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Justa, Francine Cyvia

**EFFECTS OF HOUSING ABANDONMENT, RESETTLEMENT PROCESSES,
AND DISPLACEMENT ON THE EVOLUTION OF VOLUNTARY COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATIONS IN PARK SLOPE, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK**

City University of New York

Ph.D. 1984

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THE EVOLUTION OF VOLUNTARY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS
IN PARK SLOPE, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

by

Francine C. Justa

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York.

1984

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

EFFECTS OF HOUSING ABANDONMENT, RESETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND DISPLACEMENT ON THE EVOLUTION OF VOLUNTARY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS IN PARK SLOPE, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

by

Francine C. Justa

Adviser: Professor Maxine Wolfe

In an attempt to make concrete linkages between changing neighborhoods and political economy, this longitudinal case study of an urban neighborhood of 60,000 people addresses the relationships between the transformations of older American cities translated into housing policy and processes of neighborhood abandonment, resettlement, and displacement. Employing a multi-methodological approach, the study follows the evolution and development of 20 community organizations over eight years. Five types of groups emerged to represent different class interests--improvement, mandated, redistributive-issue, ideological and improvement/redistributive-issue. The emergence of group interests followed historical and geographical patterns of accelerating gentrification.

Improvement groups attempted to attract investment interest to encourage resettlement by young urban professionals. Those local groups "mandated" by government experienced significant shifts in membership, leadership, and content of issues as blue-collar ethnic institutions

became fragmented and white-collar professional institutions grew. Redistributive-issue tenant organizations attempted to protect the rights of minorities and low- and moderate-income renters in a predominantly low-rise neighborhood where rent protection statutes were weak and enforcement lax. As gentrification progressed, ideological groups emerged to articulate inequities that they believed were supported by private-market processes and government action. Finally, improvement/redistributive-issue organizations tried, unsuccessfully, to support rehabilitation and improvement without displacement.

The study argues that the success of improvement interests and the failure of redistributive action can be understood partially in terms of the transformation of older American cities, and the consequent shifts in the role of a neighborhood in the political economy of a city. The current redefinition of urban problems in terms of accumulation and realization has resulted in 1) patterns of decreased funding for redistributive agendas; 2) attempts to undermine the legitimacy of redistributive action; 3) a willingness of the disadvantaged to identify with aspirations of urban professionals to their own detriment; and 4) a widening of cleavages between tenant and homeowners, promoted through government tax policies.

Preface

The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it is an attempt to place local processes of neighborhood change within a broader context that includes 1) the changing role of older American cities within the national economy; and 2) processes of government intervention in the neighborhood housing market. Second, it is an attempt to understand structural and dynamic relationships between the processes of urban neighborhood change and the community organizations that mediate those changes.

This work spanned a decade: eight years of research and two additional years of writing. The list of those to whom I am indebted is long indeed. First and foremost, I am deeply indebted and grateful to my family, Moe and Sarah, without whose devotion, love, and strength, this work could not have been finished.

Second, I want to thank the residents of the Park Slope community who shared their experiences and perceptions with me. They include Pete Albanese, Carolyn Bninski, Ann Burris, Doris Clark, Pat Conway, Sarah Cromer, Steve DiBrienza, John Duda, Milton Forman, Cathy Herman, Lauree Hickok, Loretta Mau, Victor Maldonado, Peter Morisi, John Noonan, Dorothy Quisenbury, Rebecca Reich, Henry Terjen, Frank Torres, Ann Thompson, Bill Schroeder, Lorna Zimmerman and countless others.

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Finally, I dedicate this work to the memory of Robert Schur and Anna Bruno. They never knew one another. They probably would not have been friends. Casualties of the same war, they fought their battles on different fronts, and for different reasons. Their struggles moved many, and I am enriched to have known them.

Francine C. Justa

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Chapter 1

Introduction

I. Problem Statement

A. Background: Neighborhood Change and Urban Policy

In the last three decades, many urban neighborhoods in large, older cities of the United States have suffered progressive housing decay and abandonment, commercial deterioration, decreases in population, and the disintegration of local social institutions (Bradbury et al., 1982; Connolly, 1979; Sternlieb et al., 1974; Women's City Club of New York, 1977). This dramatic decline of the urban neighborhood has been occurring as large corporations withdraw production capital from these cities (Angotti, 1977; Harvey, 1977, 1975), and as financial institutions disinvest in the softening markets traditionally housing working-class, minority, and unemployed populations (Case, 1972; The Center for New Corporate Priorities, 1975; Chicago Urban League, 1977; D.C. Public Interest Research Group, 1975; Devine, Winston, and Sims, 1975; National Commission on Neighborhoods, 1979; New York Public Interest Research Group, 1977; Schafer, 1978). Public policy, in its primary role to stimulate and support the activities of the private sector (Harloe, 1977; Lake, 1979; O'Connor, 1973) subsidized movement out of the cities by providing housing and infrastructure subsidies as well as liberal credit programs for suburban residential development (Grisby, 1966). At the

same time, the Federal Housing Authority initiated restrictive lending policies in minority or racially mixed urban neighborhoods through the late 1960s (Bradford, 1979).

In recent years, some urban neighborhoods that were suffering from decay have been resettled by young, white, middle- and upper-income single people and childless couples (Levy and McGrath, 1979; Sumka, 1979). In this process, however, those who cannot afford the housing costs that predominate in rehabilitated newly fashionable urban neighborhoods--namely, the poor and populations of moderate income--are being displaced (Gale, 1979; Goldfield, 1980; Grier and Grier, 1981; Hartman, 1979; LeGates and Hartman, 1981). This displacement is occurring as these large older cities become transformed from industrial to corporate centers. Cities that serve as administrative centers require a white-collar and service institution employment base rather than a much larger blue-collar work force (Lipton, 1977; Tobier, 1979). Local city government, operating with the reduced tax base that results from the loss of production capital and middle and upper-income residents, and having a diminished ability to provide services, becomes necessarily supportive of rehabilitative interests in the private sector. In New York City, for instance, subsidies for private-sector development include low-interest loans, tax abatements, project planning by government agencies, and the use of city powers of eminent domain (New York City Planning Commission, 1980).

Attempting to remediate problems of displacement that result from the private reinvestment mechanisms initiated by government is not perceived to be in the best interests of a deindustrialized city: particularly one like New York, where, the spending policies of city government are controlled by boards of economic elites (Newfield and DuBru', 1977).

In the last three decades, and particularly as the civil rights movement gained ascendancy through organized protest, dissatisfaction with inequitable treatment of citizenry effected major changes in federal laws and policies (Piven and Cloward, 1979). One direct consequence of this for urban neighborhoods was the active promotion of citizen participation in municipal affairs, as mandated by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966. Together, these pieces of legislation cleared the way for community organizations to exert pressure for funding (Zimmerman, 1972), generating programs for communities to receive block grants using community development funds. By the mid-to-late 1970s, many community organizations were receiving grants to engage in redevelopment of urban neighborhoods (National Commission on Neighborhoods, 1979; Schur and Sherry, 1977). In 1978, the federal government established an innovative urban policy calling for a building of a "new partnership" involving "all levels of government, the private sector, and neighborhoods and

voluntary associations in a major effort to make America's cities better places in which to live." (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1980). This policy emphasized the involvement of the private sector in urban revitalization and promised support to community-based organizations that were seeking assistance in development of successful public-private partnerships. However promising such policies, it has been treated as axiomatic--and therefore has yet to be demonstrated--that working-class neighborhoods and residents can benefit from the promotion of private-sector investment.

B. The Problem

A major problem for urban neighborhoods today is that moderate- and low-income residents are bearing the burden of both disinvestment and reinvestment. While current national and local urban policy is designed to stimulate private-sector interest in development, this may not lessen the burden for these working-class residents. This policy does not appear to be an equitable remedy for the redevelopment of urban neighborhoods. Federal urban policy assumes that neighborhood revitalization, or the attraction of private investment capital into a neighborhood, is necessarily beneficial for all residents. However, as reinvestment displaces low- and moderate-income residents, it may undermine the community's socioeconomic fabric. The policy's major weakness is its failure to provide any mechanisms to prevent such displacement.

Community organizations are groups formed locally for the purpose of mediating between private-sector/government interests and the needs of neighborhood residents. Government policy encourages these organizations to be "partners" in the stimulation of private-sector development interests. This assumes that all community organizations receiving public-sector funding have the same goals and values as the private developers and levels of government with whom they are meant to collaborate. However, community organizations, even those operating within the same neighborhood, may represent different constituencies and have different class interests. While investigators have documented the resistive actions of community organizations whose interests were avowedly incompatible with those of government or the private sector (Fellman and Brandt, 1974; Frances, 1975; Goodman, 1971; Hartman, 1974; Molotch, 1972; Worthy, 1976), few have emphasized the contiguous existence of organizations with different class interests within one changing neighborhood (Augur, 1979). Although Mollenkopf (1981) investigated how community organizations would be affected by market conditions, the evolution and development of different community organizations within a neighborhood in relation to public policy or changes in the housing market has not been addressed.

One way to understand how, on the one hand, community organizations influence changes in public policy, and how, on the other, such organizations can sustain themselves in

periods of reduced government support, is to investigate the experiences of community organizations as they identify and respond to the problems of abandonment, resettlement, and displacement within local neighborhoods. Investigating the evolution of several community organizations over a number of years in a neighborhood that is undergoing processes of abandonment and resettlement may provide some clues regarding the factors involved in their successes and/or failures relative to their goals. By understanding how the private market and government policy influence the evolution and ability of different community organizations to demand public services and to encourage "selective" private investment, community organizations may better be able to choose appropriate strategies for 1) sustaining themselves and the neighborhood movement, 2) mitigating the adverse impacts of neighborhood change, and 3) effecting public policy.

C. The Study

This longitudinal study of one urban neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York investigated the influences of housing-abandonment and resettlement processes on 1) the types of organizations that emerged to represent different class interests; 2) the pattern of that emergence over time; 3) the particular goals, scope, and strategies that these organizations evolved; and 4) developmental changes in the relationships between organizations, other local institutions, government agencies, and private investors.

II. Literature Review

In the problem statement, we introduced several assumptions about the causes of housing abandonment, resettlement, and displacement. By observing that neighborhood decay has been occurring as large corporations withdraw production capital from older American cities and as financial institutions disinvest in working-class neighborhoods, and by describing the primary role of public policy as stimulator and supporter of private interests, we are building a case for a political/economic interpretation of neighborhood change. This interpretation emphasizes the dual impact of political and economic decisions and events on the formation and development of older American cities. However, there are other theories of urban abandonment, resettlement, and displacement.

In particular, ecological and preference models have provided an alternative explanation for urban neighborhood change, and these approaches have occupied a dominant place in current thinking on urban neighborhoods. In order to present a balanced view of current thinking on the causes of neighborhood change, these will be discussed along with political/economic perspectives prior to addressing the literature on voluntary community organizations.

A. Ecological and Preference Models of Urban Neighborhood Abandonment and Resettlement

These models maintain that the processes of neighborhood change are a natural and inevitable expression of the

economic order and of residents' desires and abilities to improve their economic status (Downs, 1981; Gale, 1979; Goetze and Colton, 1980; Grisby, 1966b; Hoyt, 1939). This theory has its roots in the "Chicago School" of urban sociology, which submits that the city is made up of concentric rings, and that there is a natural process of outward movement as new immigrants "invade" central city areas and displace the upwardly mobile who move toward the periphery (Park and Burgess, 1925). People move into the rings depending upon their place in the economic order. In this way, people are assimilated into the economic order, which defines the structural constraints that mediate residential preferences (1).

1. Filtering, Stage, and Preference Models of Decline

The processes of outward growth affect the housing market (Hoyt, 1933, 1939). Hoyt found positive correlations between low rents and older buildings, percentages of black population, lack of utilities, and density of tenancy. To explain these findings, he developed an individual-preference model that elaborated a set of housing needs dependent upon a person's ability to pay higher rents. Hoyt also observed a "filtering" process that occurred within sectors rather than rings. He postulated that growth took place in outlying areas of a sector where land, and hence construction costs, were low; however, rents were high in these suburban areas because they were not close to poor neighborhoods. New construction led to

depreciation of existing properties, which lower-income people would inhabit as wealthier people moved into new units. Eventually, the oldest and therefore least expensive housing would become vacant. Academics and policy makers who observed this process encouraged its development, through 1) their support of liberal Federal Housing Administration programs for suburban residential development (Aaron, 1972; Bradford, 1979) and 2) their justification of filtering as a matter of public policy. Grisby (1966a:661) maintained that filtering produced "a much higher standard of housing that could not have otherwise been attained".

"Stage" theories of neighborhood decline were an extension of the filtering theory. Hoover and Vernon (1962), noting the movement of middle- and upper-income people to suburban locales and the resulting segregation of low- and moderate-income minorities in the densely inhabited city, used the concentric-ring model to describe the distribution of economic classes in New York City. They advanced a five-stage model of neighborhood decline that evaluated areas on a scale ranging from healthy to abandoned. Urban theorists, using correlational analyses of population and dwelling-unit characteristics, have since then confirmed Hoover and Vernon's position (Birch, 1974; Hughes, 1974; Mitchell, 1975). All posit a five- or six-stage sequence of decline. Healthy neighborhoods have new construction, homogeneous populations, and land use. A declining neighborhood is characterized by lower-income

minorities, multifamily dwellings, and aging housing stock. The process of decline, these theorists maintain, depends largely upon individual household decisions as opposed to investment or public policy. Private and institutional investors and public policy makers respond to, rather than initiate, changes in household income and building conditions that result from the filtering process (Mitchell, 1975).

In a study of St. Louis, Leven et al. (1976) offered an analysis that rejected the simple-preference approach inherent in filtering and stage models and emphasized individual perceptions. He found that household decisions are based on complex preference factors that include physical characteristics of the neighborhood and its population, and the future real-estate value of properties in the neighborhood. Expecting that these factors will be subject to reevaluation by others and themselves, residents make estimates about the value of their complex preference factors in a highly uncertain environment. Race and income changes, rather than age of housing or presence of multifamily buildings, are the most rapid and unpredictable factors determining preference. Leven et al. suggest that these preferences operate within a market that fluctuates based upon the variables of supply and demand.

2. Ecological, Stage and Preference Models of Resettlement

Recently, theorists have broadened the invasion-succession model of change to help explain resettlement (Gale, 1979; Goetze and Colton, 1980; Hudson, 1980, 1979; Powers, unpublished). In a study of Soho in New York City, Hudson (1979) identifies a set of subprocesses within the resettlement enterprise. "Pioneers" first immigrate and establish an area, eventually modify and stabilize it, and in the end make it so attractive that they are unable to remain because a more powerful social class displaces them. This model illustrates the possibility that "higher socio-economic groups invade lower socio-economic areas" (Hudson, 1979:4).

In a review of the literature on resettlement in 44 cities, Gale (1979) lists reasons for resettlement occurring: 1) acceptable housing prices; 2) investment potential of the property; 3) accessibility to employment; and 4) historical character of the house and/or neighborhood. After evaluating the demographic characteristics of the resettler population and the conditions of various neighborhoods, Gale concludes that there is a two-stage model of resettlement wherein certain types of families settle in a neighborhood depending upon the stage of settlement. For instance, young single men who take high financial risks move in first, and families with children come later as the neighborhood becomes more middle class. Gale suggests that resettlement is a natural result of an ethic, significantly on the ascendant, in which

intrinsic and economic value is placed on cultural, historical, and architecturally desirable "centralized enclaves of older housing" (1979:300). A similar view, held by Allen (1980:414), maintains that resettlement represents changes in "ideology towards the values of social diversity of ethnicity." Since, according to Allen, these shifts in perception and behavior take place within the context of an unfettered natural market, their pursuit offers acceptable alternatives to having to address national social problems of inequality and social injustice.

In an attempt to understand the relationship between preferences and supply and demand, Goetze and Colton (1980) designed a matrix whereby good, fair, and poor housing conditions are compared with the perceptions of people wanting to move in, stay, or leave a neighborhood. Housing conditions and preferences are correlated to rising, declining, or stable market conditions. Displacement of low- and moderate-income people, minorities being the most visible, present a potential problem in some rising market areas, and although it is a natural process of the movement of the private market, displacement would require government attention (Gale, 1979; Goetze and Colton, 1980).

Ecological and preference theories link the selection of options to market changes, thereby offering predictive information about patterns of succession. If this process is natural, however, it would appear that the needs of the members of society and the needs of the market place should

be compatible. Ecological models have failed, however, to explain the inability of minorities to assimilate into society. Within the housing market, it was assumed that older substandard housing would be vacated and abandoned as people became upwardly mobile. Evidence indicates that real income of the poor does not increase to the extent that they can afford adequately maintained, filtered-down housing (Aaron, 1972; Grisby and Rosenberg, 1975; Kristof, 1972; Sternlieb and Hughes, 1976; U.S. Census, Housing and Vacancy Survey, 1979). Furthermore, housing selection is not based solely on the ability to pay; there is a dual housing market that excludes some minority groups from large segments of it (Danielson, 1976; Gottdiener, 1977; Regional Plan Association of New York, 1979). Also, older housing does not necessarily become obsolete as the resettlement literature documents. There have been no longitudinal investigations of neighborhoods to establish the existence of sequential stages; and, in fact, a recent attempt to identify whether reinvestment in revitalizing neighborhoods progressed through clearly identifiable sequences of change failed to substantiate stage theories (DeGiovanni, 1983). Current stage theory is predicated on correlational analyses. There is little evidence from these analyses that homogeneity of land use, race, or age of housing are important descriptors of healthy neighborhoods (Bradford, 1979; Berry, 1976; Chicago Urban League, 1977; National Commission on Neighborhoods, 1979). Finally, the ecological

and preference approaches generally fail to address the role of government in influencing the housing market.

B. Political/Economic Approaches

As suggested earlier, political/economic theories stress the relationship between local housing problems, such as abandonment and displacement, and national problems of the urban housing market and its instabilities (Lake, 1979; Stone, 1978). This approach repudiates the theory that change in urban neighborhoods is a natural process in which preferences predominate (Angotti, 1977; Castells, 1977; Gordon, 1978; Harvey, 1977), and instead emphasizes the multifarious impacts of the political dimension or the importance of the economic arena.

1. The Impact of the Political Dimension

Politically based analyses hold that public-policy options are limited by "traditional sector relationships" (Lake, 1979), which assume the following: 1) the primary role of government action is to stimulate and support the activities of the private sector; 2) influenced by the dominant ideology, government actively disengages itself from the possibility of competing with the private sector; 3) government enacts its role by fulfilling the dual functions of support and legitimation; and 4) the growth of private industry is increasingly dependent upon the support of the state (Harloe, 1977; Lake, 1979; O'Connor, 1973).

Research on abandonment and displacement in cities has addressed the influence of governmental policies and programs. Lake (1979) found that government incentives such as J-51 tax abatements in New York City and direct assistance to property owners do not decrease the likelihood of abandonment in urban neighborhoods. Problems of uncompensated investment, underutilized resources, and mounting dissatisfaction among those forced to live in deteriorating neighborhoods contribute to abandonment. Bradford (1979) observed that the original policies of the Federal Housing Administration and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board either directly prohibited FHA lending to minorities or other residents in minority or racially mixed neighborhoods, or discouraged lending in such neighborhoods. These policies led to a situation where minority neighborhoods were starved for credit. FHA eventually reversed their policies, but instead created a lending situation conducive to fraud and abuses that led, by another route, to abandonment (Boyer, 1973; Bradford, 1979). Harvey (1977) found that FHA mortgages under the 1968 Housing Act 221d contributed to effecting community disruption in Baltimore.

A body of research on the relationship between displacement and government policies developed in response to processes of urban renewal and highway construction that had taken place in the United States since the 1930s (Hartman, 1974, 1979; Weiss, 1980). Directed towards measuring effects of forced relocation on residents (Fellman

and Brandt, 1970; Hartman, 1964), studies found displaced populations 1) having to move to substandard housing; 2) subject to overcrowding; 3) facing increased housing costs; 4) comprised of a disproportionate number of minority households; and 5) suffering harmful psychosocial effects.

The current form of displacement resulting from processes of resettlement is not a direct result of public action, and so does not require official monitoring as with the earlier, government-initiated relocation. As a consequence, the subtleties of the relationship between public action and current episodes of displacement has not been addressed. Guterbock (1980) has suggested that being dependent upon tax revenues, central-city governments have a direct interest in the resettlement of the inner city by the middle class.

2. The Importance of the Economic Arena

Economically oriented analyses maintain that economic forces, manifestations of the power of a small ruling class, are critical influences on the processes of abandonment and resettlement, and that the logic of developing capital is the moving force behind all urban change in capitalist society (Castells, 1977; Guterbock, 1980; Molotch, 1979; Tabb and Sawers, 1978). Research on abandonment and displacement concentrates on the effects of the movement of capital in or out of large cities. As was indicated in the problem statement, this perspective holds that the major cause of urban neighborhood abandonment and resettlement of

some neighborhoods has been the movement of production capital out of the large cities (Angotti, 1977; Harvey, 1977). This transfer of production capital has been guided by corporate interest in predictability, security, stability and growth. It has resulted in the transformation of the city from an industrial to an administrative center requiring a smaller white-collar employment base. This transformation has placed increasing pressure on blue-collar neighborhoods, particularly black or integrated ones.

Research addressing the relationship between neighborhood abandonment and the movement of capital has centered on the movement of local capital out of neighborhoods by financial institutions, the policies established to justify this movement, and the impacts of discriminatory investment policies on local neighborhoods (Case, 1972; The Center for New Corporate Priorities, 1975; Chicago Urban League, 1977; D.C. Public Interest Research Group, 1975; Devine, Winston, and Sims, 1975; National Commission on Neighborhoods, 1979; New York Public Interest Research Group, 1977; Schafer, 1978). These studies reveal several ways that neighborhoods are adversely affected by bank policies. Local institutions invest their portfolios in other areas of the United States instead of in the local neighborhoods where deposits originate. Banks systematically disinvest in black and other minority neighborhoods, and they modify terms on mortgages and improvement loans in minority neighborhoods by increasing down payments and reducing the term of payment.

It becomes increasingly apparent that a political/economic approach to interpreting urban change is productive for understanding the relationships between economic and political processes on the national and regional levels and processes of abandonment, resettlement, and displacement characteristic of the neighborhood housing market. Neighborhood communities reflect economic and political changes in their local institutions. Educational and religious institutions; commercial facilities; social-welfare groups, cultural, business, and voluntary community organizations: all emerge, grow and are altered in their course as the investment climate changes. Shifts in the aims and policies of institutions have various effects on the quality of life for local residents, just as changes in the local social base, shaped by disinvestment and reinvestment processes, influence the development of local institutions. For example, in neighborhoods where reinvestment processes are spurring the displacement of indigenous low- and moderate-income residents, institutions serving these residents may shrink, undermining the quality of life for those remaining. Voluntary community organizations are one type of institution with a specific role to mediate between private-sector/government interests and the needs of neighborhood residents. In this role, community organizations have a hand in negotiating what will be the impacts of immediate and long term changes occurring in the neighborhood housing market. By examining how

private market processes and government policies influence the evolution and ability of different community organizations to secure public services and to encourage "selective" private investment, academics and activists increase their understanding of the successs and failures of voluntary community organizations, and more importantly, the potential for growth of the neighborhood movement.

C. The Demand for Public Services by Community Groups

There has been an increase in the growth of voluntary community organizations in the last two decades (National Commission on Neighborhoods, 1979; Perlman, 1979). By 1979, the National Commission of Neighborhoods had accounted for over 8,000 community organizations, and according to Perlman (1979) HUD's Neighborhood Development Office had a clearinghouse with over 4000 entrees. Much of the growth of this neighborhood movement consists of organizations that 1) represent the interests of low- and moderate-income people and 2) emphasize voluntarism while maintaining an independence from political parties (Green, 1979). In their demand for public services, these groups have had as their targets adequate and equitable delivery of, and/or control over, local services such as housing, education, safety, and welfare. These groups share their history with other groups that emerged as social movements during the first two-thirds of this century, movements that sought control and equity in the distribution of civil, welfare, employment, student, and women's rights (Ash, 1977; Fisher and Romanofsky, 1981).

Two important issues emerge from the literature on voluntary community organizations. First, how can we understand the successes and failures of community organizations as they attempt to secure public services; and second, what are the ways that community organizations can be more successful as they attempt to achieve long-term goals? These two questions have been answered from a number of perspectives that in fact share common properties, but, for heuristic purposes, will be treated separately. Although not an exhaustive list, organizational success or failure has been explained in terms of the following: 1) sociological analysis of change within community organizations, 2) reformist perspectives, 3) societal/cultural analysis, 4) economic class analysis, 5) political analysis and 6) political/economic analysis.

In an attempt to understand what underlies the successes and failures of community organizations and what factors inhibit or enrich their potential for future success, researchers have used the various perspectives to describe and explain social, political, and economic conditions within which different groups of people form community organizations to advocate for, or protest against, environmental or social change (Fellman and Brandt, 1974; Frances, 1975; Goodman, 1971; Hartman, 1974; Worthy, 1976). Studies have examined the responses by groups to protect and demand control over education (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974), local city services (Yin et al., 1973), employment

rights (Kornblum, 1974; Philpott, 1978; Piven and Cloward, 1979), property rights (Molotch, 1972), welfare rights (Rogler, 1972), and civil rights (Fish, 1973). Following are brief descriptions and examples of research that use these overlapping perspectives.

1. Sociological Analysis

Sociological analysis of community organizations emphasizes development of the characteristics of a particular social structure of the organization and how it is shaped by societal forces. For example, in a study of a Puerto Rican action group, Rogler (1972) describes in great detail the history of a community organization that bands together successfully to pressure local government and service organizations into helping them to obtain vital social services while maintaining ethnic identity. The rich descriptions portray intermittent periods of solidarity and disarray within the group. Although Rogler clarifies the hostile political environment in which the group finds itself, he focuses on a descriptive, chronological account of the development, internal and external problems, social change, and degrees of success of the group. It is a study in which individuals change as a result of their experiences. This analysis emphasizes the strengths and weaknesses of individual members, the group itself, and its relationship to the history of Puerto Rican organizational failures and successes in a New Jersey city. Future success

is addressed only as it relates to the personal growth of members of the organization.

2. Reformist Perspective

The demand for services by community organizations has also been approached as a problem of how institutions can be more democratically responsive to communities (Altshuler, 1970; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974). There is a recognition that institutions are organized for adaptive changes that serve to maintain present allocations of power (Warren, 1972). The research evaluates specific reforms, and during the sixties and seventies decentralization reforms were tested within urban centers. For example, Barton, et al. (1977) measure changes in attitudes of residents and community organizations regarding government services after district managers were made responsible for government programs and accountable to local citizen groups. Other independent variables have included 1) an increase in the participation of neighborhood people in government-agency programs (Friedman and Golding, 1973); 2) an increase in the power of neighborhood officials who handle neighborhood problems (Yates, 1973); and 3) the election of citizens to government policy boards (Yin et al., 1973). In addition to changes in attitudes of residents and groups, investigators have also measured leadership styles of district managers and other liaisons to community groups, as well as the types of activities that groups generate, such as block cleanups or self-regulations.

In this approach, specific reforms can be measured and successes or failures can be evaluated. However, evaluating specific reforms may be too limited to generate meaningful interpretations and generalizations. For instance, there is no evidence that reforms in the direction of decentralization have any influence on attitudes about government, or that they make a difference beyond purely operational effects (Yin and Yates, 1975). There are probably many factors involved in attitudinal change and program effectiveness. By addressing the demands of community organizations as a set of problems for which solutions can be formulated, research fails to address the underlying bases and historical conditions of demands, and the limits of reform.

3. Societal/Cultural Analysis

A societal/cultural analysis of the work done in community organizations attributes political failure to the power and pervasiveness of the hegemony of values within the culture at large: both of which tend to circumscribe actions attempted in beleaguered residents' behalf. For example, Fellman and Brandt (1974), in an examination of the struggles of a working-class population to stop the construction of a highway from destroying their neighborhood, found that the protest group acquiesced to pressure from government and did not take a militant posture in protecting their neighborhood. Fellman and Brandt try to explain this organizational failure in terms of the

socialization processes inherent in American society: processes that promote respect for authority and encourage people to believe that failures lie with the individual rather than with the structural inequities of a system. They conclude that consumption becomes a substitute for power, and that even those who search for equity never question the limits of pluralism. The concept that social structure influences society's dominant institutions to function largely as agencies that shape consciousness as well as propensities for action (Freire, 1970; Lukacs 1971) is a compelling explanation for organizational actions. Certainly, failures of community organizations can be attributed to the internalization of dominant-elite cultural norms. However, this perspective is a post-hoc analysis that is exceedingly difficult to verify. There have been controlled studies focused on increased awareness of societal limitations (Scott, 1980); however, the validity of a given construct to account for such changes in awareness (concerning the surrounding contours of large-scale social systems) might be well-nigh impossible to test in open neighborhood settings. Furthermore, when research involves 1) organizations that have not developed a high level of awareness of socially conditioned limitations or 2) organizations that share enlightened perspectives but choose to work within the structure of United States society at large rather than contemplate revolutionary action, societal/cultural explanations do not specifically address

the ways that they might enlarge their spheres of influence within the existing social and economic order. The tools and perspectives of sociocultural analysis are not to be slighted. They are necessary, but not sufficient to a broad-based interpretation of events and processes.

Economic-Class Analysis

Analysis along the lines of economic class holds that the successes and failures of organizational action are firmly rooted in the relationship of production (Ash, 1977; Castells, 1977; Piven and Cloward, 1979, 1971), and that the economic/political constraints of capitalism determine organizational potential (Castells, 1977; Hartman, 1974). Here, emphasis is with those conditions that highlight contradictions in the system, thus helping to identify how social movements emerge. Independent variables include the contrasting stakes, such as profits versus housing rights, between ruling- and working-classes, and the organizational characteristics of working-class protests, such as trade unions or civil-rights groups (Oliver, 1976). Studies measure 1) types of protest actions, such as rent strikes or litigation and 2) the processes of repression that are used to thwart political action. For example, in a study of an urban-renewal project in San Francisco, Hartman (1974) found that the expectations of poor people were repeatedly frustrated and subjugated to the interests of elites through a series of delaying tactics.

In class-analysis models, the question of future organizational success is synonymous with the possibilities for the growth of social movements. Piven and Cloward (1979) measure the political effects that group actions and repressive state measures may have on shaping a movement. In Poor People's Movements (1979), they found that the successes of social movements such as for those industrial worker, civil, and welfare rights, all designed to advance the cause of equity, have rested on the disruptive abilities of protesting organizations. In many instances, the more militant tactics, which repeatedly highlight contradictions in capitalism, have greater potential for effecting social change. The strength of the economic-class analysis lies in its attempt to address some underlying reasons for protest and the lack of success that groups face working within the framework of a capitalist political economy. However, there is an assumption that the protesting group has a certain level of class consciousness that may or may not be present among local neighborhood organizations.

5. Political Analysis

In a liberal political analysis, the unequal distribution of resources and other inequities are clearly recognized as legitimate problems, but successes of organizations and movements are measured in terms of understanding the patterns of involvement of organization members (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974), and by understanding the political advantages and disadvantages of

the strategies that groups use (Gittell, 1979). According to Fainstein and Fainstein, patterns of involvement include the development of political consciousness, the social background of the people involved, and their patterns of activity; that is, whether they are technical specialists or community activists. Variables for evaluating the efficacy of groups include 1) networking ability; 2) policy goals, such as low income housing, safety, or organizational maintenance; and 3) limitations set by political and economic conditions. Employing these variables, political analysts measure the following: 1) the directions that organizations take in moving from single-issue to multipurpose organizations; and 2) access to policy makers. Findings suggest that differences in organizational ability between groups are attributable to class differences. Groups comprised of low-income residents often become service institutions (Gittell, 1979; Perlman, 1976). An assumption of this research is that groups want control over such services as housing and education, but that to do so they must maintain a strategy of advocacy rather than assume the form of a service institution (Rathe, 1979). Whereas some (Morris and Hess, 1975; O'Brien, 1975; Rathe, 1979; Simpson and Beam, 1979) report on the efficacy of singular strategies, Perlman (1979) finds that individual groups use several strategies. These include 1) pressuring existing elites and institutions for greater accountability; 2) seeking electoral power to replace existing elites and

institutions; or 3) bypassing existing arrangements and establishing self-help or alternative institutions. Kotler (1979) suggests that the future success of community organizations depends upon their willingness and ability to serve the multifunctions of advocacy, service delivery, and development. One strength of this approach is its ability to evaluate specific organizational strategies in terms of organization goals. Often, however, success or failure is measured mainly by a set of criteria established by the researcher, rather than values generated by the groups themselves. Also, even though maintaining advocacy efforts is seen as a high priority for groups, researchers do not appear to address the failure of advocacy efforts to receive sustained funding, and to question the limits of organizational development as an indicant of power.

6. Political/Economic Analysis

Political/economic analysis is an approach that overlaps with societal, class and political analyses of organizational successes and failures. There is an emphasis on examining the ability of groups to enlarge their spheres of influence within the existing social order in which the logic of developing capital is the moving force behind all urban change. Although some political analysts may describe economic conditions when comparing the varied capacities of urban-neighborhood organizations to influence political process, a political/economic interpretation of organizational capacity for success attributes primary

causality for a city's employment and housing requirements to the movement of production capital out of urban areas and the city's transformation into a corporate economy. In this approach, it is understood that the government's role is to support corporate practices by providing the necessary support systems and programs to house the changing work force and to service its consumption-related needs. Therefore, in addition to understanding the political advantages and disadvantages of the networking strategies community organizations engage in, or the processes by which their goals are established, one would also include such broader measures as how corporate decision-making and national policy would effect community organizations, or how community organizations would be affected by changes in housing-market conditions.

Tracing the relationships between community organizations, national policy, and market forces in Boston's South End, Mollenkopf (1981) describes the supportive role of national urban policy in forging the corporate headquarters economy through urban renewal practices. In an earlier paper (1975), he indicated that the rise of community organizations destabilized many of the political and programmatic practices of the progrowth coalition. However, he also found that "Even though much of the programmatic machinery through which urban renewal operated has been dismantled, these market forces have taken on a momentum all their own"(1981:17). These market forces

that were unleashed by urban renewal and its associated policies were characterized by disinvestment in those neighborhoods inhabited by an increasingly obsolete ethnic and minority work force, and reinvestment and displacement in those neighborhoods found suitable to house professional classes.

Given this model of causality, an important question to address is What is the potential for community organizations to influence government support of such working-class ethnic and minority interests as affordable housing and preservation of neighborhoods and neighborhood institutions? Earlier in this chapter we reviewed literature that found community organizations becoming service institutions as they become integrated into local political networks. Mollenkopf (1981) has further suggested the following:

As community organizations have been brought inside urban politics and have become an important political resource for city-wide political actors, local government itself has progressively weakened. The process of integration produced new claims on public revenues and public decision-making which were resisted both through private sector attempts to limit or escape public sector restraints, and by political competition within the national arena by forces seeking to remove or undermine these claims. In a sense the co-optation of community organization by the local political system may be understood as a reciprocal weakening of both with respect to higher level actors. This development has tended to bring the interests of community organizations (now largely service-based) more into line with those of their local political patrons.

Given this weakness relative both to market forces and higher level actors (public or private), neither community organizations nor city governments have been able to compensate for the negative effects of market trends. The continuing inability of community organizations and local

government to provide, for example, adequate supplies of low rent housing has allowed middle class newcomers to the central cities to displace--by market means--poor, elderly and minority residents. The third point to note is that a new potential player in local politics is standing at the ringside: the young professionals who have been drawn to the central city through its transformation into a headquarters economy. This social stratum partly helped to fuel the growth of community organizations during the 1960s, but it also represents a competing force (:18-19).

Mollenkopf's reference to the young professional as a potential competing force is also discussed by Augur (1979) in a case study of Boston's South End. She describes the history of the relationship between community organizations that represent the interests of low- and moderate-income families and those that represent the newly arrived middle class. In this area of Boston, corporate decision making involved the introduction of a multimillion dollar Prudential Center, and government agencies assisted private interests through the development of urban renewal plans to house and provide amenities for the incoming middle class. These private- and public-sector actions spurred private reinvestment and accelerated gentrification. The plans for urban renewal also stimulated local community organizing and increasing conflicts emerged between progressive, moderate, and conservative community factions over appropriate stabilizing strategies. Mollenkopf (1981) also found that in San Francisco's Western Addition, as well as in Boston, major urban-renewal projects spawned a variety of community organizations that represented those residents lacking in

market power. Eventually, they became co-opted, the process engendering "severe, sometimes violent conflict between neighborhood factions" (:27).

A focus of the present research is also to consider the potential for community organizations to influence government support of affordable housing and preservation of neighborhoods and their institutions. However, in this longitudinal case study of Park Slope, Brooklyn, our examination of the ability of community organizations with differing degrees of market power and interest to achieve their goals by building coalitions and forming alliances among themselves and with local arms of government rests on data collecting during a period when market conditions were not shaped by local urban renewal. While New York City government has developed programs to house and provide amenities to the professional classes required to administer and maintain the city's corporate economy, it is also true that abandonment, resettlement, and displacement within the Park Slope community have occurred within a context of slowly emerging private-market investment and disinvestment practices. Park Slope is a neighborhood of brownstones, tenements, and four-story apartment buildings that traditionally housed a working-class ethnic population as well as a minority of affluent professionals. The community organizations that were the focus of the current research have also slowly emerged and developed within New York's emerging corporate economy. It seems plausible to

hypothesize that when market conditions proceed slowly without a major disruptive force to generate sizeable upheaval within a community, incoming professionals will join forces with working-class ethnic, minority and elderly residents to build organizations that emphasize communal values. Yet, a political/economic analysis would also hold that at certain points the interests of these two converging groups will clash.

The uniqueness of this study lies in its possibilities for detailing the emergence of organizations, not only in their relationships with government agencies and sources of funding, but also in the approaches they evolve for representing, advocating on behalf of, and serving neighborhood constituencies with and without market power. At what point in the gentrification process will community organizations comprised of incoming professionals, minorities and long-term ethnic residents place less emphasis on strategies to attract more newcomers to live in the area and advocate for affordable housing for those being displaced? Where do the breakdowns between the groups occur? How do those groups lacking in market power maintain their goals? These are the kinds of questions that become salient as gentrification progresses and government funding is severely reduced.

In order to address these questions in the present research, I slightly modified, as a basis for organizing information, a set of dimensions developed by Mollenkopf

(1981) which will help to evaluate a decade of changes within the Park Slope community.

In his investigations of Boston's South End and San Francisco's Western Addition, Mollenkopf spanned three decades. In order to analyze various developmental phases, he kept track of a number of dimensions (under each of which he summarized periods of time), and was thus able to construct an argument concerning how these dimensions influenced each other over time. The organizational framework used by Mollenkopf consists of five dimensions: 1) social base; 2) market conditions; 3) institutionalized leadership networks; 4) penetration by government and outside actors; and 5) the larger political and economic context. Social base refers to the fluidity of the ethnic, racial, and income levels of the population. Market conditions refer not only to the possibilities of obtaining financing at a given time, but to the housing market, processes of abandonment or rehabilitation, and whether or not the market is "soft". Institutionalized leadership networks refers to the local groups, social agencies, and institutions that exert leadership in a neighborhood. Penetration by government and outside actors includes government-supported development plans or programs that would affect the political economy of the neighborhood.

The use of these dimensions is consistent with a political/economic orientation of understanding the potential for the success of community organizations. The

dimensions offer a checklist for keeping track of relevant actors in the change process, and the potential for constructing arguments that would help express the dynamic nature of the change process.

In the present study, I utilized these dimensions as independent variables to define the context within which community organizations functioned. The dependent variable, organizational emergence and development, refers to patterns of organizational growth that include 1) the emergence of community organizations; 2) the types of organizations that emerge to represent different class interests; 3) the particular goals, scope, and strategies that organizations develop over time; and 4) developmental changes in the relationships between local organizations. The present study focused on emerging and developing community organizations over an eight-year period.

D. Conclusion and Hypothesis

The current research project addresses the impact of housing abandonment and resettlement patterns in Park Slope, Brooklyn on the evolution and development of community organizations within an urban neighborhood: a neighborhood that reflects the changes in New York City's corporate economy through its gradually changing social base and local institutions. Rather than being spurred by a large-scale urban renewal process, changes in the Park Slope housing market and in local institutions have occurred within the context of slowly emerging private-market practices,

disinvestment, and reinvestment. The uniqueness of this research lies in its ability to distinguish between and detail the emergence of community organizations that represent neighborhood constituencies with varying degrees of market power. What kinds of coalitions or conflicts would emerge between these groups? I hypothesized that without a major disruptive force to generate upheaval and concomitant conflicts between residents, incoming professionals and those lacking in market power would form coalitions that emphasized communal values. These coalitions would be strained, however, as clashes between groups occurred particularly during periods of rapid resettlement and displacement.

III. Methods

A. Overview of Research and Organization of Findings

In the following chapters, data will be analyzed that were collected throughout eight years of research commencing in 1975 (2). It will be organized into two main sections: the context within which groups emerged (chapters 2-5); and the evolutions of the organizations (chapters 6-9). Chapter 10 presents a summary and conclusion of the research.

Park Slope, the site of the research, is a socially heterogeneous neighborhood in Brooklyn that reflects many of the changes in the political economy of New York City. As New York City has continued to lose manufacturing industries, Park Slope's blue-collar population has decreased. In more recent years, the pressure to house

Manhattan's white-collar and professional classes has advanced, sometimes with rapacious speed, to the city's outer boroughs. Parts of Brooklyn, Park Slope, with its predominantly white population and brownstone housing stock, have in particular witnessed an influx of professionals and an increase in housing costs.

Through a brief historical examination of New York City's transformation and of government policies that have reinforced urban change (chapters 2 and 3), we will establish a context within which we can understand Park Slope's changing housing market and social institutions (chapters 4 and 5). This contextual information presented in chapters 2 through 5 helps shape our understanding of the development of Park Slope's community organizations as they attempt to mediate neighborhood change (chapters 6-9).

In an attempt to understand the larger political and economic context, we reviewed and analyzed literature that addressed the relationship between capital accumulation and changing urban form as well as the role of government in urban reinvestment process. To help define the plight of community organizations in New York City during the late 1970s, and make connections between that plight and processes of government intervention in the housing market, housing and neighborhood journals were reviewed and major issues that might directly affect Park Slope organizations were outlined.

For describing the history of specific market conditions, social-base and leadership network changes within Park Slope, United States census material from 1950 to 1980 as well as local public- and private-school census material were analyzed. In order to describe abandonment and resettlement processes of housing market conditions in Park Slope the results of several investigations were analyzed. They included a) archival research to gather information on sales activity and property-tax arrearage as well as vacant-building surveys and b) interviews with realtors as well as with owners of vacant buildings (3). Structured interviews with neighborhood religious leaders were conducted in 1978 and were analyzed to further elaborate the social base and help explain the impact of changes in the social base on local religious institutions. In order to understand changes in local political leadership networks, a history of local political control was collected through analysis of a) interviews with local political figures, b) literature of local political studies, and c) tracing of changes in legislative boundary control.

Finally, the development of community organizations was traced largely through participant observations. Locating community organizations in Park Slope began as early as 1974. I had been living in the neighborhood since January 1972 and had established contacts with some groups through membership in a block association and a block association umbrella group. Through conversations with members of the

such groups, local merchants, and staff of a local community newspaper, I became aware of numerous block associations, social service agencies, improvement groups, parent-teachers associations, two school boards, church groups, street corner social clubs, two precinct community councils emphasizing anticrime strategies, a local planning board, and a group representing the elderly. After talking with local residents and attending meetings in 1974, it became apparent that not all of these groups were directly involved in issues of neighborhood change. I decided to focus on block associations, improvement groups, parent teachers associations, school boards, precinct community councils, tenant organizations, the local planning board and the group representing the elderly. Except for the organization representing the elderly, part of which was comprised of paid staff from member organizations, and the police officers that were mandated to participate in the precinct community councils, all organizations were (in the beginning of the study), operated solely by volunteers. Although social-service agencies were involved in community change issues, they did not have public meetings. Eventually, staff members of individual agencies were informally interviewed at other meetings and by phone regarding the scope of their programs and any advocacy efforts the agencies emphasized.

Participant observations of organizations began in the spring of 1975 and continued through mid 1982. During the years of participant observation some organizations ceased

to exist and others emerged. Some organizations, including parent teachers associations and block associations became too numerous to cover adequately. When issues were originated by these associations, they were often brought to the attention of one of the many area-wide organizations being observed. At that point, the issues were included in the research. For example, when a block association wished to halt the introduction of a publicly funded home for girls on their block, they came to area-wide organizations for support in putting pressure on the state to stop the program. When tenants protested landlord harassment on one block they, too, approached an area-wide group for assistance. In the case of the two local school boards it became apparent that the volumes of material being collected were more appropriate to city-wide research of educational issues than to a neighborhood study of organizational evolution. Observations of block associations, parent teachers associations and school boards were eliminated from the research in 1976.

Certain organizations that were initially followed or identified were also dropped from the study. Groups that met for less than six months and never pulled together as formal organizations were not included (4). Organizations that formed to confront a single issue that was not directly involved with housing or resettlement issues, or discussion groups that only occasionally had resettlement issues as a topic of their agendas, were not included (5). Merchant

organizations whose geographical boundaries were considerably greater than Park Slope were followed initially but were later dropped when it became clear that it would not be possible to show relationships between resettlement processes and change in community organizations unless the groups were primarily involved with Park Slope or unless housing market and social institutions were examined in other Brooklyn neighborhoods (6). Finally, groups were excluded that emerged in 1982 (at the end of the study period) even if they were involved in housing issues (7). Unfortunately, this meant that the only solely Hispanic group, a political organization that emerged in 1983 in southern Park Slope and Sunset Park, could not be followed. Other Latins, as well as blacks, who immigrated to New York City from Latin America, Jamaica, and Haiti, were affiliated with religious or educational institutions: the diversity or fragmentation of which will be described in chapter 5. Although U.S. blacks formed religious organizations that dealt peripherally with the repercussions of displacement, there were no exclusively black community organizations formed to address these as political/economic issues during the study period.

Over the course of the research, approximately 5000 hours of participant observations were completed. Records were kept of meetings and conversations with members of organizations.

In an attempt to corroborate participant observations and to help explain the development of organizations and their relationships to other institutions and government, archival data supplemented participant observations. These included organization newsletters, newspaper articles, correspondence, membership records, organization constitutions as well as government-housing policies, programs, and specific projects that involved Park Slope.

A time schedule of the research, summarizing the methods used in the current study, is presented in Table 1.1, and a more detailed description of each method follows.

B. Detailed Description of Methods

1. Archival Research on Contextual Concerns

To provide a rich context for interpreting housing market and institutional base change the following archival research was completed:

a. Review and analysis of literature addressing relationships between private capital and the role of government, changes in modes of capital accumulation since commercial times, and the role of New York City in the changing political economy of industrial cities. A history of Park Slope and its changing role in the political economy of New York City is addressed to place current population and housing development in a broader context.

Table 1.1

Overview of Methods Used: 1950-1982

Method	Year										
	1950	60	70	75	76	77	78	79	80	82	
1. Archival Research on Contextual Concerns											
a. Literature on N.Y.C. development and role of Park Slope in development					(1775 to present)						
b. Government intervention, policies and programs					(1934 to present)						
c. City-wide Community Organization Press				X	X	X	X	X	X		
d. P.S. Social Base											
1) Histories					(1775 to present)						
2) U.S. census data	X	X	X							X	
e. P.S. Housing Market	X	X	X							X	
f. Religious, Educational and Political Institutions											
1) Histories					(1860 to present)						
2) School census data											
a) N.Y.C. Board of Education.				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
b) Catholic Schools			X	X					X		
g. Legislative Boundary Shift Data			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
2. Participant Observations of Community Organizations											
				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
3. Archival Research Concerning Community Organizations											
a. Newsletters			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
b. Local Press				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
c. Correspondence				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
d. Constitutions	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
4. Interviews											
a. Community Leaders				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
b. Clergy							X				

b. Literature addressing recent history of government intervention in the housing market was reviewed to help place the impacts of current housing policy in broader

perspective. Community housing and neighborhood journals, specifically City Limits and to a lesser degree Shelterforce, were carefully reviewed from 1975 to 1981 to clarify the current history of major housing and neighborhood issues that local communities faced. In this way, decisions and actions that Park Slope organizations might take could be placed within a city-wide perspective. Analysis focused on specific policies and programs that Park Slope community organizations would become aware of and involved in.

c. Research on the Park Slope housing market included a review of local histories with emphasis on the changing role of Park Slope in the political economy of New York City. Park Slope and New York City census data were analyzed for housing, racial, income, and employment trends from 1950 to 1980, and the results of a study of the real estate market of Park Slope (O'Hanlon, 1982) (which included longitudinal surveys of vacancy, abandonment, sales activity and tax arrearage figures) were reviewed to reveal patterns of change.

d. Archival research on the changing history of Park Slope religious, educational and political institutions included reviewing histories of South Brooklyn, tracing membership trends of religious institutions, and analyzing racial distribution, other demographic and enrollment census material, from the New York City Board of Education and Office of Catholic Education. Alterations in legislative

boundaries were traced to illustrate changes in local political control.

2. Participant Observations

Procedure: Twenty voluntary community organizations were observed from 1975 to 1982. Some of these organizations were in existence for only a portion of this time; therefore, in any one year, less than twenty organizations were observed. Generally, organizations met on a monthly basis and, in some instances, when subcommittees were formed to deal with specific neighborhood problems I became a member of the subcommittee. Meetings were held in churches, YMCAs, storefronts, schools, restaurants, police precincts, and living rooms of private homes. These meetings usually lasted three hours and were frequently followed by discussions held in coffee shops, parked cars, bars and private homes. Discussions were usually continuations of topics discussed at the meetings and ranged from how to become appointed to the local planning board, or what groups had "pull" with the politicians and agencies, to planning a local fundraiser. In between meetings, phone conversations were held with committee members on such issues as 1) clarifications of what happened at meetings; 2) agenda items for the next meeting; 3) verification of rumors; or 4) perceptions of what should be done differently. I became very active in two neighborhood- improvement groups and the other

researcher became an active member of an antiredlining group and a political club (2).

Participant observations of nine voluntary community organizations were conducted on a regular basis from 1975 through 1977. "Regularly" means that group meetings were attended at least every other month.

In the fall of 1976 The Fifth Avenue Committee (FAC) emerged as an organization trying to halt commercial deterioration and drug-related street crime in the western part of the neighborhood. It became an amalgam of black, Anglo and Hispanic working-class and professional residents. Carefully observing the emergence of this organization and attending its many board and committee meetings offered an opportunity to monitor organizational development and the potential for coalition building among professional and working-class residents. Approximately 4200 hours of observations and involvement with FAC ensued over the next five years including daily phone calls with members, and attendance at political, social, and planning events where FAC was represented. As a result of the time devoted to observing FAC and time needed for archival and interview methodologies, other organizations were observed periodically, at least twice a year, from 1978 to 1981. In 1980, a group of residents that had a falling out with FAC members and policies formed the Park Slope Improvement Committee (PSIC) to press for a more conservative agenda for neighborhood revitalization. I was unable to attend PSIC

meetings because of my close ties with FAC. However, PSIC members were observed in numerous public meetings and through their correspondence with community residents, local officials and city agencies. In light of these observations, PSIC will be considered to have been observed periodically through early 1981. A listing of times when community organizations were regularly and periodically observed is presented in Table 1.2.

Much of the discussion of community organization behavior described in chapters 6-9 are based upon analyses of the results of three techniques of participant observations as follows:

a. Recording of community meeting minutes. The purpose of this analysis was to understand how community organizations emerged and developed over time. Comparative and longitudinal analysis focused on 1) elaborating the scope, strategies, and reasons for organizational actions; 2) revealing indicators of changes in level or quality of group consciousness that may have led to changes in goals, strategies, and attitudes towards coalition building; and 3) tracking techniques of self-maintenance.

b. Recording membership attendance at meetings and events. The purpose of this analysis was to facilitate understanding of 1) the rate of organizational development; and 2) their relationships to other organizations. Variables included 1) stability of membership participation; 2) overlapping membership across organizations; and 3)

Table 1.2

Park Slope Community Organizations Observed: 1975-1982

Name of Organization	Year Observed							
	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
1. Against Investment Discrimination	N	N	R	R	R	P	N	N
2. Community Board 6	R	R	R	P	P	P	P	U
3. Fifth Avenue Committee	N	R	R	R	R	R	R	P
4. Fifth Avenue Merchants Assoc.	P	P	P	P	P	P	N	N
5. Moncada Library	N	N	N	U	U	P	P	N
6. Park Slope Chamber of Commerce	R	R	R	P	P	P	U	U
7. Park Slope Civic Council	R	R	R	P	P	P	P	U
8. Park Slope Fifth Ave. Local Development Corp.	N	N	N	R	R	R	P	U
9. Park Slope Improvement Committee	N	N	N	N	N	R	R	U
10. Park Slope Branch, Metropolitan Council on Housing	U	U	P	U	U	U	U	P
11. Park Slope Tenants Council	U	P	P	U	U	U	P	P
12. Park Slope Together(a)	N	N	R	P	P	U	U	N
13. Revitalization of the Southern Area of the Slope (ROSAS)	N	N	N	P	P	P	U	U
14. Seventh Ave. Betterment Comm.	R	R	R	P	N	N	N	N
15. Seventy-Eighth (78) Precinct Community Council	R	R	R	P	P	P	P	U

Name of Organization	Year Observed							
	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82
16. Seventh-Second (72) Precinct Community Council	R	R	R	P	P	U	U	U
17. South Brooklyn Action Movement	N	N	N	N	P	P	P	N
18. Triangle Parks/ Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee	R	R	P	N	N	N	N	N
19. United Fifth Avenue Merchants Association (Sacket to Ninth St.)	R	R	R	P	P	U	U	U
20. United Block Associ- ations of Park Slope	R	R	R	P	P	P	P	N

N - Not in existence for more than seven months of that year.

R - Regularly observed (at least every other month)

P - Periodically observed (at least twice a year)

U - Unobserved

a - Part of a coalition of neighborhood social service agencies including: Camp Friendship, Children and Youth Development Services, Project Reach Youth, Slope Sports and the United Fifth Avenue Coalition.

participation of different racial groups within organizations.

c. Informal interviews were conducted with community organization leaders and members regarding 1) neighborhood change; 2) reasons for particular actions taken by organizations; 3) future plans for the organization; and 4) possibilities for the emergence of spin-off organizations or joint projects with other organizations.

Over the years, these interviews were held before, during, or after meetings, on the telephone or often in the street, at the local copy center, at a coffee shop, or

during social evenings on weekends. Usually the interviews were unstructured but focused. For example, after a meeting in which residents described how they thought the local assemblyman was going to support a protest against the development of a shopping mall three blocks from a commercial street, I called the assemblyman to verify this rumor and inquire as to the strategies he intended to use. Occasionally, interviews were parts of discussions initiated by an organization member about some problem. For example, in the spring of 1977 a group of teenagers, sponsored by a local social service-agency and under a small grant from a city arts group, painted a large wall mural depicting the police as brutal and repressive. They painted the mural on a corner building of a residential block inhabited predominantly by Italian working-class families and young middle class professionals. Spurred by the angry invectives of the Italian residents and the mild but disdainful remarks of the young professionals, the social service agency was called to task at a meeting held in the home of a block professional who worked for a city planning agency. The subject of the mural and the meeting itself prompted a serious rift between residents, some of whom supported the agency's youth programs financially and as board members. The assistant director of the agency, also a member of Park Slope Together (a community organization made up primarily of representatives of social service agencies) stopped me in

the street to complain about the treatment given to the agency by "racist" residents and to express amazement at their outrage. I asked what kinds of reactions he would have expected from the residents, particularly the Italian families that had resided in the area for many years, how this incident was affecting their agency, and in what way Park Slope Together was handling the issue.

Analysis of informal interviews supplemented and clarified recordings of minutes and provided comparative and longitudinal data on the meaning that abandonment and resettlement processes had for members of organizations with different class interests. Its main purpose was to clarify the relationship between perception of change and organizational actions. Analysis concentrated on 1) members' perceptions of abandonment and resettlement processes and the meaning these processes had for them; 2) the ways that organizational actions were congruent or incongruent with membership perceptions; and 3) the reasons for forming other organizations.

