

SOCIALIZATION PROCESS OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO JOIN TERRORIST  
ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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## Abstract

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In this study, the important factors on the socialization process of Turkish individuals that lead them to join terrorist organizations were identified and explained according to principles of these two theories. Differential association theory and social learning theories were utilized as the theoretical framework of the study.

The main methodological objective of this study was to obtain information regarding socialization (initiation) process of individuals into the terrorist organizations that is helpful to make a comparison between three organizations. The required data were obtained from the official court records.

Dependent variable is being a member of The PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers' Party), or the DHKP-C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party – Front), or Turkish Hizbullah. Independent variables of this study include age, sex, ethnicity, birth place, type of birth place, education, marital status, occupation, profession, number of family members convicted of terrorism, and etc.

The findings of this research are presented in three different parts. The first part includes frequency tables and contingency tables, and characteristics of the subjects will be described in this part. In the second part includes bivariate analyses. Two-way crosstabulations and chi-square tests of significance are used to explore relationships between various variables. The third part includes multivariate analyses. Three multinomial logit regression models are developed to explore the controlled effects of the predictors on the dependent variable. The findings in those three parts are compared to the findings in the literature as well.

The findings of this study showed that 46.9 percent of the subjects were initiated by friends; 9.8 percent by relatives; 8.8 percent by family members; and 1.5 percent by lovers. These findings support the findings in the literature and support the principles of the social learning theory and differential association theory. The findings also indicated the significant differences between the three terrorist organizations regarding the socialization process of their members.

It is hoped that this study will be an example for the future studies that will utilize social learning theory to explain terrorism. And it is also hoped that this study will open new avenues of terrorism studies in Turkey.

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## Chapter I. INTRODUCTION

The youngest terrorist ever reported was a nine-year-old Columbian boy. Around 300,000 combatants fighting in different conflict areas of the world are under eighteen and eighty percent of those conflicts involve children under the age of fifteen. The first U.S. soldier to die in Afghanistan was shot by a fourteen year old Afghani sniper (Singer, 2006: 105-115). 10.5 million U.S. teenagers between the ages of 16 and 22 constitute the biggest online population in the West and they are exposed to extremist ideas (Gruen, 2006: 11-21).

Most of the mainstream terrorism studies concentrate on political, economic and demographic factors. Those mainstream approaches focus on the "push" towards the violent groups and they explain what makes these people

angry and "psychologically predisposed to violence", but they do not explain "the actual process of joining a terrorist organization". In fact, in the process of joining a terrorist organization, the single most important factor is "pull" and this "pull" factor is made possible by organizational and social networks (Abuza, 2006:66-81).

Effective recruitment policies of the terrorist organizations is a fact that we can not ignore while we are studying terrorism; but the other side of the "recruitment coin" is the "socialization process of individuals" to join the organizations. Why do they want to join the terrorist organizations? How do they learn about the terrorist activities? What kind of role does the internet play in the socialization of would-be terrorists? What do the children learn about terrorism at the thousands of *madrassas* (religious school) in South East Asia? What do the Kurdish children think about the PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers' Party) guerillas while they walk around their villages with their AK-47's?

In Turkey, three types of terrorist movements have dominated the last thirty years; the leftist, the separatist, and the religiously motivated terrorism. DHKP-C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party – Front) is the most important organization of the leftist terrorism. The PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers' Party) is the only organization in separatist field. And Turkish Hizbullah is the most effective organization in the religious movements. This study compares these three terrorist organizations in terms of the socialization process their members. Are the members of the PKK more likely to be initiated to the organization by family members compared to the DHKP-C and

Turkish Hizbullah? Which organization has the younger members? Which learning tools have more impact on which organization?

While comparing the three organizations, this research also explores and describes the general characteristics of the individuals who were convicted of terrorism in Turkey. The descriptive information that was obtained in the study enables us to have a general idea about the Turkish individuals who are members of terrorist organizations. Do they come from specific provinces? Is an individual who has a relative convicted of terrorism more likely to become a terrorist? What is the education level of most of the terrorist; are they well educated or not? This research provides answers for these questions.

Furthermore, by using various statistical methods, this study provides explanations that help us to understand if there is relationship between different independent variables. Are the married terrorists more likely to be initiated to the organization by the spouse? Does the education level have an impact on the marital status of the terrorist? This study explored whether those relationships exist.

This research also tested some aspects of the differential association and social learning socialization models. The descriptive and statistical analysis of the information obtained from the court files of convicted terrorists enabled us to understand whether the differential association theory and social learning theory explain significant part of the behaviors of our sample population. What is the proportion of the individuals who were introduced to the terrorism by family members? How many percent of the individuals have a relative who was

convicted of terrorism?

This research contributes to understand the extent and nature of the role that family members, relatives, peers, schools, and social organizations play in the socialization, initiation, and utilization of individuals who are part of terrorist activities. This research produced new insight in terms of validity and applicability of the differential association theory.

It is expected that the findings of this study will help to create new terrorism prevention/intervention policies in Turkey. This study can also serve as a base for the comparative studies at international level.

## Chapter II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Terrorism has been a dominating phenomenon in Turkey since 1960's. Marxist-Leninist left-wing terror organizations were active between 1960 and 1980, and the terrorist acts in this period claimed 5,000 lives (Ozgen, 1989: 3). In the early 1980's separatist Kurdish movements became dominant and Kurdish terrorism is still on the agenda of Turkish government. The cost of Kurdish terrorism is more than 30,000 lives and around 15 billion dollars (Sevis, 1999: 4). Additionally starting from early 1990's, religiously motivated terrorist groups have attracted great deal of attention by conducting important attacks against Turkish and foreign targets in Turkey.

Partly because she was located in the Middle East, partly because her own internal problems Turkey has been suffering from terrorism in the last forty years. Despite the acuteness of the problem, which has not been diminishing at all, only a few empirical studies on terrorism in Turkey have been conducted so far. The demographical characteristics of terrorist individuals, recruitment policies of the terrorist organization, and socialization process of the members of the terrorist organizations have not been subjected to scrutiny.

In only 1994, 16,000 people were arrested by Turkish National Police because of terrorism; 4,000 of them were convicted and the other 12,000 were released by the prosecutor or by the judge (Kaya, 2002: 24). The question of why those 12,000 Turkish citizens were arrested by the police if there was no enough evidence to convict them is not an issue for this study. But the role of the custody period that they spent at the police departments on their "socialization process" to join terrorist organizations is an issue for this study.

In 1992, it was estimated that the armed members of the PKK in the mountains were between 10,000 and 15,000 (Dilmac, 1997: 8). How do the Kurdish children view those armed guerillas when they come to their villages (Ciyayi, 2002: 9-17)? Who were those some 10,000 individuals introduced the PKK by? What kind of persons are the children of those armed people going to be in the future? Considering thousands of people are in the mountains, thousands of people are in the prisons, and thousands of them are not alive in South East Turkey, what do the children learn at the school, out of the school, at home, when they watch TV? Why do we see a "devoted soul" when we look into

eyes of terrorists (Dundar, 2000: 12)?

Some terrorism studies explained terrorism according to rational choice theory; terrorist behavior was a "product of strategic choice" (Crenshaw, 2002: 54-67) and (Dugan, et al., 2005: 1031-1066). People go through a rational decision making process by calculating cost and benefit before becoming a terrorist. The choice of terrorism is not an unintended outcome or last resort of "pathological individuals", but it is "deliberate strategy".

Some other studies such as (Eqbal, 2002: 46-52) explained terrorism according to the strain theory; terrorism is an illegitimate response to the pressure that was put on certain groups by the society. Legitimate avenues are not open for them to reach their goals. They apply terrorist tactics after they try legitimate means. So again, according to these approaches terrorism is an inevitable result of impelling environmental factors.

But most of the studies on terrorism neglect the fact that individuals go through a socialization process before they become a terrorist. We should accept this "joining process" as an active phenomenon rather than a passive process which is a necessary outcome of "push" factors. In this active socialization process, individuals learn about the terrorist behavior and terrorism. Peer relations, family members, loved ones, relatives, schools, social clubs, TV, internet, video games, etc. play an important role on the socialization process of individuals in terms of learning about terrorism.

Although there has not been a study that explains terrorism according to the differential association theory, some studies like Weimann (2006), Pedahzur

(2005), Aho (1990) point out that individuals learn terrorist behavior like any other behavior. Sometimes from the video games (Gruen, 2006), sometimes from the friends (Sageman, 2004), and sometimes from their favorite uncles (Uysal, 2001); but they do learn it.

Differential association theory and social learning theory are important in terms of the socialization of the terrorists; because they focus on the process before they become the members of the organizations. If the factors that lead the individuals to join the terrorist organizations can be identified clearly, the intervention and prevention policies can be based on more concrete evidences.

The differential association and social learning models imply that criminal behavior is learned like any other behavior. Individuals learn criminal behavior in interaction with others persons in a process of communication. Differential associations play an important role on the socialization process of individuals. Terrorist act is a criminal act, and it is also learned in a process of communication.

From a scholar's standpoint, it is anticipated that this study helps to explore the relatively unknown area of socialization process of terrorists. It is hoped that this project produced significant empirical results about the learning behavior of Turkish terrorists. And it is also hoped that the proposed study opened some new avenues for research.

### Chapter III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

#### A. THE KURDS, THE KURDISH SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND THE PKK

##### 1. Ethnic Origins of the Kurds

Regarding development of the Kurdish identity, Barkey & Fuller (1998: 61) argue that divisions among the Kurds along geographical, linguistic, and political lines have played an important role. Kurdish population is divided territorially and linguistically among four regional states which are Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

Sevres Treaty (1920) “envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas wanted this” (Barkey & Fuller 1998: 9). But Kurdish population was

not mentioned in Lozan Treaty (1924) while the provisions of Sevres Treaty were reviewed.

Bruinessen (1989) defines Kurds as “all native speakers of Kurmanji or Zaza, as well as those Turkish-speaking persons who claim descent from Kurmanji or Zaza speakers who still (or again) consider themselves as Kurds” (pg.613). Barkey & Fuller (1998) point out that according to this definition, Kurds who have willingly been assimilated are considered to be Turkish, and Christians who have embraced Islam (such as the many Armenians who have assumed Kurdish Alevi identity over the centuries) are considered as Kurds (pg. 90).

Regarding the number of Kurds in Turkey, the most widely accepted number is twenty percent of the population (Barkey & Fuller, 1998: 62). According to the 1965 census, 2.2 million claimed that Kurdish is their mother tongue and 1.2 million people claimed Kurdish is their second language. The number of Zaza speakers is estimated around 150,000 (Barkey & Fuller, 1998: 62). Mutlu (1996: 519) argues that according to the 1965 census 12.6 percent of the population is Kurdish in Turkey (just over 7 million in 1990).

Two main language groups in Kurdish population are mentioned in Barkey & Fuller (1998)'s work; Kurmanji and Sorani. Kurmanji is used in Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria, and some parts of Iran (pg. 63). A second dialect Dilimi or Zaza is used by a small group in central Turkey. Erer (1994:18) argues that the total number of Kurdish words that exist is not more than 300.

During Ottoman Empire, Kurdish people were never considered as a minority group; because Kurdish people were Muslims. Ottoman Islamic law recognized only non-Muslims as minorities.

Barkey & Fuller (1998: 6) speak of the factors that played an important role on Kurdish identity. Geography is important because Kurdish people inhabited primarily mountainous region; they were scattered and isolated from each other, with no central state structure. Nomadic life also contributed the divergence of several Kurdish dialects. Kurdish people generally lived in the more isolated regions of larger empires, such as the Persian, the Arab, or the Ottoman, and isolation affected the development of their identity (Barkey & Fuller, 1998: 6).

Country	The Estimated Kurdish Population		
	Chailand	McDowall	Le Monde Diplomatique
Turkey	7,557,000	8,455,000	10,000,000
Iran	5,190,400	3,105,000	6,000,000
Iraq	2,800,000	3,701,000	3,000,000
Syria	825,000	734,000	800,000
Ex-USSR	278,463	265,00	350,000
Total	16,650,863	16,320,000	20,150,000

The Estimates of the Kurdish Population (White 2000:17).

## 2. The PKK

The PKK was created during a term of anarchy and turmoil during 1970s (Barkey & Fuller, 1998: 211). The anarchy and turmoil in this era resulted in three military coups, and these three military coups resulted in harsh policies against any opposing movement. Kurdish movement was one of them.

The PKK consists of three elements. The party itself -the PKK- is the main political body. The National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) was created in 1985 to strengthen recruitment, provide intelligence, and engage in propaganda. The third leg of the structure People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK) was formed in 1986. The PKK is the legislator body, and ERNK and ARGK are executive bodies. As a whole the PKK is considered as a well-organized, massive and complicated structure.

The primary goal of the PKK is the creation of a unified, independent Kurdish state. According to (Barkey & Fuller, 1998) the PKK sought not only independence, but also a political and social revolution among the Kurds in order to transform Kurdish society's' feudal structure. The PKK adopted a Marxist-Leninist left-wing anti-imperialist approach at first; but this approach was abandoned in the new post-Cold War era (pg. 23).

The program that was involved in the first manifesto of the PKK is as follows:

“The structure of the evolution will be a national democratic revolution. The minimum objective will be to establish an independent non-aligned Kurdistan State in the region. The maximum objective will be to establish a state based on

Marxist-Leninist principles. The proletariat will be the pioneering force of the revolution. The peasants will be the major force of the revolution. The main alliance for the revolution will be the alliance between workers, peasants and intellectual youth. (...) propaganda activities will be supported by armed violence” (Ankara Papers 2004:26).

Barkey & Fuller (1998:25) claim that the PKK has moved away from an earlier condemnation of Islam, and now speaks of political settlement within the borders of Turkey. Barkey & Fuller, (1998:25) emphasize that the PKK’s abandonment of independent Kurdistan is not convincing.

In terms of the tactics, the PKK combined violence and terror with political organization. The village guards were the top priority target of the PKK for many years (Barkey & Fuller, 1998:28). Many schoolteachers and civil servants were killed; schools and other public institutions were burned to reduce the existence of Turkish state in Southeast Turkey. Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, once stated that “the violence alternative may be difficult and painful, but it provides results” (Balli, 1991:204).

Ergil (1996) conducted a survey in the Southeast Turkey. In the survey, 42 percent of the respondents claimed to have a family member in the organization (pg. 20). Tanrikulu (1995: 7) estimated the number of the guerillas in the countryside and neighboring countries as many as 5,000-10,000.

Barkey & Fuller (1998) emphasize two separate but surprising points; the first, “many Turks still believe that the United States really is trying to split Turkey

and carve out a Kurdish state”, and the second “the PKK as a whole continues to be suspicious of the United States’ intentions towards it” (pg. 53).

The CIA pointed out that the PKK has made international terrorism a key weapon in its fight for an independent homeland in Kurdish-inhabited southeastern Turkey. The CIA viewed the PKK as a threat to US facilities and interests abroad. The CIA also noted that the PKK had been especially active in Europe, and they feared that its tactics might become a model for other ethnic and separatist movements being spawned in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union.

In 2001, the State Department estimated the armed forces of the PKK around 10,000-15,000 and listed the PKK as number one terrorist organization in the world by killing 3,575 people.

In an article, Criss (1995) examines Iranian connection of Kurdish terrorism. According to Criss (1995) Turkey had been exposed to PKK attacks from Iranian soil between 1993 and 1995; but in 1995 Iran agreed to help Turkey to eliminate PKK camps in her territories. Criss (1995) emphasizes a number of reasons for this policy change. First reason is the fear that the PKK could set an example for Iranian Kurds. The second reason is the implications of Kurdish separatism on the balance of power in the Middles East. And the last reason is that the leadership in Azerbaijan was changed from Elcibey to Aliyev. Elcibey was ultranationalist and supported by Turkey; and after this change Iran felt more secure and changed her attitude in the Kurdish issue.

In another article Uslu (2007) points out the divisions in Turkey's Kurdish community. Uslu (2007) argues that the leadership in Kurdish movement is not centralized as it was intended. Zubeyir Aydar is the head of political wing, he resides in Europe, but can not give direct orders to Murat Karayilan who is headquartered in the mountains of Northern Iraq.

According to Uslu (2007) deep political divisions do exist in Kurdish community as well. In the general elections of 2002, DEHAP (Democratic People's Party) won 6.22 % of the total vote, and in the elections of 2004 it went down to 4.9 %. In this last election, they kept Diyarbakir, but lost their stronghold cities such as Bingol, Siirt, Van, Agri, and Mus. Uslu (2007) concludes that these divisions in Kurdish community make it more difficult to reach solutions in Turkey.

Since 1978, in the fight against the PKK 5,157 civilians, 6,212 security officers, and 27,734 terrorists lost their lives. And it is still a serious threat for Turkey.

#### B. The DHKP-C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party – Front)

##### History<sup>1</sup>

The Federation of Revolutionist Youth Association was established in 1966 by Turkish college students who share communist ideas and who want a Turkish socialist revolution. This association was split into two because of opposing views on the method to achieve the revolution.

After the split, one group chose the violent method; urban guerilla tactics like Latin American groups. They named themselves as the THKP-C (Turkey

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<sup>1</sup> The information about the basic structure of the DHKP-C comes from the information obtained from the sample files and TNP records.

Public Liberation Party-Front) and Mahir Cayan became their leader. This group carried out numerous terrorist acts between 1968 and 1972. In 1972, Mahir Cayan was killed and many important members of the group were arrested by the security forces.

In 1974, many convicted terrorists were released by the government due to a general amnesty. After getting out of the prison, members of the THKP-C attempted to reorganize the structure of the THKP-C. The Revolutionist Youth Association was established for this purpose in 1976. Before implementing their reorganization process, the organization was divided once again. The Istanbul group named themselves as Dev-Genc (Revolutionary Youth) and Dursun Karatas became the new leader of this organization (Sol Teror Orgutleri, 1994: 27).

In the pursuit of their violent purposes, they established FTKME (Fighting Teams against Fascist Terror) to carry out armed attacks. In a couple of years 35 security officers, 23 soldiers, and more than 200 civilians were killed by this armed group. The murder of former Prime Minister Nihat Erim is the most well-known attack of this terrorist group.

Following the strong wave of terrorist attacks, a military coup replaced the government in 1980. Dursun Karatas and most of the members of Dev-Genc were arrested and convicted. Dursun Karatas took this opportunity to use the prison as a propaganda and education place. In the prison Karatas and his friends reorganized the organization. Karatas wrote a book in the prison (Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz = We are right and we are going to win) and in this book he

explained the purpose of the organization and their future plans, including lists of their enemies. Those enemies were government officials, law enforcement agents, ranking soldiers, and judges.

Karatas and some his friends managed to escape from the prison in 1989. Following the release of some of the other members, the organization regained its power and started renew its bloody attacks. In the early 1990s, the organization succeeded to murder many of its targets listed in their book “Hakliyiz Kazanacagiz”.

In 1991, TNP carried out successful operations against Dev-Sol nationwide; some high level members were killed and many members of the organization were arrested other than Karatas. He managed to escape abroad.

After holding a congress in Damascus in 1994, Karatas declared the establishment of a new organization which was DHKP-C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front). DHKP-C has been active in Turkey and Europe since 1994.

DHKP-C attempted to realize a revolution in the urban and rural areas simultaneously. In this sense they differ form the other revolutionary terrorist organizations. DHKP-C foresees five phases of revolution. These phases are:

1. Vanguard war
2. Increasing vanguard struggle and starting a guerilla fight
3. Expanding and spreading guerilla war beyond the country
4. Getting connected with the local units
5. Realization of a communist revolution.

The primary goal of DHKP-C is to change the current regime in Turkey and replace it with a new regime based on Marxism and Leninism. DHKP-C is assumed to have the leading role to enlighten the mass populations and create a revolution in Turkey.

### C. Turkish Hizbullah<sup>2</sup>

As a religiously motivated terrorist organization, the major goal of Turkish Hizbullah is to establish a state based on Islamic laws (seriat). Their model country is Iran. They foresee three different stages to reach this goal; propaganda (teblig), organizing (cemaat), and armed struggle (jihad).

During 1990's some of the extremist religious groups in Diyarbakir (the biggest city in South East Turkey) became more active and they started to address to larger populations compared to other religious groups. Publishing centers have a special meaning for extremist religious groups. These centers play an important role to hold them together. And in 1990's Huseyin Velioglu owned Ilim publishing center (Ilim Kitabevi) and Fidan Gungor owned Menzil publishing center (Menzil Kitabevi). These names are important because they would become the names of the groups afterwards. These two groups constituted the nucleus of Turkish Hizbullah.

In the early 1990s the PKK attempted to gain religious communities of South East region. To achieve this goal they established organizations such as Kurdistan Imamlar Birligi - Association of Imams of Kurdistan - (imam=the official

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<sup>2</sup> Due to lack of sources the information about Turkish Hizbullah mostly relies on the statements of the subjects found in the court files and TNP records.

person assigned to each mosque). Ozeren & Van De Voorde (2006:79) argue that the PKK's attempt to become the major power in the region by gaining those communities caused a fight between Turkish Hizbullah and the PKK and this fight claimed 700 lives in the region between 1992 and 1995 (500 from the PKK and 200 from Turkish Hizbullah).

In the year of 1993, between the two groups of Turkish Hizbullah (Ilim Group and Menzil Group) a vital problem aroused in terms of leadership and strategy of the organization. The leader of Menzil Group was kidnapped and murdered in 1994. Furthermore 50 members from both sides lost their lives in this internal fight (Aras & Bacik, 2002: 156).

Between 1991 and 2003, Turkish security forces arrested 14,622 people, seized 577 rifles, 986 handguns, 42 rocket launcher, 1,192 hand grenade, and cleared 1,648 terror incidents Ozeren & Van De Voorde (2006:87).

In terms of how Turkish Hizbullah view Iran, some facts may be helpful to understand it. High level leadership (including Velioglu) received military, political, and religious training in Iran. Karmon (1999) confirms that members of Turkish Hizbullah received training in Iran. Although they are in favor of the method of Iran revolution, they don't want to be controlled by Iran. They don't accept the Islamic sect of Iranian people (shie) for themselves, but they also don't think that it is a good idea to talk about the differences. In spite of many problems, they stayed in touch with Iranian intelligence units between 1992 and 1999. Ozeren & Van De Voorde (2006:80) point out that Turkish Hizbullah is also

known as the Kurdish Revolutionary Hizbullah (Hisbullahi Kurdi Shorishger) among Iraqi Kurds because its members are predominantly Sunni Muslim Kurds.

In the years 2000 and 2001 Turkish National Police conducted two successful operations against Turkish Hizbullah and those operations pushed the organization to underground for a long time. In 2000, the leader Huseyin Velioglu was killed by the security forces, the archive of the organization was seized, and 61 high level members were arrested. Totally 4,679 suspects were arrested in 2000 and 2001, and the death bodies of 67 people who were kidnapped and killed by the organization were located.

Larrabee & Lesser (2003: 37) argue that according to 1999 estimates Turkish Hizbullah had around 25,000 adherents including 4,000 armed militants.

In terms of the recent situation of Turkish Hizbullah, they have been trying to reestablish their high level management and regain their support groups. They are active in the prisons and abroad. As a new strategy, they stay away from armed struggle until the right time comes. As a different approach from the past, they have been seeking peace with other religious groups and organizations. They have been publishing books and periodicals to regain their support communities.

#### D. Ideologies of the Three Terrorist Organizations-Differences

The PKK is a separatist organization but its ideology is basically Marxist/Leninist. Its justification of violence comes from both Marxism and their understanding of "liberation movement". The leadership of the PKK showed

some efforts at times to address religious people; but its ideology is far from being religious.

The DHKP-C is completely Marxist/Leninist. Its goal is to change the regime in Turkey and establish a Marxist regime. It is different from the PKK, because they don't want another independent and separate state.

Turkish Hizbullah relies on religious ideologies. They also want to change the regime in Turkey; but the difference from the DHKP-C is they want an Islamic state based on Islamic rules. They justify their violence by interpreting Islam in their own way.

