained within the framework of more flexible but unspecified State controls and Faure warned against the "vertige de l'imitation américaine": in the Assembly as well as the bureaucracy, there were many defenders of 'laïcité' and advocates of a Jacobin institutional order.

It is clear that, as the Minister had himself indicated, Faure's speech had been primarily intended to raise a number of fundamental issues and problems more than define specific solutions. At best, the Education Minister had outlined a course of action within the framework of which the political debate could take place. One of Faure's major objectives had been to rally the revolutionaries, appease the conservatives and convince the reformists that the Government did plan to implement his pledge of basic reforms. These conflicting goals and preoccupations persuaded Faure that, in the immediate future, he had to avoid committing himself to any too obviously identifiable direction of change. Moreover, he also had to take into account the defiant mood of the National Assembly and the majority's evident reluctance to allow the introduction of reforms which many Gaullists were ready to brand as

revolutionary or subversive. Finally, it was necessary to prevent the re-emergence of old cleavages which might have alienated the Left. Faure was indeed too subtle a politician not to realize that the Orientation Act could not be too "permissive". The parliamentary debate which followed his intervention gave him a first hand opportunity to realistically appraise the scope and limits of a politically feasible and implementable reform.

The floor debate

The subsequent general debate enabled each party to clarify their respective positions on the reform of the university system and it was soon evident that the real parliamentary struggle would lay within the U.D.R. rather than between Faure and the Left and Center parties.

The two Center parties emerged as the staunchest advocates of a significantly decentralized university system. The Independent Republicans, however, devoted considerable attention to the need to introduce lay persons in the universities governing councils, much more so than the P.D.M. group which leaned in favor of 'universités concurrentielles'.⁶⁸ The difference, however, was only a matter of degree and both groups would have probably agreed with Valery Giscard d'Estaing when he stated:

Autonomy must be very broad in relation to the curricula, the internal organization of the establishments, the programs, pedagogical methods (and) the continuing education or the retraining of the faculty. In these domains, the tutelle of the Ministry must be abolished and replaced...by (periodic) controls which could be entrusted to an annual conference of the Rectors. Financial matters should be regulated at the regional universities level....Since a project on regional structures must be introduced (in Parliament) would not it be possible for the future regional assemblies to vote the taxes designed to finance the universities? (At the university level), a university council (would be) endowed with financial powers. Composed of representative of teachers, students, regional economic interests and the professions and the State, it would elect the rector and define the global policy

of the university. In addition, paritary management councils would be concerned with the daily administration of the university and would have jurisdiction over pedagogical methods. 69

Likewise, the two parties adopted very liberal positions in all matters related to the participation of students in university decision-making although the Independent Republicans were perhaps more reticent than the P.D.M. back-benchers, particularly toward first year students. But again, the difference was marginal.

The Left did not propose any reform significantly departing from Faure's own projects. ⁷⁰ Both the Communists and Socialists asked for a "democratized" "mass" university of a high intellectual caliber which would enable students to specialize without prejudice to their "culture générale". Both parties argued in favor of a new university system enjoying a large scope of financial and administrative autonomy which, nevertheless, excluded the idea of "competing universities". In this respect, the Federation and the Communists - the latter perhaps more than the former - were particularly reticent on the question of "personalites exterieures" sitting in the universities councils. Finally, both parties recommended a greater degree of structural differentiation in the system of higher education in order to promote meaningfully the "orientation" of students. In addition, they called for the implementation of more imaginative pedagogical methods as well as an upward re-evaluation of technical higher education.

What is most remarkable about the positions of the four above parties is the relatively significant overlap between their proposals. Of course, they diverged on a number of problems but these differences never had time to develop into major ideological conflicts and the Communists, the Socialists, the P.D.M. and Independent Republicans ended up supporting almost unconditionally

the Education Minister in his battle against the U.D.R..

Within the various factions of the majority, Faure enjoyed little, if any, political support. True, Faure had a few reliable allies but whenever they expressed themselves, they were hissed and put down by their colleagues. More frequently, Faure received the qualified assistance of key Gaullist front-benchers like Léo Hamon and Rector Capelle. But the views of these two highly regarded and politically influential university professors on the particular questions of selection and so-management, to mention these issues only, were far more restrictive if not at odds with those of the Education Minister.⁷²

Most of the time, Faure's statement elicited sharp or hardly veiled rebuffs from within the U.D.R.. Thus, Jacques Baumel openly asked for the establishment of selection and stressed that the Republican tradition of neutrality excluded political discussions within the universities premises. Robert Poujade was more moderate in tone but still deplored that liberal arts faculties were jammed with "students who merely learnt the art of becoming unemployed". The Secretary General of the party also warned Faure against the abolition of national concours and emphasized that the principle of autonomy should not lead to the emergence of an "université en miette". Finally, Poujade did not challenge the opening of a dialogue between the Education Ministry and students but these negotiations had to take place, in his words, not with "destructive intermediaries and misleading interpreters" but with freely elected representatives.⁷³

Other orators stressed that the financial autonomy of the universities would necessarily have to be limited insofar as the financing of higher education

remained (and had to) a responsibility of the State. Others suggested that if the faculty wanted to retain its 'fonctionnaire' status, it would have to comply with the rules of the Civil Service. Moreover, inasmuch as the students desired to earn diplomas of an equal value and prestige at the national level, a degree of homogeneity in the courses and curricula of the universities would have to be maintained. Finally, several deputies spoke on behalf of teachers and clamored for institutional guarantees protecting their careers and status within the academic community.

Concluding remarks

The debate which had taken place in the National Assembly was by no means the key, turning point in the decision-making process which led to the adoption of the Orientation Act but it proved significant in at least three respects. First, it gave an aura of legality to the decision made by French policy-makers to overhaul, in the wake of the May-June events, the Napoleonic university system. Second, Faure's shrewd and distinguished speech and the subsequent floor discussion contributed to a clarification of the major issues and problems which would have to be resolved by the framework law. Some of them (selection and the administrative autonomy of the universities) reflected the existence of basic political tensions and conflicting ideologies. Others (student participation), would not be easy to resolve and required a more or less extensive and delicate process of bargaining. Finally, the floor debate had clearly demonstrated that Faure should be expecting stiff resistance mainly from a fragmented majority party united only in its distrust of the Education Minister and its diffuse hostility to the students demands. This is why, in closing the Assembly's session on July 26th, Faure explicitly referred to the political support he enjoyed from the Chief of State.

...the Government and more particularly the Minister, are encouraged by the general objectivity and concordance of views expressed in this debate. I have not even found one point on which my viewpoints were subject to violent contestation. The worst has been an expression of skepticism or the regret at seeing me take a position which some might have wished to be more conservative. However, neither the government nor the majority have been ever known as reactionaries. One could think that the great deference I have for the Chief of State would have prevented me from saying that he was a revolutionary if he had not decided to say so himself. 74

The language was euphemistic and muted but its significance was unmistakably clear. The Education Minister had understood that he would have to cope with more than the mere expression of polite "skepticism" on the part of the Gaullist party. This was perhaps even more true in regard to his relationship with the university groups and the various branches of the French civil service.

FOOTNOTES

1. On this point, see for example, Syndicalisme Universitaire, Supplément No. 463. Militant. XV (May 17, 1968), p. 3. For an overall appraisal of the nature of the crisis by the S.G.E.N., Syndicalisme Universitaire. Supplément. No. 472. Cadres (October 21, 1968).
2. The problem is discussed at length by James M. Clark, Teachers and Politics in France: a Pressure Group Study of the Federation de l'Education Nationale (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1967).
3. The reader may consult the minutes of the debates which took place in the Fédération's Commission Administrative and its Conseil National which met on May 16th and June 6th respectively. L'Enseignement Public, " Mai 1968," No. 11 (June 1968), pp. 29-31.
4. For a detailed justification of this policy, see Ibid., pp. 15 and 22.
5. Ibid., p. 23. The "Etats Généraux" were held in Paris on October 26th and 27th in a general climate of indifference. Its deliberations have been published by the Federation in L'Enseignement Public, " Les Etats Généraux de l'Université Nouvelle," No. 5 (February 1969).
6. For example, in a confidential note adressed to its cadres, the S.G.E.N. leadership expressed its misgivings about the debates which were taking place in the faculties and gave stern instructions to those of its members participating in these discussions not to make any proposals conflicting with the official position of the union. Syndicalisme Universitaire, Supplément. No. 463, Op. Cit., pp. 2-4.
7. Representatives of the C.G.T., C.F.D.T., C.G.T. F.O., P.M.E. and the C.N.P.F. also participated in the Grenelle discussions.
8. L'Enseignement Public, Op. Cit., p. 21 and Syndicalisme Universitaire, No. 465 (June 20, 1968), p. 6. The purpose of this study group was to explore the "permanent conditions of a student-teacher concertation, encourage the integration of the university in economic and social life in addition tomaking all necessary proposals to the Government to modernize the structures and methods of higher education." The membership of this committee would have included students, teachers and lay persons. See Journal Officiel. Lois et Decrets (May 17, 1968), p. 4923.
9. This discussion is based on information found in L'Ecole Libertaire, No. 32 (June 1968), pp. 1615-1615 and 1627-1629.
10. In a roneotyped note drafted for the 1969 General Assembly. " Le S.G.E.N. devant la Loi d'Orientation (Juin 1968- Janvier 1969)," p. 1 (Personal Archives).
11. Their conclusions appear in L'Enseignement Public, No. 8 Bis (June 1969).
12. In a June 3rd statement published in Notes et Etudes Documentaires, " Chronologie des Evenements de Mai-Juin 1968," La Documentation Française (September 28, 1970), Nos. 3722-3723, p. 68.

13. To use an expression of Jacques de Chalendar, Une Loi pour l'Université (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970), p. 14. Chalendar belonged to Faure's Cabinet.
14. This proposal was made by the Science Faculties Deans of Lyons and Paris (Orsay) who had been informally consulted by Jacques de Chalendar. See Ibid., p. 32.
15. A list of the names of the Chargés de Mission appears in Le Monde (June 20, 1968), p. 8.
16. Cited in L'Education Nationale, Nos. 863-864-865 (June 20, 1968), p. 7.
17. Quoted in Chalendar, Op. Cit., p. 16. Also, Le Monde (June 30-July 1, 1968), p. 5.
18. Le Monde (June 2-3, 1968), p. 3.
19. Interview with Professor Charles Debbasch. Aix-en-Provence. March 29, 1971.
20. Interview with Mr. Trincal who, with Ms. Puybasset, juridical advisor of the Education Minister, coordinated the activities of the Charges de Mission. Paris. June 24th, 1971. Professor Debbasch made a similar observation when I met him and Jacques de Chalendar mentions the problems in Op. Cit., p. 16.
21. This point is discussed at greater length in chapter 8.
22. Edgar Faure, Ce Que Je Crois (Paris: Grasset, 1971), p. 44. A brief summary of the Chargés de Mission's function can be found in L'Express No. 890 (July 29, 1968), p. 35.
23. According to Faure's own account in Ce Que Je Crois, Op. Cit., p. 21.
24. I am indebted on this point to Charles Debbasch, L'Université Désorientée Autopsie d'une Mutation (Paris: P.U.F., 1971), p. 32.
25. They are discussed by Faure in Ce Que Je Crois, Op. Cit., pp. 23-33.
26. As observed by Jean-Noel Gurgaud in " Pompidou, le Départ," L'Express No. 888 (July 15-21, 1968), p. 18.
27. Cited from Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, Politics and Society in De Gaulle's Republic (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1972), p. 334.
28. Quoted from Francoise Bergues Lagarde and Jean-Jacques Recoules, La Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur Devant le Parlement. (Paris: Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, October 1969, unpublished dissertation), p. 35.
29. L'Université Désorientée, Op. Cit., p. 34.
30. The U.D.R. won 294 of the Assembly's seats.

31. David B. Goldey, " The Party of Fear: the Election of June 1968," in Philip M. Williams, French Politicians and Elections 1951-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 281.
32. Politics and Society in De Gaulle's Republic, Op. Cit., p. 333.
33. According to Charles Debbasch in Op. Cit., p. 34. The former Rector of the experimental center of Orleans had also co-authored an iconoclastic study of the problems of higher education in France in the mid-sixties. Andre Passeron and Gerald Antoine, La Réforme de l'Université (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1966).
34. As observed by Jean-Jacques Recoules in Op. Cit., p. 20.
35. A list of the members of Faure's Cabinet appears in Appendix III-1.
36. Half smiling, half serious, Faure observed once, " I am not altogether ignorant of the University problems; I am an old student and a young professor since I took the agregation very late (in my life)". Cited in Le Monde, (July 16, 1968), p. 7.
37. L'Université Désorientée, Op. Cit., p. 33.
38. During his passage in the stormy Agriculture Ministry in 1967 and 1968, Edgar Faure had succeeded in placating the growing rural unrest engendered by the impact of the Common Market on the French peasantry. He also played a key role in restoring a constructive relationship with the F.N.S.E.A.. These factors may have influenced the President's decision in July 1968 to reject Couve de Murville's list of ministrables.
39. L'Université Désorientée, Op. Cit., p. 50.
40. For example, the U.D.R. Secretary General tersely observed that "if the new Prime Minister does not collaborate with us, we will find (enough) Gaullists ready to threaten him with the vote of a censure motion." Quoted from L'Express, No. 888 (July 15-22, 1968), p. 19. See also the front page of the Gaullist newspaper, La Nation (July 16, 1968) and Leo Hamon's statement in Le Monde (July 11, 1968), p. 6. A similar eagerness for "participation" was also found in the parliamentary parties close to or allied to the U.D.R.. For the P.D.M., Journal Officiel. Lois et Décrets. (July 12, 1968), p. 6634 and the Independent Republicans, Le Monde (July 12, 1968), p. 4 and (July 17, 1968), p. 1.
41. On this point, see the U.D.R. parliamentary caucus statement, Journal Officiel. Lois et Décrets, Op. Cit., p. 6634. The tough minded Interior Minister, Raymond Marcellin, (an Independent Republican) stated a few days before the parliamentary session that "the problem of law and order will remain on the agenda as long as the revolutionary groups will challenge the electoral verdict and will prefer the revolution to reforms." Le Monde (July 12, 1968), p. 7.
42. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (July 17, 1968), p. 2259.
43. Ibid., p. 2258.
44. Ibid.. The Prime Minister, though, still declined to seek the Assembly's endorsement.

45. Ibid., p. 2259.
46. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (July 12, 1968), p. 2190.
47. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (July 18, 1968), p. 2258.
48. To use the expression of Raymond Mondon. Ibid., p. 2267.
49. Ibid., p. 2260.
50. Ibid., p. 2263. Jacques Duhamel made a similar point in Ibid., p. 2265.
51. Ibid., pp. 2267-2268.
52. Ibid., p. 2262.
53. As emphasized by Jacques Duhamel in Ibid., p. 2265.
54. Ibid., p. 2277.
55. Ibid., p. 2263.
56. Ibid., p. 2270.
57. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (July 24, 1968), p. 2525.
58. Ibid..
59. Ibid., p. 2529.
60. Ibid., p. 2528.
61. Ibid..
62. Ibid..
63. Ibid., p. 2525.
64. Ibid., p. 2527.
65. Ibid., p. 2528.
66. Ibid..
67. Ibid..
68. See for example the statement of Pierre Sudreau, a former Education Minister in Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (July 25, 1968), pp. 2541-2542.
69. Ibid., p. 2534.
70. The F.D.G.S. introduced a proposition de loi in October which strikingly resembled the Orientation Act. Journal Officiel. Documents de l'Assemblée Nationale (May 28, 1979). Annexe No. 333, pp. 116-128.

71. For example, when David Rousset sought to defend the students, he was repeatedly interrupted and an angry Gaullist loudly described him as a "Gaullist deputy waving a black flag". Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (July 26, 1968), pp. 2582-2585.
72. Ibid., pp. 2542-2544 and 2603-2604.
73. Ibid., pp. 2587-2588 and 2538-2540.
74. Ibid., p. 2607.

CHAPTER FIVE:

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUGGLE OVER THE ORIENTATION ACT: FRAGMENTATION AND
CONSERVATISM

Introduction

It should be stressed here that we will not question in this chapter the notion according to which the bureaucracy has become a key political actor in the policy-making process. It is common knowledge that, in all modern, industrial democracies, there has been a shift in the balance of power between the Executive and the Legislative branches of government at the expense of the latter. And the formulation of the Orientation Act, indeed, sheds considerable light on the determinant function of bureaucrats in shaping and formalizing the scope and content of legislative decisions.

The problem raised now is somewhat different: is the bureaucracy the energizing source of change and innovation in the French political system as proposed by the stalemate society thesis? If this statement is correct, why and under what conditions does the bureaucracy acquire this role in French politics? Such are the critical issues which will be discussed in the forthcoming analysis. We will suggest, in this respect, that the elaboration of the Orientation Act does not support this basic contention of the "société bloquée" students. The French administrative class and the Grands Corps were too conservative and politically fragmented to become the motor of change and decision-making in the Summer of 1968. Moreover, their centralizing ideology of the "service public" and the sheer weight of their vested interests led them into a behavioral pattern of procrastination and obstruction sharply contrasting with the "activism" of the Education Ministry, largely orchestrated by the Minister and his staff.

For the sake of the discussion's clarity, this phase of the decision-making process has been broken down into two major sequences. The first began

in the Education Ministry and was dominated by Edgar Faure and his brain trust who succeeded in drawing up a preliminary draft of the Orientation Act by September 2, 1968. As is often the case in these early stages of policy-formulation, the Education Minister's activities took place in the privacy of the Rue de Grenelle's bureaux. Tactically, secrecy was also necessary as a result of the pressure of time (the Act had to be ready for the Fall) and the reserved reactions of the Majority and some university groups to the July 24th speech.

The next phase of the administrative debate was marked by a greater involvement of the various central administrations which had their own stakes in the university reform. Their ensuing tough negotiations with the Education Ministry were refracted in the tumultuous discussions of the Council of Ministers where the opposition of several key ministers to Faure was overwhelmed only by the President's final arbitrations.

The U.D.R. and the groups balk at Edgar Faure

From the Education Minister's viewpoint, the public's reaction to his July 24th parliamentary address was somewhat disquieting and ominous. True, Faure had been politely listened to by an attentive majority but the U.D.R. still remain reticent and hostile. At the end of the parliamentary session, the Party caucus met in the presence of the Prime Minister in order to discuss the nature of the institutional links which should be established between the Government and the Gaullist movement. Georges Pompidou attempted to persuade his colleagues to "loyally collaborate with the Government" and to "resolutely support his actions and General de Gaulle's in a close knit collaboration with the (Gaullist) movement." ¹ Instead, the Gaullists stressed the second

aspect of the former Prime Minister's plea in their final communique, emphasizing that " (this collaboration) will take place notably by means of the study and action groups which have been set up." ² Meanwhile, one of the most vociferous organizations of the Gaullist movement, the C.D.R. was clamoring for a "depoliticization of education at all levels" and asking for selection in higher education. ³

The reactions of student and teacher groups were not encouraging either. U.N.E.F. derided the Education Minister's speech as a "remarkable mass ex cathedra lecture". ⁴ In reference to the financial problems of the forthcoming 'rentree', the S.N.E.Sup. charged that Faure "had talked about gold but not about money". With respect to the reform of the universities, this group stressed that "neither participation, nor promotion can take the place of socialism for the workers." ⁵

The conservative camp had been profoundly irked by Faure's stated intention to do away with the study of Latin in the lycees' fifth and sixth forms. " Mass education" not Latin, was the real cause of the university crisis, wrote Fernand Robert, Secretary General of the Guillaume Budé Association, to the Education Minister. ⁶ The Société des Agrégés frowned upon Faure's threatening silence over the uncertain future of the agrégation and described the ruling out of selection as an "erreur capitale". ⁷ As for the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres, its leadership bitterly **deplored the** fact that Faure had shown little empathy for the "professors who had been submitted to the most unfair and humiliating attacks" during the crisis of ⁸ May.

The only supportive reactions to the Education Minister came from the

S.G.E.N. which "expressed interest" in the July 24th statement and the Vedel Federation which was "pleased with Faure's offer of a dialogue and intended to participate in it." ⁹ It is clear, however, that the new incumbent of the Rue de Grenelle could hardly take these cautious remarks as evidence of a firm political support.

Faure opts for a 'blitzkrieg' strategy: the August 6th project of Orientation Act

The hostility of the U.D.R., the reluctance and opposition of interest groups and the anticipated objections of the Grands Corps brought Faure to the conclusion that time was actually working against him. To delay action would have led to an exhausting 'trench warfare' which might have prevented altogether the introduction of significant changes in the university system. Only a 'blitzkrieg' approach to the resolution of the crisis could temporarily deflect the various oppositions in the making and prevent them from gaining political momentum. Moreover, it was politically and psychologically necessary to pull the universities out of their "anomic" situation by granting them a juridical status in the best possible delays.

Thus, Faure ruled out any recourse to the slow moving and time consuming procedural means which he was planning to set up concerning the problems of primary and secondary education. Instead, he decided, after a meeting with his staff, to proceed quickly and in the utmost secrecy. By August 6th, ¹⁰ the first draft of the Orientation Act was ready. In essence, it reflected Faure's effort to translate the general principles and ideas he had outlined on July 24th into a workable, preliminary political document, remarkable for a liberalism clearly derived from the "spirit of May".

Thus, the "missions" of the universities were broadly defined and couched in rather sweeping terms. According to Faure, the system of higher education was "to bring to the whole of our society, a means for its promotion and (the development) of its critical self awareness in order to encourage the harmonious evolution of its institutions and allowing the authentic participation of each man to his own destiny." More specifically, it was stated that the universities were to perform two additional functions: the training of all teachers and researchers and "éducation permanente" (continuing education) for the purpose of "recycling" and "professional reconversion". In reference to the issue of democratization, the preamble of the Minister's project emphasized that the universities were to remain **open** to all those "who had the ability and vocation" and "provide the possibility of a second chance for those who have finished their education or were not able to pursue it."

In dealing with the structures of the new university system, the August 6th project granted a considerable degree of administrative autonomy to the universities; their basic constituent units were the "departments", "constituted around a dominant, homogeneous discipline and its related disciplines". Although exceptions to the rules were allowed, these departments could "federate" themselves into universities within the framework of each "program Region" or "Academy". The project also stressed that all the universities were to be interdisciplinary and determined that both the department and the universities would enjoy "financial autonomy" as well as the status of "personnalité juridique et morale". At the apex of this decentralized system, a "Council of Higher Education and Continuing Research" would provide for the coordination and regulation of all the university establishments".

Turning to the internal structures of the universities, Faure unequivocally

reaffirmed the principle of participation: " Every university establishment is run with the participation of the faculty, students and where the problems are relevant to them, the researchers and the technical and administrative personnel. Lay persons (personalites exterieures) may also be called upon to participate in the management."

Two strings, however, were attached to the principle of participation, both aiming at reassuring those teachers who might have found the innovation too radical or threatening. First, the departments would be managed by four "sections", each with different spheres of **jurisdiction** and representing distinct categories of individuals. Thus, the "teachers section" (which could also include assistants) dealt exclusively with all matters related to the nature of examinations and degrees as well as those relevant to their careers. The "student section" was solely responsible for the "management of social and cultural institutions of interest to the students". Only a residual cluster of problems, pedagogical methods, the organization of studies, the curricula, etc..., fell within the rule making powers of a "mixed" section composed of teachers and students. Finally, an unspecified "organisme de compétence générale", comprised of students, teachers, researchers, representatives of the administrative personnel and eventually, "personalités extérieures", was responsible for the handling of administrative and financial matters.

Second, in all "mixed" organs, Faure cautiously warned that " the faculty representation cannot be lower than that of students'." Moreover, "in those cases where there is a tripartite representation..., faculty representation cannot be less than one third (of the whole)."

These provisions were obviously directed at preserving the interests of the faculty who feared to be outnumbered by students or any other group in the new decision-making bodies of the universities and their departments. On the whole, nevertheless, the proposed scheme of participation still remained remarkably liberal for the students. The same observation applies to that part of the August 6th project dealing with pedagogical problems.

Faure strongly stressed that the need for more imaginative pedagogical methods was imperative and the Minister relegated the traditional 'cours magistral' to a relatively marginal function. Selection was flatly ruled out. Instead, Faure devoted much attention to the "orientation" of students. To that effect, each department was to organize "orientation and probationary periods" during which all students would receive non binding guidance and counseling. Only in cases of repeated failures could students be compelled to transfer to another department or enter a professionally oriented short cycle of studies although special provisions were made so that they would not lose a year of study in this process of reorientation.

The last part of Faure's project contained important "temporary measures" related to the implementation of the Orientation Act. Within one month after the adoption of the reform, "Provisional Committees" would be set up in each university. These committees would include the Academie's Rector and the faculties' deans as well as a paritary delegation of students and teachers designated by the former two on the basis of their "representativeness".

The Provisional Committees were expected to establish an interim list of departments and draft a constitution (projet de statut) for the university. Each department would thereafter examine and eventually amend these statutes

which could be adopted only by an absolute majority of the teacher and student sections. Fusions of departments were allowed and a University was constituted as soon as half of its student and teacher population had completed this constitutional process. At this point, the universities themselves would follow the same procedure and adopt their own statutes provided that this was done through "representative institutions".

By July 1, 1970, the reform of the system of higher education would be completed. Only then, the National Council, "taking into account the experimental results of the new forms of management, (would) be able to harmonize the statutes of the university establishments by setting up formulas for model statutes which would allow options for all the faculties."

Appraisal of the August 6th Project

The Minister's resolution to improve the research and economic functions of a renovated and democratized university system more in line with the needs of a modern industrial society was reflected in the creation of interdisciplinary universities broken down into departments, the project's emphasis on the orientation of students, continuing education and the need to broaden the social recruitment of the system of higher education. In this respect, the influence of the 1966 Caen Colloquium and more specifically, the recent projects of the C.N.I.D. and the A.E.E.R.S. mentioned earlier, was particularly evident. Perhaps, Faure's greatest concern, however, was the resolution of the crisis of participation and access which had become so painfully evident in the preceding months.

The August 6th project was clearly and primarily a political response to

these issues related to the legitimacy of the political system. Thus, it stressed that change would not come from above and that the teachers and students themselves would be responsible, within the legal framework defined by the political authorities, for the implementation of the reform. The intervention of the State was circumscribed to narrowly defined situations. The principle of election at all levels of the new university system was emphatically reaffirmed. The participation of student in the projected structures of the universities remained broad in scope and significance and, although the August 6th project did not grant any legal recognition and status to the May June "instances de fait", those who had participated in them were still afforded with an opportunity to play a key role in the making of the reform.

Faure's initial project, therefore, sought to reconcile two of the conflicting policy objectives of French decision-makers: the need to preserve the authority of the State without stifling the grass roots movement which had developed in the Spring. It should also be noted that the August 6th proposal was a good illustration of what was described earlier as the Minister's "blitzkrieg approach" to the resolution of the university crisis. Faure's scheme made it clear that the process leading to the overhauling of the system of higher education - at least its first phase - had to be completed by January 1st of 1969. If by this time, certain universities had still not adopted their statutes, then the Education Ministry would be empowered by the Orientation Act to intervene in order to "determine the appropriate means of insuring their provisional administration and, for the time being, their representation in the National Council."

As we shall see later, political circumstances did not allow Faure to

follow this course of action and, in any event, the final version of the Orientation Act was significantly less "participationniste" and more "utilitarian" than the Minister would have liked. At this point of the analysis, it should be observed that the August 6th project was no more and no less than a rough, sketchy and tentative draft on the basis of which the negotiating process could hardly be initiated. The reader of this draft cannot fail to note the Minister's striking silence about the Grandes Ecoles, his ambivalence toward the role of lay person in the universities' councils and the general vagueness of the text, particularly on the exact modalities of student and teacher participation in the new university structures. All of these problems were obviously highly sensitive issues which, later on, were to trigger off a fierce political debate. For the time being, the most urgent task was to refine Faure's project and translate it into a more elaborate and specific legislative proposal.

The Minister's brain trust in action: the September 2nd project

Once again, the elaboration of the September 2nd project of the Orientation Act was surrounded by a relatively thick halo of secrecy. Only three high ranking civil servants from the Education Ministry actively contributed to its preparation and only a handful of persons ever had access to this document before the meetings of the Council of Ministers. In the middle of August, Faure's Directeur de Cabinet, assisted by two technical advisers, drew up a preliminary draft whose major provisions were thereafter approved by four other administrators from the Rue de Grenelle. The text of this "avant-projet" was revised and amended several times by its authors and Michel Alliot molded it into a legal framework. The document was then circulated for advice and comment among a larger group of persons in the Education Ministry. On August

29th, Faure went to the Elysée Palace in person to submit it to the Chief of State. On September 2nd, a "Conseil Restreint" attended by Edgar Faure and his junior minister, Jacques Trorial, Couve de Murville and Francois-Xavier Ortoli under the chairmanship of De Gaulle again met in the Elysee to examine the Minister's project, thereby beginning the proces of inter-
11
departmental negotiations.

The revised project of September 2nd was a great improvement over the document drafted a month earlier by Faure. Overall, the text was more specific and juridically precise. Thus, the universities were granted administrative autonomy by means of the creation of a new category of public institutions "of a scientific and cultural nature". This legalistic innovation was, in itself, a remarkable breakthrough in French public law. Administrative tribunals in France, had, in effect, consistently ruled that the "agents" and "usagers" of public services offered by the State could not "participate" in their management which remained a function and prerogative of the State. Within the framework of these new establishments "à caractère scientifique et culturel", this became possible.

Translated into political terms, this juridical revolution was nothing but the institutional and **legal** response Faure and his close collaborators saw fit to propose in order to meet the demand for "participation". The Education Minister had clearly not lost from sight that the reform had to be an "orderly" one, to use Pompidou's expression. Although the French Parliament did not object to it, the innovation was greeted, nevertheless, with concern and ambivalence by the bureaucracy. It must be added, in this respect, that several provisions of the September 2nd project had also profoundly disquieted the French administrative class.

First, Alliot's scheme proclaimed the existence of a student 'droit syndical'. Second, it stipulated that the rules of the Orientation Act dealing with the management of the institutions of higher learning might be extended and applied to the Grandes Ecoles which were not under the jurisdiction of the Rue de Grenelle and, third, that the reform would not be implemented by governmental decrees but through the statutes freely adopted by the universities and their departments.

True, at the same time, Faure and his Directeur de Cabinet had made conciliatory gestures towards the spokesmen of the various ministerial departments interested in the Orientation Act. They had, in particular, attempted to meet certain of the objections raised by the Prime Minister's staff by dropping the idea of an experimental year altogether and by deleting the August 6th project's provisions related to the role of the May-June 'instances de fait' in the implementation of the reform. Thus, the September 2nd version of the Orientation Act stated that the preliminary task of the Education Minister would be to draw up a list of the basic constituent units of the new university system, henceforth rechristened "Unités d'Enseignement et de Recherche" (Teaching and Research Units) instead of "Departments". Thereafter, elections would be held in order to designate "representative" bodies whose function would be to draft the statutes of the U.E.R.s. The contribution and participation of the May-June de facto institutions in this overall process was strictly limited to one eventuality: they could be consulted when the Education Minister was to prepare the decrees related to the preparation of the elections in the U.E.R.s.

These were considerable concessions on the part of Edgar Faure to all law and order minded bureaucrats and politicians. They were not, however,

sufficient to appease those ministers and high ranking administrators who were anxious to preserve the administrative and financial controls of the State over the universities, unwilling to integrate the prestigious Grandes Ecoles into an "inefficient and disorganized" university system and who feared the possibility of renewed political disorders comparable to those of the Spring. The "technostructure", to use Faure's own terminology, at first expressed its reticence quietly within the framework of an interdepartmental committee set up by the Education Minister in the Rue de Grenelle and then mounted a vigorous counter-offensive against the Minister's projects which eventually split the Council of Ministers and significantly delayed its deliberations.

The resistance of the technostructure

While Faure and his brain trust were busily involved in the drafting of the Orientation Act, a committee of approximately forty persons was simultaneously meeting in the Education Ministry. The Courraza-Trincal Committee (thus designated in reference to the names of its two co-chairmen) met formally five times during the month of August and discussed some of the substantive problems of the reform.

The actual role of this deliberative body has been appraised in markedly diverging terms, some arguing that it performed an important function in the decision-making process,¹² others suggesting that it had been set up by Faure for the sole purpose of "amuser la galerie" while key decisions were made elsewhere.¹³ Even in his memoirs, Faure makes no specific references to the existence of the Trincal group, merely observing that some members of his Cabinet and the Ministry's directeurs had assisted him in his negotiations

with university groups while others participated in the "secretive deliberations of the technocrats" ("conciliabules des techniciens").¹⁴

It is true that the Courraza-Trincal group never had more than deliberative advisory functions. It is also correct to state that its recommendations were not always followed by Faure and his collaborators as they were drafting the Orientation Act, and, with the exception of some of the Education Ministry's representatives, none of the members of the Commission were fully cognizant of Faure's intentions and specific plans. The work and deliberations of the Trincal Committee, however, acquire special meaning if we keep in mind that this body was the only institutional mode of interdepartmental cooperation set up throughout the entire process which led to the adoption of the Orientation Act. The President of the Presidency and the Prime Minister's staff, the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Public Function, Justice, Finance, Equipment and Social Affairs and Youth were invited to participate in the committee's debates and were, thereby, in a position to present their respective departments on specific aspects of the reform.¹⁵

Under these conditions, Faure was entirely free to overlook the advice of the Trincal group or limit its competence to purely consultative functions. However, in a broader perspective, the Education Minister could not fail to understand that the actions which this Commission took, recommended or left unresolved, actually reflected the existence or absence of a clear consensus within the French administrative class on frequently crucial aspects of the reform in the making. As a forum for the expression of conflicting administrative viewpoints, the Courraza-Trincal Committee therefore performed two essential "latent" or "symbolic" functions. First, it contributed, in a limited way,

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to ironing out some of the differences between the various representatives of the ministries and, second, it revealed the existence of unresolvable issues requiring political arbitration at a higher level of the decision-making apparatus.

