

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

77-664

BOLOGH, Roslyn Wallach, 1944-
DIALECTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY: ANALYSIS OF A
METHOD OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIZING.

City University of New York, Ph.D., 1976
Sociology, theory

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© COPYRIGHT BY

ROSLYN WALLACH BOLOGH

1976

DIALECTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Analysis of A Method of Sociological Theorizing

by

Roslyn Wallach Bologh

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy, The City University of New
York.

1976

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

September 6, 1976

date

George Fischer

Chairman of Examining Committee
George Fischer

September 6, 1976

date

William Kornblum

Executive Officer
William Kornblum

Michael E. Brown

Lindsey Churchill

Peter Manicas

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the two people who have contributed the most to this dissertation:

George Fischer has given more of his time and energy to helping me than I can adequately acknowledge. In his lively seminars, in which we, as students, read and argued over Capital and the Grundrisse, I was introduced to Marx's thinking. This education continued through several years of regular meetings and discussions on phenomenology and Marx. My unusual dissertation could never have been done without his strong support, enthusiasm and guidance throughout.

Michael E. Brown, with his intellectual breadth, dialectical thinking, and rigorously analytical mind, generously gave himself over to helping me analyze my own work. He suffered through several drafts, meeting with me regularly for long periods. These meetings were invaluable and provided the basis for a complete rewriting of the dissertation. For his patience and perseverance in the face of the difficulties I presented, I am similarly grateful.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
1 FOUR RULES FOR PRODUCING MARX'S THEORIZING . .	1
2 RULE 1: TREAT CONCEPTS AS GROUNDED IN A HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC FORM OF LIFE	68
3 RULE 2: TREAT INDIVIDUALS AS GROUNDED IN A HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC FORM OF LIFE	121
4 RULE 3: TREAT A FORM OF LIFE AS A TOTALITY OF INTERNAL RELATIONS	184
5 RULE 4: TREAT A CONCRETE FORM OF LIFE AS CONTRADICTORY	244
6 VIOLATING FOUR RULES FOR PRODUCING MARX'S THEORIZING	299
BIBLIOGRAPHY	348

CHAPTER 1

FOUR RULES FOR PRODUCING MARX'S THEORIZING

This work reformulates Marx's critique of political economy as an explicit and socially reproducible method of theorizing. The method is one of sociological theorizing, theorizing about social processes.

The reformulation offered here I call Dialectical Phenomenology. I present my reformulation in terms of four rules. The first chapter gives an over-all view of dialectical phenomenology and the four rules.

Dialectical Phenomenology: Reformulating Marx's
Critique as Method

The approach I use reveals itself in two ways: First, my approach consists of a dialogue with Karl Marx; it proceeds dialectically. Where other attempts to uncover and explicate his work treat it as an external, independent, self-sufficient thing, my approach does not. Secondly, as alter to Marx as ego, I try to provide the phenomenological grounds of his theorizing. I try to show how it can make sense to theorize as he does by showing what makes such theorizing possible.

By phenomenological grounds I refer to that which is internal to or presupposed in the theorizing. None of the following, it should be stressed, constitute phenomenological grounds:

Personal motives--such as considering Marx's analysis of capital to reflect his values, sympathies or ambitions.

External causes--such as attributing his analysis to his position in a social structure.

Personal experiences--such as deriving his views from childhood socialization.

Underlying assumptions--such as imputing to him a version of human nature that informs his work.

Taken for granted notions--such as seeing his work as based on a commonly held and unquestioned view that workers were being exploited or unfairly treated.

Objective conditions--such as seeing his work as the result of conditions or occurrences which he observes and on which he objectively reports.

I list these common meanings that are associated with the term, grounds, in order to anticipate possible misunderstandings of my work and to show its distinctiveness as an analysis of Marx. All of these notions of grounds are irrelevant to a phenomenological analysis. Such analysis conceives of subjects and objects as universals and not as particular individuals. By phenomenological grounds, I

refer to that which is presupposed by Marx's work as a form of theorizing and not as a personal achievement. The presuppositions or grounds are the purposes and conditions necessary for producing it. However, these presupposed purposes and conditions are social and not personal. As a form of theorizing, it is a social accomplishment, something which is rule-guided or reproducible by others in principle and not just by accident.

Inquiring into how Marx's theorizing is possible makes for a self-conscious or reflexive reading. The notion of a text's grounds refers to that which is necessary for or presupposed in reading the text as an intelligible and conceivable social accomplishment. By inquiring into how Marx is able to make sense to me as reader, I am also inquiring into how I as reader am able to make sense of Marx. Thus, I conceive of the reading as a self-conscious or reflexive reading. Because a reader and its text are constituted in the work of reading, an inquiry into grounds of a reading is an attempt to do self-conscious work, unalienated labor. Needless to add, by self-conscious I do not refer to a personal self but to a social or universalistic conception of self as reader. The notion of self-conscious work as unalienated labor will be developed more fully in the course of my work.

As I conceive of it, in brief, dialectical phenomenology consists of:

(1) the Dialectic as a struggle between the divided elements of a social unity (capital or concrete theorizing versus labor or analytic theorizing); and

(2) Phenomenology as the study of the process by which consciousness is produced by a form of life (capitalism).

As a first step, I will explain the dialectic as I use the term. To do so requires explaining what I mean by: (a) separated elements of a social unity; (b) the distinction between analytic and concrete theorizing; and (c) how these in turn are related to Marx's analysis of capital and labor.

The dialectic stressed here is the dialectic of subject and object. The subject is conceived as the agent of conscious, purposive social activity. The object is that which is intended and produced by such activity. The dialectic is the reciprocal relation, and hence a unity, of subject and object.

This means that a self-conscious actor is an actor who is conscious of its object; the object is that which is known to a subject. Together the subject and object--purposive social activity and the intention that the purposive social activity is supposed to realize in the form of a product--constitute a unity, the unity of production.

As used here, production refers not to the making of things but to the self-constituting of a social being. In this conception, each and every social activity is a human production. In each case, a subject constitutes and reconstitutes (produces and reproduces) itself. It is in this sense that I call a production a form of life. I use the two terms interchangeably.

Although the object must originally be external to the subject, the act of production mediates the externality such that the object becomes internal to the subject. Without production, the subject is on consciousness. It is pure desire or fantasy, pure subjectivity or idealism in the sense of ideas that are not realized or made into a material form. This constitutes an alienated subject, a subject that is not united with its object.

Consciousness that is separated from activity is on the one hand ideology and on the other alienated labor. Ideology is composed of ideas, beliefs, explanations that are not subjected to an inquiry into grounds. It is lack of self-consciousness. Production in which a subject is not united with its object is a contradiction in terms. It is precisely such a mode of production that Marx takes for his object. He starts and ends his work with the production of political economy. Marx analyzes political economy as a form of life that is both a unity and a disunity. If production is the uniting of subject and object, how can it also be a disunity?

The production that Marx analyzes, commodity production, is a specific case of production in the broad sense explained above. On the one hand, commodity production accomplishes the unity of people with nature. On the other hand, the production of commodities involves a division within the subject, the social actor. An analysis of this division is sketched in the last section of this chapter. A depth analysis that fills in the sketch and further explicates the unity that is a disunity will be found in chapters 4 and 5. Here I will just briefly indicate how commodity production presupposes and reproduces divided subject.

The aim of commodity production is to realize exchange value through circulation. This in turn requires the production of use values. Production, therefore, is divided into the production of use values and the realizing of exchange values. The object of production, the commodity, is an exchange value which must also be a use value. This split in the object corresponds to a split in the subject between labor and capital. For the worker, the purpose is to receive wages--exchange value--which will be then exchanged for use values to be consumed. Exchange value will, therefore, be lost to the worker. For the capitalist, however, the aim is exchange value that will also be exchanged for use values, but the consumption of these use values (labor and material) will not result in the loss of

exchange value but in the increase in exchange value. Thus the ultimate aim of labor is use value while the ultimate aim of capital is exchange value.

This is a case of contradictory purposes. The purpose and struggle of labor is the producing, increasing and consuming of use values. This contradicts the purpose of capital as the producing, increasing and possessing of exchange values which requires restricting the production of use values in order to realize surplus exchange value. Thus labor's purpose involves a struggle with capital.

The division within production between capital and labor makes possible, we should note, a division in corresponding modes of theorizing. So far, I have been talking about the dialectical side of my conception of dialectical phenomenology. This brings me to the phenomenological aspect, the study of the production of consciousness. Sociological theorizing is, of course, a form of consciousness.

Capital is always within production. Therefore, theorizing from the perspective of capital is theorizing within production. Within production, the producer cannot perceive the contradictory character of the production; he knows only unity. Labor is both within production (as activity) and outside production (as purpose). Therefore, from the perspective of labor it is possible to theorize from outside of production as well as from within.

From outside of production the situation of labor makes it possible to see the disunity of purpose and activity. Labor's purpose, the consumption of use values (the reproduction of labor), comes into conflict with capital's purpose, the production of exchange values (the reproduction of capital). Yet both are united in the production of commodities. The self-consciousness (or grounds) of labor is the consciousness of its conflict with capital. Capital, because it is always within production, cannot conceive of itself as having grounds. To do so would be to recognize the purpose of labor. Capital cannot recognize its grounds in labor because labor's purpose lies outside of production; it is alien to the production of capital. Locked into production, capital cannot be self-conscious.

In these terms, theorizing only within production means "concrete" theorizing, while theorizing both inside and outside of production means "analytic" theorizing.

The concepts of concrete and analytic comes from two scholars of sociological theorizing, Peter McHugh and Alan F. Blum. For them, and for me as well, these concepts revolve around the issue of grounds. In their major statement on the subject, they write: "Analysis is the concern not with anything said or written but with the grounds of whatever is said--the foundations that make what is said possible, sensible, conceivable."¹ Analytic theorizing

¹Peter McHugh and others, On the Beginning of Social Inquiry (London, 1974), p. 2.

seeks to transcend concrete theorizing's failure to be self-conscious--to conceive of itself as having grounds.

Concrete theorizing corresponds to theorizing from within production, the position of the capitalist. Concrete theorizing treats itself as unproblematic, as a unity that is given, in start as a thing. Analytic theorizing, on the contrary, is an inquiry into grounds. As such, it treats its object as a history, a product with origins in a process of production. In doing so, it sees the contradiction in concrete theorizing as a mode of producing consciousness: its denial of itself as a process of human production, of an accomplishment by active human subjects.

Concrete speech, which treats itself as secure, contradicts itself because the very occurrence of intelligible speech makes reference to its achievement (and speech which treats itself as secure claims that it is first, natural, and has not history) . . . [Analysis] brings to light the contradiction . . . by treating the speech as an appearance of that which grounds it.²

McHugh and Blum begin with the forgetting of grounds--concrete theorizing--in contrast with which they stress the search for grounds. Marx begins with the dialectic of production in order to then show the forgetting of grounds. McHugh and Blum's work stress the phenomenological side while the dialectic remains implicit. Marx's approach stresses the dialectic while the phenomenological

²Ibid., p. 17

side remains implicit. In Marx's analysis, I show in this work, the dialectic of production constitutes that which phenomenology conceives as grounds.

Phenomenology as the study of the development of mind is here interpreted as the study of the production of objects of consciousness, the analysis of concepts. Any concept is internal to conscious, purposive activity. It is grounded in production in the broad sense of a form of life. As the study of grounds of consciousness, phenomenology calls attention to the human-made, produced character of concepts and of theorizing. Thus phenomenology implies and presupposes the dialectic of production, I argue, just as studying the dialectic of production implies and presupposes phenomenology.

My approach, dialectical phenomenology, deals specifically with the forgetting of grounds, concrete theorizing. Given a divided and contradictory process of production, the produced character of objects (their grounds) must be repressed. The reciprocal interaction or dialectic of analytic and concrete theorizing is made possible by a divided production, a unity that is also a disunity. Concrete theorizing standing within production can only see an object or a subject; the contradictory relations between them cannot be seen. Analytic theorizing standing both within and outside of production sees the totality of the subject-object dialectic, the disunity of a divided subject

and object.

Thus analytic theorizing and the proletariat are metaphors for the possibility of self-conscious activity--the unity of subject and object. By the same token, concrete theorizing and capital are metaphors for activity that is divorced from reason--alienated labor.

The approach I use in analyzing Marx's theorizing, inquiry into grounds, is akin to the method that Marks uses in analyzing capital. The rest of this chapter, as well as the next four chapters, will develop and clarify this method by focusing on his key work of theorizing, Grundrisse, and on his treatment of the key category, capital.

In reformulating Marx's critique of political economy as a mode of theorizing, I approach it from four directions which I call rules. There are two reasons for formulating them as rules. The first reason for treating them as rules rather than as themes or topics is to show how they constitute a totality that is a process of theorizing rather than an end product, a sum of collected and related themes. The rules allow the theorizing to be seen as a social accomplishment, an activity that is in principle reproducible, rather than as the personal achievement of an individual or as an accident. This is not to say that these "rules" are complete and that others could not be included. I am not claiming that these are necessary and sufficient conditions for reproducing Marx's theorizing. Rather, they

illuminate aspects of Marx's work such that a violation of any one would result in a failure to do Marx's type of theorizing.

Such a violation would result in the type of work that Marx opposes, theorizing that he labels bourgeois. Thus, a second purpose for the "rules" is to highlight the difference between Marx's theorizing and the type of theorizing which Marx's work makes problematic. The rules refer to the problematic aspects of this other theorizing. In other words, the rules allow Marx's work to be seen in terms of a method that distinguishes it from that other theorizing which Marx calls bourgeois and I call concrete.

The rules and the order in which I will discuss them are:

1. Treat concepts as grounded in a historically specific form of life. This is the principle of analysis.

2. Treat individuals as grounded in a historically specific form of life. Individuals both reproduce and are produced and limited by the totality of which they are apart. This is the principle of action.

3. Treat the form of life as a totality of internal relations. That which enables one to see phenomenas as internally related, that which makes them into a self-moving being or totality, is the principle of subjectivity.

4. Treat a concrete form of life as contradictory. The contradictions are internal struggles of opposition. This is the principle of growth, hence of change.

In this chapter, I will explain and illustrate each rule and its centrality to dialectical phenomenology. The four rules could be divided into two parts: the first two rules stressing the phenomenological aspect of theorizing and the second two rules stressing the dialectical basis.

The first two rules emphasize the need to treat social phenomena as intelligible only in terms of a form of life. The form of life produces their intelligibility, hence their existence as intentional and understandable phenomena, objects of consciousness. Thus the first two rules establish social phenomena as products of something other than the individual, as products rather than self-sufficient, immediately or naturally intelligible things.

The second two rules show how they are produced as internal relations that appear to be external relations, i.e., as relata that are indifferent to each other. The problem for the dialectic is to show the historical grounds for this contradiction. This differs from theology which also begins with contradiction, emphasizes the consequences of the contradiction and provides hope for transcending the contradiction, because theology attributes the contradiction to natural forces (human nature) or supernatural forces (the devil) rather than historical ones. Speculative philosophy attributes the contradiction to the development of mind (self-consciousness), i.e., metaphysics.

The contradiction is seen as a necessary stage in the development of self-consciousness. For Marx, according to my reading, the problem is to show the historical, material grounds for the contradiction.

Rule 1: Treat Concepts as Grounded in a Historically Specific Form of Life

The discussion of this rule will be in two parts. First, I will discuss Marx's treatment of the concept as the point of departure in theorizing. Second, I will discuss what is meant by "historically specific form of life" and its significance for theorizing. I will use the Introduction to the Grundrisse to illustrate.

In the Foreward, Micolaus relates that although Marx did not provide a comprehensive title to the seven notebooks that comprise the Grundrisse, in a letter to Lassalle (22 February 1858) Marx indicates that he had a different title in mind, namely 'Critique of the Economic Categories.'³ By economic categories, he is referring to the basic concepts employed in political economy. The emphasis on categories is no insignificant aspect. Marx intended this major work to be a critique of certain concepts. This is not as strange as it sounds; Marx's entire analysis of capital proceeds as an analysis of the concept of capital. He states:

³Karl Marx, Grundresse (New York, 1973), p. 24.

The exact development of the concept of capital [is] necessary, since it [is] the fundamental concept of modern economics, just as capital itself, . . . [is] the foundation of bourgeois society. (331)*

What is the difference between analyzing capital as a concept or as a thing in the world? For one thing, a concept, as opposed to an abstraction, refers to a relation; it is not merely a name for a thing. Analysis formulates what appears as a thing in terms of a relation and its presuppositions. "The sharp formulation of the basic presuppositions of the relation [capital] must bring out all the contradictions of bourgeois production as well as the boundary where it drives beyond itself." (331)

Marx contrasts beginning an analysis with concrete things and beginning an analysis with concepts. He says that it seems to be correct to begin an analysis with the concrete. The concrete refers to activities, things and people as they appear to the ordinary observer before analysis. However, he calls the concrete as it appears a "chaotic conception of the whole." For example, although it seems correct to begin in economics with the population, its geographical distribution and its particular activities, he claims that this proves false:

*Page numbers in parentheses in the text refers to Karl Marx, Grundrisse, translated by Martin Nicolaus, London: Penguin Books, 1973 and (same text and pagination) New York: Random House, 1973. All italics in quotations, unless otherwise noted, are in the original.

The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. Those classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labour, prices, etc. (100)

Thus what appears to be concrete is really an empty abstraction. Rather than begin an analysis with what appears as concrete, one should begin with the concepts that express the "elements on which they rest." One cannot begin with the population but would have to inquire into the relations and elements that are expressed by simpler concepts and which the concrete presupposes.

Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception (*Vorstellung*) of the whole, and I would then by means of further determinations, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts (*Begriff*), from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. (100)

I read "imagined concrete" as a claim that the concrete before analysis is an abstraction that may be likened to an image without grounds, things that are not accounted for, things without history. In contrast, a non-imagined concrete is an analytic formulation, not that which one observes or perceives. Analysis is the breakdown into simple determinations, relations that are grasped by concepts and their presuppositions. Whereas a non-imagined concrete is grasped through analysis, an imagined concrete is given with speech; it is simply there as something that can be perceived or apprehended by the senses, something

that can be perceived or apprehended by the senses, something that can be observed and measured. Analysis, on the other hand, moves from observation to the working up of observation into concepts. The concepts are formulations which account for the concrete as grounded in certain relations and understandings. The analyzed concrete is "a product of the working up of observation and conception into concepts." (101)

With the concepts (simple determinations), one reconceives the concrete as a totality of these determinations, a totality of internal relations. The totality arrived at an analysis, is a "rich totality of many determinations and relations." This contrasts with a concrete conception of a totality of external relations such as "population, its distribution among classes, town, country, the coast, the different branches of production, export and import, annual production and consumption, commodity prices, etc." which Marx eschews as a "chaotic conception of the whole."

To fail to analyze is to fail to produce a comprehensible totality, a history. According to Marx, what appears as concrete (for example, the population, Americans, and their activities) turns out to be "empty abstractions."

To reiterate, Marx's analysis of capital proceeds as an analysis of the concept of capital. This requires formulating it as a relation in terms of its

presuppositions and their implications. The formulation of concepts in terms of relations and their presuppositions, provides the foundations of the concrete. However, in this discussion of the "Method of Political Economy," Marx is engaged in a polemic with thinking that conceives of the concrete as only concepts:

. . . the concrete totality is . . . product of thinking and comprehending; but not in any way a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception; a product, rather, of the working-up of observation and conception into concepts. The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical and mental appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. (101)

Concepts are the way in which we appropriate the world as a totality. However, the concepts that reproduce the world as a totality are not the products of a mind that is outside of or independent of the world. Although the world as totality is produced by analysis, the phenomena of the world do exist concretely before analysis. Marx states that concepts "can never exist other than as an abstract one-sided relation within an already given concrete living whole." The latter I take to be material life. To conceive of life one-sidedly, as non-material life, is to see the human as an agent for a concept, an incumbent of a category. For example, one could see an individual only as

a class individual, e.g. (as a worker).

Marx's critique seems to be in contradiction with Marx's own work, the thrust of this thesis, and the Marxist tradition. Therefore, it is important to understand it and its import. I noted above that Marx's polemic with idealism is not the core of his theorizing. Rather, I will show, he directed his theorizing toward bourgeois political economy and its failure to be analytic. His critique, however, proceeds by an analysis of the categories of political economy, the very procedure that he calls one-sided, but the way that the "thinking head . . . appropriates the world."

If this is how one proceeds in doing an analysis, what is the import of cautioning against seeing the concrete or the human being (he speaks of both) as the product of concepts? Marx argues against the philosophy for which "conceptual thinking is the real human being" for which the "concrete totality is a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception." While it is easy to ridicule the notion of a concept "which thinks and generates itself" nevertheless, Marx does talk about capital and the capitalist as the personification of capital. Likewise he talks about wage labor and abstract labor; he does not talk about particular individuals.

I take it that Marx's human being is, then, not simply an abstract universal, e.g., worker, parent, patient, woman, nor is it a psychological or personal individual. It is the individual as subject within a form of life, a subject in relation to its object, an object in relation to which the subject is, has a history. This is Marx's sense of the material living being, life as agency of history, which is the dialectic of subject and object.

To think of the human as only a category, a product of the mind, is to divorce a subject from its active relation to objects, from its historically specific form of life. This is a criticism of an idealist way of "conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself."

Marx states:

. . . the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being. (101)

One might inquire of Marx, "How does the concrete come into being? An answer to this question is also a theory of the text. In order to answer it, one must first understand how it should not be answered. The concrete is not to be thought of as developing out of some prior substance that is not concrete. If we do not begin with the not-concrete, how can we understand the question of how the concrete comes into being? The answer is contingent upon the conception of the concrete.

The simple determinations of the concrete according to Marx are relations. Concepts are the way in which these relations are (re) produced theoretically (as distinguished from artistically or practically, for example). Marx states this explicitly in several places:

"Relations can be expressed, of course, only in ideas," (164) and again, "the abstraction, or idea, however, is nothing more than the theoretical expression of those material relations," (164) and still again, "relations can be established as existing only by being thought . . ."
(163)

The concrete that Marx analyzes is bourgeois society. Thus the concrete in this case comes into being with the material relations that are expressed by concepts and which characterize bourgeois society:

"Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand."

The concrete is a totality of relations. Relations are grounded in some purpose or design. In the sense in which I intend it, "production" means activity that is sensible or intelligible because of some design or purpose rather than random or accidental behavior.

In answer to the above question, the concrete comes into being through the relations (expressed by concepts) of productive activity, the carrying out of purpose. I

therefore conceive of the analyzed concrete as social production. Social production refers to any activity that is intentional or intelligible. Thus in addition to activities like farming or manufacture, engaging in sports would be a production. It produces the sport (in the sense of realizing the idea of the sport); it produces the sportsperson. Any purposive social activity could therefore be an object for analysis, a social production, for it presupposes and produces the actors as actors. Marx's object is modern society conceived as a dialectical process, a form of production. Marx concerns himself with the process by which a society produces and reproduces itself as an historically specific organization of production.

In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity. (107)

Marx therefore conceives of bourgeois society as an "historic organization of production." (105) As such, it can only be comprehended through the concepts "which expresses its relations":

Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic organization of production. The categories which express its relations, [allow for] the comprehension of its structure . . . (105)

Marx analyzes bourgeois society as an historical, social organization of production by examining its economic categories:

it must not be forgotten that their subject--here modern bourgeois society--is always what is given, in the head as well as in reality, and that these categories therefore express the forms of being, the characteristics of existence, and often only individual sides of this specific society, this subject. (106)

By conceiving a form of life as historical, the categories which express these relations must also be seen as historical and specific to that historical form. This means that these categories would mean something different or would be unintelligible in a different form of life. Marx gives the example of the economic category of labor. On the one hand, the notion of labor is a universal category that transcends particular forms of life. On the other hand, it is only within modern relations that the economic category of labor in the abstract, as opposed to specific activities such as agriculture, commercial or manufacturing activity, is conceived as such. Labor as an economic category had always been whatever specific type of activity that was seen as producing wealth.

The Monetary System, for example, still locates wealth altogether objectively, as an external thing, in money. Compared with this standpoint, the commercial or manufacture, system took a great step forward by locating the source of wealth not in the object but in a subjective activity--in commercial and manufacturing activity--even though it still always conceives this activity within narrow boundaries, as money-making. In contrast to this system, that of the Physiocrats posits a certain kind of labour--agriculture--as the creator of wealth. (104)

Marx attributes the introduction of the economic category of labor in general as wealth creating activity to Adam Smith. On the one hand, all this does is provide a more abstract conception of productive activity. On the other hand, Marx shows that the concept of labor in general is produced by a form of society in which the production of wealth in general is not linked with any specific activity.

Now that it might seem that all that had been achieved thereby was to discover the abstract expression for the simplest and most ancient relation in which human beings . . . play the role of producers. This is correct in one respect. Not in another . . . Indifference towards specific labours corresponds to a form of society . . . in which . . . the means of creating wealth in general . . . ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form. (104)

This example of the economic category of labor is intended to show its historic specificity. This means that the category must be seen as a product of historically specific relations of production.

Even the most abstract categories, despite their validity--precisely because of their abstractness-- . . . are . . . in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves . . . a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations. (105)

I take it that the term validity of categories refers to the grounds for its use. A valid category is one for which there are strong reasons for it, reasons that show how the presence or absence of the category would make a difference. According to Marx, the absence of the category, labor, would not make a difference to other forms of

life. In one way this seems to be circular reasoning, for if it is produced by one form of life and not by another, then it was obviously not essential to the other form of life. But this is not what Marx is arguing. By saying that it was produced by a form of life, he is not saying that it first made its appearance in a given society, but that it was produced by certain relations. It is only "for and within" those relations that the category is fully valid, particularly for and within a form of life in which those relations predominate.

The rule with which we begin, "Treat concepts as grounded in a historically specific form of life," can now be understood to include the following:

1. The concrete is a totality of relations.
2. Relations are concepts.
3. Concepts do not originate in consciousness.

They presuppose a subject and its object.

4. A subject-object relation is a production.
5. There are different historical modes of production.
6. The categories of a mode of production are themselves historically specific to that mode of production.
7. There are different historical modes of production.

8. The categories of a mode of production are themselves historically specific to that mode of production.

The question next arises as to the significance of the historical for Marx. What difference does it make to think in terms of the historical? What is Marx's conception of history and how is it related to concepts and analysis?

Marx considers certain concepts that are abstracted from historically specific forms of life as "rational abstractions." Such a one is production in general which "brings out and fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition." However, Marx claims that one must distinguish the relations and conditions that determine capital's specific mode of production from those relations and conditions which determine production in general:

. . . the elements which are not general and common, must be separated out from the determinations valid for production such as [in order that] their essential difference is not forgotten. (85)

In what sense can one speak of their essential difference? The essential difference between production in general and a specific mode of production is that which makes a difference with respect to Marx's notion of history. He makes the point about focusing on the distinctive in examining other theorists' treatment of production. Marx was aroused by their prefacing their works with analyses of

production in general. They would show how all production required certain elements:

No production without stored-up, past labour, even if it is only the facility gathered together and concentrated in the hand of the savage by repeated practice. Capital is, among other things, also an instrument of production, also objectified, past labour. (85)

This is a violation of the first rule. What difference does it make to speak of production in general rather than historically specific and essential differences? By conceiving of capital as objectified labor which is necessary for all production, capitalist production is treated as "a general, external quality which alone makes 'instrument of production' and 'stored-up labour' into capital."

Again, what difference does it make to conceive of capital as a natural relation? We said earlier that production is the problematic for analysis. To be produced corresponds to Marx's notion of history. Bourgeois economists treat capital as natural instead of a historical product. This type of presentation eternalizes and therefore obliterates the historical.

The aim is, rather, to present production--see e.g. Mill--as distinct from distribution, etc., as enclosed in eternal natural laws independent of history, at which opportunity bourgeois relations are then quietly smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society in the abstract is founded. This is the more or less conscious purpose of the whole proceeding. In distribution, by contrast, humanity has allegedly permitted itself to be considerably more arbitrary. (87)

Marx argues that these economists distinguish between production and distribution for purposes of human intervention. By implying that capital is a natural, eternal relation, and that bourgeois relations of production based on capital are therefore independent of history, they can then focus on distribution as problematic. Because they do not conceive of production as a history that includes distribution, they can only conceive of distribution as more or less arbitrarily determined.

One might conceive of the historical as changes in the struggle between people and nature or adaptation in which case the bourgeois conception of capital as natural would also be an historical conception. This would be a bourgeois approach. It is necessary, therefore, to understand Marx's notion of history as internal relations of production and how this differs from the bourgeois notion. For the bourgeois conception, history consists of changes in the subject (culture or politics) or changes in external nature. In contrast to this, Marx includes nature in history; it is always a particular nature produced as such by its relation to particular human purposes, relations and activities.

Thus, rather than history as an external relation of people to nature, history is an internal relation to a particular subject to its particular object. History consists of the relations of production in which a subject knows itself in its object and where the object, likewise,

is internal to the subject. Nature is internal to production; as an object of consciousness, it is a historical relation of production.

A bourgeois presentation of capitalist production as grounded in external, ahistorical nature, as essentially the same for all modes of production, as the "inviolable natural laws on which society in the abstract is founded," removes capitalist relations from history in the sense of human production. It treats capital as natural rather than historical. Marx's polemic with this thinking is made even sharper by his use of the phrase, "inviolable natural laws," with respect to their conception of bourgeois relations. Inviolable refers to that which is sacrosanct. If sacrosanct, they cannot be changed by human purpose or design. They are presented, therefore, as ahistorical in Marx's sense of the term. This means that the relations of production are not seen as grounded in social, historical purposive activity but as natural.

By showing that they could just as easily present distribution as an eternal, natural relation, Marx supports his contention that their more or less conscious purpose is to present bourgeois relations of production as inviolable:

Quite apart from this crude tearing-apart of production and distribution and of their real relationship, it must be apparent from the outset that, no matter how differently distribution may have

been arranged in different stages of social development, it must be possible here also, just as with production to single out common characteristics, and just as possible to confound or to extinguish all historic differences under general human laws.
(87)

Thus Marx is concerned to treat production and distribution historically. Again it should be noted that Marx's notion of the historical differs from other possible conceptions, particularly that which might be attributed to bourgeois presentations. Bourgeois analyses treat what Marx considers essential differences as purely objective differences, differences in objective conditions, or as purely subjective differences, differences within subjects. For Marx, in contrast, differences are grounded in subject-object purposive relation. I am claiming that there is an essential difference between a conception of history that derives from concrete observation (concrete external changes) and a conception of history that derives from analysis (internal relations). This difference is essential for producing an historical concrete, an analytic totality, an historically specific form of life.

If the concern is with history or grounds, as I am claiming, then should an analysis of production proceed by examining the history of its relations as the historical sequence of the categories? Does one begin with the earliest forms of production and trace their development? This would be a conception of history as temporal sequence. Marx makes a distinction between what I call concrete

origins and analytic origins. An historical analysis of a category or form of life is not accomplished by tracing its changes in concrete appearance over time. Its analytic origins consist of the presuppositions of a given purposive relation.

One does not treat the categories in the order in which they first appear in order to understand the historical character of the relations that they express. Rather, one should treat them in terms of their relations within a particular form of life. Priority should not be given to that which is prior in time. Marx argues it would be incorrect

to let the economic categories follow one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to historical development. (107)

That which distinguishes the modern from the other modes of production may be a late development, however it is that on which an analysis should focus. Thus there is a sense of historical that is different from that of temporal sequence. This other sense of historical refers to predominant or determinant relations that constitute a specific form of life or internal relations. We shall return to this in Rule 3, "Treat a form of life as a totality of internal relations."

To conclude Rule 1, categories should be treated as the internal relations of a historically specific form of life, not as purely objective, external or sequential relations. Concepts are therefore neither purely subjective (idealist thinking) nor purely objective (bourgeois thinking). They are produced by or grounded in a dialectic of subject and object.

Rule 2: Treat Individuals as Grounded in a Historically Specific Form of Life

Under Rule 1, we saw that analysis treat the concrete as a totality of relations expressed by concepts. The concepts derive from and express relations and purposive activity which I call social production or form of life. Phenomenologists tend to consider language as the totality of social productions. There is, for example, Heidegger's famous line, "Language is the House of Being." For Marx, the totality is captured by the concept of Production or mode of production.

Wittgenstein identifies language with form of life: "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."⁴ My notion of a social production corresponds to Wittgenstein's concept of a language game: "Here the term language game, is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the

⁴Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, p. 8.

speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life,"⁵ and again, "A language game is part of a language, part of a form of life."²⁶

I use Wittgenstein's term, form of life, as equivalent to the Marxian terms, mode of production and social formation. I do so in order to: (1) stress the conceiving of a social totality as a social activity or process; and (2) avoid a narrow economic connotation that the words production and mode of production have.

Wittgenstein and subsequent language theorists have developed the argument that there is no possibility of a language that is the product of a single, isolated individual. Marx makes the same assertion and similarly claims that production is not the result of the decisions and actions of single, isolated individuals:

Production by an isolated individual outside society . . . is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other. (84)

Emphasizing the point that the individual is not the starting point for understanding Production (i.e., a form of life in contrast with the making of a thing), he criticizes theorists from Smith and Ricardo to Rousseau. Production is not to be conceived as the production of the "individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom

⁵Ibid.

⁶Op. cit., p. 11.

Smith and Ricardo begin." Instead,

Individuals producing in society--hence socially determined individual production--is, of course, the point of departure. (83)

Marx argues that not only is production social but the individual too only appears as a product of society. That is, one can only treat the acts of individuals as grounded in a particular type of society--as acts whose reasons are given in language. In other words, the recognizability and intelligibility of individuals' activities presupposes a historically specific form of life that makes the individual's acts sensible.

The human being . . . is an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. (84)

Society as a concept and as a concrete presupposes relations:

Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations within which these individuals stand. (265)

Although there are individuals, they are only individuals as such because of their relations. The unit for analysis, whether the focus is society or the individual, is the relation. But what is a relation? Marx gives an example of the slave and the citizen. He states that a person is a slave or a citizen in and through society:

To be a slave, to be a citizen, are social characteristics, relations between human being A and B. Human being A, as such is not a slave. He is a slave in and through society. (265)

Social characteristics of individuals are the product of relations between human beings. These characteristics are the way in which an individual is known. We can now better understand the above excerpt from the following quotation:

The human being is in the most literal sense a political animal, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society.

The idea of society or what I call a form of life originating with isolated and independent individuals was prevalent in the eighteenth century. Marx has an interesting way of explaining this thinking. Taking issue with a common interpretation, Marx writes that the thoughts of the eighteenth century theorists "in no way expresses merely a reaction against over-sophistication and a return to a misunderstood natural life, as cultural historians imagine." Similarly, he argues that Rousseau's social contract, which refers to the coming together of naturally independent, autonomous subjects on the basis of a contract, does not rest on such a "naturalism."

He claims that the conception of isolated individuals is "rather, the anticipation of 'civil society,' in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides toward maturity in the eighteenth." That is, there were particular historical developments in the form of society that made their conceptions seem reasonable.

On the nature of the type of society that made such thinking possible, he writes:

In this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate. (83)

Marx is arguing that the eighteenth century conception of the natural human being as independent of community expressed the relations of the new type of society that was developing rather than, as the cultural historians claimed, that it expressed a reaction against modern sophistication.

For Marx, the conception of the "natural individual" was a product of the changes in society. For the eighteenth century thinkers, on whose shoulders Smith and Ricardo stood, the individual was an ideal whose existence they projected into the past, "not as a historical result" which is Marx's position, "but as history's point of departure." Marx argues that this eighteenth century conception of the individual is a product of the dissolution of feudalism and the development of new forces of production:

. . . this eighteenth-century individual [is] the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century . . . (83)

Before that time, the individual appeared not as independent, but as dependent, not as isolated, but as belonging to a "greater whole." It is only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society,' that social relations appear

external to the individual, as mere means of accomplishing private aims, hence creating the appearance of a private individual:

The more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole . . . Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society' do the various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity. (84)

Marx can be read as arguing that the notion of a natural, independent individual is grounded in particular historical societal developments, not in human nature or in mere reaction against modernity. There are two points here that are of particular interest for our thesis. One is Marx's insistence on the individual as part of a whole, whose production is 'socially determined.' He considers that which determines individual production to be the starting point for analysis. His interest is not in supporting and elaborating this view which he feels is obvious, but in rebutting the individualistic perspective which was being re-introduced by several modern political economists of his time:

The point could go entirely unmentioned if this twaddle, which had sense and reason for the eighteenth-century characters, had not been earnestly pulled back into the centre of the most modern economics by Bastiat, Carey, Proudhon, etc. (84)

The other point of interest is the way in which Marx engages in the critique. His criticism rests neither

on charging and trying to prove that these theorists of the Natural Individual were unrealistic romantics, not that they were just simple-minded or mistaken. Rather, he treats their notions as being grounded in a form of life, a form of life which reproduces the individual as an isolated individual and on which they report. They do not recognize their notions as being so grounded.

Marx does not just engage in trying to prove that they were wrong, but tries to account for how they could produce their ideas by showing in what sense they could be right. He does not point to possible individual motives or individual intellectual failure, but discusses how their conception, as an intelligible production, is possible, that is how their analysis is grounded in a form of life. Marx can be read as saying that their analysis is possible by taking for granted their own form of life as natural rather than as a form of life--a socially produced form. Their analysis is produced by their failure to analyze their own form of life. Hence it is not an analysis at all but a projection of the concrete appearance of the individual in the bourgeois society of the eighteenth century onto the origins of history.

Thus Marx's polemic may be seen as illustrating the first rule, treat concepts as grounded in a historically specific form of life. The first and second rule express a phenomenological commitment to analyzing the foundations

of social phenomena. In both his analysis of the individual and in his critique of theory, Marx treats social phenomena as grounded in a form of life.

Rule 3: Treat a Form of Life as a Totality of Internal Relations

There are two aspects of this rule that need explaining. The first is the distinction between a form of life and a society or social group. The other is the distinction between a totality of internal relations and a totality of external relations. Both are aspects of the conception of a form of life. As aspects, they can only be understood in terms of each other or in terms of the whole that they constitute. In other words, the distinction between form of life and society is contingent on the distinction between internal relations and external relations and vice versa.

The concept of society implies a social grouping that has boundaries, a group that is distinguishable from other groups. However, the concept of society does not provide any particular means of distinguishing between societies, any differences can be used. Thus the specification of a society becomes arbitrary. One might designate a particular geographical area a society; a particular religious group a society; a particular language group a society; a politically autonomous area and all the people and activities that are included within that area; or all the features that

characterize human life in a given historical period--modern society.

Unlike the generality of the concept, society, form of life is conceived more specifically as a dialectical process of social production, a process in which subjects realize and recognize themselves in their objects. This means that subjects and objects reciprocally presuppose and produce each other. Together, they constitute a unity, a form of life.

As noted above, a form of life is a process of social production. It is not production in the limited economic sense but more generally the process by which a particular type of act or type of experience is made possible. Thus a form of life refers to the conditions for producing historical subject or object. Beginning with either subject or object, one could analyze its distinctive form of life by formulating a process by which it produces itself including its subjective and objective conditions. Hence, not only can capital be analyzed in terms of its form of life, but such phenomena as bias in social science can also be analyzed in terms of the subjective-object dialectic, the form of life that produces bias as a possibility.⁷

A form of life as a totality of internal relations then refers to the relations that are necessary for the

⁷See McHugh, pp. 47-75.

production of the object that one studies. The relations are internal to the process of production. This differs from treating a social formation as everything that can be collected as existing within a particular historical period or within particular political boundaries. Thus, the form of life that Marx analyzes is conceived as a totality of the subjective-objective conditions for producing capital--the relation of capital and wage labor. When he sketches an analysis of the form of life that characterized the Germanic tribes, he conceives of the totality as the self-sufficient family residence. In Marx's analysis the totality of the ancient Asiatic form of life included the relations of local communities to a higher unity, the despot. Thus, religion was included in the subjective-objective condition for reproducing the Asiatic form. For Marx, therefore, a form of life is the totality of relations internal to the production of that form and not a totality of everything that can be observed in that time and place.

This contrasts with conception of society as a totality of external relations. In this conception, an object is a thing that is given to the senses or given with speech and accounted for in terms of its external relations to other things. External relations such as cause and effect contrast with internal relations conceived as determinations. What is the distinction between the social science notion of causality and Marx's notion of determinations?

Causality treats of the observable or measurable relations between things whereas determinations refer to the relations presupposed by the recognition of the thing. That is, in order to recognize an object as a particular kind of thing, certain relations are presumed.

According to Marx, nothing is what we know it to be outside of the relations and activities in which it is known. A typewriter, for instance, is only a typewriter for an observer who knows what typing is. A medicinal herb is a medicinal herb only within a form of life where medicinal herbs are known as such. Similarly, for all objects. Marx proceeds by making explicit the relations and presuppositions that are presumed by such recognition as the determinations that are internal to the knowledge of that object. The object is thereby treated as a human object or a social object produced by human relations and presuppositions.

These determinations differ from causal relations which are external to the object. Causality presumes that the object is immediately known as such. Its history as a human product, as an object mediated by human purposes and relations, is denied or covered over by treating it as a natural thing immediately known to the senses, something that is simply there which can be measured and shown to be related to other things. Analysis then is the attempt to recover the history of an object, its production as an

intelligible and historically specific social phenomenon.

The implication of the notion of totality is that activities which may appear as indifferent to each other constitute a whole. This means that they are related to each other internally, that they require each other for their own possibility.

On what basis can one claim that certain activities form a totality, a form of life? It is not enough to show that they always occur together pointing out that each of these separate activities together form a process where each is contingent on the other, e.g., consumption presupposes distribution of the product, distribution presupposes production, and production presupposes consumption.

A form of life is to be distinguished from just any activity on the basis of being self-moving. This means that there is a principle of movement which may be thought of as purpose. In analyzing a form of life, it is not enough to describe the internal relations in terms of objective conditions for its production--that which is used in carrying it out. It is also necessary to describe the subjective conditions for its re-production--the particular purpose(s), need(s) or use(s) that it serves. The conditions for its production and re-production constitute its grounds. They also constitute it as a form of life. To be a form of (human) life is to have grounds. A form of life then is purpose and the conditions for realizing that

purpose. The relations between purpose and its conditions of realization are the internal relations that comprise a form of life.

In order to better grasp this rather abstract argument about treating a form of life as a totality of internal relations, and in order to get an idea of its implications for theorizing, I shall examine Marx's discussion of the relations among the categories of political economy. The categories express the relations of political economy. How does Marx show the categories of political economy to be a totality of internal relations, a self-moving form of life?

The political economy Marx was addressing had been criticized for treating production too much as an end in itself. It was argued that distribution was just as important a matter for political economy. However, Marx considers this criticism to be "based precisely on the economic notion that the spheres of distribution and of production are independent, autonomous neighbors." In other words, economists analyze production and distribution independently of each other. In this way, we noted earlier, problems of distribution could be treated independently of production which is "inviolable," based on natural laws.

The other criticism of political economy that Marx considered in the Introduction is that "these moments were not grasped in their unity." This seems to be a view that,

given the quotation above, one would expect Marx to support. Yet he is not satisfied with this criticism either. He charges that this criticism essentially blames the separation of production and distribution on the failure of the theorists to recognize their unity.