## Chapter IV. LITERATURE REVIEW

### A. Literature on the Process of Joining Terrorist Organizations

Merari. A., Prat, T., & Tal, D. (1989: 177-202) analyses the basic causes of the Palestinian Intifada, the general background and precipitating events, and its course of the development in their study. While speaking of “a psychological angle” Merari. A., Prat, T., & Tal, D. (1989: 178) point out the new Palestinian generation created in the period of twenty years after Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to Merari. A., Prat, T., & Tal, D. (1989: 178) the first generation grew up under Jordanian rule in West Bank and under Egyptian rule in Gaza. They were used to harsh responses from the rulers and they were careful about not going against the authorities. But the second generation only knew about the Israeli occupation, and was not able to compare it to the previous harsher regimes. Their perceptions were in accordance with what they have learned in their life experiences; so they were not afraid of challenging the authorities.

Merari. A., Prat, T., & Tal, D. (1989: 181) also speak of practical results of the prisoner swap conducted in May 1985. Israeli government released 1,150

convicted terrorists to free three Israeli soldiers held by Gibril's Population Front. Due to this exchange, the young Palestinian generation learned that they can even avoid long prison sentences, and the punishment is not guaranteed. Most of the released Palestinians took active part in teaching the new generation about the struggle (p. 182).

In his work *Idaho Patriots*, Aho (1990) speaks of the process of joining extremist movements including terrorist organizations. Aho (1990: 210) argues that most of the individuals who become part of the political extremist movements are led in by social bonds to friends, family members and significant others who have joined the movement. The group becomes their "extended family and indoctrination" continues in this new family. Aho (1990: 210) also indicates that "natural biologically related groups", such as families and ethnic groups, constitute an important source for terrorist recruitment. For this reason, ethnic-nationalist or separatist groups have advantages over leftist groups "which have to rely on ideological fellow-travelers in a support network aboveground" (p. 210). He suggests that groups lose some of their recruitment opportunities when they go underground.

According to Aho (1990: 210) individuals who are exposed to others with literature, rhetoric, and incentives for group membership are most likely to be new members:

"This means that the process of recruitment and commitment of individuals to the Christian patriot movement parallels the process of conversion to left-wing causes. In both cases, left-wing or right-wing, the following proposition is true: Extra-movement or non-movement ties with movement role models generally

predate and facilitate people's affiliation with the movement itself" (p. 210).

Aho (1990: 210) concludes that "accidental fact of" having ties with people who are in the movements or in favor of movements plays a crucial role in the process of joining movements.

Sageman (2004) examines how people join four specific terrorist networks; the Central Staff around Osama bin Laden, the Core Arabs, the Maghreb Arabs, and the Southeast Asians. Sageman (2004) studied the background, recruitment, and motivations of more than 150 members of these networks. He found that social networks "provides social and psychological security" for the likely members. According to Sageman (2004: 99-136) individuals join these movements 68% due to pre-existing friendships; 20% due to kinship and 10% due to discipleship. Sageman (2004: 122) concludes that recruitment is "a bottom-up self-selected process rather than a top-down seek out and recruit process".

We should also pay attention to the new learning opportunities for the would-be terrorists created by technological developments. Internet and cyberspace are wonderful recruitment environments for the terrorist networks as well as virtual learning settings for the likely members.

Gruen (2006: 11-21) describes the unorthodox ways in which foreign Islamist groups target American population by using the Internet, video games, and hip hop music. According to Gruen (2006: 12) Islamist terrorist networks need new members who have U.S. passports to be more successful. For this reason they target the people in the United States and they develop unorthodox

ways to mobilize them without face-to-face interaction. Gruen (2006: 12) points out that the Internet was a crucial answer to their need it has become "the backbone of terrorist and extremist-group propaganda and recruitment programs".

Gruen (2006: 13) discusses that extremist groups concentrate on Western male teenagers between the ages of 16 and 22 which is the biggest online population in the West -10.5 million in the U.S. alone. This population group spends an average of 32 hours a month online and this number is 17% higher than any other age group. The extremists overcome three cultural and physical barriers to be able to recruit an individual; they locate the target individual, they isolate him from the others and they address the subject in accordance with young-male-American culture. Gruen (2006) claims that foreign extremist groups have "studied the lingua franca of young America and its popular culture so that the language and visual styles can be replicated in their websites" (p.14).

Gruen (2006: 17-19) gives examples of hip-hop songs and computer games. The British group Soul Salah Crew made a video called Dirty Kuffar and in the video they were dancing in front of the camera holding the Koran in one hand and a gun in the other. In the words of the song, the attacks of the Hamas and the Hizbullah were glorified. Extremist networks also found their places in the \$11 billion-dollar electronic games industry. Some of the game titles of the racist organization National Alliance are "Shoot the Blacks"; "Nigger Hunt"; "Kill the Jewish Rats". Hizbullah developed its first computer game "Special Force" in

February 2003 and the players are presented the opportunity of killing Israeli soldiers. Gruen (2006: 20) argues that even though American teenagers spend the same amount of time as they watch TV, "gaming is participatory while televisioning is not", so violent games are more likely to result in violence.

Gruen (2006: 14-15) concludes that the Internet is a good interaction platform especially for the individuals who do not have strong ties in the real physical world. Those individuals develop bonds in the cyber space as strong as the ones in the physical world.

In his article *Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization*, Weimann (2006: 57) describes how an average American boy became an al Qaeda member. Adam Gadahn lived with his parents who were farmers in Riverside County, California. Watching TV and listening to music were important parts of his life. His life was changed at the age of seventeen when learned about Islam on the web. His web communications finally led to his joining al Qaeda. Gadahn attended al Qaeda training camps and worked as a translator for the group. This is how his learning experience changed his life:

"The turning point perhaps, was when I moved in with my grandparents here in Santa Ana, the county seat of Orange, California. My grandmother, a computer whiz, is hooked up to America Online and I have been scooting the information superhighway since January. But when I moved in, with the intent of finding a job (easier said than done), I began to visit the religion folders on AOL and the Usenet newsgroups, where I found discussions on Islam to be the most intriguing. You see, I discovered that the beliefs and practices of this religion fit

my personal theology and intellect as well as basic human logic" (p. 57).

A videotape came to attention of federal agencies in October 2004. In the tape a masked man who claimed that he was American, was giving warnings of future attacks in the United States. Federal agencies concluded that the man was Adam Gadahn (Weiman, 2006: 57).

Weiman (2006: 59) further states that most of the active terrorist groups are present on the Internet and they have been using other facilities like e-mail, chat rooms, e-groups, forums, and virtual message boards. Terrorist groups target adolescents and teenagers in certain countries like Algeria, Colombia, and Sri Lanka, because this population have experienced the violence by themselves and violence is the most effective way to solve their problems. According to Weimann (2006: 60) web servers of the terrorist networks have the capacity to capture the information about the people who visit the website and later on contact the likely recruits. Those websites are also very "dynamic" says Weimann (2006: 59-60), they may suddenly emerge and disappear and they modify their formats frequently.

For young people schools are natural learning environments, including learning extremist and terrorist ideas, activities and organizations. Abuza (2006: 66-81) discusses the importance of education for recruitment purposes of Jemaah Islamiyah. Abuza (2006: 66) takes a different approach from mainstream explanations of terrorism and claims that many studies focus on political, economic and demographic factors to explain terrorism. Abuza (2006) further

states that those explanations focus on the "push" towards extremist groups and they explain what makes these people angry and "psychologically predisposed to violence", but do not explain "the actual process of joining a terrorist organization" (p. 66).

Abuza (2006: 66) argues that in the process of joining a terrorist organization, the single most important factor is "pull," and this "pull" factor is made possible by organizational and social networks. In the Muslim world of Southeast Asia kinship, mosque, madrassa, and friendship are the vital elements for the recruitment purposes of terrorist organizations and according to Abuza (2006: 66) "education is the commonality between those". Abuza's approach is supported by Sageman's (2004) findings and they are very important for the purpose of my study. They accept "joining process" as an active phenomenon rather than a passive process which is a necessary result of "push" factors.

Abuza (2006: 66-67) argues that kinship ties, including marital ties, are "the single most important determinant of membership in *Jemaah Islamiyah* (Islamic Community)" and for this reason the organizations sometimes look like one extended family. According to Abuza (2006: 66-67) Malaysian intelligence estimates more than 100 families while Indonesian investigators believe much higher. Many marriages were arranged to establish stronger ties between Malaysian and Indonesian members of the organization.

Abuza (2006: 69) points out to some interesting facts. According to Abuza (2006) the number of madrassas in Southeast Asia is around 25,000-35,000-14,000 in Indonesia, 7,000 in Pakistan, 1,600 in the Philippines and so

(p.69). In Indonesia, one quarter of the children attend Islamic boarding schools, in East Java it is 40 percent. In the Philippines, 1,600 madrassas have been providing education without proper supervision of the government. Abuza (2006: 69) emphasizes that most of those schools are moderate, but he also draws our attention to the connections between al Qaeda, its back office Jemaah Islamiyah and these religious schools. Abuza (2006: 70) quotes that Indonesian security forces believe 60-100 madrassas are centers of Jemaah Islamiyah recruitment. According to Abuza (2006: 74) the CIA tracked some 700-1,500 Indonesian students who went to Egypt, Syria, and Iran for study which 30-40 percent of them never showed up. The CIA don't know "where they went".

Abuza (2006: 76) concludes that "the religious nature of terrorist struggle is difficult for Western security analysts because they have little religious understanding or training".

Nacos (2006: 42-51) speaks of how text books, video clips and TV channels create opportunity to learn about terrorist activities. According to Nacos (2006: 45) in the early 1900s, 30 percent of children in Pakistan were educated in madrasas and many children were taught how to join the jihad against nonbelievers. The government was not able to control those religious schools, because the majority of the Pakistani population supported those schools. Many of those schools served as "the jihad factories" or "nurseries of terror" observes Nacos (2006: 45).

Nacos (2006: 45-46) also points out to the education tools used for Palestinian children on the West Bank and in Gaza. Nacos (2006: 45-46) argues

that textbooks and video clips produced by the Palestinian authority are used to "indoctrinate Palestinian children to join the jihad against Israel". These education tools celebrate violence and teach Palestinian boys and girls how to become a martyr. Palestinian TV programs teach second and third graders to "throw away their toys and pick up stones". Al-Manar Television which is supported by Hizballah has been used very effectively to give certain perspectives to the Muslims even beyond the Middle East. It was observed that this TV station "yielded the strongest impact on the psyche" of a certain population. Nacos (2006: 47) also mentions The Turner Diaries how young Americans learned about terrorist ideas by reading this book.

In his work *Suicide Terrorism*, Pedahzur (2005) devotes a chapter on the socialization and recruitment process of would-be terrorists. While he speaks of the life stories of suicide bombers, Pedahzur (2005: 145-146) points out to some important facts. Chechen suicide bomber Kaira was one of the perpetrators of the siege of Moscow theatre and she was 22 years old and also a student at that time. Her husband had been killed six months later joining the rebels; her brother had been killed; and her house destroyed by the officials. Pedahzur (2005: 146) observes that many Chechen women became a suicide bomber after loosing a loved one. Around 90 Palestinian suicide bombers committed their suicide act very soon after loosing a person very close them-a friend, family member or lover.

While speaking of Fatah, Pedahzur (2005: 169-170) states that in 2001, when they started to carry out suicide attacks, the representatives of Fatah were

sent to universities, schools and mosques. They were looking for "young people who had a history of confrontation with the Israelis or who lost family or friends in incidents with the Israeli army". Those young people that they were looking for had learned about the fight before the recruitment and they were easier to recruit. Pedahzur (2005: 166-167) also speaks of the influence of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) on the educational system. In the first stage, the teachers instructed by the LTTE would teach about the Tamil struggle; and in the second stage, representatives of the LTTE would talk to the students in the classrooms during the school hours and teach them about the organizations and its goals. Sometimes they showed them movies about the previous successful acts of the organizations. Thus, children between the ages of 12 and 16 would learn about terrorism in their natural learning settings.

Pedahzur (2005: 165) explains the importance of culture in terms of learning about suicide terrorism as well. He argues that culture has a vital role on the perceptions of people including their perceptions of terrorism. Individuals learn about martyrdom as a virtue through their cultures. If martyrdom has "deep roots" in a society, more volunteers can be found for suicide acts.

Prisons are another learning environment for the likely terrorists. In a special report, Atran et al. (2006:4) stress that prisons have long been places where extremist ideology and calls to violence could reach potential audience. Atran et al. (2006:18) point out to some significant facts about European prisons: Muslims are significantly overrepresented in European prisons; the number of Muslim inmates in Europe since the 1970s has been growing; France and Britain

have the largest and longest established populations of Muslims in Western Europe; most of Western Europe's 12-15 million Muslims occupy a lower socioeconomic status. Atran et al. (2006:19) argue that European policies on assimilation, in contrast to U.S. policies, have resulted in a division between Europe's Muslim population and the rest of society, and this socioeconomic marginalization of Europe's Muslims makes them more vulnerable to radical political and religious messages.

Atran et al. (2006:19) observe that shortage of imams in European prisons makes the job of radical organizers easier and as a result terrorists like Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid enter the society as prison products.

In his article *Prisons as Terrorist Breeding Grounds*, Waller (2006: 32-37) discusses how inmates become terrorists in prison environments in the U.S. According to Waller (2006: 33) extremists Islamist organizations use religious prison programs to infiltrate prisons. Traditional Islamic books, pamphlets, tapes, video, and other media are replaced with extremist, militant literature. The Wahhabi books dominate the prisons and Wahhabism has been sweeping Muslim chaplaincies in American federal prisons. Waller (2006: 34) points out that prisoners write letters saying that "We don't have the literature to fight their extremism. Please send us books". Waller (2006: 34) also quotes from New York Corrections Commissioner's report in 1973:

"For years and years, such literature was not allowed into prison systems for the seemingly logical reason that this material would add to the discontent of already discontented men and that the espoused philosophy of militancy or revolution reaching men who were already bitter, frustrated, and often dangerous would be

an added ingredient to an already volatile situation" (p. 34).

Hamm (2002:3-26) argues that terrorist acts such as McVeigh do not emerge from a single cause but from many "influences". Those influences work together, create a "fertile" environment, and in this environment individuals feel pressure to commit "political crimes". In the case of McVeigh, this "fertile situation led the creation of hard and formidable social networks that allowed secret paramilitary cells to be organized, trained, and motivated to carry out a monstrous act of political revenge" (pg. 25).

In his work, Hamm (2002) examines a possible terrorist conspiracy between Timothy McVeigh and the Aryan Republican Army and attempts to reveal the characteristics surrounding the terrorist underground. In this terrorist underground, the ideologies, mythologies, values, histories, and behaviors are shaped by drug abuse, underground literature, videos, and the music "glamorizing the ordeal of guerilla warfare" (pg. 25-26).

Waller (2006: 36) argues that two organizations dominate the training and selection of Muslim prison chaplains in the United States. The Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences trains the chaplains and the Islamic Society of North America refers Muslim clerics to the Bureau of Prisons. These organizations represent the Wahhabi political, ideological, and theological understanding in the United States and Canada. Imam Umar and Aminah Akbarin are two popular representatives of these organizations. Imam Umar was fired after his post-September article in the *Wall Street Journal*; and Aminah Akbarin, who was a Muslim chaplain at the Albion Correctional Facility in New

York, was put on administrative leave two weeks after 9/11 for calling Osama bin Ladin "a hero to all Muslims" (p. 36).

Waller (2006: 37) also cites the prominent examples who learned about terrorism in the prisons. Jose Padilla was recruited by al Qaeda to detonate a radiological bomb. But he was arrested by the U.S. authorities in 2002 upon his return from Switzerland. Richard Reid, the "Shoe Bomber" became a Muslim and terrorist in British prisons and tried to blow up a jetliner over the Atlantic.

According to Waller (2006: 36) al Qaeda has found US prisons and jails " a key area of recruitment of men who already been convicted of violent crimes and have little or no loyalty to the United States".

*The New Children of Terror* is an excellent article to explain how and why children join terrorist organizations throughout the world. Singer (2006: 105-115) studies the place of children in terrorism and the factors that lead them to join terrorist organizations. According to Singer (2006: 105) around 300,000 children (both boy and girls) under the age of 18 presently are serving as combatants, fighting in almost 75 percent of the world's conflicts; 80 percent of these conflicts that involve children include combatants under the age of fifteen.

Singer (2006: 106-107) cites popular examples of these children terrorists. The very first soldier to die in Afghanistan was shot by a fourteen-year-old sniper. In November 2004, American marines were fired by twelve-year-old children with assault rifles. British forces have detained more than sixty juveniles during the operations in Iraq and U.S. forces have detained 107 Iraqi juveniles in the year after the invasion. In Morocco, a pair of thirteen-year-old twin sisters were caught

just before suicide-bombing Western business buildings. The youngest reported terrorist was a nine-year-old boy in Columbia. Singer (2006: 107-108) emphasizes that having children members is not only about Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The Real IRA, the National Liberation Army of Columbia, the LTTE and many other organizations have active children members. According to Singer (2006: 108), 157 of 366 (40 percent) armed organizations around the world use child soldiers.

While explaining "why children join terrorist organizations", Singer (2006: 109-115) states that it is a complex issue, the information is far from complete, and certainly varies across cases. But he also speaks of some common factors that lead children into this violent phenomenon. The first factor that Singer (2006: 110) cites is "the potential of warped religious motivation". Singer (2006: 110) argues that the concept of jihad, holy wars, passages from the Koran claiming that a shaheed (a martyr) will be forgiven all his sins and will be married to seventy-two virgins in paradise, and support of the families in these interpretations of religious issues play an important role for children to join the organizations. Children learn from religious teachings and motivated by their environments to take active part in the organizations.

The second factor is the institutions that a child interacts with, most particularly educational institutions. Singer (2006: 111) argues that the Hamas, the LTTE run schools to gain children in their cause. The LTTE run orphanages in Sri Lanka, Hamas has set up a series of schools, even down to the preschool level. In Pakistan, many madrasas provide training that prepares children for

violent groups. In the schools run by Hamas, you can see posters on the walls such as "The children of kindergarten are the shaheeds of tomorrow". One of the leaders of Hamas, Sheikh Hasan Yusef in Ramallah, commented that "We like to grow them from kindergarten through college" (p.111).

The third factor cited by Singer (2006: 111) is other related institutions with which children have a deep contact such as summer camps. Singer (2006: 111) points out that the Palestinian Authority ran a series of summer camps in 2004 and more than 25,000 campers learned everything from infiltration techniques to kidnapping.

The fourth factor is social motivations. Singer (2006: 112) argues that in the "shame societies" young people are taught from birth how to acquire honor and avoid shame. In such settings, "any act of retaliation, even one that has no realistic chance of recompense, can still be interpreted as heroic and cancels out the shame". Society teaches and motivate young individuals how to interpret the facts, how to be a hero and how to avoid from shame.

Family is the fifth factor that plays an important role. Singer (2006: 112) speaks of certain terrorist groups such as the LTTE, Hamas and Jamiat Islami in Pakistan that give special recognition and honors to the families of the young suicide bombers. Hamas in Palestine even celebrates the child's martyrdom with festivities. Through these festivals and joyful scenes, young individuals learn what to do to be respected person in their society. Loosing a son or daughter in the cause is a point of pride for the families and this interpretation encourages more children to join the jihad.

The broader social environment is another factor that help "construct children's identity". Singer (2006: 113) argues that if martyrdom is taught as being good and honorable deed on national TV, then it likely that we will see more suicide bombers. On some Palestinian TV programs, children learn how to become a suicide bomber with the songs such as "When I wonder into Jerusalem, I will become a suicide bomber" (p. 113).

As the last factor, Singer (2006: 114) speaks of personal experiences that teach young people about the terrorist organizations. The loss of a relative or friend, jailing or brutalization from local security forces may place young people under the influence of radical groups.

It should be noted that some parts of the studies cited in this research (such as Gruen (2006)) concentrate on "extremism" other than "terrorism". Even though extremism can be considered as the backyard of terrorism, the difference between the two needs to be explained.

Extremism is not necessarily about violence, and violence is not necessarily about terrorism. Some groups are extremist but not violent; and some groups are violent but not terrorist.

Extremism can be viewed as a social learning environment for the individuals who are likely members of the terrorist organizations. As it is explained in Hamm (2002:25) individuals like McVeigh were created in extremist undergrounds.

B. Literature on the Process of Joining Terrorist Organizations in Turkey.

In his illegal book *Kendini Kesfeden Ulus (The Nation that Discovers Itself)*, Besikci (1993) speaks of the impact of "guerilla" fight on Kurdish society. Besikci (1993: 79) argues that young Kurdish individuals who are killed in the fight by Turkish security forces are called "martyr", mass prayers take place for those martyrs, other people visit the families of those martyrs for days and weeks, you can see martyrdom around every town and these developments have a deep impact on the consciousness of Kurdish society. Young Kurdish individuals become aware of the social realities through these developments.

Besikci (1993: 79) further states that it is very important to read Kuran and *Mevlid* (mevlid= a poem written for the prophet) for the Kurdish martyrs and reading Mevlid in Kurdish is even a more important revolutionary process. Like closing shop on certain days to protest Turkish government, these revolutionary processes that have been achieved so far create public awareness in Kurdish society and young Kurdish generations consciously or unconsciously learn about the PKK, the cause and the enemy.

Besikci (1993: 346) also mentions certain Kurdish institutions that are "focal points in Kurdish enlightenment". According to Besikci (1993: 346) Kurdish Institute, Kurdish Cultural Foundation, Rights and Freedoms of Kurdish People Foundation, Cultural Center of Mesopotamia are vital social institutions to teach Kurdish people about "the cause". Besikci (1993: 342) is in favor of campaigns like "Don't be a soldier of Turkish Republic in Kurdistan" and he argues that these campaigns also create impact on public awareness.

In another illegal book *Gerilla Anilari-II (Memoirs of Guerillas-II)*, Ciyayi (2002) reflects the memoirs and life stories of some PKK members and the impact of those lives on other Kurdish people. In these life stories we can see the practical impact of the PKK movement on small Kurdish communities. In one story, Ciyayi (2002: 9) explains how a PKK attack effect the local people in the town of Sirnak:

"...on those days, everybody was curiously talking to each other about "the PKK attack". The local women were discussing it while they were preparing food on the roofs of their houses; men were commenting on the possible consequences of the attack until late hours at the cafes...

"The attack" has created a joy in the local community. Restless, joyful and adventures youth were interpreting the attack in their own way..." (p. 9)

In another story, Ciyai (2002: 17) discusses how another PKK attack affected the "hopes" of local Kurdish people positively:

"...in the summer of 1985, a legend was dominating Botan province (one province of so called Kurdistan). It was not only a legend that you can hear about or you can dream of it; but it was so close that you can touch if you reach out, so real that can embrace your hearth and brain...August 15 attack was a strong wind that blew all the insecure feelings in the hearts away. It changed the way that the children play, it made the youth to turn their faces to the mountains, and it strengthened the hopes of elderly..."(p. 17).

All the comments above are about the impact of a PKK attack to Haftanin Border Station. Ciyayi (2002: 9-17) reflects in her own way how local Kurdish

people are affected by the PKK attacks; how the environment teaches people and how children grow up in this environment.

*Serxwebun* (freedom) is one of the illegal periodicals of the PKK. In *Serxwebun* they publish once in a while the real life stories of their members. These real life stories reflect very effectively how young people join the terrorist organization. One of these life stories is of Meral Mamyak and it appeared in the April 1999 issue of *Serxwebun*.

Meral Mamyak was born in Kars (Eastern Turkey) in 1977. She joined the PKK after the high school. Mamyak (1999) says her family was in favor of the PKK and "they played an important role" in her process to join the PKK. Mamyak (1999) worked for the organization in the big cities to mobilize Kurdish people. In those years, she read the basic books of the organization to educate herself. The more she read the more she understood "how Turkish fascism destroyed Kurdish women". Her self-education helped her understand the revolutionary ideas of President APO (Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK) who is "the creator of the contemporary freedom doctrine, who represents the socialist approach at the highest level, and who is the great hope of Kurdish people and whole humankind" (P. 3).

Peer relations are an important factor in joining terrorist organizations. In his book, Alkan (2002: 140) reflects the life story of Berrin Bickilar and how her friends affected her life. Berrin was born in 1978 into a traditional Turkish family. Nobody was related with any terrorist organizations in her family. Her parents did not have revolutionary or extremist ideas. They named her "Berrin" because one

of the republican prime minister's wife's name was Berrin. The family had traditional, conservative values. Her mother was a house wife and her father was a shop owner. She was the youngest child after two sons. But Berrin was arrested at the age of 17 when she was at the high school.