On several problems, the Trincal group promptly reached a consensus. For example, it resolved that the system of higher education should be reorganized by means of an "Orientation Act" thereby excluding any recourse to the enabling powers granted to the government by article 38 of the Constitution. In the Commission's view, the Orientation Act entailed a temporary suspension of the Fouchet legislation in order to allow for a wide range of pedagogical, educational and institutional experimentation. At its first meeting, on August 7th, the Committee reaffirmed the need to broaden the definition of the universities' "missions", stressing that the overhauling of the university system should be coordinated with the projected regional reform and that it should be necessary to develop the corps of professeurs associés. These two measures, in the Committee's opinion, would be instrumental in pulling the universities out of their traditional insulation from "social and economic realities". The Trincal group also decided that the representatives of the May-June de facto institutions would be consulted during the second week of September and that this process would be carried out by disciplines or academic constituencies. Finally, it adopted a timetable in which it was agreed that the Orientation Act would be submitted to the Council of Ministers on September 4th and then sent to the French Parliament after consideration by the Council of Higher Education and the Higher Council of National Education.

None of these problems, obviously, raised any significant disputes. Most of them were essentially procedural and we saw that the solutions proposed by

the Committee had already been envisaged by Ortoli as well as by his successor. Moreover, insofar as the Commission was discussing broad principles rather than specific measures, conflicts were not likely to arise. On other issues, though, the process of consensus building was far more delicate and lengthy. This was true, in particular, with certain of the aspects of the principle of "autonomy".

The idea of autonomy could conceivably mean "competitive universities" (universités concurrentielles). On this point, two major opinions were expressed. The representatives of the Agriculture and Industry Ministries both demanded the creation of two distinct categories of universities, some controlled and financed by the State, others by private business interests. It was argued that their "competition" (concurrence) could only foster the modernization of the sluggishly evolving public universities. The objections to this approach were that a dual system of higher education might lead to costly financial waste in the State educational budget, jeopardize the national value of university degrees and further accelerate the draining of the best students from the State establishments to the Grandes Ecoles and other institutions of higher learning.

After lengthy discussions, the issue was settled not because Faure had indicated in his July 24th speech that he was not planning to use the North American model as a possible solution to the crisis of the university system but because most members of the Committee feared that the establishment of competitive universities might inject fresh fuel into the dormant but ever divisive and tension-producing, multi faceted political issue of "laïcité". Under these conditions, the Committee recommended that the State's monopoly over the awarding of degrees (collation des grades) be maintained. Private

universities, whether run by private business or religious groups could be created but would not be allowed to award diplomas without some State supervision.

The sensitive problem of competitive universities was only part of a larger bone of contention. The principle of autonomy also raised three additional interrelated and knotty issues. First, to what extent should the universities be permitted to freely recruit their students ? Second, up to what point should the administrative and financial controls of the State be lessened ? and, third, should autonomy also be applied to the Grandes Ecoles ? On all of these questions, there was little, if any, consensus.

Twice, the Committee discussed the fate of the Grandes Ecoles. On August 7th, it resolved that the Orientation Act would "primarily" apply to those institutions of higher education attached to the Education Ministry, although, at the same time, it stressed that a greater degree of coordination was needed between all of the other Grandes Ecoles and the universities. The issue was again debated on August 27th when the Trincal group discussed the modalities of regrouping all the various universities. It euphemistically recommended in this respect, to "ménager les susceptibilités" (guard against infringing upon others rights).... Hardly anything had, in fact, been resolved and Faure actually decided to ignore these words of caution in his September 2nd project.

On August 9th, the Commission began to deal with the financial aspects of the university's decentralization. Jacques de Chalendar outlined a project in which financial responsibilities would be distributed in two different steps. In the proposed system, the Government and the National Assembly would first determine the size and proportion of the national budget to be allocated

to higher education. In a second phase, this budget would be distributed to the universities on the basis of their respective needs and demands.

Chalendar's plan immediately provoked a crossfire of critical remarks. Some feared that the proposed scheme might "spread" to the secondary level of the educational system. Others asked how it would be possible to control and regulate the ever expanding demands of the universities. At what level should the process of redistribution of the national budget take place.... The Region, the Department, the University ?... Which university organs would make these decisions ? Would the universities themselves be granted significant taxing powers ? The Trincal Committee cautiously concluded the debate by recommending that it was necessary to avoid the "excesses of federalism".

On August 23rd, these issues were again raised but this time in the presence of several Inspecteurs des Finances. Ortoli's envoys made it clear that the Treasury firmly intended to be associated with the elaboration of any reform proposals which might lead to increased State expenditures. The Inspecteurs intensified their pressure to such an extent that in the subsequent and final meeting of the Committee on August 27th, Alliot finally conceded that, whatever the degree of financial autonomy granted to the universities, their creation would entail the use of a decree. The Finance Minister had thus made sure that Faure's decisions would always receive his approval. But, as we shall see later, the question itself was far from being settled.

The same observation applies to the problem of selection which split the Trincal Committee almost evenly. The representatives of the Presidency and the Prime Minister, interestingly enough, both professeurs agrégés,

vigorously pleaded in favor of the establishment of a mechanism regulating the flow of students into the universities. In their view, none of the functional and structural problems of the system of higher education would be resolved if this issue was evaded or sidetracked. The objection to this argument was that the introduction of selective entrance examinations for access to the faculties was politically dangerous and ill-timed. Furthermore, those who defended this thesis, emphasized that selection would be a "Malthusian" measure and that the real solution to the problem was to be found in a reform of the role of the baccalauréat and the creation of university colleges offering courses of studies overlapping with the lycees 'classes terminales' and the first cycle of higher education. Unable to formulate a compromise solution, the Trincal group merely acknowledged that selection was a "fundamental problem" and adjourned its meeting without further debate.

The Commission's work was even less conclusive on a remaining cluster of issues. First, no consensus could be reached on the financial, administrative and planning functions of the National Council of Higher Education and Research although the Committee reluctantly admitted that its membership should include lay persons whose identity was left undefined. Similarly, the Committee could not agree on an acceptable definition of the "departments" or the Teaching and Research Units, some suggesting that they should be unidisciplinary, others pluridisciplinary, in order to avoid the re-emergence of the old faculties. Finally, the whole question of "libertés politiques" was left unresolved. It was agreed that a distinction should be made between "libertés publiques" and "libertés syndicales" but certain members of the group stressed that it would be indefensible and politically dangerous to regulate those individual rights, universally recognized for all citizens in liberal democracies, only for the sake of gaining the support of those who feared

a "politisisation" of the universities. In addition, the Committee was unable to define specifically where students should be allowed to exert these "libertés publiques" within the universities' premises. The deadlock was, in fact total, and the overall question of political debates in the faculties was not resolved until the end of the parliamentary debate.

When the Committee was disbanded in the last week of August, its works had contributed to the clarification and ironing out of a few problems but, most frequently, had revealed the existence of persistent basic political tensions within the bureaucracy. The multiplicity and saliency of the outstanding issues and cleavages dividing the French administrative class would alone suffice to explain why the political struggle was almost immediately transferred to the highest levels of the decision-making apparatus. In addition, Faure's policy of secrecy and his disregard of some of the cautious recommendations of the Trincal Committee dismayed and angered several of its members. The strategy adopted by the Education Minister had undoubtedly sheltered him from immediate administrative pressures and allowed him to complete his reform proposals in a relatively short amount of time. This was not a negligible accomplishment but, although Faure had succeeded in delaying the administrative debate, he could not indefinitely postpone it. The inevitable clash of men, ideas and institutions, probably intensified by Faure's methods, found its outlet in the Council of Ministers' debates.

Collision course in the Council of Ministers

It has already been noted that Faure's project had been discussed during two Conseils Restreints in the Elysée Palace in the last week of August and on September 2nd. Two days later, it was submitted to the full Council. The Education

Minister then discussed, at length, the broad principles of the reform dealing in particular, with the functions of the universities, their internal structures, the respective decision-making powers of students and teachers, the nature and role of the National Council and the increasingly differentiated organization of studies he intended to introduce in the faculties. Faure's presentation was followed by a "broad exchange of views in which numerous ministers and the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, in particular, participated." No decision, however, were made; most of the ministers argued that they had not had enough time to thoroughly examine Faure's project. As the State Secretary for Information euphemistically put it, "although a great deal was already known about the reform proposed by the Minister, other elements of it were not."

Another round of official discussions took place a week later when the Council met on September 11th. Edgar Faure then gave more detailed explanations and clarified some aspects of his reform. This did not, however, satisfy the Council of Ministers' members who stressed that further consultation with the Education Ministry was still necessary. Thus, the Council agreed that no final decision would be reached before its next meeting. In the meantime, all the ministers would be allowed to "present their written observations and submit their suggestions either to the Prime Minister or to Faure who would meet together the following week in order to draft new texts."

On September 19th, the Council of Ministers finally adopted the draft of the Orientation Act. But the debates and discussions had been heated, passionate and often bitter. Behind the scenes, some ministers had not hesitated to describe Faure's project as "pro-chinese". Each article and paragraph of the Orientation Act draft had been critically scrutinized and screened by most

of the members of the Council, all of them asking for and frequently obtaining substantial alterations or modifications in the original text. In fact, the opposition of the ministers had been so intense that the Chief of State had to repeatedly intervene during the proceedings reminding them that their proposed amendments were not supposed to challenge the fundamental principles of the reform. At one point, responding to an overwhelming number of objections presented by Michel Debré, De Gaulle exclaimed "if we were to accept your arguments, the Minister of Education would be considered insane; I do not believe this to be the case."²²

Only the intervention of the Chief of State and his final arbitration in favor of Faure's theses put an end to the agonizing controversy which had deadlocked the Council of Ministers for more than two weeks. We saw, in this respect, that De Gaulle, in his June press conference, had made clear his determination to overhaul the system of higher education on the basis of the twin principles of "autonomy" and "participation". To that effect, he had given complete freedom to Faure in the formulation and elaboration of the Orientation Act, posing, however, one basic condition which he again raised in his press conference of September 9th: "As for the administration of the university and its duties, freedom and contestation are indispensable and it is normal for certain disciplines to cover political subjects. All of this, however, must be in accordance with the law.... The university exists for the Nation which means that the State must exert its influence and authority (over it)."²³

Inasmuch as Faure had respected De Gaulle's resolution to maintain the authority of the State over the universities,²⁴ the Chief of State accepted the reform proposed by his Education Minister even if it remained too liberal and contained too much decentralization in the opinion of some of his most

faithful followers. This did not mean that the pressures and demands of key members of the Council of Ministers had not led Faure to make significant concessions. As the press communique summarizing the final debates of the Government in markedly understated terms put it, "certain ministers have focused their attention on certain provisions, particularly when they concerned their own departments and they have proposed modifications...which the Education Minister...accepted to the extent that they did not challenge the key principles (of the reform)."²⁵ What were the main objections formulated against Faure and on which points did the Education Minister yield? We now turn to these two questions.

The September 2nd project on trial: The Grandes Ecoles

To a certain extent, it might legitimately be asked whether those aspects of the September 2nd project dealing with the Grandes Ecoles were not merely a more or less symbolic gesture on the part of Faure. Early in the Summer, the representatives of the Industry, Army and Scientific Research ministries began exerting pressure in the Elysée Palace and the Hotel Matignon stressing that the Grandes Ecoles could only be debilitated by their conversion into Public Establishments of a Scientific and Cultural Nature" attached to the Education Ministry. The demand was courteously formulated and mild in appearance but was tantamount to an absolute veto and the fate of the Grandes Ecoles was immediately sealed after the first meeting of the Council of Ministers.

The Prime Minister then argued that it would be catastrophic to let the universities'"virus" spread to the efficient and professionally oriented Grandes Ecoles and most particularly, the engineering schools. Not unexpectedly,

the Premier's viewpoint was supported by all the ministers responsible for the management of Grandes Ecoles but it was further bolstered by Pierre Messmer who emphasized that it would be detrimental to French national security to lift the Defence ministry's tutelage over those laboratories involved in military research and let them join autonomous universities.

Under these conditions, all the provisions of the September 2nd project dealing with the Grandes Ecoles were promptly deleted and it was agreed that the Orientation Act would apply only to the universities. It should also be added that Faure's initial scheme was further eroded by the Council's decision to go along with the Council of State recommendation to incorporate "derogatory rules" into the Orientation Act, this time, applicable to those institutes and schools juridically dependent on the Education Ministry itself. The question was again briefly raised during the parliamentary debate but, for all practical purposes, the issue had already been settled early in September. Faure's record on the problem of "participation" was somewhat better but the principle was salvaged only at the price of extensive concessions by the Education Minister.

The September 2nd project on trial: student participation

The dispositions of the September 2nd project relevant to the modalities of student participation in university decision-making raised a general outcry in the Council of Ministers and the Interior Minister led the counter offensive against Faure. Raymond Marcellin who "discovered...revolutionaries where the (Education) minister was looking for 'interlocuteurs valables'",²⁶ went as far as demanding the inclusion in the Orientation Act of rules enabling police forces to enter the universities premises without the prior accord of their presiding officers. The Council of Ministers overruled Marcellin but swiftly

deleted Faure's reference to the universities' "critical function" from the preamble of the Act. Furthermore, it introduced a series of restrictive amendments which singularly narrowed down the scope of student participation in university decision-making and safeguarded the interests of full, tenured professors.

Thus, in spite of Faure's already significant concessions on this point, it was agreed that the government project would no longer make any reference to the May-June de facto institutions. The Education Minister, in this respect, would only be allowed to undertake "the broadest consultations of all of the involved parties". The wording of this provision was vague and ambiguous and most members of the Council did not trust Faure's liberalism. Further precautions were therefore necessary. The rules governing university elections would not be laid down by ministerial arretes as stated in the September 2nd project but by governmental decrees. Auxiliary measures were also imperative in order to prevent the "gauchistes" from undermining the renovated universities and ensure that the elected student delegates would be "representative". To that effect, the Government decided to introduce a 'quorum' of participation in all student elections. If this quorum was not reached (the figure originally proposed was 50% but the Council opted for 60%), the representation of the students in the U.E.R. and university councils would be reduced in proportion to the difference between the actual number of participants and the 60% level required by the Orientation Act. In addition, the Council resolved that teachers and students would vote in separate colleges and that the student electorate itself would be broken down into different colleges defined by year and cycle of studies. It was also decided that the right of suffrage would not be extended to first year students because they might outnumber more advanced students and because a sizable

portion of them was likely to drop out at the end of the university year. On this last point, the September 2nd project merely stated that it was possible to "eventually extend the electoral franchise to those students who completed a year of study in higher education." However, the Council of Ministers later accepted an amendment proposed by the Council of State ruling out the possibility for the "redoublants" to participate in the electoral process.²⁷

The Council of Ministers displayed much of the same distrust towards students in its decisions concerning the composition and the responsibilities of the universities decision-making bodies. The Council deemed that it would be dangerous to let first and second cycle students become involved in the management of research centers, thereby reserving this prerogative to graduate students. Moreover, in the opinion of several ministers, there was still far too much "parity" among students and teachers in the governing councils of the U.E.R.s and the universities. Two amendments were therefore introduced in the September 2nd project, both aiming at sheltering the faculty from the pressure of students and assistants who had frequently supported each other during the events of May and June. The revised version of the governmental project thus stipulated that "representation by faculty who carry out the functions of professor, maitres de conférences or maitres assistants and permanent assistants, must at least be equal to the representation of students in student-teacher bodies, on boards and in other organizations in which students and the faculty are associated. Representation (in these organizations and boards) by teachers performing the functions of professor, and maitres de conférences must at least be equal to that of all the faculty."

As we shall see later, this issue was far from being settled since the

Council of Higher Education and the National Assembly recommended and sought to introduce even more restrictive clauses in the Orientation Act. So far, the Education Minister had been compelled to retreat from his original positions in order to preserve the "essential principles" of the reform. Paradoxically enough, Faure won his most difficult battle against the Council of Ministers on what was perhaps the most sensitive innovation contained in the September 2nd project: the financial autonomy of the universities.

A triumph for Faure: the 'a-posteriori' control of the universities budgets

Left largely unresolved by the Courraza-Trincal group, the issue of the financial autonomy of the universities raised bitter controversies in the Council of Ministers. Michel Debre, in particular, argued that Faure's reform would lead to a weakening of the State authority. In the Army Minister's view, the devolution of the State's financial powers to decentralized, elected university councils would lead to their being taken over by particular interests. Debré received the unexpected support of Marcel Jeanneney who, for different reasons, also opposed the September 2nd project. As a result of his personal involvement in the formulation of the regional reform, Jeanneney had come to the conclusion that Faure's scheme was not sufficiently "decentralizing"! Emphasizing that the overhauling of the system of higher education had to be closely coordinated with and actually integrated into the overall regional reform in the making, Jeanneney demanded that the universities be placed directly under the supervision of the Region's projected institutions.

The most virulent opposition to Faure, though, came from the Finance Minister and the Inspection des Finances. Their objections were primarily focused on the need to maintain an "a-priori" control of the State over

the expenditures of the universities. They insisted that it would become impossible to prepare and implement a "budget prévisionnel"; the universities demands would be excessive and consistently inflated, and, in the absence of any administrative a-priori controls, their budgets continuously in the red.

On purely logical grounds, the argument was not altogether nonsensical although it should be added here that it undoubtedly reflected what might be conveniently called a "corporate reaction" from the Inspection and the Treasury. As the sole "ordonnateurs" (managers) of the State expenditures (depenses engagees), the Inspecteurs des Finances enjoyed a considerable, if not determining political influence in the management of the State's institutions and decisions. The establishment of an "a-posteriori" form of control of the universities's finances could not fail therefore to be taken as a threat to the status and power of this prestigious and omnipresent Corps de l'Etat.

In any event, and whatever the interpretation and meaning that could be given to explain the position of the Ministry, the Inspectors lost their case. True, they succeeded in preventing the Conseil National de l'Enseignement et de la Recherche" from acquiring budget making powers. The State funds would still be appropriated by the National Assembly and allocated to the universities by the Education Minister only. However, the university councils were left free to use their "enveloppe globale" as they wished and organize their annual budgets without any preliminary administrative supervision. Further, minor concessions were also made to the Treasury (See Article 29 of the Orientation Act, for example), but the principle of an a-posteriori control of the State over the universities became the rule. On this key point, the final arbitration of the Chief of State in favor of Edgar Faure was not significantly challenged by the Gaullist party and the National Assembly.

Concluding remarks

As the successive phases of the administrative deliberations came to an end on September 19th, Faure had some ground for rejoicing. He had succeeded in preserving two of the fundamental principles of the reform and student participation and the autonomy of the universities were in the process of becoming political realities. These were by no means negligible accomplishments but the price the Education Minister had to pay was high and Faure would have probably been unable to overcome the resistance of the "technostructure" and key members of the Council of Ministers without the determining political support of De Gaulle. In any case, as a result of administrative pressures, the new draft of the Orientation Act was significantly less "participationniste" and the Grandes Ecoles would be left untouched by the reform. Under these conditions, it will be necessary to reconsider the assumption according to which the bureaucracy in France is the motor and matrix of change and decision making. Only because it had been politically unified by Faure, did the administrative class of the Education Ministry performed that function. The other branches of the Administration, however, were too divided politically and generally **too conservative** and Jacobin minded to fall into a similar "activist" role.

All of this, nevertheless, did not necessarily mean that the process of consensus building had come to an end with the last meeting of the Council of Minister. True, an important phase, if not the most important one, of the decision-making process had **been completed**. An elaborate draft of the Orientation Act was ready and some of the fundamental principles of the reform straightened out. **However**, the key issue of selection had been sidetracked by the Council of Ministers which had also taken an uneasy stand on the question of "personnalité extérieures" stressing that their participation in the universities councils

should remain optional inspite of the opposing viewpoint of the Council of State. Also, an agreement on fundamentals still left considerable room for political debate on several specific provisions of the Orientation Act. Interest groups and members of the majority party still held the view that Faure's project remained too liberal or not adequately oriented toward economic efficiency and rationality. In the following chapter, we turn to the activities of interest groups triggered by the **uneasy conclusion** of the administrative struggle.

FOOTNOTES

1. L'Année Politique. 1968 (Paris: P.U.F., 1969), p. 61.
2. Ibid..
3. Le Monde (July 28/29, 1968), p. 8.
4. Le Monde (July 27, 1968), p. 8.
5. Mimeographed note to its members. Published by the S.N.E.Sup.. Undated. (Personal archives).
6. Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé, No. 2/3 (June-October 1968), pp. 3-5. A summary version of this letter was addressed to all the deputies in the following days and Hyppolite Ducos (F.D.G.S.) took position against Faure's decision. On this last point, see Le Monde (July 30, 1968), p. 7.
7. L'Agrégation (June-July-August-September-October, 1968), p. 59.
8. Bulletin du Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres, No. 1 (October 1969), p. 12.
9. Le Monde (July 28/29, 1968), p. 8.
10. According to Françoise Bergues-Lagarde and Jean-Jacques Recoules, La Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur devant le Parlement (Unpublished Master's thesis, Paris: Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, October 1969), p. 18. Chalendar does not give any specific date but indicates that Faure's project was completed by the first week of August. Excerpts of this document appear in Jacques de Chalendar, Une Loi Pour l'Université (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970), pp. 256-265.
11. The following discussion is based on Recoules, Op. Cit., passim and Chalendar, Op. Cit., passim.
12. This thesis was defended in particular by Chalendar, Ibid., p. 21.
13. Recoules and Bergues-Lagarde, Op. Cit., p. 18.
14. Edgar Faure, Ce Que Je Crois (Paris: Grasset, 1971), p. 87.
15. It is interesting to note that two students and the Rector of the Angers Catholic faculty were also members of the Committee.
16. The following discussion is based on the minutes of the Trincal group's deliberations. These documents are available in my personal archives.
17. Even the representative of the Catholic universities argued in favor of a greater integration of religious schools into the State run system instead of their separation.
18. Articles et Documents, Nos. o.1921-o.1922 (September 13-20, 1968), p. 32. The full text of the Government's communique on the deliberations of the Council of Ministers appears in this issue.
19. Ibid., p. 31.

20. Articles et Documents, No. 0.1923-0.1924 (September 27- October 4, 1968), p. 43.
21. According to Jean-Jacques Recoules in Op. Cit., p. 25.
22. Cited by Pierre Viansson-Ponté in Le Monde (September 19-25, 1968), p. 1. (Weekly section)
23. Articles et Documents, Nos. 0.1921-0.1922 (September 13/20, 1968), p. 37. Faure notes here that De Gaulle did not even frown upon the article of his project referring to the "critical role of the University". See Edgar Faure, Ce Que Je Crois, Op. Cit., p. 88.
24. This is why Faure did not abolish the rectorship and the office did not become elective.
25. Articles et Documents, Nos. 0.1923-0.1923 (September 27- October 4, 1968), p. 43.
26. To use Recoules' appropriate expression in Op. Cit., p. 26.
27. The Council of State generally sought to exert a conservative influence on the content of the Orientation Act. It even proposed to delete the word "pluridisciplinary" from article 6 of the Law. The government, however, overrode the Council's recommendation. On this point, see Chalendar, Op. Cit., p. 169.

CHAPTER SIX:

THE GROUP STRUGGLE OVER THE ORIENTATION ACT: CONSERVATISM BUT FRAGMENTATION

Introduction

Are interest groups in France "delinquent communities" thwarting innovative decision-makers and driving them to humiliating defeat ? This statement should be considerably altered in order to explain accurately the data presented here. True, the elaboration of the Orientation Act suggests that the academic community and its formal, representative organizations exerted a generally conservative influence on limited but significant aspects of the reform. Faure's major problems, however, did not merely originate from the behavior and demands of arch conservative groups which never represented but a marginal, though powerful, segment of the University. The key question confronting the Education Minister was to build a constructive relationship with a plurality of actors characterized mainly by their programmatic and ideological fragmentation. To put it in succinct terms, the "problématique" of the groups in France is not their alledged conservatism but rather their excessive political divisions. The pattern of atomization of the group constellation gave the decision-making process in the Summer of 1968 its distinctive flavor, explains its apparent contradictions and ambiguities and leads the writer to believe that a critical ingredient of the French decision-making process is not the attitude of "delinquent communities" but the bargaining and negotiating skills of political leadership in consulting the groups while at the same time preventing the emergence of a strong enough coalition of "veto interests" **overstepping the limits** of their "interest articulation" function and keeping ideological conflicts **at tolerable and manageable levels.**

Faure's policy of consultation

Although the Orientation Act was later criticized for a variety of substantive reasons, the procedure which led to its adoption never became

a paramount issue as this had been the case for the Fouchet reforms. This ambiguity is not purely coincidental. As we shall see later, the consensus underlying the Orientation Act was extremely equivocal and fragile but the group involvement in the making of the reform had been significantly broad and unusually open.

As in the past, university organizations and individuals were consulted exerted pressure and proposed amendments in the Council of Higher Education and the Higher Council of National Education. What was new, however, was the resolution of policy-makers to open the decision-making process to the fullest extent possible. Thus, both the National Assembly and the Senate's Cultural Affairs Committees held public hearings on the Orientation Act, a rather exceptional step in the context of the French legislative process and most of the university groups took this opportunity to present their viewpoint. Moreover, the Education Minister, who, in his July 24th speech, had indicated his readiness to "listen" to all those might have a say in the formulation of the reform, organized throughout the Summer, a systematic policy of consultation.

The Summer recess is most usually a period of languid calm. Overcrowded university institutions are suddenly deserted after the hectic completion of national examinations and educational decision-makers have a short respite to enjoy the ephemeral satisfaction of having "muddled through" the academic year without experiencing a major breakdown in the university system. The Summer of 1968 was somewhat different.

The faculties were never quite empty and the austere buildings of the Rue de Grenelle quickly metamorphosed into a busy, humming, swarming place. As Faure himself writes,

...the Education Ministry began to awake to the new joy of life.... Delegations...visitors...swarmed over the old mansion of the Rue de Grenelle; conferences were held continuously; workgroups vied over inadequate and uncomfortable premises. Psychologists held their meetings in the Minister's dining room; the deans met in (a) small library.... On the first floor...Dean Vedel...surrounded by young economists trained in marketing and management and by a few enthusiastic students, was planning the Dauphine experimental center.... At night...other companions...joined us.... 2

This description is hardly overstated. Throughout the Summer, Faure and his closest collaborators feverishly prepared the forthcoming 'rentrée', sifted through the countless reform proposals drafted in the preceding months and worked out their own against a recalcitrant administrative class. They also managed to organize a very comprehensive, ongoing process of consultation involving individual teachers and students as well as representatives of university groups.³

The policy initiated by Ortoli was pursued by his successor and organized university groups were among the first to return to the Education Ministry. Alliot received the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres as early as July 12th and, in the following weeks, one or several audiences were granted to the Vedel Federation, the S.G.E.N., the F.E.N. and the Agrégés. As indicated in Appendix VI-1, frequent meetings with moderate students groups were also arranged by the Minister or his staff. The Association Corporative des Etudiants en Science de Paris and the F.N.E.F. had several opportunities to present their viewpoint on the reform. Among the more recently created organization, the M.U.R., the Comité de Défense des Concours and the Comité pour la Neutralité de la Réforme⁴ were all given special attention. Contacts were also made with radical student groups, U.N.E.F. as well as the Comites d'Action Des Lyceens, but they remained informal and took place behind the scenes, with the notable exception of the Student Action Committee of the Paris Medical School.

As the parliamentary debate approached, the consultative process became more and more publicized. Having already met with the Education Minister on July 17th, all the Rectors, accompanied by the Regional Prefects and the Academic Inspectors, returned to the Rue de Grenelle by the beginning of August. It seems that the idea of organizing a national paritary meeting of medical students and teachers, preceded by a series of preliminary consultations in the Parisian faculties came out of this conference. It was within the framework of this policy decision that the stormy and uproarious session of the Paris Pitie Hospital was held on August 30th. There, for several hours, the Education Minister flanked by the Minister of Social Affairs, confronted a divided audience of approximately two hundred persons and tried to explain and defend some of his ideas on the reform of the university system.

The participants to this 'forum' included numerous professors and the Deans of the Parisian and Provincila faculties as well as representatives of student and teacher groups (the already mentionned Student Action Committee, the National Association of Medical Students of France, the S.N.E.Sup., the Confederation of Medical Unions and the Federation Hospitaliere). Professor Debré, the author of the 1959 medical reform and Professor de Vernejoul, President of the powerful Conseil National de l'Ordre des Médecins, were also present. The agenda of the meeting included three basic questions: student participation in university decision-making, the reorganization of medical **studies** and the reform of hospital internship. Most frequently, however, the discussion focused on "la politique" in the universities premises and the meeting turned into a noisy and inconclusive "rap-session". This is why, when similar consultations were held in the dentistry and pharmacy disciplines, the overall process was much **more** formalized and received considerably less publicity.

Continuing his consultation policy with the May-June de facto institutions, Faure decided to follow the recommendation of the Courraza-Trincal Committee. The university system was mapped out and broken down into five major regions and their representatives, paritary delegations of teachers and students designated by the Rectors or the Deans, often from the "instances de fait" which had sprung out in the Spring, were all received in the Ministry during the first week of September. These meetings were not consistently fruitful or constructive; some radical students and teachers journeyed to Paris only to announce to Faure and his staff that they did not intend to speak to them!!! Most frequently, however, these discussions were useful. The Minister was always present, listening, answering questions and testing his ideas and those of his interlocutors.

The limits of Faure's open door policy

By the end of the Summer, political observers could only acknowledge that the decision-making process had been marked by a considerable degree of participation on the part of the universities' representatives and that Faure had played a crucial role in organizing and structuring it. The overall process, nevertheless had taken place within the framework of strict rules primarily defined by the Education Minister himself.

First, Faure never relinquished his secretive methods. True, he did seek to involve, to the fullest extent possible, all of the groups and individuals concerned in the formulation of the Orientation Act. He urged them to submit their proposals and present their views on the general principles and specific provisions of the reform.⁶ In addition, he even set up in the Ministry informal workshops dealing with some of the problems raised by the reform.⁷

However, throughout the entire decision-making process, Faure deliberately and consistently maintained an atmosphere of uncertainty about the exact nature of his plans. Only the Council of Ministers ever had access to the September 2nd project and the National Assembly's Cultural Committee had no knowledge of it when it began its hearings on September 5th.⁸ As for the groups, they began to know the substance of the Orientation Act through leaks to the press in mid-September.

Second, the Education Minister's meetings with university groups were never intended to provide the setting for a bargaining process leading to the making of concurrent political decisions. As a press communique released by the Ministry in mid-August succinctly put it, their only goal was a "reciprocal effort at clarification".⁹ In consulting the groups, Faure was therefore primarily interested in sounding them out over his own projects and intentions with the avowed objective of defining a framework within which he, alone, would be in a position to elaborate a reform proposal more or less acceptable to all.

Under these conditions, Faure ruled out any procedure which would have enabled the groups to acquire a veto role in the formulation of policy. As we saw earlier, he did not follow the solution he had adopted for dealing with the problems of primary and secondary education. Faure did not either accept the S.G.E.N.'s suggestion to institutionalize the unions' participation in the "management of change".¹⁰ Likewise, the Education Minister ignored the course of action advocated by the Student Council of France which would have turned the National Assembly's Cultural Committee into a forum for the articulation and resolution of the groups' conflicting claims and demands.¹¹

Of course, one can only speculate about the reasons which led Edgar Faure to limit the groups' contribution to the decision-making process to a strictly advisory and informative function. The pressure of time was undoubtedly an important factor in the Education Minister's strategy since the reform had to be ready in September. The determining consideration accounting for Edgar Faure's approach must be found, however, in his resolution to prevent the groups' ideological and programmatic divisions as well as the open or latent opposition of some of them from either slowing down the decision-making process or altering the content of the Orientation Act in too conservative a direction. These various factors will now be discussed.

The ideological and programmatic fragmentation of interest groups: the "odd alliance" of the radical and conservative groups.

Faure's opponents were indeed strange bed-fellows since the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres and the Société des Agrégés on the one hand and the S.N.E.Sup. and U.N.E.F., on the other, had little in common with the notable exception of their shared aversion for the reform. As indicated in Appendix VI-2, the two factions differed on everything and held diametrically diverging viewpoints on the Grandes Ecoles, selection, pluridisciplinarity and above all, student participation in university decision-making. Their apparent unified stand on the question of diplomes nationaux is misleading. The conservatives stressed that the control of the State was necessary in order to maintain the standard quality and value of the degrees distributed by the universities. The radicals deemed that the autonomy of the universities should not go as far as allowing the law of educational demand and supply to freely operate without State regulation: some degrees might thereby acquire more prestige than others of an equivalent level, depending upon which university awarded them. This was unacceptable to both U.N.E.F. and the

S.N.E.Sup. inasmuch as some students in search of professional outlets might be handicapped after completing their studies. Democratization precluded such eventuality. Moreover, it could lead to a taking over of the universities by private or business groups if their administrative autonomy was not checked by the State.

The opposition of the four groups was also grounded on political considerations. For the Autonomes and the Agrégés, the Orientation Act, by doing away with the old faculties, planted the seeds of educational chaos and also increased the likelihood of political disorders. In Deloffre's view, the reform was tantamount to an insult to the "dignité des chefs" and paved the way toward a takeover of the universities by radical students and teachers. Conversely, for the S.N.E.Sup. and U.N.E.F., Faure's project did not go far enough toward the institutionalization of what they euphemistically described as "universités conflictuelles" and did not fundamentally question the "bourgeois" character of higher education.

It should be emphasized here that the position of the Agrégés was somewhat different from the other groups. Professor Bayet was less adamant than the Autonomes on the issue of "political freedoms" and the principle of student participation in university decision-making. For the Agrégés, these were unavoidable evils which had to be checked and brought under strict control. This is why this group took a leadership position in unrelentingly pressuring policy-makers to expand the teachers' responsibilities and exclusive areas of competence in the universities boards. Also noticeable was the isolated attitude of the Agréges in relation to the a-posteriori control of university budgets.

There were no similar differences between U.N.E.F. and the S.N.E.Sup.

although it seems that the latter was more inclined to conditionally support the Education Minister on minor points. In contrast with U.N.E.F. and probably as a result of internal pressures, the radical teachers group agreed to play some of the rules of the consultative game layed down by Faure. Its representatives were received several times in the Ministry but, later, they declined an invitation to be heard by the National Assembly's Cultural Committee. Similarly, it appears that the S.N.E.Sup. reaction to the Orientation Act was less negative than that of the student union. In any event, these subtle differences, for the time being, did not lead to drastically diverging modes of behavior on the part of revolutionary groups.