He denounces this criticism because it implies that the problem is one of faulty conceptualizing whose remedy, therefore, is correct conceptualizing. His words, punctuated by an exclamation point, are:

As if this rupture had made its way not from reality into the textbooks, but rather from the textbooks into reality, and as if the task were the dialectic balancing of concepts, and not the grasping of real relations! (90)

Marx develops the argument that the distinctiveness of each of the categories of political economy is determined by production, that the categories comprise a unity determined by production. Despite this unity which is uncovered in analysis, the various categories appear separate and independent of each other. If analytically they consist of a unity, then one must account for how they appear independent of each other. Not only does Marx account for the separation, he also discusses the consequences of the separation. This, according to my reading, is the task to which the Grundrisse is devoted. It is my claim that the grounds of Marx's analysis is a notion of unity such that separation is a problem. It is to this problem that analysis addresses itself. I will discuss this crucial aspect

of Marx's theorizing in the next section of this chapter under the rule: treat the contemporary form of life as contradictory.

It might seem that consumption and not production is the predominant relation.

(1) because a product becomes a real product only by being consumed. For example, a garment becomes a real garment only in the act of being worn; a house where no one lives is in fact not a real house; thus the product, unlike a mere natural object, proves itself to be, becomes a product only through consumption . . . for the product is production not as objectified activity, but rather only as object for the active subject; (91)

It is the purposes to which it is put (its consumption), that determines the type of product it is.

(2) because consumption creates the need for new production, that is it creates the ideal, internally impelling cause for production, which is its presupposition. Consumption creates the motive for production, it also creates the object which is active in production as its determinant aim. (91)

As Marx indicates, "No production without a need. But consumption reproduces the need." Therefore it would seem that consumption is the determinant moment. However, consumption reproduces the need that production produces. Marx enumerates three ways in which production creates consumption:

(1) furnishes the material and the object for consumption. (2) Production . . . produces not only the object but also the manner of consumption, not only objectively but subjectively. Production thus creates the consumer . . . the object is not an object in general, but a specific object which must be consumed in a specific manner, to be mediated in its turn by production itself. (92)

The example Marx offers is that of hunger. "Hunger is hunger," he states "but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth." In addition to producing a material for the need, it also produces a need for the material:

(3) . . . As soon as consumption emerges from its initial state of natural crudity and immediacy--and, if it remained at that stage, this would be because production itself had been arrested there--it becomes itself mediated as a drive by the object. The need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. The object of art--like every other product--creates a public which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty. (92)

Marx has been showing that just as consumption creates production, production also creates consumption. How is it that one can claim any predominance for one over the other? Marx states that:

Not only is production immediately consumption and consumption immediately production, not only is production a means for consumption and consumption the aim of production, i.e. each supplies the other with its object (production supplying the external object of consumption, consumption the conceived object of production); but also, each of them, apart from being immediately the other, and apart from mediating the other, in addition to this creates the other in completing itself, and creates itself as the other.

According to Marx, this is the type of unity or identity that not only a Hegelian would find easy to posit, but so did "socialist belletrists" and "prosaic economists themselves."

In spite of this identity, Marx claims that production and consumption are moments of one process, "in which production is the real point of departure and hence also the predominant moment." The reason for this assertion is that "The individual produces an object and, by consuming it, returns to himself, but returns as a productive and self-reproducing individual. Consumption thus appears as a moment of production."

I take this to mean that production determines the character of the consumption with the exception of consumption that is in its original state of natural crudity and immediacy. However, even then, according to Marx, it would only be at that stage if production were not able to develop.

Marx states:

. . . production and consumption . . . [are] moments of one process, in which production is the real point of departure and hence also the predominant moment. Consumption as urgency, as need, is itself an intrinsic moment of productive activity. But the latter is the point of departure for realization and hence also its predominant moment; it is the act through which the whole process again runs its course. (94)

How is it that Marx can claim that consumption is a moment of productive activity; why could one not similarly claim that production is an intrinsic moment of consumption? The only answer that Marx offers seems to beg the question.

The individual produces an object and, by consuming it, returns to himself, but returns as a productive and self-reproducing individual. Consumption thus appears as a moment of production.

If we examine that argument, Marx beings the process with the individual producing an object; one might have begun the process with consumption. I believe that for Marx, productive activity is the starting point because he conceives any intelligible activity to be productive activity in that it produces and reproduces the actor as such. The human is a particular type of being because of its activity. Even as consumer, the human is always a particular type of consumer which is determined by production. While it is possible to talk about consumption or urges in the abstract as determining production; as soon as one talks of concrete consumption, urges with a specific realizable object, production has already become predominant. It is because of production that consumption becomes concrete--a particular type. Consumption does not determine production as a particular type of production without itself having been determined as a particular type of consumption by productive activity. It take it that in identifying production as the "real point of departure" and as the "point of departure for realization," Marx means that after consumption has already been determined by production, it may be the point of departure "ideally," in positing an "ideal" for production to realize.

This would be similar to an assertion that ideas only become intelligible or real within a language game. I take it this is Wittgenstein's point when he states:

The question, 'What is a word really?' is analogous to 'What is a piece in chess.'

The priority of chess game to chess piece or vice versa is not one of temporal priority. Rather one assigns predominance for purposes of analysis. One cannot analyze the totality of which the chess pieces are a part, by examining the chess pieces. The chess pieces could not reveal their purpose for that is not given by their moves, but by the game. However, one could analyze the totality by examining the chess game with the chess piece as a move (a "moment") in the game. Similarly, one could not analyze the totality of which consumption is a part by examining only consumption. However, one could analyze the totality by conceiving of it as a production.

Marx similarly considers the possibility that distribution, rather than production, is predominant. He presents three possible reasons for this formulation. The first is that the distribution of social positions precedes production. For example, "social distribution assigns the individual at birth to wage labour." However, Marx replies that "this situation of being assigned is itself a consequence of the existence of capital and landed property as independent agents of production." (96) In other words, a

particular type of production results in the particular positions and their distribution.

There is a second basis for conceiving of distribution as preceding and determining production. The cases offered in support are: A conquering people divides the land among the conquerors, thus imposing a certain form and distribution of property in land, and thereby determining production. Or it enslaves the population that is conquered and makes slave labor the foundation of production. Or a people rises in revolution and smashes the great landed estates into small parcels, and hence, by this new distribution gives production a new character. Or a system of law assigns property in land to certain families in perpetuity, or distributes labor as a hereditary privilege and thus confines it within certain castes.

In all these cases, it seems that distribution is not structured and determined by production, but rather the opposite, production by distribution. However, according to Marx, these factors (of conquest, law, etc.) "reduce themselves in the last instance to the role played by general-historical relations in production, and their relation to the movement of history generally. The question evidently belongs within the treatment and investigation of production itself."

How is it that the factors "reduce themselves in the last instance" to the relations of production? The answer is: by carrying through an analysis of how distribution (e.g., after conquest) is possible, that is, by inquiring into the grounds of distribution, one then finds that production is always necessary.

He provides a brief example of how he feels such questions can be dealt with:

In all cases of conquest, three things are possible. The conquering people subjugates the conquered under its own mode of production; or it leaves the old mode intact and contents itself with a tribute; or a reciprocal interaction takes place whereby something new, a synthesis, arises . . . In all cases, the mode of production, whether that of the conquering people, that of the conquered, or that emerging from the fusion of both, is decisive for the new distribution which arises. (97)

Thus he asserts it is not distribution that is predominant, but it is the mode of production which is decisive for distribution because it produces that which is distributed. One could change that which is distributed by changing production but not vice versa. For example, one might alter the distribution of products, of instruments of production or of people among wage labor and capital, but this would not change the mode of production. If, however, one changed wage labor or capital itself which would be decisive for the mode of production, this would be a change in production not distribution. On the other hand, a change in the mode of production could change the type of

consumption, and the nature of the distribution (that which is distributed).

The other moments cannot change their character and therefore cannot change production. A change in distribution cannot change that which is distributed; it can only change its concentration. A change in consumption cannot change production except ideally (as the desire for or idea of something else). Production on the other hand does determine distribution by determining the character of that which is distributed; likewise it does determine consumption by determining its character.

Thus if we want to analyze the totality as a historical form of life, as having a mode distinct from other totalities, as something vulnerable to intervention, then it is necessary to begin with production, for the distinctiveness of production determines the distinctiveness of the totality:

A definite production thus determines a definite consumption, distribution and exchange as well as definite relations between these different moments.
(99)

The important point is the notion of totality derived from some subjectivity--some overriding purpose or character, which determines the character of the whole. Marx calls this subjectivity production. One might be able to locate subjectivity with the other moments. For example, if capital is decisive for bourgeois economy, one might

claim that capital arises with the desire for capital (consumption) or with the distribution of instruments of production or with exchange in which capital is realized. The need is to have some way of locating the core of a totality. Hence production refers to the core of a totality not to a particular activity such as commerce or manufacture (which after all might exist in precapitalist formations as well which Marx acknowledges).

Production is both the total process of which the others are moments--a mode of production--and a set of particular activities called production; as such it is also a moment of the totality. I take it that production as a set of particular activities is its antithetical definition to which Marx makes reference when he states what might seem puzzling on first reading:

Production dominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well. (99)

It is an antithetical definition because it is production separated from the totality of which it is a part. Likewise, I take it that is the sense of the following similarly puzzling statement with regard to "its one-sided form."

Admittedly, however, in its one-sided form, production is itself determined by the other moments. (99)

That is production is determined by the other moments if one does not treat production as the totality--a mode of production--but treats it only one-sidedly as particular activities. He illustrates how the other moments might determine production (its one-sided form) by explaining that in the sphere of exchange, the expansion of the market causes production to grow in quantity. In the sphere of distribution, changes such as concentration of capital or different distribution of the population between town and country, etc. can also change the specific activities of production. Similarly, the needs of consumption also determine the specific activities of production. He concludes, "mutual interaction takes place between the different moments. This is the case with every organic whole." (100) However, his whole is not an interaction of externals. Rather, these moments are internal relations, internal to a mode of production.

They are not autonomous or merely interdependent as is a machine; but they are themselves determined (in the sense of made possible or intelligible as particular types) by the predominant moment of the process which is the point of departure and the point of return--the ground in the sense of purpose.

The key word, moments, comes from the word movement which as we shall see is the way Marx conceives of the totality. The totality is not just a circular process, a mere

repetition, but this process is itself a movement. This means that the totality itself is changing. Hence its categories are not elements or parts in a stable structure but are sides or aspects of a totality, "moments" in a movement. They give "momentum" to the totality. Marx explicitly states that the determinations [moments] are constantly changing, that they may appear to be natural but are historical products:

. . . if they appear to one epoch as natural pre-suppositions of production, they were its historic product for another. Within production itself, they are constantly being changed. The application of machinery, for example, changed the distribution of instruments of production as well as products.
(99-100)

Marx's conception of the whole is that it is a process of production that is moving or changing on the one hand because it is composed of moments or determinations that are constantly being changed. On the other hand, it is moving because the predominant moment cannot sustain itself. Therefore, the totality, the mode of production which is determined by the predominant moment, cannot sustain itself.

The next question to be addressed is why a particular mode of production cannot be sustained. The answer takes the form of an analysis that shows how its predominant moment is self-contradictory, how its conditions for realizing itself contradict its conditions for reproducing itself. Hence one side of the relation is trying to suspend another side of the relation.

Rule 4: Treat a Concrete Form of Life as Contradictory

A form of life is a process of production composed of relations and their presuppositions. Concrete theorizing treats phenomena as things related to other things rather than as social objects which presuppose relations for their possibility. It does not treat things in terms of the form of life that produces them as possibilities and which their existence presupposes. Instead a concrete form of life is characterized by the forgetting of grounds.

Analytic theorizing remembers grounds. In recognizing grounds of its objects, an analytic form of life is a self-conscious one. A concrete form of life, because it forgets grounds, is unself-conscious. It is a form of life that denies itself as such by conceiving of itself as a collection of things rather than a conscious process of self-production. Hence, it is self-contradictory.

A self-conscious form of life is one in which objects are produced according to conscious purpose in order to realize that purpose. In this way, the product is the realization of purpose. Purpose is made real in the form of a material object, rather than remaining an idea or ideal.

In distinguishing between analytic and concrete theorizing, I am not denying that events can be accounted for in terms of external relations, such as causes and

effects. Neither am I denying that there can be reports of occurrences as independent, self-sufficient events. Neither am I claiming that reporting or concrete descriptions, explanations in terms of cause and effect, are mistakes. Rather, I distinguish analytic from concrete theorizing in terms of the aim of analysis. The aim of analysis is to show the possibility of an analytic form of life, the possibility of a self-conscious form of life, by showing how that possibility is repressed.

An analytic form of life is a production that remembers grounds, an internal relation of production to grounds. This means that an object is posited in terms of purposes that it realizes. The object is not divorced from purpose. Conversely, the purpose of a production is posited in terms of an object to be mastered. The purpose of production is not divorced from the object of production. The unity of purpose and object is realized in labor.

Furthermore, purpose is not just natural urgencies but a subjectivity, a knowing or self-consciousness that is able to posit its own aims. This means that production as a unity of purpose and object is a unity of subject and object. The object is only sensible as an object in terms of a subject for whom it has use value.

This seems to be a simple formulation: an analytic form of life is the intentional production of useable objects, the production of use values. Without qualifying or elaborating this formulation, I will contrast it with an

equally simple and familiar one, that of a concrete form of life. A concrete form of life is a production that does not recognize itself as a unity. Rather, it understands itself only in terms of subject or object. As subject, it is divorced from objects to be mastered; it is pure purpose, planning that does not actively contend with the resistance of objects. On the other hand, conceived in terms of objects, it is activity as adaptation to objective conditions, a struggle with external objects of nature in which the character of the subject is irrelevant or conceived in a general way as survival.

In contrast to an analytic form of life, a concrete form is conceived in terms of external relations, cause and effect, rather than internal relations of purpose and the conditions for realizing that purpose. An external relation is one in which purpose is not realized in the activity itself. For instance, the aim of making money as such is indifferent to the labor involved. The aim is not realized in the activity. This distinction is sometimes understood simply as the difference between intrinsically meaningful and extrinsically meaningful activity.

The difference between extrinsic and intrinsic, concrete and analytic, is not a difference attributable to individuals. It is not a moral choice that is decided by individual will. It is not that a concrete form of life or activity which is extrinsically meaningful reveals moral

weakness whereas an analytic form of life or activity which is intrinsically meaningful reveals moral integrity. Such a formulation is not analytic because it fails to account for the choice as possibility. It treats the choice in terms of pure subjectivity divorced from its objective conditions. In other words, it fails to account for its own possibility. For analysis, the possibility of extrinsic meaning and external relations is grounded in a historically specific form of life. In other words, a concrete form of life must be seen as a history and not simply individuals' choice.

Analysis shows the history of activity that is only extrinsically meaningful, a concrete form of life, in the separation of labor from its objective conditions. In contrast to the separation that analysis describes is the unity which analysis knows, the unity of an analytic form of life. I formulated this unity earlier as the production of use values, the realizing of purpose in a material object.

A form of life that denies itself as a form of life is one that forgets the unity of purpose and conditions for realizing that purpose. In the sphere of bourgeois political economy, purpose is the accumulation of wealth as capital. The accumulation of capital requires contradictory conditions. It requires suspending its conditions of reproduction in order to realize its purpose. Therefore, it must not treat itself as a totality. It must forget one side.

When remembering one relation, it must forget the other. Thus capital must see the commodity either as pure exchange value--a commodity whose worth is determined by exchange relations. Or it must see the commodity as pure use value--a product that is itself the realizing of purpose. It justifies itself by remembering that it is the production of use values. In actual production, however, it must forget this as its *raison d'etre* and remember that its purpose is the production of exchange value. Is there any essential difference between use value and exchange value that makes the above assertion sensible?

If a commodity is both use value and exchange value, then are not the two identical, just different sides of the same relation? Isn't the monetary (exchange) value of a product identical with the product itself such that having a product is also having a certain exchange value (potentially or ideally)? Likewise, isn't having a certain exchange value in the form of money, also having (potentially or ideally) any product that is an equivalent exchange value? If identity were the case, then the purpose of producing exchange value would be identical with the purpose of producing use value. There would be no "real" difference between the (purposive) relations of production (production of exchange value) and the means of production (the production of use value). They would form a unity, a form of life.

Treating the two as different would merely be a mistake due to the failure to see the totality, a failure to analyze. With analysis and the recognition of the mistake, the two would be one and production would directly realize purpose. The opposition between use value and exchange value would cease. This means that there would no longer be speculation, stockpiling, or overproduction. Each of these activities, however, is made possible by a disunity of use value and exchange value. Each case presumes that the exchange value for the same use value changes.

The treatment of exchange value and use value as identical is idealist theorizing. It assumes that the movement of consciousness from apparent opposition of subject and object, opposition of purpose and that which realizes purpose, to the realization of their unity, is the movement of concrete social phenomena. My reading of Marx is that the failure to analyze, the failure to recognize an identity is due to a real difference between exchange value and use value (a difference that is therefore internal to the commodity form). It is a real difference (not an ideal one in consciousness) that prevents such an analysis and recognition. The difference between exchange value and use value is in their origins, grounds, form of life.

One must analyze the origins of value or the commodity form as both use and exchange value in order to

understand the difference between them. One must analyze the dialectic between relations of production and forces of production. The former refer to the relations for producing the commodity as exchange value (the purpose of production) which is determined in exchange. The latter refer to the production of commodities as use value through wage labor or capital (the means of production). The dialectic between the commodity as exchange value and the commodity as use value must be determined by analyzing their origins from the standpoint of form of life or subject-object unity.

In analyzing the difference between the commodity form of production and a self conscious form, one looks for the grounds of a difference between subject and object, between aim and the means for realizing the aim. In a form of life, there is no analytic difference. That is, analysis would show the two to be identical: a subject knows itself as such in its object. In the commodity form, the aim is the production of exchange value (wealth) and the means is the production of commodities (products). In a form of life, the subject (producing exchange value) and the object by which that aim is realized (producing use value) should be identical.

For a form of life in which opposition is only an appearance, analysis (self-consciousness) would dissolve the difference by revealing the identity. It would show

that exchange value is only possible through commodities and that commodities as use value are only possible through the production of exchange value, hence that the two are an identity. It would show that the struggle between them, such as in stockpiling or overproduction is due to the lack of recognition on the part of exchangers and producers that commodities and exchange value are identical. Thus, if one thinks of a form of life only as consciousness, one need only show the identity of commodity and exchange value in order to suspend the opposition that the appearance of difference entails.

However, according to Marx, exchange value (and its agents) does not recognize the use value (and its agents) as identical with it because the difference between them is not an ideal difference, their disunity is not a false disunity. Remembering origins in this case is not a re-membering of the unity that produces them as subject and object for each other. It is a re-membering of the subject's origins in disunity. Hence, analysis does not produce unity but reproduces disunity or contradiction and opposition between a subject and itself as object. The movement of categories is not an ideal movement from the appearance of difference to the recognition and therefore realization of identity.

To quote Marx again,

Therefore, to the kind of consciousness--and this is characteristic of the philosophical consciousness--for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of production--which only, unfortunately, receives a jolt from the outside--whose product is the world. (101)

The jolt from the outside, is, I take it, occurrences of that which does not correspond with the movement of consciousness from apparent difference to recognition of identity. This seems to be the import of the note he makes to himself to remember:

Dialectic of the concepts productive force (means of production) and relations of production, a dialectic whose boundaries are to be determined and which does not suspend the real difference.
(109)

Thus the dialectic of the concepts cannot be determined as if it were a dialectic of consciousness. Within the latter, the difference between a concept and its other (subject and object) is suspended through the development of consciousness as it comes to recognize the oneness of what had appeared to be external relations, the recognition that the object is the subject in objectified form.

A concrete form of life does not remember grounds. This is not to say that it is a forgetting in the usual sense, contingent on other things such as distraction or lack of interest. Rather it is like repression because it is a necessary forgetting. Grounds cannot be remembered, the totality cannot be conceived as a totality of internal

relation--a subjectivity.

This is because the requirements for realizing and reproducing that subjectivity, its grounds, are contradictory. It is impossible to remember and proceed. Remembering would be the recognition that in realizing its purposes, the conditions for reproduction are being violated. Remembering would be recalling its internal violence, hence an impossibility. The conditions for realizing and increasing wealth as exchange value contradict the conditions for producing and increasing wealth as use value.

Forgetting (repression) allows a contradictory form to persist, but it does not eliminate the contradictions. It is a tense form because the side that is repressed is in conflict with its other side. It is a tense form because it is a coerced unity--there is a suppression of one side in order to allow its other side to realize itself. The suppressed side could not be acknowledged without dissolving the subjectivity, the purpose that distinguishes it as a totality.

Acknowledgment would be the recognition that the subject is divided. It is divided between the purpose of producing use value (production) and producing exchange value (circulation). I take it that the recognition of a divided subject is class consciousness: the recognition that the production of exchange value is not identical with the production of use value, that the purpose of the

agents of exchange value (capitalists, sellers) are not identical with the agents of use value (workers, buyers), that the realization of one purpose is not the realization of the other purpose, hence disunity. This disunity is embodied in the commodity form.

Marx analyzes the commodity form in money and capital by showing the contradictory character of its form of life. He begins by showing how its self-consciousness, the bourgeois economic treatment of categories as concrete (a repression of grounds) cannot solve its own problems. Before considering his treatment of the key concept, capital, let us see how Marx treats other concepts analytically rather than concretely.

TREATING CONCEPTS AS GROUNDED IN FORMS OF LIFE

If political economics is the concern with the production of wealth, a logical starting point for analysis is the notion of wealth. Marx formulates the notion of wealth as a relation between a product and the particular need which it satisfies.

Every particular commodity in so far as it is realized not as price, but in its natural property, is a moment of wealth by way of its relation to a particular need which it satisfies and in this relation expresses 1. only the wealth of uses 2. only a quite particular facet of this wealth. (218)

Marx distinguishes wealth in the form of money from wealth that is not money. He shows the differences in forms of life that they presuppose and the types of poverty to which they are related. I will illustrate the rule of this chapter by describing Marx's analysis of wealth. I begin with the distinction between wealth as money and wealth that is not money.

Money as General Wealth

In the quotation above, wealth, in the form of a particular commodity "in its natural property"-that is, not as exchange value but as use value - is a relation to particular uses or needs. In contrast, money as wealth is a relation to any need:

Money by contrast apart from its particular usefulness as a valuable commodity is 1. the realized price, 2. satisfies every need, in so far as it can be exchanged for the desired object of every

need, regardless of any particularity. (218)

Money is general wealth because it can be used to satisfy any need in so far as the object of the need is available for exchange. Money is not only the form that general wealth takes, but it is the content of the notion, the concept of general wealth. There is no such notion where money has not developed. The commodity possesses the property of satisfying any need only through the mediation of money, only if it can be exchanged for money.

Money possesses it directly in relation to all commodities, hence in relation to the whole world of wealth, to wealth as such. With money, general wealth is not only a form, but at the same time the content itself. The concept of wealth, so to speak, is realized, individualized in a particular object. (218)

As distinct from all other commodities, money is the general form of wealth. The substance of money, of general wealth, is the totality of all commodities. Money, as general wealth, as the representative of wealth is the representative of exchange value, of the exchangeability of products. A product that is posited as an exchange value is no longer a "simple thing" but a relation:

A product posited as exchange value is in its essence no longer a simple thing; it is posited in a quality differing from its natural quality; it is posited as a relation, more precisely as a relation in general, not to one commodity but to

every commodity, to every possible product. It expresses, therefore, a general relation; (205)

Exchange value is wealth. It is also the substance of money. It is wealth "in its totality in abstraction from its particular modes of existence." Exchange value is both the totality of all commodities and the abstraction from all particular commodities.

Thus, in the first role, money is wealth itself; in the other, it is the general material representative of wealth. This totality exists in money itself as the comprehensive representation of commodities. Thus, wealth (exchange value as totality as well as abstraction) exists, individualized as such, to the exclusion of all other commodities, as a singular, tangible object, in gold and silver. Money is therefore the god among commodities. (221)

In money, wealth has ceased being particular products in their relation to particular needs. Instead wealth exists as exchange value, to the exclusion of all other commodities, in money. Commodities cease to be wealth except in so far as they can be exchanged for money.

Particular Wealth and Its Form of Life

The importance of Marx's identification of general wealth with money is not simply to achieve the kind of understanding one gets from a lexical definition. In order to understand the significance of his identifying general wealth and money, money must be treated as

historical. Marx does this by showing the difference in form of life (social relations) that general wealth presupposes as compared with wealth in particular things where money is not involved. Particular kinds of wealth presuppose an

. . . essential relation between the individual and the objects, in which the individual in one of his aspects objectifies (vergegenstandlicht) himself in the thing, so that his possession of the thing appears at the same time as a certain development of his individuality: wealth in sheep, the development of the individual as shepherd, wealth in grain his development as agriculturist, etc. (222)

Marx explains that where wealth is (conceived as) the accumulating of particular commodities, rather than money, a particular act of production is implied. In the last cited passage, Marx states that the possession of the thing appears as a certain development of his individuality, e.g., wealth in sheep, the development of the individual as shepherd. In a later passage Marx seems to be explicating that one should go beyond what appears as the underlying social reality:

Accumulating sheep does not make one into a shepherd; to accumulate slaves or land requires relations of domination and subordination, etc. All this, then, requires acts and relations distinct from simple accumulation, from increase of wealth as such. (233)

The mere accumulating of sheep does not make one into a shepherd--to be a shepherd presupposes that one knows how to and actually does, tend the sheep which requires

certain acts and relations. Similarly, the accumulating of slaves or land, which might not seem to involve the development of a particular capacity on the part of the individual, does require particular acts and relations. Accumulating particular wealth as distinct from general wealth or money involves more than a simple increase in wealth. Wealth in the form of the accumulation of particular things presupposes a particular form of life.

Furthermore, if the possessors of the particular kinds of wealth want to realize other kinds of wealth from it, they have to trade. This is also a particular type of activity involving particular types of products:

. . . to appropriate wealth in all its particular forms, I have to engage in trade with the particular commodity I have accumulated. I have to be a grain merchant, cattle merchant, etc. Money as the general representative of wealth absolves me of this.
(233)

In other words, the accumulation of particular wealth (as distinct from general wealth or money) presupposes a particular mode of existence involving the relation of a producer to the product (i.e., the development of his productive ability or talent), the relation of a possessor to others (e.g., domination or subordination) and the relation of an individual to a particular type of exchange activity (e.g., grain merchant, cattle merchant). In each case, the particular wealth presupposes a particular set of relations which

is not the case for the possession of general wealth or money.

General Wealth and its Form of Life

The concept and phenomenon of general wealth also presupposes a form of life. However, the concept of wealth presupposes and (re)produces a very different mode of existence, one in which the particular relations and particular activities of the possessor are in no way determined by, or attributable to, the possession of it. The owning of money does not presuppose any particular type of production nor trade in a particular product but all types of production and trade in all products.

Money . . . does not at all presuppose an individual relation of its owner; possession of it is not the development of any particular essential aspect of his individuality; but rather possession of what lacks individuality, since this social (relation) exists at the same time as a sensuous, external object which can be mechanically seized, and lost in the same manner. (222)

Marx explains that, since it is a tangible object, money or wealth may be searched for, found, stolen, or discovered. The individual's relation to it " . . . appears as a purely accidental one having no connection with his individuality." It gives him at the same time, however,

a general power over society, over the whole world of gratifications, labours, etc. It is exactly

as if, for example, the chance discovery of a stone gave me mastery over all the sciences, regardless of my individuality. The possession of money places me in exactly the same relationship towards wealth (social) as the philosophers' stone would towards the sciences. (222)

Marx is making the analogy between the individual who, through an external thing independent of any talents or abilities, is able to be the master of all the sciences, and the individual who, without any particularly developed talents or abilities is able to have influence over other people's social activities and things, over all of society. In his identifying wealth with the social, we may infer that the wealth is social because it is produced socially, and power over the wealth is, therefore, power over other people's activity or work.

Marx is doing a phenomenological analysis of money as general wealth. By phenomenological analysis I mean that he treats the notion itself as problematic--inquiring into the relations (i.e., the relation of the producer to production, to others, and to society) that are presupposed by and (re)produced by it. These social relations are the grounds of the notion; they provide for the intelligibility of the category. This is in distinction to a concrete analysis which treats money (as wealth) positionally, as a thing whose only source of interest is its external relations or position, e.g., relation of (or

effect of) scarcity or plenitude to crises or prosperity.

Universal Venality and Corruption

In addition to contrasting the form of life presupposed by money as general wealth and that presupposed by wealth in particular things, Marx shows how certain activities and character types are produced by this form of life. His analysis shows the analytic history of notions of universal venality and corruption, their internal relation to form of life. This contrasts with a type of theorizing for which these concepts would represent "natural," ahistorical phenomena.

Marx attributes these phenomena to "the exchangeability of all products, activities and relations with a third, objective entity which can be re-exchanged for everything without distinction."

This means that, through the mediation of money, anything can be exchanged for anything else without any distinction. Since people can exchange their particular activity for any other activity or product, people can prostitute themselves; they can perform for money that which they might not ordinarily perform without money. These activities and products are not valued by the producer for their distinction but for their exchangeability, their equation with anything else, hence the corruption

of the distinctive. According to Marx, this form of life, performing for the sake of money, is important in the development of the social character of personal talents and abilities.

Universal prostitution appears as a necessary phase in the development of the social character of personal talents, capacities, abilities, activities . . . The equation of the incompatible, as Shakespeare nicely defined money. (163)

Regardless of the distinctiveness of an activity or product, it can be equated with every other. Through exchange value, personal talents, abilities, activities are seen as social; that is, their relation to others' is recognized. However, the social is not seen in the origins of the activities, that is in their grounding in social life, but in their exchangeability. People may work to develop their abilities because of their social value but only through the mediation of money, only as exchange value.

Marx shows how wealth in general, as distinct from wealth in particular products, originates in the quality of money as general exchangeability embodied in a particular, material thing (gold and silver). Money, as the material representative of general wealth, generates the possibility of universal venality and corruption because now people can perform solely in order to realize exchange value or general wealth.

Greed

Similarly, instead of conceiving of greed as a universal category, natural to human affairs, Marx grounds the notion of greed in money.

. . . greed as such (is) impossible without money; all other kinds of accumulation and of mania for accumulation appear as primitive, restricted by needs on the one hand and by the restricted nature of products on the other. (163)

This means that without money, the desire for accumulation and accumulation itself, is restricted by needs and the nature of the products which might not allow for accumulation beyond a certain amount without other problems emerging, e.g., storage, deterioration, etc.

Marx distinguishes between greed, and cravings for a particular kind of wealth, e.g., clothes, weapons, jewelry, women, wine. According to Marx,

Greed . . . is possible only when general wealth, wealth as such, has become individualized in a particular thing, i.e. as soon as money is posited in its third quality. (222)

The distinction between greed and cravings for particular things is due to the difference between a way of life where one may possess wealth in general (i.e. the wherewithal to appropriate anything) by possessing a particular thing--money, and a way of life where there are only particular things or particular kinds of wealth. Greed is indifferent to particular uses.

Money is, therefore, not only an object, but is the object of greed . . . Money is, therefore, not only the object but also the fountainhead of greed. The mania for possessions is possible without money; but greed itself is the product of a definite social development, not natural as opposed to historical. Hence the wailing of the ancients about money as the source of all evil. (222)

Money presupposes a form of life that produces evil as such, not particular evils. It substitutes money as the object of all desires and as the means for realizing all desires. As such it is destructive of whatever the ancients considered sacred, it is destructive of the form of life to which they were committed. It is capable of destroying all commitment.

General Industriousness

For Marx, as we have noted, wealth is the totality of the products of human activity which correspond to social needs. The source of wealth, of these products, is human activity. Industriousness refers to that human activity when it is accomplished with perseverance and zeal. General industriousness, Marx states, is based on working for money.

Greed, as the urge of all, in so far as everyone wants to make money, is only created by general wealth (money). Only through working for money, i.e. wage labor can the general mania for money become the wellspring of general, self-reproducing wealth. When labor is wage labour, and its direct aim is money, then general wealth is posited as its aim and object. (In this regard, talk about

the context of the military system of antiquity when it became a mercenary system). Money as aim here becomes the means of general industriousness. General wealth is produced in order to seize hold of its representative. In this way the real sources of wealth are opened up. (224)

General industriousness is distinguished from industriousness based on the desire for producing a particular thing which satisfies particular uses and needs.

When the aim of labour is not a particular product standing in a particular relation to the particular needs of the individuals, but money, wealth in its general form, then firstly the individual's industriousness knows no bounds; it is indifferent to its particularity and takes on every form which serves the purpose. (224)

When the aim of labor is money, it is indifferent to the particular activity or product that is being produced and will be performed in any form in order to make money. The crucial or essential element in general industriousness is that money is the aim of labor:

General industriousness is possible only where every act of labour produces general wealth, not a particular form of it; where, therefore, the individual's reward, too, is money. Otherwise, only particular forms of industry are possible. Direct labour which produces exchange value as such is, therefore, wage labour. (224)

Where the individual's reward is not money which represents general wealth, there would not be general industriousness. This means that general wealth is the foundation of general industriousness. Thus, the

industriousness which Weber attributes to the Protestant ethic, as a desire to work and be productive, Marx would see as a product of a form of life in which activity is rewarded in money. "In antiquity, one could buy labour, a slave, directly; but the slave could not buy money with his labour." (224) The implication is that one cannot have general industriousness on the part of slaves or on the part of any groups who do not labor for money. General industriousness, industriousness that is not limited to particular activities that relate to the particular needs of the individual, becomes possible only with labor for money. On the other side, this seems to mean that a leisurely way of life would not correspond to one in which activity is performed in order to obtain general wealth.

Hedonism and Miserliness

In addition to discussing the relationship between greed and industriousness, Marx indicates the two forms that greed for general wealth can take. One is hedonism; the other is miserliness.

With money, it is possible for all pleasures to be available to the possessor without any special achievements or work on his or her part. Once all forms of pleasure are potentially available, it becomes possible to treat life in those terms--as the on-going attempt to realize all pleasures. In this way,

Abstract hedonism realizes that function of money in which it is the material representative of wealth . . . (222)

This is because money, in its function as material representative of wealth, makes all pleasures available. Miserliness, on the other hand, realizes a different function of money.

Miserliness [realizes that function of money in which] . . . it is only the general form of wealth as against its particular substances, the commodities. (222)

That is, miserliness is the treatment of money--its possession and accumulation--as itself being wealth without exchanging it for particular things. Therefore,

In order to maintain it as such [i.e. maintain money as the general form of wealth], it must sacrifice all relationships to the objects of particular needs, must abstain, in order to satisfy the need of greed for money as such. (222-223)

The notion of abstinence is suggestive of the related concept of asceticism and this, in turn, calls to mind Weber's thesis in The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism. In the following passage, Marx anticipates this famous thesis but with different emphasis and perspective.

One sees how the piling up of gold and silver gained its true stimulus with the conception of it as the material representative and general form of wealth. The cult of money has its asceticism, its self-denial, its self-sacrifice --economy and frugality, contempt for mundanes, the temporal and fleeting pleasures; the chase after the eternal treasure. Hence, the connection between English Puritanism or also Dutch Protestantism and money making. (232)

The curious connection between money-making and non-consumption is attributed to the form of general wealth. By spending gold and silver, general wealth is lost. This contradicts the use of general wealth as a means for obtaining particular commodities. Whereas Weber emphasizes the effect of asceticism in the Protestant ethic on the accumulation of capital (freeing money for investment), Marx accounts for the possibility of asceticism; he grounds it in the function of money as material representative and general form of wealth.

This orientation to wealth and consumption was not just stressed by the Puritan and Protestant religions. Marx quotes a writer of the beginning of the seventeenth century as expressing the matter "quite unselfconsciously" when he writes: "We consume among us too great an excess of wines from Spain, . . . silkenware of Italy, the sugar and tobacco of the West Indies, [etc.]; all this is not necessary for us, but is paid for in hard money . . . If less of the foreign and more of the domestic product were sold, then the difference would have to come to us in the form of gold and silver, as treasure." (232)

Weber's thesis describes the anxiety that seems to be the motivating force in the Calvinist traditions. Marx's analysis of money, shows the anxiety that is grounded in money: With respect to the above quotation Marx states:

The modern economists naturally make merry at the expense of this sort of notion in the general section of books on economics. But when one considers the anxiety involved in the doctrine of money in particular, and the feverish fear with which, in practice, the inflow and outflow of gold and silver are watched in times of crisis, then it is evident that the aspect of money which the followers of the Monetary and Mercantilist System conceived in an artless one-sidedness is still to be taken seriously, not only in the mind, but as a real economic category. (232)

In addition to the anxiety, Marx attributes an "absolute" division of labor to money:

Money provides the possibility of an absolute division of labour, because of independence of labour from its specific product, from the immediate use value of its product for it. (200)

In other words, the independence of labor from the immediate use value of its product means that the product has no use value, is not valued by labor because of its use. The only value it has for labor is the money received. Because the product, its final form or qualities, is not the reason for labor (money is), it is possible for labor to be accomplished without any commitment or attachment to its product or activity; there is a complete divorce between the purpose of labor and its performance. In this way, "money provides the possibility of an absolute division of labour." (200)

Equality and Freedom

In addition to the above discussed notions of general wealth, corruption, miserliness, hedonism, asceticism, industriousness and an absolute division of labor and their grounding in the form of life of money, Marx also analyzes the concepts of equality and freedom. We saw how the former concepts derived from the relation of the subject--money making --to its object--general wealth. The latter concepts of equality and freedom characterize the subjective side of money with respect to the relations of the subject to itself as exchange.

Rather than simply using these concepts in order to describe certain situations or to criticize situations for their failure to correspond to these notions, Marx tries to account for the notions. His analysis is an inquiry into the grounds of these ideas. How are notions of equality and freedom possible? What form of life is presupposed by and produces such notions? This type of inquiry shows the historical nature of the concepts. Rather than treating them as natural (conceived as external to human production) and therefore universal, Marx treats them as having origins in a form of life, and, therefore as grounded in that historically specific form of life. The form of life is the exchange of exchange values.

In so far as the commodity or labour is conceived of only as exchange value, and their relation is conceived of as the exchange of these exchange values with one another, . . . then the individuals . . . are simply and only conceived of as exchangers . . . As far as the formal character is concerned, there is absolutely no distinction between them, and this is the economic character . . . Each of the subjects is an exchanger. As subjects of exchange, their relation is therefore that of equality. (241)

Marx is talking about the money relation of simple exchange. Within simple exchange, C-M-C, the exchange of commodity for money which is then exchanged for other commodities, distinctions between individuals are dissolved. In order for one commodity to be exchanged for another, they must be equivalent as exchange values. Therefore, in the exchange relation, which is the exchange of equivalents, the exchangers as exchangers are equal.

. . . it is in the character of the money relation --as far as it is developed in its purity to this point, and without regard to more highly developed relations of production--that all inherent contradictions of bourgeois society appear extinguished in money relations as conceived in a simple form; and bourgeois democracy even more than the bourgeois economists take refuge in this aspect (the latter are at least consistent enough to regress to even simpler aspects of exchange value and exchange) in order to construct apologetics for the existing economic relations. (241)

Bourgeois democracy, the notion of the equality of all people, "takes refuge" in the relations of the economy posited as relations of exchange. Considering only exchange, the form of the money relation, there are only three moments each of which is a relation of equality:

As regards the pure form, the economic side of this relation, then only three moments emerge as formally distinct: the subjects of the relation, the exchangers; the objects of their exchange, exchange values, equivalents, which not only are equal, but are expressly supposed to be equal, and are posited as equal; and finally the act of exchange itself, the mediation by which the subjects are posited as exchangers, equals and their objects as equivalents, equal. (241)

Thus the act of exchange posits both the exchangers and their objects as equal. Equality is both presupposed by and posited by exchange. This means that the exchange of exchange values is based on the equivalence in the values of the objects.

It also means that the equivalence in their value is only determined for purposes of exchange. Hence, equality is both presupposed and posited by exchange. Marx seems to be emphasizing that this exchange would not take place if objects of exchange were treated in some character other than the equality of exchange values, "exchange values, equivalents, which not only are equal, but are expressly supposed to be equal, and are posited as equal." The exchange of exchange values precludes exchange on any basis other than equality.

Not only the relation of equality, but that of freedom is also made possible by simple exchange.

The exchange only takes place because the exchange values while formally equal are also commodities that as use values are substantially different. These differences satisfy the differences among the exchangers' needs. They

obtain the use values they desire through exchange. In the exchange relation, appropriation does not take place by force but voluntarily through reciprocity. Exchangers recognize each other as proprietors and the commodities as their private property. This recognition means that their relations are not those of force but of freedom.

Further, in so far as these natural differences among individuals and among their commodities form the motive for the integration of these individuals, for their social interrelation as exchangers, in which they are stipulated for each other as, and prove themselves to be, equals, there enters, in addition to the quality of equality, that of freedom. Although individual A feels a need for the commodity of individual B, he does not appropriate it by force, nor vice versa, but rather they recognize one another reciprocally as proprietors, as persons whose will penetrates their commodities. (243)

To be "stipulated for each other as equals" can be understood against a relation where inequality of position or individual distinctions pervade relationships. Similarly, the relation of freedom is understood against a relation of force. Because exchange presupposes the recognition of each by the other as proprietors, the process of exchange grounds the juridical relation of the person to the commodity. That is, if exchange is only possible if one recognizes proprietorship, then the juridical person, the legal rights of the individual with respect to commodities (as well as the freedom "contained" in this relation) is consequently also recognized.

Accordingly, the juridical moment of the Person enters here, as well as that of freedom, in so far as it is contained in the former [the juridical person.] No one seizes hold of another's property by force. Each divests himself of his property voluntarily. (243)

Freedom which is contained in the legal rights of individuals concerning their relation to their products, has been found in analysis to be presupposed and posited by the exchange relation. This means that exchange requires these relations and that these relations (the juridical and exchange relations) require exchange. The relation between exchange and these relations is not one of causality but of correspondence, one corresponds to the other. This means that they constitute a totality of internal relations to be understood the same way Marx analyzed production to be a totality. Exchange as the totality of the relations determines each of them (juridical, freedom); as a moment within the totality, exchange is in turn determined by these moments.

Freedom is also a product of the exchange relation in that within exchange, the individual acts only according to self-interest, not compulsion, nor some higher reason. The individual is both the means and the end. Self-interest is the end and the individual's act of exchange is the means. Nothing is recognized as higher than the individual's own self-interest.

Out of the act of exchange itself, the individual . . . is reflected in himself as its exclusive and dominant (determinant) subject. With that, then, the complete freedom of the individual is posited: voluntary transaction; no force on either side; positing of the self as means, or as serving, only as means, in order to posit the self as end in itself, as dominant and primary; finally, the self-seeking interest which brings nothing of a higher order to realization. (244)

Marx explicitly states that the notions equality and freedom, the characteristics of interaction in industrial society, are grounded in the exchange of exchange values. Similarly, the juridical, political and social relations correspond to this exchange relation.