When Berrin started high school, she also began to meet various people from different terrorist organizations. She took part in some social events of the organizations. When she was 15, she attempted to open up a "halkevi" (a club for social events) with her friends. In her background report that she gave to the organization, "I met my people in that year" she says. Berrin explains why she joined the organization as follows: "I joined the organization, because they showed me attention, their appreciative and trustworthy approaches and intersection of those approaches with my pursuits" (p. 140).

Another life story of a terrorist is reflected by Bozkurt and Yildirim (2001) in a newspaper article. But in this story the end was not an arrest at the age of 17, but it was death at the age of 27. Saliha Dagci came to Istanbul to attend a college to become a teacher. Becoming a teacher was her passion. But meeting her roommate Ayten became a turning point in her life and she put her passion aside. Her best friend and roommate Ayten spent days and months to change her ideas about the PKK, Kurdish people and becoming a "soldier" in the mountains. Saliha was experiencing struggle between what Ayten told her and what the other people say and think.

She could not resist much to Ayten and her friends; one day she made her decision to go to mountains, to be a member of the organization, to be a hero

and to enjoy her freedom. In her second year in Istanbul, she left her school, her friends and her loved ones went to mountains to join the ranks of the PKK. Her new name was "Hevin-Berivan". On February 27th, 1998, her group had a firefight with the security forces and she was shot to death. She was 27 when she was killed. She left a diary full of regret, fear and missing. Bozkurt and Yildirim (2001) quote a couple of sentences from her diary:

"I missed my Mom a lot. I missed her soup and I missed sleeping by the stove. The PKK was explained to me in a different way. But in the mountains, I have learned the truth. I have never felt this much regret all my life. What am I doing here? I regret a lot that I quit my school. My best years were the two years that I spent at the college. Perhaps some of my classmates are married now. My God, please forgive me! If I die, please give this diary to my Mom to publish it as a book. So other young people will not fall into the same situation like me. Mom and Dad, please forgive me; I have not become a daughter that you deserve".

The influence of the family and relatives is another factor to lead individuals to join a terrorist organization. Young individuals may learn from arrested relatives or from uncles who are fighting in the mountains about the "cause" and the organization. In his illegal book, Uysal (2001: 16) quotes from another diary written by a PKK member. In his diary, this PKK member reflects his feelings and thoughts about his uncle who was also in the PKK:

"I have shared most of my "firsts" with you; like the first letter I received in the mountains was from you. Do you remember, the first picture that I have taken was with you. I have never forgotten that black and white picture. You were the

one who took me to the school on the first day and you introduced me to my new friends. Again you introduced me to the revolutionary ideas; I realized many years later that the paint boxes and the brushes that you would bring home late at nights were to write on the walls. The first revolutionary writings that I took to the school were from you. It was your book that I donated to the school library and they rejected. The music tapes that I would listen secretly under my quilt, I had taken them from your drawer without telling you. My Dear Uncle, I learned it from you the first time "what the PKK means" (p. 16).

Social events that are organized by the legal or illegal extensions of the terrorist organizations also create a learning environment for the likely terrorists. In *Yasadigimiz Vatan Dergisi* (The Homeland We Live) (March 2001) which is a periodical published by the Revolutionary Left (DHKP-C) Sultan's sad life story written by the other members reflects the influence of the social gatherings, cultural centers and events on would-be terrorists. According to *Yasadigimiz Vatan*, Sultan Canik was an ordinary girl who spends most of her time at home before joining the organization. Some of her relatives were also the members of the DHKP-C.

One night Sultan attended the event organized by Women Association of Revolutionary Struggle. She met the members of the association that night. And from that night on, those revolutionary women kept coming to their house. And then after a while, Sultan became a member of the Association. Over there, she found some friends at her age. Sultan became an active member of the DHKP-C after a period of training by the members of the organization. Sultan was ready to

do whatever the organization tells her to do. In April, 1990, Sultan was appointed to the armed unit of the organization and on October 10th of 1992, she was killed by the security forces in a firefight. Sultan was dead at the age of 23.

Pedahzur (2005) also provides explanations on the socialization process of the PKK members. According to Pedahzur (2005: 167) Kurdish cultural centers and Kurdish summer camps play an important role in the socialization process of would-be PKK members. The aim of these centers is "to build up Kurdish identity and introduce the young people to the PKK". A similar process takes place in the summer camps. In many European countries, the PKK representatives approach Kurdish children in the schools, invite them to cultural camps and in those summer camps children learn about "the Kurdish struggle". Pedahzur (2005: 167) observes that some of those children were sent to the mountains in southeast Turkey to fight against Turkish forces instead of going back home at the end of the summer camp.

Pedahzur (2005: 168) also argues that while the PKK recruit suicide bombers, they approach women who have lost family members in the fight against Turkish forces because those women learned about the "cause" through their bitter experiences.

### C. Literature on the Theories - Previous Research

Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005) studied terrorists' involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and manufacturing illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and

smuggling weapons of mass destruction. The routine activity perspective and social learning theory were taken in this study to analyze crimes. The routine activities theory was important regarding the opportunities to commit crime, and social learning theory was important to focus on how terrorists acquire necessary skills to turn opportunity into criminality.

Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005:18) conducted a secondary analysis of the American Terrorism Study (ATS) database, and compared the criminal acts of international jihad groups with domestic right-wing groups. The study also included six case studies of these groups.

Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005: 19) argue that all terrorist organizations need money, communication systems, transportation, material, identity documents, and safe havens in the pursuit of their goals. To be able to meet these needs they have to seize the good opportunities and learn the necessary skills. Crimes that may finance these needs reflect the natural history and culture of each organization. According to Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005:19) bank robbery, credit card theft, document counterfeiting, motor vehicle violations, and money laundering are the types of crimes that can meet needs of terrorist organizations.

Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005:20) found that “Jihad groups rely low-level operatives to perform menial acts necessary for a terrorist attack”. Top priority is not the criminal skills while the operatives are recruited, but their connections in the local communities are more important. Surveillance, financing,

communications, breaching airline security, explosives lie in the responsibilities of Jihad leaders who have specialized training.

Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005:20) conclude that members of Jihad groups are inexperienced criminals who leave incriminating evidence; most of the time they do not display the necessary skills; and they can not create contingency plans for their attacks.

Dugan, L., LaFree, G. & Piquero, A. R. (2005: 1031-1066) observe that they were able to identify only three studies that “explicitly examined” the rational choice approach in terms of aerial hijacking. It is also true about social learning studies within the context of terrorism. Almost all of the social learning studies focused on ordinary crimes especially juvenile criminality. But it may be helpful for the purpose of this study take a brief look at Dugan, L., LaFree, G. & Piquero, A. R. (2005)’s work where they tested a rational choice model of airline hijackings.

In their study Dugan, L., LaFree, G. & Piquero, A. R. (2005: 1031-1066) examined 1,101 attempted aerial hijackings that take place worldwide between 1931 and 2003. Their purpose was to estimate the impact of counterhijacking interventions. They used logistic regression analysis to model the predictors of successful hijackings. They found that metal detectors and law enforcement at passenger checkpoints are effective to reduce the number of hijacking attempts.

It is important to note that one their hypothesis was:

“Compared to those who hijack for other reasons, the hazard of hijacking attempts by terrorists will be less affected by counter hijacking measure that raise

the severity or certainty of punishment” (p. 1033).

Dugan, L., LaFree, G. & Piquero, A. R. (2005) did find evidence to support this hypothesis. Terrorists are not deterred by the severity or certainty of punishment even though they carefully calculate everything.

Nakshab (1978) conducted a study to test differential association theory in Tehran, Iran. In this study, the researcher first collected data on 37 juvenile correction center inmates using official records. Second, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews with the subjects and short interviews with the parents, some relatives and in some cases with the school teachers of the subjects to gather life history information of juveniles. Since almost 90 percent of the subjects were from southern Tehran, the researcher lived in the same neighborhood for approximately ten weeks to understand the cultural environment of the delinquents and observed interactions of young people. Ten of 37 cases were discarded due to lack of adequate information.

Nakshab (1978: 142) found that "most of the people in southern Tehran expressed all kinds of definitions not in favor of the law and the judiciary system. The children of these people were long acquainted with these definitions". The researcher argued that the first four assumptions and the sixth assumption of Sutherland seemed to apply in the 19 cases of 27. Nineteen of 27 subjects had become delinquent as a result of differential association; and 8 of them as a result of their interpretations of particular situations with which they had been confronted. The researcher concluded that juvenile delinquents and nondelinquents were differentiated from each other. The juvenile delinquents had

a higher degree of association with delinquent behavior patterns compared to nondelinquents.

Another study was conducted by Hwang and Akers (2003: 39-63) in Pusan, South Korea, to test Social Learning, Social Bonding and Self-Control Theories in a cross-cultural setting. The researchers collected the data by administering self-report questionnaire to a sample of adolescents in Pusan, South Korea, in 1999. They targeted the tenth and eleventh grade high school students in each of sixteen districts of Pusan. They stratified the student population by district, gender, and high school system and selected the sample from those strata at random. The sample size of the study was 1,012.

The researchers first examined the explanatory power of each of the theories of social learning, social bonding, and self-control by running separate regression models, and secondly they examined the relative explanatory power of variables derived from the three theories. The independent variables of this study were self-reports of use of alcohol and tobacco. The researchers found that the social learning model explains 58 percent of the variance in alcohol use and 67 percent of the variance in tobacco use (p. 55). The differential peer association variable had the strongest net effect on alcohol ( $B=.508$ ) and tobacco ( $B=.541$ ) (p. 54). The study also revealed that "measures of differential reinforcement had significant net effects on both alcohol and tobacco consumption, and definitions and imitation variables had significant net effects on tobacco use" (p. 47). The researchers concluded that the theories "do apply in Korean society the same way they apply in American society" (p. 55).

Wang and Jensen (2003: 65-83) conducted a study in Taiwan to test social learning theory in a non-Western culture. The researchers used the self-report method to study patterns of juvenile delinquency and to test "contemporary theories of delinquency among junior high school students in Taipei, Taiwan". The data were collected from 935 junior high school students in December 1992. The students were grade level 2 students who were between twelve and thirteen years old. This study found that there was a strong correlation between delinquency score and gender. 18 of 486 males had been arrested compared to 1 of 444 females. Mother's and father's education, father's unemployment, mother's occupation and perceived family financial problems were also significant correlates. Success in school was a stronger correlates of self-reported delinquency than the status of parents.

The researchers found it consistent with American research (p. 80). Subjects without a natural father present at home reported more delinquency than subjects with both natural parents present at home. This was also consistent with American research. Contrary to previous research, the researchers found that "the presence of stepfather does not significantly increase delinquency" (p. 75). According to the same study, 5.3 percent of male and 2.0 percent of female students defined themselves as "running around with a gang" and those who reported such activity were significantly more involved in serious delinquency than those who did not report gang activities (p. 76). Wang and Jensen (2003: 80) concluded that the correlates of delinquency in Taiwanese society were very similar to those observed in Western societies.

Another cross cultural study by Daosheng (as cited in Akers & Jensen, 2003) examined officially labeled Chinese delinquent youth. The study covered subjects between 14 and 25, thus included young adults. The researcher reported that labeled Chinese delinquents are more likely to come from broken or disturbed families, to be school drop outs, to be unemployed when out of school, and to come from lower or working-class families. Daosheng concluded that "although the crime rate for people in this age range is much lower in China than in the United States, cross-sectional differences between labeled youth and comparison groups are quite comparable" (p. 66).

In Netherlands, Junker (1988: 77-101) conducted an interesting study to test models derived from differential association theory and social control theory, and looked for evidence for the "causal ordering problem". The data for this study came from a panel study on "juvenile delinquency and its causes and on the effects of judicial contact on youngsters". The sample of the study (N=332) were interviewed twice in two years; first in 1983 when the subjects were between 12 and 18; and in 1983 when they were 14 and 20 years old. In the sample, 14 % were female and 86% were male subjects. The sample was representative of youngsters in the cities of Hague and Venlo in the Netherlands. The LISREL-V computer program was used to test the probability of the model in the study.

The results of the analysis did not support models of differential association theory but a social control model was supported by the data. The main results of the study are as follows:

- Delinquency of friends is related directly to delinquent behavior and this

influence is not mediated by beliefs as differential association theory states.

- Social control variables (attachment to friends, family integration etc.) are related within the same year and over time.
- In contradiction to differential association theory there is evidence for the idea that delinquency of friends is a result as well as a cause of delinquency.
- The influence of family integration on delinquency disappears in 1983.
- The influence of beliefs drops substantially in 1983.
- The influence of attachment to friends and unconventional leisure time activities on delinquency disappears in 1983.
- Only school remains a relatively strong predictor of delinquency of friends and of delinquent behavior (p. 100).

Junker (1988: 101) concluded that the differential association model did not fit the data but it was possible to "integrate learning theory in a social control framework". It was suggested that social control and learning principles are not necessarily opposed to each other.

## Chapter V. THEORY

### A. Differential Association Theory

The differential association theory was formulated by one of the most important criminologists of twentieth century. While developing his general sociological theory of crime and delinquency, Edwin H. Sutherland relied heavily upon the work of Shaw and McKay, Chicago school theorists (Akers, 2004: 81-84). Three major theories from the Chicago School have impact on the formulation of Sutherland's theory. These are ecological and cultural transmission theory, symbolic interactionism, and culture conflict.

We can see a general approach focusing on "reciprocal interaction between cognitive, behavioral and environmental determinants" (Bandura, 1977) in various sociological and psychological studies. Paterson (1975) applied learning principles to delinquent and deviant behavior; and Andrews and Bonta

(1998) developed a perspective on the "explanation, treatment, and prevention of crime and delinquency" using social learning principles (Akers, 2004: 81). But social learning theory was developed by Burgess and Akers as a "behavioristic reformulation of Sutherland's differential association theory". Burgess and Akers (1966) kept the concepts and definitions of Sutherland's theory, but "conceptualized them in more behavioral terms and added concepts from behavioral learning theory" (Akers, 2004: 84).

Sutherland revised the final version of his theory in 1947, and the nine postulates that his theory is based on as follows:

1. Criminal behavior is learned.
2. Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with others persons in a process of communication.
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups.
4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes: a) techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very complicated, sometimes simple; b) the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes.
5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from definitions of the legal codes as favorable or unfavorable.
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the

- law.
7. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.
  8. The process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anticriminal patterns involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning.
  9. While criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not explained by those general needs and values, since non criminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values.

#### B. Social Learning Theory

Social learning theory is a modified and clarified version of Sutherland's differential association theory. According to Akers (2004: 83-84) Sutherland asserted in the eight principle of his theory that criminal behavior involves all the mechanisms of learning, but he did not explain those learning mechanisms. Burgess and Akers retained all the principles of differential association theory and combined them with differential reinforcement and other principles of behavioral acquisition, continuation, and cessation, and created social learning theory (p. 84). They added more concepts from behavioral learning theory such as differential reinforcement, discriminative stimuli and internal stimuli, and schedules of reinforcement.

Akers (2004: 84) argues that social learning theory is not competitive with differential association theory; instead it is a broader version it. The research

evidence that supports differential association theory supports social learning theory as well. Furthermore Akers (2004: 84) argues that social learning theory explains criminal and delinquent behavior more thoroughly than does the differential association theory.

### *Central Concepts and Propositions of Learning Theory*

Four major concepts constitute the basis of social learning theory: differential association, definitions, differential reinforcement, and imitation.

*Differential Association.* Differential association involves both behavioral-interactional and normative dimensions. The interactional dimension means the direct association and interaction with others. It includes the indirect association and identification with more distant reference groups as well. The normative dimension means the various patterns of norms and values that the individual is exposed to during the direct and indirect associations.

The groups that an individual is in interaction with are the basic social context where all mechanisms of learning take place. These groups also provide examples for the individual to imitate criminal or conforming behavior. Primary ones of those groups are family and peers. Akers (2004: 86) also speaks of “virtual peer groups” formed via internet, phones, movies, television, and the other media. In those interactions *priority, duration, frequency, and intensity* have relative effect on the behavior of the individual.

*Definitions.* Akers (2004: 86) explains definitions as “one’s own attitudes or meanings that one attaches to given behavior”. They may be orientations,

rationalizations, or other evaluative and moral attitudes that define an act as right or wrong, good or bad, desirable or undesirable, justified or on justified.

Akers (2004: 86) divides these definitions into two groups; one general definitions, and the second specific definitions. Religious, moral, and other conventional values in terms of both conforming and nonconforming behavior are general definitions. Specific definition is the attitude of an individual towards smoking marijuana; it may be justified through specific definition even though it is against the laws.

*Differential Reinforcement.* It is about the rewards and punishments following the act. The balance of those anticipated or actual rewards and punishments is the differential reinforcement. Akers (2004: 87) argues that past, present, and anticipated future rewards and punishments determine whether the individual will refrain from or commit a crime at any given time.

The concept of social reinforcement does not only involve the direct reactions of others present; it also involves a large spectrum of actual or anticipated, tangible and intangible rewards valued in a society or subgroups (p.88). Sometimes the individual may put the other people's shoes on and reinforce or punish his/her own behavior. This is called self-reinforcement; the individual exercise self-control at these times.

**Imitation.** It is the act that comes after observation. The individual observes a behavior from others and then engage in a similar behavior. According to Akers (2004: 88) the imitated behavior is influenced by the characteristics of the model, the observed behavior, and the observed

consequences of the behavior.

The models that are observed may be either the real ones or some others that created by the media. Imitation is more important in the initial acquisition of novel behavior than in the maintenance of the behavior (p. 89).

The principles of the theory have been challenged repeatedly. One criticism of the theory is concerned with the "temporal sequence of differential peer association and delinquency" (Akers, 2004: 98). Some researchers have argued that young individuals first become delinquent and then find some other delinquents. These arguments suggest that "delinquency causes delinquent associations rather than delinquent associations cause delinquency".

In response to this criticism, Akers (2004: 98) argued that "Social learning admits that birds of a feather do flock together, but it also admits that if the birds are humans, they also will influence one another's behavior, in both conforming and deviant directions". Although some research finds stronger evidences running against the theory, Warr (1993) claims that there is significant amount of scientific evidences showing that "peer associations precede the development of deviant patterns more often than involvement in deviant behavior proceeds associations with deviant peers".

Another criticism of the theory is about the strong relationship between self-reported delinquency and peer associations. Some researchers have argued that "the same thing is measured twice" (Akers, 2004: 100-101). Because peer associations are often measured by the individual's report of the delinquency of his/her peers. In response to this criticism, Akers (2004: 101) argues that the two

are not the same and a report about a friend's behavior is not "simply a reflection of one's own delinquent behavior". Some other researches like Warr (1993), Agnew (1991), and Bartusch (1997) support Akers' argument as well.

## Chapter VI. METHODOLOGY

### A. Problems with Research on Terrorism

Conducting a research on terrorism involves specific problems. Silke (2001: 1-14) identifies the potential problems in this field and presents useful caveats for the researchers.

The first problem identified by Silke (2001: 2) is “terrorism as a topic”. Silke (2001) supports his arguments on this issue by a statement of Merari (1991: 88-102) that “the clandestine nature of terrorist organizations and the ways and the means by which intelligence can be obtained will extremely rarely enable data collection which meets commonly accepted academic standards” (p. 2).


The second problem identified by Silke (2001:3) is the source of information in terrorism researches. According to Schmid & Jongman (1988) “there are probably a few areas in the social science literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little research. Perhaps as much as 80 percent of the literature is not research-based in any rigorous sense...” (p. 179). Silke (2001: 3) presents a table by Schmid & Jongman (1988: 138) to identify the sources of information that are used in terrorism researches:

TABLE 3  
SOURCES OF RESEARCH DATA ON TERRORISM  
(adapted from Schmid and Jongman, p.138)

Rank	Method	Researchers
1	Scholarly books and articles	100%
2	Media and news services	92%
3	Open government documents	92%
4	Documents originating from terrorists/sympathizers	58%
5	Interviews with government officials	46%
6	Classified government documents	26%
7	Interviews with terrorists	24%
8	Other	20%

The third problem is statistical analysis identifies Silke (2001:9). Descriptive analysis is more likely to be used in terrorism researches compared to other social science areas. Silke (2001:11) provides a table of this comparison:

FIGURE 3  
COMPARING THE USE OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, 1995-99



Silke (2001: 12) concludes that these problems place “a relatively heavy burden on the researcher”.

## B. Research Questions and Hypotheses

The research questions that guided this study are as follows:

1. Are the members of the PKK more likely to learn about the organization from the family members compared to the members of the DHKP-C, and Turkish Hizbullah?
2. Do the members of the PKK have more relatives who were convicted of terrorism compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah?
3. Do the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah have a lower initiation age compared to the members of the PKK?
4. Do the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah have a higher education level compared to the members of the PKK?
5. Are the members of the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah more likely to come from Southeast Anatolian region of Turkey?

6. Are the members of Turkish Hizbullah more likely to be socialized at the mosques compared to the members of the PKK and DHKP-C?
7. Do the ideological publications play a greater role on the socialization of the members of DHKP-C compared to the members of the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah?
8. Is the Internet more likely to have an impact on the members of DHKP-C and the PKK compared to the impact on the members of Turkish Hizbullah?
9. Do the summer camps play a greater role on the socialization of the members of the PKK compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah?
10. Are the members of the PKK more likely to be influenced by the culture compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah.

Research Hypotheses:

- 1) The members of the PKK are more likely to learn about the organization through a family member compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah.

- 2) The members of the PKK have more relatives who were convicted of terrorism compared to DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah, and this fact plays an important role on the socialization process of the members.
- 3) Initiation age is expected to be lower among the members of the PKK compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah.
- 4) The members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah are expected to have a higher education level compared to the members of the PKK.
- 5) The geographical region plays a greater role on the members of Turkish Hizbullah and the PKK; they are more likely to come from the South East region of Turkey.
- 6) The members Turkish Hizbullah are more likely to be socialized at the mosques compared to members of the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah.
- 7) The ideological publications play a greater role on the socialization of the members of DHKP-C compared to the members of the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah.

- 8) In the socialization process, the Internet is more likely to have an impact on the members of DHKP-C and the PKK compared to the impact on the members of Turkish Hizbullah.
- 9) The summer camps play a greater role on the socialization of the members of the PKK compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah.
- 10) The members of the PKK are more likely to be influenced by the culture compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah.

#### C. Sources of Information

In the proposed study, three sources of information were used. The discussion of findings and conclusions of the research were based on the following sources:

1. Previous research
2. Descriptive information obtained from the court files

#### *Content of the Files*

For this study, the data were collected from the court files in Turkey. The answer of the question whether court files contain all this information is “yes”. In the trial process, the prosecutor and the judge are expected to prove that the

person is a member of the terrorist organization. To prove that they have to confirm the important investigation documents prepared by the police. Many times those investigation files include “self-reports” presented to the organization by the candidate. The police crime lab compares those handwritings and they become official evidence. In those self-report all socialization process is explained. And some of the documents that are prepared by the police are kept in the court files. Sometimes these documents are about the other terrorists that are not arrested; they are kept in the files so they can be used against the other individuals when they are arrested. And since they are convicted individuals, they don't have a reason to hide this information from the prosecutor or the judge.

#### *Turkish Definition of Terrorism and Terrorist*

The first two articles of 1991 Turkish Anti-Terror Law explain the meaning of the terrorism and the terrorist. According to Article 1:

“Any act committed by an individual or individuals belonging to an organization with a view to change the constitutionally determined characteristics of the republic and the political, legal, social, secular and economic order through oppression, violence, intimidation or threat; to destroy the invisible territorial and national integrity of the State or to endanger the existence Turkish State and Republic; to weaken or take over state authority; to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms; to disrupt domestic or external security as well as public order and health, is an act of terror.

The organization in question is formed by two or more individuals gathered around a common objective. Within the framework of the Turkish Penal Code

and other penal legislation, the term organization covers all such formations, associations, armed associations, gangs or armed gangs”.

