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# IMMIGRANTS TO URBAN AMERICA: THE KOREAN COMMUNITY IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA

by

ILLSOO KIM

A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the City University of New York.

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## ABSTRACT

Since World War II, new urban ethnic communities have arisen within America's major metropolitan areas, reflecting new internal and international migrations. The influx of new immigrants making these communities was the result of the Immigration Act of 1965.

The creation of these new communities by new immigrants is a reflection of America's position toward various segments of the world as well as the internal economic structure of the United States, its occupational structure, mass communications, and governmental policy. Additional changes relevant to the emergence of new urban ethnic communities are concomitant changes in economic, political, social, and demographic structures of the sending countries.

The new immigrants are substantially different from older immigrants to the United States in terms of national origin, race, religion, language, education, culture and political and social orientations. These differences coupled with changes in the social and economic structure of the United States cause the new ethnic communities to be quite different from those of older ethnic communities.

These differences thus require new and different paradigms if we are to study and understand the post World War II urban ethnic communities of the United States.

This study thus deals with the socio-economic adjustment by recent Korean immigrants and their creation of an urban community in the New York metropolitan area.

This study is based upon: economic, demographic, and political factors in the home country which induce and produce motivation to emigrate and institutions that foster emigration. It also focuses upon political and economic conditions and policies in the receiving country which stimulate migration and alter and specify the selective character of Korean immigrants. The latter includes the special cultural backgrounds, motivational complexes and elective affinities which cause Korean immigrants to select particular paths of entry and mobility in the receiving country.

This study also deals with how these "macro" factors affect the way in which Korean immigrants create the institutions of functioning ethnic community in the New York metropolitan area. The following ethnic institutions are included: churches, secondary associations, community-wide political, social and cultural organizations and the development of ethnic media and opinion.

The overall attempt is to describe and analyze how national and international economic and political institutions and policies result in and affect the creation, operation and character of an ethnic community. The study ultimately attempts to assess whether in fact an autonomous viable ethnic community can exist within a much larger urban world, or whether such a "community" is merely a transitional stage to some as yet undefined form of fragmented assimilation.

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Finally, I must express my special thanks to my wife, Munja, to whom this study is dedicated, for her patience and understanding throughout a long period of my "idle" pursuit of intellectual work.

# INTRODUCTION

This study is of the creation of a new racial community within the New York metropolitan area, the Korean community. It is a community that came into existence predominantly since 1967. Since that year, a half million Koreans have emigrated to the United States, of which some 80,000 have settled in the New York metropolitan region, the seven counties in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut that comprise that area. Prior to 1967, the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area consisted of some 2,000 settlers who had entered the United States over the period of 1903 to 1965. They were concentrated in the Upper West Side near Columbia University. The sudden influx in 1967 was due specifically to the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1965 and, more generally, to a wide variety of social, economic and political factors that have made the emigration from South Korea to the United States a "push" factor and the immigration to the United States a "pull" factor.

Yet we are not concerned with that emigration and immigration per se. We are concerned with a creation or

the lack of creation of a community in the New York metropolitan area. Our problem thus is: to what extent does the large-scale immigration of the new population to the United States result in the creation of the organizations, institutions and sentiments that are conventionally subsumed under the concept of "community."

In traditional sociological theory, a community is conceived of as a human group with so full a range of the institutions, culture and activities that individuals can live out the full range of their life activities within its confines. A community includes the deeply-held common sentiments, identifications, loyalties, culture and institutions that make such life possible. The concept of the community in traditional sociology implies the continuous existence of a "natural" community with all the sacredness and inviolability of its historic norms, values and culture.

To the extent that such a natural community is transformed by the processes of migration, industrialization, urbanism and the bureaucratization of society, and by the growth of mass media and secondary and tertiary organizations, it is always assumed that an original community has existed since time immemorial but is in the process of being transformed by these "external" institutions and societal developments (Stein, 1960). In these processes of transformation a vast dislocation, social problems, pathologies, "eclipses"

and disorganization are likely to occur. This phenomenon was observed by, among others, Park, Wirth, Whyte and Suttles. In the urbanization of indigenous community, social organization was discovered to exist even in the depths of disorganized "ghetto" urban society. And yet even in the discovery of the idea of the "ordered segmentation" of urban communities (Whyte, Suttles, 1968), there was a tendency to assume that the construction of urban communities was a reactive phenomenon to the anomie, isolation and demoralization caused by the problems of a community that migrated and relocated itself in an alien and hostile environment for which its culture and tradition do not prepare its members.

This study of the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area provides us with the opportunity for studying the creation of the community in vivo. That is, we are able to study that community at almost the very same time that it is being constructed. At the same time, we are able to use and apply to a limited, specific case the vast amount of insights and research provided us by the authors of classical studies of the community. We can also use the revisions and corrections of these classical studies by later students who have responded not only to the original theories and concepts of the community but also to studies of changes in communities caused by the external, societal

settings of modern society that are the political, economic and social framework for emerging, contemporary communities (Lynd and Lynd, 1937; Whyte, Vidich and Bensman, Warner and Low, 1958).

While given these advantages, we are not constrained to accept the biases that may have underlain the romantic conception of an external community. Thus the question as to whether the construction of a community involves a deep-seated emotional identification, i.e., gemeinschaft, is a problem of this study. We are not constrained to accept the notion that in a modern, industrial, urban world it is even possible for a community to exist in isolation from larger, urban, commercial world. In fact, we can even question the notion that members of the new urban community display the non-rational mentality or characteristics of peasants and primitives su-gested by classical studies. Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that the majority of the new immigrants to urban society are themselves emigrants from urban societies who have themselves undergone the process of urbanization prior to emigration or who are descendents of urbanites and thus have all or many of the attributes of an alleged "urban mentality." Despite their modernization, they may nonetheless form some of the associations and cultural committments that may become a basis of an ethnic community. Yet in making such an assertion, we may in fact

be revising the traditional concept of the community as developed in the classical literature on the community. We can also regard as problematic the idea that migration and construction of community necessarily involves one or more generations of social, psychological disorientation and disorganization, allowing for the evidence of such a phenomenon to emerge from the results of our study.

The fact that we can study a community as it emerges in periods of late capitalistic, industrial and bureaucratic society in which a strong centralized government engages either in welfare or authoritarian social policies allows us to pose the questions as to how the political, social and economic policies of the homeland government facilitate or inhibit both emigration and the construction of communities in the new land. At the same time we can raise the question as to how political, social and economic policies of the host country aid, impede or alter the construction of a new community. In addition, we can raise questions as to how the development of international trade, marekts and economic organizations affects not only immigration but also the construction of communities.

Finally, we can raise questions as to how culture, motivational structures, values and the traditions of an immigrant group and the homeland social structure affect the capacity of an immigrant group to respond both to the changes

in its own homeland society and to new social environments it enters and in which it may or may not create a community.

Given all these exigencies of modern "post-industrial" society that operate on the construction of the community, we can ask our ultimate questions: In what sense does or will a common, urban, ethnic community exist? Is the concept of community adequate to the understanding of new immigrants and their attempts at the creation of new communities? We will attempt to answer these questions in detail only of course with reference to the object of our study, the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area.

In attempting to understand the emergence of the new Korean ethnic community in the New York metropolitan area, we have attempted to ask, in addition, a number of specific questions which embody the specific theoretical dimensions of this study. These questions will be discussed briefly here, though the reader will in reading this study understand that these questions are the very woof and warp of both the collection of data and the organization and presentation of our findings. These questions and their answers are thus the underlying threads of our analysis.

In studying the emigration and immigration that provides the basis of the new community, we have, first of all, asked: what are the specific "push" and "pull" factors

accounting for Korean migration to the United States? The "push" factors are the factors that make emigration seem necessary to Korean emigrants; the "pull" factors are those that make immigration to the United States seem desirable. Yet the bald assertion of "push" and "pull" factors is an oversimplification. In discovering and analyzing specific push and pull factors, it was first necessary to study such demographic factors within South Korea as population growth, internal migration, the occupational structure of South Korean population along with urbanization and industrialization. Moreover, as we have explored the factors which make the homeland less desirable than migration, it has become necessary to study the internal politics of South Korea as well as its international relations, especially the impact of its conflict with North Korea and the imagined prospect of another Korean War on the desire of South Koreans to emigrate.

We have had to study the explicit policy of the South Korean government as a "push" factor. Thus we have had to study population policies of the South Korean government, which have been aimed at encouraging emigration in order to overcome the "population explosion" within South Korea. Yet these, as we discovered only in the course of the research, may have been less important than policies that had the effect of making the homeland so unattractive

that emigration became desirable. Thus we have had to study those policies that led to "over-urbanization" and the decline of traditional sources of income and well-being. This has led us to study the major economic, labor and educational policies of the Park regime that has ruled South Korean society since 1961.

But in addition, with respect to the "push" factors, we have had to study the major economic policies of outside powers, especially the United States, as a factor in "pushing" emigrants out of South Korea. Thus we have been led, in pursuing our over-all goal, to explore American economic policies during the early fifties, especially with regard to the overproduction of grain in the United States. These led to the dumping of grain by the United States into South Korea. We have analyzed the resulting drop in South Korean grain prices in its effects on the depopulation of rural areas, overurbanization and, ultimately, the desire to emigrate.

Most of these "push" factors have not, in the past, been the basic stuff out of which community studies are constructed; but our problem and, to some extent, the development of post World War II community studies (Lynd and Lynd, 1937; Warner and Low, 1947; Vidich and Bensman, 1958; Stein, 1960) have led us to explore pre-migration factors in the construction of communities.

If these factors "external" to the community are important in analyzing "push" factors, they are even more important for "pull" factors. These are: what are the specific changes in the United States that have caused new waves of immigrants to want to enter the United States? Such an analysis will include the whole course of international relations between South Korea and the United States; but we have been forced to focus upon more immediate relationships. We have had to examine American immigration policy, especially the United States Immigration Act of 1965 and its revisions in 1976 as providing entry points for immigration. We have also studied, in less detail, the policies of Latin American nations and West Germany from the same perspective.

We have also had to explore the policies of accepting and not accepting Korean migrants by these governments, and the specific terms under which they did so. This has led us to pose and explroe larger, apparently more indirect issues and policies. These policies initially seemed to have little direct bearing on South Korea and South Koreans themselves, i.e., general policies were aimed at all immigrants or to the internal problems of the United States, especilaly education and manpower policy and other policies toward ethnic groups, who had already immigrated, and to their descendants; but to the extent that Koreans used such policies

as a basis for emigration, and to the extent that these policies affected the amount of Korean emigration, the character (demographic characteristics) of Korean emigrants and the emigration policy of the South Korean government, we have had to study these policies of the United States. This has been especially ture, as we discovered only in the midst of our work, with respect to the American medical delivery system. The growth of these new forms of medical care within the United States has resulted, for a time, in labor shortages and educational bottlenecks in the United States that Koreans and Korean medical and nursing schools partly filled. The special emigration of medical professionals contributed, as we have attempted to show, special features to the Korean migration.

The list of "pull" factors is inexhaustible. We discovered, for instance, in the process of doing our work, the relevance of the "Americanization" of South Korea for emigration. This is to say that "pull" factors were "exported" directly to South Korea partly because of the American cultural and economic dominance over South Korea after World War II, especially during and after the Korean War. We have had to ask how these factors affected South Korean culture, character, the motivation and the desire to emigrate. But we have also had to examine specific "pull"

factors. These have included the development of South Korean export industries to the extent that these industries affected both the migration of Koreans to the United States and their economic establishment in the new land. But having raised these problems, we again have had to study the vagaries of the American market that affected Koreans to the extent that Koreans were able to take advantage of them. Thus we have had to concentrate on the wig craze in the United States of the sixties (especially among blacks and hence the rise of black nationalism) and the expansion of the American medical delivery systems under medicare, medicaid and other prepayment systems. We have studied these fashions and institutional developments insofar as they provided entry points and channels for Korean immigration.

In a negative sense, we have had to study those aspects of the developing American economy that offered resistance to the efforts of Koreans to penetrate it, given their special talents and disabilities as immigrants. This has led to study special, limited areas of the American economy which in their availability or resistance to penetration shaped in their total effect the economic base and character of the Korean community.

Yet these factors are not usually considered as being directly related to the study of community. They go far beyond the scope of the traditional concept of the

community: they include international and national relations, issues of war and peace, the multinational corporation, the welfare and authoritarian state and such "macro systems" as the medical system of the United States. We have raised the question as to how class and occupational changes within the homeland, caused by the rapid economic development of South Korea, affected the Korean migration to the United States. We have further been forced to ask how this experience contributed to the formation of the evolving character structure of contemporary South Koreans.

Our principle in raising these theoretical questions has been: everything is relevant insofar as it affects the amount and character of the Korean immigration and insofar as these have affected the processes by which Koreans have attempted to construct a community in the New York metropolitan area. We have attempted to analyze in detail these "external" factors as they specifically affect the construction of that community. Thus in Part III, we have attempted to explore the traditional dimensions of the community: its social and economic organization, "class" leadership, politics, and its problems and prospects. We have raised issues of cultural contact, isolation, acculturation and assimilation, and the overall adjustment of Koreans to American society.

We have, however, been especially careful in attempting to describe these aspects of a possible emerging community in terms of the unique characteristics of American society and the Korean homeland society as they have existed at the time of emigration and as they have developed during the process of community construction. Thus our historical focus is necessarily different from that of community studies done in earlier eras. The historical, social and economic characteristics and structure of the larger societies within which migration and community construction occurs, is substantially different from the structures that implicitly or explicitly framed earlier studies. We have been especially concerned as to how these historical differences affect the process of community construction.

We have been especially mindful of the relationship of the government of the United States and of South Korea. Thus we have inquired into the extent and how the South Korean government intervenes into, supports, modifies or impedes and affects the construction of a community. In pursuing this task, we have also been forced by events and by our data to ask how Korean immigrants respond to both the homeland government and to the "Koreagate" scandal. This has led us into a continuous examination of movements for cultural and political autonomy from the homeland and its government.

In this connection, we have been especially concerned with how the degree of economic independence of Korean immigrants from the homeland and, especially, its government have affected the development of the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area. Thus our analysis of community social structure, leadership and politics focuses upon the impact of economic and political autonomy of Korean immigrants as reflected in their economic organization upon the social and political position of the Korean community.

Thus all the external analyses of "macro-systems" in Park I of this study have become the basic dimensions of the "micro" analysis of the community in Part II and III.

Our analysis of the economic adjustment of Korean immigrants in the United States in Part II, especially of their outstanding success despite overcoming, at times, circumstances unfavorable for immigration and mobility, has led us to raise issues not originally designed as part of the plan of this study. We have asked ourselves to account for the unusually economic aggressiveness, motility and mobility that Koreans have exhibited both in the United States and in the process of emigration and, incidentally, in South Korea itself. This has led us to examine Korean history, homeland social structure and culture in order to discern the existence, emergence and liberation of Korean economic and social character as it has developed in the process of modernization and industrialization.

This has led us to examine, in Part IV, Confucianism as a "religion" and as a work ethic especially as it was modified in Korea. It has also led us to examine the peculiar history of Korea which, like ancient Judea, was the victim of endless conquests that resulted in, as we have hypothesized, a "marginal" character and the absence of a feudal traditionalism. We have also been forced to inquire into the influence of homeland conversion to Protestant Christianity, especially Presbyterianism, at the turn of the twentieth century on the Korean Christians who migrated to the United States. The economic and social background as sources of the current economic and social character of Korean immigrants, are barely suggested in Part IV, but more convincingly proof of its hypothesis must await the opportunity for a more detailed examination of this phenomenon. Thus Part IV represents tentative gropings to explain the Korean "miracle."

The ultimate questions of this study have been: have Koreans been able to construct a viable permanent community in the New York metropolitan area? Is such an attempt even possible? Our concluding chapter is an attempt at an answer to such a question. A definitive answer is, of course, a task for future historians of the American Korean community.

Instead, from the material presented in the body of this study, we have attempted to assess those factors that may or may not lead to the creation of a stable or permanent community. Because the dispersed patterns of Korean settlement in the New York metropolitan area are substantially different from those of most traditional ghetto communities of the American past, we have also attempted to analyze those factors in the Korean experience that would lead to the dispersion and assimilation of Korean immigrants and their culture into American society and culture.

Yet ultimately Korean immigrants in the United States will, in response to their own background, their social structure, and the exigencies of their moving current history, write their own history. We can only, on the basis of data currently available, make an educated guess as to the future of the Korean community in the United States. That educated guess is our conclusion.

*****

The wide range of dimensions of analysis we have presented has called forth an equally wide range of sources for this work. Our principal sources have been:

(1) Historical treatments of Korean social and economic history of Korea.

(2) Economic and demographic statistics and data regarding Korean economic and social structure.

(3) Similar data were collected for the United States, especially immigration data based upon the Annual Reports of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(4) The analysis of Korean and American social policies concerning manpower, education, and immigration or emigration.

(5) Newspaper reports of English and Korean language newspapers, especially the latter, in presenting reports of recent and current developments in South Korea and the Korean community in the United States.

(6) The use of institutional leaders as informants. I have used especially some 20 "informal" informants representing 6 different institutions -- religion, politics, business, the media, medical profession, and representatives of the home government. Most of these informants are institutional leaders. In obtaining information from them, I have used long unstructured interviews. These interviews necessarily reflected the unique social position, experience and biases of the informants; but I have cross-checked the information gathered from any one source with that provided by others and with other sources of similar data.

(7) Participant and non-participant observation: during the past four years I have attended, for research purposes, a countless number of community meetings, church meetings, cultural affairs, and other collective activities.

(8) I have also conducted several hundred informal, unstructured interviews, relative to the careers, life history and situational problems of Korean immigrants mostly in the United States (but some in South Korea). These interviews include informal conversations and "gossip." In doing this I have tried to take an outsider's point of view as far as I could. These informal interviews have been collected and related to the specific dimensions of analysis of this study. And as specific respondents have only been able to respond in terms of their particular experience as immigrants and as members of the community, the interviews have not been standardized. Because the interviews have been collected during the entire course of the study, and questions asked reflect continuously emerging perspectives and dimensions of analysis, the respondents do not constitute a uniform sample.

The different kinds of data have thus been assembled and collected as necessary to deal with specific topics and themes in answer to the overall questions raised by the study as well as by the necessity to deal with issues salient to the experience of the respondent and the investi-

gator who was in a moving process of laying bare underlying perspectives as these emerged at the moment.

In the analysis of this study, economic and political data have been intermixed when appropriate with informant's reports, and observation and interview data. The necessities of analysis, chronology and narration have thus dictated the use of data more than did the desire for "systmatic," self-enclosed reporting of any one given type of data.

The result of this method of analysis is the study itself; and for better or worse, the study, i.e., its result, is the justification of the methods employed.

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PART IV:
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OF KOREAN CULTURE, CHARACTER,
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE


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# PART I

## SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS OF THE KOREAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

## CHAPTER I

## THE UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAW AS IT AFFECTS THE KOREAN IMMIGRATION

### The Older Immigrants

> Why did you and I become husband and wife over 30 years have passed without my being able to see you. When I think of the life we could have had if I had not been forced to come to Sakhalin I almost go out of my mind. I have become an old man with white hair and live for the hope of being reunited with you.[1]

This is a recent letter sent to a Korean wife in South Korea from a Korean husband in Sakhalin, Soviet Union, who was one of 45,000 Koreans, drafted for slave labor in the coal mines of Sakhalin by the Japanese government during World War II. When they were sent to Sakhalin, a cold and bleak island to the north of the Hokkaido island of Japan, the Korean peninsula and southern Sakhalin belonged to the Japan's empire. However, at the end of World War II the Korean peninsula was liberated from the Japanese rule and divided into North and South Korea; the Soviet Union annexed southern Sakhalin and recognized only North Korean citizenship. Since most of the

Korean slave laborers had come from provinces in South Korea, they had refused to become North Korean citizens and thus to be repatriated to North Korea.

This is an example of how the history of Korean migrations to the alien lands has been interwoven with Korea's history of "national tragedies." Koreans today still express shame when they discuss the history of Korean emigration. Out of the sense of a national self-defense, some Koreans today, especially historians, novelists and journalists prefer, to use the terms "yumin" (drifting people) or "gimin" (abandoned people) rather than the formal term "yimin" (emigrants) when they refer to middle-class Koreans emigrating to the United States in part out of the fear of another Korean War. The term "yumin" or "gimin" have been used by Korean intellectuals in order to emphasize the hardships and sufferings of a Korean diasphora that began with the loss of Korean national soverignty to the imperial Japan.

Koreans' ethnocentrism is also expressed in their negative attitude toward the migration of their countrymen into alien lands. They are proud of their national identity, a "5,000 Years old history", the early part of which is derived from mythology. They boast of their "single" race, although, they are actually a hybrid of Mongols, Manchurians, Japanese, Chinese, and Polynesians. Yet they sometimes use disparaging nicknames when refering to the Chinese, Manchurians, or Japan-

ese because, throughout their recorded history, they had been harassed and attacked by these neighboring peoples. Koreans have been a pariah people at a national level. The ethnocentrism is thus partly derived from their national pariah status. In addition, during the period of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) the Kings had frequently ordered the Pyongyang governors in the northeastern province of the Korean peninsula to stop Koreans from migrating into the Manchuria: their decrees called for death penalty for the subjects who attempted to cross either the Yalu or the Tuman river toward the Manchurian virgin lands because of famine caused by crop failures in their home villages.[2]

In modern history, Korean emigration has been closely linked with struggles between China, Japan, Russia and the United States over the domination of the Korean peninsula, a strategically vital region in the Far East. Broadly speaking, the more than 3 million Koreans now residing in the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the United States are there directly or indirectly as the results of these struggles among the four big powers, that began at the turn of the century. The struggles still continue along the line of the Korean demilitarized Zone manned by more than 1 million soliders of North and South Korea.

The Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905 broke out mainly as a result of the -

conflicting national claims for suzerainty over the Korean peninsula: Japan won both wars and began to encroach upon the national sovereignty of the Yi Dynasty. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea. As a part of direct colonial rule over Korea, the Japanese government conducted during the years of 1910 to 1918 a nation-wide land inspection program by which the Japanese colonialist expropriated lands from Korean peasants as well as from the royal families of the Yi Dynasty. By 1930 about 40 percent of the arable land in Korea was in the possession of the Japanese government. This resulted in the emergence of a mass of landless Korean peasants, most of whom became tenant farmers for Japanese landlords or for a Japanese reclamation company, the so-called Dongchock.[3] These encroachments were addition to the internal development of a "usury capitalism" in Korea which at the 19th century caused a heavy concentration of lands into the hands of a small percentage of Korean landlords.[4]

These changes in land ownership in favor of a small number of Japanese and Korean landlords forced a vast number of landless peasants to migrate to Manchuria and Siberia. The migration was also the result of an increasing pressure on land because of a gradual increase in Korean population. At the end of the 14th century when the Yi Dynasty was founded, the total Korean population fell to somewhere between 6 to 8 million; at the turn of the 19th century it had almost tripled, reaching about 17 million.[5]

During the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) 1.2 million Korean landless peasants were induced by the Japanese Governor General of Korea to resettle in southern Manchuria, some parts of which needed massive reclamation.[6] As of 1961, about 1.3 million Koreans were reported to be still living in Kirin, Manchuria.[7] It was also reported that a total of 1.5 million live in mainland China and that half a million are, at present, citizens in Soviet Central Asia.[8] About 600,000 Koreans in Japan constitute the second largest Korean community abroad, and are the largest ethnic group in Japan. They are the remnants and descendents of the 18.8 million Korean migrants to Japan during the Japanese colonial period. This massive influx of Koreans consisted mostly of impoverished peasants and members of the urban proletariat who had been induced to settle in Japan to provide manual labor for the rapid industrialization of the Japanese homeland. During World War II about 690,000 Koreans were drafted into Japan in order to serve in a "slave labor" force to man the Japanese wartime economy.[9]

The Korean emigration to the United States dates back to the turn of the century when the United States received massive waves of immigrants from Eastern and Southern European nations as well as from Japan and China. A small number of students, political refugees, and ginseng peddlers were the first group of Koreans to land in the United States. Several Political refugees sought asylum in the United States after they led the abortive Kap-Shin coup in 1884, the object of

which was an attempt to modernize Korea by fashioning it after Japan. North Korean ginseng Peddlers came in 1881 to the West Coast via China in order to sell their product to the Chinese immigrants but their numbers were too small to be designated as an immigrant contingent.[10] Official Korean immigration into the United States and its territories began in 1903 when American sugar planters in the Hawaiian islands imported Koreans as contract laborers to be exploited for the labor-intensive sugar plantations in the islands. Between then and 1905, a total of 7,226 Koreans arrived in the islands. In 1905, the Korean government, which was by then degraded into a de facto Japanese protectorate, suddenly stopped permitting emigration largely under the pressure of the Japanese government. The latter wanted to protect Japanese immigrants in the Hawaiin islands from the competition of the Korean immigrants. The Japanese ambassador to Korea at that time remarked: "The Korean eimgration (into the Hawaiian islands) was banned by the will of Japanese emigration companies. They do not want the Korean immigrants to be competitive with the Japanese immigrants."[11] This statement is understandable when we consider that the sugar planters imported the Korean immigrants in order to use them as strike breakers against Japanese workers, who initiated strikes, demanding wage increase after they became free from the servitude of contract labor system.[12]

The Hawaiian islands served as an initial stepping stone for Japanese and Korean laborers entering the United States mainland. During the period of 1905 to 1910, 2012 Koreans living in the islands largely enticed by better economic opportunities moved to the West Coast.[13] During the decade of 1910's some 541 Korean students entered the United States in order to study at American educational institutions.[14] An addition to these official Korean entries was the unofficial entry of Koreans into the United States: during the period of 1910 to 1924, the year when the National Origin Act became effective, some two thousand Koreans, largely made up of political refugees (from Japanese domination over Korea) came to the United States without passports largely through Shanghai.

The Korean experience in the United States was similar to that of Japanese and Chinese immigrants as regards their economic adjustment and exposure to the anti-Oriental movements on the West Coast. The Koreans engaged in rice and vegetable farming, railroad construction and in the restaurant and hotel business. Like the Japanese and Chinese, their economic ventures were greatly limited by white nativistic racial discrimination. Like the Japanese immigrants, the Koreans were successful in agriculture. Here is one aspect of their success story:

> Korean settlers in California, Oregon, Colorado, Montana, Kansas, and Nebraska began vegetable farming as early as 1911. They followed with successful ventures in orchards, nurseries, and vineyards. In 1916, a group of sixty Koreans in the Manteca, California area pooled their resources to lease 1,300 acres for experimental sugar beet production. Business thrived, and a small cooperative village was organized nearby. A smaller group of Koreans in Logan, Utah, succeeded with a 292-acre melon farm. By far the most successful of all Korean enterprises before 1924 were the rice and fruit farming operations in the San Joaquin Valley. One California Korean, Kim Chong-nim, celebrated as the "Rice King" in 1917, was able to expand his operations to 2,085 acres in rice. Near Reedley, two brothers, Kim Ho and Kim Hyong-sun, began a truck farming business in 1921, eventually working 500 acres. Their business grew to $400,000 annually, as they expanded into nectarine and other fruit production and wholesaling along with canning and large-scale nurseries.[16]

When the anti-Oriental movements in California were in full force at the turn of the century, the Koreans were lumped together as Mongolians and were subject to the same discrimination that was directed against Chinese and Japanese immigrants.[17] And yet they maintained their national pride and identity despite victimization.

> In late June 1913, at the height of the anti-Japanese labor movement in California, eleven Koreans were severely beaten as they attempted to work in an orchard near Riverside. When an official of the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles visited the victims and offered assistance, the Tae-Han Kungminhoe (THK) interfered. Refusing to accept any offer of help from Japanese officials, the THK's leadership dispatched a telegram to William Jennings Bryan, U.S. Secretary of State, making the following points: All Korean residents of the state of California arrived before 1910, when Korea was annexed by the Japanese; they were Koreans, who opposed Japanese domination of Korea; Japanese government assistance was refused, particularly because the acceptance of such aid would imply that Koreans were Japanese subjects; and all matters community organization, the Tae-Han Kungminhoe or Korean National Association of North America. Bryan's prompt response, favoring the THK position, was widely published, and the THK gained recognition as a quasi-diplomatic organization representing the Korean immigrant community.[18]

Korean ethnic identity and solidarity in the United States were preserved and maintained by politicizing their ethnic organizations in opposition to Japanese domination over their homeland. In this aspect, Korean immigrants were different from the Japanese and Chinese. This was due to the fact that Korean migrations into alien lands were largely the results of their political pariah status caused by the big powers' struggles over hegemony over the Korean peninsula.[19] It is thus understandable that Korean anti-Japanese movements and nationalism emerged as a strong movement wherever Korean emigrants settled. Koreans had engaged in guerilla warfare against the Japanese colonial rule in Manchuria and the Vladivostok areas to the north of the Korean peninsula. North Korean President Kim Ilsung led one of the Korean guerilla groups in this area. A Korean provisionary government was formed in the city of Shanghai with its own "independence army" manned by the Korean immigrants in China. But, during the Japanese colonial rule, the United States had become a main political center for the Korean independence movement.

Students or political refugees constituted a high proportion of the Korean immigrants into the United States. Most were Protestants regardless of whether they were political refugees or laborers. American missionaries in Korea had persuaded and encouraged Korean Christians to depart from

their homeland, which was on the whole, deeply imbued with the Confucian culture of ancestral worship. Most of the Korean plantation workers in the Hawaiian island came from port cities and towns in northern provinces of the peninsula where they engaged in manual labor. Less than 14 percent of them were peasants.[20] American missionaries in Korea had played a decisive role in selecting Koreans for emigration from their homeland.[21] The Korean national pariah status also helps to explain the heavy concentration of political refugees, students, and clergymen among the Korean immigrants at the turn of the century.[22] These two factors, religion and politics, account for the unique character of the Korean immigration at the turn of the century, as compared with that of the Chinese and Japanese immigration. The same factors still apply to the analysis of recent Korean immigration to the United States under the United States Immigration Act of 1965. This characteristic of the two immigrant groups will be discussed later. But as we shall see, their reasons for emigrating are different.

Mainly because of a long time interval that lies between the old Korean immigration and the new one, there is, at present, little social interaction between the two groups. Furthermore, the old Korean immigrants were so small in number that they could not establish the kinds of ethnic institutions that might link the two different contingents of Korean immigrants.

In addition, the majority of the descendents of the old Korean immigrants have lost their sense of ethnic identity as Koreans because most have chosen their wives from among other ethnic groups. For instance, during the years of 1960 to 1964, 77 percent of the Korean males among the second or third generation of the old Korean immigrants in the Hawaiian islands had chosen their spouses from among other racial groups; for the Korean females the inter-racial marriage rate amounted to 80 percent.[23] This high rate of the inter-racial marriage rate among the Koreans in the Hawaiian islands could be partially attributed to the fact that 77 percent of the total Korean immigrants into the islands at the turn of the century were young unmarried men. The shortage of Korean women was the most serious problem facing the unmarried men. Many of the Korean males solved their problem by relying on the "picture marriage", marriages arranged among unknown parties who selected each other on the basis of exchanges of photographs. During the period of 1910 to 1924 more than one thousand Korean women arrived the islands on the bases of "picture marriage."[24] But the shortage of Korean women persisted.

Despite the absence of social interaction between the old immigrant group and the new one, there is a strong tendency for recent Korean immigrants to idealize and romanticize the hardships of the Ilsae, the first generation, of the old Korean immigrants. For instance, the Koreans in the Hawaiian islands

have, under the auspices of their home government, campaigned to organize and collect the cultural remnants of the Ilsae generation. Korean ethnic newspapers have frequently covered the success stories of the Isae, the second generation, and the Samsae, the third generation, of the immigrants with an explicit intention to protray individuals from these groups as model cases of the "hanguk iminsa" (the history of the Korean immigration). They do so dispite that most of the heroes or heroines they present do not commit themselves, either psychologically or socially, to the affairs of the Korean immigrant community.

## The Infux of New Korean Immigrants

Since the enactment of the United States Immigration Act of 1965 the United States has produced new kinds of Korean immigrants whose social characters differ substantially from those of the old Korean immigrants of the turn of the century who landed on the Hawaiian shores after enduring the hardships of long steamship voyages. The arrival of new Korean immigrants to the united states takes place twice a week in an accordance with the flight schedule of the Korean Air Line that virtually commutes from Seoul to Los Angeles. Unlike the old Korean immigrants, most of whom were illiterate, poor, and low siklled laborers intermingled with highly educated

political refugees, a majority of new immigrants are well-educated, skilled urban-middle-class Koreans in their home country. As they wait for boarding the jumbo jet airline at the Kimpo International Airport, which is heavily guarded by several military units against possible ground or air attacks by North Korean communits, they are neatly dressed, healthy, and sophisticated. Some attempt to hide, deep in their bags, illegal dollars while on line to package inspection by custom officers. They attempt to mask their anxiety over the possession of illegal dollars. Discovery could lead to conviction for violation of the South Korean Foreign Currency Law.

Many immigrants are highly skilled workers who have signed labor contracts with American employees usually through Korean employment agencies. Almost all of them have contacted relatives or friends, who have already settled in the United States, in order to find jobs and housing in the regions where they intend to reside. They have notified their relatives or friends in the United States of their arrival time at major airports in the United States, so that they will be quickly picked up upon landing.

The new Korean community in the United States is, as of 1978, made up of some 450,000 Koreans, most of whom have entered the United States since the enactment of the United States Immigration Act of 1965.[25] The figure includes immigrant, aliens "admitted for permanent residence", and nonimmigrants,

Table I-1

Number of the Koreans Who were Admitted into the U.S. Permanent Residentship By Year

| Status at Entry | Immigrant | Non-immigrant | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Year | | | |
| 1950-1954 | 538 | n.a. | 538 |
| 1955-1959 | 4,990 | n.a. | 4,990 |
| 1960-1965 | 11,686 | 1,583 | 13,269 |
| 1966 | 2,492 | 598 | 3,090 |
| 1967 | 3,956 | 1,424 | 5,380 |
| 1968 | 3,811 | 1,098 | 4,909 |
| 1969 | 6,045 | 1,820 | 7,865 |
| 1970 | 9,314 | 2,079 | 11,393 |
| 1971 | 14,297 | 4,049 | 18,346 |
| 1972 | 18,876 | 5,513 | 24,389 |
| 1973 | 22,930 | 4,961 | 27,891 |
| 1974 | 28,028 | 4,658 | 32,686 |
| 1975 | 28,362 | 2,364 | 30,726 |
| 1976 | 37,690 | 2,200** | 39,890 |
| Total | 193,015 | 32,347 | 225,365 |
| (percentage) | (86%) | (14%) | (100%) |

*The category of non-immigrant applies to the persons who had previously entered the United States with non-immigrant statuses like student, visitor, and businessmen and changed their status into a permanent resident status in the United States.

**The figure is estimated on the basis of the trend of the previous years. Source: The Annual Report of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1950-1976).

aliens "admitted in temporary status." As shown in Table I-1, during the period of 1950 to 1976, a total of 193,015 Koreans entered the United States as immigrants: 83% of them entered during the years from 1970 to 1976. Another group of 32,347 Koreans, or 14 percent of the total, had previously entered the United States as non-immigrants and managed to acquire permanent resident status in the United States during that period. Because a majority have begun to reside in the United States since 1970 and because more than 100 Koreans enter the new land daily with intention of settling, the Korean community has been undergoing a tremendous change. As shown in Table I-2, during the period of 1970 to 1976, a total of 42,135 Korean aliens became citizens after a 5-year period of permanent residence. These constitute 19 percent of the total Korean permanent residents. Since a majority of the recent Korean immigrants claim citizenship when they meet the residence requirements, the naturalized number has drastically increased since 1974. Table I-2 shows that the number of naturalized Koreans increased from 3,562 in 1973 to 7,450 in 1976.

Table I-2

Number of Koreans Naturalized by Year

| Year | Naturalized |
|---|---|
| 1950-59 | 1,451 |
| 1960-69 | 12,451 |
| 1970 | 1,687 |
| 1971 | 2,083 |
| 1972 | 2,933 |
| 1973 | 3,562 |
| 1974 | 4,451 |
| 1975 | 6,007 |
| 1976 | 7,450 |
| Total | 42,135 |

Source: The Annual Report of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1950-1976).

This new inflow of Korean immigrants into the United States is a direct by-product of the Immigration Act of 1965 which has generated the new patterns of immigration into the United States. In this context, the new Korean immigration should be viewed as part of the changing patterns of whole immigration into the United States after the passage of the 1965 immigration law. In the first place, a striking shift has occurred in the pattern of ethnic and racial origin of immigrants since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. As shown in Table 1-3, the present immigration into the United States is largely made up of Asians, Latin Americans and Caribbeans with the concomitant decline in number of the historically dominant immigrant groups from European nations, especially, North European nations.

Table I-3

The Shift of Leading Sources of Immigrants into the U.S.

| Sending Nation \ Year | 1975 | 1965 | Percent Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Europe | 73,996 | 113,424 | -34.8 |
| France | 1,364 | 4,039 | -66.2 |
| Germany | 5,154 | 24,045 | -78.2 |
| Greece | 9,984 | 3,002 | +232.6 |
| Italy | 11,552 | 10,821 | +6.8 |
| Ireland | 1,285 | 5,463 | -76.5 |
| Porland | 3,941 | 8,465 | -53.4 |
| United Kingdom | 10,807 | 27,358 | -60.5 |
| North America | 146,668 | 126,729 | +15.7 |
| Mexico | 62,205 | 37,969 | +63.8 |
| Canada | 7,308 | 38,327 | -80.9 |
| West Indies | 67,430 | 37,583 | +79.4 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asia | 132,469 | 20,683 | +540.5 |
| Philippines | 31,751 | 3,130 | +914.4 |
| Korea | 28,362 | 2,165 | +1210.0 |
| China and Taiwan | 18,536 | 4,057 | +540.5 |
| Hong Kong | 4,891 | 712 | +586.9 |
| Japan | 4,274 | 3,180 | +34.4 |
| India | 15,773 | 582 | +2610.1 |

Source: The Annual Report of Immigration and Naturalization Service (1975).

Among the new immigrant groups, the growing surge of Asian immigrants is an especially interesting phenomenon in view of the long-term influence of anti-Oriental movements by white nativists upon United States legislation which had been previously enacted against the entry of Asian immigrants. The total of 132,469 Asian immigrants during the year ended June 30, 1975 constituted 37 percent of the total number of immigrants into the United States during that period. The volume of Asian immigrants in 1975 is more than six times the number admitted in 1965 when they accounted for 7 percent of the total immigrants.[26]

Secondly, a basic change in the immigration patterns can also be found in a vast increase in the total volume of immigration. An annual average of 387,000 immigrants entered the United States during the years 1971 to 1975. This influx of new immigrants contributed about 20 percent of the United States population growth in 1973; in 1975 this ratio went up about 50 percent.[27] The annual average is 274 percent larger than that of the 1940's and 54 percent larger than that of the 1950's.

The sheer size of the present immigration is small as compared with the massive inflows of old European immigrants at the turn of the century. However, unless the present United States immigration law is revamped drastically in order to curb the influx of new immigrants, the immigration would effect a significant change in the makeup of the population of the United States. Its long-term effect on the economic, demographic and political life of contemporary American society should not be underestimated. In this period of economic stagnation, the new immigration has already provoked some negative reactions on the part of some segments of the native population. For instance, the president of Zero Population Growth Society expounded the following in his letter to the New York Times:

> The $3.5 billion jobs bill, recently passed over Presidential veto, will fail in its objective of reducing the unemployment statistics of U.S. residents. This element of labor policy will be more than neutralized by our countervailing immigration policy.
>
> The bill is designed to generate 300,000 new jobs. Each year the U.S. admits about 400,000 legal immigrants, some 200,000 of them economically active. This is not a surprising figure since the main motivation for international migration remains economic. Numbers of illegal immigrants are not accurately known, but few of the severest critics of estimated illegal immigration rates could quarrel with 100,000 as a minimum figure for economically active illegal immigrants added each year. Hence the combination of legal and illegal immigrants will produce at least as many entrants to the job market as the employment bill is designed to produce jobs ... But the point is clear: At current low U.S. birth rates, immigration emerges as a significant and even major factor in these two important policy areas, not to mention those for resources (total consumption is affected by population size), education (We should

> train our own doctors rather than draw upon less well-endowed countries) and foreign aid (the "brain drain" is a form of reverse foreign aid).
>
> It is now time for Congress to begin taking our new demographic circumstances into account and to begin integrating immigration into the policy areas mentioned above...[28]

Finally, the shift in the immigration pattern to the United States has also occurred with a great change in social characteristics of the immigrants. The new immigration, especially of Asian immigrants, is highly selective with a heavy concentration of professionals, technicians, and intellectuals.

Table I-4

Percentage of Professional, Technical, and Kindred Immigrants by Year

| Year | Number of Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers | Professional, Technical, Kindred Workers as Percent of the Total Immigrants | Asian Professional, Technical, Kindred Workers as % of the Total Asian Immigrants |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1907 | 12,600 | 0.9 | |
| 1950-59 | 183,667 | 7.2 | |
| 1960-69 | 337,216 | 10.3 | |
| 1971 | 48,850 | 13.2 | |
| 1972 | 48,887 | 12.7 | |
| 1973 | 41,147 | 10.2 | |
| 1974 | 35,487 | 8.9 | 20.0 |
| 1975 | 38,491 | 9.9 | 16.6 |

Source: The Annual Report of Immigration and Naturalization Service.

As shown in Table I-4, in the decade of the 1950's the number of immigrants belonging to the occupational category of "professional, technical, and kindred workers" were 183,667 or 7.2 percent of the total immigrants including depending wives, children, and the persons who did not report a specific occupation at the time of entry;[29] however, the decade of the 1960's saw the number increasing to 337,216 or 10.3 percent of the total immigrants of the decade. The trend reached its peak in 1971; and since then it began to taper off largely reflecting the lesser demand for professional workers in the United States economy as a result of the deepest economic recession since the Great Depression. Table I-4 also indicates that the inflow rates of Asians under the same occupational category had been almost twice as much as those of immigrants as a whole during the years 1974-74.

It should also be noted that the influx rate of highly skilled immigrants into the United States varies from occupation to occupation as well as from year to year. This fact indicates that the United States immigration policy has been geared to the importation of workers according to specific United States manpower shortages in each occupation and period.

To sum up, all these changes in the pattern of new immigration into the United States -- the shift in the components of racial and ethnic origin, the sheer volume of immigrants and

the social characteristics of immigrants have been generated by the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965.

## The Immigration Act of 1965

The United States Immigration Act of 1965 was not specifically geared to Korean immigrants, but it is the source of the creation of the Korean community in the United States. As we shall see, the change of the United States immigration law in 1965 has determined the way in which the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area has emerged.

The Congressional Quarterly Almanac recorded a historical moment of the passage of the United States Immigration Act of 1965: "A 40-year campaign by minority groups for reform of the federal immigration laws ended October 3,(1965) when the President Johnson signed into law an Administration-backed bill (H.R 2580) eliminating the national origins quota system on the basis of immigration to the United States by persons born outside the Western Hemisphere. The change had been sought by every President since Harry S. Truman."[30] This change has generated a major shift of life of the 450,000 Koreans in the United States Because their entry into the nation was largely due to the change. Their opportunities for the entry were "accidental" because neither the Korean government nor the older Korean immigrants in the United States had engaged in the "a 40-year campaign by minority groups for reform of the federal immigration law."

In view of the fact that new Korean immigrants have constituted the third largest immigrant group since 1973, they are among the largest beneficiaries of the change. However, one cannot say that they have reaped these benefits for doing nothing: it would be more accurate to say that, because their admission into the United States was previously prohibited by the National Origin Act of 1924, they were deprived of the chance to participate in the campaign to change that law.

Some specific reasons for the passage of the immigration law in 1965 can be illustrated: (1) the Congress and Presidency were controlled by Democrats, traditional supporters of immigration; (2) strong support for the bill came from the Johnson Administration; (3) many ethnic (like Italian Americans) labor and religious groups campaigned to repeal the national origins quota system; (4) attitudes in the United States towards race and ethnicity had changed.[31] Of these, the fundamental reason for the change can be found in the changing bases of the ethnic politics of the United States which was, for recent Korean immigrants, an accidental phenomenon.

First of all, it must be pointed out that ethnic-racial components of the United States population had been undergoing drastic changes; according to the 1960 U.S. Census, 65 percent of the United States population were derived from non-Anglo-Saxon origins; about 34 million of its population was of foreign or mixed-parentage stock and 83.6 percent lived in urban areas. This shift in the ethnic, social and economic compo-

sition of the population in favor of new ethnic groups, who were made up of foreign-born stock, second or third generation southeastern European immigrants and blacks from the South, created large urban voting blocs which elected a Democratic Party majority in each Congressional chamber by a 2-to-1 margin. That Congress carried out President Johnson's plan to reform the federal immigration law. This political atmosphere favorable to immigration reform was strengthened by the revolutionary tenor of the 1960's during which the black civil rights movement had been in full swing. Owing to this pluralistic and egalitarian oriented political climate of the 1960's, the Johnson Administration repealed the national origins system, which was designed in the 1920's to perpetuate cultural and political dominance of northern and western European stocks and which was reaffirmed in the Eisenhower Administration by the Immigration Act of 1952. Furthermore, the Act of 1952 proved to be anachronistic and unrealistic because "it had such huge loopholes for non-quota immigrants that for the thirteen years two out of every three immigrants would be classed as nonquota and entered without numerical restriction."[32]

In a sharp contrast with the bigotry of the 1920's, in 1965 no groups undertook the systematic opposition to immigration reform. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who chaired hearings of the Subcommittee on Immigration, recalled the social circumstances in which the Immigration Act of 1965 was passed:

> During the course of the hearings I personally met with representatives from several of these organizations, including the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, the American Legion, the Daughters of the American Revolution, and the National Association of Evangelicals. There was a candid exchange of views between myself and those who joined the discussion. While most of those with whom I met were skeptical regarding the various reform channels, and for reasons which varied among the organizations represented at the meetings, I believe it is fair to say that all recognized the unworkability of the national-origins quota system and at the close of the meeting expressed a willingness to cooperate in finding a new formula for the selection of immigrants. No significant opposition to eliminating the national origins quota system was organized by any of their organization. ...[33]

The national origins quota system was designed to accomplish two purposes: (1) To limit the influx of "unassimilable immigrants," southern and eastern Europeans and Orientals by providing a fixed quota for each nationality on the basis of "the number of inhabitants in the United States in 1920 whose origin by birth or country is attributable" to specific countries: and by doing so (2) to reduce the volume of immigrants from all countries except the designated countries in the Western Hemisphere. It turned out to be unworkable because the countries given large quotas seldom used half of their quota numbers. At the same time many people from the countries given small quotas were eager to enter the United States: 80 percent of the total quota went to northeastern European nations; and each of the Asian and African nations was given a token quota of 100 a year. The system reflected a fear of the "yellow peril" in which Asian races, pressured by home country population expansion and social-economic hardships, would "inundate" the United States unless their entry was systematically curbed.[34]

This fear on the part of white-nativists materialized into the formula of the Asia-Pacific Triangle, the strict application of which means that all Asian countries would receive an annual total of 980, calculated upon the basis of one-sixth of one percent of the total Asian population in the United States in 1920. Moreover, according to the formula, the Asians born outside of the Triangle areas should use the quota numbers alloted on their countries of ancestry.

President Johnson pointed out the essential element of the Immigration Act of 1965 in his speech at the Statue of Liberty on October 3, 1965: "This bill says simply that from this day forth those wishing to emigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and their close relationship to those already here." As a result, almost all the immigrants, admitted to the United States since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, can be divided, on the basis of their qualification for entry, into two groups -- one group is made up of those immigrants who were able to enter by virtue of the existence of their close relatives in the United States; the other group consists of those immigrants who are entitled to admission to the United States owing to their possessing specific skills which are defined as contributing to the growth of the United States economy.

The new legislation simply replaced the racial discrimination, as imbedded in the National Origins Act of 1924, with a new form of selection based upon skill and kinship.

However prospective immigrants into the United States, even though they are blessed with either close relatives in the United States or with specific skills needed in the United States economy, are not equally qualified for the admission. The Immigration Act of 1965, which took effect in 1968, operates under the legal framework of a quota preferences system. The following are the essential elements of the Immigration Act of 1965.[35]

1. The Act of 1965 abolished the natioanl origins quota system and thereby the concept of the Asia Pacific Triangle. Instead, it imposed a "democratic" quota system by which the nations of the Eastern Hemisphere receive a total annual quota of 170,000 with a maximum limit of 20,000 from any nation. Parents, spouses and unmarried children of States citizens are exempted from the quota restriction; this opens the way in which a total number of immigrants from a country could outnumber the annual quota of 20,000.

2. Within the numerical celing of 170,000,first preference goes to 34,000 persons, (20 percent of the total quota), who are the unmarried sons or daughters of citizens of the United States; second preference, to 34,000 persons who are the spouses and unmarried sons or daughters of permanent

resident aliens; third preference, to 17,000 persons (or 10 percent), who are members of permitted professions; fourth preference, to 17,000 persons, who are the married sons or daughters of citizens of the United States; fifth preference, to 40,800 persons (or 24 percent), who are the brothers or sisters of citizens of the United States; sixth preference, to 17,000 persons, who are capable of performing skilled or unskilled labor; the remaining 10,200 numbers (or 6 percent) are set aside for the conditional entry of "refugees from any Communist or Communist-dominated country" or "persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity." In addition to these preferences, a nonpreference category is set up within the numberical restriction of 170,000 for admission of others who do not fit any of the above preferences if the preferred categories do not fill the quota of 170,000. Non-preference admissions go to "qualified nonpreference immigrants", who are either willing to invest a specified sum of dollars in the American market or are capable of performing certain types of skilled work.

3. The Act of 1965 also imposed an annual ceiling of 120,000 on immigration from the Western Hemisphere. Immediate relatives of the U.S. citizens are also exempted from the ceiling. The preferences system does not apply to the Western Hemisphere; the issuance of visas for Western Hemisphere immigrants is a "first-come, first served" basis.

The actual operation of the preferences system, however, deviates from the official allocations mentioned above. The legislation gave both the State Department and the Labor Department a wide range of flexibility in the operation of the preferences system. The operation of the system differs from nation to nation reflecting a specific emigration situation of each sending nation.[36] In general, the operation of occupational preferences (third or sixth) has been governed by the business cycle in the United States.

The Act of 1965 gave the Department of Labor the authority for selection of those immigrants with specific skills and thus initiated a specific institutional linkage between national manpower policy and immigration policy. The authority stems from the following provision of the Act of 1965: aliens were not eligible for the admission into the United States if they were "seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and at the place to which the alien is destined to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B) the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed."

Thus prospective immigrants with specific skills should find, before their entry to the United States, a U.S. employer who is willing to hire them; and they should obtain from him a proper document in order to receive the certification of the Secretary of Labor's clearance establishing the provision as quoted above. The labor certification is an essential document for prospective immigrants to use in applying for a visa at the United States consul in their home country. However, "members of the professions, scientists, and artists of exceptional ability" had been exempted from this requirement until the end of 1976. This exemption applied largely to foreign medical professionals and facilitated their influx into American medical institutions, for which labor was in definitely short supply in the United States labor market.

As the application for certification is being processed, the Bureau of Employment Security's United States Employment Service, which received from the Secretary of Labor the authority for selection and administration of immigrant workers, determines "the availability of United States workers" and "the adverse effects" of the influx of foreign workers "on wages and working conditions of United States workers." In doing this the federal agency relies on such various sources of information such as public employment service offices, professional associations, labor unions and employers. The volume of the Labor

certificates varies from region to region and from year to year. For instance, California and New York state have been the two largest sources of requests for certification. Partly because of this, these two states have been the two largest sources admitting Korean immigrants. As we shall see, the two largest Korean communities have emerged in these states.

In the face of deep economic recession, high unemployment rate and millions of illegal aliens "stealing" Americans' jobs, Congress passed in 1976 legislation to amend the Act of 1965, and the Ford adminstration took every possible administrative measure to curb the flow of immigrants. The following are the major changes of the United States immigration policy that has shaped since October, 1976.

1. Professional immigrants like physicians, nurses and dentists were deprived of the privilege of "third preference" and were downgraded into "six preference." This means that they too, like the immigrants under the "six preference", would have to find, before their entry, an American employer willing to hire them. This amendment, effective January 3, 1977, was enacted largely under the pressure of American medical professional associations and schools; and it was aimed at the curbing of the massive influx of foreign medical professionals. Proponents of the amendment argued that the United States has no labor shortage in medical institutions.

2. According to the amendment, nonimmigrant aliens, who entered the United States with statuses other than that of immigrant, cannot work in the American labor market. If they take any American job, they would be disqualified for permanent residency and thus from American citizenship. This is designed to protect American laborers from the competition of cheap alien labor workers who "work hard and scared." Foreign seamen or air crewmen, who just "jumped out" in the United States territory, are not eligible for permannent residency.

3. According to the amendment, there is some restriction of the quota number allocated to "immediate relatives" of the American citizens because "so many of them have entered the United States simply to receive welfare."

4. In addition, joint federal decisions taken by the State Department and the Labor Department led to the increase of the minimum amount of capital investment into the United States market by which both of prospective immigrants and non-immigrant aliens in the United States are entitled to become permanent resident. On October 7, 1976, the "nut" went up from $10,000 to $40,000. The rationale for this increase is that the "investment" immigration, which originally intended to induce foreign capital to expand the United States economy, has become just a means by which aliens received a green card with a modest sum of money.

5. On September 2, 1976, President Ford instructed the Federal Employment Committee not to hire any alien residents as a federal employee.

President Carter, who made an issue of the United States immigration policy during his Presidential campaign--especially the problem of "silent invasion" of millions of illigal aliens who are said to outnumber the unemployed in the United States, and began to reevaluate the present United States immigration policy.

Facing deep economic problems like the energy shortage, high unemployment and inflation, the United States government is now taking every possible legal step to restrict the flow of immigrants in order to conserve national recources. This reappraisal of immigration policy is now, however, taking place within the general framework of the Immigration Act of 1965 enacted as a result of the powerful liberal, civil rights climate of the 1960's. Once the United States liberalized her immigration policy by accepting selective immigrants regardless of race and nationality, there appears to be a little alternative to the general framework of the Immigration Act of 1965. At least in the near future, there is not likely to be such Draconian solutions to this problem as was the case of past legislation enacted against certain races and nationalities. This would be so partly because
society is deeply imbued with a liberal ideology and partly

because ethnic and racial struture of the contemporary American society is so greatly diversified and pluralized.

Furthermore, such discriminatory legislation would provoke a serious strain of international relationship. In this context, in dealing with the present immigration porblem, contemporary American society is facing a fundamental but agonizing problem of how to perpetuate the ideology of American dream in the midst of the very social-economic conditions which denies it.

Social and Economic Characteristics of Recent Korean Immigrants

The Korean ethnic newspapers in the United States as well as the major newspapers in South Korea have carried the front-page stories of all the United States legislative and administrative changes of the Immigration Act of 1965, while the American mass media paid a little attention to these events. Thus Koreans are much more aware of the change of the United States immigration law than are Americans. Almost all the Korean immigrants know what each of the preference categories stands for. The Korean ethnic newspapers report biweekly or monthly on which "preferences" are now open to the prospective emigrants in South Korea: "According to the report of the United States Department of State, all the 'preferences' except of the 'sixth preference and nonpreference' are now open, as of March 15, 1977. The opening of the 'fifth preference' is applicable only to those who finished visa petition prior to May, 1976..."

This is good news for those Korean immigrants who claimed for "family reunion" by using "relative preferences." And at the same time, it is bad news to thousands of would-be emigrants in South Korea, who have waited for several years for the opening of the "sixth preference" or "nonpreference" quota. Shift of United States immigration policy also greatly affects the life chances of Koreans in the United States who "are troubled with green card problems."

Here is an example of the anxiety of non-status Koreans:

> Three years have passed since I arrived at this strange land of America. Three years ago I set my foot on this unknown land, the land where I have difficulty in passing my words -- with an enormous hope to lead a better life and thereby to raise my children well. Here I have felt an enormous difference from what I heard in my country, so that several times I wished to return home. Now, after a three-year experience of this hard American life, I feel some confidence in making a living here. But my longing for my old country is getting stronger and stronger day after day.
>
> I had to endure frequent belittlements and contempt -- such a contempt that no human being can bear. Whenever I found myself surrounded with an inferiority complex, I almost burst into tears and began to indulge in self-pity, screaming and yelling like a lunatic.
>
> Sometimes I attempted to escape from reality by thinking of my family and my children whom I have left behind -- how much my children are grown. I received education as much as man should have, but no one in America recognizes my learning in my country. This is America ...
>
> Green card! When shall I grasp a green card in my hand? I need it as urgently as a moment of breaking bones. Whenever I think of this problem, I feel as if I have become insane ...[37]

Table I-5

% of Korean Immigrants by their Entry Mechanisms and Year
Adopted from the Annual Report of INS (1967-1975)

| | Immigrants Under the Numerical Limitations | | | | | | | | | | Total % (Immi-grants) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Relative Preference | | | **** | | | | | | | |
| | * 2nd Pref. | ** 4th Pref. | *** 5th Pref. | Occupa-tional Preference | Parents of U.S. Citizens | Wives of U.S. Citizens | Husbands of U.S. Citizens | +Spouses of U.S. Citizens | Children of U.S. Citizens | *****Other Special Immigrants | |
| Year | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1967 | 5.7 | 0.3 | 4.3 | 32.7 | 1.6 | 35.3 | 2.0 | -- | 16.4 | 1.2 | 100.0 (3,956) |
| 68 | 7.6 | 0.6 | 4.6 | 27.8 | 2.2 | 35.6 | 1.5 | -- | 18.1 | 1.7 | 100.0 (3,811) |
| 69 | 8.6 | 0.1 | 8.8 | 30.1 | 1.9 | 32.3 | 1.5 | -- | 15.7 | 0.6 | 100.0 (6,045) |
| 70 | 8.8 | 0.4 | 14.2 | 30.8 | 1.9 | 28.4 | 1.0 | -- | 13.0 | 1.0 | 100.0 (9.314) |
| 71 | 7.7 | 0.2 | 13.5 | 41.9 | 1.5 | 21.2 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 11.0 | 0.8 | 100.0 (14.297) |
| 72 | 7.9 | 0.2 | 15.2 | 45.1 | 1.8 | 11.4 | 0.6 | 6.3 | 11.4 | 0.8 | 100.0 (18,876) |
| 73 | 14.0 | 0.2 | 22.0 | 32.2 | 2.6 | 9.3 | 0.4 | 6.6 | 11.6 | 1.1 | 100.0 (22,930) |
| 74 | 15.0 | 0.3 | 21.6 | 33.5 | 2.3 | 8.8 | 0.4 | 5.6 | 10.2 | 2.6 | 100.0 (28,028) |
| 75 | 16.7 | 0.3 | 30.0 | 22.2 | 3.1 | 7.6 | 0.4 | 2.7 | 11.7 | 4.8 | 100.0 (28,362) |

*The category applies to spouses, unmarried sons and daughters of resident aliens and their children.
**The category applies to married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens and their spouses and children.
***The category applies to brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens and their spouses and children.
****The category applies to immigrants in professions and with special skills and their spouses and children. It includes the "3rd preference," "6th preference," and "non-preference" categories.
*****The category applies to those immigrants like ministers of religion and employees of the U.S. government abroad and their spouses and children. +Category established on basis of Act of April 7, 1970.

The importance of the United States immigration law to the Koreans concerned -- their hopes, aspirations, despair and sorrows -- can be more vivdly understood when we look at the entry mechanisms of the recent Korean immigrants, as illustrated in Table I-5. The following are the distinctive features which can be extracted from Table I-5.

(1) The percentage of Korean entries under the "occupational preferences" reached its peak of 45.1 percent in 1972; since then it began to drop to 22 percent in 1975. This phenomenon generally reflects ongoing conditions of the United States economy that has faced a deep recession since 1972. These economic conditions have been translated into a shift of the United States immigration policy in favor of the restriction of the influx of immigrants with specific skills into the American labor market. On the other hand, in contrast to the drastic percentage decline of "occupational preference" immigrants, there has been a steady percentage increase of "relative preference" immigrants -- especially in the category of the "second" and "fifth preference." The percentage increase of Korean immigrants under the category of fifth preference can be explained by the fact that a large number of Koreans have become American citizens, as we noted before, and thus are entitled to "family reunion."

(2) During the early period of Korean immigration, a high percentage of Korean immigrants entered the United States as wives of native American citizens. They were largely made up of Korean war brides, who married American soldiers when the latter were performing military service in South Korea. This pattern of Korean immigration had existed long before the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1965. In this sense, Korean war brides are one of the Korean social groups that laid the foundation of a kinship-centered immigration.

Generally speaking, it is the political, economic, and military involvement of the United States with South Korea since the end of World War II that has provided the foundations for the recent Korean immigration into the United States. One of the cultural consequences of United States involvement is that the presence of United States forces in South Korea (which still maintains the authorized strength of 42,000 troops) has been an effective mechanism for transmitting American mass culture of post-World War II into South Korea. South Koreans, although noted for their ethnocentrism, have been deeply impressed with American affluence

and mass consumption. The Korean urban elite classes have massively emulated, since the end of the Korean War, a hodge-podge of American life styles. For the Korean urbanites, wearing the U.S. made clothes, shoes, hats, gloves, sun glasses and wrist-watches, most of which flow illegally from the PX's of U.S. military compounds, has been a powerful means of enhancing their status and prestige. American popular songs and movies have facinated Korean urgan youth. Many Korean urban intellectuals today tend to ignore Korean T.V. and radio programs in favor of the American one that are beamed by the United States army station (American Forces of Korean Network). Learning English has become a major tool by which businessmen, white collar workers, public officials and military officers strive for upward social mobility. This combination of American movies, popular songs, magazines, and Pepsi and Coca Cola has filtered into Korean traditional culture since the American occupation of South Korea immediately after the World War 11. This cultural impact of the United States involvement on South Korea has induced Korean urbanites to yearn even more for American life styles and mass consumption. In this context, American soldiers and businessmen in South Korea have unknowingly taken the role of recruitement agents who, like the case of the older immigrants at the turn of the century, advertised and exaggerated the prospective prosperity and well-being of America.

However, this cultural impact as a causal factor for the Korean exodus into the United States is somewhat less important than the unstable military and political situation of the Korean peninsula. On August 18, 1976 when two American officers were reportedly killed by North Korean soldiers over a minor dispute over trimming branches of trees at Panmunjom in Korea, the New York Times correspondent reported:

> The immediate area around Panmunjom, where two American soldiers were killed yesterday, has been the scene of so many violent incidents since the armistice that ended the Korean War 23 years ago that it is the only part of the Korean peninsula still officially designnated a combat zone by the United States. It is now the only site in Asia where American combat troops directly confront Communist forces. Incidents there range from obscene hand gestures and spitting to minelaying and machine-gun ambushes.
>
> Forty-nine Americans have died in such skirmishes in the demilitarized zone, along with a total of more than 1,000 Koreans on both sides. Incidents usually occur without warning. They erupt so quickly and end so fast that there is little time for reaction. Generally both sides-the South Koreans and Americans under the United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the North Koreans on the other blame their opponents.38

Immediately after the so-called "axe-murder incident", a deep anxiety over another Korean War swept over some segments of the population of Seoul which is located so near to the demilitarized zone that it could be bombarded by the Soviet-made long-range artillery on the North Korean side. In general, upper or upper middle class members like business and high-ranking government officials, professionals and independent proprietors are most sensitive to the unstable military situations of the Korean peninsula.

In the days following this incident, these classes were relieved to see that the prices of jewelry, gold, or small vessels-the solid means by which some wealthy Koreans could escape to Japan if and when war break out-did not jump in the domestic market as high as they did after the Communist take over of South Vietnam.

Some Korean immigrants in the United States, who have left behind their close relatives in their home land, were also deeply concerned over the military tension caused by the incident. In a sense, Korean immigrants in the United States are more sensitive to the "Korean problem" than their fellow countrymen in the homeland. A Korean woman mentioned the incident in her letter to her friend in America:

> "J. (in New York City) wrote to me saying that she is looking for someone there who will visit Korea and who,when returning to America, can bring her three-year old daughter back to the United States. Here (in South Korea) people are not so fussy over the incident as in the United states. This time, gold price did not jump. People here seem to be immune to that kind of thing. Things here seem very peaceful..."

The above letter attests to the fact that the sense of the pariah status of Korea still contributes to the recent exodus of Koreans into the United States. However, this is not to day that all Korean immigrants to the United States have been "pushed" by the fear of another Korean War. The fear varies from one segment of the population to another. It is the North Korean refugees in South Korea that are most

vulnerable to the aggravated political and military tension between North and South Korea. Thus, given the "abundance" of the economic opportunities in the United States which has operated as a main "pull" factor for a majority of Korean immigrants, the North Korean refugees have been disproportionately "pushed" by an unstable political and military factor in the homeland. No direct statistical evidence can be presented for this. But North Koreans constituted 50.6 percent of the 423 Korean emigrant families, who entered during the period of 1962 to 1968 to Latin-American nations as immigrants.[39] As we shall see, a bulk of Koreans in Latin-American nations have migrated again to the United States.

North Korean refugees and their descendants in South Korea numbered in 1977 some 5.1 million, constituting 14 percent of the total South Korean population.[40] Before taking refuge in South Korea during the period of the Korean War, they predominantly belonged to business, professional, and landlord classes. They were largely Christians. In South Korea more than half of them engage in commercial businesses.[41] Because of their bitter past experiences of being persecuted by the North Korean communist regime, most of them are single-minded supporters of the South Korean version of anti-communism. And yet they express a deep anxiety over another Korean War because they would be the first to suffer if and when North Korean

Table I-6

| Year | Status at entry | Temporary visitor for pleasure | Student | Business & Investor | Others* | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1966 | | 105 | 360 | 13 | 120 | 598 |
| 1967 | | 283 | 861 | 29 | 151 | 1,424 |
| 1968 | | 289 | 595 | 31 | 183 | 1,098 |
| 1969 | | 470 | 850 | 93 | 407 | 1,820 |
| 1970 | | 614 | 907 | 141 | 417 | 2,079 |
| 1971 | | 879 | 975 | 250 | 1,945 | 4,049 |
| 1972 | | 1,071 | 1,011 | 448 | 2,983 | 5,513 |
| 1973 | | 1,151 | 811 | 708 | 2,291 | 4,961 |
| 1974 | | 924 | 775 | 624 | 2,335 | 4,658 |
| 1975 | | 436 | 397 | 280 | 1,251 | 2,364 |
| | Total | 6,222 (22%) | 7,542 (26%) | 2,617 (9%) | 12,183 (43%) | 28,564 (100%) |

*The category of "Others" includes government officials, exchange visitors, temporary workers and trainees, and dependent housewives and children, etc.

Source: adopted from the Annual Report of Immigration and Naturalization Service (1966-1975).

communists gained control over South Korea. In addition since they are refugees, from North Korea they do not have a strong kinship tie in South Korea-, the fact that facilitates their emigration to the United States and other countries. As we shall see, this North Korean contingent of Korean immigrants to the United States dominates church-centerd community activities as well as business activities in the Korean community of the New York metropolitan area.

Apart from this regional factor in emigration, political and military instability of the Korean peninsular have generally worked as a prime factor for the exodus of wealthy South Korean businessmen, high ranking retired governmental officials, proprietors and well-qualified professionals, whenever opportunities for entry into the United States are available to them. Many of these have brought with them large sums of dollars. As shown in Table 8, many of them have entered the United States under nonimmigrant status like "businessmen and investor" and "temporary visitors for pleasure" and have changed their status after entry to that of permanent resident.

In doing this they have heavily relied on their "capital investment" in the United States market. Sons or daughters of wealthy businessmen have entered the United States on a student visa and acquired permanent resident status by using the same technique of "capital investment." Instead of studying at an Americna educaional institution, they rather tend

to engage in establishing some kind of economic or residential base from which they could bring their families from South Korea if and when war might break out in the Korean peninsula. For this phenomenon, South Korean newspapers have coined a new term "runaway emigration," which places conotations of "immorality" or "irresponsibility" on the part of these kinds of emigrants. To a large extent, the term reflects South Koreans' deep resentment against such "lucky" people. Here is a South Korean newspaper article, entitled "Wealthy Runaway Emigrants Are National Traitors," dispatched by a South Korean correspondent stationed at the City of New York:

> A majority of ordinary (Korean) immigrants here are successfuly overcoming numerous barriers and hardhships which they encounter in their adjustment into alien life styles and language, although they face an untenable problem of estrangement involved in immigrant life. In a contrast to these ordinary immigrants, there are another kinds of Korean immigrants who should be dealt with from a different perspective. They are aristocratic immigrants who brought here several millions of dollars (from South Korea) in order to enjoy a luxurious and aristocratic life style. They can be found in any places where Korean immigrants settle and they are objects of a deep resentment by many Korean immigrants here. In case of New York, these aristocrats bought in cash several-acre houses at the Fort Lee area where only rich Americans can reside. They drive Lincoln or Cadillac, frequently shopping at Saks department store where they used to surprise salemen by purchasing several-thousand-dollar worth of goods. They invest the dollars they smuggled in from our country into real estates such as land and apartment buildings. Their investment are conducted in pseudonym. All these pompous lifes styles cause Korean immigrants' criticism of their home government and thus contribute to the anti-government (of South Korea) movements here. 42

Since the end of the Korean War in 1953 more than 10,000 Korean students have crossed the Pacific ocean in order to receive a higher learning at the American universities.[43] Among them, as shown in Table I-6, a total of 7,542 had changed their student status into permanent resident status during the period of from 1966 to 1975. Their eligibility for permanent resident status is largely derived from learning or professional skills acquired in American educational institutions. They want to settle at the United States mainly because of economic opportunities, social stability and political freedom in the United States. Furthermore, many of them cannot find a job in their home country, that is compatible with their educational training they received in the United States. As far as the manpower needs of the South Korean economy is concerned, they are overqualified and overspecailized. Since most of them come from the upper middle classes in South Korean society, they contribute to the accentuation of the selective social character of the Korean immigrants by sending for their families in South Korea.

To sum up, all these "nonimmigrant" immigrant, businessmen, investors, tourists, students and governmental officials are drawn from the "elite" classes of South Korean society. They become a main source of the kinship-centered immigration as governed by the Immigration Act of 1965. However, this group of Korean emigrants small in size compared with those Koreans

who were admitted to the United States as immigrants.

Given the "push" and "pull" factors -- in this case, political instability and other socioeconomic malaise of the South Korean society, on the one hand, and the socio-economic well-being of American society on the other -- the United States immigration law generally governs the demographic, social and economic characteristics of Korean immigrants.

In the first place, the Korean immigrants had undergone an urbanization experience prior to their entry into the United States; a majority of them were from the urban middle classes of South Korean society. This is clearly indicated in Tables I-7, I-8, and I-9.

As we discussed before, the percentage of the occupational categories of urban white-collar workers in Table I-6 is very much diluted by the inclusion of the category of "Housewives, Children & Others."

In spite of this, Table I-7 shows us that a majority of Korean immigrants were drawn from urban occupational classes, especially from professional classes; this fact is reinforced in Table I-8 in which more than half of the Korean householders in the New York metropolis engaged in urban white-collar occupations at the time of their departure for the United States. The prevalence of "medical professionals" in Table I-8 draws our attention and indicates a selective demand by American medical institutions for foreign medical workers.

We shall discuss in detail this aspect of Korean immigration in Chapter V. What is an interesting fact in Table I-9 is that 34 percent of the Korean male householders in the New York metropolis are engaged in commercial businesses, for which they showed a little propensity in their home country, as shown in Table I-8.

In the second place, a majority of Korean immigrants were highly educated in their home country, as indicated in Table I-10 where 67 percent of the Korean householders in the New York metropolitan area finished college in their home country.[45] This enables them to command, at least, a simple conversational English upon their arrivals at the United States.

Table I-10

% of Educational Backgrounds* of Korean Householders in the New York Metropolis

| | |
|---|---|
| High School | 12% |
| Junior College | 16 |
| College | 67 |
| Others | 5 |
| | 100% (560) |

* It indicates the educational levels achieved in South Korea before their entry into the U.S.
Source: Jae T. Kim's Sample Survey

Table I-8

% of Korean Immigrants by Occupational Status and Year

| Occupation | Year: 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Professional, Technical, & Kindred Workers | 14.0 | 20.9 | 18.7 | 17.8 | 17.3 | 21.5 | 18.6 | 12.7 | 10.8 | 10.9 |
| Managers, Officials, & Proprietors | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 3.2 |
| Clerical & Kindred Workers | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 3.0 |
| Sales Workers | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.7 |
| Craftsmen, Foremen, & Kindred Workers | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 5.0 | 4.4 |
| Operatives & Transport Operatives | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 2.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 2.2 |
| Private Household Workers | 0.08 | 0.6 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.4 |
| Service Workers except Private Household Workers | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 1.8 |
| Farm Laborers & Foremen & Farm Managers | -- | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.4 | 0.33 | 0.38 |
| Laborers except Farm & Mine | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Housewives, Children & Others with No Occupation or Occupation Not Reported | 82.1 | 72.8 | 73.7 | 72.8 | 74.6 | 70.3 | 71.6 | 74.4 | 74.0 | 72.7 |
| TOTAL % (Total Immigrants) | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

Table I-8

Occupational Distribution of Korean Immigrant Householders at the Time of Departure in Korea

(%)

| | |
|---|---|
| White Collar, Office Workers | 31% |
| Students | 6 |
| Teachers | 8 |
| Medical Professionals | 24 |
| Engineers and Mechanicians | 5 |
| Proprietors | 5 |
| Small Business | 6 |
| Unemployed | 6 |
| others | 9 |
| | 100% (560) |

Source: Sample survey conducted in 1975 by Jae T. Kim on the Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area.

Table I-9

Occupational Distribution of Korean Immigrant Householders in the New York metropolitan area.

(%)

| | Male | Female |
|---|---|---|
| Retail and Wholesale Business | 29% | 3% |
| Catering Business | 5 | 1 |
| *Professionals | 19 | 24 |
| Clerical & Office Workers | 5 | 3 |
| Engineers & Mechanicians & Operatives | 19 | 2 |
| Student | 1 | 1 |
| Housewives | -- | 60 |
| Others | 22 | 6 |
| | 100% (138) | 100% (132) |

Source: Sample survey conducted in 1976 by the Korean Consulate General in the City of New York on the basis of the registration of the Korean nationals in the New York metropolitan area.

*Professionals mostly consist of medical professionals.

In the third place, Korean immigration is selective in terms of age and sex. A majority are young and thus economically active, and female immigrants outnumber males by a margin of 2 to 1. As is shown in Table I-11, more than 90 percent of the Korean immigrants who had entered during the period 1966 to 1975, were under 39 years old. And the percentage of immigrants belonging to the age category 20-39 had declined from 66.1 percent in 1966 to 43.2 percent in 1975. This decline was largely caused by the percentage decrease of female immigrants under the age category 20-39 for the same period.

This peculiar prevalence in number of female immigrants over their male counterparts needs a specific explanation on the basis of each age category.

First, a massive influx of Korean nurses and Korean war brides into the United States is largely responsible for the high proportion of female immigrants in the 20-29 group. During the period 1962-1970 a total of 14,554 Korean women came to the United States as wives of American citizens,[46] most of whom, as we have noted, were American soldiers. The Korean Nurse Association in South Korea estimated that some 7,000 Korean nurses were admitted to the United States either directly from South Korea or by way of third nations like West Germany and Canada where they had been previously admitted as migrant workers.

Table I-11

Percentage of Korean Immigrants by Age, Sex, and Year

| Age | Sex | Year | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Under 9 Years | Male | | 6.4 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.6 | 9.4 | 11.1 | 11.7 | 12.9 | |
| | Female | | 14.2 | 10.9 | 12.5 | 11.6 | 11.7 | 12.2 | 13.7 | 14.7 | 14.1 | 15.9 | |
| 10-19 Years | Male | | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.9 | 5.9 | 6.9 | 8.0 | |
| | Female | | 5.7 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6.0 | 6.4 | 7.7 | 8.2 | 8.8 | |
| 20-29 Years | Male | | 4.2 | 4.9 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 7.4 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 6.6 | 7.4 | |
| | Female | | 39.6 | 33.5 | 35.5 | 35.2 | 33.1 | 29.2 | 25.1 | 22.3 | 21.3 | 18.2 | |
| 30-39 Years | Male | | 8.3 | 13.0 | 10.1 | 10.8 | 10.0 | 12.7 | 12.2 | 9.7 | 9.4 | 8.2 | |
| | Female | | 14.0 | 14.8 | 12.9 | 12.5 | 12.3 | 12.7 | 11.7 | 10.4 | 10.1 | 9.4 | |
| 40-49 Years | Male | | 1.1 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 3.4 | |
| | Female | | 0.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.0 | |
| 50-59 Years | Male | | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | |
| | Female | | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.3 | |
| 60 Yrs. & Over | Male | | 0.2 | 0.05 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | |
| | Female | | 0.8 | 0.18 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.5 | |
| Total | Male | | 24.0 | 31.0 | 29.0 | 31.0 | 33.0 | 36.0 | 38.0 | 39.0 | 40.0 | 42.0 | |
| | Female | | 76.0 | 69.0 | 71.0 | 69.0 | 67.0 | 64.0 | 62.0 | 61.0 | 60.0 | 58.0 | |
| Total % | | | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | |
| (Immigrants) | | | (2,492) | (3,956) | (3,811) | (6.045) | (9,314) | (14,297) | (18,876) | (22,930) | (28,028) | (28,362) | |

Source: Adopted from the Annual Report of Immigration and Naturalization Service (1966-1975).

On the other hand, the emigration of Korean men in the same age group is seriously limited by the Korean emigration law, which permits exit visas only to those men who honorably finished three years of compulsory military service. According to the law, draft evaders in South Korea are systematically excluded from overseas travel and emigration. This legal restriction partially explains why female immigrants outnumber males in all adult age categories as shown in Table I-11.

The great number of females in the age groups of 50 years and over is mainly due to the fact that Korean working couples in the United States tend to send for their mothers in order to use them as baby-sitters or housekeepers. Of course, it cannot be denied that the Korean couples' genuine "filial piety" for their mothers is also responsible for this phenomenon.