Equality and freedom are thus not only respected in exchange based on exchange values but, also, the exchange of exchange values is the productive, real basis of all equality and freedom. As pure ideas they are merely the idealized expression of this basis; as developed in juridical, political, social relations, they are merely this basis to a higher power. (245)

In the phrase, "the real basis of all equality and freedom," I do not read Marx as meaning the basis of every type of equality and freedom, but rather equality and freedom as a totality. A subject-object relation as a totality constitutes the "real" basis as opposed to an ideal basis grounded only in the subject--"the nature of man." Without exchange, a particular equality or particular type of freedom may have existed, but individuals as totalities were not posited as equal and freed. Similarly, the relations that constitute the society as a totality were not posited as those of equality and freedom. It is only

within exchange that total equality and freedom becomes possible and conceivable.

The notions of freedom and equality would have different meaning, would correspond to a different form of life, within the ancient world, the Middle Ages and modern society.

Equality and freedom as developed to this extent [in juridical, political and social relations] are exactly the opposite of the freedom and equality in the world of antiquity, where developed exchange value was not their basis, but, where, rather the development of that basis destroyed them. Equality and freedom presuppose relations of production as yet unrealized in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages. Direct forced labour is the foundation of the ancient world; the community rests on this as its foundation. (245)

He contrasts this direct forced labor as the foundation of the ancient world with the foundation of the Middle Ages and the foundation of the modern world:

. . . Labour itself as a 'privilege', as still particularized, not yet generally producing exchange values is the basis of the world of the Middle Ages. (245)

In the modern world, "Labour is neither forced labour; nor as in the second case, does it take place with respect to a common higher unit (the guild)." (245) Thus the notions of freedom and equality presupposes particular relations of production where labor is neither forced nor a privilege granted by a higher unit.

I noted above the relationship of the legal rights of persons to the property relations of a society. It is

interesting that Weber, in testing his hypothesis that the rationalization of worldly activities as well as the necessary economic preconditions were the sufficient conditions for the development of capitalism, stressed the availability of a rational legal system developed by the Romans as being of crucial importance in the development of capitalism. Weber's research led him to conclude that a rational legal system as well as a rational system of book-keeping, free wage labor, etc. were important pre-conditions in the development of capitalism. However, Weber treats the relation as an external one stressing the crucial significance of the prior development of Roman law on the subsequent development of Capitalist relations.

Marx discusses Roman law with respect to equality and freedom in the exchange relation. He then shows its relation to modern society.

In Roman law, the servus is, therefore, correctly defined as one who may not enter into the exchange for the purpose of acquiring anything for himself
 . . . (245)

In other words, the definition of servus (slave), which is the antithesis of the free individual, is the lack of freedom to enter into the exchange for one's own self-interest. Marx explains the relation between Roman law and the development of modern industrial legal relations as follows:

It is, consequently, equally clear that although this legal system corresponds to a social state in which exchange was by no means developed, nevertheless, in so far as it was developed in a limited sphere, it was able to develop the attributes of the juridical person, precisely of the individual engaged in exchange, and thus anticipate (in its basic aspects) the legal relations of industrial society, and in particular the right which rising bourgeois society had necessarily to assert against medieval society. But the development of this right coincides completely with the dissolution of the Roman community. (246)

Marx's analysis can be contrasted with Weber's. Weber treats the relation between the legal system and capitalism as an external one, the development of the modern legal system required by capitalism as the extension and adaptation of the already available Roman system. He does not inquire into the grounds of the legal system but explains the modern in terms of its concrete development from the Roman system. Marx, on the contrary, inquires into the presuppositions of the legal system to show how it is related to exchange regardless of the concrete period or society in which it emerges, Roman or modern industrial. This is the difference between a concrete history and an analytic history.

Marx accounts for relations of freedom and equality, ideas of freedom and equality, and legal relations reflecting and protecting the basis of freedom and equality, in terms of their grounds in the system of exchange based on exchange values. However, he goes on to

argue that equality and liberty are grounded in the simple circulation of exchange values, the exchange of commodity for money and then for a different commodity (C.M.C.). In the complex circulation of industrial capital, the exchange of money for commodity and commodity for even more money (M.C.M.¹), the simple relations of circulation are only the surface process. The equality and freedom of these relations are only surface appearances.

By conceiving of relations in terms of simple circulation, the essential differences between the relations of simple circulation and those that correspond to another, more developed process of industrial capital, are disregarded.

If this way of conceiving the matter (in terms of the relations of simple circulation) is not advanced in its historic context, but is instead raised as a refutation of the more developed economic relations in which individuals relate to one another no longer merely as exchangers or as buyers and sellers, but in specific relations, no longer all of the same character [e.g., labour and owners of capital], then it is the same as if it were asserted that there is no difference, to say nothing of antithesis and contradiction, between natural bodies, because all of them are equal because all of them occupy three dimensions. (247)

Marx is referring to the use of the relations of simple exchange in which people relate as buyers and sellers of equivalent exchange values, hence as free and equal individuals, as a way of counteracting the critique of the relations of wage labor and capital.

Exchange value itself is here similarly seized upon in its simple character, as the antithesis to its more developed, contradictory forms. (247)

Rather than treating exchange value in terms of its latest and most complete development in industrial society, in talking of freedom and exchange, people are only talking about exchange in its simple character. This simple character is contradicted by its later form. The appearance of freedom and equality which correspond to simple exchange is treated by Marx as a surface process in modern industrial society.

In present bourgeois society as a whole, this positing of prices and their circulation, etc, in which people relate as free and equal ex-changers appears as the surface process, beneath which, however, in the depths, entirely different processes go on, in which this apparent individual equality and liberty disappear. (247)

Marx conceives of the depths as the process of production which is based on the relation of capital to labor in which the "apparent individual equality and liberty disappear." Marx makes that statement by analyzing the notion of exchange value which presupposes that the product is not a product for the individual who produces it but only becomes such in exchange and that the product must take on the form of exchange value.

It is forgotten, on one side, that the presupposition of exchange value, as the objective basis of the whole of the system of production, already in itself implies compulsion over the individual, since his immediate product is not a product for him, but only becomes such in the social process,

and since it must take on this general but nevertheless external form; and that the individual has an existence only as a producer of exchange value, hence that the whole negation of his natural existence is already implied; that he is therefore entirely determined by society; (248)

Marx shows that it only appears that the individual is free; in "reality," that is, in analysis, the individual's acts of self-interest are social acts, the realization of self-interest requires exchange. As a producer of exchange value, the individual is no longer a "natural" being because the production of exchange values is not a relation outside of social relations but is a relation within social relations.

Marx uses the expression "natural existence" in the sense of external to social relations which was the way the theorists that he criticized used it. For Marx, on the contrary, we have seen that there is no such possibility. Nature, for Marx, is always a particular nature understood as such in relation to a particular subject. Nature is not nature in the abstract external to social relations of production. Similarly, the individual is not "natural existence" but always a being within social relations. Therefore, the individual is not free but is "entirely determined by society." This is not to say that the performance of particular acts is determined, but that the "types" of acts, the sense of the acts, of all intelligible acts, is so determined. The production

of exchange values also presupposes relations other than those of exchange--those of production.

. . . this further presupposes a division of labour etc., in which the individual is already posited in relations other than that of mere ex-changer, etc. That therefore this presupposition by no means arises either out of the individual's will or out of the immediate nature of the individual, but that it is, rather, historical, and posits the individual as already determined by society. . . . What is overlooked, finally, is that already the simple forms of exchange value and of money latently contain the opposition between labour and capital etc. (248)

Marx states that the legitimizing of modern society with the concepts of freedom and equality is based on abstracting the relations of simple exchange from the totality in which they are grounded. Thus Marx does not treat the matter subjectively, as differences in opinion, stating that he disagrees with the identification of modern society with relations of freedom and equality pointing out ways in which this is not the case. Neither does Marx treat the matter as one of objectivity, claiming that the association of modern society with freedom and equality is based on incorrect observation. Rather he deals with the claim analytically, inquiring into the grounds for that claim, the subject-object totality which it presupposes.

Thus, what all this wisdom comes down to is the attempt to stick fast at the simplest economic relations, which, conceived by themselves, are pure abstractions. (248)

The exchange relation, freedom and equality, is only one side of the totality of bourgeois relations; the production of exchange value, the relation of capital to wage labor, is the other side:

The relations of simple exchange are, in reality, mediated by the deepest antithesis, and represent only one side, in which the full expression of the antitheses is obscured. (248)

In explicating the grounds of freedom and equality in the exchange relation, Marx shows the "foolishness" of those socialists who "want to depict socialism as the realization of the ideals of bourgeois society articulated by the French revolution."

This is a critical statement, critical from the standpoint of comprehending the difference between the grounds of Marx's critique of capitalism and those of other socialists.

Marx is critical of those theorists "who demonstrate that exchange and exchange value etc. are originally (in time) or essentially (in their adequate form) a system of universal freedom and equality, but that they have been perverted by money, capital, etc. Or, also, that history has so far failed in every attempt to implement them in their true manner, but that they have now, like Proudhon, discovered e.g., the real Jacob, and intend now to supply the genuine history of those relations in place of the fake." For Marx also exchange and exchange value correspond

to equality and freedom, but money and capital are the developed system of exchange and exchange value.

The proper reply to them is: that exchange value or, more precisely, the money system is in fact the system of equality and freedom, and that the disturbances which they encounter in the further development of the system are disturbances inherent in it, are merely the realization of equality and freedom, which prove to be inequality and unfreedom. (249)

Therefore Marx argues that the critique of capital should not be grounded in the desire to realize the ideals of equality and freedom of the exchange relation because as such these are bourgeois ideals, bourgeois relations in the form of ideas. By bourgeois relations, Marx means relations of exchange. Marx claims that whereas the "bourgeois apologists" identify these ideals with the relations of exchange and use them for purposes of legitimizing those relations, the socialists are utopian in being unable to "grasp the necessary difference between the real and the ideal form of bourgeois society, which is the cause of their desire to undertake the superfluous business of realizing the ideal expression again, which is in fact only the inverted projection [Lichtbild] of this reality." (249)

Both the bourgeois economists and the socialist critics abstract from bourgeois relations of exchange. For both "everything [is] reduced to the undeveloped relation of commodity exchange," (249) either in its ideal

form for the utopian socialists or in its "real" form for the bourgeois apologists. Marx, on the other hand, has a notion of freedom and equality which is not grounded in bourgeois relations of exchange, it is the notion of the "free social individual." Neither the apologists nor the utopian socialists analyze exchange value which would enable them to see the internal contradiction between its relation of freedom and equality and its relation of unfreedom and inequality.

Exchange Value

The totality of Marx's work in the Grundrisse and in Capital can be read as an analysis of exchange value. Chapters V and VI will be devoted to this analysis with respect to its character as a totality of internal relations and its character as a contradictory form of life. Here I will show how Marx conceives of exchange value in its developed forms of money and capital as a historical relation--as grounded in a historically specific form of life. This is in contrast to a concrete treatment that conceives of it as a natural ahistorical relation (outside of social relations).

We have already seen how the difference between wealth in general and wealth in particular things stems from the embodiment of exchange value in a form that is separate from the product. Thus, the notion of wealth

(in general, as money) derives from exchange value. Value, in the sense of exchange value, refers to the comparability of products on the basis of their costs of production--the amount of labor time it takes on the average to produce them. The notion of value, treating products in terms of their comparability or generality with all other products, presupposes and reproduces the process of exchange. This treatment contrasts with a treatment of products in terms of their relation to particular needs, hence as having particular value (use value) not value in general. Particular (use) value corresponds to a unity of purpose and production. The notion of value in general as distinct from specific value (use value) is produced by a particular mode of production--production for exchange--where particular purpose or need is not realized in production but in exchange.

The existence of value in its purity and generality presupposes a mode of production in which the individual product has ceased to exist for the producer in general and even more for the individual worker, and where nothing exists unless it is realized through circulation. (252)

The mode of production presupposed by exchange value separates the producer from the product as a particular product satisfying particular needs. Even the work of the individual, regardless of its products would be nothing, of no value, if it did not produce exchange value. The positing of exchange value is not only a matter of

the form that values takes, it is also a matter of substance. If no exchange value, money, is produced, then for the producer nothing is produced.

For the person who creates an infinitesimal part of a yard of cotton, the fact that this is value, exchange value, is not a formal matter. If he had not created an exchange value, money, he would have created nothing at all. (252)

Marx goes on to argue that the notion of value, is therefore, a historical relation:

This determination of value, then, presupposes a given historical stage of the mode of social production and is itself something given with that mode, hence a historic relation. (252)

The notion of value is historical in that it presupposes a historically specific mode of production. We have seen how value as an abstraction, value in general, presupposes money. This leads to the development of capital which becomes a dominant form of production.

It has become apparent in the course of our presentation that value, which appeared as an abstraction, is possible only as such abstraction, as soon as money is posited; this circulation of money in turn leads to capital, hence can be fully developed only on the foundation of capital, just as, generally, only on the foundation can circulation seize hold of all moments of production. (776)

Therefore it seems that the notion of value in general depends on the development of circulation and money which is only fully developed in capital. The analysis of value thus calls attention to ("makes visible"): the historic character of social forms such as capital; the historic foundation (grounds) of the category, value; and

the historical changes which certain categories, e.g., money, undergo.

This development, therefore, not only makes visible the historic character of forms, such as capital, which belong to a specific epoch of history; but also (in its course) categories such as value, which appear as purely abstract, show the historic foundation from which they are abstracted, and on whose basis alone they can appear, therefore, in this abstraction; and categories which belong more or less to all epochs, such as e.g. money, show the historic modifications which they undergo. (776)

Because the concept of value depends on the development of circulation and money which are only fully developed in capital which itself presupposes value, the concept of value is therefore specific to capital and its production process:

The economic concept of value does not occur in antiquity. Value distinguished only juridically from pretium, against fraud, etc. The concept of value is entirely peculiar to the most modern economy, since it is the most abstract expression of capital itself and of the production resting on it. In the concept of value, its secret betrayed. (776)

An analysis of value, therefore, reveals the specific historical character of capital which other economists overlook. By failing to treat capital as exchange value, they conceive of it only as objectified labor used as a means of production.

When it is said that capital 'is accumulated (realized) labour (property, objectified [vergegenständlichte] labour), which serves as the means for new labour (production),' then this refers to the simple material of capital, without regard to the formal character without which it is not capital. This means nothing more than capital is--

an instrument of production, for, in the broadest sense, every object, including those furnished purely by nature, e.g. a stone, must first be appropriated by some sort of activity before it can function as an instrument, as means of production. (257)

Marx is claiming that this definition is too general and ahistorical. If capital is anything produced by labour and used in production then it has existed in all societies without distinction. He argues that even where the limbs of the body are the instruments of production, they too would have to be considered capital according to this definition because they have to be developed (produced) through human activity and they must be reproduced--nourished--in order to function.

According to this, capital would have existed in all forms of society, and is something altogether unhistorical. . . . Capital would be only a new name for a thing as old as the human race, since every form of labour, including the least developed, hunting, fishing, etc., presupposes that the product of prior labour is used as means for direct, living labour. (257)

In addition, Marx criticizes the formulation for being abstract in that the particular material of which the products are composed (e.g., composed of material that requires gathering, husbandry, or mining; composed of material from the bodies of animals that require domestication or hunting; composed of material that requires certain processes of preparation before it can be used, etc.) is not considered. Similarly, the product is treated in abstraction from the particular purpose behind producing it: accumulation of general wealth (exchange value as money).

A further characteristic contained in the above definition is that the material stuff of products is entirely abstracted away, and that antecedent labour itself is regarded as its only content (matter); in the same way, abstraction is made from the particular, special purpose for which the making of this product is in its turn intended to serve as means, and merely production in general is posited as purpose. All these things only seemed a work of abstraction, which is equally valid in all social conditions and which merely leads the analysis further and formulates it more abstractly (generally) than is the usual custom. (258)

Marx states that such abstraction seems to be merely the work of providing a definition that will lead the analysis further than would be the case without it. However, one result of such abstrating is that it is then possible to show that capital is necessary for all production.

If, then, the specific form of capital is abstracted away, and only the content is emphasized, as which it is a necessary moment of all labour, then of course nothing is easier than to demonstrate that capital is a necessary condition for all human production. The proof of this proceeds precisely by abstraction from the specific aspects which make it the moment of a specifically developed historic stage of human production. (258)

Marx's criticism is that capital is conceived in the abstract separated from its specific historical form, a particular subject-object totality. This means that instead of conceiving of capital as expressing certain historical, social relations (the relation of people to their production), capital is treated as a thing:

The catch is that if all capital is objectified labour which serves as means for new production, it is not the case that all objectified labour which serves as means for new production is capital. Capital is conceived as a thing, not as a relation. (258)

Marx makes this implicit critique in terms of a dialectical phenomenology--that the ordinary treatment of social phenomena fails to recognize that what appears as a thing presupposes a social relation and social process.

The Pauper and Over-Population

I began this chapter with "general wealth" as the object of production. I showed how Marx analyzed it as a historically specific relation. I will conclude this chapter on grounding concepts in a historically specific form of life with Marx's treatment of the negation of wealth--his analysis of pauperism. I distinguish pauperism meaning destitute of all means from the poverty of wage labor which I discuss in Chapter 5.

Marx claims that the concept of free labor implicitly contains that of pauperism. This is because free labor can only attain necessities if it exchanges labor capacity for wages. But labor can be deprived of this exchange and the production of its necessities by conditions that are accidental for it and indifferent to its availability and willingness to work. This means that the ability to produce its necessities is not due to conditions that are internal to labor--e.g., drought conditions,

conditions of land and weather, of strength and technology, but conditions which are external and accidental for labor such as changes in market conditions. If individuals must sell their labor capacity for wages, if they cannot simply apply themselves to the production of necessities but must find a buyer for their labor power, then the individuals are virtual paupers.

It is already contained in the concept of the free labourer that he is a pauper; virtual pauper . . . if the capitalist has no use for his surplus labour, then the worker may not perform his necessary labour; not produce his necessities. Then he cannot obtain them through exchange; rather if he does obtain them, it is only because alms are thrown to him from revenue. He can live as a worker only in so far as he exchanges his labour capacity for that part of capital which forms the labour fund. This exchange is tied to conditions which are accidental for him, and indifferent to his organic presence. He is thus virtual pauper. (604)

Capitalism is based on trying to increase surplus value which can be conceived as surplus labour. As more surplus value is produced, more necessary labour can be eliminated. For example, if the workers can produce more value over and beyond the value necessary to keep them alive than they had previously been able to produce (through working longer hours, working more intensively, introducing new machinery or new techniques, etc.), then fewer workers can be employed to produce the same amount of surplus value as before. Those workers who are laid off will have lost the opportunity of exchanging their labor power for money. If they cannot get other employment, they must

become paupers:

Since it is further the condition of production based on capital that he produces, ever more surplus labour, it follows that ever more necessary labour is set free. Thus the chances of his pauperism increase. To the development of surplus labour corresponds that of surplus population . . . Only in the mode of production based on capital does pauperism appear as the result of labour itself, of the development of the productive forces of labour.
(604)

The condition of over-population, surplus labor, and pauperism varies for different modes of social production. Each mode of production is based on a particular relation of the people to the conditions of their reproduction. The society is reproduced or continued through the members reproducing the relation to conditions of production that characterize the society. If the relation of an individual or part of a population to these conditions is dissolved, if a portion of the population is deprived of any relation to the conditions of production, then that individual or segment of the population is placed outside of the conditions for reproducing the society, hence may be considered marginal to that society. This is overpopulation which is identical with pauperism.

In different modes of social production, there are different laws of the increase of population and of overpopulation; the latter identical with pauperism. These different laws can simply be reduced to the different modes of relating to the conditions of reproduction, or, in respect to the living individual, the conditions of his reproduction as a member of society, since he labours and appropriates only in society. The dissolution of these

relations in regard to the single individual, or to part of the population, places them outside the reproductive conditions of this specific basis, and hence posits them as overpopulation, and not only lacking in means but incapable of appropriating the necessities through labour, hence as paupers. (604)

Because the specific relation to specific conditions of production differs for different periods, the nature of over-population may be different for different societies and the character of this over-population (or surplus population, a term Marx favors) may be different. Marx gives the illustration of the colonies of antiquity which were people deprived of the relation to the conditions of production that characterized the society. Although over-population, they could not be considered paupers:

Thus, what may be overpopulation in one stage of social production may not be so in another, and their effect may be different. E.g. the colonies sent out in antiquity were overpopulation, i.e. their members could not continue to live in the same space with the material basis of property, i.e. conditions of production. The number may appear very small compared with the modern conditions of production. They were, nevertheless, very far from being paupers. Such was, however, the Roman plebs with its bread and circuses. The overpopulation which leads to the great migrations presupposes different conditions again. (604)

Unlike capitalism, where the development of the forces of production is the basis of the production of wealth, all previous forms of production are based on a specific relation to the conditions of production which is merely supposed to be reproduced not changed. That is, the form of property (relation to the conditions of production) includes among its conditions, the reproduction

of the forces of production as already developed--not something to be further developed.

Just as the development of the forces of production is restricted in this way, the development of population which is also a force of production, is similarly restricted. This is because the conditions of a community are consistent with a specific amount of population:

Since in all previous forms of production the development of the forces of production is not the basis of appropriation, but a specific relation to the conditions of production (forms of property) appears as presupposed barrier to the forces of production, and is merely to be reproduced, it follows that the development of population, in which the development of all productive forces is summarized, must even more strongly encounter an external barrier and thus appear as something to be restricted. The conditions of the community [were] consistent only with a specific amount of population. (605)

So far, we have only discussed the limits on the size of the population posited by the conditions for reproducing the community with its given property relations. However, if the conditions of production change, then the barriers to population likewise change; they may contract or expand:

On the other side, if the barriers to population posited by the elasticity of the specific form of the conditions of production change in consequence of the latter, if they contract or expand . . . then so does the absolute rate of population increase, and hence the rate of overpopulation and population. (605)

The point that Marx is making is that the rate of population increase changes with changes in the conditions of production that constrain population. There is a certain amount of population which is consistent with (allows for) the reproduction of the community on the basis of the already given relation to the conditions of production. The notion of overpopulation as indicated above refers to a part of the population that cannot reproduce itself on the basis of the established relation to the conditions of production. Therefore, the community cannot reproduce itself, as it had been, through the reproduction of these individuals. The latter, therefore, comprise the excess population, but excess only for that type of society, for the particular relation to the conditions of production (i.e., the property relations which characterize a society).

The amount of overpopulation posited on the basis of a specific production is thus just as determinate as the adequate population. Overpopulation and population, taken together, are the population which a specific production basis can create. The extent to which it goes beyond its barrier is given by the barrier itself, or rather by the same base which posits the barrier. (605)

Marx then goes on to a critique of Malthus' treatment of overpopulation. He faults Malthus' theorizing for failing to conceive of overpopulation in terms of the specific historical conditions of production which produce historically specific types of overpopulation.

His conception is altogether false and childish because he regards overpopulation as being of the same kind in all different historical phases of economic development; does not understand their specific difference, and hence stupidly reduces these very complicated and varying relations to a single relation, two equations, in which the natural reproduction of humanity appears on the one side, and the natural reproduction of edible plants (or means of subsistence) on the other, as two natural series, the former geometric and the latter arithmetic in production. In this way he transforms the historically distinct relations into an abstract numerical relation, which he has fished purely out of thin air, and which rests neither on natural nor on historical laws. (606)

Marx argues that overpopulation is determined by the historically specific subjective and objective conditions for reproducing the particular form of life. It is not determined by a numerical relation of human reproduction to the reproduction of edibles abstracted from a specific mode of production. For Marx, unlike Malthus, overpopulation is a historically determined relation determined not by abstract numbers or absolute limits on the rate of production, limits that are the same for all modes of production, but by limits produced within specific conditions of production.

He (Malthus) would find in history that population proceeds in very different relations, and that overpopulation is likewise a historically determined relation, in no way determined by abstract numbers or by the absolute limits of the productivity of the necessities of life but by limits posited rather by specific conditions of production. As well as restricted numerically. (606)

The limit to population that is posited by particular conditions of production is in numerical terms. The restriction to population in numerical terms means that the size of "overpopulation" is limited by (or determined by) the type of society:

How small do the numbers which meant overpopulation for the Athenians appear to us.

In addition to the notion of overpopulation and the size of the overpopulation being historically determined by the specific conditions of production, the particular character of the overpopulation is likewise determined by the type of society (its specific conditions of production).

Secondly, restricted according to character. An overpopulation of free Athenians who become transformed into colonists is significantly different from an overpopulation of workers who become transformed into workhouse inmates. Similarly the begging overpopulation which consumes the surplus produce of a monastery is different from that which forms in a factory. (606)

Another illustration of the difference in the character of the overpopulation may be the Eskimo society where the aged comprise the overpopulation.

Marx presents and elaborates Ricardo's response to Malthus which was that the quantity of grain available for consumption was not the issue for the worker who was unemployed and therefore part of the surplus population. Marx extends Ricardo's argument from referring only to the individual's ability to find employment to the individual's relation to the conditions of production:

He (Malthus) stupidly relates a specific quantity of people to a specific quantity of necessities. Ricardo immediately and correctly confronted him with the fact that the quantity of grain available is completely irrelevant to the worker if he has no employment; that it is therefore the means of employment and not of subsistence which puts him into the category of surplus population. But this should be conceived more generally, and relates to the social mediation as such, through which the individual gains access to the means of his reproduction and creates them, hence it relates to the conditions of production and his relation to them. (607)

Marx illustrates his point about the relation to the social means of one's reproduction as being the key factor rather than the means of subsistence by referring to the case of the surplus population of antiquity which did not consist of the slaves, but of non-workers:

There was no barrier to the reproduction of the Athenian slave other than the producible necessities. And we never hear that there were surplus slaves in antiquity. The call for them increased, rather. There was, however, a surplus population of non-workers (in the immediate sense), who were not too many in relation to the necessities available, but who had lost the conditions under which they could appropriate them. (607)

Similarly the case of the workers under capital and the beggars at the monasteries were products of particular conditions of production:

The invention of surplus laborers, i.e. of propertyless people who work, belongs to the period of capital. The beggars who fastened themselves to the monasteries and helped them eat up their surplus product are in the same class as feudal retainers and this shows that the surplus produced could not be eaten up by the small number of its owners. (607)

A final example that Marx uses before going on to discuss overpopulation based on capital is the case of hunting people. He argues that the existence of overpopulation among them does not prove that the earth with its natural production rate of edibles could not provide subsistence for their small size population, which would be the conclusion based on Malthus' theory, but rather that the condition of their reproduction, i.e., reproduction of the same relation to the conditions of production, involved a large amount of land for the relatively few people.

The overpopulation e.g. among hunting peoples, which shows itself in the warfare between the tribes, proves not that the earth could not support their small numbers, but rather that the condition of their reproduction required a great amount of territory for few people. (607)

Thus Marx concludes that overpopulation is not a relation to an absolute quantity of means of subsistence, but is the result of a specific relation to production, a specific subject-object totality. Instead of a relation to an absolute mass of means of subsistence, overpopulation is a relation to the specific conditions of producing those means. A surplus population, therefore, would not necessarily be a surplus in a different mode of production:

Never a relation to a non-existent absolute mass of means of subsistence, but rather relation to the conditions of reproduction, of the production of these means including likewise the conditions of reproduction of human beings, of the total

population, of relative surplus population. This surplus purely relative; in no way related to the means of subsistence as such, but rather to the mode of producing them. Hence also only a surplus at this state of development. (607-608)

Marx shows the relation of overpopulation to the conditions of (re)producing capital. We briefly indicated earlier the two ways in which surplus population is produced by capital: Firstly, that in order to be able to produce at all, labor must be able to produce surplus value that can be realized by capital. If the surplus labor cannot be realized as value by the capitalist, then labor capacity will not be employed, will not be allowed to produce. It appears outside of the conditions of its reproduction--employment:

Labour capacity can perform its necessary labour only if its surplus labour has value for capital, if it can be realized by capital. Thus if this realizability is blocked by one or another barrier, then (1) labour capacity itself appears outside the conditions of the reproduction of its existence: it exists without the encumbrance; needs without the means to satisfy them. (609)

Secondly, necessary labor time, the equivalence in labor time necessary to produce the necessities required to reproduce the worker, is only utilized to the extent that the worker also produces surplus value that is appropriated and realized by the capitalist. Thus, from the standpoint of the capitalist whose only interest is the surplus value, necessary labor, the time for which the worker must be paid appears as superfluous--something to

be reduced as much as possible. The capitalist realizes nothing from necessary labor time.

. . . necessary labour appears as superfluous, because the superfluous is not necessary. It is necessary only to the extent that it is the condition for the realization of capital . . . (609)

Under this point it should be remembered that the condition of production under capital involves the tendency to increase the surplus labor and reduce necessary labor. Thus Marx's use of "necessary" labor reveals the contradictory character of capital: necessary labor is both necessary and superfluous. As more relative surplus labor is produced while using less necessary labor, the released labor potential now exists as surplus labor capacity or overpopulation. In this way production based on capital, and the continual movement towards increasing surplus value, produces a particular type of overpopulation--that which stems from the inherent tendency of capital to continually develop the forces of production in order to produce more surplus value relative to necessary labor.

Since the necessary development of the productive forces as posited by capital consists in increasing the relation of surplus labour to necessary labour, or in decreasing the portion of necessary labour required for a given amount of surplus labour, then, if a definite amount of labour capacity is given, the relation of a necessary labour needed by capital must necessarily continue to decline, i.e. part of these labour capacities must become superfluous, since a portion of them suffices to perform the quantity of surplus labour for which the whole amount was required previously. (609)

The superfluous population that is produced through reducing the amount of necessary labour needed to produce the same amount of necessary labor as before, may be supported by others, rather than supported by its own labor. This is the condition of being dependent on the mercy of others; hence the tramp and pauper. Or else, the money to maintain the part of the working class which appears as superfluous may systematically be taken out of the revenue of all as in the case of taxes used to provide welfare payments:

The decrease of relatively necessary labour appears as increase of the relatively superfluous labouring capacities, i.e. as the positing of surplus population. If the latter is supported, then this comes not out of the labour fund but out of the revenue of all classes. It takes place not through the labour of the labour capacity itself--no longer through its normal reproduction as worker, but rather the worker is maintained as a living being through the mercy of others; hence becomes tramp and a pauper. (609)

The consequence of this for the capitalist is that the surplus working class is maintained by other parts of the society for later use by capital. In this way it is possible for members of the remaining population to become pauperized also, by using their money for the support of the unemployed. In this way, an additional part of the population would be pauperized, e.g., taxation of low income people.

. . . society in its fractional parts undertakes for Mr. Capitalist the business of keeping his virtual instrument of labour--its wear and tear--intact as reserve for later use. He shifts a part of the reproduction costs of the working class off his own shoulders and thus pauperizes a part of the remaining population for his own profit. (609-610)

The implication that the surplus labor is supported by others for the benefit of the capitalist refers to the subsequent need of capital for additional workers. This is due to the tendency of capital to reproduce itself in an increasing quantity. With the growth of surplus capital, a part of the surplus population that was set free may again be required to produce in the new branch(es) of production that the surplus capital now opens up:

Finally, the positing of surplus capital . . . requires a part of the population which is unemployed (at least relatively): i.e. a relatively surplus population, in order to find the readily available population for the growing of surplus capital. (610)

Just as Marx claims that it is misleading to talk of production in general, he makes the same point with regard to overpopulation. The notion of surplus population depends on the particular society. The surplus population differs qualitatively as well as quantitatively according to the type of society. In this analysis Marx does not treat surplus population as a given, observable, natural thing but as a social phenomenon grounded in and produced by a particular, historical form of life.

Just as Marx claims that the form of life presupposed and posited by money is historical and not "natural," he makes the assertion that a different form of life--communism--is also not attributable to nature but to history.

Universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal (*gemeinschaftlich*) relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal control, are no product of nature but of history. (162)

Marx's treatment of forms of life and notions such as greed and industriousness may be contrasted with the usual treatment of such social phenomena. The usual treatment may be thought of as the debate over human nature and the nature of society. The opposing positions within these debates tend to underly much of the theorizing in sociology, psychology, and religion. Are people essentially aggressive, individualistic, self-interested or sinful? Are people essentially peaceable, loving, communal or good? Must society constrain the individual's unruly and destructive passions? Is society the means for the individual's self realization? Is society oppressive? Is society essentially conflictual or consensual?

Marx's work may be read as claiming that none of these characteristics should be conceived as natural. Instead of claiming one or the other, one should inquire into how such claims are possible. What are the social

grounds for a particular claim? Marx insists on the need to treat concepts and social phenomena as grounded in specific historical social conditions. This is different from treating those versions of humankind or society as given, natural or universal.

CHAPTER 3

TREATING THE INDIVIDUAL AS GROUNDED IN A
FORM OF LIFEThe Objective Individual

In the previous chapter, I have shown how characteristics attributed to individuals such as greed, industriousness, asceticism, even pauperism do not originate with the individual but with a form of life that makes them possible or intelligible as such. This is not to say that an individual could not evince similar traits in another form of life, but only that they would be understood differently, they would have different meanings. In Marx's theorizing, the individual's acts and intentions similarly do not originate with the individual. They are possibilities given with a form of life. The individual is not the foundation of action, but the agent of action.

Conceiving of individuals in terms of a form of life must be understood against the conception of individuals' acts as either natural or purely subjective. A natural individual refers to the individual abstracted from social life. Conceiving of individuals' acts in terms of nature means that purposes are reduced to natural impulses,

instincts, drives, outside of particular social formations. For Marx, human nature takes form within social life.

The human as species being may have certain traits that distinguish it from other species but these are not the object of analysis, for analysis is concerned with history. This version of human nature parallels the discussion of production in general. Marx would probably argue that the species being of the human is as a historical being, one that produces its own conditions of existence and therefore its own life. This means that the human is always historically specific which therefore dissolves the notion of an ahistoric human nature. If anything, human nature outside of social life would not be recognizable as such; it would be beastlike. The human being as an individual is such only within history, only within a socially developed mode of production.

But human beings become individuals only through the process of history. He appears originally as a species being, clan being, herd animal . . . Exchange itself is a chief means of this individuation. It makes the herdlike existence superfluous and dissolves it. (496)

The human being as a particular type of individual is a product of the development of production.

A similar conception to the natural is that of the subjective individual, one whose particular impulses, desires and needs have no origins other than the individual. This means purposes are only accounted for as personal

desires, needs, goals understood in terms of the unique situation or biography of an individual, the individual as author of his acts. Given this conception, social life would be a conglomeration of private purposes. With society reduced to the activities of subjective individuals, there would be no way of determining activity or regulating social life, hence the Hobbesian problem of order. Given this conception of individual behavior, social order can only be understood as a social contract among the individuals or as social control by the domination of external forces. These theories of social life are logical conclusions from conceiving of the individual as pure subjectivity.

Both of these conceptions of the individual--as natural and as subjective being--differ from Marx's notion of the objective individual, the individual defined as Roman, Greek, etc. For Marx, individuals' purposes always presuppose a form of life.

The point is rather that private interest is itself already a socially determined interest which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means. It is the interest of private persons; but its content, as well as the form and means of its realization, is given by social conditions independent of all. (156)

For analysis there are no private purposes, if by this is meant purposes that originate with an individual outside of social life. The concept of a private person might refer to persons who are not conscious of their

purposes as socially determined, that is as purposes that presuppose a history. For Marx, private persons as unselfconscious individuals are themselves products of a particular form of life, a form of life in which history is repressed.

Analysis only knows individuals from within a form of life. This means that the relations of a form of life are presupposed to the individual, and the relations within which the individual stands determine his purposes and acts. However, to say that the individual's acts are determined by the form of life within which they are events is not to say that the individual has no choice, no will of his own, no opportunity to be creative or spontaneous or deviant. It is that objective conditions and relations constrain and make possible the individual's acts and purposes. Thus the possibility of types of acts does not originate with the individual but with the relations and objective conditions within which the individual acts. Within these constraints, the individual may be creative and spontaneous.

However, it is not the spontaneous, creative individual and his or her personal situation or personal biography that is the subject of analysis. Rather it is the individual as personification of the possible and intelligible. Analysis does not begin with the individual but with what makes a type of act possible. It is concerned with the origin of the possibility of types of acts not with the

concrete origins of the acts of specific human beings. Of course, this is not to deny the personal individual or species being. It is only to say that the objective individual is the object of analysis, not the personal, natural or subjective individual. The personal individual is irrelevant for analysis.

Analysis shows how types of acts are possibilities specific to a form of life; how they would not be conceivable as such outside of a particular form of life. Thus analysis shows how acts are not first; they always presuppose a history. However, this is not to be identified with absolute relativism which precludes analyzing a form of life except in its own terms such as a form of extreme functionalism. Instead, relativism applies only to the types of acts; they must be understood only in terms of their form of life. However, the form of life itself is the subject of analysis and not the acts. According to my reading of Marx, a form of life is not treated as the absolute in which particular acts are understood. Rather it is itself analyzed as a totality in terms of unity.

This means that one begins with the notion of a form of life as unity of purpose and activity, of subject and object, of interest and the means for realizing that interest. This conception of unity provides the possibility for history as other than an empirical tracing of events over time. Instead history is seen as struggle. In other words, analysis does not begin with a notion of unity that

is outside history such as a notion of social equilibrium or social system within which disunity is known as a disruption of the system. Rather analysis begins within unity as the answer to the problem of a particular disunity, a result of a particular struggle that is history.

I have said that Marx does not begin with the individual as the origin of acts but with a form of life that makes types of acts, the objective individual, possible. Analysis of the origins of acts, analysis of a form of life, is accomplished from the standpoint of unity. This unity is itself the analytic resolution of a struggle engendered by disunity. From this standpoint, analysis produces the objective individual as standing within the relations of the unity, as living the struggle engendered by its separation--disunity. In this chapter, I will illustrate Marx's notion of an objective individual, the individual produced by a form of life. I shall begin with Marx's discussion of three precapitalist forms of life: Asia, antiquity, and the early Germanic form.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to note that they are considered precapitalist forms. This means that they are analyzed in terms of the capitalist form. Their history is understood as the prehistory of capital. This is not to say merely that capital developed from them, but that their history is known in terms of the disunity of capital and the unity that is a solution to the problem of capital

(its disunity). Hence, from this standpoint, they are seen as stages in history, stages in the development of a self-conscious unity.

Marx is not doing an empirical history but is using empirical illustrations to formulate the prehistory of capital in terms of possible forms that are analytically prior to the form of capital--unity as analytically prior to separation. Thus the stages are not empirical events in history but are analytic formulations.

The next question to be addressed is why these forms of life are conceived in terms of property. Marx formulates these precapitalist forms as forms of landed property. I have said that forms of life are conceived in terms of unity, the unity of production, the unity of purpose with the objective conditions for realizing the purpose. This unity can be conceived as a property relation. That which I use to realize my purposes is my property. The problematic of analysis is the disunity. This unity is itself the analytic resolution of a struggle engendered by disunity. From this standpoint, analysis produces the objective individual as standing within the relations of the unity, as living the struggle engendered by its separation--disunity. In this chapter, I will illustrate Marx's notion of an objective individual, the individual produced by a form of life.

Disunity is the separation of purpose and means for realizing that purpose. This is also a separation of property from production such that those who work have no right to the objects of their work and those who have the right do not do the work. Thus the disunity is a property relation as is the unity. Hence forms of life are formulated as property relations.

The Natural Community and Landed Property

In examining precapitalist forms of life from the perspective of unity, Marx begins with the migratory form. In this form of production, where the community "grazes off what it finds," the community appears as the presupposition of the temporary utilization of the land. In this form of life, the community is not a result of anything. It is not the result of history as struggle; it is a natural unity, not a self-conscious unity.

Since we may assume that pastoralism, or more generally a migratory form of life, was the first form of the mode of existence, not that the clan settles in a specific site, but that it grazes off what it finds--then the clan community, the natural community, appears not as a result of, but as a presupposition for the communal appropriation (temporary) and utilization of the land. (472)

The importance of conceiving of the community as presupposition as naturally existing ("the natural community"), rather than as a result of individual appropriation

and utilization of the land, is to show that there is nothing prior to community. Community is not a result of anything external to it such as a "natural" individual. The "natural community" of blood, language, customs, is not external to production; it is neither external cause nor external result of the production of individuals. Rather, the "natural community" is presupposed by that production, just as that production reproduces the language, blood, customs that constitute the "natural community." The relation between community and production is an internal one, a totality.

This naturally arisen clan community, or if one will pastoral society, is the first presupposition--the communality (*Gemeinschaftlichkeit*) of blood, language, customs--for the appropriation of the objective conditions of their life and of their life's reproducing and objectivizing activity (activity as herdsmen, hunters, tillers, etc.). (472)

The community is the first presupposition of the individuals' activity by which they reproduce themselves. This means that the character of the individuals' activity is determined by its relation to its particular object just as the character of the object for the subject is determined by the subject's relation to it. To illustrate, the character of the subject, a community of tillers, is determined by its object--land and tools for tilling. Reciprocally, the character of the land as soil for tilling is determined by its subject--the knowledge and goal of tilling.

Although the "same" material may exist in two different forms of life, within those forms they may not be the same object. In one, cattle may be an object of production, consumption and exchange as well as a symbol of wealth. In the other, cattle may be a sacred being which is allowed to eat up the produce of the land thereby contributing to material poverty. Thus the mere presence of material elements does not determine production. Objective conditions although necessary are never sufficient. Production cannot be reduced to one or the other. Production must be treated as a subject-object totality.

Production is not related externally to community (cause or effect) but is an internal relation, a unity in which the conditions of community are conditions of production and the conditions of production are conditions of community. As such, the conditions of production are conceived as the community's, the earth as the property of the community that appropriates it.

They relate naively to it (the earth) as the property of the community, of the community producing and reproducing itself in living labour . . . Each individual conducts himself only as a link, as a member of this community as proprietor or possessor. The real appropriation through the labour process happens under these presuppositions, which are not themselves the product of labour, but appear as its natural or divine presuppositions. (472)

The naiveté consists in not recognizing that it is their labor, their struggle, that appropriates the land, that they are the community and the proprietor. Instead,

the individual members and workers do not constitute a self-conscious community. This is due to the condition that community is not produced by labor, but is presupposed to labor. Because the community is not produced by labor (productive activity) although it is reproduced by it, the community is natural or divine. The conditions for reproducing this natural or divine community are the conditions for the individuals' activities, the conditions for production.

Durkheim elaborates on this theme. In the Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, he theorized that religion is the re-creation of community and community is the presupposition of human life and individual activity. As such, it is not the concrete community, the particular living human beings, but the community as a meta-physical force in the lives of people, in the literal sense of more than mere physical presence. It is awe in the face of this metaphysical force that constitutes the sense of the sacred in Durkheim's analysis.

Durkheim analyzes religion as an abstract universal. He formulates religion as the recreation and strengthening of the individual's relation to the natural, metaphysical community. In doing so, he eternalizes the natural community as the presupposition of human activity and treats all community as prior to the individuals and divine as such.