Article 2 covers the accused of a terrorist crime. According to Article 2:

“A person who is a member of those organizations established to reach the goals that are mentioned in Article 1, is considered a terror criminal if he commits a crime with other persons or alone in accordance with those goals; or if he is a member of those organizations even though he did not commit the intended crimes.

Persons who commit crimes on behalf of the terror organization are also considered terror criminal and punished as terror criminal even though they are not the members of the terror organization.”

#### D. Research Design

Silke & Taylor (2000)'s study may constitute example for the methodology of this research. Silke & Taylor (2000: 249) compared the IRA and Loyalist vigilantism in Northern Ireland. They studied 635 vigilante attacks that take place in the 30-month period between July 1994 and December 1996 in Northern Ireland. Their principle source of data was media reports. They used local Northern Ireland newspapers such as *Belfast Telegraph*, *The Irish News*, *The News Letter*, and *Sunday Life*. The media was supplemented by victim support group files. In some cases the researchers conducted interviews with the victims and witnesses of vigilante attacks.

Silke & Taylor (2000: 249-267) presented the results of their study in simple tables, they did not use regression or other advanced statistical techniques. One of the tables used in their study is presented below as an example:

**TABLE 3**  
*Age Profile of the Victims*

Years of age	Loyalist victims (n = 132)	IRA victims (n = 213)
under 20	26%	43%
20–29	40%	42%
30–39	26%	12%
40–49	6%	2%
50 and over	1%	1%

*(Note. Percentages have been rounded)*

Variables:

*Independent Variables*

Independent variables of this study include age, sex, ethnicity, birth place, type of birth place, education, marital status, occupation, profession, number of family members convicted of terrorism, number of relatives convicted of terrorism, initiated into the organization by who, prior convictions, prior arrests, number of children, number of siblings, introduction age, prior terrorist organization, number of relatives killed in terrorist incidents, number of family members killed in terrorist incidents, economic status, and professions of parents, occupation of parents, and in learning about the organization the impact of TV, the Internet, publications, culture, cultural centers, summer camps.

The literature shows that the same or similar independent variables were used in several researches to explain the socialization process of terrorists. Sageman (2004: 99-136) explained the socialization process by focusing on friendships, kinships, and discipleships. Atran & Sageman (2006 : 68) used similar variables to create their own database. Those variables covered the basic biographical and socioeconomic information, including nationality, ethnicity, occupation, and religious upbringing; and the vast network of connections—the glue that holds the diverse array of terrorists together—like acquaintances, family ties, friendships, and venues for terrorist training.

Ten of those independent variables were chosen to test ten research hypotheses. These independent variables are “initiated by family members, number of convicted relatives, initiation age, education level, region of birth place, impact of cultural centers, impact of publications, impact of summer camps, impact of the culture, and impact of the mosque community”. The other independent variables were not used to test the hypotheses but they were used to provide descriptive information on the terrorist organizations and socialization process of the individuals of those organizations.

### *Dependent Variable*

Dependent variable is being a member of The PKK, or the DHKP-C, or Turkish Hizbullah.

### *Operationalization of the Variables*

Dependent variable "being a member of a terrorist organization" was operationalized as "being convicted of terrorist activities by Turkish courts". Being arrested by Turkish Police or being released from the prison at the end of the trial was not of significance for the purposes of this study. Only "conviction by the courts" indicated that the person can be considered as a member of terrorist organization.

Three terrorist organizations banned by the Turkish Laws were used in this study; The PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party). The DHKP-C (The Revolutionary Left), and The Turkish Hizbullah. These terrorist organizations are also banned and recognized as terrorist organizations by many international bodies. The PKK represents separatist terrorism in Turkey; The DHKP-C represents leftist, Marxist-Leninist terrorism; and The Hizbullah represents religiously motivated terrorism in Turkey.

As an independent variable, "education" was operationalized in five different categories; 1) Elementary school degree, 2) Secondary school degree, 3) High school degree, 4) College degree, 5) Graduate degree.

"Marital status" was operationalized as; 1) Single, 2) Married, 3) Divorced.

"Prior arrests" was operationalized as being arrested by Turkish National Police, or Turkish Gendarmerie. Prior arrest also means there is no conviction, but the person was released by the Police, the Gendarmerie or the Courts. Conviction was considered as another independent variable.

"Prior conviction" was operationalized in two categories; 1) convicted of

terrorist activities, 2) convicted of ordinary criminal conduct.

"Family member" in the independent variables "the number of family members convicted" or "the number of family members arrested" or "introduced to the organization by a family member" were operationalized in five categories; 1) Father, 2) Mother, 3) Brother, 4) Sister, 5) Spouse

"Relative" in the independent variables "the number of relatives being convicted", or "the number of relatives arrested" or "introduced to the organization by a relative" were operationalized in four categories; 1) Uncle, 2) Aunt, 3) Cousin, 4) Grand parents.

"Region of birth place" was operationalized in seven different categories. Turkey is divided into seven geographical areas and these areas were operationalized as follows: 1) Marmara Region , 2) Black Sea Region, 3) Aegean Region, 4) Central Anatolia Region, 5) East Anatolia Region, 6) Mediterranean Region, and Southeast Anatolia Region. Region of birth places have something to tell about the "traditional relationships" of Turkish citizens especially of the members of the PKK. In Turkey, birth place of the individuals reflects some aspects of cultural differences. In big cities like Istanbul, people who come from the same background live close to each other and this factor also affect their relationships

"Introduction to organization" had five options; by 1) family member, 2) friend, 3) lover, 4) relative, 5) Employer.

"Economic status" variable was operationalized in four categories; 1) Lower, 2) Lower Middle, 3) Middle, and 4) Upper Level.

### *Data Collection*

The main methodological objective of this study was to obtain information regarding socialization (initiation) process of individuals into the terrorist organizations that is helpful to make a comparison between three organizations. The required data were obtained from the official court records.

Since the statistical methods that were used in this study require that the sample should be selected randomly, the sample was selected as random as possible.

The files of 80 (N=80) individuals who were convicted of being a member of the PKK; the files of 60 (N=60) individuals who were convicted of being a member of the DHKP-C; and the files of 60 (N=60) individuals who were convicted of being a member of Turkish Hizbullah were selected randomly. These individuals were the ones who had been convicted between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2004.

In 2001, 1284 PKK members had been convicted and 20 subjects were randomly selected out of them. In 2002, 1453 PKK members had been convicted and 20 subjects were randomly selected out of them. In 2003, 1089 PKK members had been convicted and 20 subjects were randomly selected out of them. In 2004, 587 PKK members had been convicted and 20 subjects were randomly selected out of them. So totally 80 PKK subjects were randomly selected out of 4413 convicted PKK members.

In 2001, 149 DHKP-C members had been convicted and 15 subjects were randomly selected out of them. In 2002, 126 DHKP-C members had been

convicted and 15 subjects were randomly selected out of them. In 2003, 182 DHKP-C members had been convicted and 15 subjects were randomly selected out of them. In 2004, 216 DHKP-C members had been convicted and 15 subjects were randomly selected out of them. So, totally 60 subjects were randomly selected out of 673 convicted DHKP-C members.

In 2001, 385 Turkish Hizbullah members had been convicted and 15 subjects were randomly selected out of them. In 2002, 174 Turkish Hizbullah members had been convicted and 15 subjects were randomly selected out of them. In 2003, 113 Turkish Hizbullah members had been convicted and 15 subjects were randomly selected out of them. In 2004, 46 Turkish Hizbullah members had been convicted and 15 subjects were randomly selected out of them. So, totally 60 Turkish Hizbullah subjects were randomly selected out of 718 convicted Turkish Hizbullah members.

Total 200 (N=200) court files were examined and analyzed for the purpose of this study. Some of the individuals are still in the prison and some of them are released and free in the society.

### *Reliability and Validity*

As Babbie (1998: 129) puts it, reliability is about "consistency". If your technique gives the same results after repeatedly applying it to the same object, then your technique is reliable. But getting the same results does not mean that your results are "accurate". They may be consistent but not accurate. Babbie (1998: 130) names this problem as "bias".

Since official court records were examined in this study, those court records are also subject to the problems that any other official statistics are subject. Babbie (1998: 322) speaks of problems stemming from the nature of law enforcement and crime record keeping. Babbie (1998: 322) argues that during election or budget years, law enforcement agencies are subject to various pressures and these pressures affect their official statistics indirectly. It is possible to say that social or political pressures have an impact of on the behavior of the courts in Turkey as well. Turkish courts may convict fewer defendants during the time of peace compared to the time of many suicide attacks. But on the other hand, the researcher argues that if you apply the same format of variables to the court files between 2001 and 2004, you will get the same results. Since the data are in written files and words are not going to change according to researcher, the same format of the variables are going to yield the same results. So the researcher does not foresee great danger in terms of reliability.

On the other hand, validity is about "accuracy". It is a matter of whether the "empirical measure that we use adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration" or not (Babbie, 1998: 133). In terms of validity, the researcher does foresee some danger. Some of the independent variables that were measured in the sample court files had been recorded based on the information that came from the defendant during the trial. For example marital status, education, number of children, number of family members who have prior convictions, introduced to organization by who, etc. were recorded according to

what the defendant said during the trial. If it is not necessary for the case, this information was not verified. In this sense, the researcher is limited to what have been recorded and it does constitute some validity problems.

#### E. Techniques of Analysis

The data were analyzed by using SPSS computer software program. The researcher applied the following techniques of analysis:

1. Tabular and Graphical Description
  - a) Frequency Distribution
  - b) Relative Frequencies
  - c) Mean and Median values of some independent variables.
2. Contingency Tables
3. Multinomial Logistic Regression Model

One of the primary reasons for using statistical methods is to summarize and describe data, to make the information easier to assimilate (Agresti & Finlay, 1997: 3). Tabular and graphical description tools provide a summary picture of the data. A frequency distribution is "a listing of intervals of possible values for a variable, together with a tabulation of the number of observations in each interval" (Agresti & Finlay, 1997: 36). In the proposed study, frequency distributions enabled us to understand for instance, how many individuals (out of  $N = 200$ ) were introduced to the terrorist organization by a family member.

The relative frequency, on the other hand, presents us the proportion of a specific observation. For instance, in our study, relative frequencies provided us

the percentage of the individuals who are high school graduates. Relative frequencies make it easier to make comparisons between different intervals.

A contingency table is an effective statistical bivariate method to analyze the association between categorical variables. "Categorical" means, the explanatory variable may have several categories. For instance in the proposed study, the independent variable "introduced to the organization by who" have four (family member, relative, friend, lover, and employer) categories. By using contingency tables, the researcher were able to compare two proportions; like proportions of married individuals to proportion of individuals who were introduced to the organization by the spouse.

Multinomial regression model was used to compare the variations between the three groups. When the outcome has three or more values, the data can be analyzed by using multinomial logistic regression. By using this method, the researcher was also be able to understand the impact of another independent variable on a measured variation. For instance, is the average age of the PKK members is significantly different from the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah? Does the gender have any impact on this variation? Does this age variation change when we play with the gender variable?

The findings of the study were reflected as tables and outputs of SPSS and the statistical interpretation of these findings were provided. The researcher also provided the suggestions for the future studies at the end of this study.

## F. Data Analysis and Findings

The findings of this research are presented in three different parts. The first part includes frequency tables and contingency tables, and characteristics of the subjects will be described in this part. In the second part includes bivariate analyses. Two-way crosstabulations and chi-square tests of significance are used to explore relationships between various variables. The third part includes multivariate analyses. Three multinomial logit regression models are developed to explore the controlled effects of the predictors on the dependent variable. The findings in those three parts are compared to the findings in the literature as well.

### *Characteristics of the Sample – Univariate Analyses*

**Table 1: Age distribution of the subjects across terrorist organizations**

			age group				Total
			under 18	18-25	26-35	over 35	
Terrorist organization	PKK	Count	7	36	27	10	80
		% within terrorist organization	8.8%	45.0%	33.8%	12.5%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	3	34	18	5	60
		% within terrorist organization	5.0%	56.7%	30.0%	8.3%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	0	26	29	5	60
		% within terrorist organization	.0%	43.3%	48.3%	8.3%	100.0%
Total	Count	10	96	74	20	200	
	% within terrorist organization	5.0%	48.0%	37.0%	10.0%	100.0%	

**Table 2: Age distribution of the subjects**

	AGE	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	12	1	.5	.5	.5
	14	1	.5	.5	1.0
	15	1	.5	.5	1.5
	16	5	2.5	2.5	4.0
	17	2	1.0	1.0	5.0
	18	11	5.5	5.5	10.5
	19	11	5.5	5.5	16.0
	20	13	6.5	6.5	22.5
	21	12	6.0	6.0	28.5
	22	16	8.0	8.0	36.5
	23	9	4.5	4.5	41.0
	24	14	7.0	7.0	48.0
	25	10	5.0	5.0	53.0
	26	16	8.0	8.0	61.0
	27	8	4.0	4.0	65.0
	28	7	3.5	3.5	68.5
	29	10	5.0	5.0	73.5
	30	6	3.0	3.0	76.5
	31	7	3.5	3.5	80.0
	32	8	4.0	4.0	84.0
	33	4	2.0	2.0	86.0
	34	3	1.5	1.5	87.5
	35	5	2.5	2.5	90.0
	36	2	1.0	1.0	91.0
	37	4	2.0	2.0	93.0
	38	5	2.5	2.5	95.5
	39	3	1.5	1.5	97.0
	41	1	.5	.5	97.5
	43	1	.5	.5	98.0
	48	1	.5	.5	98.5
	49	2	1.0	1.0	99.5
	62	1	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	200	100.0	100.0	

Mean = 26.09

Singer (2006) points out to the use of young populations by many terrorist and armed organizations around the world. According to Singer (2006: 106-110) around 300,000 children who are under eighteen are presently serving as combatants in the areas of conflict.

In the research sample, the youngest subject is twelve years old; the oldest subject is sixty two years old; and the Mean age is 26.09 (see Table 1). The average age of sample is slightly different from Smith's (1994: 46) sample. Smith (1994) pointed out that the average age in his sample was 20. But when we analyze the age distribution as groups, it is observed that only 5 percent (10 subjects) of the sample are under the age of eighteen (see Table 2). Ninety six subjects between the ages of eighteen and twenty five constitute the largest group in the sample being 48 percent of the sample. The second largest group constitutes 37 percent of the sample and covers the subjects between the ages of twenty six and thirty five. Only twenty of the subjects are older than thirty five and they constitute 10 percent of the sample.

When we look at the age distribution of the subjects across the terrorist organizations, it is observed that terrorist organizations are different from each other (see Table 2). The PKK has more members who are under eighteen (8.8 percent) and over thirty five (12.5 percent) compared to other terrorist organizations. The largest proportions of the PKK (45 percent) and the DHKP-C (56.7 percent) members are between the ages of eighteen and twenty five while for Turkish Hizbullah the largest proportion is between twenty six and thirty five (48.3 percent). It will be measured in multinomial regression analyses whether these differences are statistically significant or not.

**Table 3: Gender distribution of the subjects**

			Gender		Total
			male	Female	
Terrorist organization	PKK	Count	74	6	80
		% within terrorist organization	92.5%	7.5%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	56	4	60
		% within terrorist organization	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	59	1	60
		% within terrorist organization	98.3%	1.7%	100.0%
Total	Count		189	11	200
	% within terrorist organization		94.5%	5.5%	100.0%

Although proportions of the female subjects differ among the terrorist organizations, it can easily be observed that females do not constitute a large proportion in the sample; only 5.5 percent of the sample is female (see Table 3). Smith (1994:48-49) mentioned that female proportion of American terrorists ranges between 7 percent to 27 percent depending on the organization. The PKK has the largest female proportion (7.5 percent) in the sample while the DHKP-C has the second (6.7 percent). In the sample there is only one female subject who is a member of Turkish Hizbullah (1.7 percent). Again multinomial regression analyses will show us whether these variations among the organizations are statistically significant or not.

It is important to note that “perception of the women” in the culture and ideologies of the organizations have an impact on the proportions reflected in the Table 3. Since females are not given active social roles in extremist religious groups, Turkish Hizbullah should not be expected to have higher proportion of female members compared to the other organizations.

**Table 4: Type of birth place**

			type of birth place				Total
			Village	Town	City	Big City	
Terrorist organization	PKK	Count	49	21	5	5	80
		% within terrorist organization	61.3%	26.3%	6.3%	6.3%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	31	14	4	11	60
		% within terrorist organization	51.7%	23.3%	6.7%	18.3%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	21	19	13	7	60
		% within terrorist organization	35.0%	31.7%	21.7%	11.7%	100.0%
Total	Count	101	54	22	23	200	
	% within terrorist organization	50.5%	27.0%	11.0%	11.5%	100.0%	

More than half of the subjects (50.5 percent) were born in the villages of Turkey (see Table 4). This fact is an important indicator of the education level and economic status of the subjects as well. Considering that only 22.5 percent (11 percent + 11.5 percent) of the subjects were born in the cities and the other 77.5 percent (50.5 percent + 27 percent) were born in villages and towns, one can draw some conclusions about the culture, family structure, and perceptions of those subjects.

Terrorist organizations are different in terms of type of birth places. A large proportion of the PKK members (61.3 percent) were born in the villages. Even though the DHKP-C has the largest proportion of the subjects (18.3 percent) who were born in the big cities, 51.7 percent of its members were born in the villages. Turkish Hizbullah is quite different from the other two organizations. Only 35 percent of its members were born in the villages and we will see the impact of this difference in the education levels of the Turkish Hizbullah members.

**Table 5: Region of the birth place**

			region of birth place							Total
			Marmara	Black Sea	Aegean	Central Anatolia	East Anatolia	Akdeniz	South East Anatolia	
Teror Org.	PKK	Count	1	0	1	2	32	1	43	80
		% within terrorist organization	1.3%	.0%	1.3%	2.5%	40.0%	1.3%	53.8%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	9	12	5	11	16	3	4	60
		% within terrorist organization	15.0%	20.0%	8.3%	18.3%	26.7%	5.0%	6.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	0	0	0	1	15	0	44	60
		% within terrorist organization	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.7%	25.0%	.0%	73.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	10	12	6	14	63	4	91	200
		% within terrorist organization	5.0%	6.0%	3.0%	7.0%	31.5%	2.0%	45.5%	100.0%

Almost half of the subjects (45.5 percent) were born in South East Region of Turkey (see Table 5). The second largest proportion was born in East Anatolia (31.5 percent) and only four subjects (2 percent) were born in Akdeniz Region. When we look at the variation among the organizations, we observe that more than ninety percent of the members of the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah were born in East Anatolia or South East Anatolia. 73.3 percent of the members of Turkish Hizbullah and 53.8 percent of the PKK members were born in South East Anatolia. Even though the largest proportion of the DHKP-C members was born in East Anatolia, the percentage is not very high compared to the other terrorist organizations. These findings are important indications of the distribution of the Kurdish population in Turkey; the differences in the goals and the ideologies of

the terrorist organizations; and the impact of regional culture on the members of the organizations.

**Table 6: Ethnicity distribution**

			ethnicity		Total
			Kurdish	Turkish	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	73	7	80
		% within terrorist organization	91.3%	8.8%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	3	57	60
		% within terrorist organization	5.0%	95.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	53	7	60
		% within terrorist organization	88.3%	11.7%	100.0%
Total	Count		129	71	200
	% within terrorist organization		64.5%	35.5%	100.0%

The findings of this study are important to show the role of ethnicity in the socialization process of the subjects. In the sample 64.5 percent (129 subjects) of the individuals identify themselves as Kurdish (see Table 6). But when we look at the differences among the organizations, the findings show us that ethnicity is much more important for two of the organizations. In the sample, 91.3 percent of the PKK subjects are Kurdish. In terms of remaining 8.8 percent, they may be half-Kurdish or even though they don't have Kurdish origins, they may think that they should take place in the Kurdish issue as revolutionists.

According to findings, ethnicity is important for Turkish Hizbullah as much as the PKK. In the sample, 88.3 percent of the Turkish Hizbullah members are Kurdish. Since the PKK is a Kurdish movement, it is not very difficult to explain why most of its members are Kurdish. But for Turkish Hizbullah it is not that easy to explain why the proportion is that high. One possible reason is that Turkish Hizbullah was developed as an anti-movement against the PKK in the Southeast Region of Turkey. Many tribes and families who were hurt by the PKK took part

in this anti-PKK movement. The second possible reason is that Turkish Hizbullah was developed in a region that where most of the population was Kurdish and where there was already an environment of terror. In this respect, it can be argued that Kurdish people choose Turkish Hizbullah as an alternative to the PKK to solve their problems in a violent environment that terrorism is considered as an effective tool in problem solving.

As the findings show only three DHKP-C members (5 percent) are Kurdish (see Table 6). This finding indicates that for Kurdish extremists DHKP-C is not alternative movement and their goals and ideologies don't match.

**Table 7: Education level of the subjects**

			education level							Total
			No Formal Education	Elementary School	Secondary School	High School	College	Masters	Some College Degree	
Ter Org	PKK	Count	23	36	7	9	0	0	4	79
		% within terrorist organization	29.1%	45.6%	8.9%	11.4%	.0%	.0%	5.1%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	3	24	17	7	1	0	8	60
		% within terrorist organization	5.0%	40.0%	28.3%	11.7%	1.7%	.0%	13.3%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	4	15	5	21	6	1	8	60
		% within terrorist organization	6.7%	25.0%	8.3%	35.0%	10.0%	1.7%	13.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	30	75	29	37	7	1	20	199
		% within terrorist organization	15.1%	37.7%	14.6%	18.6%	3.5%	.5%	10.1%	100.0%

Considering the fact that more than half of the subjects were born in the villages (see Table 4), it is not surprising that 37.7 percent of the sample have only elementary school degrees and 15.1 percent have no official degree at all (see Table 7). Thirty seven subjects (18.6 percent) hold high school degree and twenty seven subjects (13.6 percent) hold a college or some college degrees. In the sample there is only one subject who has a graduate degree (see Table 7).

But the findings do show that variations among the organizations deserve to get attention. Twenty three PKK members (29.1 percent) have no official degree compared 5 percent of the DHKP-C members and 6.7 percent of the Turkish Hizbullah members. The biggest proportion in the elementary school graduates are PKK members while the biggest proportion in high school graduates are Turkish Hizbullah members. The findings clearly show that the

least educated are the PKK members and the best educated are Turkish  
Hizbullah members. Regression analyses will show us the statistical significance  
of these differences.

**Table 8 : Economic status of the subjects**

			economic status			Total
			Lower	Lower Middle	Middle	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	72	5	3	80
		% within terrorist organization	90.0%	6.3%	3.8%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	55	4	1	60
		% within terrorist organization	91.7%	6.7%	1.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	44	12	4	60
		% within terrorist organization	73.3%	20.0%	6.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	171	21	8	200
		% within terrorist organization	85.5%	10.5%	4.0%	100.0%

In regard to economic status, 85.5 percent of the subjects are considered in lower class in the sample (see Table 8). This finding implies that vast majority of the subjects don't have much to loose in economically. One explanation of this economic deprivation, since they are convicted terrorists that also means that they were quite active in the organization and they did not focus on economic problems. Priorities of the terrorist organizations became their own priorities and they put their personal problems aside. 10.5 percent of the sample identified their economic status as lower middle while only 4 percent are considered middle. None of the subjects in the sample is considered upper level.

When we look at the differences among the organizations, we observe that members of Turkish Hizbullah are in a better situation financially. Lower class proportion of Turkish Hizbullah is 73.3 percent and it is less than other two organizations. Likewise lower middle class of Turkish Hizbullah subjects are

much higher than proportions of other two. Considering that members of Turkish Hizbullah have higher education levels than the other organizations, this outcome should be viewed as normal.