The discrepancy between female and male children under 9 years old is largely attributed to the fact that more girls than boys have been adopted from Korean orphanages by American citizens. Some 13,000 Korean orphans have been adopted by Americans since 1955.[47] The early comers were largely made up of the abandoned or mixed-blood children produced by the Korean War. Later the Korean orphans, adopted by Americans, were children abandoned by the urban poor, most of whom migrated to cities from rural areas.

As South Korea has undergone a rapid process of industrialization, the number of abandoned children has increased annually: more than 6,000 children were found abandoned in 1976.[48] Some of them were lucky enough to be adopted, usually in pairs, predominantly by white middle-class Protestant families living in American rural areas or small towns. For reasons of cultural assimilation and aesthetic value, the American families prefer girls to boys. On the other hand, the Korean families under economic deprivation would rather abandon girls than boys.

In the fourth place, Korean immigrants have predominantly settled in the largest metropolitan areas of the United States. As shown in Table I-12, during the years from 1970 to 1975, an average of 30 percent of Korean immigrants had settled in the metropolises of the Eastern Seaboard along U.S. interstate highway 95, in a series of adjoining suburban cities surrounding the major U.S. inner cities like Boston, the City of New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington D.C. During the same period, an average of 21 percent of Korean immigrants had resided at the Los Angeles metropolitan area, where the 100,000 Korean immigrants constitute the largest single Korean community in the United States. In the New York metropolitan area is found the second largest Korean community with a population of some 80,000. In each of the major inner cities of the Eastern Seaboard exist a Korean ethnic association like

## Table I-12

Percentage of Korean Immigrants' Major Intended Permanent Residences by Year

| Area | Year: 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| California | 22% | 19% | 20% | 21% | 22% | 23% | |
| (Los Angeles) | (n.a.) | (8%) | (8%) | (8%) | (9%) | (9%) | |
| Hawaii | 6 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 5 | |
| Illinois | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | |
| (Chicago) | (n.a.) | (5) | (5) | (4) | (4) | (4) | |
| Maryland | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 7 | |
| | 7 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 11 | |
| Virginia | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | |
| New Jersey | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | |
| | 15 | 17 | 19 | 15 | 13 | 12 | |
| New York | 11 | 13 | 15 | 11 | 9 | 8 | |
| (New York City) | (n.a.) | (9) | (10) | (7) | (6) | (5) | |
| Pennsylvania | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | |
| (Philadelphia) | (n.a.) | (2) | (1) | (1) | (2) | (2) | |
| Other States | 40 | 41 | 35 | 38 | 37 | 38 | |
| TOTAL | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| | (8,314) | (14,297) | (18,876) | (22,930 | (28,028) | (28,362) | |

Source: Adopted from the Annual Report of Immigration and Naturalization Service (1970-75).

the Korean Association of Greater New York, the Korean Association of Greater Philadelphia, and the Korean Association of Washington, D.C.

During the same period about 6 percent Korean immigrants had settled in the Chicago metropolitan area where some 50,000 Koreans from the third largest Korean community in the United States. Thus, the three largest urban areas of the United States have absorbed more than 55 percent of the total Korean immigrants. In this context, it should be recalled that the three areas have been the three largest sources of requests for labor certifications for the importation of immigrant workers. During the same period about 5 percent of the Korean immigrants entered the Hawaiian Islands and the remaining 40 percent had scattered over the remaining major urban areas of the United States.

Many Korean immigrants tend to settle in the inner cities largely because of the economic opportunities and the cheap rents easily available to them. But this traditional tendency for new immigrants to settle in the inner cities is not so strong among Korean immigrants as one might expect. The bulk of Korean immigrants have directly entered suburban and medium-sized cities wherever they did not encounter housing discrimination because of color and race.[49] Interestingly enough, the percentage of the Korean immigrants admitted to the City of New York drastically declined

from 10 percent in 1972 to 5 percent in 1975. Meanwhile, a growing number of the Korean immigrants have begun to enter the Sun Belt zone, particularly Houston and Dallas in Texas.

This shift of the settlement pattern of Korean immigrants is generally attributed to the economic plight of New York City aggravated by its budget crisis.

In the fifth place, the Korean immigration into the United States has taken place with its basic unit of the nucleus family, although frequently there occurs a temporary period of family separation for reasons of either establishing an economic base in the United States by a pioneer family member, or a bureaucratic delay under the United States or the South Korean emigration law. The conditions favorable either to the continuation of the old family unit or to the creation of a new family in the United States was laid by the humane nature of the Immigration Act of 1965, which permits reunion of immediate relatives. This is clearly indicated in Table I-4, in which 86 percent of the Korean householders in the New York metropolitan area are of married status. And, as shown in Table I-14, 40 percent of the Korean families in the New York metropolis are supported by two working family members, usually husband and wife. This contributes considerably to raising their family income, as indicated in Table I-13.[50]

This immigrant family structure of the recent Korean immigrants contrasts with that of the old Korean immigrants -- as well as the old Chinese immigrants -- who encountered a current United States immigration law hostile to the creation of their own families in the new land. As we noted before, a patchwork solution of "picture marriage" arrangements could not be a permanent answer for the deep shortage of female population among the old Korean immigrants. However, the opposite phenomenon of "female surplus in the marriage market has occurred in the new Korean community largely due to the selective demands by contemporary American Society.

Table I-13

Distribution of Gross Family Income of Korean Immigrants in the New York Metropolitan area
(%)

| | |
|---|---|
| Under -10,000 | 15% |
| 10,000-15,500 | 33 |
| 15,501-20,500 | 19 |
| 20,501-30,000 | 21 |
| 30,001-over | 12 |
| | 100% (560) |

Md: 16,000
Source: Jae T. Kim's Sample Survey

Table I-14

% of Number of Family Member of Korean Householders in the New York Metropolitan area

| Number | |
|---|---|
| 0 | 13% |
| 1 | 42 |
| 2 | 40 |
| 3 | 4 |
| 4 | 1 |
| | 100% (560) |

Source: Jae T. Kim's Sample Survey

Table I-15

% of Marital Status of Korean Householders in the New York Metropolitan area

| | |
|---|---|
| Single | 10 |
| Married | 86 |
| Divorced | 2 |
| Separated | 1 |
| | 99% (559) |

Source: Jae T. Kim's Sample Survey

Since Korean women outnumber Korean men in the Korean marriage market of the United States, Korean women, who have reached the marriage age, face a serious problem in finding husbands in the United States. To make matter worse, Korean men, still concerned with the traditional Korean virtue of chastity and virginity of woman, tend to distrust "Americanized" Korean women who, they think, are too aggressive and disobedient. Thus there has been a strong tendency for the Korean men of the marriage age to make a month-long chartered plane trip to their home country in order to "pick out a brand new bride." And the Korean women, if they are not successful in their attempts for marriage in the Korean marriage market in the United States, have resorted to the same marriage technique as do the Korean men. So far both groups have been successful in their marriage ventures in their homeland because "homeland Koreans are crazy about the Korean-Americans." When negotiating for their marriage in South Korea, the Korean Americans tends to inflate their status in the United States: for instance, the small shopkeepers in the

New York's ghetto areas referred themselves as "New York businessmen." In an extreme case, a U.S. automobile licence was converted into the I.D. card of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency by a Korean American who swindled money out of a Korean girl under the pretext of marriage. All these marriage ventures conducted by the Korean Americans have facilitated kinship-centered immigration because, after marrying in South Korea, they filed for "family reunion" visas upon returning to the United States. This is, of course, just one channel of kinship-centered immigration. A high proportion of Korean immigrants tend to send for their entire family once they acquire citizenship. In this process, a kind of a chain reaction of kinship-centered immigration occurs. That is to say, under "family reunion" prefernces, married family members can enter the United States with all their children. They are also eligible to send for their close relatives when they acquire American citizenship.

Since the "skill" immigration into the United states is becoming more difficult because of a deteriorating economy in the United States, Korean immigrants are now increasingly aware that kinship-centered immigration will become the main avenue for entering the United States. This partly explains why almost all Korean immigrants are looking forward the day they receive citizenship.

## Conclusion

The United States Immigration Act of 1965 has generally governed the economic, demographic, educational and familial characteristics of recent Korean immigrants. But the extent to which their social characteristics is determined by the selective nature of the Act have depended upon their different entry mechanisms. We have seen that students, businessmen, tourists and retired governmental officials had enterd the new land with a non-immigrant visa and laid the foundation for kinship-centered immigration. Since they are from the "elite" classes of South Korean society, the families, who have followed them, belonged to similar classes. An exception for this is Korean war brides and the families who followed them. Most of them came from the lower classes of South Korean society. Needless to say, the selectivity of the Korean immigration is also applicable to those skilled and professional immigrants, especially medical professionals. The families they have brought into the new land also have the social backgound of middle or upper middle classes of South Korea. Thus, "skill" immigration has produced a "kinship" immigration within the framework of the United States Immigration Act of 1965. Perhaps, a most unique character of the Korean immigration lies in the easy formation of consangineous families in the initial stage of socio-economic adjustments to the new land. This would be an unintended consequence of the Immigration Act of 1965.

We shall see the importance of Korean immigrant families as an economic unit.

If the Immigration Act of 1965 resulted from the social and political change of the 1960's, the Korean immigration into the united states is an serendipitous phenomenon. As far as "skill" immigration is concerned, the Immigration Act of 1965 reflects the professionalization, specialization and centralization of the occupational structure of contemporary American society. In this sense, "skilled" immigrants had already been trained in the homeland in order to gain entry into the kinds of occupations from which they could gain preferences into the new land. We shall treat this aspect in detail in Chapter V.

In general, a majority of prospective Korean immigrants to the United States must be, psychologically and economically, fit for the survival of contemporary American society. As we shall see in detail, Korean immigrants underwent a rapid process of urbanization and industrialization in the homeland before their entry into the United States. A high proportion of them have brought with them the means for economic self-establishment in the forms of skills and dollars. This fact distinguishes recent Korean immigrants from the older immigrant groups at the turn of the century, most of whom were made up of displaced peasants, the impoverished and low skilled urban proletariats. In addition, mainly because of the selective nature of the Immigration Act of 1965, there has been an inter-country

variation in sending emigrants to the United States within the limit of the annual quota granted to each country: some developing countries are well prepared for sending part of their trained labor force into the United States labor ma-ket while some countries are not. This leads us to the question as to how occupational or manpower changes of the South Korean society are conducive to the emigration of South Koreans to the United States.

We have presented the "push" factor involved in the Korean emigration mainly in terms of the peculiar political situation of the Korean peninsula -- the historical pariah status of Korea as a nation that is still manifested in the division of North and South Korea. In this context, we have pointed out that refugees from North Korea constitute a heavy portion of the South Korean exodus into the United States. Yet this political "push" provides us only with a partial explanation for the Korean emigration into the United States. We shall explore in the next chapter some basic changes of the South Korean political economy, which explain the other aspects of the "push" factor.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The New York Times, February 27, 1977.

[2]Ko, Sung-je, Kook Iminsa Yongu (The Study of Korean Emigration), (Seoul, Korea: Jang Moon Gak, 1973), pp. 84-94.

[3]Yi, Gi-back, Kook Shinron (The New Approach to the Korean Korean History), (Seoul, Korea: Il Jo Gak, 1967), p.362; Choi, Ho-jin, Gundae Hanguk Kyongjaesa (The Recent History of the Korean Economy), (Seoul, Korea: Dan Moon Moon Go, 1973), p. 72.

[4]The money economy had fully developed at the begining of the 19th century in urban commercial centers and spread over the rural areas. Thus the Korean government at the end of the 19th century began to collect taxes from peasants in cash rather than in local products, the traditional means of tax payment. This change in tax system forced peasants to turn their products into cash by selling them in local markets. Partly because of the lack of local markets, peasants had to borrow money from usurers at high interest rates in order to pay taxes. The Korean "usury" capitalism was characterized by the fact that if the debtors failed to pay his debts, their wives and children were demoted to the serfs of the creditors. The usurers ranged from landlords and public officials to the government itself. See, Choi, Gi-june and Oh, Duck-young, Hanguk Kyongjaesa (The History of the Korean Economy), (Seoul, Korea: Bum Moon Sa, 1962), pp.325-333.

[5]Kwon, Tai-hwan and et al., The Population of Korea, (Seoul, Korea: the Population and Development Studies Center, Seoul, National University, 1975), p. 3

[6]Ibid., p. 28.

[7]China News Analysis, (Hong Kong, No. 569), June 18, 1965.

[8]The Hankook Ilbo, March 27, 1974.

[9]Ko, Sung-je, Op. cit., pp. 241-244.

[10]Kim, Sung-lak, "Yocksajok Euire Bon Bookmi Hangukin" (The Koreans in the United States in Historical Perspective), Shin Han Minbo (The New Korea News), April 29, 1976.

[11]Ko, Sung-je, Op. Cit., p. 211.

[12]Smith, William C., "Minority Groups in Hawaii," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Sept., 1942), pp. 36-39.

[13]Kim Sung-lak, Op. Cit.

[14]Houchins, Lee and Houchins, Chang-su, "The Korean Experience in America, 1903-1924," Pacific Historical Review (November, 1974), p. 558.

[15]Kim, Sung-lak, Op. cit.

[16]Houchins and Houchins, Op. cit., p. 563.

[17]For instance, the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League was formed in 1905 at San Francisco with the number of membership expanding into more than 75,000 within a year. The Exclusion League, supported by foreign-born white laborers, declared one of its aims: "the Chinese exclusion laws be extended so as to exclude all classes of Japanese and Koreans, exempted by the terms of the Chinese Act, from the United States and its insular territories." See Buell, Raymond Leslie, "Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXXVII (1922), pp. 614-623.

[18]Houchins and Houchins, Op. cit., p. 561.

[19]The Korean government allowed the emigration of its subjects into the Hawaiian Islands in the hope that, by doing so, she would receive support from the United States in coping with the Japanes political and economic encroachment upon Korea. Ibid., p. 548.

[20]Kim, Bernice Bong Hee, "The Koreans in Hawaii," Social Science, Vol. IX (1934), p. 409.

[21]Thus the Protestant churches became a major community organization for the Koreans in the Hawaiian Islands. Other non-Christian Koreans participated in church life because churches provided them with the opportunities for social interaction. Han, Nam, "Miju Hanin Imin Gwa Doklipsa" (The Korean Immigrants in the United States and their History of National Independence Movement), The Hankook Shinmoon, May 17, 1975.

As we shall see, this church-centered community life continues in recent Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area.

[22]Ibid.

[23]The Jayoo Shinmoon, June 14, 1974.

[24]Houchins and Houchins, Op. cit., p. 559.

[25]No one knows the exact number of total Korean population in the United States. Since the influx of Korean immigrants has taken place recently, the 1970 United States Census data on the Korean population is outmoded and thus unreliable. However, based upon the data of the Annual Report of Immigration and Naturalization Service, we might crudely estimate that the total Korean population in the United States falls somewhere between 450,000 and 500,000. This estimate takes into account the unknown number of illegal aliens, temporary visitors, Korean immigrants' offspring born in the United States, older Korean immigrants at the turn of the century, and those Koreans admitted into the United States via third world nations like Latin American nations, Canada and West Germany. Such demographic factors as return migration rate and mortality rate of Koreans in the United States are too negligible to be considered.

[26]The Annual Report of Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1975.

[27]U.S. News & World Report, November 26, 1973; The New York Times, August 4, 1976.

[28]The New York Times, August 4, 1976.

[29]In interpreting Table I-4, we should consider that the number of immigrants belonging to the category of "housewives, children and others with no occupation reported" accounted for an average of 60 percent of the total immigrants admitted into the United States during the period 1971-1975.

[30]Congressional Quarterly Almanac (89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, Vol. XXI), p. 459.

[31]Ibid., p. 463.

[32]Bennett, Marion T., "The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, As Amended to 1965," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (September, 1966), p. 134.

[33]Kennedy, Edward M., "The Immigration Act of 1965," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (September, 1966), p. 10.

[34]Eckerson, Helen F., "Immigration and National Origins," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (September, 1966), p. 10.

[35]United States Immigration Laws (United States Department of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 8-10.

[36]The number of immigrants from European nations has been far below the annual quota allocated to each of them while such Asian nations as South Korea and the Philippines have had the number of applicants for emigration far more than their annual quotas. Among the Asian nations there has been a wide variation in the operation of the preference system.

[37]The Hankook Shinmoon, September 11, 1976.

[38]The New York Times, August 19, 1976.

[39]Ko, Sung-je, Imin Hyangjong Chosa Yongu (The Study of Emigration Administration), (Seoul, Korea: The Manpower Development Institute, 1969), pp. 52-53.

[40]The Joon Ang Ilbo, June 27, 1977.

[41]Ibid.

[42]The Dong-A Ilbo, January 9, 1975.

[43]According to a report of the South Korean Department of Education, a total of 10,789 Korean students entered the United States on a student visa during the period 1953-1973.

[44]The two sample surveys, of course, contain a regional bias and thus cannot represent Korean immigrants in the United States. For instance, the high percentage of medical professionals is largely due to the concentration of leading medical institutions in New York's inner city, which employs a bulk of Korean immigrant medical workers.

[45]The number of university enrollment of South Korea amounted to 223,600 in 1973, constituting about 8 percent of the college-age population of South Korea. Vreeland, Nena, et al. Area Handbook for South Korea (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 131.

[46]Chosa Wolbo (The Korean Industrial Bank, November, 1970), p. 27.

[47]The New York Times, March 1, 1977.

[48]The Joogan Hankook, April 11, 1976.

[49]The Annual Report(s) of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1970-1975.

[50]Here again, the sample survey has a bias derived from the regional character of the New York metropolitan area. A heavy concentration of Korean medical workers, and wholesale and retail businessmen in the City of New York contributes to a much higher level of family income than that of Korean immigrants in other regions.

## CHAPTER II

## THE FORMULATION OF SOUTH KOREAN EMIGRATION POLICY

### "Population Explosion" As A "Push" Factor

Korean immigrants feel it a fulfilment of a moral obligation, derived from their long cultural tradition of confucianism, to make a visit to their homeland and see their families and friends when they have accomplished economic "success" in the new land. The visit also provides them with a chance to show off their "success" or new life style accomplished in the new land. To their families and friends in South Korea as well as their peers in the United States the visit becomes a symbol of "making it"in the United States. Thus, a total of 3,685 out of some 70,000 Koreans living in the Los Angeles metropolitan area visited their homeland during the year of 1976.[1] When asked for their impressions on the homeland, many noted the "population explosion" in South Korea simply by saying that: "There are too many people. In the Myongdong downtown (in Seoul) it takes a five-minute to make one step forward," or "There are no playgrounds for children except for roads." Before their entry into the United States they had already experienced the South Korean population pressure, which operated upon them as one of the main "push"

factors for their emigration into the United States. But upon returning, they were able to perceive more clearly the "population explosion" in South Korea because of the comparison they could easily make between the "crowdedness" of their home country and the "open space" of the new land.

In spite of the strong attempts to control population growth by the South Korean Government since 1962, the total population of South Korea increased from 24.9 million in 1960 to 34.6 million in 1975, a 39 percent increase.[2] The South Korean population density per square mile was 873.1 in 1974, as compared with 58.5 in the United States. The population density in South Korea is the second highest in the world, next to Bangladesh. About 35 million people compete with one another for scarce resources in South Korea whose size is only slightly larger than that of state of Maine.

The adoption of Western preventive medical technologies at the end of the 19th century is largely responsible for the recent "population explosion" of South Korea. Antibiotics, insecticides and immunization have combined together to effect a drastic decline of mortality rate far exceeded that of fertility rate: the crude birth rate per 1,000 decreased from 35 in 1910 to 30 in 1970 while the crude death rate dropped from 34 to 9 during the same period.[3] This demographic revolution has constituted one of the most significant effects of the West on life in South Koreans.

In 1897 the Korean government introduced, for the first time in the nation's history, a number of immunization programs into the Korean medicine which had relied previously on traditional Oriental medical technology based on herbs and acupuncture. Mass immunization was an initial step to control such epidemic diseases as cholera, typhoid, dysentery and diphtheria. The Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 resulted in major changes in preventive medical system of Korea. The Japanese Government-General in Korea formulated a comprehensive program of preventive medical services, which effected a significant drop in the mortality rate among the Korean population during the Japanese colonial period. The Korean population struture entered the first stage of the "demographic transition" in the 1920's.[4]

Immeidately after the Korean War, which took a toll of 1.6 million lives, mortality rates drastically decreased largely due to South Korean adoption of preventive medical technology from the Unites States army in South Korea as well as to the massive grants of surplus grains from the United States. At the same time, the birth rate increased to 45 in 1955 largely becuase of the post (Korean) War baby boom. Since international migration during that period was a negligible factor in governing the Korean population structure, the increasing gap between birth rates and death rates had resulted in a "population explosion" that continues to the present. This gap has not as yet been narrowed enough to complete the

last stage of the "demographic transition" largely because South Korea has accepted Western medical technologies without experiencing a comparable change in its traditional family, occupational structure and cultural bias against women.[5]

The South Korean population structure has also been governed by a political factor stemmed from the division of North and South Korea. At the end of the World War 11 about 2.3 million overseas Koreans returned to their homeland largely from Japan and Manchuria. About 80 percent of these entered South Korea partly because they preferred the "democratic political system" in South Korea. In addition, during the Years surrounding the Korean War about 1 million North Koreans took refugee to South Korea. This population redistribution greatly increased the population density of South Korea, which had already been more densely populated than North Korea because its geography was more suited to agriculture. Furthermore, from the end of the Korean War in 1953 until 1962 the Korean government, faced with a heavy toll during the War, had adopted and supported a population policy oriented toward a pronatalist stance and discouraged the emigration of her people. A large population was viewed as a national asset in coping militarily and economically with North Korea. For the same reasons, North Korea had adopted a similar pronatalist stance during the period from 1953 to 1972.[6]

But faced with population increases that strained its economic and geographic resources, the South Korean military government reversed the pronatalist stance and formulated a population control policy in 1962. This reversal was a part of the First Five Year Economic Development Plan.

Partly because of the overall socio-economic developments conducive to the dissemination of population control devices and partly becuase of the development of the universal educational system, mass media and centralized bureaucracies,[7] the South Korean government has, since 1962, been able to launch successful a family planing program. South Korean family planning has been construed as a successful model case for other developing nations.[8] The annual rate of population increase of South Korea was reduced from 2.9 percent in 1961 to 1.64 percent in 1975. An optimistic view might arise from such an "impressive" accomplishment. However, past policies and tradition still govern the population structure of the future. Females, who had been born during the post Korean War "baby boom" period of 1953 to 1958 are now entering the reproductive age. Because of this, it is estimated that the annual population growth will continue to swing upwards in the near future. This prospect of further increases in population in a country, whose population density is already the second highest in the world, has provoked a sense of panic among South Korean economic planners.

In spite of the "green revolution" in the country side, largely supported by the development of new "miracle" hybrid strains, South Korean self-sufficiency in food crops had dropped from 81 percent in 1970 to 73 percent in 1973. Newsweek magazine reported: "Even in Korea where the HYV's (high yielding varieties) have helped to more than double rice production, restaurants are forbidden to serve rice-based food for two days each week and schoolmasters rummage through children's lunch boxes to make sure that they do not contain more than the alloted measure of rice".[9]

To make matter worse, South Koreans' consumption patterns have changed in response to both "a revolution of rising expectations" and to a new dependence on international markets and products. For instance, energy consumption per individual doubled during the period of from 1960 to 1973.[10] In South Korea where not "even one drop of oil cannot be produced", this change of consuption pattern partly caused the national energy dependency on foreign oil to go up from 7.6 percent to 53.3 percent over the same period. Thus the South Korean government faces an enormous problem of how to deal with an ever-increasing population, aspiring to "a revolution of rising expectations" with limited national resources.[11] Those Koreans, who are most exposed to "a revolution of rising expectations", are most sensitive to all the socio-economic malaise caused by the "population explosion."

They think that "South Korea is not a proper place to live in."

One way for the South Korean government to solve this problem is to reduce the sheer size of its population. Since the government cannot deliberately increase mortality rates, emigration and birth control are the two basic techniques available to South Korea.[12]

The military government, for the first time in the history of Korea, adopted a specific and deliberate emigration policy in order to relieve population pressure. The South Korean emigration law, which was amended in 1962, stated: "This amendment, by encouraging people to emigrate to foreign countries, is designed to be geared to population control policy and thus to contribute to the stability of the national economy.[13] The amendment also aimed at enhancing Korean national prestige in the countries receiving Koreans. This concern with national prestige, partly derived from the face-saving culture of Confucianism, influenced lawmakers to exclude from emigration such social outcasts like ex-convicts, alcoholics, psychotics, and those who are not adequately able to perform desired physical labor. Draft evaders or deserters were excluded from emigration because of South Korea's military situation.

n addition to relieving population pressure, the South Korean emigration policy also aimed at securing remittances sent home by Koreans abroad. This purpose, though not manifested in the emigration law, was clearly documented in "White Paper on Overseas Contracts" published by the South Korean Manpower Administration:

> Overseas contract and ordinary emigration provides us with the two ways by which we could earn foreign currencies and ameliorate the worsening unemployment problem. However, overseas contracts differs from ordinary emigration in the following points. First, because overseas contract laborers remit to their families the money they earn in foreign countries, they greatly contribute to the balance-of-payments as well as to the creation of national industrial capital.
> As we know, they would not spend the money in foreign countries. Let us look at the Italian case. Italian government does not allow their migrant workers to accompany with them their families in order to make them to send the money to their families they left behind. Second, when they return home after finishing labor contracts, they would greatly contribute to the development of national industry with the skills they learned in foreign countries.14

During the period of from 1963 to 1974 the South Korean "overseas contract" workers and emigrants had remitted about $720 million to their families in their home country.[15] The remittances from overseas Koreans totaled about $155 million during 1975.[16] All foreign currencies sent from overseas Koreans were required to be deposited into the Korean national bank called "the Bank of Korea" in order to improve the Korean balance of payments. The families receive the remittances in the form of the Korean currency, the Won.

The Korean emigration law divides emigrants into the three groups. The first group, called "group emigration", is made up those whose entry into specific nations is arranged by the negotiations between the South Korean government and receiving nations. This "group emigration" is, at a practical level, identical with the Korean emigration into the Latin American

nations since the amendment of the South Korean emigration law in 1962. The second group is called "contract emigration" in which each individual enters contract with prospective employer in the receiving nations, arranged largely by employment agencies in South Korea. At an operatioanl level, this group largely consists of "occupational" or "skilled" immigrants into the United States, as discussed in the previous chapter. The third group, called "special emigration", consists of those whose entry into specific nations is made possible by the invitations on the part of individuals, and private or public organizations in the receiving nations. This group actually indicates, with a few exceptions, the immigrants into the United States like "relative Preference" immigrants, Korean War brides and orphans.

Overseas contract workers can be added to the previously defined "official" emigrant groups, although they are not defined as emigrants by the South Korean emigration law. They constitute an unofficial emigrant contingent because a bulk of overseas contract workers have entered the United States via third nations into which they had previously migrated as contract workers during the period of 1963 to 1974. About 17,000 Korean nurses and miners, who were not miners but college-educated and unemployed urban youth, migrated to West Germany and were employed at mining and nursing industries.[17] Their legal status in West Germany is different from the status of

Korean immigrants in the United States because the United States gurantees citizenship to her immigrants while West Germany has expelled her migrant workers when faced with economic recession. The more tolerant atmosphere of contemporary American society plus its greater economic opportunities for emigrants has brought forth a heavy influx of the Korean nurses and miners from West Germany into the United States since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. A majority of these have entered the United States with families in which Korean miner is husband and Korean nurse is wife. They were entitled to enter the United States by virtue of the nursing skills of the wife. South Korea had also sent some 25,000 contract workers to South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. Many of the Korean workers, who had worked for the American companies in South Vietnam, have also entered the United States.

Some 30,000 Koreans emigrated to such Latin American nations as Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia since the amendment of the Korean emigration law in 1920.[20] Many of them have entered the United States usually with the status of tourist and managed to acquire permanent residency by investing a specified sum of money into business in the United States market.

In a contrast with the United States where the South Korean government could not take the initiative in sending or

resettling her emigrants, the Latin American nations have provided the South Korean government with greater flexibility in fostering emigration. Furthermore, only these four Latin American nations and the United States have shown some willingness to accept Korean emigrants. The concept of "seed" emigration was evolved from the land settlement problems of these Latin American nations. Since the Latin American- especially, Brazil and Argentina- have wanted to import Korean farmers for the reclamation of virgin lands, the South Korean government has emphasized "group emigration" in which Korean emigrant families would settle together in designated lands in order to reclaim and develope vast agricultural colonies which could serve as bases for inducing more South Koreans to migrate. In so doing, the South Korean government intends to import into South Korea the grains produced by the Korean immigrants settled in the Latin American nations. For this purpose, a South Korean emigration company, called the Overseas Development Company, which was established in 1965 under the auspices of the South Korean government in order to explore overseas contracts and emigration, attempted to purchase land in some Latin American nations. The expected accomplishment of the Korean emigration into Latin America can be inferred from the following remark made by a Korean immigrant farmer representing a successful case of Korean agricultural colonies: "Now, our group ranch is marked on the Brazilian map.

Thus we can say that Korean territory is indirectly expanded."[19] However, this is an example of only a few success stories among many failures. South Korean policy of "seed" emigration, based upon the development of agricultural colonies, has not born much fruit. In fact, the South Korean government announced May 4, 1977 a temporary suspension of the Korean emigration into the four Latin American nations on the ground that "the accomplishments of our people in settling Latin America are lagging."

We can identify some basic reasons that the agricultural "group" settlement has not yet been successful. The most crucial reason is that a majority of Korean immigrants had never been farmers, although farming experience was an official criteria for their selection. Most of them were well-educated urbanites, and as we have noted in the first chapter, more than half of them were North Korean refugees possessing acumen for commercial enterprises. Thus, after arriving at the lands designated by Latin American nations, Korean immigrants began almost immediately to move to large cities in order to engage in commercial ventures.[20] They are now concentrated into a few large cities in Brazil and Argentina such as Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeire. In the city of Sao Paulo in Brazil, for instance, some 13,000 Koreans have established an ethnic territorial enclave by "invading" a slum area which was once a den of prostitutes.[21]

Many of them have remigrated to the United States. Like the Korean immigrant contigent from West Germany, the Koreans, who entered the United States via Latin American nations, are noted for their business enterprises in the New York metropolitan area. The Untied states has been the final gathering place for the Koreans abroad.

## The South Korean Reaction to the Immigration Act of 1965

The United States, after the passage of the United States Immigration Act of 1965, became the only nation willing to admit Korean immigrants in a large number. For the Koreans in South Korea, the word "emigration" is almost synonymous with "the emigration into the United States." After the change of South Korean emigration law in 1962, about 75 percent of the total Korean emigrants have entered the United States.

Unlike its policies to Latin America, the South Korean government has not been able to effect the way in which the United States immigration policy has been determined. The South Korean Department of Health and Social Welfare, which deals with overall problem of emigration and overseas contract, has had to take Korean emigration into the United States for granted and has not been able to formulate a national policy toward Korean emigration into the United States. This is so simply because the South Korean government was powerless in influencing the enactment and execution of legislation by the

United States. However, two phenomena have occurred in South Korea as a direct result of Korean emigration into the United States. First, the South Korean government has formulated emigration policies to control the exodus of wealthy Koreans and their dollars into the United States and to influence the Korean immigrant community in the United States. Second, the Korean emigration into the United States has contributed to a change in the homeland occupational structure. Let us, first of all, focus upon the second aspect of Korean emigration into the United States.

As we have already discussed in the first chapter, Korean immigration into the Untied States has taken place on the basis of individual initiatives acted out within the basic framework of the United States Immigration Act of 1965. The initiatives have derived from either knowledge of specific skills needed in the United States labor market or from the prior existence of close relatives in the United States. In taking the initiative to migrate, prospective emigrants have influenced a selective change in South Korean educational and economic institutions. As we will see later in a case study, the selective demand for Korean medical professionals has caused a drastic expansion of Korean medical schools. This is but one of the major examples showing a selective interaction of economic institutions in the form of labor and trade between the two nations. The interaction processes, as

determined by the United States immigration and economic policy, have provided a high portion of Korean immigrants with major economic entry points. The interaction processes have also produced an unequal distribution of "emigration" or economic opportunities. A Korean newspaper in 1975 carried a front-page story on the bad fortune of more than 10,000 prospective Korean emigrants:

> In spite of the fact that "contract" emigration into the United States is no longer possible because of the recent United States economic recession, the emigration companies (in South Korea), licensed by the Department of Health and Social Welfare, are still recruting emigrants in order to receive $1,200 worth of commission for each contract. This would add more people to the long list of "emigration victims" numbering more than 10,000, who have finished all the necessary domestic procedures but could not have received visas from the United States embassy (in South Korea)...The number of the "emigration victims" has drastically increased since the last April (1975) when the United States State Department decided that the embassy should not issue visas to the "contract" emigrants. The decision of the United States Department of State reflected the bad situation of American economy, aggravated by the Arab oil embargo and by the influx of some 150,000 South Vietnamese refugees... Unfortunately enough, most of these applicants for emigration have already sold their properities and quit their jobs....And yet the B emigration company is still advertising the recruitment of "overseas" emigrants, saying that it has received new job offers from the United States for such workers as shoe repairmen, foundry men, house maids, and mechanicians and cooks, etc....22

Except for both highly professionalized workers like medical professionals and wealthy "runaway" emigrants, many of Korean emigrants into the United States have prepared themselves in their home land for the kinds of occupational skills that would be useful for them to make an initial economic adjustment in

the United States. This is so regardless of whether they are "skilled" or "kinship" immigrants. Many of "skilled" immigrants had learned, over a short period of time, the kinds of skills that could get them most easily labor contracts with American employees. Some of them had acquired the specific skills only for the prupose of being entitled to the "occupational preferences" under the United States immigration law.

All kinds of job training schools, specifically geared to the need of "overseas" contract workers or emigrants, have flourished in urban areas of South Korea. The job training schools for heavy construction equipment operators and drivers are now booming as South Korea has sent more than 50,000 "overseas" construction workers to Arab nations.[23] They are now working on more than $6 billion of construction projects run by South Korean construction companies.

However, the schools that are directly relevant to the economic adjustment of the Korean immigrants into the United States are schools for auto-repairmen, dress-makers, radio and T.V. repairmen, welders, computer programmers, embroiderers and hair dressers, etc. Thus, an advertisement of a dress-making and embroidering school runs:

> Highly popular skills in the United States, Canada, and Latin American nations, guarantee more than $2,000, a month. This school offers a special course for prospective overseas emigrants an individualized and speedy instruction for those prespective emigrants who need the skills urgently. We are using 'designs' that are currently popular in the United States.

Similar advertisements could be found for the job training areas cited above. However, except for some labor-intensive skills like garment-making, the skills they learned over short periods of time in South Korea cannot be easily utilized in the United States labor market. This is so mainly because of the different licensing systems in the United States. The poor level of skills acquired by Korean immigrants is also responsible for the problem. However, if they are skilled immigrants with much working experience, they would face much less difficulty in this problem.

On the whole, licensing systems in the United States have become a major initial barrier for all Korean immigrants who have brought with them skills, semi-skills or highly professional skills from their homeland.

Here is an example:

> Mr. Lee was able to immigrate to the United States about one year ago at the invitation of his brother who had come to the United States about 15 years ago with a student visa and became a United States citizen. Mr. Lee's brother, Jinho, is a laboratory technician in the field of chemistry. Mr. Lee graduated from a teachers' college in South Korea with Korean literature as a major and was able to find a teaching job if he wished. But he did not want to make his career as a high school teacher belonging to the class of small "salali men." Thus he wrote to his brother in the United States, beggin for his help: "I do not want to end up my future as a high school teacher. I do not want to inhable chalk powder until I die. Please, bring me to the United States."
>
> In subsequent correspondence, Mr. Lee asked his brother for suggestions as to how he sould prepare himselv occupationally before his entry into the United

States because his academic knowledge of Korean literature is useless in the United States job market. Specifically, he wanted to know from his brother what skill that could be learned over a short period of time in South Korea would be most saleable in the United States labor market.

His brother suggested that he might rather bring with him a small sum of capital than a skill because his brother saw that many new Korean immigrants have successfully run small businesses in New York City. His brother also advised him to learn auto driving and basic conversational English.

However, Mr. Lee could not receive the desired sum of money from his father who has made some money through land speculation at the outskirts of Seoul. Thus Mr. Lee then decided to learn welding after he read a Korean newspaper article on the "contract" immigrants into the United States. He enrolled himself at a small welding school in Seoul 9 months before he came to the United States. At the welding school he met a Korean-American from California, who had temporarily visited South Korea in order to learn welding.

Mr. Lee heard from him that there was a big shortage of welders in the United States in the construction of the Alaska pipeline; and that many Korean welders in California earned more than 7 dollars an hour, and in the case of pipe welding, they could make more than 10 dollars an hour. Shortly before his departure for the United States, Mr. Lee finished welding school and received a diploma.

Mr. Lee entered Dallas, Texas, partly because his fiancee, who had arrived one year earlier, worked for a Korean-run wig store in a black neighborhood in Dallas, and partly because he thought that welding jobs were easily available there.

When looking for a welding job in Dallas, Mr. Lee found that employers asked for an American welding license from the ASME, and that the welding diploma he received in Korea was useless. Furthermore, he realized that his welding skill was extremely poor because of lack of experience. He decided to attend welding school in Dallas in order to receive an American welding license. He began to work as a welding helper during the day while going to school during evening hours.

During the summer of 1976 a Korean daily newspaper in South Korea called the Choson Ilbo, carried a series of reports on the life of Korean immigrants in the United States. The reports, which were somewhat journalistic and impressionistic but had some insight, evoked an explosive popularity among Koreans because the reports dealt with a national boom of Korean emigration into the United States. Although the author of the reports argued that he intended to check Koreans' fantasy about America by conveying to them the realities of Korean immigration -- the plight, hardship, estrangements, identity dilemmas and tragicomedy -- the reports had produced a boomerang effect of intensifying the "American fantasy" among many Korean urbanites. This is so because Koreans living in overurbanized cities marked by keen economic competition tend to romanticize the typical examples of economic ventures of Korean immigrants in the United States.

Animated gossip and conversations had evolved from the Korean immigrant life. Some Koreans exclaimed "they can save $3,000 a month by doing yache sang (vegetable business), when they read the following part of the reports:

> For Mr. L, counting money at night is the sole compensation for the hardship and estrangement he must endure as an immigrant. After taking out all the expenses (for doing a vegetable and fruit store), he makes the day's profit of $200. Korean vegetable and fruit stores have

> emerged as a famous ethnic business in New York City. The New York Times reported on them. Jews originally started this business. Italians replaced Jews in the business. About four years ago Koreans began to take over the business from Italians. Blacks might have entered the business, but they couldn't be successful because of their lazy nature. On the other hand, Koreans work so hard that they could overcome competition. Furthermore, as far as the things that directly enter the mouth are concerned, customers like cleanliness. Koreans attract customers because they handle all kinds of vegetable stuffs cleanly.[24]

The series of reports were published as a book titled "Day and Night of Komericans: A Visit to Korea in the United States." The book became a national best seller not only because it dealt with a national issue of Korean emigration into the United States but also because it has provided prospective emigrants with essential information as to how they might prepare themselves occupationally or psychologically for their future life in the new land. It has become a text book for prospective emigrants by supplementing legal guidance on securing emigration and overseas contracts. However, this episode on the book "Komericans" is just one example of how prospective emigrants in South Korea can be informed of possible economic opportunities in the United States. The other similar reports sent by Korean newspaper correspondents in the United States and by Korean-Americans' frequent visits to their homeland have also provided major communication channels to prospective emigrants into the United States.

Yet, Korean emigration companies and travel agencies have been the major organizations arousing the emigration boom as well as incorporating would-be Korean emigrants into economc institutions in the United States.

## The Role of Emigration Companies

The United States Immigration Act of 1965 was enacted so dudenly and so unexpectedly that many Koreans, though well qualified for entry into the United States, did not know how to immigrate into the United States. In the absence of a governmental agency prepared for dealing with various legal and economic problems arising from emigration into the United States, a number of Korean emigration and overseas contract companies emerged in the United States by recruiting workers in South Korea. By exaggerating and inflating possible economic rewards in the United States, they had also contributed to the emigration boom in South Korea. By engaging in extra-legal or illegal activities, some companies reaped huge profits and at the same time greatly contributed to the third largest immigration to the United States.

The Korean emigration companies were established and run by early comers, most of whom came to the United States with student visas and received higher education in the United States. Here is a specific example of how

a Korean emigration company was established and operated:

> Mr. Nam came to the United States about 20 years ago in order to study at an American university and earned a masters degree. In the late 1960's when Korean immigration into the United States had just started, he set up a "New World" emigration company in New York City with a branch office in Seoul, staffed by close relatives. His main profit came from commissions he received for filling contracts between American employers and Korean workers in South Korea.
>
> His branch office in Seoul also received commissions for executing domestic emigration procedures on behalf of Korean emigrants. Mr. Nam usually operated out of his main office in New York City and tried to find American employers willing to hire Korean workers. One of his main focuses in recruitment was Korean nurses. In the late 1960's Korean nurses did not know how to find prospective American employers although American medical institutions at that time faced a keen shortage of medical professionals and were eager to import foreign medical professionals. It is said that "he had brought in several hundred Korean nurses" to be employed at small county hospitals in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. He became a notorious figure among Korean nurses imported by him. He was accused of imposing an indenture system on the Korean nurses when he arranged contracts for them.
>
> In order to import as many Korean nurses as possible from South Korea, Mr. Nam sought out the hospitals that faced financial problems and thus were forced to hire cheap foreign-born nurses instead of expensive American ones.
>
> Since Korean nurses worked hard and rarely complained (mainly because of the language problem), hospitals tended to exploit Korean nurses through low wages and overwork. Thus when Korean nurses began to work at M. hospital in New Jersey, for instance, they found that a majority of nurses in the hospital were made up of foreign-born, Asian nurses, especially Filipinoes. Unlike Filipino nurses who occupied major positions on nursing staffs, the Koreans, being latecomers with poor English, had to endure massive humiliation. Only the Korean nurses did not receive sick pay. Korean nurses were told that

they could not transfer to other hospitals and that, if they attempted to do so, they would be penalized for violation of their original contractual obligations. However, as the Korean nurses became accustomed to America, they became aware that such treatment constituted a violation of American law. They knew that many hospitals in New York City were willing to hire them under a temporary licensing system. But the hospital insisted that it could not write references for them. Thus some of the Korean nurses went to American lawyers and some to Korean community leaders in order to bring outside pressure to bear upon the hospital. The hospital was finally forced to release the Korean nurses who wished to work for other hospitals. All the Korean nurses were ultimately able to escape the sweatshop hospital.

Although a majority of the Korean nurses could not have come to the United States without arrangements similar to Mr. Nam's contracts, they began to criticize Mr. Nam for his inhumane immigration business in which he was presumed to sell the Korean nurses to exploitive American employers. Mr. Nam received a $400 commission for each nursing labor contract. He defended himself saying that he had to hire American lawyers to work out the labor contracts. The Korean nurses paid the commission fee in installments out of their paychecks. The nurses assumed that Mr. Nam had a direct deal with hospital personnel.

Mr. Nam's venture had become a community issue when Mr. Nam ran in 1971 for the election of the president of the Korean Association of New York. The opposition publicized his difficulties with the nurses as a means of attacking Mr. Nam.

This is just one of the unpleasant episodes stemming from Korean labor contracts. In an extreme case, a Korean emigration company forged labor contracts. That is to say, the employers in the contracts did not exist in the United States. This brought forth an investigation from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. Frauds in immigration have also taken place in South Korea. Forged

passports and labor certificates, and bogus marriages with Korean-Americans are examples. Fraud in Korean emigration was so rampant that officials at the United States Embassy in South Korea reportedly joked with one another: "Koreans are such geniuses that they could receive the signature of God if we require it."

These kinds of emigration frauds have been stimulated by the changes in United States immigration policy and practice. The sudden change of the United States law in 1965 has gradually caused an emigration boom among some segments of the Korean population. Those are "lucky" who could sense earlier the economic opportunities and other social benefits of the United States and thus were able to enter the United States much earlier than others. Most of them have established some degree of economic success in the United States. They are the mikook gocham (the old-timers in the United States).

As we will see later, the term indicates suburbanites or private houseowners such as medical doctors, nurses, wig merchants, garment importers, ethnic accountants, lawyers and ministers whose economic opportunities were largely made possible by their early arrival. However, as the emigration boom is in full swing in South Korea, that is to say, while every qualified Korean is aware of all plausible rewards generated by "the crossing of the Pacific," their

chances for entry into the United States are becoming more difficult than ever before. This is so partly because of the United States restriction on skilled immigrants, and partly because of an ever-widening margin of emigration applications over the annual United States quota granted for Korean immigration.

This discrepancy between the shrinking emigration chances and the emigration boom has generated the latest kinds of emigration fraud. Through the year 1975, the following headlines were spotted in major Korean newspapers: "Illegal Emigration Brokers Are Rampant As Emigration becomes More Difficult;" "Waves of Emigration Bankruptcies and Malpractices: Many Victims Already Sold Properties and Stopped Children's Education;" "International Marriage Emigration by Using False Birth Certificate;" "A Major Governmental Crackdown on Camouflage Emigrants;" "A Sudden Drop in Emigration Applicants: Reflection of Governmental Crackdown: A Special Measure Needed for Emigrants of Good Intention."

In order to prevent emigration frauds and malpractice, especially in the arrangement of labor contracts with American employers, the South Korean government imposed a licensing system on emigration activities and recognized only two emigration companies.

This governmental decision dealt a serious blow to more than 100 emigration-related agencies both in South Korea and the United States, including emigration and overseas contract agencies, travel agencies and overseas employment agencies.

The governmental action is understandable in the light of the fact that United States immigration policy is decisive for Korean emigration: no matter how those agencies strive and compete with one another to establish labor contracts with American employers, they hardly affect the actual number of Koreans admitted to the United States. In this sense, some companies did not originally intend to commit "emigration bankruptcies," which means that the companies failed to establish labor contracts although they had received an advance on the emigration fee. They had to face emigration bankruptcies because they accepted emigration applications on the assumption that the United States would continuously admit skilled immigrants under labor contracts.

In spite of the intended or unintended malpractice or fraud, emigration companies had helped to facilitate the Korean influx into the United States. Without their liaison role, a high proportion of early comers, those skilled immigrants like medical professionals and blue collar workers, could not have entered the United States. Many

blue collar workers were fired within a month of employment in the new land and many Korean nurses were almost illiterate in English. The following article in a Korean ethnic newspaper expressed this point of view:

> Korean emigration brokers in Washington, D.C. and Baltimore met together July 2 (1975) at the office of the Hankook Shinmoon in response to the Korean government's recent adoption of a licensing system for emigration activities, which was followed by the government's investigation on the illegal practices of emigration companies (in South Korea). They adopted a resolution calling for: (1) the Korean government should initiate an effective emigration policy; (2) the Korean government should provide equal opportunity for receiving licenses to all emigration companies; (3) the Korean government should help establish "good" emigration companies. They also warned that, if their demands would not be met by the Korean government, they would divert their business activities to other countries ... They reminded the Korean government of the fact that they had greatly contributed to what the Korean immigrants had ranked the third-largest immigrant group in the United States during the last three years.[25]

## The Flight of Dollars from South Korea to the United States

As has been noted, the endless confrontation between North and South Korea has partly caused an exodus of South Korean urban elite class members into the United States. The exodus has been accompanied by the inflow of dollars into the United States, the safest place for Koreans to store dollars. For many Korean immigrants, the dollars they have brought with them from South Korea is one of the main

financial sources for capitalizing their small businesses in the United States' inner cities such as New York City, Chicago and Los Angeles. The New York Times reported on this aspect:

> The second and more recent group includes many well-to-do Korean businessmen who do not necessarily oppose the current government but are seeking a refuge for money because of fears that the Park regime might colapse or there might be a Communist takeover of South Korea. The exodus of such money has increased sharply, according to banking sources, since the fall of South Vietnam, which led to fears the United States might not act to block a North Korean invasion of South Korea.
>
> According to banking officials and other people, hundreds of wealthy businessmen have smuggled in large amounts of cash out of South Korea during the last two years and invested in California real estate and small businesses, particularly liquor stores, bars, and small grocery stores.
>
> It is not uncommon for real estate agents in some affluent communities here to tell stories of Korean wives who arrived here to buy homes costing more than $100,000 and paid for them in cash, sometimes out of paper bags.
>
> A Korean-language newspaper reported that a former colonel in the South Korean Marine Corps, Kim Hae Young, who is said to have close ties to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and who has organized a pro-government organization called the Korean-American Marine Association, had purchased a liquor store for $100,000 in $100 bills. He denied any improprieties...
>
> Many Korean business executives and, in some cases, government officials have sent their wives and children here while they continue to work in South Korea. These executives regularly send large amounts of money to this country that are then invested in business or homes or other real estate, with the expectation that the head of the family will join in the others here later, according to the sources ...[26]

From the South Korean government's point of view, it hurts the national interest to let wealthy Koreans escape

freely to the United States with a large amount of dollars. Such an exodus was viewed as harmful because capital, largely amassed by commercial loans from advanced nations, especially from the United States, flows back into the United States and because such "escape" emigration was thought to demoralize national solidarity in confrontation with North Korea. Thus a South Korean emigration policy was formulated in order to curb the exodus of the Korean urban elite and their dollars into the United States.

The communists' victory over South Vietnam had caused in 1975 a renewed exodus of rich Koreans into the United States. In response, the South Korean government passed in 1975 a special emigration law exclusively dealing with "eligibility of overseas emigration." The following persons were excluded from emigration: (1) the persons who own properties valued more than $100,000; (2) military officers and retired generals; (3) high-ranking governmental officials, incumbent or retired, including national assemblymen, judges and presidents of national corporations, etc. In addition, an administrative censure was imposed on various Korean celebrities who were suspected of being "camouflage emigrants," who had already acquired some means of emigration such as large sums of dollars, wives and children already in the United States and the possession of "multiple" passports issued by the South Korean Foreign Ministry.

In spite of a strict South Korean foreign currency law designed to curb the illegal outflow of dollars, it is normal for Koreans to bring more dollars then legally permitted when entering the United States. A recent arrival said: "Anybody can bring in dollars if he has something to sell in Korea. If one makes up one's mind, there are many ways to bring in dollars." The amounts of dollars for Korean immigrants to carry from their home country vary from person to person, reflecting a continuation of old economic status in their new land. But many Korean immigrant families were not well-to-do, so that they had to buy airplane tickets on credit. They brought with them much less than the legal limit of $1,000 allowed for each member of an emigrant family.

Some of the immigrant families have been able to smuggle in fortunes of several hundred thousand dollars. These are usually produced by selling their Korean real estate. With the dollars they usually start small businesses in the United States' inner cities. Upper business class families have brought in "several million" dollars for the investment in the United States real estate market.

There are several major mechanisms by which dollars are smuggled from South Korea. The first mechanism is a primitive one in which prospective emigrants buy dollars from dollar merchants in black markets and come out of the

Kimpo International Airport hiding dollars somewhere in their packages or bodies. The dollars in the form of $100 bills can be placed inside childrens' stockings or shoes, books, scrolls and Korean hot sauce, "Kochoojan" pots. This method of "dollar exodus" has been successful with a few chances of being uncovered by custom officials at the Kimpo International Airport:

> "Dollar Alley" is located at the westside section of the Myondong downtown in Seoul, whose economic and cultural role is a combination of New York's Greenwich Village and Fifth Avenue. It has been called "Dollar Alley" since the end of the Korean War because women "dollar merchants" squat at the corners of buildings and trade dollars.
>
> It is also a hustling and bustling marketplace for blackmarketing foreign goods. Those Seoul citizens who have just returned from overseas trips with dollars but have not reported their possession of dollars to custom officials, come to "Dollar Alley" in order to change their dollars into Korean currency at a rate higher than the official exchange. In addition, foreign tourists as well as those Koreans who have acquired some dollars by catering to American soldiers, come here for the same purpose.
>
> The alley is also the place where prospective emigrants can exchange Korean currency with dollars from women "dollar merchants," who have to risk frequent incidents of murder, during which robbers pretend to be customers, and induce women "dollar merchants" to go to nearby hotel rooms and kill them. These incidents have frequently occupied big headlines in major Seoul newspapers. One undercover police agent from Namdaemoon police station hangs around in order to detect only big transactions.
>
> By taking regular payoffs from women "dollar merchants," the authority concerned may arrest her for only small transactions. However, it is an informal obligation for "dollar merchants" to

> report to the undercover police agent when they engage in a transaction of more than 5,000 dollars. If prospective emigrants are involved in big transactions, the information could lead to their arrest. Thus it is a wise tactic for prospective emigrants to change dollars through a number of small transactions.

This is a typical crude method of "dollar exodus," the failure of which to some extent results from "bad fortune." However, some Korean emigrants have asked such Americans as missionaries, businessmen and soldiers to carry their dollars for them to the United States in return for commissions or gifts when the latter returns to the United States. Some emigrants have asked American businessmen or those Koreans who open personal checking accounts at American banks, to draw on them in return for Korean currency: "Personal checks are the easiest things to be smuggled out."

The second method of "dollar flight" evolves from the situation in which a bulk of Korean immigrants in the United States send remittances to their families in South Korea. Prospective Korean emigrants pay Korean currency to Korean immigrants' families in South Korea in return for a pledge that they will be paid back in dollars by someone in America when they enter the United States.

If a prospective emigrant cannot trust his or her "partner" in the United States, the transaction could be made almost simultaneously by using the international

telephone system. That is to say, the prospective emigrant could ask the "partner" in the United States to deliver the corresponding amount of dollars to the third person in the United States -- usually his or her relatives or friends. Immediately after confirming in code the delivery through the international telephone, the prospective emigrant delivers the Korean currency to the family of the partner. For Korean immigrants and their families in the homeland, this kind of transaction produces much more Korean currency than an official exchange rate allows. Since dollars do not physicially come out of South Korea, this method does not evoke the agony of "being a national traitor."

The third method of "dollar exodus" is based upon international trade between South Korea and the United States. Compared with the two aforementioned methods, the volume of the transaction in this method is big and involves millions of dollars. It uses two mechanisms: the first derives from the over-valuing of imported raw materials; the second, from the under-valuing of exporting goods. The first mechanism requires that, when Korean manufacturers import raw materials from foreign countries, especially from the United States, and thus convert Korean currency into dollars at the Bank of Korea which regulates national inflows and outflows of dollars, manufacturers falsify docu-

ments and inflate the prices of imported raw materials. They allocate excess over actual costs to their branches in the United States, to brokers, or to American exporting firms under the direction that the balance should be deposited into American banks or delivered to friendly Koreans in the United States.

An opposite technique can be applied when Korean manufacturers export their products to the United States market: They under-value their exported items. That is to say, they report lower prices to the Bank of Korea than they actually receive from American importers and divert the balance into the United States. In addition to these two typical ways, a majority of Korean exporting or importing companies report to the Bank of Korea overestimated expenses in the operation of overseas branches, many Korean companies such as construction and transportation companies operating in foreign countries do not send back to South Korea some of the dollars they earn there. In view of South Korea's centralized governmental control over the input and output of dollars, the diversion of dollars by by South Korean businesss firms is a normal phenomenon. An immigrant who works for a South Korean business branch in New York City said: "All companies divert dollars into foreign countries. Without doing it they cannot run their

businesses." This kind of dollar diversion on the part of South Korean upper business classes is inherently linked with South Korean governmental corruption. A Korean economics student in New York City who once worked for the Bank of Korea said: "Without some protection of some in a higher level, they cannot divert such big amounts of dollars into the United States. Governmental investigations have been focused upon small fish rather than big ones."

As we will discuss in the next chapter, the exodus of dollars into the United States is clearly connected with a peculiar structure of the South Korean economy, which is heavily based upon commercial loans from advanced nations. It is also derived from economic and ideological fragility of new industrial business classes of South Korea whose emergence is largely made possible by the Korean government-guaranteed commercial loans from advanced nations. Some of the owners of "the foreign-country business-loan" business firms have sent their wives and children to the United States, but they have to stay in South Korea in order to take care of their business firms, many of which are on the brink of bankruptcy:

> "There is an amazing amount of money coming in," said a Korean-speaking attorney here (in Los Angeles) whose clients include some of these newcomers. "I know of one man who owns a big business in Korea. His son has bought a

$150,000 home here, has a $400,000 business, and is now buying a $250,000 business; he is less than 30 years old."[27]

## Conclusion

The South Korean population has rapidly increased largely under the impact of Western preventive medical technology. The widening gap between mortality and fertility rates due to the introduction of Western preventive medical technology is a general cause of population increase in developing countries. But this does not sufficiently explain the rapid growth of South Korean population. South Korean population dynamics also involves political as well as cultural factors. Mainly because of the government's view that a large population size was a national asset in the military and economic confrontation with North Korea, the South Korean government after the Korean War had adopted a pro-natalist population policy which remained in effect until 1962 when the military government formulated a pouplation control policy as part of the First Five Year Economic Development Plan. But the population control policy was adopted too late to prevent the post-Korean War "baby boom," which is responsible for a vast number of child-bearing-aged women in the 1970's.

Compared with other developing countries, South Korea has shown modest rates of population growth since 1965. However, this modest growth of population has provoked a sense of panic among the politically conscious South Koreans because South Korea is small, has few natural resources and a shortage of domestic agricultural production, and because South Korean population density is the second highest in the world.

South Korean emigration policy was formulated in order to mitigate an increasing population pressure. It came as an extension of domestic population control policy. Unlike in the 19th century when European nations had exported vast numbers of their surplus populations, largely caused by a similar development of preventive medical technology, a world-wide demand for immigrants does not exist in the 20th century. Only a few nations have been willing to accept South Korean emigrants. The United States Immigration Act of 1965 has allowed the entry of some 300,000 South Koreans on the basis of skills and kinship. A few Latin-American nations accepted South Koreans who had experience in agriculture and who were willing to reclaim their virgin lands. But, since Korean immigrants to Latin America were well-educated urbanites consisting primarily of marginal North Korean refugees, they settled predominantly in urban commercial centers rather than in the agricultural colonies

designated by the receiving nations. A large proportion of these Koreans in large Latin-American cities have remigrated to the United States. Similarly, many Korean contract workers in West Germany and South Vietnam have remigrated to the United States. Thus, the population of an emerging Korean community in the United States is based upon different entry points.

South Korean emigration into the United States has especially taken place within a framework of selective interaction in labor between the two countries: labor shortages in specific occupations of the United States allows the migration of specific kinds of South Koreans, who, in turn, respond selectively to these specific manpower situations of the United States. In response to specific labor situations of the new land, a bulk of South Korean prospective emigrants, regardless of whether they are skilled or "kinship-centered," have prepared themselves by acquiring special skills or the appearance of skills that could be utilized upon their arrival in the United States. In this process, South Korean emigration companies have brokered the selective interaction in labor between the two countries. They have been facilitators of Korean emigration to the United States.

In addition to skills, many Korean immigrants have brought with them dollars. We have specifically noted that

the large volume of the "dollar exodus" is based upon the international trade between South Korea and the United States. As we shall see in the next chapter, this "flight" of dollars involves a peculiar structure of the South Korean political economy. This inflow of dollars has been one of the main financial sources for capitalizing businsses in the inner cities of the new land and has thus become one of the economic bases for an emerging Korean community in the United States. In coping with this problem of the "dollar exodus" from South Korea, the South Korean government had in 1975 revised the emigration laws, making certain kinds of persons ineligible for emigration. These are people with skills, resources and dollars valued in the homeland.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The Hankook Ilbo, January 23, 1977.

[2]The basic statistics on the recent components of South Koreanpopulation come from the following sources: A Temporary Report on the 1975 Census, the Korean Economic Planning Board, Seoul, 1976; The Population Problem of Korea, a report on the seminar, which was held on March, 1976 in Seoul under the auspices of the Korean Development Institute.

[3]Kwon, Tai-hwan, op. cit., p. 46

[4]Ibid., p. 18.

[5]Koreans strongly prefer boys to girls. A kind of special stigma has been given on those families which "are rich with daughters." Thus there has been a strong tendency for those women "cursed with no son" to continuously produce babies until the latter happens to be a boy. The sex discrimination against females is derived from Korea's long tradition of patriarchal family structure based upon an ideological support of Confucianism. For instance, during the Yi Dynasty Korean women lost their names when they were married; only their family names were recorded in the "jockbo" or family pedigree. This traditional sex discrimination against women is embedded in the South Korean family laws in which sons are given priority over their sisters and even mothers in the inheritance of property as well as in the succession of the family as a head.

[6]The Hankook Ilbo, January 27, 1977.

[7]The illiteracy rate of South Korea was 6.8 percent in 1975. The CBS News Almanac 1977 (New Jersey: Hammond Almanac, Inc.

[8]For instance, "If the government continues to back the program as it is doing now, there is a chance that Korea will be the first country in the world to reduce its birth rate rapidly before major industrialization." Keeny, S.M., "Korea and Taiwan: The Score for 1965, Studies in Family Planning (Number 19, May, 1967), p. 4.

[9]Newsweek (Far East Edition: May 17, 1976), p. 11.

[10]The Population Problem of Korea, op. cit.

[11]For instance, South Korea imported in 1973 from foreign countries basic raw materials whose total vlue consituted

42 percent ofthe national gross product. Ibid.

[12]The seriousness of the Korean population problem is well reflected in the following slogans adopted by the Korean Wives Wives' Club: "The 1974 is the Year of Not-to-Become-Pregnant", "Love Your Country by Engaging in Contraception."

[13]Yimin Backgwa (The Emigration Encyclopedia) (Seoul, Korea: Bak Moon Sa, 1964), p. 361.

[14]Haeoe Cheeop Backso (White Paper on Overseas Contract) (The Korean Manpower Administration, 1966), p. 11.

[15]Of the total sum, $286.4 million had been sent from Korean immigrants and contract workers in North American nations. The Dong-A Almanac (Seoul, Korea: The Dong-A Ilbo Company, 1975. p.423.

[16]The Hankook Shinmoon, October 23, 1976.

[17]The Dong-A Almanac, Op. cit., p. 423.

[18]The Hankook Ilbo, May 5, 1977.

[19]The Dong-A Ilbo, July 31, 1974.

[20] "Nammi Eui Hankookin" (The Koreans in Latin America), The Dong-A Ilbo, July 30-August 5, 1974.

[21]The Hankook Ilbo, October 23, 1975.

[22]The Hankook Ilbo, October 24, 1975.

[23]The New York Times, June 19, 1978.

[24]Kim, Yong-tae, Komerican Eui Nat Gwa Bam (Day and Night of Komericans) (Seoul, Korea: Han Jin Sa, 1976), p. 90.

[25]The Hankook Shinmoon, July 15, 1975.

[26]The New York Times, October 30, 1975.

[27]Ibid.

## CHAPTER III

## MECHANISMS OF SOUTH KOREAN URBANIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS THEY AFFECT EMIGRATION

As has been noted, the population explosion is the general, objective causal factor for pushing South Koreans into the United States. However, it does not sufficiently explain why a large portion of South Korean urbanites feel a relative economic deprivation and look forward to economic opportunities that presumably exist in the United States. The rapid process of urbanization which South Korea has experienced since 1960, has generated a socio-economic malaise in a few urban centers and has indirectly or directly stimulated the recent Korean exodus into the United States. The analysis of basic mechanisms of South Korean urbanization and industrialization will help us to explain the extent to which urbanization pushes South Koreans into the United States, and the extent to which urbanization in the homeland helps them survive in contemporary American society. The analysis will also explain why South Korea could send its industrialized labor force to the United States and to other nations in a larger number than do other developing countries.

The presentation of the basic elements of recent South Korean urbanization and industrialization provides an additional meaning to our study. It would show how recent Korean immigrants differ substantially from the older European and Asian immigrants who arrived prior to the enactment of the National Origins Act of 1924. Before that time the bulk of immigrants were heavily drawn from the pre-industrial and rural areas when there was a much lower development of international trade, mass communication, transportation and economic interdependence in world-wide scale.

In classical studies on immigrants (Thomas and Zanniecki, 1918-20; Handlin, 1951), the older immigrants were viewed as uprooted as they shifted from gemeinschaft -- folk and rural life in their homeland to gesellschaft -- urban society in the new land. But, as we will see, present Korean immigrants to the United States were already uprooted in their homeland since they had undergone violent social changes arising from the rapid economic development and urbanization of South Korea. Furthermore as we shall see, the way in which South Korea has developed its economy through international trade with advanced nations, notably the United States, has substantially contributed to the economic life of Korean immigrants in the United States.

## The Over-Urbanization of South Korea

South Korea underwent an unprecedented rate of urbanization after World War II. This has produced vast social change throughout the entire country. During the period of 1960-1975 the proportion of population in urban areas of 50,000 and larger increased from 28 percent of the total population to 51.7 percent largely due to a massive influx of rural people into urban centers.[1] Perhaps no nation throughout world history has experienced such a rapid process of urbanization in such a short span of time. More than 20 percent of nation's population is concentrated in Seoul, the capital city, whose population increased from 1.6 million in 1955 to 7.4 million in 1977.[2] That city is nicknamed the "Republic of Seoul" to indicate the power of the capital city from which most Korean immigrants to the United States are drawn. The three largest cities including Seoul embrace one-third of the nation's total population. South Korea is an illustration of over-urbanization in developing countries, which focuses on the rural-to-urban migration that does not correspond to economic development or industrialization of urban centers. For South Korea, over-urbanization means an urban crisis:

> Lee Yong Nam, an errand girl for a Seoul publishing company, still has not shed her soft southern accent, " I came to Seoul," she said, " for a job." Miss Lee comes from a small farming town called Chongup, in Cholla Province. She is one of 400,000 rural migrants who are crowding into this already overblown city each year. Seoul is reeling under the impact of its 7.5 million inhabitants.
>
> That is 20 percent of South Korea's population of 3.5 million, and Miss Lee's case is a dramatic challenge to the government of President Park Chung Hee. At the begining of the year, Mr. Park expressed the urgency of the problem by saying that the only solution would be to relocate the capital elsewhere.
>
> With so many people fighting for jobs and space, life in this 585-year-old city has become insufferable. Taxis are hard to obtain and are usually shared by four or five persons, each heading for a different direction.
>
> People living in hillside shacks are suffering. With the summer coming, they are complaining about a water shortage. On top of pollution and congestion has been added a new shortage: electricity. . .[3]

The South Korean urban crisis has mainly been caused by a long history of South Korean agrarian crisis, which has pushed millions of Korean peasants into cities, especially Seoul.[4] Since national independence from the Japanese rule in 1945, the South Korean urban economy has been maintained and developed at the expense of the rural economy, especially the peasants.[5]

The South Korean land reform of 1950 was not -- as it had been intended -- the solution to the Korean agrarian crisis. The crisis had been caused by such factors as rapid population increase, exposure of the self-sufficient rural

economy to the urban money economy, lack of modern agricultural technologies and the concentration of land into a landlord class.[6] The land reform redistributed about one-third of all farmland by limiting the landholding size to 7.5 acres; but it helped wipe out economic exploitation of peasants by the landlord class. By limiting landholding size, the land reform also wiped out the very condition by which Western-type agrobusiness might arise. Furthermore, rice production resists mechanization by requiring stoop labor. Due to the lack of an effective urbanization or industrialization policy in urban sectors, the containment or the rural population in labor-intensive rice production is socially desirable. However, for the reasons that will soon be represented, millions of South Korean peasants have migrated since the 1950's, to urban areas which cannot provide them with adequate jobs and housing. Inspite of a massive exodus of the rural population into cities, the average farmholding decreased from 3 acres in the 1920's to 2.2 in the 1970's. About two-thirds of the South Korean farms in the 1970's are smaller than 2.2 acres.[7] An increasing population pressure on farmland has been matched with the South Korean governmental policy of keeping rice prices low in order to produce a massive migration of rural residents into cities.

Since Korean independence from Japan, the South Korean government has controlled the price of rice and other grains and thus protected urban consumers and manufacturers. For instance, during the 1950's when South Korea was troubled with the high inflation of a wartime economy, Korean farmers suffered from an acute "lag" phenomenon in which the increase of farm price did not catch up with that of other industrial products such as fertilizer (about 45 percent of their production costs in 1965). Under the governmental policy of low rice prices. Korean farmers have borne the major burden of inflation that has been generated by other sectors of the urban economy.[8] Governmental control of inflation by cutting down rice prices has been exercized by imposing an invisible tax on farmers who were already burdened with other forms of heavy taxes. In addition, South Korean farmers have been vulnerable to the penetration of the urban money economy because of both the higher cost of urban consumption goods and the commercial practices of urban "rice middlemen" who have become intermediaries in the marketing process. Only the government could have prevented rice middlemen from monopolizing rice and other grain commodities by taking over the monopolies in rice sales in the 1960's.

The governmental farm policy of low grain prices would have been impossible without the imports and grants of grains from the United States since the end of World War II. The massive grants and exports of surplus farm products from the United States have provided a basic means by which the South Korean government was able to keep rice prices so low that Korean farmers have lost their economic interest in their land and have left the land and migrated to cities.

The inflow of surplus grains from the United States reached its peak during the 1950's and early 1960's when the United States government took over, at enormous cost to its taxpayers, and stored millions of bushels of wheat and corn under its price support program. It exported millions of tons at a loss. South Korea has imported U.S. surplus grains since 1946. In 1956 an official agreement was made between the two countries on the South Korean importation of surplus grains from the United States sold to the South Korean government its agricultural products on concessional terms.[9]

As far as South Korean urbanization is concerned, the governmental policy of low rice prices, which has been aided by the massive imports of surplus grains from the United States, has had two domestic consequences in South Korea. One is, as we have discussed before, a massive internal migration of the rural population into a few primary cities like Seoul.[10] The other is that since 1965, the policy has been geared to an export-oriented South Korean economy. The

policy has resulted in producing a huge, cheap labor force in urban centers by curbing the wage increases of the urban proletariat, white-collar workers and other salaried men, for whom rice prices were kept artificially low.

As we will see later, the existence of a cheap labor force in urban centers has served as a main asset for building up the South Korean export-oriented economy because South Korean economic development has mainly relied on the export of such labor-intensive consumer goods as garments, toys, wigs, handbags, jewelry, gifts, shoes, etc. The economic profits out of the production of these kinds of consumer goods presuppose cheap labor in labor-intensive industries in order to compete with the high labor costs of the capital-intensive manufacturers of advanced nations.

An unique welding of the two factors -- fundamental governmental support of low grain prices and the development of export-oriented economy -- however, provides only a partial explanation to South Korean urbanization. The South Korean rural population has not been immune to the revolution of rising expectations, which has been generated by expansion of universal education, mass media and economic opportunities in urban areas. In addition, the South Korean revolution of rising expectations has evolved from historical tradition. Korean primary cities, especially Seoul, were dominant, powerful and attractive to the entire population even in

traditional Korean society because the primary cities were the places where ruling bureaucrats of the central government lived and directed political, economical and cultural activities of the entire nation. Traditional Korean society had been, unlike most traditional societies, characterized by the absence of regional power and prestige elites. The only path to success was to go to Hanyang (an old name for Seoul), pass a civil service examination, and become a bureaucrat. The power of Seoul city, originally sustained by its centralized governmental or administrative bureaucracy, still continues today. At the administrative level, for instance, in 1965 the military government passed the Provisional Act for Local Self-government, by which the military junta abolished local autonomy and provided for central government appointment of all public officials. This policy shift has partly contributed to the regional disparities in South Korea between Seoul and the rest of the country. Under the authoritarian rule of President Park, national budgets and investments have been drastically tilted even more in favor of Seoul. Consequently, Seoul embraces more than 20 percent of the national population while its land size constitutes only .63 percent of the land. Seoul in 1975 had 87 percent of the national white collar and managerial workers, 63.6 percent of savings, 57.9 percent of the private cars, 44 percent of national telephones

49 percent of national hospital beds, and 60 percent of the nation's college students.[11] Seoul's magnetic attraction, which is political, bureaucratic, educational and economic, has also bred the typical urban vices of developing countries. In 1975, 40 percent of the urban unemployed roamed in Seoul. Foreigners such as United States military personnel and business nomads avoid drinking Seoul's water because by their standards it is polluted. Thus, private water supply businesses are booming.

An American correspondent reported an ecological consequence of the vast exodus of rural people into Seoul, accompanied by South Korean industrialization:

> No one seems to know exactly what the name of this city (Seoul) means. But it is synonymous in Asia with dirt, fumes and pollution. Just 100 years ago Seoul was a village of thatched roofs and farmers. By 1900 only a quarter-million lived there. Occasionally a shepherd can be seen taking his goats across a marble downtown plaza, a reminder of those simpler times.
>
> But today the stark granite mountainsides over Seoul are often obscured by the smoke of industry. Dirt and chemicals settle heavily on virtually every surface outdoors. Eyes water freely. Headaches are common. The streets are filled with thick fume clouds. Even the taxis cough.
>
> The conditions are a measure of the economic development which has washed the Republic of Korea. Exports are climbing to $10 billion a year; per capita income jumped almost 50 percent in recent years to $698 annually.[12]

## The Educational Migration

In a cultural tradition in which education has been the national means for economic success, education for their children has been one of the prime factors that induces rural people to migrate to South Korean primary cities, especially, Seoul. The desire to educate one's children was responsible for the urbanward migration of 51 percent of the total immigrants into Seoul during the early 1970's. Just as in the Yi Dynasty (1309-1910), rural youth, if they were bright and had the family background of the Yangban ( a ruling literati class of the Dynasty), walked along the dusty country roads toward Hanyang in order to take civil service examinations or to receive education, so today the bulk of the rural youth has taken the "Seoul-bound night train" in order to study in Seoul. Since the end of the Korean War, a high proportion of South Korean farmers' income and capital has flowed to cities in the form of educational expenses. An American Catholic missionary in South Korea described this aspect:

> With so much bloody horror in the world around us, how can I tell the simple tragedy of a 13-year old Korean girl?
>
> Veronica Park does not seem to be suffering. She is, in fact, perfectly healthy. . .
>
> The tragedy lies in the fact that she can't go to school -- her father earns no more than $27 per month, and middle school fees in the Korean countryside amount to about $14 per month. And besides, Veronica has three younger brothers. That's important -- because here boys come first.

> Veronica's is an all-too-common plight for children here. When I discussed it with her father, he was on the verge of tears because of his inability to pay her way to middle school for the coming year.
>
> In poor countries like Korea, education is a supreme must if one is ever going to escape living a life-time in a straw-roofed mud hovel infested by rats. No one realizes this more than the Korean parent. A family may mortage a home, a farm, or a cow, or one of the older girls may even go into prostitution to raise the money to enroll a brother in a good school.[13]

South Korean farmers' desire for the education of their children at the expense of their lands and cows has partly been caused by the dismal economic prospects of rural areas, In the absence of the prospect of economic opportunities in rural areas, farmers prefer to invest their capital or income into the education of their children. Their investment is surely paid off because of the Korean family-centered success ethic in which a successful family member is obliged to take care of other family members. Having worked their way through the competitive and expense education system, urban youth of rural origin believe it is their duty to send for their rural family members. Korean farmers' involvement in the education of their children has siphoned off rural capital while greatly contributing to the creation of a new middle class of managerial white collar workers in urban centers. As has been noted in the first chapter, this new middle class which had experienced one or two generations of

urbanization, constitutes the majority of Korean immigrants to the United States.

As we shall see in the analysis of the character structure of Koreans (Chapter XI), the national ideology of education is derived from the social structure of traditional Korean society: in the national culture of Confucianism, a kind of social stigma was imposed upon the uneducated. In contemporary South Korean society, diplomas from urban schools have become a license for upward economic mobility. But the new middle class of wage earners has most suffered from skyrocketing educational costs: the tuition fees of South Korean public universities increased by 710 percent during the period of 1968 to 1978 while those of public high schools jumped by 920 percent.[14] Thus, given the economic and social malaise in the over-urbanization of South Korea, "education for children" has constituted one of the prime factors of Korean emigration into the United States. According to a recent sample survey, 44 percent of a total of 2,715 Korean respondents in California cited "education for children" as their primary reason for migration to the United States.[15] In a similar context, during the period of 1953 to 1973, a total of 10,789 Korean students migrated to American educational institutions, most of whom, as we have noted, decided to settle in the United States mainly because of the lack of economic opportunities in South Korean urban

centers.

## The Migration from "Rice Paddies to Factories"

Even though the land reform of 1950 substantially standardized South Korean farmers by limiting landholding size to 7.5 acres, South Korean rural lands have, since the early 1960's, begun to be concentrated among rich farmers and absentee landlords residing in urban areas. According to the 1970 Korean Census, the number of farm households owning 7.5 acres or over increased by 90.3 percent during the decade of the 1960's and constituted about 1.5 percent of total farm households in 1970. During the same period, the number of households of tenant farmers increased by 31.8 percent, consisting of 33.5 percent of the total farm households.

Although no systematic study has been made on the basic causes of this drastic change of landownership, one of the main reasons is that the urban business classes ranging from big manufacturers to small businessmen have invested heavily in rural lands, displacing a large number of farmers. Land speculation by urban land-hunters has boomed in the rural areas adjacent to big cities like Seoul. The land speculation could have been alleviated by the governmental designation of a green belt zone over the rural areas

surrounding big cities, where construction is prohibited.

South Korean farmers are conventionally divided into three groups -- the boo nong (rich farmers), the "joong nong" (middle farmers), and the bin nong (poor farmers), on the basis of the acreage they own for cultivation. Generally speaking, both the rich and middle income farmers could produce surplus agricultural products for sale in the market after setting aside portions of their own consumption. However, poor farmers are not self-sufficient even in producing their own food supply.