Marx does not treat the relation of individual to community abstractly, but analyzes the relation historically by showing the presuppositions of the relation, the conditions for its reproduction. In the early forms of production, the natural community is presupposed. The individuals relate to their individual production as members of a community which is not identical with themselves because the community is not a historical one but a natural one. It is the community which is the proprietor of that which they appropriate.

This means that individuals as members do not see their community as having an origin, as being produced by the struggle of individuals. Hence individuals appear as "mere accidents" or "natural component parts" of the community. The disunity of individual and community means that individuals as workers have no legal rights to the objects of their work. The sole proprietor is the community which may be personified in the despot.

This form, with the same land-relation as its foundation, can realize itself in very different ways. E.g. it is not in the least a contradiction to it that, as in most of the Asiatic land-forms, the comprehensive unity standing above all these little communities appears as the higher proprietor or as the sole proprietor; the real communities hence only as hereditary possessors. (473)

The form of landed property based on the natural community may take other forms.

Now, in so far as it actually realizes itself in labour, this kind of communal property can appear either in the form where the little communes vegetate independently alongside one another, and where, inside them, the individual with his family work independently on the lot assigned to them (a certain amount of labour for the communal reserves, . . . for war, religion, etc. . . . (473)

Marx uses empirical illustrations to show analytic possibilities of landed property that presuppose a natural community. However, the empirical accuracy of the illustrations is not the point. Rather, it is the illustration of the possibilities for and restrictions on development that are given with this type of community that is the point of the analysis. Hence he can speak of communes vegetating. He can also show the possibility of the development of serfdom (villeinage) from this type of unity:

(a certain amount of labour for the communal reserves, insurance so to speak, and to meet the expenses of the community as such, i.e. for war, religion etc.; this is the first occurrence of the lordly dominium in the most original sense, e.g. in the Slavonic communes, in the Roumanian etc. Therein lies the transition to villeinage [Frondienst] etc.). (473)

The emphasis in the analysis on the natural community and landed property is the lack of a self-conscious unity and its consequences with respect to the relation of individuals as members and their development.

or the unity may extend to the communality of labour itself, which may be a formal system, as in Mexico, Peru especially, among the early Celts, a few clans of India. The communality can, further, appear within the clan system more in a situation where the unity is represented in a chief of the clan-family, or as the relation of the patriarchs among one another. Depending on

that, a more despotic or a more democratic form of this community system. (473)

Thus the natural unity may take different forms. Because the unity is natural and not a historical product, the natural unity can appear to be independent of or indifferent to the individual members. In this way, the unity can appear as a chief or a relation among chieftains which can relate to the individuals as more despotic or more democratic.

Asiatic Landed Property

In the form of Asiatic landed property, the natural communities are united to form a "higher unity" or "comprehensive unity." In this form, the individuals are propertyless, and the unity of the communities, the "comprehensive unity" can appear as the sole proprietor, the higher proprietor above the individual communities. The proprietor takes the form of a despot. The surplus product then belongs to this highest unity. This relation which Marx calls oriental despotism does not contradict the land relation of the natural community. Rather, the latter is the foundation for it.

Amidst oriental despotism and the propertylessness which seems legally to exist, there, this clan or communal property exists in fact as the foundation . . . A part of their surplus labour belongs to the higher community, which exists ultimately as a person, and this surplus labour takes the form of tribute, etc., as well as of common labour for the

exaltation of the unity, partly of the real despot, partly of the imagined clan-being, the god. (473)

Because the integrity of the "little communities" and their immediate relation to nature is not destroyed, the uniting of these communities does not create a new community but is a surrender or devotion to a "higher unity," an externally imposed unity; hence the despot. Irrigation is an objective condition for uniting the "little communities." The organization for irrigation took the form of an external presence or unity--the despot. The products of this externally imposed unity such as the means of communication appear as the work of this higher unity.

The communal conditions of real appropriation through labour, aqueducts, very important among the Asiatic peoples; means of communication etc. then appear as the work of the higher unity--of the despotic regime hovering over the little communities. (473)

For Marx, the relation of the communities to the higher unity, devotion or religion, is an internal relation of the mode of production, a presupposition of this form of production.

Analysis begins retrospectively. Given a particular form of production, e.g., pastoralism, Asiatic, analysis inquires into the form of unity that is presupposed, the relation of individual to community that is required by such production. Furthermore analysis might ask what other possible forms such a relation might take; what limits if any would such a relation impose with regard to production

and its development. Thus in my reformulation of Marx's theorizing, religion is not the superstructure merely reflecting an economic base but is an internal relation, a presupposition of a form of life conceived as a mode of production or property relation, in other words a condition of a form of production.

Because the unity is the real proprietor and the real presupposition of communal property, it follows that this unity can appear as a particular entity above the many real particular communities where the individual is then in fact propertyless or property--i.e. the relation of the individual to the natural conditions of labour and of reproduction as belonging to him, as the objective, nature-given inorganic body of his subjectivity--appears mediated for him through a cession by the total unity--a unity realized in the form of the despot, the father of the many communities--to the individual, through the mediation of the particular commune. (473)

In Marx's theorizing, religion is not merely that which is called religion, but analytically religion is reformulated as a relation of individuals to their unity. Religion is the relation to the unity as a natural or divine presupposition of individual production. The negation of religion or secularism then might be reformulated as the separation of individual activity from this unity which comes with the historic transformation of the unity from a natural and therefore divine presupposition to a historic community.

Private Property of Antiquity

The second form of landed property that Marx considers as a historic development from the natural community and the natural unity of worker and the earth as workshop is that of antiquity. This form presupposes the town as the created foundation of community. This means that the community is no longer a natural presupposition but a historic one.

The second form--and like the first it has essential modifications brought about locally, historically etc.--product of more active, historic life, of the fates and modifications of the original clans--also assumes the community as its first presupposition, but not, as in the first case, as the substance of which the individuals are mere accidents, or of which they form purely natural component parts--it presupposes as base not the countryside, but the town as an already created seat (centre) of the rural population (owners of land). (474)

In the first form--the natural community and its development in the Asiatic mode--the property of the individual is directly communal property and the individual is merely its possessor as distinguished from proprietor. (Marx's distinction.) In the first form, communal labor, e. g., aqueducts, was a presupposition of individual production. This historic "higher unity" presupposed the natural community as an entity independent of an indifferent to the individuals who comprised it. By this I mean that the community was not a result of the individuals' activities. In other words, the higher unity of communal labor required by irrigation presupposed the natural community

and communal property (with the individual merely a possessor) as its foundation. The individuals did not recognize that their activity produced themselves as community because the community was not produced by individuals' activity; it was given with individuals' activity as a natural presupposition.

In the second form of landed property, the natural unity has become a historic unity, a unity that is recognized as produced, as having an origin. In this case, communal labor (for irrigation) and the natural community are not presupposed to the individual. Instead the historic community is presupposed.

The less it is the case that the individual's property can in fact be realized solely through communal labour--thus e.g. the aqueducts in the Orient--the more the purely naturally arisen, spontaneous character of the clan has been broken by historic movement, migration; the more further the clan removes itself from its original seat and occupies alien ground, hence enters into essentially new conditions of labour, and develops the energy of the individual more--its common character appearing, necessarily, more as a negative unity towards the outside--the more, therefore, are the conditions given under which the individual can become a private proprietor of land and soil--of a particular plot--whose particular cultivation falls to him and his family. (475)

However, private property in land presupposes membership (citizenship) in the community (Rome) and membership in the community requires private property. The community is no longer natural but is the result of struggle to occupy land or to protect the land against alien occupation: this is the basis of the unity of antiquity.

The earth in itself--regardless of the obstacles it may place in the way of working it, really appropriating it, offers no resistance to [attempts to] relate to it as the inorganic nature of the living individual, as his workshop, as the means and object of labour and the means of life for the subject. The difficulties which the commune encounters can arise only from other communes, which have either previously occupied the land and soil, or which disturb the commune in its own occupation. War is therefore the great comprehensive task, the great communal labour which is required either to occupy the objective conditions of being there alive, or to protect and perpetuate the occupation. (474)

Thus the unity of the community is no longer a natural presupposition of individual productive activity. Instead, the unity is a historic presupposition, a unity that is produced by the struggle against the outside and the "protection of the ager publicus for communal needs and communal glory etc." However, although antiquity is characterized by private property in land, unlike the first form, this private property still presupposes the community as a necessary condition.

Membership in the commune remains the presupposition for the appropriation of land and soil, but, as a member of the commune, the individual is a private proprietor. He relates to his private property as land and soil, but, at the same time as to his being as commune member; and his own sustenance as such is likewise the sustenance of the commune, and conversely, etc. (475)

Although the individual relates to the land as his own, he relates to himself as commune member. The relationship to the land as private property presupposes a community that mediates or warrants that relation. This community has a separate presence from the individual

proprietors in the form of the city or state as a political body. Because the commune has an independent presence, membership in which (citizenship) is the presupposition of individual productive activity, this relation therefore presupposes the commune as a divine presence.

The commune, although already a product of history here, not only in fact but also known as such, and therefore possessing an origin, is the presupposition of property in land and soil--i.e. of the relation of the working subject to the natural presuppositions of labour as belonging to him--but this belonging [is] mediated by his being a member of the state, by the being of the state--hence by a presupposition regarded as divine etc. (475)

Just as the individuals as private proprietors relate to their beings as commune members--citizens of a (city) state--and the sustenance of the commune (e.g., its protection and glorification) as their own sustenance, the sustenance of the individual as private proprietor is conversely the sustenance of the commune. Hence, Marx describes the conditions (the reproduction or survival) of the form of life of antiquity in terms of the preservation of its members as self-sustaining peasants:

The presupposition of the survival of the community is the preservation of equality among its free self-sustaining peasants and their own labour as the condition of the survival of their property. The survival of the commune is the reproduction of all of its members as self-sustaining peasants, whose surplus time belongs precisely to the commune, the work of war, etc. (476)

Thus the leaders of antiquity were concerned about the provision of landed property for the community members

in order to preserve the community.

When the auguries, Niebuhr says, had assured Numa of the divine sanction of his election, the pious king's first concern was not worship at the temple, but a human one. He divided the lands which Romulus had won in war and given over to occupation; he endowed the order of Terminus. All the law-givers of antiquity, Moses above all, founded their success in commanding virtue, integrity and proper custom on landed property, or at least on secured, hereditary possession of land, for the greatest possible number of citizens. (476)

The unity of the community is reproduced as history, a conscious struggle to maintain or occupy land as the private property of the members. The reproduction of this community, however, presupposes the unity as divine, as other than the activity of the members themselves. The divine unity is represented by the city. This differs from the German form.

Germanic Private Property

The third form of land-ownership that Marx delineates is that of the German tribes in which community members live long distances apart and the community appears as a coming together for periodic gatherings:

Among the German tribes, where the individual family chiefs settled in the forests, long distances apart, the commune exists, already from outward observation, only in the periodic gathering-together (Vereinigung) of the commune members, although their unity-in-itself is posited in their ancestry, language, common past and history, etc. (483)

Marx is making the distinction between unity-in-itself and unity-for-itself. Unity for itself in this case is not the unity as an already given natural fact of human life, or as an already given accomplishment which now forms the basis of individual property and protection against the outside--the state. Rather, unity for itself is the unification of independent or separate individuals, that is the active self-conscious commitment of individuals to forming the community by their own decision to do so.

The commune thus appears as a coming together (Vereinigung), not as a being-together (Overein); as a unification made up of independent subjects, landed proprietors, and not as a unity . . . For the commune to come into real existence, the free landed proprietors have to hold a meeting, whereas e.g. in Rome it exists even apart from these assemblies in the existence of the city itself and of the officials presiding over it, etc. (483)

The distinction between the Germanic form of landed property and the two previously discussed forms is that in the Germanic, the relation of the individual as landowner to the land does not appear to be a relation within community.

Individual property does not appear mediated by the commune; rather the existence of the commune and of communal property appear as mediated by, i.e. as a relation of, the independent subjects to one another. (484)

These three different forms of life as modes of producing and reproducing community are forms of appropriation, property relations. The Germanic offers the most extreme form of precapitalist community that Marx

analyzes, for here the commune does not appear as a presupposition of individual activity. It is the absence of community as presupposition except in terms of ancestry and language.

The economic totality is, at bottom, contained in each individual household, which forms an independent centre of production for itself (manufactures purely as domestic secondary task for women etc). In the world of antiquity, the city with its territory is the economic totality; in the Germanic world, the totality is the individual residence, which itself appears as only a small dot on the land belonging to it, and which is not a concentration of many proprietors, but the family as independent unit.
(484)

The Germanic form of production does not presuppose a relation to community. Hence the totality of production is the family unit of the proprietor. In this case, Weber's thesis that the communal is not necessarily the "original" form of property seems to hold.¹

Weber describes the concrete origins of seven types of property in land and their consequences with respect to the distinction between nobility and taxable dependents, between citizens and non-citizens.² Weber provides this concrete history in order to show that agrarian communism is not necessarily the original form of social life, the opposite claim being a particular version of Marx's

¹Max Weber, General Economic History, transl. from the German by Frank H. Knight (Glencoe, 1950), p. 53.

²Ibid.

theorizing. Weber shows how private property in land originates with either military leadership and relations of production, conquest and booty, or clan leadership with authority to regulate a community's trade.

However, according to Marx's analysis, the private proprietorship that results from these historic transformations does not mean that community is not presupposed. It is presupposed as a "communality of language, blood, etc." The difference is that with the Germanic form, the commune does not appear as a presupposed entity separate from the individual proprietors as it does in the Asiatic form in which the individual appears as mere accident, nor does it appear in the existence of the city of antiquity and its "civic needs as distinct from those of the individual."

rather, the commune, on the one side, is presupposed in-itself prior to the individual proprietors as a communality of language, blood etc., but it exists as a presence, on the other hand, only in its real assembly for communal purposes . . . (485)

The consequence of the commune not appearing as a separate entity apart from the members themselves, a form of alienated life, is that the individual proprietors are free from the domination of an alien presence, the domination of their community as a presence separate from themselves. Their freedom to be individual proprietors is "guaranteed by the bond with other such family residences of the same tribe, and by their occasional coming together (Zusammenkommen) to pledge each others' allegiance

in war, religion, adjudication etc. . . . The commune exists only in the interrelations among these individual landed proprietors as such." (484)

In other words, the community still exists but only in these relations not as an ideal entity alongside the real relations of individual proprietors. Instead the community is recognized as these relations. Thus Weber's problematic--the empirical origins of property--is not Marx's. The problem is not an empirical one of seeing if the earliest forms of property were communal or private. According to my reading of Marx, the aim is not to prove that agrarian communism is the original form of property and hence "natural." Rather, it is to show the consequence of different forms of community on individual productive activity, the individual's form of life as made possible by the community's property relations.

These are treated as precapitalist forms, that is the purpose of discussing them is as a contrast with the individual's productive activity that characterizes the property relations and form of life of capital.

In all these forms--in which landed property and agriculture form the basis of the economic order, and where the economic aim is hence the production of use values, i.e. the reproduction of the individual within the specific relation to the commune in which is its basis--there is to be found: . . . Appropriation not through labour, but presupposed to labour; appropriation of the natural conditions of labour, of earth as the original instrument of labour as well as its workshop and repository of raw materials. (485)

In contrast to the worker of the capitalist form of life, the worker in the precapitalist forms is in unity with the objective conditions for reproducing himself. His subjectivity is realized in the objective conditions, unity of subject and object. This form of life contrasts with the one that provides the standpoint for analyzing them, the form of life characterized by a separation of subject and object. In the precapitalist forms,

The individual relates simply to the objective conditions of labour as being his; [~~relates~~] to them as the inorganic nature of his subjectivity, in which the latter realizes itself; the chief objective condition of labour does not itself appear as a product of labour, but is already there as nature; on one side the living individual, on the other the earth, as the objective condition of his reproduction; (485)

The consequence of membership in the community is that the individual has an objective mode of existence presupposed to him with his ownership of the land. This contrasts with the laboring individual of capital whose existence is simply that of abstract labor, an individual who appears to be purely subjective existence, purpose or desire or need separated from any objective conditions for realizing itself, hence pure subjectivity divorced from any objectivity.

The labouring individual . . . thus appears from the outset not merely as labouring individual, in this abstraction, but who has an objective mode of existence in his ownership of the land, an existence presupposed to his activity, and not merely as a result of it, a presupposition of his activity just like his skin, his sense organs, which of

course he also reproduces and develops etc. in the life process, but which are nevertheless pre-suppositions of this process of his reproduction . . . (485)

The individual does not first have to work in order to know himself as an individual; rather it is through work that he reproduces himself as an individual.

Property as Membership

Within precapitalist forms, the relation between individuals and the objective conditions for realizing themselves as such is not mediated by labor or exchange value. The individual does not first have to work in order to produce himself as an individual. Rather the relation is a unity of subject and object, an inner unity in which the individual's subjective existence (as member) includes its objective conditions (the land) as "the inorganic nature of his subjectivity."

He actually does not relate to his conditions of production, but rather has a double existence, both subjectively as he himself, and objectively in these natural non-organic conditions of his existence. (491)

This inner unity, the unity of subject and object in these precapitalist forms, is a property relation. As such it is mediated by membership in a community, "is instantly mediated by the naturally arisen, spontaneous, more or less historically developed and modified presence of the individual as member of a commune." (485)

Therefore, in Marx's analysis property means belonging to a community.

An isolated individual could no more have property in land and soil than he could speak. He could, of course, live off it as a substance, as do the animals. The relation to the earth as property is always mediated through the occupation of the land and soil, peacefully or violently, by the tribe, the commune, in some more or less naturally arisen or already historically developed form. (485)

The distinction that Marx is drawing between property and substance that an individual could live off seems to be based on the recognition and realization of rights by others. These rights and their realization constitute the subjective and objective existence of the individual as such.

Property therefore means belonging to a clan (community) (have subjective-objective existence in it); and by means of the relation of this community to the land and soil, [relating] to the earth as the individual's inorganic body; his relation to land and soil, to the external primary condition of production . . . as to a presupposition belonging to his individuality, as modes of his presence. We reduce this property to the relation to the conditions of production. (492)

As members, individuals' activities, their property relations, their speech, are public activities as opposed to private ones. This means that they do not originate with an individual but with life in a community, membership. Individual activity is typical, a system of typifications. The individual is a type of individual and is not an individual otherwise. Individuation occurs through typification within society, within social relations. The

individual is not that which is external to or hidden from society as in the notion of a private individual. Rather, the individual's recognition of himself in that which is his, including his speech (acts), presupposes membership in a community.

As regards the individual, it is clear e.g. that he relates even to language itself as his own only as the natural member of a human community. Language as the property of an individual is an impossibility. But the same holds for property.

Language itself is the product of a community, just as it is in another respect itself the presence /Dasein/ of the community, a presence which goes without saying. (490)

Property relations, the relations of an individual to the objective conditions of his existence including the relation to intelligible speech as his own, which are given with membership, are "modes of his presence." Without the property that is given with language and membership, with social relations, the individual would be unable to separate himself from his acts. The acts would not be his; they would be him. He would be unable to reflect and determine his acts self-consciously. Hence, he would not be an individual to himself; he would not recognize himself or know himself as an individual but only as a species being, a being that is one with its natural impulses.

The identification of property relations with "modes of his presence" does not seem to correspond to the usual understanding of an individual's property. The usual understanding of property is either of two formulations.

In one, property is everything potentially, the character of property inheres in its thingness--its objectivity. This character is realized, that is things become property in actuality, in being appropriated by an individual. Hence property is an object that is appropriated by an individual.

The other formulation is that property is a set of rights and obligations (guaranteed by law). As such property is a mental relation among individuals--a purely subjective relation. Neither of these seems to refer to modes of an individual's presence. We have seen that for Marx, property presupposes membership, relations within a community. This seems to correspond to the second interpretation, a set of rights and obligations. However, according to Marx, this mental relation is a relation to the conditions of production.

Why does Marx "reduce this property to the relation to the conditions of production?" Why not a relation to the conditions of consumption? How do either refer to a mode of presence? The property relation, as a set of rights and obligations of an individual to an object, is only realized, that is made real instead of remaining mental, by an active relation of the individual to the thing. This active relation is production. Consumption itself always presupposes production including the production of "certain capacities on the part of the subject."

Property, in so far as it is only the conscious relation--and posited in regard to the individual by the community, and proclaimed and guaranteed as law--to the conditions of production as his own, so that the producer's being appears also in the objective conditions belonging to him--is only realized by production itself. The real appropriation takes place not in the mental but in the real, active relation to these conditions--in their real positing as the conditions of his subjective activity. (493)

"Real appropriation takes place not in the mental but in the real, active relation to these conditions." Property is a conscious relation in which these conditions are recognized as his own. This conscious relation is only made real in an active relation. By active, I do not read Marx as meaning a mere exertion of energy or force onto a thing as might happen when one falls against something, but active in the sense of purposive--intending some end or object as product of the exertion which in turn transforms the thing into an object of a subject. Thus active means a purpose that is being enacted; hence a production. Therefore in stating that property is only realized by an active relation to objective conditions, Marx is saying that property is only realized by production.

A specific property relation that is presupposed by a particular productive activity is not only identical with a specific relation within which individuals stand but with types of individuals as well. A property relation not only defines and distinguishes societies but also defines and distinguishes individuals, their modes of

presence. The individuals' objective presence may be as the property of a person who embodies the communal unity or as citizens of the city or as independent proprietors of land or of instruments of production (craftspeople), any of which is realized in the activity and relations of individuals. This is what Marx means by the objective individual, the individual as Roman, Greek, etc.

The individuals only realize themselves as such, (re)produce their particular mode of presence and recognize themselves as individuals, by their particular active relation within a totality, by the realization of a property relation, a production as a form of life, that is given with membership in a community of landed property.

In all these forms in which landed property and agriculture form the basis of the economy, "the economic aim is the production of use values, i.e., the reproduction of the individual within the specific relation to the commune in which he is its basis . . ." (485) This contrasts with the production of exchange values as economic aim of capital which is the reproduction of capital. Capital is produced by labor in general--wage labor, rather than a particular specific relation such as landowner.

Property relations provide the conditions for (re)production but at the same time, these conditions restrict the development of production; production is restricted to the reproduction of these property relations.

In Marx's analysis, the restriction of production is identical with the restriction of the individual's development. Because Marx treats individuals as social actors (not simply as members of the human species) and social activity as production, restriction of production is identical with the restriction of the individual's development. We have already seen that production is not limited to the economic notion of buying and selling, that any purposive activity is a production and that any production presupposes a particular subject-object relation, a property relation. Therefore a restriction of production is a restriction of individual purposive activity, hence of individual development.

Marx said of the Roman form, "But there can be no conception here of a free and full development either of the individual or of the society, since such development stands in contradiction to the original relation." He then asks if in antiquity there was no inquiry into which form of landed property is the most productive, creates the greatest wealth, and answers that in antiquity the question is always which mode of property creates the best citizens.

According to my reading of Marx, this means that the production of wealth was limited by the property relations that characterized Roman citizenship, that production was not identical with Roman citizenship although Roman citizenship was identical with production as landed

property, and further that the free and full development of the individual and the society was not compatible with the reproduction of the Roman form of community, its particular property relations. Marx states that these property relations allowed for the development of wealth and of the individual (the Roman individual) and society up to a point, but then restricted further development. This raises the issue of the production of wealth as the aim of individuals and of society.

Wealth and the Individual

The identification of the restricted development of wealth with the free and full development of the individual is significant for clearing up a serious problem in readings of Marx. According to one interpretation, of Weber, for instance, the positing of the production of wealth as the aim of individuals and societies was disturbing as well as historically erroneous. Weber seemed to stress that "people do not live by bread alone," a certain culture is always presupposed by any mode of production and furthermore such cultures exert restrictive or supportive influence on the development of the economy--the production of material wealth. Weber expressed concern over the intent to organize society as if it were one large business enterprise, the aim of which is the production of material wealth. He saw this as reducing the

human being, its culture, its freedom and its creativity.

Therefore, it will be helpful to understand the seemingly questionable identification of wealth as the object of human activity and the development of wealth as the free and full development of the individual.

Marx states:

Now, wealth is on one side a thing, realized in things, material products, which a human being confronts as subject; on the other side, as value, wealth is merely command over alien labour not with the aim of ruling, but with the aim of private consumption etc. It appears in all forms in the shape of a thing, be it an object or be it a relation mediated through the object, which is external and accidental to the individual. (487)

Thus either in the old form of particular wealth or in the modern form of general wealth (exchange value in money) wealth appears to be an object. Certainly the old view of valuing the human being as citizen over the production of wealth seems loftier than the modern valuing of the production of wealth over everything else.

Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of production, regardless of his limited national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty when contrasted to the modern world, where production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth as the aim of production. (488)

Although the character of the human being that was valued over the production of wealth was limited, it still seems a more worthy object than the modern valuing of wealth.

In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? (488)

This striking passage is noteworthy for the identification of wealth as the unrestricted development of the individual. Wealth is not the production of particular objects, not even money.

This passage reveals a view of wealth as a mode of being where there are no limits imposed on the individual's development except for the limits of previous historic development which the individual strives to transcend. The wealthy individual then is one whose needs and abilities are developed in every direction ("universality of needs, capacities," etc.), whose life is the movement of becoming all of which it is capable. However, for such an individual to be possible requires a certain type of society where the conditions of production do not limit the development of the individual. In pre-capitalist forms the conditions of production did limit the development of the individual.

Capital dissolves the limitations imposed by the old conditions of production, and in doing so opens up the possibility of the universal development of the individual. However, the relation which dissolves the old form and makes this one conceivable, at the same time prevents this development because capital is based on the separation of labor from its objective conditions. This is because the presupposition of the capitalist form of society is wealth in the form of a thing (capital) rather than the free and universal development of the individual which should be the presupposition of society. Capital posits the production of wealth independent of particular relations, but substitutes a general relation of production that is also restrictive, the relation of labor to capital. Whereas there is no longer a predetermined yardstick for the development of human powers--the individual as Roman, for example--the modern aim of producing wealth in the form of money appears as the sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end.

In bourgeois economics--and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds--this complete working-out of the human content appears as a complete emptying-out, this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. This is why the childish world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier. On the other side, it really is loftier in all matters where closed shapes, forms and given limits are sought for. It is satisfaction from a limited standpoint; while the modern gives no satisfaction; or, where it appears satisfied with itself, it is vulgar. (488)

Whereas the world of antiquity is satisfaction from a limited standpoint (from within certain constraints), the modern gives no satisfaction. The line, "where it appears satisfied with itself, it is vulgar," is interesting. How can satisfaction be vulgar? I take it Marx means "lacking in cultivation, perception, or taste." In other words, the satisfaction that the modern world provides is the satisfaction of realizing wealth in the form of money. We have seen that money, as general wealth, presupposes no particular activity, skill or ability. Hence, being satisfied with money is being satisfied without the satisfaction deriving from some particular achievement other than the achievement of money-making. This is precisely what Weber seemed to despise and reject, the reason for his polemic with what he considers Marxist theorizing. Unlike Marx, however, Weber did not treat wealth as having grounds, as presupposing a particular, historical form of life. Rather, Weber treated wealth as a thing externally related to other social phenomena such as religion or culture. To give preeminence to the thing is certainly to reduce the human as cultural being. However, for Marx, the appearance of wealth as a thing corresponds to particular forms of life. With the dissolution of these forms, wealth as the free and full development of the individual becomes possible.

Wealth and needs are dialectically related. The needs of sustenance, as the subjective aspect, lead to production which makes wealth, the objective aspect, possible. But the act of production which includes social interaction and the products themselves, i.e., wealth, creates new needs:

. . . needs are produced just as are products and the different kinds of work skills . . . The greater the extent to which historic needs--needs created by production itself, social needs--needs which are themselves the offspring of social production and intercourse, are posited as necessary, the higher the level to which real wealth has become developed. Regarded materially, wealth consists only in the manifold variety of needs. (527)

Thus needs, which seem to be a characteristic of the individual, are seen by Marx as historical and social, products of social activity. If the individual is identifiable on the basis of his needs as well as his acts, then we again see Marx grounding the individual in a historically specific form of life. It is not just production that creates the individual, but Production which includes consumption:

. . . consumption reproduces the individual himself in a specific mode of being, not only in his immediate quality of being alive, and in specific social relations. So that the ultimate appropriation by individuals taking place in the consumption process reproduces them in their social being, and hence reproduces their social being--society--which appears as much the subject as the result of this great total process. (717)

While wealth is ordinarily attributed to possession of things, Marx formulates it as the development of the individual's potentials; similarly while great need is ordinarily associated with lack of wealth, Marx shows that the greater the extent and variety of social needs, needs which are treated as necessary, the higher the level of wealth.

The mode of production based on capital is production for the sake of wealth, although wealth posited in a limited way as capital. Thus this mode of production whose aim is wealth, is not limited to reproducing forces of production merely in order to reproduce a given relation to a given set of objective conditions, but rather tries to continually develop the forces of production. However, it does so only as a means for some other end--increase in capital--which at the same time limits the development of the forces of production.

Therefore the mode of production based on capital provides the basis for a new mode of production where the development of the forces of production is not limited as it is by the precapitalist forms nor as it is by capital:

Capital posits the production of wealth itself and hence the universal development of the productive forces, the constant overthrow of its prevailing presuppositions as the presupposition of its reproduction. (541)

This is the fundamental difference between capital and all previous modes. Capital requires "no particular kind of consumption etc., of intercourse etc. as absolute condition; and likewise every degree of the development of the social forces of production, of intercourse, of knowledge etc. appears to it only as a barrier which it strives to overpower." Contrasted with capital, we saw Marx's formulation of precapitalist forms where:

property in the conditions of production was posited as identical with a limited, definite form of the community; hence of the individual with the characteristics--limited characteristics and limited development of his productive forces--required to form such a community. This presupposition was itself in turn the result of a limited historic stage of the development of the productive forces; of wealth as well as of the mode of creating it. (541)

In the pre-capitalist forms, the purpose of the community "is the reproduction of these specific conditions of production and of the individuals . . . and relations--as living carriers of these conditions."

Capital changes that purpose of the community to one where specific conditions of production or specific types of individuals and relations is not required, but rather the constant overthrow of all previous conditions is required.

The reason that capital is not the ultimate form of production and social life is that there is an inherent limit presupposed by capital:

The barrier to capital is that this entire development proceeds . . . in such a way that the working individual alienates himself; But this antithetical form is itself fleeting, and produces the real conditions of its own suspension. The result is . . . the basis (for) the possibility of the universal development of the individual, the universality of his real and ideal relations. (541)

The new mode of production, which corresponds to the dissolution of capital, will posit the universal development of the forces of production as the presupposition of the society:

Although limited by its very nature, it (capital) strives toward the universal development of the forces of production, and thus becomes the presupposition of a new mode of production which is founded not on the development of the forces of production for the purpose of reproduction or at most expanding a given condition, but where the free, unobstructed, progressive and universal development of the forces of production is itself the presupposition of society and hence of its reproduction; where advance beyond the point of departure is the only presupposition. (540)

The new mode of production presupposes "advance beyond the point of departure." In other words, continual change is the presupposition of that society, continual change through the developing of the forces of production. Thus wealth in terms of the development of the forces of production, which is also the development of labor, is the aim and presupposition of this new type of society. In the past, "societies foundered on the development of wealth." This is because the aim of all previous societies was to reproduce the specific social relations and conditions which constituted the society. Thus in early societies,

where the form of life is based on agriculture and the relation to the land, the development of the individuals was limited by that relation. However, as more wealth was produced on that basis, the basis itself--the conditions of those social relations--changed:

The feudal system for its part foundered on urban industry, trade, modern agriculture (even as a result of individual inventions like gunpowder and the printing press). With the development of wealth--and hence also new powers and expanded intercourse on the part of individuals--the economic conditions on which the community rested were dissolved, along with the political relations of the various constituents of the community which corresponded to those conditions: religion, in which it was viewed in idealized form (and both [religion and political relations] rested in turn on a given relation to nature, into which all productive forces resolves itself); the character, outlook etc. of the individuals. (540)

In the above passage, Marx puts forth a theory of social change which includes changes in the political relations, in religion, even in the character and outlook of individuals. He attributes such revolutionary changes in these aspects of society to the development of the forces of production. These changes in the forces of production constitute the development of wealth. Changes in wealth, the development of the forces of production, change the relation to the objective conditions which entails change in the political and religious spheres as well as changes in the character of the individuals. Thus changes in wealth constitute the moving force of history. History is conceived as changes in the relations to the objective

conditions, a subject-object dialectic. This conception of history contrasts with the version of it as changes in the objective conditions (development of the forces of production) or changes in the subjective conditions (changes in needs, leaders, purposes).

The Universal Individual as Analytic Possibility

For Marx, the overriding interest is the development of the human being in all its capacities which he equates with wealth and the development of the forces of production (of which the individual is a part). Not only is this the overriding interest for Marx, he implies that it is the overriding motive force of people and, therefore, the movement of history is attributable to people's transcending the barriers to this development:

The basis (of the new mode of life) as the possibility of the universal development of the individual, and the real development of the individuals from this basis as a constant suspension of its barrier, which is recognized as a barrier, not taken for a sacred limit. (542)

Marx's notion of the third stage of history which is characterized by the universal development of the individual is an analytic possibility. It is the analytic result of negating the conditions that produce the disunity and restrictiveness of capital. This analytic notion is made possible by dissolving the disunity presupposed and produced by capital, the disunity of production as a

subject-object or property relation, the disunity of production formulated as a division of labor, a division between the purpose of realizing exchange value and the activity of production, in other words a division within labor (production), a separation of purpose and activity, the division of capital and labor. This disunity restricts the development of labor, limits production to accord with the property relations--the exchange relations of a market economy. The third stage is the analytic resolution of this conflict between the relations of production and the forces of production.

Marx's notion of the third stage is a form of life in which the possibility of the universally developed individual becomes the basis for production, the basis for the real development of the individual. The possibility of the universally developed individual is the product of the dissolution of all relations that restrict that development. All previous modes of production were based on property relations, relations to the objective conditions of self-realization, that restricted development. The final stage of history will be characterized by property relations that have been generalized, in other words a relation of subject to objective conditions including social relations as its own to be reappropriated and mastered, as barriers to be suspended, limits to be overcome,

a unity of purpose and activity presupposed to and posited in labor.

The difference between the new form of life and earlier ones may be conceptualized as the difference between prehistory and history (self-conscious history) or between history (changes in property relations) and the end of history, or between private property and social property, property recognized and treated as objective conditions to be used and transformed for the development of the social being.

The production of wealth, the universal or all-sided development of the individual, was not the basis of production in the precapitalist forms of life. Instead, the individual and the community were defined by specific property relations. Development and production was always production within these relations. Hence the individual was restricted.

When we look at social relations which create an undeveloped system of exchange, of exchange values and of money, or which correspond to an undeveloped degree of these, then it is clear from the outset that the individuals in such a society, although their relations appear to be more personal, enter into connection with one another only as individuals imprisoned within a certain definition, as feudal lord and vassal, landlord and serf, etc., or as members of a caste etc. or as members of an estate etc. (163)

The individuals are "imprisoned" within certain relations although their relations appear to be more personal. Marx seems to be opposing imprisonment with

personal relations, suggesting that if the relations were "really" personal instead of just appearing that way, imprisonment would not be possible. This raises the question of the relation between personal relations and freedom. What is the relation between personal ties and freedom (as the antithesis of imprisonment)? It seems that where there are personal ties of dependence as in feudal relations, individuals have less freedom than in the impersonal relations of exchange in a market economy. Weber, for example, makes reference to this difference in his mention of the preference expressed by serfs for becoming urban wage workers even when it was clear that remaining in the patriarchal relation of serfdom was economically more advantageous. Marx compares the two forms of life with respect to individual freedom.

In the money relation, in the developed system of exchange (and this semblance seduces the democrats) the ties of personal dependence, of distinction of blood, education, etc. are in fact explored, ripped up (at least, personal ties all appear as personal relations); and individuals seem independent (this is an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more correctly called indifference), free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange within this freedom; but they appear thus only for someone who abstracts from the conditions, the conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into contact (and these conditions, in turn are independent of the individuals, although created by society, appear as if they were natural conditions, not controllable by individuals). (164)

With both the personal ties of feudalism and the impersonal relations of the market, the individual is restricted. In the first case, the individual appears to be restricted by personal relations. In the second case, he is restricted by relations that are independent of him and "sufficient" unto themselves, not controllable by individuals. These relations are external to the individuals whose relations are those of indifference.

The definedness of individuals, which in the former case appears as a personal restriction of the individual by another, appears in the latter case as developed into an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves. (Since the single individual cannot strip away his personal definition, but may very well overcome and master external relations, his freedom seems to be greater in case 2 . . . (164)

In spite of the possibility that the single individual may overcome these external relations by amassing enough wealth to get on top of these relations, the individuals of a class cannot overcome them en masse.

(A closer examination of these external relations, these conditions, shows, however, that it is impossible for the individuals of a class etc. to overcome them en masse without destroying them. A particular individual may by chance get on top of these relations, but the mass of those under their rule cannot, since their mere existence expresses subordination, the necessary subordination of the mass of individuals.) (164)

These external relations of subordination are the elaboration of the general foundation of relations of personal dependence. The foundation is the property relation which consists of a division into property owners

and non-property owners. Although the external relations of the market appear to be the abolition of relations of dependence, they are rather these relations of dependence dissolved into a general form.

These external relations are very far from being an abolition of 'relations of dependence'; they are rather the dissolution of these relations into a general form; they are merely the elaboration and emergence of the general foundation of the relations of personal dependence. (164)

Marx had stated that although their relations appear to be more personal, the relations of individuals in precapitalist forms were "imprisoned" within certain definitions. However, even with the external relations of a market economy, the relations of individuals are still determined but in this case by abstractions.

Here also individuals come into connection with one another only in determined ways. These objective dependency relations also appear, in antithesis to those of personal dependence (the objective dependency relation is nothing more than social relations which have become independent individuals; i.e. the reciprocal relations of production separated from and autonomous of individuals) in such a way that individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another. (164)

I take it that the restrictions are those of the market, that the relations are determined by abstractions, such that individuals interact as roles without recognizing their histories. This brings us to the interesting question of the connection between personal relations and independence. Where individuals relate within market

conditions as the agents of exchange value, their relations are abstracted from themselves as persons with histories. As agents of exchange value, all personal distinctions are dissolved, yet dependency on externalities still exists. Hence the "independence" of individuals within the impersonal relations of the market is an illusion.

On the other hand, we have seen that the "personal" relations of the precapitalist societies are also not characterized by independence. However, Marx claims that the personal relations of feudal times were also an illusion:

(As regards the illusion of the 'purely personal relations' in feudal times, etc., it is of course not to be forgotten for a moment (1) that these relations, in a certain phase, also took on an objective character within their own sphere, as for example the development of landed proprietorship out of purely military relations of subordination; but (2) the objective relation on which they founder has still a limited, primitive character and therefore seems personal, while, in the modern world, personal relations flow purely out of relations of production and exchange.) (165)

Neither the precapitalist nor the capitalist worlds are characterized by personal relations. The personal relations have an "objective character" in both cases. I take it this means that the relations are external to and presupposed to individuals. In other words, personal relations would be those relations that are not determined externally to the individuals. This means that the relations within which individuals stand would be treated as a barrier to be overcome and not as a "sacred limit." Thus

the individuals would not relate within a specific externally determined relation such as landowner and serf nor within an abstract, externally determined relation such as buyer and seller. Instead people would relate to each other in terms of distinctions that would be recognized as products of a history, of conditions and relations within individuals stand.

The individuals would not be limited and known by the relation within which they stand, such as Roman citizenship, nor by wealth abstracted from the activities which produced that wealth. Rather individuals would be understood historically. In other words, individuals' acts and relations by which they are known would be understood in terms of origins, as presupposing relations and conditions within which they were developed and which individuals in turn transform or suspend in realizing their historically determined purposes, the struggle to realize a unity of subject and object.

The Individual within a Market Economy

Instead of independence and impersonality, Marx formulates the relations of individuals in a market economy as those of dependence and indifference. The individual is dependent on other individuals each of whom is indifferent to the other. The dependency that forms their social bond takes the form of money. The individual is dependent on

the production of exchange value and its realization in money.

The reciprocal and all-sided dependence of individuals who are indifferent to one another forms their social connection. This social bond is expressed in exchange value, by means of which alone each individual's own activity or his product becomes an activity and a product for him; he must produce a general product--exchange value, or the latter isolated for itself and individualized--money. (157)

Just as each is dependent on money, each individual has power in money. If the individual has money, he can satisfy his needs without having to do so through his own activity. With money, his dependence is not recognized as the product of a history in which individuals are mutually dependent, a history characterized by objective personal dependence, mutual dependence reproduced and realized in personal relations. Instead of objective personal dependence, the individual with money possesses power over others to whom he relates with indifference without recognizing their history as one of mutual dependence. Instead of mutual personal dependence, there is personal indifference made possible with the power of money which mediates social relations. Money is the individual's bond with society enabling him to count on others' productive activity.

On the other side, the power which each individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth exists in him as the owner of exchange values, of money. The individual carries his social power,

as well as his bond with society, on his pocket. (157)

With exchange value, the history of any product is extinguished along with the individuality and peculiarity of it. Thus the individual who produces exchange value has a different relation to others and to his own activity than does the individual who produces use values and in so doing reproduces himself within a specific relation to others:

Activity, regardless of its individual manifestation, and the product of activity, regardless of its particular make-up, are always exchange value, and exchange value is a generality, in which all individuality and peculiarity are negated and extinguished. This indeed is a condition very different from that in which the individual or the individual member of a family or clan (later, community) directly and naturally reproduces himself, or in which his productive activity and his share in production are bound to a specific form of labour and of product, which determine his relation to others in just that specific way. (157)

The relation of the individual to his activity as the production of exchange value is one of alienation. The individual does not realize himself as a subject, as a particular purpose, in his activity. He does not engage in the activity in order to realize a purpose that is his own, but a purpose that is determined independently of him. His purpose for engaging in the activity, the realizing of exchange value, is external to the particular activity. Similarly, the relation of the individual to others is one of alienation in that the exchange of activities and

products becomes not a recognition of mutual personal dependence, an exchange of purposes and abilities realized in products, but an exchange of exchange values, abstractions.

The social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the share of individuals in production here appear as something alien and objective, confronting the individuals, not as their relation to one another, but as their subordination to relations which subsist independently of them and which arise out of collisions between mutually indifferent individuals. The general exchange of activities and products, which has become a vital condition for each individual--their mutual interconnection--here appears as something alien to them, autonomous, as a thing. In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things; personal capacity into objective wealth. (157)

Marx's analysis of the individual, the relations of a market economy, and even of precapitalist forms of life, is in terms of alienation. This is not to say that alienation is simply one concern among others. Some theorists have claimed that the concern with alienation characterized Marx's earlier "philosophical" work and that his later "scientific" analysis of capital eschews it. The issue is not a concrete one of whether Marx did or did not retain a concern for alienation. Pointing to passages in the Grundrisse to support the contention is not the point of my analysis. Rather, my aim is to show how alienation is internal to Marx's method of analyzing forms of life, particularly capital.