3. Archival Methods to Supplement Participant Observations

Archival research helped to clarify 1) the emergence of community organizations and the public images that groups wish to create and maintain; 2) institutional leadership networks; and 3) penetration by government and outside actors. It included the examination of records, histories, media and written documents relevant to the actions of the

community organizations observed. Specifically, it included the following:

a. A review of local histories of the area to determine the development of community organizations that emerged prior to 1975. Analysis elaborated the evolutions of those groups still functioning at the start of the study period including 1) projects attempted and/or completed and 2) evolving relationships between groups and other institutions.

b. Review of newsletter and publications by community organizations, the purpose of which was to help understand 1) organizational goals and strategies and 2) the public images that groups wish to create and maintain. Newsletters were published by the Fifth Avenue Committee, the Park Slope Civic Council, the 78th Precinct Community Council, and the United Block Associations of Park Slope. Other organizations keep minutes of their meetings or send out occasional requests for participation to local residents. Where meetings were not attended, a sample of minutes for each organization was reviewed. Analysis compared the organizations along the following lines: 1) issues discussed related to abandonment and resettlement, 2) positions taken, and 3) specific requests to the readership for action.

c. Examination of letters and other written material sent by organizations to local politicians, investors, government agencies and other community organizations. This

investigation will be limited to letters and documents sent and received by the Fifth Avenue Committee (FAC) and the Park Slope Improvement Committee (PSIC). These organizations were in conflict over an issue central to this research; namely, who will benefit from community revitalization? They disagreed over the meaning of gentrification for the neighborhood and the strategies necessary to effect neighborhood improvement. In this respect it was appropriate that, wherever possible, correspondence be examined that would help explain the conflicts and suggest ways that other groups could learn from these experiences. The purpose of this investigation was to understand 1) the relationships between the two community organizations and 2) limitations that they may face when they confront other organizations and local government. Analysis examines and compares 1) the types of strategies used to address different organizations for support and 2) the nature of the limitations that groups with different class interests faced: including resources, credibility, strategy, inconsistencies and intercommunity conflicts.

d. Review of articles and letters "to the editor" from and about community organizations as they are described in the local press. In the Park Slope Community during most of the study period there were two local weekly newspapers, The Phoenix and the Home Reporter and Sunset News. The Phoenix had a number of journalists who would actually attend

meetings and engage in investigative reporting about political, community board, and organizational events. On the other hand, the Home Reporter and Sunset News mainly published press releases, covered regular Democratic Club dinners, church, school, and cultural events, and avoided controversial issues. After reading a sizeable sample of both weeklies for two years, the writer ceased using The Home Reporter and Sunset News as a reliable source of information and used it only for clarification of specific events, occasional letters to the editor, and as an indicator of support for the regular Democratic Club activities. In February 1932, a new community newspaper covering Park Slope (and two neighborhoods southeast of Park Slope--Winasor Terrace and Kensington), The Prospect Press, began publishing a Park Slope edition twice monthly. This paper was carefully read. The purpose of reviewing articles and letters to The Phoenix and Prospect Press was to contrast perceptions about issues that generated those conflicts between organizations having potential influence on neighborhood leadership networks. Articles about organizations would also provide information about the emergence of new activities or new organizations.

4. Interviews

In order to expand understanding of changes in the social base during the period studied and changes in institutionalized leadership networks, interviews were conducted with sixteen clergymen and numerous community

leaders. Interviews centered on how changes in the community affect local community organizations and religious institutions. Interview schedules are presented in Appendices II and III.

a. Interviews with Community Leaders

Procedure: From March 1981 to May 1982, eight two hour individual and group interviews were conducted from March, 1981 to May, 1982 with leaders of community organizations, either to fill in the gaps in cases where their activities had been only periodically observed, or for the purpose of having certain of their recorded activities further clarified. The series of interviews included leaders from Against Investment Discrimination, Fifth Avenue Committee, Park Slope Branch Metropolitan Council on Housing, Park Slope Together, Revitalization of the Southern Area of the Slope, and South Brooklyn Action Movement.

Analysis: The purpose of these formal interviews was to 1) clarify perceptions of success in meeting established goals, and 2) supplement information regarding relationships between organizations. Formal interviews were conducted at the end of the research only when informal methods and participant observations seemed inadequate to explain perceptions.

b. Interviews with Clergymen

Procedure: A physical survey of the total population of Park Slope's religious institutions was conducted in March 1978. A stratified sample was taken from the 48

institutions according to 1) religious preference and 2) location of religious institution within the neighborhood. Clergymen were contacted by phone in 20 institutions and 16 one-and-one-half hour interviews were completed in April and May 1978 at the respective institutions. After three attempts, four clergymen were unable to schedule an interview.

Analysis: Analysis of interviews with clergymen focused on perceptions of 1) changes in the ethnic and racial characteristics of the institution's membership and 2) the types of mechanisms the institutions develop to mediate changes in their constituency.

C. Organization of the Data Analysis Framework

The methods used in this research help to elaborate the organizational framework of five dimensions discussed in the literature review. In Table 1.3, methods are categorized as they were used to explain each dimension of the framework. As described earlier, the five dimensions are the independent variables in the research and a sixth, organizational behavior, is the dependent variable. Some methods, particularly participant observations were used to describe several variables. In the chapters that follow, the discussion of results will be organized according to this framework, with the findings of appropriate methodologies presented during the discussion of each variable.

Table 1.3
Methods Used to Describe Framework

Dimension	Methods
Independent Variables: The Larger Political and Economic Context (Chapters 2, 3)	Archival: 1) studies of political economy of NYC; 2) histories of community institutions; 3) government intervention in housing, policies, programs; 4) articles on city-wide housing issues.
Social Base (Chapter 4)	Archival: 1) census analysis 2) histories of Park Slope
Market Conditions (Chapter 4)	Archival: 1) analysis of a study of the Park Slope Real Estate Market 1965-1980, including sales activity, property arrears, vacant-building surveys, interviews with realtors, and owners of vacant buildings; 2) census analysis
Institutional Leadership Networks (Chapter 5)	Archival: 1) histories of political, educational, and religious Park Slope institutions; 2) school census analysis; 3) legislative boundary shift analysis Interviews: with clergymen
Penetration by Government and Outside Actors (Chapters 2, 6-9)	Archival: 1) government housing programs and policies and 2) correspondence between organizations, government agencies and local developers. Participant Observations
Dependent Variables: Organizational Development (Chapters 6-10) a. emergence of groups b. types of groups c. goals, scope, strat. d. developmental change	Archival: 1) histories of organizations; 2) correspondence between organizations; 3) newsletters; 4) local press Interviews: with leaders Participant Observations

Notes

1. These ideas were developed at a time when urban communities were undergoing substantial economic expansion. Immigrants were moving into central city areas, income was improving, and possibilities of upward mobility for all was seen as possible.
2. Much of the research conducted from 1975 through 1979 was a collaborative effort between the present writer and Timothy O'Hanlon. Both were graduate students in the Environment Psychology Program at the City University of New York. Both of us reviewed similar literature, constructed instruments, collected data, and conducted interviews. Community-organization data from 1979 to 1982 was collected and analyzed solely by the writer: as was the primary-research data constituting the bulk of chapters 3 and 5 and 1980 U.S. Census analysis. The results and interpretations of the data are solely the responsibility of the writer. The use of the pronoun "I" will be used to distinguish personal experiences or procedural decisions arrived at independently of Dr. O'Hanlon: indicating divergences from what was, de facto, a joint study.
3. This research on the housing market of Park Slope was also the result of a collaborative effort between the writer and Timothy O'Hanlon as a part of our doctoral dissertation work. Dr. O'Hanlon's analyzed the data collected on the Park Slope housing market as part of his doctoral dissertation work. This survey will be used in this research to help explain the evolution of community organizations. A description of the housing market methods is reprinted from O'Hanlon's dissertation in Appendix I.
4. This included the Park Slope Restoration Foundation, a local development group that was sponsored by the Park Slope Civic Council but never formed a board of directors nor initiated specific projects.
5. These groups included the Park Slope Branch Library Committee, the Park Slope Community Garden of Methodist Hospital Committee, and the Park Slope Forum.
6. These merchant organizations included the South Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce and the South Brooklyn Development and Rehabilitation Corporation.
7. One such group, a housing coalition, organized at the very end of the study period, was the Park Slope Mobilization against Displacement.

Chapter 2

Transformations in Capital Accumulation and the Context of Urban Form(1)

I. Transformations and Urban Form

The ways that cities develop, what they may offer in terms of social mobility or employment opportunity, "must be viewed as intrinsically a part of a much larger set of events--the development of industrial capitalism" (Gans, Kasarda, & Molotch, 1982:168). Transformations in the development of industrial capitalism, in the ways that capital is accumulated, have altered the role of older industrial cities like New York. "People's troubles in the older cities stem from unresolved contradictions of former modes of wealth accumulation" (Gans, Kasarda, & Molotch, 1982:166). By the lights of the urban redefinition as corporate center (supplanting older definitions as manufacturing and trade center), these cities house large populations and numerous facilities that are, for a great many intents and purposes, obsolete, and whose service requirements may erode fiscal budgets. It is a contention of this research that the capacity of any urban neighborhood to house its particular population and provide residents with goods, services, and social institutions will depend upon the role that neighborhoods play in the political economy of the city, and, in a larger sense, the role of the city in the political economy of the nation.

In this chapter, we shall review some basic structural characteristics of capital accumulation, specifying the roles of important actors. For the sake of a modern historical perspective, we shall give a synoptic treatment of important changes in the development of industrial capital: first nationally; then in New York City as a whole; and finally, in the urban neighborhood, where these changes are reflected.

II. The Structure of Capital Accumulation

A. Private Capital

Under capitalism, privately owned firms coordinate labor, raw materials, and technology to generate products. A surplus, in excess of the costs of production and distribution, is extracted. This surplus--the amount of output produced by a worker that is more than is required to sustain her--is surplus product. In a broad but real sense, the form that cities take is the result of the geographical concentration of the reinvestment of the aggregate surplus product (Harvey, 1975; Lake, 1979).

Warner (1968) has suggested that what private enterprise has done well, in terms of dividing land, or building commercial, residential, and production facilities, cities have done well; where it failed or neglected, cities have been unable to overcome the problems. That is not to say that residents cannot formulate plans independent of the private market. Rather, "in the clash between the interests of the market and residents, the interests of the market

will be more compelling" (O'Hanlon, 1982:3). The private appropriation and coordination of the surplus product accounts for maintenance of much of a city's infrastructure. Government aids in the coordination process.

B. The Role of Government

In his analysis of the political economy in the United States, James O'Connor (1973), concludes from an examination of the interactions between the private and state sectors in the modern era that, not only does private enterprise dominate in economic activity, but it actively engages in minimizing government involvement in competitive activity. On state and local levels it minimizes involvement through the provision or withholding of finance capital. It withholds investment from activities that would compete with private interests and selectively invests in activities that will serve the interests of the private sector. The state role, according to O'Connor has not been to "fill the gap," as liberal interpretations would imply. Rather, the role of government is to support and underwrite private investment interests; and, in fact, the growth of private sector activities are dependent upon the support of the state.

C. Mechanisms and Mediators of Reinvestment

Intermediaries within the private market help to prepare specific areas and sites for reinvestment. Depending upon the role of an area in a city's economy or its economic base, interests groups of realtors, lawyers, bankers, politicians, newspapers and community organizations

act as rentiers or mediators of reinvestment (Molotch, 1979). These individuals and groups try to attract capital into areas by lobbying for, and manipulating, local climate and conditions that are more attractive to capital. They may offer properties at competitive prices, assist local development through government programs, or conduct house tours to convey a social climate supportive of investment. They generally stand to benefit from the side effects of the reinvestment process (Molotch, 1979).

As a result of complex organizational requirements and interdependency of facilities, a network of rentier relationships develop, as those "between politicians, bankers and property owners and developers . . . based on a solid coincidence of interest" (Mollenkopf and Pynoos, 1979:234). As they are able to profit through the manipulation of building codes, access to land and zoning regulations, they continue to act in behalf of the accumulation process and are essential to it (Gottdiener, 1977).

In light of the dependence of rentiers on access to investment capital, financial institutions are dominant in directing growth of a city's infrastructure, growth that maintains the profitability of their investments. O'Hanlon (1982:9) contends that directing growth "involves balancing the devaluation of some neighborhoods and business institutions of a city while channeling funds to newer speculative endeavors." For example, one mechanism for

directing investment has been through the institutionalization of racism. Although race and class do not coincide totally, blacks are overrepresented among low income groups, particularly in urban centers, and black neighborhoods have historically been the scapegoats for the initiation of disinvestment practices. By capitalizing on personal racism in housing and reinforcing it through institutional racism, such as through disinvestment policies that accelerate blight, financial institutions are able to consolidate losses to limited numbers of black or heterogenous neighborhoods while maintaining effective demand in other, usually white ones.

Domination of reinvestment processes by private market interests may conflict with publicly held values of equity, and residents may intermittently press the state for more equitable reinvestment of resources. However, some (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1982:180) have suggested that, by the mid-1970s,

the shift in political balance caused by the national electoral triumph of conservative forces and a decline in racial militance permitted a redefinition of urban need in terms of fiscal crisis. The structural conflict between capitalists and urban residents ceased to be defined as a question of legitimation requiring the co-optation of dissidents and was again seen as a problem of accumulation and realization.

Any shift in political balance that redefines the needs of urban residents is, in large part, a reflection of the larger processes of accumulation and their

accompanying political shifts that have defined urban history. Changes in the process of capital accumulation, traceable to national economic, local business, and political interactions, provide a context for interpreting current restructuring of urban questions, problems and needs.

III. Changes in Modes of Capital Accumulation.

In an examination of the historical links between capitalism and urban form, Gordon (1978) has suggested that rather than see the growth of cities as a unidirectional, evolutionary process, urban history can be seen undergoing transformations of form and structure that are conditioned by the particular modes of capital accumulation dominating a society. He argues that three urban forms have characterized urban development in American cities, and that these forms correspond to three stages of capital accumulation: commercial; industrial; and corporate. He further argues that transformation from one mode of accumulation to another, typically marked by "struggles between owners and workers over social relations of production in the capitalist workplace, . . . lies at the roots of the current urban crisis" (1978:28,29).

A. The Commercial City

From about 1785 to 1860, owners made their profits through the exchange of commodities and, although the country was a debtor to Europe, achieved a phenomenal rate of expansion, state aided, through the use of import

tariffs. The ports buzzed with activity; trade was booming. By 1860, one-fifth of the national population lived in cities. Tendencies for uneven development, placed New York in the forefront among port cities.

B. New York City in the Commercial Period (1785-1860)

Besides having the advantage of a central coastal location, New York City's merchant interests were able to reduce substantially the costs and time required to ship grain, when the Erie Canal project, heavily subsidized by the State, connected the trade center to the northwest via the Hudson River and the Great Lakes. New York soon held a competitive advantage over other cities. Even though manufacturing firms remained small and dependent upon the city for supplies and outlets, they increased in number and were labor intensive, so that by 1860, 35 years after the completion of the canal, New York City (including Brooklyn) had over a million inhabitants, many of whom were European immigrant factory workers. Black people, four million of whom were still slaves in the South by 1860, were only beginning to compete with Irish immigrants for menial jobs in an era of high unemployment.

The development of democratic institutions necessary to provide municipal services was retarded politically by the Republican-controlled state legislature that protected merchant interests. Projects that were needed to meet infrastructure requirements--for example, municipal water

works--were controlled by state commissions. By 1860, city government had little control over appropriations.

As in other port cities, merchants, professionals, artisans, and some laboring groups centered geographically around the wharves, and in New York City, homes of artisans and laborers were located in spaces between warehouses and fashionable homes of merchants. Only landless laborers lived shabbily on the outskirts, and as it became profitable to build rental quarters for them, slum areas expanded. Gordon (1978) points out, however, that contradictions in commercial accumulation became apparent as uneven development brought about unequal distributions of wealth, which all socioeconomic groups living in close proximity could see and react to. Often, racial hostility became an easy substitute for class frustrations, as European immigrants took out their confusion and pain on black people moving from the south. Organized protests, which centered on demands for equality, tended to limit opportunities for accumulation. Success in increasing profits could not easily be hidden, and Gordon argues that revealing this fundamentally spatial aspect of contradictions in commercial accumulation played a central role "in prompting the turn to a new and ultimately more opaque mode of capital accumulation" (1978:36).

C. The Industrial City

Between 1860 and 1930, American cities were transformed as capitalists turned towards making profits

through direct manufacture of commodities. Artisan and craft jobs were compressed into semiskilled factory jobs to minimize costs, and the presence of unemployed, often black, labor pools used as strike breakers helped discipline factory workers and reinforce racial hatred. At the same time that worker status diminished, the role of the merchant as manufacturer was enormously expanded as accumulation processes required coordination of raw materials, new technology, and expanded distribution markets .

It is difficult to describe adequately how worker status and perceived rights might have declined, since, in the late 1800s, there was support by the middle class for protests against unfair treatment, and the power of the industrialist was not yet seen as omnipotent (Gutman, 1976; Zinn, 1980). Although there was tremendous labor unrest during much of the industrial period, particularly during the 40 years prior to the First World War, any necessary contradictions between industrial profits and humane relationships of employers with workers were not as yet perceived by workers. As indicated earlier, there were still large unemployed labor pools, and Gordon argues that it was possible to discipline labor in the big cities, thereby reducing their status and widening divisions between new merchants and ex-artisans/skilled labor.

First workers had already begun to be segregated physically along economic lines, and with segregation came

indifference and hostility between isolated groups.

According to Zinn (1980:247) industrial and political elites organized this enormous economic growth

with the aid of, and at the expense of, black labor, white labor, Chinese labor, European immigrant labor, female labor, rewarding them differently by race, sex, national origin and social class, in such a way as to create separate levels of oppression--a skillful terracing to stabilize the pyramid of wealth.

Second, after a history of support for commercial accumulation, the media, political groups, and professionals had acquired "a growing sympathy for the calculus of profitability" (Gordon, 1978:42).

Investment in manufacturing rose 1200% between 1879 and 1929. The ability of capitalists to coordinate markets expanded as Republican administrations, the Civil War, and World War I established conditions appropriate for expansion. World War I led to the United States becoming a creditor rather than debtor nation and, with the aid of government, American capitalists began to diversify, gain control over foreign markets, and strengthen their ability to coordinate processes of domestic production. After the merger wave at the turn of the century, a dual economy emerged in which the capital-intensive industries of metals, petroleum, and machinery emerged as a monopoly sector, and the less successfully consolidated, labor intensive, nonstandardized industries, such as apparel or publishing, emerged as a competitive sector, having little

control over business cycles. Some workers in the elevated, skilled white unions won better conditions, but for blacks and women, conditions often worsened. As administration was increasingly centralized, the status and power of the production worker, even the foreman, were reduced. Immigrants, blacks, and women were forced to accept dehumanizing conditions. Rebellion in city factories was moderated through schools, churches and popular literature. Workers learned obedience to authority. In fact, authoritarian factory-like classrooms were patterned after the factories themselves (Spring, 1973).

A second wave of mergers near the end of the industrial period was characterized by vertical consolidations, which increased organizational complexity by internalizing functions previously handled by other organizations. This change required the growth of managerial, administrative, and nonproduction personnel. Between 1899 and 1929 nonproduction workers increased 270% as opposed to an 86% gain for production workers. This important change would shape the characteristics of an emerging corporate-city work force.

D. New York City in the Industrial Period (1860-1930)

As in the rest of the nation, the industrial period was the time of greatest expansion in production, population, and public works in New York City. The city handled 40% of the nation's exports and 50% of its imports.

Access to suppliers, credit, and variety in production made New York City particularly attractive to producers sensitive to changes in the market. However, the fact that, by 1921, producers in New York City employed 70% of the national work force in the city's largest industry, clothing manufacturing, tells only the economic facts. Again, increases in production came at the worker's expense. During the decade prior to World War I, new immigrants, blacks, women, and children toiled in the 500 New York City garment factories under dangerous, disease-breeding conditions. Hundreds died from fire, accidents, and the inhaling of lead-ridden chemicals. Zinn (1980) reports that the city became a battlefield, as strikes led to violence. By 1909, after a particularly tumultuous strike at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company, black and white women were joining the International Ladies Garment Workers Union at the rate of 1000 per day.

As production and population increased, so did property values and city revenues. In the 1860s alone, assessed property value increased 67%. Business interests, eager to improve real estate and expand commercial development, were successful in encouraging increased political and fiscal powers for a Democratic, Tweed run administration, and in expanding the city debt to create public works and grant concessions to business. Eventually, the continued expansion of city debt, and the corrupt machinations of the Tweed group produced an environment in

which investors would no longer purchase securities. The Tweed era ended. City debt was reduced despite the increase in the poor immigrant population by 80% between 1876 and 1896, and industry continued to expand. After World War I, New York City experienced a postwar boom not unlike that enjoyed by the entire nation. Pent-up housing demand surfaced, land prices increased, and the building industry expanded. Congestion from an expanding work force prevailed, and city expenditures rose from \$254 to \$692 million as a mass transit system was built to make residential land accessible for development.

In contrast to the commercial city, the form in which residential heterogeneity predominated, the industrial period saw a sharp residential segregation by economic class. Tenement housing was built for the segregated working class, upper-class people began moving to Brooklyn and the Bronx. After 1920 when mass transit made outer boroughs more accessible to middle- and moderate-income groups, they too began to decentralize. Shopping districts, which provided centralized outlets for middle- and upper-income constituencies, expanded; and prior to and during construction of subways from 1910 to 1920, merchants began to press for zoning laws that would restrict land use in Manhattan because of the increasing numbers of immigrants that populated the side streets around commercial avenues. They wanted manufacturing to be limited.

Around the same time, from the turn of the century to 1915 or so, Gordon argues that it became increasingly apparent to capitalists that the physical segregation and isolation of factory districts within the city, which had been important for regulating workers early on, began to have the opposite effect as dense concentrations of workers began to resist industrial speed-up. Class conflicts surfaced as strikes developed momentum and unions gained strength. Manufacturers, particularly those that made such standard items as underwear, and were thus less sensitive to changing market conditions, began to leave New York City in search of areas where labor surpluses, lower wages, and labor control could insure stability, predictability and security. The waves of natural mergers that characterized this period provided monopoly capital with enormous resources to pursue decentralization of production facilities and control of the labor force.

Impacts on Manhattan of the decentralization of production facilities and the early movement of residents to the outer boroughs were somewhat obfuscated by the postwar building boom and the continued influx of immigrant production workers. After the subways had been completed in 1920, however, and decentralization escalated, real-estate values in Manhattan dropped, vacancies rose, and business interests were concerned about the infiltration of diverse racial groups able to move into lower cost rental units in Manhattan. Racial animosity was growing. Prior

to World War I, racism was challenged as blacks organized and socialism grew. During the war, class conflict was subverted under the rubric of patriotism and nationalism, a rubric in which capitalism created an artificial community of interests between exploiter and exploited that made it difficult to mobilize anger against corporations. In the 1920s after the war, with the "red scare" and socialism falling apart, racial hatred grew in strength. Congress passed immigration laws severely limiting the influx of Asians, Latins, Slavs and Jews. The Ku Klux Klan spread north.

It was now possible, and particularly important, for monopoly capital and local commercial interests to protect real-estate values in Manhattan, for by the 1920s corporate skyscrapers began to dot the Manhattan skyline as corporations, having consolidated their monopoly control after World War I, were now large enough to separate administrative from plant functions and locate the former in the central business district. By 1928, the Regional Plan Association, a private group of business and commercial interests, developed the rationale and master plan for transforming Manhattan from a mixed-land-use city into a corporate capital (Fitch, 1976). By 1929, (according to McKenzie in Gordon, 1978:52) "56% of national corporations had located their headquarters in New York City or Chicago".

E. The Corporate City

From approximately 1930 to the present day, the older industrial cities have continued to be the site for corporate offices and for the provision of amenities to serve the educational, cultural, and consumption-related needs of an increasingly technical and service-oriented work force. This primary function of the postindustrial city has been created in a national environment characterized by centralized ownership of corporate capital (fewer firms with increased power), decentralized production facilities (labor can be better controlled and is more isolated), internationalized capital (third-world, low-wage labor is available), and increasingly verticalized monopoly capital (firms have more control through diversification of product lines and services) (2).

During the four years after the Depression of 1929, production fell by 50% and 15 million people (25% to 35% of the labor force) were out of work. Since then, the GNP has risen over 300% (1933-1970) as corporations with large assets have been able to resist movement of new corporations into mature commodity markets. They have also developed mechanisms to limit competition and to find ways to increase the productivity of labor and reduce costs through replacing human labor with machine labor. As the number of white-collar workers increased by 137% between 1940 and 1970, the number of manual workers increased by only 32%.

Labor militancy, strong in the 1930s, was weakened in the higher-paying job market of the World War II economy.

Minimum wage, forty-hour work week, and social security excluded most blacks who were often migrants or domestic workers. Even when it appeared that hard won gains might benefit blacks and women, fair employment practices were rarely enforced. Between 1940 and 1970, 4 million blacks left the country for the city. By 1965, 50% of black people lived in northern cities.

Strikes continued through the 1940s and 1950s. Unable to control labor and unwilling to pay increasing central-city taxes, manufacturing corporations left older cities, moved to their suburbs, and built new, sunbelt cities that didn't have the concrete remnants of an industrial era nor the centralized and unionized, working class. This new form of industrial city, characterized by fragmentation and segregation, and linked by cars and trucks, proliferated. The older cities declined (Gordon, 1978), producing social hardships for their blue collar workers and fiscal difficulties for municipalities. New York epitomized the problems of the older American city.

F. New York City in the Corporate Period (1930-present)

The national economic growth pattern of monopoly agglomeration had a profound effect on New York's urban form as it affected business, labor, politics, and ultimately urban neighborhood.

1. Business: First, increasing centralization of ownership and size, and diminishing numbers of corporations, has meant less market space for small firms, with their

limited reserves, modest capacity for research, and restricted access to markets. In short, they can't compete. When they grow, leave the city, or fail, rates of replacement are inadequate to maintain stable levels of manufacturing employment. Second, growth in corporate power, paralleled by an office construction boom from 1947 to 1973, has been followed by a steady drop in the number of large corporations that have their headquarters in New York (3). However, the largest corporations, which require access to services and a variety of consumers, have remained.

2. Labor: The labor market in New York City has also been transformed in the corporate period. After World War II, there was a slowdown in total employment growth and, during the 1970s, an absolute decline in the city and metropolitan region. Although there have been steady increases in the participation of women in the labor force and the number of female-headed households has risen 43% over the 1970-1980 period, "between 1970 and 1979, all gains in employment made since the 1930's were wiped out as the city lost 494,000 jobs or thirteen percent of its employment" (O'Hanlon, 1982:88). Although there were gains in information and service fields, these gains have not made up for job losses in manufacturing, construction, trade, transportation and utilities since 1954. Major local losses were in apparel and textiles, while national gains in these

industries rose 80% between 1950 and 1970 (Bureau of Labor Statistics in O'Hanlon, 1982:90).

The large surplus labor force created by agricultural mechanization in the South provided the textile industry with a nonunionized, low-wage work force outside of the metropolitan area. This left many New York City garment workers, by this time largely women and Latins, unemployed. Finally, by the mid-1970s, the 40% difference in wages between the blue- and white-collar work force, coupled with a competition for white-collar jobs that tends to eliminate all but the most highly educated and trained applicants, seemed to leave little opportunity for a former blue-collar white, black or Latin worker to assimilate, and deepened existing social, racial, and economic cleavages.

3. City Growth in the Corporate Period: Planning for the growth and development of New York City as the National Center was engineered by corporate, commercial, real-estate, political, and bureaucratic interests in what Mollenkopf (1978) calls the progrowth coalition. The study and plan for the growth of the city, formulated in the latter part of the industrial period by the Regional Plan Association, called for construction of suburban passenger trains, highway systems, and a network of parks and renewal projects to tie together industries decentralizing to suburbia and to promote the growth of Manhattan. Rentiers profited from the packaging and sale of property for office-building construction, and later from the spill-offs of urban-renewal

assemblages, luxury housing construction, and economic activity. At the same time, new highway systems accelerated decentralization of industry and populace to suburbia, creating rapid losses of employment for the city, and, in conjunction with urban renewal, destruction of urban neighborhoods, displacement of U.S. racial minorities, and increased pollution.

Although state funds were involved in early public works, the city had little control or involvement in the plans until 1934, when Mayor LaGuardia, in search of public-works projects that qualified for Federal Reconstruction Finance loans, hired Robert Moses to oversee park and highway development. Moses, whose enormous power rested in his capacity to represent the interests of the local progrowth coalition and ultimately of national capital, built the progrowth coalition's infrastructure for the "National Center" while services and construction of hospitals, fire houses, educational institutions, and police precincts were consistently underfunded (Caro, 1975).

4. The Fiscal Crisis: The loss of a half million jobs in the manufacturing sector over a relatively short period, and the consequent diminished capacity of the city to raise local tax revenues, precipitated a need for extensive state and federal intervention. However, the reluctance, refusal, or inability of government to engage in the planning required to mediate the impacts of the city's transformation to a corporate center led to short-term

borrowing and gimmickry (Tabb, 1982). As a result of the short-term borrowing, the city became extremely vulnerable to, and dependent upon, the financial community's willingness to supply it with funds. When, in early 1975, debt problems of the city collided with liquidity problems facing commercial banks as a result of the 1974 recession, the banks withdrew from the city bond market, leaving the city near collapse. By September 1975, the Emergency Financial Control Board was created, which removed control over revenues from the Mayor. Although it is now a matter of record that New York City's spending patterns for municipal services were, on the whole, no different from those of other, older industrial cities (Tabb, 1982), severe austerity measures were imposed on the city, justified on the grounds that the city problems were a result of its own controllable overspending patterns.

IV. Problems Facing Communities by the Mid-1970s

By the mid-1970s, when this research began, deindustrialization and uneven development, had imposed a division of labor whereby middle-range jobs were located outside of the city, leaving it with low-paid service-sector (mainly female, black, and Latin) and high-paid corporate positions (mainly white and male) (Tomaskovic-Devey and Miller, 1982). This situation was having enormously deleterious effects on blue-collar neighborhoods as inequalities produced by these divisions were becoming more pronounced. As blue-collar jobs

continued to disappear, austerity programs that had resulted from the fiscal crisis were aimed at retaining and protecting business, which meant other, "secondary" programs were being cut. Summer jobs for low-income youth were in short supply, senior citizen centers were closing, recreational and cultural programs were stripped of funds, (Tabb, 1982), free higher education came into jeopardy, teaching forces and health care services were cut, and shrinkage strategies pulled needed services from deteriorating neighborhoods.

City government, in its role as enhancer of the accumulation process, continued to 1) establish policies that would meet the needs of the growth sector and enhance corporate power (subsidies for hotel construction, write-downs, abatements and exemptions), and 2) to define its role as accommodating to basic economic policies and forces beyond its control (New York City Planning Commission, 1979). It seemed that by the mid-1970s, austerity measures instituted by corporate elites, coupled with additional cuts at the federal level, had begun to undermine mayoral efforts to hide differences between those who would benefit and those who would suffer from local progrowth strategies. One might wonder whether a new, even more opaque mode, of accumulation will emerge as divisions become more apparent and social relationships more explosive. Perhaps through the growth of the

internationalization of capital, workers will be segregated within cities, states, or countries.

V. Summary and Conclusion

Thus, trends toward reprivatization and recapitalization, trends which define the current stage of New York City in the corporate period, are graphically expressed in the city's neighborhoods. As urban neighborhoods suffer the consequences of economic transformations and political accommodations, the neighborhood organizations that evolve may articulate the obvious inequities or embrace progrowth strategies that have not yet differentiated beneficiaries from sufferers. Increasing salary differences between employees in the low-income service sector and those in the upper-income corporate sector create housing opportunities for some and exacerbate displacement problems for others. Government policies reinforce these trends.

In chapter 4, we will return to Gordon's framework, but in the context of the individual neighborhood: in this case, Park Slope of Brooklyn, New York.

In chapter 3, we shall depart from this scheme long enough to look in depth at one government policy area that has greatly influenced urban neighborhood form--government intervention in the housing market.

Notes

1. Some of the ideas, and much of the organizational structure of this chapter is adapted from chapters 1 and 2 of Timothy O'Hanlon's (1982) doctoral dissertation, *Neighborhood Change in New York City: A Case Study of Park Slope, 1850-1980*. New York: Doctoral Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York. As indicated in notes 2 and 3 of chapter 1, Dr. O'Hanlon and myself collaborated in the research on Park Slope that constitutes the body of both our studies and on the concurrent development of theoretical tools. Dr. O'Hanlon chose as his topic the Park Slope housing market and its relationship to individual perception; my own study focuses many of the same data through the prism of voluntary community organizations.
2. Ibid., pp.80-86, for a more detailed description of these processes.
3. Ibid., p. 93, for a detailed description of the changes in firms that headquarter in New York City.

Chapter 3

Government Housing Policies and the Context of Urban Form

It is not sufficient to explain urban neighborhood growth and development only in terms of private reinvestment. We must, in arguing that political decision making is a primary force in structuring neighborhood form--a ground rather than a consequent--also address the specific role of government in the transformation process.

Government intervention in the urban housing market has had a profound effect on the evolution of urban neighborhood. Housing policies have consistently supported the needs of production capital, and as such have influenced the shape and direction of the urban form from which urban neighborhoods and their organizations emerge and develop.

I. Government Policy and The Needs of Capital

O'Connor (1973) states that, in fulfilling their supportive role, all levels of government must work, not only to underwrite private-investment interests, but to maintain a social harmony, the disruption of which is endemic to and inevitable in the "self-regulating market" (Harvey, 1973:274). O'Connor calls this maintenance of social harmony, legitimation; and he describes the costs of maintaining legitimacy as social expenses. Examples are welfare payments, and police protection, neither of which contribute directly to the accumulation of private profit. These expenses stand in contrast to social capital expenses.

Social capital expenses fall into two categories: social investment and social consumption. Social investment includes those projects and services such as infrastructure development, research, and education, that increase the productivity of labor. Social consumption includes those projects and services that reduce the productive costs of labor, such as workman's compensation and medicaid. Social capital expenses are essential to maintaining increased productivity in the private sector.

A problem for production capital, and therefore for the state, is the need for increasing social capital expenditures generated by the increasing complexity and interdependence of production. Since the costs of these expenses are born by the state, Lake (1979:19) suggests that it is becoming evident, particularly at the local level, "that the public sector is increasingly unable to carry on both the supportive and legitimation functions. As more and more costs of private accumulation are publicly absorbed, government has less to spend on social expenses." Lake further suggests that maintenance of social harmony is considered an acceptable rationale for public sector activity only when it compliments the supportive function; that is only when the disruption of social harmony would interfere with private accumulation.

Lake concludes that the implications of this interpretation of private/public relationships are devastating for older postindustrial cities like New York.

The city must identify appropriate responses in a situation in which private investment may be minimal. If there is no investment interest, the justification for social investment (infrastructure development, education, research) is undermined. If there is no social investment, there would be no justification for social expenses because there is no longer a "need" to maintain social harmony unless disharmony spills over to areas of investment potential.

As we have reviewed in the last chapter, monopoly capital in New York City began to decentralize production and to internationalize operations during the corporate period. It withdrew production capital from the city, and expanded clerical, administrative, technical, and professional sectors. At the same time, the city saw a slow-down in employment growth, absolute decline in blue-collar employment in competitive capital and a continued immigration of Latin and black populations. This shift in production capital began to take its toll in some of the largely blue-collar neighborhoods of the city where investment interests stagnated and social investment ceased, and in others where investment interests shifted to pursue the needs of the wealthier professional work force.

This shift in demographic characteristics and in the forms that urban neighborhoods would take were actively fostered through government housing policies from the beginning of the corporate period.

II. Government Intervention in the Housing Market

By pursuing trickle up and trickle down filtering policies, which have encouraged single-family homeownership, suburbanization, abandonment of urban neighborhoods, and, ultimately, displacement of urban neighborhood populations, government housing policies have supported the spatial decentralization of manufacturing production capital. One can observe how these large-scale patterns are fostered through government intervention in the mortgage market, new trends in housing construction and aid to urban communities, and real-estate tax policies.

A. Government Involvement in the Mortgage Market

After the Great Depression, the federal government became increasingly involved in the development of finance mechanisms to increase residential mortgage investments in single family homes (Keith, 1973). The Federal Home Loan Bank system in 1932, and the National Housing Act of 1934, establishing the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), were steps towards the creation of a federal policy that facilitated homeownership, the bulk of which were constructed in suburbia (Fried, 1971, Keith, 1973, Dolbeare, 1979).

Opportunities for private ownership of homes were created through the use of FHA and, by 1944, VA (Veterans Administration) insurance programs. These protected lenders against foreclosure risks and drew the white middle class out of urban neighborhoods to the suburbs, leaving many of

these neighborhoods increasingly poor and populated by minorities.

One of the ways that the FHA supported white flight to suburbia was through the use of discriminatory appraisal practices that prohibited FHA lending to minorities or other residents in racially mixed areas (Bradford, 1979). In addition, these appraisal practices, adopted by other lending institutions and emanating from ecological models of neighborhood change that saw an increase in racial minorities as the major predictor of neighborhood decline, fostered a dual housing market within urban neighborhoods. By not providing mortgage financing to minority groups, FHA appraisal practices forced black people and other residents of integrated neighborhoods to rely on installment contracts and other less favorable forms of financing, or on unscrupulous realtors who were able to exploit pent-up housing demand. Realtors could purchase homes from fleeing whites at bargain prices and sell to blacks at inflated prices. The impact of this government-fostered process on urban neighborhoods is history. As Bradford states:

Once the pattern was established, it was impossible to tell whether racial changes destroyed a healthy housing stock, resulting in disinvestment, or whether disinvestment created chronic cases of mortgage deficiency anemia infecting the lifeblood of the housing itself (:325).

By 1973, when the Federal Home Loan Bank Board responded to the civil-rights movement of the 1960s by

adopting some antidiscriminatory policies, many urban neighborhoods had already experienced abandonment. According to Bradford, increased FHA-insured lending, resulting from revised underwriting policies, without changes in the practices of conventional lenders, simply subsidized the existing dual housing market and increased exploitation. With no enforcement mechanism to monitor its lenders, abuse and fraud was rampant as racial change accelerated. Ironically, Bradford argues, it was the inundation of FHA lending that called attention to the disinvestment patterns of conventional lenders and helped to shape the neighborhood movement, which would press for mortgage disclosure and community reinvestment legislation in the late 1970s. The FHA lending program was an example of social expenses being used to maintain harmony where there was little investment interest.

If urban neighborhood form has been maimed through a process supported by federal housing policies, what institutions have benefited from this process? Stone (1980) argues that the finance mechanisms developed ostensibly to expand residential homeownership opportunities were really aimed at securing the position of lending institutions in the corporate economy by adding to their power and profits. Lender risks were reduced through FHA insurance and the ability to sell mortgages in a government-created secondary mortgage market institution, the Federal National Mortgage Association. The homeowner pays the insurance premium and

has no protection if she can't meet her payments. Points, or surcharges, are demanded by lenders. Although originally it was declared that the ceiling on interest rates established at that time for insured loans would tend to depress interest rates on conventional loans, Stone argues that the fact that conventional rates have driven up insured rates attests to the power of mortgage lenders and their quest for profits. If we follow Stone's logic and accept O'Connor's model, then the effects of this pattern of governmental involvement has been to subsidize the lender and protect accumulation at the expense of 1) the families that pay exorbitant rents and 2) the neighborhoods in which they live.

B. New Trends In Housing Construction and Aid to Urban Community

The expansion of finance mechanisms to foster the growth of single family homeownership has been the primary focus of government housing policy since the 1930s and has had an enormous impact on urban form nationally. However, federal subsidies for housing and urban renewal, direct federal aid to urban communities, and in a much smaller way, New York State subsidies for housing low-, moderate-, and middle-income people have also shaped local urban form.

1. Low-Income Housing Programs

The housing needs of low-income urban populations have consistently been unmet (Dolbeare, 1979). One has only to read Keith's (1973) well-documented chronology of federal

response to the housing crisis since 1934 to appreciate Fried's (1971) comments on the issue:

The history of federal effort in behalf of the nation's ill-housed families has been a history of rhetorically impressive promises followed by singularly unimpressive performances, of intricate programs long on solemnly avowed goals but short on the first thing needed to achieve them--money (:60).

In many respects, although some were housed, there is little reason to believe that government housing programs were designed to fulfill the housing needs of low-income people. First, public housing was in large part a public works program aimed at creating jobs (Keith, 1973), and was only secondarily created to provide housing as Friedman (1980) puts it, for the "submerged middleclass" or those made temporarily poor by the Depression. Even though its financing mechanism was similar to FHA and, therefore, profitable for commercial lenders (1), public housing became politically less acceptable as it increasingly served the permanent, predominantly black poor.

Second, very little has been built. In fact, Dolbeare (:2) reports that "after more than four decades, all of the public housing ever produced amounts to fewer units than is built by the private sector in an extremely poor year." Third, even the government-assisted housing programs that followed public housing, including Turnkey, Leased Housing, and Section 8, all of which have been increasingly profitable for developers and lenders, have amounted to

roughly triple the public-housing stock: a tiny proportion of our national housing inventory (Dolbeare, 1979).

Finally, in 1983, federal budgets for all subsidies for new public housing were eliminated and operating subsidies for existing programs were substantially cut. We have shifted to a housing voucher program, which not only will serve fewer families than are aided by past subsidy programs, but will offer these vouchers in a market of decreasing affordable housing supply (Hartman, 1982).

2. Urban Renewal

Urban renewal, originated by powerful coalitions of development, real-estate, and planning interests before World War II, and created as a part of the Housing Act of 1949, was terminated in 1974, subsequent to the urban riots of the 1960s. Enabling legislation established local agencies that

demolished whole communities inhabited by low-income people in order to provide land for the private development of office buildings, sports arenas, hotels, trade centers, and high income luxury dwellings (Weiss, 1980:53).

Originally opposed by key public housers who recognized that slum clearance did not guarantee rebuilding of homes for low- and moderate-income people, many acceded when they believed such housing would be included in rehabilitation plans after slum clearance. In the main, housing for low-income groups wasn't included, and, in New York City, renewal projects carved up neighborhoods and transformed

much of the upper West Side of Manhattan, creating upper-class cultural institutions, sports arenas, and luxury housing, and displacing indigenous populations.

Government, of course, had considerable opportunity to exercise its legitimative function, and there were periods in recent urban history, such as the racial violence and urban ghetto unrest of the mid-1960s that did lead to substantial antipoverty and civil-rights legislation, as well as increased local participation. However, any effects supportive of low- and moderate-income urban neighborhood integrity were to be negated in the early 1970s as many of the programs that were hard won were dismantled in light of revenue sharing.

3. Federal Aid to Urban Community

For much of the last three decades assistance to local communities for community development has come in the form of categorical programs, wherein Congress specified the particular problems to be addressed and the models to be followed. Municipalities competed for funds and big cities often did well; although some cities draw on more compelling arguments for funding their projects, and assistance was at times uneven.

This approach to community development was changed in the early 1970s with the beginning of revenue sharing in 1972 and finally, with the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program in 1975, established by the 1974 Community Development Act. Under the CDBG approach, program funds

were lumped together, and control over allocation of funds was shifted to localities. The role of Congress was to allocate funds for a category of problem such as housing rehabilitation and community development. It was assumed that this would be an effective means of achieving the objective of the 1974 act: "The development of viable urban communities by providing decent housing and suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunity principally for persons of low and moderate-income" (2).

In the main, older urban cities went underfunded. This change, through a bureaucratically established formula, "actually shifted money away from the areas of greatest need to the suburbs and growing cities of the Sunbelt" (Newfield and DuBrul, 1981:46). Even though there have been steady increases in CDBG allocations nation-wide ranging from \$3.2 to \$3.5 billion from 1976 through 1980 (Clay, 1982), increases have amount to losses in real dollars. In the 1981 CDBG budget of \$3.95 billion, the increased allocation of \$150 million over the 1980 allocation was, in actuality, a cut of 5% in real dollars (Low Income Housing Coalition, 1980).

4. The New York City CDBG Experience

New York City receives the largest single Community Development Block Grant in the country (New York City Housing and Community Development Coalition, 1980), and, if one includes allocations for the Department of Housing Preservation and Development, the New York City Housing

Authority and the Model Cities Program, \$820,467,290, or 76% of the entire New York CD allocations between 1974 and 1981, were allocated to housing and housing related activities (New York City Office of Management and Budget, 1981).

However, although the city consistently used a demographic analysis of low-income areas in developing a justification for large CDBG requests to the federal government, it would appear that when appropriations were made locally, areas that had been used to justify the needs analysis were often ignored (Pratt Center for Community and Environment Development, 1976). The New York City Housing and Community Development Coalition, an amalgam of community organizations that represented low- and moderate-income constituencies (3) charged in 1976, that CDBG monies were continually being used to spur investment in middle class neighborhoods rather than in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, that too much was being appropriated for agency staffing, and that appropriations went unused or were spent slowly. Evidence to support these charges includes numerous instances where median income of areas designated to receive funds were above across-the-board median income, and therefore did not meet the guidelines of Title I of the 1974 Act (Schur, 1976). Furthermore, statistics released by the New York City Council indicated that, by 1979, one-half of the CD \$343 million from 1975 through 1978 remained unspent (City Limits, 1979).

The pattern of neglect of low- and moderate-income neighborhoods changed slightly in the latter part of the 1970s for two primary reasons. First, in 1977, the federal government required cities to adhere to a 75% means test, which stated that 75% of program funds should be used for projects and activities that would principally benefit low- and moderate-income persons. Second, the city began to acquire large amounts of abandoned residential property in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods that required program development. Some redistributive programs emerged, such as sweat equity (4), grants and loans to low-income homeowners, CETA employment (5), money for housing maintenance and repair, and community management programs. Local participation in the CD process was increased to include the 59 community boards as the primary mechanism for citizen input (City Limits, 1978). However, programs such as the participation loan program (PLP), used to benefit noneligible (because of income) residents located in CD eligible tracts (6), and the Article 8A mini-loan program (7), often inapplicable in low- and moderate-income buildings since buildings must be up to date in tax payments to apply, grew quickly in the late 1970s.

Once again, in 1980, a coalition of community organizations (New York City Housing and Community Development Coalition, 1980) requested HUD to redirect CD funds, citing the city's failure to satisfy the 75% means test (8), to substantiate benefits to low- and

moderate-income persons, to provide adequately for citizen participation, to protect against displacement and to open opportunities to develop legally sufficient strategies for economic development, equal housing and employment. Citing HUD regulations (9), they charged that the measure the city used to justify benefits going to low- and moderate-income persons was inadequate. HUD, however, failed to enforce its regulations and, by 1981, the Reagan Administration was championing a strong deregulatory government posture in which the city became freer to encourage investment in middle- and upper-income areas. HUD continued its history of approving the city's CD application, finding fault only with its details. The participation loan program, which had guidelines that required bank participation up to 50% of the total loan, was going to neighborhoods considered by banks to be safe for investment, and new rents resulting from improvements made under this program were beyond the reach of low- and moderate-income households (New York City Housing and Community Development Coalition, 1980). In fact, prior to 1980, the participation loan program (PLP) garnered 4.8 % the the total housing allocation (New York City Office of Management and Budget, CD Unit, 1981); in 1980-81 it received 9% of the housing allocation; by 1982-83 allocations had risen to 12% (New York City Department of City Planning, 1982). Sweat equity, on the other hand, was eliminated in 1981. In the coalition's written complaint it was shown to have resulted in the lowest rents of any

Housing Preservation and Development program, maximum benefits going to low- and moderate-income tenants. In 1981, President Reagan rescinded the 75%-means test and, in September 1982, HUD announced that it would no longer review the ways that cities use CDBG funds to see if they are assisting families with low- or moderate-incomes (Pear, 1982).

5. Trends in New York State Housing Policy

New York State housing-construction policy, long touted to be the most progressive among state efforts, responded to an unintended consequence of suburban expansion policies, a consequence that created difficulties for central city corporate capital and, consequently, for state government. By the end of the 1950s, the exodus to the suburbs was drawing middle-class technical and clerical workers out of the city too rapidly to maintain the tax base and the infrastructure and services necessary to forge the post-industrial city.

In 1955, state officials articulated a plan to stem the flight by offering the Mitchell-Lama housing program, which eventuated 73,316 units of middle-income housing by 1981 (New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, 1981; The Scott Commission Reports, 1973). A state housing finance agency (HFA), was also created to satisfy middle-income housing needs, and it was not until 1968, when Rockefeller created the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), outside of the referenda process, that federal housing

subsidies were used to develop 31,889 units of low- and moderate-income housing around the entire state (New York State Moreland Commission Act Report, 1976; New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, 1981). The fiscal collapse of UDC in 1975 also ended the state's brief and limited role in providing housing in "high risk" areas.

In retrospect, it seems clear that, as progressive as it may have been in relation to the actions of other states, New York State's housing program has generally been geared to middle-income needs. Housing programs for low- and moderate-income people were limited, were required to be self-liquidating (or face defunding or collapse, as was the case with UDC), and were tied to federal subsidy.

To summarize, in the same way that government mechanisms to finance mortgages have encouraged suburbanization and withdrawal of capital from urban neighborhoods, government-funded urban renewal has destroyed neighborhoods for profits. At the same time, the vacuum in federal- and state-assisted government housing programs has created an increased real, rather than effective, demand for low-income housing that, in all likelihood, will remain unmet. Existing rental housing nation-wide is disappearing at the rate of 600,000 to 800,000 units each year: black-occupied rental units disappearing at nearly twice the rate of white-occupied rental units, and low-income individuals and families suffering the most (McCormic, 1980). Shelter poverty in low-income urban neighborhoods

will continue to shape the urban community as housing for low- and moderate-income people continues to deteriorate and increased numbers of people become homeless.

C. Tax Policies

Tax policies have contributed to shaping urban form in in their role of subsidizing homeownership and by spurring investment. First, homeowner tax deductions, (tax revenues forgone), create an environment conducive to homeownership. They also largely redistribute income from renters to owners (Dolbeare, 1981; Starr and Esping-Andersen, 1981), and from middle-income homeowners to higher-income ones (Hellmuth, 1977). In 1979 alone, 95% of the value of homeowner deductions was received by taxpayers with incomes above the median, and almost 60% went to taxpayers with incomes in the top 10% of the income distribution (Dolbeare, 1981). Housing-related tax revenues forgone have risen from \$10.2 billion in 1977 to \$28.9 billion in 1981 (Goetze, 1981). The increase in homeowner deductions in any given year is generally higher than the total outlay of all the assisted housing payments ever made under all HUD assisted programs (Dolbeare, 1981).

Homeowner tax deductions also contribute to the lack of rental housing in inflationary times. Rather than let themselves be priced out of market, which would exert a downward pressure on prices, people will buy during inflation since property ownership can be a tax shelter. Therefore inflation stays high and rental housing can only

be produced for high income people. Dolbeare suggests that at a tax rate of 30%, a renter would have to earn \$650 before taxes for each \$500 rent check. Producing only for upper-income needs causes overly intensive use of existing units and higher rents. It also leads to resettlement of initially less marketable inner-city neighborhoods, conversions from rental to co-operative apartment units, further pressure on the rental market, eventual displacement, and change in the social base of a neighborhood: all of which can cause tremendous hardship on low- and moderate-income people.

Tax policies used to spur investment through depreciation allowances and municipal exemption programs have fostered production of decent housing for those in need, but have also encouraged frequent turnover of property. In addition, they have discouraged continuing ownership, the impact of which may be milking practices and property abandonment, particularly in low-rent neighborhoods with multifamily rental properties.

Municipal tax exemption and abatement policies used to spur investment can also have an impact on urban neighborhoods. For example, some have charged that the J-51 program, which exempts increased real estate taxes resulting from rehabilitation or improvement and abates existing taxes according to the dollar value of the improvement, has actually contributed to the displacement of low- and moderate-income people in New York City: 1) by first

displacing small businesses that employ them through commercial/industrial to residential conversions; and 2) by then displacing the poor and elderly who reside in the single-room occupancies (SROs) that have been converted to luxury housing (Tenants and Neighbors, 1982). The J-51 program might also be considered a tax give-away when one realizes that in fiscal year 1979 the city gave up \$42 million in tax revenues on J-51 properties and that the J-51's ultimate cost to the city in revenue forgiven from 1961 to 1979 approximates \$1.1 billion (Goldin, 1980). Some further argue that investment in prime real estate would continue without incentives, citing that, by 1979, "more than 55% of J-51 benefits were going to middle and upper middle-income neighborhoods such as Greenwich Village, East Side and Upper West Side in Manhattan, Brooklyn Heights and Park Slope in Brooklyn" (Baldwin, 1979b). Although controversy erupting in 1982 resulted in elimination of SROs from J-51, it seems clear that federal and municipal tax policies can and have fostered conversion and rehabilitation trends that reinforce the role of New York City in housing white-collar middle- and upper-income people, and the eventual inability of competitive capital to support the blue-collar work force and the neighborhoods in which they live.

III. Summary and Conclusion

Using O'Connor's model of the role of the state in the accumulation process to interpret the effects of government

housing policy on urban form, we have suggested that by pursuing filtering policies and discriminatory appraisal practices, government has fostered white flight, suburbanization and abandonment of urban neighborhoods. Financial institutions and developers have been primary beneficiaries of the policies. Shelter programs have housed few; urban renewal has displaced many. Federal aid to urban community has shifted money away from older urban cities to growing Sunbelt cities, and New York City, itself, has used federal aid to spur investment in middle-income neighborhoods. Where investment interest, and therefore social capital expenses, diminish, government has tried to maintain social harmony when necessary. New York State development programs have housed the middle class.

Most important, tax policies, which provide the major share of housing subsidies through taxes forgone, have redistributed income from renters to owners, promoted co-operative and condominium conversions, and depressed the affordable rental-housing market. Although municipal incentive policies have fostered production of some decent housing for those in need, home-owner tax policies continue to encourage a widening of the gap between owners and renters.

Now that we have established a theoretical framework for interpreting major characteristics of urban change, we shall employ the historical framework derived from Gordon

and from O'Connor to examine the political economy of Park
Slope.

Notes

1. "Enacted in 1937 primarily as a job-creation program, public housing was initially opposed by mortgage lenders because it is not financed by conventional mortgage loans. Nor, however, is it financed directly by public funds. Rather, local housing authorities raise funds by selling tax-exempt, federally secured bonds to private investors. In fact, the vast majority of such bonds are held by commercial banks. The federal government then makes annual payments for interest and bond retirement. In financing terms the scheme is thus not so different from the FHA subsidy". Stone, M. (1980) "Federal housing policy: A political-economic analysis." in J. Pynoos, R. Schafer, and C.W. Hartman (eds) Housing Urban America updated second edition. New York: Aldine Publishing Company :458.
2. That means that those families who earn under \$7,522 or 80% of median income, (until the 1980 census figures were available which put 80% of median income at approximately \$16,000) are to be the principal beneficiaries of the federal monies.
3. The New York City Housing and Community Development Coalition consisted of a number of citywide organizations including the Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers, Inc., Harlem-East Harlem Model Cities Policy Committee, the Coalition of Project Area Committees, Operation Open City, and the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Economic Development. See Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development (1976) Coalition of Citywide Community Housing Groups Moves to Invalidate New York City's Community Development Plan: Petition for Administrative Review Filed with HUD and Served On the Mayor, 2 June, 1976.
4. Sweat equity is a 1% loan provided to finance 100% of rehabilitation costs where prospective owners do much of the finishing work themselves.
5. Enacted by Congress in 1973 and amended in 1974, 76, 77 and 78, the Comprehensive Employment Training Act was an attempt to deal with a growing unemployment problem in American cities, particularly among the black and Hispanic poor (Jaynes, 1982). The act was designed to provide job training and employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged unemployed or underemployed people.
6. In the participation loan program, the city provides 1/2 financing of a rehabilitation loan at 1%, and a lending institution provides the other 1/2 at market rate.