**Table 9: Number of siblings**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	1	.5	.5	.5
	2	12	6.0	6.3	6.8
	3	12	6.0	6.3	13.0
	4	13	6.5	6.8	19.8
	5	32	16.0	16.7	36.5
	6	22	11.0	11.5	47.9
	7	16	8.0	8.3	56.3
	8	29	14.5	15.1	71.4
	9	16	8.0	8.3	79.7
	10	20	10.0	10.4	90.1
	11	7	3.5	3.6	93.8
	12	5	2.5	2.6	96.4
	13	2	1.0	1.0	97.4
	14	2	1.0	1.0	98.4
	15	1	.5	.5	99.0
	16	1	.5	.5	99.5
	20	1	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	192	96.0	100.0	
Missing	System	8	4.0		
	Total	200	100.0		

Mean = 6.95

**Table 10 : Number of siblings**

			Number of siblings					Total
			2 or less	3-4	5-7	8-10	more than 10	
Terrorist organization	PKK	Count	3	6	27	30	10	76
		% within terrorist organization	3.9%	7.9%	35.5%	39.5%	13.2%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	7	19	24	9	0	59
		% within terrorist organization	11.9%	32.2%	40.7%	15.3%	.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	3	0	19	26	9	57
		% within terrorist organization	5.3%	.0%	33.3%	45.6%	15.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	13	25	70	65	19	192
		% within terrorist organization	6.8%	13.0%	36.5%	33.9%	9.9%	100.0%

In the sample, the number of the siblings of the subjects ranged between zero to twenty (Table...). The Mean number of the siblings is 6.95 which is quite high. The largest proportion of the subjects (36.5 percent) has five to seven siblings (see Table ....). The second largest group is 33.9 percent of the sample and they have eight to ten siblings. Twenty of the subjects (13.0 percent) have three to four siblings.

When we look at the differences between the organizations we observe that Turkish Hizbullah and PKK subjects tend to have more siblings; 45.6 percent of Turkish Hizbullah subjects have eight to ten siblings and 15.8 percent of them have more than ten siblings. Regarding the PKK, 39.5 percent have eight to ten siblings and 13.2 percent of them have more than ten siblings. For DHKP-C these percentages are 15.3 and .0 percent respectively.

At this point it can be argued that ethnicity plays important role in the number of siblings; Kurdish people tend to have more children.

**Table 11 : Marital status of the subjects**

			marital status			Total
			Single	Married	Divorced	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	43	30	1	74
		% within terrorist organization	58.1%	40.5%	1.4%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	41	17	1	59
		% within terrorist organization	69.5%	28.8%	1.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	25	34	0	59
		% within terrorist organization	42.4%	57.6%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	109	81	2	192	
	% within terrorist organization	56.8%	42.2%	1.0%	100.0%	

In this research sample, the largest proportion of the subjects is single; the number of the single subjects is one hundred and nine and they constitute 56.8 percent of the sample. Only two subjects are divorced (1.0 percent) and none of the subjects is separated.

When we look at the distribution between the organizations we observe some differences. 69.5 percent of DHKP-C subjects are single compared to 58.1 percent of the PKK subjects and 42.4 percent of Turkish Hizbullah subjects. The proportion of single DHKP-C subjects is clearly higher than other organizations. While single PKK and DHKP-C subjects outnumber the married ones; it is the opposite for Turkish Hizbullah subjects.

The difference between Turkish Hizbullah subjects and the other two organizations can be explained with the ideologies of the organizations. Since Turkish Hizbullah is a religiously motivated terrorist organization, its members are not allowed to live boyfriend-girlfriend relationships; but they are encouraged to

get married. DHKP-C has a Marxist-Leninist organization and its members are welcomed to live couple lives without getting married. The PKK members can be considered the mainstream traditional regarding their approach to the marriage compared to other two organizations.

**Table 12 : Criminal records of the subjects – prior conviction of terrorism**

			prior conviction of terrorism		Total
			No	Yes	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	72	8	80
		% within terrorist organization	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	54	6	60
		% within terrorist organization	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	52	8	60
		% within terrorist organization	86.7%	13.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	178	22	200
		% within terrorist organization	89.0%	11.0%	100.0%

In the sample, twenty two subjects (11.0 percent) had prior convictions of terrorism (see Table 9). One explanation of this relatively small percentage is that once they are convicted they serve long time periods in the prison and they become too old to become active terrorists when they get out. Another possible explanation is that the members who have prior convictions know how not to get caught and they take low risk roles in the organizations. Furthermore the leaderships of the terrorist organizations should not be expected to give important active role to ex-members who are known by everybody.

The percentage of the Turkish Hizbullah members who have prior convictions of terrorism is slightly higher than the PKK and DHKP-C. Turkish Hizbullah subjects constitute 13.3 of their own group while the PKK and DHKP-C subjects constitute 10.0 percent (see Table 9).

**Table 13 : Criminal records of the subjects – prior conviction of ordinary crimes**

			prior conviction of ordinary crimes		Total
			No	Yes	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	78	2	80
		% within terrorist organization	97.5%	2.5%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	56	4	60
		% within terrorist organization	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	57	3	60
		% within terrorist organization	95.0%	5.0%	100.0%
Total	Count		191	9	200
	% within terrorist organization		95.5%	4.5%	100.0%

Only nine of the subjects (4.5 percent) have prior convictions of ordinary crimes. Four of those nine subjects are from DHKP-C and they are 6.7 percent of DHKP-C subjects. Three of them are from Turkish Hizbullah and they are 5.0 percent of their group. Two of them are the PKK subjects and they are only 2.5 percent of the PKK subjects (see Table ...)

It is observed that the differences between the organizations are not important. According to findings it can be argued that either ordinary criminals are not attracted to terrorist organizations or terrorist organizations do not want to accept ordinary criminals. Terrorist organizations usually look for loyalty in their members and they may not find this loyalty in ordinary criminals.

And the findings about the prison impact are also parallel to the findings of this table. Only seven subjects (3.5 percent) stated that prison played an important role in their joining process.

**Table 14 : Initiation age**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	10	1	.5	.5	.5
	12	4	2.0	2.0	2.5
	13	3	1.5	1.5	4.0
	14	3	1.5	1.5	5.5
	15	7	3.5	3.5	9.0
	16	11	5.5	5.5	14.6
	17	15	7.5	7.5	22.1
	18	23	11.5	11.6	33.7
	19	25	12.5	12.6	46.2
	20	13	6.5	6.5	52.8
	21	4	2.0	2.0	54.8
	22	21	10.5	10.6	65.3
	23	14	7.0	7.0	72.4
	24	4	2.0	2.0	74.4
	25	8	4.0	4.0	78.4
	26	8	4.0	4.0	82.4
	27	3	1.5	1.5	83.9
	28	6	3.0	3.0	86.9
	29	6	3.0	3.0	89.9
	30	1	.5	.5	90.5
	31	2	1.0	1.0	91.5
	32	1	.5	.5	92.0
	33	5	2.5	2.5	94.5
	34	2	1.0	1.0	95.5
	35	1	.5	.5	96.0
	36	1	.5	.5	96.5
	38	2	1.0	1.0	97.5
	39	1	.5	.5	98.0
	40	1	.5	.5	98.5
46	1	.5	.5	99.0	
47	1	.5	.5	99.5	
59	1	.5	.5	100.0	
	Total	199	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.5		
	Total	200	100.0		

Mean=21.88

**Table 15 : Initiation age**

			initiation age group				Total
			under 18	18-25	26-35	over 35	
Terrorist organization	PKK	Count	22	34	20	3	79
		% within terrorist organization	27.8%	43.0%	25.3%	3.8%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	10	37	9	4	60
		% within terrorist organization	16.7%	61.7%	15.0%	6.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	12	41	6	1	60
		% within terrorist organization	20.0%	68.3%	10.0%	1.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	44	112	35	8	199
		% within terrorist organization	22.1%	56.3%	17.6%	4.0%	100.0%

Singer (2006: 106-107) cites popular examples of these children terrorists: a fourteen-year-old Afghani sniper; twelve-year-old children who use assault rifles; and thirteen-year-old twin sisters who attempted to suicide bombing.

In the research sample, the lowest initiation age is ten and the highest one is fifty nine (see Table 11) while the Mean initiation age is 21.88 (see Table 10). The subjects who joined the organization before eighteen years old constitute 22.1 percent of the sample (see Table 12). The largest group is the subjects who joined the organization between the ages of eighteen and twenty five. The second largest group is the members who joined the organization between the ages of twenty six and thirty five. Only 4 percent of the sample joined the organization after the age of thirty five.

The findings show that the PKK has a lower initiation age than the other two organizations. Twenty two members (27.8 percent) joined the PKK before the age of eighteen while the number is ten (16.7 percent) for DHKP-C and

twelve (20 percent) for Turkish Hizbullah ( see Table 12). The largest proportions for all three organizations are the members who joined the organizations between the ages of eighteen and twenty five.

**Table 16 : Length of time in the organization**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	less than a year	20	10.0	10.1	10.1
	1	32	16.0	16.1	26.1
	2	26	13.0	13.1	39.2
	3	29	14.5	14.6	53.8
	4	21	10.5	10.6	64.3
	5	12	6.0	6.0	70.4
	6	10	5.0	5.0	75.4
	7	12	6.0	6.0	81.4
	8	7	3.5	3.5	84.9
	9	6	3.0	3.0	87.9
	10	9	4.5	4.5	92.5
	11	4	2.0	2.0	94.5
	12	6	3.0	3.0	97.5
	13	4	2.0	2.0	99.5
	15	1	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	199	99.5	100.0	
Missing	System	1	.5		
Total		200	100.0		

Mean=4.23

**Table 17 : Length of time in the organization**

			length of time				Total
			less than a year	1-4 years	5-7 years	8 years and over	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	7	51	10	11	79
		% within terrorist organization	8.9%	64.6%	12.7%	13.9%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	12	40	6	2	60
		% within terrorist organization	20.0%	66.7%	10.0%	3.3%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	1	18	18	23	60
		% within terrorist organization	1.7%	30.0%	30.0%	38.3%	100.0%
Total	Count	20	109	34	36	199	
	% within terrorist organization	10.1%	54.8%	17.1%	18.1%	100.0%	

The mean length of time that the subjects spend as a member before getting arrested is 4.23 years (see Table 13). Twenty subjects (10.1 percent) lasted less than a year before they were arrested. And the longest time that a subject spent in an organization is fifteen years. The largest group for the whole sample is the subjects who spent between one and four years in the terrorist organizations (54.8 percent).

The findings show that organizations are quite different in regarding the length of time that their subjects spent in the organization (see Table 15). Twenty members of Turkish Hizbullah (38.3 percent) lasted eight or more years in the organization before they got arrested. Comparing the percentages of the PKK (13.9 percent) and DHKP-C (3.3 percent) this is a much higher value. One explanation of this difference may stem from the organizational emergence, tactics and attacks of Turkish Hizbullah. Turkish Hizbullah emerged in the early

1990's in the South East Region of Turkey and fought against the PKK for a while. They stayed away from security forces. But when their kidnappings gained momentum they received more attention of the law enforcement agencies as a threat. Considering the fact that Turkish Hizbullah was started in the early 1990's and Turkish National Police carried out successful operations against the organization in 2000 and 2001, it will be easy to understand how their members could last eight and more years without getting arrested.

Furthermore the fact that more than half of the PKK subjects (64.6 percent) spend between one and four years in the organization may show as the time period that PKK members spend on the mountains. Unlike the other two organizations, most of the PKK members receive their training (military and ideological) in the camps on the mountains and then they are sent to the cities for attacks and recruiting people. The time period of one to four years may indicate that it takes that much time for more than half of the PKK members to receive their training on the mountains, to go to cities and start their activities and in the end getting caught for those activities.

**Table 18 : Number of family members convicted of terrorism**

			number of family members convicted of terrorism				Total
			0	1	2	4	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	73	5	2	0	80
		% within terrorist organization	91.3%	6.3%	2.5%	.0%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	53	6	1	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	88.3%	10.0%	1.7%	.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	51	7	1	1	60
		% within terrorist organization	85.0%	11.7%	1.7%	1.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	177	18	4	1	200
		% within terrorist organization	88.5%	9.0%	2.0%	.5%	100.0%

The research findings show that 88.5 percent of the subjects had no family members who had been convicted of terrorism while 11.5 percent had some family members who had been convicted of terrorism (see Table 16). In the sample, eighteen subjects had one family member (9.0 percent); four subjects had two family members (2.0 percent); and only two subjects had four family members (.5 percent) who had been convicted of terrorism.

When we look at the organizations, we observe that Turkish Hizbullah has a slightly higher percentage of subjects (15.5 percent) who had convicted family members compared to DHKP-C (11.7 percent) and PKK (8.7 percent).

**Table 19 : Number of relatives convicted of terrorism**

			number of relatives convicted of terrorism				Total
			0	1	2	3	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	75	0	3	2	80
		% within terrorist organization	93.8%	.0%	3.8%	2.5%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	58	2	0	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	96.7%	3.3%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	55	3	1	1	60
		% within terrorist organization	91.7%	5.0%	1.7%	1.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	188	5	4	3	200
		% within terrorist organization	94.0%	2.5%	2.0%	1.5%	100.0%

According to research findings twelve subjects (6.0 percent) had relatives who had been convicted of terrorism (see Table 17). Among these twelve subjects, five had only one relative (2.5 percent) while four subjects had two relatives and three subjects had three relatives who had been convicted.

Turkish Hizbullah has the largest proportion of subjects (8.3 percent) who had convicted relatives; the PKK has the second largest proportion (6.2 percent); and DHKP-C has the smallest proportion of subjects (3.3 percent) who had relatives convicted of terrorism.

It can be argued that DHKP-C members are less likely to be influenced by the convicted relatives compared to PKK and Turkish Hizbullah members.

**Table 20 : Number of family members killed in terrorist incidents**

			number of family members killed			Total
			0	1	2	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	79	1	0	80
		% within terrorist organization	98.8%	1.3%	.0%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	57	2	1	60
		% within terrorist organization	95.0%	3.3%	1.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	59	1	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	98.3%	1.7%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	195	4	1	200
		% within terrorist organization	97.5%	2.0%	.5%	100.0%

Pedahzur (2005: 168-170) points out that while they recruit suicide bombers, the PKK approaches women who have lost family members in the fight against Turkish forces; and the Fatah looks for young Palestinians who have lost family members or friends in incidents with the Israeli army.

The findings of this research do not provide strong support for those arguments. In the whole sample only five subjects (2.5 percent) had family members who had been killed in the terrorist incidents (see Table 18). Four subjects (2.0 percent) had only one family member and one subject had two family members (.5 percent) who had been killed in the terrorist incidents.

Research findings don't show big differences among the organizations in regarding the percentages of killed family members. For the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah, only one subject (1.3 percent and 1.7 percent respectively) had family members who had been killed while for the DHKP-C three subjects (5.0 percent) had relatives who had been killed in the terrorist incidents.

**Table 21 : Number of relatives killed in terrorist incidents**

			number of relatives killed			Total
			0	1	2	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	77	2	1	80
		% within terrorist organization	96.3%	2.5%	1.3%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	60	0	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	60	0	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	197	2	1	200
		% within terrorist organization	98.5%	1.0%	.5%	100.0%

Only three subjects (1.5 percent of the sample) had relatives who had been killed in the terrorist incidents and they were all PKK members (see Table 19). Two PKK subjects (2.5 percent of the PKK subjects) had only one relative and one PKK subject (1.3 percent) had two relatives who had been killed in the terrorist incidents.

None of the DHKP-C or Turkish Hizbullah subjects had a relative who had been killed in terrorist incidents.

**Table 22 : Prior terrorist organization**

			prior terrorist organization		Total
			DHKP-C	None	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	1	79	80
		% within terrorist organization	1.3%	98.8%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	0	60	60
		% within terrorist organization	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	0	60	60
		% within terrorist organization	.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Count		1	199	200
	% within terrorist organization		.5%	99.5%	100.0%

The findings show that members of the terrorist organizations tend not to change organizations. In the sample only one subject changed the organization. The subject had been a DHKP-C member; he had been arrested but not convicted of being a member of DHKP-C; and in the prison he joined the PKK. The proportion of having a prior terrorist organization is 1.3 percent in the PKK subjects and .5 percent in the whole sample (see Table 20).

According to research findings, there is no Turkish Hizbullah or DHKP-C subject in the sample who had prior terrorist organizations. Since the ideologies and goals of the organizations are rather different, it is possible that organizations may not prefer new members coming from other organizations.

## Socialization process of the subjects – the factors that played an important role

**Table 23 : Initiation to the organization**

			initiated to organization by						Total
			Family member	Relative	Lover	Friend	Members of the Organization	Acted on his own	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	5	6	0	28	31	4	74
		% within terrorist organization	6.8%	8.1%	.0%	37.8%	41.9%	5.4%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	8	2	2	27	12	9	60
		% within terrorist organization	13.3%	3.3%	3.3%	45.0%	20.0%	15.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	4	11	1	36	6	2	60
		% within terrorist organization	6.7%	18.3%	1.7%	60.0%	10.0%	3.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	17	19	3	91	49	15	194
		% within terrorist organization	8.8%	9.8%	1.5%	46.9%	25.3%	7.7%	100.0%

In the sample the largest proportion of the subjects were initiated to the organization by friends; this group consists of 91 subjects and constitute 46.9 percent of the sample (see Table 29). This finding supports Sageman's (2004: 112) argument that mujahedins join terrorist movements 68 percent due to friendships.

The second largest proportion consists of 49 subjects who were recruited by the members of the terrorist organization and they constitute 25.3 percent of the sample. Nineteen subjects (9.8 percent) were initiated by a relative; seventeen subjects (8.8 percent) were initiated by a family member; fifteen subjects (7.7 percent) acted on their own to join the organization; and three subjects (1.5 percent) were initiated by a lover (see Table 29).

When we look at the differences between the organizations, we observe important variations. 41.9 percent of the PKK subjects were recruited by the members of the organization while for DHKP-C it is 20 percent and for Turkish Hizbullah it is 10 percent. This variation seems very significant but multinomial regression analysis will show us how significant it is.

The largest proportion of Turkish Hizbullah subjects were initiated by a friend; this group consists of thirty six subjects and they are 60 percent of the Turkish Hizbullah members. Twenty seven DHKP-C subjects (45 percent) were initiated by a friend while for the PKK it is twenty eight subjects (37.8 percent). The percentages are high for all three organizations, but the difference is not small.

The role of the relatives in the initiation process seems more important to Turkish Hizbullah compared to other two organizations according to findings of this study. Eleven Turkish Hizbullah subjects (18.3 percent) were initiated by a relative and this finding supports Sageman's (2004: 112) argument that kinship played a role in the affiliation of 14 percent of mujahedin. Relatives played an important role for 8.1 percent of the PKK subjects and 3.3 percent of DHKP-C subjects.

These findings reflect the structure and expansion methods of the terrorist organizations and it can be argued that Turkish Hizbullah and Mujahedin are similar regarding the socialization process of the members.

**Table 24 : Impact of publications**

			Publications have an important impact		Total
			No	Yes	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	66	14	80
		% within terrorist organization	82.5%	17.5%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	9	51	60
		% within terrorist organization	15.0%	85.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	10	50	60
		% within terrorist organization	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
Total	Count		85	115	200
	% within terrorist organization		42.5%	57.5%	100.0%

Almost all of the terrorist organizations pay special attention to their publications to indoctrinate their existing members and to recruit potential members. In her life story, Mamyak (1999) points out how basic books of the organization played a vital role in her education. The findings of my research show that publications played an important role in the socialization of 57.5 percent of the subjects (see Table 21).

The biggest impact of publications is observed on DHKP-C subjects; 85.0 percent of the subjects stated that publications played important role in their socialization process. The second largest proportion is in Turkish Hizbullah subjects; publications played important role for 83.3 percent of Turkish Hizbullah subjects. Among three organizations the least impact of publications is observed on the PKK subjects; publications were important only for 17.5 percent of the PKK subjects in the sample (see Table 21).

Characteristics of the subjects and organizations are important regarding interpretation of these findings. Since the PKK subjects have the least education in the sample compared to other two organizations, it may be considered normal that less educated people are influenced by the publications less than more educated ones. It is important to note that 29.1 percent of the PKK subjects have no formal education (see Table 7).

Another important point in this interpretation lies in the characteristics of the organization. For the goals of the PKK, the number of its members is more important than the quality of them. They want to establish an independent Kurdish State and they need numbers. But for DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah, numbers don't mean a lot; they don't want an independent state but they want to replace the regime in Turkey. And for this purpose qualified people are more important for them. Publications of these organizations address qualified people and play an important role to make their members more qualified.

**Table 25 : Impact of the TV**

			TV has an important impact	Total
			No	
Terrorist organization	PKK	Count	80	80
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	60	60
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	60	60
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	200	200	
	% within terrorist organization	100.0%	100.0%	

Several researchers pointed out the impact of TV programs especially on young populations. Nacos (2006: 45-47) argues that Al-Manar TV "yielded the strongest impact on the psyche" of a certain Palestinian population while Singer (2006: 113) explains how Palestinian children learn how to become a suicide bomber by watching certain TV programs.

Surprisingly none of the subjects in the sample mentioned the impact of TV in their socialization process (see Table 22). It may not be the right approach to interpret this finding as TV has not impact at all. Instead it may be right to interpret it like this; compared to other factors that play an important role in the socialization process of terrorists, the impact of TV is so small and it is not worth to mention it. In the joining process, the impact of TV is not considered a determining factor; other factors like the publications, cultural centers, etc. are considered the determining factors. The impact of TV stays in the background in the socialization process.

**Table 26 : Impact of the internet**

			the internet has an important impact		Total
			No	Yes	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	80	0	80
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	59	1	60
		% within terrorist organization	98.3%	1.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	60	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	Count	199	1	200	
	% within terrorist organization	99.5%	.5%	100.0%	

Some researchers drew our attention to the impact of the internet on the potential members of the terrorist organizations. Gruen (2006: 11-21) discusses how foreign Islamist groups target young American population by using internet. Weimann (2006: 57) explains how an American teenager was recruited by Al-Qaeda on the internet.

But findings of this study don't show strong support for those researches. In the sample only one subject (.5 percent) stated that internet played the biggest role in his process of joining DHKP-C (see Table 23). None of the PKK members or Turkish Hizbullah members mentioned the impact of the internet.

It is important to note the characteristics of the subject who stated that the internet played the most important role in his joining process. The subject was 17 years old when convicted, not Kurdish, high school student and from Western part of Turkey (away from the East where violence is predominant). So we can

argue that in the absence of the impact of ethnicity and culture, the internet may become a more important factor.

**Table 27 : Impact of cultural centers**

			cultural centers have an important impact		Total
			No	Yes	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	63	17	80
		% within terrorist organization	78.8%	21.3%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	32	28	60
		% within terrorist organization	53.3%	46.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	49	11	60
		% within terrorist organization	81.7%	18.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	144	56	200
		% within terrorist organization	72.0%	28.0%	100.0%

Cultural centers play an important role for the terrorist organizations to attract sympathizers. Besikci (1993: 346) points out how Kurdish institutions are important to teach Kurdish people about “the cause”. Alkan (2002: 140) explains how a young Turkish girl joined DHKP-C because of the attention that she had received at a cultural center.

In the research sample, fifty six subjects (28.0 percent) stated that cultural centers played the biggest role in their joining process (see Table 24). When we look at the differences between the organizations, we observe that DHKP-C is quite different from the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah. The proportion of the DHKP-C subjects who experienced the impact of cultural centers is 46.7 percent while this value is 21.3 percent for the PKK subjects and 18.3 for Turkish Hizbullah subjects (see Table 24). For Turkish Hizbullah certain mosques play the role of cultural centers and for the PKK, since Kurdish people can meet people from their own ethnicity at regular places, they may need particular cultural centers.

**Table 28 : Impact of summer camps**

			summer camps have an important impact		Total
			No	Yes	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	72	8	80
		% within terrorist organization	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	60	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	60	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	192	8	200
		% within terrorist organization	96.0%	4.0%	100.0%

For some of the terrorist organizations, summer camps are a quite attractive way to teach young people about “the common cause”. Pedahzur (2005: 167) argues that Kurdish cultural centers and Kurdish summer camps play an important role in the socialization process of would-be PKK members. The aim of these centers is "to build up Kurdish identity and introduce the young people to the PKK". Some of the young people are sent to the mountains instead of their homes at the end of the summer camp.

Even though not very strong, the research findings support the arguments of Pedahzur (2005). In the sample 10.0 percent of the PKK subjects stated that summer camps had the biggest impact on their joining process (see Table 25). None of the DHKP-C or Turkish Hizbullah subjects mentioned the impact of summer camps on their joining process. According to findings summer camps are not a recruitment sources for DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah, while the PKK pays special attention to them.

