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**Policing the Holy Land, 1918-1957: The transition from  
a colonial to a national model of policing and changing  
conceptions of police accountability**

Caspi, Joshua, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1991

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A

**Policing the Holy Land, 1918-1957: The Transition from a Colonial  
to a National Model of Policing and Changing Conceptions of Police  
Accountability.**

by

Joshua Caspi

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in  
Criminal Justice in satisfaction of the dissertation  
requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
The City University of New York.


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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

Policing the Holy Land, 1918-1957: The Transition from a Colonial to a National Model of Policing and Changing Conceptions of Police Accountability.

by

Joshua Caspi

Advisor: Professor Barbara Raffel Price

This study explores and analyzes the transition from the Palestine Police to the Israel Police. It also examines the circumstances under which the Israeli police force was established, the impact of the Israel Independence War of 1948, and the social changes which followed the birth of the State, affecting the structure, functions and accountability of the police. The accountability of the police force in the young State during the first decade of its existence forms the main theme of the study.

The objectives of the analysis are to document the transition period and to analyze the new notions of police accountability, focusing on the mechanisms of control which were developed and introduced by Israel, a parliamentary democracy, in place of the organizational structure used by the Palestine Police, which had been organized along colonial lines and systems.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this study would not have been possible without the assistance and contributions of many persons and institutions in Israel and in the United States.

Firstly, I should like to thank Mr. Yosef Burg, until 1984 the Minister of the Interior in the Israeli Cabinet, who understood my ambitious wish to carry out my doctoral studies in the field of Criminal Justice. Mr. Burg approved my appointment as Israel National Police Representative in the United States in order to enable me to complete my studies at John Jay College.

I am indebted to the many members of the John Jay College staff, teachers and secretaries, but mostly to Dr. Gerald W. Lynch, President of the College, who constantly encouraged me to continue in my studies, despite the fact that English is not my native tongue.

My mentor, Dr. Barbara Raffel Price, was a key asset to my studies and writing. Her invaluable suggestions, accurate perception, helpful criticisms and comments throughout this study encouraged and enabled me to complete the written portion of the study - and for that, I thank her from the bottom of my heart.

My grateful thanks to Dr. Anthony E. Simpson, the second member of my dissertation committee, who assiduously reviewed my manuscript

and made important comments, amended the language and grammar, and counselled me as to where changes should be made and where I should develop a topic.

Dr. Menachem Amir of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the third member of my dissertation committee, was of great help by making available to me his vast knowledge of the Israeli society and the Israel Police. His encouragement enabled me to continue writing, despite my busy schedule as Head of the Criminal Investigations Department of the Israel Police.

My thanks to General David Kraus, the Commissioner of the Israel National Police, for his support during all my years of study, and for approving the Israel Police to support for my tuition.

Finally, this study is dedicated to my wife, Tzipora, who shared with me the joys and sadness of developing and writing this study. Her support, despite the many lost evenings and weekends, provided welcome encouragement and sustained my spirit.

Table of Contents

| <u>Chapter</u>                             | <u>Subject</u>                              | <u>Page</u> |
|--------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Part One: INTRODUCTION & THE THEORY SCHEME |                                             |             |
| I                                          | Introduction                                | 1           |
|                                            | Statement of the Problem                    | 2           |
| II                                         | The Theoretical Perspective                 | 6           |
|                                            | The Police and the Political Process        | 6           |
|                                            | The Police Role                             | 11          |
|                                            | Sir Charles Jeffries' Colonial Police Model | 14          |
|                                            | David Bayley's Model of Police Forces       | 20          |
|                                            | Police Structure                            | 21          |
|                                            | Police Strength                             | 22          |
|                                            | Police Functions                            | 23          |
|                                            | Accountability and the Control of Police    | 24          |
|                                            | Research Methodology                        | 31          |
|                                            | Archival and Published Primary Sources      | 35          |
| Part Two: THE PALESTINE POLICE, 1918-1948  |                                             |             |
| III                                        | Palestine - Historical and Background       | 40          |
|                                            | The Historical Background                   | 41          |
|                                            | The Zionist Movement                        | 43          |

| <u>Chapter</u> | <u>Subject</u>                                  | <u>Page</u> |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------|
|                | The Balfour Declaration                         | 46          |
|                | The British Mandate on Palestine                | 48          |
|                | The Country - Boundaries and Population         | 52          |
| IV             | Policing Palestine - The First Decade           | 56          |
|                | The Beginning - Military Administration         | 56          |
|                | The Palestine Police Force                      | 58          |
|                | The Police Ordinance, 1921                      | 60          |
|                | The Police and the May 1921 Disturbance         | 63          |
|                | The Gendarmeries                                | 65          |
|                | The Peaceful Years, 1922-1928                   | 71          |
|                | The Training School                             | 74          |
|                | Municipal Police                                | 75          |
|                | Conclusion - The First Decade                   | 76          |
| V              | Policing Palestine - The Second Decade, 1929-38 | 80          |
|                | Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929          | 80          |
|                | Sir Herbert Dowbiggin's Report on the Police    | 86          |
|                | R.G.B Spicer - Commandant of Police             | 90          |
|                | The Arab Rebellion, 1936-1939                   | 97          |
|                | The Jewish Settlement Police                    | 107         |
|                | "Hagana" - The Jewish Underground Militia       | 110         |
|                | The Second Decade - Conclusion                  | 113         |
| VI             | Policing Palestine - The Third Decade 1939-1948 | 119         |
|                | The Political Background                        | 119         |
|                | The Dissident Underground Movements             | 123         |
|                | The Palestine Police Structure                  | 125         |



| <u>Chapter</u> | <u>Subject</u>                           | <u>Page</u> |
|----------------|------------------------------------------|-------------|
|                | Headquarters and Districts               | 125         |
|                | Port and Marine District                 | 131         |
|                | Railways District                        | 132         |
|                | Police Strike Forces                     | 133         |
|                | Auxiliary Police                         | 136         |
|                | Police Strength                          | 139         |
|                | The Development of the Police Strength   | 139         |
|                | Length of Service                        | 145         |
|                | Authorised and Actual Strength           | 147         |
|                | Police Functions and Role                | 150         |
|                | Assignments                              | 151         |
|                | Situations                               | 152         |
|                | Outcomes                                 | 155         |
|                | The Accountability and Control of Police | 157         |
|                | The Mandate System                       | 158         |
|                | Who Controlled the Palestine Police ?    | 164         |
|                | External-Exclusive Mechanisms of Control | 165         |
|                | The Palestine Government                 | 167         |
|                | The Secretary of State for the Colonies  | 169         |
|                | The British Cabinet                      | 172         |
|                | External-Inclusive Mechanisms of Control | 173         |
|                | Legislators                              | 173         |
|                | Courts                                   | 174         |
|                | Media                                    | 176         |
|                | The Public                               | 180         |

| <u>Chapter</u> | <u>Subject</u>                                     | <u>Page</u> |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------|
|                | The Withdrawal of The Mandatory Power              | 187         |
|                | The Aggravation of the Political Situation         | 188         |
|                | Police and Security Expenditure                    | 196         |
|                | The Withdrawal From Tel-Aviv                       | 198         |
|                | The Implementation of the British Withdrawal       | 200         |
|                | <br>Part Three: THE ISRAEL POLICE, 1948-1958       |             |
| VII            | Organizational & Structural Development            | 207         |
|                | The Israel Police, First Labor Pains               | 207         |
|                | Early Preparations                                 | 207         |
|                | The Police as a Unit within the Israeli Army       | 211         |
|                | The Israel Police Structure                        | 221         |
|                | Political and Security Background                  | 221         |
|                | The Organizational Structure                       | 223         |
| VIII           | The Israel Police Strength                         | 236         |
|                | General Information                                | 236         |
|                | Strength                                           | 238         |
|                | Police Ministry Budget                             | 248         |
|                | Personnel Issues: Quality, Recruitment & Retention | 255         |
|                | The Dismissal of Palestine Policemen               | 273         |
|                | Preparation and Training                           | 285         |
| IX             | The Development of the Police Functions & Role     | 293         |
|                | Assignments                                        | 293         |
|                | Situations                                         | 299         |

| <u>Chapter</u> | <u>Subject</u>                                  | <u>Page</u> |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------|
|                | Crime Patterns                                  | 301         |
|                | Traffic Accidents                               | 304         |
|                | Count Bernadotte's Murder                       | 306         |
|                | Religious Demonstrations in Jerusalem           | 312         |
|                | "Bread and Work" Demonstrations                 | 317         |
|                | Israel Police and Immigrant Camps (Maa'barot)   | 321         |
|                | Infiltration from Arab Countries                | 324         |
|                | Demonstrations against German Reparations       | 328         |
|                | Religious Underground in Jerusalem              | 331         |
|                | The Black Market                                | 335         |
|                | Organizational Structure & Response to Change - |             |
|                | Outcomes                                        | 340         |
|                | The System of Team-Policing                     | 341         |
|                | The Criminal Investigation Department           | 345         |
|                | The Economic Investigation Division             | 357         |
|                | The Pathological Institute                      | 360         |
|                | The Political Police                            | 362         |
|                | The Border Guard                                | 372         |
| X              | The Accountability of the Israel Police         | 390         |
|                | The Regime in the State of Israel               | 391         |
|                | External-Exclusive Control of Police            | 396         |
|                | The Minister of Police                          | 396         |
|                | External-Inclusive Control of Police            | 414         |
|                | The Israel Cabinet                              | 414         |
|                | The Knesset                                     | 421         |

| <u>Chapter</u> | <u>Subject</u>                            | <u>Page</u> |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
|                | The Parliamentary Investigative Committee | 429         |
|                | The Knesset Internal Affairs Committee    | 430         |
|                | Judicial Review                           | 438         |
|                | The State Comptroller                     | 444         |
|                | The Attorney General                      | 449         |
|                | The Public and the Press                  | 453         |
| XI             | Conclusion                                | 472         |
|                | Research Questions                        | 478         |
|                | Bibliography                              | 505         |

List of Tables

| <u>Table</u>                                                                                              | <u>Page</u> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1 The Police Strength in Palestine, 1918.                                                                 | 57          |
| 2 Police Strength in Palestine v. Population, 1922-28.                                                    | 78          |
| 3 Police and Prison Strength, 1918-1928.                                                                  | 79          |
| 4 Palestine Police Strength, 1931.                                                                        | 89          |
| 5 April-October, 1936 Casualties.                                                                         | 100         |
| 6 Arab Rebellion, 1937 Casualties.                                                                        | 104         |
| 7 Arab Rebellion, 1938 Casualties.                                                                        | 106         |
| 8 Arab and Jews by Percentage in the Palestine<br>Population and the Police Strength, 1929-1939.          | 117         |
| 9 Palestine Police, 1929-1939, by Nationality                                                             | 118         |
| 10 Palestine Police Strength, 1939-1947.                                                                  | 143         |
| 11 The Percentage of Arabs and Jews in the Palestine<br>Population and in the Police Strength, 1939-1947. | 144         |
| 12 Length of Service - Palestine Police.                                                                  | 146         |
| 13 The Authorized Establishment and the Actual Strength<br>of the Palestine Police, 1939-1948.            | 148         |
| 14 Statistical Summary of Crime, 1938-1947.                                                               | 154         |
| 15 Police Coverage by Palestinian Newspapers                                                              | 178         |
| 16 Expenditure on Police and Security Matters, 1939-46                                                    | 197         |
| 17 Israel Police Districts, Sub-Districts, Police<br>Stations and Posts, 1948-1958                        | 234         |
| 18 The Israel Police Strength, 1948-1957                                                                  | 246         |
| 19 Israel Police Strength in Relation to the Population                                                   | 247         |
| 20 Ministry of Police Budget Compared to the Other Minist.                                                | 251         |

|    |                                                                                                                             |     |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 21 | Israel Police Budget and Personnel Complement<br>Compared to Israel's Population, Criminal Files and<br>Vehicles, 1948-1957 | 254 |
| 22 | Senior Police Officers According to Their Previous<br>Employment                                                            | 260 |
| 23 | Composition of Israel Police Senior Officers Ranks                                                                          | 262 |
| 24 | Personnel Composition According to Age, 1958                                                                                | 269 |
| 25 | Breakdown of Policewomen and Minority Policemen                                                                             | 274 |
| 26 | Crime cases, 1948-1957                                                                                                      | 303 |
| 27 | Ratio of Criminal Files in Relation to Population                                                                           | 304 |
| 28 | Traffic Accidents with Casualties, 1948-1957                                                                                | 305 |
| 29 | The Infiltration Damage, 1949-1957                                                                                          | 327 |
| 30 | Border Guard Effective Strength, 1951-1958                                                                                  | 389 |
| 31 | Issues Put by Ministers During Cabinet Meetings                                                                             | 420 |
| 32 | Issues Discussed During Cabinet Meetings, 1948-1958                                                                         | 421 |
| 33 | Motions for the Agenda Regarding Police, 1948-1957                                                                          | 425 |
| 34 | Queries Put to the Minister of Police in Relation<br>to all Questions Put Forth, 1949-1957                                  | 427 |
| 35 | Queries Put to Minister of Police by Knesset<br>Members, by Subject, 1949-1957                                              | 428 |
| 36 | Knesset Internal Affairs Committee Sessions, 1949-57                                                                        | 432 |
| 37 | Police Topics Discussed in the Internal Affairs<br>Committee, 1948-1957                                                     | 437 |
| 38 | Supreme Court Decisions Regarding the Police, 1949-57                                                                       | 445 |
| 39 | Content Breakdown, Police Topics in "Ha-Aretz" and in<br>"Ma'ariv", 1950                                                    | 465 |

List of Figures

| <u>Figure</u>                                     | <u>Page</u> |
|---------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1 Palestine Mandate Territory                     | 54          |
| 2 Palestine and Transjordan, 1922                 | 55          |
| 3 Palestine Police Organization Chart, 1920       | 61          |
| 4 Security Forces Organization Chart, 1922        | 70          |
| 5 Palestine Police Structure, 1931                | 127         |
| 6 Palestine Police -Districts and Divisions, 1946 | 129         |
| 7 Regional Division of the Palestine Police, 1946 | 130         |
| 8 The Israel Police Organization Chart, 1948      | 225         |
| 9 The Israel Police Organization Chart, 1950      | 229         |
| 10 The Israel Police Organization Chart, 1957     | 235         |

## Part One: INTRODUCTION &amp; THEORY SCHEME

## Chapter I : Introduction

There is hardly any public agency (excluding the schools) that affects the lives of more people than the police (Wilson, 1968, p.3). In spite of this the police function has not been the subject of systematic study until quite recently. Significant scholarly interest in the police function has only emerged in the last two decades. A flood of books, articles, commissions reports, conferences, seminars and public debates about policing has appeared since the mid-1960s.

The historical study of police organizations is quite new in comparison to the other areas of historical research. As David Bayley noted : " By and large, the police have not been subject to comparative analysis. Until very recently neither historians nor social scientists appeared to recognize that police exist....The neglect of the police role has changed dramatically during the last decade, certainly in the English-speaking world." (Bayley, 1985, p.4).

Almost nothing has been written on the police forces of the Middle East. This supports the value of this present study of the transition from the Palestine Police to the Israel National Police. The police can be better informed by learning about the past. Facts and events from the past, which were not recorded and researched at the time of



the occurrence will become increasingly difficult to retrieve. In the case of the transition to the Israeli Police, time is running out.

Statement of the Problem.

On Friday, May 14, 1948, at 4:32 p.m in Tel-Aviv, at a special and crucial meeting of the representatives of the "Yishuv" (the Jewish settlement in Palestine), David Ben-Gurion, the chairperson of the Jewish Agency, read in front of the emotional assembly the declaration of independence of the new Jewish State - Israel. An end of 1878 years of Jewish statelessness was realized (Postal and Levy, 1973, p. 205). On the next day, May 15, 1948, the British Mandate on Palestine was over. Sir Alan Cunningham, the last British High Commissioner, left Haifa on board a British destroyer (Nyrop, 1979, p. 40). On the same day five Arab states, joined by the Palestinian Arabs, declared war against the newly established State of Israel. Egypt invaded from the south, Jordan occupied the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon and different Arab groups attacked from the north. The Iraqi army sent reinforcements to Jordan. Under these conditions, with fighting on every side, the Israel National Police was born. Yeheskel Sahar, a former Major in the British army and a member of the "Hagana", the main Jewish underground movement, was appointed the Inspector General of the Israeli National Police and commissioned to establish a new, effective and loyal police force.

The Palestine Police, which was mainly British and included a large number of Arab officers and about 800 Jews, began its work in Palestine in 1918, immediately after the Allied Powers defeated the Ottoman Empire and conquered the whole area. As a matter of fact, Britain's army did not find a regular Turkish police force when it occupied the country. The Turks were sovereigns of Palestine and the all Middle East for four hundred years (1518- 1918). Most of the police functions of the Ottoman Empire were done by the Turkish army or by the local governors, using irregulars-hired ghaffirs. A few Turkish police officers were found by the British in the main cities in that time: Jerusalem, Hebron, Gaza and Tzafat (Horne, 1982, p. 17). The Israeli National Police is, even today, a relatively new police force. When established in 1948, in a time of war and chaos, it replaced a mandatorial police force whose main task or role was to secure the British interests in Palestine. A natural and expected question arose: what "dowry" did the Israeli Police receive from the former police force? Until today, no research has analysed the turbulent transition from the Palestine Police to the Israeli Police.

The concern of this dissertation is to explore and analyze the transition from the Palestine Police to Israel Police. It is also to determine the circumstances under which the new police force was established, and the impact of the Independence War and the social changes, which followed the birth of the state, affected the structure and functions of the police system in Israel. The accountability of the police force in the young state will form the main theme of the

analysis. The study will focus on the mechanisms of control that were developed and introduced by Israel, a parliamentary democracy, to replace the structures used by the Palestine Police.

The focus of this study will be first to document this transition, and second to analyze the new notions of police accountability associated with the new police structure. The broad objective of the analysis will be to examine changed views of the police role in society, and the problems experienced by the police in dealing with the demands of the constituent parts of the role. It is expected that considerable differences will be found between official definitions of the police role, and associated conceptions of police accountability in the two systems studied.

The Palestine Police, a British mandated police, organized along colonial and paramilitary lines, was patterned after the Royal Irish Constabulary and other police forces in the British colonies. As the arm of an occupying power, it showed little concern for accountability to the citizens within its jurisdiction. During its life the Palestine Police was often thought of by its unwilling constituents as being oppressive and prone to interfering arbitrarily with personal freedoms. In opposition to the colonial model, a police force in a democratic country operates under the ultimate control of a democratically elected Parliament or a local government, as an instrument for enforcing the rule of law and preserving the law and order. In a democratic country the police cannot successfully carry

out their task without the support and confidence of the people. They are therefore ultimately accountable to the citizenry (Royal Commission, 1962, p. 16).

The dissertation's task is to analyze the evolution of the Israeli new police and to determine if this police force operated as did its predecessor, or changed in role, structure, functions, behavior and image, as a police force in a new-born democratic and independent state. Did this police succeed in establishing its legitimacy and developing good public relations? Did the new police overcome the antagonism felt by the population toward the former police? Did it overcome the fear and hate that the Jewish immigrants felt towards the police systems encountered during the Diaspora?

In this dissertation, the nature, role and the development of the Israel Police will be briefly examined against the background of the Palestine Police and the political situation in which this police force operated. The Palestine Police organization, structure, tasks and functions will be analysed, mainly between the years 1945 and 1948. The study will analyse, in depth, the structural organization of the Israeli Police, and its tasks, functions, accountability and development in the first decade of its existence, comparing these characteristics with these of the Palestine Police. Theoretical and operational concepts of control and accountability within the Palestinian Police and the Israel Police will be examined in terms of issues and models. The examination of circumstances, such as

complaints against the police, external and internal disciplinary proceedings and their legal contexts, and attitudes documented in the press, will be used to evaluate the changing notions of accountability they reflect. Throughout the study, analysis of changes in public and official attitudes toward police accountability, will be used as a gauge of the social and organizational functions of the police in the settings examined.

The research concern is to provide historical analysis of the police institution in the particular setting discussed here. There are, however, compelling reasons for thinking that the issues raised in an examination of police accountability in Israel during and after the Mandate will be relevant to more general considerations of political legitimacy. These relate to both the extraordinary circumstances of the Israeli state and the politicized role of the police in modern societies.

## Chapter II - The Theoretical Perspective.

### The Police and the Political Process.

The study task is to analyse the role and the organizational development of a police force which at its beginning was under a British mandated rule and later became an institution of an independent state - Israel. The analysis will focus on the impact of the political and social changes, which followed the establishment of the state, and on the accountability and the mechanisms of control of the new police.

The police, as they exist today in most of the common law countries, are a creature of English society in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Britain is also considered the founder of modern policing in Israel. To understand the roots of the Israeli Police we have to analyze the principles of the new police in England. The industrialization, the urbanization, the large migration and the impersonality of the London population in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, led to the formation of a new police force. Political, social and economic conditions, labour unrest, the fear of the propertied classes of public riots, disorder, possible revolution and concern for the growing crime wave, were factors of vital importance in the development and design of the London Metropolitan Police system in 1829.

On the other hand, there were groups against the establishment of the new police force. For example the working class suspected that such a police force would be another instrument of repression to be used against their political demonstrations. The liberals and a few radicals in Parliament were concerned with the effect of the new police on civil liberties and constitutional rights. There was, also, strong opposition from those who attributed the new police force to an instrument of centralization of power (Lyman, 1964, p. 154; Philips, 1980, p. 172; Reppetto, 1978, p. 299). Four British police historians: W. Melville Lee, Charles Reith, T.A. Critchley and Leon Radzinowicz, whose writings were principally concerned with the founding of the new London Police, tended to assume that the institution of a professional police force was an inevitable, necessary and desirable reform. They emphasized the relationship of the police with the public, and their dependency on public support. Britain, being a democracy, and an homogeneous society could develop police forces identical with or representative of her public (Robinson, 1979, p. 35).

In all modern democratic societies, and in some non-democratic ones, too, the state seeks to rule by persuasion rather than force. Its objective is to persuade the population to accept the values and beliefs manifested by state policies. Compliance is preferred over coercion, and ideological conflicts are expressed in competition for popular support and acceptance. To establish its legitimacy, the state must persuade the citizenry of the superiority of the values and policies stemming from the dominant class or classes it most

closely represents. The public activities of the state agencies are the most obvious expressions of state ideology. Activities of the police are especially important in this scenario as, of all public institutions, it is the police who must first address those social situations in which values defined as social norms are breached. Police institutions are necessarily political in this fundamental sense. Legitimacy of the police is a necessary, although perhaps not sufficient, condition for the legitimacy of the state. A classic case-study of the importance of the criminal law and its enforcement in legitimizing one class-based society is included in Douglas Hay's article "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" (Hay, 1975, pp. 17-63). Accountability of the police, to the state and to the population at large, is a measure of the legitimacy of this institution.

The importance of the police in this political context is also demonstrated by the extent of their civil power and the difficulties of controlling this power. Only the police have the power of using force against the civil population (Bittner, 1980, p. 37; Goldstein, 1977, p. 1), and it is the police who determine the substance of "operational law" in a society. That is, that narrow body of law routinely invoked by the police, and selected from the larger body of law on the statute books (Skolnick, 1966). It is recognized that the "style" of policing in a particular community can be influenced by local political pressure (Miller, 1977). However, police responses are by their decentralized nature extremely difficult to monitor, and police accountability is accordingly a sensitive and problematic



concept. The political and operational difficulties of the police, as a crucial institution for the demonstration of state legitimacy, are compounded by the various and contradictory expectations made of police operations. In modern Western societies, such contradictions abound. Much attention has been paid to conflicts inherent in unrealistic expectations for the police to simultaneously enforce the law unselectively, maintain order, and protect the civil rights of citizens. The classic discussion of such contradiction is included in James Q. Wilson's article "The Police and their Problems" (Wilson, 1963, pp. 189-216). For the purposes of this discussion, the net effect of these difficulties is to make police legitimacy an increasingly sensitive indicator of state legitimacy, and police accountability an important issue for the state.

As noted elsewhere in this study, the Israeli Police Force was founded in circumstances which have given it much broader responsibilities than police institutions in other Western societies. These increased responsibilities have brought with them greater potential for role conflict, and make police accountability an interesting focus for the examination of notions of legitimacy. For example, many Anglo-American police forces have always participated in a "civilizing mission", even in societies in which the population was ethnically and to a large extent culturally homogeneous (Storch, 1977, pp. 481-509). In Israel in the first decade of its existence even that section of the population which had a Jewish background was quite diverse in geographical origin. This is, of course, not to mention the

obvious difficulties of policing or "socializing" Israeli communities of Arab descent. It is interesting in this context that recent observers of the problems facing police legitimization elsewhere in the Western world have increasingly paid attention to circumstances that have long been faced in the policing of Israel. Recent discussions of the British police have, for example, tended to focus on reactions to terrorism and unrest among ethnic minorities. The focus of these discussions has been to address the increased politicization of the police operations in this setting, and related problems of police accountability and the preservation of civil rights (Reiner, 1983, pp. 125-148). It is hoped that this study will make an important contribution to an understanding of the police role in modern democratic society by addressing police legitimacy and accountability in a setting which, though unique and historical, reflects some of the problems only later encountered by societies elsewhere in the West.

#### The Police Role.

What are the roles of a police force in a democratic country? The British Royal Commission on the Police in 1962 defined the police as an instrument for enforcing the rule of law. Its main tasks are to maintain and preserve the law and order, to prevent crime and to detect criminals (Royal Commission, 1962, p. 21). The police system that evolved in England was a democratic solution to a political problem of how order and liberty shall co-exist. The traditional formulation of the nature of the police role emphasises impartial

enforcement of the law and accountability. Thus, civil liberties are protected. Reith assumes that the police were created as the direct consequence of the failure of the army, as an instrument of law, in checking and controlling the steady increase of crime, and mob disorder in the early nineteenth century (Reith, 1943, p. 9). In Bittner's opinion the police in England and in other Western countries were the last basic institution in the structure of the modern executive governments (Bittner, 1970, p.15). Skolnick writes on the purposes of policing: "The civil police are a social organization created and sustained by political processes to enforce dominant conceptions of public order" (Skolnick, 1972, p. 41). In Wilson's opinion police work is carried out under the influence of a political culture, though not necessarily under day to day political direction. The political culture can affect police behavior through the choice of the police administrator, molding expectations that govern his role determining governmental objectives and assembling power for their attainment (Wilson, 1978, p. 233).

T.A. Critchley, the British police historian, notes that the task of the police has been made a great deal more difficult in modern times by the amount of unpopular laws they are required to enforce against traffic violations, drug use and pornography (Critchley, 1973, p. 34). The police are conceptualized and treated as an integral coercive bureaucratic apparatus of the state system in society. The police, said Herman Goldstein, are an anomaly in a free society. They are invested with a great deal of authority under a system of

government in which authority is reluctantly granted, and when granted, sharply curtailed. But the strength of a democracy and the citizen's quality of life are determined in large measure by the ability of the police to discharge their duties (Goldstein, 1977, p. 21). The police today are an agency of control which functions also as an agency of social support. In spite of this the police are received with ambivalence and ambiguity.

The situation in Palestine in 1918, when the British Army occupied the area, was entirely different. The country was undeveloped and sparsely populated, with only a few small cities and the majority of the population living in rural areas. The Mandate Government in Palestine established a police force modeled after the British colonial police model: a centralized force, armed, with one task: to secure British political interests in the area, without concerning itself with the local population's will and needs.

From the theoretical point of view the study will rely mainly on two models :

1. Sir Charles Jeffries' (the English historian of the British Empire colonial police) model of police development in the colonies. In his opinion almost every police force which was set up in the British colonies passed successively through three structural stages :
  - a. The "improvisation stage" - a period in which the original police system of the conquered country was adopted, or modified to suit the new colonial conditions.

- b. The organization of the police along semi- military lines patterned after the Royal Irish Constabulary.
- c. The conversion of the semi-military police to a civil police similar to those prevailing in England (Jeffries, 1952, p. 33).

2. Bayley's four dimensions model from his recently published study: Patterns of Policing - A Comparative International Analysis. Bayley analysed the range of variation between different modern police forces in the world, exploring mainly four topical features: 1) Police structure. 2) Police strength. 3) Police functions. 4) Accountability and control of police (Bayley, 1985, p. 14).

The second part of the study will examine the conditions in Palestine in order to determine if the Palestine Police passed through these three stages, while the British Mandate ruled, and if not, why not. The latter part of the study will be devoted to the study of the Israel Police and to a comparative analysis of the two police forces which operated in the same country under different regimes, and different situations.

#### Sir Charles Jeffries' Colonial Police Model:

Until this century Great Britain was one of the larger Colonial Empires in the world. Forty-odd Colonies, Protectorates, Protected States, Trust Territories and Mandated Territories were dependents, willing or unwilling of the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State for

the Colonies, was the Minister in the British Cabinet entrusted by the King with the Seals of the Colonial Department, and it is the Parliament that the Secretary of State had to answer to in the discharge of his duties. Each of the colonies had its own government headed by a Governor appointed by the Crown. He held a commission under the British Government. His powers were conferred, and his duties defined by the Crown commission and by Royal Instructions conveyed to him through the office of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Governor in a colony was the single and supreme authority responsible to, and representative of the Crown. He held the title of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Crown in the colony (Parkenson, 1946, p. 137).

The Governor, or the High Commissioner, as he was called in Palestine and in a few other colonies, was the chief executive of the colony. In an ordinary way he acted in consultation with an Executive Council consisting partly of senior Crown officials and partly of representatives of the people of the territory. Legislation and budgetary control were vested in a representative body called the Legislative Council, which was made up of permanent officials, heads of departments, members of the people unofficial elected or nominated. Usually the British Government kept in their colonies small garrisons for security purposes or to face native disturbances, revolts or armed opposition. Generally the police forces in those colonies served as a separate government arm for the day-to-day maintenance of order and tranquility. As we know, the police in Britain developed as a civilian

unarmed body, uniformed, where every policeman holds his warrant or commission as an individual, inheritor of the ancient office of "constable", exercising in his own person the authority of the law and responsible to the law for his actions. With the exception of the Metropolitan Police in London, which is under Home Office authority, each police force in England is under a local authority. The development of the police in the colonies and territories followed different lines. Colonial police forces were not civilian bodies, but developed certain military characteristics which were not possessed by most of Great Britain's police forces. The police forces in the colonies were always organs of the central government, centralized and not divided into separate units under local authorities. There is nothing in the colonies corresponding to the police authority in England. In the colonies the police were under the orders of and responsible to the governor. The really effective influence upon the development of the colonial police forces was not that of the police of England, but that of the Royal Irish Constabulary. In Sir Charles Jeffries' opinion, modern police history actually begins not in Britain itself but in Ireland, with the passing of Irish Peace Preservation Act in 1814, when Sir Robert Peel was the Irish Secretary. This Act enabled the organization of constabulary forces in areas of disturbances. In 1822 a permanent force under four Inspector-Generals, one for each of the Irish Provinces, was established (Jeffries, 1952, p. 30). In 1836 the whole force was made the responsibility of one Inspector-General. The force was developed under clear para-military lines :

- a) The higher ranks invariably were filled by military personnel.
- b) The force was armed and trained in military exercise.
- c) The rank and file lived in barracks.
- d) The force discipline was a military discipline (Seamus, 1974, p. 45).

Ireland in these times was predominantly rural, with poor communications. Social conditions were largely primitive, and a substantial section of the population was strongly opposed to the government. A gendarmerie, armed and trained to operate as an agent of the central government of an occupying power, was considered more suitable as a model, than the English police system which localized and organized on civilian lines. What are police para-military forces? The term "para-military" has several definitions:

- 1. Organized military, but not a part of the official armed forces of a country.
- 2. Existing where there are no military services, or existing alongside the military services as a potential auxiliary or diversionary military organization (Auten, 1981, p. 68).

James H. Auten, who studied the para-military model of police forces, assumes that police forces organized and structured along paramilitary lines exhibit most, if not all, the following characteristics :

- 1 A centralized command structure with a strictly vertical and rigidly adhered to chain of command.
- 2 A rigid superior-subordinate relationship, defined by prerogatives



of rank.

3. Control exerted through the issuance of commands, directives, or general orders.
4. Clearly delineated lines of communication and authority.
5. The communication process is primarily vertical from top to bottom.
6. Employees who are encouraged to work primarily through threats or coercion.
7. Initiative at the supervisory and operational level neither sought, encouraged, nor expected.
8. An authoritarian style of leadership.
9. Emphasis on the maintenance of the status quo.
10. Highly structured, system of sanctions and discipline procedures to deal with non-conformists within the force.
11. Usually, a highly centralized system of operation.
12. Strict adherence to organizational guidelines in the form of commands, directives, general orders, or policy.
13. Lack of flexibility, when confronted with problems or situations not covered by existing directives, general orders, or policy and procedure.
14. Promotional opportunities which are usually only available to members of the organization.
15. An impersonal relationship between members of the organization.
16. Feelings of powerlessness in the lower levels of the organization.
17. Concept of the administrators and top command as being arbitrary.
18. Growing level of cynicism among supervisory and operational level

personnel.

19. Development of a "we-they" attitude among supervisory and operational level personnel toward top management (ibid., p. 69).

Sir Charles Jeffries (1952) classified the development of the British colonial police structure into three main phases:

The Improvisation Phase.

This phase occurred mostly in the first years of the British occupation of a new colonial territory. As the British Government's representatives in the colony learned the conditions in the area from the maintenance of law and order point of view, they tried to maintain continuity of regular constabulary operations. At this stage the new government typically continued the service of the law enforcement personnel from the former regime in order to mobilize voluntary collaboration of the public.

The Semi-Military Constabulary Force.

The second phase was the establishment of para-military constabulary forces modelled upon the Royal Irish Constabulary and organized mainly with a view to the suppression of crimes and mass outbreaks against the peace. This model of policing was developed in the colonies during the second half of the nineteenth century, and was introduced in all the British Administrations in Africa and elsewhere in that period and in the first decades of the twentieth century. These police forces were mobilized defence units in time of war or disturbances.

The Civilian Police Forces.

The third phase of the police development in the colonies was towards the modern trend of conversion of these semi-military constabularies into civilian police forces, following in most essentials the British pattern of police organization, but still retaining certain continuing supplementary functions of a military character. This early post-colonial modification of the British pattern was necessary for the special conditions of most of the colonial territories for the preservation of internal security, especially where no regular military forces were readily available and governments relied mainly upon the police to deal with emergency situations calling for armed action.

In the first two phases, most and in many cases all of the superior ranks were filled by British officers, only the rank and file being recruited from the local population. As the colonial people advanced socially and politically and the efficiency of the forces improved, more and more local men were promoted to superior grades (Jeffries, 1952, p. 32). In most of the colonies the officer in command of the police was also in charge of prisons and responsible for the fire service. In 1936 Britain established the Colonial Police Service at the Colonial Office in London. All the senior police officers from the rank of Assistant Superintendent (Captain) and above, in any colony, were members of the colonial police service and were liable to be transferred by the Secretary of State from one colony to another. Secondly the Colonial Police Service was charged with

laying down conditions of employment and had the ability to secure uniformity in matters of pay, pension, leave etc. throughout most of the colonial territories. In 1948 the Colonial Service consisted of about 1,500 officers ranging in rank from Assistant Superintendent to Commissioner or Inspector-General (Jeffries, p.45).

David Bayley's Model of Police Forces.

David Bayley, a scholar of comparative policing forces, concentrated in his latest book Patterns of Policing : A Comparative International Analysis, (1985) in developing general propositions about police functioning on the basis of comparative contemporary and historical information from different countries in Europe, Asia and the United States. In an effort to identify common patterns of development in different police forces in the world, Bayley covered mainly four points of differentiation :

1. Police structure.
2. Police strength.
3. Police function.
4. Police accountability and control.

Part two and part three analyse the development of the Palestine Police and the transition to the Israeli National Police in terms of Bayley's four dimension.

Police Structure

Bayley shows two main types of police structure : centralized and decentralized. A country is considered to have a centralized police force when operational directions can be given to the subunits from a single center of control. Independence of command in subunits is the indicator of decentralized structure (Bayley, 1985, p. 54). Finland, Italy, Ireland, and also Palestine from 1920 to 1948 and Israel now, are examples of centralized police systems. England, Japan and West Germany are examples of moderate degrees of decentralization. The United States, with about 40,000 independent law enforcement forces, and Canada with 450 municipal police forces, are examples of extremely decentralized police systems.

Bayley has assessed the factors accounting for differences in the types of police structure according to these dimensions. He found a strong association between centralization and the character of regimes. Tradition also exerts an inertial weight in preserving the the structure of the police as it was initially developed (Austria, England, the United States). Traditions of police centralization will be reinforced where state-building is accompanied by violent resistance. Police structures are not in general affected by the rise of crime but by violence which could threaten the political order (Bayley, p. 69).

### Police Strength:

In Bayley's opinion, the police strength is affected by the objectives of the police and their priorities in : deterring crime; maintaining public decorum and order; controlling riots; repressing political dissidents. The police strength is also related to the financial situation of its national or local government.

The international data shows a strong tendency for police strength to grow, probably because both population and crime have generally increased everywhere. Bayley's studies did not find that police strength is related to domestic turbulence or rise of crime. During the past 150 years the police strength in most of the countries had risen mainly because of urbanization and related population growth. Many countries use bureaucratic formulas to assess police manpower. The major variables for these formulas are: population, territorial size, crime, anticipated revenues, specific law and order problems (Bayley, p. 87).

### Police Function

In Policing a Free Society, Goldstein describes the police function as incredibly complex and observes that the total range of police responsibilities is extraordinarily broad (Goldstein, 1977, p. 21). Police work and its functions differ greatly from one country to another, from one jurisdiction to another. Bayley divided the police

function into three categories: assignments, situations and outcomes. The assignments are: patrol, criminal investigation, traffic regulation, internal administration and auxiliary regulations. Patrol is the dominant assignment in most of the police forces. Throughout the world the police carry out different additional assignments. In France the police issue identity cards, register motor vehicles and issue driver licences; the Japanese police enforce environmental pollution laws; the Canadian police enforce bylaws pertaining to sanitation and fire prevention; the Malaysian police record births and deaths (Bayley, 1985, p. 21). Situations are described as including both those that involve violation of the law and those that do not, such as crime emergency; crime prevention; dispute resolution; care of incapacitated persons; advisory; traffic; crowd control; non criminal investigation. Situations are fundamental because they are the most direct indicator of police work. They disclose the encounters between the police and the public. The research of situations could give indications of the allocation of the assignments (Bayley, p. 124). Outcomes are divided into two categories: enforcement and non enforcement. There are consistent differences in outcomes between police forces with similar composition of situations, and how much a police force devotes manpower and resources for fulfilling enforcement or non enforcement tasks.

#### Accountability and the Control of Police

" Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? ", literally: "Who will guard

the guardians" ? asked the Roman Decimus Junius Juvenalis about 1940 years ago. The same question is still appropriate today. In the last ten years we have faced widespread public and political debate upon the issue of political accountability. Richard Card maintains that: "A person is accountable to another if he is under duty to answer to that other for his actions; that duty being attended by the possibility of disciplinary measures if his actions are disapproved or irregular.... A person will be under another's control if he can be given orders as to his actions. The fact that a person is accountable to another for a particular conduct, does not necessarily mean that he can be given orders concerning such conduct" (Card, 1979, p. 9). Kerry Milte assumes that the democratic system acknowledges the potential for abuse of police power through brutality, spying, secrecy and arbitrary undisciplined behavior. Positive measures to ensure that this potential is contained and kept under control, are vital and indispensable (Milde, 1977, p. 8).

In the discussion on the accountability of the police and the control which can be exercised over them, it is important to understand the real meaning of the word. The Dictionary of Public Administration defines accountability as: "An extent to which one is responsible to higher authority - legal or organizational - for one's actions at large or within one's particular organizational position (Shafritz, 1984, p. 4). In Webster's Third New International Dictionary accountability is: quality or state of being accountable, liable, or responsible (Webster, 1984, p. 13). In the Dictionary of



Modern Politics the concept of accountability is defined as follows:

"The strongly normative meaning, common in democracies that involves the idea that those who exercise power whether as governments, or as appointed officials, are in a sense stewards and must be able to show that they have exercised their power and discharge their duties properly. Second, accountability may refer to the arrangements made for securing conformity between the values of a delegating body and the person or persons to whom powers and responsibilities are delegated" (Robertson, 1987, p. 2).

The problem of police accountability is one of the most difficult in democratic theory and practice. The issue is how to restrain police practice, in particular the exercise of discretion, without affecting either the public or the ability of the police to do their job. Robert Reiner expresses the view that in order to achieve responsible behavior on the part of the police, society has to develop mechanisms of constraint, external to the police organization. These are considered as of three analytically distinct types:

- a. A judicial function of determining whether or not specific police actions have breached legal or procedural rules.
- b. A quasi-legislative function of setting priorities in the allocation of resources between different legitimate policing duties.
- c. An executive one of managing the performance of these in the most efficient and effective way possible (Reiner, 1984, p. 18).

Control over the police is exerted by mechanisms located both inside and outside the police. The internal control is performed by the

provisions of a hierarchical supervision, strict disciplinary proceedings, code and procedure, peer responsibility and socialization. The external control is divided in two main types: External-Exclusive and External-Inclusive (Bayley, 1985, p. 161).

#### External - Exclusive

The External-Exclusive mechanisms of control are those which devote a large part, or most, of their attention and activity to the police. Those mechanisms can be located within governments or outside, may be composed from one official or more, may be carried out by bureaucrats, politicians or a combination of the two, as in the following examples:

1. Government Executive Branch (Police Authorities). In London the Metropolitan Police is accountable to the Home Secretary who is a member of the British Cabinet. In the United States the F.B.I. is accountable to the Attorney General, who is a member of the Administration of the President of the United States. In Israel the Minister of Police, who is a member of the Israeli Cabinet, is charged with the control of the police and the corrections system. In the cities of the United States, the accountability is to mayors or city managers and in the states to the governors. In the English counties the standing joint committees, a body composed of equal numbers of elected councillors nominated by the County Council and Justices of the Peace, elected at quarter sessions. In the cities and the boroughs of England and Wales the police authority is the watch committee, a

body composed of not more than one-third of the local council (Royal Commission, 1962, p. 51). In England the police authority has no power to give instructions to the chief of police regarding the exercise of police power. The police authority can interfere in the limited areas of administrative matters and appeals for disciplinary proceedings. It cannot interfere and give directions in matters of law enforcement or force policy. The Home Office exercises a great deal of control over local forces through control over their funding. The police authority has four main duties:

- a. To provide an adequate police force for the area.
- b. To constitute a body of citizens concerned with the well-being of the local police force and their standards and needs; interested in maintenance of law and order and able to advise the chief of police about local problems.
- c. To appoint, and if necessary to remove the chief of police, his deputy and assistants.
- d. To foster good relations between the police and public (Lambert, 1986, p. 38; Mark, 1977, p. 15).

The courts in England have ruled that the power of the police is original, and not delegated and is exercised by the chief of police, at his own discretion by virtue of his office. He is neither a servant of the Crown nor of the police authority (Alderson, 1975, p. 42). In the Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex p. Blackburn case (1968) 1 ALL ER. 763, Lord Denning said:

"He (the chief constable) is not the servant of any one save of

the law itself. No Minister of the Crown could tell him that he must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and law alone"

The responsibility for maintaining public order in the United States is decentralized and locally controlled by political authorities. Americans widely believe that maintaining local control over the police is the most effective means for avoiding abuse and assuming influence through the elected officials (mayor, city manager, city council, elected boards). Through the elected officials the police are accountable to the citizenry. Americans fear the creation of police organizations that are immune from directions and inspection by elected representatives of the public (Manning, 1971, pp. 168-69).

2. Civil Review Boards. Civil review boards were established in the 1950s in the United States, and were responsible for receiving and investigating complaints of police misbehavior. These boards became more popular in the 1960s, but this popularity appears to have declined in the 1980s.

#### External - Inclusive

The external-inclusive mechanisms of control are those institutions that control the police indirectly or as a part of their

more general activities. Such mechanisms include:

1. Courts - The system of checks and balances between the three branches of government, make the chief of police, as an administrator, judicially accountable to the courts. The courts provide the citizen with an avenue of judicial review on certain police activities or decisions, such as: wrong interpretation of the law; acts beyond the authorized power; capricious acts which violate individual rights (Rosen, 1982, p. 96). Courts in England, the United States, Israel and other Western countries, are empowered to punish police officers for criminal offences committed in the line of duty and even in certain cases to award civil damages. The courts in England have recognized that the chiefs of police, in carrying out their duties to enforce the law, have a discretion with which the courts will not normally interfere. Only in extreme cases, when the chief of police refuses to carry out his duty to enforce the law, will the court intervene and order him to change his policy, but will not direct him how to perform his functions (Card, 1979, p. 13). In Israel the High Court of Justice, which is a part of the Supreme Court, can intervene when citizens have a complaint against government officials violating the principles of justice, overstepping the limits of their legal jurisdiction or causing legal errors (Freudenheim, 1967, p. 250).
2. Legislators - Legislators in Western countries can influence the police activity in three ways: by making laws that establish what the police are expected to do, and creating conditions favorable to responsible behavior (pay, qualification for appointment, etc.); by fixing the budget or appropriating money for special activities or

programs; by subjecting police activity to public scrutiny through questions and investigations.

Legislative Committees or Standing Committees in various Western countries exercise continuous "watchfulness" over agencies under their jurisdiction, as do the Home Affairs Committee in England, and the Interior Committee in Israel. In England the Parliament or the Standing Committee, and in Israel the Knesset or the Interior Committee, cannot instruct the police directly in their duties, but the recommendations or views of these bodies carry a great deal of weight (Likhovski, 1971, p. 171; Rosen, 1982, p. 49).

3. The Media - The media are one of the most important external inclusive mechanisms of control over the police. Investigative reporters have given the news media vastly increased potential for holding police accountable. The press may influence police accountability by rigorously covering abusive behavior and seeking out malpractice. The police chiefs and rank and file are extremely sensitive to the power of the media, even if they are cynical about the content of the newspapers and television coverage of police. The media frequently influence the public on controversial issues connected with the police (Perez, 1978, p. 86-89).

4. The Public - It is commonly acknowledged that the police cannot successfully carry out their tasks and functions without the support and confidence of the people. From the first day that the uniformed policemen made their appearance on the streets of London in September 1829, and years afterwards, those policemen were treated with hate,

hostility, disregard and brutality. It was many years before the English principle of policing by consent was known and accepted. Unfortunately today, almost all over the world, the police are unpopular and not perceived as impartial or neutral enforcers of the law, particularly by minorities in the large cities (Hudson, 1971, p. 518; Brogen, 1982, p. 5; Royal Commission, 1962, p. 99). Individually, citizens have different impressions of the nature of the police role. Those impressions sometimes stem from their personal experiences in contact with the police, or are based on a glamorized conception of the police produced by the media. The keys to police morality and accountability are the public respect, support and confidence, as these are reassured and reinforced by organizational means of control.

#### Research Methodology

The main research question this study addresses is: Did the transition from the Mandate rule to an independent and democratic state in Israel change the role and conceptions of accountability and control of the police in Israel? The study will order its investigation of the main question round examination of the following sub-questions:

1. Did the Palestine Police prepare a future Jewish police command cadre in anticipation of the British evacuation from Palestine and the independence of Israel?
2. Did there occur an official or orderly transition between the Palestine Police and the new Israeli Police ?

3. Why did the Israeli Police initially take the Palestine Police as a model for structure and organization, in spite of the differences between the two regimes and the contrast between the tasks and functions of the former police and its successor?
4. What kind of budget, resources, manpower and priorities did the Israeli Government allocate to the new police force, at the first stages of its establishment?
5. What was the new police force commanding staff background: Palestine Police, British Army or "Hagana" underground ?
6. Were the Jewish police officers (from lieutenant and above) who served in the Palestine Police, accepted by the new Israeli Police commanders. Were they appointed to superior assignments?
7. Did the Israel Police move quickly toward significant changes and modernization?

The study will involve a combination of three research methodologies: the historical method, the case method and the comparative method. The historical method, will concentrate on an historical analysis of the role played by the Palestine Police in various stages of its development, during the British Mandate on Palestine. The study of the Palestinian period will focus, mainly on the last period of the Mandate, 1945-1948. It will deal with: the Palestine Police structure and organization; the role and function and the police image. These factors will be examined to determine how they affect the nature of control and accountability of the police. The political situation during this period will be taken into account. The



historical study will review the impact of the political circumstances surrounding the formation of the State of Israel and the defensive war against the Arabs, on the establishment of the Israel National Police. It will analyze how the changes that took place in Israeli society shortly after the Independence affected the structure, the functions and the accountability of the Israeli Police. The ideal which inspires the historian in search of the utmost knowledge of the past, is to achieve the most informed understanding of occurrences and personalities that are available. Sources and discriminating evaluation of those sources, make possible the writing of the history with a high degree of credibility (Social Science Research Council, 1946, p. 138). Achievement of this ideal will be the objective of the writer in this study.

The second method used in this work is the case study method. A "case study" is considered as any research investigation which analyzes a phenomenon in its real-life context (Yin, 1983, p. iii). The case study method can overlap with the historical method. While the historical method deals with the "dead past", the case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, when two sources of evidence not usually included in the historian's work are used: direct observation and systematic interviewing (Yin, 1984, p. 19). The case study represents a comprehensive description and explanation of a certain social situation, in which the researcher will collect and examine as much data as can be found on the research subject (Bablie, 1973, p. 37).

The writer will interview former political leaders, who played a role in the establishment and stabilization of the Israeli democracy and the development of mechanisms of control, and ,also, former Israeli police chiefs and commanders, who administered the police in the first decade of its establishment. Open-ended interviews will add primary evidence from additional and independent sources, making possible cross-reference, validation, or contradiction of data collected from archival and other sources.

The third method, the comparative analysis, will be used to do a longitudinal comparative analysis of one institution, the police, through the rule of two different governments, Palestine and Israel. A comparison of two similar forces at different times and in different political contexts provides an acceptable setting for the application of this method, as Arend Lijphort states: "An alternative way of maximizing comparability is to analyze a single country diachronically" (Lijphort, 1971, p. 689).

#### Archival and Published Primary Sources of Information

Very little was written in the 30 years during which the Palestine Police existed. A few former British police officers who served in the Palestine Police in different periods of the Mandate have written their memoirs in the form of short articles or books (Duff, 1935; Courtney, 1939; Marsh, 1940; Farran ,1948; Morton, 1957).

A second source of information on the Palestine Police tasks, activities and history can be found in the British Colonial Office reports and the Palestine Government publications. A third source, very valuable for the richness in detail, are the Palestine Police Annual Reports, which began publication in 1931. The Palestine Police Force and Prison Service Standing Orders and Instructions, which were published in 1937 and up-dated until the end of the British Mandate, form another important primary source documenting the organizational structure of the Palestine Police. Only four short articles ( Kingsley Heath, 1928; Ariel, 1948; Jeffries, 1952 and Bowden, 1975) provide some historical background relating to this colonial police force.

In 1970 the Association of Former Jewish Palestine Police Officers appointed a committee whose task was to interview the association members with a view to compiling an oral history of the period. This history was published with help of the Ministry of Defense. This work is neither scholarly nor an organizational study, but includes valuable information on the Palestine Police, its tasks and the behavior of its members toward its Jewish officers and toward the Jewish population as a whole (Frumer, 1974). Edward Horne's book A Job Well Done, which was published in Great Britain in 1982, bridged a gap in the written history of the Palestine Police. Horne, a former British officer in the Palestine Police, is not an historian, but he succeeds in at last putting together his observations and memories in an orderly manner. It is clear that in his writing he presents a quite partisan view of the British involvement in Palestine. In spite of

this, his book is the only detailed analysis of the history of the Palestine Police (Horne, 1982).

If little has been written on the Palestine Police, even less can be found on the Israel Police. After 40 years of its existence, not one book has been written addressing the history, or organization of the Israeli Police. A few police comparative studies analysing different police forces, have reviewed contemporary Israeli Police organization and functions, while ignoring its historical roots. Connections between the early structure of the Israeli Police and that of its predecessor, the Palestine Police has been made, but in a very cursory and superficial fashion (Mylonas, 1973; Shane, 1980). The same criticism can be made of those few articles exclusively devoted to the Israeli Police (Hovav, 1965; Reifin, 1967; Rubinstain, 1969; Gurevitch, 1971; Kalden, 1973; Gamson, 1977; Besinger, 1981).

The only in depth analysis of the Israeli Police is Meir Hovav's and Menachem Amir's article (1979). This, however, devotes only three pages to the historical perspective with the remainder concentrating on modern issues. Obvious sources of primary information on the history of the Israeli Police and its development are the Israeli Police Annual Reports, and the Israeli Police Standing Orders, which replaced the old Palestine Police Orders, and which have been issued since the first week of the force's establishment. The Proceedings of the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) will be a supplementary source of information on the subject, mainly because of the Knesset regular

debates, the substance of the Minister of Police annual reports on police activity. Knesset Proceedings also include references to the police and policing in a variety of contexts. To sum up the sources of information for this study were as follows :

1. Relevant theoretical, conceptual, historical and organizational literature.
2. Government (published and unpublished) documents, reports and publications.
3. Primary archival sources in the Israel Government Archives, the Public Record Office in London, the United Nations Archives in New York, the Zionist Movement Archives in Jerusalem and New York, and the "Hagana" Archive in Tel Aviv.
4. Palestine Police and Israeli Police published and unpublished documents, reports and publications.
5. Articles and news reports on the police which were published by the major newspapers in Palestine and Israel, covering the period 1947-1958. An effort will be made to survey newspapers reflecting all sides of local opinion.
6. Open-ended interviews with senior police officers and political personalities who played a role in the establishment of the Israeli Police.

To avoid bias in this study, and to increase its reliability and validity, the following principles were adopted:

- The use of multiple written and oral sources of evidence. A single witness may be accurate, but two or more witnesses, if independent,

increase the changes of credibility and reliability. As Louis Gottscholk, the great historian, said; "The reliance upon two or more reliable witnesses gives a strong presumption that the material researched is trustworthy" (Gottscholk, 1960, p. 161).

- A chain of evidence was maintained.
- All the evidence was critically examined and analysed in order to exclude those materials that were found unauthentic or not credible.
- The study of data that offer background and a historical context.
- An effort was made to assure that the data examined represented all pertinent data on the Palestine and Israeli Police.
- The data collected was cross-refered and triangulated through consultation of related archival collections, as recommended by John H. Stanfield: "The most effective way to combat negative effects of historical awareness and contemporaneous errors in fact have on external validity, is to triangulate archival-data collection with in-depth or oral-history interviews and with extensive reading of secondary literature pertinent to the issue" (Stanfield, 1987, p.379).

Integrity is the obligation of all who seek the truth. Though I cannot be absolutely impartial, as an Israeli and an Israeli policeman, I will do my best to be intellectually honest in this study. The events studied concerning the creation of the Israel Police occurred about 40 years ago, when I was only a new immigrant and a police recruit, without any power to influence police thinking. This fact should help assure the reduction of bias influence on this study.

## Part Two: THE PALESTINE POLICE, 1918-1948

Chapter III: Palestine - A Historical and Political Background.

The Israeli National Police is a relatively new police force established on May 15, 1948, the day on which independence was proclaimed and the the State of Israel was established in a limited part of Palestine-Eretz Israel. Palestine, which was occupied by the British army after the defeat of the Turkish army in 1918, was placed by the League of Nations under a British Mandate. A Palestine Police, as the main security force of the country, was established. In order to explore the roots of the Israeli Police the study will analyze the chronicles and the deeds of the Palestine Police between the years 1918 and 1948. James G. Wilson (1978) said: " The police work is always carried out under the influence of a political culture ". The above is even more accurate for Palestine, where actually a Colonial Government ruled the country and the police was its main coercive instrument.

The turbulent political history of Palestine had a considerable influence on the Palestine Police structure, strength, functions, activity and development. It would be an impossible mission to analyze this police force without comments and reviews of the political events and breaches of the peace which occurred between the years 1920 and 1948, the year that Britain withdrew from Palestine and the State of Israel was established.

Due to the fact that this study is concerned with the development of the police in Israel by means of an historical and organizational analysis, it is appropriate to familiarize the reader with the chronicles of the Jews and their links to Palestine, the fatherland. This part of the study will briefly touch upon the historical background, the geographical location, population, the development of the Zionist movement and how the Mandate on Palestine was given to the United Kingdom, after the World War One.

### The Historical Background

The Hebrews, tribes from a Western Semites origin, migrated (according to the Bible) in the 19th century B.C headed by Abraham, from Uz of the Chaldean to Horan, and from there to what was called later Transjordan and Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel). Because of food shortages the Abraham family migrated to Egypt. After the exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt and their wandering in Sinai desert, the tribes of Israel headed by Joshua conquered Transjordan and Cnaan, at the end of 14th century and during the 13th century B.C.E, and settled the land. A process of transition from nomadic way of life to a permanent agricultural mode of life in small unwallled settlement began. In 1020 B.C.E Saul was anointed as King of the Hebrews and he united the tribes of Israel in a war against the Philistines who controlled the shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Saul established the first Israel Kingdom. His successor as King of Israel was David (c.1000 B.C.E) who captured Jerusalem and made it into his capital



and the spiritual centre of Israel. Salomon, the third king of Israel reigned from 970 to 930 B.C.E, and built the Temple of Jerusalem which was intended to serve as the focal point of religious-cultural life on a national scale (Ripel, 1983, p.187).

After King Salomon's death, the kingdom was divided into Israel in the north and Judea in the south. The kingdom of Israel existed until the destruction of Samaria by the Assyrians in 722 B.C.E. The kingdom of Judea continued to exist until the destruction of Jerusalem and the first Temple by the Babylonians in the year 586 B.C.E. Most of the settlements were demolished and a large part of the people were carried off in captivity to Assyria and Babylon (Ripel, p. 205). The Temple was rebuilt between 520 and 515 B.C.E and the walls of Jerusalem reconstructed in 445 by the permission of the King of Persia. Thereafter, and until the Arab conquests in the seventh century C.E, Eretz Israel (Land of Israel) and all its neighbors fell under the influence of kingdoms and cultures whose main source of inspiration derived from the Greeks and later from the Romans. From 166 B.C.E until 73 C.E there were a few periods that Judea was independent and periods that Israelis revolted against their foreign oppressors, like the Maccabee rebellion in 166-60 over Syrian armies and the revolt against Rome in 66-73 C.E which led to the siege of Jerusalem, the second destruction of the Temple, the fall of Masada and the exile of most of the Jewish population from the country. The Romans changed the name of Jerusalem to Aelia Capitolina and the name of Judea to Palestine.

Those events marked the suppression and termination of the Jewish independence. In 634 the Arabs conquered Syria and Eretz Israel. In 1099 the Crusaders in a holy expedition conquered the country and established a Christian Kingdom which existed until 1291 when Eretz Israel was conquered by the Mamluks. In 1516 the Ottomans, who were in their golden period, succeeded in defeating the Mamluk army of Egypt and gained Syria and Palestine (Eretz Israel). The Turks were sovereigns of this country for four hundred years. In spite of all the wars, the exiles, the massacres, the suppressions and the cultural and religious discrimination, a remnant of the Jewish population persisted in Palestine and survived through the Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Crusaders, Arabs, Mamluk and Turkish rules.

#### The Zionist Movement

The exile and migration from Palestine took the Jews to Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen, later to Greece and Italy, from where they followed the Roman legions into France, Germany and England. In the trail of the Arab conquest the Jews settled the shores of the Western Mediterranean, mainly in Spain. Oppression during the 14th and 15th centuries accompanied by massacres in Central Europe drove large numbers of Jews to Poland and Russia. The expulsion of the Jews from Spain at the time of the Inquisition caused Spanish Jews to migrate to the Netherlands, Italy, the Balkans and other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Persecution of the Jews in Czarist Russia, exemplified by the frequent pogroms, at the end of the nineteenth

century caused a wave of migration back to Western Europe and America. The position of the Jews as a religious out-group, their homelessness as a nation, and their minority status rendered them targets of attack and victims of oppression, persecution and massacres in most parts of the world. The beginnings of the modern Jewish return to the Land of Israel were due to a combination of a factors:

- The age-old devotion of the Jews to their historic homeland, the longing for redemption and their spiritual attachment to Eretz Israel.
- The intolerable conditions under which Jews generally lived in Eastern Europe and their sense of exile produced by widespread anti-Semitic movements, pogroms, repression, restrictions and persecution.
- The efforts of an active Jewish minority convinced of the inevitability of the return of the Jews to Eretz Israel as a fundamental solution of the Jewish problem (Louvish, 1973, p. 13).

Leo Pinsker, a Jewish-Russian physician, wrote in his book The Auto-Emancipation in 1882 on the Jewish chronicles of their exile in Europe and their need for emancipation and self-determination. He assumed that the Jews would never be able to identify themselves with the countries and societies within which they lived. In his opinion there are three main causes of anti-Semitism:

- The Jews are a "ghost people" without a homeland and a national identity.
- The Jews are everywhere foreigners and treated as unrespected strangers.
- The Jews are always in economic competition with every minority

within the country in which they are living (Finsker, 1882).

Theodor Hertzl, a Jewish-Viennese newspaper correspondent in Paris, wrote a pamphlet in 1886 entitled, The Jewish State, in which he developed the concept of a Jewish homeland. In 1897 in Basel Switzerland, Jewish leaders from Europe and elsewhere convened the first Zionist Congress, presided over by Hertzl. At this Congress, the Zionist Movement was founded. The root of the term "Zionism" is the word "Zion" a term used in the Bible as a synonym both for the Land of Israel and for its national and spiritual capital, Jerusalem. Zionism is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people. It is a modern realization and expression of 1900 years of dreams: to rebuild Israel by an ongoing effort through political means, in the belief that the Jewish people have the right to freedom and political independence in their homeland. These aspirations were formulated as a concrete aim at the first Zionist Congress in these words: " Zionism aims to create a publicly secured, legally assured home for the Jewish people in Palestine" (Jewish Agency, 1947, p. 1). Theodore Hertzl, the creator of the Zionist Organization developed his own definition of Zionism. He said: "Zionism is the Jewish nation on the way" and he meant the Jewish people on its way back to its home land. The Zionist leaders believed that by diplomacy and direct negotiation with European politicians and the Ottoman Sultan, they would secure the cooperation of the Great Powers and the Sultan, for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (Ben-Gurion, 1953, p. 30). The beginnings of the modern Jewish return to the Land of Israel, the

first Aliyah (immigration) took place in July 7, 1882, when a small group of 14 Jews from Europe landed in Palestine. Between 1882 and 1914 about 70,000 Jewish immigrants settled in Eretz Israel (Louvish, 1973, p. 48).

#### The Balfour Declaration

Towards the end of World War One, the British Government made public on November 2, 1917, a letter from Arthur James Balfour, then the British Foreign Secretary, to Lord Rothschild, of the British Zionist Federation, which is known as the Balfour Declaration (Stein, 1961) :

Foreign Office,

November 2nd, 1917.

" Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. I should be grateful if you

would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation."

(-) Arthur James Balfour

The Declaration was hailed by Jews throughout the world as a charter of the Jewish national renewal. The Declaration was endorsed by the French and Italian Governments and by the President of the United States and conceived by its authors as an act of historic reparation. (Jewish Agency Statements and Memoranda, 1947, p. 264). In retrospect, Christopher Sykes, the son of Sir Mark Sykes, a member of the British Parliament during the early years of the British Mandate on Palestine, wrote in his book Crossroads to Israel 1917-1948 (Sykes, 1965, p. 4):

"The brief and famous letter which Lord Balfour sent to Lord Rothschild, complicated British policy in the East from that time to our own, and perhaps for many years to come. Nobody knows why the Balfour Declaration was made"

In the opinion of the Jewish leaders from the Zionist Movement, the Balfour Declaration, which became an alliance between Britain and the Jewish people, was formed to carry out a great joint enterprise. Behind this declaration lies a long period of British sympathy for Jewish hopes and of Jewish admiration for Britain.

The British Mandate on Palestine

The first World War between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers, which started in 1914, ended with the victory of the Allied Powers. During the course of 1917 and 1918, the Allied Forces completed their defeat of the Turkish armies and occupied a large territory comprising Palestine-Eretz Israel, which was placed under a British Military Administration. The San Remo Conference of the principal Allied Powers in April 1920 decided that the Mandate for the government of Palestine should be entrusted to Great Britain and that: "The Mandatory Power will be responsible for putting into effect the Declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the British Government in favor of the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people" (Book of Documents, 1947, p. 13)

On July 24, 1922 the Mandate for Palestine was confirmed by the League of Nations. The Mandatory Power, to which the government of a territory is delegated by the League of Nations, held the territory on a double trust: On the behalf of the inhabitants of the territory and on the behalf of the League of Nations. The Mandatory Government was required to carry out the administration of the territory in such a way as to secure the well-being and progress of the population and gradually lead them toward autonomy. The Mandate document's preamble mentioned the agreement of the Allied Powers that the Mandatory Government should be responsible for putting into effect the Lord Balfour Declaration, without prejudice to the civil and religious

rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. The preamble formally acknowledged the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, and their right to reconstructing their national home in that country. The following are those articles of the Mandate most relevant to this study:

#### Article 2

"The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

#### Article 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country. The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.



## Article 6

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

## Article 25

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Article 15, 16 and 18. " (Book of Documents, 1947, p. 39-46).

Analysing the preamble of the Mandate and its main articles, it is submitted that the primary and overriding purpose of the Mandate for Palestine was the establishment of the Jewish National Home there. After the Mandate had been approved by the Council of the League of Nations, His Majesty, in his Privy Council of Great Britain, issued the Palestine Order in Council of 1922, that has the authority as an Act of Parliament. This was a constitutional instrument used by the British Government for the establishment of its jurisdiction in

foreign countries, and provided the Palestine Government with the legal authority to enact any local laws necessary. At the same time as existing British Imperial laws and regulations were applied to Palestine, other laws affecting Palestine only were introduced by the Order in Council (Bentwich, 1930, p. 29). According to the Order in Council, 1922, the Palestine Administration would be composed as follows:

1. The High Commissioner - the representative of the King in whose name he was to discharge his functions. He was to be the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Palestine with very broad executive, legislative and administrative powers, limited only by the terms of the Mandate, the Order in Council, and instructions received from the the Secretary of Colonial Office in the British Cabinet (Article 4 of the Order).
2. The Chief Secretary - In the absence of the High Commissioner the Chief Secretary would be acting High Commissioner and always his Deputy in charge of the daily administration.
3. A Executive Council consisting of the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General, the Treasurer, as Ex officio members, and other persons holding office in the public service that the High Commissioner chose to appoint. The Executive Council could assist the High Commissioner but he was not bound by their recommendations.
4. A Legislative Council with the power to enact laws thought be necessary for the peace, order and good government of Palestine. The Legislative Council was to consist of 22 members in addition to the High Commissioner. Ten of them were to be official members of the

Government: The Chief Secretary, Attorney General, Treasurer, Inspector-General of Police, Director of Health, Director of Public Works, Director of Education, Director of Agriculture, Director of Customs, Director of Commerce and Industry. The 12 unofficial members of the Council were to be elected from the population (Article 21).

5. The Order in Council also provided for the establishment of the judiciary branch: Magistrates Courts, District Courts, Land Courts, Court of Criminal Assize (felonies punishable with death), Supreme Court, Tribal Courts, Civil Courts, Religious Courts for Muslims, Jews and Christians.

#### The Country - Boundaries and Population

Palestine under the Ottoman rule comprised a part of the "vilayet" (an administration district) of Beirut, part of the Vilayet of Syria, and Jerusalem was an independent "sanjak" (a smaller administrative unit). Palestine was not a separate and distinctive political unit within the Ottoman Empire. It had no executive bodies elected or appointed to govern it as a distinct political unit, and no legislative body was unique to it (Joseph, 1948, p. 5).


The area that was given to Britain as a Mandate territory was 117,000 square km; 27,090 of them west of the Jordan river and about 90,000 east of it. Palestine lies at the Eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. The political boundaries according to the Mandate were: The Lebanon and Syria French Mandate on the north; The Egyptian

province of Sinai on the south; The Iraq British Mandate on the east; The Mediterranean Sea on the west. In 1922 the whole of the Trans-Jordan (the east part of Palestine) was declared by the British Government as a local Arab principality, headed by an Arab Emir, and separated from Palestine. The Palestine Mandate territory was reduced to 27,090 sq. km. (Gertz, 1947, p. 15).

In 1914 the population of Palestine was estimated at 689,300, including 524,150 Moslems (76,2 percent), 94,000 Jews (13,6 percent) and 70,000 Christians (10,1 percent). The official census of 1922 found a total population of 752,000, including 589,177 Moslems (78,3 percent), 83,790 Jews (11 percent) and 71,464 Christians (9,5 percent). (Bachi, 1974, p. 5).


In 1922, the year that Britain was given the Mandate for Palestine, there were 13 towns in Palestine: Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa, Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron, Nablus, Ramle, Safad, Acre, Bethlehem, Nazareth and Tiberias. The larger Towns were: Jerusalem- 62,578 inhabitants, (33,971 of them Jews); Jaffa - 32,524; Haifa - 24,635; Tel-Aviv - 15,185. The nine other towns had a average population of 10,000 inhabitants. 61 percent of the Palestine population lived in rural areas (Bachi, 1974, p. 32).

Figure 1: Palestine Mandate Territory



Source: Youth Institute for Peace in the Middle East, 1985.

Figure 2: Palestine After the Establishment of Transjordan, 1922



Source: Youth Institute for Peace in the Middle East, 1985.

#### Chapter IV: Policing Palestine - The First Decade

##### The Beginning - Military Administration

The Turkish Police forces, before Palestine was conquered by the British Troops, were very small and were formed from Municipal Police units in the main Palestine towns: Jerusalem - 15 policemen, Gaza - 10, Jaffa - 10, Hebron and Beersheba each had 5 policemen. The rural areas were patrolled by five Turkish Gendarmerie units each composed of 2 officers, 12 non-commissioned officers and seventy troopers. Three of these units were mounted and two were on foot. The units were stationed in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron and Beersheba (Robicek, 1975, p. 23).

After the British armies under Field-Marshal Lord Allenby occupied Palestine, a military governor was appointed in each town. The military administration disbanded the Turkish local police forces and the gendarmerie and replaced them with forces recruited locally. A large part of the new recruits were the former Turkish policemen from the native population, mainly Arabs.

The Standing Orders and General Instructions of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration - South (the British Headquarters that administrated Palestine) which was published in October 1918 (p. 41) set up the establishment of the police forces in Palestine, as follows:

Table 1 - The Police Strength in Palestine, 1918

| District  | Police | Gendarmerie | Total |
|-----------|--------|-------------|-------|
| Jerusalem | 76     | 189         | 265   |
| Jaffa     | 14     | 151         | 165   |
| Gaza      | 9      | 125         | 134   |
| Hebron    | 9      | 136         | 145   |
| Beersheba | -      | 27          | 27    |
| Total     | 108    | 528         | 736   |

All ranks below the rank of Assistant Commissioner in the Police were allotted serial numbers, commencing from number one. The Standing Orders forbade the enlistment in the police of those who previously served in the Turkish Police or Gendarmerie. The Standing Orders required the discharge of serving police in these categories at the first available opportunity. The Standing Orders also recommended the enlistment of both police and gendarmerie in the approximate ratio of the three main religious elements of the Palestine population (Moslems 70 %, Jews 20 %, Christians 10 %) (Standing Orders, p. 42).

Because difficulties immediately arose in recruiting the whole of



the necessary force from the local population, the Egyptian Military Authorities loaned a battalion of 300 men to undertake police duties in Palestine. The Police Forces in Palestine comprised at the beginning of 1919 of 1,273 men (Occupied Enemy Territory Estimates, 1919, p. 12). Two hundred and fifty new recruits from the local population, among them 8 Jews, were sent at the end of the year 1918 to Ismayilia in Egypt to a police training course lasting three months. The course was not on a high level but gave the participants a basic introduction to police functions and tasks (Frumer, 1974, p. 12). In July 1919 Major-General Sir Harold Watson became Chief Administrator. He immediately ordered the unification of the police local forces in Palestine under a single Department of Security. Lt. Col. Percy B. Bromley, formerly Deputy Inspector-General of Police for the United Provinces of India, was appointed as Assistant Administrator of Police and Prisons (Horne, 1982, p. 23).