Therefore, interest rates are substantially lowered. However, because banks participate up to 50%, banks also determine where loans are to be made. Therefore, loans are not made in low-income areas, but in neighborhoods that are determined by the lending institution to be safe for investment. Further, new rents resulting from improvement made under this program are beyond the reach of low- and moderate-income households.

7. Maximum loans available on 8A program were \$5,000 per unit. Because tax payments must be up to date, 8A is often inapplicable in low- and moderate-income buildings because those buildings are in tax arrears. Since maximums are low, this restricts the article 8A program from being used in repair of seriously deteriorated buildings where low-income people generally live.
8. In fact, in a line-by-line analysis of benefits to low- and moderate-income persons in the CDVI budget, the coalition demonstrated that only 61% of the program funds would benefit low- and moderate-income persons as opposed to 75% as required by law. (New York City Housing and Community Development Coalition, 1980).
9. 24, C.F.R. #570.302 (g) (6) which provided that "in determining whether a proposed project will actually benefit low- and moderate-income persons, the nature of the needs identified, the relationship of the project to meeting those needs, and the net effect of the completed project shall be considered. Thus, mere location of an activity in a low- or-moderate income area does not conclusively demonstrate that a project or activity benefits lower-income persons."

Chapter 4

Transformations in the Political Economy of Park Slope


As might be expected of neighborhoods in older industrial cities, Park Slope underwent several transformations from its settlement in the 1840s to current times. Drawing on Gordon's (1978) framework presented in Chapter 2, and constructs developed by O'Connor (1973) discussed in Chapter 3, we shall trace the evolution of Park Slope's dual housing market.

I. Park Slope in Historical Perspective

As its name implies, Park Slope, Brooklyn, is situated on a slope that extends in an east-westerly direction from a heavily wooded area near the top of a hill, known today as Prospect Park, down the "slope" toward the Gowanus Canal, originally a creek given that name by Dutch settlers. Its geography is the result of the terminal moraine that was left by the glacier that formed Long Island and Brooklyn (Raskin, 1973). It is approximately four miles from Wall Street in Manhattan, separated from it by the adjacent neighborhoods of Carroll Gardens, Boerum Hill, Brooklyn Heights, and the East River. Its own boundaries, as suggested by area-wide organizations and the Brooklyn office of the Department of City Planning, include Flatbush Avenue to the north, Prospect Park to the east, the Prospect Expressway to the south, and Fourth Avenue to the west (see Maps 4.1 and 4.2).


Map 4.1

Park Slope Within New York City



Map 4.2

Park Slope Within Downtown Brooklyn



Park Slope in the Commercial Period: 1775-1860

In the early commercial period, after the Revolutionary War, there was very little left of the mills and homes that were burned during the battle of Long Island (Civic News, 1968). Only the dredged, widened Gowanus waterway remained as a testament to the farmers and millers who built and used it to deliver their wares to the East River without having to navigate the dangerous waters around Red Hook. In the late commercial period of the 1840s, the land within Park Slope, owned by a dozen families who were descendants of original farm families or members of Brooklyn's social elite, was divided into rectangular lots extending from the Gowanus canal to what was to become Prospect Park in 1873. In the 1850s, after the Gowanus Canal was completed, Edward Litchfield, a socially prominent attorney whose father had been speaker of the New York State Assembly and a railroad president, began to acquire farms and other holdings. In 1854, he built a country estate at the top of the hill at what is currently Prospect Park and Fourth Street (Muir, 1980). By the end of the commercial period in New York, Litchfield, who owned about one-third of what is now Park Slope and was its largest rentier, saw the potential for industrial expansion along the Brooklyn waterfront and the Gowanus Canal.

B. Park Slope in the Industrial Period: 1860-1930

Park Slope was developed during the Industrial Period, with residential development completed by 1910. Litchfield

was able to control and benefit from much of the early development. In 1866, he formed the Brooklyn Improvement Company and commenced to prepare his property for expanding chemical, light metallurgical, lumber, coal, and brick industries (Civic News, 1968). He built three branch canals leading out of the Gowanus, docks, piers, basins and warehouses. As he had expected, the development of and around the canal increased the value of the area, and played a major role in its economic and social development. Small, three-story brick-filled frame row houses were built to house the trade and manufacturing workers and their families from about 15th Street north to Sixth Street, and from the Canal east to Seventh Avenue. There was little segregation between industrial facilities and blue-collar housing. For example, the Ansonia Clock Company on 12th Street and 7th Avenue was a factory that employed 1500 people in in the 1890s (Muir, 1977).

At the same time that industrial development of the western, lower part of Park Slope near the canal was providing employment and homes for blue-collar workers, Litchfield was readying the north and central eastern sections of the upper slope near himself and Prospect Park for upper-income residential development (Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1869). By 1873, Prospect Park had been completed and Litchfield himself financed street improvements, sewers, and waterlines through a loan from the City of Brooklyn. The construction of the park was also designed to create


increased property tax revenues for Brooklyn, and under the assumption that it would attract upper-classes from Manhattan, Brooklyn's debt was expanded in order to build it.

During the 1860s, a third pattern of development of the northern section of the Slope emerged as upper-class residential development expanded from the first settled downtown section of Brooklyn near Manhattan, south along the waterfront avenue of Court Street or southeast along Fulton Street, the main commercial street of Brooklyn. One-family three- and four-story brownstones were being built. It is understandable that expansion from this point, nearest to Manhattan, would occur here. Access to Manhattan was difficult enough by horsecar and ferry, but the increased time and money needed to travel to other areas of Brooklyn may have retarded development of outlying areas.

In sum, by the 1880s residential development was occurring in three separate areas simultaneously (see Map 4.3). In the southwestern sector, brick-filled frame housing was developed for working-class households and was accessible to the developing Gowanus industrial area. In the eastern sector, near the park, Litchfield owned many of the blocks and developed them for the spacious brownstones of upper- and middle-classes, and in the northwestern sector near Flatbush and Fourth Avenue, development proceeded as an outgrowth of upper and middle class expansion from downtown Brooklyn. The central section of Park Slope remained

Map 4.3

Park Slope Development, Early Industrial Period: 1860-1886



undeveloped and further residential segmentation would be shaped by two major events.

The Brooklyn Bridge and Public Transportation:
A Means of Access

Brooklyn rentiers, seeing that further expansion of Brooklyn required a means of access to Manhattan that was ultimately less costly and less time consuming than the ferry, were keenly interested in a bridge being built that they felt would double the pace of expansion in Brooklyn (McCullough, 1972). By 1889, only six years after the opening of the Brooklyn Bridge in 1883, Fifth Avenue in Park Slope was connected to the bridge terminal by elevated lines and the bridge trains had carried over thirty million passengers (Walker, 1918). The Park Slope area, then known as Prospect Hill, was completely developed by 1911, and, consistent with original development patterns, houses in the northern and eastern sections sold for considerably more than those in the west and southeastern sections (O'Hanlon, 1982).

By the 1920s, with the near completion of the subway system, the entire city was becoming a single fare zone. Park Slope was no exception. In addition to the existing elevated line on Fifth Avenue, trolley lines were built along Prospect Park West and Seventh Avenue. The IRT was extended to the Long Island Railroad Station in 1908, the Fourth Avenue RR and Seventh Avenue Brighton Beach Lines

were added in 1920, and the Independent F Line was completed in the 1930s (O'Hanlon, 1982).

As a result of the broadening industrial base, New York City's population, particularly its blue-collar component, almost doubled between 1900 and 1930, with the effect that housing demand doubled. The increase in the city's population and the integration of public transit into Park Slope, increased blue-collar housing demand as moderate-income people sought to escape Manhattan congestion. At the same time, by the end of the industrial period, some wealthy families had begun to move out to Queens and Long Island. Working-class people were actually able to outbid the wealthy as demand decreased among elites.

Irish Roman Catholics who had settled the Gowanus moved up the slope toward the park, as the descendants of English, German, Scottish, and Dutch early settlers began to disperse slowly to outlying areas. Italian Roman Catholics moved from Manhattan to the western sections near the canal and Third Avenue. Roman Catholic institutions and activities replaced Protestant ones.

C. Park Slope in the Early Corporate Period: 1930-1950

By the 1940s, Irish Roman Catholics had replaced most of the Protestant families, Italian Roman Catholics populated much of the western sections, and the main source of new apartments consisted of subdivisions into multifamilies and rooming house conversions (Raskin, 1973).

Although the northeast and eastern sections near the park remained the high-rent area, they experienced the largest increase in units through subdivision, and all areas declined in rent. According to various census information (City of New York, 1934; Citizens Census Committee, 1942; and U.S. Census Bureau, 1950), median rent for Park Slope, between 1934 and 1950, slipped between 30% and 60% in 1967 constant dollars, while the number of apartments increased by 24% (from 21,946 in 1934 to 27,179 in 1950 an increase of 5,233 apartments). In particular, 60% of this increase (3,203 units) was in the northeastern area up to about Sixth Street and within three blocks of the park. In other words, as rent declined with the onset of suburbanization and the movement of blue-collar families into the neighborhood, the rental market expanded, mainly through subdivision, particularly in the highest rent areas.

II. Park Slope Trends: 1950-1970

During the two decades prior to the study period, Park Slope experienced white flight, increases in its blue-collar population, and expansion of the black side of Brooklyn's dual housing market. At the same time that Park Slope's blue-collar population was increasing, New York City was suffering blue-collar job losses. Consequently, Park Slope's blue-collar and low-level clerical workers suffered losses in real income. A concomitant decline in housing-market prices, deterioration, and some abandonment provided opportunities for low-wage minorities from nearby

black neighborhoods and Latins from Puerto Rico and Central America to bid for housing. At the same time young, moderate- and middle-income urban professionals were able to buy and renovate houses as white- and blue-collar families left the area. Many of the minority families sought work in small plants and storage facilities along the declining Gowanus Canal and waterfront and unemployed workers from more deteriorated neighborhoods sought better housing and safety for their families.

The following summary of demographic and housing trends in the two decades prior to the study period is drawn primarily from U.S. Census Bureau 17th, 18th, and 19th Census of Population and Housing. Census Tract divisions are shown in Maps 4.4 and 4.5.


Between 1950 and 1960, rents in Park Slope rose slightly, as the number of housing units continued to increase, albeit at a somewhat slower pace. By 1960, 3239 units were added, for a total of 30,418 units representing an increase of 12%. This trend reversed during the 1960s as subdivisions ceased and housing was rehabilitated for fewer numbers of families. During the sixties over 1000 units were lost.

In Park Slope, as in the rest of the city, there were blue-collar job losses. Although the city suffered a 26% loss, in Park Slope there was a 30% loss in blue-collar jobs between 1950 and 1970 (4259 jobs). In the white-collar job market Park Slope did not follow the city trends. In New

Map 4.4
Park Slope Census Tracts
Within South and Central Brooklyn



Map 4.5
Park Slope Study Area



York City there was a 15% increase in the number of people employed in white-collar occupations, whereas in Park Slope, which was still a predominantly blue-collar areas by 1970, there was a 16% loss in the number of people employed in white-collar jobs. This trend is also evidenced in median family-income information.

For the city, median family income was \$9,682 in 1970, whereas average median income for Park Slope tracts was \$8,350. In addition, Park Slope has not followed racial shifts within the city as a whole. By 1970, Park Slope had a 25% Puerto Rican population, while they comprised only 17% of the total New York City population. On the other hand, although black people comprised 21% of the city's population, in Park Slope, blacks consisted of 13% of the population.

In order for these general housing, income, employment and racial trends to be more meaningful in understanding abandonment and resettlement patterns within Park Slope, we shall take a closer look at changes in various parts of the neighborhood that have traditionally housed different income groups. Area divisions are presented in Map 4.6 and major changes are summarized in Table 4.1 (1).

A. Northeast

Between 1950 and 1970 the northeast upper middle class brownstone sector (tracts 159, 157, 155, 165) from Sixth Avenue to Prospect Park West, and from Sterling Place to Fifth Street, went through two population shifts. Its

Map 4.6
 Northeastern, Northwestern, Southeastern,
 and Southwestern Park Slope




Table 4.1

Summary of Housing and Demographic Trends in Park Slope:
1950-1970

Northeast census tracts (159,157 155,165)	Northwest census tracts (129.01,161, 129.02,131)	Southeast census tracts (151,153 149,167 169)	Southwest cns trts (141,139, 137,135, 133)
1950 - 1960			
Housing Unit Changes			
+1780 (22%)	+610 (16%)	+1259 (17%) (1034 in 167)	+332 (6%)
Change in Percentage of White-collar Work Force			
-7% to 56%	-8% to 26%	-3% to 47%	-1% to 37%
Percentage of Black and Puerto Rican Population in 1960*			
7%	40%	2%	7%
1960 - 1970			
Housing Unit Changes			
-858 (9%)	-787 (18%)	+601 (7%)	+93 (1%)
Changes in Percentage of White-collar Work Force			
+10% to 66%	+6% to 31%	+4% to 51%	+3% to 42%
Change in Percentage of Professional, Technical and Kindred Workers, a Category of White-collar Workers			
+14% to 29%	+0.6% to 6.2%	+3% to 12%	+3% to 7%
Change in Percentage of Black and Puerto Rican Population			
+12% to 19%	+35% to 75%	+12% to 14%	+21% to 28%
1970 Area Average of Median Family Income**			
\$10,282	\$6,077	\$8,993	\$7,992

*Puerto Rican population statistics were not available in 1950 so that change information is unavailable.

** New York City Median Family Income was \$9,682.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau 17th, 18th and 19th Census of Population and Housing.

greatest was during the 1950s, when housing units were subdivided into rooming houses and small apartments as blue-collar workers outbid white-collar workers for housing. Of the units added to Park Slope during the 1950s, 55% (1780) were in the high-rent northeastern area within three

blocks of the park. Although the northeastern part of the neighborhood still experienced the majority of subdivisions, O'Hanlon (1982) demonstrates that rents were beginning to rise in the rest of the area so that owners were provided with sufficient income to upgrade their property.

As would be expected with subdivisions for less affluent families, the 1950s was a time in which fewer residents of the northeast had white-collar occupations. In 1950, approximately 63% of employed people in the northeast had white-collar occupations, whereas by 1960, 56% held these jobs.

Between 1960 and 1970, young urban professionals began to resettle the northeast. First, the number of units decreased sharply as rents increased and houses began to be rehabilitated for fewer families. Out of a 1054 unit decline in all of Park Slope, 858, or 81% of the decrease, was in the northeast. The percentage of workers with white-collar occupations also rose over the decade and by 1970, 66% of employed people in the northeast had white-collar jobs. Median tract income was over \$10,000, considerably higher than New York City as a whole. In addition, the percentage of professional and technical workers and the like increased more rapidly than the expansion of total white-collar workers in the northeast. The black and Latin housing sector was expanding from the northwest so that the blocks east of Sixth Avenue and closest to the northwestern section, such as tract 159 at

Sterling Place and Sixth Avenue and 157 at Union Street and Sixth Avenue, began to show proportional increases in black and Latin populations.

Expansion of the black housing market was not without its tension. Racism was exploited through antagonisms shown between black, Latin, Italian, and Irish youth fighting each other along border areas. Discriminatory practices aimed at excluding blacks from the white side of the dual housing market included racial steering, institutional disinvestment, and disproportionately higher rents for blacks. At the same time, realtors and mortgage brokers engaged in block-busting tactics to exploit the market. Housing in low- and moderate-income areas deteriorated as owners deferred maintenance and property tax payments while collecting rents.

By 1970, 30% of the population between Sterling Place and First Street east of Sixth Avenue was black or Latin, whereas only 4% of the population between Eighth Avenue and Prospect Park West was minority.

B. Northwest

Between 1950 and 1970 the northwest working-class sector (tracts 129.01, 129.02, 131, 161), Flatbush to Union Street, Fourth to Sixth Avenue, became a low- and moderate-income minority community. As described above, the 1950s was a time in which the black and Latin sector of Brooklyn's real estate market began to expand into its borders. In 1950, the U.S. Census notes a percentage of

blacks in that sector and the Latin population was not yet recorded. By 1960, approximately 38% of the area was black or Latin and under 30% of the population had white-collar jobs.

From 1960 to 1970, the percentage of workers with white-collar occupations in the northwest rose a tract average of 6% over the decade so that approximately 31% of the population were white-collar workers. Median-tract family income in 1970 was under \$6,077, considerably less in the city and substantially less than in the adjacent tracts of the northeast. By 1970, over 75% of this area was black or Latin, mainly the latter.

C. Southeast

The southeast quadrant above Sixth Avenue (tracts 153, 151, 149, 167, 169), extending from Fifth Street to the Prospect Expressway, and from Sixth Avenue to the Park, was also a mixed-housing and mixed-income area that remained a white, stable neighborhood over the two decades. The percentage of white-collar workers dropped from about 50% to 47% between 1950 and 1960, and the black and Latin population remained below 2%.

From 1960 to 1970, the percentage of workers with white-collar occupations remained fairly stable at approximately 51%, rising a tract average of 4% over the decade. Professional workers rose to 12% making up 23% of the white-collar work force. Median-tract family income in

1970 was \$9,000, and approximately 14% of the population was black or Latin, again mainly Latin.

D. Southwest

The southwest quadrant, consisting of low- and moderate-income working-class residents (tracts 133, 135, 137, 139, 141), was bounded by Union Street, Prospect Expressway, Fourth Avenue and Sixth Avenue. It remained relatively stable between 1950 and 1970, with the Latin population slowly expanding. The percentage of white-collar workers ranged between 35% and 40% during the 1950s, and, throughout the entire decade, this area remained a relatively stable, white, blue-collar community, with the percentage of black or Latin population remaining below 7%.

Between 1960 and 1970, the percentage of workers with white-collar occupations remained at approximately 42%, rising a tract average of 3% over the decade with only 7% of workers having professional or technical jobs. Median-tract family income in 1970 was around \$8,000, somewhat less than median for the city, and approximately 28% of the population was now black or Latin, a rise of 21% from 1960.

In summary, by 1970, Park Slope was at least four distinct neighborhoods, with some overlapping characteristics. Incomes were highest and greater numbers of white-collar workers lived in the eastern tracts nearest the park. The western sections were increasingly Latin and black, particularly in the northwest, as the minority housing market expanded south and east of Sixth Avenue.

Only the southeast, with about half of its employed people in white-collar occupations and 8% below medium income, seemed to be changing slowly.

III. Park Slope Faces the 1970s

As indicated in chapter 2, with decreases in the number of small firms and growth in corporations, with losses in blue-collar employment and limited growth in white-collar employment, there has been a widening income gap between blue- and white-collar workers that reached 40% by the mid-1970s. Even low-level clerical jobs and low-skilled jobs in competitive capital, such as sales and administrative work have been contracting as office technology has expanded. As the total number of city residents who are employed have decreased, the number of sales, clerical, and blue-collar workers has also decreased. Certain sectors of white-collar employment--namely professional or managerial occupations--have increased slowly over the decade.

Shifts in the labor market brought about by changes in the mode of capital accumulation, and, reinforced by trends in government housing policy and institutional disinvestment of black neighborhoods, have deeply affected residential real-estate markets in urban neighborhoods by promoting the expansion of those serving professional needs and homeownership, those changes have encouraged all who can manage it to own their units. There is a real crisis in the rental housing market, (see Appendix V). Rent as a proportion of household income rose from 20% to 28% between

1970 and 1981 (Stegman, 1982). The rate of growth in poor socioeconomic groups continues to rise, and over 30% of renter households pay 40% or more for rent. Add to this widening income gap between occupational and residential tenure-status groups the fact that residential submarkets servicing professionals and managers were expanding as housing costs rose precipitously in Manhattan. By 1970, Park Slope had become a site for this expansion. One could hypothesize that, in the 1970s, Park Slope, as a predominantly blue-collar residential neighborhood, would suffer the impacts of labor shifts and increasing housing costs differentially. Those areas that house the professional and managerial groups would expand as white-collar groups outbid blue-collar and clerical groups for housing. Those areas that traditionally served blue-collar groups would become increasingly peopled by minorities and suffer disinvestment.

IV. Park Slope in the 1970s

As in the entire city, Park Slope lost both population and blue-collar jobs during the 1970s. The Park Slope population was reduced by 17.6% or 13,900 people as the city suffered a 10% loss. Although some of the 1980 census categories have changed, particularly in occupational structure and race, making comparability difficult to achieve (2), certain trends are apparent and presented in Table 4.2.

First, there was a slight overall increase in the

number of housing units and a 17.6% decrease in population.
Housing demand has remained high in many areas of New York

Table 4.2

Summary of Housing and Demographic Trends in Park Slope:
1970-1980

Northeast	Northwest	Southeast	Southwest
(159,157 155,165)	(129.01,161 129.02,131)	(151,153 149,167, 169)	(141,139, 137,135, 133)
Housing Unit Changes			
-124 (1%)	+462 (12%)	+502 (6%)	+314 (4%)
Population Changes			
-3993(19%)	-1210(11%)	-5295(21%)	-3389(17)
Changes in the Percentage of Owner-Occupied Housing Units			
+4% to 19%	+4% to 16%	0% to 22%	+3%to 22%
Changes in Percentage of White-collar Work Force			
+16% to 82%	+25% to 56%	+13% to 64%	+13to 55%
Change in Percentage of Blacks and People of Spanish Origin*			
-6% to 24%	0% to 82%	+2% to 36%	+18%to51%
Changes in the Average of Median Contract Rent In Constant Dollars(3)			
+9%	+10%	+15%	+15%
Changes in Tract Averages of Median Family Income In 1970 Constant Dollars (4)			
+19%	-18%	-10%	-17%
1980 Tract Averages of Median Family Income**			
\$24,247	\$9,861	\$16,191	\$13,235

*The change figures from 1960 to 1970 represent changes in black plus Puerto Rican population because only Puerto Rican population figures were available in 1960. However in the 1970 census there was a category of Spanish-speaking people which is used in this 1970-80 analysis to compare to the 1980 census category of people of Spanish origin. According to that categorization 1970 figures were NE 30%, NW 82%, SE 34%, SW 33%.

** New York City median family income was \$9,682 in 1970 and \$16,818 in 1980.

City even though population has declined (see Appendix V).

Household size is getting smaller, and Park Slope reflects

this overall trend. In addition, there has been a slight increase in the percentage of housing units that are owner-occupied in Park Slope. Since census tract data does not take co-operative and condominium conversions into account, and since at least 2000 units have been removed from the rental housing market in Park Slope over the decade (5), it would appear that the increase in owner-occupied units, coupled with conversions, indicate a reduction in the rental housing stock. However, small increases in the numbers of housing units in all but the northeast (Table 4.2) may offset this reduction.

Second, as in the entire city, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of the Park Slope population engaged in white-collar employment. However, as shown in Table 4.3, for the last decade it would appear that in comparison to New York City, Park Slope's managerial and professional white-collar work force is growing somewhat more rapidly than the city as a whole. Park Slope is becoming increasingly resettled by young professionals. Therefore, it is not surprising that, by 1980, the largest white-collar work force resided in the eastern sectors and in the northeast in particular, with 82% of its employed population over 18 engaged in white-collar employment (see Table 4.2). Unfortunately, because of the recategorization of white-collar variables in the 1980 census, comparability between 1970 and 1980 is presently unattainable (6).

Table 4.3

Comparison of Percentage of Work Force Employed By
Occupation Between New York City and Park Slope: 1950-1980

Occupation	1950		1960		1970		1980	
	NYC	PS	NYC	PS	NYC	PS	NYC	PS
Professional Managerial	22%	17%	21%	17%	24%	20%	26%	37%
Sales	27	33	30	31	34	32	36	31
Clerical								
Total WC	49	50	51	48	58	52	62	68
Craftsmen	38	39	35	39	28	34	23	20
Operatives								
Laborers								
Service	13	12	13	13	14	14	15	12

Source: U.S. Census Bureau 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th Census of Population and Housing.

In terms of race, Park Slope, like the entire city, is becoming increasingly black, Hispanic, and segregated. As Table 4.4 reveals, by 1980, the predominant minority in Park Slope were people of Spanish origin (30%), whereas in New York City as a whole, the predominant minority was black. However, when we look at the changes over the decade within Park Slope (Table 4.2), a trend seems to be emerging in which, not only is the upper income northeast increasingly white-collar, but it is decreasingly minority. On the other hand, the low- and moderate-income northwest, although predominantly minority, has remained racially stable and has had the largest increase (25%) in white-collar workers as the northeastern section expanded. The moderate-income southwest, which traditionally served a white, blue-collar constituency, became increasingly minority over the decade.

Table 4.4

Distribution of Race in New York City and Park Slope:
1970-1980

	1970		1980	
Population	NYC	PS	NYC	PS
Black	21%	13%	25%	13%
Hispanic	17	25	20	30
Other	62	62	55	57
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: U.S. Census Bureau 19th and 20th Census of Population and Housing.

Finally, in terms of changes in the median contract rent and family income (see Table 4.2), we see a widening of the rent-income ratio among occupational and racial/cultural categories. In the professional northeast, incomes have risen 19% in 1967 constant dollars and rents have increased only 9% over the decade, so that even though the median contract rent for the area, \$236, is considerably higher than in any other area, income is outpacing rent increases.

In all other areas, the reverse is true. Income has decreased by 18% in the northwest while rents have increased by 10%. In the southeast, income has decreased 10% and rent has increased 15%. The hardest hit area is the southwest, which is furthest away from the expanding white-collar northeast. Here, income has decreased by 17% over the decade and rents have increased by 15%.

We can get an even closer look at housing-market changes within these areas by reviewing O'Hanlon's (1982)

findings on the "Park Slope Real Estate Market, 1965 to 1980". He categorized sales, tax arrearages and distribution of vacant buildings (see Appendix I for definitions) into 14 distinct areas within Park Slope. His exhibits and tables are reproduced in Appendix IV. Although his 14 areas do not always coincide with census tract lines, by collapsing them into the four areas we have been using in this paper, we can compare housing market and demographic trends. Map 4.7 illustrates the divisions made which coincide most closely with O'Hanlon's categorization system, and Table 4.5 summarizes the housing market trends.

A. Northeast

Throughout the 1970s the resettlement trends begun in the early 1960s continued and expanded unabated. Young urban professionals purchased and renovated brownstones at increasingly high prices. In constant 1967 dollars, the average sales price for a home in the upper-middle-class northeast rose by 53% (from \$29,127 to \$44,432) over the decade. On the average, the percentage of residential buildings five quarters in tax arrears showed a slight decrease over the decade, to a low 3.4 %. Surveys of vacant or demolished buildings were conducted on a yearly basis beginning in 1975. In the northeast, as would be expected, few buildings were vacant or demolished--12 in 1975 and seven, or .2% of the housing stock, in 1980.

Map 4.7

Areas Within Park Slope that Conform Most Closely to Census
Track and Housing-Market Sections Used by O'Hanlon (1982)



Table 4.5

Summary of Housing Market Trends in Park Slope: 1970-1980			
Northeast (3,4,7,8,9)*	Northwest (1,2)*	Southeast (12,13,14)*	Southwest (5,6,10,11)
Change in Mean Sales Price for Private and Walkup Residential Buildings in Constant 1967 Dollars			
+53% to 44M	0 to 16M	-11% to 16M	+16% to 19M
Actual Mean 1980 Sales Price			
\$112,700	\$35,200	\$38,900	\$41,800
Change in Percentage of Residential Buildings Five Quarters in Tax Arrears			
-.2% to 3.4%	+5% to 16%	+2.3% to 6.3%	+2% to 6.75%
83 bldgs	154 bldgs.	117 bldgs.	131 bldgs.
Change in Actual Number of Vacant or Demolished Buildings 1975-1980			
-5 to 7	+73 to 105	+36 to 49	+29 to 40
Number of Vacant Buildings Reoccupied or under Construction in 1980 That Were Vacant between 1976 and 1979			
17	28	15	21
*These numbers correspond to the area numbers used by O'Hanlon (1982) that are closest to Census Tract Lines. See Figure 6 in Appendix IV.			

In looking at O'Hanlon's (1982) Table 4.6 in Appendix IV it seems clear that the only section in the northeast with more than three vacant buildings in 1976 was area 7, half of which would be in the southeast according to tract lines. It is interesting to note that in this central Park Slope location (Union to Ninth Street, Sixth to Seventh Avenue) nine buildings were vacant in 1975, and that by 1980, nine buildings were reoccupied or under construction. In addition, the actual mean sales price in sector 7 was \$70,600 by 1980, rising 59% in constant 1967 dollars. We can observe a similar pattern in section 3 (Flatbush to

Union, Sixth to Seventh Avenue), which is also on the periphery of northeastern Park Slope, adjacent to the more deteriorated northwest. Although there was little abandonment or arrearages, mean sales price rose 116% in constant dollars to an actual sales price of \$91,500 in 1980, whereas the sales price in the adjacent "heart" of the wealthy white-collar area (Flatbush to Union, Seventh Avenue to Prospect Park West) rose 89% over the decade. It would appear that resettlement by wealthier white-collar workers was spreading out from the northeast during the 1970s, and that this group was recapturing the area formerly in the black side of the dual housing market.

B. Northwest

Of all the sections of Park Slope, the low-income, increasingly black and Latin northwest suffered the most deterioration and housing abandonment over the decade. As indicated earlier, by 1970 the northwest was 75% minority. Although the processes of institutional disinvestment and deferred maintenance had begun in the 1960s, widespread deterioration was largely precipitated by the razing, in 1973, of over 400 units on an entire block between Fourth and Fifth Avenue to make way for a new school that was never built. The sudden loss of the families, and the increase in surrounding abandonment was disastrous for the local shopping street, Fifth Avenue, as well as for surrounding residential blocks. Housing above the stores along the commercial street deteriorated and became abandoned as the

stores themselves went out of business. By the end of the decade, however, northwest properties near Sixth Avenue, the border of the upper-income northeast, were being renovated by new white-collar black and white professionals. Gentrification was rapidly moving west.

Although actual sales prices have risen as a result of inflation, in constant 1967 dollars, the average sales price in the working-class northwest rose less than 1% (from \$15,365 to \$15,548). In fact, in section 1 of the northwest (Flatbush to Union, Fourth to Fifth Avenue), sale price, in constant dollars, actually decreased by 25% during the 1970s. In the entire area, the average percentage of buildings in arrears increased by 4% over the decade from 11% to 16%, and the number of vacant or demolished buildings rose by 228% from 32 buildings to 105, or 11% of the northwest area's total housing stock. However, as O'Hanlon shows in his Table 4.6 (Appendix IV) 28 buildings that had been vacant were reoccupied or under construction by 1980.

In section 2, adjacent to the northeastern sector 3, (Flatbush to Union, Fifth to Sixth Avenue), there were signs of movement into the white-collar housing sector. First, housing prices rose by 14% in constant dollars during the 1970s, whereas, in section 1, housing prices decreased by 21%. Second, whereas tax arrearages rose by 5% between 1978 and 1980 in section 1, arrearage remained stable in section 2, decreasing by one percent between 1979 and 1980.

C. Southeast

With blue-collar jobs disappearing city wide and ethnic European families continuing to leave South Brooklyn, the housing market suffered in the traditionally working-class southeast. Mean sales prices dropped by 11%, property arrearages increased to 6.3% of the residential housing stock, and the number of vacant or demolished buildings rose to 49, or 2.6% of the stock. Mean sales price dropped by over 16% in O'Hanlon's sections 12 and 13 (Ninth Street to the Prospect Expressway, Sixth Avenue to Eighth Avenue). In these sections, including the commercial strip along Seventh Avenue, mainly Latin people were housed in undermaintained apartments above the stores. These properties became increasingly deteriorated over the decade as owners deferred maintenance and cut services to tenants. Although arrearages only rose 2.3% in the entire area, they rose 3.5% along Seventh Avenue in areas 12 and 13, from 50 to 94 residential properties.

D. Southwest.

In the predominantly moderate-income southwest, with its three-story brick and frame houses, two trends occurred concurrently. First, housing prices rose where blocks bordered the upper middle class northeast and fell in the rest of the sector. Even though the mean sales prices in constant dollars increased (by 16%) so did the percentage of residential building in arrears (by 2%, to 131 buildings) and the number of vacant buildings. It would seem that, once again, rising sales prices can be attributed to the

increased ability of white-collar workers to outbid blue-collar and low-level clerical workers for housing. In section 6, which borders the northeastern area for 14 blocks, sales prices increased by 49% over the decade, whereas in the rest of the southwestern area, sales prices decreased by 14%. Arrearages and vacant buildings predominated in section 5 (Union to Ninth Street, Fourth to Fifth Avenue), increasing to 14% of the housing stock while vacant or demolished buildings rose to 23.

E. Institutional Financing Patterns

In addition to his housing-market findings, O'Hanlon found substantial evidence of institutional disinvestment and block-busting activities by private mortgage companies in Park Slope in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By the late 1970s there was a reversal in investment policies in which some banks liberalized their mortgage terms. Areas of Park Slope were differentially affected by these investment decisions.

As might be predicted, the northeast, having the largest percentage of bank financing, remained attractive to banks and had little block-busting activity. Banks disinvested heavily in the northwest. Mortgage companies increased activity, and when they withdrew from the area market in 1975, almost all sales were financed with cash or private mortgages. In the southeast and southwest, bank financing followed a similar tack, but not as extreme as in the northeast. Bank investment decreased but not below 20%

of sales, and mortgage-company activity never rose above 30% of sales. O'Hanlon postulates, and the evidence seems to support his contention, that even though the south Slope had a brick filled frame-housing stock and working-class population--and certainly experienced disinvestment--it suffered less because it was some distance from the center of the black and Latin populations at Flatbush and Fifth Avenue.

F. Perceptions of Realtors

In early 1978, real-estate brokers were interviewed by O'Hanlon and myself. The findings are reported in O'Hanlon (1982) and summarized below.

By 1978, it was clear that in the northeast and those parts of the northwest that lie east of the Fifth Avenue, predominantly white professionals from Manhattan and other communities, singles or couples with few children, were securing housing. Although black, Latin, and white working-class families from the area, and from more deteriorated Brooklyn neighborhoods, were looking also, they were priced out of the market above Sixth Avenue, north of Ninth Street. Between Fifth and Sixth Avenue levels of desirability and rates of vacancy varied on a block-by-block basis, depending on race, income level, and presence of multifamily housing. Although financing of multifamily housing was impossible, there was optimism because of increased and continued demand. Even though whites consistently outbid blacks and Latins for housing, some

black middle- and upper-income professionals were also able to secure housing. Brokers described overt discrimination against blacks based upon the supposed arrogance of blacks towards whites, the fear of crime and of decreased property values, and the inability to rent to whites when blacks came to reside in a building.

In the deteriorating northwest, on the blocks below Fifth Avenue and on some blocks between Fifth and Sixth Avenue, blacks and Latins were continuing to rent and buy lower-priced homes although, or perhaps because, as the evidence indicates, abandonment and arrearages were high.

In the white working-class southwest and mixed-income southeast, perceptions were different, but consistent with demographic and housing trends. From Union to Ninth Street demand by white professionals was high east of Fifth Avenue, particularly South of Third Street where there were fewer eight-family and four-story buildings and a majority of one- and two-family homes, many of which were brick and brownstone.

South of Ninth Street, demand was mixed. Brokers tended to specialize in different ethnic groups. There were some white professionals from Manhattan moving in the southeastern blocks bordering on the park. Black families were moving from areas north of Flatbush Avenue and Latins were coming from nearby neighborhoods. Although these latter groups may have preferred park blocks, they had limited resources and difficulties acquiring mortgages and

fire insurance for the less-expensive, brick-filled frame houses. Brokers and sellers discriminated against blacks more than Latins. However, demand in southern Park Slope predominated among moderate-income minorities, as is evidenced by the increase in minorities in the south Slope.

V. Summary and Conclusion

The development of Park Slope during the industrial period and the subsequent changes through the current corporate period are reflections of the changing role of one neighborhood in the political economy of an older industrial city.

Over the last hundred years, Park Slope can be described as having been comprised of several smaller neighborhoods. As a result of its demographic and housing development in conjunction with those boundaries chosen by the U.S. Census, we have chosen to distinguish four areas for comparison. Others might have been chosen, and, as is evidenced by the above analysis, boundaries between areas will shift as dual labor and housing markets shape choice and limit potential.

We have witnessed several transformations in Park Slope's development. Originally, the southern and western parts of the area were developed to house those who worked in the areas of industrial development near the Gowanus Canal and other manufacturing and storage facilities. On the other hand, the northern and eastern sections were built to house upper-income residents who were moving from

Manhattan and the downtown Brooklyn area. During the first three decades of the twentieth century, however, when New York City's industrial base was expanding, blue-collar families began to outbid the upper-income families who were moving to the suburbs. Between 1930 and 1950 northern and eastern sections of Park Slope became home to the moderate-income blue-collar worker as units were subdivided into rooming houses and small apartments and rents declined. Southern areas remained stable, white/blue-collar areas.

During the 1950s and 1960s, as New York City lost manufacturing, subdivisions ceased and Park Slope suffered disproportionately due to the fact that it still housed mainly blue-collar families. By 1970, the black side of the dual housing market had expanded into the northeast and rents were rising there as managerial and professional employment began to expand in the city. Between 1960 and 1970, professional white-collar workers expanded by 14% in the northeast, a much greater percentage of expansion relative to white-collar expansion in other sections of Park Slope. In the southeast and southwest sections of the area, the white-collar work force increased by what it had lost during the 1950-60 decade and both areas were under 30% minority-occupied by 1970. Southern Park Slope remained relatively stable. By the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, financial institutions redlined all but the heart of the northeastern section, and mortgage companies engaged in blockbusting, furthering deterioration.

During the 1970s we have witnessed the expansion of the upper-income white-collar housing market throughout the northeast, as upper-income professionals outbid low- and moderate-income families for housing. In the sections of the northwest and south, where low- and moderate-income blue-collar, clerical, and service workers have predominated, areas become increasingly populated by minorities and the income gap between the professional/managerial class and the rest of the population has widened even further. In the northwest and south, the decrease in real income, and the increase in contract rent has produced a rising rent-income ratio. Even as increasing numbers of residents become white-collar, the large salary differences between workers in competitive versus monopoly capital or between clerical and professional employment continues to grow, promoting fragmentation and perhaps legitimizing inequalities in authority and in the providing of housing and neighborhood services.

As would be expected from these widening gaps within the housing and labor markets, northwestern and southern areas inside of the moderate-income, blue-collar, and clerical white-collar sectors are deteriorating with rising arrearage and vacancy levels, the magnitude of which is partially hidden by the expanding professional sector. By the late 1970s, local rentiers were optimistic about white-collar expansion and actively promoted it where

possible. It was in this housing market that local institutions changed and community organizations emerged.

In the following chapter we shall discuss some of the changes that occurred within local religious, educational, and political institutions.

Notes

1. Area divisions were made in the way that they were for a number of reasons. First, they were made according to housing and ethnic group development in the area. For example, the housing stock between Fourth and Fifth Avenues north of Union Street is high rise and four-story brownstone and brick, whereas south of Union Street it is mainly three-story brick and brick-filled frame. In the early 1970s, Union Street was a known dividing line between Italian and Latin residential groups, although those lines were blurred by 1980. Second, the lines were drawn to conform to census lines. That is why there is a section that appears to jut out at the northeastern border of the northwestern area, and accounts for the irregular division between the North and Southeast. Third, the lines were drawn to conform as closely as possible to O'Hanlon (1982) in order to have comparability.
2. Comparability was difficult to achieve particularly when comparing Latin population from 1960 to 1980. In 1960 only Puerto Rican population figures were available. In 1970, census data was available for Puerto Rican and Spanish-speaking populations and in 1980 data was available for Puerto Rican and people of Spanish origin, which according to M. Oling of the Department of City Planning, Population Division, is comparable to the 1970 figures for Spanish speaking populations. In this research we compared Puerto Rican population in 1960 and 1970 and Spanish-speaking population to people of Spanish origin in 1970 and 1980.
3. Median contract rents are presented in census material per tract and individual Ns are not given. Therefore it is only a guesstimate to average tract rents since Ns may vary.
4. Median family income is also presented in the census material per tract, and therefore attempts to average income over an area are only estimated since population varies by tract. In the 1980 census median income is presented by family and by household whereas in the 1970 census it is presented only by family income. Family membership is limited to those persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption who reside together in the same housing unit. Because there has been a substantial increase in the number of persons who live alone or with nonrelatives, the household may be a more appropriate unit of analysis today. However, for the sake of comparability, we chose to compare median

family income. It is interesting to note that median household income is substantially lower than family income in the study tracts, and that comparing family income for 1970 and 1980 is a more conservative estimate than comparing family income from 1970 and household income in 1980.

5. It would seem important to know how many rental units were removed from the rental market as a result of condominium and co-operative conversions in order to predict the effects of removal of rental housing units from the market. In Park Slope, according to informal interviews with real-estate brokers John Noonan and Susan Breen and developers Charles Friedman and H. Einhorn, co-op conversions began in earnest in mid 1978. Records on conversions are not reported in the census and information is on a building-by-building basis in the Department of Real Estate and/or held by the State Attorney General's office. Since the Attorney General's records are backlogged and unavailable after 1979, and review of real-estate records for each building in Park Slope does not indicate whether buildings were eviction or non-eviction plans, brokers and developers offered an estimate. In an informal count of units developed by known developers and buildings converted since 1978, these local real estate people came up with an estimate of 2000 to 3000 units.
6. In the 1980 census, occupational structure is completely different from that presented in the 1970 census. According to M. Oling of the Population Division of the Department of New York City Planning in February 1983, except for gross categories such as white-collar occupations, further comparisons are not feasible at present.

Chapter 5
Institutional Change in Park Slope:
Fragmentation and Expansion

I. Park Slope Institutions: 1860-1960.

As we outlined in Chapter 4, Park Slope was developed in three separate areas simultaneously. In the northeast, many of the blocks were developed for and by upper and middle classes, and the development of the originally middle income northwest was an outgrowth of expansion from downtown Brooklyn. In the southwest, brick-filled frame housing was built for working-class households. Local religious, educational, and political institutions, reflecting Park Slope's changing role in the political economy of New York City, have emerged, developed, contracted, become fragmented and reemerged as early upper-class development was followed by expanding industrial development: which, in turn, has become increasingly fragmented as New York City's employment base has changed.

A. Religious and Educational Institutions

Dominated by the religious and educational institutions of Brooklyn's upper-class Protestants, local schools and churches were built in the late 19th century. According to the Brooklyn Daily Almanac of 1892, there were 18 Protestant and five Roman Catholic churches constructed by 1892. Over 6000 people belonged to the Protestant churches and 12,000 to the Roman Catholic (Bklyn Daily Eagle, 1912). By the

beginning of the 20th century, five public schools had been built. In the upper-income northeast, the area's only private school, the Berkeley Institute, a college preparatory school for girls, was built in 1886 (The Berkeley Carroll Street School, 1982). Methodist Hospital was also built in the eastern section as well as Episcopal (Buck, 1976), Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Baptist churches.

The Irish Catholics population had originally settled along the Gowanus Canal district, moving east toward Prospect Park in the late industrial and early corporate period. Consequently, the membership of the Roman Catholic parishes in eastern Park Slope swelled and continued to do so as Italian Catholics moved into the western parts of the area. By 1929, membership in the seven Roman Catholic churches within Park Slope numbered 34,000: an increase of 183% over almost four decades (1892-1929). In the same period, membership in Protestant churches had increased by 28% to over 8000 members. It seems clear that, by the corporate period, Roman Catholic institutions were a significant social force in Park Slope.

On a much smaller scale, other religious institutions surfaced in the 1920s and 1930s. The Reformed Jewish Congregation, Beth Elohim, and the Ethical Culture Society and School, were founded in the northeast. Less wealthy garment-center workers and small storekeepers along Fifth Avenue built a conservative synagogue and YMHA on Ninth

Street and an orthodox synagogue, Congregation B'Nai Jacob Tefereth Israel, on 14th Street and Eighth Avenue. In the 1940s, this small Jewish community became fragmented as younger members moved to the suburbs; in the mid-1950s, the two synagogues merged to form the Park Slope Jewish Center (Shor, 1983). Also, during the 1920s, an expanding working-class community of non-Roman Catholic Poles emerged in the southwest, the Holy Cross Church, on Fifteenth Street between Fourth and Fifth Avenue, serving as the center of its social life.

As a result of the transformation of the city into an industrial center, and the consequent increase, between 1920 and 1960, of blue-collar workers in Park Slope, the area's dominant leadership networks became the Roman Catholic parishes. These working-class parishes were central to community life. Residents schooled their children there, celebrated social occasions, and participated in the religious life that the church offered.

Even though Protestants continued to control their existing religious institutions, and, to a large extent, the public schools, and though Jewish and Polish communities had active institutional networks, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s, the swelling Roman Catholic working-class that spread throughout the area established the Slope's dominant religious and social institutions.

B. Political Institutions

The dominant Irish and Italian Roman Catholic constituency brought with it its ethnically affiliated political institutions: institutions that dispensed patronage through the Italian, and Irish United Mazzini Club (1928-1970) in the northwest, and the Irish, Italian and Polish Regular Democratic Club of the Seventh Assembly District in the south. These political clubs, hierarchically organized into block-captain and worker groups, were part of an efficient vote-gathering political machine. In return, clubs were able to provide patronage and pry loose concessions and services from government for their constituency. In the northeast, until 1961, the electorate tended to vote Republican and was connected, through gerrymandering, with areas outside of Park Slope. This effectively isolated it politically from the rest of the area (O'Hanlon, 1982).

Formed in 1928 by a funeral parlor owner, the United Mazzini Club became successful in 1934 when its leadership negotiated an arrangement with an older Irish political club (Mangano, 1983,1978). James Mangano, the funeral parlor owner's son became the leader of the club, and, for the next 36 years, there was not one contested Democratic primary in the assembly district. In both the northwest and the south, the regular Democratic clubs, through tight hierarchical networks, provided services to constituents who asked for help and "delivered" local districts during election campaigns by means of the organization's block captains and

workers. Local Roman Catholic parishes, ethnic organizations, and small-business owners worked co-operatively with these political clubs, which would provide help in securing school, park, housing, and social services. However, independent service organizations not connected to the network of ethnic institutions were actively resisted (O'Hanlon, 1982).

II. Park Slope Institutions in the 1960s.

As described in chapter 4, blue-collar jobs were lost throughout Park Slope during the 1960s. Professional white-collar expansion took place in the northeastern section, and the black and Latin side of the dual housing market moved into the northwest. In addition, there was an increase in the Latin population in the south. Park Slope institutions reflected these changes. Institutional heterogeneity and fragmentation of working-class institutions increased in the north and south.

A. Religious Institutions: 1960-1970

The 1960s can be characterized as a time of increasing heterogeneity within ethnic groups. For example, the expanding black population in the north included Caribbean as well as American blacks, and their religious affiliations included Protestant, Roman Catholic and French-speaking Pentecostal sects. The Latin population, which was predominantly Puerto Rican, included people from Cuba, Honduras, Bolivia, Chile, Nicaragua, Panama, Santo Domingo,

Ecuador, and Mexico. They, too, shared Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions.

In the increasingly minority northwest, Spanish-speaking Baptist and Pentecostal store-front churches emerged. A Brooklyn-wide, black evangelical church opened in a closed theater, and the congregation of the Baptist church on Sixth Avenue and Second Street became increasingly black over the decade. The Roman Catholic parishes in the north became more diverse, suffering large membership losses during the 1960s, and in the late 1960s, St. Augustine, located in the north on Sterling Place, began its Spanish Mass (Maynard, 1978). According to Protestant clergymen interviewed in 1978, the Protestant churches in the northeast also lost membership during the 1960s as many of their members became older or moved away. However, even with memberships as low as 75, some were able to continue operating on long-standing endowments. During the 1960s, Beth Elohim synagogue maintained a stable membership, slightly increasing its local membership, but the Jewish institutions in the south were comprised of a small number of elderly worshipers.

In the working-class south, there was an emergence of Baptist and Pentecostal store-front churches to serve the swelling Latin population. Although the Roman Catholic parishes in the south lost some population, they remained stable, particularly the two in the east, St. Saviour and Holy Name, where population remained largely white Western

European. In fact, Holy Name in the most southeasterly location in the study area experienced growth during the 1960s (Office of Catholic Education, 1983). Protestant churches in the south lost population during the 1960s. In the southwest, St. Stanislaus, a Roman Catholic church with a predominantly Polish congregation became increasingly Latin and the Polish National Church in the southwest became increasingly elderly.

B. Educational Institutions: 1960-1970

In addition to the already established Berkeley Institute and the Ethical Culture School, two new private schools opened in northeastern Park Slope: The Montessori School of Brooklyn in 1966, and the Montessori Academy in 1968. They were opened to serve the increasing number of higher income urban professionals in the neighborhood. On the other hand, two Roman Catholic high schools in the north closed during the 1960s, St. Augustine's and St. Francis Academy.

Roman Catholic elementary-school enrollment also decreased over the sixties (Office of Catholic Education, 1983). On the whole, they suffered a 16% decline in enrollment: from 6202 to 5202 students. However, enrollment losses were concentrated in the north and southwest, where a dual housing market, in which minorities were moving east, still existed. In the northwest, there was a 33% enrollment loss over the decade and, in the southwest, a 29% loss. In the east, although St. Saviour experienced a 16% decrease

over the decade, Holy Name Elementary School, connected to the largely Irish and Polish parish in the southeast, increased its enrollment by 40% to 1489 children. St. Saviour High School, the only Roman Catholic high school within Park Slope by the end of the 1960s, remained fully enrolled.

C. Political Institutions: 1960-1970

During the 1960s, the regular Democratic clubs maintained political control of most of Park Slope. As the non-ethnically aligned, liberal-voting middle class moved in to the east, districts were gerrymandered to maintain control. However, by the end of the decade, clubs formed that were to represent new middle-class interests.

Until the late 1960s, the United Mazzini Club, operating from its home on Union Street between Fourth and Fifth Avenue, continued to be the political stronghold of the northwest area and ran south to about 6th Street. Hispanic membership increased and many of those regular Democrats who moved away returned to work on election campaigns and to vote using addresses of relatives (Thompson, 1983). In fact, from 1961, when Dowd, a regular Democrat, was elected assemblyman in the Third Assembly District (1), until 1969 when Republican Riccio became assemblyman in the 51st A.D. (after shifts in district lines took place) (2), political leadership and service delivery was entirely controlled by the regular Democratic organization. Even though not every elected official was a

member of the United Mazzini Club, per se, they were members of a network of Italian- and Irish-controlled clubs. For example, Anthony Carraciolo, District Leader of the 51st Assembly District club, is also the nephew of James Mangano, the leader of the United Mazzini Club, as well as the attorney for Thomas Cuite, Councilman of the 20th Councilmatic District and a member of the United Democratic Club in Carroll Gardens.

Prior to 1966, when assembly, senatorial, and councilmatic lines were changed, Park Slope was in one senatorial district, one councilmatic district, and one congressional district (League of Women Voters, 1960-1982). Councilmatic and assembly lines were congruent with state senatorial lines, and two assembly districts comprised one senatorial district. In 1966, when the lines were changed, eastern and western Park Slope were in different councilmatic districts. The increasingly middle- and upper-middle class eastern areas above Seventh Avenue were removed from Councilman Cuite's district and were instead tied to Republican Councilman Arculeo's strong Bay Ridge base. Senatorial and assembly districts were also gerrymandered. In this case, Senator Mangano's (3) District 13 was also divided. The largely Italian western Park Slope area was left in the district, and the eastern areas were removed. A new assembly district, 53, which went from Fifth Avenue to Seventh Avenue, was included, and a member of the Mazzini club became assemblyman. By 1970, each section of

Park Slope was to be represented by six different legislators (See Table 5.1).

Table 5.1

Changes in Park Slope Legislative Districts: 1960-1970

	Northeast*		Northwest		Southeast		Southwest	
	60	70	60	70	60	70	60	70
A.D**	3,8	51,53	8	53	8	51,53	8	51,53
S.S.D**	13	21	13	21,22	13	21	13	21,22
Cncl**	20	20,22	20	20	20	20,22	20	20
C.D**	12	15	12	14,15	12	15	12	15

*For area boundaries, see Map 4.5

**A.D.= Assembly District, S.S.D.=State Senatorial District, Cncl= City Council District, C.D.= Congressional District.

Source: League of Women Voters, 1959-60, 1966, 1970.

Although, according to Democratic captains of the Mazzini Club and James Mangano (1983), these changes were instituted for a number of reasons through negotiations with regular Democratic and Republican factions, a primary reason for removing eastern Park Slope from the regular Democratic club areas was the increase in nonethnically aligned liberal middle class people moving into the areas east of Seventh Avenue. The then new 53rd Assembly District was a small district won through the efforts of the regular Democrat organization and renegotiated out of the area during the 1972 reapportionment.

By the end of the 1960s, as the professional white-collar work force continued to expand into South Brooklyn, opportunities were present for the emergence of

alternative organizations that would challenge the monopoly control of services held by the regular Democratic organization. Although the expansion of the professional white-collar work force resulting from the transformation of the city was central to emergence of alternative political institutions, there was another important condition that was present.

John Lindsay, who had been the liberal Republican Mayor since 1966, had succeeded in establishing a network of neighborhood-based service offices and task forces. These provided kinds of service information and assistance that were formerly the preserve of the regular Democratic organization in south Brooklyn. In this way, he encouraged the development of new, reform Democratic clubs. In some city neighborhoods, this strategy would prove supportive to the expansion of minority political control. However, in south Brooklyn, it supported emerging networks of white middle-class civic organizations, improvement groups, and block associations interested in developing the clout to bring their projects to fruition.

One might suspect that new political clubs would begin to emerge in the early 1960s from the middle- and upper-middle-class civic organizations in the northeast. However, the political base of this area was tied, through gerrymandering, to Republican ethnic political institutions south of the Slope in Windsor Terrace, Sunset Park, and Borough Park. The existing network of Roman Catholic

institutions, civic organizations, and business groups were affiliated with the regular Democratic organization.

In 1967, however, a national group of antiwar activists that had supported Eugene McCarthy for president--the Coalition for Democratic Alternatives--organized a local chapter in Park Slope. In 1968, they elected a slate of delegates in the Democratic National Convention against a weakly supported slate run by the regular Democratic organization (O'Hanlon, 1982). They then formed the Central Brooklyn Independent Democrats, which would become an amalgam of anti-war liberals, white-collar professionals committed to neighborhood improvement, and residents already engaged in politics or simply interested in working in it.

Around the same time, in the northwest, a new political force began to emerge in what was the bedrock of regular Democratic territory west of Park Slope, the largely Italian Carroll Gardens. Here, second-generation Italian professionals and residents working in civic organizations to improve the area through residential development, street improvements, and clean-up of pollution in the Gowanus Canal formed the Independent Neighborhood Democrats (Ferraioli, 1978). These reform political clubs would play a major force in shaping the political and neighborhood organizations of the 1970s.

III. Park Slope Institutions in the 1970s.

During the 1970s, working-class institutions became increasingly fragmented, minority institutions grew

increasingly diverse, and institutions serving white-collar managerial groups continued to expand.

A. Religious Institutions in the 1970s

During the 1970s, religious institutions grew in the white-collar northeast and became increasingly diverse and under stress in the rest of Park Slope. By 1978, there were 48 religious institutions in the Park Slope community (see Map 5.1). Many of the new additions over the decade were Spanish-speaking Protestant churches. In an analysis of a geographically stratified sample of 15 interviews with clergymen in 1978 (see Appendix III for the interview schedule), an overriding theme was the sense of well-being perceived by those institutions that served the growing middle class, and the great sense of stress and conflict felt by clergymen whose churches served a diverse group of working-class or minority residents.

The religious institutions in the northeast typified those with a strong sense of well-being. For example, the Roman Catholic St. Saviour may have experienced a decrease in attendance over the decade, but the parish priest reported that the church was a stable "professional parish" that had \$85,000 to show for that year's fund-raising campaign. He perceived little poverty and reported that white professionals were moving back into the area. A sense of stability was also voiced by the Rabbi of Beth Elohim. He reported that 90% of the synagogue was comprised of

Map 5.1

Distribution of Park Slope Religious Institutions, 1978



professionals, and the rest were retired people. The synagogue had opened a nursery school in the fall of 1978, and the expanding membership was getting younger with an upsurge of interest in traditional religious activities. The predominantly elderly Park Slope Jewish Center in the southeast was beginning to attract a young middle-class congregation, and Old First Reform Church, a Presbyterian church in the northeast, was also attracting a greater number of middle- and upper-income worshipers.