**Table 29 : Impact of the culture**

			culture has an important impact		Total
			No	Yes	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	22	58	80
		% within terrorist organization	27.5%	72.5%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	59	1	60
		% within terrorist organization	98.3%	1.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	60	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	141	59	200
		% within terrorist organization	70.5%	29.5%	100.0%

In South East Region of Turkey, violence has been the dominant determining factor to solve social issues in the last forty years. (Grigoriadis, 2004:14) points out that the PKK emerged during a term of political instability and turmoil between 1960s and 1980s in Turkey. Three military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980 resulted in harsh policies against any opposing movements and Kurdish movement was one them.

Besikci (1993: 79) points out that closing the shops to protest Turkish government creates public awareness in the Kurdish society. Ciyai (2002: 17) discusses how some local people base their hopes on the PKK attacks.

The research findings support these arguments. According to findings, 72.5 percent of the PKK subjects stated that culture played important role in their socialization process (see Table 26). Only one (1.7 percent) DHKP-C subject experienced the impact of culture while none of Turkish Hizbullah subjects mentioned the impact of culture. It can be argued that ethnic and regional factors create a particular culture in Turkey and it has a huge impact on the PKK subjects.

**Table 30 : Impact of the mosque community**

			mosque community have an important impact		Total
			No	Yes	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	79	1	80
		% within terrorist organization	98.8%	1.3%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	60	0	60
		% within terrorist organization	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	12	48	60
		% within terrorist organization	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	151	49	200
		% within terrorist organization	75.5%	24.5%	100.0%

Some researchers like Abuza (2006: 69) and Nacos (2006: 45) drew our attention to the relationship between religious education and terrorism in Southeast Asia. Nacos (2006:45) argued that in the early 1900s, 30 percent of children in Pakistan were educated in madrasas and many children were taught how to join the jihad against nonbelievers. And according to Abuza (2006: 66) in the Muslim world of Southeast Asia kinship, mosque, madrassa, and friendship are the vital elements for the recruitment purposes of terrorist organizations.

The findings of this study support those arguments regarding the members of Turkish Hizbullah. In the sample 80.0 percent of Turkish Hizbullah subjects mentioned that the mosque community played very important role in their socialization process (see Table 27). For the PKK the impact was unimportant (only one subject) and for DHKP-C it was zero impact.

While for the PKK and DHKP-C do not pay attention to the mosques, for Turkish Hizbullah members it was a gathering and training center. Most of

DHKP-C members are not religious at all, and the PKK members share the mainstream approach regarding religious matters. But Turkish Hizbullah is very different regarding religious matters; the organizations targets the mosque communities; the members share extreme religious ideas; they justify their violence by interpreting Islam in their own way; and the members and sympathizers attend particular mosques to be able to use them without getting attention from the public.

**Table 31 : Impact of the prison**

			prison has an important impact		Total
			No	Yes	
terrorist organization	PKK	Count	78	2	80
		% within terrorist organization	97.5%	2.5%	100.0%
	DHKP-C	Count	56	4	60
		% within terrorist organization	93.3%	6.7%	100.0%
	Turkish Hizbullah	Count	59	1	60
		% within terrorist organization	98.3%	1.7%	100.0%
Total	Count		193	7	200
	% within terrorist organization		96.5%	3.5%	100.0%

Several researchers point out the relationship between the prisons and terrorism. Merari, A., Prat, T., & Tal, D. (1989: 181) speaks of the impact of Israeli prisons on young Palestinians; and Waller (2006: 32-37) discusses how inmates become terrorists in prison environments in the United States.

The findings of this study do not support those arguments. Only 7 subjects (3.5 percent) stated that prison had important impact on their joining process (see Table 28). Organizations are not very different from each other regarding the prison impact; two of the PKK subjects (2.5 percent), four of the DHKP-C subjects (6.7 percent); and only one (1.7 percent) Turkish Hizbullah subject mentioned the impact of prison. One of the DHKP-C subjects was a correctional officer and he was in charge of DHKP-C inmates. He was influenced by them and joined the organization.

While interpreting the findings it important to point out how terrorism convicts kept in Turkish prisons. In Turkish prisons terrorism convicts and

ordinary crime inmates are not held in the same prison cells. In the past 10-20 of terrorism convicts used to be held in a big prison cell. Since the inmates used these prison cells as classrooms to excel in terrorism, the government experienced many problems. Because of these problems a decision was made to keep each individual terrorism convict in a separate prison cell. And the government is careful about not to keep ordinary criminals and terrorists in the same prison as much as possible. This interpretation may be the best explanation as to why prisons don't have important impact on the socialization process of the terrorists in Turkey.

*Bivariate Analyses*

**Table 32 : Ethnicity and education level**

			ethnicity		Total
			Kurdish	Turkish	
new education level	No formal education	Count	25	5	30
		Expected Count	19.4	10.6	30.0
		% within ethnicity	19.4%	7.1%	15.1%
	Less than high school	Count	61	43	104
		Expected Count	67.4	36.6	104.0
		% within ethnicity	47.3%	61.4%	52.3%
	High School	Count	27	10	37
		Expected Count	24.0	13.0	37.0
		% within ethnicity	20.9%	14.3%	18.6%
	College or Graduate Degree	Count	16	12	28
		Expected Count	18.2	9.8	28.0
		% within ethnicity	12.4%	17.1%	14.1%
Total	Count	129	70	199	
	Expected Count	129.0	70.0	199.0	
	% within ethnicity	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

$$X^2 = 8.046 \quad df=3 \quad p < 0.05$$

The findings of the study suggest that education level of Kurdish subjects is lower than Turkish subjects. 19.4 percent of Kurdish subjects have no formal education while the percentage is 7.1 percent for Turkish subjects. For Kurdish subjects the percentage of elementary school graduates is around 47.3 percent and for Turkish subjects it is 61.4 percent. The percentages of college and graduate degree holders are higher for Turkish subjects compared to Kurdish subjects; 17.1 percent of Turkish subjects have a college or graduate degree while it is 12.4 percent for Kurdish subjects. (  $X^2 = 8.046$ ;  $df=3$ ;  $p < 0.05$  ) (see Table 32).

**Table 33 : Ethnicity and type of birth place**

			type of birth place				Total
			Village	Town	City	Big City	
ethnicity	Kurdish	Count	67	37	17	8	129
		% within ethnicity	51.9%	28.7%	13.2%	6.2%	100%
	Turkish	Count	34	17	5	15	71
		% within ethnicity	47.9%	23.9%	7.0%	21.1%	100%
Total		Count	101	54	22	23	200
		% within ethnicity	50.5%	27.0%	11.0%	11.5%	100%

$$X^2 = 10.968 \quad df=3 \quad p < 0.05$$

Current research indicates that subjects who have Turkish ethnicity are more likely to have been born in the big cities. In the research sample, sixty seven Kurdish subjects (51.9 percent) were born in the villages while this number is thirty four for Turkish subjects (47.9 percent). Regarding the subjects who were born in the big cities, the percentage is 21.1 for Turkish subjects and 6.2 for Kurdish subjects ( $X^2 = 10.968 \quad df=3 \quad p < 0.05$ ) (see Table 33).

These findings are important to understand the role of ethnicity, culture and geographical region in terrorism. It should be noted once again that 64.5 percent of the sample consists of Kurdish subjects.

**Table 34 : Ethnicity and the region of birth place**

			new region of birth places			Total
			Other Regions	East Anatolia	Southeast Anatolia	
ethnicity	Kurdish	Count	5	44	79	128
		Expected Count	30.4	41.4	56.2	128.0
		% within ethnicity	3.9%	34.4%	61.7%	100.0%
	Turkish	Count	42	20	8	70
		Expected Count	16.6	22.6	30.8	70.0
		% within ethnicity	60.0%	28.6%	11.4%	100.0%
Total		Count	47	64	87	198
		Expected Count	47.0	64.0	87.0	198.0
		% within ethnicity	23.7%	32.3%	43.9%	100.0%

$$X^2 = 86.503 \quad df=2 \quad p < 0.05$$

Distribution of Kurdish subjects across the geographical regions is also worth to be analyzed. Even though half of the Kurdish population lives in regions of Turkey other than Southeast Region, research findings suggest that 61.7 percent of Kurdish subjects were born in Southeast Region and 34.4 percent of them were born East Anatolia region (see Table 34). That means 96.1 percent of Kurdish subjects were born only in two regions of Turkey; East Anatolia and Southeast Anatolia.

The findings suggest two outcomes; first one is Kurdish people who were born in East and Southeast parts of Turkey are more likely to be involved in terrorism compared to Kurdish people who were born in other regions of Turkey. Once again it should be noted that half of the Kurdish population live in the West parts of Turkey and Istanbul has a huge population of Kurdish people. And the second outcome is Turkish people who were born in Southeast part of Turkey are not more likely to be involved on terrorism. If the geographical region has an impact on socialization of individuals, it is not valid for Turkish people; it should be considered in the context of Kurdish ethnicity ( $X^2 = 88.301$ ;  $df=6$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ).

**Table 35 : Ethnicity and number of siblings**

			ethnicity		Total
			Kurdish	Turkish	
new siblings group	2 or less	Count	4	9	13
		Expected Count	8.3	4.7	13.0
		% within ethnicity	3.3%	12.9%	6.8%
	3-4	Count	5	20	25
		Expected Count	15.9	9.1	25.0
		% within ethnicity	4.1%	28.6%	13.0%
	5-7	Count	44	26	70
		Expected Count	44.5	25.5	70.0
		% within ethnicity	36.1%	37.1%	36.5%
	8 or more	Count	69	15	84
		Expected Count	53.4	30.6	84.0
		% within ethnicity	56.6%	21.4%	43.8%
Total	Count	122	70	192	
	Expected Count	122.0	70.0	192.0	
	% within ethnicity	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

$$X^2 = 39.047 \quad df=3 \quad p < 0.05$$

The siblings and family structure also play an important role in the socialization process of individuals and findings of this study indicate that Kurdish and Turkish subjects are significantly different regarding the number of siblings ( $X^2 = 39.047$ ;  $df=3$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ) (see Table 35).

According to findings of current study, the largest proportion of Kurdish subjects (56.6 percent) have 8 or more siblings while this proportion is 21.4 percent for Turkish subjects. 92.7 percent of Kurdish subjects have more than four siblings while it is 58.5 percent for Turkish subjects. 12.9 percent of Turkish subject have two or less siblings while it is 3.3 percent for Kurdish subjects.

**Table 36 : Ethnicity and length of time in the organization**

			ethnicity		Total
			Kurdish	Turkish	
length of time	less than a year	Count	6	14	20
		Expected Count	12.9	7.1	20.0
		% within ethnicity	4.7%	19.7%	10.1%
	1-4	Count	69	40	109
		Expected Count	70.1	38.9	109.0
		% within ethnicity	53.9%	56.3%	54.8%
	5-7	Count	27	7	34
		Expected Count	21.9	12.1	34.0
		% within ethnicity	21.1%	9.9%	17.1%
	8 and over	Count	26	10	36
		Expected Count	23.2	12.8	36.0
		% within ethnicity	20.3%	14.1%	18.1%
Total		Count	128	71	199
		Expected Count	128.0	71.0	199.0
		% within ethnicity	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

$$X^2 = 14.668 \quad df=3 \quad p < 0.05$$

The findings of the study indicate that Kurdish subjects last longer than Turkish subjects in the terrorist organizations (  $X^2 = 14.668$ ;  $df=3$ ;  $p < 0.05$  ) (see Table 36). 20.3 percent of Kurdish subjects spent eight or more years in the organization while it is 14.1 percent for Turkish subjects. 21.1 percent of Kurdish subjects spent between 5-7 years in the organization while it is 9.9 percent for Turkish subjects. 4.7 percent of Kurdish subjects spent less than a year in the organization while for Turkish subjects the percentage is 19.7 percent.

The length of time spent in the organization should be considered in the framework of organizational policies of the terrorist organizations and success of the law enforcement agencies as well. Kurdish subjects who spend years in the mountains of Northern Iraq in the PKK camps are away from the danger of getting arrested. And similarly if a terrorist organization decides to stay away from the arms for awhile, its members are less likely to be arrested and

convicted. For instance, after the successful operations of TNP, Turkish Hizbullah decided not to carry out attacks until it resumes its power again.

**Table 37 : Ethnicity and impact of culture**

			impact of the culture		Total
			No	Yes	
ethnicity	Kurdish	Count	74	55	129
		Expected Count	90.3	38.7	129.0
		% within ethnicity	57.4%	42.6%	100.0%
	Turkish	Count	66	5	71
		Expected Count	49.7	21.3	71.0
		% within ethnicity	93.0%	7.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	140	60	200
		Expected Count	140.0	60.0	200.0
		% within ethnicity	70.0%	30.0%	100.0%

$$X^2 = 27.627 \quad df=1 \quad p < 0.05$$

In most of the societies ethnicity and culture intermixed and they are affected from each other. The findings of current study suggest that Kurdish subjects are more likely to be influenced by culture in their socialization process compared to Turkish subjects ( $X^2 = 27.627$ ;  $df=1$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ) (see Table37).

In the sample, 42.6 percent of Kurdish subjects stated that the culture played an important role in their joining process while 57.4 percent of them did not mention the impact of culture. But for Turkish subjects the culture played much less important role; the culture played an important role for only 7.0 percent of Turkish subjects while for 93.0 percent of them it was not important.

It should be noted that none of Turkish Hizbullah subjects mentioned the impact of culture in their joining process while 72.5 percent of the PKK subjects stated that culture played an important role for them (see Table 26). This suggests that the ideologies of the PKK are intermixed with Kurdish culture while the ideologies of Turkish Hizbullah have a smaller place in Kurdish culture. This implies that the PKK has a larger supporter population in Kurdish society compared to Turkish Hizbullah.

**Table 38 : Education level and type of birth place**

			new type of birth place			Total
			Village	Town	City	
new education level	No formal education	Count	22	6	2	30
		Expected Count	15.1	8.1	6.8	30.0
		% within new education level	73.3%	20.0%	6.7%	100%
	Less than high school	Count	62	20	22	104
		Expected Count	52.3	28.2	23.5	104.0
		% within new education level	59.6%	19.2%	21.2%	100%
	High School	Count	9	17	11	37
		Expected Count	18.6	10.0	8.4	37.0
		% within new education level	24.3%	45.9%	29.7%	100%
	College or Graduate Degree	Count	7	11	10	28
		Expected Count	14.1	7.6	6.3	28.0
		% within new education level	25.0%	39.3%	35.7%	100%
Total	Count	100	54	45	199	
	Expected Count	100.0	54.0	45.0	199.0	
	% within new education level	50.3%	27.1%	22.6%	100%	

$$X^2 = 29.229 \quad df=6 \quad p < 0.05$$

In the sample, the subjects who were born in small places are more likely to have a lower level of education. 73.3 percent of the subjects who have no formal education were born in villages while only 6.7 percent of them were born in the cities (  $X^2 = 29.229$ ;  $df=6$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ) (Table 38).

21.2 percent of elementary school graduates, 29.7 percent of high school graduates, and 35.7 percent of college or graduate degree owners were born in the cities.

**Table 39 : Education level and impact of publications**

			impact of publications		Total
			No	Yes	
new education level	No formal education	Count	26	4	30
		Expected Count	12.8	17.2	30.0
		% within new education level	86.7%	13.3%	100.0%
	Less than high school	Count	44	60	104
		Expected Count	44.4	59.6	104.0
		% within new education level	42.3%	57.7%	100.0%
	High School	Count	9	28	37
		Expected Count	15.8	21.2	37.0
		% within new education level	24.3%	75.7%	100.0%
	College or Graduate Degree	Count	6	22	28
		Expected Count	12.0	16.0	28.0
		% within new education level	21.4%	78.6%	100.0%
Total	Count	85	114	199	
	Expected Count	85.0	114.0	199.0	
	% within new education level	42.7%	57.3%	100.0%	

$$X^2 = 33.990 \quad df=3 \quad p < 0.05$$

There is also a significant relationship between the education level and the impact of the publications according to findings of this study (  $X^2 = 27.627$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < 0.05$  ) (see Table 39). The subjects who have a higher education level are more likely to be influenced by the publications of terrorist organizations in their socialization processes.

In the sample, 78.6 percent of the subjects who hold a college or graduate degree stated that publications played an important role in their joining process. For the subjects who are high school graduates it is 75.7 percent. 21.4 percent of the college or graduate degree holders did not mention the impact of publications.

**Table 40 : Education level and impact of mosque community**

			impact of the mosque community		Total
			No	Yes	
new education level	No formal education	Count	27	3	30
		Expected Count	22.5	7.5	30.0
		% within new education level	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%
	Less than high school	Count	83	21	104
		Expected Count	77.9	26.1	104.0
		% within new education level	79.8%	20.2%	100.0%
	High School	Count	22	15	37
		Expected Count	27.7	9.3	37.0
		% within new education level	59.5%	40.5%	100.0%
	College or Graduate Degree	Count	17	11	28
		Expected Count	21.0	7.0	28.0
		% within new education level	60.7%	39.3%	100.0%
Total	Count	149	50	199	
	Expected Count	149.0	50.0	199.0	
	% within new education level	74.9%	25.1%	100.0%	

$$X^2 = 15.040 \quad df=6 \quad p < 0.05$$

The study findings suggest that the subjects who have a higher level of education are more likely to be influenced by the mosque community ( $X^2 = 27.627 \quad df=1 \quad p < 0.05$ ) (see Table 40). It should be noted that none of the DHKP-C subjects mentioned the impact of the mosque community while only one PKK subject mentioned it. But 80 percent of Turkish Hizbullah subjects stated that the mosque community played an important role in their joining process (see Table 30). So the impact of mosque community is mostly about Turkish Hizbullah subjects.

20.2 percent of elementary school graduates, 40.5 percent of the high school graduates, and 39.3 percent of the college/graduate degree holders

stated that the mosque community played an important role in their socialization process. The impact of the mosque community increases as the education level increases.

## Multinomial Regression Analyses and Findings

Two different multinomial regression analyses were performed in order to explore the controlled effects of the independent variables on subjects' joining process to terrorist organizations. The first two sections below provide descriptive information on the dependent and independent variables that are utilized in both regression models. The following two sections elaborate on the model specifications and discuss model fits. The findings of the regression analyses are explored and briefly discussed in the remaining sections.

### *Dependent variable*

Being a member of terrorist organizations in Turkey served as the dependent variable in the regression models. Being a member of terrorist organization was operationalized in three separate categories; 1= PKK, 2 = DHKP-C, and 3 = Turkish Hizbullah. Subjects who are members of the PKK were coded as "1"; subjects who are members of DHKP-C were coded as "2"; and subjects who are members of Turkish Hizbullah were coded as "3" and used as the dependent variable in the models.

<b>Table 41 : Dependent variable in the models</b>				
<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Coding</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
Being a member of a terrorist organization in Turkey	191	1 = PKK	71	(37.2%)
		2 = DHKP-C	60	(31.4%)
		3 = Turkish Hizbullah	60	(31.4%)

### *Independent variables*

In the regression analyses, ten independent variables were used in order to analyze the important factors in the socialization process of terrorist individuals. Each of these ten independent variables was utilized to test a research hypothesis.

“Number of relatives convicted of terrorism” was measured as the actual numbers of the relatives who had been convicted of terrorism in Turkey.

“Initiation age” was measured in years and the numbers of years were not grouped.

“Education” was measured in years and there was no grouping regarding the number of years spent in education.

The geographical region of birth place was labeled as “region” and coded as follows: “0” = Southeast Anatolia; “1” = Other regions.

The subjects who stated that they were initiated by family members were coded as “1” = Yes; and the other subjects were coded as “0” = No.

The subjects who stated that cultural centers had an important impact on their socialization process were coded as “1” = Yes; and the other subjects were coded as “0” = No.

Table 42 : Independent variables included in the models					
Variable	N		Coding	Mean	Std Dev
Number of relatives convicted terrorism	200		Actual number of convicted relatives	.11	.48
Initiation age	199		Actual initiation age of the subjects	21.88	6.679
Education	199		The number of years spent in education	7.25	4.308
Region	198	0	Southeast Anatolia	1.56	.498
		1	Other Regions		
Initiated by family members	194	0	No	1.91	.283
		1	Yes		
Impact of cultural centers	200	0	No	.28	.450
		1	Yes		
Impact of publications	200	0	No	.58	.496
		1	Yes		
Impact of summer camps	200	0	No	.05	.218
		1	Yes		
Impact of culture	200	0	No	.30	.459
		1	Yes		
Impact of mosque community	200	0	No	.25	.434
		1	Yes		

The subjects who stated that publications had an important impact on their socialization process were coded as “1” = Yes; and the other subjects were coded as “0” = No.

The subjects who stated that summer camps had an important impact on their socialization process were coded as “1” = Yes; and the other subjects were coded as “0” = No.

The subjects who stated that the culture had an important impact on their socialization process were coded as “1” = Yes; and the other subjects were coded as “0” = No.

The subjects who stated that the mosque community had an important impact on their socialization process were coded as “1” = Yes; and the other subjects were coded as “0” = No.

### *Model specification*

“Being a member of a terrorist organization” served as the dependent variable in both regression models. In Model 1, two different reference categories were used. For “Turkish Hizbullah vs PKK” and “Turkish Hizbullah vs DHKP-C” analyses, “Turkish Hizbullah” was selected as the reference category. This first multinomial logit model can be specified as follows:

$$g_1 = \log\left(\frac{P(\text{PKK})}{P(\text{Turkish Hizbullah})}\right) = B_0 + B_1 X_{\text{By family}} + B_2 X_{\text{Convicted relatives}} + B_3 X_{\text{Initiation age}} + B_4 X_{\text{Education}} + B_5 X_{\text{Region}} \\ + B_6 X_{\text{Cultural centers}} + B_7 X_{\text{Publications}} + B_8 X_{\text{Summer camps}} + B_9 X_{\text{Culture}}$$

$$g_2 = \log\left(\frac{P(\text{DHKP-C})}{P(\text{Turkish Hizbullah})}\right) = B_0 + B_1 X_{\text{By family}} + B_2 X_{\text{Convicted relatives}} + B_3 X_{\text{Initiation age}} + B_4 X_{\text{Education}} + B_5 X_{\text{Region}} \\ + B_6 X_{\text{Cultural centers}} + B_7 X_{\text{Publications}} + B_8 X_{\text{Summer camps}} + B_9 X_{\text{Culture}}$$

Again in Model 1, for “DHKP-C vs PKK” analysis, “DHKP-C” was selected as the reference category. This second multinomial logit model can be specified as follows:

$$g_1 = \log\left(\frac{P(\text{PKK})}{P(\text{DHKP-C})}\right) = B_0 + B_1X_{\text{By family}} + B_2X_{\text{Convicted relatives}} + B_3X_{\text{Initiation age}} + B_4X_{\text{Education}} + B_5X_{\text{Region}} \\ + B_6X_{\text{Cultural centers}} + B_7X_{\text{Publications}} + B_8X_{\text{Summer camps}} + B_9X_{\text{Culture}}$$

$$g_2 = \log\left(\frac{P(\text{TurkishHizbullah})}{P(\text{DHKP-C})}\right) = B_0 + B_1X_{\text{By family}} + B_2X_{\text{Convicted relatives}} + B_3X_{\text{Initiation age}} + B_4X_{\text{Education}} + B_5X_{\text{Region}} \\ + B_6X_{\text{Cultural centers}} + B_7X_{\text{Publications}} + B_8X_{\text{Summer camps}} + B_9X_{\text{Culture}}$$

In Model 2, “Turkish Hizbullah” was selected as the reference category like in Model 1, but this time “impact of mosque community” independent variable was added to the analysis. This third multinomial logit model can be specified as follows:

$$g_1 = \log\left(\frac{P(\text{PKK})}{P(\text{TurkishHizbullah})}\right) = B_0 + B_1X_{\text{By family}} + B_2X_{\text{Convicted relatives}} + B_3X_{\text{Initiation age}} + B_4X_{\text{Education}} + B_5X_{\text{Region}} \\ + B_6X_{\text{Cultural centers}} + B_7X_{\text{Publications}} + B_8X_{\text{Summer camps}} + B_9X_{\text{Culture}} + B_{10}X_{\text{Mosque}}$$

$$g_2 = \log\left(\frac{P(\text{DHKP-C})}{P(\text{TurkishHizbullah})}\right) = B_0 + B_1X_{\text{By family}} + B_2X_{\text{Convicted relatives}} + B_3X_{\text{Initiation age}} + B_4X_{\text{Education}} + B_5X_{\text{Region}} \\ + B_6X_{\text{Cultural centers}} + B_7X_{\text{Publications}} + B_8X_{\text{Summer camps}} + B_9X_{\text{Culture}} + B_{10}X_{\text{Mosque}}$$

Table 43 : Percent of cases predicted correctly by the models				
	Percent predicted correct			
	PKK	DHKP-C	Turkish Hizbullah	Overall
Model 1	83.1%	86.7%	71.7%	80.6%
Model 2	88.7%	90.0%	91.7%	90.1%

### *Model fits and predicted probabilities*

Log-likelihood statistics for all of the specified models were significant. In other words, the predictors introduced in the models explained significant amount of variation in the dependent variable (see Tables 45, and 46 for log-likelihood statistics and chi-square tests for each model).