Poof farmer families eke out their livelihood by employing some of their family members at menial jobs in cities or towns, and by becoming sharecroppers. Since they have to buy grain for their own consumption, they oppose the raising of grain prices by the government. The youth of poor farmer families have responded by migration from rice paddies to factories and have serve as the huge and cheap labor force effectively exploited for the export-oriented urban economy. Since males are needed in labor-intensive rice production, females aged between 15 to 24 have constituted the bulk of this form of urbanward migration.[16] They have largely been employed in such labor-intensive industries as the garment, wig, toy and electronics manufacturing industries. They are called the "yogong." Others have become

prostitutes, domestic servants and bar girls.[17]

To sum up, this massive rural-to-urban migration, which has mainly been caused by the governmental policy of lower grain prices and an increasing population pressure on lands as well as by the various "pull" forces of a few primary cities, has produced a large, cheap, but industrious labor force in urban centers effectively geared to the development of the export-oriented economy. At the same time, the development of the export-oriented economy has intensified the influx of rural people into a few primary cities by becoming a fundamental "pull" factor in the South Korean rural-to-urban migration. In 1975 the average income in Seoul was 52 percent higher than the national average income.[18] However, South Korean cities are overurbanized because the urban economy cannot sufficiently provide productive jobs to new in-migrants, many of whom engage in non-productive, irregular service jobs. For instance, in 1977 se-vice workers working for food- and alcohol-related businesses such as bars, restaurants, and coffee and tea rooms numbered 700,000, accounting for 10.3 percent of the total work force of South Korea.[19] About 70 percent of these 700,000 were young females.

This kind of concentration of cheap but industrious workers in a few primary cities has produced a chronic problem of unemployment and underemployment, providing a major reason for ordinary South Koreans to migrate to foreign countries, especially to the United States, Latin American nations, Canada and West Germany if they are given the chance. For example, a Korean correspondent from South Korea interviewed Mr. Heeduck Lee in California who has become a millionaire out of the Korean food and restaurant business:

> "Why did you go to West Germany?"
> "I was born in Gongju. I could not find a job after obtaining my B.S. in chemical engineering at Choong Nam University. I was forced to come down to my rural village where my parents and brothers lived. Nobody could understand my miserable status of living an unemployed life as a college graduate. In 1965 I applied for an overseas labor contract and mined for three years in West Germany. I remitted all the money I earned there to my family in the homeland."
> "Why did you enter the United States (from West Germany)?"
> "I was afraid that I would become unemployed again if I returned to the home country. I wandered through some European nations for a while but I could not find a proper place to settle in. Upon arriving in the United States, I found a lot of jobs waiting for me."[20]

## President Park's Economic Policy

The development of the South Korean export-orieted needs more systematic analysis because it has become a dominant factor in the rapid change of contemporary Korean society.

The change has generally caused Korean emigration into the United States. Furthermore, as we shall see later, the export economy has provided the major mechanism by which Korean immigrants in the United States establish an economic entry point.

By taking advantage of the political upheavals and social chaos caused by the overthrow by the "April 19 student revolutions" of Syngman regime, Major General Park, backed by young, ambitious colonels, led the "May 16 Military Revolution" in 1961. Through the military revolution Major General Park toppled the Chang civilian government and seized power. Since then, Park's power has been ubiquitous and absolute. His presidential tenure was unlimited and secure under the so-called "1972 Yushin Honpop" (Constitution for Revitalizing Reforms) by which he revised the South Korean Constitution in favor of his life-long dictatorship. His leadership is so powerful that he can constitutionally appoint the national assemblymen. Since the military coup in 1961, South Korean society has been transformed to embody Park's image of society.

The legitimation of Park's dictatorship was described by one of his followers: "It is obvious that President Park regards excessive enthusiasm in politics as one of the greatest obstacles to economic development in underdeveloped

countries."[21] Park once said that his aim was to transform Korea's "political democracy" into an "administrative democracy." South Korean supporters for Park's "strong leadership" have argued that Park's monopolization of power is necessary because it pacifies volatile and sometimes violent elements of South Korean politics in order to create social stability and discipline for economic development: "A bulk of the gross national product was wasted in free elections to buy votes." Park's supporters believe that only President Park can save South Korea from the vicious cycle of military coups which characterize the politics of most new nations. This ruling ideology of putting economic prosperity ahead of political freedom has been accepted by many South Koreans, especially by those segments of the population who have "made it" by getting aboard "the 1970's express train" of rapid economic development. Moreover, largely under the impact of the Western consumption culture, South Koreans suffer from relative deprivation: it is painful for them to listen to radio while the people of rich nations watch color television. By promising a greater supply of consumption goods, Park has mustered substantial political support for his regime.

Historically, the initial process of industrialization required brutal repression, political as well as economic, to foster a primary accumulation of capital. In order to achieve political stability and economic discipline, Park established a pervasive, ruthless system of repression -- the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

The Agency is widely feared among South Koreans. Its function is to gather intelligence, survey economic and political activities, manipulate public opinions and ideologies, engage in subversive activities against the opponents of Park and control Korean communities in foreign countries.

The most important impact of Park's rule on South Korean society is the deep penetration of military institutions into civilian life and institutions. This is the inevitable consequence of the United States government's massive support since the Korean War, for the buildup of South Korean armed forces. The military has grown much master than other forms of civilian institutions. The South Korean armed forces became the first coherent group to learn American technology, administrative skills and management, and organizational discipline. In the basence of other coherent, dedicated social groups or parties in South Korean politics, it is no wonder that military leaders claimed power under the name of efficiency. Park demands that

followers act like soldiers by emphasizing efficiency and discipline. At the same time he introduced centralized military organization into civilian government. Park might be called a cool-minded pragmatist. His political ideology is non-ideological in the sense that he has accepted ideologies from socialism, fascism, nationalism and capitalism. If they are useful to his consolidation of power, he uses them. This, he thinks, is essential to national economic development.

The South Korean government has, since the military coup in 1961, put national economic development at the top of national priorities and has led to a controlled, managed national economy. "Command industralization" in the form of state capitalism has characterized South Korean economic development. As in other developing countries, the South Korean ideology of modernization or industrialization derives from an invidious comparison with advanced, industrial nations. In addition, the endless confrontation between North and South Korea has forced South Korea to perceive of a strong economy as an indispensable means of coping with North Korea. Needless to say, the historical tug-of-war between North and South Korea strongly motivated South Koreans to attempt to be the first among the latercomers of industrialization.

The development of an export-oriented economy is largely responsible for the well-publicized economic miracle of South Korea. Since 1961, the entire South Korean economic structure has been reshuffled toward the basic framework of an export-oreinted economy. The first two Five Year Economic Development Plans, concluded in 1971, built up the industrial base for an export-oriented economy. Exports rose spectacularly from $41 million in 1961 to $10 billion in 1977. In 1974 the contribution of foreign trade to the South Korean gross national product amounted to about 70 percent.[22] The bulk of South Korea's economic activities are directly or indirectly connected with exports. In 1970 about 0.6 million or 8.8 percent of the total labor force engaged in the export industry. By the end of 1976 the number increased up to 2.8 million, consittuting 23.5 percent of the total labor force.[23] By 1976 exports for South Korean products were expanded to more than 130 nations; the United States and Japan have been the major markets for South Korean goods. In 1976, 30.9 percent of the total South Korean exports went to the United States while Japan imported 21.0 percent of the total.[24]

The United States and Japan have been not only the major markets for South Korean products but also the major suppliers of capital and technology to South Korean export industries. As we shall see, the basic economic structure

of South Korea has been dependent upon the market and financial situation of the two nations.

At the initial stage of South Korean economic development, South Korean exports were largely confined to labor-intensive consumer goods such as clothing, textiles, footwear, wigs, electronics, toys and jewelry. However, since 1975 South Korean exports have become diversified with the addition of heavy manufactures -- metal products, machinery, chemical products and industrial equipment. The basic mechanism of the South Korean export-oriented economy is the importation and use of raw materials, intermediate goods and heavy capital goods in the production of finished products for overseas markets. In doing this, the abundant, well-educated, industrious, and highly motivated labor force is effectively employed and exploited. The following examples will suffice to show the essential character of the South Korean export-oriented economy:

> "Veteran executive M. Tezuka (in Japan) is trying to reconstruct a spinning company which went bankrupt two years ago owing close to $200 million: "A Japanese girl gets $10 a day for 270 days a year. A Korean girl gets $2.50 and works 365 days. We just can't compete with that," he explained. While the company's Japanese factory is narrowly breaking even, a joint venture in South Korea is reaping handsome profits.[25]
>
> The Hyundai Motor Co. (in South Korea) is likely to select the Middle East as the first target for the two to three thousand ponies that will come off the

> Ulsan works before December ... Brazen or suicidal could be an apt description for this undertaking were it not for South Korea's known capacity for expanding its external sales even during years of shrinking world trade. ...
>
> What Hyundai has produced is an interesting automotive hybrid with an Italian-designed body, a proven Japanese engine and British parts -- all put together by the already legendary hard workers of this Northeast Asian peninsula.[26]

## The Basis of the Export-Oriented Economy

Broadly speaking, two causal factors can be identified to explain the rapid economic growth of South Korea during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The first factor is the existence of surplus labor in an industrious, well-educated labor force. This might be called an internal factor, the formation of which is largely determined by long-range socio-historical trends in Korean society. How the bulk of this labor force is susceptible to being pushed from rural areas to cities has already been discussed in terms of rural-to-urban migration. The second factor lies in the South Korean economic relations with advanced nations, whereby South Korea acquired not only foreign investments through multinational corporations, commercial loans, economic aid and technology but also overseas markets for its products. This might be called an external factor based upon dependency on economic institutions of advanced nations. This factor has operated as a primary force of South Korean

urbanization by creating economic opportunities in international urban centers. That is to say, given the present centralized authoritarian political system of South Korea in which the government commands national economic activities, these two factors have jointly produced the development of the South Korean export-oriented economy. Let us first discuss the second factor of South Korea's economic relationship with advanced nations, especially with the United States and Japan.

The United States and Japan have been the major sources of capital for South Korea. Since the end of World War II the United States has been politically and militarily involved in South Korea and provided an enormous amount of dollars to South Korea. The dollars that flowed to South Korea in the form of military assistance, credit for the purchase of grain and weapons, economic assistance and payments to South Korean troops in the Vietnam War, were estimated at about $14.8 billion during the period of 1946 to 1976.[27] In addition, the United States commercial banks extended, as of 1975, $2.3 billion in loans to South Korea, which constituted 83.5 percent of total commercial loans to South Korea.[28] Also, as of 1975 South Korea borrowed $155.5 million from Japanese commercial banks. Japan contributed foreign assistance under the normalization treaty

between the two countries, in which the Japanese government paid up to $300 million by 1975 for South Korean claims on lost properties occurring during the Japanese colonial period.

By extending loans to such developing countries as Brazil, South Korea, Mexico and Taiwan, which are supposed to have a potential for economic growth, the United States commercial banks have created for these countries the same financial opportunities as those made available to the United States during the mid-19th century. But, the United States banking community and the United States Congress have shown a growing concern over the ability of these developing countries to meet mounting foreign debt payments.[29] South Korea, for instance, has shown uneven rates of economic growth because the South Korean economy has been at the mercy of the vicissitudes of international trade dominated by the United States, Japan, industrial Western nations and OPEC. When this international market system runs smoothly, the export-oreinted economy of South Korea seems to work. However, when international trade deteriorates or when oil prices jump suddenly, the South Korean economic system teeters on the brink of disaster. The basic problem of the South Korean economy is that, in a prolonged worldwide economic recession, the most

successful, export-oriented, highly-geared developing economies including South Korea are dependent upon imported raw materials, foreign loans and markets. These are most vulnerable to recession.

The whole development of the South Korean economy depends upon external market situations that it cannot control:

> The continued progress of the Korean economy this year, the newspapers and other observers here said, depends on a number of "if's." Among them: If the price of oil does not go up and raise import costs, if the prices of other raw materials stay within reason, if exports (especially of textiles) keep going up, if economic recovery in the United States and Japan continues to provide expanding markets, if export prices can be firmed but kept competitive despite domestic inflation and if the loans and investments promised actually arrive.[30]

Largely owing to the expansion of exports, immediately followed by teh gradual economic recovery of the United States in 1976, South Korean balance-of-payments have been substantially strengthened since 1976. Furthermore, Arab petrodollars have unexpectedly been added to the foreign exchange earnings of South Korea as more than 100,000 Korean construction workers have been sent to the Middle East by South Korean construction companies during the period of 1972 to 1978. However, during the years from 1973 to 1976, South Korea had to borrow $5.4 billion from foreign countries in order to sustain its export-oreinted economy. Since the South Korean economic structure is geared to

exports, and dependent upon foreign loans, markets and materials, South Korea has no choice but to expand its economy even during situations unfavorable to international trade just to maintain her credit-worthiness. As of December, 1976, South Korea owed a total of $9.8 billion to foreign banks, which constituted 43.4 percent of the 1976 gross national product.[31] South Korea cannot repay its debt with the total annual exports of $8.08 billion in 1976. Moreover, South Korea's trade balance was in considerable deficit. In 1976 its negative balance was about $700 million. The South Korean government is obligated to guarantee repayment of most foreign borrowing and investment.

South Korea has also borrowed technology from Japan and the United States. This has taken place in the form of either direct investments by multinational corporations or their joint venture with South Korean corporations. Japanese corporative investments in South Korea are much more pronounced than their American counterparts. During the period of 1962 to 1977, Japanese corporations have invested $544 million, or 61 percent of the total foreign investment, into South Korean export industries while American corporations have invested $170 million.[32] As of December, 1975, a total of 152 Japanese corporations, most of which were affiliated with large industrial business

concerns, the Zaibatsu, were involved in South Korean industries.[33] A majority of Japanese direct investments have gone to labor-intensive industries. Japanese corporations are attracted by the low-cost labor force of South Korea.

In addition, they take advantage of the South Korean government's benign neglect of the pollution problem. This is the case for high pollution industries such as chemical or petrochemical industries whose growth is seriously limited by environmentalists both in Japan and the United States.[34] The South Korean government has granted every possible favorable treatment to foreign multinational corporations in order to attract investment. South Koreans have attracted modern technology by being exploited in wage rates and by being "raped" ecologically. Thus they reenact 19th century primitive capitalism. By taking advantage of the favorable business climate in South Korea, foreign multinational corporations have made handsome profits in South Korea. During the years of 1962 to 1977, the profits remitted from South Korea by multinational corporations amounted to $170 million, or 24.3 percent of their total investment in South Korea.[35]

Meanwhile, foreign multinational corporations have created a favorable climate for South Korea to acquire Western industrial technology. In 1976, the Federation of

Korean Industries conducted a survey of 1,763 enterprises. The study indicated that overall, 58.7 percent of the technological input in South Korea's industrial activity originates from Japan. In small and medium enterprises, Japan's share of industrial technology is 75 percent.[36]

Two externally originated factors -- foreign capital and technology -- have been successfully combined with internal factors -- the existence of industrious and cheap labor force in South Korea. This has made South Korea one of the first among the latecomers of industrialization. The cheap but hardworking labor force has been a bulwark of the fragile economic structure of South Korea, and this labor force accounts for why the South Korean export-oriented economy has been so resilient even during a worldwide economic recession.

However, even this South Korean reservoir of cheap labor has largely stemmed from Western medical technology. As we previously discussed, the South Korean borrowing of Western preventive medicine has drastically lowered South Korean mortaility rates while increasing the proportion of the young, working-age population. In 1970, about 10 million South Koreans were economically active in the labor force.[37] This includes all those employed or actively seeking employment. In a Confucian cultural tradition with an emphasis on education, this young population is well-educated

as compared with other developing countries and becomes one of the most productive, industrious labor forces in Asia. This major human resource has been effectively mobilized, tapped and exploited by the South Korean government's labor policy.

## The Labor Policy of the South Korean Government

Internally, the South Korean government's labor policy is designed to repress and exploit the working classes. Externally, it is directed toward the export of South Korean workers into foreign countries under overseas contracts. South Korean labor has been sacrificed in favor of export industries. Whatever their grievances, organized labor has been prohibited from striking in order to make export industries competitive in international markets by keeping down wages. Furthermore, South Korean industrial workers have paid the costs of the high inflation of South Korea, which has been mainly caused by the rapid expansion of exports. During the period of 1970 to 1976 -- the period of an unprecedented growth of South Korean exports -- the average annual wage increase of South Korean workers was 7.2 percent while consumer prices went up annually by 15.4 percent.[38] In 1976 about 82 percent of a total of 5.6 million South Korean wage earners made less than $60 a month and were thus exempt from income taxes.[39]

The South Korean government is formally democratic, and the Constitution assures the right of trade unions to organize and bargain collectively. In 1976 some 700,000 of 5.6 million wage earners were unionized in seventeen national federations, which were affiliated with the central labor union (the Federation of Korean Trade Unions). The Federation has been a puppet organization under the control of the South Korean government. And yet, South Korean governmental propaganda is portrayed largely through a government-controlled press. The government is pictured as a benevolent patriarch defending the interests of industrial workers: "If private industries do not consider the workers' well-being, the government will intervene." "The relationship between labor and industry should be managed like a family affair."

Despite this, the South Korean government, in order to accumulate capital by relying on the expansion of export industries, has ruthlessly repressed the labor movement. Here is an example of how South Korean garment workers, the Yogong, whose cheap wages have forced some garment industries of the United States out of business, have been exploited in the building-up of South Korean export-oriented economy:

It is over 100 degrees in Shop 349 these summer days, and the 20 teenage girls who work in the crowded, airless loft in Seoul's Peace Market garment district get little relief from the one tiny fan.

The girls sew children's dresses, for export to the United States, and they work 11 hours a day, seven days a week, for $23 a month.

Under South Korea's labor law, the girls should not work more than eight hours a day, six days a week. But the uniformed police and the plainclothes members of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency stationed in the corridors outside Shop 349 do not seem to notice.

There are also policemen and agents sitting regularly in the nearby office of the Urban Industrial Mission, a Protestant organization that has tried to improve conditions among South Korea's 1.5 million factory workers.

The mission's telephone is tapped -- one day an officer picked up the phone only to hear an earlier conversation being played back -- and 11 of the mission's staff, all Protestant ministers, are in jail, accused of roles in a Communist plot to overthrow the government.

In this rapidly industrializing nation with no natural resources except its cheap work force, the cost of labor has become a critical issue to the government of President Park Chung Hee.

It has been Korea's plentiful supply of diligent and inexpensive workers that attracted American and Japanese investment and enabled the economy to grow 10 percent a year over the last decade.

Similar labor problems are faced by the other developing nations in Aisa -- Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and even Japan -- but South Korea's response has been one of the toughest.

In the view of some South Koreans and foreigners familiar with the labor situation here, President Park's effort to keep wages low and control the labor movement has resulted in even greater repression than the more publicized wave of arrests and trials of of dissident students and intellectuals.[40]

As the South Korean government undertook to develop the heavy machinery, chemical, and petrochemical industry,

the government has, since 1973, launched a massive manpower training program. The program called for the production of about 1.5 million skilled workers in order to meet the manpower needs of the new industries. Furthermore, as the South Korean "Arab construction boom" has taken a high proportion of skilled workers out of the domestic labor market, South Korea has faced a serious shortage of skilled workers. Government departments and the city government of Seoul protested that a vast number of their skilled public employees quit to work on overseas contracts in Arab states. The shortage of skilled labor is especially actue in construction-related work such as welding, electric and civil engineering, the operation of heavy locomotives, mechanics and truck driving. In order to meet the labor shortage, the South Korean government has taken the following measures: (1) increasing the college population with an emphasis on technical and professional education; (2) increasing the number of technical and vocational high schools with financial support from the government; (3) granting a specific "craft" education to soldiers who are to be discharged from the army; and (4) granting parole to those prisoners who have learned a specific skill or craft at prison job training centers.

## The Emergence of the American Protectionist Movement

We have so far discussed that the South Korean export-oriented economy is built upon financial and technological borrowings from the United States and Japan. These two external factors have successfully merged with the indigenous factor of cheap, industrious labor to produce a rapid economic development. But in exporting its finished products, South Korea is heavily dependent upon the market situation within the two countries. In this process, the South Korean economy has little autonomy, having become subservient to the economy of the two larger countries.

One of the major problems facing South Korea is that it cannot control the movements of advanced, industrial nations toward protectionism. As a headline of a South Korean newspaper indicated, "To break up the wall of protectionism of advanced nations is a national task." In coping with this problem, the South Korean government has sent diplomats and commercial missionaries to advanced nations to negotiate on tariffs and quotas: thousands of salesmen have been dispatched to Arab, African, and Latin-American nations to expand and diversify overseas markets.

The movements toward protectionism on the part of some labor-intensive American industries have posed a major threat to South Korean export industries because the United

States has provided the biggest market to South Korean consumption goods -- clothing, shoes, toys, wigs, etc. Clothing has been the largest export item of South Korea. In 1976 South Korea exported more than $1 billion in garment goods, of which Americans consumed more than 40 percent.[41] In 1976, South Korea exported 52 million pairs of footwear to the United States market. This constituted about 14 percent of total United States imports of footwear.[42] The massive imports by the United States of these two items -- clothing and shoes -- from South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have caused these two American industries to decline at an accelerated pace.[43] These two labor-intensive industries has declined mainly because of the shortage of cheap labor in America. Now, faced with severe competition from Asian-made goods produced with cheap labor, these two American industries clamor for tariffs, quotas and other protection against foreign competition. However, labor-intensive industries usually migrate to places where an abundance of cheap labor exists. Great segments of the American garment industry, for instance, moved from New York City to the South after World War II. Now the industry has begun to migrate to South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan where, though short on capital and technology but with plenty of cheap labor, such labor-intensive industries provide opportunities for development. The imports of consumption

goods in these industries have reduced American jobs while lowering costs for American consumers. In addition, as we shall see later, the importing of such consumption goods from South Korea has provided jobs in the United States for Korean immigrants and thus has become one of the major commercial mechanisms for Korean immigrants to establish economic niches in the new land.

## The Impact of the Export-Oriented Economy on South Korean Class Structure

South Korean society has been rapidly transformed under the impact of its "export boom." Entire cultural, occupational, educational and familial institutions have undergone drastic changes due to the influence of foreign trade. Park's authoritarian rule has legitimized and been legitimized by the export-oriented economy. Governmental propaganda stresses that the economic survival of South Korea depends on exports. This is undoubtedly true, but is true because the South Korean government's economic policy has, since the early 1960's, made the entire South Korean economy dependent upon exports. "The battle of exports" has become a total effort in which Korean national energy is mobilized. Ordinary South Koreans quickly respond to the South Korean leading economic indicator -- the volume input of letters of credit and the volume of orders from foreign countries.

The South Korean government coined the phrase "economic diplomacy" by which South Korean diplomats stationed in foreign countries would take the role of salesman, exploring and expanding overseas markets for South Korean products. And, exports have also become Park's political means for achieving national solidarity. President Park delivered a congratutory speech to South Korean exporters on the occasion of the 2nd anniversary of the "Export Day:"

> We should unite together in the national campaign of saving national resources; we should save even a drop of oil in order to produce and thus export more products of good quality.
>
> By doing this, we can successfully translate the external worldwide economic recession into our challenge and consolidate our export system strong enough to be competitive at international market ...
>
> When we construct our strong national defense on the basis of our rapid economic development, we are capable of deterring North Korean communists from provoking any military action. We can wipe out their illusion on another Korean War.
>
> At the same time, we can shorten the time of coming peaceful unification of our fatherland and of bringing forth the prosperity and well-being of our people.[44]

The most important result of the export boom lies in the growing numbers of the urban middle class and the emergence of the nouveau riche in the upper industrial, business class. As we have noted previously, the majority of Korean immigrants in the United States are drawn from

these newly-emerging urban classes. That is to say, Korean immigrants have already experienced a violent change in life cycle prior to emigrating due to the formation of these new urban classes.

The South Korean urban middle class can be divided into two groups. One group is made up of professionals, teachers, middle-level industrial managers, army officials and skilled blue-collar workers. The other group consists of high-ranking governmental officials, higher military officers, real estate speculators, proprietors, owners of medium or small sizes business firms, and high-level managers of big business and industrial enterprises. The latter might be called upper middle class, many of whom have "made it" without inherited wealth and higher education. The former are salaried workers, most of whom are equipped with higher education. This group might be called a new middle class. These loosely-defined urban classes -- the upper industrial class, the upper middle class, and the new middle class -- have one thing in common: they have been largely produced by the development of the export-oriented economy. An American anthropologist observed Seoul in the 1970's:

> Rapid economic development is a reality, and a majority of city dwellers today are relatively well fed, clothed, and housed. In addition a rapid

> growing elite of bureaucrats, politicians, and commercial, industrial, and educational entrepreneurs have been getting rich. Tens of thousands of new mansions, chauffeur driven cars, and fur and silk coated women decorate the city.
>
> The newly rich are energetically and competitively engaged in a flagrant and flamboyant display of wealth, while members of the growing middle class tend to invest whatever savings they are able to acquire in more elaborate consumption goods. Stores crammed with luxuries are crowded with buyers, while theatres, bars, cabarets, and restaurants provide a night life of great intensity and infinite variety. This dazzling display is an important factor in drawing migrants to Seoul, but one they are there, living in squatters slums, they are confronted daily with the discouraging contrast between the squalor of their own lives and the buoyant wealth around them.[45]

The development of the export-oriented economy has also effected a rapid change in the occupational distribution. The white collar occupations of professional, technical, managerial, clerical, and sales workers have absorbed an increasing proportion of the work force. The proportion of white collar workers increased from 17 percent in 1963 to almost one-fourth of the total employed labor force in 1971. During the same period, the proportion of wage earners more than doubled, accounting for 30 percent of all employed workers, as shown in Table III-1.

Table III-1

South Korean Employment by Occupation, 1963 and 1971

| Occupation | 1963 Employment (in thousands) | 1963 % | 1971 Employment (in thousands) | 1971 % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Professional, technical, administrative, and managerial workers .... | 256 | 3.2 | 475 | 4.9 |
| Clerical workers ..... | 276 | 3.5 | 661 | 6.8 |
| Sales workers ..... | 799 | 10.1 | 1,240 | 12.8 |
| Service workers ..... | 425 | 5.3 | 781 | 8.0 |
| Farmers, loggers, and related workers ..... | 4,802 | 60.4 | 4,558 | 46.9 |
| Hunters, fishermen, and related workers ..... | 203 | 2.6 | 133 | 1.4 |
| Other ..... | 1,186 | 14.9 | 1,860 | 19.2 |
| TOTAL ..... | 7,947 | 100.0 | 9,708 | 100.0 |

Source: Vreeland, Nena, et al., Area Handbook for South Korea, p. 59.

The South Korean occupational structure has changed in response to its emerging economic connection with international markets. Among other factors, the selective demands for South Korean workers by foreign countries in the form of overseas contracts has especially changed the South Korean occupational structure. We shall see a specific illustration for this when we analyze Korean immigrant

professionals in the United States. Another specific instance is that of the South Korean export boom that has made business managers, administrators and other business-related white collar workers one of the fastest-growing urban professional classes. In response to this, major South Korean universities have increased the enrollments of business schools, which have become the fastest-growing, most attractive and popular educational institution among South Korean college students.[46] Leading export corporations have vied with one another for the recruitment of competent managerial graduates.[47]

## The Formation of the Upper Industrial Business Class

In the process of constructing its export-oriented economy, the South Korean upper industrial capitalistic class has emerged as a formidable economic force controlling the South Korean economy. As has been noted in Chapter II, this new class is strongly inclined to funnel millions of dollars into the United States. The core group of the upper industrial class is called the "Jaebol" -- the Korean version of the Japanese "Zaibatsu." The analysis of the growth of these capitalistic, industrial, and monopolistic tycoons will shed some light on the internal dynamics of the South Korean political economy.

Hancho C. Kim, an influential Korean agent who allegedly participated in the Korean influence-buying scandal with respect to the United States Congress, wrote to the New York Times with the intention of slanting public opinion in favor of the Park regime. In doing so, he pointed out a crucial aspect of South Korean economic development -- the alliance of the Park regime with small industrialists:

> In the early sixties, by a miracle of cooperative self-denial, a group of competing Korean small industrailists set their powerful competitive instincts resolutely aside for the well-being of their nation. They banded together with some of Korea's ablest industrial engineers, bankers, land-planners and technologists to wipe out Korea's bone-breaking poverty and to deliberately plan the most efficient use of Korea's literate, but mismanaged, manpower, its superb native skills and its inherent maritime and mineral resources.
>
> They were headed then and are led now by tough-minded, strong-willed, soft-spoken Park Chung Hee -- who is president -- a man sick and tired of violence, of the incredible waste of manpower and of the hunger and wretchedness that had appalled him as a native of rural Korea and as a young teacher in rural districts.[48]

The formation of a South Korean entrepreneurial elite has been governed by specific political events. The new class has profited by taking advantage of new economic opportunities during such specific historical situations as Korean Independence from Japan in 1945, the Korean War, the May 16 Military Revolution and the South Korean military involvement in the Vietnam War. The government has been a

major dispenser of such new economic opportunities. In these situations, South Korean business elites have gained special favors ("tuck hae") from the government in return for bribes.

During the Japanes occupational period from 1910 to 1945, the Korean economic structure underwent an impressive change: modern factories were built; modern communication and transportation systems were created; commercial markets were developed; and agricultural production was substantially increased. However, all these economic developments served Japanese colonial interests. All major industrial and business enterprises were owned and run by the Japanese.

At the same time, Japanese colonial economic policy seriously limited the growth of Korean-run industries. Consequently, a few exceptional Korean capitalists, many of whom originated in the rural landlord class, arose during the period of the Japanese colonialism.

When the Japanese left Korea after the end of World War II, all Japanese properties and industrial assets were left to the Korean government as enemy assets. The government sold these enemy assets to aggressive political entrepreneurs and those Koreans who had previously worked for and been trained by the Japanese industrial firms or factories. Massive bribery and special favors were involved. At the same time a serious dislocation of the Korean

economy occurred because of the small number of Koreans who were trained for the operation and management of the production plants left by the Japanese.

With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, economic aid from the United States flowed into South Korea and became the most important source of capital for the reconstruction of the South Korean economy. The government distributed the United States economic aid to a selected group of industrialists, most of whom had previously accumulated some capital by taking over the enemy assets. They had become financially competent to buy special favors from governmental elites. Since the Korean War, buying off powerful political officials at the top governmental level in return for special favors has become a central business norm and the linkage between political and economic institutions. This basic interplay has not only resulted in the concentration of capital among a small number of industrialists, but also has helped to create the South Korean version of the late capitalistic democratic political system. One example will suffice to illuminate this crucial aspect of the South Korean political economy in the 1950's:

> In the summer of 1952, when the war was still going on, the Syngman Rhee administration allocated over three million dollars of foreign exchange to 40 private firms. This fund earned through the export of tungsten was supposedly allocated for certain

> specific needs of the country. Instead, the Rhee government illegally distributed it to several entrepreneurs enabling them to import grains and fertilizers which were badly needed in a country still in the midst of a war.
>
> By taking advantage of the discrepancy in foreign exchange rates and by monopolizing the price, these firms made enormous profits. The government was then offered a large contribution in return for the favor, which was allegedly used in Rhee's Liberal Party campaign for a constitutional amendment that permitted his election as president.
>
> In the spring of 1957, for example, the Liberal Party exerted pressure on the Korean Reconstruction Bank to grant a large loan to 12 big enterprises for the professed purpose of helping reconstruct the nation's industry. In the process, however, these firms had to contribute a certain percentage of the loans as political contributions.[44]

These two examples are just a tip of the iceberg. Speculation, monopolization of commodities and markets, tax evasion, monopoly of contracts, illicit purchase of public properties and lands, and diversion of foreign loans were the typical ways of getting rich. In doing these, the entrepreneurs required the protection of someone in the higher levels of government. However, compared with the present period under President Park's rule, South Korean business opportunities for reaping illegal profits in the 1950's were limited because national economic development was in its initial stage and foreign loans were small.

Business opportunities through political connections have boomed during the last 15 years when total South Korean foreign debts climbed to more than $10 billion and total

annual exports amounted to $10 billion. During this period of vast economic change, a group of South Korean industrial capitalists, the Jaebol, has emerged as a stable upper class. The character of this class is its unique combination of capitalistic monopoly with family-centered entrepreneurs, and the comprador with plutocrat.

When the military junta took power in 1961, its leaders called for the eradication of political corruption and other old social vices. At the same time, they determined to achieve a rapid economic development by relying on a free enterprise system. As a way of fostering social justice, they attempted to prosecute the Jaebol, who were the symbol of old vices and the object of resentment on the part of the Korean people. They investigated persons accumulating illegal wealth during the previous regime. At the outset, the young colonels of the military junta suggested that all the illicit profiteers be punished and that their illegally amassed fortunes be confiscated. However, in proceeding with the investigation they found themselves in a serious dilemma. They found that the Jaebol's illicitly accumulated capital and business experience were essential to their ambitious economic development plans. They needed a business elite to push a developing economy into competition with other economies. At the same time, they themselves became corrupt in their attempt to

eradicate old corruption. Since almost all the colonels in the military government were drawn from either poverty-stricken peasant or North Korean refugee backgrounds, they were longing for wealth.

> The only viable economic force for this difficult task (of economic development) happened to be the target group of leading entrepreneurial talents with their singular advantage of organization, personnel, facilities, and capital resources. They had to be handled with care. The pressure was also coming from a group of old-line politicians and high-ranking bureaucratic circles to ease and mitigate cases involving the handling of illegal wealth and its profiteers.
>
> Within the hard-cor junta circle, on the other hand, internal factionalism mostly rooted in regional loyalty began to undermine the solidarity of the regime. Disagreement was glaring on many issues including that of the handling of the illegal wealth. Having quickly noticed these political factors plaguing the junta leadership, the entrepreneurs under indictment wasted no time to take advantage of them. They moved to buy off various political bosses by promising or offering political kickbacks.
>
> And when the investigation committee handed down the decision, it was substantially toned down. Thirty elite entrepreneurs thus accused and convicted were asked to refund a designated amount of funds to the government by a given date.[50]

Since the military revolution of 1961, the massive flow of foreign loans has caused existing large-scale capitalist firms to grow rapidly. In order to make them competitive in the world market, the government earmarked a large portion of its foreign loans for accelerating the growth of these firms. The government also required

domestic banks to make favorable loans to favored industrial capitalists. In this process, the capitalists have exerted their political and financial influence in order to buy special favors. For instance, a South Korean poet, Chi Ha Kim, protrayed the political corruption arising from the interlocking of business and politics in his famous poem, "Five Bandits":

> Watch the tycoon demonstrate his skill!
> Roasting the cabinet minister a beautiful brown, and boiling the vice minister red, sprinkling soy sauce, mustard, hot sauce, and MSG, together with red pepper, welsh onions, and garlic on them, he swallowed them up, together with banknotes collected from taxes, funds borrowed from foreign countries, and other privileges and benefits.
> Pretty girls he lured, made his mistresses, and kept busy producing babies. A dozen daughters thus made were given as tribute to high officials as midnight snacks. Their tasks were to collect information on the pillow, thereby enabling him to win negotiated contracts, buy land cheaply, and make a fortune once a road was opened.[51]

As a reult of these political and economic maneuvers, a heavy concentration of industrial capital has flowed to a small portion of big corpoations. In 1976 the one-hundred largest corporations among a total of 15,000 corporations had 42 percent of total sales.[52] Thirty-seven of these one-hundred were subsidiaries of thirteen of the 50 Jaebol groups that emerged. Each Jaebol has spawned an average of 15.7 subsidiary corporations. The entire South Korean economy is virtually controlled by these 50 Jaebol groups.

These, in turn, are closely interlinked with the government. The government has expounded an economic ideology of "guided capitalism" in which it has led and intervened in the South Korean version of a free enterprise system. But the South Korean economic system is a mixture of capitalism and planned socialism.

The Jaebol groups made enormous profits during the 1960's by engaging in the monopolization of the manufacture or processing of such goods as sugar, toothpaste, food, cement, fertilizer, clothing, and light machinery. They were also active in transportation and construction. As the South Korean economy has matured since 1970, they have competed in gaining dominance over specific profitable heavy industries such as petrochemicals, machinery, oil refining, automobiles, airlines, electronics, factory construction, and the defense industry. They also have begun to control the hotel, tourism, insurance, mass media, stock exchange, and educational industries. In 1976, the ten largest Jaebol groups had total sales of $5.7 billion, constituting about 23 percent of the gross national product.[53]

Nine of the top ten Jaebol groups had their origins in the 1950's. Officials of the Lakee, Samsong, and Ssangyong Jaebols were convicted of illegal profiteering by the military junta. Except for these, three Jaebols were small industrialists in the 1950's and became Jaebols

in the 1960's and the early 1970's. The Hyundae and Hanjin, which were small contract companies for the United States army in South Korea in the 1950's, emerged as Jaebols in the late 1960's when they reaped enormous profits from construction and transportation works in South Vietnam.[54] The latest arrival, the Daewoo became a Jaebol in the early 1970's by exproting clothing and wig products. The Kookjae S. entered into the ranks of the ten largest Jaebol groups in 1976 by exporting a record volume of footwear to the United States.

The Jaebol's rapid growth, largely supported by the government's low wage policy and politically-favored access to foreign and domestic loans, has contributed to the formation of large-scale enterprises, which are essential to South Korean competition in international markets. However, one of the main problems facing the South Korean economy is how the Jaebols make use of the capital so accumulated.

The present data on the use of fraudulent subsidies indicates that this prospective growth of South Korean capitalistic enterprises contains major dangers.

First, the South Korean upper industrial business class moved forward mainly under the direction, supervision and instigation of the government. Most of the big

industrial business enterprises were family-centered, closed, and parochial organizations, so that they excluded participation by the public. Only the government could exert strong pressure to open stock ownership to the public.

Secondly, most top business leaders have a strong inclination to reinvest the accumulated capital in non-productive, speculative business activities. They have purchased a vast acreage of agricultural lands, producing a massive number of South Korean "okies," and thus intensified the over-urbanization of South Korea. They also want to make easy money by engaging in hotel, tourist, ice cream, cookie and golf businesses.[55]

Thirdly, the new South Korean upper class has wasted the acquired capital by indulging in vast amounts of conspicuous consumption. For instance, they have built up vast rural estates which are surrounded by landless peasants.

Finally, as we have noted in Chapter II, these new upper and upper-middle classes have shown a strong tendency to divert the acquired capital to the United States partly because of the fear of another Korean War and partly because of their sense of uncertainty concerning the future of the domestic economy.

## The Psychological Reaction of South Koreans to Rapid Economic Development

In the process of experiencing rapid economic development, South Koreans' mental energies are dissipated in "invidious comparison." South Koreans compete with one another intensely for ownership and display of consumption goods. The unequal distribution of new economic opportunities has in the light of this competition made the various South Korean urban classes more insecure, restless, and anxious than their counterparts in other developing countries. The following views of urban Koreans on the recent socio-economic changes reflect this aspect:

> "I cannot understand why my family cannot live by solely relying on my husband's salary. Nor do I understand why there are so many newly rich people around us," said Mrs. Changock Kim. She has frequently told herself: "I would not envy the new lifestyles of my neighbors and alumni friends." But she cannot stop comparing herself with them. She further said, "I wish that the T.V. home dramas would not show us the lifestyles of rich people."[56]

> "I have made my career as a newspaper reporter since 1953 -- the year that the Korean War stopped. But now I realize that it is becoming difficult to stick to one's own vocation in this changing society in which money matches with "getting ahead." I sometimes feel that those who keep their vocations faithfully and honestly are now treated as fools."[57]

> "It is a tragedy that the Confucian gentleman's ideal of enjoying a pleasant life amid stable poverty has disappeared. In the old society we believed that there are things that we must

not do. But now we seem to think that there are no things that we must not do."[58]

In a booming economy, monetary value has quickly triumphed over other social values. The following sayings are widely circulated among South Koreans: "You cannot make money without breaking the law." Bankruptcy is cited as a way of making money: many entrepreneurs have filed for bankruptcy after diverting the funds which they had borrowed from foreign or domestic banks into personal real estate land speculations on the pretext of building up export industries. Ordinary South Koreans have resented this kind of newly-rich men saying: "Businessmen become rich even when their business firms go into bankruptcy."

Those who have "made it overnight" worry about how to spend it. By spending new earnings on consumption goods, they could engage in an infinite variety of Western life-styles. However, this intensive pursuit of Western life-styles is severely limited partly because a vast number of South Korean have-nots frown upon the open display of new lifestyles, saying for instance: "Golf fields should be converted into agricultural lands." Furthermore, these nouveau riche are afraid that they might lose the money that they earned overnight, because of the uncertain economic, political, and military situation in South Korea. Specifically, they are afraid of another Korean War. Thus some of them

want to migrate to the United States with the money they have so recently made.

Those middle class urbanites, especially white collar wage earners who do not expect to "make it big" restlessly compare their economic status with that of those who have "made it." Since most are college-educated and have status pretensions, their status anxiety is severe. One of the psychological consequences of a booming economy is that mobility consciousness has been much intensified and heightened, even among those unsuccessful in achieving mobility. This mobility consciousness stimulates inclinations of mobility-oriented Koreans to migrate to the United States where better economic opportunities are expected. Given the emigration opportunities, the South Korean middle class urbanites desire to start a second life in a new land, leaving behind all the past shameful memories in the old land. The following example indicates this desire to start a second life in the United States:

> In the Kent Village Apartments (in Washington D.C. area) about 90 percent of some 600 Korean residents are skilled workers' the remaining are salesmen. Even though they are doing blue collar work, they had never touched machines in Korea. Tae-Kyong Kim, the president of the Korean Association of the Kent Village, is a graduate of the History Department of Y University (in Korea). He had been a public official at the Korean Office of Monopoly for 15 years. He also owned a small business, but he failed in that business.

> Thus he decided to migrate to the United States. After receiving five months of training in auto repair work, he could enter the United States as a skilled immigrant. About 50 percent of the Korean residents here are college graduates, most having studied social science. Most of the residents had led lower middle-class life in Korea. About 30 percent of them are from the South Vietnam where they worked as overseas contract laborers. It is really tearful to see how they adjust themselves to American society ... Because of their poor skills and language, they are subject to all kinds of contempt and discrimination.[59]

## Conclusion

South Korea's rapid economic development and industrialization has occurred within the framework of the international economic systems of advanced, capitalistic nations. South Korea has built up an export-oreinted economy by relying on foreign capital, materials, technology, and markets. These external factors have been integrated with an indigenous domestic factor -- cheap and industrious labor.

The formation of a huge, cheap labor force in a few urban centers has been the result of a rural-to-urban migration. Governmental policy of low grain prices, supported by the subsidized massive imports of United States surplus grain products, has caused a massive exodus of South Korean peasants from farms to cities. At the same time, the development of an export-oriented economy in cities

has produced economic opportunities, "pulling" South Korean peasants into cities. In this process, the South Korean government has taken a crucial role, especially through a policy of keeping industrial wages low, which is designed to help export industries to gain markets and accumulate capital.

The Korean tradition of a strong, centralized government still continues and has greatly contributed to the dominance of South Korean primary cities. An ancient Korean tradition of the predominance of a centralized political bureaucracy over every sphere of life has also influenced the recent economic development of South Korea. The emergence of South Korean primary cities is thus a ramification of the power of centralized bureaucracy in the allocation and development of national resources. Consequently, South Korean urbanization has resulted in a keen competitionover scarce urban economic resources. It has resulted in an over-urbanization. And the socio-economic vices of over-urbanization have directly or indirectly "pushed" South Korean immigration towards the United States and to other nations that permit Korean entry.

Rapid economic development in urban centers has produced the formation of new South Korean urban classes, from which the majority of Korean immigrants to the United States are drawn. The recent Korean immigration to the

United States reflects this rapid social change accompanying intensive, compressed economic development. Korean immigrants had to overcome and survive the breakdown of traditional norms and values in their homeland. They had to live throgh "dog-eat-dog" competition in South Korean urban economy. They acquired an urban personality expressing sophistication, smartness and shrewdness. As we shall see in Chapter XI, the development of this type of personality is also partly derived from the past -- the peculiar Korean class structure and Confucian cultural tradition.

The impact of the economy of the United States on the South Korean economic structure has been emphasized. Among other things, the United States has been a main supplier, along with Japan, of capital and material. It has also provided a vast market for South Korean consumer products. As we shall discuss in the next chapter, South Korean trade with the United States has provided the major economic entry point to Korean immigrants in the United States. Korean immigrants have been facilitators as well as beneficiaries of the trade between the two countries.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]The following table indicates the change of the percentage of South Korean population in urban areas (shi), of 50,000 or over:

| Year | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1960 | 28.0% | ( 7.0 million) |
| 1966 | 33.6 | ( 9.8) |
| 1970 | 41.1 | (11.9) |
| 1975 | 51.7 | (16.8) |

Source: Do, Heung-yol, "Doshi Sahoehakjok Yongu" (Sociological Study of City), Doshi Moonjae (February, 1976), p. 20; A Temporary Report on the 1975 Census, the Korean Economic Planning Board, 1976.

[2]The Hankook Ilbo, February 10, 1976.

[3]The New York Times, May 29, 1977.

[4]Rural-to-urban migration was attributed tomore than 80 percent of the total population increase of Seoul city during the years of 1966 to 1970; during the same period, Seoul city absorbed 60 percent of the total rural-to-urban migrants in South Korea. Yu, Eui-young, "Components of Population Growth in Urban Areas of Korea: 1960-1970," Unpublished Paper.

[5]In Korean society city dwellers' exploitation of peasants has a long historical root. During the Yi Dynasty, for instance, such typical urban dwellers as royal families, governmental bureaucrats, literatus and soldiers made their living on the basis of tax revenues from peasants. Since the traditional society, rice has been a staple food and a leading economic product with which the central government collected the bulk of taxes from peasants in order to finance state bureaucracies. Since the Korean liberation from Japan, rice prices have led the prices of other commodities.

[6]An, Lim, Hankook Kyongjaeron (Theory of the Korean Economy), (Seoul, Korea: Bom Moon Sa, 1961), pp. 245-266.

[7]Vreeland, Nena, et al., op. cit., p. 256.

[8]An, op. cit., p. 248.

[9]Such sales constituted a major portion of South Korean importation of agricultural products: from 1961 to 1969 South Korea imported an annual average of 136,000 metric tons of rice, 111,000 MT of barley, 642,000 MT of wheat, and 40,000 MT of other grains. Keim, Willard D., "The South Korean Peasantry in the 1970s." Asian Survey, (September, 1974), p. 855.

[10]In order to check migration of rural people to urban areas and to increase agricultural products, the South Korean government for the first time, recognized the development of rural areas in the Third Five Year Plan in 1972-1976. The government has recently increased rice prices; it has shouldered about 50 percent of the cost of fertilizers and provided soft loans to farmers. The government has, since 1970, launched the so-called New Village Movement in order to alleviate rural poverty. In spite of this governmental policy, South Korean countryside has been depopulated because of the exodus of rural people into cities: the proportion of rural people decreased from 45.8 percent in 1970 to 37.3 percent in 1975 (Korea Week, March 31, 1976).

[11]No, Choon-hi, "Sudokwon Eui Ingujipjoong Yoin Gwa Boonsan Bangan" (The Causal Factors for PopulationConcentration into Capital City and Proposals for Population Decentralization), Doshi Moonjae (September, 1975), p. 17.

[12]The New York Times, January 30, 1977.

[13]Fr. Adrian Van Leest, "The Tragedy of Veronica Park," Colomban Mission (January, 1974), p. 10.

[14]The Hankook Ilbo, March 9, 1978.

[15]The Hankook Shinmoon, October 22, 1977.

[16]According to a sample survey, the rural girls in this age group accounted for 75 percent of the total "single" migrants into Seoul city during the period of 1966 to 1970. Yoon,

Jong-ju, a seminar report addressed at the Korean Population Association's seminar on "Population Concentration into Seoul -- Its problems and Solutions," which was conducted in Seoul through April 2 to April 3, 1976.

[17]The Joong Ang Ilbo, October 29, 1977.

[18]The Hankook Ilbo, January 18, 1977.

[19]The Joong Ang Ilbo, October 29, 1977.

[20]Kim, Yong-tae, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

[21]Kim, Chong-shin, Seven Years with Korea's Park Chung-hee, (Seoul, Korea, 1967), p. 299.

[22]Vreeland, Nena, et al., op. cit., p. 297.

[23]"Remarkable Increase in Exports Key to Korea's New Economic Status," an advertisement by the Korean Traders Association in The New York Times, January 30, 1977.

[24]Ibid.

[25]The Washington Post, March 20, 1977.

[26]The Washington Star, July 16, 1976.

[27]"Economic Crisis Looms for South Korea," International Policy Report, (Institute for International Policy, Washington D.C., December, 1975), p. 8.

[28]The New York Times, November 21, 1975.

[29]The New York Times, January 15, 1976.

[30]The New York Times, June 6, 1976.

[31]The Joong Ang Ilbo, May 26, 1977.

[32]The Hankook Ilbo, October 5, 1977.

[33]The Hankook Ilbo, October 5, 1977.

[34]According to the estimate of a South Korean "environmentalists" group, 76 percent of the total foreign investments in South Korea during the period of 1962 to 1974, were made in pollution-causing, manufacturing industries. The Hankook Ilbo, October 26, 1976. And yet the South Korean government has paid a deaf ear to this pollution problem. For instance, "United States Embassy officials said they had advised the Koreans to install anti-pollution devices in new plants, arguing that it would be cheaper now than later. "They don't listen," one said. "They argue that antipollution measures are for rich countries." The New York Times, November 29, 1975.

[35]The Hankook Ilbo, October 5, 1977.

[36]Korea Week, April 15, 1976.

[37]Kwon, Tae-hwan, op. cit., p. 81.

[38]The Joong Ang Daily News, June 23, 1977.

[39]The Dong-A Ilbo, May 4, 1976.

[40]The New York Times, August 17, 1974.

[41]The Hankook Ilbo, November 17, 1976.

[42]The New York Times, May 2, 1977.

[43]In the case of the shoe industry, the New York Times reported: "Since 1968, it (the shoe industry) suffered the closing of 300 plants and a reduction of 70,000 jobs to the present total of 167,000. Foreign imports, which amounted to only 22 percent of U.S. shoe sales in 1968, totaled 46 percent last year, and the curve continues to rise. As a result, American Footwear Industries, a trade association, and the United Shoe Workers of America are vociferously seeking an import quota to restrict the sale of foreign shoes." The New York Times, February 11, 1977.

[44]The Hankook Ilbo, November 30, 1975.

[45]Brandt, Vincent S.R., "Problems of Social Integration Under Condition of Rapid Economic Development: Migrants and the Urban Slums in South Korea," quoted from Vreeland, Nena, et al., op. cit., p. 96.

[46]The Hankook Ilbo, November 23, 1974.

[47]The Hankook Ilbo, April 10, 1977.

[48]Kim, Hancho C., "Park's Shining Korean Camelot," The New York Times, March 12, 1975.

[49]Kim, Kyong-dong, "Political Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea," Asian Survey, (May, 1974), p. 468.

Some studies on the Jaebol were published in Korean: Kang, Tong-jin, "Hankook Jaebol Ui Hyongsong Kwa Kebo" (The Formation Process and Genealogy of Korean Financial Cliques), Chongkyong Yongu, (November, 1967); Kim, Sung-doo, "Hankook Dockjom Jaebol Hyongsong Ui Tukheesong" (The Characteristics of the Formation of Korean Monopolistic Financial Cliques), Sasang Ke, (September, 1968); Moon, Hyong-son, "Jabebol Non" (On Financial Cliques), Sasang Ke, (May, 1963); Lim, Myo-min, "O Il Yook Iihoo Ui Jaeke Kaepyon" (The Reformation of the Financial World After the May 16 Coup), Shin Dong-A (May, 1968).

[50]Kim, Kyong-dong, Ibid., pp. 468-469.

[51]Kim, Chi-ha, Cry of the People and Other Poems, (Japan: Autumn Press, 1974), pp. 27-28.

[52]The Hankook Ilbo, August 12, 1977.

[53]The Hankook Ilbo, April 3, 1977.

[54]South Korean earnings from the Vietnam War were the major source of capital in the late 1960's and the early 1970's. By sending military force and civilian workers to the South Vietnam, South Korea, for instance, earned about $2.3

billion during the three years of 1966 to 1968. Cole, David C. and Lyman Princeton N., Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 135.

[55]The Dong-A Ilbo, June 3-5, 1974.

[56]The Joong Ang Ilbo, Novmeber 11, 1977.

[57]The Joong Ang Ilbo, August 1, 1978.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Kim, Yong-tae, op. cit., pp. 180-182.

# PART II

# ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA

# CHAPTER IV

# SMALL BUSINESS AS ENTRY POINT FOR KOREAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA

## Koreans' Shift to Commercial Enterprises

In the previous Chapter, we have discussed Korean experience of a rapid urbanization and economic development. In this expanding opportunity structure of a rapid economic development, Korean immigrants acquired an intensified and heightened consciousness of the possibility of upward economic mobility. We have noted in Chapter 1 that the majority of Korean immigrants are drawn from South Korean urban occupational classes with a negligible number of them being industrial or farm laborers, and that 63 percent of the Korean male householders in the New York metropolitan area engaged in urban white collar occupations at the time of their departure for the United States. These immigrants showed little propensity for commercial activity in their homeland. In a contrast to this inclination to engage in white collar work in their homeland, it must be recalled that 34 percent of the Korean male householders in the

New York metropolitan area ran commercial businesses in 1976.[1] Except for Korean medical professionals, most of Korean immigrants could not continue to work in their old white collar jobs in the United States. This strong tendency for Korean immigrants to shift their occupations from white collar work in the homeland to commercial enterprises in the new land was dramatically expressed in a Korean ethnic newspaper, which carried a series of essays on the Korean immigrant life in New York City. One of the essays starts with the following introduction:

> A Mr. Park, who was a college professor at a Korean university in Seoul, has grabbed steering wheel and has become a taxi driver in New York City. Shoe-repairing is the first job for a Mr. Yang who once flied his name as a radio announcer in Seoul. In a small shoe-repairing shop he stakes his future American life on the continuous sound of his nailing-down works. A Mr. Lee, an American Ph.D. in engineering, peddled, while driving from village to village, wigs and clothing. He has just set up a wholesale company and thus has entered into the ranks of the big Korean businessmen in New York City. All these episodes reveal a naked facade of the economic struggle of our fellow countrymen ...[2]

Most Korean immigrants are inspired to run small businesses. "To do a 'jang sa' (commercial business) is the fastest way of getting ahead in America" is a kind of advice that old timers frequently suggest to newcomers. The language barrier partly explains this inclination. The centralization and bureaucratization of the present

American occupational structure, which standardizes occupation entry in terms of, among other things, facility in English, is an insuperable barrier to most Korean immigrants. This deprives Korean immigrants of many opportunities glorified in the American dream of boundless economic rewards and the possibility of achievement via economic bureaucracies which employ the bulk of American labor force. This fact combined with differences in both the skills and reward system in the United States means that the occupational status of the homeland cannot be transferred into the new land. A high proportion of Korean immigrants were thus forced to turn to small retail businesses where they could determine their own fate and where there are still some economic opportunities.

In addition, the existence of a subtle racial discrimination against new minorities at large-scale business firms and public service jobs may force even those Koreans, who received higher education at American universities, to engage in small businesses. Here is an example for this:

> Mr. Sohn, who acquired M.B.A. from a Midwestern university, had a great deal of self-respect until he was suddenly discharged in 1977 from the General Motor Company's Overseas Branch in Manhattan, New York City. As a part of a reshuffling in business organization, G.M. abolished its Overseas Branch in Manhattan and transferred all 11 of its staff members except

for Mr. Sohn to other sections of the company. Mr. Sohn was not laid off but discharged because his workplace no longer existed.

According to Mr. Sohn, a definite racial discrimination was involved in his case. He recalled "numerous subtle instances of discriminations that he had to endure in the past at his workplace. He could not be eligible for unemployment benefits because he was discharged. Neither could he find another job because of "old age" or overqualification. He was thus forced to open a small grocery store in Long Island. He said, "Now I am very happy with this grocery business. No one will meddle in my affairs. I no longer worry about being laid off by an American company.

In addition to cases as in the above example of job discrimination in large bureaucarcies, many American college-educated Koreans, if they are young and ambitious, tend to shift their career lines from large economic organizations to small businesses. They do this without encountering specific, manifest job discrimination directed against them in their workplaces. At the beginning of their careers in large firms, they discover specific limitations they will be likely to meet because of their ethnic peculiarity, and attempt to search for greater economic rewards in small businesses. Here is a story of a Korean youth who has quit an American business firm in New York City in order to engage in a small business:

Mr. Lee and his wife immigrated to the United States in 1970. His wife's nursing skill enabled them to enter the United States. His wife had supported him while he was a full-time student at a university in

New York City. Three years later he earned an M.B.A. and found an accounting job at the R Company in New York City with a starting salary of $13,500. At the outset of his entry into the American white collar job market, Mr. Lee was somewhat frustrated. He received only two job offers while he saw native-born American students receiving "a lot of job offers from famous corporations." He chose the R Company because the other company offering him a job intended to send him to its overseas branch in South Korea. But he had to rationalize this discrepancy of job opportunities, saying to himself that: "I am an immigrant with poor English." When he started to work for the company, he met a Chinese co-worker, who was born in the United States and had no foreign accent. The Chinese had worked in the same section for several years but received few promotions: "Many new American graduates bypassed him. One American guy, who started at the same time as the Chinese, reached the level of supervisor." The report of this experience caused Mr. Lee to strengthen his sense of the career limitations in the company, and caused him to leave.

Meanwhile, Mr. Lee perceived that becoming a Certified Public Accountant would provide him with better opportunities because many Korean businesses and branches of South Korean business firms in New York City increasingly demand ethnic accountants. Thus, even at the outset of his work for the American company, Mr. Lee had decided to quit when he had passed the C.P.A. examination.

While keeping his full-time job, he had devoted himself to preparing for the examination. It took him three years to pass it. Meanwhile, with the additional steady income earned by his wife, Mr. Lee accumulated enough capital to set up a small business. In the summer of 1977 Mr. Lee resigned, and with the initial payment of $40,000 of a total price of $80,000, he purchased a medium-sized stationery store in the Bronx from a retiring Jewish owner. He set up his accounting office in this store and tried to attract Korean customers. He now has three full-time Korean employees, two of whom are relatives.

This kind of occupational shift from American white collar work to small businesses, however, constitutes a small

portion of Korean business enterprises. The majority of small retail businesses are run by new immigrants. Korean business enterprises have begun to emerge since 1970. Their number have increased so rapidly that in almost every commercial section of New York City one can find Korean retail shops. It has as not yet been statistically determined how many Korean business enterprises exist. But, some Korean business leaders roughly estimate that the number of Korean business enterprises in the New York metropolitan area, as of 1978, is somewhere between 3,000 and 2,500.[3] The Korean business enterprises include wholesale and retail businsses, catering & service businsses, and South Korean business firms or branches which employ Korean immigrants.

## Classification of Korean Business Enterprises

The Korean business enterprises can be classified into four groups by interrelating the following two factors: (1) Whether the customers they cater to are Koreans or other ethnic groups; (2) Whether the goods or services they sell are produced in the United States market or South Korea.

As shown in the matrix below, the four types of Korean business enterprises are identified, each of which shows some distinctive common characteristics.

Table IV-1

Korean Immigrants' Business Enterprises by Customers, and by Supply and Demand Mechanism (of Goods or Services)

| | Demand or Customers in Own Ethnic Group | Demand or Customers in Other Groups |
|---|---|---|
| Originating in the interaction between the U.S. and Korea | I<br>Korean food & gift stores, book stores, travel agencies, newspaper and television companies, emigration & employment agencies, etc. | III<br>Garments, wigs, eyelashes, handbags, other miscellaneous goods' retailers or wholesalers, and Korean Karate businesses, etc. |
| Originating within the U.S. market | II<br>Accounting & legal services, real estate & insurance brokers, restaurants & bars, beauty salons, barbers, photo salons, carpenters, etc. | IV<br>Fruit and vegetable stores, independent taxis, fish stores, stationery stores, dry cleaning stores & laundries, groceries & food markets, gas stations, liquor stores, shoe stores, hardware stores, and furniture stores, garment subcontractors, etc. |

The Korean business enterprises in the first cell deal with specific goods or services, which are specifically geared to Korean ethnic tastes, culture, and need. Emigration and travel agencies deal with specific services, which arise from commercial interaction between the two countries, while Korean food & gift stores and book stores sell South Korean products to Korean immigrants. Such items as Korean books, gifts, magazines, cassette tapes, and records are

directly imported from South Korea. Generally speaking, the businesses in the first cell deal with goods or services through which the Korean immigrants continue and strengthen the habits, tastes and culture derived from the homeland. For instance, the majority of the Korean immigrants are unable or unwilling to accommodate themselves to American foods. They try to maintain old habits of diet, including hot, salty sauces such as garlic, hot pepper, mashed bean, and soy sauce which are essential ingredients of Korean foods. In the refrigerators of the Korean immigrants' homes one cannot miss the "Kimchee" -- hot, salty, and pickled Oriental cabbage. Korean food & gift stores can be found in almost all the neighborhoods where Korean immigrants reside. About fifty Korean food and gift stores and four Korean food wholesalers have emerged in the New York metropolitan area since 1970. By taking advantage of the strong inclination of Korean immigrants to visit their homeland, about 15 Korean travel agencies have emerged and compete for ethnic customers. More than ten emigration companies had existed in the New York metropolitan area in the early 1970's when the United States accepted a large number of "skilled" immigrants from South Korea. Now most of them are no longer in business because the United States has, since 1974, restricted such immigration. In addition, two newspaper companies receive daily South Korean newspapers and photo-

copy them in order to deliver homeland news to Korean immigrants. We shall treat the ethnic media in detail in Chapter X.

The Korean business enterprises in the second cell do not have a commercial tie with the homeland, but their economic function is to provide Korean immigrants with specific services. The Korean business enterprises, which provide such services as accounting, legal counselling, real estate and insurance brokerage, help Korean immigrants to adjust to the institutions of the larger society. These business enterprises are run by early comers, most of whom entered the United States as students and have acquired higher education at American universities. In response to the Korean immigrants' inclination to "stick together" or to seek out ethnic ease and taste, Korean restaurants, bars, barber shops, and beauty salons have come into being. About 20 Korean restaurants and bars have emerged in New York City; some of them provide a "giseng" (a traditional household female entertainer) service to their ethnic customers. All the major community affairs, formal or informal, such as business luncheons and speeches, welcome parties for South Korean celebrities, alumni meetings, meetings of ethnic associations, love affairs, match-making, and singles' dancing take place in Korean restaurants. Koreans like to talk while eating or drinking.

Since the Korean enterprises both in the first and second cells mainly cater to Korean customers, the continuous growth of these business enterprises entirely depends as much upon the increase in the population of Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area as it does upon their economic success in new economic environment. Keen economic competition has arisen among these business enterprises to attract ethnic customers from among a limited population pool. These businesses buy the most of the commercial advertisements in ethnic newspapers and on ethnic television programs. However, compared with the Korean business enterprises in both the third and the fourth cell, these businesses catering to only Korean immigrants are small in number.

The commercial enterprises in the third cell have been established and been expanded because of the international trade between the United States and South Korea. Except for the Korean Karate (or Taekwondo) components, the businesses in the third cell deal with consumer goods largely aimed at non-Korean American urban ethnic minorities. As we shall see later, the majority of the Korean retail shops are located at the vicinity of the non-white, ghetto areas of New York City. Blacks and Hispanics are their favorite customers; the business enterprises presuppose the dominant trend of mass consumption among these minorities.

Korean immigrants import such consumer goods as wigs, eyelashes, clothing, handbags, gloves, and other similar goods from South Korea and "dump" them in the larger inner cities of the United States. We have already discussed in Chapter III the basic economic mechanisms by which South Korea produces such consumer goods and of how the South Korean economy has become highly dependent upon the economy of both the United States and Japan. We shall present in detail a case study of the development of the wig industry in South Korea as one of the major economic entry points for Korean immigrants. In total, these minority-oriented business enterprises constitute a large portion of the Korean retail or wholesale businesses. Several Korean immigrant millionaires have come out of these business enterprises. The stores dealing with these cheap, miscellaneous goods are the fastest-growing businsses in the third cell. These stores are frequently called "discount stores" in which the prices of each item rarely surpass $10. Some 250 Korean "discount" stores have emerged in the New York metropolitan area. A high proportion of some 350 wig stores in the New York metropolitan area, as we shall see later, have become "discount stores" by adding to their lines cheap accessory goods, most of which are imported from South Korea. Some 200 clothing stores are run predominantly by Korean immigrants who have learned small business skills in the

United States. The clothing stores need competent Korean salesmen or salesgirls who are equipped with good English and have sensitivity to "salesmanship" for American customers. Partly because Korean immigrants have as yet not attained a high level of American cultural sophistication, and partly because most of the clothes they deal are imported from South Korea, Korean clothing stores do not respond swiftly to changes in style in women's clothes. This explains why the Korean clothing stores are mainly confined to men's wear.

Except for wig wholesalers or importers, the Korean importers dealing with the consumer goods cannot react swiftly to the sudden changes in American fashions because those consumer items are imported from South Korea where style changes occur less suddenly. This has posed one of the major handicaps for the Korean business enterprises. As one way of solving this problem, the South Korean government has simplified prodedures for exports. Another way of solving this problem is as follows: Korean businessmen in New York City have begun to produce some labor-intensive consumer goods like clothing and jewelry in New York City. For instance, a Korean garment importer has established a garment manufacturing factory in downtown Manhattan. A Korean newspaper quoted him as saying: "By using current American designs we can supply fashionable items in good

time. Furthermore, we no longer worry about the problem of quotas."

Except for a very few "big" garment stores, the retail businesses in the third cell have started with small amounts of capital. Initial investments in these retail enterprises ranged from $10,000 to $20,000. For this reason, new immigrants with little capital enter these retail businesses first. Many successful shopkeepers then have shifted to business enterprises in the fourth cell, many of which require much larger investments. In addition to small capital requirement, the Korean retailers in the third cell can purchase, on a credit basis, the retail items from Korean wholesalers or importers. The majority of the Korean garment retailers cannot gain an access to the credit from American wholesalers. This also explains why the Korean clothing retailers cannot handle expensive, fashionable clothing items that are manufactured in the United States or imported by American wholesalers. The availability of credit to Korean retailers from Korean wholesalers is an enormous advantage to the retailers with little capital but a big disadvantage to the wholesalers who also have to run their business on limited capital. Because South Korean exporters are competing with one another for the exports of more goods, the Korean importers in the United States can also import from South Korea many of their items on the basis

of supplier provided credit. However, in some cases, Korean wholesalers find it difficult to collect money from Korean retailers. Some Korean retailers have bought, on a credit basis, as much goods as possible from Korean wholesalers, and have sold out and simply disappeared. Some Korean wholesalers have done the same thing to South Korean exporters after having established a credit line with them.

The Korean shopkeepers in the third cell maintain close commercial ties with various Korean wholesalers in New York's "Korea-town" on Broadway between 31st and 23rd streets. One of the "discount store" retailers advised a newcomer: "If you want to run this business, you must keep close contact with the Broadway wholesalers. You must pick up things there almost every morning." The New York Post described the business climate of "Korean-town" in 1975:

> "This is probably the closest things we have to a Koreatown," said Ben Q. Limb, a friendly 38-year-old Korean as he waved his hand around a smoky restaurant called Kalbi House, on Broadway between 30th and 31st Sts. "This reminds me of a teahouse in Korea, where people sit and talk for hours!"
>
> At every table, conservatively-dressed Korean businessmen were busy exchanging business cards and eating their Kalbi (beef spareribs barbecued over charcoal) and Kimchi (the volcano-hot cabbage pickle found on most Korean tables). "No Koreans are living in this area," said Limb. "But on Broadway between 23rd and 31st Sts., there are 250 to 300 Korean import businesses and five Korean-owned restaurants."
>
> Limb, who had agreed to introduce a reporter around, then beckoned the president of the Korean Hair Goods Dealers Assn. to the table. "Wigs,"

> said Young Sam Song. " Korean-made wigs were a very big import item until recently. But now the wig business seems to be falling off, and people are importing everything from men's shirts to gift items. "All the things that used to be "Made in Japan ," he laughed, "are now being made in Morea." And leaving his business card he went back to work.
>
> Lim said both he and Song are typical of many Koreans, now in their late 30s, who came here as graduate students 10 years ago. "Neither of us had planned to stay," he said. "But as the political situation in South Korean grew more and more oppressive, I, for one, chose not to return.[4]"

By 1978 the "Koreatown" had greatly expanded, renovating the decaying business district. Its Korean character is emphasized by the Korean-language commercial signs that have been installed. During the two years from 1975 to 1978, the number of Korean restaurants in the area had almost doubled, indicating a rapid increase of business transactions in "Koreatown." As the volume of the trade between the United States and South Korea has increased recently, about 190 business branches of South Korean manufacturers have settled in and around the area.

Unlike the Korean business enterprises mentioned above, the Korean Karate (or "Taekwondo") businesses provide services rather than goods. But the Korean Karate businesses, like wholes and retail businesses, have been established through commercial ties with the home country. In the homeland the "Taekwondo" has been a traditional art of self-defense. In response to the emergence of the new youth-oriented culture in the United States in the 1960's, Korean immigrants have introduced this Korean art into the United

States. In doing this, Korean immigrants have commercialized and rationalized the art into a business. About 30 Taekwondo gymnasiums are found in the New York metropolitan area. Korean Taekwondo men have organized a World Taekwondo Association in the United States and have held annual Taekwondo contests. The United States Army and the military academies have begun to recognize the military usefulness of the Taekwondo and to employ an increasing number of Korean Taekwondo instructors.

Korean business enterprises in the fourth cell are typical small American businesses. Both the supply of, and the demand for, the goods and services they provide are met within the United States market. They cater to all racial and ethnic groups in the New York area. But a high proportion of them are located in "transitional areas" of New York City. For Korean immigrants, to engage in such busineses as liquor stores, gas stations, stationery stores, furniture and hardware stores is a manifest symbol of economic achievement in the United States because they are no longer dependent upon an ethnic market. Many successful shopkeepers in the third cell, especially wig retailers, have switched to these businesses, the opening of which usually requires large amounts of capital. The shopkeeprs who run these "capital-intensive" businesses tend to be old timers with relatively long experience in American society. But many

new Korean immigrants, who have smuggled in dollars from South Korea, have entered these businesses. Fruit and vegetable stores, fish stores, dry cleaning establishments, laundries, and garment subcontractors are exceptions. As we shall see in a case study, fruit and vegetable stores are run by new immigrants with little capital. It must be emphasized that, in the fourth cell, Korean immigrants have succeeded older white ethnics in operating small business enterprises in New York City.

In addition to focusing their sales efforts on the new urban minorities, Korean immigrants have faced other changes in the structure of urban America. Most central cities have, between the 1950's and mid-'70's, declined in population while population growth has been concentrated in the suburbs, middle-sized cities, and exurbia. This new urbanism has taken place at the time when there has been a heavy influx of blacks from the South and the West Indies, of Puerto Ricans, and of other minorities into the inner cities. This fundamental shift, although an accidental phenomenon for Korean immigrants, is an important factor determining the way in which Korean immigrants have made occupational niches in the present economic structure of America. The majority of Korean retail shops in both the third and the fourth cell cater to blacks and other minorities by being located in "transitional areas" where old Jewish,

Irish, and Italian shopkeepers are moving or dying out and are being replaced by the increasing number of the new minorities.

For instance, about 30 Korean small businesses such as furniture, liquor, toy, wig, hardware, gift, Korean food, fruit and vegetables, and "discount" stores have emerged since 1973 along the "Fordham Road" shopping areas in the Bronx.

> Gone, by the tens of thousands, are the middle-class Jews, Irish and Italians who used to come to Fordham Road to trade up to $200 suits and $1,000 bedroom suites.
>
> But in their place have come tens of thousands of generally poorer Spanish-speaking people and blacks who may have less to spend individually, but who collectively are spending heavily enough on moderately priced goods to keep Fordham Road the sixth biggest shopping center in the Metropolitan area.[5]

Korean immigrants find new opportunities in ghetto businesses where a heavy proportion of old, white, minority shopkeepers, especially Jews, are retiring from their businesses because of old age. The second or third generation of these older immigrants have already entered the mainstream of the American occupational structure, a fact that leads them to be reluctant to take over their parents' small retail businesses. The Korean small businesses relevant to this ethnic succession in business include all the small businesses illustrated in the fourth cell.

Their total number runs to more than 1,000 throughout the New York metropolitan area. Korean immigrants are active especially in such businesses as fruit and vegetable stores, fish stores, stationery, drycleaning and grocery stores, laundries, and small-sized supermarkets, all of which, as we shall see later in a case study of Korean fruit and vegetable stores, need cheap family labor for successful business management.

## The Newest Busineses

By taking advantage of a commercial interaction between the United States and South Korea, Korean immigrants have begun to open the business enterprises aimed at non-Korean customers (the third cell). Some of the businesses are entirely new to the United States market. Korean immigrants, for instance, have greatly contributed to the commercialization of wigs in the United States; they have initiated and developed the commercial exploitation of the Korean self-defense art in the United States. They have relatively easy access to credit supplied by Korean wholesalers. This is an economic advantage that an ethnic tie can provide to Korean retailers. The Korean immigrants, who possess little capital and command poor English, have entered these retail businesses on the bases of ethnic capital and connection. Many of them have accumulated their own capital out of these retail busi-

nesses and have moved to a "higher" level of American businesses, which have no Korean connection either in origin, style or flavor.

The Korean retail businsses are typically "inner city" ghetto businesses, largely catering to the poor, the elderly, and new racial minorities. They have emerged during a fundamentally declining trend in American small businesses. American small businessmen are on the defensive because of the emergence of big shopping centers, big department stores, and franchised chain stores. The majority of the Korean shopkeepers have taken over small businesses from retiring Jewish shopkeepers in inner cities. Established Korean shopkeeprs advised prospective Korean small businessmen: "The prospect is very good if you buy a store in a good location from old Jewish people."

In employing family labor and initiating aggressive commercial activities, Korean immigrants attempt to seek new economic opportunities among generally declining small businesses in New York's inner city. The Korean ethnic newspapers have reported the frequent incidents of night robberies that happened to the Korean ghetto merchants who keep their stores open until midnight. By utilizing their entire family, Korean retail business operators can maintain long store hours without paying overtime wage rates. Furthermore, Korean retail owners rarely observe various American holidays,

and since their employees are family members, they do not pay holiday wages. By so cutting down on labor costs, Korean retail businsses reduce over-all costs, and are able to compete with supermarket and chain store prices. The statement by a Korean businessman, "In this business you can earn only labor costs," means to Korean immigrants that if you do not have any specific skills that are saleable in the United States market, you might better employ yourself and your family members in labor-intensive businesses. Moreover, by employing family members or other close relatives, Korean retail businssesmen hope to eradicate "inside enemies" -- non-related ethnic employees who steal cash and goods or give away goods to their friends or relatives who visit the store as customers.

In addition to family members, Korean businesses as a whole predominantly employ new Korean immigrants without capital or specific skills. Since greenhorns cannot find "American" jobs, they are easily exploited by Korean employees. Low wages, overwork, and unpaid overtime are the common forms of exploitation. But, while being exploited, greenhorns learn how to run a business in the United States. Korean employers complain frequently the absence of steady workers among the Korean immigrant population: "As soon as we have trained them how to manage a business, they quit to start their own."

Ethnic succession in business has mainly taken place in the business enterprises whose supply and demand is in the non-Korean sector (the fourth cell). Those Korean shopkeepers, who have acquired some capital out of either such labor-intensive businesses as fruit and vegetable stores and dry-cleaning stores, or the businesses selling cheap, Korean products, tend to move toward "comfortable" and "clean" businesses such as stationery, liquor, jewelry, shoe, and hardware stores. Or they tend to acquire chain franchises. Many of these "higher" level "American" businesses are located in white neighborhoods or in suburban cities. These Korean shopkeepers, who locate in white, middle-class neighborhoods, are proud of the fact that they are catering to "only whites." A typical example of such pride is: "In my shop the New York Times is sold in a greater number than the Daily News," or, "No one touched my store during the last blackout."

These general statements need specific substantiation. By conducting a detailed study on the two predominant Korean businesses -- the wig and the fruit and vegetable businesses in the New York metropolitan area -- we will specify these generalizations. The two business enterprises deserve special attention because they have provided Korean immigrants with major economic entry points into American society.

## The Korean Fruit and Vegetable Business: A Case Study

The Emergence of Korean Greengrocers. Korean immigrants began to enter the fruit and vegetable business in New York City in 1971. The number of Korean-run fruit and vegetable stores has increased rapidly since 1974. By 1978 some 350 Korean fruit and vegetable stores exist in almost every neighborhood, white, black, and Hispanic, of the New York metropolitan area. Korean greengrocers cater to all segments of the population of New York City. In entering the fruit and vegetable business, Korean immigrants have revived the older process of the immigrant striving for the ethnic take-over of ghetto business enterprises. A vivid illustration is provided by the New York Times:

> "It's like this," said a veteran produce supplier in a raspy Brooklyn accent, as he unpacked a crate of extra fancy figs at a Bronx Hunts Point Market stall. "When I first came into this business -- that was before the war -- to do business here you had to know Jewish phrases. Then, some years later you had to pick up a few Italian words to make it. Now I'm trying for all the Korean words I can. There are that many Korean buyers now.'[6]
>
> If Ill Y. Chung were Chinese and he had immigrated here, he might well have gone into the laundry or restaurant business. If he were Greek, he might have gone into a coffee shop or delicatessen. But Mr. Chung is Korean and so he entered the new popular Korean-American enterprise: he opened a fruit and vegetable store.
>
> "What else can I do?" asked Mr. Chung, 35 years old and the holder of two masters degrees on city planning from a school in Korea and one in mechani-

> cal engineering from the University of Hawaii. "I need money but there are no good jobs for Koreans." ... In fruits and vegetables, traditionally an immigrant business, first it was Jews, when it centered in the Washington market area, then Italians. And now up in the Bronx, it's the Koreans. [7]

The Korean immigrants, who entered the United States via Latin American nations, first started the fruit and vegetable business in 1971. These Korean immigrants had entered various businesses in Latin America. They had encountered severe difficulties as they struggled to progress from designated agricultural colonies of original settlement to the metropolitan areas of Latin America. From there they migrated again to inner cities of the United States. During the years of uncertain and hostile journeys in foreign countries, they had acquired a business acumen and a special sensitivity to economic opportunities. Furthermore, as we might recall, they were heavily drawn from North Korean refugees in South Korea, who constitute a tough-minded, aggressive, and marginal group of South Korean society. It is no wonder that this Latin American, Korean immigrant contingent first detected economic opportunity in the fruit and vegetable business when they settled in New York City. News of their economic success in this business quickly spread throughout the Korean community in the New York area. New Korean immigrants from South Korea quickly followed them in entering the business. This economic news also spread to

the Koreans in Philadelphia, resulting in the emergence of Korean fruit and vegetable enterprises in that city.