On the other hand, in the working-class north and southwest, Roman Catholic institutions, originally built to serve large numbers of immigrant families, underwent a different, more complex experience. First, there was a tremendous decrease in church attendance as children of white European populations left Park Slope. Although no accurate figures for Mass attendance were kept, pastors reported a drop in attendance, four Roman Catholic elementary schools merged into two in 1978, and one church in the southwest was closed in 1979.

Second, there was increasing diversity within the congregations. By the late 1970s, St. Augustine's, in the northwest, conducted Mass in English, Spanish, and, for the 20% of the congregation that was Haitian, in Creole. Although 60% of the congregation was Hispanic, they represented people from diverse Latin cultures and countries. Services were held in Spanish and English at St.

Francis and in the southwestern parishes of Holy Family and St. Stanislaus.

Third, with diversity came increasing conflict between ethnic and racial groups within the church. Priests at St. Francis, St. Augustine's, Holy Family, and St. Stanislaus spoke about the problems arising between Spanish and white European groups. It seemed that white European families sometimes resisted the idea of having Spanish Mass. Even more disturbing to the clergy was when a church did not offer Spanish Mass, as in the case of St. Thomas Aquinas, Spanish-speaking families would frequent neighboring parishes where Spanish Mass was held. When those families made these moves--for example to Holy Family--Irish, Italian, and Polish Roman Catholic families would leave their churches and go to the closest parish that did not offer Spanish Mass, even though the Spanish and English-speaking services were segregated. At St. Augustine's, white professionals in the parish crossed parish lines to affiliate with the more "professional" St. Saviour parish. Also, when attempts were made to make social events, such as Bingo, bilingual, European ethnic groups boycotted the events. Even in the southeast where white European parishioners significantly outnumbered Latins, conflicts were reported.

Finally, increased diversity and dwindling white European congregations in the north and southwest brought about open conflicts between clergymen themselves as they

attempted to understand or reconcile themselves to the changes. Roman Catholic priests would blame the incoming groups for loss of membership or financial tribulations. For instance, the pastor at St. Francis stated that, "The church is getting more and more Spanish membership, and they are squeezing other people out." Another complained that Puerto Rican people did not contribute to the church the way the Irish and Italian people did, and that they did not go into the priesthood. A priest at St. Augustine's also complained that poor people were pushing the elderly white parishioners out. "The problem with all this discrimination business," decried one pastor, "is that if you don't let a neighborhood go down the drain, you're discriminating."

Some priests criticized those priests who did not support increased diversity. Spanish-speaking priests in the north and southwestern Roman Catholic churches complained that their non-Spanish-speaking counterparts were uninterested in making the Latin community feel welcome or in providing necessary support services. For example, a South American priest at St. Stanislaus complained that the Irish pastor eliminated a summer lunch program which fed 400, mainly Hispanic youth on the grounds that it was too much of a mess. This priest also reported that, when Mass was supposed to be conducted in Spanish, it would, on occasion, be conducted in English if the pastor had invited non-Spanish-speaking visitors. One young bilingual priest from St. Augustine's spoke of how uncomfortable many

parishes made poor minorities feel, and he explained that poor Haitians and Latins from other parts of Brooklyn would travel to come to his church. He summarized his remarks by saying, "Often the Catholic church in the U.S. is run by a bunch of old men who do not try to make the newcomers welcome."

For parishioners, the results of racial prejudice were sometimes devastating. For example, many residents, particularly middle-aged and elderly women spent one or two nights each week playing Bingo at their church. When the pastor at one southwestern church, Fr. Kennedy, began to call bingo in Spanish as well as English, some European ethnics became enraged and stopped coming. Some Latin women, at first surprised, then angry, did not want to participate where they thought they were unwanted. Word spread and soon there were not enough people to play. Bingo ended and many parishioners, even those who had stopped going, expressed bewilderment and despair. One regular player lamented, "What will we do on Tuesdays?"

Roman Catholic institutions were not alone in reporting the conflict and stress that often accompanies diversity and fragmentation. Some Protestant institutions that attempted to serve different constituencies were similarly affected.

In one, St. John's-St. Matthew Emmanuel Lutheran Church, there were three separate services. One was very contemporary with singing and guitar playing. The second was formal, and the third was traditional and conducted in

Spanish. By beginning a Spanish ministry, they attracted 60 new Hispanic families by 1978. However, the Spanish-speaking group was very conservative, and, during social events, cultural differences between the groups were exacerbated by the Spanish-speaking congregants' eschewing the English-speaking members because, according to the pastor, the latter "wanted to drink and party."

For the most part, however, Protestant churches served ethnically or racially homogenous groups. The existence of 36 different Protestant churches within Park Slope in 1978, some serving as few as 25 members, testifies to the increased heterogeneity of the population and members' desires to affiliate in homogeneous groupings. Which populations would comprise the congregation of a particular church was partially a function of location and partially one of meaning: what the church held for that population. For example, the Episcopal churches, even those located in the predominantly white northeast, attracted a largely British West Indian black population. This church is Anglican and therefore the church of those who immigrated from the British West Indies.

In the northwest, and southeast along Seventh Avenue, the large number of Spanish-speaking Pentecostal churches reflected the diversity of the Latin and Haitian population there. Some had memberships that originated from Puerto Rico, others from South or Central America, and still others from French-speaking Haiti. Many congregants traveled from

one part of the neighborhood to another and often continued their membership when they left the area. Since these churches are comprised of racially and ethnically homogeneous groupings, the conflicts described above, so apparent in changing and stressed heterogeneous situations, were not described by Pentecostal clergy. In fact, one might hypothesize that in addition to the fact that there was an increase in Hispanic and black populations, the Protestant churches serving these groups were emerging and expanding precisely because of the conflicts in the heterogeneous Roman Catholic parishes. For example, in the Church of God, a Pentecostal Haitian church, the Pastor explained that, although Haiti is a Roman Catholic country and that he too was Roman Catholic at one time, the Haitian people are lost in this country. Since 1967, 13 churches for Pentecostal Haitians "had been born from this church." Interviews with Roman Catholic clergy supported this contention.

However, other stresses of the changing role of Park Slope in the political economy of the city did surface in interviews with Protestant clergy. In light of the small membership size of most Protestant churches (25 in store-front churches; up to 500 in one Lutheran church), in comparison to the Roman Catholic churches (520 in St. Stanislaus up to 4000 in Holy Name), and the fact that the groups are often homogeneous according to income, the stability of the Protestant church is a fragile, tenuous

thing. Even in those churches that are well endowed, population shifts take their toll. For example, in the Prospect Heights Presbyterian church in the southeast, where membership was down to 75 elderly Scottish and Irish members, the reluctance to do outreach campaigning, predicated on the belief that all one would get is "them," was ensuring the continuation of a dwindling, depressed, albeit well-endowed, congregation.

The signs of stress in Protestant churches located in northwest and south that served moderate-income black and Latin populations appeared in the form of a seemingly unresolvable conflict. On one hand, some reported that the new white professionals moving into the area were good for the neighborhood because they kept up their homes, and where they moved in there were fewer drug, prostitution, and alcohol problems. Therefore, even though these newcomers were not members of the church and therefore did not help to maintain it, they contributed to an environment in which temptation to be involved in sin would be reduced. On the other hand, rents were beginning to climb in the area, store-front churches not owned by the group were in jeopardy of losing their leases, and, even though membership was increasing, some members who had experienced increased housing costs were forced to move out of the area.

In 1982, a sample of the original clergymen were interviewed (Murrell, et al., 1982) using our interview schedule. They found an acceleration of the displacement of

low- and moderate-income Latin, black and white European ethnic families, and a slight increase of white professional families in some of the previously black English-speaking Protestant churches. Interestingly, they also found involvement by two Roman Catholic and one Methodist church in traditionally defined secular matters such as tenant referrals and support of tenant issues.

B. Educational Institutions in the 1970s

School enrollment, ethnic change, and income distribution patterns (4) were consistent with census demographic findings presented in Chapter 4. During the 1970s, Roman Catholic schools consolidated, public schools, except for those in expanding white-collar areas, became increasingly Latin and private schools expanded. First, public school enrollment in Park Slope decreased by 20% (6020 to 4854), from 1974 to 1980. During this same period, the last half of the 1970s, racial, and ethnic distributions changes, presented in Table 5.2, reflect a increase in the percentage of white children enrolled in the northeast (P.S. 321), and a decrease in black and Latin enrollment. In the northwest (P.S. 133, 282), southeast (P.S. 107, 10), and southwest (P.S. 39, 124), the trend reflects stable percentages of black children, increases in percentages of Latins, and decreases in white enrollment.

Table 5.2

Shifts in Ethnic and Racial Distribution of Park Slope
Public Elementary School Children by Area:
1974-75--1980-81

	Northeast*		Northwest		Southeast		Southwest	
	74	80	74	80	74	80	74	80
Latin	43%	36%	61%	64%	51%	60%	74%	79%
Black	26	23	33	33	11	11	07	05
Other	31	41	06	03	38	30	19	16

* For area boundaries see Map 4.5

Sources: Board of Education of the City of New York 1974-75 School Profiles. Board of Education of the City of New York. Office of Student Information Services Annual School Census October 1980, Pupil Ethnic Composition Report.

Comparisons of the changes in percentage of low-income elementary school children by area, presented in Table 5.3, reflect and reinforce 1970-1980 census findings. The percentage of low-income elementary school children enrolled in the northeast area school decreased by 16% whereas the percentage of low-income children in all other areas increased between 1975 and 1981.

Enrollment in the second largest educational institution in Park Slope, the Roman Catholic Schools,

Table 5.3
Changes in Percentages of Low-Income* Elementary School
Children by Area**: 1975-76--1981-82.

	Northeast	Northwest	Southeast	Southwest	Cut-Off***
1975	63%	69%	64%	56%	43%
1981	47	74	66	60	45
Change (16%)		05%	02%	04%	02%

* Percentage of low-income children represents a weighted average of percentage of those receiving public assistance--aid-to-families-with dependent-children (AFDC)--and those eligible for the free lunch program.

** For area boundaries see Map 4.5

*** The cut-off is a city-wide figure which represents the point at which a particular school is eligible to receive special federal funding for enrichment programs.

showed a dramatic decline during the 1970s. In 1970, there were 5202 children enrolled in Park Slope Roman Catholic Schools (Office of Catholic Education, 1983) as opposed to approximately 6000 in the Park Slope public schools. By 1975, parochial elementary school enrollment had decreased by 33% (to 3460) and between 1975 and 1980 when Park Slope public school enrollment fell by 20%, Roman Catholic school enrollment fell by 36% (to 2226). While the Park Slope population was reduced by 17.6% over the entire decade, Roman Catholic School enrollment fell 57%. Enrollment fell so sharply over the decade that, in 1978, there were several school mergers. In the northwest area, St. Augustine's school merged with St. Francis Xavier, and, in the southwest St. Thomas Aquinas merged with Holy Family school(5). The enrollment comparisons by area are shown in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4

Park Slope Roman Catholic School Enrollment Changes:
1970-1980

	Northeast*	Northwest	Southeast	Southwest	Total
1970	967	1435	1489	1311	5,202
1975	594	999	955	912	3,460
1980	495	647	560	491	2,226
70-80	(49%)	(55%)	(62%)	(63%)	(57%)

* For area boundaries see Map 4.5.

Source: Office of Catholic Education, 6025 Sixth Avenue, Bklyn, N.Y.

It seems clear that Roman Catholic institutions have become increasingly fragmented over the decade. As the Irish and Italian families mature or leave Park Slope, fewer numbers of people are replacing them and those who do, are not educating their children in the religious institutions. For example, in an examination of the ethnic distribution of children in the Roman Catholic schools from 1975 to 1980 we see that Latins, many of whom may be Roman Catholic, are not replacing Irish and Italian Roman Catholics in sufficient number to maintain the schools (see Table 5.5). In interviews with parochial school administrators and parish priests it seems that increasing tuition costs and decreasing real income have forced these families to attend the public schools. Our analysis of ethnic distribution within public schools, which shows a trend of increasing proportions of Latin enrollment in the all areas except the northeast (Table 5.2), would support the occurrence of this

shift. In addition, when the St. Francis Xavier and St. Augustine's school merger took place in 1978, Italian and Irish parents withdrew their children at the same time that black children became the majority (see Table 5.5).

Table 5.5

Shifts in Ethnic and Racial Distribution of Park Slope Roman Catholic School Children By Area* 1975-76---1980-81

	Northeast		Northwest		Southeast		Southwest	
	75	80	75	80	75	80	75	80
Latin	11%	22%	37%	41%	11%	07%	19%	32%
	65	109	369	265	105	39	173	157
Black	04%	13%	14%	59%	.6%	.7%	01%	07%
	23	64	140	381	6	4	9	34
Other	85%	65%	49%	00%	88%	92%	80%	61%
	505	322	490	01	850	517	730	300
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	593	495	999	647	961	560	912	491

*For area boundaries see Map 4.5

Source: Office of Catholic Education, 6025 Sixth Avenue Bklyn, N.Y.

During the same period of disintegration of Roman Catholic educational institutions, decreasing enrollment in the public schools and shifts in the proportion of Latin enrollment, private schools in the northeast were able to maintain themselves, and in some instances, to expand. During the mid-1970s the Carroll Street School moved into space formerly occupied by St. Francis Academy. In 1980, this private school expanded again, purchasing another building on the block for its lower school. Private and co-operative nursery schools proliferated, and by 1981, one

could locate 15 nursery schools in the northeast and southeast areas.

C. Political Institutions in the 1970s.

Partially as a result of the changing role of Park Slope in the political economy of New York City, and of the consequent fragmentation of ethnic institutions and expansion of upper-income professional ones, alternative political institutions, began to grow during the 1970s. These were primarily in reform Democratic clubs. Their growth had occurred in a community whose hierarchical political institutions had controlled service delivery and political decision making for four decades, and the 1970s was a tumultuous time for them.

Reform Democratic clubs in the west and south expanded, gained strength, and ran successful candidates for the New York State Assembly and Senate. Regular Democratic clubs held on to New York City council, borough president and some assembly district leadership positions. Patronage possibilities contracted. Brutal campaign battles ensued, as reform candidates and regular Democratic club candidates fought for control in western and eastern Park Slope.

In 1972, a number of events coincided to provide a context within which the reform club covering much of western Park Slope would, for the first time, win assembly (52nd A.D.) and senatorial (23rd S.S.D.) seats. First and foremost was the growth of independent civic organizations that gave birth to the club, the Independent Neighborhood

Democrats (IND). It is important to remember from our discussion of the emergence of the club in the late 1960s, that the politicization of community organizations was, in large part, a response to the inability of the regular Democrats to halt neighborhood deterioration or to respond to the demands for development of the emerging white-collar constituency. Second, in that key year, 1972, the district was reapportioned to include the professional white-collar Brooklyn Heights community with its established reform club, the West Brooklyn Independent Democrats (WBID). That meant there would be a larger pool of white-collar professional voters. Third, since the day of the local primary coincided with the primary for the Democratic National Convention, funding and volunteers were available to assist in local efforts (O'Hanlon, 1982). Although reform candidates won the seats in the legislature by a few hundred votes on a pro-abortion anti-Vietnam war platform, the IND-WBID coalition lost the District Leadership, by over 1000 votes to United Mazzini head James Mangano. Although he was growing older, and the power of the Mazzini and Court Street United Democratic club was waning, Mangano still commanded substantial loyalty. However, he never ran for public office again and none of the candidates from the Carroll Gardens regular Democratic organization were elected to state-wide public office during the 1974, 1976, or 1980 primaries.

State and city legislative boundaries changed three times over the decade, each time further isolating ethnic and income groups within eastern and southern Park Slope from one another. As is shown in Table 5.6, by 1974, the 44th A.D. was entirely in the high-rent northeast and the 51th A.D. covered only the southern portion of the area.

Table 5.6

Changes in Park Slope Assembly Districts 1970-1982*			
	1966-71	1972-73	1974-82
Northeast**	51,53	44,51,52	52,44
Northwest	53	52,44,57	52,57
Southeast	51,53	51	52,51
Southwest	51,53	51,52	52,51

* Democratic party candidates who have run for assembly seats in the 52nd and 53rd A.D. have been members of the regular Democratic United Mazzini Club on Union Street or the United Democratic Club on Court Street or they have been members of the reform Democratic Carroll Gardens based Independent Neighborhood Democrats (IND). Democratic Party Candidates who have run for Assembly seats in the 51st A.D. have either been members of the regular Democratic Club in Sunset Park or the reform Democratic Southern Park Slope/Sunset Park based Central Brooklyn Independent Democrats (CBID). Candidates who run from the 44th A.D. are members of a regular Democratic club based in Flatbush on the eastern side of Prospect Park. The 57th A.D. touches only a few blocks in the northwestern tip of Park Slope.

** For area boundaries see Map 4.5.

Source: League of Women Voters, 1966-1982, New York City Board of Elections.

Prior to 1974, the 51 Assembly District was controlled by Republicans, being geographically tied to the conservative Irish, Italian, and Jewish working-class Windsor Terrace, Kensington, and Borough Park neighborhoods.

During the early 1970s, however, while the northeast was still in the 51st A.D., CBID put together its second local campaign running Joseph Ferris, former president of the Park Slope Civic Council, for assembly. He and two other CBID members won the primary for assembly and district leadership, but he lost to the Republican candidate, Riccio, in the general election.

As the northeast became predominantly white-collar professional, it also became increasingly Democratic and liberal. The likelihood of Republicans retaining this once conservative area decreased. By 1974, the entire northeast had been gerrymandered out of the 51st A.D. and was attached instead to the largely regular Democratic stronghold in the Flatbush--44th A.D. Now the 51st A.D. was moving south encompassing Irish, Italian, and Spanish Sunset Park. The regular Democratic club, home of majority leader of the City Council, Tom Cuite, had its office on the boundary between Sunset Park and Borough Park, and its constituency was now heavily Italian, Irish, and Hispanic blue-collar and moderate-income white-collar families. As a result, it became increasingly active in state-wide elections.

As the 51st A.D. moved south, and the district became increasingly conservative and sensitive to parochial issues, inherent contradictions of opposing ideologies within CBID surfaced. For example, tenant-rights themes would play a subservient role to prodevelopment issues. Over time, the neighborhood improvement, service delivery, prodevelopment

constituency locked horns with the antiwar liberals and leftists who were concerned with broader-based issues of civil rights, equity, and redistribution. Although civil-rights issues remained important for both CBID groups, once there was real competition and enmity between the reform and regular Democratic clubs (evidenced by the 1973 "defection" from CBID to the regular Democratic club of elected district leader, Finney, and some like-minded members) concern for broader-based issues took a back seat to service delivery and economic-development concerns.

This shift in concern is significant in light of the inability of city government (and therefore of local political institutions) to fill the service-delivery needs of neighborhood residents in the 1970s. In a blue-collar neighborhood like southern Park Slope, where the low- and moderate-income Latin population was expanding, and where rent-income ratios were rising and real income declining, the likelihood of major interest in private reinvestment coming to the fore remained remote. As O'Connor would predict, maintaining an adequate level of service delivery without investment interest would prove difficult for any club.

Finally, in 1977, the leftists lost leadership control within CBID and departed. Ferris, who by then was the firmly ensconced assemblyman, led the opposition against them. By the early 1980s, Ferris had won several reelections, but the regular Democratic club had retained

the district leaderships. The CBID club office had moved further south underplayed its position on civil-rights issues such as abortion and the death penalty, and become increasingly involved in the consumer issues of energy alternatives and economic development.

In south Brooklyn, reform Democratic political clubs emerged from pro-growth neighborhood improvement organizations in coalition with those interested in broad-based issues of equity. The contradictions that eventually surfaced in the pursuit of their seemingly congruent goals in CBID can be understood in terms of the circumstances that led to their emergence. First, the demographics changed, providing the base for organizational opposition and reducing established working-class constituency. Equally important, however, was the legitimation crisis facing the state. The regular Democratic organization was unable to continue to provide service delivery and patronage at previous levels as a result of the redefinition of the urban problem: development priorities of the corporate city and the ever-present fiscal crisis. Corporate priorities were not always congruent with those of South Brooklyn neighborhood residents. The South Brooklyn reform clubs grew from a community organization base, politicized by the same set of events that would eventually lead them to pursue neighborhood service-delivery strategies not unlike their predecessors.

IV. Summary and Conclusion

Religious, educational and political institutional change during the industrial and corporate periods has reflected Park Slope's shifting role in the city's development. The early influence of Protestant controlled religious and educational institutions gave way to the enormous infusion of Irish and Italian Roman Catholic working-class residents during the latter industrial and early corporate periods. With the Roman Catholic parish at the center of social life, it is little wonder that ethnically affiliated political institutions emerged to dominate and control service delivery and patronage.

By the 1960s, Park Slope's predominantly blue-collar Roman Catholic institutions began to show signs of contraction as non-Roman Catholic white-collar professional expansion proceeded in the northeast, and heterogeneous Latin and black populations expanded in the northwest and south. As white professional, Latin, and black groups developed their own religious and educational institutions, the bedrock of Roman Catholic institutions, the parochial school, began to contract. Although ethnically controlled political institutions remained in power, they were increasingly unable to satisfy the demands of their own shrinking constituency, and, by the end of the 1960s, white-collar professionals and activists were developing alternative institutions.

By the end of the 1970s, spurred on by racism within the church itself, the stress of trying to serve a highly

heterogeneous but shrinking population was evidenced in Roman Catholic institutions as Mass attendance dwindled and parochial schools closed. Much of the expanding Latin population developed its own non-Roman Catholic religious institutions and sent its progeny to the public schools, while some white European Roman Catholics, faced with the prospect of increasing minority parochial school enrollment, withdrew their children from local Roman Catholic schools. The working-class Roman Catholic church was facing its own legitimization crisis. Meanwhile, those Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish institutions that served the new white-collar professional constituency flourished and private schools in the northeast expanded.

Public and parochial elementary schools experienced a decrease in enrollment over the decade. Whereas Park Slope population decreased by 17.6%, public school enrollment fell by 20%. However, parochial-school enrollment decreased by 57%, once again illustrating the fragmentation of Roman Catholic institutions during the 1970s.

In addition, analysis of educational, income and ethnic trend data is consistent with analysis of demographic data presented in Table 4.2. While the minority population is stable or increasing in the northwest and south, it is decreasing in the northeast. Public-school enrollment figures support this trend. Median family income is decreasing in the northwest, southeast, and southwest, and increasing in the northeast, and the proportions of low

income public elementary school children is similarly shifting. Finally, as one might expect, private schools that serve the increasing middle- and upper-income white-collar population have expanded and grown over the decade.

Finally, the 1970s saw the growth of the essentially white-collar reform Democratic movement and the ebbing of regular Democratic organization power. Reform institutions emerged from neighborhood civic organizations and broad-based interest groups. In the northwest, district alignment with upper-income Brooklyn Heights and increasingly professional Carroll Gardens and Boerum Hill helped the reform club to maintain political power and service delivery for the parts of the district that were increasingly professional. In the heterogeneous south, reform Democrats maintained a balance of power with the regular Democrats as securing satisfactory service delivery became increasingly difficult.

Within the changing market and institutional context of the 1970s, other community organizations would emerge to try to force government to fill the service delivery gaps and/or attract private interests to invest in projects they considered to be important. In the chapters that follow, we shall trace the emergence and evolutions of some of the community organizations that would attempt to mediate market and institutional changes in the late 1970s.

Notes

1. The Third A.D. covered the eastern area of Park Slope, east of Seventh Avenue, and south from Flatbush to the Prospect Expressway as well as parts of Bklyn Heights, Cobble Hill, Red Hook and Bay Ridge
2. The 51st A.D. was formed in 1966 and covered much of eastern Park Slope above Seventh Avenue and Sunset Park.
3. Senator Mangano was James Mangano's son.
4. Elementary school enrollments and distributions were used in this analysis because they generally reflect local population within a small catchment area. Intermediate, Jr. High and High School figures were not used because catchment areas are much larger and don't reflect very local population demographics.
5. St. Saviour (corner Eighth Avenue and Seventh Street) is considered to be in the Northeast and Holy Name (Prospect Park West and Prospect Avenue) in the Southwest.

Chapter 6

Community Organizations and Neighborhood Change:

An Overview

I. A Summary of the Context

A central concern of this study up to now has been to describe the context of city and neighborhood change and to show how it establishes the differential structure in occupational and residential opportunity available to neighborhood residents. We have found that residents who represent different class interests have varying opportunities for meeting their housing and neighborhood environmental needs and desires.

In chapters 2-5, we identified features of the political economy and housing market of New York City and Park Slope that have shaped residential opportunities.

First, we traced the transformation of New York City into a corporate service center and the consequent deleterious effects on small firms and on dwindling employment opportunities for blue-collar or former blue-collar workers. We found that, although opportunities in corporate service have been expanding (if slowly), large corporations that do not require immediate access to services and a variety of consumers have continued to leave New York. Salary differentials between low-level clerical or remaining blue-collar workers and professional service workers continue to widen, the impact on local neighborhoods

being to create housing opportunities for some and to exacerbate displacement problems for others.

In chapter 3, we described how patterns of government intervention in the housing market have reinforced income, racial and tenure status divisions between neighborhood residents: by encouraging suburban home ownership, discouraging rental housing construction, and upwardly redistributing income through federal and municipal tax policies. We have shown that federal funding to cities tends to be spent in fast growing sun-belt areas and, in New York City, it has been reduced, spent in middle-income rather than low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, and, in recent times, not spent at all.

In chapter 4, we traced the historical development of Park Slope and reported recent demographic and housing-market shifts that illustrated racial, income, occupational, and housing-cost differences. By dividing Park Slope into four geographical areas, and comparing demographic and housing trends between areas, we found that some areas within Park Slope have suffered disproportionate impacts of labor-market shifts and housing costs. Great contrasts in income, occupational status, minority concentration, and housing costs emerged between the wealthier, white, professional northeast section of Park Slope, and the poorer, minority, blue-collar northwest. We also found an expansion of the northeast housing market populated largely by white-collar professionals, into

bordering areas of the northwestern and southeastern quadrants. At the same time that this white-collar housing market was expanding to adjacent blocks, the relatively stable, blue- and low-level white-collar housing market in the south suffered heavy abandonment as sales prices declined and arrearages and vacancies rose: particularly along Seventh Avenue in the southeast. Finally, by the end of the decade sales prices in the northwest had decreased by 25% in constant dollars, and vacant and demolished buildings rose by 228% to include 11% of the northwest's total housing stock. This occurred, as is often the case in a dual housing market, even as the professional classes expanded: in this case, west across Seventh and then Sixth Avenue. For Park Slope, the latter half of the 1970s was a period of increasing contrasts between income-, occupational-, racial- and tenure-status groups of residents.

Finally, in chapter 5, we saw some of the manifestations of the changing role of Park Slope in the neighborhood institutions of New York City. The area's dominance in the fifties and sixties by predominantly blue-collar and Roman Catholic religious, educational, and political institutions ebbed in the sixties and seventies as professional white-collar institutions emerged. The theme of increasing contrast was evidenced as Roman Catholic institutions suffered membership and enrollment losses and professional institutions expanded and prospered. Although regular Democratic political organizations retained control

of service delivery, their omnipotent strength was no longer buttressed by the election of regular Democratic legislators. By 1980, challenges from white collar reform Democrats continued to shift local control away from waning working class institutions. Local voluntary community organizations emerged to represent changing residential interests.

II. The Community Organizations: An Overview

In tracing the evolution of the Park Slope community organizations in relation to demographic and housing processes, we shall consider their evolution from three perspectives. First, since it has been a central focus to show that different groups of residents have varying class interests, and are therefore differently affected by abandonment and resettlement processes, we shall categorize evolving community groups by the interests they seem to represent, at least at their inception. Second, since we have made four geographical distinctions within Park Slope in order to develop a basis for comparison in our discussions of the processes of neighborhood change, we shall consider evolution by area. Finally, since this is a longitudinal study of change we shall address ourselves to change over time.

A. Emergence of Interest Groups

Five types of voluntary community organizations existed in the latter half of the 1970s, some of which were in existence prior to 1975. The organizations are categorized

by type in Table 6.1. They consist of improvement, mandated, redistributive-issue, ideological, and improvement/redistributive-issue groups.

Table 6.1

Types of Voluntary Community Organizations in Park Slope:
1975-1982

Improvement	Homeowner Groups: 1) Park Slope Improvement Committee (PSIC) 2) Park Slope Civic Council (PSCC) 3) Revitalization of the Southern Area of the Slope (ROSAS) 4) United Block Associations of Park Slope (UBA) Merchant Groups: 1) Fifth Avenue Merchants Association, 9th-24th Street 2) Fifth Avenue Local Development Corporation. 3) Seventh Avenue Merchants Association, changed to the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce in 1975 4) United Fifth Avenue Merchants Association, Sacket St. to 9St. Homeowner/Merchant Groups: 1) Seventh Avenue Betterment Committee (7ABC) 2) Triangle Parks, Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee
Mandated	1) 72nd Precinct Community Council 2) 78th Precinct Community Council 3) Community Planning Board 6
Redistributive	1) Park Slope Branch, Metropolitan Council on Housing (Met Council) 2) Park Slope Tenants Council
Ideological	1) Moncada Library 2) South Brooklyn Action Movement
Improvement/Redistrib.	1) Against Investment Discrimination 2) Park Slope Together (PST) 3) Fifth Avenue Committee (FAC)

Criteria for distinctions between groups center on three kinds of variables: 1) the type of activities in which the groups engaged; 2) the motivations of actions as defined by the groups themselves over time; and 3) structural relationship to agencies of government. Characteristics of each type of group are sketched in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2

Characteristics of the Five Categories of Community Groups

	Activity	Motivation	Relat. to Gov.
Improvement	Attract investment	"Upgrade neighborhood"	Voluntary: No formal relat w/government
Mandated	Provide forums for airing issues, proposals	Protect citizenry	Required by agency of government
Redistributive	Articulate inequities, Increase awareness	Protect disadvantaged	Voluntary: No formal relat. w/government
Ideological	Articulate inequities Raise Con- sciousness	Promote structural change	Voluntary: No formal relat. w/government
Improve/Redis.	Attract investment without displacement	Improve Area but protect disadvantaged	Voluntary: No formal relat. w/government

Improvement groups are further categorized into three types: homeowner; merchant; and homeowner/merchant. The criteria for this subdivision is based upon 90% of the group belonging to a particular tenure status or occupational

category. For example, if membership or regular attendance at meetings was over 90% homeowners, the group was considered a homeowner group.

1. Improvement Groups

Improvement groups, comprised mainly of white homeowners, property owners, and businesspeople, generally represented the interests of the middle- and upper-income professionals and the merchants who served them. All homeowner-improvement groups wanted to attract investment and middle- and upper- income professionals into Park Slope. They functioned as intermediaries in the process by hosting house tours, publishing "how-to restore and rehabilitate newsletters", pressuring government for provision of police and sanitation services, sponsoring beautification projects, and promoting private market processes of rehabilitation with subsidies to property owners (low interest rehabilitation loans) rather than to renters.

For merchant improvement groups, attracting investment was also important, but the overriding concern was to increase business in a neighborhood with a decreasing population. For merchants who catered to a wealthier clientele--for example, a plant store, clothing boutique, or cheese store owner--attracting middle- and upper-income professionals was paramount. However, for other merchants who catered to Latin or dwindling blue-collar ethnic groups attracting more customers of any group was primary. The merchants groups also functioned as intermediaries by

hosting street fairs, publishing calendars and directories, pressuring government for police protection, sponsoring holiday events, beautifying the commercial streets and promoting business investment through government subsidized low-interest loans, and matching facade-improvement programs.

The homeowner/merchant improvement group functioned as the homeowner improvement groups did: to attract middle and upper income professionals, in this case, to shop on Seventh Avenue, through the beautification of the street itself.

2. Mandated Groups

The mandated, quasigovernmental organizations were comprised entirely of appointed volunteer neighborhood residents, with guidelines and directions for actions provided by government charter or agency directive. Since issues were generally predefined and possibilities for response circumscribed, it could be said that this type of group was generally supportive of mainstream values as prescribed by government. Mandated groups functioned as mediators or arbitrators between local residents and agencies of government. Their meetings provided a forum within which complaints, requests, or disputes could be aired. These forums often functioned to provide a sense to the neighborhood resident that a grievance or request was being heard. Group members or boards discussed various requests within their purview, such as complaints about drugs being sold in the neighborhood or requests for zoning

variances or disposition of land. For example, a community planning board might vote that a particular piece of city-owned property should be sold privately to be used for a particular purpose. However, a body's decisions were only recommendations to respective government agencies and were never binding.

3. Redistributive Issue Groups

Redistributive-issues groups--comprised of white and minority tenants, local social-service or, organizing professionals, and a small number of volunteers from other areas and institutions--most often represented the interests of tenants, low- and moderate-income residents, and minorities. The redistributive-issue groups functioned to articulate inequities in the distribution of resources to these groups. They did this by exposing injustices and fighting for some control over some of those institutions that controlled resources. They exposed landlords who harassed tenants, conducted rent strikes, and fought for protenant legislation. Most of them became parts of larger city, state, or national coalitions in order to foster redistributive goals.

4. Ideological Groups

Ideological groups were comprised of 20- to 40-year-olds, usually white residents or friends of residents. They represented what they termed working-class, low-income and minority interests. Although they often became involved in redistributive housing issues,

these issues were considered useful ways to develop consciousness that would ultimately help to build a revolutionary movement. The ideological groups functioned not only to call attention to inequities within the system but to criticize the foundations and existence of capitalism. Although there were tremendous differences in expressions of militancy between the groups, both of the groups studied denounced what they perceived to be the racist or antipoor posture of local organizations and institutions. In their role as agitators and demonstrators against local organizations, they often functioned to force issues that the less militant, redistributive-issue groups were sympathetic with but unable to press themselves.

5. Improvement/Redistributive Issue Groups

In some cases, redistributive-issue groups also represented the improvement interests of homeowners and professionals, particularly when the groups were multiservice, when attempts were made for all groups to work together, or when the redistributive issues in question dealt with the withdrawal of institutional investment from neighborhoods, as such, rather than from the poor (as in the case of antiredlining efforts). In this improvement/redistributive-issue category, groups often tried to be many things to different interest groups. An organization might set up a development arm to rehabilitate abandoned property. At the same time, in an attempt to serve tenant interests, it might establish a tenant outreach

clinic and become a member of a broad-based rent-control coalition. These groups were initially comprised mainly of white and black homeowners. Over time, however, as resettlement processes expanded and intensified, group composition and interests shifted, encompassing low-income minority and tenant interests. All organizations in this category expressed interest in attracting investment without major displacement. However, there were periods in the lives of the organizations when either improvement or redistributive issues took precedence over other issues, or when there was a general lack of clarity or disruption over what interests a particular group represented.

B. Interest Group Emergence Over the 1970s

In order to clarify the relationship between interest groups and the resettlement process, we have charted the life span of the different interest groups over time in Table 6.3. The 1970s was a period of simultaneous abandonment and resettlement. As housing prices rose in the northeast Park Slope spreading to the northwest and southeast, displacement became a crucial issue by 1980. The emergence of community organizations parallels shifts in the expanding resettlement process.

Over half of the improvement groups emerged prior to 1974, when displacement had not yet become a widely known or

Table 6.3

Interest Group Emergence Over the 1970s													
	1970	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2
Improvement													
Homeowner													
PSIC*													
Civic Council													
ROSAS													
UBA													
Merchant													
5th Ave Mchts(9-24)													
5th Ave LDC													
PS Chamber of Comm.													
United Mer of 5 Ave													
Homeowner/Merchant													
7ABC													
Triangle Pks.													
Mandated													
72nd Precnt Com Cncl													
78th Precnt Com Cncl													
CPB 6													
Redistributive Issue													
PSB, Met. Council													
PS Tenants Council													
Ideological													
Moncada													
South BAM													
Improvement/Redistributive Issue													
AID													
PST													
FAC													

* Proper names for groups in which abbreviations or acronyms are given can be found in Table 6.1 in the same order as presented above.

discussed problem and when abandonment and arson were prevalent in the north and southeast. Only one of the redistributive issue and neither the improvement/redistributive-issue nor the ideological types, emerged

prior to fall 1976. This tends to suggest that as dual housing-market processes became more explicit through the transference of increasing amounts of property from the minority and low-income side to the monied white side of the market through abandonment and rehabilitation of formerly minority or low-income occupied units or through displacement and rehabilitation, groups representing the interests of those being displaced tended to emerge.

In earlier chapters, we described the different resettlement patterns occurring in four geographical areas. Therefore, in order to see the connections between emergence and changing market processes over time, we must not only ask when different interest groups emerged, but where. For example, we would hypothesize that improvement groups that centered their activities in northwest, southeast, or southwest areas undergoing rapid resettlement processes in the middle or late 1970s would emerge later in the decade. We therefore turn our attention to clarifying the geographical areas in which organizations operated.

C. Community Organizations and Geographical Areas

All community groups perceived themselves as working within certain geographical boundaries, and for many, these boundaries were stated in their by-laws and constitutions. However, the issue of geographical boundary of operation is somewhat complicated. After a year or two of observations, it became clear to me that already-defined geographical boundaries and predominant areas of interest were not always

congruent, or that they changed over time. Therefore, I established two criteria against which to determine a group's predominant geographical area of interest and how those areas of interest changed over time. First, I used the actual location of group activities on a yearly basis, assuming that areas in which the group had activities would be considered within their geographical boundaries. Second, I considered the addresses of active members, defining an area within the group's boundary if at least 10% of the active members lived there.

For example, let us take the case of the oldest homeowner group, the Park Slope Civic Council. The group defined itself as an area wide "umbrella organization which can help others with their problems as they occur" (1). At public meetings it claimed to represent Park Slope. The primary activity carried out by the group was the continuation of an annual house tour begun in 1959. By looking at the location of the house tour from its inception to 1983 (see Table 6.4), one can see the shifts in the interests of the group.

It seems clear from the following Table that until the mid-1970s, the major Civic Council project was centered in the wealthier northeast. As the boundaries of professional residency shifted, so did the house tour.

Table 6.4

Location of Park Slope Civic Council House Tours: 1959-1983

1959-1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
NE*	NE,NW	NE,NW SE,SW	SE	NE,SE	NE	NE	SE

* Area boundaries are presented in Map 4.4, and are as follows: NE=northeast, NW= northwest, SE=southeast and SW=southwest. When more than one area is given in any one year, it indicates that the boundaries of the house tour included at least a part of a block within that area.

Changing geographical areas of interest are also apparent when we look at where the members of the 27- to 34-member Board of Trustees of the Civic Council lived. Membership trends, shown in Table 6.5, reflect a predominant origin of board members from the northeast with a small but stable membership from the northwest and southeast. It was not until the early 1980s that a few members of the board had their homes in the southwest, and that more than 15%, or four members, lived in the southeast.

Table 6.5

Park Slope Civic Council Board of Trustees Membership Trends

Area*	Year and Percentage of Board Members Residing in Area									
	1974	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83
Northeast	81%	81%	82%	81%	82%	74%	83%	73%	66%	60%
Northwest	06	07	11	11	11	13	06	10	06	12
Southeast	10	11	07	07	07	13	06	10	17	18
Southwest	03	00	00	00	00	00	00	06	06	09

*Area boundaries are presented in Map 4.4.

After examining membership and activity trends by area we might say that the group was concerned mainly with the improvement of the northeast with some interest in the

northwest and southeast. Therefore, we did not classify it as an area wide group although most of its members did. Each group was analyzed as to its membership and activity trends in order to estimate its areas of representation and concern. These results are summarized in Table 6.6.

A number of observations can be made by examining the organizations by area, over the decade. First, for the most part, numerous organizations were established early on in the decade to represent the wealthier northeast. Second, there were no resident-represented groups in the south that were mandated before 1975 (although there were quite a few merchant associations), and third, most area-wide groups that were not mandated did not surface until the mid-1970s. It would be consistent with resettlement patterns for the northeast to support numerous organizations prior to organizations being developed in the south if those organizations represented the interests of the wealthier professionals moving into the south. Also, in order to understand why so many area-wide groups did not surface prior to the mid 1970s, we would also have to ask what interests these groups served. Therefore, we shall turn our attention to an analysis of the three perspectives we have developed: interests groups; areas; and time. Groups are depicted according to types, areas, and time in Table 6.7. By charting the existence of groups within

Table 6.6

Geographical Areas of Concern of Park Slope Community Groups

Area	Year		
	1970-74	1975-79	1980-82
Northeast	nie(a) PSCC(b) Trian Pks 7thAve Mer 7ABC 78th Prcnt CC	nie PSCC Trian Pks PSChamber 7ABC 78th Prcnt CC	PSIC PSCC nie PSChamber nie 78th CC
Northwest	nie PSCC Trian Pks nie nie 78th Prcnt CC	nie PSCC Trian Pks Fifth AveLDC FAC 78th Prcnt CC	PSIC PSCC nie Ffth AvLDC FAC 78th CC
Southeast	anc(c) nie 72nd Prcnt CC	PSCC ROSAS 72nd Precnt CC	PSCC ROSAS 72nd CC
Southwest	nie FAMer 9-24 nie Untd FAMer nie 78th Prcnt CC 72nd Prcnt CC	FAMer 9-24 Fifth AveLDC Untd FAMer FAC 78th Prcnt CC 72nd Precnt CC	ROSAS FAMer 9-24 Ffth AvLDC Untd FAMer FAC 78th CC 72nd CC
Area-wide	UBA nie nie nie PSTen Cncl nie nie Comm Bd. 6	UBA PST AID PSBnch MetCncl PSTen Cncl Moncada SoBAM Comm Bd 6	UBA PST AID PSBchMetCl PSTen Cncl Moncada SoBAM Comm Bd 6

a= not in existence

b=Proper names for groups in which abbreviations or acronyms are given are as follows: PSCC (Park Slope Civic Council), Trian Pks (Triangle Parks/Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee, 7thAve Mer(7th Avenue Merchants Association), 7ABC (7th Avenue Betterment Committee), 78th Prcnt CC (78th Precinct Community Council), 72nd Prcnt CC (72nd Precinct Community Council), FAMer 9-24 (5th Avenue Merchants Association, 9 to 24 Streets), Untd FAMer (United Fifth Avenue Merchants Association), UBA (United Block Associations), PSTen Cncl (Park Slope Tenants Council), Comm Bd. 6 (Community Planning Board 6), PSChamber (Park Slope

Chamber of Commerce), Fifth AveLDC (Park Slope Fifth Avenue Local Development Corporation), FAC (Fifth Avenue Committee), ROSAS (Revitalization of the Southern Area of the Slope), PST (Park Slope Together), AID (Against Investment Discrimination), PSBnch MetCncl (Park Slope Branch, Metropolitan Council on Housing), Moncada (Moncada Library), SoBam (South Brooklyn Action Movement), or can be found in Table 6.1 in the same order as presented above.
c= area not covered by organization during that time

areas over time we are able to see that the emergence of community organizations in Park Slope generally followed resettlement processes. Improvement groups comprised of homeowners emerged first in the northeast (compare to Table 6.1 for exact year of emergence). Most merchant improvement organizations were in existence prior to 1970, but as abandonment and resettlement processes expanded into the south and northwest, new merchant and homeowner groups emerged in those areas. Although the early 1970s saw one area-wide redistributive-issue group emerge in the northeast (serving tenants from other areas as well), by the middle of the decade redistributive issues, improvement/redistributive issues, and ideological changes were affecting low- and moderate-income renters and homeowners, and groups formed to reflect the conflicts and the inequities of the dual housing market.

Table 6.7.

Types of Park Slope Community Organizations and Their Geographical Areas of Concern: 1970-1982.

Area	Type of Organization														
	Improvement			Redistributive			Improv/Redist.			Ideological			Mandated		
	70-74	75-79	80-82	70-74	75-79	80-82	70-74	75-79	80-82	70-74	75-79	80-82	0-4	5-9	0-2
NE	PSIC(h)												78th PCC---		
	PSCC*(h)a-----														
	Tri Pks(h)-														
	PS Chamber(m)b--														
	78BC(hm)c---														
NW	PSIC(h)												78th PCC---		
	PSCC(h)-----												FAC-----		
	Tri Pks(h)-														
	FALDC(m)--														
SE	PSCC(h)-----														
	ROSA(h)--												72nd PCC---		
SW	ROSA												FAC-----		
	FALDC(m)--												78th PCC---		
													72nd PCC---		
	S Ave Mer9-24St(m)														
	Unitd Mer 5Av(m)														
AW	USA(h)-----												PS BrchMetCl		
													AID-----		
													#oncada		
													Comm Bd 6		
													PSTenants Encl---		
													PST-----		
													SoBAM---		

*Proper names for groups in which abbreviations or acronyms are given can be found in Table 6.1

a=(h) homeowner group, b=(m) merchant group, c=(h,m) homeowner and merchant group

NE=Northeast, NW=Northwest, SE=Southeast, SW=Southwest, AW=Area-wide

Notes

1. Consensus arrived at during a discussion of the purpose of the Council on 5 June 1975 at their monthly Board of Trustees meeting and stated by the then president, Robert Burton.

Chapter 7

Community Organizations and Resettlement Issues: Improvement Organizations

I. Northeast Improvement Organizations

A. Park Slope Civic Council (1)

Of the ten improvement groups observed, the Park Slope Civic Council was the oldest, most established group: having been from its inception in 1896, concerned with such improvement matters as restoration of historic sites and widening and repaving of streets (Arens, 1976). Abandonment and resettlement issues became salient for the council in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the effects of the transformation of the city were felt in decreasing real income of local blue-collar workers and the departure of upper-income families. The Civic Council defined the change as "a creeping blight that threatens the civic health of the whole area" (Civic News, 1960). As four-story one-family homes began to be divided into single-room occupancies for mainly single, working-class Irish, members turned to government to support a major code-enforcement program (Park Slope Civic Council, 1966). However, by the late 1960s, members began to reevaluate this strategy as they noticed an increase in housing sales prices in the northeast. They saw the possibility that young white-collar professionals could move to Park Slope and buy houses similar to, but less expensive than, those in adjacent Brooklyn Heights and

Manhattan. They increased the circulation of their monthly newsletter, hosted an annual house tour, advertised individual homes, held cocktail parties, and attracted media coverage.

As indicated in chapter 6, the house tour was the major annual event for the Civic Council, attracting as many as 3500 people annually in the mid-to-late 1970s. Whereas the tour grossed \$1,300 in 1974, income from the tour was \$13,000 by 1980 with the only annual expenses consisting of printing and advertising costs. The steady increase in income generated by the house tour during the 1970s is important for several reasons. First, it indicates the increasing interest in Park Slope by upwardly mobile professionals (even though ticket prices did rise somewhat). Second, it provided a steady source of income to defray the staff and overhead costs required to publish a 25-page monthly newsletter and, by the late 1970s, to hire another part-time person.

In an attempt to attract upwardly mobile professionals to join the council, members campaigned to change its image from an old, established, "stuffy" organization to one concerned with a certain contemporary aesthetic. Hundreds of hours were spent debating whether, and who, to hire to edit and produce a new monthly newsletter that would have modern graphics and incorporate historic-preservation themes. In addition, wine and cheese parties, boat rides and cultural events were sponsored by the council. Almost all

members were white middle- and upper-income professionals and events that they sponsored were expensive. Residents "dressed" for meetings which were held in the northeast on Prospect Park West and many had been members for five years or more.

Another important function of the Civic Council in the resettlement process was its capacity to act as a catalyst for the formation of new groups that committed to "improve" specific "problem areas". For example, it spawned 7ABC, the UBA, Triangle Parks Improvement Committee, the Fifth Avenue Committee, ROSAs and, in part, the Park Slope Improvement Committee.

Generally, new homeowners concerned with abandoned property, crime, dirt, garbage, noise, or what they considered inappropriate social behavior sought out others concerned with similar issues. Sometimes they formed or joined existing block associations. Through their block association membership they found out about the Civic Council, and if the problems they were concerned about or the networks they wanted to form were larger than block-wide they attended Civic Council meetings. Some became integrated in the organization and its general goals. Others left when issues discussed didn't appear to be related to them, and still others would form separate organizations, attracting a few people from the Civic Council, a few from their own block associations and a few from neighboring block associations, or other area-wide groups. With

considerable overlap in membership between organizations, it was common for members of the board of one improvement group to be on the board of another.

Sometimes this process took several years. For instance, a ubiquitous cause for concern and anger at Civic Council meetings was garbage and dirt on Seventh Avenue in the northeast. People were worried that the garbage would discourage shopping, thereby inhibiting resettlement processes by creating an unpleasant atmosphere. After a number of years of discussion, members who were particularly concerned with the issue formed the 7ABC in 1974, inviting merchant representation and their friends to help organize the new group. The Civic Council publicized their efforts in the Civic News and helped the group secure local press coverage.

Sometimes, the strategies that the Civic Council used to support the resettlement process could be seen in the things they failed to do. At times, groups would approach the Civic Council for support on some resettlement or displacement issue (2), and, if the trustees agreed with their position, a letter would be sent to appropriate authorities expressing their concern. However, in many instances, particularly in the early and mid-1970s, the council failed to support a number of groups' requests. For example, on 14 October 1975, when a group from nearby Fort Greene came to the group to ask for support for low- and moderate-income housing that they were sponsoring, trustees

suggested that the area was changing and that the group "reevaluate their goals away from subsidized housing or lower-income co-operatives." At a Civic Council meeting on 2 February 1977, when a local legislator (3) spoke to the group of increasing rents and tenant problems, members failed to support the legislator's request, confining their remarks to the importance of fair return on investment.

The council's reluctance to support low- or moderate-income renters was occurring at a time in which members feared the expansion of the northwest's deterioration moving across Sixth Avenue into the core of the wealthy northeast just as new brownstoners were beginning to purchase homes west of Seventh Avenue. Council members saw their interests threatened.

In mid 1977, under the chairmanship of a local realtor, the council formed a housing committee. The committee reported to the group that the main housing problem was that there were too many nonowner-occupied multiple dwellings north of Third Street. They recommended the formation of a development group to address the problem. Through real estate and development contacts of Civic Council members, The Park Slope Restoration Foundation was formed in December 1977. The Civic News (1978a) stated that the foundation would be concerned with "the physical condition and economic health of real property and will not be concerned with related problems like code enforcement, landlord-tenant relations, tenant organizing, or property management." It

was organized to promote homeownership "either of the condominium or co-operative variety," and to meet the "rental housing needs for senior citizens of low- and moderate-income." When there was reluctance on the part of other community organizations to support foundation proposals, an editorial appeared in the Civic News encouraging its development.

If Park Slope with some of the the finest housing stock anywhere, is permitted to slip back into a cycle of deterioration, the psychological impact on the back-to-the-city and urban homesteading movements will be devastating, not only on other city neighborhoods but on neighborhoods in other cities. More than shelter is to be preserved here: the community fabric is at stake, and irreplaceable resources of wood and stone, of labor and imagination. There is space for many groups and many kinds of enterprises. Thus we welcome the Foundation. Reflexive antagonism could thwart the resolution of the very real problems we all face. Park Slope is not a monolithic entity; as the Fifth Avenue Committee is proving; co-operation can occur without homogeneity; merchant and resident, brownstoner and renter, upslope and downslope have the same rights to home and community and opinion, and must proceed together (Civic News, 1978b).

Although the foundation never materialized (4), the assertion that all interest groups could work in harmony, that housing rehabilitation was essential to all, and that everyone faces similar problems was a central belief of the Civic Council and of other improvement groups during most of the decade. Evidence to the contrary and criticisms of the rentier approach were interpreted by improvement groups, as the above passage seems to indicate, as attempts to repress "community" opinion.

However, the belief that everyone shared similar problems seemed to be moderated by three important processes in the late 1970s. First, the acceleration and expansion of the upper-income housing market reduced the threat of encroachment by the black side of the dual housing market and permitted an atmosphere in which the mounting evidence of displacement-related hardship could be recognized as legitimate. Second, the mounting evidence of hardship placed enormous pressure on individual members of the council, particularly those that were involved with other organizations that had philanthropic or redistributive bents. For example, in 1979, the president of the Civic Council was also on the board of directors of the Fifth Avenue Committee; an improvement/redistributive group that supported moderate- and low-income tenants, and, in 1980 and 1981 the president of the council was also on the board of the local settlement house (5). Third, as a result of the expanding white-collar housing market, the membership of the Civic Council expanded west and south by the early 1980s. The championing of gentrification in areas with a decidedly mixed-income population made the group more vulnerable to challenges of lack of sensitivity as expensive renovations stood in sharp contrast to surrounding housing styles and conditions. Protests of displacement in the south and west became more frequent.

Moderations in positions that legitimized displacement concerns began to appear in 1979. First, at a board meeting

in June 1979, the trustees passed the following resolution that they sent to local realtors.

That the Civic Council communicate with all real estate developers, brokers and investors doing business in Park Slope and inform them of the council's disapproval of eviction or compulsory co-operative conversions. The Trustees felt that because eviction co-op conversions usually displace older, longtime residents, such compulsory conversions are harmful to the well being of our community. We hope that you will respect the wishes of the Civic Council in this matter.

From the dramatic increases in co-operative conversions that proliferated throughout Park Slope from 1979 through 1983, one might suspect that this resolution did not alter market forces. Nevertheless, it is a good example of the strategy used by the council to moderate its reputation as an elitist organization with upper-class interests at a time in which contradictions in the housing market were becoming sharpened.

In an attempt to improve its image, the council spent part of the money received from running house tours on local philanthropic projects. Although the council had been making small donations to local organizations for years, in 1977, the trustees established a "foundation" that received requests for small grants from block associations, local youth agencies, and educational institutions. The institutionalization of grant giving by setting forth guidelines, maximum amounts, and application deadlines established the group as a source for small project funds

(grants rarely exceeded \$250), and tended to make it less subject to criticism as an elitist institution. Some applicants believed that the Civic Council was placating poor people with "blood money" earned from encouraging gentrification through the house tour and displacing those who needed, but would not be around to apply for, the next round of grants (6). However, such discussions were held privately, and since there were no obvious options, their perceptions did not stop the groups from applying for the small grants.

Finally, by 1980, with the expansion of resettlement assured, the council began to open its newsletter to debate on resettlement and displacement issues (Civic News, 1980, 1981a, 1981b; Noonan, 1980). Debate ensued over displacement, co-operative conversions and gentrification. The board of trustees sponsored open meetings on these topics (7) and invited people with diverse opinions to express their views. A particularly heated debate on gentrification took up a large portion of the Civic News from January to May 1982 (Civic News, 1982a 1982b, 1982c, 1982d, 1982e). In this instance, the council published an article highly critical of the motives of "militant gentry" and "zealots" who press antisubsidy, "free market" agendas in their efforts to rid their neighborhoods of low-income people (Sleeper, 1982). In the article, the gentry were cautioned that "as long as middle-income people remained absorbed in the short-run aspirations to make neighborhood

"reputation" a marketable substance while ignoring real human needs, they invite social disaster."

As might be imagined, most of the letters to the editor surrounding the issue were hostile to the criticism and angry that the Civic Council would print such "rhetoric" (L. Smith, 1982; Spontak, 1982) and felt that their positions were more appropriately represented by the president of the Park Slope Improvement Committee (Berg, 1982; Borchar, 1982, Brennan, 1982) who defined the gentry as "those people who contribute to the upgrading of a neighborhood's appearance." However, there was a minority opinion that was sympathetic to Sleeper's analysis (Mann, 1982) and acknowledged the destructive forces of displacement (Friend, 1982; Noonan, 1982).

Although the council did not take any positions itself in relation to subsidized housing or follow up on its co-operative-conversion resolution in later years, there were, by 1982, several factors that fostered its reputation in the early 1980s as a moderate organization rather than an elitist one. First, as mentioned above, it opened up its meetings and newsletter for debate on resettlement issues, probably, in part, because there was no longer a threat of declining property values in the northeast. Second, another group surfaced in 1980, the Park Slope Improvement Committee, which was more conservative than the Civic Council, taking strong positions against subsidized housing for the poor. In comparison to the strong rhetoric of the

Park Slope Improvement Committee, the Civic Council position appeared conciliatory. Finally, housing-market costs had accelerated so much during the period from 1978 to 1983 that larger numbers of local residents were being affected, and by 1981, and 1982, local media was extremely supportive of this long-term neighborhood constituency and highly critical of the "gentrifiers" (DeRocker, 1981a; Goodno, 1982; Hoffman, 1981; James, 1982; Perrin, 1982a-c; Saafir, 1982a-e; J. Smith, 1982, 13th Street Block Association, 1982). This put pressure on the council to continue its antidisplacement posture.