By formulating a form of life as a mode of production, a subject-object unity, the disunity (alienation) of capital and of exchange value becomes the problematic. The form of life where the production of wealth is identical with and realized directly as the development of the forces of production (including the individual) contrasts with alienated forms of life in which the individuals relate to their social relations and products, their conditions of existence, as objective relations alienated from themselves.

From the perspective of the unity that is known as the antithesis to the disunity or alienation of capital, Marx can formulate the possibility of the universally developed individual and the universal development of wealth.

The degree and the universality of the development of wealth where this individuality becomes possible supposes production on the basis of exchange values as a prior condition, whose universality produces not only the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also the universality and the comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities. (162)

The universal development that characterizes modern society is alienated from the single individual and appears as independent social powers and relations opposite the individual. Although the individual as producer has developed all kinds of machinery and social relations, these developments are not subject to the control or mastery of the individual as producer. Rather, these products,

as impersonal social forces, oppose the individual producers who develop only one-sidedly as personifications of exchange value--wage labor or capitalist--and not universally as master of their social production.

Compared to the universal development of the individual that is made possible (but not realized) by exchange value and the production of exchange value, and even compared to the limited development of the individual in pre-capitalist forms, the development of the single individual as producer of exchange value appears as a "complete emptiness."

In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be developed more fully, because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their fullness, or erected them as independent social powers and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this romantic viewpoint, and therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate antithesis up to its blessed end. (162)

Marx contrasts the alienation of labor with the unity of labor in terms of the character of work for each.

The Unity of Labor Realized in Work as Mastery

A mode of existence in which individual production is directly social and general production, in which the development of the individual is therefore also directly the development of the society and known as such, in which

the production of wealth is the production of universally developed individuals is a self-conscious form of life. As such it is the opposite of an alienated form of life in which individual production is separated from social wealth such that labor does not realize itself as subject in its products.

The mode of existence in which the universal development of the individual and the continual development of the forces of production (wealth) are presupposed and posited as aim by the society may be summed up by the phrase, self-conscious mastery. This mastery includes human knowledge of the processes of nature. In this form of life, wealth means scientific knowledge which includes understanding one's own history as a process. A self-conscious form of life would therefore include the development of science as an essential element in the development of the forces of production.

Hence also the grasping of his own history as a process, and the recognition of nature (equally present as practical power over nature) as his real body. The process of development itself posited and known as the presupposition of the same. (542)

A self-conscious form of life which for Marx is a scientific form of life would be one that recognizes the process of development and posits it as presupposition of this development, hence a form of life in unity with its own process of development.

Marx contrasts his notion of work as self-conscious mastery over the conditions of life with Adam Smith's conception of work as a sacrifice, a sacrifice of the tranquility of not working. Adam Smith's formulation of work corresponds with work under capital or as Marx cogently puts it, "Adam Smith, by the way, has only the slaves of capital in mind." The conception of labor as self sacrifice is made possible by a form of life in which labor does not posit the conditions of work, in which "labor has not yet created the subjective and objective conditions for itself in which labor becomes attractive work, the individual's self-realization."

In precapitalist forms of production, the objective conditions of labor--land and agriculture--are products of the community as an external being not the products of labor itself. Hence labor is self-sacrifice; in order to exist as labor, as having a right to its objective conditions, labor must surrender itself to the external being and aims of the community.

In the capitalist form of production, although the objective conditions of labor are produced by labor, the subjective conditions of labor, the purpose of labor, is not posited by labor itself but by capital and the market as an external condition. Hence labor again is self-sacrifice, surrendering of the self to an external being.

Thus it is not that Adam Smith's conception of work as sacrifice is not true; it is true within historically specific modes of production. Marx, however, describes the conditions in which a different conception of work would be possible. Adam Smith's conception is true within a form of life but false as a general assertion about work. Adam Smith treats work as an abstract universal failing to treat it as grounded in a historically specific form of life, a concrete universal.

But Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles (work) is in itself a liberating activity--and that, further, the external aims become stripped of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits--hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour. (611)

Thus real freedom in action, self-realization, is the positing of aims by the self (rather than merely trying to satisfy natural urgencies), whose action is labor. Self-realization as the positing and producing of an object as the object or aim of the active subject is the unity of labor. Marx specifies two conditions for the unity of labor as self-realization:

Really free working, e.g. composing, is at the same time precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion. The work of material production can achieve this character only (1) when its social character is posited, (2) when it is of a scientific and at the same time general character, not merely human exertion as a specifically harnessed natural force, but exertion as subject, which appears in the production process

not in a merely natural, spontaneous form, but as an activity regulating all the forces of nature.
(612)

These two conditions deserve some explication. First, the condition of positing the work as social. I take this to mean that one conceives of the work as social in the sense that the individual recognizes that his characteristics, intentions and actions are possibilities given with a form of life, that his individuality presupposes the history of that form of life. Thus the unity of individual and society is the unity of subject, of purpose. Furthermore, the individual assumes that that history, that form of life, is a process of continual change.

In addition to the individual's intentions and actions, the individual's products and the objective conditions for his activity would be social products. This means that they would presuppose and reproduce the changing conditions and purposes of the society and the individual living within it. Hence the individual as purpose and as product would be recognized as immediately social the purpose and product of social life.

A type of production whose character was posited as social would be identical with a unity of labor, a unity presupposed and posited as aim to be reached. In other words, if certain relations and conditions of labor are developed to realize certain purposes of labor, it would be expected that with new purposes and conditions,

the old conditions would be treated as changeable in order to realize the new purposes. However, change would be accomplished with the recognition that the previous relations and conditions were themselves answers to certain problems, which therefore are not treated indifferently as things that can be changed by force, but as products or histories themselves presupposing purposes and needs. Hence labor would realize itself self-consciously as a history.

Second, the condition of being scientific and at the same time general should be explicated. I take it Marx means mastery of the forces of nature rather than mere exertion of natural force in accomplishing a particular aim. For example, in attempting to get water, rather than simply exerting oneself by traveling to a spring for water, which is a particular aim, one could try to figure out a way of getting the water by regulating or subjecting the forces of nature to one's aim. This would be a more general aim (e.g., developing a system of aqueducts). It would entail the development of scientific knowledge which by its nature is general and which presupposes history--the previous labor of society. Marx identifies science with a condition "where labour in which a human being does what a thing could do has ceased." (325)

Thus in his discussion of how the development of wealth has resulted in the dissolution of previous modes of existence, Marx can include science as a form of wealth--i.e., science as the development of the individual's potential which is also a development of the human forces of production:

The development of science alone--i.e. the most solid form of wealth, both its product and its producer--was sufficient to dissolve these communities. But the development of science, this ideal and at the same time practical wealth, is only one aspect, one form in which the development of the human productive forces, i.e. of wealth, appears. (540)

In this chapter I have shown how the objective individual is produced by the analysis of forms of life. The analysis itself proceeds from the standpoint of a unity that is a solution to the problem of the disunity of capital. I have traced the objective individual within the specific relations of a restricted landed property economy whose production is characterized by the subject-object unity of agriculture. I then sketched the objective individual within the abstract relations of an unrestricted market economy whose production is characterized by the division of capital and labor. Finally, I described the possibility of the individual within the personal and general relations of an unrestricted economy whose production is achieved by the unity of labor. Labor would take the form of scientific mastery of the processes of nature

including its own process--labor as a self-conscious history whose process is understood as presupposition and as product.

I will now show how Marx analyzes the labor process within a market economy, the history of capital as a totality of internal relations.

CHAPTER 4

TREATING A FORM OF LIFE AS A TOTALITY OF INTERNAL RELATIONS

Internal Relations as Unity of Labor and Its
Objective Conditions

In this chapter, I reformulate Marx's analysis of money and capital as a history. As indicated, the notion of history with which I am working is not the tracing of sequence that leads to the formation of capital as a history of external relations--cause and effect. Rather, it is analysis of the relations and conditions that are presupposed and produced by capital--its internal relations. Capital is a totality of its internal relations.

While in the completed bourgeois system every economic relation presupposes every other in its bourgeois economic form, and everything posited is thus also a presupposition, this is the case with every organic system. This organic system itself, as a totality, has its presuppositions, and its development to its totality consists precisely in subordinating all elements of society to itself. . . . (278)

The totality refers to a relation of subject to its object, the conditions by which a subject realizes itself as such. A totality is a self-moving process of production and therefore of development--hence a subjectivity, a form of life.

I will show how the history of capital as a concrete form of life is formulated in terms of the separation of labor from its objective conditions and how its prehistory is formulated in terms of unity. I will further show how both of these formulations are ways of making reference to the possibility of an analytic form of life that is different from both.

Analytic Socialism--The Form of Life that Grounds
Marx's Theorizing

A form of life is a relation to self to its other, a subject to its object. Relations are known in consciousness with concepts. A form of life is the consciousness of otherness. It is the recognition that the individual is not first, that he presupposes that which is other to him, that which is opposite him and which completes him, that without which he would not be as such. Thus the individual as mother presupposes the child, the teacher presupposes the student, etc. Similarly, the producer presupposes the conditions of his producing. In precapitalist forms, this otherness is conceived in terms of an external being--a higher unity, a city-state, a communal organization for defense.

In the various precapitalist forms of landed property, the relation of subject and object is a unity that is mediated by membership in community. Thus the

individual is conscious of himself in terms of community as his other; in other words, the individual as producer is conceived as member. The act of production presumes the property relation as secure because it is secured by the community in which the producer is member. The producer sees the community as other, an otherness represented by the sacred. The sacred is a necessary condition of the individual as producer. The relation of the producer to the community is one of unity; the producer does not stand alone outside of community. It is only as member that he is possible as producer.

It might seem that the relation of member in pre-capitalist forms is not a relation and consciousness of otherness. It might seem that membership is an identity, the identity of producer with community such that one is immediately the other. However, an analysis of the concept of membership shows that this is not the case. The unity of producer and community is a mediated unity. If producer and community were an immediate identity, the concept of member would be inconceivable. There would only be individuals who recognized themselves as and related to each other as producers. Community would be given with this recognition and relation.

I read Marx's theorizing about capital and pre-capitalist forms as making reference to his own possibility, to his own analytic commitments which I take to be the form

of life of socialism. By this, I do not mean a concrete set of objective conditions such as government control of production, nor a concrete goal such as available and adequate housing, food, education or medical care for all. Rather, I mean by socialism an analytic relation to objective conditions, the treatment of objects as presupposing a subject. Such a relation is an immediate unity of subject and object, a form of life in which the individual's relation to himself, his relation to the objective conditions of his existence, is not mediated by an external other. Instead, the otherness which provides the possibility for the individual as such, for the individual as a type, and for the individual's consciousness of himself as such, is not external to the individual. In other words, analytic socialism is a form of life in which the individual recognizes himself as product, as a product of his history, of the relations and conditions that produce him as such and which he in turn produces. A form of life in which the individual knows himself as a subject in terms of his object, knows himself as both subject and object, as self and other--a social individual.

This form of life presupposes the unity of labor with its objective conditions, the relation of labor to itself as object unmediated by anything but the social individual. According to my reading, analytic socialism is the ground of Marx's theorizing, the ground from which

he criticizes the political economy of his day.

From the possibility of the self-conscious social individual, from the form of life of socialism, Marx describes capital and its prehistory. From the unity of subject and object that I call socialism, analysis understands the relations of capital in terms of separation. Separation presupposes a unity that has been sundered. If capital is formulated as separation, its prehistory is formulated as unity. Analysis understands the past in terms of the relations and conditions that are suspended and transformed in the relations and conditions of capital. Thus from the analysis of capital as separation of labor from its objective conditions, the past is seen as the prehistory of capital, a unity of labor with its objective conditions.

Similarly, analysis understands the present in terms of the suspension and transformation of its conditions in socialism.

Just as on one side the pre-bourgeois phases appear as merely historical, i.e., suspended presuppositions, so do the contemporary conditions of production likewise appear as engaged in suspending themselves and hence in positing the historic presuppositions for a new state of society. (461)

Marx uses historical here to refer to the conditions for the arising or formation of a form of life. Hence the pre-bourgeois phases are "merely historical," presuppositions that are suspended with but only known

as such in terms of the conditions of capital which in turn are shown as such from the perspective of their suspension in the form of life of socialism.

I see Marx making reference to precapitalist forms for two analytic reasons. One is to show the relations of capital as a historical, as opposed to natural, separation by showing its prehistory as a unity. The second reason for the reference is to show the consciousness of precapitalist forms in terms of membership. Membership in a community is the self-consciousness of precapitalist forms; it is the consciousness of the individual's relation to his community as other, as that which makes the individual possible. This contrasts with the consciousness of capital which does not even recognize otherness, only difference. It sees the individual as original, as pursuing his own private interests. Both of these contrast with the self-consciousness of socialism in which otherness is internal to the subject.

The main point here is this: In all these forms--in which landed property and agriculture form the basis of the economic order . . . there is to be found: (1) Appropriation not through labour, but presupposed to labour. . . . The individual relates simply to the objective conditions of labour as being his, [relates] to them as the inorganic nature of his subjectivity, in which the latter realizes itself . . . (2) but this relation to land and soil . . . is instantly mediated by . . . his naturally arisen presence as member of a commune. (485)

In reading Marx's description of precapitalist forms as a way of contrasting the self-consciousness of socialism with the self-consciousness of precapitalist forms the point is to show the restrictiveness of the earlier unity against the freedom of the unity of socialism. The restrictiveness of the "early" forms is known retrospectively in terms of their conditions of existence which must be suspended in the development of "later" forms. Early and late are not empirical categories of time. They refer to the development of socialism as an analytic possibility. By analytic possibility I do not mean some ideal state of affairs which one imagines and then hopes to see realized. (Marx's notion of utopian socialism.) Rather, I mean a possibility that is known in terms of the suspension of certain conditions of capital--the separation of labor from its objective conditions.

Given this reading, questions about the empirical validity or accuracy of Marx's descriptions are not relevant. If one were to do an empirical reading (as opposed to a phenomenological or analytic one) such questions would of course be relevant. An empirical reading might ask how there came to be different forms of landed property. In terms of my reading, this question would not arise. It presumes that difference

is given and can be explained by some external principle such as economic conditions or natural temperament like aggressiveness.

Instead of formulating difference analytically as answering to a problem of analysis, such as "early" forms being used to show the historic character of "later" forms, it begins with difference as an already given problem. Instead of showing how difference is a product of analysis, instead of asking how difference can be seen as a problem to be addressed, how difference comes to be as such, an empirical theorist asks how a particular difference comes to be. One might read Marx as doing this, as asking empirically how precapitalist forms come to be. If this is the reading one does, what is to be made of the following account?

. . . these different forms . . . depend partly on the natural inclinations of the tribe, and partly on the economic conditions in which it relates as proprietor to the land and soil in reality, i.e., in which it appropriates its fruits through labour, and the latter will itself depend on climate, physical make-up of the land and soil, the physically determined mode of its exploitation, the relation with hostile tribes or neighbor tribes, and the modifications which migrations, historic experiences, etc. introduce. (486)

One could, of course, do such a history of a particular society. However, I would distinguish that from an analytic history. The above passage reveals Marx's awareness of the complexity of empirical

history. But that is about all one can make of his explanation of difference empirically. That is not very satisfying if one reads Marx to gain a description of that complexity or to gain an empirical understanding of the differences among the various forms.

Changes in Internal Relations

Although Marx does not provide an empirical history, he does make what appear to be empirical descriptions of precapitalist forms. Further, I see him addressing the question of social change and history. However, rather than an empirical history, I reformulate his description of social change in terms of the restrictiveness of "early" forms and their suspension in "later" forms. The problem is the transition from early to late. If a form of life is a relation to objective conditions that is not reducible to the purposes and acts of individuals prior to or outside of some society, then how does this relation change? If the relations within which individuals stand are given with the individuals, then how do these relations change?

For Marx, although the property relation which presumes membership in a community is a presupposition of production, production is the way that the property relation

and the community is reproduced. However, production changes the objective conditions the relation to which constitutes the practical life of the community. Thus changes in the conditions of production are also changes in the practical life of the community. (I distinguish practical from purely mental activity which does not affect material conditions including social relations.) Since the reproduction of the community's form of life is the reproduction of the relation to objective conditions, changes in the objective conditions that result in the destruction of those conditions bring with them the destruction of the community and the property relations on which it was based.

This is not to say that aspects of the community do not remain such as religion or music or food preferences and taboos. However, these do not constitute a vital part of the community. Thus the vitality of the community can be said to decline and the community to decay. Either that, or the other aspects of the community may be absorbed in a new form of life, a new relation to objective conditions, in which case one could say that the community's form of life has changed, although certain features have remained. The important point is that re-production changes the relation to objective conditions, the property relation, and destroys the community that is known in terms of that relation:

The survival of the commune as such in the old mode requires the reproduction of its members in the presupposed objective conditions. Production itself, the advance of population (this too belongs with production) necessarily suspends these conditions little by little; destroys them instead of reproducing them etc., and with that, the communal system declines and falls, together with the property relations on which it was based. (486)

Marx is not saying that the advance of population in itself necessarily suspends these conditions. It is only because the size of the population is a condition of production based on landed property that its advance suspends the conditions of production. The form of life which presupposes a certain size population as a condition of production declines.

If the conditions for reproduction, a particular form of life, include a certain amount of land for each producer, then an increase in the population of producers will change the internal conditions of that form of life. The impoverishment which might result would contribute to suspending the old conditions of production perhaps through the development of warfare and conquest.

If the individual changes his relation to the commune, he thereby changes and acts destructively upon the commune; as on its economic presupposition; on the other side, the alteration of this economic presupposition brought about by its own dialectic--impoverishment etc. In particular, the influence of warfare and of conquest, which e.g. in Rome belonged to the essential conditions of the commune itself, suspends the real bond on which it rests. (487)

The "real bond" on which a historical community rests, as distinct from an ideal bond which would be consciousness of a relation, is its production. Production is the activity that presupposes and reproduces community as a particular relation of the individual to the conditions of his existence including his co-workers. The reproduction of these relations is the foundation of social and economic development, the development of production.

In all these forms, the reproduction of presupposed relations--more or less naturally arisen or historic as well, but become traditional--of the individual to his commune, together with a specific, objective existence, predetermined for the individual, of his relations both to the conditions of labour and to his co-workers, fellow tribesmen, etc.,--are the foundation of development, which is therefore from the outset restricted, but which signifies decay, decline and fall once this barrier is suspended. (487)

In other words, reproduction of the objective existence of its members provides for its development. However that development is restricted by the conditions of that existence. Once this relation as barrier to further development is suspended, the community declines and falls because it fails to reproduce itself as the community that knows itself in terms of those conditions. Thus production is both the realization and reproduction of the conditions of a form of life and also the changes in those conditions and the destruction of that form of life:

It is thereby also clear that these conditions change. Only when tribes hunt upon it does a region of the earth become a hunting domain; only cultivation of the

soil posits the land as the individual's extended body. After the city of Rome had been built and the surrounding countryside cultivated by its citizens, the conditions of the community were different from what they had been before. (493)

The aim of communities is survival, according to Marx, but not survival in general. The aim is not to provide for the needs of individuals where those needs are conceived in an abstract, general form so that they are universally attributable to all societies. Rather, survival is the reproduction of particular relations among members that constitute a particular society.

The aim of all these communities is survival, i.e. reproduction of the individuals who compose it as proprietors, i.e. in the same objective mode of existence as forms the relations among the members and at the same time therefore the commune itself. This reproduction, however, is at the same time necessarily new production and destruction of the old form. (493)

In other words, the very attempt to preserve the mode of existence based on a particular form of property relations, through the activities of production, introduces new conditions and forces that ultimately change the original conditions and the property relations that correspond to them:

For example, where each of the individuals is supposed to possess a given number of acres of land, the advance of population is already under way. If this is to be corrected, then colonization, and that in turn requires wars of conquest. With that slavery etc. . . . Thus the preservation of the old community includes the destruction of the conditions on which it rests, turns into its opposite. (494)

In addition to the changes in the objective aspects of existence, the subjective mode of existence changes too. That is, the producers themselves change as they actively go about reproducing themselves and their property relations:

Not only do the objective conditions change in the act of reproduction, e.g. the village becomes a town, the wilderness a cleared field, etc., but the producers change too, in that they bring out new qualities in themselves, develop themselves in production, transform themselves, develop new powers and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs and new language. (494)

Marx emphasizes the restrictiveness of precapitalist forms and attributes it to the specificity of the relation to objective conditions. This means that the form of life specifies the reproduction of these objective conditions and the relation to them. According to Marx, the restrictiveness and specificity of these forms of life correspond to a relatively limited development of production which is necessarily limited.

All forms (more or less naturally arisen, spontaneous, all at the same time however results of a historic process) in which the community presupposes its subjects in a specific objective unity with their conditions of production, or in which a specific subjective mode of being presupposes the communities themselves as conditions of production, necessarily correspond to a development of the forces of production which is only limited, and indeed limited in principle. (496)

The above quotation should be read with the emphasis on the word specific: the community presupposes a specific objective unity between the subjects and their

conditions of production or a specific mode of being presupposes the community as an external being, as a condition of production. The specificity of the conditions of existence, however, are only specific against the changes which suspend those conditions. In other words, the conditions of landed property are only possible as conditions when other conditions are possible. They are only known as specific and restrictive retrospectively. It is only from the perspective of later developments that they are specific and restrictive.

The specificity of these conditions is only known as such in terms of the generality of the conditions for the reproduction of capital's form of life--labor in general. It is against the generality of labor, "labor in general," that the specificity of labor in precapitalist forms is known as such. The community that knows itself in terms of a specific relation to objective conditions cannot know itself in terms of labor because the community there is not a product of labor. It is a community that is presupposed to labor but not produced by labor. Therefore, it can only know itself in terms of the specific relation to objective conditions in which it reproduces itself. Thus it is not a mistake or morally inferior choice on the part of these communities to specify a certain relation to objective conditions. Rather, the community can only know itself in that specific relation.

It is only with capital that the community ceases to know itself in terms of a specific relation to objective conditions which must be reproduced as such. With capital, the community knows itself in the exchange of products as the objectification of labor in general. Hence money becomes the community. It is with the generality of labor that the freedom of socialism is possible as opposed to the restrictiveness of precapitalist and capitalist forms. Precapitalist forms restrict development to a specific objective mode of existence. The capitalist form restricts development to pure subjectivity which is only realized in the production of exchange values.

In bourgeois society, the worker e.g. stands there purely without objectivity, subjectively; but the thing which stands opposite him has now become the true community. . . . (496)

By positing labor as general immediately without having to be realized in exchange value, the restrictiveness of capital is suspended and the freedom of socialism made possible.

Social Change and the Relation to Objective Conditions

From the perspective of their suspension in the relations of capital which in turn provides the possibility of socialism, Marx formulates precapitalist forms as specific relations to objective conditions. Thus social change is seen in terms of a relation to objective

conditions. This is different from an explanation in terms of changes in a subject--new purposes or needs--or changes in objective conditions. Conditions are only known as such in terms of that for which they are the conditions. An object is only known as such in terms of a subject for which it is an object.

Other readings of Marx interpret him as attributing social change to changes in economic conditions, changes in the forces of production. I will review Marx's discussion of the persistence of the Asiatic form of precapitalist landed property in order to illuminate the difference between attributing social change to changes in the relation to objective conditions which presumes a particular subject that knows itself in terms of its relation to objective conditions, and attributing social change to changes in the objective conditions alone.

Marx states:

The Asiatic form necessarily hangs on most tenaciously and for the longest time. This is due to its presupposition that the individual does not become independent vis-a-vis the commune; that there is a self-sustaining circle of production, unity of agriculture and manufactures, etc. (486)

The two conditions that he mentions are the presupposition about the relation of the individual to the commune and the unity of agriculture and manufacture. He begins with presuppositions which implies a subject that has presuppositions. Marx compares the Asiatic form with the

struggle of the clan system to reproduce itself. Ordinarily the clan system results in warfare.

. . . The only barrier which the community can encounter in relating to the natural conditions of production--the earth--as to its own property (if we jump ahead to the settled peoples) is another community, which already claims it as its own inorganic body. Warfare is therefore one of the earliest occupations of each of these naturally arisen communities, both for the defense of their property and for obtaining new property. (491)

With warfare as a necessary condition for defending or obtaining new property, the development of slavery and serfdom becomes possible. They "are only further developments of the form of property resting on the clan system." Slavery and serfdom in turn "corrupt and modify" the original form of the communities--the relation to objective conditions. However, this is least likely in the Asiatic form.

Slavery and serfdom are thus only further developments of the form of property resting on the clan system. They modify all of the latter's forms. They can do this least of all in the Asiatic form. In the self-sustaining unity of manufacture and agriculture, on which this form rests, conquest is not so necessary a condition as where landed property, agriculture are exclusively predominant. (493)

I take it that conquest is not so necessary in the unity of manufacture and agriculture because new population can be absorbed whereas where landed property and agriculture predominate new land is necessary. Marx is stating that slavery, which alters the relation to objective conditions, does not do so in the Asiatic form. He attributes this to the unity of agriculture and manufacture, but also

to the specific relation to objective conditions that is presupposed, the subjective conditions for its existence. The subjective condition is the consciousness of itself in terms of a higher unity that is divine. The mediation of the relation to objective conditions by membership in a community which in turn mediates between the higher unity and the individual precludes the development that could occur in antiquity. In the latter,

the conditions already arise in which the individual can lose his property, i.e. the double relation which makes him both an equal citizen, a member of the community, and a proprietor. (494)

Private property in this form entails both having and holding for having does not necessarily mean holding. In the oriental form, it is the other way around, holding does not presuppose having.

In the oriental form this loss is hardly possible, except by means of altogether external influences; since the individual member of the commune never enters into the relation of freedom towards it in which he could lose his (objective, economic) bond with it. He is rooted to the spot, ingrown. This also has to do with the combination of manufacture and agriculture, of town (village) and countryside. (494)

With the unity of town and country in the oriental system, the individual can never become free of the relation to the commune--he is possessed by the community. That which he holds he does not have (as his own). Hence there is little possibility of new development, which I assume to be mercantile capital, as there is where manufacture and towns are separate from agriculture and the country.

In classical antiquity, manufacture appears already as a corruption (business for freedmen, clients, aliens) etc. This development of productive labour . . . which necessarily develops through intercourse with aliens and slaves, through the desire to exchange the surplus product etc., dissolves the mode of production on which the community rests, and, with it, the objective individual, i.e. the individual defined as Roman, Greek, etc. Exchange acts in the same way; indebtedness etc. (495)

The implication is that the Asiatic form, in which the individuals are not independent proprietors, but "at bottom . . . the property, the slave of him in whom the unity of the community exists," precludes the development that occurs on the basis of the individual proprietor form.

Marx's discussion of the tenacity of the Asian system does not indicate an identification of forms of life with economic conditions nor social change with economic developments per se. Rather, it shows a treatment of a form of life as a relation to objective conditions, a totality of internal relations. Rather than concern with the empirical accuracy of the analysis, I want to show that Marx treats the change from one form to another in terms of internal relations which presuppose a particular subject as well as its objective conditions.

The Historic Character of the Separation of Labor from Its Objective Conditions

Marx formulates precapitalist forms in order to bring out the historic character of the property relation

of capital. The exchange of labor for labor (objectified labor as exchange value for living labor capacity) is an historic relation not a "natural" one. It presupposes the separation of labor from its objective conditions. "The notion that production and hence society depended in all states of production on the exchange of mere labour for labour is a delusion." (515) In precapitalist forms, the reproduction of society as the reproduction of the worker "is by no means posited through mere labour, for his property relation is not the result but the presupposition of his labour."

While this might seem obvious for the case of landed property, Marx claims that it is also the situation of the guild system. Property there, too, rests on "an objective connection between the worker and a community and conditions which are there before him, which he takes as his basis." Of these objective conditions, Marx states:

These too are products of labour--of the labour of world history; of the labour of the community--of its historic development, which does not proceed from the labour of individuals nor from the exchange of their labours. Therefore mere labour is also not the presupposition of realization. (515)

Production and appropriation, the realization of the worker and the community, do not originate with the individual and his work, but the individual and his work presuppose objective relations and conditions. Even the objective conditions are products of labor. This may seem

to contradict his earlier statement that "the original conditions of production cannot themselves originally be products, results of production." These seemingly contradictory statements are reconcilable.

Production can refer to individuals' labor in which case the original conditions are presupposed to labor. They are not the products of the individual's work. On the other hand, production can refer to the community's activities in which case the conditions of production are such only in so far as the community so treats them (produces them as such). For example, land for agriculture only becomes a condition of production when the community treats it as such, when the community has produced agriculture.

We have seen that Marx treats the community as a natural condition which is not to be attributed to or reduced to the actions of individuals in some state of nature outside of community. Rather a community is always the relations within which individuals stand. Therefore, in one case he can state that the conditions of production cannot be the result of production. He means they cannot be the result of individual labor. In the other case, he can state that the conditions of production are products--products of the community, the historic development of the community. The realization of individuals in production presupposes property relations that are historic products

of a community. The realization of individuals in production is not simply the result of the individual's labor.

With capital, however, labor appears independent of community or as itself producing community. This is because labor does not realize itself in its property which presupposes community. Rather, labor is separated from its property, therefore separated from community. The relations within the form of life of capital appear as external relations. This appearance however is the product of history, of the dissolution of all forms in which labor is one with its objective conditions.

Dissolution of the relation to the earth . . . to which he relates as to his own inorganic being. . . .
Dissolution of the relations in which he appears as proprietor of the instrument. (497)

Just as the former relation of the subject to the earth as its own, its organic being, presupposes a community, the latter relation as proprietor of the instrument presupposes the community of the guild-corporation system. According to Marx, these indicate, "Labour still as his own; definite self-sufficient development of one-sided abilities, etc." Labor is self-sufficient but its self-sufficiency is based on a one-sided development. This means that its development is limited by the same relations that provide for its self-sufficiency. The property relations restrict the development of labor.

In addition, the relations of capital presuppose the dissolution of the relation in which the slave or serf is the basis of production which in turn is a development of the landed property form:

Dissolution . . . of the relations in which the workers themselves, the living labour capacities themselves, still belong directly among the objective conditions of production, and are appropriated as such--i.e. are slaves or serfs. (498)

Separation of Subject from Object Personified in Class
Relations

The unity of labor with its objective conditions is part of the formulation of precapitalist form. This internal relation is seen as a precapitalist form in contrast with the separation of labor from its objective conditions in capital. This separation means that the purpose of labor (the realization of exchange value--capital) is not identical with the activity of labor (the production of commodities). The separation of purpose from activity results in a common-place experience of activity without intrinsic meaning. This experience sometimes has moral value attached. When it does, it is attributed to the character of a subjective individual, an individual whose activity is seen to be original with him as his own private interest, "He's only in it for the money." On the other hand, it is sometimes attributed to objective conditions

that are likewise devoid of history, "You can't live on love."

However, the separation of purpose and activity is a historical relation. It is neither a subjective condition nor an objective condition alone. It is made possible by the historical separation of labor from its objective conditions. This separation presupposes and produces social classes.

The independent, for-itself existence [Fürsichsein] of value vis-à-vis living labour capacity--hence its existence as capital--the objective, self-sufficient indifference, the alien quality [Fremdheit] of the objective conditions of labour vis-à-vis living labour capacity, . . . goes so far that these conditions confront the person of the worker in the person of the capitalist--as personification with its own will and interest. . . . (452)

Wage labor in not appropriating its objective conditions as its own fails to realize itself as mastery. Labor only treats as its own what Marx calls its subjective conditions, that which is needed to reproduce the worker as labor-power, the means of subsistence, objects of consumption.

Labour capacity has appropriated for itself only the subjective conditions of necessary labour--the means of subsistence for actively producing labour capacity; i.e. for its reproduction as mere labour capacity separated from the conditions of its realization. (452)

The question arises as to why labor cannot be formulated as mastery in terms of its relation to the subjective conditions of labor, the objects of consumption with which the

individual may produce himself as a particular type. Although Marx talks of the subjective conditions of necessary labor as means of subsistence with which the worker reproduces himself as labor power, why cannot the relation to the subjective conditions be formulated as a relation to the means of sustenance and means of self-realization, a relation of mastery in which the individual produces himself with the objects he consumes?

Marx suggests the answer when he states that objects of consumption are themselves produced. These objects then make possible the consumer as a particular type. Thus the consumer is made possible by production. The worker who is consumer is not produced by his own purposes and activity. He is not master of his condition because the object of consumption is produced by the labor of the worker and the purpose of capital. In consuming, the worker does not reproduce himself as subject, as master of his conditions of existence. Instead of reproducing himself as master, he only reproduces capital and himself as living capital.

With capital, instead of mastery of the objective conditions as the condition for the realization of the worker, the worker becomes the condition for the realization of the objective conditions and of products as values for themselves independent of the laborer. Because of the

separation, analysis is made possible. Analysis remembers the unity from which the separation is wrested. This does not mean that analysis merely knows the early, "natural" unity that is analytically prior to the separation. Rather, it knows the possibility of unity that is made possible with the analytic suspension of the separation, the possibility of a new unity based on the conditions produced with that separation.

The separation of labor from property, of subject from object, is at the same time the reversal of the relation of labor as mastery. Labor, instead of master and subject, becomes the slave and object of that which is objective. The objective conditions confront labor as subject, as master.

Instead of their being realized [the objective conditions of labor] in the production process as the conditions of its realization [the realization of labor], what happens is quite the opposite: it [labor] comes out of the process as mere condition for their realization and preservation as values for themselves opposite living labour capacity. (462)

This reversal of the subject-object relation is the consequence of the separation of the subject from its unity with its objective conditions. In earlier forms, this unity was realized as mastery, mastery as a "natural unity of labour with its material [sachlich] presuppositions." (471) The separation of worker from the soil as his "natural workshop" is a product of history; it is not

"natural." Marx sketches the relations of mastery that characterize the precapitalist forms and in so doing, creates a picture that contrasts strongly with that of the relations of capital:

The worker thus has an objective existence independent of labour. The individual relates to himself as proprietor as master of the conditions of his reality. He relates to the others in the same way . . . the individuals related not as workers but as proprietors--and members of a community, who at the same time work. . . . The positing of the individual as a worker, in this nakedness, is itself a product of history. (471)

The metaphor of nakedness with which he portrays the worker is a metaphor for the separation of labor from its objective conditions. This nakedness is poverty; it is the exclusion of wealth in its objective form, the objective conditions of labor. Wealth in its subjective form, we have seen, is the individual.

labor [is] separated from all means and objects of labour; from its entire objectivity. This living labour, existing as an abstraction from these moments of its actual reality; this complete denudation, purely subjective existence of labour, stripped of all objectivity. Labour as absolute poverty: poverty not as shortage, but as total exclusion of objective wealth. (295)

The division of labor into capital and wage labor that comes with the separation of labor from its objective conditions not only produces relations of mastery and subjection but class relations of wealth and poverty.

Division of Labor and Class Relations of Wealth
and Poverty

As the exclusion of objectified labor in the form of value, labor is not-value or only use value. However, as use value, it is purely objective; it is not a subject-object unity. Rather its subject or purpose is not its own; it is an alien, imposed purpose. Thus, labor is use value whose use is not its own.

. . . as the existing not-value, and hence purely objective use value, existing without mediation, this objectivity can only be an objectivity not separated from the person: only an objectivity coinciding with his immediate bodily existence. Since the objectivity is purely immediate, it is just as much direct not-objectivity. In other words, not an objectivity which falls outside the immediate presence [Dasein] of the individual himself. (296)

Labor does not mediate between itself and its activity by positing purpose to be realized in the activity itself. In not positing purpose, it is purely objective. This objectivity coincides with the individual's bodily existence. At the same time that labor is an object, a use value for another, it is the subjective existence of the worker, the "purely subjective existence of labour, stripped of all objectivity." It is activity that is not itself value, value for itself, because it does not relate to the value it produces as its own. Instead of value, it is the "living source of value." I take it that is what Marx means in the rather tortuous passage above and the one

that follows:

Not-objectified labour, not-value, conceived positively, or as a negativity in relation to itself, is the not-objectified, hence non-objective, i.e. subjective existence of labour itself. Labour not as an object, but as activity; not as itself value, but as the living source of value. (296)

Labor, as the potential for objectifying itself in products, is subjective wealth. Marx, in the following passage, also calls it general wealth, wealth that has not taken a specific form in objects.

[Namely, it is] general wealth (in contrast to capital in which it exists objectively, as reality) as the general possibility of the same, which proves itself as such in action. (296)

We now have a contradiction; labor is absolute poverty, the exclusion of objective wealth, and at the same time labor is general wealth, the general possibility of wealth which it proves in its activity as production. However, this contradiction is not the result of faulty reasoning. Rather, it is a real contradiction, that is, a contradiction realized in the separation of labor from itself as value, the division of labor into capital and wage labor.

Thus it is not at all contradictory, or rather, the in-every-way mutually contradictory statements that labour is absolute poverty as object, on one side, and is, on the other side, the general possibility of wealth as subject and as activity, are reciprocally determined and follow from the essence of labour, such as it is presupposed by capital as its contradiction and as its contradictory being, and such as it, in turn, presupposed capital. (296)

The contradiction is the separation of subject from itself as object, the division of purpose and means for realizing that purpose. This contradiction is already posited in the exchange of labor for wages. In this exchange, labor "surrenders its creative power," its general wealth, to capital for a fixed sum, for exchange value.

It is clear, therefore, that the worker cannot become rich in this exchange, since, in exchange for his labour capacity as a fixed, available magnitude, he surrenders its creative power, like Esau his birthright for a mess of pottage. Rather, he necessarily impoverishes himself, . . . because the creative power of his labour establishes itself as the power of capital, as an alien power confronting him. (307)

The contradiction which appears as result of production, the contradiction that wealth in products is produced by labor while labor itself is poor, is not an external result of production such as low wages or uneven distribution as if distribution were externally related to production. Rather, it is presupposed to production in the act of exchange. That is, because the exchange is an exchange of labor and wealth, use value and exchange value, the exchange posits that separation in its own reality. Hence, the contradiction is not the result of production, but presupposed to production with the exchange relation.

He divests himself (entausst sich) of labour as the force productive of wealth; capital appropriates it, as such. The separation between labour and property in the product of labour, between labour and wealth, is thus posited in the act of exchange itself. What appears paradoxical as result is already contained in the presupposition. (307)

Poverty is not an empirical category for Marx. It is an analytic formulation of the condition of wage labor. This means that poverty is not something that can be discovered in the world; it is produced in analysis. Thus, characterizing social class on the basis of income is irrelevant to Marxist analysis. Rather, income is a consequence of the analytic poverty of wage labor, its condition of being separated from its objective conditions.

Whereas the unity of subject and object in production is the realization of labor, the process by which labor as purpose realizes itself in the objective conditions, the separation of subject and object is the de-realization of labor. This curious formulation means that as labor realizes itself, it does not recognize itself in its products. In other words, the reality produced by labor is perceived as an alien reality.

Living labour therefore now appears from its own standpoint as acting within the production process in such a way that, as it realizes itself in the objective conditions, it simultaneously repulses this realization from itself as an alien reality. . . . This realization process is at the same time the de-realization process of labour. It posits itself objectively, but it posits this objectivity, as its own not-being, or as the being of its not-being--of capital. (454)

Instead of recognizing its products as its own, instead of treating objects as presupposing itself as subject, labor relates to its products as alien things, objects without history. The subject does not recognize

itself in the object. This relation is not a failure of perception but is produced by the division of labor in which the subject is divorced from itself as object. Hence labor can only know itself as subject or object; it cannot recognize one in the other because it is not a unity.

Instead of treating objective conditions as the condition for the realization of labor, labor becomes the condition for the realization of objective conditions, for the realization of products as values for themselves independent of labor. This reversal makes possible the treatment of objects as independent things instead of as relations. An object presupposes a subject to which it is the object otherwise it is not an object but a thing. Therefore objects are relations. The treatment of objects as things is a concrete form of life the opposite of which is analysis. The separation of subject and object places analysis outside of the subject-object relation. If the relation were instead a unity, then analysis would not be known as such, for it would not be separate from the form of life itself. The form of life that is a subject-object unity is an analytic form of life, a self-conscious form of life. To reiterate, this unity is not the "natural unity" of precapitalist landed property, but the unity that analysis knows as the solution to the disunity of capital.

Separation of Subject and Object as the Problematic
of Analysis

I have been reformulating Marx's description of capital as a form of life in terms of its internal relations. I have been calling such a description an analytic history. The internal relations of a form of life are the relations of production, the relation of labor to its objective conditions which presupposes the relations of a community. The relations of production are property relations. However, with capital, the property relation is the opposite or negation of a property relation. That is, labor does not relate to its objective conditions as its own, as its property.

We have seen how earlier forms were characterized by a "natural unity" whereby labor related to the conditions of production as its extended body. This original unity of subject and object is not problematic according to Marx. This is the natural condition of self-realization. Rather, it is the separation of subject and object which is problematic. One might formulate the Marxian method as the treatment of the separation of subject and object as problematic. The rules of grounding concepts and individuals in historically specific forms of life highlight the problematic character of a form of life in which concepts and individuals appear as things without history. As

things without history they are conceived as either objectivities independent of the purposes that make them meaningful or as subjectivities, purposes without the relations and objective conditions which make those purposes possible.

Similarly, the rule to treat forms of life as internal relations highlights the problematic character of a form of life in which the relations appear to be those of externalities. A separation of subject and object is a concrete form of life, one which does not re-member grounds. As such it is the problematic of analysis.

It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their appropriation of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process, but rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of human existence and this active existence--a separation which is completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and capital. (489)

It might seem that the separation between the active existence and the inorganic conditions of existence which Marx claims is completely posited only in capitalism is also posited in the slave relation or the serf relation. According to Marx this is not the case:

In the relations of slavery and serfdom this separation does not take place; rather one part of society is treated by the other as itself merely an inorganic and natural condition of its own reproduction. The slave stands in no relation whatsoever to the objective conditions of his labour; rather labour, itself, both in the form of the slave and in that of the serf, is classified as an inorganic condition of production along with other natural beings, such as cattle, as an accessory of the earth. (489)

Thus the serfs and slaves are not persons within the ancient form of life, for they do not have a position in relation to the objective conditions of their existence. They are themselves an objective condition of existence for the reproduction of persons. In the wage labor situation, the workers are not only a condition for the existence and reproduction of capital. They are persons that capital recognizes as such in exchange; they are not just another force of nature. The laborer is both exchanger and labor power. As exchanger, he relates to himself as owner of labor power. He has a subjective existence in relation to his body as object. Yet, while the worker has a subjective existence as an exchanger, he is at the same time just another objective condition of production for capital.

As exchanger, the individual is master of that which he exchanges, hence he is a master within the exchange relation. However, the exchange relation of capital is, as we have seen, not an exchange of equivalents. The worker engages in the exchange in order to realize the means of subsistence, exchange value. Capital engages in the exchange in order to realize the use value of labor as surplus value. In the exchange, labor relates to itself as exchange value.

As exchange value, the worker is not master but an objective condition for the reproduction of capital which is indifferent to his existence as laborer. Capital only relates to the laborer as exchange value and as labor power

not as master. Hence, labor is a living contradiction. It is posited as master but realized as labor power, mere force of nature rather than master of nature.