The Three Causal Factors. The three structural factors can be identified with the emergence of the Korean fruit and vegetable business. First of all, the business can be opened with small capital and can be operated and managed without great knowledge of English. Given the small amounts of capital available, Korean immigrants with high economic motivation have entered this business:

> Mr. Huh, who immigrated here five years ago, started his immigrant life as a cleaningman; a few months later he became a T.V. repairman. For the first year in the United States he saved about $4,000. Mr. Huh found a Korean partner and invested his savings into the opening of a fruit and vegetable store in Manhattan. In four years he has earned more than $100,000. Mr. Huh now employs eight workers...[8]

Secondly, Korean immigrants with an abundance of family labor but little capital have either pushed out or taken over the businesses of old Jewish and Italian shopkeepers who are too old to compete with a new generation of relatively young and economically aggressive Koreans. A Japanese journalist wrote on New York's Korean fruit and vegetable business and observed the importance of family labor in the running of the business:

> Mr. Kim bought his store two years ago from a Jewish American for the total payment of $15,000 -- $10,000 in store price and $5,000 in key money. He and his son daily purchase vegetables: at four o'clock every

> morning when the dawn is coming, they get up and drive to Hunts Point in the Bronx where a city-run wholesale market is located ...
>
> In the market they run and run in order to buy at low prices as many as one-hundred-seventy different kinds of vegetables and fruits. All the transactions are made in cash. At 7 o'clock they return to the store and mobilize the rest of the family members in order to wash and trim vegetables. Here we can find the Koreans' secret of economic success in the business. In American supermarkets they do not wash and trim...[9]

The Korean shopkeepers, who have not sufficient family labor, employ new Korean immigrants who otherwise could not find jobs in the American labor market. They exploit these non-unionized Korean immigrants. The president of the Korean Association of Fruit and Vegetable Businesses of New York wrote on this matter:

> ...Recently, the officials from the Food Employee Union have frequently visited the Korean fruit and vegetable stores, asking for a collective mutual contract with the Union. If we continue to turn down their offers, it may be possible for them to picket in front of our stores or to attach a protest statement to our store windows. Thus a ready-made answer should be prepared in advance to stave off their demands. We can make an excuse as follows: 'This store is run by family members,' or, 'We, partners, run this store.' It should be noted that American law allows three partners at a maximum. We should take a special consideration in employing Americans because the Union officials may encourage them to become Union members. Once they belong to the Union, extra expenses such as overtime payments, the hourly minimum wage, and social security taxes follow. Small Korean fruit and vegetable stores cannot afford to pay all these extra costs...[10]

Since new Korean immigrant workers are, as a whole, well-educated, individualistic, and ambitious enough to start

their own business or find other, better economic opportunities, Korean fruit and vegetable shopkeepers, who cannot mobilize sufficient family labor, face the problem of continuously securing new laborers among the latest arriving Korean immigrants. Ethnic newspapers carry daily advertisements of job offers by fruit and vegetable store owners. One of the advertisements runs like this: "Urgently seek healthy young man who wants to work in a vegetable store." There is, however, a quick turnover of Korean workers in Korean fruit and vegetable stores. One Korean greengrocer complained: "To employ Koreans is really a headache. They work only two or three days and quit without giving notice. One guy started to work in themorning and disappeared in the evening without giving a word." Sophisticated and well-educated Korean immigrants are reluctant to work long hours at low wages. Thus six Korean workers, employed at a Korean fruit and vegetable store on 14th Street in Manhattan, petitioned the United States Labor Department because they felt that they were being exploited by being paid lower than minimum wages. Mainly because of this difficulty in securing easily-exploitable workers among the Korean population, a Korean greengrocer suggested to a newcomer that: "If you do not have sufficient family members willing to help you, you might be better not to start this business."

Those Korean greengrocers, who employ sufficient family

members, can compete with supermarket chains in the fruit and vegetable business because they can work the long hours necessary to do the daily shopping at the Hunts Point wholesale market. This daily shopping is necessary to provide a daily supply of fresh fruit and vegetables to customers. In addition, family members are effectively employed in the clipping, sorting, and watering necessary to reduce spoilage and waste. Thus the existence of family workers provide Korean greengrocers with a marginal advantage over their competitors, supermarkets and non-Korean fruit and vegetable store owners, most of whom receive delivery service for their retail products.

Intra-Ethnic Conflict. Partly because of these factors, many Korean immigrants have set up new fruit and vegetable stores without buying established businesses. Once Korean immigrants open new stores in a neighborhood, nearby non-Korean stores face a serious competition. Many of the older Jewish or Italian stores have been forced out of business, and a new form of competition has emerged among Korean shopkeepers. Her is an example of how an inter-ethnic competition transforms itself into an intra-ethnic competition:

> Mr. Lee, his two brothers and one sister set up in 1975 a new fruit and vegetable store near the South Bronx. They invested into the new business their total savings which they had earned through menial work. At the time of opening their store, they were uncertain about their economic future partly because

they had to compete with an established Italian shop located a few blocks away. But, Mr. Lee once boasted: "When we started our business, they (the Italian shop) operated four cashiers. Six months later, the number of cashiers was reduced to two. About nine months later, the owner came to our shop and asked whether we were interested in buying his shop." Mr. Lee's family could not take over the shop because of the lack of capital. The shop eventually went to another Korean, named Mr. Oh, who owned two fruit and vegetable stores at the time when he purchased the shop. Since Mr. Oh's taking over the shop, a fierce intra-ethnic competition has taken place between the two Korean stores. Mr. Oh could purchase retail items from wholesalers at much lower prices than Mr. Lee because Mr. Oh, an owner of three retail stores, buys large amounts of retail items. Thus Mr. Oh's retail prices were generally lower than Mr. Lee's. Mr. Lee once grumbled that Mr. Oh's store was practicing "dumping."

The intra-ethnic competition in the fruit and vegetable business also takes place when Korean immigrants buy stores from Americans. The "key money" for buying the fruit and vegetable stores in New York City has increased substantially because Korean immigrants have competed among themselves in purchasing stores from non-Koreans. In 1974 the amount of "key money" to purchase a fruit and vegetable store was approximately five or six times that of the total weekly sales of the store. By 1977 the ratio of "key money" to the total weekly sales has increased to one-to-seven or -eight. In the face of this increased capital requirement, Korean immigrants have opened new stores by leasing stores which became vacant after their owners were forced out of business. These newly-opened Korean stores have encroached

upon the sales territory of the nearby stores, regardless of whether the latter are run by Americans or Koreans. If the new Korean greengrocers compete with "small" American-run stores, they can easily overcome the competition because of their lower costs. But, if they encounter other Korean greengrocers, the chance is that "they would ruin each other." Korean ethnic newspapers frequnetly offer advice to potential greengrocers when they carry articles on the Korean fruit and vegetable business: "Competition among our 'kyopo' (fellow countrymen) should be avoided."

Thus, one of the major functions of the Korean Association of Fruit & Vegetable Businesses, which was established in 1974, is to defend the interests of established Korean stores against newer Korean greengrocers. The Association has systematically discouraged the opening of fruit and vegetable stores by new arrivals. An example of this can be found in the following episode:

> A Korean, named Mr. Lee, is now in the process of setting up a new fruit and vegetable store at the vicinity of an established Korean store located in the South Bronx. The established Korean greengrocer, named Mr. Kim, reported this event to the Association, saying that if Mr. Lee will open the business, both of them will lose business because of the limited number of customers.
>
> The Association's officials came to Mr. Lee and persuaded him not to open the business by promising him to grant him all the expenses that he had spent in the setting-up of the business, out of the Association's fund. But Mr. Lee turned down their offer. Thus, in order to set an example designed to curb new openings by other Koreans as well as

> to rescue Mr. Kim's store, the Association has decided to open a new store in the same block where Mr. Lee will open his store, and has planned to dump vegetables at wholesale prices.

By taking advantage of many Korean immigrants' aspirations for economic opportunities in the fruit and vegetable business, Korean business "hawks" emerged at the initial period of the Koreans' entry into the greengrocery business. The hawks set up new stores and, after running them for a while, sold them to Korean newcomers, reaping "smart" profits in the form of "key money." Or they purchased stores from older ethnic owners and resold them to recent arrivals at inflated prices. A gimmick frequently involved in this kind of resale was the fraudulent inflation of sales volume. A Koren ethnic newspaper reported on this matter:

> A (Korean) couple in Flushing had worked sixteen hours a day for two years and had made some savings: the husband had labored in menial jobs and the wife had toiled at a garment factory. Their dream was simple: they wanted to have their own business rather than work for someone else.
>
> One day, a church member (in their Korean church) approached and asked them whether they wanted to buy a fruit and vegetable store, saying that the owner of the store was a conscientious Christian. He added that the business of the store was very good, but that the store owner had to sell the store because of the lack of hands.
>
> When the couple heard this offer, they were very excited. The couple loitered around the store for two weeks and watched the customers patronizing the store in order to determine the volume of transactions. Then they decided to buy the store

> for the payment of $20,000 in "key money" because the store had always been crowded with so many customers.
>
> They finally took over the store. But two or three weeks later they realized that they had been swindled. The once-teeming block customers suddenly disappeared. The former owner had lowered his retail prices in half while they watched his store.[12]

Inter-Ethnic Conflict. We have so far discussed the three factors conducive to the emergence of the Korean fruit and vegetable business in New York City: (1) the business requires small capital but produces quick cash turnover; (2) success in the business needs hard-working family labor; (3) such a labor-intensive business cannot be provided optimally by supermarkets. Aggressive Korean immigrants have combined these three factors and have emerged as one of the dominant ethnic groups in the fruit and vegetable business. As far as the fruit and vegetable business is concerned, an ethnic business succession had not occurred until Korean immigrants entered the business.

In the process of entering such businesses, Korean greengrocers have encountered some discrimination by Jewish and Italian wholesalers at Hunts Point market. In response, Korean greengrocers for the first time in the history of New York's Korean community, staged a mass demonstration in the spring of 1977 "to protest what they say is discrimination against them in pricing practices and even in the allocation of parking services."[13] A Korean ethnic newspaper covered

this event as a front-page story with the headline: "The Demonstration Showed Our Solidarity for a Common Interest." About 100 Korean greengrocers participated in the demonstration at Hunts Point market, which was formally touched off by a "racist slur" by a Jewish salesman in the market. The salesman was interviewed by an Eastside & Westside reporter and was quoted as saying: "All Koreans are stupid ... They are controlled by Sung Myong Moon's Unification Church."[14] Faced with the protest by Korean greengrocers, the salesman apologized and insisted that the newspaper report was quite different from what he had actually said. But the Korean Association of Fruit & Vegetable Businesses used this episode as an excuse to demonstrate their muscle. But basic structural conditions had led Koreans to undertake the demonstration.

American wholesalers have frequently taken advantage of those Korean retailers' inadequacy in English and their lack of business experience. The wholesalers have sometimes sold them "rotten" fruits or vegetables. They have also sold their products to Korean greengrocers at higher than market prices. Some Koreans were beaten up in the process of complaining about unfair business transactions; some Koreans were robbed at the market's parking lot in the South Bronx. Korean retailers have fequently fought with white retailers over parking space at the Hunts Point market. When physical

violence occurred, Koreans became the victims because of their small size. In some cases, several Koreans ganged up and knocked out white Americans when they saw fellow Koreans fighting with Americans over parking space and other minor matters. However, all these incidents directed against Koreans have taken place on an individual basis. No charge of systematic, organized "conspiracy" has been lodged by wholesalers against Korean greengrocers. But the Korean Association of Fruit & Vegetable Business, with an increasing membership, felt that the newspaper interview provided an appropriate opportunity for them to demonstrate Korean "clout" and thus to put psychological pressure on the Hunts Point establishment.

On the whole, wholesalers at the Hunts Point market welcome the entry of Koreans into the business. This is so because, as one wholesaler whose family started their fruit and vegetable supply business three generations ago with a pushcart in lower Manhattan, said: "They're good businessmen, they buy good produce and they pay their bills in cash ... That's something we could use around here from everybody."[15] Wholesalers contributed some $3,000 in 1977 to the Korean Association of Fruit & Vegetable Business. The Association used part of this contribution to pay the cost of its 1977 (annual) picnic for its members and their families.

The Greengrocery Business as a Means of Capital Accumulation. For the majority of Korean greengrocers, the fruit and vegetable business is just a means to accumulate capital from which they could start other types of "clean" and "comfortable" small businesses. Several Korean greengrocers own more than one store and adopt a "chain store" management to run them; but the majority of Korean greengrocers do not enter the businesses as a life-long, permanent enterprise. Frequent changes in store ownership characterize most of the Korean fruit and vegetable stores. Partly because of this, Korean greengrocers have not formed cooperatives through which (as some of them advocate) they could do group purchasing at much lower prices from the producers in California and Florida. One of the basic reasons for the frequent turnover of the Korean fruit and vegetable stores is that to run such a business requires hard, painstaking work. Some Korean greengrocers said that two years is a maximum duration for them to stand the toil of running their businesses: "No matter how much energy, health and stamina one may have, one cannot stand more than two years of this daily toil." They use extreme forms of expression such as "bloody urine," "drastic loss of weight" and "benumbed fingers like a leper's," when they describe the daily struggle to operate their businesses. Many Korean greengrocers have "made it" by getting out of that business and have reinvested the capital

they acquired from it into other small businesses that require less self and family exploitation. In doing so they have converted this self-exploited labor into capital, and thus decreased the amount of necessary primitive exploitation necessary for capital accumulation. Some of them, however, sold their store in order to engage in other small businesses, but have returned to the greengrocery business, saying that: "No small businesses in America can beat the fruit and vegetable business." Some of them have become absentee owners by "renting" their stores to new Korean immigrants under agreements that a percentage of business profits be paid to them. Most of these absentee owners own and run other small businesses.

To sum up, the economic entry of Korean immigrants requires the existence of several factors that Korean immigrants to the United States possess. First of all, we must recall that Korean immigrants could continue their old family structure in the new land because the United States Immigration Act of 1965 has made it possible for them to form a three-generation extended family in the new land. Thus some Korean immigrants with an abundance of family labor but little capital have found economic opportunities in the labor-intensive fruit and vegetable business during the initial stage of economic adjustment to the United States. Korean immigrants possess a family-centered success ethic which

causes each family member to be willing to devote himself to the family business. This goes together with an intense economic motivation of Koreans to establish a "natural" affinity toward the greengrocery business, which requires labor intensity and willingness to exploit oneself for economic mobility. Their entry into the business has revived and sustained a classical American immigration pattern of ethnic succession in economic activity. However, the Korean immigrants' economic opportunities through the fruit and vegetable business are small compared with those granted by the Korean wig business in the United States. Unlike the Korean fruit and vegetable business whose economic boundary has largely been confined to a few big cities on the Eastern Seaborad, the Korean wig business has established a national market throughout the United States. The Korean wig business emerged as a result of quite different commercial mechanisms. As the Korean fruit and vegetable business is a typical example of the Korean business enterprises in the fourth cell, so the Korean wig business is an example of the business enterprises in the third cell, in which the Korean businesses in the United States maintain close commercial ties with South Korea.

## The Korean Wig Industry in both South Korean and the United States: A Case Study

The Impact of the American Fashion Movement. A sudden change in American life styles in the 1960's has largely

affected the development of the wig industry in South Korea; and in importing Korean-made wigs from South Korea, Korean immigrants in the United States found their initial occupational point in the United States. The adoption, since the middle 1960's, of wigs as a fashionable element in personal adornment by some segments of the American population has largely caused the development of the wig manufacturing industry in South Korea, and thereby, the emergence of the Korean immigrants' wig businesses in the United States. The American wig "craze" has provided many Korean immigrants with new economic opportunities even in the centralized business structure of the United States.

The use of wigs, which had been forgotten since the Rococo era -- except by small circles in the theatrical and movie world and by aristocratically-oriented upper classes in both American and Europe -- turned up unexpectedly in the American fashion world in the early 1960's and spread over Europe, Japan, the Arab world and Latin America. The wig fashion both for men and women in America came as part of the permissive, youth-oriented and anti-establishment fashion movement of the 1960's. The wig has appeared as a fashionable item along with such ever-changing fashion items as boots, platform shoes, bell bottom trousers, unisex clothes, mini, midi, maxi, pants suits, and hot pants. All these styles reflect such attributes as "naturalness,"

"easiness," "carefreeness," and "chic." Coupled with these fashion modes, "the making-your-own-fashion" constitutes an implicit ideology of contemporary American fashion world, indicating an artificial sloppiness in the life styles of the American urban masses. Contemporary American urban masses accept and discard styles which seem to be natural, easy, and unrestrained. Since they can choose every possible style, they could accept no style authentically, i.e. with a natural, unself-conscious, taken-for-granted attitude.

The civil rights movement and black nationalism have greatly affected black dress and costume styles. One of the effects is a massive adoption of wigs by blacks as an expression of the idea of Negritude itself, French-African in origin. The wig, in the 1960's, became a symbol of ethnic pride for the majority of blacks in the United States. The idea of Negritude, with an emphasis on the glorification of an unknown African past, has been reflected in the making of black's wig styles. The Afro-wigs, so-called "Numidian Lady" and "Nubian Queen," are the examples for this. The term "Numidian" is derived from "Numidia" which was an ancient kingdom of North Africa corresponding roughly to modern Algeria; "Nubian" means a member of a Negroid people of an ancient kingdom of North East Africa. However, the wig styles for blacks have mainly resulted from a caricaturing of traditional white styles.

For instance, the classical "Cleopatra" style has undergone a little change and has emerged in different names such as "Skin Crown," "Mushroom," and "Skin-Top;" the "Bouffant" style has been imitated for the development of Afro-wig styles such as "Giant Afro Puff," "Darling," and "A Dome of Curls."[16] This kind of artificiality in blacks' life style[17] has directly contributed to the development of the Korean wig industry in South Korea as well as the emergence of the Korean wig business in the United States.

The prevalent use of the wigs among blacks since the middle of the 1960's cannot sufficiently explain why the wig industry has prospered among Koreans both in the United States and South Korea.

Under the impact of American "cultural revolution," the wig has been worn by the segments of the American population that include both black and white, male and female, poor and rich, the young and the old, traditionalists and modernists. The psychological demand for them varies by segment of population and by timing in a fashion cycle.

Middle-aged men under the pressure of American youth-oriented culture are increasingly wearing "toupees" in order to retain images of their vanishing "masculinity."[18] Meanwhile, bank robbers, prostitutes, and stage entertainers use them for their deadly serious businesses. The use of the wig may be economical for the middle-class white housewives

because it may cut down the cost of hairdressing at beauty parlors. All these uses of wigs have made the hair goods industry one of the fastest-growing industries in the United States: for instance, "Between 1965 and 1966, hair goods purchases by dealers from manufacturers and distributors increased by $4,200,000 or 44 percent. This makes wigs, hairpieces, and accessories the industry's fastest growth item."[19]

When so many Americans had suddenly adopted wigs, the demand for them grew so great that traditional American wig-makers could not meet the demand by their domestic production. The basic reason for this is that American wig-makers had produced wigs on the basis of small handicraft, work-shop system; they could not expand their enterprises into a large factory system mainly because of the lack of a cheap labor force in the American labor market. Furthermore, the wig industry, like the garment industry, cannot be completely mechanized or automatized because of requirements of intensive manual labor in the process of planting individual hairs into wig pads.

In the early 1960's when the chemical synthetic thread for wigs was not yet invented, the traditional American wig-makers had to import human hair from South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indochina, and India although they had previously despised these ethnic hair types for the reason of their

darkness, stiffness, and straightness. They had to import them because they could no longer meet the expanding demand for wigs by relying exclusively on European hair.

The development of dyeing technique in the 1960's could make the imported Asian hair look like European hair. In a response to this technique and the demand for human hair, Korean hair-exporters emerged in the early 1960's. Their immediate customers were the American and Japanese wig makers who fashioned the hair into merchandisable products. Korean vendors or peddlers of human hair were purchasing agents for Korean hair-exporters. They made a house-to-house visit to Korean homes in order to collect human hair from the heads of Korean women.

At that time, they were frequently seen in every alley of Seoul city, yelling: "We buy human hair" ; it was also a common phenomenon in Korean rural villages to see these hair collectors inducing rural women to sell their center-parted long hair.

The Emergence of Korean Wig Manufacturers. Meanwhile, Korean hair-exporters became aware of the economic opportunities in manufacturing wigs themselves. They could contemplate entering the wig business because they were engaged in exporting other such goods as clothes, gifts, and marine products. Thus they were mentally equipped to move from hair exporters of raw materials to manufacturers and exporters of manufactured hair goods.

Most of the human hair exporters also ran small brokerage companies facilitating foreign trade. In return for receiving commissions, brokerage companies play an intermediary role linking foreign buyers to small domestic producers of labor-intensive goods. These brokerage companies are small in size and are staffed by business technicians who know how to transact foreign trade. In South Korean they are called "oppa sang" ("oppa" is derived from the English word "offer;" "sang" means business in Chinese characters.) Mainly because of the emergence of big business trade corporations represented by the South Korean industrial conglomerates, the "Jaebol" groups, which have encroached upon the traditional functions or interests of the "oppa sang," the functional importance of the brokerage companies has been declining. Furthermore, with the drastic increase of foreign trade, the South Korean government instituted in the early 1970's a centralized brokerage company in order to facilitate the exports by small and medium-sized producers. But the "oppa-sang" played a crucial role in the initial period of South Korean foreign trade, especially of the wig business.

At the initial stage of the Korean wig manufacturing, the size of the factory was small and the jobs were usually performed in the owners' home. In most cases hair exporters became wig manufacturers. Their production was confined to so-called "hand-made wigs."

As the demand for wigs in the United States increased in the middle of the 1960's, the Korean production of hand-made wigs of human hair could not meet the increasing demand because of growing scarcity of human hair and its rising cost. In response to this, the Japanese invention of synthetic thread as a substitute for human hair for wigs revolutionized the wig business. Four leading Korean wig manufacturers had emerged, outpacing all other Korean competitors in factory size and amount of export. These had acquired from a Japanese synthetic thread maker the exclusive right to the new product -- "Kanekalon." The Japanese salesman of the manufacturer had come to South Korea with samples of the new product in order to find Korean buyers. Only the four Korean wig producers appreciated the potential market value of the new product, "Kanekalon." At that time, the majority of Korean wig makers who produced wigs from human hair, could not anticipate a massive demand for the synthetic fiber. A synthetic fiber called "Venicelon" made in Italy and "Elura" in the United States followed the Japanese "Kanekalon." These were supplied to selected Korean wig makers. But those Korean wig makers who gained an early access to the materials expanded their businesses the most.

Many South Korean manufacturers of labor-intensive goods turned to the production of wigs. Partly owing to the production of wigs, the "Daewoo" industrial corporation, for

instance, emerged as one of the leading South Korean capitalistic businesses, the Jaebol. During the late 1960's, about 80 Korean wig manufacturers emerged. At this time, the South Korean government began to encourage and support Korean wig manufacturers by providing them with special loans and tax-exemption on imported materials.

The "Putting-Out" System. A "putting-out" system characterized the early stages of Korean wig manufacturing. Later, after the demand for wigs in the United States had increased, the hair-exporters expanded factory size and began to "put out" work to smaller handicraft workshops run by subcontractors who received allocations of work "put out" by hair exporters or wig manufacturers. Many of the hair-exporters did not own a factory: they pretended to be manufacturers when they contracted with foreign buyers. Thus when they received orders, they "put out" the work to subcontractors. In one case, a big American wig wholesaler provided a Korean wig-maker with capital, materials, and skills. The Korean wig-maker was a subcontractor while the Korean subcontractors under the Korean wig-maker were sub-subcontractors. In the late 1960's when the wig fashion in the United States began to boom, subcontractors increased substantially in number and spread from cities to rural areas. In the late 1960's, the Dana wig manufacturer, for example, had more than 100 subcontractors. But the "putting-out" system was mainly

located in urban areas.

Korean wig making had been from its beginning connected with the American market. Seventy-four percent of the Korean wig products had been sold to American consumers during the years between 1966 and 1972. Almost the entire operation of the Korean wig industry had been governed by fluctuations in demand for wigs in the United States.

When the Korean wig manufacturers received orders from American or Korean wig importers in the United States, they did not face any difficulty in securing subcontractors who either brought workers into their household workshop or placed the job assignments to a worker in his own household. Business was usually conducted on the basis of short-term orders. In rush days we can easily imagine a bunch of Korean girls, most of whom were rural-to-urban migrants, sitting around working tables, doing the continuous work of trimming, cutting, sewing, or planting synthetic threads or human hair on wig pads under sweatshop working conditions. Workshops were usually a part of subcontractors' households. When job assignments were done in workers' households, subcontractors made house-to-house visits to workers' homes in order to direct and supervise working processes.

Some aggressive subcontractors became manufacturers by directly opening contracts with American or Korean buyers in the United States. But most of them were technically

incompetent and financially weak. Thus, they were under the control of wig manufacturers or exporters.

The wig manufacturing process in South Korean usually consists of four main parts. The first is the "roller" team which does the job of cutting and screening synthetic threads; the second is the "cap" team which makes wig-pads; the third is the "post" team which "plants" synthetic threads on the wig-pads by means of sewing machines; the last one is the "skin" team which adds curling and other "artistic" touches to the products produced by the "post" team. Within each team there are also differentiated functional teams. Accordingly, subcontractors are highly differentiated by specific functions and wig manufacturers assign them differentiated work loads.

Wig manufacturers own centralized factories which produce finished products by putting together the parts collected from subcontractors. This "putting-out" system was not efficient in meeting the increasing demand for wigs in the American market. For instance, many American buyers filed "claims" against Korean wig manufacturers demanding compensation for bad quality wigs sold to them. American buyers complained that there were substantial differences in qaulity among wigs for which they paid the same price. This lack of standardization could largely be attributed to the "putting-out" system in which producers do not have a central-

ized and constant process of supervision and control over work. Furthermore, when the number of subcontractors increased and spread to remote rural areas, wig manufacturers faced enormous difficulties in supervising and directing the work of their subcontractors. Although manufacturers sent men to their subcontractors to supervise and direct their work, subcontractors frequently bribed these supervisors by cash payments and by entertainment in local bars.

The Korean "putting-out" system in wig manufacturing has been in a drastic decline since the late 1960's and has been replaced by a centralized factory system into which manufacturers directly recruit female workers. Many factories have instituted dormitory systems in order to house young female migrant workers from rural areas. Big manufacturers employ thousands of female workers who produce not only wigs but also other labor intensive products such as eyelashes and dolls. Thus in less then ten years the Korean wig industry has recapitulated as much as five hundred years of the textile, shoe, hat-making and manufacturing industry in the West.

The Decline of the Korean Wig Industry. One of the main advantages of the Korean wig industry is derived from the abundance of cheap but careful labor. This advantage neutralizes the competition of manufacturing done in the advanced, industrial nations. As has been noted, wig produc-

tion cannot be completely mechanized; it requires intensive manual labor for trimming, cutting, sewing, and curling. The Korean "yogong," female migrant workers aged from 15 to 25 years, are suitable for such jobs. In 1970 they received somewhere between $20 and $25 per month for laboring under sweatshop working conditions. At the initial stage of wig manufacturing they were paid on the basis of piece-rates. By taking advantage of its cheap labor force, the Korean wig manufacturers made substantial profits out of manufacturing a finished product with materials imported from the developed nations, mainly from Japan. The prosperity of the industry has entirely depended on foreign nations both for its supply of materials and its final market. Japanese and American market conditions especially have had accelerating effects on fluctuations in the South Korean wig industry. Thus a hard blow struck the entire Korean wig industry when the world-wide energy crisis of 1973 occurred during the period of the gradual decline of the demand for wigs, especially in the United States. The number of Korean wig manufacturers was reduced from 80 in 1970 to 35 in 1977.[21] The majority of the manufacturers who left the wig business, turned to the production of toys, gloves, dolls, and handbags, etc., which they could produce with little dislocation in their established installations and methods of operation.

At a very early stage of Korean wig manufacturing, the South Korean government, concerned with the Confucian idea of "saving-face," prohibited Korean wig makers from exporting their products, which at that time were entirely made of human hair, on the ground that it would be a national shame to make money out of such an unserious activity. This policy was immediately reversed. By 1970 the wig industry outpaced all other export industries in earning dollars and contributed about 10 percent, 94 million dollars, to the total amount of national exports. Some leading wig manufacturers in 1970 were awarded special citations by South Korean President Park Chunghee for their outstanding accomplishments in the export trade which, as has been discussed in Chapter III, Park's economic policy had encouraged in the effort to accumulate capital. The power and status of Korean wig manufacturers had been so enhanced during the period of their commercial expansion that they had held a series of conferences at leading hotels in Seoul. High-ranking government officials participated, along with Japanese, Italian, and American synthetic fiber-makers. In their business magazine, the Journal of Wig World, they used the slogan "the wig Korea," the advertisement of which had supported the expansion of wig exports into Arab, Latin America, European nations and into the United States. But this enhanced status of the Korean wig industry was tainted by massive dumping practices,

which had largely been caused by the decline of wig useage in the United States. Still, in 1977 the Korean wig industry supplied about 60 percent of the total wigs manufactured in the world and about 90 percent of the wigs sold in the United States.[22]

The Entry of Korean Immigrants into the Wig Business. The Korean emigration to the United States began during the same period that the Korean wig industry emerged in response to the massive use of wigs by American consumers. This coincidence is crucial for the economic success of many Korean immigrants to the United States. Wigs were used to establish a major entry point for Korean immigrants. These immigrants ranged from importers, wholesalers, and dealers to retailers and peddlers. Strictly speaking, there is no distinct line demarcating importers, wholesalers, and dealers: their market roles overlap. In 1974, these Koreans ran 68 importing or wholesaling companies in New York City;[23] in the Washington D.C. area in the same year there were 30 such companies. Korean immigrants owned and operated some 2,500 wig retail shops throughout the United States in 1974,[24] and in the New York metropolitan area they ran some 300 wig shops. But in 1977 the number of Korean wig importers in New York City had been reduced by more than 50 percent from its peak years as many turned to other importing businesses. Similarly, many of the Korean wig shops have turned

to other kinds of retailing. Korean wig peddlers, who were once found in every ghetto shopping area of New York Cith, have almost all left. But, during the early 1970's, the comparatively small Korean wig business had been the leading occupation used by Korean immigrants to "make it" in the United States, despite the centralized character of the dominant business structure of contemporary American society.

The Wig Industry in America. Before the emergence of mass production of synthetic wigs, American wig men -- wig makers, dealers, and hairdressers -- had run their business based upon "scarcity" and "craftsmanship."

A sense of scarcity can easily be imposed on clientele because human hair, especially European hair, is -- as a commercial product -- scarce; and its conversion into a wig needs a great deal of skill by wig makers or hairdressers. Thus wig makers can sustain an occupational image that they are artists and their products are the works of art. As a result, an "art" wig is not a thing to bargain about; the price charged is dependent upon what kind of clientele is being dealt with.

This craft occupational ideology is on the defensive as the mass production of machine-made wigs emerges. For instance, Joseph Fleischer, who brought wig-craftsmanship from Austria to America as an immigrant and became a leading

figure in the field of American wig-making during the decade of the 1940's, complained that: "Few care about skill to go through the tedious slow and complicated apprenticeship that was his as well as the master-craftsmen under his tutelage ... This is especially important in wigs since a machine-made foundation can never fit the head properly."[25]

This craft ideology still survives among French wig makers as well as among traditional American wig makers. In the case of French wig-making, the whole process of production is accomplished through an assembly-line of female workers. In France, too, individual craftsmanship in wig-making has been replaced by the use of differentiated functional skills in a factory system. And yet the commercial advertisement runs: "Delicately wefted for lightness and strength by master French craftsmen. The world's finest hand-made wig, created in France by master artists for the women accustomed to buying the very best."

And the French wig manufacturers invented such sophisticated accessory items as wig cleaners, wig care kits, wig driers, wig color rings, wig sprays, wig pins, and wig perfume.

As the demand for wigs by the American lower classes or by the marginal ethnic groups such as blacks and Puerto Ricans had dramatically increased, the conventional beauty shops could not satisfy the massive demand by these low-income

people because receiving an artistic service from hairdressers in beauty shops was too expensive for those people who need mass production of "wear-as-you-buy-it." In this context a market researcher for the beauty shop business recommended to beauty shop owners that:

> Wigs and hairpieces should never be regarded as strictly retail items. Many hairpieces today are sold as part of a professional styling service. A wig is also different from any other retail item as it gives the patron another "head" to have serviced and provides the dealer and shop owner with a whole new category of accessory products which of necessity must be sold in conjunction with the sale of hair goods.
>
> The wig business belongs in the beauty salon, for the salon is the one stop shopping unit for everything and anything connected with hairpieces ... Wigs are not only a commodity, they are a way of life. The sale of a wig is just as personal a matter as the sale of a personal beauty service ... The beauty salon staff has a close personal relationship with the patron, knows her needs, knows the way she wears her hair, and is capable of giving advice on her color shades, conditioning products, etc. Even if she knows all this and still goes ahead and buys the wig, the odds are she will be dissatisfied.[26]

In addition to not wanting to charge the higher prices for furnishing individualized services, many beauty shop owners had been reluctant to supply new wig items and to offer the accompanying services of shaping and cleaning. This might explain the relatively slow acceptance of the new and profitable item by beauty salon owners.

In 1967 about 26 percent of the country's beauty salons retailed wigs and other hair pieces; and in 1968

about 43 percent of the shops did some retailing of wigs and wiglets; of these, 46 percent or a little less than half sold wigs, wiglets and other hair pieces.[27]

Thus there was a discrepancy between a massive demand for wigs and the relative absence of retail centers to meet it. This opened the way for the emergence of independent wig shops or salons which exclusively sold wigs and provided service at reasonable prices to people of lower incomes. The Modern's Market Guide for beauty shops reported:

> Some of the dealers who are more experienced and successful in handling wigs and hairpieces find that they have literally established a second business. They not only sell hair goods and accessories to their shop customers, in many instances, they actually service the wigs and hairpieces for those of their customers who are too timid to tackle the job themselves. These dealers frequently employ stylists to pre-style pieces and, as a consequence, expand their market.[28]

Under the circumstances, a solid basis of market condition as well as the wig craze created the sudden emergence of the Korean wig industry in American society. The wig industry in the United States had emerged so suddenly and expanded so rapidly that Koreans did not encounter conflicts with vested interests in catering to lower class and marginal ethnic customers.

Intra-Ethnic Conflict over the Wig Market. The kinds of wig businesses that Korean immigrants engaged in were a

function of their time of arrival. The wholesalers or importers were the earliest Korean settlers and frequently boast of their long experience in American society. The retailers and peddlers were, in comparison, newcomers. Most of the wholesalers had a crucial role in the development of the Korean home wig industry by providing manufacturers with market information and criteria for styles for the American market when the wig craze began to emerge in the early 1960's. Some of them were able to accumulate large amounts of capital by building their own factories in South Korea. Some established retail chain systems throughout the United States, and sent for their cousins and friends in Korea to manage and work in these stores. This also stimulated migration.

In ideal economic practice there are three market channels for the delivery of goods from manufacturers to consumers: manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing. In the case of the Korean wig community, these orderly channels did not operate largely because of the Korean manufacturers' direct sales of their goods in the United States market. Ideal market channels have been operative for some time until Korean mainland manufacturers began encroaching upon the established domains of Korean wholesalers or importers in the United States. The Korean wig manufacturers had become aware that higher profits could be made by direct sales in American

markets. They then began to open their own branches in America to compete with the importing, wholesaling, and retailing operations of Korean immigrants. A black ethnic newspaper described this aspect:

> S.Z. Chuu came to the United States about a year ago. A few months later he opened a wig shop, Happy Chuu Inc., in the heart of the Black community in Bedford-Stuyvesant-Nostrand Avenue near Fulton Street. Chuu has one employee, a Black; the business he says is "doing well." Before coming here Chuu worked with the Korean Manufacturing Company in South Korea. Through the company he was able to obtain a four-year trade visa from the American Embassy in South Korea. Chuu says the company paid his air fare and provided the financing for his store. Chuu now imports his goods directly from the company that paid his air fare and provided the financing for his store.[29]

The expansion into retailing and exporting by the Korean wig manufacturers blurred the traditional distinctions between importers (or distributors), wholesalers, and retailers. This resulted in the drastic lowering of wig prices. Whatever prices they charged, the manufacturers still made some profit out of mass sales in the American market because of the low labor costs in South Korea.

During the period of the wig boom, from approximately 1969 to 1972, the sales agents of Korean manufacturers as well as the Korean wholesalers and importers had imported into the United States their wig products on the assumption that the American market for wig products was limitless and would

continue to expand indefinitely. Partly because of the economic recession beginning in 1971, and partly because of the fact that potential wig users have already bought as many wigs as they wanted, the market for wigs in the United States has gradually declined since 1971. Furthermore, there has, since 1972, been a movement in American fashion to turn to hats and caps.

All these factors, which South Koreans could not control, caused the Korean wig industry to pile up a huge inventory which resulted in a tie-up of capital in the form of inventory and a "cash flow" problem. These factors inflicted a great economic burden on homeland wig manufacturers whose number had increased drastically, and who had expanded and upgraded their factories in response to their expectations of unlimited demand in the American market. Moreover, in expanding their factories, many had received Korean government-guaranteed commercial loans from American or Japanese banks. In order to achieve liquidity, Korean wig manufacturers had to resort to a mass dumping of their inventory into the American market at reduced prices. A drastic reduction in retail prices ensued. In the late 1960's Korean retailers sold a wig to American customers at the price of somewhere between $15 to $30. At that time, the production of a wig cost Korean manufacturers somewhere between $1 to $1.50. But, by 1977, the retail prices of a wig fluctuated

between $7 and $10 depending upon the quality of wigs, despite skyrocketing costs of synthetic fibers caused by a world-wide inflation and by the rise in the prices of oil, out of which the fibers are made.

The Korean manufacturers as well as Korean wholesalers in the United States had, during the high point of the wig boom, encouraged some Korean immigrants to become wig-peddlers. In some cases they organized their own peddling systems in which the peddlers were hired on the basis of both salaries and commissions. Under these circumstances, a fierce conflict took place between peddlers, wholesalers, and the sales agents of the manufacturers on the one hand and the retailers on the other.

The Korean agents of manufacturers and independent wholesalers could still make profits simply because of the large number of transactions they made; and the peddlers could avoid retailing expenses such as rent, taxes, and labor costs by engaging in street-selling. But dumping practices easily upset Korean retailers as well as the American wig and beauty salon owners who had run their businesses under the aegis of "scarcity" and "craftsmanship."

The conflict between Korean retailers and peddlers frequently became the object of a sense of shame in the Korean ethnic community of New York City, for it evoked street violence. Direct violent encounters were occasionally

touched off when Korean peddlers did their selling near the vicinity of Korean retail shops. The shop owner had to charge higher prices because of rentals and salaries they paid to wig stylists.

Since their customers were blacks and Puerto Ricans, the ecological site of their sales competition was limited to shopping centers in black and Puerto Rican communities. They had to set up their businesses at the ethnic comercial centers where space was so limited that the two groups of Korean wig men could not coexist. An example of this is the commercial section in Jamaica, Queens, where a Korean peddler working for for a wholesaler died in 1972 as a result of fighting with Korean retailers.

Except for cases in which a homicide was involved, Koreans did not want the publicity of police intervention in their disputes. They did not want to be accused by the wig community and by their ethnic community of causing unfavorable publicity to all Koreans. Korean ethnic newspapers frequently carried articles on this issue. For instance, an editorial in the Koreapost states:

> A series of violent incidents among Korean wig merchants in New York City provokes a sense of shame in our community and reminds us of the gangster warfare once rampant in the Myondong downtown in Seoul. The fighting with knives among wig merchants in Jamaica and the recent fist fighting in the Bronx are among the incidents that have left a shameful spot on our community. Furthermore, on last June 18

> our Koreans fought each other throwing dishes and chairs when they gathered in a Korean restaurant here to settle their dispute. It is our regret that the fighting eventually resulted in the arrival of three police cars ... [30]

The dumping practices by the sales agents of Korean manufacturers also have provoked a keen conflict with American wig dealers or wholesalers who are of predominantly Jewish and Italian origin.

While Koreans have mainly catered to blacks and Puerto Ricans through retailing and peddling, American wig dealers have supplied the imported wigs to beauty shops and department stores throughout the United States. Their economic practices and financial foundation are so secure and solid that they have been able to keep the wig prices stable despite the vicissitudes of supply and demand. The various advantages coming from their established status in the United States enabled them to control the wholesale lines throughout the United States when the wig boom began to emerge in the early 1960's. Unlike Koreans, they had developed such sophisticated sales techniques as the mail order system and advertised it in leading woman's magazines. By relying on the mail order system, their market had expanded into Caribbean nations, Mexico, Latin American nations, and to the new nations in Africa. They have also controlled "wig concessions" in leading department stores throughout the United States.

Korean sales agents had encroached upon the markets of these American wholesalers. Immediately after arrival in the United States, Korean sales agents were equipped with new cars and were sent to leading cities throughout the United States. Their mission was to seek buyers of their products. They made direct contracts with beauty shop owners and department stores by offering drastically reduced prices and thus "broke up" the established price and sales lines of American wholesalers. For instance, in 1970 Korean-made wig and eyelash products constituted 44 percent of all the items imported by the United States from foreign countries.[31] The dumping practices of Korean sales agents brought forth an immediate outcry not only from American wholesalers but also from independent Korean wholesalers or importers. Thus when Korean sales agents bid for contracts from American wig wholesalers, they often received "the cold shoulder treatment" that said in effect: "Your people have spoiled the wig business." Ironically, in the late 1960's when American wholesalers or importers faced a keen shortage of wigs due to a growing United States demand, American wig dealers went to South Korea and competed in bidding for wig goods from Korean manufacturers; by doing so they stimulated wig manufacturing and production. American purchasing agents frequently bribed Korean manufacturers and their employees to get larger allocations of wigs. At that time Korean manu-

facturers did not send their sales agents to the United States market. In this context, Korean sales agents used to complain: "You know, at that time they knelt down before us and bid for more wigs. Now they even refuse to make an appointment with us."

The Intervention of the South Korean Government. Being faced after 1971 with extremely unfavorable wig market conditions in which the wig prices were falling while the costs of production increased due to increased costs of raw materials, the Korean wig men ranging from manufacturers to wholesalers and retailers had felt an urgent need to reform the market and to rationalize the price system. In order to prevent their markets from being encroached upon by new competition from Korean manufacturers as well as by the late arriving small scale Korean wholesalers or importers, the established wholesalers in American in 1972 formed the Korean Wig Union.

The Korean government intervened strongly in this reform movement. At the initial stage of reform, the Korean government asked the Korean Wig Union to: (1) establish a minimum "check price;" (2) stop dumping practices; and (3) stop the direct sales to street peddlers. And the Korean government also warned wig men through the voice of the Manufacturers' Export Association in South Korea, that any violation of the above regulations would result in the depri-

vation of the right to import wig products from South Korea. In return for the acceptance of these "government" regulations, the Korean Wig Union asked the Korean government that only members of both the Korean Wig Union in America and the American Wig Union (AWU) should be entitled to import wigs; and that all sales branches of Korean wig manufacturers should either withdraw from the United States or become members of the Korean Wig Union and thus be subjected to the same regulations.

The two groups seemed to reach, at least at a formal level, an agreement through the intervention of the Korean government. But at a practical level the agreement could not be made effective. Manufacturers in South Korea could not accept the demands of the Korean Wig Union simply because their economic position did not allow them to retreat from the American market. They could not withdraw from the American market partly because they had sold their products on a credit basis and had outstanding credit. Moreover, there was no proper law enforcement agency for Koreans to regulate dumping activities in the United States. The sales branches of mainland manufacturers were not responsive to American commercial law. On the other hand, many established wholesalers or importers had kept their own peddling system while urging the home government to prevent the direct export of wig products by manufacturers to retailers and other non-union

wholesalers. But those manufacturers, who were able to receive favored treatment from the government, had ignored the agreement and exported their products to non-union wholesalers and retailers, who had not yet "made it" in America. In doing this they had frequently used sub-standard raw materials and abused other maker's trademarks in labeling their products.

Meanwhile, the established wholesalers' claim to a monopoly over the right to import wigs caused non-union wholesalers and retailers to raise an outcry against the Korean Wig Union.

Seeing that the mutual agreement between the two groups had not been made effective at a practical level, the Korean government began to wield its legal authority in order to make it effective. The government's basic decisions were made when the Korean Department of Commerce and Industry convened a series of meetings during the month of February, 1974.

The staff members of both the Korean Wig Union in America and the Manufacturers' Export Association in South Korea participated in the meetings. The government decided (1) that the export of wigs by Korean manufacturers should be restricted to the members of both the Korean Wig Union and the American Wig Union; (2) that the manufacturers' sales branches should withdraw from the American market by the end of May, 1974; (3) that, if an established Korean wholesaler in the United States failed to import a minimum of $50,000

worth of wigs for a year, he would be automatically deprived of the right to import wigs from South Korea. In the meetings, the members of the KWU were granted permission from the government to import eyelashes, which had previously been supplied by Korean eyelash-makers exclusively to American wholesalers belonging to the AWU. This was done in order to avoid dumping practices similar to those in wig exporting.

These Korean governmental decisions violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. In August 1975, the United States federal court in New York City charged the Korean Wig Union, a de facto surrogate of the Korean government, with violation of the anti-trust law. This resulted immediately in a great change in the Korean wig community in the United States. The Korean Wig Union held a series of meetings, in which the Union members replaced its president and formed an ad hoc committee in an effort to deal with the case.

The Korean Wig Union asked the Korean Consul General in New York City to extend its help. While the case was pending, the Union had decided to allow non-union Korean wholesalers to become members with the declaration that: "The Korean Wig Union no longer claims the exclusive right to import of wig products from the homeland." It took more than a year for the federal court to arrive at a final verdict in the case. The Korean Wig Union was somewhat relieved

when the court sentenced the Union to a fine of only $2,500. But this decision pleased non-union wholesalers and retailers who had accused the Union leaders of the misappropriation of the Union's funds and of wasteful life styles, saying: "They held union meetings in restaurants and on golf fields."

In response to this event, the Koren government has, since 1976, reduced the exports of wig products by imposing export quotas on Korean wig manufacturers. Thus big wig manufacturers have survived while small ones were either forced out of business or absorbed by big manufacturers. Partly because of this, the Korean wig prices have gone up slightly in the world market.

The Economic Activity of Wig Peddlers. The peddlers under the control of the established wholesalers were small in number and had their own handicaps either because of their visa status or of their lack of money and skill. Independent peddlers had comprised the bulk of the Korean wig peddlers and had increased in number as the wave of Korean immigrants began to surge in 1970.

Contrary to the common public image, they seemed to be the most tranquil group among Korean wig men. Since they ran their business on the street on a day-to-day basis, they were free from the economic anxieties caused by long-term market fluctuations and from the chores of managing a regular wig shop. They had also taken advantage of a gradual aware-

ness among wig consumers that there were few quality differences between the wigs displayed at a regular beauty or wig salon and those sold on the street.

The independent peddlers were subdivided into two groups on the basis of the way they operated their business. One group was made up of those who made extra-legal contracts with American shopkeepers, the owners of bargain, garment, shoe, and gift shops, for the permission to do their peddling near the shop entrance.

In return for receiving weekly payments by the peddlers, the shop owners were obliged not only to provide a proper space for them but also protect them from police harassment as well as from the intervention by Korean retailers. This group might be called "fixed peddlers" whose sales per day usually surpassed that of a regular wig shop owner.

Like Korean wig shopkeepers, the ambience of their peddling activites, with some exceptions, were limited to the business sections of black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods. The contract fee varied depending on the location of the store: for instance, it amounted to about $1,000 per month near the entrance to Gimbles and Macys department stores in Manhattan; at the business sections of 14 St. in Manhattan, Eastern Parkway of Brooklyn, and Third Avenue of the Bronx they used to pay from $150 to $500 per month. However, they could not intrude into the black neighborhoods in Jamaica,

Queens, where Korean wig shops were so numerous and their owners so well organized that any attempts by Korean peddlers to do peddling there could be easily frustrated. As mentioned earlier, a Korean peddler committed "harakiri" there after he stabbed a Korean retailer in a dispute over commercial interests. When the wig boom was at its highest point, some aggressive Korean women dared to display wigs in the lounges of hosptials, nursing homes, and factories largely catering to black and Puerto Rican employees.

In addition to those peddlers whose economic activities were concentrated in the transitional areas of inner cities, there were migratory peddlers who moved from city to city and state to state seeking temporary sales opportunities.

In doing so they had to be equipped with station wagons to carry maximum amounts of goods for the long periods of time before their return to their home bases in inner cities. There they rested and resupplied their inventories from wholesalers for their next venture. And some young Koreans formed peddling teams and used commercial airlines in order to respond more quickly to the demands for wigs throughout the country. During the summer vacation season, when the entire wig business was slow in inner cities, these migratory peddlers rushed to national and regional resort areas such as Niagara Falls and Atlantic City. And during the winter season when the wig sales, especially street sales,

slowed down mainly due to cold and windy weather in Northern cities, they opened their business at resort areas of Florida and shanty towns of the deep South. They had to be aggressive enough to endure frequent police harassment and attacks by local businessmen.

The Ambivalence of Korean Wig Merchants. A sense of self-mockery, self-irony, satire, and self-defense characterizes the whole mood of the Korean wig community, but that attitude coexists with the deadly seriousness of their rational economic behavior. This ambivalence partly derives from their sense of lack of authenticity of the item they deal with. In their home country wigs were rarely worn; Koreans had never thought that such a foolish item of adornment could become the means of making a living until the 1960's. The whole irony of Korean wig men was centered on their making money out of such unserious products as wigs. Korean wig men could not resist displaying mockery and contempt for their business and for their clientele when they saw how a slight change in wig styles could enormously affect their business. They laughed among themselves in seeing that wigs and eyelashes, which could not meet the Korean government export standard, had suddenly become popular among American consumers because of their coarse (or natural) color combinations and their wild shapes. But when interviewed by a black newspaper reporter on their business, they said: "... Besides the fact

that Black women buy more wigs, I think Black people are not as complicated as white people. They are easier to serve."[32] They had contempt for the extravagant life styles of blacks and Puerto Ricans from whom they want to maintain social distance. They also had contempt for the foolishness of their favorite customers when they said: "Some of them have tried to buy wigs with food coupons," and, "On welfare day business is really good." But Korean wig men were serious in the pursuit of their economic goals. Korean peddlers, doing business on the street by displaying conspicuous "wig trees" loaded with wigs, often surprised American bank clerks by making frequent deposits of large sums. Korean peddlers were sometimes amused at tourists in New York City who photographed them as poor new immigrants. Korean wig men described contemporary American society as "stupid," "loose," or "dummy" country.

Yet, for the same reasons, Korean wig men in the United States were psychologically on the defensive. Peddlers and retailers were reluctant to tell compatriots other than intimate friends their occupation, partly because the rest of the Korean community expressed an implicit contempt for the wig business. For Koreans, the phrase "wig business" automatically provoked such connotations as "peddling," "fighting," "quick fortunes," "vulgarity," and "swindle." A combination of shame and resentment lurked beneath such

statements as: "He has made big money out of the wig business;" "Elder X in that church is a wig merchant;" "With the money earned from the wig business he has opened up a liquor store;" and "He quit his good American job to set up a wig store in Newark." When forced to reveal their occupation, peddlers and retailers presented their occupation as a small independent business without describing the commodity sold. A sensitive listener understood this as referring to the wig business. On such informal occasions as at an alumni picnic or a party for a baby born in America, they revealed in self-derisive tones their work in America. In translating the English word "hair" into Korean, two Korean words can be used. In an ironic sense they frequently use the Korean word "tol" to describe the hairs on sexual organs and the breast, and the hairs of animals rather than the word "mobal," which originated from Chinese characters and means the hairs of the head. The latter term is used in a formal conversation and literature. They giggled when using the word "tol:" "I am in the 'tol' business."

This sense of self-mockery and irony is partially derived from the Koreans' sense of a sudden decline in prestige resulting from their immigration to the United States. Since most Korean wig men have received a college education and, in many cases, enjoyed some degree of prestige in white collar jobs in their home country, they reveal bitterness

arising from the comparison between their current occupational status and the social status they had in their home country. But they defend their current status because of the opportunity of making money: "What else can I do in this country if I want to make money?" This defense was more pronounced among small wig shop woners and peddlers who had not yet "made it" economically.

Korean wholesalers expressed a self-righteousness when faced with the alliance between the Korean government and homeland wig manufacturers. They pointed out manufacturers' exploitation of the "yogong," the female workers working inhomeland sweatshops, and accused manufacturers of their greed by saying that: "They are sapping the blood of the 'yogong.'" They had not made such complaints before homeland manufacturers attempted tc enter the wholesale market directly.

Their ironical attitude to their occupation is also due to the fact that their customers were mainly composed of blacks and Puerto Ricans from whom they want to maintain social distance. Koreans in New York City derisively called their countrymens' wig business a "black business." But among recent Korean immigrants this feeling of contempt easily turns into a sense of envy when they learn that many of the early comers had made a great deal of money out of the "black" business. When discussing the opportunity of making money

during the present economic recession, recent Korean immigrants recall the boom times of their predecessors in the wig business, saying that "I should have come over here at that time."

In New York City, Korean wig men penetrated into every nook and cranny of black and Puerto Rican communities, central Harlem mostly exceptioned, for the following reasons. First of all, wigs had become a social desiderata for a large part of the black and Puerto Rican population. According to a market survey on the consumption of wigs by the American population, 89 percent of black adult females in 1974 wore wigs while the wig-wearing population among white adult females constituted 43 percent.[33] Only black Muslims, largely under the influence of Elijah Muhammad, opposed wig-wearing among blacks. Secondly, store rent in these ethnic neighborhoods is reasonably cheap, so that Korean immigrants were able to open stores in these areas with a relatively small amount of capital. Thirdly, black- and Puerto Rican-owned stores were few in number and could not compete with Koreans who had the advantages of commercial ties in their own ethnic group. In response to the invasion of the black community by Korean wig men, a black newspaper carried the following item: "With the natural hairstyle gradually losing its hold on the fancy of Black women, the return to hairpieces and wigs may be inevitable ... Capitalizing on this trend in

many Black communities -- including Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant and Crown Heights section -- are a growing number of South Korean wholesale and retail wig merchants. So rapidly are their numbers growing that many Black-owned stores may soon be forced out of business."[34] Strictly speaking, the places where Korean wig men most flourished were not the predominant black ethnic communities but the racially balanced business sections where old Jewish, Irish, and Italian shopkeepers were abandoning their business enterprises. For example, Koreans had not invaded the commercial sections of Harlem. They were often denied rentals by black landlords who are afraid of economic pressure from their own ethnic group. Some Koreans managed to open wig stores in Harlem only to be forced out because of harassment and theft. One exception for this was a chain wig store on 125th Street which, although owned by a Korean, was managed by black employees.

In this competition for commercial space, Korean wig men have encountered an added limitation mainly because of their lack of both American business sophistication and of capital. With some exceptions, they have not as yet invaded the commercial sections of Fifth Avenue where the luxurious beauty and wig salons are located, nor have they moved into the suburbs. In middle class wig and beauty salons the owner's relationship with his clients is direct, personal,

nd intimate. The "American" owners still assert the virtue of traditional "craftsmanship" and disparage the vulgar mass consumption of "ear-as-you-guy-it" wigs. These stores bear such titles as wig studios, coiffures, hair weaving salons, and hair replacement centers. They are predominantly run by the Jews and Italians who deal with the finest quality wigs including Korean human hair wigs, Sicilian tresses, and French wigs and hair pieces. In contrast to these qualities, Korean wig shopkeepers play down, to some extent, the deliverately arty and shiny decoration of their stores in order to evoke the "cheap smell." To attract customers, Korean peddlers deliberately avoid long, complicated, and sophisticated statements on style and quality in order to take advantage of Americans' image of Asians as naive and primitive. All they need are ten fingers to show the proper price and a few compliments such as "beautiful" or "muy bonita." Korean wig men ironically call themselves "saviors" of blacks and Puerto Ricans: 'Without the cheap Korean wigs, how could they afford to wear wigs?"

Korean wig men have also participated in designing wig styles that express black ethnic pride. Wholesalers and sales agents of homeland manufacturers sensitively read such leading black magazines as Ebony, Essence, and Sepia as well as such fashion magazines as Vogue, the American Hair Dresser, and the Journal of Beauty in order to keep

up with the trend of American hair fashion. In response to the new styles among blacks which have become increasingly stylized and idealized since the civil rights movement of the 1960's, Korean wig men are aware that the only way to perpetuate the wig fashion among blacks lies in the continuous renovations of wig styles. At the same time they frequently complain that a fashionable wig style will not last more than two months.

Since the gradual decline of the wig boom, a major area of competition among Korean wig manufacturers has become the renovations of wigs. Manufacturers have now become aware of the fact that blacks' taste for wigs has become so sophisticated that they no longer can make money by relying on cheap and coarse wigs such as the "Afro-Freedom" wigs. For instance, an advertisement of a new wig style by a Korean manufacturer recently appeared in Ebony and Essence as well as in Korean ethnic newspapers, stating: "Revolutionary styles and fibers for blacks ... Z wigs provide you with a new opportunity for making money ... Unliketraditional Afro-wigs made of cheap fibers, Z wigs will arouse new admiration from millions of black women throughout the United States." A Korean was reported as saying: "The Z wigs have satisfied the desire of blacks to return to natural human hairs. Without the invention of this new fiber style last year (1976), the Korean wig industry would have completely ruined."[35]

Some Korean manufacturers have begun to recruit black hairdressers and fashion designers in order to create new black styles. In some cases Korean wig-shop owners have taken on the role of fashion-maker by exploring a new idea with black customers and black hair stylists. They report the new idea to their wholesalers who, in turn, send the idea for a new item to wig manufacturers in South Korea. However, Korean wig men rarely create a new style, but, in the process of making wigs, they have caricatured, exaggerated, and imitated the "natural" hair styles which have already been invented by black hairdressers and which have become popular among some segments of the black population. Only then do they advertise their wig products through leading black magazines and newspapers under the general title, "Afro-Wigs," which, as they insist, are made of a synthetic thread especially designed for blacks under the trade name, "Afrilon," a name created specifically for such advertising.

When the demand for wigs among the ethnic populations increased suddenly, some Korean wig men began -- like the greengrocerymen -- the job of seeking out commercial space in transitional areas to set up wig stores and sell them to Koreans. Most buyers were recent arrivals with little or no experience and knowledge of American society. The sellers were concerned not only with developing retail businesses but also with the making of sudden profits from "key money" from

the sale of the stores they set up. They pretended to potential store purchasers that they had set up store as a permanent business, but for some unavoidable reasons such as having to return to the home country they were forced to sell. And they also enticed Koreans with visa problems to buy stores by claiming that "You can acquire a green card by showing this store as a capital investment in the United States."

When business slowed down, some Korean wig shop-keepers laid off their wig stylists and turned their shops into "discount" stores by adding some items as cheap jewelry, eyelashes, "artistic" pictures and photographs, handbags, etc. By selling wigs on a "sale" basis they fill the available demand in a neighborhood and then they move out and seek another place where they can set up either a wig store or another retail store. For this reason, as the wig fashion in the United States had gradually declined, an increasing number of advertisements for the sale of wig stores have appeared in Korean ethnic newspapers. On the whole, Koreans do not now think that the wig business is stable enough to afford a life-time living.

Consequences of the Wig Business. The wig business has provided Korean immigrants with temporary economic opportunities through which they can accumulate enough capital and experience to provide entry into other kinds of businesses

such as gift shops, men's wear stores, stationery stores, groceries, small supermarkets, restaurants, dry cleaning stores, candy and liquor stores. Some wig store owners did not know how to reinvest the capital they had acquired in other businesses. They bought suburban homes and paid the entire price in cash, provoking laughter among those Korean shopkeepers who were more aggressive economically and more sophisticated. This phenomenon was more pronounced among the fixed space peddlers who were generally older than other Korean wig men. Their average age was in the 40's. They drove daily from suburban houses to transitional areas of the inner city in order to peddle on the street -- a job they held for several years. Even those retailers and peddlers without a private house did their business in black and Puerto Rican communities, but occupied residential areas in lower white middle-class neighborhoods of New York City. Thus for Korean wig men the racial and economic desegregation have occurred simultaneously with housing segregation. This phenomenon is not merely confined to Korean wig men but is extended to other Koreans doing small businesses in the inner cities of the Eastern Seaboard area. This fact, as we shall discuss in Chapter IV, partly causes animosity among blacks against Korean ghetto merchants.

Since wig sales have begun to decline, many Korean wig wholesalers have started to import other labor-intensive

goods from South Korea such as garments, handbags, jewelry, and gift items. A Korean wig wholesaler who became a multi-millionaire in the wig business and emerged as one of the leading Korean community leaders in New York City has shifted to the garment business by importing clothes from South Korea. As has been noted, many Korean wig retail shops have turned to a "discount" store or a store of miscellaneous goods by adding cheap consumer goods mainly imported from South Korea. In the face of the declining trend of the wig business, Korean wig wholesalers are on the defensive: "Now the wig business has become normalized. The windfall profits that we made in the past out of the wig business were abnormal. In a society like the United States, we cannot sustain such abnormal businesses on a long term basis."[36]

As has been discussed, the decline of wig consumption in the American market has mainly caused the decline of the Korean wig manufacturing industry in South Korea. In the process, the Korean wig manufacturing industry has begun to merge and incorporate with large industrial corporations. A similar phenomenon has emerged in the United States. Korean wig wholesalers have explored and opened "concessions" by occupying small spaces at major department stores. Some 100 Korean-run wig "concessions" have recently emerged on the Eastern Seaboard.[37] Korean owners of wig "concessions" are obliged to pay somewhere between 20 and 25 percent of

their total sales to department stores in return for the space. Korean owners of wig "concessions" emphasize their wig stylists' sales technique rather than "cheap prices."

## Conclusion

The creation of an ethnic business by Korean immigrants has depended upon the broad structural changes in contemporary American society. When they arrived in their new land, Koreans had to face a centralized business and occupational structure, which prevented them from acquiring "boundless" economic opportunities as imbedded in the concept of the "American dream." Korean immigrants could not enter the mainstream of the new American middle-class occupations mainly because of the demand in the United States for different skills and also due to their lack of command of English. This economic centralization, coupled with the existence of discrimination against new minorities in larger business firms, has forced a large number of recent Korean immigrants to engage in small businesses where some economic opportunities still exist.

In addition to the centralization and bureaucratization of the economic structure, Korean immigrants have encountered a new trend in American urbanism -- the massive migration of the white middle-class population from central cities to the suburbs or suburban cities, leaving central

cities dominated by new minorities. By taking advantage of this transition, the majority of Korean immigrants have settled in inner cities and a high proportion of them engage in small businesses. In this process, as we have seen in the case study of the Korean fruit and vegetable business, Korean immigrants have succeeded in the small business enterprises previously run by the older white, minority shopkeepers, most of whom are old and somewhat on the defensive in the face of massive influx of new minorities. We have also noted that Korean succession in business occurs only when they sell non-Korean customers the kinds of goods which are produced in the United States.

In addition to these broad social changes -- occupational centralization and suburbanization -- Korean immigrants have entered the United States at a time when contemporary Americans have been washed by the new waves of mass consumption, which has been supported by the economic developments since World War II. Even new American ethnic minorities or urban lower classes are not immune to the dominant trend of the American mass consumption culture. The South Korean exports of labor-intensive consumption goods to the United States market have taken place to meet new demands of American urban masses, which have coincided with the entry of Korean immigrants to the United States. The market basis of the Korean immigrant busineses such as wig,

gift, garment, and handbag stores has been established by taking advantage of the "cultural revolution" since the 1960's, in which a series of chic styles and fashions were quickly accepted and discarded. Capitalizing on these two factors -- the mass consumption among urban lower classes, and the South Korean exports of cheap consumption goods to the United States -- Korean immigrants have established entry points in American inner cities. In facilitating South Korean exports to the United States, Korean immigrants have become both agents and beneficiaries of the trade between the two countries. In this context, it is not coincidental that Korean immigrants have gained occupational entry out of the wig business. Wigs have become an element for attaining new life styles for some segments of the American population. Korean immigrants arrived in the United States when blacks were attempting to develop and demonstrate their ethnic distinction by creating their own life style. Korean wig manufacturers profited from the demand so created.

The case study of the Korean wig industry shows us how a minor change in American consumption habits has conditioned the whole industrial process by which the Korean wig industry emerged and began to decline in both South Korea and the United States; how the economic institutions of advanced capitalistic nations have effected, through the nexus of international trade, a great change in South Korean

industrialization and economic development. It also demonstrates how the selective interactions of economic institutions between the two countries have provided Korean immigrants with somewhat serendipitous opportunities.

Since a large-scale wig industry was new in the United States market, Korean immigrants encountered little resistance by established interests to their attempts to create and expand the wig industry in the United States. In contrast to this, the Korean immigrants who have entered the fruit and vegetable business have taken the path of ethnic succession in their entry into that business and have met minor conflicts with established businesses. The Korean immigrants' "massive entry" into the fruit and vegetable business suggests how the economic opportunities in the new land have an elective affinity to Korean immigrants' economic motivations. We shall discuss this later in Chapter XI, suggesting that these motivations have a base in the historic personality structure as it has been developed in their home country.

The kind of social structure of Korean immigrants, their family and personality structure, the degree of their previous urbanization and educational experiences in the old land, all have been supportive to their economic ventures in the new land. We have focused, among other things, on how the continuation of the old family structure -- which is

made possible by the United States Immigration Act of 1965 -- has become one of their most important factors in their success in labor-intensive small business enterprises. We have also noted a "puritanic," urban personality among Korean immigrants. In the pursuit of the American dream, Korean wig men exhibit the kind of business attitudes in which their contempt for the artificiality of black life styles is concealed beneath the facade of their rational economic ventures. Korean wig men express a sense of irony, self-mockery, and self-defense not only because their black and Hispanic clients display a wasteful life style by adopting unnecessary adornment, but also because they cannot maintain an authentic self-respect for and confidence in the wig business which has, in addition, been at the mercy of both sudden changes in American fashion and of fluctuations in the economic cycle.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]According to a sample survey conducted in 1977 by Dr. Hyong-gi Jin, 32% of Korean householders in Southern California are engaged in small business enterprises; another 28% are interested in the opening of small business. The Hankook Shinmoon, November 5, 1977.

[2]The Hankook Ilbo, December 28, 1976.

[3]It was reported that in the Southern California area, Korean small business enterprises numbered, as of 1977, about 4,500; and that 65% of the total of 110,000 Koreans in that area settled in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The Joong-Ang Ilbo, September 15, 1977.

[4]The New York Post, August 8, 1975.

[5]The New York Times, December 24, 1976.

[6]The New York Times, February 18, 1976.

[7]The New York Times, June 25, 1977.

[8]The Hankook Ilbo, December 28, 1976.

[9]Chuokoron (Tokyo, Japan: January, 1977).

[10]The Hankook Ilbo, February 26, 1976.

[11]The Joong Ang Ilbo, August 1, 1977.

[12]The Joong Ang Ilbo, August 4, 1977.

[13]The New York Times, June 25, 1977.

[14]The Moonies run fruit and vegetable stores in New York City, but Korean greengrocers have nothing to do with the Unification Church.

[15]The New York Times, February 18, 1976.

[16]The labeling of the wig styles for blacks has been taking place under the two categories of image-making. One category depicts the image of naturalness and carefreeness by using such names as "Windswept," "Cascade," "Freedom Puffs," "Sunny Flip," "Carefree," "Sexama," "Gypsy," and "Country Girls," etc. The other category aims at a personification of styles in order to show a social characteristic of the wearer. It includes such styles as "Page Boy," "Private Secretary," "Boss Lady," "Baby Afro," and "Black Huntress;" in the case of male Afro-wigs, there are such styles as "The King," "The Sophisticate," "Score Man," and "Top Man," etc.

[17]The use of wigs as a way of expressing an artificiality in life styles can be traced back to the recorded history of the West. Originally, wigs were intended to protect the head from sun heat and cold. They were also intended to imitate nature by compensating for the loss of hair. In the West, wigs were used as a status and class symbol with which the wig wearer attempted to claim recognition of his social status. Thus wigs lost their original function of either protecting one from or imitating nature when they became an artificial element of life styles. In terms of Huizinga's theory of the play elements in culture, the use of wigs in fashion might be seen as acting-out turgid playfulness in human culture. See, Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture, (Beacon Press, Boston, 1955), pp. 183-186. And, for the detailed description of the history of wigs, see Richard Corson, Fashion in Hair: The Five Thousand Years (Peter Owen, London, 1965).

[18]The New York Times, April 22, 1974.

[19]Modern's Market Guide, (Modern Beauty Shop Magazine, 1968), p. 79.

[20]The following table shows the annual amount of export of Korean-made wigs to the United States during the period 1966 to 1972:

| Year | |
|---|---|
| 1966 | $10.6 (million) |
| 67 | 19.9 |
| 68 | 30.1 |
| 69 | 51.6 |
| 70 | 80.3 |
| 71 | 57.1 |
| 72 | 53.1 |

Source: The Hae Oe Han Min Bo (The Overseas Korean News), July 20, 1973.

[21]The Joong Ang Ilbo, August 30, 1977.

[22]Ibid.

[23]The figure indicates the number of the companies which were registered at the Korean Wig Union in New York City.

[24]The Hae Oe Han Min Bo (The Overseas Korean News), July 20, 1973.

[25]"The Saga of Joseph Fleischer," Fashion-Right Hair Pieces, (New York: Joseph Fleischer Company, 1949), p. 143.

[26]Modern's Market Guide, Op. cit., pp. 88-115.

[27]Ibid., p. 79

[28]Ibid., p. 90.

[29]New York Echo, April 27, 1974.

[30]Koreapost, July 6, 1974.

[31]In spite of the fact that the total amount of export of Korean-made wigs in the United States declined from $80.3 million in 1971 to $25.6 million in 1974, Korean-made wigs constituted 86 percent of all the wigs that the United States imported in 1974. The Hankook Shinmoon, June 15, 1975.

[32]New York Echo, April 27, 1974.

[33]Yoon, Sok-man, "Gabal Shijang Eui Jongsanghwa Ae Gwanhayo" (On the Normalization of the Wig Market), The Hankook Shimoon, July 26, 1975.

[34]New York Echo, April 27, 1974.

[35]The Joong Ang Ilbo, August 24, 1977.

[36]The Joong Ang Ilbo, August 25, 1977.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid.

# CHAPTER V

# THE OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY OF SOUTH KOREAN MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS TO AMERICAN MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS

## The Influx of South Korean Medical Professionals

We have indicated, in Chapter I, that Korean immigrants include a heavy concentration of professionals and technicians. This fact points to the pull of certain segments of American economic institutions upon international migration, and reflects, in the case of Korean immigrants, the selective interaction of economic institutions between the two countries. In Chapter II, we have also pointed out how prospective Korean emigrants to the United States have prepared themselves for their economic entry into a new homeland. In doing this, we have also discussed how the emigration of Korean skilled workers to the United States has been facilitated at the institutional level by South Korean agencies and those of the United States.

The kinds of jobs, which Korean immigrant blue collar workers engaged in, largely corresponded to the occupational categories to which they belonged at the time of

entry. They included automobile mechanics, tailors, dressmakers, carpenters, air conditioning repairmen, television or watch repairmen, welders, etc. But the majority of Korean blue collar workers do not consider their present jobs to be permanent ones: blue collar work is just a means of accumulating sufficient capital to start their own commercial enterprises. The Korean immigrants' high level of education, their white collar, middle class background, and their cultural sophistication, all these things cause them to show an universal contempt for the drudgery of factory work. When they do blue collar work, they are reluctant to reveal that fact to other Koreans. Unlike the small businessmen, the Korean immigrants, who do blue collar work, have not as yet established any distinctive niches in industry. That is, they are not concentrated in any one cluster of industries.

Korean white collar workers range from college teachers, accountants, medical professionals to bank clerks, bookkeepers, typists, and computer technicians. Mainly because of language problems, Korean white collar workers tend to concentrate in jobs that do not require highly developed verbal skills in English. Those Koreans, who do such works, include accountants, typists, bookkeepers, computer technicians, etc. Higher professional workers, such as, college teachers, lawyers, accountants, and scientists had entered the United States as students and received higher education in the United States. As has been

noted, Korean white collar workers tend to shift to small business. Korean medical professionals are an exception to this trend if they are licensed by and employed at American medical institutions.

More than 13,000 Korean physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and dentists have entered the United States since the passage of the United States Immigration Act of 1965. According to the statistics of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, a total of 6,185 Korean medical professionals had arrived from 1965-1973.

Table V-I

Number of Korean Immigrant Medical Workers Admitted to the United States By Year

| | Doctors | Nurses | Pharamacists | Dentists | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 11 | 2 | 0 | 0 | |
| 66 | 35 | 19 | 0 | 0 | |
| 67 | 70 | 26 | 4 | 5 | |
| 68 | 63 | 60 | 10 | 4 | |
| 69 | 128 | 102 | 17 | 7 | |
| 70 | 228 | 254 | 38 | 3 | |
| 71 | 965 | 526 | 81 | 20 | |
| 72 | 768 | 738 | 257 | 26 | |
| 73 | 598 | 744 | 346 | 30 | |
| Total | 2,866 | 2,471 | 753 | 95 | 6,185 |

Source: Based upon the Statistics of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

As we shall see, they have established a solid occupational enclave in American medical institutions. They are leading financial supporters of Korean community activities including churches and other community service

organizations. In addition, some 7,000 Korean nurses, who are currently employed at American medical institutions, are one of the main financial sources of capitalizing their husbands' retail businesses. Korean medical professionals constitute a large proportion of Korean suburban single-family owners.

There has been an entry of Korean medical workers via third nations. As has been discussed, the bulk of the Korean migrant nurses in West Germany, who numbered 6,124 as of December, 1973,[1] had migrated again to the United States. Korean doctors, who had previously migrated to other foreign countries such as African nations through the arrangement of overseas labor contracts, also have entered the United States. Taking account of the Korean medical workers who have entered either via third nations or since the year of 1974, we might estimate that Korean medical professionals in the United States numbered by 1977 at least 13,000.[2]

The influx of Korean medical professionals, however, constitutes a small portion of the foreign medical professionals admitted to the United States since the end of World War II. As shown in Table V-2 for instance, a total of 68,305 immigrants doctors had entered the United States. Table V-2 shows us that this influx of foreign medical professionals, especially, physicians, had reached its

climax in the early 1970's and filled the United States shortage of physicians and nurses.

Table V-2

Number of Immigrant Doctors Admitted to the United States By Year

| | Total Number of Immigrant Doctors (1) | Total Number of Asian Immigrant Doctors (2) | Col. (2) as % of Col. (1) (3) | Total Number of Korean Immigrant Doctors (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1950-54 | 6,321 | | | |
| 1955-59 | 7,988 | | | |
| 1960-64 | 9,396 | | | |
| 1965 | 2,012 | 226 | 11.2 | 11 |
| 1966 | 2,552 | 614 | 24.0 | 35 |
| 1967 | 3,326 | 1,175 | 35.3 | 70 |
| 1968 | 3,128 | 1,277 | 40.8 | 63 |
| 1969 | 2,756 | 1,448 | 52.5 | 128 |
| 1970 | 3,158 | 1.744 | 55.2 | 228 |
| 1971 | 5,756 | 3,836 | 66.6 | 965 |
| 1972 | 7,144 | 5,046 | 70.6 | 768 |
| 1973 | 7,119 | 5,029 | 70.6 | 598 |
| 1974 | 4,537 | | | |
| 1975 | 5,361 | | | |
| Total | 68,305 | | | |

Source: Adopted from the statistics of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Table V-3

Number of Immigrant Doctors and Nurses as Percentage of Graduates of American Medical Schools

| | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Graduates of American Medical Schools | 8,799 | 9,446 | 10,036 | 11,000 | 12,100 |
| Immigrant Doctors | 3,158 | 5,756 | 7,144 | 7,119 | 4,537 |
| Immigrant Doctors as Percentage of American Graduates | 40.0 | 60.9 | 71.2 | 64.7 | 37.4 |
| Graduates of American Nursing Schools | 43,639 | 47,001 | 51,784 | 59,000 | 68,000 |
| Immigrant Nurses | 4,937 | 6,442 | 6,851 | 6,335 | 5,331 |
| Immigrant Nurses as Percentage of American Graduates | 11.3 | 13.7 | 13.2 | 10.7 | 7.8 |

Source: Adopted from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce

According to Table V-3, the entry of Asian doctors had begun approximately with the enactment of the Immigra- Act of 1965 whereas non-Asian doctors, especially European doctors had immigrated to the United States long before the passage of the Act. The inflow of Asian doctors had drastically increased in size after 1966: in 1973, for instance, Asian doctors constituted 70.6 percent of the total immigrant doctors. Korean doctors alone comprised about 12 percent. But, as we shall see later, the immigration of foreign medical professionals has drastically reduced in

in number since 1976.

During the period of 1966 to 1975, there had also been a massive influx of foreign nurses, pharmacists, and dentists into American medical institutions. As shown in Table V-4, a total of 56,949 foreign nurses had immigrated to the United States during the period of from 1966 to 1975.