#### The Palestine Police Force

The Palestine Police Force was formally created on July 1, 1920 when a civil government under Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner took over the administration from the military authorities. The Force, which had an establishment of 1217 policemen at the beginning of the year, was reduced to 1160 within a few months because of financial difficulties (Government of Palestine Report, 1922, p. 97). A salary of 3.5 Egyptian pounds per month in the years 1919-1920, and six Palestinian pounds per month later, did not attract high quality

recruits, particularly among the Jews whose standard of living was higher than that of the Arabs. Each constable recruited into the Palestine Police force was committed to serve five years after an initial training course at the police school (Bowden, 1975, p. 116).


Under the Civil Administration the Country was divided into seven administrative districts, later reduced to three, each with a District Governor and officers in charge of Sub-Districts. The head of the police force retained the title of Director of Public Security with the rank of Commandant. He was in charge of both the police and the prisons and was assisted by two Assistant Commanders, one for the general administration of the force and one for the control of criminal investigation. Each administrative district was commanded by a District Commandant who was supplied with a staff of Assistant Commandants, British Reserve Inspectors (a title used in the India Police which was changed to 1st Inspector of Police) and Sub-Inspectors. An Inspector or a Sub-Inspector was placed in charge of each police station that was opened. Some of those officers in these ranks were Palestinians. Small police posts were established in certain villages and each staffed by a non-commissioned officer and 4-6 constables. Although the civil administration initially divided the country in seven districts, the police later found it more suitable for police purposes to work with three police districts: Jerusalem, Northern and Southern Districts. In 1920, under this chart of organization, the force was divided into 24 police stations and 65 police posts (Heath, 1928, p. 80; Horne, 1982, p. 37). Palestine Police

Organization Chart, 1920 - see Figure 3 on the next page. During 1920 and until February 1921, financial considerations unfortunately involved unsettling changes in the strength and constitution of the police. There could be no certainty or permanency of service to attract recruits, and the type of men obtainable was naturally indifferent. A serious situation arose in the winter of 1920 and the spring of 1921, owing to the resignation of 60 percent of the force on the score of being underpaid and inadequately quartered. The strength of the regular force was at the end of 1921: 70 officers (Palestinians and British) and 1143 other ranks. Excluding the British officers, the composition by religious group was: Moslems - 26 officers and 824 policemen; Christians - 16 officers and 198 policemen; Jews - 12 officers and 100 policemen (Report on Palestine Administration, 1922, p. 99).

#### The Police Ordinance, 1921

On February 22, 1921 the Police Ordinance was published. Before this there was no proper legislative authority to the police activity. The Standing Orders of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration from October 1918 ordered only the establishment and the strength of the Police, the recruitment, the salaries and the uniform, but those Orders did not constitute a complete legislative act. The Police Ordinance was regulated by the High Commissioner according to the British experience in their Colonies. The Ordinance determined that Palestine would support one police force under the control of the

Figure 3 : Palestine Police Organization Chart - 1920



Source: Horne, 1982, pp. 55-56.

Palestine Government (meaning the High Commissioner). The Administration of the Police was to be vested in an officer to be styled "The Inspector-General of Police and Prisons" assisted by a Deputy Inspector-General and Assistant Inspector-Generals. The administration of the police districts would be vested in a District Commandant of Police. Every police officer on appointment was to take an oath of service to the Government of Palestine.

The Inspector-General was to frame orders and rules relative to the organization classification, deployment and discipline of the Police Force, the place at which the members of the force should reside, the particular services to be performed, their inspection, arms, the collecting of intelligence, and all matters connected with the efficiency of the force, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner. The Inspector-General was empowered to deputize additional police officers for special purposes at any place and for such time as should be deemed proper. The Inspector-General could order the employment of Special Police Officers when it appeared that an unlawful assembly, riots, disturbance of the peace was imminent and the Police Force ordinarily employed for the preservation of the peace was not sufficient. The Ordinance defined the police officer's duties as follows :

1. To obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued to him.
2. To collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace.

3. To prevent the commission of offences.
4. To detect and bring offenders to justice.
5. To apprehend all the persons whom he is legally authorised to apprehend.
6. To keep order in the public road, and the public streets, public resorts, railway platforms and harbours (Bentwich, 1926, pp. 136).

#### The Police and the May 1921 Disturbances

In April 1920, five Jews were killed and over two hundred injured in the first outbreak of anti-Jewish Arab violence in Palestine. A military committee of enquiry (the civil administration was not then established) found that the cause of the outbreak was the belief of the Arabs that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the Arab rights of self-determination, and their fear that the establishment of the Jewish national home would increase the Jewish immigration and would bring economic and political subjection of Arabs to the Jews (The Political History of Palestine, 1947, p. 3). A year later, in May, 1921, more serious attacks were made by Arabs on Jews at Jaffa and five Jewish rural settlements. In these disturbances 47 Jews were killed and 146 were wounded. In 1921, Jaffa was the second largest city in Palestine after Jerusalem, with 42,000 inhabitants, among them 16,000 Jews. Jaffa was the main port of entrance to the country and via it arrived most of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine. The main incident took place at the "Jewish House for Immigrants" in Jaffa which served as a temporary absorption place before the immigrants

were sent to rural settlements.

The British Commission of Inquiry was headed by Sir Thomas Haycroft, Chief Justice of Palestine, and two Palestine Government officials, appointed by Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner for Palestine, to inquire into the disturbances in the town and neighbourhood of Jaffa and elsewhere in Palestine. Its findings were very critical of police behaviour and activities in the handling of these disturbances:

- Excluding the chief of police of Jaffa and one another police officer, there were no British policemen on duty in Jaffa police station at the time. Most of the policemen present were Arabs.
- Mr. Wainright, the District Commandant of Police, was then away at Khan Yunis, a coastal Arab village in the Gaza District, 66 miles from Jaffa, where he had gone on the morning of the 30th of April. There was no telephone in Khan Yunes, and he returned to Jaffa only on the 3rd of May. His absence from Jaffa was noteworthy in that the disturbances had been predicted by police intelligence. The commission mildly censured him on this point: "in the Commission's opinion, there was unsufficient justification for his absence" (May 1921 Disturbances Report, 1921, p. 48).
- The Acting Commandant, Abadin Bay (a Christian Arab) left when the attack began. Second Inspector Hanna Borcodosh (also a Christian Arab) left the Immigration House and returned to his home for lunch, leaving the Arab crowd to break into the Immigration House and kill eleven Jewish immigrants.

- Evidence was brought before the Commission of Inquiry that Arab policemen fired on the Immigration House from the streets and from a nearby half-completed building. A British clergyman witnessed the Arab policemen breaking the House door and leading part of the mob into the grounds of the House. An Arab policeman robbed a Jewish woman and made indecent advances to two others. This policeman was convicted by a Special Court and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment.

- The Commission concluded their report saying : "The attitude of the other ranks of Jaffa police throughout the riots was on the whole unsatisfactory. We cannot avoid the conclusion that racial consideration influenced their conduct. Some of them even became active participants in violence and crime of serious order. The Jaffa Police, apart from their conduct during the riots, made an unfavorable impression upon us, through their lack of smartness, alertness, discipline and policemen like appearance. The police, were, with few exception, half-trained and inefficient, in many cases indifferent and in some cases leaders of or participants in violence" (p.59).

On 5th May 1921 about 2,000 Arabs from neighboring villages attacked the Petah-Tikvah Jewish settlement, north of Tel-Aviv. Only resistance of the settlers and the timely intervention of the British Army prevented a massacre of the settlers, 4 of whom were killed. Twenty-eight of the rioters were killed by the Army. On the next day, 6th of May, a raid was made by the Arabs from nearby villages upon Khedera, 30 miles south of Haifa. The lives of the settlers were saved, in this case by a British Royal Air Force aeroplane which



bombed the Arab mob and fired on them with his machine-gun. The pilot observed 10 mounted Arab policemen, participating in the raid with the mob. He attacked them, wounding four and killing several police horses (p. 10). The widespread political troubles of May 1921 found a police force consisting largely of raw recruits without any British constables, with most of the force being Arab. In the second and third days of disturbances in Jaffa, the Commandant of Police ordered the Arab policemen to be disarmed. Only military assistance, which was repeatedly invoked in dealing with the civil disturbances, succeeded in clearing the crowd and restoring law and order. Unfortunately, army reinforcements did not arrive in Jaffa and in the other attacked settlements until hours after the outbreaks.

#### The Gendarmeries

The 1920 and 1921 disturbances and political unrest, compounded by the problems of the smuggling of goods and firearms through the northern and eastern borders and Bedouin raids against the Arab villages in the south, persuaded the British Government to allow the High Commissioner to establish two separate Gendarmeries.

#### The Palestine Gendarmerie

The Palestine Gendarmerie Ordinance of 1921, ordered the institution of a section of the Police Force to be styled the Palestine Gendarmerie. The new force came under the control of the

Commandant of Police and was a part of the Police Force, with the Police Ordinance, 1921, applying to it (Bentwich, 1926, p. 265). Initially, the High Commissioner announced that the composition of the Palestine Gendarmerie would be one third Arabs, one third Jews and one third Circassians and Druze from the frontier villages of Upper Galilee, but by the enrolment stage and the training only one eighth were Jews. At this stage, the Palestine Gendarmerie included 13 British officers, eight Palestinian officers, and 486 constables. By July 1921, after a few months of training in military duties by the Military Authorities and police duties by the Police, the structure of the Palestine Gendarmerie was as follows :

- The headquarters in Jerusalem. The Commanding Officer- Lt. Col. F.W. Bewsher.
- The infantry Section formed from two Companies with a strength of one hundred each. One company was stationed in Jerusalem, the second in Rosh-Pina in the northern part of the country.
- The Cavalry Section formed from two Squadrons with a strength of one hundred each. Cavalry units were stationed in Jenin, Jericho, Beit-Shan, Tzemakh and Tul-Carem.
- A Camel Corps of 50 men in strength was established in Beer-Sheba and policed the desert area in the southern part of the country. All commanders of companies and squadrons were former British Army Officers. The Palestine Gendarmes earned four Egyptian pounds a month, half a pound more than their comrades in the regular police force. 9/10 of the force was engaged on the eastern frontier, preventing smuggling from Syria and Trans-Jordan, and fighting Arab gangs which

preyed on Arab villages and Jewish settlements. The establishment of the Palestine Gendarmerie enabled the police to return to their regular tasks (Colonial Office Report, 1923, p.38).

#### The British Gendarmerie


The British Gendarmerie Ordinance, 1922, which was published in the Official Gazette in 1st May, 1922, authorized the establishment of a section of the Police Force to be styled the British Section of the Palestine Gendarmerie (the British Gendarmerie). This came under the control of the Commandant of the Police and Prisons. No person who was not a British subject was allowed to enlist in or to be appointed an officer of the British Gendarmerie (Bentwich, 1926, p. 265). The British Section of the Palestine Gendarmerie of 36 officers and 724 N.C.O and constables, was raised, and equipped in Ireland and England, and arrived in Palestine on April 29th, 1922. Most of the men were recruited from the old Royal Irish Constabulary, which ceased to exist with the end of the Irish nationalist "troubles", or from the Irish Auxiliaries to the police there, called "The Black and Tans". Brigadier-General A.J. McNeil was appointed Commanding Officer of the British Gendarmerie. The Force was trained in Fort Tregautle in England. The force uniform was Khaki and the men wore the New Zealand Stetson hat with a thin red and green pugri. A member of the force received 16 pounds per month basic pay, about four times more than a Palestinian policeman earned in that time (Horne, 1982, p.79). The force had no company formation. It consisted of fourteen independent

platoons, each commanded by a captain and two lieutenants. The plan was to spread these platoons across Palestine at strategic centers to back up the police when required or to operate as an emergency reserve and a strike force controlled by the civilian police. Although it was a civil force it was organized on military lines and, like the Palestine Gendarmerie, did not undertake any normal police duties. The Force was well equipped with motor transport and was therefore extremely mobile and formed a valuable reserve for the police (Frumer, 1974, p. 60; Heath, 1928, p. 82-83; Report on Palestine, 1922, p. 38).

The British Gendarmerie was a decisive factor in the maintenance of the law, peace and order in Palestine in the years of its existence. In 1922, with the arrival of the British Gendarmerie there were three semi-military forces in the country: the Police, the Palestine Gendarmerie and the British Gendarmerie. It was decided that the three forces should be placed under the command of the General Commanding Officer in Palestine, Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, who was appointed General Commanding Officer and Inspector-General of Police and Prisons. The Director of Public Security, Lt. Col. P.B. Bramley, became the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and Prisons and was responsible to the General Officer Commanding for the performance of the civil police duties. The Gendarmeries were not available for reinforcement of the police without the approval of the General Officer Commanding. In March 1923, A.S. Mavrogordato, an Assistant Commandant of the Sierra Leone Police, succeeded Lt. Col. Bramley as Deputy Inspector-General. The following figure shows the organization

chart of the security forces in Palestine for the year 1922 :

Figure 4 : Palestine Security Forces - Organization Chart - 1922



Source : Horne (1982), p. 52.

When security conditions in the country had improved and stability appeared to exist, the British Government in London began to raise the question of reducing the massive expenditures of policing in Palestine. In April 1925, the Secretary of State for the Colonies accompanied by the Secretary of State for the Air, visited Palestine to talk with Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner. As a result it was decided to disband both gendarmeries and to replace them with a small British Section attached to the Palestine Police. The decision was implemented on 1st of April 1926, after Lord Plumer, the new High Commissioner, took office. About 320 men were transferred from both

gendarmeries to the police. An additional number of former gendarmes joined the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force established to replace the Palestine Gendarmerie in that part of its role involving the defense of the eastern and northern frontiers of Palestine (Bowden, 1975, p. 123; Heath, 1926, p. 82-83).

#### The Peaceful Years - 1922-1928

The period of 1923-1928 was a period of consolidation, comparative tranquility and improved security conditions. The Palestine Mandate enjoyed six years of relative peace. By the end of 1926, the British garrison was reduced from three infantry battalions and three cavalry squadrons with artillery, to a single squadron of the Royal Air Force and two companies of armored cars (Survey of Palestine, 1946, p. 22). The main security force became the police force which was largely composed of Arabs, together with 120 Jews and about 250 Britons. The northern and eastern frontiers were controlled by the Transjordan Frontier Force, an Arab unit commanded by British officers. These reforms represented a radical change in the style of policing in Palestine. From one side it ended the aggressive stance of mobile heavy gendarmeries and substituted for them a static and single unit, the Palestine Police. From the other side, 1926 symbolizes the year that the Arab component in the police became increasingly predominant, despite their reluctance to prosecute and act against rebellious fellow Arabs (the disturbances of April 1920 in Jerusalem and May 1921 in Jaffa proved this fact). The Jewish Agency officials

warned the Palestine Government and the Permanent Mandate Commission to the League of Nations that the Arab police could not be relied upon for the protection of Jewish life and property. The Government, in the Jewish Agency's opinion, took an unjustifiable risk in regard to the Jewish lives for which it was responsible (Bowden, 1975,p 125).

The ethnic and religious imbalance of the force was in part a product of social conditions which made police work more attractive to Arabs. However, it was also a product of the unwillingness of Jewish youth to enlist in the police. Jews regarded police work as poorly paid and lacking in prestige. Jews refused to serve in rural areas, far from their homes and families, in a force whose language of communication was Arabic. Most of the Jews who decided to join the police in this period were recent immigrants or those from the lower strata of society. For those Jews in these categories, policing was a temporary occupation, to be abandoned when better opportunities arose in Tel-Aviv or Jerusalem. Most of the Arabs who enlisted were from rural areas or poor sections of the urban population. A large proportion of them were illiterate.

The British section of the police was composed of a mixed group of personnel, as Geoffrey Morton (1957), a former British police officer wrote in his book: Just the Job -Some Experiences of a Colonial Policeman:

"Between us we represented every conceivable situation of life in

the British isles, from the heir of an impoverished earl, products of exclusive public schools, and graduates of famous universities to professional bruisers, coal miners, regular soldiers and really tough Tyneside Geordies who played a better game of football in their bare feet than they did with boots on" (p. 19).

Tom Bowden in his article "Policing Palestine 1920-1936" (1975, p. 117), gave his impression of the British section of the police :

"The British section could perhaps best be caricatured as an agglomerate of adventurers, escapers and marginal men with a salting of professional colonial service policemen from Ireland, India, Ceylon and elsewhere"

The two sections of the police, Palestinian and British, were kept apart from each other and virtually segregated. The conditions of service for each of the two sections were entirely different:

- The Palestine policeman was paid 6 pounds monthly, the British 11 pounds.
- The two groups lived and ate apart in separate messes and barracks.
- There were times when even in a police station with a Palestinian officer, a British sergeant would be put in command over him.
- The two groups were trained separately at the Training School.
- The British section was primarily a emergency reserve and a strike force. Regular police functions were left to Palestine units.



### The Training School

The first decade of policing Palestine was also a learning period which saw efforts to develop training schemes suitable to the force and local conditions. The police administration had, in fact, to start in this field from scratch, because those who had served in the Turkish police and were recruited by the Palestine Police had received no official training and were in no better situation than the raw recruits. For a year or more the training mission was carried out by the local police forces. In February 1921, the Central Police Training School at the Grey Hill House on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem was opened. The school was divided in two classes: one for literate recruits and the another for illiterate. Each courses ran for three months and its curriculum included law, police regulations, police duties and prevention, investigation, drill, military and physical training. The school was also used to provide reinforcements in emergencies and disturbances (Report on Palestine, 1922, p. 100). In July 1923, because of financial crisis in the affairs of the Palestine Police, the Training School was closed. In 1926 it was reopened. The first Commander and officers of the school were former Irish army or police officers who were transferred from the British Gendarmerie which has been disbanded. They succeeded to introduce at the school, in a short time, good discipline, drill and smartness in appearance. The recruits who were sent to the field districts after three months of training, were quite well trained, absorbed police atmosphere, and were well-disciplined, and equipped with a working knowledge of police

regulations and criminal law and procedure.

The years 1926-1928 symbolize the laying of a corner-stone in the training system of the Palestine Police. In 1927 the Training School trained 106 recruits and held a few refresher courses and mounted courses. In 1928, for the first time, Palestine non-commissioned officers completed an officer course and were promoted to the rank of Sub-Inspector (Report on Palestine, 1929, p. 23). The recruits of the British section of the police, which was established in 1926, were not sent to the Training School. As little more than a military riot force, they were given military training in their camp by their own officers and sergeants.

#### Municipal Police

In the main towns of Palestine including Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa, Jaffa, Hebron and Gaza, small municipal police units, were established and maintained from municipal funds. These municipal police units acted, except in Tel-Aviv, as night watchmen (Gaffirs - in Arabic) and auxiliary police. In 1923 there were 182 municipal Gaffirs. In 1927 the total strength of the municipal police was: one Christian officer, one Jewish officer, 40 Christian Gaffirs, 250 Moslems, 106 Jews - a total of 398. In 1928 the force was reduced to 373 (Palestine Report, 1927, p. 44; Palestine Report, 1928, p.58). The Tel-Aviv Municipal Police was established in July 1921 at the request of the city mayor. This unit, with the help of the municipality

succeeded in recruiting qualified and educated personnel. In the first year, the unit counted 26 men under the command of a Tel-Aviv inhabitant who was recruited with the rank of Sub-Inspector. The Tel-Aviv Municipal Police functions were: patrolling the city streets and boundaries with the Arab city of Jaffa, prevention of crimes, an investigations. Their uniform was identical to the regular police, with the exception of headgear. As the Palestine Police hat - the Kalpak - was a type of hat worn by the Turkish police, it was not popular with Jews who did not wish to identify themselves with a hat symbolizing the Moslem tradition (The writer's interview on June 22, 1983 with late Major Shlomo Sofer, one of the first policemen in the Tel-Aviv Municipal Police in 1921).

#### Conclusion - the First Decade

It is quite clear that Sir Charles Jeffries' "The Improvisation Phase" (the first stage of his colonial police model, see pages 14-21) functioned in Palestine much as it did in other British Colonies. In Palestine this phase existed between December 11, 1918, the day in which the British troops made their formal entry into Jerusalem and a Military Administration was established, and 1st of July, 1920, when a civil government replaced the military and the Palestine Police Force was born. In this period of eighteen months the British made an effort to give the population a level of service as good or better than that provided by the old Turkish forces. The British continued the existing local police system even to the extent of employing former Turkish

constables, who were Arabs, but they also began to recruit from the Arab and Jewish communities. The Ottoman Criminal Law remained in force, although amended somewhat by British Military Standing Orders. The new police made only those innovations needed for securing the essentials of law and order. In the course of this, the authorities began learning the conditions of the country and the population's culture and social structure, as a prelude to improving the police functions in Palestine.

The formation of the Palestine Police Force in 1st July, 1920, symbolizes the transition to the second phase in Sir Jeffries' model: "the Semi-Military Constabulary Force". The following characteristics are identical in the model and in the new Palestine Police:

- One centralized command structure.
- A police force formed on an underlying military pattern.
- A armed police force.
- A police force organized as a semi-military constabulary, like the other colonial police forces, with a view to the suppression of crimes and mass outbreaks against peace and the colonial ruler.

With the establishment of the Palestine and British Gendarmeries, the semi-military phase was emphasized much more. The main development of the Palestine Police along the lines of the second phase of the colonial police model took place in the second and third decades of British mandate in Palestine. The Palestine Police in the first decade of the British Mandate in Palestine was constituted mainly of Arabs,

reduced in number because of financial crisis, poorly trained and ill-prepared for the events of the late 1920s. The following table shows the Palestine Police strength versus the population in Palestine between the years 1922 and 1928:

Table 2 : Police Strength in Palestine versus Population, 1922-28.

| Year | Population | Police<br>strength | Policemen per 1000<br>inhabitants |
|------|------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1922 | 752,048    | 2540               | 3.30                              |
| 1923 | 778,989    | 1025               | 1.30                              |
| 1926 | 898,362    | 1752               | 1.98                              |
| 1927 | 917,315    | 1780               | 1.94                              |
| 1928 | 935,951    | 1770               | 1.89                              |

Sources: Great Britain, Colonial Office: Reports on the Palestine Administration for the years 1922-28; Gertz A: Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine 1947, p. 46.

The following table shows the Palestine Police and strength between the years 1918-1928, classified by nationality:

Table 3 : Palestine Police Strength, 1916-1928

| Year | Officers |       |      |       | Other Ranks |       |      |       | Grand Total |
|------|----------|-------|------|-------|-------------|-------|------|-------|-------------|
|      | British  | Arabs | Jews | Total | British     | Arabs | Jews | Total |             |
| 1918 |          |       |      | 34    |             |       |      | 702   | 736         |
| 1919 |          |       |      |       |             |       |      |       | 1,273       |
| 1920 |          |       |      | 55    |             |       |      | 1,105 | 1,160       |
| 1921 | 16       | 42    | 12   | 70    |             | 1,043 | 100  | 1,143 | 1,213       |
| 1922 | 17       | 49    | 12   | 78    |             | 1,047 | 82   | 1,129 | 1,207       |
| 1923 | 30       | 33    | 8    | 71    |             | 841   | 113  | 954   | 1,025       |
| 1926 | 48       | 62    | 15   | 125   | 197         | NA    | NA   | 1,627 | 1,752       |
| 1927 | 50       | 63    | 17   | 130   | 193         | 921   | 220  | 1,650 | 1,780       |
| 1928 | 51       | 64    | 17   | 132   | 166         | 1,265 | 207  | 1,638 | 1,770       |

Source : The Reports on Palestine Administration, 1926-1928.

Chapter V: Policing Palestine - The Second Decade, 1929-1938

Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929

Sir John Chancellor, the High Commissioner for Palestine appeared, before the Permanent Mandate commission at Geneva on July 5th, 1929, and reiterated the statement that had been made many times by the British representatives before to the Commission that "the relations between the two communities (Arabic and Hebrew) continue to improve" (Mandate Commission Minutes, 1929, p. 79). Before the end of August 1929 this statement was contradicted by new facts. The relative peace that the country and the Mandatory Power had enjoyed, during the years 1922-1928, was ruptured following an incident at the Wailing Wall. The Wailing Wall is a ancient wall in Jerusalem which is a remnant of the western boundary of the Jewish Temple built by Solomon, King of Israel. The wall is the most holy place for the Jews who used to pray in front of it daily and especially on the most sacred holy days - the fast of Tisha B'av and the fast of the Day of Atonement. The Wailing Wall, which is still standing, and its surrounding area have been the property of the Moslem community since the seventh century, when the Moslems conquered Jerusalem. This area, which houses now two mosques, also became a holy place for the Moslems. The Moslems believe that it was from this spot Mohamad, the Moslem prophet, ascended to heaven while mounted upon El Buraq, his white horse. For years the Jews were allowed by the Turks to pray in front of the Wailing Wall with

restrictions not to bring screens or furniture to the place. The Palestine Government continued this policy. Every year, during the holiday period, the Wall was the scene of violence between Arabs and Jews demanding free access to their holy places, according to the articles 2 and 13 of the Mandate for Palestine. On September 23, 1928, the Jewish day of Atonement, the Jewish worshippers put a screen near the Wailing Wall to separate the sexes during prayer, according to Jewish custom. The Arabs complained to the police who came and removed the screen. This act angered the Jews, who complained to the Palestine Government. Tension between the Jews and the Arabs continued to grow. On the 3rd of August, 1929, a Jew was wounded by an Arab near the Wailing Wall. On the 14th of the same month, on the eve of the Fast of Tisha B'av, the Jews demonstrated in Tel-Aviv against the Government and the Arabs for the restriction of praying at the Wailing Wall. The day after the Jews demonstrated again at the Wailing Wall.

On 17 August a Jewish boy who played soccer in Jerusalem was stabbed by an Arab and died at the hospital. The route of the intended funeral procession passed the Old City, but the police, fearing violence, disbanded the participants by force (Horne, 1982, p. 135). Although tension between Arabs and Jews became stronger and stronger, the authorities did nothing to reduce it. On Friday, the 23rd of August, 1929, thousands of Arab residents of Jerusalem and its surrounding area, began to gather in the Haram area (the mosque yard). The Police posted at the entrances to the city noticed that many of the villagers who were coming into Jerusalem for the midday Friday



prayer were carrying heavy sticks and clubs. The Police began to disarm those villagers, but after a short time were ordered by Major Saunders, the Acting Commander of Police, to cancel the disarming of the villagers. He explained his decision later as follows :

- Effective disarming would have required many more British policemen than were available.
- Deployment of policemen from neighboring posts would have dangerously depleted forces in those areas.
- Ineffective efforts at disarmament would have aggravated the situation.
- There was nothing to prevent those persons who had been disarmed from obtaining some other weapons after they entered the city (Shaw Report, 1930, p. 61).

After the midday prayer, Moslems issuing from the Haram area gates into the Old City began to attack Jewish pilgrims and also residents of the neighboring Jewish quarter. These disturbances in Jerusalem continued for several days. On the morning of Friday, the 23rd of August, the actual strength of the Palestine Police was as follows :

|                               |            |
|-------------------------------|------------|
| British officers              | 31         |
| British policemen             | 142        |
| Palestinian officers          | 69         |
| Mounted Palestinian policemen | 520        |
| Foot Palestinian policemen    | <u>714</u> |
| Total                         | 1,476      |

Of the British police, which included 22 members of the Motor Transport Section (charged with the licensing of vehicles), 70 were stationed in Jerusalem, 27 in Jaffa, 34 in Haifa and 9 in Nablus. The remainder, mainly officers, were distributed between the Police Districts, Sub-Districts and Police Stations. The British garrison in Palestine on the same day, under the command of the Royal Air Force included: 31 officers and 363 other ranks. Their weaponry included 10 armed vehicles, 11 armored cars, and 12 aircraft. Most of this garrison was stationed in Transjordan, far from Jerusalem. On the day of the disturbances, 6 officers and 79 men, with 4 armored cars and 4 armed tenders, were within 25 miles of Jerusalem. In addition to these units, the Palestine Government had at its disposal the Transjordan Frontier Force, with a strength of 11 British officers and 551 Arab rank-and-file, stationed in Transjordan and at different frontier posts on the eastern border (Shaw Report, p. 60).

On the second day of the riots the Police advised the Acting High Commissioner that they were no longer able to accept responsibility for public security in Palestine, and the commander of the Royal Air Force in Palestine and Transjordan took charge of all forces (Shaw, p. 64). At the request of the Acting High Commissioner for reinforcements, additional units of British troops from Malta and Egypt began to arrive beginning 24th of August until 27th of August. About 9 o'clock on the morning of the 24th of August, Arabs in Hebron made a most ferocious attack on the Jewish ghetto and on isolated Jewish homes in the town. 60 Jews, including many women and children,

were murdered and more than 50 were wounded, out of a total Jewish population of 600. The officer in charge of the Police Station in Hebron was Mr. Caffarata, the only Briton in a unit of mainly Arabs. When he heard what happened in Jerusalem and observed the unrest in Hebron, Caffarata asked for more British policemen and was informed that no reinforcements could then be spared. At about 2 p.m., five hours after the disturbances had begun, 6 British police arrived from Jerusalem, too late to prevent the massacre. Mr. Cafferata was later accused by the Jewish Agency of not doing enough to save the Jews, in spite of the fact that the British Government had decorated him for his role in quelling an infuriated Arab mob in Hebron. The Chronicles of the Hagana (the main Jewish underground movement in Palestine) for the years 1918-1948 include a statement written 43 years after the event about the role of Mr. Cafferata in the suppression of the Hebron disturbances :

"Now after about 40 years, is possible to appreciate fully his behaviour. He tried on that day to fulfill his task and also to save his own life. What could one British officer do in a town like Hebron ? He had come to Hebron only three weeks before the disturbances and had not even met the Arab notables of the town. He could not even trust the Arab policemen who were under his command" (Dinur, 1972, p. 321).

On the same day, 24th of August, a threatening Arab crowd attacked the Police barracks in Nablus and a small Jewish community in Beisan.

There was a minor disturbance at Jaffa, and several other Jewish colonies were attacked. On 29th of August, six days after the first outbreak in Jerusalem, Arab mobs attacked the Jewish ghetto in Safed, in the north of the country. Captain Faraday, the British Police officer in charge at Safed, had for some days feared that an outbreak might occur, and accordingly requested reinforcements. Only a small unit of the Transjordan Frontier Force (Arab soldiers) was sent. In the course of this outbreak, 45 Jews were killed or wounded, Jewish homes and shops were set on fire and much property was destroyed. British reinforcements did not arrive until two hours after the outbreak. The August 1929 disturbances ended with 133 Jews killed and 339 wounded. 87 Arabs were killed and 181 wounded, mostly in clashes with British Police and military forces. The British Government appointed Sir Walter Shaw to head a Commission of Inquiry on the disturbances of August, 1929. The Commission Report was presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the British Parliament on March 1930. The conclusions of the Commission were as follows :

- The outbreak of August neither was nor was intended to be a revolt against British authority (Shaw Report, p.149).
- The fundamental cause of Arab violence toward Jews was Arab fears for their economic future and their national identity in Palestine (p. 150).
- The outbreak in Jerusalem on the 23rd of August was from the beginning an attack by Arabs on Jews (p. 15).
- The disturbances spread from the capital to the most outlying centers of population and to some rural districts (p. 158).

- Earlier policy of reducing the garrison in Palestine was taken too far (p. 163).
- The conduct of the British police in Palestine during the period of the disturbances was deserving of the highest commendation. The Palestine Police regarded collectively, was not to be relied upon in emergency situations.
- The Intelligence Service in Palestine had proven inadequate (p. 163).
- The Commission associated itself with the High Commissioner's request that an experienced police officer from some other Dependency should be sent to Palestine to undertake a full-scale enquiry into the structure and functions of the Palestine Police (p. 147).
- The decision taken in 1925 to abolish the British Section of the Gendarmerie had been unfortunate. The presence of British policemen in larger numbers would at least have had a calming effect on the public in Palestine during the weeks preceding the outbreak. The Commission recommended that the establishment of the British Section of Police should be increased substantially (p. 146).

Sir Herbert Dowbiggin's Report on the Police, 1930

In December 1929, even before the Shaw Commission finished its inquiry, the High Commissioner, referring to the Commission's opinion that an experienced police officer be sent to Palestine to undertake an enquiry into the organization of the Department of Police and

Prisons, requested the Secretary of State for the Colonies to appoint such an officer. Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, the Inspector-General of Police in Ceylon, appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to carry out the inquiry recommended by Shaw Commission, arrived in Palestine in January, 1930 (Shaw Report, 1930, p. 147).

Dowbiggin, who joined the police force of Ceylon in 1901, was regarded one of the most prominent colonial police officers of his day and in 1926 had made a similar inquiry into the Ceylon Police. After four months of investigation, interviews with government officials, police officers, Arab and Jewish notables, and many inspections of police stations and units, Dowbiggin submitted a valuable and professional report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The report, which included about 250 pages, was published on 6th May, 1930. Dowbiggin's examination of the Palestine Police and its requirements was, in fact, the first detailed and independent enquiry on the police in Palestine since 1918. Among his recommendations, apart from detailed suggestions for administrative actions and improvements in service conditions, included the following :

- The Criminal Investigation Department had failed in most of its functions, except the Fingerprints Section. The CID was "the weakest spot in the Force". Information was not being collected and communicated. The CID had to be reorganized totally.
- The Palestine Police training system was well organized, but there was almost no training scheme for the British element of the force.
- There was an urgent need for an increase in the British Section of

the police to 650 men, of whom 100 should be mounted.

- The defense of the Jewish settlements against Arab attacks was poorly organized and insufficient. The police were to increase the number of sealed armouries for the Jewish settlements and to form 37 patrolling areas and detail 130 British policemen for the protection of the settlements in time of emergency.
- The establishment of a permanent Special Constabulary reserve.
- There was a positive need to separate the Prison Service from the Police. The functions and the tasks of the two were seen as different.
- The building of barracks for single policemen and special quarters for married (Peel, 1937, p. 191; Fromer, p. 97).

Dowbiggin's report had a considerable influence on Palestine Police structure for many years after it was written. In October 1929, even before Dowbiggin had arrived in Palestine, the establishment of the the British Section had been increased by three officers and 200 other ranks (Report on Palestine, 1930, p. 88). The Palestine Police Annual Report of the year 1931 (this was the first year that the Palestine police issued an annual report) announced the following improvements in the establishment of the force which were sanctioned by the Government on the recommendations of Sir Dowbiggin :

- The increase of the British Section by five Head Constables, 16 sergeants, 24 corporals and 201 constables.
- The increase of the Palestine Police by one officer, 8 sergeants, 9 corporals and 112 constables.

- The establishment of the CID was increased by one Deputy Commandant, one Deputy Superintendent, 6 inspectors, 5 sergeants and 27 constables. (Palestine Police Annual Report, 1931, p. 4).

Two infantry battalions, from the army reinforcements which were brought to oppress the disturbances of 1929, remained in Palestine at the same strength until 1936. Until the end of 1930 the police distributed 585 Greener shot-guns to 77 Jewish settlements in sealed armories (Slutsky, 1972, p. 414). At the end of 1931 the composition of the police force was :

Table 4 - Palestine Police Strength, 1931

| The Rank    | British | Jews | Arabs | Others | Total |
|-------------|---------|------|-------|--------|-------|
| Officers    | 58      | 23   | 68    | 1      | 150   |
| Other ranks | 645     | 253  | 1,614 | 3      | 2,515 |
| Total       | 703     | 276  | 1,682 | 4      | 2,665 |

Source : Peel Report, 1937, p. 191.



R.G.B. Spicer - Commandant of Police, 1931-1937

In Dowbiggin's view the Commandant of Police A. Mavrogordato, who headed the Palestine Police from March 15, 1923, had not the qualities to command a police force in a country with strong political, social, religious conflicts and expectations of unrest and disturbances. He recommended to the Colonial Office Roy Godfrey Bullen Spicer, the Commissioner of Police in Kenya and formerly a high ranking police officer in the Ceylon Police, to be appointed the Commandant of the Palestine Police. A.S. Mavrogordato left in May 8, 1931 and on July 1931 Spicer was appointed the Commandant of the Police and in Palestine (Horne, 1982, p. 161). Roy Spicer, born in 12th February 1889, entered the Ceylon Police as a probationary Assistant Superintendent in November 1909. In 1915 he was promoted to Superintendent. After World War One, he was appointed the Commissioner of the Kenya Police, a force which under his leadership came to be regarded as a high level police force. Spicer took over the command on the Palestine Police when the shadow of the 1929 disturbances and its consequences still hung over the public mind. He was accepted by the Palestine Police senior officers with mixed feelings, as he was known for his strict demands for obedience to orders, discipline, standards, and his will-power to accomplish his assignments. Spicer at the beginning of his tenure was not the most popular leader, but in a short time he showed himself as one of the best commandants of Police Palestine ever had. The Palestinian policemen liked, respected, and trusted him, they were impressed by his vitality, correctness and

will to improve the Palestine Police. His concern for the policemen's individual needs made him the most sympathetic commandant the Palestine Police ever had. Roy Spicer was, also, respected and appreciated by the "Yishuv" Jewish leaders. Dr. Chaim Arlosoroff, one of the prominent notables of the Jewish community in Palestine and the Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency, (killed in June 16, 1933) said about Roy Spicer : "He is an energetic man, devoted to his task - the development of a good and efficient police force in Palestine. Sir Herbert Dowbiggin was his "Moses the Master" and his report the "Police Bible" (Arlosoroff, 1952, p. 8). Spicer who was Dowbiggin's trainee, respected his recommendations and insisted they be implemented to the letter. In Edward Horne's opinion, Roy Spicer rescued the Palestine Police from the doldrums of the 1920s and prepared it up from what lay ahead in the 1930s. Without his presence the story of the police in Palestine would have been very different (Horne, 1982, p. 171). Roy Spicer in his five years' tenure brought about the most extensive reforms in the Palestine Police history (Horne, pp. 168-171, 231, 369-372, 445-446, 458-459, 469, 473; Fromer, 1973, pp. 107-110) :

#### British Section

Until Roy Spicer's arrival the British Section of the Palestine Police was little more than an anti-riot squad. Spicer ordered the incorporation of the activities of this section into regular police work in police stations and mounted patrols in the rural areas. That

bred a new spirit in the British Section and its members began to understand much better the Palestinian policemen and to know the country and its native population. He stepped up recruitment into the British mounted branch and opened the Beisan mounted training school. The involvement of British policemen in mounted patrols achieved three important objectives: it brought Palestinians and British policemen much closer together; it developed British knowledge of Arabic and Arab customs; it developed public relations by visiting villages and settlements. The police patrols became aggressive (proactive).

#### Promotion From the Ranks

Spicer ordered the recruitment of senior police officers for the needs of the Palestine Police from the ranks of the British Section. He even recommended his British policemen for senior appointments in the other Colonial parts of the Empire (Between 1933 and 1939 about a hundred members of the British Section left to take senior police appointments in other colonial police forces). An era of rapid promotion of British Section policemen began first in 1932 when four British Corporals were promoted directly to the rank of Acting Assistant Superintendent of Police.

#### Visits and Inspections of Police Stations

Roy Spicer meticulously visited and inspected annually all the police stations of his force. These visits contributed to his

knowledge of happenings at the field level, made it possible for his subordinates to know and understand the Commandant's policies and opinions. In these visits Spicer met his policemen, British and Palestinians, face to face, and even exchanged opinions with them.

#### Establishment of New Units

The Traffic Unit - With the enactment of the Road Transport Ordinance in 1929 a few British personnel were appointed to administer this Ordinance. A Traffic Section was set up at the Headquarters in Jerusalem, and later in Haifa and Jaffa. These units were in charge with the testing and licensing of vehicles, enforcement of the Laws and Regulations of Transportation and Traffic. Roy Spicer developed the traffic police by stationing traffic units, equipped with motorcycles and motor cars in every subdivision. Later, traffic police on motor cycles were introduced in rural areas. The Palestine Police became, in this area, more efficient than any police in the Middle East.

The Marine Section - A small coastguard unit was established in 1923, but was disbanded in 1926. In October 31, 1933 was inaugurated the new harbour in Haifa and the police began to face a massive problem of port control. Roy Spicer decided to form the Port and Marine Section in July 1935 in Haifa with a small detachment in Jaffa. The new section numbered 40 policemen under the command of a British Inspector. The sea patrol were made by two motor launches.

The Dog Section - The Palestine Police had not inherited any

traditions on the using of dogs in police patrol or for detecting crime. In 1927, before he came to Palestine, Spicer was sent by the Kenya Police to South Africa to study the use of dogs in police work. He came back enthusiastic about the concept but, because of financial problems, did not succeed in introducing it in Kenya. Spicer won approval to set up a dog section in the Palestine Police, and in 1934 he sent two men on a course in South Africa. At the beginning of 1935 the Dog Section was established. In the first year of the Dog Section's existence, the dogs were used for tracking at 99 crime scenes. In Horne's opinion the Palestine Police was the first Colonial Police force to pioneer the use of dogs for police purposes. From time to time the dogs were brought to the crime scene in Royal Air Force aeroplanes.

The Reorganization of the CID - Roy Spicer brought Captain Harold Rice from the Kenya Police to take over the CID and to reorganize it according to Dowbiggin's recommendations. Rice had served in Kenya under Spicer's command, and was the first really professional head of the CID in Palestine. He was an old South African policeman, having served there between the years 1906 and 1915. Herold Rice was given the new rank of Deputy Commandant on 3rd August 1932 (Palestine Police Report, 1932, p.3). Changes made in the CID during the first years of Rice's tenure included :

- a. The establishment of a new liaison system between the CID, the government, and the army, mainly for intelligence purposes.
- b. All the information collected was double-checked for accuracy.
- c. Local CID offices were opened in each police district and CID

sergeants were posted to each divisional headquarters. The CID duties were defined as: Investigation, intelligence, immigration and emigration, passports and visas, control of sedition and illegal conspiracies, assistance in prevention and suppression of the smuggling of firearms and narcotics, deportation and extradition, and the administration of criminal and fingerprint records.

d. In 1935 the CID grew from about 30 men to 52, with 50 more men scattered in districts and divisional offices. When the Arab Rebellion did break out in 1936 the CID numbered 150 men, most of them in Jerusalem, Haifa and Lydda Districts.

The Camel Corps - Through Roy Spicer's initiative the old Camel Unit in Beersheba Division was reorganized and strengthened. In January 1, 1934 the unit strength was 70 men, most of them Bedouin.

Communications - During Spicer's tenure the communication system of the police was improved: wireless telegraphy was added to police stations and posts without telephone connection; telephone lines were introduced in other police stations.

Armored Cars - In 1936, when Spicer noticed that many policemen were killed and wounded by Arab gangs sniping and shooting on police tenders and cars, he initiated the building of armored cars (self made) for road patrol and escort duties.

Palestine Police Magazine - In June 1933 the Palestine Police Magazine was launched. This appeared until 1942, when it came to an end because of wartime paper shortages. It emerged again for one year only in 1947.

Social Activities - Spicer encouraged social activities among the

force like : music, amateur theater, sport, hunting, exhibitions, art, physical recreation and excursions. Those activities made a big contribution to the morale, good spirits and pride of the force.

Annual Administrative Report - Roy Spicer introduced, at the end of 1931, an Annual Administrative Report which summarized the police strength, the police activity, the crime situation and the achievements of the Palestine Police in the reported year.

New Police Stations - A considerable advance was made between 1930 and 1934 in the opening of new police stations and posts. In 1930 in all Palestine there were 39 police stations. In 1934 there were 59 police stations and 53 additional police posts. The policy of increasing the number of police stations produced better service to the public and also contributed to the reduction of crime (Slutsky, 1972, pp. 500-503; Palestine Police Annual Report, 1933, p. 16).

The Palestine Police Standing Orders and Instructions - One of Spicer's most spectacular attainments completed a month before the end of his tenure, was the publication of the Palestine Police Standing Orders and Instructions in November 1937. These Standing Orders, were compiled from administrative circulars, force orders and instructions that were issued to the force from 1st July 1920 until 1st December 1937. The Standing Orders, from the day of their initial publication until the end of the Mandate in May 1948, were amended, up dated and remained the only set of orders in use for the Palestine Police.

On 13th January 1933, at Roy Spicer's request, the new title of "Inspector-General of Police and Prisons", common in many British

colonies, was adopted in Palestine instead of the old title of Commandant. The Inspector-General was allotted two deputies: one Deputy Inspector-General for Administration and the second Inspector-General for Criminal Investigations. Roy Spicer took over in 1931 an establishment of 2347 men of whom 691 were British, and he left the force in 1937 with the figures of 3887 men of whom 1192 were British. On 24th November 1937 Roy Spicer relinquished command and his place was taken by Major Alan Saunders, a former Deputy Commandant of the Palestine Police, later Commander of the Nigerian Police (Statistical Abstracts of Palestine, 1939, p. 145).

#### The Arab Rebellion, 1936-1939

A permanent feature of political unrest in Palestine was Arab discontent with Jewish immigration and the sale of Arab land to Jews. From the beginning of 1930 Arab political and aggressive activity intensified until it reached a climax in the riots of October and November 1933. Popular Arab feeling at this time was that Jewish mass immigration was being allowed and encouraged by the Palestine Government in order to make the Jews a majority sector in Palestine (Esco Foundation, 1947, p. 770). The Executive of the Palestinian Arabs announced early in October that a "general strike" would be declared in October 13th, and that a demonstration would be held at the Government Offices in Jerusalem. The Government prohibited the demonstration but the Arab crowd made an attempt to demonstrate, whereupon the police dispersed the demonstrators. In the following



weeks, outbreaks occurred in Jaffa, Nablus, Haifa and again in Jerusalem. Public and police buildings were attacked. In these riots one police constable and four civilians were killed, 28 constables and 204 civilians were wounded. 18 Arab leaders were prosecuted for conspiracy to organize the demonstrations. A special commission of inquiry under Sir William Morison, former Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements, investigated these riots and in February 1934 submitted a report. The main differences between the disturbances of 1933 and those of 1920, 1921, and 1929 were that for the first time Arabs accused the Government of favouring the Jews (A Survey of Palestine, 1946, p. 31). In 1936 new Palestine disorders had their beginning in a holdup of Jews by Arabs on the Tulkarem-Nablus road on the way to Tel-Aviv. On the night of April 15th, Arab highwaymen held up ten automobiles and robbed the passengers. Then they selected three Jews, put them in a truck and shot them to death. The following night two Arabs were murdered near Petah-Tiqwah. The funeral of one of the Jews on 17th April led to a serious rioting in Tel-Aviv and Jaffa during which three Jews were murdered by Arabs on 19th April. Curfew was imposed in Jaffa and Tel-Aviv, and Emergency Regulations under the Palestine Order in Council, 1931 were brought into effect in all Palestine by proclamation of the High Commissioner (Palestine Gazette, 19th April, 1936). On 25th April, 1936 a Supreme Arab Committee was established with Haj Amin al-Husaini, the Mufti of Jerusalem (the highest Moslem religious rank in Palestine), as president of the committee. The Committee decided on an Arab general strike to force the British Government to change its policy and stop Jewish

immigration. During May and June there were intermittent local demonstrations and assaults on Jews, destruction of Jewish property and sniping at Jewish settlements. Sporadic attacks were made on the railway lines, highways and roads were barricaded and telephone wires were cut. Arab bands swelled by volunteers from the rural areas of Palestine, Syria and Iraq made appearance in the hills. Palestine had never been entirely free from banditry, but with the development of the revolt these bands were strengthened, became more organized and better armed. Their numbers were estimated at about 5,000 men in the summer of 1936. In August, Fowzi al Kowakji, who had been the leader of a Syrian rebellion, crossed the border into Palestine and assumed command of the Arab rebel forces (Marlowe, 1946, p. 156). In August and September 1936 the bands on the hills began to sabotage the oil pipe which crossed Palestine from Iraq to Syria. Roads were systematically mined and railway tracks frequently damaged. Murders of Jews increased. Toward the middle of August acts of retaliation by the Jews began. From 11th May onwards the military forces in Palestine were reinforced from Egypt and Malta. Until August no attacks by the military were made on the bands in the hills. In September more reinforcements were brought in, and by the end of the month the number of the British troops in Palestine had risen to 20,000 men - two army divisions. In September the control of the armed forces in Palestine was taken out of the hands of the Royal Air Force and put in the hands of the Army. On September 29, 1936 Martial Law was proclaimed but not put into force. On May 18th, 1936 the Colonial Secretary informed the British House of Commons that he had advised His Majesty to appoint a

Royal Commission to investigate the causes of unrest in Palestine. He announced that order would have to be restored before the Commission would proceed to Palestine. The official list of casualties during April-October, 1936 disturbances gave the following figures:

Table 5: April-October, 1936 Casualties

| Casualty            | Killed | Wounded |
|---------------------|--------|---------|
| Defence Forces      | 21     | 104     |
| Police and TJFF     | 16     | 102     |
| Arabs               | 195    | 804     |
| Jews                | 80     | 308     |
| Non Arab Christians | 2      | 19      |
| Total               | 314    | 1,387   |

It has since been estimated that approximately 1,000 rebels were in fact killed, mostly in fighting with troops and police (Survey of Palestine, 1946, p. 156).

The Jewish Agency reported that 82 Jews were murdered and 405 wounded in those disturbances. There were 1996 attacks on Jews in various towns, settlements and public places; 895 acts of damage to

agricultural and urban Jewish property; over 200,000 fruit and forest trees and 68,000 acres of crops were destroyed; there were 795 attacks on authorities (police, military); 380 attacks on means of communication (railways, highways); 305 attacks of intimidation of Arabs; 3,111 Arabs were arrested or detained (Jewish Agency, Statistical Tables, 1936, p. 1). The Royal Commission of Inquiry headed by Lord Peel arrived in Palestine on November 11th, 1936. The Commission stated that the underlying causes of the disturbances were:

- The desire of the Arabs for national independence.
- Their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

The Commission stated that there was an open rebellion of the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by fellow Arabs from other countries, against British Mandatory rule. Two features distinguished this rebellion from the earlier disturbances: the Arab officials openly took an anti-Government attitude and the "external factor" - the involvement of the "volunteers" from the neighbouring Arab peoples (Peel Report, p. 104). Regarding the Police, the Commission found that some of Dowbiggin's recommendations had been implemented, these included :

- The reorganization of the Criminal Investigation Department.
- The collection of intelligence had improved but still was far from satisfactory.
- The Training School was doing excellent work. The recruits received much better training.

- The Force still lacked morale and "esprit de corps".
- Elements of the Police Force (the Commission intended to the Arab Policemen) were reported to be disloyal, and it was thought highly dangerous to expose the Arab Police of Palestine to another strain of the same kind.
- The position as regards the Jews in the security forces was found unsatisfactory. Of 439 Jewish constables enlisted during the years 1932-1936, 255 resigned or were discharged.
- It was felt necessary that central and local reserves be established.
- The Commission repeated Dowbiggin's recommendations to build barracks and married quarters for the police in the larger towns.
- The system of supernumerary voluntary police for defence of the Jewish settlements, as was established in 1936, was to be continued and was regarded as a part of the internal security arrangements.

The Commission emphasized: "The first of all conditions necessary for the welfare of any country is public security (so wrote the first High Commissioner of Palestine when reviewing his five years of office). Today is evident that the elementary duty of providing public security has not been discharged. If there is one grievance, which the Jews have undoubted right to claim it, is the absence of security" (Peel Report, 1937, p. 201). The Commission's chief recommendation was to enforce martial law throughout the country under absolute military control, if such disorders should break out again. The political

recommendation was the termination of the Mandate and the partitioning of the country between the Arabs and the Jews. The British Government realized that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine and that those aspirations could not be satisfied under the terms of the existing Mandate. After a few months of relative peace the reinforcements temporarily moved in began to return to their bases. From November 1936 until March 1937 the military garrison in Palestine was reduced to two infantry brigades, ancillary units and a squadron and one flight of R.A.F. The second phase of the Arab revolt began with the murder of Mr. L. Y. Andrews, the Acting District Commissioner of the Galilee District, and his British police escort in Nazareth by the Arabs on September 26th, 1937. With the intensification in organized Arab campaigns of terrorism and assassinations, the Palestine Government declared the Arab Higher Committee an unlawful association and ordered the arrest and deportation of six leading Arab politicians and deprived Haj Amin al Hussein of his office of President of the Supreme Moslem Council. Al Hussein fled from Jerusalem to Lebanon (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939, p. 99). On November 11, 1937, new Emergency Regulations were enacted providing for the establishment of Military Courts, empowered to pass the death penalty on all those found guilty of discharging or carrying firearms. 861 attacks were made by Arab groups and individuals during 1937, of which 109 were against the police and military, 143 against Jewish settlements and 109 against Arab targets. The total casualties from terrorist or gang activities were as shown in the following table:

Table 6: Arab Rebellion 1937 - Casualties

| Casualty | Killed | Wounded |
|----------|--------|---------|
| Arabs    | 486    | 636     |
| Jews     | 292    | 649     |
| British  | 69     | 233     |
| Others   | 12     | 6       |
| Total    | 859    | 1,524   |

In 1937 the British troops and the police killed 1138 Arab rebels and wounded 196 of them (Morlowe, 1946, p. 214).

During 1938 the Arab terrorist campaign of murder and sabotage gathered strength. The economic life of the country was seriously disrupted, the towns and the highways became unsafe, firearms, supplies and money were smuggled across the frontiers, more Arab volunteers were recruited and equipped by organizations in Beirut and Damascus. During the first half of the year the Jews showed restraint with few acts of retaliation, but from the end of June the Jewish attitude changed and more retaliatory attacks on Arabs were made. On August 21 the Assistant District Commissioner of Jenin was murdered in his office by Arabs. On September 9 Beersheba was raided by a large

number of Arabs who broke into the prison, released the inmates and raided the police station, set it on fire and destroyed the government building and the police station.

In fact, in 1938, a large part of Palestine was physically under the control of the rebels. Many police stations in areas populated mainly by Arabs were evacuated and closed. On September 12, 1938, the police force was placed under the operational control of the General Officer Commanding the Army and on October 18th Military Commanders were appointed in the various districts to assume the power and duties of the respective District Commissioners.

Army reinforcements were further brought from England at the end of September, curfews were imposed on the whole country. By the end of the year large-scale military operations had dislocated the Arab rebels, but still the terror and sabotage continued. In 1938 there were 5708 incidents of violence of which 986 were attacks on police and military, 651 attacks on Jewish settlements and town quarters, 430 assassinations or attempted assassinations.

The number of Arab rebels killed by the military and the police actions was estimated at not less than 1000. The military courts tried 382 persons during the year and 54 death sentences were confirmed but only a few were executed. 2543 were detained according the Emergency Regulations, of whom 2463 were Arabs (Survey of Palestine, 1946, p. 47).



The casualties from terrorism and the Arab rebellion in 1938 were as shown in the following table:

Table 7: Arab Rebellion, 1938 Casualties

| Casualty | Killed | Wounded |
|----------|--------|---------|
| British  | 74     | 216     |
| Jews     | 255    | 390     |
| Arabs    | 503    | 598     |
| Total    | 832    | 1,204   |

Rebel activity continued in 1939 and there were 425 murders and attempted murders of Arabs by Arab rebels, 139 additional Jews and one Briton killed in this year. There were 400 sniping incidents on Jewish settlements, 295 on military and police and 255 sabotage incidents. The scale of the rebellion had been reduced by the beginning October 1939, a month after the start of World War Two (Bowden, 1977, p. 251).

The Jewish Settlement Police (J.S.P)

The Village Ghaffirs Ordinance of 1921 continued to allow the enrolment of Ghaffirs (an old Arab-Turkish word for a watchman) for performing watch and ward duties in villages and guarding municipal buildings in towns. Until 1930 there were only a few Ghaffirs in every town and one or two in the main villages. With the widespread events of the 1936 disturbances and the attacks on Jews in towns and settlements, the Jewish Agency demanded from the government an immediate increase in the number of Jews in the Palestine Police and the organization of the Jewish settlers for the defence of their settlements (Riblin, 1963, p. 15).

As a matter of fact, with the outbreak of the Arab rebellion, the police were quite unable to cope with the situation and could not deploy forces to secure every Jewish settlement. The events of 1936 brought into being a new police formation which became a regular element in the Palestine Police establishment and materially gave the suitable response to the problem of ensuring the protection of the Jewish rural community. The formation was the Jewish Settlement Police, which at the beginning set up Jewish Ghaffirs in the three main towns: Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Haifa, and small Ghaffirs units in the rural area, which were enlisted according to the Police Ordinance, 1926, Part IV for the protection of property or crops of the villages or owing to the state of public security or the behaviour of the

inhabitants. In June 1936 the Government approved the enlisting of 600 Jewish supernumerary constables according to part V of the Police Ordinance, 1926, section 28. They received firearms and uniforms from the police. One-third of their salary was paid by the Police and the rest by the Jewish Agency. Due to the spread of the Arab Rebellion the Government was forced to allow an additional enlisting of 240 Ghaffirs, and on September 1, 1936 the number of Ghaffirs reached 2863 (Slutsky, 1972, p. 886). At the beginning of 1937 the Supernumerary Constables were organized in four categories:

1. An active force of 740 men employed and maintained by the government, which paid half of their salary, the remainder being paid by the Jewish Agency.
2. A force of 740 men as a reserve, available to be called to duty at two hours notice.
3. A reserve of 1,480 men available for duty at twenty-four hours notice.
4. A reserve force of 1,500 men drawn from a list of names supplied by the settlements, for supplying reinforcements to category 1, 2, and 3 (Riblin, 1963, p. 26).

In July 1936, with the Arab Rebellion still causing casualties among Jews and British in Palestine, the Jewish Agency demanded from the Government an increase in the number of supernumeraries. The Government appointed a army major and a police senior officer to investigate the security needs of the Jewish settlements. The Committee recommended the development of a force, recruited from the

supernumeraries, and organized on military lines and under the control and command of the police. The government accepted the recommendation and on January 1939 the four categories of supernumerary constables were abolished and a force of temporary additional police and special constables, according to the sections 28 and 30 of the Police Ordinance, 1926, were organized as the Jewish Settlement Police. The new force was composed of ten companies divided in groups and settlement units. Each company was placed under the command of a British Inspector of Police. A senior police officer was in charge of the administration and control of the whole Jewish Settlement Police at the Police Headquarters at Jerusalem. The members of the new force were issued regular police uniforms and an Australian style felt hat, which became quite popular and improved the morale of the force. The Jewish Settlement Police (J.S.P) had, at its establishment, a strength of 1,289 Additional Police whose salary was paid by the government and the Jewish Agency, and 13,122 Special Police as a reserve; a total of 14,111 (Riblin, 1963, p. 33).

Beginning in the summer of 1938, supernumeraries were enlisted to help the police in the towns, and later for watch and ward duties in the army and the air force camps and for patrolling the railways. In July 1938 three special units were established. These were manned with British soldiers and Jewish supernumeraries, and comprised the Special Night Squads which fought together against Arab gangs who sabotaged the oil-pipe line in Yzrael Valley. On November 1, 1938, in addition to the Jewish Settlement Police there were 434 railway Ghaffirs, 314

supernumeraries in the Special Nigh Squads, 1,659 Ghaffirs in general service, and a total of 2,407 (Riblin, 1963, p. 459). The J.S.P. during the years 1936-1939 proved to be a well trained force which was very helpful to the Palestine Police in fulfilling their task of securing the Jewish settlements against Arab attacks. There is no doubt that the existenc of the J.S.P saved many Jewish settlements from being wiped out by Arab insurgents.

#### "Hagana" - The Jewish Underground Militia

At the beginning of the British rule in Palestine the Yishuv (the Jewish community) was convinced that the Mandatory power would do everything possible to secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, and to prevent danger to Jewish life there. In fact, from the first years of the Mandate there was increasing tension between the Arab and the Jewish communities in Palestine. The serious disturbances of 1920-1921 in North Palestine, Jaffa and Jerusalem demonstrated that the Yishuv could not rely on the British authorities for their security. For this reason the Jewish population made sporadic efforts to organize self-defense groups to protect the Yishuv's physical security and to ward off future Arab violence. A underground Jewish defensive Militia, the "Hagana" (the Hebrew word for defense) was established in June 1920 (Dinur, 1956, p. 667). The period between 1920 and 1929 must be considered a formative period for the development of Jewish self-defence structures. The organization was small, poorly-organized and badly armed. The Arab riots of 1929

spurred the leaders of the Yishuv to think more seriously about defense and the importance of the underground movement. The riots convinced thousands to join the Hagana ranks. The Hagana was the major structure of the Jews in Palestine for their own defense. Its task was to protect the Yishuv and constitute its loyal militia. The Hagana had a secret and military nature, but even with that, every Jewish male or female over 17 years could volunteer for it (Lev-Ami, 1979, p. 26). The founders of the Hagana thought of this organization as a purely defensive body to be mobilized in emergency only and solely against Arab attacks.

After the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1936 the Hagana followed the Jewish Agency and the Zionist movement political line of "havlaga" (restraint) which prescribed purely defensive tactics and condemned blind retaliation or indiscriminate killing of Arabs. That policy led to conflicts and the split of "Hagana B" or the "National Defense" in 1931 and the establishment in 1937 of the "Irgun Zevai Leumi" (National Military Organization) as called the "Irgun" or "Etzel", a right wing group which categorically rejected the Hagana policy of restraint as too passive. The Irgun began a campaign of terror, sabotage and reprisal against Arabs (Nyrop, 1979, p. 235 ; Borisov, 1947, p. 10). The British attitude toward the Hagana was marked by considerable ambivalence. On the one hand, they were against any Jewish armed organization and the Hagana was accordingly persecuted and oppressed. On the other, when the Palestine Government needed the Yishuv help, they knew how to use the Hagana services. With the

establishment of the Jewish Settlement Police the Government was aware that most of its members it also belonged to the Hagana. The British Army Special Night Squads (SNS), which were established in 1938 under the command of Captain Orde Wingate, were composed of British regular troops and Hagana members. What was the British official opinion on the Hagana ? A quotation from the Survey of Palestine, a publication which was prepared by the Palestine Government in 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (appointed to investigate the situation in Palestine), shows exactly the official British opinion on this Jewish underground movement:

The Hagana appears to be under some form of control by the Jewish Agency and to be regarded as a "demi-official" para-military organization. The association certainly played a substantial part in beating off Arab attacks on Jewish property during the rebellion of 1936-1939 and, through the medium of the Jewish Agency, selected units were provided and trained by British officers to assist in maintaining public security, the guarding of vulnerable points and guerilla warfare: such were Major (later Major-General) Wingate's special night squads. At no time, however, has there been official recognition of this illegal organization. The argument for its existence lies principally in the contention that various changes in the security forces in the country since the occupation have left the Jewish community open to attack in successive periods of disturbances with, consequentially, a heavy loss of Jewish lives and much damage to Jewish propriety.....On the whole the Hagana has maintained the

policy of "havlaga" (self-restraint) and during the period 1936-39 was mainly free from imputation of acts of retaliation against the Arabs. Equally, until recently, it did not engage in terrorism or activities directed against the Government" (Survey of Palestine, 1946, pp. 600-601).

There is no doubt that, from the year of its establishment, the Hagana and the other Jewish underground movements that emerged after the Arab rebellion formed the main intelligence and operational targets for the police and especially for the CID.

#### The Second Decade - Conclusion

The shadows of the 1929, 1933 and 1936-39 disturbances, and their consequences in the second decade of the British rule in Palestine, darkened the Palestine Government's efforts to develop Palestine and advance it towards a western civilization. The British desire to be loyal to the Balfour Declaration of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine, and at the same time, their care not to hurt their relationships with the Arabs and their interests in the Middle East, made life in Palestine difficult and risky. From the time the Mandate over Palestine was given to Britain, the British Government insisted that large amounts of British public money should not be spent in Palestine. Security expenses of policing Palestine had to be covered by the Palestine tax payers. For this reason, whenever the Colonial Office thought that the political and the security situation in Palestine had improved, it ordered the High Commissioner to reduce the



British garrison and prevented the enlargement of the police strength. Three main flaws appear in the British security system in Palestine during this decade:

- The size of the British garrison and the police;
- The unreliability of the Palestine Police (which were composed mainly of Arab policemen) in states of emergency. Although, in normal times, it functioned reasonably well;
- The failure of the CID to be aware of the disturbances before they occurred.

Despite the political tension, turbulence and the severe disturbances of 1929 and 1933, the second decade of the Palestine Police existence was characterized by a professional consolidation, mainly due to Sir Herbert Dowbiggin's recommendations and Inspector General Spicer's reforms and improvements: the reorganization of the training system; the increase of the police strength, especially the British complement; the improvement of the service conditions; the reorganization of the CID; the introduction of the Police Administrative Annual Reports and the Police Standing Orders and Regulations; the establishment of new police sections (Traffic, Marine, Dogs and Camels Corp). The 1929 disturbances occurred while the police were still weak, not yet organized and not able to accept responsibility for the public security. The Arab rebellion of 1936-39 developed so that the police, even had they been much more powerful and better-organized, could not have dealt with it. The army, which was reinforced from England and from bases in the Middle East, had

intensified its activity progressively and in September 1938 the police were placed under the operational control of the General Officer Commanding the Army. The second decade of the British rule in Palestine was characterized by an absence of security. The Palestine Police, which had begun to develop in a positive direction as a professionalized police force, was caught off balance by the Arab rebellion of 1936-39 and forced to invest all its resources in the suppression of the revolt. In the course of this, conventional police tasks were almost totally neglected. The establishment of the Jewish Settlement Police assured the security of the Jewish settlements in the turbulent years of 1936-39. The Palestine Police historian, the British Edward Horne, described the part of the Jewish Settlement Police in the suppression of the Arab rebellion as follows:

During the revolt a large number of Jewish Supernumary Police died while patrolling the borders of settlements, and there are numerous acts of unrecorded gallantry by these auxiliary police who did so much in the defense of their lands. In the whole of the Arab revolt, not one Jewish settlement was seized by Arab gangs, and this in large due to the Hagana oriented Jewish Police constables who were to defend them (Horne, 1982, p.238).

Britain, which was still an Imperial Power with great experience in ruling colonies and dealing with local conflicts, persisted in trying to maintain the security of Palestine by means of a small police force. This was largely composed of Arabs who were usually unreliable and incapable of acting against their compatriots. Year after year it was proved without any doubt that the Arab part of the Palestine

population was the initiator of all the disturbances. Nevertheless the Palestine Government recruited Arabs and Jews into the police according to their percentage in the population, thereby demonstrating at last the appearance of British impartiality. As the facts show, this policy was more a statement of principle than of practice. Table 8 presents the Palestine population and the police composition by percentage of Arabs and Jews between the years 1929-1939. It is quite clear that the Jews in Palestine were under-represented in the police and only between the years 1937-39 did their percentage in the police exceed their percentage in the population. The recommendations of Dowbiggin and Shaw in 1930, that the establishment of the Palestine Police should be substantially increased, were fulfilled in the same year. Shortly after the disturbances of 1933, it became clear that, in accordance with the political situation and the state of security in Palestine, the police force had to be further increased, especially the British component. Because of budget problems and in spite of pressing needs, the police were not increased significantly. Only at the end of 1936, when the first phase of the Arab revolt took place, about 200 additional British policemen were recruited in England and sent to Palestine and the Government decided to recruit more Jews into the force. In 1937 the Jewish segment of the Palestine Police numbered 767 men, compared with 484 in 1936, and 240 in 1930. The British part of the Palestine Police began to grow yearly, from 691 in 1930, to 2,965 in 1939. In 1939, for the first time, the British became the majority group in the Palestine Police - 55.2 percent of the whole force.

For Arabs and Jews by percentage in the Palestine population and in the Palestine Police, see the following table:

Table 8: Arabs and Jews by Percentage in the Palestine Population and in the Police, 1929-39

| Year | Population % |       | Police % |       |
|------|--------------|-------|----------|-------|
|      | Arabs        | Jews  | Arabs    | Jews  |
| 1929 | 83.01        | 16.99 | 86.06    | 13.94 |
| 1930 | 83.40        | 16.60 | 85.26    | 14.74 |
| 1931 | 83.11        | 16.89 | 83.11    | 16.89 |
| 1932 | 82.83        | 17.17 | 81.57    | 18.43 |
| 1933 | 81.07        | 18.93 | 83.01    | 16.99 |
| 1934 | 78.34        | 21.66 | 85.10    | 14.90 |
| 1935 | 74.60        | 25.40 | 81.96    | 18.04 |
| 1936 | 72.28        | 27.72 | 76.47    | 21.53 |
| 1937 | 72.10        | 27.90 | 71.09    | 28.91 |
| 1938 | 71.35        | 28.65 | 70.15    | 29.85 |
| 1939 | 70.34        | 29.66 | 70.77    | 29.23 |

Source: Palestine Police Annual Administrative Report for years 1929-1939.

The following table shows the composition of the Palestine Police force by nationality:

Table 9 : Palestine Police, 1929-1939, Classification  
by Nationality.

| Year | British |      | Arabs |      | Jews |      | Total |
|------|---------|------|-------|------|------|------|-------|
|      | No.     | %    | No.   | %    | No.  | %    |       |
| 1929 | 410     | 21.2 | 1,313 | 68.1 | 207  | 10.7 | 1,931 |
| 1930 | 691     | 29.4 | 1,418 | 60.4 | 240  | 10.2 | 2,347 |
| 1931 | 703     | 29.0 | 1,431 | 59.2 | 286  | 11.8 | 2,421 |
| 1932 | 690     | 26.7 | 1,549 | 60.0 | 344  | 13.3 | 2,584 |
| 1933 | 698     | 26.3 | 1,627 | 61.4 | 327  | 12.3 | 2,653 |
| 1934 | 728     | 26.7 | 1,708 | 62.6 | 291  | 10.7 | 2,729 |
| 1935 | 754     | 26.1 | 1,750 | 60.7 | 377  | 13.2 | 2,883 |
| 1936 | 960     | 29.9 | 1,799 | 55.1 | 484  | 15.0 | 3,216 |
| 1937 | 1,192   | 30.7 | 1,926 | 49.6 | 767  | 19.7 | 3,887 |
| 1938 | 2,194   | 46.2 | 1,808 | 38.0 | 750  | 15.8 | 4,754 |
| 1939 | 2,965   | 55.2 | 1,715 | 31.9 | 692  | 12.0 | 5,374 |

Source : Palestine Police Annual Administrative Reports,  
years 1929-1939.

## Chapter VI: Policing Palestine - The Third Decade 1939-1948

### The Political Background

The third decade of the Palestine Police existence and activity was deeply and directly connected with the political events and the state of security of the country. This decade was the most difficult and harsh period for the Palestine Government and the two native communities, the Arab and the Jews. Arab Palestinian nationalism grew, and the Arab states became increasingly involved in Palestine's affairs. The British Government, which for its own interest in the Middle East desired to gain the friendship of the Arab states, published a White Paper on 17th May 1939 formulating British policy regarding Palestine's future :

1. It is not a part of the British policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state.
2. There is not a just basis for a claim that Palestine be converted into an Arab state.
3. The British Government's objective is the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine state in which Arabs and Jews govern jointly, so as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.
4. Over the next five years a total of 75.000 Jewish immigrants be admitted to Palestine, after which no further Jewish immigration will be permitted, unless the Arab population of Palestine is prepared to agree.

5. Prohibition of further transfers (sale) of Arab land in designated areas of Palestine that the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land (Palestine, Statement of Policy, 1939, p 4 12).

Despite the fact that the White Paper was a victory for the Arabs, the Arab High Committee rejected it. They demanded the immediate establishment of a Arab state, the cessation of the Jewish immigration to Palestine and the authority to review the status of every Jew who entered Palestine since 1918. The Jewish Agency's reaction to the White Paper of 1939 was also that of rejection. They emphasized that the new policy denied the Jewish people the right to reconstitute their National Home in their ancestral country, and protested against the transfer of authority over Palestine to the existing hostile Arab majority, and the end of the Jewish immigration which established a territorial ghetto for the Jewish minority in their own homeland.