B. The Seventh Avenue Betterment Committee
and the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce(8)

The Seventh Avenue Betterment Committee, a highly task-oriented northeast area improvement group, grew out of a response against a government-initiated proposal to turn Seventh Avenue into a shopping mall in the early 1970s (Tarzian, 1983). It took its name from the Park Slope Betterment Committee, begun in 1960 by real estate developer and local resident Kenneth Patten, who became president of the Board of Realtors of New York City.

The specific goal of the group was to beautify Seventh Avenue and keep it clean in order to attract professional middle-income shoppers. Largely comprised of white homeowner professionals and a few merchants from the northeast, the group's leadership was composed of architects, designers, bankers, attorneys, and merchants who

catered to the new brownstoners. As opposed to the Civic Council, whose leadership, with one exception, was dominated by men, there was shared leadership between professional men and women in the "cleaning up" of northeast Park Slope's major shopping street. White middle-income professionals who lived in the northeast wanted the shopping street to be attractive. Early on, the group defined the problem as one in which the housing market was moving faster than the improvement of Seventh Avenue, and they feared that the street's dirty appearance could hamper the market's movement (9).

The group's strategy was threefold. They would plant trees and brick part of the sidewalk near the curb along Seventh Avenue on as many blocks as possible, keep pressuring the merchants to keep their places clean and to participate in the brick and tree planting by releasing their property for the work, and finally they would operate a sweeper vac on the avenue. They were successful in bricking two blocks along Seventh Avenue in 1975, and in operating a sweeper vac from 1975 to 1977. They were able to approach the merchants and solicit funds to keep the sweeper vac going. They raised money from wine-and-cheese parties, cultural affairs, and door-to-door requests which brought in over 200 members. They were well known as an important and successful self-help group after which other groups could model themselves (Blair, 1975; Gershun, 1975a; The Phoenix, 1974, 1975a-d).

However, they were unable to keep the momentum going after several setbacks. Merchants refused to contribute to sweeper vac program. After the first completed project, whenever a new block or two were chosen for tree planting and brickwork, there were always some merchants who refused to sign a release or who didn't want to pay the \$200 cost for buying the bricks, although the volunteers did all the brick laying and planting gratis. Residents, tired of arranging for sanitation tickets to be issued and boycotting nonparticipating merchants, did not receive enough support within the group, which had few merchant members.

Another set of events also sapped the strength of the group. By mid-1976, the favorable press received by the group attracted 1) social-service groups representing low-income constituencies to request donations for their programs and 2) other block-associations and improvement groups requesting support on specific issues. Although members of the Betterment Committee did not appear interested in these requests, other groups managed to get on the agendas of monthly meetings and divert substantial attention away from the main purpose of the group. Protocol, government cutbacks, and the changing market conditions made it impossible to disallow requests from being made, but in the three-year life of the Betterment Committee, it responded only once to a request made by another improvement organization: to protest a teen drug-prevention program being located on Flatbush Avenue.

Finally, in 1977, there was a change in leadership and the group fell apart. All that remained were the three blocks of bricked sidewalk and eight trees. However, the group had gotten several hundred residents involved in a concrete project with social side effects that included considerable enthusiasm, publicity, and a widely felt presence during a time in which white-collar housing expansion was moving west.

C. The Park Slope Chamber of Commerce

The Park Slope Chamber of Commerce, or the Seventh Avenue Merchants Association as it was known prior to 1976, was another northeast improvement group that changed over the decade as the Seventh Avenue shopping strip changed to reflect the influx of brownstoners. There was an overlapping relationship between the 7ABC and the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce. Some of the same merchants were members of both and, when the 7ABC dissolved, some of its perennial tasks were assumed by the chamber. The leadership of the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce and the Park Slope Civic Council also overlapped (10).

During the late 1960s and through 1975, most merchants had been in business on the avenue for some time, and a few of them, perhaps twenty or so, often ate dinner together before their monthly merchants meetings and then used the meetings to complain about their individual problems: lack of customers; taxes; sanitation; and overpriced carting services. It was also an organization that had long-term

ties to religious and cultural institutions, making regular donations to the area's little league clubs, senior-citizen centers, hospital, day-care centers and the local cultural center. In other words, it was well integrated into the social structure of the neighborhood.

This began to change in 1975 and 1976, when a few new and older members wanted the group to change its function from a social organization to one that actively sought to draw people to the avenue to shop. In 1975, they held a street fair, Seventh Heaven, the first of what would become an annual event. Those interested in this approach pursued it as volunteers, but soon found out they couldn't run their businesses and direct events as well. Dues increased and the organization hired part-time help to coordinate their fair.

Many of the older ethnic merchants were overruled in their discussions of personal problems, and soon a rule was passed that meeting time could not be used to discuss individual problems. Some of the older merchants left, and the group became increasingly involved in joint advertising and private protection. Some of the older merchants, whose merchandise was not geared for the new, white-collar market were reluctant to participate in strategies such as art shows, because they didn't believe those strategies would help them. Their concerns were increasingly ignored and they left the group.

By the late 1970s, increased rents became a topic of concern as merchants reported rent increases of from \$300 to

\$800 per month at the end of their lease. By 1983, there were three ice-cream parlors and four plant stores within a radius of six blocks. Although the group had changed its name to the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce, it had little contact with the merchants along Fifth Avenue, Flatbush Avenue, or for that matter along Seventh Avenue south of Ninth Street. Merchants who had businesses south of Third Street and had joined the association in the late 1970s and early 1980s influenced the group to extend the boundaries of the annual street fair.

Merchants who lamented the loss of long-term customers through displacement were rarely overruled at meeting time; but the art festivals, the fairs, the advertising campaigns, the annual directory of shops and services, the calendars and special promotions continued as if they had a life of their own. The Park Slope Chamber of Commerce had achieved success.

II. Northwest Improvement Organizations

A. Triangle Parks/Flatbush Ave. Improvement Committee (11)

As market conditions softened in some areas of the northwest in the early 1970s, young professionals who had bought homes on blocks adjacent to Flatbush Avenue tried to deal with what they considered the filth and the terrible quality of stores on Flatbush Avenue .

At first, a few residents led by a dramatist and shoe designer actually began themselves to sweep down Flatbush

Avenue (12). The group, comprised of white young professionals who were relatively new to the neighborhood, brought their concerns to the Civic Council and became a standing committee of the council; but soon, since the council was not meeting their needs directly they made other contacts and formed their own group. This organization's specific goal was to clean up Flatbush Avenue and bring in stores that would sell, what they considered to be, quality merchandise. Their statement of purpose can be paraphrased to say that they wanted to develop Flatbush Avenue from Atlantic Avenue to Grand Army Plaza. Their major program areas were increased security, cleanliness and beautification. They wished to eliminate environmental problems such as "litter, abandoned cars, chaotic and unkempt signs, unsightly street and sidewalk conditions, to stimulate enthusiasm for Flatbush Avenue, and to promote diversification in the types of shops and service establishments in order to broaden the areas appeal as a shopping center" (Triangle Parks/Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee of Brooklyn, 1974).

In the early 1970s, Flatbush Avenue's stores sold mainly low-end merchandise, liquor, and second-hand goods. There was also a number of sizeable well-stocked stores that sold sporting goods, paint and hardware, floor coverings, and lighting. Generally, these stores served the low- and moderate-income black and Hispanic population that lived there.

Triangle Parks was in somewhat of a unique position to effect some physical changes in Flatbush Avenue for the six-block stretch that bordered Park Slope. Since this northern corner of Park Slope was considered by some to be an extension of downtown Brooklyn, these residents were able to form relationships with established downtown private and government development agencies, the Mayor's Office of Downtown Brooklyn, and the Downtown Brooklyn Development Association. The networking was made possible through connections between the leadership of Triangle Parks and influential agency staff, some of whom lived in the northern section of Park Slope (13).

Over a four-year period, the group also developed extensive networks within local groups and institutions. First, in addition to its relationship with the Civic Council, it developed overlapping leadership with the 78th Precinct Community Council (14). Second, unlike some of the other improvement organizations that were working solely with private-market funding, Triangle Parks sponsored a government-subsidized design and construction of a new facade to replace a crumbling one for a small take-out eatery at Flatbush and Fourth Avenue. The agency staff person assigned to the project was also a member of Triangle Parks. Third, Brooklyn Union Gas, with its offices on Flatbush Avenue, became interested in and supported the committee's work. Unlike the Seventh Avenue Betterment Committee, which enlisted volunteers to lay brickwork on

Seventh Avenue, Triangle Parks' members, through their contacts with city agencies, were able to have the New York City Transportation Department cut curbs and lay cobblestones for the triangular parks that the committee refurbished (Triangle Tribune, 1974). They learned, through discussions with government staff, to make contact with local politicians and to seek appointment to the local planning board. They were eventually able to have two people appointed to Community Board Six which made it easier to promote improvement projects. The group's goal and the goals of local institutions and government were congruent.

Group members considered themselves "pioneers," were extremely hardworking, and were able to develop a number of different strategies to promote the changes they wanted to make. Like all other improvement groups, they were able to build a small working constituency to publish a newsletter. They organized block captains and facilitated friendly relationships among merchants and between residents and merchants. They were able to plant trees, install tree grates and attract a restaurant to Flatbush Avenue as well as introduce new graphics to the avenue.

As with other improvement groups, goals and strategies can be gleaned from what the groups fail to support: or in this case, what it worked actively against. In 1973 and 1975, Triangle Parks took several hiatuses from beautification efforts to work actively against the location of a Methadone Center at 191 Flatbush and against a plan to

convert a center from a Family Income Maintenance Center to one serving single, unattached adults. Members were worried that the single adults were alcoholics, addicts, and former mental patients. When asked in an informal interview in 1976 how it became interested in working against these projects, the president of the group said that he was very friendly with the president of the Office of Downtown Brooklyn Development and the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, who told him about the proposed changes and suggested that Triangle Parks should "get busy thinking about them" (15). By the end of 1975, the group had turned its attention to protesting noise, drugs, and prostitution problems along Pacific Street and west of Fifth Avenue. Articles in their newsletters with headlines such as "I Can't Hear You with the Gypsy Cab's Horn Blowing" or "Put the Pros to Bed One Way or Another" (Triangle Tribune, 1975) protested these conditions. Letters demanding action were sent to local politicians and officials in development agencies. The group was no longer involved in beautification efforts.

Towards the middle of 1976, the president of the organization resigned in despair over what appeared to him to be an increase in the blight with no end in sight, and the organization dissolved. In an informal interview with him two weeks before his move to New Jersey in June 1977, he spoke of his opposition to the infiltration of the poor into the area, and his perception that others in the organization and people like himself were victims of the

"creeping poor coming into an area that is being rejuvenated with people who care" (Cuff, 1977).

B. The United Blocks Associations of Park Slope (16)

In 1972, the Civic Council trustees were anxious to involve more of the block associations, now rapidly forming throughout Park Slope to deal with sanitation, abandonment, and crime problems. They were particularly concerned with blocks in the northwest, since poor black and Hispanic families were beginning to move into the area east of Sixth Avenue. Since the council itself was an individual-membership organization, and not open to membership from block associations, and since it was based in the wealthier northeast, it spawned a block association umbrella group in January 1973: the United Block Associations of Park Slope.

The UBA, as it came to be known, did not remain a northwest organization, for it tried, with some success to interest block associations throughout the area to join its ranks. However, it began as a northwest area organization, and this would remain its focus for three years.

The goal of the UBA was to have increased power in the resettlement process, to exercise influence on specific issues more effectively than one block association could by acting alone. A 1975 UBA Newsletter article (UBA Newsletter, 1975) stated that the purpose was "to confront situations within Park Slope that the community found offensive, and to try to effect changes desired by the

residents of this neighborhood . . . what an individual cannot accomplish, a large organized group can." In its nine-and-a-half-year history the UBA usually attempted to mediate environmental change by pressing a pro-resettlement agenda presented to its membership by leaders of its member block associations. It was generally assumed by the UBA that block associations represented the interests of block residents.

As a rule, the block associations represented the more highly educated professional residents of a block. In an interview study of 20 Park Slope block associations (O'Hanlon, 1976), members were asked to describe block-association activities. Ninety-nine block-association members were interviewed. Seventy-three percent were white, their median age was 34, and their median household size was two. Residents had lived on their blocks a median of three and one-half years, and 86% of those employed had white-collar jobs. Even more revealing, the median number of years of education was 16, or four years of college. Although it is possible that this study did not represent the demographic characteristics of all 41 block associations operating in Park Slope in the mid-to-late 1970s, it indicated the demography of the leadership.

For the first three years of its existence (1973-1975), the UBA centered its efforts in the northwest. The group of eight to 10 white middle-management men who started the organization interested other, newly forming block

associations in the northwest in jointly addressing the local issues of crime, prostitution, drugs, and block security. Although many of them had bought their homes for what was then considered by upwardly mobile professionals to be very little money (\$20,000 to \$35,000) and were therefore able to renovate, they also perceived themselves to be facing serious security problems, and drug traffic and gang fighting between Italian and Latin youth seemed to be jeopardizing their investments (17).

Stores on Fifth Avenue began to close, and by 1975, entire blocks were devoid of commercial activity. For a while, the group acted as a forum to discuss these problems and built a network of shared interests. Most of the members were newcomers and had little experience in local politics. While leadership from Triangle Parks was inviting the Police Commissioner to tour the area under pressure from local real-estate interests, the members of the UBA felt overwhelmed by these problems. Under the direction and persistence of one of their members, a local film maker, they turned their attention to what they considered the cause of the problem, law-breaking youth. They developed a youth recreation program and were able to get it funded. Block associations could call the UBA during the summer and sports equipment would be sent to the block on weekends. They spoke about how this would keep teenagers busy "so they wouldn't get into trouble" (Thomas, 1976). When the film maker left the group, the program also folded.

Over the years, however, UBA did sponsor local teams, and in 1977, another evening youth program was sponsored out of UBA dues. Members continued to see these activities as anticrime measures. At one point, when requests were made to the group by a local agency to sponsor a girls sports program and the group decided not to do this, the treasurer of the group gave the rationale that they were "concerned with crime and mainly boys commit crimes and we want to try to prevent that" (Caire, 1977). Some members also organized a softball league where groups from different blocks could play each other and informal social networks were built. Although the group remained essentially white middle-class professionals, the youth outreach work encouraged others with similar interests to join, and blacks as well as working-class ethnic homeowners became part of the group.

As in the case of other improvement organizations discussed, resettlement positions can be gleaned from the issues the group failed to support or fought against. Block associations often joined the UBA as a result of their experiences in getting UBA support on land-use issues. For example, in 1975 new brownstoners from 10th Street sought UBA support in stopping a Burger King from opening on Fifth Avenue in the predominantly working-class southwest. Although the issue lost and the Burger King was constructed, the new residents stayed a few years to work on UBA fund-raising projects. Another block association sought support in stopping a mental-health clinic from locating on

its block, and a third association wanted to stop the conversion of a tenement building into a residential home for emotionally handicapped girls on its block. Each time the UBA offered full support by writing letters to appropriate authorities. In the case of the Burger King, it supported a protest march in front of the proposed site. Rarely was there much debate on an issue or an attempt to look at a position not supported by the representatives of the block association.

By 1976, the UBA was supporting the resettlement efforts of other improvement groups but was still able to maintain ties with some black and white working-class homeowners. First, the newsletter ran articles supporting the house tours, conversions to co-operatives, and brownstone renovations. There began to be some overlap in membership trends between the UBA and other improvement groups. Yet the issue of cutbacks in services, which became particularly pertinent in 1976, at the peak of New York City's fiscal crisis, united old-and newcomers in their attempts to save the local fire house, keep sanitation services from being cut, and a local school gym from closing. Members commiserated with one another and wrote letters of protest to appropriate authorities.

Conducting the survey with block associations in 1976 to find out what block associations considered their problems to be and what they wanted the UBA's role to be in assisting them (O'Hanlon, 1976) had a number of important

effects. Prior to commissioning the survey, attendance at meetings had dwindled from 25 to nine. Afterward, interest in the organization increased. The group had a dinner dance, cleaned a vacant lot, and had a number of social events. Puppet shows were sponsored for local kids and pro-UBA sentiment was strong. Efforts to maintain the organization took precedence over resettlement and land-use issues for the moment. Second, the findings of the survey and the increase in organization membership engendered by conducting the interviews led to the formation of a number of committees, some of which eventually led to the formation of other improvement organizations and the eventual demise of the UBA. Representatives from blocks bordering Fifth Avenue south of Union Street were concerned about the closing stores and were fearful that the general abandonment north of Union Street was beginning to move south. This led to the formation of a subcommittee that eventually became the Fifth Avenue Committee. Members of block associations involved with the Fifth Avenue Committee improvement efforts ceased attending UBA meetings.

In 1977, leadership in the organization began to come from newly formed block associations in the south and the UBA became increasingly interested in the potential for brownstoning in the south. Since the white-collar housing market was expanding south, discussions often centered on how the areas south of Ninth Street could become developed for co-operatives and for artists. Members continually

compared the southeast to the northeast, setting the wealthy northeast as a model. Some of the working-class members that had been attracted by programs and socializing of 1976 left the group, and the image of the northeast as model was not challenged. By 1978, the UBA Newsletter rarely carried information on youth programs, but was instead directed towards dispensing information on historic preservation, and encouraging expansion of landmark status in the south. In January, 1978, the editor of the UBA newsletter wrote "the brownstone block is the mainstay of neighborhoods . . . which should be treated like gold . . . the failure of the block is the corner apartment building, the midblock tenement and rent control" (UBA Newsletter, 1978). Words like pioneers and preservation appeared with increasing frequency, and the chairperson of the UBA real-estate committee, was, by 1979, involved in the partnership of the largest renovation of residential housing in the northeast, Garfield North Co-operatives, in which low-income Hispanic and working-class white tenants were displaced (18). In 1978 and 1979, the dinner-dance and potluck suppers at the YMCA, gave way to the wine and cheese cocktail parties at local real-estate offices. Members from the south who had become the mainstay of the organization left to join the southern area improvement organization, ROSAS.

By 1980, membership attendance was down, and the group wanted a *raison d'être*. Only 12 block associations were sending representatives to meetings, and these were the

current officers of the UBA. Others interested in the brownstone movement had joined improvement organizations that were located in more narrowly defined geographical areas. In addition, many block associations became temporarily inactive from time to time, so that the individual membership organization that was popular among area-specific groups was more amenable to many. Since development issues seemed to be consuming the attention of other groups, the UBA decided to concentrate on the formation of a sanitation task force to combat what the president termed the "filth of the neighborhood." Members met with sanitation officials and a few blocks organized spring sweeps. However, by 1982, current officers could find no one to run for office and the organization dissolved.

C. The Park Slope Improvement Committee (19)

The Park Slope Improvement Committee emerged in mid-1980, as a response against the increasingly redistributive posture taken by the Fifth Avenue Committee in housing matters. The leadership of the group was largely comprised of white-collar homeowners who had been active, at one time, in the FAC. In fact, the chairman of the group had been active in the FAC Housing Committee, having been appointed by that body to be its representative to Community Board Six, and had unsuccessfully run for membership to the board of directors of the FAC in September 1979. Another member had been the chairperson of FAC's public safety

committee and still another had been a founding member of the Fifth Avenue Committee.

Group members were also well known and active in numerous other community organizations. They had been officers in the 78th Precinct Community Council, and were either appointed members of Community Board Six or participated in the board's subcommittees. Many were also members of the Park Slope Civic Council and a few had been members of the by-then defunct Triangle Parks/Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee.

The members of this group were very involved in resettlement issues since most of their members lived in the northwest, where abandonment and crime problems were the worst. The members saw the positions being taken by the Fifth Avenue Committee in support of low- and moderate-income housing as a threat to the real estate values in the northwest and as an affront to their own community efforts to attract capital and white-collar professionals. Over 40% of their executive body had had leadership positions in anticrime organizations and they were particularly concerned about the deleterious effects of drug sales, prostitution, and street crime on neighborhood safety. They made a causal connection between the presence of low- and moderate-income people and crime. In a 23 November letter to 10,000 neighborhood residents, the president of the organization wrote

The Fifth Avenue Committee is quietly attempting to construct buildings (or convert present structures) for Section 8 or other subsidized rental The tremendous fallout from compacted subsidized housing, just in terms of crime, affects us all Those of us trying to revitalize that portion of the Slope in greatest need (the Fifth Avenue corridor) are appalled that anyone (let alone a group that is supposed to be upgrading the neighborhood) can encourage these projects which will only serve to downgrade the vicinity.

There was strong consensus within the group that if the private market could be used to sell and rehabilitate buildings, then there should be neither subsidies nor Section 8 tenancy. In its policy statement, it indicated that the "the restoration of economic life on the main business strip of northern Fifth Avenue" was its primary goal, and the development of a large supermarket on a vacant lot between Baltic and Butler Streets was the key to that revitalization, which would provide a "ripple effect."

In a long-running argument with members of the Fifth Avenue Committee at community meetings, in the local press, and through the mail, Park Slope Improvement Committee members cited that buildings in the neighborhood were selling at auction for \$18,000 to \$20,000 in 1978, and at \$40,000 to \$60,000 unrenovated in 1980. The Fifth Avenue Committee responded that most of the buildings that went to contract at these prices never went to closing when owners were unable to secure financing to rehabilitate them. Although they claimed that the FAC was sponsoring massive Section 8 housing, the Fifth Avenue Committee plan appeared

to call for 50 owner-occupied three-family buildings with Section 8 tenancy.

Although three active members of PSIC were black, it would appear from their 23 November 1980 letter to the community and from subsequent community meetings, that the group equated crime with subsidized housing and therefore with low-income minority populations. At community meetings black and Hispanic residents told members of the group that they thought their strategies were racist and designed to eliminate their housing. At one meeting held by the Fifth Avenue Committee a black resident shouted at a black member of the Park Slope Improvement Committee, "Even if you got rid of all of us, how long do you think you would last?" (20).

The strategies of the PSIC were designed to discredit FAC in order to ensure that there would be a large supermarket on Baltic Street. If there were to be new houses or rehabilitation of vacant properties, members wanted it to be market-rate housing. They wrote letters to financial institutions that backed the FAC plan, to public officials, newspapers, and residents. They made presentations at community meetings that included the clergy, most of the improvement organizations, and the Community Board. They developed strong interlocking networks with other improvement groups and in 1981, tried unsuccessfully to have five of their members elected to the Civic Council Board of Trustees.

The Park Slope Improvement Committee was successful in its attempts to have a large supermarket and market rate homes built on Baltic Street. By September 1983, the supermarket was completed and the homes were in the process of being built. The plan, sponsored by the Park Slope Improvement Committee, was also sponsored by the office of the borough president and the mayor. Where there was an opportunity to encourage resettlement processes, government encouraged it.

III. The Southern Area Improvement Group:
Revitalization of the Southern Area of the
Slope (21)

A south-area improvement group evolved in 1977. As resettlement expanded south, a few new southeast area residents--specifically, an architect and a graphic designer (22)--began to search out established neighborhood organizations from which to draw support for the rehabilitation of the commercial strip, Seventh Avenue, south of Ninth Street. They attended meetings of the Civic Council and the UBA and found support from their membership. A year later, they had broadened their interests to include housing rehabilitation in the southern Slope, and changed their name from Restoration of Seventh Avenue South to Revitalization of the Southern Area of the Slope, maintaining the same acronym, ROSAS. Although the group was not an actual spin-off from other improvement groups in the same way that most were, the established groups lent support and considered ROSAS to be part of the improvement network.

Of all the improvement groups, this was the smallest, attracting about seven to 10 consistent members with increases up to 30 when the group was in the midst of a project (Kaiserman, 1983).

The main goal of the group was to "point out the affordability and beauty of the South Slope." (Kaiserman, 1983). From 1977 to 1980, it promoted the south Slope by publishing a how-to-renovate newsletter, publicizing landmark and architecturally outstanding buildings, conducting the Park Slope Civic Council house tour in the southeast, sponsoring an art show, and supporting a number of co-operative conversions in the south.

Planning and carrying out the house tour was a major year-long task that turned out to be highly successful, attracting 2600 people. It was held in the spring of 1979 and publicity for it was worked out almost a year in advance. Until that time, a house tour had never been held south of Ninth Street and ROSAS members wrote letters to the local press to disabuse them of the commonly held perception that Park Slope ended at Ninth Street. This involvement with the Civic Council during the planning of the tour resulted in considerable overlapping of membership for both groups, and in 1982-83, the wife of the president of the Civic Council was the president of ROSAS (23).

Sponsoring specific market-rate conversions was also an important objective for many members of the group. It was relatively unusual for an improvement organization to

sponsor specific development projects, but the south Slope had a number of industrial buildings and warehouses that were underutilized. One very large block-square building, the Ansonia Clockworks building, had been a busy clock factory during the industrial and early corporate period, but by the late 1970s only a few light industrial manufacturers were renting space there. The group wanted to start a local development corporation to develop its own rehabilitation projects, but there was another one in the south Slope and government regulations prohibited dual structures. Through the real estate contacts of two members, however, members were able to interest Manhattan real estate people to become involved with the project (Kaiserman, 1983).

By late 1979 and early 1980, ROSAS began to undergo a change in strategy as a direct result of displacement processes in Park Slope. Displacement began to be perceived as a housing problem and antidisplacement organizations were beginning to challenge the actions of groups that were active in the gentrification process. ROSAS was invited to present its ideas on displacement problems in November 1979 at a meeting sponsored by Park Slope Together. In its position paper, written by the architect actively involved in the conversion process, ROSAS proposed a technical solution to the displacement problem: low interest loans and tax abatements to owners to rehabilitate multiple dwellings, co-op conversions which would offer "existing tenants right

of first refusal at an equitable dollar value, not whatever the market will bear" (Kaiserman, 1979), and urban homesteading programs whereby the poor can own homes. According to the ROSAS position, displacement problems could be avoided if homeownership opportunities were made available to everyone. However, ROSAS actively continued to support market-rate conversions and dropped out of the Park Slope Together Antidisplacement Committee.

In addition to the pressures from other neighborhood groups, a new local newspaper, the Prospect Press, began publishing in 1980, covering Park Slope with a particular interest in the south. The owner and publisher was sympathetic to long-term working-class residents and the displacement problems they were having. He was also critical of gentrification forces and the groups he perceived to be supporting them. ROSAS was so perceived and was criticized in the paper.

Some members of ROSAS began to reevaluate their strategies. Over the objections of the prodevelopment members, the group became a less controversial clearing house for background information on community issues facing the south Slope. Not only did they advise how a block association could pursue landmark status, but they wrote about consumer rights as well. The conversionists went underground, continuing to pursue rehabilitation projects without the ROSAS rubric. In 1982, ROSAS worked, for the first time, on an issue that concerned some of the Latin

residents on a southeastern area block. They were able to assist a block association to pressure an owner to fence a lot where a group of men were spray-painting cars. In a spring 1983 interview, a ROSAS leader, described the group's current strategy.

We try to work now on a one-to-one strategy. We call up owners of vacant buildings to see if they are willing to sell and we try to make connections and deals for renovation. That's our main strategy, and we do it very quietly. We have our members involved in Community Board Six and we publish a newsletter to improve our credibility and maintain contacts within the neighborhood. Unfortunately moving in the direction of a clearinghouse has been detrimental because it has decreased interest in the organization . . . but we've stepped back and become a clearinghouse rather than doing projects in response to and because of this gentrification thing (Kaiserman, 1983).

Like the Civic Council, antidisplacement sentiment encouraged ROSAS to moderate its progentrification rhetoric, although individual members continued their housing-development work.

IV. Western Area Improvement Groups

Five voluntary community organizations, four of which were improvement organizations, grew up along Fifth Avenue from north to south. One, the Park Slope Improvement Committee, has been discussed. The other three organizations were merchant groups with goals and strategies not unlike the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce. These three organizations, The United Fifth Avenue Merchants from Sackett to Ninth Street, The Fifth Avenue Merchants

Association from Ninth to 24th Street and the Fifth Avenue Local Development Corporation, with boundaries from Flatbush Avenue to 24th Street, were all concerned with improving business along Fifth Avenue (24).

There were different market areas along Fifth Avenue. From Flatbush to Union Street the vacancy rate was as high as 70% on some blocks in 1977, and there were only a few long-term viable businesses. From Union Street to Third, businesses were spotty but the vacancy rate was only 18% to 20%. From Third Street to Ninth, there was little vacancy, although many businesses were small, poorly stocked stores. Ninth to 24th Street was a small regional shopping section with national chain stores like Flagg Shoe, Thom McAnn, and Rainbow Shops, MacDonalds and Burger King dotting the street from Ninth to 16th Street.

The merchant associations reflected the differences in the market. There was no association from Flatbush to Union Street, a small association to Ninth Street, and a larger one from Ninth to 24th Street.

The United Merchants of Fifth Avenue, centered in the north-to-central west, struggled against store abandonment along Fifth Avenue. In 1972, the organization was formed to try to improve the commercial strip on Fifth Avenue between Sackett and Ninth Street. Stores were closing south of Union Street as the working-class population along Fifth Avenue became increasingly poorer and more fragmented. The eight to 10 men and one woman that formed the association were

mainly Italian merchants who had occupied their stores for many years and had fairly strong businesses.

As opposed to the Seventh Avenue Merchants, these store owners turned to the regular Democrats for help. The merchant association was able to have several traffic signs installed, a few meters changed from half-hour to one-hour parking, a bus stop moved, and a crew of Youth Corps workers periodically clean up the Avenue. The regular Democrats, however, as discussed at length in chapter 5, were hamstrung by fiscal crisis, and could do little about increased robberies and the movement of older Italian families out of the neighborhood.

Sometimes, the Italian families who sold their homes were replaced by white-collar professionals who did their major shopping on Seventh Avenue but also frequented Fifth Avenue for Italian delicacies or for milk in a late night bodega (Albanese, 1977; McIver, 1977; Terjen, 1978). Sometimes they were replaced by black and Latin families who opened their own stores or shopped elsewhere. The deterioration continued and, by 1975, stores were closing on blocks that had been Italian strongholds from Union to Third Street.

The merchants continued to meet and discuss problems in the way they had for years. They operated as a social group, having known each other for 20 to 40 years. They ate dinner together, had dinner-dances at catering halls, and showed movies on solutions to security problems. They

discussed buddy-buzzer systems for protection, railed against the Latin merchants, who they claimed sold beer and marijuana after hours, and thought about low-interest merchant loans to improve their businesses. However, they lacked the skills and interest and time necessary to write grants and work on marketing the avenue to the newcomers. Fighting broke out between merchants over who gave out the biggest turkey for Christmas or who left their garbage out too long. They put up banners and took down banners. As the crisis worsened, people began to drop out of the association or felt that merchants who hadn't been on the avenue for 40 years had no right to talk. Some began to complain about throwing good money after bad. And then, as a result of the influx of white-collar professionals west of Sixth Avenue, things changed.

In the fall of 1976, a few residents who lived on blocks perpendicular to Fifth Avenue (between Fifth and Sixth Avenues), and were block association representatives to the UBA, met to discuss the problems of Fifth Avenue. Merchant-association members were invited to join the group and the Fifth Avenue Improvement Committee, which later became the Fifth Avenue Committee was formed. By 1977, the merchant group had become a subcommittee of the Fifth Avenue Committee and the United Merchants became a paper organization that allowed merchants to use their letterhead when they wanted to get some service from city government. The original merchants in that association formed a strong

core in the Fifth Avenue Committee merchant subcommittee, and by the end of 1977, a CETA (25) worker was hired to work with the merchants.

A. The Fifth Avenue Merchants Association

During the early and mid-1970s, the Fifth Avenue Merchants Association, operating from Ninth to 24th Street, was very much like the Seventh Avenue Merchants Association. They met regularly depending upon the leadership and the group hung Christmas lights and coordinated and sponsored sale days. Merchants complained mainly about the increase in rents and the decrease in more affluent customers. As the 1970s progressed, this blue-collar shopping district suffered as local residents real income decreased. Some merchants were worried about the future.

In 1976, a neighborhood change was proposed that would galvanize the south merchants into action for the next six years. On 12th Street, three avenue blocks west of Fifth Avenue, was an old Goya Foods warehouse. A supermarket/mall developer, through his contacts with the mortgage holders, and the Pathmark Supermarket chain, began the process of rehabilitating the Goya site for a 40,000-square-foot supermarket and 32 ancillary stores with parking for 400 cars. The merchants immediately became aware that if this happened it could destroy the fragile viability of Fifth Avenue, particularly since the heart of the Fifth Avenue shopping district was between Ninth and 15th Street. Fifth Avenue only had a small parking lot for 25 cars on the

corner of 16th Street, and cars were frequently ticketed for being double parked. The merchant organization, led by merchants who thought they would be hurt by the Pathmark--namely the large supermarkets, the butcher shops, and the son of a long time pasta manufacturer who was more interested in politics than in pasta--led the fight against this development, which became the major focus for the organization.

The merchants first went for help to their longtime authorities, the regular Democrats. However, the majority leader of the City Council, Tom Cuite, who was the most powerful force in the regular Democratic organization in the south, had already made his alliances with the city of New York Office of Economic Development which was in favor of the rehabilitation.

Eventually, the merchants turned for support to reform Democratic Assemblyman, Joseph Ferris, who led an unsuccessful five-year battle against the Goya/Pathmark renovation. If this development had relied on private funding using the established tax abatements and low-interest loans for development, the battle would have been relatively short lived, since no further public monies would have been involved and no public reviews required. But, after the Board of Estimate voted to approve development of the site with only eight satellite stores in June 1977, the developer applied for a \$1 million UDAG grant (26) and \$500,000 from the city's capital budget to assist

the private capital financing. There were public hearings in which the showing of support for the project was substantial, particularly from nearby Red Hook and Carroll Gardens. The merchant organization raised about \$10,000, and Joe Ferris lent staff support to continue the fight against allowing UDAG monies to be spent on the project. Merchants hired lawyers, commissioned studies, and traveled to Washington to make the point that contrary to the New York City Office of Economic Development and the developer's argument, the project would damage Fifth Avenue by skimming off the consumer dollars of the car owning public. It would not bring 450 new jobs to the area, the tax base would be decreased instead of increased, and even a small reduction of Fifth Avenue's share of the potential market for convenience shopping would mean an increase in vacant commercial space (Fifth Avenue Committee, 1979). According to Clay (1982), there was considerable evidence to support the notion that UDAG grants did not stimulate neighborhood employment. However, during their trip to Washington it became clear that the recommendations of New York City and the support of financial institutions would determine the federal government position. The HUD representative in Washington, Stanley Newman, remarked that if it was okay with the City of New York and the banks it was okay with HUD.

Eventually, it became clear that the developer was undercapitalized, a new developer was found and the Pathmark

supermarket and satellite stores opened in 1982. The largest supermarket on Fifth Avenue, a 20,000-square-foot Key Food, closed its doors in 1983 and the space remains empty. The owners of the Key Food eventually became the tenant of the Baltic Street Lot Supermarket Development in the northwest Slope. The merchants had, by 1977, become a part of the Fifth Avenue Committee and, by 1980, had formed the Fifth Avenue Local Development Corporation. The Fifth Avenue Merchants Association became a paper organization.

B. Fifth Avenue Local Development Corporation

The Fifth Avenue Local Development Corporation (LDC) was, as was indicated above, a spin-off organization of the Fifth Avenue Committee. The two Fifth Avenue merchant associations were part of the Fifth Avenue Committee from its inception in 1976-77. Early in 1977, Chase Manhattan and Citibank sent representatives to work with the Commercial Task Force, as the merchant committee was known, to develop a program for storefront facade rehabilitation, loan programs, and street beautification and security programs. The city (Office of Economic Development and Brooklyn Office of City Planning) had negotiated with some of the leaders of the anti-Goya movement and had offered a CD grant of \$215,000 for revitalization of the entire commercial strip from Flatbush to 24th Street. It was the city agencies that had encouraged the four Fifth Avenue groups--Fifth Avenue Neighbors (Flatbush to Union); Fifth Avenue Improvement Committee (Union to Ninth Street); United

Merchants of Fifth Avenue (Sackett to Ninth Street); and the Fifth Avenue Merchants Association (Ninth to 24th Street)--to become one unified entity with whom the city could work. The plans, developed with the help of bank representatives, served as a basis from which numbers of subsequent plans emerged, faltered, and reemerged until 1980, when the city finally awarded the LDC the funding.

Until the LDC received its funding and moved into its own offices with its own staff in 1980, it was a part of the Fifth Avenue Committee and had a CETA staff person assigned to it in 1978. Planters were installed along the avenue, a yearly fair began in 1977 that would be held annually for five years, and merchants became interested in facade improvement. Because the avenue appeared to be deteriorating, merchants were extremely reluctant to spend money, even on a matching-fund low-interest basis; although many, realizing the potential for earning profits in a changing housing market, bought and rehabilitated residential property. These merchants, through their encounters with brownstoners interested in commercial revitalization, and through discussion held in meetings, became increasingly aware of the long term financial benefits of the process of bringing in residents with a higher per capita income than now resided in the area. Some became slightly less reluctant to invest in their businesses. However, for those who catered to blue-collar minorities and Italians, matching funds were insufficient

incentive for them to participate in the programs. On the other hand, most of the merchants who were willing to participate wanted "cheap money," not buddy buzzer systems or technical assistance.

The transformation of the Commercial Task Force into the LDC was not only stymied because of the four year lag time in securing city funds, but because of intense controversy between the FAC board of directors and the incorporators of the LDC over control of the LDC. Some of the FAC board members felt that the LDC, being an improvement organization more in line with the goals of most major funding institutions, would sap the strength of FAC once the groups were totally separate by appealing to funding sources that would rather fund the LDC. The perception of competition lay in the fact that FAC was becoming increasingly oriented towards redistributive issues; and funding sources could easily rationalize their lack of support of FAC, by claiming to be able to fund only one group in an area. Citibank and Chase Manhattan had indicated that they could support but one local organization. In the years of the study, this fear did not materialize. In fact the LDC was almost totally dependent upon city government for funding and had to close its offices for almost one year in 1981 when renegotiation of its city contract became embroiled in administrative and personality battles between representatives from the LDC and the city.

In February 1981, the city announced a shopsteading program to rehabilitate vacant stores in the northern section of Fifth Avenue and as of this writing, spring 1984, none of the store rehabilitations have materialized.

Summary

Improvement groups were a widely accepted and respected part of neighborhood life. Their members volunteered time and effort for community betterment: efforts that were highly valued by community and government institutions. The community press, creating and reflecting local sentiment, generally supported improvement efforts. During the 1970s The Phoenix praised their efforts and held them as models to be emulated. Government officials, and agencies publicly recognized and supported their work. Interorganizational networking reinforced the belief that attracting investment was a morally acceptable and socially appropriate value.

Despite their lack of experience in setting organizational objectives and working within bureaucratic limits, merchants groups were aided by banks, funded by city government, and supported by resident improvement groups in their attempt to attract capital. Merchant and resident-improvement groups shared common interests.

All improvement organizations observed shared similar concerns and strategies. First, they all believed that the resettlement of Park Slope with white-collar professionals was a priority. That is not to say that this view remained unshaken. Merchants who served disappearing minority and

low-income residents realized that what was good for those who served the affluent, was not working for them. Some refurbished, while other closed their doors. Although some went to the long established regular Democrats to help maintain city services, none challenged the value. Second, networking among improvement groups became an important strategy for solidifying sentiment to foster resettlement processes. There were spin-off groups formed to tackle particular area problems, and extensive interlocking directorates among organizations. Third, the fervor of proresettlement rhetoric advanced by an organization seemed to depend upon 1) the threat of abandonment processes in its area and 2) the highly selective perception of the displacement problem and its consequences. Only when public sentiment, shaped by local press, community consensus and evidence, focused to lament the deleterious effects of resettlement processes on the soon-to-be-displaced resident, was the progentrification model challenged. Yet the goals, and in most cases the activities of the improvement groups remained unshaken, shaped by belief in the attraction of investment as the best insurance for creating a strong viable community.

Notes

1. Data for the discussion of the Park Slope Civic Council came from regular meeting attendance from 1975 through 1977 and from periodic attendance from 1978 to 1981. Data was also drawn from a review of the monthly bulletin of the organization, Civic News from 1960-1983, from informal conversations with trustees Joan Ryan, Laurie Hickok, Helen Ann Tucker, Edwin O'Connor, Hank Terjen, and from participation in Civic Council sponsored house tours in 1976 and 1977.
2. Examples include the request made to the council by the Fort Greene Non Profit Improvement Association on 14 October 1975 to support low income housing and by a local group looking for support to provide temporary shelter for abused women and their children. The latter group, according to Civic Council trustee Herb Steiner, was unable to get on the Civic Council agenda because several of the trustees felt it was an inappropriate topic for the council. Requests by the Fifth Avenue Committee on 2 March 1978, 1979 and 1980 for support of moderate-income housing with subsidized rental units in the northwest area were also stonewalled. Discussions of incidents in the remainder of the paragraph were from minutes taken at Civic Council meetings.
3. Park Slope and Flatbush Assemblyman Melvin Miller spoke to those assembled.
4. The original incorporators, all wealthy white men (an architect, banker, developer and Civic Council trustee) were unable to garner community organization support. FAC members were suspicious because the foundation planned to do co-operative and condominium conversions in what FAC considered to be its territory. On 3 February 1978, after a meeting with Citibank officials on the possibilities for FAC low- and moderate-income housing-development funding, it became clear that Citibank was suddenly withdrawing support from FAC and was more interested in funding foundation upper-income projects and that FAC's funding potential might be jeopardized if the foundation got a foothold in the neighborhood. Even though a trustee of the Civic Council, (Charlie Teschner) was one of the foundation's original incorporators, other council trustees who had been involved with FAC (namely, Doris Clark and Henry Tergen) along with UBA members who were involved with FAC (namely Lorna Zimmerman, Ann Burris and Lottie Williams) attempted to discredit the foundation within community-organization circles. That might not have worked since Ken Patten, a Park Slope resident and president of the New York Real Estate Board, was solidly behind the foundation and in fact had called

Citibank officials to his home for a meeting on 1 November 1977, to secure their investment support for foundation projects. However, once FAC realized that the foundation was working autonomously and could hinder rather than help its stabilizing attempts, it brought that issue into the open. The neighborhood atmosphere in 1978 was still encouraging of co-operative and condominium redevelopment of abandoned buildings. The foundation was attacked essentially on other grounds, such as unwillingness to work with established groups, diverting funding to themselves, undermining others' efforts. Eventually, after a barrage of attacks directed at the four incorporators at several community meetings, Patten abandoned the project to work on something further in the southeastern area, and the group collapsed.

5. James Goetz was president of the Civic Council in 1979, at the same time that he was on the Board of the Fifth Avenue Committee. Joan Ryan, president of the council in 1980 and 1981 was also on the board of directors of South Brooklyn Houses.
6. Discussions between local groups applying for funds were held between Pat Conway and Rebecca Reich of the Fifth Avenue Committee and the writer on 14 May 1978, and between John Duda of Camp Friendship and Bill Schroeder of Slope Sports and the writer in June 1978.
7. On 20 January 1981, the Civic Council sponsored a meeting in which the topic was "Government-Assisted Housing in Park Slope." Heated debate broke out at this meeting when some members of the audience objected to subsidized housing and the people on welfare who inhabit the buildings. On 14 April 1981, the council sponsored a general meeting that addressed the subject "Co-op Conversion of Residential Buildings in Park Slope," in which a realtor, co-op attorney, developer and a tenant organizer were the panelists.
8. Data for the discussion of the Seventh Avenue Betterment Committee came from regular meeting attendance from 1975 through 1977, at which time the group dissolved. Data was also drawn from participation in beautification projects. Data for the discussion of the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce came from regular meeting attendance of the Seventh Avenue Merchants Association from 1975 to 1976 at which time the merchants association renamed itself the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce. Regular meeting attendance continued until early 1978. Events were monitored subsequent to this and until 1981 through periodic attendance and informal interviews.

9. They were particularly concerned with Seventh Avenue being perpetually dirty, caused in large part by owners of large apartment buildings leaving their garbage around and stores using carters who picked up garbage infrequently.
10. The president of the Civic Council from 1976 to 1978, Edwin O'Connor, was also a president of the Chamber of Commerce for several years.
11. Data for the discussion of the Triangle Parks/Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee came from regular attendance of meetings from 1975 through 1977, at which time the group dissolved. Data was also drawn from participation in beautification projects and review of the group's periodic publication, Triangle Tribune.
12. The sweepers were Penny Mongin the wife of Stan Mongin, soon to be president of the 78th Precinct Community Council and Bruce Graham, who became the group's first cochairman.
13. The chairman of the Office of Downtown Brooklyn Development (O.D.B.D.), Richard Rosan, a Park Slope resident, knew residents involved in the organization. Bob Votava, another Park Slope resident who lived in the northwest area bordering Flatbush Avenue was the staff person at O.D.B.D. assigned to work on the area and projects deemed a priority by Triangle Parks.
14. The president of the Triangle Parks/Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee in 1975, Penny Mongin, was also the wife of the president of the 78th Precinct Community council in 1975, 1976. Triangle Parks also supported the council. In 1974 Triangle Parks held a fund-raiser and donated \$571.35 to the 78th Precinct Youth Program as reported in the Triangle Tribune 2(5):2. 2/75.
15. In 1976, the president of Triangle Parks was William Cuff and he was friendly with president of the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, Donald Moore, who also resided in Park Slope. Both were part of the cultural and social network that included participating in events sponsored by the Brooklyn Academy of Music, Prospect Park, the Brooklyn Museum, and the Brooklyn Botanical Gardens. It is not surprising that Moore became director of the Botanical Gardens in the early 1980s.
16. Data for the discussion of the United Block Associations of Park Slope came from regular meeting attendance from 1975 to 1977, periodic attendance from 1977 to 1982 when the group dissolved, and participation in the executive board meetings as secretary from 1976

to 1977. In addition data sources included the UBA newsletter, (1973-1982) a study of block association goals and practices done by O'Hanlon (see references), discussions and informal interviews with Bill Thomas, Robert Caire, Bernie Bolitzer, Kevin Brooks, Mildred Minogue, Anne Burris, Lorna Zimmerman, Loretta Mau, Norman Peller, Richard Valcich, Norman Minov, Mike Wolfeson.

17. Rapid ethnic and racial transition that accompanied block-busting activities in the early 1970s generated violent racial disturbances. In the summer of 1973, after a history of violent responses, a robbery between Italians and Latins generated violence in which four Latins were wounded in gun battles. Also, there was an explosion in drug traffic as a city-wide market was based along Fifth Avenue between Sackett and Degraw Streets bringing in addicts, robberies, and more violence.
18. Richard Ferrara was the chairperson of the UBA real estate committee in 1978. By 1982, he and his partner Perter Saltini had developed and sold the Garfield Place apartments as co-operatives and were attempting to renovate buildings across the street and in other Park Slope locations.
19. Data on the Park Slope Improvement Committee came predominantly from attendance at meetings in which the group was one among other participants, and from correspondence between the group and neighborhood residents, the New York City Department of Housing, Preservation and Development, the Aetna Life Insurance Company (a sponsor of Fifth Avenue Committee housing development projects), Community Planning Board Six, and letters to the editor in The Phoenix newspaper.
20. These remarks were made by St. John Houses resident Ibon Muhammed to PSIC member James Malone on 9 December 1980 at a public meeting called by the Fifth Avenue Committee to explain its development plans to the public and in response to a letter sent to neighborhood residents about what they considered the harmful nature of the development activities of the Fifth Avenue Committee.
21. The data for the discussion of Revitalization of the Southern Area of the Slope were drawn from periodic meeting attendance in 1977, review of ROSAs purpose statements, newsletters and participation in neighborhood meetings and forums. Data were also drawn from an interview with Carl Kaiserman, a founder and active member of the group, and informal discussions with Peter Altschuler, Bob Caire, Marty Bernstein, and

Judy Kaiserman.

22. The architect was Carl Kaiserman and the the graphic designer was Peter Altschuler.
23. Gloria Fleisher was president of ROSAS in 1982-83: the same years that her husband, Mort Fleisher, served as president of the Park Slope Civic Council.
24. Data for the discussion of the three western area commercial-improvement organizations, The United Fifth Avenue Merchants from Sackett to Ninth Street, The Fifth Avenue Merchants Association from Ninth to 24th Street and the Fifth Avenue Local Development Corporation were drawn from meeting attendance of the first two organizations from 1975 through 1977 and from the third (an organization that subsumed the first two) from 1979 to 1981. Data were also drawn from informal discussions with Peter Morisi, Peter Albanese, Vincent Sagesse, Al Cabbad, Paul Corrado, Tony Maldonado, John Noonan, Milton Forman, Tim Glasgow and Jeff Abel.
25. Enacted by Congress in 1973 and amended in 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1978, the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) was an attempt to deal with a growing unemployment problem in American cities, particularly among the black and Hispanic poor (Jaynes, 1982). The act was designed to provide job training and employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged unemployed or underemployed people.
26. The Urban Development Action Grant Program (UDAG), a categorical program, provided grants to cities to undertake economic development projects in which an advance commitment on the part of the private sector had been made. The UDAG program was the major urban policy initiative of the Carter Administration (1977-80), and was established by Congress as part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, to assist distressed cities in alleviating physical and economic deterioration, by providing direct grants to specific projects involving economic development, neighborhood revitalization, job creation, or expansion of the tax base. Adding up to \$675 million since 1980 (Clay, 1982), it was cut to \$440 million in 1982 and is scheduled for elimination in fiscal year 1984 (Community Service Society, 1982). By 1981, 24 UDAGs had been made in New York City for \$49 million, with 45% of the funds used to develop the Portman Hotel in Manhattan. During the late-1970s, UDAG was very much alive and was beginning to be perceived as a "downtown" program used to support hotels and convention centers rather than industrial, residential, or neighborhood economic-development projects.

Chapter 8

Community Organizations and Resettlement Issues: Mandated, Redistributive-Issue, and Ideological Groups

I. Mandated Organizations

As a response to the legitimation crisis of the 1960s (whereby an urgent need was felt for government to demonstrate its good faith as a responsible and responsive organ of society-at-large rather than a tool of private capital, O'Connor, 1973), mandated organizations were established by agencies of government to provide a forum for airing issues and discussing problems. They became involved in south Brooklyn-wide resettlement issues in their role as mediators of neighborhood land-use changes and anticrime strategies.

In our portrait of group emergence it is advisable to place the discussion of mandated groups following, but in close proximity to, our review of the fragmentation of ethnic institutions (chapter 5) and the emergence of improvement groups (chapter 7). As we shall see, the mandated groups, representing a broad cross-section of interests during the period of our study, experienced a shift in power base that draws into their orbit many of the class issues and issues of capital on which our study turns.

Mandated organizations were established at a time--early-to-mid-1960s--when ethnic political institutions were in control and their appointed and volunteer boards

were thus quickly filled by club members. This operated as an extension of the patronage system, a system whose power to influence events would be challenged both by the growing fiscal crisis and the resettlement process itself.

Although our study as a whole traces the shifts in power between interest groups, our case of the mandated groups is particularly significant in that, however serious the contests for power between ethnics and professionals, the outcomes reflect no substantive change in values. Ironically, the then firmly ensconced blue-collar ethnics, in their willingness to identify with the rentiers and the latter's desire to attract capital, do not see beyond the visible improvement occurring in the neighborhood to the impending social costs to themselves and their families. As a result of the city's transformation, of which the gentry may be but a symbol, they are put in imminent danger of losing their institutions, their jobs, and even their homes. Yet, they would continue to identify with aspirations of the young urban professionals, rejecting the need for a government-sponsored support system that might protect their own interests. The three mandated groups that covered all or parts of Park Slope were two precinct community councils and the local community planning board.

A. The Precinct Community Councils (1)

The Precinct Community Councils were established in December, 1965, as a part of an expanded police community relations program. They were set up in response to social

disturbances in the early and mid 1960s, a time in which relationships between the New York City Police Department and New York City residents were obviously problematic (New York City Police Department, 1982). As the New York City Police Department states in its community-relations literature (1982)

Through these Councils the Police Department sought to provide a permanent forum for face-to-face communication between local police and community residents on matters of neighborhood concern.

All Community Councils had similar structures. Monthly meetings were held in the precincts. Police representatives, usually the precinct captain, the community-relations officer and one other officer, sat in front of the room with the officers of the council who were residents elected annually by the resident members. Although officers attended meetings regularly, there was little continuity among membership. Meetings were often attended by people who voiced a particular problem and once a problem was resolved, or even voiced, a resident often did not return. Some, however, returned regularly for years, often bringing up recurrent problems. Park Slope was covered by two police precincts, the 78th in the north and the 72nd in the south. The dividing line between precincts was 3rd Street.

1. 72nd Precinct Community Council

In terms of control, the 72nd Precinct Community Council was mainly a white working-class institution, although there were usually a number of Latin residents who

attended meetings. The precinct covered the largely Latin Sunset Park, in addition to the southern part of Park Slope. Meetings were held on 25th Street at the precinct station, and were frequented by regular Democratic legislators and candidates. In fact, many members of the council were affiliated with the 51st A.D. regular Democratic club, and there was considerable overlap in membership between the council, the 51st A.D. Regular Democratic Club, the Knights of Columbus, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and local Roman Catholic churches. Often as many as 80 people attended meetings, usually dressed in jackets or dresses.

The meetings were characterised by a high degree of police-resident cooperation and integration. People seemed comfortable with the hierarchical structure and few challenged the police. Only a few times over the years were charges of racism or police misconduct levied at officers, and much time and energy was consumed planning and working on police appreciation days, dinners, parades, bowling leagues, and entertainment and membership committees.

Meetings were also forums within which perennial police problems were discussed. Discussion centered on what to do about gangs of kids, the local methadone clinic, or dangerous crossings where children could be hurt. Often, people would discuss a particularly gruesome murder or heinous crime, disdaining the particular area or neighborhood in which the crimes were committed.

As the years passed, the issue of resettlement problems rarely arose in any direct fashion. People spoke about others leaving the neighborhood or the church or the group, but no connections were made to issues of displacement. This is understandable in light of the location of the precinct in the less rapidly resettled Sunset Park, and the nature of the constituency, which was essentially long time homeowner residents. By the end of the 1970s, people had begun to complain more about increases in crime, and fear of bodily harm seemed to have become more intense.

2. 78th Precinct Community Council

The 78th Precinct Community Council was diametrically opposite to the 72nd. Where there was cooperation and integration between police and residents in the 72nd, there was antagonism and bitterness between the two groups in the 78th. Where the 72nd served a social networking function, the 78th was a site for far-reaching enmity between residents and officers. Of course the social/political and economic contexts in which the groups operated were entirely different.

The 78th was a very small precinct that included the devastated, crime-ridden, drug-filled, Fifth Avenue neighborhood. It covered the entire northern Slope plus a few blocks on the northern side of Flatbush Avenue, and it held its meetings at St. Augustine's church in the northwest area.

Over the years, resettlement issues were discussed as they related to crime problems. For example, theories about the sinister causes of housing abandonment, such as arson-for-profit, were often advanced to explain how areas became abandoned and therefore breeding grounds for crime and drug sales. There was general consensus that housing rehabilitation and commercial revitalization along Fifth Avenue would help to reduce criminal activity. However, like the 72nd, the 78th Precinct Community Council concentrated on decreasing crime through police enforcement and citizen awareness. The relationship between resettlement patterns and group evolution was expressed in two ways. First, there were changes in the leadership and composition of the group from a working-class to a brownstoner institution. This change implied corresponding changes in strategy, including that of increasing pressure on the police. Second, blue-collar whites and minority groups had different organizational affiliations than the new white-collar professionals. For example, the blue-collar whites were often networked with the regular Democratic organization and the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, and the culturally diverse minorities were often affiliated with individual churches. On the other hand, many of the white-collar professionals who were involved in the council also belonged to improvement organizations. Therefore, the change in leadership expanded and reinforced an orientation toward proimprovement networking.