The programmatic fragmentation of interest groups: the elusive and reticent consensus of the moderates

The reformist groups were, in appearance only, far more united in their support for Faure than the odd negative alliance of the revolutionaries and the conservatives. They all agreed (See Appendix VI-3) that the reform entailed a degree of administrative decentralization coupled with milder State controls in pedagogical matters. Also, they all stressed that the universities were to be interdisciplinary and that their management involved the participation of students. On the surface, therefore, they did not seem to fundamentally object to the Orientation Act. There were, nevertheless, deep fissures in this "consensus".

With the exception of the S.G.E.N. and F.E.N. which firmly ruled out any form of selection, most moderate groups seem to have had misgivings about Faure's decision not to establish a system of selective entrance examinations in the faculties. Although they thought that something should have been done to regulate the flow of students into the system of higher education, they

preferred not to raise the issue, stressing instead the need for the "orientation" of students. The problem could always been dealt with later at the implementation stage of the reform and this is indeed what happened, although the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Medecine did not wait that long. Its representatives pressed several Senators during the October parliamentary debate to introduce amendments to the Orientation Act aimed at establishing a quota system for the admission of first year students in medical schools.

Likewise, the consensus of moderate groups was highly ambiguous on the degree of administrative autonomy to be granted to the universities. The F.N.E.F. openly advocated the setting up of a system of "competitive universities" having recourse to private financing, recruiting students on their own terms and awarding their degrees without State supervision. Although the A.E.E.R.S. leaned toward the F.N.E.F. proposals, all the other groups were opposed to them. With the notable exception of the A.E.E.R.S. again, all university groups were extremely reluctant on the related issue of the sitting of laymen in the national, regional and university councils. The F.E.N. warned that the reform should not, in this respect, open a breach in the sacro-sanct principle of laicite and the S.G.E.N. accepted the innovation only at the level of the National Council emphasizing at the same time that personalities exterieures should primarily be recruited from the National Planning Commission Board.

Finally, the Autonome group, in contrast to the S.G.E.N., F.E.N., the A.E.E.R.S. and F.N.E.F. were particularly reticent to accept the introduction of pluridisciplinarity in the universities. The Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Medecine, for instance, pushed two amendments in the Senate which would

have created special universities christened "interdisciplinary" to the extent that they would have regrouped the existing medical, dentist and veterinarian schools and Dean Vedel, during the National Assembly's Cultural Committee hearings made it clear that the concept was redundant in regard to the Law faculties.

In the final analysis, it seems that a genuine consensus among the moderates only on the issue of student participation. They all accepted a differential mode of co-management which would allow the students to have a full share of participation in the management of their own affairs and a far more limited one in pedagogical matters. All other questions such as the designation of the members of examination boards, the determination of the content of examinations and the recruitment and promotion of teachers, they contended, were the faculty's "domaine réservé". On the whole, the moderates' position did not drastically depart from what Faure had proposed but it seems that the moderates were significantly more inclined to restrict rather than expand the scope of student participation in university decision-making. Most of them never went as far as the Autonomie Lettres or the Agrégés in this respect, but it should be kept in mind that they all had been traumatized by the May-June events. Thus, whether they perceived the university as a functionally differentiated community of scholars or were primarily interested in the administrative efficiency of its various governing boards or in the status of the enseignants and the maintenance of public order in the faculties, the moderates' proposals always ended up with the demand for a more or less stiff quorum of student participation in university elections or for the banning of political discussions in the class room, "la politique" being a topic of discussion allowed only in well defined areas of the campuses.

The ideological polarization and overall fragmentation of the group

constellation as well as the very ambiguous and conditional support he received from the moderates explain why Faure eventually ruled out any procedure which would have led to the formulation of a reform resulting from the free interplay of conflicting viewpoints. To institutionalize group participation in the elaboration of the Orientation Act and to have let them have access to the draft proposals prepared in the Ministry, would have, in all probability, considerably slowed down the decision-making process or even paralyzed it. The procedure would have been time consuming and time was a luxury the Education Minister could hardly afford. Faure, in fact, quickly realized that his "blitzkrieg" approach was hardly sufficient to keep under control the fierce resistance of the conservatives and the groups ideological conflicts within manageable limits since both found an immediate outlet in the politically damaging and passionate debate over "la politique".

The dispute over political discussions in the universities and its impact on the formulation of the Orientation Act

The fierce debate over " la Politique" which broke out during the first week of August must be understood against the background of a series of tense political events. Throughout July, sporadic but persistent student manifestations erupted in Paris and several provincial cities, particularly Avignon and Antibes, leading to the arrest of several students and the incarceration of Alain Krivine, the former leader of the J.C.R.. In mid-August, the Interior Minister made a violent speech in which he justified his policy of cracking down on the "subversive groups which are planning to overthrow the Republic". At the end of the month, Raymond Marcellin circulated a pamphlet entitled "the objectives and methods of revolutionary movements", sharply denouncing those who were "organized to seize power through violence".¹² Meanwhile, U.N.E.F.

seemed to lend additional credence to Marcellin's arguments by holding its widely publicized "People's Summer University" in Montpellier which, in spite of the presence of C.F.D.T. observers, did not attract many workers. 13

The powder keg was ignited on August 7th when Faure, after meeting with the S.N.E.Sup. leadership in the Rue de Grenelle, acknowledged that the Orientation Act should include provisions dealing with "libertés politiques et syndicales à l'intérieur des Facultés". The Education Ministry stressed that the rules concerning political discussions within the universities' premises still needed clarification and remained to be spelled out in detail although Faure's decision unmistakably amounted to a significant concession 14 to the radical teacher union.

The reaction of conservative groups was immediate. The very same day, the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres expressed its "indignation and stupor". Faure's decision, according to the "thunderstruck" Professor Deloffre, would put an end to the universities' "secular tradition of neutrality". The Secretary General of the Autonome also accused Faure of not having revealed his plans on "la politique" in his July 24th speech and announced that his organization would fight "by all means available all the decisions which might be made at the expense of the neutrality of education." 15

In the following weeks, the Autonome Lettres received the support of the Agrégés, 16 the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Science, 17 the F.N.E.F. 18 the M.U.R., 19 as well as various educational groups from the secondary school system. 20

Faure attempted to lower the temperature and appease the passions unleashed by his stated intention to allow political discussions in the universities'

premises by making public a letter he had sent to the President of the Fédération des Syndicats Autonomes. "It seems natural to me that students should be interested in politics, especially since several academic disciplines are devoted to it...", wrote Faure to Georges Vedel. "Of course, we must take precautions to assure that this activity will not become an obstacle to education and research (and) because it is an exercise of one's individual freedom, it should not be monopolized nor lead to intolerance."²¹

Vedel's emollient answer²² did not put an end to the wave of militant "a-politisme" which had seized most university groups and the controversy was further sharpened by an article published in the daily press by Maurice Duverger who praised Faure's initiative.²³

The Autonome Lettres resumed and intensified its press campaign. Deloffre accused Pr. Vedel of having expressed a personal viewpoint conflicting with the official position of the Fédération and of Duverger's comments, he pointed out with irony, "Is it necessary to plan special compartments in trains for protesters? And can leaflets be distributed and meetings held in subway stations?"²⁴ Simultaneously, the Autonome contributed to the creation of a "Liaison Committee for the Neutrality and Reform of Education" which, in mid-August began collecting signatures against "la politique" in the universities. More or less ephemeral groups supporting the "maintainance of legality" within the faculties' premises continued to emerge throughout the Summer and Professor Deloffre's organization succeeded in receiving the backing of non university groups like the C.G.T.-F.O.²⁵ Insults were traded and personal attacks became the rule of a debate which seemed to have gotten totally out of the hands of those who had initiated it. Thus, Vedel charged Deloffre of behaving like a "syndicaliste improvisé".²⁶ The Secretary-General of the Autonome Lettres accused the leadership of the S.N.E.Sup. of

"subversive activities" and Herzberg returned the compliment to Deloffre by describing his organization as a "bande de fascistes déguisés en professeurs".²⁹

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Clearly, the debate could remain within the insulated walls of the universities for long. The daily and weekly press provided a great deal of publicity to the dispute³⁰ and the Autonome Lettres brought itself the issue into the political arena. In July, this group had already sent to all parliamentarians a pamphlet entitled "Must the liberal University be assassinated?". In August, it contacted all the parties and in September, it lobbied in the U.D.R. meeting in La Baule and mailed to all the deputies and ministers a brochure sharply criticizing Faure's project.³¹

It should be pointed out here that the Gaullist movement hardly needed any incentive to inject new fuel in the political dispute which was polarizing the university groups. In mid-August, the C.D.R. accused the S.N.E.Sup. of having "totalitarian objectives"³² and, simultaneously, it announced the creation of a special committee dealing with the problems of national education whose primary purpose was to "unmask the agents of subversion, prevent them from unduly relying on the authority of the chair to organize the revolutionary mobilization of the fourteen to twenty years old age groups and undermine the moral basis of our civilization."³³

The Gaullist party also reacted bitterly to Faure's decision. In a widely publicized oral question in the National Assembly, a Gaullist back-bencher charged the Education Minister of "playing the game of progressivism" and Jacques Baumel, Robert Poujade and later, the entire National Executive Committee of the party took a staunch position against any "politicization of the universities".³⁵ Even the Gaullist political allies were themselves shaken since the Secretary General of the Independent Republicans stressed in

an interview that it would be necessary to "restore tolerance and liberalism
 in the system of higher education".³⁶

The consequences of the dispute over "la politique"

By the end of the Summer, it was clear that the bitter debate which had been triggered off by Faure had been politically damaging to the Education Minister in spite of his political strategy of containment. The dispute rapidly spread outside of the university and cost Faure whatever political support he ever had left within the Government and the French administrative class. As one political observer put it, after a single week of polemics, Faure had become "the lonely man in the Government, struggling with shadows".³⁷ Furthermore, Faure's increased political isolation among unrelenting law and order ministers produced the harmful impression that the Government was simultaneously pursuing two conflicting policies in the universities which, as we saw earlier, the C.A.L. euphemistically described as the policy of the "stick and the carrot".³⁸

The authorities' intransigence for the jailed students and the extraordinary number of "auxiliary precautions" they introduced in Faure's project in regard to student participation in university decision-making explain why U.N.E.F. remained eventually outside of the official decision-making process and ultimately decided to boycott the Orientation Act. There is converging evidence, however, that U.N.E.F. would not have adopted its inflexible stand of principled opposition if conciliatory gestures had then been made by the Government or the majority party during the parliamentary debate. Jacques Sauvageot, during the deliberations of the Higher Council of National Education did acknowledge that, in spite of all of its "ideological" shortcomings, the

Orientation Act remained flexible. As the leader of the student union put it, " the draft proposal presented by the Minister, for once, has a certain advantage which is to remain vague thereby enabling students and teachers to determine by themselves the conditions of their collaboration.... (the text) is relatively open."³⁹

In any event, another opportunity for appeasement and reconciliation was lost and the leadership of U.N.E.F. refused to play Faure's rules of the game and denounced the whole process as mere "consultationisme", an attitude which was likely to harden the political opposition of the conservatives.

On the university front, things were indeed hardly better. The debate over "la politique" was a grim but useful reminder to the Education Minister that to institutionalize the participation of university groups in the formulation of the Orientation Act would probably have meant the institutionalization of political chaos. The groups were simply too polarized along political and ideological lines and the moderates themselves generally failed to stand firmly behind Faure.⁴⁰ The restrained observations of André Philip went⁴¹ unheard in the uproar of unleashed passions and personal invectives. No one bothered listening either to the Rapporteur of the Contre Gouvernement on educational problems who deplored that the public discussion was too exclusively focused on a single problem at the expense of more important⁴² issues.

In and by itself, the idea of a politically neutral and consensual⁴³ university system was nothing but a reassuring myth. It was however, an influential one which could rally under the same flag the conservatives as well as the vacillating supporters of Faure. The conservative groups were

well aware of the fact that the Chief of State and his Education Minister were determined to bring about significant changes in the university system in spite of their opposition. They also knew, nevertheless, that the moderates were highly sensitive to all those aspects of the reform dealing with student participation in university decision-making and the status of the teaching establishment. Under these conditions, the conservative groups contented themselves with rearguard, delaying and symbolic actions on behalf of what they deemed vital but temporarily unattainable objectives (selection for example). More efficient pressure could always be applied later in a more favorable political environment. For the time being, they focused on the reform weakest link. Waving the flag of a politically neutral and functionally differentiated university system, the conservatives mounted a vigorous counter offensive first within the Council of Higher Education and the Higher Council of National Education and then in the Parliament itself.

The restrictive impact of the academic community on the Orientation Act

While it was still being discussed by the Council of Ministers, the September 2nd project, as required by law, was sent to the Council of Higher Education and then to the **Higher** Council of National Education. Neither of these bodies has effective decision-making powers and the Education Minister is not bound by their amendments. However, to the extent that those Councils reflect more or less accurately the "mood" of the university and the preoccupations of its senior members, their contribution to the decision-making process cannot be overlooked.

The deliberations of both Councils were brief but tense. The Council of Higher Education convened the 16th of September from early in the morning until

late at night. The Higher Council meetings were lengthier and lasted two days. In contrast with past experience, the two Councils were asked to examine a rather comprehensive reform proposal. They approved it in spite of strong opposition and only after introducing significant alterations in the September 2nd project.

The major objections to the Orientation Act were formulated by Raymond Aron in the Council of Higher Education and Marc Zamansky in the Higher Council. Still profoundly distressed by and discouraged by the "irrationality" of the May-June events, the French sociologist did not seek to criticize specific aspects of the reform although he had previously defended the cours magistral, denounced the "absurdity of student power" and the "demagoguery of parity" and the absence of selection in the Orientation Act in the National Assembly's

44

Cultural Committee. For Aron, the Orientation Act sought to reconcile too many conflicting interests and could not, therefore, cope with the deep seated university malaise. Furthermore, the reform was dangerous to the extent that it might lead to a lowering of academic standards and political chaos in the university system. Warning that the French universities might evolve toward the Latin-American model,⁴⁵ Aron strongly urged limitation of the scope of student participation in university decision-making.

Zamansky went much further than merely expressing skepticism and weariness about the future of the French system of higher education. The outspoken and fiery Dean of the Paris Science Faculty, spurred by his tense confrontation with Jacques Sauvageot during the proceedings of the Higher Council, proposed several amendments which would have drastically altered the Orientation Act provisions dealing with the administrative structures of the universities. Arguing that Faure's project would "pulverize" the authority of the State,

Zamansky put forth a complicated scheme of differentiated management councils which clearly reinforced the control of the faculty in the universities decision-making bodies and sharply reduced the influence of students.⁴⁶

Both Councils, however, were not ready to go as far as cutting the Orientation Act to pieces but their amendments clearly indicated that their members had not been entirely insensitive to the arguments of Aron and Zamansky. To ensure the "legality" and "regularity" of university elections, the two Councils demanded the establishment of separate colleges of students and teachers (far more differentiated than those proposed by Faure), a 60% quorum of student participation and a system of proportional representation. The Council of Higher Education, concurring on this point with the Council of State, excluded third cycle students from the management of research laboratories and kept first year students who had failed their final examinations out of the universities electoral process. Both Councils stressed that students should enjoy their "libertés politiques," only outside of class rooms and in well defined places of the campus. They also made sure that there would be no loopholes in the Orientation Act with regard to the responsibilities of teachers. A series of amendments in this respect, emphasized that the recruitment and promotion of the faculty as well as the curricula, examinations and jury duties were the sole responsibility of the teaching staff. On one specific point, nevertheless, the Council of Higher Education went a step further in attempting to protect the interests of the senior members of the teaching establishment.

One of its proposed amendments read as follows: "Representation by the faculty must at least be equal to 50% of the total membership in (all) mixed organs.... Representation by faculty who carry out the functions of

professor or maîtres de conférences must at least be equal to (the representation of other permanent teachers."⁴⁷ By demanding an equal number of representatives for the "corps enseignant" and the other members of the university councils (this category would have included students and laymen and the administrative staff), the Council was clearly aiming at doing away with whatever student-teacher parity there was left in the September 2nd project. The introduction of the notion of "enseignants permanents" into the Orientation Act had far more reaching implications. The provision was obviously directed against junior faculty members who were perceived as too restless and radical. It also betrayed a corporative reaction on the part of senior faculty. As Jacques de Chalendar writes: "The expression 'corps enseignant'...reveals the existence of a corporative reaction (and) betrays a need for security sharpened by the May contestation. Likewise, the members of the Council, by restricting admission into the 'corps' to the 'enseignants permanents' only, show their reluctance to accept as their peers persons who would not have followed the university⁴⁸ cursus honorum, whatever their titles and quality might be."

Concluding remarks

More will be said later about this 'réaction corporative' although it is already clear that several provisions of the Orientation Act - pluridisciplinarity, the participation of students in university decision-making as well as that of laymen - were often perceived as dangerous innovations threatening what was considered the legitimate dominant ethos of the university system by its 'establishment'.

This discussion also attempted to clarify the impact of a politically polarized and programmatically fragmented group constellation on the nature

of the decision-making process which, not unexpectedly, was simultaneously very open and highly secretive. The qualified support of most moderate university groups and the intransigent opposition of a minority of them which do deserve the qualificative of "delinquent communities", left the Education Minister with no other alternative than to orient his strategy toward the containment of his most outspoken opponents. From the standpoint of policy-formulation, Faure, considerably helped in this respect by the groups own divisions, had been relatively successful. He had not been able, though, to moderate the intensity of ideological cleavages reinforced by the emergence of the 'phénomène gauchiste'. Moreover, if the 'Mandarins', the Agregés and the Autonome Lettres had been contained, they had not been necessarily tamed. Frustrated in their demands, they had not yet exhausted their political resources and they still had opportunities for pressure in the National Assembly where most Gaullist backbenchers were unwilling to fall into line without first extracting concessions from the Education Minister.

FOOTNOTES

1. Assemblée Nationale, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales et Sociales sur le Projet de Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur, Compte-Rendu des Auditions de la Commission. Annexe au Procès-Verbal de la Séance du 2 Octobre 1968. Annexe No. 288.
2. Edgar Faure, Ce Que Je Crois (Paris: Grasset, 1971), pp. 65-67.
3. Even Faure's political opponents lauded him for his policy of consultation. See for example, Fouchet's statement in the National Assembly in Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 4, 1968), p. 3084.
4. The two last groups were established in the Summer for reasons which will be explained later in this chapter.
5. On this point, see L'Express (September 23, 1968).
6. The S.G.E.N. and the S.N.E.Sup., for example, sent their proposals and observations on August 14th and September 2nd respectively. Both documents are available in my personal archives.
7. There is converging evidence that Professors Deloffre and Herzberg contributed to the work of these informal workshops. Interviews with MM. Trincal in the Education Ministry and Paul Vignaux and Charles Pietri (S.G.E.N.) and Monteux (S.N.E.Sup.).
8. Its President, Alain Peyrefitte stressed that point in his opening statement welcoming Faure. Rapport de la Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Op. Cit., p. 7.
9. Quoted from Le Monde (August 18-19, 1968), p. 6.
10. To use an expression found in the above mentioned draft proposal of the S.G.E.N..
11. The President of the C.E.F. formulated this demand in the National Assembly Cultural Committee. See Rapport..., Op. Cit., p. 61. The F.N.E.F. made a similar claim in Le Monde (September 5, 1968), p. 8.
12. L'Année Politique. 1968 (Paris: P.U.F., 1969), p. 59.
13. Le Monde (August 16, 1968), p. 6.
14. Le Monde (August 9, 1968), p. 6.
15. Bulletin du Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres, No. 1 (October 1969), p. 12. See also Le Monde (August 9, 1969), p. 6.
16. L'Agrégation (October 1968), p. 63.
17. Le Monde (August 11-12, 1968), p. 6.
18. L'Année Politique, Op. Cit., p. 59.

19. Le Monde (August 13, 1968), p. 6.
20. Le Monde (August 18-19, 1968), p. 14 and (August 13, 1968), p. 6. The reaction of these groups can be explained by the fact that Faure was planning to allow students' representatives to sit in the lycées' 'conseils de classe'.
21. Le Monde (August 10, 1968), p. 2.
22. Le Monde (August 11-12, 1968), p. 6.
23. Le Monde (August 14, 1968), pp. 1 and 6.
24. Bulletin du Syndicat Autonome..., Op. Cit., p. 13.
25. This committee included the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres, the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Science, the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Medecine, the Confédération des Groupes Autonomes de l'Enseignement Public, the C.G.C., the Mouvement de l'Organisation pour la Liberté, the M.U.R. and the Comité de Liaison de l'Enseignement Supérieur which itself was a federation of the S.N.A.L.C., the Société des Agrégés, the Association des Etudiants en Sorbonne and the three above mentioned Autonome unions. See Le Monde (August 6, 1968), p. 8 and (August 20, 1968).
26. See for example Le Monde (August 14, 1968), p.6 and (September 1-2, 1968), p. 7.
27. Bulletin du Syndicat Autonome..., Op. Cit., p. 18.
28. Le Monde (August 20, 1968), p. 6.
29. Le Monde (August 10, 1968) and Bulletin du Syndicat Autonome..., Op. Cit. p. 14.
30. At the request of the Autonome Lettres, the Figaro agreed to publish a story entitled " Neutrality or Politicization" which asked the newspaper reader to write to Deloffre's organization in support for "the absolute respect of the political, religious and ideological neutrality of the French educational system at all levels". Deloffre acknowledged later that he received only 600 answers. On this point, see Ibid., p. 14. Several journalists of varying political background also published 'committed' articles in Le Figaro Littéraire, No. 1162 (August 12-18, 1968) and Le Nouvel Observateur, No. 194, 195 and 196.
31. This memorandum stressed in particular that 66% of the French population was opposed to the introduction of 'la politique' in the universities. The survey had been conducted by the Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique and had been ordered and in part paid for by Deloffre group. See Bulletin du Syndicat Autonome..., Op. Cit., pp. 18-19.
32. Le Monde (August 18, 1968), p. 7.
33. Cited from L'Express, No. 892 (August 12-18, 1968), p. 16.
34. Le Monde (August 13, 1968), p. 6.

35. La Nation (September 5, 1968), p. 1.
36. Le Monde (August 22, 1968), p. 9.
37. L'Express, No. 893 (August 19-25, 1968).
38. Raymond Barillon made a similar point in Le Monde (Weekly Selection) (August 8-14, 1968), p. 1.
39. Quoted from the minutes of the meetings of the Higher Council of National Education available in my personal archives. Sauvageot's statement is also cited in part by Jacques de Chalendar in Une Loi Pour l'Université (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1971), pp. 113. See also Sauvageot's 'Tribune Libre', "Non, La Baule n'est pas une ville universitaire," in Le Monde (September 12, 1968), p. 10, in which the Vice President of the radical student union makes a similar remark.
40. Only the S.G.E.N., the C.L.E.R.U. and the F.E.N. mildly supported Faure. See Le Monde (August 22, 1968), p. 9; Le Figaro Littéraire, No. 1165 (September 2-8, 1968), pp. 12-14 and L'Enseignement Public, No. 1 (August September 1968), pp. 2 and 3.
41. Le Monde (September 5, 1968), p. 8.
42. Le Monde (September 4, 1968), p. 9.
43. This point is developed by Michel Amiot, " La Politique dans l'Université L'Homme et la Société, No. 16 (April-May-June 1970), p. 101.
44. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Op. Cit., pp. 71-74.
45. Fouchet made the same point during the parliamentary debate. Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 5, 1968), p. 3084.
46. For more details, see Chalendar, Op. Cit., p. 143.
47. Compare this amendment with the September 2nd project as altered by the Council of Ministers.
48. Chalendar, Op. Cit., p. 113.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

THE PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE OVER THE ORIENTATION ACT: THE RESOLUTION OF AN
INTRA-PARTY CONFLICT

Introduction

Is the French Parliament made up of a collection of "delinquent communities"? Did the Legislature behave accordingly during the elaboration of the Orientation Act? These contentions are not supported by our data. Of course, there were demagogues of the Left and the Right in both the Senate and the National Assembly, who, willy nilly, defended the status quo. Ideological disputes, however, were muted (though not altogether absent) and, on the whole, the legislative debate was an enlightening model of a constructive and educational experience.

Did French parliamentary elites refuse to negotiate, bargain and compromise? Again, we did not find any factual evidence legitimizing these claims. The legislative struggle was undoubtedly characterized and structured by the conflict pitting Edgar Faure against his restless but divided majority and, clearly, the U.D.R. backbenchers still found the Minister's project unpalatable and too "permissive" and "liberal" in spite of the alterations introduced by the Council of Ministers. Why then did the Gaullists (almost) unanimously voted the Orientation Act? As we shall see, the U.D.R. fell into line only after a lengthy process of mutual adjustments and compromises during which the unduly underestimated majority party exerted a subtle but real influence matched, however, by the dazzling political leadership of the Education Minister. Under these conditions, the following account of the parliamentary debate over the Orientation Act will emphasize these two key variables which the stalemate society students either overlook or downgrade in their description of the decision-making process in France: the value of leadership skills in building a political consensus and decision-making through mutual adjustments and compromises.

Prelude to the parliamentary struggle: The Gaullist Action and Study Groups meet in La Baule (September 10th-13th).

Commenting on the overall aspects of the legislative process, Jean-Jacques Recoules observed that Faure consistently sought to "flirt with the opposition and the rallies while chattering with the Gaullists".¹ The term 'badinage' used in the French text is somewhat misleading because there was never any romance involved in Faure's relationship with the U.D.R.. In July, the Majority had already expressed its misgivings about hasty or too radical changes in a disorderly university. The reticence of the U.D.R. again came to a fore when the Party met in La Baule on September 10th.

To describe this widely publicized conclave as mere "Journées d'Etudes" as its organizer, Roger Tomasini, christened it, would be a gross understatement. The first avowed objective of the Gaullist meeting was, again, to call upon the Government not to overlook the "suggestions and critiques" of the Majority.² Although the demand of the President of the parliamentary group for the establishment of a "permanent delegation of the Majority" institutionalizing the Government and the U.D.R. rapports was not acted upon, the presence of several ministers and Couve de Murville in La Baule was a clear indication that the Government was not taking these warning signals lightly.

The second objective of the Party's gathering was to articulate coherently its position on various policy matters. To that effect, the Gaullist deputies discussed the recommendations of the "Study and Action Groups" they had set up in July. Thereafter, they adopted policy resolutions which marked the completion of the "study days".³ The "pré-rapport" of the Action and Study Group on higher education, authored by Rector Capelle, made it plain that none

of its members had remained indifferent to the dispute of the preceding month over "la politique" and insensitive to the demands or reticences of the moderate and conservative groups.⁴

The Capelle's pré-rapport overlapped with Faure's project only on a limited number of points. For example, it stressed the need to enhance the prestige of technical higher education, urged the abolition of "medieval", "patrimonial" chairs and proposed an organizational scheme which overhauled the traditional division of the university system into faculties. On all other matters, however, the propositions of the Action Group clashed with the stated intentions of the Education Minister. Thus, Capelle openly called for the establishment of selective entrance examinations. According to the former Rector, the universities should become autonomous and be allowed to determine their own student admission policy because it was impossible not to acknowledge "the natural law of selection, according to which the most difficult roads (to higher education) are opened only to those who excel." In regard to student participation in university decision-making, Capelle warned that "it should be kept in mind that the primary duty of a student is not to... 'jouer à l'administrateur' but to study." Finally, the Action Committee sternly reaffirmed its opposition to the "politicization of a public service, that is to say to ideological confrontations in places which are destined to the welfare of all."⁵

The floor debate which followed was tense. Personal attacks against Faure were often enmeshed in substantial critiques of what was known of his project. Sanguinetti fiercely denounced the Education Minister was a "man of the Fourth Republic" while Pompidou sourly ironized about the "thorough" and "radical" reform planned by the Grand Maître de l'Université. All the orators dealt with the issues raised by Capelle and Andre Fanton summed up the views of many back-

benchers when he stated: " We feel that the policy that is being envisaged is very different from what we expected."⁶

Edgar Faure met this concerted offensive with conciliatory gestures. He stated that he was an "advocate of political freedom" but remained opposed to their seizure by any group, that he had no intention to allow any one "challenge the university and the State". At the same time, however, the Education Minister vigorously defended his educational objectives and his consultative policy which had been loudly decried for leaning too much in favor of the "enragés" and he warned: " I believe that our electors do not merely expect from us the maintenance of law and order. We are men of order but we must also be 'hommes de la pensée'⁷".

Faure's firm stand must have somewhat shaken the Gaullist opposition. The final resolutions of the Action Group on Higher Education agreed upon by the Party (significantly enough without any formal vote) were less openly critical and were couched in such ambiguous terms that they were not likely to antagonize anyone. Thus, Pompidou's ominous demand to establish a watchdog committee of the Majority in the Education Ministry was not adopted and the U.D.R. seemed to give its approval to the reform, at least in its general principles. The Gaullists decided that the "universities must become autonomous. This will enable them to diversify their offerings, make possible their adaptation to regional economic realities. We will also be able to create technical universities and reconcile the privileges granted to the faculty with the need to call upon qualified laymen from outside the universities. Eventually, a fruitful emulation (among the universities) might emerge from this process." As to student participation in university decision-making, " as a rule, students must be...associated to the management of the universities according to modalities varying with the various

subject matters to be dealt upon". Finally, the Party agreed that it was necessary to make a distinction between the "need to teach political science disciplines and the possibility of political debates in the universities which is obviously dangerous."⁸

Subsequent relations between Faure and the Majority were significantly less tense than at the beginning of the La Baule meeting.⁹ On September 17th, the Education Minister had a three hour meeting with the U.D.R. deputies in the National Assembly. Faure again reminded his Gaullist backbenchers that he would remain at his post as long as he had the confidence of the Chief of State. At the same time, he reassured them stressing in particular that he would "never allow a red flag or a black fleg to be raised on a building" of which he was in charge. Above all, he announced that he had ruled out any recourse to a vote bloque (blocked vote) during the parliamentary debate, thereby making it clear that the U.D.R. could propose as many amendments to the Orientation Act as it would see fit.

The simmering conflict between Faure and the Gaullist party had thus been contained within acceptable limits but was only postponed until the final parliamentary discussion of the reform. The adoption of loosely defined principles susceptible of conflicting interpretations did not reflect a genuine, supportive consensus within the U.D.R. rank and file. In spite of the evolving attitude of some deputies,¹⁰ the strong undercurrent of opposition to Faure had by no means disappeared. The Majority was assuredly not ready to challenge openly the authority of the Chief of State but neither was it willing to accept a reform without first posing its conditions and possibly obtaining considerable concessions. The report prepared by Rector Capelle for the National Assembly's Cultural Committee clearly showed that the Orientation Act did not have the unanimous

blessings of the Gaullist backbenchers.

A restive Majority: the report of the National Assembly's Cultural Committee

Subject to the approval of several amendments by the National Assembly, Rector Capelle recommended the adoption of the Orientation Act. The stated objective of the alterations proposed by the Committee was to "foster the provisions (of the Act) implementing the principles of participation and autonomy and to prevent abuses."¹¹ Capelle's arguments and demands, however, indicated that the Commissaires had been more concerned with the prevention of "abus" rather than with the effective implementation of the principles of participation and autonomy as Faure understood them.

The provisions of Faure's project dealing with two aspects of the universities' autonomy were not questioned by the Committee. Capelle ruled out any return to the pre-existing system of administrative centralization in pedagogical matters while maintaining that milder forms of State regulations remained necessary in order to guarantee the national value of the degrees awarded by the universities. He also strongly supported the idea of an a-posteriori administrative control of the universities's budgets although, at the same time, he requested derogatory rules for the former Science faculties taking into account the long term nature of their capital expenditures.¹² These were, nevertheless, the only areas of agreement between Faure and Capelle.

Waving the flag of 'laïcité' and warning against the dangers of 'intimidation' and "indoctrination", the Committee found Faure's project full of shortcomings on the issue of political discussions in the universities' premises. Capelle welcome the limitations introduced in this respect by the Council of Ministers.

He demanded, however, "further auxiliary precautions" to preclude the exclusive
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 "rule of a faction". By requesting that the universities be allowed to freely
 recruit their students, the former Rector made it evident that the problem of
 selection had not been buried in La Baule. Capelle also called for the
 mandatory sitting of laymen in the university councils in contrast with Faure's
 project which stipulated that their participation should remain merely optional.
 Finally, the Committee's spokesman launched a savage attack on the scheme of
 student participation proposed by the Education Minister. His critique, relying
 on an enlightening metaphor, deserves to be quoted in full for a better
 understanding of the forthcoming struggle over this issue:

In the university as in any other enterprise, a distinction must
 be made between...the persons who have decision-making responsibilities
 - let us call them 'enseignants principaux'- and...the subordinate faculty
 (enseignants subordonnés), the students and the personnel of the various
 services of the establishment. Under these conditions, it would have been
 natural to lay down the principle of a paritary representation (in the
 university councils) between the enseignants principaux and the other
 categories of the academic community. Far from it, the project... (of
 Faure) grants half the seats to the students and the 'responsables' are
 in the position of a largely dominated minority. The weariness... of
 the 'responsables' is therefore not surprising. 14

Inasmuch as the Committee accepted only what it described as "parite
 restreinte" between students and "enseignants principaux", its proposals
 were tantamount to a drastic revision of the Orientation Act.

The Committee report was a crucial step in the legislative process. Not
 only did it reveal the major sources of concern of the Majority, it also
 determined much of the content of the parliamentary debate. As Jacques de
 Chalendar observes on this point,

Participation alone occupies more than a third of the time devoted
 to the discussion of the articles (of the Orientation Act)... The Assembly's
 interest (in participation) is not the result of pressure applied by
 certain groups of teachers only, or the Majority's concern over the behavior
 of leftist students; the technical problems raised by (the issue) of
 participation in addition to its implementation are familiar to the

parliamentarians: allotting of seats in the councils, the establishment of electoral rules, discussions on the quorum or the electoral systems. It is also because the Assembly feels competent in dealing with these kinds of issues that it will discuss (at length) the composition, nomination and powers of the regional councils and the National Council. 15

The second part of Chalendar's analysis should not be overestimated. The long and heated debates over the quorum and the number of seats to be allotted to the representatives of students and *personnalités extérieures* in the university councils, to cite these two issues only, were not merely disagreement over technicalities. First and foremost, they reflected the existence of fundamental divergences over the nature of the main axis of the reform. Should students and laymen be allowed to participate in university decision-making, should the university system be opened to the influence of an evolving economy and society, and if so, to what extent? These were the real questions underlying the controversies over figures and percentages. In this respect, the divisions of the French Parliament and in particular, the fragmentation of the Majority over most of the issues raised by the Orientation Act, considerably facilitated the consensus building task of the Education Minister.

