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AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF SHAME FEELING STATES
AMONG SHAME-PRONE SUBJECTS.

The City University of New York, Ph.D., 1975
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AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF SHAME FEELING STATES
AMONG SHAME-PRONE SUBJECTS

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
DAVID GLASSMAN

A dissertation submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Psychology
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York


1975

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ordered in terms of: (1) Conflict theories of shame (where shame is conceived of as a counterforce which regulates and opposes drive tensions; (2) Structural theories of shame (where shame is conceived of as resulting from intersystemic conflict between psychic structures (i.e., between ego and ego ideal) or intrasystemic conflict within psychic structures (i.e., within the ego)). The discussion of the conflict and structural theories of shame will be followed by a brief discussion of the perspective from which shame will be considered in the present study.

No attempt will be made to be exhaustive in presenting the various theories of shame, to reconcile what are essentially uncoordinated conceptions of shame or to favor one theory in preference to another. The objective in reviewing the various conceptions is to: (1) isolate some of the issues that a unified and comprehensive theory of shame must account for; (2) to point out that the theoretical analysis of shame remains in an exploratory stage of development; (3) to extract those common themes relating to the experience of shame from the theories in order to develop categories to guide and organize the observations in the present study.

In the last section of this chapter, the four existing experimental investigations of shame will be presented.

Each of these studies explores shame in relation to individual differences in the relative proneness to shame and guilt. There have been no studies which have dealt with shame alone.

The Phenomonology of Shame

In this section a fictionalized description of a student's experience of shame when called on in class is presented along with some tentative propositions about shame feeling states. These propositions are primarily based on the work of Lewis (1971) who, among other authors, was concerned about various aspects of the phenomonology of shame. (Lynd, 1958; Laing, 1959; Mayman, 1968; Beall, 1972)

Report of the Subjective Experience of Shame

"After I had raised my hand in class to answer a question, I forgot what I had planned to say. At that point, I got this feeling that the spotlight was on me and I could imagine how stupid everyone would think I was - I had nothing to say...

"I don't know what set it off. I just saw a girl with a bored look on her face, looking out the window. I can't figure out what that had to do with it. I just went blank and - it was like I got hit by lightning...

"All my ideas were gone. I was just watching everyone's eyes looking at me like something was wrong - and I hadn't even said anything yet. I was also watching myself not being able to do anything...

Tentative Propositions About Shame Feeling States

The stimulus situation involves the exposure or the threat of exposure of some incongruity, deficiency or failure of the 'self' plus some negative reaction (i.e., scorn, ridicule, etc.) by some 'other'.

The experience is unexpected and painful; triggered by some apparently trivial stimulus. The intensity of the feeling is out of proportion to the stimulus that triggered it.

Initially, a relatively wordless experience accompanied by compelling images of one looking at one's 'self', being looked at, unfavorably, by 'others'.

"It reminded me of looking in one end of a tunnel and seeing the others in the class at the other end of the tunnel...

"Of course, the people I knew the best in the class stood out a little more - but it seemed that there was an attitude they all had - that something was wrong with me...

"I could feel my skin tingling - I don't usually notice it. I broke out in a sweat, my heart pounded and I probably looked red in the face...

"Before I was embarrassed, I felt regular - not good, not bad. But after - I felt dumb. I was a dumb thing...

"It was like I was watching an instant replay on T.V. of myself lousing up my answer and the class coming down on me...

"The feelings were going on inside of me, but it went beyond that. What I mean is that my feelings and their feelings were combined. There was something between us...

The 'self' and 'others' are both focal in awareness; imagery of 'self' vis-a-vis 'others'.

While there is heightened 'sensitivity' to others, they personify the negative reaction and the characterizations of them as people in their own right are limited.

There is an increased awareness of the body and skin surface; there are physiological changes associated with autonomic arousal (i.e., vasoconstriction).

The negative reaction is global; involves the whole 'self' rather than some specific aspect or act of the 'self'.

Attention is split between awareness of one's 'self' and awareness of one's 'self' as an object of some 'other's' awareness.

The source of the negative reaction is localized as 'out there'; as outside the "self-as-place" (extending past the physical limits of the body).

"At the same time I thought they disapproved of me, I also knew that they didn't even notice me or know that anything was wrong...

Imagery is followed by thoughts about how 'others' seem to be responding negatively. However, there is also an awareness that the people who are an integral part of the experience are not actually involved in the way they seem to be involved.

"I guess I wanted to show off my initiative and independence in the way I answered - like showing off - maybe to get that girl, who was looking out the window, interested in me...

Embarrassing incident related to "phallic-assertive" (themes of mastery, strength or competence) or "phallic-exhibitionistic" strivings.

"I couldn't really impress her if I couldn't think straight, and my feelings were doing flips. I was surprised - usually I'm a thinker and I don't get such strong feelings without knowing why...

The affective component of the experience predominates over the cognitive component.

"There was no rational way to figure out what happened and to work out, logically, what to do about it...

There is no logical solution to the affective dilemma.

"What kind of student was I? I never was too smart in school when I was a kid. When I was embarrassed I would resolve that I had to do more studying so that I would never be in the spot again where I forgot what I wanted to say. If I learned more, it would come out - automatically...

Content of ideation reflects concern with one's identity; with the past and the future.

"The whole thing got me angry. What was I angry at? I don't know. It was like someone was being condescending and I couldn't fight back. I annoyed myself for getting into a situation like that...

"I felt like a little kid that someone put on a stage and said, 'Go ahead and show all the big people how much you know', and I froze up...

"Boy, was I tongue-tied. But I would've bet that anyone in that class could have done better than I did without their batting an eyelash. Concentrating on all those things at once made it harder to go on and say what I wanted to...

"No one else could have felt as stupid as I did at that moment...

"I hate to come across by making a bad impression. I wanted to give my answer and have them know I knew my stuff. I would have been cool then...

"I was fidgety and squirming and my lip was twitching. That was terrible because I wanted to appear relaxed, not nervous...

Anger has quality of helpless rage; anger directed at 'self'.

The 'self' is experienced as immobile, smaller and childish; 'others' are experienced as active, larger and adult.

'Others' seen as functioning more effectively than the 'self'. One's effectiveness is disrupted as a result of the splitting of attention, the helpless quality of the anger, the unexpectedness of the experience, the absence of a logical solution for the dilemma, etc.

'Self' embedded in the "field"; sense of 'self' as better or worse than 'others'.

Concern with making a good impression on 'others'; concern with one's control, mastery or power.

Affect state communicated to 'others' via gestures, posture and other non-verbal behaviors.

"I put down my pencil so it would be less obvious that my hand was shaking. I wished the bell had sounded so that I could have gotten out of there before I made a fool of myself...

"I thought for a minute that it would be a good idea to answer a question again later - to do really well to make up for the time I loused up...

"I had a fantasy of waiting until someone else screwed up an answer and then putting them down like I had felt put down...

"I poked the person next to me, later, and we had a good laugh about what a fool I was. You know - I was clowning around to make it look like I loused up purposely...

Efforts made to mask one's affective reaction from 'others' by appearing poised or limiting one's self-exposure.

Efforts made to reaffirm one's 'self' in thought or deed.

Efforts made, in thought or deed, to diminish 'others'. Fantasies of revenge, triumph or retaliation.

Efforts made to change passive experience into active experience (i.e., by mocking one's 'self').

Conflict Theories of Shame

The theories of shame presented in this section involve formulations in which shame is conceived of as a "motive of defense". (Fenichel, 1945) Broadly speaking, shame becomes, after the formation of drive-controlling structures, a defense against drives and their "affect charges". (Rapaport, 1953).

Freud (1905) described shame as a force which regulates and controls the sexual instinct and "like a dam, restricts its flow". More specifically, Freud assumed that there are constitutional, inhibiting forces, mediated by painful affects, including shame, which are counterforces against the sexual instinct, particularly in the form of the partial instincts, exhibitionism and scopophilia. Exhibitionism involves sexual pleasure in being looked at and scopophilia involves sexual pleasure in looking at others.

The relationship between the sexual instinct and the partial instincts requires some further qualification. Exhibitionism and scopophilia are considered paired, partial instincts. (Hinsie and Campbell, 1960) There are passive and active forms of both partial instincts. The aim of both forms is the same, but when the 'self' is the object of the instinct, the form is "passive"; when the 'other' is the object of the instinct, the form is "active". Therefore

the passive form of exhibitionism and the active form of scopophilia are equivalent in aim and object and are, in that sense, paired (cf. sadism and masochism).

According to Rapaport (1951), the notion of partial instincts involves an assumption that the delay of drive-cathexes results in the differentiation of the cathexes and that one possible consequence of this differentiation is that cathexes may appear as drive-cathexes of ideas. For example, the system of ideas associated with exhibitionism is so uniquely integrated in the wake of experiences surrounding looking as to suggest that these ideas are cathected with some component of the sexual drive.

Fenichel (1945) describes two phases in the development of shame as a "motive of defense" against exhibitionism and scopophilia. At first, shame is an innate physiological response pattern where being looked at is equated with being despised. Subsequently, the ego uses this response for defensive purposes where shame is a signal that, "If you do this or do that, you will be looked at and be despised." As a magical gesture to avert the threat of being despised, people who are ashamed hide, close their eyes or refuse to look in the belief that if one does not look, one cannot be seen.

Fenichel (1945) notes that when either looking at others or being looked at is sexualized, the experience of looking involves some degree of fusion of self and object. He notes that shame as a defense against exhibitionism and scopophilia is not a specialized form of castration anxiety, since the sexual component of these partial instincts is pre-genital. The gratification connected with exhibitionism involves an increase in self-esteem that results from being looked at; the gratification connected with scopophilia involves the pleasure of being at one with an object. Both partial instincts are associated with the fantasy of incorporation through the eyes.

Fenichel (1945) remarks on the fairy tales, myths and dreams that portray being turned into stone as a specific punishment for scopophilic wishes. Lewis (1971) refers to shame as a protection against the loss of self-boundaries, which is implicit in sexual fantasies, because of the "distancing" involved in the experience of the 'self' as rejected by the 'other'. Levin (1967) suggests that shame is an "affective symbol warning" against a specific danger: that one is overexposed (in a sexual sense) and likely to be rejected.

There are divergent views among authors about the function of looking and being looked at in scopophilia and

exhibitionism. For example, Bressler (1965) discusses the partial instincts in terms of their role in the development of an articulated body image and the differentiation of self and object. Kanzer (1964), however, states that the partial instincts are "unmistakably" associated with the phallic stage of development and that the image of one's 'self' as pleasing others is a "phallic self-image".

A possible resolution of these differences is offered by Pine (1970), who notes that the scopophilic drive (and presumably the exhibitionistic drive as well) has a different function at various stages of development. During the oral and anal stages, looking is a source of "diffuse pleasure" and functions in the development of body image and differentiation of self from object. It is only during the phallic phase that looking becomes a source of "focal pleasure". The transition from diffuse to focal pleasure is related to the awareness of sex differences and the biological linkage between looking and genital excitement. The scopophilic drive becomes a source of "focal anxiety" (leading to the formation of defenses against looking) when the sexual gratification connected with looking becomes prohibited.

A concept that is central to Pine's discussion of the ontogenesis of the scopophilic drive is the

structuralization of drive-defense relationships. He assumes that behaviors which gratify drives and those which defend against drives may be linked. The choice of drive-defense relationships (or linkages) and the probability that the relationships will become relatively permanent (i.e., structuralized) depends on the degree to which the linkages permit drive gratification. Pine does not refer to the linkage between shame and exhibitionism-scopophilia, but it would be a good example of a structuralized drive-defense relationship. For example, the defense against exhibiting oneself, shame, involves a sufficient degree of public display (i.e., blushing, averting one's eyes, etc.) to permit some gratification of the drive it is defending against.

Several authors relate shame to the development of control over the anal and urethral sphincter muscles, although they are not in agreement about the phase-specific conflicts that are associated with shame. (Fenichel, 1945; Erikson, 1950; Jacobson, 1964)

Fenichel (1945) says that feelings of shame are associated with loss of urethral sphincter control; feelings of pride are associated with the maintenance of control. He adds that shame is a defense against "urethral-erotic temptations" (i.e., ambitious and competitive fantasies).

Erikson (1950) defines the nuclear conflict that takes place during the period when anal and urethral musculature can be controlled as that of autonomy vs. shame and doubt. Autonomy and an inner sense of goodness result from maintenance of sphincter control; doubt, shame and an inner sense of badness result from loss of control. Erikson (1959) states that shame involves a situation in which " ... one is completely exposed and conscious of being looked at. ... one is visible and not ready to be visible." (Erikson, 1959, p. 68) He agrees with Fenichel (1945) that efforts to deny shame may result in a type of ambitiousness that involves a determination to get away with things unseen, a deliberate shamelessness.

Jacobson's (1964) formulation manages to straddle the position that shame is a defense against phallic-exhibitionistic strivings on the one hand, and anal and urethral strivings on the other hand. She notes that shame is experienced in relation to visible proof of loss of instinctual control and "actual failures"; pride is experienced in relation to visible proof of instinctual control and "actual accomplishments". In addition, she describes the fears associated with shame (fear of disapproval, rejection, exposure, etc.) as falling midway between more archaic fears

associated with the oral phase (i.e., loss of objects) and fears associated with the oedipal phase (fear of mutilation or castration).

Structural Theories of Shame

The theories presented in the previous section conceive of shame as an innate physiological reflex pattern that, in the course of development, is structuralized and functions as a defense against drives; shame, then, is conceived of as an "affect structure". (Leaff, 1971)

Hartmann (1950) points out that "affect structures", which initially function as a defense against drives, are further modified in the course of development and achieve a relatively greater degree of autonomy from the drives with which they were originally associated. These "affect structures" influence the way in which experiences are registered, evaluated and regulated; in turn, the experiences serve to modify the "affect structures", altering their structure and function. (Leaff, 1971) The "affect structures" and the other psychic structures (of greater or lesser complexity) which they are associated with are arranged in a hierarchy, the layers of which differ in their degree of autonomy from the original drives, ranging from a drive organization and mode of functioning to a conceptual, conflict-free organization and mode of functioning. The structures in the hierarchy exist at various levels of complexity, stability, integration, awareness and autonomy from the drives. (Rapaport, 1953)

The theories of shame that will be presented in this section are structural in the sense that shame is seen as meaningful, primarily, in the context of its relationship to the psychic structures and to the organized relationships that exist among these structures; they are not structural in the technical sense in which this term is used in psychoanalytic theory. And, while the theories are considered to be structural, the types of structures that are related to shame vary according to the particular theorist (i.e., superego, ideal self, cognitive style).

Historically, the impetus for the development of several theories of shame has been provided by the controversy surrounding the distinction between the terms 'superego' and 'ego ideal'. The issue here is not to review the various theories about the structure, function and content of the superego and ego ideal, but to discuss them to the extent that they are relevant to shame.

The view that the structure and function of the superego and ego ideal are synonymous has prevailed since Freud's (1923) publication of The Ego and the Id.

(Rapaport, 1957; Hartmann & Loewenstein, 1962; Nass, 1966)

A number of authors, however, who have contributed to the theory of shame attribute to the ego ideal some of the functions and contents previously attributed to the

superego. (Piers & Singer, 1953; Lampl-de-Groot, 1962; Sandler et. al., 1963)

Rapaport (1957) noted that the development of a comprehensive psychoanalytic theory of the superego has lagged behind the development of ego theory. He attributes this lag to the fact that, whereas Freud's writings have provided an ample framework for the clarification of the structure, function and content of the ego, this has not been so in the case of the superego. Several reviews of the meaning of the superego construct have concluded that the meaning of the term "superego" remains ambiguous. (Rapaport, 1957; Hartmann & Loewenstein, 1962; Furer, 1968; Lewis, 1971)

One of the consequences of the confusion inherent in the meaning of the superego construct has been that the affects associated with the superego, shame and guilt, have not been adequately distinguished, theoretically, despite general agreement that the phenomenology of these affects differs markedly. (Piers & Singer, 1953; Lynd, 1958; Jacobson, 1964; Lewis, 1971) They are generally grouped together because of their common function as drive controls. (Erikson, 1950; Wallace, 1963; Lewis, 1971)

Piers and Singer (1953) argue that it is immaterial whether the ego ideal is part of the superego or a separate

structure. However, the superego and the ego ideal each have functions and contents that are distinguishable. The contents of the ego ideal "retain a core of infantile narcissism"; that is, idealized self-images, "positive" images of the parents and goals of mastery (i.e., growth, self-actualization and individuation). The functions of regulating self-esteem and setting goals are attributed to the ego ideal. The contents of the superego consist of the negative, restrictive images of the parents and its function is to establish standards of proper conduct.

Shame and guilt are both reactions to "intersystemic tension", but they differ in terms of the particular psychic structures in conflict, the type of "internalized norm" that is violated and the type of threat associated with violating each norm. Shame reflects a "tension" between the ego and ego ideal. Shame arises from a failure to meet goals (set by others whom the individual wants to please or one's own goals). Shame is a response to failure; it is a "real shortcoming". The nature of the threat, related to failing, is that one will be abandoned. Guilt reflects a "tension" between the ego and superego. Guilt arises when a "boundary is transgressed". Guilt results when a standard of proper conduct is transgressed and the threat is that one will be castrated.

Lynd (1958), a sociologist, proposed a formulation about the differences between shame and guilt that is comparable to Piers and Singer in that shame is seen as involving "the whole self"; it is a literal failure to reach one's goals. Guilt involves "specific aspects of the self"; it involves transgressions of specific social codes. The situations in which shame arises highlight the "artificial life" one has been leading and one's fantasied accomplishments by exposing one's actual accomplishments and real identity.

It is generally conceded that the ego ideal does have an earlier genesis than the superego. (Schafer, 1967; Furer, 1968; Lewis, 1971) One inference that has been made is that shame is a more primitive affect than guilt. Variants of this position are that shame is tied to outer sanctions (i.e., requires actual exposure of the self to the criticism of others) and guilt to inner sanctions or that shame, though tied to inner sanctions, reflects a less complete internalization of sanctions relative to guilt. (Lewis, 1971)

Piers and Singer (1953) note that feelings of shame precede feelings of guilt in the development of the mature superego. They regard shame as a less internalized reaction than guilt, since the threat in shame involves a more

primitive fear (loss of love) than does guilt (fear of castration).

Levin (1967) notes that the crucial component in the experience of shame is that the shame-producing behavior is actually perceived by others and reacted to negatively by them. He assumes that shame is more primitive than guilt because the regulatory function of shame operates only in the presence of another person. What is internalized is the anticipation of a negative response; the external sanction itself is not internalized.

Wallace (1963) attributes the external orientation and the concern with the visibility of one's activities during the experience of shame to the incomplete internalization of standards. Shame is described as an affect associated with oral conflicts and therefore the shame-prone person must be dependent on external objects as sources of narcissistic supplies to maintain self-esteem.

Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962) are critical of the view that shame is a more primitive affect than guilt, in an adult. They point out that this argument confuses a genetic proposition (that shame precedes guilt in the development of an individual) with a structural proposition (that, in adults, shame is a more primitive affect than guilt). Their position is that the character of the

pre-oedipal affects are altered after the resolution of the oedipal conflict and that fear of transgressions and fear of failing to measure up to an ideal (or the fear of castration and fear of loss of love) involve equally sophisticated controls in an adult.

Lampl-de-Groot (1962), led by considerations about the phenomenological differences between shame and guilt, proposed that there was a difference in the function and content of the superego and ego ideal. She described the ego ideal as "originally and essentially" an agency of wish-fulfillment and the superego as a restricting, prohibiting agency. She regards the ego ideal as a substructure of the superego, though it retains a degree of functional independence from the superego. The ego ideal has its origins in the idealized images of the self ("I am like my omnipotent parents"). The superego has its origins in the internalized parental restrictions ("I will live up to my parents' demands."). The ego ideal functions to restore "narcissistic equilibrium" by providing gratification and undoing the pain caused by frustration. Shame results from a conflict between the ego and ego ideal; guilt from a conflict between the ego and superego. Another distinction that Lampl-de-Groot makes is that the superego can

"initiate cathexes or withhold it"; the ego ideal can only "receive cathexes" from the other psychic structures.

(Steingart, 1969)

Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962) state that after the resolution of the oedipal conflicts the superego and ego ideal cannot be distinguished structurally or functionally (nor can shame be distinguished from guilt dynamically). They assume that the genetic determinants or precursors of the superego are not equivalent to the superego as a systemic psychic structure. They state the definition of the superego rests on its functions: "conscience", "self-criticism" and "upholding ideals". They would agree with Piers and Singer (1953) and Lampl-de-Groot (1962) that the contents of the ego ideal (self- and object-idealizations) and the superego are different, but they add that these idealizations do not have the characteristics that would permit them to be described as a separate system or agency.

They point out that:

" ... the 'striving after perfection' of the ego ideal becomes dynamically a partly independent direction-giving function which is relatively independent of the objects and relatively independent of the instinctual precursors. The aims of the ego ideal are then to a considerable extent no longer identical with the primitive wishes which played a role in its formation".

(Hartmann & Loewenstein, 1962, p. 64)

Piers and Singer (1953), Lynd (1958) and Lampl-de-Groot (1962) consider shame to be a function of an intersystemic conflict between the ego and ego ideal. Sandler et. al. (1963), Jacobson (1964) and Kohut (1971), the authors whose work will be discussed next, consider shame to be a function of an intrasystemic conflict within the ego. The conflict within the ego that results in shame is related to a discordance within the ego between archaic self-structures and mature self-structures.

Sandler et. al. (1963) propose a distinction between the contents of the "ideal self" and the ego ideal. The contents of the "ideal self" (which the authors consider an aspect of the ego) are idealized images of the "self" ("the child's gratifying images of the self"); the "self I want to be" in order to maximize the likelihood of receiving narcissistic gratification. The aim of the "ideal self" is to restore the primary narcissistic state. The contents of the ego ideal are identification with "idealized parent images". Shame would result when an individual perceives the "self" or believes the "self" to be perceived by others as having failed to "live up to the ideal self"; that is, "I can't see myself as I want to see myself or as I want others to see me". Guilt would result when the "ideal self" differs from what an individual feels is

dictated by the ego ideal; that is, "I do not really want to be what I ought to be".

Jacobson (1964) states that guilt results from an intersystemic conflict between the ego and the superego and shame results from an intrasystemic conflict within the ego, or, more specifically, from a "discordance between wishful self-images" which embody the narcissistic goals of the ego and a self that appears to be failing, defective, inferior, weak, contemptible in comparison".

(Jacobson, 1964, p. 154)

Jacobson describes "wishful self-images" as the images one has of one's "self" when a "narcissistic goal" has been satisfied. These "narcissistic goals of the ego" involve the striving for strength, competence, power and control over instinctual drives, objects and possessions. These "wishful self-images" may remain unmodified within the ego and as a result they are not reconciled, combined and organized with "realistic self-images" and "realistic, object-directed goals". As such, the contradictory self-images and goals represent a potential source of intrapsychic conflict and interfere with the autonomy of the ego and a sense of inner continuity that is associated with a stable identity.

In analyzing a patient's frequent, unmodulated attacks of shame, Jacobson observed a combination of narcissistic conflicts and character traits. The history of this patient was characterized by early experiences of disillusionment or abandonment and parents who were narcissistic, inconsistent and unstable and who had difficulty supporting their child's efforts at individuation. Several other authors have noted similar characteristics in parents of shame-prone patients. (Piers & Singer, 1953; Lynd, 1958; Erikson, 1959; Kohut, 1971; Beall, 1972)

Jacobson (1964) agrees with the observation made by Piers and Singer (1953) and Lynd (1958) that people who are very ambitious also tend to be shame-prone and have identity problems. However, she disagrees with their formulation that shame arises when a person fails to live up to their "ego ideal". She notes that the conflicts associated with shame do not actually involve the ego ideal or any true "ideal". The conflicts involve narcissistic conflicts and pathological forms of self-esteem regulation (cf. Reich, 1960).

Kohut (1971) also notes that shame-prone people do not possess "strong ideals", but are exhibitionistic people who are driven by their ambitions. The experience of shame (here referring to massive affect storms rather than to

other more modulated variants of shame) is due to the flooding of the ego by "unneutralized, exhibitionistic" impulses associated with the "grandiose self", and not a relative weakness vis-a-vis an overly strong system of ideals. Kohut notes that these "narcissistic-exhibitionistic" impulses are ordinarily modified in the course of normal development. But a propensity to shame attacks is related to "early narcissistic trauma", which leads to the "disavowal of the grandiose self with its narcissistic-exhibitionistic aims" so that this "self-structure" is retained in its unaltered form and strives for fulfillment of its primitive aims.

Rapaport (1953) makes a point, in his discussion of the psychoanalytic theory of affects, that is relevant to Jacobson's (1964) and Kohut's (1971) conception of shame as well as to the other conceptions of shame that have been presented in this section. In all of these conceptions, shame has either been regarded as an intersystemic conflict between the ego and ego ideal (or superego) or as an intrasystemic conflict within the ego. Rapaport notes that in order for the theory of any affect to account for the various shades of an affect (ranging from massive attacks to the signal variety), for combinations of the affect with other affects or for the chronic, characterological forms

of an affect (i.e., shame-proneness), the theory needs to specify the integrations and complex balances within and between all the major psychic structures. He indicates that:

" ... the structural point of view does not seem to stop at the analysis of ego, id, superego factors; it enters upon the study of structuralization within each of these, as well as upon the study of structuralization of functions uniting components from all three major structural divisions of the psyche". (Rapaport, 1953, p. 508)

Two other theories of shame (Steingart, 1969; Lewis, 1971) propose that individual differences in cognitive organization (i.e., perceptual styles) which reflect stable, structured organizations and modes of functioning mediate individual differences in the relative proneness to shame or guilt.

Steingart (1969) suggests that differences in "identification form" determine whether intrapsychic conflict (specifically, superego-ego conflict) is experienced as shame or guilt. The "identifications" that comprise an individual's "sense of self" may be typed as being predominantly "visual (sensational)" or "ideational (verbal)" in form. In other terms, "identification forms" which retain large elements of imagery mediate shame experiences; "identification forms" which are more ideational mediate guilt experiences.

The differences in "identification forms" are due to individual differences in "self-representation-learning", the process by which identifications are integrated into a "sense of self". These individual differences are the product of constitutional differences in the preferred mode (visual or ideational) of conceptualization.

Lewis (1971) developed a model to explain individual differences in "style of superego functioning", shame or guilt. This model is based on the dimension of field dependence-independence (Witkin et. al., 1962), which is assumed to reflect an underlying difference in the degree to which psychological structures are differentiated (i.e., reflect specialization of functioning and separation of aspects of the "self" from the context in which they appear). Lewis reviews experimental evidence in her book, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, that suggests that field-dependent and field-independent subjects differ from each other in their relative proneness to shame or guilt. Using a post-hoc analysis of the individual difference variables correlated with FD-FI (i.e., defensive style, self-concept, suggestibility, identification patterns, attentiveness to facial cues of others, sense of separateness of "self", direction of discharge of hostility and articulation of body concept), Lewis concluded that a "field

dependent style of superego functioning is shame" and a "field independent style of functioning is guilt". The author grants that the model is based on a "speculative network" of experimental findings and that the assumption that there are "superego styles" precedes any experimental demonstration confirming the existence of such styles.

Another point that needs clarification before describing the present study is the sense in which women, as a group, will be considered to be more shame-prone than men. This clarification will begin with a brief presentation of the basis of the generalization within psychoanalytic theory that women are more shame-prone than men and with a critique of the line of reasoning on which this generalization is founded.

This line of reasoning begins with the assumption that the resolution of the oedipus complex is a crucial step in the internalization of parental standards and prohibitions and in the structuralization of the superego which is the foundation, according to Freud, of one's moral code.

(Furer, 1972) The capacity to affirm and abide by abstract and so-called objective moral principles regardless of the consequences to one's personal relationships was the hallmark, for Freud, of a firmly established moral code.

(Schafer, 1974) Where, for boys, the oedipal wishes are

more climactically and decisively renounced, for girls, these wishes are only slowly, if ever, abandoned. (Muslin, 1972) Since castration anxiety is considered the primary motive for the renunciations and for the identifications from which the superego is crystallized, and since girls already believe themselves to be castrated, this incentive is lacking. The result is that women are seen by Freud to " ... bend their morality all too readily in order to fulfill these [oedipal] cravings; their fear of disapproval often overrules whatever independent sense they have of what is right for them and others." (Schafer, 1974)

Since the threat of loss of love from external objects is the predominant danger situation for women and the internalized threat of castration is the predominant danger situation for men, it is more likely, according to Freud (1925), for men to be more moral than women, so that:

" ... for women the level of what is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their superego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men. ... they show less sense of justice than men, ... they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, ... they are more often influenced in their judgments by feelings" (Freud, 1925, 257-259)

The inference drawn from Freud's observations about sex differences in the resolution of the oedipal complex and

their consequences for superego development is that women are less moral than men. Another inference, using the same line of reasoning, is that women are more likely to be shame-prone than men. (Lewis, 1971) The threat of loss of love from external objects, which is characteristic of shame, reflects a lesser degree of autonomy of superego functioning than the threat of castration, which is characteristic of guilt.