The transition from blue-collar to white-collar professional leadership took place over a five-year period and was complete by the late 1970s. First, in the early 1970s, the regular Democrats from the Mazzini club had a number of members as officers and active members of the council. The council was integrated with black, some Latin, and Anglo blue-collar residents. However, by 1974, with the expansion of the white-collar housing market and the consequent growth of improvement organizations in the north, the leadership of the group was taken over by new white-collar professionals active in Triangle Parks Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee, and to some extent, in the United Block Associations of Park Slope. As block associations formed in the north, representatives from the blocks became involved in the council because they had what they considered serious crime problems. Their strategies were different from the working-class leadership. They were not interested in using the group to expand social networks; they wanted crime reduced.

The atmosphere at meetings for the entire last half of the 1970s was combative. The white-collar professionals moving in west of Seventh Avenue were pressuring police to be responsive to their demands by following up on incidents that were reported. These brownstoners were not too intimidated to fill in the forms, and were present the following month to inquire as to the disposition of their complaint. At the same time, the meetings were equally

frequented by black blue and white-collar homeowners and tenants who also demanded police support. There was considerable turnover among captains, and tempers, particularly on narcotics complaints, ran high. For example, new urban professionals disrupted a meeting in 1975 by emptying a garbage bag of glue containers, purportedly having been sniffed by neighborhood youth, on the captain's desk (2). Police policy dictated that narcotics was to be handled out of a central office, and that the priority was to arrest large-scale dealers, not street pushers or users. Fifth Avenue was a center for narcotics sales, yet the police continually told the crowd that their hands were tied. The residents were not interested in police hierarchical procedures. Representatives came from Police headquarters to explain the problems. Residents remained unmoved.

Incidents repeated themselves month after month. For example, one woman complained

Three weeks ago a man was shot to death at a club on 141 St. Marks Place. The club is El Barrio and the man died on the street. People use drugs there and there have been four murders and a number of stabbings. What can we do about it? We are all afraid. We live there (meeting of 9/30/75).

The captain's weary response was to suggest that the complainant secure a noise summons by writing to the Environmental Protection Agency. There were numerous confrontations between police and the new brownstone residents, and more than one meeting ended in total chaos

with the president of the council defending the police and residents screaming obscenities.

The community-relations officer, a twenty-year veteran of the force, spent most of his meeting time trying to interest local residents in becoming involved in preventative police programs or in working with youth. He described block watcher, auxiliary police, operation identification and other programs that could lessen the likelihood of burglary and street crime. He also requested volunteers to go on trips and sponsor teams for teenagers. He had little cooperation from the new young professionals who attended these meetings although the impetus for some of the UBA youth programs came from these discussions. However, when, month after month, the police proposed preventative programs, some residents hurled epithets at them, and shouted out that they were not social workers. On more than one occasion, a new captain would storm out of a meeting, a host of irate brownstoners in hot pursuit.

In the late 1970s, the white-collar professionals had expanded their improvement organizational networks and were able to enlist more sophisticated strategies that would reinforce their growing strength. By 1977, a group of brownstoners that would later form the active core of the Park Slope Improvement Committee had become firmly ensconced in the leadership of the council, and its strategies began to change. While, during most of the 1970s, resident anticrime strategies had largely been confined to

complaining at meetings and writing letters to authorities, by 1979, larger more broad-based coalitions began to form. First, there was considerable overlapping membership between the 78th Precinct Community Council, the Park Slope Improvement Committee, the United Block Associations, the Park Slope Civic Council, and Community Board Six. A public-safety committee was established by Community Board Six, chaired by Lewton Smith who had been chairman of both the Park Slope Improvement Committee and the housing committee of Community Board Six. The community board had broader boundaries than the precinct, and the board members who initiated the committee thought their coalition would have more influence in rousing the public and pressuring city officials if it encompassed three precincts instead of one. In October 1980, representatives from the 76th, 78th and 72nd precincts met with residents under the auspices of the community board. There, the group began the long, tedious, but more sophisticated strategy of trying to increase the number of police in south Brooklyn by pressuring for an increase in the budget. Police asked residents to follow up on crimes in the courts and reminded the crowd of 200 that the police must deploy officers to handle major crimes, not attend to noise, the selling of marijuana, or loitering.

Coalition building between precinct community Councils and neighborhood anticrime groups continued to grow in the early 1980s, spurred on by the white-collar professionals

living in Brooklyn Heights, Boerum Hill, Cobble Hill and Park Slope. By 1981, coalitions of associations were continuing to hold demonstrations, speak-outs on drugs and prostitution (Paul, 1981), publicity campaigns addressing their plight (3), and follow-ups on prostitution arrests (4) (Napach, 1982a).

Members of the 78th Precinct Community Council who had been most vociferous in council meetings were still part of the coalition working with the Public Safety Committee of the Community Planning Board. Drugs were still being sold on Fifth Avenue, but council members felt confident that with housing rehabilitation and supermarket construction in progress on Baltic Street, drug trafficking days were numbered (Burris, 1983).

B. Community Board Six (5)

Community boards are mandated and have functioned according to New York State Charter guidelines since 1963. They are local bodies of not more than fifty people appointed by the borough president with nominations made by the city Council members that represent the area within the geographical boundaries of the community district. In 1976, through state charter revision, and as a result of years of increased pressure to decentralize power and incorporate neighborhoods in the planning process, the community boards' powers and duties were expanded to include planning functions, operating funds, and advisory powers (6) (State Charter Revision Commission for New York City, 1975).

As in the case of the 78th Precinct Community Council, South Brooklyn resettlement patterns were manifested in the changing composition of the organization and the subsequent evolution of strategies within a network expanded by white-collar professionals. For years, Community Board Six, covering Boerum Hill, Park Slope, Carroll Gardens, and Brooklyn Heights (7), was controlled by the Italian and Irish regular Democratic clubs. In 1975, when participant observation of the community board began, the board had 43 members (Phoenix, 1975), the majority of whom were from Carroll Gardens and most of whom were members or family of members of the regular Democratic club on Court Street, the Mazzini club on Union Street, or the 51st A.D. regular Democratic club. Although both Councilmen in Park Slope were regular Democrats, it was Thomas Cuite, majority leader of the city council, who made most of the regular Democratic nominations, and Borough President Leone, and his successor, Golden, who confirmed them. In 1977, when the list of appointments was released, a review with a member of reform Democratic club, the Independent Neighborhood Democrats (IND), showed that the new board had 32 regular Democrats, three reformers, five independents, and five places still open (Ferraioli, 1977). It was through the efforts of the often independent Councilman Abraham Gerges that some of the new white-collar professionals were able to be appointed to the board. Gerges represented the most northern corner of Park Slope as well as Boerum Hill and Brooklyn Heights

during the 1970s (8), and he nominated a few members to the board who were leaders in the 78th Precinct Community Council and Triangle Parks/Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee.

By the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, power relationships were changing. As reform candidates became elected district leaders in the 52nd A.D., they negotiated with Cuite to increase their membership on the board (DiBrienza, 1982). In addition, much to the consternation of regular Democratic country leadership, Gerges appointed increasing numbers of community leaders from Boerum Hill and Park Slope who applied for board membership. Members of the Park Slope Improvement Committee, the UBA, the Fifth Avenue Committee, and some of the youth agencies were appointed to the board, and a number also joined board committees (9). Finally, in December 1981, after a battle for leadership between reform and regular Democrats, the regulars were able to remain in control of the chairmanship, most of the officers, and, therefore of the committee chairmanships (Vail, 1981).

With the revision of the City Charter in 1976, pressures on the board to alter the way it functioned (10), tended to open it to the conflicts and debates endemic to urban neighborhood resettlement processes.

Change was slow, and it took several years to implement revision requirements. After passage of the charter revision, the group was subject to considerable scrutiny.

Meetings became more open and The Phoenix newspaper reported the transgressions of Cuite appointee, Community Board Six chairman, Gerard Carey. For example, when Carey reportedly lost the list of standing committees that charter revision recommended, The Phoenix printed the list and delays in setting up the committees were reduced. Also, new charter requirements indicated that board members with three consecutive unexcused absences could be removed from the board. When the board, led by a reformer from Brooklyn Heights, wanted to vote on whether to expel members who had not attended meetings for over a year and a half, almost all of whom were Cuite-appointees and regular Democrats, Carey engaged in delaying tactics by failing to notify the derelict members of the meeting at which this issue was to be aired. However, Carey's failure to act was reported in the press. Eventually, after a few years of battle, some nonattending members did send in resignations. Through the administrations of two subsequent chairwomen, the board became increasingly responsive to community group pressures.

The development of strategies to press political agendas within the community board gained strength through organizational networking. The community board was the community's legitimate mediator of environmental change. Although most groups were unfamiliar with the board's functions prior to the charter revision, all types of groups were petitioning or joining committees to press their agendas by the late 1970s. Some redistributive-issue

organizations, which were not fully networked with groups that might have shared their perspectives, pressed positions alone. At the same time, by the late 1970s, the already networked improvement organizations were able to enlist considerable support for their positions. For example, members of Triangle Parks, 78th Precinct Community Council, and the Civic Council were very interested in attracting businesses to Flatbush Avenue and did not want to attract social clubs. When in April, 1977, a group of 80 black couples in a bowling club wanted to relocate their social club to Flatbush Avenue after a building fire had damaged their space, the improvement groups wanted to influence the community board to petition the liquor authority to revoke their license. They testified (11) and were able to enlist support from a substantial institution, Brooklyn Union Gas Company.

Hundreds of different land-use changes appeared before the board in the following five years. With the board becoming increasingly diversified as a result of the influx of reform Democrats and representatives from different types of community organizations, but increasingly those of the improvement sort, alliances within the board would shift from battle to battle with political allegiances not as clearly held as in previous years. Housing, land use, and budget committees functioned to screen and recommend changes to the entire board.

Organizations were able to develop influence, even when they were not on the board by having their members join committees, thereby affecting committee recommendations to the board (12). Issues became increasingly complicated, and, as resettlement processes advanced through South Brooklyn, agendas became overcrowded with developer-sponsored cooperative conversions and the occasional subsidized rental rehabilitation (Paul, 1981a). Brownstoner institutions gained strength as improvement organizations captured leadership positions on the community board, and often those who had their ties with regular Democratic clubs voted to support these proimprovement agendas. For example, the budget committee of the community board, which established priorities to submit recommendations for the city's capital budget, came to be chaired by a former UBA president. Members of the regular clubs worked with him, and , while both groups attempted to press for acceptance of "pet projects," they also failed to select budget priorities that would benefit the large south Brooklyn low-income population.

Although attendance at meetings remained a serious problem (Vail, 1982, 1982c, 1982e), and the representativeness of the board was periodically questioned by those who perceived their interests to be underserved (Chambers, 1982), Community Board Six, through its membership and leadership patterns, reflected the decade of changing resettlement patterns.

II. Redistributive Issue Groups and Resettlement Processes: Park Slope Neighborhood Tenants Council and the Park Slope Branch, Metropolitan Council on Housing (13)

Although their agendas for action were quite different, like mandated groups, the redistributive issue organizations were comprised primarily of long-time residents. As indicated in chapter 6, the role of redistributive-issue groups in the resettlement process was to articulate inequities that surfaced during the resettlement of Park Slope. Both groups studied were tenant organizations that tried to increase the level of local awareness regarding the rights of the disadvantaged tenant by working with small groups or by attracting media attention. A crisis in the rental-housing market prevailed throughout New York City (see Appendix V, Section I, for an explanation of the crisis) and the Park Slope organizations responded to local symptoms. These two redistributive issues groups were area-wide although they did focus their attention in particular geographical areas as resettlement processes proceeded.

The Park Slope Neighborhood Tenants Council was founded in 1971, by a group of people who were displaced by a local hospital's expansion program (14). Neighborhood controversy was generated over the displacement, and in 1972, some of the tenants from those houses and their friends established a small housing clinic at St. Francis Xavier, located in the northeast between Sixth and Seventh Avenue.

In the early 1970s, important state laws regulating rent protection were passed (see Appendix V, Section II for a discussion of the evolution of rent-protection). In 1971, vacancy decontrol put tremendous pressure on tenants, forcing them to pay higher rents. It wasn't until 1974, when ETPA (Emergency Tenant Protection Act) was passed that vacancy decontrol was repealed for rent stabilized units and that destabilized and decontrolled units fell under ETPA regulation. Also, the City of New York was administering the MBR (maximum base rent) increase program that allowed increases in rent controlled units on a yearly basis. Resettlement processes were not to drive rents up until after 1971. Still, it was no wonder that, in light of the displacement of an entire block of tenants and the increasingly antitenant political environment, a tenant group would emerge in the early 1970s.

The Tenants Council helped tenants to organize their buildings, publicized issues of tenant concern through their newsletter, and worked for tenant-protection laws and on political campaigns that incorporated a tenant platform. During the early 1970s, many of the buildings that the Tenants Council organized were buildings in the northeast (Tenants Together, 1973,1975). Tenants complained of lack of services, and, at the weekly clinic, tenants would be apprised of their rights and would plan rent strikes and gain confidence and strength to withhold rents or to take landlords to housing court. The leaders of the group

emphasized that it was not rent control that caused abandonment, but inflation, high interest rates and the higher levels of profitability required in times of inflation. They made it clear that there was no rent protection for people who lived in buildings with less than six units. Since most of Park Slope consisted of housing stock within this category, tenants had little recourse. Metropolitan (Met) Council advocated for rent strikes. Often, however, when services were improved, tenants would leave the organization. Therefore, meetings were characterized by recapitulation of tenant-rights issues as new tenants came for help. Discussions of tenant-protection issues were led by a core of activists, usually young and white, who volunteered enormous time and experience to help others and to work on city and state-wide tenant issues.

In 1973-74, the Park Slope Tenants Council affiliated with the Metropolitan Council on Housing. Although the group continued to meet in the northeast, and the majority of tenants associations were still from the northeast, tenants from buildings in the southeast and northwest began to approach the group.

In the mid-to-late 1970s, there was dissension between the leadership of the old Park Slope Tenants Council and some of the volunteers from Met Council over whether the group should pursue a strategy of organizing individual buildings or develop city and state-wide organizing strategy (15). Finally, the groups separated; the Park Slope Tenants

Council continued its Wednesday-night clinics to address individual tenant problems on a building-by-building basis. The affiliate groups became the Park Slope branch of Met Council. They organized buildings with an eye towards broad-based organizing. In the proimprovement, conservative Park Slope political climate of the northeast, the branch had considerable difficulty finding a space in a local church that would allow it to pursue its more politicized agenda (16). They became increasingly involved in developing consciousness of displacement issues.

A change reflecting the expansion of the upper-income housing market was evidenced in the type of tenant complaints that arose. In the early 1970s, tenants from individual buildings came with service delivery complaints. By the late 1970s, many landlords were trying to empty buildings, and, according to Claudia Mansbach of Met Council, they simply stopped essential services (Carswell, 1981; Napach, 1982). Beginning in 1979, there was an increase in displacement through cooperative conversion, and tenant complaints came increasingly from the southeast as well as the north (Goodno, 1982; James, 1982; Vail, 1982g). Also, in 1981, when the co-op market threatened to collapse as a result of dramatically rising interest rates and increased demand, tenants came to the organization complaining of severe harassment tactics being used to empty buildings. Tactics included threats and beatings (Perrin, 1982). Even though some of those being harassed in the

south Slope were working-class Irish residents, most were Latins. Racial conflict was apparent in comments scrawled on building walls for Yankees to "get out of Central America and Park Slope." Organizers as well as tenants began to fear for their personal welfare, according to Met Council organizer, Churcher.

Although the improvement organizations developed strong intraorganizational networks as resettlement expanded, the redistributive-minded organizations developed more fragile organizational networks based upon an issue-by-issue affiliation. For example, as part of their effort to raise a redistributive agenda locally, the tenant organizations became involved in electoral politics. In 1973, the Park Slope Neighborhood Tenants Council joined successfully with other neighborhood tenants organizations (Metropolitan Council on Housing, Boro Park Tenants Council and Tenants of Methodist Hospital Association, 1973) to defeat an antitenant candidate for state assemblyman, Vincent Riccio. The campaign was organized by a few who were also involved or had leadership positions in the Central Brooklyn Independent Democrats. However, throughout most of the 1970s, overlapping membership between the tenants groups and other Park Slope community organizations was at best intermittent. Overlapping membership between CBID, (from which, as the reader may remember from our discussion in chapter 5, many members had been involved with the antiwar movement) and the Tenants Council was one of the few places

that intergroup networking occurred among redistributive issue groups in the early 1970s, although by the decade's end there would be networks formed between tenant organizations and religious and political institutions.

For example, in 1981, as housing pressures increased, the Park Slope Tenants Council and the Park Slope branch of Met Council again turned to electoral politics. The Tenants Council became embroiled in another anti-Riccio campaign, while Met Council became involved in the protenant, anti-Koch, Barbaro mayoral campaign. They formed coalitions with local chapters or members of the Unity Party, reform Democratic clubs, the Communist Party, and the Citizens Party. According to Mansbach, this was the first time that Metropolitan Council on Housing, as a city-wide organization, had become openly involved in electoral politics. Although Barbaro lost, relationships among protenant groups were solidified.

The building of coalitions around issues such as tenant protection for residents of small buildings (17) and co-op-conversion legislation became a major strategy by 1981. According to Met Council organizer Patty Churcher, in the late 1970s almost all the tenants who came to Met Council were white middle class people. "Not that working and poor people weren't being displaced," admitted Churcher, "but Met Council hadn't gone out to organize and bring in different groups through Hispanic organizations, churches, senior centers, etc." By 1979 and 1980, larger numbers of

neighborhood residents were being affected by displacement and Met Council organizers began developing the more comprehensive neighborhood strategy. For example, when an older man who was a church member was being displaced, organizers approached his church, as well as his neighbors in the apartment building. In addition to developing outreach programs to churches, Met Council organizers began to disseminate tenant protection information at local hospitals. By 1982, the Park Slope Branch had a more heterogenous membership.

The branch also tried to develop a long term working relationship with church clergy, rather than continue the case by case approach. In working with clergymen at St. Francis and St. Augustine's in 1982, they raised the possibility that the loss in parish membership could be interpreted as a part of the displacement process, suggesting that if the clergy didn't fight displacement they might not have a parish. If we look at some of the dwindling parish statistics presented in chapter 5, we can understand how this argument might appeal to parish clergy, even though only four years prior in 1978, the Pastor at St. Francis was blaming the influx of minorities for the fragmentation of the church (18).

Soon displacement processes began to move west and more of the Catholic parishes' elderly parishioners were being displaced. Met Council organizers approached by these tenants spoke to the Senior Citizen clubs within their

churches about the need to have housing for people, not for profit. Leaders spoke about the enormous profits an individual makes when he or she converts a cooperative, highlighting the contradictions between housing for profit and human housing needs. The timing was better this time; the elderly parishioners listened to their arguments and some of them joined the organization. In 1975, the Met Council was unable to secure a space for its tenants clinic purportedly because of its radical ideas. By 1982, less than seven years later, these ideas were being embraced by, and coalitions were being built with, the same organizations that had disdained them earlier (Harney, 1982). The effects of displacement were being felt in local institutions, and the tenants organizations were experiencing some success as measured by a rise in long-term participation by members. However, in the absence of rent protection for most of Park Slope's housing stock, and in the absence of state or widespread neighborhood support for their efforts to protect the disadvantaged, tenant organizations suffered political isolation. This isolation was mitigated somewhat by the ability of the group, in spite of its rhetoric advocating housing in the public domain, to build fragile networks with the generally conservative Roman Catholic Church. (Goodno, 1983; O'Malley, 1983 Vail, 1982a).

III. Ideological Organizations

Like redistributive-issue groups, ideological organizations articulated inequities in an attempt to "raise

the level of consciousness" among local residents. However, as indicated in chapter 6, their goals were to articulate inequities primarily in order to promote structural change. The Moncada Library would have the structural change come through revolutionary action. For the South Brooklyn Action Movement, political power--and, ultimately, democracy and equity--could be evidenced through building a "heterogenous democratic organization" (South Brooklyn Action Movement, 1979).

A. Moncada Library (19)

The Moncada Library emerged in 1978, opening its headquarters office at 434 Fifth Avenue, above a vegetable and fruit stand in the heart of the white and Hispanic working-class southwest. According to informal interviews with Moncada members, they chose the area because "there were many problems of repression" and it was a good opportunity to "build a Third World people's force". The name of the organization comes from a military garrison in Cuba that was taken over by revolutionaries at the beginning of the Cuban revolution and represented a symbol of hope for structural change. The organization, according to one member, was a project of the May 19 Communist Organization (Vail, 1982b), which is a legal, above-ground arm of the Black Liberation Army (BLA).

Most of the activities in which Moncada engaged were not neighborhood related. It was a group of about 10 to 20 mainly white young people with a strong leadership core of

around six to eight workers. Members showed films to local youth whenever they could, and provided a library for reading about revolutionary issues and ideas. Much to the chagrin of neighborhood residents, members plastered revolutionary literature up and down Fifth and Seventh Avenue.

In 1981, however, the group turned its attention to a neighborhood issue that brought it to the attention of newspapers and other Park Slope community organizations. Members focused on what they considered to be a local example of rising racism and fascism (Boxer, 1981). In 1980, after a number of muggings on a block in the northeast Slope, a meeting of mainly white-collar professional residents was held to discuss what could be done about crime. The group formed a civilian anticrime patrol called SCAN (Slope Citizens Anticrime Network) with the idea that it would grow into an effective crime deterrent and not a vigilante group (Vail, 1982f). In 1981, when members were having public meetings to solicit support to people the patrol, Moncada picketed the meetings, charging that SCAN was a

white supremacist organization committed to preserving Park Slope as a buffer between the largely black neighborhoods to the north (Crown Heights, Bedford-Stuyvesant) and the largely white areas to the south (Sunset Park, Bay Ridge) (Vail, 1982b).

The Library lumped Mayor Koch, SCAN, and the Ku Klux Klan together as repressive forces trying to block economic

progress for blacks and integration. SCAN countered that it had more minority members than the Moncada (Vail, 1982b). The Moncada continued to claim that SCAN was based upon "racist hysteria," and was part of the building of the infrastructure for fascism in the form of blockwatchers, block patrols, civilian observation patrols, and motor patrols. In May 1981, six members of the Library were arrested after getting into a fight with a man who was protesting its presence on Fifth Avenue and Ninth Street (The Phoenix, 1981).

During its five-year history in Park Slope, the Library also became peripherally involved in protesting the letter sent out by the Park Slope Improvement Committee against the Fifth Avenue Committee plan for subsidized housing. Members attended community meetings on the topic and protested the letter as a racist attack on low-income people. Their revolutionary jargon tended to make the other ideological, redistributive and improvement/redistributive groups' rhetoric against the PSIC letter seem moderate in comparison.

In the fall of 1981, a robbery of a Brinks truck took place in Nyack, New York, in which members of the Black Liberation Army, who killed three men, were linked to the Moncada Library. When questioned about the incident, Moncada member Dana Biberman defended the BLAs actions, stating for The Phoenix that the word "robbery" deprived the Nyack incident of its political meaning which was the

expropriation of the "people's money." According to Biberman, the three men killed "were defending imperialism" (Vail, 1982b). Shortly after March 1982, the Library closed its storefront and disappeared from the area. It would appear that the Nyack incident influenced the Moncada's decision to leave Park Slope.

Although Moncada Library members were particularly interested in building coalitions of Third World people to support liberation struggles throughout the world, they also made connections between local events and the struggles of Third World people at a time when gentrification was peaking and displacement problems were acute. They raised questions regarding repression of human rights and told anyone who would listen that they did not have to look far to see repressive forces at work. Although the group did attract some local residents for short periods of time, mainly young students of color, it was the most politically isolated group within Park Slope.

B. South Brooklyn Action Movement (20)

The South Brooklyn Action Movement was comprised mainly of middle-class, white, left-leaning professionals who moved to Park Slope in the early and mid-1970s and lived primarily as renters. Most of them were involved in movement issues in their work and had been involved in antiwar or civil-rights issues in their college pasts. Some had worked in trade-union and community organizing, and they were legal-aid or human-rights lawyers, social workers,

government-agency workers or employed by such not-for-profit civil rights groups as the Urban League.

Many members had moved to Park Slope because they saw it as a racially and economically integrated neighborhood in which they wanted to live. Finding the northeast expensive, they lived in the northwest, or, more often, in the blue-collar southern areas and became friends through working at the periphery of local politics. Although the south was integrated, they began to notice the rise in housing abandonment and vacant and/or demolished buildings, the phenomenon of which doubled between 1977 and 1979. They were aware of the deleterious effect this abandonment was having on the Hispanic families that lived along Seventh Avenue and saw the change as a reflection of racism in society. They saw this and deterioration in the northwest as an opportunity "to test their political ideas and ideals" (Fisher, 1983).

Like other organizations interested in redistributive issues, this group of eight to 10 activists thought they could use their organizing skills in electoral politics. In 1979, before the group actually called themselves South BAM, they became involved in running a slate for South Brooklyn's Area Policy Board, some of whose members are elected and the rest appointed by the borough president to recommend the disposition of federal funds to locally funded antipoverty agencies. They were familiar with the politics of antipoverty funding, since a few of the members worked in

local agencies that were so funded. They proceeded to run an interracial slate and won. Building a platform of openness in funding decisions, they were true to their promise of sponsoring open meetings. However, meeting attendance was sparse, and they did not constitute a large enough voting bloc on the board to make major changes.

The sojourn into electoral politics helped them to build a small but solid constituency of around 20 activists. By early 1980, they had begun to try to build a multiracial working-class organization that could unite different constituencies in Park Slope, Red Hook, and Sunset Park. Much of their time over the following three years would be devoted to building a coalition among races and groups that were interested in fighting racism, displacement and inadequate services (South Brooklyn Action Movement, 1979). As one member put it, "We wanted to gain political power for the powerless" (Urich, 1980).

In early 1980, there was substantial optimism in South BAM. Members worked diligently to run a slate for school board on a child-advocacy platform. Those running on the slate were teachers, activists and PTA parents. One member of their coalition won: a victory insufficient to the task of challenging the established forces, certainly, but enough of a foothold from which to regularly inform the public of what they considered to be patronage appointments or misuse of funds. They started housing, education, and entertainment committees. They formed a working relationship

with the Black United Front, a group of black activists in South Brooklyn, and they were supportive of black power politics. Although blacks were initially attracted to the group, according to one of its founders (Fisher, 1983), meetings were long on discussion and short on action, and blacks did not stay long in the group. Its own leadership was dominated by what one member described as "white leftists" (Beale, 1983).

The group saw itself as one that could unite unaffiliated individuals as well as established groups. Its members, some of whom worked in local social-service agencies, felt that South BAM had sufficient credibility to be able to attract redistributive-issue groups such as the Park Slope Tenants Council, Met. Council, Children and Youth Development Services (21), and the Fifth Avenue Committee, around specific issues: issues which South BAM thought had a civil-rights component. Members felt that taking on these issues would contribute significantly to democratic action, as well as fill an important void.

Members also realized, however, that in militating for certain reforms they would always walk a thin line of credibility since their strategies relied on disruption: through picketing, demonstrations, and sit-ins. For example, in 1979 and 1980, there was considerable debate and discussion within the group on the way real estate brokers were harassing tenants, engineering cooperative conversions, and engaging in racial steering practices. The reader may

remember that the Park Slope Civic Council sent copies of a resolution showing its disapproval of compulsory cooperative conversions to realtors. South BAM's response to the same problem was quite different. It organized a 30-person march up Seventh Avenue, replete with picket signs. Members chanted slogans and handed out information at the offices of brokers who had the worst reputations for tenant harassment and at those that had been legally indicted for racial steering. They organized the tenants in buildings owned by one or two well-known "slumlords" and engaged other redistributive-issue groups to show solidarity in exposing one landlord's particularly pernicious activities.

(Goldstein Tenants et.al, 1981). Although they were fearful that they would be perceived as leftists, which would mean they would be seen as "slightly off, irrational, hard line or unwilling to listen to reason" (Rosenberg, 1981), they felt that if they had well substantiated claims and worked in a systematic rather than "wild-eyed way" (Beale, 1983), they would be respected.

The organization got involved in a multitude of issues aimed at building coalitions among groups. It protested the sale of city owned property by disrupting Community Board Six proceedings on property disposition (Paul, 1980). It demonstrated and organized moderate-income tenants in buildings adjacent to a closed hospital that was slated for conversion into upper-income cooperatives. Members petitioned and planned picketing against Citibank when the

bank displaced residents in order to renovate a Seventh Avenue building for a local branch, and it organized a coalition to protest a Community Board Six Task Force on Drugs and Prostitution report that recommended the investigation of a group of homesteaders that task force members suspected of selling drugs (Negron et al, 1982; Vail, 1982h).

In each instance, it attempted either to mobilize or to join with groups and individuals around an issue, and members generally took a stance more radical than other groups. For example, there was the issue of the disposition of city-owned property. The Park Slope Improvement Committee wanted all city-owned buildings to be sold at auction. The Fifth Avenue Committee advocated a policy in which vacant city-owned buildings for which there were no rehabilitation plans should be auctioned, but those that were inhabited should not be auctioned. The South Brooklyn Action Movement firmly opposed the sale of city owned property under any condition, arguing that there were or should be programs by which these properties could be rehabilitated for moderate- and low-income people.

Also, in its support of local groups, South BAM adopted actions that the groups they supported were themselves reluctant to contemplate. For example, on 23 November 1980, when the Park Slope Improvement Committee sent out 10,000 copies of a letter attacking the Fifth Avenue Committee for covertly sponsoring subsidized housing on the

Baltic Street lot, South BAM wrote and distributed throughout South Brooklyn a strong letter denouncing the attack as elitist and racist (South BAM, 1980) and calling for the dismissal of Lewton Smith from the Community Planning Board. Smith was chairman of the housing committee of Community Board Six, as well as chairman of the Board of the Park Slope Improvement Committee. South BAM members wanted a public repudiation by the Community Board of the PSIC letter and a public statement of affirmative support by the Community Board for low- and moderate-income housing in South Brooklyn. On one hand, the Fifth Avenue Committee wrote a letter to the press and Community Board Six, explaining that its program did not include massive subsidized housing but about 50 owner-occupied, three-family units with subsidized rental units; the FAC board then requested the resignation of Smith from the housing committee of Community Board Six. On the other hand, South BAM wanted to petition the borough president's office, under whose auspices planning-board members are appointed, for Smith's removal from the board. Members were willing to conduct a sit-in in the borough president's office, but the Fifth Avenue Committee Board of Directors would not vote for this tactic, since FAC was deeply involved in negotiations with the borough president on development matters and did not want to alienate him.

Working on these issues did not attract long-term memberships, although people did commit themselves for

limited periods of time on specific issues. It was exhausting, time-consuming work with little societal support. In addition, members of the group contributed financially to maintain the group and finally, in November 1981, after receiving a small grant from the North Star Foundation, South BAM opened a store front on Fifth Avenue and Third Street across from a local park. Members were enthusiastic and had ideas to install printing equipment in order to work with neighborhood youth. However, they all had daytime employment and were unable to keep the store front open during hours when young people might use it.

They also became increasingly frustrated because they were unable to help people with rising rent and displacement problems. Income disparities within the group became increasingly apparent and fostered discomfort and guilt. Over the years, they had begun to attract minority members. However, low-income minority members had few options for staying in the area when their rents rose, whereas the social workers and legal-aid or human-rights lawyers were able to buy modest homes in the south when they were displaced from apartments.

Group members, feeling impotent, began to flounder. According to Fisher, the usual high energy of the group would attract people with impressive writing and research skills, but these people soon left when the group was unable to follow through on a specific research project. Members began to blame themselves for being unable to focus on one

project, cease the rhetoric, and to act, or even for being unable to help other people with their problems. They became demoralized and although they acknowledged that political and economic conditions established a context within which their goals were extremely difficult to attain, members continued to feel that they hadn't tried hard enough (Beale, 1983; Fisher, 1983).

In the spring of 1982, after sponsoring a human rights day that was rained out, the group ceased functioning. In discussions with members, most seemed unable to pinpoint exactly why it died then. Most acknowledged that they were very tired and had postponed job changes and family matters long enough. Without paid staff and a larger base of support, members felt unable to continue.

IV. Summary

The effects that resettlement processes had on the evolution of mandated organizations can be seen most clearly in the changes that took place in leadership and composition of the organizations and the consequent development of white-collar professional organizational networking. In the precinct community councils the 72nd remained a predominantly blue-collar ethnic organization controlled by the long-entrenched regular Democratic forces, while the 78th became a conflicted block association-based brownstone institution shaped by the militant demands of the new urban professionals, and the difficulties of existing in a crime ridden, abandoned, yet increasingly expensive neighborhood.

The capacity of the organizations to form broad-based anticrime coalitions across neighborhoods in the early 1980s was a reflection of the development of improvement-oriented intraorganizational networking processes, which was in turn a reflection of the extensive nature of the resettlement processes within South Brooklyn.

Community Board Six's evolution over the decade was shaped, in part, by the structural changes mandated by charter revision. The pressure placed on the board to conform to the dictates of revision were generated by the reform Democratic political institutions and community organizations of many interests. The changing composition and leadership of the board brought about shifts in political power. These shifts increasingly reflected the inclusion of the white-collar professional in the political power structure of the area; as well as the acquiescence and support of the blue-collar ethnic in the development of a rentier ethic.

The establishment of mandated organizations arose in response to a legitimation crisis. These local bodies were to have provided opportunities for government to respond to the demands of local constituents. Here was to be an obvious separation between the levels of government and private market forces wherein channels of communication, if not power, would remain open. Ironically, as resettlement progressed and city problems became increasingly defined as those of accumulation and realization rather than as

problems of provisions of services and opportunities to a disenfranchised minority, both the young urban professionals as well as the blue-collar ethnics came to identify with the prodevelopment south Brooklyn elites.

The redistributive-issue groups attempted to protect the interests of the disadvantaged tenant. Resettlement processes shaped their evolution from relatively isolated groups, functioning on a building-by-building basis, to groups that were able to form coalitions to help organize individual tenant organizations as well as to pursue collectively broader-ranging tenant protection goals. The pressures that processes of gentrification brought to bear on the blue-collar minority and ethnic populations, and the resultant displacement of these groups, were instrumental in educating the established Roman Catholic institutions to social issues and fostering fragile coalitions between the groups and institutions.

The emergence of the ideological groups in the late 1970s, was itself a manifestation of the changing social, political, and economic environment within Park Slope over the decade. The issues they forcefully pressed and the questions they raised about racism, injustice, and abuse were a reflection of the turmoil endemic to the displacement of the poor and moderate income by the white-collar professionals and their institutions. The force with which these groups protested inequities was not only a reflection of the effects of resettlement processes, but, also, a

reaction to a government that was not only failing to adequately protect the disadvantaged, but was complicitous in the process. In forcefully articulating these inequities at a time in which the contradictions within capitalism were highlighted to some, the ideological groups functioned to make what might have seemed radical in 1972 seem reasonable in 1980. They were, in a very real sense, stalking horses for the more moderate redistributive interests as well as forces that generated coalition building among organizations and institutions.

Notes

1. Data for the discussion on the precinct community councils comes primarily from attendance of regular monthly meetings from 1975 through 1977, and periodic attendance from 1978 through 1980. Data is also supplemented by interviews with police in the community-relations departments at headquarters, and in the local precincts. Material was also secured through informal discussions with members of the respective councils, and from articles in the local press.
2. The couple, who were active in the UBA and who had moved into a block between Fifth and Sixth Avenue on Prospect Place, brought in the garbage bag, dumping it on the table while the captain spoke about being undermanned (meeting of 10/28/75). The captain's response was that people had to control their children, and that they did not have the manpower to track down glue-sniffing children because they were understaffed. People complained about bongo music and loud noise from local bars and discos. With limited manpower, the captain reminded the group, they had higher priorities than prostitution, kids sniffing glue or noise.
3. In addition to lobbying and demonstrating throughout most of 1981, the Park Slope Improvement Committee took out a full-page ad in the local paper protesting narcotics sales and police collusion in September, 1981.
4. By February 1982, many of the white-collar professionals who had bought homes near Pacific and Fourth Avenue, where prostitutes had worked for at least 20 years, were monitoring the trial of one of the last alleged owners and operators of houses of prostitution (Napach, 1982). On 14 September 1983, Clarence Taliaferrow was found guilty of permitting prostitution in 582 Pacific Street. The verdict was handed down by Judge Michael J. Pesce, who had been the reformer assemblyman of the district during the late 1970s and who had assisted local residents in their efforts to rid the area of prostitutes (Watkins, 1983).
5. Data for the following discussion on Community Board Six came primarily from regular meeting attendance from 1975 through 1977 and from periodic meeting attendance from 1978 through 1981. It also came from informal discussions with board members, district managers and others who attended board meetings or had regular dealings with community board staff or members. Supporting information came from local newspaper accounts.

6. Prior to that time, the boards mainly heard requests on zoning variance matters that were then passed on to the Board of Standards and Appeals for review. However, after the revision, new powers and duties included planning for the growth, improvement and development of the district, submission of capital- and expense-budget priorities, participation in planning of individual capital projects, initial reviews of all applications for land use, evaluating service delivery and disseminating information about city services, programs, as well as the processing of complaints and inquires of district residents. The state charter also mandated that boards would have operating funds, advisory power and the ability to generate committees of interest. Although all members of the boards served without compensation, each board was able to hire a district manager and support staff within budgetary allocations. Regardless of the increased powers and duties of the boards, all decisions were recommendations that were then considered by other government bodies, such as the borough board, city planning commission, and the board of estimate. The community boards were also able to create committees in which people in the community, who were not necessarily on the board could participate. A member of the board, however, had to chair any committee. Board members serve for two-year terms with half the board coming up for reappointment each year (State Charter Revision Commission for New York City, 1975).
7. Brooklyn Heights was in Community Board Six until 1 January 1977, when community board district-lines were changed.
8. When Councilmatic lines were redrawn in 1982, Gerges' district extended further south into Park Slope.
9. Members appointed to Community Board Six in 1979, 1980, and 1981 who were affiliated with community organizations included Lewton Smith, past chairman of the board of the Park Slope Improvement Committee; Richard Valcich, past president of the UBA; Frank Torres, Fr. Sebastian Buccellato and Vincent Sagesse, board members of the Fifth Avenue Committee.
10. Prior to the charter revision changes, Community Board Six was very closely orchestrated by Cuite appointee Gerard Carey. As long time chairman, Carey never handed out meeting agendas and did not allow non-members to speak at meetings. He interrupted people when they spoke, and pandered to members of the board who were regular Democrats. When Councilman Cuite or District Leader Mangano entered the meeting hall, he stopped all discussion to introduce them and laud their

accomplishments, and when he did not come (meeting of 11 March 1975) no one knew what the agenda was. When resolutions were passed that had taken sometimes months of discussion, he failed to send out letters to appropriate authorities informing them of the board's decision. There were few committees, and those that operated rarely made reports. The budget committee relied entirely on staff from the Brooklyn Office of City Planning to draw up recommendations for approval. Carey rarely let reform Democrats who were members of the board talk for long, and he arbitrarily closed meetings.

11. In their testimony, they argued that the social club would be noisy and Bill Cuff, the president of the Triangle Parks/Flatbush Avenue Improvement Committee, testified that merchants wanted no more social clubs. He argued that social clubs give nothing to the community since they pay no taxes.
12. Members of the Park Slope Improvement Committee, ROSAS, and FAC joined housing and land use committees of the community board from 1979 to 1983.
13. The data for the discussion on the Park Slope Tenants Council and the Park Slope Branch of Metropolitan Council on Housing came primarily from three interviews and participant observations of meetings in 1975 and 1976. The people interviewed were Dot Rubin, one of the founders of the Park Slope Tenants Council, Claudia Mansbach, an employee of Metropolitan Council on Housing and who worked with both groups for a few years, and Patty Churcher who worked as the main organizer in the Park Slope Branch from 1979 to 1982. Supplementary sources were Tenants Together, the newsletter of the Park Slope Neighborhood Tenants Council, and local newspaper clippings about their activities.
14. Methodist Hospital, between Seventh and Eighth Avenue on the border between the north and southeast areas, owned a square block of homes which was eventually razed in order to build a hospital wing. When financial problems ended development plans, the land where homes had stood was black-topped for a parking lot. All tenants living in the hospital-owned housing were displaced.
15. The leadership of the Park Slope Neighborhood Tenants Council was centered around a married couple who had come to the group when they were being harrassed by their landlord. The couple and their supporters soon felt that the group should concentrate its efforts on organizing buildings against harrassment, rather than

pursuing state or city-wide agendas. There was tension and conflict when the newer leaders accused some of the original organizers and CBID members of being radicals.

16. When they did find a reform church, the clergyman wanted considerable control over agenda items, according to founder, Rubin. Finally, they were able to meet in the northeast, in an upstairs room of the Park Slope Food Cooperative on Union Street.
17. Small buildings are those consisting of five units or less, and are not protected by the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (described in Appendix V).
18. See chapter 5, page 163.
19. The data for the following discussion of the Moncada Library comes from two primary sources. First, although I never attended meetings of the group (they didn't emerge until 1978) I attended a number of community meetings in which library members presented their ideas and spoke about issues they considered to be important. These included Fifth Avenue Committee public meetings and meetings concerning SCAN (Slope Citizens Anti-crime Network) in which members of the library were particularly vociferous. I also spoke informally with several members about their activities in the neighborhood. In addition, information came from the Moncada's hand out sheets, an editorial in local papers written by members, and articles about them in the Phoenix and Prospect Press.
20. Data for the discussion of the the South Brooklyn Action Movement (South BAM) is drawn from several sources. Some information comes from periodic attendance of South-BAM-sponsored community meetings, and numerous community board meetings in which they were participants. Other information came from informal conversations with members Jack Urich, Arlene Tessler, Mimi Rosenberg, Simon Taylor and from formal 4 hour interviews with Harvey Fisher and Betsy Beale, two founders of the group. Data also comes from letters-to-the-editor of The Phoenix written by and about members of South BAM, from information that the group wrote and distributed regarding resettlement issues in Park Slope, as well as their goal and organizational-structure statements.
21. A local, Roman Catholic run, social service agency that served low income people.

Chapter 9

Community Organizations and Resettlement Processes: Improvement/Redistributive Issue Organizations

Improvement/redistributive issue organizations often reflected the conflicts and contradictions inherent in resettlement/displacement processes. On one hand, the three groups that fit this category were, like the improvement organizations, interested in attracting investment into Park Slope. On the other, they were aware, almost from their emergence in the latter half of the 1970s, that a number of forces were at work, not all of which were "in the public interest."

I. Against Investment Discrimination (1)

During the early and mid-1970s, when Park Slope was beginning to attract increasing numbers of middle-income professionals, local banks were disinvesting in Brooklyn (Advocate Press, 1977; New York Public Interest Group, 1977). Government legislation enacted in 1975 (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act), and in 1977 (Community Reinvestment Act) required disclosure by depository institutions and enabled organizations to petition government (see Appendix VI for a discussion of redlining and government policy). After the Mortgage Disclosure Act made it possible for organizations to report redlining practices, it became clear that Brooklyn was undergoing systematic disinvestment.

By the mid-1970s, antiredlining groups were surfacing in numerous Brooklyn neighborhoods (2). The NYPIRG study showed that racially integrated areas had few mortgages, and Park Slope was no exception. Within this economic and political context, a small group of about 20 active community people from local institutions, such as the socially conscious Park Slope United Methodist Church, the UBA, Fifth Avenue Committee, Pratt Center, NYPIRG, and local residents interested in the issue, met on 27 January 1977, at the home of a local college teacher to discuss a way to challenge institutional disinvestment policies in Park Slope.

From this group of highly skilled professional academics, organizers, activists, and community organization members, United Blocks Against Investment Discrimination emerged. The group soon changed its name to Against Investment Discrimination and, finally, in an attempt to broaden its base, to South Brooklyn Against Investment Discrimination. Even though the group was relatively shortlived (1977-1979), it was enormously successful in its three year history . It emerged at a time in which redlining had become almost a household word. State legislators were introducing bills in the assembly and senate, other groups were picketing their local banks, and the city was considering withdrawing funds from banks that redlined (3).

The overarching goal of the organization was to secure increased institutional investment in local neighborhood. Specific goals and strategies changed in relation to legislative dictates and local needs, but the tone of the group and the identity of the interests it was primarily to serve were established within the first six months of its existence.

Initially, the group attracted activists and upwardly mobile homeowners alike. It was an easy task to interest white-collar professionals to work on this issue. It had been difficult, if not impossible, for many of them to secure mortgage financing, and some had either sought purchase money mortgages or had had to accept particularly onerous terms: very high downpayments and/or 15 to 20 year mortgages (4). These residents willingly participated, and, while they wanted to open up mortgage financing for others in a similar predicament, they were interested in negotiating in a reasonable and "prudent" manner with the banks (Steiner, 1977).

On the other side were the activists, who had also been involved with the group since its inception. They either worked in the housing movement or were interested in redistributive-issue politics. Although they wanted mortgage financing to be made available locally, they also wanted the redlining problem to be defined in terms of discrimination against women, racism, and refusal to provide financing for multifamily properties. They also feared that

if AID's actions worked, housing prices could escalate further, driving out the poor (Herman, 1977).

From the first meeting, the homeowner professionals dominated the group. Activists, some of whom had professional ties to progressive institutions, wanted neighborhood people to assume major responsibility within the antiredlining group and attempted to interest local community groups in sending representatives to meetings. Initially, interested people represented the income, class and racial differences within the community. However, several educated and articulate professionals offered their time, homes, and resources to work on the group. When professionals offered resources that working-class residents could not, their domination was assured. Leadership of the group was assumed and retained by Herb Steiner, a local manufacturer of vending machines, who lived in a northeast area brownstone near Prospect Park. Steiner was in a position to give considerable time, money, and resources to the group and he enlisted the talents of a real estate attorney and a few other interested brownstoners. A reformer assemblyman from the 51st A.D., Ferris, became peripherally involved in the group and a number of people from his political club, Central Brooklyn Independent Democrats (CBID), who were sympathetic to Steiner's strategies, joined formally.

Although everyone agreed that sufficient research had demonstrated that redlining was occurring in Park Slope,

debates among interest groups centered on appropriate strategies. The activists wanted to harass banks by opening and closing accounts, tying up phone lines, and conducting sit-ins. Steiner's tactics were to meet with the president of Greater New York Savings Bank, the largest local savings bank, whose investment record was seriously flawed (NYPIRG, 1977). He wanted to ask that the bank advertise the availability of mortgage financing and make records of acceptances and denials available to a community mortgage review committee.

When it became clear the bank wasn't going to be responsive to any of their negotiating strategies, AID initiated a pledge-card campaign designed to encourage people to sign cards stating they would withdraw their money from Greater New York if the bank refused to advertise and commit to a mortgage review committee. As the group became increasingly sophisticated in its knowledge of state regulatory agencies, members formed subcommittees and began keeping lending record data on the bank.

In April 1977, AID members met with George Cincotta, Chairman of the Banking and Finance Committee of the state assembly. He explained to the group that disinvestment in Brooklyn was not done because there were increased risks, but because the banks wanted to expand their markets, exacting larger profits. The usury rate was the major question. The banks wanted a floating interest rate in New York State and AID members suggested that interest rates

could be raised above the then-prevailing 8.5% but that investments should also be increased and, of course, based upon the creditworthiness of the applicant. The activist members were troubled by Steiner's willingness to accept higher interest rates for increased investment. They believed higher rates would drive all but the wealthy out of the market.

The group had extended debates over strategy. Although withdrawal from the bank was initially rejected as being too radical a tactic, after a successful town meeting in March in which 600 people came to hear information on Greater's local disinvestment practices and recounts from people who were unable to secure financing, the bank made a few loans to nondepositors and agreed to advertise locally. When the bank's advertising campaign consisted of placing a sign in the bank window, AID members, and a considerable number of new members drawn by the town meeting, felt duped, expressed outrage, and initiated a withdrawal week in July 1977. As a result of their efforts, \$863,000 was withdrawn from the bank.

Even though the withdrawal strategy was extremely successful and gave AID an enviable reputation among bankers and regulatory agencies, by withdrawal week all the housing activists had left the organization. They complained that Steiner never asked for enough and was not concerned with demanding investment west of Seventh Avenue and in multifamily buildings. They were increasingly worried that

the group's lack of interest in multifamily financing and their willingness to agree to increased interest rates if investment could be increased would end up removing low- and moderate-income minorities from Park Slope (Herman, Morrison and Picciano, 1977). Even though some lived in the neighborhood, they did not have a strong enough base within the group to oust Steiner, nor did they have the time or credibility with which to form a separate organization. Most of the working-class members were also homeowners and, although some lived west of Seventh Avenue and knew that credit was difficult to secure, they tended to think that absentee landlords who owned multifamily property had certain character deficiencies and should not be able to secure financing as readily as homeowners (Mau, 1977). By this time, professionals were well ensconced in AID and, as a group, maintained strong leadership.

After the group's successful withdrawal week, AID was able to make additional demands, some of which were met: having mortgage applications available in local branches; having 25% of Greater New York's advertising budget spent on Brooklyn advertising; and seeing that a stipulated amount was invested in Brooklyn.

Gradually, Steiner and others began to see that a broader base was necessary to secure mortgage financing in Brooklyn. Other antiredlining groups had heard of AID and several approached them to join forces after their successful withdrawal week. In the fall of 1977, only three

months after most of the activists had left the organization, AID began to consider working with other groups in a coalition to effect legislation. Unlike AID, other coalition groups did not represent gentrifying neighborhoods. Rather they represented moderate- and low-income white and minority areas. Although AID's agenda was not heavily concerned with housing subsidies or multifamily disinvestment, it needed leverage. By joining with other groups that represented constituencies for whom these issues were paramount, it was able to press for state and federal action. In doing so, AID became intimately involved in redistributive issues. In January 1978, at New York State Banking Board hearings AID became involved with the Coalition Against Redlining (CAR). When the state offered a compromise in which applications for credit in local areas would be considered on merit, the groups, including AID, rejected it because the agreement did not include making loans for multifamily housing.

After the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed in 1977, CAR attended and reported at hearings on the CRA state regulations. It worked to have the regulations hammered out to the point where the Federal Deposit Insurance Company agreed to deny application for branch expansion if banks did not invest a fair proportion of funds in the service area, and charters of branches would be revoked if banks were not already investing in local service areas. Service areas would be defined as the area from

which the majority of depositors lived. Through its coalitioning with CAR, AID was able to review pending state legislation, take position votes, follow up on individual groups, coordinate lobbying in Albany and reach local senators.

In March 1978, AID hired a full-time researcher on a CETA line from the Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers, and in May 1978, AID decided to challenge a branch opening for Greater New York. Based on the evidence compiled by the researcher, FDIC, in an unprecedented move, rejected Greater New York's application for a branch in April 1979.

As the group became increasingly involved in state and then national networking with CAR and the National Peoples Action Coaliton (NPA), its local organizing efforts suffered. Members became involved in the time-consuming bureaucracy of the Greater New York Bank challenge. After AID's successful challenge with Greater New York, their relationship with the New York State Banking Department became routine and legitimized. AID was contacted whenever a bank applied for a branch to see if they thought there were CRA infractions. AID members felt that monitoring branch applications gave them a measure of control over preventing CRA infractions. There was some discussion over whether they were monitoring bank actions in order to protect citizens, or whether they were being used as tools

of the regulatory agencies. AID members opted to believe they were playing an important part in CRA enforcement.

In meetings with CAR and NPA, insurance redlining was frequently discussed. By the end of 1978, AID was involved in working to end insurance redlining in Park Slope. Members planned strategies to encourage Hartford and AETNA Insurance companies to invest locally. As part of a settlement with NPA, AETNA acquiesced to numerous demands and, at the suggestion of Steiner, became involved with the Fifth Avenue Committee in financing several housing rehabilitation projects in the northwestern Slope.

In 1979, interest rates skyrocketed, making redlining an obsolete issue because, as the activists had suspected, only the wealthy were able to buy homes with interest rates over 15%. By this time, AID members were mainly responding to Steiner's suggestions rather than initiating new ideas, since he had been the representative to coalition groups from AID. When his concern waned as a result of a growing interest in a new business, other members of the group, now made up almost entirely of people who followed Steiner's suggestions, seemed uninterested in maintaining momentum. The group never actually met to agree to disband. However, the CETA worker's two years were over and Steiner stopped calling meetings.

The group had been enormously successful locally and with other groups in statewide and national antiredlining campaigns. It emerged at a time in which government

policies supported their work, when there was national interest in their cause, and when resettlement pressure in Park Slope provided the impetus for wide-ranging brownstoner interest and support. Although AID essentially attempted to serve the interests of the professional, the issues were complicated and success dictated that alliances be formed with redistributive-issue organizations which, in this case, represented low-income and minority constituencies. Through the efforts of National People's Action, AID was able to secure financial support for housing in the northwest Slope from the AETNA Insurance Company. Through the lobbying efforts of CAR, legislative and regulatory authorities were more responsive to antiredlining groups. AID members came to understand the tenure-status ties between low- and middle-income homeowners. When interest rates rose, however, AID members also saw that mortgages were easier to secure if you could pay the rates. Since many of the people they were fighting for, mainly other professionals, were now able to secure mortgage financing, the commonalities between income groups appeared to diminish. Instead, divisions between classes became reinforced as high interest rates redistributed housing resources upward. Whatever coalition gains had been made were obscured by changing market conditions.

II. Park Slope Together (5)

The idea of starting an area-wide umbrella group to which other organizations would belong, was initially

discussed by a merchant and the manager of the Seventh Avenue branch of the Greater New York Savings Bank, in early 1977. The merchant, Harry Tarzian, a second-generation owner of a successful hardware business on Seventh Avenue and a local resident, was also active in the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce and the Seventh Avenue Betterment Committee. The branch manager, a lifelong northeast area resident, and active in the same two improvement organizations, was also president of the Park Slope Civic Council.

Both businessmen were beginning to feel overwhelmed by the deluge of requests for donations they and their organizations were receiving from the increasing numbers of community organizations. They met with Rev. Fred Melton, the director of one of the area's youth programs, about the formation of a coalition of groups that could raise funds for all the groups and act as an information resource. They were hoping the group could rent a store front with a paid staff. Other social service providers were contacted and they all agreed that Park Slope was filled with wealthy and talented people who could possibly give of their time if they could only be found, and that all groups could work together to make Park Slope a better place.

The group met for the first time in February 1977. It was comprised of the directors and leaders of seven social service groups, many of which were Lutheran- and Roman Catholic-sponsored programs, as well as representatives from

each improvement and redistributive issue organizations (6). The group continued to meet monthly for four years, and although it never opened a store front or raised any money as an umbrella group, it became an important reflection of the different interest groups in a changing neighborhood.

Groups came and shared information on what they were working on and ideas concerning what they thought should be done. Early on, the director of Camp Friendship, an agency providing recreational programs for predominantly minority low-income youth, set the tone for the position that was to develop among the social-service-agency staff people. He said, "In the past, people in organizations have concentrated on improving the physical appearance of the area, but this time has passed. It is now time to work on the needs of the poor" (Duda, 1977). Close networks developed among the social-service groups that enabled them to develop a sensibility for community issues as well as the requisite skills for funding programs in individual agencies. Representatives of improvement organizations came to meetings and reported on house tours and attempts at physical improvement. Some said they continued to come simply because they were the assigned representatives from their organizations (Johnson, 1977), or because they were interested in the issues (Yannatuna, 1977), or because they were instrumental in the organization of Park Slope Together (O'Connor, 1977).

Shortly after the group began, a number of members who were also affiliated with the social-service groups drew up a statement of purpose over which there was considerable debate. The statement suggested that Park Slope was "a paradox of wealth and poverty," and that

We must pursue a course of community growth which embraces and supports the poor, the disadvantaged, the aged and the youth among us. We must advocate against those forces that perpetuate the impoverishment of these groups, that push these groups away and that neglect them or contribute to their decay (Park Slope Together, April 1977).

The goals of the organization were to establish working channels of communication between groups, agencies, and institutions and to educate residents as to the workings of Park Slope Together. The statement read that area residents would be educated to the needs of "the poor, disadvantaged, aged and youth of the area." Representatives of improvement organization wanted the wording changed to "the needs of the community," commenting that the community has many needs. The wording was changed.

By the end of 1977, Park Slope Together was a monthly forum in which all types of organizations reported on their activities, nothing more. Although some of the social-service members wanted to work on a local issue such as deterioration of services in local schools, merchants and improvement-group representatives felt that the group should be apolitical and that all ideas for action should filter through a steering committee. Resource sharing continued.