Marx posits the resolution of this contradiction in a mode of existence in which the unity of subject and object is presupposed and posited, a self-conscious form of life characterized by unity instead of disunity and indifference. The production would not be limited by specific relations and conditions of production. Rather production would presuppose the suspension, transformation and transcendence of all previously produced conditions. The suspension and transcendence of those conditions would be itself the condition and aim of production. The conditions of such production would include presupposing and positing its general, social character just as earlier production was presupposed as and limited to a specific form.

If the social nature of production is both posited and presupposed, then both the conditions of labor and the products of labor are immediately social--the inorganic body of the individuals as social individuals, producers who both presuppose and posit each other as condition for their existence. This means that each individual's labor is social or general immediately, part of the total production immediately not through the mediation of exchange value.

But with the suspension of the immediate character of living labour, as merely individual, or as general merely internally or merely externally, with the positing of the activity of individuals as immediately general or social activity, the objective moments of production are stripped of this form of alienation; they are thereby posited as property, as the organic social body within which the individuals reproduce themselves as individuals, but as social individuals. (832)

I have been reformulating Marx's problematic as the separation of the subjective and objective aspects of social life. The dissolution of the separation produces the possibility of social life that is a unity, a unity inherent in the notion of the social individual, a self-conscious form of life.

The Possibility of Capital and Labor as Externally Related

In reformulating Marx's problematic in terms of the separation of labor, the separation of purpose from the means of realizing itself, I have taken the unity of labor as the point of departure. The separation of labor presupposes and produces the two essential social classes--capital and wage labor. A question that arises is whether the relation between capital and labor is not an external one. The whole analysis so far has been predicated on the formulation of labor as an internal relation, a relation of purpose to itself as objective conditions. Given this formulation, the separation of labor as the relation of capital and wage labor, is "improper and forcibly imposed."

However, it is possible to conceive of the two classes as the analytic origin of capital. In other words, rather than separation which presupposes an original unity, one might begin with a duality. In this case, the relation would not be an internal one at all but an external one. Thus I will now turn to the process by which capital realizes itself. Instead of focusing on labor, I will see if capital can be conceived in terms of external relations rather than internal ones.

The first form of capital is merchant capital. I will review Marx's analysis of the history of merchant capital. Merchant capital is realized in the simple exchange relation which Marx calls simple circulation. In order to have exchange of unlike items (if they were the same there would be no reason for exchange), there must be some way to calculate exchange value. Value allows unlike items to be compared quantitatively and then exchanged as equivalents.

Considered as values, all commodities are qualitatively equal and differ only quantitatively, hence can be measured against each other and substituted for one another (are mutually exchangeable, mutually convertible) in certain quantitative relations. Value is their social relation, their economic quality. (141)

As a value, a commodity can be equated with all others. Value, then, is a general measure. As such, it allows for exchange. Thus value is also a medium of exchange. As value, the commodity is money.

As a value, a commodity is an equivalent for all other commodities in a given relation. As a value, the commodity is an equivalent; as an equivalent, all its natural properties are extinguished; it no longer takes up a special, qualitative, relationship towards the other commodities; but is rather the general measure as well as the general representative, the general medium of exchange of all other commodities. As value, it [the commodity] is money. (141)

Exchange value originates as a calculation, a comparison between commodities. In its natural existence, a commodity is not immediately exchangeable for any other. Its exchange value must first be determined. The transformation of a commodity into exchange value occurs through abstraction. The exchange value is expressed in terms of some common denomination or unit in which the other commodities can likewise be expressed. Marx specifies this common denominator as labor time. The exchange value of a commodity is calculated on the basis of the amount of labor time it takes to produce it in relation to the amount of labor time it takes to produce another commodity. For the purpose of merely making a comparison, one can simply determine exchange value in the head. However, in actual exchange, the abstraction must be symbolized in an object.

In order to cover the excess of one value over another in exchange, in order to liquidate the balance, the crudest barter, just as with international trade today, requires payment in money. (143)

Even the simplest exchange relation, barter, requires money. It might seem that what distinguishes simple exchange including barter from complex exchange is precisely

the absence of money. However, the direct exchange of one commodity for the desired other commodity depends on conditions of place and time, the availability of the desired commodity and an owner of that commodity who desires the commodity owned by the first exchanger. Treating a commodity as an exchange value should make the two items exchangeable in a certain relation regardless of the desires of the particular owners.

In order for the commodity to realize its generality as exchange value, it cannot retain its particularity as a use value. In order to realize itself as exchange value, it must be exchanged with something that symbolizes the exchange value of the commodity and which can then be exchanged with any commodity. This thing which symbolizes exchange value is money. In other words, although the commodity as exchange value is itself money the owner has the problem of finding an exchanger with the desired commodity with whom to exchange it. To alleviate this problem, a symbol of exchange value is developed.

The use of money as symbol of exchange value is the result of the process of exchange. A particular commodity that is available in the community becomes used as a medium of exchange and "becomes transformed into money, into a symbol only little by little." In other words, money is not the origin of exchange. Money is not a natural thing

but a historic product, the result of exchange.

The process, then, is simply this: The product becomes a commodity, i.e. a mere moment of exchange. The commodity is transformed into exchange value. In order to equate it with itself as an exchange value, it is exchanged for a symbol which represents it as such. As such a symbolized exchange value, it can then in turn be exchanged in definite relations for every other commodity. (145)

Once exchange value becomes symbolized in a commodity as money, it takes on the additional character of representative of general wealth. As such it becomes an end in itself as well as a medium of circulation. Instead of being a means for facilitating exchange, exchange can now take place in order to accumulate money.

If I sell in order to buy, then I can also buy in order to sell. In the former case money only a means to obtain the commodity and the commodity the aim; in the second case the commodity only a means to obtain the money and money the aim. (201)

In this latter case, money is no longer a mere medium of exchange. As such it would remain in circulation following its circular course "always anew like a perpetuum mobile." In other words if all exchange were selling in order to buy, then whenever money was received in exchange, it would again be used to acquire objects for consumption. But, as representative of wealth, as end in itself, the aim is to withdraw it from circulation in order to possess it as wealth. This forms the basis of merchant capital, the buying of commodities in order to then sell them. The distinction between selling commodities in order to realize

money with which to buy other commodities to consume and buying commodities in order to sell them and realize money as end is represented by the formulae C-M-C and M-C-M respectively.

. . . money which enters into circulation and at the same time returns from it to itself [buying in order to sell] . . . is at the same time the first concept of capital, and the first form in which it appears.
(253)

Capital is the movement of money in the process of buying in order to sell. This is merchant capital which Marx also calls commercial capital and circulating capital. In this form it has not yet become the foundation of production--industrial capital. "Capital comes initially from circulation, and, moreover its point of departure is money."

The Relation of Merchant Capital to Production

If capital comes from circulation, then it is not a product of labor; hence it is not an internal relation of production. It is externally related to production. This would mean that merchant capital is only externally related to the reproduction of the community, to labor. The movement of circulating capital is not internal to production.

This motion can take place within peoples or between peoples for whose production exchange value has by no means become the presupposition. The movement only seizes upon the surplus of their directly useful production, and proceeds only on its margin. Like the Jews within old Polish society or within medieval society in general, entire trading peoples, as in antiquity

(and later on, the Lombards), can take up this position between peoples whose mode of production is not yet determined by exchange value as the fundamental presupposition. (253)

Trading peoples then "live" on the "margins" of society. Their work is not integral to the society as mode of production. This is not to say that they do not have importance in the society or that their influence is not great. Only that merchant capital is not a presupposition for labor. It might have tremendous influence, however, on the development of the society, on subsidizing political ventures, wars, etc. But the relation of capital to production remains an external one. It is not an objective condition for the existence of labor as such and therefore the separation of labor and capital is not a separation of an internal relation but a relation of two discrete beings.

Merchant capital is not, however, an independent, self-sufficient form of life. It presupposes the circulating commodity which "steps outside circulation and directly satisfies a need." He calls this "consumption-directed circulation." While the aim might be to realize money and withdraw it from circulation, it can only be used by exchanging it for a commodity to be consumed.

The simple movement of exchange values, such as is present in pure circulation, can never realize capital. It can lead to the withdrawal and stockpiling of money, but as soon as money steps back into circulation, it dissolves itself in a series of exchange processes with commodities which are consumed, hence it is lost as soon as its purchasing power is exhausted. (254)

The movement within pure circulation can never realize capital, for in the exchange for the commodity to be consumed, money is lost. On the other hand, if money is withdrawn from circulation, it is not "realized" because it has no substance. ". . . it merely represents the non-substantial general form of wealth." In realizing itself as substance by exchange, it disappears as money.

Since equivalents are exchange for one another, the form of wealth which is fixed as money disappears as soon as it is exchanged for the commodity; and the use value present in the commodity, as soon as it is exchanged for money. All that can happen in the simple act of exchange is that each can be lost in its role for the other as soon as it realizes itself in it. (254)

Merchant capital is not a form of life. Its internal relations, buying and selling, do not constitute a self-moving totality. Rather, the process of circulation in which capital is realized comes to an end with consumption. The realizing of merchant capital is also the loss of merchant capital. For its realization consists in its exchange with a commodity to be consumed, but with that exchange and consumption, capital disappears. Circulation does not reproduce itself but comes to an end with consumption. In order for circulation to reoccur, some outside force must move it. In other words, its grounds are presupposed but not posited by circulation. Circulation does not provide for its self-renewal.

The repetition of the process from either of the points, money or commodity, is not posited within the conditions of exchange itself. The act can be repeated only until it is completed; i.e. until the amount of exchange value is exchanged away. It cannot ignite itself anew through its own resources. Circulation therefore does not carry within itself the principles of self-renewal. The moments of the latter are presupposed to it, not posited by it. (253)

"Commodities constantly have to be thrown into it anew from the outside. . . ." (255) Thus circulation presupposes the production of commodities.

. . . now, circulation itself returns back into the activity which posits or produces exchange values. It returns into it as into its ground. . . . This is their [commodities'] point of departure, and through its own motion it [circulation] goes back into exchange-value-creating production as its result. We have therefore reached the point of departure again, production which posits, creates exchange values; but this time, production which presupposes circulation as a developed moment and which appears as a constant process. (255)

The development of trade as an on-going process, even while it retains its character as an external force in relation to production, presupposes a regular surplus production. With the development of circulation, the organization of production becomes altered.

At first the effect is of a more physical kind. The sphere of needs is expanded; the aim is the satisfaction of the new needs, and hence greater regularity and an increase of production. . . . The degree to which the movement towards the establishment of exchange value then attacks the whole of production depends partly on the intensity of this external influence, and partly on the degree of development attained by the elements of domestic production--division of labour etc. . . . (257)

The relation between capital and production becomes qualitatively different when "exchange value attacks the whole of production." Capital ceases to be merchant capital, which disappears in circulation, and becomes industrial capital which maintains, reproduces and multiplies itself in circulation.

Industrial Capital as Internal to Production

Capital becomes industrial capital, reproducing and multiplying itself in circulation, when production becomes the production of surplus value. In other words, the difference between merchant capital and industrial capital is the exchange with labor. Without the exchange with labor, the exchange of commodity for commodity, pure circulation, can never realize capital; it can never maintain or reproduce capital.

The only aspect in which capital is here posited as distinct from direct exchange value and from money is that of exchange value which preserves and perpetuates itself in and through circulation. . . . (262) Its own animation consists exclusively in that; it preserves itself as a self-validating exchange value distinct from a use value only by constantly multiplying itself. (269)

The process of realization then consists in the exchange between capital and labor. This exchange is made up of two parts which are qualitatively different. That is one is an exchange; the other is not.

- (1) the worker sells his commodity, labour,
- (2) the capitalist obtains labour itself . . . i.e. the productive force which maintains and multiplies capital . . . the reproductive force of capital, a force belonging to capital itself. (274)

Through the first exchange, the reproductive force of capital now belongs to capital. The second process is not an exchange but the appropriation of labor by capital. This is "directly opposite exchange." The relation is not one of exchange but of compulsion.

Unlike the case of merchant capital, industrial capital is a form of life. It is a totality of internal relations. I reformulated Marx's analysis of capital as providing a history of the relation of labor to its objective conditions of existence. However, the analysis of capital so far suggests that capital does not come from labor but from circulation. Marx distinguishes merchant from industrial capital in terms of the one disappearing in circulation whereas the other maintains, reproduces and multiplies in circulation. It remains to be seen how industrial capital implicates labor in such a way as to abolish itself as an external relation.

In the first encounter, the presuppositions themselves appeared to come in from the outside, out of circulation; as external presuppositions for the arising of capital; hence not emergent from its inner essence, and not explained by it. These external presuppositions will now appear as moments of the motion of capital itself, so that it has itself--regardless how they may arise historically--pre-positing them as its own moments. (450)

In other words, originally, the presuppositions of capital--the production and realization of exchange values --appear to come from circulation. However, with industrial capital, the production and realization of capital appear as moments of the motion of capital itself. We have seen that this motion begins with the exchange with labor which is part exchange and part compulsion. The product of labor, that is realized in this process, the exchange value produced, if it is to be realized as capital and not hoarded or consumed, is then divided into objective conditions of labor--material and instrument--and subjective--consumption goods for the living labor that is to be put to work. This means that whereas in the first encounter, the conditions of labor were external to labor, in the next encounter, the conditions of labor are products of labor.

Furthermore, with the production of surplus value, the presuppositions which appeared to come from circulation, exchange values which are exchanged for living labor capacity, are no longer external presuppositions but moments of capital itself.

[With the production of] surplus capital (in contrast to the original capital, before it had undertaken this cycle), as independent exchange value . . . [all] moments which confronted living labor capacity, and employed it as alien, external powers, and which consumed it under certain conditions independent of itself, are now posited as its own product and result.
(451)

In other words, with the production of surplus capital, the new cycle begins with presuppositions that are internal to the production process. With the production of surplus value, the moments of capital--wages, machinery, raw material--are now produced by labor; they do not come from outside.

. . . surplus value or the surplus product are nothing but a specific sum of objectified living labour--the sum of surplus labour. This new value which confronts living labour as independent, as engaged in exchange with it, as capital, is the product of labour. (451)

Thus from the side of capital, analysis shows capital to be a relation of labor to its objective conditions, an internal relation of production and not an external relation of capital (with origins in circulation outside of production) and labor.

Legitimizing and Legalizing Property Relations

The treatment of a form of life as a totality of internal relations not only has consequences for analysis but, as one might expect, for the form of life that makes analysis as such possible--the form of life that appears to be and which treats itself as a totality of external relations. What seems legitimate and proper for a relation between externalities, labor and capital, no longer seems legitimate and proper if analysis shows it to be an internal relation--relation of living labor to itself as objectified

labor. The production of surplus capital I presupposes the existence of values belonging to the capitalist and thrown by him into circulation, the exchange with living labor capacity. But the presupposition of surplus capital II is nothing more than the existence of surplus capital I.

True, in order to create surplus capital II, he had to exchange a part of the value of surplus capital I in the form of means of subsistence for living labour capacity, but the values he gave in that exchange were not values which he originally put into circulation out of his own funds; they were, rather, objectified alien labour which he appropriated without giving any equivalent whatever, and which he now re-exchanges for alien living labour. . . . (457)

The exchange that produced surplus capital I was a simple exchange between objectified labor owned by the capitalist and living labor owned by the worker. The exchange is based on the laws of the exchange of equivalents which according to Marx's analysis is measured by the quantity of labor or labor time contained in them. As such, "the legal expression of this exchange presupposed nothing other than everyone's right of property over his own products, and of free disposition over them."

In highlighting the difference between the presuppositions of capital I and capital II, Marx's analysis contrasts with the treatment of capital by other political economists. A presupposition of capital I is the accumulation of exchange values "perhaps by means of savings garnered from products and values created by his own

labour etc." or merchant capital accumulated in trade. This accumulation is a condition and presupposition for the arising or becoming of capital. Marx considers it part of its history of formation which he contrasts with its contemporary history. Once capital has arisen, then such presuppositions become "results of its presence." The analytic origins of capital that already exist as such are not the origins of the formation of capital. To fail to analyze the origins of capital as an already existing phenomenon and to conceive of its origins concretely in terms of the preconditions of its coming to be, is to do a concrete explanation. For Marx, concrete explanations are "bourgeois apologetics."

The bourgeois economists who regard capital as an eternal and natural (not historical) form of production then attempt at the same time to legitimize it again by formulating the conditions of its becoming as the conditions of its contemporary realization; i.e. presenting the moments in which the capitalist still appropriates as not-capitalist--because he is still becoming--as the very conditions in which he appropriates as capitalist. (460)

Concrete explanations can be conceived as bourgeois apologetics because they fail to reveal the analytic origins. They attempt to treat capital idealistically as an eternal and natural form of production, a general property relation realized in simple exchange. However, being able to conceive of the origins of its formation means that it is not a general property relation, a natural form of production.

These attempts at apologetics demonstrate a guilty conscience, as well as the inability to bring the mode of appropriation of capital into harmony with the general laws of property proclaimed by the capitalist society itself. (460)

The "general laws of property" refer to the right of property over one's own products, free disposition over them. As such, these general laws do not correspond to the situation of wage labor where the product of wage labor is not its property. One might consider the general laws of property as the ideals of capital and the situation of wage labor as its reality.

Thus, a concrete explanation of origins in terms of the simple exchange of property leaves unaddressed the contradiction between its ideals and its reality. Because the ideals and the reality cannot be brought into harmony, explanation can be either idealistic or realistic. It cannot reconcile the two; it cannot see the origins of those ideals in the origins of the real conditions and relations. To do so would be to see the contradictions as historical and not natural.

It is not that concrete theorizing does not recognize the contradictions. Rather it does not see their history. It sees the contradictions as natural and not as historical.

To see contradictions as natural is to assume that ideals as distinct from reality are natural, given with the human condition, part of the subjective reality of the

human; and that reality is objective, an objective condition outside of the human that is also natural and not historical. In this way, capital can be explained "ideally" as a form of production that corresponds to general laws of property. Or it can be explained "realistically," as a form of production that assumes certain preconditions such as the accumulation of capital. The contradiction or relation between the real and the ideal is not accounted for historically.

Marx's analysis accounts for the relation between the ideal and the real, the legitimations of a form of life, historically. He does this by comparing the presuppositions, the property relations, of capital I with capital II.

The interesting development is that the right of property, which is the legal expression for the exchange, becomes the right to an alien product on the part of capitalist and the duty to relate to one's own labor or one's own product as to alien property.

We see that by a peculiar logic, the right of property undergoes a dialectical inversion [dialektischer Umschlag], so that on the side of capital it becomes the right to an alien product, or the right of property over alien labour, the right to appropriate alien labour without an equivalent, and, on the side of labour capacity, it becomes the duty of respecting the product of one's own labour, and one's own labour itself, as values belonging to others. (458)

The paradoxical result is that the law which expressed the unity of labor with its product, the property relation of labor, now allows for the separation of property and labor.

Furthermore, the right of property originally appeared to be based on one's own labour. Property now appears as the right to alien labour, and as the impossibility of labour appropriating its own product. The complete separation between property, and, even more so, wealth, and labour, now appears as a consequence of the law which began with their identity. (458)

The separation of wealth and labor, property and labor, legitimized by law, brings us back to the class relations of capital. The problem of wealth and poverty as the problem of social classes is a problem of the internal separation of capital and labor. The legal relations confirm and legitimize this separation. Analysis shows the legitimacy of capital to rest on property relations of simple exchange. By contrasting the analytic origins of the legal relation in simple exchange with the analytic origins of capital in the exchange with labor, analysis delegitimizes capital and its legal relations.

We had initially reformulated Marx's analysis in terms of an internal relation of production from the standpoint of labor. We now see that even from the standpoint of capital as exchange value that realizes itself in circulation, once posited, capital is an internal relation of production, a relation to the conditions of production.

If capital is an internal relation of labor, how is it that it appears as an external relation? How is it that labor and capital are able to be conceived as external relations? Marx attributes this conception to bourgeois apologetics, to using relations of simple exchange to legitimize relations of capital. However analysis requires an account of the possibility of that conception. It is not enough to attribute a conception to individual purposes. In other words, analysis does not account for theorizing as a mistake, intentional or otherwise or to poor reasoning. It is not that Marx is smarter than others or that Marx intentionally tries to delegitimize whereas others intentionally want to legitimize capital.

I will show how Marx's analysis of the relations and processes of capital reveal these to be external to each other although internal to capital. Thus it is not that Marx simply accuses other theorists of a mistake that he corrects. Rather, Marx's analysis shows how such a conception is correct, how it is possible as such.

Money and Capital as the Unity of External Relations
and Processes

The internal relations of capital appear as external ones because they are external to each other. This externality is the result of capital's not being value immediately but is separated from itself as value. In order to realize itself as value, it must go through three exchanges.

While capital is reproduced as value it is at the same time posited as not-value, something which has to be realized as value through exchange (with labour, with consumers, with raw material). (403)

Capital is separated from itself as self-multiplying value. The processes of realizing capital are external relations. Despite their inner unity in capital, they exist as independent processes. Just as the exchange of use values is mediated by exchange value, the exchanges of capital are themselves mediated. Capital is the unity of these external processes.

Similarly, exchange is the unity of exchange value and use value. It is not just the relations of capital that appear as external, so do the relations of money--the relations of simple exchange.

With money, the act of exchange is split into two acts, buying and selling. Although exchange is a unity, it is a unity of external, indifferent acts,

the acts of buying and selling. Buying may take place separately from and independently of selling.

While exchange implies an identity, the identity of the commodities being exchanged, this identity is mediated by money. There is a difference between money which mediates and the commodities which are being exchanged. Thus it is a mistake to conceive of buying and selling as immediately identical. With the mediation of money, selling in order to realize exchange value in money is different from buying in order to realize use value.

Similarly, it is a mistake to conceive of the exchanger as the immediate unity of seller and purchaser. The political economists whom Marx criticizes conceived of each exchanger as both purchaser and seller, "each is posited in the double and antithetical aspect, and hence in the living unity of both aspects."

When it is said that he who sells also buys in as much as he buys money, and that he who buys also sells in as much as he sells money, then it is precisely the distinction which is overlooked, the specific distinction between a commodity and money. (197)

The failure to recognize the distinction between money and commodities, the failure of the political economists who formulate exchange as this identity, is a failure of analysis. It is the failure to remember grounds. Instead, it treats unity as given, as natural,

as presupposing no separation.

Marx points out the inconsistency of this theorizing. On the one hand, it recognizes that money is necessary and that it is distinct from commodities. On the other hand, it asserts that there is no distinction between money and commodities. Money as the unity of exchange value and use value, is seen as identical with the commodity form, as just another commodity. However, the difference between money and commodity is crucial. The commodity that is money is different from other commodities. It is in this difference that the contradictions of money are revealed.

It is entirely wrong, therefore, to do as the economists do, namely, as soon as the contradictions in the monetary system emerge into view, to focus only on the end results without the process which mediates them, only on the unity without the distinction, the affirmation without the negation. (197)

In Marx's theorizing, analysis is the inquiry into the possibility of unity, the origins of unity. Thus Marx inquires into the analytic origins of capital, the relations and processes in which capital realizes itself as such. Just as the exchange relation of money is a unity divided into external, indifferent acts, capital is also a unity divided into external, indifferent processes:

The three processes of which capital forms the unity, are external, separate. As such the transition from one to the other, their unity as regards the individual capitalist is accidental. Despite their inner unity, they exist independently. (403)

The unity is a separated unity, its internal relations are indifferent to each other. The unity of money is the separation of buying and selling. The unity of capital is the separation of labor, consumption and raw material and machinery. Capital is the production and realization of exchange values. But the process of production and the process of realization are separated.

The main point here, where we are concerned with the general concept of capital--is that it is this unity of production and realization, not immediately but only as a process which is linked to certain conditions, and as it appeared, external conditions. (405)

The indifference of the various moments of the realization process of capital, the contradiction between the inner unity and the external independence of the moments, is the foundation of all contradictions in capital.

CHAPTER 5

TREATING A CONCRETE FORM OF LIFE
AS CONTRADICTIONARYHow Contradictions Produce a Concrete
Form of Life

In Chapter 5 we saw that capital was a form of life whose internal relations were separated and whose moments were therefore indifferent to each other. That means that the internal relations did not know themselves as such but only as external relations. For instance, labor treated its objective conditions which were its own product as alien property. Capital treated labor which was a condition for its existence with indifference. The process of producing was separated from the process of realizing capital, the relation of buying separated from that of selling.

A form of life whose internal relations appear as external ones, whose concepts and acts appear as things having no history, whose subjects recognize no grounds, is a concrete form of life. I have indicated the source of contradictions in separation. In this chapter, I will show how Marx analyzes money and capital in terms of

contradictions and their consequences in a concrete form of life. In other words, I will reformulate Marx's analysis in order to show how a concrete form of life is possible, how the contradictions do not allow grounds to be remembered.

The Autonomy of Mediations

I have formulated a concrete form of life in terms of the repression of grounds. I prefer the word, repression, to that of forgetting for the latter implies an element of will. "If they had only made an effort, they would not have forgotten." Rather, the forgetting itself is grounded in the contradictory conditions of a form of life. The contradictions are grounded in separation. With separation, the internal unity is forgotten. In its place is the mediation.

In other words, orienting to the mediation is identical to not orienting to the separation which it mediates. Thus the character of the separation is forgotten or repressed in the recognition of the mediation as a thing. The mediation becomes the unity of the separated elements and becomes more important than the separation which it mediates.

Thus in the religious sphere, Christ, the mediator between God and humanity--a mere instrument of circulation between the two--becomes their unity, God-man, and, as such, becomes more important than God; the saints more important than Christ; the popes more important than the saints. (332)

Similarly, money as mediator between producers and their use values becomes independent of the producers. As mediator between the extremes (the buyer and seller)--one oriented to use value, the other to exchange value)--money as the mediator of the exchange relation appears as the subject for which the extremes are merely its moments, whose autonomy it suspends and which posits itself as the only autonomous thing.

As the producers become more dependent on exchange, the exchange relation establishes itself as a power external to and independent of the producers. What originally appeared as a means to promote production becomes a relation alien to the producers. (332)

Furthermore, the mediation is the relation expressed to a higher power but expressed one-sidedly. That is one side of the relation, one of the relata, takes precedence over the other. Thus, among producers of commodities, the exchange value takes precedence over the use value. This means that circulation of exchange values takes precedence over the production of use values or the production of exchange values takes precedence over the circulation or consumption of use values. "The gap between the product as product and the product as exchange value appears to widen." Similarly,

Within capital itself, one form of it in turn takes up the position of use value against the other as exchange value. Thus e.g. does industrial capital appear as producer as against the merchant, who appears as circulation. At the same time, mercantile capital is itself in turn the mediator between

production (Industrial capital) and circulation (the consuming public) or between exchange value and use value, where both sides are posited alternately, production as money and circulation as use value (consuming public) or the former as use value (product) and the latter as exchange value (money). (332)

Thus the separation of labor from its objective conditions is not seen as such because the unity of money, the appearance of money as a thing, is seen instead. Similarly, the separation of production from realization is not seen as such; instead the appearance of capital as a thing is seen. In other words, seeing the mediation is identical with not seeing the unity that was separated and which the thing mediates. The mediation seems to become autonomous, and the autonomous relata lose their autonomy and become moments of the mediation.

. . . because the movement, or the relation which originally appears as mediatory between the extremes necessarily develops dialectically to where it appears as mediation with itself, as the subject [Subjekt] for whom the extremes are merely its moments, whose autonomous presupposition it suspends in order to posit itself, through their suspension, as that which alone is autonomous. (332)

The mediation is the relation expressed to a higher power but expressed one-sidedly. That is one side of the relation, one of the relata takes precedence over the other. Thus the relation of use value and exchange value takes the form of money as mediation. In money, exchange value takes precedence over use value.

Within capital itself, one form of it in turn, takes up the position of use value against the other as exchange value. Thus e.g. does industrial capital appear as producer as against the merchant, who appears as circulation. (332)

Within capital, mercantile capital takes precedence over, in the sense of appears autonomous in comparison with, industrial capital. Mercantile capital is the mediator between production (industrial capital) and circulation (the consuming public) or between exchange value and use value "where both sides are posited alternately, production as money and circulation as use value (consuming public) or the former as use value (product) and the latter as exchange value (money)."

Marx similarly states this to be the case within commerce. The wholesaler appears as a higher power, as mediator between manufacturer and retailer, or between manufacturer and agriculturalist, or between different manufacturers. In turn, and in the same way, the commodity brokers take on more importance than the wholesalers. Also the banker appears autonomous to the industrialists and merchants. In all these cases the mediation becomes a higher power in relation to the extremes it mediates, but this higher power is itself onesided as exchange value, relating to the lower form as use value or labor.

Money becomes an end rather than a means; and the higher form of mediation, as capital, everywhere posits the lower as itself, in turn, labour, as merely a source of surplus value. For example,

the bill-broker, banker etc. as against the manufacturers and farmers, which are posited in relation to him in the role of labour (of use value); while he posits himself toward them as capital, extraction of surplus value; the wildest form of this, the financier. (332)

Class struggle can be seen in terms of manufacture and banking. The terms of the struggle are metaphors for the separation of subject and object in use value and exchange value. This is not to say that class struggle between labor and capital is not real. It is to say, rather, that class struggle is the analytic consequence of the separation of use value and exchange value, that is the separation inherent in the commodity form. Thus class struggle may take different forms. For instance, the struggle between manufacturer and banker does not mean that the struggle between capital and labor has ceased, only that it has taken the form of a struggle between manufacture as labor and banks as capital.

Just as the class struggle can be seen on the level of manufacture and banking, it can be seen on the level of the individual's internal struggle between himself as end or use value, and himself as means or exchange value. "Should I take a job during my vacation? Should I take a better paying job that I know I'll hate?"

Of course, the individual's internal struggle cannot result in suspension of the conditions of the struggle. This is because the terms of the struggle are presupposed

to the individual. The individual's internal struggle can only lead to a one-sided resolution in which the individual satisfies one side of himself while depriving another side. However, class struggle can result in a suspension of the terms of the struggle either from the side of capital or exchange value or from the side of labor or use value. I take it this is the progressive character of the struggle.

Thus if labor realizes itself as unity in its struggle with capital, then capital is dissolved. If on a higher level, industrial capital (as use value to financial capital) realizes itself as unity in its struggle with financiers (as exchange value), a unity taking the form of a single industrial capitalist, then again capital is dissolved as such. It is not that the dissolution of capital is something that must necessarily occur with or without struggle. It is rather that the dissolution of capital can only come with struggle that results in unity. Struggle corresponds to the condition of a self-contradictory form of life, the struggle of two opposing tendencies.

The Autonomy of the Exchange

Relation as Mediation

The development of exchange as a mediation between producers results in its relative autonomy and power over the producers and their struggle to realize exchange value.

. . . the exchange relation establishes itself as a power external to and independent of the producers. What originally appeared as a means to promote production becomes a relation alien to the producers. As the producers become more dependent on exchange, exchange appears to become more independent of them, and the gap between the product as product and the product as exchange value appears to widen. (146)

The separation of exchange value from commodities is a contradictory relation that is expressed with money. As Marx puts it: the contradictions are "immanent in the money relation, in the relation of the product to itself as money." (146)

The first contradiction of the exchange relation derives from the difference between the commodity as use value and its property as exchange value which creates the necessity for money as "an external thing alongside the commodity." This difference and separation implies the possibility that these two forms in which the commodity exists are not convertible into one another. This becomes of great importance if the purpose for producing the commodity is to convert it into exchange value.

As soon as money has become an external thing alongside the commodity, the exchangeability of the commodity for money becomes bound up with external conditions which may or may not be present . . . The commodity is demanded in exchange because of its natural properties, because of the needs for which it is the desired object . . . There thus arises the possibility that the commodity in its specific form as product, can no longer be exchanged for, equated with, its general form as money. (148)

A second contradiction of the exchange relation derives from separating the act of exchange into two mutually independent acts: purchase and sale. In this way, their immediate identity ceases, as compared to exchange with barter for example, where to exchange one's product is to get another one. With the separation of purchase and sale through the mediation of money as exchange value, these two moments may not balance.

Originally, there was an immediate equality, one commodity is equated with the other immediately with the exchange. But when the commodity is exchanged for money, the equivalence of one commodity with another may now involve momentary non-equivalence. That is, the exchange value of commodity A may be 10, and the exchange value of commodity B may be 10. However, since commodity A is exchanged for 10, rather than exchanged immediately for commodity B, it is possible, that commodity A may not realize the exchange value equivalent to that with which it would be necessary to purchase commodity B at a later date, i.e., 10 may not

purchase commodity B tomorrow. Instead of immediate identity, they may enter into disproportion with one another just as the relation between the commodity and its exchange value may likewise enter into disproportion:

They will of course always attempt to equalize one another; but in the place of the earlier immediate equality there now stands the constant movement of equalization, which evidently presupposes constant non-equivalence. It is now entirely possible that consonance may be reached only by passing through the most extreme dissonance. (148)

A third contradictory feature of production based on exchange value is the separation of the movement of exchange from the exchangers, the producers of commodities. Exchange for the sake of exchange is now separated from exchange for the sake of commodities. The former is the basis of the merchantile estate.

A mercantile estate steps between the producers; an estate which only buys in order to sell and only sells so as to buy again . . . The rise of exchange (commerce) as an independent function torn away from the exchangers corresponds to the rise of exchange value as an independent entity, as money, torn away from products. (148)

The purpose of the commerce among merchants is the gaining of money, exchange values. The merchant expects to receive back the money he has laid out plus more whereas this is not the case for the consumer who is the one who provides the final exchange value for the commodity.

Exchange within the mercantile estate, and exchange between the mercantile estate and the consumers--as much as they must ultimately condition one another--are determined by quite different laws and motives and can enter into the most acute contradiction with one another. The possibility of commercial crises is already contained in this separation. (148)

The mercantile estate may corner the market or stockpile in order to control the supply and raise the prices. Furthermore, when there is a shortage of a commodity such as grain, the grain merchants try to sell it at a high price in order to make a high profit which is possible due to the greater demand than supply.

In addition to the above contradictions, money contains a fourth contradiction by virtue of being a particular commodity once it is not a mere mental abstraction but is objectified. Because it is a particular commodity, it is subject to the conditions of exchange. That is, its value can fluctuate based on demand and supply or changing costs of production. This conditioned exchangeability contradicts its essence as unconditional exchangeability. This is because it is treated as a commodity subject to the fluctuations of the market and the costs of production. However, as money, it represents general unconditional exchangeability. General unconditional exchangeability refers to the property of money where the particular qualities of money

(gold and silver) do not determine whether or not they can be exchanged, but they can always be used in exchange.

A fifth contradiction contained in the separation of the commodity from its exchange value--the money relation--is realized in money as medium of exchange. In this capacity, the attribute which is essential is that of quantity, of amount in which it circulates. This contradicts its character as measure. As measure, it only served a mental function for calculating the relationship between two commodities by relating them to a third. As measure, the symbol of exchange value did not have to be around in any particular quantity.

Money as measure . . . is required only as an imagined unit once the exchange value (labour time) of an ounce of gold compared to any one commodity has been determined; its actual presence is superfluous, along with, even more so, its available quantity: as an indicator (an indicator of value) the amount in which it exists in a country is irrelevant; required only as accounting unit. (208)

Thus as medium of exchange it contradicts the requirements of money as measure of exchange value. As measure, there is no need for it to exist in any particular quantity. As medium of exchange, the amount of gold and silver available for circulation affects circulation and therefore production.

A sixth contradiction is between money as means for accomplishing exchange in order to realize human

needs and money as an end in itself. By becoming an end, money can be withdrawn from circulation in order to serve the need for possessing wealth in general--the potential for buying any and all commodities. Money was set up as a means for accomplishing exchange, but as soon as it takes a material form, it represents wealth in general and is treated as an end in itself. Instead of being a means for facilitating exchange, exchange now occurs only in order to accumulate money.

If I sell in order to buy, then I can also buy in order to sell. In the former case money only a means to obtain the commodity and the commodity the aim; in the second case the commodity only a means to obtain the money and money the aim. (201)

In this latter case, money is no longer a mere medium of exchange. As medium of exchange, it would remain in circulation following its circular course "always anew like a perpetuum mobile." If everybody sells in order to buy, then when one person receives money for his commodities, he then uses it to buy something else from somebody who in turn uses the money realized from that sale to buy something else. In this situation, money functions only as long as it remains in circulation.

But in its third character as representative of wealth in general, money is no longer merely a medium of exchange, a mere means. As an end in itself, it can be withdrawn from circulation. In fact the aim is to withdraw it from circulation in order to possess it as wealth.

It represents a greater or lesser amount of general wealth according to whether its given unit is possessed in a greater or lesser quantity. If it is general wealth, then one is richer the more of it one possesses, and the only important process, for the individual as well as the nation, is to pile it up. In keeping with this role, it was seen as that which steps outside circulation. (229)

Thus the sixth contradiction contained in the concept of money is its negating itself as medium of exchange where its function or essence is to remain in the circulation process. In its function as general form of wealth and material representative of wealth, it "steps outside circulation."

We see how Marx analyzes money by uncovering the functions of money and their antitheses which are the result of the separation of the product from itself as value which is expressed in a different form--money. What is in essence a unity (the product and its value) becomes in practice a separation. By separating the two, the essential unity becomes forgotten or disregarded which is the basis for the contradictions and possible crises that develop as exchange becomes more developed.

Contradictions within the "Completed" Form of Money

So far we have traced the contradictions among the various properties of money. The final feature of money, as the general form of wealth and the material representative of wealth, not only contradicts the function of money

as medium of exchange, but involves internal contradictions as well. Marx uncovers the self-contradictions of money in its "completed character" by comparing the appearance of money as wealth in general with the process of producing, reproducing and realizing money. These processes constitute the presuppositions of money as wealth. Marx shows how these processes are in contradiction with each other.

As the general form of wealth the whole world of real riches stands opposite it. It is their pure abstraction. (233)

In other words, money is merely the representation of wealth abstracted from its content and expressed in a different form. The real content of wealth consists of all that has been produced. However, it is only the mere abstraction that is treated as wealth.

Where wealth seems to appear in an entirely material tangible form, its existence is only in my head, it is pure fantasy. (233)

People fail to recognize that the material that constitutes wealth, i.e., money, is only a representation of wealth. It functions as wealth only because people treat it that way as a result of the development of exchange. It has value only because of the use people make of it for conducting exchange. Therefore, its value is due to people's treating it that way, its value is symbolic, which means that its value exists only in the mind, yet people treat it as having intrinsic (rather than symbolic) value independent of them.

As material representative of general wealth it is realized only by being thrown back into circulation, to disappear in exchange for the singular particular modes of wealth. (233)

In order to realize the wealth that money represents, it must be exchanged for the particular products which constitute real wealth. In other words, it must be used in circulation in order to realize itself as general wealth. Yet it appears to be and is treated as wealth in and of itself.

It remains in circulation as medium of exchange; but for the accumulating individual, it is lost and this disappearance is the only possible way to secure it as wealth. (234)

Although as medium of circulation it must remain in circulation, this means that in so far as this is the case, it is lost for the person who wants to accumulate it. For that person, it is as though the money had disappeared. Yet if it did not so disappear, it would be impossible to make it into wealth.

I can really posit its being for myself only by giving it up as mere being for others. If I want to cling to it, it evaporates in my hand to become a mere phantom of real wealth. (234)

If we all keep it and do not recognize that it is meaningful only because of its use for others, and do not throw it into circulation where it can be used by others, then exchange cannot take place. If exchange does not take place, production will not take place. If production does not take place, then there is no real wealth for it to represent and therefore it loses its character as wealth.

Further (the notion that) to accumulate it is to increase it turns out to be false. If the other riches do not accumulate, then it loses its value in the measure in which it is accumulated. What appears as its increase is in fact its decrease. (234)

Accumulating money without a corresponding increase in real goods, means that there are the same amount of things which is now represented by a greater amount of gold. Therefore, each unit of gold is now worth fewer goods.

Its independence is a mere semblance, its independence of circulation exists only in view of circulation, exists as dependence on it. (234)

Although people may think that money is independent of circulation when they treat it as wealth, its value as money depends on the circulation of goods.

It pretends to be the general commodity, but because of its natural particularity, it is again a particular commodity, whose value depends both on demand and supply and on variations in its specific costs of production. (234)

Therefore, although it may appear as and actually be treated as the general commodity, as a standard that is not variable, it is actually a particular commodity subject to the variations in the costs of producing it and subject to the fluctuations of the market.

As absolutely secure wealth, entirely independent of my individuality, it is at the same time, because it is something completely external to me, the absolutely insecure, which can be separated from me by any accident. (234)

This is different from the case where wealth is dependent on one's qualities and particular abilities where,

therefore, it cannot be separated from the person by any accident.

Similarly, it has entirely contradictory qualities as measure, as medium of circulation and as money as such. (234)

We discussed above how its qualities as measure contradict its qualities as medium, and how its qualities as medium are contradicted by its qualities as wealth. In addition to these three functions, but only because of them, the embodiment of wealth--gold and silver--can take on a different function as display of wealth in the form of jewelry.

As a particular commodity it can be transformed out of its form of money into that of luxury articles, gold and silver, jewellery; . . . or as money, it can be accumulated to form a treasure. (216)

However, although it can be treated as a particular commodity having use value outside of circulation in the form of jewelry or other types of luxury commodities, in reality, its character as luxury item derives from its use value for circulation. Therefore, although appearing to be independent of circulation, it is dependent on circulation:

It stands independent of circulation, but this independence is only its own process. It derives from it just as it returns to it again. Cut off from all relation to it, it would not be money, but merely a simple natural object, gold or silver . . . Its independence is not the end of all relatedness to circulation, but rather a negative relation to it. (217)

As wealth, its transformation into an article of display or as treasure is a way of signifying that one is so rich that one does not need it as money. In this way it has a negative relation to circulation. It is not independent of circulation, in its form as jewelry; it is only because it could be used to purchase things that not using it gives it its character as treasure or luxury items.

In analyzing the category of money, Marx, unlike the analysts he criticizes, goes back to uncovering its origins in exchange and the various forms it takes or functions it acquires as it ceases to be merely an abstract or ideal means of measurement and becomes objectified in a material thing separate from the product, its natural qualities, and the exchangers. As it becomes a separate thing, it expresses the contradiction between exchange value and use value to a higher power. In its developed form (where it is measure, medium of exchange and material representative of general wealth) certain of its attributes which are essential to certain aspects negate other features. Its surface identity as one thing--money--is a negative unity, a unity of negations.

According to Marx, "the special difficulty in grasping money in its fully developed character as money is that a social relation, a definite relation between individuals, appears as a metal, a stone, as a purely physical, external thing," which is indistinguishable from its natural

existence. The social relation is exchange. Gold and silver, in and of themselves, are not money.

We saw earlier that this was the criticism that Marx leveled against other economists--that they treated gold and silver as absolute wealth rather than as symbols deriving from social relations and social needs. "It is not at all apparent on its face that its character of being money is merely the result of social processes." (240) That is, its character of being money is a result of people's using it for exchange.