Schafer (1974), in his discussion of the logic and preconceptions involved in Freud's generalizations about the development and character of women, raises three objections to the viewpoint that women are less moral than men. These objections are relevant here since the generalizations that women tend to be less moral and more shame-prone than men are both supported by the same line of reasoning.

First, Schafer points out that Freud, when speaking of men being more moral, consistently focuses on a quality of moral rigidity stemming from their greater capacity for isolation of affect. Further, Freud observed that hysterical features are more commonly encountered among women and obsessive features among men. Schafer notes that:

" ... it seems to follow from Freud's generalization that obsessive natures are more moral than hysterical natures. But the

proposition makes no sense, and this for two reasons. One is that, although obsessives differ from hysterics in at least certain aspects of their morality, it is meaningless to suggest that it is possible to measure such differences on a single scale or indeed on any scale, for these are no scalar quantities that are in question, they are modes of response or configurations of attitude and behavior. One would only be imposing a value judgment in the guise of making an empirical quantitative comparison. Apparently following the patriarchal approach of his time, Freud was, in this sense, confusing values and observation." (Schafer, 1974, 462-463)

In a similar way, a quantitative comparison has been made between shame and guilt, where shame is characterized as a less sophisticated regulator of behavior because its operation is seen to be dependent on the emotional posture of an external object. (Wallace, 1963) Also, shame has been linked with hysterical proclivities among women and guilt with obsessive proclivities among men. (Lewis, 1971) But, as Schafer suggests, these sex differences in the regulation of behavior, mediated by shame and guilt, are qualitative, corresponding to different modes of functioning which can only be described and contrasted. A quantitative comparison makes sense only in the context of some value system. And, as Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962) contend, shame and guilt are, in adults, equally sophisticated ideas of right and wrong. While shame and guilt may differ

in terms of their respective infantile precursors and in the uniqueness of their contents, no structural or functional distinction can be made between the two.

Second, Schafer points out that Freud failed to distinguish between the contributions to morality of the "unconscious infantile superego" and the "reality-attuned, organized, adaptive moral code" to morality. For him, morality was largely superego morality. Schafer suggests that if the harsh, irrational, vindictive character of the "unconscious infantile superego" is considered, then it must be acknowledged that:

" ... superego is not morality at all, nor can morality grow out of it alone whatever superego does contribute toward eventual morality requires considerable tempering before that morality can be secured, and certainly superego cannot temper itself; it cannot achieve its own independence of its being and its emotional origins.

It follows that Freud may have drawn exactly the wrong conclusion from his theory. If, on account of her constellation of castration concerns, a girl does not develop the implacable superego that a boy does, then at least in this respect she might be better suited than a boy to develop a moral code that is enlightened, realistic and consistently committed to some conventional form of civilized interaction among people." (Schafer, 1974, 465-566)

In a similar way, if shame is more commonly encountered among women than men, then perhaps women, being freer than

men from the harsh and arbitrary internalized strictures associated with guilt, retain a greater potential for the kind of development in which their sensitivity of their own needs and the needs of others is not overshadowed by an overly rigid adherence to abstract principles of what one should and should not do, where these principles may represent social conventions which are antithetical to autonomy and to engagement with others. It is in this sense that Lynd (1958) suggests that shame enhances the struggle for a valid identity to a greater extent than guilt.

Third, Schafer notes that if there are sex differences in modes of functioning (here referring to moral judgment, though the same point applies to shame- vs. guilt-proneness) the question remains whether these differences are inevitable or whether they are enforced or enhanced by social conventions mediated by family role behavior, child-rearing practices, the educational system, etc. Within the context of Freud's "evolutionary-mechanistic" model and his phallogentric bias, these issues were not raised.

Another effort to account for the generalization that women tend to be more shame-prone than men was made by Lewis (1971). Her account begins by citing the results of one study which demonstrated that women are more likely to be field-dependent and men field-independent and another

which demonstrated that field-dependent subjects are more likely to be shame-prone and field-independent subjects guilt-prone. (Witkin et. al., 1954, 1968) She assumes that individual differences in both perceptual style and "superego style" (shame- or guilt-proneness) are a reflection of variations in the degree of psychological differentiation. The differentiation construct refers to the idea that development proceeds from the global to the articulated and from the undifferentiated to the structured. Field-dependence and shame-proneness are characterized as reflecting a lesser degree of psychological differentiation than field-independence and guilt-proneness.

Lewis suggests that the factors which account for sex differences in perceptual style should also account for sex differences in the relative proneness to shame or guilt. She also reviews "evidence for sex differences in personal functioning" (cited in Maccoby, 1966) which, taken together with sex differences in perceptual style, would predict that women are more likely to be shame-prone than men. This evidence includes women's greater "interest in and positive feelings for others", their greater "need for affiliation", their lesser display of overt aggressiveness, etc. To give an example of how Lewis ties these findings together, she notes that:

" ... from her generally greater positive attitude toward others and from her lesser degree of aggression towards them, women should, in situations of conflict, retain the valued image of the 'other' longer and more steadily than men. ... women should be more prone to accepting hostility from the 'other' directed onto the self. Because she is more prone to care more, and is less likely to get angry at others, women should be more prone to shaming from them. ... on the basis of evidence that females tend to have more positive, nurturant and affiliational attitudes towards others, we may predict that females have more positive 'images' with whom they strive to be in unison, and whose attributes they strive to emulate. This greater tendency toward 'anaclitic' identifications on the part of females would make them more prone to shame than males." (Lewis, 1971, 154-155)

Lewis' prediction, which is supported by an impressive effort to integrate research findings on individual differences, is basically that the correlation between sex differences in "superego style" and perceptual style can be accounted for in terms of the differentiation construct and that the characteristics of shame- and guilt-proneness can be inferred from the aggregate of individual difference variables which have been found to correlate with the original field-dependence and field-independence measures (i.e., articulation of body concept, "characteristic symptom pictures", defensive styles, etc.).

As Wachtel (1972) points out, the conceptual difficulty involved in an argument of the sort developed by

Lewis, is that when correlations are obtained, one at a time, between field-dependence and field-independence measures and other individual difference variables, it is not necessarily true that "a further extension and elaboration of the differentiation construct has been obtained". Such a finding, in the absence of factor analytic studies which simultaneously relate all the variables under consideration, may "represent instead a relation completely external to the field-dependence or differentiation construct ...". In addition, Wachtel (1972) notes that:

" ... it is necessary to go beyond the descriptions of consistencies and consider more carefully the nature of the consistencies observed. In particular, it is important to distinguish those consistencies which express the limitations of the individual's adaptive capacity and those which reflect choices and strategies." (Wachtel, 1972, 187-188)

Despite the difficulties involved in accounting for the generalization that women are more likely to be shame-prone than men, this appears to represent a commonly accepted clinical observation and it is supported, indirectly, by an intriguing though speculative network of experimental findings and, directly, by the research completed by Binder (1970).

Experimental Studies of Shame

The four experimental studies in which shame-proneness or the level of shame anxiety have been variables are presented in this section.

Perlman (1958) developed a rating scale for assessing subjects' relative proneness to shame or guilt. The Shame-Guilt (SG) Scale consisted of brief descriptions of life situations judged by experienced clinicians as provoking shame (26 items) or guilt (26 items). Subjects were asked to rate the level of anxiety they would experience in the 52 situations in order to assess their relative proneness to shame or guilt.

The SG Scale and the Mandler-Sarason Test (a measure of a subject's general level of anxiety) were administered to 63 second-year medical students at the beginning of the term (neutral condition) and before written midterm exams (shame-provoking condition). Prior to the midterm, subjects were also asked to describe two situations that they thought would be most anxiety-provoking for them and to rate each of their classmates' level of test-taking anxiety. In addition, the three most shame-prone and three most guilt-prone subjects were given a Rorschach, TAT and Sentence Completion Test.

Perlman's hypotheses were that: (1) The relative increase in the level of shame anxiety would be greater than

the relative increase in the level of guilt anxiety for all subjects during the shame-provoking condition; (2) the two situations described as most anxiety-provoking by the shame-prone subjects would involve the threat of evaluation; (3) Shame-prone subjects would be rated by classmates as being more anxious in test-taking situations.

None of the hypotheses were confirmed. The only significant finding was that there was an increase in the general level of anxiety during midterms. The clinical evaluation of the most shame- and guilt-prone subjects showed that the shame-prone subjects were concerned with themes of adequacy vs. inadequacy; guilt-prone subjects with themes involving control of aggression.

In an interesting study, Witkin, Lewis and Weil (1968) claimed that there is a link between perceptual style (field-dependence and -independence) and superego style (shame- or guilt-proneness). Perceptual style was assessed by the Rod-and-Frame, Body Adjustment, Embedded Figures and Figure Drawing Tests. Superego style referred to the implied affect (shame or guilt anxiety) in verbal productions scored by a system of content analysis developed by Gottschalk. According to this system the presence and intensity of various types of anxiety (death, mutilation, separation, guilt, shame and diffuse anxiety) and the presence and direction of

hostility (directed outward, inward or ambivalently) could be scored. The unit measurement was each sentence clause of recorded therapy sessions. Shame anxiety would be scored when there was any reference to ridicule, inadequacy, embarrassment, humiliation, fear of exposure of deficiencies or the threat of such exposure.

A total of 172 candidates applying for treatment at a clinic were tested for perceptual style. Four "extremely" field-dependent (FD) and four "extremely" field-independent (FI) subjects, matched for age, sex and education, were assigned in FD-FI pairs to each of four experienced therapists. The taped transcripts of the first two therapy sessions were scored for implied affect. The therapists and the assistants who scored the transcripts were naive about the purpose of the study. After the two sessions were completed, the perceptual style of the therapists was assessed.

The results showed that: (1) the verbal productions of the FD patients reflected a significantly greater amount of shame anxiety; verbal productions of FI patients reflected a significantly greater amount of guilt anxiety; (2) FD patients were "more prone to directing hostility inward"; FI patients "more prone to directing hostility outward"; (3) FD patients had the highest rate of verbal exchange with their therapists, regardless of the patient's characteristic rate

of verbal exchange (assessed prior to treatment); the highest rate of exchange took place between FD patients and FD therapists; the lowest rate of exchange took place between FI patients and FI therapists.

De Groot (1968) continued the study of the relationship between perceptual style and superego style. He conducted semi-structured biographical interviews among a group of 40 male and 47 female undergraduates. FD-FI was assessed by the Embedded Figures Test. Five-minute sections of the recorded interviews were scored for shame and guilt anxiety using the Gottschalk system. He found, surprisingly, a small but significant correlation ($r = +.26$) between shame-proneness and field-independence; there was no significant correlation between guilt-proneness and the measure of perceptual style. The difference in the results obtained in this study was attributed to the fact that the Witkin et. al. study used patients as subjects, whereas the subjects in this study were normal.

Lewis (1971) reports that the Witkin research group, of which she and De Groot were members, studied the interviews of the 10 most field-dependent and 10 most field-independent subjects used in De Groot's study. They concluded that the FD subjects tended to be "repressors" who reported events in a positive tone and denied having problems; the FI subjects

tended to be "sensitizers" who reported events in a negative tone and exaggerated problems. Also, the basis of the "implied shame anxiety scores" for the FI subjects was their suspiciousness about the purposes of the experiment.

Binder (1970) studied the relative proneness to shame and guilt as a function of "character style". Relative proneness to shame and guilt was assessed by an objective measure, Perlman's SG Scale, and a projective measure, the Early Memories Test (scored using a shame-guilt scale devised by Binder). "Character style" was assessed by various measures: direction of attention deployment (inner or outer); internalization-externalization in defensive style; tolerance for self-ideal discrepancy; faking good or bad in self-presentation; prevailing psychosexual themes (using the Rorschach). In addition, subjects were asked to judge their relative proneness to shame or guilt and to give a brief description of their experience of shame and guilt.

The major hypotheses were that: (1) shame-proneness is related to external attention deployment, externalization in defensive style, low tolerance for self-ideal discrepancy, faking good in self-presentation and psychosexual issues focused around phallic-sexual concerns; (2) guilt proneness is related to internal attention deployment, internalization in defensive style, high tolerance for self-ideal discrepancy,

faking bad in self-presentation and psychosexual issues focused around conflicts over aggression and its control. The subjects in the study were 66 male and female undergraduates.

Analysis of the data showed no support for the hypothesized relationship between relative proneness to shame or guilt and "character style". However, a post hoc analysis of interaction effects among the measures of "character style" indicated that Perlman's SG Scale was actually a measure of cognitive leveling and sharpening, not shame- and guilt-proneness. That is, subjects who got "high shame and high guilt scores" on the SG Scale tended to be cognitive levelers; subjects who received scores in the middle range tended to be cognitive sharpeners.

A significant relationship was found among three variables: gender, cognitive leveling and sharpening (using the results from the SG Scale scoring) and relative proneness to shame or guilt as assessed by the Early Memories Test. Females as a group tended to be shame-prone; men as a group tended to be guilt-prone. Women who were cognitive levelers were shame-prone and men who were cognitive levelers were guilt-prone. Women who were cognitive sharpeners tended to be guilt-prone.

Among cognitive levelers, their self-assessment of their shame- or guilt-proneness did not correspond to the

investigator's assessment of the shame- and guilt-proneness, which was based on their phenomenological report of their experience of shame and guilt and on the Early Memories Test results. Among cognitive sharpeners, their assessments corresponded to the investigator's assessments.

Binder also concluded that the Early Memories Test seemed to be a good method of assessing relative proneness to shame and guilt. The EMT produced the only scores that were systematically related to the subject's phenomenological description of their relative proneness to shame or guilt and was a crucial component of all significant relationships found among the other variables.

After Binder had completed his impressive study, he noted that the experimental study of individual differences in relative proneness to shame or guilt seemed to be premature. He suggested that no theory or experimental study has clarified the meaning of shame on an abstract or phenomenological level. He recommended that it would be worthwhile to limit future studies to a consideration of the phenomenology of shame. The exploration of the phenomenology of shame is one of the ends of the present study.

After reviewing some of the theories and the experimental studies that deal with shame, a word is in order about the perspective from which shame will be considered in this study.

Shame will be considered from an experiential frame of reference, as a complex feeling state. The usual distinction between affects and feeling states is that affect is an abstract, theoretical, metapsychological construct which refers to structures, energies and regulatory mechanisms, whereas feeling state is an empirical, experiential term which refers to the phenomenal content of subjective experience (i.e., wishes, images, fantasies, ideals, feelings, physical sensations, self- and object-representations, etc.). (Leaff, 1971)

Schafer (1964) points out that the overly abstract, metapsychological formulations of affects in psychoanalysis are insufficiently tied to the observable aspects of experience. He suggests that affects are:

" ... part of a complex phenomenon that can't be extricated from the ongoing stream of experience. ... It seems wiser to remain closer to the fluidities and ambiguities of affective experience as observed and not to attempt more precision and exclusiveness of definition than observation can support". (Schafer, 1964, p. 276)

Schafer (1968) points out that, while exploration of subjective experience, guided by categories (i.e., intensity, duration, stimuli triggering experience) that help to guide and organize the observations, provides essential data, it is also necessary to conceptualize the results on a more abstract level. But, he cautions that the experiential and

metapsychological frames of reference should not be confused.

An example of this confusion of frames of reference is Kohut's (1971) use of the term, "grandiose self". According to Schafer (1968) this term is an example of a self-representation, which is an experiential term which refers to the ideas, wishes, values, fantasies, etc. that one has about one's "self". When Kohut attributes structural properties (i.e., it has energy, aims, interactions with the ego) he is confusing the two frames of reference. Schafer (1973) suggests that it is a logical development within ego psychology to use theoretical terms that are closer to subjective experience and actual clinical work, but it is necessary to maintain the separation between abstract concepts and their experiential referents.

Schafer (1968) elaborates about the relationship between the experiential and metapsychological realms. For example, he notes that self-representations (an experiential term) may vary along several dimensions: they may be conscious or unconscious; abstract or concrete; emotional or intellectual; distorted (devalued or idealized) or actual; simple (a perception of a body detail) or complex (an insight into one's personality); organized as aggregates that are coordinated or unintegrated; exist on several levels of organization; vary with time, mood, circumstances, etc.

Though self-representations and the psychic structures represent different levels of conceptualization, it is possible, to some degree, to analyze the experiential terms in terms of their relationship to metapsychological constructs. For example, the self-representation, "I want to be seen as a more competent public speaker," may express the superego standard of renunciation of sexual gratification, an ego interest in competitiveness, an ego value of mastery and an id objective of gratifying exhibitionistic impulses.

Schafer (1967) also clarifies an issue that is relevant to the theory of shame. He observes that the terms 'ideal,' 'ideal self,' and 'idealized self,' all experiential terms, are not distinguished from one another in the theories of Piers and Singer (1953) and Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962).

'Ideals' are not only shaped by the superego, but by all psychic structures. "Ideal self" refers to the images one has of one's 'self' when an 'ideal' has been satisfied. Jacobson's (1964) "wishful self-image" is comparable to the 'ideal self'.

The 'ideal self' and 'idealized self' are not equivalent terms. The 'idealized self' is an aspect of the 'experienced self', which is defined as the image one has of one's 'self' as one thinks one is. The 'experienced self' may be accurate or distorted (devalued or idealized). Therefore, the 'ideal

self' refers to 'ideals' that have been attained; the 'idealized self' falsely implies that an 'ideal' has been reached.

If the 'experienced self' is idealized, there is a small discrepancy between the 'ideal self' and 'experienced self'. But, shame may result when the distortion involved in the idealization is exposed. This conception of shame is typical of many of the theories that were presented. (i.e., Jacobson (1964)) However, another conception is that shame might result when there is a large discrepancy between the 'ideal self' and the 'experienced self' when the latter is devalued (defensively distorted). This second possibility is not one that has been considered in any of the theories of shame.

An additional point, worth considering, is the relevance of the abstract, metapsychological conceptions of shame for a study of shame which stresses an experiential conception of shame. The answer is that there are a number of themes that occur in nearly all the theories, though the way in which they are conceptualized varies from theory to theory. These themes can be incorporated in the categories that guide and organize the observations about the experience of shame. For example, one of the themes that is regarded as central to the experience of shame is concern with being seen by others. Fenichel (1945) discusses the fear of

being seen and despised as an innate reflex pattern that becomes a motive of defense against exhibitionism; Erikson (1950) notes that situations that provoke shame involve the threat that "one is visible and not ready to be visible"; Wallace (1963) relates the concern with the visibility of one's activities during the experience of shame to the incomplete internalization of standards; Steingart (1969) notes that "visual identification forms" mediate the shame experience. This issue, to use one example, is incorporated into the present study in the form of rating scale items used to score interview data about the subjects' experiences of shame. The next section provides more specific information about the present study so that it is clear how the various issues related to shame will be explored.

CHAPTER II

Introduction

This study was conceived of as an exploratory investigation of shame feeling states among female subjects who were self-selected as being prone to shame experiences.

It was an exploratory study because the existing theoretical and empirical investigations of shame have not, in any systematic way, dealt with the question of what the dimensions of shame feeling states are. 'Shame feeling states' is an experiential term that refers to the phenomenal content of the subjective experience of shame (i.e., wishes, images, fantasies, ideals, feelings, physical sensations and self- and object-relationships). (Leaff, 1971)

The study was an empirically-oriented, descriptive approach to the exploration of shame feelings states that involved the development of procedures that served as a basis for guiding, organizing and quantifying observations about shame experiences.

This approach to the study of shame experiences was not an attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of shame or to compare competing theories of shame. Several authors who have attempted such an ambitious undertaking, whether from a theoretical or an experimental point of view, have

concluded that their efforts were premature. (Hartmann & Loewenstein, 1962; Binder, 1970; Lewis, 1971; Beall, 1972)

Female subjects were chosen because women (as a group, in comparison to men) tend to be shame-prone. (Piers & Singer, 1963; Jacobson, 1964; Binder, 1970; Lewis, 1971; Muslim, 1972) Sex differences and other individual difference variables that influence a subject's experience of shame (or report of the experience) were not focal issues in this exploratory study. That is not to say that individual difference variables are not important areas of investigation, but that the study of the relationship between these variables and shame feeling states must come after we study what we mean when we refer to the 'experience of shame'.

Subjects were self-selected because there are no reliable and valid, objective or projective methods of assessing a subject's relative proneness to shame experiences. (Beall; Lewis; Mayman - personal communications) Subjects for whom shame is a characteristic and frequent experience were considered to be well-suited to describe the experience. It was assumed that for these subjects shame represents a "partly independent factor" in their experiences, in the sense that this affect is associated with enduring, stable structures which have acquired a relative degree of autonomy,

so that the existence of this affect is no longer heavily dependent on the momentary strength of its precursors.

(Schafer, 1964)

Method

Subjects

The group from which the final sample of twenty (20) subjects was selected consisted of 102 female graduate students enrolled in their second year of the New York University Master's Program in Nursing. The following instructions were read to the students in seven graduate classes:

"Shame is one of the feelings that people commonly experience. It is a familiar word to all of us, but there isn't much information about the qualities of this experience - what kind of experience - this word refers to. One way to learn about shame is to ask people to talk about what this experience is like for them. This study has two parts. The first involves asking all of you to give me some information about your experience of shame. The second part involves asking some of you, who volunteer, to discuss their experience of shame in more depth at some other time.

When I talk about shame, the experience I have in mind refers to the kind of embarrassment some people commonly feel when they have to give a speech in public, when they are making introductions and forget someone's name or when they feel self-conscious about dressing informally at a formal party. I am not interested at this time in the experience of guilt that some people commonly feel when they are breaking a rule, when they say something that hurts someone's feelings or fail to take care of someone who then gets into an accident and injures himself.

As I mentioned, I would like all of you to answer some brief questions about your experience of shame. I would like to say that I am interested in the nature of the experience of shame, not in what it means when someone is ashamed. I will hand out some forms that you should complete. Please read the instructions that precede each of the forms. Your answers will be anonymous and confidential.

The first form provides a space for you to indicate whether you are or are not interested in volunteering for the second part of the study. Please listen carefully - the people I would like to have as volunteers are people to whom the experience of shame is familiar. Volunteers will be known to me by their first names. They will remain anonymous and what they say will be confidential. Volunteers should write a name by which they can be identified - their first name, for example - and a telephone number at which they can be reached to schedule the in-depth interview about their experience of shame. Thank you."

These instructions conveyed, among other things, that the experience of shame is not 'abnormal', that it was the experience of shame and not the experience of guilt that the investigator was interested in exploring and that only students for whom shame is a familiar experience should consider volunteering. The students were not told that the study would be limited to female subjects.

All students were then asked to complete the following three forms in class (copies of these forms can be found in Appendix A):

- 1) Form I (Interested/Disinterested in Volunteering)

This form requested subjects to place a check in the

appropriate space to indicate that they considered themselves to be shame-prone and were interested in volunteering for the in-depth study of the experience of shame or that they did not wish to participate. Volunteers were asked for additional information so they could be contacted by the examiner to arrange for a second, individual session with them.

2) Form II (Literary Passages/Self-Evaluation of Shame- vs. Guilt-Proneness) This form presented subjects with two passages from Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamazov. The first passage dramatized the experience of shame; the second, the experience of guilt. Subjects were asked to "put yourself in the place of the main character so you can feel the inner experience that is described" in the passages. They were further told that these inner experiences "differ in some of the following ways: in

- the ideas that the character has about herself (himself)
- the ideas that the character has about other people
- the thoughts that other people have about the character
- the issues that the character must struggle with
- ways the character tries to resolve these issues."

The use of the literary passages facilitated the subjects' self-assessment of their shame- (or guilt-) proneness and suits this study well. If the subjects were selected simply by asking them if they were shame-prone, without providing them with the literary passages, it would be possible that the abstraction, 'shame-prone,' would not represent a common set of experiential referents for all the subjects.

Or, if subjects were simply selected by presenting them with a series of situations that are commonly thought of as shame-producing and asking them if they are troubled by those situations, it would be possible that the inner experiences of those students who identified themselves as shame-prone might differ widely in those situations. For example, forgetting the name of a person you are introducing to another is commonly thought of as a shame-producing situation. Some people might experience this forgetting as a personal defect and feel ashamed. On the other hand, the same event might produce a feeling of guilt in another person who experiences the forgetting as a purposive and harmful act.

The purpose of the literary passages was to provide the subjects with a controlled set of experiential referents for the word shame (and guilt) to use as an anchor in assessing their shame- (or guilt-) proneness rather than an abstraction (the words 'shame' or 'guilt') that had no constant

experiential referents for all subjects. And subjects could identify themselves as being shame- (or guilt-) prone on the basis of a comparison of their inner experiences with the inner experiences of the characters rather than identifying themselves as shame- (or guilt-) prone because they are troubled by situations that are commonly thought of as shame- (or guilt-) producing (though they may not be for that individual and the troubled feeling may actually involve some affect other than shame or guilt).

The subjects chosen for the in-depth study from the larger group of students included those females who volunteered for the study (on Form I) and identified themselves as being shame-prone (on Form II). Those females who volunteered and identified themselves as being shame-prone (on Form I) were not included in the second part of the study if they were identified as being guilt-prone on Form II.

3) Form III (Personal Data Sheet)

This form requested students to provide information about their age, birth order, marital status, grade point average, parents' occupations, history of psychotherapy, extracurricular activities, etc.

The average age of the students in the larger group from which the final sample was selected was 31 (ranging in age between 24 - 53). Approximately one-half were married and

one-half were single, divorced or separated. Slightly more than one-half were oldest and only children and the others were later-born children. Most were classified, on the basis of their parents' occupations, as members of the upper-lower or lower-middle socioeconomic classes. Slightly less than one-half had been in some form of psychotherapy for a period exceeding six (6) months. Their mean grade point average was 3.25 on a scale of 0 - 4. The average number of extracurricular activities listed by the students was three (3).

Approximately 6 out of every 10 students in the larger group of students identified themselves as shame-prone. Approximately 4 out of every 10 students who identified themselves as shame-prone volunteered to participate in the second part of the study.

The average age of the subjects was 28 (ranging in age from 24 - 33). Approximately half were married and half were single, divorced or separated. Two-thirds were oldest and only children and one-third were later-born children. Approximately one-half were classified, on the basis of their parents' occupations, as members of the lower-middle class, one-fourth as upper-lower and one-fourth as upper-middle class. Approximately one-half had been in some form of psychotherapy for a period exceeding six (6) months. Their mean grade point average was 3.4. They listed an average of three (3) extracurricular activities.

None of the comparisons that were made on demographic variables (i.e., age, marital status, etc.) yielded significant differences between any of the following groups: subjects vs. non-subjects, shame-prone students vs. guilt-prone students and volunteers vs. non-volunteers.

Description of Instruments

The twenty (20) subjects were seen individually for a period of approximately two hours apiece, during which time the Critical Incident Interview (CII) and the Early Memories Test (EMT) were given. Subjects' responses were tape recorded. The order of presentation of the CII and EMT was counterbalanced. These two instruments are described below:

1) The Critical Incident Interview

The CII is an open-ended, structured interview developed for this study and is designed to obtain a detailed and comprehensive description of the subject's experience of shame. Subjects were asked to recall their most recent experience of shame (the "critical incident") and to discuss the experience for at least five minutes (and to conclude the discussion within ten minutes). The initial instructions to subjects were to:

" ... recall the most recent incident in which you experienced what you would call shame. In the next five minutes please describe what happened at that time. Try to describe how the incident unfolded as a novelist would in writing a short story. Include

details about what led up to the incident and about what the outcome was. Also, mention what you and other people, if they were present, thought, felt, said and did during the incident".

Subjects were then asked a series of 21 questions about the "critical incident" and about their "typical experience of shame." The CII questions are listed below without the directions for the inquiry that accompanied the questions (a copy of the Critical Incident Interview appears in Appendix E):

- 1) Describe the ideas or thoughts you had. What kind of inner dialogue took place in your mind?
- 2) Describe any images or pictures or visual fantasies that were in your mind.
- 3) Describe any feelings you had. What emotions were you experiencing or what mood were you in?
- 4) Describe any physical sensations you had in your body.
- 5) What did you notice about your body positions, movements and gestures? What did you do? What actions did you take?
- 6) What did you say?
- 7) Describe the ideas or thoughts the others had. What kind of inner dialogue took place in their minds?
- 8) Describe any images or pictures or visual fantasies they had in their minds.
- 9) Describe any feelings they had. What emotions were they experiencing or what mood were they in?
- 10) What did you notice about their body positions, movements and gestures? What did they do? What actions did they take?

11) What did they say?

(Asked with respect to the feeling of shame as the subjects typically experience it)

12) What is there about the things you think, your ideas, that makes you feel ashamed?

13) What kinds of emotions or feelings make you feel ashamed?

14) What is there about the things you say or how you say them that makes you feel ashamed?

15) What are the things you do that make you feel ashamed?

16) How does your image of yourself - how you see yourself in your mind's eye - change when you are ashamed?

17) How does your image of other people change when you are ashamed?

18) How does the image other people have of you change when you are feeling ashamed?

19) What do you think - what kind of thoughts make you feel less ashamed?

20) What do you say to others to make yourself feel less ashamed?

21) What can you do - what kind of actions make you feel less ashamed?