A restive but fragmented majority

While the general mood of the Gaullist party was conservative, the opposition of the U.D.R. to Edgar Faure was by no means homogeneous and monolithic. The La Baule meeting had been intended to display an impressive show of unity but the policy resolutions which were agreed upon merely consisted of elusive principles. In fact, as pointed out earlier, they were not even put to the test of a formal vote by the rank and file: on the verge of an important debate, it would have been untimely to publicize any internal dissensions. However, the Government had decided not to enforce party discipline during the votes of the amendments and articles of the Orientation Act. The latent divisions of

the U.D.R., thus, came to a fore during the floor discussions.

Constructed on the basis of policy statements and amendments proposed by the Gaullist deputies who played a prominent role during the debate, Appendix VII-1 shows a rather high degree of fragmentation and the absence of a clear consensus within the U.D.R. on several aspects of the Orientation Act. The opposition of the Gaullist was most intense and unified on those matters related to the status of students in the universities. This was particularly true for selection and to a much greater extent for any plan involving a paritary representation of students and teachers in the universities' decision-making bodies. On other related problems, the Majority was divided. Thus, the Cultural Committee of the National Assembly asked for a quorum of 66% but several deputies would have preferred a higher figure in contrast to the more liberal attitude of David Rousset for example. As for Capelle, Boscher, Kasperit and Hamon, they all demanded a mandatory voting system. Most of the U.D.R. backbenchers asked for "auxiliary precautions" against "excessive" modalities of student participation in university decision-making but the former Education Minister, Christian Fouchet, remained reticent, if not hostile. Boscher, Fanton, De Grailly and Sanguinetti who considered the events of May as a "phenomenal explosion of intellectual and political infantilism",¹⁶ were all opposed uncompromisingly to political discussions in the universities' premises even if these rights were strictly codified and limited by the Orientation Act. On pedagogical issues, Hamon and Sanguinetti objected to the creation of interdisciplinary universities and Triboulet made a glowing plea in favor of the study of Latin in the Lycees and the massive doctoral thesis required by the Liberal Arts Faculties. Sanguinetti was perhaps the fiercest Jacobin in the National Assembly, opposing any form of administrative decentralization while several deputies - Peyrefitte, Boscher, Fanton and Habib-Deloncle, though for

varying reasons, leaned toward the establishment of a system of competing universities close to the North American model. Finally, Capelle was far more reserved than most Gaullists over the seating of personalites exterieures in all of the university councils and practically stood alone in favoring an extension of the Education Ministry's purview over some of the Grandes Ecoles.

Fully aware of these divisions which considerably weakened the U.D.R. resistance, Faure did not hesitate to exploit them during the floor debate. In addition, the Education Minister could always count on the firm political support of the other parties present in the National Assembly.

Faure's political allies in the National Assembly

The Center and Left parties in the National Assembly had several reservations concerning the proposed Orientation Act. The Independent Republicans and the P.D.M. found the provisions dealing with the administrative and financial autonomy of the universities too restrictive and the F.D.G.S. and the C.P. considered the Government project inadequate on the issue of democratization. As indicated in Appendix VII-2, there also serious differences between the two groupings over the Grandes Ecoles, the role of personnalités extérieures and the degree of decentralization they deemed necessary to introduce in the university system.

However, these cleavages did not develop into stalemating political disputes and the reticences of the four parties did not lead them to oppose the Orientation Act. Moreover, their position on most aspects of the reform was far more liberal than the U.D.R.'s. As the parliamentary debate opened,

Faure immediately understood that he could always rely on the Left and Center parties. Gilbert Faure, Rene Billères, Dupuy, Jacques Duhamel and Claude Guichard praised the Education Minister for his consultation policy of the Summer and stressed that their major objection to the Orientation Act was that it incorporated too many of the conservative demands formulated by the Gaullist majority and certain university groups. The support of these parties was at times crucial in helping Faure to overcome the resistance of the U.D.R.. In any event, the Education Minister could still have recourse to an additional ally whenever this assistance was insufficient.

The Senate is turning "red" !!!

"The Senate is turning red" exclaimed a Gaullist deputy during the floor discussions. This was certainly not true for a minority of Senators like MM. Henriot and Galvan whose demands and amendments reflected the position of the Autonomie groups (the medicine teachers in particular). Nor could the concept be easily applied to a political institution whose membership, in terms of its recruitment and social background, was closer to traditional, rural France than to the new crop of urban radicals produced by the social and economic revolution of the last twenty years. In any case, the Higher Chamber, whose very existence had been threatened by De Gaulle's project of 'régionalisation' was assuredly 'pinker' than the National Assembly in regard to the Orientation Act.

Edgar Faure, a former Senator himself, was at home in the old mansion of the Luxemburg Gardens. The Education Minister received the immediate and warm support of Marcel Prélôt (U.D.R.), Berthoin (Democratic Left) and several

Communist Senators and even before attempting to formally defend his reform, won the consent of the Senate. The rapporteur of the Senate's Committee on Cultural Affairs praised the Orientation Act in unambiguous terms: "It has an immense merit: it exists...and is a timely measure."¹⁸

Cornu's rapport was in most respects closer to Faure's conceptions than to the recommendations and amendments proposed by Rector Capelle in the National Assembly. The rapporteur of the Senate's Cultural Committee, in contrast with Capelle, did not eulogize the now defunct Napoleonic university system. Instead, Cornu dealt at length with the events of May in a way reminiscent of the Education Minister's speech of July 24th. In discussing the specific provisions of the Orientation Act, Cornu made it clear that there was no need for additional "auxiliary precautions" guaranteeing the rights and responsibilities of the faculty in the universities boards. Those introduced by the Council of Ministers were sufficient. The Committee also expressed its firm opposition to any form of selection. It demanded, in addition to a 60% quorum of student participation in university elections, a "generous" and "frank" autonomy for the faculties and regretted that the Grandes Ecoles were not included in the scope of the reform. Finally, the Committee proposed two amendments which would have led to the distribution of an "allocation d'études" to all students and which explicitly spelled out the details of the new system of examinations to be used in the universities ("notation continue").¹⁹

Throughout the debate, and inspite of its limited legislative powers, the Senate was a precious ally to the Education Minister. Its political support and amendments contributed to the openness of the legislative process and, to a certain extent, this explain why the final draft of the Orientation Act was less restrictive than it might have been under the sole impact of the Gaullist Majority controlling the National Assembly.

Faure's personal coefficient

Within the framework of a "disoriented" Parliament where party lines were often blurred and intra-party discipline (particularly in the U.D.R.) was practically absent, the major task of the Education Minister was to build up the 'majorities de rechange' he needed for each of the major aspects of the reform. Obviously, Faure felt quite at home in this endeavor. As Jean-Jacques Recoules observes,

Edgar Faure was anxious to assuage certain susceptibilities (and sought to) convince the U.D.R. that there was not too much participation in the Law; the Independent Republicans and the P.D.M., that there was not too little autonomy and the parliamentary Left that the project would lead to the democratization of the university. Aggressive and prudent, conciliatory on the details and intransigent on the principles, refuting each argument with a boutade or at greater length, (Faure) dealt with the proposed amendments with such dexterity that the President (at times) lost track of the discussion. Faure clarified his argument involving by the same token the National Assembly and the Senate into committee work.... Leading the debates...he reminded the deputies and senators or taught them the enjoyments of parliamentary oratory struggles. 20

The entire parliamentary debate was undoubtedly a dazzling demonstration of Faure's leadership qualities. Armed with the additional and determining support of the Chief of State, Faure simultaneously used two basic strategies in order to build a consensus in favor of a project which has been accurately described by Jean-Jacques Recoules as "réconciliateur".

Most of the time, informal negotiations between Edgar Faure and the Majority took place behind the scenes and before the floor debates through the intermediary of the National Assembly's Cultural Committee rapporteur. Meetings with the U.D.R. leadership were also arranged at the request of Roger Frey, the Minister of State responsible for coordinating the relations between the Legislative and the Executive branches of government. The relationship between Faure, his brain trust and Capelle was not always smooth. As pointed

out earlier, Capelle was a reformer as much as a 'mandarin'. But compromises were possible to the extent that Faure was willing to make limited concessions on the problems related to the status and responsibilities of students and teachers in the new university system. In return, Capelle was conciliatory on all other matters.

This overall process of informal bargaining avoided open and violent confrontations between Faure and the conservative wing of the Gaullist party and such events were relatively rare during the floor debates. When Capelle was unyielding and reticent, Faure pressured him by having recourse to amendments prepared by his staff in collaboration with the Senate or the leadership of the Center parties in the National Assembly. In this respect, the Education Minister preferred to rely on his excellent and friendly relations with Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Duhamel rather than openly and too frequently call upon the support of the Socialists and Communists, an initiative which might have further alienated the Gaullists. ²¹ The legislative process was thus characterized by the slow resolution of the conflict between Faure and the U.D.R. through the mediation of the Senate and the other parties sitting in the National Assembly. This point will become clearer as we examine the nature of the impact of the parliamentary debate on the final content of the Orientation Act.

Salient features of the floor discussion

Several problems raised by the Orientation Act received only scant attention on the part of the Legislature. As we saw earlier, the key decisions on the Grandes Ecoles and the financial and administrative status of the universities had been made at the administrative level and the legislative

consensus - particularly in the National Assembly and the Gaullist group - was to accept the solutions proposed by the Council of Ministers. The Senate did not go further than expressing its regrets on the neglected and already sealed fate of the Grandes Ecoles and Sanguinetti failed to mobilize any significant support on behalf of his centralizing views. The demands and amendments of the Communists deputies and senators, aiming at integrating the Grandes Ecoles within the university system were promptly buried and Capelle, realizing that he had no chance of weakening the Government's determination, reluctantly withdrew an amendment which would have regrouped and brought some engineering schools under the purview of the Education Ministry.

The French Parliament quickly gave its consent to the provisions of the Orientation Act related to the "missions" of the universities. Similarly, it approved the principle of interdisciplinarity and the use of new, more imaginative and active pedagogical methods without lengthy debate. Unable to suggest a viable alternative, the Senate and the National Assembly rapidly settled on the universities structures proposed by Faure merely raising questions of clarification concerning the nature and size of the U.E.R.s and the modalities of their federation into universities.

The rapid resolution of these issues did not necessarily mean that it reflected a genuine political consensus. In fact, pluridisciplinarity later raised bitter disputes and considerably slowed down the implementation of the reform. Moreover, "orientation", for some, was merely a preliminary step toward the establishment of selective entrance examinations. The deputies concerns, however, lied elsewhere. "As if they had been primarily preoccupied with those university problems which had been the object of polemics in the press

during the Summer", the deputies focused their attention on selection and the issue of student participation in university decision-making.²² By giving up "parity" and making marginal concessions on *personnalités extérieures* and the status of the faculty in the university system, Faure was able to withstand the onslaught of the Majority and even liberalize the Government project on one specific problem.

Faure's concessions: the Assembly makes the participation of laymen in the universities councils mandatory

For a variety of reasons, the Gaullist and Center parties wanted the presence of professionals, industrialists and practitioners in technological fields to be made compulsory in all of the universities boards. Some argued that *personnalités extérieures* would arbitrate and moderate the conflicts between students and teachers, others, that they would stimulate the research and economic functions of the universities by enabling them to develop closer ties with the regions. All agreed that the academic community would be most likely to cling to its traditional insulation if this measure, generalizing²³ and altering the 1964 law, was not included in the Orientation Act.

Fully aware of the opposition of the Left²⁴ and the reticences of several university groups, Faure, in his project approved by the Council of Ministers, had stressed that the participation of laymen in the universities councils should remain optional. The Education Minister, however, was unwilling or unable to resist the wave of distrust which accounts for much of the attitude of the Gaullist and Center parties toward the academic community. The objections of the Senate which wanted to maintain the governmental text were overridden by the Commission Mixte Paritaire and Faure eventually accepted the compromise

solution which had been originally advanced by the National Assembly's Cultural Committee. While it remained optional in the U.E.R.'s councils, the presence of laymen (which could also include representatives of 'collectivités locales' and trade unions, etc... at the request of the Left) was made mandatory in the national, regional and university boards but could not exceed or be less than one third and one fifth of the membership of these councils.

Faure's concessions: the teachers responsibilities and representation in the universities boards

The controversy over the role and status of the faculty in the proposed decision-making bodies of the university system was focused on the composition and functions of the universities and U.E.R.'s boards. The Education Minister overrode the amendments proposed by the Council of Higher Education related to the representation of the various categories of teachers in the university councils. He reverted back to the provisions of his September 2nd project but altered it in two significant respects. First, Faure deleted any reference to the "assistants permanents". Second, he introduced the idea that the assistants' functions could be equated to those of the maitres assistants. These arrangements disquieted several deputies in both Houses and the National Assembly's Cultural Committee. Requested to clarify his position, Faure defended the assistants at great length and attempted to reassure the professeurs titulaires, stressing that "the reform could not be made either against the corps enseignant or the students.... Do not believe, my dear colleagues, that there must be perpetual votes by categories. If this was the case, whatever your figures and percentages, we would be on a catastrophic course.... An ethos, a spirit of teamwork should cristalize. In any event, we must take a risk, because without it, nothing will work."

The argument convinced hardly any one in the U.D.R. and Capelle, supported by Leo Hamon, Boscher and Rickert pushed an amendment on the floor which reserved 60% of the seats allotted to teachers in the university councils to senior faculty members thereby reducing the representation of the maîtres assistants and assistants to 40%. Simultaneously, Capelle secured by means of another amendment, the chairmanship of the university councils to titular professors and the maîtres de conférences alone could become President of a U.E.R.. Finally, Faure definitively gave up his scheme for an equal staff-student representation in the university boards and titular professors received half the seats in the councils, the other half being distributed among the other categories of teachers, the students, laymen and the university personnel. "parité restreinte" had thus triumphed.

In accepting Capelle's demands, Faure made substantial concessions to the university's 'mandarins'. However, the former Rector had been able to score a political point only by yielding to the Education Minister who, in return, obtained the possibility of derogations to the general principles agreed upon. Faure had to make more significant concessions over the teachers' decision-making powers in the university boards.

During his Summer consultations, Faure progressively abandoned his original scheme of differentiated 'sections' meeting separately. Instead, the Minister opted for a less cumbersome system providing for a single council at each level of the university organization with the express condition that the faculty would be granted an exclusive 'domaine réservé'. The Council of Ministers, in this respect, had introduced important changes in the September 2nd project. The National Assembly's Cultural Committee influenced by the demands of conservative groups, found these alterations and precautions insuffi-

and, through a series of amendments, Capelle progressively expanded the scope of the teachers' exclusive responsibilities.

According to the September 2nd project, the faculty alone could determine teaching and research assignments and appoint the members of examination boards. There were two loopholes here which had been overlooked by the Council of Ministers. First, there were no provisions in the Orientation Act preventing a student from acting in a 'Jury'. In June and July, this procedure had been used in Nanterre. The experience was repeated in the Fall and led to an uproar on the part of the faculty which compelled the Education Minister to release a communique emphasizing that

the May 29th decree which allowed the deans, because of the circumstances, to determine the rules related to the nature and modalities of examinations, did not enable them to change the general principles of the awarding of degrees and diplomas. They cannot in particular, organize the participation of students in the Jurys. The examinations which would not follow these rules would only be pedagogical experiments under the sole responsibility of their organizers. They cannot lead to the awarding of university degrees and national diplomas. 26

Faure's communique merely anticipated the amendment presented by Capelle which was promptly adopted by the National Assembly.

Second, the September 2nd project allowed derogations to the rule according to which teachers alone were responsible for the distribution of teaching and research assignments. Under these conditions, the National Council of Higher Education and Research might have given its assent to a university constitution entrusting this function to the whole university council. By ruling out any violation of the principle, the National Assembly made sure that it could not take place.

The influence of the National Assembly's Cultural Committee was also

evident in the setting up of separate scientific councils managing and handling the universities' research policy. The idea originated from the Council of Higher Education which then proposed an amendment stipulating that "the research policy of the establishments where the volume of research funds makes it necessary is determined by a Research Council made up of faculty exerting the function of professor or maître de conférences or director or maître de recherche chosen for their scientific competence."²⁷ The adoption of this proposal would have eliminated the maîtres assistants as well as third cycle students already involved in research work. The Higher Council of National Education did not accept it and Faure, while not ruling out the idea of a separate Research Council, specified, however, in the draft submitted to Parliament that "the determination of research curricula and the distribution of the necessary funds are the sole responsibility of the faculty and the researchers of an equivalent level."²⁸ In contrast with the Capelle report, the Senate's Cultural Committee went along with the Higher Council of National Education in proposing to include third cycle students in the membership of the Research Councils. Faure attempted to reconcile these diverging viewpoints by suggesting that the Research Boards should be left free to retermine their membership rules. The Commission Mixte Paritaire, nevertheless, finally resolved to allow the maîtres assistants only to participate in the universities Research Councils management which therefore remain close to all students.

A victory for Edgar Faure: the issue of selection

De Gaulle and Couve de Murville had somewhat reluctantly made clear that they did not intend, for the time being, to institutionalize any form of selection through the Orientation Act. The Gaullist backbenchers, however,

were not ready to yield without some rearguard actions particularly if at the same time they could drive Faure to marginal but significant concessions. The U.D.R. eventually failed but its unrelenting pressure occasioned a most fascinating parliamentary struggle.

The offensive was led by Sanguinetti and Fanton who, at the very outset of the floor debate, argued their cases along somewhat different lines. The former proposed the establishment of a quota system resting on "projections (which) would allow (us) to determine the society's needs in a foreseeable future..." The latter, reputed to reflect Debre's viewpoint on the issue, demanded the elimination of non qualified students: " selection does not merely consists in evaluating the necessary number of jobs in five years and award a corresponding number of degrees." Its purpose is " to prevent, I say to prevent, a certain number of young men and young women to undertake studies" for which they are not qualified.²⁹

Arguing that the first conception was "aristocratic" and "malthusian" in essence, and the second, grounded on misleading comparisons with the Soviet Union and the United States, Faure stressed that he would veto both.³⁰ The partisans of selection therefore gave up their frontal attacks and revived the issue more quietly later on during the debates by means of amendments of the National Assembly's Cultural Committee stating that " the public institutions of a scientific and cultural nature are responsible for the recruitment of their students and faculty. All baccalauréat recipients can apply to one or several establishments of higher education of his choice and is assured to be admitted in at least one of them."³¹

Didier Julia remarked that the amendment was a contradiction in terms

although Fanton, again, took advantage of it, to emphasize that the universities' autonomy made it possible and necessary to establish a system of selective entrance examinations. But Faure remained vigilant and intransigent. The purpose of the universities administrative autonomy, stated the Education Minister, was "to offer a public service, not refuse it. If Mr. Fanton deems that by means of the Committee's amendment, the (universities) autonomy will make possible the creation of selective entrance examinations...our thoughts do not converge in the same direction."³²

After reasserting his uncompromising opposition to selection, Faure, relying on the support of Julia and Rousset (U.D.R.), Mondon (I.R.), Duhamel (P.D.M.) and the political Left which had been, up until then, more a **spectator** than a participant in the discussion, finally succeeded in finding a majority to vote against the Committee's amendment. After this climactic vote, Faure's residual task was to consolidate his victory with the help of the Senate. Cornu amended Article 21 of the Orientation Act to prevent the 'stages d'orientation' from being eventually used for the unavowed purpose of sifting out students from the universities. In the Commission Mixte Paritaire, Cornu also succeeded in overriding one of Capelle's amendments which would have made the baccalaureate³³ the sine qua non condition for access to higher education.

A triumph for Edgar Faure: the first year student vote in university elections

Noone in the Parliament never seriously questioned the elective principle which was to be used to appoint the members of the universities' boards as well as their executive officers and article 12 of the Orientation Act was adopted without major bickering. The majority party, however, feared that the university elections might be marred by the Gauchistes' agitation and a high rate of

student abstention. The National Assembly's Cultural Committee therefore upheld all the restrictive measures introduced by the Council of Ministers and the Council of State. In addition, its rapporteur demanded the establishment of mandatory voting for all students.

Exploiting the divisions of the U.D.R. and relying on the support of the other parties and the Senate, Edgar Faure first secured a 60% quorum of participation instead of the 70% figure or the mandatory voting system advocated by some Gaullists. The Education Minister then turned to the more delicate task of convincing his law and order minded backbenchers to be more liberal than the Council of Ministers itself by allowing first year students to participate in the electoral process.

Faure had only reluctantly bowed to the pressure of the Council of Ministers which, on September 19th, on the proposition of the Council of State, had decided that "no student will be allowed to vote unless he has successfully completed a year of study in higher education." In the Education Minister's view, this disposition conflicted with the "participant" philosophy of the Orientation Act. Three amendments, none of them originating from the U.D.R., enabled him to revise the Government's decision.

When the floor discussion began, Faure invited an open debate. Stressing that first year students made up 45% of the entire student population and that they were likely to have already participated in Lycees elections, Dupuy proposed an amendment which read: "Elections for students delegates take place by distinct electoral colleges in accordance with years or cycles of study. The percentage of first year student representatives cannot exceed that of all students representatives." In the wake of Dupuy's amendment,

Duhamel introduced another amendment prepared by Faure's braintrust which would have extended the electoral franchise to all first year students with the exception of those who had "not satisfied the normal academic requirements for the preceding year." The objective of the proposal was to eliminate, in Duhamel's own terms, the 'redoublants' and the 'éternels étudiants'.³⁵ The Independent Republicans were somewhat more reticent. They accepted the presence of first year **delegates** in the various university councils but only "a titre consultatif et non deliberatif".³⁶

Only then did Faure begin to make his position known. Addressing himself to Rector Capelle, he observed : " The Committee has not corrected this lacuna, but I believe that Mr. Capelle agrees with me that something should be done anyway."³⁷ Simultaneously, the Minister discreetly sounded out the deputies on their opinion on the compromise solution he wanted to lead them to. Stressing that none of the proposed amendments had his entire approval, Faure pointed out : " Our original idea was to prevent first year students from overwhelming by their number student representatives.... It would therefore be preferable to do something about this problem but precautions are necessary. (We could follow) the idea expressed in Mr. Dupuy's amendment or (decide) that (first year students) will not enjoy a voting power corresponding to their number, but, for example, to one fifth of all student representatives."³⁸

When the debate resumed later at night, Capelle stated outright that he did not intend to alter the text proposed by the Government. Faure was therefore compelled to take a more explicit stand. After cleverly pointing out that "the Government is (only) trying to open a dialogue with the Assembly. I am thus **obliged** to study all amendments...", Faure bluntly said, in the midst of an angry growl of disapproval from the U.D.R. benches : " We have made a mistake and so did the Government by totally excluding first year students

(from the electoral process)."³⁹ Arguing that it was necessary to find a solution which "would not completely eliminate first year students without at the same time giving them the rights which, as a result of their number or inexperience, would lead them to dominate the students' representation", the Minister hinted that it would still be possible to combine the amendments presented by Duhamel and Dupuy.⁴⁰

The situation was embarrassing but a Gaullist deputy, by introducing a last minute amendment, resolved the dilemmas of the Education Minister who loathed the idea of openly asking the U.D.R. to vote a text endorsed by the Communists. Flornoy's amendment stipulated that "all students can vote. The percentage of first year student representatives cannot exceed one fifth of all student representatives and will be determined by the U.E.R. councils."⁴¹

Under these conditions, Faure, to appease his adversaries, merely had to sound slightly less liberal than Flornoy. The National Assembly voted the first part of the article stating that "the right to vote is reserved to those students who have satisfied the normal academic requirements for the preceding year." Some difficulties, however, were expected on the second part of the sentence which read: "The percentage of first year student representatives cannot exceed one fifth of all student representatives."⁴² The Education Minister, though, disarmed his opponents with a last 'pirouette'. "When a first year student is a bachelier", observed Faure, "he has satisfied the normal academic requirements for the preceding year." No one in the House without windows had thought of this interpretation and the Education Minister had, for obvious reasons, refrain to mention it earlier. Overwhelmed by Faure's manipulative talents, the National Assembly bowed and adopted a text which granted a limited share of participation to first year students in university elections.⁴³

Concluding remarks

On October 2nd, 1968, at 1:30 A.M., 441 deputies gave their approval to the Orientation Act. On October 25th, 278 Senators followed the same path and after the statutory 'navette' between the two Chambers, the reform was definitively adopted on November 7th and promulgated the 12th. With the exception of the Presiding Officers of the Senate and the National Assembly and six Gaullists and all the Communists who abstained, all members of both Houses upheld the Orientation Act. These massive votes of confidence were undoubtedly a personal victory for the Education Minister as well as a tribute to his energizing leadership and bargaining skills. Sprinkled with hundred of amendments and televised for the first time, the debate had been unusually open and thorough and Faure, secured, without recourse to arm twisting methods, the passage of a legislative measure which significantly changed the French system of higher education.

The parliamentary struggle had been marked by numerous compromises and mutual adjustments but the consensus patiently built by Faure remained fragile. Many in the Gaullist majority felt that they had been cheated and the abstention of three former Ministers (Sanguinetti, Fouchet and Triboulet) made it clear that the unanimous vote of both Houses rested on shaky foundations. Faure had won a battle but not the war itself. What remained to be done was to implement the Orientation Act.

1. Jean-Jacques Recoules and Françoise Berques-Lagarde, La Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur devant le Parlement. Mémoire de Science politique (Paris: Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, October 1969), p. 132.
2. The expression is from the U.D.R. group President. Cited in La Nation (September 11, 1968), p. 1.
3. Six Action and Study Groups dealt with the problems of Information, Employment, Public Function, Participation in the firms, Prices and Higher education.
4. It is significant to note that none of the Group's members were favorable to Faure. Sanguinetti was an irreducible 'Jacobin'. Leo Hamon and Rector Capelle shared much of the 'Mandarins' viewpoint. The respective positions of Robert Poujade and Michel Habib-Deloncle who chaired the Group have already been discussed.
5. Le Monde (September 12, 1968).
6. Cited in Jean Charlot, The Gaullist Phenomenon. The Gaullist Movement in the Fifth Republic (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 153.
7. Quoted in La Nation (September 12, 1968), p. 4.
8. Cited in La Nation (September 13-14, 1968), p. 4.
9. Le Monde (September 19, 1968) and La Nation (September 18, 1968).
10. For example, Robert Poujade deplored the personal attacks which had been launched by the Majority against Faure's collaborators during the Summer. He also acknowledged that the U.D.R. had not always "simplified" the "arduous" task of the Education Minister. See his remarks in La Nation (September 12, 1968), p. 4.
11. Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales et Sociales sur le Projet de Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur. No. 266. Assemblée Nationale. Première Session Ordinaire de 1968-1969. No. 288. p. 9. The Orientation Act was also examined by the National Assembly's Finance Committee. Its rapporteur, Jacques Charbonnel, gave the reform a favorable 'avis' but proposed several amendments amounting to minor concessions to the Inspection des Finances and the Treasury. On this point, see Avis Présenté au nom de la Commission des Finances, de l'Economie Générale et du Plan sur le Projet de Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur. Assemblée Nationale. Session Extraordinaire de 1967-1968. No. 275.
12. Earlier, in the Higher Council of National Education, Dean Zamansky had made a similar demand. Both Capelle and Zamansky are Science Professors.
13. Commission des Affaires Culturelles..., Rapport., Op. Cit., p. 9.
14. Ibid., p. 5.
15. Jacques de Chalendar, Une Loi Pour l'Université (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970), pp. 236-237.

16. The expression was used by Sanguinetti. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 5, 1968), p. 3072.
17. Within each party, there were, nevertheless, several shades of opinion on these matters, although they were not as significant and frequent as in the U.D.R.. For example, Claude Guichard (I.R.) wanted the orientation of students to be made mandatory in contrast to Valery Giscard d'Estaing who maintained that it should remain optional. Gilbert Faure (F.D.G.S.) and Leroy (C.P.) both favored a paritary system of student-teacher representation in the universities boards as opposed to Billeres and Dupuy whose viewpoints were closer, in this respect, to the Gauliists'.
18. Journal Officiel. Sénat. Débat (October 24, 1968), p. 841.
19. On these points, see the Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Culturelles sur le Projet de Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur par l'Assemblée Nationale après Déclaration d'Urgence par André Cornu. Sénat. Annexe au Proces-Verbal de la Séance du 17 Octobre 1968. No. 8.
20. Recoules and Berques-Lagarde, Op. Cit., p. 137.
21. In 1954, Duhamel had been Faure's Chef de Cabinet and Giscard d'Estaing had himself been a close collaborator of Duhamel.
22. As pointed out by Jacques de Chalendar in Op. Cit., p. 236.
23. On this point, see for example Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 10, 1968), p. 3144.
24. For example, Dupuy (C.P.) warned that 'universités concurrentielles' might fall into what he described as "mercantilism". His statement can be found in Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires Culturelles, Familiales de Sociales de l'Assemblée Nationale sur le Projet de Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur par Mr. Capelle. Compte-Rendu des Auditions. Annexe No. 288, p. 20. It should also be noted here that, in spite of the objections of the Left which saw in it an extension of the 1959 Debré Law, Faure accepted a series of amendments allowing the universities to "cooperate" with private institutions. Fontanet, an ex-M.R.P., played, in this respect, an instrumental role.
25. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 10, 1968), p. 3180.
26. Cited in Jacques de Chalendar, Op. Cit., p. 151.
27. The Education Minister must have been influenced by the fact that a similar demand was made by the Prime Minister's Consultative Committee on Scientific Research. On this point, see Ibid., p. 153.
28. Cited in Ibid., p. 152.
29. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 5, 1968), pp. 3073-3074.
30. Ibid., pp. 3077-3079.

31. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 11, 1968), p. 3206. Peyrefitte made a similar demand at the opening of the debate. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 4, 1968), p. 3001.
32. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 11, 1968), p. 3209.
33. Capelle's provision would have prevented the establishment of the Vincennes experimental center, for example.
34. Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 10, 1968), p. 3161.
35. Ibid., p. 3162.
36. Ibid..
37. Ibid..
38. Ibid..
39. Ibid., p. 3167.
40. Ibid., p. 3168.
41. Ibid..
42. This is the reason why Jacques Baumel had asked for a separate vote on each part of the amendment.
43. The Senate easily overcame the objections and counter amendments of Senators Henriot and Galvan which reflected the demands of the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Médecine. Journal Officiel. Sénat. Débats (October 25, 1968), pp. 918-919.

CHAPTER EIGHT:

THE ORIENTATION ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION (1968-1971): BACK TO IMMOBILISME ?...

Introduction

Once the period of "structural fusion" was over and the reform voted, did the political system and the universities relapse into a stifling state of "immobilism" ? After three years of implementation of the Orientation Act, the record is far more complex and ambiguous than the students of the stalemate society would lead us to believe. The lack of political and programmatic consensus backing up the Orientation Act definitively hampered its implementation. Moreover, the principles and philosophy underlying the reform foreclosed any recourse to "authoritarian" decision-making methods. Thus, an exhausting but not altogether sterile 'trenchwarfare' marked by incremental breakthroughs, followed the breathtaking 'blitzkrieg' imposed by the Education Minister from July to November 1968. Political disputes and the resistance of the bureaucracy, certain university groups and the majority party slowed down the process of change. In the wake of De Gaulle's resignation in 1969, Faure was dismissed from the Education Ministry and the Orientation Act was partially revised in June 1971. In spite of the political difficulties, however, the Loi Faure was put into effect and the establishment of the new university structures was completed with the inaugural session of the National Council of Higher Education and Research on May 14th, 1971.

Although this had been often forgotten in the midst of the acrimonious debates over the student and teacher respective status and responsibilities, the overhauling of the old Napoleonic university was clearly intended to improve the universities teaching, research and economic functions. At the same time, the reform sought to cope with the May-June demand for 'participation' by altering the universities internal decision-making processes and their relationship with the State. The data is too fragmentary to determine whether

and to what extent these objectives have been met. But, again, no definite pattern of "stalemate" is discernible.

The Orientation Act on Higher Education: a modernizing measure

Often described as a mere political "mesure de circonstances", the Orientation Act, in several respects, was also an epoch making event. First, and foremost, the reform sought to adapt the university system to the needs of a modern, industrial society. Article one of the Law unambiguously stated that

The fundamental aim of the universities and institutions to which the provisions of the present Act will apply is the working out of and the transmitting of knowledge, the development of research and the training of men.

The universities must strive to bring the advance forms of culture and research to their highest level and their best rate of progress and to make them available to all those who have the necessary calling and ability.

They must meet the demands of the Nation by providing it with top ranking personnel in every field and by taking part in the social and economic development of every region. In this task, they must comply with the democratic evolution made necessary by the industrial and technical revolution. 1

To foster scientific research and integrate the universities into the society and the economy, the chairs were abolished (Article 33) and the participation of *personalités extérieures* made mandatory in the universities and National Councils (Article 13). For the same reasons, the faculties were dismantled and superseded by interdisciplinary universities which became the basic cells of the new system of higher education. It is worth noting here that the Orientation Act consistently stresses the preeminence of the universities and does not even mention the word 'faculties' once. Thus, the Education Minister "after consulting with the National Council of Higher Education and Research assigns...the uses of funds detailed in the Finance Act and allots... a global appropriation for current expenditures" to the universities which, in

turn, assign and approve the budgets and constitutions of their constituent U.E.R.s (Article 27). The universities organize the 'stages d'orientation' and, in addition to adult education (*éducation permanente*), provide students with career counseling (Article 21-25). Weary about the eventual **reemergence** of the old "ordre facultaire", the authors of the Orientation Act also stressed that the universities were to be interdisciplinary and should "associate Arts and Letters with Science and Technical studies as much as possible" although they could have a "dominant field of specialization" (Article 6).