"It is the darkest of Jewish history that the British Government proposes to deprive the Jews of their last hope. The Jews will never accept the closing against them of the gates of Palestine" (Jewish Agency Book of Documents, 1947, pp. 137-138).

Winston Churchill said in the British House of Commons on May 23, 1939 during the debate on the White Paper: "....." there is the violation of the pledge, there is the abandonment of the Balfour

declaration; there is the end of the vision, of the hope, of the dream..... The triumphant Arabs have rejected it (the White Paper recommendation), the despairing Jews will resist it" (Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 347, No. 101, columns 2177-2189).

On May 18th, one day after the White Paper was issued, Jewish demonstrations were held throughout Palestine. The Jewish population proclaimed that this treacherous policy would not be tolerated but fought and defeated. The Yshuv would neither recognize nor accede to restrictions on Jewish immigration into its land. The Jews regarded the White Paper policy as a breach of faith and a surrender to Arab terrorism. The Permanent Mandates Commission in their report to the Council of the League of Nations, declared that the policy set out by the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation which, in agreement with the Mandatory Power and the Council, the Commission had placed upon the Palestine Mandate (Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Thirty- Sixth Session, 1939, p. 275). On February 28th, 1940 the British Government issued the Land Transfer Regulations which divided Palestine into three zones as follows:

- 1) In zone "A", approximately 63 percent of the area of Palestine, the transfer of land was prohibited to Jews.
- 2) In zone "B", some 32 percent of the area, the transfers were prohibited ordinarily, and only with the permit of the High Commissioner was the passage of land to a non-Arab person allowed.
- 3) In the remainder of Palestine, about 5 percent of the country (of which about half the land was already Jewish), transfers remained



unrestricted (Esco Fondation, 1947, p. 933). The publication of the land transfer regulations provoked large Jewish protest demonstrations. Troops and police were stoned, and streets were barricaded. Force was used against the demonstrators and curfews were imposed in towns. Many Jews were arrested. The White Paper of May 1939 and the Land Transfer Regulations inaugurated a decade of conflict between the Jews and the British Government in Palestine. The White Paper policy limited immigration endangered the efforts of the Zionist movement to rescue of maximum Jews number from Hitler's grasp in Europe. The Jewish Agency, which had previously brought Jews illegally to Palestine, on a small reduced scale, ordered the "Hagana" underground movement to organize an illegal immigration route from Europe to Palestine. The Palestine Government informed of those plans, reinforced the forces dedicated to stop the illegal immigration by bringing to the Mediterianian shores a flotilla composed of four Navy destroyers, and enlarging the Police Port and Marine Section. From the begining of 1939 until the outbreak of the World War Two, 20 illegal ships with about 9000 illegal Jewish immigrants from Europe were intercepted by the British Navy and the Police and the immigrants apprehended (Slotzky, 1972, p. 82).

With the outbreak of the war the Yishuv in Palestine faced a dilemma. On one hand, Hitler and Nazism, dedicated to eradicate Jewish existence in Europe, were considered the Jews' main enemy. For this reason the Yishuv should fight them side by side with Britain and its allies. On the other hand, the recent British policy was hostile to

the Jewish issue and gave precedence to the Arabs and their own interests in the Middle East, endangering the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine. David Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Jewish Agency, declared at that time: "We will fight with the British against Hitler as if there was no White Paper, and we will fight the White Paper as if there was no war" (Lucas, 1975, p. 195). At the very beginning of the war the Jewish Agency announced to the Palestine Government that all the energies and resources of the Jews in Palestine would be at the disposal of the British war effort. The Jewish proposal to recruit a Jewish Division in the British Army was rejected by the Government which argued that there is not yet any danger to the security of Palestine. The Jewish Agency request to form a Jewish Brigade made up mainly of Palestine Jews was granted only in the autumn of 1944. By the end of the war about twenty-six thousand Palestine Jews were in the British Armed Forces and an additional twenty thousand were involved in home guard duties within the framework of the supernumerary police. In addition to the regular service with the British forces, the Palestine Jewry contributed important missions of intelligence in Middle East and behind the enemy lines in Europe. In 1941-1942 there was close cooperation between the illegal Hagana and the British military authorities.

#### The Dissident Underground Movements

After the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1936, the Hagana followed the official Jewish Agency line of "havilaga" (restraint),

which prescribed purely defensive tactics and condemned every attempt of retaliation against the Arabs. That policy led to conflicts among the Hagana members which produced the "Irgun Zvai Leumi" (The National Military Organization) in April 1937. This new body rejected the policy of restraint and adopted a line of retaliation and reprisal against Arabs. With the outbreak of the World War Two the "Irgun" declared a truce with the Palestine Government, in order to turn their resources against the common enemy - the Nazis. Even David Raziel, the Irgun military chief, collaborated with British forces in commando-type raids in Iraq, in one of which he was killed (Brenner, 1965, p. 3). The truce between the Irgun and the Palestine Government ended in January 1944, when Menachem Begin took the command of the Irgun and declared a open war on the British administration in Palestine, which denied the establishment of a Jewish Palestinian army; closed the gates for the Jewish emigrants; betrayed the Jewish people and favored the Arabs (Slutsky, 1972, p. 520).

In August 1940, because of disputes between two leaders of the Irgun, David Raziel and Abraham Stern, the latter left the Irgun and created a independent body under the name "Fighters for Israel's Freedom" (Lohamei Heirut Israel - "Lehi"). The differences between the Irgun and Lehi group were tactical, psychological, personal and political. Lehi or the "Stern group", as it was called afterwards, advocated individual terror. They looked upon Arabs as rivals and upon the Britons as the Jews' real enemy. The Stern group had no sources of income and they relied mainly on robberies for funds. After a few

police searches and arrests of Lehi members, the group proclaimed war on the Palestine Police.

On January 20, 1942 a bomb which was planted by Lehi members, intended for two British Intelligence Officers, accidentally killed two well-liked Jewish police officers and another British officer. On February 12, 1942 Stern himself was traced to a flat in Tel-Aviv and shot dead by a British police officer. The British Government claimed that Stern was killed while trying to escape; the Stern group maintained that he was shot in cold blood by the police (Brenner, 1965, p. 5). The dissident activity of the Irgun and Lehi against the British Administration in Palestine and its servants increased, causing concern among those who were in charge of security, law and order.

### The Palestine Police Structure.

#### Headquarters and Districts

In the third decade of existence the Palestine Police crystallized its structure around the Irish centralised police model, which had been developed in British colonies in Africa and Asia. This featured :

1. A centralized organ of the central government.
2. The police force headed by an Inspector-General.
3. An armed and military trained force.

4. A strict discipline imposed by regulations and controlled by the supervisory and command levels.
5. A strictly vertical command structure : Headquarters, Districts, Divisions, Police Stations and Police Posts.

The Inspector-General was to be responsible to the High Commissioner for the administration of the police and the prisons in Palestine. He was to be assisted at Headquarters by the Deputy Inspector-General for Administration, who was also the second in command of the force, the Deputy Inspector-General for Criminal Investigation, the Deputy Superintendent in charge with the Traffic and Transport, the District Superintendent in charge of Prisons and the District Superintendent in charge of police training. District Superintendents were in charge of Police Districts and Assistant Superintendents were in charge of Divisions. At the field level the police functions were performed by Police Stations under the command of Inspectors. In the previous decade the police stations were controlled and inspected by the District Superintendent and his headquarters. Beginning with the 1930's the Divisions were established as middle command and supervisory level under an Assistant Superintendent.

In 1931 the Palestine Police operated through 5 Police Districts, 13 Divisions, 39 Police Stations and 68 Police Posts.:

Figure 5 : Palestine Police Structure - 1931

| District   | Divisions                                          |
|------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| Jerusalem: | Jerusalem-Urban; Jerusalem-Rural; Hebron           |
| Northern:  | Haifa-Urban; Haifa-Rural; Safad; Acre;<br>Nazareth |
| Nablus:    | Nablus; TulKarem                                   |
| Southern:  | Jaffa; Ramle                                       |
| Beersheba: | - -                                                |

In October 1933 the Tiberias Division in the Northern District was formed. In May 1933 the Jaffa Rural Division in the Southern District and Jenin Division in the Nablus District were formed. In April 1934 Tel-Aviv Division in the Southern District was formed, and in July 1934 the Gaza Division and Beersheba District were combined and renamed Gaza District (Palestine Police Administrative Report, 1934).

In 1938, during the Arab revolt, 14 police stations and post

buildings were damaged beyond repair by attacks of Arab gangs and 12 buildings were partially damaged during the same year (Palestine Police Administrative Report, 1938).

At the beginning of 1939 there were 7 Districts, 21 Divisions, 51 Police Stations and 38 Police Posts. At the beginning of 1947 there were in all Palestine 8 Districts, 24 Divisions, 67 Police Stations and 44 Police Posts. The changes in the formation of districts, divisions and the opening or closing of police stations or police posts were a function of the country's development, the population growth, the establishment of new settlements, and the crime and security situation.

The Palestine Police chart of organization at the end of 1946 is shown on the next page.


Figure 6: Palestine Police - Districts and Divisions, 1946

| District   | Divisions                                     |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Jerusalem: | Jerusalem-Urban; Jerusalem-Rural; Hebron      |
| Lydda:     | Jaffa; Tel-Aviv; Petah Tiqva; Ramle; Rehovoth |
| Haifa:     | Haifa-Urban; Haifa-Rural                      |
| Samaria:   | Nablus; Tulkarem; Jenin                       |
| Galilee:   | Nazareth; Tiberias; Safad                     |
| Gaza:      | Gaza; Beersheba                               |
| Railways:  | Railways-North; Railways-South                |
| Ports:     | Haifa; Jaffa; Tel-Aviv; Tiberias              |

Source: Palestine Police Administration Report, 1946, p. 28.



Figure 7: The Regional Division of the Palestine Police, 1946



Source: Palestine Police Annual Report, 1946, p. 28.

Port and Marine District

The Marine Section which was inaugurated in July 1935 in Haifa with a small detachment in Jaffa, continued to develop. In 1938 the principal functions of the Port and Marine Section, which was under the direct control of the Criminal Investigation Department, were the prevention of illegal immigration, the prevention of smuggling of goods and firearms, the ports' area patrol and the control of the ports' gates. The total strength of the section was 28 British and 36 Palestinians. Sea patrols were made with 4 launches and 6 smaller vessels. On August 8, 1939 the Marine Section was the object of "Hagana" retaliation due to its activity against the Jewish illegal immigration according to the White Paper policy. The launch "Sinbad", a 60 ton armed motor vessel, was sunk by the explosion of a bomb which was planted on board the vessel. The launch captain was killed, the five crewmen survived (Slutsky, 1972, p. 75). During the war the Port and Marine Section served as the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and its command placed under the Senior Naval Officer at Haifa. On November 1st, 1945 the "Hagana" struck again. Mines attached to two police vessels in Haifa harbour and to one vessel in Jaffa harbour, exploded and damaged the vessels (Slutsky, 1972, p. 859). Because of the increase in the Jewish illegal immigration and the underground movement activities against the Port and Marine units and vessels, the division was changed on November 1st 1945 to the level of a district and put under the command of a superintendent at the Headquarters in Jerusalem which reported directly to the Inspector-General. Four

launches were taken on loan from the Royal Navy to replace those which were sabotaged. In the same year the police fleet was in attendance at the arrest of 20 vessels found carrying Jewish illegal immigrants to Palestine.

Railways District.

The Palestine railways system was a preferred Arab target during the revolt of 1936-39. Railway stations were set on fire, railway lines were sabotaged, trains were stoned and shot, passengers killed and wounded. In April 1937, after a year of insecurity and public suffering, the Palestine Police established in April 1937 the Railways Guard, staffed by Temporary Additional Police, mainly Jews commanded by British officers. The unit continued to exist after the suppression of the Arab revolt because of World War Two. With the the Jewish declaration of resistance against the Palestine Government and the Jewish attacks on the railways system, the Railways Guard became a Police Division manned mainly by auxiliary police. In November 1st 1946, the Railways Division was promoted to the level of a District, coordinated directly by the Police Headquarters in Jerusalem. In December 1946 the strength of the Railways District was 1,440 men, including only 107 Jewish auxiliary police (Palestine Administrative Report, 1946, p. 44; Riblin, 1963, p. 461). With the "Declaration of War" against the Palestine Government in 1945, the Palestine Railway once again became a preferred target, as in 1936-39, this time for the Jewish underground movements.

On the night of November 11, 1945, the "Palmach" (the "Hagana" shock forces) mined, in a large and coordinated operation, the railways in 153 different points throughout Palestine. Railway lines, bridges and viaducts were destroyed by hundreds of "Palmach" comando troops without inflicting any casualties among the railway workers. On the same night the "Lehi" and the "Irgun", the two dissident underground movements, destroyed three locomotives, in which actions two British soldiers and four Arab auxiliary police were killed (Slutsky, 1972, p. 859). These were the major attacks on the railway system; many additional strikes occurred during the years 1945-47.

#### Police Strike Forces

After the disturbances of 1920 the Palestine Government was convinced that the police force, which actually was in charge of law and order and also was a paramilitary organization in charge of the security of the country, needed to establish a strike force, concentrated in barracks, and ready to face large disturbances or any opposition to rule. For these reasons the Palestine Gendarmerie was established in 1921 and the British Gendarmerie in 1922. But because the British Government wanted to reduce the expenditures of policing Palestine, both Gendarmeries were disbanded in April 1926. The Arab disturbances of 1929, 1933, and the Arab revolt of 1936-39 repeatedly proved that the Government could not rely on the Arab policemen (which were the majority in the force). The British Section of the Palestine Police which was created after the disbandment of the Gendarmeries was

insufficient and spread over the police stations, the Jews in the police were a small minority and they could not be used against the Arab dissidents because of political reasons. A riot force or strike force, with military training capable of operating like military units, was urgently needed. The police had been repeatedly forced to invoke military assistance due to shortage of such a force. The day after the outbreak of the 1929 disturbances the police announced to the High Commissioner that they were no longer able to accept responsibility for public security in Palestine, as a result of which the Commander of the Royal Air Force was given charge of all the security forces. In the disturbances of 1938 the police were placed under the operative control of the General Officer Commanding the Army in Palestine. The question of a proper reserve force for the police was raised again and again. The Arab revolt of 1936-39 and the poor performance of the police convinced the Government of the need for such a force. In late 1940 the Mobile Police Striking Force (M.P.S.F) was established. The force was composed of two infantry units, twenty-five British and twenty-five Palestinians, with motor transport commanded by a British Inspector and one mounted troop with an additional fifty men. The M.P.S.F assisted the regular police to combat Arab gangs which remained active in the hills, to visit trouble spots and conduct routine patrols. The political situation in Palestine became more complex and difficult. Britain began to understand that its Mandate in Palestine was unworkable. Their policy of restraining the immigration of the homeless Jewish , survivors of the holocaust victims, to Palestine incited the Palestine Jewry and

did not satisfy the Palestinian Arabs. Clouds of unrest darkened the sky of Palestine. The new Inspector-General, Captain J. M. Rymer Jones, appointed on August 21, 1943, arrived to the conclusion that the country urgently needed a large striking force as a support unit to the regular police. He succeeded in convincing the War Cabinet in London and got the approval and the budget to establish this unit (Horne, 1982, p. 516).

In the summer of 1944 the Police Mobile Force (P.M.F) was established. A strike force of 48 officers and 836 other ranks, all British. (Statistical Abstracts of Palestine, 1946, p. 216). Colonel R.H. Stable from the Indian Army was appointed the Commander of P.M.F at the rank of Assistant Inspector-General. Most of the unit commanders were also brought from the Army, while the middle level officers were drawn from the police. The P.M.F was composed of four companies stationed in Jerusalem, Sharona, Kfar Vitkin and Shafamr, located so to be capable of assisting and reinforcing all Police Districts. The P.M.F recruits received only one month basic training and were sent to operational work, which consisted of cordoning and searching areas, road checks, escort duties and mobile and foot patrols in urban and rural areas. The P.M.F were largely activated against the illegal immigration and the Jewish underground movements. The lack of manpower which affected the police generally in 1945-1946, affected also the P.M.F which could not be brought up to full strength. That situation resulted in the disbanding of two companies in July 1946 and the complete disbanding of the force by the end of

the year, in order to keep the police in the large urban areas at a sufficient strength to permit the carrying out of essential police duties (Palestine Police Report, 1946, p.43). In 1947, the P.M.F was replaced by Operational Patrol Units in the three main urban areas; Jerusalem, Jaffa, Tel-Aviv and Haifa. Those units, equipped with a few wireless armored-cars, were to deal with any form of crime or terrorism, to conduct security patrols, to safeguard government property and to carry out escort duties. The personnel in these units were all British.

#### Auxiliary Police.

Part five of the Police Ordinance of 1926, articles 28-30, authorized the Inspector-General of the Police to enlist Supernumerary Constables to be employed on special duties. When an unlawful assembly, riots or disturbances of the peace had taken place and the police were not sufficient to handle the situation, the District Commissioner or a Magistrate, at the request of a police officer, could appoint citizens to act as Special Police Officers for a certain time in a certain area. Such a Special Police had the same powers, privileges and protection as a regular policeman (Government of Palestine, Ordinances, 1926, p. 9).

The continuing disorder during the Arab rebellion of 1936-39, together with the shortage of police manpower, necessitated the employment of auxiliary police for the protection of government

buildings and property and the defence of Jewish settlements. The need to guard the large military establishment brought to Palestine in World War Two, as well as the Jewish resistance against the British Government in Palestine, beginning in 1945, brought about a considerable increase of the auxiliary forces employed. Three forms of auxiliary police were developed during this period: Temporary Additional Police, Supernumerary Police and Special Police:

The Temporary Additional Police - The Temporary Additional Police personnel were enlisted for periods of six months and received the pay of regular police personnel. Part of them were employed for general protective police duties and distributed throughout the police districts, safeguarding government buildings and property against theft and sabotage. At the beginning of 1939 there were 1628 T.A.P. of this sort, most of them Jews. As a result of Jewish attacks on Government buildings and installations it was found necessary to increase the establishment of this kind of T.A.P. In 1945 there were 2154 men in these units and at the beginning of 1947 the figure increased to 4527, but at this time only 220 of them were Jews, the remainder - Arabs (Palestine Police Report, 1946, p. 44; Riblin, 1963, p. 461). An additional unit of about 300 T.A.P. guarded enemy aliens in four detention camps under the command of British officers. A third unit was in charge of the protection of railways and ports. This unit was established in 1937 and except for its administrative staff of regular British police officers, was entirely Jewish. The personnel were distributed for protection of railway stations and blockhouses at vulnerable and important bridges or the main railways.



They also patrolled sections of the lines. In 1939 they numbered 434 men. When the railways became a important sabotage target for the dissident Jewish underground movements, the strength of this force grew. Because of three large scale attacks of the "Hagana" on the Palestine Railways, the number of T.A.P employed for the protection of the railways and ports was increased at the end of 1946 to 1440 men. At this time only 107 of them were Jews (Riblin, 1963, p. 461).

The Jewish Settlements Police - The establishment of the Jewish Settlements Police (J.S.P) was a consequence of the widespread of the Arab revolt in 1936. The development of this force was described and analysed in the previous chapter. The J.S.P were Temporary Additional Police in charge of ensuring the protection of the Jewish settlements. The strength of this force fluctuated with the variations in the public security situation, political developments and the relationship between the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) and the government. On April 15, 1940, 206 men were removed from the J.S.P for reasons of "economy" and the force stood at 1073 men. On June 1941, because of fear of enemy actions in the Middle East, the J.S.P was expanded by 1790 men, reaching a strength of 2863 (Survey of Palestine, 1946, p. 591). The Palestine Government knew that the majority of the J.S.P recruits were members of the "Hagana" and their main loyalty was to the "Hagana" leadership. For many years the Palestine Government purposely overlooked "Hagana" existence, knowing that this illegal Jewish army had risen as a self-defense force against the Arab violence and because of the government failure to protect the Jewish settlements. The creation of the J.S.P was

tantamount to de facto legalization of the "Hagana", as said Horne, the Palestine Police historian : "With the creation of the Jewish Settlements Police, the "Hagana had got itself an organized Jewish force with government consent, government money and government training" (Horne, 1982, p. 538). The political struggle of the Jewish community against the White Paper restrictions became, from 1945, a Jewish armed resistance. The Jewish Agency refrained from involving the J.S.P openly in operations and demonstrations against the Palestine Government, on the other hand the Palestine Police did not use the J.S.P in cordon and search operations against Jewish rural settlements, to spare them embarrassment and disobedience of orders. In these years there were periods that the Palestine Government tended to minimize the J.S.P contribution, although this was politically difficult. There is no doubt that the J.S.P was an important factor in the defense of the Jewish settlements against the Arab violence and aggression.

### Police Strength

#### Development of the Palestine Police Strength

In following the changes in the Palestine Police strength during its existence it is clear that the size and ethnic composition of the force was affected by political developments and the origin and magnitude of civil disorder in Palestine. Financial difficulties or the desire to reduce expenses were the causes of reduction of police

strength. In 1920 the strength of the Palestine Police was 74 men less than in 1919. The reasons for this were the small police budget and low wages for personnel. The May 1921 disturbances and a political unrest persuaded the British government to allow the establishment of two gendarmeries in Palestine; In July 1921 the Palestine Gendarmerie of 631 men was established, and in April 1922 the British Gendarmerie of 762 British officers and constables was established. The two Gendarmeries were a emergency reserve, well equipped, which backed up the police when required, as a strike force controlled by a civilian police. The establishment of the British Gendarmerie was the result of the Haycroft Commission of Inquiry which criticized the attitude and involvement of the Arab policemen in the disturbances of 1921, and the absence of a British police force, which in such situations would be a neutral reliable armed force.

The comparative tranquility and improved security conditions led the British Government to disband both gendarmeries in April 1926 and replace them with a small British Section attached to the Palestine Police. This was a result of the British Government's will to reduce the massive expenditures of policing in Palestine. The disturbances of 1929 and the Arab revolt in 1936-1939 proved that the reduction of police forces in Palestine and mainly the disbanding of the British Gendarmerie was a mistake that lost lives. The analysis of the Palestine Police strength between the years 1929-1939 proves a direct connection between the enlargement of the police strength, its ethnic composition, the political situation and the security condition in the

country :

- In 1928, before the 1929 disturbances, the police strength was 1770 men, of whom 219 were British. In 1930, a year after the 1929 disturbances, following the Dowbiggin and Shaw Commission of Inquiry recommendations to increase the Palestine Police establishment, particularly its British component, the police strength rose to 2347, of whom 691 British officers and constables.
- In 1937, a year after the Arab revolt begun, the strength of the police was 3887, of whom 1194 British. In 1939, the last year of the Arab revolt, the police strength rose to 5374 men of whom the British numbered 2964. In this year, for the first time since the establishment of the Palestine Police, the British element became the majority in the force - 55,2 percent.
- From the outset of the Palestine Police existence, and in spite of the British Government's commitment that the Jews would comprise one-third of the police force, the Palestine Government never fulfilled its obligation. In 1922 the Jews formed 11,1 percent of the Palestine population and only 9,5 percent of the Palestinians in the Palestine Police. In 1929, the year that the Arab disturbances became widespread, the Jews were 16,99 percent of the Palestine population and only 13,94 percent of the Palestine Police. In 1936, in the middle of the Arab revolt, the Jews were 27,72 percent of the Palestine population and only 21,13 percent of the Palestinians in the police. 1939 was the first year, since the establishment of the Palestine Police, that the percentage of Jews in the police was an

equal to their part in the Palestine population - 29 percent. During the years 1940-41 the number of the Jews in the Palestine Police grew proportionally to the growth of the police force as a whole, as did the number of Arab policemen.

In 1943 the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) declared their resistance to the British limitation on the Jewish immigration and purchase of land. In this year all the Jewish underground movements consolidated in their struggle against the British administration in Palestine, and the number of Jews in the police began to decrease, so that in 1948, at the end of the British Mandate in Palestine their number was smaller than in 1941. The reasons for this situation were:

- A large enlistment of Jewish youth in the British Army, joining the fight against the Nazi enemy.
- The dissatisfaction of the Jewish policemen with their treatment by the British, who were inclined to suspect them as cooperating with the "Hagana" or the dissident underground movements.
- The British policy to recruit fewer Jews to the police beginning with the broadening of the Jewish struggle against the British Administration in 1943.

The following table reflects the strength of the Palestine Police in its third decade of existence :

Table 10 : Palestine Police Establishment and Strength, 1939-1947

| Year | British |       | Arab |       | Jews |       | Total |       |
|------|---------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|
|      | No      | %     | No   | %     | No   | %     | No    | %     |
| 1939 | 2965    | 55.20 | 1715 | 31.90 | 692  | 12.90 | 5374  | 100.0 |
| 1940 | 3063    | 52.07 | 1994 | 33.90 | 826  | 14.03 | 5882  | 100.0 |
| 1941 | 2856    | 48.51 | 2148 | 36.48 | 879  | 15.01 | 5887  | 100.0 |
| 1942 | 2749    | 47.25 | 2228 | 38.30 | 839  | 14.44 | 5816  | 100.0 |
| 1943 | 3113    | 50.20 | 2307 | 37.20 | 780  | 12.60 | 6200  | 100.0 |
| 1944 | 3954    | 55.69 | 2473 | 34.83 | 672  | 9.48  | 7099  | 100.0 |
| 1945 | 5445    | 65.94 | 2145 | 25.97 | 668  | 8.09  | 8256  | 100.0 |
| 1946 | 5453    | 64.08 | 2371 | 27.86 | 685  | 8.05  | 8509  | 100.0 |
| 1947 | 5071    | 61.78 | 2394 | 29.17 | 743  | 9.05  | 8208  | 100.0 |

Source: Palestine Government: The General Bulletins of Statistics.

The following table presents the Palestine population (Arab and Jews) and their representation in the Palestine Police, by percentage, between the years 1939-1947 :

Table 11 : The Percentage of Arab and Jews in the Palestine  
Population and in the Police Strength, 1939-1947

| Year | Population % |       | Police % |       |
|------|--------------|-------|----------|-------|
|      | Arab         | Jews  | Arab     | Jews  |
| 1939 | 70.34        | 29.66 | 70.77    | 29.23 |
| 1940 | 70.00        | 30.00 | 70.73    | 29.27 |
| 1941 | 70.09        | 29.81 | 70.49    | 29.41 |
| 1942 | 71.00        | 29.00 | 72.64    | 27.36 |
| 1943 | 70.00        | 30.00 | 74.73    | 25.27 |
| 1944 | 69.60        | 30.40 | 78.63    | 21.37 |
| 1945 | 69.09        | 30.60 | NA       | NA    |
| 1946 | 69.09        | 30.91 | 77.19    | 22.81 |
| 1947 | 68.00        | 32.00 | 79.69    | 20.31 |

Note : This table was computed from statistical data published by Government of Palestine General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics, Vol. XIII, January-February 1948, p. 5, and in Roberto Backy's book: The Population of Israel, Jerusalem, Scientific Translations, 1974, p. 5.

Parallel to the tendency to reduce the number of Jewish policemen in the force, there was a slight increase in the number of Arabs in the police and a large increase in the British sanctioned strength, from 2965 in 1939 to 5453 in 1946. All this strength was

devoted to security functions, mainly against the Jewish resistance, but also to deal with violent incidents between Jews and Arabs.

#### Length of Service

The Palestine Police succeeded in attracting a large number of British police officers from different colonial police forces in Asia and Africa, and also many Army officers who decided to join the Palestine Police and develop a new career. Over the years many British non-commissioned policemen were promoted directly to the rank of Inspector and even Acting Assistant Superintendent (Captain), without any course or examinations, solely on the recommendation of their commanding officer.

The officers in the Palestine Police typically served long terms and many were transferred to other colonial police forces in the British colonies, and even promoted to higher ranks. On the other hand the Palestine Police did not succeed in keeping the British constables on the force for long periods of service. Generally, British personnel were signed on a service contract for three years (the Palestinians on a five year contract). Many British resigned before the end of their contract.

The following table shows the length of service of the British and Palestinian sections of the Palestine Police in different periods of the British Mandate :



Table 12 : Length of Service - Palestine Police

| Amount of Service              | 1931 |       | 1936 |       | 1946 |       |
|--------------------------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
|                                | No.  | %     | No.  | %     | No.  | %     |
| <u>The British Section</u>     |      |       |      |       |      |       |
| 10 years and over              | -    | -     | 48   | 2.34  | 114  | 3.2   |
| 8 years and less than 10       | 8    | 1.2   | 106  | 5.16  | 183  | 5.3   |
| 5 years and less than 8        | 72   | 11.2  | 115  | 5.60  | 466  | 13.7  |
| 3 years and less than 5        | 26   | 4.0   | 119  | 5.80  | 121  | 3.5   |
| 2 years and less than 3        | 91   | 12.5  | 224  | 10.91 | 527  | 15.20 |
| 1 year and less than 2         | 262  | 40.7  | 309  | 15.05 | 518  | 15.05 |
| under 1 year                   | 196  | 30.4  | 1132 | 55.14 | 1505 | 43.90 |
| <u>The Palestinian Section</u> |      |       |      |       |      |       |
| 10 years and over              | 302  | 21.8  | 478  | 21.82 | 1001 | 32.75 |
| 8 years and less than 10       | 141  | 10.3  | 133  | 6.11  | 287  | 9.40  |
| 5 years and less than 8        | 297  | 20.9  | 391  | 17.84 | 402  | 13.15 |
| 3 years and less than 5        | 153  | 10.9  | 342  | 15.61 | 317  | 10.37 |
| 2 years and less than 3        | 93   | 6.7   | 226  | 10.32 | 216  | 7.07  |
| 1 year and less than 2         | 161  | 11.6  | 427  | 19.49 | 361  | 11.81 |
| under 1 year                   | 250  | 17.8  | 193  | 8.81  | 443  | 15.51 |
| Total                          | 1092 | 100.0 | 2190 | 100.0 | 3056 | 100.0 |

Source : The Palestine Police Annual Administrative Reports for the years 1931, 1936 and 1946.

The British constables, because of the security condition and lack of manpower, were only superficially trained and sent to reinforce the field units. Their main duties were guarding government

and police buildings, escort duty, conducting searches and enforcing curfews. Only a few of the British constables were involved in conventional police work.

#### Authorized Establishment and Actual Strength

Until 1937 the British Government succeeded in enlisting British sergeants and constables according to the authorized establishment. It was not so easy to enlist Jews because they did not find police service socially and economically attractive. The Jewish institutions convinced the Jewish youth that serving in the police force was a national duty and every Jewish policeman got a supplementary bonus from the Jewish Agency, in addition to his regular salary from the Palestine government. On the other hand there was not any problem in enlisting Arabs in the police. In spite of the planned increase of the authorized establishment of British personnel in the Palestine police, the Government did not manage to enroll enough men to the positions authorized during the war.

In 1946 there was a considerable turnover among the British personnel, many of whom joined the police during the war and had completed their period of service, returning to England. The recruiting campaigns in England were not very successful, Palestine was no longer an attractive place to serve for British youngsters, having become a source of great stress and considerable danger. The lack of British manpower affected the Police Mobile Force and resulted

in the disbanding of this force at the end of 1946 and its embodiment in the regular police units (Palestine Police Report, 1946, p. 43).

The following table represents the planned changes in the Palestine Police establishment and actual strength in the last decade of the British Mandate in Palestine:

Table 13 : The Authorized Establishment and Actual Strength of the Palestine Police, 1939-1946

| Year | British    |        |      | Palestinians |        |       |
|------|------------|--------|------|--------------|--------|-------|
|      | Authorized | Actual | %    | Authorized   | Actual | %     |
| 1938 | 2944       | 2029   | 68.9 | 2308         | 2190   | 94.9  |
| 1946 | 5453       | 3144   | 57.6 | 3018         | 3056   | 101.3 |
| 1948 | 5071       | 3737   | 73.7 | 3420         | 3137   | 91.7  |

Note : The table was computed from data published in the Palestine Police Annual Administrative Reports for the years 1938, 1946 and from the file CO 537/ 3846 at the Public Record Office in London.

Bayley, in his comparative study of police systems, found that police strength is related to the objectives of the police and their

priorities in crime deterrence, riot control, suppression of political dissention and maintainance of public law and order. He did not find consistent evidence of the relation between police strength and the crime rate. Only one particular form of crime might, in his opinion, play a part in the increase of police strength : crime against social order reflected in collective violence (Bayley, 1985, p. 87).

Bayley's assumption was confirmed by this analysis of the changes on the Palestine Police strength. There is a clear conclusion :

- The Palestine Police strength was affected in the first years of the police existence by financial considerations.
- Between the years 1921 and 1939 police strength was affected by the political struggle between the Arabs and the Jews as well as by the Arab disturbances and revolt.
- From 1943 until the end of the British Mandate on Palestine, the police strength was affected by the Jewish struggle against the British Administration.

#### Police Functions

Bayley divided the functions of a police force into three categories: assignments, situations and outcomes .

The assignments are : patrol, criminal investigation, traffic regulations, internal administration and auxiliary regulations. Patrol

is the dominant assignment in most of the police forces.

Situations are the most direct indicator of police work, including events that involve violation of the law and those that do not. Situations reveal the characters of encounters between the police and the public.

Outcomes are divided into two categories: enforcement and non enforcement tasks (Bayley, 1985, p. 21). Comparison of the Palestine Police functions to Bayley's categories is informative.

The Police Ordinance No. 17, which was formulated by the Palestine Government in 1926, defined, in section 4, the Palestine Police duties as follows: Prevention of crime; Detection of crime; Prosecution of crime; Apprehension of offenders; Safe custody of prisoners; Maintenance of public order; Safety of persons and property (Police Ordinance, 1926, p. 96).

The Police Stations were the principal functional and operational units of the Palestine Police for the performance of these duties. The Police Station was the most important subordinate formation, to which were posted a number of policemen, under the command of an Inspector or a senior N.C.O, designated Station Officer. The Police Stations were located in well-defined geographical areas of Palestine and responsible for the police work in such areas (Force Standing Orders No. 1236, p. 1).

The Station Officer was responsible for the Station police work

to the Officer in Charge of a Police Division, who reported to the Officer in Charge of the District. The Officers in Charge of the Districts were controlled by the Inspector General of the Police whose his Headquarters were located in Jerusalem.

#### Assignments

The police duties of the Police Stations were divided into two branches, Investigation and Administration:

The Investigation Branch - The Investigation Branch of the Police Station was responsible for the following assignments: Recording, investigation and prosecution of offences against the Criminal Law in the station area; Maintenance of criminal registers; Preparation of criminal statistics; Registration of lost and found property; Collection and reporting of intelligence on political matters and subjects affecting public security and other matters of importance in the police work.

The Administrative Branch - The Administrative Branch of the Police Station dealt with all the executive assignments of the Station: Patrolling the Station area for crime prevention and enforcement of the law; Arrests and apprehension of offenders; Service of summons and warrants; Safe custody of arrestees; Traffic Regulations control; Maintenance of public order.

In addition to the police assignments which were performed by the Police Stations, there were additional assignments which were

fulfilled by special units of the police at the Division, District or Headquarters level, such as: Registration of motor vehicles and the issue of driver licences; Crowd control; Detection and prevention of illegal immigration; Prevention and detection of the smuggling of goods and firearms across the Syrian and Trans-Jordan borders; Frontier control; The collection of intelligence of interest to the Government and the police: rumors which disturb the public peace, information regarding political leaders, movements and publications, the activity of political agitators; deportation of illegal immigrants; extraditions of fugitive offenders and the use of dogs as an investigative aid.

#### Situations.

The Palestine Government, which prepared the Survey of Palestine for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on the situation in Palestine in 1946, aptly defined the function of the Palestine Police: "The police had the double function of action against what may be termed private crime and guarding against what may be called political crime" (Survey, 1946, p. 583).

The Palestine Police was an armed civil police force. Under section 51 of the Police Ordinance 1926, the Palestine Police was proclaimed to be a military force and, during war, liable to be employed with military duties in defence of Palestine (Survey, 1946, p. 119). The Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.), which at the

beginning of the British Mandate on Palestine was in charge of criminal investigation tasks at the Headquarters level, developed into national intelligence agency which collected information of interest to the government and served as a political police with security supervision, sedition intelligence and prosecution objectives against political activity of the "natives" (Jews and Arabs).

Over the years Britain arrived at the conclusion that the Mandate in Palestine had proven to be unworkable and the obligations undertaken toward the two communities in Palestine had been demonstrated to be irreconcilable. Even crime was affected by political situations. Table 14 on the next page shows this situation clearly: The rate of murder, attempted murder, robbery and attempted robbery increased considerably in the last years of the Arab revolt in 1938-1939.

These cases decreased significantly during World War Two, and increased again, reaching the highest figures on record for these types of offences in the last two years of the British Mandate (1946-1947). This was a result of intensified attacks of the Jewish dissident movements against British targets, acts of Arab sabotage and strikes against Jews, and retaliation activity of Jews against Arabs. In the last ten years of the British Mandate on Palestine the total criminal offences recorded increased by 171 percent - from 13,208 offences in 1938 to 35,807 in 1947.



Table 14 : Statistical Summary of Crime, 1938-1947

| Year | Murder | Attem.<br>Murder | Serious<br>Assault | Robbery | Burglary | Animal<br>Theft | Total  |
|------|--------|------------------|--------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|--------|
| 1938 | 566    | 568              | 1,407              | 615     | 804      | 219             | 13,208 |
| 1939 | 487    | 505              | 1,559              | 544     | 1,069    | 314             | 14,480 |
| 1940 | 160    | 166              | 3,197              | 426     | 1,220    | 571             | 20,017 |
| 1941 | 121    | 166              | 2,297              | 491     | 1,071    | 646             | 21,751 |
| 1942 | 108    | 107              | 3,460              | 345     | 1,213    | 545             | 22,390 |
| 1943 | 138    | 148              | 3,891              | 352     | 1,331    | 552             | 28,890 |
| 1944 | 143    | 205              | 5,009              | 520     | 2,801    | 517             | 35,138 |
| 1945 | 117    | 200              | 6,088              | 611     | 3,560    | 901             | 33,767 |
| 1946 | 189    | 467              | 6,566              | 880     | 4,015    | 1,099           | 33,738 |
| 1947 | 562    | 654              | 6,099              | 1,192   | 4,847    | 926             | 35,807 |

Source: Palestine Government: A Survey of Palestine, 1946, p. 589:

Palestine Police Annual Report, 1946, p.8: Palestine

Government: General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics,

1948, 13(1-2), p. 75.

As a matter of fact, most of the conventional police functions were fulfilled by the Palestinians, who were the main patrol and investigation personnel at the field level in the Police Stations. The Palestine policemen, Arabs and Jews, were the main contact between the population and the police.

Britons in the police were mainly employed in security tasks, cordon and search operations, crowd control and dispersion of demonstrations, and protection and guarding of government buildings and properties. Because of the depletion of the British part of the Palestine Police after the World War Two and the intensification of the rebellion against the Palestine Government, the British garrison, which numbered 100,000 troops, already severely strained, was also being used in police functions (FO-371/ 52525 E 4774).

#### Outcomes

Every police force today divides its functions into two main categories: Enforcement and non enforcement functions, with the non-enforcement tasks increasing every year in many departments. The outcomes of the Palestine Police functions were different. The ordinary police functions were accomplished by the Palestine policemen. Those functions included all the enforcement tasks, like : patrol, investigation, prosecution at the courts, custody of arrestees, execution of court warrents and so on. The British were engaged mainly with security matters, intelligence, the detection of

illegal immigration , combatting terrorism and guarding government buildings and their own safety. The non enforcement tasks were minimal. The Palestinians were busy with the regular routine police activities and with the investigation of the criminal offences which tripled in the last decade of the British Mandate on Palestine. The British segment of the police, which in majority were young, untrained and new to Palestine, operated mostly in security tasks which could be considered enforcement functions. They were not engaged in non enforcement tasks. As an outcome of the political situation in Palestine in the last years of the British Mandate, the larger part of the police was busy with security and guard activities. The Inspector General of the Palestine Police wrote at the conclusion of the police annual report of 1946: "As a consequence of the high incidence of terrorist activity throughout 1946 it was again necessary to use a great part of the police physical force in the protection of life and property from attacks, as a result normal watch and ward duties have suffered considerably" (Palestine Police Annual Report, 1946, p. 48). Undoubtedly the British Mandatory Government had the will to develop a fine police force in Palestine which, in addition to enforcement functions would also develop non enforcement tasks, with a central feature of community relation and service-oriented policies. Unfortunately, the Mandatory Police soon found itself involved in a serious political conflict which compelled it to allocate most of its force to security and guard tasks and to neglect the ordinary police functions. This police appeared to be the executor of an oppressive government whose main role was to secure the British interests in

Palestine. Nevertheless the Palestine Police provided the population with a few isolated services like broadcasting the Palestine Broadcasting Service programmes designed to improve the standard of driving and to prevent traffic accidents, and having the Police Band give concerts in city squares and public halls. The Police Band was established in 1921 and in spite of the troubles during the police activity in Palestine continued to exist. Its task was to boost the morale of the force, make a favorable impression upon the population and to engender their goodwill. In troubled times the band resumed normal police duties. It could be said that the Traffic Broadcasting Programms and the Police Band were the sole non enforcement functions of the Palestine Police during the British Mandate.

#### The Accountability and Control of Police

Over the last few years there has been a widespread public and political debate about policing, focused upon the issue of police accountability. The concept of police accountability was given only limited attention in the first half of this century in the United States and England, not to speak of the Middle East countries. To analyze the accountability of the police during the British Mandate on Palestine, between the years 1918-1948, and the control exercised over it, we must examine the administrative structure of the country and the mutual relations between the Palestine Government and the Palestine Police.

The Mandate System

The First World War between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers which started in 1914, ended with the victory of the Allied Powers. In 1918 the British Army defeated the Turkish Army and occupied Palestine-Eretz Israel. The country was placed under a British Military Administration. At the Conference of the Allied Powers in April 1920 at San Remo, Britain was entrusted with the Mandate on Palestine. On July 24, 1922, the Mandate was confirmed by the League of Nations and officially came into force on September 29th, 1923. The Mandatory Government was required to carry out the administration of Palestine, and achieve the political, administrative and economic conditions to secure the establishment of a Jewish national home, the development of self-governing institutions, and to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine. On the 1st of July, 1920 the Military Administration was replaced by a Civil Administration headed by Sir Herbert Samuel, who assumed office as the British Crown High Commissioner for Palestine. In October 1920, the High Commissioner formed a nominated Advisory Council, consisted of 10 British officials and 10 Palestinians (4 Moslem Arabs, 3 Christians and 3 Jews). Two years later, in August 1922, the Palestine Order-in-Council was issued by the King's Privy Council in England, with full legislative power for the maintenance of order and development of Palestine. This Order was the main constitutional instrument of the Mandatory Government (Bentwich, 1965, p. 205; Political History, 1947, p. 4). According to the Order-in-

Council the Palestine Administration was composed of: The High Commissioner; The Chief Secretary; The Executive Council; The Legislative Council; The Judiciary Branch; The Administrative Districts and The Government Departments.

#### The High Commissioner

Under the Palestine Order-in-Council 1922, sections 4-5, the British Crown had the authority to appoint a fit person to administer the Palestine Government under the designation of High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Palestine. The High Commissioner executed in due manner the provisions of the Mandate according to the tenor of the Order-in-Council and the orders of the British Crown through the Secretaries of State (Bentwich, 1930, p. 148). The position of Palestine High Commissioner was similar to that of a Governor in the British Colonial Territories, and in that period, included absolute powers. In theory, he was the representative of the Crown and could act only within the limits of the authority delegated to him by the Crown and conform to the directions of the British Government, transmitted mainly by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Jeffries, 1960, p. 35).

#### The Chief Secretary

According to Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922, the Chief Secretary was the High Commissioner's principal adviser in

Administrative matters, his deputy, and in the absence of the High Commissioner was authorized to exercise, perform and execute, on behalf of the High Commissioner, all the powers and authorities vested on him (Luke and Keth-Roach, 1934, p. 217; Bentwich, 1930, p. 149).

#### The Executive Council

Under the Mandate system, like under the British Colonial system, the High Commissioner presided over the Executive Council which had the duty of advising the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner was to consult the Council in all matters of importance. The Executive Council was composed of the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General, the Treasurer, the District Commissioner of Jerusalem District and the Civil Service Commissioner. The Colonial system allowed the Executive Council to include unofficial members, such as elder local statesmen of weight and experience. But in Palestine during the British Mandate the members of this council were exclusively British officials (Political History, 1947, p. 6). The Executive Council met when necessary, on an average of three times a month, to discuss political questions, and examine new Ordinances and other matters (League of Nations, Minutes of the Fifth Session, 1924, p.74).

#### The Legislative Council

There was no elected parliament in Palestine to enact, amend, or reject bills. For the first two and half years of the civil

administration on Palestine the High Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel, the first Commissioner, had an advisory council, composed half of appointed Palestinian Moslems, Jews and Christians, and half of British officials. In the third year (August, 1922) the Palestine Order-in-Council was issued, providing for the creation of a Legislative Council, to be composed of 10 British officials and 12 elected members, 8 to be Moslems, 2 Christians and 2 Jews. The Arabs boycotted the elections, compelling the High Commissioner to appoint a new advisory body, entirely official, composed of English department heads, which remained to the end of the Mandate. The British Government desired to establish a self-government in Palestine in stages when the Advisory Council was to be the first stage, the Legislative Council in the second stage and the establishment of a constitution, on more democratic lines, would have been the last stage. Over the years the Arabs had successively opposed the establishment of the Legislative Council and the Jews refused to participate in a council in which the Arabs were the majority, therefore the Government continued to use the entirely English Advisory Council as a Legislative Council which enacted all the Palestine Ordinances, signed by the High Commissioner. The Secretary of State for the Colonies in England had the power to reject Ordinances enacted by the High Commissioner, and His Majesty's Privy Council in England had the power to issue legislation for Palestine, directly. In reality until the end of the British Mandate on Palestine, both the executive and the legislative functions of the government were conducted without any representation of the local



population, Arabs or Jews (Bentwich, 1965, p. 205; Political History, 1947, p. 6; Luke, 1934, p. 33).

### The Judiciary

The Palestine Order-in-Council authorized the establishment of Civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction in all matters and over the entire Palestine population. The Judiciary was headed by the Chief Justice. The Supreme Court was composed of the Chief Justice and four judges, of whom two were British and two were Palestinians. The Supreme Court could sit as a Court of Criminal Appeal, a Court of Civil Appeal or a High Court of Justice. As a High Court of Justice the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction in the following matters: Applications (in the nature of habeas corpus proceedings) for orders of release of persons unlawfully detained in custody; Orders directed to public officers or public bodies in regard to the performance of their public duties and requiring them to do or refrain from doing certain acts within their province; Applications for orders directed to a magistrate in regard to the conduct of any preliminary inquiry held under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance.

The Court of Criminal Assize, presided over by the Chief Justice and two more members, a British judge and a Palestinian judge, had the exclusive jurisdiction with regard to offenses punishable by death. In Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel-Aviv, Jaffa and Nablus District Courts were composed of British Presidents of Courts and Palestinian judges. The

District Courts exercised jurisdiction on civil matters not within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Courts, and criminal matters which were not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Assize, and as an Appellate Court on trials before the Magistrates' Court. The Judges of the Supreme Court and the District Courts were appointed by the High Commissioner. Twenty-four Magistrates' Courts throughout the country were courts of first instance in both civil and criminal matters. In addition there were Land Courts, Religious Courts, Tribal Courts and Military Courts established under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 and staffed wholly by military personnel. (Survey of Palestine, 1946, p. 111-112; Palestine Order-in-Council, Sections 38-43; Court Ordinance No. 31 of 1940, pp. 143-152).

#### Administrative Districts

The Order-in-Council empowered the High Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in England, to divide and subdivide Palestine into administrative districts convenient for purposes of the good administration (Section 11). In the years preceding the termination of the British Mandate on Palestine, the country was divided into six administrative districts, each under the control of a District Commissioner. Assistant District Commissioners controlled the Sub-Districts in each District. The main task of the District Administration was to coordinate the activities of the government in the districts. The District Commissioner was the chief representative of the government in his district. Although he

had no direct authority over the representatives of the government departments in the district, he coordinated their activities and received information from them. An important duty of the District Commissioner was the maintenance of the public security, and the police in his district were required to cooperate with him and to consult with him in matters involving the maintenance of peace and order (Kahane, 1962, p. 44).

### The Government Departments

As in colonial administration, the Palestine Government was organized into 20 self-contained departments, each under an official Director, who in the case of a professional department, was a member of the profession concerned. The heads of the departments were responsible to the High Commissioner through the Chief Secretary. All the heads of departments were Britons. Following is the list of the Palestine Government Departments : Agriculture and Fisheries; Forest; Antiquities; Broadcasting; Customs; Commerce and Industry; Labour; Development; Education; Health; Income Tax; Immigration; Legal; Land Settlement and Irrigation; Police and Prisons; Post, Telegraphs and Telephones; Public Works; Railways; Social Welfare; Surveys (Palestine Government Staff List, 1945, p. 36; Luke, 1934, p. 220).

### Who Controlled the Palestine Police ?

The theoretical aspects of the accountability and control of

police were analyzed in the second chapter of this study (pages 24-31). This part of the study examines the accountability of the Palestine Police, which in fact was a colonial police force, a part of the Palestine Government apparatus committed by British political purposes to watch, control and prevent native political resistance. The Palestine Police maintained the law and order among a population of which large elements were often actively, or passively, opposed to the Mandate Government. The police apparatus in Palestine reflected the complex problems that the Mandate Government faced. The British Mandate on Palestine reveals that the maintenance of internal security was a perennial problem. Policing Palestine, as policing Ireland, was from the outset more a military than a civil task (Bowden, 1977, p. 145). Because a military organization operating as an internal security force was very expensive, the Palestine Police was built as a quasi-military police force under civilian control. The major advantage of this solution was its reduced cost. The Palestine Police was a creature of crisis, lacking legitimacy and without a clear notion of what its precise role was to be: a centralized semi-militarized force, providing the means to suppress disorder, disband demonstrations and fight terrorism. The main question is: To whom was the Palestine Police accountable? On what grounds? Who policed the Palestine Police?

#### External-Exclusive Mechanisms for Police Control

Contrary to the traditional, and "Anglo-Saxon", doctrine that law

enforcement should be carried out in a manifestly impartial manner, and should be shielded from even the appearance of politically motivated interference, the colonial policing doctrine, absorbed from the Royal Irish Constabulary system, manifested itself as a political police which operated as the chief executive and retributive instrument of its administration (Milte, 1977, p. 233). Rosen, in his book Holding Government Bureaucracies Accountable, said: "Hierarchy as a basis for accountability is old as bureaucracies." Even in the time of Hammurabi, about 1700 B.C. the line of accountability was clear - to the Emperor. In this framework accountability is a hierarchy based on power to appoint and remove (1982, p. 17). The Palestine Police line of accountability was not to the Emperor at the period in discussion. The Inspector-General of the Police was responsible to the High Commissioner through the Chief Secretary who operated as a Prime-Minister of a Government Cabinet in a regular state. The Palestine Police was a part of the Palestine Government administration, and the Inspector-General of the Police was one of the heads of Government departments (Tobias, 1977, p. 248). As David Bayley defined the external-exclusive mechanisms of control of the police, these mechanisms devote the greater part of their attention and activity to the police and are located within the government or outside it. In the present case the external-exclusive mechanisms of control of the Palestine Police were the High Commissioner and the Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government, who devoted only a small part of their time or activity to the control of the police. More over, the Inspector-General of the Police was himself a member of the Palestine

Government, in which capacity he was to be controlled by a government of which he himself was a member. Therefore in Palestine there did not exist another police authority or civil Review Board with control over the Palestine Police.

#### The Palestine Government

The study of the Palestine Government administrative files at the Public Record Office in the British National Archives in London, clearly shows that the Palestine Police was accountable to the Palestine Government which exercised tight external control over the police, mainly through the Chief Secretary and his office. Following are a few examples of this kind of control :

1. The Inspector-General submitted to the High Commissioner, every year, a report which enabled the government to judge the extent to which the police were successful in the prevention, detection and prosecution of crime and what reforms in methods, procedure and organization were needed (CO-733/206/13).
2. Every year the Inspector-General forwarded to the Chief Secretary the Police budget proposals for approval in which he specified the estimates for the new year which included the expected force expenses, new planned services, equipment and so on (Israel Archives, 343-O/34/47).
3. The Police Headquarters would request the approval of the Chief Secretary for budgeting the purchase of special equipment. For example: on September 23th, 1946, Col. Gray, the Inspector-General,

wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary requesting the authority for the purchase of 20 wireless cars (Israel Archives, 343-O/2229/46).

4. Requests to the Chief Secretary for approval of special arrangements. On October 9th, 1946, the Inspector-General sent a letter to the Chief Secretary asking the permission to provide a truck for the conveyance of the police school children from different police stations to be sent to schools (Israel Archives, 347-O/233/46).

5. The Chief Secretary would approve the sending of police officers to courses in England, such as the course of Forensic Science which took place in London in 1947 (Israel Archives, 343-O/15/47), or the Senior Detective Officers course in Hendon, England in 1948 (Israel Archives, 343-O/40/47).

6. Every reorganization of the police force was approved by the High Commissioner. Even minor changes or small increases in police strength were approved by the Chief Secretary. Examples: On December 1929 Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, the Inspector-General of the Police in Ceylon, was appointed to undertake an enquiry into the organization of the Palestine Police and propose the reorganization needed. On May 6th, 1930, he submitted his report to the High Commissioner. A year later, because of economic restrictions, the Palestine Government appointed Sir O. Donnell to propose personnel reductions in the Government Departments. Even the police, which in the preceding year were the subject of a prolonged investigation and recommendation for the reorganization and increase, were reduced by 140 men according to Sir Donnell's recommendations.

On August 1st, 1946, the High Commissioner sent a top secret and personal telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London announcing: "I am anxious to be assured that our police methods are the best that can be achieved and I should welcome a visit from some expert, not to render me a critical report on the deficiencies of the Palestine Police, but to advise me whether our police methods could be improved". Following this telegram Sir Charles Wickham, the late Inspector-General of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, agreed to contribute his advice on police matters in Palestine and on December 2nd, 1946, he submitted his report to the Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government (CO-537/3847; CO-733/ 208/13).

#### The Secretary of State for the Colonies

The High Commissioner of Palestine was required to carry out any instructions of the British Government in London, conveyed to him by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. This Minister had the power of approval or veto of every law enacted by the Palestine Legislative Council and signed by the High Commissioner. In practice, the High Commissioner reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on a daily basis, asking his approval for every action or inaction affecting the British policy in Palestine, or deviating from the standing regulations (Jeffries, 1960, pp. 34-49). In this way, in fact, the Colonial Office in London was involved in many matters affecting the Palestine Police.



During the British Mandate on Palestine two additional British Government Offices were deeply involved in the Palestine political situation and its security : the Foreign Office and the War Office. The British army, which was accountable to the War Office, became quite active in Palestine, not necessarily in war matters but in the area of law and order and confrontation with Arab disturbances, Jewish reprisals against Arabs attacks and Jewish resistance against the British policy. A few examples show us how these offices were involved and the effect on decisions and policies concerning the Palestine Police:

1. In April 1925 the Secretary of State for the Colonies, L. C. Amery, and the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Samuel Hoare, visited Palestine to discuss the abolishment of the British and Palestine Gendarmeries for economic reasons. Due to their visit from 31st March, 1926, both Gendarmeries ceased to exist (Kingsley-Heath, 1928, p. 93).
2. On October 19, 1937, the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a telegram to the High Commissioner that the services of Sir Charles Tegart, formerly of Indian Police had been secured and that he would proceed to Palestine to advise the Government on matters concerning the Palestine Police organization, intelligence and anti-terror activity.
3. In the same telegram The Secretary of State for the Colonies notified the High Commissioner that the vacant post of Inspector-General of the Palestine Police had been offered to the Inspector-General of Nigeria Police, Mr. Saunders, who had accepted (CO-733-355/8).

4. On November 1st, 1946, the High Commissioner notified the Secretary of Colonies in London that he wanted to send Col. I.G. Gray, the Inspector-General of the Palestine Police, to the Colonial Office in London to discuss urgent police matters, such as: Recruitment of new British officers; The establishment of a Palestine Police Training Center in England; The replacement of twenty Palestine Police motor-transport vehicles. During the presence of the Inspector-General in London he consulted with MI5 and MI6 (British security and intelligence departments), the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Army and other security authorities which showed interest in the situation in Palestine (CO-537/1699).
5. On November 20, 1946, following an inquiry of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, regarding the possibility of disarming or reducing the Jewish Settlement Police, the High Commissioner responded by telegram that he instructed the Inspector-General of Police to continue the recruitment of the J.S.P on the basis of the existing approved establishment, but as long-term policy they should be terminated and replaced by increasing the number establishment of the regular police force (CO-537/2407).

These are only a few examples from the Colonial Office files at the Public Record Office in London and the Palestine Government files at the Israel State Archives in Jerusalem, which show the involvement of the British Government offices, beyond the Colonial Office, and their control of Palestine Police organization and functions.

The British Cabinet Control of the Palestine Police

Despite the close control of the Colonial Office on the Palestine Government activities, and the wide interest of the Foreign and War Offices in the political situation in Palestine, from time to time Palestine problems, and even Palestine Police matters, were brought to the British Cabinet meetings in London for decision or determination of policy. The security situation of Palestine was frequently dealt with by the Chief of Staff of the British Army meetings, for example:

1. Field Marshal Montgomery, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff since June 1946, told the Staff meeting, on November 20, 1946, that the Palestine Police was 50 percent below establishment and required an additional 3000 recruits to be brought up to full strength. He asked for a directive to be given by the British Government to the High Commissioner to use more army forces to maintain strict law and order in Palestine (FO-371/52565).

2. On June 20, 1946, the Secretary of State for the Colonies conveyed to the High Commissioner the British Government decision to take steps necessary to break up the Jewish illegal organizations. On June 29, 1946, the operation "Agatha" was launched with the occupation of the Jewish Agency building in Jerusalem. Some 17,000 British police and soldiers took part in a search-and arrest operation all over Palestine for more than two weeks. 2,700 Jews were arrested, among them several members of the Jewish Agency Executive (FO-371/52530; FO-371/ 52532).

3. On January 1st, 1947, the British Government approved the proposal of Field Marshal Montgomery for harsh operations to restore law and

order in Palestine, permitted the army to institute searches at any time and in any part of Palestine and to increase the number of patrols in dangerous areas (Montgomery, 1958, p.421; Cab-128/9).

4. The statutory Martial Law which was proclaimed by the High Commissioner on March 2, 1947, over Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem, after the dissident movements carried out sixteen major operations, in which over twenty British personnel were killed, was confirmed by the British Prime Minister and his Cabinet (CO-537/2299).

#### External-Inclusive Mechanisms for Police Control

In a democratic regime there are several institutions that control the police indirectly, or as a part of their more general activities, such as: the legislators, the courts, the media and the public. Did those external-inclusive mechanisms of police control exist in Palestine ?

#### Legislators

Legislators have a vital role in setting the main objectives of administration in democratic states. The legislators pass the laws and appropriate the money which make administration possible. They may conduct investigations to reveal how well the bureaucracy is carrying out its legal obligations. In Palestine the British Mandate did not succeed in creating an elected Parliament, called in Palestine the Legislative Council, composed of Arabs and Jews. Throughout the

Mandate the Legislative Council was composed of British officials - Heads of Government departments. Even the Inspector-General of Police was a member of this council. How effective could members of the Legislative Council be in their control of the Palestine Government when in the same time they were heads of the Government departments ? The Palestine Government system significantly violated the well-known principle of separation of powers among the executive, the legislature and the Judicial branches of the government. As a matter of fact the police, one of the government departments, was not controlled by an elected parliament, a police authority board or a Minister of a Cabinet, rather by a Legislative Council composed of British officials from the executive branch, appointed directly by the High Commissioner and approved by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London - among them the Inspector-General himself.

#### Courts

The courts have the task of reviewing decisions of the administrative branch of the government. Bureaucracies are legally accountable to the courts for their observance of individual rights and liberties, whether in their investigative capacities or in the course of routine activities. The courts have the ultimate say in defining acceptable legal boundaries for the behavior of individuals or governmental officials. The Courts in Palestine fulfilled, to a certain extent, the task of a judicial review. The Courts took measures to ensure that the police adhered to legal and procedural

restraints in enforcing the law. In all cases in which a person made a criminal charge in court against a police officer with respect to an action relative to his functions, the magistrate forwarded a copy of the complaint to the officer in charge of the police area in which the offence was committed. The Police Standing Orders obliged the officer in charge of the area to undertake an immediate and personal enquiry into all such cases. On completion of the enquiry the proceedings were forwarded to Police Headquarters via the officer in charge of the police district with his recommendations.

When charged with a criminal offence, whether in the course of his duty or otherwise, the police officer was brought to trial before a Magistrate's Court, or a District Court, depending on the gravity of the offence (Standing Orders, 1937, pp. 147-148). The officer in charge of every police station was expected to note and report any comment or criticism made by Judges or Magistrates in Courts, referring to the Police Force generally or to any police officer in particular (Force Standing Order No. 1236, 1944, p. 4).

The Supreme Court, when sitting as a High Court of Justice, adjudged petitions of petitioners, arrestees and accused in matters concerning police behaviour, activity or proceedings. Between the years 1920-1947 the Supreme Court gave 90 judgements concerning the Palestine Police on the following subjects: the delegation of power of the Inspector-General - 6; police discipline - 18; Police Ordinance - 10; the authority and discretion of the police - 6; investigation

proceedings - 38; actions against assembly -2. There is no doubt that the Supreme Court judgements constituted a form of control over the Palestine Police regular performances of duty during the British Mandate on Palestine. Regrettably all the police and army activities according to the power given to them by the Defence (Emergency) Regulations which developed mainly between the years 1936-39 and 1945-48, were not scrutinized by the Supreme Court which did not exercise jurisdiction over these regulations. In this period the main public criticism was against the behavior of police and the army occurring during arrests, searches, curfews and cordon and search activities against Jewish settlements.

#### Media

The media today is one of the most important external-inclusive mechanisms of control over the police. The press may influence police accountability by rigorously covering abusive behavior and pointing out malpractice. The police are sensitive to the power of the media because of its influence on public opinion regarding police performance. Had the media in Palestine during 1940s the same power as today ? Did the ruling system and the political situation in Palestine in those days make possible the existence of a free press which had the ability to cover and criticize the police in controversial issues ?

An accurate analysis of what was published on the Palestine

Police in two of the most important newspapers which appeared in Palestine in the last years of the British Mandate on Palestine, could most certainly reveal the extent of the media coverage of the police in those days and bring us a picture of the police function, behaviour and image. Chosen for such an analysis were the newspapers "Palestine Post" (in English) and "Ha'aretz" (in Hebrew) of the year 1947 - the year that symbolized the escalation of the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews, and the Jewish "revolt" against the British rule in Palestine. In 1947 the United Nations voted for the partition of Palestine into two states, a Arab state and a Jewish state, and the military conflict between both nations began.

The regular police activity, including that affected by the Arab-Jewish conflict, or by the struggle between both nations and the British Mandate Administration, which was expressed in police arrests, searches, curfews, will not be analysed by this study. The analysis of the content of both newspapers includes only the articles, readers' letters and editorials which give us some notion and details on the police structure, functions, behaviour and accountability.

The following table shows the police related topics and frequencies covered by these newspapers during the year 1947. We have to take into consideration that the newspapers during the British Mandate period in Palestine were under a tight regime of censorship which limited the proportions and the subjects of coverage.



Table 15; Police Coverage by Palestine Newspapers  
"Palestine Post" and "Haa'retz" - 1947

| Subject                | Articles/<br>News | Readers<br>Letters | Editorials | Total |
|------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------------|-------|
| Police behavior        | 40                | 4                  | 7          | 51    |
| The British withdrawal | 33                | 4                  | 4          | 41    |
| Crime situation        | 1                 | -                  | -          | 1     |
| Traffic situation      | 1                 | -                  | -          | 1     |
| Manpower issues        | 14                | -                  | -          | 14    |
| Promotions             | 24                | -                  | -          | 24    |
| Farran case            | 30                | 2                  | 3          | 35    |
| General matters        | 6                 | -                  | -          | 6     |
| Total                  | 148               | 10                 | 14         | 172   |

Source: "Palestine Post" and "Haa'retz", 1947.

An examination of the different articles published in the "Palestine Post" and "Haa'retz" on police issues reveals that the central subject which occupied Jewish public opinion in Palestine, and which is reflected in the articles, critiques, editorials and reportage, was the relationship of British policemen to the Jewish population and the feeling of those inhabitants who were badly and

cruelly treated (51 articles - 29.7 percent of all articles published). The main complaints raised in these articles were: unjustified use of force, unjustified arrests, illegal search, firing without justification and causing of deaths and woundings, playing favorites with the Arabs, discrimination against Jewish policemen by providing low standarts and keeping them in the lower ranks, criminal acts carried out by British policemen against the Jewish population such as thefts, causing damage to the property, etc. The second subject which preoccupied the press was the activities being carried out by the British Government in preparation of the withdrawal from Palestine: would there be an official handover of police stations, equipment, etc? What about pension conditions for Jews who served in the Palestine Police, the departure of British policemen from Tel-Aviv area and the handing over of areas to the Jewish Police, and Arab policemen deserting the Palestine Police with their firearms (41 articles - 23.8 percent of all articles published). The third topic which greatly disturbed the Jewish population, and which was accorded wide coverage in the press, was the disappearance of the youth A. Rubowitz and the accusation of Major Roy Farran of his murder (35 articles - 20.3 percent of all articles). This subject will be elaborated upon later. The appointments and advancements of police officers were announced to the public (24 news - 14 percent of the articles). Crime and traffic issues did not concern or interest the press in 1947. When the coverage of police issues in those two newspapers is analysed, it must be taken into account that there were certain censorship regulations in Palestine which prevented the

publication of anything which might harm the security of the country, reveal British army activity or that of the political section of the CID. As a result, the amount of articles critical to the government's actions or its curbing of Jewish terrorist action, was definitely limited.

### The Public

Since the British occupation of Palestine in 1918, there have been but few intervals when the problem of internal security has not been a major preoccupation of the Government and the concern of the Palestine population. The relationships between the Palestinian Government and the Jewish population worsened beginning in 1939 and arrived at the nadir of deterioration during the years 1946-48. The Jewish Agency pointed out to the Mandatory Government that, however determined to oppose the dissident group terrorism, the Jewish community could not cooperate in this matter with a Government which enforced a policy that breached the fundamental rights of the Jews in this country. The terrorism had its roots in the despair and bitterness engendered by the White Paper policy, which the Jewish population regarded as betrayal and a menace to its very existence. The bitterness of the Jewish population against the British was aggravated when, beginning in February 1947, the Government forced hundreds of Jewish families living in residential quarters of Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Haifa to leave their flats or homes. These areas were declared security zones and all the British personnel was

quartered therein. Statutory Martial Law, which was imposed from time to time initially on March 2nd, 1947, enabled the Mandatory Government to withdraw from the population normal facilities of civil government and to establish exclusive jurisdiction regarding criminal offences in Military Courts. Repressive measures - death sentences, curfews, street searches and numerous prohibitions and restrictions, were imposed to weaken the dissident groups and overpower them. These measures of repression affected the mass of the Jewish community, which in fact did not take a part in the dissident activity. In addition to being subjected to such legal restrictions, the man in the street was frequently exposed to brutal treatment on the part of the army and the British police. Jewish citizens were searched on the streets, exposed to the indignity of having to stand with uplifted arms and forced against the wall. There were bitter complaints of brutality, thefts and other illgalities on the part of the soldiers and police, including misbehaviour against women. In a number of cases people were shot at by soldiers and police in the street, sometimes with fatal results (FO-371/61932; Jewish Plan for Palestine, 1947, p. 42). The state of lawlessness in this regard was revealed by two additional incidents which occurred in Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem:

1. The Case of Major Roy Farran - As we saw in table 15 the Major Farran case was one of the main topics of the Jewish press in Palestine during 1947. The analysis of this case cast light on the police accountability during the British Mandate on Palestine. The details of this case were as follows: On February 12, 1947, Brigadier Bernard Fergusson, the Assistant Inspector-General of the Palestine

Police for Training and Special Tasks, wrote a letter to the Colonial Office in London announcing that he was directed by the Inspector-General to study the problem of terrorism in the urban areas of Palestine, and to make proposals for steps to be taken to combat it in addition to current police methods. As a result he established in Jerusalem, Haifa and Lyda three Flying Squads headed by three Deputy Superintendents (Majors) and ten constables with experience and knowledge of terrorist methods during their service in the army. The new type of police activity was based on the "countergang" principles. A.I.G Fergusson suggested that, rather than waiting in their barracks, these special trained squads would go out and provoke contact with terrorists and confront them (CO-537/2270). On May 6, 1947 a sixteen year old boy named Alexander Rubowitz, found distributing Stern group literature on the streets of Jerusalem, was seen, by three Jewish boys, being chased and caught by four men dressed in civilian clothes and armed with revolvers, one of them displaying a Palestine Police identity card. They forced the boy into a car with the licence number 993, and drove off. One of the men lost his hat at the scene of the incident. On the sweat-band of the hat were the letters FAR AN, the hat was handed to the police. The boy, Rubowitz, was not brought to a police station and disappeared without a trace, and to this day his fate remains unknown. Major Roy Farran, an army officer who joined the Palestine Police only a month before, the appointed commander of the Jerusalem Flying Squad, took refuge in Syria immediately after this incident. Upon his return on June 17, he was arrested and charged with the abduction of A. Rubowitz. While in custody he submitted his

resignation from the police (Palestine Post, July 2, 1947). Major Farran was brought to trial before the Martial Court in Jerusalem on October 1, 1947, and found not guilty of the murder of the sixteen old boy. A notebook in which Farran wrote down all matters concerning the incident before he went to Syria, and was left by him in his quarters in Allenby Police barracks, was declared by the court as a privileged document, written by the accused for communication between himself and his legal adviser, and could not be used in evidence against him. The court stated that Major Farran was not identified by the witnesses, and there was no evidence of the boy's death because no body was found. A.J.G. Fergusson, Major Farran's commander, declined to give details before the court, of a conversation he had with Farran after the disappearance of Rubowitz, because "the details of that conversation, if they became known, might tend to incriminate himself" (Palestine Post, October, 3, 1947). Moshe Hashin, one of the three boys who witnessed the Rubowitz arrest, and was interviewed by the "Haa'retz" reporter Amos Nova on May 1974, revealed that he and his friends had categorically identified Farran in the identification parade conducted at the Kishle police station in Jerusalem. He was very surprised when the prosecutor claimed that the boys did not identify Farran. Regarding the kidnappers' car, the police claimed that it was not found because the licence number was falsified ("Haa'retz", May 10, 1974). An editorial in Palestine Post from October 3, 1947, criticized the court decision comparing the principles applied in this case to those in the cases of the hundreds of Jewish detainees, deprived of their liberty for months and years

without trial, and in many instances with much less evidence than that against Farran. In the file CO-537/3872 at the Public Record Office in London there is a large correspondence between Farran's lawyers, (Lawrence Collins and Teornley Whittingstall) and the Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government. The Lawyers requested the Chief Secretary to destroy the Farran notebook, which contained his statement and was retained by the Palestine Police. The High Commissioner requested the opinion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who decided that the document would be preserved until April 1, 1948, when it would be destroyed. On April 13, 1948, the High Commissioner announced, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that the notebook had been destroyed on April 1, 1948. Thus the last chance to learn the fate of young A. Rubowitz and, the location of his body, was lost. The Fergusson squads, which had depended on secrecy, were known far and wide after the Farran case, and were disbanded, their officers being posted out of Palestine. Farran himself, after a short stay in England, emigrated to Canada, where in 1979 he held the post of Solicitor General of the Canadian province of Alberta (Bethell, 1979, p. 348). The Alexander Rubowitz disappearance disturbs the Rubowitz family and the Israeli public to this day. The general opinion is that the police did not show great "enthusiasm" or "skill" in proving Farran's guilt. The same can be said of the prosecutor's appearance before the Military Court. The Military Court decision not to oblige the prosecution in disclosing the contents of Farran's notebook, which was supposed to include his confession, and the decision not to require A.L.G. Fergusson to testify at the court regarding what Farran

had said to him about the Rubowitz disappearance the next day, prevented the conviction of Farran and brought about his acquittal.