The verbatim transcripts of the interviews were scored by two raters using the Critical Incident Interview Rating Scale devised for this study. The CII Rating Scale consists of 22 seven-step, bipolar scale items. Before it is clear how the CII Rating Scale was used, it is necessary to describe the scale in more detail (a copy of the Critical Incident Rating Scale appears in Appendix F).

Each of the 22 scale items refers to a particular dimension of affective experience (i.e., nature of stimulus eliciting affect, affect localization, etc.). Piers and Singer (1953), Binder (1970), Lewis (1971) and Beall (1972) have indicated that the dimensions of the affective experiences of shame and guilt are antithetical. For example, these authors propose that the nature of the stimulus eliciting shame is some incongruity, failure or deficiency of the 'self-as-object'. In contrast, the nature of the stimulus eliciting guilt is some transgression, irresponsible act or failure to act of the 'self-as-agent'. With respect to localization of affect, shame is localized as outside the 'self'; guilt is localized within the 'self'. The CII Rating Scale items are bipolar in the sense that the continuum associated with a particular dimension of affective experience varies in the direction of two opposite extremes, shame and guilt. For example, the scale item used to assess the nature of the stimulus eliciting the affect reported by the subject in the interview reads:

"affect triggered by some incongruity, failure or deficiency of the self."

"affect triggered by some transgression, irresponsible act or failure of the self to act."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The cue or label which appears on the left side of the scale item is associated with the experience of shame; the cue or label which appears on the right side of the scale item is associated with the experience of guilt. The cues which appear on either side of the scale items were counter-balanced so that there was no consistent left-right placement of the shame or guilt cues anchoring the items. There was also a supplementary category, "not applicable", that the raters could score for each item if it did not apply for a particular subject.

Two raters, naive about the aims of the study, were asked to score the interviews as part of a study of the dimensions of affective experience. Raters were trained in the use of the CII Rating Scale and they were given a set of instructions which provided them with a clear conception of the continuum associated with each of the scale items. These instructions contained, for each item, a definition of the continuum and examples to illustrate the cues or labels anchoring the opposite extremes of the continuum.

The CII Rating Scale provided a framework for organizing the subjects' reports of their affective experiences. It was assumed that if the various dimensions of the experiences of shame and guilt are antithetical, then the

shame-prone subjects' reports of their experience of shame should be described by the set of cues associated with the shame end of the bipolar shame-guilt scale items.

2) Early Memories Test

The EMT is a projective technique based on the analysis of a subject's early memories. (Mayman & Faris, 1960; Mayman, 1968) Mayman (1968) states that:

" ... early memories are not autobiographical truths, nor even 'memories' in the strictest sense of this term, but largely inventions developed to express psychological truths about a person's life. Early memories are expressions of important fantasies around which a person's character structure is organized". (Mayman, 1968, p. 304)

Each subject was asked to recall their two earliest memories; their earliest memory involving their mother; their earliest memory involving their father; the story their family most frequently told about their childhood; an early memory which is "special" to them. The inquiry after each memory was elicited followed the procedure used by Mayman (1973). Because of the frank description of the purpose of the study as an investigation of shame, subjects were cautioned that this part of the study involved the recall of early memories in general, and not necessarily early memories related to shame experiences. The subjects' answers were tape recorded and the recordings were transcribed for scoring purposes (a copy of the Early Memories Test appears in Appendix B).

The Relationship Paradigm Scale (Mayman, 1973) was used to classify each early memory in terms of its core organizing theme or "relationship paradigm" (as Mayman describes them). These "relationship paradigms" (i.e., "oral", "anal", "phallic-intrusive", "phallic-locomotor", etc.) are organized around a distinctive affect, self-representation, adaptive and defensive position, as well as phase-appropriate needs, conflicts and ego competencies. One of the 20 sub-categories (associated with a total of 6 major categories of the scale) was used to code each memory (a copy of the Relationship Paradigm Scale appears in Appendix C).

The Quality of Object Relationships Scale (Mayman, 1973) was used to classify each early memory in terms of the level of object-relatedness manifested in the "remembered self-other interactions". The 20 sub-categories (associated with a total of 4 major categories) in the scale refer to a distinctive self-other dilemma, life strategy, level of object-relatedness and characterization of self-other interactions. The major categories of the scale are: "psychotic", "borderline", "neurotic" and "normal" (a copy of the Quality of Object Relationships Scale appears in Appendix D).

Coding of the early memories was done by two experienced clinicians naive about the purposes of the study. To increase the accuracy and reliability of the two EMT rating

scales, raters received training in the use of the scales. They received, along with each of the rating scales, a comprehensive written description of the scale items along with sample scored memories.

Analysis of Data and Hypotheses

1. The primary source of information about the experience of shame is the content analysis of the Critical Incident Interview. This involved the investigator's effort to isolate the subjects' explicit inferences about the meaning, significance or origin of shame and an effort to develop a synthesis, on a more abstract level, which would account for the consistencies among the subjects' inferences about shame. The procedures involved in the content analysis and the results of the analysis are presented in Chapter III.

2. The Critical Incident Interview was scored using the Critical Incident Interview Rating Scale. The hypothesis related to the use of this scale is that the various dimensions of the affective experience described by the shame-prone subjects will be characterized by the descriptions associated with the 'shame' end of the shame-guilt continuum for each of the scale items. In effect, this hypothesis assumes that it is possible to specify a set of descriptions which characterize various dimensions of the experience of shame for each subject. These descriptions were based on the work of Lewis (1971) and other authors

concerned with the phenomenology of shame. (Lynd, 1958; Laing, 1959; Beall, 1972)

3. The Early Memories Test was scored using the Relationship Paradigm Scale. The hypothesis related to the use of this scale is that the early memories of the shame-prone subjects are more likely to reflect paradigms associated with Category III (phallic-assertive, -intrusive, -locomotor and urethral) and Category IV (phallic-sexual) than any of the other major categories of the scale. These categories are scored when the early memories involve conflicts, feelings, needs, activities, etc. related to mastery, strength, competence, status, etc. (Category III) and exhibitionism-scopophilia (Category IV). These conflicts, etc. (as above) have been related to shame by several authors. (Fenichel, 1945; Piers & Singer, 1953; Kanzer, 1964; Jacobson, 1964; Levin, 1967; Pine, 1970; Binder, 1970)

4. The Early Memories Test was also scored using the Quality of Object Relationships Scale. The hypothesis related to the use of this scale is that the early memories of the shame-prone subjects are more likely to be assigned to the "Neurotic" category (subcategories C1 through C5) than to any of the other major categories of

this scale. One problem inherent in Mayman's (1973) calling his major categories "Psychotic", "Borderline", "Neurotic" and "Normal" is that this would seem to imply that a diagnostic classification could be made using this scale; this was not Mayman's intention. Rather, he intended to provide an elaborate description, with corresponding examples of early memories, of various levels of object-relatedness. The labels (i.e., "Neurotic") are intended to suggest, in a broad way, "natural breaks" in the continuum of object-relatedness. Jacobson (1964) and Kohut (1971) suggest that shame-proneness is commonly encountered among people exhibiting some degree of narcissistic character pathology whose interactions with others are characterized by self-centeredness and a relative inability to empathize with the separate emotional postures of others; others are secondary in importance, though their attention and approval are sought. The descriptions of the self-other interactions associated with subcategories C1 through C5 would seem to correspond most closely with this characterization.

CHAPTER III

ResultsI. Analysis of the Critical Incident Interview

The interviews generated the primary source of raw data about the subjects' experience of shame. The verbatim transcriptions of the taped interviews produced 156 single-spaced, typed pages. The average length of the interview transcriptions was approximately eight pages per interview. The average duration of the interview was 70 minutes, with a range of 50 to 90 minutes per interview. The analysis of the interview data is divided into two parts: the results of the content analysis and the results of the bipolar rating scale scoring.

A. Content Analysis of the Critical Incident Interview

The traditional models of content analysis described by Marsden (1965) involve procedures for systematically ordering the content of communications. When applied to the present study, these procedures involved dividing the content of the interviews into units, assigning these units to categories and grouping these categories together in order to synthesize major themes which characterize the subjects' experience of shame. The aim of these procedures was to organize and summarize the welter of information about the experience

of shame of the shame-prone subjects and to make public the assumptions that were made in developing the units, categories and major themes.

Before presenting the results of the content analysis, I feel it would be of use to the reader for me to describe how I proceeded with the analysis - the problems I encountered along the way and the decisions I made in an attempt to resolve them.

Since this is an exploratory study of a complex phenomenon, I decided against any a priori specification of the content units and categories. It was not until I had conducted the interviews, typed the transcripts and reread the transcripts many times that it occurred to me that each subject had gone beyond a simple description of the experience of shame and had offered numerous insights into her experience of shame. Perhaps these insights - the subjects' inferences about the meaning and significance of their experiences - could be the content units. An example of such an insight is the following quote from one of the subjects in the study:

"If I offend somebody, I feel ashamed. (E: Could you say more about offending somebody?) If I -- when you've got a lot of hostility, you end up being very other-directed to hide your hostility and try to be somebody everybody else wants you to be. And when you don't fit that thing and offend somebody -- then you sort of feel ashamed."
(S #1)

The form of the questions in the interview (i.e., "What did you say during the incident?") and my style of inquiring (i.e., "Could you say more about that?") were geared to elicit detailed information about the "critical incident", not to elicit subjects' insights about their experience of shame. Therefore it was surprising that subjects offered their spontaneous insights as frequently as they did.

These insights represent more than the subjects' ability to describe their behavior; they involve the subjects' capacity to detach themselves from their behavior, to observe that behavior and to make explicit the meaning, origin, significance and relatedness of their behavior. Of course, these insights differed in the degree to which they were accurate or distorted, abstract or concrete, emotional or intellectual, simple or complex, contradictory or coordinated, concise or lengthy, etc.

I used the term 'proposition' to describe these insights or explicit inferences about shame. I decided that these propositions could be the content units since they best represented the complexities, paradoxes and texture of the subjects' experiences.

My decision to isolate the propositions (to underline the propositions in each interview) so that they could serve as the content units raised the question of specifying those

portions of the interviews which I considered propositions. How could I discriminate between a proposition and a simple description of the subject's behavior? Should there be a maximum and minimum length for propositions? Would I consider a proposition which occurred in one section of the interview and a similar proposition which appeared in another section of the interview (and added something to the first proposition) as separate propositions? These are not problems in content analysis studies which subdivide the entire interview into units of uniform length (i.e., five minute speech samples) or into units where the matter of specifying the beginning and end of a unit is simple (i.e., sentence clauses or paragraphs).

Since some propositions were stated in the space of one sentence and others occupied the space of a half page in the transcripts, I saw little to be gained in restricting the propositions to a specific length.

Subjects' explicit inferences about the meaning, origin and significance of their experience of shame were generally introduced by qualifying statements such as, "I wonder if I feel ashamed because I ...", "I believe that whenever I get ashamed ...", "I can see the reason that what I said made me ashamed ...", "It occurs to me now that the connection between shame and ...", etc. Schafer (1968) points out that

these qualifying statements which represent oneself as thinker of a thought are reflective self-representations. The portions of the transcripts that I designated as propositions had to be introduced by such a qualifying statement and then go on to spell out some explicit inference about the meaning, origin, significance, relatedness, etc. of the subjects' experience of shame. The propositions conceptualize some link between shame and some aspect(s) of subjective experience - some feeling, wish, fantasy, ideal, need, sensation, impulse, etc.

The specific types of linkages between shame and some aspect of subjective experience varied from proposition to proposition. For example, all the subjects stated propositions which linked shame and anger, but the nature of the linkage varied. I'll paraphrase some of these propositions which link shame and anger to illustrate some of the different types of linkages: "I noticed that when I'm ashamed I'm more likely to feel anger than any other feeling; the two feelings coexist"; "When I look back on the past, I can remember that I always seem to be angry before I get ashamed; feeling angry seems to precede feeling ashamed"; "I've observed how often I have angry fantasies if someone makes me ashamed; anger seems to make me feel bigger to compensate for feeling so small when I'm ashamed"; "I wonder if shame

has to do with anger turned against myself; when I'm ashamed I'm angry at myself until the shame disappears"; "I believe that my anger is trapped and I can't express it when I'm ashamed; I feel so vulnerable when I'm ashamed that I feel I have to be nice to people and keep my anger to myself"; "It never seems to fail; when I'm ashamed I feel angry at people for no reason and they're angry at me for no reason; anger is injected into the situation and there's no logical reason for that to happen"; "It's occurred to me that my getting angry when I feel embarrassed is my way of deflecting others' attention away from what I said that made me feel ashamed".

Given this description of the content unit - the subjects' propositions or explicit inferences about their experience of shame - I will present an excerpt from one subject's interview to illustrate which portions I considered to be propositions and how I isolated the propositions (as I did in each of the twenty interviews) by underlining them in the transcript.

"Once I got furious at a resident because he was just being really obnoxious to one of the interns during rounds -- putting him down in front of other people. And I guess I got really mad at him and started crying. I always get ashamed in situations like that when I do something that's out of place -- I shouldn't have done that there -- it was out of place. I felt ashamed that I did it -- that I got angry that way and that I couldn't have been reasonably controlled. (E: What was the resident doing?)

The intern was with a patient who had d.t.'s all night and he stayed up all night with him taking care of him. And the resident was yelling and said, 'You did a horrible job. Why didn't you give him' -- this kind of medicine? He did it in front of everybody. (E: What was he saying that the resident should have done?) The intern was giving the guy only a little valium and the guy was still foaming at the mouth -- and the resident was telling him he should have given him more -- he should have knocked him out. The intern just stood and took it. He probably should have kept the patient quieter, but he didn't know about that. But he was the one who stayed up all night with him and no one gave him support. Plus, the resident who yelled at him had done the same thing to everyone there that morning. He probably yelled because he was a new chief resident so he was feeling insecure in the position. It seemed to me that he was knocking down the other guy to maintain his position and it really made me furious. But I know that because I expressed my anger by crying and ranting and raving and saying that I was going to quit -- I was embarrassed because I lost control. Uh -- when I get loud, I get very ashamed. When I tell my nurses what to do - like that they should talk to the families of patients - they say they have so much work to do and they don't have the time to talk to them. I'll try to explain and they get louder and louder at me -- and then I say, 'That's okay.' Uh -- when I get loud, I get very ashamed and that's not very often. (E: Say more?) I know that when I've asserted myself -- like at work -- and realize that I went out on a limb and that I've stepped on some toes -- even if I'm right -- I get ashamed and I'll have to retract it." (S #12)

Let me also use this excerpt to make a point about the relationship of a proposition to the context in which it appears. In this first proposition, the subject's inference is that she characteristically feels ashamed when she experiences the expression of her anger, in public, as a loss

of control that is "out of place". She also notes that she "always gets embarrassed in situations like that", but it is not clear what "situations like that" refers to. She might be referring to her loss of control, to her identification with the intern who is publicly humiliated by his superior, to the resident's way of humiliating people in public, to her contempt for the intern because he "took it", to some attempt to expose the resident as being "insecure in his position", to blunting her attack on the resident by acting in such a way as to have other people accuse her of not being able to control her anger, etc. I think all of these speculations are possible, but the subject did not make explicit what she meant by "situations like that" and I didn't inquire at that point to clarify what the subject meant.

The way I dealt with this proposition, and others like this one, in which the meaning of some portion of the statement is not clear, was to use only that portion of the proposition that was clear. My reason for eliminating from consideration those portions of propositions which could only be understood in the context in which they occurred was that I wanted to isolate propositions in which the subject's own inferences about shame were explicit. While I considered my inferences to be valid and worthwhile to my understanding of

the subject's experience, I wanted to distinguish them from the subjects' inferences as much as possible.

Another point I'd like to make concerns combining propositions stated by one subject where the inferences of two propositions were materially the same. In my judgment, the core inferences of the first and second propositions in the excerpt are the same; the subject felt ashamed when she experienced the expression of her anger as a loss of control. In the first proposition the subject adds to this core inference the fact that her loss of control was public. In the second proposition she adds to the core inference a more specific description of the way in which her anger was expressed - "crying and ranting and raving and saying I was going to quit". I combined these propositions because the core inferences were similar and the portions which were unique to each of the propositions extended and clarified the core inference. As a matter of practical detail, combining propositions involved making a written notation to cross-reference similar propositions so that they would be considered one proposition in assigning them to a particular category.

In the third proposition the subject observes, when she is in a position of authority (she is a supervising nurse), that if she asserts herself she feels ashamed when she

realizes that she's "stepped on some toes"; even though she knows she's "right", she retracts what she's said. According to the guidelines for designating propositions and combining similar propositions, I would consider the third proposition to be a separate proposition because the explicit inference is different. However, when I considered the context in which the three propositions appeared and the implicit meaning of the propositions they were, on a deeper level, all related. The subject's embarrassment seems to go beyond her concern with losing control or with "stepping on some toes". On a deeper level, when she has a legitimate point to make (i.e., that the resident is unreasonably critical or that patient care would be improved if the nurses she supervised would be willing to learn about working with the families of patients), she fails to assert her point, even though she knows she is right, if she has to struggle to make her point with others she is angry at; she ends up looking and feeling foolish and her ability to make her point is blunted.

What concerned me was that if I ignored the ways that the context in which a proposition occurred clarified the meaning of a proposition or ignored the ways in which propositions were implicitly related for a particular subject, I would be losing valuable information. What I did so that this wouldn't happen was to make notes in the margins of the transcripts as

I underlined propositions which referred to the context and to the implicit relatedness of propositions.

The next step in the content analysis involved assigning propositions to categories. At that point, I had to decide what these categories should be and what would be the rules for assigning propositions to particular categories. I observed that a number of propositions were stated by more than one subject. The likelihood that a particular proposition would appear in more than one transcript varied from those propositions which appeared in all the transcripts to those propositions which appeared only in one transcript. I decided that one way to organize the propositions was to assign similar propositions in each of the transcripts to a particular category; only one proposition in each transcript could be assigned to a particular category. Let me illustrate what I considered to be similar propositions:

"My image of myself when I'm ashamed -- I see myself as smaller -- visually smaller -- and less a full person." (S #6)

"My image of myself when I'm embarrassed is that, particularly in stature, I'm very small -- very insignificant" (S #8)

"When I'm feeling ashamed I feel smaller -- I feel dumpy and buckteeth and I can see every pimple on my face -- that sort of thing." (S #12)

The central inference of each of these propositions is similar -- that the subject experiences herself as being

physically smaller when she is ashamed. While these propositions are similar, they are not identical; in each case the subject added something to the central inference. For example, the first subject quoted added the idea that she was "visually smaller -- less a full person". The second subject added that she felt "insignificant". The third subject added the idea that she felt physically unattractive. As I examined these propositions, and other sets of similar propositions assigned to a particular category, I tried to examine the so-called additions which were unique to each proposition to see if they were related and whether they clarified and expanded the meaning of the central inference. To use the additions here as an example, to be "insignificant", unattractive and an incomplete person is to be missing something that is essential to the person. So the experience of "being smaller" when ashamed involves both a literal ("I am physically smaller") and a figurative element ("I am less than I need to be"). By examining the similar propositions in each category, I developed category descriptions (these will be presented subsequently) which represented not only the explicit core inferences, but my inferences about the propositions as described above.

Since there were no pre-existing categories to which similar propositions could be assigned, let me describe how I

proceeded to assign the propositions. I took the transcript of subject #1 and numbered all of the separate propositions consecutively. I also abbreviated the central inference of each numbered proposition and wrote it next to the corresponding number. Then I transferred the numbered abbreviations of the propositions to the first row of a large data analysis sheet; these then became the initial set of categories.

Then I compared each of the propositions in the transcript of subject #2 with the categories developed as described above. There were three possible outcomes to the process of matching propositions: 1) a particular proposition for subject #2 could be similar to a proposition stated by subject #1; 2) a particular proposition could appear in the second transcript and not in the first transcript; 3) a particular proposition could appear in the first transcript and not in the second transcript.

If the propositions were similar, I placed a check mark under the appropriate category for the second subject (each subject's name and number were listed in a column on the left-hand side of the sheet and the category numbers and abbreviations were listed in the top row of the data sheet). If a particular proposition appeared in the second transcript, but not in the first, I added a new category to the

existing list of categories. I placed a minus sign under this category to indicate that subject #1 had not stated a proposition assigned to this category. If a particular proposition appeared in the first transcript, but not in the second, I placed a minus sign in the appropriate category for subject #2. I continued this procedure until I had developed a matrix which indicated, by a system of checks and minuses, whether or not a particular subject had stated a proposition assigned to a particular category.

When all of the propositions in each subject's transcript had been assigned to the appropriate categories, I noted that the number of propositions assigned to a particular category varied from category to category. I decided to eliminate from further consideration those categories which contained fewer than five propositions. This reduced the number of categories from 71 to 49 and the total number of assigned propositions from 687 to 622.

The number of propositions stated by each subject varied from subject to subject; the number of propositions stated by a particular subject ranged from 19 to 40 and the average number of propositions was 31.1. Since the length of the interviews varied from subject to subject, I wondered if the variation in the number of propositions stated by subjects was a function of the length of a subject's interview. I

correlated the number of propositions stated by subjects with the length of their interviews in pages. The correlation was not significant ($r_s = -.38$; $t = 1.75$; n.s.); there is no relationship between the number of propositions and the length of the interviews.

The last phase of the content analysis involved the grouping together of mutually supportive category descriptions into five major themes. Each of the category descriptions which were grouped together constituted one link in a chain of ideas which, together, conveyed a novel and fundamental theme related to the experience of shame. The synthesizing work involved in these groupings produced more than a simple summary of the component category descriptions; it produced a novel integration of these elements into superordinate themes which transcended the scope and depth of the unsynthesized elements from which they were formed.

Let me clarify this notion of a novel integration which transcends the elements from which it was synthesized by discussing the way in which an archeologist might solve the following problem. An archeologist is asked to examine shards and to determine whether these fragments come from Greek or Roman vessels. These fragments vary in shape, size and color. In sifting through them, he recognizes that some of

the fragments come from amphoras, some from bowls and some from urns. He decides that, of the various vessels, the amphoras are most likely to provide useful clues about which of the two civilizations the vessels come from. In the first phase of his investigation, through the process of "exclusion"*, he must separate the fragments of the amphoras from the fragments of the other vessels. In the second phase, through the process of "inclusion", he must group the pieces (i.e., by color, etc.) so that he can reconstruct the different amphoras. In the third phase of the archeologist's work (which is comparable to the work of the final phase of the content analysis), through the process of "transformation", the reconstructed amphoras are typed as Greek or Roman on the basis of their size, shape, style, etc. Putting the pieces together yields more than a simple vessel. It produces a vessel of specific size, shape and style which is a reflection of the civilization that produced it.

It is easier for me to specify how I decided that the propositions would be the content units and how I isolated them or to describe how I grouped similar propositions together in categories and developed the category descriptions

*Schafer (1968) uses the terms "exclusion", "inclusion" and "transformation" to describe the work of various types of synthesizing efforts.

than it is for me to specify how I integrated the category descriptions to synthesize the major themes. In developing the themes, I reread the interviews, the propositions and my notes about the propositions. With this information in mind, I sorted the category descriptions into different piles a number of times until I felt that the elements in each of the piles were compatible and mutually supportive. While there is some degree of logic and objective judgment involved in this synthesis, it remains largely a matter of subjective judgment.

In the following section I will present the five major themes, the 49 category descriptions associated with the themes and quotes from the transcripts of various subjects to illustrate the category descriptions. For each of the category descriptions there is a notation to indicate which of the twenty subjects is quoted and a number, in parenthesis, to indicate how many subjects stated propositions which were assigned to that category.

1) Devalued Self

The first major theme deals with the experience of oneself as devalued during the experience of shame. The category descriptions which appear under this heading deal, to a greater or lesser extent, with some aspect of this theme.

The term devalued self as it is used here requires some clarification. According to Schafer (1968) the 'experienced self' is a type of self-representation which refers to the ways in which a person experiences himself; it is an experiential term. It may vary along several dimensions, including the extent to which this self-representation is actual (and involves no distortion) or defensively distorted (devalued or idealized). This theme deals with the question of why the 'experienced self' is defensively distorted (devalued) during the experience of shame.

An observation that I made about the subjects' description of themselves as devalued was that they were not specific or consistent in stating what they felt was wrong with them. They knew that something was wrong with them, they were devalued in some way, but was it that they were lazy, or a poor speller, or too loud, or ugly, or stupid - any critical self-evaluation was interchangeable with any other. Lewis (1971) notes that, during the experience of

shame, the devaluation of the self is global; during the experience of guilt, the devaluation is specific - the target is not the whole self, but some specific aspect or act of the self. I would agree with Lewis' point that the scope of the devaluation of the self is broader during shame, but her point does not account for my observation that the subjects were willing to accept any and all critical evaluations of themselves, whether or not they believed they were true for them. The subjects' experience of themselves as devalued could be compared to a situation in which a person is being criticized and agrees with any and all of the criticisms being leveled at her as being equally valid. Not only did there seem to be evidence of compliance in accepting the criticism (or self-criticism), but the compliance was in some ways superficial. For example, one subject told me that she, "... really, really felt stupid" when she was embarrassed. When I asked, "What came to mind about feeling stupid?", she said, "I didn't really feel stupid; it was just something I didn't feel right about."

All of the subjects reported that, prior to feeling ashamed, some aspect of their actual self -- their position on some issue, for example -- was different than another's position. This observation that they were, in some way,

different was accompanied by a poignant sense of separateness from others. They felt they were different, but not devalued, in relation to others. If they were to assert their position, they believed they would thereby be increasing their feeling of separateness from others. On the other hand, if they were to accept another's position as being correct, even though this involved their disavowing their own position and accepting one they didn't believe in or which represented a threat to them, then, perhaps, they would not feel so separate from others. If subjects did comply in this way, they felt embarrassed and devalued. Subjects speculated that if they had not disavowed their position, feelings, needs, etc., in order to be accepted by others, they would not have experienced themselves as devalued or ashamed.

This sense of loneliness or separateness, which precedes shame, and the willingness to comply with others are crucial factors in understanding the experience of oneself as devalued during the experience of shame. Instead of feeling separate from others, the defensive distortion of the 'experienced self' is a vehicle through which one can 'join' with others. But this bond prevents any genuine engagement because the person must conceal the ways in which he is different from others.

1. During shame, one experiences oneself as devalued.
(20 subjects)

"(E: How did your image of yourself change when you were embarrassed?) Huh, do you mean how I saw myself? (E: Question repeated.) Well, before I felt okay and then I sat there and just wanted to die. I felt horrible -- that's all. Everything was horrible -- a thing. (E: A thing?) Like a stupid baby." (S #19)

2. During the experience of shame, the experience of herself as devalued functions to prevent the subject from expressing her anger. (10)

"If you're ashamed of yourself, it's hard to explain anything to someone because, at the same time, you feel you're such a shit -- you know. It's hard for you to feel the right. That's what it comes down to. The right to tell anything to anybody. You're feeling hostility to some extent because you're feeling misunderstood and you're feeling like such a shit that it's hard to express your hostility. It's a binding kind of feeling." (S #1)

3. During shame, the experience of oneself as devalued functions to obscure the threat posed by another's position; other's position is accepted as valid. (10)

(Note: The subject quoted to illustrate this category description is a psychiatric nurse who is in therapy. Her relatives, blue-collar workers, characterized people with degrees in higher education as "people in their own little world" and people in therapy as "weak". Their position represented a threat to the subject's professional identification and to her involvement in therapy. While she was playing a board game with these relatives, she expressed a concern that her poor performance would support their view of professionals as limited, weak people. She felt embarrassed and experienced herself as stupid, although she was aware, in retrospect, that she took an active role in making herself appear stupid because she wanted to be "part of the family". At the time of the game, she felt "so stupid" that she felt in no position to challenge their views.)

"(E: Describe your thoughts, your inner dialogue during the incident.) Well, thinking, 'How did I get this far? How did I get through all this school? Maybe I should just cut this professional career business out and start having babies or something.' Those ideas were all put-down ideas about what some of my aspirations were. Um -- ideas of them thinking I was stupid. I've heard them talk about people with doctorates -- how they're all people in their own little world and don't know what's going on in the outside world. Especially people in science. And this family is highly critical of any psychological tuning-in -- it's weak. They're more strong kind of people who take care of their own needs and problems. And to go for any kind of emotional support or assistance is weak." (S #6)

4. During the experience of shame, the devalued self functions as a vehicle for 'joining' others. (20)

(Note: The subject quoted here indicated that her classmates agreed with a statement made by a student that the subject considered naive and she expressed anger about their naivete. She also sounded distressed about the fact that she was different from the others -- that she was not in agreement with their position. When she tried to state her position, she was mortified because she got flustered and ended up stating her position in such a way as to encourage her classmates to attack her for being naive. In a sense, she joined others in being naive. An important part of the quote is the subject's observation that her embarrassment was preceded by a feeling that she was different than others.)