We saw that the growing dysfunctions of the university system had been attributed to its excessive centralization and uniformity. The Orientation Act, therefore, granted a significant but limited degree of administrative, financial and pedagogical autonomy to the universities. Structurally, the new system of higher education is characterized by a four layer pyramidal organization (See Appendix VIII-1). At the apex of the system is the National Council of Higher Education and Research. Chaired by the Education Minister, this advisory body, made up of representatives of the universities councils, supersedes the Council of Higher Education, takes over its functions and acquires new ones. Thus, the National Council participates in the planning of higher education within the framework of the national plans and coordinates the research and educational policies of the universities. Moreover, it is consulted by the Education Minister about the annual budgetary "enveloppe globale" distributed to the universities and may make propositions regarding the nature and awarding of national diplomas which remain, however, regulated by the Ministry (Article 9).

Regional boards presided by the Rectors, henceforth rechristened 'Chancellors' are found at the regional level in each of France's 21 'Régions de programme'.

These councils, which include representatives of regional establishments of higher learning coordinate their activities and programs and are supposed to provide an institutional link between the universities and the economic organizations of the Region.

At the next lowest organizational level are the universities which emerge as a "federation" of U.E.R.s roughly corresponding to the American notion of department. Both the U.E.R.s and the universities (the former under the supervision of the latter) enjoy administrative autonomy; they are free to elaborate their own charters, define their relations with other establishments, determine their research and teaching programs, methods of education within the guidelines layed down by the Orientation Act. Moreover, the universities become financially autonomous: their budgets are no longer submitted to the prior authorization of the Treasury and are henceforth controlled by subsequent audit only (Article 11, 19 and 26-29). The universities' autonomy, though, is not total. Their diplomas remain regulated by the Education Ministry and the Orientation Act does not abolish the office of the Rector. The Chancellor is still the personal representative of the Minister in the universities' councils which fall within the scope of his jurisdiction and although he loses several of his previous powers (he no longer presides over the universities' boards), he still keeps his 'autorité de tutelle'.

The Orientation Act: toward new modes of decision-making in the universities

The second major innovation contained in the Orientation Act was the establishment of new modes of decision-making and governance within the universities. Complicated electoral schemes and a mixture of 'régime d'Assemblée' and "régime présidentiel" replaced - though not entirely - the preexisting

system of oligarchical rule and cooptation. The universities are now governed by a President responsible to and elected by a council consisting of faculty members, students, researchers and laymen, a category which could include trade-unionists, professionals, businessmen, civil servants, local councillors and politicians....

The rule of co-management is applicable to all of the universities boards but is also tempered by several provisions which take into account the hierarchical and differentiated nature of the academic community. Some categories of individual are under or overrepresented and others enjoy special responsibilities and rights. For example, the *personalités extérieures* cannot number less than one sixth nor more than one third of the total membership of the universities' councils (Article 13). The Orientation Act rules out any system of paritary representation of students and teachers and gives a clear preeminence to titular professors and associate professors among the faculty delegates (Article 13).

The teacher-student partnership in decision-making is also limited. The determination of the universities research policies and the management of their research funds are entrusted to a special board exclusively composed of senior faculty members and researchers coopted for their scientific competence (Article 13). The President of a university must have the rank of a titular professor and the Director of a U.E.R. must be either a full professor or associate or assistant professor although derogations to these rules are possible (Article 13). Finally, the faculty retains complete control over examinations, grades, degrees in addition to all matters related to its recruitment and promotion (Article 13).

Mention should be made here of those provisions of the Orientation Act dealing with electoral procedures. The various representatives of the U.E.R.s

and university boards are elected from separate electoral colleges of professors and associate professors, assistant professors and instructors, first year students, second and third cycle students, etc,...(Article 14). Moreover, the electoral franchise is reserved to those students "who have satisfied the normal academic requirements for the preceding year" and the number of their representatives is computed by taking into account the extent to which a quorum of 60% has been reached in a university election (Article 14).

The Orientation Act: the limits of a modernizing measure

Overall, the Orientation Act was essentially a structural reform whose authors hoped that it would modernize the system of higher education and cope with the crisis of participation revealed by the events of May and June. The changes thereby introduced were not, however, as extensive as might be expected in the wake of a major political crisis. The Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (C.N.R.S.) and most of the Grandes Ecoles were left untouched (Cf. Article 46 and 1) and the Act itself contained several tension producing contradictions and ambiguities inherent in all compromise decisions.

Thus, the issue of selection had been reluctantly sidetracked by decision-makers who preferred to opt for the rather equivocal notion of "orientation" (Article 21). The Education Minister's powers in the "determination of the joint rules for the pursuit of studies leading to national degrees" (Article 20), the Chancellor's 'autorité de tutelle' and all the strings attached to the university financial autonomy (Title 5), suggest that the autonomy granted to the system of higher education was more an 'autonomie en laisse' than a genuine and thorough decentralization measure. The political factors behind these half measures will

be examined later and we will show that the Orientation Act was a bundle of uneasy compromises reflecting a plurality of conflicting viewpoints over the content and direction of the reform of the university. This was particularly true for those provisions of the Law which were related to the implementation of the reform and sought to reconcile a somewhat milder version of the French tradition of Jacobin decentralization with a policy encouraging the grass roots movement of participation of the academic community initiated during the 'events'.

The Orientation Act: a measure fostering grass roots participation

The new system of higher education was supposed to become operative as soon as the universities were designated by the Education Minister in accordance with the wishes of the U.E.R.s student and teacher delegates. The U.E.R.s, though, existed only on paper and the Government had subordinated the implementation of the Orientation Act to the election of "legitimate" student and teacher representatives. Under these conditions, the Education Minister "after consulting with the pertinent groups" was to draw up, by December 31, 1968, a provisional list of U.E.R.s which were to be used as electoral constituencies (Article 39). Elections would be held in the Spring of 1969 to designate student and teacher delegates who would, then, first, draft the statutes of their U.E.R.s and, second, negotiate among themselves the modalities of fusion of the U.E.R.s into universities (Article 40).

The transition period from the old to the new university **regime** was expected to come to an end once the U.E.R.s delegates, meeting in "constituent assemblies", had adopted their universities constitutions (Articles 40 and 41). After the election of the universities' executive and legislative organs and the designation of their representatives to the National Council of Higher Education

and Research, the Orientation Act became fully operative (Article 43).

Clearly, the university reform was not going to come from above but primarily through the interaction of students and teachers resolving their differences in educational matters within the framework of the rules layed down by the Law. The Orientation Act, nevertheless, still granted considerable powers to the State. Thus, after consulting the National Council, the Education Minister, "in case of serious difficulties in the functioning of the statutory bodies or in the event that they do not fulfill their responsibilities" may " in such exceptional cases, take all necessary measures." (Article 18) During the transitional period, the Education Minister may also determine "all provisional measures to ensure the administration of the new institutions (and) the development of their research and educational activities" (Article 44). Moreover, he must approve of the universities and U.E.R.s constitutions and, by decree, grant provisional statutes to those establishments which did not draft their statutes in due time (Articles 40 and 41).

Given the polarization of student and teacher groups and their tenuous consensus over most aspects of the reform, sharp conflicts were bound to emerge in the university decision-making bodies and were likely to slow down or hamper the process of consensus building once the constraints engendered by a crisis situation were removed. Some might have been tempted then to turn the clock back to the status quo ante and much of the success of the entire undertaking depended on the attitude of the Education Minister himself. Neither Faure nor his successor sought to use their powers to the fullest extent. They both imposed deadlines, issued terse warnings, attempted to influence and persuade teachers and students, eventually vetoed some of their proposals. However, they consistently avoided "imposing" any solution without

the consent of the academic community thereby encouraging the new modes of decision-making instituted by the Orientation Act. The 'permissive' attitude of the Education Minister and the conflicts which soon arose among the university actors explain the slowness with which the transitory provisions of the Act were implemented.

Step one: the designation of the U.E.R.s

The parliamentary debate was not yet completed when Faure requested the Rectors to organize the consultative process through which the universities new constituencies were to be defined. The Rectors were instructed to undertake "the most thorough consultations of all interested groups: teachers and students, members of legal and de facto organizations including minority groups and those without representation. The chargés de mission... in the various academic districts will be made available to the Rectors for that purpose."²

With an eye on the substantive objectives of the reform, the Education Minister also stressed that the U.E.R.s' size could not exceed 2,500 students and their offerings should be diversified enough to allow for the orientation of students in the future interdisciplinary universities. In this respect, Faure tersely warned the Rectors: "The mere transformation of the present establishments into U.E.R.s would rapidly turn the (Orientation Act) into an empty shell. Conversely, the excessive proliferation of U.E.R.s, that is to say the atomization of the present structures, would also jeopardize the reform. This is why, even if its primary purpose is to create electoral constituencies, ...this preliminary redistricting should be carefully planned."³

In general, none of these pitfalls were fully avoided. Whenever the Rectors

and the chargés de mission consulted representatives of the May-June 'instances de fait' which were still active, they were in a position to propose innovative modalities of regroupment and fusion. Most of the time, however, their suggestions were somewhat conservative. A majority of the small faculties simply changed their names into U.E.R.s and, in Paris, the pattern of "balkanization" was most apparent. The deadline of December 31st, compelled Faure to accept these propositions but in the last hectic days of the month, a provisional list of approximately 600 U.E.R.s was ready in the Ministry.⁴ It was within this imperfect but perfectible framework that the first university elections took place between January and April 1969.⁵

Step two: the students and teachers elect their delegates

The Spring 1969 university elections were a turning point in the implementation of the reform. A poor student showing at the polls would have put Faure in a difficult political situation since the Minister had made of participation one of the key underlying principles of the Orientation Act. It might also have given new impetus to the growing academic and political opposition to Faure fed by the continuing disturbances paralyzing several high schools and universities.

The immediate stakes of the elections were therefore high and their outcome could either block, delay or on the contrary, speed up the implementation of the Law. All Cassandras eventually proved to be wrong since 52% of the eligible student voters cast their ballots. The 60% quorum of participation was therefore not always reached but student participation was particularly high in the professionally oriented establishments of higher education (77% in the University Institutes of Technology and 68% in the former medical

faculties). It was significantly lower in Law (53%) and at its lowest in Sciences⁶ (43%) and Liberal Arts (43%).

As a preliminary test of 'participation', the first university elections were an undeniable success for Faure. In a long term perspective, however, their significance is more difficult to determine. Commenting on the electoral process which was about to begin, the Education Minister, in January, observed that "this (was) a decisive step (in the implementation of the reform) since co-management was going to emerge from (the elections) and lead to pedagogical change in higher education."⁷ As far as co-management was concerned, the three months long elections revealed a number of political phenomena and realignments within the university system which were not altogether encouraging.

First, the elections increased the political isolation of the Gauchistes who had called for their boycott. To a large extent, the failure of Leftist students to mobilize their colleagues as they had in the Spring of 1968 was due to the Education Minister's policy. As a political observer put it,

Presently, among students, Gauchisme can only be a force challenging an institution which functions. The extremists would have had a role to play if the new university had been set up through a series of decrees and instructions from above. They no longer had any within the framework of a arduous and painstaking undertaking involving grass roots participation. 8

Unwilling to integrate themselves into a 'bourgeois university', the Gauchistes went back to their esoteric internal ideological disputes and were left with no other alternative than to resort to uncoordinated, isolated but often spectacular disruptive tactics.⁹ Sporadic agitation marred the implementation of the reform throughout 1969 and 1970 in several universities and particularly unpleasant incidents took place in Nanterre faculty and the Vincennes Experimental Center launched by Faure in January 1969, to cite

two examples only. None of these events, however, went politically unnoticed and, as we shall see later, they contributed to Faure's dismissal.

Second, the university elections contributed to an eclipse of the radical leadership of U.N.E.F. and the S.N.E.Sup. and marked the beginning of a remarkable comeback of the Communist Party among French intellectuals. The December 1968 U.N.E.F. Congress in Marseille selected Jacques Sauvageot as its President but simultaneously, a new faction, U.N.E.F. Renouveau (U.N.E.F. Renewal) supported by Communist students, emerged in an effort to destroy the influence of the union's revolutionary leadership. Challenging Sauvageot's call for a boycott of the elections as well as his policy of systematic contestation and non cooperation with Faure, U.N.E.F. Renewal accepted the rules of the electoral game and eventually won one fifth of the seats allotted to student delegates in the U.E.R.s councils.

Although Faure could find the emergence of U.N.E.F. Renewal congruent with his participation policy, this development also weakened the student movement by further fragmenting it precisely at a time when forms of parliamentary democracy were being introduced in the universities. Later, Sauvageot was drafted and gave up the Presidency of the student union. This did not, though, put an end to U.N.E.F. internal bickering. At the price of another ideological split, U.N.E.F. Renewal captured the leadership of U.N.E.F. leading the student group into total confusion, disarray and discredit, nobody knowing exactly who controlled what. Similar realignments were also taking place in the S.N.E.Sup. but these evolved in a different direction.

In defiance of the National Executive Committee's instructions, several sections of the S.N.E.Sup. nominated candidates in the university's elections and the simmering conflict which had plagued the radical teachers union since

May 1968, finally came to a fore in March of 1969 when a special Congress was convened. It resulted in the ousting of Bernard Herzberg who was replaced by an "a-political" Secretary General backed by the Communists, Georges Innocent. The S.N.E.Sup. swiftly abandoned its policy of systematic opposition and, a year later, a member of the Communist Party, Daniel Monteux, took over Innocent's position.

Again, the ideological mellowing of the S.N.E.Sup. brightened the prospects for 'participation' in the university system, but, in turn, is hardened the resistance of the conservative camp. Henceforth, the opponents to the Orientation Act combined their distate for the reform with a crusade directed not only against the Gauchistes but also the Communists. The Autonome Lettres group was instrumental in this respect in the setting up of a new student-teacher organization, the Union Nationale Inter-Universitaire (U.N.I.) in January 1969. In the perspective of the forthcoming elections, this group pledged to "place the university at the service of the Nation, preserve the quality of education and diplomas (and) rally, without any discrimination, all those who are determined to efficiently fight the 'desordre gauchiste' and 'l'Ordre Communiste'".

Step three: the birth of the first universities

Undaunted by the ambiguous significance of the university elections and capitalizing upon the unexpectedly large participation of students, Faure continued to press for a speedy implementation of the reform. The Education Minister's haste was due to his desire to put an end to the unstructured situation of the university system and also to prevent its excessive redistricting of December 1968 from becoming a permanent one. The procedure used by Faure

as well as the conditions he set forth for the creation of new universities, however, considerably slowed down the pace and scope of change.

Still unwilling to impose any solution from above, Faure requested the Rectors to "speed up the consultations...already in progress with the U.E.R.s student and teacher delegates, without neglecting to also contact the representative of teachers and students' movements or unions" and to remain available to "all persons who might have suggestions to make...about the designation of the universities and the nature of the constituent assemblies."¹² Moreover, the Education Minister stressed that the universities should include from 6,000 to 18,000 students at the most and were to be interdisciplinary, a concept which Faure defined at length in another note to the Rectors:

In general, (interdisciplinarity) means the co-existence of disciplines which in the past were isolated from one another... in separate faculties; more specifically, (interdisciplinarity should) enable students majoring in different fields, to register in a number of common courses when their program of studies included identical disciplines..., work in small groups on horizontal themes..., improve their education through a diversification of course offerings... (and) encourage...the use of costly equipment...by making it available to all the students of a university, disregarding their major field (of interest).¹³

Within the framework of these procedural and programmatic guidelines, a painful and often tumultuous process of multilateral negotiations among the U.E.R.s student and teacher delegates began as the elections were near completion. They lasted for approximately two years.¹⁴ In brief, the bargaining process was slowed down by two major stumbling blocks. First, there was no agreement on the fate of the giant faculties and how they should be restructured. Second, the creation of universities in medium sized urban areas where the number of students was close to the ceiling and bottom figures layed down by the Education Minister was often an open and thorny question.

In the cases related to the second category of situations, the search for

a consensus was hampered by regional rivalries. Thus, St.Étienne sought to be "emancipated" from the tutelle of Lyons . Chambéry invoked an 1860 treaty to legitimize its demand for the creation of a new university independent from Grenoble. Local politicians, some of them members of the French Parliament or the Bureaucracy, motivated by considerations of prestige, exerted pressure to transform their two year Collèges Universitaires into full universities. The academic community was divided. Most teachers accepted the principles of autonomy but preferred to exert their profession in reputed, prestigious universities rather than in the newly established ones. In the Overseas Departments, the students themselves refused to sever their establishments from the universities of Aix-Marseille and Bordeaux. Finally, the bureaucracy of the Education Ministry kept reminding everyone of the budgetary cost incurred in the creation of too numerous universities. The problems of the large urban areas with their gigantic faculties were even more intricate although, in these cases, it seems that the inertia and opposition of the divided academic community was the major obstacle to change.

Some of the 'mandarins' simply wanted the maintenance of the status quo ante. As Jacques de Chalendar points out, " often hoping that the new organizational order would merely duplicate the previous one, the faculties, by remaining united within a single university, expected to be able to easily preserve their present autonomy.... If the Minister had allowed this, the U.E.R.s assemblies would have slowly lost their powers to the faculties' transitory councils and then to the boards of the new public establishments. The University Council would have thereby reemerged again as a meeting of deans sprinkled with a few
15
elected delegates."

In addition, political considerations also exerted a paralyzing influence

on the bargaining process. The representatives of the former Arts faculties were reputed for their revolutionary political ideologies and were therefore held in deep suspicion by moderate teachers and students who declined to join them in the same university boards. The well endowed faculties were reluctant to share their equipment with the overcrowded and underequipped Law and Liberal Arts establishments. Finally, the teaching staff of the medical schools almost unanimously rejected being integrated in interdisciplinary universities.

By the end of May 1969, the creation of 37 universities and six university centers had been approved by the Education Minister. Approximately fifteen universities still remained to be set up in and outside of Paris where the U.E.R.s delegates had been unable to reach any agreement. Considering the complexity of the issues which had to be resolved, these accomplishments were not negligible and, again, were a tribute to the energetic leadership of Edgar Faure. They were even more significant if we keep in mind that the Education Minister had increasingly become the target of strong political pressures which eventually led to his dismissal after the ill fated referendum on regional reforms and the subsequent presidential elections.

A pause in the implementation of the Orientation Act. Faure's growing political difficulties and his dismissal

While the Education Minister was attempting to implement the reform as promptly as he could, he was confronted with the mounting hostility of the U.D.R. and some university groups. He also has to cope with the reluctance of the Prime Minister and the disenchantment of several of his university supporters. Actually, Faure's political fate was already sealed when, with the resignation of De Gaulle, he lost his most important political resource.

The simmering conflict between Faure and the conservative wing of the majority erupted only a few weeks after the adoption of the Orientation Act. On December 27th, 1968, the Caen section of the C.D.R. released a communique describing the reform as a "bluff, a fiasco, a dangerous delayed action bomb which will blow up not only the reform but also our civilization." A few days later, in a strongly worded statement, Faure replied that the C.D.R. press release was an incipient form of "fascism".¹⁶ Probably as a result of De Gaulle's intervention, the incident did not go further than an exchange of verbal insults but some political observers suggested that Pompidou had played behind the scenes a significant role in provoking this brief but intense confrontation.¹⁷ In any event, Faure's relations with the U.D.R. did not improve thereafter.

Fed by the endemic agitation disrupting several campuses, the U.D.R. opposition to the Education Minister hardened in the Spring. In February, the Political Bureau of the U.D.R. publicly denounced the students' "sterile agitation". In March, Faure received an angry Gaullist delegation which criticized him in hardly veiled terms for the persisting disorders in the universities and, throughout this period, the Minister was submitted to a cross fire of sharply critical oral questions in the National Assembly.

These developments weakened Faure's position within the Government and his tense relationship with the Prime Minister irritated by student unrest suddenly worsened when the Education Minister publicly argued that the Grandes Ecoles should be integrated into the university system.¹⁸ This basic difference between Faure and Couve de Murville probably explains why the latter delayed until May the publication of several of the decrees authorizing the creation of universities in the Journal Officiel. The ever increasing

resistance of university groups itself must not have been unrelated to the Prime Minister's decision.

From its very inception, the Orientation Act had been met with a cool or lukewarm reception. U.N.E.F. and the S.N.E.Sup. criticized it for its political shortcomings. The S.G.E.N. and F.E.N. adopted a wait and see attitude and the conservatives called for its "loyal implementation" without bothering defining the expression. In the last six months of his stay in power, Faure picked up the conditional support of U.N.E.F. Renewal and the S.N.E.Sup.'s new leadership. At the same time, however, the designation of the U.E.R.s and the universities provoked dismayed reactions on the part of the S.G.E.N. and the S.N.E.Sup., and, later, after three months of 'participation', the F.N.E.F. withdrew its elected representatives from the transitory U.E.R.s councils.²⁰ In addition, all the groups close to the French Left were all alienated and irked by Faure's decision to allow the Science, Liberal Arts private faculties to award their own degrees.²¹

While his support was growing weaker among those groups which did not fundamentally oppose the Orientation Act, Faure's efforts to put the reform speedily into effect were met with the growing resistance of the conservatives. The Société des Agrégés raised a political storm when Faure announced his intention to abolish the Agrégation and a resolution adopted in June by the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres summed up the resentment, anger and frustrations of the conservative camp by denouncing "the anarchy and waste of public funds entailed in the creation of whimsical U.E.R.s, the extravagant use of the notions of interdisciplinarity, credit units (unités de valeur) and controle continu des connaissances which have led to a catastrophic degradation in the value of education and diplomas and a threat of cultural

22
 revolution."

Under these conditions, De Gaulle's resignation in late April 1969 and the subsequent presidential elections came as a "divine surprise" to the conservatives exasperated by Faure's educational policy and his 'permissiveness'. They took advantage of the campaign to press for a halt in the implementation of the Orientation Act. In May, a group of professors led by Dean Zamansky published a manifesto "L'Université au bord de l'abîme" whose title speaks for itself. The Comité de liaison de l'Enseignement Public asked for the restoration of law and order in the universities.²³ The Bureau National of the Groupes Autonomes de l'Enseignement Public denounced the "innovations parfois heureuses mais toujours hasardeuses"²⁴ introduced by Faure. Louis Mazeaud complained that prior to 1968, the Law faculties were functioning normally.²⁵ A Sorbonne professor and member of the Council of State clamored that he favored 'participation' but not "anarchy" while a liberal arts teacher begged the presidential candidates to "deliver (the universities) from infamy".²⁶

The conservatives found understanding, solace and comfort in Pompidou who, in an interview on June 10th, criticized the universities disorders and most of Faure's decisions with particular emphasis on the absence of selective entrance examinations and the projected abolition of the Agrégation.²⁷ A press release issued by the Union Nationale Inter-Universitaire made it clear that several university groups expected a change in policy with the election of Pompidou, the formation of a new government and the appointment of a new incumbent in the Rue de Grenelle:

The French university has come now to a standstill. It has been balkanized into frequently rival units and individuals in the name of

interdisciplinarity. It is being undermined by the disillusionment of its healthiest elements and by the secret but efficient activities of the Communists who have seized power in several faculties.... The designation of a new Government brings hope to those who, until now, have felt abandoned...and makes possible a necessary and urgent 'redressement'". 28

Although Pompidou, in his July 10th press conference, explained that Faure's departure had been made necessary to "draw a balance sheet" of the reform and "make certain adjustments", the conservatives only won a Pyrrhic victory: Olivier Guichard consolidated Faure's realizations and firmly continued to implement the Orientation Act "jusqu'à la lie", as a political observer put it.
29

Olivier Guichard takes over the Education Ministry

Guichard's arrival in the Rude de Grenelle was followed by a rather long period of 'attentisme' and uncertainty. The new incumbent of the Education Ministry, while cautiously preparing his 'dossiers', primarily sought to avoid antagonizing anyone of the university groups. By trying to find a compromise solution to the damaging "querelle des équivalences", Guichard attempted to appease the Left which held him in deep suspicion for his "technocratic" past and close ties with business and industry.
30 On the other hand, Guichard met one of the conservatives' basic demands by overriding Faure's decision to do away with the Agregation. The Education Minister's position on the Orientation Act, nevertheless, remained obscure until the National Assembly's Cultural Committee hearings on September 10th.

To the conservatives' dismay, Guichard emerged as a staunch advocate of the reform. Stressing that its implementation had to be a collective undertaking relying on the consensus of all, Guichard warmly defended the principles of autonomy, participation and interdisciplinarity.
31 Later, the Minister made

it clear that Faure's dismissal did not entail any major reappraisal of the Government's educational policy: " I will not transform the Orientation Act into an empty shell," stated Guichard in the Senate's Cultural Committee, " I will implement it 'dans son esprit'." ³² Firmly supported by the Prime Minister who, in his June inaugural address to the National Assembly, had discussed the reform within the framework of the "New Society", Guichard ³³ resumed the implementation of the Orientation Act.

The creation of the Parisian universities and the establishment of the National Council of Higher Education and Research

In the Fall of 1969, Guichard turned his attention to the most urgent problem left outstanding by his predecessor: the creation of the Parisian ³⁴ universities. The Minister was confronted by the same difficulties which had plagued Edgar Faure in the preceding months. This time, however, the opposition had had plenty of time to organize and the constituent unions of the Fédération des Syndicats Autonomes fought a bitter battle against the creation of pluridisciplinary universities. Thus, the science professors, led by Dean Zamansky, invoked the national interest in a public letter addressed to all the deputies. ³⁵ The Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Médecine warned against the risks of 'balkanization' while the Paris section of the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Droit openly attacked the notion of pluridisciplinarity. ³⁶ Simultaneously, some university mandarins gave much publicity to their attachment to the old regime and the faculties, which, according to them, were ³⁷ already interdisciplinary.

In the meantime, the reformists had not remained inactive. In January 1970, the A.E.E.R.S. launched a petition campaign whose objective was to "rally the supporters of truly interdisciplinary universities" and the S.G.E.N., the S.N.E.Sup.

the C.L.E.R.U. and F.N.E.F., all took strong stands in favor of the reform. The deadlock, nevertheless, remained total and by January 1970, no progress had been made in the talks and negotiations organized by Rector Mallet among the U.E.R.s' delegates. Under these conditions, Guichard, in a letter sent to the Rector on January 28th, warned that if by March, the U.E.R. delegates had not been able to reach a consensus, he would have recourse to his emergency powers, put an end to their bargaining and set up the universities himself "taking into account the opinions of all".³⁹

Widely and loudly decried by the conservative groups, the Minister's personal intervention did contribute to a breakthrough among student and teacher delegates and a few days before the deadline set by Guichard, Rector Mallet was in a position to accept their proposals. The carving up of the Paris Academie into thirteen universities was greeted with mixed reactions by the moderates.⁴⁰ The S.N.E.Sup. described it as a "joke" and the A.E.E.R.S. criticized the excessive concessions made to a "conservative lobby".⁴¹ The establishment of Paris VI, for example, was a clear victory for Dean Zamansky who had consistently sought the creation of a university offering scientific programs only. The Paris I and II universities, on the one hand, and Paris III and IV on the other, were concessions to the Syndicats Autonomes des Facultés de Lettres et de Droit. Paris VIII (the experimental center of Vincennes), Paris IX (Dauphine) and Paris VII (which was later headed by Michel Alliot) were, however, successes for the reformists.

The new Parisian universities emerging from the proposals and counter proposals of the U.E.R. delegates were, therefore, the product of an uneasy compromise between the "Anciens" and the "Modernes" which had led to more "divorces than marriages" among the former faculties, to use Girod de l'Ain's appropriate expression.⁴² Faure and Guichard's laissez-faire policy and their

emphasis on 'participation' in addition to the divisions and resistance of the academic community, thus, predetermined to a large extent the outcome of a process in which 'interdisciplinarity', one of the major long term objectives of the reform, was a casualty of the new modes of decision-making established within the university system.

The last stages of the implementation of the transitory provisions of the Orientation Act were essentially procedural and never raised the kind of divisive issues which had confronted Faure and Guichard in the preceding months. In the Spring of 1971, another round of university elections were held and the elected teacher and student representatives drafted the statutes of their respective U.E.R.s and universities in accordance with constitutional guidelines provided by the Education Ministry before designating delegates to the National Council of Higher Education and Research. The National Council itself officially convened for the first time on May 14th, 1971 and, on this occasion, Guichard made a speech which deserves to be quoted at length for its accurate description of the painful and at times disappointing process through which the Napoleonic university was overhauled:

Three years after the beginning of a crisis which led to the collapse of the old university system, two and a half years after the vote of a law which layed down the foundation of a new structure, we are gathered here to inaugurate its crowning institution.... I cannot hide today my great satisfaction and my relief.... The Law bestowed upon the university has been fully implemented. A great deal of patience and stubbornness was necessary. The underlying philosophy of the law made it imperative to rebuild the university with the consensus of the academic community. This (consensus) has not always been easy to reach.... For some, the present university system has strayed too far from the original (university) model, for others, it is still too far removed from reality. As for myself, I would not (merely) say that these conflicting criticisms reflect the value of the compromise (reached) because these university institutions are something more than a compromise only; they are a decisive step forward. The primary objective of the law is to create within the university, centers of innovation and the potential for change thereby enabling it to cope with immense problems on its own.... For three years, the university has been involved in a process of change during which structural and institutional matters have been emphasized at the expense of these 'problemes de fond': balancing culture with professional training, responding

to the growing need for professional qualification, spreading culture outside of the university, adapting teaching objectives and methods to mass education, orienting students, (rethinking) the relationship of research and education. Some wrongly object that the law itself led to a disregard of these problems.... We may (also) regret that this interim period was so long, although this was inevitable. However, from now on, these institutions must (begin to) function and work toward the profound reform...of the university.... This is all the more urgent because these long months have aggravated certain difficulties. The crisis of May and then the establishment of the new structures have revealed and often sharpened tensions among persons, groups, categories, disciplines.... This is unhealthy...but it is not reasonable to expect the reformulation of the university's tasks to go without debate and conflict. 43

Prospects for the future: cautious optimism

It is still far too early to determine whether the changes introduced by the Orientation Act have brought the university system closer to the long term objectives of the reform enumerated by Olivier Guichard in his address to the National Council. The evidence presented in this chapter seems to indicate that significant but inconclusive progress has been made in this direction. The dismantlement of the faculties has, to a certain extent, broken down the stifling isolation of disciplines. The universities have been able to further broaden their offerings and diversify their diplomas without overwhelming State controls. 44 The Fouchet reform establishing three cycles of increasingly differentiated and specialized courses of studies in the former Liberal Arts and Science Faculties, has been extended to most other fields of higher education. Experimental centers have been set up in Vincennes, Dauphine and Marseilles. The possession of the baccalauréat for admission into higher education has been waived in certain situations. Teachers of foreign nationalities and renowned laymen have joined the universities' faculty without major hurdles. New pedagogical methods - the British tutorial system, the American credit system (unités de valeur), continuous grading throughout the year (notation continue) have been introduced with varying degrees of success.

All of these transformations, very much in line with the pre-1968 reforms, should, in a long term perspective, give new impetus to the universities' educational, research and economic functions. Change, however, has frequently been delayed or watered down to overcome academic resistance and political opposition. These two factors have marred the implementation of the Orientation Act between 1968 and 1971 and are likely, in the future, to have an impact on the substantive goals of the reform.

Traumatized by the events of May, the teaching community has been swept by an enduring, strong undercurrent of 'réaction nobiliaire' and has displayed more interest in the preservation of its rights than in the modernization of the university system. The teachers' defensive attitude can be best evidenced by their distrust of students and laymen and the subsequent institutionalization of countless electoral colleges which might indeed hinder rather than foster the interaction and communication of the university groups and strata. Continuing academic reluctance toward student participation in university decision-making also casts a long shadow over the principle of 'co-management'. Several moderate student groups have singled out the teachers unwillingness to share their decision-making powers as a major cause for their disillusionment and growing apathy.⁴⁵ Whether there is a correlation between the teachers attitude and the students' disenchantment is not clear.⁴⁶ In any event, the Spring 1971 university elections were a blow to all advocates of 'participation'. Only 32% of eligible student voters bothered to cast their ballots and the contrast with the 1969 elections was so devastating that Guichard, in June 1971, requested the National Assembly to lower the quorum from 60 to 50%.⁴⁷

The adoption of this measure may reactivate student interest in the administration of the universities but it is not likely to remedy the growing

disorganization and fragmentation of the student movement into bickering splinter groups. As long as this pattern of political fractionalization prevails in conjunction with the negative attitude of the faculty, participation will remain a disruptive issue rather than a means of political integration.

Finally, academic inertia and resistance has been particularly evident in most educational and pedagogical matters. Besides the issue of interdisciplinarity which has already been discussed at length, mention should be made here of the new system of examinations established by the Orientation Act which provoked fierce disputes among the Anciens and the Modernes and was temporarily resolved in favor of the former by the Council of State.⁴⁸ The Act allowed students to choose among three modes of examinations: the old system of yearly final examinations, continuous grading or a combination of both. The Council ruled that, in order to preserve the intellectual standards of diplomas, students had to take both a final examination and periodic tests throughout the academic year.

Considerable political difficulties have also hindered the implementation of the Orientation Act. Laïcité has proved to be a dormant but lively issue precluding the establishment of too decentralized university system. Moreover, whenever the Government sought to increase the universities' autonomy, tensions flared up with the Left. Thus, in June 1971, the National Assembly partially abrogated the 1880 law granting the State a monopoly over the awarding of degrees in order to enable the universities to distribute their own diplomas. The Gaullist and Center parties stopped short of granting the same rights to private establishments of higher learning. They alienated, however, the Socialists and Communists by making possible the creation of examination boards comprising teachers from public and private institutions. Clearly, the implementation of

the Act relies to a great extent upon the support of a majority of the university groups and the reform might very well be compromised if the F.E.N., S.G.E.N., U.N.E.F.-Renewal and the S.N.E.Sup. came to the conclusion that the Orientation Act was a Trojan horse manipulated by the Gaullist to further nibble away the laïcité of the system of higher education.

Another political obstacle has been the endemic agitation of leftist students. Although highly localized and limited in scope and intensity, the turmoil created by anarchist, Maoist and Trotskyist students is detrimental to the implementation of the reform to the extent that it has considerably reinforced political and academic opposition. In spite of Faure's departure, parliamentary criticisms continued unabated and the conservative wing of the Gaullist party, mainly through the C.D.P., has kept asking for an overhaul of the Orientation Act while the Independent Republicans complained that the reform had contributed to "the progressive decline of the teachers' authority, growing confusion...and the profound discouragement of 'maîtres'." ⁴⁹ Within the National Assembly, budgetary discussions or ministerial statements always provided a convenient forum for the adversaries of the Orientation Act to stigmatize its shortcomings.