Table V-4

Number of Immigrant Nurses Admitted to the United States by Year

| | Total Number of Immigrant Nurses (1) | Total Number of Asian Immigrant Nurses (2) | Col. (2) as % of Col. (1) (3) | Total Number of Korean Immigrant Nurses (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1966 | 3,574 | 340 | 9.5 | 19 |
| 67 | 4,944 | 794 | 16.0 | 26 |
| 68 | 6,942 | 1,304 | 18.8 | 60 |
| 69 | 5,466 | 1,507 | 27.6 | 102 |
| 70 | 4,934 | 1,781 | 36.0 | 254 |
| 71 | 6,442 | 2,969 | 46.0 | 526 |
| 72 | 6.851 | 3,836 | 56.0 | 738 |
| 73 | 6,335 | 3,595 | 56.7 | 744 |
| 74 | 5,331 | | | |
| 75 | 6,131 | | | |

Source: Adopted from the statistics of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.

During the period from 1966 to 1973, Asian nurses consisted of 28.3 percent of the total foreign nurses admitted to the United States. Like the Asian doctors, Asian nurses were largely made up of Filipino, Korean, and Indian nurses. In 1973, for instance, the 744 Korean nurses comprised 20.6 percent of the Asian total while the 1,281 Filipino nurses constituted 35.6 percent. Similarly, in 1973, 1,100 Asian immigrant pharmacists constituted 84.4 percent of the total foreign pharmacists entering the United States. A large proportion of the Asian pharmacists were, too, from South Korea and the Philippines.

## The "Pull" Factors in American Medical Institutions

The massive influx of foreign medical professionals into the United States has resulted from the broad institutional changes in the health care delivery system in the United States since the end of World War II. The health care delivery system before World War II was mainly based upon the fee-for-service private practitioner operating an individual practice. This pre-War system has been diminished in importance and size as prepaid and group health care systems have been increasingly centralized and incorporated into hospitals & group practice. Big hospitals have become the new centers for the delivery of medical service as well the power basis of American medical institutions -- teaching.

research, and service complexes. Before World War II, the professional service of physicians, dentists, and other private practitioners consumed more than half of the nation's total expenditures for health care. In 1974, however, 26.8 percent of total expenditures went to private practitioners of all types: 39 percent were spent for hospitals.[4]

This centralization of health care delivery system in the United States has occurred in favor of specialists and against general practitioners.

> . . . The defeat of the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bills in the 1940's sounded the death knell for the possible public support of the general practitioner through a health service payment scheme. Given such support the decline in the number of general practitioners might have been stemmed, as it was under the National Health Service in Britain. . .
> The old-style generalist, with less training than the specialist and with a wide field of practice, was with some justification withering away. Those who remained were fighting an uphill, ultimately a a losing, battle to retain their professional standing in comparison with the specialist. At the same time, the need to reconstitute a generalist role in medicine through rational organization of physician services was pointing toward an increasing emphasis in the future on the idea of primary medical care-that is, the encouragement of a stable and continuing relationship between each person and a particular physician, who would act as the general manager and coordinator of the patient's care. . .
> As patients flocked to pediatricians, internists, obstetricians, and psychiatrists, the general practitioner could not claim this role . . .[4]

This trend to specialization in health care system has partly contributed to the immigration of foreign medical professionals into the United States. That is to say, at

the bureaucratic organizational level, foreign medical professionals can be employed and adjusted to big hospitals without encountering the kinds of resistances and difficulties they might face in private practice. One bit of evidence for supporting this statement is that the largest employer of immigrant doctors are the Veterans Administration Hospitals. The Veterans Administration is largest single centrally directed medical complex in the United States. The Veterans Administration, in operating 171 hospitals and employing about 200,000 persons, had filled in 1974 52 percent of its residencies with foreign graduates.

On the other hand, the specialization trend has created a skewed distribution of physicians with respect to specialization, and thereby has produced huge vacancies for some "unpopular" specialties, which, as we shall see later, have been filled by "marginal," i.e., foreign, doctors. Stimmel pointed out the concentration of American-born doctors into some popular specialties:

> Available evidence indicates that without intervention maldistribution in the United States is likely to continue. Before 1972, the number of subspecialty certificates awarded by the American Board of Internal Medicine and those available in four subspecialty areas represented 11 percent of general certificates awarded. In 1972 this figure increased to 37 percent of general certificates awarded. In cardiology, candidates seeking certification from the Sub-Specialty Board in Cardivo-vascular Disease increased from 84 in 1969 to 543 in 1972. . . Redirection of physician training to the field of primary care is therefore a distinct need.[5]

The centralization of the health care delivery system in the United States is also associated with the change in health care financing and the improvement of medical technology. Before World War II, the American Medical Association had successfully prevented government or private insurance agencies from initiating any kind of comprehensive health insurance plan. Thus, those in need of medical service would have to go to the office of private practitioners and meet their medical expenses out of their own pockets. Now, insurance companies and other health plans including Medicaid and Medicare cover a large portion of individual medical expenses. This change in payment and organizational systems occurred at the same time that the mass consumption of medical service has emerged, which has been a major part of the development of service-oriented economy in the United States since the end of World War II.

The mass consumption of medical service reflects an increased emphasis on health and longevity. In 1950, 4.5 percent of the United States gross national product was spent for health care. In 1976, 8.6 percent or $139 billion was so spent. Despite a massive influsion of Federal and state funds for Medicaid and Medicare, New York City's municipal taxes for health care amounted to $1.2 billion in 1975, or 17 percent of all city tax revenues.[7] Robert P. Whalen described

this mass consumption of medical service as follows:

> We Americans are health worshipers. We have invested, and continue to invest, billions in our temples of health: our hospitals, medical schools and nursing homes. As no other society, we indulge physicians and surgeons, not only monetarily but technologically.
>
> Last year, we spent over $139 billion on health care-8.6 percent of the gross national product, or about $638 for every man, woman and child in the United States. Government at all levels contributed 42 percent of this money. In New York State, government's share was 49 percent and per capita spending for health exceeded $800 last year. Almost 25 percent of the nation's entire Medicaid outlay is spent in one state, New York.
>
> Can we really buy better health by spending ever-increasing sums on acute health care? There is a growing body of evidence that we cannot, that despite our faith in hospitals and curative medicine we may be worshipping in the wrong church.
>
> Since 1900, our average life expectancy has increased dramatically-from 47 to 72 years. But there has been a relatively small gain in longevity over the last decade, when health spending more than doubled and government spending for health quintupled. Most experts agree that further gains in life span seem unlikely in the near future. . .

The development of a service-oriented economy in the United States had been built upon the awareness of a growing number of "deficient" people who needed the delivery of specific services. As for medical service, the service-oriented economy has produced a massive demand for medical professionals. However, the American Medical Association, among other medical groups, had successfully established the policy and was relatively effective in limiting the number of students in

in medical schools in order to defend and perpetuate the professional interests, status, and power of medical doctors. Stevens has described this aspect of American medical education:

> The question of standards and content of medical education was one side of the coin. That of the number of physicians was the other. At a time of declining professional incomes it had been natural to attempt to restrict physician supply in the cause of raising educational standards, as the AMA did during the 1930's, and these attitudes survived World War II. The old arguments in relation to the "oversupply" of physicians, the accelerated three-year medical curricula and increased production of physicians during the war (as a result of which some 7,000 additional medical students had been graduated), and the reappearance into civilian life of thousands of physician veterans seemed to indicate a need for continuing caution. As the medical schools relaxed back into their four-year peacetime curricula, the AMA established its policy of no major expansion in the number of medical students. . .

This AMA policy had greatly limited the supply of American physicians in proportion to population, a population increasing at a faster rate than the number of medical school graduates. During the period of 1950 to 1960, for instance, the physician-population ratio actually declined: In 1950 there were 149 physicians for every 100,000 population; but in 1960 there were 148 physicians per 100,000. This decrease in the physician-population ratio occurred despite the fact that a total of 15,883 foreign medical doctors entered the United States during the period. The total number of foreign medical doctors practicing in the United States is enormous when we compare

it with the number of American medical graduates. In 1950, for instance, American medical schools produced only about 5,900 graduates. Stevens discussed the social circumstance under which the United States had to import foreign physicians:

> Nowhere was the cumbersome structure and lack of centralized responsibility for graduate medical education more evident than in consideration of the increasing flow of foreign medical graduates into internship and residency positions. . .
>
> Foreign physicians, ostensibly as students, were actively wooed by many hospitals, at least in part to meet their staffing needs. Indeed, without substantial aid from abroad many hospitals would have had to function without house staffs, thus developing a very different staffing system. With the deliberate recruitment of foreign physicians for accredited educational programs, there was a real danger of the residency changing from its old education function to a form of cheap hospital labor; nor could this be controlled under the existing professional accrediting procedures. . .

In order to increase the supply of domestically trained physicians, the Federal government has, since 1963, supported financially American medical schools and has encouraged the expansion in their number. The number of American medical schools increased from 91 in 1960 to 121 in 1974. During the period of 1968 to 1974 the number of total students enrolled in American medical schools increased from 35,833 to 53,554. And yet the United States has not been self-sufficient in the provision of medical doctors as related to the unequal geographic distribution of physicians and their

overspecialization.

As shown in Table V-2, in the early 1970's, the discrepancy between supply of and demand for medical doctors in the United States reached its climax, forcing the hospitals in the United States to import a large number of foreign medical school graduates to staff their intern and residency programs. Consequently, 44.5 percent of all doctors in the United States, who were licensed to practice during 1973-74, were graduates of foreign medical schools.[13] Such graduates or immigrant doctors constituted in 1977 about 30 percent of all interns and residents in the United States. In New York State they made up, in 1977, 52 percent of the total with the heaviest concentration being in state, city, and municipal hospitals.[14]

Table V-5

% of Residencies by Foreign Graduates, By Type of Hospital Controls, as of December 31, 1974

| Type of Hospital | | |
|---|---|---|
| Veteran Administration | 52 | ( 579) |
| State | 29 | (1,352) |
| County | 27 | ( 693) |
| City | 58 | ( 558) |
| City-County | 22 | ( 88) |
| Hospital District | 24 | ( 62) |
| | 31 | (2,753) |
| Church Related | 46 | (1,526) |
| Nonprofit Corp. | 37 | (5,673) |
| | 39 | (7.199) |

Source: Directory of Approved Internships and Residencies, American Medical Association (1975-1976).

Table V-6

% of Residencies by Foreign Graduates By the Seven States, Which Attracted a Large Number of Immigrant Doctors

| State | | |
|---|---|---|
| New York | 51 | (4,703) |
| New Jersey | 74 | ( 914) |
| Pennsylvania | 29 | ( 972) |
| Connecticut | 40 | ( 416) |
| Illinois | 49 | (1,455) |
| Michigan | 45 | (1,025) |
| Ohio | 39 | (1,030) |

Source: Directory of Approved Internships and Residencies, American Medical Association (1975-1976)

As shown in Table V-5, graduates of foreign schools constituted in 1974, 58 percent of residencies in city-run hospitals throughout the United States. This heavy concentration of graduates of foreign medical schools in city-run hospitals is an example of how immigrant doctors are distri-

buted.

New trends in urbanism in the United States have partly contributed to the influx of immigrant doctors into inner cities of the United States. Under the impact of sub-urbanization, well-qualified, white medical doctors have concentrated in more profitable private and group practice in suburban cities and exurbs, resulting in a substantial shortage of medical doctors in rural areas as well as in the ghettos of inner cities. For instance, the number of office-based medical practitioners in New York City has actually declined from 13,275 in 1966 to 10,453 in 1974.[15] The New York Times reported on the unequal distribution of medical doctors:

> In a city that has nearly twice as many physicians per capita as the national average, the New York City Department of Health has found a number of neighborhoods in poverty-stricken areas with grinding health problems that have virtually no physicians to deal with them. . .
>
> Dr. Imperato also is expected to ask the Federal officials to consider sending in public-health physicians who would serve poverty-stricken areas or Indian reservations, seeing patients in an office and dispensing medication. A similar request was recently made by city health officials in Newark.
>
> The city department cited Health Planning Area 18 in the Tremont section of the South Bronx. It has a population of about 10,000 and not one practicing private physician except for a Medicaid clinic. A few blocks to the Southeast in the Morrisania section, Health Planning Area 59, within sight of where President Carter visited recently, has no physicians either and only one Medicaid Clinic. . .

In response to this unequal distribution of medical doctors in the United States, the Federal government has recently formulated a policy in which priority is given to the training of general practitioners rather than that of specialized physicians in order to fill a shortage of 20,000 medical doctors in rural American. In addition, President Ford signed into law, in October 1976 a $2.1 billion health manpower bill that "for the first time ties Federal support to medical schools to the redistribution of doctors by location and choice of practice."[17] This law is designed to address two major problems: (1) The insufficient number of doctors in rural and inner-city areas; (2) The decline in the number of doctors practicing "primary medicine" -- general and family practice and pediatrics. Furthermore, American native-born doctors have also been reluctant to enter the military services since the draft ended in 1972. Foreign medical graduates have filled this shortage. For instance, of 190 physicians recruited by the Navy in 1977, 106 were trained outside the United States and 72 of these were aliens.[18]

## The "Marginal" Role of Asian Medical Professionals

It is the Korean, Philippine, Indian, and Pakistani immigrant medical workers that have filled the shortage of medical workers in inner cities of the United States. In

New York City, for instance, immigrant doctors, most Asians, make up more than half of the 2,700 interns and residents in New York City's municipal hospitals. They constitute more than 80 percent of the house staff at some voluntary institutions such as the Brooklyn Hospital.[19] In New York City, Asian immigrant medical professionals provide medical services to poor Blacks, Hispanics, and other urban minorities who lack their own ethnic medical doctors and nurses. In 1973 there were about 7,000 Philippine physicians in the United States as compared with 6,000 American Black physicians.[20] Furthermore, nonwhite minority doctors too, are reluctant to practice in their own ghetto neighborhoods:

> One of the attempted justifications of the preferential procedure under attack in Bakke is based on the alleged willingness of non white medical graduates to practice in their own ghetto. It should be emphasized that experience has failed to uphold this thesis.
>
> In 1972, the highest concentration of black physicians was found in California, whereas the Southern states of Georgia and North California, did not even rank in the top 10 of black physician distribution. It was concluded that these doctors are likely to shun ghettos of our large metropolitan centers:'What scant evidence there is reveals a similar trend in the career plans of Hispanic medical students. . . Large numbers of medical students of Asian extraction have chosen to practice here, where the rewards are noticeably higher than in their native lands. . . [21]

As American medical schools have increased in number and have produced an increasing number of medical graduates since 1965, "the Congress further finds and declares (in

October 1976) that there is no longer an insufficient number of physicians and surgeons in the United States such that there is no further need for affording preference to alien physicians and surgeons in admission to the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act."[22]

The United States now restricts the entry of such professionals as scientists, nurses, and pharmacists by degrading them to the sixth or non-preference category with respect to priority for immigration visas. In Chapter I, we have already discussed this new development in the United States immigration law. This new federal law restricting the influx of foreign medical professionals has drawn protest on the part of municipal and voluntary hospitals in New York City, which need a continuous supply of "cheap labor" of immigrant medical professionals. The New York Times reported on this aspect:

> A new federal law that will drastically limit the recruiting of graduates of foreign medical schools by hospitals was assailed yesterday as posing a serious threat to effective health care. The criticism of the law, which goes to effect Monday, came in interviews with officials of New York City municipal and voluntary hospitals.
>
> The new limitation is part of a comprehensive law approved by Congress last October that is designed to enable American medical schools to produce enough physicians to meet national needs by 1980. . .
>
> According to an official of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, the hiring of licensed doctors to the work now being done by doctors in training -- namely, interns and residents -- would at least double the cost of such work at a time when hospitals faced major deficits.

> While the new law would not affect the 15,000 alien physicians on hospital staffs, it would effectively prevent hospitals from recruiting any others for new intern and residency programs beginning next July.
>
> As a result, hospital officials are attempting to persuade the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to adopt a four-year phasing-in of the new limitation so that hospital staffs will not be precipitously cut off from an important source of interns and residents. . . [23]

## The Adjustment Patterns of Korean Medical Professionals

We have indicated how the broad changes in the delivery of medical service in contemporary American society have stimulated the influx of a large number of foreign medical workers into American medical institutions. The peculiar developments in American medical institutions have governed the way in which Korean medical professionas have been recruited by, employed at, and adjusted to American medical establishments. In spite of the danger of repetition, we want to emphasize the following points that characterize the adjustment patterns of Korean medical professionals.

First, the New York metropolitan area is the largest locus of concentration of Korean medical workers. The tri-states such as New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut have absorbed about 1,300 Korean immigrant physicians or 35.3 percent of the total Korean doctors admitted to the United States. As shown in Table V-7, the medical institutions in

New York City have attracted 20.3 percent of the total number of Korean immigrant doctors.

Table V-7

% of Korean Medical Doctors in the United States By Region, 1976

| State | |
|---|---|
| Massachusetts | 2.2 |
| Connecticut | 1.7 |
| New York | 26.2 |
| (N.Y.C.) | (20.3) |
| New Jersey | 7.4 |
| Pennsylvania | 7.5 |
| Maryland | 7.6 |
| Virginia | 2.2 |
| Ohio | 8.4 |
| Michigan | 7.7 |
| Indiana | 1.2 |
| Illinois | 7.6 |
| Texas | 1.6 |
| California | 3.4 |
| Other States | 15.3 |
| | 100.0 (3,640 |

Source: Based upon the Directories of Korean Medical School Alumni Associations in the United States.

About 55 percent of Korean immigrant doctors have settled in the Eastern Seaboard area in or near inner cities of this area. Another 25 percent are found in the Midwest, especially, in Ohio, Michigan and Illinois.

A similar geographical distribution can be found for Korean nurses and pharmacists. In the New York metropolitan area there were in 1978 about 600 Korean pharmacists, some 190 of whom were licensed by the New York State government. The 600 Korean pharmacists represent about 24 percent of some

2,500 Korean pharmacists admitted to the United States. Korean nurses also show a similar concentration in the New York metropolitan area.

Second, the concentration of Korean doctors in New York is explained by the fact that large hospitals in New York's inner cities employ a large number of Korean medical workers. New York City is a medical capital of the world, boasting of the existence of excellent medical centers. But the majority of Korean medical professionals work for second- or third-rate public hospitals such as city, state, or FEderal hospitals, that have recruited "cheap" foreign medical workers. For instance, in 1977 the Montefiore Hospital in the North Bronx, one of the finest hospitals in New York City, hired about 10 Korean medical workers whereas the Willowbrook State Hospital for Mentally Retarded Children employed about 120 Korean medical workers including doctors, nurses, and nurse-aides in the same year. The patients to whom Korean medical professionals deliver medical service are largely made up of blacks, Puerto Ricans, the elderly, and other marginal peoples with whom American-born white doctors are reluctant to deal. Many Korean doctors in New York either work for small clinics in ghetto neighborhoods or engage in private practice in racially mixed neighborhoods.

Third, Korean medical doctors are heavily concentrated in several specialties which native-born American doctors usually avoid. As shown in Table V-8, 62 percent of Korean doctors have been forced to choose such nine "fringe" specialties, as anesthesiology, psychiatry, obstetrics & gynecolgy, pediatrics, radiology, pathology, physical medicine & rehabilitation, and general practice. Ambitious American-born graduates have avoided making a professional career out of these relatively low paying "fringe" specialties. In contrast, only about 15 percent of Korean doctors have managed to acquire positions in the 18 "core" specialties which are included in the general titles of "medicine" and "surgery."

Table V-8

% of Korean Medical Doctors in the United States By Region, 1976

| Specialty | |
|---|---|
| Medicine (Including Nine Specialities) | 6.6 |
| Surgery (Including Nine Specialities) | 8.7 |
| Anesthesiology | 16.0 |
| Psychiatry | 12.6 |
| Obstetrics & Gynecology | 8.3 |
| Pediatrics | 6.6 |
| Radiology | 7.7 |
| Pathology | 7.8 |
| Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation | 3.0 |
| General Practice | 3.4 |
| Other Specialities and Unidentified | 19.3 |
| | 100.0 (3,640) |

Source: Based upon the Directories.

Korean physicians have functioned as a backstop to American-born doctors in staffing hospitals.[25] At the same time, American medical institutions have been reluctant to offer residencies in "core" specialties to Korean immigrant doctors with different educational and language background.

In South Korea the "fringe" specialties absorbing a bulk of Korean immigrant doctors were largely filled by either "dull" male doctors or female doctors. But in the new land a majority of Korean doctors, most of whom were either "bright" students or "promising" doctors in South Korea, have been forced by their own standards to degrade themselves when they enter the marginal sectors of the American medical industry, because opportunities exist only in these sectors. They have also become "marginal" doctors in the United States in terms of geographical and organizational distribution. As we shall see later, the Korean immigrant doctors, who have entered the United States most recently could not even find jobs in "inner city" hospitals and thus are predominantly recruited by rural medical institutions. Similarly, the high concentration of Korean nurses in the New York metropolitan area can be explained by the same marginal situation facing Korean medical workers.

The Koreans' entry into the marginal sectors of the American medical system can also be found in other fields of

American medicine. A heavy concentration of Korean pharmacists is due to the fact that in New York State, particularly in New York City there has been a short supply of Ame-ican-born pharmacists. The college population in New York's pharmaceutical colleges has diminished partly because, given almost the same amount of investment and training, American students can enter medical schools rather than pharmaceutical schools. The Pharmaceutical College of Columbia University, for instance, was recently shut down mainly because of lack of students. Thus, New York State is the only state in the United States that has granted, through a specific examination system, licenses to immigrant pharmacists without requiring specified training at American pharmaceutical schools. Re;gistered pharmacists are largely employed by inner city medical institutions.

Korean immigrants are also active in such marginal positions as dental, laboratory, and X-ray technicians. In addition, many Korean nurses, who cannot pass a license examination in the United States, have become nurse's aides. Ohter marginal medical jobs in which Korean immigrants are very active include dental laboratory work, i.e. making dental ceramics. In New York City more than 100 Korean dental technicians have emerged since 1973 and have largely succeeded Jews in that field. Americans have shied away from this profession because it needs a self-disciplined, tedious, and a patient apprenticeship to become a skilled worker. In order to do

dental, laboratory, and X-ray technician's work, Korean immigrants have either learned the skills in their homeland or have acquired them after arriving in the new land; but acquisition of these skills has been solely motivated by its utility for mobility or migration.

## The Development of South Korean Medicine As it Affects On International Mobility and Migration

A massive immigration of Korean medical workers to the United States presupposes a special kind of development of Korean medical institutions that will qualify their graduates for American internships and residencies, licenses and certification in response to the demand for medical workers on the part of American medical institutions. The analysis of the development of Korean medical institutions, to follow, indicates how South Korea has, since the United States Immigration Act of 1965, contributed the second largest group of foreign medical professionals to the United States. During that period the emigration of Korean medical workers into the United States has effected a tremendous change in Korean medical institutions, especially in Korean medical education.

Largely under the influence of American and Japanese medical institutions, Korean medical institutions had been as well developed as those of other developed countries.[26] The impact of the United States on the development of Korean

medical institutions was far greater than that of the Japanese. Koreans have adopted Western medicine and its institutions from these two countries even as they have experienced political and cultural domination by these two countries.

American Protestant missionaries, especially sent from Presbyterian and Methodist Church foundations in the late 19th century, undertook a crucial role in introducing Western medical institutions in Korea. Horace Newton Allen, a physician-preacher from the American Presbyterian Church, came to Korea in 1881 and demonstrated the effectiveness of Western medicine by providing medical service to the nobility and to royal families.

In 1885, Allen persuaded King Kojong to set up a royal hospital, "Kwang Hae Won", which became the first Western-type hospital in Korea.[27] Partly as a result, Christian missionaries including Catholic priests have been allowed to enter Korea. Funded largely by philanthropic organizations in the United States, they built modern medical schools and hospitals and instituted a modern medical system in Korea as part of their mission. In doing so, they imposed an indelible stamp on the development of Korean medical institutions. American medical professional ideology, hospital systems, the medical educational system, and Western medical knowledge were among the things that traditional Koreans

learned from American missionaries. Allen, for instance, founded the Severance Hospital and the Severance Union Medical College which has become one of the largest medical complex in South Korea, the Yonsei Medical Center. About 800 graduates from the Medical College, which was renamed as the Yonsei University Medical College, have entered the United States. The Medical College has also sent several hundred nurses to the United States.

The Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 had further facilitated the introduction of Western medical institutions into Korea. The Japanese medical system was derived from the German system. Thus the American and Japanized German medical system had formed two sources of Korean medical development, but the development of Western medicine took a somewhat different course during the period of Japanese colonialism. The Japanese had focused on the institutionalization of public licensing systems.[28] They also built public hospitals and public (or national) medical or nursing schools, in which "Japanese textbooks were forced upon Korean students".[29] One of the medical schools was the "Kyongsung Medical College", which became Seoul National University Medical College Korea was liberated from Japanese rule. This college has been the prestigious one in South Korea and has sent about 1,200 doctors or about 50 percent of its total graduates, to the

United States. After the Korean independence, the two different forms of Western medical institutions began to intermingle, and together they laid the basic foundation from which the present structure of Korean medical institutions have evolved.

However, the Korean War was a cause of the acceleration in development of Korean medical institutions. One of the effects of the War on Korean medical institutions is that a massive flow of American medical technology into South Korea occurred during and after the War. Thanks to the War, Koreans first encountered antibiotics. The United States Army, the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency were the specific agents for introducing advanced American medical technology into South Korea.[30] These organizations initiated various programs under which hospitals and nursing schools were built. American Protestant and Catholic foundations created nursing schools and helped existing medical or nursing schools to expand and streamline their educational facilities. During and after the Korean War, Korean medical professionals, especially, nurses, had been produced in large numbers in order to meet wartime manpower needs. Many Korean doctors and nurses had been chosen by various American foundations for continuation of their study at American medical schools or hospitals. They came home with a new knowledge of American

medical technology which was adapted to Korean medical institutions. One of the American educational programs was the Exchange-Visitor Programs which the United States government promoted during the cold war period, "on the assumption that bringing foreign visitors to the United States would give the world an introduction to freedom and democracy.[31] But American hospitals, facing short supply of American doctors, used the Program as a means of recruiting "cheap" foreign medical workers. The Program was designed so that the participant would come to the United States for medical training and then return to his/her homeland to utilize that training. But, as we shall see later, the majority of Korean participants did not return; they rather settled in the United States in order to reap greater economic rewards.

All these historical events governed the way Koreans borrowed Western medical technology, but they also shaped homeland Korean medical institutions. It is a commonly accepted view in South Korea, but not in American hospitals that "Korean medical science can be competitive with that of Western nations." Moreover, Koreans, who are equipped with high educational motivation, could quickly borrow new medical technology from the United States. And the fact that medicine is an applied practical science has made the borrowing easier. Thus, once the United States Immigration Act of 1965

had opened doors to the immigration of professional, skilled workers, South Korea could send such a large number of medical workers to the United States.

## The Impact of the "Medical Exodus" on South Korean Medicine

A massive emigration of Korean medical professionals into the United States has also effected a tremendous change in South Korean medical profession. A South Korean newspaper expressed, among other things, an overall impact of the emigration of Korean medical professionals on the manpower situation of South Korean medical industry.

> (In South Korea) It costs more than $20,000 to produce a physician through the process of a 6-year medical education and a 5-year training in internship and residency. A substantial potion of the doctors, produced at such an expensive cost, have immigrated to foreign countries, resulting in a serious loss in national manpower resources. This brain drain of medical professionals has caused a setback to our national health program. According to recent statistics compiled by the Department of Health and Social Welfare, a total of 3,800 doctors including dentists and 'Oriental medicine' doctors have migrated to foreign countries. The figure constitutes 22 percent of the total 16,800 registered doctors in 1975. An annual average of 300 doctors had flowed to foreign countries during the period of from 1969 to 1975. The number represents about a fourth of the total annual graduates from 14 (Korean) medical schools. Consequently, the physician-population ratio, which had decreased through the 1960's to 1,851 in 1973, has increased up to 2,064 in 1976. This reversal trend can also be applicable to nurses, dentists, and 'Oriental medicine' doctors. This massive outflow of medical professionals has created a dislocation in the present

> Government's attempt to formulate a comprehensive national medical insurance program. Government is now trying to solve the problem of so called "the rural villages without doctors". Fortunately, manpower shortage in medical field is likely to be improved because the United States, which has accepted the majority of Korean medical professionals, is planning to restrict the entry of foreign medical workers. In addition, the two new medical schools (in South Korea) shall produce new graduates next year. [32]

The above statement needs some clarification. A geographical maldistribution of Korean medical professionals, as in the United States, has posed a serious threat to a balanced delivery of medical service throughout the country. In 1970, for instance, about 50 percent of medical institutions were concentrated in the two largest cities in South-Korea-,Seoul and Pusan.[33] Twenty percent spread over other major cities. Thus, rural Koreans, which in 1970 constituted about 60 percent of national population, had an access to 30 percent of total medical institutions. These were poorly staffed and equipped.

This mal distribution of Korean medical institutions in favor of a few big metropolitan areas is a ramification of the rapid post-World War II urbanization of South Korea. As we have discussed, a few primary cities, especially Seoul have been so powerful that they have attracted major political, economic, and cultural institutions. In the absence of a strong governmental policy on the regional distribution of

of medical facilities and personnel, South Korean medical institutions have been concentrated in a few metropolitan areas where the urban well-to-do settle. Of the 278 general hospitals in South Korea in 1972, the majority were private hospitals and located in a few big cities. However, the big hospitals in urban areas cannot, just as in the United States, provide sufficient number of well-paid jobs to ambitious medical graduates.

South Korean medical students have largely been recruited from the members of the middle or upper middle classes. They undergo keen competition to enter prestigous medical schools and incur large educational expenses to complete their education. When they finish their education, they are reluctant to settle in poverty-stricken rural areas even though they could find ample job opportunities in the countryside. For college-educated urban youth, moving to a rural area is "to go into exile". South Korean medical graduates, deeply imbued with an urban culture and mentally, try rather to find lucrative economic opportunities either in South Korean cities or in foreign countries, especially the United States. As shown in Table V-9, 75.1 percent of the total Korean physicians in the United States graduated from the five prestigous medical schools in Seoul.

Table V-9

% of Korean Immigrant Medical Doctors by the Medical Schools (Korean), 1976

| School | | |
|---|---|---|
| Seoul National U. * | 30.8 | (1,120) |
| Yonsei U. * | 21.2 | ( 770) |
| Korea U. * | 11.3 | ( 410) |
| Catholic U. * | 8.0 | ( 290) |
| Yihwa U. * | 3.8 | ( 140) |
| Kyongbuk U. | 12.6 | ( 460) |
| Chonnam U. | 7.7 | ( 280) |
| pusan U. | 4.7 | ( 170) |
| | 100.1 | (3,640) |

* The medical school which is located in Seoul City.
Source: Based upon the Directories.

When South Korean medical graduates pass the National Medical Board Examination, they are entitled to become private practitioners without undertaking an internship and residency. Thus, upon graduation, they are roughly divided into two groups. One group is made up of those whose family is affluent enough to subsidize their entry into practice. And the other, a majority, consists of those who cannot afford to set up an office and thus must find jobs or internships in hospitals. But entry into intership training has become competitive mainly because the Korean Medical Association has restricted the number of hospitals which can grant training opportunities to medical graduates. In 1975, for instance, only 65 general hospitals with 65 beds or more were available for the training of new graduates. The salary scale for South Korean interns has been low. As a result, graduates, who are

incapable of opening their own offices, have shown a strong tendency to seek employment in the United States and other foreign countries. The higher salary scale in American hospitals has operated as a major force pulling Korean medical professionals from South Korea. In 1977 Korean immigrant doctors during their internship and residency period in the United States were paid somewhere between $16,000 and $20,000 a year. If they were in South Korea, they would receive about $3,000 during the same period. Thus, an United States Congressional Report highlighted this aspect of the "brain drain" from developing countries:

> Between 1962-68, 1,914 Korean doctors came to the United States, but only 49 had returned by early 1969. . . Between 45-60 percent of Korea's 11 medical schools find employment abroad. . .
>
> Meanwhile, only 1,000 doctors are practicing in rural areas where about half (some 15 million) of the South Korean population lives. . . [34]

In spite of the insufficient number of the general hospitals that could provide apprenticeship to new graduates, the Korean medical profession could have been proud of its "100 percent" full employment as long as the United States medical institutions had absorbed a bulk of new medical graduates from South Korean medical schools. A heavy blow was inflicted upon Korean medicine when the United States Congress approved in October 1976, upon the assumption that shortage of medical professionals in the United States came to an end,

a 1976 Health Manpower Act which ended, effective January 10, 1977, the preferential treatment granted for the immigration of professional and skilled workers. A south Korean newspaper presented a detailed description on the change in the United States immigration law:

> According the new regulations, such professionals as scientists, medical doctors, pharmacists and nurses, who were classified as third-preference applicants under the former law, will belong to the sixth preference or non-preference categories. . . They will also be required to have specific jobs awaitingthem in the United States before they can qualify. . . The regulation also states medical doctors must pass a new oral test in English and a professional examination more stringent than was required under the old regulations. . .

This shift in immigration policy has caused a serious disruption in the South Korean Government's manpower policy on medical professionals. Based upon the assumption that the emigration and Overseas Contracts of Korean medical professionals, especially nurses and doctors, would continue over a long period of time, the South Korean Government had, since 1966, stimulated the mass production of Korean medical professionals. In addition, as South Korea has achieved a rapid and extensive economic development, the Government has also attempted to raise the quality of national health care to the level of advanced Western nations by increasing the number of medical workers. The ratio of medical workers to the total population has actually decreased mainly because of the massive exodus of medical professionals into foreign countries.

During the period of from 1966 to 1969, the number of Korean medical schools increased from 8 to 13. By 1977 there were 15 medical schools in South Korea, which produced annually some 1,200 doctors. In 1966 when the United States, West Germany and other advanced nations began to admit a large number of Korean nurses, the South Korean Department of Health and Social Welfare formulated a 5-year plan for a mass production of nurses. According to the plan, the number of nursing students in existing nursing schools were doubled; 20 nursing schools were newly established.[36] In 1973 there existed 37 junior nursing colleges in South Korea, which would yield 2,546 graduates by 1976. In 1973 there were two nursing colcolleges and ten nursing departments, all of which were affiliated with medical schools. By 1976, a total of 648 graduates would come out of these 4-year nursing schools annually. During the period of from 1966 to 1973, some 20,000 nursing assistants (or aides) had been produced by a special government training program.

The impact of medical institutions of advanced nations on the labor situationof Korean nursing industry had been much greater than on that of Korean doctors because a huge number of Korean nurses had migrated to foreign countries. In this context, we may repeat, some 7,800 Korean nurses and nurse assistants were at one time or another employed, as of September 1975, in the medical industry in West Germany.

A high proportion of these Korean nurses and those who initially migrated to Canada had entered the United States. Thus the Korean Nurse Association in South Korea claimed in 1976 that some 7,000 Korean nurses had settled in the United States.

As the demand for Korean medical workers by the United States and West Germany has shrunk since 1975, the Korean medical industry has been plagued by internal troubles. Urban medical institutions in South Korea do not have the capacity to employ, by themselves, the vast number of graduates from domestic medical and nursing schools. The creation of a vast number of unemployed graduates has undermined the prestige of the South Korean medical profession. Previously that profession had claimed a highest occupational status in the country. A Korean newspaper reported on the declining status of the South Korean medical profession:

> The medical profession, which once boasted of a '100 percent' full employment, has lost its popularity because employment through overseas contracts has become virtually impossible for new graduates whose number has almost doubled over the last 5 or 6 years. In order to seek internship positions, new graduates have recently stampeded a few general hospitals in Seoul, which are not affiliated with medical schools. According to a source, some of them have paid some $2,000 in commissions in return for a position. Officials concerned worry that the unemployment for new medical graduates would continue and be out of control unless the Government make a substantial amount of investment into the expansion of medical facilities. In contrast with this fuss over job-hunting, many villages in rural areas still have no doctors and nurses. . . [37]

Korean nurses faced a similar situation much earlier, a situation that was much harsher than the one facing doctors. This was because there was a much greater oversupply of nurses than there was of doctors. Fifty-nine percent of 2,670 nursing graduates in 1973 were jobless.[38] A dean of a missionary nursing school in South Korea observed the current manpower situation of South Korean nursing profession:

> In the past ten years there has been a tremendous increase in the number of young women seeking careers in nursing. Although modern medical centers have absorbed many of these graduates, many have been unable to find work in Korea and so have sought employment overseas. Many of these will not return because they find greater satisfaction and remuneration overseas, and because they have nothing similar to return to in their own country. The lack of development of health care facilities in rural and provincial areas in Korea has caused a migration to Seoul, a surplus of nurses in the capital and thus facilitates the movement out of Korea. Meanwhile the health level of the people in the rural and provincial areas has improved little, A large segment of the Korean people are still unable to meet their basic health needs. . . [39]

In 1975, 13 Korean medical schools produced 970 graduates, of whom some 580 acquired internship positions.[40] Some of the remaining 390 were self-employed having opened their own offices. The rest were either jobless or became army doctors. New graduates jammed the traditionally unpopular specialties such as anesthesiology and radiology and hospitals began to reject female graduates.

In order to save new graduates from unemployment as well as to enhance their professional skills, some young doctors in South Korea have called for a reform in the training system. They have demanded that even small hospitals or private offices should be allowed to provide internship training to new graduates. The Government has recently encouraged university hospitals to adopt the so-called "All Specialty Training System" in which new graduates would be assigned to general hospitals in order to receive training on all specialties over a two-year period.

After training they would be granted an "All Specialty" license. The proponents of this training system have argued that since the emigration of doctors is impossible, new graduates should be given training opportunities to improve their professional skills. The system is also designed to increase peoples' confidence in private practitioners. Urban Koreans have increasingly been reluctant to seek treatment from private practitioners and have flocked to general hospitals because many of private practitioners have not undergone internship training.[41]

The "All Specialty" training system would result in a mass production of specialists, thus making the private practitioners competitive with the general hospitals. The Korean Hospital Association has opposed to this new system. It

wishes to regulate the production of newly trained specialists. Similarily, the Korean nursing establishment has protested the governmental policy of mass producing nurses, arguing that "the increase in the number of nursing schools and students has resulted in a serious deterioration of the quality of Korean nurses."

The life chances of a bulk of Korean doctors, nurses, and pharmacists both in the United States and in South Korea have been linked to the peculiar changes in the manpower situation of American medical institutions. Those Korean professionals, who had been graduated during the 1960's and the early 1970's, had been able to enter the United States in relatively favored emigration categories. The majority of them have reaped ample economic opportunities by being absorbed into the expanding American medical industry. They were "lucky" simply because they happened to finish their education in South Korea at the time when United States hospitals was wooing foreign medical workers. For instance, as shown in Table V-10, about 83 percent of the Korean immigrant doctors from the Seoul National University College of Medicine graduated during the period of 1957 to 1972. Those doctors, who graduated after 1972, constituted only 1 percent of the 15 year total.

Table V-10

% of the Korean Medical Doctors, Who were Graduated from Seoul National University College of Medicine, by Year of Graduation, 1976

| Year of Graduation | |
|---|---|
| 1941-47 | 1.8 |
| 1948-52 | 5.8 |
| 1953-57 | 8.9 |
| 1958-62 | 26.9 |
| 1963-67 | 33.0 |
| 1968-72 | 22.7 |
| 1973-75 | 1.0 |
| | 100.1 (1,120) |

Source: Directory of Seoul National University College of Medicine Alumni Association of North American, Inc., 1976-1977.

New graduates after 1973, many of whom had chosen the medical profession in the hope of emigrating to the United States, have missed these economic opportunities in the United States. With some exceptions, it is highly probable that none of the new graduates from the 7 new medical schools established after 1966 will enter the United States. The Korean doctors in the United States are entirely made up of the graduates from the 8 medical schools which had produced doctors before the enactment of the United States Immigration Act of 1965.

## The Immigration Law and the Life Chances of Korean-American Physicians

The Korean doctors in New York are the most "successful" of Korean immigrants. They represent the largest group of Korean suburban houseowners. Most of the Korean residents of Scarscale are immigrant doctors. With MD plates on their cars, the Korean doctors in New York can display their highly esteemed status in white suburban neighborhoods. Since their professional skills have been badly needed in the United States market, they also enjoy the highest status among Korean immigrants. As we shall later see, they are deeply committed to church-centered community affairs and exert a strong influence on the Korean community in New York. When a group of well-established immigrant Korean doctors visit their homeland, they are frequently approached by Korean medical students who inquire of them about whether there is any easy way for them to enter the United States. A Korean-American doctor suggested that, if they could enter the United States by whatever means, they would still easily find medical positions in rural America. A dean of a Korean medical school recently talked to a Korean doctor from America about Korean medical students' academic morale: "Nowadays, senior medical students do not study at all. They'd rather play billiards all day long."

Differences in economic opportunities in the United States have existed even for Korean medical professionals depending upon their time of entry. Early comers could easily and profitably accomodate themselves to the expanding economic opportunities simply because the market demand for them was greater than for latecomers. To the Korean medical professionals concerned, the discrepancy in economic opportunities between early comers and latecomers can be translated into the status difference between licensees and non-licensees. This is so because Korean medical professionals have met difficulties or ease in securing license based upon "need" for practitioners as defined by the profession and by licensing authorities who respond to such definitions of "need." A. H. Raskin reports:

> The list of professions and occupations in the region that need state or municipal licenses takes up at least one-third of the Yellow Pages in many telephone directories.
>
> The roster stretches past such quick-to-mind groups as physicians, dentists, lawyers, and accountants to scores of more plebeian occupations, from amusement-arcade operators to undertakers, pawnbrokers to manure haulers. . .
>
> The danger that wolves will watch the sheep, under the guise of civic guardians against monopoly-gouging or other abuses, is as old as the market place. Medieval guilds, which were essentially devices for enforcing a closed shop, developed in this country into organizations that use government to insure restricted entry into crafts and professions. . . In much the same way, medical societies and other professional groups, which determine the membership of boards that, in turn, decide who practices, can use the power of the

state to sustain exclusionary practices and self-protective rules. . . [43]

A discrepancy exists between the ability of recently arriving Asian medical professionals to secure state medical licenses and the demand for them especially by hospitals. This has resulted in the prevalence of unlicensed medical practice by late arriving Asian medical professionals. The following two reports addressed to the same problem but with different perspectives. The first one reflected a nativist's point of view while the second one represented an immigrant's outlook:

> A growing "medical underground" of thousands of foreign-trained doctors is practicing medicine without licenses and often without supervision in many American hospitals, according to a report published today in the New England Journal of Medicine. . .
>
> The study raises basic questions about how well the quality of medical care in this country is regulated, particulary since the number of graduates of Asian medical schools practicing in the United States has soared after a change in immigration law in 1965. . .
>
> The report also rekindles the controversy about this country's growing reliance on graduates of foreign schools to treat patients. Last year the number of foreign medical graduates licensed in the United States almost equaled the number of doctors who graduated from American medical schools.
>
> The report comes at a time when a record number of Americans-about 6,000-are studying medicine in foreign schools. . .
>
> American Medical Association records cited by the study's authors show at least 10,000 unlicensed physicians working in the health field in 1971. Dr. Henry Mason of the A. M. A., characterizing these people as 'not quite physicians', has attributed the problem to 'loopholes' in our immigration law and to the practice whereby some states grant

> temporary licenses to uncertified doctors who work in state hospitals. . . [44]

The viewpoint of Asian immigrants is reported as follows:

> Some spokespersons for the foreign medical doctors alleged that those who had obtained employment as medical assistants were often exploited by private hospitals and clinics who assigned them duties usually given to a practicing physicians. . . At a meeting on November 7, 1974,. . ., Dr. Cadag pointed out that foreign-trained medical doctors were working in paramedical jobs, such as laboratory technicians and medical assistants to licensed doctors. His presentation at the meeting included examples where unlicensed medical doctors were expected to handle duties and responsibilities normally and legally assigned to licensed medical doctors in private hospitals and medical clinics.[45]

The United States Government regulation of foreign-trained doctors through a licensing system dates back to the 1950's. The influx of a large number of foreign-trained doctors through the Exchange-Visitor Program had induced the American medical establishment to adopt some regulatory measures concerning the quality of foreign doctors. At first the AMA Council on Medical Education and the Association of American Medical Colleges attempted to screen foreign medical graduates by publishing a list of recognized foreign medical schools. But this attempt proved to be impractical and ineffective. Another approach to regulating foreign-trained doctors was made in 1957. It aimed to test foreign medical graduates before their entry into the United States. For this purpose, the Educational Council for Foreign Medical Graduates

(ECFMG) was created in 1957 and sponsored by the Council on Medical Education, the Association of American Colleges, the Federation of State Medical Boards, the American Hospitals Association, and government agencies. From 1958 up until 1976 when the United States immigration law was amended, the ECFMG test had been an essential requirement for foreign medical graduates seeking jobs in the United States. Almost all foreign-educated medical doctors would have to acquire ECFMG certification if they were to intern in a hospital. Another set of examination, the so-called FLEX test was required for them to receive a state medical license.

But with the amendment of the U.S. immigration law in 1976, the United States Congress declared in the Health Profession Educational Assistance Act of 1976 that "immigrant physicians should be henceforth be required to pass the same professional examinations as the American-trained".[46] In previous legislation in 1975, the Federal aid to medical schools, based on "capitation" under which a fixed amount of money would be paid to the school per matriculated student. The capitation was linked to the regulation of a foreign-trained doctors: ". . . previous legislation has mandated that as a requirement for American medical-student capitation, the positions of foreign medical graduates in residency programs in institutions affiliated with medical schools be decreased

markedly from 40 to 35 to 25 percent of total house-staff positions over the next three years."[47] In addition, the Federal government has recently shifted its policy and focused upon the training of general practitioners at the expense of specialized physicians as a way of delivering sufficient primary care to those patients in inner cities and rural areas.

All these recent changes in the United States manpower policy toward medical workers have worked against Korean doctors whether they are in South Korea as prospective emigrants or late comers to the United States. First, the ECFMG test was replaced in 1977 with the Visa Qualifying Examination (VQE). Since then, only "a few" Korean doctors in South Korea have passed the VQE test, which consists of a language test in English and a test on medical subjects. Korean doctors complained that the English test is much more difficult than the test of medical knowledge. Second, the late-comers in the United States have encountered a tremendous difficulty in finding apprenticeship positions in hospitals because they had arrived in the United States at a time when a "sufficient" supply of doctors became a reality. Thus the American medical establishment could successfully launch the campaign which deprives foreign-trained graduates of job opportunities. Time has worked against the late comers and a structural underemployment has plagued many Korean doctors:

"They have had to accept low-income jobs in fields totally unrelated to their knowledge and expertise in order to support themselves and their families."[48] This underemployment problem is especially pronounced for the older generation of Korean doctors, most of whom received a Japanese medical education and somehow could not update their medical knowledge. Old age and an extremely limited English characterizes them and becomes a disadvantage when they seek jobs in hospitals and attempt to acquire state licenses.

Despite their ample clinical experience in the home, some of this older generation of Korean doctors have to work in New York City as hospital orderlies and as nurse's assistants. But those Korean doctors who are young and competent can still find ample economic opportunities in rural medical institutions. One Korean employment agency in New York City is active in recruiting Korean doctors for rural medical institutions. Its recruiting targets are those Korean doctors who either have acquired the ECFMG certification but have not yet received a "AMA approved training," or have finished internship or residency training in American hospitals but have not passed the FLEX test. A majority of the late coming Korean doctors have been sent to rural areas. But some of them have returned to New York City, saying that, "Life over there is very monotonous. There are no Koreans."

It is fair to say that foreign medical graduates could not have posed a threat to American physicians in private practice before the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1965. Most foreign medical graduates entered the United States with non-immigrant visas, and were not eligible for certification by the specialty boards because of the boards' requirements of citizenship. They had rather filled the labor shortage in interns and residencies: after the training they were expected to return to their home country. However, owing to the Immigration Act of 1965, these non-immigrant foreign graduates could easily change their status into that of a permanent resident; after the 5-year residency requirement, they could become a United States citizen. This liberalization in the United States immigration and naturalization law coincided with requirements for the acceptance of foreign medical graduates. "In the meanwhile the dominant professional attitudes toward physician supply have changed firmly to acceptance that there is an acute physician shortage. The foreign medical graduate is finally being brought into the certification system on equal terms."[49] These two changes had created golden economic opportunities for the foreign graduates who had entered the United States during the 1960's. In the case of Korean medical graduates, the changes had produced a group of "golden" doctors, called the "Kim Plan Group."

South Korean Defense Minister Kim contrived in 1964 a plan designed to facilitate the outflow of Korean graduates into the United States under the Exchange-Visitor Program. The majority of Korean graduates at that time were eager to go to the United States under the Program, but they were not eligible for the exit visas issued by the Korean government because they did not fulfill the compulsory military service. According to the Kim Plan, the Korean medical graduates were temporarily exempted from the requirement of the military service while they received training in the United States. Upon returning to South Korea, they would be obliged to serve the Korean military for five years with the skills they learned in the United States. The Plan had two purposes: One was to expand training or economic opportunities for Korean medical graduates who otherwise would be unemployed or under-employed because of the limited training facilities in Korean hospitals: the other one was to improve the quality of medical service in the Korean military by recruiting American-trained doctors. When the graduates under the Kim Plan left for the United States, they took a solemn oath to abide by their agreement with the Government. "Several hundred" Korean graduates had entered the United States during the period of from 1964 to 1967 without being hampered by the Korean emigration requirement. But only a handful of graduates

returned to South Korea after the completion of their training in the United States. Thanks to the United States Immigration Act of 1965, the rest had changed their status to that of permanent resident. By the early 1970's, almost all had become United States citizens. They were in a position to take advantage of the expanding economic opportunities in American medicine because they were in the United States when the American medical establishment, faced with an acute physician shortage, began to liberalize its licensing system in favor of foreign medical graduates. Furthermore, they had saved "the 3-year waste" in their career development by not serving the Korean armed services. The Kim Plan doctors have "made it": many of them are suburban private practitioners, faculty members in American medical schools, and staff members in American hospitals. The Kim Plan doctors are the objects of resentment among the late arriving Korean doctors who could not benefit from the Plan: "They could not visit Korea. A K.C. I. A.-made black list awaits them at the Kimpo Airport and would pull them off the line." They would be forced to fulfill their military obligation.

Korean nurses have had to overcome the same license problems as have Korean doctors. But Korean nurses have not had to face as much difficulty in acquiring a license. Unlike Korean doctors, they were not required to take a test before

their entry into the United States. But the "license problem" is the problem at which their whole life in the new land is at stake. Once unmarried Korean nurses receive RN licenses, their value in Korean marriage market is substantially increased. A Korean nurse wrote a letter to the journal of the Korean Nurse Association in order to make some advice to prospective emigrants:

> One year and a half have passed since I began a new life in New Jersey. Last July I took a licensing test both in New York and New Jersey state and passed both. Thus, my new life here has begun to take a stabilized form. My mental torment, mainly caused by language barrier, is now much alleviated. I'd life to use this space in order to provide some information to those who wish to come to the United States.
>
> New Jersey state issues a temporary work permit to the (foreign) nurses who scored more than 447 points in TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) test. Once they receive the state work permit, they are treated in equal terms with registered nurses. Fortunately, I had taken the TOEFL test at USIS in Tagu (in South Korea). Thus, when I arrived here, I could receive the work permit. . . The Korean nursing licensing is not useful here. I have frequently seen Korean nurses, who were officically licensed in Korea, not trying to get a license here. An urgent economic problem forces them to work as nurse-aides. . . [50]

As in the case of Korean doctors, time of entry has determined the ability of Korean nurses to acquire a state license. The Korean nurses, who had entered the United States before 1971, did not need to take the TOEFL test in order to qualify for the work permit in New York and New Jersey state. Because of the demand for "cheap" labor of foreign-educated

nurses, New York state had been the most liberal state in granting licenses to foreign-educated nurses, especially Asian nurses. Up until 1971, New York state had operated a special licensing system for foreign-educated nurses, in which foreign-educated nurses records of transcripts and clinical experiences in home country were evaluated and credited in the qualifications for state RN licenses. According to the system, foreign-educated nurses were required to take examinations on only the subjects for which they showed a poor performance both in school subjects and in practical experience. Thus, the early comers of Korean nurses could acquire New York state's nursing licenses without making too great an effort. But, since the early 1970's, New York state has imposed an identical examination on foreign-and domestically-educated nurses seeking licensure as registered nurses. Foreign-educated nurses must take the National League for Nursing State Board Test Pool Examinations, which covers all the subjects of nursing education. This raising of examination standard for foreign-educated nurses has created an "examination hell" for the unlicensed Korean nurses. Korean nurses have reacted to the new examination system with organizing group study, seminars, and special lectures on examination subjects at Korean churches. Such programs have given content to community organization activities of Korean churches.

## Conclusion

The emergence of a large number of Korean medical professionals in the United States is a byproduct of the expansion of the American medical economy. During the 1960's and the early 1970's, the demand for medical personnel had risen as a result of the emergence of service-oriented economy which has increasingly characterized contemporary American society. But, the United States was not self-sufficient in the supply of medical workers partly because the demand for them was so large and had increased suddenly and partly because the American medical establishment had been unwilling or unable to produce medical workers in sufficient numbers enough to deliver proper medical service to a growing number of the medically "deficient" American population. This peculiar development in American medical industry had worked as a main "pull" factor for generating the selective immigration of Korean medical workers into the United States. Thus, vast economic opportunities were serendipitous for Korean workers.

The entry of Koreans into the medical service occupations is in sharp contrast to the occupational entry of older immigrant groups. The latter entered into primary or secondary sectors of American industry, and were not highly educated and learned.

Given the broad expanding structure of American medical industry, we have identified some specific "pull" factors in the United States, that had facilitated a massive exodus of Korean medical professionals into American medical institutions. First of all, we have discussed a maldistribution of American-born doctors in terms of both geographical areas and specialty fields. Under the impact of suburbanization, well-qualified white medical doctors and nurses have concentrated in suburban medical institutions while "inner city" hospitals and rural medical centers have suffered from the shortage of medical professionals, especially physicicans. This skewed distribution of American medical professionals had created vast vacancies for foreign-educated medical workers in inner cities. Since New York City has the largest inner city in the United States with a large number of large hospitals, Korean medical professionals have settled predominantly in the New York metropolitan area. They provide medical services to poor whites, the elderly, Blacks and Hispanics who lack their own ethnic doctors and nurses. American-born and trained physicians tend to concentrate on more lucrative practice and clientele. In addition, the concentration of American-born physicians into several "core" specialties at the expense of "fringe" specialties had also produced vacancies in "fringe" areas of medicine which were eventually to be filled by foreign doctors in general and Korean doctors

in particular. Thus, Korean doctors had entered the marginal sectors of American medicine.

A selective demand by the United States for Korean medical professionals had greatly contributed to the change in South Korean medical profession. In response to the import of Korean medical workers by the United States and other countries, the South Korean Government had permitted, and encouraged an increase in the number of medical and nursing schools. Once, however, the United States changed her immigration policy toward the entry of foreign-educated medical professionals, South Korean medical profession in both the homeland and abroad has been in trouble with a "surplus" generation of medical doctors and nurses. In addition, the South Korean medical profession has undergone an internal change: in order to save surplus medical graduates from unemployment, a reform movement has emerged in intern training system.

Once the United States allowed the immigration of Asian medical professionals, South Korea could send such a large number of medical workers to the United States mainly because South Korea had already developed the kind of medical institutions prepared medical graduates for and responsive to the American demand for domestically trained medical workers. We have discussed specifically how American missionaries,

Japanese colonialists, and the American military presence in South Korea during and after the Korean War had contributed to the growth of South Korean medical institutions in a much more substantial way that it did for any other scientific profession in South Korea. We have also noted that a maldistribution of South Korean medical institutions had been one of the prime "push" factors for the emigration of South Korean medical workers. The concentration of South Korean medical centers in a few "primary" cities where concentrations of people and money exist. Meanwhile, most South Korean rural villages are a medical wasteland devoid of doctors and nurses. South Korean medical graduates, most of whom being drawn from the urban middle or upper-middle classes, had to compete with each other for limited job opportunities provided by a limited number of urban medical institutions. Furthermore, South Korean medical graduates were imbued with urban life styles and sought urban opportunities and culture. They pursued a higher economic reward either in South Korean cities or in the inner cities of the United States.

United States Government regulations such as those in the immigration legislation and in state and federal licensing systems governed the life chances of Korean medical workers. As long as the United States immigration law was formulated in such a way as to accept Korean medical workers, they could

seek to maximize their life chances in both the South Korean and the United States market. AS long as the United States faced a keen shortage in medical workers, a liberal licensing system was adopted for Korean medical workers. And when "shortages" were perceived, and licensing and immigration opportunities dried up, Korean medical professionals in South Korea and in the United States, especially recent arrivals, began to suffer from restrictions that were not of their own making. Impersonal, external forces shaped the destiny of the individual and the communities in which they lived.

## FOOTNOTES

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[25]This statement can be applicable to immigrant doctors in general as it is indicated in the following table:

% of Residencies by Foreign Graduates, by Specialty

| Specialty | 1968 | 1974 |
|---|---|---|
| Anesthesiology | 50 | 54 |
| General Practice | 55 | 87 |
| Pathology | 48 | 52 |
| Pediatrics | 42 | |
| Physical Medicine | 40 | 70 |
| Psychiatry | 29 | |
| Radiology | 37 | 52 |

Source: Directory of Approved Internships and Residencies, 1969-70 and 1975-76.

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[47]Stimmel, Op.cit., P. 73.

[48]A Dream Unfulfilled, P. 26.

[49]Stevens, Op.cit., P. 403.

[50]Dahan Ganho (The Korean Nurse) (December, 1973), P. 45.

# PART III

# THE EMERGENCE OF A KOREAN COMMUNITY

# CHAPTER VI

## INTRODUCTION: THE KOREAN COMMUNITY IN THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA

### Its Phenomenological Base

By separating themselves both socially and psychologically from the rest of the population of the larger society, Korean immigrants have attempted to achieve a sense of community among themselves. Since they are recent arrivals in a new land, they identify themselves primarily as Koreans and treat the institutions of the larger society as an alien force which is strange, unmanageable and, frequently, hostile. Thus, the psychological basis of Korean community is built upon Korean immigrants' wide-spread acceptance of the dichotomy expressed in the terms, "We" vs. "they" or "kyopo sahoe" (our countrymen's society) vs. "mikook sahoe" (American Society). Almost all the major articles and essays in Korean ethnic newspapers, which deal with "Korean problems", are written on the basis of this dichotomy. Korean immigrants have frequently used the terms expressing the dichotomy in their daily conversations. By thinking of themselves as sep-

arate from the larger society, they can identify and evaluate the common situation, which, they think, is imposed upon them by the larger society. They can thus defend and, to some extent, strengthen themselves. For Korean immigrants, the "we" values, life styles, and customs are the basic means for sustaining their new life in new social environment. "Koreaness" functions as a castle into which they can easily retreat whenever they feel assaulted by the overwhelmingly "hostile" institutions of the larger society.

This does not mean, however, that Korean immigrants do not endeavor to learn "rules of game" in the new land. In fact, the kinds of conflicts, psychological as well as material, Koreans experience with the larger society occur because Korean immigrants try, perhaps too quickly, to assimilate and adjust to the dominant culture, customs, and institutions of contemporary American society. Largely because of a character structure derived from the old land, Korean immigrants on the whole over-react to contemporary American culture and attempt to "master" it. They are predominantly preoccupied with the "education problem" of their children, but many Korean women have undergone eye-lid and face-lift surgical operations in order to acquire a facial structure resembling that of Americans. In spite and perhaps because of these self-conscious efforts, Korean immigrants have not yet liberated

themselves from the "un-American" Korean values, character, behavior, and life style which separate them from native Americans. Yet the common life situation of all Korean immigrants has become the basis for constituting a Korean ethnic community in the New York metropolitan area.

## The Founding Fathers

The historical changes of New York's Korean community have been marked by the different times of entry of Korean immigrants into the United States. As has been noted in Chapter I, a large proportion of the older Korean immigrants entered the United States before the enactment of the National Origin Act of 1924. These were students, political refugees, and Christians. Up until the end of the Korean War, a small group of Korean immigrants and their descendents had formed the nucleus of the ethnic community in New York City. Their activities were centered around a Korean Protestant church. In 1920 some seventy Koreanslived in New York City and about thirty Christians established the first Korean church in New York, which still exists near Columbia University.[1] Since then, the church had been central to the community life of New York's Koreans. Thus a small Korean ghetto was formed around the church at 633 West 115th Street. Korean students and political refugees, including some who later became prominent political leaders after the Korean

independence, were associated with the church. An elderly Korean recalled the church-centered community life in 1929:

> As the Great Depression had deepened in the fall of 1929, a throng of paupers emerged and loitered on the street near Columbia University. They begged for a penny after a penny. I saw for the first time a white beggar ...
>
> The Depression also hit our Korean students, forcing them to drop out of school. An increasing number of Korean students had become drifters.
>
> At that time, the New York Korean Church, the only Korean church in New York City, had provided an effective force of integrating our community life. Regular church membership numbered some 20, most of whom, if my memory is correct, were students ... In addition to being a house of God, the Church was a center of the overseas Korean independence movement. All other community activities were merged into the church life. The Church provided various services to those Korean immigrants who visited New York City. The dormitory of the Church, which occupied the third and fourth floors of the Church building was always crowded with students and immigrants ... There we Koreans used to spend a whole night talking about our national independence and our bitter or sweet experiences on American jobs and school life, etc. ...

As first-generation immigrants aged, producing a negligible number of descendants, New York's Korean community was on the verge of extinction. But with the influx of Korean students into New York City after the end of the Korean War, New York's Korean community received a fresh number of members.

## The New Wave of Immigrants

The new group of Korean students included physicians, who entered the United States on the Exchange-Visitor Program. This Korean generation resuscitated New York's Korean community and later emerged as a dominant component as their number increased during the 1960's. The majority of them did not return to the home country after finishing their education at American universities mainly due to the bleak job situation in the home country. A Korean scholar visited in 1957 New York City from South Korea and reported on Korean students:

> In 1955 there were 288 Korean students including 75 medical doctors in New York City, 60 in Philadelphia, and 187 in Boston. . . The enrollment of so many Korean students in these prestigeous American universities was the result of the endless efforts of our students who had arrived in the United States after the Korean War with a proper life goal and a correct outlook on life. . Korean students worked so hard in the hope that someday they would contribute themselves to our fatherland. But what bothered them was the bad job prospect in our country. Many students had asked me whether they would get a job if they would return to our country.[3]

Korean students in New York City formed the Korean Students Association through which they initiated a number of major community activities. They became new members in the New York City Korean Church and influenced strongly church-centered community activities. A substantial number of Korean students, especially those specializing in social sciences, had switched to such commercial activities such as importing from South Korea. Many students became well-established in the 1970's and have achieved strong leadership roles in major ethnic organizations.

Thus the leadership structure of present Korean community in New York is largely based upon those businessmen, medical doctors, and ministers who had entered the United States with student status during the 1950's and the early 1960's. These early comers were pioneers of all major ethnic institutional programs. Korean students of theology established Christian churches, which totaled, by 1978, seventy-two. By doing this, students-turned-ministers have made a profound impact on the basic structure of Korean community. Students-turned-businessmen had initiated major ethnic businesses such as the wig and Korean Karate business. Korean medical students, who entered the United States under the Exchange-Visitor Program, have become well established in American medicine and have played a vital role in the Korean-American Doctors Association as well as in community activities. In addition, those influential Korean professionals such as lawyers, accountants, social workers, and college teachers have emerged from the student population in the 1950's and the early 1960's. With the rapid increase of Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area since 1970, these early arrivals could become issue and opinion makers, mediators with the larger society, therapists, labor-exploiters, philanthropists, and preachers. All these activities, functions, and roles are ethnicity-based. Korean leaders represent and

"lead" Korean citizens and subjects with respect to the outside world on "ethnic" issues.

## The Non-Territorial Basis for the Korean Community

Except for some pocket areas, Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area have not yet formed territorial enclaves. Korean immigrants scatter over the whole New York metropolitan area. Their residential areas range from the poverty-stricken and crime-ridden South Bronx to affluent Scarsdale, from hustling and bustling lower Manhattan to remote suburbs of Long Island. But, in New York City Korean immigrants heavily concentrate in the white-lower-middle class neighborhoods in Queens such as Flushing, Jackson Heights, Woodside, and Sunnyside, in which they intermingle with a second or third generation of old immigrants as well as such new immigrants as Cubans, Greeks, and other Asians. Even in these neighborhoods Korean immigrants have not yet established a single-block ethnic residential enclave.

Once Korean immigrants have made some economic gains in inner city, they have followed the dominant trends of suburbanward migration. For Korean immigrants, to become a suburban homeowner is a manifest symbol of economic success in the new land. An increasing number of Korean immigrants have become suburbanites. This following of the typical

American upward mobility pattern is one of the main reasons why Korean immigrants have not yet created residential, territorial enclaves in New York's inner city. However, this decentralization of Korean immigrants' residential pattern does not mean the absence of ethnic solidarity or ethnic community activities among Korean immigrants.

In the absence of an ethnic territorial base, Korean immigrants have achieved an ethnic solidarity by intensifying organization-centered community activities. The following are the basic characteristics of Korean community actions in the New York metropolitan area.

(1) A large number of secondary groups such as professional, occupational, artists, recreational, and alumni associations have emerged since 1973 and have become the basic mechanism for differentiated, segregated community activities. Membership of these associations are selective. Korean restaurants and churches are main providers of spaces to the organizational activities of these secondary group associations.

(2) As was the case for the older Korean immigrants, Korean churches have become a center of "grass roots" community activities. In addition to providing religious service, Korean churches respond to direct needs of Korean immigrants and thus perform all kinds of secular functions.

(3) By informing geographically scattered Korean

immigrants of community meetings and events, ethnic newspapers have emerged as a powerful means of provoking, leading, integrating, expanding, and enlightening some selective community values or opinions. Ethnic newspapers seek a community consensus by reinforcing Korean nationalism and culture.

(4) No centralized ethnic organization or leadership has emerged in order to integrate, coordinate, and direct various community activities. Community activities and leadership are segregated mainly along the line of occupations or different walks of life. One of the main functions of each different set of organizational leaders is to link their group activities to the corresponding institution of the larger society and or of the homeland. Decentralization thus characterizes the Korean community structure.

(5) By supporting or inhibiting major community activities, the Korean Consulate General, a surrogate of the home government, has exerted a strong influence on the way in which some basic patterns of community organizations has formed. Almost all the major community organizations except for churches are ideologically or materially associated with the Korean Consulate in New York City. One of the functions of community leadership is to link the community with the Korean Consulate and thereby with the home government.

These five dimensions of the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area will be explored in detail in the following chapters.

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# CHAPTER VII

## THE CHURCHES AS A BASIS FOR THE KOREAN COMMUNITY

### The Emergence of Korean Churches

Community churches represent the most important facet of community life. By opening membership to all segments of the population, churches provided a grass roots base for communal interaction. For churches members at least, community churches provide for some degree of integration and coordination of their divergent life activities, an integration which does not exist in non-religious organizations. Thus community churches become the most suitable substitutes for an ethnic territorial community. In addition, most of community churches are, ideologically and financially, independent of the Korean Consulate General in New York City. The Sunday News describes this function of Korean churches in presenting an overall picture of a Korean immigrant church in Queens:

> From the hills and cities of South Korea they come, their hearts filled with hope, their minds eager and alert, their backbones braced for a struggle.
>
> They are the new immigrants, and for most of these hardy, intelligent, hard-working orientals, their first foothold in this new world is Flushing.
>
> Flushing is the first stop, for here help awaits them in the presence of the Rev. Jim-Kwan Han, co-pastor of the Korean Church of Queens, and director of the Korean Community Action Center.

> The Community Action Center sponsors numerous programs aimed at easing the adjustments the immigrants must make in a land far from home. They include instruction in English, employment counseling, vocational, legal and medical counseling, a housing service, and a nursery school. . .
>
> "They are very proud people," the Rev. Han said, "They will not accept anything they did not earn. It is beneath their dignity to take something without earning it. Every able-bodied person must work and contribute no matter how menial the work might be". . . Last year the center found employment for 110 people and 170 families. The center charges no fees for the services it provices. . . [1]

The Korean churches in the New York metropolitan area have increased in number from 6 in 1971 to 74 in 1978, reflecting the dramatic increases in population due to the influx of Korean immigrants into the area since 1970.

Table VII-1

Number of the Korean Churches in the New York Metropolitan Area by Religious Affiliation, 1978

| | |
|---|---|
| Protestant Churches | 68 |
| Catholic Churches | 4 |
| Buddhist Churches | 2 |
| | 74 |

Sixty-eight of these churches are of Protestant denominations: four are Roman Catholic; and only two are Buddhist.

## Christianity in Korea

The prevalence of Protestant churches among Korean immigrants reflects the selective characteristics of Korean immigrants. As has been pointed out in Chapter I, the majority of Korean immigrants are drawn from urban middle classes in South Korea. As was Christianity in its early Western history an urban, civic religion, so too the Christianity of Korea has mostly appealed to urban classes since it was introduced by Western missionaries at the end of the 19th century.

Because Christianity was accompanied by Western scientific knowledge and thought. Koreans called it the Sohak (Western learning) movement. A number of Korean literati, who were alienated from the inner circle of the centralized state bureaucracy, were the first to accept Christianity in their attempt to solve social and political problems of the day. These problems were largely attributed to the national pariah status of Korea.[2] It was what we now call North Koreans who first received Christianity as an alternative to the established elite and the ruling Confucian ideology of Seoul. During the period of the Yi Dynasty, North Koreans were discriminated against in the government's appointment of Korean literati into preferred positions in the state bureaucracy. This resulted partly in the emergence of a pariah merchant class most heavily concentrated in northwestern part of the Korean peninsula . It is here that Christianity had

flourished most until the establishment of the North Korean communist regime. "Confucian principles were less respected at Pyongyang, and explanations of the strong favorable response to Christianity in that area rests in part on the fact that they did not have a solid vested interest in the status quo."[2]

As has been discussed in Chapter I, up to during the Korean War, most of the Christians and clergymen in North Korea, partly because of their marginal class status, took refugee to South Korea and became a leading force in expanding South Korean Protestant churches. That is to say, they migrated to South Korea as refugees because their religion and their committment to a free enterprise system, i.e., their merchant or professional class status, made them vulnerable and opposed to the communist regime in North Korea. Thus the North Korean refugees to South Korea are the most sensitive to the military tension between North and South Korea. In addition, these migrants within Korea do not have strongly rooted multi-generational kinship or village ties in South Korea. This marginal status, political, religious, and familial has mainly caused them to migrate to foreign countries.

These structural and historical factors mainly explain why the majority of Korean ministers in America are of North

Korean origin and why Protestant churches are a dominant religion of Korean immigrants, despite the fact that Christianity is a minority religion in South Korea as shown in Table VII-2.

Table VII-2

Korean Religious Population by Religion, 1977

| Religion | Number | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| Buddhist | 12.9 (million) | 46 |
| Confucianist | 4.7 | 17 |
| Protestant | 5.0 | 18 |
| Catholic | 1.1 | 4 |
| Chondokyo (a nationalist religion) | 0.8 | 3 |
| Others | 3.5 | 12 |
| | 27.0 | 100 |

The total religious population represents 77 percent of the total South Korean population in 1977. Source: Annual Report on Religious Population, the Department of Culture and Information of the South Korean Government.

As we shall see, the ministers of North Korean origin, most of whom came to the United States in order to study theology, were instrumental in forming and increasing the Korean immigrant churches in New York.

Since the turn of the century and even during the Japanese colonial period, Korean Protestant churches have played a leading role in introducing and disseminating Western culture, science, and ideas of democracy. As has been indicated Chapter V, the development of Korean medicine was largely attributed to Western missionaries. In addition, Western

missionaries, especially from the United States, founded a great many Western educational institutions through which Koreans acquired Western political ideas and institutions. Most of prominent political leaders and opponents of Japanese domination were graduates and students of the Christian schools. Western democratic ideals and institutions were deeply planted into Korean Christians. That is why Korean Christians today have constituted the only one coherent class of believers in democracy, and have engaged in serious opposition to President Park's authoritarian rule. This homeland background has resulted, as we shall see, in the rise of ministerial leadership in the new land: Korean ministers in New York are relatively free from the influence of South Korean governmental agencies in New York City.

## The Churches as the "Grass Root" Community

Even though less than 40 percent of Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area participate in church life, almost all routine community activities are centered around churches. This is because they are the only places where Korean immigrants can meet regularly. In the absence of the effective community organizations which could meet the secular needs of all segments of Korean population, Christian churches have emerged as a basic "grass roots" community organization.

Churches have become the focus for strengthening immigrants' psychological defense against the dominant institutions of the larger society. For Korean immigrants who have not formed any territorial enclaves, churches are the surrogates of ethnic neighborhoods. In their non-religious roles Korean churches assume a brokerage function, mediating between Korean immigrants and the dominant institutions of the larger society. They also serve as a surrogate for the extended family in a situation where immigration severs the generational and locality ties that constitutes the basis for the extended family. But even more than this, the churches in this non-religious role reinforce the secular culture of Korea among Korean immigrants and keep alive, even strengthen Korean nationalism.

## The Geographic Dispersion of Korean Churches

With the exception of the two Buddhist churches in Manhattan, the geographical distribution of Korean churches indicates the loose settlement pattern of Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area because Korean churches have emerged wherever Korean immigrants have settled.

Table VII-3

Number and Location of Korean Christian Churches
In the New York Metropolitan Area, 1978

| Location | | Number |
|---|---|---|
| New York City | | 43 |
| Manhattan | | 7 |
| Brooklyn | | 3 |
| Bronx | | 2 |
| Staten Island | | 3 |
| Queens | | 28 |
| Flushing | 10 | |
| Elmhurst | 4 | |
| Woodside | 4 | |
| Other Areas | 10 | |
| Other New York Metro. | | 8 |
| New Jersey | | 19 |
| Connecticut | | 2 |
| | Total | 72 |

As shown in Table VII-3. the concentration of 27 Protestant churches and 1 Catholic church in Queens reflects a concentration of Korean immigrants in Flushing, Elmhurst, and Woodside. A large number of Korean immigrants have found these white lower middle class neighborhoods of Queens a suitable place for living. The smaller number of Korean immigrants in Brooklyn and the Bronx is due to their attempt to avoid living in the Black and Puerto Rican belts in these boroughs. As a result, there are only two Protestant churches in the Bronx and three in Brooklyn . Two Protestant churches and one Catholic church exist in Staten Island where Korean immigrants have difficulty in finding suitable residence mainly because of high rents.

## Changes in Church Membership

All but four of these Korean churches were founded after 1970, and three-quarters of them have emerged since 1974. The four Korean churches, founded prior to 1970, are the New York Korean Church in Manhattan, the Brooklyn Korean Church, and the Korean Church of Queens. As has been noted, the New York Korean church, which is located on West 115th Street of Manhattan, was founded in 1921 by Korean immigrants who entered the United States prior to the National Act of 1924. Its location at the vicinity of Columbia University and the Union Theological Seminary reflects the fact that many Korean politicians, intellectuals, and clergymen attended the church while they were students at the two schools. Up until the late 1960's the New York Korean Church had virtually a monopoly over religious service to Koreans in New York, and all Korean community activities took place in its church. Its membership had been mainly composed of students before the influx of Korean immigrants in 1967. As is the case of Korean community as a whole, where students and intellectuals have been replaced by new immigrants, so has the membership of the New York Korean Church. Partly because of its location in Manhattan and partly because of its reputation as a leading Korean church in New York City, many visitors from the homeland, businessmen, artists, and

tourists attend the church. But new immigrant members of the church increasingly move to suburbs as do most Koreans in inner cities. Thus its congregation is "always turning over". A church member said: "There are always new faces".

The Korean Central Church split in 1968 from the Brooklyn Korean Church and moved to East 42nd Street of Manhattan in order to become a religious center for Koreans in New York City. Partly because of the personal ability of its minister, the turnover of membership is less pronounced than that of the New York Korean Church. The Brooklyn Korean Church was founded in the early 1960's, and its congregation has recently declined in size partly because the medical professionals who constitutes a bulk of its membership moved to the suburbs of New York City. A high rate of membership turnover characterizes all the Protestant churches in the inner city because of the migration to the suburbs among those Koreans having achieved some economic success. This does not necessarily mean a decline of church population in the inner city. New immigrants become new church members or establish new churches. Thus several big churches, including the old churches mentioned above, maintain a size ranging from 200 to 400 members.

The upward mobility of Korean immigrants is clearly indicated by the emergence of Korean suburban churches since

1974. During the period of 1974 to 1978, 12 Protestant churches and 1 Catholic church emerged in the New Jersey suburbs contiguous to New York City. During the same period, 6 Protestant churches came into existence in the New York suburbs. The Korean suburban churches do not show any one pattern of concentration. They are scattered over the whole suburban area; in Long Island, White Plains, Englewood, and Monteclair. This reflects the fact that Korean suburbanites have not yet formed any one area of residential concentration. Unlike the churches in the inner city, the suburban churches have achieved stable memberships. Their size, however, is small. The number of participants of each suburban church ranges from 30 to 100. However, the suburban congregation does not necessarily consist exclusively of those Koreans who had previously established themselves and become successful in the inner city. As has been noted in Chapter I, there is a strong indication that many new Korean immigrants have settled directly in the suburban areas of New York City without first settling in the inner city.

## The Dominance of Professionals inLay Life

All Korean immigrants do not participate equally in church life. Church membership varies to a large extent with occupation. In every Korean church, without exception,

medical professionals and other white collar workers constitute the largest part of the congregation; and dominate lay leadership of every Korean church. Medical professionals are made up of immigrant doctors, nurses, and pharmacists. They have "made it" faster than the other groups of Korean immigrants. White collar workers mainly consists of those Koreans who came to the United States as students and received education in American universities. They can afford to participate in church activities mainly because they have the leisure for attending the church.

Medical professionals have played a leading role of the creation of some Korean churches. In fact, some ministers set up their churches by recruiting medical professionals for their congregation. The conspicuous participation of medical professionals in church life is partly due to the fact that in the homeland they had been exposed to Christianity through the years of medical or nursing schools, many of which, as we have noted, were founded by Western, especially American missionaries. This does not mean that all the Korean medical professionals participate in church life. This rather means that in the absence of ethnic gathering places they are most prone to attend the church. In the Brooklyn Korean Church, graduates of the Yonsei University School of Medicine, founded by the North American Presbyterian missionary at the turn of

the century, once constituted the largest part of its congregation. Its members tended to move out of the city to suburbs. Another example can be found in the Korean Seventh Day Adventist in Woodside, in which some 90 percent out of its 70 members once consisted of those Koreans who were either graduated from the nursing school founded by the American Seventh Day Adventist missionary or who were affiliated with the hospital or schools run by the missionary.