The memory of use value, as distinct from exchange value, has become entirely extinguished in this incarnation of pure exchange value. Thus the fundamental contradiction in exchange value, and in the social mode of production corresponding to it, here emerges in all its purity. (240)

The "fundamental contradiction" arises from forgetting the origins or use value of money--its origins in social relations. Marx's analysis is a display of treating money not as the thing which it appears to be, but as a result of social processes which include social relations and social needs. Marx's work is a form of analysis that treats its objects not as things, not as givens, as first, but as presupposing social relations. Analysis treats its objects as products of social processes. The purpose for inquiring into grounds is to reappropriate it--make it one's own.

Consequence of Failing to Remember Grounds--
Societal Dissolution

For Marx, the failure to re-member the grounds of money, distinct from capital, results in the dissolution of the community that is based on money. This is because the members cannot recognize that wealth in the form of money originates with exchange. By attributing wealth to money independent of exchange, they are in danger of disregarding the basis of their community:

In antiquity, exchange value was not the "nexus rerum" (the reigning connection); it appears as such only among the mercantile peoples, who had, however, no more than a carrying trade and did not, themselves, produce. At least this was the case with the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, etc. But this is a peripheral matter. They could live just as well in the interstices of the ancient world, as the Jews in Poland, or in the Middle Ages. Rather this world itself was the precondition for such trading peoples. (223)

In other words, in the ancient world as well as in the Middle Ages, there were people for whom money through trade was the "nexus rerum." However, these trading people existed only because of the production of the ancient world or the communities of the Middle Ages. Marx goes on to explain that they, therefore, would fall apart if they came into conflict with the other communities:

That is why they fall apart every time they come into serious conflict with the ancient communities. Only with the Romans, Greeks, etc. does money appear unhampered in both of its first two functions, as measure and as medium of circulation, and not very far developed in either. But as soon as either their trade etc., develops, or, as in the

case of the Romans, conquest brings them money in vast quantities--in short, suddenly, and at a certain stage of their economic development, money, necessarily appears in its third role, (general representative of wealth) and the further it develops in that role, the more the decay of their community advances. (223)

According to Marx, and this is crucial, although exchange value is a result of exchange, wealth, as the general representative of all commodities in the form of money, requires the production of commodities. By striving for wealth in the form of a thing, which is the aim of trading people, and disregarding its basis in production, the "more the decay of their community advances." Vast increases in gold that are not the result of increased commerce (i.e., increase in goods exchanged) bring the appearance of wealth, but increased gold is not enough to guarantee that the community will become wealthier. In order for increase of wealth to continue, there must be a corresponding increase in circulation. This only happens in conjunction with wage labor. This means that money must become the reason for production, the precondition for production.

Where money is only the precondition for circulation and not production, then discovering new gold is not going to increase the total available wealth in the form of commodities. It will, if anything, lead to wasteful consumption.

In order to function productively, money in its third role, as we have seen, must be not only the

precondition but equally the result of circulation, and, as its precondition, also a moment of it, something posited by it. Among the Romans, who amassed money by taking it from the world, this was not the case. (223)

If it is a result of circulation, an increase in money signifies an increase in goods circulated which means increased production. In order for money to be the basis of this increased production, wage labor is used. Money in conjunction with wage labor can act as a "driving wheel" for the development of all forces of production. It can be used to get more people to work more productively:

It is inherent in the simple character of money itself that it can exist as a developed moment of production only where and when wage labour exists; that in this case, far from subverting the social formation, it is rather a condition for its development and a driving wheel for the development of all forces of production, material and mental. (223)

In the world of antiquity, the coming into money by chance, rather than through commerce, could dissolve those communities because of the failure to remember that production is the real source of wealth, and that an increase in gold must be used to increase production if that increased gold is to represent an increase in wealth. "Where money is not itself the community [Gemeinwesen] it must dissolve the community." (224)

Marx compares this situation to that of the individual in modern society who comes into money by chance and is undermined by it because he fails to remember that it is only in conjunction with production that money brings

wealth. If the individual ceases to be productive because he now possesses money, and if he uses that money unproductively to buy for consumption rather than using it directly or indirectly as a source of production, e.g., purchasing material and hiring wage labor, then the individual will be undermined by his increase in money just as the ancient communities were:

A particular individual may even today come into money by chance, and the possession of this money can undermine him just as it undermined the communities of antiquity. But the dissolution of this individual within modern society is in itself only the enrichment of the productive section of society. The owner of money, in the ancient sense, is dissolved by the industrial process, which he serves whether he wants and knows it or not. It is a dissolution which affects only his person. (224)

Unlike the ancient communities where their dissolution was not related to any increase in production, the individual in the modern society, who ceases to produce because of his possession of gold, is at the same time contributing to the industrial process by providing the money for the seller of commodities (while he himself is being destroyed through consumption without production). The seller of the commodities who receives the gold will then use it to continue and increase production which adds to the accumulation of capital. Capital, as we shall see, by definition is productive.

Money as aim here becomes the means of general industriousness . . . General wealth is produced in order to seize hold of its representative. In this way the real sources of wealth are opened up. (224)

We have already traced the relation of industriousness, wealth and money which helps account for the connection between capital, wage labor and productivity:

When the aim of labour is not a particular product standing in a particular relation to the needs of the individual, but money, wealth in its general form, then, firstly, the individual's industriousness knows no bounds; it is indifferent to its particularity, and takes on every form which serves the purpose; it is ingenious in the creation of new objects for a social need, etc. It is clear, therefore, that when wage labour is the foundation, money does not have a dissolving effect but acts productively, whereas the ancient community as such is already in contradiction with wage labour as the general foundation. (224)

Not just in the ancient communities was the increase in gold and silver dissolving, but a similar consequence occurred during the mercantilist period, the period just before the development of industrial society. This was a period in which there was general greed for money on the part of states as well as of individuals:

The real development of the sources of wealth takes place as it were behind their backs, as a means of gaining possession of the representatives of wealth. Wherever it does not arise out of circulation--as in Spain--but has to be discovered physically, the nation is impoverished, whereas the nations which have to work in order to get it from the Spaniards develop the sources of wealth and really become rich. (225)

The problem of mercantilism is the failure to recognize that the grounds of wealth are in production, not in the physical material with which wealth is

represented. This "failure", of course, is a necessary condition of mercantilism as the hunt and desire for gold. However, this failure to recognize what real wealth is, and the treatment of money as real wealth, when combined with a system of production based on wage labor as an attempt to get the money, to "make money", results in the real development of the forces of social production. This is in spite of the failure to recognize the truth about money:

But it is inherent in the attribute in which it here becomes developed that the illusion about its nature, i.e., the fixed insistence on one of its aspects, in the abstract, and the blindness towards the contradictions contained within it, gives it a really magical significance behind the backs of individuals. In fact, it is because of this self-contradictory and hence illusory aspect, because of this abstraction, that it becomes such an enormous instrument in the real development of the forces of social production. (225)

Thus abstracting out a certain aspect and objectifying it in some thing leads to the treatment of the thing as real in itself. In orienting to this illusory aspect, people then develop the forces of production in order to gain that which appears as wealth. In doing so, they develop the real source of wealth, but in a limited way.

We have seen how contradictions arise from the money relation, the relation of the product to itself as exchange value. Contradictions arise when the essential unity of the product is broken and exchange value is

separated from it becoming symbolized in a material form. The separation of the internal unity of a product characterizes exchange, industrial development, and accumulation of treasure. Therefore, each of these activities involves inherent contradictions, just as each of the features of money--measure, medium and representative of general wealth--contradict each other and yet appear as a unity in the form of money. The contradictions are found through the analysis of the concept of money formulated as the relation of a product to itself as exchange value.

A Contradictory Form of Life and Repression of Grounds

Like the trading peoples and the mercantilist, the economists Marx criticizes fail to treat money and capital as having grounds. Rather, they treat them as natural conditions of production or expressions of natural property relations. Marx refers to the economists who on the one hand distinguish money from other commodities in explaining that conditions of modern production require money and who on the other hand, in explaining money, do it in terms of simple exchange, formulating money as only another commodity. "They take refuge in this abstraction because in the real development of money there are contradictions which are unpleasant for the apologetics of bourgeois common sense, and must hence be covered up." (197) I

read this not as an intentional covering up necessarily but a necessary covering up. In order for the bourgeois exchange relation to be maintained, its contradictory character, its grounds in separation cannot be re-membered. Separation cannot be re-membered. Only unity can be re-membered. Separated moments can be recalled.

The exchange relation of buying and selling provides an illustration of the necessity of not recognizing contradictions. The relation of buying and selling originates in the separation of exchange value and use value. It is an external relation; one side can take place independent of and with indifference to the other. At the same time the relation of buying and selling is an internal one. This means that the buying of a commodity is the selling of another commodity; the money used to buy the commodity comes from the selling of a different commodity. With the mediation of money, buying can take place independent of selling.

Although the relation of buying and selling appears to be independent and is independent in practice, the relation is internal to exchange. This means that the money for buying comes from selling. Hence no more value can be bought than was already sold. Therefore, if more value is spent on one commodity because of

stockpiling, less can be spent on other commodities. The commodities for which there is less money become devalued. This is a situation of economic crisis.

In so far as purchase and sale, the two essential moments of circulation, are indifferent to one another and separated in place and time, they by no means need to coincide . . . But in so far as they are both essential moments of a single whole, there must come a moment when the independent form is violently broken and when the inner unity is established externally through a violent explosion. Thus already in the quality of money as a medium, in the splitting of exchange into two acts, there lies the germ of crises, or at least their possibility, which cannot be realized, except where the fundamental preconditions of classically developed, conceptually adequate circulation are present. (119)

In other words, the inner unity of buying and selling is reestablished in crisis, in the depreciation of all commodities. Such economic crises are only possible when circulation and the division of labor have developed to the point that instead of production oriented toward immediate subsistence, the specific product and the specific labor must be exchanged for money. In other words, when the production of exchange values is the dominant form of production.

The splitting of exchange into purchase and sale makes it possible for me to buy without selling (stockpiling of commodities) or to sell without buying (accumulation of money) . . . At moments when purchasing and selling assert themselves as essentially different acts, a general depreciation of all commodities takes place. At moments when it turns out that money is only a medium of exchange, a depreciation of money comes about. General fall or rise of prices. (200)

Thus when buying occurs without selling (stockpiling), there is a general depreciation of all commodities. When there is an accumulation of money, there is a depreciation of money.

The economists do not recognize the contradiction in the independence and indifference, the externality, of the relations of exchange which are internal relations, an inner unity. They focus only on the end results and not on the process which mediates them. However, this "failure" on their part is necessary if they are to act as merchants or theorize in terms of the activity and problems of merchants. To be a merchant is precisely to act in terms of the externality of the moments of exchange, to buy and sell in order to realize money. Not doing this is not being a merchant. Hence it is not that seeing exchange as external relations is a mistake or an intentional cover up; it is a necessary condition for being a merchant. In other words, the condition of being a merchant is engaging in the relations of exchange, buying and selling, as external relations. To be a merchant is to realize money in exchange. As such there is no unity, only buying and selling as activities that are externally related.

Deriving Tendencies and Contradictions from
the Concept of Capital: Tendencies

By treating capital as a totality of internal relations, by examining the process in which capital is produced, Marx is able to show the tendencies of capital. With these tendencies, the possibilities of contradiction can be seen. These tendencies are derived from the formulation of capital as exchange value that reproduces and multiplies itself in circulation. Given this formulation, the development of the world market can be seen as made possible with capital. The surplus value that is created must be exchanged for other surplus value in order to continue reproducing, realizing and increasing itself. Thus the sphere of circulation must continue to expand.

The surplus value created at one point requires the creation of surplus value at another point for which it may be exchanged . . . A precondition of production based on capital is therefore, the production of a constantly widening sphere of circulation, whether the sphere itself is directly expanded or whether more points within it are created as points of production . . . The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself. (407)

Given with the tendency to create the world market is the tendency for the development of new consumption, the expansion of the consuming circle:

. . . the production of relative surplus value, i.e., production of surplus value based on the increase and development of the productive forces, requires the production of new consumption; requires that the consuming circle within circulation expands as did the productive circle previously. (408)

Marx describes three ways in which the expansion of consumption may occur:

Firstly quantitative expansion of existing consumption; secondly: creation of new needs by propagating existing ones in a wide circle; thirdly: production of new needs and discovery and creation of new use values. (408)

Thus Marx is able to treat needs as socially produced, not as natural, absolute givens. In addition to these changes that are concomitants of the production of capital and its quantitative increase in surplus value, there is also produced a corresponding increase in qualitative differences among the workers. This is because the additional capital that is made available is able to develop a different branch of production. This in turn brings forth new needs which it satisfies:

If through a doubling of productive force, a capital of 50 can now do what a capital of 100 did before, so that a capital of 50 and the necessary labour corresponding to it become free, then, for the capital and labour which have been set free, a new, qualitatively different branch of production must be created, which satisfies and brings forth a new need. (408)

The development of a new branch of production entails exploring nature to discover new things of use and to discover new useful qualities in things which in turn spurs the development of the natural sciences. In addition it leads to the discovery and/or creation of new needs in society and the cultivation of the human being rich in social needs, that is able to appreciate many

different kinds of things, therefore more cultured than before:

. . . the discovery, creation and satisfaction of new needs arising from society itself; the cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being, production of the same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and relations--production of this being as the most total and universal possible social product, for, in order to take gratification in a many-sided way, he must be capable of many pleasures (genussefahig), hence cultured to a high degree--is likewise a condition of production founded on capital. (409)

In addition to developing a more cultured human being as the product of capitalism, there is also the developing of new kinds of labor, new kinds of human activities and skills, and new needs which correspond to them:

This creation of new branches of production, i.e., of qualitatively new surplus time, is not merely the division of labour, but is rather the creation, separate from a given production, of labour with a new use value; the development of a constantly expanding and more comprehensive system of different kinds of labour, different kinds of production, to which a constantly expanding and constantly enriched system of needs corresponds. (409)

Marx, as we see, treats social needs not as independent but as derivative, as presupposing a particular process by which they are produced. This is important. It means conceiving of social needs in terms of the process by which they are created and in which they are grounded. This approach differs from, and distinguishes Marx from, the ordinary treatment of social needs as object-like

things that can be observed, measured or assessed, where the objective aspect is separated from the subject--the processes and relations by which it is produced and made intelligible.

While on the one hand, capital develops and utilizes all kinds of physical and mental qualities, on the other hand these are developed only in order to serve the reproduction and multiplication of capital, i.e., the development of these qualities as a means for capital production rather than as an end. The development of the human being through the development of new needs, capacities and abilities is not the aim of production. Instead the only end is the constant increase in capital:

Just as production founded on capital creates universal industriousness...so does it create on the other side a system of . . . general utility, utilizing science itself just as much as all the physical and mental qualities, while there appears nothing higher in itself, nothing legitimate for itself, outside this circle of social production and exchange. Thus capital creates the bourgeois society, and the universal appropriation of nature as well as of the social bond itself by the members of society. (409)

Thus the bourgeois society is equated with a system of utility, a system where everything is treated in terms of its use for making money, i.e., reproducing and increasing capital. Marx indicates that this includes not just the appropriation of nature, but of the social bond as well, i.e., treating social relations in terms of its use for increasing wealth.

We have seen that by treating the concept as presupposing a process for its realization, we have been able to derive many characteristics of industrial society from that process. Unlike the approach which might notice that these characteristics are associated with capital or industrialization and then posit a reason for the connection, Marx derives them from the analysis of the concept or phenomenon, capital, itself. These characteristics are seen as internal to the concept, not external relations to it.

Deriving Tendencies and Contradictions From
the Concept of Capital: Contradictions

In addition to the exchange with labor and the appropriation of labor, there are several other processes involved in the realization of capital. After capital (in the form of wages) is exchanged with labor and labor is appropriated, a product is produced. Capital now exists in the form of a commodity. In order to realize itself as value, the capitalist must exchange the product for money. Because capital is not immediately exchange value but must realize itself by going through certain exchanges, devaluation is an integral moment of the process.

Suppose that this process breaks down--and the separation by itself implies the possibility of such a miscarriage in the individual case--then the capitalist's money has been transformed into a worthless product, and has not only not gained a new value, but also lost its original value.

But whether this is so or not, in any case devaluation forms one moment of the realization process; which is already simply implied in the fact that the product of the process in its immediate form is not value, but first has to enter anew into circulation in order to be realized as such. (403)

Since capital is value which is realized only through processes of exchange, it is at the same time not-value because it first has to be realized. It is possible that the value may not be realized because of external conditions, conditions external to the individual producers and individual processes of production. Thus the separation of what is considered a conceptual unity--capital--into several processes is the grounds of problems.

The unity of capital requires various processes which are separated in time and space. For the individual producer, the unity--the transition from one phase to another--may not occur. Because of the separations, capital may not be realized although as the basis of all production, capital must not be realized or else there would be no production. This analysis of capital as a negative unity, a unity of negations mediated by exchange, accounts for the crises and contradictions according to my reading of Marx.

Capital is made up of processes, each of which is the absence of or negation of the others. Thus capital is both value and not-value. It is not an immediate

identity but a mediated one. In order for not-value to also be value, the mediation of exchange is required. According to my reading, any mediation between the subject and object, other than labor is problematic for Marx.

The concept of capital presupposes the unity of production with exchange value. It is defined by Marx as the production of exchange value. However, exchange mediates capital. The concept (capital) can only be realized through the process of exchange which is separated from and external to the process of production. Exchange mediates the unity of production and the realizing of exchange value. Hence capital is a mediated unity (of negations) rather than an immediate unity.

Therefore, while capital is reproduced as value and new value in the production process, it is at the same time posited as not-value, as something which first has to be realized as value by means of exchange. The three processes of which capital forms the unity are external; they are separate in time and space. As such, the transition from one into the other; i.e., their unity as regards the individual capitalist, is accidental. Despite their inner unity, they exist independently alongside one another each as the presupposition of the other. (403)

The three processes of which capital forms the unity are: exchange with labor (wages); exchange with consumers as commodity for money; exchange with other producers as money for raw materials and instruments of production. Each of these processes contains its own conditions, e.g., the need for it, the availability of

equivalent exchange value with which to purchase it, etc. which may exist as barriers to the realization of capital.

The indifference of the various moments of the realization process of capital, the contradiction between the inner unity and the external independence of the moments, is treated by Marx as the foundation of contradictions:

So far in the realization process, we have only the indifference of the individual moments towards one another; that they determine each other internally and search for each other externally; but that they may or may not find each other, balance each other, correspond to each other. The inner necessity of moments which belong together, and their indifferent, independent existence towards one another, are already a foundation of contradictions. (414-415)

In addition to the contradiction between production and realization of capital due to the apparent independence and indifference of the different processes involved in its realization, analysis shows the contradiction in capital that derives from that foundation.

The contradiction between production and realization of which capital, by its concept, is the unity--has to be grasped more intrinsically than merely as the indifferent, seemingly reciprocally independent appearance of the individual moments of the process, or rather the totality of processes. (415)

I have shown how Marx formulates capital as the preservation, reproduction and expansion of itself as general wealth which requires the continual development of the forces of production. Given this formulation of

the concept, in positing inherent limits to that development, it contradicts itself as the expansion of general wealth.

First of all, there is a limit, not inherent to production generally, but to production founded on capital. (Capital) appears as the condition of the development of the forces of production as long as they require an external spur, which appears at the same time as their bridle. It is a discipline over them which becomes superfluous and burdensome at a certain level of their development, just like the guilds, etc. These inherent limits have to coincide with the nature of capital, with the essential character of its very concept. (415)

In other words, analysis shows that the limits that capital places on development contradict the essence of its concept.

Limitations that Contradict the Essence of Capital

The contradiction between restricting production and its essence in increasing production derives from the indifference of the various moments of the realization process of capital, moments that "belong together" and "determine each other internally." These limits on the development of the forces of production that are inherent in the concept of capital are:

1. Necessary labour as limit on the exchange value of living labour capacity or of the wages of the industrial population. (415)

The wages paid to labor are limited to the equivalent of the cost of purchasing the necessities for

subsistence. The worker gets paid as if he worked the amount of time to produce the equivalent of the necessities--necessary labor time. He is not paid more than it costs to reproduce him as labor power. This is a limitation on the development of the forces of production which include the laborer. His development is limited by the exchange value of necessary labor.

2. Surplus value as limit on surplus labour time, and in regard to relative surplus labour time, as barrier to the development of the forces of production. (415)

The workers can only produce more than necessary labor time to the amount that can be realized as surplus value, as money. Thus the production of goods is limited to their ability to be exchanged for money, even if the labor capacity to produce more is there. In regard to relative surplus labor time, which is produced through machinery or any other means that can reduce necessary labor time, it is only when more surplus value can be realized, that labor-saving machinery will be introduced. If labor-power can be hired more cheaply, then the material forces of production will not be developed.

3. What is the same, the transformation into money, exchange value as such, as limit of production. This is:

4. Again the same as restriction of the production of use values by exchange value; or that real wealth has to take on a specific form distinct from itself, a form not absolutely identical with it, in order to become an object of production at all. (416)

Thus the essential limit on production is the need to transform it into money. Even if the objects themselves constitute real wealth, contribute to the reproduction and development of labor, they will not be produced if people will not purchase them with money, e.g., lack of good housing for the poor if they cannot afford to buy it.

However, these limits come up against the general tendency of capital to forget and abstract from these four internal limits. The tendency is to forget and simply strive to produce as much as possible. Such production is considered "over production" when it cannot be transformed into money. With overproduction the moments of production are recalled and production ceases. Forgetting these constraints and producing "too much" results in devaluation.

Hence overproduction: i.e., the sudden recall of all these necessary moments of production founded on capital; hence general devaluation in consequence of forgetting them. (416)

There is another contradiction that is grounded in forgetting the various moments that constitute the production and realization of capital. This contradiction is due to forgetting that, as Malthus says:

'the very existence of a profit upon any commodity presupposes a demand exterior to that of the laborer who has produced it.' and hence the demand of the laborer himself can never be an adequate demand. (420)

The tendency is for each capitalist to abstract his relation to his workers from the totality of the capital-labor relation. Each capitalist restricts the wages and therefore the worker's ability to exchange and consume while hoping that the workers of other capitalists will purchase his own commodities:

Every capitalist knows this about his worker, that he does not relate to him as producer to consumer, and (he, therefore,) wishes to restrict his consumption, i.e., his ability to exchange, his wage, as much as possible. Of course he would like the workers of other capitalists to be the greatest consumers possible of his own commodity. (420)

However, it seems to each capitalist that the demand of the working class is an adequate demand. Therefore, the capitalists set production in motion to produce as much as possible which they expect to be purchased by the workers of the other capitalists. This production, therefore, goes beyond the proportion that would correspond to what the workers could purchase:

Since one production sets the other into motion and hence creates consumers for itself in the alien capital's workers, it seems to each individual capital that the demand of the working class posited by production itself is an 'adequate demand.' On one side, this demand which production itself posits drives it forward, and must drive it forward beyond the proportion in which it would have to produce with regard to the workers: on the other side, if the demand exterior to the demand of the laborer himself disappears or shrinks up, then the collapse occurs. (420)

And again we see Marx attributing the contradiction to separation, in this case each capital is indifferent to and independent, i.e., separate from, the other capitals:

It is the indifference to and independence (competition) of one another which brings it about that the individual capital relates to the workers of the entire remaining capital not as workers, hence is driven beyond the right proportion. (420)

According to Marx's formulation, capital is the reproduction and expansion of wealth accomplished through appropriating surplus value produced by labor. While it appropriates the surplus value, it only pays labor for necessary labor, that which is necessary to reproduce the worker as labor power:

To begin with: capital forces the workers beyond necessary labor to surplus labor. Only in this way does it realize itself and create surplus value. (421)

However, since the aim is surplus value, necessary labor only comes in when there can be surplus labor that can be exchanged for surplus value--wealth in the form of money. Therefore, if surplus value cannot be realized for any reason, then necessary labor is no longer called into being, i.e., workers are no longer able to find work and earn wages that will pay for their subsistence.

But on the other hand, it posits necessary labour only to the extent and in so far as it is surplus labour and the latter is realizable as surplus value. As soon as it cannot posit value, it does not posit necessary labour; and given its foundation, it cannot be otherwise. (421)

By restricting labor according to the possibility or lack of possibility of realizing surplus value, the creation of wealth is restricted. This barrier to the creation of wealth is internal to the process of capital at the same time that it contradicts the essence of (the concept of) capital which is to expand wealth:

By its nature, therefore, it posits a barrier to labour and value-creation, in contradiction to its tendency to expand them boundlessly. And in as much as it both posits a barrier specific to itself, and on the other side equally drives over and beyond every barrier, it is the living contradiction. (421)

In addition to the inherent limits on the development of production which contradict the essence of its concept: keep increasing and expanding production, is the inherent devaluation of capital. Although the formulation of capital is a process in which wealth reproduces and increases itself in circulation, it is at the same time a process of devaluation, a process of realizing itself as decreasing value.

Devaluation as a Contradictory Tendency

In order to understand how devaluation is involved, we first have to review the processes and moments of which capital is the unity:

If we examine the entire turnover of capital, then four moments appear, or each of the two great moments of the production process and the circulation process appears again in a duality: . . . The moments are (I) The real production process and its duration. (II) Transformation of the product into money. (III) Transformation of the money in the proper proportions into raw material, means of labour, . . . (IV) The exchange of a part of the capital for living labour capacity. (520)

The important point is to start from the recognition of the totality. We saw earlier Marx's critique of others' analyses who treated circulation alone and did not consider production. Marx said that circulation should be considered a moment of Production. The point rather is the emphasis on considering the two processes as a unity expressed by the concept of capital--the unity of the realization of capital. It does not much matter which is called the totality--production or circulation and which is considered a moment of the other:

. . . we can take either circulation or production as the point of departure here. This much as now been said, that circulation is itself a moment of production since capital becomes capital only through circulation; production is a moment of circulation only in so far as the latter is itself regarded as the totality of the production process. (520)

Marx then shows how the separation into distinct processes, which appear indifferent to and independent of each other contradicts the inner unity of capital. This contradiction takes the form of devaluation, which is a contradiction of the essence of capital which is to increase continually.

Capital exists as capital only in so far as it passes through the phases of circulation. . . in order to be able to begin the production process anew, and these phases are themselves phases of its realization--but at the same time, as we saw, of its devaluation. (546)

Devaluation occurs because during each phase capital is fixed in one form which means that it cannot be realizing itself in another form, i.e., the process of realization, reproduction and multiplication, is held up:

As long as capital remains frozen in the form of the finished product, it cannot be active as capital, it is negated capital. Its realization process is delayed in the same degree, and its value--in process negated. This thus appears as a loss for capital, as a relative loss of its value, for its value consists precisely in its realization process. This loss of capital means in other words nothing else but that time passes it by unseized, time during which it could have been appropriating alien labour, surplus labour time through exchange with living labour, if the deadlock had not occurred. (546)

The unity of capital consists in movement, in the process of realization which includes both the circulation process and the production process; anything which impedes the movement is an impediment, a barrier to capital. The

separation of the unity of capital, as unity-in-process, into its various phases and their existence as dependent on seemingly external and independent conditions, e.g., finding a market for its goods, creates its own barriers. Capital, fixated in any of its phases--which is posited by the separation of the unity into indifferent moments--is a negation of itself as subject, as unity-in-process:

This unity itself is motion, process. Capital appears as this unity-in-process of production and circulation. . . But while capital. . . is the process of going from one phase into the other, it is at the same time, within each phase, posited in a specific aspect, restricted to a particular form, which is the negation of itself as the subject of the whole movement. Therefore, capital in each of its particular phases is the negation of itself as the subject of all the various metamorphoses. (620)

We saw above how during the time in which capital is frozen in the form of the product, it is negated capital, devalued, because it is time during which it could have been engaged in producing more surplus value. Similarly, the time during which it is fixated in any of the other phases is also a devaluation process at the same time that it is a realization process:

As long as it remains in circulation, it is not capable of producing. . . As long as it cannot be brought to market, it is fixated as product. As long as it cannot be exchanged for conditions of production, it is fixated as money. Finally, if the conditions of production remain in their form as conditions and do not enter into the production process, it is again fixated and devalued. (621)

The key to understanding capital then is grasping that capital is a process; a unity in process which is divided into aspects called moments which are separated in time and space and indifferent to each other. This means that for the individuals attempting to realize capital, the realization is dependent on external uncontrollable circumstances.

Because the separation, fixation and consequent devaluation contradicts the essence of capital as unity which is to maximize itself, capital invents certain procedures for minimizing the time that it is fixated and devalued. One of the methods is the utilization of the middleman--a merchant--who will buy the product immediately in order to resell it. This way the capitalist does not have to wait so long to realize the exchange value of his products. Another method is the use of credit in order to continue or expand the production process even before the products have realized their exchange value. These methods bring with it a third which is the production at maximum capacity for an extended period followed by a reduction of production after it has been found that the products are not able to realize their exchange value, i.e., the alternation of overproduction and underproduction:

. . .since the decomposition into these two aspects, in which the realization process

appears at the same time as the devaluation process, contradicts the tendency of capital towards maximum realization, it therefore invents contrivances to abbreviate the phase of fixity; and at the same time also, instead of the simultaneous co-existence of both states, they alternate. In one period the process appears as altogether fluid--the period of the maximum realization of capital; in another, a reaction to the first, the other moment asserts itself all the more forcibly--the period of the maximum devaluation of capital and congestion of the production process. (623)

Thus a period of maximum devaluation and restriction of production follows the period of maximum realization. The alternation of the two periods, according to Marx, is due to the use of credit.

As we saw earlier that money suspends the barriers of barter only by generalizing them--i.e., separating purchase and sale entirely--so shall we see later that credit likewise suspends these barriers to the realization of capital only by raising them to their most general form, positing one period of overproduction and one of underproduction as two periods (623). . . The necessary tendency of capital is therefore circulation without circulation time, and this tendency is the fundamental determinant of credit and of capital's credit contrivances. (659)

In other words, in order not to lose valuable production time during circulation time, the capitalist uses credit to keep him producing. This has the effect of seeming to allow for increasing production independent of circulation. However, production is not independent of circulation. When the product starts having difficulty realizing its exchange value

on the market (i.e., in circulation) then production must eventually cease. In this way according to Marx, we have the periodic crises of capitalism--depression, unemployment following a period of prosperity.

Contradictory Tendency of the Falling Rate of Profit as
an Analytic Possibility

A final contradiction that Marx derives is that of the tendency for a falling rate of profit. Capital tries to eliminate wages which must be paid to reproduce the worker, his necessary labor. The capital that is paid as wages to the worker seems to reduce capital. Therefore capital tries to limit or eliminate necessary labor. However, the belief that one can eliminate necessary labor and still produce capital is a delusion, as capital is the production and realization of surplus value, which is the production that takes place during surplus labor time. The concept of surplus labor time is only possible given that of necessary labor time. Surplus labor time is labor time beyond that necessary for reproducing the worker, for producing his wages. Hence, the process of producing and realizing capital is again seen as involving contradictory tendencies. The contradiction arises from forgetting the essential unity of necessary labor time and surplus labor time:

Capital itself is the contradiction in that while it tries to suspend necessary labor time, necessary

labour time is the necessary condition for surplus labour time. (543)

The contradiction "is at the same time the reduction of the worker to a minimum, i.e., his existence as mere living labour capacity." It takes the form of keeping down wages.

This contradiction is similar to the contradiction that is the basis of Marx's famous "law of the tendency of the rate of surplus value to fall."

Whereas the rate of surplus value is determined by the relation of surplus labour employed by the capital to necessary labour, the rate of profit is nothing but the relation of the surplus value to the total value of the capital presupposed to production." (753)

If the rate of surplus value to the total value is high, this would mean that constant capital such as machinery and raw material was taking up a relatively large share of the total capital compared to capital paid to labor as wages. This would mean that the rate of profit would be less than if, given the same total capital, a proportionately larger share went to labor than to constant capital. If the labor component remained the same size and produced the same amount of surplus value, then the relation of this surplus value to a larger total capital (represented by a larger constant capital) would decrease.

Presupposing the same surplus value, the same surplus labour in proportion to necessary labour, then, the rate of profit depends on the

relation between the part of capital exchanged for living labour and the part existing in the form of raw material and means of production. Hence, the smaller the portion exchanged for living labour becomes, the smaller becomes the rate of profit. (747)

With increased productivity, more capital necessarily goes to constant capital. At the same time, the rate of profit declines.

The empirical accuracy of Marx's analysis is not of issue here. Therefore, I will leave to others the explication and discussion of the empirical relevance of the theory of the falling rate of profit and the ways in which this tendency is counteracted according to Marx.

Rather, my purpose in introducing this contradictory tendency as well as the others discussed above is to analyze how it is possible for Marx to be able to theorize in terms of contradictory tendencies. According to my analysis, the contradictory tendencies are made possible by formulating capital in terms of the exchange relation which itself is a contradictory form. Its contradictory character derives from the separation and indifference inherent in the exchange relation, the separation of the inner unity of use value and exchange value. This separation is expressed in a still higher power as producing and realizing continual increases in capital. The separation is seen as such against the possibility of unity that analysis knows as the unity of subject and object, purpose and objective

conditions for realizing that purpose. I have reformulated this unity in terms of Marx's work as the form of life of socialism.

A form of life that is contradictory is an internally violent form, a form that presupposes and produces struggle. Its inherent contradictions do violence to its possibility as a form of life. Its necessary actions contradict its basic premises; devaluation and restriction of the development of the forces of production contradict its posited character as constantly expanding wealth and constantly expanding forces of production. The contradictions of capital derive from the separation of an internal unity.

Capital as the unity of circulation and production is at the same time the division between them, and a division whose aspects are separated in space and time, at that. In each moment, it has an indifferent form towards the other. For the individual capital, the transition from one into the other appears as chance, as dependent on external, uncontrollable circumstances . . .
(622)

Because of its contradictory character, the form of life of capital must be concrete; it must forget grounds in order to maintain itself as a self-contradictory, one-sided form. It is one-sided in that it represents exchange value against itself as use value. In order to exist as such, capital must forget grounds and treat itself as first, as its own foundation:

Through the absorption of living labour time and through the movement of its own circulation, it relates to itself as positing new value, as producer of value. It relates as the foundation to surplus value as that which it founded. Its movement consists of relating to itself, while it produces itself, at the same time as the foundation of what it has founded, as value presupposed to itself as surplus value, or to the surplus value as posited by it. (745)

Capital is a divided subject that cannot recognize itself as such and still be capital. Therefore, it treats itself as subject (or object). It treats surplus value as something it has founded. It considers itself the producer of value as well as the value produced.

Proceeding from itself as the active subject, the subject of the process-- . . . capital relates to itself as self-increasing value; i.e. it relates to surplus value as something posited and founded by it; it relates as well-spring of production, to itself as product, it relates as producing value to itself as produced value. (746-747)

In other words, in forgetting grounds and treating itself as subject, capital is a concrete form of life. Its forgetting allows for contradictory tendencies, tendencies which are in opposition and conflict. These contradictory tendencies are presupposed in the concept of capital. An analysis of capital reveals its essential contradiction: the separation of an internal unity into indifferent moments.

Separation is the condition of capital and the ground of concrete theorizing. The separation and its contradictions not only provide for the possibility of a

concrete form of life but for the possibility of overcoming these contradictions by suspending the separation, suspending the relations of capital. Conversely, the possibility of suspending the relations of capital, provides for the possibility of Marx's analysis.

Marx's analysis begins from the possibility of the unity of an analytic form of life, the form of life of analytic socialism. From this perspective, it is able to formulate capital as a separation and to see the contradictory tendencies that derive from it.

CHAPTER 6

VIOLATING FOUR RULES FOR PRODUCING MARX'S THEORIZING

For sociology, Marx's method of theorizing serves as an answer to, a critique of, a form of life that fails to be self-conscious. I have made this method more explicit. I did so by providing the conception of dialectical phenomenology put forth in chapter 1, together with a grammar (a set of rules) for producing it. Chapters 2-5 displayed and explicated the four rules of dialectical phenomenology. I use these rules, in short, as a heuristic device for analyzing Marx's method of theorizing in the Grundrisse.

In a last chapter, I will show how concrete theorizing violates these four rules. Part One of this chapter deals with violations by political economists in Marx's own time. Part Two turns to present-day sociologists and Marxist scholars.

How, the reader may ask at this point, do past or current violations of such heuristic "rules" make a difference in the character of the sociological theorizing produced?

In providing examples of other readings of Marx that violate these rules, I will show how these rules implicate the theorizing and conception of Marx that is produced. They violate the rules, I claim, as a result of not providing phenomenological foundations (see pp. above) for Marx's theorizing. Such violators stress the end results of his work as against its grounds. In turn, such emphasis on result rather than origin makes the sociological theorizing of Karl Marx appear more problematic than need be.

Similarly, Marx criticizes political economy for precisely the same reason: it too, Marx claims, considers only the end product and fails to account for its origins.

Part One: Violations by Political Economists

My first illustration of concrete theorizing comes from a bourgeois theory of economic crises that Marx criticized. His critique of this theory highlights the difference between that method of theorizing and his own. I will begin by showing how Darimon's theory of economic crisis violates the first rule.

Rule 1: Treat Concepts as Grounded in a Historically Specific Form of Life

Under this rule I will examine Darimon's treatment of gold and silver as things independent of the

productive activities of a people. His theory was that abolishing the metal standard would eliminate the problems that constituted economic crises.

Darimon argued that the practices of the banks were harmful to the public in that they raised the price of gold (the discount rate or rate at which it would lend money) precisely when the public most needed funds. He explained this crisis by the flow of gold out of the country and the need of banks to maintain their reserves by discouraging borrowing. This "need" is the condition, and the "flow" the foundation, of the crisis that Darimon took as a theoretic problem. He concluded, therefore, that the elimination of the metal standard would enable the banks to lend at a rate proportional to the public need and compatible with the need to maintain sufficient bank reserves.

Darimon's explanation rests on his account of the gold drain. He attributes the flight of the precious metals to crop failures that required the importation of foreign grain. He further cites the numerous expensive but unproductive undertakings associated with the industrial exhibition in Paris. Marx answers that Darimon "forgets" the failure of the silk harvest and the need to purchase silk in vast quantities from China. Marx states that Darimon "forgets" speculations and ventures abroad launched by the Credit Mobilier and its rivals plus the unproductive

expenditures of the Crimean War, including borrowings of 750 million francs. On one side there was a great and unexpected collapse in two of the most important branches of French production (failure of grain and silk harvest). On the other, there was an unusual employment of French capital in foreign markets for undertakings which by no means immediately paid their way and which might never cover their costs of production.

The solution of going off the gold standard would only make sense if gold (and silver) were only symbols of circulation which facilitates the exchange of equivalents. In other words, if gold and silver were simply money. (Marx distinguishes between money as measure of exchange value and medium of exchange, and capital as productive wealth.) In that case a shortage of gold would be attributable to a failure to produce as much as is necessary for circulation, a problem that paper money and a printing press could remedy. However, Marx argues that gold, in this situation, is capital. In order to make up for the "real" losses, production and capital lost through speculations and ventures abroad as well as the Crimean War, what would be needed would be "not money but capital."

The reduction in capital is not due solely to the failure of the domestic production because "the losses in

domestic production, in any case, were not an equivalent for the employment of French capital abroad." In other words, even if there had not been a crop failure, there would have been a crisis because more capital had been lost than would have been produced had the crops been successfully harvested.

Marx's analysis highlights the inconsistency in Darimon's thinking. Marx shows that Darimon's solution is based on seeing gold and silver as symbols of the circulation of equivalents (money) rather than as capital. On the one hand Darimon sees that the gold drain is due to the loss of productive wealth (capital) through grain failures ("forgetting" the loss due to speculation and war). On the other hand, Darimon sees the gold drain as a loss of the medium of circulation. He sees it this way when he suggests that going off the gold standard would allow the banks to lend at a more favorable rate. Marx points out Darimon's inconsistency by showing that the increase in the discount rate was due to a loss in capital and the laws of supply and demand.

Marx takes Darimon's analysis and carries it out to its logical end, showing that the crisis is the loss of capital (this is what increases the discount rate) not the gold drain per se. He does this by showing what would happen if the metal basis were eliminated.

Because of the great demand relative to the decreased supply of goods, there would be a great increase in demand for bank loans to invest in production. However, due to the decreased supply of goods and the increased demand, there would be an increase in the price of products that are necessary for production. Thus, compared to the increase in these prices, the price of bank loans if unchanged would have decreased relatively. Each dollar the bank possesses would now be worth less, would be able to purchase less. Therefore, the bank would then devalue its paper money by raising the price of a loan (credit) to reflect its decreased value. With the devaluation, production would decline because the devaluated money would result in a relative increase in the price of the necessary goods.

All of this can be reduced to the impact of a smaller supply of goods to back the dollar; therefore, the dollar is worth less than before at a time when the price of goods is even greater than before due to the shortage:

On the other side, an unlimited increase in bank drafts. Direct consequence therefore, increase in the price of products, raw material and labor. On the other side, decrease in price of bank drafts. The bank would have undertaken a very ordinary operation to devalue its own paper. With this devaluation, a sudden paralysis of production!
(121-122)

What Marx's criticism of Darimon amounts to is his claim that Darimon fails to understand that gold and silver

in this case symbolize the exchangeable wealth of a country, capital. The need of banks to raise its terms of discounting (its discount rate) precisely when the 'public' most needs money is not due simply to the need to maintain its gold and silver reserves, but rather is due to the decrease in the exchangeable wealth of the nation and the consequent increase in the price of goods relative to the dollar. Thus the bank would devalue the dollar to reflect its new lower value. The effect of this is the same as if the metal standard were retained and the banks raised the discount rate--made loans more costly. In either case, the necessary goods for production would be difficult or impossible to purchase and production would, therefore, decline or cease.

Thus the problem with Darimon's thinking is that he fails to see through or to understand the grounds of gold and silver. He treats the precious metals as absolute wealth, as things, rather than symbols of exchangeable wealth. The problem is the failure to realize that gold and silver as capital (productive wealth) originate in production, whereas gold and silver as money (measure of exchange values, medium of circulation) originate in exchange. Darimon treats gold in terms of its concrete availability as a thing used in exchange rather than in terms of its production as capital, exchangeable wealth. This is possible because of the difference between money

and capital, a difference that is internal to gold since gold is capital and is also money. It is the difference, also, between a commodity as product and as exchange value. Darimon must forget that gold is capital when he attributes the appreciation of gold to the bank's policy and the metal standard. If he did not, he would have to see that the crisis, the appreciation of gold, was due to the production of capital itself. At the same time, he must recognize that gold is capital in accounting for the gold drain.

Thus Darimon fails to treat gold (capital) as a concept, an object grounded in a historically specific form of life. Instead of treating it as a product, a social relation, he treats it as a thing. As Marx said with regard to Adam Smith's formulation of capital:

The catch is that if all capital is objectified labour which serves as means for new production, it is not the case that all objectified labour which serves as means for new production is capital. Capital is conceived as a thing, not as a relation. (258)

The failure of Darimon's solution is not unique to Darimon (although the solution might have been). What is of interest is not just the solution, but the type of thinking that produces the solution, the type of thinking that conceives of capital as a thing. Darimon's is an example of concrete, rather than analytic, theorizing. It denies history.