" ... I felt a little ashamed -- a feeling against everybody. You know, everyone was on this rap and I felt hostility and I guess I have a hard time showing it, a hard time feeling it. And I guess I felt a little ashamed about what I was going to say because I was feeling mentally hostile -- and I should have said it hostile, but it came out -- you know -- really bad. The real shame, I think, the beginning was when I felt bad that I was feeling different than what other people were feeling. And then -- then, when I said that, came the other shame. Like two doses of it."
(S #1)

5. During the experience of shame, the devalued self functions to provide the subject with a sense of identity she, otherwise, indicates she is not sure of. (12)

(Note: The subject quoted in the preceding proposition accepts the view of herself as devalued in order to relieve her sense of isolation from others. In doing so, she fails to assert a point she believes is true. The point here is not that the subject quoted side-steps the struggle to assert her position; she is so unclear about what her position is and, ultimately, who she is, that by experiencing herself as devalued (i.e., as having no informed opinions of her own and seeing others as having "better thoughts") she is, then, in a position to absorb, as her own, the views of others.)

"Sometimes, as far as ideas go, I feel that I have to read about something. If we're going to talk about something, I like to read about something so that I have that to fall back on -- somebody else's ideas. ... A couple of weeks ago -- there were four of us, including myself -- and, uh -- we started discussing about the future of test tube babies. The other three were lawyers. They were saying that this is the thing to come -- the better thing, possibly And I felt that they didn't know yet what babies get in utero from the mother... . My boyfriend -- (E: He was one of the lawyers?) Yeah. He said it's ridiculous, it's less traumatic to be a test tube baby. It was like all the others had better thoughts on it than I did (laughs sadly)." (S #10)

5. During shame, subject experiences herself as devalued; subject is critical of herself for complying with others' needs and relinquishing her own needs. (10)

[This subject reluctantly agreed to play a board game with relatives who had overstayed their welcome as house guests for the weekend. She decided to play the game even though she had course work to do for the next day. Her husband sat out of the game because he had work to prepare for the next day.] "I would just sit there and laugh and encourage my enemy -- my opponent -- to answer. ... that type of experience -- it was one where I feel shame. ... I was thinking, 'I'm this

dummy that isn't answering the questions,' but it felt like I was directing the anger at me -- because that's what I always do. I was getting angry at me -- uh -- because 'heavens forbid if I get angry at someone else' type of thing. Being this dumb! But I was angry at myself for playing the game and at my husband -- but I feel that it was all kind of a projection. (E: What was the reason he was sitting out of the game?) ... He had work to do for his insurance course. ... But I also had work to do for my master's courses -- but his work seems more 'here and now', whereas my work is less easy to justify to people without being hospitable (sic)." (S #6)

7. The experience of oneself as devalued provides the basis for submitting to others; subject condemns self for submitting (actually, surrendering); others seen as mocking subject for submitting to them. (7)

" ... I was real ashamed, but I had no choice. In the guy's mind -- I don't know what was going through his mind. I think he was so satisfied that he was getting his way all through the thing. I really thought he thought I was stupid. And I was stupid -- I knew it. ... maybe it was like he was king. That he had full control over me -- over my mind -- he controlled every action that I would make. He was laughing at me." (S #3)

8. The devalued self (specifically, 'playing the fool') as a defensive distortion of the actual self that is rewarded by others. (7)

[The subject quoted here is a student teacher at a nursing school. She and her nursing supervisor took a vacation together in the Caribbean where they met a handsome bachelor. During a dinner conversation, the man questioned the subject's supervisor about whether or not she considered nursing a 'true' profession. The subject felt embarrassed because she didn't consider nursing a 'true' profession and considered herself a failure because she had failed in her effort to be a doctor. At that point in the conversation, she left the table to go to the bathroom. When she tried to return to the table, she wandered between the tables because she "was too drunk to find them".] "People were sort of looking, wondering,

'Who was this girl who keeps on wandering past?' I finally found my friends later. I was afraid that I couldn't find them. I felt like an ass -- 'Who was this girl who keeps on passing, trying to make an impression on her friends?' ... Actually, I used my embarrassment to make conversation about it -- to make conversation about myself. And look how I felt -- I was so silly -- and I sort of put myself up for people to laugh at. ... I would probably have been theatrical. Probably I would have come right out -- I interrupted the conversation and said, 'You wouldn't believe what happened to me. I almost couldn't find the table.' It was sort of a tension reliever. It actually made me more attractive -- because, 'Look what a fool I am!' ... It broke the ice. 'This girl is a little drunk, but she's silly -- little-girlish and fun to be around'". (S #12)

9. Thinking about one's accomplishments in order to minimize the impact of the experience of oneself as devalued during the experience of shame. (19)

"(E: What thoughts make you feel less ashamed?) At that moment? (E: Yes) If I exaggerate something at the time that's positive about whatever they have to say -- or even if it's not related exactly, but it bolsters my confidence. (E: Could you give me an example?) Well, I guess about what's going on at the hospital now. I feel extreme confidence in my interpersonal relationships. And were I to make a tremendous mistake medically -- which well might happen -- the only thing I could say is that everybody has their area of specialization and this is mine." (S #14)

II) Being Seen

The second major theme deals with one aspect of shame, the awareness of oneself as the devalued object of another's awareness. One subject, for example, noted, "I don't know-- like I could see by the look in his eyes that he saw me like I was some kind of dope or something." The category descriptions listed under this heading deal, to a greater or lesser degree, with this theme.

Subjects described shame as a compelling visual experience. They indicated that they were being seen (or felt they were being seen), though they didn't want to be seen. The experience was not mutual, it seemed to involve the unilateral intention of others to invade their privacy. The gaze of others seemed to immobilize them. Their gazing at others gazing at them 'joined' them in some way with others, but, unlike the gaze of lovers which brings them together, the experience of being seen by others as devalued seemed to tie them to others and, at the same time, to create a sense of distance from others. This experience of being seen was even more complicated, because while subjects experienced others as looking at them in a critical way they simultaneously observed that people were really not noticing them or that people were even looking at them in an accepting way.

It's possible to devise some formulation in which the experience of being seen during shame is related to a wish to be seen, to exhibitionism, to egocentricity, etc. However, my impression is that what is exhibited serves the function of drawing attention away from one's actual self. Attention is drawn to the devalued self, which is a defensive distortion of one's actual self, a 'false self' as Winnicott (1960) or Laing (1965) would describe it.

An important point can be made about the experience of being seen during shame if one considers this experience in relation to other experiences in which thoughts are represented as visual images. Schafer (1954) discusses the variations in the level of psychic functioning which characterize the continuum - visual perceiving, purposeful visualizing, daydreaming and dreaming. The experiences in this continuum vary in the degree to which the representation of thought is experienced as concrete and is expressed in terms of visual imagery. They all involve a regressive shift in the level of psychic functioning that is temporary, reversible and limited in scope. Shame would seem to fall somewhere between daydreaming and dreaming on this continuum.

These experiences, including shame, involve the temporary suspension of the reflective self-representation (Schafer, 1968). With regard to the experience of shame, when the

representation of the self as thinker of a thought is suspended, the thought remains and is believed to be more actual, though it is not believed to be actual. The distinction between the self and not-self is blurred, but not lost. Thoughts are represented as visual images and, to some extent, they are confused with percepts. The images may be localized 'out there', but they still retain their 'inner' quality and there is no regressive loss of structure of differentiation. Secondary process prevails over primary process thinking. The imagery is still recognizable as being derived from an internal source rather than an external source. The thought, "If someone could see what I actually am, they would despise me," is transformed into the experience of believing that one can see in another's eyes that one is despised, given the temporary suspension of the reflective self-representation and the limited and reversible regression in the level of psychic functioning. The thought that one can be seen in this way is represented in visual imagery which seems more actual, but it is not believed to be actual.

On another level of conceptualization, what is experience of being seen by others as a devalued object involves is the establishment of a bond with others. This bond diminishes the sense of separateness from others that is associated with the feeling that some aspect of one's actual self is not

acceptable to others. But this bond involves little mutual-ity; one's "false compliant self" is engaged with others who are not seen as people in their own right, but as critics. The bond allows one to mask one's actual self, but this is accomplished at the expense of concealing one's actual self, experiencing oneself as devalued and eliminating the possibility of genuine engagement with others.

10. Shame associated with being seen as a devalued object; seeing in another person's eyes that they see you as defective. (18)

"... then, all of a sudden, I saw it -- I guess from R _____ 's eyes I felt as if he -- in his eyes -- I was failing. ...he likes to have around him people who look like he does, which I don't. His favorite people, especially women, are blond and blue-eyed -- Greenwich types -- and that's not me." (S #5)

11. Shame associated with being seen as a devalued object; intensity of shame diminishes if others are not actually present or if subject senses others are not aware of her potentially embarrassing behavior. (18)

"Very little makes me ashamed unless someone else is aware of it. Um -- anything that I've ever done that I feel ashamed of -- the shame has come when someone else has found out about it -- or in anticipating someone else finding out about it." (S #5)

12. Shame associated with being seen as a devalued object; specific reference to checking to see whether or not others have been watching. (17)

[Subject described her concern with flying into a rage at her roommate while they sat in the back seat of a car driven by strangers who were giving them a ride home from a party they had attended.] "... it's all right that we have arguments in our apartment -- but in the car I felt extremely awkward yelling and screaming at her. ... Then -- I remember both of them facing

forward and not turning back. I'm usually in a position to look into the front mirror and see if anyone is looking back, but I didn't see anyone looking back (smiles broadly)." (S #7)

13. Shame associated with being seen as a devalued object; subject indicates that it is uncanny that others have not noticed them, since the sense of being seen by others was an integral part of her experience of shame. (18)

"I know that it was all going on inside of me -- but it's sort of -- no one really seemed to be doing anything. It was such a traumatic experience, but I'll bet that if I asked anybody what happened they would say, 'Nothing'. I don't know if that made me feel better that nobody noticed or whether it made me feel worse -- like I was nuts or something." (S #1)

14. Shame associated with being seen as a devalued object; the experience involves the sense that while others can see you, despite your efforts to remain unseen, what others can see is one's false self, not one's actual self. (9)

"It could have started when -- uh -- the rest of the -- when I realized that I was the only one left in the room with P _____ and he wanted to talk to me about something or other -- I don't know. I didn't want him to see how nervous I was. I got kind of stiff -- he was bored or he looked bored. ... I know he could see that I was nervous for him. Like he expected me to be nervous. He was a doctor and I was a nurse. Like I really knew more about the lecture than he did. But I had to go along with the idea -- you know -- being nervous so he could tell me, 'Don't worry. If you don't understand the lecture I can explain it to you'." (S #19)

15. Shame associated with being seen as a devalued object; subject indicates that she recognizes that the experience of being seen as devalued is based on one's own devaluation of oneself. (12)

"I visualized they were all looking at me, seeing how I couldn't do it. ... Basically, it was my perception of them looking at me. ... You know, what they're seeing is terribly incompetent. Um -- a klutz. ... Like, again I was incompetent and everybody knew it. ...

I think the things that I've been describing -- the visual fantasies -- I don't think it was true. Reality-wise, it wasn't true kind of thing. It was my perception and that's what would make it self-degrad- -- self-deprec- -- I can't pronounce the word now -- as opposed to a degrading type of experience that would involve somebody else... . There would have had to have been more reality to it for it to be degrading instead of self-deprecating. (E: If it wasn't real on that level, was it real on some other level?) ... it's true in the sense of my internal kind of structure ... well, it's kind of an internal construct that I've got for myself of how I have to be able to do certain things and if I don't, other people will know about it." (S #11)

16. Shame associated with being seen as a devalued object; subject wishes to avoid being seen by becoming invisible, encapsulated or hidden. (12)

"I hate to say the word shame --embarrassed. Feeling about two and a half feet tall. ... (E: Say more about feeling two and a half feet tall.) Rolled up in a ball two and a half feet tall. Fetus-like, to hide. ... of getting myself into a position where they weren't looking at me or I wasn't having a fantasy of them looking at me. If I was small and insignificant, maybe then they wouldn't look at me." (S #11)

17. Shame associated with being seen as a devalued object; 'being seen' experienced as an intrusion; efforts to ward off intrusion by affecting a socially acceptable facade. (7)

[The subject quoted here described an incident in which she had been working very effectively in her effort to complete a project. Papers were in disarray on her desk. Her boss, a man she described as being interested in appearances, entered her office unexpectedly and yelled, "This office is a shithouse".] (E: Describe what you said?) Big glad-handing things. 'Hi, how are you? How are things going?' -- to try to mitigate the effects of the mess that was around. ...If a boss comes in and there are three people working hard on something ... it should have been a feeling of being pleased with myself. ... I was extremely embarrassed. I felt like shit. I felt almost undressed. It felt as if my privacy had been invaded." (S #5)

III) Hiding One's Actual Self

The category descriptions listed under this heading deal with the third major theme, the wish to hide one's actual self during the experience of shame and with those aspects of one's actual self that need to be hidden. Subjects indicated that they wished to hide the fact that they felt helpless, needy, dependent and angry. They indicated that to reveal these feelings to others would make them feel "weak and vulnerable". Subjects also said that if they did not need to hide the fact that they had legitimate needs, that they did feel helpless, that they needed to be engaged with people and that they could be enraged - then they might not be embarrassed as often as they were.

The ways in which subjects hid included withdrawing and masquerading. The withdrawing took the form of limiting one's involvement in potentially embarrassing situations, leaving embarrassing situations, averting one's eyes in embarrassing situations, wishing one could disappear in embarrassing situations, etc. The masquerading took the form of making efforts to appear unaffected when embarrassed, appearing 'strong' when feeling vulnerable, impressing others with one's mastery when feeling insecure and embarrassed about one's ability, etc.

18. Shame associated with sense that others would be disgusted if they were aware of one's hidden self (17)

"(E: How does your image of yourself change when you are embarrassed?) Well, the image is, a -- more like -- if these people really knew what I was like, they would be disgusted ... so repulsed. (E: What comes to mind about what would disgust them?) If they knew how childish and immature and silly I could be." (S #2)

19. Shame associated with the sense that others can see that you are helpless and weak or needy. (12)

[The subject quoted here indicated that she was phobic about eating in public places. She regards her difficulty as a weakness that she has to hide from other people.] "When Mary asked me to go to the -- to meet her for lunch and I went -- I knew what would happen. I said, 'How dumb could you be to go?' ... Mary must have had the idea she was being helpful to me. She knew about my eating problem. I mean -- you know -- all those ideas were going around. I was trying to make the best of it -- trying to eat. She knew, but I was trying to make it seem like nothing was wrong. (E: Say more about wrong.) I didn't want her to think that I was helpless and that I needed her help or anything like that." (S #20)

20. Shame hidden because of sense that if others knew you were ashamed you would be vulnerable. (20)

"I can't acknowledge the embarrassment to other people. I can't acknowledge that feeling to other people ... because then I'll have to acknowledge the other things that go along with it. (E: Go along with it?) I think all the infantile type of stuff. I have the feeling that if I acknowledge it, then I'll be giving in; I'll have lost." (S #11)

21. Subject expressed wish to speed up, stop, disappear from or run away from an embarrassing situation. (18)

[The embarrassing incident related by this subject involved a panel discussion that she was a participant in. She was embarrassed because she was the only panelist who referred to notes while presenting.] "I wished I could have just vanished from that point. ... I just

felt it should be over fast. ... I just wanted to get it over with. I blew it in my own mind. I just wanted to read it fast and get it done." (S #10)

22. Shame associated with feeling singled out as being different from others and excluded. (12)

[The subject quoted here was introduced by her boyfriend to a girl who had a reputation for being seductive. The subject tried to be overly friendly to mask her anger at the girl, but only managed to be insulting. The subject was embarrassed by her "accidental" insults.] "I stuck out like a sore thumb. Whoever says something like that is immediately ostracized -- not ostracized, because they don't really ostracize me. But, you know -- immediately you're not one of the group anymore. You know what I mean?" (S #9)

23. Shame associated with sense that others can see you are angry at them; that one's mental contents are visible to others. (6)

" I wasn't from a very -- like sort of intellectual background. I always had this anger about intellectuals when I was younger. During the class I almost felt as if people could see that. You know what I mean? ... And here I am in school with the same smart-ass bastards and I'd like to kick their faces in. But I'd also like to be their friend -- so how do you deal with that?" (S #1)

24. Shame associated with being loud, boisterous or fighting in public. (19)

" ... And then the argument starts and I'm not thinking. I'm not thinking about what's going on except what he's [her boyfriend] saying to me. ... and I'm becoming very embarrassed because we're arguing in front of them [two friends] and I hate that. It's like rushing through an argument, but trying not to say anything to get him angry. And then we were outside and there was nobody around and I turn and I start answering him" (S #16)

25. Subject values appearing 'strong' or 'cool' or 'never losing control'; shame associated with expressions of or experience of strong feelings in public. (7)

[This subject's husband had been receiving treatment for cancer for two years. A month before the interview was conducted the subject and her husband were told that he was expected to live for less than six months. The embarrassing incident she related involved her crying in front of co-workers when she phoned an old friend to tell him about the prognosis.] " ... And then while I was talking to him, I started crying ... after telling him what had been happening the last few months. ... Well, I guess it was a matter of keeping my image of strength and of keeping things to myself -- things that were bothering me. ... over the past couple of years I definitely feel that I've become a strong person. And it was against my self-image to break down like that, whether or not I had a reason to do it." (S #15)

26. Specific reference to feeling like crying after embarrassing incident and suppressing one's tears. (6)

"During the incident I felt a tightening in my stomach -- a lump in my throat -- holding back tears After the incident ended, I just wanted to not look around. I just looked down and I just wanted to hide. I was very fidgety and yet I wanted to move, but I wanted to stay hidden. Like -- you know -- to keep myself together, in one place." (S #1)

27. One's awareness of one's limitations results in embarrassment in the context of attempting to obscure those limitations by impressing others and failing. (17)

" Anything that ruins my image makes me embarrassed. I think that bothers me more than anything else. (E: Image?) I certainly -- okay -- an image that I want to project. I think everyone has an image that they want to project and then there's the real 'you' underneath that you know about. Okay. I really know that my intelligence is really middle-of-the-road ... average. But I'd like to project myself and give people the impression that I'm smart. ... So that's why you hate to stick your foot in your mouth and come out looking like a complete asshole." (S #4)

28. Feeling weak, blank, empty or unsubstantial as physical concomitants of the wish to vanish during the experience of shame. (18)

"I remember feeling kind of light-headed when I was ashamed. Sort of short of breath -- difficult to breath -- a heaviness on my chest -- and then, a lump in my throat. I just felt drained. Kind of numb, as if I was coming off a rush. ... And like I wasn't really aware of what was happening around me. ... I was feeling the numbness and emptiness." (S #2)

29. Shame associated with heightened awareness of skin sensations; one feels 'touched'. (17)

"(E: Describe the kind of physical sensations you experienced when you were embarrassed?) Yeah, I felt like a little shock or tingle. Like -- just about the same feeling if you walk and think you're alone in a room and you turn and there's someone there -- a sensation almost on your skin." (S #5)

IV) 'Being' for Others

The category descriptions listed under this heading deal with the fourth major theme, the relationship between shame and failing to 'be' for others. 'Being' for others involves defining oneself in terms of others' needs, feelings, opinions, expectations, etc., while one's own needs, etc. are obscured (suppressed or dissociated). To give an example, one of the subjects in the study described the pleasure she received from completing some work for a project she was working on. Papers were in disarray on her desk. Her boss came into her office and told her that the place looked like a "shithouse". She was jolted by his remark because she expected him to praise her for working so hard. She felt her privacy had been invaded, she felt naked and she felt like "shit". She noted that her boss was an empty man, intoxicated by his own importance, who cared more about her papers being arranged neatly than about the project she was working on for him. She tried to charm him, to apologize for being sloppy; she did this automatically, though she was angry at him and did not feel committed to what she said to him. In glad-handing him and accepting his indictment of her, she betrayed her own feeling that the work she had done was valuable and her evaluation of him as being an "empty" man. She joined him in this way, complying with his indictment of her,

not simply because he was her superior or because she couldn't get angry at him. She was impressed by him and if she were able to win him over, to please him, his approval of her, she felt, would be a great gift only he had the power to bestow. She noted, "I think that if my real feelings for him were overt and I didn't make any effort to hide them when I was around him, I wouldn't have been embarrassed. ... And I do it automatically. I don't plot it. When I meet him, I spring into action and do things that I think he will like for me to do." (S #5)

It is in the context of failing to 'be' for others that the subjects reported that they experienced shame. Shame occurred in the framework of needing others' approval and failing to get it, of acting as an agent for others' needs and failing to achieve what others desired or of needing to have power over others and to impress them and failing so that one felt vulnerable. This formulation is quite different than formulations which consider shame to result from failing to live up to one's ego ideal (Piers & Singer, 1953) or failing to achieve an ideal state which is associated with the strivings of an "archaic, grandiose self-structure" for reunion with an idealized object. (Kohut, 1971) It also does not refer to failing to achieve a goal one has set for oneself or to disappointing others, in the limited sense of letting them down.

In this connection, Gruen and Hertzman (1972) note that it is compliance that leads to the substitution of the need for approval and achievement for one's strivings for autonomy, and, ultimately, to the need for power as a means of denying one's helplessness.

In addition, subjects reported feeling blank, numb, empty or unsubstantial during the experience of shame. I assumed that these feelings, which are a reflection of the subjects' 'not being there', resulted from the subjects' needs, feelings, etc. having been obscured, suppressed or dissociated in connection with their need to 'be' for others and not themselves. Of course, the extent to which subjects defined themselves in terms of others' needs, etc., rather than their own varied from subject to subject. But to the extent that they did, others were experienced as being, on the one hand, more impressive and alive, and, on the other hand, more controlling and intrusive.

30. Shame associated with failing to 'be' for others; acceptance by others is predicated on complying with others' demands. (2C)

[This subject noted that she was able to sing in public without feeling embarrassed. But she couldn't sing at home with her boyfriend when the two of them were alone without feeling embarrassed.] "I feel inferior to him in cultural sorts of things. Like he really knows

symphonies and painting and he can recite Shakespeare and I can't What I probably equate it with is his love for me and his acceptance for me -- doing what he wants me to do." (S #12)

31. Shame associated with failing to 'be' for others; acceptance by others is predicated on acting as an agent for their needs, rather than for one's own needs. (8)

"(E: Anything come to mind about the connection you made between feeling ashamed and seeing yourself as smaller?) Oh, sure. I'm sure it's connected back up earlier where my mother used to make me feel terribly embarrassed. She used to put me into positions where I couldn't be what she wanted me to be and I'd feel ashamed. I remember -- I must have been three and a half -- she made me sing a song. I couldn't sing it. I couldn't remember it. I was so embarrassed. I think it was up at a camp we were at. It was like this group of trustees were up there and my mother [a camp counselor] made me sing a song for these people. And she was always doing things like that -- putting me in that position where I was supposed to be something for her that I'm not and as a result of failing at it and not doing well and then feeling, 'Why did she do that to me...?'" (S #11)

32. Shame associated with failing to 'be' for others; subject notes tension between anger at others and compliant false self is associated with feeling embarrassed. (10)

"(E: What is there about the things you say that makes you ashamed?) Yeah, I got lots of shame (anxious laugh). I feel a lot of times like very -- ashamed when I've been dishonest with somebody -- if I say the wrong word -- if I offend somebody I feel ashamed.

(E: Could you say more about offending somebody? Could you give me an example?) If I -- when you've got a lot of hostility, you end up being very other-directed to hide your hostility and be somebody everybody else wants you to be. And when you don't fit that thing and you offend somebody -- then you sort of feel ashamed." (S #1)

33. Shame associated with failing to 'be' for others; subject notes that expressing anger at others hidden by compliant false self would relieve embarrassment.
(11)

"On the one hand, fuck you, so you don't like me. On the other hand, I find myself doing things that -- if they will not make him like me -- well, at least they will please him. ... I was sort of caught in a dual role -- with everyone knowing that I didn't like him and, at the same time, that I was trying to be ... charming with him -- that I set myself up to be smacked down. ... I think that if my real feelings for him were overt and I didn't make any effort to hide them when I was around him, I wouldn't have been embarrassed. ... And I do it automatically. I don't plot it. When I meet him, I spring into action and do things that I think he will like for me to do." (S #5)

34. Shame associated with failing to 'be' for others; sense of self as not skilled, competent or proficient obscures underlying sense of self as helpless. (9)

(Note: In the context of feeling embarrassed for failing to live up to others' expectations, nine subjects indicated that they pictured themselves as failing because they were unskilled or untalented in some way. When these subjects were asked to elaborate about their lack of skill or talent, their associations pointed to an underlying sense of helplessness. Their sense of themselves as unskilled represented a transformation of a self-representation of being helpless into a self-representation of being unskilled, etc. For example, for the subject quoted to illustrate this proposition, the embarrassing incident she related involved feeling herself as out of shape so that she couldn't keep up with the exercise routine that others were performing in a gym class. However, when asked whether or not it was a matter of being unable to do specific exercises or all exercises, she noted it was a matter of being unable to do two exercises which put stress on her ankle joints. She then recalled memories of feeling helpless as a child because of an orthopedic problem involving her ankles.)

"Um -- but at one point I just stopped and everybody else went on and I was left behind and alone and feeling

like, 'Well, I can't do it. I can't make it. I can't go on with this particular type of thing and I wish I hadn't been so stupid and come and do this thing to myself -- put myself in this position.' ... (E: Why do you think you had difficulty with those two exercises?) Uh (anxious laugh) -- when I was a child, I couldn't do anything because they had to do orthopedic work. (E: Say more?) I used to have to wear heavy metal arches that came up to here (points to ankle joint) and special orthopedic shoes. Something was wrong with the bones and I walked on the sides of my feet. So, that it wasn't exactly -- it was more the sense of not being able to do or not being able to function in a certain way -- but I got myself functioning." (S #11)

35. During the experience of shame, others seen as being contemptuous, arrogant and supercilious. (16)

"It was everybody and they were looking at me -- just basically -- I don't know whether I can expand it. It was patronizing and condescending Something along the lines of, 'What did she come for anyway?' ... Haughty kind of arrogance -- and an unwillingness to accept -- I can't get the word to describe it." (S #11)

36. During the experience of shame, others seen as being more powerful, prestigious or impressive. (10)

(Note: The subject quoted here describes a man, who had embarrassed her, as being prestigious in the sense of his having an illustrious background and impressive appearance. However, she also sees him as being superficial. It is interesting to note that the Latin word from which prestigious is derived, praestigiōsus, is defined as 'having the power to command admiration through deceitful tricks or illusions'.)

" ... a very attractive appearance in a very conventional sense. A tall, well-built, fair-skinned, fair-haired person. Brooks Brothers dress. Um -- who plays paddle tennis and went to Yale. Okay, that's in one sense -- and then, in another -- who believes that an orderly desk means an orderly person means a successful person. And feels that how you look really should be geared to what impression you want to make on other people He's not worried about intrinsic

values -- or what's really good or what's really bad, but only about what he will get out of it." (S #5)

37. During the experience of shame, others experienced as more mobile and intrusive. (9)

(Note: This proposition refers to statements involving a sense that one is riveted in place and hiding and that others are mobile and moving closer to the place where one is hiding. This sense might correspond to the thought, "If I remain still, perhaps I won't be seen.") "I was feeling like -- an oppressed minority or something (laughs). Feeling alone. Feeling like -- I can't explain it -- very separate from the class -- like really alone at the moment. ... People sort of seemed to be coming at me. They really weren't coming at me. They were in their seats and talking -- but they seemed to be coming at me." (S #1)

38. During the experience of shame, others experienced as being more alive and threatening. (20)

[The embarrassing incident related by the subject quoted here involved her being told by a girl who was a stranger to her that she was having an affair with the subject's boyfriend. In the quote, the subject is describing the girl.] "I had seen her a couple of times and I remember her because she was very flashy. She had long black hair and big tits. And, she was very threatening to me. ... I thought that she was -- she had big breasts and she was sexier and more of a woman." (S #2)

39. During the experience of shame, others experienced as being higher in relative status; the disparity in relative status associated with the observation that others are idealized. (8)

"I have a serious case of foot-in-mouth disease -- where I'll open my mouth and say something to someone that I shouldn't have and then I'll wish I had been a little more prudent -- um -- where I'm trying to prove myself by something I've said. If I don't feel that I have to prove myself, then it doesn't happen. ... (E: What kind of person does that happen with?) Well, for example, the leader of my Family Therapy seminar -- people who I have a great deal of respect for, but who I feel very distant from and who I feel I can't get

close to them in any kind of way. People who I put up a couple of feet instead of keeping them down on the ground where they belong." (S #11)

40. During the experience of shame, others experienced as being higher in relative status; others have the power to bestow approval. (10)

[The subject quoted here noted that she felt flustered and child-like when speaking on the telephone with 'important' people.] "Well, there are certain situations in which I actually get tongue-tied. There are a few people I have difficulty talking to on the phone. People who are either pressed for time with whom I'm taking time that I feel doesn't belong to me. Then I really have to make a list of what to talk about to not take up any more time than is necessary because their time is important -- and I'm constantly thrown when someone like that wants to chat. I feel that I've been given a great gift." (S #17)

41. Shame associated with failing to 'be' for others; the paradox of minimizing one's accomplishments in order to maximize the possibility of complying with others' expectations. (11)

(Note: While there are many factors involved in obscuring one's accomplishments, one factor is relevant to the present study. Eleven subjects indicated that they played down their accomplishments or abilities so that others wouldn't expect too much from them. In that way they wouldn't be embarrassed for failing to comply with others' expectations. The subject quoted here was offered a position as a clinical specialist because her supervisors were "superimpressed" by a paper she had written. She said that she would have to minimize her competence after she received the offer so others wouldn't expect as much from her.)