In every Korean church at least one-fifth of the total congregation is made up of medical professionals and their families. In one case, the New Jersey Central Korean Church in Orange County, physicians and their family members once constituted some 60 percent of it over 100 members. In the Korean Church of the Bronx, physicians, nurses, and pharmacists once comprised about 30 percent of its 250 members.

## Small Business and Church Life

With exceptions of those established businessmen who, after achieving success, assume lay leadership positions, Korean small businessmen are not committed to church life simply because they are too busy or tired to participate in the leisured activities centered around the church: "If I had the time to go to church on Sunday, I would rather sleep." The self-employed small businessmen work 6 or 7 days a week

and have little time to participate in church activities even on their day off. Even the devoted Christians with a long personal history of church-going in the homeland tend to dissociate themselves from church life when they set up their own business. As has been noted, Korean small businessmen predominantly engage in "labor-intensive" enterprises and employ themselves and their family members in order to save labor costs. They maintain long-store hours and exploit themselves and their families. This effectively prevents them from devoting themselves to church life.

Korean food store owners are an exception. They tend to participate in church life because their clientele comes from their own ethnic group. They can thus close their store to attend church while their customers are also attending church. Similarly, those businessmen catering to ethnic customers, such as insurance brokers, travel and employment agents, real estate brokers, and accountants are strongly committed to church life. Some of them attend several churches on a rotation basis in order to "make contacts".

## The Age Distribution of Church Members

The composition of church membership also has special age group characteristics. In every church, without exception, elderly women constitute the core and loyal membership.

It is this group that attend the church every Sunday all the year round if they can secure the means of transportation. Most of these women have been brought here from the homeland by their sons or daughters for the purpose of baby-sitting. Due to language barriers they are confined to their houses or apartments and do not even watch television. Thus the church has become the sole source of their outside activities. In every Korean church there is a club for the elderly, called "Kyongnohoe" or the association of the respectable elderly. Non-married youth such as college students are least committed to church life because they are able to express themselves in the recreational facilities of the larger society.

In every church there is a large group of children ranging in age from 4 to 12. During the time when their parents are participating in the main religious service, the children are attending Sunday school classes where they receive language lessons, Korean folk dance, folk singing, and karate. A high proportion of these children belong to the families of medical professionals and white collar workers. Unlike small shopkeepers and blue collar workers, medical professionals and white workers have enough leisure time and interest in education to pay special attention to the education of their children. In many cases shopkeepers and blue collar workers send their children to the Sunday

School classes without ever presenting themselves to church activities. This provokes an almost instant negative reaction on the part of the minister: "Those children's parents send them to the Sunday School and sometimes even to church picnics. I have checked who they are. . . "

## Church Affiliation in the Homeland and the United States

In addition to the variables of occupational class and age, the religious experience of Koreans in the homeland also determines the degree of church attendence in the churches of the new land. This cuts across every other characteristic of Korean immigrants and determines the denominational membership of the four Catholic churches, the two Seventh Day Adventist churches, one Baptist church, two Full Gospel churches, one Episcopal church, and other informal meetings of Mormons and Jehovah Witnesses. The membership of the above churches are almost all made up of Korean immigrants who were affiliated with the same denomination in the homeland. The organizational activities of the two Korean Seventh Day Adventist churches are linked with their American counterpart as well as with their denominational church in the homeland. A similar example is that of the Cathclic churches whose membership, unlike the majority Protestant churches, consist of those Korean immigrants with

experience in the Catholic churches in the homeland. The Queens Korean Catholic Meeting was promoted in 1974 to the official status of the Korean Catholic Church of Queens by a higher American Catholic institution. The Korean Catholic meeting, which began in 1968 to hold service at St. Andrew's Cathedral, was similarily promoted in 1978 to Korean Catholic Apostolate of the Archdiocese of New York. The membership of two Full Gospel churches, which are "branches" of a Korean evangelical church in the homeland, are mostly made up of those with previous attendance in the denomination in the homeland. Before bringing their own minister from their headquarters in Seoul, they had held services by relying on the tape-recorded sermons of a founding minister of the church, so called "Soonbokwoom Kyohoe", ideographically, the pure gospel church. Its organizational and ideological structure is similar to that of the Unification Church. In addition, there are the meetings of Korean Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses, both of whom have not yet established their own ethnic churches at an offical level. The membership of the two are so small that their existence is almost unknown to Korean community at large.

In the churches where membership are mainly due to the fact that for the majority of Korean immigrants church-going does not necessarily mean the attempt to gain religious salvation. Since they consider the church as an gathering

place to maintain ethnic solidarity or as a place for the release from the isolation they feel from the larger society, they frown upon the Catholic ritualism such as catechism and the strict observance of the sabbath in the Seventh Day Adventist church. They also ridicule the Jehovah's Witnesses for their strange taboo of refusing blood transfusion and for making uninvited visits to poor Korean immigrants in order to proselytize them.

## Non-Denominational Protestant Churches

In the other majority Protestant churches or non-denominational churches there has existed an implicit agreement not to ask newcomers whether they had ever attended church in the homeland, and if so, what denominations they belonged to, unless the new comers volunteers the information. The minister does not want to embarass newcomers most of whom attend the church because of secular needs rather than of deep religious needs. The minister's desire to expand his church membership as much as possible is reflected in the slogan "a super-denominational church". This meaning unwittingly coincides with the idea of ecumenicalism. The minister as well as lay leaders know that if they expound the theology of any one denomination they would lose a significant number of their members who had belonged to different denominations in the homeland.

The other reason for the prevalence of non-denominational churches is due to the fact that Korean immigrant churches, especially the churches administered by Presbyterian ministers, have been denied the admission into American denominational headquarters, which construe the numerical increase of Korean churches as a menace to their internal power. Moreover, many Presbyterian ministers, even though being admitted into the Presbytery of New York City, are extremely reluctant to call their churches Presbyterian. For instance, the four leading Korean churches in New York City -- the Korean Church of the Bronx, the Korean Church of Queens, the Brooklyn Korean Church, and the Korean Central Church of New York -- omit the word "Presbyterian" in the title of their churches in spite of the fact that they have acquired membership status from the Presbytery of New York City. At a private level, however, some ministers boast of the official recognition by the Presbytery, especially when they compare their churches with new small "masterless" churches without any affiliation with American denominational organizations.

On the whole, the church attendance rates of most Protestant, non-denominational churches fluctuates according to weather conditions. On sunny Sundays through summer seasons the attendance rate reaches the lowest point partly because the cliff dwelling church members prefer to go to

beaches in the absence of centralized air conditioning system in their churches. On cloudy Sundays when outdoor recreational activities seem to be impossible, the size of the congregation increases dramatically. It is also conditioned by the existence of a specific recreational program as advertised in a weekly pamphlet: "After today's service there shall be a show of homeland's film in the basement auditorium". The biggest turnout occurs when the church holds an "the outdoor service day" which takes place twice a year, on the occasion of the arrival of spring and fall, when a picnic is held.

## Immigration Policy and the Proliferation of Churches

Simply because the church provides the minister with the means of livelihood in the form of salarly and the same high prestige given to his profession in the home country, the minister's personal ambition plays a dominant role in the emergence as well as the functioning of the church. Most ministers intend to reside permanently in the United States. For most their professional training, mostly acquired in the homeland, could not become the means of another living in the labor market of the larger society. Thus the meaning of their existence in both idealistic and materialistic sense is directed toward the creating and leading their own ethnic church. This is one of the most important factors of a rapid increase

of the number of Korean churches, and may be the underlying reason that ministers have dominated the "grass roots" community leadership whose contents and forms are quite different from the leadership centered around the Korean Association, an umbrella organization, and other major community organizations.

Ministers on the basis of the visa status at their time of entry, can be divided into the three groups. The first group is made up of those who entered the United States as theology students and received their higher education in American seminaries. Most of the leading Korean churches with a relatively long history have been founded and administered by these American-trained ministers. Mainly because of their higher education in the United States, these American-trained ministers dominate the leadership of inter-church activities and represent the radical or "liberation" theology. The second group consists of visitors to the higher denominational institutions in the United States (or the ministers sent from a Korean denominational church to its American counterpart for offical business). The third group is made up of those ministers who immigrated to the United States at the invitation of the Korean churches in the United States. They were invited in order to administer a Korean church without a trained full time minister or to assist the chief minister

of the larger churches, and came the United States with immigrant status. Their number is small. Except for the ministers belonging to the third group, most of the ministers have become permanent residents in the United States by taking advantage of the United States Immigration Law under which any alien minister administering at least more than 30 church members is eligible for permanent residence. In the early 1970's when Korean churches began to emerge in mass, there had been a keen competition for recruiting church members. The ministers, who did not have enough members in their church to meet the qualification of housing a congregation of 30, frequently "took away" church members from other large churches. Offering important lay leadership positions to new influential members was an implicit means of proselytizing. This partly explains the fact that most of the large churches have undergone an internal split, resulting in the emergence of a new church.

In most cases the split was caused by the revolt by the "assistant minister" against the "chief minister". The "assistant minister" formed his own clique by gathering together alienated lay leaders and church members. For instance, in the early 1970's a total of seven Korean Protestant churches had emerged by being separated from main churches. In four of these cases, the splits were led by "assistant

ministers" who then founded their own churches.

In an effort to prevent any other Korean ministers from creating new churches, some established Korean ministers of large churches had asked American white Protestant churches located in their vicinity, not to provide rental to any additional Korean congregations. But their demand was largely unheeded. On the whole white Protestant churches in New York City have welcomed Korean congregations as a means of solving their own financial problem. Most of the white Protestant churches in the inner city, from which Koreans rent a space for religious service, suffer from declining membership. Elderly women constitute a main body of the landlord churches congregation, and no religious service is provided during the summer vacation season. Many Korean churches act like the host to the internally fragile American Protestant churches from which they rent space. Koreans have said that, "Someday we shall take over this church.

## The Church as a Pseudo Extended-Family

One of the main function of Korean churches is to provide church members with "family atmosphere", which presupposes a small congregation in which everybody knows everybody else and each other's business. Through church-centered activities Korean immigrants attempt to cope with the over-

whelming sense of alienation from the larger society. Korean immigrants' search for a pseudo-extended family on the basis of the church has also caused the increase of the number of small churches. Church members that belong to a large church, a membership of 200 or more, frequently complain about the crowdedness of their church. They sometimes recall the good old days when the church had a small membership, which is a precondition to the creation of the "family atmosphere". Because of this "universal" longing of Korean immigrants for a direct, personal interaction, the ministers of newly established small churches can easily draw a significant portion of their members from large churches. And for this same reason the "assistant ministers" can easily establish their own church by assembling alienated members and lay leaders. To create a "family atmosphere" in the church is the most important task that the minister must carry out.

The congregation as well as community as a whole use the minister's non-religious activity as a criteria for judging the minister. Negligible weight is given to the minister's religious conviction and religiosity. The minister's extra-church activities include all the mundane and earthy activities essential to the formation of a "family atmosphere". His extra-church activities are: match-making, presidings over marriage ceremonies, visits to hospitalized members, assistance in moving families, congratulatory visits

to families having a new baby, airport pick-ups of newly arrived family members, interpreting service to "no English" members, job referral and housing services, and other similar personal services. In order to deliver these kinds of humane services, the minister is expected to know a great deal about American society. Thus the minister is judged by his degree of erudition as manifested by educational degrees received from American seminaries. Highly educated audiences admire the minister's ultimate competence is displayed in his ability to link his congregation with the dominant, secular institutions of the larger society. Thus organizational and executive ability in operating church programs determines the quality of the minister.

All Korean churches except for the two Buddhist churches have in common the following auxiliary organizations which conduct most church activities: a Sunday School, youth association, women's association, father's association, elderly women's association, high school student's association junior high school student's association, and a choir. All these associations have their own rules, organizational goals, and budgets. Each association is subdivided into various sections: for instance, the youth association is made up of missionary, athletics, service, and arts and literature sections. After the religious service, all major informal

or formal church activities take place based upon the associations. The activities of the Sunday School, in which Korean dance, song, and language are taught to children, proceed while the main religious service is being delivered. The Sunday School is also subdivided according to age groups. All these associations within the church are designed to continue and expand church activities after the main religious service.

However, this is only one dimension of church activity. All church members are also regrouped according to the residential area in which they live; in every church more than 10 district service areas promote mutual assistance among nearby members and enhance their faith by holding a religious service at a member's residence on a rotation basis. Food is served and informal social interchange follow these unofficial religious services.

On the basis of the intra-church associations and the district service areas, Korean churchgoers attempt to create a substitute for the extended family as a means of coping with their estrangement from the larger society. This is one of the mechanisms for achieving ethnic solidarity.

## The Church as a Broker

In addition to these inner-oriented church activities, the church conducts a brokerage function to connect church

members with the large-scale, bureaucratic institutions of the larger society. In every church there exists a group of professional experts who assume positions of lay leadership. They provide church members with all kinds of counseling services on immigration and naturalization, employment, housing, health care, social security, and education. All these services are essential for Korean immigrants in adjusting to the larger society. If the minister wants to earn a high reputation and respect, he must be willing and able to organize these counseling services. Most of the large churches operate "life counseling centers" which are exclusively addressed to the adjustment problems of Korean immigrants.

On the basis of these church programs oriented toward the larger society, churches compete with one another both for membership and prestige. Some large churches have provided some unique programs which were directed towards some specific segments of Korean population. The following are some examples of the programs:

> The Korean Church of Queens once provided for special lectures designed to help Korean pharmacists and nurses pass the New York State licensing examination. Although the lectures were given irregularly, it appealed greatly to those unlicensed nurses and pharmacists throughout the community. Rev. Han of the Church, a graduate of the Union Theological Seminary, is well-known in the community for his active involvement in church-centered community activities.

The Korean Central Church in Manhattan conducted a series of lectures in order to help Korean immigrant doctors pass their medical board examination. The Church sponsored the Korean Acupuncturist Association when the latter gave seminars to Korean acupuncturists. These special programs were entirely due to the work of a devoted elder whose name is well publicized in the community for his active participation in major community organizations such as the Korean Association of New York, the Lions' Club, the Korean Cultural Center, and the Korean Guidance Center.

In addition, the Church has put on mini operas since 1974.

The Korean Church of the Bronx has, since 1973, held a series of seminars aimed at helping unlicensed pharmacists to prepare for the New York State licensing examination. The seminars have been initiated and organized by a leading lay leader of the Church who has served as president of the Korean-American Pharmacists' Association. Many unlicensed Korean pharmacists attend the Church simply because of the existence of the seminars. In addition, the Church set up in 1977 the Korean Language School of the Bronx, which became the fifth Korean language school in New York. The foundation of the School was initiated by a leading elder of the Church, who received a doctoral degree in education from an Ivy League school.

The above examples indicate a small portion of the church programs that are addressed to the community as a whole. The Brooklyn Korean Church has provided Korean immigrants with a free counseling service on income tax returns. The Korean Catholic Church of Queens set up a community health center in 1977 in order to deliver some basic medical services to community members by mobilizing Korean Catholic doctors and nurses.

The kinds of church programs mentioned above have become a source of inter-church competition for membership

and prestige. On the basis of the church programs each large church claims to represent the Korean community. The claim is usually made in the form of advertisements in community newspapers:

> The Guide to Summer School
> of English and Mathematics
>
> The Bronx Korean Language School of the Korean Church of the Bronx has received some financial support from the outside and has decided to open summer school to provide a good opportunity for Korean children to improve English and mathematics. ...
>
> The Guide to the Application
> for the Scholarship for New York's
> Korean Students (The Scholarship
> Fund of the Korean Methodist Church)
>
> Thanks to God's grace, your support, and this church's continuous services to our community, this church has grown, developed since the last 6 years and has become the church for our countrymen. This year, as one of our series of programs, this church set up a scholarship fund for Korean students in New York. ...

## Emerging Lay Leadership and the Politics of Church Governance

The way in which church programs are initiated and executed is largely governed by the interplay of the minister with his lay leadership. It is determined by the minister's capacity to organize and coordinate the professional skills of devoted lay leaders.

Because Presbyterianism is the predominant denomination in the homeland and most Korean ministers in the United

States belong to that denomination, the organization structure of lay leadership of the majority of Korean Portestant churches in New York is derived from the American Presbyterian church. Trustees, deacons or deaconesses and elders constitute the lay leadership. Some old and large churches have relatively autonomous trustee boards, entrusted with the overall operation of the church. In these churches the deacons and elders are selected by popular vote. But only the New York Korean Church which was founded in 1921 has an absolutely autonomous trustee board which can hire and fire the minister.

In most new Protestant churches the founding minister controls most church affairs; and active church members, many of whom are founding members, become elders or deacons regardless of their religious faith. They can obtain the lay leadership positions after contributing professional skills and dollars to the church. The positions are given to them because their skills or money are needed in running the church. Big businessmen such as importers or wholesalers occupy the positions of elders owing to their big cash contributions to the church. A former music professor in South Korea or an American conservatory student becomes a choir conductor. An accountant becomes a church treasurer; a T.V. repairman, a church movie projector operator. A former athlete becomes a leader of the youth association

in order to organize and lead the church team in annual inter-church or community sports contests. Thanks to their economic and professional status, medical professionals, especially physicians, occupy the largest portion of lay leadership positions in almost all Korean churches. A church member said: "Whenever a new doctor first attends the church, the minister goes crazy over him and follows him to the entrance to see him off."

If the lay leaders capable of contributing skills and dollars to church activities have faith in God and an experience of church life in the homeland, they lead a "perfect" Christian life in the new land. However, a high proportion of lay leaders have started church-going in the new land and have frequently become the objects of resentment on the part of believers: "He does not know how to pray for the congregation;" "He would have become a deacon even if he was not baptized." Sometimes, believers play down the professional skills offered by "non-believers" to the operation of the church: "Even if he is a well-known musician, he cannot really understand the tone and feeling of church music." These kinds of resentment appear to have little impact on the management of church life because such resentment is expressed at a private level. But in many Korean churches a serious dislocation of church life has frequently occurred when the "non-believers" in the position

of lay leadership have attempted, out of their overzealousness, to control the entire level of church activities. They thus turn the believers' private resentment into an overt hostility. The deep involvement of the "non-believers" in church activities appears to be related to their status anxiety in the new land. They appear to find a home, a family atmosphere in the church, and they give their all to their church; but their all does not include religion.

As has been indicated, church lay leaders are heavily drawn from well-established and successful professionals and businessmen, most of whom are proud of their long experience in the United States. The number of businessmen is much smaller among church members than that of professionals. All these successful Koreans have deeper status anxiety than do new arrivals struggling for everyday economic gains because they have achieved economic success which allows for leisure activities. But even successful professionals cannot get along with their American colleagues in pursuing American life-styles. Money does not guarantee successful businesmen and professionals a commensurate status recognition in the larger society. This sense of status alienation from the larger society causes many successful professionals and businessmen to commit themselves deeply to church affairs as well as to other community activities. In these activities they can enjoy prestige granted by their fellow countrymen if not by

their occupational or professional peers.

Intra-church conflicts frequently occur when the non-religious lay leaders challenge the authority of the minister and by-pass the due process of decision-making in church government. They sometimes initiate ambitious church programs which cannot be carried out with the available resources. In some cases they form their own cliques by recruiting new church members and attempt to fire the minister. Their challenge to the minister's authority poses a serious problem partly because their professional skills and money are indispensable to the development of the church and partly because many of them were founding members when the minister established his own church. Frequently, other believers in lay leadership positions emerge to rescue the minister from active "non-believers" on the lay boards. They accuse the ambitious lay leaders of destroying the order and harmony of church life. They openly attack the overzealous lay leaders' vulgarity or the secular manners they express in church life. For instance, a group of believers of a church were upset when they heard that an abmitious lay leader, an accountant who became a church treasurer, said to the minister: "Hey, minister, you want a pay increase?" In most cases, the minister tries to minimize the internal conflict caused by the intrusion of ambitious persons into the lay leadership church government.

## The Ambivalence of the Churches towards Material Success

In response to the secular needs of Korean immigrants and because of the peculiar life chances of the minister, an expansionary spirit characterizes Korean immigrant churches. In spite of this underlying reality, church life is organized on the basis of evangelic commitment to religious ideals. The coherent theme of the minister's sermon lies in the denial of the "materialistic" American culture. The minister poses contemporary American materialism as an evil which should be eschewed. The following sermon represents the theme that Korean ministers share most frequently:

> Since the middle of the 20th century American society has suffered from its highest development of materialistic civilization which on the other hand has brought forth the corruption of religious and moral life. ...
>
> Materialistic progress of American society has not produced a paradise. On the contrary, it has caused whole social problems -- labor unrest, racial conflicts, the busing issue, prostitution, traffic congestion, juvenile delinquency, and drug addiction. ... The fundamental reason for all these social problems derives from the degradation of moral life on the part of Americans. Is it right that the fetishism of material progress give rise to a belief thatmoral life is an individual matter? Is it right that moral education should be excluded from the curriculum of elementary schools? ... Materialistic civilization bases its premise on the fact that the human brain could solve all problems. This kind of civilization means idolatry. Miracles will happen at the moment we liberate ourselves from idolatry and return to God. ...

The above sermon is quoted from a monthly church pamphlet which was published by a Korean Protestant church in Queens. The same pamphlet shows another facade of church life.

It contains advertisements of annual church bazaars where all kinds of Korean products including food, gifts, furniture and ginseng are sold to the general public at discount prices. The profits yielded by the bazaar will be added to the church fund for purchasing its own building. The pamphlet also lists the names of newlyweds, new babies, donors to a church fund for buying the church's building, and the announcement of medical doctors and businessmen who have opened new offices or shops.

In order to help Korean immigrants cope with the larger society, the church unknowingly revives and promulgates its version of the old Protestant ethic and of 19th century America. The coherent ideology of the church lies in emphasizing and enhancing an endless self-abnegation, endurance, hardship, and frugality. All these Puritan virtues are compatible with Confucian values, which Korean immigrants, regardless of their religious affiliation, have already internalized in their homeland. As we shall see, the congruity of values between the Protestant ethic and Korean cultural ethics based upon Confucianism partly explains why Korean immigrants are equipped with a Protestant discipline necessary for their socio-economic adjustment to U.S. society. Thus it is a natural phenomenon that the church reinforces the Korean value of self-control and self-abnegation in a Protestant context. The church makes Korean immigrants vigilant and ready

to sustain a kind of combat discipline necessary to survive in and deal with the larger society.

In reviving the Protestant ethic, Korean immigrants juxtapose their common life situation in a strange land against hostile, alien, dominant forces of the larger society. "Special attention to our hardships in this strange land" is a commonly used phrase in their prayers. By pointing out the materialistic corruption of the larger society, Korean immigrants feel a moral superiority even when they have advanced their material status to a greater degree in less time than any other recent immigrant group. Mentioning the decline of the white Protestant church in New York City without knowing of the ascendance of black and Hispanic churches, a minister said: "We Koreans will rekindle religious faith among Americans."

The church is a bulwark for protecting and reinforcing Korean nationalism and culture. Major South Korean national holidays such as the August 15 National Independence Day, the March 1 Anti-Japanese Day and Children's Day are strictly observed in the church. The traditional value of respect for the elderly is systematically enhanced by offering special programs for them. The use of Korean language is systematically promoted while the use of English in conversation is frowned upon. For children there is a Korean language contest in which they compete in reciting Korean folk stories and writing short essays or poems. In reinforcing Korean

nationalism and culture, the church provides Korean immigrants with one of the psychological mechanisms of defending themselves against the larger society.

To sum up, we have so far presented the church as a basic "grass roots" community organization around which a bulk of Korean immigrants band together and lead a communal life. In order to make a communal life possible, the church accentuates non-religious, secular functions. We have discussed, among other things, how the church creates a family atmosphere in its intra-church activities, and thus how the church becomes a substitute for the extended family. We have also seen how the interplay of ministers with professionals can be crucial to the creation as well as the sustainment of church life. In leading church life, Korean immigrants can achieve some degree of integration of their life activities because of the multiple, secular roles that the church play on their behalf. And yet, the church has a limitation in organizing and leading life activities of Korean immigrants simply because it is a religious institution and thus cannot absorb "overt" non-believers representing more than a half of the Korean population in New York. Thus Korean immigrants have created another form of organizational activities based upon non-religious, "secondary" associations.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]Sunday News, November 4, 1973.

[2]Spencer J. Palmer, for instance, described the impact of the Korean crisis at the turn of the century on the Korean acceptance of Christianity:

> During these years surrounding the turn of the century, Korea was beset with an almost incredible sequence of tragic events. The queen was murdered. Japan announced its intention of exercising paramount control in Korean affairs. The Korean king's frantic efforts to gain American governmental support for his shaky kingdom failed. Two wars were fought between Japan and China and Japan and Russia, with Korea as the focal point of conflict. Korean domestic political strife remained at a bewilderingly high pitch. Famine and epidemics were ever present threats to human life. The people were caught up in a spirit of despondency and decline (what Buddhists called Kali yuga of the "last days"). Feelings of loss and shame pervaded the country. Finally, the fate of the people seemed forever sealed in 1910 when Japan, after having earlier coerced the king into abdicating his throne, politically annexed Korea into the Japanese empire.
>
> Each of these crises in turn had a profound effect upon Korean attitudes toward Christian religion, although there was not always an exact correspondence between specific crises and periods of increases in membership. Sustained social and intellectual pressures also has their longer-range historical ramifications in Korea, as well as in China. One response was a search for utopia and a desire for messianic deliverance. ...

Palmer, Spencer J., "Western Religion and Korean Culture," Korea's Response to the West, ed. by Jo, Yung-hwan, (Michigan University Press), p. 99.

[3]Palmer, Ibid., p. 102.

# CHAPTER VIII

## SECONDARY ASSOCIATIONS OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY

### The Emergence of Secondary Associations

Community secondary associations have emerged as a basic mechanism by which Korean immigrants carry out the bulk of their normal activities. An infinite number of routine, sub-community activities take place on the basis of secondary associations. Most of these are unnoticed and unpublicized in community media. And yet these routine activities conducted by secondary associations are an underlying fabric, which interweaves, supports, and influences the individual life of ordinary community members. The analysis of the secondary community can tell us how Korean immigrants form ethnic solidarity and how they survive in their new social enviornment in the new land. Moreover, it can show us how Korean immigrants can sustain their non-territorial community.

Secondary associations of the post-1965 immigrants contrast sharply with those of older immigrants in the way they act as basic mechanisms for creating and organizing ethnic solidarity. The older immigrants relied largely on primary-group togetherness, kinship associations, homeland social or territorial segmentation based upon regional ties,

and rotating credit associations. No kinship or territorial associations derived from the family and regional ties in the old land have emerged in New York's Korean community. This is so in spite of the fact that, as we shall see, a regional tie to the homeland once operated informally in community politics. Korean solidarity on the basis of secondary associations reflects to a large extent a feature of Korean immigration in the United States. This has taken the character of urban-to-urban migration consisting of the highly-professional, well-educated, and well-to- do people from the metropolitan areas of South Korea. As has been noted, the majority of Korean immigrants have been drawn from the urban-middle or upper-middle classes with the experience of a one- or two-generation period of urbanization. In addition, their high educational accomplishments, and their urban occupational experience and socialization in the old land have determined much of the way that new forms of Korean ethnic solidarity in the United States have emerged.

Secondary group associations are found in every walk of life. The following is only an illustration of secondary group associations which have been created by Korean immigrants in New York in the last 10 years:

(1) Religious Associations. Sixty-eight Protestant churches, four Catholic churches, and two Buddhist churches.

(2) Political Associations. Two anti-Park (Korean government) associations, and the Korean-American Political Association.

(3) Business Associations. The Korean-American Businessmens' Association, and associations of greengrocers, grocerymen (Korean food) dry cleaners and laundry men, garment retailers, garment subcontractors, fish retailers, wig men, taxi cab drivers, travel agents, Korean Karate men, and Korean restaurant owners.

(4) Professional Associations. Associations of painters, musicians, opera singers, stage entertainers, ministers, radio-announcers, medical doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists, x-ray technicians, computer technicians, dental laboratory technicians, athletes, political scientists, engineers, scientists, and Sunday school teachers.

(5) Recreational Associations. Associations of golfers, tennis players, hunters, baseball players, and mountaineers.

(6) Veteran Associations. Associations of anti-Park veterans, pro-(Korean) governmental, (Korean) navy veterans, (Korean) Air Force veterans, and Korean veterans of the Vietnam War.

(7) Social and Civic Associations and Organizations. Associations of women, the elderly, youth, alumni, and students; the Korean Y.M.C.A., Jaycees, Lions Club, Y.W.C.A. These associations are formal organizations which have official organizational goals, leadership, and financial resources. The group activities of these associations are advertised and publicized through community news media. These formal groups, however, do not exhaust community organizations. Informal group activities also constitute an important part of community life.

## The Korean-American Pseudo Extended Family

An infinite number of family groups are basic molecular units supporting ethnic sub-group solidarity. Almost all Korean immigrant families belong to at least one family group. The creation of this group that extends over several families is based upon the husbands' or wives' common schooling or work experiences in the new or old land. It is not based on actual kinship. But rather, members of a number of nuclear families act as if they were related by blood or marriage. They also emerge from living in the same neighborhood, or from having identical hobbies. These family associations are entirely different from an extended family. They are informal, based upon nuclear families, and have few

traditions and rituals. At most, they are substitutes for the extended family. These informal family associations are designed to exchange among members mutual material and emotional support. During special occassions such as Christmas, New Year's eve, and Chinese New Year's day, they usually meet to enjoy Korean foods, dancing, and talk. In many cases, family groups or associations conduct the function of the "Gae," a Korean equivalent of rotating credit associations.

One of the characteristics of these family groups is that they are short-lived, and subject to a constant process of grouping and regrouping. Economic status is a major factor determining the continuation or discontinuation of the informal association of a certain family groups. For instance, some families within a family group have "made it" faster than their peer group families. They move to suburbs and acquire new life styles and new Korean friends. In addition, economic status contributes to the formation of family groups. Nurses', doctors', and small businessmens' family groups are a few examples. In many cases, these kinds of family groups have formed sub-groups within a certain occupational association. For instance, the Korean Association of Fruit and Vegetable Business embraces several family groups.

Informal groups also include the meeting of several hundred ex-miners who entered the United States after sharing the common experience of working in West German mines. These ex-miners maintain an intense fraternal solidarity. They are also active in small business enterprises. In Chicago these ex-miners have organized a powerful association in order to influence community business and politics. But the ex-miners in New York's Korean community have not yet transformed their informal meetings into an official association, and their organizational activities have never been made public. Korean War brides of non-Korean GIs have tended to segregate themselves from other Koreans and hence Korean community life, but they have formed communal groups of their own in Long Island. A group of Korean immigrants from Latin American nations once occupied a small residential enclave in Queens, and produced a cement-like solidarity and brotherhood. But their tiny ghetto disappeared when they achieved enough economic success to move to the suburbs or to other residential areas. As has been noted, the Latin American Koreans pioneered in the entry of Korean immigrants into the fruit and vegetable industry.

The informal associations of ex-miners, Korean war brides, and Koreans from Latin American nations constitue a few, typical examples of informal group associations. It is

beyond our ability to identify and describe other types of informal group activities which also exist in superabundance. Most of their activities are clannish and oriented to intimacy. We can only focus upon those formal secondary associations whose activities have been publicized by community news media as well as by community members.

Origins and Focus of Secondary Associations: Home versus New Land. We can classify Korean secondary group associations into four groups by confounding the two factors: (1) whether the qualifications of membership are derived from the United States or from South Korea and (2) the degree to which each association interacts with the larger society. As has been noted, Korean churches do not fit into any cell in the matrix below and the scope and importance of church-related community activities are much greater than the community activities generated by secondary group associations. And yet secondary group associations reach the areas that churches cannot cover, and cut across the total life activities of Korean immigrants.

The membership of the associations in the first cell are largely derived from the common experiences in certain walks of life or organizations in the homeland. With membership originating in the homeland, the associations continue to act out and, to some extent, reinforce the old country

institutional ties. Since the associations are mainly concerned with intra-ethnic community affairs ranging from mutual assistance to social, recreational, and educational services, they have little or no interaction with the larger society.

Korean Immigrants' Voluntary Associations
by Membership and by the Degree
of Interaction with the Larger Society

| Membership | Interaction with the Larger Society: None or Low | Interaction with the Larger Society: Middle or High |
|---|---|---|
| | I | II |
| Originated in Korea | Sports Association(s), Medical Professionals Associations(s), Ministers Association, Y.M.C.A., Jaycees, Lions Club, Alumni Associations, Veterans Associations | Pharmacists Association, Korean Karate Association(s) Artists & Performing Artists Association(s). |
| | III | IV |
| Originated in the U.S. | Recreational Association(s), Scientists & Engineers Association, Associations of the Elderly, Women, students. | Associations of Small Businessmen, Korean-American Businessmen Association (KABA), Anti-Park Association(s), Korean-American Political Association (KAPA). |

Alumni Associations. Alumni associations are the most populous and active organizations in the first cell. Alumni associations of all the major universities and high schools in South Korea, which are well-known or well-recognized but not necessarily prestigious, have been formed since 1972 and have attracted great numbers of Korean immigrants as members. The membership of alumni associations vary from school to school, depending upon both the school's prestige and the number of immigrants who attended the school and later migrated to the United States. The largest associations are from graduates of the big, prestigious universities and high schools of South Korea. These graduates have been inclined to and have been able to enter the United States. About two thirds of the Korean alumni associations in the New York metropolitan area have been created by Korean immigrants who graduated from schools in Seoul. Korean immigrants who have been graduated from Seoul National University are so numerous that the alumni activities of its members have been conducted on the basis of its individual colleges: the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, the Medical College, the Pharmaceutical College, etc. Each of the two alumni associations of Yonsei and Korea University, the two "Ivy League" schools in Seoul, is made up of several hundred members. The two associations have maintained and held the "Yongo Jon," which, in Seoul, is the annual festival of sports contest between the two rival schools.

The nature and intensity of the activities of alumni associations differ from school to school. But the prevalence of recreational or leisure activities is common to all alumni associations. By focusing upon recreational activities, alumni associations provide Korean immigrants with a systematic mechanism of escaping from their social isolation and estrangement from the larger society. Usually at the change of seasons, almost all the alumni associations in New York hold parties or picnics for alumni members and their families. At the advent of spring or autumn, they have picnics in New York state parks. These include games, eating Korean foods, and along, leisurely conversation. During the month of December, they hold Christmas or New Year's Eve parties at Korean restaurants. In doing so they usually engage Korean bands. When these alumni meetings take place, Korean ethnic newspapers carry both ads announcing the alumni meetings and articles describing past events. A Korean ethnic newspaper reports this aspect of the recreational activities of alumni associations:

> December with such big holidays as Christmas and New Year's Eve has become the month for holding the parties or meetings of alumni associations. As December approaches, our countrymen, who are daily struggling in the "life front" far away from the motherland, have begun to announce alumni association parties in order to renew the old friendship created by their school. . .
>
> In the face of this rush season of alumni

> association parties, our countryman, Mr. Y., grumble: "Even if I had ten different bodies, I couldn't participate in all those parties -- high school alumni party, university alumni party, business association's party, and other kinds of Korean parties. It would cost me several hundred dollars in admission fees to present myself at all those parties". . .[1]

In addition to these recreational activities, big alumni associations have carried out various group activities such as the publication of a newsletter and journal, job counseling and seeking for their members, and the raising of scholarship funds for their schools in South Korea. A large portion of the group activities of alumni associations has been directed toward a making financial contributions to their mother schools in South Korea. The Journal of the Alumni Association of the Chonnan National University Medical School, for instance, summarized the main activities and plans that the Association has initiated since 1973: (1) the incorporation of the Association; (2) the plan to raise a $3,000 scholarship fund for its mother school; (3) the contribution of library fund, medical books, and an x-ray film duplicating printer to its mother school (4) the plan to grant a financial help to the bereaved family if and when a member dies; (5) the arrangement of invitations of faculty members (of its mother school) to American hospitals.

The alumni association as a whole is too big and abstract to provide the face-to-face, carefree, and warm interpersonal relationships that Korean immigrants desire. We have seen that the same penchant for small groups characterizes church membership and pseudo-family groups. Since age is an important cultural variable in establishing and maintaining social relationships among Koreans, the alumni association is subdivided by the year of graduation. This fact, in turn, creates multiple sub-groups within an alumni association. This is one way for Korean immigrants to create a family group. Old classmates have formed congenial peer groups in the new land even though they have not maintained close relationships in South Korea. At alumni parties or picnics, old classmates usually form a unit in which they eat, drink, and talk together. They maintain and intensify the solidarity among themselves beyond the formal level of the alumni association. Their solidarity evolves around such activities as match-making for unmarried persons, picnics, birthday or Christmas parties, the Gae (a Korean rotating credit activity), and other kinds of mutual assistance.

In spite of their widespread popularity and functional importance in organizing Korean immigrants, alumni associations have made no organizational contacts with the larger society because their activities are largely directed

toward intra-ethnic mutual assistance and recreation. Instead, the big alumni associations of famous universities and high schools are concerned with financial contribution to their homeland schools. This kind of concern or relationship with the homeland is the common characteristic in the first cell because the membership of the associations are assembled on the basis of their common ties or experiences in the homeland.

Medical Professional Associations. Associations of Korean medical professionals in the New York metropolitan area include those of medical doctors, nurses, pharmacists, dental technicians, and x-ray technicians. The basis for organizing these associations is their common occupational or craft experiences in the homeland. The associations of doctors, pharmacists, and nurses were originally established by assembling each corresponding field among various alumni associations. Since alumni associations are the basic units around which doctors, pharmacists, and nurses gather and conduct substantive organizational activities, the associations of doctors, pharmacists, and nurses have lost their major functions to alumni associations. The alumni associations of prestigeous medical, nursing, and pharmaceutical colleges have overpowered each corresponding professional association in terms of the intensity and volume of

organizational activities. But the existence of the three professional associations has been justified because Korean medical professionals need an ethnic organization to represent them in relation to the larger society if and when they deal with some broad issue directed toward the larger society.

In this respect, the Korean-American Pharmaceutical Association of New York has been the most active of all the professional associations. As has been noted, only New York State has provided foreign-trained pharmacists with the opportunity to take the state license examination without requiring them to receive a specified period of training at American pharmaceutical colleges. For this reason, Korean pharmacists throughout the United States have made long trips to New York City whenever a state license examination takes place, and many Korean pharmacists have decided to settle in New York State. Thus, the Korean-American Pharmaceutical Association of New York represents all Korean pharmacists in the United States. The Association has established brances in Washington D.C., California and Chicago. The Association's encounter with the larger society has been intense as compared with associations of medical professionals. A group of 60 Korean pharmacists and their family members in the Washington D.C. area took to the street in

August 8, 1976, demanding: "No Discrimination, Equal Opportunity," "Help K.P.A.! Why Don't the D.C. and State Boards Give Korean Pharmacists a Chance to Practice." The Association of New York has become an ethnic branch of the American Pharmaceutical Association of New York as well as a Korean branch of the Korean Pharmaceutical Association of South Korea. The Association of New York has kept a close tie with the Korean Pharmaceutical Association. Korean pharmacists annually submit to the Association of New York the application form for the renewal of their Korean licences; the Presidents of the Association and the American Pharmaceutical Association of New York have participated in the 1977 Korean Pharmaceutical Conference in Seoul at the invitation of the Korean Pharmaceutical Association. By holding a series of seminars for the unlicensed Korean pharmacists to prepare for a state license examination, the Association of New York has gained a coherent body of membership.

In contrast to this, the Korean Nursing Association of New York has been inactive partly because some of the larger alumni associations of prestigious nursing colleges in Seoul have not recognized the legitimacy of the Association. To state it differently, the founding members of the Nursing Association have not been able to gain the participation of the alumni associations of major nursing schools in Seoul. For this reason, the Association represents only

only a small segment of the Korean nurses in the New York, metropolitan area. But, in other areas such as Chicago and Los Angeles, effective and strong Korean Nursing Associations were founded by representatives of major nursing alumni associations. In the case of Chicago, the president of the Korean Nursing Association of South Korea on a visit to Chicago has encouraged Korean nurses in the area to form their own association. All the Korean Nursing Associations in the United States have maintained an organizational tie with the corresponding organizations in South Korea.

For the reason mentioned above, the major activities of the Korean nurses in the New York metropolitan area have been confined to alumni associations of nursing schools. In the absence of an effective central organization to represent and work for all the Korean nurses in the New York metropolitan area, some Korean churches have responded to this need. By providing unlicensed nurses with seminars or special lectures on a state license examination, some churches have helped prepare them for the examination.

The Korean-American Doctors Association was established in 1975 in New York City on the basis of existing alumni associations. There are regional Korean doctors associations, in California, Chicago, Washington D.C. area and in the New York metropolitan area. Since Korean doctors

are heavily concentrated in the New York metropolitan area, the Korean doctors in this area have constituted a dominant force in terms of leadership and membership size. The Association aims at: (1) the pursuit and consolidation of the common interests of Korean-American doctors; (2) Contribution to the well being of the Korean community in the United States; (3) Creation of organization linkage with American Medical Association; (4) Dedication to the development of the Korean medicine in South Korea. Since medical alumni associations are powerful but separate units around which Korean doctors organize and express basic communal actions, the Association has so far focused almost exclusively upon external affairs that bear upon common interests and concerns of the Korean medical profession. The Korean-American Doctors Association of New York, for instance, has delivered free medical check-ups to Korean immigrants. The Association has also held annual parties at large hotels in New York City. The main activity of the Korean American Doctors Association in the United States, which represents all Korean-American doctors and is planning to have its main office in Washington D.C., has focused upon annual medical seminars in Seoul. These are co-sponsored by the Association and the Korean Medical Association. The Association has encouraged its members to participate in the seminars,

through which Korean-American doctors are expected to contribute American medical knowledge and technology to the South Korean medicine.

In addition to this purely academic purpose, group visits of Korean-American doctors to the homeland have been facilitated by the South Korean government as a part of its broad policy to create favorable public opinion among Korean immigrants toward the South Korean government or "to implant in overseas countrymen the right view on their fatherland." When a group of some 400 Korean doctors and their families visited South Korea at a reduced air fare during the summer of 1977, they were lavishly treated by the South Korean government. An ethnic newspaper reported:

> While they shall stay for three weeks in Seoul, the academic seminar will be held from June 17 to 18, alternately, at the Seoul National University and the Yonsei University. In addition, they shall make domestic tours to major industrial complex, Panmunjom, and other famous historical sites. . .
>
> They will stay for three weeks at the Plaza Hotel in Seoul. The Korean government is scheduled to provide a special touring service to children in order to lead them to recognize correctly their fatherland. . .[2]

The Relationship Between Korean-American Professionals' Associations. We have so far described two kinds of influential community organizations -- alumni associations and the three major medical professionals' associations, in

order to ascertain some basic organizational patterns of community associations. This portrait illuminates other associations in the first cell, those characterized by two common factors: organizational activities having little or no interaction with the larger society and membership based upon common institutional experiences in the old land.

One major characteristic of the three medical professionals' associations is that alumni associations are the basic units that establish and support medical professionals' associations. The importance of alumni associations in establishing and running the medical professionals' associations is an unique phenomenon. But alumni members also have formed informal and diffusive subgroups within many associations such as ministers', Korean Karate men's and artists and performing artists' associations.

Secondly, each professional association has maintained organizational connections with the corresponding institution in the homeland. This organizational nexus between the two nations runs through all the associations in both the first and second cell simply because membership of the associations have originated in common institutional experience in the homeland. Furthermore, as in the case of the Korean-American Doctors Association, the homeland government has influenced the organizational activities of Korean immigrants. As we

shall see, this is a dominant pattern that governs community activities of Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area.

Thirdly, of the three medical professionals' associations, only the Korean-American Pharmaceutical Association has broken its ethnic shell and has succeeded in forming an ethnic branch in the American Pharmaceutical Association of New York. As has been noted, only New York state has granted foreign-educated pharmacists an opportunity to take a state licensing examination mainly because of the great shortage of pharmacists in New York. In addition, a group of Korean pharmacists staged a mass demonstration in Washington D.C. to protest against the other states' discrimination against their taking licensing examinations. This kind of hardship facing Korean pharmacists largely explains why they have concentrated in New York City and have organized such intense group activities directed toward the larger society. Thus the Korean-American Pharmacists' Association differs from all other medical professionals' associations including nurses' doctors', dentists', X-ray technicians', dental laboratory workers' and veterinarians' associations. Thus the Korean-American Pharmacists' Association rather belongs to the associations in the second cell, which are characterized by membership derived from the homeland but with organizational

activities that are oriented toward the larger society.

In order to substantiate the above generalizations, let us specifically outline the major activities of some organizations in both the first and second cell. Let us first describe some major activities of both the Korean Sports Association and the Korean Veterans' association, which are typical organizations in the first cell.

> The Korean Sports Association in the East was founded in 1974 by former athletes including those who participated in Olympic games. Its organizational purpose is (1) to improve health conditions of Korean immigrants by holding various sports contests; (2) to organize and send a team of Korean American athletes to major sports contests in South Korea; (3) to provide South Korean athletes with up-to-date training opportunities and facilities of the United States. In 1977 the organization was officially promoted into an American branch of the Korean Athletics Association of South Korea. In 1977 the organization and the Korean Sports Association in the West jointly sent a team of 48 delegates, 36 being athletes, to the 58th National Athletic Contest in Kwangju, South Korea. The team represented all Korean-Americans in the United States. The organization has, since 1976, held annually an "indoor sports contest" for Korean immigrants in New York. Community associations, churches, and big business firms constitute basic units for competition. A community newspaper and the Korean Consulate General have sponsored the contest.
>
> The Korean veterans' Association in the East was founded in 1969 by a group of retired high ranking officers of the Korean Army. All Korean veterans are eligible for membership. The organization enlisted in 1977 a total of 384 active members. It became an official American branch of the Korean Veterans' Association in South Korea, Although an official aim of the organization lies in mutual

assistance among members, the organization has a deep political commitment to the Park regime. The Korean Veterans' Association in South Korea is Park's political tool to control millions of Korean veterans under Park's powerful governmental bureaucracy.

The Korean Veterans' Association in the East and the Korean Association in New York, an umbrella organization for Korean immigrants in New York, jointly initiated an anti-North Korean rally in New York City. The Korean Veterans' Association in the East has held community marathon contests at Flushing Meadows Park. In 1977 the Association had its 32 members taking part in the parade of the Korean Army Day. It conducted a fund-raising campaign to send money and gifts to the Korean soldiers in the front of South Korean combat area.

The following two artists' associations typify the associations in the second cell:

Nineteen Korean painters in New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C. established in 1977 a painters' association named the Korean Painters' Association in the East. Their organizational purposes lie in (1) making a group debut in the arena of American painting; (2) exchanging mutual help and improving professional craft among its members; (3) disseminating "with a sense of national pride" Korean paintings in the new land; (4) encouraging promising young painters in the Korean community. Since 1977 the Association has held two exhibitions, alternately, in Washington D.C. and New York City. The New York exhibition was held at the Korea Center at 460 Park Avenue. The Korean Consulate General in New York sponsored the exhibition.

The Korean Emile Opera is one of the Korean musicians' associations in New York City. It is composed of some 60 musicians in the New York metropolitan area. It was formed in 1977 with the following purpose: In New York City, a world capital of the arts, we Korean musicians have earned an international

reputation for their artistic creativity. This is a fruit of our tenacious efforts to overcome hardships and difficulties facing us in the new land. At this moment of gaining an international recognition on our artistic quality, we have founded the Korean Emile Opera in order to enhance our status, pride, and confidence by entering the international arena of music with a more positive self-determination.

In November, 1977, the Opera put on before 2,500 Korean and American audience three performances of a traditional Korean opera, Choon Hyang Jon, which was adopted from an old Korean novel of the same title. The total operating expense of the show was $40,000 a part of which was collected by the Opera's holding a "Dinner and Music Night" for established Koreans. The South Korean Department of Culture and Information contributed $12,000 and costumes to the Opera. More than 100 staff and cast members were involved in the show. The New York Daily News covered the show. A community newspaper, the Hankook Ilbo sponsored the performance on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the establishment of its branch in New York City.

In the spring of 1978, a group of outstanding Korean musicians in New York City, including some members of the Emile Opera, were invited to the Korean Arts Festival in Seoul in which they showed their talents to Korean audiences. The Festival was held by Seoul city government in order to celebrate the opening of the Saejong Hoekwan, a Seoul's equivalent of New York's Lincoln Center.

Korean Associations Focused upon Purely American Activites. The associations in the third cell were characterized by membership formed on the basis of common life experiences in the new land with their organizational activities being confined to intra-ethnic affairs. Thus the associations have a little or no interactions with the larger society. Unlike the associations in both the first and second cell,

the associations in the third cell have no organizational nexus with the corresponding institutions in the homeland. We shall see immediately that the Korean Scientists and Engineers Association in America is an exception for this.

Golfers', tennis players', hunters', and mountaineers' associations or clubs organize, encourage, and direct recreational activities for some segments of Korean population in the New York metropolitan area. Their members are predominantly recruited from well-established Koreans, who have hobbies which they have acquired in the new land. These hobbies have become the basis of their recreational associations.

In contrast, age and sex are the basis of creating the Elderly Association, called Sang Nock Hoe (Evergreen Tree Association). A group of old ministers, many of whom entered the United States before the National Origin Act of 1924, was a leading force in establishing the Elderly Association in 1976. Koreans, who are 55 years old or over, are eligible for membership in the Association. Its membership increased from 30 in 1976 to 178 in 1977. The Association had its headquarters and recreational facilities at the Korean Medical Center in Flushing. There are a group of Korean doctors who conduct a group-practice for Korean immigrants. Some community organizations such as the Lions Club,

the Womens' Association, and the Ministers' Association have frequently entertained the members. They have provided Korean food, dancing shows, and music. The lonely and isolated life confronting the Korean aged, most of whom were forced to immigrate to a new land in order to join their sons or daughters, necessitated the formation of the Association.

The Women's Association is high "society," founded in 1974 by a group of female celebrities, including wives of big businessmen. The Association is inclined to preserve traditional virtues of Korean femininity. The Association has held seminars on flower arrangement, cooking, and hair-cutting and dressing, etc. It once initiated a "Buy-Korean Products" campaign, urging Korean housewives to purchase only Korean consumption goods imported from South Korea. It also raised funds to be sent to Korean orphans in the homeland. The two Associations,-the Elderly Association and the Womens' Association,- have received some assistance from the Korean Consulate in New York City.

The Korean Scientists and Engineers Association As An Exception. The Korean Scientists and Engineers Association in America, Inc. deserves detailed description because it is the most influential and important association of those community organizations illustrated in the third cell.

The Korean Scientists and Engineers Association was created in 1971 by scientists and technical engineers, most of whom entered the United States as students and established successful professional careers in American science and technology. The Association has two main organizational goals: (1) To exchange new ideas and the accomplishments of and among members; (2) To contribute to the technological and scientific development of South Korea. The South Korean Government was indirectly involved in the formation of the Association partly because South Korea needs Korean-American "brains" in the process of a rapid industrialization.

The Association has its headquarters in Washington D.C. with 22 branches throughout the United States. In 1978 some 1,500 Korean scientists and engineers were organized into the Association. Its major activities include: (1) annual seminars in Seoul with the participation of South Korean scientists; (2) sending newly produced tools, machine equipment, and new books to South Korea. In 1977 the Association made a "Mutual Assistance Treaty" with the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), which is called the "Korean brain tank." An ex-president of the Association was cited by the South Korean government for his devotion to the establishment of the Association.

In New York City, a group of Korean scientists and engineers formed a New York branch and has had regular meetings at Korean restaurants.

Korean Associations Focused upon American Issues.

The associations in the fourth cell share the following two attributes: members are recruited on the basis of common interests in the new land, and their activities are largely oriented toward the larger society. As we shall describe in detail in the next chapter on community politics, the anti-Park organizations, whose membership were formed by making the Park regime the common enemy, have tried to alienate the United States from the Park government. By doing this the

organizations have attempted to influence the politics of South Korea. The Korean-American Political Association (KAPA) has tried to defend the interests of Korean immigrants as well as the South Korean government by participating in American politics.

In addition, community small businessmen have formed specialized associations on the basis of business categories. The greengrocers', Korean food grocerymens', fish retailers', drycleaners', liquor retailers', garment retailers', garment subcontractors', and cab drivers' have emerged independently of the Korean-American Businessmen Association which claims to represent the business interests of whole Korean businessmen in the New York Metropolitan area. Such an association as the Korean Association of Fruit and Vegetable Businesses has become one of the most influential and powerful community organization as we shall see in the analysis of the 1978 election of the president of the Korean Association of New York, an umbrella organization representing New York's Koreans.

"The establishment of mutual friendship and the expansion of common interests" is a main organizational goal common to all small businessmens' associations. This mutual friendship is usually strengthened by association picnics and parties in which members' families participate. Thus

Korean small businessmens' associations also assume recreational functions. Because of this double role, the small businessmen have formed business associations in every area of business into which they have entered. The following report describes the creation of a small businessmens' association:

> Twenty Korean dry cleaners (of some 150 Korean drycleaners in New York City) met together on last April 15 (1978) at the Woori House Restaurant and officially declared the foundation of the Korean Drycleaner's Association of New York. The Association is designed to promote mutual assistance and friendship and to pursue common business interests. After listening to Mr. Yong-bom Lee's lecture on how to handle new clothing materials, they unanimously adopted the charter of the Association. The charter is composed of five articles and twelve rules. They elected as the first president of the Association Yong-bom Lee who commands good English and has a close relationship with NCA (Neighborhood Drycleaners Associations) ...
>
> Mr. Yong-bom Lee made a brief speech. He said: "About vive years ago Americans were reluctant to leave their clothes to Orientals. But now they are glad to receive drycleaning services from Orientals because of Oreintals' reputation of doing a good job on drycleaning service. This good credit results from our hard work. ..."[4]

Secondary group associations are the major mechanism of organizing Korean immigrants. The emergence of the secondary group associations in almost all major life spheres points to an urbanized, professionalized, or differentiated character of Korean immigrants into the United States. Those associations, whose membership have originated in common

occupational or professional experiences in the homeland, maintain systematic ties with the corresponding institutions of the homeland. This is the case of sports, alumni, medical professionals' veterans', ministers', artists', associations, and the Y.M.C.A. and Lions Club, among others. But for those associations whose membership are based upon common interests or life chances in the new land, this kind of institutional interlocking with the homeland is almost negligible. This is the case of recreational, elderly, womens', students', and small businessmens' associations. A conspicuous exception for this is the Korean Scientists and Engineers Association. This is so because the Korean government inspired Korean-American scientists and engineers to establish the Association in order to utilize them for the development of South Korean technology.

Active interaction with community associations with the larger society largely takes place in economic associations and depends upon a certain amount of economic association with agencies of the larger society. The encounter between the Korean-American Pharmaceutical Association and the larger society occurred over the "licensing problem." Korean pharmacists think it unreasonable for state governments (except for New York state) to restrict the issuance of licenses to immigrant pharmacists, who were qualified to

enter the United States by virtue of their pharmaceutical skill. One of the main purpose of small businessmen in establishing associations lies in protecting and expanding their common business interests in relation to the larger society. Similarily, the Taekwondo (Korean Karate) Associations in New York have hosted world or American Taekwondo contests as a means of promoting and popularizing Taekwondo among Americans.

It must be noted that almost all major community associations, regardless of their membership structure and degree of interaction with the larger society, are associated with the Korean Consulate in New York City. This does not mean that the Korean Consulate directs all organizational activities. It rather means that all major community organizations except for the anti-Park organizations and churches are eager to receive some financial, material or moral support in conducting their organizational activities. The Korean Consulate is, if possible, willing to help community organizations conduct group activities in order to make Korean immigrants loyal to the Park regime. This relationship of the Korean Consulate with community organizations will be presented in detail when we deal with the community politics in the next chapter.

We have noted that Korean immigrants do not live in territorial enclaves as did not other earlier immigrants in New York. In the absence of residential niches, secondary group associations generate major community activities and become the fabric for organizing different segments of Korean populations into an "associational community". As we shall see in the next chapter, no effective, central organization has emerged to coordinate and integrate a diversity of community activities produced by these secondary associations. As we shall see, the Korean Association of New York is not sufficiently effective, and powerful to become the one organization capable of coordinating or representing secondary associations. Instead, the Korean Consulate works with major secondary associations by helping them conduct their activities. This, in turn, causes most of secondary associations to identify with the Korean Consulate, a surrogate of the South Korean government.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]The Joong Ang Ilbo, December 19, 1977.

[2]The Hankook Shinmoon, April 28, 1977.

[3]The Hankook Ilbo, February 11, 1977.

[4]The Joong Ang Ilbo, April 17, 1978.

# CHAPTER IX

## THE POLITICS OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY

We have so far presented some basic patterns of the routine, ordinary, and diffuse community activities generated by churches and other secular secondary associations. Another facade of community life can be presented by focusing upon some "core" community organizations such as the Korean Consulate, the Korean Association of New York, and ethnic media. "Core" community organizations are central and attempt to be representative of community-wide activities -- community elections, politics, leadership, and community public opinion in its reaction to the larger society. These community activities and opinions have made headlines in the two daily community newspapers.

### The South Korean Government as a Community Organization

The Korean Consulate in New York City, as an agency of the home government, has been the most influential and powerful organization in New York's Korean community. The governmental agency has directed, financed, sponsored, or coerced major community activities. The influence of the

Korean Consulate on the community has been achieved on the basis of a recriprocal interaction between the community and the home government. That is to say, almost all Korean immigrants are still Korean citizens with a strong national identity with the home government. Even though Korean immigrants become American citizens, they rarely renounce Korean citizenship. Thus dual citizenship exists.

On the other hand, the South Korean government regards overseas Koreans, even those with an immigration visa, as its subjects in need of its constant care and protection as well as of its "corrective guidance and education." Partly because of the Korean cultural tradition of confusing power with moral supremacy, the majority of Korean immigrants express a sense of loyalty to the home government and thereby to the Korean Consulate even though President Park's regime is viewed as dictatorial and "indecent" by American public opinion. This relationship between Korean immigrants and the home government is supported by Korean nationalism, which is deeply embedded in Korean immigrants. For example, a substantial number of Korean immigrants share the South Korean governmental interpretation of "Koreagate." Their attitude can be expressed in the following way: There is nothing wrong in the Park Tong Sun affair because Park Tong Sun tride to pursue the national interest of South Korea."

In this context, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Korean Consulate is the informal government of New York's Korean community with its Consul General as its "mayor" though appointed by the home government. The follow-

ing detailed report on a luncheon party, which community leaders held in honor of a new Consul General, showed a facet of the relationship of the community with the Korean Consulate:

> A welcome reception party for the newly appointed Consul General, Dousoon Chong, was held last April 14 (1975) at the Korea Center, in which a group of sixty community leaders exchanged dialogues with the new Consul General. The Korean Association arranged the meeting ...
>
> The first speaker was Dr. Jaetack Kim, professor at John Jay College. Dr. Kim, saying that, unlike the Embassy, the Consulate exists for the sake of community, advised the new Consul General to exert efforts for the interest of the community. Dr. Kim added that "in a community there is no such a division between the Opposition Party and Government Party (of South Korea). Fellow sountrymen only endeavor to make some contributions to Korea. But there has been a rumor that the government (Korean) recently black listed some immigrants subjecting them to a governmental surveillance." Dr. Kim asked the new Consul General whether the rumor is true or not.
>
> The second speaker was Mr. Kwanghan Moon, an ex-chairman of the board member committee of the Korean Association. With the open statement that he and the new Consul General have maintained a brotherhood-like relationship, Mr. Moon said that "the new Consul General is not such a man to be offended by Dr. Kim's remark."
>
> On the other hand, Mr. Suckjoon Yoon, a grocer in New Jersey, was pleased when his wife received a phone call of invitation from the Korean Consulate; but when he arrived at the welcoming party, he found that he was an uninvited guest. The Korean Consulate mistook him for the vice president of the Korean Grocers' Association. But Yoon was given a chance to make a speech: "The guests who are invited here do not have any problems. The fellow countrymen who can't present themselves at this party are troubled by tremendous financial problems. The new Consul General should help those people who struggle at the bottom." ...
>
> The new Consul General responded as follows: "It is heartening that many fellow countrymen have successfully entered business and educational fields ...

> The Korean Consulate will do its best to help fellow countrymen adjust to the new society."
>
> With respect to the recent Communist take-over of South Vietnam, the new Consul General remarked: "the home government and people have the strong confidence and will necessary to deter any future North Korean military attacks. Fellow countrymen should not loosen their solidarity with the fatherland. They should help the home government solidify her alliance with the United States."[1]

The Korean Consulate in New York City has administrative jurisdiction over the immigrant or non-immigrant Koreans living in the entire Eastern Seaboard area except Virginia and Maryland. It performs administrative, political, economic, and cultural functions for the Koreans under its jurisdiction. In carrying out these functions, the Korean Consulate has directly or indirectly administrated various South Korean governmental policies with respect to the Korean-American community.

Its administrative services to Koreans range from the issuance or extension of passports or visas to the validation of English translation of Korean documents and the confirmation of financial affidavits. These administrative services are necessary for Korean immigrants who wish to visit the home country or bring in their close relatives from the homeland under the "relative preferences" of the United States Immigration Act of 1965. In addition, those immigrant Korean couples seeking divorce consult with and report to the Consulate if they were married in the homeland.

Because of these administrative functions that the Consulate performs on behalf of the home government, the majority of Koreans are attached to the Consulate through its legal functions. During 1976, for instance, the Consulate had performed a total of 36,509 civil actions, most of which were provided to the Koreans under its jurisdiction.

The Consulate has also taken an economic role as promoter and facilitator of trade between the United States and South Korea. In assuming the role, the Consulate has had direct impact on the economic activities of those Korean businessmen who have established their businesses by selling South Korean products.

We have already noted (on pp. ) that, when the Korean wig market in the United States was in chaos, the South Korean government had intervened in the Korean-American wig community in order to organize the market. Because of this intervention, the Korean Wig Union in the United States, an agency of the home government, was held in violation of the United States anti-trust laws. The home government thinks this kind of economic intervention necessary because, as has been noted in Chapter III, the South Korean economy has a vital stake in exports.

Korean diplomats in foreign countries are assigned a salesman role in promoting South Korean products in the countries in which they are stationed. There are all kinds

of South Korean business organizations in New York City such as some 190 branches of homeland businesses, 7 bank branches, the Korea Traders Representative Club, the Korea Trade Promotion Center and the Korea Traders Association. All of these are under the guidance of the Consulate. The Vice Consul for economic affairs specializes in coordinating and directing various organizational activities of South Korean economic organizations. For instance, the Consul General and the Vice Consul for economic affairs are the consultant members of the Korea Traders Representative Club whose membership is drawn from representatives of almost all of South Korean economic organizations in New York City.

The Korea Traders Representative Club and the Korea Trade Promotion Center, the latter a semi-governmental agency designed to promote Korean products throughout the world market, have kept a close tie with various community business organizations. One of the main functions of the two South Korean organizations is to induce community businessmen to participate in "the export front" of South Korea. The Korea Trade Promotion Center has urged community businessmen, mostly importers of South Korean products, to take part in the annual Korean Fair in Soeul. The Korea Traders Representative Club and the Korea Trade Promotion Center have recently held a seminar on "Commercial Laws on American Business Transactions" in order to educate community businessmen

on how to run business in the new land. An ethnic newspaper reported as follows:

> In keeping pace with Korean business world which set a goal of $10 billion in exports for the year of 1977, the Korea Traders Representative Club and the Korea Trade Promotion Center held in September 12, 1977, a seminar on "Commercial Laws on American Business Trasactions," designed to make community businessmen familiar with American business. Some 100 community businessmen participated in the seminar which lasted three hours at the 6th floor conference room of the Korea Center.[2]

Seven South Korean bank branches in New York City have also contributed to the economic life of Korean immigrants. They have extended loans to Korean immigrants by mortgaging the properties that the latter left behind in the homeland. The total amount of loans to Korean immigrants has so far been small as compared with that granted to South Korean business firms in New York City. The banks have been hesitant in providing loans to Korean immigrants on the ground that "their economic foundations are unstable." An ethnic newspaper recently criticized the banks for their "stingy" loan policy toward Korean immigrants. In a recent meeting with the Consul General Yoon, a group of community leaders attached to the Korean Association of New York formally asked Consul General Yoon to press for the banks to adopt a liberal policy in extending loans to community members. But the branch of the Korea Exchange Bank, a governmental bank, had granted, as of September 1976, a total of

$2.7 million in loans to community members.[3] The amount was part of the $6 million fund, which was set up in 1975 by the South Korean government for the purpose of helping Korean emigrants to establish themselves in foreign countries. The government thought the fund necessary for emigrants who, according to the South Korean emigration law, are allowed to possess a small amount of dollars when leaving for receiving countries.

The Consulate fosters and promotes Korean culture, language, and nationalism. These are, of course, the ideological backbones for creating one kind of community solidarity in the new land. It has sponsored, occasioned, and often financed almost all major cultural and social events or activities conducted by ethnic secondary associations of artists, musicians, athletes, veterans (Korean), the elderly, women, scientsits, and small businessmen. It has also supplied materials such as books and films to Korean language schools, newspapers, and even some churches. The Vice Consul for community affairs undertakes the job of boosting and promoting cultural and social activities of the community organizations. Korean immigrants are inclined to give much more weight to the group activities that are sponsored or endorsed by the Consulate than those that are not. The cooperation by the Consulate in community group actions is a kind of official recognition on the importance of the actions

that deserve wide community attention.

The Consulate is also a morale booster for community group activities. Whenever a large number of Korean immigrants gather in observance of Korean national holidays, community medical check-ups, community picnics or parties, and community funeral services for robbery victims, the Consulate sends its representatives to the Korean meetings. Ethnic newspapers have sometimes attacked the Consulate General if and when the latter failed to send its officials to a major community activity.

Consul General Yoon, who took office in 1977, recently visited the Hunts Point market in the Bronx in order to encourage a group of Korean greengrocers who gathered there to commemorate the anniversary of the "March 1 Anti-Japanese Movement Day." He made a brief speech, and was quoted as saying: "Even though we are far away from our fatherland, it is worthy for us to recollect our patriotic forefathers who fought for the independence of our nation. Equipped with the true spirit of our patriotic forefathers, let us unite and build a golden tower of our immigration history." The home government has honored, through the Consulate, community leaders for their dedicated services to community life and "model immigrants" for their pioneering economic achievements. In 1977 the home government chose, with the recommendation of the Consulate, a greengrocer as the "model immigrant."

All the aforementioned functions of the Consulate supplement its primary function: a political function of making Korean immigrants loyal or silent in their opposition to the Park regime which has especially been tarnished by the 1976 Korean influence-buying scandal in Congress. In that scandal, the South Korean government attempted to obtain special kinds of legislations favorable to South Korea. Special attention by the home government to Korean immigrants is necessary because of anti-Park movements in the United States, which are led by a small number of Korean ministers and intellectuals. These are detrimental, although not a threat, to the Park regime and to South Korean governmental overtures with the United States. The anti-Park movement in the United States is usually expressed in such forms as mass petitions to the United States Congressmen and mass demonstrations in front of the United Nations building, the White House, and the Capitol. The primary mission of both the Consulate and the K.C.I.A. detachment in New York City is to keep Korean immigrants away from the "unpatriotic," "anit-state," and "anti-national" movements in the United States.

## Recent Korean Governmental Activism in Community Affairs

The political influence of the home government on the Korean community in the United States has been intensified

since the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War. Immediately after the end of the Vietnam War, President Park had consolidated his rule on the ground that North Korean communists would provoke another Korean War seeking the same kind of communist victory as in Vietnam. President Park felt the need for national solidarity and a consensus of all segments of the South Korean population including those Koreans living overseas, especially those living in the United States. In order to curb anti-Park movements in the United States, the first step for the home government was to form a consensus among Korean immigrants toward Park's "strong leadership." Broadly speaking, the home government's concern with the Korean community in the United States was in part a reaction of the Park regime to the proposed shift in the United States policy toward South Korean military security, the gradual military disengagement of the United States from South Korea.[5]

Even anti-Park organizations have kept a peculiar relationship with the Consulate. Whenever a group of South Korean dissidents in Seoul undertook specific protests against Park's dictatorship, resulting in mass arrests, anti-Park organizations in New York organized and staged mass demonstrations denouncing Park's rule in front of the Korea Center on Park Avenue (New York City), which houses the Korean Consulate. Anti-Park movements have been organized and

sustained by various organizations which are split along different personal networks and conflicting ideologies and strategies over the Korean question. Some were branded by a Korean newspaper as "pro-North Korean" organizations.

The majority of Korean immigrants are indifferent to the political situation in South Korea. Even though many Korean immigrants are angry about the Park regime, they rarely participate in anti-Park movements. They are afraid of possible reprisals by the home government for "anti-governmental and state behavior." This is indicated in the following words: "Watch your mouth, otherwise you can't visit Korea;" "I can't take part in the demonstration because I left my family in Seoul." The South Korean government and the government party recently proposed special legislation by which the government would be enabled to confiscate all the property and pensions of those overseas Koreans who have engaged in "anti-state" behavior.[6]

The New York Times reported a South Korean governmental harassment on "anti-government leaders" in the Korean-American community:

> The South Korean Intelligence Agency appears to have resumed a campaign of threats against Korean residents of the United States who are critical of President Park Chung Hee's government ...
>
> The government is Seoul evidently fears opposition by Koreans here because it reaches the ears of American leaders who influence the military, political and economic support the United States gives to Korea.

> Dissent here also filters back to Korea, and the government fears that it will encourage anti-government feeling here.
>
> In one case, the publisher of a Korean newspaper here said he had received three threatening telephone calls and a disturbing letter from his father, who lives in Korea. The publisher, Chung Kee Yong, puts out the Han Min Shin Bo about twice a month with the news of the government's opponents and articles criticizing President Park. Mr. Chung said ... he was certain that the letter from his father had been dictated by Korean Intelligence agents, because it contained political views that he had never heard his father express ...
>
> One said he had seen Korean intelligence agents watching his house and noted that his associates in a business venture had suddenly quit. The other said that through a friend that his father had been dismissed from his job because the son here was engaged in what the agency considered to be anti-government activity.[7]

Partly because of various kinds of governmental harassment, threats, and indirect punishment against them, the anti-Park movement has mustered only a small number of intellectuals, ministers, and students. But anti-government organizations have claimed to represent the Korean community in opposition to claims by the Korean Association which has been under the influence of the Consulate. Whenever New York's Korean community has observed major South Korean national holidays such as the "August 15 Independence Day" and the "March 1 Anti-Japanese Movement Day," there has been two separate community meetings: one has been jointly held by the Korean Association and the Consulate; the other by anti-government organizations.

To sum up, we have so far discussed the administrative, economic, cultural, political or ideological influence of the home government on New York's Korean community. In doing this we have described the specific interaction between the community and the Korean Consulate, which embraces the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, South Korean business branches, banks, and other business associations.

We have also dealt with some community activities to the extent to which they have been affected by the South Korean government or its business organizations. A group of community leaders have emerged in facilitating this interaction. The Korean Association is a community organization around which community politics has evolved.

## The Korean Association as "Community Government"

In all the major cities or metropolitan areas with a large concentration of Korean population, the Korean Associations, called the "Hanin Hoe" have been founded. The Korean Associations claim to represent Korean settlers in specific areas by automatically enlisting them as members. The president of the Korean Association is selected through a community election. The extent to which the Korean Association is accountable and responsive to the needs of its members varies from region to region and largely depends upon the leadership structure of the specific community in

question. In many cases the Korean Associations are only symbolic representations to the larger society. But the Korean Association in New York City, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., Chicago, and Los Angeles are influential organizations. The home government has influenced Korean communities through the Korean Associations.

Four Korean Associations have emerged in the New York metropolitan area: one in Connecticut, two in New Jersey, and one in New York City. The latter is called the Korean Association of New York. The Korean Association of New York originally claimed ethnic jurisdiction over the whole tri-state area. But as the number of Korean immigrants has rapidly increased in Connecticut and New Jersey, "local" ethnic power leaders have turned up and set up, since 1975, their own Korean Associations "in response to specific regional needs of our countrymen." By describing how the Korean Association of New York has evolved and operated, we can ascertain some of the basic characteristics of intra-ethnic politics and thus perceive some aspects of the fundamental fabric of the Korean community structure.

As the Korean population began to increase gradually since the end of the Korean War, a group of articulate Koreans had reactivated in 1960 the Korean Association of New York which had almost died out by becoming a "club" of aged Korean immigrants of the original, pre-1965 migration. The club

had been led by a minister. In order to put new breath and new image into the Association, seventeen Koreans, most of whom were old-timers, gathered and founded a new Korean Association of New York after dissolving the old one. With the founding of a new Korean Association, Koreans renewed their sense of Korean identity and solidarity in a city that had a growing Korean population. Up until 1967, no heated politics were involved in the election of the president of the Association. The position of president usually went to those elders, respectable but somewhat active old-timers, who were eager to lead ceremonial community activities, i.e., the observances of South Korean national holidays. The majority of Koreans, mostly students, were indifferent to the Korean Association because "they were too busy in establishing themselves." Students formed their own association whose main program was the annual New Year's party held for the Korean students in New York. Through both the Korean Students Association and the New York Korean Church, students were committed to the social life of the entire Korean community. But, as students became established in their post-graduate occupations, they have politicized a number of major community activities and have taken over the leadership of the Korean Association from the old timers.

Nineteen-sixty-seven was a crucial year for New York's Korean community. It was the year when the United

States Immigration Act of 1965 became fully effective, allowing for the immigration of ordinary Korean immigrants. A substantial increase in the number of Korean entries to the United States occurred in that year -- some 4,000 Koreans. In response to this influx, New York's Korean community began to change rapidly. Ethnic organizations started to multiply. Interestingly enough, two economic organizations in South Korea first responded to a long-range busines prospect of the expanding Korean community in New York. In 1967 the Korea Exchange Bank opened its New York office, which was later raised to branch status. In that same year, a Korean businessman in New York City began to import from South Korea the Hankook Ilbo, a Korean language daily newspaper, and to circulate its photocopies among Korean immigrants. In that year, word came out from the Consulate in New York City that: "The home government will help New York's Koreans build or purchase a 'Korea Center' (or Korean community building)." This was the first "wind" from the South Korean government that gave specific content to the community actions of the Korean Association. In that year, the Korean Association initiated the first substantive community program -- the annual dancing party called the Korean Night Ball -- in order to raise funds for purchasing a Korean community building.

The first Korean Night Ball was unexpectedly successful. A huge number of Koreans, including men dressed in tuxedos, showed up at the fund-raising dancing party. The Association made a net profit of $3,800 and opened a savings account to deposit the money. The Korean Consulate General in New York kept two separate saving account books for accumulating the fund, whose amount increased to some $50,000 by 1976.

The annual events of the Korean Night Ball have some significant implications to New York's Korean community. First, by gathering a large number of Korean immigrants at a specific place, the Korean Night Ball has aroused a sense of solidarity and communal feeling among Korean immigrants especially when a group of the top South Korean singers and entertainers stirred nostalgia for the homeland. This kind of Korean meetings based upon entertainment -- Korean music, dancing, and food -- have become one of the pervasive elements in Korean ethnic solidarity. We have already noted this aspect of Korean solidarity when we discussed the community activities centered around secondary associations. Second, The Korean Consulate has, willingly or unwillingly, been involved with the fund-raising campaign. This is just an example, as we have seen, of how the South Korean government is instrumental in forming the patterns for community activities. Third, a group of community leaders has emerged

and divided over the issue of establishing a Korea Center which aims to "enhance national pride among Koreans by propagating Korean cultural heritage and spirit." This, in turn, has intensified organizational activities.

## The Korean Cultural Center as a Schismatic "Government"

As has been noted, the Korean Association initiated the Korean Night Ball under the encouragement of the Korean Consulate. But when Dr. A, an old timer, in 1967 finished his term of presidency, he attempted to make the Korean Cultural Center -- an ethnic organization he founded earlier -- to undertake and continue the fund-raising campaign of the Korean Night Ball. For this purpose, Dr. A and his associate members in the Korean Cultural Center had succeeded in incorporating their organization. Thus, the Korean Association was deprived of its most important function of holding the Korean Night Ball. Up until 1972 there had been no conflict over the jurisdiction over the fund-raising campaign between the Korean Association and the Korean Cultural Center because there had been an interlocking leadership between the two organizations. The presidents of the Korean Associations had been elected among those who either were board members of the Korean Cultural Center or were supported by the Center. However, in 1972 Mr. F., an outsider to this interlocking network, became the president of the Korean Association and

attempted to reclaim sponsorship of the Korean Night Ball. Mr. F had decided to hold a competing dancing and musical party under almost the same title "The Korean Night." In a response, the Korean Cultural Center threatened to bring suit against the Korean Association. The Korean Consul General intervened in the dispute; he persuaded the Korean Association to stop in its plan under the condition that the Korean Cultural Center would pay the Association $2,500 as compensation for the expenditure that it had incurred for the preparation of the party. The dispute was thus settled through the arbitration of the Korean Consul General.

Partly because of this kind of "issueless" division of community leadership, the movement to establish the "Korea Center" has slowed down since 1972. The movement has not been able to bring forth a sufficient amount of participation on the part of various community organizations. But, a fatal blow to the movement came from the South Korean government. After large numbers of South Korean business organizations emerged in New York City as a result of the rapid increase of trade between the two nations, the Korean Trade Association of South Korea, a governmental agency, bought a building in 1974 at 460 Park Avenue for $15 million. The building, named the Korea Center, not only houses South Korean organizations such as the Korean Consulate, the Korea Association, the Korean Airlines, the Korea National Tourism

Corporation, Korea Traders Representative Club, South Korean banks, and the South Korean business branches but it also provides space for the community activities of Korean immigrants in New York. The Korean Association has its headquarters in the building. During the period 1975 to 1976, some 20 community meetings, 10 exhibitions, and 15 community receptions were held in the building. Thus the annual events of the Korean Night Ball have lost their original purpose of establishing the "Korea Center" for the autonomous Korean Community of New York. The majority of community leaders think that it is useless to continue the fund-raising campaign once the Korea Center was established by the South Korean government. But some community leaders associated with the Korean Cultural Center have insisted on going on with the fund-raising party. The history of the "Korea Center" provides an example of how the South Korean government dominates major community activities. Another similar episode highlights one of the basic patterns governing New York's Korean community.