Olivier Guichard did not do away with the reform but he did eventually yield to the concerted pressures of the Presidency, the Health Ministry, the Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Médecine and the majority on limited but significant aspects of the Orientation Act. ⁵⁰ In June 1971, the National Assembly overrode the opposition of the Left and adopted a governmental proposal establishing a numerus clausus in the former medical faculties. Whether this amendment was "malthusian" or in fact will foster the training of a greater number of more qualified doctors is far from clear. It was nevertheless an unmistakable concession to the conservatives.

Selective entrance examinations, however, were not extended to the other establishment of higher education. Moreover, Guichard took advantage of the parliamentary debate to liberalize several provisions of the Orientation Act. Thus, the National Assembly lowered the quorum, overrode the Council of State's restrictive interpretation of Article 19 and 33 of the Act and made possible the creation of universities ex-nihilo (the Orientation Act stipulated that new universities could be set up only by dismantling the former faculties).

Thus, all in all, the package legislation adopted by the French Parliament was again an awkward compromise between the reformists and the conservatives and the latter's gains would have been greater if the Government had been vacillating in its commitment to implement the reform. We saw, in this respect, that the taking over of the Presidency by Pompidou did not lead to drastic departures from past policies. The new President was indeed a university mandarin who jealously protected the independence of the Grandes Ecoles and the status of the Agrégation. However, Pompidou also acknowledged that the Orientation Act was a necessary evil which had to be used in order to modernize the French universities and adapt them to the needs of a complex, industrial society. Although his commitment to the reform was probably stronger, Guichard shared much of the same philosophy and consistently sought, during his tenure of office, to improve the economic function of the universities.

In 1970, Guichard set up the Office National d'Information sur les Enseignements et les Professions (O.N.I.S.E.P.) whose services were made available to students and placement agencies. The Minister also founded the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche sur la Qualification (C.E.R.Q.) made up of representatives of the Labor and Industry Ministries who were to study the methods and content of higher education for the purpose of improving professional training within

51

the former faculties. Finally, Guichard established fourteen workshops in the Education Ministry which included businessmen, high ranking civil servants and university teachers who were to evaluate the number of graduates needed by industry and the capacity of the universities to cope with these demands. The reports of these workshops were eventually used in the preparation of the Sixth Plan.⁵² At the same time, Guichard tried hard to convince business that the Orientation Act was not merely an empty shell.

In general, business has remained reserved toward the reform and frequently criticized the nature of the new university system, the shortcomings of the State educational budget and the Government's refusal to move toward "universités concurrentielles". In the Summer of 1968, a C.N.P.F. official denounced the "incoherent projects related to 'participation'" and a year later, a study conducted by the powerful employers group concluded that the Orientation Act had not truly resolved anything.⁵³ In 1969, Capelle still complained that technical higher education remained "depreciee".⁵⁴ In addition to this, student enrolments in scientific disciplines have continued to decline and one of the basic assumptions of the Sixth Plan was that the universities output in technicians and graduates in Science had to be increased in order to meet the needs of the economy. Finally, the participation of *personnalités extérieures* in the university councils is too recent to say whether the traditional psychological barriers between the universities and industry have been broken down.⁵⁵

Much remains to be done. But after three years of implementation, the Orientation Act has not sunk into a quicksand and its adversaries have not been able to turn the clock back to the pre-1968 situation. The structural innovations painfully put into effect by Faure and Guichard have generally been followed by a strenuous process of gradual change in which academic and political opposition have been effectively counter-balanced by the universities'

reformists and the Government's resolution to modernize the French system of higher learning. The future is still clouded with uncertainties. Participation and co-management have yet to take root; several universities are pluridisciplinary only in name; the Grandes Ecoles have been left untouched; political cleavages within the academic community have grown sharper; pedagogical innovations have been met by the resistance of a segment of the faculty which, overall, has remained politically and programmatically fragmented and often hostile or apathetic. However, the balance of forces both in the universities and the Government is such that change is likely to continue at the same incremental pace and will probably follow the same tortuous path. As the Prime Minister observed in July of 1968, the reform was expected to be "une oeuvre de longue haleine."

FOOTNOTES

1. The exposé des motifs stressed identical points.
2. Information note No. 1 sent to the Rectors, cited in Cahiers des Universités Françaises, "De l'Université aux Universités, October 1968-Janvier 1971," Cahiers No. 1 (Paris: Armand Colin), p. 420.
3. Ibid.. During the parliamentary debate, Faure explained that the vagueness of the term "Unités d'Enseignement et de Recherche" was deliberate and that he preferred it to the concept of "departement" which, too often in France, evoked the idea of a single, isolated discipline. On this point, see Journal Officiel. Assemblée Nationale. Débats (October 9, 1968), p. 3112 and Sénat. Debats (October 25, 1968), p. 909.
4. According to Jacques de Chalendar, the Education Minister's Cabinet was involved in secretarial work during the last days of December. Jacques de Chalendar, Une Loi Pour l'Université (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970), p. 178.
5. Both the S.G.E.N. and the S.N.E.Sup. criticized the redistricting of the university system. The former charged that the procedure used had been "authoritarian" and "hasty", the latter that "it systematically safeguarded antiquated structures and the mandarinales." Syndicalisme Universitaire, No. 478 (December 5, 1968), p. 7 and Note de Documentation pour l'Assemblée Générale du 15-16 Février 1969. Département de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Enseignement Supérieur, "Universités et U.E.R.," available in my personal archives. Also, Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup., No. 174 (February 1969).
6. L'Education (February 27, 1969), p. 23 and (April 17, 1969), p. 28. Also, Y. de Gentil-Baichis, "L'Université Convalescente," in Projets, No. 35 (May 1969).
7. L'Education, No. 18 (January 30, 1969), p. 17.
8. Projet., Op. Cit., p. 578.
9. For more details on the Gauchistes' viewpoint, see, for example, Recherches Universitaires, "Milieu Etudiant et Classes Sociales," No. 1 (undated and published by the Mutuelle Nationale des Etudiants de France affiliated to U.N.E.F.).
10. Action Universitaire, No. 1, "Spécial Sorbonne," (undated), p. 1. (Personal Archives).
11. On this point, Information note No. 6 to the Rectors, Cahiers des Universités Françaises, Op. Cit., p. 437.
12. Information note No. 9 to the Rectors, in Ibid., p. 440.
13. Cited from Jacques de Chalendar, "La Loi d'Orientation. La Désignation des Nouvelles Universités," in Etudes (December 1969), p. 650.
14. The following discussion on the creation of the universities is based on Ibid., pp. 643-650 and Etudes (January 1970), pp. 21-48.

15. "La Désignation des Nouvelles Universités," in Etudes (December 1969), p. 656.
16. L'Année Politique 1969 (Paris: P.U.F., 1970), p. 9.
17. Faure alluded to the role of the Chief of State in the C.D.R. affair in an interview published in Le Monde (June 29, 1969), p. 6.
18. See for example, his televised address of January 27th in L'Année Politique, Op. Cit., p. 7.
19. Le Monde (March 27, 1969), p. 10.
20. On this point, L'Education, No. 34 (June 5, 1969), p. 25.
21. For more details on the 'querelle des equivalences', see Dominique Dubarle, " La Querelle des Equivalences et l'Enseignement Supérieur Catholique," in Etudes (December 1969), pp. 661-676. Faure's arrêté was struck down by the Council of State but Jean Foyer proposed the adoption of a legislative measure to override the Administrative Tribunal decision. The issue was again raised when Guichard was in office.
22. Bulletin du Syndicat Autonome des Facultés de Lettres, No. 1 (October 1969), p. 33. For similar views expressed by the Societe des Agréges, the various Syndicats Autonomes and other university groups and persons, see L'Aggrégation, No. 171 (July 1969); Le Monde (June 12, 1969), p. 13 and L'Education (February 1969), p. 25.
23. Le Monde (June 12, 1969), p. 13.
24. Le Monde (June 1-2, 1969), p. 11.
25. Le Monde (June 12, 1969), p. 12.
26. Le Monde (June 1-2, 1969), p. 11.
27. Le Monde (June 11, 1969), p. 2.
28. Le Monde (June 21, 1969), p. 6.
29. This mixed metaphor was used by Bertrand Girod de l'Ain in Le Monde (February 22-23, 1970), p. 8. Pompidou's observations can be found in L'Année Politique, Op. Cit., p. 61.
30. It is worth noting in this respect that the new Education State Secretary was an expert on problems of industrial reconversion and that Guichard's Directeur de Cabinet had been Directeur des Carburants.
31. Guichard's statement has been published in book form. See L'Education Nouvelle (Paris: Plon, 1970). Excerpts of his testimony appear in Le Monde (September 12, 1969), p. 14.
32. L'Education, No. 43 (October 30, 1969), pp. 19-22.
33. Le Monde (June 27, 1969), pp. 1 and 8.

34. The cases of the provincial universities, Lyons, Bordeaux and Aix in particular, were resolved in the Spring of 1970 only.
35. Zamansky's position can be found in Le Monde (November 6, 1969), p. 16. The text of this letter appears in Le Monde (January 29, 1970), p. 9.
36. Le Monde (December 25, 1969), p. 6.
37. For example, see Dean Vedel and Professor Marcel Merle's articles in Le Monde (December 24, 1969), pp. 1 and 10 and (December 21-22, 1969), p. 10.
38. Le Monde (January 7, 1970), p. 11.
39. L'Education (February 12, 1970), pp. 1 and 11.
40. For more detail on the nature of the new Parisian universities, see Le Monde (March 22-23, 1970), p. 15.
41. Le Monde (March 12, 1970), p. 9 and (March 8-9, 1970), p. 11.
42. Le Monde (March 22-23, 1970), pp. 1 and 14.
43. The complete statement of the Education Minister was made available to me by the Ministry's press services and is available in my personal archives.
44. For more detail on this point, see Bulletin de Liaison des Universités Françaises, " Les Universités et leurs U.E.R.," No. 4-5. Passim.
45. This point has been made in particular by the F.N.E.F. and the C.L.E.R.U.. Le Monde (July 13-14, 1969), p. 7 and (July 23, 1969), p. 13. For revealing but fragmentary analyses of the increasing lack of student interest in "participation", see Le Monde (December 16, 1969), p. 10 and The New York Times (December 1, 1971).
46. Informal chats with students in the Universities of Nice, Aix-Marseilles and Paris during my field research, seem to suggest that there is indeed such a correlation.
47. For more detail on these elections, Michel de Certeau and Dominique Julia, " Le Silence des Etudiants," in Etudes (Marcj 1971), pp. 395-405.
48. The Council of State also consistently sought to protect and reinforce the faculty's rights. For example, the Orientation Act stipulated that the U.E.R.s Councils "determine...their methods for testing and verifying knowledge and aptitudes" (Articles 19 and 33). The Council of State ruled that both the "determination" and "organization" of methods of testing were the exclusive responsibilities of the faculty.
49. Le Monde (March 12, 1970), p. 8.
50. For more detail on the demands of the Syndicat Autonome des Facultes de Medecine, see Le Monde (July 11, 1969), p. 9 and (September 5, 1969), p. 11. Also, L'Education (December 11, 1969), pp. 9-11 and (December 18, 1969), p. 18.

51. It should be noted that Faure set up the Committee whose recommendations led to the establishment of O.N.I.S.E.P.. For more detail on the Office and the C.E.R.Q., L'Education (March 19, 1970), pp. I-VI.
52. For more detail, L'Education (February 12, 1970), p. I-III and (February 5, 1970), p. 4.
53. Le Monde (July 12, 1968), p. 9. The pessimistic conclusions of the C.N.P.F. are contained in a roneotyped note made available to me by one of the members of the Conseil.
54. Le Monde (August 12, 1968), pp. 1 and 6.
55. According to a brochure of the C.N.P.F., they have not. See Conseil National du Patronat Francais, " La Formation des Hommes dans la Société Moderne," (Paris: Editions Techniques Patronales), pp. 20-22.

CHAPTER NINE:

DECISION-MAKING AND CHANGE IN FRANCE; THE STALEMATE SOCIETY THESIS REVISITED

Introduction

In the first chapter, we outlined two models of decision-making and change. The first one was constructed after surveying the literature influenced in particular by the writings of Stanley Hoffmann and Michel Crozier. The second was derived from the pluralist interpretation and approach to the American political system. Which one is most useful for the purpose of describing and explaining the patterns of policy-formulation and change in France ? What generalizations can we draw from this case study focused on the politics of the genesis, formulation and implementation of the Orientation Act ? To what extent does it question the contentions of the stalemate society thesis and contribute to theory-building ? Up to what point can we generalize about change in France on the basis of a single event dealing with the problems of higher education under the Fifth Republic ? In other words, how "representative" and "typical" is this work and what are its inherent methodological and substantive limitations ? We turn to these questions in this concluding portion of the dissertation.

Decision-making in the Fifth Republic and the Stalemate Society Thesis

In brief, the stalemate society thesis gives a grossly distorted and oversimplified picture of the French policy-making process. It misconstrues the actual role of the bureaucracy, interest groups and parties and significantly underestimate bargaining and negotiating processes among the political actors involved in a decision.

According to Stanley Hoffmann and even more so Michel Crozier, administrative elites in France play a key function in the initiation and formulation of major policies. Again, we did not question here the assumption according to which

the activities of national bureaucracies in today, modern, industrial and complex societies go much beyond the mere 'administration des choses'. What we are objecting to is that contention of the stalemated society students who stress that the bureaucracy in France is the primary (if not the only one) motor and instrument of change. The elaboration of the Orientation Act shows that this is true only to the extent that administrative elites are brought under political control and if they are reasonably unified politically.

The Education Ministry is reputed for "its hermetic baronies committed to the corporate interests they are supposed to regulate".¹ The judgement may seem rather severe when applied to the Direction des Enseignements Supérieurs but, significantly enough, Faure's first decisions were to reshuffle the Direction's personnel and fire the Secretary General of the Ministry who, during the 'events', had made no bones about his sympathies for the most conservative university groups. Once ministerial control was firmly reasserted and Faure gave it a unified political impulse, the Ministry's bureaucracy did begin to perform an innovative function. Thus, we noted the contribution of the Chargés de Mission in the resolution of the May-June crisis and the preliminary aggregation of the demands of the academic community. Later, during the implementation of the Orientation Act, the Minister's envoys (often shortcircuiting and struggling with the generally reticent and conservative Rectors) again played a constructive role in the redistricting of the university system and the creation of the new universities superseding the old faculties.

If we turn to the other branches of the bureaucracy, we find a consistent pattern of paralyzing political fragmentation and conservatism sharply contrasting with the 'activism' of the Rue de Grenelle. Pluridisciplinarity, selection, student participation in university decision-making, the fate of the Grandes Ecoles and the administrative and financial decentralization of the system of

higher education, all produced intense bickering within the French administrative class and generally pitted the Rue de Grenelle against most other ministries and Grands Corps (the Interior and Finance Ministries and the Inspection des Finances and the Council of State in particular).

Not unexpectedly, the Trincal-Courraza Committee was in no position to iron out administrative differences. Several 'conseils restraints' chaired by the Chief of State, **three** lengthy and stormy meetings of the Council of Ministers and significant concessions on the part of Edgar Faure, would have probably proved insufficient to break down the bureaucratic impasse had not the Education Minister been supported by De Gaulle on the critical issues of student participation and the a-posteriori control of the universities budgets.

Clearly, the Orientation Act owes far less to the French bureaucracy than to Edgar Faure and some key members of his Cabinet, mostly recruited from the university. The minister and his team drafted the reform and, although the process was surrounded by much secrecy (a rather usual procedure at these early stages of the decision-making process anyway...), they organized at the same time an impressive procession of university groups and delegations from provincial universities which was not mere window dressing. Finally, Faure and his Cabinet masterfully steered their reform through the legislative process. The Civil Service and the Grands Corps had hardly anything to do with these activities. Its consensus was limited to a diffuse and loose attachment to laicite (jealously defended by the Council of State) and a Jacobin conception of the State. Accordingly, French administrative elites procrastinated, delayed and obstructed and it is difficult not to agree with Professors Williams and Harrison when they point out that France is by no means a "paradise" for imaginative and innovative technocrats.

The stalemate society thesis is somewhat more convincing in its description of the role of interest groups in the policy-formulation process. In spite of their frequently noted numerical and organizational weaknesses, pressure groups in France seem indeed to constitute a formidable obstacle to change. In this study, we have found considerable evidence supporting Alfred Grosser's contention that "the tragic situation of education in France was not merely caused by government ~~im~~preparedness (or) inadequate budgetary outlays", but also and above all by the demands of faculty organizations which, "insensitive to change, delayed if not blocked the transformation of an outdated system." 3

Academic resistance to change was undoubtedly stiffened by the excesses of the student revolt and the unmistakable 'permissiveness' of Faure's original project. Consequently, several teachers who had been clamoring for reforms in the mid-sixties, suddenly began worshipping the very institutional order they had sought to alter. But the 'mandarinate' syndrome which found an outlet in the Council of Higher Education was more than an adventitious expression of vested academic interests and opposition to the sharing of power with laymen, junior faculty members and students. The same consistent pattern of resistance to pedagogical innovations and experimentation was as evident during the elaboration of the Orientation Act as it had been prior to the 'events'. 4 Moreover, the implementation of the reform and the creation of several pseudo interdisciplinary universities shows that it is easier to reform structures than attitudes.

Notwithstanding these observations, the making of the Orientation Act indicates that there is still a good deal of oversimplification in the argument of the stalemate society students. The academic community, from a purely programmatic perspective, is by no means monolithic (the significance of its

political divisions will be discussed later). There were broad educational policy differences between the teaching staffs of the professionally oriented faculties and the other establishments. Faculty attitudes also varied in accordance with the degree of integration within the academic hierarchy as illustrated by the respective positions of the S.N.E.Sup. and the Vedel Federation. Finally, there were genuine disagreements over selection, the place of the Grandes Ecoles within the system of higher education, student participation in university decision-making, pedagogical methods and the degree of administrative and financial autonomy to be granted to the universities.

How then is it possible to conclude that student and teacher groups were all demagogically interested in the preservation of the status quo ? Pitts concept of "delinquent communities" would most readily apply to the Société des Agrégés, the Franco-Ancienne and the Autonome Lettres for their blind attachment to the structure facultaire, outdated pedagogical methods and the administrative centralization of the university system. It has also a great deal of relevance to the revolutionary groups whose demands for "parity" and "student power" as well as boycott of the reform were clearly demagogical.

But if certain groups were unquestionably "delinquent", it would be objectionable to lump them together with the A.E.E.R.S., the S.G.E.N., the F.E.N. or even the moderate groupings which emerged during the May-June crisis. Both the A.E.E.R.S. and the S.G.E.N. devoted considerable attention to structural, pedagogical and research problems before 1968 and exerted a strong and constructive influence - particularly the former, whose leadership had excellent and close relations with Faure - on the substance of the Orientation Act.

If there is a problem about interest groups in France, it is not their

alleged conservatism but rather their programmatic and ideological fragmentation. The atomization of the group universe and its cleavages (sharpened by the May crisis as this was refracted in the debate over "la politique") singularly complicates the formulation of a workable public policy and we saw that Faure had to steer a difficult way between the ideologies of the Left and the Right and the conflicting views of the moderates. Accordingly, meaningful relationships between the groups and the authorities are not always smooth and, notwithstanding the Rousseauist dimension of Gaullism, the status of the groups in the decision-making process remains precarious and very much dependent on the emollient skills of policy-makers.

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Was Parliament a "delinquent community" during the elaboration of the Orientation Act ? There is little in the parties' behavior pointing up in that direction. Although the Left did refer to the Langevin-Wallon Plan more than once, it did not use it as an alibi for obstructing educational change. The Socialists and the Communists did criticize Faure for his concessions to the bureaucracy and his own backbenchers. But on the whole, both parties played the role of a "loyal opposition" making useful contributions to the resolution of the debate. We also noted the restrained and generally progressive attitude of the Center parties which collaborated with the Left and Faure's staff in building a consensus between the Education Minister and his own backbenchers.

Within the Gaullist rank and file, there were demagogues of law and order for whom the university crisis was tantamount to an extremists' conspiracy in addition to advocates of the defunct university order who became the spokesmen for the most conservative groups. The U.D.R., however, was most united only on a limited number of problems and was bickering over most aspects of the reform. Moreover, its leadership was in the hands of men like Rector Capelle who, in

spite of his support for some of the 'mandarins' demands, was at the same time a committed and enlightened reformer ready to go as far as integrating certain Grandes Ecoles into the university system.

In any event, whatever potential for "delinquency" there might have been in the House without Windows (the Senate itself unexpectedly came out of its traditional conservatism, sometimes restoring Faure's original draft and liberalizing the Assembly's decisions), it never had a chance to develop or find a durable outlet. In his distinguished speech of July 24th, Faure set the tone of the rest of the parliamentary debate and the floor discussions of October and November 1968 were marked by extensive and penetrating analyses of the major issues raised by the reform as well as by lengthy and elaborate clarifications and numerous compromises on the part of most of the parties involved. As Professors Williams and Harrison point out, "thus, the ill considered Parliament (showed) that it could after all attain a high standard of illuminating debate reaching down to the real issues, and also that there could be a constructive relationship between a minister and both houses. By a rare exercise in political skill, Faure...turned a government bill into a solemn national commitment binding on the majority and opposition alike." ⁶

The stalemate society is highly misleading in stressing the absence of compromises and negotiations in the French policy-formulation process. The Orientation Act itself was a bundle of compromises reached either by postponing action on intractable issues, watering down the most extreme demands and superimposing the old upon the new.

For example, a showdown over selection was averted by a somewhat elusive agreement on the ambiguous notion of a mandatory 'orientation' of students.

Another dispute about selection predictably flared up in 1971, but again, the issue was partially resolved only since selective entrance examinations were established exclusively in the medical schools. In pedagogical matters, "continuous grading" throughout the year did not supersede the old system of anonymous, yearly, final examinations; it was added to it. The traditional *ordre facultaire* was dismantled to enable the universities to become pluridisciplinary but the Orientation Act, in stressing that the universities could have a "dominant field of specialization" provoked interminable disputes over its interpretation when the reform was implemented. The demands of all extremists, 'mandarins', conservatives and radical alike, were reconciled by means of compromises entailing the recognition that the faculty enjoyed special responsibilities in research and educational matters, the creation of differentiated electoral colleges and the mandatory presence of laymen in the university boards. Similar mutual adjustments were evident in the nature of the autonomy granted to the universities. The State's supervision of university budgets was made more flexible but was not abolished altogether. The Rectors lost some of their powers to the universities' Presidents but still remain the personal representatives of the Education Minister in their districts. The Orientation Act did not go as far as setting up "universités concurrentielles". It merely sought to encourage their 'émulation' and the limited powers of the National Council of Higher Education and Research as well as the maintenance of 'diplomes nationaux', all make it clear that the French university system is still closer to the former Napoleonic edifice than to the North American model.

The Orientation Act was indeed a "reconciling project". It was also the outcome of an intense process of negotiations taking place at all levels of the decision-making apparatus among a plurality of actors with conflicting claims and demands.

The bargaining process began once the May-June demands had been aggregated by the Chargés de Mission and translated into tentative public policy by the preliminary August 6th reform project. The most salient actors included thereafter the following: the Chief of State who intervened at key turning points of the deliberative process during the Council of Ministers meetings and before the parliamentary debate in press interviews, the Prime Minister and most of the Ministers, the Council of State, the Inspection des Finances, Faure and his Cabinet, all established university groups in addition to the more informal groupings created during the 'events', all the parliamentary parties and their leadership and the National Assembly and Senate's Cultural Committees and their rapporteurs.

The overall process of intense bargaining among French political elites was characterized by much give and take and reciprocal concessions. Admittedly, Faure did much of the giving and the groups, the bureaucracy and Parliament, most of the taking, compelling the Education Minister to revise his August 6th project several times in order to make the reform acceptable to all. Concessions were thus made to the law and order advocates and led, for example, to the elimination of the May-June 'instances de fait' in the implementation of the Orientation Act. The university establishment was confirmed in its preeminent status in the new educational order and "parity" quickly fell into oblivion. The Grandes Ecoles were sacrificed to the High Administration and the Jacobin Ministers and deputies in addition to the centralizers of the Left prevented the setting up of competitive universities.

The process, however, was not a one way process. Faure did succeed in obtaining the financial autonomy of the universities and preventing the establishment of selection. The Education Minister was also able to win a

scheme of student participation which was more liberal than that proposed by the Council of Ministers and which is probably the most innovative change introduced by the Orientation Act in the university system.

The political actors involved in the implementation of the reform were slightly different and included the Education Ministry's officials, the Rectors, municipal authorities, Faure and Guichard's Cabinets and elected student and teacher delegates. The bargaining process did not come to an end and was, in fact, further encouraged by the Orientation Act which called for the participation of the academic community at large in laying down the foundations of the new university system. Again, we saw in this respect, that the universities which emerged from this complex and often confusing process reflected the existence of awkward compromises leaving much to be desired in relation to the substantive objectives of the reform.

To summarize, the elaboration and implementation of the Orientation Act demonstrates 1) that the French bureaucracy, far from being an innovative force, can also exert a conservative influence on the decision-making process, 2) that the groups and parliamentary forces may very well have other objectives than the demagogical preservation of the status quo and 3) that French political elites do not loath "face to face relationships" involving compromises and mutual adjustments.

Decision-making in the Fifth Republic: a system of bargaining power centers

Under these conditions, the assumption according to which decisions in the Fifth Republic come from above along hierarchical and formalized lines and that they will be vetoed or stalemated as a result of pressures from below,

appears, to say the least, highly misleading. The pluralist approach with its emphasis on the dispersion of political power and coalition building offers a more accurate and appropriate perspective on the French pattern of policy-formulation.

Throughout this study, we have stressed that French political elites are fragmented on policy matters and that profound divisions over the scope and content of public policy exist within the bureaucracy, among groups and parties and inside the Gaullist majority in particular. Thus, informal coalitions including various branches of the bureaucracy, interest groups and party leaders emerge throughout the political system on both sides of the issues entailed in the making of a decision.⁸ Appendix IX-1 summarizes the "whirlpools" of influence and power which crystallized as the decision-making process progressed toward the adoption of the Orientation Act.⁹ It indicates that the problems raised by the reform pitted different sets of protagonists against one another as the issues changed. Bargaining, mutual adjustments and compromises thus become a crucial and necessary ingredient of the decision-making process in order to translate the conflicting claims and demands of these shifting coalitions into public policy. This is possible, however, only if three conditions are present.

First, an alliance formed over one or several issues must not enjoy an overwhelming influence over the others. Public debate would then be most likely stifled thereby generating "stalemates" and "immobilisme" (for example, the Grandes Ecoles). Second, each individual actor must not have too high or unnegotiable stakes in all the issues raised by the making of a decision. He should expect some payoffs by yielding on what is relatively marginal to him in order to preserve a higher value (contrast the respective attitudes of

Capelle and Professor Deloffre on the status of the faculty, the participation of students and laymen in university decision-making). In addition, a political actor must not have an inflexible position on any single issue (the Treasury on the State control of the universities' budgets). In these situations, problems become intractable, lead to "delinquent" patterns of behavior and generally must be resolved by appealing to a higher constitutional authority.

Finally, each political actor must enjoy some bargaining power in relation to the others. This does not mean that the pattern of influence is evenly distributed along the political spectrum. Faure's bargaining skills, mastery of the legislative process and central position in the decision-making apparatus in addition to the support he received from the Chief of State made him so influential that hardly any coalition could hope to win without his acquiescence.

Power and influence, however, are relative values. Faure wanted the reform to materialize and have an aura of legitimacy. By the same token, all the university groups and the majority party had some bargaining power. Moreover, the Senate, the Center and Left parties in the National Assembly, by virtue of their pivotal position and role of honest brokers in the dispute between Faure and the Gaullists, could exert a degree of influence in the decision-making process. Insofar as the universities budgets were still for the most part provided by the State, the objections of the Treasury and the Jacobins ministers, groups and deputies could not either be completely overlooked. With the impending threat of "another May", even the demands of the S.N.E.Sup. and U.N.E.F. had, to a certain extent, to be taken into account.

Compromises among political elites thus became possible and their

subsequent bargaining resulted in a decision in which all lost or gained something. For example, Faure, at the price of minor concessions, overruled the opposition of the Treasury on the financial status of the universities and the U.D.R.'s on selection. Lacking the support of De Gaulle, however, he failed to integrate the Grandes Ecoles into the university system. The mandarins did not lose their position of power in the universities decision-making bodies but were unable to impose their views on the traditional 'ordre facultaire' or keep the students and laymen out of the universities boards. To the extent that Faure and the Government intended to improve the economic function of the universities, the U.D.R. was able to score a political success on 'personalités extérieures' although this victory was tempered by the resistance and objections of the political left. The Center parties obtained some concessions on laicite but utterly failed in their bid for "universités concurrentielles". Similarly, political discussions in the universities' premises were allowed but the Government did not yield on the paritary form of university governance advocated by U.N.E.F. and the S.N.E.Sup.

For comparative purposes, it should be noted that, as indicated in Chapter two, the pluralist model outlined here in relation to the Gaullist regime could also, to a large extent, be applied to the Fourth Republic. ¹⁰ It is evident, though, that the decision-making machinery of the present political system, even if it does not foreclose the possibility of "blocages", is now far better equipped than its predecessor to handle potential political stalemates. Since 1958, the balance of constitutional power has shifted from the legislature to the executive and, clearly, the Chief of State cannot be described as a "powerful but impotent" central authority figure. This case study, in fact, highlighted the dominant role of the President in the definition of fundamental policy orientations as well as his decisive influence in overcoming political

11

obstacles.

The efficiency of the Fifth Republic has also been enhanced by the emergence of a disciplined majority in the National Assembly. Thus, the Government is now able to get its business through without undue delay and controversial measures can be voted with reasonable speed. We are not suggesting that the Orientation Act was "imposed" on a recalcitrant majority nor do we imply that the U.D.R. backbenchers were "godillots" submitting helplessly to the Government's commands. The reform does bear the imprint of the U.D.R.'s demands and the party fell into line only after Faure accepted to compromise. As Jean Charlot writes,

In order to win over the majority, the problem had to be discussed during the study days of the parliamentary group, in a specialized university movement inspired by the U.D.R., in several full meetings, in the political committee of the parliamentary group, and finally, before debates were held and the bill voted in session. General de Gaulle indirectly, the Prime Minister directly and all the leaders of the U.D.R. were involved in the matter: former ministers, educational experts, the president of the group, the general secretary. 12

In any event, the extension of executive power is not inconsistent with an extensive pluralism ¹³ and the Fifth Republic's decision-making process appears as a dispersed, polyarchical system of competing, shifting clusters of elites or power centers, negotiating and bargaining with one another and whose conflicts are resolved by mutual adjustments or arbitration by a higher authority.

The stalemate society thesis and the problem of change in France

Let us recall that the model of change contained in the stalemate society thesis emphasizes first, the existence of long periods of "immobilisme" during which nothing really new is experimented and, second, the periodic eruption of

political crises presented as the functional substitutes for the alleged low capability of the French political system for "thorough self reform". Three questions must therefore be raised here. First, was the Orientation Act the outgrowth of a political stalemate ? Second, did the reform "thoroughly" overhauled the university system and was it followed by another era of stifling routine ? The answers to these questions is "no" and, again, the pluralist-incrementalist approach to the question of change in France seems to us to be a much better analytical tool than the sweeping generalizations and half truths characterizing the stalemate society thesis.

In the second chapter, we saw that the university system between 1945 and 1968 had been in a constant state of flux and had slowly evolved into a mass system of higher education. We did stress that, as a result of the pluralism of the policy-making process, the response of the political system was in general cautious and incremental and that the scope of feasible change was further narrowed down by the ideological divisions of French elites. We also noted, though, that the May-June crisis broke out precisely at a time when new reforms were being elaborated to cope with the universities structural problems resulting from the growth of student enrolments.

Under these conditions, it is difficult to accept the argument of the stalemate society scholars. The events of May and June did not suddenly set up in motion a hitherto stagnant and static university. They did not mark either the end of a complete political stalemate. Nor did they announce the dawn of an ephemeral period during which daring innovations and what was otherwise utterly impossible and unthought of became instantaneously conceivable and implementable public policy.

The state of "structural fusion" characterizing the Spring political crisis did not cancel out the effects of the programmatic and ideological pluralism of French elites on the formulation of policy. The old disputes over laïcité, administrative centralization and democratization, not to mention the fresh wound revealed by the "gauchiste phenomenon", did not allow the establishment of selection and competitive universities and were all behind the ambiguous debates over 'diplômes nationaux' and the mandatory seating of laymen in the university councils.

Accordingly, the Orientation Act did not "thoroughly" overhauled the university system. The relationship of the State and the universities as well as the internal balance of power within the former faculties were not drastically altered and a different outcome would have been quite surprising. In brief, the Orientation Act was an incremental decision which did not mark any significant departure from past policies and all in all, the university system in France, still remains in the early seventies, a half way house between a decentralized and centralized models of organization fraught with unresolved problems, imbalances and contradictions which probably will require further (necessarily) incremental adjustments in addition to those already accepted by the National Assembly in 1971. It should also be kept in mind here that the shock provoked by the May crisis was not sufficient to prevent the emergence of a political stalemate over the Grandes Ecoles and nothing was done about the damaging dualism of the French system of higher education.

Thus, one may seriously question the alleged innovative "function" attributed to the crises which periodically rock the French polity. The May-June events were not followed by an educational revolution but by partial and limited reforms foreshadowed by previous decisions. For example, the

Orientation Act merely gave a stamp of legislative approval to a great number of governmental decisions made in the preceding decade (the seating of laymen in the university boards, the creation of differentiated cycles of studies, the introduction of more imaginative pedagogical methods). In other areas, the reform institutionalized the limited experiments which had been launched in the preceding years in addition to most of the moderate demands of the 1966 Caen Seminar. Even student participation could be traced back to a 1944 Capitant decree which, thereafter, fell into disuse until 1967, when fragmentary experiences in co-management were undertaken in several universities. With regard to the particular issue of selection, it seems in fact that the May crisis led to a step backward which was only partially compensated by the half step forward of 1971.