"I do that because it's like a protection against myself if I feel I should fail -- all I'm getting [now] is positive feedback -- which feels great, but I'm terribly frightened about whether I'll really be able to live up to the positive feedback that I'm getting" (S #14)

V) Submission, Helpless Rage and Power

The category descriptions associated with the fifth major theme deal with one of the aspects of shame, the subjects' efforts to deny or reverse, in thought and/or deed, the helplessness and rage associated with submitting to others during the experience of shame.

The submitting refers to the subjects' efforts to 'go along with others' in order to gain their approval. The extent to which subjects submitted ranged from appeasing or placating others to more abject forms of surrender. When subjects discussed incidents in which they submitted to others, they said that they not only felt embarrassed, but enraged. However, at the time, they felt that they couldn't express their anger because it had the quality of helpless rage, because it would offend others whose approval they needed, because others seemed more powerful, because they felt devalued and felt they had no right to express their anger, etc.

Subjects who recognized that their submitting resulted from their need to have others approve of them and from their need to protect and conceal those aspects of their actual self which they felt others would not accept (including their expression of their rage), reported that, after they felt ashamed, they had fantasies of being more powerful than

others or of getting revenge. Subjects who regarded their submitting as something they had to do because they were being victimized by others and who regarded the experience of themselves as devalued as resulting from others 'putting them down', reported that, after they felt ashamed, they acted, overtly or covertly, to turn the tables on others. They felt they had a right to seek revenge, to diminish others as others had diminished them.

Gruen (1974b) points out that one reflection of the lack of an autonomous self is the need to submit to others in order to gain their approval. He adds that man hates to submit, but, in weakness, accepts submission in return for the promise that if one does what others expect, he will be loved. This love, however, is a false love which demands conformity. In accepting false love in return for being an agent of others' needs, rather than one's own needs, one dismisses the possibility of being loved for one's true self. When the need for approval becomes central and is substituted for the more fundamental need to strive for autonomy, one hates oneself for betraying one's needs and hates others for exacting submission as the price for (false) love. If the lesson is learned that one can get what one wants through power, one can deny one's helplessness and limitations by exercising power over others. And, in being vengeful toward others who

demand submission, one can deny the self-betrayal involved in submitting to others.

42. Shame associated with submitting to others followed by fantasies of revenge. (10)

"E: What did you notice about the quality of the anger? Yeah, the quality of the anger was well -- oh -- you're a bully -- a bully you have to appease and you don't have -- and any way you have of getting back has to have the quality of a fantasy and you won't have the opportunity of doing it. So, it takes an exaggerated form of walking into his office and kicking him in the balls. ... Sort of a smoldering anger you feel at a bully's hands where you're not strong enough to stand up to him -- and the anger becomes inverted into fantasies of getting back and -- in ways that are so much stronger than anything that he has ever done to you." (S #5)

43. Shame associated with submitting to others followed by fantasies of power. (20)

[The subject quoted here is describing one aspect of her relationship with her roommate.] " ... usually I feel as if I have the higher position with her. ... But when she started to pick at me, it was like she was a woodpecker -- you know -- continually expecting me to come up with some answer that I didn't know. ... I was feeling very cramped and I shifted my weight -- and when I did I felt as if I was squishing everybody on the seat off to one side (laughs). My fantasy of power wasn't true." (S #7)

44. Shame associated with submitting to others followed by an effort to control others. (6)

[The subject and her female roommate attended a party where they met a man who was being secretive about who he was, what his profession was and where he lived. He was teasing the two women, but they continued to

question him in an earnest way until they both realized they were being humiliated. When the subject's roommate asked her, in an aside, how she should deal with the man, the subject became enraged at her.] "She was controlling me -- but in order not to appear controlled, I have to control her. ... I was screaming at her. I remember all of the people [at the party] fading away from me and I was getting larger -- like Alice in Wonderland -- is that it? -- and they were getting smaller. ... If looks could kill --. But, there was probably hurt there too. ... Maybe it's when I'm angry that I expand and maybe the anger is a response against the shame -- instead of taking the anger on yourself." (S #7)

45. Share associated with submitting to others followed by an act of vengeance. (8)

[The incident to which the following quote refers involved the subject's submitting to the cruelty of a man who impersonated a policeman. He interrogated the subject and her boyfriend after they had driven into a parking lot that was deserted. The subject refused to notify the police because, among other reasons, they wouldn't believe that she allowed a man she knew wasn't a policeman to interrogate her for more than an hour, and, also, she might be arrested. If she were arrested, so her thinking went, she might be expelled from her nursing program. Some weeks later, her boyfriend stopped a car that looked similar to the one used by the impersonator and, thinking the man to be the criminal, he pummelled him. The subject then identified him as the impersonator and he was arrested. It was only as a result of an improbable sequence of events that it was discovered that the man was innocent before he went to trial.] " ... it was too embarrassing to tell the cops ... and, really, they'd never find out anyway -- find the guy. ... I had to pick out of a line of guys -- and one of the guys was the guy that P_____ (her boyfriend) beat up -- and out of the line I picked the guy that P_____ beat up. I thought it was the guy, but I wasn't sure. ... I told him [her boyfriend, just after the incident in the parking lot], 'I don't know if we should go to the police and tell them or just stay calm and try to forget about everything that happened?' I just kept on repeating to him that we have to get that guy back on our own. That we have to find him and get him back." (S #3)

46. Shame associated with the exposure of efforts to deceive others in order to get one's own way; when the deception is exposed, the subject maintains that the deception was unintended. (8)

[The incident this subject related involved her feeling ashamed when she had to tell her husband that she had gotten pregnant because she had, secretly, refused to use her diaphragm.] "I was supposed to be using the diaphragm, which I was. But it became more off than on -- and I really wanted to -- but I really wasn't supposed to because we had mutually decided that -- . Well, I was really trying not to deceive him, but I was -- you know -- I was, but I wasn't trying to get pregnant. Well, then I did. ... (E: Could you describe your thoughts, your inner dialogue when you told him?) Uh -- I think I wanted him to say that, 'Everything was all right. I'm really glad that you told me.' And I think that's what I expected. ... I felt like I was a creep. I felt really low, sneaky and miserable. I felt like a -- I blew it. I was also concerned about myself. Uh -- we really had a good marriage. I didn't want anything to change -- because I decided to get pregnant. ... And I thought that, 'Well, gee -- now I'm pregnant and I really need to be taken care of.' -- and that whole thing -- and had to be accepted -- and I needed the baby to be accepted too. And I was very concerned with that. I was more concerned with myself. ... (E: How did the conversation end?) Everything worked out the way I thought it was going to work out (laughs heartily)." (S #4)

47. Shame associated with appeasing others; acting in a solicitous way in order to control others - at the same time, acting in a solicitous way experienced as being controlled by others. (9)

[This subject tried to convince a neighbor that he should move his car that was parked in such a way as to prevent her father from driving his car out of a space in a restricted parking lot. The space belonged to the neighbor and he had blocked the car because it was parked in his spot.] " ... I had my uniform on and everything and I figured that would get me somewhere and evidently that didn't. I said, 'I'm sorry -- hey -- I didn't know they parked there. I told them that. They shouldn't have and I'm really sorry.' I was really

demeaning myself. Really like being extra sweet -- and I really felt like hitting him in the kneecap. I really felt like telling him, 'Hey, take a walk and get your car out of there.' ... Usually people say, 'Now, don't worry about it.' But these people came right on in and attacked. ... and as he came out to move the car, I was kind of following him -- to apologize more (said in disbelief)." (S #9)

48. Acting in a solicitous way in order to make others comfortable; shame associated with an inability to make others comfortable or with having made others uncomfortable. (10)

(Note: Ten subjects indicated that they felt embarrassed when they made others uncomfortable or they were unable to make others comfortable. It is difficult to make a general statement about the meaning of this experience because it refers to a complex phenomenon, because the experience and its determinants are peculiar to each subject and because the experience was not explored in depth. However, the examiner's sense of what the subjects experienced when they were ashamed because others were uncomfortable could be expressed by comparing this experience with the experience of a child faced with the dilemma of feeling it should provide mothering for a withdrawn mother. In such a situation, the rage associated with the frustration of the child's needs and the resentment at having to mother it's mother would be difficult to tolerate. One way of dealing with the rage and resentment might be to condemn oneself for being an inadequate mother rather than expressing the anger and resentment at the actual mother.)

"If I'm uncomfortable in someone's company, I wonder if they're uncomfortable in my company and this makes me feel -- . (E: If they are uncomfortable?) I'd feel ashamed that I'm not able to make them comfortable. (E: If they are comfortable when you are not comfortable?) I don't think that would matter. (E: You also mentioned before that you feel it's a weakness in you that you can't make people comfortable.) Another -- eh -- when I meet people and I'm not able to communicate with them or I'm more uncomfortable in their company -- I just sit there and wring my fingers or something like that -- and I feel uncomfortable. ... I feel that I've put them in a spot -- maybe that they would be thinking

that it's something that they did that has made me embarrassed or ashamed."

[This subject's earliest memory is of sitting with her mother before a hearth. She notes, "And I can visualize my mother -- maybe because she's reinforced it -- not being very happy... . And I can see her sitting there holding her face with her hands and looking very sad. and I can remember I felt uncomfortable because she felt something like this."] (S #8)

49. Shame associated with appeasing others and derogating oneself as a rival in order to mask a hidden sense of power. (13)

[The subject quoted here is a student teacher at a nursing school. She and her teaching supervisor took a vacation together and met a handsome bachelor. During dinner she was embarrassed because she couldn't find her way back to the table after she had gone to the bathroom. When the women returned to their room, the subject engaged her supervisor in a conversation in which she derogated herself and asked for 'motherly' advice. The conversation didn't seem sincere. The subject was asked what the point of the conversation was.] " ... J____'s thirty years old and not too attractive -- intelligent -- comes across kind of coarse. ... J____ was feeling good because I don't think she's had a -- much social experience with guys. ... There was some competition going on between us but it wasn't oppressive. It was sort of a jockeying back and forth. ... The only thing -- maybe it had to do with my feelings about J____. The fact that I was trying to make myself -- the fact that she wasn't involved with anybody there -- maybe I was trying to make myself foolish in her eyes so she wouldn't feel bad that -- uh -- here I was with this nice-looking guy." (S #12)

B. Analysis of the Critical Incident Interview Rating Scale

The verbatim transcripts of the CII were scored by two raters using the CII Rating Scale devised for this study. I've described this scale in more specific terms in Chapter II. Let me now describe the CII Rating Scale and the task of the raters in more general terms before I describe the results of the scoring.

Each of the 22 seven-step, bipolar scale items was used to assess a separate dimension of the affective experience reported by the subjects, but this assessment was made in terms of a continuum which represents variation in the direction of two opposite extremes, 'shame' and 'guilt'. To use one of the scale items as an example, the raters were asked to read each interview and to decide what stimulus elicited the affect. The bipolar continuum associated with this dimension of affective experience, the stimulus eliciting the affect, reads:

"affect elicited by
some incongruity, failure
or deficiency of
the self"

"affect elicited by
some transgression,
irresponsible act
or failure to act"

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The description anchoring the 'shame' end of the scale is on the left; the description anchoring the 'guilt' end is on the right. The raters, having decided what stimulus elicited

the affect for a particular subject, had to decide whether it was best described: 1) exclusively by one or the other descriptions anchoring the ends of the scale (scored 1 or 7) or, 2) by some combination of both descriptions (scored 2 through 6). It was also possible for the rater to decide that the stimulus which elicited the affect was not described by the continuum, in which case he would score the item "not applicable".

Although it was obvious to the raters that the interviews involved an exploration of shame, they were not told that the descriptions anchoring the ends of the scale items were characteristic of shame or guilt. In addition, the left-right placements of the descriptions were counterbalanced.

When the Rating Scale was used to score the interviews, the distribution of the rater's scores indicated that the seven-step scale was ineffective, since the raters tended to use only the extreme categories (1 or 7) and the middle category (4). Raters indicated that finer discriminations couldn't be made and that the data could only be meaningfully assigned to one of three categories. The scale items were reduced to a three-point scale and the raters were asked to reread the interviews and to make judgments using the three-point scale items. The percent agreement for the rater's judgments was 94% (this is actually an average of the percent

agreements of the rater's judgments for each of the scale items). The matrix of CII Rating Scale scores (22 scale items x 20 subjects) is presented in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 here

A score of 1 in Table 1 indicates that the raters considered a particular dimension of the affective experience reported by a particular subject to be characterized exclusively by the description anchoring the 'shame' end of the shame-guilt continuum for the particular scale item used to assess that dimension. To simplify, a score of 1 indicates the behavior was characterized by the 'shame' description. A score of 2 indicates the behavior was characterized by both the 'shame' and 'guilt' descriptions. A score of 3 indicates the behavior was characterized by the 'guilt' description.

In devising the CII Rating Scale, I assumed that the set of 22 descriptions anchoring the 'shame' end of the bipolar scale items catalogued various dimensions of the experience of shame. To have confirmed my hypothesis about these dimensions, ideally, the entries in Table 1 should all be 1's. From an examination of Table 1, this is not the case. I did not know how to interpret the results. I could not discern

TABLE 1

Matrix of Critical Incident Interview Rating Scale scores arranged by Rating Scale item number and subject's number

Subject's Number	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
5	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
6	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1
7	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
8	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
11	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
12	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1
13	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
16	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	1
17	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
18	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
19	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
20	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
21	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
22	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

- A score of 1 indicates that the affect dimension assessed by a particular scale item was characterized by the 'shame' description exclusively.
- A score of 2 indicates that the affect dimension assessed by a particular scale item was characterized, to the same degree, by both the 'shame' and 'guilt' descriptions.
- A score of 3 indicates that the affect dimension assessed by a particular scale item was characterized by the 'guilt' description exclusively.

any trends in the pattern of scores from which I could revise my hypotheses about the dimensions of shame. The issue I needed to resolve was whether my hypotheses about shame were fallacious or whether there was some individual difference variable which could account for the divergence of the obtained from the predicted results. I will return to the discussion of the CII Rating Scale scores after I describe the developments which led to distinguishing among subjects on the dimension of self-awareness. It was this distinction which facilitated my interpretation of the results.

C. High and Low Self-Awareness Subjects

In conducting the interviews and reviewing the transcripts, my impression was that subjects differed in the extent to which they had insight into their experience of shame and an awareness of their needs, feelings, etc. I compared the transcripts of the two subjects I considered most insightful with the transcripts of the two subjects I considered least insightful to see what differences existed between them in relation to the five major themes derived from the content analysis. I will discuss these differences below:

I) Devalued Self

The more insightful subjects realized that their experience of themselves as devalued was, in some way, related to obscuring their own views, etc. and accepting the views of others as correct. They side-stepped the struggle to assert their views, without losing sight of what those views were. They said their views would not be accepted by others. They complied with others, but their compliance was half-hearted. The less insightful subjects were more likely to accept others' views as correct and valid without considering what their views were. The more insightful subjects recognized the experience of themselves as devalued as a subjective event; the less insightful subjects

considered it an objective event. The insightful subjects noted that they would not have been ashamed or devalued if they had asserted their views. The less insightful subjects resolved to deal with feeling devalued by improving themselves (i.e., "I felt stupid because they knew more about it than I did. I have to learn more politics before I get into another discussion about it.")

II) Being Seen

The more insightful subjects recognized that the experience of being seen by others as a devalued object was a subjective experience; that this experience was related to their own devaluations of some aspect of their actual self. The less insightful subjects considered being seen by others as an objective event.

III) Hiding One's Actual Self

The more insightful subjects tended to withdraw from or maintain a low profile in potentially embarrassing situations. The less insightful subjects tended to masquerade in potentially embarrassing situations by acting in a pseudo-independent way and by impressing others with their mastery, strength and competence. The most embarrassing situations for these subjects involved the exposure of their self-deception and deception of others.

IV) 'Being" for Others

When the more insightful subjects were embarrassed for failing to 'be' for others, they recognized that their so-called failures would not be an issue if they could be themselves. They were continually troubled by the tension between what they needed and what others seemed to need. The less insightful subjects were less troubled by the discordance between their needs and others' needs; there was a way one ought to be, to feel, to think, etc. and they considered their failures to 'be' for others a matter of a literal deficiency.

V) Submission, Helpless Rage and Power

The more insightful subjects tended to comply with others in ways to which they were not truly committed; to appease and placate others. The less insightful subjects tended to submit to others in more abject ways. The more insightful subjects reported fantasies of being more powerful than others or of triumphing over others after they were embarrassed; the less insightful subjects acted in destructive and vengeful ways after they were embarrassed and the target of their overtly harmful acts was likely to be some person who, like them, was submissive.

In order to systematize my impressions about the differences among subjects in their insightfulness, I devised

a procedure for ranking subjects on the dimension of self-awareness (the three components of this dimension are described below). Three experienced clinicians, naive about the aims of this study, were asked to read each transcribed interview and to rank order subjects on this dimension (A copy of the instructions to the raters appears in Appendix G).

Description of the Self-Awareness Dimension

- a) Self-awareness refers to more than the ability to describe one's behavior in such terms as, 'I am' or 'I feel'. It involves the capacity to detach oneself from one's behavior and to observe that behavior. It is more a reflective self-awareness than an awareness of oneself. Statements in which this reflective self-awareness is apparent not only describe one's behavior, but refer to the meaning, origin, significance and relatedness of one's behavior. Such statements are often introduced by propositions such as, 'I wonder if ...', 'I believe that ...', 'It occurs to me why I ...', etc.
- b) Self-awareness also refers to the capacity to assert and to maintain the integrity of one's needs, opinions, feelings, etc. in the face of internal and external conflict. This capacity is not demonstrated if one denies one's needs, etc. (as above) or relinquishes one's needs in order to submit to others or to avoid internal or external conflict.
- c) Self-awareness also refers to a capacity for self-criticism and a concern for and curiosity about one's inner life. Note that it is possible for a person to relate experiences that are intense without considering their involvement in those experiences. Their involvement can be overlooked, rationalized, disguised and, as a result, continued in the future unchanged.

There was significant agreement among the raters' rank ordering of the subjects on the dimension of self-awareness. The Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (corrected for tied observations), a measure of interjudge reliability, was significant ($W = +.89$; $\chi^2 = 51.4$, $df = 19$; $p = .001$). The ranks assigned to a particular subject were pooled and used to separate the group of twenty subjects into a High Self-Awareness (High S-A) and a Low Self-Awareness (Low S-A) Group. The High S-A and Low S-A Groups each contained ten subjects.

D. Analysis of the Critical Incident Interview Rating Scale Scores for the High S-A and the Low S-A Groups

In Table 2, the CII Rating Scale scores for the High S-A subjects and the Low S-A subjects are grouped together. The matrix of scores arranged by the Rating Scale item number, subject number and subject's designation as being a High or Low S-A subject is presented in Table 2.

Insert Table 2 here

It is striking that the overall pattern of item scores for all subjects in the High S-A Group is identical. By contrast, the overall patterns of item scores are unique for all subjects in the Low S-A Group. The overall pattern of item scores of only one subject (#8) in the Low S-A Group is identical to the pattern for all High S-A subjects.

Let me repeat again that a score of 1 indicates that a particular dimension of the subject's experience was characterized by the 'shame' description associated with a particular scale item; a score of 2 indicates that a particular dimension was characterized by both the 'shame' and 'guilt' descriptions; that a score of 3 indicates a particular dimension was characterized by the 'guilt' description.

TABLE 2

Matrix of Critical Incident Interview Rating Scale Scores arranged by Rating Scale item number and subject's number and designation as being High or Low Self-Awareness Subject

		High S-A Group										Low S-A Group										
Subject's Number		1	2	5	6	11	12	14	17	19	20	3	4	7	8	9	10	13	15	16	18	
Rating Scale Item Number	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	
	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	
	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	
	8	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	11	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1
	12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	
	13	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	16	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2
	17	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	18	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	19	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
	20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
	21	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1
	22	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1

A visual examination of Table 2 indicates that the various dimensions of the affective experience reported by the High S-A subjects (and one Low S-A subject) could be characterized by the series of 'shame' descriptions associated with the Rating Scale (with the exception of item #8). The hypothesis that the 'shame' descriptions would characterize the subject's experience was confirmed for the High S-A subjects, but not for the Low S-A subjects (with one exception).

There were two issues that I needed to explore further as a result of the divergence of the obtained scores, represented in Table 2, from the predicted scores (that all scores would be 1). The first was, how does the dimension of self-awareness relate to the subjects' experience of shame? More specifically, why were particular dimensions of the Low S-A subjects' experience of shame judged by the raters to be characterized by both the 'shame' and 'guilt' descriptions (scored 2). The second was, what could be learned about the experience of shame from the unexpected finding represented by the fact that one item (#8) was scored 3 for all subjects? I'll consider this single item first and then discuss the results that were obtained for the Low S-A subjects.

Fenichel (1945), Piers and Singer (1953) and Lewis (1971) all suggest that shame functions as a distinctive control over some component of the sexual instinct and that guilt

functions as a distinctive control over some component of the aggressive instinct. Item #8 relates to this distinction and reads:

"associated with the sexual instinct and its derivatives (i.e., scopophilia, exhibitionism, etc.)"

"associated with the aggressive instinct and its derivatives (i.e., sadism, masochism, etc.)"

1 2 3

The raters were asked to consider the subject's description of their most recent experience of shame and to make a judgment about whether the underlying conflict associated with the onset of the experience of shame was associated with the sexual instinct, etc. or the aggressive instinct, etc. The rater's judgment was that the onset of shame was triggered by conflicts associated with the aggressive instinct. When the raters had completed their scoring, I asked them to describe the information they had considered in making their judgments for this item. They pointed out those portions of the transcripts where, prior to the experience of shame, subjects reported that they had experienced a dilemma. If they expressed what they felt, for example, they sensed that they would alienate others whose approval they needed. If they didn't express what they felt or tailored it to suit others, they would despise themselves for being false. They anticipated the consequences of stating their views and others'

reactions to their views in an inner dialogue in which their struggle with others was marked by increasing rage and frustration. It was not a simple matter of stating their views and allowing others to respond. They were caught up in an inner struggle that preceded any actual involvement with others. One subject in the study wanted to make a statement in class that would be in opposition to the position expressed by a majority of her classmates. She thought they were being naive, but she was concerned that they would experience her statement as an attack on them. She thought, " ... I'd like to kick their faces in. But I'd also like to be their friend. -- So how do you deal with that?" When she did speak, she was mortified because she stated her position in such a confused way that she never made her point that others were naive, and she stated it in such a way that she provoked her classmates to attack her for being naive. She was amused, but also distressed, at this ironic outcome.

Let me return to the consideration of the Rating Scale scores for the Low S-A subjects. Since the point in using the Rating Scale was to organize observations in an exploratory study of shame, and not to perfect a rating scale, my goal was to understand the significance of the finding that

particular dimensions of the experience of shame were scored 2.

Ten of the scale items were scored 1 for all High and Low S-A subjects. One of the scale items was scored 3 for all High and Low S-A subjects. However, for eleven of the items, a minimum of one and a maximum of seven of the ten Low S-A subjects received a score of 2. I decided to examine those items where more than four of the ten subjects received scores of 2 (items 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 19 and 21). I examined the 'guilt' descriptions to see if there was some common feature they shared which would distinguish them from the other 'guilt' descriptions; there was. They all dealt, in some way, with a concern with the consequences of having harmed someone. If I paraphrase them and string them together they deal with: others have reacted negatively to some specific aspect or act of the self/ which has harmed someone/ an act for which the subject feels responsible/ the ideational component of the experience involves a concern with the present and the specific act and its consequences/ one sees oneself as being good or bad in relation to one's personal moral or ethical standards/ others are seen as dependent and are pitied as a result of the harm done to them/ efforts are made to establish one's innocence, to make restitution or express

remorse/ efforts are made to change an active experience into a passive experience (i.e., by claiming act was unintentional).

My working hypothesis about the meaning of the scores of 2 for the Low S-A subjects was that their experience of shame was similar to the High S-A subjects in most respects, but, in addition, they were also concerned with the consequences of their having harmed others.

The subjects' descriptions of the 'critical incident' were quite lengthy and they frequently digressed and talked about other incidents which came to mind as they spoke. The question arises whether a score of 2 reflects the fact that the Low S-A subjects' concern with having harmed others was an integral part of the 'critical incident' or whether the 'critical incident' involved a description of shame and the digressions referred to guilt experiences and a concern with having harmed others.

The answer is that, for the Low S-A subjects, their shame does involve some transient aspects of guilt which are an integral part of the 'critical incident'. For example, one subject in the Low S-A group discussed an incident in which she said she was embarrassed because she had to tell her husband that she had been deceiving him and had gotten pregnant because she had secretly refused to use her

diaphragm. She said she felt humiliated when he accused her of lying to him when she'd said she was using her diaphragm. She appeared to show concern that he had been hurt by her deception, but she sounded contemptuous of him when she described that her getting pregnant was his fault; he didn't want children as much as she did. She seemed most interested in having triumphed over him and more concerned with her own welfare than with his pain. I asked her to describe her inner dialogue when she told him that she was pregnant. She said,

"Uh -- I think I wanted him to say that, 'Everything was all right. I'm really glad you told me'. And that's what I expected. ... I felt like I was a creep. I felt really low, sneaky and miserable. I felt like a -- I blew it. I was also concerned with myself. Um -- we really had a good marriage. I didn't want to change -- because I decided to get pregnant. ... And I thought that, 'Well, gee -- now I'm pregnant and I really need to be taken care of.' -- And that whole thing -- and had to be accepted -- and I needed the baby to be accepted too. And I was very concerned with that. I was more concerned with myself. ... (E: How did the conversation end?) Everything worked out the way I thought it was going to work out (laughs heartily)." (S #4)

Her concern with the consequences of her act was superficial; she never resolved the basic issue of her need to deceive her husband or to confront him with any complaint she had about his not wanting to have children. She still maintained that her pregnancy was an accident and her apology to him represented a means of placating him and a

maneuver to secure his acceptance for deceiving him. She seemed delighted to get what she wanted at the price of only a slight rebuke from her husband.

Many of the 'critical incidents' related by the Low S-A subjects involved shame culminating in overt acts of revenge or the exercise of power over others in an attempt to 'right' the wrongs that had been done to them. Their concern with the consequences of acts which were harmful to others was associated with this sequel to their experience of shame. Their guilt was transient and seemed to represent more of an attempt to reinstate themselves in the good graces of those they harmed than a profound struggle about their responsibility to others or an interest in exploring the basis of their destructiveness. It is in this sense that the Low S-A subjects received a score of 2, indicating that the behavior assessed by particular scale items was considered to be characterized by both the 'shame' and 'guilt' descriptions.

In order to present the results of the CII Rating Scale scoring in another way, the item descriptions will be presented here. The 'shame' descriptions are listed on the left side of the page; the 'guilt' descriptions on the right side of the page. The notation alongside the item numbers indicates the distribution of scores for that item

for the High and Low S-A subjects. A single asterisk alongside an item number indicates that the 'shame' description was scored for all twenty subjects. A double asterisk, followed by a number in parenthesis, indicates that the 'shame' description was scored for all subjects with the exception of some number (from 1 to 7) of Low S-A subjects for whom both the 'shame' and 'guilt' descriptions were scored. A triple asterisk alongside item #8 indicates that the 'guilt' description was scored for all subjects.

Critical Incident Interview Rating Scale
(Dimensions of the Subjects' Experience of Shame)

Aspects of the Stimulus Situation

Item 1 *

experienced as encounter
between self-other;
imagery and thoughts
about self vis-a-vis
others.

experienced as encounter
within self; others not
focal in awareness.

Item 2 *

affect triggered by some
incongruity, failure or
deficiency of the self.

affect triggered by some
transgression, irrespon-
sible act or failure
to act.

Item 3 *

some other is experienced
as source of negative
reaction.

the self is experienced
as source of negative
reaction.

Item 4 *

the self-as-object ("me")
is target of neg. re-
action.

the self-as-agent ("I")
is target of neg. re-
action.

Item 5 ** (5)

the negative reaction is
global; involves the
whole self.

the negative reaction is
specific; involves some
act or aspect of the self.

Item 6 ** (7)

other is experienced as
source of ridicule, scorn
or disapproval directed
toward self; subject's
suffering is focal.

other is experienced as
having been harmed phys-
ically or emotionally by
the self; others' suffer-
ing is focal.

Item 7 ** (5)

affect triggered by stimulus that appears trivial or petty; intensity of affect appears inappropriate to stimulus that triggered it.

affect triggered by some act for which the self is responsible; intensity of affect appears appropriate to stimulus that triggered it.

Item 8 ***

associated with the sexual instinct and its derivatives (i.e., scopophilia, exhibitionism, etc.).

associated with the aggressive instinct and its derivatives (i.e., sadism, masochism, etc.).

Aspects of the Subject's Conscious ExperienceItem 9 *

"imagery mode" of representation of thought (i.e., organized in terms of concrete categories, similarities and diffs., metaphors, etc.).

"lexical mode" of representation of thought (i.e., organized in terms of abstract categories, logic, linear sequences, etc.).