## The Korean Community Foundation as Schism

The community leaders involved in the Korean Cultural Center engaged in internal feuds over the distribution of power. In 1969, some founding members or board members of the organization resigned and set up their own organization

called the "Korean Community Foundation" for a similar purpose -- to preside over a dancing and musical party in order to raise funds for the delivery of cultural services to the Korean community. The Korean Community Foundation had held a couple of dancing and musical parties under the name of the "International Friendship Night." In planning the American Bicentennial in 1976, the president of the Korean Community Foundation claimed to represent New York's Korean community when the mayor's office invited the representatives of some 50 national or ethnic groups to discuss the preparation for the Bicentennial festival. Mr. O, the president of the Foundation, participated in the City Hall meeting without endorsement of, or consultation with, other community leaders. At the same time, Mr. O wrote a personal letter to the South Korean President Park Chung-hee, asking him for $200,000 as financial support to the Foundation's plan to build a Korean-style pavillion in New York City as a gift to the American Bicentennial. President Park did not respond to Mr. O's request. However, these "exceptional" actions taken by Mr. O provoked wild controversy among other community leaders. The community leaders centered around the Korean Association and the Korean Cultural Center felt that they were "outflanked" by Mr. O. They criticized Mr. O for his "extremely individualistic behavior harmful to the unity of the Korean community." Mr. O

responded to the attack by saying that "All the preliminary plans concerning the Bicentennial are officially endorsed by the Consulate.

After seeing that the Korean Community Foundation, led by Mr. O, was incapable of organizing and preparing for Korean participation in the Bicentennial festival in the face of such protest on the part of other community organizations, the Korean Consul General directly undertook the project of presenting unique Korean cultural shows to the Bicentennial festival in New York City. At the invitation of the Korean Consul General, some fifty Korean leaders representing South Korean governmental agencies, banks, and business firms as well as Korean immigrant organizations gathered in April 26, 1976 at the Korea Center in order to discuss the matter of the Bicentennial. There they formed an ad hoc committee which was entrusted with organizing a group of Korean cultural delegates to the festival. The Korean Consul General was elected as the chairman of the committee, and Mr. Han, the Korean Ambassador to the United Nations, became honorary chairman. In the meeting the Korean Consul General revealed the plan to invite the "Korean Folk Artists Mission" from South Korea. This group was composed of some fifty Korean folk musicians and dancers. The Korean folk artists came to New York City at the expense of the South Korean government and put on their shows for American

audiences. Thus, owing to the intervention and support of the Korean Consulate, New York's Korean community could have an excellent homeland Korean team represent the local community at the Bicentennial festival in New York City.

The two episodes indicate some basic patterns of the leadership structure of the Korean community in New York -- leadership in the sense that it involves community representation.

The Korean Consulate as an agency of the home government has organized leadership groups and has willingly and unwillingly played the role of an arbitrator whenever conflicts arise among community leaders. In assuming this role, the Korean Consulate has become an informal government of Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area. One of the main functions of the indigenous community leadership lies in taking the liaison role between the ethnic community and the Consulate. As we shall see, a group of community leaders have become virtual functionaries of the Consulate and have competed among themselves in currying favor with the governmental agency. Partly because of this subordination of community leaders to the Consulate, no autonomous community leadership has emerged in New York's Korean community.

## The Korean Association as Leadership Structure

These patterns of community leadership are clearly embedded in the leadership structure of the Korean Association which originally sought to be an independent ethnic organization representing the Korean community to the larger society.

As has been noted, the presidency of the Korean Association is a non-paid, elected job. The financing of the Association is, theoretically, based upon membership dues from Korean residents in the New York metropolitan area since all Koreans in the area are automatically enlisted as members of the Association. But the majority of Koreans are indifferent to the Association.

Rather, they are affiliated with and loyal to the Korean Consulate. Thus only a negligible number of Korean residents have paid their membership dues to the Korean Association. For this reason, the Korean Association has been technically insolvent.

The expenditures incurred in operating the Association have been largely covered by the contributions by its presidents and its board members. Mainly because of this fragile financial structure, the Association has not been able to initiate and execute the kinds of programs that could help new immigrants adjust to the larger society.

This fact, in turn, has alienated Korean immigrants from the Association.

Except for organizing and sponsoring ethnic picnics and ceremonies of the South Korean national holidays, the activities of the Association have been governed by sporadic, intermittent, external events. Whenever natural disasters hit South Korea, producing a large number of victims, the Association led community relief campaigns "to extend our brotherhood love to the hopeless people of our fatherland." Whenever North Koreans provoked hostilities against South Koreans or American soldiers, as in the case of the North Korean slaying of the two American officers at the Panmunjom truce site in 1976, the Association organized or sponsored community rallies or demonstrations denouncing North Korean aggressiveness and atrocities. All these community activities have been coordinated with the corresponding collective actions taken by South Korean organizations in South Korea. With these kinds of activities, the Association seeks to attain a broad community consensus and participation on the basis of the unhappy events of the homeland. It has contributed to some sense of community solidarity among New York's Koreans. Thus, the Korean Association has its own reason for existence even though it lacks a substantive program of community activities and services. Furthermore, the Korean Association presents all Koreans as a group in dealing with

large-scale organizations of the larger society. Thus the Korean Association is the umbrella organization around which all other ethnic organizations cluster, and through which Koreans pursue and defend their interests in relation to the larger society. Because of their role of being community representative, "high" status has accrued to the position of president of the Korean Association.

Since 1967 when the immigration of Koreans into the United States began, a group of businessmen and American-educated professionals has politicized the presidential election of the Korean Association. Unlike that of the old Korean community of the 1950's and early 1960's, the presidency was no longer a symbolic job which automatically went to honorable and respectable elders. After the new influx of Koreans into New York, community politicians could increase the range and number of community activities. Here is a typical example of how a community leader can activate some major community actions:

> Mr. A is a retired colonel of the South Korean Army who runs an antique shop in New York City. When he ran for the presidency of the Korean Association in 1967, he provoked a sensation and concern over the election by mobilizing a large number of his people into the voting place. An old timer ridiculed Mr. A's zealousness over the election: "He mobilized Cadillacs to get his people into the voting place."
>
> Mr. A was the first to seek the election of the presidency of the Korean Association actively. He is believed to be an informal functionary of the South Korean government. He became the 8th presi-

dent of the Korean Association. After leaving the presidency, he organized a "one-man organization" called the Overseas Pan-Korean Association, which claims to represent all Korean organizations in Japan, Latin America, North America, and Europe. The goal of the Association is "to fend off North Korean communists' intrusion among our overseas Koreans." He recently emerged as a "freedom fighter" against Communism when his organization and the Korean Association jointly organized a big "Anti-Kim Ilsung, Freedom Preservation Rally" in 1976 in front of the office building of the North Korean observers to the United Nations. The rally came as a part of community commemoration of the 26th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. Mr. A became a chairman of the rally by enlisting major community organizations, South Korean business associations and firms, and the Korean Associations in other areas as sponsoring organizations.

But the Korean Ministers Association, whose name was printed as a sponsoring organization in the ads for the rally in ethnic newspapers, protested that Mr. A used its name without previous permission. A spokesman for the Korean Ministers Association said: "The title of our organization cannot be misused for a political purpose which implies that the rally was inspired by a South Korean governmental agency.

Mr. A has been an active supporter of the controversial Unification Church, which does not appeal to Korean immigrants. He has helped the Unification Church to induce Korean immigrants to participate in the entertainment meetings offered by the Church. He once defended his involvement in the Unification Church, saying that "I am not a member of the Unification Church. But I have helped Mr. Sung Myon Moon because he is a Korean, and, with the Korean flag in his hand, he has led anti-communist movements."

Community politics has, since 1967, been deeply interconnected with the home government. Five businessmen, one lawyer, and one political scientist have, since 1967, been presidents of the Korean Associaiton. Five of them had entered the United States under student status and had

received their higher education in the United States.

A small number of community leaders who have taken the presidency of the Korean Association have reaped personal gains, political, economic, and honorific. All these gains have been made possible by the broad interaction of the Korean community with the homeland or the home government. Let us first discuss the political involvement of community politics with the home government.

## Homeland Politics and Community Leadership

In 1972 South Korean President Park Chung-hee gained absolute power after proposing a new Constitution, the Yushin Honpop (Constitution for Revitalizing Reforms), which was approved in a plebiscite held under martial law. The Yushin Honpop empowered President Park, among other things, to appoint one-third of the 219-member National Assembly. The seventy-three assemblymen, who were handpicked by President Park, did not belong to any political parties but have formed another pro-government party in the Korean National Assembly. This group of assemblymen, called the Yujonghoe is loyal only to President Park, who in turn has used this appointment system as a means of co-opting intellectuals. A couple of seats in the Yujonghoe were given to those overseas Koreans who led overseas Korean communities along lines consistent with the South Korean

governmental policy. One ex-president of the Korean Association of Washington D.C., for instance, was appointed by President Park as a member of the Yujonghoe for his outstanding pro-governmental activities in trying to gain support by Korean residents in the Washington D.C. area for the referendum for the new Korean Constitution. He issued, under the name of the Washington D.C. Korean Association, a declaration in support of the referendum. This declaration was widely disseminated in the major South Korean newspapers. After 1972, the presidential elections of the Korean Associations in major Korean-American communities have been hotly contested. At the same time, the homeland political issues have, in part, resulted in the creation of new Korean Associations by homeland-oriented, politically-minded Koreans in cities where Korean immigrants began to concentrate. For example, two new Korean Associations have recently emerged in Jersey City and Trenton, New Jersey, respectively. In discussing the 1978 presidential election of the Korean Association of New York, a Korean ethnic newspaper editorialized about the interrelationship between American Korean community politics and homeland politics:

> It is a pity that community leaders have revived the traditional Korean political pattern of factional strife even in this democratic country, the United States. The fact that community politics is an extension of the homeland politics derives from the interest of community leaders in homeland politics.

> Community leaders vaguely expect that if they would take the leadership position of the Korean Association in New York or in the Washington D.C. area, they could earn membership in the Yujonghoe assembly. In fact, they have been encouraged to become involved in community politics by the fact that Mr. Jin-hwan No, an ex-president of the Korean Association in Washington D.C. area, is now active in the National Assembly as a member of the Yujonghoe ... Someone might think that in the new land the presidency or board membership of the Korean Association is a ridiculous status. But whenever they visited the homeland, they were treated well. If they were lucky, they could even meet such powerful men as the President and Prime Minister or Ministers.[8]

Mr. Y, the 13th president of the Korean Association of New York, is a perfect example of how an ambitious Korean claims community leadership under the impact of the peculiar political structure of South Korea. Mr. Y is a student-turned-lawyer and political scientist. He received a doctoral degree in international politics from a prestigious private university. He was little known to the Korean community up until 1974 when he suddenly turned up in community politics by running for president of the Korean Association of New York. In view of the fact that community politics had been previously dominated by businessmen, the sudden appearance of this non-businessman was an unusual phenomenon. By skillfully engaging in a behind-scene pre-bargaining, Mr. Y eliminated all other aspirants of the presidency. Thus he was elected unopposed. During the year 1974, he was looked upon as an active president. In 1975 he unexpectedly resigned from his post as President after he

made a brief visit to South Korea. His visit to South Korea "coincided" with an important political process of South Korea, in which President Park screened new members of the Yujonghoe. Mr. Y was not on the list of the newly appointed national assemblymen.

This kind of close political interacting of immigrant community leadership with the home government is one of the major characteristics of community politics in the new land. In addition to seeking the aforementioned political position, community busiessmen have used the status of the presidency to expand their business interests arising from the trade between the two countries. Those community businessmen who engage in importing or wholesaling South Korean products, have sought the presidency in order to receive special favors or protection from the home government in return for taking on the role of supporting the home government. The title of president has, in addition, become the basis for receiving loans from South Korean banks and American banks. This interlock between business and politics in the new land is derived from the economic structure of the old land.

As has been noted in Chapter III, the government in the South Korean economy dispenses economic opportunities as well as supplies capital to businesses. The major economic activities of South Korea have been controlled by a powerful governmental bureaucracy that is, in turn,

controlled by President Park. We have also noted that South Korean businessmen have delivered massive bribes to high-ranking governmental officials in exchange for special favors that provide access to economic opportunities. As the trade between the United States and South Korea has become a vital factor for the South Korean economy, and, as Koreans in the United States have played an important role in facilitating the trade, interlocking connection between business and politics in South Korea has been extended to Korean communities in the United States.

But in the United States, Korean businessmen can gain special favors or protection from the home government when they take the role of supporters of the South Korean government. A typical example of this is Tongsun Park who had participated in the Korean influence-buying scandal in the United States Congress in return for exclusive rights to arrange rice exports from the United States to South Korea. Tongsun Park "testified under oath in Seoul that his only reason for cultivating the friendship of three consecutive directors of the Korean Central Intelligence AGency was to fend off his business enemies and keep a lucrative rice agent's assignment."[9] Tongsun Park is an exceptionally successful case. He could gain coveted economic opportunities in exchange for his active involvement in the execution of the South Korean policy of bribing American Congress-

men. But Tongsun Park's economic venture is a paradigmatic case of many Korean businessmen whose business interests lie in the trade between the two countries.

However, the businessman's pursuit of the presidency of the Korean Association is not entirely based upon purely economic motivation. In some cases, businessmen expect the home government to provide the direct kinds of political reward that we have seen in previous discussions. Yet, it is more accurate to say that a combination of economic and political rewards from the home government constitutes a basic goal that community businessmen strive for through community politics. The expectation of economic benefits constitute the factor underlying business domination of Korean community politics. As we shall see, pervasive but hitherto opaque economic motivations were made transparent when two rival groups of community businessmen exchanged attacks and counterattacks during the 1976 presidential election of the Korean Association of New York. The analysis of the 1976 presidential election of the Korean Association casts some light on how businessmen have initiated and expanded community activities as they have pursued their economic goals.

## Conflict and Cleavage of the Korean Association

In the 1976 presidential election, two groups of

businessmen were competing with each other for control of the Korean Association of New York. One group of businessmen were led by Mr. B, who represented the established leadership of the Korean Association. Mr. B was the director of the Board of the Korean Association when he decided to run for President. He was supported by almost all the ex-presidents, board members and the staff of the Korean Association. The solidarity of Mr. B's group was largely derived from the fact that they came from Cholla province, the southwestern part of South Korea. In anticipation of a powerful opposition group, Mr. B's group changed the election law by adding new qualifications and requirements for presidential candidates. These included a mandatory five-year residence in New York. This partly prevented the announced opposition candidate from formally entering the election. Mr. B was elected uncontested. The profile of Mr. B follows:

> Mr. B was a student-turned-businessman. He has, since the 1960's, been an importer of South Korean products. Mr. B had been actively involved in major community activities long before he became President of the Korean Association. He was at one time President of the Korean Cultural Center. Mr. B and Mr. A are close associates, both being from Cholla province. They organized anti-North Korean rallies.
>
> Mr. B is also a founding member of the Korean-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry which claims to represent Korean-American businessmen. He is now president of that organization. An opponent of Mr. B charged that: "the KMCI is a

one-man organization without membership and financial resources. It has its office at B's business office."

Under the name of the KMCI, Mr. B organized and led, during 1975 to 1976, group visits of Korean-American businessmen to South Korea. The visits were made at the invitation of the Korean Trade Association in South Korea. Its aim was "to strengthen mutual solidarity and common interests between Korean-Americans and homeland businessmen and thereby open the way for Korean-American businessmen to contribute to an increase in Korean exports to the United States, and to the economic development of the fatherland. ..." The itinerary included visits to the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Commerce and Industry as well as to historical sites, industrial complexes, and to the Demilitarized Zone.

In 1975, on the occasion of the August 15 Korean Independence Day, Mr. B, as one of the Korean-American delegates to the Korean National Unification Council (a "people's congress" where the South Korean President is elected), met President Park and recommended the following points to him: (1) to set up a special governmental fund designed to help Korean immigrants establish themselves in the United States; (2) to adopt a more positive policy towards the education of a second generation of Korean immigrants; (3) to adopt a more liberal eligibility policy towards emigration; (4) to extend governmental support and cooperation to the Korean Associations in the United States.

In response to the previously described election irregularity, the opposition group of businessmen founded another type of Korean Association, the Korean Community Federation. It elected an ethnic lawyer as its new president. This new president once had operated an emigration company which went bankrupt mainly because of new restrictions by the United States (starting in 1975) on the influx of skilled immigrants. The vice-presidency

of the Korean Community Federation went to a wig importer and wholesaler who was once president of the Korean Wig Union. This new group of community leaders was heavily financed and supported by a famous businessman, Mr. D, who became a millionaire as a result of his wig business. A brief profile of Mr. D follows:

> Mr. D came to the United States as an employee of the Korea Trade Promotion Center (KOTRA), a semi-governmental agency whose function is to promote South Korean exports throghout the world market. Mr. D quit the agency in 1962 and entered the wig business by setting up a small wig factory in Seoul. His wig business prospered and he entered garment manufacturing, shipping, and real estate. In the early 1970's, whe he switched from the wig to the garment business, he established a retail clothing chain-store by importing men's clothes produced in his factories in South Korea. In setting up a chain of retail clothing stores, he encroached upon the territory of small garment retailers, many of whom had bought their retail products from him. He opened his chain-stores near established Korean retail clothing stores in New York. Thus, a group of Korean garment retailers publicly accused him of "immoral commercial beahvior." One Korean retailer called the Korean Consulate and denounced his "shameful" action. In response, Mr. D once filed a $1 million libel suit against the Korean Association of Garment Retailers.
>
> Mr. N, a close associate of Mr. B, was president of the Korean Association of Garment Retailers when Mr. D filed suit. Mr. N had been deeply involved in the operation of the Korean Association represented by Mr. B. With the intervention of the Korean Consulate in the dispute, Mr. D later dropped the libel suit.
>
> Mr. D has twice been cited by the South Korean government for his contribution to the exports of South Korean products to the United States market. In 1968 he became president of the Korean Association of New York after he entertained a large number of Koreans at Korean restaurants. An ethnic news-

> paper reported that during his term he spent about $8,000 of his own money to cover the expenses of the Association. But somehow, he had become alienated from the establishment of the Korean Association, led by Mr. B and his associates, though he had actively been involved in establishing and maintaining other community organizations. With a largess of $30,000, he helped a group of ministers found the Korean Community Activity Center to become the most active service organization in responding to the needs of new Korean immigrants. The Center recently has received a U.S. grant in support of its activites. Mr. D was also one of the founding members of the Korean Cultural Center, the Korean Radio Broadcasting Corporation, and a Korean language school.
>
> Meanwhile, he has acquired a good deal of credit from Korean and American banks. A South Korean journalist reported that he once borrowed some $2 million from American banks. A Korean businessman in talking about him said: "He has never used his own money in running his business." Mr. D's business was in trouble before the community election took place; he sold his building near Koreatown.

In the face of the emergence of the Korean Community Federation which, like the Korean Association, claimed to represent New York's Korean community, the Korean Association, represented by its newly elected president, Mr. B, began to engage in personal attacks on the central figures of the Korean Community Federation, its president, vice president, and their supporter, Mr. D. The Korean Association issued the following declaration which was advertised in a Korean ethnic newspaper:

> According to a fellow countryman, those businessmen who owe a large debt to American banks, have tried to set up another Korean Association in an attempt to defer their debts under the pretext of being officials in the Korean Association. We hope that this is not true. A fellow countryman said that

> some businessmen have frequently visited Korea, displaying their business cards on which titles of presidents of all kinds of organizations are printed. They have used their business cards to make deals in the homeland. A fellow countryman further indicated that those kinds of businessmen have chosen Mr. X as their pawn in their conspiracy to establish a bogus Korean Association, named the Korean Community Federation. We must say that the Park Young-bok affair[10] -- as the biggest bank scandal in Korea -- should not occur again ... As we all know, Mr. X was a controversial figure well-publicized in Korean newspapers when he committed emigration bankruptcy. It is a great disappointment to us that such a man is now running for president of a second Korean Association.[11]

The above personal attack was in response to the following declaraction which the Korean Community Federation had advertised in a Korean ethnic newspaper in order to denounce Mr. B and his associates in the Korean Association:

> Mr. B's side has attempted to create circumstances of unprecedented terror, fear, and violence when a man, disguised as an agent of an intelligence agency (the Korean Central Intelligence Agency), made threatening phone calls to ex-board members of the Korean Association.[12]

The Consul General intervened in this conflict by taking the role of mediator. Insisting that there should be only one Korean Association in New York City, Consul General Dou-soon Chung presided over several negotiating meetings between representatives of two rival groups. But, as we shall see in the next chapter on ethnic media, Mr. B revealed under a special circumstance that the Consul General

and his personnel sided with the opposition group of businessmen and attempted to destroy Mr. B's leadership. The meetings had produced no specific positive agreement on the merger of the two Korean Associations. Thus, during 1976 to 1977 the Korean Association and the Korean Community Federation competed with each other in claiming to be the authentic community representative. In the process of the competition, however, the two organizations initiated various new community activities.

Community politics has deeply reflected the politics of the homeland. A group of community leaders has emerged in the attempt to reap personal gains which are derived from the political and economic interpenetration of the home government into the community. In pursuing their personal interests by seeking and achieving the leadership positions in the Korean Association, a small number of community businessmen and intellectuals have made community politics hotly contested affairs even though most Korean immigrants have shown extreme apathy toward community politics. In the presidential elections of the Korean Associations an average of two or three hundred Koreans have turned out. Most of these have been and still are personal friends, relatives, and schoolmates of the community leaders concerned. However, as a means of gaining personal profit by "reaching out" to the community, a small number of community leaders

have produced a number of community activities. Most of these are beneficial to the community as a whole.

## The Effect of the Koreagate Scandal and of Rev. Moon on New York's Koreans

A deep change in ocmmunity politics has begun to take place since 1976 as Korean immigrants are increasingly aware of their collective socio-economic position in relation to the larger society. As time passes, Korean immigrants are becoming more conscious of their ethnic identity in relation to the larger society. The Koreans' articulation of a collective consciousness of their common interests has been facilitated by external events -- the Korean influence-buying scandal in Congress, the controversial religious movement of the Unification Church, and anti-Korean campaigns among some segments of the black population. A Korean ethnic newspaper reflected this new perception of their collective position in contemporary American society among Korean immigrants as follows:

> Because of their progressive economic spirit and dynamic life force, Koreans in the United States have acquired a special nickname characterizing their unique traits. They have gained the nickname of "Asian Jew," which may have good or bad connotations. Regardless of the racial definition of Jew, the name "Jew" has a universal application as the description of industrious, diligent, thrifty or stingy personalities. This Jewish idiosyncracy has become a secondary national characteristic for Koreans in the United States.

> Recently, an ethnic community in the Philadelphia area has publicly criticized Koreans there, saying that: "Koreans are not cooperative but only know money." This anti-Korean campaign has shocked not only Koreans in the Philadelphia area, but also all other Koreans who are aware of it. Koreans are surprised and distressed not only because the campaign is unfair but also because it has occasioned Koreans to turn to self-reflection and self-evaluation of their life in American society.
>
> The Park Tongsun scandal, the K.C.I.A., and the Unification Church have provided names that symbolize Koreans in the United States. Koreans have suffered from their public identification with these big events. Koreans, who have so far lived without friction in American society, have begun to ask themselves an agonizing question of "how we can live in American society."[13]

Korean reaction to "Koreagate" is a mixture of shame and amusement. In the face of tenacious attacks by American mass media on the indecent but normal Korean political game, many Korean intellectuals have felt shame: "We are now branded as that kind of people." But at the level of private morality, the majority of Koreans have exhibited amusement over their own caricature of American Congressmen: "Koreans bribed poor American Congressmen in order to help them make a living." However, this kind of private amusement or self-defense coincides with a public seriousness when Koreans are taunted by Americans over the scandal. The following report describes the effects of the bribery scandal on the Korean community in the United States:

> Just before Christmas last year, several Korean children living here made little gifts for their school teachers, in the custom of their homeland. But the teachers, so the story goes, politely refused the gifts because they feared the stain of accepting anything from a Korean.
>
> Koreans here recite that tale with a touch of humor and some bitterness. They laugh at the comic twists in their lives that the Korean bribery scandal has caused, but they consider many of its consequences less than funny.
>
> Some Koreans say they have been the butt of teasing and jokes since last fall, when newspapers began publishing allegations of South Korean bribes to American Congressmen and covert attempts to manipulate public opinion.
>
> Some are quick to disassociate themselves from the Koreans alleged to be involved in the scandal. "We are different from Park Tong Sun and Moon Sun Myung," says a shop owner, referring to the wealthy businessman and the controversial preacher who are alleged to have been operatives for the South Korean government.
>
> "I am not interested in Park Tong Sun and Reverend Moon," he says. "I have my way, they have their way."
>
> Others say the scandal has caused them to lose face. "At first, we were angry about Park Chung Hee," says one Korean, speaking of the President of Korea. He ruined our country's face...
>
> Some Koreans say that they have been hurt because perhaps half of their neighbors refuse their invitations or just do not show up. A few have seen vulgar anti-Korean signs on the streets.
>
> Korean businessmen say business has dropped off a bit. A storekeeper selling wigs says he has fewer customers. An auto mechanic reports that he is not getting as much work as before. Workers find it harder to get jobs...[14]

In addition, New York's Korean community has experienced the following events. The Korean-American Cultural Federation was established in 1976 by some well-established Koreans in order to disseminate Korean traditional culture, arts, and music to the American public. It recruited as members "top" American business executives or businessmen

who have some "cultural" (or business) interests in South Korea. The organization was forced to dissolve itself because American business executives "avoid the image of Korea itself." Two Korean churches in New York were audited by the IRS because of "the controversy surrounding the Unification Church." Some community church leaders angrily said: "It is quite exceptional that religious organizations like churches are audited." In Westchester County where the Unification Church possesses vast real estate holdings, Koreans have met some resistance on the part of county residents when trying to buy houses. The residents tend to confuse Koreans with "Moonies." Some segments of the Westchester population are afraid the Korean properties will be transferred to the Unification Church whose properties are exempt from taxation. They are afraid of the possible resultant increase in their own property tax.

Mainly due to the Korean bribery scandal in Congress, there has been a growing community-wide consensus that community leaders should not be involved in homeland politics. "Don't look to the politics of the homeland" is a commonly used phrase when community opinion-makers like ministers, journalists, and intellectuals discuss community politics. The Korean influence-peddling scandal has forced community leaders to reconsider their "blind" loyalty to the home government. The Korean Association in New York attempted to hold a public hearing on the scandal.

The public hearing, entitled "The Impact of the Park Tong Sun Affair on the Korean Community" was scheduled to be held on December 4, 1977 with the participation of representatives of the home government, the Korean Consul General in New York and the Korean Ambassador to Washington D.C., as well as representatives of anti-Park organizations in New York. This bold initiative of the Korean Association, which had never previously taken a political position independent from the home government, was a surprise to the community. Some Koreans argued that the initiative was a political tactic for gaining votes in the forthcoming 1978 community election for President of the Korean Association. However, a spokesman of the Association said: "We feel that a public hearing is overdue. We must have the meeting because so many of our fellow countrymen have inquired of us about the scandal. We think it necessary to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong."[15]

It was reported that the Association was forced to cancel the public hearing because the Korean Consul General refused to take part in it.[16]

In addition, the Korean Community Federation, the second Korean Association, strained its relationship with the Consulate because its president presented himself before the House Ethics Committee as a lawyer for Hyong-wuck Kim, an ex-director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency

when the latter testified before the Committee about his knowledge of Korean operations with respect to the United States Congress.

## The Rise of Indigenous Politics

A new community consensus over community politics is clearly indicated in the 1978 presidential election of the Korean Association of New York. The Korean Association of Fruit and Vegetable Businesses entered community politics by proposing one of its members as a candidate for the election. It confronted the established leadership of the Korean Association which had chosen one of its board members, a wig importer and wholesaler, to run for the election. The two groups engaged in a bitter and deadly struggle over hegemony of the community, and greengrocers won the election.

This victory is largely due to the fraternal solidarity among greengrocers and to their Association's vast financial resources. Greengrocers were determined to unify the community leadership by crushing the established leadership of the Korean Association. In the election campaign, the Korean Community Federation supported greengrocers and suggested that it would dissolve itself if the greengrocers would take over the Korean Association. After the election, the Korean Community Federation was voluntarily dissolved. The Korean Elderly Association, which is a highly

esteemed organization because of Korean cultural respect for old people, also supported the greengrocers. With the entering of greengrocers into community politics, as a news headline shows, the "Community Is Swept by Heated Political Winds." More than 2,000 Koreans have registered to vote; some 1,400 community members have turned out in the voting place. The Korean Association of Fruit and Vegetable Businesses has resorted to its well-organized internal network in order to get its members and their families and supporters to the voting place.

The debut of greengrocers in the arena of community politics has two significant aspects. First, community politics has begun to shape along the line of organizational groups rather than about specific individuals who used community elections in order to make personal gains in relation to the South Korean government. As has been noted, the community elections had been dominated by businessmen who had commercial or political interests in the homeland. Since the fruit and vegetable business has no connection with the homeland and its economy, the action for greengrocers to gain control of community leadership has marked a radical departure from established political patterns. Secondly, this new development in community politics is a response to a prevailing mood in the community that says "Let us not get involved in homeland politics but tackle American politics."

In this sense the new politics of the Korean community is to establish its autonomy from the homeland. If the movement persists and succeeds, it could establish a genuine politics that is based upon indigenous leadership, issues, and interest. The homeland government and its agents may no longer be able to control the politics and leadership of the Korean community. Accordingly, one of the main platforms of the Korean Association of Fruit and Vegetable Businesses was to "defend and pursue common interests of our fellow countrymen in the new land." The Association has promised that it will set up a special bureau designed to assume a liaison role with city, state, and Federal organizations. In a welfare state like the United States, the Korean community in the United States wants a direct piece of the pie represented by state and Federal money. In this context, some community leaders have pointed to the shift in black movements toward service-oriented community programs as opposed to overt ideological or political movements.

## The KAPA and Korean Participation in Domestic Politics

But this aspect of community politics with respect to the larger society has already been initiated and carried out by a group of American-educated Korean intellectuals, who already have such an interest in ethnic politics. The Korean-American Political Association (KAPA), which was

founded in 1971 and became a nationwide organization with headquarters in San Francisco, has focused upon Korean politics in relation to the larger society. This organization, for the first time in the history of Korean-Americans, participated in American politics when it contributed some $3,000 in campaign funds to the election of Governor Brown in 1974. Governor Brown in response appointed a Korean as judge. In the Presidential election of 1976, the organization supported Ford rather than Carter because the South Korean government opposed Carter's campaign promise to withdraw American military forces from South Korea. The KAPA has a branch in New York City that has held conferences to which the United States immigration officials were invited to explain various immigration and naturalization problems facing Koreans in the New York metropolitan area. The organizer in charge of KAPA's New York branch said: "If we could unite naturalized Korean-Americans and cast a single ethnic block vote, we could make substantial political and economic gains."

One college professor, named Mr. Z, who belongs to KAPA, has actively engaged in linking the community with the politics of the larger society. He has, since 1976, been a Korean representative of the Asian-American Coalition of Greater New York, which represents the Asian community in New York. When the greengrocers took control over the Korean

Association in the Spring of 1978, its new president, Mr. P, appointed Mr. Z as Director of the Board Committee of the Korean Association. Both graduated from a Korean university. Mr. Z has emerged as a most effective community leader since his participation in the Korean Association. He has systematically contacted, on behalf of New York's Korean community, City Hall, its Police Department and Asian-American interest groups. He has also participated in an Asian-American campaign to organize New York's Asians for the re-election of Governor Carey. Thus, owing to the participation of Mr. Z in the Korean Association, an organizational or leadership interlocking between the KAPA and the Korean Association of New York has been generated.

## Korean Response to Black Anti-Koreanism

The growing awareness by Korean-Americans of their collective fate in the new land has, as we have noted, also partly been caused by anti-Korean campaigns by some segments of the black population. Anti-Korean incidents have occurred in the form of murder, picket-lines, and press attacks against Korean merchants who operate their businesses in black ghettos. The racial conflicts between blacks and Korean ghetto shopkeepers have occurred sporadically in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. In New York Cith there have been no major overt incidents between the

two groups although "numerous" Korean ghetto businessmen have experienced robberies by both blacks and Hispanics. Three Korean merchants in New York's ghetto were killed in separate holdups during the period between 1975 and 1978. One Korean owner of a supermarket in a black neighborhood was shot to death by two black youths for reasons other than robbery.

Because of this kind of racial conflict between Korean ghetto merchants and black residents or businessmen, Koreans in New York were disturbed when they first encountered an overt political attack by some Philadelphia black leaders against Korean merchants in the area. The attack started with anti-Korean articles in a black biweekly newspaper, the Tribune (July 12 and July 16, 1977). The articles were immediately followed by an open letter (July 26, 1977) denouncing Korean merchants, which was sent by an influential black leader to the United States Congressman in West Philadelphia. A Korean ethnic newspaper summarized the contents of the two articles ans the open letter:

> (1) Koreans find it easier than blacks to receive loans from the Small Business Administration. This should be investigated to ascertain whether irregularities are involved in the handling of business loans by the Small Business Administration. The sources of capital for Koreans should be traced.
>
> (2) Koreans are not thankful to the blacks who have participated in the Korean War and helped Koreans

> fight against the communist invasion. Instead they despise blacks. They invade and exploit the black community.
>
> (3) Koreans do business in black neighborhoods, but they do not employ blacks.
>
> (4) Koreans are not cooperative in community affairs. They do not enlist themselves into community business associations. They never pay their membership dues. They never contribute money to the operation of community affairs such as street decoration during the Christmas season.
>
> (5) Koreans have a superiority complex over blacks despite the fact that they are yellow.[17]

In addition, Good News, a daily black newspaper published in Baltimore, argued (February 8, 1978) that the business enterprises of Korean ghetto merchants are "a conspiaracy of foreigners." It implied that, as in the Korean influence-buying scandal, the South Korean government encourages and finances Korean businesses in black ghettos.

The above charges against Koreans illuminate the peculiar racial and ethnic relationship between ghetto blacks and Korean ghetto merchants. Black grievances against Korean merchants focus upon the "parasitic" commercial behavior of Korean small businessmen. Black complaints might be summarized into one sentence: "Koreans milk cows without feeding them." This kind of protest indicates the economic situation facing marginal Korean immigrants. Korean immigrants are a typical example of the so-called "middlemen minority." As has been indicated in Chapter IV, the inability of Korean

immigrants to enter the mainstream of American economic opportunity has caused a high proportion of Korean immigrants to seek economic rewards out of ghetto business enterprises. In addition, Korean immigrants are economically aggressive and energetic and thus dare to enter ghetto businesses which involve high risks, robbery, fire, looting, and buglary. The following report describes a typical hardship facing Korean ghetto businessmen:

> Mr. Na opened on July 15, 1975 -- a grocery store at 2116 Coronaga Avenue (in Brooklyn). During the last year and a half, Mr. Na met four pistol robberies, two gurglaries, and one window-smashing by black youths. Mr. Na keeps his store open from 9 A.M. to late midnight. Whenever Mr. Na's wife took care of the business, they underwent these misfortunes.[18]

Partly because of these kinds of security problems, Korean ghetto merchants do not intend to remain in ghetto businesses permanently. By catering to low-class blacks and Hispanics they want to earn enough to start other businesses. For them ghetto businesses are only a means of expanding their business ventures. Thus they do not have a sense of "roots" in the areas in which they pursue their economic activities. Objectively and subjectively, they are strangers to the ghetto. They are marginal traders. They do business in black ghettos while residing predominantly in white, lower-middle-class neighborhoods.

The anti-Korean campaigns among blacks have thus occasioned sensitive Koreans to think about their marginal status as Korean immigrants. This, in turn, has contributed to attempts at creating deeper and greater ethnic solidarity. Community leaders and businessmen in New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington D.C. have held a series of meetings, conferences, and seminars in order to discuss how to cope with black attacks on the Korean community. In the case of Philadelphia's Korean community, a record number of small businessmen, who had been indifferent to community affairs, took part in the meetings and engaged in serious discussions of the issue. They formed an ad hoc committee to negotiate with black leaders over the incidents. In this context, an ethnic newspaper reports that: "Philadelphia community leaders indicated that the incidents have occurred when the Korean community in the United States confronts a difficult and embarrassing situation due to the bribery scandal in Congress and other events. They have urged fellow countrymen to show community cooperation and solidarity."[19] In the 1978 presidential election of the Korean Association of Greater Philadelphia, "how to cope with blacks" has become a major issue confronting presidential candidates. In New York City, community businessmen gathered and discussed preventive measures against a potential racial conflict similar to that in Philadelphia. They formed another business

association called the "Bong Young Hoe" (the Prosperity Association) whose major aim is to deal with the protection of Korean common business interests from other racial groups.

## The New Community Politics

Koreans' maturity in their protection of their collective position in relation to the larger society has been fostered by the social events external to the immediate affairs of their ethnic community. "Koreagate" and conflicts over the Unification Church are such controversial and historical events that bring Koreans into disrepute but which immigrants as a group find it difficult to disassociate themselves from. These events have imposed themselves upon community life and have precipitated basic changes in the pattern of community organization. Community leadership has become oriented towards American society rather than the homeland. Community politics has begun to shape itself along the line of organized associations instead of being the personal affair of a small number of self-selected leaders whose political motivations stem from their economic or political connections with and rewards by the home government and its agencies.

The marginal economic role that Korean immigrants play near the lower depths of society puts them in conflict with blacks in urban ghettos. This confligt with ghetto

blacks has provided an added impetus among Korean immigrants to assess their collective fate and identity in the new land. It has also caused the community to search for some collective mechanisms for ethnic solidarity in dealing with the larger society. In reaching out for collective mechanisms, Korean immigrants have become oreinted towards indigenous issues in relation to the larger society. As we shall see in the next chapter, ethnic media have emerged as a most powerful means for upgrading this kind of ethnic solidarity.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The Hankook Ilbo, March 15, 1975.

[2]The Joong Ang Ilbo, September 13, 1977.

[3]The following table shows the amounts of loans provided by the Korea Exchange Bank to Korean immigrants:

Amounts of Loans by the Korea Exchange Bank (in NYC) to Korean Immigrants (as of September 30, 1976)

| Purposes | Mortgages | # of Cases | Amounts* | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Business Capital | Korean Properties | 108 | $1.70 | 63% |
| | Local Properties (U.S.A.) | 85 | 0.76 | 28 |
| | Personal Guaranty | 9 | 0.62 | 6 |
| Settlement Expense | Personal Guaranty | 39 | 0.08 | 3 |
| | TOTAL | 241 | $2.70* | 100% |

*in millions

Note: $20,000 is a maximum amount for each case; the annual interest rate for the loan for capitalizing business is 9 percent while the rate for the loan for settlement expense is 8.5 percent.

Source: The Korean Guardian, October 16, 1976.

[4]The Hankook Ilbo, March 1, 1978.

[5]The following report highlights some aspects of the South Korean policy towards the United States and the Korean-American community:

> A House subcommittee disclosed today a 1976 plan by the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency to manipulate the Ford Administration, Congress, American news organizations, academicians and the clergy to Seoul's advantage, overtly and covertly ...

> Creating American public opinion that favored South Korea with a variety of lures, including inviting "influential" United States journalists to visit Korea to convert them.
>
> Converting academic critics with invitations to Korea, financing seminars, and publishing materials not identified as coming from the K.C.I.A.
>
> Encouraging supporters of the Korean government among Korean residents of the United States and frustrating activities of antigovernment organizations ...
>
> The plan showed that the Seoul government's objectives were to thwart North Korean efforts to open contacts with the United States, to guarantee the efficacy of the American security commitment to South Korea and to prevent anti-Seoul movements among Korean residents of the United States ...

The New York Times, November 30, 1977.

[6]The Joong Ang Ilbo, December 5, 1977.

[7]The New York Times, May 22, 1977.

[8]The Joong Ang Ilbo, March 13, 1978.

[9]The New York Times, March 1, 1978.

[10]Young-bok Park, a penniless crook, was able to receive some $15 million loans from major South Korean banks, owing to the backing of a senior official of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

[11]The Hankook Ilbo, December 1, 1976.

[12]The Hankook Ilbo, October 18, 1976.

[13]The Hankook Ilbo, September 23, 1977.

[14]The New York Times, April 13, 1977.

[15]The Hankook Ilbo, November 17, 1977.

[16]The Hankook Ilbo, December 1, 1977.

[17]The Hankook Ilbo, August 5, 1977.

[18]The Hankook Ilbo, November 23, 1976.

[19]The Hankook Ilbo, August 5, 1977.

## CHAPTER X

## ETHNIC MEDIA AS A MECHANISM OF COMMUNITY INTEGRATION

As has been noted, in the absence of "natural" population centers for face-to-face ethnic interaction, the churches and restaurants are the focal points for major community activities. Korean restaurants are not just the places where meals are served. All kinds of community activities take place at the restaurants: ethnic association meetings and parties, business transactions, negotiations over disputes, public hearings, love-affairs, match-making and dancing are conducted at the restaurants. Similarly, the churches are not just the places for delivering religious services. As has been discussed, the churches assume non-religious functions which are more important to the community than their original religious function. Similarly, ethnic media go beyond the level of delivering news to the community. By informing geographically dispersed Korean immigrants of community meetings and events, community media are a most powerful means of integrating and sustaining the community. They are also specific agents of maintaining and to some extent reinforcing Korean nationalism among Korean

immigrants whose ethnic identity is largely achieved by their strong identification with the homeland. This, in turn, contributes to the continuation of the non-territorial community. Perhaps, it is because of the existence of ethnic media that the non-territorial community can exist.[1] Like major community organizations, the contents of ethnic media is subject to an indirect influence of the home government. The ethnic media in New York are made up of two daily newspapers, two radio programs, one television program, and one bi-monthly newspaper.

A Korean businessman set up the Korean Television Corporation in 1975. During its first year of broadcasting, the KTC was forced to stop airing its program to the community twice because of a financial pinch. In 1977 the KTC conducted a fund raising campaign, calling for community members to contribute money to the operation of the Korean television program. In making this appeal, the KTC felt it had to announce that it had no financial support from the home government. Another basic reason for the Corporation's financial problem is that the community business enterprises are not so large or so strong as to invest sufficient amount of money in the community television advertisement. The major cost for running the community television program is incurred in renting broadcasting facilities from American television

stations. The KTC pays some $3,000 for a one-hour rental. Up until 1977, the major portion of the program was the rebroadcast of videotapes imported from and produced by the Korean Broadcasting Station, a governmental communication agency. But the KTC recently changed its format and some programs. It has added local news by employing two ex-Korean radio announcers and one television announcer. Community businessmen, especially, those catering to Korean customers, are now willing to buy commercial time from the KTC. Thus every Saturday morning when the Korean television program is on the air on the Channel 60 and 68, an audience of Korean television watchers forms throughout the tri-state area. Many Koreans give up the opportunity to sleep late on Saturday mornings to be able to view the program, which lasts one hour and a half.

Similarly, by renting communication facilities from American radio broadcasting stations, two big Korean churches run two separate radio programs. One is produced by the Korean Methodist Church in Queens and the other, by the "Soonbokwoom Kyohoe", the Pure Gospel Church. The former came into being in 1977 after the church took over the financially troubled Korean Radio Broadcasting Company, a company that was set up in 1972 by a former Korean radio announcer with the support of some community businessmen. As we have

noted in Chapter VII on the analysis of church life, the two churches broadcast these radio programs as one way of claiming ethnic leadership in inter-church representation. Since both are operated by the religious institutions, the contents of the programs are religious. Sermons are an essential part of the programs; but Korean secular songs are also transmitted to a general Korean audience. Like the television program, each of the two radio programs is beamed for several hours a week. This time limitation prevents the television and radio programs from becoming as powerful a means of ethnic communication as are the ethnic newspapers.

## The Two Daily Newspapers

The two daily newspapers -- the Hankook Ilbo and the Joong Ang Ilbo -- provide the major mass communication, information, and advertisement services to Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area. They are the public channels of community issues and opinion as well as the media promulgating major community cultural events. The two daily newspapers compete with each other for readership. The newspapers are not sold on news stands but are directly delivered to each Korean subscriber by the second-class mail. Each daily newspaper, published by its "headquarters" in Seoul, is airmailed daily from the Kimpo International Airport to

Kennedy Airport. The New York branch of each newspaper reproduces by photo-copying. In addition to duplicating the airmailed paper by means of an electronic copier which reproduces 12,000 papers per hour, each New York branch adds local news to the original edition. This influx of the homeland newspapers has forced two small locally produced newspapers (a biweekly and a weekly) in New York City out of business.

The subscribers of the two daily newspapers are spread over the entire Eastern Seaboard area with a heavy concentration in the New York metropolitan area. The total number of subscriptions of the two newspapers reaches, as of 1978, about 14,000. The Hankook Ilbo has some 9,000 subscribers; the Joong Ang Ilbo has the circulation of some 5,000. In the New York metropolitan area alone, the Hankook Ilbo has some 7,000 subscribers while the Joong Ang Ilbo serves some 3,500. The Joong Ang Ilbo, which was published later in New York City than was its competitor, has focused upon the Korean communities in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington D.C., and Atlanta, Georgia. Many Koreans, especially businessmen, are subscribers to both newspapers: and more than 50 percent of the Korean householders in the New York metropolitan area subscribes to at least one of the newspapers.[2] Most of the readers are established community members or relatively old-timers. Perhaps, new arrivals cannot afford to the monthly

rate of six dollars. For those Koreans having difficulty in reading English language newspapers, the two Korean daily newspapers are a sole source of their information about the larger society as well as the homeland. Because of this, almost a third of the "local news section" with the masthead of "New York Hankook" or "Eastern American Edition" is made up of the articles translated from English language newspapers and magazines.

Both of the newspapers had taken a pro-governmental stance long before the South Korean government deprived the Korean newspapers of freedom of the press in the early seventies. In addition, the Joong Ang Ilbo with a total circulation of 930,000 is a subsidiary of the Samsung "Jaebol," a South Korean industrial and commercial conglomerate corporation. Gi-young Chang, who once served the Park regime as a vice premier, had founded and run the Hankook Ilbo until he died in 1977. His son has taken over and the newspaper with a total circulation of 350,000. These two newspapers have American branches in New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Because of their long term service in defending the Park regime, the South Korean government authorized the two newspapers to set up branches in the United States. It is for this reason that the two newspapers have monopolized the mass media serving Korean communities throughout the United

States. According to a well-informed source, the Dong-A Ilbo, a South Korean newspaper that had been the sole voice of media opposition to the South Korean government until it yielded in 1975 to a governmental harassment (the K.C.I.A. informally banned all the commercial advertisement in the newspaper), could not establish its branches in the United States because of its anti-governmental stance. At present, however, a New York businessman is preparing to set up a New York branch of the Dong-A Ilbo, but that newspaper is no longer an opposition paper.

In addition to the two daily newspaper, an indigenous bi-monthly newspaper, called the Hae Oe Han Min Bo, the Overseas Korean Journal, has existed since 1973. The newspaper represents the political view of the anti-Park overseas movements. It expounds three political goals: (1) "This newspaper rejects the dictatorship (of Park) that exploits and oppresses the Korean people;" (2) "This newspaper proposes a peaceful unification of the fatherland;" (3) "This newspaper arouses a national consciousness among overseas Koreans." The newspaper appeals only to a small number of Korean immigrants, the articulate Koreans sympathetic to the cause of the anti-Park overseas movements. The newspaper pays little attention to ordinary community affairs. It focuses on the activities of dissidents in South Korea as well as on the anti-Korean governmental movements conducted

by Korean nationals in the United States, Canada, Japan, and West Germany. It agrees with the North Korean communist regime on such a controversial issue as the withdrawal of the United States forces from South Korea, a policy which almost all South Koreans including the major opposition leaders oppose. The tone of the paper is somewhat inflammatory even as one headline clearly indicates: "The Flame of Resistence Movement Burns Up Again at Seoul Campus." The headline points to continuing, intermittent demonstrations by a group of college students in Seoul. An official of the Consulate has labeled the Hae Oe Han Min Bo as a "boolon" paper. The term "boolon" roughly means a "break," a South Korean governmental euphemism of communism or radicalism. Ordinary Korean immigrants greet the paper with a sense of confusion because in the homeland they had accepted the South Korean version of anti-communistic ideology. That acceptance partly is based upon North Korean totalitarianism and its military aggressiveness against South Korea, but it is also reinforced by South Korean governmental propaganda. Thus readers are somewhat irritated when they encounter such words in the newspaper as "labor exploitation," "workers' solidarity," the alliance between intellectuals, students, and workers," "union movement" and "monopolistic capitalism" because they think that these slogans are communistic propaganda. Some

Korean immigrants react to the newspaper with an exclamation: "This is a red paper!" Mainly because of the ideological gap between community members and the newspaper, the newspaper has little impact on the formation of "ordinary" community issues and opinion. This is so despite the fact that the Hae Oe Han Min Bo is a powerful organ for expressing and disseminating the political views of a small segment of anti-governmental Korean immigrant intellectuals.

## The Integrating Roles of the Two Daily Newspapers

By emphasizing Korean culture and values, the two daily newspapers play a primary role in "achieving" a value consensus among Korean immigrants whose life patterns, as we have noted, are otherwise decentralized and segregated. Through the daily encounter with each others via their ethnic newspapers, Korean immigrants, who are scattered over the tri-state area, vicariously maintain a sense of communal feeling. Typical headlines are: "Korean Musicians (in New York) Enhances the Pride of National Culture," "August 15, the Korean Day: the Korean Association Recommended to the City Hall," and "The Two Graduates with Summa Cum Laude: Illuminating the Superiority of the Second Generation." The stories behind the headlines are designed to raise "Koreaness" among Korean immigrants.

At the same time, the Korean dailies reflect the common concern of Korean immigrants with the homeland problems facing South Korea. In the early summer of 1978, headlines were: "The Worst Drought in Thirty Years," "The Worst Inflation Since 1970: Prices Daily Jump." By focusing on these and similar problems, Korean culture and the homeland, the community newspapers provide an effective mechanism of sustaining a communal feeling among Korean immigrants. They reinvoke the common origins of all Korean immigrants.

In addition to this general orientation of buttressing "ethnicity" in relation to the larger society, the community newspapers perform specific functions of coordinating the disparate life patterns of Korean immigrants. First of all, they advertise community events conducted by secondary ethnic associations. Associational meetings or announcements for meetings are advertised daily in each newspaper. In addition to disseminating information, community organizations buy ads in order to draw community-wide attention and recognition of their activities. As we have noted, when churches initiate and conduct special programs and religious meetings, they claim prestige and inter-church leadership by advertising them in the community newspapers. By publicizing their activities through the ads, secondary associations attempt to enhance their organizational status and

> conflict between the big churches and small churches over the election of the staff members. Shouting and disorderly conduct characterized the meeting which continued until midnight. The secular manners of the ministers, who take a major community leadership role in the name of God, have caused a serious disappointment to our community.[3]

As we shall see, this kind of moral judgement over secondary associations sometimes evokes wild controversy itself.

The coverage by the newspapers over their organizational activities provides an additional meaning to the community leaders concerned. Service-oriented community organizations, when they apply for grants from Federal, state, city and philanthropic organizations, use the news articles on their activities as evidence of their "accomplishments" for the community. Furthermore, community leaders use the newspapers' articles dealing with basic community problems in order to highlight Korean problems to the larger institutions especially when they need some support from the latter. This is the case when a community leader, who teaches education at a college in New York City, hleped a high school in Queens to set up a bilingual edcuational program for Korean immigrant students. The community leader translated into English the newspaper articles dealing with the language problem facing Korean students when the high school applied for a special grant at the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

prestige in comparison with other, similar organizations. In other words, community leaders attempt to have their leadership roles "legitimized" in the community as a whole by use of community-wide publicity. Thus at the end of "uncommon" organizational activities and meetings, media-conscious leaders usually raise the question of how to make their activities public: "Let us summarize our activities and send the summary to each newspaper;" "I know Mr. X works for the Hankook Ilbo, I'll call him immediately." In the above quotations, organizational leaders want the community newspapers to write articles on their activities.

But for community-wide events such as the election of President of the Korean Association, an annual community festival or picnic, the community newspapers send their reporters to the scene. In informing their readers of the major community events, the community newspapers frequently pass judgement on the contents of the events and play the role of "moral entrepreneur" for the community. The following report, for example, attacks on internal leadership conflict of the Federation of the Korean Protestant Churches:

> The fourth general assembly meeting of the Federation of the Korean Protestant Churches was held on June 29 (1978) at the Korean Church of New Jersey.
>
> The internal feud over leadership hegemony in the Federation, which had existed since the foundation of the organization, revealed itself again in the meeting. The feud took the form of the

In addition to this use of the newspapers to serve organizational purposes the newspapers provide advertisement services to individuals. The daily advertisements of job-offers, store-sales, commodity-sales, and rental and housing sales provide vital information to new arrivals. Marriages are also arranged through such an advertisement:

> "A 29-year old man, a born-again-Christian, seeks a born-again female Christian as a life-long marriage partner." A husband carried an advertisement in an effort to persuade his wife, who had left home, to return home: "Sookhee's mommy! Please come back home. I forgive you for everything. Let us start again. Children wait for you."

In addition to these kinds of roles that the community newspapers play on behalf of secondary associations and individuals, the community newspapers themselves initiate and operate various cultural and recreational programs for the community. For instance, the New York Branch of the Hankook Ilbo presides annually over the Miss New York Beauty Contest (whereby three Korean girls in New York are selected and sent to the Miss Korea Contest in Seoul), the community painters' exhibition, the community soccer contest, the community childrens' drawing contest and the community musical show by the "homeland" entertainers, etc. The New York branch of the Joong Ang Ilbo hosts similar programs. But the number of its programs is fewer than that of the

Hankook Ilbo. But in order to compensate for this "inferiority," it runs a unique program, called the "24-Hour Telephone Service to Readers" in which its personnel attempt to answer all questions posed by community members. These concentrate on such problems as jobs, "green cards," education and marriage etc. In launching many of these programs the newspapers seek support from the Consulate General. This fact constitutes one of the reasons why the community papers do not upset the Consulate General by reporting the news critical of the home government.

## The Community Newspapers as Issue-Definers

The Hankook Ilbo carried on March 21, 1975 a headline in its section of the New York Hankook: "Rice Powdered by Talc Causes Cancer: An Alarm to Koreans Using Rice as a Staple." Talc is a chemical that American rice producers use as a preservative to keep rice free from vermin and moisture. The community newspaper "scoop" was that talc is also a cancer-causing agent -- a long-established theory among medical professionals. The newspaper report provoked a sensational reaction in the community as a whole. In response, the community newspaper carried a follow-up-on news items by interviewing an American expert. Community leaders representing each secondary association spontaneously reached an agreement to open a public hearing on that matter. The

Hankook Ilbo reported the public hearing as follows:

> The public hearing on rice powdered by talc was held in April 16 (1975) at the Hankook Hoekwan restaurant by the Korean Association. Mr. Jung-won Kim, president of the Korean Association presided the hearing. After listening to various opinions by community leaders representing business, education, and consumer groups,the participants agreed upon the formation of an ad-hoc committee designed to deal with the matter.
>
> Before the decision about the establishment of the committee, there were heated exchanges of various views. Mr. Yong-duck Lee, who represented the owners of Korean food stores, expressed his view: "Talc has not yet been responsible for a single Korean death in the United States. FDA (the Federal Drug Administration) has not yet confirmed whether talc causes cancer or not. In spite of this, the newspaper has reported subjectively about the matter and has created a panic among our consumers. This biased report is a blow to our business; it is an intrusion into public interest. . .
>
> Mrs. Jin-ho Yom, President of the Korean Women Association, presented her view: (What a benefit does talc give to us if we must wash it away before cooking? On this occasion we should unite together and decisively tackle the problem. By doing this we contribute to the development of our community. . .[4]

Because of this community campaign against talc, American rice growers, especially the Japanese in California who virtually monopolize the supply of rice to Korean immigrants, were forced to stop applying talc to their products. This issue was the first genuine, "grass roots" community issue that the community newspapers had touched off. It involved spontaneous and voluntary participation (direct or indirect) by all segments of the entire Korean population

because talc was said to effect the health of all "rice-eating" Koreans.

Since then the community newspapers have not generated another so genuine an issue involving broad, "grass roots," participation of the community although they have produced minor issues. The Joong Ang Ilbo, for instance, raised the issue on sales-tax evasion by some Korean small businessmen when it reported on frequent auditing of Korean small businessmen by the I.R.S.: "Let us Not Evade Tax: A Campaign to Build A Pleasant Community." The report specifically pointed out that some Korean greengrocers did not "sufficiently" pay their income taxes. It cited a specific case in which a Korean greengrocer was forced to close his store for not reporting sales and paying sales taxes. This report might have generated another public hearing, one to educate Korean small businessmen on the technical procedures of sales tax reporting. In many cases, Korean small businessmen became the "victims" of the I.R.S because they did not know how to keep books. This newspaper report had, instead, met with a wild protest by the Korean Association of Fruit and Vegetable Businesses. The latter insisted that the report was fabricated. It said that "No members belonging to our Association have ever been audited by the I.R.S.". The Association demanded that the Joong Ang Ilbo apologize and

write a correction. Some greengrocers, "armed with knives" visited the office of the newspaper and shouted this demand. The newspaper did not submit to the demand and replied that the report was based upon a factual event. In response, the Association wrote a declaration, denouncing the "irresponsible" and "false" report, and submitted it as an advertisement to the Hankoo Ilbo, a competitor of the Joong Ang Ilbo. The Hankook Ilbo did not accept this kind of advertisement on the grounds that it had to abide by an unwritten ethical code of the press. As a last resort, the greengrocers boycotted the newspaper. But the report had some impact on Korean small businessmen: a large number of Korean small businessmen contacted their ethnic accountants to get their books in order to solve their tax payment problems.

These two episodes are examples of how the community newspapers can generate community and group actions by raising issues. Except for the community action centered around talc, the issues focus upon specific, limited segments of the Korean population. This is the case with the issue on tax-evasion. This can also be found in another instance. When the Joong Ang Ilbo reported on the Bronx High School of Science -- its academic tradition and quality, its admission standards and the "excellent" performance of the Korean students there -- a group of well-established Koreans with

children of school-age telephoned the Joong Ang Ilbo in order to acquire detailed information about the school.

But the community newspapers suffer under a specific limitation in raising issues. They cannot open up issues with respect to the South Korean government that reflect negatively on that government. Such issues include the political operations of its agents in the United States such as the influence-peddling scandal, which, as we have noted, has such negative impact upon the Koreans in the United States. This failure to report on major events and issues central to Korean interests and experience in both the homeland and the United States is mainly due to the indirect intervention of the home government in the affairs of community newspapers.

## The Relationship of the Newspapers to the Home Government

Although the two daily newspapers claim to be a "branch" of homeland newspapers, they are not a branch in the strict sense. They are financially independent of their "headquarters" in Seoul. In this respect, they are different from their counterparts in Los Angeles which are directly run by its publisher's brother; the Joong Ang Ilbo, by the

business branch of the Samsung "Jaebol," the conglomerate.

The Hankook Ilbo began circulation in the United States, when in 1967 a student-turned-importer in New York started to distribute to 125 Korean immigrants copies of the Hankook Ilbo. The head offices of the Hankook Ilbo in Seoul had at times wanted to expand its circulation into the United States. But as the distribution business of photocopied newspapers turned out to be profitable because of the rapid increase of Korean immigrants in New York after 1967, the "headquarters" in Seoul "resorted to all kinds of means to take over the photo-copy business from the importer." But the New York businessman did not succumb to these pressures. In 1971 he began to add local news to the original edition. With the increase of Korean immigrants in New York and the growth of their business enterprises, circulation has increased and advertising has thrived. By 1978, the New York publisher employs some 30 full-time workers five of whom are reporters. This New York Hankook Ilbo , a "pseudo" branch, had virtually monopolized a community mass communication up until the Joong Ang Ilbo reappeared in 1976 in New York City. The latter was organized by student-turned-businessman, who once served as president of the Korean Association of New York, and has, since the late 1960's, engaged in the emigration and employment business. He set up in the early 1970's the New York Joong Ang Ilbo; but he abandoned the business

because of the demand for key money by the head office in Seoul. In addition, the population size of Korean immigrants and their business basis were too limited to support the existence of the two daily newspapers. In 1976 a student-turned-wig wholesaler tried again to run the New York Joong Ang Ilbo which had in the meantime, suspended publication in New York. He invested all the money he earned from the wig wholesaling business into his business venture. In the first year, he operated his new business at a loss. Largely owing to the continuous influx of new arrivals and the increasing demand by community businessmen for ethnic advertisements, his business in 1977 ran in the black. By 1978 the New York Joong Ang Ilbo employed twelve full-time workers, three of whom were reporters.

This peculiar status of the pseudo "branches" of the two homeland newspapers caused the direct intervention by the Korean Consulate and the K.C.I.A. into the process of reporting community news. Unlike their counterparts in Los Angeles, the two "branches" maintain financial independence from their "headquarters" in Seoul and thus claim autonomy in reporting local community events. Many community events such as anti-Park rallies and the "Park Tong Sun Affair" are viewed as detrimental to the South Korean government. Furthermore, such community events eventually reach the ears of United States governmental policy-makers in view of

the fact that major community news is translated into English by Korean employees at some Federal departments and agencies. From the point of view of the Consulate and the K.C.I.A. detachment, the two community newspapers, run by Americanized businessmen, needs the "corrective guidance" of the home government, which has taken the form of ex-post facto censorship of the community newspapers. A community member, who once worked for one of the community newspapers, described this kind of censorship by the two governmental agencies: "If we carried news unfavorable to the home government, we immediately receive phone calls from them (the governmental agencies). Sometimes, he (the branch publisher) was subject to indirect pressure from headquarters in Seoul. Headquarters, pressured by the K.C.I.A., threatened to stop sending him its master newspaper if he continued to show a poor performance in self-censorship. This caused him, when he received some delicate news reports, to call the Consulate in order to ascertain whether the news could be printed. The government side (the Consulate and the K.C.I.A. detachment) even prohibited him from printing translated articles from the New York Times on the Korean bribery affair in Congress by saying that "It is unnecessary to inform the community members, who are unable to read English, of the scandal."

Regardless of this direct and indirect pressure from the home government, the community newspapers try to avoid upsetting the Consulate simply because the latter is a vital source of news, news that the Consulate generates in dealing with community affairs. In addition, the community newspapers need moral and material support from the Consulate when they host major cultural activities aimed at the general community.

Consequently, the Korean immigrants in the New York metropolitan area encounter the kinds of community and homeland news that are directly or indirectly censored by the home government. Through this kind of censorship, the home government attempts to manipulate Korean immigrants in order to reach a consensus favorable to the Park regime. This is one of the mechanisms by which Korean immigrants achieve ethnic solidarity.

However, this South Korean policy of "implanting in overseas Koreans a positive outlook on the fatherland" does not always work effectively. This is so partly because the publishers of the newspapers cannot control the professional ideology of their reporters. Seven of the eight reporters (excluding photographers) who are employed by the two newspapers, are "first rate" professional journalists with a long working experience at major daily newspapers in Seoul. The

majority of them came to the United States in order to study at American universities. Partly because of their higher education and partly because of their rearing in an anti-governmental tradition of South Korean reporters (this tradition is still manifested in a recent declaration for the autonomy of the press by a group of reporters of the Joong Ang Ilbo in Seoul), they have an objective eye in dealing with news. There are, of course, individual variations; several serve as conspicuous exceptions to the norm. In general, however, their professional ideology and pride frequently dictate that they write "unexpected" articles or essays which are critical of the home government.[5] In one case, two reporters engaged in a serious dispute with their publisher over the coverage of an important anti-Park meeting. They insisted on covering it even when their "boss" would not let them go to the meeting. The two reporters were not permitted to cover the meeting.

## The Involvement of the Newspapers in Community Politics

By supporting different groups of community leaders, the two community newspapers have had an influential impact upon community politics. In this area, their important role are that of issue-raisers and opinion-makers.

As we have noted, in 1976 the politics of the New York Korean community centered around the leadership of the Korean Association. In the election of President of that Association, two groups of businessmen, both of whom were loyal to the home government, clashed over the control of the leadership of the Association. One group, led by Mr. B, represented the established leadership of the Association; the other group, faced with a change in election law, was unable to list its candidate, Mr. Z, a college professor, on the ballot. The latter group, which was heavily financed by Mr. D, a big businessman, then formed a rival Korean Association named the Korean Community Federation and elected as its president a lawyer. In the 1978 election, a greengrocer, Mr. P, who was supported by the Korean Association of Fruit and Vegetable Businesses, won the presidency of the Korean Association of New York and ousted the old establishment represented by Mr. B. The community newspapers were deeply involved in these community politics.

In the 1976 election, the Hankook Ilbo sided with the anti-establishment group in the Korean Association. During the period of election, the Hankook Ilbo almost daily attacked the way in which Mr. B's group operated the Korean Association and handled the election. The newspaper even engaged in a personal attack against Mr. B; it quoted an accusation made by a businessman belonging to Mr. D's group

against Mr. B: "You said (to South Korean Prime Minister) that some Koreans (in New York) should be abducted (from the United States to South Korea for their anti-governmental activities) when you were in Seoul."

The reason why the Hankook Ilbo, the sole newspaper at that time, undertook a press campaign against the establishment of the Korean Association is complex. First of all, Mr. B's group, whose solidarity was based upon the regional ties from Cholla province, was "clannish" and "manipulative" in handling some community activities. For example, the change in the election law was regarded as under-handed. Thus Mr.B's group was an object of resentment by the community in general. Secondly, Mr. K, the editor-in-chief of the Hankoo Ilbo, is a friend of the college professor, Mr. Z, who was forced to withdraw his candidacy. Both were old class mates at a prestigeous university in Seoul. Thirdly, the Consul General directly intervened in the election in favor of the new group of businessmen and against the older establishment of the Korean Association. A businessman associated with the anti-establishment group said: "The top persons (the Korean Ambassador to the United Nation and the Korean Consul General) think that they (Mr. B's group) are not capable of dealing with this growing Korean community. They (Mr. B's group) don't know how to connect the community

with American society." This governmental intervention in the community election was revealed in a long declaration which Mr.B wrote two years later and which was printed in a special issue of the Korean Association's newspaper, which, as we shall see, was published under a special circumstance:

> At that time when the election campaign was in full swing, the Consul General mobilized, under the direction of the Ambassador H, all his personnel in order to force me to give up the presidency. At first, they attempted to persuade me with all kinds of sweet and beautiful words. But I did not bow to their pressure. At last, they resorted to a press campaign aimed at calling a public hearing, which would then ostracize me. The Ambassador, a big businessman and Mr. K (the editor-in-chief) campaigned together to elect Mr. Z (the college professor) as the president of the Korean Association of New York. . .[6]

Meanwhile, when the Joong Ang Ilbo reemerged in New York City in the spring of 1976, the Korean Association, led by Mr. B, allied itself with the Joong Ang Ilbo. The alliance was based upon mutual necessity. The Joong Ang Ilbo needed the Korean Association and its influence to expand its circulation, while the Korean Association needed a "mouthpiece" to defend and advertise the community activities it conducted. In addition, Mr. B and the publisher of the newspaper are close friends. The position of the Korean Association, whose image had been badly tainted among Koreans by a barrage of press attacks in the Hankook Ilbo, was strengthened and enhanced by the favorable coverage given

by the Joong Ang Ilbo over its activities. The staff members of the Korean Association and the reporters of the Joong Ang Ilbo frequently drank together at Korean restaurants and bars.

In the 1978 election, the Hankook Ilbo again criticized the Korean Association for the way in which it handled the procedures involved in the election. As we might recall (p. ), the Korean Association chose one of its board members, a wig importer-wholesaler to run for presidency. At the same time, the Hankook Ilbo systematically promoted and defended the views and positions taken by the Korean Association of Fruit and Vegetable Businesses. On the other hand, the Joong Ang Ilbo interpreted election-related events in favor of the established leadership of the Korean Association.

In the election of 1978, no evidence could be found to show that the Consul General directly intervened in the election. But this time personal patronage and loyalty were responsible for the deep involvement of the two community newspapers in the election. Mr. P, the candidate representing Korean greengrocers, is a friend of Mr. K, the editor-in-chief of the Hankook Ilbo. Mr. K, Mr. P and Mr. Z acquired the B.A. degree in political science from a private university in Seoul. This "alumni" connection constituted one of

the reasons why Mr. K engaged in the press campaign in favor of each of his alumni brothers and against the establishment of the Korean Association during the two elections. But in the election of 1978 Mr. K received a specific favor from Mr. P: Mr. P extended a personal endorsement of Mr. K's notes when the latter applied for a loan of $20,000 from the New York branch of the Korea Exchange Bank. This "secret" exchange of favors between the two persons was made public in a violent incident in a Korean restaurant.

On the night of April 15, 1978, a group of the Hankook Ilbo reporters including the publisher, Mr. K and other personnel went to a Korean restaurant for a "group" dinner and accidentally encountered there Mr. B and his friends, instructors of the Taekwondo (a Korean Karate). Seeing his staunch enemy, Mr. K, Mr. B., somewhat intoxicated, seemed to "lose his reason." Mr. B approached the tables occupied by the Hankook Ilbo men and began to scuffle with Mr. K, shouting that: "You are selling (the support of) the Hankook Ilbo. I got information that you have received a favor from Mr. P.." Physical violence erupted between the Hankook Ilbo men and Mr. B's group and policemen were called in.

On the next day, the Hankook Ilbo reported the incident, bitterly denouncing the "unreasonable" and "immoral" action of Mr. B. Mr. B was also criticized on T.V. But the Joong Ang Ilbo reported the event in somewhat neutral tone. Personal charge and counter charge followed. The Hankook Ilbo reported an "open secret" among Korean businessmen that Mr. B was once interrogated by the home government on the charge of fraudulent commercial deals when he visited Seoul. In response, Mr. B's group revealed through the Joong Ang Ilbo that Mr. P, the candidate for president supported by the Hankook Ilbo and greengrocers, was charged with the "smuggling diamonds" (from the United States into South Korea) when he made a short trip to Seoul.

Faced with public opinion overwhelmingly against him, Mr. B had to find a way by which he could defend himself and the Korean Association he represented. But this time he could not issue a declaration in the form of newspaper advertisement, which is a conventional means for community leaders to express and disseminate their views. Mr. B had to do something to improve the public image about him and "his" Korean Association because the incident took place only two weeks before the election in which one of his close associates was a candidate. But the Joong Ang Ilbo would not carry Mr. B's declaration because of an unwritten ethical

code of the press, the violation of which would antagonize the Hankook Ilbo. Moreover, the Hankook Ilbo men telephoned their colleagues at the Joong Ang Ilbo, urging them not to carry a declaration by Mr. B's group. Thus in order to disseminate Mr. B's version of the incident as well as to publicize the achievements of the Korean Association, Mr. B and his associates decided to publish a special issue of the Hanin Wolbo, the organ of the Korean Association which had been intermittently published for a limited audience. The Joong Ang Ilbo helped Mr. B's group to publish the issue. The editor-in-chief in the newspaper wrote and edited "almost all the articles and essays" intended to advertise the achievements of the Korean Association. One of the essays, entitled "THIS IS TRUE" with Mr. B as its writer, denounced Mr. K personally. The essay documented all the "unfair and irresponsible articles" written anonymously by Mr. K. This special issue of the Hanin Wolbo was mailed to all the Korean householders in the New York metropolitan area, whose addresses were available to the Korean Association. As noted earlier Mr. P, representing greengrocers won the election.

## The Place of the Newspapers in Community Life

The community press is a major mechanism of sustaining and, to some extent, reinforcing Korean nationalism and culture. By maintaining common Korean values and sentiments,

the community newspapers vicariously integrate the disparate, segmented, and differentiated life patterns of the Korean community. In view of the fact that Korean immigrants have not yet established natural, core, living areas, the various actions of organization-centered community activities or individuals are publicized and responded to by the mass media. The community press, like the churches, is thus one of the most effective organizations for continuing and cementing together a community without a territorial base.

Within this general role that the community press plays, we have identified and described some of the specific relationships of the press with secondary associations, the home government, and community politics. First of all, the community press is the place where secondary associations advertise their activities and thus compete with each other in claims for prestige and status that will be recognized by the community as a whole. On the basis of the paid advertisements and reporting, secondary associations recruit a general audience and selective membership. In addition, the community press itself is an organizer of major cultural activities.

We have also noted that the community press provokes some issues and controversies, inviting the participations and reactions on the part of secondary associations or some

segments of community members. By doing this, the community press expands community members. But in raising issues the community press find it difficult to go over a specific boundary: it cannot question the legitimacy of the authoritarian rule of the home government and its policies with regard to the United States government as well as to Korean-American communities. Nor can it expose the corruption and crime of the agents of the home government. This is so because the community press, like most community organizations and like a free press, is subject to strong pressures and coercion by the home government.

The community press participates in community politics by taking partisan positions in that politics. The community press politicizes the election and thus evokes some interests of community members in community politics. Since the community leaders deliver their message to the community as a whole, personal animosity or alliance between a community newspaper and a particular group of leaders has been a fundamental fabric of community politics.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]This issue was first raised by Morris Janowitz. By focusing upon the community press, he was able to identify metropolitan sub-communities or communities within the metropolis. See, Janowitz, Morris, The Community Press In An Urban Setting: The Social Elements Of Urbanism, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp.1-7.

[2]According a recent sample survey on the Korean immigrants in Southern California, conducted in 1977 by Dr. Choon-goon Kim, 81 percent of the Korean householders in that area subscribed to at least one Korean language newspaper. A total 2,715 Korean householders responded to the same survey. The Hankook Shinmoon, October 22, 1977.

[3]The Hankook Ilbo, June 30, 1978.

[4]The Hankook Ilbo, April 21, 1975.

[5]As we have seen in the discussion of community politics Chapter IX), these "unexpected" articles or essays became important sources of our study.

[6]The New York Hanin Wolbo, April 24, 1978.

# PART IV:

# THE BASIS OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY IN THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF KOREAN CULTURE, CHARACTER, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

# CHAPTER XI

# THE ORIGIN OF THE CHARACTER STRUCTURE OF KOREAN IMMIGRANTS

## The Korean Quest for Economic Mobility

We have seen Korean immigrants' deep committment to socio-economic mobility as it is embedded in the business enterprises of Korean immigrants and their community activities. Korean immigrants' business ventures have expanded into almost every possible kind of retail business. In the process of this expansion, Korean immigrants have invaded black ghettos, touching off racial conflict and Korean immigrants are willing to toil unceasingly as they take over the fruit and vegetable businesses from Jewish and Italian proprietors who abandon these enterprises either because of age or because their sons move into more prestigious and less dangerous professions. But partly because of the strong tendency for Korean immigrants to migrate to the suburbs or suburban cities after economic success in the inner city, Korean immigrants have not created "permanent" inner-city ghettos like Chinatown. They have made economic gains even

when the United States economy has been troubled by structural obstacles and when the urban economy, as in the case of New York City, seemed no longer viable in supporting and absorbing an influx of new immigrants. Moreover, as we have indicated, Korean immigrants have arrived and succeeded in small businesses when a high degree of centralization and bureaucratization typified United States business structure.

The aggressiveness of Korean immigrants in economic ventures to some extent offsets this structural limitation. No other immigrant group entering the United States since the Immigration Act of 1965 has achieved such rapid economic mobility as Koreans. The New York Times reported on this aspect of Korean immigrants:

> The neighborhood is clean and well taken cared of, and the immigrants have earned considerable respect here for their enterprises and willingness to work. "I don't think any ethnic group in Los Angeles has risen so fast and as hard -- there's something dynamic about what they've (the Koreans) done," Joseph Sureck, district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, said.[1]

In New York City, for instance, Filipino immigrants have been negligibly active in small business although they have entered this nation at the same time as Koreans and are, like Koreans, carefully selected by United States immigration with a heavy emphasis on medical professionals.[2] Chinese immigrants in New York are largely concentrated in Chinatown;

they have not yet significantly expanded their business enterprises beyond their traditional businesses such as hand laundries and restaurants.[3]

This kind of disparity of socio-economic adjustment among new immigrant groups leads us to raise the following questions: (1) how the cultural and motivational traits or social character that immigrants had internalized in their homeland can be supportive of, or an impediment to, their socio-economic success in the new land and; (2) how homeland experiences in urbanization, economic mobility, and educational achievement are related to immigrants' socio-economic mobility, adjustment as well as the formation of communities in the new land. These two aspects are interdependent although the first is focused upon the long-term historical and cultural contexts out of which national character has been moulded. With respect to the second, we have already discussed the rapid urbanization and economic development in South Korea; recent Korean immigrants underwent these changes before their arrival in the new land. We have also pointed out that economic development has resulted in a drastic changes in the homeland value system and in patterns of income distribution. This rapid economic development has effectively removed traditional barriers to migration among South Koreans, who had already migrated from rural areas to

cities, from the homeland to other nations, especially to the United States. It has also caused South Koreans to experience a revolution of rising expectations that has spurred their specific efforts at economic, geographic, and social mobility. In this context, we have noted that highly professional, well-educated, and sophisticated urban middle-class Koreans, most of whom could not "make it" within the new economic structure of South Korea, have shown a strong propensity to emigrate to the United States. Korean immigrants have experienced a "Great Transformation" within South Korea, a rapid industrialization and modernization, whose pace is much faster than that of most Western nations. This experience has contributed to an economic shrewdness and aggressiveness, and to an unrivaled committment to work and mobility in the new land.