2. The British Vengeance in Tel-Aviv - On July 31, 1947, five Jews were killed and fifteen were injured when several armored vehicles of the army and the British police dashed through crowded streets of Tel-Aviv, fired shots into the crowd and threw a bomb into a cafe. This serious incident, which was termed by the Jewish press "a ferocious and hideous British vengeance", was a reprisal for the hanging of two British army sergeants in Natanya by the "Irgun", which in turn was a reprisal for the hanging of three "Irgun" members who participated in the liberation of 29 Jewish dissident detainees from the Acre Prison. The inquiry, which was ordered by the Inspector-General, concentrated on the police rather than on the army (Palestine Post, August 1, 1947). On November 1, the Public Information Office stated that the official investigation regarding the disturbances which took place in Tel-Aviv on the night of July 31, had been concluded and no grounds for criminal charges were found. The evidence had been used in support of disciplinary charges and a few police personnel were dismissed or discharged as a consequence of this incident (Palestine Post, November 2, 1947).

David Ben-Gurion, the chairman of the Jewish Agency, appearing before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine on July 4, 1947, stated that all civil liberties known to English law in England were, for all practical purposes, abolished in Palestine. Orders could be made for the detention of any person for any period without due



process of law. Unrestricted rights of arrest, search, confiscation of property, detention and deportation were reinforced by the wide powers given to the Palestine Government by the Defence (Emergency) Regulation, the death sentence was imposed for the use and carrying of firearms and explosives. Searches of agricultural settlements for arms, persons engaged in defence training or for illegal immigrants, was a daily occurrence. Press censorship, house curfews, road curfews, identity checks accompanied by shooting of curfew violators typified the regime, which had repeatedly displayed a preference for collective punishment of the entire Jewish community. Parallel to the official measures, over the years there had occurred unofficial assaults by police in the prisons, in detention camps and on the streets. Not the policeman nor the soldier was to be blamed, rather the regime, which violated the conditions of the Mandate, concluded David Ben-Gurion (Jewish Plan for Palestine, 1947, p. 313).

The greatest measure of popular Jewish opposition to the Mandatory Government was engendered by the government campaign against Jewish refugees from Europe who were trying to reach Palestine, the one country where they had families and friends waiting to receive them and where they would have the opportunity of rebuilding their lives. The British Government did not allow free immigration to Palestine and mobilized, against the illegal immigration, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, the British Army and the Police. Pursuant to the British Cabinet decision, the High Commissioner ordered the deportation of illegal immigrants to Cyprus.

The deportations were carried by force and aroused large Jewish demonstrations against them. These demonstrations were, in most cases, dispersed by police and military troops, often utilizing force (ibid, p. 25). The circumstances of the political conflict in Palestine increased the gap between the government and the population. The police were identified by the people as the arm of an occupying power, which showed little concern for accountability to the citizen. The British policeman in Palestine was not, like his counterpart the London "Bobby", friendly and helpful to the citizen. The British policeman in Palestine was an oppressive instrument of an unrepresentative government. The police were hated by the population, especially by the Jews. This was necessarily so because of the nature of the police as the paramilitary instrument of an occupying power, and accountable only to that power, and not to the community being policed. The few positive relationships existing between the police and the community in 1931-1936, deteriorated in the period between 1945 and the end of the Mandate in 1948.

#### The Withdrawal of the Mandatory Power from Palestine

The thirty months which passed from the end of the World War Two (August 5, 1945) and the United Nations resolution for the partition of Palestine into two states, a Arab state and a Jewish state, (November 29, 1947), symbolized the struggle between the Zionist movement and the Jewish community on one side, and the British Mandatory rule in Palestine on the other. The political manoeuvres of

the Jewish Agency and the armed operations of the Jewish resistance and underground movements joined together for the attainment of the long-awaited independence. The last three years of the Mandate were, politically the most difficult of all. For the Jews the essential point of principle was the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle was to resist to the last the establishment of a Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. (Colonial Office - Palestine, 1948, p. 9; Samuel, 1970, p. 219).

### The Aggravation of the Political Situation in Palestine

In the background of the outbreak of the Jewish revolt in Palestine, which encompassed the entire Jewish population, were two fundamental facts - the extermination of millions of Jews in Europe by the Nazis and the barred gates of Palestine to the surviving European Jews by the British White Paper policy of restrictions in Jewish immigration and land purchases.

Early in 1944 the "Irgun" broke its truce with the Palestine Government, a truce which had lasted over three years. The Stern group had been at "war" with the British Mandatory power from 1939. The year 1944 was filled with increasingly violent attacks of these two dissident underground movements against governmental institutions, buildings and personnel. The British element in the police was the most hated branch of the British Administration, and was the constant target of the dissident groups' attacks, as the main arm of the

British policy and the "eyes and ears of the Government". The "Hagana", whose main efforts were made to consolidate the defence of the Jewish settlements against Arab attacks and to promote the illegal immigration to Eretz Israel, and to settle the land with new Jewish communities, also began to organize operations against the Palestine Government, mainly as a reaction to the British policy of restriction of the immigration and the incarceration of illegal immigrants in detention camps. On October 9, 1945, a group of the "Hagana" attacked the Atlit Clearance Camp near Haifa, where 208 illegal Jewish immigrants were detained, and, in a fearless armed operation, freed them. On the night of October 31, 1945, the "Hagana" elite shock troops - The "Palmach", blew up the railway lines in 153 places throughout Palestine as well as two police launches in the port of Haifa. On November 25, 1945, the "Hagana" retaliated for the seizure of a party of illegal immigrants by the British authorities by attacking two police coast stations at Givat-Olga and Sidna-All. In reprisal 10,000 British troops and police, using armored cars, mortars, machine guns and teargas, surrounded and invaded six Jewish settlements in a search for hidden arms and illegal immigrants (Borisov, 1947, p. 78). From November 1945 to September 1946 there was an agreement between the "Hagana" and the two dissident movements the "Irgun" and "Lehi" (the Stern group) to coordinate their attacks against the British regime in Palestine. All the armed operations which took place in this period were agreed upon by a joint committee of the three movements. The alliance between the three underground organizations was named "The Jewish Resistance" (Begin, 1977, p. 187).

From the end of 1945 a virtual state of war existed between the "Jewish Resistance" and the British regime in Palestine. Attacks against British targets, mainly military and police installations and personnel, railways, ports, government buildings, occurred almost daily. On December 28, 1945 the Headquarters of the Police C.I.D. in Jerusalem and Jaffa were attacked by the "Irgun" and "Lehi". The Givat-Olga police coast station which was attacked in November 1945, was bombed again in January 20, 1946. 1500 Jews were detained for questioning in the same month. On February 5, 1946 the police sub-division headquarters in Safed was attacked. In February 20, the Mount Carmel radar station, which had been instrumental in intercepting ships transporting illegal immigrants, was blown up. On the next day simultaneous attacks were launched by the "Hagana" on police camps at Shefar-Amer, Sarona and Kfar-Vitkin. In these camps were stationed units of the Police Mobile Force which were used mainly for the suppression of illegal immigration. On April 23, the police station in Ramat-Gan was attacked and firearms were confiscated. In June 17 eleven bridges which connected Palestine with Jordan and Syria were blown-up in a broad operation of the "Palmach". That was the last military operation of the "Jewish Resistance". The British reaction was a country wide operation code-named "Agatha" which was launched in the early morning of June 29, 1946. The Jews called this operation the "Black Saturday Operation" in memory of the day of its onset. The plan of the operation was approved in a special British Cabinet meeting in London. Thousands of heavily armed British troops and police descended upon the Jewish Agency offices in Jerusalem (hoping to find documents

proving that the Jewish Agency executive had approved the sabotage of Palestine's bridges by the "Palmach", and documents proving the existence of an alliance between the "Hagana" and the more violent "Stern" group and the "Irgun", Jewish labour institutions, banks and tens of settlements, arresting thousands of Jews, including all the members of the Jewish Agency Executive. Five Jews were killed and 60 were injured in this operation, and 2738 Jews were arrested. Operation "Agatha" was devised to destroy the "Palmach" striking force of the "Hagana", to intimidate the Jewish Agency and to break the back of the united "Jewish Resistance". A White Paper published by Britain on July 24, charged the Jewish Agency with responsibility for the "terrorist activities" in Palestine. The Jewish Agency Executive members arrested in operation "Agatha" were released only after one hundred days of detention without trial, and after they had publicly denounced terror activity (Begin, 1977, p. 207; Brenner, 1965, p. 19).

On July 22, 1946 the "Irgun" blew up a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem which housed the British Army Headquarters and the Secretariat of the Palestine Government. The King David Hotel was warned by a telephone announcement before the explosion but the British security officers at the hotel ignored the warning. The explosion destroyed the entire wing, killing ninety-one and injuring forty-six, among them Britons, Arabs and Jews (Clarke, 1981, p. 294). The success of the "Irgun" in penetrating the headquarters of the British Army in Palestine and the great loss of life inflicted, produced a shock in Palestine itself, in Britain and throughout the world.

Eight days after the explosion, on July 30, the army and the police, about 27,000, men cordoned off Tel-Aviv and conducted a four day house-to-house search in a operation called "Shark". Eight hundred Jews were arrested and sent to detention camps, although none of them was responsible for the attack on the King David Hotel (Begin, 1977, p. 227; Slutzki, 1973, p. 902). The King David explosion damaged the alliance between the "Hagana" and The "Irgun". The "Black Saturday" operation added to the tendency of the "Hagana" to cease cooperation with the dissident groups. David Ben-Gurion, the chair-person of the Jewish Agency, ordered the "Hagana" to refrain from further attacks on British installations and personnel and confine itself to smuggling illegal immigrants and procuring weapons to prepare the Yshuv for the probable eventuality of a war with the Arabs. In fact, following the "Black Saturday" operation the "Hagana" suspended their military operation against the British forces until their final departure in May 1948. The "Irgun" and "Lehi", freed from the "Hagana" restraint continued their revolt against the British Mandate. Since the fall of 1946, there had been an increase in acts of violence comitted by these two extremist underground groups : bombing of buidings and offices, planting of mines on thoroughfares over which British military vechiles passed, and the ambushing and killing of troops and police became daily occurrences. The attacks were in part in retaliation to British anti-terrorism measures and to the introduction of the Martial Law in March 1947 (Britain and Palestine, 1947, p. 21). On December 11, 1946 two young "Irgun" members were sentenced by a Military Court to eighteen years imprisonment and given, in addition, eighteen

lashes. On the next morning the "Irgun" published a warning to the British Government: "For hundreds of years you have been whipping natives in your colonies without retaliation. In your foolish pride you regard the Jews in Eretz Israel as natives too. You are mistaken. Zion is not exile. Jews are not Zulus. You will not whip Jews in their homeland, and if British Authorities whip them - British officers will be whipped publicly in return"

On the next day in Nathanya, Tel-Aviv and Rishon-le-Zion British officers were seized and each received exactly the same as the "Irgun" young members - eighteen lashes. Thereafter the British whip was not used in Eretz Israel. The Mandatory authorities amended their law to restrict whipping (Begin, 1977, p. 234). On January 26 and 27, 1947 two British subjects, Major H.A. Collins and Judge R. Windham, were kidnapped by the "Irgun" to prevent the hanging of Dov Gruner, an "Irgun" member, sentenced to death for his participation in a terrorist attack of a police station seven months before. On the evening of January 27th, the High Commissioner announced the suspension of the execution. The kidnapping of the two Britons drew the attention of the whole world to the situation in Palestine. A storm of indignation in the Jewish community and the postponement of the Gruner execution led the "Irgun" to free the two (Begin, 1977, p. 257; Cohen, 1982, p. 236). The abduction of Judge Windham and Major Collins drove the Palestine Government to evacuate about 2,000 non-essential British civilians from Palestine by the end of January 1947. The remainder of the British community was concentrated in wire-



enclosed security compounds sequestered in blocks of former Jewish residential areas, nicknamed by the Jews "Bevingrad" - after the hated Foreign British Secretary of State, Ernest Bevin (CO-537/228; Cohen, 1982, p. 237). On Saturday, March 1, 1947, the "Irgun" began a new wave of attacks. In Jerusalem they broke through the British security zone, and blew up the British Officer's Club causing heavy casualties. On the same night the "Irgun" carried out ten more attacks throughout the country. The newspapers in London devoted their leading articles to the situation in Palestine stating bluntly that Britain must get out of Palestine. The British authorities responded within twenty-four hours by imposing Martial Law in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, which continued from March 2nd until March 17th, 1947. The High Commissioner's decision was confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British Prime Minister himself. On April 16, a strict curfew was imposed throughout the country. During the curfew four "Irgun" members sentenced to the death penalty were executed by hanging at Acre prison. On the same day the "Irgun" published a communique announcing that any British soldier or policeman who fell into their hands would be liable to die - as their "Irgun" comrades had died (Begin, 1977, p. 275). The Government announced that on April 21, two more members of the dissident groups would be executed. The night before the execution both inmates killed themselves with a hand-grenade which was smuggled into their cell.

The "Irgun" response to the executions of their members came quickly. On May 4, 1947 the "Irgun" in a meticulously planned

operation, blasted and penetrated the Acre prison, a fortress which was regarded as impregnable and enabled 29 Jewish dissidents to escape. Two hundred Arab inmates escaped also. Nine of the "Irgun" members were killed and eight were arrested during the operation, three of the arrestees were sentenced to death by a Military Court. During the trial, on July 12, the "Irgun" abducted two British sergeants in Nathanya, in order to prevent a death verdict for their comrades. The Jewish Agency and the "Hagana" joined efforts to discover where the sergeants were hidden, to prevent their execution, without success. On July 14, the Army Commander declared Nathanya a "Controlled Area" in accordance with the power given to him by the Defence (Emergency) Regulations. This situation continued until July 27th, during which time the area was thoroughly searched, but without any results. On July 29 the three "Irgun" members were executed, on July 31st the bodies of the two sergeants were found hanged in a forest not far from Nathanya, executed by the "Irgun" in retaliation. On the night that the sergeants' bodies were discovered, a British police party attacked Jewish civilians and property in Tel-Aviv. Five Jews were killed and fifteen injured (CO-537/2284; CO-733/477).

The grim act of retaliation forced upon The "Irgun" in Nathanya, wrote Menachem Begin, the Commander of the "Irgun" in these days, and later in 1977 the Israeli Prime Minister, not only saved additional Jewish young men from the gallows, but broke the back of the British rule in Palestine. This was confirmed later by Colonel Archer-Cust, the former assistant to the Chief Secretary of Palestine Government

who said in a lecture to the Royal Empire Society in 1949: "The hanging of the two British sergeants did more than anything to get us out" (United Empire Journal, November-December, 1949; Begin, 1977, p. 290).

#### Police and Security Expenditures

During the British Mandate on Palestine the Police and Prisons were one of the major items of expenditure. Since 1943 the Police and Prisons had the largest expenditure among the government's departments. For example: during the fiscal year 1944-45 the expenditure of the Police was 3.4 million Palestinian pounds - six times larger than the Department of Education's budget and nine times larger than the budget of the Department of Health in the same year. In 1943, Britain reinforced their garrison in Palestine with two army divisions which were added to help the police to suppress the Jewish activity against the British presence in Palestine.

In 1947 the Mandatory power had no less than 80,000 troops stationed in addition to units of the Transjordan Arab Legion and 16,000 British and local police. This combined military-police establishment was four times larger than at the height of the Arab revolt in 1936-39. The huge army had been erected throughout the country at a cost of thirty to forty million sterling pounds per year to the British tax payer, and more than six million Palestinian pounds a year from the Palestine budget, from 1943 onward. British troop

strengthen in Palestine was larger than the total projected figure for Britain imperial overseas commitments at this time (Cunningham, 1948, p. 481; Sachar, 1976, p. 277; Josse, 1980, p. 69).

The following table shows the development of the Police and Security expenditure during the years 1939-1946 :

Table 16: Expenditure on Police and Security Matters, 1939-46

(In millions of pounds)

| The head of expenditure                 | 1939/40 | 1941/42 | 1943/44 | 1945/46 |
|-----------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Police and Prisons                      | 1.65    | 1.97    | 2.46    | 3.40    |
| The percentage of the total expenditure | 27.50   | 26.40   | 16.70   | 20.20   |
| Defence                                 | -       | -       | 6.05    | 6.33    |
| The percentage of the total expenditure | -       | -       | 40.80   | 37.60   |
| Total Expenditure                       | 6.00    | 7.46    | 14.81   | 16.83   |

In the above table the combined expenditure of the Police and the Army accounted for 57.5 percent of the total expenditure for the

year 1943/44 and 57.8 percent of the total expenditure for 1945/46 (Statistical Abstracts of Palestine, 1945, p. 8; Supplementary Survey of Palestine, 1947, p. 3). The cost of the Palestine Police per head of population in 1935 (before the Arab revolt) was 0.35 Palestinian pounds ; in 1938 - 0.70; in 1939 the cost increased to 1.10 pounds and in 1946, with the outbreak of the Jewish resistance and the terrorist activity - 1.88 pounds.

In 1922 the ratio between the police establishment and the population was 1:296, in 1928 - 1:528 (in this year the police strength was reduced for economic reasons), in 1936 increased to 1:424, in 1939 at the peak of the Arab Revolt increased to 1:279. In 1944, the beginning of the Jewish "revolt" the ratio reached 1:245 and in 1947 the ratio was 1:238. If we consider that in the last years of the British Mandate in Palestine there was a population of about 1.9 million and the security forces numbered about 100,000 troops and police, all for the purpose of internal security, since there were no conflicts with neighbouring countries, the ratio between the Palestine population and the security forces achieved the incredible figure of 1:19.

#### The Withdrawal from Tel-Aviv

In order to free more British and Arab police for duty in the mixed areas, the British and Arab element of the Palestine Police were evacuated from certain areas of Lydda district, including the towns of

Tel-Aviv; Ramat Gan, Petah Tiqva and Bnei Brak., on December 15, 1947. This area was policed henceforth by Jewish personnel of Palestine Police under the administrative control of the Superintendent of the Lydda District, while the officer in charge of the Tel-Aviv Sub-District continued to be responsible to him in discharging normal police duties in accordance with Police Orders and practice. Assistant Superintendent Shalom Rosenstein, an investigation officer, was promoted to the rank of Deputy Superintendent and appointed in charge of the Tel-Aviv Sub-District which included six police stations and numbered about 300 policemen. The Government also accepted the Jewish Agency's offer to establish an armed 500 man civil guard, called "Mishmar", recruited mainly from the "Hagana". The purpose was to assist the Jewish police in the maintenance of law and order within the Jewish community in the area from which the British and Arab police had withdrawn. The Government did not provide this new force with firearms, taking into consideration that the force would be armed by the "Hagana". At the same time the Government established an Arab Civil Guard in Jaffa, as a Municipal police of 300 men, to protect the Arab community against attacks by Arab dissident groups and rioters. The members of this force were given police status and powers as Special Constables and were armed with police firearms.

David Ben Gurion, the chairperson of the Jewish Agency, urged the High Commissioner to reconsider his decision in this matter and either require the Arabs themselves to provide the firearms for this unit or to supply arms to the Jewish Civil Guard on exactly the same footing

(Israel Documents, 1980, p. 37; FO-371/61961 ; Ulitzki, 1951, p. 180; "Haa'retz", December 16, 1947). In the Petah Tiqva Sub-District, which was comprised of three police stations, the Jewish Assistant Superintendent J.Krammer was appointed as the officer in charge. Under his command approximately 100 policemen served ("Haa'retz", December 11, 1947).

#### The Implementation of the British Withdrawal

The rejection of the British proposals for resolution of the Palestine political situation by both the Arabs and the Jews and the course of the security events in 1947, strengthened the British Government decision to surrender the Mandate and to submit the Palestine question to the United Nations. On September 10, 1947, the British Government concluded that: "the right course for His Majesty's government is to announce the intention to surrender the Mandate and failing a satisfactory settlement, to plan for an early withdrawal. Neither British lives nor resources would be expended any longer in suppressing one Palestine community for the advantage of the other" (Cabinet Minutes 47/76; FO-371/68826). On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly gathered in New York and decided upon the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine not later than August 1, 1948, and voted the partition of Palestine into two independent Arab and Jewish states and a Special International Regime for the city of Jerusalem. Between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the independent states, a U.N Commission would

take full responsibility for the administration of the country and gradually relinquish this to the two new states (Israeli Documents, 1980, pp. 800). On the next day began the Arab hostilities and attacks on the Jews. On December 1, 1947, the Arabs proclaimed a three day general strike. On December 2nd an Arab mob burned down the Jewish commercial centre in Jerusalem. Jewish dissident groups in reprisal planted bombs in Arab areas near the old city of Jerusalem. On January 1948 the Arab Liberation Army which included irregulars from the neighbouring Arab states invaded the country. The hostilities gradually escalated into a full-scale war. The British lost control and in fact were concerned almost exclusively with their own safe withdrawal, protecting their own flanks, and avoiding the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews. The peace and security of Palestine was adversely affected and threatened as the result of the British Government's failure to maintain law and order, despite the declaration of Mr. Creech-Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the British House of Commons on December 11, 1947, that until the termination of the Mandate the British Government would remain responsible for law and order in Palestine (Cohen, 1982, pp. 302-316; Jewish Agency Memorandum, 1948, p. 5).

The first research sub-question which this study addressed (see page 32) was: Did the Palestine Police prepare a future Jewish police command cadre in anticipation of the British evacuation from Palestine and the Independence of Israel?



All the senior police officers at the Police Headquarters in Jerusalem, the Districts and the Sub-Districts Commanders were British, excluding two or three small rural sub-districts where the commanders were Arab or Jewish officers. Only on December 15, 1947, when the British were compelled to withdraw from the Tel-Aviv area, did they appoint a Jewish Assistant Superintendent (Captain), formerly in charge of an investigation unit, as the Commander of the Tel-Aviv Sub-District and then promoted him to the rank of Deputy Superintendent (Major). The same was done in Petah-Tiqva Sub-District.

The facts brought out in this study show clearly that Britain was reluctant to promote Arabs and Jews (natives) to high ranks in the police. Until the end of the British Mandate on Palestine there was no Jewish officer above the rank of Deputy Superintendent. From among 176 Superior Police Officers who were serving in December 1946, only four were Jews (2.27 %) and 13 were Arabs (7.38). Among 276 Inspectors (Lieutenant) 36 were Jews (13 %) and 67 were Arabs (24.3 %). None of the Jewish Officers had any knowledge of how the Police Headquarters or a District Police Headquarters operated. Most of the Jewish Police Inspectors served in investigation units or in low-level administrative capacities at the police station level (Palestine Police Annual Report, 1946, p. 4). In fact the Palestine Government did not trust the Arab members of the Palestine Police from the beginning of the Mandate, and trusted even less the Jewish members, especially following the intensification of Jewish dissident activity and the "Jewish Resistance" beginning 1943. Taking into consideration

these facts, and that Britain refused to cooperate with the United Nations Assembly decision to establish two independent states in Palestine, but decided to withdraw from Palestine leaving an administrative vacuum, it is clear that Palestine Police Headquarters did not prepare a future Jewish police command in anticipation of the British withdrawal from Palestine.

The second research sub-question which this study addressed (see page 32) was: Did there occur an official or orderly transition between the Palestine Police and the new Israeli Police?

An outline plan of withdrawal had been drawn up by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the Middle East in consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine. The plan was comprised of two phases: the withdrawal of the Civil Administration and the Military withdrawal. It was the desire of the British Government that the maximum amount of serviceable stores, equipment, machinery and vehicles should be evacuated from Palestine in the time available. The Palestine Government decided that 500 British policemen would be seconded to the army until the last day. Before Britain pulled out of Palestine, all inmates were released from lunatic asylums and all convicts were released from prisons. Sir Henry Gurney, the last Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government, who had as his principal function in 1948 the liquidation of the Mandate, declared at a meeting of all the heads of Government Departments, that there would not be any formal handing-over to any Jewish or Arab nationalist body or even to any local

authority. The British policy was to withdraw from Palestine leaving a vacuum (FO-371/61960; FO-371/61961; CO-537/3913; Samuel, 1970, p. 221). In a top secret telegram, No. 2749 from November 8, 1947, the Secretary of States for the Colonies ordered the High Commissioner: "So long as we are responsible for the civil government of Palestine there can be no question of recognizing the existence of any de facto government set up by Jews or Arabs, or the handing over to it of any of the functions of government" (FO-371/61960).

Neither Jews nor Arabs were informed in advance of British withdrawal plans. Each side made plans to seize as much territories, military camps and police stations as possible in advance or with the withdrawal of May 14-15, 1948. Both Jews and Arabs accused the British of partiality for the other side during their evacuation and for allowing the other side to occupy important police forts and army installations. It seems that partiality in either direction was shown mainly by British local commanders motivated by political, emotional, logistic or security considerations (Cohen, 1982, p. 347).

In the last month of the Mandate all postal, telegraph and telephone facilities were cut off, government employees were discharged, the railways ceased to operate, currency reserve stocks were removed to England, and food supplies remained sufficient for only three months. Police were ordered to burn precious or secret files and to destroy important property. Armored cars, which were not to be evacuated, were driven over an open area near Haifa and

destroyed by fire. The police stations and police posts were evacuated without notice, leaving the Jews and Arabs to fight over them. Before the British left, they discharged all the Palestine policemen, gave to every one of them a rifle and 50 rounds of ammunition and paid them three months of salary (Horne, 1982, p. 576-578).

On the night of the 14th and the 15th of May, 1948, the British evacuated the Police Headquarters in Jerusalem quietly. After a few hours of fire fighting between the Arabs and the Jews, the "Hagana" forces succeeded in occupying the building. The British left behind the building furniture and the fingerprints records but they burned or took away to England all the C.I.D files and records, the Police Laboratory instruments and the weapons arsenal (from the interview of the Jewish Palestine policeman Tzvi Zandberg, October 30, 1977; Frumer, 1973, p. 248).

On May 10th, 1948, the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a telegram to the High Commissioner, containing the following British Prime Minister's statement :

"On the termination of the British Mandate, I wish to send you and the members of your Administration a message of gratitude from His Majesty's Government. The high hopes with which we took up the Mandate have not been fulfilled and we say farewell to the peoples of Palestine in conditions tragically different from those to which it had been our purpose to lead

them.....We recall with special pride the gallant record of the Palestine Police Force and we remember at this time those members of the Force as well as of the Civil Service whose lives have been sacrificed (CO-733/489/2).

On Friday, May 14, 1948, in Tel-Aviv, David Ben Gurion, the Chairman of the Jewish Agency, read in front of an emotional assembly the declaration of independence of the new Jewish State - Israel. On the next day, May 15, thirty years of British sovereignty in Palestine, as a Mandatory power, were over. Sir Alan Cunningham, the last British High Commissioner, left Haifa on board a British destroyer. On the same day five Arab states, joined by Palestine Arabs, declared war against the newly established State of Israel and invaded the country from all directions. The Israeli War of Independence began (Postal and Levy, 1973, p. 205; Nyrop, 1979, p. 40).

Part Three: THE ISRAEL POLICE 1948-1958

Chapter VII: Organization & development

The Israel Police - First Labor Pains

Early Preparations

In the beginning of November 1947, the Jewish Agency and the National Committee established a committee called the "Situation Committee", aimed at taking immediate steps to organize the administration of the Jewish State which was in disarray due to a laxness within the framework of the British Mandate rule, and in order to carry out the preparations necessary for establishing a Jewish State. Ze'ev Sharf, who, at a later date was appointed State Secretary and in 1968 appointed Minister of Housing, became Committee secretary. The Situation Committee was divided into sub-committees, among them a sub-committee responsible for organizing the courts and the Police (Ze'ev Sharf, 28 July 83)

At the end of November 1947, Ze'ev Sharf asked Yehzekel Sakharov (Sahar) to come to see him. At the time, Sakharov was acting as liaison officer between the Jewish Agency and the British authorities regarding all facets of service conditions for Jewish policemen and supernumerary constables serving in the Mandate Police Force. Sharf

told him that based on the United Nations decision to establish an independent Jewish State, the Situation Committee had decided to establish a Jewish Police. Ze'ev Sharf appointed Yehezkel Sahar to prepare a plan for the establishment of such a police force.

Despite the fact that Yehezkel Sahar acted as liaison between the Jewish Agency and the Mandate Police, he had no idea of the organization within the Mandate Police nor the range or scope of its activities. He recruited his deputy, Yosef Nachmias, and consulted with Robert Lustig, who had served as a C.I.D. officer and had resigned that year with Bechor Shitrit, a former police officer who, at the time, was serving as a Judge in the Central Magistrate's Court, and with two more Jewish police officers from among the Pay and Accounts Office of the Mandate Police. After having consulted these people and having poured through written material concerning the Mandate Police, Yehezkel Sahar managed to prepare a proposal for the organization of the Police. On December 21, 1947, he presented the proposal to the "B" Sub-Committee, headed by Ze'ev Sharf. Following are the main points of the proposal:

1. A police force was to be established which would not be burdened with the daily security duties and which would concentrate on preventing and solving crimes. Alongside this police, under the same command and administration, a gendarmerie was to be established to fulfill the duties of guarding and securing the rural areas and the borders.

2. The police was to consist of a security and administrative department, and a department responsible for investigating serious crimes, each department to be headed by an officer bearing the rank of Assistant Inspector-General.

3. The Security Department was to be responsible for administration, public security, crime prevention and for primary investigations of incidents. This Department was to be divided into four districts: Galilee, Haifa, the Sharon and the Negev. An officer bearing the rank of District Superintendent was to head each district.

4. Every district was to be divided into sub-districts, each headed by an Assistant Superintendent, and each sub-district divided into police stations, each headed by a Police Inspector.

5. The Criminal Investigations Department (CID) was to be made up of two Divisions: political and criminal.

6. The Criminal Investigation Division was to be accountable for investigations, immigration and naturalization offences, prosecuting criminal cases in court, handling criminal records, the fingerprint collection and centralizing the fight against the traffic and use of drugs.

7. The Political Division was to be responsible for handling matters concerning aliens and minority groups residing in the country, gathering information regarding the political parties, terrorist and rebel actions, dealing with public opinion, counter-espionage, as well as keeping track of suspects liable to disturb the public peace and internal security.



8. The Police Headquarters was to contain a unit responsible for the administrative and secretarial services, the armory, traffic and a transport division.

9. A budgetary estimate was appended providing for the recruitment of 116 officers, 282 sergeants and corporals, as well as 2,160 constables - a total of 2,558 police personnel and 131 civilian functionaries. A proposal was also attached giving estimates for cost regarding vehicles, furniture, communications equipment, uniforms, rent and mechanical upkeep. The proposed budget came to 1.5 million Palestinian pounds.

On January 20, 1948, the "B" Sub-Committee approved the proposal for establishing the Israel Police, and recommended to the "Situation Committee" that appointments for the main duties of the future Police Force be made immediately, particularly commanders who would be responsible for the areas of administration and crime investigations. The Sub-Committee also recommended that a Police Academy be established and that advertisements be placed in the press for candidates for an officer course (National Archives, File nr. 114; Yehezkel Sahar, Interview on January 16, 1983). On February 17, 1948, the Jewish press published advertisements wherein Jewish youths were called upon to register as candidates for the first police officers' course in the future Jewish State. Entrance examinations for candidates were carried out by a selection committee consisting of seven members, headed by Mr. J. Perlson. The committee members included Messrs. Bechor Shitrit, Yehezkel Sahar and Yosef Nachmias.

In mid-March 1948, Zeev Sharf informed Yehezkel Sahar that he would probably be appointed Inspector General of the Israel Police by the Jewish Agency Board. On March 22, 1948, the Secretariat of the Situation Committee turned to the Jewish Agency Board and requested that five rooms in the Sharona Camp (an army camp which had been emptied of British soldiers on December 15, 1947) be put at the disposal of Y. Sahar and Y. Nachmias in order that they be able to continue their work in organizing the Police Force.

The Police as a Unit within the Israeli Army

On March 26, David Ben Gurion, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Board, sent a letter to Mr. Yehezkel Sahar wherein he placed upon him the responsibility for organizing the Jewish Police for the future Jewish State. Following is the text of this letter:

To: Yehezkel Sahar, esq.

Dear Sir,

"The Board has made you responsible for the immediate organization of the Jewish Police for the whole area of the Jewish State. At this point in time, the Police will be part of the security forces, however, under the orders of the Supreme Command of Army Headquarters, it will be responsible for internal police duties, and the rest of the security forces will no longer be responsible for these

duties. Only in special cases, as per specific orders, will it be possible to utilize the services of the general security forces, for internal security.

For these particular purposes, you will be part of Headquarters Staff. Headquarters will place up to 1,200 persons from among the recruits at your disposal, in order that they be given additional training in police matters and when the Police Force is established, they will serve the Jewish State.

Their upkeep and salaries will continue to be paid from the general security budget, and they will thus be eligible for the same conditions and benefits received by the rest of the security forces, however, their uniforms will bear a special emblem which will distinguish their separate police duties.

You will be assigned 700 policemen still serving in the Palestine Police, however, until the Mandate is abolished, they are to be kept in two separate units, set apart by their dress, and they will be internally subordinate to one authority."

(-) David Ben Gurion

(Israel Police: The Development of the Police in Israel,

History Department, Jerusalem, 1988, p.49).

On the very same day, David Ben Gurion wrote a letter to the Chief of the National Hagana Command and to the Head of the Army General Headquarters (which was in the process of being organized), wherein he notified them that according to the Jewish Agency Board decision, Yehezkel Sahar had been given the responsibility of organizing the Police for the physical area of the Jewish State. The Police would take on 1,200 new recruits and would be accountable to the Army High Command, however, it would be solely independent in its activities. Mr. Yehezkel Sahar would serve as Commander of this Police Force, which would become a Department in Army General Headquarters (Gershon Rivlin and Elchanan Oren, 1984, p. 321).

The Commander of the Hagana National Headquarters as well as the Head of the Army General Headquarters notified their headquarters staff of this fact and ordered them to extend all necessary assistance to the Police Department regarding establishing positions, recruiting personnel, acquiring materiel and vehicles, etc. (Israel Police Archives, File Nr. M/S/1637; Israel Army Archives, File Nr. 2315/50).

On April 15, 1948, the Deputy Army Chief of Staff issued Personnel Order nr. 13/48 announcing the formation of the Police as a Brigade of the Army. The composition of the Police Brigade was to be established as follows:

A. Headquarters was to be divided into two divisions - the Security and the Criminal Investigations Divisions.

B. Two district headquarters were to be established, with seven platoons of policemen and a training base.

A complement of 910 police personnel was approved - 65 officers, 78 sergeants, and 767 policemen. With the establishment of the districts and additional platoons, the strength was to be increased accordingly. All British Mandate policemen who would continue to serve in the Israel Police were added to the complement (Israel Army Archives, Classified Documents File).

Who was this Yehezkel Sahar (Sakharov) who was charged with the heavy responsibility of organizing the Police for the soon to be formed Jewish State? What were his qualifications? Yehezkel Sahar, born in Jerusalem in 1907 to Russian-born parents, had completed his high school studies in Jerusalem and his University studies in London. He had been an active member of the Hagana since 1924. Between the years of 1936-1939, he acted as personal secretary to Professor Chaim Weizman, the President of the World Zionist Organization. In January 1941, he joined the British Army and was sent to an Officer's Course. Completing the course, he was assigned to Platoon 178 as an officer. In 1943, he was appointed Commander of the 462nd Platoon with the rank of Major. During the war, he served in Syria, Egypt, Italy and Austria. He was demobilized in 1946 and in July of the same year, he was asked by Golda Meir (who served as Israel's Prime Minister from 1969-1974) to act as liaison officer between the Jewish Agency and the Mandatory Government concerning all matters pertaining to Jewish policemen and supernumerary constables.

He served in this capacity until just before the establishment of the State. It seemed most natural for the members of the "Situation Committee" to propose him as Commander of the Jewish Police, for who else was able to wander around the halls of the Mandate Police Headquarters or was more intimately familiar with the workings of that Police Force. First-hand knowledge regarding the organizational and activities make-up of the Mandate Police was most meagre.

Only eager willingness to accept the proffered challenge, and the exuberant atmosphere which, at the time, prevailed in the Jewish settlement and was conducive to working in order to realize the establishment of the long awaited Jewish State, enabled Yehezkel Sahar to accept the post. Assisted by the same group of men who had previously helped him prepare the proposal for organizing the Police Force, Sahar began, with great alacrity to actually establish the Jewish Police, even though the British Mandatory Government was still in force in Palestine, and the Mandate Police had full authority to enforce its directives.

Since November 29, 1947, the day on which the United Nations decided to establish two Palestinian states - one Arab and the other Jewish - the Arabs in Palestine, with the assistance of "volunteers" from neighboring Arab countries, began attacking the Jewish neighborhoods in the mixed population cities, and along the main traffic arteries to these cities. Incidents involving killing and

wounding began to be daily occurrences. Shops and homes were set on fire by Arab rioters, valuable agricultural equipment was destroyed, random sniping and stone-throwing endangered the lives of every passer-by. The British authorities, involved in the accelerated process of preparing for the withdrawal, were amassing the equipment and heavy armament in the area of the Port of Haifa, as well as evacuating the families of British policemen and army officers, and therefore, were not always able to enforce a state of law and order between Jews and Arabs. Diminishing Army and Police presence in view of the withdrawal of units to the Haifa Port area seriously harmed the security situation in the country, and armed conflicts between Jews and Arabs became daily occurrences.

During that period, Jewish community institutions were active in two main directions: organizing and establishing representative institutions which would be prepared to establish an independent State on the one hand; and on the other, concentrating all resources within the Jewish settlement in Israel to establish a standing army capable of fighting back and protecting the new country which was to be established in its part of Palestine. As a result of the United Nations decision regarding the Partition borders, the "Situation Committee" prepared the basis for founding a "National Administration" (Minhelet Ha'am), an administrative body consisting of 13 members, a Provisional Government which was to manage the affairs of the State during its establishment, until Parliamentary democratic elections elected a permanent government.

According to the preliminary plans, the Police and Prison Services were to be politically accountable to the Ministry of Interior. During negotiations regarding the distribution of ministerial portfolios according to party strength as they existed in the Jewish settlement, the Minister of Interior-designate, Mr. Itzhak Greenbaum, refused to accept responsibility for the Police, claiming that during the Russian conquest of his homeland, Poland, he had hated the police there, and therefore, had been unable to tolerate the Free Police Force and here, in Palestine, he had abhorred the rude behaviour of the British Mandatory Police. The Minister of Interior-designate clearly stated that he wanted to have nothing to do with the future Police Force, and in any case, he was certain that David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense-designate, would want to have a say in the running of the Police, particularly regarding the work of the C.I.D., which, as was well known during Mandatory time, was in fact, a political Police, so that, actually, he, as Minister of Interior and responsible for the Police, would not be allowed a free hand in his work. Due to Itzhak Greenbaum's refusal to direct the Police within the framework of the Ministry of Interior, it was decided to establish a separate Ministry, a Ministry of Police, which would be responsible for the Police and the Prison Services. Bechor Shitrit, a former police officer and a Magistrate's Court Judge during the Mandate period, was appointed to head this Ministry. He was the only Minister in the Israeli Government with an Oriental-background (Ze'ev Sharf, interview on July 28, 1983; Ze'ev Sharf, 1962, p. 60). On April 20, 1948, the day that the "National Administration" was



established, the "National Council" (a provisional Israeli Parliament) was also established, made up of 43 representatives from the Jewish Agency, members of the Jewish National Committee and members of the Jewish political parties who were not represented in the two national bodies.

At the same time, Yehezkel Sahar, assisted by the Minister of Police, Bechor Shitrit, tried to convince the "Hagana" Command levels that some of the Hagana commanders be allowed to become commanders of Police districts. These requests were not well received. On April 8, 1948, Y. Sahar wrote to David Ben Gurion stating that the heads of the Personnel and Operations Departments in the Hagana Central Command were not permitting him to recruit the 1,200 policemen from among the new army recruits, as had been promised in his letter of March 26, 1948. In his letter, Sahar announced that under these conditions, he could not be responsible for having the Police Forces ready by May 15, 1948, the day on which the independence of the State was to be declared. On May 4, 1948, Y. Sahar and Bechor Shitrit met with David Ben Gurion and complained that the Hagana Central Command had not transferred all required commanders to the Police. David Ben Gurion then ordered Moshe Zadok, who, at that time, was responsible for personnel in the Hagana, to make immediate arrangements to have the required number of commanders transferred to the Police. (Rivlin, 1984, p. 386; National Archives, File Nr. 114/G). On May 14, 1948, only a few hours before the end of the British Mandate in Israel, the National Council, headed by David Ben Gurion, met in Tel Aviv and

declared the establishment of the State of Israel. The National Council became a Provisional National Government. The 13 members of the National Council became members of the Provisional National Government. David Ben Gurion became Prime Minister and Bechor Shitrit, the Minister of Police (The Jewish Encyclopedia, 1957, p. 569). On the day that the State was declared, Bechor Shitrit, Minister of Police, appointed Yehezkel Sahar (Sakharov) the first Police Inspector-General of the Israel Police and the Prison Services. Following is the text of the appointment:

#### APPOINTMENT AS INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE POLICE

I, Bechor Shitrit, in my capacity as Minister of Police of the State of Israel, hereby appoint Mr. Yehezkel Sahar Inspector-General of the Israel Police and Prison Services, to act according to the authority vested in him by the Police Orders.

This appointment is valid from May 14, 1948, subject to approval by the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government.

May 14, 1948

Bechor Shalom Shitrit

Minister of Police

(Israel Police: Headquarters Orders, 1952, p.1)

On the same day, Yehezkel Sahar, the Inspector-General published his orders:

## ORDERS FROM THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL

As per my appointment by the Minister of Police, I, Yehezkel Sahar, hereby accept, on this day, command of the Police and Prison Services of the State of Israel.

We stand, today, on the threshold of a new era and are committed to supporting the establishment of the State. Every man will continue to do his duty and faithfully carry out that which is demanded of him during these difficult times.

The rule by strangers has ended and every man should consider himself a partner in the job of establishing an efficient and viable Police Force.

May 14, 1958

Y. Sahar

Inspector-General

Israel Police and Prison Services

(Israel Police: Headquarters Orders, 1952, p. 1)

In fact, the State of Israel and the Israel Police were born as twins, one attached to the other. The Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, and the Government symbolize the sovereign strength of the country, and the Israel Police demonstrates, through the authority accorded to it by law, the State's sovereignty, upholding the laws and maintaining the peace for

the people.

### The Israel Police Structure

#### Political and Security Background.

Since November 30, 1947, the day after the United Nations decision regarding the Partition of Palestine into two countries, Jewish and Arab, followed by the refusal of Palestinian Arabs and the neighboring Arab nations to recognize this decision, the Jewish settlement came under attack and was forced to fight in order to secure the freedom and independence of the future State. The small Jewish settlement, consisting of approximately 650,000 persons, feverishly prepared itself to raise forces which would be able to face the local Arabs and neighboring Arab countries' armies which were preparing to invade with the British withdrawal from the area.

And indeed, on May 15, the day after the declaration of the State of Israel, these countries declared war on Israel and began their invasion. The Syrian and Lebanese armies invaded from the North, capturing some Jewish settlements in the Jordan valley and threatening to capture Tiberias, one of the principal cities in the North of the country; the Jordanian army captured the West Bank of the Jordan River and controlled East Jerusalem; most of the South of the country was captured by the Egyptian army, which succeeded in coming as close as approximately 30 kilometers from Tel Aviv, the capital city of the

Jewish settlement in Israel at that time.

The "Hagana", which, for almost 30 years had been the main underground organization of the Jewish settlement, became, on June 1, 1948, the "Israel Defense Army" - the legal, standing army of the country. The "National Army Organization" (Irgun) was disbanded and its members recruited as a group into the Army. This fact did not prevent a tragic incident whereby "Irgun" members attempted to offload armaments brought by them to the shores of Tel Aviv on the ship "Altalena". This incident occurred on June 20, 1948 and almost caused a hand-to-hand battle between the army and members of the "Irgun". The Army Command demanded that the arms be transferred from the ship to army depots and when "Irgun" members refused, the ship was fired upon by the army and set on fire along with the arms still on her. This incident almost caused a civil war.

All the resources of the small Jewish settlement in Israel at that time were dedicated, on the one hand, to the war effort, and on the other, to absorbing the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees arriving from Europe. The refugees left behind the Nazi holocaust and were looking to build new lives for themselves in the independent Jewish State, which, despite the dangers involved in its establishment, had opened its gates to the multitudes of immigrants.

The Israeli Army had top priority in the general call-up of the whole of the Jewish population to Army service. The recruits passed


through short training periods and were rapidly sent to the war fronts. The actual physical existence of the young and tender State was in danger of extermination (Lorch, 1958, p. 570; Levy, 1986, p. 13). Under these difficult conditions, when large parts of the country were either captured or cut off, with Jerusalem under siege, with great losses suffered in the Galilee and in the North, and with the South of the country cut off, the Army turned its main efforts towards preventing the advance of the Egyptian Army towards Tel Aviv. The conquest of that city would mean the destruction of the State of Israel. Under these emergency conditions, the Israel Police Inspector General, Yehezkel Sahar, had to organize and consolidate the Police so that it could fulfill its basic duties and go even beyond that required by the situation.

#### The Organizational Structure

The organizational composition of the Israel Police, with its establishment on May 15, 1948, was identical to that of the British Mandate Police, in addition to being influenced by the wartime conditions existing in Israel at the time. The borders of the country had not yet been set and battles were being fought in most parts of the country. The Inspector General and his Deputy reached the conclusion that in view of the defense/political situation in the country, which was neither clear nor stable, and the lack of certainty regarding the capabilities of the Israel Police to organize itself and reach personnel and equipment proportions required for efficient

functioning, it was preferable to copy the organizational structure of the Mandate Police and only delete or add those functions necessitated by the prevailing situation and conditions. The Inspector General of the Israel Police and Prison Services derived his authority to organize the Israel Police, to recruit policemen into its ranks and to have it efficiently carry out its duties, from Police Ordinance 1926 which had been enacted during the Mandate Period and remained in force in the State of Israel. The Deputy Inspector General and the National Headquarters, divided into two Departments, assisted the Inspector General in administering the Police. The Departments were sub-divided into Divisions. This was a national Police and from a territorial-operative basis, broken down into districts, sub-districts, police stations and police posts. For the organizational composition of the Israel Police, see the chart on the following page.

In 1949, a third Department was established in the National Police Headquarters - the Training Department, responsible for organizing training bases, training policemen and sergeants, and establishing a dog service for the Police. Changes also occurred in the territorial distribution: the Tel Aviv Sub-district became a District, the Sharon and the Shfela Sub-districts were attached to the new Tel Aviv District - the Shores and Borders Division which had been under the command of the Investigations Department became an independent operational unit.

Figure 8: The Israel Police - Organizational Chart, 1948

(Israel Police Annual Report, 1948, p. 6-7).



In order to examine the organizational structure of western police forces and to learn modern work methods, a number of senior officers traveled abroad during 1949 and visited the following countries:

- Y. Sahar, the Inspector-General - France, England and the United States.
- Y. Nachmias, Deputy Inspector-General - England.
- Ram Yaron, Head of C.I.D. - Switzerland, France and England.
- Amos Ben Gurion, Head of Training Dept. - England and the United States.

(Israel National Police, Annual Report, 1949, p.1-2)

During 1950 as well, organizational changes took place in the Police. This time, the changes came about as a result of the Israel Police having operated for a period of over two years, and from experience garnered from the senior commanders' visits in the United States and Europe. That year, the Administrative Department minimized the attention paid to the areas of services, administration and personnel, and subjects such as organization, planning, crime prevention, operations, traffic and communications were transferred to a newly established department, the Organization Department, which replaced the recently disbanded Training Department. This Department was put in charge of Training Programs within the Police and was also made responsible for securing the country's borders and preventing Arab infiltration from the neighboring Arab countries. The Arabs had begun penetrating the border settlements in Israel, as well as going

deep into the country, in order to smuggle merchandise and carry out thefts and robberies.


That same year a new Division was added to the Investigations Dept. - the Economic Investigations Division - which, in addition to supervising investigations concerning economic, fraud and extortion crimes, dealt with offences against the fair prices laws (black market), foreign currency offences, as well as drug use and traffic offenses. Changes during 1950 also included the establishment of the Inspector General's Bureau, which assisted the Inspector General in establishing police policy in accordance with government policy, as well as coordinating the workings of the different departments.

The Headquarters Secretariat was established in the National Headquarters and, in addition to the regular duties of a secretariat (filing, maintaining archives, registering and carrying out correspondence), was responsible for Police Public Relations (Spokesman, dealing with complaints against Police personnel and publishing Police publications). From a territorial point of view, the Southern District was disbanded in 1950, its sub-districts and stations attached to other existing districts. Two sub-districts were established as part of the Jerusalem District: The Capital Sub-district and the Rural Sub-district, and the Shfela Sub-district, formerly part of the Southern District, were attached to the Jerusalem District. An additional sub-district was attached to the Tiberias District - the Safed Sub-district. The Sharon Sub-district was

disbanded, some of its stations transferred to the Hadera Sub-district, which changed its name to the Mediterranean Sub-district, and the rest of the Sharon stations were organized into a new Sub-district - the Petach Tikva Sub-district, which was made subordinate to the Tel Aviv District.

In 1951, the various versions of the organizational structure of the Israel Police had, to a large extent, stabilized, however, no final version had, as yet, been crystallized. During that year, the National Headquarters Secretariat became consolidated with the Inspector General's Bureau and became a General Secretariat. No changes occurred in the composition of the Departments nor in the territorial organization of the Israel Police. The breakdown of district and sub-district headquarters, stations and posts remained the same. That year a new sub-district was added to the Tiberias District - the 'Amakim Sub-district, and in the Southern part of the country, the Negev Sub-district was established.

In 1951, the first two platoons of the Border Guard were established, subordinate to the Sub-district headquarters in whose district they were posted. The National Headquarters appointed a Staff Officer in charge of the Border Guard. Later, a separate chapter will be devoted to the development of the Border Guard within the Israel Police (Israel Police, Annual Report, 1951, pp. 7-15). The organizational composition of the Israel Police at the end of 1950 - see the following page:

Figure 9: The Israel Police - Organizational Chart, 1950

Source: Israel Police, Annual Report 1950, pp.4-6.

Few organizational changes were effected in 1952. During that year, the organizational framework of the Israel Police became relatively stable. The General Division in the Investigative Department was disbanded and instead, the Criminal Identification Division was established, previously a field handled by a section within the Criminal Division. An officer responsible for Special Tasks, in charge of liaising between the Police, the Army and other Security and Intelligence Departments, was assigned to the Inspector General's Bureau. No changes took place in the territorial composition of the Police (Israel Police, Annual Report, 1952, pp. 5-7).

During 1953, many organizational changes took place in the Israel Police, some effected in order to adapt the territorial breakdown of the Police to that of the State, and others were due to the everchanging circumstances of the country: a rise in population, the establishment of new settlements, the development of additional urban centers, etc. A Division for Special Tasks was established within the Organization Department, and began handling duties which were the responsibility of the Special Tasks Officer, directly accountable to the Inspector General, as well as all subjects involving minorities. The Communications Division, which had been part of the Organization Department, was transferred back to the Administrative Department when it was decided that in fact, communications was more a service than an operational function. The following changes took place during this year regarding the territorial aspect of the organization: A Northern District was established, to which were assigned the units under the

Tiberias District, including the Zvulun Sub-district, whose name was changed to the Akko Sub-district. The Shores and Border Unit, which which had been acting as an independent unit, was abolished and its sections attached to various Districts. A Haifa Port Sub-district was added to the Haifa District. Within the Organization Department, a Border Guard Command Post was established, concentrating and planning the actions of the Border Guard units as well as handling the problem of infiltration from the Arab countries. At the end of 1953, the territorial composition of the Israel Police was as follows:

| <u>Districts:</u>     | <u>Jerusalem</u> | <u>Tel Aviv</u> | <u>Haifa</u> | <u>Northern</u> |
|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|
| <u>Sub-districts:</u> | Capital          | Northern        | Urban        | Safed/Kinneret  |
|                       | Rural            | Southern        | Port         | Yizre'el        |
|                       | Shfela           | Pat/Sharon      | Hadera       | Akko            |
|                       | Negev            | Ramat-Gan       |              |                 |
|                       |                  | Lod             |              |                 |

In 1954, the changes which occurred were mainly in the area of territorialism: A new District, the Central District, was established, to which were assigned the Petach-Tikva/Sharon Sub-district, the Airport (Lod) Sub-district and the Shfela Sub-district. A Building Division was established in the National Headquarters, responsible for building Police structures and for their maintenance, (Israel Police Annual Report, 1954, pp. 7-8).

Few organizational changes took place in 1955, and from a territorial point of view, there were no changes at all. A very important alteration took place in the Organization Department in the National Headquarters - the Planning Division was disbanded and instead, the Policing and Headquarters Duties Division was formed. This Division was established in order to deal with job complements of Police units at all levels and to unify and improve the efficiency quotient in planning the work of the Police. It was decided that this Division would also deal with establishing personnel positions and determining requirements for equipment necessary for research and for statistics, and would be responsible for setting out guidelines for dealing with crime prevention, public order and the security of the citizen and property. That year, the Forensic Medicine Laboratories, previously part of the Hebrew University Medical School, were incorporated into the Police.

During 1956, no significant changes took place in the organizational or territorial structure of the Israel Police. With the outbreak of the war in 1956 and the conquest of the Gaza Strip by the Army, a Military Government was established in the Gaza Strip. The Israel Police was asked by the Army to establish a Police Sub-district within the area controlled by the Army, with police stations in the main cities of the Gaza Strip. This Sub-district recruited local policemen who had served during the Egyptian rule, and put them under the command of Israeli officers and NCO's transferred there from different police units in Israel. In the beginning, the Gaza Sub-

district was directly accountable to the National Headquarters, and later, it became subordinate to Jerusalem District (Israel Police Annual Report, 1956, pp. 8-9).

Research question 3 (see page 32) seeks an answer to the question: Why did the Israel Police initially adopt the Palestine Police structure and organization, in spite of the differences between the two regimes and the contrast between the tasks and functions of the former police force and its successor. This section addresses this question. Y. Sahar, the first Inspector General, lacking knowledge in police matters, was given command of the Israel Police during a period of chaos, with a war raging all around, was allocated a limited budget and was unable to recruit high level personnel because of the war. He thought that the organization structure which had been satisfactory for the British, who were very experienced in police administration in England and in their British colonies around the world, would also be suitable for the young corps which had just been established. Sahar was certain that in time, with more experience, he would be able to effect changes, as needed. (Interview with Y. Sahar, December 12, 1987.)

The organization of the Israel Police crystallized during the years 1953-54. The organizational changes which took place suited the needs of the country and the Police. In part, the changes were a result of the administrative distribution of the State, population growth, the creation of new population centers and the security




situation. At the end of 1957, a decade after the establishment of the Israel Police, the organizational structure of the Israel Police was as follows:

Table 17: Territorial Breakdown of Israel Police Districts, Sub-districts, Stations, Posts, 1948-1958

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Dists.</u> | <u>Sub-Dists.</u> | <u>Stations</u> | <u>Posts</u> | <u>Total Units</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------------|
| 1948        | 4             | 6                 | 34              | 15           | 59                 |
| 1949        | 5             | 5                 | 33              | 14           | 57                 |
| 1950        | 4             | 9                 | 45              | 26           | 84                 |
| 1951        | 4             | 11                | 52              | 25           | 92                 |
| 1952        | 4             | 13                | 51              | 24           | 92                 |
| 1953        | 4             | 14                | 41              | 28           | 87                 |
| 1954        | 5             | 15                | 39              | 32           | 91                 |
| 1955        | 5             | 15                | 39              | 32           | 91                 |
| 1956        | 5             | 16                | 37              | 32           | 89                 |
| 1957        | 5             | 15                | 36              | 33           | 89                 |
| 1958        | 3             | 13                | 36              | 34           | 86                 |

NOTE: Police stations were closed in the Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa Sub-districts, where team-policing had been in effect since 1952.

Figure 10: The Israel Police - Organizational Chart - 1957Source: Israel Police Annual Report, 1957, p. 14.

## Chapter VIII: Police Strength and Competition for Resources

### General Information

Since the establishment of the State of Israel the Israel Police had not, as yet, quite solved the problems of police strength and personnel. This section concentrates on, and examines these problems as they reflected the first decade following the establishment of the police. However, this is the time to point out that the problems of police strength and personnel still exist to this day, 41 years since the declaration of the State and the establishment of the Israel Police.

From its very beginnings, the State of Israel fought for its very existence against the Israeli Arabs and the armies of five neighboring Arab countries which invaded her territory and began a bloody war. During this war, which began on May 15, 1948, and until the signing of the cease-fire with the last of the Arab countries, Syria, on July 20, 1949, the main bulk of the country's budget, human resources and equipment were put at the disposal of Israel's Army, the main defense and fighting force of the young country, enabling it to conduct a defensive war. As a result the Israel Police, although the only official entity in the country empowered to deal with law-enforcement and the securing of life and property, was not given top priority concerning personnel and equipment resources.

In addition to recovering in the wake of a cruel war which had caused the loss of approximately 5,000 soldiers and the injury of thousands more, the young State of Israel was undecided, already in the first year of its existence, regarding the difficult problems of absorption. The issues included housing and providing work for the great flood of new immigrants who had "climbed up" to Israel as full citizens to join the newly established Jewish State. Many were survivors of the Holocaust and the remnants of European Jewry, which had been massacred by Hitler and the Nazi Regime and exterminated in the gas chambers.

Although the war between Israel and the Arab countries ended with an Israeli victory, the neighboring Arab countries firmly refused to turn over the ceasefire documents signed in 1949 and would not agree to a permanent peace. Only Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1981, with the mediation of the United States. This non-peace/non-war situation, during which acts of hostility continued to be a daily occurrence at the border, caused Israel to build and maintain a strong army, equipped with resources suitable for protecting the country from the possibility of war with the Arab armies. The Army continued to be given marked preference over the Police regarding personnel, weapons and equipment. This situation forced the Israeli Government, every year, to allocate a large part of its budget to defense. During the first decade after the establishment of the State, an additional large part of the budget was allocated to the absorption of hundreds of thousands of new immigrants who, during the short period since the

establishment of the State, had tripled the country's Jewish population. Additional budget allocations were approved for education, health and the establishment of new settlements. The Government assigned only a small part of the budget to the Israel Police for the purpose of establishing and developing Police resources.

### Strength

The aim of establishing positions is to supply the needs of the organization regarding all aspects of personnel and equipment, in order to enable that organization to carry out its daily duties in an efficient manner, and at the same time, enable the organization to deal with developmental or operational needs which may take place over a certain period of time.

The first proposal for resources for the Israel Police was a temporary one worked out even before the establishment of the State. It was presented by Yehezkel Sahar to the "B" Sub-Committee of the "Situation Committee", responsible for planning the establishment of the different government offices for the new State. In the proposal, which was presented on December 21, 1947, were positions for 2,558 officers and policemen. On January 20, 1948, the "B" Sub-Committee recommended that the Situation Committee adopt the proposal. The Situation Committee approved Yehezkel Sahar's proposal and appointed him to establish the proposed Police Force. (National Archives, File Nr. 114/G).

A reading of David Ben Gurion's letter to Yehezkel Sahar on March 26, 1948, indicates that Ben Gurion approved the use of 700 Jewish policemen who, at the time, were serving in the Mandate Police, as well as the recruitment of an additional 1,200 policemen through the offices of the "Hagana" Headquarters. This letter set the approved limits for recruiting policemen for the future Police Force at only 1,900. By the end of 1948, it was clear to the Police Command that the police strength proposed on the eve of the establishment of the State was not realistic. It was not equal to the needs of the Police in view of the dimensions of immigration, the rate at which new settlements were being established, the social and economic conditions existing in the State, the general atmosphere prevailing and influences of the war, and what was even closer to the actual Police duties - the challenge posed by crimes being committed. The Inspector General appointed the Deputy District Commander, Yosef Ben Porat, as Head of the Administrative Department to work out a new complement proposal compatible with the above-mentioned changes. In the meantime, Bechor Shitrit, the Minister of Police, proposed to the Knesset and the Minister of Finance a temporary Police strength of 2,923 policemen. Within the framework of the State budget for the months of July until December 1948, a temporary strength of 2,065 policemen was approved, including police for the Prison Services, which, until January 1, 1949, would still be part of the Israel Police. In December, positions for another 230 persons were approved, so that by the end of 1948, the approved strength of the Police stood at 2,295 policemen, of which only 1,882 positions were actually filled.

(National Archives, File 16/92, Box 3323/G).

On February 10, 1949, the Inspector General presented to the Police Minister the new temporary proposal for Israel Police strength, a proposal approved by the Police Command and in its opinion, compatible with the situation in force at the time. In the letter which accompanied the proposal, the Inspector General stressed the fact that with the end of the state of emergency, the Police would present a complementary proposal which would be consistent with Police activity in peacetime. In this provisional proposal, the Inspector General asked approval for 4,221 persons, based on the ratio of one policeman for every 200 residents (Israel Police, Selected Sources from the Development of the Israel Police, 1989, p. 94). This proposal was not approved by the Ministry of Finance, which demanded a more detailed and clarified proposal. In the meantime, the Ministry of Finance approved a ceiling of 3,650 positions for the Police. At the end of 1950, the third year since the establishment of the State, the Police was still operating without a well-defined personnel complementary plan which took into consideration its growth requirements for organizational development, its broadening and growth in areas of activity and additional duties.

At the end of 1950, the Inspector-General, once again appointed a committee whose purpose was to prepare a new, flexible strength proposal which would suit the needs of the Police Force in a country such as Israel, which was absorbing large numbers of immigrants and

developing at a rapid rate from the point of view of economy, industry and growth in settlements. The committee was requested to take into account the existence of the positive demographic revolution which had brought about such rapid growth in the Jewish population in Israel, had caused significant social changes and concurrently, a rise in the crime rate. The committee succeeded in preparing a flexible and dynamic complementary proposal which took into account all results and changes which could be foreseen to take place in the coming five years. The proposal was presented to the Police Command at the end of 1951, discussed in detail and transmitted to the Minister of Police by the Inspector General for his approval, as well as that of the Ministry of Finance and the Knesset. In the meantime, in 1952, the Treasury carried out a policy of approving a general personnel ceiling for the Police, without explicitly delineating exact proportions according to units, a fact which enabled flexible application of personnel according to the needs of field units and the decisions of the Police Command.

In 1953, the sixth year since the establishment of the State, the Israel Police complement strength had yet to be approved, and the system of setting provisional personnel ceilings continued. In fact, that year, an important organizational change took place, requiring a rise in the personnel ceiling: the Border Guard, which, until that time, had operated on a very limited basis through the use of platoons or companies assigned to police sub-districts, became an independent body, directly accountable to the Organization Department in the



National Headquarters. At the same time, the Border Guard was substantially enlarged, in part by being assigned personnel from the additional ceiling allocated, and in part, by transferring personnel positions from other Police units. From that, it can be understood that the number of personnel positions at the disposal of the Police for carrying out regular duties was reduced. During the same year, the Police were assigned two additional duties: border control at the various border crossings, a duty formerly carried out by the Ministry of the Interior; the prevention of smuggling, a subject which had previously been dealt with by the Customs Administration. These responsibilities were transferred to Police operations without any increase in personnel.

In 1954, for the first time since the establishment of the State, the number of persons employed in the Police diminished, even if only by 100 positions (1.7%). This decline was a result of difficult economic problems in the country, and the decision of the Treasury to reduce government functionary positions. In 1955, since the Police were unsuccessful in recruiting more than 65-70% of its approved annual personnel ceiling, and in view of the difficult economic situation which had persisted throughout that year, the Police Command decided to prepare a new, reduced complement strength proposal. The Treasury approved the personnel ceiling for that year, a ceiling which was closer to the new provisional complement proposed by the Police. However, that same year, the Police were unable to recruit more than 90% of the approved strength. Near the end of the year, the ceiling

of 6,827 approved in the Spring of 1955 was reduced by 200 because of budgetary considerations (Israel Police Annual Report, 1955, p. 7). At the end of 1956, the approved personnel ceiling for the Israel Police came to 6,687 (including tenured policemen, Border Guard policemen and civilian employees). The actual complement filled was 6,483, 5,806 of whom were policemen and members of the Border Guard (Israel Police Annual Report, 1956, p.7).

By the end of 1957, the end of the first decade after the establishment of the State, no permanent Police personnel complement had been approved by the budgetary authorities. The personnel ceilings which had been approved every year by the Ministry of Finance and the Knesset actually constituted a compromise or concession on the part of one of the sides, and did not, in fact, reflect the actual situation and requirements of the Police and the public. Several procedures and conditions developed in Israel which required particular treatment and special attention and preparedness on the part of the Police. These differed, perhaps, from those faced by other police forces in other Western countries, and included: an unending population growth whose source came from all over the world; serious social problems springing from the arrival of the Jewish exiles from all corners of the world, language problems and difficulties caused by different cultural backgrounds; and problems in education, employment and the economy. The movement of rural settlements, which was very large and was accompanied by the establishment of new cities in arid and sparsely populated areas, caused serious security problems since,

despite the ceasefire in existence between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries, the state of war between the two sides had not abated. Every night, thousand of Arabs, mostly Palestinian, former residents of the area, managed to infiltrate Jewish settlements along the border, and at times, reached further inside the country, with intent to kill, rob, steal, smuggle or simply cause damage. This situation required the Police to distribute its strength in order to create additional Border Guard companies and platoons which would guard the length of the borders of the State. "Fedayin" gangs (Arab word for suicide gangs) which operated from the Gaza Strip in order to kill and commit robberies. They caused great losses in life and property, and forced Israel to come out in a preventive war. The "Kadesh" Operation, the Sinai War, began on October 29, 1956, with the incursion of the Israel Army into the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert. On November 5, this operation ended with an Israeli victory, the Egyptian army was destroyed. The Israeli Military Government ruled in the Gaza Strip, and the Israel Police was given the responsibility of organizing the Police in the area. A Sub-district Headquarters and five stations were established in the Gaza Strip under Israeli command. Policemen were recruited from among those who had served in the local police during the Egyptian rule or from among the local youth.

In summarizing the first ten years of the existence of the Israel Police, we cannot disregard the glaring fact that the Police were not accorded an approved personnel complement during all those years. The

Ministry of Police, the Ministry of Finance, and at times, the Knesset, were in the habit of approving annual personnel ceilings, which, in fact, were the result of compromise, battles and lobbying. Since the Police Force was unable to recruit a sufficient number of policemen, the annual effective strength of police units reached 65-70% of the approved ceilings.

During 1954, 1956 and 1957, the effective strength dropped drastically and it was only in 1955 that a small rise (2.1%) was noted in the effective strength. The table on the following page shows the details of the Israel Police strength for the years 1948-1957. If we compare the number of policemen relative to 1,000 residents in Israel between the years 1948-57, we can see that until 1953, that ratio was on the rise reaching 3.6 policemen per 1,000 residents. From 1954 onward, this ratio dropped to 2.9%. (For details, see Table nr. 19).

It was only in 1959, with the appointment of the new Inspector General and when broad organizational reforms were carried out, that a new personnel complement for the Police was approved - 7,523 persons (Israel Police Annual Report, 1963, p. 12).

Table 18: The Israel Police Strength - 1948-1957

| RANK         | 1948  | 1949  | 1950  | 1951  | 1952  |
|--------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Sr. Officers | 40    | 52    | 72    | 110   | 128   |
| Officers     | 136   | 152   | 183   | 233   | 253   |
| NCO's        | 124   | 607   | 750   | 947   | 1,162 |
| Policemen    | 1,582 | 2,223 | 2,551 | 3,501 | 3,832 |
| TOTAL        | 1,882 | 3,034 | 3,556 | 4,791 | 5,375 |
| % of Growth  |       | 61.2  | 17.2  | 39.7  | 12.2  |
| Rank         | 1953  | 1954  | 1955  | 1956  | 1957  |
| Sr. Officers | 137   | 147   | 156   | 168   | 168   |
| Officers     | 281   | 291   | 285   | 297   | 292   |
| NCO's        | 1,391 | 1,412 | 1,415 | 1,406 | 1,389 |
| Policemen    | 4,230 | 4,017 | 4,135 | 3,935 | 3,851 |
| TOTAL        | 5,967 | 5,867 | 5,991 | 5,806 | 5,700 |
| % of Growth  | 11.0  | - 1.7 | 2.1   | - 3.1 | -1.8  |

Source: Israel Police Annual Report, 1957, p.15.

Table 19 - Israel Police, Personnel Strength in Relation to  
Population - 1948-1957

| Year | Population | Police<br>Empl. | Police<br>Personnel | Police Empl.<br>per 1,000<br>Residents | Pers.<br>per 1,000<br>Residents |
|------|------------|-----------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1948 | 879,000    | 2,028           | 1,882               | 2.3                                    | 2.1                             |
| 1949 | 1,179,000  | 3,225           | 3,034               | 2.7                                    | 2.6                             |
| 1950 | 1,370,000  | 3,756           | 3,556               | 2.7                                    | 2.6                             |
| 1951 | 1,577,000  | 5,017           | 4,791               | 3.2                                    | 3.0                             |
| 1952 | 1,620,000  | 5,586           | 5,375               | 3.4                                    | 3.3                             |
| 1953 | 1,670,000  | 6,187           | 5,967               | 3.7                                    | 3.6                             |
| 1954 | 1,718,000  | 6,174           | 5,867               | 3.6                                    | 3.4                             |
| 1955 | 1,789,000  | 6,680           | 5,991               | 3.7                                    | 3.3                             |
| 1956 | 1,872,000  | 6,483           | 5,806               | 3.5                                    | 3.1                             |
| 1957 | 1,976,000  | 6,432           | 5,700               | 3.3                                    | 2.9                             |

Source: Israel Police Annual Report, 1957, p. 14.

Footnote: Police employees are unsworn personnel.

Police Ministry Budget

The proposed national budget, which included proposed budgets for the government ministries, is presented every year to the Knesset plenum by the Minister of Finance, after the Ministers have reviewed the activities of their own Ministry and substantiated its financial needs. After long deliberations and discussions, listening to reservations of Knesset members and introducing various alterations as a result of the above, the Knesset approves the budget. The fiscal year begins, on the first of April.

The Ministry of Police budget consists of an administrative budget for running the Ministry, the Israel Police budget and the Prison Services budget. In Table 20, the approved budget for the Ministry of Police for the years 1948-57 is shown in relation to the budgets of two other government ministries - the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. Table 21 points out the annual growth, in dollars, in the Police budget, and the changes in effective strength compared to population growth, the number of vehicles in the country and the number of criminal cases investigated by the Police during the years 1948-57. An analysis of the data presented in these two tables will enable us to answer the fourth sub-question presented in chapter II (see page 32), which is: "What budget, resources and personnel did the Israel Government allocate to the Police during the first stages of its establishment? What were the Government's priorities?"

The 1936 budget of the Mandate Police Force was 27.5% of the total Mandatory Government budget for that year. During that fiscal year, the British had no additional security expenses. In 1945, the year in which the struggle between Jews and British in Israel escalated and therefore required an increase in Police and Army personnel, the Mandatory Government allocated 37.6% of its budget to maintaining the Army (approx. 100,000 soldiers) and an additional 20.2% to the Palestine Police.

With the establishment of the State of Israel, the Israel Government found itself faced with difficult dilemmas regarding the allocation of the limited budget at the disposal of the young State. Resources had to be expended on the bloody war then being fought between the Israel Defense Army, an army which had just officially been formed to replace the underground organizations which, until then, had operated against the British, the Palestinian Arabs and the five organized and well-equipped armies of the neighboring Arab states. Provision had to be allocated to the hundreds of thousands of new immigrants, remnants of European Jewry, survivors of the Nazi concentration camps, and Jews from Arab countries who had left all their possessions behind and fled from Arab hatred to the renewed Jewish State, the Holy Land - Israel.