Item 10 *

affective component of experience predominates over ideational component.

ideational component of experience predominates over affective component.

Item 11 ** (7)

ideational content reflects concern with one's identity; concern with one's past and future.

ideational component reflects concern with specific acts and their consequences; concern with events in the present.

Item 12 ** (4)

self embedded in field;
sense of self as better
or worse in comparison
to others; about "me."

self isolated from the
field; sense of self as
good or bad in relation
to one's personal stand-
ards of conduct; about
"I."

Item 13 ** (1)

concern with making a
good impression on
others; concern with
one's mastery, power,
competence, etc.

concern with satisfying
one's personal moral or
ethical standards; with
punishment for trans-
gressing.

Item 14 *

source of neg. reaction
localized "out there."

source of neg. reaction
localized "within."

Item 15 *

anger has quality of
helpless rage; anger
directed primarily
at the self.

anger has quality of
righteous indignation;
directed primarily at
others.

Item 16 ** (7)

others experienced as
powerful, active,
capable of function-
ing effectively.

others experienced as
having been hurt phys-
ically or emotionally;
as dependent; as an
object of pity.

Item 17 *

self passive, childish,
helpless; reduced in
size.

self active, adult,
capable; increased
in size.

Item 18 *

subject concerned with communication of affect state via gestures, posture, non-verbal behavior, etc.

subject unconcerned with communication of affect state via gestures, posture, non-verbal behavior, etc.

Defensive Aspects of the Subject's ResponseItem 19 ** (4)

efforts to reaffirm self; to restore loss of status, mastery or competence in thought or deed.

efforts to absolve self; to establish one's innocence in thought and deed; demonstrations of remorse; efforts to make restitution.

Item 20 ** (3)

efforts to diminish others; fantasies of revenge, triumph or retaliation.

efforts to get others to share blame for harmful acts; efforts to blame others.

Item 21 ** (5)

efforts to change passive exp. into active experience (i.e., by mocking self).

efforts to change active experience into passive experience (i.e., by claims act was unintentional).

Item 22 ** (3)

primary defenses: repression and denial.

primary defenses: isolation (intellectualization), rationalization, undoing and projection.

II. Analysis of the Early Memories Test (EMT)

The six early memories requested of each subject produced a set of 120 early memories for the total group. These memories were each scored by two raters using, first, the Relationship Paradigm Scale and, second, the Quality of Object Relationships Scale. (Mayman, 1973) These scales were designed to assess, respectively, the psychosexual level and the level of object relations in "remembered self-other interactions", the early memories.

A. The Relationship Paradigm Scale (RPS for Early Memories)

The RPS consists of six major categories corresponding to oral, anal, phallic-assertive, -intrusive, -locomotor and -urethral, phallic-sexual, oedipal, latency paradigms* and 20 subcategories within these major categories. The percent agreement between the coders' ratings for the six major categories was 89%; the percent agreement for the subcategories was 74%. Table 3 presents a comparison of the RPS categorization of the early memories for the Total and High and Low S-A Groups.

Insert Table 3 here

* Mayman (1973) used the term "paradigm" to mean a configuration or pattern of self- and object-representations and phase-appropriate needs, conflicts, etc., associated with each stage of psychosexual development.

TABLE 3

Comparison of the Relationship Paradigm Scale
Categorization of Early Memories for the
High and Low Self-Awareness Groups and for
the Total Group

Relationship Paradigm	High S-A Group	Low S-A Group	Total Group
I Oral	34	28	62
II Anal	9	15	24
III Phallic-Assertive, -Intrusive, etc.	12	15	27
IV Phallic-Sexual	3	2	5
V Oedipal	2	-	2
VI Latency	-	-	-

The nominal data generated by the RPS scoring could not be subjected to statistical analysis because repeated observations were made for each subject and because of the low cell frequencies. Visual inspection of the obtained frequencies strongly suggests that the following inferences can be drawn: 1) That a majority (62) of the early memories of the Total Group reflect oral paradigms; 2) that nearly all (106) of the early memories reflect paradigms that are pregenital (categories I through III). These two inferences are true for the High and Low S-A Groups as well. The inferences are also true for the Total Group whether the EMT was presented before or after the CII (the order of presentation had been counterbalanced).

The hypothesis that the early memories of the subjects would be more likely to reflect "phallic paradigms" (Category III: phallic-assertive, -intrusive, -locomotor and -urethral and Category IV: phallic-sexual) than other paradigms of the RPS Scale was not confirmed. The relevance of this finding will be made clearer in the next chapter.

B. The Quality of Object Relationships Scale (QORS)
for Early Memories

The QORS is divided into four major categories which reflect the natural breaks in the continuum of the quality of object relationships: psychotic, borderline, neurotic

and normal. There are 20 subcategories associated with these four major categories. The percent agreement between coders' ratings for the major categories was 85%; the percent agreement for the subcategories was 77%. Table 4 presents a comparison of the QORS categorization of the early memories for the Total and High and Low S-A Groups.

Insert Table 4 here

Visual inspection of the obtained frequencies strongly suggests the inference that a clear majority (94) of the early memories of the shame-prone subjects were classified as "neurotic". This inference held true for both the High and Low S-A Groups. It was also true whether the EMT was presented before or after the CII.

When the distribution of obtained frequencies within the subcategories is considered, the modal subcategory, the one which is most representative of the level of object-relatedness of the early memories, is the fourteenth of the twenty subcategories in the continuum. To paraphrase Mayman's (1973) description of the level of object-relatedness reflected in the early memories assigned to this subcategory: Others appear in the early memories as important foci of one's relatedness to the world, but the overriding focus is on the self. Others begin to appear as persons

TABLE 4

Comparison of the Quality of Object Relationships Scale
Categorization of Early Memories for the High and Low
Self-Awareness Groups and for the
Total Group

	High S-A Group	Low S-A Group	Total Group
Quality of Object Relationships Category			
Type A: Psychotic	-	-	-
Type B: Borderline	2	1	3
Type C: Neurotic	42	52	94
Type D: Normal	16	7	23

with distinctive emotional postures and motives, but their characterizations are thin and they remain as props, extensions or projected facets of the self. Others appear to the reader of the early memories as larger than life, as protagonists involved in the subject's infantile conflicts. But others begin to transcend their roles as transference objects and appear as separate people in their own right. While the characterizations of others are primarily defined in terms of the subject's affect state, others begin to seem more real. The reader can begin to empathize with the motives of others, but more insight is gained about the subject's own motives and experience when the characterizations of others are considered. Others are aware of and responsive to the self, but they are secondary figures in the cast of characters. The self seems more sensitive to and responsive to people in a world that begins to exist independently of the event being reported. The self-other interactions begin to reflect some degree of mutuality.

The rationale for the prediction that the early memories of the shame-prone subjects would be more likely to reflect "Neurotic" self-other interactions will be restated. This will be done in order to clarify the appropriate inference to be drawn from the confirmation of the hypothesis

about the level of object-relatedness reflected by the early memories.

Jacobson (1964) and Kohut (1971) both suggest that shame-prone people manifest some degree of narcissistic character pathology and that their self-other interactions are typically self-centered. The overriding focus of attention is on the self and others are secondary in importance.* The descriptions of the self-other interactions which correspond most closely to those described by Jacobson and Kohut fall within the "Neurotic" category of the QORS.

The QORS contains a series of "complex, multi-dimensional" descriptions which characterize the level of object-relatedness in "remembered self-other interactions". These descriptions are arranged in four groups which are labeled "Psychotic", "Borderline", "Neurotic" and "Normal" to indicate, in a broad way, the "natural breaks" in the underlying continuum. However, Mayman did not intend that the QORS be used for diagnostic classification.

Kernberg (1970) discusses the link between various levels of object-relatedness and levels of character pathology (i.e., "low, intermediate and high") in his proposed

* This is only one of several points made about the level of object-relatedness associated with narcissistic character pathology.

psychoanalytic classification of types of character pathology. His discussion of the level of object-relatedness associated with the "intermediate" level of organization of character pathology is very similar to the description of the level of object-relatedness reflected in early memories assigned to subcategory C4 of the QORS discussed above. He notes that it involves a self-centeredness and a relative absence of interest in and empathy for others. Others are sought for their approval and as need-satisfying objects. While others are important in this way, the person has difficulty understanding the complex motivations of others and they are typically idealized or seen as lifeless and shadowy. Object relationships are stable in the sense that the person is capable of involvement with others and of tolerating the markedly ambivalent and conflictual nature of the involvement, but a fuller involvement is avoided because of the person's narcissistic vulnerability. At this level of organization, self- and object-representations are fairly well-integrated and stable; the person's self-concept and representational world are well-established. However, as a result of unresolved conflicts, the integration and stability of the self- and object-representations and the psychic structures at this level of organization are not complete when compared to the "higher" level of organization.

Kernberg (1970) also notes that most 'oral' types of character pathology are organized at the "intermediate" level, including those described as well-integrated hysteroid and narcissistic personalities. He also relates the "intermediate" level of organization of character pathology to a clinical picture characterized by pregenital, especially oral, conflicts. This point is interesting in view of the findings that the early memories of the shame-prone subjects in this study reflected pregenital, especially oral, paradigms.

The point of this discussion is that the appropriate inference to be drawn from the obtained findings is that the early memories of the shame-prone subjects can be characterized by the description of the level of object-relatedness associated with the modal subcategory C4. It is not appropriate to conclude that the subjects are neurotic. And, while it is highly speculative, it appears that the link between shame-proneness and narcissistic character structure would be a fruitful area for further investigation.

CHAPTER IV

Discussion

The present study is conceived of as an exploratory investigation of the experience of shame among female subjects, self-selected as shame-prone. In this chapter the findings will be reviewed, the implications of the findings for a theory of shame will be discussed in relation to existing theories of shame, the limitations of the present study and suggestions for future research will be presented and the major findings will be summarized.

A. Content Analysis of the Critical Incident Interview

The content analysis involved an integration of the subjects' explicit inferences about shame into five major themes which conveyed the fundamental consistencies in the subjects' reports of their experience.

The first major theme, Devalued Self, refers to the experience of one's self as devalued during the experience of shame. The way in which one experiences oneself as one thinks one is may be accurate (actual) or defensively distorted (idealized or devalued). The significance of the experience of one's self as devalued needs to be understood in the context of a dilemma which the subjects reported had occurred prior to their feeling ashamed. They believed that

some aspect of their actual self - their opinion about some controversial issue, for example - would not receive the approval of others. In stating their opinion, they felt they would be seen as different from others, but they did not yet feel devalued in relation to others. The subjects' dilemma was that if they asserted their opinion, they would feel separate from others and lonely. If they devalued their opinion and agreed with an opinion that was more acceptable to others, even if they were not committed to it, they felt they would be establishing a bond with others. In doing so, however, they felt ashamed and devalued. In retrospect, they stated that if they could have tolerated the sense of separateness involved in asserting their opinion, they would not have felt ashamed and devalued. The experience of being devalued in relation to others involves a defensive distortion of one's actual self in order to establish a bond with others. This bond involves the denial of one's separateness and authenticity and limits the possibility of genuine engagement because of the need to conceal the ways in which one is different from others by devaluing oneself.

The second major theme, Being Seen, refers to the awareness of oneself as the devalued object of another's awareness during the experience of shame. In one sense, the subjects' experience of seeing themselves as devalued in another's eyes

increased their contact with others. In another sense, however, real contact is restricted because the subjects drew the attention of others to their devalued self in an effort to conceal their actual self and because others were not seen as people in their own right, but as critics. The experience of being seen as devalued involves a temporary suspension of reflective self-awareness and a regression in the level of psychic functioning that is temporary, reversible and limited in scope. As in daydreaming, the representation of one's thoughts is more concrete and is expressed in terms of visual images which are, to some extent, confused with percepts. The image (i.e., 'I am being looked at and despised.') is localized 'out there', though it is generally recognized as being derived from an internal source. Subjects reported that it felt uncanny to attend to an image that they were being looked at scornfully when, at the same time, they could observe that other people's attention was not on them.

The third major theme, Hiding One's Actual Self, refers to those aspects of one's actual self that one feels must be hidden when ashamed and to styles of hiding them. Subjects said it was their feeling helpless, needy, dependent and enraged that they had to obscure from others because they considered themselves weak when they experienced these feelings. In potentially embarrassing situations, subjects tended to

withdraw and limit their involvement and/or to masquerade in such a way as to suggest that they were 'strong', not weak.

The fourth major theme, 'Being' for Others, refers to feeling ashamed of one's failures. These failures were not reflections of some literal deficiency; they were failures to 'be' for others. 'Being' for others involves, to a greater or lesser extent, defining oneself in terms of others' needs, feelings, goals, etc., while one's own needs are suppressed or dissociated. Subjects equated being the same as others, acting as an agent of others' needs and complying with others with receiving others' love or approval. In failing to 'be' for others, subjects reported that they experienced shame. They also noted that if they did not need to 'be' for others, their so-called failures would not be embarrassing.

The fifth major theme, Submission, Helpless Rage and Power, refers to the subjects' efforts to deny or reverse, in thought and/or deed, the helplessness associated with submitting to others during the experience of shame. The submitting refers to the subjects' 'going along with others' in an effort to conceal and protect some aspect of their actual self in order to be accepted. This not only generates feelings of self-contempt for betraying one's actual self, but rage at others for the real or imagined demands for submission as the price for approval.* It was primarily the

* See Gruen (1974b), to be discussed subsequently.

helpless quality of the rage which blocked its expression during the experience of shame. After the experience, however, all subjects reported either having fantasies in which they were powerful enough to get revenge or acting overtly in a vengeful or destructive way in an effort to diminish others. Subjects who fantasized being powerful recognized that it was their own self-betrayal which led to their submitting and feeling helpless. Subjects who were overtly destructive saw themselves as having been victimized by others. The target of their vengeful acts was generally someone who, like them, was submissive.

B. The Critical Incident Interview Rating Scale

The CII Rating Scale items were used by raters to assess separate dimensions of the affective experience described in the interviews in terms of a bipolar continuum representing contrasting "superego styles", shame and guilt. The hypothesis related to the use of this scale is that the experiences described by the shame-prone subjects will be characterized by the series of descriptions associated with the 'shame' end of the continuum for each of the scale items.

In an effort to interpret the obtained scores, which did not confirm the hypothesis for the total group of subjects, the subjects were separated into equal groups on the basis of raters' judgments of their relative degree of self-awareness.

The overall pattern of scores was identical for all subjects in the High S-A group and for one subject in the Low S-A group. With the exception of one scale item, the series of twenty-two 'shame' descriptions characterized the affective experiences reported by these subjects.

The one scale item mentioned above as an exception was scored in the same way for all twenty subjects. This item required raters to assess whether the underlying conflict associated with the onset of the experience of shame was associated with the aggressive or the sexual instinct (and their derivatives). Contrary to what had been predicted, the onset of shame was associated with aggression, as described below.

The raters made this judgment on the basis of the subjects' recollections of their experience immediately preceding the onset of shame. On the one hand, the subjects believed that their being different from others would result in their being shunned by those whose approval they needed. Others would confuse the subjects' need to be separate with an attack on them, others' approval was contingent on the subjects' being the same as them. On the other hand, if the subjects tailored the ways in which they were different to suit others, they would despise themselves for being false. These thoughts were accompanied by increasing rage and frustration. In the context of this dilemma, then, the subject's

subsequent embarrassing behavior involved the substitution of ways in which they were devalued and involved with others in a false way for ways in which they were different from others and separate from them.

The overall pattern of scores was unique for each of the subjects in the Low S-A group. For each Low S-A subject, particular dimensions of the experience were characterized by the 'shame' description, while others were characterized, equally, by both the 'shame' and 'guilt' description. When I attempted to account for the finding that some dimensions of the Low S-A subjects' experience of shame were different than that of the High S-A subjects, I developed the following speculative hypothesis.

The subjects in the High and Low S-A groups were judged to differ in: 1) their capacity for reflective self-awareness; 2) their ability to assert and maintain the integrity of their needs, opinions, feeling, etc. in the face of internal and external conflict; 3) their capacity for self-criticism and concern for and curiosity about their inner life.

The High S-A subjects recognized that the experience of being seen by others as a devalued object was a subjective experience. They understood the experience as a self-devaluation resulting from their side-stepping the struggle to assert their views and their compliance with others'

views in order to be accepted. In potentially embarrassing situations, they tended to withdraw or maintain a low profile. They recognized that their so-called embarrassing failures could be understood in the context of an inner conflict about being different from others rather than devalued in relation to them. They understood that their fantasies of being powerful were a sequel to feeling helpless when they were embarrassed.

The Low S-A subjects considered the experience of being seen by others as a devalued object as an objective event. In potentially embarrassing situations, they feigned self-sufficiency and impressed others with their strength, mastery and competence. They felt that their embarrassing failures involved the exposure of literal deficiencies by others. Feeling themselves victimized, they felt justified in exercising power over others and in seeking vengeance for the ways in which they believed they had been diminished by others. The target of their destructiveness, however, was not those who they felt had belittled them, but some person who, like them, was submissive.

This destructiveness among the Low S-A subjects resulted in their being concerned about having harmed others. Thus, on some of the scale items they received scores which reflected the fact that they experienced both shame and guilt.

However, it seemed that the guilt they experienced was transient and they seemed more concerned with expressing remorse as a means of securing others' approval and denying their responsibility for their harmful acts than with exploring the basis of their destructiveness.

The difference in the patterns of CII Rating Scale scores for the High and Low S-A groups may be explained in terms of the transient guilt resulting from the destructiveness which is a sequel to the experience of shame among the Low, but not the High S-A subjects.

C. The Early Memories Test

The Relationship Paradigm Scale was used to classify each early memory in terms of its core organizing theme or paradigm. The hypothesis related to the use of the scale is that the early memories of the shame-prone subjects are more likely to reflect phallic (-aggressive and -sexual) than any other paradigms. This hypothesis was not confirmed. The majority of the early memories reflected oral paradigms. The relevance of this finding will be discussed later.

The Quality of Object Relationships Scale was used to classify each early memory in terms of the level of object-relatedness it reflected. The hypothesis related to the use of this scale was confirmed. That is, in the early memories others appear as important foci in one's relatedness to the

world, though the overriding focus of attention is on the self. Others begin to appear as people with distinct emotional postures and motives, but their characterizations are thin and they remain props, extensions or projected facets of the self. Others are sought for their approval or as need-satisfying objects. While others are primarily defined in terms of the subject's affect state, others begin to seem more real. The self-other interactions reflect a greater capacity for mutuality, though a greater degree of involvement with others is limited by the subject's vulnerability. In other words, the level of object-relatedness which was reflected in the early memories involves a transitional stage between self-centeredness and mutuality.

The view of the experience of shame derived from the findings in this study differs from that presented in the literature in a number of ways. For the purpose of arguing this point, I will cite some generalizations about shame which are commonly encountered in the theoretical literature and discuss them in relation to the present findings.

The first is that shame involves a loss of love (approval, acceptance and admiration) which is contingent on evidence of loss of power (mastery, strength, competence, etc.) or loss of control (over instinctual drives, objects, etc.). This generalization about shame is accepted by several

theorists, though it is variously conceptualized as a drive-defense conflict (Fenichel, 1945; Erikson, 1950; Jacobson, 1964; Levin, 1967), an ego ideal conflict (Piers & Singer, 1953; Lynd, 1958; Lampl-de-Groot, 1962) and a conflict between the strivings associated with archaic and mature self-structures within the ego (Sandler, 1963; Jacobson, 1964; Kohut, 1971). Shame-prone people are characterized by these authors as being driven by their ambitions and their vulnerability to shame is seen as a consequence of their failure to attain their goals of power or control.

The results of the content analysis, however, suggest that the sequence which culminates in the experience of shame begins with an awareness of one's separateness - the ways in which a person is different from others - and that the feeling of weakness accompanying this awareness is central in understanding shame. This feeling of weakness has no direct relationship to the person's actual abilities, which may be considerable, but to a sense of inadequacy associated with one's sense of self-as-a-separate being. (Guntrip, 1969)

Prior to their experience of shame, all subjects believed their opinions, feelings, needs, etc. distinguished them from others. At this point in the sequence they experienced themselves as being different from others, but not devalued in relation to them. Subjects were vaguely aware of feeling

lonely and excluded from contact with others. The embarrassment which followed, whether or not the embarrassing behavior was public, was instrumental in establishing a bond with others, thus substituting a sense of self-as-devalued in relation to others for a sense of self-as-separate from others. One subject noted, for example, "I knew what I was going to say would make me look stupid - like I don't know what I'm doing. But, I said it because I didn't agree with them and if I said what I thought, I was afraid they would ignore me and go on with their conversation without me ... like I would be left out." If the subject's anxiety about separateness is acknowledged as a central issue in the experience of shame, then the sense of one's self as devalued can be seen as a defensive distortion of one's actual self and not a literal deficiency in the capacity for control or power. As Guntrip (1969) notes, when a person's capacity for separateness is limited by the sense that they are not enough, they may prefer to be a 'bad something' in another's eyes than a 'nothing' if they are alone.

Another generalization about shame-prone people is that they are exhibitionistic, that their self-display involves a wish to be seen and admired. (Freud, 1905; Fenichel, 1945; Jacobson, 1964; Kohut, 1971) The results of the content analysis suggest, to the contrary, that the subjects do not

wish to be seen. This experience involves a temporary, limited and reversible regression in the level of psychic functioning and the temporary suspension of reflective self-awareness. As a result, the thought, 'I will be looked at and despised for being weak, vulnerable and inadequate', was represented in terms of a visual image and the image, to some extent, confused with a percept.

The subjects intended to draw attention away from themselves by focusing on inadequacies which were not genuine. The subjects' energies were devoted not to showing themselves as they were but to hiding, denying, disguising and mastering the vulnerability associated with the ways in which they were different from others.

The subjects in the Low S-A group were likely to regard their failures as literal deficiencies, to resolve to master those inadequacies through some program of self-improvement and to masquerade by impressing others with their competence and fetching self-display. While it is truer of the subjects in the Low S-A group, most all subjects began the interview by characterizing themselves vis-a-vis others as less competent, efficient, impressive, pleasing to look at, powerful, intelligent, socially graceful, etc. when they were feeling embarrassed. However, when the subjects described their experience in detail, it was clear that it was not a

sense of inadequacy vis-a-vis others that was central, but a sense of weakness associated with feeling helpless, dependent, needy and enraged.

It was on the basis of the view generally accepted in the literature that shame is associated with phallic-assertive and phallic-exhibitionistic conflicts that I hypothesized that the early memories of the shame-prone subjects would be more likely to reflect phallic paradigms than any other. (Fenichel, 1945; Piers & Singer, 1953; Jacobson, 1964; Binder, 1970; Lewis, 1971) This hypothesis was not confirmed. The majority of early memories reflected oral paradigms. The early memories tended to involve themes of deprivation resulting in frustration, distress and impotent rage. This finding supports the observation derived from the content analysis that the sense of inadequacy reported by the subjects involves conflicts, feelings, self-images, needs, etc. associated with the oral rather than the phallic phase of development.

Perhaps it would clarify the point I am making about the nature of the weakness that is central to understanding the experience of shame if the issue of the relative importance of phallic and oral conflicts, etc. is restated in a different way. This involves a consideration of the issues related to the phallic phase of development as a matter of 'doing'

and the issues related to the oral phase as a matter of 'being'. It may appear that shame is related to problems concerning 'doing', but only in the sense that 'doing' is like the superstructure of a house with a relatively unstable foundation. The experience of 'doing' in the relative absence of a secure sense of 'being', of genuine selfhood, involves an effort to manufacture a sense of 'being' one does not possess. (Guntrip, 1969)

The subjects' awareness of themselves as separate from others preceding their experience of shame involved a sense of loneliness. Guntrip (1969) notes that loneliness involves some degree of precariousness and instability of object-relatedness. It is experienced when contacts with others are somewhat uncertain and unsatisfactory or when one does not fully 'get through' to another person. It is interesting in this regard that the QORS scoring of the early memories reflects self-other interactions which are characteristic of a transitional phase between self-centeredness and a fuller involvement with others based on mutuality.

There is one further generalization about shame-proneness which I would like to discuss at some length - that shame-proneness is a reflection of narcissistic conflicts and character pathology. (Jacobson, 1964; Kernberg, 1970; Kohut,

1971, 1972) This generalization is developed most fully in Kohut's recent work on narcissism.

One note of caution, however, in using Kohut's theory as a framework for discussing the relationship between shame-proneness and narcissism is that while there is considerable agreement about the descriptive, clinical characteristics of narcissistic conflicts and character pathology, there is no unanimity among theorists about the metapsychological assumptions which account for the clinical manifestations of narcissism. (Kernberg, 1974) The main conceptual issue which accounts for this divergence among the various theories of narcissism is the extent to which "narcissistic and object-instinctual realms" are considered to represent independent, interdependent or sequential lines of development. (Spruiell, 1974) So, while Kohut's work is not a definitive theory of narcissism, it will be considered here because of the extent to which the link between narcissism and shame-proneness is developed in this theory.

In his theory, Kohut assumes that the "narcissistic and object-instinctual realms" represent independent and parallel lines of development. The progression and development of narcissism does not culminate in object love. (Kohut, 1972) The drives associated with the narcissistic and object-instinctual lines of development are not distinguished by

their target (self vs. others) but by their aims. (Kohut, 1971) He describes three forms of libido associated with the narcissistic line of development and their respective aims: 1) idealizing libido which involves striving for perfection; 2) grandiose libido which involves insisting on acceptance, admiration and approval; 3) exhibitionistic libido which involves insisting on control and power.

There are two branches within the overall line of development of narcissism which Kohut calls the "grandiose self" and the "idealized parent imago". They both vary in form, in the course of development, from archaic to mature.

The archaic form of the "grandiose self" refers to primitive self-representations invested with grandiose and exhibitionistic libido. The archaic form of the "idealized parent imago" refers to primitive object-representations invested with idealizing libido. (They are actually self-object-representations in the sense that others are only extensions of idealized aspects of the self.) To simplify this overly complicated formulation, the archaic "grandiose self" refers to the ideas, 'I am in control and powerful' and 'I demand acceptance, attention and approval' and the archaic "idealized parent imago" refers to the idea, 'You are perfect and I am part of you'.

As a result of "narcissistic trauma", the "grandiose self" becomes "fixated". That is, it is not integrated into the ego, but remains unaltered in form and strives for fulfillment of its archaic exhibitionistic and grandiose aims. Similarly, the "idealized parent imago" is not integrated into the ego ideal, but remains unaltered and strives for fulfillment of the archaic aim of merger with an idealized (self-) object. In the course of normal development these structures, which are precursors of the ego and ego ideal, are integrated and their energies neutralized. In narcissistic personalities, these archaic structures are split off (i.e., isolated, repressed or disavowed) and unmodified by subsequent development. As a result, they may be "reactivated" so that the "realistic" (mature) ego is subject to the "breakthrough and intrusion of these archaic structures and their archaic aims". (Kohut, 1971)

According to Kohut (1972), shame involves the "flooding" of the ego with unneutralized, exhibitionistic libido associated with the split-off, archaic "grandiose self". When the exhibitionistic libido is mobilized in expectation of an approving response from others and the response is not forthcoming, the discharge of the libido is experienced as shame. Kohut describes shame-prone people as narcissistic personalities who tend to be driven by their ambitions for power and

success. They experience shame when they fail in the pursuit of their grandiose and exhibitionistic goals.

Kohut (1971) notes that shame-proneness and a diffuse sensitivity and vulnerability to real or imagined slights of others are typical of narcissistic personalities. Before the meaning of these characteristics is clear, it is necessary to describe more about Kohut's conception of the way in which people classified as narcissistic personalities experience others. As noted before, others are conceived of as extensions of idealized aspects of the self (they are self-objects). The qualifier, 'idealized', refers to the subjective experience of something as perfect.

Goldberg (1974) discusses Kohut's conception of the development of the "idealized parent imago" from the archaic to mature forms, as follows:

"The experiencing of others as part of the self extends from the early stages of union with the mothering figure; through the struggles of separation, ... ; to the exquisite sensitivities of the phallic-oedipal period, when others are both part of the self as well as distinct objects; and on to the adult, who is never freed from needing others in order to know himself."
(Goldberg, 1974, p. 244)

The omnipotence strivings of the archaic "grandiose self" are manifested in the expectation of absolute control over others and an uncompromising insistence on their perfection.

Failure of others to dispel or prevent narcissistic injuries, including shame, is seen as intentional. (Kohut, 1972)

While the independence of others is denied because they are experienced as extensions of the self, the regulation of self-esteem is dependent on their approval and attention. Kohut (1971) notes that the chronic object hunger of narcissistic personalities, which should not be confused with dependence, is related to the need for external regulation of self-esteem in the absence of the transformation of the split-off, archaic "idealized parent imago" into an internalized psychic structure regulating self-esteem.

The conclusions drawn in this study about the shame-prone subjects' experience of others are at variance with those of Kohut. Others are seen as more alive, but only as a consequence of the subjects' need to obscure their own aliveness. The process of defining themselves in terms of others is not evidence of the subjects' needing others to know themselves, but evidence of their needing to comply with others so that others do not know them. Being the same as others in order to seek their approval was central to the subjects only insofar as they experienced themselves as more vulnerable in asserting the ways in which they were different from others. It was the subjects' awareness of being separate from others

(and vulnerable), not their lack of differentiation from others, that is central in understanding the experience of shame.