But this is only a partial explanation of why Korean immigrants are so committed to upward economic mobility. In this chapter we want to view Korean immigrants' motivation structure in a broad cultural and historical context as it has evolved from a pre-existing national character.[4] We cannot attempt to provide a definitive answer to the question of why one immigrant group "takes off" while others lag or seem to be overcome by the very process of immigration. We rather want to propose some suggestions for further investigation by providing some basic hypotheses for such an

investigation only with respect to the Korean immigration since the Immigration Act of 1965.

## The External Factor of Korean History

Korea, which occupies a small peninsula between the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, has been historically overshadowed by the vast Asian continent extending from Manchuria to Siberia and mainland China. The historical fate of Korea has been interlocked with the rise and fall of military powers in mainland China, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Japan. Korea was subject to two great Chinese invasions in sixth century A.D., the Mongolian conquerers in the thirteenth century, the Japanese piratical raids during the thirteenth and fourteenth century, two great Japanese invasions of 1592 and 1597, and the Manchu invasions of 1627 and 1638. These are some of the major historical examples of Korean humiliation and devastation by neighboring powers. Whenever Korea was subjugated by foreign powers, especially by Chinese empires, Korea underwent deep social, cultural, and political changes. Politicall Korean kings were never called emperor because Korea was a vassal state of Chinese empires since approximately 676 A.D. Korea imported cultural and political institutions from China since 108 B.C., when Emperor Wu Ti of the Chinese Han Dynasty established four colonies in the northern part of the Korean peninsula.

In this context, Japanese and Korean historians have constructed a theory of Korean history, called "the theory of geopolitical determinism," which focuses on the geopolitical influences of foreign powers on the historical processes of Korea. That theory implies that Korea has no internal dynamic for creating its own historical destiny. Japanese colonialists misused the theory to legitimize the Japanese rule over Korea. Gi-back Lee, a Korean historian, for instance, noted:

> Some Japanese scholars have vigorously expounded this concept (geopolitical determinism). According to them, because of the geographical periphery and fringe characterizing the Korean peninsula, Korea has been marked by a long but stagnant history with little contribution to the construction of a glorious world history. Korea has always suffered from the oppressions by her neighboring powers such as Japan, China, Mongolia and Manchuria because of the characteristic of the Korean peninsula -- its multiple adjacency to those powers. . .
>
> According to Japanese scholars, Korea could overcome this historical fatalism attributed to the Korean peninsula, owing to a humanistic Japanese rule (over Korea). . .5

Proponents of the theory neglected the unique and creative response of Koreans to the outside challenges superimposed upon them by the peculiar geopolitical location of the Korean peninsula. Constant foreign threats, invasions, and intervention have helped Korea achieve special kinds of national unity and solidarity throughout its long history.

This has been expressed in an extreme form of centralism. This centralism has been political, bureaucratic, economic, and cultural. Given the small size of the country, Korean centralism is unique and peculiar in its intensity and duration. The impact of centralism on the formation of Korean social structure is multi-dimensional: cultural and racial homogenity, lack of regionalism, private civic institutions, and a mobility-oriented class structure, especially during the later period of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), are among the social elements that directly or indirectly result from an intense form of Korean centralism.

## The Korean State Bureaucracy

The Silla Kingdom (ca. 300-935 A.D.) in 676 A.D. first unified the Korean peninsula by attacking and conquering the two other Korean kingdoms, Koguryo in the north which included a substantial portion of southern Manchuria, and Paeche in the southeast portion of the peninsula. The governmental bureaucracy of the Silla Dynasty became pervasive and ubiquitous. For instance, a governmental document in 755 A.D., which was revised every three years for the purpose of taxation and corvee, shows one aspect of the centralization of the Silla society.[6] The document listed the population of four villages by sex and age, grade of houses, cows and horses owned, acreage cultivated, and even by

ownership of taxable trees. The village, called Chon, was the smallest administrative unit in Silla society. It was settled by an average of ten consanguinous families, and was governed by a village chief appointed by the central government. When the Silla Dynasty faced the decline of its central bureaucratic authority which began in mid-eighth century A.D., it attempted to regain its central bureaucratic authority by introducing a rudimentary form of the Chinese civil service examination system. But the system was not fully accepted. Its operation was imperfect due to the opposition of hereditary nobles. The nobility's status was embodied in a highly rigid hereditary system of hierarchical classifications, called the "bone ranks system." The Silla Dynasty, however, collapsed mainly because local lords emerged and cut state revenues by destroying the governmental system of taxation.

Centralism reemerged to dominate the Koryo Dynasty (935-1392 A.M.), which was established by Wang Kon, a general and local lord who emerged during the last days of the Silla Dynasty. The state under the Koryo Dynasty continued to own all the land. In order to destroy local military lords and the aristocratic families, many of whom were "meritorious subjects" for the foundation of the Dynasty, the King, Kwanjong adopted the civil service examination system from China in 958 A.D. and recruited Confucian literati as governmental bureaucrats. Governmental bureaucrats, the Yangban, were

divided into two groups, military and civil, but each group was dependent upon the king. The power basis of literati officials was not solid because the Koryo Dynasty accepted Buddhism as both the state religion and as a magic force to help repeal foreign aggression, especially that of Mongolian invaders. Thus Buddhist monks and aristocratic families began to form a formidable upper class by 982 A.D., which frequently revolted against the king. In addition, the king's alliance with Confucian literati through the use of civil service examinations led to an unbearable governmental discrimination against the military. The grievances of military officials deepened and led to a military coup in 1170, which was triggered by a court incident in which a literati official taunted a general and scorched his whiskers. The coup was followed by nine deades of military rule in which the king was a puppet. Even during the military dictatorship of several consecutive military families, the centralized rule continued. No local elites emerged and rose to power over given localities to rival one another, as happened in the case of Japanese feudalism. During this period (1170-1258), the Koryo Dynasty engaged in a series of wars with Mongolians, which thus created the needed strong national solidarity.

It was during the Confucian Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) that the central state bureaucracy again became formal and rigid. It was a golden age of the neo-Confucianism constructed by Chu Hsi, a Chinese scholar (1130-1200). General Yi Song-gye, who ascended to the throne by staging a palace coup, consolidated the foundation of his new Dynasty on the basis of: (1) adoption of neo-Confucianists as a state creed and; (2) land reforms in favor of a group of neo-Confucianists who gave ideological support to the new Dynasty and thereby legitimized rule by the Confucian creed. These changes brought forth two social consequences. First, Confucian political, social, and ethical ideals formed a dominant value system defining social relationship in Yi society; and the Confucian value system became firmly embedded in the structure of the Korean national character. Secondly, a ruling stratum of Confucian literati emerged on the basis of prebendary offices and became the class whose idealized character was the model for which the rest of the population strived. Competitive civil service examinations became a basic avenue of achieving upward social mobility.

## The Class and Status System of Yi Society

The Yi Society was stratified into four social classes or status groups. The Yangban, a ruling class, occupied the top ladder of Yi society by monopolizing virtually all governmental positions. In principle, they obtained their

Yangban status by passing examinations. In return for their service to the government, they acquired a prebendary right to the yield of state lands or of other public income. In addition, they were exempt from taxation, the corvee, and military service. Since they were Confucian literary generalists, they (like Chinese Mandarins) were not equipped with the technical knowledge needed to exercise specific administrative functions such as tax-collection, waterways and irrigation systems, etc. The Chungin class (ideographically middlemen) consisted of technical professionals such as medical doctors, translators, weathermen, accountants, legal experts, copiers, painters, geographers, policemen, etc. They were hired to do specialized administrative work of the governmental bureaucracy. A large number of the Chungin were sons of the Yangbans' concubines, who were officially deprived of the right to take the civil service examinations. Since they claimed but were denied the Yangban status, the status boundaries between the Yangban and the Chungin were often obscure. The Sangmin class (commoners) constituted the majority of the population. They were peasants, merchants, artisans, and fishermen. They were burdened with the bulk of existing civilian duties necessary to sustain the administrative regime, the Yangban, the Chungin, and the court, etc. They paid heavy taxes, manned the

corvée, and were subject to military service. Since the economic ideology of the government favored agriculture and despised trade, the status of peasants was higher than that of merchants, artisans, or craftsmen. At the bottom of the society was the Chonmin class, the low-born, composed of serfs, slaves, butchers, actors, Shamans, gisaeng (female entertainers), acrobats, and clowns, etc. The Chonmin class was theoretically hereditary.

However, this division of the Yi population into four classes is social fiction -- an ideal typical blueprint constructed by the Yangban, if we consider the mobility patterns of the non-Yangban classes. The class structure of Yi society was highly volatile. It could not maintain strict and rigid boundaries among the four classes. An analysis of the dynamics of Yi social classes will provide us with insight into the national character of contemporary Koreans.

## The Mobility Patterns of the Yi Classes

Mainly for the purpose of taxation and corvee, the central governmental bureaucracy conducted a thorough comprehensive census throughout the country every three years. Every Korean household had to update its Hojok, a brief history of family. Utilizing these Hojok materials, Shikata Hiroshi, a Japanese political economist pioneered in the study of the class or status structure of Yi society by

focusing upon the Taegu area located at the southeastern part of South Korea. The following is a brief summary of Shikata's findings.

(1) The total population size ofthe area was relatively stable during the period 1670 to 1858.

(2) During the same period, the percentage of Yangban households increased from 9.2 to 70.3 percent while Chonmin (low-born) households decreased from 37.1 to 1.5 and Sangmin (commoners) households dropped from 53.7 to 28.2 percent. In terms of population size, during the same period the Yangban increased from 7.4 to 48.6 percent; and the commoners fell from 49.5 to 20.1 percent. And, during the period 1690 to 1783-89, serfs fell from 43,1 percent of the population to 15.9 percent.

(3) This shift in the population size of each class was not due to a differential natural increase of each class but to a long process of social mobility. That is to say, a large number of commoners moved up into the Yangban class while the overwhelming majority of serfs achieved the status of commoners and subsequently jumped up into the Yangban class.

This massive upward mobility was not confined to the area of Taegu. Simialar studies of other areas show almost identical results.[8] Yi society did not adhere to the status

boundaries formally recognized by the central government. The status monopolization by the Yangban class failed because of a "Yangbanization of the entire population." There are basic underlying factors explaining this mobile class structure that existed even in the pre-industrial and traditional society. Shikata, for instance, identified some patterns of formal or informal upward mobility. The patterns include raising one's status by faking birth records, by marriage or by acquiring higher status from the government in return for the contribution of grain and money. Keeping in mind the findings of Shikata and other Korean scholars, we can identify and describe other structural factors accounting for this mobile character of the Korean class and status system.

First of all, this mobile class structure was partly due to the way in which the civil service examination was operated. The Korean examination system can be appreciated as an enlightened form of recruiting civil servants in view of the fact that the Yi Dynasty did not legally restrict against commoners in eligibility requirements for the examination.[9] For instance, a recent study on the Korean civil examination indicates that:

> the civil examination system during the early part of the Yi dynasty was not closed to all who were not members of the Yangban class. It was open to commoners who qualified by devoting their energies to Confucian scholarship. While it cannot be

> denied that one's Yangban lineage background and membership in a certain influential clan offered clear advantage in the civil examinations. . .
>
> As a consequence, the social stratification of early Yi Korea was probably not as rigid as has been once believed and the class barrier between commoners and Yangban was less insurmountable. . .[10]

In addition, since the examination was the only outlet for upward social mobility, those persons at the bottom of the society who were ineligible for the examination resorted to every possible technique to qualify for the examination. In 1538 a court historian recorded this aspect of covert upward mobility:

> The recruitment examination is of major importance to the state, and candidates are allowed to participate only after their four ancestors (father, paternal grandfather, paternal great grandfather, and maternal grandfather) have been screened. This (screening) is aimed at differentiating the lineage background of candidates so that the channel of recruitment may remain untainted. Recently, however, public morality has deteriorated, and men born of concubines, descendants of merchants and artisans, and men of low birth, completely disregarding their positions, illegally take part in the examinations, either by fabricating their family registries or by falsely including a governmental offical among the four ancestors, or, in the cases of men born of immoral women, forging names of their sponsors. . .[11]

Furthermore, the conduct of the civil service examination, which was triennial at an official level, was subject to the whims of the king. Whenever some good fortunes fell from the heaven, "irregular examinations" took place as a

part of a national festival.[12]

All these things, caused by the peculiar nature of the examination system, resulted in an oversupply of Yangban in relation to a limited number of job opportunities available in the state bureaucracy. The Yangban were in oversupply partly because the kind of the state bureaucracy that Yi agrarian society developed was a primitive one with a limited demand for governmental positions. At the top level of the central bureaucracy, this oversupply mainly contributed to intense court politics, which took the form of factional strving among individual patronage networks that were not based on hereditary classes or parties. Court bureaucrats fought one another over such issues as the proper period of mourning for a deceased queen, criticism of the writings of a court historian on the subject of a court event, and the designation of an heir apparent. Court battles over the limited job opportunities constituted the most fundamental aspect of politics of the Yi Dynasty. Great purges of the literati occurred in 1498, 1504, 1545 and were examples of this intense court politics.[13] As a result of these kinds of purges, degraded Yangban families were excluded from the power circles in Seoul and settled predominantly in rural areas. They became the Hyangban or rural Yangban.

These processes were thus the specific means of "Yangbanizing" the low-born rural population. Gregory Henderson, a Koreanologist, observes the degradation of the Yangban families into the Hyangban:

> Those who thought themselves eligible steadily increased, but the number of jobs that were the formal justification for status apparently remained, until the coming of foreign influence, not much over 1,000 hopelessly few in proportion to the demand.
>
> As generations passed, most Yangban found themselves ever more distant from their ancestor's position and from their own possibility of renewing it. The result on the one hand tended to sanction almost any scheme -- influence-peddling, corruption, or even crime, however base-in order to get a governmental position. One the other, it contributed to the creation of an enormous "in-between" class of shadowy or pretender Yangban. Many of these had "fallen from the capital" and are often called by Koreans Hyangban or T'oban local squires' . .
>
> The downward path was trodden when the aristocratic or royal ancestor fell from Seoul through exile or punishment or was edged out in factional fights, through poverty as new reigns and new favorites came. . .
>
> Strict marriage custom, avoidance of both work and money, the paraphernalia and food requirements of Confucian ceremony became harder and harder to maintain. Marriage with daughters of other local families, then commoners, finally even slaves, was contracted. Lands were divided or forfeited to the more powerful. Heavy debt brought sale or exchange of status. To thousands-perhaps to more than retained status, a Yangban past became a dusty record in the family Chokpo (a family record ) and a hoarse laugh in village gossip. . .[14]

This forced migration of Yangban families to rural areas and their contribution to the Yangbanization of local people partly caused a higher density of Yangban in rural areas than in cities. For instance, according to Shikata, the Yangban population in the urban area of Taegu increased from 9.7 percent in 1708 to 15.1 percent of the total population in 1858 while the Yangban in the rural area of Taegu jumped up from 8.2 percent to 61.3 percent during the same period of time.[15]

The greater increase of the Yangban population in rural areas than in cities needs further explanation. Cities were not a proper place for the downward Yangban to make a livelihood. Because of Confucian status norms, the Yangban, if they lost governmental jobs, could not engage in trade or crafts which, as we shall see, began to rise in the private sectors of the urgan economy after the 18th century. On the other hand, the poverty-stricken commoners and serfs or slaves in rural areas, who could not raise their status, migrated or escaped to cities.[16] In order to prevent peasants and serfs from leaving the land and to maintain the corvee and taxation system, the Yi central government used a nation-wide identification system or the Hopae Bop.

This process of collapse of the Korean class and status system, that was formalized at the time of its foundation by the Yi Dynasty, continued for almost five hundred years. Given the general process of Yangbanization, which was linked to governmental monopolization of economic rewards and of status symbols, other specific factors contributed to the failure of these attempts at status monopolization by the Yangban class.

The Japanese invasions of 1592 and 1597, which shook the East Asian continent including China, caused a tremendous change in Yi society. Because of the invasions, Yi Korea underwent a massive displacement of population, starvation, and the breakdown of its system of taxation. The war also caused a breakdown of the class and status system. Slaves or serfs burned almost all governmental records of the registration of slaves. In addition, the central government sold governmental titles to commoners and to serfs in return for gain contributions in order to increase tax revenues, which had dwindled due to the war's devastation. During times of war, the Myonchon system, liberation from legally defined low-bornstatus, was adopted by the government as an incentive for recruiting previously despised, low-born classes into the army: slaves, Buddhist monks, and sons of concubines. In order to increase and reward the resistance and heroism of guerrilla warriors, the government created a special

reward system: a higher status or governmental positions were granted to those commoners and serfs who brought Japanese heads as evidence of their bravery. Frequently, they beheaded starving Koreans. The Japanese invasions thus provided great momentum for the lower classes to liberate themselves from the shackles of the estate system of the traditional society.

However, the emergence of a primitive capitalism in Yi society during the middle of the 18th century is perhaps the most crucial factor responsible for the gradual but continuous increase in status mobility. Although no systematic study has as yet been conducted on the impact of the development of the money economy on the breakdown of the traditional class structure in Korea, it has been pointed out by Korean scholars that the emergence of trade was followed by a rapid increase in economic mobility, as Shikata indicated, after the late 18th century.[17]

In China the powerful state bureaucracy plus the peculiar Confucian life orientation formed a formidable traditionalistic barrier to the development of Western-type capitalism.[18] In spite of some major differences, this statement is roughly applicable to Yi Korea. In Yi society individual economic status was determined by political position based upon prebendary office. Economic institutions such as craft

and merchant guilds and markets were controlled by the central bureaucracy. No legal concept of private property emerged as opposed to the state bureaucracy. In Confucian life-orientation, technical experts and traders were despised in favor of Confucian generalists. Acquired wealth was not an object of reinvestment but a secular means to good health, accumulation of concubines (chook chop), or to bureaucratic success for descendents.

But Yi Korea was different from China in many respects.[19] First of all, partly because of the small size of the country (Korea is smaller than most medium-sized Chinese provinces), the cental bureaucracy in Korea was much more direct and pervasive in its effect on the underlying population than in China. Yi Korea did not suffer as much as China did from regional or provincial particularism, especially financial particularism, embedded in local financial institutions; and Yi Korea, unlike China, could easily carry out centralized and unified economic policies or reforms, which, as we shall see, could introduce change in economic life when intended.

In spite ofthe insurmountable barrier of the central bureaucracy, Yi Korea had developed some elements of modern capitalism. This is a recent consensus of findings by Korean scholars.[20] For instance, Jo Gi-june, an expert on

the Korean political economy, wrote in 1969: "It cannot be denied that, since the late 18th century, many factors conducive to modernization began to spring up from the internal structure of the Korean economy. The emergence of agro-businessmen out of feudal (sic) landlords, the growth of independent farmers out of feudal tenant farmers, the increase of the currency and a money economy, the decline of government-run handicraft factories and the predominance of independent, self-employed artisans, all these phenomena can be interpreted as signs of approaching modernization."[21]

The most crucial factor underlying the emergence of a primitive capitalism lies in (1) the shift of governmental taxation policy and (2) the governmental adoption of metal money as a universal means of exchange of goods and services. After the Japanese invasions of 1592 and 1597, the taxation system was in disarray. Destruction of land registers during the war enabled prebandary officials to transfer taxable state land to their private possession. In order to increase tax revenue, the central government adopted the Daedong Bop, a form of tribute system in which rice replaced local products as a means of paying the state tax. This taxation policy, which began in 1608, aimed to eradicating various irregularities produced by local officials who were brokers between taxpayers and the government.

Under the new taxation policy, local products no longer flowed directly to the Seoul government. Thus, the government had to purchase various goods necessary to run the vast central bureaucratic organizations including the military. A group of government contractors called the Gongin emerged to supply the government's goods. This governmental demand facilitated the expansion of private economic organizations such as handicraft factories and merchant and craft guilds. At the same time, government-run handicraft factories declined. Government-indentured artisans escaped to private sectors of economy. Government-controlled markets or monopoly rights by governmentally-licensed traders over certain commercial items declined in favor of private markets which were established throughout the countryside.[22] These new economic developments occurred almost simultaneously with the emergence of the money economy. The latter began with the introduction of money in 1651 when coins replaced rice and textiles as a means of exchange.

This emergence of trade had a tremendous impact on the restructuring of the class and status system of Yi society. Capitalists largely came out of the Gongin or the government's contractors, but displaced peasants became merchants, mainly peddlers, the so-called Popusang. In the late 19th century, these peddlers numbered about 2 million or 200,000, depending upon sources.[23] Despite frequent governmental

warnings, the downwardly mobile Yangban surreptiously began to engage in trade while non-Yangban merchants purchased lands and governmental titles. Thus in the late 19th century social and economic status did not necessarily flow from political status: there was a strong tendency for commoners to become landlords or rich farmers and for the Yangban to degrade themselves to tenant or poor farmers.[24] Taking advantage of their professional and technical knowledge and their marginal status, the Chungin class, professional and administrative classes, ascended economically. During the Japanese rule from 1910 to 1945, a majority of biggest landlords and merchants came from the Chungin class. Yet they lacked their own class identity, solidarity, and ideology. Many of them were collaborators of the Japanese rule as well as claimants of the Yangban status.

## The Impact of the State Bureaucracy on the Formation of the Korean Character

The Koreans of Yi society experienced both an upward class mobility and a circulation of elites, which is akin to the mobility attributed to modern mass society. In addition, the central governmental bureaucracy was so ubiquitous that Yi society did not develop regional powers, local particularism, autonomous guilds, private armies and civic guilds, all of which were social organizations for the development

of feudalism and feudal traditionalism. The Yi Dynasty is a classical example of what Karl A. Wittfogel called "Oriental Despotism." Tradtional Korea never experienced the Western-type feudalism which conditioned the emergence of autonomous, civic organizations and thereby of coherent, rigidly divided social classes. In addition, the powerful central bureaucracy conditioned a remarkable degree of ethnic and cultural homogenity.[25] This plus the smallness of the country contributed to the formation of a highly mobile and atomized class structure in which social classes or groups were not able to define, enforce, and maintain rigid boundaries, interests, and ideologies. The central state bureaucracy provided a single but limited magnet by absorbing all purely social aspirations and by monopolizing dominant status, symbols, ideologies, and bureaucratic reward systems. In addition, since provincial particularism was weak, the state bureaucracy could execute unified economic policies which contributed to the reshaping of the class structure by generating some capitalistic economic opportunities. Traditional Korean classes emerged but never stabilized into permanent castes or estates.[26]

In the absence of class-bound or organization-bound norms, solidarity, or bonds, individual initiative largely determined economic success even in the traditional

society. The traditional Korean society had already sown the seeds for producing the kind of social character which has an elective affinity for survival in modern mass society. That is to say, if modern industrial society favors rapid social mobility, Koreans have already prepared themselves historically and culturally to experience a similar phenomenon of large-scale upward class mobility. Largely due to the cultural and social legacy of centralism, Koreans are prepared to accept and emulate any new social and economic system once they view it as offering economic opportunities and as being powerful and ascendent. This social character was already developed and had adjusted to the tremendous social and economic changes that Korea experienced when the Japanese imposed colonialism upon Korea in 1910. It was present when Korea became involved with the United States since the end of World War II and the Korean War. An emphasis on economic mobility and motivation in acculturation is thus a deep part of contemporary Korean culture and value orientation.[27]

For Koreans, education has become a national ideology because, in their Confucian past, the civil service examination provided the only official outlet for upward social mobility. Among those Korean literati who were edged out of the power positions in the central bureaucracy, an indigenous

and original school of Confucianism, the Shilhak school (a pragmatic school), began to emerge in the late 16th century. The Shilhak school opposed the abstract, formalistic, void philosophy or ideology of the neo-Confucianism, which was embedded in the state bureaucracy: "they (the Shilhak literati) sharply criticized Chu Hsi philosophy (neo-Confucianism) on the basis of a rather systematic brand of textual criticism. From this beginning, the school came to stand for the inductive method of research which led to application of this method to the fields of history, phonetics, and etymology. As a rebellion against the primarily deductive, literary, and abstruse methods of thought, this school was somewhat closer to Western and scientific viewpoints than were the Neo-Confucian schools; its advocates were also more open to Western influence and methodology."[28]

This Shilhak school was first advocated and spread among the Namin, a factional group of Confucian literati who were ousted from the central bureaucracy during the 18th century. It was also popular among such marginal social groups as the sons of concubines of Yangban and Chungin professional and administrative classes. Thus when Korea began to accept Western culture in the late 16th century largely via China, Shilhak literati became agents of introducing Western culture into Korea. A large number of Shilhak

literati belonging to the Namin faction converted to Roman Catholicism, and were subjected to frequent persecutions by the central government. Although this Shilhak school was never accepted by the central bureaucracy, many Korean scholars today argue that the Shilhak school has, since the late 19th century, offered a powerful national ideology for modernizing Korean society.[29]

In the late 19th century American missionaries began to proselytize Koreas. North Koreans, especially in the northwestern provinces, accepted American Protestantism enthusiastically, especially Presbyterianism. They were those literati who were alienated from the central bureaucracy largely because of governmental discrimination against North Koreans in access to governmental positions. The theory for this governmental discrimination is that North Koreans, heavily inter-mixed with Manchurians or "northern barbarians," were ambitious, aggressive, and revolt-minded. They were directly or indirectly influenced by the unorthodox Shilhak school. These Christianized North Korean literati "Koreanized"the American Protestant ethic. By emphasizing technical education, and by building "national" factories, markets, and corporations, they created an indigenous capitalism as opposed to that created by the invasion of Japanese capitalism after the late 19th century.[30]

This peculiar acceptance by North Koreans of American Protestantism has had an impact upon the Korean immigration to the United States. As has been noted in Chapter I, older Korean immigrants to the United States were predominantly North Korean Christians; American Protestant missionaries in Korea persuaded them to emigrate to the Hawaiian islands. The post-1965 Korean immigration to the United States, as we have noted, is also heavily composed of former North Koreans who, with the advent of the North Korean communist regime, were forced to take refuge in South Korea. They are mostly Christians. We have also noted in Chapter VII that Korean ministers, most of whom were born and educated in North Korea, have immigrated to the United States and have assumed crucial leadership in the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area. These ministers have generated a disciplined, Protestant moral life for the Korean community as a whole.

For Koreans, the higher value placed on education has, since the late 19th century, become an effective tool in accepting and adjusting to Western culture and technology. They enthusiastically accepted American missionary schools as well as Japanese schools. In addition, they built their own schools: during the decade 1910-1920, for instance, Koreans founded some 3,000 high schools and colleges.[31] The

high cultural value Koreans placed on education helped Koreans prepare for emigration when, as we have noted, education such as medical education is required as a condition for their entry into the United States. In addition, as we have seen in Chapter III, the desire for "education for their children" constitutes one of the main causal factors for Korean emigration to Seoul and to the United States.

A distinctive character of contemporary Koreans is evolved from the kind of social structure that we have discussed: Koreans are both individualistic and marginal. They possess a pragmatic quality. They are concerned with "fruits" rather than "roots." They are culturally flexible in discarding old cherished norms or vested ideals which might block their upward mobility. And they do not let traditional aversions of lack of experience interfere with their thrust for mobility. As we have seen, although they despised the idea of adornment via wigs, they embraced the wig business because it provided the only avenue for them to make money. They embraced the fruit and vegetable business, not because they had any affinity to that business, but because it was the one business that allowed an individual with small amounts of capital to succeed in competition with a highly capitalized chain store by virtue of their own hard, continuous work, family exploitation, and devotion to business.

The same motility enabled educated Koreans to embrace small business as an economic pursuit, even after they failed to find acceptance as educated professionals in large-scale American corporations. In fact, given the exigencies of their economic position, the central values in Korean personality appear to be, in addition to devotion to do whatever work necessary for mobility, a complete motility in discovering economic opportunity. However, Koreans so far have not been attracted to organized crime.

Since the long tradition of centralism, which still continues in contemporary Korean society, deprived Korea of the formation of strong intermediary social organizations which channel social mobility, Korean individual success has been dependent upon individualistic means such as education, patronage, family loyalty, and chance. Mainly because of the lack of group or class norms, ideals, and notion of status honor, shady and dubious individual techniques are culturally permissible in pursuing economic goal. This committment to success is identical with the success ideology of 19th century American society in which means justify economic ends.

Mainly because of long-time training by the central state bureaucracy, Koreans are submissive to the power in whatever form that power takes. They quickly switch to what is viewed as a dominant idea, trend, fashion, and system.

This power-oriented personality is well-expressed in the Korean concept of the "sadae sasang" (the ideology of worshipping bigness). Korean scholars use this concept to denote an historical Korean propensity to bow to big powers' systems, ideas, and culture. Again, the "sadae sasang" is mainly due to the fact that Korea could not sustain, in the face of external invasions, a coherent and aristocratic upper class which would assume nationalistic leadership in political, economic, and cultural domains. Nor could that upper class stabilize, traditionalize, and rigidify a traditional cultural and value system to such an extent that Koreans would resist to modernization and industrialization, and the economic and cultural penetration by dominant Japanese and Western societies when the agents and institutions of those societies impinged upon them. On the contrary, Koreans embraced the new whenever the new was powerful and promised economic opportunities and mobility.

## Confucianism as a Source of Forming Korean Character

Such a peculiar trait of Korean character structure as manifested in contemporary Koreans originates from other sources than the traditional class and status structure. Given the single magnet of the central state bureaucracy, Confucianism has played an important role in motivating

Koreans to strive toward prevalent economic rewards and status symbols.

As Weber noted in his essays on China, Confucianism was an ideological bulwark of sustaining traditionalism. Politically and socially, Confucianism functioned to pacify the masses by defining and maintaining "the Great Five Relationship" -- father and son, husband and wife, ruler and subject, elder and younger, and friend and friend. Each of these relationships was governed by sanctified norms and ethics. Rebeliousness against the established patterns of the relationships constituted a cardinal sin.

Economically, Confucianism hampered the development of rational bourgeois capitalism because of its peculiar direction of rationalization of the world: Confucianism had no metaphysical foundation for manipulating or transforming the world. Confucianism precluded a radical change in the economic, political, and social order because it viewed the world as a cosmic and harmonious order to which man should adjust.

In spite of these traditionalistic features of Confucianism which are detrimental to generating modern rational economic actions, Weber provides us with two essential points which are central to our concern with Korean character formation. First, like the Puritans, Confucianists were

cool-minded, sober men: they methodically controlled their immediate need for impulse and sensual gratification. Secondly, Confucianism bred a practical rationality.[32] It did not stress the need as in the Judeo-Christian ethic for inner necessity or logic that unified the entire self in response to an internalized ethnical code based originally on the ideal of a super-mundane eternal God. Confucianism was not concerned with the sense of "sin" but with "shame," caused by an improper behavior in social situation. Since Confucianists lacked the inner constraint of a transcendental ethnical God and ethics, their behavior pattern was multiple and flexible. Confucianists could switch their behavior pattern in accordance with almost every situational requirement provided that the norms in that situation were clear-cut or sufficiently ambiguous to disallow loss of face. Thus Confucianists were traditionally "other-directed" men. These two Confucian qualities have become powerful dynamics when such capitalistic, developing countries as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore began to abandon traditionalism and launch economic development programs by accepting Western technology and capital. These four Confucian nations are front-runners among the latercomers of industrialization.

As far as the socio-economic adjustment of Korean immigrants is concerned, there is a value congruence between Confucianism and the Protestant ethic in the sense that both

of them are directed toward self-control and self-abnegation even though they are derived from different sources of value orientations and point to a different kind of rationalization of the world. We are not concerned here with the comparison of face value differences between the two value systems but with their manifest common consequences for the long-term internalization of commercial, industrial, and modernistic mobility ethics. That is to say, Confucianism is not longer a vital manifest religion among contemporary Koreans; in the same way, original, theological Protestantism is no longer a vital theology among white middle-class Americans. But contemporary Koreans still maintain Confucian values such as a concern for propriety, the control of impulse and emotion, respect for age, deference to authority, and industriousness. These Confucian values manifest in Korean immigrants correspond to white middle-class Protestant values in terms of emphasis on work, politeness, family authority, diligence, cleanliness and neatness.[33]

Furthermore, a high proportion of Korean immigrants are in fact Protestants who have been in the past closely affiliated by American Protestantism. For instance, the New York's Sunday News, which largely reflects the values of the white lower-middle class entrenched in the inner city, deliberately emphasized this aspect of Korean personality:

> The Rev. Han told a story of an elderly immigrant that depicts the fiber of the Korean people.
>
> "The old man had little money and was in dire need of an operation," he said, "We took him to Kings County Hospital where he was operated on and released after full recovery. He was embarassed because he had no money to pay. This bothered him even after we told him there were medical programs for the needy. The old man scrimped and saved and eventually paid the hospital bill in full, even though he didn't have to.[34]

The Confucian habit of saving-face constitutes a core-value-orientation of contemporary Koreans. For another example, a Korean community leader inflated some positive aspects of Korean community life in his address to the New York State Advisory Committee of United States Commission on Civil Rights:

> Koreans are an extremely ambitious, industrious, law-abiding and diligent people. They have a great deal to contribute to the growth and development of the United States. In Korea, the literacy rate is over 90 percent, one of the biggest in the world, and a remarkable fact for a country which is classed as underdeveloped. . .
>
> Koreans do not make demands on the American system. We don't draw welfare checks or unemployment benefits. As recent immigrants, there are not even very many of us who draw Social Security benefits. We don't want public housing or bilingual education or special social services. We don't want a free ride anywhere, anytime. Today, most Americans have grown up in a climate of affluence, and many people seem to feel that America owes them a living. We Koreans believe that it is we who are indebted to America. . .[35]

Confucian values and norms imposed an indelible stamp on the institution of the Korean family. Confucian norms governed intra-and inter-family relationships. The following is a general description of these relationships of the Korean family:

> Within the family household an individual's status depended on his generation, relative age, and sex. Generation was the primary factor, and grandparents and parents of either sex had to be treated with considerable respect by their descendants. Within a generation, however, sex and age were the determinants; a wife was inferior to her husband, a sister to her brother, and a younger brother to his older brother. Within a larger societal context, an individual's status was in part related to his age but was also greatly related to the status of his family in society, whether noble or common, a family of scholars or of peasants. Family status also depended on the number of generations of ancestors whose memorial tablets were kept and honored.[36]

Largely under the influence of their Confucian past, Koreans today still closely attach themselves to the family. The preservation and propagation of the institution of the family still constitutes a paramount social element. The loyalties and obligations toward the family supersedes all other social values. In order to ensure the continuation of the past in the present through the family, traditional Koreans systematically worshipped their ancestors. This ancestral worship still continues among contemporary urban Koreans: in the 1978 Choosok (a national holiday for the

memory of ancestors), more than 1 million Seoul citizens went to their rural villages in order to pay tribute to their deceased ancestors.[37]

An individual is still defined, evaluated, and recognized as a part of the family. One's success is construed as a success of the family; or one's failure is counted as a failure of the family. Koreans regulate the behavior of their own family members by saying that: "You are a shame to our family. or "you are a cause of disgrace to our family."

This ideal type Korean family has undergone tremendous change as South Korea has experienced a rapid process of urbanization, industrialization, and modernization. The nuclear family has begun to replace the three-generation extended family, the ideal traditional Korean family form, which is composed of the grandparent generation, their sons and sons' wives, and the children of the couples. Large-scale social institutions have begun to take over the original functions of the Korean family. Elderly centers and nursing homes have come into being. Gerontology has recently been accepted as a field of social science. Parental authority has declined in favor of the authorities embedded in large-scale social organizations. The New York Times reported this recent change in the Korean family structure:

> The challenge, however, can be disturbing within one's own family. Mr. Kang obeyed his father, who even chose his son's bride. But Mr. Kang's son has announced that he will pick his own wife, and the father agreed -- provided he can still offer advice.
>
> To assure continuity with tradition and the past, Mr. Kang insists on weekend family dinners and occasional trips to ancestral graves. And while Mr. Kang generally accepts the social changes washing over his country, he sometimes has glimmers of doubt.
>
> "My roots were in the land," he says. "I can fall back on the farm, the large family we had, my father's memories. But my children's roots seem much weaker. These young people are better off. They are more assertive. Andy they have the right now to complain. But I don't know if that's enough."[38]

In spite of this recent change in the Korean family, the institution of the family is still a primordial social institution in South Korean society. According to a recent sample survey, 41.1 percent of Korean householders spend the largest portion of their income on the education of their children.[39] In the new land, this family-centered success ethic has greatly facilitated Korean upward mobility. As has been noted, Korean success in labor-intensive small businesses presupposes the willingness of all family members to devote themselves to their family business. Many Korean small businessmen in New York City are proud of the fact that they are able to send their children to Ivy League schools. A Korean greengrocer said: "My son comes here every weekend from Princeton to help me." Korean parents with children

of school age worry about inner-city educational institutions by saying that: " We have to move to suburbs because of the education of our children."

## Conclusion

The character structure of contemporary Koreans has evolved from the mobile class and status structure of Yi society as well as from the Korean adoption of Confucianism and Protestant Christianity. The long dominance of the central state bureaucracy on the basis of the ideological support of Korean Confucianism has effected an indelible mark on Korean character. An atomized class and status structure, cultural and ethnic homogenity, and lack of regionalism are derivatives of the long-range process of centralism. In this sense, it would not be an exaggeration to say that pre-industrial Korean society shared a basic similarity to modern mass society in which centralism in political, bureaucratic, adn economic institutions determines the biography of an individual.

Korean centralism has moulded distinctive traits among contemporary Koreans. Koreans are both marginal and individualistic. Thus when they arrive in the affluent new land where economic competition is not as great as in their homeland, they are quick to grasp every possible marginal

economic opportunity. In addition, their cultural heritage of Korean Confucianism reinforces their economic acumen and family-centered success ethic. Sober-minded, industrious Korean immigrants have swiftly adjusted to those marginal sectors of the United States economy which provide toe-holds for opportunity. Korean immigrants are armed with a double-bladed cultural sword and values -- Korean Confucianism on the one hand and their historical training by the central bureaucracy. They dare to do sweatshop work in ghetto businesses and in the crime-ridden inner city. This kind of Korean personality causes Korean immigrants to have an elective affinity with marginal economic opportunities that American natives have shied away from. As we have witnessed, they have conspicuously entered such labor-intensive businesses as the fruit and vegetable, fish, retail, dry-cleaning, and garment subcontracting business.

The character structure of Korean immigrants is reflected not only in their economic activities but also in their way of establishing some basic pattern of community activities. As we have noted, the South Korean governmental bureaucracy has influenced major community activities by extending its power to its "subjects" in the new land. In this process, community leaders have emerged and attempted to accomplish their own personal gains by contributing to

the execution of a South Korean policy toward the United States and Korean community. They have expanded or politicized community affairs for the sake of establishing a patronage connection with the South Korean government. Korean upward mobility via a governmental patronage has its historical roots in traditional society. Now, under the rule of President Park, this kind of mobility pattern effectively governs individual success in the business, intellectual, and political world.

Partly because Koreans have been trained for a long period of time by the central bureaucracy, the majority of Korean immigrants identify themselves with the Korean Consulate, a surrogate of the South Korean government. This fact plus the Confucian taboo on political rebellion against the ruler contributes to a remarkable degree to Korean immigrants' passivity towards all kinds of irregular, indecent, and inept behavior of their home government.

We have also noted that a variety of secondary group associations represent a fundamental pattern of community life. The membership of these associations is based upon achieved rather than upon ascribed status. Their previous upward mobility in education, urbanization, and professional occupations are responsible for this pattern of ethnic solidarity. No kinship and regional associations based upon

their homeland provinces have emerged in New York's Korean community because regionalism and kinship or clans are not a big factor in effectively determining social relationships among contemporary Koreans.

Diverse secondary associations have as yet not formed a unified direction toward ethnic solidarity. Like an individualistic Korean, each of the associations has its own interest and ideology. They conduct their organizational activities by directly contacting their home government or corresponding institutions in the new land. Korean immigrants cannot make the Korean Association powerful enough to coordinate, direct, and channel various community activities. Like the Korean class structure in the homeland, community structure is highly atomized and individualized.

Moreover, the Korean propensity to "concretize" loyalties, i.e. to avoid the abstractions of large numbers, in Confucian style, has caused them to seek group activities involving relatively small number of persons. In addition, Koreans personalize social relations within larger associations such as churches, alumni associations and business associations by forming sub-divisions, club-like cells or pseudo-extended families. Such an affinity to concrete personal relations could, of course, limit the effectiveness of attempts to organize an abstract, ideological community.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]The New York Times, October 30, 1976.

[2]Kim, Illsoo and Azores, Tania, A Preliminary Report on Asian Americans in New York, Submitted to the Asian American Research Center, 1975.

[3]Ibid

[4]This cultural and institutional perspective in explaining the interconnection between ethnicity and economic structure can be traced back to Weber's famous essay of "The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism" and Somber's "The Jews and Modern Capitalism" which were addressed to the problem of how purely cultural, and religious behavior and attitude become transferred into economic behavior.

[5]Lee, Gi-back, Hankooksa Shinron (A New Approach to Korean Hisotory), (Seoul, Korea: Il Jo Gak, 1967), p.1.

[6]Ibid., pp 98-99.

[7]The following table indicates a long range process of Korean class and status mobility by non-Yangban population in Taegu area:

% of Households of Taegu by Social Classes and by Years

| Year | Yangban | Sangmin | Chonmin (Serfs) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1690 | 9.2 | 53.7 | 37.1 | 100.0 (3,156) |
| 1783-89 | 37.5 | 57.5 | 5.0 | 100.1 (3,092) |
| 1858 | 70.3 | 28.2 | 1.5 | 100.0 (2,985 |

For technical reasons, the Chungin class (or middlemen) and non- serf, Chonmin class (or the low-born) were included into the Sangmin class (or commoners). Thus the category of Chonmin was entirely made up of serfs who, unlike household slaves, maintained separate residences from masters.

Source: Hiroshi Shikata, Richo jinko ni kansuru mimum kaikyu betsuteki kansatsu (A Study of the Population of the Yi Dynasty by Social Classes), Trans. from Japanese to Korean by the Sociology Department of the Yihwa University, (the

Yihwa University Press, Seoul), p. 25.

[8]Some Korean scholars recently added some qualitative expansions and changes to the Shikata's study, which was originally published in 1939 in Chosen Keizai no Kenkyu (The Study of Korean Economy), Vol. 3. Among the recent studies on the class structure of Yi society are: Kim, Yong-sop, "Choson Hugi e isoso ui Shinbunje ui Dongyo wa Nongji Chomyu" (Land Ownership and Change in the Status System in the Later Period of the Yi Dynasty), Shak Yongu,Number 15, April, 1963; Chon Sok-jong, "Choson Hugi Shinbunje Boong Gye" (The Breakdown of the Status System in the Later Period of the Yi Dynasty), Daedong Moonhwa Yongu, Number 9, 1972; Choi Yong-hi, "Yimjin Gaenon ui Saehoe Dongyo" (The Yimjin Japanese Invasion and Social Unrest), Hankook Yongu, 1975. A comprehensive analysi of the class structure of the Yi society was done by: Son, Jong-mock, Choson Shidae Doshi Sahoe Yongu (A Study of Urban Society of the Yi Dynasty), (Il Ji Sa, Seoul, 1977), pp. 112-2.

[9]There was a controversy on this issue. For instance, Sang-baek Yi, an expert on the social stratification of the Yi Dynasty, noted: "There was an important restriction based on one's social status, and, in principle, no one but Yangban possessed the qualification allowing them to participate in the civil examinations." But, Yong-ho Choe in his recent study of the civil examination system of the Yi Dynasty argued that the central government placed no legalrestrictions on the participation by commoners. He specifically quoted the Great Codes of the Yi Dynasty, which stipulated the eligibility to take the examination:. . . "The Great Codes stipulate that a person in any of the following categories is to be barred: (1) one who, having been convicted of a crime, is permanently excluded from government service; (2) sons of corrupt officials; (3) sons and grandsons of remarried widows and of immoral women; and (4) descendents of concubines." See, Choe, Yong-ho, "Commoners in Early Yi Dynasty Civil Examinations: An Aspect of Korean Social Structure, 1392-1600" Journal of Asian Studies, (Vol. XXXIII, No.4), pp. 612-614.

[10]Choe, Ibid., p. 637.

[11]Chungjong Sillok, 85, 40a-b, quoted from Choe, Ibid., p. 615.

[12]Lee, Gi-back, Op. cit., p. 211-212.

[13]For the study of these factional strifes in English, see, Wagner, E. Willard, The Literati Purges: Political Conflict in Early Yi Korea, (East Asian Research Center. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1974)

[14]Henderson, Gregory, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1968). pp. 41-43.

[15]Son, Jong-mock Op.cit., p. 176.

[16]Ibid. pp. 179-181.

[17]For instance, see Lee, gi-back, Op.cit., pp.280-281.

[18]Weber, Max, The Religion of China, trans. by Hans Hl Gerth, (The Free Press, New York, 1951), pp.226-249.

[19]Weber's brief description of traditional Korean society, in which he saw Korea in the context of China, is unreliable because of a number of erroneous statements or false historical facts. See, Weber, Max, Religion of India, trans. by Hans H. Gerth and Don Mardindale, (The Free Press, New York, 1967), pp. 269-270.

[20]This issue was an implicit or explicit reaction of Korean scholars to the so-called "Japanese colonialists'' perspective on the Korean history" whereby many Japanese scholars argued that Korea had not generated the dynamics of capitalism up until Korea was forced to open her door to Japan in the late 19th century.

[21]Jo, Gi-june, Hankook Kyongjae Baldalsa (the Historical Development of the Korean Economy), (Bom Moon Sa, Seoul, 1969), p. 3.

[22]Since the early 1960's Korean historians and political economists have conducted many detailed studies on these processes of the development of capitalism in Yi society. But, for a systematic and theoretical presentation of the development, see, Chon, Kwan-woo, Hankooksa Eui Jaebalkyon (The Rediscovery of the Korean History), (Il Jo Gak, Seoul, 1974), pp. 274-280.

[23]Son, Jong-mock, Op.cit., p. 93. The Popusang formed peddlers guild which emerged in the late 19th century a most influential, powerful civic organization. They controlled the private markets throughout the country. But they did not develop themselves into a coherent merchant class. They

did not demand their own terms against the various restrictions and barriers imposed on them by the central government. Instead, they were co-opted by the central government. They provided the government with postal, fire-fighting, body guard, and intelligence agency services. At the turn of the century, they emerged as a terrorist group employed by the government against Christian-led democratic demonstrations.

Peddling as an easy and quick way of making money with a little capital had been widely used by Koreans up until the recent economic development. The wide-spread peddling activities among Korean immigrants in the United States might be derived from the old, lowest technique of commerce.

[24]Kim, Yong-sop, Op. cit.

[25]This cultural and racial homogenity is best indicated by a heavy concentration of Korean family names into three family names-Kim, Yee (Lee), and Pak (Park), which constituted in the past the majority of Korean royal and the Yangban clans. The three family names of the total 249 family names in Korea comprised in 1975 45 percent of the total population of South Korea: "Kim" represented 22 percent, "Yee", 15, and "Pak", 8. This concentration results largely from the covert upward mobility by the lower classes. They clandestinely adopted the three names associated with a higher social status. For the statistical distribution of South Korean population by family names, see, the Hankook Ilbo, February 22, 1978.

[26]The pattern of Korean class and status mobility is in contrast with that of Indian subcaste mobility, which is expressed in the concept of the "Sanskritization," whereby Indian subcaste groups move upward as a group by claiming ritually higher status than has been recognized by local opinion.

[27]Richard Halloran, who once stayed in South Korea as a correspondent of the New York Times observes one aspect of Korean character: Let me confess an unabashed admiration and affection for Korea and the Koreans. This is a rugged and sometimes harsh land and it breeds a tough and sometimes brutal people. But they work hard to make the best of the meager resources that nature has alloted them.

They are perhaps the most independent and individualistic people in Asia, loyal to their friends and fierce with their enemies.

The men are handsome, lay warranted claim to being hard drinkers and consider themselves the world's greatest lovers.

The women are beautiful. Koreans are romantic and and stubborn, disconcertingly direct and warmly humorous. They are a fiesty lot, not unlike my ancestors in Ireland-which may explain my feelings for them. . . The New York Times, October 3, 1976.

[28]Yang, Key P., Henderson, Gregory, "An outline of Korean Confucianism (Part 2): The Schools of Yi Confucianism," The Journal of Asian Studies, (Vol. XVIII, No 2, February, 1959), p. 268.

[29]Chon, Kwan-woo, Op, cit., pp. 107-139.

[30]Min, Kyong-bae, Hankook Minjock Kyohoe Hyonsong Saron (The Hitorical Formation of Korean Nationalistic Churches), (The Yongsei University Press, Seoul, 1974), pp. 182-256.

[31]Lee, Gi-back, Op. cit., p. 268.

[32]Weber noted on the Confucian practical rationality: A true prophecy creates and systematically orients conduct toward one internal measure of value. In the face of this the "world" is viewed as material to be fashioned ethically according to norm. Confucianism in contrast meant adjustment to the outside, to the conditions of the "world." A well-adjusted man, rationalizing his conduct only to the degree requisite for adjustment, does not constitute a systematic unity but rather a complex of useful and particular traits. .

Such a way of life could not allow man an inward aspiration toward a "unified personality," a striving which we associate with the idea of personality. Life remained a series of occurrences. It did not become a whole placed methodically under a transcendental goal. Weber, Op. cit., p. 235.

[33]For instance, some studies were conducted on the Japanese American personality in somewhat similar context. They argued that the high economic achievement of the Nisei, the second generation of Japanese Americans, was largely due to the compatibility of the values found in American white middle-class with the traditional Japanese values found Japanese Americans. See, Caudill, Williams and De Vos, George, "Achievement, Culture and Personality: The Case of the Japanese Americans," American Anthropolgists, (Vol. 58, 1956): Nishi, Setsuko M., Japanese American Achievement in Chicago

A Cultural Response to Degradation (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1963), Chapter XI.

[34]Sunday News, November 4, 1973.

[35]Equal Opportunity for Asian Americans in the New York Metropolitan Area, (Unpublished Report by the New York State Advisory Committee, United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1974), pp. 136-138.

[36]Vreeland, Nena, et al., Op. cit., p. 85.

[37]The Joong Ang Ilbo, September 18, 1978.

[38]The New York Times, June 20, 1978.

[39]The Joong Ang Ilbo, October 4, 1977.

# CHAPTER XII

# CONCLUSION

## The Future of the Korean Community in the New York Metropolitan Area

The question of whether Korean immigrants have actually created a community is the problem of this study. The sense that a community is classically based upon a deep committment to a sense of shared values and culture and to the development of autonomous institutions, within which the members of a purported community can live most of their lives, is a problem we have wished to explore.

The Korean community in the New York metropolitan area is only in the process of being created. Whether or not such a community will ultimately emerge or whether in a modern world -- the realization of such a classical community is possible, is problematic. We shall conclude with a tentative answer to this question. But until we give our answer, all references to the term "community" in this study have not been posed by nostalgia for this sociological and pragmatic ideal but by the fact that an attempt at community construction is being undertaken by Korean immigrants in the New York

metropolitan area. We have been concerned with the process, regardless of the final and as yet unknowable outcome.

We have dealt with an initial stage of the creation of a community -- a special modern type of community -- a community that has only developed or has been in the process of development in the past ten years. Yet it is different in many ways from the classical notion of community in sociology in which the gemeinshaft, the folk society, the mechanical society, is the ideal type of social organization that sociologists accept as a generic form of social institution. The process of studying it involves the study of how it is held together, how it functions and how it responds to changes, especially changes brought about by large-scale urbanism, industrialism, capitalism, and mass society; but the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area is a community that will emerge, if it does at all, within a metropolitan, industrial, capitalistic world. It emerges not out of an integrated folk community but as a result of immigrations of many people from a wide variety of places. It does not emerge like most American ethnic communities from the immigration of peasants to a new urban world, but rather from the immigration of a people who have only recently undergone the process of urbanization in the homeland. In this respect, Korean immigrants may be similar to older immigrants of the original English settlers in the American colonies --

the German Forty-eighters and Russian Jews. Some of the newer immigrants to the United States from Latin America have also been urbanized but, by and large, these urbanites have been peasants who had not adjusted completely to urban life before they entered the United States.

Korean immigrants are relatively unique because they have settled in the New York metropolitan area without establishing an ethnic enclave. This is in part due to the fact that many of them have entered the United States as professionals, especially medical professionals, skilled workers and businessmen and have initially settled in the areas close to the widely dispersed sources of their economic opportunities. In addition, their number may have been small (some 80,000), so that even if they had wanted to form a residential territory, they could not have dislocated the residents of urban ghettos, the usual site of initial settlement.

Korean immigrants have entered American society at a time when the basic industrial development of the United States, based upon a primary capital accumulation, was already over. They entered the world when primary economic oppotunities no longer existed in unskilled work or in agriculture. White collar employment through education is now the area of growth for those who seek economic mobility. But Koreans are penalized because of their difficulties in

the mastery of language and a diffuse racism that has limited them in their efforts to gain access to the main-line areas of economic opportunities in the United States. Despite these handicaps, Korean immigrants have done a remarkable job of achieving economic success. But they have done this in part by entering marginal sectors of economic opportunities -- areas which have been abandoned by older ethnic groups. They have made of these opportunities perhaps the most dramatic advances that have ever been achieved in such a short time by any immigrant group in American history. Part of this study has focused upon explaining this remarkable mobility among Koreans.

Koreans have also studied immigration law in fine detail , noting the rulings of the Department of Labor and the labor market in order to pinpoint areas of labor shortage and areas where the possession of special skills and education facilitates entry into the United States and economic success once entry is achieved. They have pursued education and training in the homeland in order to qualify for entry into the United States after graduation and/or certification. This drive for education accounts for the large number of doctors, nurses and pharmacists among Korean immigrants.

The study of the emergence of the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area at so late in date in American history allows us, in addition, to pose problems which have generally not been posed with respect to other immigrant groups to the United States. We are able to ask a question concerning the sources of the "push" to emigration and "pull" of a large-scale urban society. The "push" is to leave a society that only relatively recently has entered the process of industrialization and modernization. The "pull" is embedded in various economic, social, and political advantages in a highly industrialized affluent society which attracts immigrants.

Immediately after World War II the United States was the dominant industrial power of the world' its policies and opportunities may have affected the course of immigration in ways that did not affect the process of emigration and immigration in any other period of American history. We are thus able to ask questions as to how policy and the image of the host country determines even the individual decision to emigrate. We are also able to raise questions as to how the sending country responds to the "pull" of the receiving country by formulating governmental policies designed to facilitate or impede emigration.

In the initial and simple, perhaps even simple-minded attempt to answer to these questions, we have studied the United States Immigration Act of 1965 which resulted in the great influx of immigrants that began in 1967. Yet the underlying economic processes that have shaped the service-oriented economy of the United States have largely determined the characteristics of Korean immigrants. We have noted this especially in the discussion of the occupational mobility of Korean medical professionals with respect to United States medical institutions. This difference in the occupational and industrial structure of America in the last half of the twentieth century characterizes Korean immigration as different from the earlier immigration in the sense that earlier immigrants predominantly entered the primary of secondary segments of the labor market of the United States economy.

Korea, to some degree, entered the modern world in approximately 1910. Up until that time, Korea had been under the suzerainty of China and had been isolated from the Western influence of modernization. Even before that time, Koreans had been targets of modern, primarily American missionary efforts. American missionaries had been successful in converting a small percentage of Koreans to Protestanism. Korean Christians became the basic source of Korean immigration to the United States. In 1910 when Korea came under the

domination of the Japanese, the overlords did not undertake any substantial attempt to industrialize Korea. To a degree, the Japanese preferred to exploit Korea as a source of raw labor and to limit the competition of Korean capitalists with their Japanese counterparts. The early first waves of Korean immigration came as a result of the opposition by Korean intellectuals, primarily Christian, to Japanese domination. These intellectuals entered the United States either as refugees, organizers of opposition, or as religious students and leaders who found their native land inhospitable.

Only with the end of World War II did Korea come totally under the influence of the United States. Internal and external impetus and pressures for industrialization and modernization arose under this influence. American influence became intensified after the Korean War in 1950-1953. American military expansion in South Korea provided a local, economic base for modernization and the consumption ideals ~~for~~ of an advanced industrial society were transmitted through the behavior of troops, officers, officials, and suppliers to South Koreans. This undermined whatever traditionalism existed in South Korea. Yet we have pointed out that, having experienced continuous foreign conquests, invasions, and domination throughout their long history, Koreans never developed the great worship of tradition that often appears

to be characteristic of most underdeveloped countries.

The division of Korea after World War II also resulted in a vast internal migration from North to South Korea. A high proportion of these internal migrants had already been, by their conversion into Christianity, alienated from the traditional Korean Confucian culture. Moreover, their affinity to Christianity undoubtedly reflected their alienation from the Korean version of Chinese mandarin bureaucracy. That is, the early Korean Christians were displaced members of a Korean bureaucratic class who had been driven out of office and Seoul as result of the normal but high turnover rates in a corrupt, political bureaucracy. They had been forced to degrade themselves by becoming merchants and professionals. As a result of their alienation, they found it easy to become Christians. Christian families with this predominant historical background took refuge in South Korea after the communist takeover of the northern part of the Korean peninsula. These North Koreans in South Korea felt great fear of being overcome by the communist "menace." They were political, religious, and economic enemies of the communists and felt that they would specially be treated as traitors in the event of a North Korean triumph over South Korea. They were traditionally marginal. They were marginal as North Koreans living in South Korea, and as small

businessmen in a society that valued only land ownership and bureaucratic office-holding. They were marginal as Christians in a Confucian-Buddhist nation.

Because of their marginality in their homeland, North Koreans with Christian backgrounds became primary candidates for emigration when such opportunities became available. Marginality in the homeland accounted especially for the first wave of Korean immigration that took place at the turn of the century. The majority of these older immigrants were Christians from what is now called North Korea. Many of them were political refugees, students and ministers driven out in response to Japanese domination. A small number of them settled in New York City and clustered around the New York Korean Church near Columbia University. They were highly educated and, as we have seen, were not the basis of the Korean community as it now exists. And yet in many ways they were a magnet for succeeding migration and a moral base for the emerging Korean community. Moreover, as we have seen, the tradition of a church-centered community life is particularly important in helping new arrivals to adjust to the immediate problems of settlement in a new society. Moreover, the church-centered social life provides a framework for social, personal, and prestige associations that can be grasped and used in ones' immediate social life, especially

because so much of Korean life is dispersed due to the lack of territorial centers.

These Korean immigrants to the United States are not typical homeland Koreans. They are primarily Christians, better-educated, middle class, and highly motivated towards economic mobility. But these differences recapitulate the whole history of marginality within Korean society. In the twentieth century Korean marginality became the basis of migration and the creation of new communities in new forms continues.

The impact of American policy and economy on South Korean society is far greater and more direct than that which we have so far described in this chapter. American policy after the Korean War was to dump American grain into the Korean economy. That policy was pursued to solve the problem of surplus grain production in the United States. The dumping was done under the guise of foreign aid. But the impact of massive imports of low price subsidized grain contributed to a vast migration of Korean farmers into urban areas, primarily Seoul. Korean farmers were driven off the land because they could not compete with American grain, and migrated to Seoul. This would not have resulted in the emigration to the United States, had it not been for a peculiar ability for Koreans to adapt to adversity.

South Korea is not a land of great natural resources. Given the population explosion and over-urbanization of South Korea, the chief export item of South Korea is its labor force. In order to alleviate population pressures, the South Korean government encouraged Koreans in the early sixties to emigrate and migrate as contract workers to the United States, West Germany, Canada, and Latin American nations. A substantial part of these emigrants and migrant workers receive job training in South Korea in order to prepare themselves for the kinds of jobs that would be desired in the receiving countries and which would qualify Koreans for immigration visas. Koreans migrated to wherever there were apparent labor shortages in some segments of the labor market of a country that would thus permit immigrants or migrant workers.

Given the earlier development of Korean medical institutions by American missionaries at the turn of the century, and given the shortage of medical professionals in the United States, some 13,000 Korean physicians, nurses and pharmacists have entered the United States, constituting the second largest group of immigrant medical workers in the United States. A large part of these Korean medical professionals have settled in the New York metropolitan area and have constituted an important economic and social base for the

emerging Korean community. Many Korean nurses, as we have seen, provide the necessary capital for their husbands' small businesses. Yet this internationally mobility of Korean medical professionals took place under the impact of the development of the service-oriented economy in the United States and constitutes one of the major economic entry points for Korean immigrants.

Due to a peculiar change in the American fashion movement, the wig industry emerged in South Korea and provided vast economic opportunities to Korean immigrants. American and Japanese wig-makers, again reflecting the influence of the outside industrial world on the home economy, began to purchase the hair of Korean women in order to manufacture wigs. In the mid-60's, wigs became an item of high fashion, especially in the United States. At this time, Koreans began themselves to manufacture wigs in Korean sweatshops for export to the United States. Koreans, whose Confucian cultural background made wigs as a focus on personal adornment repugnant to them, nevertheless found that the profit from the sale of wigs to Japanese and American exporters so great as to overcome their repugnance at selling their hair and manufacturing useless items of personal adornment. Thus the first step into the development of a South Korean export-oriented economy was the development of a wig manufacturing

and exporting industry. When Japanese technology refined the process of wig-making, replacing human hair with synthetic fibers, Korean took over the process and began to dominate world-wide wig markets. Koreans were able to do so because, in the light of the new urban poverty caused by massive rural-to-urban migration, they were willing to exploit themselves and each other in labor-intensive sweat shop labor to manufacture wigs. The development of the wig industry provided for a great deal of foreign exchange necessary to underwrite the industrialization of South Korea. In saying this, we cannot of course underestimate the amount of American military and foreign aid as well as of the American and Japanese commercial bank loans given to South Korea that also underwrite its industrialization.

The wig business was a characteristic business serving as the vehicle for Korean immigration to the United States in general and the New York metropolitan area in particular. It established, to a large degree (medical professionals excepted) a characteristic of the Korean community in the United States. This initial economic penetration via the wig business is not at all exceptional. Almost every immigrant group to the United States has based its path of entry into the economic structure of American society on particular and unique paths of economic and industrial

penetration. The entry point is determined by the stage of economic expansion in the United States at the moment of entry, that is, by those industries that can provide economic opportunity to an immigrant group based upon the characteristics of that immigrant group. That is, Italians arrived during the time when work in the construction industry began to expand as urban America was developing its municipal, transportation and public works programs. The Jews used the garment industry, an industry which was just entering mass commercial marketing at the time of their arrival. The Eastern European Jews entered that industry because German Jews had developed it for some 15 years before the vast influx of the Eastern European Jewry, and because a small portion of the Eastern Jewry had worked in the garment trade in Cracow and Warsaw before they entered the new land. Slavs arrived at the time when steel and coal mining were beginning to expand.

The wig industry provided opportunities in the United States for immigrants to become wholesalers, retailers, and peddlers. Many immigrants became representatives of the homeland manufacturers. The characteristics of most Korean-run small businesses were determined by those of the wig business which was developed in the mid-60's in South Korean urban ghettos. Korean immigrants primarily catered to Blacks who at that time were self-consciously pursuing their

ethnic identity by, among other things, relying on the "Afro" wigs. Thus when Korean wig merchants began to leave the wig industry after 1974 and switched to other retail businesses, they intended to concentrate in the same areas with the same kinds of customers.

But the wig business was more than an economic opportunity for an individual businessman. It was a major means for the homeland wig manufacturers and the government to acquire foreign exchange and to finance economic development of the homeland. As a result, the South Korean government was deeply involved. When the mad scramble for economic opportunities in the United States occurred and when peddlers, retailers, wholesalers, and manufacturers were often competing for the same market, the South Korean government was called in to organize and regulate the market and to provide standards of fair competition and to restrict competition in order to sustain the market, especially after the wig business in the United States began to contract. It is perhaps ironical that the Korean Wig Union, a front organization of the homeland government, was held in violation of American anti-trust laws. More important is the precedent of the homeland government's intervention and interference in domestic retailing and wholesaling of wigs by Korean immigrants. This is perhaps an established precedent for the

homeland government's interference in an emerging American ethnic community.

The wig business served primarily as the economic point of entry for Korean immigrants to the United States. But as has been noted, the Koreans had no special affinity to the wig business and other industries of personal adornment. The wig business presented itself only as an historically accidental entry point for Korean immigrants. Once having arrived and stablished a characteristic presence in urban American, Korean immigrants began to look around for other economic opportunities. Their quest for alternatives was prompted by the declining of the wig business in the early 1970's. As alternatives to the wig business, Korean immigrants entered the garment, handbag, eyelash and other miscellaneous businesses. They began to import all these labor-intensive items from the homeland, which could be produced by low-paid homeland labor.

But the quest for economic opportunities did not stop here. The intense pressure for economic mobility especially in retail and service organizations which do not depend upon upon a fluency in English and work experience in American large-scale bureaucratic industries, has led Korean immigrants to follow native Americans and older immigrant groups into labor-intensive small businesses. Korean small business-

men exploit themselves, their family members and even more recent arrivals in order to keep their shops open for long hours. They exploit the recent arrivals, the greenhorns, until the latter find alternatives to being exploited by these ethnic compatriots, which, of course, include opening up their own exploitative businesses.

All Korean-run retail businesses are characterized by a labor-intensive retail and service work. The success of the businesses is dependent upon intensive care and concern for one's inventory and customers. Thus Korean immigrants found an ideal, small enterprise in fruit and vegetable business. Once the discovery was made, Korean immigrants began to flood that business, which is ideal for aggressive Korean immigrants, with little capital. Thus fruit and vegetable business became a secondary characteristic business for Korean immigrants. To a lesser extent, retail fish markets, taxi driving, drycleaning, liquor stores, and garment industry subcontracting are similar businesses and occupations.

These secondary businesses do not derive their sources of supply from the homeland nor are their products based upon ethnicity. They are based upon the fact that Korean immigrants are willing and able to perform the required work and services within a totally American commercial and service economy.

This has had profound consequences for the Korean community in the New York metropolitan area because the businessmen of these enterprises are in no way dependent upon the homeland government for export and import licenses, nor on economic and political connection with the homeland and its government.

The economic and occupational history of Koreans in the United States constitutes the basis for their attempt to construct a community. The older immigration of ministers, students, and political refugees who entered the United States prior to the Immigration Act of 1965, provided the basic leadership for the Koreans in the United States. The ministerial class has provided the moral, intellectual, and service function to the would-be Korean community. The professional class, primarily medical, has provided the basis for a prestige community and the lay leadership in the churches. The business class, especially that class oriented toward the homeland by importing and exporting, has provided the basis of much public and cultural self-presentation of the homeland to the outside American society and has attempted to control and coordinate the Korean community. It has done so with cooperation, the direction and control by the Korean Consulate in New York, a surrogate of the homeland government. The small businessmen, especially those not

attached in any way to the homeland economy, were initially excluded from leadership, partly because of their long hours of work and their committment to individual and family mobility. But we have noted that, because of their independence from the homeland government, they have become a source of competition for leadership against the government-oriented businessmen.

In addition, Korean immigrants in every specific industry and profession have tended to organize themselves into merchants, professional, occupational, and alumni associations. These secondary associations segment and cut across the total life of the would-be Korean community. The associations in most respects are community:"they tend more to be like a classical, MacIver-like conception of associations (MacIver, 1931), "societal" rather than communal organizations in that they are not necessarily deep-seated feelings of belonging together. And yet because of the experience of being immigrants in the alien society, Koreans feel forced to band together in ways that go beyond the narrow interests of associationalism.

These group activities, based upon secondary associations, provide a point of departure in community study. In American community studies (Lynd and Lynd, 1937; Warner and Lunt, 1941; Vidich and Bensman, 1958), "class" was a

paramount social element in both describing community life and defining community structure. But "class," if this term indicates a collectivity of individuals who display and pursue common economic interests or lifestyles, has not as yet emerged as a factor governing social relationships among Korean immigrants. This is partly because Koreans as new immigrants have not yet had enough time to establish socially-recognized class distinctions among themselves. All Korean immigrants are struggling for economic gains on the basis of roughly equal terms. In this sense, their social and economic life are to large extent divided by occupational groups rather than class. The significant occupational categories are various: medical professionals, businessmen, ministers, blue collar workers, and non-medical professionals etc. This lack of separate class distinctions also originates in the "class structure" of their homeland. As has been noted in Chapter I, Korean immigrants were largely drawn from a relatively homogeneous urban middle, white collar class. In addition, as has been noted in Chapter XI, the Korean homeland class structure has been historically fluid and atomized because of special historic factors underlying Korean culture and social structure.

What is especially interesting, perhaps unique, in Korean group activities is the rise of "pseudo extended families." Traditionally, Koreans were strongly attached to

the kinship system having characteristics based upon Confucian ideals of kinship piety. As we have noted, this extended kinship system has already become weakened in the process of urbanization and population displacement especially during the Korean War. All large-scale transcontinental migrations tend to weaken the traditional extended family in part because initial migration is usually undertaken by single male. Later on, the spouse and children, and sometimes individual brothers and sisters and other family members follow the original migrant. But the extended family usually does not emigrate as a unit. Thus the nuclear family is the family of immigration and urbanization, if and when the family is involved in such processes.

Koreans have faced special problems in immigrating to the United States because they arrived relatively late, came in relatively small numbers, and were linguistically, racially distinct from the host population. They have felt a sense of isolation and alienation from the dominant society and thus have attempted to do something about it. As a result, they have created pseudo-extended families. As we have indicated, the pseudo-extended family is the voluntaristic formation of a group of nuclear families that act as an extended family in the provision of social support, mutual aid, recreation and companionship. The immediate origin of

such an arrangement is unknown. But once learned, Korean immigrants have adopted the principle of the pseudo-extended family and have organized it with a degree of self-conscious rationality that is truely remarkable. Pseudo-extended families exist as an organized institution within Korean churches, clubs, alumni, professional and business associations. Korean immigrants apparently need to experience the sense of community in a relatively small scale, personal, face-to-face relationships. The large scale associations, which they have also organized at almost the drop of the hat, are themselves apparently not sufficient to meet the personal needs of Korean immigrants. Perhaps the need of the particularism of the extended family, which they had already partly lost in homeland urbanization and in the experience of being strangers in the new land, has caused them to organize pseudo-extended families.

Yet their reliance on relatively small groups as a basis for one's non-work life and the form these small groups take, may tend to atomize Korean group life to the point that large scale organizations may be ineffective. On the other hand, Korean immigrants' committment to personal mobility, that includes the nuclear family, may limit the power and the presence of the pseudo-extended families. A differential rate of mobility and success among the heads of various

nuclear families, that make up an extended pseudo-family, may weaken family structure. If this is the case, the pseudo-extended family may be a temporary expedient similar to Eastern Jews' Landsmanschaft Verei (mutual aid and benefit societies) and the credit and sports association among other older immigrant groups.

Is there a community in the process of being constructed? One initial answer to our ultimate question is negative. The Korean community as it exists and as it is represented by the Korean Association of New York cannot be considered as a community even if it has other attributes of community to the extent that that community is a creation of the homeland government. We have noted that much of the development of community politics, especially the leadership conflicts centered around the Korean Association, were influenced by the homeland government. A group of leaders emerged and attempted to seek their personal gains through access to the patronage connection with the home government. Community leaders conducting export-import business with the homeland were eager to receive favors and protection from the homeland government. In addition, community businessmen and intellectuals sought governmental positions of the homeland as rewards for their leadership for the community. In this sense, the leadership of the Korean community was a product of the homeland government. Through their control of

homeland media, and through social and public pressures that they can exert, agents of the homeland government can even influence the definition of public issues in Korean communities in the United States; they can determine the flow of information in ethnic media, and organize community consensus. This is particularly true when the home government felt it necessary to organize American response to the Korean influence-peddling scandle in the United States Congress. The South Korean government's intervention in the community reflects its attempt to continuously receive American military and economic aids despite the scandal and the undemocratic nature of the Park regime.

However, the South Korean government cannot be totally accused of dominating the leadership of the Korean community because Korean immigrants express deep-seated Confucian political values. They want to respect their established political leadership in the homeland. For Koreans, the home government, whatever form it takes, symbolizes and represents their homeland. In addition, the home government extends all kinds of support to the activities of immigrants in the new land. When the exposure of the actions of the homeland government did not produce a deep sense of shame, Koreans in the United States remained silent about many of the corrupt and repugnant actions that they knew to be performed by

the homeland government. They remained silent so long as Americans did not know of these actions or of their magnitude.

To be sure, not all the movements to the construct of Korean association of the associations is an exclusive product of the homeland government. In many instances, Korean leaders, especially import-oriented businessmen, have appealed to the Consul General to solve political leadership conflicts within their associations. Thus the Consul General was given a task of resolving leadership squabbles; in doing so he became a most influential leader of the Korean-American community.

But if a Korean community is to emerge, it must emerge indigenously from within the resources of that community. So long as the community is a puppet of the homeland government, some groups within the Korean population are automatically excluded or exclude themselves from the community. This includes intellectuals who are opposed to the homeland government on political grounds, and religious leaders who attack the home government on moral grounds.

The activities of the homeland government in attempting to control the Korean community produced their own dialects of authenticity and opposition. For the Korean influence-peddling scandal involving the South Korean government

has produced a deep shame among Korean immigrants for the negative publicity that the scandal has created through American mass media. This, together with the development of autonomous economic institutions which are now in no way dependent upon export and import licensing and government-sponsored credit, has allowed some Koreans to express themselves independently of the desires of the home government. In this sense, an autonomous public opinion is beginning to emerge within an emerging Korean community. And only when an autonomous public opinion emerges can one say that a genuine community exists. Otherwise, the community is a public relations front for an external government and for opportunists who would curry favor with the government.

However, there are structural limitations in the degree to which the Korean community becomes independent from the homeland government. Given governmental "control" over the community newspapers, and given the ideological and financial dependence of the community on the homeland government, community leaders are not likely to antagonize the homeland government. And yet as Koreans are increasingly aware of their collective fate in the new land, they may overthrow governmental "control" of their community. The victory of Korean greengrocers in the 1978 presidential election of the Korean Association of New York is a step in that direction.

In this context, another factor that tends to make a Korean community possible is the response given to their presence by other ethnic groups. At the present, it is the response of Blacks that is relevant. We have noted that Koreans have concentrated much of their retail activities in black ghettos. In, doing so the American dream of Korean conflicts with the aspiration of blacks to gain control of their ghettos. The aggressive activities by Koreans in ghetto business may be viewed as an insult to the black aspirations. Koreans in only a few years have, with little capital or resources, become an important retail store ownership group in the ghettos. Blacks have aspired to such business ownership, but have not had dramatic success in similar ventures. In addition, Koreans have been accused of being sharp traders, price-gougers, and exploiters of blacks. In this respects, Koreans, who are taking over many retail businesses being abandoned by Jews and other non-black ethnic groups in black ghettos, have inherited some negative images attributed to these ethnic groups. But this rise of anti-Koreanism has forced Koreans to organize on political and ethnic grounds to counteract such quasi-public sentiment and movements. As in the case of all ethnic communities, anti-ethnic attitude ultimately strengthens the aspiration of a minority toward its ethnic organization, delaying the process of

acculturation and assimilation.

The racial characteristic of Koreans in the United States is also likely to help Koreans develop and maintain a community. Like blacks, the Japanese and the Chinese, Koreans will find it difficult to assimilate themselves into the dominant society and for at least a generation or two they may be driven into themselves by their racial difference from the white majority until they completely master American language, education, and culture. Furthermore, the first generation of Koreans have a strong desire to maintain part of their own culture even though, in terms of their economic motivation, they seem to be more American than contemporary Americans.

But a deep, fundamental cultural characteristic of Koreans tends to mitigate against their formation of a strong ethnic community. Korean immigrants to the United States have combined the pragmatism of a Confucian economic ethic with the driving mobility and aspiration of the Protestant ethic. Thus they have sought opportunities wherever these existed. They have been willing to exploit themselves in whatever way necessary to achieve success especially in primary capital accumulation. They appear to have all the original virtues of the Protestant ethic -- prudence, devotion to business and to work and the avoidance of self-indulgence and sloth. They have also a remarkable

ability to shift from one industry or business to another in order to find new opportunities as these arise or become apparent to them. But above all, Koreans are historically deeply committed to education and to individualistic and bureaucratic success. The first generation of Korean immigrants has been handicapped, apart from the medical profession, from employing all of the administrative and bureaucratic skills they possessed based upon the education which they have already acquired. If Koreans maintain their "Protestant" character and master American education, especially professional education, they will be able to enter the white collar, managerial ranks of business and government and to proceed on mobility paths which are presently denied them; and they will have new opportunities at least for economic and professional assimilation. They may be submerged by American mass culture with all that implies, good or bad, from the standpoint of Korean traditional values, however weak the latter may be. If and when this occurs, they will be pulled out of the cultural and linguistic enclaves which the first generation of Korean immigrants are now forced into.

Certainly, differential access to opportunities and success may partially test the boundaries, i.e. the unity and loyalty, of the emerging Korean community. Koreans will,

in the next two generations, have an opportunity to create a voluntary community based on their own aspirations and culture. They may find that their own emerging Americanization will overcome their identity with an already withered traditional culture and their sense of community. And yet this process is a process that is likely to take at least a generation or two. In the meantime, an autonomous Korean community is likely to emerge. Whether it ultimately disappears or is replaced by a pluralistic cultural community is an open question.

In part, the future of the Korean community is, like in the past, dependent upon American immigration policy. The present Korean community has emerged because of the United States Immigration Act of 1965, which, however, was not specifically oriented toward Koreans. The 1976 Amendment to the Immigration Act of 1965 has altered the character of Korean immigration to the United States, making it more difficult for professionals and skilled workers to enter. And yet the Amendment still allows for the continuous influx of Koreans (annually, some 35,000) largely in the form of "family reunions." As compared with the older immigrant groups, the total influx of Koreans is small. The small number of Korean immigrants constitutes a limit to the critical mass of Korean population within which its culture can

be maintained. If Koreans continue to enter the United States, the Korean community will be sustained and its culture will be supported by the homeland culture that new immigrants bring with them. The process of cultural assimilation will thus be delayed. And yet one must note that, since South Korea is being rapidly urbanized and Americanized, Korean assimilation to American society begins in the homeland and is completed in the United States. In the long run, success in economic activity is the main obstacle to the emergence of an autonomous Korean community in the United States; and racism, exclusion, and the denial of opportunities in mainstream economic activities will create a ghetto community.

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