The models offered good fit to the data. Pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> statistics was .717 for Model 1 and it was .798 for Model 3. In other words, the predictors explained 72 percent of the variation in Model 1, and 80 percent of the variation in the dependent variable in Model 2 (see Tables 45, and 46 for Pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> statistics for each model).

The classification table (Table 43) also indicated a good fit. Both models did very good in predicting the distribution of subjects across the levels of dependent variable. For example, Model 1 correctly identified 83.1 percent of the subjects who joined the PKK. In Model 2, the prediction rates were higher. Model 2 correctly identified 88.7 percent of the PKK subjects; 90.0 percent of DHKP-C

subjects; and 91.7 percent of Turkish Hizbullah subjects. Overall prediction rates of three models ranged between 71.7 percent and 91.7 percent.

**Table 44** : Likelihood ratio tests for the multinomial logit models

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
By family members	173.64	173.64	114.99
Number of convicted relatives	177.85 *	177.85	116.44
Initiation age	177.34	177.34 *	117.41
Education	183.30 **	183.30 *	121.98 ***
Region	227.21 ***	227.21 ***	134.18 ***
Impact of cultural centers	178.30 *	178.30 *	111.60
Impact of publications	186.82 **	186.82 **	122.48
Impact of summer camps	175.37	175.37	115.14
Impact of the culture	223.48 ***	223.48 ***	140.43 *
Impact of mosque community	-	-	175.73 ***

“-“ Not included in the model; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Independent variables “education”, “region”, and “impact of culture” were significant in both models. In the first two analyses of Model 1, “number of convicted relatives”, “education”, “region”, “impact of cultural centers”, “impact of publications”, and “impact of culture” were significant. In the third analysis of Model 1 (DHKP-C vs PKK), independent variable “number of convicted relatives”, became insignificant; but “initiation age” became significant (see Table 44). In Model 2, independent variables “number of convicted relatives”, “initiation age”, “impact of cultural centers”, “impact of publications” became insignificant; but “impact of the mosque community” became significant. The third analysis in Model 1 (DHKP-C vs PKK), was needed to show the significance of “initiation age”; and Model 2 was needed to show the significance of “impact of mosque community”.

*Interpretation of multinomial regression tables*

Relatives who are convicted of terrorism play an important role in the joining process of would-be terrorists. Regarding the “number of relatives convicted of terrorism,” the findings in Model 1 indicate that the members of the PKK are significantly different from the members of Turkish Hizbullah. Relative to “Turkish Hizbullah” subjects, leaving all other conditions equal, an increase in the number of convicted relatives increases the likelihood of being a member of the PKK by 3 ( $B= 1.104$ ;  $SE= .488$ ; at the .05 level) (see Table 45). But the same variation between DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah was not significant.

Education level is another important factor in the socialization process of terrorist individuals. Regarding the education level of the subjects, Model 1 indicates significant differences among the organizations. Table 45 shows that, relative to Turkish Hizbullah, for each year increase in the number of years spent in education decreases the likelihood of being a member of the PKK by .779 ( $B= -.250$ ;  $SE= .086$ ; at the .01 level).

The variation regarding the education level of subjects is also significant between DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah. Findings in Table 45 indicate that, relative to Turkish Hizbullah, for each year increase in the number of years spent in education decreases the likelihood of being a member of DHKP-C by .84 ( $B= -.176$ ;  $SE= .073$ ; at the .05 level).

Table 45 : Multinomial logistic regression results for socialization of subjects (Model 1 )											
	Turkish Hizbullah vs PKK			Turkish Hizbullah vs DHKP-C			DHKP-C vs PKK				
	B	SE	Odds ratio	B	SE	Odds ratio	B	SE	Odds ratio		
Intercept	.788	2.359		-4.505	2.319		5.292 *	2.656			
Initiated by family members	.91	1.091	1.096	-1.051	.990	.349	1.143	1.167	3.135		
Number of convicted relatives	1.104*	.488	3.016	-.663	1.139	.515	1.767	1.168	5.854		
Initiation age	-.77	.57	.926	.044	.051	1.045	-.121 *	.55	.886		
Education	-.250**	.086	.779	-.176*	.073	.839	-.074	.085	.928		
Region	1.571*	.708	4.810	3.834***	.672	46.232	-2.263 **	.813	.104		
Impact of cultural centers	1.047	.739	2.849	1.395*	.605	4.034	-.348	.728	.706		
Impact of publications	-2.117**	.711	.120	.447	.743	1.564	-2.564 **	.746	.077		
Impact of summer camps	1.701	1.418	5.482	-.699	1.546	.497	2.400	1.470	11.024		
Impact of the culture	5.103***	1.232	164.552	.519	1.642	1.680	4.584 ***	1.248	97.926		
N = 191											
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = .717											
Log-likelihood = 413.455; X <sup>2</sup> = 241.309; df = 18; p < 0.05											
* p < 0.05    ** p < 0.01    *** p < 0.001											

The reference category is “Turkish Hizbullah” for “Turkish Hizbullah vs PKK” and “Turkish Hizbullah vs DHKP-C”.  
The reference category is “DHKP-C” for “DHKP-C vs PKK”.

In the joining process of terrorists, publications of the terrorist organizations play an important role. Regarding the impact of publications, Model 1 shows significant variation between the organizations. Relative to the members of Turkish Hizbullah, the subjects who were influenced by publications are .120 times less likely to be a member of the PKK compared to the subjects who were not influenced by the publications ( $B = -2.117$ ;  $SE = 1.232$ ; at the .01 level) (see Table 45). But the variation between DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah is not significant.

Model 1 also indicates that the variation between the organizations is significant regarding the “impact of cultural centers”. Relative to Turkish Hizbullah, the subjects who were influenced by the cultural centers are 4.034 times more likely to be a DHKP-C member compared to the subjects who were not influenced by cultural centers ( $B = 1.395$ ;  $SE = .605$ ; at the .05 level) (see Table 45)

Regarding the impact of culture, Model 1 indicates significant variation between the organizations. Relative to Turkish Hizbullah, the subjects who were influenced by the culture in their joining process are 164.552 times more likely to be a member of the PKK compared to the subjects who were not influenced by the culture ( $B = 5.103$ ;  $SE = 1.232$ ; at the .001 level) (see Table 45). The variation between DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah is not significant.

Table 46 : Multinomial logistic regression results for socialization of subjects (Model 2 )							
	PKK			DHKP-C			
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>Odds ratio</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>Odds ratio</i>	
Intercept	-.208	2.863		-5.366	2.991		
Initiated by family members	2.453	1.402	11.625	.687	1.170	1.988	
Number of convicted relatives	.956	.745	2.601	-1.394	1.441	.248	
Initiation age	-.070	.082	.932	.067	.077	1.069	
Education	-.333**	.117	.717	-.244*	.108	.784	
Region	1.091	.923	2.977	3.709***	.920	40.797	
Impact of cultural centers	-.542	.937	.581	-.193	.842	.825	
Impact of publications	-1.599	.919	.202	.978	.938	2.660	
Impact of summer camps	.038	1.481	1.038	-2.431	1.589	.088	
Impact of the culture	2.989*	1.420	19.869	-1.749	1.851	.174	
Impact of mosque community	5.639***	1.496	281.253	6.293***	1.331	541.01	
N = 191							
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = .798							
Log-likelihood = 417.039; X <sup>2</sup> = 305.814; df = 20; p < 0.05							
* p < 0.05    ** p < 0.01    *** p < 0.001							
The reference category is Turkish Hizbullah							

Regarding the “region of the birth place”, Model 1 indicates that the variation is significantly different among the three organizations. Relative to the members of DHKP-C, the subjects who were born in the regions of Turkey other than Southeast Anatolia were .104 times less likely to be a member of the PKK compared to the subjects who were born in Southeast Anatolia ( $B = -2.263$ ;  $SE = .813$ ; at the .01 level) (see Table 45). And relative to the members of DHKP-C, the subjects who were born in the regions of Turkey other than Southeast Anatolia were .022 times less likely to be a member of Turkish Hizbullah compared to the subjects who were born in Southeast Anatolia ( $B = -3.834$ ;  $SE = .672$ ; at the .001 level) (see Table 45).

Regarding the “initiation age” of the subjects, Model 1 indicates significant variance between the organizations. Relative to DHKP-C, for each year increase in the initiation age decreases the likelihood of being a member of the PKK by .886 ( $B = -.121$ ;  $SE = .55$ ; at the .05 level) (see Table 45). But the variation between the PKK members and Turkish Hizbullah members is not significant.

Model 2 indicates that the variation among the organizations is significant regarding the “impact of mosque community”. Relative to Turkish Hizbullah, the subjects who were not influenced by the mosque community in their joining process are 281.3 times more likely to be a PKK member compared to the subjects who were influenced by the mosque community ( $B = 5.639$ ;  $SE = 1.496$ ; at the .001 level) (see Table 46). And relative to Turkish Hizbullah, the subjects who were not influenced by the mosque community in their joining process are 541.01 times more likely to be a DHKP-C member compared to the subjects who were influenced by the mosque community ( $B = 6.293$ ;  $SE = 1.331$ ; at the .001 level) (see Table 46).

Regarding the independent variables “initiation by family members” and “impact of summer camps”, none of the three regression models indicated significant difference.

#### G. Scope and Limitations of the Study

This project was intended to be an exploratory analysis of the demographical characteristics and socialization process of the individuals who were convicted of terrorism in Turkey between 2001 and 2004. Forty percent of

the sample (80 out of 200) are members of the PKK; thirty percent (60 out of 200) are members of the DHKP-C; and thirty percent (60 out of 200) are members of the Turkish Hizbullah. So the study covers a time period of four years, and members of three terrorist organizations. These terrorist organizations were compared in terms of various independent variables.

It should not be anticipated that the sample population of this study represents all individuals who were convicted of terrorism in Turkey. Thousands of individuals have been convicted of terrorism in the last forty years and our sample is only 200 court files. So the findings of this study can not be generalized to all population.

One caveat that should be kept in mind while evaluating the findings of this study is, since forty percent of the sample consists of the members of the PKK, this portion reflects the cultural values, traditions, and family structure of Turkish citizens whose ethnicity is Kurdish. These people have large families; education level is lower than the standards; and they have strong relationships between the relatives. The demographic characteristics and socialization process of Kurdish individuals can be different from the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah.

Another caveat is about the "behavior of Turkish Criminal Justice System". The laws and the behavior of the justice system have been changed in Turkey. That suggests that official definition of terrorism and characteristics of the convicted individuals have been changed. During 1980's there was a military coup in Turkey and the laws were stricter. A person who was convicted of

terrorism at that time most likely would not have been convicted today.

In spite of its limitations, it is expected that this study will assist the reader to understand demographic characteristics and socialization of Turkish terrorists.

#### H. Ethical Considerations

"No harm to the participants" is an important principle in the social science and as Babbie (1998: 439) states; social research should never produce any kind of harm on the people being studied, regardless of whether they volunteer for the study. Since this study used the information collected from the official court files and no human subjects were involved, the researcher does not foresee any kind of physical or psychological harm to any individual.

In order to be considered as "anonymous", a participant should not be identified with the collected information (Babbie, 1998: 440-441). Even though this research does not involve human subjects, the researcher made sure that the findings of this study would not be identified with any specific individual. The individual court files were only represented by numbers and the research did not reveal any names.

Another ethical concern that should be paid attention in social studies is confidentiality. "Confidentiality" can be defined as not to share the information with the others, or not to make it public. Since the researcher used the official court records and they are open to the public, confidentiality is not considered to be of concern in this study.

## Chapter VII. DISCUSSION

### *Initiation by family members*

The findings of this study indicated that 8.8 percent of the sample was initiated by family members; 9.8 percent by relatives; 1.5 percent by lovers; 46.9 percent by friends; 25.3 percent by the members of the terrorist organizations; and 7.7 percent acted on his own (see Table 23). These findings support the findings in the literature (Sageman, 2004). But these findings do not support the first hypothesis that “the members of the PKK are more likely to learn about the organization through a family member compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah”. Regression analyses indicated no significant difference between three terrorist organizations regarding “initiation by family members”. Proportion of members who were introduced to the organizations by family members are not significantly different among the organizations.

### *The role of relatives convicted of terrorism*

The second hypothesis aimed to test impact of the relatives who had been convicted of terrorism on the initiation process. In the second hypothesis it was stated that “the relatives convicted of terrorism play a greater role on the members of the PKK compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah”. Results showed that Turkish Hizbullah has the largest proportion of subjects (8.3 percent) who had convicted relatives; the PKK has the second largest proportion (6.2 percent); and DHKP-C has the smallest proportion of subjects (3.3 percent) who had relatives convicted of terrorism (see Table 19).

Regression analysis indicated that the members of the PKK are significantly different from the members of Turkish Hizbullah (see Table 42) ( $B=1.104$ ;  $SE=.488$ ; at the .05 level).

### *Initiation age*

In the third hypothesis it was argued that “initiation age is expected to be lower among the members of the PKK compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah”. In the research sample, the lowest initiation age is ten and the highest one is fifty nine (see Table 11) while the Mean initiation age is 21.88 (see Table 10).

The findings show that the PKK has a lower initiation age than the other two organizations. Twenty two members (27.8 percent) joined the PKK before the age of eighteen while the number is ten (16.7 percent) for DHKP-C and twelve (20 percent) for Turkish Hizbullah ( see Table 12).

Regression analysis also indicated that initiation age is significantly different among the organizations ( $B = -.121$ ;  $SE = .55$ ; at the .05 level). Therefore third hypothesis was supported by the findings in Tables 10, 11, 12, and multinomial regression results (Table 43).

### *Education*

The fourth hypothesis aimed to explore the differences between the organizations regarding the education level of their members. In the hypothesis it was stated that “the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah are expected to have a higher education level compared to the members of the PKK”.

The findings do show that variations among the organizations are significant. Twenty three PKK members (29.1 percent) have no official degree compared 5 percent of the DHKP-C members and 6.7 percent of the Turkish Hizbullah members (see Table 7). The biggest proportion in the elementary school graduates are PKK members while the biggest proportion in high school graduates are Turkish Hizbullah members. The findings clearly show that the least educated are the PKK members and the best educated are Turkish Hizbullah members.

Regression analyses also indicated that these differences are statistically significant ( $B = -.250$ ;  $SE = .086$ ; at the .01 level). The education level of the PKK subjects is .779 times less than the members of Turkish Hizbullah. Therefore the fourth hypothesis is supported by the findings.

### *Geographical region*

The impact of the geographical region on the socialization process was tested with the fifth hypothesis. In the fifth hypothesis it was argued that “the geographical region plays a greater role on the members of Turkish Hizbullah and the PKK; they are more likely to come from the South East region of Turkey”.

The research findings showed that almost half of the subjects in the sample (45.5 percent) were born in South East Region of Turkey (see Table 5). Regarding the variation among the organizations, it was observed that 73.3 percent of the members of Turkish Hizbullah; 53.8 percent of the PKK members; and only 6.7 percent of DHKP-C members were born in South East Anatolia.

Bivariate analysis results also suggested that 61.7 percent of Kurdish subjects were born in Southeast Region (see Table 34). Kurdish people who were born in East and Southeast parts of Turkey are more likely to be involved in terrorism compared to Kurdish people who were born in other regions of Turkey. But Turkish people who were born in Southeast part of Turkey are not more likely to be involved on terrorism.

Regression results indicated that variation among the organizations regarding geographical region is significant as well. . Relative to the members of DHKP-C, the members of the PKK are .104 times less likely to be born in the regions of Turkey other than Southeast Anatolia ( $B= -2.263$ ;  $SE= .813$ ; at the .01 level). And relative to the members of DHKP-C, the members of Turkish Hizbullah are .022 times less likely to be born in the regions of Turkey other than Southeast Anatolia ( $B= -3.834$ ;  $SE= .672$ ; at the .001 level). Therefore the fifth

hypothesis was supported by the findings in Table 5, 34 and regression results (Table 42).

### *Impact of the mosque community*

The sixth hypothesis was designed to test the impact of the mosque communities on the members of terrorist organizations. In the hypothesis it was argued that “the members of Hizbullah are more likely to be socialized at the mosques compared to the members of the PKK and the DHKP-C”.

The research findings supported the arguments in the literature (Abuza, 2006; Nacos 2006) that in the Muslim world of Southeast Asia kinship, mosque, madrassa, and friendship are the vital elements for the recruitment purposes of terrorist organizations.

The findings of this study suggested that 80.0 percent of Turkish Hizbullah subjects mentioned that the mosque community played very important role in their socialization process (see Table 27). For the PKK the impact was unimportant (only one subject) and for DHKP-C it was zero impact.

Regression analyses also indicated that variation among the organizations is statistically significant regarding the impact of the mosque community. The subjects who were influenced by the mosque community in their joining process .004 times less likely to be a PKK member relative to be a Turkish Hizbullah member ( $B= -5.639$ ;  $SE= 1.496$ ; at the .001 level), and .002 times less likely to be a DHKP-C member relative to be a Turkish Hizbullah member ( $B= -6.293$ ;

$SE= 1.331$ ; at the .001 level). Therefore the sixth hypothesis was supported by findings of this research.

### *Impact of publications*

In the seventh hypothesis it was argued that “the ideological publications play a greater role on the socialization of the members of DHKP-C compared to the members of the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah”.

The arguments in the literature (Mamyak, 1999) were supported by the findings of this study. The findings of this research showed that publications played an important role in the socialization of 57.5 percent of the subjects (see Table 21). The biggest impact of publications is observed on DHKP-C subjects; 85.0 percent of the subjects stated that publications played important role in their socialization process. The second largest proportion is in Turkish Hizbullah subjects; publications played important role for 83.3 percent of Turkish Hizbullah subjects. Among three organizations the least impact of publications is observed on the PKK subjects; publications were important only for 17.5 percent of the PKK subjects in the sample (see Table 21).

Regression results indicated that the PKK is significantly different from DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah, but DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah are close to each other. The subjects who were influenced by publications are .120 times less likely to be a member of the PKK rather than to be a member of Turkish Hizbullah ( $B= -2.117$ ;  $SE= 1.232$ ; at the .01 level). Therefore it can be concluded that the seventh hypothesis is partly supported by the findings of this research.

### *Internet*

The eighth hypothesis was designed to test the impact of internet on the socialization process of subjects. In the hypothesis it was argued that “in the socialization process, the Internet is more likely to have an impact on the members of DHKP-C and the PKK compared to the impact on the members of Turkish Hizbullah”.

The findings of this study did not support the arguments in the literature (Gruen, 2006; Weimann 2006). In the sample only one subject (.5 percent) stated that internet played the biggest role in his process of joining DHKP-C (see Table 23). None of the PKK members or Turkish Hizbullah members mentioned the impact of the internet.

Although this hypothesis was not supported by the findings, the researcher believes that the impact of internet on the socialization process of individuals is greater than reflected in the sample of this study. Turkey has the third youngest population in the world, and these young people are using internet to a large extent. In the near future the internet definitely will play a more important role for the likely terrorists.

### *Summer camps*

The ninth hypothesis was designed to test the impact of summer camps on the socialization process of subjects. In the hypothesis it was argued that “the summer camps play a greater role on the socialization of the members of the PKK compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah”.

Findings in Table 28 indicate that 10 percent of the PKK subjects stated that summer camps played major role in their socialization processes while none of the DHKP-C or Turkish Hizbullah members mentioned the impact of summer camps. Although these findings show support for this hypothesis none of the regression models indicated significant difference among the three organizations.

### *Culture*

The last hypothesis of this research aimed to test the impact of culture on the socialization of members of the organizations. In the hypothesis it was stated that “the members of the PKK are more likely to be influenced by the culture compared to the members of the DHKP-C and Turkish Hizbullah”.

The findings supported both the hypothesis and the arguments in the literature (Besikci,1993; Ciyayi, 2002). According to findings, 72.5 percent of the PKK subjects stated that culture played important role in their socialization process (see Table 26). Only one (1.7 percent) DHKP-C subject experienced the impact of culture while none of Turkish Hizbullah subjects mentioned the impact of culture.

Bivariate analyses results indicated that there is a significant relationship between the culture and ethnicity for the PKK subjects; but this result is not the same for Turkish Hizbullah subjects even though majority if its members are also Kurdish (see Table 37).

Regression analysis in Model 1 indicates significant variation among the organizations. The subjects how were influenced by the culture in their joining processes are 164.552 times more likely to be a member of the PKK rather than

to be a member of Turkish Hizbullah ( $B= 5.103$ ;  $SE= 1.232$ ; at the .001 level).

Thus findings in Tables 26, 37 and 42 strongly support this hypothesis.

## Chapter VIII. CONCLUSION

After September 11, new but similar attacks took place in Istanbul, Madrid and London, and terrorism has gained new dimensions as “new terrorism”, “modern terrorism”, or “global network terrorism”. This new image of terrorism has been much more destructive, more invisible and difficult to detect, and more difficult to respond. Studies took different approaches while they were approaching this giant escalation of evolving threat.

Some researchers focused on the definition of this phenomenon; why certain acts are considered terrorism and others are not (Hoffman, 2002; Ahmad 2002). Some other researchers examined why terrorism took place and what are the underlying reasons behind terrorism (Crenshaw, 2002). And some others took more practical approaches to understand this new global network and develop effective prevention policies.

One part of those terrorism studies is the theory; without the proper theoretical explanation of the problem the understanding of terrorism would not

be considered complete. Rational choice theory was utilized in some of the studies to explain the terrorist behavior (Crenshaw, 2002; Dugan, et al., 2005). Strain theory provided the theoretical background in some other studies (Ahmad, 2002).

Although social learning theory is considered one of the most frequently tested and endorsed theories (Akers & Sellers, 2004), it was mostly tested in delinquency field. Researchers did not attempt to utilize social learning theory to construct theoretical framework of their terrorism studies. The only study that the researcher was able to find was by Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005). In their study Hamm & Van De Voorde (2005) took routine activity perspective and social learning theory to analyze terrorist involvement in a variety of crimes. In this study social learning approach was utilized to explain how terrorists acquire necessary skills to turn opportunity into criminality.

The researcher of this study strongly believes that differential association theory and social learning theory are of vital importance to understand and explain terrorism phenomenon. As Atran (2006) puts it what makes terrorists different from many other people are “group dynamics” or socialization process and without understanding these group dynamics terrorism can not be prevented.

This study was designed to utilize differential association theory and social learning theory as the theoretical framework. The important factors on the socialization process of Turkish individuals that lead them to join terrorist organizations were identified and explained according to principles of these two theories.

Since the previous research showed that “legal documents, captured information, and intercepted conversations” entered into trial evidence and court transcripts are more reliable because they are subjected to cross examination (Atran & Sageman, 2006); official court files of two hundred subjects were used in this study. They were members of three different terrorist organizations (the PKK, the DHKP-C, and Turkish Hizbullah) and they were convicted of terrorism between the years of 2001 and 2004.

The findings of this study showed that 46.9 percent of the subjects were initiated by friends; 9.8 percent by relatives; 8.8 percent by family members; and 1.5 percent by lovers (see Table 23). These findings support the findings in the literature and support the principles of the social learning theory and differential association theory. The finding also indicated the significant differences between the three terrorist organizations regarding the socialization process of their members.