During 1978, through the efforts of staff from Children Youth and Development Services, Cabby, Slope Sports, and Camp Friendship, the group became involved in educational issues. They petitioned to keep schools opened after hours for sports programs, and the group challenged the effectiveness of the local high school principal. All groups were able to support these efforts and articles supporting the work appeared in the newsletters of improvement organizations.

In mid-1979, the issue of displacement began to be discussed at meetings with increasing regularity. Agency people began to commiserate with one another about the disinvestment in the southern areas of Park Slope and the increase in rents in the rest of the neighborhood. First, it meant that there was tremendous pressure to move on many of the families they served, causing these families stress and depression. Second, it was clear that the agencies would have to become increasingly family-problem oriented rather than program-oriented. For example, if an agency were running a sports program and one of their athletes was unable to function at games because he was unable to sleep at night due to the landlord's having cut off heat in an effort to displace the tenant, then that sports program was providing an inadequate service (Torres, 1978). Agency staff, many of whom were renters in the area, were also worried that they would be displaced (Park Slope Together, 1979), as rents for a one-bedroom apartment rose from \$250

to \$450 per month between 1979 to 1980 (Marcus, 1979), and as co-operative conversions seemed to be in progress everywhere (Conroy, 1979).

Social service group members wanted to establish some way to deal with the displacement problem. They discussed applying public pressure on realtors and politicians and disseminating information on tenant rights. They decided to have a public forum to clarify the issues, and they invited all Park Slope groups to participate by making a short presentation of their perception of the housing/displacement issue, their experiences and their suggestions.

Park Slope Together held a public forum on displacement on 9 November 1979, and groups presented their views. Children and Youth Development Services spoke for the social service agencies when it said that reinvestment in Park Slope has meant displacement of long-time residents. They were opening a housing services center in the south and had two VISTA volunteers added to their staff to work on displacement issues (Children and Youth Development Services, 1979). In a statement fairly representative of the improvement organizations, ROSAS (Revitalization of the Southern Area of the Slope, 1979) saw the problem as "the deterioration and decay of sound housing stock by owners seeking to maximize profit and incapable of dealing with major depreciation of building systems." What can be done, ROSAS asked, "to halt decay, keep our older and poorer population and still make opportunity available for an

aspiring middle class seeking decent housing in an urban environment?" The organization recommended government-subsidized, low interest loan programs, such as the participation loan program, abatement programs on the pattern of J-51, and co-operative conversions, which recycles abandoned buildings and provides a high level of building maintenance and owner occupancy, to remediate the displacement problem. Although representatives from the UBA and Civic Council maintained a low profile during the forum, Civic Council President Goetz reiterated that the council had passed a resolution opposing co-ops when they displaced elderly long-established residents.

Representing the viewpoint of the ideological organizations, Jules Lobel spoke about the larger economic forces. He expressed the belief that displacement is the policy of the city. Since government leaders want only middle-class people in the city, they encourage displacement. "Racism," said Lobel, "is basic to displacement."

Religious leaders were also present. One priest, Fr. Maynard from St. Augustine's brought a dozen Hispanic parishioners who recounted harassment experiences. Not only were tenants denied heat and hot water, but apartments were burglarized repeatedly, fires set, and vacant apartments filled with people who sold and used drugs. Other organizations described the programs they were thinking about and FAC described their organizing efforts and housing

programs. Improvement-organization leaders expressed amazement that there were not strong laws protecting people from co-op conversions.

Towards the end of the meeting, Ed O'Connor, former president of the Civic Council, member of the Park Slope Chamber of Commerce and the Seventh Avenue Betterment Committee, and branch manager for Greater New York Savings Bank, lamented his own dilemma. His building was being sold and all tenants were being asked to leave. "There must be some protection for tenants who would put their blood into a building," said O'Connor. "We have lived in this building over 20 years. Laws do not protect citizens."

There was wide consensus among social-agency, redistributive-issue, and ideological groups about the lack of tenant protection, while improvement-organization representatives remained relatively quiet. The group decided to form an antidisplacement subcommittee of Park Slope Together. ROSAS representatives never attended another Park Slope Together meeting and the other improvement organizations never joined the subcommittee. The divisions had been made.

Over the following year and a half Antidisplacement Committee members tried to make residents aware of their rights by tackling manageable projects, and by making their work highly visible. First, they developed a position paper and distributed it to all organizations. The paper stated that forced displacement, particularly of minority, low

income, and the elderly was not be be tolerated by the group, and that they saw their role as "staving off the forces that are currently pushing out our neighbors" (Park Slope Together Antidisplacement Committee, 1979). Members spoke at tenant and block association meetings warning people that displacement would eventually reach them, and that racism and classism underlay the movement. They also saw disinvestment in nonprime areas in the southern Slope, and publicized that these buildings were being "milked by the unscrupulous." What the housing activists didn't know in 1979 was that the seemingly abandoned buildings in the southeastern Slope would soon be "warehoused" by private owners who would acquire them in 1980 and 1981 (Tsuruoka, 1982), and hold them until property values rose in the mid-1980s.

The Antidisplacement Committee also researched changing housing patterns on a northeast and southwest area block undergoing displacement (6). The blocks were Sterling Place, between Sixth and Seventh Avenues, and Second Street, between Fifth and Sixth Avenues. The committee held tenant workshops, tried to keep city-owned properties from being auctioned in tenant-occupied buildings, showed films on displacement, circulated petitions opposing co-op conversions, wrote and distributed a tenants-rights brochure and held community meetings where 75 to 100 people attended. It sponsored antidisplacement month in May, 1980, and targeted one particularly unsavory landlord in the southern

Slope, developing strategies for organizing and picketing his buildings.

In the meantime, Park Slope Together continued to meet as a resource sharing group, and the Antidisplacement Committee made monthly reports. At one point there was a volatile argument on the value of the Park Slope house tour and its aid in the displacement process. The representative of the Civic Council, an original organizer of Park Slope Together, became red-faced and upset. When Brooklyn Union Gas volunteered to publish their tenants-rights brochure, the Antidisplacement Committee, much to the consternation of the parent body, turned down their offer and suggested that, instead, Brooklyn Union work to rehabilitate housing for low-income people.

Finally, the Antidisplacement Committee was left with a core of about a dozen people. They lost energy. Since there was no tenant protection for families who lived in buildings with five units or less, and much of Park Slope was comprised of smaller buildings, families who made up the constituencies of the social-service workers were disappearing rapidly. Many committee members spoke of a sense of being overwhelmed by events. Although the idea of working towards legislative changes arose in discussion, members were so involved with the provision of day-to-day social services that they were unable to envision any possibilities for moving in this direction. Individual members, however, made personal decisions to do what they

could. One of the leaders, Bill Schroeder, decided to leave the directorship of an agency to go to law school. Another, Roberta Marcus, made a lateral move to another agency and began to develop a wide range of tutorial programs to help disadvantaged youth. Still a third, John Duda, began a campaign to purchase a building so that his program would not be displaced. Others left their jobs in some despair or moved away. One, Frank Torres, continued to work for his agency, but went to work for a corporation in the evening and removed himself from local issues. The staff that worked for the Sisters of the Good Shepherd were able to raise some funds to provide additional services for displacees.

On 1 April 1981, four years after its emergence, Park Slope Together met for the last time at the Old First Reformed Church in the northeast. Members of the steering committee handed out a one-page missive entitled, "Is Park Slope Together? Park Slope Together Is Not." They wrote:

It is now the Spring of 1981. We live not in a unified community. We live in a divided community. The forced flight of the poor has escalated in geometric proportions since our first meeting in the "Old First." The community groups are not together, the local organizations are mostly separate, pursuing individual purposes.

The Steering Committee has decided to recommend that Park Slope Together cease to exist. We feel that the hope of bringing unity to our community and the hope of sustaining a model urban community are beyond reach (Park Slope Together, 1981).


In this final statement the steering committee recommended that the Antidisplacement Committee continue its efforts as a separate group. It did not. Of those who remained, a few became members in other antidisplacement efforts such as a store front opened by Children and Youth Development Services, or the Fifth Avenue Committee. With bitterness between those who supported tenant protection and those who shared the values of the quiet but-still-operating improvement groups, Park Slope Together died.

III. Fifth Avenue Committee (7)

The Fifth Avenue Committee emerged from two different directions simultaneously. In the northwest, in the fall of 1976, members of the Civic Council, Triangle Parks, and the 78th Precinct Community Council who lived in the northwest began to meet regularly to discuss the worsening drug, prostitution, and housing-abandonment problems along Fifth Avenue. These white-collar homeowners felt that the 78th Precinct was not addressing their concerns, and they feared that problems of crime and deterioration would become a threat to the value of their property and ultimately to their own safety. They decided that the only way to deal effectively with the crime problem was to change the physical, and ultimately the social environment along Fifth Avenue. They saw the six-acre cleared site from Baltic to Butler Streets and from Fourth Avenue to Fifth Avenue (see Map 9.1), hereafter referred to as the Baltic Street lot, as

Map 9.1

Baltic Street Lot Within Park Slope



the cornerstone for commercial development and change. If they could attract substantial commercial investment they could attract more middle-income professionals to resettle the area. They carved out a target area from Third Avenue to Sixth Avenue and from Flatbush to Ninth Street.

By Christmas 1976, the newly formed Fifth Avenue Neighborhood Committee had proclaimed its purpose to "dramatize public demand to rid Fifth Avenue of its drug and crime problems and to demonstrate wide support to create a revitalized strip from Flatbush to Ninth Street" (Fifth Avenue Neighborhood Committee, 1976). Through its contacts with city agencies in working on other improvement projects, it planned and was ultimately successful in having a study of the uses and vacancy patterns of Fifth Avenue conducted by the Brooklyn Office of City Planning. The study, completed in summer 1977, showed a commercial vacancy rate of 24% from Flatbush to Ninth Street, with a substantially higher vacancy rate from Flatbush to Union Street (Brooklyn Office of City Planning, 1977). By early spring, 1977, six months after its inception, The Fifth Avenue Neighborhood Committee was publishing its own newsletter, amassing community pressure to clean up the drug problem through letters to the police commissioner and local legislators, and looking for ways to begin a commercial development of the Baltic Street lot. It had a core of 12 members, all homeowners who lived in the northwest (8).

A Fifth Avenue organization also developed south of Union Street. In the fall of 1976, block-association representatives from the UBA began to meet as a result of the survey the UBA conducted that suggested it was time to start a Fifth Avenue improvement group. Most of the people were homeowners who represented new block associations that had formed on blocks below Sixth Avenue, on the border between the north and southwest. They were part of the new force of brownstoners that were expanding the white collar housing market towards the west. However, because housing prices were still moderate west of Sixth Avenue (\$50,000 to \$80,000) many of the newcomers were social-service, teaching- or middle-management professionals. As opposed to the group in the northwest, which was black and white, the group in the "central" area, reflecting the population, was predominantly white, with two Hispanic members. Concerned because Fifth Avenue had so many vacant stores, members spoke with local merchants in the United Merchants of Fifth Avenue. The groups met, formed the Fifth Avenue Improvement Committee, and tried to develop ways to market the vacant commercial properties along the strip.

The problems in this part of the southwest area (from Union to Ninth Streets), called by the Fifth Avenue groups, FAC central, were not as severe as those in the northwest. Housing prices were rising, at least east of Fifth Avenue, and except for a few blocks, there was considerably less housing abandonment than there was in the northwest. The

group felt that if it could bring merchants into the vacant--but not vandalized stores--the area could serve as a varied and attractive local shopping street.

Although, at the outset, it would appear that both groups were following the improvement-group model of attempting to attract investment to attract middle-income homeowners, this was not entirely the case. Two main forces operated to shape this group differently from other improvement organizations. First, there was pressure from outside forces for these separate area groups with different problems to unite. The organizational structure produced by the union of groups that were not interested in uniting, established a complex organizational framework designed to protect territorial interests. Although it was not so intended, this structure would work to the advantage of redistributive-issue interests that would arise early in the group's existence.

Early on, the of outside forces, namely Chase Manhattan Bank and the Brooklyn Office of City Planning, pressured the Fifth Avenue improvement groups to become one Fifth Avenue group in order to qualify for funding support. Chase representatives, who were approached by leadership from Triangle Parks, said that funding for loan pools slated for commercial revitalization would be infinitely easier to obtain if the entire commercial strip were united. The Brooklyn Office of City Planning was interested in assisting

with commercial street revitalization plans (9), and thought it important that revitalization be strip-wide.

The Brooklyn office was also being pressured, through several legislators, to assist the merchants south of Ninth Street with some sort of revitalization plan. As described earlier, these southwest-area merchants had been protesting against the development of a Pathmark shopping mall at 12th Street and Second Avenue. According to one of the most politically active merchants (Morisi, 1977) and a planner assigned to the project from the Brooklyn Office of City Planning (Gelber, 1977), providing community development funds for their area was an attempt to show concern for the merchants hurt by the publicly subsidized Pathmark development. Therefore, in order to secure planning and eventually financial support, there was a situation in which merchants in the southwest were being pressured to join forces with the central-area residents and merchants and the northwest improvement group. The amalgam of forces did unite in May 1977, as the Fifth Avenue Committee, but it was not their choice to do so; nor did they trust one another.

Even when the groups agreed to unite, there were disagreements over control of territory, and over which outside institutions most represented the values of the organization. For example, the leadership from the central (Union to Ninth Street) organization became enraged when members in the north (Union to Flatbush) organization wrote letters to politicians and city-agency staff claiming to

represent the area from Flatbush to Ninth Street and suggesting the kind of development they wanted for the commercial strip.

Other outside institutions became involved, and fear of redistributive values soon surfaced. In addition to approaching banks and the Department of City Planning, members of the to-be-united FAC (from north and central) approached several technical assistance organizations in order to secure planning and technical support for rehabilitation efforts (10). One of those approached for help was the Pratt Center for Community and Economic Development. They offered to help FAC secure CETA staff support through the Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers, and they offered their own staff to help form block associations, conduct research on abandonment and organize merchants.

There was considerable pressure from leaders of FAC north to not allow Pratt to be involved in any of the planning or organizing. For instance, FAC had approached the Mayors Office of Downtown Brooklyn Development (MODBD) and Downtown Brooklyn Development Association (DBDA), for technical assistance, and Brennon and Cuff, two northwest area leaders, as well as several employees of those organizations indicated that FAC should not work with Pratt. One employee of MODBD (Votava, 1977) told FAC members: "They're against everything, we're for everything." A leader of FAC north (Cuff, 1977) said, "I wouldn't touch Ron

Schiffman or his group for anything. They're all for nonprogress, non doers, radicals who want to ruin neighborhoods. They tend to stir up the poor and get them all riled up, especially the Hispanics. It's always better not to stir them up." Although leaders from FAC central were not wedded to Pratt, no other group was offering comparable assistance. Battles over who would or would not assist the group continued for years.

Meanwhile, once the groups knew and agreed to unite, representatives from the north and central areas spent months drawing up a set of by-laws that would ensure territorial representation and discourage cliques. The organization, bounded by Flatbush, Sixth Avenue, 24th Street, and Fourth Avenue (later enlarged to include Third Avenue), was structured as a board of directors with two bodies. First, there were geographical representatives elected by residents from each of the three areas. There was an equal number of merchant and resident board members. Second, chairpeople of committees of common concern--elected by the members of their committees to represent them--served on the board. If there were more residential than merchant committees, then there were merchant-at-large members appointed to the board to equalize merchant/resident representation. Third, in order to discourage cliques from forming, there could be no more than one person elected as a geographical representative from any one block.

Although the numbers of representatives from the merchant/resident groups changed over the years as a result of the merchants forming their own local development corporation, the structure remained the same. For example, when a tenants' union became part of the organization, the chairperson was a member of the board. When a park improvement committee ended after the park was rehabilitated, the committee ceased functioning and the chairperson of the committee left the board.

Elections were held annually in each area. The structure seemed supportive of a long-time residential constituency. For example, when new, professional middle-class homeowners ran for geographical representative against life-long, often moderate-income minority or working-class white residents, they often lost. The residents with long-term neighborhood ties and social networks were often able to draw out more people to vote for them.

A second way that FAC was different from other improvement organizations was that as a result of both a) the redistributive housing interests of a few members and staff, and b) the desire to be credible since there were obvious conflicts of interest in the area, the organization sought a broad-based, multiethnic, multiracial membership.

In addition to the original impetus for the group's formation (commercial revitalization and anticrime interests), some of the original members were interested in

housing revitalization. During the summer of 1977, after the group had officially become the Fifth Avenue Committee in May 1977, a housing committee was formed by a social worker from the local Children, Youth and Development Services (CYDS) a local resident who was also a staff member at Pratt Center, a northwest-area resident who had been a district leader on the upper west side of Manhattan, and an urban planner (11). Almost immediately, members wrote a goal statement that reflected a mix in improvement- and redistributive-issue interests. It stated simply, "Our major emphasis is on stabilization of the Fifth Avenue community without major displacement of residents." The more fully developed goal statement, of February 1978, stated that they intended to

- work toward the rehabilitation of existing deteriorating housing, including both empty and occupied owner-abandoned dwellings.
- attempt to maintain a mix of private owner-occupied and rental units.
- encourage community-based ownership of rental units.
- maintain the ethnic, racial and economic mix of the community.
- assist tenants in obtaining the entitled services
- encourage agency development of low-income housing.
- assist landlords in making building improvements.
- assist tenants in the management and co-oping of owner abandoned buildings.
- encourage the private development of open spaces in the community.

In March 1978, the FAC opened an office around the corner from the Baltic Street lot in the devastated

northwest, and, through small donations from local banks and the technical assistance from the Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers, secured a five-person CETA staff that was headed by the urban planner who had been an original organizer of the Housing Committee. The group hired housing organizers, development staff, and a person to work with the merchants. Staff was involved in developing housing rehabilitation and organizing programs. There was very little turnover among the leadership and organizing staff. By 1983, the group had developed relationships with tenant coalitions and broad-based redistributive issue housing groups (12).

Together with FAC committees, staff organized tenants into city programs that helped them to maintain and eventually manage or own their buildings (13). Many residents interested in redistributive housing issues joined the Housing Committee. A housing clinic was started, and by 1979 had evolved into the Fifth Avenue Tenants' Union (FATU). From these organizing efforts, low-income and minority residents became involved in the organization.

In addition, FAC board and staff, desirous of attracting as broad-based a constituency as possible, in part, to maintain credibility with local residents and funding sources, organized around neighborhood issues that residents expressed concern about such as sanitation or anticrime issues. Annual block-by-block clean-ups with accompanying school poster contests became the norm and

maintained the interest of the Italian and Polish working class in the southwest as well as block associations throughout the area.

Other programs generated at the interest of homeowner board members, tended to maintain block association interest in FAC as an improvement organization, and were highly fundable because of their high visibility (Velasquez, 1979). For example, each year the Fifth Avenue Committee sponsored a facade improvement program. Block associations in one of the three FAC areas competed to be chosen by FAC as the block that would have extensive facade work done on buildings that required masonry repair, or painting. Homeowners donated \$50 each which was passed on to the block association for beautification, while the project was paid for through contributions from local financial and utility institutions.

The FAC open-space development projects attracted a more heterogeneous constituency than tenant clinics or facade programs. For example, as the white-collar housing market moved west, young professionals began a project to rehabilitate a badly deteriorated, little maintained block-square park on Fifth Avenue and Third Street. They wanted to have a nearby place for their young children to play. Since this would require a sizeable city expenditure, they wanted to show substantial community interest. The first chairperson, a social-service professional, helped organize Italian working class, Latin, and new white-collar

professionals, most of whom were women with children, to rally for the park. The local councilman supported it (14), and the second chairperson, a former parks-department planner and upper-income homeowner with small children, guided the project through city bureaucracy for five years, while organized working- and middle-class mothers planted greenery and raised funds.

On the other hand, although most of the FAC housing organizers were interested in redistributive housing issues, board members and development staff walked the fine line between wanting to rehabilitate housing to improve the neighborhood, and wanting to rehabilitate housing to house the existing low- and moderate-income, mainly minority population. Although in the minds of most board members these two goals were not mutually exclusive, the actions of other community organizations and city agencies suggested that FAC board members and staff were in the minority.

Over the years, major conflicts between FAC and other groups and government centered on housing rehabilitation and development projects, and the ways that improvement interests perceived FAC's plans in light of the Park Slope housing market. Although FAC housing development plans were redistributive-minded, as a result of the corporatization of the city and the resultant rentier interests of city administration, increased interest rates, construction costs and loss of low-interest government programs, nothing was ever built for low- or moderate-income people. Second, as a

result of what staff at the city department of Housing Preservation and Development considered the increasing marketability of the area (Cohen, Baldwin, & Robbins, 1980), the city became increasingly unwilling to subsidize Park Slope projects regardless of the needs of existing population, thereby supporting the improvement-minded, rehabilitate-to-improve-the-neighborhood constituency. Finally, other local organizations, representing improvement or redistributive-issue groups, fought against or supported FAC plans, depending upon whose interests were perceived to be threatened. Two examples of FAC's attempts to develop housing for moderate-income families in the dual housing market of Park Slope were housing development projects on Warren Street and on the Baltic Street lot.

A. The Warren Street Project

In September and October, 1977, the Housing Committee members spoke of organizing a house tour along the lines of the Park Slope Civic Council house tour. Members thought they could get in touch with owners of vacant buildings, design a tour, approach local banks for financing and sell buildings. However, most vacant and abandoned buildings turned out to be city owned, (see Appendix VII for a discussion of the New York City-owned property crisis and the city's programs and policies that evolved during the crisis) or it was not possible to locate a private owner. In 1977, the Brooklyn Office of City Planning found that 44 of the 79 vacant and abandoned buildings were in need of

immediate repair and that, in order of priority, Warren Street, between Fourth and Fifth Avenue, was in the worst condition, with 13 vacant buildings (Brooklyn Office of City Planning, 1977).

After the FAC office was opened in 1978, a Warren Street subcommittee was formed and FAC staff began to develop a proposal to market the buildings for moderate income people. When the plans began, interest rates were 8% to 10%, and the 312 loan program, which was used in the proposal, had rates of 3%. There were six buildings available, two owned by HUD and four by the New York City Housing Authority. In 1979, the city vested 200 properties in the FAC target area, seven of which were on Warren Street. FAC approached HPD. It suggested that FAC put a proposal together. FAC was able to secure mortgage financing at four points below market rate from AETNA Insurance, a contact made through the antiredlining efforts of AID. By fall 1979, FAC submitted its proposal requesting \$27,000 per unit. In the spring of 1980, staff from HPD notified FAC that there were no more 312 funds (15). They suggested that the group put a proposal together that would use the Participation Loan Program (PLP). This would mean that the project was no longer accessible to moderate-income people. Interest rates would be 4% higher, adding a \$250-per-month increase to monthly mortgage payments. Mortgage interest rates were past 12% By 1981, when

construction started they would be 18%. Fuel costs had skyrocketed from \$.45 a gallon to \$1.10 for #2 oil in 1981.

FAC did not debate the issue of whether to reapply under the PLP program very long. There was some discussion at the Warren Street sub-committee and in the Housing Committee meetings. However, some members and particularly staff began to feel frustrated, and their redistributive interests were subordinated to another more pressing interest--getting something done. They felt that middle income housing was better than abandoned buildings and that, with some subsidies, they still might be able to house families in the \$20,000 to \$25,000 income range.

In September 1980, a HUD self-help grant (16), for which FAC had applied in order to write-down the costs of the Warren Street buildings, was approved in the amount of \$118,000: sufficient to defray the cost of each building by \$7800. Staff applied for the PLP, believing that they could still house middle-income residents with stabilized rental units to which Section 8-eligible households could apply.

However, the city felt the area was highly marketable, and refused to sell the buildings to FAC at a low price. After spending one year raising \$10,000 to put the PLP proposal together (16), it soon became obvious that the city was unwilling to sell the city-owned properties to FAC for the price they sold vacant property to owner-occupants, \$250 per unit, or for the price they sold property to developers for new construction, \$500 per unit. In city auctions held

in 1981, properties in the area were being auctioned for \$25,000.

FAC presented two arguments in an attempt to have the \$6500 building price the city was asking reduced. First, they documented that most of the buildings that sold for those prices never closed, or, when they did, were never renovated for lack of funds. Second, they argued that if the city sold the buildings to FAC at the \$6500 price, it would result in a \$33 additional monthly cost to the buyer (Burris, 1981; Fierstein, 1981). The staff at HPD was not responsive to the arguments. After months of haggling, the city sold the buildings to FAC for \$6500 per building. FAC went through similar experiences with the Housing Authority. FAC members were unaware that two-and-a-half years later, the city would sell a building on the next block, St. Marks Place, to renovators for \$1.

Finally, in December 1981, the city announced that the completed buildings would be sold according to a city-wide lottery rather than through FAC. FAC requested that the lottery include people within the local community board (18). HPD Commissioner Gliedman and Mayor Koch argued that New York City was one community and that lotteries were to be city-wide. FAC countered that the city had a double standard. When private developers secured PLP loans, there were no restrictions on who lived in the units and under what circumstances. In a meeting in December 1981, HPD Commissioner Gliedman negotiated with FAC, promising that

FAC could sell the two buildings from HUD that they already owned in whatever way they wished, but that, with the remaining eleven, 51% would be sold at a city-wide auction and 49% would be weighted for neighborhood residents. He told FAC staff and board members that they shouldn't push him, and that, if they tried to fight it, he would challenge them legally. FAC capitulated. It was becoming clearer that even middle-income people would have problems buying these homes. The first building, completed in May 1982, sold for \$140,000. AETNA and the city repaid the construction lender and issued a 30-year mortgage to the individual purchasers at a combined interest rate of 6.75%. The building was sold to a family in the \$35,000-40,000 range. The downpayment was \$7500, with a monthly maintenance fee of \$678 after rental income was accounted for.

Other local organizations, representing improvement or redistributive issue groups either fought against or supported the Warren Street project, depending upon whose interests they served. Originally the Warren Street subcommittee had a few people from Warren Street as members, however the majority of committee members were board members from other blocks. According to one of the members from Warren Street (Columbo, 1980) others on the block didn't think it was possible to do anything, and, although FAC members went door-to-door to try to enlist block support, block residents, most of whom were low- and moderate-income

Latins, did not attend meetings. They only became involved when the city approved the PLP proposal.

When block residents did become involved, it was with some antagonism. Although they had expressed disbelief that anything could be done with all the abandoned property, once they became aware that the city had approved the loan some became suspicious that if the city was interested, it would not help them. Some saw FAC as a developer that was more an adversary than representative of their interests, particularly when they learned how expensive the rehabilitations were going to be. At meetings held on 31 October and 14 November 1980, some block residents expressed fear and anger that FAC was trying to "decide our priorities . . . This will really start the process of gentrification on our block" (Ortega, 1980).

At these meetings FAC Development Director Reich explained the limited options made available by the city. They could continue the rehabilitation with subsidies provided by HUD, the city, and AETNA, or the city would auction the buildings. If auctioned, Reich argued, only those with a significant amount of capital would be able to renovate them since some were barely shells. Neither Reich nor other board members brought up the possibilities of bringing these issues to the press, refusing to accept the city's offer or building a strong coalition to protest in the interests of block residents. FAC now had other projects at stake, projects funded by banks, insurance

companies, and the city. They did not want to jeopardize them.

Warren Street block residents, many of whom were tenants in the remaining deteriorated buildings on the block, wanted to purchase these renovated homes or rent apartments in them, and they were not assuaged by Reich's reasoning. They did not believe that they would be able to buy the houses or pay the stabilized rents. Some had children who were teachers or who worked in low-level service jobs. They questioned the potential financial repercussions if they were to own one of the buildings and any apartment remained unrented for a few months. At that time FAC thought that monthly payments would be \$350: not the \$678 that was to become an owner's monthly payment.

The Park Slope Improvement Committee was also unsupportive of the project. According to a Phoenix account (Misslbeck, 1981) at a 20 January 1981 forum on subsidized housing, sponsored by the Park Slope Civic Council, Park Slope Improvement Committee President David Brennan asked, "Why couldn't someone just buy the house on public auction and renovate it themselves--the costs would be approximately the same?" FAC housing director Rebecca Reich explained that moderate income people can handle monthly payments better than the big cash outlays required by individual rehabilitation efforts. Residents who attended the Civic Council forum were not assuaged either, but for different reasons. They did not question Reich's explanation.

Rather, they expressed opposition to using subsidies to housing low-to-moderate income people at all. According to 12th Street resident Wentworth Miller, "Providing those people (residents of subsidized housing developments) with houses has not provided them with the middle class morals that go with it--they are burglarizing us. . . . We don't want your projects near us!"

Around the same time, Brennan also wrote a letter to Commissioner Gliedman, urging that the Warren Street buildings be auctioned (Brennan, 1981). He stated that the buildings were "misguidedly assigned to the Participation Loan Program by HPD". He further stated that Park Slope was "on the way up and the funds should be used for neighborhoods in transition on the way down, where private monies are reluctant to go, such as Crown Heights, Flatbush, Bed Stuy, East New York, South Bronx, etc."

On the other hand, there were Warren Street and other neighborhood residents who spoke for the project (Community Board Public Hearing, 1981). Some felt that since the rental units would be stabilized under the proposal, Section 8-eligible local residents would be able to stay in the neighborhood and downpayments would be low. The chairperson of FAC's housing committee, a parochial school teacher, was less sanguine than most. "This is the best we can do. It is a disappointment to us. However, it is a beginning" (McComisky, 1981).

The Warren Street project, took seven years when completed in 1984. It was originally planned to house moderate income local families in the \$14,000 to \$20,000 range and Section 8-eligible tenants. By the time the first building was completed in 1982, family income was \$25,000 to \$40,000. Rental units were still stabilized, but monthly carrying costs for owners accounting for rental income rose from \$350 to \$678. FAC had been unable to accomplish its goals. Members reasoned their options to be narrowly circumscribed, were unable to adhere to redistributive-issue principles, and were unwilling to use disruptive strategies.

B. The Battle of Baltic Street

As the reader may remember from earlier discussions, the Baltic Street lot project created substantial controversy in Park Slope. In fact, it might be said that it was probably the most controversial neighborhood issue from fall 1980 through spring 1981. Acrimonious correspondence between rivaling interest groups flooded the local press from December 1980 through July 1981. Improvement, redistributive-issue, ideological, and mandated groups became involved in discussions of what should be built on this six-mile cleared portion of land--and for whom.

Baltic Street was considered by many northwest residents to be the cornerstone of northwestern development. In fact, it was the only site of considerable size in Park Slope in which new construction could take place, and its development seemed to symbolize the "direction" the

northwest would take and what forces would ultimately control it.

In the case of Baltic Street, as in the case of Warren Street, the forces included the corporatization of the city, the economic development/housing market, the middle class development orientation of the New York City mayoral administration, FAC, and other community organizations.

First, the city spent almost \$4 million tearing down the buildings and clearing the lot. Prior to 1970, when the Board of Education decided to build a new elementary and intermediate school, the Baltic Street lot housed 200 low-to moderate-income families, and a few factories (Council on Municipal Performance, 1977). In 1973, after the city razed the lot, leaving the old elementary school P.S. 133 building on the Fourth Avenue side, and relocating the families at a cost of \$3,869,900, the Board of Education postponed construction of the elementary school and canceled construction of the intermediate school (Council on Municipal Performance, 1977).

Second, when the school wasn't built, Fifth Avenue groups planned for a commercial development. In the winter of 1976, before the three Fifth Avenue groups united, a large supermarket was the primary goal of the Fifth Avenue Neighborhood Committee's commercial committee. After the three groups united, and the Brooklyn Office of City Planning conducted its study of Park Slope in the spring of 1977, FAC and City Planning presented its plan for Baltic

Street at FAC's first public meeting on 17 May 1977. The plan included a new elementary school, approximately 300 units of low-rise housing and a commercial facility.

From 1978 through mid 1979, FAC met with representatives from the Board of Education, the community school board, parents in P.S. 133, and AETNA, and held public meetings to discuss the options for the lot. In its development program, distributed in July 1979, FAC called for a 28,000 square foot supermarket, 250 units of housing and a new school and yard. As far as the type and occupancy of the proposed housing, there was no inclusion of low-income housing. In fact, as the FAC plan stated:

In the belief that individual ownership promotes community pride and improvements, it is deemed desirable that a certain portion of the total number of dwelling units be set aside for either immediate or eventual purchase by individuals. The units might be available under either co-op or condominium plan or as individual "row houses" where an owner might own a one, two, three or four family house, but only on the stipulation that he/she, the owner, or a member of the owner's immediate family occupy one of the dwelling units. In keeping with the present economic mixture of income levels in the community, it is urged that the housing be planned for a broad range of affordable rents and purchase prices.

In fall 1979, FAC dropped the supermarket from its plan, because members believed it would be impossible to put together a mixed use project. Several real estate developers were asked to gauge the extent of private-market interest in the site. A number were interested, but there was a caveat. None of the ten developers that FAC met with,

and most were developers of housing, had seen successful mixed-use development (19). FAC was told that no commercial developer would be interested in constructing a facility less than 40,000 square feet. With parking required by the city to accompany such a development, there would be no space for housing or school development. These housing developers suggested building housing, and that commercial development would follow. AETNA was particularly interested in working with Kraus Enterprises, a developer of low-income housing, although FAC was not (20). FAC had close ties with P.S. 133 mothers and administration with whom they had worked for several years to improve the school. Staff and volunteers were also painfully aware of the housing shortages caused by gentrification and worked with imminently displaced tenants on a daily basis. They willingly accepted the developers' arguments. On 10 October 1979, the FAC Board of Directors passed a resolution to exclude commercial development from FAC's program for the site; in December, AETNA awarded a \$25,000 grant to FAC to hire a consultant to develop a marketable plan.

Removing the commercial facility from the FAC program and securing the substantial AETNA grant to package the FAC proposals signaled a period of tumultuous inner group conflict. Early in the organization's development around the time of the three-group merger, David Brennan and James Malone left the group when it became clear that any plan for Baltic Street was going to be the product of long-term

committee discussions. At that time they complained that the democratic process within FAC was unwieldy, unnecessary and would discourage interested investors. However, they maintained contacts with FAC-north Housing and Commercial Committee members.

When the FAC board dropped the supermarket from the plan, three other members--Smith, Blake and Baar--two of them board members, angrily left the group. In minutes of some of the last board meetings they attended, Blake expressed concern about the fact that FAC had not consulted the community before dropping the supermarket from the plan and the other two were incensed that FAC would consider mixed-income housing and the school a priority over the supermarket. If developers felt that only one thing could be built, they wanted it to be the supermarket. Just before they left the group, at a 24 January 1980, Baltic Street Lot Committee meeting, Smith, Baar, Blake and many of the twenty people who attended made it known that they wanted a supermarket on the site. The differences in position were illustrated during the meeting. First, some FAC leaders expressed the belief that it was a moral and ethical thing to support housing with the displacement problems. They saw the housing as a real human need. This contingency was comprised mainly of staff and people who had worked on the housing committee. They were a mixture of 20 or so white and minority homeowners and tenants. All the homeowners in this group owned but one piece of property, their own homes,

and had lived in the community for several years. Two were teachers, one was an elderly woman who worked as a clerk, three were single black women who supported their extended households, some were parents of children or grandchildren in P.S. 133. Second, they felt it was important to maintain a strong prohousing stand as a strategy for confronting HPD. Even if the group eventually negotiated to include a supermarket, they wanted it to be a part of a proposal to include the school and mixed-income housing as well. These FAC members believed that the city had a vested interest in wanting a supermarket. Economic development, as opposed to subsidized housing, could bring in federal grants such as UDAG, while Section 8 housing allocations were difficult to secure. The prosupermarket residents, comprised mainly of white and minority homeowners shouted that housing on Baltic Street wasn't going to solve any displacement problem. People were being displaced everywhere and that didn't mean that "we have to have them here."

It is difficult to categorize the differences between those who supported the housing/school and those who wanted the supermarket. However, it is safe to say that those who wanted the supermarket were almost all homeowners, a number of whom owned several properties. However, there were poor and moderate-income homeowners and tenants in these meetings who also wanted a supermarket. Some found themselves in an untenable position. To support the supermarket was to cast another vote for their own demise as property values would

certainly rise (Cromer, 1980). On the other hand to cast a vote for the housing was to make their lives more difficult in terms of daily shopping needs, since there was only one small local supermarket.

Soon letters began to appear from the disgruntled FAC members and others in The Phoenix protesting FAC's position on the supermarket (Smith, 1980a; Blake, 1980; Blondeau, 1980; Topminnow, 1980), and implying that FAC wanted to build low-income housing (Mongin, 1980) (21). Within a month or so the disgruntled former FAC members formed the Park Slope Improvement Committee and began organizing opposition to FAC. First, they sent out a letter to all registered voters describing what came to be known as the Rentar plan and asking voters to respond on an enclosed card as to whether they would like to see a supermarket on the site. No mention was made of any other possibility. Second, they began writing letters to AETNA, requesting a meeting, questioning their commitment to FAC, and informing them that the FAC plan was not the neighborhood plan (Park Slope Improvement Committee, 1980).

In addition to local opposition to FAC plans, city officials also had a specific plans for the site. Borough President Golden let FAC know he had an interest in the site. On 8 January 1980, Harvey Schultz, assistant to the borough president, informed FAC staff and Baltic Street Lot Committee members at a meeting with representatives from City Planning and the Office of Economic Development that

Arthur Ratner, a developer of other downtown Brooklyn developments, was interested in the site for a Waldbaum's supermarket and that the construction of a replacement school was unlikely. They invited FAC to meet with Ratner.

Not knowing that the city had signed a contract with Ratner for a feasibility study, the FAC board sent a letter to Schultz stating that FAC wanted to be designated community sponsor and they felt that housing and a new school were essential elements to the plan. Although Schultz never replied in writing to the FAC Board, he let it be known (DiBrienza, 1980; Torres, 1980, Reich, 1980) that he was angry with the FAC stance. He told FAC members he didn't believe in community control. He believed in city control.

Meanwhile, an article appeared in The Phoenix (Gelber, 1980) in which Schultz described plans for the lot that would erect housing and a supermarket or commercial development, leaving room for "modernization or replacement" of P.S. 133. He noted that FAC did not want a supermarket, although he added that there "seems to be a split" on that issue within the committee.

Under pressure from the Park Slope Improvement Committee and some city staff members, FAC held a public meeting on 28 February 1980, to present the three options to the community. Over 150 people signed the attendance sheet. The majority were from blocks immediately surrounding the lot, but there was a representative from every block between

Pacific (one block south of Flatbush) and Union Street. The three plans were a) the original FAC proposal developed in 1977 in conjunction with the Brooklyn Office of City Planning, 200 to 300 units of housing, a replacement school, and a commercial facility; b) the newer FAC proposal, 300 units of housing and a replacement school; and c) the Rentar plan, a 30,000-square-foot supermarket and 15,000 square feet for satellite stores, with parking for 160-170 cars plus 45 units of housing. People spoke for and against the plans and were asked to fill out opinion polls.

Speakers articulated racial concerns in the more than 50% Latin audience. First, some rebuked earlier speakers, reminding them that there was already a supermarket across the street from the lot, and that perhaps the name should be changed from El Faro to an Anglo name for all the people who were saying there was none. Other Latin women voiced fear about the safety of their children who attended P.S. 133 if a large supermarket with parking for 170 cars was to be so close to the school. P.S. 133 had a predominantly Latin and black school population, as was indicated in chapter 5.

Of the 133 people who filled out the opinion polls, 27 voted for A, 56 for B and 32 for C. Those 18 who checked "other" felt the school should be the highest priority. FAC took this vote to mean that people were casting their preference for a substantial number of housing units to be built.

The conflict over the lot's use was aired publicly when the issue went to the Community Board Six Land Use Committee. Committee chairperson and Park Slope resident Zedalis and Land Use Committee member Lewton Smith had publicly voiced opposition to the FAC plan. On Monday night 3 March 1980, the Land Use Committee held a meeting to vote on the Rentar plan. No one from FAC was informed. However, one of the members of the Land Use Committee notified a FAC Board member just before the meeting, and he was able to attend it. Zedalis informed the group that Borough President Golden requested her to expedite this matter and had asked that a position be taken as soon as possible on the Rentar plan. Generally community boards have 90 days within which to make recommendations on parcels to be ULURPed (22). She stated that nothing new had occurred since they met last except a FAC public meeting and asked Smith to report since he had been there. He reported that over 50% of the audience was in favor of a supermarket and recommended that the committee pass on the Rentar plan (Dibrienza, 1980). She asked for questions, at which point the FAC board member, an active member of the Independent Neighborhood Democrats, filibustered the session until someone came in and requested the space in which they were meeting. The meeting was adjourned until 12 March one hour before the regular Community Board Six meeting.

Prior to the meeting, FAC sent a letter to Zedalis with copies to all members of the community board. The letter

incorporated the results of the 28 February public meeting and requested that the Land Use Committee of Community Board Six take no position on the Rentar plan, or any other plan, and make no recommendation to the full board in order to give Harold Bell Associates, the group FAC had hired with the AETNA grant, and Rentar Corporation an opportunity to present to the Land Use Committee.

At the 12 March Land Use Committee meeting, 25 people from FAC attended. Under pressure, Zedalis asked how long FAC needed to come up with a plan. The FAC board member present at the last Land Use Committee meeting said 90 days. She stated that she and the district manager would come up with a date within two weeks. The meeting was adjourned.

Over the next several months, while FAC worked on a new plan, meetings were held between FAC consultants Bell, AETNA, FAC, Schultz and the board of education. It became clear there would be no new school unless Bell could figure out a way.

On 5 June 1980, Bell Associates and Rentar Corporation presented their plans to the Land Use Committee. As FAC leadership had expected, the Rentar plan had eliminated the 45 units of housing, increased the square footage of satellite stores to 17,000 and increased the size of the parking lot from 170 to 357 spaces. The FAC plan was similar to the original mixed-use FAC/Brooklyn Office of City Planning plan: A replacement school, 200 units housing and 30,000 square feet of commercial space. The school was

to be built by the Educational Construction Fund, a self-supporting public benefit corporation similar to a public authority, which had been used as a vehicle for financing revenue producing public and quasipublic facilities. The fund was to be reimbursed from revenues in lieu of taxes from the housing and commercial development. The housing was to be three-story row, owner-occupied with Section 8 rentals, while the school was to be structurally integrated within the supermarket building. No votes were taken at the meeting.

Although community objections to no supermarket had been satisfied in the FAC plan and housing had been eliminated from the Rentar plan, the borough president wanted Joel Ratner to be the developer of whatever was developed. However, Ratner himself was not sure (23).

In mid-June just when it appeared that the FAC plan had considerable strength, Borough President Golden announced that he had been able to secure \$2.5 million for the rehabilitation of P.S. 133 and had placed it in the 1982 capital budget. The pressure to build a new school collapsed.

As interest rates on bonds climbed from 7.5% to 13.5%, it became clear that the Educational Construction Fund would be unable to float the bonds necessary to initiate the project. In addition, FAC and city government were having problems with the ECF plans (24).

Between November 1980 and March 1981, when the city released an RFP (request for proposal) for Baltic Street, FAC and PSIC became embroiled in a fierce battle that would highlight the polarization between income and racial groups being reflected in the rapidly changing resettlement process. Unlike 1976, when plans for Baltic Street were first contemplated to include mixed-income housing, by late 1980, the boundaries between the professional white-collar housing market and the low-income minority housing market had moved to Fifth Avenue. As the housing market shifted there was increased support for a large supermarket instead of mixed-income housing.

First, FAC and PSIC presented their respective cases at local organization meetings. From September to November 1980, the two groups appeared before the Park Slope Clergy Association, the Park Slope Civic Council, and the UBA. It became clear that, under the FAC plan, a three-family house could cost \$180,000, even though the rental units would be subsidized and the owner would only have a monthly carrying cost of \$400. Middle-income professionals were incensed at the high cost to subsidize low-income families. The meetings were battle grounds between classes, and antagonisms were strong. At the Civic Council meeting, Latin residents from FAC shouted at PSIC speakers "Don't come over hear and say that you represent us because we know where you're at. We know who you represent."

Second, the PSIC distributed 10,000 copies of a letter (described in discussions of PSIC and the South Brooklyn Action Movement), which accused FAC of "sponsoring massive Section 8 housing" and implying that subsidies cause crime. FAC responded in the 4 December issue of The Phoenix explaining that the Baltic Street project was for 50 three-family owner-occupied homes with subsidized rental units, and that families of four could earn up to \$19,000 a year and still be subsidized. The FAC letter asked, "Do the members of the Park Slope Improvement Committee fear all families that earn under \$19,000 a year? If so, they have much to fear since most of the Fifth Avenue area residents are moderate-income working families." The letter called for the resignation of Lew Smith, Chairman of PSIC, from his position as Chairman of the Housing Committee of Community Board Six.

FAC held a public meeting on 9 December at which time a majority of the 130 residents who attended expressed anger at the PSIC letter. Ibon Muhammed, a resident of one of the nearby housing projects said to James Malone, the only member of PSIC present, "You have some nerve trying to come here and throw our names around. I don't mug people and I live in a project," and pointing to her neighbor, "She doesn't mug people and she lives there. You have absolutely no compassion."

Writers of numerous letters to the editor in The Phoenix tried to discredit one group or the other. Members

or friends of PSIC wrote that FAC was misusing its public grants and never did anything to help the community with the money it received (Smith, 1980; Parham, 1980), while members or friends of FAC wrote that PSIC was racist (Aronson, 1980) and elitist (Maxay, 1980), and that FAC had been an asset to the community (Gonzalez, 1980; Liell, 1980; Gothelf, 1980; Perez, 1980). One life-long resident and FAC board member (Thompson, 1980) wrote to Brennan, with a copy sent to The Phoenix, expressing how infuriated she was by what she termed "your racist letter." Near the end of her description of what the neighborhood has been like and how it's changed, she writes:

The Fifth Avenue area is now proud. They publicize all over the city. Hey fellows, the lower Slope is coming alive, everyone is involved. I hear six years ago angels wouldn't dare to tread there. OK let's go, it's a good location, near the park, subways. Lots of professionals are buying house here. Lawyers, doctors, artists, professors--they're all buying and co-oping the houses. Let's get rid of the sewing machine operators, mechanics, housepainters, clerks, housewives, children and senior citizens.

Now the landlords hear about the big bucks to be made here and if tenants ask for necessary service the landlords harass us: "Get out. I want to co-op!" They're putting a rope around our neck. Now, David Brennan, you can drag us, it's only a straight line down to the river, because you have the rock to drown us.

On the other hand, former FAC board member and vice president of PSIC, Baar (1981), in an attempt to discredit FAC wrote

Or is the Fifth Avenue Committee not really a community group? . . . Isn't the Fifth Avenue Committee just a developer? Don't indeed they want the gift of public properties, the loan and gift of public and private monies to support the

costly, high-income Warren Street project? More that this, Rebecca Reich's disapproval [he is referring to the belief that it was the housing director Reich who decided that FAC would no longer debate PSIC in public forums] conforms to the inability of the Fifth Avenue Committee to provide resident spokespersons for these meetings. They have no community base or support. They cannot round up enough people to come to present themselves to community organizations except to rabble-rouse at Community Board 6 meetings. No, the Rebecca Reichs, the Doris Clarks and the Fran Justas are trying to develop an empire of buildings and public funds to ensure the financial base that will enable them to pursue the socialist propaganda that will continue to encourage hatred and economic depression. The worse the neighborhood the better their chances for funding. An interesting but transparent tactic: preside over the devastation of Fifth Avenue and get paid for it.

FAC and South BAM wrote letters to the community board chairperson charging that Smith, chairperson of the Community Board Six Housing Committee, and chairman of the Board of PSIC, had a conflict of interests and should be removed. Although feelings ran high and letters were sent to the borough president, Smith was reappointed to the Board in January. Three months later in March, he resigned from the PSIC.

New York City released an RFP for Baltic Street on 1 March 1981. It had no provision for Section 8 subsidies. It called for Section 235 mortgage-interest subsidies for homeowners. Families would have to earn at least \$23,000 to apply. There would be no housing for low-income families at all.

FAC held a public meeting to apprise the community of the problems with the RFP and to report the conflicting

views within the Fifth Avenue Committee on whether FAC should respond to the RFP at all. Only 70 people came although the meeting was widely publicized. There was a feeling of sadness. People were tired and resigned. The FAC housing chairman, McComisky, representing the most redistributive issue voice within FAC, spoke:

The city has great hopes for this neighborhood. Those plans, however, do not include the vast majority of people who live in this neighborhood now and that is its plan. Ten years ago people didn't ask the city to tear down housing, and we have a right to ask the city to put back the same housing for the same kind of people who still live in the neighborhood now. When we look at the RFP we see a call for government help--no room for rental housing . . . The people who have designed this program must not read the papers, there won't be any 235 housing here--only market housing thanks to budget cuts . . . We've got to tell the City of New York that their plan isn't worth anything, that it isn't for us.

Board member Mark Levy, who worked for a community organization in the upper west side of Manhattan presented an opposing view.

If we act or don't act they will build. If we do not respond we won't be the developers. If we choose not to sponsor a program then five years worth of work goes down the drain and everything comes to nothing. If we do sponsor a developer, we will be a partner and we will have a central role. The city says that 235 is available and that it has 2000 units allocated and that it is in place for up to 100% of our units. With 235, people could own their own homes and FAC would be involved in reaching out and marketing units in the neighborhood. We could ensure people have a place to live. It's not a perfect situation, but we do have a commitment from Aetna and can work with them.

The FAC Board, rejecting their commitment to a redistributive agenda, decided to respond to the RFP. From

March through April, the period allotted for the RFP to be submitted, FAC scrambled to put together a program. First it contacted the original set of developers that members had spoken with in 1979 (18). None were interested. Then it requested a list of builders/developers who had submitted proposals for other sites. Members contacted and met with all of them. They found that they were experienced working with community groups, were willing to work with AETNA, expressed some concern for low-income rental units as being a part of the package, and didn't see the need for a large number of parking spaces for the supermarket. The FAC Board selected the City Homeownership Corporation, a subsidiary of the New York City Builder's Association. One of their members, Julius Mehrberg of Urban Housing Association was to be the actual builder. Mehrberg agreed to construct a 15,000-square foot supermarket with 50 parking spaces and FAC received a letter of interest from Key Food to be tenant on the site. They would also build 56 three-family buildings, selling for about \$120,000 each. The units would be owner-occupied with two rentals. Downpayments would be \$10,000 and carrying charges would be \$450 per month. Section 235 subsidies were not requested, since Mehrberg felt very strongly that the mortgage limits established by the federal government were too low (The maximum amount allowable at the time was \$44,000). Instead interest rate subsidies would come from AETNA. The rates were to be

12.5%, considerably below the rate in May 1981 of 16% to 17%.

Four other developers responded to the RFP. Borough President Golden's choice, Rentar Associates, did not respond. One was disqualified, and the other three offered variations from a 12,000-square-foot supermarket to a 30,000-square-foot supermarket. All other plans used the 235 subsidy plan. The plan of Baltic Associates, the developers of the largest supermarket, which proposed a 30,000-square-foot supermarket with a 10,000-square-foot basement, was supported by PSIC. Louis Rosenberg, a principal of Baltic Associates was, according to DeRocker (1981), "one of the most prominent supermarket builders in the metropolitan area." He had completed 20 supermarkets and was constructing the Pathmark on the old Goya site. His plan also called for 53 three-unit condominium buildings, 70% of which would be subsidized with 235 subsidies and the remainder carrying FHA insured mortgages. It would seem that all ten developers that FAC originally spoke to were wrong. There were developers willing to build a mixed-use development and at least three willing to build medium-sized supermarkets.

Even though FAC tried to put together a program that would provide low-income rentals, the city blocked it. At a Baltic Street Lot Committee meeting on 6 June, Randy Lee, of Mehrberg's group, told the assemblage that Schultz made it clear that he did not want Mehrberg to try to secure

Section 8 certificates so they could rent the apartments to poor people. FAC and Mehrberg tried to work out incentive/penalty plans: owners willing to rent to people meeting Section 8 requirements would be able to get higher rents; or, only if they did so would they be able to take advantage of the below-market interest rates. On 11 June Charles Reiss, Deputy Director of Development for HPD asked Lee if he would split the site. Rosenberg would get the supermarket; Mehrberg/FAC, the housing. It had been decided. Having been deceived by the city before, FAC members expressed disbelief.

Nevertheless, the Land Use Committee met on 17 June to come up with a recommendation to make to Board Six the following night. After considerable debate, there was discussion over whether to split the site. The motion failed. A motion was made to recommend the Baltic Associates (Rosenberg) plan. It passed 9 to 5 with two abstentions. The FAC plan became the minority recommendation with five votes. The others received no votes.

After the Land Use meeting FAC members lobbied members of the community board and made plans to set up car pools to take people to the community board meeting the following evening. Even though many of them knew the decision had been made they wanted the support of the local board.

After a short public hearing at the community board meeting, a motion was made by a board member who was also a member of the Park Slope Together Antidisplacement Committee

to reject the majority report in favor of the minority opinion. The vote was taken. Many of the regular democrats voted along party lines for the Baltic Associates proposals backed by Golden. However, a few did not. All of the reformers from IND voted for the FAC plan; as they had been lobbied by DiBrienza, who was the current 52nd A.D. district leader from their club and a former member of the FAC Board. A few independents who had been called the previous night and were generally sympathetic to FAC voted for the FAC/Mehrberg plan. Out of the 29 people present, 17 voted for the FAC plan. The place went wild. People hugged shouted and jumped in the aisles. The 8 to ten PSIC people present were stunned into silence. FAC supporters knew that it was a great loss for low-income people's housing. But somehow that night, all perspective was lost. All that mattered was winning, and they did.

After HPD announced that Baltic Associates would develop the supermarket and Mehrberg the housing, AETNA partially reneged on its commitment conveying an interest rate 2% below market at 10.75% rather than 4% below market as originally promised.

Supermarket construction commenced in 1982. Marketing for the homes began before groundbreaking in May 1983. Homes sold for \$137,500, with a \$13,750 downpayments and a 10.75% 30-year, five-year adjustable rate mortgage from AETNA. Accounting for rents, owner's monthly payments would be \$450. FAC was able to press for rent restrictions for

the first five years. The top-floor, three-bedroom apartment would rent for \$575 and the street level, one-bedroom for \$375. The owner would have a floor-through three-bedroom apartment. Rents would be subject to rent-stabilization guidelines. Once the five years had passed, owners could charge free-market rent. Within two weeks of offering the homes for sale, requests for contracts were signed by 44 families with a substantial waiting list. According to Reich, 75% of the families were white-collar white professionals. Most were childless couples, and there were few Latin families. The battle of Baltic Street was over (or perhaps, if history and the Park Slope housing market repeats itself, there will be a few more scrapes when the housing is completed and housing costs for those nearby begin to rise again). Key Food on Baltic Street opened in late 1983.

When the Baltic Street sponsors were announced by the city in 1981 and Warren Street was well on its way, many of the homeowner board members, particularly those residing in the northwest, no longer ran for geographic representative. There was little need for a Baltic Street Lot Committee except to deal with the nitty-gritty of traffic studies and irate neighbors. FAC's development interests were limited to the Warren Street project, and a few individual developments, since there were no longer funds available for housing even moderate-income families. Although there were opportunities to develop vacant buildings, Reich and the

Housing Development Corporation members (25) saw little point in pursuing market rate development.

C. Resettlement Processes and the Changing FAC Board

As with other improvement/redistributive interest groups, FAC could not easily retain an improvement and a redistributive stance within what most members perceived as an inequitable environment. The organization became increasingly tenant oriented, and the board changed (26). Although it was still comprised of 70% homeowners, it had been 90% homeowner in 1977.

Finally, the racial composition of the board was also changing, more closely reflecting neighborhood population patterns. Whereas in 1978 the board was 34% black and Latin, it was 50% black and Latin by 1982. Leadership of the group also changed. Prior to 1981, presidents of the board had been white professionals, from 1981 through 1983, presidents and many of the officers were office workers, blue-collar workers or retired blue-collar workers.