This massive immigration required substantial funding in order to assist in absorbing the immigrants, furnish them with housing, enable them to find sources of income, and educate their children.



The necessities of war and the problem of supplying the needs of a growing population which had doubled and tripled within a very short period of time, obligated the Cabinet to declare a state of austerity and to ration food and basic necessities. Despite the necessity and indispensibility of the Police, the Israel Government, due to this difficult situation, was unable to allocate sufficient funds to the Israel Police. Table 20, indicates that the Israel Police budget for the 1948/49 fiscal year was 4.59% of the total national budget. This small budget shrank over the years and by 1957/58, had dropped to 2.5% of the total national budget. On the other hand, the 1948 budget for the Ministry of Education came to half of that of the Police, 2.11%, but by 1957/58, had risen to 5.99%, over twice that of the Police.

There is no doubt that during the first decade since the establishment of the State, the Ministry of Police was allocated only a small slice of the country's budgetary "cake". This treatment clearly denoted the priorities of the State and the manner in which the national budget was to be divided. The first priority was defense requirements, since failure in this area could bring about the destruction of the country. The second priority was immigration and absorption of new immigrants. The fields of education, health, economy, etc. followed. In spite of this, the British Mandatory Government in Eretz-Israel had put the internal peace-keeping needs in Palestine at the top of its priorities and was concerned with the stability of the British Mandate. In order to accomplish this, during the last years of its rule, 57.80% of its total budget was allocated

Table 20: Ministry of Police Budget Compared to that of Other  
Ministries (in millions of Israeli pounds)

| Fiscal<br>Year | Ministry<br>of<br>Police | Ministry<br>of<br>Education | Ministry<br>of<br>Health | Total<br>Nat'l<br>Budget | % of Nat'l<br>Budget<br>Assigned<br>to Police | % of Nat'l<br>Budget<br>Assigned<br>to Health |
|----------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 1948           | 1.25                     | 0.58                        | 0.95                     | 27.52                    | 4.54                                          | 3.45                                          |
| 1949           | 2.60                     | 2.25                        | 3.27                     | 58.60                    | 4.43                                          | 5.58                                          |
| 1950           | 3.53                     | 4.55                        | 4.22                     | 82.03                    | 4.30                                          | 5.14                                          |
| 1951           | 6.07                     | 8.35                        | 6.23                     | 135.53                   | 4.48                                          | 4.60                                          |
| 1952           | 10.95                    | 15.95                       | 10.56                    | 180.44                   | 6.06                                          | 5.85                                          |
| 1953           | 13.90                    | 18.28                       | 12.50                    | 389.04                   | 3.57                                          | 3.21                                          |
| 1954           | 18.85                    | 23.88                       | 16.56                    | 572.53                   | 3.29                                          | 2.89                                          |
| 1955           | 21.07                    | 26.87                       | 20.10                    | 631.10                   | 3.33                                          | 3.18                                          |
| 1956           | 23.74                    | 47.16                       | 25.76                    | 769.30                   | 3.08                                          | 3.34                                          |
| 1957           | 24.92                    | 58.08                       | 29.08                    | 969.00                   | 2.57                                          | 3.00                                          |

Source : Government Statistics for the years 1948-1958.

to these aims (37.60% to Army needs, and 20.20% to the Police budget).

The growth of the Israel Police during its first decade also caused the Police great difficulties. The Israel Government had set the goal of sending every able-bodied Jew (men and women) capable of carrying a gun to Army recruiting centers. With the establishment of the State, the Israel Police took upon itself the traditional duties of every police force. In addition, the Police also dealt with problems arising on the homefront within the country, while most of its resources were earmarked for the war effort. In 1948, the Police was assigned all the policemen who had served in the Mandatory Police, as well as an additional 1,000 recruits assigned by the army recruiting centers. Generally they were 35 years of age or over at the time, or wanted to serve in the Police rather than in the Army.

The effective strength of the Police, at the end of 1948, stood at 1,882 persons. By the end of 1949, with the fighting at an end and the army releasing soldiers, the effective strength of the Police had doubled, and in 1953, reached a peak of 5,967. The effective strength of the Police gradually began diminishing in 1954, and in 1957, the Force had 5,700 persons serving - including policemen, NCO's and officers - 267 people less than in 1953, despite the fact that the population, vehicles and criminal files were increasing annually - see Table 21.

It is therefore possible to answer sub-question 4 (see page 32)

and state: during the initial years of the existence of the State, the Israel Government was forced to give greater priority to building up the Israel Defense Army and to the war effort than to the Police, since the very existence of the State and the people were in the balance. During the war, and the years which followed, the young and inexperienced government was forced to deal with a great stream of new immigrants arriving from all corners of the world.

This very situation makes it clear that the Israel Government was unable, during the first decade of the State, to allocate a similar budget to the Israel Police. The budget received by the Israel Police during those years barely sufficed for salaries and maintenance, and only minimal sums were able to be earmarked for development. Despite the difficult financial situation and the need to improvise and find ways of covering shortages, the Israel Police succeeded in developing, growing and becoming more professional.

The previous chapters VII and VIII touched lightly on these points and more will be documented in section: Preparation and Training (see pages 285-293) and in chapter IX: Organizational Structure and Response to Change - Outcomes (see pages 340-389).

Table 21: Israel Police Budget and Personnel Complement Compared to  
Israel's Population, Vehicles and Criminal Files, 1948-1957

| Year | Population | Compared to 1948 | Personnel Complement | Compared to 1948 | Budget (in \$) | Compared to 1948 |
|------|------------|------------------|----------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1948 | 879,000    | 100              | 1,882                | 100              | 2,800,256      | 100              |
| 1949 | 1,174,000  | 133.6            | 3,034                | 161.2            | 4,963,913      | 177.3            |
| 1950 | 1,370,000  | 155.9            | 3,556                | 188.9            | 8,549,624      | 305.3            |
| 1951 | 1,577,000  | 179.4            | 4,791                | 254.6            | 13,505,879     | 482.3            |
| 1952 | 1,629,000  | 185.3            | 5,375                | 285.6            | 26,575,574     | 943              |
| 1953 | 1,670,000  | 189.9            | 5,967                | 317              | 37,785,266     | 1,349            |
| 1954 | 1,718,000  | 195.4            | 5,867                | 311.7            | 9,568,027      | 341.7            |
| 1955 | 1,769,000  | 203.5            | 5,991                | 318.3            | 11,012,472     | 393.3            |
| 1956 | 1,872,000  | 212.9            | 5,806                | 308.5            | 12,102,272     | 432.2            |
| 1957 | 1,976,000  | 224.8            | 5,700                | 302.9            | 13,863,888     | 495              |

| Year | Vehicles in Israel | Compared to 1948 | Criminal Cases | Compared to 1948 |
|------|--------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1948 | 5,940              | 100              | 8,292          | 100              |
| 1949 | 24,366             | 410.2            | 18,498         | 223              |
| 1950 | 32,706             | 550.6            | 24,854         | 299.7            |
| 1951 | 34,103             | 574.1            | 35,950         | 433.5            |
| 1952 | 40,931             | 689              | 41,070         | 495.3            |
| 1953 | 41,627             | 700.8            | 40,169         | 484.4            |
| 1954 | 44,025             | 741.2            | 43,441         | 523.9            |
| 1955 | 46,808             | 788              | 46,453         | 560.2            |
| 1956 | 50,759             | 854.5            | 48,936         | 590.2            |
| 1957 | 56,110             | 944.6            | 50,800         | 612.6            |

Source: Israel Police: The Development of Hebrew Policing and the Israel Police, Jerusalem, April 1968, p. 108.

Personnel Issues: Quality, Recruitment and RetentionRecruiting Officers

Among the research questions posed in this work (see page 32), two questions apply directly to this section:

Question 5 - What was the former background of the Police Force's commanding staff: Palestine Police, British Army or the Hagana?

Question 6 - Were the officers (from the rank of Inspector and above) who had served in the Palestine Police accepted by the new Israel Police commanders? Were they appointed to senior positions? This section will reply to these two questions.

The first commanders in the Israel Police were recruited from three different sectors: The Jewish officer level of the Palestine Mandatory Police; Hagana commanders who were not inducted into the Israel Defense Army because of their relatively advanced age, because no suitable position could be found for them, or because the Police Inspector-General requested the Hagana command staff to release them and assign them specifically to Police service. The third group was made up of former British Army officers.

At that time, Yehzekel Sahar, the Police Inspector-General, at one time a Major in the British Army and active in the Hagana, suspected the national loyalty of the Mandate Police Jewish Officer ranks, in particular those who were senior among them. Some of the

officers' honesty and moral standards were suspect. By the end of 1948, the Israel Police had recruited 83 Mandate Police officers, most of them from the lower officer ranks - Sub-Inspectors, Inspectors, as well as three officers bearing the rank of Assistant Superintendent. The three most senior officers, bearing the ranks of Deputy Superintendent (D.S.P.) - Nathan Kramer, Kalman Cohen and Shlomo Rosenstein, realizing that they were not wanted in the Israel Police, subsequently resigned from the service (Israel Police Annual Report, 1948, p. 7; Israel Police, National Headquarters Ordinance 4/48, p. 43; Interview with Y. Sahar, January 16, 1983; Interview with Y. Nachmias, November 29, 1983). Mandate officers accepted into the Israel Police were mainly assigned investigative duties which they had fulfilled in the Mandate Police, some of them were appointed to lower command duties in police stations which had recently been re-opened and put back into action. Yehezkel Sahar wanted to place former Hagana commanders in the posts of commanders of districts and sub-districts. He believed that these kinds of commanders, although lacking knowledge of police operations, would be very suitable as senior commanders in the young, democratic Police Force which was aspiring to rid itself of all strictures remaining from the Mandate Police, a foreign police force, and to turn itself into a service-oriented and caring Police Force. In Sahar's opinion, Hagana commanders, who for the most part were members of the veteran settlements, ardent Zionists, imbued with love for the land, honest and capable of commanding, would be successful in creating a new kind of Police Force, modern, with high standards, well versed in nationalism, excelling in morality and even

more important, faithful to the authorized leadership, a select and democratic leadership.

Yehezkel Sahar ran into many difficulties in his attempts to recruit command staff from among former Hagana leaders. This problem is raised in David Ben Gurion's war diary, where, among others, Ben Gurion noted the contents of his daily conversations regarding the future State and the nation at war. On the subject of recruiting commanders to the Police, he relates conversations with Y. Sahar and B. Shitrit, who was later appointed Minister of Police. Ben Gurion states:

May 5, 1958 - Bechor Shitrit and Yehezkel Sahar: "The matter of the Police is not advancing. The necessary commanders are not available. (Following was a list of candidates whom Sahar wanted transferred to the Police). A decision has to be made concerning who will be transferred from the permanent Hagana complement to command Police Sub-districts" (Rivlin and Elchanan Oren, 1984, p. 386).

May 27, 1948 - Yehezkel Sahar complains to David Ben Gurion, who, at the time, until the elections, headed the Provisional Government: "To date, the Police has not received one single Commander. It needs three District Commanders (Tel Aviv, Haifa and the Galil, no one will be assigned to the Negev for now), five Sub-district Commanders (out of seven): Tel Aviv, Netanya, Petach-Tikva, Hadera, Zvulun, Haifa, Galil. He has (commanders) for the first two. He has 850 policemen, most of them old ones (Mandate policemen), only 150 new ones".



Furthermore, names of Hagana commanders and other persons are listed, whom Y. Sahar wanted Ben Gurion to transfer to the Police (Ibid., p. 462). Finally, Y. Sahar succeeded in acquiring a number of officers/commanders from the Hagana and later, from the Israel Defense Army command, whom he appointed District and Sub-district Commanders.

An additional recruitment source of Police officers were demobilized soldiers from the British Army. As former British Army officers themselves, Yehezkel Sahar and his deputy, Yosef Nachmias, succeeded in convincing a number of former British army majors and captains to join the Israel Police, despite the fact that they had no knowledge of police work at all. They agreed to join the Police, some because no position was found for them in the Israel Army, others because their age precluded their being accepted for army service and were therefore directed to the Police by the army recruiting centers, and some of them were convinced by their friends, the Inspector-General and his deputy, to join the Police.

In view of their previous experience, officers coming from the British Army were placed in administrative, service, training and organizational positions. They were integrated principally into the National Headquarters and headed Divisions, or were appointed deputies in the areas of Stores, Buildings, Transport, Administration and Training. When the initial commander and senior officer recruitment was completed, they were appointed to various duties, as follows: Former Hagana commanders were assigned command posts at the district

and sub-district levels, former British Army officers were appointed Division heads for services and administrative duties in the National Headquarters, former Mandate Police officers received lesser command posts in police stations or as investigations officers in stations, district and sub-district headquarters and occupied most of the officer positions in the Investigations Department in the National Headquarters.

By the end of 1950, the Police Command had managed to recruit and appoint most of the senior commanders and staff officers. Table 22 (on the next page) shows senior officer strength of the Police from the level of Assistant Supt. upward, according to the area from which he was recruited into the Police.

In analysing this table, it seems that those who, during the period of the underground, had served as Hagana commanders until 1948, were appointed to the majority of senior positions of the Israel Police (39.5%). The next largest group was that of Mandate officers (21%), and the third group consisted of former British Army officers (18.4%).

In 1949, the number of Hagana officers in the officer ranks of the Israel Police grew (47.2%), former British Army officers became the second largest group (20.7%) and the former Mandate Police officers became the third largest group (17%).

Table 22: Senior Police Officers According to Previous Employment

| Previous<br>Employment                               | 1948 |       | 1949 |       | 1950 |       |
|------------------------------------------------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
|                                                      | Nr.  | %     | Nr.  | %     | Nr.  | %     |
| Mandate Police                                       |      |       |      |       |      |       |
| Officer                                              | 8    | 21    | 9    | 17    | 9    | 11.4  |
| Hagana Commanders                                    | 15   | 39.5  | 25   | 47.2  | 30   | 38    |
| British Army                                         |      |       |      |       |      |       |
| Officers                                             | 7    | 18.4  | 11   | 20.7  | 11   | 13.9  |
| Mandate NCO/<br>policeman raised<br>to Israel Police |      |       |      |       |      |       |
| Officer rank                                         | 5    | 13.1  | 6    | 11.3  | 15   | 19    |
| 1948 Officers'                                       |      |       |      |       |      |       |
| Course                                               | -    | -     | 1    | 1.9   | 3    | 3.8   |
| Unknown Previous<br>Employment                       |      |       |      |       |      |       |
|                                                      | 3    | 7.9   | 1    | 1.9   | 11   | 13.9  |
| Total                                                | 38   | 100.0 | 53   | 100.0 | 79   | 100.0 |

Source: Israel Police Annual Reports, 1948-1950.

In 1950, Mandate Police officers became the minority among Israel Police officers (11.4%), mainly because they had not been promoted, had retired for reasons of age or due to a feeling that they were not wanted in the Israel Police and were being discriminated against despite their abilities and high professional standards. Former Hagana commanders continued to constitute the majority (38%). The number of former British Army officers did not change, however, their percentage in the whole of the officer population in the Police dropped (13.9%). During that year, an additional cadre of senior officers began to form from among the sergeants and policemen who had served during the British Mandate and had cooperated with the Hagana, or had proved themselves unswervingly loyal to the national Jewish institutions during the whole period of their service. Inspector General Sahar tended to promote members of this group more rapidly than their commanders, the Jewish officers from the Mandate period, and they were promoted to the lower officer ranks. In 1950, this group became part of the senior officer ranks and constituted 19% of all senior officers in the Israel Police. With the passing of years, the number of persons who had been officers during the British Mandate period diminished, and even those few who remained in service were not promoted beyond the rank of Chief Supt (Interview - Y. Sahar, January 16, 1983; Interview - Joseph Bar-Ner, December 12, 1977).

In 1964, the 16th year after the establishment of the Israel Police, the senior officer ranks of the Israel Police, from the rank of Superintendent and above, were as shown in Table 23:

Table 23: Composition of Israel Police Senior Officer Ranks, 1964

| Previous<br>Employment                  | Maj.-<br>General<br>and above | Comman-<br>der | Chief<br>Supt. | Supt. | Total<br>Nr. | %     |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------|--------------|-------|
| Mandate Pol.<br>Officer                 | -                             | -              | 2              | 1     | 3            | 2.4   |
| Commander<br>in Hagana                  | 4                             | 7              | 4              | 3     | 18           | 14.4  |
| British Army<br>Officer                 | 3                             | 3              | -              | 1     | 7            | 5.6   |
| Mandate NCO/<br>policeman               | 2                             | 5              | 10             | 38    | 55           | 44.0  |
| Graduates of<br>1st Officers'<br>Course | -                             | 1              | 1              | -     | 2            | 1.6   |
| Recruited after<br>May 15, 1948         | 1                             | 1              | 8              | 30    | 40           | 32.0  |
| Total                                   | 10                            | 17             | 25             | 73    | 125          | 100.0 |

Source: Police Officers List, 1964.

The table shows that the number of officers from the Mandate period became a very small and an insignificant minority (2.4%) within the officer ranks in the Israel Police, and they did not even reach the rank of Commander. On the other hand, those who had been policemen or NCO's in the Mandatory Police were encouraged and advanced, and by 1964, formed 44% of senior officer ranks. Those who were recruited after the establishment of the State made up 32% of the officers, and two of them had even been raised to the ranks of Commander and Major-General. Former British Army officers made up only 5.6%, but most of them held the ranks of Commander or above.

#### Recruiting Policemen

When David Ben Gurion, in his letter of March 26, 1948, placed upon Yehezkel Sahar the responsibility of establishing the Police, he authorized the recruitment of 1,200 persons through the Hagana and Israel Defense Army Headquarters, which, at the time, was in the process of being set up. In addition, that same letter indicated that Sahar was to integrate approximately 700 Jewish policemen still serving in the Mandate Police into the ranks of the Police (Rivlin, 1984, pp. 319-20; p. 211-212 of this work).

Yehezkel Sahar and his organizational team ran into great difficulties in recruiting commanders and policemen in view of the lack of positions which had been approved for the Police. During that

same period, personnel and resource recruitment was mainly in the hands of the Hagana Headquarters, feverishly preparing for the anticipated war with the Arabs. The soon to be established army had been given definite, almost total, priority in the selection of suitable commanders and soldiers.

The entire Jewish settlement at the beginning of 1948 numbered barely 650,000 persons, including women, children and the elderly, and those of recruitment age, 18-55, were much less than required by the nascent nation. Every healthy youth was inducted directly into the army to defend the new nation.

The first nucleus within the Israel Police consisted of Jewish officers and policemen who had served in the Mandate Police and had transferred directly into the Israel Police upon its establishment. They had been informed, at that time, that their service was temporary and depended upon results of investigations regarding their loyalty to the State of Israel and their personal honesty. According to the report presented by the organization team on April 18, 836 officers, NCO's and policemen were then serving in the Mandate Police - 347 in Tel Aviv, 180 in Jerusalem, 85 in Haifa, 54 in police stations in the North and 125 in police stations in the central part of the country. In addition, 20 clerks were working for the Mandate Police, as well as 6 policewomen, mainly serving as guards for female detainees. (National Archives, File nr. 120/G).

According to the 1948 Annual Report of the Israel Police, only 723 members of the Mandate Police were recruited into the Israel Police, among them 87 officers, most of them junior officers. The others chose to join the Army and to participate actively in the unavoidable war with the Arabs, or were demobilized due to age or for health reasons (Israel Police, Annual Report, 1948, p.7). By the end of 1948, 1,397 men had been recruited, either through recruiting centers of the Israel Defense Army, or directly, among them 106 officers, and during the same period, 506 others were removed from the effective strength. The effective strength of the Israel Police, at the end of the year, came to 1,882 persons. With the invasion by the Arab armies, an emergency army call up was declared and the Israel Police was assigned people who were over the age of 35, who were found unfit for army service or for whom no suitable position was found in the army. Thus, those recruited had either previously served in the Mandate Police or in the army, and were still capable of serving in the Israel Police.

Under those conditions, the Israel Police was forced to take into its service candidates of a low educational, health and social level. This concession was accepted for lack of any other choice. In 1949, criteria were set for recruitment to the Police: minimum height - 172 cm; maximum age - 30 years old; in superior medical health; with at least a grammar school education; a good knowledge of Hebrew and no criminal record. During that year, the Police succeeded in recruiting 2,190 persons, however, 600 others were removed from personnel rolls



for various reasons, mostly due to resignation. Despite that, 1949 was a year during which the ranks swelled, and by December 31, 1949, the effective strength of the Israel Police had reached over 3,034 persons. Many of the new recruits were new immigrants who had arrived in Israel after the establishment of the State, recruited into the army during the War of Independence and with the end of the battles, demobilized to civilian life. They found permanent employment with the Police which enabled them to become absorbed in the life of the country. Very few of the recruits were actually born in Israel.

The lack of personnel in the Police during its first years forced the Command level to recruit women into the service. By the end of 1948, the number of women in the Police came to 105, and by the end of 1949, it had grown to 216. Additional sources for personnel were the minority groups in the country: Arabs (Moslems and Christians), Druzes and Circassians. In 1948, 62 members of minority groups were serving in the Police. By the end of 1949, their numbers had grown to 178 (Israel Police, Annual Report, 1949, pp. 3-5).

The central problem facing the Israel Police during its first decade, and actually, during its entire existence to date, was and has remained the problem of personnel, and it can be subdivided into two categories: the quality of recruits into the Police and the great turnover due to resignations. Most of the recruits who, with the outbreak of the war, joined the Police instead of joining the army, had left at the end of the battles and turned to the calmer

and more orderly civilian life. Among them were also new immigrants who had chosen to serve in the Police as a temporary haven until they learned the language, acquired a profession, become acclimatized to the conditions in the country and found an easier and better paying job (Israel Police, Annual Report, 1950, p. 9). The economic and social developments in the country after the war opened up horizons and possibilities for advancement and job opportunities in different sectors: government and public service, in science, economics, commerce, industry and in the army. It turned out that these many opportunities enticed policemen in large numbers, because, in the Police, there was an emphasis on discipline, difficult working conditions, week-end and holiday shifts, low salaries, and even more important, the job of a policeman was not well regarded nor appreciated. For these reasons, the Police were forced, during most years, to accept into its ranks almost everybody who applied and had the minimum qualifications required. During 1948-1957, the Israel Police were unable to recruit policemen in keeping with its complement or approved ceilings. Due to a lack of candidates from among native born Israelis, the Police extended recruitment to the new immigrants.

Policemen in the Israel Police came from 50 different countries, and during the first years of its existence, the Israel Police had to hold special language classes for those who had recently immigrated to Israel and joined its ranks to enable them to learn Hebrew. The Israel Police reflected the "ingathering of the exiles" and its members presented a faithful cross-section of the country's

population. In 1958, only 1,059 native-born Israelis were serving in the ranks of the Israel Police (18.3%), of which, 404 were from minority groups. Immigrants from five countries were prominently represented in the Israel Police:

Poland - 765, 13.3% of all policemen in Israel

Romania - 720, 12.4% of all policemen in Israel

Iraq - 580, 10.0% of all policemen in Israel

Morocco - 502, 8.65% of all policemen in Israel

Egypt - 502, 8.65% of all policemen in Israel

(Israel Police, Annual Report, 1958, p. 24)

In 1952, 50.4% of the policemen in Israel had served in the Police for five years or less. Over the years, the situation improved, and in 1958, only 4.3% of all the policemen had less than five years' service behind them - 18.5% were native born, 41.8% had been in Israel for over 11 years, and 35.6% had 6-10 years' experience in the Police.

Regarding service seniority in the Police: by the end of 1952, most of the policemen (45.6%) had at least two years' service, an additional 7.81% had served between two to four years. By the end of 1958, the situation was different: only 15% had at least two years' service, 54.3% had six to ten years' service, while only 592 police personnel had been serving since the period of the British Mandate (9%). (Israel Police Annual Report, 1952, pp. 14-18; Annual Report 1957, pp. 26-33; and Annual Report 1957, pp. 15-29).

In 1958, the composition of Police personnel, according to age, was as follows:

Table 24: Personnel Composition, According to Age, 1958.

| AGE         | Officers |        | Policemen |        |
|-------------|----------|--------|-----------|--------|
|             | Nr.      | %      | Nr.       | %      |
| Up to 25    | 2        | 0.44   | 954       | 17.86  |
| 26 to 30    | 29       | 6.40   | 1,406     | 26.34  |
| 31 to 40    | 155      | 34.22  | 2,264     | 42.42  |
| 41 and over | 267      | 58.94  | 715       | 13.38  |
| Total       | 453      | 100.00 | 5,340     | 100.00 |

Source: Israel Police Annual Report, 1958, p. 21.

One can therefore deduce that in 1958, officers over 40 years of age made up over half of the officer corps in service, while the majority of the policemen and NCO's were under the age of 40.

It has been said that a second issue, which, during the first decade of the existence of the Police, very much troubled the Police Command was the subject of personnel and the drop-out factor, in particular resignations. During certain years, the rate of drop-outs

from the Force was greater than the number of recruits during that same year. During 1946-1957, 12,294 policemen enlisted in the Police, and during that same period, 6,587 dropped out, 4,517 through resignations - 68.6% of those removed from the effective strength during those same years. In 1954, the percentage of policemen who left in comparison with those recruited was 118.2%; in 1956 - 137.4% and in 1957 - 116%. Half of those resigning stated that they had resigned because of service conditions and salaries. (Israel Police Annual Report 1957, p. 25). This high drop-out rate greatly influenced the service level and professional capabilities of the Israel Police and required a significant investment in recruitment and training.

In 1962, an in-depth study was carried out to examine the reasons for the high drop-out rate and for the failure of the Police to recruit a sufficient number of policemen. It was discovered that two main factors were responsible for the situation: the monetary remuneration to policemen for their work was not compensatory with their efforts, the responsibility, danger and investment put into fulfilling their duty; the second reason was not related to material issues but to the general work situation. It included the following areas:

Discipline: the policemen found it difficult to adapt themselves to the rigorous discipline which was the order of the day in the Police (having been copied from that carried out in the British Mandate Police or in the British Police).

Responsibility: the responsibility placed on the shoulders of the policemen seemed to some to be too weighty. The policeman was given a wide degree of discretion and was required to use his own judgement in many cases. At times, his decision could be decisive in the carrying out of justice and in keeping the public peace.

Working conditions: working in shifts, on holidays and week-ends - 24 hours shifts did not particularly attract the youth of the country, most of whom had joined the Police after a long term of obligatory service in the army.

Danger and stress: the Police profession is fraught with dangers, death or injury while on duty, and the work required prolonged emotional stress in addition to physical effort.

A policeman is always on duty: a policeman could be called back to duty at any hour and for long periods during which he would have to neglect his family; at times he was even required to move his place of residence from one place to another.

Ban on additional employment: since its establishment, the Israel Police had unilaterally forbidden its employees to engage in any additional employment, even though during those years, the Police was unable to obtain suitable salary scales for them.

Public relations: A large part of the Israeli population did not like the Police. The new immigrants had brought with them the customs, behavioral patterns and beliefs of their countries of origin. Most of them, while they had been in the minority in their countries of origin, and had considered the Police to be the representatives of the ruling bodies, had feared and tended to avoid contact the Police. The

same could be said of the Jews who had lived in Israel during the period of the British Mandate and who had been persecuted by the Mandate Police and, therefore, had considered it an enemy and adversary.

These feelings, despite the changes which had occurred with the establishment of the State, were still ingrained in the veteran population. Efforts on the part of the Israel Police to bridge the gap and build bridges of understanding and confidence between the Police and the public ran into difficulties. This situation was not particularly encouraging to the efforts made to recruit personnel into the Police and at times, even influenced and caused resignations from the service. (Israel Police Annual Report 1962, pp.13-16)

The lack of candidates for recruitment pressured the Police Command into allowing the recruitment of policewomen. This had already begun in 1946, with the recruitment of approximately 100 policewomen, and by 1952, the number of policewomen in the Israel Police had reached 415. They were mainly assigned to secretarial work, guarding and escorting female prisoners, as well as other administrative jobs. In time, policewomen were given traditional police tasks, such as traffic and even investigations.

Since 1953, due to reductions in personnel ceilings allocated by the Ministry of Finance, the Police Command nevertheless decided to recruit principally men, since that same year the establishing of the

Border Guard was initiated and therefore, the need for men in the Force increased. By the end of the first decade of the existence of the Police, the number of policewomen in service had dropped to 238. For a breakdown of the effective strength of policewomen in the Israel Police during the years 1948-1957, see the Table 25.

The recruitment of minorities in the Israel Police began immediately with the establishment of the State. Policemen, members of the minority groups, were mainly employed in police stations established in regions where the population consisted of minority groups, such as: Nazareth, 'Akko, the Galilee, the Bedouin regions in the Negev, etc. Many Druzes and Circassians joined the Border Patrol units. By the end of 1957, the number of members from minority groups stood at 402, 5 of them officers. For a complete breakdown - see Table 25 above.

#### The Dismissal of Mandate Policemen

On 9 June 1948, the Provisional Government published the State of Israel Government Employees Ordinance meant to organize the continuation of service in the Israel Government on the part of those who had been employed by the Palestine Government (Israel Government, Official Publication nr. 4, Addendum A).

Regarding Police personnel, Paragraph 2(A) states as follows on page 275;



TABLE 25: Breakdown of Policewomen and Minority Policemen, 1948-1957Policewomen

| Year        | 1948 | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Officers    | 2    | 3    | 1    | -    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 3    | 4    | 3    |
| NCO's       | 3    | 13   | 30   | 45   | 58   | 75   | 74   | 69   | 71   | 63   |
| Other Ranks | 100  | 200  | 254  | 375  | 356  | 296  | 252  | 210  | 186  | 172  |
| TOTAL       | 105  | 216  | 285  | 420  | 415  | 373  | 329  | 282  | 261  | 238  |

Minority Policemen

|             |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Officers    | 1     | 1     | 2     | 3     | 4     | 4     | 5     | 5     | 6     | 5     |
| NCO's       | 10    | 28    | 13    | 28    | 47    | 68    | 67    | 67    | 65    | 58    |
| Other Ranks | 51    | 149   | 165   | 247   | 279   | 345   | 309   | 301   | 351   | 339   |
| Total       | 62    | 178   | 180   | 278   | 330   | 417   | 381   | 373   | 402   | 402   |
| I.P Total   | 1,882 | 3,034 | 3,556 | 4,791 | 5,375 | 5,967 | 5,867 | 5,991 | 5,806 | 5,700 |

Source: Israel Police Annual Report, 1957, p. 14; p. 16.

"All persons who on May 14, 1948 were serving in the Israel Police of the State of Israel and whose regular post of duty on that day was within the boundaries of the country, will temporarily serve, according to the instructions of the Provisional Government or the Minister of Police, whether he was accepted before the issuance of this or any other announcement or did not swear loyalty to the country within one month of the publication of this ordinance - this person will be called (considered) a policeman".

According to Paragraph 2(B) of the same Ordinance, the Government or the Minister of Police has the right to terminate a policeman's employment within six months of his recruitment without giving any reasons. According to Paragraph 2(D), the Provisional Government published, on July 14, 1948 in Official Gazette Nr. 9, an appointment order for an investigative committee based on Regulation 1(A) of the Israel Government Regulations (Investigative Committees), 1948, to inspect the personal capabilities of each government employee or policeman who had served during the Mandate Period (Palestine) and thereby determine if they are suitable to serve in the Israel Police.

The temporary employment period ended on September 12, 1948, however, since the investigative committees has not completed their enquiries, the period was extended to April 9, 1949. The investigative committees appointed operated in three main cities: in

Haifa - for the Northern region, in Tel Aviv - for the Central region and in Jerusalem - for the South. The committees published announcements in the press requesting citizens with any information or complaints regarding unworthy behavior or corruption on the part of Jewish clerks or policemen who had served during the British Mandate, to come forward to give evidence.

The data gathered by the investigative committees was in the form of information, mostly general information, at times anonymous, and not by acquiring statements from witnesses who personally appeared before the committees. Those investigated were, for the most part, not called to appear before the committees, nor were they ever confronted with the person providing the information or making a statement in order that they be able to verify the information, or agree with or/and dispute it (Hagana Archives, Ephraim Dekel File). After having heard witnesses and having gathered intelligence data, the committees classified the clerks or policemen examined by them into three categories:

Category A - those against whom no information or statements were made, or where no suspicion fell on their honesty and loyalty to the country.

Category B - those regarding whom data presented to the committee indicated that they had taken bribes, but had done so only seldom and were not in the habit of receiving large sums. According to the committee, they had strayed from the straight and narrow because of

the corrupt atmosphere which had been prevalent among Mandate Government employees. The committees were satisfied that employees classified as belonging to this category, with proper supervision, would succeed in becoming loyal and useful public employees in the positive atmosphere which had been created with the establishment of the State of Israel.

Category C - this group included all of those concerning whom accusatory statements or great amounts of reliable information had been placed against them regarding corrupt activities on their part, or that they were not loyal to the Jewish people. They were disqualified and it was recommended that they be discharged (National Archives, Box 5477/G, File nr. 2344).

The staff committees completed their activities in April 1949. The Government staff committees in the regions of Tel Aviv and the South examined 2,123 government employees and policemen - 1,556 were classed in category A (73.3%), 349 in category B (16.44%) and 208 in category C (9.48%), 126 of them policemen. That meant that policemen recommended for dismissal made up 60.6% of all those recommended for discharge (Hagana Archives, Ephraim Dekel File). The staff committee for the region of Haifa and the North completed its activities on June 11, 1949, having examined 1,411 employees and former Mandate Policemen, and disqualified only 25 from continued employment (1.77%); 97 others were placed in category B (6.87%), and it was recommended that the employment of the rest be continued (Davar, June 12, 1949). The activities of the investigative committees were avidly followed in

the press, and announcements were reported, articles written, and in some newspapers, editorials were even published concerning the hard line taken by government institutions concerning employees and policemen, who, at one time, had been encouraged by the Jewish community to join the Mandatory establishment rather than leave it solely in the hands of the British and the Arabs, and now, found their honesty and their loyalty suspect. Many public representatives, mayors and former Hagana commanders wrote letters to the editorial board of newspapers, to the Prime Minister, to the Minister of Police, the Inspector General and members of those committees, and expressed their bitterness at the dismissal of Police personnel, among them officers, who, during their service in the Mandate Police, had greatly benefitted Jewish institutions and the Settlement as a whole.

On December 17, 1948, Ephraim Dekel, the commander of "SHAI", the intelligence arm of the Hagana in the Tel Aviv and Southern regions, wrote a letter to David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, wherein he referred to the dismissal of 18 Police officers and the demotion of other officers. The writer criticized the manner in which the accusatory material had been collected by the committees, emphasizing the fact that among those dismissed from the Police were some who had cooperated with the Hagana intelligence arm, "SHAI", as well as with the national institutions of the Jewish community, at great risk of being discovered and brought to trial, or at best, loss of their source of income, and they had certainly not done this in hopes of gaining any rewards. Continuing, Ephraim Dekel pointed out that the

data provided by the Jewish policemen had, for the most part, been reliable, exact, and significant to Hagana operations during those days (Hagana Archives, Ephraim Dekel File).

In some of the newspapers, the articles claimed that the dismissal of policemen was a screen for the Police Command, which, for the most part, was made up of members of the ruling political party, MAPAI, in order for it to rid its ranks of those policemen and officers known to be close to or belonging to the right wing parties which, during the time of the Mandate, had aided the extremist underground groups - LEHI and ETZEL. The Inspector General of the Police strongly denied these allegations, stating that the intention of the Police Command had been to purify its ranks and rid the Police of all those who had been known to be disloyal, who had taken bribes, who were not educated enough, not efficient and whose level of dedication was low.

One of the senior officers who was dismissed, Chief Inspector Shlomo Sofer, who, during the Mandate Period had been one of the best C.I.D. investigators in the National Headquarters of the Mandate Police, and who, with the departure of the British, had been appointed by the Hagana Command in Jerusalem to be Police Commander of the city, appealed to the Supreme Court on November 19, 1948, and demanded that the Minister of Police, the Inspector General and the Staff Committees appear before the Court and present their reasons for his dismissal. On November 11, 1948, 13 other dismissed Police officers also

presented similar appeals. (Supreme Court, Appeal 22/48; Appeal 23/48). The Supreme Court, consisting of three judges, Judge M. Zmora, Supreme Court Chief Justice and Judges Y. Olshan and G. Finkelbaum, held ten sessions regarding this problem. The defense lawyers for the dismissed officers presented four main complaints:

1. The regulations according to which the staff committees had been established were not legally valid;
2. The committees had overreached their authority;
3. The committees had limited the scope of their investigations and had erred in the organization of their discussions;
4. The Minister of Police had not fully considered the situation.

On the one hand, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of the need to establish a Police Command which would be ideal from the point of view of ability and honesty, and on the other hand, with the question of the great danger which unjustified dismissals could cause to the morale and to Police officers. Many had dedicated their lives to serving the Jewish Settlement during the Mandate, and were now finding themselves in the State of Israel, cut off from their source of income for themselves and their families, with their honesty and loyalty to the State suspect. The Court found that the staff committees had been legally established and therefore the Court did not delve deeply into the question of whether the Minister of Police had indeed considered the dismissal of the officers and if that consideration had taken into account the reasons upon which he had

based his opinion. The Court found that the Minister of Police had taken the recommendations of the staff committees at face value and had not examined the investigative material which had been prepared for each dismissed officer, before deciding to send him the letter of dismissal. The Court therefore concluded that the officers' dismissal had not been the result of a decision, but the result of the committees' deliberations. The committees' classification of officers as Category C should not have been reason enough for the Minister of Police to have considered dismissal. The investigative steps taken by the committees and the depth to which they were taken were not accepted by the Court. On April 7, 1949, the Court put aside the dismissal of 14 officers, and ordered that they be returned to service (National Archives, Box 5477/G, File 2344)

The Supreme Court decisions raised much interest among the rest of those dismissed who had not appealed. On April 6, 1949, one day before the Court decision regarding the officers' appeals was handed down, all those who had been dismissed from the Police gathered in the Police building on Yehuda Halevy Street in Tel Aviv to protest the injustice and wrongs which, in their opinion, had been done to them by the Police Command which had not taken into account their unpleasant service in the Mandate Police, while, in fact, they had faithfully served the public. The demonstrators demanded that an independent public committee be appointed to publicly examine their honesty and suitability for service, and that the material held by the staff committees against them be made public, material which had been the



basis for their being deemed unsuitable for continued service in the Police. The persons dismissed were of the opinion that the Police had gravely erred in dismissing so many experienced policemen, particularly during a period when the young and inexperienced Police Force was being established and sorely lacking in experienced personnel. At the end of the demonstration, a public statement on the subject was issued to all participants (National Archives, Box 5477/G, File nr. 2344).

Those dismissed, 111 of them, continued to appear at that Police station every day and carried out a sit-down strike. On April 10, 1949, the Inspector General ordered that the demonstrators be removed from the station building and dispersed. When attempts at dispersal were opposed, the dispersal force was obliged to use tear gas against their professional colleagues. Following orders from the commanding officers, 25 activists were arrested in their homes during the night. The next day, the judge before whom they were brought released them upon their own recognizance until their trial, since the discharged officers, angry that they had been arrested, refused to pay the bail set and preferred to go to the detention house instead. The fact that they had been forced to disperse a demonstration held by colleagues with whom they had worked and to detain them caused much concern within the young Police which had just recently been established. Two officers, who had taken part in dispersing the demonstrators and felt that they were unable to act against their friends, deserted their posts, aware of the seriousness of their act and of the fact

that they were putting their jobs at risk. The two officers were tried before a disciplinary court, and one of them was demoted to the rank of sergeant.

On April 11, 1949, the subject of the 'purging' of the Government system, the policemen's strike and subsequent arrests was brought before the Knesset for discussion. The Cabinet announced the establishment of a Higher Appeal Committee which was given the authority accorded to an investigative committee, to consider the appeals of those who had been dismissed and to carefully examine the bases for their dismissals. (Minutes, 23rd Knesset Session, April 11, 1949, pps. 841-842). This Committee, headed by Judge H. Schwartzman, was established in mid-June 1949.

The Committee was empowered to judge appeals placed by clerks and policemen who had been discharged as a result of staff committee recommendations and to decide whether the appellants should be returned to service. The Committee held public discussions, informed the appellant of the content of the accusations which had led to his dismissal, and heard his version of the facts and his defense. The Committee even permitted the appellants to bring witnesses before it. With these measures, the High Appeals Committee became a judicial institution. (Hagana Archives, Ephraim Dekel File). Until the establishment of the High Appeals Committee, 179 policemen who had formerly served in the Mandate Police had been dismissed from service, according to the following breakdown:

46 - discharged by the Police before the staff committee  
decisions

119 - discharged as per decisions by the committees

14 - discharged during 1948 as not suitable for service

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179 - total dismissals

When the High Appeals Committee's activities ended in October  
1949, the situation was as follows:

37 - recommendations for dismissal upheld

30 - appeals overruled for technical reasons

2 - appeals rejected because of late application

7 - appeals still under consideration (Oct. 1949)

29 - did not appeal their dismissal

74 - returned to active service

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179 - total

(Israel Police, Annual Report 1949, p.7; National Archives, Box  
3323/G, File nr. 16/87).

The incident involving the dismissed policemen and officers was  
the affair which most disturbed the Israel Police upon its inception,  
greatly damaging its image and the standing of those who had served  
under the British Mandate and, in addition, created a rift between  
them and the new recruits. Even those who were returned to the ranks  
by the Superior Court or the High Appeals Committee did not regain

their spirit. Many of them remained bitter throughout the rest of their period of service and felt, perhaps with reason, that they were systematically discriminated against in promotion decisions. Some of the dismissed policemen had, during the Mandate period, indeed been in the habit of accepting bribes, following the example set by the British and Arab policemen. However, a great number of them had actually been victims of rumors and unreliable and malicious information placed against them, and were subsequently dishonorably discharged. This group, to this day, if still alive, still feels that they had been mistreated. They believe they were punished instead of thanked for their service in the Mandate Police, a service which had caused such a stir and which had been so full of danger during the British Mandate in the Land of Palestine.

#### Preparation and Training

Training and preparing the personnel of the budding Israel Police for service, most of whom had just joined its ranks without any previous police experience, was a difficult challenge and required rapid and orderly organization of the training and drill bases.

Preparing hundreds of new immigrants who had been recruited into the Police before being properly integrated into the country and who had not yet managed to master the Hebrew language was indeed a unique, and certainly not an easy task. Even the training given to policemen who had served during the British Mandate had been limited mostly to

Army order and exercises, keeping shoes well shined and clothes in good condition. Very few policemen had any practical knowledge of crime investigations and the law. This situation also forced the Israel Police Command to send former Mandate policemen to attend various courses.

The pressing need to recruit policemen to fill the positions needed in order to once again operate police stations which had been left mostly unattended during the war, as well as the establishment of new stations in areas which had been liberated during the first year of the existence of the State, forced the Police Command to hold short, intensive preparatory courses. The first of such courses were held in a temporary training base set up in a former British Army camp in Beit Lid near the city of Netanya. In 1948, this base trained 628 recruits in light arms, parade exercises, and the basics of criminal law, police duties and responsibilities. During that same year, two sessions of courses for NCO's were held, wherein 76 candidates completed the course and were promoted to the rank of Staff Sergeant. Courses in wireless communications and traffic were also held that year. (Israel Police Annual Report, 1948, p. 12).

A sign that the Israel Police Command attached great importance to the subject of training can be seen in the fact that on April 29, 1949, an additional department was established in the National Headquarters of the Police - the Training Department - alongside the Administrative and Investigations Departments (Israel Police Annual

Report, 1949, p. 9). In June 1949, the temporary training base in Beit Lid was closed and an Israel Police National Training Base was established in an abandoned Taggart Police fort near the Arab town of Shfar'am, which, during the British Mandate period, had housed one of the key units of the Mandate - the Police Mobile Force (P.M.F.). Maxim Cohen, a former Captain in the British Army who had fought in the War of Independence at the head of an Infantry company, was appointed Base Commander. Cohen had shown initiative and unusual organizational ability and within a short period of time, with a limited budget and a small staff of instructors, managed to turn deserted and neglected buildings into a clean, orderly, improved and impeccably organized training base. Before the base was opened, an advanced training course was held for instructors who, for the most part, had been policemen and NCO's in either the Mandate Police or the Jewish Settlement Police, or had been discharged from the Israel Defense Army.

The first class of trainees consisted of 129 new recruits and 42 policemen who had previously served for a time in police stations. Of the trainees 46.2% were new immigrants. The course lasted four months (Maxim Cohen, Interview, August 31, 1977; Israel Police Annual Report, 1949, p. 11). David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, Bechor Shitrit, the Minister of Police, the Army Chief of Staff and the Commissioner of the Israel Police all attended the passing out ceremony of this first class. A sergeants' course lasting four months was also held in 1949, in which 29 NCO's and veteran policemen participated. On

November 1, 1949, a second training base was opened in the Police building in Beit Dagon. This base held courses on subjects such as wireless communications, fingerprints, dog training, as well as the first two sessions of a course for investigators, each course lasting six weeks, wherein 60 NCO's and policemen participated (Israel Police Annual Report, 1949, p. 12). In 1950, due to the great training needs and the lack of sufficient training sites in the Shfar'am Training Base, District training bases were established in the Tel Aviv and Haifa Districts, where policemen were sent for short training courses lasting four to six weeks (Israel Police Annual Report, 1950, p. 21).

#### Officers' Courses

The first officers' course was held in March 1948, while the British were still in the country, and concluded immediately upon the establishment of the State, in May 1948. In November 1948, the first course for administrative officers was held, wherein 16 cadets holding the ranks of sub-inspector, inspector and Assistant district commissioner from the National Headquarters, the district and the sub-district headquarters participated.

The development and broadening of the Police Force from the point of view of personnel and the addition of police stations and new sub-district headquarters necessitated an increase in officer posts and the advancement of NCO's and policemen to officer ranks. In 1950, the National Headquarters began planning an officers' course which would

last nine months, to which would be sent officers who had been promoted without courses, as well as NCO's and policemen with high school educations who had been recommended by their commanders, and even external candidates to the Police who had the appropriate abilities and education (Ibid., p. 21).

The course began on October 23, 1951, and the study plan included studies in criminal law, laws of evidence, criminal justice, the organization of the Police and its responsibilities, work practices, the governmental organization of the country, how to deal with subordinates, training, geography of Israel and the Middle East, firearms and physical training. During the course, cadets were sent to various Police stations for practical work experience under the supervision of station commanders. The first course had an enrollment of 40 students, 40% of them aged 26-31; 50% aged 32-40. 85% of them had a high school or academic education. 57.5% had two to five years' service in the Police. 42.5% were relatively new to the service - two years or less. 55% had been born in Israel or had been in Israel for over 10 years. 77.5% were European born (Israel Police Annual Report, 1951, p. 25).

On December 1, 1952, the second officers' course was begun, wherein 52 cadets participated, 19 of them bearing the rank of Inspector - 67.8% were 32-40 years old; 83% had a high school education or higher (Israel Police Annual Report, 1952, p. 27). Beginning in 1950, recruit, investigator and NCO courses became a



permanent thing. Every year, several sessions of each kind of course took place. In addition, short advanced courses were scheduled in various professions, such as: wireless communications, horseback riding, dog handlers, etc.

From 1949, senior officers, from the rank of Assistant District Commissioner and above were given examinations. The subjects covered: Criminal law, criminal justice, evidence laws, knowledge of the Permanent Ordinances of the Israel Police, financial regulations and auditing (National Headquarters Ordinance nr. 20, May 29, 1949, p. 8). As of December 4, 1950, in order to facilitate studies for officers facing senior officer examinations, special two-week advanced studies courses were held on these subjects (National Archives, Box 3311/G, File 1/155).

As of that same year, 1950, examinations began to be given to investigators. It was decided that whoever was employed as an investigator, from the rank of constable to inspector, inclusive, and had passed examinations on the subjects of: Criminal law, criminal justice, evidence laws, crime investigations and National Headquarters Ordinances, would be eligible for a salary increment which would be called an 'investigator's bonus'. That same year, service excellence bonuses were paid to all policemen who had successfully passed exams with that aim in mind.

At the end of 1955, the educational system for recruits was

changed and a system introduced involving training by stages, where during the first stage, which lasted ten weeks, the trainees would be given the theoretical basics in a training base. The second stage, lasting seven weeks, was dedicated to giving the trainees practical training in police station work, under the supervision of instructors and command staff of the stations. During the third stage, the trainees would return to the training base for the final portion of the course. That year, for the first time, an advanced course for investigators was held for those who would be working in the field of investigating juvenile offences according to the new law which had been enacted regarding the subject of juvenile crimes. From 1955, two-week advanced study course sessions for NCO's and policemen began to be held in the District training bases, where the participants were instructed in innovations occurring in police work in the fields of patrol, traffic and investigations.

Since, during the first decade of the existence of the State, the Hebrew language had not yet become natural to a large portion of members of the Police, a campaign was initiated in 1955 to teach Hebrew to the Israeli policemen. About 3,000 policemen learned the language within the framework of 110 classes given all over the country. All of those policemen who had been recruited without their having completed eight years of schooling were organized into suitable classes at the National Training Base. These courses lasted five months, during which time the policemen learned Hebrew, the Bible, the history of Israel, geography, mathematics and citizenship. That year,

an additional 111 policemen studied for their baccalaureate examinations (Israel Police Annual Report, 1955, p. 35).

In 1956, the National Headquarters began preparations for establishing a Senior Officer's Academy which would train staff officers and operative unit commanders. In 1957, preparations were completed for the first session of this senior course to be held. The subjects to be taught included: the conception of the Police, Police responsibilities, the principles of organization and administration, staff work, personnel administration, an introduction to criminology, an introduction to penology, the principles of criminal justice, the Police in a democratic society. Lecturers came from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the Tel Aviv University, the Civil Service, the Army, from among Police Commanders and senior headquarters officers. Fourteen Division heads, deputy district commissioners and sub-district commanders were sent to participate in the first session. The first and second courses were held during 1958 (Israel Police Annual Report, 1958, p. 38).

During the ten years of the existence of the Israel Police, 236 officers, 375 NCO's, 810 investigators, and over 3,000 recruits were trained in the various training bases, as well as hundreds of members of the various police professions: traffic, dog handlers, wireless operators, sappers and instructors. In addition, thousands of policemen were taught Hebrew, hundreds of others raised their levels of education. Police training was based on three training levels:

Basic training - training new recruits before placing them in police stations;

Specialized training - providing specialized training to policemen before placing them in positions which required particular professional knowledge.

Continuous training - on-the-job training aimed at improving knowledge and ability needed for better carrying out responsibilities in the operative units.

#### Chapter IX: The Development of the Police Functions & Role

##### Assignments

Police responsibilities are described as follows in paragraph 4 of the Mandatory Police Ordinance, 1926, which remained in force with the establishment of the State, and which were not altered during the first decade of the Israel Police:

- preventing crimes
- solving crimes
- arresting offenders and bringing them to trial
- guarding prisoners
- keeping the public peace and securing human lives and property.

(Police Ordinance, 1967, p. 4)

The Israel Police, with its establishment, adopted the organizational structure of the Mandatory Police, which had been built

upon the principle of a National Headquarters, District headquarters, Sub-district headquarters, operational field units in the form of police stations and posts. The police stations represented the spearhead of the Israel Police, and through them the Police carried out assignments as detailed in the Police Ordinance. The internal structure of Police units at all levels changed with the years as a result of the nature of the additional duties which were assigned to the Police by legislation or by the Cabinet. In any case, Police responsibilities were carried out, during the first decade of its existence, by the various units, by the following structure:

The National Headquarters: Headquarters was in Tel Aviv until 1967 at which time it was transferred to Jerusalem, to the new building which had been erected for that very purpose. The Inspector General administered the Israel Police from these headquarters, assisted in the areas of planning, supervision, training, provision of services and inspection by staff officers, each operating within his particular professional field. The administration was divided into three Departments: Organization, Investigations and Administration.

District headquarters: District commanders, the highest ranking field officers, were also assisted in administering their districts by staff officers who fulfilled functions parallel to those of their colleagues in the National Headquarters, albeit bearing lower ranks.

Sub-district headquarters: These were the lowest headquarter units operating within the organizational structure of the Israel Police during the first decade. The Sub-district commander was responsible for four-six stations. He was also assisted in

administering his sub-district by professional staff officers who acted according to his instructions, supervision and control in matters relating to policing, investigations and administration within the Police stations' responsibility in the Sub-district. The station commanders and office heads reported to the Sub-district commander and/or his staff officers daily either by telephone or telegram, and through periodic written reports transmitted to the Sub-district headquarters. Sub-district commanders and their headquarters staff officers were often in the habit of visiting police stations within their Sub-districts in order to keep in close touch with the manner in which the station was being run and the way police assignments and responsibilities were being carried out in their area.

The Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion, visited the Israel National Police Headquarters on November 9, 1951. He spoke before a special officer's gathering organized in honor of his visit, and provided his view of the responsibilities of the Israel Police:

"The security of the State lies in the hands of two forces - the Army and the Police. Although the areas of operations of those two forces are separate, they both share the care of the country's standing. The efficiency of the Army raises the State's value in the eyes of the world. Police efficiency constitutes the most important factor in the State's existence and determines the people's relationship to the country. During emergencies, the Police joins forces with the Army .... the trust

of the residents regarding the country's internal security lies in the hands of the Police ... the Police is a deterrent force (Police Archives, 1/MP).

Police station: This is a subordinate unit in the Sub-district, consisting of Police personnel of various ranks, under the command of an inspector who is called the Station Commander. Near the end of the 1950's, there were only a few stations with commanders who bore the rank of Captain. The station was responsible for carrying out Police assignments in a specific geographical region. For the purpose of efficient implementation of its responsibilities, the station was divided into two separate sections: the policing section and the investigations section.

#### Policing Section Assignments

The responsibilities of the policing section included: preventing crimes; preventing traffic accidents and regulating traffic in the region directed by the police station; summoning witnesses and accused to court; implementing arrest warrants for non-payment of fines, debts or alimony/child support; arresting offenders and/or persons wanted for questioning; looking after prisoners in the detention cells in the station; carrying out administrative, stores, maintenance and transport duties in the station; handling lost/found claims;

(Permanent Ordinances - Police Station Organization, 1953, p. 4)

The policemen in the policing section made up the main bulk of

the station personnel. They patrolled the city streets and agricultural areas under the jurisdiction of the station. They wore uniforms in order to make their presence felt, to provide a feeling of security among the citizen population, to prevent crimes and to arrest criminals on sight. Policemen serving in the policing section also constituted the main force dealing with public disturbances, demonstrations and riots.

Implementing court summons and orders regarding arrests are duties which the Israel Police inherited from the Mandate Police, responsibilities which are carried out by the Israel Police to this day. All attempts by the Israel Police to transfer the implementation of court summons and orders for arrest for non-payment of fines or debts to the Ministry of Justice or to another institution, failed.

The unrealistic personnel ceilings which were allocated to the Israel Police, on the one hand, and the difficulties in recruiting enough people to cover these ceilings, on the other, caused a serious lack of policemen in the policing sections. This situation directly affected the ability of the police stations to assign a sufficient number of police to patrol the streets in the cities and the rural settlements during all hours of the day.



Investigations Section Assignments

The responsibilities of the investigations section in the police stations are: receiving complaints from plaintiffs and crime victims; going to the scene of the crime, securing the scene and gathering physical evidence from the site; investigating criminal incidents by questioning witnesses, suspects, accused, and preparing criminal files for the prosecution to present in court; prosecuting criminal files in court; collating intelligence data to assist in conducting investigations; registering criminal files, registering and storing exhibits; reporting on incidents and the manner in which they have been handled to the command staff of the sub-district and maintaining station statistics.

In 1953, the National Police Headquarters published Permanent Ordinances for the organizational structure of Police stations and their administration. Those orders described the duties of the station commander, his responsibilities, the organizational structure of the policing section in the station; the responsibility, organizational structure and activities of the investigations section in the station; instructions regarding discipline and orders; permanent orders for police posts; addenda containing instructions for handling station correspondence, handling station criminal statistics, channels for reporting, etc. These Permanent Ordinances greatly simplified the carrying out of duties by the station commanders and those responsible for the policing and investigations sections, and

were used as an important accessory tool for training policemen in the stations (Israel Police, Permanent Ordinances for Organizing Police Stations and Their Administration, Tel Aviv, 1953).

### Situations

The political, security, social and economic situations of any nation directly influence its type of government. The patterns of government in a country usually determine the organizational structures of the law enforcement bodies in that country, their goals and their ways of implementing those goals.

The Government of Israel, which was preoccupied with conducting a difficult war against Palestinians Arabs and the neighboring Arab countries since the country's proclamation of independence on May 14, 1948, could not allow itself to initiate organizational changes in the Police Force which had just been established to deal with internal problems alongside the Israel Defense Army which was fighting on the various fronts. From this, it follows that it suited the Israeli Government, as well as the founders of the Police, the Inspector General and his assistants, to rely on the organizational structure of the Mandate Police, and to alter it here and there according to situations, need and ability to carry out such changes.

The responsibilities and objectives of the Israel Police, in addition to those delineated by the Police Ordinance of 1926, were,

for the most part, dictated by the conditions existing in the State at that time, the needs of the people and the character of the populations. This section will describe different situations which faced the Israel Police during the first decade of its existence, such as dealing with general problems concerning crime, the problem of traffic accidents, etc., as well as other situations, sometimes unusual and complicated, with which the young and untried Police Force had to contend.

In addition to a significant rise in crime and traffic accidents, the Police were occupied with a number of special events, unusual in their seriousness, scope or the public outcry which these incidents aroused. These incidents involved crime, public order and even State affairs and required the use of hundreds of policemen to keep order and ensure the safety of the participants, such as: parade marches, ministers and other personages, etc. The Police succeeded in achieving its goals in some cases, however, there were incidents with which the Police were not yet prepared to deal. As a result, the Police were criticized by the Cabinet and the public.

Following are a number of incidents and events with which the Israel Police had to deal during the first decade of its existence. These incidents are described in order to present the problems which faced the Israel Police from its inception and show the extent to which the Police succeeded or failed in handling them.

Crime Patterns

The characteristics of the State of Israel during the first decade of its being pointed to the existence of factors which undoubtedly influenced the development and increase in crime in the young country: violent and bloody conflict with local Arabs and neighboring Arab countries which had ended in a tense cease-fire, subsequently broken by a short-lived war in 1956; the mass immigration from all the corners of the Diaspora, in particular from Europe and the Arab countries. The immigration wave brought with it social and economical development but, in the beginning, caused great unemployment, a lack in housing and schools. People from 100 or more different countries, speaking a mixture of languages, slowly, through great efforts, became one people speaking and understanding Hebrew. Along with the immigrants came those who had been involved in criminal activity in their country of origin, those who continued their criminal activities in Israel. As a result of unemployment, other immigrants turned to crime. Some of those who turned to crime were children of immigrants from Arab countries. These young people experienced the freedom of a democratic country, where the controls of family no longer worked and where the educational system failed to integrate them into their new world. See Table 26 for the development of crime in Israel during the years 1948-57.

Table 26 shows a continuous rise in the number of criminal cases between the years 1948-57, with a slight drop during 1953. In 1957,

there were 39,160 more criminal cases than in 1948, a rise of 336%. Murder incidents increased during the years 1950-54, a period of increased Arab infiltration into Israel, particularly Palestinians, former residents of regions which had passed into Israeli hands as a result of the war. These infiltrators murdered, robbed, stole cattle and sheep, as well as agricultural produce and equipment. There is no doubt that infiltrators greatly contributed to the rise in crime. About one half of the murders or robberies, and approximately 70-80% of all sheep and cattle thefts were committed by infiltrators.

The percentage of cases solved, which could have been expected to drop in view of the great rise in the number of criminal incidents, rose over the years and in 1957, stood at 55.6% - an acceptable percentage in comparison with the number of cases solved in Israel today - only 25%. The percentage of young offenders, which, at the beginning of the establishment of the state had stood at about 20%, dropped and by the end of the decade, stood at 15%.

Table 27 above shows the ratio of criminal cases in relation to the population during the years 1948-57. It seems that the ratio of criminal cases to 10,000 residents stood at 132.4 in 1948, and almost doubled itself by 1957 - 257.1. During those years, the population rose by 124%.

Table 26: Criminal Cases, 1949-57

| Offense           | 1949   | 1950   | 1951   | 1952   | 1953   | 1954   | 1955   | 1956   | 1957   |
|-------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Murder            | 47     | 50     | 61     | 61     | 66     | 55     | 30     | 56     | 30     |
| Robbery           | 196    | 208    | 174    | 161    | 137    | 94     | 69     | 51     | 74     |
| B & E             |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Home              | NA     | 2,055  | 2,482  | 3,007  | 2,687  | 2,967  | 2,945  | 3,179  | 2,664  |
| Business          | NA     | 1,137  | 1,220  | 1,799  | 1,744  | 1,462  | 1,475  | 1,911  | 1,867  |
| Animal            |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| Theft             | 624    | 662    | 678    | 812    | 777    | 581    | 556    | 107    | 122    |
| Rape              | NA     | 46     | 48     | 70     | 51     | 70     | 74     | 73     | 99     |
| All Off.          | 19,099 | 25,540 | 36,652 | 41,635 | 41,231 | 49,247 | 46,453 | 48,936 | 50,800 |
| % solved          | 45.8   | 49.2   | 55.7   | 49.3%  | 49.9   | 50.5   | 52.3   | 54.3   | 55.6   |
| % Young offenders | 18.4   | 14.1   | 9.2    | 12.1   | 12.6   | 14.2   | 16.0   | 15.5   | 15.5   |

Source: Israel Police Annual Reports, 1948-1957.

Table 27: Ratio of Criminal Cases in Relation to  
Population 1948-57

| Year | Population | Criminal files | Nr. of cases per<br>100,000 residents |
|------|------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1948 | 879,000    | 11,640         | 132.4                                 |
| 1949 | 1,174,000  | 19,099         | 162.7                                 |
| 1950 | 1,370,000  | 25,540         | 186.4                                 |
| 1951 | 1,577,000  | 36,652         | 232.4                                 |
| 1952 | 1,629,000  | 41,635         | 255.5                                 |
| 1953 | 1,670,000  | 41,231         | 246.8                                 |
| 1954 | 1,718,000  | 44,247         | 257.5                                 |
| 1955 | 1,789,000  | 46,453         | 259.6                                 |
| 1956 | 1,872,000  | 48,936         | 261.4                                 |
| 1957 | 1,976,000  | 50,800         | 257.1                                 |

Source: Israel Police Annual Report, 1957, p. 58.

#### Traffic Accidents

The first decade of Israel's existence experienced a significant rise in the number of vehicles in the country. As a result the police were obliged to establish, in its first year of existence, a Traffic Division in the National Headquarters and branches in all the sub-

districts. Traffic policemen handled the orderly stream of vehicle traffic in the urban streets and the rural roads, and investigated traffic accidents, which were on the increase. Table 28 clearly points to the changes which occurred in the amount of traffic accidents and injured.

Table. 28: Traffic Accidents with Casualties, 1948-57

| Year | Accidents | Deaths | Injuries | Accidents ; Casualties<br>per 100,000 Residents |     |
|------|-----------|--------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1948 | 2,037     | 93     | 651      | 232                                             | 97  |
| 1949 | 4,699     | 174    | 2,794    | 400                                             | 238 |
| 1950 | 6,406     | 217    | 3,875    | 468                                             | 283 |
| 1951 | 8,300     | 198    | 4,751    | 526                                             | 301 |
| 1952 | 10,659    | 210    | 5,032    | 654                                             | 309 |
| 1953 | 11,624    | 162    | 5,055    | 656                                             | 303 |
| 1954 | 12,790    | 156    | 5,916    | 744                                             | 344 |
| 1955 | 15,113    | 129    | 6,436    | 845                                             | 360 |
| 1956 | 17,387    | 149    | 7,843    | 929                                             | 419 |
| 1957 | 19,171    | 208    | 8,870    | 970                                             | 449 |

Source: Israel Police Annual Report, 1957, p. 87.



During 1957, 79.1% of the accidents registered were the result of careless and unsafe driving, another 9.9% were caused by pedestrian behavior, and 4.5% were due to mechanical faults of vehicles involved in accidents. In 1957, 196,542 traffic tickets were issued to drivers transgressing the traffic laws.

.11 Count Bernadotte's Murder in Jerusalem

On Friday, September 17, 1948, while the Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte and his entourage were travelling through the Katamon neighborhood of Jerusalem in a three car convoy, heavy gun fire was directed at them from an ambush. He was hit by six bullets and died instantly. The Chief of the UN Observer Force, Colonel P. Sari, was also killed. Count Bernadotte, former Chairman of the Swedish Red Cross, had been appointed by the Security Council of the United Nations to act as its representative to try and find a solution in the Middle East conflict between Jews and Arabs.

The background to the murder is as follows: On June 27, 1948, Count Bernadotte published a plan which, in his opinion, would be the turning point in the Jewish-Arab dispute. The plan angered many Israelis because it proposed that Jerusalem be handed over to the Kingdom of Jordan. Immediately after the murder, an announcement was issued by an organization calling itself the "Homeland Faction", claiming responsibility for the attack. Later, it became known that,

in fact, the "Freedom Fighters of Israel" (LEHI), a Jewish underground organization which had been active during the British Mandate period in Israel, was behind the "Homeland Faction", convinced that the murder of Count Bernadotte would prevent the loss of the Holy City of Jerusalem.

The murder of Count Bernadotte was the first political murder in the State of Israel. It rocked the very foundations of the State. The new police force in Jerusalem, consisting of 400 policemen, some of whom had served in the Mandate Police, and others hired by the Police as guards and gendarmes now faced a Jerusalem under siege and military rule. The Jerusalem Police, established on May 15, 1948 with the departure of the British, had not yet had the time to organize itself. Communication lines between it and the National Headquarters did not exist due to the Arab blockade of Jerusalem. The Commander of the Jerusalem Police, Yeshurun Shiff, a former British Army officer who lacked Police experience, had been appointed one month before the murder.

The investigation and handling of this political murder, which had aroused the attention of the whole country as well as of the whole world, was a relatively woeful attempt by the Police and exposed to all its lack of experience. According to information provided by the General Security Services, the body responsible for internal security which had sprung from the Hagana Intelligence Services (SHAI), the murder had been carried out by members of LEHI. On the very eve of

the murder incident, David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, ordered the arrest of known members of LEHI and the dissolution of this underground organization. The hunt for members of LEHI continued all over the country for a whole week and 280 persons were arrested, among them, two leaders of the organization - Nathan Yellin-Mor and Mattityahu Shmuelewitz.

Bernadotte's murder was discussed several times in Cabinet meetings during September and October 1948. On September 20, 1948, the Cabinet requested that the Provisional Council enact the Prevention of Terror Ordinance, 1948, and declared that the organization known as "Freedom Fighters of Israel" (LEHI) and that known as "The Homeland Faction" be declared terrorist organizations (Cabinet Decisions, Vol. 1, Decision nr. 35 - September 20, 1948).

On September 22, 1948, the Israeli Cabinet announced that a reward of 500 Israeli Pounds would be given to whomever brought about the imprisonment of the murderers (Cabinet Decisions, Vol. 1, Decision nr. 36 - September 22, 1948). On September 23, 1948, the Provisional Cabinet met and issued the Prevention of Terror Ordinance, 1948, which outlawed LEHI, the underground organization. On December 5, 1948, two LEHI commanders were tried under the above Ordinance. Yellin-Mor was sentenced to eight years imprisonment, and Shmuelewitz, to five years. The two were released from prison in February 1949 when a general amnesty was declared for all prisoners in Israel. (Minutes, Provisional Council, 19th session, September 23, 1948, pp. 4-8;

Interview with Isser Harel, June 26, 1989).

The efforts made by the Israel Police and the General Security Services to discover the identity of Count Bernadotte's and Col. Sari's assailants failed. On January 1, 1951, Jerusalem Police criminal file nr. 148/49 was officially closed because the perpetrators were unknown. The murder came up for discussion in the United Nations as well as in the Swedish Parliament. The Swedish Government set up an investigative committee headed by the Attorney General. This committee presented a report to the Swedish Government wherein they accused Israeli authorities of not having carried out a proper investigation regarding the murders and, therefore, not discovering the perpetrators. A copy of this report was sent to the Israeli Cabinet. On March 22, 1950, the Israeli Cabinet decided to establish a governmental investigative committee headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice, Judge Shimon Agranat, whose members consisted of Haim Cohen, the Cabinet Legal Counsel and Walter Eytan, the General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cabinet Decisions, Decision nr. 38, March 23, 1950).

The Committee presented its conclusions to the Israel Cabinet in May 1950. Following are the main points of the conclusions referring to the Israel Police:

- In Israel, the murder incident was considered not only to have done serious harm to the U.N. institutions but also to have served to undermine the existence of security within the State.

- During that particular period, Israeli authorities did not have much faith in the ability of the Israel Police to manage the investigation regarding the underground organization.
- Yehezkel Sahar, the Inspector General of the Police, himself, was not convinced that policemen were capable of handling this sort of political investigation.
- The General Security Services also doubted the Israel Police's ability to investigate criminal acts carried out by underground organizations.
- Y. Sahar and Y. Schiff, Commander of the Jerusalem Police, were convinced that the murder investigation should be handled by the General Security Services, and not by the Police. For that reason, investigations into the incident were only begun the day after the murder, when police commanders understood that neither the Security Services nor the Military Police intended to investigate the incident.
- Cooperation and coordination between the Security Services, which were handling the intelligence coverage concerning underground organizations, and the Military Police, which was operating in the area of military camps, and the Israel Police, was inadequate.
- The Commander of the Jerusalem Police, a former Captain in the British Army, was recruited to the Police and had been appointed to this job only three weeks before the murder, despite his lack of police experience.
- Despite the fact that Officer Rabinowitz, responsible for the Jerusalem Police investigation, had acquired a certain amount of experience during the Mandate period, he did not proceed correctly on

the day of the murder: the scene of the crime was not cordoned off; he did not collect evidence and physical proof from the scene, nor did he question eyewitnesses. The order to open an investigation was only received on the day following the murder.

- Y. Yaron, Head of the Investigations Department of the Israel Police, was subsequently given the responsibility for continuing the investigation, and, in fact, he was convinced that the investigation should have been carried out by the Military Police, since Jerusalem was under Army rule and he thought that the Israel Police should be assigned only to assist the Military Police's investigation.

The committee recommended that the Israel Cabinet establish a clear division of responsibility for investigations of criminal acts, whether these acts be of a political nature or not. In addition, it recommended that the Cabinet should turn the Police into a representative organization from the point of view of its professional capabilities and its loyalty (The Count Bernadotte Murder Enquiry, May 1950 - National Archives, File 1/42/M/P/H, 2154/L).

It was 40 years later, in 1988, when the law of limitations applied, that members of LEHI broke their silence regarding the identity of those who had participated in the murder of Count Bernadotte by giving interviews to the press. The incident had been carried out by five LEHI members and their names were known to all. Some of them have since died, and some are still alive ("Ha-Aretz", September 16, 1988; "Yedi'ot Aharonot", September 11, 1988).

Religious Demonstrations in Jerusalem

On Saturday, May 28, 1949, several hundred ultra-religious persons gathered in front of the "Edison" and "Eden" movie theaters in Jerusalem, demonstrating against the sale of tickets on the Sabbath, and tried to force their way into the theaters. Harsh words were exchanged between the secular crowd waiting to enter the hall and the religious demonstrators, and the situation became violent. The Police was summoned and reluctant to disperse the crowd with the use of force, asked them to disperse. Eight demonstrators were arrested. The incident was immediately criticized by the religious circles in the Knesset and the Cabinet. The day after the incident, during the Cabinet session, the Minister of Religious Affairs, M. Shapira, asked the Minister of Police to explain the violent behavior of the Police during the demonstration which had occurred on the previous Sabbath.