Perhaps, political crises accelerate certain changes already in the offing. Perhaps, they contribute to a temporary lessening of traditional ideological disputes which recede in the background. They certainly do not necessarily perform a "latent" or "overt" function of innovation for the political system. In fact, the whole notion according to which it takes political crises "to inject massive doses of change" in France remains untested and untestable. Obviously, there has been in the course of the Fourth and the Fifth Republics history, countless examples of policy areas which never entailed any recourse to major political upheavals in order to bring about change. Moreover, is it realistic to think in terms of "thorough" changes or "massive doses" of innovation? Is not it assigning a task to the French political system which no system is really equipped for with the possible exception of transitional or totalitarian polities? Finally, how is it conceivable to ascertain that there is a causal link (or even a probabilistic correlation only) between political crises and the question of change? Clearly, the historical and sociological analyses of the stalemated society students are not adequate

research tools. More elaborate and sophisticated means of investigation (for example, a statistical approach relying on probability and correlation theory) would be necessary before making any tentative or more reliable judgements. Methodological cautiousness (undoubtedly not the strongest point of the stalemate society thesis) should therefore supersede those rash and sweeping generalizations which explain everything and nothing at the same time.

The question which must be finally asked is to determine whether the Orientation Act was followed by another period of "immobilisme". The data presented in Chapter 8 questions again this dimension of the stalemate society analysis. The years which followed the adoption of the reform were not marked by breathtaking innovations and, as in the past, the programmatic and political divisions of the academic community which was primarily responsible for the implementation of the Law, slowed and narrowed down the pace and scope of change. Although one may deplore the existence of these factors as well as the conservatism of a segment of the faculty as major brakes on change, the most cursory readings of specialized periodicals dealing with the evolution of the educational system since 1968 still demonstrates that the universities have not relapsed into a pattern of immobilisme which never existed anyway: new universities were created, new modes of decision-making were experimented and widespread pedagogical ventures launched. How imperfect these may have been, these activities are sufficient to cast doubt on a major aspect of the stalemate society thesis. To state that "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" is neither accurate nor the best way to understand the pattern of change in France.

The model presented by the students of the stalemate society therefore seems to place undue emphasis on the syndrome of "blocage" and the data provided by the genesis, elaboration and implementation of the Orientation Act

simply does not fit into the simplistic tryptic of immobilism, innovative crises and back to immobilism.

What is most puzzling about the stalemate society students is that they are not altogether insensitive to the significance of some of the factors which, in our view, explain decision-making and change in France. In discussing the "weight of the past" which overburdens French politics, Stanley Hoffmann deals at length with the ideological fragmentation of French elites. He stresses in particular the political wounds provoked by the 1789 Revolution as well as the further **segmentation** of the French polity caused by the failure of the political system to integrate the working class. We might add to this enumeration what could be conveniently called "the **weight of the present**" since the student upheaval of 1968 revealed another unresolved crisis of participation which led to the emergence of "movements of anarchistic and nihilistic protest". ¹³ Crozier himself, though not primarily concerned with the problems engendered by the tenuous legitimacy of the political system, is well aware of the fragmentation of French elites and refers, throughout his works, to the existence of "isolated strata" in the society.

Still, the inferences of both authors are not supported by this case study's findings. We have found ample evidence suggesting that it is not easy to introduce reforms in a political system whose elites are still bickering over the legitimacy of the regime. Change is thus hampered by the emergence of new ideological cleavages (refracted in the bitter disputes over political discussions in the universities) and must be brought about in such a way so as not to reopen old wounds. In a long term perspective, however, the programmatic and ideological divisions of French elites have not led to a consistent pattern of general blocage in educational matters. In fact, the events of May are a useful reminder that incremental and middle of the road solutions, "the morass

of centrism" so prevalent in French politics, ¹⁴ are the only way to prevent ideological cleavages from tearing the political system apart. Thus, the absence of a clear consensus in France does not preclude a pluralist and incrementalist interpretation of French political life. On the contrary, to the extent that they contain a clear element of prescription, both theories acquire an even greater degree of relevance and appropriatedness when used in relation to non-consensual polities.

Even applied to the Third Republic, the stalemate society is hardly convincing. After all, the educational system was secularized and the foundations of an industrial society layed down between 1875 and 1920. ¹⁵ These were no negligible accomplishments for a reputed "stalemate" political system.... In dealing with post-war France, Hoffmann is far more hesitant and circumspect since after proclaiming the "death" of the stalemate society, he gives an impressive list of some of the "mécanismes bloquant" which were not swept away by the collapse of the Third Republic. In subsequent writings, ¹⁶ Hoffmann responding to certain criticisms, ¹⁷ somewhat nuanced his original observations. But his discussion of the 1968 events seem to indicate that the stalemate society thesis, again, rose from its ashes, perhaps in its most caricatural form. One may therefore wonder about the accuracy and explanatory powers of a theory constantly fluctuating in response to the evolving political fortunes of the French polity!... ¹⁸

If we turn to Michel Crozier, the first question which must be asked is how the French sociologist can safely generalize about the university system, the labor movement, industrial relations and the entrepreneurial system in France on the narrow basis of a few case studies of public corporations. To the extent that Crozier does not explain what allows him to move from a

micro to a macro level of analysis or from a bureaucratic to a political setting. Metaphors are useful but they also have obvious limitations and Professor Aron's description of the Bureaucratic Phenomenon as a "grandiose extrapolation" ¹⁹ seems well taken.

Also, it must be recognized that there is a large element of self fulfilling prophecy in Crozier's discussion of change in France. The French sociologist focuses exclusively on the pattern not the scope of change. Accordingly, Crozier dismisses as insignificant all "prosaic" reforms thereby overlooking the fact that incremental alterations, in a long term perspective, involve a cumulative, ongoing process of gradual change with its own "rationality" and dynamics which cannot easily be "blocked". Thus, Crozier's conclusions are predetermined and may very well dissimulate a certain dogmatism which found an outlet in his hostile attitude toward students during the 1968 crisis and the Orientation Act thereafter.

Finally, there is a definite Rousseauist, if not utopian, dimension in Crozier's thinking. In the *Société Bloquée*, Crozier seems to be arguing that change, in France, must be introduced by means of controlled and engineered crises. ²⁰ But, again, Crozier misconstrues the role of political actors in the policy-making process. Furthermore, he overlooks that "structural fusion" will not necessarily erase the divisions of French elites nor prevent their competition. In other words, no "general will" should be expected to crystallize as a result of political crises. To that extent, there is an obvious reluctance on the part of the French sociologist to accept the inevitable cost of the politics of change. All industrial societies are complex and delicate mechanisms which can be altered only incrementally and this applies even to those political systems which are not plagued by problems of legitimacy: Crozier's ideal type,

the United States political system in spite and probably because of its decentralization, is not either exempt of political stalemates. And there too, change is also a matter of more or less rather than the outcome of a cathartic process.

Crozier's longing for a Greek City style democracy, obviously leads him to underestimate the key function of political leadership in the building of a consensus among competing elites over a decision affecting change. Stanley Hoffmann also makes a similar error in paying far too much attention to "heroic" leadership. We do not claim that the Orientation Act would have been different had not Faure been in the Education Ministry. But, clearly, the resolution of the crisis, the pattern of relationship between the groups and the authorities in addition to the nature of the parliamentary debate can hardly be comprehended satisfactorily without reference to the Education Minister's manipulative and negotiating skills as well as his energizing leadership. In our view, this variable, as emphasized by the pluralists should be moved toward the top of the chart in any attempt to understand the patterns of decision-making and change in France.

Concluding thoughts: the limitations of this study

To sum up, we have been concerned here with a model of decision-making and change which has been tested in light of the evidence provided by the genesis, formulation and implementation of the Orientation Act of Higher Education. We found that these models did not accurately describe the respective role of the bureaucracy, the groups and Parliament as they interacted with one another in 1968 and seriously underestimated the abilities of the parties involved to bargain and compromise. Finally, they misconstrued

the nature of political crises and placed undue emphasis on the syndrome of "blocage".

Instead, we argued that the Orientation Act was the outcome of an intense process of mutual adjustments among competing and shifting clusters of elites (bureaucrats, groups, party leaders and ministers) overshadowed by the compelling leadership of the Education Minister and the political weight of the Presidential office. Far from being "hierarchical" or "bureaucratized", the Fifth Republic's (and probably the two preceding regimes) policy-processes are characterized by an extensive pluralism which makes us believe that the pluralist model is far more accurate and useful than the stalemate society thesis.

We also suggested that the ideological fragmentation of French elites in addition to the pluralism of the decision-making process, while preventing any "comprehensive" or "thorough" changes, whether in a crisis situation or not, did not, though, lead to any durable stalemates. Decisions affecting change cannot be reduced to a single issue over which a monolithic coalition of political forces would coalesce nor should they be viewed in isolation from one another. In a long term perspective, replacing the making of decisions on a developmental continuum, change in France appears to be sluggish, incrementally oriented, full of contradictions requiring constant further minor adjustments. In other words, change in France as in any other modern, complex industrial societies, is not an all or nothing affair but rather a mixture of modernity and tradition primarily determined by what is politically feasible.

Of course, we do not claim that a single case study can lead to more than

limited judgements. The Orientation Act was obviously a "loi de circonstances": student participation in university decision-making for example, would never have become a salient issue without the background of the Spring political disorders. Moreover, only tentative working hypotheses must be derived from a specific situation and a particular stage of development of the Fifth Republic.

In regard to the role of the various political actors involved in the policy-making process, additional case studies reveal a somewhat kaleidoscopic body of information. On numerous occasions, the bureaucracy was indeed an instrument of change and innovation confronted by the demagogic and paralyzing demands of "delinquent communities". The Senate in 1968 was unusually "liberal". As to the National Assembly and the majority party, when they were not straight-jacketed by the Government's formidable constitutional arsenal, they were not always as dignified, constructive and thorough as they had been during the Summer of 1968.

Notwithstanding these observations, all the case studies which we examined, convey the impression that the expansion of the Executive under the Fifth Republic has by no means cancelled out the pluralism of a decision-making process in which "interest groups, political parties, civil service and parliamentary institutions remain in place and continue to participate in the formulation of policy."²¹ Variations must therefore be taken into consideration. They do not, however, contradict our conclusions and should in fact be understood as an integral part of the pluralists' argument.

More cautiousness is perhaps necessary in relation to the problem of change. Educational policy is only one of the political system's outputs and different areas of public policy should be explored. Moreover, as Durkheim

observed long ago,²² educational systems are highly conservative social institutions. Systematic comparative studies of policy-formulation under the Fourth and Fifth Republics should be undertaken in order to ascertain the consequences of differing constitutional arrangements on the making of decisions affecting change. Finally, it would be useful to inquire into a number of political crises to determine whether they temporarily "unblocked" the political system.

Clearly, much remains to be done. And again, a single case study cannot pretend resolving all the questions raised by a complex and multi-faceted theory. The stalemate society thesis, however, in general does not adequately answers its own questions. This is true in particular for its emphasis on political culture which both Crozier and Hoffmann present as a key, independent explanatory variable. It was beyond the scope of this study to deal with this issue although, in our discussion of the decision-making process, we found little empirical evidence supporting the contention that French elites avoid "face to face relationships" and loath getting involved into conflictual and bargaining situations.²³

A few cases studies relevant to the French petits fonctionnaires is no sound substitute for rigorous methodology. What should be done is to bridge the gap between broad and narrow gauged theories. Undoubtedly, this will be a fascinating undertaking for empirically oriented political scientists. But as long as this methodological problem is not confronted and dealt with, the stalemate society thesis, in spite of its growing popularity in France,²⁴ will remain an elegant literary device with little explanatory powers. Firmly grounded empirical observations, not cosmic extrapolations and other impresionistic "paradoxes", are what we need most urgently to describe and understand the functioning of the French political system.²⁵

FOOTNOTES


1. To quote Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison, Politics and Society in De Gaulle's Republic (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1972), p. 231.
2. The divisions of the French bureaucracy and its frequent 'esprit de chapelle' are discussed by Roger Gregoire in "Tradition et Changement dans la Haute Administration," in Tendances et Volontés de la Société Française (Paris: Futuribles, 1966), pp. 248-256. Also, Jean-Francois Kessler, "L'Influence de l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration sur la Rénovation de l'Administration et ses Limites," in Ibid., pp. 257-267. The reader may also consult the perceptive study of Bernard Gournay, "Un Groupe Dirigeant de la Société Française: les Grands Fonctionnaires," Revue Française de Science Politique, XIV 2 (1964), pp. 215-256. For an overview of the problems of the French bureaucracy, see F. Ridley and Jean Blondel, Public Administration in France (London: Routledge and Paul Kegan, 1964) and the more recent issue of Esprit, "L'Administration," (January 1970).
3. Francois Goguel and Alfred Grosser, La Politique en France (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964), p. 221.
4. On this point, Jean-Claude Passeron, "Quelques Remarques sur l'Université Française," Cahiers de l'A.U.P.E.L.F., No. 4 (September 1970), pp. 125-131.
5. On this point, see Williams and Harrison, Op. Cit., p. 166.
6. Ibid., p. 324.
7. I am indebted on this point to Bernard E. Brown, "The French experience of Modernization," World Politics, Vol. 21, No.3 (April 1969), pp. 366-391.
8. The concept of "government by whirlpools" was first coined by Ernest Griffith, The American System of Government (London: Methuen, 1954).
9. Several studies emphasize the pragmatic and non ideological pattern of elite interaction in the making of political decisions. See Nathan Leites, On the Game of Politics in France (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959) and Philip M. Williams, Crisis and Compromise. Politics in the Fourth Republic (New York: Anchor Books, 1966). Also Duncan Mc Rae, Parliamentary Parties and Society in France, 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1967).
10. The making of the Orientation Act could be contrasted, for example, to the "un-making" of the 1957 Billères project by the National Assembly. See Francois. G. Dreyfus, "Les Syndicats Universitaires et le Projet Billères de Réforme de l'Enseignement," Revue Française de Science Politique (April 1965), pp. 213-250.
11. Jean Charlot, The Gaullist Phenomenon. The Gaullist Movement in the Fifth Republic (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 155.
12. The pluralism of the policy-making process also sets limits to the President's powers. On this point, see Williams and Harrison, Op. Cit., pp. 296-302.

13. On the significance of the May-June events for the legitimacy of the political system, see Bernard E. Brown, "The French Student Revolt," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (Eds), Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1972), pp. 274-290. For a more "ideological" interpretation, Alain Touraine, The May Movement: Revolt and Reform (New York: Random House, 1971). Georges Dupeux treats the question of the entry of social groups into the political system in La Société Française (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964). For an overview of the timing of political conflicts and its impact on the legitimacy of political systems, Seymour Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1960).
14. Maurice Duverger, "L'Eternel Marais: Essai sur le Centrisme Français," Revue Française de Science Politique (February 1964), pp. 38-48.
15. On this point, see Atlas Historique de la France Contemporaine, 1800-1965 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966), passim.
16. See for example, his "Succession and Stability in France," in Journal of International Affairs, No. 1 XVIII (1964), pp. 86-103.
17. Goguel has had trenchant comments on Hoffmann's thesis in Stanley Hoffmann (Ed), In Search of France (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 359-405.
18. Michel Crozier has also revised several times his theories before coming back to his original assumptions in the Société Bloquée. See, for example, his "Cultural Revolution. Notes on the changes in the intellectual climate in France," in Stephen R. Graubard (Ed.) The New Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 602-630. Also, "Le Modèle d'Action Administrative à la Française est-il en voie de Disparition?", in Tendances et Volontés de la Société Française, Op. Cit., p. 423-444.
19. Le Monde (February 15, 1964), p. 7.
20. Michel Crozier, La Société Bloquée (Paris: Le Seuil, 1970), p. 219.
21. Bernard E. Brown, "France", in J.B.Christoph (Ed.), Cases in Comparative Politics (Boston: Little Brown, 1969), pp. 112-184. Also, Aline Coutrot, "La Loi Scolaire de Decembre 1959", Revue Française de Science Politique (June 1963), pp. 352-388; Gaston Rimareix and Yves Tavernier, "L'Elaboration et le Vote de la Loi Complementaire a la Loi d'Orientation Agricole," in Ibid., pp. 389-425; F.G. Dreyfus, "Les Syndicats Universitaires...", Op. Cit., pp. 213-250. Philip Williams, The French Parliament. Politics in the Fifth Republic (New York: Praeger, 1968), especially chapter Six and Williams and Harrison, Op. Cit., pp. 275-326.
22. Emile Durkheim, L'Evolution Pédagogique en France. Tome II, De la Renaissance à nos Jours (Paris: Alcan, 1938), passim. See also his Education et Sociologie (Paris: Alcan, 1934), passim.
23. For an excellent critique of Crozier's methodology and conclusions, see the forthcoming book of Erza Suleiman, The French Administrative Elite: Power, Politics and Bureaucracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974)

24. The concept of the stalemate society has been used by Régis Paranque, Le Malaise Français (Paris: Le Seuil, 1970); Michel Drancourt, Cinquante Millions d'Héritiers (Paris: Fayard, 1969); Robert Laffont, Décoloniser en France. Les Régions Face à l'Europe (Paris: Gallimard, 1971). This growing body of literature is all the more puzzling in light of the fact that France has been undergoing in the past decade rapid social and economic changes comparable to those of the Second Empire. These transformations are extensively discussed by John Ardagh, The New French Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); Bernard E. Brown, " The French Experience of Modernization," in Op. Cit., p. 366-391; Georges Dupeux, La France de 1945 à 1965 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969); Darras, Le Partage des Bénéfices (Paris: Minuit, 1966); Michel Gervais, Claude Servolin and Jean Weil, Une France sans Paysans (Paris: Le Seuil, 1965); Jacques Guyard, Le Miracle Français (Paris: Le Seuil, 1965); Jean Lecerf, La Percée de l'Économie Française (Paris: Arthaud, 1963); Serge Mallet, Les Paysans Contre le Passé (Paris: Le Seuil, 1962); Henri Mendras, The Vanishing Peasant. Innovation and Change in French Agriculture (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1970); Edgar Morin, Commune en France. La Métamorphose de Plodemet (Paris: Fayard, 1967); Francois Henri de Virieu, La Fin d'une Agriculture (Paris: Calmann-levy, 1967); Gordon Wright, Rural Revolution in France. The Peasantry in the XXth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
25. Fred I. Greenstein and Sidney G. Tarrow make a similar point in " The Study of French Political Socialization," World Politics, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (October 1969), p. 137.

APPENDIXES

Appendix I-1: The traditional organization of the university system



Appendix II-2: Major post-war reforms in Higher Education

Constitutional Channel	Date	Nature of the decision
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I. Modernization of the universities

A. Widening of the universities' curricula and offerings

Decree.....	5/9/1947....	Creation within the Liberal Arts Faculties of a 'licence' in psychology.
Decree.....	9/14/1950....	Creation within the Liberal Arts Faculties of a 'licence' dealing with the study of Overseas populations.
Decree.....	10/25/1957....	Creation within the Law faculties of a 'diplôme de démographie'.
Decree.....	8/26/1957....	The Law Faculties become Law and Economic Sciences Faculties.
Decree.....	4/2/1958....	Creation within the Liberal Arts Faculties of a 'licence' in sociology.
Decree.....	7/23/1958....	The Liberal Arts Faculties become Liberal Arts and Human Sciences Faculties.
Decree.....	7/29/1958....	Creation within the Liberal Arts Faculties of a 'licence' in the History of Art and Archeology.
Decree.....	11/14/1958....	Creation within the Law Faculties of a degree in General Demography.
Decree.....	8/17/1959....	Creation within the Law Faculties of a 'licence' in Economic Sciences.
Decree.....	7/25/1958....	Creation within the Liberal Arts Faculties of a degree of "expert géographe".
Arrêté.....	12/20/1955....	Creation within the Law Faculties of a 'Certificat d'Aptitude à l'Administration des Entreprises'.

B. Pure and Applied Research

Ordonnance.....	11/2/1945....	Reorganization of the C.N.R.S..
Decree.....	2/8/1954....	Creation within the Liberal Arts Faculties of a Doctorat d'Université prepared in two years.
Decree.....	7/20/1954....	Creation within the Sciences Faculties of third cycle of studies.
Decree.....	1/5/1955....	Creation of a new category of teachers: The 'professeurs associés'.
Decree.....	11/28/1958....	Creation of the Interdepartmental Committee for Technical and Scientific Research.
Decree (Article 42).....	1/9/1959....	Departments are set up in the faculties for the purpose of regrouping "neighboring disciplines".

Appendix II-2 (continued)

Constitutional channel	Date	Nature of the decision
Decree.....	6/15/1959...	Reform of the Law and Economic Sciences Doctorate stressing research training.
Decree.....	1/15/1963...	Creation within the universities of Coordination Committees of identical faculties.
Decree.....	6/26/1963...	Creation within the Law and Economic Sciences Faculties of a 'Doctorat de spécialité'.
Arrêté.....	8/10/1964...	Definition of the academic requirements for the Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures in Economic Sciences.
C. Upgrading of Technical Higher Education. Bridging of the gap between the universities and the professions		
Decree.....	27/3/1954...	Reform of Law studies stressing better professional training.
Decree.....	7/28/1955..	Creation within the Law Faculties of a Certificat d'Aptitude à l'Administration des Entreprises.
Decree.....	9/30/1957..	The governing councils of the National Institutes of Applied Sciences may include "personalités scientifiques ou industrielles.
Law.....	4/2/1960...	Creation of Agricultural Lycées.
Decree.....	5/5/1961..	Creation within the universities of Higher Technical Training and Social Promotion Committees which may include representatives of business and may propose measures where the institutions of higher learning will develop further their offerings in technical education.
Decree.....	3/12/1962..	Creation within the Liberal Arts Faculties of a certificate of practical literary studies to promote higher technical training.
Decree.....	12/14/1964.	Creation of coordinating committees between the National Institutes of Allied Sciences and the Sciences Faculties within the same university.
Law.....	12/26/1964..	The Higher Council of National Education is opened to laymen.
Decree....	6/10/1965..	Creation of new differentiated sections in the baccalaureat degree: literary studies, economic and social sciences, mathematics, natural sciences and technical and industrial sciences.

Appendix II-2 (continued)

Constitutional Channel	Date	Nature of the decision
Decree.....	1/7/1966....	Creation of University Institutes of Technology, offering technical and scientific training at an intermediary level between secondary and higher education with the cooperation of the relevant professions.

II. Democratization of Higher Education

A. Decentralization of the University system

Decree.....	10/8/1957....	Creation of university colleges of first cycle scientific studies in towns not yet possessing a university
Decree.....	11/2/1960....	Creation of university colleges of first cycle Liberal Arts studies in towns....
Decree.....	12/29/1961...	Foundation of a university at Nantes.
Decree.....	1/1/1962....	Foundation of a university at Orleans and Reims.
Decree.....	4/29/1963....	Creation of university colleges of first cycle Law studies in towns....
Decree.....	10/1/1964....	Foundation of a new university at Amiens and Rouen.
Decree.....	10/1/1965....	Foundation of a new university at Limoges and Nice.

B. Implementation of the 'tronc commun'.

Ordinance.....	1/6/1959....	Extension of compulsory schooling to the age of sixteen.
Decree.....	1/6/1959....	Creation of a three months long "observation cycle" in secondary schools.
Decree.....	6/14/1962....	The observation cycle is extended to 2 years.
Decree.....	8/3/1963....	Organization of a new type of comprehensive secondary establishments, the Colleges d'Enseignement Secondaire.

C. Reorganization of the Ministry.

Ordinance.....	11/20/1944....	Reorganization of the Ministry.
Decree.....	6/1/1960....	" "
Decree.....	3/14/1964....	" "

Appendix II-2 (continued)

Constitutional channel	Date	Nature of the decision
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D. Measures in favor of students.

Law.....	4/16/1955...	Reorganization of the Service des Oeuvres Sociales in favor of students. Creation of the Centre National des Oeuvres Universitaires whose governing councils include representatives of students.
Decree.....	2/27/1957...	Creation of the Instituts de Préparation à l'Enseignement Secondaire in the Science and Liberal Arts Faculties where 'élèves professeurs' can receive a salary.

III. Pedagogical changes

A. Organization of studies into differentiated cycles involving a progressive degree of specialization.

Decree.....	3/27/1954...	Reform of Law studies. Creation of two cycles of studies, the first one, common to all students.
Decree.....	7/10/1962...	Creation within the Law Faculties of a Diplôme d'Etudes Juridiques Générales awarded at the end of the first cycle of studies.
Decree.....	7/31/1962...	Creation within the Science Faculties of a Diplôme d'Etudes Scientifiques Générales awarded at the end of the first cycle of studies.
Decree.....	11/25/1962...	Reform of the five year pharmacy studies. They are henceforth divided into three periods: an initial one year period of basic scientific studies followed by three years of general training and a final year of specialization.
Decree.....	1/25/1963...	Creation within the Law and Economic Sciences Faculties of a Diplôme d'Etudes Economiques Générales awarded at the end of the first cycle of studies.
Decree.....	6/22/1966...	Reform of higher studies in Arts and Sciences. Abolition of the 'propédeutique'. Creation of three cycles of studies. The first, a two year course, leads to a University diploma of literary or scientific studies, the second to the

Appendix II-2 (continued)

Constitutional Channel	Date	Nature of the decision
Decree.....	6/22/1966..	licence or to a master's (maîtrise) after a further two years, while the third is devoted to research.

B. Differentiation of the teaching staff.

Decree.....	5/13/1942..	Creation of assistants in the Liberal Arts Faculties.
Law.....	4/27/1947..	Creation of a corps of "chargés de Travaux Pratiques"
Decree.....	10/24/1960..	Definition of the legal status of the teaching staff in the medical schools. A distinction is made between professors with or without chair, 'chefs de travaux', 'assistants', 'moniteurs'.
Decree.....	10/26/1960..	Creation of 'maîtres assistants' in the Liberal Arts Faculties and other institutions of higher learning.
Decree.....	1/27/1962..	Creation of a corps of 'maîtres assistants' in the Law and Economic Sciences Faculties.

C. Changes in pedagogical methods.

Circulaire.....	8/20/1945..	Experiment of the 'classes nouvelles'.
Decree.....	4/1/1950..	Creation of a Certificat d'Aptitude à l'Enseignement Secondaire.
Decree.....	2/27/1951..	Creation of a Certificat d'Aptitude à l'Enseignement Technique.
Law.....	3/18/1957..	Creation of a National Institute of Applied Sciences at Lyons. Students without the baccalauréat are admitted if they have sufficient vocational training and work experience.
Decree.....	11/29/1961..	Two additional I.N.S.A. are set up in Rennes and Toulouse.
Decree.....	10/14/1963..	Creation of an Institut National pour la Formation des Adultes in Nancy whose activities are related to pedagogical research and training.

Appendix II-3: Positions of the major student and teacher groups on selected issues raised by the reform of the university system (prior to 1968)

	Selection	Orientation	Agrégation	Creation of Departments
Société des Agrégés	+	-	+	?
Franco-Ancienne	+	-	+	?
Association G. Budé	+	-	+	?
S.N.E.S.	+	-	+	?
F.N.E.F. and F.N.A.G.E.	-	+	?	?
Fédération des Syndicats Autonomes	-	-	?	?
A.E.E.R.S.	-	+	-	+
S.G.E.N.	-	+	-	+
S.N.E. Sup.	-	+	-	+
U.N.E.F.	-	+	-	+
S.N.E. Sup. (after 1967)	-	+	-	+

Appendix II-3 (continued)

	Abolition of the chaires	Integration of the Grandes Eco- les in the University	Autonomy of the Univer- sity	Student participation
Société des Agrégés	?	-	-	-
Franco-Ancienne	-	-	-	-
Association G. Budé	-	-	-	-
S.N.E.S.	?	-	-	-
F.N.E.F. and F.N.A.G.E.	?	-	+	?
Fédération des Syndicats Autonomes	-	-	-	-
A.E.E.R.S.	+	?	+	-
S.G.E.N.	+	?	+	?
S.N.E.Sup.	+	+	-	?
U.N.E.F.	+	+	-	+
S.N.E.Sup. (after 1967)	+	+	-	+

Key to the symbols used:

1.: (+): in favor of...

2.: (-): opposed to...

3.: (?): indecise, ambiguous or impossible to determine.

Appendix II-4: Brief attitudinal profile of the major teacher groups in France

Teachers associations in France, fall into two main categories: the first, includes those groups which have more or less direct relationships with the workers' unions and political parties; the second, encompasses so-called independent, "learned societies".

The most important teacher association of the first group is the Fédération de l'Education Nationale (F.E.N.). The bulk of its membership comes from its four most influential constituent unions: the Syndicat National des Instituteurs (S.N.I.), the Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Secondaire (S.N.E.S.), the Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Technique (S.N.E.T.) and the Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur (S.N.E.Sup.). The numerical representativeness of the remaining functional categories of the sector of National Education (archivists, librarians, researchers, etc...) is nevertheless not negligible. As a result of the heterogeneity of its rank and file, F.E.N.'s leadership severed all official links with political parties in order to maintain at least a facade of unity among teachers. Internal bickering, though, never disappeared and this explains why, over the years, F.E.N. has become increasingly involved in the resolution of the differences existing among teachers organizations. It should also be noted that F.E.N. has retained numerous informal and close relations with the French political Left in the National Assembly.

Although there is still much overlap between the Syndicat Général de l'Education Nationale (S.G.E.N.) and the Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail (C.F.D.T.), the former has consistently shown a high degree of intellectual and pedagogical independence, particularly on the question of 'laïcité'. It recruits its membership from all levels of the educational system. This is not the case for the Fédération des Syndicats Autonomes de l'Enseignement Supérieur which was founded in 1948 in order to avoid a merging into a larger organization which would have ignored the specificity of the demands of higher education teachers. Consequently, the Fédération refused to join the Fédération de l'Education Nationale while stressing at the same time its 'a-political' character. Before turning to the second category of teacher organizations, mention should be made here of the Syndicat National des Lycées et Collèges (S.N.A.L.C.) which is affiliated to the Confédération Générale des Cadres (C.G.C.) and which is mainly known for its concerted actions with the Société des Agrégés.

The second cluster of teacher groups is essentially made up of groups of specialists, mostly recruited from the secondary level of the educational system. It includes, for example, the Société des Professeurs d'histoire, the Société des Professeurs de Sciences Naturelles, etc... The most important ones, however, are, in order of decreasing significance and influence: the Société des Agrégés claims to represent approximately half of the Agrégés; the Franco-Ancienne and the Association Guillaume Budé recruit their rank and file mainly from French, Latin and Greek teachers. It should be noted that a dissident, Société des Jeunes Agrégés was set up in 1963 whose approach to the problems of educational change was somewhat more 'progressive' than that of Professor Bayet's group.

The following table summarizes the preceding discussion and at the same time provides additional and basic elements of information about these faculty organizations.

Appendix II-4 (continued)

- F.E.N.....Fédération de l'Education Nationale
 Approximate membership as of 1965: 400,000 (80% of the National Education personnel.
 Secretary General: James Marangé.
 Publication: "L'Enseignement Public".
- S.N.E.Sup.....Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Supérieur.
 Affiliated to F.E.N.
 Political orientation: until 1967, leans toward the Communist party; between 1967 and 1969, toward the Parti Socialiste Unifié and since then back to the Communists.
 Approximate membership: 4,000 in 1966. Includes a majority of junior faculty members mainly recruited from the Liberal Arts and Science Faculties.
 Secretary General: until 1968, Alain Geismar. Between July 1968 and March 1969: Bernard Herzberg. Since then, Georges Innocent and Pierre Monteux.
 Publication: "Bulletin du S.N.E.Sup."
- S.N.E.S.....Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Secondaire.
 Affiliated to F.E.N..
 Political orientation: political Left with a minority of Communists.
 Approximate membership: 40,000 recruited among Lycées professors.
 Secretary General: André Drubay.
 Publication: "L'Université Syndicaliste".
- S.N.E.T.....Syndicat National de l'Enseignement Technique.
 Affiliated to F.E.N..
 Political orientation: moderate Left.
 Approximate membership: 17,000 recruited from technical educational establishments.
 Secretary General: Jacques Fournier.
 Publication: "L'Apprentissage Public".
- S.N.I.....Syndicat National des Instituteurs.
 Affiliated to F.E.N..
 Political orientation: Socialist majority with a Communist minority; lay and traditionally anti-clerical.
 Publication: "L'Ecole Libératrice".
- S.G.E.N.....Syndicat Général de l'Education Nationale.
 Affiliated to the C.F.D.T..
 Political orientation: progressive Christian Democratic Left.
 Approximate membership: 28,000 in 1967 recruited from all levels of the educational system.
 Secretary General: Paul Vignaux. Since 1969: Charles Pietri.
- Autonome.....Fédération Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes de l'Enseignement Supérieur.
 Not affiliated to any political organization.
 Political orientation: claims to be "a-political".
 Approximate membership: 7,000 higher education teachers.
 President: Professor Georges Vedel.
 Publication: "L'Enseignement Supérieur".

Appendix II-4 (continued)

- Société des Agrégés..... Not affiliated to any political organization. Claims that it is not a 'union'.
 Political orientation: "a-political".
 Approximate membership: 7,500 in 1963 recruited among Lycées teachers and faculties' assistants.
 President: Professor Bayet.
- Franco-Ancienne.....Not affiliated to any group. Claims that it is not a "union".
 Political orientation: "a-political".
 Approximately 3,000 literature teachers from secondary and higher education.
 Publication: "Bulletin".
- Association
 Guillaume Budé.....Not affiliated to any group. Claims that it is not a "union".
 Political orientation: "a-political".
 Approximate membership: unknown.
 Publication: "Bulletin".

Appendix IV: Edgar Faure Cabinet and major high ranking civil servants in the Ministry.