Ironically, the products of FAC's development interests, (middle- and upper-income housing) ultimately became "improvement" ventures, and may undermine the existence and credibility of FAC's redistributive issue tenant and antidisplacement interests. As the middle- and upper- income population moving into the FAC housing form educational and cultural institutions that support the urban professional's lifestyle, not only might the blue-collar and minority populations diminish as a result of cost induced

displacement, but this lower-income and minority population may become decreasingly representative of the neighborhood institutional concerns. For example, as population shifts, support for civil libertarian issues, such as demands for decent housing for low- and moderate-income people, or against racial discrimination in housing, may become eclipsed by the "improvement" concerns for beautification and clean streets.

IV. Summary

The improvement/redistributive issue organizations suffered serious internal conflict and controversy. The changing Park Slope housing market highlighted interest divisions and, although groups often sought to define and satisfy "community interests," it became increasingly apparent that what was good for middle- and upper-income people was harmful to others. In the mid- and late-1970s, when all of Brooklyn was redlined, professional white-collar brownstoners became embroiled in an effort that seemed to serve the interests of many. After becoming aware of the necessity of coalition buildings to effect legislative change and enforcement, they sought out groups with redistributive agendas. However, a paltry reinvestment in Park Slope by savings banks discriminated against multifamily buildings that traditionally house low- and moderate-income families, preferring instead to invest in owner-occupied brownstones--the local constituency AID came to serve. Discriminatory treatment by financial

institutions highlighted the contradictions between reaping profits and housing poor people. AID's willingness to support the rights to credit for women, minorities, and owners of housing for low-income families was never fully tested because interest rates rose and discriminatory credit and underwriting practices were masked by the rise in the cost of credit. Under these high-income requirements, credit loosened and community-based efforts to articulate contradictions were undermined.

In the case of Park Slope Together, all types of organizations were brought together through the efforts of social service and improvement groups. They believed in the mainstream/liberal ideology. Through education, programs, and resources provided by the privileged, the underprivileged could be assimilated. There was a wealth of skills and financial resources in Park Slope that could be shared and would serve to enrich all classes and races. One needed only to define the problems and solutions, if only partial, could be found. While members of improvement groups saw the changing environment in positive social terms, it did not take long for the social-service workers, who dealt with the housing problems of the poor daily, to recognize that the effects of expanding gentrification would eventually make their own constituencies obsolete. Therefore it became increasingly difficult for them to share the optimism of the local merchants and improvement groups. As one frustrated, overwhelmed youth worker put it. "For

every tree that is planted, we lose a hundred Puerto Ricans. We've got to cut down all the trees" (Duda, 1979).

For FAC the issues were more complicated. More than any other group studied, FAC was able to generate a broad range of improvement and redistributive projects, some of which had widespread appeal and attracted significant funding. The majority of members believed that rehabilitating housing for low- and moderate-income families was neighborhood improvement. However, when it saw this path to be untenable and out of their control, largely as a result of changing market possibilities accompanying resettlement processes and government support of the market, it capitulated: compromising its goals in order to stay in the game. The fact that development projects like Warren Street and Baltic Street took such a long time made it more difficult to maintain a neighborhood-supported redistributive agenda as the white side of the dual housing market spread west bringing with it increasing improvement-minded sentiment. This shifting of the housing market and the potential loss of support was probably a key element in restraining FAC leadership from engaging in more disruptive actions.

Although it is true that FAC was probably able to place sufficient pressure on public officials through the ECF proposal to have the school rehabilitated, in actuality, as a result of city actions to block Section 8 certificate rentals and to support middle- and upper-income development

and FAC's reluctantly acquiescent role in the change process, displacement processes in the northwest were probably accelerated.

As resettlement processes spread, FAC, like the other improvement/redistributive-issue groups, saw differences surface as members with differing class interests defended their actions. FAC staff became increasingly devoted to redistributive tenant issues, and the composition of the board changed, reflecting those changing interests. As development projects bore fruit, the original white-collar homeowners attracted to the group through their interest in physical improvements left the organization, apparently satisfied with the direction the neighborhood was taking.

All of these improvement/redistributive-issue organizations emerged to represent "community" interests. However, their well-intended, albeit naive, inclinations did not, in fact could not, remain steadfast: not in the changing housing market of Park Slope, Brooklyn in the 1970s.

Notes

1. Data for the discussion of Against Investment Discrimination came from meeting attendance, reading of period reports from the organization and from the very extensive notes maintained by Tim O'Hanlon who worked as the only employee of the organization from 1978 to 1979. It also came from informal interviews with Herb Steiner, president of the organization, and members Bernie Block, Cathy Herman, Tim O'Hanlon, Tanya Morrison, and John Picciano.
2. Groups included Bank on Brooklyn in Flatbush, the Mortgage Task Force in the southwest and Sunset Park under the aegis of the 51st A.D. regular demonstrators and the Brooklyn Reinvestment Coalition (BRIC) which included a number of groups including the New York City Housing and Community Development Coalition, Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers and Pratt Center for Community and Environmental Development.
3. Bank on Brooklyn in East Flatbush had picketed Fulton Savings bank as AID emerged, and, in July 1977, a group in the Northwest Bronx picketed Northside and Eastern Savings Bank and Mayor Beame announced that the city would invest \$30 million of city money in "good" savings banks.
4. Witnessed affidavits on the difficulties of securing financing and of the onerous terms given by Greater New York Savings Bank were sent as an addendum of an extensive brief from South Brooklyn Against Investment Discrimination to Muriel Siebert, Superintendent of the New York State Banking Department as part of the documentation in opposition to allowing the bank to open a new branch office in Manhattan (7/6/78). Affidavits were from the following: Richard Valcich (homeowner), Lillian Port (homeowner), John Noonan (real estate broker), Richard E.C. White (Seventh Street Block Association), Lynn Kearney (homeowner), Allen Dokovna (homeowner).
5. Data for the discussion on Park Slope Together came from attendance at meetings, goals statements and materials distributed by the group, informal conversations with Roberta Marcus, Harry Tarzian and Dick Yannatuna, and interviews with Rev. Fred Melton, the groups first president and Bill Schroeder, the leader in the groups' antidisplacement committee.
6. The social service groups involved in Park Slope Together were Camp Friendship, Project Reach Youth, Project Clear, Christian Help in Park Slope, Children

and Youth Development Services, The YMCA, Cabby, and Park Slope Sports. The community organizations included the Park Slope Civic Council, UBA, ROSAS, Seventh Avenue Betterment Committee, Fifth Avenue Committee, and the Park Slope Neighborhood Tenants Council.

7. Data for discussion of the Fifth Avenue Committee comes from extensive participant observation of meetings, committee meetings, phone conversations, and personal involvement in the organization on the board of directors and for one year as president. Although I was involved in the organization, my activities were limited primarily to administration, fund raising, and publicity. I participated only peripherally in housing programs or setting housing policy. I was not involved in tenant organizing activities. All newsletters and minutes of meetings were reviewed as were the day files of the FAC office from 1978 to 1983.
8. The core of members lived on Prospect Place, Sterling Place, Bergen Street, St. Marks Place, and St. Marks Avenue. Although they claimed to represent the area south to Ninth Street, they had no members south of Berkeley Place.
9. There was considerable interest in commercial revitalization in city government in the late 1970s, for according to planners Schiffman and Sullivan at Pratt Center, commercial revitalization was a way in which Community Development funds were spent in city neighborhoods that were essentially middle class.
10. They included Pratt Center for Community and Economic Development, Mayor's Office of Downtown Brooklyn Development, Downtown Brooklyn Development Association, Cornell Extension Services, Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers, and the Department of Housing Preservation and Development.
11. The people who started the committee and became its working group for several months were Roberta Marcus, Cathy Herman, Doris Clark, and Rebecca Reich.
12. They formed relationships with National Peoples Action, Chicago-based National Training and Information Center, Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers, New York State Neighborhood and Tenant Coalition, and others.
13. FAC staff encouraged and organized tenants into the city's 7A management program, and the Tenant Interim Lease program.

14. At first, Tom Cuite, the local councilman and influential majority leader of the city council was not particularly responsive to the renovation, although this park had been in disrepair in his district for over a decade. However, he met with a growing park committee on four occasions, when the Brooklyn Office of City Planning included the park renovation in their recommendations for capital improvements in the city budget, Cuite did not exercise his power to have the item removed from the budget.
15. During the seven months of waiting to hear from HPD, FAC staff reported (Reich, 1980) that HPD never planned to transfer these buildings to FAC because there was increased interest in Park Slope and they would probably sell them at auction with 312 financing attached to each purchase.
16. The Neighborhood Self-Help Development Program was a small HUD grant program begun in October 1978 and terminated by the Reagan administration for fiscal year 1982. It made grants available directly to existing rural and urban-based non-profit organizations for projects that were initiated and developed at the local level, without restrictive federal intervention.
17. Proposals to the city for housing rehabilitation under the participation loan program were so expensive because they involved architects and engineers reports and plans as well as considerable staff time.
18. The issue of a city-wide versus neighborhood lottery was a city-wide issue for community organizations. There was considerable pressure on the Fifth Avenue Committee from other low-income housing organizations not to negotiate with the city.
19. FAC met with Kraus Enterprises, Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Foundation Development Corporation, HRH Development Corporation, Catholic Charities, Starett, Schnay Developers, and Kings Restoration.
20. Board and staff of FAC did not want to work with Krauss because they were afraid of losing tenant-selection control. He had a reputation in Williamsburg, Brooklyn of ignoring the views and wishes of community organizations with whom he worked. Reputation discussed with FAC staff members Rebecca Reich and Williamsburg housing-organization staff person Cathy Herman.
21. Smith was Lew Smith, who formed the Park Slope Improvement Committee with David Brennan and became its first chairman. Blake was the sister of a FAC Board

member, who was opposed to stating that the entire community was opposed to the supermarket. Mongin was a former president of the 78th Precinct Community Council, a community board member who would become a vice president of the soon-to-be organized Park Slope Improvement Committee. Topminnow was the pen name of Robert Ohlerking, a Park Slope resident and the Brooklyn Project Manager for the Office of Economic Development (OED) who had been quoted in the Phoenix as stating that the AETNA grant was a waste of money.

22. U.L.U.R.P., or uniform land use review procedure is the process wherein various land use actions by individuals, groups, businesses and government agencies are subject to a formal review procedure, which includes review by community planning boards, the borough board (when a project involves more than one community board), the City Planning Commission and, ultimately, the Board of Estimate.
23. There was considerable negotiating outside of the community-organizations network. First, Bell Associate Tarrantini informed FAC Housing Director Reich that former Planning Commissioner Zuccotti, who was the attorney representing FAC in this matter, spoke with Borough President Golden and had informed FAC that they have serious political problems; namely, Golden wanted Joel Ratner to be the developer on whatever project was decided upon. Rentar Corporation was the developer of the Albee Square Mall, an important part of the overall revitalization of downtown Brooklyn. According to Robbins (City Limits, 1980), Rentar was also "politically involved and has been served well by its close ties to the Brooklyn Democratic Party." Second, when DeMattias, a well-connected Manhattan developer, was chosen by Bell to develop the site, Ratner called DeMattias and let him know that he would pull out of the project if DeMattias were interested. A few days after a 10 July meeting between representatives from Bell, AETNA, and Golden's office FAC housing director Reich got a call. The call, from Altman, the AETNA representative to FAC, was encouraging to FAC. It seemed Altman was friends with Andrew Fisher, head of a Brooklyn development corporation and son of Harold Fisher, former chairman of the MTA and personal counsel to Howard Golden. Golden, was reportedly, going to run for office again and was speaking to the elder Fisher about the Baltic Street project. Fisher thought the Rentar mall idea with shops across the street was insane for that area, and agreed that the single supermarket was most appropriate. He conveyed that opinion to Golden. Andrew Fisher told Altman that Golden was becoming duly impressed with the FAC plan if Bell could make the housing part work.

24. At one point a FAC Board member took the Bell feasibility plan home to her husband, who was a municipal bond underwriter. He said there were over ten fallacies in the proposal that made the plan untenable. When housing director Reich approached Tarrantini with this information he screamed and suggested FAC hire the board member's husband if they were dissatisfied. Schultz began to have serious doubts about ECF's capacity to float bonds. Andrew Fisher told Altman that Koch would not allow ECF to float any bonds, because he wanted centralized control over these formerly autonomous authorities. By November the relationship between Bell and FAC had become strained.
25. The FAC Housing Development Corporatin was a subsidiary corporation made up predominantly of board members in order to orchestrate development projects.
26. While in 1977, 1978 and 1979 an average of 87% of board members were homeowners, 70% of board members were in 1982. While in 1977, 1978 and 1979 over 60% of the board was college educated, by 1982 the percentage had dropped to approximately 30%.

Chapter 10

Summary and Conclusions

I. Findings: Evolution of Organizations

The purpose of this research was to examine the influences of resettlement processes on the evolution of community organizations in Park Slope, Brooklyn. Specifically, we were to investigate how these patterns influenced the chronological order and geographical pattern of emergence, the types of organizations that emerged, and the goals, scope, and strategies that organizations developed over time as they mediated change between neighborhood residents, themselves, and other institutions. Twenty community organizations were included in the findings: all of which, if they continued to exist, were followed from 1975 to 1982.

The task was divided into two sections. In chapters 2 through 5, we elaborated the history and context within which the community organizations would emerge. In chapters 6 through 9 we described the emergence and evolution of the groups, attempting to relate their behaviors to the context of neighborhood change. We had originally hypothesized that incoming professionals and those lacking in market power would form coalitions that emphasize communal values, and that these coalitions would be strained as clashes occurred between groups as a result of accelerating processes of displacement.

In part, this hypothesis was confirmed. However, the evolution of community organizations proved to be more complex than the hypothesis indicates. The major findings are summarized below.

First, community organizations emerged over time following the resettlement patterns. As the geographical boundaries within which resettlement processes were taking place expanded, groups representing different interests emerged. In this study of Park Slope, five types of groups were identified: improvement, mandated, redistributive-issue, ideological, and improvement/redistributive issue.

Different types of groups showed different area-wide interests. Improvement organizations were generally area-specific, planning improvements within the areas that were closest to the interests of the groups' members. The emergence of improvement groups paralleled boundary shifts of the resettlement processes. As the processes expanded, improvement groups formed in the areas of expansion.

On the other hand, redistributive issue and ideological groups tended to be area-wide, although they may have initially concentrated in a particular area.

II. The Evolution of Community Organizations

The evolution of groups over time was affected by abandonment/resettlement/displacement processes in a number of ways. First, improvement organizations formed to curtail the housing-abandonment process and encourage resettlement through the rehabilitation of property for other

professionals like themselves. In addition they formed new social rituals such as house tours and cultural events to attract middle-income professionals. As opposed to other types of groups, they also engaged in high levels of intraorganizational networking that helped maintain and shape proresettlement activities.

When displacement processes became a part of local public consciousness in the late 1970s, primarily through media introduction and organizational interaction, the rhetoric of improvement organizations changed, incorporating the new antidisplacement sentiment. However, those of their activities directed towards expanding resettlement processes did not alter. In some instances they went "underground," a process whereby individual members of improvement organizations continued activities no longer "sponsored" by the improvement organization. On the other hand, when an improvement organization's efforts to improve through private market processes was threatened, as in the case of the Park Slope Improvement Committee, ugly battles exploiting racial and class tensions ensued. The usual tack was to blame rival organizations for abandonment and deterioration rather than to direct attention to the corporate and institutional forces that shaped the shifts of the dual housing market.

The effects of resettlement processes on the evolution of mandated groups was evidenced in shifts in leadership and composition of the organizations, and the consequent changes

in strategies adopted by the new leadership. Just as other existing blue-collar and Roman Catholic institutions became fragmented in the 1970s, the mandated groups that represented Park Slope began to shift their membership as white-collar professionals joined, and eventually led, their ranks.

Although changes in control of the highly political community board moved more slowly than in the 78th Precinct Community Council, this was largely a reflection of area control being maintained by the regular Democratic party organization. Many of the important structural and organizational changes were mandated by charter revisions, but pressed by newer white-collar professional interests. The effects of resettlement on the evolution of mandated groups can also be interpreted in light of the original purpose for which the groups were established. Created in response to what we have referred to as the legitimization crisis--and this chiefly in order to defuse what was recognized as a critical situation--they developed over the decade into purveyors of those conditions conducive to accumulation. Not always in their eventual best interest, working-class ethnics and minority members of the community board were coopted into believing the dream and identifying with the aspirants.

The evolution of redistributive-issue organizations, parallels the evolutions of improvement groups in several ways. To begin with, they too emerged as resettlement

processes expanded. Originally, tenant organizations emerged to serve the needs of tenants being harassed or displaced in the northeast; later their range of concern extended to tenants from other geographical areas. Then, partly through the redistributive interests of the Antidisplacement Committee of Park Slope Together, a social-service-agency member of the group, Children and Youth Development Services opened a southeast areas housing clinic in the late 1970s, serving the residents of the south. Finally, the housing clinic and Tenants Union of the Fifth Avenue Committee emerged in the late 1970s to serve tenant interests in the western areas.

Just as networking developed among improvement organizations, redistributive-issue organizations, which did not fully emerge until the late 1970s, began to form intraorganizational coalitions to press for government intervention in a displacement process engineered by the private market. While it may be true that intraorganizational networking among organizations with like interests may not only have been the result of the pressures of resettlement processes; it seems safe to say that the groups emerged within a context of resettlement processes. The acceleration of gentrification may have contributed to coalitions emerging soon after displacement pressures forced residents to seek assistance.

Although comparisons between improvement and redistributive-issue organizations break down when one

considers that improvement organizations interests are closely aligned with other purveyors of private-market processes, and therefore mainstream and powerful, we shall risk one final comparison. As improvement organizations formed alliances with prodevelopment private and government agencies, redistributive-issue organizations began to build fragile coalitions with another mainstream institution, the Roman Catholic church.

It was the fragmentation of Park Slope Roman Catholic institutions that may have established the context within which coalition building and the dissemination of ideas that accompanies it emerged as a possibility. Although a Roman Catholic concern for the oppressed is not new, coalitions between redistributive-issue organizations and such mainstream institutions as the church were only beginning to occur in the early 1980s in Park Slope. Whether a changing context, one in which Roman Catholic institutions are unable to survive at all in Park Slope, will alter those now-fragile networks, is dependent upon a number of factors: 1) the development of class differences between the churches as white-collar professional interests continue to shape the issues of concerns that different churches address; 2) the rate at which the constituency fostering coalition building is displaced; and 3) the commitment of the churches, particularly the Roman Catholic church, towards fostering a redistributive agenda. Moreover, the cultural diversity and fragmentation within minority groups, described in chapter

5, may have acted to inhibit the formation of solidarity from which unified action could grow. (Within the period and area covered by our study, no black or Hispanic leaders succeeded in mobilizing the minority communities.)

Ideological organizations emerged to articulate inequities that were supported by private market resettlement processes and government decision making. In comparison to other organizations, their emergence and development in the Park Slope study was relatively brief and their social base narrow. That is not to say that the organizations are defunct or that their activities have not continued. The Moncada Library has moved to another Brooklyn location, and members of the South Brooklyn Action Movement became integrated in other redistributive issue movement work. Rather, the two groups' emergence in the late 1970s, was indicative of the possibilities of wider acceptance of a radical interpretation of displacement processes than may have been possible when the contradictions within the housing market were not so apparent. In the same light, their demise in 1982, may have signaled a narrowing of the possibilities of a radical interpretation of these processes as the potential audience for these ideas was being displaced. Although the issues they raised were certainly not neighborhood-specific, and are being raised by organizations every day, they used neighborhood-specific problems to clarify the issues and attract membership. In so doing, they encouraged interests

as well as antagonisms. The fact that the leadership of the ideological groups was comprised of educated professionals with options, may have meant that the groups always lacked a credibility that is important to long-term organizational development.

Finally, improvement/redistributive-issue organizations, in full pluralistic regalia, emerged to improve conditions in the neighborhood so that purportedly a variety of interests could coexist. In one way, this type of group had considerable potential for acting as mediators of the change process. In Park Slope, the improvement/redistributive-issue groups were well networked to all other types of organizations, a phenomenon no other type of group enjoyed. Initially, they were interested in ensuring government protection for all residents. AID wanted to increase institutional investment in "the neighborhood." Park Slope Together wanted to share information with groups that represented all interests to assure better communication and goal development between groups, and FAC wanted to provide housing rehabilitation without displacement. Their very evolution highlights the crosscurrents implicit in our analysis of the impacts of deindustrialization and corporate-headquarters expansion on resettlement potential and organizational evolution. In light of this context, it was soon obvious to many involved that the vision of representing all interests was impossible to realize. Rather, a situation arose in which the primary

question became Which side are you on? Market changes were moving too fast, making the neighborhood more highly marketable, regardless of the presence of large numbers of low- and moderate-income people, and local government fully supported private market processes. There was no room for naive assumptions about the interests of all, no time to sponsor more house tours, no place to house poor-and working-class people. There was only the private market and government working to ensure the complete transformation of Park Slope into an urban neighborhood that could support the postindustrial white-collar work force.

III. The Failure of Redistributive Interests

One might ask why redistributive-issue and improvement/redistributive issue groups were so late and unsuccessful in responding to market forces. It seems plausible to assume that a number of interrelated factors must account for their late response and ultimate weakness. First, there is the increasing fragmentation of, and between, ethnic, religious and racial institutions as urban deindustrialization and the transformation of New York City and its neighborhoods have proceeded unabated.

Second, in the last few years of the 1970s and during the 1980s, federal neighborhood and housing programs that could have lessened the burden of change for the poor were defunded: this, in a period of accelerated gentrification in Park Slope. As housing assistance and direct grants to neighborhood groups have decreased, and public service jobs

have been eliminated, the government support system that helped FAC to develop has all but disappeared. Without such support, or at least an atmosphere of acceptance, it would be difficult for small voluntary redistributive-minded groups to grow. During this same period, forces within New York City government have attempted to undermine the legitimacy of redistributive action in gentrifying neighborhoods. Local officials decry the use of precious subsidies for the poor in neighborhoods where market forces are strong, while quietly providing enormous infrastructure subsidies and tax incentives for developing those same neighborhoods for the rich. Such attempts to undermine redistributive legitimacy gains strength as advocacy organizations are coopted in the process of working with city agencies over time. In discussing the Park Slope housing market, FAC development staff and members have recently conceded that perhaps limited subsidies should be spent in more needy "areas," although the disruptive displacement of low income minorities bodes ill for the "people themselves" (Reich, 1984). A willingness to accept the view that a redevelopment aesthetic is more important than human need, or that subsidies for the poor are rightfully limited, is a signal of changing norms among the redistributive-minded, and, more importantly, a reflection of the power of the progrowth coalition to shape attitudes.

The shifts from social expense to social investment in resettled communities like Park Slope can be traced through

O'Connor's model presented in chapter 3. O'Connor argues that because of the increasing complexity and interdependence of production, the state is required to increase social capital expenses where there is investment interest, which leaves less social expense funds to be used to prevent disharmony. Lake argues, however, that when there is no investment interest there is no justification for social investment. When there is no social investment, the need to maintain social harmony is undermined. We argue that when there is reinvestment interest, and disharmony or a legitimation crisis affects the low-income, minority and tenant population, then not only does social investment reappear with reinvestment as O'Connor would predict, but social investment may accelerate as rapidly as the resettlement process itself. What's more, it not only performs its primary function to support the reinvestment economy, but deludes the disharmonious into believing that it will ultimately benefit them.

When \$2 million is spent to rehabilitate a school in a seemingly poor district, FAC members interpret this as government support for their interests. When roads are repaved, trees planted, or parks refurbished, groups interpret these actions as positive and indeed many types of groups worked for the changes. However, when it comes to housing these populations so that they may remain and benefit from their efforts, there are no funds. It is understandable that, like anyone, groups of clerical,

blue-collar, and unemployed people would welcome social investments in parks, schools, and zoos. Besides their potential for improving the quality of life, low-income people identify with the aspirations of professionals, even at their own expense. In interviewing several residents who were being forced to move, I asked how they felt about their predicament. One woman replied

Oh, the neighborhood is so nice now. Just like it used to be years ago. I know it'll be a good place for all these young people to raise families. I feel kinda bad. I wish I could stay. I'm gonna miss everybody, but it really looks nice now, doesn't it?

The state has been able to perform its primary function to support accumulation while undermining the legitimacy of redistributive action.

As reinvestment interest returns, social expense projects of the disinvested neighborhood economy, like the maintenance of public parks, become the new social investment projects of the reinvested neighborhood economy, as in the case of the \$500,000 renovation of J. J. Byrne Park on Fifth Avenue. The Fifth Avenue Committee is told that local government cannot afford to give away houses for low-income families where the private market is strong, yet it can provide financial support for a \$14 million renovation to house animals in the Prospect Park Zoo (Sheehan, 1984) less than 10 blocks from the housing site. So we witness a prime example of the undermining of redistributive action when social investment expenditures of

\$14 million for zoo rehabilitations are praised rather than challenged by the disenfranchised disharmonious.

Another way to interpret the failure of the redistributive and ideological segments of the Park Slope organizations is to consider a sociocultural explanation that argues that the dominant social ideology attributes lack of income to character deficiencies rather than to externalities. This belief impedes redistributive-minded solidarity and promotes intergroup assignation of blame for poor housing conditions. The self-blame ideology is reinforced rather than called into question by the continuing fragmentation of the working-class social institutions, and possibilities for developing a social consensus about local problems are retarded.

In addition, cleavages between homeowner and tenant interests intensify as resettlement expands and the affordable rental housing market collapses. Rather than promoting coalition building, federal tax policies, which redistribute income upward by dispensing enormous subsidies to homeowners, reinforce widening class differences while remaining sacrosanct in the eyes of those who suffer as well as those who benefit.

The white-collar professionals benefit from the city's transformation, the tenor of government policy, as well as the income/character ideology: all of which confer legitimacy and promote continued development of social institutions and social consensus about local problems.

If this argument makes sense, one might be compelled to question how redistributive-issue and improvement/redistributive-issue groups were able to develop and maintain themselves over time. As resettlement processes progress and the circle of those displaced widens to include the "hard-working, long-term resident," the monopoly on legitimacy and credibility assured by the income characteristics, race and social status of the white-collar professional is subject to question, at least in-so-far as "long-term" and "hard-working" also remain part of acceptable social ideology. Even though the values expressed in these characteristics may be subordinated to the income/character deficiency ideology, these characteristics are attributes of respectability, and therefore displacement may be interpreted as inequitable treatment rather than as a personal failure of the displacee. This forced redefinition of the issue not only provides an important wedge for generating and promoting institutional solidarity, as in the case of the coalition building between organizations and the Roman Catholic church, but the implied challenge to the sanctity of the income/character deficiency ideology pressures improvement organizations to reduce their proresettlement rhetoric.

In an attempt to understand why redistributive interests failed to elicit or sustain widespread support from a minority and blue-collar ethnic population that had

much to lose from the transformation of Park Slope, we have embraced sociocultural and political/economic analyses. We have attributed the "weaknesses" of the redistributive interests to massive shifts in the political economy of the older American city, and the consequent role of a particular neighborhood in the government-supported processes of transformation. Decreases in government funding; attempts by a new administration to undermine the legitimacy of redistributive action; the willingness of the disadvantaged and the gradually disenfranchised to identify with the aspirations of the professionals in the hopes that the neighborhood change would be of growing benefit to them; the power of the self-blame ideology; the cleavages between tenants and homeowners promoted by government policy: all these are the hidden instrumentalities by which improvement groups, and the interests they represent, were able either to overcome or override objections, ethical and otherwise, to their agendas.

As a parting thought, we might consider both the failure of redistributive action and the success of proimprovement rhetoric and action in terms of a history of values. It would seem that, as Fainstein and Fainstein (1982) have suggested, urban problems have been redefined by a particularly loaded interpretation of the fiscal crisis. There has been a widespread acceptance of these issues, not as a problem of legitimation, but as purely a problem of accumulation and realization. In the 1930s, or even in the

1960s, the disenfranchised populace sought protection in an atmosphere that, at the very least, endowed changes in social structure or models of downward redistribution with positive emotional significance. Today, highly selective definitions of urban improvement, coupled with all the patterns of government-supported neighborhood changes, presents an atmosphere within which antipoor, antitenant, and antiblack sentiment can advance unchallenged and with impunity. The neighborhood-wide acceptance of the accumulation/realization model has local consequences beyond the hardships borne by the most visible victims of the resettlement process. There seems to be an increasing callousness, a meanness of spirit, that permeates local action and rhetoric, and baldly promotes values of accumulation over all others.

What then, one might ask, is the importance of our method, our findings. Case studies such as this that make concrete connections between local events and political economy may help strengthen organizational resolve. The knowledge that the success of redistributive action lies not merely in perfecting organizational technology or clarifying need, but rather within the changing political economy provides an historical perspective that informs action. Local political action, informed of, and by, constraints to mobilization can and must move in the direction of national coalition building. We know that action can shape national

consciousness. We have seen it happen before and we shall see it happen again.

Appendix I

A Reprint of Real Estate Market Methods from O'Hanlon's
Doctoral Dissertation, Neighborhood Change in New York
City: A Case Study of Park Slope 1850-1980, pp.209-213

Sales Activity

The Real Estate Register for Brooklyn is a privately published listing of deed transfers and mortgage liens against property. This information is published in a monthly and annual report. The Register lists by street address deed transfers, sales price of property transfers, amount and originator of mortgage liens and type of property. From this Register information on the sale price and method of financing sales of residential buildings was collected. This information was collected from the annual reports ending March 15 of 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1978 for all residential property transfers in the study site. The same information was collected from the monthly reports for the period August 16, 1979 through August 15, 1980.

Tax Arrears

All real estate parcels are listed by block and lot number and type of improvement on the lot for the County of Brooklyn in the records of the Tax Collection Department in the Brooklyn Municipal Building. Further, on a quarterly basis, property taxes outstanding on these parcels are recorded. In this survey, the number of residential properties which were five or more quarters in arrears for

property taxes was recorded for each city block in the survey area. This information was collected for the blocks from the June quarterly reports of 1970 and 1975 through 1980.

Vacant Building Survey

Vacant buildings for the purpose of this research were defined as residential structures that in their observed condition were uninhabitable and not undergoing reconstruction or condemned for other public purposes. In particular, structures with boarded-up doors and windows, burned out interiors, broken windows or vandalized interiors were considered vacant and uninhabitable. The buildings so classified are not necessarily abandoned by their owners.

Field surveys of vacant buildings were conducted in October of 1975 through 1980. Additionally, as the condition of vacant buildings could be up-dated on subsequent surveys, the condition of initially observed vacant property was recorded in subsequent surveys; eg. building demolished, undergoing construction, re-occupied or still vacant.

Interviews with Real Estate Brokers

The population was limited to professional real estate brokers who had active offices within the study site. A field survey uncovered 21 offices. However, these offices were not equally distributed throughout the study site. Eleven were located within a narrow area from 5 Street to Flatbush between 7 Avenue and Prospect Park West. As

information on the dynamics of the various submarkets of Park Slope was desired, a stratified sample technique was used. Six of the 11 brokers in the concentrated area were sampled. The interviews were conducted in February and March of 1978 in the broker's offices. None refused to participate.

The interview schedule was constructed to cover three topics: the professional activity of the broker including rentals, sales and management of property; the character of demand for owner occupied housing including types of people in the market and variations by type of building and location; and the character of owners of rental property and the character of demand for, and the costs of supplying, rental properties and variations by building type and location.

Interviews with Owners of Vacant Buildings

For three successive years a field survey of vacant properties was conducted; e.g. 1975, 1976, and 1977. Cumulative records of the disposition of these buildings were kept including whether they were still vacant, demolished, under reconstruction, or re-occupied. From this record, ownership searches were performed on all vacant buildings except those that were demolished. Using deed and mortgage records in the Brooklyn Registrar's Office, and tax records in the Tax Collector's Office in Brooklyn, the names and addresses of current owners and mortgages was constructed. From this information searches were made for

the phone numbers of both owners and mortgagees. The greatest difficulty encountered was that the public records would list the address of the owner at the address of the property currently vacant. In those cases searches of phone directories throughout the Metropolitan area were made for people with similar names. If this proved unsuccessful attempts were made to contact the owner through the mortgagee or obtain the mortgagee's account of the owner's disposition of the building.

The total population consisted of 139 buildings of which 120 were vacant and 19 were under construction or re-occupied in February of 1978. These buildings were owned by 113 different individuals or corporations. Phone interviews were completed with 49 owners, mortgagees or other representatives of 62 buildings or 44 percent of all buildings. Another 13 owners were contacted but refused repeated requests to participate in the interviews.

Interviews were constructed to elicit information about three different areas; characteristics of the owner, including reasons for purchasing the property, race, number of other properties owned, and perceptions about the future of the area; factors relating to the costs of operating the building including those attributable to the size of the building, tenants, use of management service, cost of availability of credit, and the social and environmental externalities of the site; and finally the market demand for the building.

Appendix II

Interview schedule for Community Leaders.
(Used to supplement participant observations when necessary.)

1. When did your group first emerge? Why? Was there a specific issue? (If so) What was (were) the issue(s)?
2. Who was in it? Was it a spin off from another group (movement)? How did people in it know each other? (if any particular time period is unknown, solicit races, age, tenure state of members)
3. How were goals developed? Over time? What were they initially and how did they change? (If an issue) How did you manage to maintain them?
4. What issues did you take on? Why those particular issues?
5. What were your main strategies? How did they change over time?
6. Did you spin off other groups? What were they?
7. How did you maintain your organization? (contributions, volunteers, staff, grants,)
8. How about your relationships to other groups. (If any, what were they? How did they develop over time? (stability of membership, overlapping across organizations, membership shifts from group to group)
9. What sort of public image do (or did) you wish to convey?
10. What about your successes. Were you under constraints? What kinds of constraints were you under and how did that influence your success?
11. How successful were you in meeting your original or changing goals?
12. As far as you can tell, how did government policies, agencies impede or support your work?
13. (If appropriate) When did the group cease to exist and why?

Appendix III

Interview Schedule for Clergymen

1. What are the church/parish/synagogue boundaries? (or what areas do most of your members come from?)
2. Has membership in the church/synagogue changed over the past five years? For instance, has it increased or decreased? Why do you think this is happening?
3. What types of families or groups have been interested in becoming members in past few years? (Probe: (black, Haitian, Hispanic{Cuban, Puerto Ricans, Panamanians}, white professionals, blue collar families, new residents, changes in long time residents)
4. What type of activities or organizations are offered now by the church/synagogue (religious, social, educational, day care, after school program, senior citizen). For each yes, ask how many people attend and where they come from (in or outside of the community)?
5. Have the activities offered by the church/synagogue changed over the past few years? How? Why? How does a new activity get started? by the clergy, membership, interested people in the community?
6. Do different types of families or groups have preferences for specific activities within the church? Why?
7. Other residents and clergy have told us that there are some problems with the relationships between Spanish speaking parishioners and English speaking parishioners. Do you find that to be true here? If yes, what kinds of issues or problems arise? Why do you think this exists?
8. Do you have separate services for Spanish and French speaking members? How does that work? Are there different priests/ministers that Spanish speaking people seek out?
9. Are there issues or activities that the church/synagogue is currently not addressing that you feel should be addressed? What are they? Why don't you think these issues are not be addressed?
10. Are there changes happening within the community or city that are having an impact on your church or synagogue? What kind of changes and what kind of impact? Why is this happening?

11. What do you think the future will hold for this church/synagogue? What will change in the future? Why?

Appendix IV

Reprint of O'Hanlon (1982) Exhibits 4.1, 4.2 and Tables 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6 (: 222, 223, 231, 232, 234; attached)

Source: O'Hanlon, T. (1982) Neighborhood Change in New York City: A Case Study of Park Slope 1850-1980. New York: Doctoral Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York. Chapter 4, Park Slope Real Estate Market:

Exhibit 4.1

Sale Price of Residential Buildings in Park Slope, in Constant 1967 Dollars, 1965 to 1980




Exhibit 4.2
Residential Buildings Five Quarters in
Tax Arrears, 1970 to 1980




Table 4.2
Sale Price for Private and Walkup Residential
Buildings, 1965 to 1980

Section	March 1964/65 Sale Price N	March 1969/70 Sale Price N	March 1974/75 Sale Price N	March 1977/78 Sale Price N	August 1979/80 Sale Price N
1	12,300	61	17,300	85	17,600
2	17,400	37	17,800	58	24,300
3	19,400	32	21,000	44	36,100
4	23,100	18	32,800	25	66,800
5	15,500	22	15,500	31	15,200
6	17,000	64	19,300	89	29,600
7	20,200	51	22,000	68	39,000
8	27,400	40	39,300	60	66,500
9	29,400	34	47,100	58	76,200
10	12,500	18	16,400	16	19,500
11	12,400	27	16,900	34	18,800
12	10,500	34	19,100	65	21,600
13	12,700	26	17,400	54	25,000
14	19,300	30	23,500	43	34,200

Sale Price in Constant 1967 Dollars (1)					
Section	1964/65 Sale Price	1969/70 Sale Price	1974/75 Sale Price	1977/78 Sale Price	1979/80 Sale Price
1	13,200	15,400	11,100	12,200	12,100
2	18,700	15,900	15,300	17,100	18,100
3	20,800	18,700	22,700	32,700	40,400
4	24,800	29,200	42,100	34,100	55,300
5	16,700	13,800	9,600	13,100	11,100
6	18,200	17,200	18,600	19,300	25,700
7	21,700	19,600	24,500	21,800	31,200
8	29,400	35,100	41,900	39,400	47,700
9	31,500	42,000	48,000	44,600	63,200
10	13,400	14,600	12,300	13,500	15,500
11	13,300	15,100	11,900	13,000	12,400
12	11,200	17,000	13,600	12,600	14,300
13	13,700	15,500	15,700	15,500	12,900
14	20,700	21,000	21,500	21,100	21,900

Source: Brooklyn Real Estate Register (Brooklyn Real Estate Register, Inc., published monthly).

(1) Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for New York City - Northeastern New Jersey for September of 1964, 1969, 1974, and 1977, and January 1980.

Table 4.5

Percent of Residential Buildings Five Quarters in
Tax Arrears in Park Slope, 1970 to 1980

Section	Buildings	<u>Percent in Arrears</u>						
		1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
1	479	11	12	19	16	15	18	20
2	486	11	15	17	15	16	17	16
3	356	6	8	10	6	6	7	7
4	231	4	6	5	5	3	5	3
5	325	7	10	14	14	14	14	14
6	756	3	5	5	6	4	5	5
7	573	4	5	7	5	4	4	3
8	620	2	2	2	2	1	2	2
9	676	2	1	1	1	2	2	2
10	425	3	3	4	3	2	2	3
11	438	6	8	7	6	5	5	5
12	666	4	3	6	6	5	8	8
13	567	4	6	5	6	5	6	7
14	619	4	4	4	4	3	4	4
Total	7,217	4.9	5.8	7.1	6.3	5.6	6.6	6.6

Source: Brooklyn Tax Collection Department.

Table 4.6

Disposition of Vacant Buildings in Park Slope,
1975 to 1980

<u>Number of Vacant or Demolished Buildings</u>						
<u>Section</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
1	24	28	39	52	65	71
2	8	7	14	19	25	34
3	3	2	4	1	1	2
4	-	-	2	2	1	3
5	6	13	19	18	23	23
6	2	5	7	7	7	8
7	9	9	11	10	2	2
8	-	1	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	1	-	-	-
10	-	-	-	2	3	1
11	3	3	7	11	11	8
12	5	6	7	13	15	18
13	-	1	6	8	10	11
14	8	8	16	16	18	20
Total	68	82	133	159	181	201

Vacant Buildings Re-Occupied or Under-Construction

<u>Section</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>
1	6	7	11	14	19
2	2	3	7	8	9
3	1	1	4	5	5
4	-	-	-	1	1
5	1	1	3	4	6
6	-	1	3	5	6
7	-	-	1	9	9
8	-	1	1	1	1
9	-	-	1	1	1
10	-	-	-	-	2
11	-	-	1	4	7
12	-	-	2	3	5
13	-	-	2	3	5
14	2	2	5	5	5
Total	12	18	41	66	82

Source: Field Surveys, 1975 through 1980.

Appendix V

I. Crisis in the Rental Housing Market

Tenants turn to government for protection when rent consumes a large share of income, housing is in short supply, and housing conditions are inadequate. In urban neighborhoods throughout New York City housing inflation and inadequate income and supply, as well as mounting tenant harassment, have accelerated the demand for protection. In the Dynamics of Rental Housing in New York City, Stegman (1982) addresses these problems.

Rent/Income Variables: All renters have lost purchasing power since 1969. Even though renter income has risen over 50%, the cost of living in the city has more than doubled. Incomes for all renters fell by 28% in real terms between 1969 and 1980. However, as inflation rose rapidly between 1977 and 1980, cost of living rose 28%. Whites tenants almost kept pace losing 2% in real income while black tenants lost 4% and Puerto Ricans lost 14%.

As higher-income families have become cooperative or homeowners, and as the rate of growth in poor socioeconomic groups has risen, the income gap between renters and homeowners has widened (1). The median gross rent-income ratio for households in the City has increased by nearly 50% since 1950 from 19% to 28% in 1981. Even with rent regulation, 57% of all renters spend at least one-quarter of their income for housing (2). The percentage of renter

households that pays 40% or more for rent has increased 83% since 1968. By 1981, 30.5% paid 40% or more.

As one might predict, low- and moderate-income people and U.S. minorities suffer the rent-income ratio increases disproportionately, with low-income people spending at least half of their resources for housing. The increase in rent-income ratios for moderate income households also shows sharp rises between 1978 and 1981.(3)

Housing Supply: New York City's housing inventory decreased from 1975 to 1981. Approximately 46,392 units or 1.63% of the stock was lost. While total population also decreased by 10.4%, the number of households has remained constant. Stegman reports that the disparity between population and household loss results from a decline in size of household. Unit losses were in the occupied rental stock where 3.25% or 65,150 units were lost, whereas the owner-occupied stock grew by 3.6% or 26,302 units. The number of available rental vacancies declined by 26% during this period producing a net rental vacancy rate of 2.13% in the City, a rate which rose above 2.25% only for apartments that rented for over \$750 per month.

Housing Conditions: Measurements of housing quality are subject to different operational definitions and inconsistencies in application, so that findings may be inconclusive. Recognizing these data limitations, the Stegman report indicates that the occupied rental stock has deteriorated since 1978, and suffers higher rates of

maintenance deficiencies than the rental inventories of all central cities collectively. Although 4% of renters live in dilapidated housing and 20% live in apartments that have at least three maintenance deficiencies, U.S. minorities suffer disproportionately, and 31% of those who spend at least 40% of income for rent live in inadequate rental housing .

In sum, with an increasing proportion of income consumed by housing, a decrease in rental housing supply, and a deterioration of rental-housing conditions, one could easily hypothesize that there would be an increasing interest in tenant protection legislation as large blocs of voters are personally affected by worsening conditions. .

II. Rent Protection Regulations

The history of New York City's rent regulation system is described in detail elsewhere (New York State Temporary Commission on Rental Housing, 1980; Niebanck, 1970; Stegman, 1982). Suffice to present a very brief history here.

There has been some form of rent control in New York City since 1942. After the Second World War and the normalization of the economy, the federal government allowed state and local government to decide whether they would continue or modify controls. New York State saw fit to continue controls in a tight market until increases in supply would ease price pressures and make controls unnecessary. In 1950, a 5% vacancy rate was established as the point at which controls would be considered unnecessary.

Vacancy rates in New York City have never risen to 5 %; a rental housing shortage has continued unabated.

Under the Emergency Housing Act of 1962, the state transferred the administration of rent regulation to the city, and, by 1969, rent stabilization, a modified form of rent control, was established in post-1947 buildings (those built prior to 1947 were already under rent control) and in decontrolled units in buildings of six or more units. The Rent Guidelines Board (RGB), Rent Stabilization Association (RSA), and the Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB) were established to administer rent stabilization. The RGB, comprised of nine mayorally appointed members, set maximum rates for rent increases involving renewals and new leases. The RSA, the organization to which all building owners under rent stabilization belong, collected member dues to administer the program and is a voice for owners; and CAB adjudicated tenant-landlord problems. Until 1984 when rent stabilization was turned back over to the state to administer, CAB was funded by RSA. Problems arose between owners, the RGB, and tenant organizations on the estimates used to determine changes in operating costs which, in turn, determine rent increase orders.

In 1971, vacancy decontrol was adopted that provided for the decontrol of all controlled and stabilized units after a change in tenancy. This placed enormous pressure on many of the city's poor, moderate- and middle-income groups by forcing them to pay exorbitant rents and by their losing

assurances against future increases (The New York State Temporary Commission on Rental Housing, 1980). Finally, in response to the rent rise, the state enacted the New York State Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 (ETPA), which has been extended to 1983. It repealed vacancy decontrol for the city's rent stabilized units, and provided that previously destabilized units and all decontrolled apartments were subject to ETPA.

As the Stegman report indicates, rents in New York City rose substantially between 1975 and 1981: 55% in the entire city, 60% in the rent controlled sector, and 44% in the post-1947 stabilized sector. However, the cost of living as measured by the Consumer Price Index rose at a rate of 55%, with the result that in real terms, rents increased about 4% in the controlled sector but decreased in the stabilized sector, and decreased by 1% for all renter households. Since, as we indicated earlier, real income has decreased substantially for low- and moderate-income and U.S. minority households, and has not kept up with the cost of living, these groups continued to bear the burden of escalating operating costs, and therefore of rent increases.

It is little wonder that rent protection became a major issue in New York City neighborhoods in light of trends in rent regulation from 1970 to 1981 in which 1) tenant avenues for adjudication were mainly landlord controlled and 2) landlords of rent-controlled apartments were permitted to increase rents a maximum of 13%, and owners of stabilized

apartments were allowed to raise their rents by an average of 91%. Under considerable pressure from tenant groups, in late 1983, rent protection regulation was finally transferred back to New York State.

Notes

1. In 1978, renters had a median income 58% as high as owners. By 1981, it was just 54% as high. Stegman, M.A. (1982) The Dynamics of Rental Housing in New York City. New York: Department of Housing Preservation and Development.
2. Ibid. Whereas in 1978, 43.3% of households with incomes of between \$10,000 and \$12499 paid 25% or more of their income on housing, by 1981, 65.7% of this income group were paying 25% or more for rent.

Appendix VI

Redlining and Government Policy

The impacts of discriminatory investment policies on local neighborhoods reveal how local institutions have invested their portfolios in areas other than where deposits originate. By May 1975, evidences of redlining activity were presented in hearings before the United States Congressional Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. Soon thereafter Congress enacted the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, which required all depository institutions to disclose to public officials, the federal government, and the public, the number of loans, how much money and the geographic location of mortgage loans for housing. Soon, consumer advocates began investigating the mortgage lending practices of thrift institutions, and studies of redlining proliferated (see page 1 for a partial list of studies).

A furor arose in New York State, when the New York State Banking Department applied to be exempt from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and issued its own regulations (Herman, 1976; Murphy, 1976; Sanders, 1976). Antiredlining organizations demanded wider disclosure (New York City Commission on Human Rights, 1976).

In 1977, Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which is intended to "encourage" banks to meet the credit needs of their communities, including low and moderate income neighborhoods. It requires that federal regulatory agencies assess the local lending records of

banks when considering applications by institutions for branches or mergers.

These two acts established a context within which pressures could be applied to lending institutions to increase the flow of credit to neighborhoods. Now, there were penalties for disinvestment. Branches could be denied if credit needs were not met. The public was able to find out investment information, and could act to force banks to comply through the courts. As a result of this legislation, community and public interest groups began to document neighborhood disinvestment patterns and, after 1977, to attempt to force banks to comply with CRA requirements.

Unfortunately for disinvested communities, antiredlining challenges proceed on a case by case basis through the courts and, in large part, these cases came to a standstill, when, by the end of 1980, interest rates had risen to a point where redlining by area was replaced by redlining by price.

Appendix VII

New York City-Owned Property Crisis

By the mid-1970s New York City officials became increasingly concerned about the rising number of residential properties that began to fall into city ownership. In 1976, a one year in-rem law was enacted by the city council (This law shortened the length of time to one year from three years that a property could be in tax arrears before it was taken over by the city for non-payment of taxes). Shortly after the Koch administration took office in 1978, there were 6,894 city-owned buildings, and 10,404 by 1979 (Tobier and Roistacher, 1980). By 1980, the city owned approximately 500,000 units of housing.

The causes of the crisis varied and are described elsewhere (1). For the City of New York or, for that matter, for any city, public ownership of housing, except for a small amount of low-income housing, can be provided only on an interim basis. Unlike other Western countries, there is no well developed ideology in the United States, promoting public ownership of housing.

For municipal government, returning city-owned properties to the tax rolls is a primary goal. For New York City, property taxes, a major source of revenue, make up about 35% of its revenue budget (City of New York, 1981). A central problem for the residents of neighborhoods with city-owned property was that a considerable number of the properties were occupied; and, therefore, the welfare of

those residents was at stake. In an attempt to return properties to the tax rolls, city officials established three primary strategies: design of alternative-management programs for occupied buildings as a first step to encourage private takeover; auctioning of property; and negotiating of direct sales.

Alternative Management Programs: In late 1978, with 50,000 units of occupied city-owned units to manage the city developed options, many of which made use of community organizations as resources. By December 1979, Housing Preservation and Development had a total of 9600 occupied units: a little less than one-third of occupied units enrolled in city, tenant, community, private, or housing-authority management programs (3).

Despite the fact that rent payments in tenant- and community-managed buildings were high in comparison with city-managed properties (City Limits, 1979a) (4), maintenance was running two to three times more than rent roles by 1979 (Baldwin, 1979). The city was forced to use \$30 million per year of its tax-levy funds to make up the difference between CDBG allocations and costs when HUD was reluctant to release CDBG funds to operate management programs (City Limits, 1979b). Tensions between residents concerned with the welfare of tenanted buildings, and city officials concerned with disposition of property converged around two major issues--auction and sales policies (4).

Auction Policies: Evidence mounted within the city administration in the mid- and late-1970s that auctioning was ineffective in returning properties to the tax rolls (Michels, 1978; Zucotti, 1977). Deputy Mayor Zuccotti (1977) found that four years after an auction, 94% of properties sold are in arrears, and Councilman Michels (1978) found that 90% of all properties sold in auction during the first four months of 1978 were in arrears by November 1978. Owners often bought back their own buildings for less than the cost of back taxes. They continued to milk them or else, new owners in the business of buying "slum" property, continued the pattern. With pressure mounting for an auction moratorium in fall 1978, Park Slope Councilman Cuite introduced legislation, subsequently passed, that provided for easy redemption for city-owned property (5). A one-year moratorium went into effect but, under pressure from HUD to develop a self-sufficiency plan for city-owned property in 1979, the city resumed auctioning, offering owners a two-year grace period to correct major violations (6).

As interest rates rose, however, uncollected real estate taxes were on the rise. Owners in arrears were essentially borrowing tax dollars at a very reasonable rate since penalties for paying taxes late were considerably less than prevailing interest rates. Under pressure from redistributive-issue community organizations, the Koch

Administration had slowed the vesting process considerably and, by 1982, auctions were irregularly held.

Sales Policy: Desiring to maintain properties at reasonable cost and make them more marketable, the city council in April 1979, decontrolled rent in city-owned property without requiring maintenance of services (7), and offered exemptions as added incentives for development. This policy was problematic, because those tenants who were unable to purchase their buildings without substantial repair had to contend with the fact that the city could now raise rents and sell buildings. In addition, a crucial issue to tenants was the sales price that they must pay to buy their own building.

In 1978, goals were set to sell 100 buildings to nonprofit groups in 1979, twice what was sold in the previous five years, and 200 in 1980 (City Limits, 1979c). Debate over sales price revolved around two points: first, whether price should be in line with past sales, and second, whether goals of direct sales were to generate immediate income from sale, or whether the city should first consider the long-term revenues it stood to gain from sales made to those groups committed to maintaining the building, thereby insuring continued payment of property taxes (City Limits, 1979f).

A sales price of \$250 per unit in low- and moderate-income or CD-eligible areas was unanimously adopted by the Board of Estimate in July 1979, in recognition that this

amount was in line with past sales prices. However, the resolve of the city administration to honor this commitment has steadily weakened, particularly in regard to low income people in the gentrifying neighborhoods of Manhattan and Brooklyn. The city contends that where investment potential exists, prices should reflect increased property values even when sales are made to community organizations representing low- and moderate income interests. By mid-1981, two years after the City had adopted the \$250-a-unit sales policy, five buildings with 82 units had been sold to tenants and community groups (City Limits, 1981). Finally, in November 1982, the city sold property to tenants in a gentrified Manhattan neighborhood with a provision that part of the profits on the sale of apartments would go to the city.

Notes

1. For general readings on the crisis of housing deterioration in older industrial cities: Alcala, R.E. and D. Mermelstein (1976) (eds) The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities. New York: Vintage Books; Boyer, B.D. (1973) Cities Destroyed for Cash. Chicago: Follett Publishing Company; Downie, L. Jr. (1974) Mortgage on America. New York: Praeger; Morris, R.S. (1978) Bum Rap on America's Cities. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall; Newfield, J. and P. DuBrul (1981) The Permanent Government. New York: Pilgrim Press; Starr, R. (1977) America's Housing Challenge. New York: Hill and Wang.
2. A brief description of Alternative Management Programs follows:
7A Administration--A law whereby when privately owned buildings are not being maintained (often they are in tax arrears but not yet vested) the tenants can file with the courts to appoint someone, even a tenant, to administer the building using the rent roll to do so. This is a way for tenants to seize a building legally. It was enacted in 1965, but restraints were such that a tenant couldn't be an administrator. By 1974, reforms made it possible for tenants to administer, and no landlord or lienor could. By July 1978, the city was making loans up to \$10,000, to make repairs or restore vacant apartments. By mid-1981, 301 Buildings were in 7A. See Gillerman, M. (1978) "7A law gives tenants a way to seize a building legally." City Limits 3(6):8.

Tenant Interim Lease (TIL)--Tenants of a city-owned building establish a tenants organization and manage their own building, with major repairs paid for by the city. The tenants receive instructions in building management and bookkeeping. The intent of the program is to have the tenants buy their buildings as soon as they are able.

Community Management Program (CMP)--A program whereby the city contracts with nonprofit community housing organizations for maintenance and rehabilitation by locally recruited labor of tenanted, tax-foreclosed property. The intent of the program is also to have either the community organization or a tenant groups purchase the building after approximately two years.

Property Ownership Management Program (POMP)--A private management program that went into effect in mid-1979, POMP allows private companies to use CD funds to operate and maintain the city's better tax-foreclosed stock and provides a 10% management fee. These private companies manage city-owned property in neighborhoods where they have real-estate interests, and they develop modest

treatment programs that would lead to purchase in one year. The managing firm has first option to purchase the building.

Housing Authority Management Program (HAMP)--A program in which the Housing Authority trains managers to oversee approximately 100 buildings with 1000 occupied apartments near to its own projects. HAMP was allocated 8000 units to manage and repair that were to be sold to tenants as low-income cooperatives.

Management in Partnership Program (MIPP)--A program in which experienced management groups oversee community management projects. They provide classroom instruction in management and bookkeeping skills as well as provide on the job training.

HAMP and MIPP were short lived arising from problems between the Housing Authority and HPD.

3. In February 1979, HPD Commission Leventhal announced that the rate of rent payment was 95% in buildings managed by tenants under the interim lease program; 80% in community managed buildings and only 45% in city-owned buildings as a whole. City Limits (1979) "Rent collection." 4(2):19. A year later rent collection in city managed buildings was only 40%.
4. During these years, many other issues would surface, including the use of CETA staffs, the problems in a lottery system, and sale of public housing, to mention a few. However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s auction and sales policies were consistently major issues that would affect the actions of community organizations in Park Slope as well as in other neighborhoods.
5. The legislation permitted delinquent landlords to redeem properties by paying 15% down on back taxes, and the balance over a period of double the number of calendar quarters in arrears up to a maximum of 32 quarters or eight years. Prior to the bill's passage, redemption agreement with the city required landlords to pay 25% down of the arrears owed and gave them only the same number of quarters that they were in arrears to pay off the balance.
6. Under the City's Emergency Repair Program, prior to August 1979, similar violations had to be corrected within a 72-hour period
7. This was City Council resolution 594A. It permitted rents to be raised freely by the city and to remain at the higher level when the building was sold.

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