Rule 2: Treat Individuals as Grounded in a Historically
Specific Form of Life

Individuals are, for this rule, grounded actors, or simply actions in the sense of engaged, interested, practical acts. Darimon treats the banks' actions as externally motivated, as reasons, rather than interested and practically exclusive of alternative interest. If reasons for changing high interest rates are eliminated, the banks will lower the rates. However, Darimon's proposal requires that the 'reasons' for the banks' actions not be imbedded in a historically specific form of life, but be rationally specific to a particular decision. Darimon began with the assertion of a problem that pre-determined its solution--that bank decisions were responsible for a harm to the public and that the decisions were immediately responsive to a depletion of supply of money. Darimon's assertion that the banks took measures "to stem the progressive diminution of its reserves" to the public detriment, led him to conclude that the metal basis of the banks' reserve was in contradiction with the requirements of circulation.

Marx argues that the banks were not simply responding to an immediate need that might increase or decrease, come or go. They were, instead, acting in accord with the general law of accumulation that expresses

policy and, therefore, recommends eliminating the metal standard. Marx suggests that this is inconsistent. Why not reproach the grain merchants or, by implication, all merchants for they also raise prices when the public is most in need? He says that these actions are all in accordance with the economic laws of supply and demand--that money and grain are commodities--and that Darimon fails to realize this.

Thus Marx is arguing that it is only as appearance that the bank or by extension any individual independently determines its own acts. The bank is not an independent entity separate from its acts but its acts are, together, the bank itself as a form of life. The situation may be compared to a game where the moves of the players are made in accordance with the rules of the game and it is only to that extent that these are players, or actors in the game. For Marx, it would be absurd to treat the acts of the banks apart from the rules that makes these acts acts and the bank a bank.

Rule 3: Treat the Form of Life as a Totality of Internal Relations

In addressing himself to the theories of the monetarists, who attributed the crisis to the drain or outflow of capital in the form of gold and silver, Marx

argues that the gold drain is not a separate process from production, but is part of production. The crisis is the crisis of the particular mode of production which is based on the laws of supply and demand. It is not enough, in fact it is misleading, to attribute the crisis to the drain of gold, as if refraining from importing would eliminate the crisis by keeping gold at home.

Marx begins by giving reasons for the outflow of gold (or silver):

1. drain as a result of domestic harvest failures in a chief food crop
2. increased prices in main imported goods due to crop failure abroad
3. drain because of crop failure in decisive industrial raw materials (e.g. silk)
4. drain because of excessive imports (caused by speculation and war)

Because of the need to replace the shortage through imports, a part of its invested capital or labor is not reproduced; there is a real loss of production. A part of the capital which has been reproduced has to be shifted to fill this gap. The price of the deficient production or yield rises on the world market as a result of the decreased supply and increased demand. The grain failures and the excessive imports are the most important cases, he feels. The impact of war is self-evident. It is economically the same as if the nation were to drop a part of its capital into the ocean. Marx states that "[it] is necessary to

analyze precisely how such crises would look if money were disregarded, and what determinants money introduces into the given relations." p. 218. In other words, Marx looks to Production as a totality before inquiring into the effects of money. Marx goes on to work out how a crop failure results in the depreciation of capital:

Suppose that the entire English wheat crop were 1 quarter, and that this 1 quarter fetched the same price as 30 million quarters previously. [If] we postulate that the working day necessary to produce 1 quarter = A, then the nation would exchange A x 30 million working days (cost of production) for 1 x A working days (product). The productive force of its capital would have diminished by millions since every working day would have depreciated by a factor of 30 million. (128)

With the crop failure, each working day produces 1 quarter instead of the previous 30 million quarters. Yet, the costs of production are based on the "normal" productivity, the average labor time required in the previous production of 30 million quarters. This average labor time (one of the costs of production) now produces 1/30,000,000 of what it had previously. Marx concludes that every unit of capital would then represent 1/30,000,000 of its earlier value, of its equivalent in production costs. He traces the effects of the grain crisis to other branches of production as follows:

With or without metallic money, or money of any other kind, the nation would find itself in a crisis not confined to grain, but extending to all other branches of production, not only because their

productivity would have positively diminished, and the price of their production depreciated as compared to their value, which is determined by the normal cost of production, but also because all contracts, obligations etc. rest on the average prices of products. (129) [Emphasis mine]

The increase in the grain price by a factor of A x 30 million would be the expression of an equivalent depreciation of all other products. The surplus sum which the nation must expend in purchasing grain is a direct subtraction from its capital, its exchangeable wealth. Thus, Marx is able to say, the rise in the grain price is the same as a fall in the price of all other commodities.

The major point that Marx is making in this discussion is that one cannot simply attribute an economic crisis to the export of gold, as a factor that is externally related to production. It must be seen in relation to the totality, that which produces it as a sensible action.

A crisis caused by a failure in the grain crop is therefore not at all created by the drain of bullion. . . . The depreciation of most commodities (labour included) and the resultant crisis, in the case of an important crop mishap, cannot therefore be crudely ascribed to the export of gold, because depreciation and crisis would equally take place if no gold whatever were exported and no grain imported. (129-130)

The totality that is Production in this particular historical mode is characterized by the laws of supply and demand. These laws are the basis of the type of Production and the basis of the crisis.

The crisis reduces itself simply to the law of supply and demand, which, as is known, acts far more sharply and energetically within the sphere of primary needs--seen on a national scale--than in all other spheres. Exports of gold are not the cause of the grain crisis, but the grain crisis is the cause of gold exports. (130)

The problem or crisis is the "depreciation of most commodities as compared to their value." The value of a commodity is determined by the average labor time required to produce it in relation to the average labor time needed to produce other commodities. (Cost of production.) If a certain amount of labor time is expended and the quantity of product A that is produced is significantly less than previous times (e.g., crop failure), it is the same as if the average labor time has increased for producing each item of commodity A. Therefore, the labor time embodied in the other goods, B, C, D in relation to or in proportion to that embodied in commodity A changes the relative value of commodities B, C, D. This is particularly important when commodity A is within the sphere of primary needs.

After analyzing the basis of the crisis independent of gold and silver, he then goes to examine their role in the crisis:

Gold and silver in themselves can be said to intervene in the crisis and to aggravate its symptoms in only two ways: (1) When the export of gold is made more difficult by the metal reserve requirements to which the banks are bound; when the measures which the banks therefore undertake against the export of gold react disadvantageously on domestic circulation; (2) When the export of gold

becomes necessary because foreign nations will accept capital only in the form of gold and not otherwise. (130)

The necessity of exporting gold and silver, then, does not cause the crisis but can aggravate it. The economic "crisis" must, therefore, be understood as produced by a form of life characterized by relations of exchange, laws of supply and demand, i.e., commodity production.

The export of gold and silver which appears to be the immediate reason for the bank's depreciation must be seen not as an independent factor or cause but as grounded in a totality called Production. He describes the totality as production for exchange value realized through supply and demand.

Rule 4: Treat a Concrete Form of Life as Contradictory

A form of life, in which crises appear to be due to a shortage of gold which could be remedied by retaining gold instead of exporting it, is concrete in its self-understanding. It denies the grounds of gold in production. Gold appears to be a thing rather than a relation. Its character as capital is not analyzed. Therefore, it is not recognized that the crisis of gold is a crisis of capital--a loss of productive wealth which in a market economy results in an increase in the exchange value of that wealth. This is the economic crisis.

Darimon and others had been concerned about the appreciation of gold and silver. The rise in the costs of bank loans, the appreciation of gold and silver, reduces or prevents production and produces crisis. Marx claims that the appreciation of gold and silver, however, is only one side of a relation, the side that surfaces during crises. Bourgeois economists fail to see the other side, the depreciation of gold and silver during prosperity. They fail to theorize about crises and prosperity together.

Darimon and consorts see only the one aspect which surfaces during crises: the appreciation of gold and silver in relation to nearly all other commodities; they do not see the other side, the depreciation of gold and silver or of money in relation to all other commodities (labour perhaps, not always, excluded) in periods of so-called prosperity, periods of a temporary general rise of prices. (134)

Marx states that the depreciation of metallic money always precedes its appreciation. I take this to mean that periods of high productivity produce the accumulation of capital which needs to be re-employed, hence depreciation, low rates on bank loans, new ventures, overproduction and speculation. This results in losses of capital and the consequent appreciation of gold and silver--rise in the discount rate. Therefore Marx states that seeing the problem only in terms of appreciation is one-sided. The other side of the capital relation is depreciation; depreciation always precedes appreciation, and a theory of the crisis must be simultaneously a theory of prosperity:

Since this depreciation of metallic money (and of all kinds of money which rest on it) always precedes its appreciation, they ought to have formulated the problem the other way round: how to prevent the periodic depreciation of money (in their language, to abolish the privileges of commodities in relation to money). (134)

According to Marx, this would have reduced itself to: how to overcome the rise and fall of prices. The way to do this, he states, is by abolishing prices:

And how? By doing away with exchange value. But this problem arises: exchange corresponds to the bourgeois organization of society. Hence one last problem: to revolutionize bourgeois society economically. It would then have been self-evident from the outset that the evil of bourgeois society is not to be remedied by 'transforming the banks or by founding a rational' money system! (134)

Bourgeois economists theorize about the crisis concretely--the appreciation of gold and silver, the rise in the discount rate, the export of gold. To be analytical would be to inquire into how these phenomena are produced, to treat gold as a relation not a thing. Gold is the relation of purpose to the means for realizing that purpose, the relation of production to itself as exchange value. Exchange value (capital) as the ground and aim of production produces the rise and fall of prices because exchange value changes with changes in productivity. Hence Marx states that to overcome the rise and fall of prices, abolishing prices, requires doing away with exchange value.

Marx shows that the bourgeois economists fail to see that appreciation is one side of a relation where

depreciation is the other; that the "problem" of appreciation is only intelligible (i.e., is produced by) the "desirable" depreciation of gold. This failure, however, is essential to bourgeois economics. To recognize that the problem of appreciation is only the other side of the depreciation of gold and silver and that both are produced by the exchange relationship, the production of exchange value, is to recognize that the "problem" is the bourgeois mode of production; it is to recognize that to eliminate the "problem" is to revolutionize the bourgeois mode of production, hence to cease being committed to the bourgeois form of life, therefore to cease being a bourgeois economist.

Part Two: Violations by Sociologists and Marxist
Scholars

I have presented the above theorizing about crises as violations of the rules that are implicit in Marx's theorizing. In this way, the rules can be seen as distinguishing between Marx's method and that which Marx criticizes. Similarly, I will now use these rules to distinguish my analysis from other readings of Marx by present-day sociologists and Marxist scholars. With each rule, I will show how a theorist failed to provide grounds for Marx's theorizing and how this failure results in a problematic reading of Marx.

Rule 1: Treat Concepts as Grounded in a Historically
Specific Form of Life

Other theorists tend to treat concepts as referents of things in the world. They fail to provide grounds for their possibility. Thus they may treat concepts such as wealth, pauperism, overpopulation or alienation empirically. This means they locate the phenomenon, measure it, relate it to others. In chapter 2, I have shown how Marx, on the contrary, formulates such concepts in terms of a given historically, specific form of life that makes them possible. He does not treat them as natural, empirical, given things.

Concepts, in this work, include ideas and that which more generally is called consciousness. Form of life, in this work, is conceived as process of self-production which includes any social activity. These definitions have been developed and elaborated on in the course of the text. Keeping these definitions in mind, the first rule can be restated as, treat consciousness as grounded in a process of production. This, then, raises the problem of the relation of ideas or consciousness to production, or what is often referred to as the relation of superstructure to base.

The problem is usually seen as a question of which comes first, consciousness or production, or as a question of their relative autonomy. In this connection, Weber is usually cited as showing that religious consciousness

can be significant in determining economic forms of production as refutation of the Marxian claim that modes of production determine consciousness. Weber's work suggests that the relation of superstructure to base must be studied empirically.

For those to whom this is a problem, consciousness and production or social action are conceived as separate. This means that either consciousness precedes action or action precedes consciousness. Shlomo Avineri's treatment of this problem should have put an end to it as an issue. According to his interpretation, consciousness is conscious activity. This is precisely what it means for consciousness to be grounded in a form of life. It is only when consciousness is separated from activity, taking the form of rationalizations for already existing activity, that the term superstructure makes sense. When consciousness is united with activity in conscious purposive activity then it follows from Avineri's interpretation that consciousness is a productive force.

. . . the distinction between 'material base' and 'superstructure' is not a distinction between 'matter' and 'spirit' (as Engels in his later writings would have had it), but between conscious human activity, aimed at the creation and preservation of the conditions of human life, and human consciousness which furnishes reasons, rationalizations and modes of legitimation and moral justification for the specific forms that activity takes.¹

¹Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge, 1968), p. 76.

However, the question continues to crop up. Al Szymanski argues that objective conditions must be changed in order to change consciousness. He holds that everybody will not be able to see truly, that false consciousness will prevail, as long as capitalism prevails. Therefore, the aim should be to change material conditions rather than concentrating on changing people's consciousness.²

Albrecht Wellmer, on the other hand, is most concerned with Marx's divorcing consciousness from revolutionary activity. He refers to Marx's statement that

At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or . . . with the property relations within which they have acted until now . . . With the transformation of the economic base, the whole immense superstructure is more slowly or more speedily transformed. . . . One must always make a distinction between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production and the . . . ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.³

According to Wellmer, this passage can be interpreted to mean that to the conflicts of "material life" there are necessary solutions "independent of human volition." The class struggle is necessary, but "it is at the same time merely the vehicle of an historical progress

²Al Szymanski, "Marxism and Science," Insurgent Sociologist, Vol. III, No. III (Spring, 1973), p. 28.

³Karl Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," MA, Vol. 6, pp. 838 ff. Quoted in Albrecht Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society (New York, 1971), p. 95.

which advances to completion behind the backs of the warring classes." Wellmer is unhappy with this passage because a commitment to human freedom entails a commitment to consciously determined action. Therefore, for Wellmer, revolution must be understood "also as the protest of repressed individuals against forms of domination whose legitimations had become questionable, and against the burdens and deprivations demanded by such forms of domination and experience as capricious and unjust."⁴

Continuing with Wellmer's critique, we are told by him that consciousness is not a mere "epiphenomenon of 'objective' conflicts between productive forces and conditions of production." Furthermore, social transformation

could not be carried out solely by recourse to the 'transformation of the economic conditions of production,' . . . on the contrary, it would first of all require recourse to an immanently critical dissolution of their false consciousness.⁵

Wellmer, then, can be read as disagreeing with Szymanski over the primacy to be given to the overcoming of false consciousness. Yet both continue the distinction between material base and superstructure.

Avineri is not the only theorist who attempted to account for this problem by claiming that consciousness and activity are not to be conceived as two separate factors

⁴Ibid., p. 96.

⁵Ibid., p. 97.

but as a unity of conscious activity. Georg Lukacs too argues that

In the theory of 'reflection' we find the theoretical embodiment of the duality of thought and existence, consciousness and reality, that is so intractable to the reified consciousness. And from that point of view it is immaterial whether things are to be regarded as reflections of concepts or whether concepts are reflections of things.⁶

According to Lukacs, the problem lies with the conception of consciousness and activity, superstructure and base, as two different externally related things instead of a unity or internal relation. Lukacs contrasts conceiving of thought and existence as a duality with conceiving of it as an identity.

Thus thought and existence are not identical in the sense that they 'correspond' to each other, or 'reflect' each other, that they 'run parallel' to each other or 'coincide' with each other (all expressions that conceal a rigid duality). Their identity is that they are aspects of one and the same real historical and dialectical process.⁷

Although the answer to the problem of the relation of consciousness to activity lies with Avineri and Lukacs, the issue continues to surface. That it does suggests that there is some problem to which this issue responds and which Avineri and Lukacs do not solve. This is the problem of revolutionary activity and how it is produced. Merely

⁶Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge, 1971), p. 200.

⁷Ibid., p. 204.

asserting that consciousness and activity are one dialectically--as Avineri and Lukacs do--does not solve the problem. Rather, since the problem of revolutionary activity persists, so does the issue of the relation of consciousness and activity. This persistent problem stems from the need for a conception of a historical subject, an agency of social change or revolutionary activity. The trouble derives from confusing subjectivity with consciousness.

By subjectivity I mean self-conscious social purposive activity, a form of life or production. Consciousness on the other hand refers to a subject that is not conceived as a form of life or an individual personification of a form of life. Rather, such a subject is conceived dialectically in the philosophical sense of pure idea, desire, self-interest, fantasy ungrounded in a form of life. Thus ideas and motives are seen as determinants of existence, or as determined by existence (in essence a notion of causality), rather than as co-determining each other.

Bertell Ollman makes such a claim regarding the overriding significance of consciousness not only for revolutionary activity but for a whole social existence:

To conceive of machines as needing workers is to accord machines the power to need workers. Likewise to conceive of money as having the power to buy everything is indeed to have money which has the power to buy everything. The laws of capitalism operate as eternal necessity in the same

manner. They become necessary in virtue of everyone thinking and acting as if they are.⁸

Ollman's discussion of consciousness includes Wellmer's problem, that of revolutionary activity. Ollman, however, goes even further than Wellmer and raises the problem of rationality and irrationality.

For people often proceed in a very irrational manner--they do not grasp their interests, or if they do, they have more difficulty than Marx imagined in seeking for the best way to satisfy them . . .⁹

Ollman then suggests that this problem of irrationality may originate with sexual repression. Furthermore, childhood socialization creates character structures that become obsolete due to the rapidly changing character of society. Most people "are destined to be misfits whose responses are forever out of date."¹⁰

In contrast with the conception of consciousness and activity as two different and separate things, I will try to show how the first two rules here--treat both concepts and individuals as grounded in historically specific forms of life--correspond to the statements of Lukacs and Avineri quoted above. But, going beyond their dialectical formulation, I deal with this phenomenologically as well in terms of how Marx grounds revolutionary activity.

⁸Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge, 1971), p. 202.

⁹Ibid., p. 238.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 241.

Rule 2: Treat the Individual as Grounded in a Historically Specific Form of Life

In chapter 3 of this work, I discussed Marx's conception of the objective individual and contrasted it with a conception of the individual as purely subjective. The concept, subjective individual, refers to the formulation of an individual whose impulses, desires and needs have no origin other than himself. Purposes are only accounted for as personal desires, needs, goals understood as deriving from the unique situation or biography of an individual. The individual and his personal background are conceived as the author or origins of his acts.

Given this conception of a subjective individual, social life would be a conglomeration of private purposes. With society reduced to the activities of subjective individuals, there would be no way of determining or regulating social life; hence, the Hobbesian problem of order. Talcott Parsons rightfully criticizes such a conception of social life. However, he attributes that conception to Marx. In this regard, Parsons compares him unfavorably with Durkheim and, in particular, with Weber who analyzed the "interrelations between cultural and societal factors." According to Parsons,

Marx completely accepted the assumption of the givenness of the wants of individuals, and even, if not their randomness within the individual personality, the irrelevance of inquiries into what interconnections among them might obtain. . . .

From this point of view, it can be said that Marxian theory was, and on the whole has remained, psychologically naive.¹¹

Parsons, in sum, faults Marxian theory for being psychologically naive and presenting "no solution of the basic problems of order and social organization."¹²

I shall quote from Parsons at length one more time because his critique is pertinent to the discussion raised by the scholars on Marx, Ollman and Wellmer. Although they fail to consider this argument, it follows from their separation of consciousness from action, or what I call the subjective individual.

This "materialism precluded him from building into his system the normative elements [cultural, social, or personal] notably the ones of religious derivation which Weber emphasized . . . This intellectual situation left Marx essentially in the position of postulating a "utopian" conception of harmony. . . . Order in the socialist society had, then, to be attributed to the "spontaneous" goodness of its members, who, once freed from the corruptions of capitalistic interests, allegedly could not conceivably act in any antisocial manner. The "state" . . . would wither away. But then, how would the necessary coordination of the activities of individuals and subgroups, and the integration of their interests, be brought about?¹³

Parsons reminds us that the solution of modern sociology is that "in any society, this integration can only be brought about by the institutionalization and

¹¹Talcott Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: 1967), p. 133.

¹²Ibid., p. 123.

¹³Ibid., p. 119.

internalization of values . . . [which] must legitimize a ramified system of norms, legal and otherwise, that regulate action."¹⁴

Purposive activity is the unity of purpose with the objective conditions for realizing that purpose. That which is used to realize one's purpose is one's property. Hence the individual is understood in terms of property relations. The types of individuals considered by analysis, therefore, are limited by types of property relations. Marx considers several possible types of property relations and their corresponding types of objective individuals.

How does this conception handle Szymanski, Wellmer, and Ollman's problem with respect to the relation of consciousness to revolutionary activity? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to recognize that action, including revolutionary struggle, is not a subjective phenomenon; it is objective in Marx's sense. These other theorists violate the first two rules by failing to ground revolutionary activity in a form of life or totality. Marx conceived of this totality as property relations or relations of production. I will, therefore, continue Marx's explanation of revolutionary activity under the third rule.

¹⁴Ibid.

Rule 3: Treat a Form of Life as a Totality of Internal Relations

Marx grounds the possibility of revolution not in individual intentions, but in a mode of production that is self-contradictory. In that mode of production, capitalism, the process of producing is characterized by a divided unity: something is both A and not A. A use value is both an exchange value and not an exchange value. It is an exchange value ideally since labor time is embodied in it. On the other hand, it is not an exchange value if market conditions are not right.

Similarly, labor is both capital and not-capital, both exchange value and use value. Yet it loses its exchange value if market conditions are not right. The struggle to survive is a struggle to overcome the consequences of the market; the consequences of the exchange relation. This struggle is revolutionary in that suspending the consequences of the market requires suspending the conditions for producing exchange value, the abolition of capital and wage labor, which would constitute a revolution in the mode of production.

In other words, production is not a separate factor related to other factors such as consciousness or revolution. Production is a form of life that is a totality of internal relations, a dialectical unity of subject and object. Because the internal relations are contradictory,

for Marx, it is a very much revolutionary form of life. The struggle to overcome the vicissitudes of the market is itself a revolutionary struggle.

By the same token, theorists such as Wellmer fail to see Marx's conception of mode of production as referring to conscious, purposive activity by which a subject produces itself in its object. These theorists violate the third rule by not treating a form of life as a totality of internal relations. Hence they are left with insoluble problems: a revolutionary class that does not want to make a revolution, a theorist (Marx) who cannot reconcile his humanistic values with his scientific analysis.

The concept of production, however, is not an empirical one. It does not refer to particular observable activities. Rather, activities that are observable are formulated as productions. Marx's concept of production is a formulation of conscious purposive activity in which a subject and object are dialectically united. Parsons, though, holds that Marx confines the "core variables of social systems . . . to the economic and political interest categories, relegating other components to a "superstructure status." Parsons fails to recognize Marx's formulation of production as a totality and hence much more than an "economic or political interest category."

Parsons' conception of Marx in terms of core variables rather than a totality of internal relations

called production is mirrored in Tom Bottomore's reference to the primacy of the economic structure in the Marxist analysis of society.¹⁵ Such a conception fails to comprehend the Marxian notion of mode of production. Thus Parsons and Bottomore, too, can be read to violate the third rule put forth here.

The third rule sheds light not only on capitalist production as a revolutionary form of life. The same rule sheds light on one more key conception of Marx, that of history. I deal with this at length in chapters 3 and 4. Here I touch just on violations.

Marx begins from a notion of a self-conscious history or analytic form of life: the subject recognizes itself as both product and producer of history, of the relations and social conditions of its existence. Within such a form of life, the subject knows itself as a subject in relation to its object. That subject knows itself, therefore, as both subject and object, producer and product, self and other--a social individual.

Thus Marx starts from the solution to the problem of disunity. He begins with the conception of an analytic form of life as a future possibility, grounded in the suspension of the conditions of disunity. From the conception of a future unity--communism--Marx sees the

¹⁵Tom Bottomore, Marxist Sociology (New York: 1975), p. 68.

disunity of the present.

This analysis differs sharply from those that see Marx as standing analytically in the present, observing its tendencies and projecting them into the future. This is not to say that Marx does not observe tendencies. But he is doing so from within that which makes his kind of theorizing possible: a self-conscious form of life characterized by the unity of conscious purposive action.

If Marx formulates capitalism as disunity, a unity that has been sundered, he must formulate its prehistory as a unity. However, precapitalistic unity is not a self-conscious one resulting from the activity of labor. Rather, precapitalist forms are natural unities, natural communities. A self-conscious unity differs from precapitalist unity. The latter is natural and presupposed to labor whereas the former is an outcome of labor's own struggle; hence it provides for self-consciousness.

Other readers of Marx have not seen Marx's formulation of modes of production and stages of history in terms of his commitment to a free or self-conscious form of life. Habermas, for example, has recently criticized Marx's "theory of evolution." He states that the development of productive forces occurs after a new form of social integration has been completed. Hence such development cannot account for the development of new forms of society. The development of productive forces is not an independent

variable but a dependent one in the evolution that led to the rise of ancient civilizations or capitalism in Europe. It is a consequence of changing forms of social integration. "Only when a new institutional framework had emerged could the unresolved problems be dealt with through the accumulated cognitive potential. This, in turn, resulted in an increase in the productive forces."¹⁶ He concludes that the application of Marx's scheme of six modes of production is not abstract enough to "encompass the universals of developmental levels." Habermas, suggests that the "origin of the state should be explained by the structural change of legal institutions" in settling conflicts.

It is not that Habermas disagrees with Marx's conception of a conflict between relations of production and forces of production resulting in a crisis. Rather, according to Habermas, Marx does not explain how these problems can be solved. "We cannot precisely locate the developmental mechanism." He writes:

The introduction of new forms of social integration, as for instance, the replacement of the kinship system with the state, demands a knowledge of a practical-moral kind. Technical knowledge, which can be implemented with rules of instrumental and strategic action, or an expansion of our control over external nature, is not what is required, but, rather, a knowledge which can seek its embodiment in structures of interaction.¹⁷

¹⁶Jurgen Habermas, "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," Theory and Society, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall, 1975), p. 293.

¹⁷Ibid.

Habermas takes Mar's description of precapitalist modes of production as empirical descriptions that stress economic factors in the development of societies. He does not see these as formulations of a totality of internal relations which produce and reproduce themselves. He does not see these formulations as intended to show various possible developments of a natural unity of social life, the natural community, which must be dissolved in the development of capital formulated as a disunity.

Similarly, others have read Marx's formulation of the third stage of society as an empirical projection. That is, other theorists have interpreted Marx's formulation of the stage that is to follow capitalism as a projection based on observation of empirical tendencies within capital. Avineri, for instance, states that Marx's descriptions

bring present actuality to its ultimate conclusions and try to project an image of future society from the internal tensions of existing society.¹⁸

While this is true in a sense, it implies that Marx does not formulate present actuality; it is just there. Avineri seems to claim that Marx observes the tendencies in capital that lead in a new direction and quotes the following statement by Marx as indicating the tendencies of which Marx was aware and which led to his projection

¹⁸Avineri, p. 222.

of the future society:

'The capitalist stock companies, as much as the co-operative factories, should be considered as transitional forms from the capitalist mode of production to the associated one, with the only distinction that the antagonism is resolved negatively in the one and positively in the other.' (Capital, I, 763)

Avineri states that "socialism is in practice nothing but what capitalism is potentially." While this is also true in a sense, it implies again that Marx was only an observer of capitalism's potential instead of a theorist who begins from a formulation of post-capitalist forms as a self-conscious unity. That is, Avineri fails to conceive of Marx's analysis as phenomenologically grounded. For Avineri, Marx's analysis of the future of capital is accomplished through observation of external reality. He does not see Marx as formulating that reality in order to show that to which he is committed, his grounds: a self conscious form of life.

Where Habermas and Avineri thus fail to understand Marx's concept of mode of production as a totality of internal relations, Ollman does the reverse. Ollman is the interpreter of Marx's theorizing in terms of internal relations. Yet he fails to see how internal relations are internal relations of a mode of production. Ollman explains how, for Marx, concepts are internal relations; they contain their relations to other things as internal to their definition. However, Ollman does not conceive of the

totality of internal relations as a production, a dialectical relation of subject and object.

Totality for Ollman is not a totality of all things as they relate to each other externally. But neither is it a totality of a process of production. It is, for Ollman, a totality of everything related to everything else internally--a whole that has been broken up into parts. As such, it is "a system contained relationally in each of its parts." Ollman explains Marx's use of concepts as conceiving of the conditions of a thing's existence as part of what it is. However, he fails to conceive of those conditions, the system that is contained relationally in the part, as a process of production. He fails to conceive of the totality as a process of producing the phenomena of which it is composed, a dialectic of subject and object.

Because Ollman does not formulate Marx's dialectic as a dialectic of social production, a dialectic of subject and object, Ollman is able to treat Marx's concept of class as referring to:

social unity based on people's relationship to the mode of production, similar economic conditions and interests, a consciousness of these interests, the existence of a group-wide political organization, cultural affinity and a common antagonism for opposing groups . . . people's interaction at work . . . likewise, bourgeois culture . . . helps create a capitalist class in distinction to the proletariat.¹⁹

¹⁹Ollman, p. 208.

He does not see Marx's formulation of classes as grounded in a division of labor such that labor is not self-conscious production but activity--labor--separated from the purpose and product of that activity--capital. But Ollman gets into a still greater difficulty than failing to account for the grounds of Marx's concept of class: He also fails to recognize the significance of the dialectic of production in his view of totality as necessarily including all of "reality." Given this view, Ollman would be unable to account for how Marx is able to state that the residential family unity is the totality of the precapitalist Germanic mode of production. How is it that the totality of the precapitalist Asiatic mode is different from that and still different from that of classical antiquity? For Ollman, totality is simply all of "reality."

Reality, being whole and in flux, cannot be grasped in bits and pieces. What concerns me, however, and what does not seem to have bothered Marx, . . . is whether such 'distortions' are not due . . . to limitations inherent in men's senses and even in his mental powers.²⁰

Ollman's failure to understand totality as a process of production accounts for his inability to provide for how totalities are broken up into particular categories or relations and not others.

²⁰Ollman, p. 234.

Rule 4: Treat a Concrete Form of Life as Contradictory

There are two views represented among sociological theorists with respect to how Marx treats contradictions. One is that contradictions refer to conflicts that are empirically derived. The other view sees contradictions as dialectical.

Given the empirical version, it is possible for Ralf Dahrendorf, for example, to conceive of his work as a revision and correction of Marx. Dahrendorf's revision stems from his replacing private property, as the criterion of class formation, with the exercise of or exclusion from authority. He does this for empirical reasons: "A theory of class based on the division of society into owners and nonowners of means of production loses its analytical value as soon as legal ownership and factual control are separated."²¹

In addition to the empirical reason, Dahrendorf notes that classes, including those based on private property, are logically determined by relations of authority. According to him, "Marx believed that authority and power are factors which can be traced back to a man's share in effective private property. In reality, the opposite is the case. Power and authority are irreducible factors

²¹Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society

from which the social relations associated with private property can be derived." Although private property is a form of authority, it "is by no means the only form of authority; it is but one of its numerous types. Whoever tries, therefore, to define authority by property defines the general by the particular--an obvious logical fallacy. Wherever there is property there is authority, but not every form of authority implies property. Authority is the more general social relation."²²

Dahrendorf fails to follow up his insight that property is delegated authority. He asserts that with the separation of private property from management, private property ceases to be significant in class conflict. Instead, he formulates society as composed of diverse interest groups competing over the power to delegate authority. The origins of the competing interests are not specified. Dahrendorf just accepts competing interest groups as a natural fact of life. What makes Marx's analysis compelling where Dahrendorf's appears merely 'obvious' is the search for origins--and a stress on contradictions.

Marx sees the conflict as grounded in a process of production that is not self-conscious, a process in which the subject is divided as its object. For Marx, the conflict between capital and labor is not an empirical conflict that he observed between owners who have certain

²²Ibid., p. 137.

interests and workers who have others. But this is how Dahrendorf interprets Marx's theory. For Dahrendorf does not inquire into the origins of Marx's formulations of the contradictions of capital or into the origins of conflicting interests. Instead, he assumes them to be a natural consequence of freedom and complexity. He conceives of a pluralist society that allows for conflict and provides mechanisms for regulating conflict as a most desirable, free, democratic society.

Dahrendorf violates the fourth and last rule, to treat a concrete form of life as contradictory. Instead, he exemplifies concrete theorizing in his failure to inquire into grounds of conflict. Instead of conceiving of society as a process of producing itself, he conceives of it as a totality of externally related groups with competing interests, a community formed in the political marketplace, in the competition over delegating authority that will represent those interests.

Therefore, Dahrendorf's concrete mode of theorizing, Marx's conception of revolutionary class conflict between labor and capital appears incorrect in the light of contemporary developments.

For those theorists for whom class conflict is derived empirically, the term contradiction is an unnecessary carry-over from Hegel. Parsons has an interesting footnote to that effect. He explains that the relation

"between the classes in concrete society are on the level of 'interests' which are not entities in a logical proposition. These interests, on Marxian premises, are not logically incompatible, but stand in realistic, "material" conflict." ²³

Parsons is not the only one to suggest that the contradictions should be thought of as empirical conflicts and not as contradictions. Lucio Colletti, a Marxist scholar, distinguishes between what he calls contradictory opposition and real opposition.

Colletti states that by showing that the contradictions of which Marx speaks are real oppositions and hence "non-contradictions," Marxism could establish itself as a science, sociology, without having to make reference to the dialectic. ²⁴

In this way, the conflict between capital and wage-labor would be conceived as a real opposition and not a dialectical contradiction. Colletti attributes such an attempt to reconstruct Marx as a scientist as distinct from a dialectician to Della Volpe. Colletti, himself, had been taken with this version of Marxist sociology. However, he now states that a re-reading of Marx's Capital suggests that this is not the whole of the matter. Rather, he claims

²³Parsons, p. 107.

²⁴Lucio Colletti, "Marxism and the Dialectic," New Left Review, 93 (October, 1975), p. 19.

that there are two Marxes:

. . . On the one hand, there is the Marx of the pre-faces to Capital, who puts himself forward as the man who has developed and completed as a science the political economy founded by Smith and Ricardo. On the other hand, there is . . . man who has intertwined (and overturned) the arguments of Smith and Ricardo with a theory of alienation of which the economists knew nothing.²⁵

Colletti goes on to suggest that these two cases result in two different versions of reality. Marx's scientific economic argument is directed at a reality viewed in the same positive way that every science views it.

In the second case, the reality . . . is not reality sic et simpliciter, but the realization of alienation. It is not a positive reality, but one to be overthrown and negated.²⁶

Colletti asserts that Marx could not be extolled as a scientist and have equal importance attached to the theory of alienation and fetishism. According to him, that is just what is done by Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness, Korsh in Marxism and Philosophy and in their wake, the whole of the Frankfurt School. By concentrating exclusively on the theory of fetishism and on the interpretation of Marx as a 'critic of political economy,' all of them had to make a complete break with the thesis of Marxism as science.

²⁵Ibid., p. 22.

²⁶Ibid.

Colletti's re-reading has led him to conclude that the contradictions of capitalism are not, for Marx, 'real oppositions'" (as I, too, following Della Volpe, believed until yesterday), i.e., objective but 'non-contradictory' oppositions, but are dialectical contradictions in the full sense of the word."²⁷

The contradictions that Marx's analysis brings into relief make life under capital more painful than would be possible in a version of capitalism as composed of empirical conflicts. To recognize the contradictions of capital means beginning from the possibility of a self-conscious form of life and seeing that possibility repressed. Such recognition brings with it the pain of seeing the subjects and objects of the contradictions not comprehending the outrageousness of their situation; they do not see the contradictions as contradictions but only as oppositions. The pain comes from seeing the absence of outrage, the lack of awareness of the contradictory character of capital, the failure to see how the possibility of self-consciously producing themselves and their world is denied. These failures take the form of seeing struggles only as real, concrete oppositions and not as personifications of a contradictory form of life.

²⁷Ibid., p. 23.

Colletti concludes his rethinking of Marx's method by arguing that reality cannot contain dialectical contradictions but only real oppositions, conflicts between forces, non-contradictory oppositions. This, he holds, constitutes the very principles of science itself!

Now science is the only means of apprehending reality, the only means of gaining knowledge of the world. There cannot be two (qualitatively different) forms of knowledge. A philosophy which claims a status for itself superior to that of science, is an edifying philosophy--that is, a scarcely disguised religion.²⁸

Because capitalist oppositions are, for Marx, dialectical contradictions and not real oppositions, "this confirms the existence of two aspects in Marx: that of the scientist and that of the philosopher."²⁹

Unlike Marx, Colletti contrasts dialectical contradiction with real opposition. Something that is 'real' in Marx's terms is something that is material as opposed to merely ideal or mental. However, Colletti seems to mean not just material but empirical--something that one perceives with the senses rather than an object that presupposes a form of life which provides for its possibility as a conceivable thing.

An empiricist conception of reality, however, raises numerous problems. It leads to explanations in terms of the study of concrete individual acts and statements. Suppose, for instance, that workers respond to

²⁸Ibid., p. 29.

²⁹Ibid.

questions by asserting that they are happy with their jobs and employers. They say they are not alienated. Observation indicates that the employer-employee relations is respectful. Does all this mean that there is no opposition between workers and capitalists? This would follow from Colletti's conception.

Sociologists such as Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset have interpreted Marx's conception of alienation just this way:

Marx believed that the alienation of labor was inherent in capitalism and that it was a major psychological deprivation, which would lead eventually to the proletarian revolution. . . . the worker had lost all opportunity to exercise his "knowledge, judgment and will" in the manufacture of his product. To Marx this psychological deprivation seemed more significant even than the economic pauperism to which capitalism subjected the masses of workers."³⁰

In contrast to that empiricist conception, which corresponds with Parsons' understanding of capitalist contradictions as class conflict, how is it possible for Marx to talk of contradictions and not simply observable conflicts of interest?

In terms of violating the fourth rule of dialectical phenomenology, the difference between a contradiction and a conflict is that a contradiction always refers to a conception. A conflict, on the other hand, refers to a

³⁰ Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Karl Marx' Theory of Social Classes," in Class, Status and Power, ed. R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (Glencoe: 1953), p. 33.

perception. A contradictory conception is a relation in which the possibility of one side of the relation denies the possibility of the other; the acceptance of one side requires the rejection of the other.

A contradictory form of life is captured by the term, double bind. It means that doing one thing will have negative consequences but not doing that thing, or doing the opposite thing, will also have negative consequences. "They get you coming and going." "Damned if you do and damned if you don't." "Who told you this world was supposed to make sense?" "No matter what you do, you can't win." These are all expressions that capture the experience of a contradictory form of life.

Marx's concept of class conflict refers to the personification of a contradictory relation. This is not to say that class conflict is not real. On the contrary, it is precisely the reality of a contradictory form of life. Class conflict for Marx is real just because it is grounded in a historically specific form of life, which makes it possible.

Dahrendorf and Colletti's notion of class conflict as empirically observable conflict derived from the observation of opposing interests thus constitute violations of the fourth rule. For Marx, the conflict they stress is not real. It is ideal in the sense of ungrounded. As noted above, Dahrendorf does not inquire into the grounds

of opposing interests. Similarly, Colletti could only hold onto his earlier view of Marx's notion of class conflict as referring to empirically derived phenomena by not inquiring into the origins of the conflict. When he re-read Marx, he saw that the origin of the conflict was not in the acts and opinions of workers and capitalists which could be observed. Rather, the conflict originated in the contradiction within the conception of exchange value as it is materialized in money.

In chapter 5, we saw all the contradictions inherent in money, the contradictions between money's function as measure and its function as medium of exchange, the contradiction between these functions and its function as representative of general wealth. Most of all, perhaps, it is this explicit account of the contradictions of the money relation, the relation of a product to itself as exchange value, that makes the Grundrisse so important for understanding the difference between concrete conflicts and analytic contradictions.

Colletti's concern that any method other than direct observation of sensory data is unscientific brings us to the final conclusion of this thesis. It also brings us back to the initial formulation of social life. If the science with which we are concerned, sociology, is one that studies social life, we must begin with a conception of social life as other than sensory data. The sounds and

gestures of social life are more than sensory data. They are meaningful and their meaning is not simply given as an immediate thing. Their meaning is mediated by a form of life. In other words, meaning is only given with a form of life.

This thesis offers a conception for studying social life. The conception stands opposed to the concrete method based on empirical observation. This conception of sociology proceeds dialectically, by treating concrete forms of life as contradictory. Beginning from the conception of an analytic form of life, of self-conscious human activity, one inquires into phenomenological grounds of concrete social phenomena. Such a beginning of social inquiry reveals the self-contradictory character of the concrete, its denial or repression of grounds, its origins in unself-conscious activity or what Marx would call alienated labor.

Nothing in this chapter or the whole thesis should be read to claim that the formulation of phenomenological grounds of Marx's theorizing that I offer is the only one possible. I am not at all claiming one more "true reading." Rather, what I offer is one possible formulation of grounds for the sociological theorizing of Karl Marx. It is in this spirit that I analyze his theorizing and present dialectical phenomenology as a method of sociological theorizing. However, the concluding chapter on violations makes clear that past and present readings of Marx stop

short of the kind of phenomenological grounding of which
this thesis is but one example.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Avineri, Schlomo. The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- Bendix, Reinhard, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Class, Status and Power. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953.
- Bottomore, Tom. Marxist Sociology. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975.
- Blum, Alan F. "On Theorizing," in J. Douglas (ed.), Understanding Everyday Life. Chicago: Aldine, 1970.
- _____. "The Corpus of Knowledge as a Normative Order," in J. McKinney and E. Tiryakian (eds.), Theoretical Sociology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970.
- _____, and Peter McHugh. "The Social Ascription of Motives," American Sociological Review. Vol. 36, No. 1.
- _____. "Reading Marx," Sociological Inquiry (1), 1973.
- _____. "Positive Thinking," Theory and Society. Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall, 1974.
- _____. Theorizing. London: Heinemann, 1974.
- Colletti, Lucio. "Marxism and the Dialectic," New Left Review 93 (September, October, 1975), 3-29.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.
- Douglas, Jack. Understanding Everyday Life. Chicago: Aldine, 1970.
- Dreitzel, Hans Peter. Recent Sociology No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970.
- Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 1961.

- Habermas, Jurgen. "Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," Theory and Society. Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall, 1975), 287-300.
- Lukacs, Georg. History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971.
- Marx, Karl. Grundrisse. New York: Random House, 1973. Translated by Martin Nicolaus.
- McHugh, Peter. Defining the Situation. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968.
- _____. "A Common Sense Conception of Deviance," in Hans Peter Dreitzel (ed.), Recent Sociology No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970.
- _____. "On the Failure of Positivism," in Jack Douglas (ed.), Understanding Everyday Life. Chicago: Aldine, 1970.
- _____, Stanley Raffel, Daniel C. Foss, Alan F. Blum. On the Beginning of Social Inquiry. London: Routledge, and Kegan Paul, 1974.
- McKinney, J. C. and E. Tiryakion (eds.). Theoretical Sociology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970.
- Ollman, Bertell. Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- Parsons, Talcott. Sociological Theory and Modern Society. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- Szymanski, Al. "Marxism and Science," The Insurgent Sociologist. Vol. III, No. III (Spring, 1973), 25-38.
- Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.
- _____. General Economic History. Translated by Frank H. Knight. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950.
- Wellmer, Albrecht. Critical Theory of Society. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967.