It was important to utilize social learning theory to explain socialization process of terrorists and support the theory and the explanation with reliable data (Silke, 2001). It was important to use advanced statistical methods in the researches of terrorism like in the other fields of social science (Schmid & Jongman, 1988). This study aimed to be a pioneer in this field. It is hoped that this study will be an example for the future studies that will utilize social learning theory to explain terrorism. And it is also hoped that this study will open new avenues of terrorism studies in Turkey.

### *Methodological Implications of the Study*

The data required for the purpose of this study was obtained from the legal documents. It was the right choice to use official records in this study. Unlike open sources, legal documents are subject to cross examination, and at times they contain the statements of the previous terrorists, captured information, and wiretapped communications. The researcher believes that it would have not been possible to depict socialization of those individuals this much if the legal documents were not used.

Although generalization of findings may create problems, the sample was the right selection for the purposes of this study. The number of the subjects was enough to apply statistical methods; the subjects were selected randomly; and the time period was quite recent.

Some of the independent variables did not explain much in this study. One example is the “impact of the internet”. The internet had impact on the socialization of only one subject, and for all the other subjects it had no impact at all. Another example is the “impact of the TV”. None of the subjects stated that the TV had an impact on their socialization process. Those independent variables may not have been used for the purposes of this study.

### *Theoretical Implications of the Study*

As emphasized in the literature, what makes terrorists different from other individuals is the group dynamics, and their socialization process. The findings of this study showed that 46.9 percent of the subjects were initiated by friends; 9.8

percent by relatives; 8.8 percent by family members; and 1.5 percent by lovers (see Table 23). These findings support the findings in the literature and support the principles of the social learning theory and differential association theory. The researcher believes that it was the right choice to apply differential association theory and social learning theory in this study; and those theories explained a significant portion of the socialization of the members of the terrorist organizations.

The researcher would like to point out some of the findings of this study that can be an interesting topic for the future research. The findings of this study showed that 85.5 % of the subjects are lower class individuals, and additionally the average number of the siblings that the subjects have is 6.95. These findings show that most of the subjects are deprived from enough economic opportunities. The researcher believes that this issue could be a good topic for the future research, and strain theories could be applied as the theoretical framework of this research.

## **Policy Recommendations**

### *Law enforcement side*

The literature and this research indicated the major role of group dynamics and socialization process of terrorists. Members of the terrorist organizations are just ordinary people who are shaped in their socialization process. Profiling individuals are not enough to prevent future terrorist attacks. Law enforcement agencies should develop new policies to be able to prevent possible attacks.

One important issue about the new policies is databases that are used by laws enforcement agencies. Atran & Sageman (2006) pointed out that the current databases are incident-based catalogs of names and events; they provide information to explain who, what, where, and when; but they don't provide information on "why" (p. 68). Instead they suggest a new type of database that rely on legal documents, captured information, and wiretapped communications.

Atran & Sageman (2006: 68) created their own database which consists of two parts. The first part is a detailed categorization of basic biographical and socioeconomic information, including nationality, ethnicity, occupation, and religious upbringing. The second part includes the vast network of connections—the glue that holds the diverse array of terrorists together—and includes data on acquaintances, family ties, friendships, and venues for terrorist training.

Turkish National Police can create a similar database for its own terrorism prevention strategies. In November 2003, four suicide attacks took place in one week in Istanbul and claimed more than fifty lives. It was the first al-Qaeda attack in Turkey and it created a shock in Turkey. Even though TNP was very successful in arresting all the perpetrators who did not leave Turkey in two weeks; the major problem was lack of a database that can provide useful information.

The researcher strongly believes that new database can be developed by TNP and law enforcement agencies of other countries and sharing these databases would be a valuable source in prevention strategies.

### *Education / Schools*

The literature indicated that friendships that are developed at the schools and teachers play an important role in the socialization process of terrorists (Abuza, 2006; Nacos, 2006; Pedahzur, 2005). The researcher does not believe that the situation is as worse as the situation in Southeast Asia regarding education and terrorism. In Turkey education is secular and madrassas are banned by the laws. But still schools are important in the socialization process of would-be terrorists. In Turkey many students dropped out of the school and joined the terrorist camps on the mountains.

A joint program between TNP, Department of Justice, and Department of Education would be very helpful to provide the students information about the danger that is expecting them. If the students can be approached by these institutions before they are approached by their terrorist friends, the number of students who join terrorist organizations due to their friendships will be reduced to an important extent.

### *Corrections / Rehabilitation*

Although several studies pointed out the role of prisons as breeding grounds of terrorism (Atran et al. 2006; Waller, 2006); this study indicated that it is not the case in Turkey. Only 3.5 percent of the subjects stated that prison played an important role in their joining process (Table 31).

But Turkish prisons are important for rehabilitation of terrorists. Since the group dynamics and socialization processes are important in initiation process, they are important in the rehabilitation process as well. Department of Justice

can create new policies to prevent terrorism convicts to socialize with other terrorism convicts. And furthermore a positive socialization environment can be created for terrorism convicts at certain prisons. Any socialization program would be better than socializing with other terrorist for the purposes of rehabilitation.

### **Future Research**

Since Turkey has been dealing with terrorism for more than forty years, the raw data on terrorism are abundant in this country. The missing elements are “research in rigorous sense” and “use of inferential statistical methods” as indicated in the literature (Silke, 2001; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). More research is needed on Turkish terrorism that can combine both theory and statistically analyzed data. This type of new research will help to understand whether the findings of current research can be generalized to a large extent. Especially further research that conducted together with western co-researchers will help to carry raw terrorism data to international academic field may reflect the terrorism experience of Turkey.

Application of social learning and differential association theory is another important concern of the future research. As indicated in the literature group dynamics, socialization process, and associations of the individuals play a crucial role (Atran, 2006; Sageman 2006). Use of these theories in further research will help to understand new dynamics of terrorism, and to develop new prevention policies that can be more effective to counter upcoming terrorist attacks.

## Summary

In every society, in every period of the history, one can find dissatisfied individuals. Those dissatisfied individuals exist because of two reasons. The first reason is the individuals who hold the power in the society, who hold administrative positions, who have more capacity to change the lives of other individuals are not perfect; they make errors. Judges convict innocent individuals wrongfully; police officers arrest the wrong person; professors give wrong grades, etc. Because of the errors that are made by the individuals who hold power, some other individuals in the same society are victimized. They become dissatisfied, or even angry as a result of the actions of the government, judiciary, or legislation.

The second reason is the problem is not only the errors, but also the intentions of the individuals who hold the power in the society. They do not only make errors, but also they abuse the power that they hold. They abuse their power to gain more wealth, to provide benefits to their relatives, to remain longer in the position, or just to maintain control over others. This abuse creates dissatisfied individuals in return.

Some of those dissatisfied individuals choose the violent way to express their opinions. And some of those violent ones opt for terrorism to effectuate some changes in the society. Due to those reasons one may argue that we will always have terrorism.

However, another side of the story is interaction and socialization of those dissatisfied individuals. How do they learn about the problems and solutions?

What is the meaning of subcultures? What is the meaning of being born in a violent environment? Do people reach conclusions by themselves or their opinions are shaped in a social process?

The story in this research is about the socialization process of Turkish individuals who became members of the terrorist organizations. A close look at the issue will reveal that those individuals are not very different from the average Turkish citizens. What makes them different is the socialization process that they go through before they join the organization. Their friends, their mosque community, their cultural environment, or the magazines that they read.

For the terrorism researchers this study opens some new research venues that can provide new insights to the issue. The violent culture in the Southeast part of Turkey may be a good topic to study. The issue of high number of siblings accompanied by the low economic status can be another interesting angle to pursue for future researchers.

Policy makers do not have the luxury of ignoring the socialization process of those individuals. The new policies cannot be successful unless they intervene in this process and divert individuals before they enter the slippery slope.

Dynamics of the groups have the greatest impact on the individuals who are likely to become members of terrorist organizations; and those dynamics should be the focal point of researchers, policy makers, and law enforcement agencies in their quest to prevent and deal with terrorism.

**Data Collection Format**

1. Organization:
  - a) The PKK
  - b) The DHKP-C
  - c) The Turkish Hizbullah
2. Age:
3. Sex:
  - a) Female
  - b) Male
4. Ethnicity:
  - a) Turkish
  - b) Kurdish
5. Birth place:
6. Type of birth place
  - a) Village
  - b) Town
  - c) City
  - d) Big city
7. Education level:
  - a) Elementary school
  - b) Secondary school
  - c) High school
  - d) College
  - e) Masters
  - f) Ph.D.

8. Number of siblings
  - a) 1
  - b) 2
  - c) 3
  - d) 4
  - e) 5
  - f) more than 5
9. Marital status:
  - a) Single
  - b) Married
  - c) Divorced
  - d) Separated
10. Profession:
11. Occupation:
12. Economic status:
  - a) Lower
  - b) Lower middle
  - c) Middle
  - d) Upper level
13. Parents' economic status:
  - a) Lower
  - b) Lower middle
  - c) Middle

- d) Upper middle
- 14. Father's profession:
- 15. Father's occupation:
- 16. Mother's profession:
- 17. Mother's occupation:
- 18. Prior arrest by:
  - a) Turkish National Police
  - b) Turkish Gendarmerie.
- 19. Prior arrest due to:
  - a) Terrorism
  - b) Ordinary crime
- 20. Prior conviction:
  - a) Convicted of terrorist activities
  - b) Convicted of ordinary criminal conduct
- 21. Initiated to organization by:
  - a) Family member
  - b) Friend
  - c) Lover
  - d) Relative
  - e) Employer.
- 22. If initiated to organization by a family member:
  - a) Father
  - b) Mother

- c) Brother
  - d) Sister
  - e) Spouse
23. If initiated to organization by a relative:
- a) Aunt
  - b) Uncle
  - c) Cousin
  - d) Grand parents
24. Initiation age:
25. Length of time in the organization:
26. Number of family members convicted of terrorism:
- a) 1
  - b) 2
  - c) 3
  - d) More than 3
27. Number of relatives convicted of terrorism:
- a) 1
  - b) 2
  - c) 3
  - d) More than 3
28. Number of family members killed in terrorist events:
- a) 1
  - b) 2

- c) 3
  - d) More than 3
29. Number of relatives killed in terrorist events:
- a) 1
  - b) 2
  - c) 3
  - d) More than 3
30. Prior terrorist organization:
- a) The PKK
  - b) The DHKP-C
  - c) The Turkish Hizbullah
  - d) Others
31. Learning about the organization - publications have an impact:
- a) Yes
  - b) No
  - c) If yes - explain
32. Learning about the organization - TV has an impact:
- a) Yes
  - b) No
  - c) If yes - explain
33. Learning about the organization - the Internet has an impact:
- a) Yes
  - b) No

- c) If yes - explain
34. Learning about the organization - cultural centers (including publishing centers) have an impact:
- a) Yes
  - b) No
  - c) If yes - explain
35. Learning about the organization - summer camps have an impact:
- a) Yes
  - b) No
  - c) If yes - explain
36. Learning about the organization- the culture has an impact:
- a) Yes
  - b) No
  - c) If yes – explain
37. Learning about the organization – mosque community have an impact:
- a) Yes
  - b) No
  - c) If yes – explain
38. Learning about the organization – prison has an impact
- a) Yes
  - b) No
  - c) If yes - explain

## List of attacks by the PKK<sup>3</sup>

<b>Date:</b> Jul 24, 1999	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Bombing
<b>Target Type:</b> Civilian	<b>Location:</b> Istanbul, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 1 <b>Injured:</b> 24

**Details:** One person was killed and 24 wounded, five of them seriously, when a bomb went off in an Istanbul park in the Avclar quarter. The bomb was placed in a trash can and detonated at 10:30 p.m. Sunday night.

<b>Date:</b> Jul 20, 1999	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Shooting	
<b>Target Type:</b> Civilian	<b>Location:</b> Caglayan, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 1 <b>Injured:</b> 7	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b> 4

**Details:** A 49-year-old man was killed and seven people wounded when a group of suspected Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels opened fire on an open-air restaurant in Caglayan town.

<b>Date:</b> Apr 9, 1999	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Suicide Bomb	
<b>Target Type:</b> Government Personnel	<b>Location:</b> Yuksekoa, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 2 <b>Injured:</b> 4	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b> 1

**Details:** A suicide bomber threw himself in front of a provincial governor's car in southern Turkey, killing himself and the driver of the car. Hakkari province governor Nihat Canpolat was injured in the attack, along with a paramilitary police chief and a bodyguard. Several bystanders were also injured.

<sup>3</sup> Source: The Institute for Counter-Terrorism ( <http://www.ict.org.il/> )

<b>Date:</b>	<b>Organization:</b>	<b>Attack Type:</b>	
Dec 24, 1998	Kurdistan Worker's Party	Suicide Bomb	
<b>Target Type:</b>	<b>Location:</b>	<b>Casualties:</b>	<b>Number of</b>
Military Personnel	Van, Turkey	<b>Killed:</b> 1	<b>Terrorists Involved:</b>
		<b>Injured:</b> 22	1

**Details:** A woman set off a bomb outside of an army barracks in east Turkey, killing herself and a passer-by. Security officials said twenty-two people, including 14 soldiers were injured in the blast. No organization claimed immediately responsibility but the Kurdish television channel said the Separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was behind the explosion.

<b>Date:</b>	<b>Organization:</b>	<b>Attack Type:</b>	
Dec 1, 1998	Kurdistan Worker's Party	Suicide Bomb	
<b>Target Type:</b>	<b>Location:</b>	<b>Casualties:</b>	<b>Number of</b>
Marketplace	Lice, Turkey	<b>Killed:</b> 1	<b>Terrorists Involved:</b>
		<b>Injured:</b> 14	1

**Details:** A Kurdish woman blew herself up in a suicide attack in the Turkish town of Lice. Fourteen people were injured in the attack, which took place at small supermarket frequented by Turkish soldiers. Though it wasn't immediately clear how many of the injured were soldiers, at least some of the casualties were civilians, including a child.

[More information](#)

<b>Date:</b>	<b>Organization:</b>	<b>Attack Type:</b>	
Nov 27, 1998	Kurdistan Worker's Party	Bombing	
<b>Target Type:</b>	<b>Location:</b>	<b>Casualties:</b>	
Bus	Kirikkale, Turkey	<b>Killed:</b> 4	
		<b>Injured:</b> 17	

**Details:** A bomb exploded on a bus in central Turkey, killing four passengers and injuring seventeen. The bomb, apparently operated by a timer, was hidden in the luggage rack above the bus door. It went off just after midnight when the Istanbul-bound bus was about 14 km from the town of Kirikkale, east of Ankara.

[More information](#)

<b>Date:</b> Nov 17, 1998	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Suicide Bomb	
<b>Target Type:</b> Police Facility/Personnel	<b>Location:</b> Yuksekoa, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 1 <b>Injured:</b> 6	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b> 1

**Details:** A PKK suicide bomber killed herself with a bomb strapped to her body. The blast wounded 6 people outside of a police station in southeast Turkey. The attack came as a response to the arrest in Italy of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

[More information](#)

<b>Date:</b> Oct 30, 1998	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Hijacking	
<b>Target Type:</b> Aircraft	<b>Location:</b> Adana, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 1 <b>Injured:</b> 0	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b> 1

**Details:** A Turkish airliner carrying 34 passengers and 6 crew members was hijacked after taking off from Adana. The hijacking ended in Ankara early Friday morning when an elite Turkish anti-terrorist team stormed the plane and killed the hijacker. None of the passengers were hurt.

[More information](#)

<b>Date:</b> Jun 3, 1998	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Kidnapping	
<b>Target Type:</b> Civilian	<b>Location:</b> Agri, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 0	

**Details:** Armed PKK militants kidnapped a German tourist and a Turkish truck driver at a roadblock in Agri. The German tourist was found unharmed the next morning near the site of the kidnapping, but the truck driver is still missing.

<b>Date:</b> Jun 1, 1998	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Shooting	
<b>Target Type:</b> Police Facility/Personnel	<b>Location:</b> Near Iraqi border, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 10 <b>Injured:</b> 0	

**Details:** Rebels killed ten members of a village guard militia in a clash near the mountainous Iraqi border.

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<b>Date:</b> Apr 10, 1998	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Incendiary Device	
<b>Target Type:</b> Tourist Site	<b>Location:</b> Istanbul, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 9	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b> 2

**Details:** Two members of the PKK threw an explosive device into a park near the Blue Mosque in Istanbul, injuring two Indian tourists, one New Zealander, four Turkish civilians, and two Turkish soldiers. Two PKK members suspected of the attack were arrested by security forces on 12 April 1998.

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<b>Date:</b> Oct 13, 1997	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Kidnapping	
<b>Target Type:</b> Civilian	<b>Location:</b> , Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 1 <b>Injured:</b> 0	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b> 9

**Details:** Nine PKK terrorists kidnaped two Bulgarian and one Turkish engineers from a coal mine. The Turkish engineer was found dead, but the Bulgarians were released unharmed on 16 October.

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<b>Date:</b> Mar 25, 1997	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Arson	
<b>Target Type:</b> Civilian	<b>Location:</b> The Hague, Netherlands	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 6 <b>Injured:</b> 0	

**Details:** Suspected members or sympathizers of the Turkish Grey Wolves organization or the PKK set a fire at a home in a predominantly Turkish neighborhood in The Hague, killing a mother and her five children, and causing extensive damage.

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<b>Date:</b> Mar 21, 1997	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Bombing	
<b>Target Type:</b> Restaurant	<b>Location:</b> Bad Vilbel, Germany	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 1	

**Details:** Suspected members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) detonated an improvised explosive device next to propane/butane gas tanks outside a Turkish-owned fast food restaurant in Bad Vilbel, injuring one person and causing extensive damage.

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<b>Date:</b> Jan 21, 1997	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Kidnapping	
<b>Target Type:</b> Civilian	<b>Location:</b> Atrush refugee camp, Iraq	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 0	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b> 400

**Details:** At the Atrush refugee camp approximately 400 militants took 1,500 Turkish male refugees hostage and fled to nearby Garo mountain after the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) closed the camp. There are approximately 5,000 to 8,000 persons remaining at the camp. UNHCR and Turkish Government officials believe the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is responsible.

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<b>Date:</b> Jul 12, 1996	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Kidnapping	
<b>Target Type:</b> Office	<b>Location:</b> Vienna, Austria	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 0	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b> 4

**Details:** Four Kurdish militants occupied a Reuters news agency office in Vienna and held two employees hostage for several hours before surrendering. The attackers are suspected Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) sympathizers.

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<b>Date:</b> Aug 20, 1995	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Incendiary Device	
<b>Target Type:</b> Civilian	<b>Location:</b> Paris, France	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 6	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b> 3

**Details:** Assailants threw a molotov cocktail at a building in Paris that housed a Turkish sporting and cultural association, injuring six persons and causing minor damage. Witnesses reported seeing three people flee the scene. The Kurdistan Workers' Party may be responsible for the attack.

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<b>Date:</b> Jul 13, 1995	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Kidnapping	
<b>Target Type:</b> Tourist	<b>Location:</b> Siirt, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 0	

**Details:** Kurdish separatists abducted a Japanese tourist at a rebel checkpoint near Siirt. No demands were made, and the kidnappers released the hostage unharmed on 17 July. The Kurdistan Workers' Party is suspected.

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<b>Date:</b>	<b>Organization:</b>	<b>Attack Type:</b>	
Apr 22, 1995	Kurdistan Worker's Party	Shooting	
<b>Target Type:</b>	<b>Location:</b>	<b>Casualties:</b>	<b>Number of Terrorists Involved:</b>
Civilian	The Hague, Netherlands	<b>Killed:</b> 2 <b>Injured:</b> 0	4

**Details:** Two Turkish citizens were shot by Kurdish extremists at a coffeehouse in The Hague. Four men were arrested in connection with the attack.

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<b>Date:</b>	<b>Organization:</b>	<b>Attack Type:</b>	
Jun 21, 1994	Kurdistan Worker's Party	Bombing	
<b>Target Type:</b>	<b>Location:</b>	<b>Casualties:</b>	
Tourist	Fethiye and Marmaris, Turkey	<b>Killed:</b> 1 <b>Injured:</b> 10	

**Details:** In the coastal towns of Fethiye and Marmaris, bombs killed one foreign national and injured 10 others at tourist sites. German television stated that the PKK had claimed responsibility for the attacks.

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<b>Date:</b>	<b>Organization:</b>	<b>Attack Type:</b>	
Apr 2, 1994	Kurdistan Worker's Party	Bombing	
<b>Target Type:</b>	<b>Location:</b>	<b>Casualties:</b>	
Marketplace	Istanbul, Turkey	<b>Killed:</b> 2 <b>Injured:</b> 17	

**Details:** The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) claimed responsibility for bombing IC Bedesten, the old Bazaar at the Center of the bazaar complex in Istanbul. Two foreign tourists, one Belgian and one Spanish were killed and 17 others were injured.

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<b>Date:</b>	<b>Organization:</b>	<b>Attack Type:</b>	
Mar 27, 1994	Kurdistan Worker's Party	Bombing	
<b>Target Type:</b>	<b>Location:</b>	<b>Casualties:</b>	
Building	Istanbul, Turkey	<b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 3	

**Details:** A bomb detonated in the gardens of the Saint Sophia Mosque and museum in Istanbul, injuring three tourists: one German, one Spanish and one Dutch. The Metropole Revenge Team of the political wing of the PKK, claimed responsibility.

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<b>Date:</b> Nov 4, 1993	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Incendiary Device
<b>Target Type:</b> Building	<b>Location:</b> Six Western European Countries, Europe	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 1 <b>Injured:</b> 20

**Details:** The PKK made a second round of co-ordinated attacks against Turkish Diplomatic and commercial facilities in Six Western European countries. The assaults consisted mainly of firebombings and vandalism, but one person was killed and about 20 people were injured.

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<b>Date:</b> Jul 5, 1993	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Kidnapping
<b>Target Type:</b> Tourist	<b>Location:</b> Turkey, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 0

**Details:** In eight separate incidents within this period, the PKK kidnapped a total of 19 Western tourists travelling in southeastern Turkey. The hostages, including U.S. citizen Colin Patrick Starger, were released unharmed after spending several weeks in captivity.

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<b>Date:</b> Jun 27, 1993	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Handgrenade
<b>Target Type:</b> Tourist	<b>Location:</b> Antalya, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 28

**Details:** Terrorists threw handgrenades at a number of hotels and restaurants frequented by tourists in the Mediterranean resort area of Antalya. Twelve foreigners were among the 28 persons injured. Earlier, on 9th June, PKK leader , Abdallah Oealan, threatened that his group would start to use violence against tourist facilities in Western Turkey.

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<b>Date:</b> Jun 24, 1993	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Vandalism
<b>Target Type:</b> Diplomat	<b>Location:</b> Western Europe, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 0

**Details:** Terrorists from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) staged a wave of Terrorists from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) staged a wave of coordinated attacks in more than 30 cities in six Western European countries. The attacks consisted primarily of vandalism against Turkish diplomatic and commercial targets and included the take-over of one Turkish consulate.

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<b>Date:</b> Sep 9, 1992	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Shooting
<b>Target Type:</b> Pipeline/Powerline	<b>Location:</b> Batman, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 0

**Details:** Probable Kurdistan Workers Party terrorists attacked the Mobil exploration site near the city of Batman. Several non-American workers were wounded.

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<b>Date:</b> Aug 23, 1989	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Bombing
<b>Target Type:</b> Embassy	<b>Location:</b> Istanbul, Turkey	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 0 <b>Injured:</b> 0

**Details:** A bomb exploded near the Israeli Consulate, causing no damage or injuries. The Armed People's Unit, associated with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) claimed responsibility for the attack. Prior to the attack the Israeli Consulate received several anonymous calls threatening to avenge the abduction of Sheikh Obeid.

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<b>Date:</b> Apr 1, 1988	<b>Organization:</b> Kurdistan Worker's Party	<b>Attack Type:</b> Bombing
<b>Target Type:</b> Diplomat	<b>Location:</b> Paris, France	<b>Casualties:</b> <b>Killed:</b> 1 <b>Injured:</b> 0

**Details:** The Kurdish National Liberation Front, affiliated with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) claimed responsibility for the shooting to death of the West German consular affairs attach in Paris.

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