Kohut (1972) suggests that the self-condemnation and revenge associated with the experience of shame can be understood in terms of "narcissistic rage" directed, respectively, at the self and others. This rage is mobilized by the failure of the self to be perfect and others to be perfect, available and controllable. He adds that narcissistic injuries result in rage and shame. He compares shame to a withdrawal or a flight reaction and rage to a fight reaction in which revenge, power, retaliation, undoing hurts by any means, etc. are efforts to reestablish control over others.

The results of the study suggest an alternative to Kohut's explanation of the self-condemnation and revenge as a manifestation of rage associated with the frustration of primitive demands for control, admiration and perfection. Self-condemnation was associated with the subjects' betrayal of their own needs in submitting to others. And, the subjects did not typically attack those to whom they submitted. Rather than seeking revenge, they sought vengeance by attacking (or by fantasizing an attack on) those who were, like

them, submissive. In doing so they denied evidence of their own submission to others.*

In considering Kohut's formulation, it appears that it does not deal with the deeper issues related to shame. He assumes that shame-proneness is associated with arrested development at a normal phase in the development of the mature self, the archaic "grandiose self". As a result of this arrested development, the striving associated with this primitive self-structure remains unmodified. In considering the experiences related by the subjects, these strivings did not appear to be central. For example, one subject reported she was too ashamed to talk about current events with her 'high brow' friends because she was too stupid. Her need to be perfect seemed less fundamental than her need to define situations in such a way as to obscure what she felt to be true for her. When another subject said she was embarrassed because she failed to impress others with her competence, the 'show-off' quality of her behavior and her overreliance on external sources of approval seemed less central than her feeling that she was not enough, in some way, to stand alone. When another subject spoke about her flying into a rage at her roommate after she was embarrassed, her need to control

* This insight about the relationship between self-betrayal and self-condemnation and vengeance is based on the work of Gruen, 1974b.

and have power over others seemed less focal than her need to deny her helplessness. These strivings, which Kohut regards as normal in the context of the development of the mature self, appear to reflect disturbances in the development of the self which precede the existence of the archaic "grandiose self".

The existing theories which deal explicitly with shame conceptualize this experience in terms of the vicissitudes of drives (object-instinctual or narcissistic) or to conflicts within psychic structures. These theories do not adequately account for the subtle paradoxes, the complexities and the deeper issues associated with the experience of shame. However, the work of several authors, for whom the central concept in understanding normal or pathological development is the self and the vicissitudes of the strivings of the self for autonomy does provide a more suitable framework for understanding shame. (Laing, 1959; Winnicott, 1965; Straus, 1966; Gruen, 1968, 1969, 1974a, 1974b; Guntrip, 1969; Gruen & Hertzmann, 1972) While these authors do not deal directly with shame, their discussions of disturbances in the development of the self are relevant to an understanding of the findings in this study, particularly the results of the content analysis.

For these authors, these strivings for control, power and admiration which Kohut suggests is associated with a normal phase in the development of the self would indicate that a fundamental fault in the development of the self had already occurred. These strivings suggest that trust in genuine love, freely given, has been abandoned and that it has been replaced by the struggle to obtain a response from others by means of power or by complying with them to gain approval. Gruen and Hertzmann (1972) state that "orality, dependence and rage" are indicators of a disruption of the normal development of selfhood and a distorted derivative of the self in which the struggle for authentic development has been undermined.

Gruen (1974a) discusses the ways in which inadequate mothering that interferes with the autonomous strivings of the self can result in the development of a non-autonomous self-structure. One example he gives is that where love has been once given, but then is found lacking, the human potential for fantasy offers the possibility of preserving the positive experience in fantasy. But, in the absence of a reinstatement of the positive experiences in reality, the ability to fantasize may lay the groundwork for a withdrawal from life in a quest for happiness. In addition, the quest

can follow another course that involves the denial of the helplessness and pain associated with inadequate mothering experiences by faulting oneself, rather than the environment, for not being enough.

Gruen (1974a) notes that the denial of reality through the devaluation of the self sets the stage for maintaining a bond with others who represent a threat to one's autonomy. It is by falsely devaluing oneself and complying with the needs of others, while denying one's own needs, that one can maintain a bond with others in which the betrayal of one's own needs and the threat that others represent to one's authenticity are denied. Values that are not one's own are accepted as valid and are complied with. Gruen and Hertzmann (1972) express the consequences of this distortion of the self through devaluation in the following way:

"Compliance leads to substituting the need for achievement and approval for autonomy and, at the same time, leads to the sanctioned way of avoiding the pain of impotence and helplessness: the need for power."
(Gruen & Hertzmann, 1972, p. 152)

This distortion of the self-structure that involves the devaluation of the self and the substitution of the need for power and approval for love is central in understanding the experience of shame. Guntrip (1969) points out that it is this stunting of the development of one's autonomy which results in the weakness associated with being separate and

feeling that one is not enough. And it is the fear of appearing weak which "lies behind all the rationalized self-assertiveness, the subtle exhibitionism, the disguised boasting, the competitiveness ..., the need of praise, reassurance and approval". (Guntrip, 1969, p. 190)

It might appear that one is embarrassed for failing, for exhibiting oneself, for losing control, for failing to receive approval for one's behavior, etc. But the detailed descriptions of the subjects' experience of shame indicate that the experience is more complex. For example, the subjects indicated that the helplessness, loneliness, separateness, the threats to one's autonomy, the yearning for genuine contact with others without fearing one will be seen as weak, the anger at others' insensitivity all operate on a level of awareness that is barely conscious prior to experiences of shame that are public. Shame, which involves the experience of the self as devalued, is instrumental in masking these feelings. In the suddenness of the onset of shame, one is overwhelmed by one's incapacity, one's stupidity, one's failure to be like others even when others are seen as destructive to one's way of being.

A similar point is made by Sennett and Cobb (1973) when they note that society has the power to establish universal standards of behavior (or being) on the basis of a political

decision that fails to consider the inherent differences in human temperament, needs and abilities. Some temperaments, some needs, some abilities are valued more highly than others. If a member of that society betrays his own temperament, needs and abilities, complying with the standards set by others, the groundwork is laid for transforming the experience of oneself as different but valid into the experience of oneself as devalued in relation to others.

Winnicott (1965) notes that narcissistic mothers seduce their infants into complying, but adds that their compliance is false and the infants only appear to react to demands by accepting them. Gruen (1968) notes that the paradox involved in compliance is that one acts according to others' expectations but, in remaining uncommitted to those actions, one remains invulnerable, unaffected and untouched. One appears sensitive to others, but the aim of the sensitivity is to avoid contact with others (i.e., by anticipating their needs and placating them). Being cut off from one's feelings and from life-giving attachments with others, precludes the possibility of engaging in activities and relationships that would lead to genuine autonomy, but this kind of development, despite the distortion of the self, retains the seed of a self that has not given up the desire for authenticity.

Several authors (De Saussure, 1971; Kohut, 1971; Grand, 1973) who write about the treatment of narcissistic personalities regard their patients' unbridled need for approval, achievement and power as primitive forms of drives that should be channeled into more socially acceptable forms. Gruen and Hertzmann (1972) point out, however, that "a theoretical structure that mistakenly identifies the distorted derivatives of the struggle for autonomy as fundamental life forces ... (p. 157)" enables the patient to avoid the deeper issue of avoiding life, by reinforcing the operations of the non-autonomous self which facilitate the avoidance. The crucial factor is not the vicissitudes of patients' drives for approval and ambition but the vicissitudes of the development of the self. These authors are making the point that self development that looks socially acceptable and involves actions that appear to reflect independence may, in fact, represent submission and the surrender of one's authenticity.

Two modes of non-being that function, paradoxically, to thwart the development of autonomy in order to maintain the potential for autonomy are: affecting a socially acceptable facade that is experienced as false and complying with others in a way that is experienced as false. A third mode of non-being which functions to a similar end involves emptying oneself of one's needs and feelings. (Gruen, 1968)

Laing (1959) notes that self conscious people may appear narcissistic and exhibitionistic but, actually, despise themselves and hate being seen. The formulation that they are exhibitionistic eludes the central issue, which is that in a world where being seen is experienced as a threat to one's autonomy (or to the cohesiveness of one's self) one must remain invisible and avoid contact (through depersonalization). Referring to schizoid people, Laing notes that their dilemma is that they need to be seen in order to experience themselves as alive, but they must also avoid being seen because of the threat of loss of the self through merging with others. One way of resolving the dilemma is to hide their fragile, true self and exhibit their false self in order to be seen.

Straus (1966) notes that the quality of the experience of being looked at during shame involves a transition from a reciprocal I-thou relationship to a non-reciprocal subject-object relationship. Shame has a negative, concealing function as well as a positive, protective function (in that it provides a barrier against the intrusion of one's immediate experience. Bradlow (1973) notes that both shame and depersonalization involve a splitting process in which the "good self" is subsequently dissociated or projected and the self is identified with the fantasy of being non-human.

Turning, now, to another aspect of shame: an investigation of the source of the rage manifested in terms of the self-condemnation and revenge (in fantasy or action) that follows the onset of shame. Kohut (1972) indicated that the source of the rage manifested in self-condemnation and revenge or vengeance is the omnipotent demands of the "grandiose self". Essentially, this is a conception of rage as a response to the frustration and deprivation that results from the inability to control others. In contrast to this conception, Gruen (1974b) sees rage as rooted in the helplessness associated with the subversion of one's strivings for autonomy; rage is the result of an interference with a basic life force and to regard it as a fundamental life force, in itself, misses an essential feature of human nature.

Gruen explains that man hates to submit and in doing so hates himself for the self-betrayal that is involved in submitting and he remains secretly enraged at others who demand compliance. The need for power and approval are substituted for the hope of being loved. The security of being loved for being genuine and sensitive to others is surrendered for the false security of love obtained by exercising power over others or through complying with them.

These contrasting conceptions of the source of rage lead to opposite conclusions about the curative processes that

lead to genuine selfhood. Kohut's (1972) conception involves the channeling of primitive rage into more mature forms of anger. Gruen's (1974b) conception involves efforts to re-establish the connection that exists between rage and helplessness. The author notes that only in that way can one transcend the rage. That is, if it is accepted as being rooted in one's limitations and the limitations of others that result in one's helplessness. This also reverses the distortion of the self, so characteristic of the experience of shame, that involves seeing one's self as defective and condemnable for being helpless. One can then give up the self-betrayal inherent in being for others and begin to struggle with the pain and enjoy the pleasure of genuine engagement with others and being for one's self.

Gruen (1968), in discussing the relationship between autonomy and identification, contrasts the development of a self-structure that involves a lack of genuine identification and approaches depersonalization (though the quest for authenticity is retained) with the development of a self-structure that appears to reflect solid identifications which are socially acceptable, appears to engage in independent, self-validating activities, yet involves a more extreme form of submission in which the struggle for authenticity is abandoned.

The Death of a Civil Servant (1883) by Chekov is a short story about embarrassment in which the author is aware that there is interaction between the character of a person and the quality of that person's experience of shame. The civil servant is a man born to be obsequious; his struggle for authenticity has been abandoned. His submissiveness to authority is complete and he can only respond to what is expected of him, not his human needs. He is estranged from others and from himself. His embarrassment involves a collapse into an inner emptiness. The story is a metaphor for the death-in-life existence of this successful, but cameleon-like man whose sychophancy results in his death.

The story deals with a civil servant who attends a performance of the opera. He sneezes with gusto but is not at all embarrassed, noting to himself that high or low, all people sneeze. But he is mortified when he notices that his sneeze has moistened the bald head of a stranger sitting in front of him, whom he recognizes as a government official (but not his superior). Being polite, he vigorously wipes the man's head and apologizes for the awkward situation; he is forgiven. That evening, the significance of the incident grows out of proportion in his mind. He was forgiven, but he thought that the mean look in the man's eye (which he imagined he saw) and the fact that the man didn't make a

fuss must have meant he was angry because the civil servant didn't know how to behave in public (one shouldn't sneeze). The next day he barged into the official's office, apologizing again in such an abject way that the official felt the man was mocking him. The civil servant considered the idea that the man might be a high official and should understand why he needed to apologize, but he didn't seem to understand that if people were allowed to mock him (this idea reveals the protagonist's underlying concern) there would be no respect for authority. Annoyed by the civil servant's slavish behavior the official asked him to leave. The civil servant went home and died!

This short story by Chekov deals with more than the civil servant's acute embarrassment. It deals with the link between his embarrassment and the subversion of his striving for autonomy through his extreme submission. To repeat some of the points made about the link between shame and the vicissitudes of the self and its striving for autonomy - the weakness associated with the sense of oneself as a separate being, which precedes the onset of shame, is a manifestation of some degree of failure in the development of an autonomous self. By falsely devaluing oneself and by seeming to comply with another's needs, a bond is established with others in which this weakness can be obscured or denied.

This occurs at the expense of denying one's authenticity and limiting the possibilities of genuine relationships with others in which one can be responded to as one is. And, through falsely devaluing oneself and through one's attempts to secure approval by means of one's achievements, compliance or power, the struggle for autonomy is postponed or surrendered.

Since the term 'self' is used as a central concept in the discussion of the results of this study, it would be appropriate to acknowledge the controversy about the definition and meaning of this term in the history of ideas and psychological theory. (Levin, 1969; Guntrip, 1969; Schafer, 1973; Saperstein & Gaines, 1973; Abend, 1974)

Levin, Saperstein and Gaines, and Abend generally agree that the term is a theoretical construct, a superordinate class of self-representations or a set of ideas which have in common the depiction of the individual as an entity separate from others with an awareness of its wholeness, uniqueness and continuity in time.

Schafer (1973) argues that 'self' is not a superordinate term. It is "not a name of an identifiable homogenous entity; it is a class of self-representations that exists in the vocabulary of the observer". (Schafer, 1973, p. 52) It is

a way of thinking about people, a way a theorist has of pointing to certain features of people's experience of themselves.

He questions the validity of a definition of 'self' which relies primarily on notions of "self-sameness", such as unity, stability or continuity of self-representations since:

"empirically self-sameness is usually a rather inconsistent idea in that it can change markedly in content with a significant change in mood and circumstance . . . the self-representations in this class are quite varied in scope, time of origin, and objectivity; many are unconscious . . . and many remain forever uncoordinated, if not contradictory." (Schafer, 1973, p. 52)

Schafer notes that the term 'self' is not the same as the term 'sense of self', the latter term referring to what people experience about themselves as whole, discrete, unique or continuous in time, on the one hand, and stunted, fragmented, or concealed on the other. The 'sense of self' refers to the contents of raw experience; it is phenomenological data. And, within the natural science model associated with psychoanalytic theory, theorists "should not use experiential terms that are to be explained in the explanation itself".

He notes that even when the term 'self' is limited to a way of describing experience, it is used in a different sense when it refers to one's body, person, actions, needs,

subjective space, etc. He recommends specifying what aspect of experience the term 'self' designates in each situation if its referents vary.

Schafer points out that the meaning of the term 'self' is particularly ambiguous when authors, such as Kohut (1971), confuse concrete, experiential and abstract, metapsychological levels of conceptualization when they speak of the self as a structure with energies which are determinants of behavior (i.e., the "grandiose self" is a primitive self-structure which strives for perfection). Schafer notes that 'self' is an experiential term; it is not a "motivational structural entity."

He does, however, note that while a formulation like Kohut's is inappropriate to a natural science model, it is appropriate to an "experiential, intentionalistic, action-oriented model" which Schafer recommends as a valuable alternative model since it is closer to subjective experience and actual clinical work.

Guntrip (1969) points out that in a natural science model the vicissitudes of instincts and the development of "autonomous apparatuses of control and adaptation" are central. By contrast, in his work and in the work of other authors, the development and distortions of the inborn potential for a stable sense of self as a whole person is

central. (Laing, 1959; Winnicott, 1965; Gruen, 1969, 1969, 1974a, 1974b; Gruen & Hertzmann, 1972) In these "whole person" theories, pathology is seen in terms of conflicts between different levels of experience within the same psychic whole which splits the unity of the self. One example of this splitting would be Winnicott's (1960) concept of a true self representing an arrested but valid infantile self and a false self representing a semi-adult, ungentle self which conforms to environmental demands to defend against the annihilation and exploitation of the true self.

In this study the term 'self' is used in the sense that Gruen uses it. He defines the (autonomous) self in terms of its striving for authenticity which involves the capacity to struggle to assert and to maintain the integrity of one's feelings, needs, etc. and to resist the denial or surrender of one's needs in order to comply with others or to avoid internal and external conflict. It also involves the capacity to maintain one's wholeness and to be engaged in one's feelings and activities (being-in-oneself and being-in-the-world). This is the sense in which the term 'self' is used in this study.

Limitations of the Study and Implications for Future Research

It was necessary to select a relatively homogeneous sample of shame-prone subjects best suited to provide information about their experience of shame for this exploratory study of shame feeling states, although, in some ways, this limits the generality of the findings.

Women were selected because they tend, as a group, to be more shame-prone than men. Subjects were not paid so that this would not be an incentive for volunteering. Subjects were asked not to volunteer unless they considered themselves to be quite shame-prone (and the criteria for shame-proneness were specified in the instructions to the students in class). Students who identified themselves as shame-prone (on Form I) were not selected as volunteers if they did not again indicate that they were shame-prone on the basis of their responses to both the question about which character they identified with in the literary passages and the question about how frequently they experienced shame. They were informed that they would be asked to discuss their experience of shame in detail and at length.

The sample consisted of graduate level nursing students because of my expectation that they would be able to verbalize their experiences better than college students and because they would be relatively well-matched on such variables

as age, intelligence, socioeconomic level, academic achievement, profession, etc.

There are three subject variables which might have influenced the results. One, the subjects were all women and it is possible that none of the 'critical incidents' dealt explicitly with sexual material because the investigator was a man. Second, all the subjects were nurses. The results may have been affected to the extent that the choice of nursing as a profession is associated with particular personality characteristics or because of the subordinate role afforded nurses in a medical setting. Third, nearly all of the subjects were members of the upper-lower and lower-middle socioeconomic classes. Since one's relative status, in a literal and figurative sense, is an issue in the experience of shame, the subjects' socioeconomic level may have had some bearing on the findings.

In conducting the interviews, subjects were specifically instructed to describe only their most recent experience of shame. The investigator inquired about when the incident had occurred; if it did not take place within the previous month, subjects were asked to think of a more recent incident so that they would be able to recall the experience in detail. For example, subjects were told that the embarrassing incident had to be recent enough for them to specify

what people actually said, rather than giving a generalized description of the dialogue. Subjects expressed disappointment when they were asked to discuss a recent incident; they had been prepared, in many cases, to relate their 'most embarrassing experience ever'. The most recent experiences of shame generally involved embarrassment associated with some thought or feeling and others were typically unaware that the subject was embarrassed. The 'most embarrassing experience' was generally associated with some action and others were aware of the subjects' embarrassment. One possibility for future research would be to compare an unselected, detailed account of a recent experience of shame with an account of shame that the subjects felt was more characteristic or meaningful for them. In addition, subjects could be asked to keep a detailed record - a diary, perhaps - of any embarrassing incidents which took place within the period of a week. In this way, the influence of selective recall in describing the experience could be diminished.

I would make two suggestions about altering the form of some of the questions at the end of the interview. These included questions about the subjects' "typical" experience of shame. I gained little information from the subjects' responses because they tended to be brief, generalized and conventional (i.e., "Examiner: What are the things you do that

make you feel ashamed? Subject: When I do something that makes me look foolish.") I would recommend changing the form of this type of question to read, "Could you give me a specific example of something you did that made you feel ashamed?" It might even be valuable to eliminate the series of questions which deal with the subjects' "typical" experience of shame to allow more time for inquiry during the subjects' descriptions of the 'critical incident'.

It could also be worthwhile to add a series of questions which deal with the history of the subject's experience of shame. Most of the questions are cross-sectional, rather than longitudinal, in the sense that they deal with the present and not the history of the subject's experience. For example, I would add questions such as - "When you think of how you felt during the incident, what does it bring to mind? What does it remind you of? When have you felt something like that before? When was the first time in your life you can recall having that feeling?"

The specific problems which were encountered in doing the content analysis and the ways in which they were resolved was discussed in detail in the Results chapter. However, the general problems of reliability and validity inherent in the process of clinical inference should be mentioned. This is necessary since the content analysis did not involve

simple rules for dividing the content of the communications into units, assigning the units to pre-existing categories and drawing inferences from a statistical analysis of the obtained findings in connection with the testing of hypotheses established prior to the collection of the data. This is an exploratory study in which the content analysis was designed to organize and summarize the wealth of material provided by interviews about a complex experience which has received little attention in the theoretical literature, has been the focus of only four research studies and has never been the central issue (apart from studies which are concerned with both shame and guilt) in any study.

The four phases of the content analysis involved specifying those portions of the interviews which contained the subjects' explicit inferences about shame, grouping similar inferences together to form categories, analyzing the inferences within a category in order to develop a category description and, finally, grouping mutually supportive category descriptions into the five major themes.

The initial phases of the content analysis involved relatively low level inferences, deductive reasoning and decisions made primarily on the basis of logic and the later phases involved higher level inferences, inductive reasoning and decisions made on the basis of clinical judgment.

Schafer's (1968) description of different types of "synthesizing work" is applicable to this discussion of the work that was done in the various phases of the content analysis. First, he notes that the work of "exclusion" involves the exercise of logic and objective judgment in selecting elements which fit into an existing organization and eliminating those which do not fit. This work was done in specifying those portions of the interview which were explicit inferences and in grouping similar inferences together. Second, the work of "inclusion or coordination" involves the fitting together of compatible elements which initially appear partially incompatible. This work was done in developing the category descriptions. Third, the work of "transformation" involves changing previously unsynthesized elements by defining their nature more precisely and objectively, decreasing the emphasis on ways in which they appear incompatible, evolving more assimilable versions of them -- all with the objective of making those elements more compatible and mutually supportive. This work was done in developing the five major themes.

The development of the major themes involved a synthesis of elements, each of which constituted a link in a chain of ideas which, together, convey a novel and fundamental theme related to the experience of shame. These themes are more

than a simple summary of the component category descriptions, but are a novel integration of these elements into themes which transcend the scope and depth of the unsynthesized elements from which they were formed. In part, this synthesis originated from the investigator's inductive generalizations based not only on the category descriptions, but also on certain theories, clinical work and personal experiences.

The point of this discussion of the content analysis is that the finding in this study which needs most to be replicated in order to confirm their validity is the final synthesis of the major themes.

The experience of shame still needs to be studied among men who are extremely shame-prone. The experience of shame also needs to be studied among men and women who vary in the degree to which they are shame-prone. The individual difference variable which seems most relevant for future research in the area of shame-proneness or the experience of shame, however, would be autonomy rather than sex.

APPENDIX A

Forms (I, II and III) Used in
Selection of Shame-Prone Subjects

A STUDY OF THE EXPERIENCE OF SHAME

Please fill in the blanks on this page and then complete the forms that follow.

Initials: _____

Female or Male: _____

Date: _____

FORM I

Please check one of the following statements:

I DO/ (I DO NOT) volunteer to participate further
in the in-depth part of this
study.

If you DO volunteer to participate further, please fill in
the following information:

1. Name by which I can be identified on the
telephone: _____
2. Telephone number (s) where I can be
reached: _____
3. The most convenient hour to call: _____ A.M. _____ P.M.

Please write any comments or information you would like me
to know about contacting you below:

FORM II

Instructions:

The following two brief passages are based on incidents that appear in The Brothers Karamazov by Dostoyevsky.

Each passage dramatizes the inner experience of its main character. The first describes the inner experience of shame; the second describes the inner experience of guilt. All people report having both of these inner experiences.

The experiences described in the passages differ in some of the following ways; in -

- the ideas that the character has about herself (himself)
- the ideas that the character has about other people
- the thoughts that other people have about the character
- the issues that must be struggled with
- ways to resolve these issues.

Read the two passages quickly (approx. one minute each). Try to put yourself in the place of the main character so you can feel the inner experience that is described. Do not be concerned with 'figuring out' the passages or with remembering them.

When you have finished reading please answer the three brief questions on the page following the passages.

The Meeting at the Monastery

Old Fyodor and his sons had come to the monastery for Fyodor's audience with the revered church elder, Father Zossima.

What was taking place in the room was incredible. All previous visitors admitted for audiences, men of high rank and learning, had shown the most profound reverence and delicacy. Fyodor, however, was telling an anecdote that was so embellished that hardly a soul could believe it.

One of the monks could bear no more and cried out, "Fyodor, stop! You know that anecdote isn't true. Why are you playing the fool?"

"I suspected that it wasn't true," Fyodor cried with conviction. "Forgive me, I made it up just now to add some spice. I play the fool to make myself more agreeable. Though I really don't know myself what I do it for. Your reverence," he cried with sudden pathos, "The minute I see my joke is not coming off my cheeks feel as though they were drawn down to my lower jaw. Great Father, do I annoy you with my talk," asked Fyodor.

"I beg you not to disturb yourself and not to be uneasy," the elder said. "Make yourself at home. And, most of all, do not be so ashamed of yourself, for that is at the root of it all."

Fyodor called out, "Father, you pierced right through me by that remark, and read me to the core. Indeed, I always feel when I meet people that I am lower than all, and that they take me for a fool. So I say: 'Let me really play the fool. I am not afraid of you and your opinion, for you are every one of you worse than I am.'"

The Witness

The evidence against Dimitri, in his trial for the death of his father, had been refuted. Indeed, he was innocent.

Katerina was called to the witness box. The court was hushed. Before the prosecutor could examine her she cried out: "There is evidence I must give at once ... at once." She pointed to Dimitri. "It was he who killed his father. He wrote me a letter saying he would kill him. Here is the letter. Take it!"

The court usher took the letter to the judge. Had it not been for that letter, Dimitri might have escaped his doom.

When she finished, Dimitri suddenly cried out in a sobbing voice: "Katerina, why have you ruined me? Now I am condemned!"

"He's been false to me and meant to abandon me," she said with venom and malignant triumph. The moment of revenge had come upon her suddenly, and everything that had been accumulating so long and so painfully in her offended heart burst out unexpectedly. She had betrayed Dimitri.

After the trial had ended Katerina was tormented by the thought of what she had done to Dimitri. "Oh, my temper was the cause of everything! I paved the way to that hideous scene at the trial ... I am the cause of it all, I alone am to blame. I am responsible for his fate. Oh, I am unhappy. It's my nature, my awful, unhappy nature! I told them about the letter to hurt him."

Please note -

The Meeting at the Monastery dramatizes the inner experience of shame.

and

The Witness dramatizes the inner experience of guilt.

Kindly answer the following questions:

I. Which of the two inner experiences described in the passages do you experience most often?

(check one) shame or guilt

II. Which of the two experiences feels more intense and unpleasant for you when it occurs, though you may not necessarily experience it "most often". (Your choice may be different in question one and two)?

(check one) shame or guilt

III. With regard to shame only - which statement listed below is true of you?

(check one)

I experience shame frequently.

I experience shame occasionally.

I experience shame only rarely since it is such an unpleasant feeling that I keep away from any situation that might make me feel shame.

Please continue with Form III on the next page.

FORM III

Please answer all of the questions below:

PERSONAL DATA SHEET

Initials	_____	Year in College	_____
		(freshman, etc.)	
Date of Birth	_____	Major	_____
Marital Status	_____	Grade Point	
Female or Male	_____	Average	_____
Father's Occupation	_____		
Mother's Occupation	_____		

Age and Sex of Brothers and Sisters

	(Age)	(Sex)
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____

List your Extracurricular Activities and Hobbies (Please be specific)

Have you ever had therapy or counseling? ____ If you have, please specify the type of treatment _____, the frequency of sessions _____ per week and the duration of treatment _____ in months or years.

Thank you for your assistance. Please give these forms to the examiner.

APPENDIX B

Early Memories Test

(Adapted from Martin Mayman's, 1971
Early Memories Form)

EARLY MEMORIES TEST

Subject's Initials: _____

Date: _____

- I. Think back as far as you can and try to recall your very earliest memory (Urge subject to relate a specific incident rather than some general description of an event).

Is it a visual image you have of the event? (If it is) What do you actually see as you picture it? (Which details does the subject recall as they were experienced; those recalled through hearsay or by a kind of secondary reconstruction of the events; and those that are visualized?)

Do you see yourself in the memory, or feel yourself in it, or both?

What do you notice about yourself (and about the others described)?

Any feeling or emotion accompanying the memory?

How old were you at the time of the memory?

- II. Now tell me your next earliest memory. (Obtain further details, feeling tone, age, etc.)

Which details do you recall most vividly? What do you actually see in your image of this incident?

Do you see yourself? (If so) What do you notice about yourself (and about the others described)?

- III. What is your earliest memory of your mother? (Proceed with inquiry as described above.)

- IV. What is your earliest memory of your father? (Proceed with inquiry as described above.)

- V. Whether you remember the stories or not, are there any stories the family likes to (used to) tell about you from your childhood? (Proceed with inquiry as described above.)

Who usually tells this story? What point does he (she) make about you when he (she) tells the story?