	Occupation	Function
Gérald Antoine	University professor.....	Chargé de Mission
Michel Alliot	University professor.....	Director
Xavier Beauchamps.....	Sous-Préfet.....	Press Attache
Armand Bianchéri.....	Academic Inspector.....	Technical adviser
Alain Bienaymé.....	University professor.....	Technical adviser
Robert Blot.....	Finance Inspector.....	Technical adviser
Jean-Denis Bredin.....	University professor.....	Technical adviser
Jacques de Chalendar...	Finance Inspector.....	Technical adviser
Francois Furet.....	University professor.....	Technical adviser
Yann Gaillard.....	Finance Inspector.....	Directeur Adjoint
Henri Gauthier.....	University professor.....	Head of the Pedagogy Direction
Claude Gruson.....	Finance Inspector.....	Technical adviser
Paul Maillot.....	Sous-Préfet.....	Chargé de Mission
Pierre Prum.....	Academic Inspector.....	Technical adviser
Michèle Puybasset.....	Council of State.....	Juridical adviser
Jean Sirinelli.....	University professor.....	Head of the Direction of Higher Education
Guy Thuillier.....	Court of Account.....	Technical adviser
Jacques Trorial.....	Sous-Préfet.....	State Secretary

Sources:

Bulletin Officiel de l'Education Nationale, No. 28 (August 1, 1968), p. 2165 and No. 29 (August 29, 1968), p. 2227. Also, Edgar Faure, Ce Que Je Crois (Paris: Grasset, 1971), pp. 39-49.

Appendix V-1: Members of the Government (July 13, 1968).Ministers

Prime Minister.....	Maurice Couve de Murville
Minister of State (Cultural Affairs).....	André Malraux
Minister of State (Social Affairs).....	Maurice Schumann
Minister of State (Relations with Parliament)...	Roger Frey
Minister of State.....	Jean-Marcel Jeanneney
Justice.....	René Capitant
Foreign Affairs.....	Michel Debré
Interior.....	Raymond Marcellin
Army.....	Pierre Messmer
Economy and Finance.....	Francois Ortoli
National Education.....	Edgar Faure
Plan and Amenagement du Territoire.....	Olivier Guichard
Scientific research, Atomic and Space questions..	Robert Galley
Equipment and Housing.....	Albin Chalandon
Industry.....	Andre Bettencourt
Agriculture.....	Robert Boulin
Transports.....	Jean Chamant
Veterans.....	Henri Duvillard
Post-Office and telecommunications.....	Yves Guéna

Junior ministers (State Secretaries)

Information.....	Joël Le Theule
Public Function.....	Philippe Malaud
Youth and Sports.....	Joseph Comiti
Overseas Territories and Departments.....	Michel Inchauspe
Social Affairs.....	Marie-Madeleine Dienesch Pierre Dumas
Foreign Affairs.....	Yvon Bourges Jean de Lipkowski
Interior.....	André Bord
Economy and Finance.....	Jacques Chirac
National Education.....	Jacques Trorial
Equipment and Housing.....	Philippe Dechartre

Appendix VI-1: Faure's policy of consultation

Date of the interview or reference in the press	Interview granted by	Interview granted to
July 12.....	Alliot.....	Autonome Lettres.
July 19.....	Faure.....	Students striking the mathematics agregation examination.
July 23.....	Faure.....	S.G.E.N..
July 26.....	Alliot.....	Société des Agrégés.
July 29.....	Trorial.....	Société des Agrégés.
July 30.....	Faure.....	F.E.N..
August 5.....	Faure.....	Vedel Federation.
August 7.....	Faure.....	S.N.E.Sup..
August 9.....	Faure.....	Autonome Lettres.
August 10 (Le Monde)..	Alliot.....	Corporative Association of Science Students.
August 12.....	Antoine.....	Société des Agrégés.
August 14.....	Faure.....	Société des Agrégés.
August 14.....	Faure.....	M.U.R..
August 20.....	Faure.....	Students striking the mathematics agregation examination.
August 21 (Le Monde)..	Faure.....	Action Committee of Medical Students of Paris.
August 23.....	Faure.....	Liaison Committee for the neutrality of the Reform.
August 23.....	Faure.....	Committee for the Defense and Reform of the Concours.
August 26.....	Gauthier.....	Société des Agrégés.
August 27.....	Faure.....	F.E.N..
September 2.....	Faure.....	F.E.N..
September 5 (Le Monde)	Faure.....	F.N.E.F., Liaison Committee for the Reform of the University, Corporative Association of Science Students in Paris.
September 4.....	Faure and members of his Cabinet...	Student and teacher delegations from the universities of Lille, Amiens, Rouen, Caen and Reims.
September 5.....	Faure and members of his Cabinet...	Student and teacher delegations from the universities of Nancy, Strasbourg, Dijon and Besancon.
September 6.....	Faure and members of his Cabinet...	Student and teacher delegations from the universities of Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes and Poitiers.

Appendix VI-1 (continued).

Date of the interview or reference in the press	Interview granted by	Interview granted to
September 9.....	Faure and members of his Cabinet.....	Student and teacher delegations from the universities of Clermont, Lyon, Grenoble and Limoges.
September 10.....	Faure and members of his Cabinet.....	Student and teacher delegations from the universities of Aix-Marseille, Nice and Montpellier.
September 11.....	Sirinelli.....	Société des Agrégés.
September 13.....	Trorial.....	Société des Agrégés.
September 17.....	Faure.....	S.G.E.N..

Appendix VI-2: Position of radical and conservative groups over the major issues raised by the Orientation Act.

I. PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES

	Selection	National diplomas	Pluridisciplinarity
U.N.E.F.	-	+	+
S.N.E.Sup.	-	+	+
Agrégés	+	+	?
Autonome Lettres	+	+	-

II. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

	A-posteriori control of the universities budgets	Competitive universities	Integration of the Grandes Ecoles into the university system
U.N.E.F.	+	-	+
S.N.E.Sup.	+	-	+
Agrégés	-	-	-
Autonome Lettres	+	-	-

III. CO-MANAGEMENT AND STUDENT PARTICIPATION

Teacher-student parity in the universities councils	Differentiated co-management	Strictly defined and regulated political discussions	Quorum or mandatory voting	Mandatory seating of laymen in the universities councils
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U.N.E.F.	+	-	-	-	-
S.N.E.Sup.	+	-	-	-	-
Agrégés	-	(-)	(-)	+	?
Autonome Lettres	-	-	-	M.V.	?

Key to the symbols used:

+: in favor of...

-: opposed to...

(-): leaning against...

M.V.: Mandatory voting.

Appendix VI-3: Position of moderate groups over the major issues raised by the Orientation Act

I. PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES

	Selection	National Diplomas	Pluridisciplinarity
A.E.E.R.S.	(-)	(+)	+
Vedel Federation	(-)	+	(-)
S.G.E.N.	-	+	+
F.E.N.	-	+	+
Autonome Medecine	(+)	+	-
F.N.E.F.	+	(-)	+
C.E.F.	(-)	+	+

II. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

	A-posteriori control of the universities budgets	Competitive universities	Integration of the Grandes Ecoles into the university system
A.E.E.R.S.	+	(+)	(+)
Vedel Federation	+	-	?
S.G.E.N.	+	-	(+)
F.E.N.	+	-	(+)
Autonome Medecine	+	-	?
F.N.E.F.	+	+	?
C.E.F.	+	-	?

III. CO-MANAGEMENT AND STUDENT PARTICIPATION

	Teacher-student parity in the universities councils	Differentiated co-management	Strictly defined and regulated political discussions	Quorum or mandatory voting	Mandatory seating of laymen in the universities councils
A.E.E.R.S.	-	+	(+)	?	+
Vedel Federation	-	+	(+)	M.V.	(+)
S.G.E.N.	-	+	(+)	60%	(+)
F.E.N.	-	+	(+)	60%	(+)
Autonome Medecine	-	(+)	(+)	M.V.	(+)
F.N.E.F.	-	+	(+)	40%	+
C.E.F.	-	+	(+)	60%	+

Key to the symbols used:

- + : in favor of...
- : opposed to...
- (+) : leaning in favor of...
- (-) : leaning against...
- ? : impossible to determine.
- M.V. : Mandatory voting

Appendix VII-1: Attitudinal profile of the U.D.R. over the major issues raised by the Orientation Act.

I. PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES

	Selection	National diplomas	Pluridisciplinarity
Westphal	+	+	+
Boscher	+	?	?
Kasperit	+	+	?
Sanguinetti	+	+	-
Fanton	+	?	?
Ribières	+	?	?
Hamon	+	+	-
De Grailly	+	?	?
Triboulet	+	+	?
Fouchet	-	?	?
Poujade	+	+	?
Flornoy	+	?	?
Habib-Deloncle	-	?	+
Capelle	+	+	+
Baumel	+	?	+
Rousset	-	?	?
Peyrefitte	+	-	+
Julia	-	?	+

Appendix VII-1 (continued).

II. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

	A-posteriori control of the universities budgets	Competitive universities	Integration of the Grandes Ecoles into the university system
Westphal	?	?	?
Boscher	+	+	?
Kasperit	?	?	?
Sanguinetti	-	-	-
Fanton	?	+	-
Ribières	?	?	?
Hamon	+	(+)	?
De Grailly	?	?	?
Triboulet	+	?	?
Fouchet	+	+	?
Poujade	+	?	?
Flornoy	?	?	?
Habib-Deloncle	+	+	?
Capelle	+	?	(+)
Baumel	?	?	?
Rousset	+	?	?
Peyrefitte	+	+	?
Julia	?	?	?

III. CO-MANAGEMENT AND STUDENT PARTICIPATION

	Teacher-student parity in the universities councils	Differentiated co-management	Strictly defined and regulated political discussions	Quorum or mandatory voting	Mandatory seating of laymen in the universities councils
Westphal	-	+	+	?	+
Boscher	-	+	-	M.V.	+
Kasperit	-	?	+	M.V.	?
Sanguinetti	-	-	-	?	?
Fanton	-	?	-	?	?
Ribières	-	?	+	?	?
Hamon	-	+	+	M.V.	+
De Grailly	-	?	-	?	?
Triboulet	-	?	?	?	?
Fouchet	-	(+)	?	?	+
Poujade	-	+	+	?	+
Flornoy	-	?	+	66%	+
Habib-Deloncle	-	?	+	66%	+
Capelle	-	+	+	M.V.	(+)
Baumel	-	?	+	?	?
Rousset	+	?	+	60%	?
Peyrefitte	-	?	?	?	+
Julia	-	+	+	60%	?

Key to the symbols used:

+: in favor of...

-: opposed to...

(+): leaning in favor of...

(-): leaning against...

M.V.: Mandatory voting

?: impossible to determine

Appendix VII-2: Position of the parties on the major issues raised by the Orientation Act.

I. PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES

	Selection	National diplomas	Pluridisciplinarity
U.D.R.	+	+	+
I.R.	-	+	++
P.D.M.	-	+	++
F.D.G.S.	--	++	++
F.C.P.	--	++	++

II. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

	A-posteriori control of the universities budgets	Competitive universities	Integration of the the Grandes Ecoles into the university system
U.D.R.	+	+	-
I.R.	++	+	--
P.D.M.	++	++	--
F.D.G.S.	++	--	+
F.C.P.	++	--	++

III. CO-MANAGEMENT AND STUDENT PARTICIPATION

	Teacher-student parity in the universities councils	Differentiated co-management	Strictly defined and regulated political discussions	Quorum or mandatory voting	Mandatory seating of laymen in the universities councils
U.D.R.	--	+	+	66%	+
I.R.	--	++	++	60%	++
P.D.M.	--	++	++	60%	++
F.D.G.S.	--	++	++	60%	--
F.C.P.	--	++	++	50%	--

Key to the symbols used:

- + : in favor of...
- : opposed to...
- (+) : in favor of...but divided
- (-) : opposed to...but divided

Appendix VIII-1: The new structure of the university system

This diagram sums up the main principles of the orientation of higher education and research. It was worked out by M. Foucault and adopted by the Minister on September 11, 1963.

Composition

- Elected representatives of the universities and of public establishments outside the universities.
- One third of the representatives will be competent lay people, particularly from economic and social fields.

Composition

- One board to a region
- Elected representatives from:
 - Universities
 - Establishments outside the universities
 - Regional groups and communities
- In each category, elections by direct vote


Composition

- The universities include education and research units (see below)
- They may or may not correspond to regions, that is to a given region there can be several universities.
- The twenty-two universities currently existing are going to "burst". They will number from sixty to one hundred by next February.

In some cases, multi-disciplinary faculties will constitute in themselves a unit; see, for instance, the case with Nanterre, where Letters, Humanities, Law and Economics are taught.

Composition

- The education and research units are at the very heart of the reform. They will sometimes be former faculties, sometimes faculty sections, or simply new institutes. The units will be determined by the Minister when they are public establishments, and by the academy rectors in other cases.
- These different establishments can have varying statuses. Some will be public establishments of a scientific and cultural nature, others will have the traditional nature of an establishment belonging to a university.



Purpose

- To pave the way for the planning of higher education within the framework of national plans.
- To assemble the programs for the establishments.
- To coordinate the general policy of the universities.
- To make proposals regarding national diplomas.

Purpose

- To coordinate the activity and the programs of regional establishments.
- To give opinions on requests for programs and funds.
- To insure links between regional institutions.

Autonomy and administration

The universities, which have financial autonomy, are administered by an elected board (see below). The boards of the establishments (see below) will also include notable lay figures. The lay members or non-representatives present at the board's deliberations. The universities are directed by a president who is elected for a minimum of two years and a maximum of four years, and who can be re-elected once. He must be a professor. A decree will indicate the voting procedures.

Autonomy

These units will be autonomous, regardless of their status. This state, in particular, of financial autonomy: the budgets are supplemented by government funds, donations, deposits, payments for services rendered, and various other subsidies.

They determine their own status, as well as their internal structures, and their link with other university units. They are also responsible for their educational activity, their research programs, their pedagogical methods, and for their procedures, the organization of learning and appropriate examinations.

The organization of the examinations will be the sole responsibility of the teachers. The boards of the different establishments (see below) have the last word as regards the conditions of examinations, but the designation of boards of examiners, the delivery of diplomas, and the selection and payment of teachers are the exclusive prerogative of the professors.

Organization

Each unit is administered by a faculty board composed of teachers, researchers, students, and members of the non-teaching personnel. The members of the universal and selective faculty boards are appointed by the minister, and constitute an important part of the university's management. They are responsible for the organization of the units, the organization of the teaching, the organization of the examinations, and the organization of the research.

Note: The text in this section is a translation of the original French text. The original text is in French and is available in the original document.

Appendix IX: "Whirlpools" of influence emerging on both sides of the issues raised by the Orientation Act.

I. PEDAGOGICAL ISSUES

A. Selection

<u>In favor of...</u>	<u>In favor of... but divided or reticent</u>	<u>Opposed to...</u>	<u>Opposed to... but divided</u>
Autonome Lettres Autonome Medicine Agrégés Debré Capelle	U.D.R. F.N.E.F.	F.D.G.S. F.C.P. Senate Faure De Gaulle S.G.E.N. F.E.N.	I.R. P.D.M. A.E.E.R.S. Vedel Fed. C.E.F.

B. National diplomas

Capelle Senate Faure F.E.N., S.G.E.N., U.N.E.F., S.N.E.Sup. Agrégés Vedel Fed. C.E.S. C.S.E.N. F.D.G.S. F.C.P.	U.D.R. A.E.E.R.S.	Agriculture Industry F.N.E.F.	I.R. P.D.M.
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C. Pluridisciplinarity

I.R., P.D.M., F.D.G.S., F.C.P., Capelle, Senate A.E.E.R.S., S.G.E.N., F.E.N., C.E.F., F.N.E.F., U.N.E.F., S.N.E.Sup. C.S.E.N.	U.D.R.	Conseil d'Etat Vedel Fed. Autonome Lettres Autonome Medicine Autonome Droit Autonome Science	C.E.S.
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Appendix IX (continued)

II. ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

<u>In favor of...</u>	<u>In favor of... but divided or reticent</u>	<u>Opposed to...</u>	<u>Opposed to... but divided</u>
A. A-posteriori control of the universities budgets			
Capelle P.D.M., I.R., F.C.P. F.D.G.S., Senate De Gaulle, Faure U.N.E.F. S.N.E.Sup. A.E.E.R.S., S.G.E.N., Vedel Fed., F.E.N.	U.D.R.	Treasury Ortoli Jeanneney Agrégés	
B. Competitive universities			
I.R. P.D.M. Agriculture Industry U.N.E.F.	U.D.R. A.E.E.R.S.	F.C.P. F.D.G.S. Capelle Senate Treasury Vedel Fed Agrégés U.N.E.F. C.F.S., C.S.E.N.	
C. Integration of the Grandes Ecoles into the university system			
F.D.G.S. F.C.P. U.N.E.F. S.N.E.Sup. S.G.E.N. F.E.N.	Faure A.E.E.R.S. Capelle Senate	P.D.M., I.R. Prime Minister Industry Army Scientific Research Agriculture	U.D.R. Council of State

Appendix IX (continued)

III. CO-MANAGEMENT AND STUDENT PARTICIPATION

<u>In favor of...</u>	<u>In favor of... but divided or reticent</u>	<u>Opposed to...</u>	<u>Opposed to... but divided</u>
A. Differentiated co-management			
Senate I.R., P.D.M. F.D.G.S., F.C.P. Faure F.N.E.F., C.E.F. S.G.F.N., F.E.N. Vedel Fed.	U.D.R. Capelle Conseil d'Etat	U.N.E.F. S.N.E.Sup. Autonome Lettres	Agrégés
B. Mandatory seating of laymen in the university councils			
I.R., P.D.M. A.E.E.R.S. C.E.F. F.N.E.F.	U.D.R. Faure Capelle Senate Vedel Fed. S.G.F.N. F.E.N. C.S.L.N.	F.C.P. U.N.E.F. S.N.E.Sup. C.E.S.	F.D.G.S.
C. Strictly defined and regulated political discussions			
I.R., P.D.M. F.D.G.S., F.C.P. Senate De Gaulle Faure	U.D.R. Capelle Most ministers A.E.E.R.S. Vedel Fed. C.E.F.	Interior Autonome Lettres U.N.E.F. S.N.E.Sup.	Agrégés

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Avis présenté au nom de la Commission des Finances, du Contrôle Budgétaire et des Comptes Economiques de la Nation sur le projet de Loi d'Orientation de l'Enseignement Supérieur par Mlle Irma Rapzzi, Sénat, Première Session Ordinaire de 1968-1969, Annexe au Procès-Verbal de la Séance du 23 Octobre 1968, No. 15.

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III. NEWSPAPERS

- L'Express.
 Le Figaro.
 Le Figaro Littéraire.

Le Monde.
La Nation.
Le Nouvel Observateur.
Tribune Socialiste.

THE ORIENTATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION ACT, no. 68-978. November 12, 1968.

National Assembly of the Republic have adopted, and the President of the Republic has promulgated, the following Act:

Title I

The Aim of Higher Education

Article 1

The fundamental aim of the universities and institutions to which the provisions of the present Act will apply is the teaching, out and the transmission of knowledge, the development of research and the training of men.

The universities must continue to bring the attainment of forms of culture and research to the highest level and to train researchers of promise, and to make them available to all the faculties for the necessary scientific and technical progress.

They must meet the demands of the nation by providing it with top-ranking personnel in order to take part in the social and economic development of every region. In this task, they must comply with the evolutionary evolution made necessary by the industrial and technological revolution.

To promote teaching and research, the universities must provide them the means of carrying out their teaching and research activity in an atmosphere of independence, intellectual freedom and responsibility to intellectual reflection and creation.

To promote students, the universities must make every effort to insure the means of their development and to bestow on them the professional training that they intend to acquire. They must also make every effort to give them not only the necessary knowledge but the fully developed personality.

The universities must facilitate the cultural, sporting and social activities of the students, thus assuring them a evolution of a well-balanced and complete training.

The universities must receive members of national education, attend to the general university education and to the higher specialization of the teachers, to the university professors, to the research and to the students, and to the maintenance and improvement of the quality of the teaching, the research and the studies.

Higher education must be open to every citizen, and to people who have not been able to pursue studies, in order to enable them, according to their aptitudes, to improve their professional situation or to reach all towards another profession.

the universities must contribute, by taking advantage (among other things) of the new means of disseminating knowledge, to making continuing education available to every segment of the population in the light of its possibilities.

Finally, speaking of the contribution of the universities to the development of science and technology, the Commission states that it is necessary to create an environment which will enable the universities to respond fully to the requirements of the new scientific

Article 2

The universities and the national and regional institutions provided for in Title II operate within the framework established by the Government, the initiatives and resources of the universities being necessary to organize and develop international university cooperation, particularly with countries which are partially or entirely trans-European. These countries are those established within the territory of those countries which are members of the European Economic Community.

Title II

University Institutions

Article 3

The university is a public institution of a essentially cultural nature which is a social person. It is a *personne morale* with financial autonomy. Universities are independent institutions which are not subject to the services of the State and can receive the status of a public institution of the State with certain limitations. These limitations are: all the activities carried out by the university are subject to the law of the State; the university is subject to the law of the State in the area of its relations with the State.

The law which regulates the activities carried out by universities, the law which regulates their management and the law which regulates their present and future relations with the State shall apply to them.

The law which provides for the organization of the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique shall apply to the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique. The law which provides for the organization of the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique shall apply to the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique. The law which provides for the organization of the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique shall apply to the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique.

Article 4

The organization and activities of the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique shall be determined by the law which provides for the organization and activities of the Institut National de la Recherche Scientifique.

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Article 5

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An association can be formed by a group of citizens to oppose the request of the institution for the approval of the university after the approval of the National Board of Higher Education and Scientific Research. The association shall be registered in the Ministry of Education and Scientific Research.

Article 6

The association shall have the right to submit a petition to the Council of the University. The association shall have the right to submit a petition to the Council of the University to request the cancellation of the approval of the university.

Article 7

The association shall have the right to submit a petition to the Council of the University to request the cancellation of the approval of the university. The association shall have the right to submit a petition to the Council of the University to request the cancellation of the approval of the university.

Article 8

A group of citizens shall have the right to submit a petition to the Council of the University to request the cancellation of the approval of the university. The group shall have the right to submit a petition to the Council of the University to request the cancellation of the approval of the university.

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Article 9

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research which are independent of the universities, and, for one-third of its composition, members representing the important national interests, as created with the Minister of National Education, as chairman.

Scientific and technical institutions, independent universities, and the organizations of a scientific and cultural nature under the jurisdiction of the Minister of National Education are entitled to elect members of the National Board of Higher Education and Research, composed of faculty and of students, who are to be members of the advisory and institution boards.

Article 10 defines the composition of the national board and the conditions by which its members are designated:

the National Board of Higher Education and Research;

1. Plans the organization of higher education and research in relation with the organizations in charge of the recurrent national plans, taking these plans into account, and with a view towards a more long term perspective;

2. Is consulted regarding cutbacks and requests for funds made by the universities and by other institutions of higher education under the jurisdiction of the Minister of National Education, must be consulted on the distribution of budget assignments among the various institutions;

3. Advises the Minister of National Education regarding the rectors' oppositions, in accordance with the following Article 10 during the deliberations of institution boards:

a. Makes all proposals and gives all advice on decisions pertaining to the coordination of the activities of the various public institutions of a scientific and cultural nature, and assesses the general responsibility of coordination between the universities and other institutions;

b. Makes proposals and gives all advice on decisions regarding the organization of technical education in progress under the Minister of National Education and regarding access to the institutions on the pursuit of studies;

c. National Board of Higher Education and Research performs all the functions of the National Board of Higher Education. It can hold sessions by electronic means, which may be attended by organizations representing various fields of study.

Article 10

The members of the "Academy" shall be appointed by the Council of Higher Education and Research, as follows:

1. A representative of the universities, namely "Academy", to represent the Ministry of National Education, a representative of scientific organizations of public institutions of a scientific and cultural nature, to represent the Council of Higher Education and Research, and a representative of the scientific and technical organizations, to represent the Council of Higher Education and Research, as representative of the Minister of National Education, who shall be appointed within the framework of the National Board of Higher Education and Research;

2. The members of the "Academy" shall be appointed by the Minister of National Education, after the approval of the Council of Higher Education and Research.

Title III

Administrative Autonomy and Participation

Article 11

The scientific, educational, scientific, and cultural nature and the educational and research activities of the institutions mentioned in Article 8, their internal organization, and their financial, administrative, and legal relations with the government of the USSR and USSR Republics are:

1. subject to national jurisdiction, determined by the Council of the USSR Ministry of Higher Education.

The scientific, educational, and research units are approved by the universities, each of which they are a part of.

Article 12

The restrictions of administrative and legal nature are administered in a selective and limited form by a representative board of the university.

The education and research units are administratively autonomous units and are headed by a director who is elected by this board.

The number of members on these boards cannot exceed thirty for the institutions and ten for the units.

Article 13

A spirit of participation reigns on the boards, which are composed of faculty, researchers, students, and non-teaching personnel. No one can be elected to more than one university board or to more than one education and research unit board.

The same article to must prevail in statutes, which provide for participation on the boards of universities and of public institutions of higher education of the universities by faculty chosen for their expertise and especially for their part in regional activity. They do not number less than one sixth nor more than one third of the total make-up of the board. Statutes can also provide for participation by women on the boards of education and research units. Provisions regarding this participation are enforced by the university boards, which are part of the universities and by the institutions of scientific and cultural nature, which are independent of the universities.

Representation by faculty who carry out the functions of professor, "maître de conférences," "lecture assistant," or functions similar to these, must be at least a percentage of the total number of the faculty, on a par with any other occupational category and must be assured by representation of all occupational categories. The functions of professor, "maître de conférences," must be at least 50% of all faculty, except under special circumstances approved by the Minister of National Education after consulting the National Board of Higher Education and Research.

The determination of research criteria and the organization of the research units is a responsibility of service boards composed of faculty, including the functions of professor, "maître de conférences," or possibly "maître de conférences" or equivalent, and of a small number of persons chosen for their scientific competence.

Article 16

Decisions on the conditions of employment and administrative conditions of services of teachers shall be made by the National Board of Higher Education.

Article 17

The National Board of Higher Education shall have the authority to determine the conditions of employment of the staff of the institutions of higher education, and to determine the conditions of employment of the staff of the National Board of Higher Education.

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Article 18

In the event of a serious difficulty in the functioning of the institutions of higher education, the fact that the responsibility of the Minister of National Education can, in such exceptional cases, take on the necessary measures, previously consulting the National Board of Higher Education, shall not be an excuse for the creation of an emergency committee, as soon as possible.

The National Board of Higher Education shall have the authority to determine the conditions of employment of the staff of the National Board of Higher Education.

Title IV

Pedagogical Autonomy and Participation

The National Board of Higher Education shall have the authority to determine the conditions of employment of the staff of the institutions of higher education, and to determine the conditions of employment of the staff of the National Board of Higher Education. The National Board of Higher Education shall have the authority to determine the conditions of employment of the staff of the National Board of Higher Education.

Article 20

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Article 21

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with examinations are compulsory for all students for whom they have been planned. At the end of these periods, students can be advised to choose other studies in the same university or a shorter educational cycle adapted to a professional activity. If the student follows this advice, his new enrolment automatically follows. If he pursues his initial choice and if he completes his course successfully, the academic calendar can be waived at the beginning of the following year to allow another orientation period involving several fields of study. The results of this period will be conclusive.

With all the means at their disposal, the universities provide for the continuous orientation of students, particularly at the end of each study cycle.

Article 22

The Minister of National Education and the universities take all the measures which concern them in co-operation with the national, regional and local organizations qualified to inform and advise students regarding the job and career possibilities to which their studies can lead them.

The universities and the above-mentioned qualified organizations also take all the necessary measures, in keeping with their fundamental aim, in order to insure a reciprocal adaptation of professional openings and of the university subjects taught.

Article 23

The universities, having recognized an aptitude in people who are already engaged in professional activities, courses of whether they hold university titles, open educational training and improvement programs to them, thus enabling them to obtain the corresponding degrees. The educational contents, pedagogical methods, degrees, academic calendar and schedules are specially adapted.

Article 24

The universities provide for the organization of continuing education through the education centres and study groups within them, in the institutions attached to them, and in the services created by the universities for this purpose. This activity is organized in conjunction with the labour market communities, public institutions, and all other organizations.

Article 25

The universities are authorized to receive foreign students in accordance with the provisions of the law on the entry, stay and work of foreigners, in order to cover an exceptional situation.

Title V

Financial Autonomy

Article 26

In order to enable them and public institutions of a scientific and cultural nature have at their disposal the facilities, personnel and funds allotted to them by the Government, the universities are authorized to carry out the following activities, such as: accept donations, borrow funds and donations, raise money for the support of their activities, and, as a result:

Once authorized, heads of institutions of education and research units can hire and discharge the personnel under their jurisdiction, in accordance with the status of the latter.

The institutions determine the system of student guidance, curricular and orientation work, and make decisions on the academic and research activities, including residence and attendance requirements. The institutions may also exercise, in accordance with the mission of the scientific faculty, a right of examination, certification, and awarding by the Minister on the advice of the National Board of Higher Education and Research.

Article 34

Teaching and research activities, completion of operations, and the freedom of expression and publishing and research activities with an international impact, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant articles of the present Act, take place in principles of objectivity and impartiality.

Title VII

University Rights

Article 35

Teaching and research, demand of rectitude of knowledge, and tolerance of opinions cannot be incompatible with all forms of propaganda and must remain at side of all political influence.

Article 36

Students and members of institutions of education and research units are not interfered with, and provided this must not have to any state of propaganda and public order is not disturbed.

The premises put at the students' disposal for this purpose will be, insofar as possible, free of charge from the premises intended for teaching and research. They will be off hospital trusts. The conditions of their use will be defined after consulting the board and they will be supervised by the president of the institution or by the director of the education and research unit.

Article 37

The presidents of institutions and the directors of education and research units will be responsible for maintaining order on university premises. They exercise this function within the framework of the basic, general rules and internal ruling of the institution.

Any action of institution to activate the arena, in the conditions defined in the preceding articles, on top of the university premises is subject to disciplinary measures.

Any person subject to the "Council of Law" will refer, and the application conditions of the present article.

Article 38

Disciplinary power regarding faculty is exercised first by the university boards or by the boards of public institutions of a scientific and cultural nature, which are independent of the government, and may, as of appeal, by the National Board of Higher Education.

Functional matters are dealt with by a disciplinary section of the courts. The members of this section are elected by a disciplinary section of the courts. The members of the section are elected by a disciplinary section of the courts by a limited representation of the teaching staff.

In no case, even in the disciplinary section, which can only include teachers of a rank equal to, or higher than that of the teacher being investigated, can be completed, according to the individual case, either by co-optation of a member of the teaching body to which the teacher in question belongs, if this body is not represented, or by naming representatives of private institutions of higher education.

The reports and other acts connected with the judicial part of matters selected from among the matters selected, student representatives, exercise disciplinary power regarding the facts.

A decree issued by the "Consent d'Etat" will determine the applicable penalties and will specify the composition and the working order of these special national sections.

Title VIII Implementing the Reform

Article 39

Before December 31, 1958, the Ministry of National Education will establish, after consulting the pertinent groups, a provisional list of the education and research units which will make up the national universities. The categories of electorial colleges will be determined by the Ministry on the basis of two personal lists in order to elect their delegates. The make-up of the national colleges, the voting constitution, and the measures necessary to insure regularity and equanimity in their composition, especially regarding the quotas, will be specified by a decree in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the present Act.

Article 40

Delegates who are designated are to:

1. Draw up the statute for the unit to which they were elected, the statute must be approved by the faculty;

2. Designate the delegates of the unit to the provisional consultative assembly of the university;

3. Carry out an inventory of the units which have not adopted statutes and conditions, with the views of the present Act, by March 15, 1959, and to give provisional approval to the units which have not done so.

4. On the basis of the national lists, and of the vote which they cast, designate their delegates to the national assembly, and to the national assembly of the national colleges and to the national assembly of the sciences, except in the case of their representatives to the provisional consultative assembly of the university.

Article 41

The representatives of the national colleges and of the national assembly of the sciences will be designated by the provisional consultative assembly of the national universities. They will work out university regulations, which must be approved by the Ministry of National Education, and they will appoint their representatives to the national bodies.

The structure of the electorial colleges, the measures regarding the election, the voting constitution, and conditions, and the composition of the assembly of the national colleges will be determined by a decree in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the present Act.

It is intended that the publication of the general order designating the universities of the "territoire" of those universities which have not adopted statutes in accordance with the provisions of the present Act shall give no regulations which may be observed.

The institutions designated with a legal status will become "degree-granting institutions" as a result of the general order.

Article 42

It is intended that the "Council of State" will administer the transfer of the faculties of medicine and dentistry to the "universities" of the "territoire" as a result of the present Act, except in the case where the transfer is a result of the publication of a general order of institution.

Article 43

The National Council of Higher Education and Research will be constituted, when necessary, which will include half of all faculty and students in France having voted to adopt their statutes and designate their representatives. The Board of Education will then be eliminated.

Article 44

It is intended that the implementation of the institutional provisions in the present Act and in articles 10 to 14 of the present statute provisions currently in effect, in order to take all provisional measures required to insure the administration of universities, institutions, the development of their education and research activities, and the transition between the former and the new institutions.

Title IX

Final Provisions

Article 45

As regards higher education leading to the medical and dental professions and related research, the provisions of Ordinance no. 58-1473 of December 30, 1958, and of the public health code remain applicable to the institutions and institutions of the present Act, continuing upon their new institutions which will be decreed by the "Council of State".

The Minister of Social Affairs will participate in all decisions concerning medical, pharmaceutical and dental education and related research.

Article 46

The provisions of the present Act regarding research apply solely to non-oriented research, concerning fundamental sciences, and excluding the field of higher education with a view towards training in the various fields of scientific activity.

The provisions of the present Act are not aimed at modifying the mission of the "Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique", nor the conditions of the part it plays, nor the power of its subsidiary consultative organs, particularly the "Comité National de la Recherche Scientifique".

The present Act will be executed as State Law

signed in Paris, November 12, 1908

By the President of the Republic, C. de Caillaux,
 the Prime Minister, Maurice Couvreur, Mayallé,
 the State Minister of Social Affairs, Maurice Schumann,
 the Minister of Education and Finance, François Oudet,
 the Minister of National Education, Edgar Faure,
 the Minister of Scientific, Research and Atomic Affairs, Mayors, delegated to
 the Prime Minister, Robert Guille.



Footnotes

1. This term designates an educational district, each "académie" is headed by a rector and includes at least one university.

2. This following is an explanation of the "titulaire" of the "Faculté de Droit" of Lyons: "avocat" "Me" is a lawyer, "titulaire" is usually, historically, "avocat" has probably completed his studies, studies and has the list of those who are qualified to teach in a university.

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