During the Cabinet session which took place on May 31, 1948, the incident was once again placed on the agenda for discussion. The Minister of Police read out the Inspector General's report. The motion presented by those Ministers belonging to religious parties to appoint an investigative committee to conduct an enquiry regarding police behavior was voted down by a majority consisting of the other ministers (Cabinet Decision, Vol. 2, Decisions 17-18). On June 6, 1949, in the Knesset plenum, one of the religious party members criticized the behavior of the Police and requested that the subject

be brought up for discussion. A majority vote decided that the subject would be discussed in the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee.

Demonstrations in Jerusalem on the part of the religious factions continued in various degrees. Every Sabbath since that first demonstration in May 1949, their scope widened. They continue today. At times, many months pass with no incident, and then, all of a sudden, they are renewed. The religious demonstrations in Jerusalem are a nuisance for the secular public and take up a great amount of police time. Hundreds of thousands of policemen work-days are spent on handling these demonstrations, while other Police duties have to be neglected and many policemen are called back from their Sabbath day off. The main reason for these demonstrations was to keep the Sabbath sanctified as a day of rest for the Jews. That meant that the religious circles were convinced that no activity was to be carried out on the Sabbath - no movies, no theater performances, no sport activities, no public transportation on the Sabbath, no cars driving in religious neighborhoods, and no businesses, including restaurants open.

The religious demonstrations greatly enraged the secular population, which felt that their freedom of movement was being curtailed and that this constituted an intrusion in their private lives. In addition, these secular factions, after a week of hard work (at that time, Israel had a six-day week), were in the habit of enjoying themselves on the Sabbath, whether through entertainment or



trips. The secular population was not as organized as the religious factions, and therefore, with the exception of one counter-demonstration, limited itself to vocal arguments with the religious demonstrators in the streets of Jerusalem, or to deliberately and provocatively traveling on the Sabbath through streets inhabited by the pious. These actions caused even more violent reactions including by stone-throwing on the part of the religious factions.

Between 1949 and 1958, eighteen Cabinet motions concerning demonstrations by the religious and the manner in which the Police had handled these demonstrations were presented in Cabinet meetings by various ministers, mostly religious ministers. In addition, during that same period, the Cabinet placed the subject on the agenda 15 times (Cabinet Decisions, for the years 1949-1958).

On September 1, 1956, an unlicensed demonstration was held in Jerusalem in which many religious factions participated. The Police requested that the demonstrators disperse and, when they refused, used force to disperse them. During the confusion, one of the demonstrators died. The next day, the Cabinet discussed the incident and decided to appoint an investigative committee, headed by Supreme Court Justice A.M. Mani. The committee was tasked with finding out :

- Who was responsible for organizing the demonstration in Jerusalem, on the Sabbath, September 1, 1956?
- What were the causes and effects of the Sabbath demonstrations?
- What resources did the demonstrators use?

- What happened on Saturday, September 1, 1956, and what was the cause of P. Segalov's death?

The committee held 22 sessions and heard 130 witnesses. Witnesses summoned from among the Netorei Karta faction (an extremist religious sect which does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel) refused to appear. The committee minutes consisted of 1,677 pages. The committee decided that the catalysts for the Sabbath demonstrations and riots were:

- The opening of movie theaters before the end of the Sabbath;
- All other incidents considered a desecration of the Sabbath such as holding exhibitions, a soccer game or any other public social event;
- Vehicles being driven on the Sabbath.

From the beginning of 1950 until 1956, 51 demonstrations were registered as having been held by the religious factions, according to the following breakdown: 1950 - 10; 1951 - 0; 1952 - 19; 1953 - 2; 1954 - 3; 1955 - 15; 1956 - 2. Out of the 51 demonstrations, 32 had been organized by the Netorei Karta, nine by factions sympathetic to the Netorei Karta, three by the "Agudat Yisrael" political party and seven by various non-aligned religious factions. On May 31, 1952, a secular group made up of members of Kibbutz Zora organized an anti-demonstration, after Kibbutz vehicles transporting milk to Jerusalem had become the target of stone-throwing by religious demonstrators.

The committee determined that the demonstrations were causing

serious public disorders, physical as well as property damage, and in addition, were disturbing the day of rest of many citizens including a large number of policemen, who, instead of being able to spend the Sabbath with their families, were obliged to carry out the duty of dispersing demonstrations. The demonstrations created tension between the religious and secular public, on the one hand, and the religious public and the Police, on the other. The demonstrations brought about civil strife, bitterness and estranged the various sectors of the people. The committee did not place the blame for Pinchas Segalov's death on the Police.

The committee report was delivered to the Cabinet on February 27, 1957. The Cabinet held a number of discussions on the subject. Later, the Minister of Police, the Minister of Justice and the Police Command were requested to propose measures which would satisfy the religious population so that they would not incite the rest of the population in Jerusalem. The letter sent by the Inspector General to the Minister of Justice on June 27, 1958 indicated that the recommendations of the Mani Committee had not been carried out. In the opinion of the Police, the only effective solutions would be to close off the religious neighborhood to traffic on the Sabbath.

However, the Police did not have the authority to impose new traffic measures and it was up to the municipal authorities to decide on this topic, or the Government would have to institute the appropriate regulations (National Archives, Box 5585/G, File 9072).

The Sabbath demonstrations and pressure from religious factions in the Jerusalem Municipality, in the Knesset and in the Cabinet caused the secular population to retreat and concessions to be made in favor of the religious factions. The neighborhoods of Mea She'arim and Geulah, as well as other streets in Jerusalem, were thereafter closed to automobile traffic on the Sabbath. Public transport came to a halt on the Sabbath in Jerusalem as well as in many other parts of the country. Despite these concessions, Sabbath demonstrations have continue to be carried out in Jerusalem.

"Bread and Work" Demonstrations"

Mass immigration, the release of tens of thousands of soldiers from the army with the end of the Independence War, the difficult economic situation, inflation, the period of austerity and lack of basic products, as well as unemployment, created a fertile field for organizing mass demonstrations and public disorders by the different political factions. These demonstrations took place all over the country, in addition to those organized and carried out for religious reasons mainly in Jerusalem. Israeli policemen were not accustomed to dealing with demonstrations. Most of them had been recruited into the Police only a short time before, and even those who had served in the Mandate Police did not have much experience in dispersing demonstrations, since during the Mandate Period, the job of dispersing demonstrations had been only in the hands of British policemen.

The first demonstration concerning unemployment was held on July 26, 1949, next to the Knesset building in Jerusalem. Masses of angry and incensed demonstrators broke through the chain of policemen standing between them and the Knesset building. They began breaking the Knesset gate and trying to force their way inside. Policemen and Knesset ushers used force in order to stop them. A number of demonstrators and policemen were injured and the first demonstration which almost succeeded in destroying the sovereignty of the Knesset was dispersed. Most of the demonstrators were new immigrants who had not found work nor permanent lodging. The incident of the demonstration was discussed in the Knesset on the same evening, most of the Knesset members implemented their right to the floor, some of them condemning the demonstrators, others justifying their actions (Knesset Minutes, Vol. 2, pp. 1137-1140).

During 1950, 69 demonstrations took place, in 1956, 56 demonstrations and in 1960-76. Due to the rising frequency of demonstrations and unruly processions which disrupted life in the cities and in the settlements, during which demonstrators broke into government buildings and policemen and demonstrators were injured, the Cabinet took action in its August 13, 1950 session. It ordered the implementation of paragraph 35 of the Police Ordinance, 1926, which authorized District Police Commanders to require that every person desiring to organize a demonstration or outside procession request authorization and obtain an appropriate license for such at least three days before the event, in the interest of keeping order (Cabinet

Decisions, Vol. 7, Decision nr.61 - August 13, 1950). Upon receiving this authorization, Police District Commanders were empowered either to:

- approve the requested permit;
- approve the requested permit under certain conditions;
- refuse to approve the permit.

A person requesting a permit to hold a meeting, a demonstration or an outside procession whose request was refused could appeal to the High Court of Justice (Police Ordinance, 1926, para. 35). Meetings held in closed halls were not required to obtain a permit. A meeting or procession taking place outside without a permit or which had broken permit conditions, would be considered an illegal gathering and its participants could expect to be dispersed by the Police and tried in court (Ibid., para. 35A).

Since many demonstrations took place without having been accorded permits and had subsequently turned into riots, the Police, after having issued warnings, were often obligated to disperse the demonstrators by force and carry out arrests. These actions were strongly criticized in the Knesset by members belonging to the opposition. The Communist and Religious factions headed Parliamentary action on this subject. Eleven sessions were held by the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee as a result of complaints received regarding Police behaviour during demonstrations and workers' strikes during the years 1949-1957 (Internal Affairs Committee Minutes

for 1949-1957). During those years, 12 motions concerning demonstrations, strikes and Police handling of these phenomena were discussed in the Knesset plenum. Most of the motions were presented by Knesset members belonging to the Communist Party.

During the same period, 13 Parliamentary questions were put to the Minister of Police by various Knesset members (Knesset Minutes, 1948-57). In addition to discussions concerning Sabbath demonstrations, as described above, the subject of demonstrations in general and the manner in which they were being handled by the Police was discussed three times in the Cabinet, and Ministers posed 10 queries during the period of 1948-1957 (Cabinet Decisions, 1948-1958).

There is no doubt that the subject of demonstrations and strikes greatly preoccupied the Israel Police. Police handling of demonstrations became a weapon in the hands of the opposition parties, and was used to criticize the Cabinet by criticizing and attacking the Police. On the other hand, this frequent criticism obligated the Police to examine itself each time and to insist on proper treatment during handling of demonstrations and strikes. Sam Lachman-Weilzig (1983), who researched the subject of demonstrations in Israel and Police behaviour, reached the conclusion that in 70.8% of all demonstrations which took place between 1950 and 1970, the level of Police reaction during those events was measured and in equal degree to that shown by the demonstrators.

In the event of quiet demonstrations - the Police did not react; in demonstrations which turned slightly riotous - the Police reacted verbally and did not use force; when demonstrations resulted in violent acts against property - the Police carried out arrests; when very violent acts occurred during demonstrations - the Police, after having issued several warnings, opened fire (in most cases, shots were fired in the air). It turned out that when the Police dealt with demonstrations carried out by religious factions, the Police was thought to have underreacted in 28.7% of the cases, and only in 15.8% of the cases, was the Police considered to have overreacted (Lachman-Weilzig, 1983, p. 43).

Lachman concluded that Israel is one of the most protest-oriented countries from among the Western countries - in the United States, England and West Germany, 11% of the population participates in demonstrations, while in Israel, 21.5% is the norm (Ibid. p. 44).

#### Israel Police and the Immigrant Camps (Ma'abarot)

From the establishment of the State until the end of 1952, 700,000 immigrants arrived in Israel. This meant that in 1952, every second resident in Israel was a new immigrant who had arrived in Israel after May 14, 1948, the date marking the establishment of the State. The Government was able to provide housing and work for 470,000 of those immigrants in the cities or existing settlements, or



in settlements established to fulfill the needs of the immigrants. Due to a lack of housing facilities, 230,000 immigrants were placed in temporary immigrant camps which, at the time, were called Ma'abarot. The immigrants in these camps were housed in tin shacks and canvas tents (Government Yearbook, 1952, p. 230).

The concentration of immigrants in those camps was very high. The fact that the camp inhabitants originated from different countries, spoke different languages, had no means of support and were being supported by funds provided by the Jewish Agency, caused great social problems. Property crimes, violence and prostitution developed in the camps. The Police, which at that time lacked resources, in particular manpower, were unable to establish a Police station or post in every camp, as the situation required. The Jewish Agency hired guards to patrol the camps, and who, for the most part, were older people unable to control the many disputes and public disorders. After a year, the Police agreed that the camp guards would be recruited by the Police as supernumerary constables, paid by the Jewish Agency. The Police would supervise their activities from the point of discipline and the manner in which they carried out their responsibilities.

In February 1950, riots broke out in two immigrant camps. Many incited by the religious factions, demonstrated against "the desire of the Government to estrange them from their faith and their beliefs", broke into the camp administrative offices and injured clerks and constables.

The Police was called, dispersed the crowds and carried out arrests. The incidents were discussed in the Knesset plenum on February 27, 1950 (Knesset Minutes, Vol. 4, pp. 855-862). Requests by the Jewish Agency, which were passed on to the Police Inspector-General, asking that police stations be established in the immigrant camps went unanswered. On November 19, 1950, the Inspector-General replied in writing that the personnel situation in the Police did not allow for the establishment of police posts in the Ma'abarot. The Inspector-General added that he knew that in the near future the Army would take upon itself the care of Ma'abarot (National Archives, Box 3324/G, File nr. 193/16).

Indeed, at the end of 1950, many Army units adopted Ma'abarot and began taking care of immigrants from the social and cultural aspects. With the help of the immigrants themselves, the soldiers began cleaning up the camps and putting them in order, paving access roads and internal paths, and even more important, increasing the feeling of security and resolve within the camps.

On November 24, 1950, the Israel Police adopted two such Ma'abarot: The Migdal Gat camp in the northern Negev, and the Har Tuv camp on the way to Jerusalem. Caring for these camps consisted of: providing guidance as to how to set up and care for tents, preparing the surrounding area with proper drainage to prevent flooding, providing medical care for the ill, transferring supplies, helping out in the kindergartens and nursery schools, calling for clean-up

operations and assisting the immigrants, organizing cultural activities, providing assistance regarding technical problems, guarding the camp, etc.

In the National Headquarters, an officer was appointed to liaise with the immigrant camps, a sergeant and ten policemen and policewomen were assigned to each of the two camps. Their continuous presence in the camps provided a link between the inhabitants and the Police, and they came to realize that the policemen were also part of the nation and that the Police cared what happened to them. Looking after Ma'abarot continued until the end of 1952 (Police Archives, File 42/10/S).

#### Infiltration from Arab Countries

The war between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs and the neighboring Arab states, which had broken out on May 15, 1948 and had ended in an Israeli victory in the Fall of 1949, had caused hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to leave their homes either voluntarily or through coercion, fleeing to Arab countries, mainly Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank of the Jordan River, which had been captured by Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, captured by the Egyptians. All of those refugees were certain that the Israelis would be overcome and forced into the sea within a week and they then would quickly be able to return to their villages. The Israeli victory which came about determined a series of geo-political facts which prevented the return

of the Palestinian Arabs who had fled. This situation created a movement of infiltration into Israel during the period when the country was not yet organized to guard her borders effectively. During this in-between period, tens of thousands of Arabs succeeded in infiltrating into Israel and returning to their deserted villages, or settling in mixed-population cities. Others, choosing to remain in the areas governed by Arabs, would, once in a while, infiltrate into Israel to visit relatives, to ask for financial help, to smuggle supplies and stolen goods.

Over the years, the phenomenon of infiltration increased to such an extent that it became a risk to the secure existence of Israel. Most of the infiltration was carried out over the Jordan River and through the West Bank; fewer came from the Gaza Strip and very few from Lebanon and Syria. When the number of thefts, robberies and murders carried out by infiltrators began endangering the security of the agricultural sector in Israel, the Police and the Israeli Army, which had not been too anxious to take on the war against the infiltrators, began organizing themselves to act against this damaging phenomenon. Table 29 provides data concerning the extent of infiltration and its effects. The data for 1949-50 was not available.

During the first decade of the State, infiltration was considered to be of criminal intent on the one hand, and to be a security risk on the other. Some Israelis were injured by shooting from over the border, and at times, by Arab army units or individual soldiers who

shot at the field workers or the inhabitants of rural areas in Israel. In other incidents, the roads and dirt paths were mined or public transportation came under armed attack from ambush. There were incidents of infiltration to carry out espionage by the Jordanian, Syrian and Egyptian armies. The criminal phenomena which accompanied the many infiltration incidents greatly increased crime in Israel. 40 % of the murder incidents in 1957, 48.4 % of the attempted murders, and 60 % of the livestock robberies were the results of actions by infiltrators (Israel Police Annual Report, 1957, pp. 50, 71).

Preventing infiltration was a most difficult task. The borders between Israel and the Arab countries, were long, convoluted and broken. Arab authorities had placed Palestinian refugees in special camps, mostly on the borders with Israel. These refugees were well acquainted with access and retreat roads in rural Israel, and where cattle herds and flocks of sheep as well as agricultural machinery and irrigation pipes were kept. Having committed their crimes, the infiltrators would usually retreat safely across the border where the Police could not reach them, because the Arab Police forces would not cooperate with the Israel Police. This phenomenon speeded up the establishment of the Border Patrol (see pages 372-389).

At the end of 1955, there was an increase in infiltration incidents. The Palestinians had organized themselves into army-like bodies in Egypt and in Jordan. Trained and organized by those countries, they called themselves "Fedayin" (suiciders). These "fedayin" infiltrated into Israel in order to foment terror, carry out

acts of murders and sabotage, set mines and snipe at public transportation.

Table 29: Infiltration into Israel and its Results, 1952-1957

| Issue            | 1952    | 1953    | 1954    | 1955    | 1956    | 1957    |
|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Infiltration     | 9342    | 7018    | 4638    | 4414    | 5713    | 4373    |
| Infiltrators     |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| arrested         | 3181    | 1649    | 1012    | 461     | 263     | 336     |
| Israelis Killed  | 33      | 58      | 46      | 41      | 74      | 14      |
| Israeli injured  | 42      | 58      | 88      | 129     | 206     | 85      |
| Property damage  | 517,000 | 582,910 | 629,250 | 358,120 | 549,090 | 369,340 |
| (Israeli pounds) |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| Infiltrators     |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| killed           | 125     | 110     | 77      | 36      | 38      | 66      |
| Infiltrators     |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| injured          | -       | 16      | 18      | 11      | 6       | 3       |

Source: National Archives, Box 5434/G, File 1394; Box 3320/G, File 15/429; Border Guard Documents 12-198, 10-19; Police Archives, File TA/06, M/10 for the years 1953-1957.

The Army responded by raiding fedayin camps in the Gaza Strip, and when terrorist actions from the Gaza Strip border and Northern Sinai increased, causing great losses from among the civilian

population in Israel, Israel initiated the "Kadesh" Operation against Egypt on 29 October 1956. In six days of battles, the Gaza Strip and the whole of the Sinai Desert had been captured. The Israeli Army gradually retreated from Sinai. With the Army retreat from the Gaza Strip on March 7, 1957, the Israeli Army evacuation of Egyptian held land was complete.

#### Demonstration Against German Reparations

Dealing with demonstrations based on social and economic problems, unemployment, religious ardor and other subjects were not the only challenges placed before the Israel National Police during its first years. Another crisis in the country also quickly began preoccupying the Police. The crisis concerned the intention of the Israeli Government to negotiate with West Germany on the subject of reparations to be paid to the Jews who were the remnants of the Nazi Holocaust. These Jews who had succeeded in surviving had arrived to safety in Israel.

The subject of German reparations gave rise to great opposition on the part of many in Israel who were unwilling to have any contact at all with Germany, a place which, not too long before, had given rise to the Nazi scourge, Hitler, and had caused the extermination of six million Jews. Most of the opposition came from the members of the Herut Party, a new party which had risen after the establishment of

the State and whose organizers and party members had previously been members of the IRGUN (National Army Organization), an underground organization during the Mandate Period, headed by Knesset member Menachem Begin, formerly commander of the IRGUN.

On the evening of January 7, 1952, the Knesset plenum met to hold a fateful and decisive discussion on the subject of German reparations. The final result of this discussion was to be a vote by Knesset members for or against entering into negotiations with the German authorities. On the same evening, the Herut Party planned a meeting in Zion Square in Jerusalem with many of its party members, only a few hundred meters away from the Knesset building. The meeting was being held to express opposition to a reparations agreement. The main speaker was to be Menachem Begin. Begin, known for his oratory, managed, during this meeting, to incite his listeners, inflame them against the Cabinet's intentions, and to cause the crowd, an angry and inflamed group now numbering several thousands, to march on the Knesset building with the deliberate intention of preventing the vote.

The Israel Police, which was aware of what could happen, was prepared and had brought hundreds of policemen from all parts of the country to Jerusalem. The policemen were stationed around the Knesset building behind fences and Police roadblocks. The angry crowd, among them many former IRGUN members, downed the barriers by force and despite clashes with the Police, succeeded in reaching the Knesset building itself and began throwing stones, as well as anything else



that came to hand, at the Knesset hall windows, and attempted to break into the hall. The Police tried to disperse the demonstrators by use of batons, high pressure water hoses and tear gas. Fist and stick fighting broke out between the demonstrators and the policemen. For some of the police, this was the first experience they had ever had with violent demonstrations. Some of the demonstrators went beyond the Knesset building and began to break store windows, to set parked cars on fire and to attack passers-by. At 19:00, when stones began flying into the Knesset hall, and some of the Knesset members were actually injured, David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, fearing that the demonstrators would succeed in breaking into the Knesset, called for Army reinforcements. The large company of paratroopers which joined the Police tipped the scales and the demonstrators began dispersing.

During that demonstration, 92 policemen and 361 demonstrators and passers-by were injured, 362 demonstrators were arrested, some of them released the next day, and arrest warrants were issued by the court against 156 persons. In the end, all were released since the Police was unable to prove that they had each actually participated in the demonstration and riot. It could be said that the Police, untrained and unprepared to face this kind of demonstration, were barely able to oppose members of Herut, people with great political motivation and who had gained experience in demonstrating against the British Police during the Mandate Period. This demonstration was doubtless the worst public disorder with which the Police had had to

deal since its inception. On January 9, 1952, the Knesset voted in favor of the reparations plan. (Harel, 1989, pp. 188-190; Ben Porat, 1988, pp. 77-80; Knesset Minutes, Vol. 9, p. 2068).

### Religious Underground in Jerusalem

Jerusalem has always been fertile ground for religious extremism. Jerusalem, holy to the Jews, had, over the years, concentrated within her large numbers of religious Jews of all kinds, among them some of the most extreme, such as: The "Netorei Karta", the "Sons of Penkas", the "Jewish Fighters", etc. The religious demonstrations against the desecration of the Sabbath which began in mid-1949 and which, since that time, have continued gave birth of the idea of force and violence being used by young religious extremists. In November 1950, some cars in Jerusalem were set alight, an act which was repeated several times. On January 1, 1951, eight cars belonging to residents of the northern neighborhoods in Jerusalem, known to travel on the Sabbath, were set on fire. Another attempted arson was carried out against the garage belonging to the EGGED bus cooperative. Over the period of one month, 12 more cars were set on fire, as well as butcher shops known to sell non-kosher meat, and a homemade bomb was thrown inside a restaurant which remained open on the Sabbath.

According to information received by the Police and the Security Services, it turned out that the arson incidents had been carried out

by an underground group called "The Union of Extremists", consisting of approximately 50 religious youths. Furthermore, information was received indicating that the aim of the organization was to lay a fragmentation bomb inside the Knesset Hall on May 14, 1951, during a meeting which was to take place to discuss the topic of obligatory recruitment of females into the army. The Police, in cooperation with the Security Services and with the approval of the Speaker of the Knesset, placed all members of the underground group who would enter the visitor's gallery of the Knesset under surveillance, and at the proper time, they were to be arrested along with all members of the group whose identity was known. On the day of the hearing, the Speaker of the Knesset decided to close the session to the public and to delay the hearing because of disturbances caused by several religious persons sitting in the visitor's gallery. These individuals were not members of the underground organization. The members of the organization already present in the gallery and who were holding the bomb, departed in a hurry.

On May 15, 1951, the Police, reinforced by other units, raided the homes of members of the organization and carried out searches for weapons and documents. Over 40 members of the organization were arrested, among them a young woman. The searches revealed three pistols, two sub-machine guns, many bullets, six grenades, two homemade fragmentation bombs and many documents. Most of the persons arrested were released the next day when the investigation and existing material did not provide enough proof to have them tried.

Administrative arrest warrants were issued for 14 youths and one woman as per para. 111 of the Defence Regulations (Emergency), 1945. The detainees were transferred to an improvised detention building in the Police Station in Jelami near Haifa.

The incident involving the arrests of members of a religious underground organization was discussed during the Cabinet meetings which took place on May 17, 1951 and May 21, 1951. During the May 24, 1951 session, the Minister of Welfare (member of a religious party) announced that he had been informed that a group of policemen guarding the underground detainees in Jelami were behaving towards them in a very crude, humiliating and violent manner. He requested that the matter be investigated. That very day, the Cabinet appointed the Minister of Police to look into the behavior of the policemen in Jelami (Cabinet Decision, Vol. 11, Decision nr. 58).

The day after the arrests, on May 16, 1951, Knesset member Adi Jabotinsky placed a motion on the Knesset agenda to discuss the problem of religious coercion and terror in view of the actions of the religious underground organization. A discussion was held and the subject was passed on to the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee for further clarification (Knesset Minutes, Vol. 9, pp. 1777-1781). During an additional discussion held on May 28, 1951, the Minister of Police, as per the Cabinet decision, recommended that the Knesset appoint a Parliamentary Investigative Committee to investigate the behavior of the Police in Jelami. The Knesset approved the suggestion

and appointed an Investigative Committee made up of seven Knesset members, headed by Knesset member Hanna Lamdan. The Committee was given investigative powers by the Minister of Police, as per the Investigative Committee Ordinance. The Committee's conclusions and recommendations were brought before the Cabinet during its sessions on August 8, 1951, October 4, 1951, and December 2, 1951.

During the last of these sessions, the Cabinet appointed the Minister of Police spokesman to inform the Knesset of its decision, after having read the Parliamentary Committee's report, which made the following recommendations:

1. Make the Inspector General responsible for bringing any policeman who, according to the report or police investigation was found to have broken the law or Police Ordinances when fulfilling his duties in the detention camp of Jelami.
2. The Police Command was ordered to issue instructions to those policemen responsible for the detainees, to see that orders in force regarding behavior towards detainees are scrupulously obeyed.
3. The Police found no basis for placing the blame for the behavior of the policemen in the camp of Jelami on Police Headquarters.

On December 4, 1951, the Minister of Police brought the contents of the Cabinet decision before the Knesset. A discussion followed, and many Knesset members, in particular from the opposition benches, criticized the Cabinet which had considered the Parliamentary Investigative Committee's recommendations and took the position that

discussions concerning the Committee's recommendations should have been first carried out in the Knesset, since, the Committee had been appointed by the Knesset. The discussion was put off until December 10, 1951 and when it was concluded, the Knesset decided to accept the Cabinet's announcement concerning the Parliamentary Committee's report. The unusual aspect of this same discussion was that among those members of the Knesset who took the floor, was a Knesset member who had just been elected, Shlomo Lorencz, one of the detainees of the Jelami camp, who had, in the interim, been released (Knesset Minutes, Vol. 9, pp. 2196-2201; Cabinet Decision, Vol. 12, First Session, Eleventh Session).

The events which occurred in the Jelami camp, and the disputes in the Cabinet and the Knesset distracted the public from the seriousness of the acts committed by the Union of Extremists Underground organization. At any rate, the Attorney General's Office prosecuted four of the underground organization's leaders. On March 25, 1952, the District Court sentenced them to six months to one year imprisonment (Harel, 1989, pp. 180-186).

#### The Black Market

With the establishment of the State, the question of how the War of Independence was to be financed became a central problem in the financial circles of the State during the first two years of its existence. The main problem faced by the Government after the war was

the difficulty in budgeting for the heavy expenses resulting from the war and the maintenance of the Israel Defense Forces, which, if weakened, would cause the destruction of the country and its Jewish inhabitants. At the same time, the problem remained as to how to finance the great immigration and expenses incurred in providing housing for hundreds of thousands of immigrants, in supporting them, providing employment and health, welfare and educational services. These two budgetary items - security and immigration - caused a great imbalance in the national budget as well as galloping inflation. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of immigrants within a short period of time and the war needs imbalanced the industrial and the agricultural sectors, created a lack of basic commodities and food products, which caused panic, price rises, a black market and profiteering.

In May of 1949, the Cabinet decided to institute an austerity program and to regulate production, marketing and prices by distributing coupons in an effort to guarantee that every citizen could acquire basic products at minimum prices. The austerity and regulation measures permitted the public to acquire basic products for acceptable prices, but the steps taken by the Cabinet did not abolish the black market nor the sale of products at inflated prices.

On July 18, 1950, while the Knesset was considering the enactment of a law to prevent profiteering and speculation, Knesset member Y. Ben Eliezer proposed that a Parliamentary Investigative Committee be

appointed to enquire into the problem of the black market in the country. The Knesset transferred this discussion to the Knesset Economic Committee. The Economic Committee chose a sub-committee from among its members, and on August 10, 1950 this sub-committee was given investigative authority according to the Investigative Committee Ordinance. On April 2, 1951, the sub-committee presented its initial report after having investigated the situation in the building materials market (National Archives, Box 5512/G, File 5122).

The Cabinet dealt with the subject of the black market during its September 24, 1950 session, when it placed upon the Ministers' Committee, headed by the Prime Minister, the responsibility of opening war on the black market by:

1. Investigating existing arrangements concerning food distribution to the consumers.
2. Organizing an encompassing information campaign for the public concerning the existing situation and the need for cutbacks.
3. Activating the public to resist black market speculators.
4. Approving a budget for employing additional supervisors to control prices and products (Cabinet Decision, Vol. 8, Decision C - Sept. 24, 1950)

At the beginning of October 1950, the Prime Minister ordered the Israel Police to take part in the campaign against the black market. The Deputy Inspector General, appointed to centralize Police activity against the black market, issued an operational order on October 4,



1950, which stated:

- Every Israel Police unit will be put into action against the black market.
- The operation's aims will be to find and arrest black market offenders operating in the following areas:
  1. building materials and all sorts of raw materials.
  2. cars and motor parts, furniture, tools and house appliances.
  3. all kinds of clothing.
  4. all sorts of food products.
- The goals of the operation were:
  1. to uncover all black market sources.
  2. to uncover hidden stores.
  3. to arrest and bring offenders to trial.
  4. to enforce the laws regarding products and prices.
  5. to make the public full partners in this war.

Every day, Headquarters published a daily operations report, copies of these reports being sent to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Police and the Budget and Supply Minister (Police Archives, File ML/2).

During the Cabinet meeting on November 15, 1950, it was decided that the import, export and production of food would be under the professional supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture; the rest of the economic branches, including services, would be under the control of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Administrative control

would be in the hands of the Police. A special unit was established in the Police for this very purpose. The control system of the Budget and Supply Ministry was cancelled and the positions were transferred to the relevant Government Ministries and the Police (Cabinet Decision, Vol. 8, 13th session - November 15, 1950). During an additional Cabinet session on December 6, 1950, it was decided, among others, that control of the roads would be in the hands of the Police, and the investigation of economic subjects and prosecution of offenders - in the hands of the Ministry of Justice (Cabinet Decisions, Vol. 8, 20th session - December 6, 1950). Since the Ministry of Justice did not have investigators at its disposal, the Police continued investigating economic cases and their prosecution was carried out by District Attorney Offices.

These new duties relating to the fight against the black market forced the Israel Police to reorganize its Headquarters work as well as field units at the District and Sub-District levels, in order to handle all activities connected to the black market and price speculation. This was an added load on a burdened Police which did not have the necessary budget for its needs and was sorely lacking in adequate personnel.

Organizational Structure & Response to Change - Outcomes

The last research sub-question (7) posed at the outset (see page 32) asked: After its establishment, did the Israel Police rapidly move toward significant changes and modernization?

The introduction to this section and the sub-sections which follow will describe how the Israel Police, during the first years of its existence, began to initiate significant changes in its organizational structure and work habits, despite the fact that in actuality, its commanders had no intention of effecting such changes initially. The system of responsibilities which was placed on the Police upon its inception, and the situations with which it came into contact, encouraged the Command levels to carry out organizational changes during its first year of existence and almost every year thereafter. Further, they established a set of priorities for implementing the responsibilities and introduced changes in work habits.

When Yeheskel Sahar, the first Inspector General of the Israel Police, proposed the future organization of the Police Force, he had actually adopted the organizational structure of the Mandate Police. He was convinced that the organizational structure which had been satisfactory for the British, experienced in the administration and establishment of police organizations in their land, England, as well as in the British colonies, would certainly be suitable for Israel, a

new country plagued with grave internal and external problems. A short time after its inception, it turned out that the problems and unique needs of the State of Israel forced the Israel Police to effect changes, and quite significant changes at that, almost within the first decade of its existence. Some of these changes were described in the previous chapters, chapter VII and chapter VIII - see pages 207-293. The aim of this present chapter is to analyse changes in the organizational structure, the establishment of new units, changes in work methods, the level of responsibility during the period and the reasons for these changes. Bailey had argued that the aim of any Police Force is a combination of three factors: Assignments + Situations + Outcomes. (Bailey, 1985, pp. 103-127). This chapter analyse the third factor of the Israel Police - Outcomes.

#### The System of Team-Policing

Amos Ben Gurion, the Head of the Training Department, who had traveled to England and the United States to learn about police organization, was particularly impressed by the system of team-policing used at that time in a number of outlying cities in England. On March 7, 1950, he proposed the establishment of two committees which would look into:

- Methods of Police operations to prevent crime and apprehend offenders;
- Investigative unit work procedures at the District, Sub-District and Station levels.

On March 13, 1950, the Deputy Inspector General appointed the two committees. The search for new ways of carrying out police duties did not come about only as a result of Amos Ben Gurion's visit to police departments outside of Israel. This initiative was mainly the result of the Police's inability to send out enough foot patrols into the streets or to staff the investigative offices with enough investigators. Insufficient personnel had been a problem for the Police since its inception.

The Committee concerned with crime prevention consulted Amos Ben Gurion and proposed policing methods based on maximum mobility for personnel and wireless communication between Sub-district Police command centers and the policemen, be they mobile or on foot. The Committee proposed changing large urban sub-districts into team-policing units by doing away with the police station system and by sending all policemen into the city streets in cars equipped with wireless communication. (During the Mandate period, the British had used several wireless-equipped cars attached to the special forces dealing with the fight against terror and dispersing demonstrations. These cars, with their equipment, had been taken away by the British when the country was evacuated).

Team-policing units, headed by a sergeant, would be responsible for a specific patrol area and would deal with every type of offence, complaint, every operation or other duty imposed upon it by the commander via the Sub-district central dispatch command post. The

policemen serving in foot patrol units, and who were not yet equipped with portable wireless instruments would be able to contact the Sub-district central dispatch post via special telephones bearing the number 999 connected directly to central dispatch. As of June 2, 1949, these telephones had been installed in the three largest cities - Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa - and could be used by the public to establish rapid and direct contact with the Police when needed. These telephone calls were free of charge. The Israel Police system was ahead of many cities in the United States - the 911 telephone system was installed in New York only in 1968 (Caspi, Mar'ot, Israel National Police Publication, Issue 89, 1987, p. 21; National Headquarters Ordinances, June 2, 1949).

Team-policing was first introduced in the Northern Sub-district of the Tel Aviv District on July 1, 1950. Every day, the Sub-district sent out nine patrol cars equipped with wireless communication equipment, seven traffic patrol cars and one investigations vehicle. On November 1, 1950, the system was put into operation in the Southern Sub-district of the Tel Aviv District. On January 18, 1951, the system was implemented in Jerusalem, and on June 1, 1951, in Haifa. The Israeli public gratefully and with open arms accepted this new system of policing (Israel Police Annual Report, 1950, pp. 36-40).

The second committee, made up mainly of persons who had been involved in the field of investigations during the Mandate period and headed by the Head of the Criminal Department, enquired into the

compatibility of investigative methods with the new policing system. In its final report, the committee raised several doubts regarding the necessity for changing conventional investigative methods. The committee recommended no change in the system by which complaints were received and investigated in the Police stations by station investigators, where investigative personnel on the Sub-district levels act as advisers, direct, train and supervise the investigative work of the stations. The committee recommended finding a way to combine the team-policing system in the areas of patrol with the continued work of investigators in the stations. If this system was not acceptable to the command levels of the Police, the committee recommended that investigative personnel of the Tel Aviv District be centralized at headquarters of three Sub-districts in the District.

The proposal put forth by the committee for investigative affairs to remain unchanged was not accepted and the method of concentrating investigations in the three Sub-district headquarters was put into operations, Police stations within the Sub-district which had operated on the system of team-policing were closed. Investigators were organized into investigative offices within the Sub-district investigations sections and investigators were assigned to patrol cars receiving calls. They then were directed at the crime scene and questioned witnesses. In situations involving minor offences, such as neighbor or marital disputes, the investigators attempted to close the cases on the spot with the cooperation of those involved.

The system of team-policing was the first change effected by the Israel Police in the area of actual police work. However, there are persons, today, in the Israel Police, who feel that the system of team, mobile policing formed a wedge between policemen and citizens. The mobile forces, moving rapidly through the city streets, did not enable patrolmen to feel what was going on in the streets nor to make contact with people in the streets. The foot patrolmen disappeared from city streets. Similiar complaints are heard in all western countries and there is a growing trend these days, in many places, to return to the system of foot patrol. In 1959, an attempt was made to once again implement the system of the "beat policeman".

#### The Criminal Investigations Department (CID)

With the establishment of the State of Israel, one of the factors which most influenced the transition from the Mandate Police to the Israel Police and the formation of the Criminal Investigations Department, were the social, economic, security and crime changes taking place in Israel. From the time of the establishment of the State until 1953, inclusive, changes within the Investigations Dept. occurred every year, and at times, even several times a year. It was only in 1954 that a kind of stability was finally felt in the organizational structure of the Department. The situation remained quite stable until the end of the first decade of the establishment of the Police. However, improvements, the introduction of new systems and the addition of equipment to the Police laboratories continued without



stop. With the establishment of the State, the organizational structure of the Investigations Dept. was set out as follows:

The Investigations, Prosecution and Inspection Division: The responsibilities of this Division consisted of - investigating serious crimes and other offences of public importance; investigating offences with an international bearing or which had spread over more than one district; centralizing and planning special actions for preventing crimes; controlling and supervising the investigative work carried out by field units; coordinating and cooperating with the Attorney General's Office, the State Attorney's Office and Army authorities; exchanging information and cooperating with "Interpol" and foreign police forces.

The Registration, Criminal Identification and Research Division: This Division centralized the criminal statistics data; administered the criminal records; initiated the establishment of laboratories. Laboratory equipment from the Mandate period, for the most part, had been taken away by the British when they left Israel, and most of what had been left behind had been stolen during the battles or taken over by the Israel Defence Forces for its own needs. It was necessary to start a new system for comparing fingerprints; providing clearance certificates for those requiring same in order to emigrate or to be hired by government offices or agencies; weekly publication of Investigations Department announcements containing details concerning fugitives from justice or those wanted by the Police, missing persons

and details concerning lost/stolen/found property.

The Training Division: The Division dealt with gathering material concerning work methods in the field of investigations as used by modern and advanced police forces in the world; contacts and relations with different institutions in the country to fulfill training and advanced studies requirements; establishing a professional library, administering same and acquiring the necessary books; organizing professional courses and advanced studies possibilities for investigators and other related professions in the Division; carrying out proposals for changes and improvements in the field of investigations.

The Special Division: This Division supervised the movements of foreign nationals in the country; handled the deportation or repatriation of unwanted or illegal aliens; carried out sensitive investigations at the request of various government offices; investigated offences against Foreign Currency Regulations; investigated suspected security or treason offences, terror acts and offences against national security, in coordination with the Security Services.

In October 1948, the Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.) laid the foundations for establishing a Canine Unit for search and security, a Service which had been dissolved by the British upon their departure, when they took with them all the trained dogs and had

destroyed the rest (Israel Police Annual Report, 1948, p. 20).

Robert Lustig, a former British C.I.D. officer, was appointed the first Head of the Investigations Department of the Israel Police. In December 1947, he had assisted Yehezkel Sahar in preparing his proposal for the future organization of the Israel Police. Upon his joining the Police, he was given the rank of Assistant District Superintendent. A group of officers and NCO's, all former members of the Mandate Police who had been mainly involved with investigations, made up the nucleus of the Investigations Department around Lustig. The Police National Headquarters, which had been established in a rented building in Tel Aviv, was staffed by senior officers, recent Hagana commanders and former British Mandate officers. The Head of the C.I.D. and his staff made up a separate, isolated group, which, other officers, recently recruited and unfamiliar with Police procedures, tended to ignore and avoid. The new senior officer ranks were wary of Lustig. They complained that he was too conservative and would not change the character of the Department and its branches in the Districts and Sub-districts, as necessitated by the new spirit sweeping the Israel Police, the Police Force of a democratic country which had only just been freed of the yoke of foreign rule.

The fact that Lustig stood alone within the Police hierarchy directly influenced his ability to receive appropriate budgets for advancing the investigations units. The National Headquarters, during its first years, stressed organization and administration. The subject

of investigations, which, in all modern police forces is of prime importance, was accorded rather low priority. "The rulers" within the Police during its first decade, were, in fact, administrators (Interviews: Y. Sahar, January 16, 1983; Y. Ben Porat, November 27, 1987; R. Lustig, June 8, 1977).

Despite the attitudes of the officer ranks in the National Headquarters toward Lustig and his staff, the members of the C.I.D. began organizing its affairs with vigour. The Israel Police Archives contain four proposals for organizing the Investigations Department and its branches, as presented by Department officers at the request of their superior: the proposal put forward by Sub-Inspector T. Menkes on September 1, 1948; Assistant District Superintendent Shlomo Sofer's proposal of October 8, 1948; a proposal presented by Inspector M. Shefer on July 10, 1949, and a proposal of Inspector A. Bayer on August 15, 1949 (Israel Police Archives, File 1/17/P/M).

Starting July 27, 1948, the Head of the C.I.D. initiated monthly meetings for senior investigations officers in the National Headquarters and the Districts. During these conferences, legal topics were explained, instructions and directives were formulated, and the bases for investigative work in the Israel Police were crystallized. As of December 10, 1948, weekly coordination and report meetings began to be held for C.I.D. officers in the National Headquarters (File 3/20/M/P/M).

On January 26, 1949, the first course for police investigators was opened in the Beit Dagon Police Station, in which 25 new investigators took part. The course lasted one month and a new session was begun as soon as the first class graduated. During its first two years of operation, the Department issued many standing orders, instructions and directives which instructed and structured investigative work in the field units.

During the first half of 1949, a new Division was established in the C.I.D. - the Economic Investigations Division. This was done at the initiative of the Police Command when it became evident that economic problems in the country and the black market and profiteering were becoming widespread. When, after a few months, it became evident that the government offices responsible for the economy had established supervisory bodies of their own for these purposes, it was decided to dismantle the Economic Investigations Division within the Police. In 1949, with the establishment of the Training Department in the National Headquarters, the Training Division within the C.I.D. and its responsibilities regarding training in the area of investigations were transferred to the new Department.

In 1949, the Fingerprint Bureau within the Registration and Identification Division began developing a system for lifting single prints from the scene of the crime, in an attempt to identify the offender by comparing prints, a system which, at the time, was in use in only a few police forces in the world. That same year, additional

equipment was acquired for the criminal laboratories. The equipment enabled them to carry out examinations which had not been possible before (Israel Police Annual Report, 1949, p. 18).

In February 1950, Y. Sahar, the Inspector General of the Police, invited Lustig to his office and informed him that he was planning to divide the C.I.D. into two principal divisions - a Criminal Division which would handle all investigations, and a General Division which would be responsible for subjects involving politics, monitoring aliens and responsible for contacts with the various intelligence bodies in the country. For this purpose, he had decided to appoint Na'aman Stawi (who had been a member of the Hagana before the establishment of the State, had been recently recruited as Commander of the Haifa District, and was untrained in investigations) as head of the C.I.D. in its new format and to promote him to the rank of Assistant Inspector General. He had decided to place Lustig at the head of the Criminal Division, accountable to Stawi.

Lustig viewed that Stawi's appointment as a vote of no confidence, in addition to the personal insult of being transferred from the position as Head of Department to that of Division Head within that Department. It was, in fact, a demotion and a sign that he was not wanted as a senior officer within the ranks of the Police Command.

Lustig met with Bechor Shitrit, the Minister of Police, and tried

to have the measure cancelled, but discovered that either the Minister was powerless to change the situation, or that the changes had been coordinated in advance between the Minister and the Inspector General, and the Minister was unable to change it. Lustig decided to leave and transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was appointed Israeli Consul to Cyprus, and later, Ambassador to Congo-Brazzaville (Interviews: R. Lustig, June 8, 1977; Y. Sahar, November 27, 1987; Y. Nachmias, November 29, 1987).

On February 1950, the Deputy Inspector General published the new organizational order for the C.I.D. in its new format, wherein, as of March 1, 1950, there would be two divisions instead of four as in the past. At the same time, every District established two branches: The Investigations Branch (Criminal) and the Investigations Branch (General). Members of the investigations sectors were not consulted in the planning and it is not clear how or why it was decided to centralize all the responsibilities of the former divisions, investigations, on the one hand, and registrations and identification on the other, into one division.

At any rate, the organizational structure of the C.I.D., as of March 1, 1950, was as follows:

Head of Investigations DepartmentCriminal DivisionGeneral Division

Criminal Investig. Section

Jewish Section

Economic Investig. Section

Aliens Section

Fingerprint Section

Minorities Section

Crime Registration Section

Criminal Laboratories

(Israel Police Archives, File 7130/Sh/M)

As a result of the Cabinet decision of November 15, 1950, the Israel Police was made responsible for preventing crimes related to food distribution, controlled raw material stocks and services, as well as for preventing price speculation and the black market. This decision forced the Police, at the end of 1950, to establish the Economic Investigations Division, replacing the Economic Section operating within the Criminal Division. Branches of the Economic Investigations Division were established in Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem (Cabinet Decision, Vol. 8, Session 13 - November 15, 1950; Israel Police Annual Report, 1950, p. 42).

During 1950, post mortems began to be carried out by the Tel Aviv Hadassah Hospital Pathologist, a register was kept of criminals whom it was deemed necessary to keep under surveillance, and a register was compiled of immigrants who had been convicted in their countries of



origin for crimes committed there. A collection began to be set up of all sorts of ammunition possible for ballistics comparison purposes. The possibility of establishing a mobile laboratory which could be called to the scene of serious crimes in order to gather and retain evidence was seriously considered.

In 1951, the Forensics Section was detached from the Criminal Division and made directly accountable to the Head of C.I.D. and its scope of activities broadened. As a result, the Section's rate of success in solving crimes increased. That year, the Section had begun organizing a national collection of data on criminals and a centralized registration of property which had been stolen and could be identified. The laboratories were equipped with new photographic equipment, a forensic laboratory was set up, as well as a mobile technical unit to assist in murder and other serious crime investigations. This unit was able to arrive at the scene of the crime after being called in by the field unit, photograph the scene of the crime, sketch the scene and prepare models reconstructing the scene of the crime for presentation in court. The structure and organization of the Economic Investigations Division was altered three times during 1951, as will be described later.

In July 1952, the Forensics Section became a Division, whose responsibility it was to centralize all the scientific aspects of criminal investigations: criminal files, criminal identification and the carrying out all required laboratory examinations. During that

year, the laboratory for miniature models, sketching and crime scene reconstruction was developed. That year, the Forensics Division supervised eleven photography laboratories which were working along with the various Police Sub-districts (Israel Police Annual Report, 1952, p. 48)

The General Division of the C.I.D., which had led to the reorganization within the C.I.D. Stawi's appointment as Head of the Department, was annulled in 1952. Some of its responsibilities were transferred to the Forensics Division and the balance divided among other Divisions in the National Headquarters. As of 1952, the following Divisions were part of the C.I.D.: Criminal Investigations, Economic Investigations and Forensics.

In 1954, in addition to regular C.I.D. publications, the Forensics Division began publishing an issue called "Know the Criminal", wherein were detailed histories of known and dangerous criminals. In addition, that year, the Forensics Division succeeded in developing a number of new examination methods, such as: discovering stamp forgeries; examining suspects' clothing for shreds and dust particles; establishing blood types and human discharges; metallurgic examinations of vehicles involved in traffic accidents; comparing dirt and colour samples; making color photographs (Israel Police Annual Report, 1954, p. 58-59)). In 1955, the Forensics Division began a centralized registry of the emotionally disturbed, including physical descriptions, fingerprints and photographs. In

addition, a number of new laboratory tests were put into use for particles from hands of persons suspected of having fired a weapon, for comparing teeth marks of suspects on food, and chemical tests on gasoline products (Israel Police Annual Report, 1955, p. 51). That same year, due to the load carried by the Forensics Division, a second laboratory was established in Haifa in order to provide partial laboratory services to the units in the Northern and Haifa Districts.

In 1956, the Forensics Division began preparing a classified register of stolen bicycles to be passed out to police stations to enable the identification of stolen bicycles. That same year, many investigators were trained to carry out superficial area searches and examinations instead of having the Forensics Division do so. In addition, new equipment was acquired for improving the physical laboratory, including the acquisition of a spectograph.

In 1957, the end of the first decade of the existence of the Israel Police, the C.I.D. consisted of three Divisions: Criminal Investigations, Economic Investigations and Forensics. The Forensics laboratories, which had become very advanced during those years, were able to carry out tests in the following areas: documents and handwriting; banknotes and coins; weapons and ammunition; metals; plaster casts of footprints; dangerous drugs; bodily discharges; various chemical tests, fires and suspected arson, clothing and hair. That year, the polygraph laboratory was also established. During 1957, the laboratories handled 13,499 exhibits, over half of

them (7,646) document examinations. Toxicology and serology tests were carried out for the Police by Ministry of Health laboratories (Israel Police Annual Report, 1957, p. 56).

#### The Economics Investigations Division

The development of the Economic Investigations Division in the Israel Police and the types of economic investigations which this Division carried out were the results of the economic climate within the country and the need to institute government controls. A regime of controls was usually based on a system of laws which allow government authorities to limit or forbid the carrying out of economic dealings such as: financing, import, export, production, marketing, etc. The Police, within the framework of its regular duties, was authorized to prevent crimes, solve crimes and bring offenders to justice. The economic offences were criminal offences, however they were offences which had to be detected, because the nature of the crimes did not induce people to make complaints. The public was more willing to forgive this type of crime. The economic criminal, the "white collar" criminal, was not considered as a regular criminal, even though we know that the monetary damage caused by this type of criminal could be greater than that, for example, caused by the customary "property" criminal. The following is a history of the development of the Economic Investigations Division in the C.I.D. and a description of its responsibilities as they developed during the first 10 years of the existence of the Israel Police:

On March 1, 1950, within the framework of the reorganization of the C.I.D., the Economic Investigations Section was established within the Criminal Division, mainly to deal with investigating offences concerning money, foreign currency and customs regulations violations. With the introduction of austerity controls and product rationing, which resulted in speculation in merchandise and goods sales, the Cabinet quickly acted to dissolve the black market. The Israel Police, upon the personal orders of the Prime Minister, initiated the "Taleh" Operations, which symbolized the beginnings of Police action against the black market. The Economic Investigations Section was given the task of dealing with all aspects of food controls, controlled merchandise stocks and services by making efforts to prevent violations connected with the black market and by detecting speculators and profiteers. The Section also dealt with offences related to drug use and traffic, and banknote counterfeiting.

On November 15, 1950, following the Cabinet decision to expand the administrative and criminal control authority of the Police over black market violations, the Police Command, decided to turn the Section into a Division and establish branches of this Division in the three main cities: Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (Cabinet Decision, Vol. 8, Session Nr. 13, November 25, 1950; National Archives, File 1/16. Box 3311/G).

During 1951, the structure and duties of the Economic Investigations Division were altered three times: Until the month of

April, authority regarding black market violations was divided between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Police. The Control Division of the Supply and Budget Ministry was disbanded, and approximately 20 employees of this office were transferred to the Police. In April, the Cabinet decided to disband the Control Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and all matters concerning supervision of economic offences were transferred to the Police. For this purpose, three sections were established within the Economic Investigations Division: a food section, a commercial, industrial and services section, and a financial section. Branches of the Division were established in the Districts as well as offices for economic investigations in the Sub-districts.

On April 1, 1951, the Section responsible for preventing foreign currency violations, operating within the Ministry of Finance, was dissolved and its responsibilities were also transferred to the Police, together with five employees of the Section (National Archives, File 17/Foreign Currency, box 2213/L). At the beginning of December 1951, as a result of opposition on the part of the Government economic bureaus, the responsibilities for controlling duties over food, stocks and services were transferred from the Police to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The Police were left with control over financial violations, smuggling and drugs. The economic investigations bureaus in the Sub-districts were dismantled, their employees sent to economic investigations branches in the District Headquarters (Israel Police Annual Report, 1951, p. 44).

In 1953, following recommendations of the Improvements Committee, the Lavon Committee, the Section for preventing smuggling within the Customs Services was dismantled and its responsibilities transferred to the Economic Investigations Division of the Police. In 1958, the responsibility for dealing with drugs violations was transferred from the Economic Investigations Division to the Criminal Investigations Division (Israel Police Annual Report, 1958, p. 56).

From 1954 until the end of 1957, the duties of the Economic Investigations Division were as follows:

- regulating foreign currency regulations, preventing foreign currency speculation and smuggling;
- preventing and uncovering smuggling of merchandise for which customs duties were not paid;
- control over import/export violations;
- regulating travel and tourism services;
- battling against use and traffic of dangerous drugs.

#### The Pathological Institute

When investigating deaths, every police force requires the services of pathologists whose responsibilities are to carry out post mortems and establish the reasons of death. During the British Mandate period, no forensic medicine institute existed in Israel. Autopsies had been carried out by pathologists serving in government hospitals. During the first months of the establishment of the State,

attempts were made to establish a Forensic Medicine Institute in Israel. On August 28, 1948, Dr. Mordechai Itzkowitz of the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem proposed that an institute for examining serious crimes be established similar to the Coroner's offices in the United States. On September 17, 1948, the Director General of the Ministry of Police wrote to the Ministry of Health and proposed the establishment of a joint institute. The Minister of Police also wrote to the Minister of Health on September 21, 1948 concerning the same subject. On September 1, 1949, negotiations were opened between the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Police, the Israel Police and Dr. M. Lowenthal, the pathologist of the Tel Aviv Hadassah Hospital, to examine the possibility of his acting as Police pathologist. On June 26, 1950, Dr. Lowenthal began serving as Police pathologist. On July 15, 1950, a chemist was added to his staff (National Archives, File 5/11, Box 6836/G).

In 1954, Prof. A. Gordon of South Africa, founder of the Leopold Greenberg Foundation and a Jewish South African Supreme Court Judge, visited Israel and established a Chair for Forensic Medicine at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and together with the Israel Police, began searching for an appropriate site for the establishment of the Forensic Medicine Institute. On November 18, 1955, in the presence of Judge Greenberg, the Forensic Medicine Institute in Abu Kabir, Tel Aviv was inaugurated. The Institute's budget is handled by the Police, the Israel Defence Forces, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice (National Archives, File 5/23, Box 6836P/G; Israel



Police Annual Report, 1955, p. 52).

### The Political Police

When, on December 21, 1947, Yehezkel Sahar presented his plan for the organization of the Police Force in the future State of Israel to the "B" Sub-Committee of the Situation Committee of the Jewish Agency, he proposed that the C.I.D be made up of two divisions: The Criminal Division and the Political Division. In fact, Sahar was suggesting a structure identical to that of the C.I.D. in the Mandate period, where the Political Division had been the main body responsible for Intelligence during the British rule of Palestine. According to Sahar's proposal, the Political Division within the Israel Police would have to consist of three sections: Jewish, Aliens, and Minority groups. This Division would have to control and gather intelligence information in the following areas:

- subversive activity on the part of political parties and organizations;
- rebellious activity, incitement, espionage or any other activity aimed at the security of the State;
- keeping track of persons suspected of not being loyal to the State;
- maintaining contact with foreign diplomatic legations;
- gathering information on tendencies among the minorities.

Sahar proposed that the personnel complement of the Division be as follows: Assistant District Commissioner, five Inspectors and

thirty NCO's and policemen (National Archives, file 114/G).

David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister and the first Minister of Defense of Israel, who, at the time, had given Sahar the responsibility of establishing the Israel Police, was convinced that there was no need for a Police Force in a democratic country to deal with political aspects of the country, nor ahead for intelligence control of extremist organizations who had the potential of undermining the State. During the Mandate period, the Hagana had had an intelligence branch, the SHAI (Intelligence Service). From Ben Gurion's point of view, it was perfectly natural that intelligence services, acceptable in every modern country, would evolve from this pre-Independence intelligence service, such as: army, foreign and an internal intelligence services. Discussions concerning the establishment of these intelligence services began with the establishment of the State. On June 7, 1948, Ben Gurion wrote the following entry in his diary:

"It is necessary for Army Headquarters to form an army intelligence service to be headed by Isser (Isser Beeri's nickname) and Vivien (Haim Herzog's former name - later to become the head of the Intelligence Branch of the Army Defense Forces, the Israel Representative to the United Nations, Member of the Knesset and presently President of the State of Israel). The Army Intelligence Service would be responsible for security, censorship and counter-espionage. The Internal Intelligence

Service, headed by "Little Isser" (Isser Harel's nickname, who became head of the Internal Security Services, and the "MOSSAD" - Foreign Intelligence Services, until 1963). The Political Foreign Intelligence Services was to be headed by Reuven Shiloach and, until the end of the war, was to be subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, and afterwards, perhaps to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (Rivlin and Eliyahu Oren, 1984, p. 494).

The intelligence services of Israel were established in a rather makeshift fashion in the midst of the War of Independence, pointing to a lack of professionalism or knowledge in intelligence/organizational affairs. Placing the responsibility for counter-espionage on Army Intelligence clearly points to a lack of experience, since it is well known today that counter-espionage falls under the auspices of bodies responsible for internal security such as the F.B.I. in the United States and MI5 in Great Britain.

That year, no one was responsible for dealing with minorities in Israel (Harel, 1989, p. 104). The Internal Security Services were established in June 1948. Isser Harel, who was appointed head of this Service, changed its name to the "General Security Services", or as it is popularly known, the "SHIN-BET". During the war, the SHIN-BET was an Army body, and later a civilian body, directly accountable to the Prime Minister. The SHIN-BET was responsible for the following:

- gathering intelligence regarding underground organizations with terrorist tendencies;

- carrying out surveillance of subversive persons or organizations active against the government and the laws of the State;
- responsible for security control over Israeli Arabs;
- providing security clearances for Government employees.

In the beginning of 1949, the responsibility for counter-espionage was transferred from Army Intelligence to the SHIN-BET (Ibid., p. 161). On October 26, 1948, the Minister of Police was asked by the members of the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee whether the Israel Police was a political police. The Minister replied that although the Israel Police had copied the organizational structure of the Mandate Police where the C.I.D. acted mainly as a Political Division, the Israel Police had established only a Criminal Division - the Criminal Investigations Department (National Archives, File 16/20, Box 3322/G).

On November 21, 1948, within the framework of discussions in the Cabinet on the structure of the Ministry of Defense, the issue of dividing the responsibilities between that Ministry and other government Ministries was discussed. During that meeting, the Cabinet decided that a Ministerial Committee would be set up, consisting of the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Police, the Minister of the Interior and a representative of the Minister of Defense. The Committee was to investigate the matter of Police criminal investigative responsibilities and the Army Intelligence Office (Cabinet Decisions, Vol. 1, Session 17 - November 21, 1948). On

November 23, 1948, during a meeting of the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee, the Minister of Police notified the members of the Committee that a Ministerial Committee had been established to determine if there was a need for establishing a political criminal investigations bureau. The Minister added that such a bureau had not been as yet established due to the prevailing circumstances (of war), a period during which the Israel Defense Forces were in charge and, therefore, active. According to the Minister, times were changing and during normal times, it was necessary to establish a political police. The Inspector General, Y. Sahar, who was present during this session, explained that establishing a political police was not practical. In his opinion, it was not necessary to designate such a body, since, should a political criminal investigations department be established, it would be a kind of security investigations department which would gather intelligence data regarding movements among Israeli Arabs, intentions to form underground movements and espionage contacts between Israeli nationals and intelligence bodies in Arab countries or other countries in the world.

Y. Nachmias, the Deputy Inspector General, also present at the meeting of the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee, was of the opinion that the Police, whose responsibility it was to handle criminal investigations, should not be required to deal with political matters (National Archives, File 16/20, Box 3322/G).

Written material from the first years of the existence of the

Israel Police indicates that the Police Command did not set aside the idea of establishing a Political Division in the Investigations Department of the Police. On December 5, 1948, Yerachmiel Yaron, the Head of the Israel Police C.I.D., presented the Inspector General, at the latter's request, with a proposal for establishing a Political Division in the C.I.D. The proposal was similar to that put forward by Sahar in 1947, with the addition that the Section for Jewish Affairs would also keep track of the activities of the Communist Party (an issue which, at that time, fell within the sphere of activity of the C.I.D.) and that the Aliens' Section would be responsible for matters involving counter-espionage (National Headquarters Archives, File M/P).

The Special Division which was established in the Israel Police C.I.D. in 1948 handled investigations involving security, and was responsible for coordinating actions between the Police and the various intelligence bodies in the country, however, it would be difficult to say that this, in fact, was a Political Division as delineated in Sahar's proposal of 1947. On May 28, 1949, during a conference for District Commanders, Sahar informed them that they had to start establishing Political Sections in their District headquarters. On December 9, 1949, the Commander of the Tiberias District announced that an Intelligence Section had been established to handle the gathering of data regarding activity in the midst of the Arab population within the District (National Archives, File O2/DA, Box 2147/L; Tiberias District, 104/MTM).

On February 26, 1950, the Deputy Inspector General published an announcement in which he informed the Police population that as of March 1, 1950, the structure of the C.I.D. would be changed to include two Divisions: The Criminal Division and the General Division. The General Division was to be made up of three Sections: the Jewish, Aliens and Minority Sections (National Headquarters Archives, File 7130/H/Sh).

The General Division was not a political police. The Internal Security Services, which was established in July 1948 was, for the meantime, sufficient, particularly in the area of internal security. Isser Harel established principles whereby there was a definite division between Police duties and those of the Internal Security Services. The Security Services gathered intelligence data and was responsible for internal security, political subversives and preventing underground organizations from being formed by Jews or Arabs. The Israel Police, through the offices of the General Division and its branches in the Districts, handled arrests of those targets designated by the Security Services and upon request by the Security Services, handled their investigation and preparation of the criminal files in order to try the suspects in court. The separation of these two authorities was meant to prevent unintentional or arbitrary mistakes, as well as political involvement.

With the passage of years, when the authority and responsibilities of the Internal Security Services and the Police had

become clearer, cooperation between the two bodies flourished. There were exceptions, such as in 1953, when according to a prior coordination agreement between the Police and the Security Services, the Police arrested a group of religious youths who were acting in a suspicious manner, suggestive of an underground organization. The head of the Internal Security Services asked Yeshurun Schiff, then the Head of the Police C.I.D., to release one of the suspects whom the Security Services intended to run as an informer. Schiff refused. The Head of the Security Services complained to the Inspector General, who attempted to convince Schiff. Schiff insisted that he would not release the detainee and was forced to resign as a result (I. Harel, Interview, June 26, 1989; Y. Sahar, Interview, November 27, 1987; Harel, 1989, pp. 164-165).

The Internal Security Services, during the first years of its existence, acted secretly, while publicly denying its own existence. The General Division of the Police C.I.D., during that period, as well as later, when the veil of secrecy over the Security Services was partially lifted, acted as the legal body which carried out overt security verifications, arrests, special activities including sensitive security topics, and preparing criminal files with a view to bringing the suspects to trial. The intelligence, follow-up and covert surveillance stages were carried out by the Security Services in advance. The Security Services, which, during the first year of the establishment of the State, did not trust the political loyalty of a number of members of the Police, in particular those who had served



in the Mandate Police and had expressed sympathy for the declining underground organizations, found a brilliant solution for ensuring control over the Political Section of the Police - Meir Novick, who had been one of Isser Harel's deputies, was transferred to the Police in the beginning of 1952 and appointed Head of the General Division. This step ensured close, mutual cooperation, coordination, and a harmonious working relationship for many years to come between the Israel Police and the Internal Security Services.

At the end of 1952, when the danger of a rebirth of underground activity by the former underground organizations had passed, and a certain sense of stability began to be felt in the country, the General Division was dismantled and most of its responsibilities spread among the Divisions in the National Headquarters. The Minorities Section was transferred to the Organization Department, where it was combined with the Section responsible for preventing and fighting infiltration (MALAB) which had recently been established and was in charge of intelligence/investigative activities on infiltration from Arab countries, a phenomenon which was growing and worsening during that period.

Meir Novick, who, headed the General Division, was appointed Special Duties Officer and made directly accountable to the Inspector General, and continued to be in charge of contacts and coordination between the Police and the Security Services. He was assisted by Aharon Chelouche, a young officer, who, prior to that period, had been

Personal Secretary for Minority Affairs to Minister Shitrit and when the Minorities Office was abolished, had joined the Israel Police.

In 1953, with the increase in infiltration and the Cabinet decision that the Border Guard, a kind of gendarmerie, was to be established under the aegis of the Police, it was decided to raise the level of the Anti-Infiltration Section to that of a Division in the National Headquarters. The Division of Special Duties in the Organization Department was thereby established, the same Department which was responsible for the activities of the Border Guard.

The position of Special Duties Officer was cancelled and Meir Novick, who, in 1952, had transferred to the Israel Police from the Internal Security Services, was appointed the first head of the Special Duties Division. He served in the position until 1958, when he was appointed Head of the Training Division in the Organization Department, and his deputy, Aharon Chelouche, was the appointed Head of the Special Duties Division (MATAM).

The main duties of this Division during the first decade of the existence of the Israel Police was keeping track of Israeli Arabs; dealing with infiltration incidents originating from Arab countries; gathering intelligence data concerning infiltrator activity and transmitting the data to Police and Border Guard units; arresting infiltrators; interrogating infiltrators; bringing them to trial and deporting them back over the border after their sentences had been

served. The Division continued to be in charge of contacts and mutual relations with the Internal Security Services, and even investigated security offences and espionage incidents wherein Jews, Arabs and foreigners were involved (Meir Novick, Interview, September 26, 1989; Aharon Chelouche, Interview, September 16, 1989; Israel Police Annual Report, 1953, p. 5).

#### Border Guard

When, on December 25, 1947, Sahar presented his proposal for the establishment of the Police of the soon-to-be State of Israel, in his opening statement, he pointed out that alongside the Police, there was a need to establish a Gendarmerie which would handle the responsibilities of guarding and securing the rural areas and the borders. These two forces, the Police and the Gendarmerie, would be operated by the command level of the Police. The Police would consist of recruited personnel, while the Gendarmerie would consist of volunteers commanded by Police officers. On the same day, Sahar presented the following detailed proposal for the establishment of the Border Guard:

Gendarmerie responsibilities - To defend the agricultural and border settlements; to assist the Police in restoring the peace and to constitute a strike force to handle riots; to patrol along the roads, the railroad tracks and the borders.

The organizational structure of the Gendarmerie - The Gendarmerie headquarters will be a National Headquarters Division and its

commander given a rank equivalent to that of the Deputy Inspector General; the Gendarmerie will be divided into four companies assigned to Police Districts, subordinate to the District Commanders; the companies will be divided into platoons and the platoons into units. Every unit will consist of a commander and 36 NCO's and policemen; the Gendarmerie will consist of 64 platoons, approximately 4,000 persons. (National Archives, File 41/204, Box 114/G)

The establishment of the Gendarmerie was not approved by the Situation Committee, since it was necessary to recruit a large number of young people for service in the future army and in the Israel Police. With the end of the War of Independence, the Israel Defence Forces began demobilizing a large number of its soldiers and organizing permanent and structured army frameworks. The main goal was to establish a trained and well equipped army force which would be able to withstand the onslaught of the regular armies of the neighboring Arab countries. The topic of guarding the borders on a regular, day-to-day basis, was neglected. The number of Palestinian Arabs infiltrating over the border to visit families, to repopulate villages which had been deserted before or during the war, or to smuggle goods or carry out acts of theft, robbery and murder began to greatly disturb the inhabitants of settlements along the border.

The problem of infiltration became the principal security problem in Israel. The Police, which were responsible for personal and property security, felt that it had to act in order to ensure the

security of border settlements. In spite of the drastic lack of personnel to fill available positions in the Police stations which had been established, the Police Command decided to form patrols which would survey the length of the borders to prevent infiltration and to arrest those who had succeeded in doing so. However, these small patrol groups were not a suitable answer for putting a halt to the growing infiltration.

Sahar, the Inspector General of the Police, worried because the Army was not willing to place some of its men along the borders, and also because of the growth in the scope of infiltration and crime related to it, turned to the Minister of Police, Bechor Shitrit. He reiterated his proposal to establish a Gendarmerie within the Police which would, in the main, deal with the problem of infiltration. On September 6, 1948, the Minister of Police wrote a missive to David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, wherein he reviewed the security situation existing along Israel's borders and in the rural regions, and demanded that a discussion be held in order to find a solution to the situation. On September 10, 1948, Ben Gurion replied that under the present security/political conditions, it was not possible to add the problem of infiltration to the Army's responsibilities, nor was it possible to utilize Police forces for this purpose, taking into consideration the great number of duties which had already been placed on the shoulders of the Police. David Ben Gurion stated that a separate border force had to be established, separate from both Police and Army. On November 16, 1948, the issue of infiltration and the

need for establishing a Gendarmerie were brought up for discussion before the Internal Affairs Committee of the Provisional State Council, and on June 21, 1949, before the Internal Affairs Committee of the first Knesset (National Archives, File 1/67, Box 3311/G).

On February 6, 1949, the Prime Minister appointed a committee, headed by Shaul Avigur (one of his most faithful followers), with David Shaltiel and Sahar, the Inspector General, as its other members, in order to decide upon the minimal number of positions required for operating the Police and the Gendarmerie. On March 17, 1949, the Committee proposed the establishment of a Gendarmerie, which would be part of the Israel Police, and whose duties would consist of the following:

- guarding the nation's borders in areas which are not the responsibility of the Army;
- preventing actions by infiltrators and robbers;
- assisting the Police in dealing with public disorders and riots;
- protecting strategically important installations such as: traffic arteries, sea routes and oil pipelines;
- protecting the public, rural or sparsely populated areas.

(Border Guard Archives, Document 1-58)

The Army Command was undecided as to whether or not the Gendarmerie should be established under the aegis of the Police or whether it should be under Army control, and whether or not it should support the establishment of a separate Border Force at all. During

the meeting of the Police Commanding Officers which took place on May 28, 1949, the Inspector General announced that discussions concerning the establishment of the Gendarmerie had been going on for three months and that no decision had been taken as yet. The subject would be brought up before the Prime Minister. On June 25, 1949, the Inspector General notified the Commanding Officers that apparently, because of budgetary considerations, it had been decided that the Gendarmerie would be part of the regular army. On September 9, 1949, the Inspector General announced that responsibility for securing the Northern border had been placed on the Police, asked that arrangements be made to appoint Police forces for that purpose, and ordered the Head of the Administration Department to order green-colored berets for the special forces, which consisted of 350 persons.

On September 21, 1949, Ya'akov Dori, Army Chief-of-Staff, General David Shaltiel and Shaul Avigur met with the Prime Minister to discuss the establishment of the Gendarmerie. General Shaltiel proposed the establishment of an independent Border Force, directly accountable to the Minister of Defense, whose actions would be coordinated with the Police. Apparently, the Prime Minister accepted General Shaltiel's proposal, since, on September 23, 1949, the Inspector General notified the Commanding Officers that the establishment of a Border Force had been decided upon and that the Police could remove its forces from the borders. On September 26, 1949, the Prime Minister visited Police Headquarters, met with the Police Commanding Officers and discussed with them the various problems within the Police. On that occasion,

the Inspector General did not hesitate to criticize the decision to establish a Border Force as a separate body, rather than as part of the Israel Police (National Archives, File 02/RA, Box 2147/L; Border Guard Archives, Documents 1-85, 1-88, 1-89, 1-90).