- VI. Is there any early memory which is very special as far as you are concerned -- any which is your own special favorite? (Proceed with inquiry, as above.)

(Adapted from Martin Mayman, 1973)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLASSIFYING EARLY MEMORIES

USING THE (1) Relationship Paradigm Scale and
(2) Object Relationships Scale

For both scales, the code number or "score" you assign each memory should be based on the memory as a whole. Consider each memory as a metaphor or parable and listen to what the subject seems to be saying. Don't reach for an interpretation - let your intuitive, clinical impression guide you. Empathize, don't think your way to an understanding of the memory.

Classify the molar meaning of the memory first. That is, identify which major category it belongs in. For example, for the relationship paradigm scale there are six major categories (i.e., oral, anal, etc.) and for the object relationship scale there are four major categories (A, B, etc.).

Then classify the memory according to the proper sub-classification. If this is not possible just code the memory using the major category it belongs in. Some memories will be too ambiguous to assign to any category; leave these unscored rather than forcing them into a category.

Some memories may be too complex to be assigned to a single category (sub-category). In classifying these complex memories use the symbol "→" to indicate a distinct shift from one relationship paradigm or object relationship score to another in the content of the memory. Use the symbol ";" to indicate when two distinct themes blend in the memory. Don't score a minor theme even when it is distinctly different from a dominant theme.

Occasionally, a memory which fits into one of the sub-categories (of the Relationship Paradigm Scale) seems to include features of several of the lettered categories (i.e., I Ia and I Ib). Feel free to assign as many letter scores as seem indicated, but list them in order of their dominance in the memory.

APPENDIX C

Relationship Paradigm Scale

* (Adapted from Martin Mayman, 1973)

RELATIONSHIP PARADIGM SCALE (Core Organizing Themes)

I. "Oral" Paradigms

1. Primal theme of basic mistrust:
 - a. Danger of personal extinction by abandonment, starvation, being swallowed, torn apart; sense of engulfing evil or impending doom.
 - b. Being overpowered, overwhelmed, helpless, impotent to cope with evil forces.
 - c. Bleak, empty aloneness; being sent away from home; death of parents; themes of traumatic separation; depression verging on despair.
 - d. Losing one's way and reacting with panicky sense of loneliness.
2. Deprivation or insufficient supplies of attention, food or love; dissatisfaction, bitter resentment, sense of unfulfillment (not despair as in I 1):
 - a. Temporary separation from others; parents away and not aware of the child; child is sent away; children left out of adult activities.
 - b. Insufficient supplies of comfort, reassurance, love, attention, care or food; loss of some object to which one had a strong attachment.
 - c. Being sick, feeling miserable; left alone with no nurturant figure available to intervene, help, comfort or cure.
3. Aggressive reactions to deprivation or frustration. Demanding or grasping needed supplies (rather than merely yearning for them as in I 2):
 - a. Suffused with impotent rage.

* This scale is for private use only at the request of its author.

- b. Greedy hunger for what is lacking. Taking, holding onto, snatching away, grasping or biting.
 - c. Resentment and/or malicious treatment of younger siblings.
 - (p). Punishment, criticism, or "accidental injury" as a direct consequence of oral-aggressive behavior.
4. Gratification themes. Sense of snugness, security, trust, expectation of fulfillment; sense of personal worth; availability of comforts and supports:
- a. Snug pleasures of sleep, bed, breast, food or physical closeness.
 - b. Eating in a pleasure-filled atmosphere; being fed by others in pleasurable atmosphere.
 - c. Comfort of care during illness.
 - d. Close, comforting, attentive presence of mother or surrogate.
 - e. Receiving gifts as proof of love; sense of warmth, belonging and fulfillment; exclusive attention and love from nurturant adults.
 - f. Being helped by adult to learn to care for oneself; being taught one's name, address, directions, etc.
5. Themes of obtaining oral supplies by a reversal of roles; insuring the availability of nurturant care by becoming aggressively active rather than receptively passive:
- a. Taking the nurturant role in relation to a younger sibling, pet, friend or parent; giving rather than receiving care.
 - b. Insulating oneself or withdrawing to replenish narcissistic supplies. Relief comes from self-insulation, self-comforting or self-sufficiency.

- c. Manipulativeness or extortion of oral supplies from neglectful parents or parental figures.

II. "Anal" Paradigms

1. Themes of retentiveness, willful stubbornness, defiance, or passive-aggressive non-compliance:
 - a. Withholding from adults.
 - b. Refusal to comply with adult's requests; refusal to eat or go to bed.
 - c. Passive-aggressive "inability" to produce what is asked for or expected by adults.
 - (p). Meets with punishment, ridicule or attack on one's self-esteem by figures in retaliation against one's retentive behavior.
2. Themes of expulsiveness. Hurting self or others by dirtying them or treating them like dirt:
 - a. Insufficient sphincter control; other forms of being dirtied or feeling one's self to be unclean.
 - b. Defiance by vilifying others or demeaning them; throwing dirt or rocks at others; extruding others by pushing them away or keeping them at a distance.
 - c. Being the object of vilification; being treated like dirt by others.
 - (p). Meeting with punishment, ridicule or other injury to one's self-esteem for activities like those described in 2a and 2b.
3. Themes of sublimation or reaction formation:
 - a. Willful assertion of self in opposition to others marked by a quality of stubbornness, oppositionalism and negativism; being told not to do something, but persisting or challenging the request.

- b. Doing what one is supposed to do; avoiding conflict with coercive parents.
- c. Attention to cleanliness; cleaning up.
- d. Preoccupation with one's own or another's possessions with emphasis on quantity, orderliness and ownership; collecting objects.
- e. Playing in the mud, building sand castles; pleasure in being dirty, making a mess.

III. "Phallic" Paradigms of Self-Actualization. Pleasure in mastery, strength, competence, status, etc.:

- 1. Phallic-assertive or phallic-intrusive themes:
 - a. Expressing self-assured initiative, independence; going off on one's own in pursuit of one's own special interest.
 - b. Boisterous play (esp. with peers); vigorous activity including vigorous attacks on others.
 - c. Competitive games; pleasure in conquest; insistence on asserting one's dominance over people or impersonal obstacles (to be distinguished from "greediness" of I 3b). Proving one is not inferior; being as good as someone else.
 - d. Mischievous, teasing or provocative play.
 - (p). Any of these activities causes injury, punishment or narcissistic insult.
- 2. Phallic-locomotor themes:
 - a. Active use of conveyances, especially if the emphasis is on vehicles which carry one to adventure and new places; riding a bicycle or horse (being taken for a drive or ride is classified under III 5a).
 - (p). Any of these activities causes injury, punishment or narcissistic insult.

3. Phallic-urethral themes:
 - a. Squirting water from a hose; urinating with pride in one's skill, prowess or masterfulness.
 - b. Setting fires and enjoying the ensuing excitement.
 - (p). Any of these activities causes injury, punishment or narcissistic insult.
4. Passive posture in relation to phallic-assertive and phallic-intrusive themes:
 - a. Admiration and envy of phallic objects (symbolic or real); Disappointment at unfavorable comparisons with one's phallic prowess (real or symbolic).
 - b. Admiring father or father surrogate and wanting to be like him, to fix things as he does, to do as he does as well as he does.
 - c. Receiving an object which is admired for its size, beauty or other remarkable properties.
 - d. Watching the feats of others but more in envy than in admiration.
 - e. Inability to be active (helpless in the sense of feeling unable to participate actively rather than utter helplessness).
5. Passive posture in relation to phallic-locomotor themes:
 - a. Being taken for a ride by an adult.
 - b. Passively watching large, moving vehicles or other wondrous objects.
 - c. Being teased, being tossed around playfully by an adult or carried by father in horse-and-rider play.

6. Passive posture in relation to phallic-urethral themes:
 - a. Watching fires, firemen, boys at urethral play.
7. Being the object of a phallic-aggressive assault:
 - a. Being knocked down and overpowered by brute strength; fantasy of being whipped or beaten.
 - b. Fear of dangerous, brutish characters (cars, ghosts, animals).
 - c. Being shy, timid, fearful of taking initiative.
 - d. Themes of physical injury; actual injury to the genitals; symbolic castration themes.
 - e. Being hurt, physically, by a doctor.
 - f. A stronger figure is needed to help stave off physical assaults.

IV. "Phallic-Sexual" Paradigms. Associated with exhibitionistic-scopophilic activities and affects:

1. Active/Intrusive Themes:
 - a. Playful, sexually-colored curiosity; sex play with peers; "doctor" games or other scopophilic/exhibitionistic games.
 - b. Eager curiosity; wandering away to explore one's surroundings and discovering things in nature or in one's world.
 - c. Proud or excited self-display; performing before an audience of potential admirers. Emphasis is on doing something to win favor rather than expecting to be admired for some passive display of the self.
 - d. Shame or embarrassment rather than pleasure in self-display.

(p). Any of these activities causes punishment, physical injury or narcissistic insult.

2. Passive/Inceptive Themes:

- a. Being fetchingly coy or seductive; trying to make one's self attractive and endearing; teasing others in a sexually provocative way.
 - b. Pleasure in one's appearance; attention to pretty clothes; attractive grooming; pleasure in being looked at, noticed, admired or photographed; playing dress-up.
 - c. Shame or embarrassment rather than pleasure in inceptive self-display.
- (p). Any of these activities causes punishment, physical injury or narcissistic insult.

V. "Oedipal" Paradigms. Competitive striving to win favor with a love object:

- 1. Male Themes (This category, V 1, should not be scored):
 - a. Jealousy or rivalry with a father or sibling for the affection of a mother or mother surrogate; interest in mother's dealings with another male.
 - b. Failure to win mother's love, often accompanied by self-blame for one's personal inadequacy.
 - c. Resentment or fear of the father as an overt or tacit rival for mother's love.
 - d. Conflict between parents in which the child sides with the mother against the father; anger at father for hurting mother.
 - e. Doing things with mother which are pleasurable and exciting (with father tacitly excluded).
 - f. Pleasure in bringing mother a phallic gift.

- g. Interest in mother's pregnancy or childbearing.
- h. Identified with father as a male-role model; enjoying close positive relationship with father.

2. Female Themes:

- a. Jealousy or rivalry with mother or siblings for the affection of father or father surrogate; interest in father's dealings with another female.
- b. Resentment or fear of mother as an avowed or tacit rival for father's love.
- c. Failure to win father's love with accompanying sense of personal inadequacy.
- d. Conflict between parents in which the child sides with father and rejects mother.
- e. Denial of oedipal conflict by stressing warm, harmonious noncompetitive aspects of one's relationship with mother.
- f. Doing exciting or pleasurable things with father with mother tacitly excluded.
- g. Interest in having a baby as mother did or receiving some symbolically equivalent phallic gift from father.
- h. Playing house; playing with dolls; dressing up in mother's clothes or some way doing as mother does as an indication of successful resolution of one's oedipal conflict; enjoying a close, positive relationship with same sexed parent.

VI. "Latency" Paradigms. Memories assigned to this category involve more sublimated peer group activities than memories assigned to Category V:

- 1. Themes of productivity and positive self-esteem:

- a. Socialization with peers; peer-group play with well-differentiated sex-roles.
 - b. Industriousness; learning to do things, constructing and planning with others in a common endeavor.
 - c. Learning manipulative skills for the purpose of creative accomplishment.
2. Themes of inferiority and negative self-esteem:
- a. Withdrawal from one's peer group; isolation from peer groups or rejection by them.

APPENDIX D

Quality of Object Relationships Scale

* (Adapted from Mayman's 1973
Scale)

QUALITY OF OBJECT RELATIONSHIPS SCALE

Type A - Psychotic:

Prototypical memories assigned to this category are characterized by qualities of chaos, other-worldliness or objectlessness. One does not feel the presence of human objects that the person is involved with in an affectively charged way. From the point of view of ambivalence the relationships are pre-ambivalent - there is a belief that only malevolent objects exist. There is a depiction of a malevolent world which offers, at best, a minimal hope of rescue in an otherwise evil world.

- A1: The object world is unreal, nightmarish, other-worldly.
- A2: The self is the object of a malevolent attack in a hostile world of 'bad' objects. No one intercedes or staves off the threat. The threat is more archaic than feelings of loneliness or deprivation.
- A3: There is no control over potentially devastating events. The self is represented as a victim of the unexpected and uncontrollable occurrences. People are not experienced as agents, but rather as elements in a field of forces with these forces originating outside the self.
- A4: At best there is a cry of protest out of the field of forces (see A3). There is a hint of the emergence of self-assertation in a cold or uncontrollable object world.
- A5: The cry for help or the plight itself brings some glimmer of hope in the form of a fortuitous intervention. The 'good' object who might come to the rescue is more magical than real.

* This scale is for private use only at the request of its author.

Type B - Borderline:

Prototypical memories in this category are characterized by object relationships that are coldly narcissistic. People are recognizable but there is only minimal contact or interaction. There is evidence of affective detachment. The subject is unable or unwilling to be engaged. The relationships are still pre-ambivalent and objects are seen as all good or all bad. Relatedness is not to objects in a real world, but rather to a projection of the narcissistic sense of the 'all good self' or 'all bad self'. There is no vestige of a sense of there being 'good objects' in the subject's inner world. Memories B1 to B4 convey an empty aloneness along with some self-invested satisfactions filling the peopleless world. Memory B5 depicts a chronic object-hunger.

- B1: The world is not so much bad as it is empty of 'good' human objects, past or present, and also empty of good feelings about the self. Or the memory may be a purely narcissistic expression of well-being, unrelated to the presence of others who are instrumental to the person's well-being.
- B2: The self is narcissistically absorbed due to an illness; absorbed in the experience of pain, symptoms or deprivations associated with being ill. May be some allusions to care-takers, but these people are only props in the subject's self-involved state.
- B3: Alone except for things rather than people. Self is related to possessions which give them a special value as transitional objects. There is in this relationship with inanimate objects a large component of "primary narcissism" (if valued for its secondary narcissistic value - for its socially defined or mutually enjoyed qualities it is categorized as a Type C memory).
- B4: Others are present, but as shadows; they are incidental or two-dimensional. They are not yet 'good' or real objects; they are props. Self and others are described as being detached and impersonal. They have no real effect on each other. The seeming interaction, if it exists, evokes no empathy from the examiner.

B5: Yearning for unavailable or lost objects in an otherwise bleak world or a euphoric basking in a diffuse goodness. Others, if present, are anonymous, interchangeable figures onto whom global feelings may be assigned.

Type C - Neurotic:

People are engaged in painful, conflictual, crisis-laden interactions. The characters are in some way larger than life. The way they are seen is related to the subject's internalized conflicts. However, they are figures with whom it is possible to make affective contact. Objects are pulled into being figures in a transference conflict rather than being objects in their own right.

- C1: The other person is present in the subject's life-space, but his character is defined almost solely as a need-satisfying or need-frustrating object (If an object takes on the characteristics of a more individually distinctive person, the memory would be assigned to categories C2 or C3).
- C2: The self is involved in some special, interpersonally relevant but nonetheless self-centered interest of his own in relation to others. The interaction involves a parallel activity.
- C3: The self and others are more recognizable as separate people, but they are defined exclusively in terms of the subject's immediate intrapsychic conflict or affect state, not as unique people in their own right. Although the people seem more alive, the infantile transference elements in their characterization is readily apparent.
- C4: There is some give and take between the self and others. However, the overriding focus is on the self; others are secondary. The self is somewhat aware of events, people and things which exist in a real world and this world begins to reflect a reality that exists independently of the event being reported.

C5: The self-other interactions are more real. But the characterizations, especially of other people in the story, remain thin. Interactions begin to appear more palpable and increasingly believable motives are ascribed to the self and others.

Type D - Normal:

The interpersonal relationships reflect a more sharply defined differentiation of a real self from real others involved in interactions which are mutual. Others have their own personalities and emotional postures; they are more than mere props or projected aspects of the self. Even in memories where the story is built around an infantile conflict (usually phallic or oedipal) the figures transcend their roles as transference objects. The listener can have a sound basis for empathizing with each of the figures. Figures provide more than access (for the empathetic listener) to the subject himself; the separate emotional posture of others is apparent.

- D1: Although the memory is self-centered, other people and circumstances are depicted with a realism that allows the listener to see the interaction in a broader, less self-centered perspective. One can empathize with the subject and, to a lesser extent, with the separate postures of the others.
- D2: Events are reported with less of a self-centered bias. There is sharing and joining with others in a common interest outside the self. The interest, activity or event that is shared does not have more relevance for the subject than for the others.
- D3: Self-other interactions reflect clearly the separate, inner-directed motives of self and others. One has the opportunity of participating in the event vicariously as it was experienced for the self and others.
- D4: There is active, two-way communication of separate emotional and interpersonal messages. Others have well-differentiated thoughts, feelings and motives of their own. The other figures can be imagined in situations other than the one recounted.

D5: These memories are characterized by the existence of multiple role relationships with a variety of different people with a clear articulation of the distinct individuality of all the characters. A sense of belonging to a community of separate individuals. Negative experiences are presented in a wider context of mutual trust, acceptance, regard or affection.

APPENDIX E

Critical Incident Interview

CRITICAL INCIDENT INTERVIEW

(Read the following instructions to the subject:)

I would like you to recall the most recent incident in which you experienced what you would call 'shame'. In the next five minutes please describe what happened at that time. Try to describe how the incident unfolded as a novelist would in writing a short story. Include details about what led up to the incident and about what the outcome was. Also, mention what you and other people, if they were present, thought, felt, said and did during the incident.

(Inquire if:

- a) any details are vague, peculiar, omitted or striking.
- b) there is no clear description of what the subject and others thought, felt, said and did during the incident.
- c) the events that led up to the incident are not clear (especially if the point at which the subject first experienced shame is not clear).
- d) the outcome is not clear (or if the subject's defensive style is not evident).

(Read the following instructions:)

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about the incident you just told me. I will ask you separate questions about what thoughts you had, about the things you pictured, about the things you felt and about the things you said and did.

(Pause to give the subject an opportunity to ask any questions about the focus of the more detailed inquiry, then read the following:)

When you answer these questions I would like you to consider only the period of time during which you felt ashamed - not the time before you felt ashamed or after the feeling went away.

(Pause to give the subject an opportunity to ask questions about the period of time in question.)

1. a) Describe the ideas or thoughts you had. What kind of inner dialogue took place in your mind?
(Inquire if the ideational form and content are not described. If the point of the question is missed, give the subject some examples. If the subject's response is ambiguous (i.e., "I felt lousy.") inquire so that the ideational component can be distinguished from the affective component.)
- b) Describe any images or pictures or visual fantasies that were in your mind. (The object of this question is to determine if any visual imagery occurred and to describe it if it did occur. If the subject does not understand the question say, "In addition to what you could actually see happening did you picture anything else in your mind? For example, did you have an image of what was going to happen, did you picture yourself in a scene that happened at some other time, or did you imagine how you looked from someone else's point of view?")
- c) Describe any feelings you had. What emotions were you experiencing or what mood were you in? (If the subject is not certain what the question means or if the response refers to ideation rather than affect say, "What I am interested in is how you felt inside rather than in what you were thinking. For example, were you upset - calm - excited - anxious?" If anger is mentioned spontaneously, inquire so that the quality of the experience is clear (i.e., helpless rage vs. righteous indignation).)
- d) Describe any physical sensations you had in your body. (Inquiry should be directed at obtaining any information about kinaesthetic/proprioceptive feedback and/or evidence of autonomic arousal. Give an example if the meaning of the question is not clear.)

- e) What did you notice about your body position, movements and gestures? What did you do? What actions did you take? (The object of this question is to obtain information about non-verbal behavior; to inquire about postures, gestures, etc.; to have the subject describe actions taken.)
- f) What did you say?
 (Inquire in order to distinguish between verbalizations that occurred during the experience of shame and those that occurred after the affect was diminished. It is also vital to obtain, to the extent it is possible, the subject's exact words.)

(The second general area of investigation is concerned with the subject's experience of 'others' during the critical incident. 'Others' may refer, depending on the subject's description of the critical incident, to one person, to one person who stands out in a group, to a group, etc. The instructions to the subject and the phrasing of subsequent items relative to this issue should be modified by the interviewer in accordance with the subject's characterization of 'others' in the critical incident. If the critical incident does not involve 'others,' the subject should be asked to imagine how 'others' might have reacted were they present.)

(Read the following instructions:)

Now I would like to ask you some questions about what the 'others' thought, felt, said and did during the time when you felt ashamed.

(If the subject says there is no way of knowing how the 'others' responded, ask them to use their imagination or to guess how the 'others' responded. Inquiry for each item should permit a distinction to be made between what the 'others' actually did and said and what the subject imagined or implied they did and said. Inquiry should proceed as in questions 1a through 1e.)

2. a) Describe the ideas or thoughts the 'others' had. What kinds of inner dialogue took place in their minds?

- b) Describe any images or pictures they had in their minds.
- c) Describe any feelings they had. What emotions were they experiencing or what mood were they in?
- d) What did you notice about their body positions, movements and gestures? What did they do? What actions did they take?
- e) What did they say?

(Read the following instructions:)

The next set of questions has to do with the experience of 'shame' as you typically feel it and not to any specific incident. In answering the questions try to think of the ways in which feeling of 'shame' is the same from one situation to another.

(For each of the following questions, 3 to 7, read the entire question before eliciting a response.)

- 3. a) What is there about the things you think, your ideas, that make you feel ashamed?
- b) What kinds of emotions or feelings make you feel ashamed?
- c) What is there about the things you say or how you say them that makes you feel ashamed?
- d) What are the things you do that make you feel ashamed?
- 4. How does your image of yourself - how you see yourself in your mind's eye - change when you are ashamed?
- 5. How does your image of other people change when you are ashamed?
- 6. How does the image other people have of you change at times when you have felt ashamed?

7. a) What do you think - what kind of thoughts make you feel less ashamed?
- b) What do you say that makes you feel less ashamed?
- c) What do you do - what kind of actions make you feel less ashamed?

APPENDIX F

Critical Incident Interview Rating Scale

CRITICAL INCIDENT INTERVIEW RATING SCALE

Subject's Initials: _____

Rater's Initials: _____

Date: _____

Instructions to Raters:

After reading the complete transcript of each interview, rate the subject's responses on each of the twenty-two (22) behavioral dimensions by circling the appropriate scale number from 1 to 7 for each of the scale items. Rate each of the dimensions separately. The judgment you make on one scale item does not have to be consistent with your judgments on any other scale items.

Base your clinical judgments as closely as possible on the subject's specific statements. It is important for you to use the subject's statements as a basis for making your judgments about how to score a particular scale item rather than making your judgment on the basis of an inference you've made about what the subject's response 'ought to be'. Please reread the appropriate section(s) of the interview when making your judgments rather than relying on your memory of what the subject said if you are in doubt.

It is certainly possible for there not to be any specific information in the interview for you to use in making your judgments or the subject's response may not be scoreable within the framework of the continuum associated with each scale item. In both of these instances write N.A. (not applicable) over the numerical scale for the scale item.

Please refer to the examples in the "sample scored interview" if you are in doubt about the more elaborate definition of the behavioral dimension represented by the abbreviated cues or label associated with each of the scale items.

CRITICAL INCIDENT INTERVIEW RATING SCALE *

Aspects of the Stimulus Situation

Item 1

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. experienced as encounter between self-other; imagery and thoughts about self vis-a-vis others. | 1. experienced as encounter within self; others not focal in awareness. |
|---|---|

1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 2

- | | |
|---|---|
| 2. affect triggered by some incongruity, failure or deficiency of the self. | 2. affect triggered by some transgression, irresponsible act or failure of self to act. |
|---|---|

2) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 3

- | | |
|--|--|
| 3. some other is experienced as source of negative reaction. | 3. the self is experienced as source of negative reaction. |
|--|--|

3) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 4

- | | |
|--|--|
| 4. the self-as-object ("me") is target of negative reaction. | 4. the self-as-agent ("I") is target of negative reaction. |
|--|--|

4) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

* In the CII Rating Scales given to the raters, the 'shame' and 'guilt' cues were counterbalanced so there was no consistent left-right placement of the cues. Here all the 'shame' cues appear on the right side of the scale items.

Item 5

5. the negative reaction is global; involves the whole self.

5. the negative reaction is specific; involves some specific act or aspect of the self.

5) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 6

6. other is experienced as source of ridicule, score or disapproval directed toward self; subject's suffering is focal.

6. other is experienced as having been harmed physically or emotionally by the self; other's suffering is focal.

6) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 7

7. affect triggered by stimulus that appears trivial or petty; the intensity of affect appears inappropriate to stimulus that triggered it.

7. affect triggered by some act for which the self is responsible; intensity of affect appears appropriate to stimulus that triggered it.

7) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 8

8. associated with the sexual instinct and its derivatives (i.e., exhibitionism, scopophilia, etc.).

8. associated with the aggressive instinct and its derivatives (i.e., sadism, masochism, etc.).

8) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Aspects of the Conscious ExperienceItem 9

- | | |
|--|--|
| 9. "imagery mode" of representation of thought (i.e., organized in terms of concrete categories, similarities and differences, metaphors, etc.). | 9. "lexical mode" of representation of thought (i.e., organized in terms of abstract categories, logical sequences, cause and effect relationships, etc.). |
|--|--|

9) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Item 10

- | | |
|---|---|
| 10. affective component of experience predominates over ideational component. | 10. ideational component predominates over affective component. |
|---|---|

10) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Item 11

- | | |
|--|--|
| 11. ideational content reflects concern with one's identity; concern with one's past and future. | 11. ideational component reflects concern with specific acts and their consequences; concern with events in the present. |
|--|--|

11) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Item 12

- | | |
|---|---|
| 12. self embedded in field; sense of self as better or worse in comparison with others; about "me". | 12. self isolated from the field; sense of self as good or bad in relation to one's personal standards of conduct; about "I". |
|---|---|

12) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 13

13. concern with making a good impression on others; concern with one's mastery, power competence, etc.

13. concern with satisfying one's personal moral or ethical standards; with punishment for transgressing.

13) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 14

14. source of negative reaction localized 'out there'.

14. source of negative reaction localized 'within'.

14) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 15

15. anger has quality of helpless rage; anger directed primarily at the self.

15. anger has quality of righteous indignation; directed primarily at others.

15) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 16

16. other experienced as powerful, active, capable of functioning effectively.

16. others experienced as having been harmed physically or emotionally; as dependent; as an object of pity.

16) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 17

17. self passive, childish, helpless; reduced in size.

17. self active, adult, capable; increased in size.

17) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 18

- | | |
|---|---|
| 18. subject concerned with communication of affect state via gestures, posture, non-verbal behavior, etc. | 18. subject unconcerned with communication of affect state via gestures, posture, non-verbal behavior, etc. |
|---|---|

18) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Defensive Aspects of the Subject's ResponseItem 19

- | | |
|--|--|
| 19. efforts to reaffirm self; to restore loss of status, mastery or competence in thought or deed. | 19. efforts to absolve self; to establish one's innocence in thought and deed; demonstrations of remorse; efforts to make restitution. |
|--|--|

19) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Item 20

- | | |
|---|---|
| 20. efforts to diminish others; fantasies of revenge, triumph or retaliation. | 20. efforts to get others to share blame for harmful acts; efforts to blame others. |
|---|---|

20) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Item 21

- | | |
|--|---|
| 21. efforts to change passive experience into active experience (i.e., by mocking self). | 21. efforts to change active experience into passive experience (i.e., by claims that act was unintentional). |
|--|---|

21) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Item 22

22. primary defenses:
repression and
denial.

22. primary defenses:
isolation (intellec-
tualization), rati-
on-
alization, undoing
and projection.

22) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

APPENDIX G

Instructions for Ranking Subjects
on the Dimension of Self-Awareness

Instructions to Raters for Ranking Subjects on the
Dimension of Self-Awareness

I. Description of the Self-Awareness Dimension

- a) Self-awareness refers to more than the ability to describe one's behavior in such terms as, 'I am' or 'I feel'. It involves the capacity to detach oneself from one's behavior and to observe that behavior. It is more a reflective self-awareness than an awareness of oneself. Statements in which this reflective self-awareness is apparent not only describe one's behavior, but refer to the meaning, origin, significance and relatedness of one's behavior. Such statements are often introduced by propositions such as, 'I wonder if ...', 'I believe that ...', 'It occurs to me why I ...', 'I can see the reason for ...', etc.
- b) Self-awareness also refers to the capacity to assert and to maintain the integrity of one's needs, opinions, feelings, etc. in the face of internal and external conflict. This capacity is not demonstrated if one denies one's needs, etc. (as above) or relinquishes one's needs in order to submit to others or to avoid internal or external conflict.
- c) Self-awareness also refers to a capacity for self-criticism and a concern for and curiosity about one's inner life. Note that it is possible for a person to relate experiences that were intense, without considering their involvement in those experiences. Their involvement can be overlooked, rationalized, disguised and, as a result, continued in the future unchanged.

II. Rating and Ranking the Subjects' Self-Awareness

Please read each of the twenty (20) interviews in order to establish for yourself the degree of self-awareness exhibited by the group as a whole. Then please reread the interviews, making brief notes that will enable you to identify each subject and the degree of self-awareness reflected in the subject's interview. Then compare each subject with all other subjects and assign a rank from 1 (highest degree of self-awareness) through 20 (lowest degree of self-awareness) to each subject.

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