On October 10, 1949, Nachmias, the Deputy Inspector General, wrote a letter to Shaul Avigur wherein he stated that the establishment of the Gendarmerie as a separate body would not be the correct step to take. The steps which would be necessary to coordinate between the Border Force, the Police and the Army were complex and not at all efficient. The danger existed that the three bodies would compete with each other and thereby harm the common interest - the efficient securing of the borders. On October 12, 1949, the Government Information Bureau announced the establishment of the Border Force. General D. Shaltiel was appointed its commander (Border Guard Archives, Document 1-94; Ha-Aretz, October 13, 1949).

According to General Shaltiel's plan, 600 volunteers were to be recruited during the initial stages, 100 of them Circassians and the rest Jews from fighting units in the Army, and new immigrants who would receive special training. When General Shaltiel visited the Prime Minister on January 6, 1950, he once again brought up the question of which body would be responsible for the activities of this Force (Border Guard Archives, Document 2-9).

Recruitment efforts for the Border Force were not very



successful, because former soldiers were reluctant to reenlist in a new army framework, since, at that time, the Border Force was the first permanent unit in an army which had only recently begun organizing itself into permanent units. The Army, as a result of its reorganization, was not ready to send recruits to the Border Force, and therefore Army Command tended to pass Border Force missions over to the Police. During discussions which took place in the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee on this issue on February 21, 1950, many of the Knesset members showed a preference for transferring responsibility for the Border Force to the Police. In the meantime, the Police continued to be responsible for guarding the Northern border of the country. During March and April, Syria initiated several shooting incidents in the area of the Huleh Lake, where Israel was carrying out reclamation activities around the Lake. The Israel Police guarded those working in the area and stationed a unit consisting of 45 policemen there (National Archives, File 1/36/Sh, Box 2301/L).

The Border Force was originally planned to consist of two battalions. By the beginning of 1950, one battalion 895, consisting of 500 recruits, was operational and attempts to fill the second troop's personnel complement were unsuccessful. Even though the Army was not enthusiastic over the formation of the Border Force and the way in which it was to fulfill its assignments, Headquarters suggested that Battalion 895 join the Police, on condition that its structure and training remain military. On May 17, 1950, Battalion 895 was attached to the Israel Police for the period of one year and the

Police broadened its sphere of responsibilities to include guarding borders and preventing infiltration along the Eastern border up to the region of Beit Naballah as well (Border Guard Archives, Document 2-59, 2-69).

On May 25, 1950, it became known that General David Shaltiel, the Commander of the Border Force, had been appointed Israeli Military Attache in France. That was actually the beginning of the dissolution of the Border Force (Ha-Aretz, May 25, 1950). On September 30, 1950, it was decided to dissolve the Border Force and to establish a "Guard Force" within the Police which, at first, would consist of 500 policemen divided into four companies, one company in every Police District, subordinate to the District Commander (Border Guard Archives, Documents 2-115, 2-117).

On January 5, 1951, during a meeting of the Commanding Officers, the Inspector General announced that the Guard Force would, as of that day, be called the "Border Guard". He called upon all of the youths of Israel to join the Border Guard. Two years' service in the Border Guard would be recognized as mandatory Army service. During the Officers' meeting on January 12, 1951, the Inspector General requested suggestions for the Border Guard insignia. During the second half of January, police officers who had volunteered to serve in the Border Guard and had been assigned to train as commanders for this new force, arrived in the National Training Base in Shfar'am. They underwent command training and prepared the groundwork for absorbing recruits to

the soon-to-be established Border Guard companies. During that same month, Lt. Colonel Maxim Cohen, a former British Army officer, was recruited to serve as the person responsible for Border Guard Affairs in the Police National Headquarters. On February 21, 1951, Sahar visited the Prime Minister and reported that the Army had transferred 380 soldiers to the Police from the disbanded Border Force. Some of them were already in the Police training bases and would finish their training on March 27, 1951. The Police succeeded in recruiting 120 additional persons, and requested a budget for acquiring vehicles, communications equipment and for building Border Guard stations along the borders. On April 7, 1951, the Inspector General, during a meeting of the Senior Commanding Officers, announced that despite his oft-repeated requests addressed to the Prime Minister and the promises he had received, no budget had, as yet, been allocated to the Border Guard. If the necessary budget were not received by the end of April, the Police would be forced to disband the Border Guard and transfer its personnel to regular Police duties (Border Guard Archives, Documents 3-4, 3-7, 3-17, 3-24, 3-43, 3-50).

In spite of the Inspector General's threats, the Border Guard was not disbanded. On April 18, 1951, the Police had 106 Border Guard policemen; during 1951, three basic courses were held for Border Guard recruits, in which they were trained in the necessary police duties and Army skills necessary for carrying out their responsibilities along the borders. Graduates of these courses were organized within the framework of companies and divisions and sent to serve in the

border regions, under the aegis of the Police Sub-district commanders. By the end of 1951, three companies were in operation, attached to the Northern, Haifa and Tel Aviv Districts, a total of 70 persons. In Jerusalem, a Police unit consisting of 120 persons continued to carry out patrol duties along the borders and attempted to prevent infiltration. On August 19, 1952, the effective strength of the Border Guard was increased to 363 persons as a result of the security requirements in the area of the Huleh Lake (Israel Police Annual Report, 1951, p. 25; National Archives, File 1/20/Sh, Box 2283/G; Border Guard Archives, Documents 3-184; 4-136).

On March 29, 1953, the Cabinet met on the security situation along the borders of the country. The Prime Minister announced that the Army was unable to release the forces necessary for guarding the borders, and in addition, it was not the responsibility of the Army in peacetime to ensure internal security. During the previous few years, the internal security situation had become increasingly more difficult, causing tens of citizen casualties and hundreds of thousands of Israeli Pounds in financial losses due to damages. A feeling of insecurity existed in the border settlements and in the settlements around Jerusalem. It was necessary to establish the Border Guard, and the Police had already begun assigning small units of forces along the Northern border, however, these forces were not sufficient and it was necessary to face the problem of establishing a Border Guard worthy of its name. It was proposed that the Army continue to be responsible for guarding the borders from the 70th

parallel southward, and that the Police, through the Border Guard which would be established under its aegis, would guard the border from the 70th parallel northward. It was therefore necessary to allot an additional budget of 2.5 million pounds in order that the Police be able to recruit nine Border Guard companies in addition to the three which the Police were already using for this purpose. The Cabinet approved the Prime Minister's proposal (Border Guard Archives, Document 4-246; Cabinet Decision, Vol. 19, 38th Session, March 29, 1953).

On April 19, 1953, the Head of the Administrative Department approved the recruitment of six Border Guard companies of 110 policemen each, a total of 660 persons. On April 24, 1953, Pinchas Koppel, a former Army lieutenant-colonel and a member of the "Dan" transportation cooperative, was recruited into the Border Guard and appointed to the post of the new Border Guard Commander, with a rank equivalent to that of District Commander. During 1953, members of the three police companies assigned to guarding and patrolling the length of the Northern and Central borders of the country since 1951, were sent to the training base in Shfar'am, in order to undergo training together with the new recruits during 12-week courses. By the end of the year, 486 persons had been trained in that manner (Border Guard Archives, Documents 4-266, 4-270, 7-33).

On March 12, 1954, National Headquarters Directive 36/54 - The Structure of the Border Guard - was published. This directive

established the responsibilities of the Border Guard to be as follows:

- guarding the country's borders from infiltrators;
- organizing a guard system in the settlements and supervising the implementation of this system;
- planning settlement defense regarding infiltrators;
- retaining a trained cadre and having it fulfill all duties assigned by the Inspector General.

Members of the Border Guard were assigned a khaki uniform with a special emblem and green berets. They were empowered with the same authority and responsibilities as that vested in the other members of the Police. The Border Guard consisted of a Headquarters, battalions, companies and departments. The Commander of the Border Guard coordinated with the Head of the Organization Department in the Police National Headquarters. Border Guard units were posted along the borders and in agricultural areas while being administratively accountable to Police Sub-district commanders in order to be able to avail themselves of administrative, logistic and transport services. During the Staff meetings of May 11, 1954 and 18 May 1954, Police District commanders expressed to the Inspector General their opposition to the fact that the Border Guard Companies were not operationally subordinate to the Sub-district commanders. The Inspector General explained that the the Border Guard was not operationally accountable to Sub-district commanders for tactical reasons and to enable it to organize itself and complete their training program.

On June 1, 1954, the Border Guard was given the responsibility of securing the settlements in the North and in the center of the country. This responsibility consisted of: organizing a defense system in the settlements; organizing weapon distribution among the settlements; keeping and caring for weapons; planning and providing advice to settlements regarding perimeter fencing and the installation of security lighting. The settlements were grouped into sections and a local security officer was assigned in every settlement (RABASH). According to this arrangement, the Israel Police, through the offices of the Border Guard, were responsible for the security of 254 border settlements and 354 other settlements. 100 local security officers were recruited and paid from the Jewish Agency budget, and an additional 50, from the Police budget. On November 21, 1954, there were 1,263 Border Guard members in the Police (Border Guard Archives, 7-367; National Archives, File 3/1/Sh, Box 2343/L).

During the years 1954-55, work procedures for the Border Guard were consolidated as follows: day and night patrols (both foot and motorized), border observation posts, ambushes, road- and other blocks, searches, pursuing infiltrators, using trackers and dogs, and inspecting guard systems in settlements (day and night). The Border Guard was responsible for guarding the country's borders along the Northern border and the Eastern border until Lachish. The organizational structure of the Border Guard during 1955 was as follows:

Border Guard CommanderDivision I

Company A - Jerusalem

Company B - Har-Tuv

Division II

Company C - Ramle

Company E - Kfar Saba

Division III

Company F - Karkur

Company G - Afula

Company H - Zefat

Company I - Zemach

(Source: Border Guard Archives, Document 10-142)

Acts of provocation on the part of the Egyptian regular forces, as well as on the part of the irregular forces, called "Fedayeen" (suiciders) who often penetrated across the border from the Gaza Strip and caused many victims in Israel, preventing Israeli vessels from reaching the Port of Ellat, forced Israel, on October 29, 1956, to initiate an army operation, the "Kadesh" operation, against Egypt. Britain and France joined Israel in this operation. Fearing that Jordan would join the war, a state of emergency was declared along the border with Jordan. Border Guard companies were annexed to the Army and positioned in bunkers along the borders and posted in places overlooking the Israeli Arab villages near the border, lest the village inhabitants rise and carry out terrorist acts against the Army.

The Army commander responsible for the area declared an evening



curfew in the Arab villages in the area. Responsibility for enforcing the curfew was placed upon Battalion 2 of the Border Guard, which was ordered to scrupulously enforce the curfew, and should the curfew be broken, actually open fire. When the Army commanding officer was asked by the Commanding officer of the Border Guard Battalion what would be the fate of any village resident returning home after nightfall after having worked in the center of the country, after curfew, the Army commander replied in Arabic: "God be merciful".

The Border Guard unit commander who was ordered to enforce the curfew in Kfar Kassem, a village near the Jordanian border, ordered his men to shoot any villager seen outside of his home after 1700 hours. That same evening, members of this unit shot and killed 47 men, women and children returning to the village after curfew.

The Battalion commander, the unit commander and nine other members of the Border Guard were arrested for questioning that same night. David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, during a Knesset discussion on the events of that night, called this "a horrible deed", and expressed the shock of Israeli citizens, and first and foremost that of the Israeli Government, at this frightening incident. All members of the Knesset rose for a moment of compassion and identification with the victims, the residents of Kfar Kassem.

The Battalion commander and ten members of the Border Guard went to trial before an Army tribunal at the beginning of 1957. The trial

lasted several months and in the end, eight persons were indicted for murder, three declared not guilty. On October 16, 1958, the Battalion commander was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment, the unit commander and one NCO were sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, and the rest, to seven years. The trial was covered by several organs of the press. Many articles were written, including headline articles and editorials, and many readers sent letters to the editor concerning this incident.

The courts interpreted paragraph 19 of Penal Code, the paragraph which dealt with the criminal responsibility of a person who had committed a deed as a result of obeying an order from an authority which the law obligates him to obey, and decided that if it is clear that the order is of an illegal nature, the soldier or policeman is exempted from following that order, and if he does obey it, he has to bear the criminal responsibility for the consequences ('Al Ha-Mishmar, October 24, 1958; Davar, October 17, 1958; Inbar, 1982, p. 188).

The horrible experience of Kfar Kassem, despite the fact that the guilty Border Guard policemen were sent to prison, and despite the fact that the Cabinet, the Knesset and all of the Israeli public condemned this cruel and criminal act, was very damaging to the public image of the Border Guard. Previously the Border Guard had been greatly admired and encouraged by all strata of the public, particularly by the residents of the agricultural settlements and the

border settlements. In fact, this sad incident has been part of the Border Guard history to this day and has diminished the achievements of this great force. Thus, the unorthodox actions of a few degraded the good name of a whole force.

By enlarging personal training, strengthening discipline, ensuring that behavior be according to the law and Police regulations, the Border Guard, in part, atoned for the incident in Kfar Kassem. By the end of 1958, the Border Guard had turned into a professional, efficient, dedicated force. The Border Guard succeeded in overcoming and reducing the scope of infiltration and crime occurring as a result of infiltration and developed unusual work systems which suited its goals. The Border Guard turned into the principal defense force of the Border settlements, accepted and needed by the residents and the people of Israel as a whole.

The Border Guard was rehabilitated due to the pressing needs of security and as a solution to a situation which pointed to a lack of security along the borders and the border settlements, it proved its tenacity and efficiency, and served as a respectable solution for the situation during that period.

Following is a detailed table indicating the personnel strength of the Border Guard since its establishment until the end of 1958:

Table 30 - Border Guard Effective Strength, 1951-1958

| Year | Strength | Complement | Settlement<br>Security | Data Source           |
|------|----------|------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1951 | 330      |            | -                      | 20/1/Sh - Box 2283/L  |
| 1952 | 363      |            | -                      | 20/1/Sh - Box 2283/L  |
| 1953 | 974      | 1,073      | -                      | 52/Sh - Box 2302/L    |
| 1954 | 1,148    |            | 135                    | 3/1/Sh - Box 2343/L   |
| 1955 | 1,148    | 1,670      | 574                    | 3/1/Sh - Box 2343/L   |
| 1956 | 1,100    |            | 597                    | Bor. Gd. Arch. 12-194 |
| 1958 | 884      | 867        | 584                    | Pol. Arch. 01/RT      |

### Chapter X: Accountability and Police Structure

According to Robert Reiner, in order for a police force in a democratic country to behave responsibly and in accordance with the law, the country must develop control standards which regulate the work of the police. It is possible to distinguish the following three types of regulation systems:

- a legislative or semi-legislative system capable of establishing an order of preference for allocating resources to bodies which enforce the law of the State;
- a legal system which can establish whether a particular action on the part of the police was legal, or whether it went beyond the law or any other procedural regulation;
- an administrative system which will be able to run law enforcement bodies in a more efficient and expedient manner (Reiner, 1984, p. 18).

Bailey was convinced that police control had to be carried out by supervisory bodies from both outside and inside the police. Internal supervision should be carried out by commanders at various command levels by effecting tight discipline, issuing written directives and instructions, and assigning mutual responsibility within the department. There are two types of external control: External-Exclusive and External-Inclusive. The External-Exclusive apparatus include those systems which dedicate most of their time to regulating

the police. External-Inclusive apparatus are those very institutions which carry out controls over the police in an indirect manner or as part of its other activities (Bailey, 1985, p. 161).

This chapter will discuss and examine the bodies and institutions which supervised the Police during the first decade of its existence, both on an External-Exclusive basis and on an External-Inclusive basis. This examination will not include internal accountability within the Police, because there is almost no difference between internal controls used by the Israel Police, and those used by other Police forces in the United States or in Europe. It is more important to present and examine the external supervisory bodies, as they evolved in Israel, the country which replaced a Mandate/Colonial regime, and the manner in which controls were exercised over the Israel Police. However, in order to examine accountability procedures for the police, it is, first necessary to explain the characteristics of the regime existing in the State of Israel:

#### The Regime in the State of Israel

The regime in the State of Israel is Parliamentary, republican, based on a democracy run by representatives elected to the Knesset (the Parliament) in direct, free, secret and proportional elections. In the absence of a formal constitution, the legislative body is supreme over all other institutions in the country.

### The Provisional State Council

The Provisional State Council possessed legislative authority from the first day of the establishment of the State. It established the make-up and authority for all other national institutions and enacted the laws until the election of the first Knesset, which began operating on February 14, 1949.

### The Knesset

The Knesset took over from the Provisional Council as the legislative authority of the State. The Knesset consists of 120 members, representatives of the different parties according to their relative sizes, as per the results of the Knesset elections. Knesset members are elected to four year terms by all citizens of the country aged 18 or over. Among the Knesset's duties are the expression of confidence in the Government (the operative branch of the country). A large part of the Knesset's activity is dedicated to regular supervision of institutions in the operative branch - the Cabinet and the governmental administrative apparatus. The Knesset is empowered to approve the national budget and establish which taxes and other levies will be imposed on the citizens of the country. The Knesset is directed by the Chairman and his deputies and has sub-committees. To a certain extent, a member of the Knesset enjoys legal and administrative immunity regarding all actions related to the fulfillment of his/her responsibilities as a member of the Knesset.

### The President of Israel

The President of Israel has representative and symbolic responsibilities. According to the law in force in Israel, the President places the responsibility for forming a government on one of the members of the Knesset, usually, a representative of the largest party in the elected Knesset. The President is also empowered to pardon prisoners, sign diplomatic notes presented by foreign diplomats as well as various official documents, along with the Prime Minister or one of the Ministers. The President is elected by the Knesset to a five year term and enjoys complete immunity during the term of office with regard to all actions taken in relation to the fulfillment of the duties of the office.

### The Cabinet

Following Knesset elections, the President, after consultations with the representatives of the various parties in the Knesset, places the responsibility for forming the Cabinet upon one of the members of the Knesset. The Cabinet consists of the Prime Minister and a number of Ministers appointed from among the members or non-members of the Knesset. Most of Israel's Cabinets were made up of coalitions, opposed in the Knesset by the Opposition, which consisted of representatives from parties which had not joined the Coalition. The first actions of the Government depend upon a vote of confidence expressed by a majority in the Knesset. The powers which, according



to the law, were assigned to the High Commissioner during the British Mandate, were, in the State of Israel, accorded to the Prime Minister or the Cabinet Ministers. The Cabinet establishes the internal and foreign policy of the country, initiates the enactment of laws by the Knesset and ensures their implementation.

#### The State Comptroller

A supervisory institution, the Comptroller is appointed by the nation's President to a five-year term of office, based upon recommendations expressed by the Knesset Committee. The State Comptroller is accountable to the Knesset for the following: regulating the administration of the economic and property aspects of the country, the local councils, industry and institutions in which the Government participates in administering.

#### The Judicial System

This is the third authoritative power in the State, alongside the Legislative Authority (the Knesset) and the Operational Authority (the Cabinet). The Judicial Authority consists of civil courts established at three levels: Magistrate's Courts, District Courts and a Supreme Court. There are also special jurisprudence organs, such as Municipal Courts, Military Tribunals, Administrative Courts, Ethnic Courts, and Labor Courts. Judges are completely non-partisan. The Supreme Court acts as a High Court of Justice, authorized to issue writs of Habeas

Corpus (a court order which enables a person to be released from custody if there is no legal basis for arrest) or court orders ordering public servants or public institutions to act or refrain from acting (conditional court orders), as well as to issue absolute orders. The High Court of Justice is an important tool for ensuring that public institutions act according to the law. The Cabinet and its institutions, as well as the different courts, must obey Supreme Court decisions. Only the Knesset, in its function as the legislative body of the country, is not obligated to be controlled by the High Court of Justice. The law presently in existence in Israel has its roots in Mandate Legislation which, on the whole, was adopted by the State of Israel with its creation (with the exception of laws which had previously limited Jewish immigration to Israel and the purchase of lands in many areas of the country). The Mandatory laws themselves are rooted in the Ottoman Law, which had been used before November 1, 1914, the Palestinian laws in force between 1920-1948 and the British Common Law. Laws which are based on religious laws, and laws which have been enacted since the establishment of the State in 1948, have joined the above-mentioned sources to form the laws presently in force in the State of Israel.

#### External-Exclusive Control Systems in the Israel Police

In the State of Israel, the Prime Minister and the whole of the Cabinet can, in addition to its other responsibilities, take an interest in, or receive reports concerning the workings of the Israel

Police or regarding actions taken concerning any particular incident, as had been the case during the British Mandate where the High Commissioner or the First Secretary of the Mandatory Government were concerned. Since the Israeli Cabinet did not devote most of its time to supervising the Police, it could not be considered an Exterior-Exclusive system, and therefore, that portion of the Government which carried out controls regarding the Israel Police will be examined within the framework of an Exterior-Inclusive control system.

Within the State of Israel, there is only one police organization, and it is a national one - the Israel National Police. If local police forces exist in the cities and in the various rural areas, they are part of the Israel Police, the National Police. Only one person is occupied full-time with the Exterior-Exclusive control system of the Israel Police, and that is the Minister of Police. Did not the creation of the function of Minister of Police in the Israel Cabinet, and the establishment of a National Police - having a somewhat military orientation - embody the danger that Israel might become a Police state? This question will be discussed further on in this chapter.

#### The Minister of Police

According to early planning on the part of the "Situation Committee" which, in November 1947, had been appointed by the Jewish Agency to propose organizational structures for Government Ministries

in the future State of Israel, it was decided that the Minister of the Interior would be ministerially responsible, among other duties, for the Police and the Prison Services as well. Since the Minister of the Interior-designate, Yitzhak Greenbaum, had refused to accept responsibility for the Police (for details, see page 217), David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister-designate, decided that the future Cabinet would have a separate portfolio for Police affairs, and that Bechor Shitrit would be given the responsibilities of the Ministry of Police, in addition to his duties as Minister for Minority Affairs. During the British Mandate period, Bechor Shitrit had served as a Police officer, and later, as a judge.

On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was declared, the first Cabinet headed by David Ben Gurion was appointed, and Bechor Shitrit was indeed appointed Minister of two Government Ministries: The Ministry of Police and the Ministry for Minorities. According to the Transition Law, the powers of the British High Commissioner were transferred to the Israeli Cabinet. The Cabinet divided its powers among the different Cabinet Ministers according to paragraph 2(e) of the Judicial and Government Ordinance, 1948. The Minister of Police was accorded powers established in the Police Ordinance, 1926, and the Prisons Ordinance, 1946 (The State of Israel, Provisional Government - Official News Gazette, Nr. 5 of June 14, 1948, pp. 22-24).

According to the Police Ordinance, 1926, which had not been changed with the establishment of the State, the powers vested in the

Minister of Police were as follows:

- to establish the composition of the Police and its personnel positions [para. 5(1)].
- to appoint senior officers from the rank of Assistant District Commander (Captain). To the appointment of Inspector General, contingent upon Cabinet approval [para. 5(2)].
- to approve dismissal of officers [para. 18 (10)].
- to review Police Disciplinary Court sentences handed down which are over three months' imprisonment, to temper or suspend those sentences [para. 18(8)].
- to ratify suspension of a senior officer who is being investigated for committing a criminal or disciplinary offence (para. 19).
- to institute regulations regarding subjects related to the Police Ordinance (para. 50).
- in times of war, following a Cabinet decision, to declare that the Police or part of it will become an army unit and be placed under Army command (para. 51).
- to appoint Police officers as judges regarding Disciplinary Court decision [para. 111(3)]

The Police Ordinance also accorded the Inspector General of the Police with a long list of powers. Following are a few of the principal ones:

- the Inspector General is responsible for the running of the Police and the manner in which its units are divided, and over the monies and property belonging to the Police [para. 7(1)].

- to recruit policemen [para. 7(2)].
- to dismiss policemen, to demote them when they have been found to have acted irresponsibly and inefficiently [para. 7(3)].
- to promote policemen [para. 7(4)].
- to have every Police officer swear an oath of allegiance (para. 13).
- to punish officers through dismissal, demotion, fine, reprimand [para. 17(4)].
- to appoint the bench of the Disciplinary Courts [para. 18(1)].
- to ratify disciplinary Court decisions, to temper or suspend sentences.
- to decide where the detention or incarceration is to take place (para. 18c).
- to suspend policemen who are the subject of investigations for having committed a serious criminal or disciplinary offence.
- to authorize irregular recruitment of policemen and the employment of policemen by civilian institutions [paras. 29 (1), 30)].
- to appoint officers to serve as prosecutors in the Disciplinary Courts (para. 109).
- with the approval of the Minister of Police, to institute regulations regarding Police disciplinary matters, promotions and the protection of Police monies and property (The Israel Police, Police Ordinance and Regulations, Terminology and Publications Section, Jerusalem, 1967).

The establishment of a separate Ministry for Police affairs was the subject of political and public disagreement for many years. The

liberation from the yoke of foreign oppression with the end of the British Mandate gave birth to an atmosphere of freedom of expression, an absence of prejudice and stimulated the consolidation of political parties from the time of the British Mandate, and accelerated the establishment of new political parties. The different parties were not favorable to the idea of establishing a separate Ministry for Police Affairs, seeing in that a danger to the democratic ideal and the possibility that a Police State would be the result. On June 17, 1948, within the context of initial discussions in the Provisional State Council in an attempt to assemble a Cabinet, N. Nir-Refalex pointed out that the establishment of a separate Ministry for Police Affairs would create a possible State within a State. He stressed that, to the best of his knowledge, most of the democratic countries in the world do not have such an internal arrangement. Later, the speaker criticized the structure of the Police wherein a Headquarters was organized in the same manner as an Army Headquarters. What do the Police have in common with an Army organizational structure? He thought that the subject of criminal investigations should be transferred to the Ministry of Justice (State of Israel, Provisional State Council, Fourth Session, June 17, 1948, pp. 22-26).

During discussions regarding the Transition Law, 1949, held on February 16, 1949 by the First Knesset, during when the issue of the establishment of Cabinet Ministries and their numbers was being discussed, Knesset member Menachem Begin of the "Herut" party objected to the establishment of a Police Ministry, because, as he put it,

there was no room for such a Ministry in a free country (Knesset Minutes, Vol. 1, 1949, p. 40). On March 8, 1949, David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, informed the Knesset of the constitution of his Cabinet after the elections. Bechor Shitrit continued to act as Minister of Police. During a political discussions which took place immediately after the Prime Minister's announcement, Knesset member Samuel Mironis of the Communist Party announced that his party was opposed to a separate Police Ministry and that the place of the Police was in the Ministry of the Interior. Members of the Knesset belonging to the Sefaradi party, the party to which Minister B. Shitrit belonged, promoted the idea of a separate Ministry of Police (Knesset Minutes, Vol. 1, 1949, pp. 97-113).

At times, during Knesset discussions regarding the State budget, some Knesset members, when discussing the Police budget, would criticize the existence of a separate Police Ministry (statement made by Knesset member Arie ben Eliezer of the "Herut" party on August 31, 1949 and June 27, 1950 - Knesset Minutes, Vol. 3, 1950, p. 1890). The Ministry of Police was very sensitive to any mention of annulling the Ministry. On December 31, 1948, Yitzhak Chissik, the Director General of the Ministry of Police, issued a memorandum to the press wherein he detailed the duties and responsibilities of the Ministry of Police, its structure, its powers and the activities carried out by this Ministry since its inception. On January 26, 1949, the Director General issued a similar memorandum to all members of the Cabinet, in which he emphasized the need for a separate Ministry of Police, in



view of the conditions existing within the country, the nature of the population and the particular problems of the State. The existence of a Minister, continued the Director General, who only deals with the Police and the Prison Services, enables the efficient development of those services for the good of the population (National Archives, File 13, box 5662/G).

During the first years of the existence of the State, serious disagreements came to light between the Minister of Police and his Director General, on the one hand, and the Inspector General on the other. The root of the disagreement was the interpretation of the Police Ordinance, 1926, and the powers which this Ordinance granted to the Minister of Police, to the Director General of the Ministry of Police and to the Inspector General of the Police. The Minister of Police, Bechor Shitrit, was certain that he, in fact, gave orders to the Inspector General, while, at the same time, he had more police and judicial experience and knowledge than the Inspector General. The Director General of the Ministry of Police was certain that, as in other Government Ministries, he stood between the Minister and the Ministry Branches - the Israel Police and the Prison Services. This meant that if the Inspector General wanted to approach the Minister of Police on any matter, he would have to do so through him (the Director General). The Inspector General was of the opinion that the Police Ordinances empowered him to run the Police independently and to give orders to its policemen as he thought best, while carrying out their police duties in accordance with the laws of the State. The Inspector

General considered that there was no authority over him except for the law, and that the Minister of Police was the Police's representative before the Cabinet and the Knesset. He and his Ministry were the civilian authority while the Police was an operative body charged with preventing crimes, solving crimes and guarding the persons and property in the State (Yuchtman and Gamson, 1977, p. 202).

Sahar, the first Inspector General of the Police, said: "To tell the truth, I did not like this institution (the Ministry of Police) from the beginning. The Police is an institution defined by law, and in spite of the fact that with the establishment of the State, some of the powers vested in the High Commissioner were transferred to the Minister of Police, the authority for running the Police remained in the hands of the Inspector General. I was satisfied that the responsibility of the Minister of Police was to ensure the acquisition of an appropriate budget for the Police, and he was not very successful at obtaining this since he was unable to convince the Treasury, therefore, I (the Inspector General) was obliged to deal with this every year. He was also required to represent the Police in the Cabinet and to protect Police standing and interests - and this also, he did not do. The parliamentary responsibility in the Knesset was properly carried out. The Minister had ambitions - to command the Police. I was not willing to accede to this". (Interview with Yehezkel Sahar, November 30, 1977).

Following are some examples of "conflicts" between the Ministry

of Police and the Inspector General:

- On July 23, 1948, the Inspector General wrote a letter to the Minister of Police, wherein he informed him that of late, members of the Ministry of Police tended to approach Police field units directly, and not through the offices of the National Headquarters, as required by the regulations. The Inspector General asked that the Minister instruct his personnel to turn to Headquarters regarding every subject, in order not to harm Police discipline. The Minister requested that the Inspector General provide specific examples, and the Inspector General did so in an additional letter (National Archives, File 1/12, Box 3310/G).

- After the Minister of Police and the Director General had proposed several citizens to Headquarters as candidates for positions or to be sent to the Officers' Course, on August 25, 1948, the Inspector General wrote the following to the Minister: "I am not prepared to accept into the Officers' Academy people from outside of the Police. Candidates must be from within the Police Force ... the choice of candidates for promotion is a Police matter and no political party, movement or ethnic group has the right to interfere in this matter". The Director General, Y. Chissik, pointed out in a letter to the Inspector General: "I do not think that this is the most correct and final line to take - I shall include this issue on the agenda of the meeting (reference is made to the weekly meeting between the Minister of Police and the Inspector General, during which the Director General was also present) (National Archives, File 1/52, Box 5835/G).

- On August 29, 1948, the Minister of Police sent a memorandum to all

Government Ministries, wherein he announced that the Police was accountable to the Ministry of Police, and therefore, as of the receipt of this memo, all requests to the Police must be made through the Ministry of Police (National Archives, File 16/6, Box 3311/G).

- The first and most serious difference of opinion between the Minister of Police and the Inspector General occurred in September 1948, when the Director General of the Ministry of Police, Y. Chissik, pointed out to the Inspector General, in writing, that he should refrain from appointing senior officers to the Police because he was not empowered to do so, that only the Minister of Police was empowered to do so. The Inspector General replied to the Minister, that according to Addendum Nr. 2 in the Official Gazette nr. 436 of April 26, 1934, p.368, the High Commissioner, at the time, had empowered the Inspector General to appoint senior officers. The Police Minister, having looked into this claim and found it to be justified, turned to the Ministry of Justice and demanded that this authority be cancelled, and indeed in the Official Gazette nr. 41 of January 7, 1949, p. 266, the authority of the Inspector General to appoint senior officers was repealed and the Minister of Police began signing such appointments (National Archives, File 1/15, Box 3310/G).

- On March 8, 1949, the Inspector General proposed to the Minister of Police a new staff strength for the Israel Police. On March 15, 1949, the Minister returned the proposal to the Inspector General, pointing out that he had not been consulted prior to presenting the proposal, and instructed him, in the future, not to carry out any structural or organizational changes in the Police without his approval and

agreement (National Archives, File 1/54, Box 3310/G).

- On February 11, 1949, the Minister of Police sent a letter to the Prime Minister wherein he criticized the press and those members of the Knesset who had suggested cancelling the Ministry of Police and placing the Israel Police under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Justice. In his opinion, those proposals had caused unrest among the command levels of the Police and had harmed the mutual relations between the Ministry of Police and Police Headquarters. The Senior Officer ranks within the Police were not yet fully professional and the fact that the Police was under the jurisdiction of a special office, which was in a position to devote all of its time to advancing its interests, could only benefit the country and the public." The Minister of Police went on and itemized the responsibilities of the Ministry of Police: establishing the policy of the Israel Police; forming communication channels between the Police and other Government Ministries; preparing the Police budget, presenting it to the Ministry of the Treasury and representing the Police during budgetary discussions in the Knesset; acting as the Parliamentary representative of the Police and the Prison Services in the Knesset. In the same missive, the Minister of Police presented the Prime Minister with a long list of incidents wherein the Police Command had not obeyed his instructions, such as:

Not implementing decisions - not implementing decisions which had been approved during the weekly meetings between the Minister and the Inspector General.

Budget - Police Headquarters had presented a budget proposal directly

to the Ministry of the Treasury instead of through the Ministry of Police.

Monthly reports - Since August 1948, the Ministry of Police had asked Police Headquarters to transmit monthly activity reports to the Ministry. Despite frequent reminders, no such reports had been received.

Opening Police Stations - the Minister of Police, in the wake of his travels through the country, or as a result of requests from the public, had instructed the Inspector General to open Police stations in different areas of the country. His instructions had not been carried out.

The establishment of a Disciplinary Court - the Minister was informed through the press that the Inspector General had appointed a Disciplinary Court which had sentenced Senior Officer Gerro Gera to a reprimand, without having informed the Minister of the need to appoint such a Court and without his having approved the sentence. The Minister suspended the sentence.

Appointing a Deputy Inspector General - With the establishment of the State, the Minister of Police approved the appointment of Y. Nachmias as Acting Inspector General (in the Inspector General's absence). A few days later, the Minister discovered that the Inspector General had appointed Nachmias to be his Deputy. The Minister informed the Inspector General that such an appointment was illegal and that an officer of this rank must be appointed by the Minister. Despite the Minister's comment, Y. Nachmias continued to sign documents as Deputy Inspector General.

In his letter to the Prime Minister, the Minister stressed the existing good relations between himself, his Ministry and the command levels of the Prison Services (National Archives, file 16/93, Box 3323/G).

On February 28, 1949, as a result of the increasing tension between the Ministry of Police and the Israel Police Command, and at the desire on both sides to find a solution to this embroilment, the Inspector General, Y. Sahar, put a proposal to the Minister of Police to divide the responsibilities between them. Following are the main points of the proposal:

Jurisdiction of the Minister of Police

- deciding upon Israel Police strength and organizational make-up.
- outlining Israel Police policy concerning its activities;
- establishing Israel Police budget and manner in which it is to be used;
- establishing contacts with other Cabinet Ministries regarding all aspects touching upon basic areas of Police work.

Jurisdiction of the Inspector General

- supervising the whole of the Israel Police on the basis of general guidelines established by the Police Minister;
- handling administrative and disciplinary matters concerning the Police;
- recruiting, training, and appointing police personnel within the framework of the approved strength complement.

(National Archives, File 210/15, Box 5443/G)

On March 17, 1949, the Minister of Police replied to the Inspector General in a long letter wherein he explained that the powers vested in the High Commissioner regarding Police matters had been, upon the departure of the British and the establishment of the State, transferred to the Minister of Police within the Israeli Cabinet. Therefore, it followed that the Inspector General's powers were valid only as long as they reflected instructions issued by the Minister of Police and that the Inspector General was subject to his instructions. Furthermore, the Minister instructed the Inspector General that with the receipt of this letter, he was to act as per orders transmitted to him directly by the Minister or the Director General of the Ministry of Police. In the same letter, the Minister ordered the Inspector General as follows:

- In the near future, as per his orders, basic changes will be made in the strength and structure of the National Headquarters of the Police;
- The Accounting, Stores, Information, Spokesman, and Welfare Divisions would be transferred from the National Police Headquarters to the Ministry of Police;
- No person was to be dismissed from the Police without prior permission from the Minister of Police;
- Promotions of Police personnel up to the rank of First Inspector would be accorded by the Inspector General with the approval of the Minister. Promotions of officers over the rank of First Inspector would be accorded by the Minister with the Inspector General's recommendation;



- No senior officer will be tried before the Disciplinary Court without the Minister's authorization;
- New police stations will be opened only after having been authorized by the Minister;
- The Minister is empowered to transfer senior officers from one position to another, after having consulted with the Inspector General.

On the same day that he received the Minister's letter (March 18, 1949), the Inspector General replied, sending a copy of his letter to the Prime Minister. In his letter, the Inspector General announced that under the conditions set out in the Minister's letter, he was not prepared to continue acting as Inspector General of the Israel Police. On March 22, 1949, the Minister replied that he regretted that the Inspector General was not prepared to accept his orders, which were intended to introduce arrangements meant to prevent friction between the Ministry of Police and the Israel Police. The Minister added that if the Inspector General intended to retire, he should notify him of the date on which he wished to retire. During a meeting of the Police Command on March 26, 1949, the Inspector General notified his officers that the relationship with the Ministry of Police had reached a serious crisis. The Ministry of Police had taken upon itself authority which, in fact, nullified the Inspector General's authority, and he intended to request that the Prime Minister hand down a judgement on the matter (National Headquarters Archives, File 1234/Sh).

This troubled situation concerning the relationship between the political level (Minister of Police) and the operative level (Inspector General of the Israel Police) forced the Prime Minister to invite the two sides to come to his office in order to mediate between them. The details of this meeting were not written down, however, from reading a personal letter written on March 30, 1949 in Bechor Shitrit's handwriting, the Minister of Police, and addressed to David Ben Gurion, the Prime Minister, immediately after the meeting, and from an interview with Sahar, the Inspector General, it is possible to see that the Prime Minister, after having listened to the Minister of Police and the Inspector General, found Sahar to be right and recognized his right to command the Israel Police.

The Minister of Police was a political figure whose duty it was to supervise the Police, take care of its budget and represent it before the Knesset and the Cabinet. The Prime Minister directed the Minister of Police to remove the Director General, Y. Chissik, from his present position, in order that he not serve as a buffer between the Inspector General and himself, since no mediator should be needed for Inspector General-Minister relations. In the above-mentioned letter, Minister Shitrit wrote, bitterly, how hurt he was by the meeting, where he, a Minister, had actually been reprimanded in the presence of his subordinate, was judged regarding his ability to supervise the Police, while it was the Inspector General who, in effect, had flaunted discipline and broken the existing good relations, and would not obey instructions issued by his superior, the

Minister (National Archives, File 1/108, Box 3322/G; Interview with Y. Sahar on November 27, 1987). On July 5, 1949, the Minister of Police issued announcement no. 1/49 wherein he announced the following changes in the Ministry of Police:

- Yitzhak Chissik, the Director General of the Ministry would be transferred to another position in the Prime Minister's office;
- Y. Sahar, Inspector General of the Police would also undertake to be the Director General of the Ministry of Police;
- Ram Solomon, the Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Police, would also act as responsible for the Ministry of Police - bearing a rank lower than that of Director General (National Archives, File 16/59, Box 3322/G).

The discussion which ensued in the presence of the Prime Minister, Y. Chissik's removal and the Minister of Police and the Inspector General's knowledge that it was up to them to find a solution for working together in order to advance the cause of the Israel Police, improved relations between the two. Behind the arguments and "incidents" which took place between the Minister of Police and the Inspector General lay the question: was the Police autonomous, or was it run by a Minister who is a political figure, and, what was the division of responsibilities between the two. The Minister of Police, despite his knowledge of Police affairs, had no organizational/administrative experience. A pleasant man, well conversed and with many contacts with personages from among Christian and Moslem ethnic groups, he began to develop his contacts with the

public as well as his activities in the Knesset and the Cabinet. His meddling in Police affairs diminished; he stopped insisting on his right to command and administer the Police. He became satisfied with representing the Police in the Knesset and in the Cabinet, and with receiving regular reports from the Inspector General regarding what was happening in the Police. He occasionally visited Police units and training bases. The Minister often asked the Inspector General why a particular policeman from the Sefaradi ethnic group had not been promoted, or why a complaint placed by a member of one minority group or another had not been dealt with.

In fact, the Minister of Police stopped trying to establish policy guidelines for the Israel Police, and policy was actually set by the Inspector General, or by direct order from the Prime Minister, as, for example, in activating the Police on the matter of the black market in 1950. There is no doubt that the strong personalities of Y. Sahar and Y. Nachmias, and the fact that Sahar was able to approach the Prime Minister directly whenever he needed to, on the one hand, and Minister Shitrit's weak personality, his admiration for Ben Gurion and his definite submissiveness, actually neutralized the Minister of Police. The Minister turned into a ceremonial figure during the 18 years he served as Minister of Police.

The Minister was received with honors and politeness whenever he visited any of the Police installations. He did not interfere in Police organization or in setting its path. The Inspector General

would, once in a while, report to the Minister concerning particular incidents and serious crimes with which the Police had dealt and would appear at the weekly meetings in the Minister's office in order to present the weekly reports. Promoting officers from the rank of captain and above remained the Minister's prerogative, while the Inspector General could only recommend such a promotion.

#### External-Inclusive Control Systems in the Israel Police

Several External-Inclusive control systems operate in Israel, and occasionally, in addition to their other responsibilities, carry out a modicum of control regarding the activities of the Israel Police. These are: the Israel Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister, the Knesset, the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee, the Attorney General and the State Attorney's Office, the Courts, the State Comptroller, the Press and the Public. This chapter will examine how these offices and personalities effect their supervision over the Israel Police, the scope of their interest, how it is implemented and its effect on the Police and its actions.

#### The Israel Cabinet

The citizens of Israel are under the impression that every Cabinet Minister, upon being appointed Minister of a particular Government Ministry, bears sole responsibility for the workings of that Ministry, while the Cabinet, as a whole, seldom interferes in

what is done by and within that Government Ministry. For the country's citizens, the Israel Police is headed by the Inspector General, the only head of the Police. The Minister of Police is considered to be a political figure who, on the one hand, supervises the Israel Police as the Cabinet representative, and on the other, represents the Police before the Knesset and the Cabinet. A closer look at written material concerning the organizational development of the Israel Police during the first decade of its existence, and from conversations with Government Ministers, former Ministers of Police and former Inspectors General reveal a large amount of involvement on the part of the Cabinet regarding all aspects of the organizational structure of the police, the manner in which it was intended to fulfill its duties and deal with incidents and serious crimes occurring during the relevant decade.

David Ben Gurion, the First Prime Minister of Israel, was directly and very actively involved in the selection and appointment of Yehezkel Sahar as first Inspector General of the Israel Police, in establishing the Police in appointing a large part of the members of its senior ranks, and in establishing its character and working procedures. Sahar, who enjoyed a personal relationship with the Prime Minister and had his trust, was in the habit of writing or speaking with him directly, rather than through the Minister of Police, in order to receive approbation for a program intended to enlarge the Police, to acquire budgets or to solve personality conflicts (Rivlin, 1984, p. 386). At times, the Prime Minister himself did not hesitate

when he wished to initiate pressing police action, calling or writing to Sahar directly.

When, in 1949, Sahar decided that the Police had to divorce itself from the Army, he approached the Prime Minister directly and received his agreement to effect the separation. When, during the first years of the existence of the Police, the Minister of Justice attempted to transfer the Investigations Department of the Police to his Ministry, Sahar once again turned to David Ben Gurion directly and requested that he prevent this move.

Stories have even been told regarding David Ben Gurion's interference in the running of the Police: Y. Sahar often attended meetings held in the Prime Minister's Office. Ben Gurion, at times, used to go out of the meeting room to the nearby hall where the participants' hats were hanging, among them that of the Inspector General, a blue hat with a visor adorned with a wide silver band, a legacy of the British Mandate period. Ben Gurion used to hide the Inspector General's hat and then return to the meeting. When the Inspector General would leave the meeting, he would be hard pressed to find his hat. Ben Gurion played this joke several times when Sahar attended meetings in the Prime Minister's Office, until the Inspector General understood the Prime Minister's allusion, that the Prime Minister considered the senior officers' hats too grand, not appropriate for a democratic Police in a young, poor country. as a result, he ordered the removal of the silver band from the visors of

hats worn by officers. This was Ben Gurion's way to effect any change in the behavior of those close to him, since, as Prime Minister, he could have just as well given the Inspector General a direct order, directing him to change the appearance of senior police officers' hats (Yehezkel Sahar, Interview, November 27, 1987).

In the Police correspondence files and in the Prime Minister's files found in the National Archives, it is possible to find many letters sent directly Sahar to the Prime Minister, for example: there are reports from August 7, 1951 and November 14, 1951 regarding an inquiry concerning policemen stationed in the Jelami camp to guard the detainees belonging to the religious underground organization; reports concerning Police activity against the black market as of October 17, 1950; the Israel Police Annual Reports (National Archives, File 1510, Box 5437/G).

The Prime Minister would often visit Police Headquarters and the various Police installations. On September 9, 1949, he participated in the Senior Officer Staff meeting which took place in the Police National Headquarters and listened to the officers talk about the problems facing the police at that time. He told them of his appreciation and admiration for the manner in which they and the Police Forces were carrying out their police duties, all the while stressing the importance of the existence of a police force in a democratic state. At the end of 1949, he was the guest of honor at the graduation ceremony of the first police course at the National



Training Base in Shfar'am. On January 9, 1951, the Prime Minister participated in a wider gathering of police officers, from the rank of Captain on up, where he spoke about the importance of police activities and their contribution to the absorption of the waves of immigrants and to the education of the public, and to keeping law and order (National Archives, File 02/RA, Box 2247/L).

During the years 1949-53 Sahar would often visit the Prime Minister in order to attempt to convince him of the pressing necessity to establish a special Police unit which would be called "Border Guard" and which would guard the country's borders and detect infiltration from the neighboring Arab countries. The Prime Minister's involvement in what was happening in the police continued throughout the whole of the first decade of the existence of the Police. In 1957, as a result of harsh criticism regarding the way in which the police were operating and its commander, Y. Sahar, the Prime Minister appointed one of his followers, Shaul Avigur, to look into the situation in the Israel Police and to report to him. In 1958, Ben Gurion himself personally decided who would be the second Inspector General of the Israel Police. A look at the decisions taken by the Israel Cabinet between the years 1948 to 1958, indicates that the Cabinet was aware of and interested in all unusual incidents handled by the police, and those in which the police were involved. The Cabinet also discussed the personnel difficulties of the police, its budget and organization. The Cabinet Ministers' interest was evident through queries placed before the Minister of Police and by the fact

that motions concerning the police were placed on the agenda of the Cabinet meetings. During the period which is being examined, 73 queries were placed before the Minister of Police or the Prime Minister. Twenty of them (27.4%) concerned demonstrations by religious factions, issues concerning the religious underground organization which had been arrested in 1951 and the manner in which the Police were dealing with these incidents. Most of these queries were put forward by the religious ministers in the Cabinet. An additional 15 queries (20.5%) were put forward regarding various criminal phenomena which had occurred and the manner in which the Police were proceeding with the investigations. Additional details can be found on Table 31.

During this period, 84 Cabinet meetings were held regarding various subjects touching upon the police itself or incidents and events handled by the Police. Issues concerning police handling of religious demonstrations and manifestations against the secular population made up the majority of police subjects dealt with by the Cabinet - 21 discussions (25%), the problem of infiltration followed - 17 discussions (20.2%). The Cabinet even discussed the organizational problems of the police, the subject of discipline, the budget, legislative initiatives related to Police work, placing additional responsibilities upon the police, etc. A breakdown of topics under discussion can be found on Table 32. From a glance at the two a/m tables it can be seen that the Israel Cabinet showed great involvement in the functioning of the Police, while being interested in its

activities and its responses to incidents involving disorders as well as criminal events. Political grounds prevented the involvement of some of the Cabinet Ministers, such the religious Minister, when issues such as keeping the Sabbath or Police handling of religious demonstrations came up for discussions. Subjects related to the security situation of the country, such as the problem of infiltration, or to the economic situation, such as the black market, and the manner in which the police set out to handle these problems, also had a prominent place in discussions during the Cabinet meetings.

Table 31: Queries Raised by Ministers During Cabinet Meetings, 1948-58

| Topic                                          | Issues | %      |
|------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Police structure, strength, personnel          | 8      | 10.95  |
| Policemen's salaries                           | 7      | 9.59   |
| Discipline, integrity, disciplinary hearings   | 5      | 6.85   |
| Patrol activities and road traffic             | 6      | 8.22   |
| Police actions during demonstrations/strikes   | 10     | 13.69  |
| Police actions concerning religious demonst.   | 20     | 27.40  |
| Criminal manifestations and results of invest. | 15     | 20.40  |
| The problem of infiltration                    | 2      | 2.74   |
| Total                                          | 73     | 100.00 |

Source: Israel Government, The Government Book of Resolutions, 1948-58.

Table 32: Issues Discussed During Cabinet Meetings, 1948-1958

| Topics                                             | Queries | %      |
|----------------------------------------------------|---------|--------|
| Police structure, strength, personnel              | 5       | 5.95   |
| Discipline, integrity and disciplinary problems    | 5       | 5.95   |
| Patrol activities and road traffic                 | 1       | 1.19   |
| Police activity during demonstrations and strikes  | 3       | 3.57   |
| Police activity during religious demonstrations    | 21      | 25.00  |
| Criminal manifestations and investigations results | 11      | 13.10  |
| Infiltration and hostile activity                  | 17      | 20.24  |
| Police actions concerning the black market         | 8       | 9.53   |
| Legislation regarding Police topics                | 5       | 5.95   |
| Assigning additional duties to the Police          | 6       | 7.14   |
| Legality of the Police Magazine - 999              | 2       | 2.38   |
| Total                                              | 84      | 100.00 |

Source: Israel Government, The Government Book of Resolutions, 1948-58.

### The Knesset

In the Parliamentary system in Israel, the Knesset is the highest and most sovereign institution in the State of Israel. Legislation is its first and main concern. The Knesset also serves as the main

institution which supervises the operational branch of the Government - the Cabinet. The work of the Knesset is carried out in plenary sessions and in its sub-committees.

The principal control measure which is at the disposal of the Knesset regarding the Cabinet is the fact that the Cabinet needs a majority in the Knesset and a vote of confidence can be requested at any time. The second control measure which the Knesset possesses is its authority to regulate all income and expenditures of the Cabinet by legislating various tax laws and approving the national budget after a thorough discussion by the Knesset plenum, assigning specific sums to each of the Government Ministries (Rubinstein, 1974, p. 301; Weiss, 1977, p. 144).

The Ministry of Police budget, which consists of the budget for the Israel Police, the Israel Prison Services and the Ministry itself, are brought before the Knesset for approval every year. The Minister of Police's speech before the Knesset, during the discussion regarding his Ministry's budget, actually serves as an annual report regarding the activities and problems of the Ministry. The report includes detailed arguments for the budgetary requirements of the Ministry. The reaction of the Knesset members, its approval or refusal, is a measure of the views of the Knesset members and the public regarding the Ministry of Police and its two branches.

Another way in which the Knesset effects control over the Cabinet

is by requesting reports from the Cabinet regarding its activities. This information is presented to the Knesset by the Minister in the form of reports. The Minister also replies to agenda questions and to queries on the part of Knesset members, as well as reporting to the Knesset Permanent Committees.

Motions for the Agenda - Members of the Knesset are permitted to present written motions to the Chairman for inclusion in the daily agenda. The contents of the motions are given to the Minister involved so that he can be prepared to reply to the Knesset plenum and present his position, or that of the Cabinet, regarding the issue. On the date set for discussion of the motion made by the Knesset member, the person proposing the subject presents and justifies the motion. The Minister responsible for the area of interest replies.

Later on, a discussion ensues regarding the issue or, as per the Minister's suggestion, the Knesset tables the issue raised or transfers it for discussion in one of the Knesset Permanent Committees. A motion for the agenda serves as an important parliamentary tool for Knesset procedures, since in most cases, the Knesset deals with topics which are initiated by the Cabinet (laws, budgets, etc.). Through motions presented for the agenda, the members of the Knesset can bring up important, contemporary topics for discussion, subjects which are important to the Israeli public, and, at the same time, benefit from the ensuing publicity in the press (Tsidon, 1967, p. 150; Weiss, 1977, p. 236). Knesset minutes reveal

that during the years 1949-1957 Knesset members presented 42 motions for the agenda on topics concerning the Israel Police. For a breakdown of agenda motions during the years 1949-57 - see the following table:

Table 33: Motions for the Agenda regarding Police and Delinquency,  
1949-57

| Year  | Demons. | Invest. | Police | Criminal | Accidents | Personnel | Total  |
|-------|---------|---------|--------|----------|-----------|-----------|--------|
|       |         |         | behav. | incid.   |           |           |        |
| 1949  | 1       | -       | -      | -        | -         | 1         | 2      |
| 1950  | 3       | 1       | 2      | -        | 1         | -         | 7      |
| 1951  | 2       | -       | 3      | 2        | -         | -         | 7      |
| 1952  | 1       | 1       | -      | 2        | 1         | -         | 5      |
| 1953  | 1       | 2       | -      | 1        | -         | -         | 4      |
| 1954  | 2       | -       | 1      | 2        | -         | -         | 5      |
| 1955  | -       | 2       | 1      | 1        | -         | -         | 4      |
| 1956  | 1       | -       | 1      | -        | -         | -         | 2      |
| 1957  | 3       | 2       | -      | -        | -         | 1         | 6      |
| Total | 14      | 8       | 8      | 8        | 3         | 1         | 42     |
| %     | 33.33   | 19.05   | 19.05  | 19.05    | 7.14      | 2.38      | 100.00 |

Source: Knesset Minutes for the years 1949-1957.

Fourteen motions (33%) touched upon demonstrations which had taken place, the manner in which the police had dealt with them and police behavior toward the demonstrators; eight motions (19.5%) dealt with Police handling of criminal incidents and the way in which they were investigated. The motion is an important parliamentary tool used by the opposition or smaller parties in the Knesset and often initiates parliamentary activity. The relevant Minister is usually assisted by staff and members of Ministry in preparing replies to the motion.

Questions put to the Minister of Police referring to police activity, to the state of delinquency or to special incidents being dealt with by the Police, are directed by his administrators to the Inspector General for verification and handling (Knesset Regulations, 1965, pp. 18-20; Weiss, 1977, p. 246).

Queries - Any Knesset member has the right to raise an issue before a Minister regarding his or her area of responsibility. The motion is presented to the Knesset Chairman in writing and transmitted to the respective Minister. The Minister must reply from the Knesset podium within 21 days, except in cases wherein the Minister is certain that a public reply might be harmful to the interests of the country. The object of the queries are:

- to acquire information regarding a specific subject or incident;
- to ensure that facts regarding a specific incident will be faithfully presented;
- to serve as a platform for provoking or criticizing the Government



or a particular Minister;

- to make a Minister aware of a fact in order to bring about a change;
- to give a Minister the opportunity to make an announcement regarding a topic of important public or political interest (this is generally an initiated query).

For a breakdown of the number of questions put to the Minister of Police during the years 1949-1957 in relation to queries put forth in the Knesset during those years, see Table 34. The table shows that the percentage of questions put every year to the Minister of Police ranged from 2-8% of all queries. During 1949 and 1956, less questions were put, however, during 1951, the questions put to the Minister came to 8.46% of the total questions put to the Knesset.

Table 35 shows questions put by Knesset members to the Minister of Police during 1949-1957, divided according to subject. The subjects are wide and varied, since the queries are meant to serve as an efficient control of Police activity. The table shows that 62 (32.3%) of the queries put to the Minister and Police by Knesset members, dealt with the results of how the Police handled different incidents and investigations; 32 questions (16.67%) with Police behavior on duty; 29 additional queries (15.10%) were put to the Minister of Police concerning Police behavior while carrying out arrests.

Table 34: Queries put to the Minister of Police by the Knesset  
in Relation to all Questions put Forth, 1949-1957

| Year | Total Knesset<br>queries | Queries put<br>to Minister<br>of Police | % of queries put to<br>Minister of Police<br>from total queries |
|------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1949 | 169                      | 5                                       | 2.95                                                            |
| 1950 | 212                      | 12                                      | 5.66                                                            |
| 1951 | 189                      | 16                                      | 8.46                                                            |
| 1952 | 466                      | 23                                      | 4.93                                                            |
| 1953 | 513                      | 33                                      | 6.43                                                            |
| 1954 | 498                      | 22                                      | 4.41                                                            |
| 1955 | 473                      | 31                                      | 6.55                                                            |
| 1956 | 458                      | 10                                      | 2.18                                                            |
| 1957 | 618                      | 40                                      | 6.47                                                            |

Source: Knesset Minutes, 1949-1957

The greater part of the queries and motions touched upon Police actions during the religious demonstrations in Jerusalem, and those of the Communists in the northern part of the country and in Tel Aviv. They were put forward mostly by Knesset members belonging to the religious parties (in spite of the fact that they belonged to the Coalition) and by Knesset members belonging to the Communist factions

Table 35: Queries put to Minister of Police by  
Knesset Members, by Subject, 1949-1957

| Subject            | 1949 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | Total | %      |
|--------------------|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------|--------|
| Police arrests     | 3    | 1  | 4  | 3  | 3  | 2  | 6  | 2  | 5  | 29    | 15.10  |
| Police behavior    | -    | 2  | -  | 2  | 7  | 6  | 5  | 3  | 7  | 32    | 16.67  |
| Demonstrations     | -    | -  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 1  | 3  | 1  | 2  | 11    | 5.74   |
| Investigations     | -    | -  | 6  | 12 | 11 | 8  | 9  | 1  | 15 | 62    | 32.30  |
| Sabbath incid.     | 1    | 1  | 1  | -  | 2  | 1  | -  | -  | 3  | 9     | 4.68   |
| Police and Law     | -    | 3  | -  | -  | -  | -  | 1  | -  | 2  | 6     | 3.12   |
| Traffic accid.     | -    | -  | -  | -  | -  | 2  | -  | 1  | 1  | 4     | 2.08   |
| Assis. the public  | -    | -  | -  | -  | 3  | -  | -  | -  | -  | 3     | 1.56   |
| Party partisanship |      |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |       |        |
| in the Police      | -    | -  | -  | -  | -  | -  | 2  | 1  | -  | 3     | 1.56   |
| Police stations    | -    | 1  | 1  | -  | -  | -  | -  | -  | -  | 2     | 1.04   |
| Personnel          | 1    | 2  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 1  | 1  | -  | 3  | 12    | 6.25   |
| Discipline         | -    | -  | 2  | 3  | 2  | -  | 4  | 1  | 2  | 16    | 8.34   |
| Police magazine    | -    | -  | -  | -  | 2  | 1  | -  | -  | -  | 3     | 1.53   |
| Total              | 5    | 1  | 16 | 23 | 33 | 22 | 31 | 10 | 40 | 192   | 100.00 |

Source: Knesset Minutes for the years 1949-1957

(mostly Arabs). This Parliamentary action represented the Police as

being politically involved. The secular parties, on the other hand, attacked the Police, accusing it of using "kid gloves" when coming up against the religious, acting upon orders given by a Cabinet which was refraining from Coalition considerations.

#### The Parliamentary Investigative Committee

According to paragraph 24 of the Knesset Formation Law, the Knesset is empowered to appoint a Parliamentary Investigative Committee to investigate an incident, a phenomenon, or the manner in which any Government institution handles itself, which, in the opinion of Knesset members, have to be looked into. The Knesset plenum can empower one of the Knesset permanent committees to act as an investigative committee, or it can select a committee from among the members of the Knesset plenum. On two occasions during its first decade, the Knesset appointed investigative committees. Both committees concerned Police activity. In the first instance, on August 10, 1950, the Knesset appointed a sub-committee of the Economic Committee to investigate matters concerning the black market (Knesset Minutes, Vol. 6, p. 2246). On May 28, 1951, the Knesset, for the second time, appointed a committee from among the plenary members to investigate the attitude of the Police towards the arrested members of the religious underground who were being detained in the Jelami camp (Knesset Minutes, Vol. 9, p. 2196). These committees were empowered by the Minister of Justice to call witnesses, to adjure and question them. The Knesset investigative committees serve as an additional

control for checking the activities of the operative branch of the government, of which the Police is a part.

The Kneset Internal Affairs Committee

The main work of the Kneset is done in committees. The Kneset has nine permanent committees. The Kneset Committees are; Finance; Economic; Foreign and Security; Internal Affairs; Constitution, Law and Justice; Public Services; Education and Culture; Labor. All subjects concerning municipalities and other municipal authorities come under the responsibility of the Internal Affairs Committee, which also deals with topics concerning immigration, the press, religions, the Police and the Prisons. The Committees are party-affiliated. The Committee members and Chairmen are selected according to a party index and Kneset Committee recommendations. Terms of committee office are dependent on Kneset terms. The powers held by the committees are set out in the regulations, as follows:

- Discussions concerning law proposals which have passed the first reading in the Kneset plenum and transferred to the relevant committee for discussions and the preparation of a proposal for second and third readings in the plenum;
- Discussing regulations after they have been put forth by the relevant Ministers;
- Discussing requests sent to the Kneset or the Cabinet by citizens and transferred to committees for further consideration;
- Discussing all other matters which have been sent to committee by

the Knesset plenum;

- Calling the relevant Minister before the committee to provide information concerning the topic under discussion and which is relevant to the Minister's duties. The Minister is obliged to appear before the committee or to send a representative (Israel Knesset, Knesset Regulations, 1965 pp. 10-13, 28-30).

Committee meetings are closed, with the exception of those sessions which are announced as being open to the press. When the Internal Affairs Committee requests the presence of the Minister of Police for deliberations regarding the Israel Police, the Minister is usually accompanied by the Inspector General or his Deputy, and his advisors. The Knesset Internal Affairs Committee is the principal resource in the Knesset for accountability and supervision of Police activity. The frequency with which the Internal Affairs Committee deliberates on subjects regarding Police activities depends on the number of topics transferred to the Committee for discussion. There were years during which the Internal Affairs Committee often dealt with topics concerning the Police and its activities, and years during which very little was done. Internal Affairs Committee activities depended on the times, problems presented to the Committee and on the Committee members themselves. Table 36 describes the number of Internal Affairs Committee sessions which took place between 1948-1958 and the percentage of sessions during which Police subjects were brought up for discussion.

Table 36: Knesset Internal Affairs Committee Sessions, 1948-1958

| Year  | Total Sessions | Sessions on Police Topics | % of Sessions on Police Matters from Total Number of Sessions |
|-------|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1948  | 15             | 6                         | 40.0                                                          |
| 1949  | 28             | 6                         | 21.4                                                          |
| 1950  | 31             | 8                         | 25.8                                                          |
| 1951  | 35             | 16                        | 45.7                                                          |
| 1952  | 58             | 6                         | 10.3                                                          |
| 1953  | 39             | 7                         | 17.9                                                          |
| 1954  | 53             | 2                         | 3.8                                                           |
| 1955  | 35             | 9                         | 25.7                                                          |
| 1956  | 32             | 3                         | 9.4                                                           |
| 1957  | 34             | 6                         | 17.6                                                          |
| 1958  | 39             | 2                         | 5.1                                                           |
| Total | 399            | 71                        | 17.8                                                          |

Source: Knesset Internal Affairs Committee Minutes, 1948-1958.

In several instances, the Internal Affairs Committee was the catalyst which caused the Finance Committee and the Minister of Finance to present addenda to the Police budget, or, it acted as a

lobby with other Knesset members to convince them to vote positively during discussions on subjects touching upon the Police or its activities (Flekser, 1977, pp. 20-38; Rubinstein, 1967, pp. 206-217; Knesset Regulations, 1965, pp. 10-13, 28-30).

As a rule, the Chairman of the Internal Affairs Committee is a Knesset member belonging to a different political party than the Minister of Police, and Committee members equally belong to different parties in the coalition and the opposition, a situation which ensures that Committee discussions will not be have automatic consensus. During the period under discussion in this work, the following were active: Provisional State Council, May 1948 to January 1949; First Knesset, January 1949 to July 1951; Second Knesset, July 1951 to July 1955; Third Knesset, July 1955 to November 1959. Chairmen of the Internal Affairs Committee were: during the Provisional State Council - M. Gribovsky; First Knesset - Binyamin Minz and Zerach Warhaftig; Second Knesset - Yosef Sapir; Third Knesset - Y.,. Riftin.

The Internal Affairs Committee was empowered to establish a sub-committee made up of some of its members. There were years, although not during the first decade of Knesset activities, that the Internal Affairs Committee constantly operated a special Sub-committee for Police Affairs. The Internal Affairs Committee could discuss any Police topic, but, it could not dictate to the Police what and how to do things. However, if the Police failed to carry out a certain duty,



or acted outside the bounds and not according to the law and its authority, the Internal Affairs Committee had the right to request the Israel Police to explain and justify its actions through the Minister of Police, or to request, via the Minister, that the Inspector General appear before the Committee to explain the Police actions and the reasons for which they had been carried out. Committee conclusions are not binding, they take the form of proposals put before the Minister of Police and the Israel Police. As a rule, the Minister of Police and the Police Command levels tend to take the Committee's recommendations into consideration and attempt to implement them. According to Knesset Regulations, three months after the Committee has sent down its recommendations, the Minister of Police is requested to appear before the Committee and report on how the Ministry or the Police have implemented those recommendations, and if this was not done, explain why. When the Minister of Police and/or the Inspector General are requested to appear before the Internal Affairs Committee regarding a particular topic, they must be completely conversant in the subject, be aware as to how the Police dealt with it and prepare themselves to present the situation before the members of the Committee. Committee actions are an efficient control tool which forces the Police to regulate the actions of its personnel. At times, because of the multi-party composition of the Committee, these sessions turn into a political battle. Such a situation can be detrimental to the Police image which is identified as being on the side of the Minister of Police, who is a political figure, and can disturb the normal process of the sessions.

At times, the Chairman of the Internal Affairs Committee belongs to a party which is not in the coalition to which the Minister of Police's party belongs. He sees the Police as a tool which serves the Minister of Police, an "enemy" to his party. In situations such as this, the Chairman can actually be hostile to the Police, selecting topics for discussions which present the Police in a negative light and initiating decisions which can be harmful to the Police image. It is very important to create mutual trust and respect between the Committee Chairman, the Committee members, the Minister of Police and the Inspector General (Knesset Member Shoshana Arbeli-Almozilino, Interview, November 13, 1987; Knesset Member Zerach Warhaftig, Interview, November 20, 1987).

During the years 1948-1957, 154 topics regarding the Police were discussed in the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee relating to its organization, its personnel strength, its budget, personnel problems, dismissal of policemen, use of force, behavior towards the citizenry, handling of criminal incidents, demonstrations and other public disturbances, etc. In terms of frequency the following discussions stood out: personnel (20); Police behavior while carrying out arrests (14); the way in which the Police handles various criminal phenomena (12); Police behavior during demonstrations and strikes (11); and investigative methods of the Israel Police (11). Sometimes, the Internal Affairs Committee would request the presence of the Minister of Police or the Inspector General so that they could present a picture of the situation in the Police, its problems and plans for

future activity. For a list of police issues which were discussed in the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee during the years 1948-1957, see Table 37 on the following page.

The Committee would visit police installations and the Shfar'am Training Base in order to personally acquire an idea of the level of policemen and their accomplishments. Y. Sahar, the Inspector General of the Police, was quite suspicious of the purity of the intentions of the Internal Affairs Committee members, who represented most of the political streams existing in Israel. He feared that some of those Knesset members would look at the Police through political eyes and that they were not always regarding the Police objectively. The religious members of the Knesset would often question the Inspector General and needle him after every Police handling of religious Sabbath demonstrators. The Communist Committee members, usually Arabs, would strongly criticize Police behavior regarding communist demonstrators in Nazareth, Haifa and Tel Aviv, while accusing the Police of having used force and having carried out brutal arrests of demonstrators. The Internal Affairs Committee often served as a political platform for needling the Police.

In spite of the above, the Internal Affairs Committee contributed, and still contributes, to the advancement of the Police, to acquiring improved budgets, and to creating an atmosphere of mutual trust between the members of the Knesset and the Police Command. The Inspector General, despite the fact that he did not consider the

Table 37: Police Topics Discussed in the InternalAffairs Committee, 1948-1957

| <u>Subject</u>                                                      | <u>Police Topics</u> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Minister of Police's survey of the Police                           | 6                    |
| Inspector General's survey                                          | 4                    |
| Organizational structure of the Police                              | 8                    |
| Israel Police Budget                                                | 7                    |
| Personnel and training problems, policewomen                        | 20                   |
| Crime phenomena                                                     | 12                   |
| Problem of infiltration                                             | 4                    |
| Dismissal of policemen who served during<br>the British Mandate     | 2                    |
| Need for a Ministry of Police                                       | 4                    |
| Political branch in the Police                                      | 2                    |
| Police public relations                                             | 8                    |
| Establishing a Gendarmerie, Border Guard                            | 6                    |
| Police use of force                                                 | 5                    |
| Police behavior while carrying out arrests                          | 14                   |
| Police behavior during demonstrations or strikes                    | 11                   |
| Police handling of citizen complaints                               | 4                    |
| Police investigative methods                                        | 11                   |
| Traffic accidents, traffic police                                   | 7                    |
| Transferring Police duties to other<br>Government Ministries        | 3                    |
| Topics concerning to Police-Internal Affairs<br>Committee relations | 12                   |
| Police magazine                                                     | 4                    |
| -----                                                               |                      |
| Total                                                               | 154                  |
| -----                                                               |                      |

Source: Internal Affairs Committee Minutes, 1948-57.

Internal Affairs Committee an effective body which could greatly contribute to improving the Police's situation, respected the Committee, responded to requests for his presence before the Committee and replied to all queries (Y. Sahar, Interview, November 16, 1987; Y. Nachmias, November 29, 1987).

### Judicial Review

The courts in Israel are responsible for and supervise the duties and activities of the Israel Police at different stages in its activities. In particular, the policeman is supervised and accountable for the manner in which he carries out his duties, and the Police as a whole, for the manner in which its responsibilities are carried out in the organization as a whole. The courts ensure that actions carried out by the Executive Authority are according to the law, the Police being part of the Executive Authority.

The judicial control ensures that the interests of the individual as a suspect or as an accused are respected throughout all the criminal judicial proceedings (Mann, 1988, p. 561). Five different judicial review directions of Police activity can be perceived on the part of the courts:

- when presenting requests to the court for arrest warrants;
- when presenting requests to the court for search warrants;
- during court sessions concerning criminal files investigated by the Police;

- during District Court and Supreme Court sessions when dealing with appeals;
- during discussions regarding a plea which has been placed before the Supreme Court in its capacity as High Court of Justice.

Requests for Arrest Warrants - The Criminal Code (arrest and search) - 1969 delineates the authority of a policeman or a policewoman to arrest a person without an arrest warrant signed by a judge. Should a man/woman be arrested without an arrest warrant and should the investigation against him/her not be completed within 48 hours, and in the opinion of the Police it is necessary for him/her to remain in detention, the Police must then go before a judge and request that a warrant be issued for an additional period of detention.

Should the judge be convinced that additional detention is necessary for the continuation of the investigation, he is authorized to order an extension of 15 days' detention, and then, an additional 15 days. Should the Police need to retain the suspect in detention for a period of over 30 days, special permission has to be obtained from the Attorney General's Office to present an additional request to the courts. During the court discussion concerning the detention, the suspect has the right to be represented by an attorney. The judge approves a request for an arrest warrant only after he is convinced that there is substantial cause for the suspicions to be attributed to the suspect and that detention is required by the Police in order to

pursue the investigation.

The whole process of discussing a Police request for detaining a suspect is an important check to ensure the legality of the Police action in depriving a person of his freedom as well as delineating the justifications for detention (Libai, 1978, p. 53).

The principle of "a person's freedom" as a means of preventing haphazard arrests is an important principle which is always considered by the courts when handing down a decision regarding a suspect's detention, when requested by the Police. Supreme Court Justice, A. Gilon said: "When there is no fear for public safety or that the trial held is not just, the basic right of every person to be free is preferable to every irrelevant or even invalid decision regarding the efficiency of the investigation, to speeding up the legal process and the like" (1/87 - Dzanashvili and others vs. the State of Israel, Court Decisions, Vol. 42 (2), pp. 281-287).

Requests for Search Warrants - When the Police require that a search be effected in the house or business premises of a suspect against whom an investigation is being carried out, the Police must request a search warrant from a judge. The judge will authorize the Police request only after he is convinced that the search is necessary to acquire an item required to complete the investigation, or to locate/free a person is being held illegally on those premises (Criminal Code (Arrest and Search), Para. 23).

The need to acquire a search warrant from a judge ensures legal control by courts over the actual need for such a search and minimizes the possibility that illegal searches will be carried out.

Legal Controls during a Criminal Trial - When the various Police units complete their investigations of criminal or misdemeanor offences, they bring the investigations files to the Police prosecution offices in order to have the accused tried. When a felony is the subject of the investigation, the actual prosecution is carried out by the District Attorney's Offices. During a criminal trial and the presentation of the facts, the court very carefully examines if all arrest and investigation procedures carried out by the Police were legal. Invalid Police action could cause the accused to go free or a comment to be added to the judge's decision. Judges' comments are sent to the Police Command who enquire into the conduct of those policemen mentioned and if their behavior is found to have been detrimental, disciplinary steps are taken against them. Should it be discovered that a policeman committed a criminal offence, a criminal investigation is begun against him, and should sufficient evidence be found regarding his guilt, he is tried in criminal court. With the presentation of a indictment against him - a member of the Police is immediately suspended from his job; should he be found guilty by the court and subsequently sentenced - he is dismissed from the service.

Criminal Appeals - District and Supreme Courts are the appellate courts of the first and second instance. During appeals, the



different legal questions are discussed in addition to accusations made regarding the manner in which the Police conducted the investigation of this or another criminal file. These court decisions consist of basic decisions and direct the lower court decisions as well as the Police and the Attorney General's offices. In examining basic Supreme Court decisions published between the years 1948-1957, and which relate to Police activity, it can be seen that 14 decision, consisting of 21.2% of all decisions, touched upon maintaining the rights of suspects during their interrogation by the Police. 11 other basic decisions handed down during that period, making up 16.6% of all such decisions, were concerned with investigative procedures, the manner in which physical evidence was taken from the scene of the crime, the manner in which identification line-ups were carried out and the value of fingerprints lifted from the scene of the crime.

For a list of Police topics examined by the Supreme Court when it acted as an appellate court or a High Court of Justice, which were published and had wide judicial and decisive consequences, see Table 38.

The High Court of Justice - The standing of the High Court of Justice in the eyes of the Israeli public is very high indeed. The High Court of Justice has the authority to criticize most of the decisions made by the Executive Authority and the public authorities. Any citizen unable to receive legal assistance from the various courts, has the right to turn to the High Court of Justice. This

Judicial Authority guards the laws of the country impartially and according to the law, is empowered to issue court orders against state authorities and against anyone holding a public position. The High Court of Justice, in fact, is the Administrative Court of the State of Israel (Segal, 1988, p. 245).

Following are a number of principles which have guided the activities of the High Court of Justice since the establishment of the State:

Freedom of the individual - no administrative authority has the power to limit the freedom of the individual, unless there is a law which clearly empowers it to do so.

The legality of the administration - no administrative authority is empowered to act in any way which may limit the freedom of the individual, unless there is a law which clearly empowers it to do so.

Rights of the individual - no administrative authority is empowered to limit the rights of the individual unless there is a law which clearly empowers it to do so (Porush, 1988, pp.480-483).

The High Court of Justice never interferes in judgments made by authorized officials, unless it has been proven that this opinion was made arbitrarily or with malicious intention. The High Court of Justice will not rescind the decision made by an authorized official and impose its own judgement (Vines, 1953, p. 213). Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak said: "Our duty (of the High Court of Justice) is to ensure that the branches of Government act within the framework

of the law in order to ensure rule by law. The Government branches are highly placed indeed, however the Law is higher still" (High Court of Justice 428/86 - Barzilay and Others vs. the State of Israel, Court Decisions, Vol. 40 (3), pp. 505, 585).

During 1949-1957, the Supreme Court handled 66 cases involving Police activity, 23 of them handled by the High Court of Justice - 34.8% of all cases cited. The legal accountability of the High Court of Justice touched upon most of the Police powers, its actions in the areas of arrests, search, investigation, enforcing court orders, administrative Police decisions in the areas of approving business licenses and permits for demonstrations. The High Court of Justice is the only legal body to which any policeman or policewoman can appeal administrative decisions made by the Police Command regarding service and salary conditions, as well as any disciplinary procedures taken against him which, in his opinion, were not legal. During the period examined, eight appeals were presented by policemen, five of them questioning the Inspector General's authority to dismiss policemen from the service and three, questioning the authority of the Police Disciplinary Court. A list of topics touching upon Police activity which were considered by the Supreme Court can be found in Table 38.

#### The State Comptroller

In many countries boasting of a Parliamentary Government, a controlling institution exists which acts for the Parliament in

Table 38: Supreme Court Decisions Regarding the Police, 1949-1957

| Subject                                   | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | Total |
|-------------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Arrest and search                         | 1    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | -    | 10    |
| Use of force/weapon                       | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 3     |
| Suspects' rights                          | 1    | -    | 2    | -    | 2    | 3    | -    | 4    | 2    | 14    |
| Seizure of evidence                       | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 2     |
| Investigative procedures                  | -    | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 3     |
| Line-ups                                  | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | 4     |
| Fingerprints                              | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | 2     |
| Police duties                             | -    | 1    | -    | 3    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 10    |
| Securing private property                 | 1    | 1    | 1    | 2    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | 6     |
| Police dismissal                          | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 6     |
| Administrative authority of Insp. General | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 2     |
| Disciplinary Court                        | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | 3     |
| Policeman as an offender                  | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1     |
| TOTAL                                     | 4    | 7    | 8    | 8    | 8    | 8    | 7    | 10   | 6    | 65    |

Source: Court Decisions, Vols. 1949-1957.

supervising the manner in which the country and its budget are handled. On March 22, 1949, a proposal for the establishment of a State Comptroller was placed before the Knesset. On May 24, 1949, the State Comptroller Law-1949 was enacted. This Law called for a State Comptroller to be appointed and empowered him to supervise the administrative activities of Government Ministries, Government industry, its institutions, local councils and other various institutions supported by the Government, and to ensure that Government Ministries and institutions are economically and efficiently run.

Every year, the State Comptroller presents a report to the Knesset Finance Committee, with a copy to the Minister of the Treasury. After discussing the Comptroller's report, the Committee presents it to the Knesset plenum together with the comments of the Treasury (Official Gazette, Law Proposal nr. 3, March 22, 1949; Official Gazette, Law Compendium nr. 8, May 24, 1949, pp. 33-36). The State Comptroller is appointed to a five-year term by the President of Israel, as per the recommendations of the Finance Committee. The State Comptroller is very highly ranked and is not partisan nor dependent on the Cabinet. He enjoys complete independence, is responsible for assisting the Legislative Authority (the Knesset) by carrying out wide and all-emcompassing inspections of Government Ministries, industry and State institutions, local councils and institutions supported by the Government (Segal, 1988, p. 103; Sidon, 1964, pp. 348-349).

The State Comptroller Law-1958 (Combined), which was ratified by the Knesset and published in the Law Compendium nr. 248, of March 30, 1958, pp. 92-97, was amended with several additions. Among others, it was established that in addition to administrative-financial control, the Comptroller, according to para. 10(A) (2) in the law, is authorized to examine the integrity of Government employees and the rest of the institutions examined, as well as, according to para. 10(A) (3), carry out inspections regarding anything which he considers must be examined. These two control responsibilities, which were added to the State Comptroller's duties in 1958, widely broadened his scope of authority and activity.

The Israel Police is examined every year by a staff working in the State Comptroller's office. The findings are sent to the Minister of Police who passes them on to the Inspector General, so that the deficiencies can be corrected and a report of such made. The facts evolving from such examinations, as well as the replies by the various institutions involved are published every year by the State Comptroller in his annual report. During 1949-1957, the State Comptroller's staff examined the following aspects of the Israel Police:

- the ways in which communications equipment is provided and the manner in which it is distributed to Police units, registered and inventory maintained;
- the manner in which Police repair shops are administered and in what areas they operate;

- the operations of the Payments Division in the Police, payments made to suppliers, income and expenses, trips abroad, salary payments;
- the manner in which outside purchases for the Police are carried out;
- managing the various foundations administered within the Israel Police, sources of income for these funds and detailed breakdowns of financial expenses;
- Police personnel allocations according to types of duties;
- administering restaurants and canteens in the Police units;
- placing purchases and manufacture orders without tenders;
- implementation of telephone installation budget;
- examining the efficiency and economy of District Headquarters activities;
- Police Kitchen operations; cook positions; handling excess food;
- damage caused to Police vehicles as a result of traffic accidents;
- registering lands owned by the Israel Police;
- examining service conditions for policemen;
- Police recruitment and dismissal procedures;
- registering and safekeeping of Police exhibit.

(State Comptroller Annual Reports 1-9, 1949-57).

Since, every year, 600-800 citizens would complain to the State Comptroller regarding unbecoming behavior or care on the part of Police employees, the Knesset, in 1971, amended the State Comptroller Law by adding an additional function, that of Ombudsman. Complaints related to judicial activity in the courts do not come under the State

Comptroller's jurisdiction, nor do those of policemen regarding discipline or service conditions, which, instead, were transferred to the Police Headquarters for verifications (State Comptroller Law, 1958 [combined version], p. 192, State Comptroller Annual Reports, 1949-57)

On January 1, 1973, an officer "Responsible for Public Complaints" was appointed in the Police National Headquarters, and he then handled all civilian complaints regarding Police behavior or the manner in which police duties are carried out. Concentrating the handling of public complaints in the Police National Headquarters in one office prevented favoritism and superficial handling of civilian complaints.

#### The Attorney General

Another body which is authorized to supervise Police activity, to direct its work, mainly in the area of investigations, is the Attorney General's Office. With the establishment of the Ministry of Justice at the inception of the State and the appointment of a Minister of Justice as the highest political position in this Ministry, the Minister appointed his Director General, Ya'akov Shapira, to also act as Attorney General and to be responsible for the wording of proposals for legislation. Y. Shapira, despite the fact that he was an active member of David Ben Gurion's party, succeeded, in a very short period of time, to turn his position into an independent and non-partisan post, not accountable to any orders or government policies, nor to the



Minister of Justice where law enforcement in the State was concerned. The Attorney General is accorded his authority directly by law. He is the head of the General Prosecution Offices and represents the State in criminal proceedings. In Israel, there are two bodies which have the authority to prosecute suspects in court: The District Attorney's offices, concerning felonies which were investigated by the Police; the Israel Police, regarding the rest of the offences (approx. 75-80% of all cases prosecuted). Investigative and prosecution proceedings require close cooperation between Police investigators and its prosecutors, and the Attorney General, the State Attorney and District Attorney offices. Several times during the period under examination, the Ministry of Justice proposed making the Investigations Department of the Police accountable to the Attorney General's office. Police Command levels were firmly opposed to this proposal, claiming that if the Investigations Department were to be taken out of Police hands, it would become void of any importance and would become just like a security company (Gutman, 1981, p. 70; Yosef Nachmias, Interview, January 29, 1987).

Following are the powers accorded to the Attorney General which bear directly on Police investigative work:

- The Police must acquire written permission from the Attorney General whenever it intends to request that a suspect's detention be extended to beyond 30 days. The wording of this law enables the Attorney General to examine the legality of Police arrests (Criminal

Code (Arrests and Search) [new version], 1969, para. 18);

- To delay criminal proceedings against a suspect at any time after the indictment and before the judgment, by presenting a substantiated letter to the court (Criminal Code [combined version], 1982, para. 231);
- To instruct the Police to open an investigation concerning a criminal incident without having the authority to set Police priorities nor policy;
- To establish prosecution policy (also for the Police). For example: the Attorney General, Haim Cohen, directed that those suspected of having homosexual relations could not be prosecuted if adults and the deed is carried out modestly and with mutual agreement (Segal, 1988, p. 169);
- The Israeli Penal Code and other special legislation resolve that the following offences should not be criminally prosecuted, unless permission and consent of the Attorney General has been received. Offences by Israelis abroad, state security offences, official secrets offences, insurrection offences, offences acting as incitement to racism, unlawful assembly, disturbances aimed against work relations, printing and distributing a newspaper without license; wire offences, offences requiring the death penalty, Nazi crimes;
- no minor is to be tried for an offence if a year has past since it has been committed, unless authorized by the Attorney General (Juvenile Law [trial, punishment and handling] 1971, para. 14);
- a plaintiff has the right to appeal to the State District Attorney

regarding a Police decision not to investigate nor prosecute a suspect of having committed an offence against him, due to lack of public interest. If the Attorney General is convinced that there is enough public interest to opening an investigation, he is empowered to order the Police to carry out such an investigation (Criminal Law [combined version], 1982, para. 64).

Over the years, regulated work procedures were developed between the Police and the Attorney General and his offices and the District Attorney offices. During investigations regarding serious offences where the prosecution is carried out by the District Attorney's office, the Police investigators inform the District Attorney's office dealing with the domain in which the crime was perpetrated of the fact that an investigation has begun, consult them regarding investigative methods and the amassing of evidential material, and request legal directives during the investigative process. At the end of the investigation, the criminal file is transferred to the pertinent District Attorney's office in order to bring the suspects to trial. The District Attorney's office has the right to return the investigative file to the Police and request supplementary material, if it finds it necessary. The District Attorney's office has the authority to close criminal felony files investigated by the Police due to lack of guilt, lack of proof or lack of public interest in bringing the suspect to trial. The Attorney's office even has the authority to handle the disposition through the process of plea bargaining in felony cases which have been transferred by the Police

for prosecution. In cases of misdemeanors, the plea bargaining process is carried out by the Police prosecution offices.

The Attorney General, the State Attorney and the District Attorneys, within the scope of their legal authority, carry out effective controls over the manner in which the Police operates concerning actions relating to arrests and investigation of criminal incidents. Police prosecutors and investigators accept this since it falls within the scope of powers assigned by law and by knowledgeable persons at high judicial levels, a fact which can only improve the manner in which the Police deals with crime.

#### The Public and the Press

The Public - Policing, in any society, is always a controversial public issue. The Police is made up of men who operate between the hammer and the anvil, performing duties regarded as onerous and distasteful (Bowden, 1976, p.25, 263; Rubinstein, 1973, p. 435).

The working environment of the Police is charged with emotion, tension and suspicions. Some of the duties of the Police involve hostile encounters with civilians. The Police are received with ambivalence and ambiguity when required to enforce unpopular laws, such as: traffic violations, drug use and pornography. Police authority in its specific forms - to arrest, to search, to detain and to use force against whom such action is required, such as alleged

criminals, offenders and disruptive protesters - is awesome (Skolnik, 1987, p.87; Brogden, 1982, p.202; Goldstein, 1977, p. 1; Critchley, 1973, p.34; Wilson, 1978, p.27).

The memories of previous regimes ruling the country were still fresh, such as the great suffering which had been caused during conflicts with the British Mandate Police, and the struggles of the Jewish people against a foreign power in order to realize independence. The Mandatory Police had been the basic tool used by the British Government to neutralize the hopes of independence of the Jews in Palestine. The old-time residents of the country were suspicious and afraid of the new police, since they had confronted the Mandate policemen in demonstrations against foreign rule or when they had been arrested for underground activities.

The new immigrants who arrived after the establishment of the State brought with them a very negative attitude towards the Police in their country of origin, where Jews had been a hated and hunted minority and had been treated with humiliation, brutality and tyranny by the police, the active arm of the ruling body. They brought with them their suspicious attitudes towards the policeman as they had experienced it in their country; they were not adverse to showing their attitude to the Israeli policemen themselves. When they arrived in Israel, they felt released from their fear of the government. On the one hand, they considered an Israeli policeman as "one of us", with whom it was possible to get fresh, to oppose, and disobey; on the

other hand, they still bore a certain dislike for those who wore uniforms, the policemen, and tended not to cooperate with them.

The War of Independence and the difficult economic situation which resulted from the War and the great wave of immigration which hit the young country during its first years, were accompanied by many "Bread and Work" demonstrations in all of the country's settlements due to the heavy unemployment, and gave birth to many mass and individual offences against the law. Many public disturbances accompanied by demonstrations compelled the Police to use force against the demonstrators, to carry out arrests and bring accused to court. This activity did not add to the Police a positive image despite the fact that it carried out its tasks as demanded by the law.

The violent demonstration by members and fans of the "HERUT" political party in 1952 next to the Knesset building in Jerusalem, held in an attempt to frustrate the intention of the Knesset to arrive at reparation agreements with Germany in order to compensate for the destruction of European Jewry by the Nazis, brought about a very serious confrontation between the Police and the demonstrators. Only great efforts neutralized the demonstrators' efforts to break into the Knesset building. This atmosphere, where the Police became obligated to use force in order to maintain public order, was not conducive to building a bridge of understanding with the public.

Israeli society has been characterized by its high degree of

political polarization and divisions which had provided the principal sources of contention within the Jewish community, such as: the ethnic cleavage between Ashkenazi (Jews from Central or Eastern Europe) and the Sephardi (Jews from Oriental stock) majority; the division between ultra-orthodox and secular Jews; the cleavage between right-wing and left-wing parties (Samson and Yuchman, 1977, p.202; Brewer, 1966, p.144).

Most of the Arab population in Palestine participated in one way or another in the Arab countries' war against the State in 1948, and were a hostile factor against Jewish sovereignty. The Arab population in Palestine gave birth to gangs, and these gangs received aid and shelter from the Arab villages. During the war, and following it, many Palestinian Arabs fled from the areas under Jewish control to the other side of the border, hoping to return quickly with the Arab armies. Approximately 100,000 Arabs remained in Israel. The existence of a hostile minority in Israel created a serious security problem, particularly since Israel was still in a state of war with the neighbouring Arab countries. The military government was established in 1949, as a result of the uncertainty and fear because of the existence of the Arab minority in Israel (approx. 11% of the whole of the population in Israel in 1957). The massive guerilla infiltration originating from the Palestinian refugee communities in the Arab countries reinforced the need for military rule. According to the existing laws, the military authorities was empowered to declare a curfew, censor publications, provide permits to leave closed

areas, as well as to carry out administrative arrests which did not require trials.

The Israel Defense Forces were responsible for military rule and the General Security Services were responsible for preventing acts of sabotage, espionage and destruction by the Arab minority in Israel. In the areas governed by the military, the Israel Police carried out normal police duties, in particular, dealing with criminal offences and ensuring the public peace.

Over the years, public and political criticism against the military government increased. The opposition parties claimed that the military government was a political tool used by the ruling parties and was a stain on the image of a democratic Israel. Israeli Arabs joined the Israel Communist Party in droves, and it turned into the main mouthpiece of the Arab minority in Israel. While the Israel Defense Forces gained in strength and the General Security Service improved its intelligence network in the areas populated by Israeli Arabs, the need for military rule diminished. In 1966, the military government was abolished (Harel, 1989, p.440-443; Ben Amos, 1985, p.8).

Between 1950 and 1957, several demonstrations took place involving Arabs, having been organized by the Communist party. These demonstrations were mainly aimed against the continuation of the military rule, and demonstrations held on the first of May, the



worker's holiday, were used to further anti-Israeli propaganda. In general, the Arab minority in Israel, during the first decade of the existence of the State was of rather small proportion and did not present a security problem or danger to the existence of the State of Israel. Many Arabs voted for Jewish Zionist and religious parties and reciprocal relations between Jews and Israeli Arabs were satisfactory.

Brewer (1968, p. 149) stated that a common feature of divided societies, especially those in which it is possible to draw a clear distinction between dominant and subordinate communities, is the polarization of attitudes toward the Police, as is the case in Northern Ireland. The dominant community looks upon the Police as the guarantor of its position, while the subordinate community tends to see the Police as the agents of their oppression by the dominant community.

The Israel Police was faced with a situation where it was obliged to deal with events of a political nature and involving social conflict, such as Count Bernadotte's murder, religious demonstrations, the 1952 demonstration organized by the Herut Party, demonstrations for the unemployed, demonstrations by Arabs organized by the Communist Party. There is no doubt that by acting in that way, the Israeli Police received support from the greater part of the population. But there were always sectors of the population which criticized the activities of the Police and openly expressed their opposition.

It is well known that the Police cannot be fully accountable to all parts of the population. Such was the case also for the Israel Police. Those very minority groups which came into conflict with the Israel Police, and against which the Police was compelled to act in order to maintain law and order, nevertheless recognized the legitimacy of the Israel Police as the National Police Force of the State of Israel, all the while criticizing the manner in which it acted against them.

Since the Israel Police had limited duties in the realm of security and dealings with the Israel Arabs, this minority did not have great reason to criticize the Police, as opposed to the amount of criticism expressed against the Army which was in charge of the military government, and against the General Security Services which actively carried out supervision over the Israel Arabs (Brewer p.150).

At any rate, The Israel Police cannot be compared to the Police Force in Ireland. There, the Police is designated as a civilian arm, but also serves as the main resource for ensuring security, acting against terrorism and political violence (Ibid., p.8, 175; Bowden, 1978, p.167). In Israel, during the first decade of the State's existence, the Police were principally involved in the war against ordinary crimes and maintaining law and order, while the Security Services dealt with political sabotage, espionage and keeping tabs on the Arab minority, alongside the Army, which were responsible for the military rule of the Arab population in the country..

Based upon its knowledge of the particular circumstances under which the State of Israel was formed, the composition of her population make-up and its history, the Police Command, from the very beginning, decided to launch a two-pronged information campaign:

- propaganda based on the principle that the policeman is the servant of the public;
- the mission of a police force in a democratic state is to ensure that the citizenry be able to live in an atmosphere of law and order.

The Police initiated meetings with the public, radio interviews with the Minister of Police and the Inspector General, as well as newspapers interviews and explanatory articles, in order to explain matters, situations and actions to the public.

A second, important step taken by the Police with the establishment of the State was to eliminate the bribe-taking culture which had been part of the police service during the British Mandate period. The Police Command purified the ranks of Mandate policemen and dismissed every policeman whose integrity was suspect. In addition, if it could be proven that policemen recruited after the establishment of the State had taken bribes or received any kind of present, they were also dismissed without hesitation. These bold steps quickly turned the Israel Police into a "clean" Police. Important principles were introduced into the Force and constantly drilled into the policemen's consciousness: not to boast in the

presence of the public; to act impartially, regardless of standing, sect or religion; to act politely and courteously at all times, but when necessary - firmly. The policeman must be loyal to the State, the Police and the people.

The members of the Israel Police come from the people and they are a part of the people. The Police of the State is, first and foremost, the Israeli public's trustee and a reflection of its trust. During the first ten years of its existence, it was possible to find within the Israel Police ranks veterans, many new immigrants hailing from several countries, members of minority groups, women and academicians alongside non-academicians (Israel Police Annual Report, 1956, p. 43).

The Press - The freedom of the press is one of the democratic principles based on the right of the public to receive unbiased information, free of any governmental strictures. The press has great influence on public opinion, and together with the public, is capable of influencing policy-makers and decision-makers. Since it carries such great weight, the press must be cautious to transmit information faithfully and in a balanced manner, having verified the information and the sources faithfully and completely (Landau, 1984, p. XII).

The Police Command, aware of the power of the press, hoped particularly to develop good relations with the press. As early as 1948, the Inspector General appointed a Spokesman in the National

Headquarters and ordered that every Police station set up a press table where visiting reporters could find a synopsis of events of the day. In the latter half of 1950, the Police and the radio management agreed upon a bi-weekly, half-hour program concerning Police matters, a program called "The Policeman's Corner" (National Archives, File 1019, Box 5443/G; Israel Police Annual Report, 1950, p. 25).

Since in the first year of the existence of the State there were only a few newspapers and they consisted of only a few pages (four), and due to the fact that police reporters did not have very much to do, the amount of information regarding Police matters and crime was rather skimpy. However, it information gradually increased near the end of the decade. In addition, the degree of aggressiveness and criticism expressed in the Israeli press regarding the Police, which at the beginning, went almost unnoticed, increased during the years 1956-1958. Political enmity also contributed to this, when the Opposition parties saw the Police as an ally of the ruling party and acting to maintain its hegemony. Many of the attacks made upon the Police in the press were actually aimed at the ruling party, MAPAI. Internal stories regarding the Police and rumors regarding senior Police officers served as "ammunition" for criticism against the Police.

In the second part of this study on the period of the British Mandate, press coverage of the Police and its activities were examined for one year, 1947, a year during which relations between the Jewish

population and the British rule in the State of Israel reached a point of crisis, a fact which caused armed civilian revolts. The third part of the work, this part, which examines the development occurring in the Israel Police during the first decade of the existence of the State of Israel, will examine press coverage given to the Police during 1950. This year was chosen because it was the first year after the end of the War of Independence, the year during which the country began facing the problems which confronted the newly established country, such as: society, economy, education, security, the difficulties caused by mass immigration, and the need for work and housing for the immigrants.

The newspapers chosen for content examination are "Ha-Aretz" and "Ma'ariv", a paper which used to come out in the afternoon and which became the most popular one during that period. Following are the basic characteristics of those papers during 1950, relating to the manner in which they covered the Police and crime:

- there were no reporters who particularly specialized in Police and criminal matters;
- both newspapers consisted of four pages every day. During the weekends, sports, entertainment, culture and literature sections were added;
- during 1950, only four editorials were published touching upon Police and criminal matters;
- during that same period, only four leading articles dealt with Police matters. Three were concerned with the phenomenon of the

black market and the fourth, with the problem of infiltration;  
 - most of the Police topics were covered by short items.

From an examination of the contents of the items published in the "Ha-Aretz" and "Ma'ariv" newspapers in 1950 concerning the Police and crime in Israel, one can see that the newspapers of the new country tended to cover Police matters on a broader basis than those active during the British Mandate period: 568 articles in 1950 as opposed to 172 in 1947, a difference of 230%. From all the articles published in 1950 regarding the Police, 453 articles and items (79.75%) surveyed criminal acts, demonstrations, traffic accidents and the manner in which the Police dealt with them. During 1947, only two articles surveyed these topics. Following are percentages regarding the main topics, from among all subjects concerning the Police, which were surveyed during 1950:

| <u>Subject</u>    | <u>Articles</u> | <u>Percentages</u> |
|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| Infiltration      | 170             | 29.9               |
| Black market      | 74              | 13.0               |
| Serious crimes    | 70              | 12.3               |
| Traffic accidents | 32              | 5.6                |
| Demonstrations    | 31              | 5.5                |

For a breakdown of the content of Police matters as published in the above papers in 1950 - see Table 39.

Table 39: Content Breakdown, Police Topics in "Ha-Aretz" and in "Ma'ariv", 1950.

| Subject                                                      | Ma'ariv | Ha-aretz | Total |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------|----------|-------|
| Arrests, searches                                            | 24      | 3        | 27    |
| Demonstrations, public unrest<br>and Police handling of same | 10      | 21       | 31    |
| Crime phenomena and Police<br>handling of same               | 18      | 8        | 26    |
| Police actions against the black<br>market                   | 27      | 47       | 74    |
| Infiltration and Police actions<br>against this phenomenon   | 128     | 42       | 170   |
| Economic crimes, smuggling of<br>foreign currency            | 9       | 5        | 14    |
| Survey of serious crime incidents -<br>murder, robbery, etc. | 54      | 16       | 70    |
| Traffic problems, traffic accidents                          | 11      | 21       | 32    |
| Assault of policemen                                         | 8       | 1        | 9     |
| Use of force and other complaints<br>against the Police      | 13      | 9        | 22    |
| Exemplary police behaviour                                   | 2       | -        | 2     |
| Personnel, training, and appointment<br>of officers          | 19      | 11       | 30    |
| Positions and changes in the Police                          | 16      | 14       | 30    |
| The Police in Knesset discussions                            | 2       | 6        | 8     |
| Letters to the editor about the Police                       | 7       | 10       | 17    |
| Tidbits about the Police                                     | 6       | -        | 6     |
| Total                                                        | 354     | 214      | 568   |



Mention of Police positions, personnel problems, officer appointments appeared in 60 articles and items, 10.56% of all items concerning the Police which were published. That year, "Ma'ariv" published 354 such articles and items, 62.32% of all articles regarding the Police appearing in both papers put together. "Ha-Aretz" published 214 such items, 37.68% of the whole.

The quality of Police relations with the public and the extent of press coverage of the Police and its activities were influenced by the different events which took place and which were connected to the Police. An incident which greatly harmed the Police image concerned the arrest of the religious underground organization and the behavior of the policemen holding them in the Jelami detention camp (see p. 331 above).

On the other hand, great public value was gained from mention of the assistance activities of the Israel Police in the immigrant camps during the years 1950-1951 (see page 322). The Police proved that its policemen were indeed part of the people and ready and willing to be partners in building a better society in Israel. When the immigrants became accustomed to the conditions and customs of the country, a definite improvement began to be felt in their behaviour and from 1954 onward, they began to be more respectful of the law and the Police. Demonstrations against lack of work almost ceased, order was maintained and the public obeyed Police instructions during events such as public celebrations, government ceremonies.

Members of the Police became more professional as the end of the first decade came near and a viable system of relations with the public increased in direct proportion to the faith which the citizens of Israel placed in the Police. During this period, no public polls were taken regarding Police image. The first survey regarding this topic was carried out by the Institute for Practical Research of Society at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem which was held in 1969 on the topic: the relationship of the public to the Police, its image and values. The results of the survey could also shed some light on the period with which this work is concerned. The survey found that those persons questioned regarding their evaluation of the professional status of the policeman, in comparison with other professions rated the status of the policeman as being average. Sixty-four percent placed the policemen at the level of 4-6 on a scale of 9 (page 38). Regarding the concept of the policeman's work conditions and the efforts involved, 74% of those questioned rated work conditions as being difficult, involving great efforts (page 39).

When those participating in the survey were asked concerning their sources of information regarding the Police, 55% replied that they garnered their information from the media: 34% from the press, 11% from television, and 10% from the radio. Twenty-one percent of the whole did not read nor listen to the radio, nor had they ever come face to face with policemen (page 47). It should be remembered that in Israel, in 1969, television was only in its initial stages and the newspapers were not widely distributed. Today, the media plays a

larger role in creating public opinion. The general image of the Police in the eyes of the public, at the end of the 1960's, as is evidenced from the results of this survey, was definitely a positive one.

In December 1955, "Volunteer Ranks" published a pamphlet called Danger lurks within. The "Volunteer Ranks" was an organization comprised of intellectuals which set out to fight corruption in general and to point out glaring defects in the government and the rule, and to warn the country of dangers. Among others, the pamphlet stated that three merchants, well-known to the Israeli public, were taking advantage of their friendship with one of the most senior officers in the Police, Amos Ben Gurion, the Head of the Organization Dept. (David Ben Gurion's son), in order to influence the manner in which the Police was investigating them. This article dragged the Police, and in particular, senior officers, into a whirlpool of events which greatly harmed the Police image and caused great personal damage to some of the senior officers.

Amos Ben Gurion, who considered the publication to be libellous, sued the publishers belonging to the "Volunteer Ranks" in the Tel Aviv District Court (File 113/56). The press, sensing fertile ground, began covering the subject, Amos Ben Gurion as the main target. Some of the Prime Minister's opponents saw, through attacks carried out on his son, a golden opportunity to harm the Prime Minister. A large part of the Police Command, headed by the Inspector General, were

accused by the press of helping Amos Ben Gurion and of doing everything possible to blur the truth. Although, in the end, Amos Ben Gurion was cleared of all charges, this incident had even greater consequences for the Israel Police and its Command.

During Amos Ben Gurion's trial, Y. Sahar, the Inspector General, appeared as a witness in his favor. This was the first time that Sahar had appeared in court as a witness and, in addition, he was not well acquainted with the investigative file which the Police was conducting against the three merchants, Amos Ben Gurion's friends. When Y. Sahar was asked whether Yishayahu Yarkoni, one of the merchants, was suspected by the Police of having committed an offence, he claimed that according to the Police understanding of the expression 'suspect', Yarkoni was not considered a suspect. The defense attorneys proved that Yarkoni was indeed considered a suspect by the investigators and accused the Inspector General of have perjured himself in an attempt to protect his friend, Amos Ben Gurion, and to help him.

The Court, when referring to Sahar's testimony, stated: "The Inspector General's performance in court was a kind of tragedy" because he denied the fact that Shai Yarkoni was a suspect. During the appeal in the Supreme Court, the Court also noted, concerning the same subject: "Our opinion is that if the District Court reached the desired conclusions in view of the facts proved before it, it could not have avoided deciding, without a doubt, that Mr. Sahar

intentionally lied in his testimony in order to hide the fact that he was aware that Yarkoni was a suspect...." (Civil Appeal 256/57; 263/57; S. Applebaum and others vs. A. Ben Gurion, Court Decisions, Vol. 14, 1960, 2, p. 1232).

Amos Ben Gurion's trial and the accusation that the Inspector General had lied in court, in addition to the wide press coverage and editorializing and the echoes that resulted, created an atmosphere within the Police which necessitated changes in the Command levels. The Prime Minister appointed one of his confidants, Shaul Avigur, to examine the situation within the Police and prepared a proposal indicating as to how to deal with it. Upon receiving S. Avigur's report (apparently presented orally because no written records were found in the Archives on this subject) the Prime Minister decided to replace the Inspector General with Yosef Nachmias. Until 1953, Nachmias had been Deputy Inspector General; he resigned and had become Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Defense.

On May 18, 1958, the Minister of Police, during the weekly Cabinet meeting, announced Y. Sahar's decision to resign. During the same meeting, the Cabinet decided to appoint Yosef Nachmias as the second Inspector General of the Israel Police (Decision nr. 401), as of June 1, 1958 (National Headquarters Directive nr. 22 of June 1, 1958, p. 271).

On June 4, 1958, during an interview in the "La-Merhav"

newspaper, Y. Sahar stated: "I would not have left the Israel Police if not for the cheap press. I failed in the area of relations with the public despite the fact that I was aware of the importance of such relations. At first, I employed a reporter as my Spokesman, then a writer, and during the last few years, I appointed a senior Police Officer (Division Head), however, all of these steps did not improve the Police image with the public" ("La-Merhav", June 4, 1958).

The testimony presented by Y. Sahar during Amos Ben Gurion's trial against the "Volunteer Ranks" served as a basis for prosecuting him in the Tel Aviv District Court (File T.A. 513/60), wherein he was accused of perjury, offence as per para 117(1) of the Criminal Code, 1936. The Court indicted Y. Sahar and sentenced him to nine months imprisonment suspended, and fined him 15,000 IL. Y. Sahar appealed before the Supreme Court. The appeal was heard over a period of three days, February 14-17, 1961, before three Supreme Court judges who confirmed the District Court sentence, but reduced the fine to 5,000 IL. (Criminal Appeal nr. 21/61. Yehezkel Sahar vs. the State Attorney General, Court Decisions, Vol. 15, 1961, pp. 561-585).

Thus ended one of the stormiest episodes in the history of the Israel Police during its first decade following the establishment of the State.

## Chapter XI: Summary & Conclusion

The turbulent political history of Palestine had considerable influence on the Palestine Police structure, strength, functions and accountability. This study has provided an historical and organizational analysis of the Palestine Police institution and development, as a British Mandated Police organized along colonial and paramilitary lines, and patterned after the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Police forces in the British colonies.

The second part of this study concentrated on the historical and organizational analysis of the role played by the Palestine Police during the various stages of the British Mandate on Palestine. It described how the political situation during this period affected the nature of the Police structure, organization, functions and accountability. It identified and analyzed strong connections between the political situation in Palestine and the functions, tasks and organization of the Palestine Police.

It seems that Britain, while occupying Palestine, had the best of intentions in its attempts to establish a modern and dedicated administration and bureaucracy, including a police force. The British statesmen thought that such a force could be developed on the same organizational lines as the British colonial police forces in Asia and

Africa. Britain did not take into consideration the particular circumstances which, in the shadow of the Arab-Jewish conflict, transformed Palestine into a critical and difficult territory of control, in contrast with the other British colonial territories.

This study found clear evidence that the central duty of the Palestine Police, which during the British Mandate on Palestine was to be the main armed force in the country providing public security, had not been discharged. The weakness of the Palestinian Government and its main arm, the Police, cost many lives and much property loss during the Arab disturbances of 1921, 1929, 1936-39, and the Jewish fight for independence. Despite the political tension and turbulence, the period during which Roy Spicer was the Inspector General of the Police, 1931-37, was characterized as one of professional consolidation and development for the Palestine Police. The outbreak of the Arab Rebellion in 1936 was a setback for this consolidation. The outbreak of World War Two in 1939 further weakened the commitment of the Police to strictly civilian duties.

This study has demonstrated that the first two stages of Sir Charles Jeffries' Colonial Police model (see pages 14-20), the "Essential Phase" and the "Para-Military Phase", were as developed in Palestine as in the other British Colonies. The third phase - which includes the conversion of the semi-military Police into a civil Police similar to that prevailing in England (Jeffries, 1952, p. 33), was not achieved in Palestine during the Mandate. On the contrary,



the Palestine Police, after World War Two, became a strong semi-military Police force, heavily armed, including the use of armored cars, and mainly engaged in security and anti-terrorist activities. The conventional Police duties were almost abandoned by the British members of the Police and only partially implemented by its Palestinian members.

Analysis of Palestine Police strength during the British Mandate showed a direct connection between the increase in Police strength, its ethnic composition, the political developments and the security conditions in the country. The Palestine Police, during the first 20 years of the Mandate, consisted mainly of Arabs who were thought not to be reliable in emergency situations. From the outset of the Palestine Police Force's existence, Jews were under-represented in the Police. At the beginning, the British found that it was easier and cheaper to recruit Arabs in the ranks of the Police rather than Jews. During the "Arab Revolt" of 1936-39, the Government preferred to recruit more Jews into the Police. However, from 1943 until the end of the Mandate, the Government avoided increasing the Jewish component of the Palestine Police for fear of collusion and cooperation between Jewish policemen and the Jewish underground movements.

Due to "Jewish Resistance" activity, the intensification of dissident and terrorist groups' attacks on British targets, and the armed struggle between the Jews and the Arabs, the British complement within the Palestine Police was significantly increased from 1943, and

became the majority group by the end of 1947 (61.78%). Parallel to this tendency of increasing the number of British policemen in the Force, the British Government reinforced the British army garrison in Palestine, which, at the end of the Mandate, consisted of approximately 100,000 troops - an enormous force for such a tiny country. The Force which was mainly used to suppress Jewish resistance and to provide a barrier between the Arabs and the Jews.

As we review the history of the Police in Palestine during the British occupation during the years 1918-1948, it can be said with confidence that upon their arrival, the British found a barren, sparsely populated and primitive land, whose inhabitants were unfamiliar with Western conceptions of law and order. The British did not inherit a Police force with an efficient and active organization from the Turks, masters of the land for 400 years. Small groups of town police forces functioned in the main cities of Palestine, and rural areas were policed by gendarmes and irregular units.

The British began energetically to organize the Police, starting with local units, which, after two years, were followed by a unified and uniform National Police, recruiting Arab and Jewish local residents. Command remained in the hands of British officers. Had the land been quiet and free of political and security problems, the British might have produced the best of its colonial police, more developed even than those of India or Ceylon. The political conflict, generated by the desire of the Jews to establish an independent state,

the opposition expressed by the local Arabs and neighboring Arab states to this intention, and the reversal of the British position to assist in the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, led to a harsh, armed struggle between the Jews and the British, and between the Jews and the Arabs. This situation severely disrupted the fabric of life. Thus the Palestine Police de-emphasized conventional Police functions such as patrols, receiving complaints from the public, and conducting regular criminal investigations. A growing proportion of its resources was diverted to security problems, protection of public and government buildings, combatting terror, dispersing demonstrations, searches for weapons and arrests of illegal immigrants. The percentage of British policemen serving in the Palestine Police steadily increased and became the majority in the years 1943-1948. Large military forces brought to the Holy Land during the last decade of the Mandate were also employed in Police work.

The Israel Police was established on May 15, 1948, the day on which the Independence of Israel was declared. Declaring the establishment of the State was a very brave act on the part of the Jewish Palestine leadership during that period, particularly in view of the fact that the British were opposed to allowing the Jews of Palestine to establish their own state and had therefore withdrawn from the Mandatory State, leaving a political and administrative vacuum behind them, while a war was being waged between the Jews and Arabs in the country. The stream of Jewish refugees began arriving

from Europe immediately upon the establishment of the State. This caused serious problems for the young country's leadership as to how all of these people would be absorbed, housed, provided for and the thousands of children educated. During all of this, a savage war was being waged between the new State and the Arabs of Palestine and the armies of five neighboring Arab states which had invaded Israel on the eve of the Independence of the State.

Although it seems that the Israeli Police was imposed from above, there was no problem of consent to its establishment, but to its organizational nature and its power. During this state of emergency, it was natural that the Israel Police, during its first year of existence, was assigned lowest possible priority. While every healthy and able-bodied young Jew was recruited into the Israel Defence Forces, only those either above the age of 35 or found to be unfit for army service were directed towards the Police. The Israel Police counted itself lucky that the Army authorities permitted former Jewish members of the Mandate Police to continue serving in the Police. These policemen formed the basic foundation of the Police. David Ben Gurion, the leader in Jewish Palestine and the first Prime Minister of Israel, appointed Yehezkel Sahar as the first Commander of the Israel Police. Sahar, who, in the past, had been a Major in the Transport Division of the British Army and an active member of the "Hagana", had no conception as to what constituted a Police Force nor of the responsibilities which should be undertaken by the Police of this young State.

There is no doubt that the Prime Minister, by this appointment, showed much daring and took a great chance when he decided to place, at the head of the Police, a man lacking in Police knowledge and experience. Today, such an appointment is difficult to understand, however, it should be taken into account that during the first days of the existence of the State, days of great organizational struggles and war, days of states of emergency and great apprehensions, the leaders of the State of Israel had many posts to fill and there were not really many qualified persons available.

Sahar was also bold in accepting the difficult task of Inspector General of a Police Force which was not organized, did not have the necessary personnel, equipment or knowledge. It was a difficult and complicated job, especially since Sahar, knew nothing of the workings of the Police.

Sahar, assisted by his deputy, Yosef Nachmias, by a group of former British Army officers whom he had known during his years of service, and a group of former Hagana commanders recruited into the Israel Police as senior officers, succeeded in creating an honest, disciplined Police Force. Despite the difficulties before which it found itself, the Israel Police, during the first decade of its existence, succeeded in gaining enough proficiency and for the most part successfully carried out its tasks. Since its legitimacy was not an issue during those years, the main police task was to build a new image and to change old conceptions about the police.

### Research Questions

The main research question this study addressed was: Did the transition from the British Mandate rule to an independent and democratic state in Israel change the role and conceptions of accountability and control of the police in Israel? In this summary chapter, the results of the seven questions posed at the beginning of this work (see page 32) will be succinctly summarized, providing, in brief, an answer to the principal question in the study.

Sub-question 1: Did the Palestine Police prepare a future Jewish police command cadre in anticipation of the British evacuation from Palestine and the independence of Israel?

The facts put forward in this study (see page 200-203) clearly show that Britain was reluctant to promote Arabs and Jews (natives) to high ranks in the Police. Until the end of the British Mandate on Palestine, there was no Jewish officer above the rank of Deputy Superintendent (Major); None of the Jewish Senior Police officers. Knew how Police Headquarters or District Police Headquarters operated. In fact, from the beginning of the Mandate, the British Government did not trust the Arab members of the Palestine Police, and trusted the Jewish members even less, especially following the intensification of Jewish dissident activity and the "Jewish Resistance", beginning in 1943.

Taking these facts into consideration, it is clear that Palestine Police Headquarters were not interested in preparing a future Jewish Police command in anticipation of the British withdrawal from Palestine.

Sub-question 2: Did there occur an official or orderly transition between the Palestine Police and the new Israeli Police?

An examination of this question proved (see page 203-206) that Great Britain, which did not approve of the United Nations General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947, to establish two separate states in Palestine, decided to retreat from the territory. The British withdrew from Palestine in May 1948, leaving behind an administrative and political vacuum, while war raged between Arabs and Jews. The Palestine Police evacuated its accommodations without an orderly transfer of authority to any representative of the local population, Jewish or Arab. Most Police equipment, including vehicles, communications instruments, weapons, C.I.D. correspondence, was taken to England or destroyed. The modern Police buildings which had been built following the Arab disturbances of 1936-39 were left standing and have been used since by the Israel National Police. Policemen were left with their personal weapons, as well as three months' severance pay. In terms of infrastructure the Israeli Police was to start from the basic beginnings.

On the positive side, the British left behind an organized

legislature and regulations concerning the Police, as well as a collection of Standing Orders and Rules, which, with minor alterations, served as the basis for the establishment of the Israel National Police. Seven hundred and fifty Jewish policemen, trained and experienced in patrol and investigations, formed the hard core of the new Police Force in the independent State of Israel. Thousands of Jews who had trained and served in the ranks of the Jewish Settlement Police (JSP) formed the basis of the Israel Defense Forces, which was organized shortly before the British withdrawal.

Despite harsh conflicts between the Jews and the British in Palestine, the lack of orderly transition or adequate preparation of Jewish Police officers, it can be decisively said that the Israel National Police learned and inherited much from the Palestine Police, and was founded in the British tradition, whose influence on Israeli policing is apparent until today. The bitter memories of Israelis regarding the period of the British Mandate have faded, and today, free of hatred, the two nations share excellent relations and cooperation, including in police matters.

It is fitting to quote the words of Menachem Begin, who, until the British withdrawal from Palestine, had been the leader of the "IRGUN" underground movement which had fought relentlessly against the British. Begin was elected a member of the Knesset upon the declaration of the independence of the State, and from 1977 to 1983, served as Israel's Prime Minister: "The British Mandate on Palestine



was sometimes repressive, undeniably undemocratic and capable of being cruel and arbitrary, but was not a reign of terror. During the Mandate's history of thirty years, fewer than a dozen Jewish underground fighters were executed" (Begin, 1977, p. 55). These words also apply to the Palestine Police, which was the executive arm of the British Mandate Administration in Palestine.

Sub-question 3: Why did the Israeli Police initially take the Palestine Police as a model for structure and organization, in spite of the differences between the two regimes and the contrast between the tasks and functions of the former police and its successor?

Bayley (1985, p. 69) stated that tradition exerts an inertial weight in preserving the structure of the police as it was initially developed (Austria, England, the United States). In his opinion traditions of police centralization will be reinforced where state-building is accompanied by violent resistance which could threaten the political order. This supposition was once again proven in this work (see pages 223-235). Despite the fact that the Israel Police was established in place of the Palestine Police, which was hated equally by both the Jewish and the Arab population, it adopted the latter's organizational structure. The reasons for that were:

1. The State of Israel arose during a war carried on with the neighboring Arab countries and the Palestinian Arabs. Part of the lands which had been destined to become part of the State of Israel were occupied by the invading Arab armies, and the entire existence of

the State was in danger. Neither the Israeli Cabinet, nor the Inspector-General designate felt, in view of the situation, that any organizational changes should be effected.

2. Most of the resources available at the time were allotted to the Israel Defense Forces, and the Police was assigned only the most minimal resources possible.

3. The Israeli Cabinet developed a system by which all government offices would be centralized. The District Commissioners, who during the British Mandate had been very powerful, found their duties limited to those related to the Ministry of Interior. They had no authority to control the regional police forces, as they had had during the British Mandate.

4. During the first two years of the State's existence, the government still feared the partisan feelings in the underground organizations: The PALMACH (supported by the leftist political parties); IRGUN and LEHI (supported by the right political parties) and their basic desire to take over the government in Israel. Therefore, the Cabinet established the Israel Defense Forces as a popular and legitimate army and supported the centralization of the Police.

5. When Sahar, the first Inspector-General of the Israel Police, proposed the future organization of the police, he had actually adopted the organizational structure of the Palestine Police. He was convinced that the organizational structure which had been satisfactory for the British, experienced in the administration and establishment of police organizations in their land, England, as well as in the British colonies, would certainly be suitable for Israel, a

new country plagued with grave internal and external problems.

Sahar was actually very pleased with the Mandatory Police Ordinance, 1926, which gave the Inspector General broad and varied powers. He invested many efforts to keep the Palestine Police Ordinances from being abolished or even changed in any way, from fear that during Knesset deliberations regarding the enactment of a new law or an amendment, the Minister of Police or members of the Knesset would attempt to diminish the authority of the Inspector General. In fact, the Police Ordinances were not changed in any way until 1971. The organizational structure and goals of the Israel Police during the first year of its existence were identical to those established in the Mandatory Police Ordinance, 1926. It was demonstrated that the rise in crime and its seriousness, and the increase in traffic accidents in Israel were not the factors which compelled the Police Command to make any organizational changes. But rather political, security, social and economic phenomena in the country directly influenced the structural changes in the Police, including its responsibilities and objectives.

Sub-question 4: What kind of budget, resources, manpower and priorities did the Israeli Government allocate to the new police force, at the first stages of its establishment?

During the initial years of the existence of the State, the Israeli Government was forced to give greater priority to building up

the Israel Defense Army and to the war effort, since the very existence of the State and the people were in the balance. Also, during the war, and the years which followed, the young and inexperienced government was forced to allocate resources for the absorption of a great stream of new immigrants arriving from all corners of the world. This very situation meant that the Israel Government was unable, during the first decade of the State, to allocate an adequate budget to the Israel Police (see pages 248-254). The budget received by the Israel Police during those years barely sufficed for salaries and maintenance, and only minimal sums were able to be earmarked for development. This treatment clearly denoted the priorities of the State and the manner in which the national budget was to be divided. Again, the first priority was defense requirements, since failure in this area could bring about the destruction of the country. The second priority was immigration and absorption of new immigrants. The fields of education, health, economy, etc. followed.

The problem of personnel was one of the central problems faced by the Israel Police during that period (see pages 255-273). As can be recalled, only those aged 35 or over were sent to Police recruitment centres during the first year of its establishment. When the war ended, most of those recruits resigned. The low salary, the economic boom at end of the war, and the absorption of immigrants into new, better paying jobs, did not encourage the youths of the country to enlist in the Police. Most of the recruits were new immigrants who had found themselves unable to become absorbed in the Israeli work

market, and who chose the Police as a temporary place of work until they acclimitized to the existing conditions and to the country, and until they became proficient in Hebrew. These immigrants all resigned after a few years of service.

Each year, the Police found itself unable to recruit enough personnel to fill its ranks according to the strength complement allocated by the Ministry of Finance for recruitment. Until 1957, the Police had not been assigned an official strength complement because it was unable to convince the Ministry of Finance of the great personnel needs of the Israel Police. The deficiency of male manpower forced the Police to recruit many women, a phenomenon which, until then, had not been standard for a Western Police Force during that period. Members of the minorities were recruited as well: Arabs, Druze and Circassians. The problem of personnel in the Israel Police has remained a major problem until this day when, more than once, the Police has been forced to compromise its standards regarding recruits and to accelerate recruitment due to the large number of persons resigning and leaving the Police.

Sub-question 5: What was the new police force commanding staff background: Palestine Police, British Army or "Hagana" underground?

The first commanders in the Israel Police were recruited from three different sectors: The Jewish officer level of the Palestine Mandatory Police; Hagana commanders who were not inducted into the

Israel Defense Army because of their relatively advanced age, because no suitable position could be found for them, or because the Police Inspector-General requested the Hagana command staff to release them and assign them specifically to Police service. The third group was made up of former British Army officers (see pages 255- 263).

At that time, Sahar, the Police Inspector-General, suspected the national loyalty of the former Mandate Police Jewish Officer ranks, in particular those who were senior among them. Some of the officers' honesty and moral standards were suspect. Mandate officers accepted into the Israel Police were mainly assigned investigative duties which they had fulfilled in the Palestine Police. Some of them were appointed to lower command duties in police stations which had recently been re-opened and put back into action. Sahar appointed former Hagana commanders in the posts of commanders of districts and sub-districts. He believed that this kind of commanders, although lacking knowledge of police operations, would be very suitable as senior commanders in the young, democratic Police Force which was aspiring to rid itself of all strictures remaining from the Palestine Police and to turn itself into a service-oriented and caring Police Force.

In Sahar's opinion, Hagana commanders, who for the most part were members of the veteran settlements, ardent Zionists, imbued with love for the land, honest and capable of commanding, would be successful in creating a new kind of Police Force, modern, with high standards, well

versed in nationalism, excelling in morality and even more important, faithful to the authorized leadership.

In view of their previous experience, officers coming from the British Army were placed in administrative, service, training and organizational positions. They were integrated principally into the National Headquarters and headed Divisions, or were appointed deputies in the areas of Stores, Buildings, Transport and Administration.

Despite the rise of politicization in Israeli society, as early as during the first years of the establishment of the State, and despite the fact that a large part of the senior commanders of the Police came from the ranks of the Haganah, and were members of Kibbutzim which belonged to the Socialist parties, or members of the central parties, Y. Sahar, Inspector General of the Police, avoided any political involvement in the daily life of the Police. Nor did he appoint any officers on the basis of their political affiliations.

However, there was some discrimination on a political basis. The Israel Police, for many years, had avoided recruiting into its ranks persons who, in the past, had belonged to the right-wing underground organizations such as "LECHI" and "IRGUN", which had, during the Mandate period, been considered "splinter groups". There is no doubt that the fact that David Ben Gurion did not attempt to impose the rule of his party, MAPAI, over the Police, enabled Y. Sahar to administer the Police according to the law.

Sub-question 6: Were the Jewish police officers (from lieutenant and above) who served in the Palestine Police accepted by the new Israeli Police commanders? Were they appointed to superior assignments?

Most of the Jewish officers (those from the rank of lieutenant and up) in the Mandate Police did not remain in the Israel Police for long - some of them were dismissed because of doubts about their past loyalty to the British or on moral grounds. Others simply felt unwanted when they were placed in low positions or not promoted, and resigned on their own (see pages 255-263). The fate of the most Jewish policemen (constable) from the Mandate period was different - they were gladly accepted and integrated into investigative and patrol duties in the Police stations and served as the main foundation base for the Police in carrying out those police duties. Many of them were promoted to the ranks of sergeants and officers, and some of them even reached the most senior ranks, such as: Shaul Rosolio, a Sgt. Major in the Jewish Constabulary (J.S.P.) became the fifth Inspector General of the Israel Police, 1972-1976; Haim Tavori, a simple policeman during the Mandate, was appointed sixth Inspector General of the Israel Police, 1976-1979. Others concluded their Police service bearing the ranks of District Commander, Sub-district commander and as senior Headquarters Officers.

Sub-question 7: Did the Israel Police move quickly toward significant changes and modernization?



Various developments and the serious criminal manifestations which occurred in Israel during the first decade of the existence of the State greatly disturbed its inhabitants. That plus the development of police experience forced the Police Command to initiate significant changes in its organizational structure and work habits, despite the fact that its commanders had no intention of effecting such changes initially. The system of responsibilities which was placed on the Police upon its inception, and the situations with which it came in contact, encouraged the command levels to carry out organizational changes during its first year of existence and almost every year thereafter. Further, they established a set of priorities for implementing the responsibilities and introduced changes in work habits.

With the dispersal of the Israeli population the police had to change its structural organization: districts altered their territorial boundaries; new Police regions were established; new Police stations and posts were opened; departments and divisions in the National Headquarters were constantly being abolished and others established. The Police changed its image and adapted itself to the changing times and needs. During the first decade, clear preference was given to National Headquarters facilities over field units, and to the Administrative Department in the National Headquarters, over the other Departments. This, in itself, is not a healthy situation in any organization, but particularly not in a Police Force. The Investigations Department was placed in an inferior position. The

reasons for this were that during that period the heads of the Administrative Department were officers who had very strong personalities and who had brought with them Army administrative /organizational experience, but no investigative experience. Persons with very little police and investigative experience were appointed to head the Investigations Department, a position which often found itself with a change of command. They were uncomfortable with police investigations, emphasized the importance of the administrative and operational aspects of the Police, and minimized the attainments and achievements of investigations.

The assassination of Count Bernardotte in 1948 accelerated the establishment of the General Security Services (G.S.S.) attached to the Prime Minister's Office and the establishment of the Special Duties Division in the Israel Police. The demonstrations staged by the religious factions in Jerusalem, demonstrations concerning unemployment during 1950-52, and the those staged in 1952 by supporters of the "HERUT" party (remnants of the "Irgun" underground organization) against the receipt of reparations from Germany, compelled the Police to accelerate police training on demonstration dispersal with the use of batons water and tear gas.

The problem of Palestinian infiltration from the neighboring Arab countries had a direct influence on the establishment of the "Anti-infiltration Unit" within the framework of the Organizational Department in the Police National Headquarters as well as parallel

units at the District and regional level, dealing in infiltration, intelligence and investigations. The establishment of the "Border Guard" in 1951, initially as small units integrated into the police regions, and in 1953, as a separate force molded in the image of a military-gendarmerie, but under the authority of the Israel Police, was the result of a Government decision to provide an efficient solution to the phenomenon of infiltration.

From 1948 to 1955 the government imposed an extensive ration system, mainly for food. Economic crimes, price gouging and speculation forced the Police, in 1950, to declare war on the "black market". The Police was forced to take part in this battle, which brought about the establishment of the Economic Investigation Division within the C.I.D. in the Police National Headquarters, as well as parallel units in the District headquarters. Because of the low rate of common crimes there was not a rhetoric of "war on crime" but, of a war against "black market".

Most of the organizational changes which took place in the Israel Police were due to security situations or a result of having to deal with socio-economic phenomena. However, some changes were brought about by the fact that the Israel Police joined the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). Others were a result of adopting outside influences learned in study tours which had been undertaken by senior Police officers to the United States and to Europe. Among the latter changes were: the introduction of team-

policing and patrol car systems established in the main cities in 1950; developing the Police laboratories which, in 1952, became a Division in the C.I.D.; establishing the Forensic Medicine Institute in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice.

The first decade of the existence of the Israel Police, 1948-1957, was a very active period in which its structure, image and responsibilities were formed. During the early days, the Israel Police was greatly assisted by personnel who had served in the Palestine Mandate Police and by its written regulations and directives. The British (corrected) discipline code and work habits were copied and adopted and the Police Ordinance, 1926, was accepted as it had been during the Mandate period, without any alterations. The Taggart Forts, which had been built by the British as a result of the 1936-39 disturbances, still serve as a major building foundation in the deployment of Police units. The organizational/administrative knowledge brought by officers who had served in the British Army during the Second World War, and the leadership qualities and moral attitudes brought by Hagana officers, who had served as the first cadre of senior officers in the Israel Police, enabled, in a very short time, the establishment of an efficient and proper Police force. It was a Police Force which was able to inscribe the following words on its flag: "The policeman in the State of Israel is not a ruler nor a tyrant, but secures the law and serves the public".

Now to the main research question of this study: Did the transition from the British Mandate rule to an independent and democratic state in Israel change the role and conceptions of accountability and control of the police in Israel?

The Palestine Police, from the outset, was a creature of crisis, an alien occupied force which lacked popular legitimacy and support. Jews and Arabs alike did not trust this police and avoided cooperating with it. In fact, during the entire Mandate period, the Palestine Police was considered by the population to be an alien presence, an oppressive body in the form of a quasi-military, centralized police force.

The Palestine Police had the dual function of acting against what could be termed "common crimes", and of suppressing what might be called "political crime" of a public disorder nature - demonstrations, riots and terrorist activities. The police served as the main coercive instrument and arm of a Mandatory Power. This Police showed little concern for accountability to the leaders and the citizens within its jurisdiction. During most of its existence, the Palestine Police was popularly viewed an alien force as routinely and arbitrarily interfering with personal freedom. The Palestine Police used most of its resources and manpower to try to resolve security issues and to secure British interests in Palestine on the one hand, and, in keeping with British policy in Palestine, to suppress national aspirations of the native population on the other. The native

population, Arabs and Jews, were mostly passively opposed to the Mandate government, but large elements of this population often expressed their opposition actively.

The Criminal Investigations Department (C.I.D.), which, in a normal police force is in charge of criminal investigative tasks, had developed, in the Palestine Police, into the central intelligence/political agency of the government. It collected political information of interest to Britain and served as a political police with security supervisory functions against sedition, terrorist extremist groups and illegal immigration. The C.I.D. was the main executor of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, which gave the authority to arrest and search without Court warrants, to detain for long periods without due process of trial, to proclaim statutory martial law over Palestine and prescribe that all criminal offences be tried by military court.

This study has shown that the Palestine Police was accountable only to the Palestine Government which exercised tight external control over the Police, mainly through the Chief Secretary, but often directly by the High Commissioner, himself. The British Government in London was able to control the Palestine Police as well through the Office of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, which, in fact, closely controlled the Palestine Government. The Palestine Police was not controlled by any elected body, nor by any other external authority, as are police forces in democratic states. The Legislative

Council in Palestine was not an elected Parliament, but rather was composed of British-appointed government officials from the British Mandate, without any locally elected representation, and did not exercise any popular control of the Police. What made the situation even more abnormal was that the Inspector General of the Police was, himself, a member of the Legislative Council.

The Courts in Palestine, to a certain extent, fulfilled the task of judicial review, mainly regarding investigative proceedings and by overseeing excesses in the regular performance of duty. The Police and army activities, according to the authority vested in them by the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, were not scrutinized by the Supreme Court, which had no jurisdiction over these regulations.

In view of censorship restrictions, the limited size of the newspapers during the period being researched, and the lack of police reporters devoting themselves solely to police and crime issues, it is possible to say that the amount of attention and thus control focused by the newspapers on Police activity during the Mandatory period was very limited. Despite this, the Jewish press occasionally raised its voice in anger when Palestine Police actions passed beyond the boundaries of law and good taste, and exhibited cruelty, causing losses in lives and property.

The fundamental nature of political conflict in Palestine created a wide gap between the Palestine Government and the native population.

The relationship between the community and the Police had always been fragile and characterized by natural suspicion. In fact, during the last years of the British Mandate, no positive mutual relationships existed between the Police and the public. The latter would exert no control or influence on the police.

The Israel Police, as in other Western Police Forces, held many legal powers, such as to arrest, investigate and bring a suspect to justice, carry out body search or search a person's living quarters, to use force in order to carry out an arrest or to disperse illegal demonstrations. The State of Israel, whose establishment was based on a democracy, created many political and formal tools without which it would have been impossible to control the workings of the Israel Police.

These accountability tools were described and detailed in the chapter dealing with the subject of The Accountability of the Israel Police (chapter X). There is a very clear distinction between the way in which police accountability was carried out during the British Mandate period, and then after the establishment of the State. The difference is in the manner, tools and scope of such supervision.

#### During the Mandate period

- Supervision was carried out by a foreign government which had absolute powers;
- There was no differentiation between the legislative and the



executive authorities, when the legislative body consisted solely of British officials carrying out executive duties. The local population was not involved nor represented in the legislative process;

- There was no External-Exclusive control. Control over the Police was carried out by the High Commissioner and the Chief Secretary who had been appointed by the British Government. Their supervision over the Police was but a small part of their other activities;
- The Courts were only responsible for control over criminal affairs.
- There was no State Comptroller;
- As a colonial police force, the Palestine Police had no problem about being accountable to the local citizenry because it did not particularly care what they thought.

#### In the State of Israel

- The government is chosen by the people in democratic elections;
- There is a separation of power: Executive (the Cabinet), Legislative (the Knesset), and the Judicial authorities;
- The legislative process is carried out by the Knesset;
- The Cabinet has a Minister for Police Affairs, who is responsible for External-Exclusive control, and that is his sole responsibility;
- Within the framework of its responsibilities, the Cabinet also supervises the Police;
- The State of Israel developed additional accountability factors over the Police in terms of civil rights and due process, such as the Knesset, the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee, the State

Comptroller, the public and the press;

- The courts have broad controlling powers over the Police;
- The Attorney General, State Attorney and District Attorneys closely and constantly control Police investigations.

The Minister of Police, appointed by the Cabinet and the Knesset with sole responsibility for accountability of the Israel Police, was unable to carry out this legal authority in view of the strong and stubborn opposition of Y. Sahar. The Inspector General of the Police strongly believed that the Police Ordinance gave him exclusive authority over the Police and that the Minister only represented the Police in the Cabinet and before the Knesset. When the Minister attempted to wrest this authority from the Inspector General and establish senior officer appointments, or to interfere in operational decisions made by the Inspector General, the Inspector General complained to the Prime Minister, who decided in favor of the Inspector General. This incident caused the dismissal of the Director General in the Ministry of Police, who had been the main factor in causing the tension between the Minister and the Police Command, having always demanded that requests made by the Inspector General to the Ministry go through him. The position of Director General of the Ministry of Police was abolished, despite the fact that Director Generals continued to head other ministries. This mediation carried out by the Prime Minister forced the Minister of Police to retreat from his stand. Thereafter he received the Inspector General's report regarding the activities of the Police, signed officer appointments

based on the Inspector General's recommendations, and represented the Israel Police before the Cabinet and the Knesset when it became necessary to reply to Police issues put by Knesset, as well as during discussions regarding the Police budget. The Minister of Police's image became that of a fatherly, human and sympathetic figure. He loved the Police, however, he was unable to influence its development and the way its responsibilities were carried out.

From the Cabinet minutes it is clear that, despite its many and varied interests, the Cabinet showed great interest in happenings of the Police and in the crime situation in Israel. The Cabinet actually intervened and influenced decisions by providing budgets for establishing new units, or by directing Police activity. The influence of the religious party ministers, members of the Coalition, stood out conspicuously. More than once, they had taken advantage of Cabinet meetings to criticize the manner in which the Police had handled the demonstrations and the fact that religious demonstrators had been arrested.

In the first decade of the Israeli Police the Inspector General was in constant contact with the Prime Minister, to whom he turned when he wanted to achieve any organizational change in the Police or when he was attempting to acquire additional budgetary allocations. At times, the Prime Minister would approach the Inspector General directly, not through the Minister of Police, and order him to carry out some specific task or turn resources towards a particular criminal

phenomenon or other. There is no doubt that the Prime Minister had more influence over the Inspector General than had the Minister of Police.

The Knesset was also instrumental in carrying out certain supervisory actions over the Police through queries presented by Knesset members, motions made in the agenda and plenum discussions. There is also no doubt that interest on the part of Knesset members regarding Police activities or the crime situation was largely a factor of party/political interests, as happens in most democratic countries. In the Israeli coalition politics the opposition parties, in particular the Communist Party, as well as the Knesset members belonging to the Religious parties which were part of the Coalition, often took advantage of the Knesset platform to criticize the Police as a way of criticizing the Cabinet. They criticized the Police regarding its actions when dispersing demonstrations, during arrests and investigations, which seemed, to the Knesset members, to have been tendentious.

However, at times, discussions took place in the Knesset regarding items of interest raised by Knesset members which surpassed party affiliation. The members often showed great interest and helped the Police carry out its responsibilities by allocating resources. The system of queries, as it is used in the Israel Knesset, enables Knesset members to effect a rather efficient accountability system over Police activity and behavior.

What we have described is how in the light of the danger of politicization of the police, the coalition politics saved the police from strong-one party pressure. The police acted a-politically because it had to deal with public protest and demonstrations of all political parties. Accountability issues were raised, therefore, in the area of public order and the political arena, and less about common criminality.

The role played by the Knesset Internal Affairs Committee in supervising Police activities was very prominent during the first decade of the existence of the Police. The Committee often requested the presence of the Minister of Police and Inspector General as a result of citizen requests sent to the Committee, or after a call issued by the Press in view of criminal incidents or activity carried out by the Police. In many cases, the Internal Affairs Committee discussed subjects or queries addressed to it by the Knesset plenum. The Inspector General, despite the fact that he did not like these meetings with members of the Knesset, suspecting that the Knesset members were not always interested in a real discussion, but were in fact, expressing their political opinions, always responded to Committee invitations and treated the Knesset members politely and respectfully.

The Israel Police, as opposed to the British Mandate Police, was very sensitive to the reaction of the population. During the first year of the existence of the Police, the Police Command made

efforts to change the image of the Police in the public eye emphasizing its service role to the new immigrants, by relying on local leaders but not succumbing to local pressures.

The difference between crowd incidents which took place during the first decade of Israel's existence and similar incidents during the British Mandate period is that under the new State of Israel, only part of the populace took part in confrontations with the Police. Most of the population looked upon Police activity concerning the demonstrations as a legal and necessary tool in order to maintain Democracy in the country. At any rate, despite the knowledge on the part of the people of Israel that Police activity regarding demonstrations was necessary, this activity harmed the Police image, in particular among new immigrants. The welcome activity of the Police in the immigrant camps, strengthening the life of the camp society, and later, strengthening the contact between policemen in Police stations and new immigrants who arrived in the development towns and the newly established settlements, greatly helped to improve the image of the Police and to build ties with the community. The policemen in the Israel Police were taught to look at themselves as part of the people and as servants of the public. They were trained to maintain law and order and to react to all offences against the law without discrimination but politely, all the while ensuring and maintaining the basic rights of the citizen.

To summarize, there was the danger of no political neutrality of

the police because of the politicization of the Israeli society, the history of ethnic subcultures, the multiple-parties system and the political and normative protests and demonstrations. But formal accountability arrangements, the fact of a coalition government and the emphasis on national goals that overshadowed social cleavages prevented partisan politics by the police, as well as the establishment of a police union.

As to accountability through the press which is representative of the public and provides informal control over the Israel Police: Until the midway point of the first decade of the establishment of the State, the Israeli press was not very influential in the political or social happenings in Israel. There were relatively few newspapers. A newspaper, on the average, consisted of only four pages. There were very few reporters employed, and there were no reporters who particularly concentrated and specialized on Police affairs.

Beginning with 1954, an awakening began to take place in the Israeli press, the newspapers increased their number of pages, investigative articles appeared, editorials broadened their scope, and various supplements began to be added to the weekend editions. In addition, a change was also felt in the coverage given to the Police and crime. Critical articles were published and criminal acts were more broadly covered. Articles were published on the activities of the Police as regards working conditions of the policemen, and salary difficulties. The libel suit instituted by the Assistant Inspector

General, Amos Ben Gurion, the son of the Prime Minister, and the appeals in the Supreme Court during 1955-57, were given wide press coverage. The press was not satisfied with only covering the personages involved in the trial. It broadened its scope reporting on the rest of the Police High Command and the Police as a whole. Looking back, it could be said today that the press had the greatest direct influence on forming a negative public opinion vis a vis the Police during that period. Public opinion compelled Y. Sahar, the first Inspector General of the Israel Police, to hand in his resignation. It could also be said today, 41 years since the establishment of the State, that the Israeli press, more than once, influenced the introduction of a process which brought about a change in Inspector Generals in the Israel Police.

The Israel Police, as a Police in a democratic State, enjoys very efficient controls by the ruling bodies as well as by the public. It could be said that despite lively political activity, and the multi-partied structure of the State of Israel, the Israel Police, a national body, succeeded in changing into an apolitical State Police and acquired a field of operations based on the principles of law and justice. The press, which expanded near the end of the decade, turned into the "watchdog" of the Israel Police, constantly examining the manner in which Police responsibilities and tasks are carried out.

It is possible to divide the development of the Israel Police during the first decade of its existence into three main sub-periods:



1948-1949 - Period of establishment in the shadow of the War of Independence.

1950-1955 - Completion of organizational structural changes and professional advances.

1956-1957 - Stability and the beginning of press criticism of the Police Command with harm to the public image of the Police.

With the resignation of Y. Sahar, the first Inspector General of the Israel Police who served as Inspector General longer than any other Inspector General since, and with the nomination of Yosef Nachmias as the second Inspector General of the Israel Police, the Police marched toward a period of profound and significant reorganization both at the policy level and at the organizational level. Reorganization, basically, with additional specific changes, has remained an issue until this day.

The period headed by Y. Nachmias should be the subject of another, separate research project.

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